

JOSEPH GOEBBELS: CHIEF SPOKESMAN
OF THE THIRD REICH

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Henry von Moltke
1961



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JOSEPH GOEBBELS: CHIEF
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PH.D. degree in SPEECH

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ABSTRACT

JOSEPH GOEBBELS: CHIEF SPOKESMAN OF THE THIRD REICH

Heinrich von Moltke

Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) was the chief spokesman for National Socialism in Germany. He was not only considered the most influential speaker in the Third Reich but also succeeded in maintaining the trust and confidence of the people long after they had forsaken all other Nazi officials, including Adolf Hitler.

Consequently much has been said and written about Goebbels by foreign observers and German authors alike. Some have denounced him, regarding him as an isolated German phenomenon of an especially evil and mischevous kind. Others have praised him and considered him to have been a genius within the limits of his philosophy of life and the political sphere within which he worked.

In this study an attempt is made to discover the forces which influenced Goebbels' speechmaking, to determine the methods he employed in the speaking situation, and to evaluate his influence and effect upon the audiences to which he addressed himself.

Chapter I contains the translated version of what is generally considered Goebbels' most effective speech, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose." It was delivered in Berlin on February 18, 1943, and serves as the core of this chapter and, in essence, of all other chapters. In addition, representative examples of Goebbels' other

speeches which were translated from the German language by this writer are cited to indicate his growth as a speaker, as well as the variety and kinds of speeches which he delivered.

Chapter II deals with Goebbels, the man and speaker. Attention is given to the forces which contributed to his personal and social development, the factors which affected him in the speaking situation, and those which he employed to influence others.

Chapter III is concerned with the speaking occasions of Goebbels' career. To set the study in its proper perspective the chapter includes a survey of the historical, philosophic, economic, and political forces which influenced Goebbels and his audiences.

Chapter IV refers to Goebbels' audiences and their response to his speeches. An attempt is made to identify the kinds and types of audiences, as well as the intent of the speaker in representative speaking situations.

Chapter V contains a rhetorical analysis of the speaker's most effective speech and other representative addresses. Attention is given to such factors as preparation, arrangement, and delivery, and to stylistic matters, insofar as they are translatable from the German text. From this analysis it was discovered that a relationship existed between Goebbels' education, religious training, and his proficiency as a speaker, that he applied both logical reasoning and evidence, and extra-logical appeals to advantage, and that he seemed most effective when addressing the low-income groups of the German society. Furthermore, it was noted that Goebbels was a prolific speaker who strove for perfection and re-

mained a traditionalist throughout his career.

Chapter VI, the conclusion of the study, indicates that Goebbels endorsed the following principles in the speaking situation: (1) the spoken word is the most influential means of affecting others, (2) all propaganda should be designed to win the masses, (3) a speaker must speak the language of his audience, (4) the public speaker must know the soul of man, (5) the cause advocated by the speaker is more important than his personal convictions, and (6) the desired end in the speaking situation justifies the employment of any means.

Joseph Goebbels made few contributions to the cause which he advocated by means of the originality of his thoughts or even through his use of the principles and methods of propaganda and persuasion. Rather, his achievements in the public speaking situation stemmed from the power of the man and the historical and contemporary situation in which he found himself and which he exploited to his advantage.

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1962



JOSEPH GOEBBELS: CHIEF
SPOKESMAN OF THE THIRD REICH

By

Heinrich von Moltke

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1961

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Malcolm S. MacLean and Dr. Frederick G. Alexander for their time and interest given to this study.

To Dr. Stuart A. Gallacher, who supervised the translations from the German texts, I am especially grateful.

I further would like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Kenneth G. Hance and Dr. Donald H. Ecroyd, who so generously gave their time to the preparation of this study.

It is impossible for me to try to assess my debt to my wife and Dr. David C. Ralph, the Chairman of the Guidance Committee, whose patience, encouragement, and understanding made this study possible.

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INTRODUCTION

I

Propaganda and persuasion are forces which have influenced or determined human behavior frequently and have been recognized and evaluated throughout the history of mankind. Significant social and political movements have often in part depended upon the application of these forces by individuals or groups of persons.

In the case of the development and rise of National Socialism in Germany, Joseph Goebbels has generally been credited with the application of these factors. He was an individual who rose from obscurity to international prominence during the years from 1923 to 1945.

Consequently, much has been said and written about Goebbels both by foreign observers and German authors alike. Some have denounced him, regarding him as an isolated German phenomenon of an especially evil and mischievous kind. Others have praised him and considered him to have been a genius within the limits of his philosophy of life and the political sphere within which he worked.

This range in viewpoints is perhaps best exemplified by such statements as those of F. W. Pick, who wrote in 1942 that he considered everything emanating from Joseph Goebbels repulsive to such an extent that it needed no coloring. In Mr. Pick's estimation this was particularly disconcerting because an attempt was made "to mould (sic) the soul of an entire nation according to the will and whim of one man--a criminal."¹

Similarly, Curt Riess, in his biography of Goebbels, states that when future generations attempt to answer the question of why millions of

¹F. W. Pick, The Art of Dr. Goebbels, (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1942), p. 10.

people were motivated to bring about their own ruin, they might express it in thousands of words, "but, if it were expressed in one word alone, that word would be: Goebbels."²

In a more detailed explanation, Roger Manvell, a British BBC critic and co-author of the book, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, declared that the story of Goebbels as a propagandist and persuader of extreme intellect is of the greatest psychological interest. Pointing out that Goebbels has been considered an unlikely person to be found among the strong-armed Nazi leaders, this author contends that Goebbels was only second to Hitler in understanding the exploitation of power and that "without him the movement might never have gained its ascendancy in Germany during the crucial years from 1932 to 1933."³

Even more favorable for Goebbels are the comments of D. McLachlan, who, after having organized and edited Rudolf Semmler's diary, Goebbels-- the Man Next to Hitler, prefaced the work by writing in part:

. . .He was a man of great ability and considerable personal courage, who made his own job and was a pioneer in a field, where he has now many imitators, even in countries 'liberated' from German influence. His career was a portent of the use that can be made of absolute power through what are sometimes called 'mass media'-- the service of news and views through the press, the wireless, the stage and film, books, art, and-- above all-- the demonstrations and the ritual of the political party.⁴

In light of these statements above it becomes evident that Goebbels was,

²Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), p. 1.

³Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. x-xi.

⁴D. McLachlan, "Introduction," In Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels-- the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse, Ltd., 1947), p. 8.

and will remain, one of the most controversial figures in the history of the twentieth century. Furthermore, when analyzed and evaluated in terms of the rhetorical standards of "effectiveness," there can be little doubt about his success as a propagandist and persuader. Quick of mind, resourceful and tireless in his determination, he has frequently been designated as the most influential person in Germany during the years from 1933 to 1945. One author has gone so far as to suggest that it was Goebbels rather than Hitler who played the leading role in shaping the destiny of Germany during the National Socialistic movement.⁵ Others accord only second or third place to him in the hierarchy of this organization. Yet, there appears to be general agreement among most authorities that Joseph Goebbels became the most trusted and prominent spokesman of the party during the development of World War II.

It is perhaps because of the impact which Goebbels made upon the German society and the world at large as a propagandist and persuader that he has become the subject of careful scrutiny and close analysis by writers the world over. The variety and kinds of approaches dealing directly with the life and activities of Goebbels may be demonstrated by citation of the following works which appeared during and following World War II: F. W. Pick, The Art of Dr. Goebbels, [The Propaganda Ministry] (1942); Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld, The Goebbels Experiment, [A Study of the Nazi Propaganda Machine] (1943); Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, [1942-1943] (1948); Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, [A Biography] (1949); Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels— the Man Next to Hitler, [Semmler's diary of

⁵Boris v. Borresholm, ed., Dr. Goebbels nach Aufzeichnungen aus seiner Umgebung, (Berlin: Verlag des "Journal," 1949), p. 226.

Goebbels' activities during World War II⁷ (1947), and Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, ^{[A} Biography based upon recently discovered evidence⁷ (1960).

The existence of these and other sources dealing with Goebbels' techniques and principles of propaganda and persuasion seems to permit attention to be directed to the analysis of Goebbels, the man and the speaker, as well as the period of those political, economic, social, and philosophical developments which made his rise and the rise of the National Socialist movement possible.

II

In this study an attempt will be made to discover the forces which influenced Joseph Goebbels' speechmaking as the chief spokesman of the National Socialist party in Germany, to determine the methods which he employed in the speaking situation and to evaluate his influence and effect upon the audiences to which he addressed himself.

An attempt will further be made to evaluate critically the speaking of Goebbels from the rhetorical point of view with emphasis upon: (1) criteria which emerge from the study of Goebbels, the man and his speaking, rather than upon pre-established criteria, and (2) the circulatory approach to rhetorical criticism rather than the traditional approach.

By the "circulatory approach" to rhetorical criticism here is meant the selection of an address delivered by the speaker which is generally considered to be the most influential or effective attempt in his career. Such an address, hereafter identified as the "basic" speech, is then utilized as the focal point or core from which analyses and evaluations of other speeches and activities of the speaker are made. Thus, in effect,

such an approach requires the examination of the "basic" speech in relation to other speeches delivered prior to or after the "basic" speech itself. When determining factors directly concerning the speaker himself within the framework of this approach, observations and recorded comments of an authoritative nature are gathered in terms of the "basic" speech, as well as in relation to other speeches and situations. Similarly, the examination of the occasion, that is, the color of the times and the circumstances under which the "basic" speech was delivered, is made in relationship to other similar or different occasions. In the same manner, audience analysis is first conducted in respect to the "basic" speech, then applied to other speaking occasions and events. Finally, the same procedure is used when making a rhetorical analysis of the "basic" speech and other speeches to maintain a uniform and controlled study.

With such a procedure in mind, it is believed that the criteria for judgment will emerge from within the study itself. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, the circulatory approach may well require the assembly of contemporary rather than traditional criteria. Yet it should also be noted that possible limitations may exist within this approach. Among these the most serious could perhaps be the fact that the investigator may not readily recognize the emerging criteria in the development of the study. It further appears that there is no existing pattern of rhetorical analysis that can be followed or applied in every given case. In addition, the ability to draw valid inferences and to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the speaker being studied depends primarily upon the investigator's academic training and knowledge of the subject matter being considered.

It is with these factors in mind that the chapters of this study are organized in the following manner.

Chapter I will contain the translated version of Goebbels' "basic" speech, delivered on February 18, 1943, in the Sportpalast in Berlin.⁶ Serving as the essential core of this chapter, and in essence all the other chapters, the "basic" speech text will include footnotes designed to clarify the meaning of certain abbreviations and reference remarks. Within the chapter references will be made to other speeches which were delivered prior to or after the "basic" speech. Finally, an attempt will be made to suggest Goebbels' growth as a speaker by noting some significant similarities and differences of the speeches which he delivered prior to the "basic" speech.

Chapter II will deal specifically with Goebbels, the man and the speaker. Attention will be given to Goebbels' official position, status, and responsibilities at the time of the "basic" speech as he perceived them and other authorities assessed them. Similarly, attention will also be given to the position, status, and responsibilities of Joseph Goebbels in other speaking situations. Thus, during the formative years of the party concentration will be given to the election campaigns, the attempt to unify the party and Goebbels' Reichstag manoeuvres. In the same manner, during the periods when the National Socialists were in control of the nation and during World War II, Goebbels' persuasive and propaganda attempts at national holidays celebrations, at special events including eulogistic and ceremonial addresses, and his capacity as Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will receive attention.

Chapter III will be concerned with the speaking occasion both of the

⁶The date of the speech has been designated as February 13, 1943, by various authorities.

"basic" speech and other significant speeches as viewed by Goebbels and other authorities. The chapter will also include a resume of the historical events leading up to the "basic" speech, as well as those which affected some of the other speaking occasions. Examples will be cited to illustrate the color of the times and the situations which involved general audiences, radio audiences, mass assemblies, mass demonstrations, and gatherings on national holidays, as well as specific interest groups to which Goebbels addressed himself.

Consideration will also be given to the biographical aspects of Goebbels: the man in relation to his growth and rise in the party. References will be made to his childhood experiences and student days, as well as to those events and occasions in his later life, which he and other authorities deemed influential upon his speaking career.

The summary and conclusion of the chapter will contain some generalizations about Goebbels' position, status, and responsibilities at the time of the "basic" speech and during other significant periods of his life.

Chapter IV will be an analysis of Goebbels' audiences both at the "basic" speech and upon other occasions. Furthermore, in this particular chapter, Goebbels' personal evaluation of his audiences will be recorded, as well as the relationships which he and other observers felt he had to them. Factors such as his preferences for certain groups of individuals and audience situations will also be included. In addition, the observations and reactions of other sources will be utilized to present a more complete picture of Goebbels' relationships with his audiences at a variety of occasions.

The summary section of this chapter will consist of a number of

generalizations dealing with Goebbels' audiences at the "basic" speech and at other times.

Chapter V will contain an analysis of the content of the "basic" speech by this writer. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the criteria which emerge from this study and those taken from contemporary sources. In essence, such procedure will require a detailed examination of the "basic" speech from an inductive point of view with reference to the questions, "What did Goebbels actually do and say?" and, "What did the speaker attempt to do and say?" By an examination of the text of the "basic" speech it is hoped that relevant generalizations can be drawn.

In the development of this chapter other significant extant speeches will receive similar consideration in an attempt to suggest a consistent or inconsistent method and procedure, depending upon the emergent facts, singularly employed by Goebbels. This chapter will further contain references to Goebbels' preparation, arrangement and delivery of his speeches and stylistic matters, insofar as they are translatable from the German text.

The summary section of this chapter will pertain to the factors of speech analysis cited above.

Chapter VI will be the concluding chapter of the study. It will record the findings and conclusions which grow out of the previous chapters and which apply to the "basic" speech. Further, this chapter will also include those findings and conclusions which emerge from the consideration of Goebbels' other speaking engagements. Moreover, an attempt will be made to provide an answer to the question, "What were the propaganda and persuasive principles and methods utilized by Goebbels in the speaking

situation?"

III

In view of the remarks above, this study attempts to discover the influences which were exerted upon Joseph Goebbels and which he employed in the public speaking situation from an objective point of view.

Furthermore, with regard to Donald C. Bryant's comments concerning the scantily noticed areas of British and foreign public address⁷, an analysis of Goebbels' speeches and speaking characteristics should contribute to the body of German public address. By studying Goebbels and the period in which he spoke, an indication of what influences were exerted upon the German people should be gained.

The material upon which this study is based was obtained from selected speeches, diaries and other works of Joseph Goebbels. All of his available extant speeches were examined by this writer; and, insofar as they exhibited a close proximity in their purpose and content, were classified in groups of expository, persuasive, eulogistic and ceremonial addresses. Additional material was procured from American, English and German sources. Although some of this material was published in the English language, most of the reference material and all of the information pertaining to the speeches, including the "basic" speech, were translated from the German by this writer. This was possible primarily because the writer lived in Germany from June 22, 1939, until January 3, 1947, and was subject to as much exposure to Goebbels by means of all existing media during World War II as were all other residents of Germany.

⁷ Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Its Scope", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 39, (December, 1953), pp. 401-424.

It is from this personal experience that this writer can attest to the fact that Joseph Goebbels became the most influential person in Germany by 1945, particularly in regard to public speaking. Prior knowledge that Goebbels would speak to the people always created great excitement and tremendous crowds turned out to greet him when he entered a city or town. Similarly, when it was announced that Goebbels would deliver one of his radio addresses, almost all German families were eager to hear him speak.

Authorities the world over seem to agree that Goebbels was the best speaker of the National Socialist party in Germany, winning more praise than any other leader of the party. Moreover, he has been designated as that individual among the National Socialists who retained the trust and confidence of the German people until the movement collapsed.

It is for these reasons that Joseph Goebbels, the chief spokesman for the National Socialist movement, has been chosen for this study.

CHAPTER I

GOEBBELS' "BASIC" SPEECH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES

The "Basic" Speech

Among the many speeches which Joseph Goebbels delivered during his lifetime perhaps none was more important to his personal prestige and status as a leader in the National Socialist movement nor met with greater success than the one entitled, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose." Delivered at the Sportpalast in Berlin on February 18, 1943,¹ both German and foreign observers alike generally designate it as the most challenging and effective address ever delivered in Goebbels' career.

Thus, while commenting upon his speechmaking in general, Ernst Kris and Hans Speier wrote in their book, German Radio Propaganda, that it was Joseph Goebbels, who during the latter part of 1942 increasingly assumed Hitler's role of addressing mass meetings at home and radio audiences abroad, "and scored what was perhaps his greatest triumph on 18 February, when he whipped up public frenzy for the new total mobilization decrees."²

Similarly, Rudolf Semmler, an aide to Goebbels in the Propaganda Ministry during World War II, recorded in his personal diary on February 13, 1943, the remarks that "Goebbels had a Sport Palace meeting after his own heart. His play with question and answer-- 'Do you want total war, do you want etc.?' will remain memorable as an example of National Socialist

¹Some authorities identify the date of the speech as February 13, 1943. However, in his book, Der Steile Aufstieg, Goebbels has dated it as February 18, 1943.

²Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 143.

technique in public meetings and propaganda."³

Another writer, Wilfrid Bade, described this event as being "undoubtedly one of the memorable speeches of the war,"⁴ while Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel identified this particular speech as "one of the outstanding pieces of oratory in his career."⁵

According to an American point of view, as indicated by Alexander L. George, the ". . . climax to the speech was powerful and was aptly labeled by the FCC as one of Goebbels' greatest propaganda stunts."⁶ In supporting this point of view, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner reported that towards the end of the speech, "the crescendo of agreement ended with a fanatical display of enthusiasm for Goebbels."⁷ In much the same manner, Curt Riess noted while describing the effectiveness of this particular address that "on the shoulders of the frenzied people Goebbels was carried triumphantly off the platform."⁸

There is little doubt concerning Goebbels' own recognition of the

³Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels— the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse, Ltd., 1947), p. 69.

⁴Wilfrid Bade, Joseph Goebbels, (Lübeck: Charles Coleman Verlag, 1943), p. 173.

⁵Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 230.

⁶Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II, (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959), p. 69.

⁷Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Evil Genius: The Story of Joseph Goebbels, (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), p. 200. Translated by Louis Hagen.

⁸Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), p. 321.

success which he had achieved on this occasion. Thus, in an article entitled, "Then and Today," of March 7, 1943, he wrote:

In response to our last speech in the Berliner Sportpalast a flood of letters descended upon us from the homeland, the front lines and the friendly and neutral countries in such proportions that the responsible agencies had difficulties to even read them through completely.⁹

Again on March 9, 1943, Goebbels referred to the "basic" speech in his personal diary. This time, however, he recorded the effect of the "basic" speech at the Sportpalast upon Adolf Hitler, by observing:

My measures concerning total war meet with the Fuehrer's full approval. In that connection he referred to my last address in the Sport Palace in the most flattering terms and characterized it as a psychological and propaganda masterpiece. He said he carefully studied it from beginning to end, had read of the echo it had awakened in foreign countries, and had arrived at the conclusion that we hit the bull's eye. He was full of enthusiasm about its effect.¹⁰

In light of these observations the reader is asked to read the English version of the "basic" speech translated by this writer and taken from Goebbels' book, Der Steile Aufstieg. [The Steep Ascent].

NOW, NATION ARISE
AND STORM BREAK LOOSE!

Speech delivered in the Berlin Sportpalast on February 18, 1943

It is hardly three weeks since I last spoke to you and the German nation from this spot on the occasion of the reading of the Fuehrer's

⁹Joseph Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, (München, Franz Eher Nachf, 1944), p. 219. Translated by the writer.

¹⁰Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948) p. 284.

proclamation at the 10th anniversary of our struggle for power. The crisis in which our eastern front presently finds itself stood at that time at its highest point. We had gathered together on January 30,¹¹ of this year, in the face of the severe misfortune which befell this nation in the battle for the Volga, for a demonstration of unity, of agreement, but also with the willpower to come to grips with the difficulties which this war, in its fourth year, is managing to pile up in front of us.

It deeply moved me and most likely all of you to learn a few days later¹² that the last heroic fighters of Stalingrad, joined together with us in this hour through the radio waves, had taken part in our exalted Sportpalast demonstration. They radioed in their final report that they had heard the Fuehrer's proclamation and perhaps for the last time in their lives had sung with raised arms the national hymn together with us. What staunch bearing of German soldiership in these great times! But what obligation does this bearing place upon all of us, especially for the entire German nation. A people who possess the power to bear and overcome such misfortune, yes, even to derive additional strength therefrom, are unconquerable.

The remembrance of the heroes of Stalingrad therefore shall become an obligation for me and for all of us in my speech to you and the German people.

¹¹Speech delivered on the tenth anniversary of the seizure of power entitled, "Fuehrer Command, We Shall Follow."

¹²In an article entitled, "Die Harte Lehre," ["The Hard Lesson"], Goebbels wrote on February 7, 1943, "one will never again be able to talk among people and nations about sacrifices in the face of unsurmountable conditions and silent heroism without thinking about the German Sixth Army, which faithfully lives up to (sic) its military oath in order to check the Asian storm, at least long enough until its comrades have established themselves in new positions." [*Italics mine*].

I do not know how many millions of people, joined together with us through the radio waves at the front and in the homeland, are taking part in this demonstration and are my listeners tonight. I would like to speak to all of you from the bottom of my heart to the depth of yours. I believe the entire German nation is passionately involved in that which I must report to you tonight. I want, therefore, to endow my statements with the whole solemn seriousness and open frankness which this hour requires of us. The German people, raised, schooled, and disciplined in National Socialism can endure the complete truth. They know how difficult the Reich's situation is and especially because of this, its leadership can request them to derive from the oppressiveness of the situation the necessarily hard, yes, even the hardest conclusions. We Germans are armed against weakness and attack, and blows and misfortunes of the war give us additional strength, strong determination and a spiritual and battle-like activity which is prepared to overcome all difficulties and obstacles with revolutionary splendor.

Now is not the moment to ask how everything came about. This will have to be left up to a later statement of account which shall follow in full view and will show the German people and the entire world that the misfortune which has hit us in the last week possesses its own deep fateful meaning. The great, heroic sacrifices which our soldiers in Stalingrad contributed have been of decisive historic meaning for the entire eastern front. They were not wasted. Why, that the future will prove.

If I now direct my view over the most recent past to the future again, then I do this full of intention. The hour presses! It leaves no time anymore for fruitless discussion. We must act, and indeed without delay quickly and thoroughly, just as has always been the nationalistic

way.

From its beginning this movement has dealt with the many crises which it had to live and battle through in this way. And the National Socialist state has also, if a threat confronted it, thrown itself with determined willpower against it. We are not like the ostrich, who buries his head in the sand in order to avoid seeing danger. We have the courage to take it [the danger] into sight immediately, to measure it and without regard to anything and then to march against it with a raised head and firm determination. Only in this manner as a movement and as a nation did we develop our highest virtues, namely a wild and determined will to break and ban danger; a strength of character which overcomes all obstacles; tenacious determination in the pursuit of the once-recognized goal, and an iron heart which is armed against all internal and external temptations. It shall be the same today. I have the task of drawing an unretouched picture of the situation for you to draw therefrom the hard consequences for the actions [to be taken] by the German leadership, as well as the actions of the German people.

We presently are living under a difficult military burden in the East. This burden has at times taken on greater efforts and is similar to that of the past winter, if not in the manner of the arrangement, then in its extent. Its cause will be talked about at some later date. Today there is nothing left for us, but to note its presence and to test and apply the ways and means, which lead to its removal. There is, therefore, no reason to dispute this burden itself. I consider myself above giving you a false picture of the situation, which could only lead to false conclusions and would be suitable to lull the German nation into a secure way of life and business dealings which would be unrealistic in light of

the present situation.

The attack of the steppe against our honorable continent broke forth with such force in this winter that it places all historic human imaginations in the shadows. The German army with its allies constitutes the only protective wall against it which can even be considered. With serious and penetrating words, the Fuehrer, in his proclamation of January 30, 1933, has already brought up the question of what would have become of Germany and Europe if, instead of the National Socialistic movement, a civil or a democratic regime had taken over the power! What threats would then have befallen the German nation, quicker than we could have ever imagined, and what kinds of defenses would have been at our disposal to confront them? Ten years of National Socialism have been sufficient to clarify for the German people the seriousness of the fateful problem, which grows out of eastern Bolshevism. One will now understand why we so frequently placed our Munich Party days under the motto of the battle against Bolshevism. At that time we raised our warning voices in front of the German nation and the world at large, to awaken occidental humanity, smitten with a paralysis of will and spirit heretofore unknown, and to open its eyes to the horrible historic threats which grow out of the existence of eastern Bolshevism making a nation of almost 200 million people serviceable for the Jewish terror and preparing them for the war attack against Europe.

When the Fuehrer ordered the German Wehrmacht to assemble in the East on June 22, 1941, we were all in agreement that herewith the decisive battle of this world struggle really began. We knew that the dangers and difficulties would never diminish but would only grow with prolonged delay. It was two minutes before twelve. A further hesitation could easily have

led to the destruction of the nation and complete bolshevistic domination of the European continent.

It is understandable that we did not assess the war potential of Soviet Russia properly because of the large scale camouflage-and bluff manoeuvres of the bolshevistic regime. Only now this potential reveals itself to us in its entire wild greatness. Accordingly, therefore, above all human imagination, the battle which our soldiers must withstand in the East is hard, difficult, and dangerous. It requires the exertion of our total national might. Here a threat exists against the nation and the European continent, which places therewith all dangers of the occident that existed up to now deep into the shadows. Were we to fail in this struggle, we would play out our historic mission. Everything that we have built up and accomplished till now becomes pale in the face of the gigantic problem which is placed immediately in front of the Germany army and indirectly in front of the German people.

I first turn to the world at large in my explanations and proclaim in front of it three theses of our battle against the bolshevistic danger in the East.

The first thesis states: If the German army was not in the position to break the danger of the East, the entire nation and in short order all of Europe would fall prey to Bolshevism.

The second of these theses states: Only the German army and the German people with their allies possess the ability to save Europe from this threat.

The third of these theses states: Danger is imminent. Action must be brought about quickly and thoroughly, otherwise, it will be too late.

In regard to the first thesis I have to remark in particular: Bolshevism has always openly proclaimed as its goal, not only to revolutionize Europe alone, but also the entire world and to plunge it into a bolshevistic chaos. This objective has been ideologically represented and practically advocated since the beginning of the Soviet Union on the part of the Kremlin. It is clear that the more Stalin and the other Soviet leaders believe that they are nearing the realization of their world destruction-intentions, the more they are intent upon camouflaging and hiding them in mysteriousness. This can not confuse us. We are not like those fearful individuals who are like the hypnotized rabbit which stares upon the snake until it is devoured. We want to recognize this danger in time and to confront it in time with effective means. We not only see through the ideology, but also the practical aspects of Bolshevism, because we already once before settled our differences on the inner political field and indeed with greatest conceivable success. The Kremlin cannot put one over on us. We have unmasked their intentions and infamous manoeuvres to deceive the world in the fourteen-year battle prior to our rise to power and in a ten-year battle since our rise to power.

The goal of Bolshevism is the world-revolution of the Jews. They wanted to bring chaos upon the nation and upon Europe in order to build their international, bolshevistic disguised, capitalistic tyranny upon the ensuing hopelessness and despair of the nations.

What this would mean to the German nation does not require more detailed explanation. With the coming of Bolshevism to this nation a liquidation of our entire intelligentsia and leadership stratification would follow, with the consequence that the working masses would be led into Bolshevik-Jewish slavery. As the Fuehrer already stated in his

proclamation of January 30, in Moscow they are looking for forced-worker battalions for the Siberian tundras. The insurrection of the steppes is readying itself in front of our front lines, and the attack of the East which in its daily increasing strength breaks against our lines, is nothing more than the repetition of attempted, historic devastations which frequently have endangered our hemisphere. An immediate and acute life-threat exists therewith for all European nations. One should not believe that Bolshevism would stop somewhere at our borders if it had the opportunity to begin its victory march through the nation. It conducts aggressive politics and aggressive war leadership which outspokenly intend to end with Bolshevism in all countries and nations. Written explanations which are given out on the part of the Kremlin or are issued as guarantees on the part of London or Washington against these unalterable intentions do not impress us. We know that in the East we are dealing with infernal, political devilry which does not recognize the usual relationships among the people and nations. If, for example, the British Lord Beaverbrook¹³ explains that Europe will have to be given over to the leadership of the Soviets, if a leading American-Jewish journalist Brown adds to this thesis through cynical divulgence that Bolshevism in Europe might perhaps be the solution to our continental problems, then we know exactly what this means. The European powers are confronted here by the decisive question of their

¹³ According to Louis P. Lochner, Goebbels' opinion of Lord Beaverbrook underwent frequent changes. In The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, on February 6, 1943, Lord Beaverbrook is represented as a strong character; in the "basic" speech he is identified as a friend of the Russians; on September 26, 1943, he is depicted as a great enemy of Sovietism, and on September 29, 1943, again as a man who favored an understanding with the Soviets.

Lord Beaverbrook, the former Rt. Hon. William Maxwell Aitken, born in 1879, was a British newspaper magnate and chief stockholder of the London Daily Express. He sponsored the Empire Free Trade Movement. During the

survival. The occident is in danger. It is entirely irrelevant whether their government and the intelligentsia want to realize this or not.

The German nation, in any event, is not willing to expose itself to this danger even if only on a trial basis. Behind the attacking Soviet divisions we see already the Jewish liquidation commandoes, behind these, furthermore, the terror arises: the ghost of the hungry millions and complete anarchy. Here international Jewry once again shows itself as the devilish ferment of decomposition, which experiences an almost cynical satisfaction to throw the world into its greatest chaos and therewith to bring about the destruction of thousand-year-old cultures with which they never had any internal affiliation.

We know, therefore, what historic task confronts us. A two-thousand year old build-up of occidental humanity is in danger. One cannot describe this danger seriously enough, but it is also indicative that if one names it by name, the international Jews alone raise a protest against it with noisy explanations in all countries. It has progressed so far in Europe already that one no longer can call a danger, a danger, if it is instigated by the Jews.

This, however, does not prevent us from making the necessary observations. We also used to do this earlier in our internal political battle when the communistic Jews utilized the democratic Jews in the Berliner Tageblatt and in the Vossischen Zeitung, to prettify and to make petty a danger which became more threatening from day to day and thereby lulled

war he was successively Minister for Aircraft Production, Minister of State, of Supply, of War Production, and Lord Privy Seal. As suggested above, Lord Beaverbrook received repeated attention in Goebbels' writings and speeches.

and numbed the senses of that part of our nation into security whom they threatened.¹⁴ If we could not master this danger, we could see in spirit already, the ghost of hunger, misery, and millions of forced laborers taken from the German nation, and could see the most venerable continent sway in its foundations and bury under its rubble the historic inheritance of occidental humanity. This is the problem which confronts us.

My second thesis states: The Third Reich and its allies alone are in the position to banish the danger just described. The European states, including England, insist they are strong enough to meet Bolshevism on the European continent in time and effectively. This explanation is childish and does not deserve refutation. Should the strongest power in the world not be in the position to break the threat of Bolshevism, who else could assemble the necessary strength to do it? (Here stormy replies, from the masses assembled in the Sportpalast, answer: "No one!")¹⁵ The neutral European states neither possess the potential nor the necessary military strength and means nor the spiritual attitude within their nations in order to offer even the least resistance to Bolshevism. They would, if necessary, be run over in a few days by its motorized robot divisions. In the main cities of the middle and smaller European nations one reconciles oneself with the intention of arming oneself spiritually against

¹⁴This reference to earlier internal political battles is perhaps best exemplified by such speeches as, "Kommunismus Ohne Maske," ["Communism Without a Mask"] and "Bolshevism in Theorie and Praxis," ["Bolshevism in Theory and Practice"]. The former was delivered at the Nuremberg Party Rally in September, 1935 and appeared in English, French and Spanish while the latter was given on September 10, 1936, at the Eighth National Socialist Party Congress in Nuremberg and was also published in foreign languages.

¹⁵According to Curt Riess,--these comments were noted down by Goebbels' stenographer.

bolshhevistic danger. (Amusement.) This is reminiscent of the despairing explanation of the middle class parties during the year 1932, that the battle against Communism could only be fought and won with spiritual arms. This contention was, even at that time, too silly for us to have come to grips with it. Eastern Bolshevism is not only a terroristic lesson, but also a terroristic practice. It tracks its goals and objectives with infernal thoroughness, under desolate drainage of its internal potential and without consideration for luck, wellbeing and peace for the nations which are subjugated under it. What would England and America intend to do if the European continent fell, in the roughest misfortune, into the arms of Bolshevism? Does one from London perhaps want to convince Europe that such a development would come to a halt at the channel border? I have already pointed out that the foreign legions of Bolshevism already stand grounded in all democratic states in form of Communist parties. None of these states can assert of itself that it is immune against Bolshevism internally. A recently conducted recount of an election of the Lower House in England indicated that the uncommitted, that is, the communistic candidate received 10,741 votes of a total of 22,371 from a vote district which up to now was the undisputed domain of the Conservatives, which means that the national parties alone, in a relatively short period of time have lost about 10,000 votes. This means, in other words, that half of the votes went to the Communists which is further proof that the bolshhevistic threat also exists in England and that it cannot be banned simply because one wants to overlook it. All territorial obligations which the Soviet Republic assume do not possess effective worth in our eyes. Bolshevism tends also to draw its borders ideologically and not only militarily and

herein lies a danger which is greater than the question of any nation's borders. The world, therefore, does not have the choice between a Europe which either falls into its old divisions or into a newly arranged one under the Axis leadership, but only the Europe sheltered under the military protection of the Axis or one of Bolshevism.

Beyond this, I am of the firm belief that the lamentary lords and archbishops in London in reality do not even have the intention to confront the bolshevistic threats which may be brought about by the further advancement of the Soviet armies. The Jews have already undermined the Anglo-Saxon states spiritually and politically to such an extent that they do not see or recognize this danger as being true. Just as it camouflages itself in a bolshevistic manner in the Soviet Union, so it camouflages itself plutocratic-capitalistically in the Anglo-Saxon state. The methods of mimicry used by the Jewish race are well known. It has always been intent upon lulling its host-nations to sleep and thereby paralyzing their defensive power against the acute and life-endangering threats practiced by them. (Calls from the crowd: "We have experienced them!") Our insight into this problem has given us long ago the perception that the union between international plutocracy and international Bolshevism are not opposed to each other but rather represents a deep and causal relationship. The seemingly civilized West European Jews and the Jews of the eastern ghettos already hold hands above our land. Herewith Europe is in mortal danger.

I do not flatter myself to be able to alert the public opinion in the neutral or even in the enemy states with these explanations. That is not the purpose or intention. I know that the English press will fall all over me tomorrow yelping angrily that I had attempted to make the first peace contacts in the face of our pressures at the eastern front.

(Stormy laughter.) There can be no talk of this. In Germany today no person thinks of a vile compromise, the German nation thinks only of a hard war. I require for myself the sovereign right as a responsible speaker of this continent's leading country, to call a danger a danger, even if it does not threaten our own country alone, but our entire hemisphere. As National Socialists we have the responsibility to sound the alarm against the attempted chaos of the European continent brought about by the international Jews, who have built up through Bolshevism a terroristic military might for themselves, whose threatening cannot be overestimated.

The third thesis which I want to explain here in greater detail, is this, that danger exists in the immediate present. The apparent paralysis of the West European democracies, in the face of their deadliest threat, is disheartening. The international Jews promote it with great vigor. Just as the opposition against Communism in our battle for power in our own country was artificially lulled to sleep by the Jewish newspaper and could only be awakened through National Socialism, so it is exactly the same case with all other nations. The Jews once again proved themselves as the incarnation of evil, as a plastic demon of corruption and as a carrier of an international, culture-destroying chaos.

One will, if only to mention it here, in this connection also understand the consistency of our politics. We perceive the Jews as an immediate danger for every country. How other nations attempt to defend themselves against this danger makes no difference to us. How we defend ourselves against them, however, that is our own business in which we will not tolerate any interference. The Jews represent an infectious appearance which acts contagious. If the enemy countries sanctimoniously protest against our anti-Jewish politics and shed hypocritical crocodile tears

because of our measures against the Jews, then this cannot detain us from doing what is necessary. Germany, at least, does not have the intention to bow itself to this threat but rather to confront it in time and if necessary with the most radical counter measures. (For many minutes the Minister is hindered from speaking, following these sentences, by the agreeing voices which chime in.)

The cause for all of these reflections is the military threat upon the nation in the East. The war of the mechanized robots against Germany and against Europe has reached its climax. The German nation fulfills with its Axis partners a European mission in the truest sense of the word, if it confronts this immediate and serious threat of life with weapons. We will not let ourselves be confused through the yelling of the international Jews throughout the world in the brave and upright pursuit of the gigantic battle against this world pest. It can and it must end in victory. (Here loud interruptions resound: "German men to arms! German women to work!")

The struggle for Stalingrad became in its tragical complications gradually a symbol of the heroic, manly defense against the uproar of the steppe. It had for the German people, therefore, not only a military but also a spiritual and psychological meaning of the deepest affect. Right at this moment our eyes were opened to the growing problems arising out of this war. Now we don't want to hear anything more about false hopes and illusions. We want to face the facts bravely, even if they are very hard and gruesome. Because everytime it has proved itself in the history of our party and our nation that a recognized danger soon is a banished danger. In light of this heroic defense stands our further defensive battle

in the East. It requires our soldiers and their weapons in such dimensions as has been completely unknown to us in all previous campaigns. In the East the war rages without mercy. The Fuehrer has characterized it correctly when he explained that rather than victors and vanquished, only survivors and the annihilated would come to the fore.

The German people have perceived this very closely. With their healthy instinct they have cleared by their own means a realistic path through the underbrush of the daily stipulated spiritual and psychological difficulties of the war. We know only too well today that the Blitz war of Poland and the western campaign have only one consequence for the East. Here the German nation fights for its very existence. In this battle we have arrived at the realization that the German nation must defend its most sacred possessions here: its families, its wives and its children, the beauty and purity of its countryside, its cities and villages, the 2,000 year old inheritance of its culture and everything that makes life worth living.

Bolshevism naturally does not have the slightest understanding for this treasure of our rich nationality and it would also, in any event, if necessary, not take the least consideration thereof. It does not even do this in regard to its own people. The Soviet Union, for twenty-five years has drained out the bolshevistic war potential in such dimensions that it was impossible for us to imagine it and was, therefore, also estimated wrongly on our part. The terroristic Jews have made 200 million people in Russia serviceable for themselves, have welded their cynical methods and practices with the dull toughness of the Russian race, which therefore represents a greater danger for the European cultural nations. In the East an entire nation is being forced into battle. Here men, women, yes,

even children are driven not only into the armament factories, but also into the war. 200 million confront us with wild bluntness in part under the terror of the GPU, partly imbued with a devilish conception. The hordes of tanks which in this winter assault our eastern front are the result of twenty-five years of social misfortune and misery of the bolshevistic nation. Against this we must stand with corresponding counter measures, if we do not want to give up the game as lost.

I give my firm conviction expression that we can defeat the bolshevistic danger in the long run if we confront it, even if not with the same, nevertheless with equivalent methods. The German nation, therefore, faces the most serious question of this war, namely that it must produce the determination to risk all in order to keep everything that it owns and to win everything that it needs for later life.

The total war is the commandment of the hour. The civil prudery must now come to an end which in this battle still exists under the principle: wash my fur but don't get me wet! (Every sentence of the Minister is accompanied by growing applause and stronger agreement). The danger which we face is gigantic. Therefore, our efforts with which we face it must be gigantic. The hour has arrived, therefore, to take off the kid gloves and to bandage the fist. (Like a single cry the hurricane-like applause arises. Speaking choirs from the galleries and the house support the full agreement of the masses). It is no longer feasible to draw only the rich war potential fleetingly and superficially from our own country, as well as from a considerable

part of Europe which is available to us. A complete drainage must be brought about and in fact, so quickly and thoroughly as is organizationally and objectively possible. Here faulty considerations would be completely out of place. Europe's future depends upon our battle in the East. We are prepared to protect it. The German nation makes its most precious blood available for this battle. The other part of Europe should at least make its work available for it. There are many serious-minded critics in other countries too, who recognize this compelling obligation. Others still dispute it. This, however, cannot be of consequence to us. If the danger existed solely for them, one could assess their expressions as literary nonsense which is meaningless. But the danger exists for all of us and therefore we must all defend ourselves against it. Whoever does not understand this battle in the rest of Europe today will thank us tomorrow on his knees that we have taken it bravely and unwaveringly upon us.

We are not even angry if our enemies in foreign countries maintain that the measures which we now carry out for the totalization of the war effort are very similar to those of Bolshevism. Sanctimoniously they explain one would have to deduce from that under these circumstances the war against Bolshevism could be saved. The method is not important here with which one battles Bolshevism to the ground, but rather the goal, namely the removal of the danger. (Minute-long applause). The question, therefore, is not whether the methods which we are employing are good or bad, but whether they lead to results. In any case, as National Socialistic leaders of the nation, we are now resolute in every respect. We act without consideration for the protests of one or the other. We don't want to weaken the German war potential any longer in order to maintain a high, sometimes even peace-like internal standard of living for a given class of

people and thereby jeopardize our war efforts. On the contrary, we voluntarily forego a considerable share of this standard of living, to raise the war potential as quickly and thoroughly as possible. This action does not represent an end in itself, but only a means to an end. After the victory, the nation's social standard of living will therefore climb higher again. We do not have to imitate the bolshevistic methods, especially because we have the better man--and leadership material at our disposal and therewith possess a greater advantage. But we must, as the development indicates, accomplish more than we have in the past in order to give the war in the East a decisive turn for the better.

On the whole there exists only one opinion among the entire German nation as is revealed to me by uncounted letters from the homeland and announcements of consent from the front. Everyone knows that if we were to lose this war it would destroy all of us. And this is why the nation and the leadership are now determined to grasp the most radical self-help. The broad working masses of our nation do not reproach the government that they are inconsiderate, but rather that they are being too considerate. One should ask the German nation, from one end to the other; one will only receive the same answer everywhere; the most radical is today just radical, and the most total is today just total enough to achieve victory.

This is why the total war is an objective of the entire German nation. No one can even pretend to shirk himself past requirements with justification. When I proclaimed the total war effort in my speech from this spot on January 30, hurricane-like applause engulfed me from the assembled masses of human beings. I therefore can observe, that the leadership with its measures is in complete agreement with the entire German nation in the homeland and at the front. The nation is prepared to assume all needed

sacrifices, even to bear the most difficult ones, if the cause of victory is served with them. (Lively cries of agreement.)

The necessary prerequisite, is that it is self-understood, however, that the burden must be shared equally.¹⁶ (Loudest cries of agreement.) We cannot be expected to tolerate that the greatest part of the nation carries the entire burden of the war, and a small, passive part attempts to shirk itself past the burdens and responsibilities of the war. The measures which we have adopted to date and those which still must be, will therefore be carried out in the spirit of National Socialistic equality. We will not give special consideration to social position or occupation. Poor and rich and high and low must be utilized in the same manner. Everyone will be expected, if necessary, will be forced to fulfill his part in regard to the nation in this serious phase of our fateful battle. We know that we are in complete agreement with the national will of our people. We would rather exert too much than too little power in the struggle for victory. There has never been a war lost in the history of nations because the leadership had too many soldiers and arms. Many, however, were lost because the opposite was the case.

The time has come, therefore, to motivate the slowpokes. (Stormy calls of "bravo.") They must be rattled out of their quiet comfortable-ness. We cannot wait until they come to their senses by themselves and it

¹⁶On September 22, 1944, Rudolf Semmler noted in his diary, Goebbels--the Man Next to Hitler, that as part of the total war effort, Goebbels had begun to cut down both his officials and personal staff. In regard to office personnel Semmler observed that " . . . Ministry officials, temporary officers and secretaries are being dismissed so that they may go into the munitions factories. In fact some take war work, but others find safer jobs." p. 151.

may then be too late. It must pass through the entire German nation like an alarm call. A work of a million pair of hands must be put into action, and indeed from one end of the country to the other. The measures which we have already put to use and those which must still be applied and which I want to discuss in some detail in the further development of this explanation, are of consequence for the entire private and public life. The sacrifices which the individual citizen must make, are sometimes difficult; but they are relatively meaningless in relation to those sacrifices which he would have to make, if he refused to make those sacrifices and therewith conjured up the greatest national catastrophe upon our nation. It is better to make the incision at the right time than to wait until the disease has taken a good hold. One may, however, not interfere with the surgeon who makes the incision or even accuse him of causing bodily harm. He does not cut to kill, but rather to save the life of the patient.

Once again I must emphasize here that the more difficult the sacrifices which the German nation has to make, the more important it is to require that they are equally distributed. The German nation wants it this way. No one today refuses to accept even the most difficult war burdens. But it must certainly irritate everyone when certain people repeatedly attempt to shirk the responsibilities. The National Socialistic leadership has the moral, as well as the political responsibility to confront such attempts in a manly fashion, even if necessary with sardonic penalties. (Agreement.) To spare such individuals would fail the mark and would in the long run lead to confusion of feelings and attitudes in our nation, which would as a result greatly endanger our public war morals.

We are, therefore, also forced to institute a series of measures, which, it is true, are not of great consequence to the success of our wag-

ing of war, which, however, appear requisite to the maintainance of the war morale at home and at the front lines. Even the optics of the war, that is, the outward appearance of the war leadership is, in the fourth year of the war, of consequential importance. The front lines have in light of their superhuman sacrifices, which they must make daily, the fundamental right to expect that not even a single individual at home claims the right for himself to live past the war and his responsibilities. Not only do the front lines require this, but also the greater majority of the decent part of the homeland. (Storm-like applause.) The busy individuals have a right to expect, if they work ten and twelve and sometimes fourteen hours daily, that the lazy ones right next to them don't lie around or indeed even consider the former to be stupid and not cunning enough. The homeland must remain clean and intact in its entirety. Nothing may mar its war-like picture.

Therefore, a number of measures have been instituted in light of this new view of the war. We have, for example, ordered that the bars and nightclubs be closed. I cannot imagine that people still exist today who fulfill their war obligations and at the same time sit around till all hours of the night in amusement centers. I can only conclude from this that they are not very particular about their war obligations. We have closed these amusement centers because they began to annoy us, and began to mar the picture of the war. We are therewith by no means persuing any bigotted goals. After the war we will gladly follow the principle: live and let live. During the war, however, the principle applies: fight and let others fight!

Luxury restaurants also, whose existence stands in no relationship to the desired effect, fell prey to closure. It may be, that one or

another individual views the care of the stomach as a main objective even during the war. We cannot give him any consideration. If at the front our fighting troops, from the grenadier to the general field marshal eat in the same messhall, I believe it is not asking too much if we force everyone at home to be considerate at least in terms of the most fundamental community feelings and rules. We will want to become gourmets again after the war. Today we have more important things to do than to care for the stomach.

Uncounted luxury and representation businesses have also been disbanded in the meantime. They are frequently a tautology for the buying public. There was hardly anything practical left to buy, in some instances only, if one paid here and there with butter and eggs instead of money. What is the purpose of businesses which do not sell goods anymore and only waste electric lights, heat, and human productivity which are solely needed elsewhere at every turn and corner, and especially in the munitions production.

One should not interject here, that the maintainance of a favorable but artificial peace would impress foreign countries. Foreign countries are only impressed with a German victory! (Storm-like agreement.) When we have won, everyone will want to be our friends. If we should be defeated, however, we could count our friends on the fingers of one hand. We have, therefore, brought these false illusions to an end which obscure the war picture. We will give the people, who stood around uselessly in the empty businesses, a useful employment in the public war business. This process is currently in operation and will have been completed by March 15. It represents, of course, an enormous reorganization of our total economic life. We are not advancing without plans. We also do not

want to accuse anyone falsely or hand out censure and reproachments in all directions. We are merely doing what is necessary. This we do, however, quickly and thoroughly.

We would rather wear patched clothes for a few years than conjure up a situation in which our nation would have to run around in rags for centuries. What are elegant shops good for today which use up light, heat, and human energy. They will come to life anew after the war, if we have time and desire them. What are beauty salons good for in which beauty culture is practiced, which requires enormous amounts of time and energy, which is very nice and pleasant during peacetime, but is superfluous for the war. Our women and girls will again appeal to our returning, heroic soldiers without peace-like makeup. (Applause.)

In the public offices business will be conducted somewhat quicker and less bureaucratically in the future. It does not produce a favorable picture if, after eight hours of work, business is terminated right on the minute. The nation does not exist to serve these offices, but these offices exist to serve the nation. One should, therefore, work until the business has been accomplished. That is the rule of the war. If the Fuehrer can do this, then the servants of the state can also do it. If there isn't enough work available for a longer business period, one should give ten or twenty or thirty percent of the working force to the war essential economy and therewith release and make free an equivalent number of men for the front lines. This applies to all service areas at home. Perhaps this may serve to quicken and reduce the clumsiness of the work done in the offices somewhat. We must learn to work, not only more thoroughly, but also more promptly in the war. The soldier at the front lines, too, does not have weeks of time to think about an order, to pass it on from

hand to hand, or let it gather dust in the files. He must act at once because he will otherwise lose his life. We, in the homeland, do not lose our life due to prodding work, but we endanger therewith the life of our nation in the long run.

In general everyone must make it for himself a selfunderstood war rule, to give the greatest consideration to the rightful demands of the working and fighting nation. We are not bad sports, but we do not let others spoil our game either.

If, for example, certain men and women lounge around for weeks in the resort areas, exchange rumors with one another and take the place to which war casualties and men and women workers are entitled after one year of hard employment, then this is unbearable and therefore has been cancelled. The war is not the proper time for a certain amusement riffraff. The work and battle is our joy till the end in which we find our deep, internal satisfaction. Whoever fails to comprehend this because of a lack of feeling of responsibility must be trained to such a feeling of responsibility, or if necessary, be forced to accept it. Only hard decisive action helps here.

It doesn't make a good impression on the nation, for example, if we publish through a gigantic propaganda campaign the slogan: "Wheels must turn for victory." Whereupon most of the nation decides not to begin unnecessary train rides, while in comparison some unemployed pleasure travelers thereby obtain more space on the trains. The railroad today serves important war transports and necessary war-business trips. Only that individual may demand a vacation who otherwise would greatly endanger his work and battle strength. The Fuehrer has never had a day of vacation since the war began and long before it started. If, therefore,

the first man in the nation accepts his duty so seriously and with such responsibility, then it must be for every man and woman of this state a mute request, that cannot be ignored, to follow this lead.

The government, on the other hand, does everything to maintain the necessary and varied relaxation centers for the working people in these difficult times. Theater, movies, music halls remain in business. The radio will be intent upon further extending and rounding out its programs.¹⁷ We do not have the intention to conjure up a dismal winter mood for our people. That which serves the nation, which maintains its battle and working strength, hardens and increases, that is good and necessary in war. The opposite is to be removed. I have ordered therefore to equalize the rules just described, that the spiritual and psychological places of recuperation for the nation should not be reduced but increased. In so far as they do not hamper our war efforts, but rather assist them, they must receive an equivalent endorsement also on the part of our government and national leadership. This applies also to sports. Sports today are not a matter of privileged circles, but rather a matter for the entire nation. U. K. positions are senseless in all areas of sports. Sports have the task to harden the physical stamina, but mainly seem to serve the purpose of helping the people through their

¹⁷ According to Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld, in their book, The Goebbels Experiment, Goebbels had already implemented significant changes in broadcasting policy as early as June, 1941. Based upon the listeners' reactions and in anticipation of greater requirements particularly during the peak periods of fighting in the war, programs became lighter and brighter. March 1, 1942, Goebbels again foresaw the need for additional concessions to the soldiers and people at home at the expense of higher quality programs and "he even went so far as to readmit jazz as an officially approved form of entertainment." p. 171

greatest time of need.

All this the front lines want too. It is required with stormy agreement by the entire German nation. It does not want to hear anything about unimportant business outside of the war effort and similar pompous businesses, which only require time and energy. It does not want to hear anymore about an extravagant, involved questionnaire for every nonsense. It does not want to become bogged down in thousands of unimportant little matters, which may have been important for peace, but have no meaning in the war. It also does not have to be continuously reminded of its responsibilities through the great sacrifices of our soldiers at Stalingrad. It knows what it must and must not do. It wants a spartan-like life for all, for the high and low, for the poor and rich. Just as the Fuehrer presents an example for the entire nation, so the entire nation must in all its layers take this example as its model. If he only knows work and worries, we don't want him to carry the work and worries alone, but rather take that part upon us, which we can take from him.

These times, through which we are living today, have in their entire makeup for every true National Socialist an amazing similarity with the battle period.¹⁸ We have always gone through thick and thin together with the people, and this is why the people have followed on all paths. We have always carried all the burdens together with the nation, and this is why the burdens did not appear heavy, but rather light to us. The people want to be led. There has never been an example of a nation in history, which in the critical hour of its national life, failed to follow a brave and determined leadership.

¹⁸The rise to power period.

In this relationship I would like to mention a few words concerning some of the practical measures of the total war, which we are already putting into effect.

The problem which is being considered here is: freeing soldiers for the front lines, freeing men and women workers for the war industry. Every other need must become subservient to these goals, even if the price is our social living standard during the war. This shall not represent the final stability of our living standard, but shall only be the means to achieve the end, namely that of a total victory.

In the scope of this action a hundred thousand U. K. positions in the homeland must be abolished. These U. K. positions were necessary up to now, because we did not have enough specialists--and key personnel at our disposal, who could take over the position being vacated by the abolition of the U. K. positions. The scheme of the already enacted measures and those still to be enacted, is to mobilize the necessary work forces. This is why our appeal is directed to the man standing outside of the war economy and to the women who up to now stood outside of the working forces. They will not want to refuse to answer this appeal and will not be able to reject it. The work responsibility for the women is prepared with great foresight. This does not mean, however, that only those may work, who have been named in the law. Everyone is welcome to us, and the more who make themselves available for the great changeover in the internal economy, the more soldiers we can free for the front lines.

Our enemies assert the German women are not in the position to replace the man in the war economy. This may apply to certain physical work of the war preparations. I am convinced beyond this, however, that the

German woman is determined to take over completely in the shortest possible time, the place vacated by the man who is going to the front lines.

For this we do not have to recall bolshevistic examples. In the German economy, too, for many years now, millions of the best German women have been busy with the greatest effect and they are waiting impatiently that their lines will soon be increased and replenished by new replacements. All those who make themselves available for work fulfill therewith a thankful responsibility in regard to the front lines. Hundreds of thousands have already come, hundreds of thousands will still come. In the shortest period we hope therewith to free armies of worker-forces, who in turn will free armies of fighting front line soldiers again.

I would have to be greatly deceived in regard to German women if I were to suppose that they would not hear the appeal which is being directed at them now. They will not hang on to the law in a narrow-minded manner or indeed try to slip through its loopholes. In general, the few who made such attempts would not reach first base with us. Medical certificates will not be accepted fully in place of summons to work. Even some so-called alibi-work, which one can obtain from one's husband, or one's brother-in-law, or from a good friend in order to be able to shirk such work unnoticed, will be answered on our part with the corresponding counter measures. The few, who pursue such plans, can only ruin their reputation in public. The nation will pay them with contempt alone. No one requires that a woman who does not possess the physical requirements should go into the heavy assembly in a tank factory. There are, however, numerous assemblies in the war economy which can be fulfilled without too great a physical requirement and for which a woman, even if she belongs

to the better social circles, can make herself available. No one is too good for this, and we have only the choice to do something in its entirety or to lose entirely.

It would also be worthwhile that women who employ servants would take this question under close scrutiny. One can very well dedicate oneself to the home and the children and release one's maid or relinquish the home and the children to the maid or the NSV,¹⁹ and report oneself for work. Life would not be as comfortable as during peace to be sure. But we do not live in peace, but rather in war. We will make it comfortable for ourselves once again if the victory rests in our hands. Now, however, we must fight for victory by continuously sacrificing our comforts.

Likewise and especially the war women would understand this. They will deem it to be their highest responsibility, to stand at the side of their men at the front lines by making themselves available for war-necessary work. This especially applies to farming. The wives of the farm workers can present a good example here. The fundamental rule applies to all men and women, that it is not appropriate for anyone to do even less in the war than in peace; the work must be increased in all areas.

One may not make the mistake, by the way, to push everything that is necessary on the government now. The government can only formulate the larger scope of laws. To give life and meaning to the scope of these laws is the assignment of the working people and indeed this shall be

¹⁹ "Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt." (NSV) ["National Socialist Welfare Organization"] was responsible for such activities as the "Winter Clothing Drive," "Aid to Mother and Child," "Strength Through Joy," and providing recreational areas for German underprivileged children and needy citizens under the slogan of "Recovery Action for the German Nation," as early as 1933.

accomplished under the inspiring leadership of the party. Quick action is the first commandment here.

Above and beyond the legal responsibilities the watchword now applies: Volunteers to the fore! I appeal especially as District Leader of Berlin to the women citizens of Berlin. They have already given so many noble examples in the development of this war of a brave opinion on life that they will certainly not let themselves be embarrassed by this appeal. They have obtained for themselves, because of their practical way of life, as well as the freshness of their view of life, even in the war, a good name throughout the world. It is essential to retain and strengthen this good name now through generous deeds. If I therefore call upon my Berliner women citizens, to make themselves quickly, promptly, and with few objections available for necessary war work, I know that all will respond to this appeal. We do not now want to complain about the difficulties of the time or grumble to one another. We want to do what is not only the Berliner way, but is also the German way, get to work, act, take the initiative, do something ourselves and not leave everything for others to do.

Which German woman could be heartless enough to refuse such an appeal which I am making especially for the fighting front to the world of German women. Who would now want to place Babbitt-like comforts above the national responsibility commandment? Who would still want to think about his egotistical, personal needs in the face of the current, hard danger and not about the necessities of war which stand above all else?

I reject with contemptuousness the charge which our enemies make, that this was an imitation of Bolshevism. We do not want to imitate Bolshevism, we want to conquer it, and indeed with means and methods which

are equal to it. The German woman will readily understand this, because she has long recognized that the war which our men are waging today is especially a war to protect her children. Her most sacred possession is therefore protected in this war through the employment of the most precious blood of our nation. In this battle of men, the German woman must also outwardly state her spontaneous solidarity. It would be better tomorrow than the day after, if she integrated herself into the ranks of a million of accomplishing, employed, and working women and increased also the army of the working homeland through her own person. It must pass like a river of readiness through the German nation. I expect that now uncounted women and especially men, who until now did not do any important war work, will report to the registration offices. Whoever gives himself quickly, gives himself doubly.

Next to these, generous mergers are taking place in our general economy. This applies especially to our insurance-and banking system, the tax system, our journal-and newspaper system which are unnecessary for war and subsistence. It also applies to war--dispensable party and management organizations, but also in regard to further simplification of the way of life of our nation.

I know that greater parts of our nation must therewith make heavy sacrifices. I have compassion for these sacrifices, and the national leadership is intent to hold them to a minimum. But a certain rest will remain, which must be carried. After the war we will rebuild with greater beauty than ever before that which we have to disband today and the state will extend a helping hand for this purpose.

In this connection I turn urgently against the assertion that the purpose of our measures is to make the middle class dormant or a monop-

lization of our economy. Immediately after the war, the middle class will be reactivated economically and socially in its greatest dimensions. The temporary measures are exclusively emergency measures for the war needs and war requirements. They do not attempt to structurally change the economy, but are simply designed for the objective, to gain by fighting the victory as quickly and thoroughly as possible.

I do not dispute the fact that we are confronted by worrisome weeks in the face of carrying out the just mentioned measures. But with this we finally clear the air. We base these measures upon the actions of the coming summer and get down to our work today without paying any attention to the threats and bragging of the enemy. I am most happy to have the privilege of presenting this program of victory (storm-like applause) to a German nation which not only voluntarily takes these measures upon itself, but also requests them, and indeed with more urgency than it ever has been the case in the development of this war. The nation wants decisive and quick action to be taken. It is time! We must utilize the moment and the hour so that we are protected from further surprises.

I turn to the entire nation with this appeal, especially, however, to the party as the appointed leader of the totalization of our internal war leadership. It is not being confronted by such a gigantic problem for the first time. It will resolve this problem with the familiar revolutionary elan. It will sooner be done with laziness and indolence which may appear here or there. The government has released its general laws and will release others in the days and weeks to come. The incidentals which remain unnoticed in the laws will have to be carried out by the people themselves under the leadership of the party. Above everything else, however, that we do or don't do now, the moral law applies to

everyone not to do that which will hurt the war and to do everything which serves the victory.

We have frequently in the past years recalled in our newspapers and speeches the Frederick example. We had no right to do so. As calculated by Schlieffen, Frederick II confronted ninety million Europeans at times with five million Prussians in the third Silesian War. And again in the second of the seven hellish years he experienced a defeat which started the entire Prussian government tottering. He never had enough soldiers and arms in order to fight his battles without a great risk. He conducted his strategy always as a system of makeshifts. But he followed the fundamental law to attack the enemy wherever an opportunity presented itself and to beat him wherever he assembled. That he suffered defeats is not of consequence. It was of consequence, however, that the great king in all battles of fate remained unbroken, that he took upon himself the wavering luck of war unshaken, and that his iron heart overcame every danger. At the end of the seven years he stood, a fifty-on year old, toothless, gout-sick old man, tormented by thousands of pains, yet victor upon the desolate battlefield. What do we have to compare to him?! Perhaps only the will and determination to do the same as he, if the hour requires it, to remain unwaveringly as he in all developments of fate, to force the victory as he, even under the most unfavorable circumstances and never to despair in the great deed in which we are involved.

I give my deepest conviction expression, that internally the German nation has been purified deeply through the tragic blow of fate at Stalingrad. It has looked into the hard and pitiless face of war. It now knows the gruesome truth and is determined to go through thick and thin with the

Fuehrer. (Inspired with these words the masses arise and like the surge of the sea speaking choirs unendingly sound: "Fuehrer command, we'll follow! Hail to our Fuehrer!") For minutes the Minister is kept from continuing his speech.)

In these days the English and American press has concerned itself at great length with the bearing of the German nation in the present crisis. The English people, according to their bragging, know the German people much better than we, its leadership. They give us hypocritical advice, what we should and should not do, always from the point of view that the German nation of today is similar to the German nation of November 1918, which fell prey to their art of seduction. It is not necessary for me to present counter-proof against these assumptions. The counter-proof is hardened every day anew by the fighting and working German people.

I would like, however, for the sake of truth, to direct a series of questions to you, my German men and women, which you must answer with the best knowledge and conscience. When my listeners gave me their spontaneous acknowledgment to my demands on January 30, the English press asserted the next day it had been a propaganda theater and did not represent in any sense the true mood of the German nation. (Spontaneous call of: "Shame!" "Lie!" "They should just come here! They will get to know us!") I have invited only a representative sample of the German people to this gathering today in the best sense of the word. (The enumeration of the Minister is accompanied by impetuous demonstrations which are dedicated with seemingly unending applause and strongest agreement to the representatives of the army present in the Sportpalast.) In front of me are seated rows of German disabled veterans from the eastern front, leg and arm amputees with

bullet-riddled bodies, war-blinded, who have come with their Red Cross nurses, men in their prime years who have crutches in front of them. Among them I count around fifty holders of the oak cluster and the Ritterkreuz²⁰, a splendid delegation of our fighting front. Behind them rises a tier of men and women munitions workers of the Berlin tank works. Again behind them sit men from the party organization, soldiers of the fighting army, doctors, scientists, artists, engineers and architects, teachers, officials and office workers from their offices and bureaus, a proud representation of our intellectual life in all its stratifications, to whom the Reich owes thanks especially now in the war for their wonders of invention and human genius. Throughout the entirety of the Sportpalast I see thousands of German women. Youth is represented here and old age. No position, no occupation and no age-class was overlooked in the invitation. I can therefore say with full right and authority: those who sit in front of me are a representation of the entire German nation from the front lines and the homeland. Is that true? Yes or no! (The Sportpalast experiences a demonstration in this moment of questioning, as this old battle-ground of National Socialism only experienced at special high points of its national events. The masses jump up from their seats as if electrified. Like a hurricane the many thousand voices cry "yes" through the hall. What the participants of this demonstration experience is a national vote in demonstration of will, which finds no stronger spontaneous expression.) You, therefore, my listeners, represent at this moment the nation. And to you I would like to direct ten questions, which you, together with the entire German nation, shall answer in front of the entire world, but es-

²⁰The highest military citation given for distinguished military service.

pecially in front of our enemies, who are also listening to us over their radios. (Only with difficulty can the Minister make himself be heard for the following questions. The masses are caught in a situation of exalted feeling. Razor-sharp the individual questions fall. Every individual feels himself personally addressed. With the last ounce of participation and enthusiasm the masses reply with an answer to each single question. The Sportpalast echoes with the uniform cry of agreement.)

The English assert that the German nation has lost the belief in the victory.

I ask you: Do you believe with the Fuehrer and with us in the final, total victory of the German nation?

I ask you: Are you determined to follow the Fuehrer in the battle of victory through thick and thin and with the acceptance even of the most personal burden?

Secondly: The English assert that the German nation is tired of this battle.

I ask you: Are you prepared to continue this battle together with the Fuehrer as phalanx of the homeland, standing behind the battling army with wild determination and unerringly through all developments of fate, until the victory is in our hands?

Thirdly: The English maintain the German nation has no desire anymore to subjugate itself to the rapidly multiplying war work which the government requires of it.

I ask you: Are you and the German nation prepared, if the Fuehrer orders it, to work ten, twelve, and if necessary fourteen and sixteen hours daily and to give your last for victory?

Fourthly: The English assert that the German nation defends itself

against the total war measures of the government. It does not want total war, but capitulation. (Calls of: Never! Never! Never!)

I ask you: Do you want total war? Do you want it, if necessary, even more total and radical than we can imagine today at all?

Fifthly: The English maintain that the German nation has lost its confidence in the Fuehrer.

I ask you: Is your confidence in the Fuehrer greater, with more belief and unshakeable today than ever? Is your preparedness to follow him on all his paths and to do everything which is necessary and to bring this war to a victorious end, absolute and confined? (The masses arise as one man. The enthusiasm of the masses spends itself in a demonstration of heretofore unexperienced dimensions. Many thousands of voices as speech choirs roar through the hall: "Fuehrer command, we'll follow!" A wave of never-ending hail calls to the Fuehrer arises. As if by a single command the flags and standards arise, an expression of the solemn moment in which the masses pay homage to the Fuehrer.)

I ask you sixthly: Are you prepared to utilize your entire force and to make available to the eastern front the people and arms which are needed to give the deadly blow to Bolshevism?

I ask you seventhly: Do you pledge with sacred oath to the front lines, that the homeland will stand behind it with strong morals and will give it everything which it needs to win the victory?

I ask you eighthly: Do you want, especially you women, that the government should take care that the German woman makes her entire strength available for leading the war, and jumps into the breach whenever it is possible to release men for the front lines and therewith to help

husbands at the front lines?

I ask you ninethly: Do you sanction, if necessary, the most radical measures against a small circle of shirkers and profiteers, who play a game of peace in the middle of the war and who want to exploit the troubles of the nation for their personal gains? Do you agree that whoever misuses the war should lose his head?

I ask you tenthly and lastly: Do you want, as the National Socialistic program prescribes that especially in the war equal rights and equal responsibilities prevail, that the homeland takes the heavy burdens of the war squarely upon its shoulders and that they should be distributed equally among high and low, and poor and rich?

I have asked you, you have given me your answer. You are a piece of the nation, through your mouths the position of the German nation has herewith manifested itself. You have shouted to your enemies what they must know, so that they do not indulge in illusions or false visions.

Herewith we are, as from the first hour of our might on and through all ten years united solidly and brotherly with the German people. The mightiest party member who exists in this world, the nation itself, stands behind us and is determined to fight for the victory together with the Fuehrer with the acceptance of even the most difficult sacrifices and no matter what the price may be. Which power in the world could now detain us from carrying through and fulfilling everything which we have set as our goal. Now we will and must be successful. I stand in front of you here not only as the spokesman for the government, but also as the spokesman of the nation. Around me my old friends of the party are seated, who fill the high positions in the leadership of nation and government. Next

to me party member Speer²¹ is seated, who has received from the Fuehrer the historic order to mobilize the German munitions economy and to supply the front lines with arms in wrap and abundance. Next to me sits party member Dr. Ley,²² who has received the order from the Fuehrer to carry out the leadership of the German workers' federation and to school and train it in the untiring utilization for its war responsibilities. We feel united with our party member Saukel,²³ who received the order from the Fuehrer to bring uncounted hundreds of thousands of workers into the Reich, who represent an addition to our national economy, which our enemy cannot catch up with. Beyond this all leaders of the party, the army, and of the states are allied with us.

All of us, children of our nation, welded together with the nation in the greatest hour of fate of our national history, we promise you, we promise the front lines, and we promise the Fuehrer that we want to weld the homeland together into a union of will, upon which the Fuehrer and his fighting soldiers can depend unconditionally and blindly. We pledge our-

²¹ Albert Speer was Minister of Armament and War Productions, who admitted at the Nuremberg trials, according to William F. Shirer, author of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, that 40 per cent of all prisoners of war were employed in 1944 in the production of weapons and munitions and in subsidiary industries. p. 947 fn.

²² As early as 1925, Dr. Robert Ley was District Leader for Cologne-Aachen and by 1932 was commissioned by Hitler to organize the German Labor Front which both workers and employers were compelled to join. At the time of the "basic" speech, Dr. Ley was not only head of the German Labor Front, but also Reichsleiter, with cabinet rank of the political division of the Nazi party. According to Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels: A Biography, Dr. Ley was "a man for whom Goebbels held no esteem." p. 384.

²³ Fritz Saukel, who had been District Leader and Governor of Thuringia was placed in charge of the whole problem of forced-labor and given the title of Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. According to his diary entry of April 11, 1943, Goebbels considered Saukel to be "one of the dullest of the dull." p. 325.

selves, to do everything in our life and work which is necessary for the victory. We want to fill our hearts with that political passion, which always, in the great battle days of the party and the state, consumed us like perpetual, burning fire. We will never want to fall into that erroneous and hypocritical objectivity-babbling, which the German nation in its history can thank for so much misfortune already.

When this war began we leveled our sights singularly and alone upon this nation. That which serves it and its course of life is good and must be maintained and furthered. That which harms it and its course of life, is bad and must be removed and severed. With an inspired heart and a cool head we want to approach the conquest of the great problems of this period of the war. We therewith walk upon the path to the final victory. It lies on the foundation in the belief in the Fuehrer.

So I place this evening before the eyes of the entire nation once again its great responsibility. The Fuehrer expects of us a performance, which places everything heretofore known into the shadows. We do not want to fail his challenge. As we are proud of him, so he should be able to be proud of us.

In the great crises and shocks of the national life only the true men prove themselves, as well as the true women. Here one has no longer the right to speak of the weaker sex, here both sexes prove the same determination to fight and the same strength of soul. The nation is prepared for everything the Fuehrer has commanded, and we will follow him. If we have ever believed faithfully and unflinching in the victory, it was in the hour of national reflection and the internal uplift. We can see it lie close within our reach; we must only set to work. We must only create

the strength of determination, to make everything else subservient to its service. That is the command of the hour. And this is why the watchword states:

Now, nation arise and storm break loose!

(The last words of the Minister die in seemingly unending, roaring applause.)

Other Representative Speeches of Goebbels

The varied talents which Joseph Goebbels displayed in the many speaking situations throughout his career were to some extent directly related to his interest in the Latin language, which he studied in his youth.

It was during his high school years in the Gymnasium in Rheydt, in the Rhineland Westphalia district that Goebbels was first exposed to and became aware of the inherent clearness, structure, and logic of Latin. Of particular interest to him, moreover, were the orations of Cicero delivered against Cataline in 63 B. C. Through them he studied the composition of political speaking, the laws of their effectiveness, and the arrangement and style in which they were delivered. From this analysis Goebbels concluded at an early age that speaking was superior to books, newspapers, and almost everything else in politics.²⁴

But since speaking situations did not readily present themselves prior to his graduation from high school, nor were courses in the areas of speech offered in those days, Goebbels spent most of his spare time reading. So intense was his desire to read that "nothing was too difficult or too dry. He read Caesar, Virgil, the Iliad in its original, the

²⁴Bade, op. cit., p. 6

encyclopedia from beginning to end, and everything Goethe ever wrote."²⁵
Because of a physical impairment which he suffered at the age of seven, Goebbels concentrated most of his energy into academic pursuits and quickly rose to the top of his class--a position which he retained until he graduated from high school.²⁶

It was due to his scholastic standing and because he had written the best German essay of the graduating class that he was asked to deliver the farewell address at the graduating exercises, which was to become the first speech he ever delivered.

According to Boris v. Borresholm, Goebbels' first attempt at speaking was far from being a satisfactory performance. In describing the event, the author reported that Goebbels, his manuscript clutched tightly at his side, slowly limped to the platform, from where he began to address his audience with great reluctance. With poor eye-contact and a notable lack of effective vocal and bodily activity, the speaker read most of his speech. When he had finished, the principal of the Gymnasium approached Goebbels, praising him for the content of his talk, and while shaking his hand vigorously added, "but believe me, you will never be a good speaker!"²⁷

Goebbels' Entry into Politics.--The actual year in which Goebbels delivered his first political speech is subject to controversy. Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner report that Joseph Goebbels addressed

²⁵Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁶Ibid., p. 12.

²⁷Boris v. Borresholm, ed., Dr. Goebbels Nach Aufzeichnungen Aus Seiner Umgebung, (Berlin: Verlag des "Journal," 1949), pp. 30-31.
Translated by the writer.

his first audience at a little Rhineland Inn in Elbersfelde during 1923. His talk upon this occasion consisted largely of an appeal to "Every patriotic German to resist the bayonets of the rapacious imperialist French,"²⁸ who had occupied the Ruhr valley.

Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, however, maintain that Goebbels first embarked on his career as an agitator in 1924, when a group of his friends, at a meeting organized by a Socialist group, "dared Goebbels to get up on the platform and speak in the debate."²⁹

But the content of his speeches during the formative years of the party (1923-1932) remained essentially the same whether he was a spokesman for National Socialism for the Völkische Freiheits Partei [National Freedom Party]⁷ which he served during 1924, while Hitler's party was nearly forced out of existence. He attacked the existing government, the other minority parties, political and social institutions in Germany, and foreign countries alike--in short, almost everything that was considered a threat to the organization which he represented.

So busy was his schedule that he once commented in his personal diary, "'Between October 1, 1924, and October 1, 1925, I spoke 189 times'. . . 'You can drop dead from this kind of work.'"³⁰

Representative of his speaking was his address in 1926, entitled, "Lenin or Hitler." Invited by Hitler to speak at a Munich gathering, Goebbels had decided to talk on the difference between Communism and National Socialism.

²⁸ Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁹ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

³⁰ Riess, op. cit., p. 26.

As recorded by Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Goebbels said in part:

I believe in the proletariat's will to sacrifice, in their determination towards freedom, which slumbers now but will one day awake. I believe in the Socialism of the proletariat. I believe in the rhythm of the masses, in the future of history. That is my final comfort and ultimate support. If I ever can say that I believe no more in these things then I am beyond despair. But that cannot be! That must not be!³¹

The Gauleiter of Berlin.--When on October 20, 1926, Hitler appointed Goebbels Gauleiter [District Leader] of Berlin, it became his task to reorganize the party in the capital city and to win new followers to his cause. The task seemed almost hopeless since "the large majority of the population were Social Democrats and approximately 100,000 well-organized and militant Communists represented the left wing."³²

During the weeks and months that followed his arrival in Berlin, Goebbels concentrated upon mass meetings and street demonstrations. He invented a complete ceremonial because he realized that it was a wasted effort for a speaker to address an audience for an hour or more before he had established contact.³³ His favorite meeting place was the Sportpalast, but he also spoke in the Lustgarten and the Pharus Saale, a hall at which the Communists generally held their meetings, as well as at any other place where crowds would assemble.

The list of his topics and the subject matter upon which he spoke appears almost overwhelming. They ranged from attacks upon "the Dawes or

³¹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

³²Ibid., p. 48

³³Bade, op. cit., p. 33

the Young Plan as the products of American capitalism,"³⁴ to charges designed to provoke the Communist factions in Berlin. But Goebbels perhaps made his strongest bid for publicity on February 11, 1927, when he announced his topic, "The Collapse of the Bourgeois State," a topic which he attempted to discuss before an audience made up of both Communists and National Socialist party members. Because of an ensuing fight in the meeting place, however, in which a number of S. A. men [Storm Troopers] were hurt, Goebbels announced to his audience in a voice trembling with emotion, "you will understand that I can no longer speak about this evening's topic . . . I shall now talk to you about the 'Unknown S. A. Man.'"³⁵

On October 5, 1927, when giving a commencement address at the founding of the High School for Politics for the District of Greater Berlin, Goebbels spoke on the topic, "Was Ist Politik?" [What is Politics?].

In part he said:

. . . Politics is that business which concerns itself with providing space, freedom and bread for a nation. Space, so that this nation can expand its population, freedom, so that its culture can blossom forth under the flag, bread, so that the children of this nation have something to eat. Not the individual in the nation, but the nation in and for itself thereby leaves the level of inconsequentiality and wins a new, different basis. It towers above everything else and politics then is only of service to the nation. It serves the nation to achieve its greatest development, and this it achieves if it is surrounded by space in which the population can expand where it is free to develop this increasing national population, and if it has the bread which permits the acceptance of the responsibility to put children into this world . . .
.....

³⁴Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 54.

When we compare the Germany of today with the Germany that was, we arrive at the terrible premise: a nation without space, a nation without freedom and because of this also a nation without bread. And that is the terrifying accusation of which one can accuse the government, that it took the responsibility to barter off the space, to sell freedom for a dish of lentils and to shrink the bread of the nation.

On this premise the compulsory measures of the New German politics emerge: to safeguard the space in which the nation resides, to fight for freedom with which our nation can attain the last blossom of its nationality, and to work for bread with which we can provide for the children of this nation. If a higher-working fate has destined the German nation to freedom and to a greater, more powerful future, then it will not withhold its blessing in this task.

To prepare this is our responsibility,
What is required of us, we shall do.³⁶

The Chief of Party Propaganda.-- On January 9, 1928, Goebbels delivered an address on the subject, "Erkenntnis und Propaganda," ["Perception and Propaganda."] The significance of his remarks pertaining to his views on propaganda is best demonstrated by the following excerpts below:

. . . To discuss propaganda is of little use: it is not a matter of theory, but a thing of practice. One cannot discover on the theoretical path which propaganda is better or worse, but rather that propaganda is good which leads to success and that is bad which leads past the desired result, even then, if it is most clearly conceived, because it is not the objective of propaganda to be clear, its objective is to lead to a goal . . . Whether the propaganda was good is indicated if it was able, in a given period of time, to influence a given kind of people whom it attempted to win for its idea and wants to win. Whether the propaganda was bad is then indicated too. . . Therefore, no one can say, your propaganda is too crude, too mean, or too brutal, or it is not decent enough, because all these are not characteristic signs of its differences. It should not be decent, it should also not be gentle or humble; it should lead to a result.

.
Propaganda is absolutely necessary, even if it is only the means to an end. If it did not exist, an idea could never conquer the state. It is important that I can transmit to a majority of people that which I recognize as being correct. It will be the responsibility of the really great propagand-

³⁶Goebbels, Signale der Neuen Zeit, op. cit., pp. 23-27.

dists to formulate that which many heads thought out together so that the broad masses of intellectuals, as well as the simplest man can understand it.

.....
I do not place any value upon delivering pleasant aesthetic speeches or to speak in such a manner that women cry. The purpose of a political speech is to convince people of that which we have recognized as being correct. When I speak in the province, I speak differently than in Berlin, and when I speak in Bayreuth,³⁷ I speak of different things than in the Pharus Halls.

.....
Look at our own times. Was Mussolini perhaps a scribbler or was he rather a great speaker? When Lenin returned from Zurich to St. Petersburg, did he drive from the train station to his study and write a book or did he not speak in front of thousands instead? Nothing else has formed Fascism and Bolshevism but the great speaker, the great creator of the word! There is no difference between the speaker and the politician. . .³⁸

With the election of twelve National Socialist party members to the Reichstag on May 20, 1928, Goebbels was permitted to address more audiences than in previous years. Without the immunity granted him as a representative of the Reichstag, he had been seriously hampered and frequently had been forbidden to speak to audiences both in Berlin and in the district of Prussia. When in November of the same year Hitler appointed him to the position of Head of Party Propaganda, Goebbels increased his personal appearances in public and became instrumental in organizing the election campaigns on the local, state, and national level. Most noteworthy were his efforts in regard to the following five campaigns: (1) November 17, 1929--election of members to the City Council of Berlin; (2) September 14, 1930--Reichstag elections; (3) March 13, 1931--attempt to get Hitler elected President of Germany; (4) 1932--second attempt to

³⁷The sight of the world-famous Bayreuther festival plays.

³⁸Goebbels, Signale der Neuen Zeit, op. cit., pp. 28-49.

get Hitler elected President; September 1--Reichstag election; November--Reichstag election, and (5) January 30, 1933--Hitler appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg.

In attempt to win the German people to the cause of National Socialism, Goebbels personally traveled throughout the country. As early as 1932, he had confronted so many audiences that he wrote in his diary on October 28 of that year, "One speaks, speaks, speaks and can no longer enumerate individually when, where, and how."³⁹

Although a complete and accurate listing of Goebbels' speaking engagements does not seem to exist, the references in his diary, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, serve to indicate the number of times and the places at which he spoke during the period from January 1, 1932 to May 1, 1933.

[See Appendix].

While reflecting upon his speaking in Berlin, Goebbels wrote in 1934, in his book, Kampf um Berlin, [Battle for Berlin]:

I came from the province and was still caught in provincial thinking. The masses still were a dark monster for me at that time, and I was still not possessed with the strong determination to conquer or master them. Without them one can make no headway in Berlin. Berlin is, when seen from a population-political viewpoint, a conglomeration of masses; whoever wants to achieve something there must speak the language of the masses, understand [them] and must organize and base his actions in such fashion that the masses can muster sympathy and devotion for it.

Because of these sudden impressions, an entire new style of political speaking developed within me. When I compare the shorthand versions of my speeches during the Berlin period today with those of my later speeches than the first appear to me almost tame and home-made. And as it happened to me, so it happened to all agitators of the Berlin movement. The tempo of the four-million city trembled like a hot breath through the rhetorical declamations of the entire

³⁹Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, (München: Franz Eher Nachf., 1941), p. 188. Translated by the writer.

capital city propaganda. A new and modern language was being spoken here, which had no relation to the so-called antique national expressions. The National Socialistic agitation was trained upon the masses. Searching for a modern way of life for the party, it found here a modern, compelling style.⁴⁰

The Reichsminister of Propaganda.--During the period of 1933 to 1938, the topics and subject matter of Goebbels' speeches underwent some notable changes. Dealing generally with governmental policies, designed for enlightenment and attempting to present an aura of respectability and confidence, Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht concluded that "what speeches there were, were moderate, pacific and friendly toward other nations."⁴¹ However, not all of Goebbels' speeches during this period can be classified in such manner, as indicated by the address which he delivered on the "Party Day of Honor," in September, 1936. Speaking to a large assembly on September 9, and while identifying Bolshevism as the dictatorship of inferiors, he said in part:

Since this congress [the Comitac Congress of July 25 to August 21, 1935] more than one hundred Communist revolts took place in different countries of the world, among them the revolts in Brest and Toulon with a number of dead in August, 1935, on April 18, 1936, in Lemberg with ten dead, on May 10, 1936, in Soloniki with more than 100 dead.

.....

Let us select a few examples. At the meeting of the Communist World Congress of July 30, 1935, Comrade Dsordos appeared as the representative of Greece and developed a plan of action for the future. Almost to the day of his appearance in Moscow, on August 5, 1936, Greece was shaken by a general strike which turned into an uprising with weapons. Only with the energetic intervention of General Metaxas, Greece could be saved from the catastrophic fall

⁴⁰Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München: Franz Eher Nachf., 1934), p. 46. Translated by the writer.

⁴¹Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, Confessions of "The Old Wizard," (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 304.

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into the bolshevistic chaos and the plan of Comrades Dimitroff and Dsordos could be thwarted.

.....
The Red East threatens, but the Fuehrer stands guard. Germany as the outpost of European culture is prepared and determined to defend the borders of its country against this danger with all means. . .⁴²

Perhaps more representative of this period, however, was Goebbels' speech, "Hitler über Deutschland," ["Hitler over Germany"], a radio speech of introduction delivered at Königsberg, on March 4, 1933. Since this particular day had been designated as a national holiday, Goebbels prepared to set the scene for Hitler's personal appearance in the free city as demonstrated in the excerpt below:

My German Men and Women!

In all of Eastern Prussia the bells are ringing from the church steeples above the wide acres, above the silent forests and above the secret solitude of the Masurian Lakes. Bells of iron call with steel-like voices across the entire German countryside. They greet all of you, our German people, greet you, German brothers and sisters on this and the other side of the borders, in German living space, in the brother-land of German Austria, in Sudeten-Germany, in the Saar area, in eastern Upper-Silesia and in the Polish Corridor. The sound of the East Prussian ringing bells is an appeal to the entire German country. East Prussia's bells are ringing strong. From the Maas to the Memel, from the Etsch to the Belt,⁴³ Germany now is aglow with fires of freedom. The day of the national awakening has arrived. The nation arises, the storm breaks loose.

.....
East Prussia! German land, where acres were ploughed and seeded since time immemorial through farmers' diligence, whose forests were planted by German settlers, old cultural German land, where every furrow, every path, every stone, every house, every church and every castle testifies of German daring and German work. The entire province appears to have assembled in this hall. Here the fisher

⁴²Gerd Rühle, Das Dritte Reich, (Berlin: Hans Eugen Hummel, 1934), Vol. I, pp. 227-230. Translated by the writer.

⁴³The third and fourth lines of the German National Anthem.

.....

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.....

from the haff sits next to the farmer from the inland region, here sits the small town citizen next to the factory worker from Elbing and the Masurian fishers and farmers. Deep thankfulness lies within all these people: Adolf Hitler, the nation's Chancellor has especially sought out their homeland in order to direct his last appeal from here on the Day of Freedom of the German Nation to Germany, yes, and to the entire world. . .

.

Now everyone is waiting. The tension seems almost unbearable. Suddenly everything is quiet. Now calls of hail break out at the entrance. Adolf Hitler has arrived. And now they are calling out their greetings and it is as if the Chancellor was greeting all of Germany here in Eastern Prussia.

The 'Day of the Awakening Nation' has reached its climax. Adolf Hitler, the German Chancellor, speaks to the nation.⁴⁴

On February 28, 1934, as Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda in Germany, Goebbels addressed the representatives of the international press on the topic, "Für den Frieden der Welt," ["For Peace in the World"]. In part he said:

. . . The world now finally begins to realize that National Socialism is a new, entirely original attempt to come to grips with the intellectual, political and economic crises which befell Europe following the terrible war. This attempt requires everyone's respect, and the measure of respect can be based solely in regard to the abundance of problems which we have taken over and upon the size of those problems which have been placed upon us to be solved.

The old methods have failed. There is only one safe way out for our hard-pressed continent: to seek new possible solutions with new methods. The youth who went through the war rightfully make the demand and they have been satisfied in Germany through National Socialism.

Germany wants peace, it wants to work and build in peace; it offers equal respect and sympathy to all nations, but it requires of them that they confront it with respect and without prejudice in its gigantic battle against all danger. It has given proof of its love for peace. One must recognize it, if it raises its demands for equality among other nations. It has a right to see its most vital necessities of national existence guaranteed. Every honor-loving nation will have

⁴⁴Goebbels, Signale der Neuen Zeit, op. cit., pp. 109-117.

compassion for this. In its dealings with the other nations, however, it makes use of the honorable means which up to now registered the greatest political successes: honesty and clarity.

If you, Gentlemen, do not want to forsake this honest attempt, then you are providing the country a service which extends a heartfelt hospitality to you, but also to that country which sent you to us in order to get to know through you the real, everlasting Germany. You therewith provide an unmeasurable service to the future, better Europe. Fifteen years after the war it is still caught up in the most difficult crises and circumstances. Its nations yearn for peace. May we all do our part to contribute so that they will not go unheard.⁴⁵

The War Years: 1939-1945.--During World War II the issues to which Goebbels addressed himself were concerned with increasing his own status and prestige, preparing and winning the German peoples' support for the war effort and bolstering and improving their morale when the German army experienced severe setbacks on all battlefields throughout the world.

Representative of this period was Goebbels' speech, "Danzig vor der Entscheidung," ["Danzig before the Decision."] Speaking to the citizens of Danzig on June 17, 1939, Goebbels said in part:

. . .Overnight your city has become an international problem. You did not know of this earlier and did not want it so. What you always wanted, what you want today, and what you will want in the future is clear: you want to belong to the great German Reich. Your desire is understandable, clear, singular and, as I can judge by your bearing, unshakable.

You have the misfortune that your beautiful German city lies at the mouth of the Weichsel and according to the theories of Warsaw, cities which are located at the mouths of rivers always belong to the countries through which these rivers flow. This is why, for example, Rotterdam belongs to Germany since it lies at the mouth of the Rhine and since the Rhine is a German river. . .

.
The Polish political intriguers recently demanded East Prussia and Silesia from Germany. Poland's future border, according to them shall become the Oder. One wonders why they do not claim the Elbe or even the Rhine for themselves, there they would meet with their new allies, the

⁴⁵Goebbels, Signale der Neuen Zeit, op. cit., pp. 351-352.

British, whose borders, as everyone knows also begin at the Rhine. The Polish chauvinists explain they want to beat us Germans to the ground in the coming battle in Berlin.

.....
I have come to strengthen you in your determination and now you have strengthened me. And therefore I urge you now to remain brave, gallant and upright in the future. Germany is everywhere where Germans stand, therefore where you are too.

So let us shout in this festive hour from a deep and overflowing heart:

Long live the Fuehrer!

Long live our German Danzig!

Long live our united German Reich!⁴⁶

On September 11, 1940, while addressing an audience of Czech educators and journalists on the subject, "Das kommende Europa," "The Coming Europe", Goebbels attempted to predict the future course of European life and the German point of view by saying in part:

...At that moment when the English forces fall to the ground, we have the opportunity to reorganize Europe anew, and indeed from such viewpoints as comply with the social, economic, and technical possibilities of the twentieth century.

.....
Today the train is no longer the modern means of transportation. It has been replaced by the plane in the meantime. The distance which we covered with the train in twelve hours in the past today is spanned with the modern plane in one half or one hour. . . It is not just an accident that these technical aids have been developed just now. Because the population of Europe has increased and this increase confronts the European society with new problems--problems of nutrition and economic-political, financial and military dimensions. Through the utilization of these technical accomplishments it is self-understood that the continents have moved closer together. Among the European nations, more and more the realization comes to the fore that much of that which we have to settle among ourselves is really only a family conflict when seen in light of the great questions which the continents must solve today.

I am convinced that in fifty years one will not think any longer in terms of countries--many of our present problems will then have completely disappeared and much will not remain of them; one will be thinking in terms of continents and entirely different, perhaps even much greater problems will need and

⁴⁶ Joseph Goebbels, Die Zeit Ohne Beispiel, (München: Franz Eher Nachf., 1942), pp. 177-180. Translated by the writer.

motivate European thought.

You must not believe under any circumstances that we, if we institute a certain process of order in Europe do this to cut off the life of single nations. In my opinion the concept of freedom of a nation must be brought into agreement with the existing circumstances which confront us today and with simple questions of expediency. If in a family a member does not possess the right to continuously disturb the internal peace for personal gains, then a single nation in Europe should not have the opportunity in the long run to oppose a universal process of order.

Initially we never had the intention to enforce this process of order— or the reorganization of Europe.

.....
It was not in our interest to violate the economic, cultural or social peculiarities of the Czech people, for instance. Only, a clear basis of understanding must be established between our two nations. We must confront each other either as friends or as enemies. And I believe you know us well enough from the past; the Germans can be terrible enemies, but also very good friends. We can give a hand to a friend and really work loyally together with him; we can also battle with an enemy till annihilation.

.....
You can be assured that the Axis powers, once England has been beaten to the ground, will not permit any changes to be made in terms of the power-political facts of the new organization of Europe once they are fashioned after great political, economic, and social points of view. If England is powerless to make any changes, the Czech nation will also be unable to do so. If you have learned anything from the history of the most recent times you will know that nothing can be altered concerning the power-political circumstances and nothing will be changed. . . .⁴⁷

Perhaps most representative of Goebbels' annual Christmas speeches was the one delivered over the radio on December 24, 1941, in which he said in part:

. . . All eyes are directed upon the homeland today. How beautiful it is. This our soldiers and Germans in foreign lands have experienced and learned this year. Perhaps they have stood up so bravely for their homeland because of this. They wanted to protect it from the horrors of the war. All those who, responding to their duty, had to leave would like to find it upon their return as they left it.

.....

⁴⁷Goebbels, Die Zeit Ohne Beispiel, op. cit., pp. 314-318.

The great demand which involves everyone, requires complete devotion from us! And especially so it confronts the soldier with demands. They are spending, for the most part, the third war-Christmas away from home. The homeland is the centerpol around which their thoughts and wishes revolve. It must be their greatest pride, especially in this hour, that they are protecting the homeland and saved it from the fury of the war. They have gotten to know the horrors of modern warfare. They daily see themselves surrounded by it.

.....
And the same thing holds true for the Germans in foreign lands. They frequently live in a completely strange, if not hostile world. We should not be surprised that we Germans of today are not liked very much out there because we are defending our rights to live. Out there our Volksgenossen [comrades] are frequently surrounded by jealousy and envy, hate and persecution.

.....
They too would rather be at home than out there; but they remain at their foreign posts because they want to serve their country. They do not let themselves be disturbed by hate and envy. They feel like pioneers of Germanism in the world, not to conquer the world as our enemies lyingly imply, but rather to defend their nationality.

.....
I send you greetings from a full heart. Just as we used to sing about peace on earth in our songs faithfully in the past, the time has now come to fight and work just as faithfully for it. For peace through victory! That should be our slogan.⁴⁸

To the end of his career, even after delivering his most important speech, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose," Goebbels continued to make many personal appearances in public. Traveling throughout the country in attempt to bolster the morale of the people, he visited many heavily bombed cities and spoke to the populace. It was perhaps due to the fact that most of the other party officials refused to speak on such occasions that Goebbels soon became known as the funeral orator of Germany. Yet, in spite of this reputation, his willingness to face audiences under such circumstances brought him respect and admiration from the hard

⁴⁸ Joseph Goebbels, Das Ehrne Herz, (München: Franz Eher Nachf., 1943), pp. 139-144. Translated by the writer.

hit people.

Representative of such speeches was the funeral oration, "In vorderster Reihe," ["In the Front Row"], delivered on June 18, 1943, at the city hall in Elberfeld. In part he said:

. . .I stand at this spot among you, my Rhine-Westphalia country people, to tell you that the population of this province neither fights its difficult battle alone nor stands in forlorn hope. The entire German nation is with you and surrounds you with its love and loyalty. Full of prideful amazement the nation gazes upon the defiant, sullen preserverance of this part of our nation against the enemy air-terror attacks which may place towns and villages in rubble and ashes but can never break the hearts of the people.

Loud and audible I want to speak to all in this hour so no one will fail to hear me. I stand here as accuser in front of the entire world. I level an accusation against the enemy who has no other objective in mind with this brutal air-terror than to torture a defenseless civilian population and to pile suffering, gruesomeness, pain, and death upon them, to force them to betray the national deed. Such an attempt can never succeed, but the reputation of those nations will suffer for this cowardly deed whose governments resort to such abominable and insidious means of warfare against women, old people, and children.

.
Someday the hour will come when we will break this terror through counter-terror. The enemy heaps outrage upon outrage and therewith adds up a bloody figure which one day will have to be paid off. Uncounted workers, engineers, and builders are at work to bring the day nearer quickly. I know that the German nation awaits it with burning impatience. I know what thoughts fill all hearts when we take part in the solemn ceremony of the remembrance of those who have fallen prey to the air attack. In these hearts the enemy has written in the sorrow and grief-filled weeks which lie behind in unerasable letters an admission of guilt, which one day will be placed in front of him as the counter-account and reason for our action. . .⁴⁹

⁴⁹Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, op. cit., pp. 324-329.

SUMMARY

In light of the factors discussed in the development of this chapter concerning both the "basic" speech and other representative speeches which Goebbels delivered throughout his career, a number of generalizations seem to emerge as follows.

According to a number of authorities there seems to be general agreement that Goebbels' "basic" speech was one of the most effective, if not the most successful, of his career. In contrast with his first attempt at speechmaking during his student days in Rheydt, the "basic" speech suggests that Goebbels had not only become aware of some of the principles and practices of public address but also had become a proficient speaker in the practical speaking situation.

That Goebbels was aware of the success which he achieved when delivering the "basic" speech also seems apparent from his personal remarks in his diary concerning the large amount of mail which he received, as well as from the optimistic remarks attributed to Adolf Hitler.

An analysis of the "basic" speech, to be discussed at greater length in Chapter V of this study, seems to demonstrate the existence of some interesting inconsistencies. Thus, although Goebbels indicated to his audience that the defenders of Stalingrad had taken part in the Sportpalast demonstration for the last time on January 30, 1943, an article published almost eight days later intimated that the troops were still successfully defending the city. Furthermore, Goebbels' references to Lord Beaverbrook, Dr. Robert Ley, and Fritz Saukel within the "basic" speech itself are not in harmony with his personal evaluations of these individuals expressed upon other occasions.

There seems to be a direct relationship between Goebbels' study of

Cicero's orations delivered against Catiline in 63 B. C. and his high esteem of public speaking. Furthermore, Goebbels' career as a public speaker may have been motivated to some degree by the negative reaction of his high school principal who insisted that Goebbels would never become a good speaker.

During the formative years of the party (1923 to 1932), Goebbels demonstrated that he possessed an impressive amount of energy in spite of his physical impairment. The existence of this energy was demonstrated by the great number of public addresses which he delivered during this period as described in his diary and recorded in the Appendix of this study. The large majority of his speeches during this period further appear to have been addresses of agitation, directed at almost all forces and institutions which were considered threats to the organizations which he represented. However, speeches such as, "The Unknown S. A. Man," (1927), seem to suggest that Goebbels had already learned to adapt himself to the changable nature of many of his speaking situations. Moreover, his speech on, "Perception and Propaganda," (1928), not only offers insight into Goebbels' personal evaluation of the means of propaganda, but also seems to indicate that he approved of the ancient sophistic philosophic point of view "that man is the measure of all things," hence, that any means justifies the desired end.

The period further seems to be the one in which his development as a proficient speaker made its greatest strides. Thus, by his own admission, Goebbels pointed to his experiences in Berlin as factors which made him aware of audience analysis and consequently the need for careful selection of the choice of subject matter.

An examination of the content of Goebbels' speeches during the years

from 1933 to 1938, seems to indicate the emergence of new themes dedicated to the enlightenment of the German people and the world, and respectability. Although such speeches as the one delivered at the "Party Day of Honor," in 1936, suggest the overtones of aggressiveness, the majority of Goebbels' speeches appeared to be confined to governmental policy statements and ceremonial addresses.

In contrast to such addresses, those of the World War II period primarily appeared to be attempts on the part of Goebbels to increase his personal prestige and status, to win the German peoples' support for the war effort, and to bolster their morale during particularly difficult times.

An overall view of the speeches or excerpts of speeches cited in this study seems to permit the following generalizations to be made:

1. The range of topics to which Goebbels addressed himself throughout his career was impressively large.

2. Goebbels seems to have been particularly conscious of the flavor of the times during which he spoke. Thus, during the more favorable period of the war, he confidently spoke of "The New Order" by declaring that " . . . nothing can be altered concerning the power-political circumstances and nothing will be changed. . .". In contrast, the "basic" speech appeared to suggest that without a total contribution on the part of the German people to the war effort, only total destruction of the nation could be expected.

3. Through the willingness to appear in public, even in the face of the most adverse conditions, Goebbels appears to have gained the reputation of being the most reliable and trustworthy spokesman of the National Socialist movement in Germany.

CHAPTER II

JOSEPH GOEBBELS, THE MAN AND SPEAKER

Goebbels' Personality as a Factor at the "Basic" Speech

Much has been said and written about Goebbels, the man and speaker. There appear to be differing viewpoints expressed regarding the forces which influenced Goebbels throughout his lifetime. Equally as many viewpoints seem to be recorded in respect to the influence which he exerted upon others. Yet, most of the observations recorded by authorities the world over seem to support the belief that Goebbels' personality was to a large extent instrumental in determining his effectiveness as a speaker.

Thus, when Goebbels stood in the Sportpalast on February 18, 1943, and delivered his "basic" speech, the image which he presented seemed to differ significantly from that which he had exhibited on other speaking occasions. Already during the introductory remarks of his address both the radio listeners and the audience present at the event noted with surprise that it was not the old, familiar Reichsminister who was speaking to them. They were not hearing the usually bright, clear, and penetrating voice of the speaker who was famous for his cleverly constructed arguments and emotional overtones. Instead they appeared to be listening to a serious and troubled man who was speaking in an intimate manner to his family and friends, - a man "who was not interested in effect or applause, but who had something very important to communicate."¹

For once it seemed that Goebbels "was too exhausted for cynicism."²

¹ Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), p. 318.

² Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Evil Genius: The Story of Joseph Goebbels, (London: Allan Wingate, Ltd., 1953), p. 200.

Although his listeners had readily perceived his changed personality, most of them were unaware of the factors which had contributed to the change. They did not know, for instance, that the night prior to the delivery of the speech Goebbels was so nervous that he could not sleep. They further were not aware of the fact that the speaker had used those precious hours to practice every phrase and every gesture of the speech. But most important of all, they did not realize that Goebbels was going to say much more than Hitler had expected or approved. Yet Goebbels himself appeared to be well aware of the significance of the occasion. He knew that in this historic moment, at the time when the fall of Stalingrad had to be announced, "a single speech could either save the situation or ruin it."³ Hence, when he confronted fifteen thousand jubilant people in the Sportpalast, he drew upon his previous experiences and attempted to portray the image he desired. He seemed to be so successful in his attempt that Curt Riess declared succinctly, "His speech became the best he ever made."⁴

Goebbels' Personality on other Occasions.--In discussing some of the personality traits and characteristics which Goebbels exhibited on other occasions, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel reported that he "had two great advantages which he began to exploit early in life-- his voice, which could be either caressing or powerful as he willed, and a certain magnetism in his looks."⁵ Moreover, with specific reference to his impressive vocal quality, Martha Dodd, after having heard him speak on several occasions recorded her experiences by writing that he manipulated "his voice and

³Riess, op. cit., p. 317.

⁴Ibid., p. 318.

⁵Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 17

tones, crescendos and diminuendos, rhythm and timing, as if he were handling a musical instrument."⁶

Rudolf Semmler, when reporting his impressions upon meeting Goebbels for the first time in 1940, observed that he had been quite uneasy prior to their first encounter. Since he had heard that Goebbels possessed a violent temper and since he faced the prospect of becoming part of a personal circle which worked for a temperamental man, Semmler was quite relieved to note in his diary, "I was surprised by the charm of Goebbels's (sic) manner."⁷ Similarly, when in June, 1933, the leading Turkish newspaper, Vakit, reported on the personality of Goebbels, it singled out his popularity and speaking ability by quoting a high-ranking official who stated that Goebbels was a man to whom one could only say "yes".⁸ Much in the same manner, although outspokenly displeased with Goebbels' character and feelings, Otto Meissner reported that next to Hitler, Goebbels was the most talented and efficient personality of the National Socialists. Meissner contended that the Reichsminister was well educated in many areas, possessed artistic interests, understanding, and agility, was an outstanding speaker and a prominent political journalist. This writer further identified Goebbels as the very heart of the entire party propaganda machine during the battle and governing period of the National Socialists.⁹

⁶Martha Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), p. 149.

⁷Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels-- the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse, Ltd., 1947), p. 13.

⁸Gerd Ruehle, Das Dritte Reich, Vol. I, (Berlin: Hans Eugen Hummel, 1934), p. 66.

⁹Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär, (München: Hoffman and Campe Verlag, 1950), pp. 623-624. Translated by the writer.

In describing some of the more prominent characteristics of the officials serving Hitler during World War II, Oswald Dutch stated that Goebbels was well educated and possessed an excellent brain. Moreover, Dutch wrote in 1940 that the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,

. . . commands in his own sphere with masterly technique, and he is untiring and talented. His mind is keen as steel, cold and calculating. His considerable wit is mostly satirical. He has a scintillating intellect, presence of mind, and is never embarrassed. He turns a deaf ear to insults and reproaches.¹⁰

D. McLachlan, while writing the introductory remarks to Rudolf Semmler's diary and summarizing the various successes of Goebbels noted that "he succeeded as a leader of street fighting, as an agitator, as an administrator and as a speaker."¹¹ While also attesting to Goebbels' intelligence, Joseph C. Harsch concluded that the Reichsminister's "powerful intellect . . . [kept] . . . Nazism palatable and wartime privation tolerable to the mass of Germans."¹²

In describing the agility and quickness of mind which Goebbels possessed, Louis P. Lochner recalled an experience which a German friend once had while attending a party at which the Reichsminister was present. It was there that Goebbels, for the amusement of all present, successively delivered a speech on behalf of the restoration of the monarchy, the recreation of the Weimar Republic, the introduction of Communism in the

¹⁰Oswald Dutch, Hitler's 12 Apostles, (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company, 1940), p. 78.

¹¹D. McLachlan, "Introduction," In Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels-- the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse, Ltd., 1947), p. 12.

¹²Joseph C. Harsch, Pattern of Conquest, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1941), p. 191.

Third Reich, and finally, on behalf of National Socialism. In elaborating on this anecdote, Lochner reported that his friend said with great conviction,

' . . . I was ready at the end of each speech to join the particular cause Goebbels had just advocated. He had compelling and convincing arguments for each of the four forms of government.'¹³

In addition to a quick and able mind, Joseph Goebbels also seemed to possess an unreasonable need for physical activity to remain content. In this respect, Rudolf Semmler once identified him as a "bundle of nerves [who] cannot live without worries, excitement and a quickened pulse."¹⁴ The prospect of successive days with their deadly certainty of problems and disappointments did not seem to worry him. Instead it appeared that he would be pleased more if he were involved with such things as "conferences, telegrams, visitors, telephone conversations, papers, instructions, quick results, and then back to anxiety and worries."¹⁵

A typical working day for the Reichsminister during 1943, according to Wilfred von Oven, was carefully scheduled and was repeated with almost relentless precision, as follows:

At exactly 7:30 every morning Goebbels' valet, Emil, would enter the dressing room next to the bedroom, pushing before him a trolley on which were a plate with three different vitamin capsules, a cup of coffee, two thin slices of whole-wheat bread cut into sections, and a large briefcase labeled, "Telegrams for the Herr Minister." The valet then knocked on the

¹³Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), p. 16.

¹⁴Semmler, op. cit., p. 103.

¹⁵Ibid.

Reichsminister's bedroom door until he received some reply.

It was von Oven's responsibility at 6:00 A.M., to receive and sort out the messages which were to be passed on to Goebbels. These were labeled as "Confidential," "Secret", or "Top Secret," and their significant contents were colored differently and underlined according to the level of their eventual and possible release to the press, to district leaders, or to other officials. Mr. von Oven was further responsible for focusing the Reichsminister's attention upon the more urgent and significant releases and also for preparing the daily newspapers for him. One of the papers that Goebbels never omitted to read was the local newspaper from his hometown, Rheydt.

Goebbels took exactly forty-five minutes to prepare himself for the day. He shaved and dressed meticulously. His hair was groomed once a week while a manicurist attended to his hands. He favored neat clothes, cream-colored silk shirts, and eau de cologne. Even in uniform he always managed to look civilian by frequently wearing evening trousers decorated with silk braid and patent-leather shoes. Mr. von Oven reported also that he had never seen Goebbels wear the same suit twice within one year. All his clothes were carefully tailored, elegant and inconspicuous in both color and pattern. He always took an overcoat, hat, and gloves to his office and when he had no need for them, they were neatly folded by his valet and carried to the car for him.

At 8:15 A.M., von Oven and another aide awaited the Minister in the reception hall of the house. Prior to this moment they had telephoned the ministry for any special information which Goebbels expected to be told in their three hundred yard journey to the ministry. At the appointed hour, Goebbels would appear accompanied by Emil, who held two briefcases,

the official case and a case containing the Minister's personal papers. These briefcases in turn had to be placed on his office desk at an exact distance from the edge, just as his secretaries had to lay out his carefully sharpened pencils in a neat row.

While riding in his armored car¹⁶ to the Propaganda Ministry, Goebbels preferred to sit next to Rach, his chauffeur. When he arrived at the ministry, Ochs, his personal secretary, would step forward to receive Goebbels' hat, gloves, and coat. Once in his office, the Minister at once poured over the papers which had been prepared for his attention. In an adjoining room two secretaries, part of a team which was on duty day and night, were hard at work.

At 10 A.M., Werner Naumann, Goebbels' Under Secretary of State, whose offices were located next to the Minister's own suite, would be announced for the daily morning conference. The meeting was adjourned promptly at 11 A.M., at which time conferences were held with heads of departments and other officials. These were followed in turn by private interviews of various kinds until lunchtime. Because Goebbels preferred to talk rather than eat, this was the only period of the day not subject to strict regulation. After a meager lunch, which generally included Goebbels' favorite vegetable—spinach,—he frequently talked and smoked a cigarette before napping for thirty minutes in an arm chair.

Work was resumed in the afternoon when von Oven awakened the Minister punctually and attended him with a notebook while Goebbels took his coffee, his thin slices of bread, and his three vitamin capsules. The afternoon

¹⁶Given to Goebbels by Hitler as a Christmas present in 1942, after an attempt on his life had been made.

work generally consisted of preparing speeches and articles to which Goebbels gave much thought and attention. Details of fact were constantly needed, and von Oven had to hasten to verify these items for the Reichsminister. For von Oven the early evening hours were the most unpleasant, for almost anything could be asked of him. For example, he might be called upon to find the date on which Hannibal had crossed the Alps or the source of a quotation which Goebbels wanted to use.

Upon Goebbels' return home, dinner would be served at eight o'clock, which was frequently followed by a program of movies and, if the date was appropriate, a preview of the current newsreel prior to its public release. Following such program the Minister would often talk until midnight, using the persons in his company as sounding boards for his ideas. Then he would quickly rise, shake everyone's hand, and depart to his bedroom with books and records in case he could not sleep.

At other times he would spend many hours on his diaries which he had carefully kept and edited since 1920. Taking his writing pad, upon which he had jotted down every event and occasion as it occurred during the day, Goebbels would enter or have them written down under the following headings: (a) personal, (b) business, and (c) politics and war. In this manner, von Oven observed, the diaries not only represented a report of the Minister's personal experiences, feelings, and thoughts, but also a true chronological development of the daily events and their significance as evaluated by the leadership.¹⁷

It is perhaps with the events, as described above, in mind and with

¹⁷Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels Bis Zum Ende, Vol. I, (Buenos Aires: Dürer-Verlag, 1949-1950), pp. 51-52. Translated by the writer.

particular reference to Goebbels' personal remarks in his diaries during the years 1942 to 1943, that Leonard Doob concluded that the Reichsminister by means of his organizational machinery and through personal contact, sought to reveal the rationale of his propaganda to his subordinates "and to improve their morale by taking them, ostensibly, into his confidence."¹⁸

Yet it is important to note that Rudolf Semmler reported in his diary on April 22, 1941, that Goebbels was "full of distrust of the men around him, even those closely connected with him."¹⁹ In describing this personality factor further, Mr. Semmler observed that,

. . . Goebbels himself watches the scene around him like a watchman on a tower with his telescope, always suspecting that somewhere intrigues are going on which may threaten his position. Goebbels secretly distrusts all his staff. He sees the worst side of every human being and admits frankly that he has become an uncompromising misanthropist.

.
Moreover, he always believes that important matters are concealed from him, or that people are trying to cut him off from the outside world, if he is left undisturbed for more than an hour-- that is to say, if an hour passes without his seeing a press message from abroad, or having to take some rapid decision (sic) or being called to his room for some urgent telephone conversation.²⁰

Upon another occasion, Semmler noted that Goebbels was very superstitious. With the increase of severe setbacks experienced by the German fighting forces, this particular trait became more readily apparent. Thus, Semmler recalled that the Reichsminister had told him that his mother

¹⁸Leonard Doob, "Goebbels Principles of Propaganda", In Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), p. 521.

¹⁹Semmler, op. cit., p. 29.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 29-30.

and brother had "second sight" and that his mother suffered severely from this malady until freed from the obsession by a Jesuit priest. In his own case, Goebbels remarked that he once had had similar experiences. To demonstrate the effect of Goebbels' superstitious nature, Rudolf Semmler recorded the following events. He had been called into the Reichsminister's office to submit some press telegrams. Among them was an American release which stated that Hitler was ill beyond recovery and that the General Staff had forced him to retire. While handing the telegrams to Goebbels, Semmler accidentally knocked a picture of Hitler, which had been standing on the desk, to the ground. In recollecting the events that followed, Semmler reported:

For an instance there was a painful silence. Goebbels face had gone pale. I was horrified. Then with a furious expression he shouted: 'No bad omens from you, please.'

I rang for the servant, who removed the 'bad omen'. A piece of glass had pierced the Fuehrer's left eye. The photograph bore Hitler's signature and was dated 1936 and dedicated to Goebbels in warm terms. The whole evening Goebbels remained upset by this occurrence and looked thoroughly nervous.²¹

In contrast, one of the more desirable personality factors which Goebbels seemed to develop during his speaking career was an impressive amount of confidence and poise. In supporting this belief, Wilfred von Oven told of an instance in which Goebbels was asked to speak to 150 high-ranking officials from the German military headquarters. With less than an hour to prepare for the occasion, the Reichsminister was expected to speak on the political and general war situation. While identifying the occasion as a "delicate situation", von Oven observed that it was a

²¹Ibid., pp. 166-167.

peculiar sight to see the small, physically handicapped man among the medal-bedecked officers, glittering with gold, silver and red ornamentations. The contrast seemed particularly marked since Goebbels wore sports clothes,— light-gray trousers and a navy-blue jacket. Full of admiration, the author further observed, "he does not reflect even the slightest feeling of inferiority. He confronts them with sovereign superiority, shared with conquering friendliness, speaks without restraint, without making a show, clear and convincing."²²

Another significant variable in Goebbels' personality development was his love and appreciation of history. Throughout his speaking and writing career he made many references to historic events and frequently attempted to establish relationships between past events and those of his own life. Among his favorite historic personalities were such men as Bismark and Hindenburg. But the man who commanded his greatest admiration and respect was Frederick the Great, of whom replicas, according to von Oven, were located in the Propaganda Ministry and in Goebbels' various residences.

So great was Goebbels' love for the Prussian king that he not only referred to him frequently in his public speeches but had also collected a considerable library of reference works dealing with the life and career of the great king. These he consulted regularly, even during the last weeks of his life. When describing one of these occasions, William L. Shirer reported that as late as April, 1945, Goebbels had spent one evening with Hitler in the underground bunker in Berlin where he read to the Fuehrer from one of their "favorite books, Carlyle's History of Frederick the

²²von Oven, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 33.

Great.²³

Perhaps another significant personality trait which Goebbels possessed was his great loyalty to Hitler. Although he had not always been loyal to Hitler,-- one occasion, identified as "pure legend" by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, is cited by many authors in which Goebbels supposedly screamed, "I propose to expel this semi-bourgeois Adolf Hitler from the National Socialist Party,"²⁴-- once he pledged his loyalty to the Fuehrer, Goebbels remained with him to the end. In his relationship to Hitler, with particular reference to the early organizational period in Berlin, Goebbels remarked:

. . . I feel above this, in regard to the Fuehrer of the movement, from the day I had the great luck to get to know him personally, and-- I might say,-- had learned to value and love him, a political and personal relationship so that it will never be possible for me to do anything without his sanction, let alone do anything against his will.²⁵

Goebbels continued loyalty to Hitler is further indicated by Leonard Doob's observation that he "willingly yielded his authority for issuing directives only to Hitler, whose approval on very important matters was always sought."²⁶

One of the most despicable traits, however, was Goebbels' hatred of

²³William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 1108

²⁴Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Evil Genius: The Story of Joseph Goebbels, (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), p. 39. Translated by Louis Hagen.

²⁵Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München: Franz Eher Nachf, 1943), p. 39. Translated by the writer.

²⁶Doob, op. cit., p. 521

the Jews. Although he "was never an anti-Semite by conviction,"²⁷ according to Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Rudolf Semmler observed on August 16, 1943, in his diary that:

Goebbels's hatred of Jews is fanatical. Everything Jewish is to him like a red rag to a bull. The hatred is so strong that he becomes incapable of even recognizing (sic) facts when he has to deal with them.

.....
Every week the press officer has to prepare for Goebbels a report on the letters addressed to the Ministry by the public. . .

.....
I summarised (sic) the impression these letters made on me in one paragraph: 'Anti-semitism is as unpopular as ever among the mass of the people and causes distrust or definite opposition. Here and there the suggestion is made that whenever things go wrong with us there is a search for a scape-goat, and the Jews come in handy. A few writers say that the present hate campaign against the Jews proves once again that the leaders are trying to distract the people's attention from difficulties they cannot master!

This passage in my report made the Minister angry. . .²⁸

In regard to his opposition to the Jews and the threat which they were against Germany as he perceived it, Goebbels wrote in his personal diary on March 27, 1942,

One must not be sentimental in these matters. If we did not fight the Jews, they would destroy us. It's a life-and-death struggle between the Aryan race and the Jewish basillus. No other government and no other regime would have the strength for such a global solution to this question.²⁹

On March 4, 1943, Goebbels attempted to link the Russian and Jewish people by maintaining that Russia was in essence a proletarian-Jewish state. He warned the German people that if they failed to resist this combined

²⁷Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 111.

²⁸Semmler, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

²⁹Lochner, op. cit., p. 148.

threat, they would be overrun by these adversaries. In keeping with the theme of the "basic" speech, Goebbels added at that time, "Our slogan should be, now more than ever: 'Total War Is the Imperative Need of the Hour.'"³⁰

With respect to the Russian people themselves, Goebbels wrote during the same month that if they were "organized thoroughly as a people they would undoubtedly represent the most tremendous danger possible for Europe."³¹

Yet, despite the severe misfortunes which befell the German armies on all fronts, Goebbels appeared successful in keeping his composure. After the fall of Stalingrad and in spite of the news which reached the German people through the returning soldiers, the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda continued to make personal public appearances.

While describing this period, Rudolf Semmler wrote that foreign estimates of Goebbels were generally favorable. The Swiss newspaper, Weltwoche, for instance, singled Goebbels out at the time of Stalingrad, "as the man who kept his head in a crisis,"³² when comparing him with other leaders including Hitler, who refused to make public appearances or comment on the events of the day. Largely due to the success of his "basic" speech and the increase in status and prestige which Goebbels derived therefrom, Rudolf Semmler reported on July 18, 1943,

Here is one foreign comment at this moment. Petersen on the British wireless at six o'clock this morning, in the German Workers' Programme, says: 'Goebbels in the present situation is the only leader of the regime who has the courage, will and ability to speak to the people about

³⁰Ibid., p. 272.

³¹Ibid., p. 144.

³²Semmler, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

it. He is the only one who really tries to answer the questions the nation is asking, the only one who seriously tries to defend the regime and fights for its existence. . .³³

The reaction to Joseph Goebbels during the last years of his life on the part of the German people was similar to that of the foreign observers. In one of the last entries which Goebbels recorded in his diary, on November 27, 1943, he indirectly described the confidence and belief which the people placed in him,-- long after they had forsaken all other leaders of the National Socialist movement,-- by writing:

People slap me on the back familiarly, give me good advice, prevent me from continuing because, as they put it, nothing must happen to me since I am still very much needed.³⁴

Goebbels' Personality on Other Occasions

Goebbels' Growth to Manhood.-- Joseph Goebbels was born on October 29, 1897, in Rheydt, an industrial town in the Rhineland-Westphalia district of Germany with a population of approximately 30,000 inhabitants. He was the son of Fritz Goebbels, who managed a small textile plant in Rheydt. His mother, Maria Katherina, bore three sons, Konrad, Hans, and Paul Joseph, and seventeen years after Joseph a daughter, Maria.

Although the family owned a two story house on the Prinz Eugen Strasse, later to become known as the Paul Joseph Goebbels Strasse, they were relatively poor.³⁵ Yet in comparison to their predecessors, they could be

³³Ibid., p. 92.

³⁴Lochner, op. cit., pp. 531-532.

³⁵Manvell and Fraenkel report that Goebbels was born in the Odenkirchener Strasse and spent his youth at 156 Dahleener Strasse in Rheydt.

considered more successful in their social standing and ambitions. Conrad Goebbels, Joseph's grandfather, was a carpenter who had married Gertrude Margaret, nee Rosskamm, the daughter of a farmer from Beckrath near Duesseldorf. His maternal grandfather, Michael Odenhausen, was a blacksmith who had married Johanna Maria Coervers, the daughter of a laborer. In spite of the fact that Goebbels frequently boasted in later life that he was of peasant stock, he appeared to have inherited the ambitious nature of his parents to rise above the station accorded to them by society. Thus, his father, for instance, had spent most of his lifetime working for a firm of gas-mantle manufacturers, W. H. Lennartz of Rheydt and rose slowly from being an office boy through various clerkships to the minor directorial position of "Prokurist."

Joseph Goebbels' father was a stern and devout man. At times he could exhibit a deliberate sense of humor, but when seriously discussing the family's social position, he "looked to his sons to raise the fortunes of the family toward the ideal status of the prosperous middle class."³⁶ Joseph's mother, on the other hand, was a simple woman of little education who possessed "great strength of character."³⁷ Both parents knew that their financial status would never permit them to provide their children with more than a high school education or its equivalent, yet they carefully planned a career for Joseph which was far more ambitious than those his older brothers embarked upon.

Perhaps this special consideration which was given to Joseph Goebbels by his parents was partly due to the fact that he had fallen sick with

³⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 2.

³⁷Ibid.

osteomyelitis [Inflammation of the bone-marrow] when he was only seven years old. The disease had a crippling effect upon him,-- and henceforth he was called a variety of nicknames by the other children in his neighborhood such as "Clubfoot" and others. Consequently, Goebbels became a lonely boy, withdrawn from his brothers and avoiding the company of neighborhood children and his classmates. Because of his physical impairment, Joseph Goebbels believed that he had to prove to everyone, including himself, that he was intelligent. He soon jumped at the chance to criticize and scorn others, and because of his "constant and malignant remarks earned. . . the reputation of being arrogant, quarrelsome and difficult."³⁸ Goebbels was not much more successful in his relationship with adults. He hated their whispering remarks, overheard as he passed them, their patronizing glances and the apparent sympathy they extended to the poor little cripple whose head was too large for the small body, and whose appearance was marred and accented by a decided limp.³⁹

An important development which had a significant impact upon Goebbels' later life and career occurred when he was fourteen years old. Discussing this experience, Goebbels told his assistant, Wilfred von Oven, years later, that his father summoned him one day and explained that he was buying a piano for him. Goebbels was amazed since his family seldom purchased or received presents of any kind. The piano on which he was permitted to play every day was only second hand. It was placed in the living room, a place where the Goebbels children were seldom permitted to stay. All through the winter months Joseph Goebbels sat frequently in an overcoat

³⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 11.

³⁹Ibid., p. 11f.

in the unheated room practicing on the piano. Although he realized that the purchase of the instrument was part of a planned state in the development of his career, he nevertheless developed the taste of enjoyment for music.⁴⁰

When World War I began, Goebbels was almost seventeen years old. Most boys in his age group enlisted in the army. Goebbels too, attempted to enlist. When he presented himself for the physical examination, the doctor, without bothering to examine him, briefly looked at his frail body and immediately designated him "kriegsuntauglich." ["unfit for military duty"]. As some authorities suggest, Goebbels must have been aware of his inability to qualify for military service. Yet he reacted in the strongest emotional manner. For two days he refused to speak to anyone. He shut himself into his bedroom and sobbed and cried for one whole day and night.⁴¹

Joseph Goebbels' inability to qualify for military service had a significant effect upon his later life. Once again he was thrust back upon a career of intellectual rather than physical actions. His parents had to consider the possibility of sending him to a university for further education. Initially both Goebbels' parents had hoped that their deformed son would become a priest, serving the Catholic Church. Thus, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel report that Prelate Moller remembered Joseph as an interested student of religion in his early youth. His parents had attempted to provide him with educational experiences far greater than those of most other children of his social group. In school he had demonstrated the possession of superior intelligence. Particularly during his senior

⁴⁰ von Oven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 243.

⁴¹ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 5.

year, when he no longer felt obliged to exert himself in order to compensate for his physical impairment, he demonstrated his scholarly abilities. He became a relatively successful amateur actor and soon rose to the top of his class through academic achievement. He gained a minor triumph at the end of his high school career when he was asked to deliver the farewell address at the graduating ceremony. [See Chapter I]

In spite of the family's poverty, Joseph Goebbels managed to enroll at Bonn University for a single term. After this initial semester, however, he became dependent upon the Albertus Magnus Society, a Catholic charitable institution, for financial assistance.

Traditionally university students in Germany attended several institutions in order to hear the outstanding scholars of the day, but in Goebbels' case the frequent moves from one institution to another soon indicated the absence of a planned curriculum. Thus, in Bonn, Goebbels had begun reading history and literature while concentrating specifically on Goethe's dramatic works. In the summer of 1918, he attended the University of Freiburg, where he studied the writings of Winkelmann, the eighteenth-century Catholic archaeologist and student of classical art, as well as the influence of Ancient Greece and Rome on the Middle Ages. In the winter of the same year, Goebbels moved on to Würzburg University, where he again concentrated upon ancient and modern history. In the summer term of 1919, he returned again to Freiburg, where his fees were waived and he received his last financial aid from the Albertus Magnus Society. During the winter term of that year, Goebbels moved on to the University at Munich. From here he transferred on to the University of Heidelberg in 1920, where he was to be graduated the following year.⁴²

⁴²Most authorities believe that Goebbels received his doctorate

At Heidelberg, Goebbels studied under the renowned and celebrated Jewish Professor of Literature, Friedrich Gundolf, who was the most famous contemporary literary historian in Germany and author of what is still judged to be the best-known biography of Goethe. Through Gundolf's lectures, Goebbels came under the captivating spell of such German Romantics as the Schlegel brothers, Tieck, Novalis, and Schilling. He also studied history, philology and art. During the same period, he began to work on his doctor's thesis on the Romantic era, "Wilhelm von Schuetz: Ein Betrag zur Geschichte des Dramas der Romantischen Schule." ["Wilhelm von Schuetz: A Contribution to the History of the Romantic Drama"].

According to Curt Riess, as Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, "Goebbels later realized that his preoccupation with the German Romantics had been a flight."⁴³ Consequently, he had his thesis removed from the library at the University of Heidelberg and had its title changed in his official biography to, "The Spiritual Political Currents of Early Romantics." ["Die geistig politischen Stroemungen der Fruehromantik"]⁴⁴ Furthermore, although a statutory rule normally required that every thesis had to be printed in at least two hundred copies and sent to all German universities, "his thesis seems never to have been distributed."⁴⁵

Three other significant factors during Goebbels' student days which were to play an important role in his career in the National Socialist party were his gradual estrangement from the Catholic Church, the relationship with his college friend, Richard Flisges, and his subsequent preoccupation in 1922.

⁴³Riess, op. cit., p. 16.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁵F. W. Pick, The Art of Dr. Goebbels, (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1942), p. 15.

pation with literature and the desire to become a writer.

Although Goebbels was supposed to notify the Albertus Magnus Society of his whereabouts and educational activities as long as he was receiving financial aid, his correspondence with the society became less and less frequent towards the end of his studies. In spite of the fact that his parents had hoped he would enter the priesthood and Goebbels himself seemed initially to favor such a profession, he soon abandoned this idea and severed his relations with the church.

In regard to his relationship with his college friend Flisges, little reliable information seems to exist. It is known that Flisges was a sick man who had been badly wounded during World War I and had been decorated for bravery. Yet, according to Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, "he emerged from the struggle an anarchist unable to find a satisfactory way of life for himself."⁴⁶ He was basically unsuccessful as a college student and intensely hated the postwar government of Germany. In his hatred for politically existing conditions he turned to Marx and Engels, to Communism and pacifism, and any form of criticism available. He was instrumental in acquainting Goebbels with the theoreticians of Communism, as well as the works of Walther Rathenau, the German statesman and philosopher. Through Flisges, Goebbels discovered Dostoeveski and together the friends "passed through a phase of nihilism which left a destructive adolescent element in. . . [Goebbels'] . . . nature never to be outgrown."⁴⁷ Flisges, after his estrangement with Goebbels became a laborer and was killed in a mining accident in 1923.

⁴⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴⁷Ibid.

Goebbels' initial attempt at becoming a writer indicates the influence which Flisges had exerted upon him. One of his first attempts at creative writing was his short novel, Michael, which he wrote in 1921. It was written in Goebbels' favorite diary-form and consisted of barely thirty thousand words. According to Curt Riess, Goebbels' mother considered the novel to be largely autobiographical,⁴⁸ but a closer examination seems to indicate that it is a collective expression of Goebbels' friendship with Flisges and the experiences of his student days. Thus, when Goebbels had become Reichsminister of Propaganda, the National Socialist publishing house, the Eher Verlag, published it in 1929. Goebbels wrote a florid dedication of his novel to his friend Flisges, by stating in part:

1918

Your wounded arm still in a sling, the gray helmet on your head and your chest covered with medals- that's how you faced those staid citizens to pass matriculation. They failed you because you didn't know some figures or other. They said you weren't mature yet.

OUR ANSWER WAS: REVOLUTION!

1920

We were both about to suffer spiritual breakdown and capitulate. But we helped each other up again and hardly faltered.

MY ANSWER WAS: SPITE!

1923

You challenged fate. Do or die! But the time was not yet and you must needs be victimized.

YOUR ANSWER WAS: DEATH!

1927

I stood at your grave. In gleaming sunlight a quiet green hillock. It spelled Mortality.

MY ANSWER WAS: RESURRECTION,⁴⁹

Michael was essentially a diary of a hero who combined the occupations of a soldier, a worker, a poet, a lover, a patriot, and a revolutionary.

⁴⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 14 fn.

⁴⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 18.

The long discussions and debates, as well as the basic thoughts which occupied the friends during their student days are revealed to some extent by the following passage:

No longer is the stallion neighing under my thighs;
no longer am I hunched over a gun or tramping through
muddy clay of neglected trenches.
How long is it since I walked the vast Russian plain
or the shell-ridden French countryside!
A thing of the past!
Like a phoenix rising from the ashes of War and
destruction.
Peace!
The very word is like balm on a wound still trem-
bling and bleeding. I seem to grasp the blessing of
that word with my hands.
When I look out of the window I see German land:
towns, villages, fields, woods. . .
Homeland! Germany!⁵⁰

The thoughts which appear to have been most closely related to Goebbels' college days are further revealed by the following excerpt from Michael:

May 12
What indeed?
All and nothing. I'm too lazy and, maybe, too stupid
for exact science.
I want to be a man. With a profile of my own.
A personality! On the road to a new Germany!
May 17
I've been thinking a long time what it is that makes
me drink life so copiously.
It's because I stand on the hard soil of my homeland
with both my feet. The smell of the soil is around me.
And in my veins the peasant blood is welling up healthi-
ly.⁵¹

The novel progresses with a meeting between the character "Michael" and a girl at the university named Hertha Holk. Together they go for long walks and become involved in deep discussions. At the same time another

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 20.

⁵¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 21.

character emerges who is reminiscent of Goebbels' student companion, Flisges. The character's name is Ivan Wienurovsky, a nebulous Russian student who lends Michael Dostoevski's novel, The Idiot. Out of the images and characterizations of Hertha, Ivan and the spirit of Dostoevski, Michael develops the desire to write and selects for his subject Jesus Christ.

I talk to Christ. I had thought to have vanquished
Him, but I had mistaken Him for His false priests.
Christ is hard and inexorable.
He whips the Jewish money changers out of His temple.
A declaration of war on money.
Yet, if one said that today, they would put one into
a jail or madhouse.
We are all sick.
Hypocrisy is the characteristic of a decaying bourgeois
epoch.
The ruling class is tired and has no courage for new
adventure.
The Intellect has poisoned our people.⁵²

In addition to Michael, Goebbels also wrote several plays in verse, among them one called The Wanderer, written about Christ. This play was never published.

The existing social and economic conditions during Goebbels' student days and the years prior to his entry into the National Socialist party were turbulent ones and they were no happier for him than the childhood days spent in Rheydt. During the five years in which Joseph Goebbels had studied at various universities, these institutions throughout Germany had been invaded by young men walking on crutches, with sleeves hanging empty, and sometimes their faces terribly mutilated. In describing the political atmosphere at the universities, Curt Riess observed:

Millions of young Germans were torn and hopeless. The universities became political incubators. The students split. The nationalists and reactionaries dreamed of a

⁵²Ibid.

restored monarchy, of starting another war, of avenging Germany's 'honour' (sic); the minority of radical leftists tensely observed and applauded the communist experiment in the Soviet Union. But few were interested in the young Republic. It had nothing to offer, its leaders had neither talent, nor passion, nor ideas. The German Social Democratic Party betrayed the workers, they thought. Conditions throughout the country rapidly deteriorated. People starved. The staggering sacrifices of four war years seemed to have been in vain. There was no hope- at least not from those in power.⁵³

From the social standpoint too, "the decade during which Joseph Goebbels grew to manhood was the period of the greatest moral license as well as the greatest economic instability- for the mark, which was still nominally worth a shilling in 1918, had utterly collapsed by 1923."⁵⁴ In keeping with the times, Goebbels became involved in a series of unhappy love affairs. The first of these involved a girl called Anka Stahlhern.⁵⁵ The affair apparently lasted from 1918 to 1922, and served as the theme for the characterization of Michael and Hertha in the novel, Michael. Soon after Goebbels was introduced by his friend Fritz Prang to a school teacher in Rheydt by the name of Else.⁵⁶ Her family was instrumental in procuring a clerical position for Goebbels at the Cologne branch of the Dresdener Bank where he remained for eight or nine months. Then it was Fritz Prang's turn to help Goebbels. Prang came from a wealthy family and had become interested in politics. He had joined the National Socialist party in 1922, "but at this stage Goebbels had no thought other than for

⁵³Riess, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁴Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 27.

⁵⁵Curt Riess identifies her as Anka Helhorn.

⁵⁶The sources consulted do not identify the last name of Else.

literature and journalism."⁵⁷ Prang found a job for him calling out the positions of shares at the Cologne Stock Exchange, but Goebbels was not very happy with this employment. In one of his many letters addressed to Else during their friendship, he speculated about the future and lamented the fact that his real potential energy was being wasted. Thus, on June 5, 1923, he wrote in part:

I am firmly convinced that the time will come for me to use my real strength. I just want to preserve it and my heart and my conscience for a better cause. It isn't the industrial tycoons or the bank managers who will bring about the new millennium. It will be done by the few who have remained loyal to themselves and who haven't soiled their life with the so-called treasure of a world that has lost its gods. I am waiting for a new epoch to do what I cannot do today. And should that new epoch come too late for me, very well, it is quite commendable to be a mere pathfinder of a new and great epoch. . . .⁵⁸

Goebbels' Entry into Politics.---On January 23, 1924, Goebbels applied for work with the Berliner Tageblatt, but was unsuccessful. At another time he tried to apply for a job with the Rhineland Theater and was equally unsuccessful. At the same time, Fritz Prang, as an early convert to National Socialism, began to interest Goebbels in politics. He had heard Hitler speak at Munich and brought home pamphlets and circulars for his friend to read. On several occasions during the winter of 1923/24, Prang took Goebbels to political meetings. At one of these, Goebbels took part in the debate that ensued, prodded on by Prang and his friends. [See Chapter I7. On another occasion, Goebbels and Prang attended a Congress at Weimar, where the nationalistic speeches Goebbels heard "so stirred his

⁵⁷Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 28.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 33.

blood that he could not stop talking politics when the meeting was over . . .⁵⁹. During the same year Goebbels found a job as private secretary with a salary of 100 marks per month working for Franz Wiggershaus of Elberfeld. Wiggershaus was a Reichstag deputy for the "Voelkische Freiheitspartei," ["/Peoples' Freedom Party"/], which was one of a number of nationalist splinter groups that appeared following the disintegration of the National Socialist party and Hitler's imprisonment. Many such organizations had formed during 1924, largely due to the fact that economic conditions in Germany had greatly improved. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, had been successful in stabilizing the mark and the majority of Germans turned to the Republic with renewed interest. It was largely due to this fact that "parties of the extreme right and the extreme left suffered greatly from the upward trend."⁶⁰

Together with his friends, Franz Wiggershaus published a small weekly in Elberfeld, the Voelkische Freiheit ["/People's Freedom/]. In his capacity as secretary to Wiggershaus, Goebbels' task was to edit the paper. But he soon realized that he was also expected to deliver speeches for the "Voelkische Freiheitspartei", "whose existence depended more or less on the death of the other nationalist groups and their subsequent amalgamation."⁶¹

At one of such speaking engagements at which Goebbels was particularly critical of the National Socialists, Gregor Strasser was present. Strasser was an old National Socialist party member from Landshut, Bavaria, who had

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 35.

⁶⁰Riess, op. cit., p. 32.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 33

taken over the political direction of the party after Hitler had been imprisoned for his attempted putsch in November, 1925. When Goebbels had concluded his speech, Strasser "congratulated him on his performance, and offered him a job with his old party at an additional 60 marks a month."⁶² By Christmas, 1924, Hitler was pardoned, released from prison and soon Goebbels' pay was increased to 200 marks a month. Under a new master, Goebbels again became a private secretary. This time, however, he replaced a secretary whose performance had been unsatisfactory to Gregor Strasser,-- Heinrich Himmler.⁶³ In his new position, Goebbels demonstrated his thoroughness and devotion to his work. He was soon appointed business manager of the district Rheinland-Nord and spent much of his time in public speaking situations. In describing his experiences and abilities in such situations, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, reported:

Here at last he found some scope for his ability. Now he could prove the effectiveness of his speeches and make use of the innumerable ideas for propaganda which were constantly springing to his mind. With an uncanny sense of the background and mood of his audience--part intuition and part shrewd appraisal--he knew exactly how to deal with them. He spoke three, four, five times a day. None of his speeches was as yet really important, nor in front of a very large audience, but every time he spoke he won new followers. He worked untiringly and spared himself no attention to detail; it is not remarkable that he could not always find something new to say and one finds basically the same themes in his speeches. He quickly learned that this was in no wise detrimental to the effectiveness of his propaganda. On the contrary, he was proving by every day's experience the value of the slogan, the catch-phrase, the constant repetition, the appeal to the most primitive emotions of the least cultivated of his audience; proving for himself, in short, those basic laws of propaganda which Hitler was at the same time formulating in Mein Kampf.⁶⁴

⁶²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 41.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 41-42.

Goebbels' other responsibilities during this period were twofold. He became the editor of a new political magazine sponsored by the brothers Strasser, Nationalsozialistische Briefe, (National Socialist Letters), first published in October, 1925, and was expected to attend to organizational work in the Gau office.

An important insight into Goebbels' thoughts and activities is gained through the diary which he kept during the period from August 3, 1925, to October 16, 1926, now located in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in California. According to Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, "it is of the greatest importance in the history of Goebbels' career because it was during this period that he came into direct contact with Hitler for the first time and finally decided to throw in his lot with him rather than remain with the Strassers."⁶⁵ Just ten days later, on October 26, 1926, Joseph Goebbels was appointed Gauleiter/District Leader of Berlin. Much of the diary is devoted to Goebbels' relationship with Else. The range of fluctuating moods which he experienced during this period are exemplified by such statements as "'Life is so beautiful!! Laugh, Clown, Laugh. . . We've spent some hours full of happiness and pain. . . How gruesome beautiful life is. . . With Else both bliss and trouble. . .'"⁶⁶ In regard to his political activities, Goebbels' entries in the diary equally reflect a wide range of moods and feelings, as well as his reactions to the work assignments he had to fulfill. Thus, in May, 1926, he wrote, "'I shouldn't like any more to have so much talking to do. Much rather devote myself to the paper and administration. Though even there I would

⁶⁵Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 42.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 43.

have more work than is good for my health.'"⁶⁷ Yet, in September, 1925, he had reported, "'Off again soon. Back on the gypsy life. But I love that sort of life very much. . .'" and on another occasion, 'Now the traveling starts again. . . There's a relief in the energy of moving about.'"⁶⁸

Goebbels' diary of this period further indicates that he was quite pre-occupied and worried about his salary. It further suggests that when he was over-burdened and in great debt he would turn to his family for relief. Furthermore, in regard to his relationship with the brothers Strasser and Hitler, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel suggest that Goebbels was "entirely for the Strasser."⁶⁹ Until the summer of 1926, when he was won over by Hitler, the diary suggests that his admiration alternated between these masters in direct proportion with the assignments which he received. When it was announced that the Nationalsozialistische Briefe were to be published, Goebbels responded by writing, "'A paper to come out every fortnight. Publisher, Strasser. Editor-moi! Just as we want it.'"⁷⁰ In December, 1926, he wrote in regard to Strasser's attempt to set up a party program, "'Strasser's draft is inadequate. . .'"⁷¹ Similarly, in regard to Hitler, Goebbels declared on September 26, 1925, "'The movement in Munich stinks. I am absolutely disgusted with the Munich clique!'"⁷² Again on February 22, 1926, he added, "'I no longer entirely believe in

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 46.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 47.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 48.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 49

⁷²Riess, op. cit., p. 39.

Hitler himself."⁷³ Yet, on April 20, 1926, when Goebbels had been won over completely by Hitler, he confided in his diary, "He is thirty-seven years old. . . Adolf Hitler, I love you because you are both great and simple. These are the characteristics of a genius."⁷⁴

Joseph Goebbels' diary also provides insight into his personal reactions and evaluations of his frequent speaking engagements during this period. From his diary entries, recorded below, it appears that he indulged in considerable self-praise and was more concerned with the effect of his speeches than with his political beliefs, for he stated in part:

'Yesterday a group evening. I told them about my growing fame and I had a most attentive audience. . . After three hours, Bamberg. Straight on to the meeting. They received me with considerable acclaim. I am requested to speak and they listen as devoutly as if they were in Church. . . And then I preached (predigte) for two hours. A breathlessly spellbound audience. And at the end they waived to me and cheered me to the echo. I am dead tired. Such an exciting meeting there is not a dry thread on me. . . That evening I spoke in Landshut. Everybody is raving with enthusiasm. A few very young women seem to be quite crazy about me.'⁷⁵

Two significant events which contributed to the solidification of the National Socialist party and influenced Goebbels' career occurred on January 25, and February 14, 1926, respectively. On the first date, Gregor Strasser called a meeting held at Hannover which was attended by twenty or thirty party representatives. The conference was intended to settle a dispute between the Strasser and the Hitler factions concerning the disposition of the property belonging to the former German royal house.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 45.

⁷⁵Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 51.

Strasser, because of his strong socialist tendencies, demanded expropriation, while Hitler, who was not personally present, basically opposed this move. Goebbels, who was present and has been personally credited with advocating Hitler's removal from the party,⁷⁶ reported in his diary that he had talked about Russia and its possible relation to Germany. Furthermore, he wrote, "I spoke for about an hour with everyone listening in breathless tension. Then they all agreed with me enthusiastically. We have won. . . Finish. Strasser shakes my hand."⁷⁷ A second conference to discuss the basic differences between the two factions was called by Hitler at Bamberg. Goebbels was again required to attend. In anticipation of the event he had recorded in his diary as early as February 6, 1926, "Next Sunday to Bamberg. Hitler has invited us. We must stand up and fight. The time of decision approaches."⁷⁸ For this particular event, Goebbels arrived two days in advance. He was met at the station by Heinrich Himmler who introduced him to the impressive accommodations and headquarters of the Munich party organization. Yet, in spite of the fact that Goebbels had already met Hitler on several occasions and was formally introduced to him on November 2, 1925, he continued to identify himself with the Strasser faction. It was from this point of view that he reacted to the Bamberg meeting by writing in his diary:

'Hitler makes a two-hour speech. . . I feel completely exhausted. What a Hitler! A reactionary! Extremely awkward and unsteady. Completely wrong on the Russian question. Italy and England are our natural allies!

⁷⁶Manvell and Fraenkel refute this contention by other authors by pointing out that "had he done so, he would have boasted about it in his diary." (p.53).

⁷⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 42.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 43.

Horrible! Our task is to wreck Bolshevism! Bolshevism is a Jewish creation! We must annihilate Russia! . . . Compensation for the noblemen. Justice must remain justice. Furthermore, the question of the private property of the nobility must not even be touched upon. Horrible! This programme (of Hitler) is satisfactory to the Munich clique. Feder nods. Ley nods. Streicher nods. Esser nods. 'It hurts to see you in this company.' (Quotation from Goethe's Faust.) Brief discussion follows. Strasser speaks. He stammers, he is trembling, he is awkward. Good, honest Strasser. . . I cannot utter a word. I feel as though I've been hit over the head. We're driving to the station. Strasser is completely confused. More quarrels, more disputes. All this hurts a lot. . .⁷⁹

In spite of his objection to Hitler's program, Goebbels, nevertheless, was impressed by the leader of the Munich faction and particularly by the manner in which the representatives of the party lived. On March 29, 1926, he received a letter from Hitler-- one of the earliest attempts to win Goebbels away from the Strasser faction-- which excited him considerably. "I shall make a speech on April 8 at Munich," he noted in his diary and on that particular day Goebbels added, "Thursday. . . Hitler 'phones. He wants to say hello to us. He will be with us in fifteen minutes. Tall, healthy, full of pep. I'm fond of him. His kindness in spite of Bamberg makes us feel ashamed. He is lending us his car for the afternoon."⁸⁰ Goebbels addressed two meetings on that day and received the usual ovation following his speeches. However, the second address was of greater significance to him since Hitler was present. While noting Hitler's reaction to the speech, Goebbels wrote, "At the end Hitler hugs me. My eyes are full of tears, I am happier than ever in my life. Through the milling crowds to the waiting car. Thunderous shouts and heils."⁸¹ Hitler intensified

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 44.

⁸¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 57.

his campaign to win Goebbels to his cause and soon succeeded. He engaged his new disciple in long, personal talks about his political views and asked him to speak with increasing regularity. By April 17, in spite of the fact that Goebbels returned to Elberfeld and the Strasser faction, he had been won over by Hitler.⁸² Subsequent statements seem to substantiate this point of view, for on April 20, Goebbels wrote a birthday letter to the Fuehrer in which he said in part:

'Dear and revered Adolf Hitler! I have learned so much from you! In your comradely fashion you have shown me fundamentally new ways which have finally made me see the light. . . The day may come when everything will go to pieces, when the mob around you will foam and grumble and roar, 'Crucify him!' Then we shall stand firmly and unshakably and we will shout and sing, 'Hosanna!'⁸³

In July, 1926, Goebbels went to Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgarden. Entries of his diary of this period seem to suggest that Goebbels had fallen completely under Hitler's spell. On July 25, he wrote, "'These days have shown me the way and the direction. . . I feel at peace with myself. Now my last doubts have vanished. Germany shall live. Heil Hitler!'"⁸⁴ By August, 1926, Joseph Goebbels had changed his position and completely revised his attitude towards the Strasser Faction. In an article published in the Voelkischer Beobachter, he made this quite clear when he wrote:

Only now do I recognize you for what you are: revolutionaries in speech but not in deed. . . Don't talk so much about ideals and don't fool yourselves into believing that you are the inventors and protectors of these ideals. Learn, have confidence! Have faith in the victory of our ideals! What I said then I am repeating now: we are not

⁸²Riess, op. cit., p. 45.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 46.

doing penance by standing solidly behind the Fuehrer. We do not bow to him in the manner of the Byzantines before the throne of an Asiatic emporor, but with the manly unbroken pride of the ancient Norsemen, who stand upright before their Germanic feudal lord. We feel that he is greater than all of us, greater than you and I. He is the instrument of Divine Will that shapes history with fresh, creative passion.⁸⁵

But even more important perhaps was Goebbels' confession in his diary which he made at an earlier date when he wrote about Hitler, ". . . 'I recognize him as my leader quite unconditionally. I bow to the greater man. To the political genius!'"⁸⁶ This pledge Goebbels was to maintain till the end of his life.

The Gauleiter of Berlin.-- On October 20, 1926, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels to the position of Gauleiter [District Leader] of Berlin.⁸⁷ Although he had hoped to become Propaganda Minister instead, that position was given to Gregor Strasser, since Hitler liked his sub-leaders to quarrel among themselves.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in reflecting upon his decision to appoint Goebbels Gauleiter of Berlin, Hitler once remarked:

From the time I started to organize the Party, I made it a rule never to fill an appointment until I had found the right man for it. I applied this principle to the post of Berlin Gauleiter. Even when the older members of the Party bombarded me with complaints over the Party leadership in Berlin, I refrained from coming to their assistance, until I could promise them that in Dr. Goebbels I had found the man I was seeking. For Dr. Goebbels poses two attributes, without which no one could master the conditions in Berlin: he has intelli-

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁸⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 58.

⁸⁷Curt Riess dates Goebbels' appointment October 26, 1926, while Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel indicate that the appointment became effective some time in November of that year.

⁸⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 47.

gence and the gift of oratory. Further, he is a typical son of the Ruhr- that type which, thanks to its close ties with the iron and steel processes, gives us a man of exceptional value and merit.⁸⁹

In his capacity as Gauleiter of Berlin, Goebbels fully met the expectations of Hitler. He first set out to reorganize the membership of the National Socialists in the capital city and then embarked upon a propaganda campaign to bring the movement to the attention of the people. Among his many carefully worked out plans was the famous mass meeting in the Pharus-Saele [Pharus Halls], "the traditional meeting place of the Socialists and Communists in Wedding, the 'reddest' part of Berlin."⁹⁰ [See Chapter III]. Although the press comments were not flattering in the least, "three days later, Party headquarters received 2,600 membership applications and 500 additional applications to join the S. A."⁹¹ [S. A. = Storm Troopers].

To captivate and sustain the interest of the people of Berlin, Goebbels not only conducted mass demonstrations but also flooded the city with posters and placards, and attacked prominent citizens and officials in high governmental positions. The result of such activities was that in May, 1927, the Police Commissioner suspended the party functions in the area of Greater Berlin. Goebbels immediately conceived a new plan. He ordered the party to go underground by creating seemingly harmless clubs which were supposedly dedicated to athletics or other outdoor activities.⁹²

⁸⁹Martin Bormann, Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-44, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp. 431-432.

⁹⁰Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 51.

⁹¹Riess, op. cit., p. 55.

⁹²In carrying out this plan, Goebbels apparently followed a method employed by Hitler, who in 1921, as chairman of the party had "formed the semi-

As substitute organizations these clubs were given names such as "Zum Ruhigen See," ["/The Quiet Lake"/], "Zur Schoenen Eichel," ["/The Beautiful Acorn"/], or "Wandervogel 1927," ["/Hikers of 1927"/], which served to provide the Gauleiter with political platforms.⁹³ But again the police intervened and placed Goebbels under "redeverbot," ["/a ban on Speechmaking/"] "because the Government considered his speeches highly seditious."⁹⁴ Deprived of his most effective means of communication, Joseph Goebbels founded his newspaper, Der Angriff, ["/The Attack/"]. To insure its rapid growth in circulation, the Gauleiter carefully mapped out a plan of publicity. On July 1, thousands of posters appeared throughout Berlin with only two words on them: "Der Angriff!" ["/The Attack!"/]. The next day a series of new posters appeared shouting: "Der Angriff erfolgt am 4 Juli!" ["/The attack will commence on July 4!"/]. Again later new posters read: "Der Angriff- das deutsche Montagsblatt!" ["/The Attack- the German Monday newspaper."/]⁹⁵

On October 29, 1927, Goebbels' thirtieth birthday, the Police Commissioner notified him that he was again permitted to speak. Although the party newspaper had gotten off to a shaky start, the Gauleiter insisted that it should continue to be published. At the same time, he made an attempt to write articles and deliver speeches on a higher intellectual level with little regard to their immediate propaganda and persuasive effects. Among them were such topics as "Was ist Politik?" ["/What is Politics/"] and "Erkenntnis und Propaganda," ["/Perception and Propaganda/"]. [See

military Sturm-Abteilung (The S. S., or Storm Troopers under the guise of a sports or athletics association)." Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 40.

⁹³Riess, op. cit., p. 58.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 61.

Chapter I7.

On March 31, 1938, the Prussian Government also lifted the ban on the National Socialist party. New Reichstag elections were to be held on May 20. Goebbels earlier had been opposed to taking part in them. Now he recognized the potential of the Reichstag as a platform for the party, for he explained:

'We will move into the Reichstag to supply ourselves at the Arsenal of Democracy with its own weapons. . . We will become deputies of the Reichstag to paralyze the Weimar way of thinking with the support of Weimar. . . If we succeed in planting in parliament sixty or seventy of our own agitators and organizers, then the state will equip and pay for our fighting machine. Whoever is elected to parliament is finished, but only if he plans to become a parliamentarian. But if, with his inborn recklessness, he continues his merciless fight against the increasing scoundrelizations of our public life, then he will not become a parliamentarian but he will remain what he is: A revolutionary. Mussolini also was a member of parliament. In spite of that, not long afterwards, he marched on Rome with his blackshirts. . . The agitators of our Party are spending between six hundred and eight hundred marks a month on train fares in order to strengthen the Republic. Is it then not just and fair that the Republic should reimburse their travelling expenses by giving them free railway passes? . . . Is that the beginning of a compromise? Do you believe that we should lay down our arms for free railway passes? We, who have stood in front of you a hundred and a thousand times in order to bring you faith in a new Germany? . . . We do not beg for votes. We demand conviction, devotion, passion. The vote is only an expedient, for ourselves as well as for you. . . We do not care a damn about co-operation for building up a stinking dungheap. We come to clean out the dung. . . We do not come as friends or as neutrals. We come as enemies.'⁹⁶

To secure as many seats in the Reichstag as possible, Goebbels embarked on an exhausting campaign trip, which he described in his own words, as follows:

'I can hardly see or think. For eight weeks now I have been all over Germany. Sometimes I have travelled by

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 72-73.

car as much as five hundred miles a day. In the evening I have spoken before thousands of people, who applauded or booed me. After the meeting, in the middle of the night, I got a few hours' sleep. Then up at six or seven, and more driving until five in the afternoon. Berlin! Heaps of mail, newspapers, complaints, demands, telephone calls, no money, nothing but troubles, conferences, a poster, a pamphlet, a few words to someone who is discouraged, a few words of thanks to a brave comrade; home, change clothes, the telephone rings. It is high time for me to leave, they are waiting for me, the hall is already crowded. . .⁹⁷

Although the leftist parties won by a sizeable majority, the National Socialists were successful in obtaining twelve seats in the Reichstag made up of 500 deputies. Goebbels became one of the representatives and indicated how he would put his office to use when he wrote:

'Maybe the representatives of the other parties regard themselves as representatives. . . I am not a member of the Reichstag. I am an I.D.I. and an I.D.F.- Inhaber the Immunitaet (possessor of immunity) and Inhaber der Freifahrkarte (possessor of a free railway pass). . . The I.D.I. is a man who may speak the truth from time to time even in this democratic Republic. He distinguishes himself from other mortals by being permitted to think aloud. He can call a dung-heap a dung-heap and needn't beat about the bush by calling it a state.'⁹⁸

While reflecting upon his days of agitation in Berlin, Goebbels wrote in 1934,

Our agitation has been frequently decried as being primitive and thoughtless. But one proceeded with this harsh criticism from completely false presumptions. Granted, the National Socialist propaganda is primitive; but, the people's thoughts are primitive too. It [propaganda] simplifies the problem, it removes the confusing by-products with full awareness in order to fit them into the horizon of the people. Once the masses had understood that the pressing questions of the present were discussed in the National Socialist meetings in such style and language that everyone could understand them, a river of tens and hundreds

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 73.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 74.

of thousands irresistably flooded to our meetings. Here the little man found clarification, incentive, hope and belief. Here he won a tenable position in the confusion and despair of the post-war years to which he could cling to in desperation. It was because of this that he was prepared to give his last "Hungergroschen" (last coin saved for a rainy day) to the movement. Only through the awakening of the masses- and he had to become aware of this- could the nation be awakened. This is the explanation for the fact that our meetings soon experienced increasing approval and the party not only saved money but derived the best and most reliable financial aid from them.⁹⁹

In regard to the party ban and the speaking ban, the Gauleiter wrote:

When our speaking and agitation in Berlin was prohibited, we went into the country. Around the capital city, in the suburbs and villages of the Mark we assembled our party members, founded dependable bases everywhere and surrounded the capital city with a ring of National Socialist cells. From here the advance into the capital city could be carried on once our movement was permitted to function again. Thus, we gained dependable positions in Teltow and Falkensee, gained ground through refreshing and sometimes even bloody discussions with the K.P.D. (Communist Party of Germany), settled into the Mark and intensified our propaganda from here in such dimensions so that the reactions and disappointments got through to Berlin.

And even in Berlin we had here and there the opportunity to be active in propaganda and speechmaking. Like a runaway fire it sometimes passed through the party membership: 'Tonight everybody attend a mass assembly of this or that party organization. We will speak in the forum period.' Then one of us got himself recognized during the discussion period- we won time to speak for one or two hours because of our majority at the meeting and thus had the opportunity to say what we intended to say.¹⁰⁰

In his book, Kampf um Berlin, (Battle for Berlin), Goebbels further presented some of his viewpoints on the effect of the speaker's ethical responsibility upon the audience and a brief, historical account of political oratory in Germany. When discussing these two factors, Goebbels remarked:

⁹⁹Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 253-256.

A people can feel whether a political speaker believes what he is saying. Our movement grew out of nothing, and those men who gave their services to it from the beginning were convinced of the righteousness and necessity of the political idea which they publicly advocated with unfaltering conviction. They believe what they say, and this belief they instilled through the force of their words in their listeners.

The political speaker has never been at home in Germany heretofore. While the western democracies had developed and refined the art of delivering the political speech to their people from the beginning, the effectiveness of the political speaker in Germany, even to the end of the World War, [World War I] was almost solely confined to Parliament. Politics has never been a thing of the people with us, but always a matter for the privileged ruling class.¹⁰¹

Again, in regard to the training and education of the party speakers during the formative years of the National Socialist movement, Goebbels maintained that they were not systematically placed in schools or trained to become great rhetoricians. Rather, he contended that they grew out of the movement itself and that their enthusiasm gave them the force and ability to affect and motivate the people.¹⁰² Yet, according to Borris V. Borresholm, Goebbels did provide directives for such party speakers around 1928, which were designed to provide them with some basic agitational techniques and methods. [See Chapter III]

On numerous occasions, Joseph Goebbels insisted that the spoken word is more effective than any form of writing. More specifically, he believed that modern propaganda was best disseminated through public speaking and that any means justified the end. Reminiscent of his speech on "Perception and Propaganda," [See Chapter I] was his discussion of the concept "propaganda" and its implementation through public address as described in

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 211-212.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 211.

his book, Kampf um Berlin. In part he said that propaganda is not based upon a fundamental method, but rather that it has one objective. This object "is in politics always: conquest of the masses. Every means which serves this purpose is good. And every means that fails to meet the objective is bad."¹⁰³ Furthermore, Goebbels claimed that the theoretician's ideas of propaganda, whose intellectually developed methods were conceived at the desk were of little significance, for, in the final analysis he was always very surprised and perplexed because his methods were not employed in practice, or if employed, failed to achieve the desired end. According to Joseph Goebbels, methods were developed out of the daily problems and no one was born to become a propagandist. Thus, he observed, "We learned the means and methods of effective mass propaganda through daily experiences and it developed into a systematic system through repeated application."¹⁰⁴

In respect to the superiority of the spoken word, Goebbels added:

'Modern propaganda too depends essentially for its effect on the spoken word. Revolutionary movements are not promoted by great writers, but rather by great speakers. It is a mistake, if one assumes that the written word is more effective because it reaches a larger public through the daily press. Even if the speaker can reach only a few thousand people at best on most occasions--whereas the political writer sometimes and frequently finds ten or a hundred thousand readers--the spoken word in effect does not only influence that individual who hears it immediately, it is passed on by him a hundred and thousand times and carried away. And the suggestion of an effective speech far outshadows the paper-like suggestion of a lead article.'¹⁰⁵

So great was Goebbels' respect for the spoken word that he advised the

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 18-19.

political writer to assume that a speaker was standing beside him, who was attempting to influence his opinions with simple and compelling thought processes.¹⁰⁶

Yet, in spite of his preference for the spoken word, Goebbels spent much time in carefully preparing his written material. Thus, Curt Riess observed that during World War II Goebbels would start weeks in advance preparing notes for one of his articles. His aides would obtain necessary research information and present him with resume's of books which he studied carefully. Then, mostly late at night, he would retreat to his office or studio, where he would write out his articles in longhand in a black notebook. Next he would edit his own text two or three times, and frequently six or seven times. When it finally met his expectations, he would dictate it to his personal stenographer over the telephone rather than have one of his secretaries type it. As soon as it had been transcribed, the material had to be typed and resubmitted to Goebbels, who made further corrections until the final version corresponded to his own standards of perfection. In evaluating some of these articles carefully, Curt Riess observed that "the result was an excellent, lucid, and almost austere German style,¹⁰⁷ with well-constructed rhythmic sentences, and words which conveyed the subtlest overtones."¹⁰⁸

Perhaps most representative of this style of writing was an excerpt of

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 200.

¹⁰⁷ Curt Riess, Albert Speer, and Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel suggest that Goebbels' articles were reminiscent of his "Latin" training rather than of his Germanic training.

¹⁰⁸ Riess, op. cit., p. 249.

Goebbels' article, "Die Winterkriege und der totale Krieg," ["The Winter Crisis and the Total War"] of March 14, 1943, in which he wrote:

. . .On the morning after the last British terror attack upon the capital city we visited a series of hard-hit areas and in the process arrived at a hospital, which the British friends of humanity had changed completely into rubble and ashes. The remains of a young nurse, just removed, were lying under the arch of the main entrance. As air-raid warden she had carried the patients into the basement during the alarm and in the process was fatally wounded by a bomb. We raised the linen cloth which had been spread over her and gazed upon a peaceful, completely unchanged young girlish face. The blond hair flowed forth from below her helmet which had been pushed slightly to one side of her head. Below were two blue, half-opened eyes, now fixed, and the arms hung lifeless and formless at the sides of the delicate feminine body.

One could perhaps ask what this innocent girl had to do with the war. But this question would have to be directed to our enemies, perhaps to that twenty two year old Canadian roughneck [Lümmel] who started off from an English airport to unload his bombs over Berlin. But he would probably have no answer. Perhaps he couldn't even locate Germany on the globe. He comes from a rich continent, but his people and his government are unable to make its wealth, which is present in abundance, available to their community. They have too much, we have too little. But instead of giving us some of their surplus, they want to take the little from what we still have now away from us. Against this we defend ourselves and even if it takes eternity and appears hard and gruesome. Most likely the nurse knew this and this is why a transfigured smile crossed her features in death. If, in the last moment of her small and undemanding life she thought once more about her parents or a friend or a fiance', who perhaps is at the front and whom she had to leave, then she will have found comfort in the single thought that she too had to die for a great and good mission.¹⁰⁹

The strong contrast between the carefully prepared articles written during World War II and those which appeared in the party newspaper, Der Angriff, were subject to repeated criticism by German and foreign authors. Goebbels explained that even though "the National Socialist movement

¹⁰⁹Joseph Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1943), pp. 226-227. Translated by the writer.

became prominent due to the speakers, and not the journalists,"¹¹⁰ the party newspaper was designed to meet a specific purpose, as follows:

We wanted to continue the propaganda methods by means of publicity, which had been prohibited with free speech. We did not intend to create an informative tabloid which was designed, in a sense, to replace the daily journal for our followers. Our newspaper was formed out of a need and was to be written in and for that need. Our goal was not to inform, but to move, to fire up, to motivate. The organ which we founded, was in a sense to act as a whip, which awakens the belated sleepers from their slumber and hurries them on to action without rest. Just like the name, the slogan of the paper was a programme too. Next to the title, one could read great and inciting headlines: 'For the suppressed! Against the parasites!' In this manner our fighting attitude was expressed in the new organ. It was already indicated in the title and slogan of the programme and in the areas of activity of the paper. It only remained for us to supplement the title and slogan with an active political life.¹¹¹

The Chief of Party Propaganda.--- The next four years from 1928 to 1932, were perhaps the most taxing and strenuous of Joseph Goebbels' career. On January 9, 1929,¹¹² Goebbels was appointed head of party propaganda, a position formerly held by Gregor Strasser, which gave him national status and additional powers. His first task was to construct a propaganda machine with Hitler as the central figure. Throughout the country concentration was given to political mass demonstrations, amplified by emotional stimuli, such as singing, parades with banners, flags or torches which prepared the audiences to receive the spoken word. The center of attraction was always the speaker. Speakers were procured from Goebbels'

¹¹⁰Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, op. cit., p. 76.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel date the appointment in November, 1928.

Department of Propaganda and "only the best were allowed to 'perform' in Berlin, Munich, Hamburg and other large cities. For smaller audiences lesser talents would do."¹¹³ But Goebbels' chief spokesman was Hitler himself, whose ban on speaking had been revoked by the German government in the fall of 1928. For him, Goebbels rented great halls and filled them to capacity, and soon both the Sportpalast in Berlin and the Stadium at Nuremberg became two favorite meeting places for the National Socialist demonstrations. According to Curt Riess, "such meetings were to be repeated frequently during the following years, with Hitler making the main speech and Goebbels introducing him, staging the whole show but remaining more or less in the background."¹¹⁴ [See Chapter III].

Next Goebbels glorified individuals among the National Socialist party members, basing this technique on the theory that "the average German, emotional and sentimental, has always been more impressed by the spectacular exploits of 'heroic' individuals than by the rational approach to a given problem."¹¹⁵ One such individual was Horst Wessel, who had written a political poem for Der Angriff. [See Chapter III]. The poem in turn, set to a popular tune of the Communist youth became famous as the "Horst Wessel Lied."

With his intensified political campaign, Goebbels had been instrumental in winning twelve seats in the Reichstag during March, 1928. On November 17, 1929, the National Socialists "won more than twenty per cent of the

¹¹³Riess, op. cit., p. 77.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 79.

seats in the newly elected City Council,"¹¹⁶ in Berlin. But his biggest effort was directed at the new Reichstag elections of September 14, 1930. In describing these efforts, Wilfrid Bade reported:

With an incomparable wave of agitation he flooded the country. Into the last village, into the last hut the National Socialist propaganda advanced. . . Every meeting was pre-scheduled. An exact termin-calendar permitted an uninterrupted usage of speakers. With unheard of skill he organized mass meetings of such proportions such as the whole world had never known before. Tents of tens of thousands of people were erected, meeting beneath open skies with torches for forty thousand people brought to life, he brought entire tracts of the country into swirling excitement, who descended as a trainload of people upon the meeting place. From all fences, hedges, house fronts, sign posts, and walls the posters of the party glowed. The National Socialist press was, for the time being, placed under the complete control of the national press chief during the election. The thrilling news of the meetings appeared in well prepared directives. There was no place where air leafs and newspapers did not arrive. The proportion of the election campaign greatly increased. American propagandists became pale with jealousy. Newspapers which had fifty thousand subscribers, appeared during the election campaign with half a million copies, a procession of cars raced through Germany from one end to the other, and the Fuehrer of the movement himself hurried from city to city, from province to province, leaving behind jubilation and enthusiasm, confidence and trusting belief, everywhere.¹¹⁷

It was readily apparent that the head of party propaganda had invented an entirely new face for the election campaign. Yet, basically Goebbels made use of the same method as he had invented it-- gigantic, inspirational, genial, and almost suffocating-- until the movement took over the leadership in Germany in 1933.

On September 14, 1930, more people than ever before cast their votes.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 87.

¹¹⁷Wilfrid Bade, Joseph Goebbels, (Lanbeck: Charles Coleman, 1933), pp. 56-57.

The effectiveness of Goebbels' techniques were indicated to some extent by the results of the election. Thus, in 1928, the National Socialists had received 8,000 votes in East Prussia; now they counted 253,000. In Frankfurt-on-the Oder they increased from 8,200 to 204,000 votes; in Pomerania from 13,500 to 236,000; in Breslau from 9,300 to 259,000; in Thuringia from 20,700 to 243,000; in Cologne from 10,600 to 169,000; in Leipzig from 14,600 to 160,000; in Hamburg from 17,800 to 144,000, and in Berlin they moved from 50,000 to 550,000.¹¹⁸ But the most significant gain was the increase in Reichstag seats. They had leaped from twelve to 107, and thereby established the National Socialist party as the second strongest organization in the Reich.

During 1931, Goebbels' personal life also improved considerably. Financially he was earning "400 marks a month as Gauleiter and a further 500 marks a month as a member of the Reichstag."¹¹⁹ Furthermore, on December 12, 1931, Goebbels married Magda Quandt, a woman who had been divorced from a wealthy industrialist in 1929. Hitler was present at the ceremony, acting as best man. He favored the marriage because of Magda's social position and wealth.

The period from January 1, 1932 to May 1, 1933, carefully recorded by Goebbels in his diary, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, [From the Emperor's Palace to the Reich's Chancellery], required even greater fortitude and endurance than the previous years. According to Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, "this period was to be one of the hardest in Goebbels' life of service to his master. It could be reasonably debated that Hitler might

¹¹⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 89.

¹¹⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 89.

never have gained the position to maneuver himself and the party to power without the outstanding ability, tireless energy and political acumen of his campaign manager."¹²⁰ Within the period of one year the National Socialists became involved in five major election campaigns. There were two for the Presidency, the first of which on March 13, 1932, just failed to give Hindenburg the absolute majority he needed, and another on April 10, 1932, in which Hitler obtained 36.8 per cent of the votes as compared to Hindenburg's 53 per cent. There were also three campaigns in which the National Socialists attempted to increase their representation in the state administrations and the Reichstag. In each of these attempts, their success varied. In the April 13 election they became the strongest party in the Prussian Diet, but failed to obtain a majority in Wuertenberg, Bavaria or Hamburg. Again in the General Elections of the Reichstag on July 31, 1932, the National Socialists obtained 230 seats which made them the strongest single party in Germany, but they failed to obtain an absolute majority. The majority was held instead by other parties, particularly by the Social Democrats. Hermann Goering, Speaker of the Reichstag, attempted on September 12, by preventing him from speaking, to keep Chancellor von Papen from dissolving the Reichstag, which had failed to give him its vote of confidence. However, the President favored the dissolution and another General Election was held in November, 1932. In spite of the fact that the National Socialists dropped two million votes and their representation fell to 196 seats, they still remained the largest single party in the Reich. When von Papen resigned as Chancellor on November 17,

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 91.

the struggle for the position began between von Schleicher and Hitler. Adolf Hitler submitted his terms for an authoritarian government to Hindenburg on November 23, with the result that von Schleicher became Chancellor for a few weeks on December 2. When von Schleicher resigned on January 28, 1933, the path for Hitler was clear. He was appointed Chancellor by Hindenburg on January 30, 1933, and remained in control of the nation until the end of World War II.¹²¹

Behind the scenes and largely instrumental in successfully staging these election campaigns was Joseph Goebbels. He was primarily concerned with organizing and executing the necessary propaganda techniques, the writing of untold articles, and the continuous travel that his speaking tours required. From his diary of this period some insight is gained concerning Goebbels' own thoughts and estimations of the greatest propaganda campaign he ever waged. [See Chapter III]. Thus, in March, 1932, for instance, Goebbels reported a new innovation in the campaigning techniques. In order to expose the Fuehrer to as many audiences as possible, Hitler was to be shuttled across the country by means of an airplane. Thus, on March 18, he reported:

. . . The Fuehrer will wage his next campaign by plane and will speak three or four times daily, if possible on public places or in sports arenas. In this way, he can reach about one and one half million people in spite of the shortness of the available time.¹²²

On July 1, 1932, Goebbels gave some indication of the exhausting pace which the campaigning required of him and Hitler, when he wrote:

The work must be accomplished while standing, walking,

¹²¹Ibid., pp. 91-92.

¹²²Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1941), p. 67. Translated by the writer.

riding or flying. The most important conferences are held on the stairs, in the hallway, at the door, when riding to the trainstation. One hardly comes to one's senses. One is carried criss-cross over Germany by means of train, car and plane. A half hour prior to the start, one arrives in a town, and sometimes even later, and then one climbs to the speaker's stand and speaks.¹²³

A representative example of Goebbels' campaigning technique during this period was the way in which he handled the election campaign in the smallest German state, Lippe Detmold. The population in the district consisted of 150,000 inhabitants who were to go to the polls in January, 1933. No other political organization was very much interested in Lippe Detmold, but Goebbels reasoned that a victory there would discourage the anti-National Socialist trend which had began to grow during the past years in alarming proportions. Secondly, Goebbels intended to build up the prestige of the party, which needed such reinforcement badly. "We are going to concentrate all our strength on this small country to gain a prestige success," Goebbels candidly admitted on January 3. "The Party would show once more that it could win."¹²⁴ While the Berlin papers made fun of the National Socialists, Goebbels, Goering, Hitler, and other spokesmen addressed many audiences in the small towns and villages with the consequence that the party again achieved an overwhelming victory. More important even than the election results was the task of telling the German people that the "Party was marching again. . . The decision of the citizens of Lippe is not a local affair," Goebbels commented in Angriff on January 20. "It corresponds to the sentiment prevailing throughout the country. Again

¹²³Ibid., p. 120.

¹²⁴Riess, op. cit., p. 118.

the great masses of people are on the move in our direction."¹²⁵

In evaluating Joseph Goebbels' contributions to the cause of National Socialism during the period from 1928, until they were in complete control of the country in May, 1933, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner observed that the head of party propaganda created "the third Reich, by sheer force of his propaganda."¹²⁶ In summarizing the factors which these authors believed were instrumental in Goebbels' success, they wrote:

He had a cool analytical mind, which could work with extraordinary rapidity, but he was not an original thinker, nor even an outstanding intellect, as his various essays had made quite evident. He had a vast store of miscellaneous learning; he was by now a powerful orator and an almost unerring judge of the reaction of audiences; he had a flair for 'picking up the unconsidered trifle', for making capital out of the most unlikely, even catastrophic-seeming situations; he was almost tireless in his efforts and was at his best in a crisis. All of these things helped him, but undoubtedly the ultimate secret of his success lay in his complete detached contempt of the masses and his utter indifference to claims of humanity or individuality.¹²⁷

The Reichs Minister of Propaganda.--- On March 13, 1933, Goebbels arrived at another significant milestone in his career. It was on this day that Hitler, who had become Chancellor of Germany on January 30, informed his cabinet that he wanted to create a Ministry for National Enlightenment and Propaganda. Thus, on March 14, Joseph Goebbels was sworn in by President Hindenburg and became a cabinet member. According to Goebbels' own diary entry this appointment was no surprise to him. As early as January 22, 1932, he had referred to the creation of such an organization and

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 118-119.

¹²⁶Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 60.

¹²⁷Ibid.

indicated its chief function by stating, "I am now beginning to formulate the basic policies for this ministry. It shall not only serve to spiritually support our power in regard to the state apparatus, but to conquer the entire nation as well."¹²⁸

Two days after Goebbels had been officially sworn in, he delivered a speech to the representatives of the press in Berlin, entitled, "Parolen an den neuen Staat", ["Watchwords in the New State"] in which he clarified his points of view concerning the new ministry. In part he said:

In the newly instituted Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda I see a connection between the government and the people, an active relationship between the national government as the expression of the people's will and of the nation itself. . .

.

We have founded a Ministry for National Enlightenment and Propaganda. These two titles do not mean the same. National Enlightenment is essentially passive while Propaganda is active. We cannot rest our case by simply telling the people what we want to do and to enlighten them about how we are going to do it. Instead we must place this Enlightenment next to an active governmental propaganda, a propaganda which attempts to win people for its cause. It is not enough to pacify the people more or less with our regiment, to motivate them to assume a neutral position in regard to us, but rather we want to work upon the people until they have fallen prey to us, until they understand ideologically that that which transpires today in Germany must not only be accepted, but can be accepted.¹²⁹

.

The word 'Propaganda' always connotes a bad taste. If, however, one analyzes propaganda into its most secret causes, one will arrive at different conclusions. The propagandist must know the soul of man. I cannot influence about the necessity of a given thing, if I do not understand the soul of this individual, if I do not understand how to strum that string on the harp of his soul which must be sounded. It is not true that the propagandist

¹²⁸Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 28.

¹²⁹Italics throughout the text are Goebbels'.

does nothing more except to hand out complicated thought processes in roughest form, in an unboiled state to the masses. The propagandist must not only know the soul of the people in general, but must also understand the secret movements of the nation's soul from one side to another. The propagandist does not only face the nation in its entirety, but also speaks to the worker, the farmer, the citizen, the German Southerner and the German Northerner. He must be able to speak to various professions and to the various faiths. The propagandist must always be in the position to speak to the people whom he understands. These abilities are the basic prerequisites to success.

.....
The new ministry has no other purpose than to organize the nation solidly behind the idea of the national revolution. If the goal is achieved, one may criticize my methods severely; it wouldn't matter since the ministry would then have achieved the goal through all the work. But if the goal is not realized, then I might be able to prove that my methods of propaganda meet all aesthetic laws, but then I should have become a theater stage manager, or director of an art institute instead of Minister of a Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda.

.....
With the passage of time revolutionary changes have been brought about in all areas, especially in technology. Today we live in the era of radio, of great mass demonstrations; mass assemblies involving one hundred, two hundred or three hundred thousand people are no longer impossible for us.

The most important assignment for this Ministry must be the following: at first all propaganda attempts and all institutions of national enlightenment of the nation and districts must be centrally unified in one hand. Furthermore, it must become our task to breathe life into the propaganda developments to give it a new pulse which brings them up to date with the present. One may not permit technology the freedom to run ahead of the Reich, but rather the Reich must be in step with the technology. The most modern developments are barely good enough. We happen to live in a period of time where the masses must stand behind politics. . . The modern national leaders must be national kings, they must understand the masses, but do not have to appease the masses. They have the responsibility to tell the masses what they want to do and to clarify this for the masses so that it is understood. . . It is the responsibility of political propaganda, to simplify involved thought processes to such a degree that even the simplest man on the street understands them in the end. The people are not as irrational as it is frequently assumed. . .

.....

...We must make it clear to the people why the situation is the way it is and why we must take those measures to change the situation.

.....
I think it is incomprehensible that a national event, as for instance the opening of a new Reichstag or a service in the Church of Potsdam or a parade of the Regiment of Potsdam reviewed by the Herr President should take place with only 10 to 15,000 people present. That would be antiquated. A government which permits such developments must not be surprised when no more than 15,000 people display an interest in such a national event. On the contrary, I believe it to be of the utmost importance that the entire nation-- for this we have the necessary technological aids-- should take part and listen directly to such events. Once television is discovered, then the entire nation shall view the developments of these events. . . .The radio should not only make it possible for the people to take part directly in the significant events of the times, but this medium, at the same time, should help in the cultivation of German art, German science and German music.

.....
. . .The press may criticize the government, but may not do so in order to swindle the nation out of the hands of the government. Against such tactics the government will advance with all means.

As I have already indicated, the press should not only inform but also instruct.

.....
When I speak about the areas of the theater and film, I expressly indicate that those questions, insofar as they are developed by provincial interests, shall not be interfered with and will be considered by the division of the new Ministry only when national interests are at stake. . .

In the fifth area, the area of National Enlightenment, we must attempt to carry a unified national spirit to the people, which, so to speak, is the new foundation of the national government, so that everyone will understand what we desire, so that the entire nation will begin to react uniformly and so that everyone serves this government with total sympathy.

Eventually we will win the entire nation for our cause. We don't want to accomplish this through the ban of newspapers, but through gradual influence upon the nation, 130
by means of building and formation of public opinion. . .

On June 30, 1933, a decree supporting Goebbels' point of view informed

¹³⁰ Joseph Goebbels, Goebbels Spricht: Reden aus Kampf und Sieg, (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1933), pp. 46-62. Translated by the writer.

all German people that,

'The Reich Minister for National Enlightenment and Propaganda is in control of all questions connected with the exercise of an intellectual and moral influence upon the nation, propaganda in the interest of the state, of culture and of national economy, the instruction of public opinion at home and abroad concerning the same, and the administration of all organizations to serve these ends.'¹³¹

Under Goebbels' organizational leadership the ministry was divided into seven sub-chambers headed by the Chamber of Culture, which was officially set up on November 22, 1933. With the formal opening of the main chamber, the German people experienced for the first time the organizational attempt made on the part of the National Socialist leaders to unite them according to their professions and vocations, as well as to replace "all former organizations by a State institution with enforced membership."¹³²

The seven sub-chambers were concerned with the management and control of literature, press, broadcasting, theater, music, art, and films. Any individual who was directly engaged in cultural work was required to join one or more guilds or "Fachschaften", ("branches") which in turn were part of the sub-chambers. To dispell any question about what individual ought to belong to which chamber, Goebbels announced that "'whosoever takes part in the creation, reproduction, spiritual or technical manufacture, distribution, preservation, sales or in the propagation of sales, of cultural goods, must be a member of the appropriate sub-chamber."¹³³

The ramification of this decree is readily apparent. With the restric-

¹³¹Oswald Dutch, op. cit., p. 64.

¹³²F. W. Pick, op. cit., p. 39.

¹³³Ibid., p. 40.

tions and controls clearly established, any individual deemed undesirable by the National Socialist leaders was successfully deterred from living or working in the German society.

When the Reichsminister first began to operate his ministry, he employed 150 officials and 200 employees. By 1936, there were 800 officials and 1,600 employees. A year later about 3,000 people worked for the Ministry for National Enlightenment and Propaganda; and towards the end of World War II, twenty two buildings had been erected while thirty two others were rented for the propagation of the National Socialist doctrines and the enlightenment of the people. By 1937, between 300 to 500 persons unsuccessfully attempted to see the Minister personally, and approximately 5,000 letters arrived daily, of which everyone had to be answered within twenty-four hours.¹³⁴

From the very beginning, Goebbels chose his assistants and secretaries with great care. He was more concerned with their proved abilities than with their party loyalty. The Reichsminister differed from most other ministers in that he did not treat the assignments of jobs as special favors or rewards. He gave his staff an impressive amount of freedom, was responsive to original contributions, encouraged initiative, and seldom bothered to supervise personally details of individual assignments. He strongly opposed "standardization" methods employed in other ministries, "which seemed to be the chief aim of all the 'little Hitlers' who were springing up all over Germany."¹³⁵ Moreover, Goebbels seldom became personally involved with his staff. Although several of his adjutants lived

¹³⁴Riess, op. cit., pp. 175-176.

¹³⁵Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 101.

in his house, particularly during World War II, his attitude toward the employees of the Ministry prompted Rudolf Semmler to write in his diary on January 13, 1941:

Goebbels wants no real personal contact with his staff. He prefers them to be working machines, without personality, which can be switched on and off as he pleases. Frowein says that he thinks of his fellow men and staff as he thinks of his fountain-pen or his wrist-watch- useful articles which have to be changed or repaired from time to time.¹³⁶

The relative ease with which Goebbels explained the purpose of his Ministry and enacted the policies were to some extent indicative of the status and prestige which he enjoyed following his appointment to the cabinet. It is perhaps with these developments in mind that William L. Shirer designated Goebbels as "the third most important man in the Nazi Party,"¹³⁷ by midsummer of 1933. Four years later, Stephen H. Roberts was granted a study-leave from the University of Sydney and studied the "New Germany" from 1935 to 1937. In spite of the fact that the National Socialist leaders were aware of Mr. Stephen's "objective" critical analysis, they permitted him to examine a series of official documents. From his careful analysis of the political conditions in Germany, he concluded at that time that Goebbels, because of his influential position, had become "the most dangerous man in Europe, precisely because he. . . /was/. . . so diabolically clever and so frankly Mechiavellian in his views of mankind and the methods he would employ."¹³⁸

The War Years: 1939-1945.-- With the advent of World War II, Goebbels'

¹³⁶Semmler, op. cit., p. 15.

¹³⁷William L. Shirer, op. cit., p. 204.

¹³⁸Stephen H. Roberts, The House that Hitler Built, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 29.

capabilities as Reichsminister for National Enlightenment and Propaganda were taxed to the utmost. Most authorities seem to agree that he did not want war. He had had ample experience with propaganda and persuasive tactics which had served the desired ends of the National Socialists. Furthermore, Goebbels "realized better than Hitler himself that to fight wars by means of arms meant putting the conduct of the Nazi campaign for power into the hands of professional soldiers, who would immediately be given an opportunity to attempt the frustration of Hitler's ambitions by demands of military tactics."¹³⁹ Even though the professional soldiers failed to take advantage of their opportunity and the first three years of the war, which Goebbels frequently referred to as "the years of triumph", were favorable for Germany, the Reichsminister was apprehensive and less optimistic than most of the other leaders of the party.

With the progression of World War II, Goebbels' ingenuity was frequently challenged. For the first three years when the German armies experienced victory upon victory, the Reichsminister's responsibilities at home consisted primarily of keeping "the limelight focused on the right news at the right time and in the right place for the right audience."¹⁴⁰ Goebbels further attempted to prepare the people for war as early as 1938, by writing articles entitled, "War In Sight?", and "Who Wants War?" Furthermore, for each significant event during the subsequent years, the Reichsminister attempted to invent and apply carefully thought out propaganda campaigns. [See Chapter III]. In most instances he appeared to be relatively successful, but there were some occasions which Goebbels could

¹³⁹ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 166.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 170.

not foresee or which he was not aware of. One of these was the German-Russian pact which was announced over the German radio on Monday, August 21, 1939. In the weeks and months prior to this announcement Goebbels had criticized the Western powers because they refused to battle Communism. Now he was forced to make a drastic change, and without the slightest hesitation he wrote in his own newspaper, Der Angriff:

'The world stands before a towering fact: two peoples have placed themselves on the basis of a common foreign policy which during a long and traditional friendship¹⁴¹ has produced a foundation for a common understanding.'

The common understanding appeared to vanish rapidly, however, because the German armies crossed the Russian frontier at dawn on June 22, 1941, and "within a few days. . . had driven deep into Soviet territory and within three weeks reached Smolensk, some 200 miles from Moscow."¹⁴²

It was during this period that Goebbels began to feel that a new long-term propaganda policy was necessary. Particularly, he realized, a post-conquest program was necessary in the 'years of triumph', "not only in a practical way for the actual peoples conquered, but to give the conquering Germans something to fight for."¹⁴³ Consequently, the Reichsminister began to spend much time and care on his political articles of which he was very proud and which led him to report in his diary on numerous occasions that they had achieved their desired effect. On January 31, 1942, for instance, he observed:

I continue to receive an enormous number of letters which on the whole are very favorable. Above all there is praise for my articles in the Reich, which apparently¹⁴⁴ are exerting the greatest influence upon public opinion.

¹⁴¹Riess, op. cit., p. 214.

¹⁴²Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 169.

¹⁴³Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 173.

Goebbels also spent much time on developing the Party Propaganda Department which he headed. He gave particular attention to the development of a party speaker system in which orators and agitators underwent special training at centers set up in everyone of the forty-three districts in Germany. [See Chapter III]. He was further concerned with those sections of the department which were instrumental in staging demonstrations and rallies and the promotion of political broadcasts and their reception on the national and international level.¹⁴⁵

Another organizational attempt undertaken by the Reichsminister during the early years of the war was the formation of propaganda companies which utilized as many of the mass media as possible to bring the battle actions to the people. According to Curt Riess, "Goebbels described these propaganda battalions as something entirely new and unique in the field of war reporting, which was perfectly true. (The idea was later copied by the U.S. Marines.)"¹⁴⁶

At the very beginning of the campaign against France, Goebbels immediately put his carefully worked-out plans to work. In the early stages of the war, thousands of letters were sent to private citizens with the intent to start a whispering campaign in France. Soon the French soldiers, too, were subject to a war of nerves. In describing some of the experiences which the soldiers had to endure at the Maginot Line, Curt Riess reported:

If a Frenchman left cover, no one shot at him. German officers, with the air of tennis players who patiently

¹⁴⁴Lochner, op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁴⁵Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 173.

¹⁴⁶Riess, op. cit., p. 223.

wait until their opponent has gone back into position before they continue the match, allowed him to get away unharmed. Sometimes at night French soldiers were commandeered to do repair work at some point of the fortifications. Suddenly floodlights would be directed to the spot, but loudspeakers assured the startled Frenchmen that they had nothing to fear. The Germans would not shoot but only wanted to help them by providing indispensable illumination.¹⁴⁷

Goebbels' propaganda worked with such precision that the French people fell prey to his attempts. Thus, on one occasion a trip of the French President, shrouded in secrecy and organized with elaborate precautions, was announced by German loudspeakers at the exact section of the front where the President had arrived. On another occasion while Winston Churchill was sitting down to lunch at the Maginot Line, the exact menu was announced by the Germans while he was being served. Other techniques which Goebbels employed to advantage were predictions attributed to Nostradamus, a Belgian periodical which was sent to French soldiers via Switzerland in which only the puzzle section was changed, and pornographic pictures which were circulated among the soldiers designed to arouse their fear and jealousy against their women and the British who were supposedly the subjects of such pictures.¹⁴⁸

Following the collapse of the French resistance, Goebbels was forced to change his propaganda techniques somewhat. The German people generally were under the impression that the war would soon be over. Thus, "Goebbels had to take immediate measures to revive their enthusiasm for the war and he transmitted at once a number of "confidential" instructions to his propaganda offices in the Reich. While visiting the ruins of the Propaganda

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 233.

Ministry following World War II, Curt Riess found the original document which contained these official directives, which in part read:

'August 2, 1940. . . In dealing with the subject of France the speakers are requested to present emphatically the following ideas to the people: all the talk about the innocence of the French people in connection with precipitating the war. . . is to be refuted categorically. The mood and attitude of the French people has been decidedly anti-German. . . The treatment of German military and civilian prisoners in France is further proof of this hostility towards all things German. . .

' . . . Hence the speakers are to suppress any feelings of compassion about the fate of the French people. . . In dealing with our remaining principal enemy, England, the speakers are to point out that we do not judge the British by the same yardstick as we do any other European nation. The Englishman does not feel any common bond with the destiny of the whole of Europe. . . At the same time the speakers must refrain from creating the impression that the coming battle will be child's play. . .'

' . . . All speeches are to culminate in the condemnation of the plutocrats, while the English people as such are to be described as the victims of their masters' brutal greed. . . There have been rumors saying the defeat of Britain will be followed immediately by a war with Russia. This calls for the following comment: these rumors are entirely without foundation. In explaining this point to the audience the principal proof is to be found in the Fuehrer's speech. Furthermore, the speakers are to see to it that there will be no press reports on the subject (of a war with Russia).'

' . . . The speakers are requested to make no detailed, glowing promises on the subject of the European New Order after the war. All future questions in this respect are subject to the Fuehrer's decision. . . The solution of this task demands the leadership of the racially finest and most efficient nation in Europe. . .'¹⁴⁹

In May, 1941, Goebbels introduced his special announcement technique which interrupted whatever program was on the radio. These announcements were preceded by fanfares. In devising this technique, Goebbels indirectly gave some indication of the care with which he planned his propa-

¹⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 236-237.

ganda attempts. Thus, before these special announcements were broadcast, he experimented with the interval of the fanfares, the time needed for the housewife to get to the living room from the kitchen, and other similar problems. To observe the effects of such special announcements, the Reichsminister further "called in his own family, actors and actresses, his secretaries, and they all had to listen."¹⁵⁰

Goebbels also became a prolific writer. With the same care and determination he developed his many articles for Das Reich, [The Nation] a newspaper which appeared on May 26, 1940, for the first time, the Voelkischer Beobachter, Der Angriff, and others, which met with acclaim even among "neutral" and "oppositional" readers. In pointing to one of the factors which contributed most to the success of his articles, Curt Riess observed that "it was probably first and foremost his style which left the deepest impression on his readers' minds, the style of which Goebbels himself had written that like the feeling for propaganda it could not be learned."¹⁵¹

Towards the end of 1941, a series of strategic blunders on the part of the National Socialist leadership forced Goebbels in essence to shift ground in terms of his propaganda campaigns. By October of that year, Hitler had declared in one of his Sportpalast speeches, "I can tell you now-- and I would not say this until now-- that the enemy in the east has been struck down and will never rise again."¹⁵² A few days later Hitler also permitted the announcement to be made that only two Russian armies were in the field and these would soon be annihilated. However, this

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 234.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 248.

¹⁵²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 179.

announcement was made without Goebbels' knowledge. Since the victory was not forthcoming, as Goebbels well knew, his fury knew no bounds. In addition, Hess's flight to England had added to the confusion and distrust among the people. For several days following the Hess incident, Goebbels and Hitler held their breath. On May 19, 1941, Goebbels confided to his aide, Rudolf Semmler, that he was amazed that Churchill had failed to bring about the gigantic catastrophe which he could have if had he used the Hess story with real propaganda skill. Goebbels added, "One had only to think of the false statements and views with which Hess could have been made to credit Hitler, statements which might have wrecked our friendship with Italy and Japan without our being able to put up any defense."¹⁵³ In addition, the Reichsminister realized more and more that Hitler began to rely upon his military strategy alone, while Goebbels believed "the practice of propaganda implied an active participation in shaping policy."¹⁵⁴

Since Goebbels believed that Hitler was no longer taking him into his personal confidence, the Reichsminister began to act with greater independence. He knew that the war would be long and hard and that the German people would feel let down because they had not been prepared adequately. Consequently, Goebbels instituted a series of new propaganda campaigns in light of the comments which he had made in the presence of Rudolf Semmler on April 15, 1941, when he observed, "I myself hope that during this momentous struggle I can play a political role as spiritual physician of the nation."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Semmler, op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁵⁴ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 186.

¹⁵⁵ Semmler, op. cit., p. 28.

When the first signs of discontent appeared among the German people, Goebbels invented two quarrelsome, fictitious characters, Herr Bramsig and Frau Knoeterich, whom he severely took to task. [See Chapter III]. In addition, he called upon the members of the propaganda companies and the press and issued new instructions. He insisted upon tough, realistic reports from the front lines. He was aware of the fact "that soon hundreds of hospital trains would roll into the country, filled with soldiers without legs, arms, or eyes; soldiers who had dreadful stories to tell. He had to do everything to prepare the people at home and abroad for what was in store for them."¹⁵⁶ On December 12, when Hitler declared war on the United States, Goebbels stepped up his campaign against the Jews, since "America had entered the war 'to save the Jews'. . ."¹⁵⁷ Again on December 21, 1941, he appealed for the collection of winter clothes for the front lines in underscoring the seriousness of the situation. During the early winter months of 1942, the Reichsminister began to exploit the German submarine victories. They were announced by "Sondermeldungen", ["special announcements"] and introduced by fanfares. Goebbels chose to focus attention upon their feats because "the exploits of the submarine crews were surrounded by mystery, romanticism, and a sense of adventure comparable perhaps to the daring feats of the pilots-- and their accuracy could not be checked."¹⁵⁸ He also pointed to the successes of General Rommel, the phantom general of Africa, as representative examples of German heroism.

¹⁵⁶Riess, op. cit., pp. 267-268.

¹⁵⁷Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., pp. 182-183.

¹⁵⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 293.

Under the pressures which weighed heavily upon him, Goebbels' personality underwent a noticeable change. He adopted a military vocabulary, he seldom made jokes, and he demanded merciless, purposeful concentration on the part of his assistants and secretaries to the tasks which he had assigned them. The articles which he continued to write for Das Reich became calm and soothing and were read over the radio, whereupon, "after every transmission thousands of letters poured in from all parts of the country proving that Goebbels had struck the right note."¹⁵⁹ This response prompted him to observe on February 8, 1942, "U. S. papers were writing several days ago that all hopes for the collapse of German morale have to be definitely buried."¹⁶⁰

On August 26, 1942, Radio Moscow reported that the battle for Stalingrad had begun. For Goebbels this announcement meant that a new crisis had started. The crisis grew in proportion when Hitler spoke in the Sportpalast on September 30, and insisted: "The occupation of Stalingrad which will be concluded will become a gigantic success and we will deepen and strengthen this success. And you can be of the firm conviction that no human being shall ever push us away from that spot."¹⁶¹ Other problems were added to the situation when in the last days of October General Montgomery successfully routed Rommel's forces in Africa and on November 8, the American forces landed there. On that day Hitler announced that Stalingrad had been taken.

The weeks and months that followed were to become again one of the most

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 286.

¹⁶⁰Ibid.

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 293

difficult periods in Goebbels' career. On December 16, 1942, for instance, a Dr. Kumerow, an engineer and departmental head in the Loewe wireless equipment factory in Berlin, planned an attempt on Goebbels' life. Under the pretense of going fishing at Wannsee, he planned to blow up the bridge which Goebbels used daily to get to his Schwanenwerder Island home. Arrested while placing the charge from his boat, Dr. Kumerow was condemned to death by the People's Court, but no public announcement was made of the incident. Instead Goebbels received a huge, armoured Mercedes from Hitler as a Christmas present which "had been built on Hitler's orders for his closest colleagues."¹⁶² Yet without any hesitation and with renewed energy and determination the Reichsminister attempted to come to grips with the rapidly deteriorating military and political situation. In this respect two factors came to his aid. First was the Allied declaration of "Unconditional Surrender" issued at Casablanca in January, 1943, which provided little opportunity for the German military leaders to negotiate a peace settlement or for the German resistance to gain support among the populace. The second factor was the stepped up Allied air attacks which Goebbels branded as "terror attacks", and which "filled the people with anger and indignation, . . . [and] . . . strengthened their determination to continue the war."¹⁶³

Goebbels was deeply concerned about the nightly Allied air attacks. He felt it to be his personal obligation to restore the morale of a people who had been told earlier not to expect such attacks because of the superiority of the German Luftwaffe. The Reichsminister went to many

¹⁶²Semmler, op. cit., p. 61.

¹⁶³Riess, op. cit., p. 303.

bombed cities and attempted to encourage resistance and endurance. In Cologne he told an audience:

'The Reich will never forget what this town has so bravely taken on itself. . . What matters now is not to achieve transient successes; we must win substantial victories so as to win the war. It is comprehensible that Churchill and Roosevelt should try to find a way out by resorting to terror raids. But, as last winter, with its dangerous strain on a Germany at war, the expression coined by Nietzsche still holds good: 'What fails to kill us, adds to our strength.'¹⁶⁴

In discussing Goebbels' activities with specific reference to the air raids and his effect upon the people, Wilfred von Oven gave a detailed report while accompanying the Reichsminister on one of his missions. On June 23, 1943, for instance, von Oven reported that the "bomb terror" of the enemy had reached its climax during those weeks. The downtown district of Duesseldorf had been systematically erased, Wuppertal had been transformed into rubble and ashes, and Dortmund and many other beautiful and busy cities had been destroyed beyond recognition. The sorrow of the populace affected by these raids, von Oven commented, could not be measured and the loss of property and lives was high. No one any longer made jokes about Hermann Goering, who once had promised the German people that an enemy plane would never penetrate or be sighted beyond the German border. With these experiences in mind, von Oven, visibly disturbed asked, "Was it not required that one of our leading men should drive to the destroyed cities like Churchill had done during the 'Blitz' war? Was not Goering obliged to do so since Hitler was preoccupied with more important business? He didn't do it. Because of fear? Because it was inconvenient? Because of dread of the responsibility? What he refused to do, Goebbels did."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 187.

Goebbels drove directly into the hard-hit areas, spoke at the burial of 3,000 victims in Elberfeld, [see Chapter I] visited the ruins of Duesseldorf and Bochum, and finally gave another speech at a mass assembly in the partially destroyed Westfalenhalle at Dortmund. In specifically describing this event, von Oven reported:

Without a doubt it was a gamble. He knew of the anonymous threatening letters which came from the Rhineland, he knew of the seriousness of the situation and the public opinion which was everything else but pleasant here. But in contrast to Goring, the difficulty of the task challenges him, yes, it prompts his activity and increases his powers. The trip was a huge success. The people did not throw stones at him. They did, however, jump on the running board of the car, yes, even stopped him, but not to inflict harm upon the Doctor, but to shake hands with him and to give him messages of greetings for the Fuehrer.

The speech in Dortmund was a rhetorical masterpiece. The mood of the 20,000 in the Westfalenhalle, through whose broken windows the wind blew a smokey scent, was, if not exactly alien, then at least sceptical and reserved. But oh, how he handled them! He knew only too well that the party phrases were out of place here. In a sense, he took them into his confidence. He admitted that we had experienced setbacks, yes, had made mistakes. We Germans are not used to such talk on the part of the party speakers. This Goebbels, however, really says it. With a wink in the eye he says in essence: 'I can speak in all frankness with you!' And those who are used to hearing and reading that everything is on the up and up that is done up there, suddenly begin to pay attention. They feel that they are being considered in earnestness. Oh, he is a master, this Doctor. He knows exactly what is effective. And in a few minutes he has moved the people so far that they forget sorrow and rubble, danger and grief and applaud and shout approval.

Now he even uses the Rhineland dialect, his home dialect. That is their man! And the wonder happens: in the middle of the dark surroundings, the most alien mood at the beginning changes into a turbulent demonstration with spontaneous approval and roaring shouts of Heil. When he then began to speak of the coming retaliation with new weapons, the 'Armada of Revenge,' the enthusiasm has no end. He holds these people here completely in his hands. They will literally go through the fire for him and the cause which he represents. A significant internal crisis has been overcome. The Doctor has

¹⁶⁵von Oven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 29.

actually won a battle.¹⁶⁶

There seems to be some evidence which suggests that Goebbels was profoundly affected by the sights and reports which he received about the Allied bombing raids. In this respect, Rudolf Semmler reported in his diary on February 16, 1945:

For the first time I saw Goebbels lose control of himself when two days ago he was given the stark reports of the disaster in Dresden. The tears came into his eyes with grief and rage and shock. Twenty minutes later I saw him again. He was still crying and looked a broken man.¹⁶⁷

During the early weeks of 1943, Goebbels began to talk more and more about his plan for "total war". The term "totaler Krieg" was initially employed by General Ludendorff towards the end of World War I when he attempted and failed to move the German people on to complete sacrifice for the war effort. Goebbels also had employed this term during the Christmas season of 1939, but only as a high sounding phrase.¹⁶⁸ On January 15, 1943, however, the Reichsminister announced a new policy in which the term "total war" played a significant role, for as Rudolf Semmler declared:

'TOTAL WAR' is the slogan which fills Goebbels's mind at the moment. If someone says in front of him that the position at the front is catastrophic, he admits it but goes on to push the idea aside. He starts rhapsodising with hectic enthusiasm about how everything is going to change. Soon we shall be strong enough to deal a devastating blow at the enemy. For the real war is only just beginning- total war.

Up till now, he insists, we have failed to get decisive results because the last ten per cent. of effort was missing- at Moscow, at Leningrad, and now at Stalingrad. In future there would be not merely ten per cent. in reserve but

¹⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 29-30.

¹⁶⁷Semmler, op. cit., p. 181.

¹⁶⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 311.

thirty and forty per cent.¹⁶⁹

A few days later, Goebbels experienced a bitter setback "when Hitler appointed a Committee of Three- Lammers, Bormann and Keitel- to carry out what Goebbels claimed were his own plans to put Germany on a total-war basis."¹⁷⁰ When it seemed to him that the Committee of Three were not acting with the necessary decisiveness and speed, Goebbels attempted to force the issue by delivering his "basic" speech in the Sportpalast on February 18, 1943.

The "basic" speech was to become the most significant public address delivered in his career, for "he staked everything on this speech. . . [and] was determined, without Hitler's knowledge or consent, to put before the German people in the plainest possible terms exactly what the situation would require of them, exactly what 'total war' meant."¹⁷¹

Towards the end of January, 1943, the Russians were able to point to considerable success in defending Stalingrad against the German Sixth Army. On January 30, Hitler was expected to address the nation on the tenth anniversary of the National Socialist seizure of power. A year earlier Hitler had discussed the annual party anniversary and his role as primary speaker by telling his friends:

. . . it's better that it should be I who speaks on the 30th, and not Goebbels. When it's a question of raising morale, I know how to preserve the golden mean between reason and rhetoric. In his last appeal, Goebbels exhorted the soldiers at the front to remain tough and calm. I'd not have expressed myself like that. In such a situation, the soldier is not calm, but resolved.

¹⁶⁹ Semmler, op. cit., p. 65.

¹⁷⁰ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 230.

¹⁷¹ Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 199.

One must have been through it to understand these matters.¹⁷²

Yet on the night on the tenth anniversary, Hitler refused to speak. He said "he would not confront them again. . . until he was able to offer them another victory- for which he hoped against hope."¹⁷³ In his place, Goebbels read a proclamation of the Fuehrer and told his listeners that "in this winter our soldiers are facing a new defensive battle of unparalleled severity. . . Who knows when and where we will be called for a final decision in this war."¹⁷⁴ In an attempt at being honest and straight-forward, the Reichsminister tried to live up to a principle which he spelled out in his diary on March 15, 1943, when he wrote:

In wartime one can achieve certain successes by silence, but one can also gain certain results by very frank and candid talk. Since silence is the rule, speech is something extraordinary. Its effect is all the more sensational and convincing.¹⁷⁵

Before Bormann's appointment to the Committee of Three, he had been a frequent visitor at the Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda. During his visits from December 1942 to January 1943, Bormann had urged Goebbels to step up the propaganda campaigns. He wanted the party speakers to deliver more speeches with greater determination and more promises, including a grand victory that was waiting just around the corner. Goebbels reacted favorably to these suggestions and advised his speakers:

'Propaganda is the art of simplification. . . Propaganda must be as simple and coarse as a woodcut. It is

¹⁷² Bormann, op. cit., pp. 184-185.

¹⁷³ Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 196.

¹⁷⁴ Riess, op. cit., p. 313.

¹⁷⁵ Lochner, op. cit., p. 299.

much easier to give a highly learned lecture before a group of scientists than to present the same topic in simple, intelligible terms, although the details may not exactly correspond to the complexities of the subject.¹⁷⁶

Yet, according to Goebbels' own personal observations the German people were not responding as favorably as he had hoped they would, for he reported in his diary that "a lot of criticism is contained in the letters reaching us. Morale among the masses is so low as to be rather serious. Even people of good will are now worried about further developments."¹⁷⁷ Thus, the Reichsminister embarked upon his campaign of frankness and realism. In this respect, particularly after the fall of Stalingrad, Rudolf Semmler reported that Goebbels had used the following example to illustrate his new approach to propaganda:

'A horseman with fine boots and snowy-white breeches is very frightened of passing through a dirty puddle. The thought of what might happen is intolerable. Once he has been splashed he gets very angry; but he will not worry about further puddles. Once he gets dirty the catastrophe is over. . .'¹⁷⁸

In analyzing this particular period, Ernst Kris and Hans Speier observed that "in adopting frankness and realism as devices of persuasion, Goebbels hoped to retain the initiative in his struggle against the growth of doubt among the Germans."¹⁷⁹ Citing another of Goebbels' methods, the authors explained that the Reichsminister publicly uttered complaints that he knew the populace was making privately and thereby redirected their ag-

¹⁷⁶Riess, op. cit., p. 307.

¹⁷⁷Lochner, op. cit., p. 380.

¹⁷⁸Semmler, op. cit., p. 72.

¹⁷⁹Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 47.

gressive behavior. Whenever he recognized a complaint as being justifiable, Goebbels promised to make the necessary corrections. If, however, he believed them to be simply unacceptable, the Reichsminister would exaggerate them and attribute them to those factions with whom no German, he assumed, would want to be identified. In this way, the authors contended, "frankness enabled the propagandist to further the pretense of popular participation and shift the responsibility on to the people."¹⁸⁰

In spite of these comments and observations, however, Goebbels appeared to feel a certain amount of responsibility in regard to his "total war" effort. Thus, two days before he had confided to his diary that the morale of the masses was very low, he observed that,

Total war is giving me a lot of work to do, but matters are progressing according to rule and program. I have received a great number of letters— more than 15,000 in but a few weeks. All of these letters testify to the unqualified agreement of public opinion with my views, as well as to the great confidence of the letter writers in me— a thing about which I am very happy. I must try to justify this confidence; in other words, in case errors are committed in the realm of total war, I simply cannot fade out of the picture. The people identify the idea and conception of total war with my person. I am therefore in a certain sense publicly responsible for the continuation of total war.¹⁸¹

In a more optimistic manner, Goebbels wrote on July 25, 1943 that the letters which continued to reach his office were full of praise for his work. Moreover, with a certain amount of personal satisfaction he noted that "my activity as a writer and speaker is especially appreciated and is contrasted with the activity of a number of prominent people who hardly even face the public."¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Lochner, op. cit., p. 373.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 404.

Towards the end of 1943, the general military situation from the German point of view looked almost hopeless. Yet Goebbels' campaign for the "total war" effort and his frequent public appearances continued without interruption. People began to identify him as the most responsible and reliable individual among the leaders of National Socialism, as exemplified by an incident which Rudolf Semmler experienced in Berlin on November 24, 1943.

Wherever he is recognized he gets a friendly greeting in spite of everything. Even bombed-out people come and shake him by the hand. He is always ready with a jest. A woman who is engaged to be married complains that her whole home has been wrecked the very night before the wedding. She is no longer young: she tells Goebbels she is 55. 'Well then,' he says to comfort her, 'be thankful that it's your furniture that's gone and that your future husband is still alive. You can get new furniture all right but do you think you would find a new husband easily?' Many people gather round and laugh.¹⁸³

Goebbels also seemed to receive the trust and confidence of many of his assistants in the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. As late as April 20, 1944, Wilfred von Oven noted that the Reichsminister had delivered his traditional radio speech in celebration of Hitler's birthday without resorting to glittering generalities or trite expressions. "Even an expert speaker like Goebbels can do this only if he is moved by a true feeling," von Oven observed. "We listened to the transmission of his speech. It sounded real."¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³Semmler, op. cit., p. 110.

¹⁸⁴von Oven, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 235.

the morale of the people and the communication system, were so poor that Goebbels told his assistants in the ministry to make use of "poetic truth" in contrast to, or to amplify, "concrete truth." The assistants were informed to describe events as they might have happened or probably did happen. Goebbels justified this action by explaining to Rudolf Semmler and others that, "we are only helping the public when we call imagination to our aid in certain cases where the record of the facts is for some reason incomplete."¹⁸⁵

Joseph Goebbels continued to address the German people to the very end of his career. While recording the effect of his speeches during the last months prior to the collapse of the National Socialist party, Wilfred von Oven made some interesting observations. He noted that Goebbels regularly prerecorded all of his speeches on tape, a measure which he had employed for the first time on July 20, 1944, when an attempt on Hitler's life was made. With particular reference to the Reichsminister's speech on December 24, 1944, von Oven noted:

The Minister's traditional radio speech on Christmas Eve was a work of art. Uncounted women in all districts once again shed their tears of emotion as they listened. He spoke with warmth and touched the heart as a good father to his family. There was no unevenness in style or delivery. Every sentence was carefully weighted with stress and effect.¹⁸⁶

In the final weeks of his life, Goebbels concentrated his last effort on a propaganda campaign which was made up of two parts. The first was a tactical short range propaganda dedicated to the propagation of the war and motivated by the hope that with every new day a possible miracle

¹⁸⁵ Semmler, op. cit., p. 163.

¹⁸⁶ von Oven, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 197-198.

could change the destiny of National Socialism. But the second part, composed of a strategic long range propaganda, seemed to be of greater importance to the Reichsminister. In essence this kind of propaganda was not meant to propagate the National Socialist movement but rather to support the contention that Goebbels had been right in his historical analysis of the events that were to come. Thus, Goebbels staked everything on the belief that if some day the people were really desperate they would recall his prophesies and "think with longing of the good old days under the Nazis."¹⁸⁷ With this end in mind Goebbels wrote in his article, "The Year 2000,"

'At the Yalta Conference the three enemy war leaders, in order to carry out their programme of annihilation and extermination of the German people, have decided to keep the whole of Germany occupied until the year 2000. One cannot but admit that this project has certain grandiose aspects. . . How empty must be the brains of those three charlatans, or at least the brains of two of them! For the third, Stalin, has planned much further ahead than his two partners. . . If the German people surrender, the Soviets would occupy. . . the whole east and south-east of Europe, in addition to the larger part of Germany. In front of this enormous territory, including the Soviet Union, an iron curtain would go down. . . The rest of Europe would fall into political chaos which would be but a period of preparation for the coming of Bolshevism. . .

'Roosevelt would not be re-elected in 1948, and a Republican, that is, an isolationist, would become President of the United States. His first action would probably be to recall the American troops from the boiling cauldron of Europe. This would be applauded by the entire American public. . .'

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'Where are the days when Great Britain's word was important, even decisive in world politics? . . . It seems really naive that a British Prime Minister meddles in the arrangements for the political and social status of the Reich until the year 2000. During the years and decades to come England will be preoccupied with other worries. . . She will have to fight desperately to retain

¹⁸⁷ Riess, op. cit., p. 382.

a small part of the position of power she once enjoyed on every continent.'

.....
'One could have imagined another development for which it is too late now. The Fuehrer proposed it in numerous memoranda and offers directed to London, the last four weeks before this war began. He suggested co-ordinating German and British foreign policy in such a way that the Reich would respect England's sea power, while Great Britain would respect German land power. . . That both nations. . . would guarantee world peace. . . Bolshevism, under these circumstances, would have been restricted to its breeding place.¹⁸⁸

In this particular article, Curt Riess reported, Goebbels had also predicted a third world war in which Soviet Russia would successfully overpower Great Britain. The Reichsminister further prophesied that England would go Communist, that the iron curtain would fall anew, this time over all of Europe for five additional feverish years of war preparations, and then he added, "'the general attack against the United States will begin.' He continued: 'The Western hemisphere will be in its deadliest danger. The U. S. will curse the day when a long-forgotten American President in Yalta. . .made such developments possible. . .'"¹⁸⁹

On April 19, 1945, the eve of Hitler's birthday, Goebbels delivered his last important radio speech. Although he attempted to instill in his words a ring of hope, there seems to be an unmistakable air of finality about them, for Goebbels said in part:

I may have spoken in a happier or perhaps a less happy hour, but never before have matters been on the razor's edge as they are today. Never before has the German people had to defend its bare life under such enormous dangers and, by a last all-out effort, make sure that the Reich does not break apart.

This is not the time to celebrate the Fuehrer's birth-

¹⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 383-384.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., p. 383.

day with the usual words or to express our traditional good wishes to him. I have shared joy and sorrow with the Fuehrer, the unparalleled victories and the terrible setbacks of the crowded years from 1939 to today, and still I stand at his side and am convinced that fate will after the last hard test award the laurel wreath to him and his people. I can only say that these times, with all their somber and painful majesty, have found their only worthy representative in the Fuehrer. To him alone are thanks due that Germany still lives, and that the West, with its culture and civilization, has not been completely engulfed in the dark abyss which yawns before us. . . .

Wherever our enemies appear they bring poverty and sorrow, chaos and devastation, unemployment and hunger with them. What remains of the loudly proclaimed 'freedom' is something that would not be considered worthy of mankind in the darkest parts of Africa. We, on the other hand, have a clear program of restoration which has proved its worth in our own country and in all other European countries where it has a chance. Europe had the chance to choose between these two sides. She has chosen the side of anarchy and has to pay for it today.¹⁹⁰

Twelve days later Goebbels committed suicide with his wife after she had first poisoned their six children. The last statement which the Reichsminister, who had been elevated to the position of Reich Chancellor by Hitler on April 29, 1944, left for posterity was an Appendix to the Fuehrer's political testament. In essence, Goebbels' last public act was to compose a brief, clear, and pointed address to the German nation in which he proclaimed the reason for his death.¹⁹¹

'The Fuehrer has ordered me. . . should the defense of the Reich capital collapse, to leave Berlin, and to take part as a leading member in a government appointed by him.
'For the first time in my life I must categorically refuse to obey an order of the Fuehrer. My wife and children join me in this refusal. Otherwise—quite apart from the fact that feelings of humanity and loyalty forbid us to abandon the Fuehrer in his hour of greatest need—I should

¹⁹⁰Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., pp. 261-262.

¹⁹¹Ibid., p. 276.

appear for the rest of my life as a dishonourable traitor and common scoundrel, and should lose my own self-respect together with the respect of my fellow citizens; a respect I should need in any future attempt to shape the future of the German nation and State.

'In the delirium of treachery which surrounds the Fuehrer in these most critical days of the war, there must be someone at least who will stay with him unconditionally until death, even if this conflicts with the formal and (in a material sense) entirely justifiable order which he has given in his political testament.

'In doing this, I believe that I am doing the best service I can do to the future of the German people. In the hard times to come, examples will be more important than men. Men will always be found to lead the nation forward into freedom; but a reconstruction of our national life would be impossible unless developed on the basis of clear and obvious examples.

'For this reason, together with my wife, and on behalf of my children, who are too young to speak for themselves, but who would unreservedly agree with this decision if they were old enough, I express an unalterable resolution not to leave the Reich capital, even if it falls, but rather, at the side of the Fuehrer, to end a life which will have no further value to me if I cannot spend it in the service of the Fuehrer, and by his side.'¹⁹²

SUMMARY

The material of the previous sections in this chapter appears to suggest a number of observations which can be based upon those factors which seemed instrumental in influencing Joseph Goebbels, the man and speaker, as well as those which the Reichsminister utilized to influence others. In recording these observations it further appears desirable to classify them under the headings of: (1) Factors which motivated Goebbels to deliver his "basic" speech; (2) factors which contributed to his personal and social development; (3) factors which influenced his public behavior and conduct, and (4) factors which affected both Goebbels the speaker and those he employed to influence others.

¹⁹²H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, (New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 186.

1. Factors which motivated Goebbels to deliver his "basic" speech:

Perhaps one of the primary forces which prompted Goebbels to deliver the "basic" speech was the fact that the German armies began to experience strategic military setbacks towards the end of 1941. With the surrender of France during the spring of 1940, the German people had been led to believe that the war had been won. But instead, Hitler's Wehrmacht embarked upon its eastern campaign. At the same time Goebbels began to feel that Hitler was neglecting him and instead began to rely more and more upon military accomplishments. With newly acquired, but unrequested, independence from direct supervision, the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda began to interpret his role in the National Socialist hierarchy as the "spiritual physician of the nation." Thus, as the war progressed and the military situation began to deteriorate rapidly, Goebbels repeatedly attempted to bolster the morale of the German people by means of propaganda campaigns and persuasive techniques. At one point he invented two quarrelsome characters to give expression to the frustrations of the people in an attempt to redirect their aggressive tendencies. But he soon noted from the large volume of mail which reached the ministry that such attempts were almost futile.

By March, 1942, Goebbels managed to have Hitler place him in charge of the bomb-damaged areas in Germany. Furthermore, during the same period the Reichsminister constantly exerted pressure upon Hitler to give him increased power over the domestic affairs of Germany and to institute a campaign for total war.¹⁹³ Failing to obtain direct and immediate approval from Hitler, Goebbels tried to force the issue by publicly proclaiming his

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 300.

campaign for total warfare in January, 1943. Within the same month, however, Hitler appointed his Committee of Three to organize and supervise the total war effort and assigned Goebbels to the committee in an advisory capacity. The Reichsminister in turn appeared to interpret Hitler's move as a further indication of the Fuehrer's loss of confidence in him. Thus, Goebbels perceived himself to be confronted by a dilemma. On one hand he had pledged to obey Hitler's orders and to follow his instructions without question. On the other hand, he was also aware that because of the large amount of mail which the German people addressed to him, he was being identified with the total war effort.

In the Reichsminister's eyes the Committee of Three was a cumbersome and inefficient organization. In heated words he frequently described to his aides, particularly Rudolf Semmler and Wilfred von Oven, what he believed to be an impossible and demoralizing situation. Therefore, he looked for a means by which he could usurp the power from the Committee of Three, yet, at the same time, obtain Hitler's approval. Two events came to his support. The first was the tenth anniversary celebration of the National Socialist party on January 30, 1943. In previous years Hitler had been the most prominent speaker on this occasion. Now he refused to speak primarily because he felt he had little good news for the German people. Other party leaders similarly declined to make public appearances, but Goebbels spoke. He referred to the total war effort, making it a public issue. There were no reprimands from Hitler on that occasion nor did any of the other party leaders seem to object.

The Reichsminister soon provided a second opportunity to publicize his total war program. He called for another mass meeting in the Sportpalast in Berlin on February 18, 1943. He entitled his speech, "Now, Nation Arise

and Storm Break Loose," and devoted all of his time to the total war issue. [See Chapter V]. Observers who were present reported that this was perhaps the most outstanding public speech ever delivered throughout his career. The German people were impressed. Their letters to the Reichsminister expressed new hope and confidence in the speaker. Even Hitler was impressed and by August 24, 1944, Goebbels was appointed Reich Trustee for Total War.

2. Factors which contributed to Goebbels' personal and social development:

There seem to have been many factors which significantly influenced Joseph Goebbels' personal and social development. From the time he was a small boy, Goebbels appeared to perceive himself as being different from other youngsters his own age. When he was seven, he fell sick with osteomyelitis [inflammation of the bone-marrow] and soon appeared to compensate for his physical deformity. No doubt he was subject to frequent ridicule by other children and violently objected to the sympathetic approaches of adults. He became a secluded boy who lost himself in the daring deeds and romantic exploits of fictional characters in literature. In school he rapidly excelled as a scholar and graduated at the head of his high school class. At home he received considerably more attention from his parents than his brothers and sister and received a far better education than was normally provided for the children of most middle-class families.

It was during his adolescence that Goebbels appeared to develop an ambitious nature and a desire for relentless physical and mental activity. Both of these factors seemed to give rise to many comments years later by observers the world over, who told of Goebbels' impressive endurance. It is further believed that the crippling disease and Goebbels' rejection from

military service may have contributed to his obsession that he had to prove himself to others. It was also during this period that he developed an appreciation for art and music. In one of his many conversations with Wilfred von Oven, Goebbels explained how a piano purchased by his father first had stimulated his interest in these areas.

The years which Joseph Goebbels spent in attending a host of universities seem to reflect indecision and instability in his basic personality make-up. He spent most of his time studying ancient and contemporary history, literature and art. But Goebbels also aspired to become a writer, became involved in a series of love affairs, and established friendships with Richard Flisges and Fritz Prang, who both were instrumental in shaping his philosophy of life. In his study of history, Goebbels soon discovered his favorite personality, Frederick the Great, to whom he referred repeatedly in his speeches and writings. His attraction to the Prussian king was indicated by Wilfred von Oven to some extent by a description of the Reichsminister's office in the ministry. Mr. von Oven reported:

To the left of the desk hangs a picture of Frederick the Great, who looks stern--it appears to me--upon the desk of that man, who cites him in almost every essay and every speech. The old king [alte Fritz] generally appears to be the guardian of Goebbels' thoughts. I have counted six different portraits of the great Prussian king in the house so far.¹⁹⁴

In spite of his meandering ways during the university days Goebbels was almost always identified as an intelligent and well-educated individual. Yet, an analysis of his relationship with the Catholic Church which had made his university attendance possible also seems to demonstrate his

¹⁹⁴von Oven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 27.

basic indecision and instability referred to above. Both of his parents were devout Catholics. Goebbels too, had been conscientious in his church attendance and during his childhood even aspired to becoming a priest. But the further he became removed from his parental environment the more he appeared to withdraw from the Catholic faith. When he began his university studies, he corresponded regularly with the church officials. However, with the progression of his studies this regularity was soon replaced by intermittent and sporadic correspondence until it subsided altogether. Instead, Goebbels devoted his attention to his friend, Richard Flisges, a pacifist war veteran who had strong Communist leanings. The influence which Flisges exerted upon Goebbels was extremely great. The roots of the Reichsminister's philosophy of life appear to have been firmly entrenched at this time. Not only was he exposed to the writings of Marx and Lenin, but the friends frequently engaged in disputations which were analogous to dialectic exercises. The thoughts and ideas which passed through Goebbels' mind during this period are revealed to some extent in his autobiographical novel, Michael. In essence Goebbels believed, as did so many other young men of his generation, that the world in general and Germany in particular possessed little inspiration and few rewards for their inhabitants. It was with this point of view in mind that Goebbels evaluated society at large by declaring, "We are all sick." The social and economic conditions in Germany seemed to support his contention to some degree. Thus, most authorities seem to designate the period of Goebbels' growth to manhood as being both unstable and unhealthy.

There seems to be relatively little evidence which suggests that Joseph Goebbels had formulated any precise or definite political views at this time. Perhaps his friendship with Fritz Prang became the motivating

force which introduced him to National Socialism. Some authorities suggest that he was primarily concerned with finding a leader rather than selecting a political faction or party with which he could identify. Moreover, it has frequently been suggested that Goebbels, once having been won over to Hitler's cause, pledged his energy to the National Socialist movement and finally even his life. A number of authorities have gone as far as to suggest that Goebbels probably would have joined any cause provided a leader like Hitler had been present. This viewpoint seems to be substantiated in part by Goebbels' behavior during his relationships with Franz Wieggershaus and the Strasser brothers. In both instances he was indebted to these individuals since they were instrumental in providing him with employment. Yet, he rejected these relationships in order to improve his social status and position. He even recanted his political position by first denouncing National Socialism while in the employment of Wieggershaus and then supporting Hitler's cause when he left the employment of the Strassers. Fundamentally Goebbels appeared to operate, even at this time, on the principle that the end justifies any means.

Much like his constant maneuvering for a better social position, Goebbels appeared to fluctuate in terms of his personality make-up. Throughout his career he frankly admitted that he never trusted anyone except Hitler. He was never anti-Semitic by conviction but endorsed such behavior when it seemed desirable. Thus, he reported in his diary on March 19, 1943, for instance, that "the Jews all over the world are trying hard to make Bolshevism look innocuous and to represent it as a lesser danger as compared with National Socialism."¹⁹⁵ In recording such state-

¹⁹⁵Lochner, op. cit., p. 310.

ment, the Reichsminister employed one of his favorite principle techniques which "was displacing German aggression on some outgroup."¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, as Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel suggest, Goebbels also succeeded in preventing the German people from noting that he retained some adolescent personality traits throughout his career. It was not generally known that he was superstitious, nor did most people appear to think that Goebbels was vain or extravagant as were Göring and other party officials. In this respect an anecdote is cited by many writers which tells of a near disastrous mistake which the Reichsminister made when he permitted a film to be released showing German audiences the impressive living standard which his family enjoyed during the war.

3. Factors which influenced Goebbels' public behavior and conduct:

Almost at the beginning as an agitational speaker, Goebbels demonstrated a keen insight into those forces which determine public opinion and audience reaction. According to Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner this insight was supplemented by extensive reading as early as 1922, for they reported:

On this subject one book in particular excited him and fired his imagination. It was About the Psychology of the Masses by a Frenchman called Le Bon. He read this book again and again until he almost knew it by heart. It seemed to him to contain the magic formula, the spell which would one day transform his ambitions into power, and he made quite sure that he would forget none of it.¹⁹⁷

In public he always presented a meticulous appearance. He could be charming and displayed a pleasing personality when the situation required it. But he could also be satirical and occasionally delivered strong invectives

¹⁹⁶ Doeb, op. cit., p. 535.

¹⁹⁷ Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 27.

when he believed a given situation warranted such action. Joseph Goebbels was relentless in his persecution of the Jews and attempted to link them with all possible threats perceived to be directed against the German nation. He further seemed to fulfill the role of a successful administrator and leader in the National Socialist movement. He succeeded in contributing to the creation of the Third Reich with Hitler as the central figure by means of propaganda and persuasion. As Reichsminister, Goebbels worked tirelessly to organize the total population behind the National Socialist cause. Special decrees affecting his powers and the ministry were instituted to facilitate these efforts.

Joseph Goebbels further demonstrated a particular aptitude in organizational matters affecting propaganda and political campaigns. His intensive efforts during the party's rise to power and particularly the Lippe Detmold election appear to support this belief. As head of party propaganda, he systematically flooded the country with pamphlets, leaflets, and placards. Moreover, he attempted to involve all of the German people in the national events and was responsible for scheduling Hitler's public appearances and those of other party speakers. Although his own propaganda and persuasive attempts appeared to be inconsistent at times, Goebbels carefully designed them to meet existing circumstances. Thus, whereas his articles and speeches were aggressive during the formative years of the party, those of the pre-war period were largely designed to condition the German people for the impending World War II. During the progression of the war the Reichsminister developed propaganda and persuasive campaigns which successfully undermined the morale of the French people. He also formed propaganda companies which exploited and re-

ported the victories of the German army. He gave detailed instructions to the party speakers when the Russian campaign began, in an effort to prevent a collapse in morale of the German people. To bolster their hopes, further, Goebbels invented special announcements which were carefully tested prior to their application. He also continued to write articles for the German public, as well as for neutral and enemy consumption.

With the deterioration of the German military situation the Reichsminister attempted to dispell the feeling of defeatism of the German people by focusing their attention upon the heroic deeds of Field Marshal Rommel and the submarine crews much like he had publicized Horst Wessel and the Allied airplane raids which he labled "terror attacks." In addition, he engaged the people in an annual winter clothing drive and redirected their mounting aggression by calling attention to the unconditional surrender clause of the Allied forces.

Motivated by the feeling of responsibility for the total war effort, Goebbels drove himself relentlessly. He visited bombed out cities and spoke on every occasion which presented itself. Moreover, long after most other leaders of the National Socialist party refused to make public appearances, Goebbels continued to fulfill the role as spiritual healer of the nation. It was perhaps due to this energetic effort that the German people appeared to believe and trust him more than any other leader of the party, as they indicated in the voluminous mail which they addressed to the Reichsminister.

Shortly before the end of World War II, Goebbels embarked upon two final propaganda campaigns. As Curt Riess suggests, the first of these was designed for immediate consumption, whereas the second was meant to

affect people the world over many years after the National Socialist movement had collapsed. To achieve this end, Goebbels made predictions which he publicized in an article entitled "The Year 2000". He hoped that the readers of later generations would, on the basis of having been exposed to these predictions, tend to agree that the Reichsminister had been correct in his evaluation of the political developments of the world.

Joseph Goebbels' last public act seems to have been the writing and publication of his appendix to Hitler's testament. In attempting to explain why he refused to obey Hitler's order to leave Berlin after the war, Goebbels sought to convince the world that his devotion to the Fuehrer was unshakable to the end. He further seemed to believe that his death would set a better example than possible flight and capture by the Allied forces. Perhaps he also realized that his capture would mean death in any event.

4. Factors which affected Goebbels the speaker and those he employed to influence others:

As a speaker, Goebbels enjoyed several advantages which he already possessed early in life. Among them were his impressive verbal facility, a pleasing voice quality, and considerable confidence and poise. As a high school student he studied Latin and Cicero's orations against Cataline which first made him aware of the inherent logic and structure of political oratory. From his initial experience at speechmaking in high school through a number of political discussions and debates, Goebbels soon recognized the power of the spoken word. He gained his early speaking experiences as an advocate for the People's Freedom Party and National Socialism. In serving both causes, Goebbels demonstrated that he was primarily concerned with serving that faction which promised immediate

rewards and possible social and financial improvements.

Particularly revealing was the period during which Goebbels embarked upon a campaign of agitation for the National Socialist party. Through frequent personal appearances in front of many different audiences in the Rhineland-Westphalia district and in Berlin, he demonstrated his talents as a street-fighter and agitator. With such practical experience he soon became proficient in the application of propaganda and persuasive methods and techniques. Although he personally expressed contempt for the masses, he always carefully analyzed his audiences. He also possessed a rare presence of mind which permitted him to speak on almost any occasion at a moment's notice.

Through his intensive training period as a public speaker in the Rhineland-Westphalia district, in Berlin, and in the national election campaigns, Goebbels became a master at organizing and conducting mass demonstrations and gigantic party rallies. The exhaustive pace which he set for himself as an orator led him to confess from time to time that he feared a physical breakdown under the strain. He made use of every conceivable situation to address the German people and frankly admitted that even the Reichstag was an advantageous platform from which to speak to the nation. His effectiveness as a speaker led Stephen H. Roberts to remark once:

He uses every device of oratory and effect to embellish his speeches; he speaks a slow and limpidly perfect German (very different from Hitler's hoarse tumult of words or Goring's crude shouting); and he is far and away the best speaker among the Nazis.¹⁹⁸

Even the other leaders of the National Socialist party had to concede

¹⁹⁸ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

that Goebbels was their most effective spokesman. Moreover, as far as Martha Dodd was concerned in respect to "knowledge of propaganda methods, of the psychology of the masses, of new daring and untried schemes. . . , he. . . [was]. . . unique and. . . [could not]. . . be surpassed."¹⁹⁹

When Goebbels was prohibited from speaking in Berlin and the Prussian district by the government, he went underground and manipulated the meetings of other parties in such a manner that he could still make himself be heard in the discussion periods. When reflecting upon public address as a political instrument, Joseph Goebbels declared that the speaker must speak the language of the people. He advised the party speakers that the orator and propagandist must know the soul of man. He further demonstrated that the effects produced within the audience were of greater importance to him than his personal convictions and beliefs. During his visits to the bombed cities of Germany, particularly towards the end of World War II, Goebbels made use of such persuasive devices as employing the dialect which prevailed in the region where he was speaking, being frank and candid, appearing to take the audience into his confidence, name calling, and promising retaliations against the enemies. Yet, in spite of the employment of such techniques and the high degree of trust and confidence with which the German people rewarded him, Rudolf Semmler was once prompted to observe that "the sad fact remains, that even with Goebbels there is all the difference in the world between what he says and what he does."²⁰⁰

Because of his frequent public appearances, Goebbels' prestige ap-

¹⁹⁹Dodd, op. cit., p. 232.

²⁰⁰Semmler, op. cit., p. 107.

peared to rate significantly higher than that of most other leaders of the party. Even foreign observers were impressed by his activities and noted that it was the Reichsminister who attempted to bolster the morale of the people and instill within them some degree of hope and confidence. They further observed that Goebbels seemed to function best when he was confronted by serious problems and they acknowledged that he seldom lost his head in a crisis.

Although it has been stated that Goebbels "never knew or expressed what media was best,"²⁰¹ the Reichsminister, by his own admission, seems to have preferred the spoken word to any other means of propaganda and persuasion. It was in the capacity as the spokesman for the party that he gained his greatest prominence. And it was in this role, as in all the others which he played throughout his life, that Joseph Goebbels basic philosophy stands revealed-- the desired end justifies the employment of any means.

²⁰¹Doob, op. cit., p. 524.

CHAPTER III

THE OCCASION OF THE "BASIC" SPEECH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES

The Occasion of the "Basic" Speech

Of all the significant dates in the historical development of National Socialism and the career of Joseph Goebbels perhaps none was of greater consequence than January 31, 1943. It marked the surrender of the German armies at Stalingrad, became the turning point of Hitler's fortunes in Europe, and ushered in the period of total war for the German nation.

The scheduled celebration of the tenth anniversary of the party's rise to power one day earlier had to be called off since Hitler refused to address the nation as had been his custom previously. Instead, Goebbels delivered a speech entitled, "Fuehrer Command, We Shall Follow," which was broadcast from the Sportpalast in Berlin. Although evidence exists that the Reichsminister was well aware of the fact that the German Sixth Army had been defeated at Stalingrad, he nevertheless insisted in his speech that, "for us it has always been an unmovable and irreversible basic principle that the word surrender does not exist in our language. We shall and will always stick to this contention."¹

Goebbels failed to utter a word in regard to the fall of Stalingrad publicly until an article of his appeared on February 7, entitled, "The Hard Lesson." Yet, the dire news was disseminated by other means the following day when "muffled drums preceded the announcements on the

¹Joseph Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, (München: Franz Eher Nachf, 1944), p. 139. Translated by the writer.

radio, and the newspapers the following day were edged with black bands of mourning."²

Within the same month the Allied forces successfully occupied French North Africa and General Montgomery succeeded in routing Rommel's men at El Alamein. Both von Paulus and Rommel had been ordered by Hitler to defend their positions to the last man, and failed. While Rommel was recalled and eventually ordered to inspect the defenses of the western front, von Paulus became a prisoner-of-war.

With these diverse military developments in mind the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda began to see the possibility of putting a daring plan to work. In order to assume control of the total war effort which he wanted to direct, the necessary circumstances had to exist before Goebbels could make his intentions public.

During the early months of 1941, even Goebbels had not given much thought to the possibility of a "total war." Up to that time the German armies had been successful in conquering or routing the enemy in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and North Africa. Even when on June 22, 1941, the German military forces crossed the Russian border at dawn, Goebbels was still filled with optimism like Hitler. By November, 1941, "Hitler believed Russia to be all but defeated and forced his frozen armies to press their campaign in appalling conditions of cold."³ He appointed himself Commander in Chief of the German Army and became in-

²Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 209.

³Ibid., p. 169

volved in serious disagreements with his general staff. Despite the objections of his generals, Hitler insisted upon a state of no retreat in Russia and moved his troops toward Stalingrad. By September this historic city had become the turning point of the Russian campaign. In May of the same year, "the RAF made the first of its thousand-bomber raids on the German war industry."⁴ Soon reports both from Russia and the home front reached Goebbels which indicated that the military and social conditions were becoming grave. The Reichsminister concluded that his propaganda machine had failed to meet these developments effectively. In assessing his role and the general disposition of the German people, Goebbels concluded that he had "'spoiled and mislead them, instead of preparing them to be tough and resistant. They had been like a mollycoddled child, he said, carefully wrapped in cotton-wool."⁵ Thus, he decided upon a new propaganda approach which employed stark realism and frankness. The nightly enemy air-raids were no longer reported in conventional terms. Rather, Goebbels informed the German newspaper publishers in September, 1942,

'It will be impossible to state in one sentence that a city like Duesseldorf lies in ruins. Special sections of press correspondents will be formed, whose duty it will be to glorify the events of night bombing in the style of battlefield reports and present them in a mystical light...'⁶

⁴Ibid., p. 170.

⁵Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Evil Genius: The Story of Joseph Goebbels, (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), p. 181. Translated by Louis Hagen.

⁶Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), pp. 302-303.

Similarly, the Reichsminister began to insist that all reports from the front lines also had to conform to this new policy. He knew only too well that the returning soldiers would inform their friends and relatives of the catastrophic conditions at the front lines in Russia. Therefore, Goebbels insisted that all communiques from that area should not deemphasize the hardships encountered by the army nor embellish the battles which were fought there. Instead, the people at home should be told "what it meant to struggle through oceans of filth and blood; what it meant when a tank was destroyed in battle, when a village went up in flames, when a horse died under its rider..."⁷ and similar shocking events.

According to Gert Buchheit, however, the real determinants for frankness and realism which Goebbels began to employ with regularity were primarily motivated by other forces. In supporting this contention, Buchheit explained:

The forces which were to change the war after the collapse of the [Russian] offensive of 1942, were the immediate military, as well as internal and foreign political developments rather than the losses which were hard to replace. The unheard of surrender of an entire army which branded Hitler's predictions as lies and the failure of the offensive in the Caucasus were simple facts which even with the slickest means of distortion could not be suppressed. By pure chance the results of the conference of the Western powers at Casablanca came to the rescue of German propaganda at this moment which was caught in deadliest embarrassment while desperately searching for new victory slogans. With the statement of 'unconditional surrender' ('Inconditional [sic] surrender') Roosevelt handed a man like Goebbels a singular means to change the fear of the impending, final collapse into a renewed will to fight by working upon the masses with dark visions and crafty allusions, psycholog-

⁷Ibid., p. 267.

cally, indicating the final, unconquerable might of the German army. The demand for 'the unconditional surrender of the German people' became a welcome catchword for the staggering National Socialist power regime which especially now continued on the same well-trodden path to mobilize the forces of despair.⁸

While reacting to the unconditional surrender demands of the Allied powers, Goebbels' comments were recorded by Wilfred von Oven on February 2, 1944. In part the Reichsminister said:

'What he [Churchill] concocted together with Roosevelt in Casablanca, to whom the same criticism applies, with the formula of 'unconditional surrender' is a first class blunder in the history of the world. I would never have been in the position to think up such an inspiring catchword for my propaganda. When our Western enemies explain to us: We will not confer with you, we only have one goal, to destroy you until you give yourself up to us for mercy and with disgrace and you have to expect neither fairness or reconciliation, but rather punishment and retaliation in addition for tens of years, then every German must, whether he likes it or not, whether his disposition is friendly or alien to us, continue to fight and especially with all the might at his disposal.

Through the demand for unconditional surrender Churchill and Roosevelt accomplished that which would have been most difficult for my propaganda to achieve: to weld the German nation into an inseparable block, which in its entirety will win or fall. However, he who thinks today about opposition to us and of peace with the enemy is a hopeless fool and deserves nothing else but to have his head cut off, if only because of his stupidity.⁹

With the continuously increasing destructiveness of the nightly air raids, Goebbels began to assume the responsibilities of coordinating the rescue activities since no one else seemed to be concerned about them. Wilfred von Oven reported on the complexity of such activities by citing

⁸Gert Buchheit, Hitler der Feldherr, (Rastatt: G. Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung KG, 1958), p. 332. Translated by the writer.

⁹Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, Vol. I, (Buenos Aires: Dürer-Verlag, 1949-1950), p. 202. Translated by the writer.

the city of Hamburg as a specific example. After a particularly heavy enemy attack, von Oven explained, Hamburg was like a lame individual whose crutches had been taken away from him. That is, the individual could still exist, but remained inactive. In the case of Hamburg all conventional modes of life in the modern city had to be abandoned following the air raid. Gas, water and electricity were shut off, the transportation system brought to a standstill, the streets blocked and the train stations were destroyed. Mail, telephones and telegraph offices no longer functioned. The next morning there were few newspapers, bread, or fresh milk or hardly anything to eat. It was under such circumstances that the complexities of life in a big city really became apparent. Wilfred von Oven further observed that one could hardly imagine how difficult it was to round up several hundred thousand people under such conditions who were robbed of the technical necessities of the community. At such time the coordination of rescue activities had to be brought into play. This became the Reichsminister's responsibility. Fires had to be brought under control, people caught in the rubble had to be rescued, the wounded had to receive first aid, those who had lost their quarters had to be relocated and furnished with new shelter, tens of thousands had to be fed, streets had to be cleared, transportation had to be reactivated, and the food supply had to be replenished. The tens of thousands who were suddenly left standing homeless in the streets, without food, without any possessions, even without money, suddenly resembled new born infants who expect the mother-state to nurse them at her bosom. Under such circumstances, von Oven remarked, it was surprising to see that the greater majority of the people not only lost their

heads in such a situation, but also lost their initiative and even the desire to live. They were overcome by a deadly lethargy and experience indicated again and again that food from the emergency kitchens had to be funneled into them and they had to be forced to live on. But there were also those who in such moments displayed the possession of a surprising ability to organize and lead the masses. They became the central core of the civilian defense. Through their exemplary behavior the others came to their senses. With advice and deed, with kind or harsh words, with strong hands and full of determination they pulled their companions out of their dangerous dullness.¹⁰

Such were the problems with which Goebbels was concerned on the home front. But he also was concerned about the military situation in the East. As had been the case with Rudolf Semmler and Wilfred von Oven, most of the Reichsminister's aides had to serve on active duty at the front lines for a considerable period of time. Hans Fritzsche was one of these men who was ordered to return from the Russian front to his former radio post late in the fall of 1942. Goebbels had great need for his services and proposed that he should assume control of the entire German radio facilities. In their initial interview Fritzsche described the appalling conditions at the front lines in Russia and reportedly said to Goebbels, "'If you only knew, Herr Minister, how badly things are going at the front.'"¹¹ Furthermore, when Goebbels proposed that the attention of the German people should be directed upon an impending

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 84-86.

¹¹Riess, op. cit., p. 310.

victory to improve their morale, Hans Fritzsche replied, "I cannot tell my listeners what I myself don't believe, namely that a victory is an absolute certainty."¹² Instead, the two men agreed that it would be wiser to employ Churchill's theme of "Blood, Sweat and Tears," even though Goebbels continued to ridicule the Prime Minister's approach in public.

In line with the Reichsminister's new propaganda campaign of frankness and realism he made frequent references to Frederick the Great. In his annual New Years speech in 1942/43, which was primarily directed to the German armies in the East, Goebbels concluded by saying:

Thus, I give you the watchword for the coming year with which the great Prussian king greeted his soldiers during a decisive period of the Seven Years War: 'In such desperate times one must provide oneself with intestines of iron and a heart of steel to get rid of all sensitivities.'¹³

On the day Goebbels delivered this speech, the Russians announced the beginning of an offensive campaign south of Stalingrad. The German military headquarters hardly mentioned these activities and insisted that they had been successfully repelled. Even after the Russians had launched their greatest counter-offensive at Stalingrad on January 16, 1943, and had surrounded the city after routing an entire German division, the German High Command still refused to admit defeat. But Goebbels fully understood what the effects would be among the German people if Stalingrad fell. He knew that this was not a kind of defeat

¹²Ibid.

¹³Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, op. cit., p. 112.

which could be brushed aside lightly. It required a supreme effort on the part of all German people,-- it meant total war.

In the middle of December, 1942, the Reichsminister had already approached Hitler with a program for total war according to Rudolf Semmler. Furthermore, following a series of discussions with Martin Bormann, Goebbels had decided that a revision in the living standard of most Germans had to be brought about. Especially the upper ten thousand at the home front were to make considerable sacrifices, and it was hoped that such revisions would supply additional man-power and material for the war. On January 4, 1943, Semmler further reported:

At his conference of departmental heads to-day Goebbels made an important statement of policy. I reproduce the key sentences from the short-hand record:

'One cannot escape the impression that we are enjoying to-day a standard of living which, pleasant though it may be, could only be justified if the men at the front had all they needed. That is not the case. We have to remember that in some defensive positions on the Eastern front to-day one man has to watch 500 to 1,000 yards of ground. Against this consider that we are still hesitating to ration household goods and that the Ministry of Supply says we can produce anything that is needed in any quantity, and you will agree that our attitude to the war is still rather light-hearted.

'I myself want to see disappear from my mind and from the mind of the Ministry the idea that we cannot lose the war. Of course we can lose the war. The war can be lost by the people who will not exert themselves; it will be won by those who try the hardest. We must not believe fatalistically in certain victory; we must take a positive view.

'It is my conviction, and not even the greatest national disaster will shake it, that we will win this war with ease if we now strain every nerve. We have all the trumps in our hand. What we need is to make an all-out nervous effort, and to throw in every reserve we have. We must mobilise [sic] all our strength, and that is what is going to happen on the largest scale.

'I believe we can force the Soviet Union to its knees next summer if we now use every ounce of the energy which has lain idle in the German people. We should have done this last winter. If we do not bring in all our reserves

then we shall achieve no decision in the East. There lies the crucial point of the whole war. If we can win in the East then we cannot lose the war.'

In the evening we are told that Goebbels's statement is the unofficial signal for total war to begin on the home front.¹⁴

By the middle of January, 1943, Semmler reported that the total war campaign had become an obsession with Goebbels. However, in succeeding diary entries, Rudolf Semmler recorded a number of events which were instrumental in influencing Joseph Goebbels to deliver his "basic" speech on February 18, 1943. Thus, on January 18, 1943, Rudolf Semmler wrote:

On Hitler's orders Goebbels's proposals are to be carried out by the Committee of Three consisting of Lammers, Bormann and Keitel. Goebbels will be called in to advise. He is bitterly disappointed at the subordinate place he is to occupy. He did all the work of planning and now he is to have nothing to say about its execution. He complains to the Fuehrer.¹⁵

Two days later, Semmler added more information concerning the activities of the Committee of Three. He noted that the committee met in the Reich Chancellery where Goebbels spoke to them for an hour, proposing among other measures that all luxury shops, businesses and cafés be closed till the end of the war. The Reichsminister's aide further reported that Goebbels "had to fight like a tiger to get his proposals through,"¹⁶ and that he thought Lammers to be a "wet blanket." Again on January 26, Semmler reported that Goebbels was still preoccupied with the inefficiency of the Committee of Three. "Everything is going too slowly for his impulsive nature. He is still furious at the total

¹⁴ Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels --the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse, Ltd., 1947), pp. 63-64.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁶ Ibid.

powers being given to someone else,"¹⁷ the writer observed.

The Reichsminister's reaction to the inefficiency and appointment of the Committee was reminiscent of the early months of the war when Hitler had divided the field of propaganda into two parts. During those days the Fuehrer had given control of all foreign propaganda to Goebbels' sworn enemy, Ribbentrop. Goebbels not only hated Ribbentrop but also "knew him to be stupid and to have no conception at all of the function of propaganda."¹⁸ Now he seemed to be confronted by a similar rebuke from Hitler. But Goebbels apparently felt that his responsibilities rested with the people. Consequently, the Reichsminister began to assemble a plan which could possibly change the situation in his favor. In discussing the ensuing events, Semmler wrote in his diary on January 29, 1943,

The drama of Stalingrad is coming to a climax. The Committee of Three are wrangling about ludicrous formalities. Goebbels said to-day that he was fed up with the Punch-and-Judy show. He would have to answer for their antics to the public, and the bureaucrats were ruining the whole idea.

Goebbels is brooding over a daring plan. He will try and bring pressure to bear on Hitler by putting forward radical demands in a speech in the Sports Palace. The crowd will applaud wildly. In this way he may be able to force Hitler to put an end to half-measures. If his demands are not met then the Government will be compromised. The Fuehrer could not afford that at the moment.¹⁹

On the following day Goebbels appeared in the Sportpalast at the tenth anniversary celebration of the party's rise to power. Although he was not prepared to put his "total war plan" into action on the occa-

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 67-68.

¹⁸Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 154.

¹⁹Semmler, op. cit., p. 68.

sion, he nevertheless was obliged to speak in Hitler's behalf since the Fuehrer refused to make a personal appearance as had been his custom. In his absence, Goebbels read Hitler's proclamation to the people and then was interrupted in his speech when British planes appeared over Berlin. According to Curt Riess, Goebbels had been quite nervous at the outset of his address, fearing that the people would resent Hitler's absence. Furthermore, when he was forced to announce that the meeting would have to be postponed for an hour because of an impending air attack he also realized that it would be a decisive propaganda defeat for him, if he were to leave. Thus, amidst the explosion of bombs, Goebbels remained in the Sportpalast with a majority of his audience who carefully observed the Reichsminister. They soon noted that the speaker appeared to be unmoved by the excitement which surrounded him. When he began to speak again he referred to the defensive battles which the soldiers were waging in the East. He spoke of the severity of the winter campaign and the possibility of a final victory. Finally he referred to a group of imaginary letter-writers with whom the listening audience could identify itself. The Reichsminister feverishly proclaimed, "In countless letters from all levels of the population, the cry for a total war effort is resounding in our ears."²⁰

Following the delivery of his speech, Goebbels immediately returned to his office with his stenographer. At home his wife had arranged a party for him as it was customary since he did not want to be alone after an important speech. On this occasion, however, Goebbels ordered

²⁰Riess, op. cit., p. 313.

that the publication of one of his articles, which was to reach the public on February 7, be stopped. In its place he wrote a new article entitled, "Die harte Lehre," ["The hard Lesson"] in which he repeated his contention, "In countless letters from all levels of the population the cry for a total war effort is resounding in our ears."²¹

Once at home and in his own circle, the Reichsminister gave vent to his feelings and the pressure which weighed heavily upon him. Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner reported that in a moment of disillusionment and despondency, Goebbels declared:

'It doesn't matter what form of government the masses go for, whether it's democracy or dictatorship; they'll be deceived either way. Nazism has wasted a lot of time and energy in trying to realize this unrealizable dream of raising the animal-level proletariat to the higher plane of a so-called German community. Nietzsche was quite right! For the millions their animal pleasure, for us the caviare.²² It stands good in the Kremlin and New York-- why not here?'

When the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad was finally conceded, Goebbels had to move with lightening speed to salvage as much of the situation as possible. He quickly embarked upon a campaign of extreme gloom. The announcements of the catastrophe were introduced by rumbling drums on the radio. Moreover, there were no fanfares as had been employed during the more favorable periods of the war. In their place an orchestra played a melancholy song, "Ich hatt' einen Kameraden," ["I once had a Comrade"] which was an old, familiar song to all Germans. In addition all further radio programming for the day consisted of serious music and funeral marches. Even the newspapers which

²¹Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, op. cit., p. 162.

²²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 198.

reported the events of Stalingrad on the next morning followed this propaganda line by appearing with black edges of mourning. Most German and foreign observers appeared to react negatively to this extreme form of propaganda, thinking that Goebbels had made a grave error in his evaluation of the German people, but Curt Riess reported:

The people, half in a daze, pulled themselves together, and their mourning turned into a fatalistic mysticism. They were hypnotized by Goebbels' thesis that defeat and sacrifice had their 'meaning.' Goebbels screamed, 'The army of the fallen has not surrendered its arms. In reality it is marching in the ranks of the soldiers!' And the people really believed it. They gave renewed confidence in a government which obviously was telling them the truth.²³

To sustain the new won confidence of the people and their apparent determination to continue the war, Goebbels had to act. He appeared to believe that after the horrible experiences of Stalingrad they were almost ready for anything. In his opinion the people had to be prodded into the total war effort if Germany was to survive. Already some events were beginning to undermine his plans. Thus, streams of postcards from German prisoners-of-war in Russia were arriving at home. Enemy propaganda was being conducted with greater vigor and more German people were beginning to listen to enemy radio broadcasts despite the possibility of being punished with death for such activity. Furthermore, the generals in the High Command refused to release concise and accurate military reports.²⁴ Hitler simply had to speak. Goebbels concluded that in dire times like the Stalingrad period, a speech delivered

²³Riess, op. cit., p. 315.

²⁴Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 199.

by Hitler could well be of even greater consequence than one of his own. The Reichsminister believed that Hitler's speaking, when he was in good form,

'probes the most secret recesses and ramifications of the soul of the masses, knows how to bare it with his masterly hand and makes it respond. Just as his voice speaks from the depths of the blood, so the listener is thrilled to the depths of his blood... His art of moulding the masses is so unique that no doctrine or dogma can fit it... His speech is like a magnet, drawing whatever iron the people have in their blood from them.'²⁵

But in spite of the Reichsminister's insistence, Hitler refused to speak. The disastrous effects of the military events in the East had already affected the Fuehrer's speaking ability to some extent. Goebbels himself made this observation hardly a month later, when Rudolf Semmler recorded the Minister's reaction to Hitler's speech on Heroes' Day. Semmler wrote on March 21, 1943,

The guests of honour in the courtyard of the Berlin Arsenal heard Hitler's speech on Heroes' Day with the greatest dismay. Goebbels-- already angry about his low place in the seats allotted to the members of the Government-- was deeply dejected at the pathetic performance which Hitler put on today. He spoke fast, jerkily, without light and shade, as if he was plagued with a bad conscience.

It was the first time he had spoken in public since Stalingrad. He read from his papers like a schoolboy who has not prepared his work properly. He made many mistakes; at one moment a sheet of his speech fell on the ground and a long pause followed. His account of the casualties which the war had cost so far could be understood by no one, even by Goebbels himself, who was sitting only five yards away.²⁶

Thus, confronted with Hitler's inability and refusal to speak, Goebbels was forced to jump into the breach himself. For days he care-

²⁵Riess, op. cit., pp. 315-316.

²⁶Semmler, op. cit., p. 80.

fully composed and practiced his speech. [See Chapter V.] He intended it to be a kind of informal plebescite on the total war issue and predicted specific places at which his audience would enthusiastically respond. For him it became "a new technique of shouting challenges and rhetorical questions at his vast audience in order to rouse them to roar back at him replies he needed to show Hitler their determination to wage a total war."²⁷ When Hans Fritzsche, who was working next door to Goebbels' office asked him on one occasion what would happen if the people failed to respond to the total war issue, the Reichsminister replied:

"You forget that by that time I will have spoken for almost an hour. From there on I can make them climb trees if I feel like it..."²⁸

On the day when Goebbels was to deliver his "basic speech" the Sport-palast was filled to capacity hours before the Reichsminister made an appearance. The tickets needed to gain entry into the Sportpalast had been carefully distributed by the party offices and the Propaganda Ministry. The speaker, although outwardly presenting an appearance of confidence and calmness, was filled with great tension when he confronted his audience of "fifteen thousand people frenetically jubilant..."²⁹ Goebbels knew full well that much depended upon the speech he was about to make. In fact, "he staked everything on this speech."³⁰ He had carefully analyzed the occasion and adapted his mode of delivery to

²⁷Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 230.

²⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 317.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 199.

meet it effectively. The startled audience quickly noted that it was not the old, familiar spokesman of the party who was speaking to them but rather, he appeared to be a serious, troubled man who had come to talk with his family and friends. He did not seem concerned about effects or applause, but instead intent upon making himself understood completely.³¹

Goebbels spoke for more than two hours. His speech was frequently interrupted by shouts of approval and applause. His efforts in preparation had been rewarded with success. Many authorities the world over later agreed that it had been one of the most effective speeches ever delivered in his life and when commenting on the immediate events following the address, Curt Riess reported:

On the shoulders of the frenzied people Goebbels was carried triumphantly off the platform. Magda and half a dozen of his closest associates were waiting for him. He was so hoarse that he could only whisper: 'What unprecedented, nightmarish lunacy! If I had commanded them, 'Go jump out of the window of your apartment,' they would have done it!'

Late at night, when the guests had gone, he undressed and weighed himself on his scale. The effort of the speech had cost him seven pounds.³²

The Supporters of National Socialism

Almost from its very inception writers the world over have attempted to identify the forces which were responsible for the rise and development of National Socialism in Germany. Some authorities have pointed to historical, political, social or philosophic factors while others have combined them or have offered entirely different explanations.

³¹Riess, op. cit., pp. 317-321.

³²Ibid., p. 321.

To understand the persuasiveness of Joseph Goebbels and the principles and methods which he employed on various speaking occasions, it would seem necessary to examine representative viewpoints advanced by some writers concerned with the National Socialist movement.

In the introduction of her book, Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich, [The Myth of the Third Reich], Jean F. Neurohr writes that the National Socialist movement with its mass-rapture was perhaps only a transient, superficial phase in German history. Yet, the author contends that "the 'national movement' which carried Hitler and the thousand-year Reich to to power are, nevertheless, end results of currents, movements, illusions, [and] myths, which, accompanying the development of the German nation in the nineteenth and especially the twentieth century, latently or openly were the synthesis of all German wishful dreaming."³³

The individuals in whose social behavior these wishful dreams found expression and who were perhaps most instrumental in supporting the rise of National Socialism were the younger people of the generation which immediately preceded World War I. They were sons and daughters of "good" families who reacted strongly against the social conditions of their time. They withdrew from and rejected the customs and traditions of their fathers which had been carefully fashioned after King Wilhelm II. To these young people it seemed that they were living in an unreal and truthless generation. Their fathers wore the fashionable long, dark coat, the stovepipe hat and the false-front shirt, while their mothers were

³³ Jean F. Neurohr, Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich, (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1957), pp. 7-8. Translated by the writer.

constantly faced by ever-changing styles in fashions. It was also the period in which the greatest homage was paid to the sixth Commandment. Men and women bathed separately on public beaches. Bathing suits were designed to cover more of the human figure than is the custom today. Duels were fought for the simplest reasons and people, whether they were religious or not, felt an inner compulsion to belong to the church.³⁴

To these conditions the youth reacted by withdrawing from social activities. Carl Misch described such reactions by writing:

The new youth wanted to leave the parental home and the school, to reject the social class distinctions, the return to simplicity, honesty, and naturalness. The wanderer adopted a special 'garb', rough, simple, anti-social clothes. He sang to the lute, camped in the forest or at a lake, cooked his simple food for himself, scorned a soft bed. With a friendly 'Heil!', the young people greeted each other, whose number grew to ten thousand by 1914.³⁵

Friedrich Glum suggests that some additional factors which contributed to the development of this anti-social behavior were the regeneration and industrial development of Germany which had made many people too rich too quickly. Frequently they became materialists, who, in an attempt to gain significant social positions and prestige, sacrificed their personal reputations.³⁶

In discussing the industrial development during this period, J. Ellis Barker observed that while Germany's soil produced twice as much

³⁴Friedrich Glum, Philosophen im Spiegel und Zerrspiegel: Deutschlands Weg in den Nationalismus und Nationalismus, (München: Isar Verlag, 1954), p. 24. Translated by the writer.

³⁵Carl Misch, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Massen, (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1952), p. 153. Translated by the writer.

³⁶Glum, op. cit., p. 29.

bread, corn, oats, potatoes, and five times the quantity of sugar by 1910, "the productivity of her mines and the output of her manufacturing industries...[had]...grown about sevenfold, [and] the rural industries of Germany...[had]...not changed or stood still."³⁷ More specifically, Edmond Vermail suggests that "the prodigious development of industry, prepared over a long period of evolution, dates back in particular to the reign of William II. Until 1890 the balance between agriculture and industry had still been held. However, it was soon upset, to the advantage of industry."³⁸ This advantage, Vermail further observed, gave rise to a heterogeneous middle class threatened with absorption into the working class and "a proletariat tending to become a petite bourgeoisie."³⁹ The proletariat, Vermail concluded,

was the truly fresh element in the new German society, deriving straight from the Industrial Revolution. Before 1850 it was easy to confuse workman, artisan, and tenant. A real proletariat came into being between 1850 and 1871, increased swiftly, and knew the horrors of want, the most shameful exploitation by employers, an indeterminate working day, unhealthy premises, inadequate pay, and the crises of unemployment.⁴⁰

The emphasis upon materialistic gains as perceived by the youth of the pre-World War I generation was not only visible in economic areas.

³⁷Ellis Barker, "Modern Germany, Its Rise, Growth, Downfall and Future," In Louis L. Snyder, (ed.), Documents of German History, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 308.

³⁸Edmond Vermail, Germany in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Cultural History of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 11.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 12.

Rather, the trend was also reflected in the architecture of the period. Palaces and homes were built in a style which since then has been derided as being second only to that of the Victorian age. Priceless furniture, handmade and beautifully decorated by the craftsmen of previous generations was rapidly replaced by cheap, factory-made imitations.⁴¹

The social behavior of the landowners and the wealthy families was typified by the behavior of the lady of the day, who in all probability was the wife of an officer in the service, who perhaps was married to a gentleman in a supervisory position of the bureaucracy, or was the wife of an industrialist. Such a lady generally lived in quarters which were adorned with imitations of the paintings of the great masters and other superficial furnishings. Her typical day usually consisted of attending fashionable tea parties in the afternoon for which she had carefully prepared. For at such parties she would convey the impression of being both well-bred and intelligent by quoting from the most prominent and reputable authors, while her mornings were spent primarily in devouring the cheaper novels which circulated throughout the country and were known as "Hintertreppen Romane."⁴² ["Backstair Novels"]

Such conditions prompted the younger people to seek new leaders and new moral standards. In their search the youth rediscovered the writings of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche [1844-1900], who dominated their thinking as the nineteenth century drew to a close. In Nietzsche's

⁴¹ Glum, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴² Ibid.

philosophy the young people seemed to detect a number of directives specifically meant for them, for the philosopher wrote:

And here I see the mission of the youth that forms the first generation of fighters and dragon-slayers: it will bring a more beautiful and blessed humanity and culture, but will have itself no more than a glimpse of the promised land of happiness and wondrous beauty. This youth will suffer from the malady and its antidotes: and yet it believes in strength and health and boasts a nature closer to the great Nature and its forebears, the cultured men and gray beards of the present. But its mission is to shake to their foundations the present conceptions of 'health' and 'culture,' and erect hatred and scorn in the place of this rococo mass of ideas.⁴³

Nietzsche defined the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as he perceived them, for the youth of the pre-World War I generation by writing that the seventeenth century was a period of the aristocracy. He believed that this century was dominated by orderliness, austerity, and haughtiness. In contrast, he felt the eighteenth century to be spiritual, gushing, flat and primarily dominated by women. He identified the nineteenth century as "more animal, more subteranean, hateful, realistic, plebian, and on that very account 'better,' 'more honest,' 'more submissive to reality' of what kind soever, and truer; but weak of will, sad, obscurely exacting and fatalistic."⁴⁴ The philosopher further appeared to be outspoken in his opposition to the democratic society in his time. He argued that the relationship between a nation and its government ought to serve as a model for those between teacher and student, master and servant, father and family, officer and

⁴³Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, "Critique of Culture," In Heinrich Mann, (Tr.) The Living Thoughts of Nietzsche, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1939), p. 81.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 124.

soldier, and master and apprentice. "All these relationships," he maintained, "are now changing a little under the influence of the leading constitutional form of government; they are becoming compromises. But how they must change and displace one another, change names and entity, once the newest concept has entered the minds everywhere!-- which will, however, probably take another hundred years."⁴⁵

But the strongest reaction which Nietzsche produced in the young German readers seemed to be his frequently quoted contempt of German society as a whole. In Volume XV of his works entitled, "Der Wille zur Macht," ["The Will for Power"], he lashed out by stating:

The Germans are nothing yet, but they will become something; therefore they do not possess a culture yet,-- therefore they could not have a culture yet! That is my statement: may anyone stumble over it who must.-- They are nothing yet: that is, they are quite something. They are becoming something: that is, they will some day stop being quite something. The last is in essence only a wish, hardly a hope anymore; fortunately a wish with which one can live, a thing of will, work, discipline, as well of breeding as a thing of vexation, desire, deprivation, uneasiness, yes, even of exasperation,-- in short, we Germans expect something from ourselves that was not wanted from us-- we want something more.⁴⁶

Hanna Hafkesbrink suggests that such criticism of German society by Nietzsche was primarily meant as a warning cry "at the moment when Germany had won her decisive victory over France and when wide groups of the population were relaxing in the happy confidence that the country was sailing toward brighter horizons."⁴⁷ Nietzsche warned the

⁴⁵Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche's Werke, Vol. I (Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1917), pp. 333-334. Translated by the writer.

⁴⁶Ibid., Vol. XV, p. 221.

⁴⁷Hanna Hafkesbrink, Unknown Germany, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 3.

German people that victory itself could prove to be a great danger and "he was alarmed that the national conscience, in contrast to its better tradition, could acquiesce in a merely military success and thus become alienated from its cultural task."⁴⁸

Whether the youthful readers assigned similar interpretations to Nietzsche's viewpoints is open to discussion, since Goebbels frequently quoted the nineteenth century philosopher when his readers had grown to manhood.

Two other individuals who are said to have influenced the young people of the pre-World War I generation were Friedrich Ludwig Jahn [1778-1852] and Ernst Moritz Arndt [1769-1860]. Jahn, commonly known as "Turnvater Jahn," [the father of gymnastics] was famous throughout Germany not only for his writings, but also for the "Turner" movement which he instigated. He insisted that the strength of Germany was dependent upon the physical fitness of its people and that all "Germans were to read books to strengthen their love for the beautiful and true, not in the abstract, but in German terms."⁴⁹ Ernst Moritz Arndt was well-known for his nationalism and preoccupation with the German peasant. In evaluating his role in German literature and history, Ralph F. Bushoff wrote:

In the peasant class Arndt found the kernel for his Volk. The peasant personified life in its most natural form, the emotional side of human nature as opposed to the rational, the sacredness of German soil and the German past. Like the

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁹ Ralph F. Buschoff, Nazi Conquest through German Culture, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 50.

Nazi, he attributed to the peasant an inherent sense of honor and duty and deplored the sophisticated veneer of the urbanite. Attachment for the land of one's ancestors is soon transformed into a love for the German fatherland. Very much like the original platform of the National Socialists, his idea called for a landowning peasant class, even if it became necessary to divide the large estates.⁵⁰ He combined with the worship of the German peasant an emphasis on a common language as the most effective force in aiding the growth of the consciousness of the individuality of the group.⁵¹

Another influential author at the turn of the century was Huston Stewart Chamberlain, a Germanized Englishman [1855-1927], whose book, Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century was widely read and sold "sixty thousand copies in Germany."⁵² Chamberlain was the son-in-law of the world-famous composer, Richard Wagner, and although he attributed his appreciation for the German way of life to other factors, his ideals and attitudes about German nationalism were not particularly far removed from Wagner's. Richard Wagner was not primarily concerned with political philosophy, yet in composing his operas "his aim was to embody certain national thoughts, as projected in the great folk-legends of the Teutonic people, in artistic plays, and to use for that embodiment the most influential means at his command."⁵³ While he was greatly admired in his time, Wagner seemed to possess an attraction for all generations that followed because of his

⁵⁰The differences in viewpoints on this issue between the Strasser and Hitler factions led to the subsequent alienation of these groups. See Chapter II, p. 102f.

⁵¹Buschoff, op. cit., p. 53.

⁵²T. L. Jarman, The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany, (New York: New York University Press, 1956), p. 65.

⁵³W. J. Henderson, Richard Wagner, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901), p. 208.

strong emphasis on national unity. Thus, his famous opera, Lohengrin, perhaps best serves to demonstrate this point. At the very beginning of Act I, Scene I, the following dialogue appears:

Herald. Hark! Princes, nobles, freemen of Brabant!
Henry, our German Sov'reign, calls ye forth
This day to muster for the realm's defence. (sic)
Will ye, as faithful vassals, serve your King?
Men of Brabant.
 We will, as faithful vassals, serve our King.
Be welcome, Henry, to Brabant!
King. Heav'n shield ye, loyal lieges of Brabant! Not
idly have I journeyed to your shores; I come to
warn that danger is at hand. Ye know full well the
tide of death and ruin
That oft hath from the east swept o'er the land
Upon our frontiers pray the wives and children
'Lord, from th' Hungarian hordes protect our hearths!'
For me, the nation's guardian, it was fitting
To put an end to misrule and oppression.
As conqueror, at last I gained a nine years' truce.
That time I used to arm the land.
With walls and towers I fortified the towns.
And now against the foe I summon you.
The term is just o'erpast; the foe prepares;
The wonted tribute I refuse to pay.
Now is the time to guard our nation's honor.
From east and west, all men of German blood
Arise united; knights, your thralls assemble---
No man shall dare deride my sov'reign rule.

Saxons and Thuringians (Striking their arms.)

'Tis well; we'll guard our German land!⁵⁴

Wagner's son-in-law attributed his admiration for Germany to a series of experiences which he had as a young man. In reporting on these, Huston Stewart Chamberlain wrote:

The first impression which immediately awaited me upon entering German soil, tore me out of the indifferent, uniform path of my childhood days and filled my soul with heretofore unknown feelings: I experienced the declaration of

⁵⁴The Authentic Liberettos of the Wagner Operas, (New York: Crown Publishers, 1938), p. 62.

war in Ems after having been one of the few eye-witnesses through an extraordinary coincidence to the world-important meeting between King William and Benedetti in the health resort garden. The King's departure for Berlin embedded itself forever in my mind. Half of my days I spent at the train station in order to see the German troops move off to war and soon also saw entire trains filled with French prisoners move through in the opposite direction. But mostly I experienced the excitement and dedication of the entire nation when our trip took us from Mars-la-Tour over Mainz, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg in those days, at which time I saw a camp of Uhlans in the field and heard the cannons thunder at Strassburg. I frequently had occasion to report these experiences in public, the last time in the collected volume, Deutsches Wesen, German Existence and do not want to repeat myself. Here only one thing should be stressed: the influence which these experiences had to exert upon the mind of a fourteen-year-old, who was not confronted by a philistine-like Germany right from the start, nor a Germany of traveling salesmen and factory directors, not even a Germany of visionaries and professors, and in the least a Germany of talkative parliamentarians and weak ministers. But rather a heroic Germany stood before my eyes, standing erect in its unconquerable power of its justness and its traveling men, driven by undying heroes. Verily, a splendid beginning to my introduction into the world of German thought.⁵⁵

It is perhaps with this statement in mind and the views which Chamberlain expressed in his Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, that Edmond Vermail has designated him as the link between the William II era and Hitlerism. Thus, Vermail contends that "William II had believed in him, Chamberlain and Hitler followed the example..."⁵⁶ Chamberlain became famous for his insistence that "the inhabitants of northern Europe have become the makers of world history."⁵⁷ Much like the Frenchman, Count de Gobineau, [1816-1882] Chamberlain specifically emphasized

⁵⁵Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Lebenswege Meines Denkens, (München: F. Bruckmann A. G., 1919), p. 54. Translated by the writer.

⁵⁶Vermail, op. cit., p. 159.

⁵⁷Jarman, op. cit., p. 62.

the racial supremacy of the German people, who were considered to be "men of honour, worthy of esteem and respect, and ready, if men did not grant them respect, to take it."⁵⁸

A representative example of Chamberlain's viewpoints on the theory of racial purity is perhaps best exemplified by the following citation:

Nothing is so convincing as the consciousness of the possession of Race. The man who belongs to a distinct, pure race, never loses the sense of it. The guardian angel of his lineage is ever at his side, supporting him where he loses his foothold, warning him like the Socratic Daemon where he is in danger of going astray, compelling obedience, and forcing him to undertakings which, deeming them impossible, he would never have dared to attempt. Weak and erring like all that is human, a man of this stamp recognizes himself, as others recognise (sic) him, by the sureness of his character, and the fact that his actions are marked by a certain simple and peculiar greatness, which finds its explanation in his distinctly typical and super-personal qualities. Race lifts man above himself: it endows him with extra-ordinary-- I might almost say supernatural-- powers, so entirely does it distinguish him from the individual who springs from the chaotic jumble of peoples drawn from all parts of the world: and should this man of pure origin be perchance gifted above his fellows, then the fact of Race strengthens and elevates him on every hand, and he becomes a genius towering over the rest of mankind, not because he has been thrown upon the earth like a flaming meteor by a freak of nature, but because he soars heavenward like some strong and stately tree-- no solitary individual, but the living sum of untold souls striving for the same goal.⁵⁹

Chamberlain was equally outspoken in his opposition to the Jewish race. In comparing the Jew to the German on religious grounds he wrote:

Outwardly his inheritance was the same as ours; inwardly it was not so: he inherited quite a different spirit. One single trait is all that is necessary to reveal in almost an

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 59.

⁵⁹ Houston Stewart Chamberlain, In John Lee, (Tr.) Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, (New York: John Lane, Company, 1912), Vol. I, p. 269.

alarming manner to our consciousness the yawning gulf which here separates soul from soul; the revelation of Christ has no significance for the Jew!⁶⁰

Again in regard to the social and political influence which the Jews exerted during the period of antiquity, Chamberlain contended:

Now the political and social influence of the Jews has been very variously judged, but the greatest politicians of all times have regarded it as pernicious. Cicero, for example (no great politician but an experienced statesman), displays a genuine fear of the Jews; where a legal transaction encroaches on their interest, he speaks so low that only the judges hear him, for he is well aware, as he says, that all the Jews hold together and that they know how to ruin the one who opposes them; while he thunders the most vehement charges against Greeks, against Romans, against the most powerful men of his times, he advises caution in dealing with the Jews; they are to him an uncanny power and he passes with the greatest haste over that city of 'suspicion and slander,' Jerusalem: such was the opinion of a Cicero during the consulate of a Julius Caesar!⁶¹

Chamberlain further seemed to perceive a continuous, unending struggle between the Teutonic and Jewish race. Thus, when a translation of his Foundations of the Nineteenth Century appeared in 1912, his readers were warned that "to this day these two powers-- Jews and Teutonic races-- stand, wherever the recent spread of the Chaos has not blurred their features, now as friendly, now as hostile, but always as alien forces face to face."⁶²

Another significant variable which began to preoccupy the youth of the pre-World War I generation was the concept of nationalism as expounded by Johann Gottlieb Fichte [1762-1814] and the Romantics. Fichte delivered a series of lectures, Addresses to the German Nation, in the

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 336.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 345.

⁶²Ibid., p. 257.

winter of 1807-1808, in the Academy Building at Berlin, which were primarily concerned with the political and educational evolution of Germany. Despite the fact that these lectures were said to be "applicable not to one country alone but to every nation,"⁶³ their emphasis on German unity and Fichte's concern over the political strife among the principalities and states of the German Federation could not be overlooked by the listeners and readers of subsequent generations. Thus, in the first lecture, Fichte declared:

I speak for Germans simply, of Germans simply, not recognizing, but setting aside completely and rejecting, all the disassociating distinctions which for centuries unhappy events have caused in this single nation.⁶⁴

In his seventh address entitled, "A Closer Study of the Originality and Characteristics of a People," Fichte said:

So, let there appear before you at least in complete clearness what we have meant by Germans, as we have so far described them. The true criterion is this: do you believe in something absolutely primary and original in man himself, in freedom, in endless improvement, in the eternal progress of our race, or do you not believe in all this...? All who either are themselves alive and creative and productive of new things ...and stand on the watch for the stream of original life... all these are original men; they are, when considered as a people, an original people, the people simply, Germans.⁶⁵

Much like Fichte the Romantics served to stimulate and give added impetus to a growing awareness of unity and nationalism in Germany. In this group, variously assigned or deleted, were such men as Novalis, Adam Müller, Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Schlegel, Görres,

⁶³ R. F. Jones and G. G. Turnbull, (Trs.), Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1922), p. xxii.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 126.

Arndt, Tieck, Arnim, Brentano, and Solger. Together with their successors, men like Eichendorff and the brothers Grimm, they became the spokesmen for nationalism and authoritarian thought designed "to bolster up German self-esteem and overcome the German sense of inferiority."⁶⁶

Although the Romantics were strongly criticized as being a degenerate lot by Kant and Goethe, some justification for their worth was advanced by H. S. Reiss, who observed:

During the wars of German liberalism when Romanticism was at its height, nationalism burst into the open. The nationalists waged war violently upon foreign influence in German thought; primarily this entailed hostility against the French, at that time the arch-enemy, and especially against eighteenth century French rationalism. As the German Romantics were also anti-rationalists an unholy alliance was concluded. Many Romantics became nationalists and many nationalists became Romantics. Romantic thought appeared to be able to justify the principle of nationality.⁶⁷

The youth of the pre-World War I generation were also strongly affected by existing conditions in their own time. They were mostly educated in private schools in which they were exposed to lectures on social problems. As students they became concerned with the readjustment of the lower classes and began to feel a need for the improvement of social and political legislation. Particularly in respect to voting rights did they seem to sense the inequality which existed, since in 1849, the threefold division of the electorate was based on the amount of taxes paid. This meant that the "upper third of the tax list represented 5 per cent of the electorate, the second 15 per cent and the

⁶⁶H. S. Reiss, The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 1793-1815, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 41.

⁶⁷Ibid.

third 80 per cent."⁶⁸ Furthermore, with the growth of the great industrial expansion, however, by 1888,

the first property class contained only 3.5 per cent of the electorate, the second 11 per cent, and the third 86 per cent. There were by now, more districts than ever in which the electors for the first class were chosen by one wealthy man, who could thus practically dictate his choice of candidates. Thus, although in theory the suffrage was universal, in practice the vote of the lower classes, the vast majority of the population did not count.⁶⁹

Added to the awareness of nationalism and the need for an improvement in social and political legislation was the endorsement of anarchy as the most desirable form of government. Heinrich von Treitschke, [1834-1896] a member of the Reichstag and professor of History at the University of Berlin from 1874 to 1896, was perhaps most responsible for such endorsement. Recognized as one of the most outspoken advocates of German imperialism, he urged the greatest concentration of power to be placed in the hands of the state. The most successful course which von Treitschke taught at the University of Berlin was entitled, "Politics." The course was offered every winter and soon "became the largest at the university, attracting students from all departments and auditors from many walks of life-- officials, officers, professional and businessmen, writers and editors. Even high school students slipped into the crowded room to listen to the famous speaker."⁷⁰ So great was his influence and effectiveness as a speaker that his biographer,

⁶⁸J. Alden Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, The Caprivi Era: 1890-1894, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 259.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Andreas Dorpalen, Heinrich von Treitschke, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 227.

Andreas Dorpalen wrote:

Even those few who found much to object to in what he said found themselves spellbound by the stirring pathos of his rhetoric. It was an experience which no one who shared it would ever forget. Fifty years later students would still recall it with vividness which belied the length of the intermitting time span.⁷¹

Heinrich von Treitschke considered the state to be the guardian of a selfish society within which the anarchical and conflicting aspirations had to be kept under control. He viewed the state primarily as an instrument through which order and protection of society could be maintained and believed that the obedience of the citizen was more important than his personal desires. Like his contemporary, Friedrich Nietzsche, von Treitschke viewed war as the great purifier of the nation, for in his lectures he maintained that "again and again there will be confirmation of the truth that only in war a nation will truly become a nation... It is political idealism which demands war while materialism rejects it."⁷²

With many of the viewpoints expressed by the intellectuals of earlier generations and their own in mind, the young Germans of the pre-World War I generation carefully examined their own society and observed two conditions. First, they found an efficient bureaucracy in control which was applauded on an international level. The development of this form of government during the first third of the nineteenth century into a liberal system was carried out under the leadership of such men as Freiherr vom Stein [1757-1831] and Wilhelm von Humbolt, [1767-1835] the

⁷¹Ibid., p. 228.

⁷²Ibid., p. 232.

founder of the University of Berlin. In the years to follow, however, under the influence of Georg Wilhelm Hegel [1770-1831] and Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling [1775-1854] with their "state-philosophy," it became a conservative venture.⁷³ Secondly, the youth recalled the "Heilige Römische Deutscher Nationen," ["Holy Roman Empire of German Nations"] which once had been a reality. They further recalled the empire of Frederick the Great, [1712-1786] which was comparable to Napoleon's empire and the Third French Republic.

In addition the young Germans were cognizant of the critical political situation in Germany which had its origin in the release of Bismarck [1815-1898] from his position in 1890. With Bismarck's dismissal many people throughout the country believed that forty years of peace had come to an end since William II [1888-1918] insisted that he would not tolerate pessimists around him. Moreover, the king expressed his displeasure with the rapidly expanding Catholic Church which he believed was threatening his empire. He also insisted upon an appearance of outward optimism on the part of all public figures.⁷⁴

In regard to the question of colonial expansion the German youth felt that they faced an acute problem as a nation. Because the belated national unification had prevented a successful, competitive struggle with Great Britain and France in this race, they were convinced that such expansion constituted an important variable in the political area of supremacy among nations. While reflecting upon the colonial ex-

⁷³Misch, op. cit., p. 393.

⁷⁴Glum, op. cit., p. 33.

pansion of Great Britain and France, many Germans concluded that such acquisition of land and wealth was designed to intimidate Germany as one of the leading countries on the international scene. Moreover, the Triple Entente, which was made up of France, Russia and Great Britain in 1907, and was attributed to Edward VII [1841-1910] appeared to be anything but a peaceful organization to most Germans. In fact, "it seemed rather a deliberate attempt to 'encircle' Germany and Austria and stifle their free development."⁷⁵ Yet, the younger Germans did not seem overly concerned with such existing conditions. They believed that their country with its militaristic Prussia and Italy had become two important world powers. They further felt that the German nation had rapidly developed into an industrial community after its successful severation from Austria with the Treaty of Prague on August 23, 1866, and that many of the splinter parties had united for the cause of nationalism.

In other areas the theories of Darwin and the natural sciences had also made a profound impression upon the young people. Furthermore, when they reflected upon the history of their nation and considered the hopes, ideals and views of their forefathers as well as those of their own generation, many young Germans began to embrace one fundamental theme: the belief that the ethical rebirth of the individual was the beginning of overcoming the apparent decay within the society and state.⁷⁶

It was with such feelings and attitudes that the German people en-

⁷⁵Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Brun, A Survey of European Civilization, Part II, (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 830.

⁷⁶Glum, op. cit., p. 33.

tered into World War I on August 1, 1914. There were, however, numerous groups of German people who opposed the thought of becoming involved in a war. Hanna Hafkesbrink, who carefully studied this period of German history reported that mass meetings were called throughout the nation by the German Social Democrats, "who decades before the war had devoted themselves to a determined antimilitaristic and anti-imperialistic education of the German masses and who in 1921 had gained the electoral support of a third of the nation."⁷⁷ They tried desperately during the fateful month of July, 1914 to stave off the war. Even the Kölnische Zeitung, a moderate, rightist newspaper, "did not hesitate to sanction publicly the efforts of its opponents for the cause of peace."⁷⁸

However, there also appeared to be an impressive number of Germans who greeted the declaration of war with enthusiasm and anticipation. Without a doubt, most of the young men who left home for the front did so with the knowledge that things would not remain the same while they were gone. Yet their chief concern seemed to be the war and their feelings and attitudes were based upon the concepts advocated by Nietzsche, Fichte, von Treitschke and other intellectual leaders. Thus, most young men at the front did not seem particularly concerned with world supremacy or domination. Rather, they thought it to be a struggle against overwhelming world opposition and a necessary cause to insure their self-preservation.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Hafkesbrink, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 29.

⁷⁹Glum, op. cit., p. 51.

The diary entry of a young German volunteer cited by Walter von Rummel in Das erste Jahr: Aus den Erinnerungen eines Kriegsfriewilligen, [The first Year: From the Memories of a Volunteer] seems to express what many felt when the war officially began, for it stated:

'War!' The incomprehensible and yet long expected has really come. It comes over one like release and one is again able to breathe and say softly: 'At last!' No matter what grave and graver things may come, the last weeks, and especially the last days were unbearable. The leaden nightmare grew hourly more oppressing.⁸⁰

Even people who were unable to wear a uniform felt compelled to do their part. Patriotic demonstrations and street parades took place throughout the country and the early Thomas Mann, who, as a literary observer recorded the reactions of the people at that time made note of this. In his book, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, [Observations of a Non-Political Person] Mann carefully recorded the experiences of millions of Germans who were pessimistic in their general outlook on life, who were willing to sacrifice their lives, who continued to pay glowing tributes to Frederick the Great, and who possessed the Romantic notion that such a war would result in the strengthening of nationalism and the cleansing of man's soul. Of his relationship to the war, Thomas Mann wrote:

A citizen, however, this I know I am too in relation to this war. The citizen is nationalistic in his make-up if he was the carrier of the thought of German unity, especially since he has always been the carrier of German culture and intellect. Frequently, however, the teleological function of the war has been recognized in that it retains, maintains and strengthens the national character: it is a great device against the rationalistic destruction of national culture, and my participation in this war has nothing to do with world--

⁸⁰Quoted by Hafesbrink, op. cit., p. 31.

and business supremacy, but is rather nothing more than the participation in that impassioned process of self-recognition, self-delimitation and self-fortification to which the German culture has been forced because of a terrible intellectual force and attack...⁸¹

With the progression of the war, however, the general attitude of enthusiasm and anticipation soon seemed to dissipate. Thus, a student from the University of Giessen wrote a letter on October 28, 1914, a week before he died on the battlefield, in which he observed:

'With what joy, with what enthusiasm I went into the war, which seemed to me a splendid opportunity for working off all the natural craving of youth for excitement and experience! In what bitter disappointment I now sit here, with horror in my heart!'⁸²

Another student volunteer of the Technical Academy at Charlottenburg who suddenly realized that his romantic longing for death was most unrealistic exclaimed, "'Ah me, I thought it would be so easy to sacrifice one's life: I talked so glibly about it as first; but now...'"⁸³ Moreover, as the war began to degenerate into trenchwarfare in France, the idealistic precepts which had motivated many young men to embark upon their military adventure soon changed to pious endurance. Thus, many of the German soldiers began to look "upon their harrowing experience as a cross God had put on their shoulders which they.../had to/... carry patiently according to his will."⁸⁴

There appeared to be little change in their attitude even after the

⁸¹Thomas Mann, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, (Frankfort: S. Fischer Verlag, 1956), p. 108. Translated by the writer.

⁸²Quoted by Hafesbrink, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 95.

German military resistance and the home front had collapsed in 1918. For the returning soldiers the loss of the war had a number of significant effects which were of great importance to the National Socialists some eleven years later. Thus, whereas the German soldier had been cheered on to war, had worn his uniform with pride and had generally been admired by the populace, he now found himself resented, unwanted and even despised by a people who did not want to be reminded of their defeat. He further noted that the ideals which he had held, for which he had been willing to sacrifice his life suddenly were considered worthless. Strikes and general discontent appeared on the national scene. With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, many people began to believe that England and France had succeeded in effectively surrounding Germany. Almost immediately the "German reaction to the peace terms was one of anger, indignation and-- real or pretended-- disillusion. On the day of signature of this important document an article in the Berliner Tageblatt described the treaty as 'the document of disgrace.'⁸⁵ Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, representing Germany at the signing of the treaty declared:

It is required of us that we designate ourselves as the sole responsible ones for this World War; such statement coming from my mouth would be a lie! Far be it from us to remove every responsibility from Germany that it came to this World War... In the last fifty years imperialism has chronically poisoned the international situation of all European states. The politics of retaliation, the failure of self-determination on the part of the nations have contributed to this crisis. The Russian mobilization placed the decision into the hands of the military powers.⁸⁶

⁸⁵Jarman, op. cit., p. 77.

⁸⁶Misch, op. cit., p. 58.

The introduction of the proposed German Republic under pressure from the West appeared to create even stronger opposition and resentment among the people. Thus, Thomas Mann, as the spokesman for Germany angrily wrote:

Away with the strange and repulsive catchword 'democratic!' The mechanical-democratic state will never become home rule with us. One may Germanize the word, one may say 'national' instead of 'democratic'-- and one says and understands the exact opposite: because German-national, that means 'free'-- whether inside or out. Who wanted to oppose a national development of the Reich and government? None of those, this I pledge, who wanted to resist the enforcement of certain kinds of democratic and political principles in Germany.⁸⁷

In observing the political and social developments on the national scene many Germans concluded that their country had never been very successful in the political sphere when forced to exist with other nations in a coalition and it seemed to many that the Weimar Republic was nothing more than a coalition government. Yet, when the German National Assembly met in Weimar in the summer of 1919, the Socialist minister of Interior, Eduard David, insisted that "'the German Republic is henceforth the most democratic democracy in the world,' while the president of the National Assembly, Konstantin Fehrenbach, a member of the Center Party, added, 'We now lay the constitution in the hands of the German people, whom we have thereby made the freest people on earth.'"⁸⁸ Once the constitution was adopted a rash of minority parties began to appear almost overnight, many of which sent representatives to the new form of government. These representatives were instrumental in deterring the

⁸⁷Mann, op. cit., p. 270.

⁸⁸Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), p. 306.

Weimar Republic from functioning successfully. They knew that it operated on the principle of majority rule. Yet, they attempted to legislate in terms of party affiliations rather than for the benefit of the nation as a whole. In its relatively brief history the Republic government met only eight times out of twenty attempts to conduct business.⁸⁹

Those parties, on the other hand, which had no voice in determining the political policies of Germany soon resorted to techniques which were meant to attract attention. Slogans were invented and a series of articles appeared in various newspapers which decried the corruption which supposedly flourished within the Weimar Republic. Charges and counter-charges added to the general disorganization of the system that continued to operate on the traditional principle that the well-being of the intellectuals was of primary importance.⁹⁰

It was during this period that the three most influential parties, the Old Conservatives, the National Liberals and the New Conservatives came into being. The first group consisted largely of wealthy gentlemen who lived on their land estates, who were concerned about cultural improvements, who were loosely organized, and believed that their salvation could be found only in the return to traditional anarchy. Among them were such men as Freiherr vom Stein, Count Hellmuth von Moltke, and Count York von Wartenburg. They felt incapable of serving the Weimar Republic since they believed themselves obligated and pledged to the crown. The National Liberals, however, were more active and under the

⁸⁹Glum, op. cit., p. 65.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 67.

leadership of Gustav Stresemann became identified as reactionaries. Stresemann believed in Bismarck's much publicized system of military might. Yet he was unable to win a large following primarily because the youth of this generation had little compassion for the traditions of Bismarck. The New Conservatives, the strongest of the three parties, was basically concerned with esthetic problems. Its membership consisted of both Catholics and Protestants. Included in its ranks were some advocates of Nietzsche's philosophy, veterans of World War I, people who strongly opposed the rationalism and materialism of the nineteenth century, and a great number of the younger people.⁹¹

The New Conservatives were strongly influenced by the Fascist movement in Italy. They paved the way for National Socialism, while the other two parties, belabored by disorganization and lack of leadership, soon fell by the wayside. In attempting to explain these developments, Hermann Rausching, the President of the Senate of Danzig, wrote:

We had the upper class of society which should, at the same time, have been the class of the intellectual leaders and would so have been able to justify its claims to political leadership. Above all, we had no middle class. The destruction of the middle class in its two forms of prosperous and lower middle class was, indeed, not actually the work of the inflation and of defeat in war; it had begun from within before the war. After the inflation became manifest there began the reduction of Germans to mass conditions.⁹²

Thus, all three parties were in agreement in their opposition to the Weimar Republic for they believed that "enforced" democracy which was expected to compete with a successful government which had existed

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Hermann Rausching, The Conservative Revolution, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), p. 173.

before World War I, did not seem to fulfill the needs of the German people.⁹³

In summarizing the unhappy period of the Weimar Republic, Ralph F. Buschoff wrote:

When democracy, in its usual sense, was superimposed on Germany in 1918, it was done with little regard for the German past. It came at a time when Germany was so rent with diverse political opinion that this system, which is primarily dependent for efficient functioning on the existence of political parties agreeing in their belief on the fundamentals of government, was soon lost in the morass of innumerable political factions, some of which did not even agree on the democratic method. The outcome of the various elections in the years immediately preceding 1933 indicated a growing strength in the party of the extreme left, the Communist, and the party of the extreme right, the National Socialist. Since neither of these believed in democracy, a fundamental prerequisite for the continuance of that form of government was lacking.⁹⁴

From the economic point of view many Germans suffered extreme hardships before the National Socialists came to power. Already during World War I they had been asked to contribute to the war effort by turning over all privately owned gold, silver, and other valuable possessions to the government. During the years following the war the conditions steadily worsened. For many people "the situation by the end of 1922 was appalling."⁹⁵ Those who controlled the economic situation profited by the fall in the mark and were unaffected by the catastrophe of the ensuing inflation. However, the majority of the German people, particularly the middle class and the low-income group not only lost their possessions but faced considerable periods of unemployment. The

⁹³Glum, op. cit., p. 70.

⁹⁴Buschoff, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

⁹⁵Vermail, op. cit., p. 65.

floating debt of Germany became overwhelming during the financial year, 1921-1922. In a comparison between the years of 1914 and 1921, "the former showed 2129 millions in metal coinage and paper money to the value of 5045 millions in circulation, while the latter showed 1007 millions in metal coinage and 113,639 millions in paper money."⁹⁶ The poverty of the masses continued to grow and soon the "syndicalist youth began to get impatient, breaking away gradually from the old bureaucratic organizations."⁹⁷ Furthermore, Germany was faced by an enormous expenditure in terms of the reparations agreement which it had to sign. A series of economic plans were instituted which were designed to alleviate the situation. Thus, for a period of five years the famous Dawes Plan was put into operation. It was followed by the Young Plan which was administered in 1929, by a Committee of Experts, "and Dr. Schacht, together with a banker and two industrialists, representing German interests in it."⁹⁸

The gravest threat, however, to Germany's economic situation did not occur until May, 1931, when the Oesterreichische Kreditanstalt, "one of the largest banks in Europe controlled by the Vienna Rothschilds, collapsed. Panic spread throughout Austria and Germany."⁹⁹ Worried investigators immediately withdrew their loans and people attempted to withdraw their savings from the banks which remained open. President

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 65-66.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 73.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 89.

⁹⁹Riess, op. cit., p. 93.

Hindenburg appealed to President Hoover for help. It was suggested that France and England should grant a moratorium to Germany for one year. There was little, however, that seemed to help, for "on July 13, Jakob Goldschmidt's bank had to close, and twenty-four hours later all other German banks followed suit. So did the Berlin stock exchange. Germany's economic leaders were at their wit's end."¹⁰⁰ By September of the same year the world at large appeared to face severe economic misfortunes. In Germany at least six million people were unemployed while the United States counted more than ten million jobless workers.

Throughout the years from 1919 to 1933, the influence of National Socialism grew in proportion to the economic and social problems in Germany. In an attempt to explain the early attractiveness of Adolf Hitler's movement, Friedrich Glum advanced the following premise: First, Hitler was part of that generation which grew up prior to World War I and experienced the cruelties of the war in its most violent forms. Moreover, the experience of this struggle became firmly entrenched in the minds of that generation and also influenced the youth of the generations that followed. These young men had not only fought in the war but also had witnessed the collapse of the German Republic and "made up most of the following which obeyed Hitler's orders and helped him to power by also involving the older generation in the end."¹⁰¹ Surrounded by economic and social crises the young people, including men and women from all walks of life, left their family homes. Since

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 93-94.

¹⁰¹ Glum, op. cit., p. 25.

their parents could not feed them, "they sang and played their guitars on trains, so as to pick up a few pfennigs; still well-dressed enough, they played chess in doss-houses to keep themselves entertained, and during the summer season they took to the roads in their thousands."¹⁰²

The problem of the wandering youth was subsequently resolved to some extent through the formation of National Socialist Youth groups. In such an organization, moreover, "no effort was spared to strengthen the youngsters' health, to instruct them, and to let them learn self-reliance under the guiding principle that their immediate leaders rose from the ranks."¹⁰³ The greatest attraction, however, which the National Socialist movement seemed to have for the young people was "that it appeared to be a radical reform movement which promised to realize all of the expressed and unvoiced wishes of a youth standing in opposition to the saturation of the previous generation."¹⁰⁴

For the older people of the post-war generation the National Socialists also attempted to provide desirable attractions. Thus, they tried to link the past with the present by circulating picture post-cards throughout the nation which showed the portraits of Frederick the Great, Bismarck, Hindenburg, and Hitler and bore the caption, "Was der König eroberte-- der Fürst formte-- der Feldmarschall verteidigte-- rettete der Soldat."¹⁰⁵ / "What the king conquered-- the prince molded

¹⁰²Vermail, op. cit., p. 178.

¹⁰³André Francois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 83. Translated by Jacques Le Clercq.

¹⁰⁴Glum, op. cit., p. 26.

¹⁰⁵Jarman, op. cit., p. 29.

into form-- the field-marshal defended-- was saved by the soldier."⁷

Such reasoning had its greatest effect on the poor and the illiterate, as well as the younger people who seemed to find new hope in Hitler's assertion that there once had been the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations followed by the Empire of Frederick the Great and that he would create a Third Reich with the Weimar Republic falling by the way-side as an intermittent catastrophe. With such a promise the membership of the National Socialist Party grew rapidly, aided by the realization of the uneducated followers that for once no one seemed to care whether they had little or no education and most of all it appeared to them that no one looked down upon them.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the philosophic concepts and those historical **developments of the nineteenth century** and the early years of the twentieth century which seemed most appropriate to the National Socialists were soon assimilated and became part of their doctrine. This doctrine in turn was presented to the more sophisticated members and the young people of the new generation by such people as Joseph Goebbels.

Thus, in respect to the philosophic concepts, Hitler and his disciple referred to such men as Nietzsche, Chamberlain, Wagner, de Gobineau, Fichte and von Treitschke as links of the past and supporters of their cause. In the area of historical developments the National Socialists further cited the unification of Germany, the colonial expansion of other countries, World War I, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Weimar Republic as some of the indicators of a need for a change.

¹⁰⁶Glum, op. cit., p. 73

German literature of this period also seemed to support this contention. Thus, one of the representative novels, written by Hans Grimm, appeared in 1926. The book was entitled, Volk Ohne Raum, Nation without Space⁷ and soon became one of the best sellers throughout Germany. Some representative examples which seem to express the German consensus best at that time were recorded by Grimm when he wrote:

Because the life which is described in this book shows the face of our common German fate, as it happens at times, that the story of a simple man at the same time contains the fate of his people, because our most important business will be exposed to broad insight, for this reason, ringing bells must precede this book! Or do you believe that there is something bigger on earth and in heaven than the last question of the fate of our people?

You, however, raise your head with an air of superiority, you say, moreover, the German nation will, nevertheless, live and escape all questions of fate? What is meant by living, friend? The sickly person lives and the thief lives and the prostitute lives and the insects live who feed on one another, but the German person needs space around him and the sun above him and freedom within him to become good and handsome. And if he can become straight and noble in mind and spirit, and if your children have not become sickly and furtive thieves and poor prostitutes, is that your doing? Look about you, look ahead and think of the grandchildren and newly born! There is a slave-like danger of smallness out of which natural bodies and souls can never grow. But I, my friend, I know that my children and my race and the German nation are one and the same and must carry our fate. ¹⁰⁷

In describing the lack of "national consciousness" which the German people possessed for many centuries, Hans Grimm further observed:

During the same period, from the Thirty-Years-War to the Peace of Frankfurt and beyond that, the German nation permitted itself to be torn apart externally and within its tribes; and while it served the quarrels of princes and their jealousies and ambitions and believed this to be loyalty, the world was divided and for the children of the German nation

¹⁰⁷Hans Grimm, Volk Ohne Raum, (München: Albert Langen, Georg Müller, 1926), pp. 10-11. Translated by the writer.

not one piece remained, which they could grow into without bothering a foreign people.

And the children of the German nation reproduced in spite of this and became envious and unagreeable with one another in their congested space; they failed to understand that they only lacked room and air at home; they believed, due to their learned, dependent feelings that the obscure fate could be conquered with parties and cunning.¹⁰⁸

While discussing the problem of needing additional space for the sake of the nation's adequate development, Hans Grimm, at one point utilized one of the main characters of his book to give expression to his main thesis. Speaking through G6rge Friebott, Grimm wrote:

'I know that on the average 104 people live on one square kilometer if one takes all factors into consideration, possessions and Meinte (sic), forest and wasteland. I know that a German person has, in light of such division, ninety-eight square meters of land available; I know that the space is growing less with every child which is born. I know that next to the Russians with their own great world no one grows quicker than we do in our own country.¹⁰⁹

With such viewpoints in mind there appeared to be little change in the attitude of the German people following the failure of the Weimar Republic. The first President of the Reich following an improvement in the economic situation "was the aged imperial Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who had remained faithful to the antidemocratic convictions he inherited."¹¹⁰ From his hands the leadership in Germany was passed on to Adolf Hitler, who began to form his totalitarian state which appeared to satisfy "the traditional bourgeoisie, the big industrialists, the great landowners of plebian origins, the bureaucrats, Army officers,

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 114-115.

¹¹⁰Kohn, op. cit., p. 13.

and university professors."¹¹¹

In an attempt to explain the great appeal which the National Socialists had for the German people during the crucial, formative years, Hans Bernd Gisevius, a civil servant prior to and during the Hitler regime, listed such factors as "the lost war, continual unrest, the inflation, grave evidences of cultural decay, unemployment to an extent hitherto thought impossible..."¹¹² From his vantage point, Gisevius perceived these factors as tension-producing forces preying upon the souls of sixty million people. But once the National Socialists began their active campaigning and Hitler promised work, food and a better social climate for everyone, the pressure seemed to subside. With the assembly of gay and jubilant crowds, trumpet blasts, booming drums and endless marches few Germans could resist this movement. It was as if a new era was beginning. Throughout the country devices such as "stirring slogans, the new rhythm, the colloquial language, the gay and youthful songs, the optimism, and the passionate promises of the Nazi movement..."¹¹³ carried the excited people along with them as a mass movement. Individualism and rational thought were exchanged for mass reactions and strong emotionalism. Everyone appeared to want to belong, to be in on the great event, to have a part in shaping the destiny of the nation before it was too late.

¹¹¹Vermail, op. cit., p. 181.

¹¹²Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 93.

¹¹³Ibid.

While describing the period from 1923 to 1933, Gisevius observed:

A wild national jubilation broke out. Banners, garlands, testimonials, laudatory telegrams, worshipful orations, changes of street names, became commonplace as parades and demonstrations. Victory celebrations, community appeals, followed one another in rapid-fire succession. The glorious sensation of a new fraternity overwhelmed all groups and classes. Professor and waitress, laborer and industrialist, servant girl and trader, clerks, peasants, soldiers, and government workers-- all of them suddenly learned what seemed to be the greatest discovery of the century-- that they were comrades of one race, 'Volks-genossen.' Above all, youth, youth was getting its due. The dreary past was forgotten, even the oppressive present was hardly noticed in view of the transcendent future of this new, this Third Reich, which was at last being established.

No wonder that the popular rejoicing verged on the ecstatic. Serenity vanished; all rational thinking, all inner restraint, were abandoned. In the end there remained nothing but black and white, good and evil; the whole world was divided into rascals and heroes, the past and the eternal, centuries of ignorance and a thousand years of salvation. Everything ran to superlatives.¹¹⁴

Joseph Goebbels was there too. Like many of his countrymen he had grown to manhood during World War I. He too had experienced successive periods of unemployment, had read and discussed the Treaty of Versailles and had witnessed the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Although he personally had been classified "unfit for military service," he had always admired the romantic exploits and adventures of soldiers in war. He had read of them and experienced them vicariously. His admiration for the military even drove him to return to Munich, where he had spent one term as a university student. This happened in 1922, after he had completed his education at Heidelberg. His purpose in Munich was to join the infamous Free Corps, a group made up of "units of young mercenaries,

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 94-95.

former soldiers and officers who yearned for more and more wars, were recruited, conscripted and indoctrinated."¹¹⁵ To his dismay, Goebbels soon learned that the Free Corps was a rather loosely knit organization. He also found that the individual members frequently disagreed violently with one another and seemed uninterested in listening to his discourses on politics in Germany. After being bitterly disappointed and confronted by such unpleasant experiences, Joseph Goebbels reportedly returned to his hometown, Rheydt.

Goebbels' Entry into Politics.-- Much is made of the fact that Goebbels supposedly heard Hitler speak in 1922, just prior to his return to Rheydt. Curt Riess, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner contend that he attended a meeting quite by accident at which Hitler spoke and was so impressed that he immediately joined the party and received the relatively low membership number 8762. However, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel insist that this was not the case. Rather, they believed it to be "unlikely that he ever heard Hitler speak in 1922;... and he certainly undertook no propaganda work at all during 1923 when he was working in the bank and on the stock exchange. He did not, in fact, meet Hitler until late in 1925."¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, January 11, 1923, was a significant date for Goebbels and all German people for it was on that date that French and Belgian troops entered and occupied the Ruhr district "because, according to

¹¹⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 22.

¹¹⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

Premier Poincaré, the German Government was not even trying to live up to the obligations imposed upon it by the Versailles Treaty."¹¹⁷ The occupation of this district hit Germany like a bombshell and the government appealed to the populace calling for passive resistance.

In the United States, Time Magazine recorded the events in the Ruhr district by reporting on March 3, 1923:

The state of checkmate in the Ruhr continues. France believes that her occupation will make German passive resistance too expensive. Germany thinks that her policy of attrition will make the French 'visit' to the Ruhr longer than her purse. Great Britain maintains her attitude of sceptical neutrality.

Events show a marked tendency to violence, but on the whole nothing disastrous has occurred— accepting the situation as it stands. Precautions have been carried out on a large scale. Almost the whole of the Bochum Municipal Council was arrested for disobedience to French orders, but with certain exceptions they have been released. More than a thousand people have been arrested, and in most cases sentenced or fined for boycotting the troops.

The Germans have complained bitterly about French brutality; about the prohibition of Wilhelm Tell at the theatres; about the expulsion of German officials from the Ruhr; about the use of black troops. In connection with the last complaint, German contentions are backed up by first-hand unbiased evidence, despite French denials.

The scenes of violence have all occurred in Bochum, where the French troops fired upon the crowd. This action has done much to stiffen German resistance. The total casualties of the Ruhr occupation to date are: 9 Germans killed and 13 wounded.¹¹⁸

On March 10, 1923, Time Magazine added:

The French troops are now occupying two districts in Germany-- the Rhine and the Ruhr. Seizure were made last week of the Railway yards at Darmstadt, the town of Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Lorch, Knielingen. The German Ambassador in Paris was informed by the French government that these occupations are the result of acts of sabotage.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 26.

¹¹⁸Time, Vol. I, No. 1, (March 3, 1923), p. 7.

¹¹⁹Time, Vol. I, No. 2, (March 10, 1923), p. 7.

By August 6, 1923, economic and political developments had deteriorated in alarming proportions in Germany at large. Thus, Time Magazine reported on that date:

The political situation in Germany is rapidly assuming an alarming crisis. The inflation of the currency and the deadlock of principal industries are producing economic situations analogous to that of the Winter 1918-19. The Communists are as active now as were the Spartacans immediately after the fall of the Imperial regime in 1918. There is plenty of Bolshevik propaganda, no doubt backed by Soviet gold, in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany.

The other side of the picture is provided by the increased monarchist activity throughout the Reich.¹²⁰

Accounts concerning Goebbels' activities during the Ruhr disturbances vary. Curt Riess, as well as Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner report that he left his hometown, Rheydt, and hurried to Elberfeld, a city just outside of the occupied territory as soon as he had learned about the resistance movement there. Once he arrived in Elberfeld, Goebbels found that members of the Free Corps and National Socialism had switched from passive to active resistance. Underground movements and party cells were being formed throughout the district. Goebbels offered "to blow up bridges, derail trains-- in short, to undertake any assignment, however dangerous,"¹²¹ but his services were turned down. He was told that his physical deformity and particularly his limp would make him a marked man. Instead, he was advised to serve the resistance movement with speeches of agitation and by helping to organize National Socialist party cells. Goebbels enthusiastically accepted this advice and, according to Ebermayer and Meissner, "so it came

¹²⁰Time, Vol. I, No. 23, (August 6, 1923), p. 11.

¹²¹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 32.

about that he made his first speech in the beergarden of a little Rhineland inn only a few miles from the occupied Ruhr."¹²²

One of the most active young men among the National Socialists was Albert Leo Schlageter. On March 14, 1923, he was responsible for blowing up the railroad tracks between Dusseldorf and Duisburg. Tracked down by the French, Schlageter was caught and sentenced to death on May 26, after first confessing his activities and indicting many National Socialist party members at his trial. Joseph Goebbels immediately began to talk about Schlageter to his audiences. He knew the young National Socialist had been a paid agent, yet he subtly transformed reality into a legend as he was to do frequently in the future. Without a moments hesitation "he turned an informer into a hero, into an unselfish patriot, a martyr who preferred to go to his death rather than betray his cause."¹²³

Even after the German Government resigned and the new Cabinet called off passive resistance, Goebbels continued to speak in the non-occupied part of the Rhineland until the bitter struggle came to an end. In describing Goebbels' speaking engagements, Curt Riess observed:

Every evening he addressed another meeting. He spoke with pathos and ever increasing emotion, as though his very life depended upon his ability to convince his listeners, as though he was forever trying to convince himself. To convince himself-- perhaps this is why he was so fiery, so persuasive a propagandist even at this early date.¹²⁴

¹²²Ibid., p. 33.

¹²³Riess, op. cit., p. 28.

¹²⁴Ibid.

Without the continual support of the government the resistance movement soon faltered. Goebbels found himself without a cause, without financial support and was forced to find a job. He wrote a letter to the party headquarters in Munich in which he described his Ruhr activities and asked for a paid position, but it was to no avail. He finally obtained a position in 1924 as a private secretary to Franz Wieggershaus, the Reichstag deputy for the Voelkische Freiheitspartei [People's Freedom Party]. Among his assigned duties was the requirement to make speeches in which he was expected to attack other nationalist groups. He told his audiences that such organizations had no future and called the National Socialist party one of such groups. On one occasion while Goebbels was speaking on this theme, Gregor Strasser was present. Goebbels knew that Strasser had taken over the Party's political direction while Hitler was serving his sentence in Landsberg prison, and he was somewhat embarrassed to be seen speaking under such circumstances. But instead of getting angry at the speaker's attacks upon the National Socialists, Strasser "visited Goebbels after the meeting, introduced himself and remarked: 'You are a fine speaker. Maybe one day we can work together.'"¹²⁵

During 1925, Goebbels began working for Gregor Strasser. He was originally hired as Strasser's private secretary and was supposed to help as an editorial assistant with the publication of a small weekly journal to be called the party's "geistiges Fuehrungsorgan." [The "organ of spiritual leadership"] While Gregor Strasser intended to

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 33.

become the publisher of the journal, his brother Otto was to be the editor. But during the interim period, before the journal was ever to be published, the Strassers' decided to engage Goebbels in secretarial work for the northern party organization and to utilize his talents as a speaker. Goebbels continued to live in Elberfeld, the headquarters of the Rhineland-Nord Gau or district of the party, "and very soon, partly to reward his efforts and partly because the party was still very poor and every paid worker had to undertake several jobs, he was appointed business manager of the district Rhineland-Nord."¹²⁶ Most of his time, however, seems to have been taken up by a strenuous speaking schedule which took him through almost all of the densely populated Rhineland-Westphalia district. He spoke almost every day and frequently several times a day, which prompted Curt Riess to observe:

He became a forceful agitator; necessity developed him. He learned every trick of the trade. His talent for repartee was strengthened by the tremendous routine required of him. If he ever had stage-fright, he had it no longer; if he was ever shy, his public found no trace of it. He was able to step up on to the platform and deliver a speech to a public loudly proclaiming its distrust. And oddly enough, even with an openly hostile audience he created some impression, won over a few to the Nazi cause. He was much too busy; too tired to invent new slogans. But he soon realized that this was by no means necessary, that indeed the very same words said over and over again had the effect of a sledge-hammer...¹²⁷

For his loyalty and hard work Goebbels was rewarded by Gregor Strasser. He was asked to publish a weekly propaganda pamphlet entitled, "National Sozialistische Briefe," ["National Socialist Letters"], of

¹²⁶Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 41.

¹²⁷Riess, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

which the first issue appeared on October 1, 1925. In subsequent issues he wrote a series of articles which were pro-Russian and earned him for some time the reputation of being a Communist sympathizer. In one instance he wrote:"'I think it is terrible that we and the Communists should be bashing each other's heads. Cannot we talk things over with the leading Communists?'"¹²⁸

Until the summer of 1926, when he was won over to the Hitler faction of the party, Goebbels served the Strassers well. In his diary covering the period from August 3, 1925 to October 16, 1926, he gave some indication of the strenuous speaking schedule he was following. On one occasion he noted, "'Between October 1, 1924, and October 1, 1925, I spoke 189 times....' 'You can drop dead from that kind of work!'"¹²⁹ On another occasion he observed:

'I am desperate. I am up to my eyes in work. I don't know where to turn. I've bitten off more than I can chew... And I must do everything alone. Horrible slave driving... Mother, help me. I can't go on. I barely weigh a hundred pounds. They are exploiting me for much too much work.'¹³⁰

When Goebbels left the Strassers to serve his new master after considerable self-examination and indecision, little changed in terms of the frequency of his public appearances. But the circumstances under which he addressed his audiences and the locale in which he spoke were quite different from his past experiences. Hitler officially appointed Goebbels Gauleiter [District Leader] of Berlin on October 26, 1926.

¹²⁸Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 42.

¹²⁹Riess, op. cit., p. 37.

¹³⁰Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 46.

His objectives as Gauleiter were to rebuild the party organization and machinery in the capital city which had seriously degenerated. He was also expected to hinder and retard the growth of the Communist party in Berlin, to bring the National Socialist to the attention of the people, and ultimately to win new followers to the cause.

The Gauleiter of Berlin.-- Upon his arrival in Berlin during November, 1926, Goebbels described his first speaking engagement by writing:

The November evening already lies heavily and gray over Berlin as the D-Zug [special express train] steams into the Potsdamer train station. Two hours have hardly passed before I stand upon the platform which is to become the focal point of our future political development. I speak to the Berlin party membership.¹³¹

Although Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel insist that "this was the legend Goebbels himself perpetuated in his book The Battle of Berlin ..."¹³² Ebermayer and Meissner go to great lengths to describe the Gauleiter's first speech in Berlin. In their book, Evil Genius: The Story of Joseph Goebbels, these authors suggest that Goebbels held this first meeting in Spandau, a suburb of Berlin. After being introduced by Berlin's Chief of the S. A. Storm Troopers, Kurt Deluge, Ebermayer and Meissner reported:

...there was no applause. He began to speak about the workers of the Ruhr, evoking a picture of them bound and gagged by the greedy Jewish capitalist bosses, but still struggling desperately for liberation through the Nazi movement. There was no visible reaction from his audience, no sound to be

¹³¹Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München: Franz Eher Nachf., 1934), p. 21. Translated by the writer.

¹³²Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 64.

heard save his own voice. Glaring nervously at his notes he continued, not daring to deviate from the line he had rehearsed, as he did not feel close enough to his audience to speak spontaneously. Next he spoke on the theme that 'the basis of National Socialist Revolution is Socialist.' His audience was still not interested.¹³³

Four hundred local party members had been called to this meeting. In an effort to elicit some sort of audience response, Goebbels began to utilize provocative statements. When most of them failed to achieve their end, the speaker attacked his audience directly by shouting: "This brilliant, glittering El Dorado, which smugly calls itself the Capital of all Germany, has up till now opposed a constructive Party policy more effectively than anywhere else in the Reich."¹³⁴ This time the audience responded almost instantly. The new Gauleiter of Berlin was unable to continue his speech until Deluge ordered his S. A. men to clear the hall of the loudest objectors. Then, before the meeting was officially adjourned, Goebbels announced his first order:

'To unify and strengthen the movement in Berlin I order that all the two hundred disruptive and undisciplined members who have just been forcibly removed from this hall, should be expelled from the Party.'¹³⁵

With the remaining six hundred party members Gauleiter Goebbels set out to capture the city of Berlin for National Socialism. He quickly realized that his bid for recognition in the capital city meant that he had to provide the speaking occasions himself. He further knew that such recognition could only be obtained by successfully overcoming his com-

¹³³Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 49.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 50.

¹³⁵Ibid.

petition. Rather than attend the speeches of the newly arrived spokesman of National Socialism, the people of Berlin were concerned with other matters which they deemed more important. Thus, as Curt Riess reported:

The six-day bicycle race at the Sportpalast made headlines. Italian Fascists were staging demonstrations against France. In Britain a seven-month coal strike, which had enabled Germany to intensify her coal exports, was nearing the end. A Reichstag deputy had introduced a law against trash and vice-- a kind of literary censorship. In Rumania raged a controversy about who was to succeed the dying King Ferdinand on the throne. In France, the painter Claude Monet had died. Gustav Stresemann, Aristide Briand and Austen Chamberlain-- the foreign ministers of the great European powers-- and Charles G. Dawes, Vice-President of the United States, had received the Nobel Prize for Peace. The largest German motion-picture company, UFA, was facing an unprecedented financial crisis. A certain Harry Domela, posing as a Hohenzollern prince, had swindled hotels and store owners throughout Germany out of large sums of money, before he was finally arrested. There were so many things going on in the world, and Berlin was interested in all of them. How could Goebbels succeed in catching the eye of the capital?¹³⁶

Primarily because he recognized these events as competitive forces in his bid for publicity and attention, Goebbels conceived a daring plan.¹³⁷ He hired the Pharus-Saele for February 11, 1927, located in a low-income district in Berlin which was usually used by the Communists for their political demonstrations. The Gauleiter knew full well that his appearance there would provoke the Communists and that a serious battle might break out if he were to attempt to speak. He took steps

¹³⁶Riess, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

¹³⁷Most authorities seem to credit Goebbels with the invention of the Pharus-Saele incident. However, Gerd Rühle, author of the official account of the growth and development of the Third Reich, reports that the first such incident, almost identical to the one described in this study, occurred on August 15, 1921.

to insure that the outcome would provide him with favorable publicity. First he had posters printed on dark-red paper which were distributed throughout the district. "'The Burgeois State is approaching its end!' they screamed. 'We must forge a new State. Workers, in your hands lies the fate of the German nation!' They looked precisely like Communist posters."¹³⁸ Loudspeakers blared forth the news of the coming event and handbills were distributed on many street corners. The Communists reacted immediately, calling upon the workers to "'give the brown murderers and enemies of the workers the kind of hiding they deserve."¹³⁹ Their posters further told the workers in huge letters, "'Death to the Nazi swine on the 11th February,' and 'The red Wedding [district] will stay red. Prove it at the Pharus-Sale on the 11th February."¹⁴⁰ To incite the Communists even more, Goebbels "arranged for a parade to precede the meeting. 600 Nazis-- every single member had been forced to participate-- marching with the swastika flags through the north of Berlin. 600 Nazis, blackjacks in their pockets."¹⁴¹ In describing the occasion of this particular event which was one of Goebbels' earliest and most celebrated propaganda stunts, Ebermayer and Meissner minutely recorded the ensuing events as follows:

Long before the meeting was due to start, on the evening of the 11th of February, the hall was crowded. Every table was cluttered with beer-glasses, every chair around was occupied,

¹³⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 53.

¹³⁹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Riess, op. cit., p. 53.

and crowds of men stood packed along the walls. The air was thick with smoke and there was a general babel of expectant and excited voices, raised in loud laughter or comradely greetings. Doors slammed continually, tables and chairs scraped as they were pushed about and heavy boots resounded on the floor.

Suddenly a new sound forced itself above the general din, not so much because of its volume as because of its regular rhythm. The S. A. had arrived, in marching order, and were marking time outside the hall. For the last two hours they had been marching through the district, with drums and flags and banners. Now those inside heard commands being shouted, a trampling of hundreds of boots, and through the doors poured the S. A. men, distributing themselves systematically throughout the hall. Then followed Deluge at the head of about twenty-five especially husky young men in britches and leather jackets, who stationed themselves all around the platform as the speaker's bodyguard.

The entrance of the S. A. was so spectacular in itself that hardly anyone noticed the little man in the shiny black jacket who was to be the principal speaker. Next to the huge Deluge, Goebbels looked a mere stripling as the two climbed on to the rostrum together. Slowly the audience began to settle down as Deluge introduced 'Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the National Socialist Gauleiter of Berlin, who will talk to you about 'The collapse of the bourgeois society.' Goebbels pulled himself up behind the speaker's desk, fists characteristically pressed to his sides, and cleared his throat to begin. At this point a voice from the back shouted, 'May I raise a point of disorder, please?' Before anyone realized what was happening the heckler was surrounded by S. A. men who hustled him out, giving him a good pummelling in the process. His friends naturally came to his aid-- the fight had started.

In a flash Deluge took the speaker's glass and hurled it into the midst of the fighting group. Someone was hit and collapsed. Now beerglasses flew through the air, chairs were broken up and-- using chair-legs as clubs-- the S. A. men waded into the scene of battle. Knuckle-dusters and coshes appeared, tables were overturned and lamps smashed. From time to time Deluge from his strategical position, gave orders, and his special group made a foray into some part of the hall where opposition seemed strongest, but they invariably returned swiftly, leaving a trail of blood and wreckage behind.

All the while, Goebbels stood motionless behind the speaker's desk in the same position as he stood when he tried to begin his speech. Missiles flew past his head and from time to time a red made an unsuccessful attempt to reach him. But he remained unflinching and aloof, gazing across the tumult with a sarcastic smile. His own men were deeply impressed; he had gained their respect and admiration by now, if nothing else.

Then the police arrived to restore order. Goebbels had twelve wounded S. A. men put on stretchers and carried on to the stage. Whilst they lay there, groaning as they were being treated, he began, his voice unsteady with emotion: 'No one can now expect me to talk about the collapse of the bourgeois state. Instead, I shall speak about the unknown S. A. men.' He walked across to the twelve men on their stretchers, shook each one of them by the hand in silence, looking them straight in the eye. Then he began to speak in a taut controlled manner about the simple faithful German, always willing to sacrifice himself for his comrades, for his country, for a decent way of life. Every few minutes stretcher-bearers carried out a wounded S. A. man, when Goebbels would stop in his speech, stand to attention, and follow the injured man with his eyes until he had disappeared from view. All those left in the Pharus-Säle began to follow his example, getting up to honour in silence the 'unknown S. A. man.'

Next day Goebbels and the Nazi Party made the headlines in the 'Battle of the Pharus-Säle'. Ninety people had been injured, a positive massacre for Berlin, which was not yet accustomed to blood-letting at its political meetings. None the less the Party membership trebled within three days. Some time later Goebbels confided to friends with great pride that the whole thing had been staged from beginning to end, and that the only speech he had prepared was that of the 'Unknown S. A. man'.

He was delighted with the successful way he had stage-managed this riotous affair, especially as even his closest friends had warned him so strongly against it. All the 'actors' in the scene had done exactly what he had planned they should do, although they were not to know that, of course.¹⁴²

Goebbels' dramatization of the "Unknown S. A. man" was so effective that he decided to exploit this idea for future propaganda purposes. But on such future occasions "the wounded men, bandaged and on stretchers, were in reality unharmed actors dressed up for the occasion."¹⁴³

Another large meeting was held on May 4. Thousands of posters proclaimed: "'A people in distress! Who will save us? Jakob Goldschmidt?'"¹⁴⁴ For this occasion, Goebbels had changed the circumstances

¹⁴²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., pp. 51-53.

¹⁴³Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 73.

¹⁴⁴Riess, op. cit., p. 55.

somewhat since he knew that his speeches "must not all follow exactly the same pattern, as even the stupid 'masses' might begin to have their suspicions."¹⁴⁵ The Gauleiter chose to deliver a strong invective against the Jews in general and Jakob Goldschmidt, a leading banker, in particular. Among his audience was an elderly pastor named Fritz Stucke, who began to heckle the speaker. When Stucke was eventually removed forcibly from the meeting, he immediately went to a hospital where a doctor certified that he had been beaten up. Forty-eight hours after the newspapers reported the incident the Police Commissioner of Berlin suspended the entire National Socialist party in greater Berlin. But Goebbels seemed relatively unmoved. On the morning following the ban a man stormed into the Police Commissioner's office and shouted, "'We National Socialists refuse to recognize the ban."¹⁴⁶ Again the newspapers reported this event and when "a few days later it was found that Pastor Stucke had not been officiating for some time; he had been compelled to resign because he was a chronic drunkard— all Berlin laughed."¹⁴⁷ In a postscript on Stucke's further activities Curt Riess reported:

This is what happened to the fervent democrat, Stucke, after Hitler came to power: in 1934 he became head of the Labour (sic) Office in the little town of Koeslin, and for some time prior to that appointment he had been amtsleiter (minor Nazi bureaucrat) of the National Socialist Party in that town.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 54.

¹⁴⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 75.

¹⁴⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁴⁸Ibid.

In spite of the ban placed upon the party and a "Redeverbot" /a ban on speechmaking⁷ specifically levelled at Goebbels until October 29, 1927, the Gauleiter continued to contact audiences in Berlin. In order to do this he organized seemingly harmless clubs or visited the meetings of other party organizations in the company of a group of S. A. men. There he took part in the forum periods "and thus had the opportunity to say what.../he...intended to say."¹⁴⁹

The Chief of Party Propaganda.— In March of 1928, when the National Socialists were once more recognized by the government, Goebbels decided that the party should take a stand in the elections of May 20. He recognized the Reichstag as a potential and promising platform for his agitation. Thus began a campaign which taxed his energy to the utmost. For eight weeks he traveled extensively, speaking on every possible occasion and "almost entirely owing to his efforts— the Nazis succeeded in raising the representation from nine seats to twelve."¹⁵⁰ Subsequently, on January 9, 1929, "Goebbels was appointed Reich Propaganda Chief."¹⁵¹

The year 1928 was an important one for Goebbels and the National Socialists. On the international scene, Calvin Coolidge was still President of the United States. Wall Street was in high spirits and prosperity reigned throughout the country. Frank Billings Kellogg, America's Secretary of State, was attempting to formulate a plan which

¹⁴⁹Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, op. cit., p. 256.

¹⁵⁰Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁵¹Riess, op. cit., p. 75.

would outlaw war. Many representatives of the great countries gladly signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact, as it was called. For his efforts, Kellogg received the Nobel Prize in spite of the fact that everyone knew that if the pact were broken, little could be done about it. In the German Reichstag the main point on the agenda was whether to vote appropriations for a new battle cruiser. Though many people were seriously discussing the issues of international disarmament, even the Social Democrats, the strongest and perhaps most peace-desiring party, voted in favor of building the cruiser. Seymour Parker Gilbert, an American lawyer, arrived in Germany to inspect German finances and to analyze the problems of reparations. He concluded in several reports that German official figures were inaccurate to some degree and that big business was attempting to conceal its real wealth. He also contended that much capital had been shipped abroad for tax evasion purposes and that the once famed honesty of the German businessman had disappeared. In Italy, Mussolini was restoring order and received the admiration of the ruling classes in other countries, while Stalin was having a difficult time in Russia. He had exiled Trotsky and removed Kamenes, Zinoviev, Rakovski, Radek, and others to Siberia. It was rumored that the collapse of the Soviet Union was but a question of weeks.¹⁵²

Besides his campaigning for additional Reichstag seats for the National Socialists, Goebbels also began to develop systematic instructions for the party speakers during 1928. In spelling out his

¹⁵²Ibid.

detailed instructions, Goebbels wrote:

Directives for the National Socialist Party Organization

I. General Instructions.

1. We show in a few dozen cities of the nation that the enemy has been entirely and completely destroyed. Thus, our idea, propagandized and passionately driven to the fore in the right manner, can drive every political nonsense emanating from the right and left into anonymity of its meaningless content. Therewith we strengthen the belief of the uncertain individuals among us and rattle the security of the enemy. We prove that we can win, if we train our strength upon a reliable objective.
2. In every district which promises to be of greatest importance for the future of our movement, we will establish one or two bulwarks which can never be destroyed by an attack, by persecution, by prohibition or by terror. Therewith the movement is secured for the future at certain centers of the nation for the last great battle.
3. In every important district we conquer strongholds for the movement from which, once in possession of power and the streets, we can expand our work upon the broad land without interference. The strongholds will become inexhaustible fountains of power for the part of the country which they manage economically and politically. This example of work will influence the entire area of land favorably, will be hated by the enemy, and admired by the friend. There the energies will assemble which are necessary to stretch the network of the organization over the entire nation.
4. These strongholds will, sooner or later, pull the surrounding area into the chaos of the break-up with them, and nothing will stop the march once it has begun; then it will move forward in a single victory march.

II. Special Directives.

1. The responsible district leaders and leaders of the areas are required to work together in a serious and systematic manner with headquarters and the propaganda center in order to discover those details in their districts which are essential to our work. They are to concentrate all of their efforts upon these details even in spite of the fact that smaller and less important areas remain unorganized.
2. They must see to it that a leadership is discovered which is in a position to prepare great propaganda activities in those areas which are to be taken over and to convert overt success into practical organizational successes.
3. The propaganda must be initiated with confidence and uniformity by a central agency with only minor variations in terms of the area and its characteristics; it must

follow the uniform, carefully thought out national guide lines, and is to be designed upon a long-range plan with the strong determination to forsake immediate success for the final victory.

4. Our best speakers are to make themselves available for this activity without reservation, money is to be gathered in large proportions by any and all means so that the activities can really be carried out in great style.
5. Air leaflets and posters are already to be prepared at the beginning of the campaign in a uniform design by the best manipulators of the word and propaganda of our movement for the entire action. These will be distributed uniformly by our headquarters and-- with as little profits as possible-- given to the cities.
6. The public discourses are to be developed in light of certain points of view and are to be debated at most by three or four persons in a series of six to eight evenings and should present a uniform picture of National Socialist Weltanschauung.
7. The public meetings are to be made as large as possible. Police protection is to be declined at the outset but our own Saalschutz /hall or meeting protection/ must be of such caliber, possibly supplemented by calling upon a neighboring S. A. unit, that the meeting can be thrashed out to the very end and under any circumstances.
8. Under no circumstances, even if difficulties arise, may any changes be made concerning the initial objective of the activity. This objective must be seen through, no matter what happens, and all other propaganda objectives become secondary to it.

III. Guiding Rules.

1. A public meeting is more important than one ordinarily assumes. It is the outward proof of our movement to the world. The meeting determines the reputation of a party and with it the acceptability of its ideas. Therefore it /the meeting/ shall be prepared with seriousness and responsibility.
2. A destroyed meeting is a loss which can hardly be rectified in half a year. The citizen will never return because of fear and the worker because of contempt. Therefore, every meeting must be prepared in such a manner that it can be held to the very end.
3. Our own party members are not listeners, but passionate participants. A failure is never admitted in public under any circumstances.
4. An empty house is not an indictment of the city but rather of the organizers of the meeting. A crowded guest-room is better than an empty giant hall.
5. One meeting does not destroy the work of sixty years of Marxism. The giant work of the enemy must be broken apart in a long, tough struggle. If after three or four meetings the bulwark of the enemy begins to crumble, then

the work has been admirable. Usually it takes much longer and requires a tremendous amount of work, sacrifice and endurance. Therefore one must not expect too much from one meeting. One should be content if the enemy listens, debates towards the end, declares his opposition and on the way home begins to doubt somewhat.

6. At first our assignment can only be to soften up the enemy. We must rob him of his doctrine of salvation. Then he will soon take us as the bearer of a new doctrine of salvation. A public meeting is somewhat like a sermon, after which even the righteous sins seven times during the day.
7. The main task lies before and after the meeting. The preparation must begin at least three weeks prior to the meeting. One must not waste one's ammunition too early. Start in time and increase the methods day by day until the final day. Once one is assured of success then it is time to play out the trump card a few hours before the meeting begins.
8. After the meeting the difficult task begins to round out the success. This is not accomplished automatically. It requires tough, menial work in all possible areas. One must obtain influence over the press, one must visit newly acquired members, refute attacks of the enemy, denounce and remove mistakes of party members, transmit insights and perceptions incurred on the evenings of speeches, expound the spiritual contents of the speech, excite the half-hearted, cheer up the wavering individuals, tone down those who are carried away, in short, return from the heights of success back to the lowliness of the daily work.¹⁵³

The years from 1929, until the National Socialists were in complete control of the nation in 1933, presented perhaps even greater challenges to Goebbels the speaker, than those that had gone before. It was during this period that the party under the direction of Hitler and with the assistance of the Gauleiter set out in earnest to capture the Reich. Already on September 16, 1928, after a ban on speechmaking levelled

¹⁵³Boris v. Borresholm, ed., Dr. Goebbels: Nach Aufzeichnungen Aus Seiner Umgebung, (Berlin: Verlag des "Journal," 1949), pp. 194-198. Translated by the writer.

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against Hitler had been lifted by the government, Goebbels rented the Sportpalast and filled it to capacity with more than ten thousand people. The main speaker was Hitler himself. The Gauleiter had realized that since the National Socialist movement depended upon the Fuehrer, it was necessary that his propaganda machine had to serve Hitler. Thus, once many flags had been displayed, much singing and marching had taken place, and the audience had reached the pitch of feverish excitement, Goebbels would introduce the speaker. On many occasions "such meetings were to be repeated frequently during the following years, with Hitler making the main speech and Goebbels introducing him, staging the whole show but remaining more or less in the background."¹⁵⁴ Because Goebbels had neither radio nor films at his disposal in 1929, "all his propaganda had to be effected through the press and public demonstrations or meetings."¹⁵⁵ Many of these occasions were conducted in line with the philosophy which he had expressed at a party congress in the Ruhr in 1927, when he declared:

Whoever can conquer the street can also conquer the masses; and whoever conquers the masses will therewith conquer the state. In the long run, the man of the nation is impressed only by the display of power and discipline. A good idea, supported by proper means and carried out with the necessary energy will, in the long run always captivate the broad masses...

The aggressor is, this is known, always stronger than the defender and if the defense is indeed conducted with improper and half-hearted measures, as it is the case among

¹⁵⁴Riess, op. cit., p. 78.

¹⁵⁵Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 83.

the bourgeois, then the enemy on the offensive will soon conquer position after position and push the defender out of his final position with force.¹⁵⁶

In the same year "at Nuremberg the great rally, with its singing, its banners, its speech-making and torch-light processions, was beginning to be developed as the highlight among the party's annual demonstrations."¹⁵⁷

Whenever possible, Goebbels utilized special events to supplement his propaganda campaigns. One such occasion was the death of Horst Wessel on February 23, 1930. The Gauleiter had first become aware of Wessel in 1926, when the latter joined the party and soon distinguished himself as a street-fighter and popular young speaker in Berlin. Born in 1907 as the son of a Lutheran pastor, Horst Wessel was put in charge of a storm trooper unit by the Gauleiter after he had first carefully studied the organization of the Austrian Hitler Youth in Vienna. He possessed a promising future in the party and was slated for rapid advancement when he suddenly seemed to lose interest in all political activities. Upon closer investigation, Goebbels learned that his protégé had befriended a prostitute named Erna Jaenicke in Berlin. Since he was unemployed, Wessel relied upon the girl for his subsistence which irritated a previous admirer of Erna's known as Ali Hoehler. Hoehler had been responsible for starting the girl on her career and had been her procurer before Horst Wessel became interested in her. Ali Hoehler confronted his competitor on January 14, and shot him

¹⁵⁶Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁵⁷Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 77.

through the mouth in the girl's apartment. Wessel was taken to a Berlin hospital in critical condition where he was frequently visited by Goebbels. The Gauleiter reported every detail of his visits in the party newspaper, Der Angriff. [The Attack.] The public was not informed about the sordid events surrounding Wessel's mishap since "as far as Goebbels was concerned, Wessel had belonged only to the Party and the storm troopers."¹⁵⁸ Horst Wessel's real contribution to the National Socialist movement, however, was the fact that he "had written a little political verse for Der Angriff which happened to go well with the tune of a song popular among the Communist youth."¹⁵⁹ Very soon it became the famous "Horst Wessel Lied,"-- the National Socialist hymn which was sung for the first time at Wessel's grave. According to Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel,

Wessel himself was sanctified as the warrior crowned in death. The tune, with its hymnlike sentiment, was undoubtedly effective, and Goebbels' instinct for the religious saw that it would both dignify and hallow Nazi ceremonial in the future. In fact, it became the anthem of the movement and lasted as long as the regime itself.¹⁶⁰

In October 1929 the New York Stock Market collapsed. Huge sums of money were lost and the period of prosperity in America came abruptly to an end. Millions of people who had lived in comfortable security suddenly found they had lost everything. Businesses went bankrupt while untold workers became unemployed. All over the world their ranks were quickly growing. But to Goebbels the developments in America and

¹⁵⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 82.

¹⁵⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 83.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 84.

the subsequent world crises were important only insofar as they could be exploited for propaganda purposes. On the international level Goebbels contended that the events were solely "a direct result of the chicanery of international Jewry, directed against Germany,"¹⁶¹ while his attacks on the national level were directed against Germany's Foreign Minister Stresemann.

It was Stresemann's government that had been responsible for calling off the unsuccessful attempt at passive resistance in the Ruhr during 1923. It was he who had signed the Treaty of Locarno in 1925, advocating a policy of peaceful coexistence with the French. He also succeeded in getting Germany admitted to the League of Nations in September, 1926, and was responsible for the enactment of the Young Plan. Because of such activities Stresemann became a serious threat to Goebbels, who consequently singled him out in subsequent speeches and articles in which he contended:

'Stresemann is really not an individuality but the incarnation of everything rotten in Germany, '.../and/...'his entire foreign policy is one enormous field of ruins, strewn with questions tackled but never solved...'¹⁶²

International and national crises followed in rapid succession in the early months of 1930. Unemployment and the depression affected almost every citizen in Germany and while a pessimistic attitude towards life descended upon the nation, "Goebbels' confidence grew along with it, to the extent that he forecast an increase from twelve to forty

¹⁶¹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 66.

¹⁶²Riess, op. cit., p. 87.

Nazi members in the Reichstag election of September."¹⁶³ His optimistic prediction was based in part upon the careful planning which he had begun months earlier. Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner wrote about this particular election campaign:

He undertook an election campaign of a sort and degree never hitherto experienced by the German electorate. All the Nazi press was Goebbels-directed: all the speakers (and every possible audience was studied and catered for) were Goebbels-instructed; all the posters were Goebbels-inspired. He directed broad strategy and supervised the details. He appealed to the eye, the ear, the emotions of all sections of 'the masses.' Everywhere there were lights, stunts, noise, pageantry, and the voters were so bemused and bedazzled that they trooped to vote for him. In the end, the Nazi Party achieved a Reichstag representation of 107, and the country was astounded.¹⁶⁴

Similarly, Curt Riess reported that Goebbels' propaganda during this election campaign was almost overpowering. In explaining the systematic developments with which the Gauleiter gained his impressive victory, Riess observed:

Goebbels had worked out a regular deployment plan for his speakers, so that none of them would have a moment's idleness. He organized 6,000 meetings. He had tents erected to hold thousands of people, he staged open-air meetings at night, lighted by torches. Millions of posters were stuck on the walls of every city. The entire Nazi press was unified under Goebbels' command. He himself supervised the news coverage on the meetings and the next morning identical reports would appear in all Nazi papers throughout Germany. Whatever copies were not bought by the public were given away free. Nazi papers which previously had had a circulation of 50,000 now printed half-a-million copies.

On September 11, more people than ever before cast their votes in Germany. For hours they queued up in front of voting booths. It was obvious that a good many were voting for the first time in their lives.

¹⁶³Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 68.

In the evening the first election returns came in. They were, of course, not conclusive but showed a certain increase of Nazi votes. Nobody seemed surprized. By then the Bruenning Government was convinced that Goebbels' original prediction-- forty seats in the new Reichstag-- would come true.

During the night further returns poured in. Suddenly the people listening at their radiors, the cabinet members in the Wilhelmstrasse and the Nazi leaders gathered around Goebbels realized that the Nazi victory amounted to a landslide.¹⁶⁵

The years from 1927 to 1931 were also quite eventful for Goebbels and the National Socialist party. The party had won twelve seats in the Reichstag in 1928 and Goebbels had become one of its chosen representatives. The Allied Control Commission had been officially withdrawn from Germany in 1927, "and this permitted the German government to begin a secret policy of rearmament and of the reorganization of the professional army, the Reichswehr."¹⁶⁶ Yet in the same year, Gustav Stresemann, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, was considered to be an appeaser by the extremists. There was much political strife among various factions and the Government of Germany. In one instance, when the workers attempted to hold their annual May Day demonstration in Berlin, they were fired upon by the police with the result that twenty-five of the demonstrators were killed. By 1929, the National Socialists had won the support of a number of industrialists and bankers, such as Thyssen and Schroeder, who hoped to regain control of the nation through the party. They further supported the creation of semi-military organizations such as Hitler's S. A. and the German National party's Stahlhelm which consisted of ex-servicemen. By January, 1931, the leader of the S. A.,

¹⁶⁵Riess, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

¹⁶⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 66.

Roehm, had successfully organized his army which counted more than half a million men. The Socialists and Communists also had organized their private armies which frequently clashed in bloody street fights. In October, 1929, Stresemann, who had been instrumental in rehabilitating the nation's social and economic conditions, died. His death was followed by the great depression which affected the entire world. Unemployment rose to undreamed proportions and as Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel noted:

Between September 1929 and January 1933 (when Hitler became Chancellor) unemployment rose from over one million to over six million. Hitler's prophecies of the result of the government's evil policy seemed to have been fulfilled, and the party which had won only 800,000 votes in the 1928 Reichstag elections polled 6,401,210 in 1930. Membership of the party rose-- 17,000 in 1926; 176,000 in 1929; 389,000 in 1930; 800,000 in 1931.¹⁶⁷

In the early months of 1932, Goebbels saw what he believed to be an excellent opportunity to announce Hitler's candidacy for the Presidency of the Reich. According to the Constitution the Presidential election was to be held every eight years. In March of 1932, Hindenburg's term of office was expired. Goebbels knew that "Hitler's voting strength was at its peak, there were seven million men on relief; half the nation could be said to be living near starvation level and many were ready to turn to a leader who offered them some revolutionary form of change in their status."¹⁶⁸ Goebbels' personal diary entries which covered the period from January 1, 1932 to May 1, 1933, when the National Socialists won complete control of the nation is particularly illuminating in re-

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

gard to the speaking occasions and the techniques which he employed.

Thus, once he had obtained the Fuehrer's permission to announce his candidacy, Goebbels wrote in his diary:

The Sportpalast is overflowing. General membership meeting of the districts West, East and North. Stormy ovations at the very outset. After about an hour's introductory remarks I publicly proclaim the Fuehrer's candidacy. A deafening storm of applause rages for almost ten minutes. Wild ovations for the Fuehrer. The people arise and shout and call. The ceiling threatens to collapse. An awe-inspiring view. This is truly a moment which must win. An indescribably ecstasy reigns.¹⁶⁹

According to William L. Shirer, the first in a series of five campaigns was a bitter and confusing battle for he wrote:

In the Reichstag Goebbels branded Hindenburg as 'the candidate of the party of the deserters' and was expelled from the chamber for insulting the President. In Berlin the nationalist Deutsche Zeitung, which had backed Hindenburg's election in 1925, now turned on him vehemently. 'The present issue,' it declared, 'is whether the internationalist traitors and pacifist swine, with the approval of Hindenburg, are to bring about the final ruin of Germany.'

All the traditional loyalties of classes and parties were upset in the confusion and heat of the electoral battle. To Hindenburg, a Protestant, a Prussian, a conservative and a monarchist, went the support of the Socialists, the trade unions, the Catholics of Bruening's Center Party and the remnants of the liberal, democratic middle-class parties. To Hitler, a Catholic, an Austrian, a former tramp, a 'national socialist,' a leader of the lower-middle-class-masses, was rallied, in addition to his own followers, the support of the upper-class Protestant of the north, the conservative Junker agrarians and a number of monarchists, including, at the last minute, the former Crown Prince himself. The confusion was further compounded by the entrance of two other candidates, neither of whom could hope to win but both of whom might poll enough votes to prevent either of the leading contestants from obtaining the absolute majority needed for election. The Nationalists put up Theodor Duesterberg, second-in-command of

¹⁶⁹Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, (München: Franz Eher Nachf., 1934), p. 50. Translated by the writer.

the Stahlhelm (of which Hindenburg was the honorary commander), a colorless former lieutenant colonel whom the Nazis, to their glee, soon discovered to be the great-grandson of a Jew. The Communists, shouting that the Social Democrats were 'betraying the workers' by supporting Hindenburg, ran their own candidate, Ernst Thaelmann, the party's leader. It was not the first time, nor the last, that the Communists, on orders from Moscow, risked playing into the Nazi hands.

...Hitler threw himself into the campaign with furious energy, crisscrossing the country, addressing large crowds at scores of mass meetings and whipping them up into a state of frenzy. Goebbels and Strasser, the other two spellbinders of the party, followed a similar schedule. But this was not all. They directed a propaganda campaign such as Germany had never seen. They plastered the walls of the cities and towns with a million screeching colored posters, distributed eight million pamphlets and twelve million extra copies of their party newspapers, staged three thousand meetings a day and, for the first time in a German election, made good use of films and gramophone records, the latter spouting forth from loudspeakers on trucks.¹⁷⁰

To Goebbels these campaigns meant renewed propaganda activity and little rest and, as Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel observed, "the thirteen months from January 1, 1932, to January 30, 1933, saw an orgy of speechmaking."¹⁷¹ Besides those techniques which had been employed successfully in the past, the Gauleiter invented new ones. Thus, on January 6, 1932, he wrote in his diary:

For the battle in Berlin we are planning a gigantically conceived action with the slogan, 'Into the factories!' For this we involved the S. A., the S. S., the press, the party and propaganda in concentrated attacks. We must now imbed ourselves in the factories. Only from these positions can the conquest of the workers succeed.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 157-158.

¹⁷¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 105.

¹⁷²Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichsrauzlei, op. cit., p. 19.

On January 22, 1932, while referring to a speaking engagement on one of his frequent campaign trips near Berlin, the Gauleiter observed:

One only needs to cough and the entire leaf-forest begins to make noise. The papers wait for me to bare myself in Moabit, but I shall operate on my tried and tested principle: attack even before the enemy has oriented himself, force him into a defensive position and then beat down upon him until he has become numb.¹⁷³

On February 29, 1932, Goebbels reported upon a new method of providing publicity for the election campaign by writing:

...A record is produced in an edition of 50,000 copies. They are so small that they can be sent in a simple envelope. The hangers-on of the system will be surprised when they place this little recording on their record players.

...Spoke ten minutes for the sound film. It is to be shown at all well-known places in the large cities in the evenings.¹⁷⁴

With specific regard to the utilization of motion pictures, Goebbels remarked on March 6, 1932:

We are now taking over the movie theaters for our propaganda too. It is true that the owners are making all kinds of difficulties, but the public wants it.¹⁷⁵

Again on April 15, 1932, the Gauleiter recorded a new technique in propaganda which he considered most successful, by writing:

...We have invented a new trick. Brüning, after repeated invitations, has not accepted to publicly discuss with me. For this reason we have recorded his speech at Königsberg on records, which was broadcast over the radio. At the beginning of the meetings at the Sportpalast we play these records and then iron him over so that he is simply flattened to the ground. The public screams with enthusiasm. It was a tremendous success.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 81-82.

According to Curt Riess, only Hungeberg's Deutschnationale Volkspartei had the heart to invite Goebbels to one of its meetings. On October 19, 1932, the Gauleiter was scheduled to speak from the same platform with two of Hungenberg's men. Following the delivery of their speeches, there was to be a forum period. Curt Riess, who reported the ensuing events of this meeting pointed out that Goebbels recognized this occasion as an opportunity to obtain additional publicity for himself and the party. Thus, Goebbels is said to have remarked:

'In the afternoon I was working and then I was waiting excitedly for the big battle of the speakers... At 6.30 the phone rang and I was told there was bedlam in front of the meeting place. The German nationalists were not up to the situation. They had proved themselves incapable of keeping the masses under control. Thousands of our people were crowding the streets...

'Hundreds had already squeezed their way into the hall, God alone knows how. The German nationalist followers were queuing up at the entrance waving their perfectly good tickets, but could not get in. The chairman was frantic. Had he really believed that there would be only those Nazis for whom he had generously consented to provide tickets?... Before the meeting opened, I was carried inside on the shoulders of wildly enthusiastic S. A. men. Our members were jubilant beyond description. The meeting was won before it started.'

The chairman was much too scared he might be lynched by the mob to interfere with Goebbels. The two speakers who were supposed to debate with him were unable to make themselves heard above the noise. Finally the chairman begged Goebbels to calm the audience, and 'I had to stand next to the speaker in order to enable him to continue his speech.'

Immediately afterwards he went over to the office of Angriff. 'We printed one million copies because we feared that the German nationalists would use the overwhelming power of their press to change their defeat into victory. At 3 o'clock we had composed the stories. At 6 o'clock our paper was on the newsstands.'¹⁷⁷

On February 3, 1933, Joseph Goebbels added still another technique to his methods of publicizing the election campaigns. Since the focal

¹⁷⁷Riess, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

point of his propaganda was Adolf Hitler, the Gauleiter wanted to provide the necessary mood and atmosphere for the Fuehrer's speeches.

Thus, he wrote:

...I myself shall deliver the introductory remarks to every speech of the Fuehrer's in which I shall attempt to transmit the magic and the atmosphere of our mass demonstrations to the listener.¹⁷⁸

Again on February 10, 1933, Goebbels elaborated on the method of introducing Hitler by writing:

At first I give a lecture to the press from the speaker's stand and then deliver a twenty-minute introduction about the Sportpalast through the broadcasting facilities. It works out better than I had expected. It is a peculiar feeling, to be sure, suddenly to stand in front of a dead microphone while one was used to standing on front of live audiences up till now who provided the atmosphere and inspiration and upon whose faces one could read the effect of the speech.¹⁷⁹

For both Goebbels and Hitler the use of the broadcasting facilities was a new experience and although the Gauleiter appeared to make a relatively quick adjustment, Hitler seemed to lack the necessary radio personality for some time. Noting the lack of the expected audience response, Goebbels soon made the necessary adjustments. In one instance, Curt Riess reported that Goebbels

worked all night with a staff of radio engineers and experts, trying out different ways of changing the timbre of the Fuehrer's voice, of making him sound softer, more pliable, or more determined and concise. In this way, Goebbels made him a radio personality. After the first speech in the Sportpalast, Hitler's radio audiences became just as deliriously excited (or disgusted, as the case may be) as those who saw and heard him in the flesh.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Goebbels, Vom Kaisehot zur Reichskauzlei, op. cit., pp. 256-257.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 260.

¹⁸⁰ Riess, op. cit., p. 126.

One of Goebbels' last great propaganda campaigns, before the party was in complete control of the nation, was launched in the smallest German state, Lippe Detmold. The 150,000 inhabitants were to go to the polls on January 30, 1933, and although few people paid attention to this district, Goebbels recognized the potential prestige success which its voters could give to the party. Thus, the Gauleiter wrote in his diary on January 9, 1933:

...Everything now depends upon the result of the Lippe election. If we are successful in achieving a victory there then the Cabinet will fall. Thus we must get down to business there.¹⁸¹

January 28, 1933, marked the end of the Schleicher government. Two days later President Hindenburg received Hitler, who accepted the position as Chancellor of Germany and Goebbels proudly observed, "'Fourteen years of work had been crowned by victory. We had reached our goal. The German revolution had begun.'¹⁸²

In accounting for some of the economic and social factors which had aided the National Socialists in their bid for power from 1918 to 1933, Hans Bernd Gisevius observed that besides the political agitation,

...it cannot be denied that in the postwar years the Brown tide rose exactly in proportion to the growing disintegration of Germany as a result of the lost war, the inflation, and the approaching world-wide depression. In 1932, Hitler could pound so loudly upon the doors of the Reich president's palace only because six million desperate and hungry unemployed were also thundering their appeal for work.

This army of millions did not disappear overnight merely because the leader of the National Socialist Party had become

¹⁸¹Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 238.

¹⁸²Riess, op. cit., p. 119.

chancellor. It took ten years before the problem of unemployment was finally solved.¹⁸³

The Reichsminister of Propaganda.-- On March 14, 1933, Goebbels was sworn in as a new cabinet member and became Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. Two days later he delivered a speech entitled, "Parolen an den neuen Staat," ["Paroles in the New State"] in which he announced his policies and views concerning the new ministry. [See Chapter II] By June of the same year special decrees were enacted which were designed to support his stand. In his capacity as Reichsminister, Goebbels continued to design and invent occasions at which he and other party leaders could speak to the German people. Much of his earlier aggressiveness was substituted for a new propaganda theme. Thus, many of his "speeches during the first year of the Hitler regime ended with the words of Ullrich von Hutton, 'It's a joy to be alive.'¹⁸⁴ To evoke the same response within the German people, Goebbels began to create a number of national holidays. One of these was scheduled for March 4, and designated as the "Day of the Awakening Nation." New Reichstag elections were to be held the following day. The Gauleiter reported upon the purpose and occasion of this special day by writing in his diary on February 21, 1933:

We decided to call up the entire German nation on March 4, the 'Day of the Awakening Nation.' The Fuehrer will speak from Königsberg to all the Reich. In a never heretofore experienced concentration of all propaganda and agitational methods the election battle shall reach a singular climax. Therewith we shall win the last few hesitant individuals to our side. Our

¹⁸³Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 90.

¹⁸⁴Riess, op. cit., p. 142.

propaganda is not only recognized as an example and something entirely new by the German press, but also by the international press. We obtained such broad knowledge in this area from our previous election campaigns that our better routine will help us triumph over our adversaries with little difficulty. They are so shy already that they hardly make a sound. Now we show them what one can do with the state apparatus if one knows how to use it.¹⁸⁵

On February 27, 1933, Goebbels reported further progress on the "Day of the Awakening Nation" by reporting:

The great propaganda activity for the 'Day of the Awakening Nation' has been determined in all its details. It will unfold like a wonderful show for all of Germany.

...I give directives to the press in preparation for the 'Day of the Awakening Nation.' We concentrate all of the public interest upon this point. We will succeed in achieving everything we desire on this day.¹⁸⁶

Again on March 2, Goebbels discussed the further developments of the scheduled event for March 4, by writing:

We are deeply involved in the preparations for the 'Day of the Awakening Nation;' we shall apply all of the propaganda methods in such concentration as has never heretofore been experienced. The entire German nation shall participate in this event.¹⁸⁷

On March 4, Hitler and Goebbels flew to Königsberg to participate in the spectacular event. The Gauleiter reported the events as they developed in his diary by writing:

The great 'Day of the Awakening Nation' has begun... The final preparations for the evening assembly are being made. Everything will work out splendidly.

Already in the introductory report I give a plastic picture of the day and its results to be expected. The Fuehrer speaks with the last ounce of fire and devotion. When, in the

¹⁸⁵Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 267.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 269.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., p. 272.

end, he reports that the President of the Reich has held out his hand to him, the one who as Field Marshal freed eastern Prussia from the enemy while the other fulfilled his duty as a simple soldier in the West, a solemn quiet presides over the meeting which is deep moving and full of emotion. The prayer of thanks from the Niederland sounds powerful in the conclusion of the speech. The ringing bells of the Königsberg cathedral chime over the last verse. This hymn swings over the radio waves through the atmosphere throughout Germany. Forty million people are now standing in the market places throughout the Reich, are standing in the late evening streets or are sitting in the inns and private homes near the loud-speakers and become aware of the great event of these times. Hundreds of thousands will make the final decision in this hour to stand behind Hitler and his spirit to fight for the resurrection of the nation.¹⁸⁸

In Goebbels' opinion the "Day of the Awakening Nation" had been a tremendous propaganda victory. Thus, while delivering a speech to the representatives of the German press on March 16, 1933, he referred to the special event by stating:

The essence of propaganda is not to say as much as possible, but rather its art exists in formulating intricate, complicated thought processes into a single, precise parole and to carry it to the people. I must once again cite an example of our propaganda conducted in the past as proof, namely, the 'Day of the Awakening Nation' of March 4. No one, whether friend or foe, can doubt that this was not the greatest propaganda feat ever accomplished in Germany since time immemorial. This feat, however, was only accomplished by the rejection of all other work for an entire week and the attention of the people was trained upon it as if they were in a hypnotic trance. Thereupon we were able to record a gigantic success. The essence of propaganda is simplicity, force and concentration.¹⁸⁹

Another significant national holiday was established on May 1, 1933. For more than fifty years it had been a day of celebration for the Socialist workers throughout the world. Following World War I, the

¹⁸⁸Ibid., p. 274.

¹⁸⁹Joseph Goebbels, Goebbels Spricht: Reden Aus Kampf und Sieg, (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1933), pp. 60-61. Translated by the writer.

German Social Democrats had attempted to have it made a national holiday and failed. But Goebbels succeeded where his predecessors had not. According to Curt Riess,

In every German town parades and mass meetings were staged. The biggest affair of course took place in Berlin, where a million and a half people assembled on the Tempelhofer feld, the site of Berlin's airport. Though a few hundred thousand people might have attended anyway, Goebbels was taking no chances. He saw to it that the workers of every plant, the employees of every place of business, even the actors of every theatre and the teachers of every school would witness the spectacle. And since the weather was fine (most of the time Goebbels' festivities were favoured by the weather, and in those days a clement day in Germany was called 'Hitler weather') a good time was had by all.¹⁹⁰

But the real purpose of the first May Day celebration, which was designated as the "Day of National Labor," was to destroy the existing trade unions. The plans for this maneuver were laid out with precision. While the Reichsminister invited the labor leaders, who "were flown to Berlin from all parts of Germany, thousands of banners were unfurled acclaiming the Nazi regime's solidarity with the worker, and out at Tempelhof Field Goebbels prepared to stage the greatest mass demonstration Germany had ever seen."¹⁹¹ Hitler personally received the workers' delegates, declaring, "You will see how untrue and unjust is the statement that the revolution is directed against the German workers. On the contrary."¹⁹² Yet, the very next day the police raided numerous trade union offices early in the morning and arrested a considerable number of union leaders with the consequence that "the German workers

¹⁹⁰Riess, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

¹⁹¹Shirer, op. cit., p. 202.

¹⁹²Ibid.

were without organizations, without leadership, [and] without their traditional rights."¹⁹³

In September of the same year a giant party rally which was called the "Party Day of Victory," was held at Nuremberg. This event, however, was not a new invention of Goebbels'. Rather, it was an outgrowth of the annual party congress instituted as early as 1923. In his book, Kampf um Berlin, Goebbels described and evaluated the value of such meetings in great detail. Thus, one whole chapter of the book is dedicated to the "Party Days," which he prefaced by writing:

Party days have always played a special role in the history of the National Socialist movement. They were, in a sense, guide-posts, in the great agitational development of the party. There an account was given of the work accomplished and the tactical line of future fighting was determined in highly directional, political agreements.¹⁹⁴

Goebbels further contended that the Party Day of 1923 did much to resolve the internal strife of the party. When a nation-wide restriction was placed upon the party and its leadership was dispersed or imprisoned, the movement fell apart entirely. However, by 1925, after Hitler had been released from prison the party once again began to grow. There was no general meeting in that year, but in 1926, the Party Day was held again. This time the site was Weimar. Goebbels believed that the meeting in Weimar renewed the confidence of the membership and gave it added strength to battle its way through 1927. While discussing the Party Day at Nuremberg in 1927, Goebbels described

¹⁹³Riess, op. cit., p. 143.

¹⁹⁴Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, op. cit., p. 223.

the event with the following remarks:

The preparation for this Party Day demanded months of preparation. The greater pressure grew from the outside, the greater the joy and anticipation grew with which one looked forward to the mass meeting. The party member and S. A. man of Berlin wanted to gather new strength here for the future battle. He wanted to intoxicate himself with the demonstrating mass marches, for which the organizations of the entire Reich, from East, West, South and North met together.

Already three weeks in advance of the Party Day in Nuremberg about fifty unemployed S. A. men started out on a hike from Berlin towards Nuremberg. On the other side of the capital city they put on the old, beloved uniform again and marched in step and unison along the many hundreds of kilometers towards the goal of their desires.¹⁹⁵

Goebbels maintained that the Party Day of the National Socialists differed significantly from those conducted by other parties. Those, he argued, were organized under the democratic-parliamentarian system and were primarily designed for purposeless discussion. Mostly the high ranking officials of such parties met for platonic conferences, while the National Socialist meetings were attended by individuals from all walks of life. Moreover, while the followers of the other parties spent valuable time in listening to stylistic and high-sounding phraseology, as well as recommendations and resolutions which were voted down after prolonged debate, the National Socialist Party Day was designed to give the public the impression that unity and strength existed among the leadership and the followers.¹⁹⁶

In describing the actual events of the Party Day in 1927 from the initial meeting to the very end, Goebbels reported:

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 224-225.

The special meetings already began on Friday afternoon. The participants of the Congress met in their individual special groups, which as such represented educational attempts at future policy-making bodies. The conferences, as it was selfunderstood in the party, were conducted with moral seriousness and a great feeling of responsibility. The issues to be debated-- this is not a contradiction-- were resolved with almost no debate since, in a sense, there was agreement among the delegates in regard to all questions. One did not talk, but acted and decided upon dependable solutions. From the summaries of the beliefs the group representatives formulated their suggestions which were passed on to the Congress which met the next day. There were no votes. This would have been rather useless because the same picture of agreement and resoluteness would have reappeared again and again.

Outside the drums were already beating. The first special train of brownshirts was arriving.

Saturday brought a gentle rainshower. Already early in the morning upon entry into the city, Nuremberg presented an entirely new picture. Special train upon special train arrived. Brown-shirts upon brownshirts marched in long columns through the city to their quarters.

Ringling music was on the streets which had already been dressed up with flags.

Around noontime the Congress was called to order. The beautiful culture-meeting hall was crowded with festive people. A winged-door suddenly opens and Adolf Hitler accompanied by unending shouts of joy of the membership enters the hall with his immediate leaders.

In precise, inclusive, direction-giving summaries the policies of the party are singularly and without compromise laid down. The meeting of the Congress lasts into the seventh evening hour and then all of Nuremberg is subject to a parade of the National Socialist mass movement. When around ten o'clock at night the endless rows of torch-bearing S. A. men pass Hitler in review in front of the Deutschen Hof, everyone realizes that with this party a rock has been erected in the middle of the crashing seas of the German collapse.

And the great day begins. Fog still lies over the city as the National Socialist S. A. gathers at eight o'clock in the morning in the Luitpoldhain [a forest park]. Platoon upon platoon of brown divisions take their places in exemplary discipline until after one hour the broad terraces are overcrowded with army-like groups.

When Hitler, accompanied by unending exhuberance appears before his loyalists, the sun breaks forth from the dark clouds. In one spontaneous ceremony new standards are awarded.

The old colors sank, the flag of the old Reich was trampled into the ground. We gave our belief a new symbol.

Dismissed! Thousands upon thousands crowd the streets. Flowers, flowers, flowers! Every S. A. man is decorated like

a victorious soldier who returns to the homeland from the battlefield.

In the main marketplace of the city the parade takes place in front of an uncountable mass of people. Endless, endless, for hours! New brown groups march and greet their Fuehrer continuously.

Sunshine falls everywhere and again and again flowers.

Young Germany marches.

The battle-tested S. A. of Berlin is in the lead. It is heaped with applause and flowers. Here for the first time the heart of Germany is opened up to it.

Among them the hikers, German workers from Berlin who in the Reich were promised beauty and dignity but found neither work nor bread and one day in July moved out toward Nuremberg, a knapsack filled with air-leaflets, newspapers and books. Every day, whether it brought rain or a hot sun, they marched twenty-five kilometers, and when at night they arrived at their quarters, they knew neither rest nor tranquility for hours into the night in order to recruit for their political idea.

They were spat upon and knocked down in the big cities.

It doesn't matter! They drummed themselves through and arrived in time in Nuremberg.

Now they are marching with 'their Kameraden [buddies]'. Seven hundred S. A. men of the organization in Berlin gathered together, who sought a way to Nuremberg, on foot, with bicycles, on trucks, and on special trains. For many months they saved money from their foodbills, gave up beer and tobacco, yes, some literally starved for the trainfare. They lost two working days of pay and the cost of the special train alone was twenty-five marks. Many an individual of the seven hundred earned twenty marks a week.

Even he accumulated the necessary funds and on the Saturday he too climbed from the train which rolled in from Berlin to Nuremberg, with a beating heart with his friends; and in the evening marched passed the Fuehrer with the ten thousand, waived his burning torch held high and saluted. His eyes suddenly begin to shine. He can't quite believe that all this is really happening. At home one only spat upon and slandered him, beat him down and threw him in jail. And now thousands and thousands of people stand on the sidewalks, they salute him and shout heil!

Above the old capital city a deep blue sky shows itself; the air is clear as glass, the sun smiles as if he had never seen such a day.

And now the fanfares blare. Marching columns. Endless, endless! One could almost imagine that this would go on forever. And along the streets black walls of people are waiting. No one shouts shame. Indeed! They all wave and laugh and shout as if the ten thousand were returning from victorious battle, and throw flowers and more flowers.

The seven hundred are marching at the front. Because they fought the hardest battle for a year flowers are now being heaped upon them. They put them in their belts, more and more. Their caps are soon nothing more than blooming garlands of flowers and the girls smile and wave to them. At home one spits upon them.

And now they pass the Fuehrer in review. Thousands, ten thousand shout "heil." They hardly hear it. They yank the flowers out of their belts and throw them to the shouting people.

Pass in review. The legs fly with the music which blares the 'Parade March of the Tall Fellow.' And then the evening arrives. In a stirring final speech to the Congress delegates once more the entire revolutionary force of the movement is manifested. The streets outside overflow with shouting and inspired people. It is as if the new Reich has already come into being.

Drum snares and sounds of flutes. An inspiration which only the unspoiled heart of a yearning German youth manages to exhibit. In seven mass meetings the great party speakers deliver speeches in the evening in front of ten thousand people.

The evening descends. A great, blessed day passes on. It shall become for all of us who took part in it a source of strength for the coming year of work, worry, and battle.

And now tighten the helmet strap even more!...¹⁹⁷

While describing the Party Day in Nuremberg in September, 1933, perhaps the biggest event ever staged by Joseph Goebbels, Curt Riess reported the following statistics concerning the consumption of food and other goods:

Nuremberg was transformed into a city of tents. Two or three days before the convention opened, 750,000 people arrived there-- roughly twice the population of Nuremberg-- and they took over. Those who could not afford regular meals, subsisted on soup which was constantly cooking in 800 huge pots, containing about 125 gallons each, established on every street corner. Within a few days the crowds had consumed the following amounts of food:

About 1,200,000 lbs. of bread; more than 100,000 lbs. of butter; 150,000 lbs. of cheese; 220,000 lbs. of sauerkraut; 20,000 lbs. of pork fat; 110,000 lbs of coffee; 280,000 lbs. of sausage; 330,000 lbs. of canned meat; 380,000 lbs. of fresh meat; furthermore, 2,500,000 cigarettes and 450,000 cigars were smoked.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 230-234.

No statistics were published on the amounts of beer and wine that were drunk.¹⁹⁸

Goebbels' topic on this occasion was, "Rassenfrage and Weltpropaganda," ["Racial Questions and World Propaganda"]. In his speech, the Gauleiter referred to an organized boycott which he had directed against all German Jews. The boycott, according to Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel,

was a deliberate act of blackmail. The Nazi leaders were alarmed at the vivid pictures of violence and oppression in Germany which filled the world press. Goebbels immediately attributed these reports to the Jewish exiles whom Nazi violence had driven from their homeland, and he seized the opportunity to punish the Jews who were still left in Germany. 'Generosity does not impress the Jews,' he wrote. 'One has to show them one is equal in everything.' So the boycott was officially organized, though news of it served only to make the Nazis more than ever suspect abroad.

On April 1, initially for one day only, all Jewish shops were closed by force, and Storm Troopers were stationed in front of their entrances. It rested with the Jews left in Germany, Goebbels proclaimed, to persuade their kinsmen abroad to stop the talking. Otherwise the closure would be repeated, and in any case kept in the background, as he put it, in the form of a permanent threat. The following day the Nazi press, in calling off the boycott, boasted that the Jews had now learned their lesson.¹⁹⁹

In his speech on the "Racial Questions and World Propaganda,"

Goebbels defended his activities in regard to the boycott by declaring:

'The truth is always stronger than the lie. And the truth about Germany will win out among all other nations once again, even in respect to the racial question. We did what had to be done and was our duty. We do not have to fear the judgment of the world...'

Germany will not founder on the racial problem, but rather: In its solution lies the future of our people. Here too, as in many other areas, we shall lead the entire world and es-

¹⁹⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 143.

¹⁹⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 123.

tablish a new path. The revolution which we have started is the beginning of a new epoch. We desire that it [the revolution] finds the key for the history of the world in the subsequent solution of the racial question.²⁰⁰

There were other holidays which Goebbels soon created and which provided him with suitable speaking occasions. Among them was the creation of the "Erntedankfest," ["harvest thanksgiving"], always celebrated in the first week of October. Hitler's birthday also became an annual event which was introduced by a radio address delivered by the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The German people were told to be grateful for their country's accomplishments while the people abroad were to be impressed with the stability and integrity of the National Socialist movement.²⁰¹

The lengths to which Goebbels would go in order to establish the proper mood and atmosphere at various public mass meetings is perhaps best illustrated by an incident which occurred in Cologne. Curt Riess reported the circumstances of the event by writing:

Some time during the early part of 1933 Goebbels staged a mass demonstration in Cologne. He demanded from the Archbishop that the bells of the cathedral should chime at a given moment. The Archbishop declined, knowing well that Goebbels' request was strictly for reasons of propaganda. Goebbels wasted no time arguing. He had the Cologne broadcasting station make recordings of the chiming of the bells. 'I could have played them back in the studio,' he told a Berlin actress a few days later. 'Thus millions of radio listeners would have believed that the bells were really ringing. But what about the 100,000 people of Cologne crowding the square in front of the cathedral? Therefore, I had a number of loudspeakers placed around the cathedral. When

²⁰⁰Gerd Rühle, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 285.

²⁰¹Riess, op. cit., p. 144.

the records were played and the sound amplified through the loudspeakers, even those in front of the cathedral believed that they were listening to the real thing.²⁰²

As suggested in Chapter I of this study, the years from 1934 to 1939 witnessed a change in Goebbels' speaking from previous years. Since the National Socialists were in complete control of Germany there was little need for a display of continual aggressiveness on the part of the Reichsminister. Rather, "as the Chief of Propaganda in Germany, Goebbels reserved the right for himself to be the spokesman on the platform or over the air on every important occasion in these historic years for Germany."²⁰³ While special decrees and governmental regulations literally flooded the country, the Reichsminister addressed groups of actors in both the theaters and movie industry, the press and other "cultural" organizations which were told what the new government expected of them. It became the period of individual "Gleichschaltung," which Gans Bernd Gisevius defined by writing:

This meant that everyone rushed up and asked to be coordinated; all were so anxious to fall into line that they yielded themselves up utterly to the greedy revolutionaries. Clubs, publishing houses, business firms, suddenly threw open their doors to Nazis. Every manager wanted to have his S. A. man, every half-Aryan business wanted two S. A. men. The rage for taking on a few 'old fighters' as quickly as possible was manifested by the most unpolitical organizations, even by church congregations.²⁰⁴

While most of the German people thus appeared eager to find a place within the organizational machinery of National Socialism, a series of

²⁰²Ibid., pp. 138-139.

²⁰³Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁰⁴Gisevius, op. cit., p. 96.

significant political events occurred which were destined to affect Goebbels' career as the spokesman of the party. Already in September of 1933 Germany officially withdrew from the League of Nations. On August 2, 1934, a few hours after President Hindenburg's death, the German army took an oath of loyalty to Hitler. In spite of Hindenburg's last wish that only the next of kin were to attend his funeral, Goebbels filled the German newspapers with eulogies and staged an immense spectacle at Tannenberg, where the former President's body was laid to rest. On March 16, 1935, the Reichsminister formally announced to the world "that Hitler had restored universal military training and proclaimed the formation of a conscript army consisting of twelve army corps, altogether 36 divisions."²⁰⁵ On March 7, 1936, Hitler ordered his army to occupy the Rhineland. On September 9, Goebbels delivered a lengthy speech on "The Truth in Spain," in which he prophesied that a Communist dictatorship and inevitable chaos would result unless Franco was victorious. Two months earlier German "volunteers" had been sent to Spain. Towards the end of 1937, the first 1,500 miles of the super-highway had been constructed which prompted Goebbels to deliver a speech on "Highways of Adolf Hitler." Although "it was praised everywhere as an overture to peace,...it was evident that the entire highway system had been undertaken for the speedy movement of motorized troops in the event of war."²⁰⁶ There were some critics among the German people who perceived the dangerous directions in which the German government was moving, but the

²⁰⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 136.

²⁰⁶Ibid., p. 180.

consensus of opinion seemed to be that

you might just as well swallow the situation whole, without troubling your head too much about it. After all, things were working out. Hitler 'was simply lucky.' It was 'going to last at least fifty years.'²⁰⁷

On March 13, 1938, Goebbels officially announced the Austrian annexation and on April 9, it was reported that "approximately 99 per cent of the population was in favour of the annexation."²⁰⁸

The War Years: 1939-1945.--- Soon there was speculation concerning the possibility of war. But together with Goebbels even some of the most fanatical party members did not want war. They fully realized, according to Gisevius,

that their millennial Reich would not last twelve months if war were declared. All remembered the horrors of the First World War; they feared these perils to the marrow of their bones. The people, exhausted by the turbulence of revolution, sincerely longed for peace and quiet. Everyone realized that war was a deadly serious matter. War meant bread cards, starvation rations, and intensified terrorism. War meant hundreds of thousands of lives, not to mention air raids. War meant a headlong plunge into the abyss. In 1938 such things were simply inconceivable.²⁰⁹

By 1939, however, the Reichsminister for National Enlightenment and Propaganda was making every effort to prepare the nation for an impending war. Thus, on June 17, 1939, Goebbels delivered a speech entitled, "Danzig vor der Entscheidung," ["Danzig before the Decision"] which was broadcast nationwide. [See Chapter I]. Next the Reichsminister put his efficient propaganda machine into operation against Czechoslovakia. The headlines of the German press in September announced, "German

²⁰⁷Gisevius, op. cit., p. 178.

²⁰⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 193.

²⁰⁹Gisevius, op. cit., p. 302.

Women and Children Crushed by Czech Tanks,' and, 'Poison Gas Attack by Czechs in Aussig.'²¹⁰ A few days later, Goebbels turned to the Sudetenland question and declared, "'The cry of our Sudeten German brothers, 'Back to the Reich!' will not cease until their aspirations have been fulfilled.'²¹¹ In these fateful months, Gisevius reported that such events caused great concern throughout Germany. Moreover,

the excitement passed to England and France. They countered German mobilization measures by calling up reserves and taking their stand on the Maginot Line. Reports of these moves made a profound impression on the Germans. Such unnerving news could not yet be suppressed; listening to foreign radio stations was not yet punishable by death. But the Western Powers frittered away the effects of their firmness; sensational articles supporting Hitler appeared in the British press. The German generals were completely bewildered by these mixed reactions.²¹²

For Goebbels the rapid military and political changes meant increased propaganda maneuvers and public speaking appearances. Hitler's military aggressiveness shocked even the most complacent German citizens. While "the cowed middle class stared at the Nazi monster like a rabbit at a snake, a general psychosis had been created, under which the populace was reduced to absolute submission..."²¹³ Gisevius, who resided in Berlin at the time of the outbreak of World War II, made the following observations concerning the reaction of the German people to Hitler's last Reichstag speech on August 31, 1939:

²¹⁰Riess, op. cit., p. 202.

²¹¹Ibid., p. 203.

²¹²Gisevius, op. cit., p. 318.

²¹³Ibid., p. 334.

While Hitler's address to the Reichstag was blaring from loudspeakers on every corner of the city, I drove through the **streets** to observe the reaction. I saw no sign of cheering masses. Most people were not even listening to the speech; it almost seemed as if they were trying hard to shut their ears. Here and there I saw small groups standing silently, nervously, with faraway expressions. These people were so dulled to disaster as similar groups are today as they queue up among the ruins to receive a few scant items of food, but they were far more frightened, far more inwardly disturbed. As soon as the speech was over, they scattered in all directions without waiting to hear the singing of the national anthem.²¹⁴

By September 1940, German military victories appeared so favorable that Goebbels decided to deliver a speech entitled, "Das kommende Europa," ["The Coming Europe"]. He spoke on September 11, to a group of Czech educators and journalists. [See Chapter I]. But the Reichsminister soon found that he had to turn his attention elsewhere. He quickly realized, for instance, that after the fall of Poland, "he had to explain to a puzzled people why the war was dragging on without any indication of an end in sight."²¹⁵ Because of his many diversified activities, Goebbels could not hope to meet all of the speaking occasions personally. Consequently an intricate organization of party speakers was devised who were responsible to and part of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

Under Goebbels' supervision minute care and energy was expended in continuous training programs and scheduling of a large army of carefully briefed speakers. A school for speakers was instituted in addition to so-called "high-speed" training centers where students could receive part-time instruction in the art of speech. A party speaker's

²¹⁴Ibid., p. 374.

²¹⁵Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 156.

certificate was awarded to those individuals who successfully passed a final examination. Young recruits were obtained through recommendations from local party officials. Students with considerable skill were permitted to take "refresher" courses and received information concerning new developments in techniques and rules of speaking.

According to Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld, the aspiring party speaker was expected to be more than a dedicated National Socialist. He was supposed to be able to expound the movement's doctrine clearly to any type of audience upon short notice. His training consisted of two fields: ideological and technical. He was required to read the following books: Hitler's, Mein Kampf; Rosenberg's, Nature, Principles and Aims of National Socialism; Theodore Fritsch's, The Handbook of the Jewish Question; Goebbels', Battle for Berlin; a book on racial theory by Guenther; Ernst Krieck's, The Education of Youth for the State; and a book by von Treitschke on German history of the nineteenth century. Other books which were frequently assigned dealt with party organization, policy in finance, public administration and agriculture by such writers as Gottfried Feder, Wilhelm Frick, and Walter Darre¹.

Once the young trainee had mastered such works he was turned over to an elocutionist who trained him in effective voice production and gestures. The student was further given a series of rules to remember which applied directly to the public speaking situation. Among them some were:

'Do not speak too often in one place.'

'Every speech must first be written. It should, however, give the impression of being spontaneous and not seem too studied, otherwise the confidence of the audience might be shaken.'

'All speeches must strike a 'popular note' and never create an 'intellectual' atmosphere.'

'The title of a speech must be pungent, brief, and whisperable as a slogan.'

'Make your speeches as if you were addressing each member of your audience separately. The listener should have the feeling: 'There stands a man who seems to read my very thoughts and put them into words.''

'Never attack whole professions or occupations.'

'Argument, narrative, and sentimental approach are the main weapons of effective oratory. The Party speaker must address himself to the sentimental and emotional reactions of the masses rather than to their reason.'

'The real art of oratory may be defined as the capacity to evoke emotion.'²¹⁶

Upon completion of the basic training program the students were permitted to apply for the party speaker's certificate and were ranked according to their proficiency as speakers. Those who were classified as "Reich Speakers" were considered to be the best and had their names imprinted upon the posters announcing the speaking occasion. A second classification was the "Speakers' Squad," a unit designed to disseminate intensive propaganda campaigns in specially selected areas. In order to become a member of one of the squads, the aspirants had to be recommended by a specific party organization such as the Labor Front. Such recommendation were necessary since members of the "Speakers' Squad" were frequently ordered to speak in village halls, at factory gates or in industrialists' clubs. Each member of such a squad, which generally consisted of from twenty to forty men, had to serve a six month probationary period to prove himself. A third category of spokesmen for the party was known as the "Gau Speakers." Although they were not considered as important nor were their activities as spectacular and

²¹⁶Sington and Weidenfeld, op. cit., p. 35.

colorful as those of the "Reich Speakers," their speechmaking on the Gau or district level was deemed valuable and essential. In their capacity the "Gau Speakers" served to demonstrate to the people that the movement was interested even in the common man. A fourth category was comprised of "Specialized Speakers," who were trained in a specific area such as foreign affairs, the Jewish question or commerce. They frequently were called upon to supplement the speeches of the "Reich" or "Gau" speakers.²¹⁷

The well organized and intricate speaker system appeared particularly valuable to Goebbels after the German military situation began to deteriorate rapidly. In this respect Curt Riess observed:

The Minister could not permit himself to make promises, but the Party speaker could promise all he wished. The Minister had to weigh every word he spoke, but the Party speaker could say whatever came into his mind. Slogans which Goebbels had banned inexorably from the vocabulary of the Propaganda Ministry were used more and more often in the Party's propaganda. In the smaller towns and villages the speakers referred to the Thousand-Year Reich as though it were an established fact. They said that Hitler was the new Messiah, that the German race was the master race, that the Fuehrer was about ready to use his secret miracle weapon, and similar things. Goebbels took care not to utter such nonsense.²¹⁸

In describing some specific campaigns by the party speakers, Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld commented:

It is interesting to notice how in 1939 and 1940 Goebbels deliberately planned his biggest speakers' campaigns in the autumn, at the close of the military campaigns. After the exciting news of victories had abated a substitute had to be provided to cheer the Germans and tide them over a dull, trying winter. In November 1939, for instance-- after the Polish

²¹⁷Ibid., pp. 33-38.

²¹⁸Riess, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

campaign-- Goebbels founded a new Party propaganda body which he called the Political Shock Troops in the factories. They were mainly recruited from among the Labor Front officials and they received a special directive 'to transmit National Socialist ideas to their fellow workmen.' Their formation was part of a large-scale special campaign conducted by Dr. Ley, the head of the Labor Front, who-- with his Party speakers-- 'stumped' industrial Germany for three months, explaining to the German workers that Hitler would build 6,000,000 model houses, raise wages, and construct workers' holiday hotels 'after the victory.' Slogans like 'Only the best is good enough for the German worker' and 'Growing old must not mean growing poor' were delivered with pious earnestness by Party speakers. They were the winter stimulant for the German workers, replacing the news of victories.²¹⁹

But Goebbels did not rely exclusively upon the party speakers for all subsequent speaking occasions. Instead, with the steady increase of bad news from the front lines and the country itself, the Reichsminister became more determined that his propaganda should support the National Socialist cause. In 1940, Goebbels had dreamed and spoken of a "New Order" in Europe. He visualized a united Europe under German supervision. [See Chapter I, "The Coming Europe"]. By 1941, however, Hitler and the German Military High Command had committed a series of strategic blunders which forced the Reichsminister to return to the immediate task at hand. The German people began to exhibit signs of discontent and pessimism. To Goebbels, who under these circumstances perceived his role as being the "spiritual physician of the nation," any means which would dispell the growing disapproval of the German people was worth being employed. He invented fictitious characters like Herr Bramsig and Frau Knoeterich, whom he scolded and admonished in numerous newspaper articles. He circulated supposedly "secret" prophesies, made

²¹⁹Sington and Weidenfeld, op. cit., p. 39.

by a Norwegian fortuneteller, throughout Germany which foretold of a great victory for the German army. The "secret" message appeared in typewritten form and even his wife had obtained a copy from a close friend. In December, 1941, Goebbels embarked upon a campaign for the collection of winter clothing for the front which at the same time carefully described the hardships of the soldiers involved in the Russian campaign. Famous movie personalities were seen in newsreels donating their personal furs and other garments for this occasion and the German people were told that everyone was to be involved in this national cause. The people were shocked and remained paralyzed for a few moments when the campaign began "and then they all produced their winter clothes, their woolens, their furs, their skies, and God knows what-- and the danger was over."²²⁰ Earlier in the summer of 1941, Goebbels had intimated that Great Britain was to be invaded by publishing an article entitled, "The Example of Crete." He indicated that the paratrooper landings on Crete had been used only as a general rehearsal for another great landing which could only occur in England. The article was kept secret. Not even Goebbels' closest associates knew about it. On June 8, 1941, the article appeared on the streets and gave the impression that the Reichsminister had carelessly revealed some important secrets of the General Staff. Rudolf Semmler who became indirectly involved in this matter reported on June 8:

This morning at five o'clock the official on duty at the Ministry rang me in a state of great excitement with the news that the police had just confiscated all copies of to-day's

²²⁰Riess, op. cit., p. 271.

V. B. Voelkischer Boebachter-- the official daily newspaper⁷ containing Herr Minister's article. The police, he said were visiting all kiosks in the city, rounding up all the women newsvendors they could find and were snatching the copies from their hands. The official asked what on earth he was to do; the Minister would be furious when he heard that the particular issue with his article had been seized.

I left the credulous official to stew in his excitement and worry. For I had meanwhile been let into the secret. Like everyone else he regards this morning's event as a mystery and does not suspect that a subtly planned deception is being carried out, that Goebbels himself ordered the confiscation of the paper, and that the article was written after consultation with the General Staff and Hitler himself.

First to read the morning papers are the foreign correspondents. They at once cable the main points and phrases of the article to their newspapers.

This morning something else happened; as soon as it was known from the tapping of telephone calls abroad that the sensational Goebbels article had been cabled to America, all lines to foreign countries were closed. The police went into action and seized the offending newspaper. The foreign journalists just had time to inform their offices that the V. B. had been confiscated and pulped. The article went round the world like lightning: Goebbels had said in black and white that the invasion of England was coming.²²¹

On the following day Semmler further reported that Goebbels had achieved his desired end. People throughout the world were led to believe that he had discussed something which should not have been revealed. Again on June 13, 1941 Semmler further reported:

Goebbels goes on with his act. In the Wilhelmstrasse the rumour is going round that he is in disgrace with the Fuehrer for having given away a military secret. Hitler is said to be raging and refusing to see Goebbels.

While these rumours are going around and are passed on by international observers to the outside world, Goebbels is continually in conference with Hitler. Before he goes to the Reich Chancellery the chauffeur changes the number-plate to one that is untraceable. Inside the car sits Goebbels, hidden by a spread-out copy of the Boersenzeitung ^a Berlin daily newspaper⁷ so that no one shall notice him on his way to Hitler.²²²

²²¹Semmler, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

²²²Ibid., p. 42.

Two days later Semmler added:

Goebbels thinks that the affair of the V. B. article would make a good subject for a student writing his doctorate thesis.²²³

For some time Goebbels was successful in exploiting the German submarine victories. He also spent considerable time in dramatizing the daring adventures of General Rommel in Africa. Goebbels even toyed with the idea of treating Rommel much like Albert Leo Schlageter and Horst Wessel until the famed "Afrika" Corps was annihilated.

With continued military setbacks on all fronts and the defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad on January 31, 1943, Goebbels embarked upon his total war campaign. The military and social conditions in Germany were catastrophic. As Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel reported:

During 1943 in Germany itself the Allied bombardment of the industrial centers was massive, incessant and crippling; the Luftwaffe was chased out of the skies. In the same year the U-boat menace in the Atlantic was conquered...

...Unlike Goebbels, who was always out and about, Hitler withdrew almost entirely from public life and did nothing to comfort the hard-pressed German people by making his presence felt. Only rarely could he even be persuaded to make a speech or broadcast. This was left to Goebbels, who became a constant visitor to the devastated areas, where he did his best to hearten those who had suffered in the raids.²²⁴

Besides delivering numerous speeches in the devastated cities of Germany and attempting to furnish the necessary supplies and shelter for the homeless people, Goebbels was beset by additional problems. Hitler had appointed a Committee of Three during January, 1943, who were sup-

²²³Ibid., p. 43.

²²⁴Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 211.

posed to initiate the total war program, but according to the Reichsminister, the three men involved-- Lammars, Bormann, and Keitel-- were failing to act with the necessary decisiveness and speed. The disaster of Stalingrad was still fresh in the minds of the German people. Before all of these factors had completely undermined the morale of the people, Goebbels surmized that a last and final appeal had to be made to all Germans. Thus, he delivered what is generally considered to be one of his most effective speeches on February 18, 1943, entitled, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose."

In the remaining year and one half which witnessed the final decline of the National Socialist party in Germany, the Reichsminister "made more speeches of admiring tribute to the bombed cities and wrote more articles promising them active resistance."²²⁵ He also made many trips to the front lines which had moved dangerously close to the homeland, where "he talked to the generals, the soldiers, the propaganda speakers, the workers."²²⁶

The last significant speaking occasions were the traditional Christmas speech of December 24, 1944, and an address delivered on April 19, 1945, on the eve of Hitler's birthday. In paying tribute to Hitler for the last time publicly, Joseph Goebbels declared:

I can only say that these times, with all their somber and painful majesty, have found their only worthy representative in the Fuehrer. To him alone are thanks due that Germany still lives, and that the West, with its culture and civiliza-

²²⁵Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 201.

²²⁶Riess, op. cit., p. 365.

tion, has not been completely engulfed in the dark abyss which yawns before us...²²⁷

SUMMARY

As was the case with most of the speaking occasions in the career of Joseph Goebbels, both external and personal forces seemed to exist or arise which influenced the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda to deliver his "basic" speech, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose."

Thus, to facilitate the discussion of such forces within this section of this chapter, the subsequent information is classified under the headings of: (1) Some External Forces which Influenced the Occasion of Goebbels' "Basic" Speech; (2) Some Personal Forces which Determined the Occasion of the "Basic" Speech; (3) Some Factors which Affected the Occasions of Goebbels' Other Speeches, and (4) Some General Observations.

I. Some External Forces which Influenced the Occasion of Goebbels' "Basic" Speech:

Among the external forces perhaps the most significant was the news that the German Sixth Army had been defeated at Stalingrad on January 31, 1943. To Goebbels, as well as to Hitler, the battle of Stalingrad had become a test of the strength and determination on the part of the German people. Moreover, a defeat at this strategic position could only be interpreted by Goebbels as an indication that his propaganda machine had failed to function effectively.

²²⁷Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 261.

Long before Stalingrad became a vital issue in the development of World War II, the Reichsminister had already received reports from the front lines and the homeland indicating that the German people as a whole were near the end of their capacity to continue the war. Yet, Goebbels had manipulated the news from the front lines in such a manner that few Germans seriously contemplated the impending disaster at Stalingrad before it happened. On one occasion, while conferring with his aides in the Propaganda Ministry, Joseph Goebbels complained bitterly that too many people blindly believed that Germany would win the war in any event. But the Reichsminister failed to concede at that time that his propaganda measures were largely responsible for creating such an attitude of optimism.

Once the news of Stalingrad had to be disclosed, however, Goebbels appeared to realize that significant readjustments in his propaganda methods would have to be made. Thus, he reasoned that once the populace had overcome the initial shock of the defeat at Stalingrad, the news would lend itself to renew the determination of the people to win the war. But in order to reinforce this attitude, Hitler had to speak. Therefore, Goebbels quickly put all of his propaganda skills to work. He embarked upon a campaign of gloom, utilizing fanfares and military marches when the initial announcements about Stalingrad were made and had the newspapers appear with black edges of mourning the following day. His appeal to Hitler to speak to the nation, however, was refused. In fact, after the German surrender at Stalingrad, the Fuehrer "made only two public speeches of any importance and five broadcasts before his

death."²²⁸ Thus, the Reichsminister felt obliged to jump into the breach himself.

II. Some Personal Forces which Determined the Occasion of the "Basic" Speech:

Of the personal forces which influenced Goebbels to deliver his "basic" speech, perhaps none was greater than his feeling of personal responsibility for the wellbeing of the German people. Some information has been cited within this study which suggests that Goebbels had little respect and compassion for the "masses." Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, for instance, reported that Goebbels once declared early in his career: "'I am beginning to think they are much more primitive, even, than I had considered them.'"²²⁹ Yet, the time and energy which the Reichsminister spent in organizing and instituting rescue activities in the heavily bombed-out district of Germany, particularly when no one else seemed to care, seems to indicate that he was concerned about his fellow-countrymen.

Another significant factor seemed to be Hitler's appointment of the Committee of Three, who were ordered to activate the total war effort. The Reichsminister contended that the total war campaign was his personal invention and domain. Since Hitler had once before curtailed Goebbels' powers by dividing the field of propaganda into domestic and foreign areas, of which the latter was placed under the jurisdiction of Joachim Ribbentropp, the Foreign Minister, the Reichsminister perceived

²²⁸Ibid., p. 212.

²²⁹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 62.

Hitler's action in regard to the total war effort as a serious threat and apparent rebuke. Moreover, in Goebbels' opinion the Committee of Three was an inefficient organization, for it failed to act with the necessary speed. The Reichsminister further appeared to be extremely unhappy in his capacity as advisor to the committee because he objected to the "democratic-parliamentarian" method of conducting business and had always maintained that decisions made by one person in an authoritarian position were preferable and more efficient.

Joseph Goebbels also seemed to believe that the German people would be ready for "anything" once they had overcome the traumatic experience of Stalingrad. But he had also learned from previous experience that the masses would respond favorably only after being given new directives and incentives. To accomplish this end, the Reichsminister abandoned all propaganda methods save realism and frankness. He advocated an all out war effort as the only means to win the war. He insisted upon the supreme effort of the people which meant an increase in manpower and more stringent living conditions for all. In short, Goebbels evaluated the events which had led up to the Stalingrad disaster and then proceeded to stake his career and the future of the Third Reich upon his "basic" speech.

III. Some Factors which Affected the Occasions of Goebbels' Other Speeches:

An examination of the occasions upon which Goebbels spoke seem to suggest an inextricable relationship between the speaker, the movement with which he closely identified himself, and the pre-World War I generation.

Joseph Goebbels was part of that generation which experienced and reflected a period of German history filled with turbulence in the areas of social, economic, philosophical, and political readjustments. The chief spokesman of the party had grown up to manhood with this generation, whose ideals and aspirations had differed significantly from those which preceded it or were to follow. Consequently, many authorities tend to believe that the rise and fall of the Third Reich was an isolated event within the total, historic development of the German nation.

Goebbels' generation consisted of individuals who rebelled against the social norms and conditions of their time. They sought reforms in most areas of human endeavor and searched desperately for new directives and ideals to which they could cling. They were sons and daughters of "good" families, young men and women who believed that their own society was oblivious of truth, honor, and independence. In their search for these objectives they discovered the intellectual spokesmen of previous generations and their own. Thus, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche appeared to tell them that their generation was destined to become involved in wars and revolution, that their country was culturally immature, and that their society lacked civility. Turnvater Jahn seemed to point to physical fitness and German unity as determinants for the survival of the German people in the world. Furthermore, Ernst Moritz Arndt was apparently interpreted as advocating the need for nationalism and the rights of the lower income groups, while Houston Stewart Chamberlain predicted that the Teutonic people were to become the leaders of the world. The youth of this generation also seemed to believe that both Fichte and Richard Wagner stressed the importance of national conscious-

ness as Arndt had.

From the writings of the Romantics, the youth of this period learned that the German historic past contained the only desirable aspects of German culture, that salvation of man's soul was achieved only through death and that nationalism was the necessary prerequisite for spiritual and cultural regeneration. Moreover, Heinrich von Treitschke appeared to advise them that the youth owed their allegiance to the state, and that Prussian militarism was the most effective safeguard for the nation. Furthermore, when the young men and women of the pre-World War I generation looked upon their own society, which had been strongly affected by the industrial revolution, they became aware of social and political injustices which demanded immediate attention.

It is, therefore, conceivable that the youth of this period perceived the war and the subsequent rise of National Socialism as necessary extensions of the viewpoints and events cited above. Thus, the diary entries of the volunteers cited in Section II of this chapter seem to demonstrate that considerable enthusiasm was generated at the beginning of World War I. Even the early Thomas Mann, as the literary spokesman for the nation, appeared to perceive the war as a unifying factor in German society before a general disillusionment swept the country. Furthermore, the subsequent defeat in war with its "unbearable" conditions of surrender, the ill-fated Weimar Republic which was viewed by many Germans as an "enforced" democracy, the failure of responsible individuals to assume the leadership of the country and to give consideration to the lower classes, as well as the growing economic instability of Germany,-- all appear to make the National Socialist

movement more palatable to the majority of the German people.

Joseph Goebbels was aware of these forces and utilized them to serve the cause of National Socialism. As a spokesman for the party, he first entered the passive resistance movement in the French-occupied Ruhr in 1923. There he gathered his initial speaking experiences in the area of political discourse. He helped to organize party cells and became a forceful agitator, attacking not only the existing government but all "foreign" innovations as well. The Ruhr district became a testing ground for his principles and techniques of propaganda and persuasion, many of which he utilized and enlarged upon in later years. Although his audiences at first appeared to have been relatively small, Goebbels soon developed a reputation as a forceful and energetic speaker. He utilized every opportunity to speak and when an occasion did not readily present itself, he created it. Thus, in one instance, he turned the death of Albert Leo Schlageter, a disreputable member of the resistance movement, to his advantage by glorifying Schlageter's Ruhr activities. His seemingly promising career in the Ruhr was abruptly brought to an end, however, when the German government called off the passive resistance movement in that area.

But Goebbels, as a young, determined speaker soon resumed his public speaking activities. He entered the employ of Franz Wiewershaus, the Reichstag Deputy of the People's Freedom Party, in 1924. The occasions upon which he spoke during this period were determined by the directives of Wiewershaus, who insisted that Goebbels recruit new members for that party and attack all other nationalist factions including the National Socialist party. Goebbels was soon lured away from Wiewershaus's

supervision by Gregor Strasser primarily because of financial problems. Thus, by serving Strasser, who had become the leader of the National Socialist party in Hitler's absence, Goebbels also began to serve the movement anew. Although he was ostensibly hired as a private secretary by Gregor Strasser and his duties initially included working on organizational matters and in an editorial capacity for the party, his talents as a speaker were soon exploited to the fullest. Goebbels' personal diary, written during this period, seems to attest to the fact that his public speaking appearances increased considerably during that time.

Joseph Goebbels' real challenge as a spokesman for the party, however, seemed to begin when he was won over completely to Hitler's cause, when the Fuehrer had split with the Strasser faction. On October 26, 1926, Hitler appointed Goebbels Gauleiter of Berlin. In this capacity, his speaking activities became closely related to the progress of the party in the capital city. A listing of all of the occasions upon which Goebbels spoke during this period appears impossible. An attempt was made in Section III of this chapter to give an indication of the variety and kinds of speaking situations in which he appeared. Thus, it was suggested that he became a master of carefully thought-out publicity campaigns and mass demonstrations. He invented and organized ceremonial meetings embellished with an impressive variety of pageantry. He drew upon his earlier experiences as an agitator in the Ruhr and while in the services of Franz Wieggershaus and Gregor Strasser. In one instance, much as he had done with Schlageter, he publicized the activities of Horst Wessel, a young member of the party who was shot in a lover's

quarrel. Moreover, when the party was banned from the streets of Berlin and he too was prohibited from speaking in public, Goebbels formed seemingly harmless clubs, much like the party cells which he organized in the Ruhr, where he found ample opportunity to speak. To provide additional speaking occasions in Berlin, the Gauleiter would frequently attend the meetings of other parties while under the protection of the National Socialist Storm Troopers. There he would await the forum periods during which he would take the floor and speak for his cause. At the same time he realized that such methods not only provided him with the reputation of being a fearless orator but also provided considerable publicity for the party. Soon he invaded the Communist district of Berlin on several occasions to provoke his opponents. In every case he would carefully plan out his scheduled activities and those of every other member of the party to insure that his efforts would end with the desired results. To gain an additional platform from which to speak, Goebbels entered upon an intensive campaign to win seats in the Reichstag and when he was elected to one of them, he quickly made use of the immunity which was awarded to every Reichstag member. With the first election campaign a success, the Gauleiter turned his attention to other political races of local and national significance. For instance, when in 1929 the National Socialist party entered into the struggle for control of the nation, it was Goebbels who became the chief manipulator behind the scene. The speaking occasions during this period were frequently employed by Hitler and Goebbels to attack individuals and institutions which they perceived as threats to National Socialism. The Gauleiter even indicted the revered President Hindenburg when Hitler's

bid for the presidential position was announced. Outwardly, Hitler became the central figure of these campaigns, but it was Joseph Goebbels who incessantly arranged the Fuehrer's personal appearances, as well as his own. Thus, in 1928, Goebbels had issued a number of directives for all trained and unskilled party speakers to be used to increase the party's membership during various elections. These instructions, cited in Section III of this chapter, seem also to give some indication of the skill and understanding which the Gauleiter had acquired over a period of years in regard to the principles and techniques of propaganda and persuasion. In his directives the Gauleiter gave attention to the organization of districts and provinces within Germany for propaganda purposes, as well as the public speaking situation in all of its dimensions. Perhaps the highlight of these campaigns was the Lippe Detmold election, which was instrumental in helping the party gain control of the nation. To achieve this end, Goebbels had left nothing to chance. He flooded the district with posters and leaflets. While the national press and other parties viewed these activities with great amusement, both Hitler and Goebbels made frequent public appearances in almost every city and village there.

After the National Socialists had gained control of the nation, Joseph Goebbels was rewarded for his efforts by being appointed to the position of Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. In this capacity, he continued to make use of a great variety of speaking occasions. He created national holidays and utilized the Party Days for this purpose. All of the German people were invited to share in these mass demonstrations. In addition, the Reichsminister began to appear

before special interest groups such as representatives of the press, performers from the theater and movie industry, writers, industrialists and party groups. It became his task to disseminate the new government's policies on national and international matters. By 1939, however, Goebbels began to concentrate upon preparing the German people for war. Since he personally seemed to believe that carefully devised propaganda campaigns were preferable to bloodshed in war, his initial public speaking occasions were designed to meet this end. Thus, Goebbels employed his propaganda machinery to undermine the confidence and morale of the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and French forces. But the Chief of propaganda soon learned that Hitler placed greater reliance upon military strategy.

For a relatively brief period of time, while Germany's military situation appeared to be quite promising, Goebbels devoted his time to the creation of the "New Order" in Germany. Thus, in his speeches, the Reichsminister informed the world that Europe, under Germany's supervision and control, would undergo revolutionary changes when the war was successfully brought to an end. Once the German Armed Forces experienced severe setbacks, however, the chief spokesman of the party turned his attention to the total war effort. Moreover, with the increase of bad news from the front lines, to which were added a rapidly spreading pessimism throughout the country and increasingly destructive enemy air raids, Goebbels felt compelled to reassure the German people and bolster their morale. To accomplish this feat, he began to rely more and more upon the party speakers, who, as a unit were attached to the Propaganda Ministry. But, as the "spiritual physician of the nation," Goebbels felt a personal responsibility toward the people. He knew that other

party officials refused to appear in public. Hence, he not only took charge of the rescue activities in the heavily bombed-out districts of the country, but also embarked upon a series of speaking engagements which took him from one city to another. On such occasions the Reichsminister would indicate to his audiences that the government was concerned with their problems. He would also promise that retaliatory measures would be taken against the enemies of the Reich. He further provided other opportunities for speeches by instituting a winter clothing drive, by freely discussing complaints of the belabored population, and by utilizing the more traditional party holidays and anniversaries. The highlight of such occasions, however, seems to have been the delivery of his "basic" speech on February 18, 1943.

To the very end of his career, Joseph Goebbels continued to make use of every available occasion to address the German nation. Thus, he traveled to the front lines where he spoke to military personnel, as well as civilian forces. He also utilized the more traditional occasions for his speeches, such as Hitler's birthday, Christmas Eve, New Year's Day and the final party anniversary. Such conduct appeared to earn him the respect and confidence of the people, who turned to him long after the power of Hitler and the National Socialist party had eclipsed.

IV. Some General Observations:

There is little doubt that among the leaders of the National Socialist party Joseph Goebbels was most instrumental in furthering the cause of the movement by means of propaganda and public speaking. By such means, the Reichsminister once told his aides in the Propaganda Ministry, he had made the following four important contributions to the

party:

1. National Socialism in South Germany had been a purely middle-class affair. The Socialist element had at first been entirely absent. As leader of the Rhineland National Socialists he had been the first to bring the Socialist ideas of the workers of the Rhineland-Westphalia districts into the Munich programme. At first the Munich line had been very unpopular in the Rhineland, because it was little different from that of the German Nationalist Party and held no special appeal for the working class. He claimed he was the first to make the movement into a Socialist working-class party.

2. He had won Berlin and thereby prepared the way for seizing power in the Reich. Without control of Berlin the Party would have remained a provincial movement.

3. He had worked out the style and technique of the Party's public ceremonies. The ceremonial of the mass demonstrations, the marches with standards, and the ritual of the great Party occasions were the result of his experiments and of his achievements in Berlin. Anyone could see the difference he had made by comparing the beer-cellar gatherings in Munich with one of the giant demonstrations in the Berlin Sports Palace. The annual gatherings in Munich on November 8th, with their beer-drinking and waitresses moving up and down the room, always reminded him of skittle club meetings.

4. His fourth contribution had been his creation of the Fuehrer myth. Hitler had been given the halo of infallibility, with the result that many people who looked askance at the Party after 1933 had complete confidence in Hitler.²³⁰

As the chief spokesman of the party, Goebbels became a "manipulator" of the public speaking occasion in the truest sense of the word, for when it did not readily present itself, he fabricated it. He was a master of his craft, insisting that he "learned about the ways and means of effective mass propaganda through daily experiences and elevated it to a system by continual repetitive application."²³¹

The Reichsminister further believed that political propaganda was intended solely to win the masses by any means and was "not an oppor-

²³⁰ Semmler, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

²³¹ Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, op. cit., p. 18.

tunity to expound a creed and to invite or answer criticisms."²³² Although it is true that many external forces affected Goebbels' speaking occasions, he never seemed at a loss to apply them to advantage. They were instrumental in helping Goebbels win the support of the German people for his cause and finally involved "everyone, from top to bottom, from unskilled worker, foreman, taxi-driver, tailor, or waiter to the white-collar clerk, the university professor, and business managers, from landed proprietors down to the peasants and the agricultural laborers..."²³³

The old axiom which states that "men are but a product of their time," seems to be challenged by the life and career of Joseph Goebbels since he played a significant role in influencing that period of world history in which he lived.

²³²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 63.

²³³Gisevius, op. cit., p. 301.

CHAPTER IV

GOEBBELS' AUDIENCES AND THEIR RESPONSES

The Audience and its Response at the "Basic" Speech

'Wasn't my choice of language good again?' asked Joseph Goebbels of the usual guests who had been waiting for him at his home. The Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda had just arrived from the Sportpalast where he had delivered his nation-wide address on the tenth anniversary celebration of the National Socialist party's rise to power. The date was January 30, 1943.

Goebbels did not expect an answer. No one said anything since he had flung himself into an armchair and was nervously chewing on a handkerchief. From previous experience the visitors knew that the Reichsminister's behavior warned against any form of conversation.

After several long moments of silence, Goebbels arose from his chair and stepped over to a large bookcase. For several minutes he appeared engrossed in his search for a specific book. At the same time he secretly observed that all of his guests were carefully following his movements.

'Wille zur Macht,'¹ [*'The Will to Power'*], there it is.' He had opened the volume of a special edition of Nietzsche's collected works and looked at each individual within the circle of his guests. Finally he seemed to have located the right one,- one who dared to think even less for himself than the others. It was the chauffeur, Günther Rach. 'You did learn how to read?' the Reichsminister asked ironically. 'Please, read this selection to us from here to this point.'

Rach read:

'The recipe for that which the masses call a great man is simply stated. Under all circumstances one must give them

¹ The title of one of Nietzsche's works.

something which they like; or at least first put it in their minds that this or that would be very nice and then give it to them. But under no circumstances right away, rather one should battle for it with the greatest effort, or appear to be battling for it. The masses must gain the impression that a mighty, yes, unalterable willpower exists, at least it must appear to exist. Everyone admires strong willpower since no one has it and everyone says to himself that if he had it, there would be no boundaries any longer for him and his ego.

If such willpower indicates that it accomplishes something good for the masses instead of paying attention to its own desirability, one admires it so much more and congratulates oneself. By the way, it [this willpower] must have all the qualities of the masses; the less they will be embarrassed by it and the more popular it will be. Thus, it should be violent, envious, exploiting, intriguing, flattering, cringing, inflated, [and] depending upon the circumstances, everything.²

Joseph Goebbels was preoccupied with Nietzsche's discussion of willpower that particular evening because he had conceived a daring plan. His speech, "Führer befehl, wir folgen!" [Führer Command, We Shall Follow] delivered a few hours earlier, and particularly "the reaction of the audience at the Sportpalast had shown him he could afford to be more radical in matters of total war than he had thought."³ He had demonstrated to his listeners throughout the nation that he possessed the necessary willpower for the total war program. But even more important, the Reichsminister wanted to impress this fact upon the Führer and thereby "bring pressure on Hitler to adopt the radical measures which so far Goebbels had demanded in vain."⁴

Before he had arrived at his home, the Reichsminister had first gone to the Propaganda Ministry. There he had stopped the publication of an article which was due to appear on February 7. In its place he had inserted a new one which he entitled, "Die harte Lehre," [The Hard Lesson]. Although

²Boris v. Borresholm, Ed., Dr. Goebbels nach Aufzeichnungen aus seiner Umgebung, (Berlin: Verlag des "Journal," 1949), pp. 9-11. Translated by the writer.

³Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), p. 314.

⁴Ibid., p. 316.

this article was meant for public consumption, part of it appears to have been written expressly with Hitler in mind, for Goebbels wrote:

The people want to see deeds and if such are to be accomplished by way of an administered drainage of our internal potential over a longer period of time then one must try to get by with improvisations till then and request the active support of the people as compensation. It [the active support] will be made available willingly. The people do not want to be spared any longer. They know the hard truth and are determined to act in light of it.⁵

When on February 1, the German Military Headquarters admitted that the southern group of the Sixth Army had surrendered the total war effort seemed even more urgent to Goebbels than before. He alone "knew the state of morale on the home front, from which Hitler was...so far withdrawn,"⁶ and he seemed to realize that without some form of immediate action, German resistance at the front lines and in the homeland would collapse. To prevent this, the Reichsminister prevailed upon Hitler to speak. However, the Fuehrer refused and insisted that "he would speak only if a new victory was won and if the general situation had improved."⁷ Since there was no other official within the leadership of the National Socialist party who would dare to address the German people at a time like this, Goebbels was forced to jump into the breach himself.

The Reichsminister chose February 18, 1943 as the day upon which the public announcement of the fall of Stalingrad was to be made. Although "Hitler and his generals- wished the subject to be delt with as tactfully and unobtrusively as possible,"⁸ Goebbels perceived this occasion as an opportunity to

⁵Joseph Goebbels, Der Stille Aufstieg, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1944), p. 162. Translated by the writer.

⁶Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Evil Genius, The Story of Joseph Goebbels, (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), p. 199.

⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 316.

⁸Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 198.

increase his own prestige among the German people and to gain control of the total war campaign which had been "more sabotaged than activated by the committee set up by Hitler."⁹

More than a year earlier the Reichsminister had seen the need for the total war measure. Thus, on January 23, 1942, he had written in his diary:

I am about to release some three hundred officials of my Ministry to the army and the munitions industry and to replace them by women. That involves some difficulties, but these will be gradually overcome. The Party, especially, will have to help me with this. I should like also to force society ladies and women from our better strata into this work.¹⁰

Even Goebbels' wife, Magda, voluntarily worked in a factory. To get to and from her job she used a streetcar since she did not want to provoke the indignation of her fellow-workers by arriving in her car. By doing her part in the war effort, "the people were supposed to be convinced that she was motivated by idealism and a feeling of national solidarity, and wanted to set a good example for other highly-placed ladies of the Nazi hierarchy."¹¹

The Reichsminister further seemed to believe that many decrees had been issued during the early months of the war which seriously hampered the enactment of the total war campaign. Among such decrees was the order that a questionnaire had to be filled out for almost every social and business activity. In referring to these questionnaires, Goebbels confided to his diary on March 28, 1942:

I have ordered an investigation into the nuisance of questionnaires. That has really become a public scandal. One can hardly buy an orange today without answering a questionnaire with the most ludicrous questions. It is high time that this nuisance be stopped.

⁹Riess, op. cit., p. 316.

¹⁰Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), pp. 39-40.

¹¹Riess, op. cit., p. 361.

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If I succeed in this I shall undoubtedly render a great service on behalf of domestic tranquility.¹²

With these factors in mind, Goebbels set about preparing the delivery of his "basic" speech. In the days following his appearance at the tenth anniversary celebration of the National Socialist party at the Sportpalast, the Reichsminister spent every available moment on his speech which was scheduled for delivery on February 18. Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel reported that Goebbels worked until four o'clock in the morning with his aides and secretaries on the date the speech was to be given before he was satisfied with the final draft.¹³ Fifteen minutes later, according to Curt Riess, Goebbels

appeared in his silk lounging robe in the little office of his assistant, radiantly looked at the two secretaries and asked them: 'Well, how do you like my speech?' Everyone congratulated him on his achievement, but, without paying attention to their comments, he continued: 'Well, those ten questions, they will really strike home, don't you think? Tonight you will see the result!'¹⁴

The aides and secretaries who had assisted the Reichsminister in the preparation of his "basic" speech quickly realized that it "was designed to work the audience of twenty thousand into such a state of mass enthusiasm that when the time came to put the questions there could be no answer but 'Ja' from the mass of faces below him."¹⁵

Long before Goebbels appeared at the Sportpalast that evening the large hall was filled to capacity. Gert Buchheit described the audience as consisting of a "select group primarily comprised of S. A. men and officials of the party."¹⁶ Similarly, Curt Riess reported that all of the tickets to the event had been

¹²Lochner, op. cit., p. 150.

¹³Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels, His Life and Death, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 230.

¹⁴Riess, op. cit., p. 316.

¹⁵Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 230.

¹⁶Gert Buchheit, Hitler der Feldherr, (Rastatt: G. Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung KG, 1958), p. 333. Translated by the writer.

distributed by the party offices and the Propaganda Ministry primarily because "it would have been imprudent to take unnecessary risks and have but lukewarm sympathizers in the audience- there was too much at stake."¹⁷ But Goebbels attempted to convey to his radio audience that representatives from all walks of life were present at this event, for he said in the "basic" speech:

I have invited only a representative sample of the German people to this gathering today in the best sense of the word. (The enumeration of the Minister is accompanied by impetuous demonstrations which are dedicated in a seemingly unending applause and the strongest agreement to the representatives of the army present in the Sportpalast.) In front of me are seated rows of German disabled veterans from the eastern front, leg- and arm amputees with bullet-riddled bodies, war-blinded who have come with their Red Cross nurses, men in their prime years who have crutches in front of them. Among them I count fifty holders of the oak cluster and the Ritterkreuz, [the highest military citation given for distinguished military service] a splendid delegation of our fighting front. Behind them rises a tier of men and women munitions workers of the Berlin tank works. Again behind them sit men from the party organization, soldiers of the fighting army, doctors, scientists, artists, engineers and architects, teachers, officials and office workers from their offices and bureaus, a proud representation of our intellectual life in all its stratifications to whom the Reich owes thanks especially now in the war for their wonders of invention and human genius. Throughout the entirety of the Sportpalast I see thousands of German women. Youth is represented here and old age. No position, no occupation and no age-class was overlooked in the invitation. I can therefore say with full right and authority: those who sit in front of me are a representation of the entire German nation from the front lines and the homeland. Is that true? Yes or no! (The Sportpalast experiences a demonstration in this moment of questioning, as this old battleground of National Socialism only experienced it at special high points of its national events. The masses jump up from their seats as if electrified. Like a hurricane the many thousand voices cry 'yes' through the hall. What the participants of this demonstration experience is a national vote in demonstration of will, which finds no stronger spontaneous expression).¹⁸

Once Goebbels had assured his nation-wide audience that they were adequately represented he was ready to challenge them to support the total war effort. He

¹⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 317.

¹⁸Goebbels, Der Steile Aufstieg, op. cit., pp. 198-199.

asked them whether they were prepared to make the greatest sacrifices if necessary to bring about a lasting victory. In describing the subsequent developments and the response of the audience, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel observed:

Taking his time, Goebbels expounded his ten questions and demanded an unflinching Ja or Nein from his audience. He challenged them to affirm their belief in the Fuehrer and in victory, their desire to continue the war with 'wild determination' and to work when necessary sixteen hours a day to supply the means to defeat Bolshevism. Then he demanded their approval that women should give their whole strength to the war and that death should be the penalty for shirkers and racketeers. The whole German people must declare their willingness to shoulder equally the burdens of war. As question followed question from the booming loud-speakers the concourse resounded with the echoing roars of Ja!¹⁹

Although Ernst Kris and Hans Speier observed that following the "basic" speech "in their everyday life, the people were less unanimous in their assent to the new measure,"²⁰ Goebbels' diary entries in the following months seemed to suggest that he had achieved the desired response from the German people. Thus, on March 12, 1943, for instance, the Reichsminister reported:

Total war is still the principal theme of public discussion. The whole people have taken to it enthusiastically. Some measures are widely criticized, not because they are too stringent but rather because they are not radical enough. A number of specific questions are debated, especially that of the beauty parlors for the ladies. These play a curiously important role, especially in the large cities. Perhaps one must not be too strict about them.²¹

Eight days later Joseph Goebbels again commented upon the effect of his speech in his diary. In this instance he reported upon the many women who had volunteered for industrial work by writing on March 20, 1943:

¹⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 231.

²⁰Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda, Report on Home Broadcasting During the War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 440.

²¹Lochner, op. cit., p. 295.

I discussed with Schach how the women who have thus far volunteered for work can actually be integrated into the industrial process. The labor offices mostly are quite unable to cope with this situation. On the one hand industry lacks labor power, on the other hand the labor offices are not in a position to send the volunteer women to their jobs quickly. I am going to get the Party in on this in Berlin, so that the process of inducting women into the munitions industry will go a little faster.²²

Yet, all of the total war measures which the Reichsminister had advocated in his "basic" speech had not been readily accepted by the German people. Particularly the compulsory shut-down of businesses seemed to evoke complaints and criticism among the people. Thus, while commenting about this measure specifically, Goebbels noted that it had "'stirred up a terrible lot of dust and has undoubtedly had a somewhat bad effect on morale at home.' 'But I hope,' he added, 'we shall be able to overcome this.'"²³ Despite this criticism, however, Goebbels' personal prestige seemed to remain relatively high. While discussing this factor, Rudolf Semmler, who was traveling with the Reichsminister through the heavily bombed-out Rhineland wrote in his personal diary on July 10, 1943:

It is surprising that Goebbels was everywhere cordially greeted in the streets. He talked to people in the Rhineland dialect. One sees even in Cologne that, at the moment, he is the most popular of the nation's leaders. These suffering men and women feel that at least one of them is interested in their fate.²⁴

The Reichsminister made a similar discovery concerning his personal Prestige. On November 27, 1943, while inspecting the more heavily damaged Parts of Berlin, he noted:

²²Lochner, op. cit., p. 312.

²³Ibid., p. 361.

²⁴Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels- the man next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse Ltd., 1947), p. 88.

One can hardly pass through the streets, as they are covered with debris. The rubble of the Rheingold²⁵ is just being blasted. I have to wait here because the streets were being roped off. The Berliners gather around my car. I am amazed at their excellent spirit. Nobody cries, nobody complains. People slap me on the back familiarly, give me good advice, prevent me from continuing because, as they put it, nothing must happen to me since I am still very much needed. In short, the morale shown here by the Berlin population is simply magnificent.²⁶

While Goebbels' "basic" speech had thus seemed successful in rallying the German people to his cause, the Reichsminister apparently had been less successful in gaining the confidence of Hitler. Furthermore, whereas he had been triumphantly carried shoulder high from the Sportpalast amidst loud cheers at the conclusion of his "basic" speech, "Hitler did not give him the control of the measures for total war that he had coveted."²⁷ In all probability, however, Goebbels was not too concerned about receiving the immediate control of the total war campaign. As he indicated in his diary on March 9, 1943, the Fuehrer had carefully studied the "basic" speech and had "characterized it as a psychological and propaganda masterpiece."²⁸ Perhaps the Reichsminister also realized that he would receive additional powers and controls in rapid succession in the future. Thus, following the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, Goebbels was given increased internal powers in Germany. On August 24, he was appointed Reich Trustee for Total War. Again on January 30, 1945, he became Defender of Berlin and finally on April 30, Goebbels was appointed to the position of Reich Chancellor of Germany.

²⁵A famous wine restaurant near the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin.

²⁶Lochner, op. cit., pp. 531-532.

²⁷Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 231.

²⁸Lochner, op. cit., p. 284.

Joseph Goebbels had staked everything on his "basic" speech. He had created a situation which he knew would require his personal leadership and supervision. He knew and confided in his diary:

Experience teaches that a movement and a people who have burned their bridges fight with much greater determination than those who are still able to retreat.²⁹

Goebbels had set the blaze. He knew only too well that an effective leader no longer existed except, perhaps, he himself.

The Audiences and their Responses at Other Representative Speeches

The audiences to which Joseph Goebbels addressed himself throughout his career as a spokesman for the National Socialist movement not only varied greatly in terms of their socio-economic status but also in their political and intellectual interests and capacities.

Very early in life, even before he embarked upon a career as a political agitator, Goebbels read extensively in the areas of political theory and mass psychology. His interest in these areas seems to have been partly aroused by the circumstances in which he found himself during 1922.

Goebbels had just completed his studies at the university level but could not locate a job. He had returned to his hometown, Rheydt, where "even his father, by then a highly respected employee in the little textile factory, could not get him a job sufficiently remunerative to pay for board and lodging. The present was desperate and the future hopeless."³⁰ The young Doctor of Philosophy seemed as disappointed and confused by the rebuffs and uncertainties of the post-war world as his parents. For a time he had managed to find employment by tutoring backward students, doing

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 26.

research for writers, or holding a position as a secretary for a few days or weeks. But whenever his earnings were used up he was forced to return to his home. There he soon learned that his education separated him socially and intellectually from his parents who had sacrificed so much for their cleverest son. Bitter with disappointment, Goebbels would frequently ask himself: "Why cannot I, who am so much cleverer than most, who have stored up so much knowledge, find an occupation worthy of me?"³¹ During the long periods of unemployment, while he spent most of his time shut up in his little bedroom at home, Goebbels began to read extensively. He enthusiastically read the Berliner Tagblatt, a liberal German daily which had opposed World War I and was supporting the Weimar Republic. Goebbels also made an attempt to write for the newspaper. He "submitted fifty articles to this paper, among them: 'Christian Thought and Socialism,' 'On Socialization,' and 'Sociology and Psychology.'"³² All of the articles were turned down. But more important for his future career was perhaps Le Bon's, About the Psychology of the Masses, a book which he read "again and again until he almost knew it by heart."³³ For as Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner suggested,

It seemed to him to contain the magic formula, the spell which would one day transform his ambitions into power, and he made quite sure that he would forget none of it.³⁴

Although Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel insist that his speaking career actually began in 1924, Curt Riess, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner contend that Goebbels' first opportunity to put his theories on

³¹Ibid.

³²Riess, op. cit., p. 18.

³³Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁴Ibid.

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political agitation and those he had read about to work, came about in January 1923, when French forces occupied the Ruhr district. The troops were sent to force the German government to live up to its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. Goebbels hurried to the Ruhr and offered his services to the members of the Free Corps, an organization composed of mercenaries, former soldiers and officers, who were later taken into the National Socialist party. Although he had desired more daring and adventurous assignments, Goebbels was permitted to organize party cells among the students in the non-occupied part of the Rhineland and to speak to "groups of ten or twenty assembled in the back room of a beer-garden."³⁵

Goebbels' Entry into Politics.-- In describing the first audience which Goebbels addressed in the Ruhr district, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner observed:

His audience consisted of a handful of young people--students, workers and high school boys. He called on every patriotic German to resist the bayonets of the rapacious imperialist French. Whilst German women were being raped by black Moroccans, decent young German girls were locked up in French brothels, German children were abducted for slave labour in North Africa, any German who stood by inactive had in effect deserted his fatherland. Every German who allowed the holy soil of his fatherland to be polluted by the French-Negro hordes was as degraded and amoral as the Red Government which called impotently for passive resistance and thereby condoned the base crimes committed against the German people and their fatherland. He spoke with passionate force, in short driving sentences, backing the emotional appeal by simple realistic argument and illustration. His deep voice resounded with the sincerity of his convictions.

There was no doubt that his first speech was a great success. These of his hearers who did not at once join the Nazi Party, or volunteer for active resistance, emptied their pockets and gave all to the 'Fighting Fund.' But what elated Joseph Goebbels more than anything else was that he had falsified that rankling remark of his old headmaster, and proved himself an orator of no mean power.³⁶

³⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁶Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 33.

Joseph Goebbels was so overwhelmed by his newly discovered skill that he soon "spoke in back rooms, in schools, in station waiting-rooms, in empty haylofts and little country inns. He confined himself mostly to the unoccupied part of the Rhineland, travelling day and night, third class, on hard wooden seats of slow trains."³⁷ Although he spent most of his time glorifying the activities of such men as Leo Schlageter in the Ruhr resistance movement, it was not long before Goebbels began to publicize his own work. Thus, according to Curt Riess:

He told his listeners strange and exciting stories; that he had been working under different names in the occupied zone; that he had founded a great many branches of the Nazi Party, branches which fronted as harmless clubs; that he had been able to operate them for many weeks; that he finally had been betrayed- of course by a Jew. He described in detail his encounter with the French general- in some versions it was a Belgian general. He said he had been brutally beaten. The story went on that he was forced to leave the occupied zone, but as he triumphantly informed his audiences, the Nazi units remained there still in existence.³⁸

Similarly, Ebermayer and Meissner observed that Goebbels' "audiences were fascinated by his speeches."³⁹ In discussing this factor, the authors further described Goebbels' preoccupation with the supposedly heroic deeds accomplished by his fellow-resistance fighters, by writing:

There was no one who could romanticize- idealize- the heroic and dangerous fight against the French as he did. The deeds he spoke of had a quality of chivalric daring equal to any in the long German history of bravery and valour. He told of incredible things happening each day- even more each night- right under the nose of the enemy, things more phantastic and exciting than anything since the war.⁴⁰

Although some of the more conservative party members personally seemed

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Riess, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

³⁹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴⁰Ibid.

to object to the manner in which Goebbels took license with the facts, they refrained from expressing their views in public. All too soon "they saw how his oratory made the eyes of his young hearers shine and their cheeks glow- and how they all came immediately to enrol as Party members!"⁴¹ It was not long before the young agitator had achieved his objective. Throughout the Rhineland an impressive number of National Socialist "cells" were formed and even though some had only a few members, they represented a nucleus of members for future expansion.

In 1934, while discussing the audiences which he so frequently had confronted during the Ruhr period, Goebbels attempted to distinguish them from other audiences which he addressed in future situations. In evaluating the more pronounced characteristics of the Ruhr inhabitants and while explaining why he primarily addressed himself to the workers of that area, Goebbels wrote in his book, Kampf um Berlin, [Battle for Berlin]:

From the very beginning the movement in the Ruhr had a pronounced proletarian character. This was due to the countryside and the population itself. The Ruhr area is a working district because of its nature and arrangement. However, the proletarian of the Ruhr area differs profoundly and decisively from the other average proletarians. The motivation of this class of people is still determined by the indigenous population of Westphalia and the miners who descend into the mines early in the morning are usually the first or second generation sons of small Westphalia farmers.⁴²

Goebbels believed that the people of this area were strongly linked to the soil. He further maintained that they could never have fallen prey to Communist influences had it not been for the social injustices which had been perpetrated against them for many years and which "drove them into an

⁴¹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴²Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 17. Translated by the writer.

alien position against all national and governmental powers."⁴³

While in the services of Franz Wieggershaus and Gregor Strasser during 1924 and 1925, Joseph Goebbels continued to confine his activities to the Rhineland-Westphalia district. In spite of the fact that he was primarily hired as a private secretary by both men in succession his talents as a speaker was frequently exploited. In describing this period of Goebbels' career, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner reported that,

He spoke three, four, five times a day. None of his speeches was yet really important, nor in front of a very large audience, but everytime he spoke he won new followers. He worked untiringly and spared himself no attention to detail; it is not remarkable that he could not always find something new to say and one finds basically the same themes in his speeches.⁴⁴

In the main, Goebbels' audiences continued to be made up of the working classes for he strongly believed at that time that "we will never get anywhere...if we lean on the interests of the cultured and propertied classes. Everything will come to us if we appeal to the hunger and despair of the masses."⁴⁵

The Gauleiter of Berlin.-- Towards the end of 1926, after a prolonged period during which Hitler had won him over to his cause, Goebbels was appointed Gauleiter of Berlin. [District leader]. Although Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel described Goebbels' first speaking occasion as part of the fabrication of his own legend, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner contend that the newly appointed Gauleiter delivered his first speech only a few hours after arriving in Berlin. They further insisted that this meeting was specifically called so that Goebbels could spell out his intentions to the party members who made up his audience. When some two hundred

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 42.

⁴⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 36.

members created such a pandemonium that the speaker could not be heard, Goebbels called upon Kurt Deluege, the Chief of the Berlin S. A. to restore order. Once the audience quieted down and the disturbing element had been forcibly removed from the hall, Goebbels concluded his speech by ordering that the two hundred disruptive members were to be expelled from the party.⁴⁶

Since Hitler had written in the second volume of Mein Kampf that "the task of propaganda is to attract followers,"⁴⁷ Goebbels concluded that all subsequent audience situations would have to be organized with that end in mind. Thus, on January 1, 1927, he informed the remaining party members of the goal which he had set for himself by declaring:

'The Berliners may insult us, slander us, fight us, beat us up, but they must talk about us. To-day we are six hundred. In six years we must be six hundred thousand!'⁴⁸

Thus, with strong determination and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of energy, the Gauleiter set out to realize his goal. He concentrated all of his attention upon utilizing every conceivable means of propaganda and publicity in the speaking situation. At one time during his career in Berlin, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel reported, for instance, that

he kept his audience waiting ten minutes or so by arriving late in a taxi. Even then he spread out the time entering the hall and taking the platform. Strasser spoke to him afterward about the extravagance of hiring a taxi when the Gau was in debt. Goebbels replied impatiently. 'You don't know much about propaganda,' he said. 'Taxi be damned. I should have taken two, not one. The other for my briefcase. Don't forget you've got to impress people. And as for being late, I did that deliberately. I always do. You've got to keep them in suspense.'⁴⁹

On February 11, 1927, Goebbels made what was perhaps his biggest bid for personal publicity in Berlin. He rented the famous Pharus Hall in the

⁴⁶Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 51.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 51-52.

⁴⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 71.

Communist dominated Wedding district. As with almost every other speaking occasion the Gauleiter made careful preparations. Because he knew that a large part of his audience would consist of Communist sympathizers and workers he had a number of S. A. men strategically placed throughout the hall long before the meeting was to take place. Since he was so confident that his appearance in this Red district would result in favorable publicity he employed a number of techniques which were designed to provoke his audience. Thus, prior to the meeting he ordered every available party member to take part in a parade which moved through the Wedding district. He had provocative posters placed on almost every street corner near the hall and used loudspeakers to dare friend and foe alike to come to the Pharus Hall. Furthermore, as he knew well in advance, the meeting hardly had begun before a "Saalschlacht," a battle in the hall broke out. Once order had been restored, however, he had the undivided attention and admiration of his audience and they were "roused to deep anger or overcome with compassion- whichever way Goebbels wanted it."⁵⁰

Goebbels continued to follow the same pattern and addressed similar audiences in the following months. He organized meetings in other Berlin areas where the population primarily consisted of workers. However, after delivering a particularly strong invective against Jakob Goldschmidt, a leading German banker on May 4, 1927, the National Socialist party was banned in greater Berlin. But Goebbels seemed little concerned about this development. He simply ordered the entire party to go underground and immediately organized seemingly harmless clubs which were reminiscent of the party cells which he had founded during the Ruhr period. There he

⁵⁰ Riess, op. cit., p. 54.

spoke to his own party members. He also created new party cells in the outlying districts of Berlin, where the ban was not applicable, in order to reach larger and more diversified audiences. He further attended the meetings of other parties in the company of his S. A. men. By October 29, 1927, when the Gauleiter was again permitted to speak in public, he quickly reverted to his old practices. The party, however, was not permitted to appear as an organization until March 31, 1928.

In discussing Goebbels' activities with particular reference to his relationship with his audiences from the time he arrived in Berlin until he was placed under "Redeverbot," [prohibited from speaking in public] Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel observed:

He was wholly, absolutely self-conscious over his speech-making. He always considered his audience first- how to affect them, how to incite them. He developed little or no personal emotion while speaking, but he gave everything he had, physically and vocally, to rouse emotion in his audience. He pushed his fine, sonorous voice to its limits, and the effect of speaking to mass audiences for prolonged periods of up to two hours cost him a great deal. His small, fragile frame was shaken with nervous energy, and he developed the habit of weighing himself after his more strenuous performances. He claimed that he frequently lost two or three pounds in weight on these occasions. But several of those in a good position to know have admitted that he never expended his own emotions while he spoke. In this respect he was the reverse of Hitler. Goebbels always calculated his effects, and to those he knew well he was prepared to boast about this, saying, for example, before a meeting, 'Well, which record shall I put on now?' He also cultivated the capacity to adapt himself to audiences, particularly those likely to be hostile. He became, in other words, completely professional, the master of his audience, proud and vain of his ability to establish himself immediately with the people in front of him. His effrontery dazzled his own adherents and those who came to his meetings out of curiosity. He was a success. The image of the lonely provincial clutching his suitcase on a Berlin bus rapidly faded before the image of the man of destiny standing astride the city of which he was to become the master. He found himself in tune with the spirit of the capital and alive with desire to conquer it.

To make his great public meetings more showmanlike he developed Hitler's technique of ceremonial which stirred the hearts of his audience in advance of the speeches. He used banners, processions, marching, music and singing. Street parades normally preceded these meetings. Goebbels himself did not usually appear before the hall was crowded and ready. He would then make a dramatic entrance, like an actor timing his cue; he always appeared surrounded by his bodyguard, and the party supporters in the hall would receive him with prolonged cheering. The emotional ground was well prepared before the speech-making began to insert seeds of propaganda in the human soil.⁵¹

The Chief of Party Propaganda.--- The second phase of Goebbels' career as Gauleiter of Berlin began when he decided that the National Socialists were to become involved in the Reichstag elections scheduled for May 20, 1928. He became interested in these elections once he realized that members elected to the Reichstag enjoyed immunity from court proceedings. Thus, Goebbels, began campaigning for his own candidacy. Since these elections involved more than a localized vote, the Gauleiter became involved in a series of strenuous campaign trips throughout Germany. At one time he declared:

'I can hardly see or think. For eight weeks I have been all over Germany. Sometimes I have travelled by car as much as five hundred miles a day. In the evening I have spoken before thousands of people, who applauded or booed me. After the meeting, in the middle of the night, I got a few hours' sleep. Then up at six or seven, and more driving until five in the afternoon. Berlin! Heaps of mail, newspapers, complaints, demands, telephone calls, no money, nothing but troubles, conferences, a poster, a pamphlet, a few words to someone who is discouraged, a few words of thanks to a brave comrade; home, change clothes, the telephone rings. It is high time for me to leave, they are waiting for me, the hall is already crowded...'⁵²

It was in January of this year too that Goebbels delivered his speech on "Erkenntnis und Propaganda," ["Perception and Propaganda"] in which he

⁵¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

⁵²Riess, op. cit., p. 73.

told his audience that "propaganda should use any means to achieve its ends and that the creation of propaganda is not a matter for talent alone but for the kind of genius that inspired the great religious teachers."⁵³ The Gauleiter further insisted that propaganda had always been promoted most effectively in the past by the spoken word, "where the personality of the speaker achieves its own mastery of the audience."⁵⁴

Supported by the success of his Reichstag election campaign and following the principles which he had discussed in his speech on perception and propaganda, Goebbels considered it his primary task to make the masses accept Hitler as their leader. On January 9, 1929, he was appointed Reich Propaganda Chief and as such he began to concentrate his efforts on political meetings. He no longer concerned himself with attacks upon individuals or governmental agencies. Instead, he worked out a systematic ritual which was to be enacted at every meeting. He was in too great of a hurry to permit the speaker to "warm up" to the audience for he maintained that "we don't speak for the sake of speaking but for the sake of creating an effect."⁵⁵ Thus, as Curt Riess suggested, Goebbels seemed to feel that

All that was needed was to 'prepare the audience'. Every single person must be prejudices in favour of the Nazi cause before the speaker ever opened his mouth. Goebbels staged political meetings in the manner of a pageant. He developed new formulas. He 'invented' the 'Guard of the Speaker'- tall, good-looking boys in uniform, standing stalwart on the platform. He invented the 'solemn entrance of the flag-bearers.' He laid down rules for the speaker to welcome the audience. The entire meeting became a ritual in which flags, music, special groupings and parading were assigned definite roles. In other words, instead of clearing the heads of his listeners he further obscured their already hazy notions. Upon leaving a Nazi rally, the people knew less than before, but they were impressed, carried away.

⁵³Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 80.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 77.

The centre of attraction was, of course, the speaker himself.⁵⁶

When on September 14, 1930, new Reichstag elections was scheduled Goebbels once again put his propaganda machinery to work. In his new position as Propaganda Chief of the party, he personally supervised the organization and arrangements of over 6,000 meetings. He staged open air meetings at night and drew upon all of his past experiences with the result that "the Nazi Party achieved a Reichstag representation of 107, and the country was astounded."⁵⁷ But in spite of this success, the Gauleiter realized that the party had not yet grown to the necessary proportions nor did it possess the necessary influence to take control of the nation. By 1931, however, Goebbels began to think in terms of putting Hitler up as an opposition candidate against the aging President Hindenburg. Most of the other party officials opposed the Gauleiter's move since they believed it wiser to increase the weight of the National Socialists and then to bargain with Hindenburg. However, Goebbels had a series of meetings with Hitler and belabored the issue until the Fuehrer finally was persuaded to run for the office.

Once Hitler's candidacy was agreed upon, Goebbels immediately began to prepare for the election scheduled to be held on March 13, 1932. The Reichsminister further was permitted to kick off this first in a series of five campaigns by making Hitler's candidacy public. He chose to use the Sportpalast as the meeting place since "'it is the platform from which we speak in Berlin to this giant city."⁵⁸ While recording the response of

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 68.

⁵⁸Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, (München, Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 17. Translated by the writer.

the audience to the announcement, Goebbels observed:

...'For ten whole minutes the crowd was delirious with enthusiasm. Wild demonstrations for the Fuehrer. They all rose from their seats, jubilant and crying. The roof threatened to come down.'⁵⁹

But in spite of Goebbels' determination, Hitler was defeated. A second attempt to win Hindenburg's office on April 10, 1932, also failed despite the fact that Hitler obtained 13,417,000 votes. Hindenburg had received more than nineteen million votes. The Propaganda Chief of the party, however, hardly took note of these results for he was already involved in a new campaign, attempting to win the Diets of several states which were coming up for election two weeks later. During this time Goebbels not only spoke at least three times a day but also directed hundreds of other party speakers. In the last week of the Diet elections he stepped up his speaking schedule, addressing audiences four times nightly and even continued to speak when he suffered an attack of influenza and had a high temperature on the last day. When a new Reichstag election was called for on July 31, 1932, Goebbels had to begin his propaganda campaign anew. Again he traveled extensively and talked to audiences throughout the country with the result that on July 31, "the Nazis won their biggest victory by more than doubling the landslide of two years before."⁶⁰ In a second Reichstag election in November, 1932, which was called for by President Hindenburg because of the continual strife among the members, the National Socialists lost thirty-four representatives. To Goebbels and most of the other party officials this result was a near catastrophe. It appeared to many of the party members that the organization was entering a permanent period of decline. Dissention

⁵⁹Riess, op. cit., p. 102.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 109.

among the party leaders broke out whereupon Hitler warned, "If the party falls apart, I will end it all in three minutes with a pistol shot."⁶¹

It was then that Goebbels conceived a plan which was to save the party from disintegration and, in fact, helped the National Socialists win control of the nation.

An election was about to take place in the Lippe Detmold district to which no other party was paying any serious attention. Goebbels realized that if the National Socialists could achieve a victory there, he could once again inform the German people that "the party was on the move again." From Hitler on down every available propaganda device was utilized by the Propaganda Chief to assure a prestige victory, and according to Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner,

The prestige value was indeed tremendous. A more tangible, though not possibly a direct result was that a group of industrialist...put their resources at the disposal of the National Socialists in order to enable them to oust the then Chancellor/ von Schleicher. This group had a sufficiently large support among the extreme right in the Reichstag to ensure the Government's defeat if it wished. In January 1933 it did so wish, and von Schleicher was forced to resign. Hindenburg had now no alternative but to send for Hitler, who became Chancellor amidst the hysterical rejoicing of millions of Nazis, neo-Nazis and recent ex-Nazis. To Hitler went the glory, but Goebbels had the unimaginable satisfaction of his diabolical creation.⁶²

Joseph Goebbels faithfully kept a diary throughout the years in which the National Socialist party was engaged in the bitter struggle for the control of the German nation. The diary, covering the period from January 1, 1932 to May 1, 1933, contains many of Goebbels' personal aspirations, hopes, desires, and disappointments. Added to these remarks were repeated state-

⁶¹Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 200.

⁶²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 77.

ments concerning the places and occasions upon which the Gauleiter spoke. Although they do not appear to be an accurate history of every speech which he delivered they do seem to give an indication of the frequency with which he spoke and have subsequently been listed in Appendix A of this study. There are also a number of noteworthy entries which refer specifically to the Gauleiter's personal reactions and evaluations of the audiences to which he addressed himself. On January 1, 1932, for instance, Goebbels wrote:

The main thing: One must be among one's people; one may never separate oneself from the people. The people are the beginning, the central point, and the end of all our work.⁶³

The Gauleiter also seemed to believe that the working element of the population was most important in any election campaign, for he wrote on January 4,

Whoever has the workers, [on his side] has the people; and whoever has the people, has the Reich!⁶⁴

In support of this contention, Goebbels added one day later:

One hour rest and again back on the train at night to Berlin. Had a long discussion with the sleeping car conductor. One learns more in such a situation than by conversing with the higher gentlemen.⁶⁵

While elaborating upon the value of speaking to the lower income groups, the Gauleiter added on February 8, 1932:

The intellectuals contend that the more one treats the same theme, the more indifferent the public will become. This is not true. It depends only upon how one treats the theme. If one possesses the ability to illuminate it anew from different sides, to bring new forms of proof to bear upon it, to amass increasingly more drastic and sharper arguments for one's contention,

⁶³Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 18.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 22.

then the interest of the public will never grow lame, but instead, it will grow stronger.⁶⁶

Again on September 4, 1932, while preparing for the new Reichstag election in November of that year, Goebbels referred to the importance of winning the support of the "mass" audience. Thus, he wrote:

. . .If we want to hold the party together, we must now appeal again to the most primitive instinct of the masses.⁶⁷

While describing some specific situations during the election campaigns, the Gauleiter also alluded to some of the difficulties which he encountered when facing his audiences. In pointing to the lack of understanding which his audiences seemed to exhibit while he was speaking to them, Goebbels also gave vent to his anger concerning the critical attitude which some of his listeners possessed. Thus, on July 1, 1932, he declared:

The public usually has not even the slightest inkling what an individual speaker has already experienced during the day, before he gets around to speaking in the evening. Many probably imagine that he does nothing else but speak. They are unfair to him if he is tired or not up to their expectations. They regret that he does not achieve the height of humor or the turn of the phrase. In the meantime, however, he is troubled with the heat, with the choice of words, with the inherent logic, with a voice that becomes hoarser and hoarser, with the malice of poor acoustics, with the terrible air which reaches him from 10,000 people sitting close together; and on the following day a learned writer, who sat somewhere in the meeting in a safe spot and now and then recorded a catchword, concludes with a finger raised in warning that the speaker unfortunately failed to display the usual freshness for which he is noted. That is, he never recorded this freshness when it existed. He only notices it when it is absent.⁶⁸

Furthermore, in describing what he professed to be a typical campaign trip to Kiel, Goebbels added on the same day:

The entire city of Kiel is decorated with flags. The great

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 42.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 157.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 121.

hall is overflowing with 15,000 people. An insane heat exists and one must pull oneself together spasmodically in order not to collapse while speaking. A bowl filled with little pieces of ice, which one can take into one's feverishly-hot hands from time to time at least offers some relief.

Once the speech has been concluded, one is in a state as if one had just been pulled out of a bath fully dressed. Then one jumps into the car and drives over bumpy detours back to Altona [a suburb of Hamburg, approximately 100 miles from Kiel] in two hours. One arrives at two o'clock in the night, discusses pressing party business until four o'clock in the morning with the comrades there and at six o'clock one takes the Fernzug [train] back to Berlin. A special pleasure is provided if some fellow-traveler feels the need to dispel the tiredness with a friendly conversation and to shorten the long journey in the most pleasant manner.

In Berlin one immediately falls upon the just published morning- and noon newspapers...⁶⁹

But Goebbels did not only utilize his frequent train rides to engage in friendly conversations with strangers. In one instance the Gauleiter wrote:

It is sometimes a real ordeal, I would say, for the National Socialist who travels much, to have to sit in a compartment and listen to the political excursions of his fellow-travelers. If he wears the swastika, then he is dispised at the very beginning and if he attempts to enter the conversation then he is confronted with a compassionate smile, as if one wanted to say: 'does it hurt if one is insane?' In other words: 'You can speak with angel tongues but you cannot get close to the people.'

I do the following: I travel without a party insignia. If I feel an expedient and necessary need to take part in a political conversation- I feel this very seldom- then I get into the discussion fresh-piously-happily, and soon I realize that my partner does not consider my opinions to be so very naive. Without his noticing it, I direct the conversation to the subject which seems more important to me, entice through questions from the enemy what I had intended to say anyway and have a splendid defender of National Socialism sitting in front of me in a relatively short period of time. Very modestly I make him aware of this. In noisy opposition he maintains that the National Socialists aren't really so wrong, whereupon I extend my hand full of emotion and extend my sympathy to him.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 121.

⁷⁰v. Borresholm, op. cit., p. 203.

As Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel pointed out, during the early election years all of the Gauleiter's "propaganda had to be effected through the press and public demonstrations or meetings."⁷¹ Once in a while, however, when the party's financial situation would permit it, Goebbels attempted to employ other forms of the mass media. On February 29, 1932, for instance, he described the use of a sound movie which was expected to reach greater and more diversified audiences, by writing:

Spoke ten minutes for the sound film. It shall be shown in the evenings at the most popular places in the big cities.⁷²

Furthermore, on March 4, Goebbels expressed his own reactions to this medium by reporting that "the sound film was a great success. One sees oneself for the first time in a living picture and appears to be a stranger."⁷³

Among numerous other special speaking techniques, perhaps the Gauleiter's favorite was that of being invited to debate in the meetings of other parties. In writing about one such event, Goebbels revealed the method by which he obtained such an invitation. On October 10, 1932, he reported that the German National party had declined his offer to send a spokesman to the Sportpalast for a debate with him. Instead, Goebbels was invited to attend one of their meetings and asked to speak to their members for thirty minutes. The Gauleiter immediately accepted the invitation and made the necessary preparations. Hundreds of his own supporters gained entry into the meeting place by means of forged tickets. When the National Socialist spokesman arrived on the scene, "the party members broke into deafening applause."⁷⁴ According to Goebbels, the two speakers for the German National party were

⁷¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 83.

⁷²Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 55.

⁷³Ibid., p. 56.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 184.

overwhelmed by the occasion and were unable to deliver their speeches coherently. When it was his turn to speak, Goebbels declared:

I begin to speak; of course, no one dares to interrupt me. I move out in front [as if in a race] and attack the enemy with such massive and cutting remarks, that I win three fourths of the hall in short order. I save the main points, however, for the concluding remarks.

.....
Now the arguments crackle down upon the enemy that he loses his senses. The hall is a wave of delirious excitement. It is turning into a victory on the entire front. More and more the German Nationals must begin their retreat. They are losing ground quickly. Once again the first speaker attempts to save what can be saved, but he is already too nervous and gives up the situation as lost. His speech is drowned in the laughter and the calls from the visitors at the meeting who possess, as it is the case in this milieu, an indiscribable Berlin humor, a quickness of mind without comparison, and awaken renewed stormy cheerfulness throughout the entire hall. In the background monotonous speaking choirs. In the end I must stand next to the speaker of the German Nationalists in order to give him some kind of chance to continue his speech. At the same time I have the opportunity to correct every illogical remark. The chairman of the meeting sits upon his chair like the famous old man who does not know how to help himself. We have won!⁷⁵

During the period under discussion, Goebbels did not devote his time exclusively in speaking to the lower classes. On February 8, 1932, for instance, he reported in his diary that he had gone to the Prinz Albrecht Hotel to speak before a small group of invited guests. However, he was quick to add that he had also invited a number of S. A. men and party members since "they were to hear that one does not speak differently here than in front of the people."⁷⁶

The Gauleiter's two favorite places from which to speak to an audience seem to have been Munich with its Party Days and the Sportpalast in Berlin. While writing about his experiences in the capital city, he observed on June 23, 1932:

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 184-185.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 42.

The Sportpalast is the great political platform of the capital city and we have made it that. From this hall a peculiar fluid flows. When one enters it under crowded conditions, one is immediately touched and engulfed by it.

This evening the hall is filled with an army of people, head to head. A boundless excitement exists. Everyone feels the developments are pressing toward results. The music begins and once again the old beloved flags and uniforms enter.

To address such an audience is a real treat. One forgets time and space. I speak for two and a half hours or more. I launch attack after attack upon the cabinet. In the end there is a tremendous ovation.

.....
A strange feeling to leave the seething humanity of the Sportpalast, to drive through the cheering crowd in the Potsdamer Strasse and then to sit a few minutes later in the quiet of one's home. One arrives late and tired and tumbles into bed as if dead.⁷⁷

Joseph Goebbels also appeared to place great value upon funerals as a means to play upon the emotions of his audiences. Almost eleven years later Rudolf Semmler reported in his diary:

The people already call him the 'Reich Funeral Orator,' because he appears as orator at nearly all important funerals. Goebbels is shocked when I tell him about this sinister title.⁷⁸

According to Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, as early as 1932, the Gauleiter "saw to it that every funeral possible of an S. A. or S. S. man who had been killed in street fights or ambushes was turned to advantage."⁷⁹ In describing such an occasion, Goebbels wrote in his diary on November 11, 1932:

In Schöneberg we carry the S. A. man Reppich who was shot during the strike to his grave. Forty thousand people are present at the funeral. He is laid to rest like a prince. Above the cemetery airplanes circle with swastika flags edged in black as if they wanted to give their last greetings to the dead. The S. A. people are deeply moved.⁸⁰

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 116.

⁷⁸Semmler, op. cit., p. 85.

⁷⁹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 102.

⁸⁰Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 200.



Goebbels also utilized the death of several little boys to arouse the people of Berlin. Thus, in one instance, he remarked:

We bury the 'Hitler boy' Norkus on a biting cold day. From the bottom of my heart I speak to the children and the men gathered around the narrow coffin. The boy's father, a simple workman, is brave beyond words. Grief-stricken, with an ashen face, he raises his hand in salute to the strains of the 'Horst Wessel Lied' and sings with bitter pride and deep wrath 'Hold high the flag!'⁸¹

While discussing the means of propaganda which he employed specifically for his audiences in Berlin, Goebbels attributed his success to the use of humorous material especially designed for the population of that city and the application of original thinking. The Gauleiter further contended that since the other parties had been active in Berlin before the National Socialists made a serious effort to become recognized there, "the poster- and mass demonstration propaganda promised far greater results."⁸² Moreover, in an attempt to justify his preoccupation with the lower income classes while serving as Gauleiter of Berlin, Goebbels added:

The masses think simply and primitively. They love to derive generalizations from involved facts and to draw clear and uncompromising conclusions from such generalizations. They are usually simple and uncomplicated but they, nevertheless, as a rule hit the nail on the head.

The political agitation which grows out of this realization will always take hold of the soul of the nation at the right places. If it does not understand how to unravel the entanglement of facts but rather carries them to the people as they exist then it /the agitation/ will always shoot past the understanding of the little man.⁸³

The Reichsminister of Propaganda.-- After Joseph Goebbels had been appointed Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on March 14, 1933, and the National Socialist party had won control of Germany, he

⁸¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 103.

⁸²Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 44. Translated by the writer.

⁸³Ibid., p. 191.

continued to address himself primarily to the lower income classes. In order to insure that all of the German people could share in the victory of the party, "triumphal speaking tours of Germany were undertaken by Hitler and Goebbels (often together) both before and after the March elections."⁸⁴ Moreover, the newly appointed Reichsminister soon made use of the German broadcasting facilities to reach the largest possible audiences. As Curt Riess observed:

The German radio had always been state-controlled; the parties of the opposition were not supposed to plead their case before the microphone. Therefore, Goebbels had made only one radio speech, and Hitler none at all during the struggle for power. Now Goebbels set out to transform the radio into an instrument of Nazi propaganda. Overnight he replaced the managers of the broadcasting stations by dependable Party members. Hitler would speak only in larger cities with powerful transmitters so that his message would reach every home in the surrounding towns and villages. In order to convey to the listeners what was happening in the hall where Hitler was speaking, Goebbels always introduced the Fuehrer.⁸⁵

In speaking to the representatives of the press in Berlin on March 16, 1933, Goebbels described the effects which his employment of the radio broadcasting facilities had produced by declaring:

Whoever is not biased will have to admit that the radio propaganda which has been waged by the men of the National revolution in the weeks from January 30, till now, has been exemplary. The predicted results of the know-it-alls, that the listeners would turn their sets off, did not occur. On the contrary, millions of new listeners have been added especially because the new administration did not create the radio propaganda in a vacuum, but rather out of the atmosphere of the mass meeting. In this way the listener has become an immediate participant in these events.⁸⁶

According to Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, however, the real purpose of involving the mass audiences in such a manner rested on a different premise.

⁸⁴Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 120.

⁸⁵Riess, op. cit., p. 126.

⁸⁶Joseph Goebbels, Goebbels Spricht: Reden aus Kampf und Sieg, (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stallig, 1933), p. 56. Translated by the writer.

Thus, the authors reported:

The masses participate in Nazi politics not only for purpose of mutual control but also for other reasons more truly propagandistic in character. According to carefully planned designs, the masses create, and participate in, a vicarious political reality consisting of parades, meetings, anniversary celebrations, and beflagged medieval towns. It is a world suggesting the strength and success of the Nazi cause with a degree of persuasiveness that words alone do not have. Music, rhythm, and color play a more important part in it than reason. In this world, which is packed with opportunities for overwhelming sensory experience, success is made visible and audible, righteousness becomes extraordinarily exciting, and strength a crushing immediate experience of organized crowds. Like a carnival, it is a world of physical imagery containing no trace of everyday life with its compromises and worries, but offering instead a miraculously purified reality of elation and triumph. Propaganda through mass meetings is called 'active propaganda' by Nazis.⁸⁷

The response on the part of the German people to such propaganda techniques soon became evident. Almost "overnight the German people- not 40 per cent but apparently 90 per cent- seemed to have been seized with drunken happiness."⁸⁸ Flags appeared on every street, every city was decorated and enthusiastic telegrams were sent to Hitler. Communities tried to outdo each other by changing the names of streets to those of the now famous party officials. Villages and even the smallest hamlets had at least one Hitlerstrasse or Hitlerplatz and hardly "an evening passed without a torch parade. Every day the German anthem and the Hort Wessel song were sung in public."⁸⁹ To sustain the enthusiasm which had been generated throughout the German Reich, Goebbels created holidays and endowed each with a special National Socialist significance. Furthermore, the Reichsminister not only utilized the First of May, which for more than fifty years had been the holiday of the Socialist workers throughout the world, but there was

⁸⁷Kris and Speier, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

⁸⁸Riess, op. cit., p. 127.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 128.

Hitler's birthday, of course, and a host of other anniversaries and most spectacular of all were the great Nazi rallies. Every pageant became more colossal and more spectacular; at every one Goebbels (after Hitler, of course) made a more inspired speech; each time he carried a new slogan.⁹⁰

The preparations for such occasions required considerable effort, organization, and planning on the part of the Reichsminister. While reporting on these factors, as well as the effect of the First of May celebration, Goebbels reported the circumstances surrounding this event in great detail in his diary. Thus, as early as April 18, 1933, he wrote:

The First of May is being prepared generously. We work upon it as if it were a problem for the General Headquarters of the military. The plans for the assembly are already worked out. Difficulties arise mainly because of the limited access space available for the parade. The demonstration must unfold itself with precise timing. All possibilities must be accounted for and taken into consideration in advance. A small error because of the huge mass of people whom we want to involve may lead to a catastrophe.⁹¹

On April 28, 1933, Goebbels added:

For days now I am working on the technical aspects of the First of May. It shall become a masterpiece in terms of organization and mass demonstration.⁹²

Finally, on May 1, 1933, Goebbels reported at great lengths:

The great day of the German people has begun. Yesterday it threatened to rain, today the sun shines. Hitler weather! Now everything will turn out well. The developments of the day aren't so very important anymore; the content and the idea are important which emerge here.

In the morning the school children of Berlin have assembled in the Lustgarten. The drive there is already overpowering. Wherever one looks: Unter den Linden [name of the main street in Berlin], in the Lustgarten, children, children, children. I speak to them from the bottom of my heart.

It is easy to speak to children if one understands their souls.

⁹⁰Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 114.

⁹¹Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, op. cit., p. 300.

⁹²Ibid., p. 304.



Then there is an ovation: The President of the Reich and Hitler appear in the car sitting next to each other. Age and youth together. A wonderful symbol for the new Germany which we have erected.

Harold [Goebbels' oldest son] presents a bouquet of roses to the Reichspresident. He is very proud and happy.

The Reichspresident speaks to the youth as if they were one of our generation. He calls for loyalty, preserverance, diligence, and respect for the past. The Fuehrer calls for three cheers for him, to which the youth respond with enthusiasm and fervour.

The drive through the mass of boys and girls is like a victory ride. An indescribable swarm of people are on the Tempelhofer field. The Berliner is already on his way with child and all, workers and citizen, high and low, employer and employee, now all differences are errased, only a German nation is marching.

Just a few years ago the machineguns rattled in Berlin.

At the airport we receive the workers' delegations from all over the country who have come to Berlin by airplanes. On the faces of these serious, strong men is the expression of pure joy. At noon they are invited to eat with Hitler and afterwards are received by the Reichspresident. This reception is very moving in its monumental simplicity. The great soldier of three wars... stands among the poorest of the country and extends his hand to them in unison.

Now the masses of people roll through Berlin. An unending, uninterrupted river of men, women, and children pours into the Tempelhofer field. In the evening around seven o'clock the report arrives that one and a half million people have assembled here. Similar reports are given about other cities and villages of the Reich.

I sit in the back of the Fuehrer's car while he is passing through the mass of workers on his triumphant drive who stand guard on the streets from the Reichchancellory to the Tempelhofer field. It is indescribable. One cannot look over this enormous ocean of people on the Tempelhofer field anymore. The searchlights, passing over them, flash and throw their lights. One can only see the gray mass standing head to head.

I deliver a brief introduction and ask for one minute's silence in remembrance of the miners who had an accident in Essen on the same day. Now the entire nation stands in silence. The loudspeakers carry the silence across cities and the country. An awe-inspiring moment of unity and alliance of all levels and all classes.

Then the Fuehrer speaks. Once more he summarizes what we are and what we desire. He gives the ethos back to labor. All good Germans are now involved in labor. The nation once again has meaning.

Now we shall work and not despair.

It is all for Germany, for its future, and the future of our children.

Wild enthusiasm like drunkenness has gripped the people. Faithfully and strong Horst Wessel's song rises into the eternal evening toward heaven. The radio waves carry the voices of the one and a half million people who are united here on the Tempelhofer field across all of Germany through cities and villages and everywhere they sing along: the workers in the Ruhr district, the sailors from the port of Hamburg, the foresters from upper Bavaria, and the lonely farmer up at the Masurian lakes. No one can isolate himself from here, here we all belong together and it isn't a phrase anymore: we have become a united nation of brothers.

And the one who showed us the path now drives back to his workplace in the Wilhelmstrasse, standing erect in the car, passes through a Via triumphalis which surrounds him and is made up of living, human bodies.

Tomorrow we shall take over the union centers. Nowhere opposition is to be expected. The battle continues!

We stand with the Fuehrer at the window up in his living quarters in the Reichchancellory. From a distance the songs and shouts of heil drift up to us from the dispersing masses at the Tempelhofer field.

Berlin does not want to go to sleep, and together with the giant city the entire Reich vibrates in the blissful experience and becomes aware of the great hour in which the turning point of two great periods culminated.

Just now a marching column from the Vossstrasse turns into the Wilhelmstrasse. Below the Reichchancellory the swastika banners begin to glow, the red flags bow to the Fuehrer, and wordlessly salute him and his work with reverence.

And from the youthful throats of men the eternal Horst Wessel song resounds:

'Now Hitler-flags fly over all the streets...'

We sit together until the new day arrives.

The long night has come to an end.

The sun has arisen again over Germany!⁹³

But the main channels of propaganda remained the press and the radio facilities in spite of the fact that broadcasting, "in 1933 was still something relatively new in society..."⁹⁴ As soon as the Reichsminister had organized his Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,

the radio manufacturers were vigorously pressed by the ministry to make a special, very cheap 'people's' radio set (Volksempfänger) on a vast scale. In the years 1933-1934 German homes owning a radio set increased by over a million, making the total

⁹³Ibid., pp. 305-308

⁹⁴Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 122

sets in use in excess of six million. By 1938 the figure was nine and a half million, and after this even smaller and cheaper sets were made available for workers so that radio would be virtually in every home. In addition, on every important occasion (such as a speech by Hitler) a special loud-speaker organization was established to install equipment in such places as schools, factories, offices, public halls and in the open air. By 1935 the Nazis could boast that when Hitler chose to broadcast he could have an audience of not less than fifty-six million Germans.⁹⁵

During the period from 1934 to 1938, Goebbels continued to address audiences on every possible occasion. He still seemed to prefer speaking to the masses since "the mass of the people cared nothing for the well-balanced arguments and fine intelligent speeches. What they wanted were simple penetrating slogans- slogans were the 'schnapps' of the people."⁹⁶ Yet, the Reichsminister did find the time and opportunity to speak to other groups. On February 28, 1934, for instance, he spoke to representatives of the international press on the subject, "Für den Frieden der Welt," ["For Peace in the World."] [See Chapter I]. On other occasions he spoke to performers of both the theater and motion picture industry, who were soon placed under the supervision of the Propaganda Ministry, as well as to industrialists and businessmen. Whenever there seemed to be a need to explain the policies or intentions of the National Socialist government, the Reichsminister was quick to disseminate the information. On September 9, 1937, Goebbels "delivered a long speech on 'The Truth in Spain,' in which he predicted a Communist dictatorship and inevitable chaos, unless Franco was victorious."⁹⁷ But one of the main reasons for the speech seems to have been his attempt to justify the German "volunteers" who had been sent to Spain several months earlier. Yet, in spite of his frequent public

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 122.

⁹⁶Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 61.

⁹⁷Riess, op. cit., p. 170.

appearances, Stephen H. Roberts, who carefully studied this period of German history felt compelled to write that "Goebbels is an infinitely finer and more polished orator from our point of view, but it is always Hitler who grips the meeting."⁹⁸

The War Years: 1939-1945.-- With the advent of World War II in 1939, the audiences to which the Reichsminister addressed himself seemed to differ from previous ones in terms of size and geographical location. Not only did Goebbels attempt to communicate with and influence audiences outside of Germany, but more and more German people were forced to listen to him since he controlled all media of information.

Goebbels did not want war. He believed that his propaganda machinery could successfully win bloodless victories. Consequently, he not only chose to address the German people frequently but also directed his remarks to foreign recipients in an attempt to undermine their morale. When, for instance, the German military forces began their assault upon France, the Reichsminister singled out the French soldiers as a target for his propaganda. In describing the methods which Goebbels employed on this occasion, Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner reported:

Goebbels had found an old text, allegedly a prophecy by Nostradamus, which predicted a triumphant progress uncommonly like Hitler's march into the Rhineland and the conquest of Austria. It followed with further prophecies of his conquest, by this same leader, of Belgium and France. Under Krafft's [Hitler's personal astrologer, attached to the Propaganda Ministry] supervision, thousands of leaflets giving a modern rendering of these predictions were printed, and they descended like rain upon the Maginot Line...⁹⁹

Goebbels considered this propaganda technique so effective that he

⁹⁸Stephen H. Roberts, The House that Hitler Built, (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 16.

⁹⁹Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 160.

employed it again in 1944. This time, however, the German people were singled out as the recipients. Early in April of that year an article appeared in a Norwegian newspaper instigated by Goebbels. The article, entitled, "The Revelations of the Swedish fortune-teller, Gruenberg," gave a forecast of the future developments of the war, predicting among other things that 1948 would turn out to be Hitler's greatest year and that after a period of bitter disappointments Germany would win the war. In describing the further developments of the article, Rudolf Semmler wrote:

Soon after the Norwegian paper had published these sensational forecasts, a typewritten leaflet began to turn up in a number of German cities, giving extracts from the article. It was passed from hand to hand and one can imagine even sober, serious men, talking worriedly about the war, pulling out of their breast-pockets the comforting prophecies of Gruenberg, showing it to one another, and persuading one another once again that everything will turn out all right.

'Crazy times call for crazy measures,' said Goebbels, when he was boasting of his part in this affair. He added ironically: 'Even though in this case the name of this house (Ministry for Enlightenment of the People) does not quite fit the facts.'

Funnily enough, Frau Goebbels has been carrying a copy of Gruenberg's article around in her handbag for several days; she even gave it to me to read and without any suspicion of what lay behind it. She does not want her husband to know why she has become optimistic again.¹⁰⁰

As had been the case immediately following the party's victory at the polls in 1933, the Reichsminister was quick to employ the broadcasting facilities at his disposal during the early years of the war. Whenever the German military forces occupied foreign territory, a special detail under Goebbels' supervision took over all existing radio stations. Thus, by 1942 the German people could "listen to any station in Belgium, Holland, Occupied France, Poland, Norway, Yugoslavia and Occupied Russia."¹⁰¹ The

¹⁰⁰Semmler, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

¹⁰¹Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 177.

chief personalities that could be heard on the air during those years were Fritzsche and Goebbels himself, who "spoke in the relaxed, easy manner of the trained professional, his beautiful voice pronouncing with assurance every word and phrase of his carefully composed script."¹⁰²

For a time when the military situation seemed most promising from the German point of view, Goebbels concerned himself with such matters as the future of Europe. In one instance he went as far as to speak to a group of Czech educators and journalists on the subject, "Das kommende Europa," [^{"The Coming Europe."}] He suggested to his listeners that after Germany had won the war, a united Europe would be formed under the supervision of the National Socialists. But soon the Reichsminister found that his services were more urgently needed at the homefront. In rapid succession events at the frontlines ushered in a series of military setbacks. Hitler and the General Staff began to make a series of strategic blunders and the nightly enemy air raids were beginning to wear the German people down. More and more the Reichsminister brought his party speakers into play, who had been carefully trained and prepared under the supervision of the Ministry of Propaganda. [^{See Chapter III}]. However, because "he felt responsible for morale not merely among the civilian population but among the armed forces as well,"¹⁰³ Goebbels also made frequent public appearances. Moreover, he soon began to feel that the German people would have to wage a "total" war if victory was to be achieved at all. Thus, early in March, 1942, he confided to his diary:

The German people must remain convinced- as indeed the facts warrant- that this war strikes at their very lives and

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁰³Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 147.

their national possibilities of development, and that they must fight it with their entire strength.¹⁰⁴

To pacify the growing tensions among the irate citizens of Germany, Goebbels even instituted a "public courtesy" campaign. In discussing this campaign in his diary, the Reichsminister also conceded at the same time that his propaganda methods had not been very successful, for he wrote on April 9, 1942:

I find it necessary to start a new campaign for greater politeness in public life. Our propaganda thus far has not had the desired result. On the street, in the busses and street-cars, in restaurants and theaters, extremely coarse language (ein Sauherdenton) has gradually become a habit. It jars the nerves and cannot be tolerated any longer.¹⁰⁵

Despite these worries, however, the Reichsminister continued to believe that his speeches still were the most effective means of consoling the people. On April 14, 1942, he reported in his diary that his speech on the Fuehrer's birthday, delivered at the Berlin Philharmonic Hall, had been quite successful, for he wrote:

All who have rank or power in the state, the Party, the Wehrmacht, were assembled there. The remainder of Philharmonic Hall was reserved for soldiers, the wounded, and munitions workers. It was a very dignified and solemn occasion. The celebration began with the air from the suite in D-Major by Bach. My speech... met with great approval...¹⁰⁶

By December, 1942, Goebbels appeared to be more satisfied with the morale of the German people. While discussing a speaking engagement which he had in Hanover, the Reichsminister also revealed that he was very much concerned with the audience's response by writing:

I immediately drove to the Kuppelhalle (Hall of the Cupola), and addressed the representatives of the gau. There was an

¹⁰⁴Lochner, op. cit., p. 147.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 166.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 177.

attendance of about five thousand. I was in very good form and evoked storms of applause. No one can say that morale in this section is not good. The Party has given an excellent account of itself despite the blows of recent weeks, and again carries our banner on high. I am exceedingly well satisfied with the spirit prevailing at this meeting.¹⁰⁷

In spite of this optimistic note, however, Goebbels soon realized that he would have to return to the "total war" theme. With the announcement of the fall of Stalingrad, the Reichsminister appeared to believe that the total war campaign was the command of the hour. Thus, as Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner reported, while Goebbels spoke to the German nation on the last day of 1942,

he reviewed the war situation. He pointed out German successes in a quiet and convincing fashion. 'In the summer we took possession of an area almost twice the size of the English mother-country. We took from the enemy his most important centres of raw material, armament production and corn. He was thus dealt a blow from which he can never recover. Time is now serving us... This year of 1942 became a year in which we further safeguarded our victories. Now we can only lose through our own fault... Meanwhile the war has become a global struggle.' And after he had outlined the enemy's losses in every part of the world, he went on to say what his homeland had done. 'Now life and work go on a real war footing. This war is for our very lives, we all know.' He ended with a clarion-call. 'It is in the name of Europe, her culture and civilization, that we carry sword and banner, that we defend the ancient rights and the eternal values of our continent, firmly resolved not to lay down arms until the great aim is achieved.'¹⁰⁸

Less than two months later Goebbels delivered his "basic" speech, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose." He was not particularly happy about the prospects of a total war nor overly optimistic about the future, for on March 3, 1943, he told Rudolf Semmler:

'I regard it as my task...to train the people in the coming months to be tough. To applaud a Blitz campaign needs no toughness. And I have the feeling that this war will not come to an

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 243.

¹⁰⁸Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., pp. 194-195.

end quickly. So we must prepare our minds and hearts for bitter experiences...¹⁰⁹

Part of such training Goebbels hoped to affect through public speaking. On March 13, 1943, for instance, the Reichsminister spoke to a group of party sub-leaders in Berlin on the subject of the then current military and political situation. With the courtesy campaign in the back of his mind, he observed:

I discussed especially the theme of total war and its relation to a sort of proletarian cult of which there have been evidences here and there. It has happened, for instance, that well-dressed ladies were insulted on the streets or in public conveyances on the ground that they were not living up to the requirements of total war. That, of course, is arrant nonsense. We must not make total war unpopular by such excesses. Total war does not involve a conscious and planned cult of the primitive. We do not become more primitive because of hatred or envy, but because the exigencies of war necessitate it... Under no circumstances must it become a habit to look upon everyone who wears a starched collar as a less dependable Party member or a poor representative of the idea of total war.¹¹⁰

As was the custom in former years, Goebbels again spoke on Hitler's birthday on April 19, 1943. This time, however, he only made brief note of the occasion in his diary by writing that "at 6 P. M. the demonstration in honor of the Fuehrer's (fifty-fourth) birthday took place in the Philharmonic Hall... My speech created a very deep impression."¹¹¹ Yet, in spite of this entry, the Reichsminister seemed to be quite concerned about the decline of Hitler's popularity, as well as his own. Moreover, from the remarks which he made in front of Rudolf Semmler concerning this subject, it appears that Goebbels was cognizant of the importance of personal prestige. Thus, on March 13, 1943, Semmler reported:

¹⁰⁹Semmler, op. cit., p. 73.

¹¹⁰Lochner, op. cit., p. 296.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 336.

Nothing is worse for a man in public life than to be forgotten, said Goebbels, when we were discussing the question a few days ago. This is why Goebbels is always careful to conduct skilfully-thought-out personal publicity. In cautious doses his name is given to the public several times a week through the newspapers. Every Friday evening he has a regular date on the wireless. Press notices that look quite short and harmless, mentioning some quite unimportant reception, have for him the function of keeping the public's imagination busy and of giving the impression that he is nearly snowed under with work.

His frequent speeches in Berlin and other towns therefore have three purposes: to satisfy his new urge for work; to help the war; and to recall himself to people's memories in new and interesting ways, to make himself a centre of conversation, and to command the headlines in the newspapers.

Of course no leader in the present regime has as good an opportunity as Goebbels to use for his own purposes the machinery with which public opinion is formed. It is not surprising that the public react to the publicity bombardment just in the way Goebbels wants them to. They have the impression that he is rising fast- in short that he is a coming man.

If the present trend goes on he will have got the better of his competitors in eighteen months at the latest, and then- as far as one can foresee- he will be the most powerful man after Hitler. Goebbels thinks that no one since the Frenchman Le Bon has understood the mind of the masses as well as he.¹¹²

The Reichsminister also seemed quite concerned about the response of the German people to the measures instituted by the government, as well as to his own activities. Thus, on August 16, 1943, Semmler noted further in his diary:

Every week the press officer has to prepare for Goebbels a report on the letters addressed to the Ministry by the public. It is a very useful piece of work. It keeps Goebbels in touch with the mood, opinions and rumors among the people.¹¹³

Joseph Goebbels even considered the conversations which he had with his mother valuable indications of public opinion since "she knows the sentiments of the people better than most experts who judge from the ivory tower of scientific inquiry, as in her case the voice of the people itself

¹¹²Semmler, op. cit., p. 75.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 98.

speaks."¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the Reichsminister's preoccupation with the opinions and moods of the German people throughout the war years seemed to have been rewarded for he was able to report in his diary from time to time that he retained the confidence of the people. On November 29, 1943, for instance, he gave the following account of his reception by the people of Berlin following a particularly heavy air raid:

I drove to Reinickendorf and Wedding [suburbs of Berlin]. At the Gartenplatz I took part in the feeding of the public. The men and women workers received me with an enthusiasm that is as unbelievable as it is indescribable. This section of Wedding, all around Acker Street, was at one time full of Reds. I should never have thought it possible that such a transformation of spirit and viewpoint could take place...

I had to eat with the people and was lifted onto a box to talk to them. I delivered a very earthy and slangy speech which won the hearts of the workers. Everybody accosted me with 'Du' and called me by my first name. The people wanted to carry me on their shoulders across the Platz and I had difficulty preventing it. Women embraced me. I had to give my autograph. In short, people were in as high spirits as at a carnival.

Naturally the destruction is enormous, but in so far as the people themselves are involved, they take it with the best of humor. They are firmly convinced that we shall be able to overcome the difficulties. They have only praise for the measures thus far taken.

Wedding itself is for the most part a shambles. The same goes for Reinickendorf.

I took leave of the people. There were deeply touching scenes. One woman had given birth to a child during an air raid two or three days ago, nevertheless she insisted on getting up when she heard I had come, dressed, and hurried to the Platz. We can never lose this war because of defective morale.¹¹⁵

Several months later while discussing the same subject, the Reichsminister told his aide, Wilfred von Oven:

Once one has brought the sympathy of the masses over to one's side...it isn't so hard anymore to increase one's confidence among the people more and more. It is the same as with growing rich. The first few thousand marks are the most difficult to earn. Thereafter the money flows towards one by

¹¹⁴Lochner, op. cit., p. 56.

¹¹⁵Ibid., pp. 537-538.

itself. Every beginning is hard. Courage is especially required. Courage is always rewarded while cowardice is always deadly.¹¹⁶

By 1943, Goebbels also seemed to have a change in heart regarding his preference for audiences primarily composed of the working classes. Thus, prior to addressing the professors at the University of Heidelberg, he confided to his aide, Rudolf Semmler, that he intended to pay a longstanding debt to the intellectuals whom he had disregarded in the past. In reacting to the speech, Semmler wrote:

He partly succeeded. The speech was good and was warmly applauded by men who are very reserved in their attitude to the regime. Goebbels sees now that he made a serious psychological error in the past.

'I feel to-day much more mature and see things more soberly than I did ten years ago,' he admitted to a table-full of professors.¹¹⁷

But the Reichsminister did not seem content with adding only this new faction of the population to his listeners, since most of his propaganda efforts were also directed to the world at large. On November 29, 1943, while delivering a speech to the Hitler-Youth of Berlin, he noted:

My address seemed as if made to order. The public broke into stormy applause at every sentence with a punch... I believe this speech will make a very deep impression, not only on the German people but on the entire world. I am very happy that I spoke, despite the objections that were raised. The right word spoken at the right time sometimes achieves miracles.¹¹⁸

To the very end of his career Joseph Goebbels seemed most concerned about the impressions he made upon the audiences to which he addressed himself. As the chief spokesman of the party, he had not only spoken to all groups and classes of the German social system but had also attempted to

¹¹⁶Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels Bis Zum Ende, Vol. I, (Buenos Aires: Dürer-Verlag, 1949/50), p. 216. Translated by the writer.

¹¹⁷Semmler, op. cit., p. 89.

¹¹⁸Lochner, op. cit., p. 537.

influence the rest of the world as well. That he regarded the public speaking situation as the most effective means of propaganda seems to be best demonstrated by an anecdote related by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. The authors reported that while the Reichsminister was recording one of his last radio speeches in Berlin, in which he told the German people that the capital city had become a military objective,

the sound of shelling went on, and there was one explosion so near the house that the recording was momentarily stopped. When the speech was played back Goebbels remarked favorably on the realistic sound effects.¹¹⁹

SUMMARY

From the foregoing discussion of the audiences to which Joseph Goebbels addressed himself as a spokesman for National Socialism a number of generalizations seem to emerge which merit attention within this section of this chapter. Moreover, to facilitate an examination of these audiences, this section will be divided into two main divisions: (I) The Audience at the "Basic" Speech and (II) The Audience in other Speaking Situations. Furthermore, each division will be treated with reference to: (a) The Intent of the Speaker, (b) The Audience attending to the Speech(es), and (c) The Response to the Speech(es).

I. The Audience at the "Basic" Speech:

(a) The Intent of the Speaker:

It is true that Joseph Goebbels seemed to have given some serious thought to the question of "total war" prior to the delivery of his "basic" speech. His diary entries during 1942 give the impression that he was dissatisfied with unnecessary governmental war-regulations and the general

¹¹⁹ Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 265.

state of morale among the German people. But the events and his activities immediately preceding the delivery of his "basic" speech seem to suggest that other factors were more instrumental in motivating him to action.

Thus, Goebbels appeared to feel that the military disaster at Stalingrad, officially acknowledged on February 1, 1943, required immediate action on the part of the government if the war was to be continued. Two generals who appeared at the main broadcasting station in Berlin, apparently ready to comment on Stalingrad had prepared scripts "which contained nothing but alibis and excuses."¹²⁰ Hitler and all other responsible party officials refused to comment. The Committee of Three, appointed by Hitler to activate the "total war effort" failed to act in the emergency. Furthermore, it had been a grave disappointment when Hitler had appointed the committee, which also constituted a real threat to Goebbels' prestige as one of the important leaders of the National Socialist party during the war.

The Reichsminister seemed to feel that he could redeem himself in the eyes of his public if he could prove that he alone possessed the eagerness and determination which was needed at that time. He carefully followed Nietzsche's advice, who had said that "the masses must gain the impression that a mighty, yes unalterable willpower exists, at least it must appear to exist." Goebbels decided to speak to the nation, to demonstrate to Hitler and the people that he possessed such willpower.

In an article published on February 7, entitled, "The Hard Lesson," the Reichsminister told Hitler that the people were ready to act and carry out his commands. Less than two weeks later Goebbels stood in the Sportpalast where he violated the request of Hitler and the General Staff to treat the surrender of Stalingrad with tact and obtrusiveness. Instead

¹²⁰Riess, op. cit., p. 314.

he admonished the German people, "Now, Nation Arise and Storm Break Loose!"

With his "basic" speech the Reichsminister hoped to achieve two goals. He wanted to force Hitler to give him control of the total war effort and more powers over matters which applied to the internal affairs of Germany. He also expected to improve his status and prestige in the eyes of his audiences. In both areas Goebbels eventually was to succeed.

(b) The Audience attending to the Speech:

Evidence has been cited in Section I of this chapter which suggests that Goebbels carefully selected his audience for February 18, at the Sportpalast. Most authorities seem to agree that the Reichsminister's listeners were reliable party members or individuals who were sympathetic to the movement. Yet Goebbels himself went to considerable lengths to prove to his radio audience that representatives from all walks of life were present at the "basic" speech. Thus, within his speech he stated:

Those who sit in front of me are a representation of the entire German nation from the front lines and the homeland. Is that true? Yes or no?¹²¹

However, admittance to the Sportpalast on that occasion was by tickets only which had been distributed by party offices and the Propaganda Ministry. Since Goebbels had staked everything on this speech and since he always had been a careful organizer it seems unlikely that he would have taken an unnecessary risk by permitting lukewarm sympathizers to attend the event.

(c) The Response to the Speech:

Goebbels' diary entries following the delivery of his "basic" speech seem to indicate that his audience responded as he had expected it to. Not only did the people throughout Germany discuss many of the questions which

¹²¹See the "basic" speech, Chapter I, Section II, page 47f.

the Reichsminister had raised but a large group of women volunteered for industrial work. In fact, so many volunteers reported to the labor offices that they could not be processed quickly enough.

Although some of the measure which he had advocated in the "basic" speech were strongly criticized, Goebbels' prestige seemed to have improved due to the address. Persons who accompanied him on subsequent trips noted that he was cordially received by the people in Berlin and other areas of the country. Even the Reichsminister was so impressed by this factor that he too made reference to it in his diary. In regard to Hitler, however, Goebbels did not achieve the immediate response which he had sought. While the Fuehrer commented favorably upon the psychological and propaganda values of the speech, he did not grant Goebbels the powers he desired. Only after Germany's military situation continued to deteriorate and following the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, did the Reichsminister realize his ambitions.

II. The Audiences in other Speaking Situations:

(a) The Intent of the Speaker:

As a spokesman for the National Socialist party, Goebbels primary objective during the Ruhr resistance movement was to win new followers for his cause. When he became involved in this resistance movement his talents as a forceful, political agitator were soon discovered and exploited. Similarly, as a private secretary to Franz Wieggershaus and Gregor Strasser, Goebbels continued to win new followers for his cause. However, when he became Gauleiter of Berlin, his chief task became to create publicity for the party and himself. Yet, Goebbels did not seem particularly concerned about the manner in which he achieved these ends. He insisted that the

residents of Berlin must be influenced "to talk about us,"- that they had to become aware of the National Socialist party. Once he felt that this objective had been achieved he set out to win the local and national elections and to make Hitler the accepted Fuehrer of the nation.

After the party's victory at the polls in 1933, and following his appointment as Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Goebbels divided his attention between national audiences and specific interest groups. On the national level he sought to involve all German people in the party's victory by conducting triumphant speaking tours, in which Hitler frequently participated, and by staging giant mass celebrations. For this purpose the German radio facilities were utilized and national holidays were established. In addressing specific interest groups such as the representatives from the press, the theater and motion picture performers, and industrialists and businessmen, Goebbels further attempted to explain and justify the policies and decrees of the newly elected government.

During World War II it became the Reichsminister's mission to support the war effort. Even though he personally seemed to oppose Germany's involvement in the war, he supported Hitler's military campaigns once no other alternatives seemed to exist. His audiences were both domestic and foreign and appeared to grow larger by means of the mass media. Thus, as in the years following the party's victory at the polls, Goebbels began to rely upon all available broadcasting facilities to activate his propaganda.

Furthermore, through the manipulation of his own activities and because of the general apathy of his fellow-party leaders, the Reichsminister attempted to improve his prestige among the German people. Moreover, to the end

of his career Goebbels expended considerable time and energy in order to gain the power which he desired. On April 30, 1945, he became Reich Chancellor of Germany.

(b) The Audience attending to the Speeches:

Goebbels' first audiences during the Ruhr resistance period were primarily made up of students, high school boys, and workers of that area. They were relatively small in numbers compared with the "mass" audiences which he addressed in the later years of his career and were exposed to the same basic propaganda themes. The young political agitator spoke to them in back rooms, schools, station waiting rooms, empty haylofts, little country inns or wherever people happened to congregate. It was there that Goebbels soon gained the reputation as a speaker who could romanticize and idealize the resistance movement effectively. Moreover, his listeners and fellow party members quickly learned that he could glorify the activities of such men as Albert Leo Schlageter, a technique which he later employed in the case of Horst Wessel and Fieldmarshal Rommel.

There appeared to be few significant differences in regard to the audiences while Goebbels served Franz Wieggershaus and Gregor Strasser. However, when he became Gauleiter of Berlin, the size of his audiences seemed to increase in each speaking situation in relation to the publicity which he obtained. This seems to have been the case especially when the National Socialist party became involved in a series of national elections.

In an attempt to win the attention of the Berliner audiences, Goebbels purposely kept his listeners waiting to heighten the suspense. He also provoked them on numerous occasions, invented rituals and ceremonies, attacked individuals and governmental institutions, continued to work underground

when the party was banned in Berlin, formed clubs and party cells, and spoke at the meetings of opposition parties. Moreover, when the National Socialists became involved in the Reichstag election, Goebbels traveled extensively and frequently throughout the country to address his audiences. His greatest success in political campaigning seems to have been the Lippe Detmold election which played a major role in helping the party win control of the nation.

Both his personal diary and the book, Kampf um Berlin, [Battle for Berlin], which covered the Berlin period offer some interesting insights into Goebbels' personal attitudes and opinions about the audiences to which he so frequently addressed himself. Thus, according to these sources he continued to favor audiences composed of workers. He believed that low-income groups would be of greater consequence in helping the National Socialists win control of the nation than any other part of German society. He further seemed to feel that by conversing with the common man one could learn more about the attitudes and moods of the people than by any other means. Moreover, he insisted repeatedly that all arguments had to be reduced to their simplest terms and that repetition was an acceptable means of persuasion as long as the audience remained unaware of its application. Yet, at the same time Goebbels also conceded that his listeners were ignorant of the hardships which he faced in the speaking situation or were frequently over-critical of his performances.

Furthermore, in an attempt to win new followers for his cause, Goebbels seemed to feel that most any means was acceptable to influence his listeners. When the party finances permitted it he made use of sound films which were shown throughout the country. He attended the meetings of other parties

where he debated and manipulated the occasion in favor of National Socialism. He also organized and spoke at funerals and even engaged other passengers on trains in the hope of winning new converts to his cause.

Once the National Socialist party was in control of the nation, Goebbels' audiences appeared to take on a pronounced national character. The Reichsminister saw to it that all of the German people shared directly or vicariously in the great party celebrations. Radio sets were manufactured cheaply to insure the greatest possible audiences at such occasions. But, as indicated earlier, Goebbels also addressed himself to special interest groups to explain and justify the new policies and decrees of the government.

During World War II, the Reichsminister's audiences consisted of localized groups, as well as national and international audiences. Goebbels spoke to party sub-leaders, munitions workers, and the inhabitants of heavily bombed areas in Berlin and other sections of the country. He also began to speak to audiences composed of "intellectual" listeners whom he admittedly had overlooked in the earlier periods of his career. To affect the larger audiences, the Reichsminister made use of prophecies both for domestic and foreign consumption. He used the available broadcasting facilities and also attempted to institute courtesy campaigns within Germany. He further directed many of his propaganda attempts at listeners in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Spain, France and England in the hope of undermining enemy morale.

Since he also wanted to increase his prestige among the German people, Goebbels made certain that his name appeared frequently in the newspapers. He created the impression that he was overburdened with work, was heard

regularly every Friday over the radio, and continued to address audiences in Berlin and elsewhere with great frequency.

(c) The Response to the Speeches:

Early in his career as a political agitator in the Ruhr resistance movement, Goebbels learned that he possessed considerable talent as a speaker. He was successful in organizing National Socialist party cells and influencing many of his listeners to contribute financially or join the party. Similarly, when he was in the services of Franz Wieggershaus and Gregor Strasser, his speaking ability was continually exploited even though he had been hired as a private secretary by both men.

As Gauleiter of Berlin, Goebbels succeeded in bringing the National Socialist movement to the attention of the people. Furthermore, when the party became involved in a series of local and national elections the victories which were won attested to the Gauleiter's success. But perhaps even more significant were Goebbels' activities in the Lippe Detmold campaign which assisted the National Socialists in gaining control of the nation.

After Hitler and the party were in power the reactions of the German people continued to demonstrate Goebbels' effectiveness as a propagandist and persuader. Thus, they responded to the mass demonstrations, party holidays, and anniversaries by changing the names of streets and market-places in every city and village to those of the more famous National Socialist party officials.

During World War II Goebbels generally appeared to receive the desired response from his audiences. Even when the German armed forces experienced severe setbacks repeatedly and it became a question of personal prestige for Hitler and Goebbels, the Reichsminister's prestige appeared to remain

relatively high. Thus, Goebbels was able to report in his diary that his speeches were well received or "had made a very deep impression." In fact, long after the people had lost confidence in other party leaders they not only turned to Goebbels for guidance but seemed to trust and rely upon him.

There is little doubt that Joseph Goebbels had worked hard to achieve the status and prestige which he enjoyed among the German people towards the end of World War II. Almost from the very beginning of his public speaking career he had learned to recognize the importance of audience analysis. He discussed this factor while describing the first audiences which he confronted in the Ruhr. He again mentioned its significance during the Berlin period and in his diaries by referring to the fact that he kept in close touch with the moods and attitudes of the people. As Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel have suggested,

He was wholly, absolutely self-conscious over his speech-making. He always considered his audience first— how to affect them, how to incite them.¹²²

But perhaps even more important, the Reichsminister had attempted to heed the advice of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, who said:

'The recipe for that which the masses call a great man is simply stated. Under all circumstances one must give them something which they like; or at least first put it in their minds that this or that would be quite nice, and then give it to them. But under no circumstances right away, rather one should battle for it with the greatest effort, or appear to be battling for it. The masses must gain the impression that a mighty, yes even unalterable willpower exists, at least it must appear to exist...'¹²³

¹²²Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 74.

¹²³v. Borresholm, op. cit., p. 9.

CHAPTER V

AN ANALYSIS OF THE "BASIC" SPEECH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES

An Analysis of Goebbels' "Basic" Speech

The circumstances and events which motivated Joseph Goebbels to address the German nation on February 18, 1943, have already been treated within the foregoing chapters of this study. It was suggested that Goebbels perceived the need for a declaration of "total war" as necessary to the survival of the German people, as well as to the realization of his personal ambitions. Furthermore, when the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda realized that it would become his task to carry this declaration to the people, he immediately set out to make the necessary preparations.

The Preparation of the "Basic" Speech.-- Once the surrender of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad was officially acknowledged on February 1, 1943, Joseph Goebbels began to utilize every available moment to work on his speech scheduled for February 18, at the Sportpalast in Berlin. As was the case with all of his more important addresses, the Reichsminister proceeded to write out his speech in longhand, much as he did when writing articles for publication. In this instance, Curt Riess noted that the Reichsminister, after having revised the speech several times, "discarded most of it, [and] rewrote it with extensive revisions,"¹ which occupied his attention until four o'clock in the morning of February 18.

Once the manuscript had been completed and appeared to meet the expectations of Goebbels, two stenographers typed up the speech and resubmitted it

¹Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949), p. 316.

for further corrections. The Reichsminister then studied the manuscript anew, made last-minute corrections by changing a word or phrase here and there and gave particular attention to stylistic matters.

Throughout this period of preparation, Goebbels also practiced the delivery of the "basic" speech. He carefully read every word and phrase aloud, repeatedly changing the stress within each sentence to determine its effect, and marked each with "multi-colored pencils to indicate various shades of emphasis and pause."²

Goebbels was so nervous that he could not sleep during the night prior to the Sportpalast meeting. Instead, he rehearsed his speech in front of a large mirror in the Propaganda Ministry several times, where he had spent most of his time preparing the address with his aides. He went through his entire repertoire of speaking techniques which he had developed through years of practice, retaining only those factors which he believed would produce the desired response within his audience. Thus, he rehearsed different kinds of gestures, stretching out his hands in an appeal to his imaginary audience or pointing a finger at them when advocating action. He performed smooth, well-executed gestures with his neatly manicured fingers and hands. He further pretended to laugh or become solemn as the occasion demanded. While shouting or whispering his sentences into the mirror, he observed his facial expressions critically. He pretended to stare at the ceiling in amazement and feigned moral indignation by closing his eyes. He minutely rehearsed the entire performance and "as usual, he turned just a little to the left—knowing that his right profile

²Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Dr. Goebbels: His Life and Death, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 74.

was more attractive than the other."³

For the title of the speech, Goebbels chose a quotation which he had used on a previous occasion. On July 9, 1932, he had delivered a speech at the Lustgarten in Berlin which was attended by 100,000 people.⁴ It had also been intended to launch a new national propaganda campaign. The Reichsminister had referred to the title of his speech in 1932, by stating:

We do not want to think of classes any longer. We are not proletarians and citizens, we are not primarily Protestants, we are not primarily Catholics. We do not question origin or social position. A great unity surrounds us, and with us the word of the poet has come true:

'The Nation Rises, the Storm Breaks Loose!'

Once more my comrades, and men and women, fate places the last chance into our hands. Once more we have the opportunity to speak to the people. . .⁵

Although Goebbels did not specifically refer to the source of the quotation, both the title and the concluding sentence of the "basic" speech stem from the period of German history known as the "Wars of Liberation of 1813," when Prussia successfully extricated itself from the control of Napoleon I.⁶

The Arrangement of the "Basic" Speech.--- As was his custom when preparing most of his other speeches, Goebbels also employed the traditional divisions of an introduction, the body, and conclusion in his "basic" speech. In addition he added three "thesis" statements which are not

³Riess, op. cit., p. 317.

⁴Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 125. Translated by the writer.

⁵Joseph Goebbels, Signale der neuen Zeit, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 87. Translated by the writer.

⁶Riess, op. cit., p. 361.

readily discernable in other speeches.

Since this was a manuscript speech, which the Reichsminister preferred to impromptu and extemporaneous talks on important occasions, he gave particular attention to the internal consistency of the speech. Thus, the "basic" speech was fashioned after the classical German high school composition in which Goebbels had excelled as a student.

Based upon a report by Wilfred von Oven of similar speeches, the "basic" speech appears to have been initially divided by the use of the Roman numerals: I, II, and III. Further subdivisions were possibly made with the Arabic numerals: 1, 2, and 3, which in turn were followed by sub-points of a, b, and c. Additional subdivisions were provided by the use of green, red, and blue pencils which not only served to indicate phrases and words which the speaker wished to stress, but also provided a visible impression of the order of their significance.

Once the basic outline of the speech had been developed, Goebbels called upon his aides to supply and check the evidence and supports which he had decided to use. Thus, in one instance, the Reichsminister declared in the "basic" speech:

A recently conducted recount of an election of the Lower House in England indicated that the uncommitted, that is, the communistic candidate received 10,741 votes of a total of 22,371 from a vote district which up to now was the undisputed domain of the Conservatives. . .

But before the Reichsminister would make use of such a statistic in public, he called upon various departments of his own and other ministries to verify the accuracy of the figures. Next, Goebbels called upon his personal stenographer, Otte, who usually took down the Reichsminister's remarks over the telephone. In this instance, however, as it was the case on very

special occasions, Otte had to report to Goebbels in person. Thus, while the stenographer recorded the speech in shorthand, he also "represented the public in a sense, in front of whom this speech was delivered for the first time."⁷ Moreover, during the transcription process the Reichsminister was able to discern some of the stylistic aspects of the speech which required changes in some places. Among other corrections, he could change the length of the sentences and their structure, as well as improve the figures of speech.

Typewritten copies of the speech were sent to Werner Naumann, the Under Secretary of State, and to the chief newsreporter in the Propaganda Ministry, who carefully rechecked every statistic, every example, and analogy. On most other occasions the Reichsminister sent a copy of his speech to Hitler. In this instance, however, it appears that Goebbels failed to do so since he "went much further than Hitler had agreed."⁸

When Joseph Goebbels confronted his audience at the Sportpalast in Berlin on February 18, 1943, he was filled with great tension despite his outward display of composure, for he knew that this single speech "could either save the situation, or ruin it."⁹ He had carefully prepared and arranged his speech up to the very last moment. With more than fifteen thousand listeners in his immediate audience and even more involved with the great event through the German broadcasting facilities, the Reichsminister was ready to begin his address. Because of the seriousness of

⁷Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels Bis Zum Ende, (Buenos Aires: Dürer-Verlag, 1949-50), Vol. I, p. 127. Translated by the writer.

⁸Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels- the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse, Ltd., 1947), p. 69.

⁹Riess, op. cit., p. 317.

the situation he seemed to realize that there was no time for oratorical display or improvisations. Goebbels was prepared to present the image of a serious, troubled man who had come to speak with his family and friends about a problem which required their immediate attention.

The Substance of the "Basic" Speech: The Introduction.-- The Reichsminister began his speech by referring to his last public speaking appearance on January 30, 1943. He told his audience indirectly that Stalin-grad had fallen into enemy hands by stating that in all likelihood the German soldiers there had participated in the annual party anniversary celebration for the last time in their lives. He set the mood of the "basic" speech by pointing out that he wanted to endow his statements "with the whole solemn seriousness and open frankness which this hour requires of us", and he added that the German people were prepared to "endure the complete truth." In developing his introduction further, the Reichsminister briefly reviewed the immediate military events preceding the "basic" speech and went on to assert that only the people, supported by their allies, could prevent the total destruction of the European continent.

To integrate himself with the audience and to gain and hold their attention, Goebbels made use of reference remarks, rhetorical questions, and common-bond statements within the introduction. Thus, with the opening statement of his speech, the Reichsminister referred to his last speech by declaring:

It is hardly three weeks since I last spoke to you and the German nation from this spot on the occasion of the reading of the Fuehrer's proclamation at the 10th anniversary of our struggle for power. . .

He asked his audiences, had it not been for the National Socialist party and Hitler's leadership, "What threats would then have befallen the German

nation, quicker than we could have ever imagined, and what kinds of defenses would have been at our disposal to confront them?" In addition, while attempting to demonstrate that both he and his listeners shared common experiences, Goebbels utilized such expressions as, "we must act, and indeed without delay, . . ." or, "we presently are living under a difficult military burden in the East." Goebbels further conceded that the military and social situation from the German point of view was far more serious than anyone had realized but refused to enlarge upon this concession by declaring that "its cause will be talked about at some later date." Instead he attempted to justify Germany's invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941 by asserting that "a further hesitation could easily have led to the destruction of the nation and complete bolshevistic domination of the European continent." Thus, the Reichsminister re-emphasized the immediate threat against the German Reich by stressing his contention that the danger "requires the exertion of our total national might."

The Substance of the "Basic" Speech: The Body.-- To clarify for his listeners the subject matter which he was going to discuss in the body of the speech, Goebbels presented three basic thesis statements. First he insisted that if the German army failed to stop the Russian forces, Germany and all of Europe would be overrun in short order. To support this statement, the Reichsminister advanced the contention that "Bolshevism has always openly proclaimed as its goal, not only to revolutionize Europe alone, but also the entire world and to plunge it into a bolshevistic chaos." He further declared that such action was instigated by the Jews so that they could build their "capitalistic tyranny upon the ensuing hopelessness and despair of the [European] nations." To increase the state of

fear and anxiety within his audience, Goebbels vividly described the consequences by referring to the "liquidation of our entire intelligentsia and leadership stratification" and "forced-worker battalions" which were needed by the Russians for their Siberian tundras.

With his second thesis statement, Goebbels argued that only Germany and her allies could hope successfully to deter the eastern threat. To support this viewpoint, the Reichsminister pointed out that neither England nor the neutral states were in a position to deal effectively with Bolshevism. The Reichsminister also included the United States in his discussion of this problem by posing the question:

What would England and America intend to do if the European continent fell, in the roughest misfortune, into the arms of Bolshevism? Does one from London perhaps want to convince Europe that such a development would come to a halt at the channel border? I have already pointed out that the foreign legions of Bolshevism already stand grounded in all democratic states in the form of Communist parties. None of these states can assert of itself that it is immune against Bolshevism internally.

With his third thesis statement Goebbels insisted that Germany faced an immediate threat which required quick action. The Reichsminister singled out the Jewish race as the underlying force which had created this situation and he added, "We perceive the Jews as an immediate danger for every country." In defense of the German actions against the Jews, Goebbels told his audience,

If the enemy countries sanctimoniously protest against our anti-Jewish politics and shed hypocritical crocodile tears because of our measures against the Jews, then this cannot detain us from doing what is necessary.

Furthermore, Goebbels contended that the persecution of the international Jews throughout the world "can and must end in victory."

Following the development of his third thesis statement, the Reichs-

minister reiterated the crisis at Stalingrad and Germany's apparent readiness to wage total war. "We do not want to hear anything more about false hopes and illusions," Goebbels declared and continued, "we want to face the facts bravely, even if they are hard and gruesome." The facts, as he perceived and discussed them had led Goebbels to conclude that "the total war is the commandment of the hour." The Reichsminister argued, as he had similarly done when discussing the methods to be used for propaganda, "The question, therefore, is not whether the methods which we are employing are good or bad, but whether they lead to results", and further that "the most radical is today just radical, and the most total is today just total enough to achieve victory."

Goebbels proceeded to explain the measures which he deemed necessary to wage total war by declaring that "we will not give special consideration to social position or occupation," a statement which was reminiscent of one which he made in the 1932 speech mentioned earlier. He advocated that bars and nightclubs be closed. He demanded the dismissal of servants and that beauty parlours, high-class restaurants and luxury shops be shut down until the war was successfully ended. "We would rather wear patched clothes for a few years than conjure up a situation in which our nation would have to run around in rags for centuries," he maintained. By making such sacrifices, the Reichsminister told his listeners, additional soldiers would be freed for front line duty and more women could work in the munitions industry. In enlarging upon this factor, Goebbels further directed a series of appeals to the women of Berlin who were present in the audience. In one instance he declared, "I appeal especially as District Leader of Berlin to the women citizens of Berlin," and again, "which German woman

would be heartless enough to refuse such an appeal which I am making especially for the fighting front to the world of German women."

The Reichsminister concluded the body of the "basic" speech by observing, "I do not dispute the fact that we are confronted by worrisome weeks in the face of carrying out the just mentioned measures. But with this we finally clear the air." He consoled his listeners by comparing the military and social situation of 1942-43 with Frederick the Great's experiences in the Third Silesian War, in which the Prussian King fought against overwhelming odds and won.

Up to this point, Goebbels had spoken for almost an hour. As indicated by the footnotes recorded within the published text of the "basic" speech, Goebbels' audience at the Sportpalast appeared to be in a state of ecstasy. Moreover, the footnotes suggest that the Reichsminister had been frequently interrupted by roars of laughter whenever he was being ironical, by cries of indignation whenever he vehemently denounced the enemy, and by a chorus of voices whenever he appealed to his listeners for support of his proposals. It was with such audience responses that Goebbels entered into the conclusion of his speech.

The Substance of the "Basic" Speech: The Conclusion.--- Goebbels first set out to involve his audience directly in the speaking situation by asking them to confirm the truthfulness of his remarks verbally. Thus, he declared, "When my listeners gave me their spontaneous acknowledgement to my demands on January 30, the English press asserted the next day it had been a propaganda theater and did not represent in any sense the true mood of the German nation." Next the Reichsminister asked, "I have invited only a representative sample of the German people to this gathering today in

the best sense of the word. . . Is that true? Yes or no?" The audience in the Sportpalast responded affirmatively to both assertions. Then

Goebbels was prepared to ask his ten carefully prepared questions which were designed to prove to Hitler, the nation, and the rest of the world that the German people were ready to support the "total war" effort. Each question was phrased positively and each received an affirmative answer. It took Goebbels "almost one hour to ask the ten questions— there were that many interruptions."¹⁰ Then he summarized his speech by stating:

In the great crises and shocks of the national life only the true men prove themselves, as well as the true women. . . This nation is prepared for everything the Fuehrer has ordered, we will follow him."

Again the Reichsminister had made use of a saying familiar to his listeners, for they had verbally replied within the "basic" speech, "Fuehrer command, we shall follow," and Goebbels had chosen the very same words as the title of his speech on January 30, 1943.

Joseph Goebbels ended his speech with a quotation he had used once before at the beginning of a fateful campaign, "Now, nation arise and storm break loose!"

Goebbels' Use of Reasoning and Evidence Within the "Basic" Speech.--

Throughout the "basic" speech, Goebbels used the following forms of reasoning: (1) Cause-to-effect, (2) effect-to-cause, (3) analogy, and (4) example. These forms of reasoning appeared primarily within the first two-thirds of the speech when the Reichsminister was intent upon reviewing the military and social events and justifying the actions of the government and those of the German people in general.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 320-321.

Although the Reichsminister seemed to prefer reasoning by analogy and example in most of his speeches, the most frequently applied form within the "basic" speech was cause-to-effect and effect-to-cause reasoning. Goebbels' preference for causal arguments in this instance seems to have been based upon his desire to demonstrate to his listeners that there was a logical relationship between the military and social conditions of the times and the effects which they produced or required within the immediate future. Thus, early within the "basic" speech the Reichsminister argued that, "we did not assess the war potential of Soviet Russia properly because of the large-scale camouflage- and bluff manoeuvres of the bolshevistic regime," and concluded, "accordingly, therefore, above all human imagination the battle which our soldiers must withstand in the East is hard, difficult, and dangerous." In another instance, Goebbels told his listeners, "I believe the entire German nation is passionately involved in that which I must report to you tonight", and arrived at the conclusion that consequently he had to endow his statements with seriousness and open frankness as the hour required. Within the development of the second thesis statement, the Reichsminister argued that because Bolshevism tends to draw its borders ideologically and not only militarily, Europe would have to choose whether to live "sheltered under the military protection of the Axis or one of Bolshevism." Similarly, in regard to the Jews, Goebbels reasoned that because the Jews of the East and West "already hold hands over our land- herewith Europe is in mortal danger."

In the development of the third thesis statement in which the Reichsminister insisted that Germany faced an immediate threat from the East which required prompt action, he established a cause-effect relationship by arguing:

The struggle for Stalingrad became in its tragical complications gradually a symbol of the heroic, manly defense against the uproar of the steppe. Therefore, it had for the German people not only a military but also a spiritual and psychological meaning of the deepest effect.

Furthermore, in establishing a chain of causal arguments indirectly, Goebbels supported his contention that "the total war is the commandment of the hour" by arguing:

The danger which we face is gigantic.
Therefore, our efforts with which we face it must be gigantic.
The hour has arrived, therefore, to take off the lace-gloves
and to bandage the fist.

Joseph Goebbels' use of effect-to-cause reasoning is perhaps best demonstrated by the argument which he developed in support of the third thesis statement. In this instance the Reichsminister declared that "the apparent paralysis of the West European democracies, in the face of the deadliest threat, is disheartening." The cause for this paralysis, Goebbels concluded, were the Jews who promoted it with great rigor by artificially lulling all nations to sleep in regard to the threat of Communism. Similarly, he maintained that, ". . . we can defeat the bolshevistic danger in the long run. . . ." provided that the German nation was prepared ". . . to risk all in order to keep everything. . . ." Another example of the Reichsminister's use of effect-to-cause reasoning seems to be revealed by his declaration that "when I proclaimed the total war effort in my speech from this spot on January 30, hurricane-like applause engulfed me from the assembled masses of human beings." Goebbels reasoned that such response could have been caused only because "the leadership with its measures is in complete agreement with the entire German nation in the homeland and at the front."

As was the case with the other forms of logical argument, Goebbels'

analogies were most frequently employed in the introduction and body of the speech. Moreover, their application within these sections seems to indicate that the Reichsminister wanted his listeners to believe that his proposals could be carried out in light of the conduct of the German people in the past. In the introduction of his "basic" speech Goebbels argued that ". . . only as a nation did we develop our highest virtues, . . . a strength of character, . . . tenacious determination. . . , and an iron heart . . ." and concluded that "it shall be the same today." Much in the same manner, Goebbels contended on another occasion that "these times, through which we are living today, have in their entire makeup for every true National Socialist an amazing similarity with the battle period. We have always gone through thick and thin together with the people, and this is why the people have followed on all paths." Goebbels concluded his argument by reasoning that the people, at the time of the "basic" speech also were prepared to follow. Furthermore, in an attempt to explain why his total war proposals should have been put into action, the Reichsminister compared the military situation at the time of the "basic" speech with the experiences of Frederick the Great, by declaring:

He never had enough soldiers and arms in order to fight his battles without great risks. He conducted his strategy always as a system of makeshifts. But he followed the fundamental law to attack the enemy whenever an opportunity presented itself and to beat him wherever he assembled.

When Joseph Goebbels reasoned by example he appeared to concentrate his efforts primarily upon explaining the intent of the eastern enemy to his listeners. In one instance the Reichsminister asserted that "Bolshevism has always openly proclaimed as its goal, not only to revolutionize Europe alone, but also the entire world. . . ." In developing this line of

reasoning, Goebbels explained, ". . .the more Stalin and the other Soviet leaders believe that they are nearing the realization of their world destruction intentions, the more they are intent upon camouflaging and hiding them in mysteriousness." On another occasion the Reichsminister explained that while Lord Beaverbrook and the American journalist Brown believed that Europe would eventually become communistic and that this would be desirable, it really was a question of survival for Germany and all of Europe. Thus, Goebbels implied that Germany had to fight for survival whether Britain and America, including their "intelligentsia want to realize this or not."

In his second thesis statement, the Reichsminister advocated that only Germany and its allies could hope to deter the eastern threat successfully. In developing this argument, Goebbels explained:

The neutral European states neither possess the potential nor the necessary military strength and means nor the spiritual attitude within their nations in order to offer even the least resistance to Bolshevism. They would, if necessary, be run over in a few days by its motorized robot divisions. In the main cities of the middle and smaller European nations one reconciles oneself with the intention of arming oneself spiritually against the bolshevistic danger.

Furthermore, in attempting to demonstrate to his audience that Bolshevism posed a real threat to the world the Reichsminister contended:

It tracks its goals and objectives with infernal thoroughness, under desolate drainage of its internal potential and without consideration for luck, wellbeing, and peace for the nations which are subjugated under it.

The evidence which Goebbels utilized to support his arguments primarily consisted of statistics, examples, and illustrations. The Reichsminister's use of statistics is exemplified by the statement:

A recently conducted recount of an election of the Lower

House in England indicated that the uncommitted, that is, the communistic candidate received 10,741 votes of a total of 22,371 from a vote district which up to now was the undisputed domain of the Conservatives, which means that the national parties alone. . .lost about 10,000 votes.

The Reichsminister used examples with considerable frequency to support his contentions. In one instance he argued early in the "basic" speech that "the goal of Bolshevism is the world-revolution of the Jews." To support this statement, he added, "they wanted to bring chaos upon the nation and Europe in order to build their international, bolshevistically disguised, capitalistic tyranny upon the ensuing hopelessness and despair of the nation." On another occasion the Reichsminister stated, ". . .as National Socialist leaders of the nation, we are now resolute in every respect." To prove his statement, Goebbels explained:

We act without consideration for the protests of one or the other. We don't want to weaken the German war potential any longer in order to maintain a high, sometimes even peace-like internal standard of living for a given class of people and thereby jeopardize the war efforts. . . .

Again, while explaining the total war involvement of all the people, Goebbels argued that there was no room for "certain men and women [who] lounge around for weeks in the resort areas. . . ." Instead, the Reichsminister observed:

The war is not the proper time for a certain amusement riffraff. The work and battle is our joy till the end in which we find our deep, internal satisfaction.

Goebbels further argued, "it doesn't make a good impression on the nation. . .if we publish through a gigantic propaganda campaign the slogan: 'Wheels must turn for victory.'" To support his contention, the Reichsminister declared:

The railroad today serves important war transports and

necessary war-business trips. Only that individual may demand a vacation who otherwise would greatly endanger his work- and battle strength.

Another representative example of this form of support was evident in the development of the "basic" speech when Goebbels declared, "The government. . .does everything to maintain the necessary and varied relaxation centers for the working people in these difficult times." As evidence, Goebbels added that,

Theaters, movies, music halls remain in business. The radio will be intent upon further extending and rounding out its programs. . .

The Reichsminister's use of illustrations to support his arguments is perhaps best demonstrated by the following two citations. In one instance Goebbels stated, "I am of the firm belief that the lamentary lords and archbishops in London in reality do not even have the intention to confront the bolshevistic threats which may be brought about by the further advancement of the Soviet armies." To illustrate this lack of resistance in Great Britain, the Reichsminister added,

The Jews have already undermined the Anglo-Saxon states spiritually and politically to such an extent that they do not see or recognize this danger as being true. Just as it camouflages itself in a bolshevistic manner in the Soviet Union, so it camouflages itself plutocratic-capitalistically in the Anglo-Saxon state.

In another instance, Goebbels argued that "Bolshevism naturally does not have the slightest understanding for this treasure of our rich nationality and it would also, in any event, if necessary, not take the least consideration thereof." In supporting this argument, the Reichsminister illustrated in great detail the developments which had occurred in Russia during the past twenty-five years prior to the battle of Stalingrad. He described the influence of the Jews in Russia, as he perceived it, and

concluded that, "in the East an entire nation is being forced into battle."

Joseph Goebbels also spent considerable time within the "basic" speech in refuting the arguments attributed to other sources. Thus, he observed, "The European states, including England, insist they are strong enough to meet Bolshevism on the European continent in time and effectively." In refutation, Goebbels contended:

This explanation is childish and does not deserve refutation. Should the strongest power in the world not be in a position to break the threat of Bolshevism, who else could assemble the necessary strength to do it?

In another instance the Reichsminister declared, "Our enemies assert the German women are not in the position to replace the man in the war economy." In attempting to refute this statement he declared that, ". . . for many years now, millions of the best German women have been busy with the greatest effect and they are waiting impatiently that their lines will soon be increased and replenished by new replacements." On another occasion, Goebbels asked his audience, "Who would still want to think about his egotistical, personal needs in the face of the current, hard danger and not about the necessities of war which stand above all else?" In supporting this viewpoint, he concluded:

I reject with contemptuousness the charge which our enemies make, that this was an imitation of Bolshevism. We do not want to imitate Bolshevism, we want to conquer it, and indeed with means and methods which are equal to it.

Goebbels' Use of Ethical Appeals Within the "Basic" Speech.-- Since the Reichsminister attempted to increase his prestige among the German people and intended to persuade them to action, he made considerable use of ethical appeals within the "basic" speech.

In the introduction of the speech Goebbels insisted, "I would like to

speak to all of you from the bottom of my heart to the depth of yours." Within the same section of the speech he added, "I have the task of drawing an unretouched picture of the situation for you. . ." and, "I consider myself above giving you a false picture of the situation. . ."

Within the body of the speech the Reichsminister implied that he was aware of and could affect German public opinion by stating, "I do not flatter myself to be able to alert the public opinion in the neutral or even in the enemy states with these explanations. . ." Within the same paragraph, Goebbels attempted to demonstrate his honorable intentions by adding, "I know that the English press will fall all over me tomorrow yelping angrily that I had attempted to make the first peace contacts in the face of our pressures at the eastern front." Moreover, he insisted, "I require for myself the sovereign right as a responsible speaker of this continent's leading country, to call a danger a danger. . ."

To prove to his immediate audience that he enjoyed a good reputation among the German people he further stated in the body of the speech:

When I proclaimed the total war effort in my speech from this spot on January 30, hurricane-like applause engulfed me from the assembled masses of human beings.

Joseph Goebbels also made use of his status within the hierarchy of the National Socialist leadership to influence his listeners. Thus, he declared, "I appeal especially as District Leader of Berlin to the women citizens of Berlin." To further increase his credibility among his audience he stated toward the end of the body of the speech, "I have compassion for these sacrifices. . ." and, ". . .I am most happy to have the privilege of presenting this program of victory (storm-like applause) to the German nation. . ."

In the conclusion of the "basic" speech, Goebbels continued to make

use of ethical appeals to utilizing such statements as:

I would like, however, for the sake of truth. . .

I have asked you, you have given me your answer.

I stand in front of you here not only as a spokesman for the government, but also as a spokesman of the nation.

Goebbels' Use of the Emotional States Within the "Basic" Speech.--With-
in the "basic" speech Goebbels repeatedly appealed to the emotional states of his listeners. He quickly disarmed his audience and reduced the possibility of hostility among his listeners by referring to the "heroic sacrifices" of the soldiers at Stalingrad.¹¹ Thus, he observed early in the introduction of the "basic" speech, "What staunch bearing of German soldiership in these great times!" He increased the emotional overtones of his remarks by stating, "The remembrance of the heroes of Stalingrad therefore shall become an obligation for me and all of us in my speech to you and the German people." He enlarged upon this theme a few moments later by adding, "The great heroic sacrifices which our soldiers in Stalingrad contributed have been of decisive historic meaning for the entire eastern front", but failed to support or develop this contention.

To create a mood of unity and universal understanding among his listeners, the Reichsminister proclaimed, "The German people, raised, schooled, and disciplined in National Socialism can endure the complete truth." In the body of the speech Goebbels added, "The German nation makes its most precious blood available for this battle." Somewhat later, he insisted, "We would rather wear patched clothes for a few years than conjure up a situation in which our nation would have to run around in

¹¹See Chapter I, The "Basic" Speech.

rag for centuries."

In the conclusion of the "basic" speech Goebbels added:

Herewith we are, as from the first hour of our might on and through all ten years united solidly and brotherly with the German people. The mightiest party member who exists in the world, the nation itself, stands behind us and is determined to fight for the victory together with the Fuehrer with the acceptance of even the most difficult sacrifices and no matter what the price may be. Which power in the world could now detain us from carrying through and fulfilling everything which we have set as our goal. Now we will and must be successful.

Some of Goebbels' direct and indirect appeals for action on the part of the German people were revealed by such statements as: "Foreign countries are only impressed with a German victory! (Storm-like agreement). When we have won, everyone will want to be our friends." Further, while directing his appeal to the German women, the Reichsminister declared, "They will deem it to be their highest responsibility to stand at the side of their men at the front lines by making themselves available for necessary war work." Moreover, while singling out the women of Berlin, Goebbels said:

I appeal especially as District Leader of Berlin to the women citizens of Berlin. They have already given so many noble examples in the development of this war of a brave opinion of life that they will certainly not let themselves be embarrassed by this appeal. They have obtained for themselves, because of their practical way of life, as well as the freshness of their view of life, even in this war, a good name throughout the world.

After appealing directly to the women of Berlin, Goebbels made a universal appeal to all German women by asking, "Which German woman could be heartless enough to refuse such an appeal which I am making especially for the fighting front to the world of German women?" Similarly, in asking for support of his total war effort, the Reichsminister appealed to all of his listeners by pleading, "Above everything else, however, that we

do or don't do, the moral law applies to everyone not to do that which will hurt the war and to do everything which serves the victory."

Goebbels' strongest emotional appeal seems to have been made almost at the very end of his "basic" speech, when he said:

All of us, children of our nation, welded together with the nation in the greatest hour of fate of our national history, we promise you, we promise the front lines, and we promise the Fuehrer that we want to weld the homeland together into a union of will, upon which the Fuehrer and his fighting soldiers can depend unconditionally and blindly. We pledge ourselves to do everything in our life and work which is necessary for the victory. We want to fill our hearts with that political passion which always, in the great days of the party and the state, consumed us like perpetual, burning fire.

Goebbels' Use of Motivational Appeals Within the "Basic" Speech.--- The motivational appeals which Joseph Goebbels used in his "basic" speech are perhaps best described by some of Arthur E. Phillips' "Impelling Motives."¹² Thus, in an attempt to move his listeners to action, Goebbels made use of: (1) appeals to self-preservation, (2) appeals to the reputation of the auditors, (3) appeals to power,-- the desire to dominate and structure personal situations and events, (4) appeals to tastes,-- the desire to satisfy or protect aesthetic cravings such as literature, music, painting, sculpture, and drama, (5) appeals to the sentiments,-- the religious and morale values in life, and (6) appeals to affections,-- the desire to contribute to the welfare and happiness of other individuals or groups.

Among the motivational appeals which the Reichsminister utilized most frequently in the "basic" speech were the appeals to self-preservation.

¹²Arthur E. Phillips, Effective Speaking, (Chicago: The Newton Company, 1925), pp. 48-52.

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In the introductory remarks of his speech, Goebbels warned his listeners, "We must act, and indeed without delay quickly and thoroughly, just as has always been the national way." He further observed, "With the coming of Bolshevism to the nation a liquidation of our entire intelligentsia and leadership stratification would follow, with the consequence that the working masses would be led into Bolshevik-Jewish slavery." In the development of the body of the speech Goebbels told his listeners, "The German nation, in any event, is not willing to expose itself to this danger even if only on a trial basis. Behind the attacking Soviet divisions we see already the Jewish liquidation commandoes, behind these, furthermore, the terror arises: the ghost of the hungry millions and complete anarchy." In regard to the Jews, the Reichsminister declared, "We perceive the Jews as an immediate danger for every country. . . . How we defend ourselves against them, however, that is our own business in which we will not tolerate any interference." Again, in regard to the Russian threat, he observed, "200 million confront us with wild bluntness in part under the terror of the GPU, partly imbued with a devilish conception." Similarly, in appealing directly to his audience for immediate action, Goebbels explained:

Everyone knows that if we were to lose this war, it would destroy all of us. And this is why the nation and the leadership are now determined to grasp the most radical self-help. . . . One should ask the German nation, from one end to the other; one will only receive the same answer everywhere: the most radical is today just radical, and the most total is just total enough to achieve victory.

Joseph Goebbels also based his motivational appeals upon the reputation of his listeners and used this factor as a force to move them to action. Thus, he told them, "If at the front lines our fighting troops, from the

grenadier to the general field marshal, eat in the same messhall, I believe it is not asking too much if we force everyone at home to be considerate at least in terms of the most fundamental community feelings and rules." In the body of the speech the Reichsminister further contended, "All those who make themselves available for work fulfill therewith a thankful responsibility in regard to the front lines," and he added, when appealing to the men and women who had not been directly involved in war work, "They will not want to refuse to answer this appeal and will not be able to reject it." In the concluding remarks of the speech he added, "The nation is prepared for everything the Fuehrer has ordered, we will follow him."

When the Reichsminister made use of the motivational force of power, he told his listeners in the introduction of the speech, "We Germans are armed against weakness and attack, and blows and misfortunes of the war give us additional strength, strong determination, and a spiritual and battle-like activity which is prepared to overcome all difficulties and obstacles with revolutionary splendor." In the body of the speech he also added, "We must utilize the moment and the hour so that we are protected from further surprises."

Goebbels appealed to the motivational factor of tastes within his auditors by stating, "A two-thousand year old build-up of occidental humanity is in danger," and within the body of the speech he also maintained, "In this battle we have arrived at the realization that the German nation must defend its most sacred possessions here: its families, its wives and children, the beauty and purity of its countryside, its cities and villages, the 2,000 year-old inheritance of its culture and everything that makes life worth living."

In appealing to the sentiments and affections of his audience, Joseph Goebbels cautioned his listeners, "were we to fail in this struggle, we would play out our historic mission." He further warned his audience that like the soldier at the front lines, all of the German people had to show compassion for one another if they were to be successful in their struggle for victory.

The Factor of Style Within the "Basic" Speech.-- As was suggested earlier in this section of this study, Joseph Goebbels seemed to realize that the occasion of the "basic" speech did not lend itself to oratorical display or improvisations. Hence, an examination of the speech indicates that it was prepared and delivered with little embellishment and ornamentation. Rather, Goebbels' choice of words and the language he used were simple and appeared to be readily understood by the audience which consisted of individuals from all social and intellectual levels of the German population. These factors further conveyed the impression that the speaker was prepared to deal realistically with the German military and social situation at the time of Stalingrad.

To integrate himself with the audience, the Reichsminister made use of colloquial expressions and familiar sayings. Thus, he used such common German expressions as, "Wasch mir den Pelz, aber mach mich nicht nass!" ["Wash my fur, but don't get me wet."], "Es ist . . . an der Zeit, den Säumi-gen Beine zu machen," ["The time has come . . . to motivate the slowpokes"], "Im übrigen würden die wenigen . . . bei uns nicht landen," ["In general, the few . . . would not reach first base with us"], ". . . mit dem Führer durch dick und dünn zu gehen," [" . . . to go through thick and thin with the Fuehrer."]

Goebbels also utilized several familiar quotations within the "basic"

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speech. One of these which first appeared as a slogan during the early months of the war was posted on almost every window of the passenger and freight trains. It read, "Räder müssen rollen für den Sieg!" ["Wheels must turn for victory!"]. Another well-known quotation, "Führer befehl, wir folgen. . .," ["Fuehrer command, we shall follow. . ."] which appeared both in a German marching song and was used by the Reichsminister in articles and other speaking occasions was subject to Goebbels' poetic license and appeared in the "basic" speech text as, "Der Führer hat befohlen, wir werden ihm folgen." ["The Fuehrer commanded, we shall follow him."] In addition, the Reichsminister concluded his speech with, "Nun, Volk steh auf und Sturm brich los!" ["Now, nation arise and storm break loose!"], a quotation which was discussed under The Preparation of the "Basic" Speech, within this section.

An examination of the "basic" speech text in its original German version further indicates that Joseph Goebbels made use of two basic figures of speech, the metaphor and the simile. The Reichsminister used metaphors when referring to the Russian military forces by designating them as "the attack of the steppe" three times in the speech. He also referred to these forces as "the attack of the East" and "motorized robot divisions." The Jews were termed by Goebbels "the ferment of decomposition" and "the world pest," while Hitler became "the phalanx of the homeland."

The Reichsminister further employed a number of similes in his "basic" speech while telling his listeners that the German people were "not like the ostrich, who buries his head in the sand in order to avoid seeing danger," nor "like the hypnotized rabbit which stares upon the snake until it is devoured." Rather, he insisted that the desire to volunteer for war

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work "must pass like a river of readiness through the German nation," and added in the conclusion of the speech that "we want to fill our hearts with political passion, which always. . .consumed us like perpetual, burning fire."

When addressing his remarks directly to the audience in the Sportpalast and over the radio facilities and while appealing to them for support of his "total war" measures, Goebbels used the pronoun "we" far more frequently than the "I—you" relationship. Thus, while he used such phrases as, "I speak to you. . ." or "I have told you. . ." only seventeen times within the German text and repeated the phrase, "I ask you. . ." eleven times when asking his audience to respond verbally to his ten questions, the Reichsminister utilized phrases like, "we must act. . ." or "we are prepared. . ." ninety-seven times.

Joseph Goebbels also used enumeration and restatement to describe and emphasize the "crisis of Stalingrad." When describing Germany's priceless possessions, he spoke of "its families, its wives and children, the beauty and purity of its countryside, its cities and villages, the 2,000 year-old inheritance of its culture and everything that makes life worth living." For stylistic purposes and to create the desired emotional response within his listeners he referred to Stalingrad as, "the call of fate of the German nation," "this misfortune," "the oppressive situation," "the heroic sacrifice," "the difficult military situation," "the oppression," "the military oppression", "the fateful problem coming from the East," "the Jewish terror," "the gigantic task," "the world struggle," "the danger," "the acute life threat," "the defensive battle," and "a war without mercy."

Similarly, while heightening the anxiety level of his audience and at-

tempting to evoke a response through fear-arousing appeals, the Reichsminister used such statements as, "We must act, and indeed without delay..." "Were we to fail in this struggle, we would play out our historic mission," "Danger is imminent," "an immediate and acute life-threat exists. . .," "we know. . .what historic task confronts us," ". . .danger exists in the immediate present," ". . .it can and it must end in victory," "200 million confront us. . .," ". . .we must stand with corresponding counter-measures if we do not want to give up the game as lost," "the danger which we face is gigantic," ". . .the danger exists for all of us. . .," "we must. . . accomplish more than we have in the past. . .," ". . .if we were to lose this war, it would destroy us," "if we should be defeated. . .we could count our friends on the fingers of one hand," "the occident is in danger," "a two-thousand year old build-up of occidental humanity is in danger," and "we must utilize the moment and the hour."

Goebbels' Delivery of the "Basic" Speech.--- Reference has been made to some of Goebbels' techniques of delivery within the other chapters of this study. It was suggested by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, for instance, that while delivering the "basic" speech, the Reichsminister shouted "challenges and rhetorical questions at his audience in order to rouse them to roar back at him replies he needed to show Hitler their determination to wage total war,"¹³ and that "he marked his speech by a new style in his delivery, abandoning his usual elegance for a grim urgency of utterance."¹⁴ It was further reported that Goebbels controlled "his voice and tones, crescendos and diminuendos, rhythm and timing, as if

¹³Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 230

¹⁴Ibid.

he were handling a musical instrument."¹⁵

Earlier in this section of this chapter, reference was further made to the fact that the Reichsminister carefully practiced the delivery of his "basic" speech. Thus, it was reported that he carefully read every word and phrase aloud and repeatedly changed the stress within each sentence to improve its effectiveness. According to Curt Riess, the two hour speech with its frequent interruptions and demonstrations on the part of the audience placed such strain upon the voice of the Reichsminister that after the speech had been concluded, "he was so hoarse that he could only whisper. . ."¹⁶

To achieve the desired response from his listeners, Goebbels had prepared beforehand and employed a "yes-response" technique toward the end of the "basic" speech. He introduced this technique by asking his audience, ". . .those who sit in front of me are a representation of the entire German nation from the front lines and the homeland. Is this true? Yes or no?" It culminated in the last of the ten questions:

Do you want, as the National Socialist program prescribes that especially in the war equal rights and equal responsibilities prevail, that the homeland takes the heavy burdens of the war squarely upon its shoulders and that they should be distributed equally among high and low, rich and poor?

I have asked you, you have given me your answer.

An Analysis of Goebbels' Other Representative Speeches

Within the preceding chapters of this study reference was made to the

¹⁵Martha Dodd, Through Embassy Eyes, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1939), p. 149.

¹⁶Riess, op. cit., p. 321.

fact that Goebbels' interest in political oratory was first awakened when he studied Cicero's orations delivered against Cataline in 63 B. C. It was further suggested that from his analysis of these orations, Joseph Goebbels surmized that public speaking was more effective in influencing others than any other form of mass communication. Furthermore, since courses in speech were not offered during his student days, Goebbels concentrated his attention upon extensive reading and practiced writing compositions.

During his high school days he read such works as Caesar, Virgil, the Illiad in its original, the encyclopaedia from beginning to end, and almost everything Goethe ever wrote. As a university student he expanded his readings to include such subject matter as Nietzsche's works, essays on political theory, and Le Bon's About the Psychology of the Masses, which made a profound impression upon him.

Similarly, through repeated practice and diligence as a high school student, Goebbels soon excelled in writing compositions. He continued to explore and expand in this area, too, as a university student not only by studying German Romantic Literature, but also by attempting to write and publish selections of prose and poetry alike. Among his works were Michael, a short novel, The Wanderer, a play, and The Lonesome Guest, also in verse which was never accepted for publication. In addition, Goebbels wrote many political essays which he sent to various German journals and newspapers. Most of these were rejected too, until he became an influential member of the National Socialist movement.

Joseph Goebbels' continued interest in public address seemed to lie at the basis of these activities and although he had only one singular experience in this area as a high school student, he repeatedly spent hours

"alone in his room [where] he would practise (sic) addressing an imaginary audience held spellbound by the magnetic power of his oratory."¹⁷ He never changed his belief that the spoken word was superior to written discourse as a persuasive force, for years later when he had gained the reputation as a forceful speaker, he wrote:

Modern propaganda, too, depends essentially for its effect on the spoken word. Revolutionary movements are not promoted by great writers, but rather by great speakers.¹⁸

Boris von Borresholm reported that throughout his career as a spokesman for the National Socialist movement the preparation and delivery of most of Goebbels' speeches were influenced by his high school and university experiences. To support his contention, von Borresholm observed that in Goebbels' case it was:

Writing as a temporary emergency measure, as long as there is no opportunity for great speeches. But writing in such a manner, that the written could be recited as a speech at any moment and could have an effect on the masses. With everything that Goebbels writes—even later in his lead-articles in the Reich, the spoken word is the goal; the written is only effective, if it can be transformed into spoken discourse without any changes.¹⁹

To learn this kind of writing, Goebbels attended various speaking occasions during his youth. He listened to the priest in the pulpit and noticed that "he employed methods which the writer seldom takes into con-

¹⁷Erich Ebermayer and Hans-Otto Meissner, Evil Genius: The Story of Joseph Goebbels, (London: Allan Wingate Ltd., 1953), p. 18.

¹⁸Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München, Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 18.

¹⁹Boris von Borresholm, Dr. Goebbels Nach Aufzeichnungen Aus Seiner Umgebung, (Berlin, Verlag des "Journal," 1949), p. 33. Translated by the writer.

sideration-- the old methods of the psalmists, the repetition, the parallelism of the component parts."²⁰ He also read various party newspapers and observed that the lead articles of the leading social democratic press in Germany were written like little speeches.²¹

The Preparation of Goebbels' Other Representative Speeches.-- From his observations and studies Joseph Goebbels seemed to evolve a system of preparing his articles and speeches which almost never varied for the duration of his career. As reported by Wilfred von Oven, who worked closely with the chief spokesman of National Socialism in the Propaganda Ministry, almost every article and speech credited to Goebbels passed through the same procedural development before it was released to the public at large.²² Sometimes the formative stages of his articles and speeches would take more than a week. Goebbels himself reported this fact in his personal diary when he wrote on April 8, 1942, that he spent "the evening making a first draft for the Fuehrer's birthday."²³ Hitler's birthday was not until after April 20.

With the first draft of a speech the basic pattern or outline would emerge. Then, after he had thought about the subject matter and in many instances had slept on it for a night, Goebbels would frequently change entire paragraphs, add or delete an idea, substitute a more forceful argument or develop a more striking conclusion the following day. Next, when writing an article, Goebbels would dictate it to his personal steno-

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²von Oven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 127.

²³Lochner, op. cit., p. 165.

grapher, Otte, who in turn would resubmit it in typed form. It would remain with the Reichsminister for one or two days and undergo renewed changes, additions, or deletions. Once again Otte would be required to type up a new draft. On the following day the chief news reporter at the Propaganda Ministry was called in to verify the facts and figures quoted within the article. Sometimes, as Goebbels reported in his diary on May 16, 1942, "the Research Office sent. . .background material on a number of important matters that. . .were. . .of some interest."²⁴ In most instances dictionaries such as Brockhaus, Büchmann, or Duden were consulted. However, when particularly difficult and involved mathematical problems or scientific research findings were needed, research institutes or experts were called upon. A third draft was usually completed by Otte the following weekend and given to Goebbels for final corrections during the two or three day period. Thereupon on Monday, the completed version of the article was given to von Oven, who was responsible for its simultaneous release to all mass media.²⁵

As reported by Wilfred von Oven, Goebbels preferred impromptu speeches but used them very infrequently and finally, as World War II drew to a close only when addressing small groups such as at the reception of soldiers and officers from the front lines or when speaking to his guests on his birthday and to the "old guard" of the party.

When Goebbels delivered an extemporaneous speech, he would develop it in terms of a memorized idea-sequence, frequently developing an idea further than he had initially intended, and would add or delete a thought,

²⁴Ibid., p. 216.

²⁵von Oven, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 53-55.

depending upon the situation. But in every case the Reichsminister would carefully observe the time limit which he had set for himself by repeatedly glancing at his wrist-watch which he always placed next to his outline on the speaker's stand.

With regard to the manuscript speech, Goebbels would follow a rigid schedule of preparation. He usually set aside at least one complete week for the initial composition.

The Arrangement of the Other Speeches.-- As indicated in Section I of this chapter, the organization of Goebbels' speeches followed the traditional pattern of the German high school composition which included an introduction, a development section or body, and a conclusion. The main ideas were divided under the Roman numerals I, II, and III, while additional subdivisions were classified under 1, 2, 3, and a, b, c, depending upon the extent to which Goebbels wanted to break down his ideas.

As in the case of the written compositions, Goebbels insisted upon verification of the facts, statistics, and quotations which he used. Similarly, historical examples, analogies and illustrations were always checked. If verification could not be obtained through the facilities of the Propaganda Ministry, the Reichsminister called upon other ministries or research offices. At the appointed date all such information had to be submitted to Goebbels. He would then proceed to incorporate such material into his speech and thereby familiarize himself with the general arrangement of the speech. Moreover, through repeated editing and by re-reading the manuscript several times, the general pattern as well as large portions of the speech would become firmly entrenched in his mind.²⁶ Once the

²⁶Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 125-126.

speech met the expectations of the Reichsminister copies were sent to Hitler and the Under Secretary of State, Werner Naumann, for criticism.

Although the systematic procedure employed by Goebbels seems to suggest a smoothly functioning operation there were several instances when the Reichsminister's secretaries and aides became involved in hectic and nerve-shattering experiences. In describing one of these occasions, von Oven reported that Goebbels insisted upon making corrections on a speech up to the very last minute. The speech had passed through five drafts and was awaiting Hitler's approval one day prior to the scheduled delivery date. When von Oven called the Fuehrer's headquarters about the speech late at night, he was informed that some additional corrections were being contemplated. Goebbels was expected to speak to the nation at eleven o'clock in the morning. At ten o'clock he asked for the manuscript for the sixth time to make additional changes. Finally, at ten-thirty, Hitler's corrections and additions were given to von Oven, who in turn gave the manuscript to a secretary for the seventh draft. The secretary, who was surrounded by Goebbels, Naumann, and a group of others who were to escort the Reichsminister to the Sportpalast, was under such pressure at the typewriter that she broke down and cried. To meet the emergency, Otte was asked to type the final draft. Goebbels himself pulled every page from the typewriter as soon as it was completed. The last page was ready exactly at eleven o'clock whereupon the Reichsminister raced to the meeting hall with his escort.

Meanwhile, von Oven called the Sportpalast. He was informed that the audience had been waiting for several minutes. He gave orders to start the proceedings. Goebbels' speech was to be presented after a short address by the Secretary of State, Backe, who had been asked to confine his

remarks to fifteen minutes. While Goebbels was being driven to the Sportpalast, von Oven was giving the final corrections to the mass media. At ten minutes after eleven another call came from Hitler's headquarters. He had another change which he insisted was necessary. This correction, too, had to be passed on to the mass media and then von Oven hurried to the Sportpalast. Once he arrived at the meeting hall he observed:

I am relieved to notice as I enter the hall that Backe is still speaking. It is already 11:25. A short prayer to heaven that he may still remember a lot of things to say. I would have preferred to run down the main aisle to the platform upon which the distinguished representatives of the party, state, and Wehrmacht, and among them Goebbels, are seated to the left and right of the speaker's stand. But this cannot be done since the eyes of 20,000 audience members already inquisitively follow the lieutenant, who, during the address of Secretary of State Backe, walked directly towards the speaker's rostrum without embarrassment, mounts the stairs, is looked upon by Goebbels full of expectation, whispers something into his ear, and then sits down on a chair behind him. He gave me the manuscript and I entered the Fuehrer's last corrections on it with a fountain pen. Everything did work out all right after all. Backe still speaks. Even the Minister does not seem displeased. He still is paging through the speech. Two or three times before Backe concludes, he motions me to him and requests that I change this and that which I patiently do even though I am slowly getting fed up.

The speech itself was a huge success.²⁷

Joseph Goebbels also spent considerable time on the aspect of delivery while preparing his speeches. Early in his career as a spokesman for the National Socialist movement he spent many hours practicing in front of a mirror to improve his gestures, body movement, and facial expressions. When he arrived in Berlin as Gauleiter, he "began to use a huge, three-sided mirror. . . before which he could rehearse his speeches."²⁸ His

²⁷Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 127-129.

²⁸Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 73.

landlady was so impressed by these performances that she insisted that "he reminded her. . .of Savonarola- so ascetic, so dedicated."²⁹

Goebbels' Use of Logical, Ethical and Extra-Logical Appeals.-- Within this section Goebbels' use of logical, ethical and extra-logical appeals are discussed in regard to their emergence from the representative speeches. That he was skilled in the application of such appeals has been repeatedly indicated by such remarks as those of Ebermayer and Meissner who reported that already during his Ruhr resistance activities,

He spoke with passionate force, in short driving sentences, backing the emotional appeal by simple realistic argument and illustration. His deep voice resounded with the sincerity of his convictions.³⁰

Similarly, reference was made to Goebbels' quickness of mind and his proficiency in argument in Section I of Chapter II. It was reported that Louis P. Lochner recalled an experience of a German friend who had heard Goebbels argue effectively on behalf on the restoration of the monarchy, the re-creation of the Weimar Republic, the introduction of Communism in the Third Reich, and on behalf of National Socialism at a party. After having listened to the four consecutive speeches, Lochner's friend concluded:

. . . 'I was ready at the end of each speech to join the particular cause Goebbels had just advocated. He had compelling and convincing arguments for each of the four forms of government.'³¹

Joseph Goebbels' apparent ability in argumentative discourse was perhaps first developed while in the company of his friend, Richard Flisges.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 33.

³¹Lochner, op. cit., p. 16.

Goebbels took particular "delight in arguing with Flisges and his friends about Communism. Being far more quick-witted and eloquent than they, he was able to refute their arguments over and over again. . ."³² Moreover, he seemed to enjoy this activity so much that even Rudolf Semmler was able to report more than twenty years later:

In the four months that I have been close to Goebbels I have many times noticed contradictions in his view. To-day, for example, he presents to his staff a point of view, political or philosophic, and skilfully builds up a logical case to support it; a fortnight later he will assert just the opposite with the same conviction and persuasiveness, and denounce as fools those who had taken the original view. I am not certain yet whether he does this to test the effect of his oratory or whether it is just an intellectual whim.³³

In regard to the Reichsminister's use of extra-logical appeals most authorities seem to believe that he was equally effective. However, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel contended that Goebbels "was for the most part incapable of true emotions," and insisted that "his nature did not extend beyond mere emotionalism."³⁴ These authors described an incident which, according to their point of view, supported their contention by writing that Goebbels, who was scheduled to deliver a funeral oration during the formative years of the party, took an assistant along on the ride to the grave yard in order to discuss some editorial problems concerning the party newspaper. On the way to the cemetery, Manvell and Fraenkel wrote,

Goebbels explained certain. . .points that were wrong and demanded improvements. Then he went into typographical

³²Ebermayer and Meissner, op. cit., p. 42.

³³Semmler, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

³⁴Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 53.

details. His instructions continued in a whisper as he and Berger [his assistant] walked past the columns of Storm Troopers on parade for the funeral. Then, the open grave before him, he launched into an apparently emotional oration on behalf of the dead comrade. The moment they were back in the car, Goebbels resumed his typographical discussion like an actor who had just come off the stage. He even went so far as to admit he had forgotten who the man was whose virtues he had extolled.³⁵

To suggest the frequency with which Goebbels spoke and appendix has been added to this study which covers the period from January 1, 1932 to May 1, 1933. In addition, several excerpts of speeches were cited in Section III of Chapter I, which seem to represent best the variety and kinds of addresses which Goebbels delivered throughout his career. Among them was one entitled, "Was ist Politik?" [What is Politics?], delivered on October 5, 1927, at the commencement ceremony of the High School for Politics for the District of Greater Berlin. With this particular speech Goebbels made one of the few attempts in his career to address himself to an audience made up of the more intellectual citizens of Berlin. To impress the fact upon his listeners that the National Socialists and their chief spokesman were capable of resolving significant social problems, Goebbels embarked upon a lengthy philosophic discussion of the relationship of the individual to the nation and to humanity. Since his attempt to deliver this address on a higher intellectual level was made "with no regard for. . . [an] . . . immediate propaganda effect,"³⁶ it was devoid of both logical argument and extra-logical appeals. Instead, the speaker relied almost exclusively upon expository material, but failed to define his terms or clarify his ideas. Goebbels' use of abstract terms and his lack

³⁵Ibid., p. 88.

³⁶Riess, op. cit., p. 66.

of clarity was perhaps best illustrated in the speech when he said:

The individual develops into a nation. The nation makes up a component part of humanity. Humanity is not a thing in itself and individualism is not a thing in itself.

The thing in itself is the nation.

Individualism is only worth while in that it develops and supports the nation. The leaf is not an end in itself, it is the means to the end and as such it serves the real end, the tree.

While reacting to this particular speech, Curt Riess observed:

For a man of Goebbels' talents it was an amazingly dreary and muddled dissertation. He never explained why the nation was the thing-in-itself- das Ding an sich, a phrase he had borrowed from Immanuel Kant- or why the individual was not, and the German philosopher would have turned in his grave if he had been obliged to listen to such 'philosophy.'³⁷

Similar to the speech cited above, Goebbels' address, "Erkenntnis und Propaganda," ["Perception and Propaganda"] delivered on January 9, 1928, was made up of expository material. In this instance the speaker was primarily intent upon explaining to his audience that propaganda, as he perceived it, was essentially an art. In contrast to his talk on "Politics," however, the spokesman for National Socialism seemed to have been more successful in clarifying his ideas by use of restatements and examples. Illustrative of his use of examples was Goebbels' attempt to establish the similarity of the speaker to the politician in the minds of his listeners when he said:

. . . Look at our own times. Was Mussolini a scribbler or was he rather a great speaker? When Lenin returned from Zurich to St. Petersburg, did he drive from the train station to his study and write a book or did he not speak in front of thousands instead? Nothing else has formed Fascism and Bolshevism but the great speaker, the great creator of the word! There is no difference

³⁷Ibid., p. 67.

between the speaker and the politician. . .

To clarify his point of view, Goebbels also made use of restatements, analogies, and definitions. When using a definition, for instance, he stated:

If someone says to me today, 'You are a demagogue', I answer, 'demagoguery in the true sense of the word is nothing but the ability to convey that to the broad masses which I intend to say.'

Yet, despite his efforts to explain his theories of propaganda, Goebbels failed to define clearly the term "propaganda" itself, other than to say:

It does not matter, if I have perceived something as being so that it is correct in theory, but rather it is more important that I locate people who are prepared to fight with me for that which is perceived as the correct Weltanschauung. This winning, this bartering for something that I have perceived as being correct, this one calls propaganda.

More illustrative of Goebbels' use of logical reasoning was his speech entitled, "Für den Frieden der Welt," ["For Peace in the World"]. This particular address was delivered on February 28, 1934, to the representatives of the international press upon whom Goebbels wanted to impress the fact that Germany had only peaceful intentions at heart. He therefore made use of illustrations, causal arguments, and examples. To illustrate the differences among the various European nations, Goebbels observed that "today Europe is still threatened by those misunderstandings which developed from the unfortunate end of the war almost fifteen years ago and partly lie upon deep, fateful experiences. . . ." Furthermore, when speaking of the press representatives and their responsibility to report facts accurately and objectively, he made use of a causal argument by stating:

Here a word more or less, a thoughtless sentence, perhaps written down in an hour of passion, can conjure up a bitter misfortune and the sole carriers of the burden are the nations themselves.

Among the many examples which he employed within the speech, Goebbels explained Germany's orientation to world problems in regard to the other countries by observing:

Whenever we got into dispute with. . .[the world]. . .we advocated our new ideals with warmth and passion, without being disrespectful to that world of thought which we overcame in Germany. . .

Moreover, as indicated by the choice of language and the arguments advanced, the spokesman for National Socialism had made a serious effort to improve world opinion in respect to Germany. In this particular speech Goebbels refrained from employing satirical remarks, being critical of other nations, or utilizing threats for which he was noted on other occasions. Instead he concluded his address by reminding his listeners:

If you, gentlemen, do not want to forsake this honest attempt, [Germany's desire to maintain peace], then you are providing the country a service which extends its heartfelt hospitality, but also to that country which sent you to us in order to get to know through you the real, everlasting Germany. You therewith provide an unmeasurable service to the future, better Europe.

A representative example of Goebbels' speeches which were primarily made up of logical reasoning and evidence was his speech, "Das kommende Europa," ["The Coming Europe"], delivered to a group of Czech educators and journalists on September 11, 1940. Since the speaker attempted to predict the future of European life under German supervision he made little use of extra-logical appeals in his address. Instead, he chose to employ expository material, a condition argument, a series of examples, assertions, and analogies. Thus, when Goebbels attempted to convey to his listeners that the planned reorganization of Europe would be achieved by peaceful means, he argued:

If, as German-thinking people we have no intent to harm

the economic, cultural, or social peculiarities of the Bavarian or Saxon peoples-- then we must also have little intent in harming the economic, cultural, or social peculiarities of, let's say, the Czech nation.

When using an example to support his contention that the world was rapidly advancing technologically, the speaker pointed out:

Today the train is no longer the most modern means of transportation. It has been replaced by the plane in the meantime. The distance which we covered with the train in twelve hours in the past, today is spanned with the modern plane in one half or one hour. . .

Goebbels' use of assertions was indicated by such an unsupported statement as, "I am convinced that in fifty years one will not think any longer in terms of countries. . ." When reasoning by analogy the speaker declared:

Our German Reich experienced a similar process about two hundred years ago. It was divided in as many parts, bigger and smaller, as is the case in Europe today. This 'little state system' was bearable only as long as the technical aids, especially the means of transportation were not so far developed that the move from one small nation to another would require only a short period of time. . .

In addition, Goebbels demonstrated that he possessed a two-valued orientation when he told his listeners that "we must either meet each other as friends or enemies," and, "we can give a hand to a friend and really work loyally together with him; we can also battle with an enemy till annihilation." The speaker's attempt to use some ethical appeals within this speech was further evident when he said:

. . .I read a whole series of Czech books, saw a whole series of Czech films, received a whole series of Czech cultural works, and I was really sorry that I could not bring the results of your cultural life in greater dimensions to the attention of the German people.

Representative of Goebbels' more persuasive speeches was one entitled, "Danzig vor der Entscheidung," ["Danzig before the Decision"], delivered

on June 17, 1939. In his address to the population of the free city, Goebbels attempted to persuade the people of Danzig to demand that they should fall under the jurisdiction of the German government by utilizing both logical and extra-logical appeals. An analysis of the speech further indicates that it was similar to the "basic" speech in many respects although it was considerably shorter. To influence his listeners, Goebbels used such logical appeals as analogies, examples, and causal arguments. While speaking of the similar interests of the German people and the population of Danzig, Goebbels said:

You people of Danzig speak the German language as we do in the Reich. You belong to the same race and nationality. You are united with us in a great fateful unity; for these reasons you want to return home to the Reich. . .

When discussing the desire of the German people to see Danzig returned to the Reich, Goebbels explained:

That which we desired in the Reich is as clear as that which you desire. The Fuehrer expressed it in his last Reichstag speech unmistakably when he said, 'Danzig is a German city and wants to return to Germany.' One ought to be able to assume the world should have understood this. . .

But Goebbels seemed to rely primarily upon causal arguments in his "Danzig" speech as is demonstrated by the following three excerpts:

The Polish chauvinists explain they want to beat us Germans in the coming battle in Berlin to the ground. . . . In order to be beaten to the ground, there must be two parties, one who does the beating, and the other who lets himself be beaten. . . . Therefore, we in the Reich do not take the Polish bragging seriously as you probably do not either. . .

The National Socialist Reich is not weak, it is strong. It is not unconscious, rather it presently possesses the most impressive Wehrmacht in the world. . . . Therefore, we consider the talking in Warsaw and London as a lot of verbal battles, which are designed to hide the lack of power and determination by a profuse use of words. . .

. . .And the world ought to know from previous experience that the Fuehrer does not use empty words. . . Therefore, you men and women of Danzig may look confidently into the future. . .

Within the "Danzig" speech, Goebbels also made use of some refutation.

Thus, in one instance he employed a reductio ad absurdum argument by stating:

You have the misfortune that your beautiful German city lies at the mouth of the Weichsel and according to the theories of Warsaw, cities which are located at the mouths of rivers always belong to the countries through which these rivers flow. This is why, for example, Rotterdam belongs to Germany since it lies at the mouth of the Rhine and since the Rhine is a German river. . . .

Goebbels' use of extra-logical appeals included emotional appeals, motivational appeals, and ethical appeals. When he appealed to the emotions of his audience he said:

With the spontaneous enthusiasm which you display for me as a representative of Hitler, you demonstrate the blood-relationship of the people of Danzig with our great German Reich, with our German homeland, but also demonstrate the determination to remain loyal to the fatherland, no matter what may happen.

The speaker further appealed to the desire for self-preservation on the part of the people of Danzig by declaring that "the Polish political intriguers recently demanded East Prussia and Silesia from Germany," and he further confided to his listeners, "Poland's future border, according to them, shall become the Oder." He also attempted to improve his own credibility and ethical responsibility by such remarks as, "This is not the first time that I stand in front of you, . . ." and, "I have come to strengthen you in your determination and now you have strengthened me."

After the party's rise to power and throughout World War II, Joseph Goebbels became noted for his annual Christmas speeches and his funeral

orations. In most instances these speeches were based almost exclusively upon emotional appeals and were intended to improve the morale of the German people as well as to increase their determination to continue the war. In general, Goebbels reviewed the events of the preceding months and attempted to instill confidence in his listeners by predicting a brighter future in his Christmas speeches. Moreover, a considerable portion of such speeches was made up of expository material, illustrations, and vivid descriptive passages. Usually Goebbels delivered very short speeches on such occasions and ended them with stirring conclusions.

A representative example of these Christmas speeches was the one delivered in 1941, in which the speaker told his audience:

I . . . want to speak very little about politics. . .
I would rather speak of the ideas and feelings which
motivate us and are with us on this Christmas Eve.
It shall be a half hour of reflection. . .

In illustrating the love which the German people possessed for their country, Goebbels told his audience, "All eyes are directed upon the homeland today. How beautiful it is," and he added, "All those, who, responding to their duty had to leave would like to find it upon their return as they left it."

The emotional overtones of his Christmas speeches and the vivid descriptions which he employed are perhaps best demonstrated in the following excerpt of his speech on Christmas Eve in 1941:

There probably is no one among us who does not direct his glances heaven-ward; the war has not only taught us to be strong in regard to our enemies, but also to be humble in respect to our fate and its divine guide. We should therefore thank the Almighty for the proud victories which he has presented to us. We shall continue to fight until victory is ours.

Now our Christmas hour is ended. Our soldiers

sit together and chat about the homeland; here at home one thinks of them and speaks only with them in the spirit. . .

Goebbels added a moving conclusion to his speech when he told his listeners:

I send you greetings from a full heart. Just as we used to sing about peace on earth³⁸ in our songs faithfully in the past, the time has now come to fight and work just as faithfully for it. For peace through victory! That shall be our slogan.

Similarly, Goebbels usually played upon the emotions of his audience when delivering his funeral orations. But he also frequently moved his listeners to anger and attempted to establish his own ethical responsibility as was the case in his speech, "In vorderster Reihe," ["In the Front Row"], which was delivered at Elberfelde on June 18, 1943. Thus, in an attempt to arouse the anger and hatred of his audience, Goebbels asserted:

Recently an official spokesman of the British broadcasting facilities said in public cynically: 'One catches oneself time and again that one is happy if men, women, and children are forced to suffer so terribly.' It is like a direct invitation to murder German women and children, if even prior to this a British news agency writes: 'In the name of heaven, start to clean up with the German civilian population since it has been proved that this is the only way to break their morale.' Even the Church of England explained just recently to the question: 'We cannot sympathize with the movement to stop the air attacks of the cities because civilians are killed. We are all alike in regard to the bombs. The bombs do not make distinctions among men, women, and children. . .'

To integrate himself with the audience and to gain their confidence the chief spokesman for National Socialism explained to his audience:

It is a sad and moving experience which calls me back to this city and my young manhood days today. I stand here as a representative of the Fuehrer and the entire German people to take leave from the

³⁸Italics mine.

dead of Wuppertal, who lie as a sacrifice on the field of ruins of the British air terror. . .

Untold great and personal memories unite me with this city, its population and the population of the entire Rhineland-Westphalia province. I speak to them as a son of the land blessed in peace and praised in song, who, wherever his political assignments may have taken him, never severed his close ties which unite him with his homeland. I have lived and worked many years among its populace. . .

Goebbels' Style and Delivery in Other Representative Speeches.-- Very early in his career as a spokesman for National Socialism, Joseph Goebbels recognized the importance of cultivating his style and delivery for the public speaking situation. Through hours of practice at home in Rheydt, and by speaking enumerable times during the Ruhr resistance movement, Goebbels rapidly developed his techniques of style and delivery. He continued to improve them as spokesman for the People's Freedom party and the National Socialist party and was soon considered to be the most effective and polished speaker in Germany.

There were many opportunities during his career in which Goebbels could demonstrate his talents in these areas to his listeners. Observers like Martha Dodd, who heard him speak on many occasions noted that in each situation, "the words. . .[were]. . .clear and formed, controlled. . .," and further that he never permitted "his voice to go into a screaming hysteria or break into the sharp and hideous staccatos of his Leader."³⁹ Similarly, Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel reported that "he gave everything he had, physically and vocally, to rouse emotion in his audience," and they added that "he pushed his fine, sonorous voice to its limits. . ."⁴⁰ Moreover, Curt Riess declared that his experiences as

³⁹Dodd, op. cit., p. 149.

⁴⁰Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 74.

Gauleiter of Berlin had contributed significantly to Goebbels' style and delivery in speaking, for he wrote:

The stream of his speech flowed smoothly and his voice, formerly brittle and without warmth, had acquired new nuances and could express anything he wanted; contempt, rage, indignation, pain and sadness.⁴¹

Throughout most of his career Goebbels' choice of language was determined by a basic tenet which he had stated over and over again. For example, in his book, Kampf um Berlin, [Battle for Berlin], he observed that, "if one wants to appeal to millions of people then this can only be done by use of a language which can be understood by millions of people."⁴² A necessary corollary was Goebbels' insistence upon clarity and simplicity of expression. In discussing these two factors, Wilfred von Oven wrote:

'Propaganda must be simple,' is the main maxim of his propaganda lesson, if one wants to use that expression. 'Repetition achieves miracles,' is a second. An involved political process is reduced by him to the simplest formula imaginable so that it makes sense to the intellect of the average person. . .⁴³

While describing the source from which Goebbels had obtained these maxims, von Oven further noted:

His teacher, in this always effective method, is without doubt the Catholic Church. He applied the system of the Rosary, with which the son of the orthodox family Goebbels was raised by the spiritual teachers in his youth with masterful success later in the area of political propaganda.⁴⁴

⁴¹Riess, op. cit., p. 55.

⁴²Joseph Goebbels, Kampf um Berlin, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1934), p. 43. Translated by the writer.

⁴³von Oven, op. cit., p. 247.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 247-248.

Joseph Goebbels himself seemed to recognize a relationship between his education as a youth under the supervision of the Catholic Church and the application of his principles of propaganda. Thus, he once confided to his aides in the Propaganda Ministry:

'I thank two fortunate circumstances for my political success. One, that I come from a small-town worker's family, and secondly that I grew up under the strict discipline of the Catholic Church. Both of these circumstances provided me with a deep insight into the psychological makeup of the people and the art to make them servicable to a higher cause. The great strength of the Catholic Church is that it does not continuously confuse and makes its little sheep uncertain with new theses and problems, but that it hammers into them a few and unalterable fundamental principles with the monotony of the Rosary.

Involved spiritual and methaphysical problems such as the Trinity or the Immaculate Conception are decided by a chosen few, and if they are perceived as being true, are reduced to a very simple formula which is understood by everyone, which is burnt into the heart of everyone as a dogma. Therewith the Catholic Church realizes an absolute and unshakable belief among its followers which then takes the place of doubt and criticism among the masses.

.

Because even the garments and the symbols, the songs and prayers, all the outward factors of the church ceremony are anchored so deeply in the conscience of the people they have become the sole property of each individual. With new methods one can produce temporary attractions. With the traditional methods, however, one wins a people and forms it into a strong, close unity.⁴⁵

Joseph Goebbels' concern with matters of style and delivery even extended to the radio upon which a great many of his speeches were heard once the National Socialist party had won control of the German nation. Particularly during World War II, he made every effort to establish and sustain the confidence of the people by speaking "in the relaxed, easy

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 207-208.

manner of the trained professional, his beautiful voice pronouncing with assurance every word and phrase of his carefully composed script."⁴⁶ A representative example of this kind of speaking was Goebbels' speech, "Hitler über Deutschland," ["Hitler over Germany"], a radio speech which introduced the Fuehrer to the people of Königsberg and the entire nation on March 4, 1933. In this particular address, which was void of logical reasoning and evidence, Goebbels attempted to set the mood and spirit of the festive occasion by use of a great number of figures of speech, familiar sayings, an enumeration of vivid imagery, by emotional connotations, and by restatements which led up to the climax of the speech. Thus, Goebbels made use of metaphors when he identified Hitler as "the caller in the German night," and "the waker of German conscience." He referred to President Hindenburg as "the savior of East Prussia," and "the victor of Tannenberg." He further employed such phrases as "bells of iron," "fires of freedom," "oceans of people," "fires of joy," and described the bells ringing across the country as "steel-like voices." Goebbels struck a familiar note in the minds of his audience by including the familiar phrase of the German national anthem when he said:

East Prussia's bells are ringing strong. From the Maas to the Memel, from the Etsch to the Belt,⁴⁷
Germany is now aglow with fires of freedom.

He also made use of vivid imagery and emotional connotations by stating:

East Prussia! German land, where acres were
ploughed and seeded since time immemorial through
farmers' diligence, whose forests were planted by
German settlers, old cultural German land, where
every furrow, every path, every stone, every house,

⁴⁶Manvell and Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 180.

⁴⁷Italics mine.

every church, and every castle testify to German daring and German work. . .

The speaker's appeals to the emotions of his audience which were presented through the use of figures of speech seem best exemplified by the following excerpt in which Goebbels said:

The period of brutal arbitrariness against everyone in Germany who had a German thought has now passed on. The great old man from the Wilhelmstrasse, the savior of East Prussia, the General Fieldmarshal of the war, the victor of Tannenberg, the Reichspresident Hindenburg has extended his hand to the unknown corporal of the World War, his comrade in a battle campaign, Adolf Hitler, and has given the highest responsibility in the state to him. The old and the young Germany once again are united. Full of reverence and deeply moved we transmit from here in this hour our greetings and thanks to the great old soldier of the great war. We call, and all of East Prussia, all of Germany joins in this call: Reichspresident Hindenburg, General Fieldmarshal, victor of Tannenberg, your people raise their hands solemnly to you and greet you on this day of the awakening nation. . .

Goebbels' use of restatements which led to the climax of the speech were evident when he stated:

Therefore, the bells ring throughout all of East Prussia in this hour of festivity. Therefore, their thundering sounds storm across Germany. Therefore, the flags flap everywhere in the wind, therefore, the houses in the cities and the farms in the villages are decorated with flowers and garlands. Therefore, the endless brown columns carry the burning torches through the evening. Therefore, they light up the fires of joy on the mountains, hold hands around the flaming pieces of wood and sing into the night: Servitude has an end. . .

Towards the end of World War II, Goebbels recorded all of his speeches on tape prior to their actual release. By this means, Wilfred von Oven observed, the Reichsminister had an opportunity to listen to them repeatedly and evaluate his delivery. In some instances he would interrupt the tape recording of the speeches which did not meet his standards of perfection. Whenever he heard a hesitation in the flow of his speech,

when the stress of a word or his vocal emphasis failed to create the desired effect, or when his voice seemed a little hoarse or uncertain, he would insist upon doing that particular part of the speech over again. Then skillful technicians would "splice the tape together with such precision that even a trained ear. . .[could]. . .not discover the interruption."⁴⁸

Joseph Goebbels, however, also seemed to recognize the inherent danger in relying solely upon this technique. Thus, when Wilfred von Oven once called his attention to a little mistake which seemed to have been overlooked, Goebbels told him:

'You know, a speech which does not possess even the slightest mistake is like a face, which because of its symmetry becomes monotonous, or like a gentleman, who is dressed so faultlessly that his correctness creates suspicion by itself. We can, therefore, let the little mistake remain.'⁴⁹

Wilfred von Oven also observed Goebbels at the recording sessions so frequently that he was able to give a detailed account of the gestures which the Reichsminister used. Thus, he wrote:

When the Minister spoke his speech on tape, I carefully observed him. In spite of the fact that he has no other audience other than the radio technicians and I, he underlines his words with strong gestures by using his right hand, while his left is busy with turning the pages.

They are the same gestures which he uses as a public speaker, only, as it were, more restrained, plastic, full of strength, and elegant. When counting up arguments or questions of accusation, he knocks hard with his knuckle upon the desk which is almost painful for him (a gesture which is toned down in the studio to such an extent that it does not produce a bothersome effect). When involved in tricky illustrations he raises his right hand with fingers spread apart and turns it back and forth. When involved in argumen-

⁴⁸von Oven, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 198.

⁴⁹Ibid.

tation which leads like a path through a maze and suddenly reveals the goal, he stabs repeatedly into the air with his index finger.

All these gestures are so well known to me that I could plug my ears and could still tell pretty well which words he has just used.⁵⁰

SUMMARY

Joseph Goebbels delivered his "basic" speech at the height of his career and at that moment when Germany's future hung in a precarious balance during World War II. The Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda was well aware of the fact that the determination of the German people and their willingness to wage a "total war" in the succeeding weeks and months of 1943 would determine the future course of the Third Reich. Consequently, Goebbels utilized every means at his disposal to implement the total war program. He seemed to believe that he could make the greatest contribution to this cause by employing those skills which had been instrumental in determining the success of his own career. He attempted to influence and move the German people to action through the spoken word. He staked everything on the "basic" speech including the future of his own career.

Some Observations Concerning the "Basic" Speech.-- In Section I of this chapter it was pointed out that Goebbels followed a systematic procedure in the preparation and delivery of his "basic" speech much as he did when he wrote articles for publication. Eighteen days prior to its delivery he began to assemble and organize the material. During the following days a series of written drafts were assembled, edited, and rewritten

⁵⁰Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 203-204.

and although other authorities and institutions were called upon to verify and check considerable portions of the speech, Goebbels himself was responsible for its composition. The Reichsminister divided the "basic" speech into the traditional divisions of an introduction, a body, and a conclusion with additional subdivisions. For the title and concluding statement of the address he chose a phrase which he had employed on previous occasions. The introduction of the speech contained reference remarks, rhetorical questions, and common-bond statements designed to integrate the speaker with the audience while the remainder of the address was composed of expository material, logical reasoning and evidence, as well as extra-logical appeals. Goebbels also included a "yes-response" technique within the speech by means of asking his audience to respond to ten questions which he asked towards the end of the conclusion.

An analysis of the "basic" speech seems to suggest that the Reichsminister used expository material primarily to explain the total war measures to his listeners. When he employed logical reasoning and evidence it was to justify the action of the government in the past, as well as to demonstrate the need for a greater effort on the part of the people in the future. He also engaged in refutation in an attempt to discredit the enemies and the critical citizens of Germany. To motivate his listeners to action, Goebbels included extra-logical appeals, assertions and the "yes-response" technique in the "basic" speech.

Most of Goebbels' logical appeals appeared in the first half of the speech. The forms of reasoning which he used were: (1) cause-to-effect, effect-to-cause, (3) analogy, and (4) example. The existence of a greater number of causal arguments seems to indicate the Reichsminister's desire

to demonstrate to his audience that there was a logical relationship between the military and social events of the time and the effect which they produced or required in the immediate future. The evidence which Goebbels used to support his contentions was made up of statistics, examples and illustrations.

In contrast to the forms of logical reasoning and evidence, the extra-logical appeals generally appeared within the second half of the "basic" speech. Many of these were indirect appeals which consisted of ethical statements, emotional and motivational appeals. While Goebbels' ethical statements were designed to show his listeners that he was an honest and responsible speaker, his emotional appeals were intended to disarm his audience, to create a desirable mood among his auditors, to make them more favorably disposed towards his pleas, and to energize the audience's support for his proposals. The Reichsminister's motivational appeals, as defined in Section I of this chapter, were readily discernible in the "basic" speech and consisted of appeals to the listener's self-preservation, reputation, power, tastes, sentiments, and affections.

Joseph Goebbels devoted considerable time to the aspects of style and delivery during the preparatory stages of the "basic" speech. Thus, he not only practiced the speech aloud, observing his facial expressions, bodily movements, and gestures, but also repeatedly changed the words and phrases to improve their effectiveness. In keeping with the seriousness and urgency of the occasion, the style of the "basic" speech was simple with little ornamentation and embellishment. To insure that he was understood by all of his listeners, Goebbels used simple language, colloquial expressions, familiar sayings, quotations, metaphors, and similes. In order to add

clarity of expression to his ideas he employed enumerations and restatements. It was further reported that after the speech had been concluded, the Reichsminister was so hoarse that he could only whisper.

Joseph Goebbels had drawn upon twenty years of experience to deliver what is considered to be the most successful speech of his career. While the introduction served to gain the attention of his audience, the climactic development of the "basic" speech, interspersed with logical and extra-logical appeals, succeeded in holding their interest. The simplicity of the language and style, as well as the frequent enumerations and restatements used were instrumental in making the speech understood as it was intended. Moreover, Goebbels status and position in the National Socialist hierarchy at the time the speech was delivered, his use of statements designed to demonstrate his honesty and ethical responsibility, and the apparent consistency of his reasoning and evidence increased the credibility of the speech. Furthermore, the Reichsminister's employment of logical and extra-logical appeals succeeded in strengthening the relationship between the "basic" speech and the audience's needs and wants. By means of expository material, assertions, refutation, and motivational appeals, Goebbels linked the behavior of his listeners which he recommended in the speech with their scheme of personal values. To insure an immediate and overt response from the audience throughout Germany, the Reichsminister had the listeners in the Sportpalast engage in the speaking situation by affirmatively answering his ten questions. Thus, in terms of its persuasiveness, the "basic" speech had been most effective.

Some Observations Concerning Goebbels' Other Speeches.-- Throughout his career as the chief spokesman for the National Socialist movement, Joseph Goebbels seemed to prefer manuscript speeches on important occasions.

Although some evidence has been cited which suggests that he occasionally delivered impromptu and extemporaneous speeches, all of his significant public addresses appeared to have been first prepared and organized as written compositions. In their development such speeches bore a striking resemblance to Goebbels' written essays and articles. Moreover, in almost every instance their preparation and arrangement followed a consistent pattern from which the Reichsminister seldom varied. First an outline would be constructed which was divided into three main sections, an introduction, a body, and a conclusion, with as many subdivisions as were deemed necessary. Next, a series of drafts were made which underwent continuous and extensive revisions. Then all material to be cited as evidence within a speech was subject to close scrutiny on the part of various experts and authorities. At the same time, the Reichsminister began to assimilate as much of the sequence of the speech as possible. He also devoted considerable attention to the stylistic aspects of the speech. He would also practice its delivery and utilize multi-colored pencils to designate important words, phrases, and sentences. Finally, when the completed and last draft was at his disposal, Goebbels would continue to edit and rehearse his speech until he confronted his audience.

In Section II of this chapter a number of representative examples were cited which indicated that the Reichsminister's speeches varied in purpose and kind. On the basis of this writer's evaluation it seems permissible to group them into the arbitrary categories of: (1) expository, (2) persuasive, and (3) ceremonial and (4) eulogistic speeches. Thus, although in almost every instance Goebbels' primary objective was to affect his audiences favorably, his speech on "Politics," for example, primarily con-

sisted of expository material and was perhaps the least influential of his career. His address on "Perception and Propaganda" was very similar in that it was also largely made up of expository material. However, it appeared to be more influential because Goebbels employed restatements, analogies, and definitions to clarify his ideas.

Joseph Goebbels' speeches entitled, "For Peace in the World," "The Coming Europe," and especially "Danzig before the Decision," were more persuasive in nature. The first two of these speeches were illustrative of that group of addresses in which the Reichsminister relied upon reasoning and evidence by utilizing illustrations, causal arguments, examples, expository material, and a condition argument. In his speech, "Danzig before the Decision," Goebbels attempted to persuade the population of the free city to demand that they should be subject to German jurisdiction. In this instance the speaker not only employed such forms of reasoning and evidence as analogies, examples, causal arguments, and a reductio ad absurdum argument, but also made use of ethical, emotional, and motivational appeals.

Among the group of ceremonial and eulogistic addresses, Goebbels' speeches entitled, "Christmas 1941," "In the Front Row," and "Hitler over Germany," were cited as representative examples. The first of these was one of a series of annual speeches which were based almost exclusively on emotional appeals and usually included some expository material, illustrations, and vivid descriptive passages. The Reichsminister's speech, "In the Front Row," was cited as an example of the many funeral orations which he delivered throughout his career. In this particular speech, Goebbels attempted to arouse the anger and hatred of his audience by playing upon

its emotions. At the same time he also tried to establish his own ethical responsibility. His speech entitled, "Hitler over Germany," was perhaps the best example of his use of style and emotional appeals to influence his listeners. On this occasion, while introducing Hitler to the German nation in 1933, Goebbels attempted to capture the spirit of the event by using a great number of figures of speech, familiar sayings, enumeration of vivid imagery, emotional connotations, and repeated restatements which led up to the climax of the speech.

Some Generalizations Concerning Goebbels' Speaking Skills.--- In light of the material presented in this chapter a number of generalizations seem to emerge as indicated below:

1. There was a relationship between Goebbels' education, religious training, and proficiency as a public speaker. As a high school student he not only studied the orations of Cicero delivered against Cataline, but also practiced writing compositions in which he soon excelled. During his student days Goebbels also read extensively, studied various articles written by the leading social-democratic press, wrote a novel and two dramas, as well as a good many articles himself, and practiced addressing imaginary audiences in his home. Moreover, he listened to the priest in the pulpit, learned to value the discipline of the church, to apply such factors as simplification and repetition in the speaking situation, and to transpose the ritualistic ceremonies of the Catholic Church to his public speaking occasions.

2. Goebbels applied both logical reasoning and evidence and extra-logical appeals to advantage. As discussed earlier in this summary section, the chief spokesman for the National Socialist movement delivered speeches

which ranged from some that were composed exclusively of expository material to those consisting primarily of emotional appeals. Thus, depending upon the occasion and his intent, Goebbels learned to apply the logical forms of reasoning and evidence and the extra-logical appeals when they appeared to best serve his cause. Furthermore, the frequent exercises in argumentative discourse in which he engaged with his friend, Richard Flisges, and which were alluded to twenty years later by Rudolf Semmler, were to a large extent responsible for the proficiency which Goebbels exhibited in these areas.

3. Goebbels was most effective when he addressed himself to the low-income groups of German society. As was suggested earlier in this chapter his attempts at delivering "philosophic" disputations only seemed to demonstrate his inability to clearly present and interpret intellectual concepts. Although Goebbels did address more intellectual audiences on several occasions, particularly towards the end of his career, the overwhelming majority of his speeches were directed at the low-income groups of the German nation.

4. Goebbels was both a prolific writer and speaker. Repeated reference has been made to the voluminous collections of articles and speeches which he composed during his lifetime. An Appendix covering a fifteen months period during which Goebbels campaigned for the National Socialist party has been added to this study to indicate the frequency of his public speaking appearances. Although he did deliver impromptu and extemporaneous addresses on several occasions, he primarily relied upon manuscript speeches for the important speaking occasions. Furthermore, even though he had a staff of secretaries and aides once he became the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Goebbels always supervised the initial prep-

arations and wrote his speeches himself. Since he believed that the spoken word was the most effective means of influencing others, even his written compositions were meant to be read aloud.

5. Goebbels always strove for perfection. Both in his personal life and as a public figure, he always attempted to present the image of a well-organized and orderly individual. Similarly, the preparations and delivery of his speeches reflected this attempt. All of his important speeches followed the same basic pattern of preparation. They were developed systematically, passed through a series of drafts, and were constantly checked for errors ranging from faulty evidence to awkward stylistic expressions. Goebbels also spent hours practicing his speeches in front of large mirrors and even rigidly adhered to the time limits whenever possible, which he had set for himself.

6. Goebbels was a traditionalist. He once told Wilfred von Oven in regard to the public speaking situation that new methods can produce temporary attractions, while traditional methods win a people and thereby forms it into a strong, close unity. Consequently, he always developed his speeches in terms of the traditional divisions of an introduction, body, and conclusion. Similarly, most of his persuasive speeches, such as his "basic" speech, followed the same pattern and were developed in the climactic order.

But perhaps most important of all, the chief spokesman for the National Socialist movement put into practice what he had learned early in his life when he had begun his study of public address by reading and analyzing Cicero's orations delivered against Cataline in 63 B.C.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The terms "propaganda" and "persuasion" have been variously defined by writers and students in the field of speech and related areas. Among the contemporary authors, Wayne C. Minnick declares in his book, The Art of Persuasion, that

Some definitions of persuasion, by placing too much emphasis on motives, ignore or slight important determinants of behavior. Many definitions stress impulsive, irrational action; accordingly, they treat persuasion and propaganda as the same thing. In reality there is a great difference. Propaganda is the process of inducing people to act without reflection. ... Persuasion...is discourse, written or oral, that is designed to win belief or stimulate action by employing all the factors that determine human behavior.¹

In the introductory remarks it was stated that the objective of this study is to discover the forces which influenced Joseph Goebbels' speechmaking as the chief spokesman of National Socialism, to determine the methods which he employed in the speaking situation, and to evaluate his influence and effect upon the audiences to which he addressed himself. Since an attempt has been made in previous chapters to demonstrate that Goebbels did "induce people to act without reflection," as well as by employing many "of the factors that determine human behavior," this chapter is developed in light of Minnick's definitions cited above.

In their book, Persuasion: A Means of Social Control, Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell advise the student of persuasion that "in any given case, the persuader's analysis of his purpose, audience,

¹
Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 33.

occasion and himself must determine the methods of persuasion."² In the case of Joseph Goebbels it would therefore seem desirable to follow a similar pattern in order to discover the principles and methods of propaganda and persuasion which he utilized during his career as a public speaker. Consequently, for purposes of this study the subsequent remarks in this chapter will appear under the headings of: (1) Joseph Goebbels, the Man and Speaker, (2) The Speeches of Goebbels, (3) The Circumstances, Occasions and Audiences as Factors which Influenced Goebbels' Speechmaking, and (4) Joseph Goebbels' Principles and Methods of Propaganda and Persuasion.

Joseph Goebbels, the Man and Speaker.-- A significant factor which influenced Goebbels' career as a propagandist and persuader was the education and religious training which he received early in his life. In contrast to most other sons of the middle-class families living in the Rhineland-Westphalia district of Germany, Goebbels' academic training included both his attendance of the Gymnasium [high school] in Rheydt and a number of universities in Germany. His contraction of osteomyelitis at the age of seven was partly responsible for motivating his parents to provide him with an education which was far superior to that which his brothers and sister received. Both of his parents, but especially his mother, believed that their youngest son needed such advantage because of his physical impairment; and the devout Catholic parents wished him to enter the priesthood. For a time Goebbels him-

²Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social Control, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 25.

self seriously considered this profession but became estranged from the church under the influence of his student friend, Richard Flisges.

In high school, Goebbels' interest in speechmaking was first aroused when he studied the orations of Cicero delivered against Cataline in 63 B. C. Although courses in the area of speech never became part of his academic training, Goebbels did study the rudiments of organization and presentation of ideas by writing compositions in which he soon excelled. It was partly due to such studies, as well as to his observations of the manner in which the local priest delivered his sermons, that he began to recognize and value the power of the spoken word. This perception was further strengthened when Goebbels began to read essays and the newspaper articles of the leading parties in Germany.

In spite of his physical impairment, Goebbels possessed a remarkable amount of energy and determination during his youth which was to become one of the marked characteristics throughout his life. Since he could not pursue the physical activities which his fellow students did he became a lonesome, brooding boy who spent a great deal of his time reading. He also practiced writing essays and delivered many speeches in his bedroom in front of imaginary audiences. Among the books which he read and which were to have a lasting effect upon his speechmaking were accounts of German history, the works of Goethe and Nietzsche, and Le Bon's Psychology of the Masses. He channeled most of his energies into his studies at school and because of his intelligence and determination graduated at the head of his class. As a reward for having achieved this distinction and because he had written the best German compositions in his class, Goebbels was provided with the first real

opportunity to deliver a speech. He was invited to deliver the farewell address at his commencement ceremony. Yet, this first attempt at speech-making gave little indication of the talents and abilities he was to display in later life and even prompted his headmaster to remark that although his ideas had been commendable, he would never become a good speaker.

When Joseph Goebbels began to attend a number of universities by means of a scholarship obtained from the Catholic Church he elected to study ancient and modern history, art, philology and German Romantic literature. His frequent moves from one institution to another reflected the instabilities of the times, as well as his own indecision and his lack of purpose and goals. His non-academic education was provided to a great extent by his college friend, Richard Flisges. Flisges was a wounded, disillusioned World War I veteran who expounded the theories of Marx and Engels, who advocated pacifism and was influenced by Communism, and who introduced Goebbels to his personal viewpoints. Further, under his friend's influence Goebbels discovered the works of the German statesman and philosopher, Walter Rathenau, and those of Dostoevski. Together the friends passed through a phase of nihilism which left its mark upon Goebbels for the rest of his life. But before Goebbels severed his relationship with his friend, Flisges provided him with two other experiences which affected Goebbels' career as a speaker. First, the friends engaged in a series of debates about Communism through which Goebbels gained his first insight into the process of oral argument. He became so adept at developing his arguments that he was able to refute those advanced by Flisges in almost every instance. Goebbels also aspired

to become a writer and here, too, the influence of Flisges made itself felt. Thus, his first literary attempt in 1921, which he called Michael, was a short novel written in diary form. In it Goebbels recorded a conglomeration of experiences which he had during his university days. He made reference in the novel to a girl called Hertha Holk, who went for long walks with the main character, Michael. Michael combined the roles of soldier, worker, poet, lover, patriot, and revolutionary. Flisges himself appeared in the novel in the role of a nebulous Russian student, Ivan Wienurovsky, who lent Michael Dostoeveski's novel, The Idiot. In the novel Goebbels expressed his basic views on life and German society through the main character, Michael, by declaring that "we are all sick," and concluding that "the Intellect has poisoned our people."

Yet, despite these extreme views and the apparent lack of purpose and goals in his university studies, Goebbels did obtain a relatively sound educational background, especially when compared to many of the other National Socialist party leaders with whom he was to associate. It was perhaps for this reason that H. R. Trevor-Roper observed:

Joseph Goebbels was the intellectual of the Nazi Party; perhaps its only intellectual... He retained to the end the distinctive character of his education: he could always prove what he wanted.³

Through his religious experiences and observations in the Catholic Church, Goebbels learned to value and respect the traditional repetitive ceremonies, the attempts made by the priests to reduce ideas and in-

³H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 16.

volved concepts to their simplest terms, and the rigorous discipline of the church. In his career as spokesman for the National Socialist party, Goebbels learned to apply these factors in the speaking situation with increasing effectiveness.

In conjunction with his education and religious training, Joseph Goebbels' personality development and character traits significantly affected the use of his principles and methods of propaganda and persuasion. Thus, already very early in life he discovered that he differed from other children due to his physical impairment. He was unable to participate in the physical activities which other children normally pursue and was subject to repeated ridicule by them. He developed an ambitious nature during adolescence and despite his physical deformity learned to push himself beyond the normal limits of activity. This was a crucial factor which made it possible for him to endure the exhausting schedule which he maintained throughout most of his speaking career. During his youth Goebbels further developed an unhealthy need to prove himself to others, to show that he could succeed in academic and intellectual pursuits. So great was his concern for his physical inadequacies that he once confided to Wilfred von Oven:

'The worst punishment...which someone can think up for me is to walk past an honor guard. And yet this cannot always be avoided. But if such inspection is on the program of some event then I already have nightmares many nights before the event.⁴

Because he was unable to perform physical feats himself, he turned to books in which he could vicariously share the romantic deeds of the

⁴Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels Bis Zum Ende, Vol. I (Buenos Aires: Dürer-Verlag, 1949-1950), pp. 139-140.

heroes. He even attempted to enlist in the military service in spite of the fact that he knew he would be rejected. When he received the official rejection from the medical examiner at the induction center, he hurried home where he confined himself to his room and gave vent to his anger and despair by remaining in seclusion for several days. Furthermore, when he was questioned about his slight limp during the university days and on subsequent speaking occasions, he would intimate that his affliction was due to the war.

Joseph Goebbels had considerable personal courage. While confronting his listeners during the Ruhr resistance movement and particularly as Gauleiter of Berlin, he remained on the speaker's platform during the many "Saalschlachter," [fights in the meeting halls]. He even had volunteered to plow up train tracks and other strategic facilities during the Ruhr resistance movement, but his offer had been declined. He continued to demonstrate his apparent courage during World War II by remaining with his audiences in the meeting halls during air raids and even addressed the soldiers and civilian workers at the front lines towards the end of the war.

In his personal life, as well as in the public situation, Goebbels always presented a meticulous appearance. He developed a systematic procedure both in his daily living routine and in the preparation of his speeches. He could be charming and disarming when the occasion demanded. He could also be cynical, satirical, and malicious when he believed that such action would best serve his cause. He was superstitious and vain, but successfully withheld these personality traits from his audiences.

Despite his acknowledged intelligence and education, however, Goebbels had hardly ever developed few original ideas and viewpoints of his own. As he was influenced by Richard Flisges to reject the German social system in which he grew to manhood, so he was persuaded to join the National Socialist movement by his friend, Fritz Prang. It has been reported that Goebbels would have joined any cause provided it was headed by a strong leader. Goebbels demonstrated this lack of originality and indecisiveness in his personality makeup when he fluctuated between the National Socialist movement and the Peoples' Freedom party. Moreover, although he readily admitted that he was indebted to Gregor Strasser and considered him to be a close friend, Goebbels was quick to denounce him once he had been won over to Hitler's cause.

Early in his political career Goebbels sought a strong, determined leader. Yet, when he met Hitler, he passed through an agonizing period of indecision. However, once he had pledged his loyalty to the Fuehrer, he did so with complete abandon to the end of his life. He committed himself to Hitler with such devotion that he seldom questioned the Fuehrer's decisions. He once even told his aides in the Propaganda Ministry that he only trusted Adolf Hitler.

Among the talents which aided Joseph Goebbels in the application of the principles and methods of his propaganda and persuasion were his high degree of verbal facility, his pleasing voice qualities, and the confidence and poise which he displayed in the speaking situation. He also contributed much to the growth and development of the Third Reich as a systematic administrator, organizer, and party leader. In his various leadership positions he demonstrated that he was reliable and

efficient. He possessed a rare presence of mind and could adapt himself to most any occasion or speaking event. He appeared to function best when under pressure and seldom lost his head in a crisis. He was considered by many foreign and German observers as one of the few leaders among the National Socialists who could rise to the occasion when required.

Throughout his career the primary purpose of Goebbels' speechmaking was to organize and win the support of the German people for the cause which he advocated and to gain personal power and control in the hierarchy of the National Socialist party. To achieve these goals, Goebbels embraced the sophistic philosophy that "man is the measure of all things." Furthermore, as he acknowledged in his speech on "Perception and Propaganda," he was guided in all of his speechmaking by the philosophy that any means justifies the end. Therefore, as long as he believed that an attack upon or a support of an individual or institution would produce the desired response within his listeners, he would unhesitatingly endorse that point of view. Thus, within his career he spoke for and against the National Socialist party, he praised and attacked the revered President Hindenburg, he spoke on behalf of the friendship and alliance of Germany and Russia, denounced the Russian people as the threat against the European civilization, and although he was initially opposed to the war, he used every means at his disposal to support Hitler's military campaigns.


It was perhaps because of such actions that Rudolf Semmler, who worked closely with Goebbels in the Propaganda Ministry, once observed:

The sad fact remains, that even with Goebbels there is all the difference in the world between what he says and what he does.⁵

The Speeches of Goebbels.--- The types and kinds of speeches which Joseph Goebbels delivered throughout his career as a spokesman for National Socialism were impressively diversified. Thus, whereas in the formative years Goebbels' speeches were primarily agitational in nature and directed at those forces and institutions which he perceived as threats to his cause, those that he delivered after the party had gained control of the nation were intended to enlighten the German people about the policies of the new government and to spread a feeling of good will. In both of these periods, however, Goebbels also addressed himself to other issues. In the formative years of the party he delivered speeches which were designed to publicize the activities of the National Socialists and some which were meant to influence his more intellectual listeners. After the victory at the polls in 1933, Goebbels also delivered many ceremonial addresses and a number which advocated Germany's peaceful intentions in future years.

Similarly, during the period of World War II, Goebbels delivered a variety of speeches which differed significantly in subject matter and content. Thus, he not only prepared the German people for the demanding and difficult war years, but also spoke on many occasions to bolster the morale of his listeners. In addition, Goebbels spoke to gain support for Hitler's military campaigns among the people, to improve his own status and prestige, and to affect foreign listeners as well.

⁵Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels--the Man Next to Hitler, (London: John Westhouse Ltd., 1947), p. 107.



Although Goebbels did deliver impromptu and extemporaneous speeches on rare occasions, he preferred manuscript speeches for all important events. In the development and preparation of such addresses he invariably followed the same consistent pattern which he had learned while writing compositions in high school. Thus, almost all of his speeches were made up of the traditional threefold division of an introduction, a body, and a conclusion. They were further divided into additional subdivisions if the speaker deemed it necessary. Goebbels nearly always developed his speeches through several drafts and insisted that all material which was to be used as evidence and supporting material had to be checked and verified. At the same time he would begin to concentrate his efforts on stylistic matters and the aspects of delivery. Long before such speeches were presented to an audience, the speaker had already committed their idea-sequence to memory.


Goebbels' speeches generally fell into the categories of expository, persuasive, ceremonial, and eulogistic addresses. Depending upon the circumstances, the subject matter chosen for a given speech, and the speaker's intent, Goebbels could apply both the forms of logical reasoning and evidence and a great number of extra-logical appeals to advantage. Among his most frequently used forms of reasoning were causal arguments, examples, and analogies. His evidence was primarily made up of illustrations, statistics, examples, descriptions, and quotations, while his extra-logical appeals included ethical statements, emotional appeals and motivational factors. He further engaged in refutation and frequently made use of reference remarks, common-bond statements, and rhetorical questions to gain the attention and integrate himself with his audiences.

In more persuasive situations he also favored the pronoun "we" when appealing directly to his listeners.

In regard to the style and delivery of his speeches, Joseph Goebbels made use of such factors as simple language and expression. He also used quotations, familiar sayings, colloquial expressions, figures of speech, enumerations and restatements.

The Circumstances, Occasions and Audiences as Factors of Goebbels' Speechmaking.-- The circumstances, occasions, as well as the audiences to which Joseph Goebbels addressed himself as a spokesman for the National Socialist movement were important factors in determining the application of his principles and methods of propaganda and persuasion. While he spoke in the Rhineland-Westphalia district during the Ruhr resistance movement, Goebbels spoke to small groups of high school boys, college students, and workers from that region. But such groups soon began to grow in size and number as his reputation as a forceful political speaker grew. During this period he addressed his listeners in back rooms, empty haylofts, station waiting rooms, schools, little country inns, and wherever people tended to congregate.

In contrast, Goebbels began to pre-arrange speaking situations more frequently when he worked for the Peoples' Freedom party, Gregor Strasser, and spoke as Gauleiter of Berlin. Although it is true that he continued to address his audiences at unscheduled meetings on occasions, particularly when he was invited to speak at meetings of other parties, he preferred to speak at events which could be publicized in advance. Thus, when he attempted to provoke the workers of Berlin, when he began to bring attention to Hitler as the central figure of the party, and



personally became involved in a series of local and national elections, Goebbels carefully organized and arranged each event to insure that a maximum capacity audience would attend these events.

It was also during the Berlin period that Joseph Goebbels learned to value the factor of audience analysis. In his book, Battle for Berlin, the chief spokesman of the party reported that the spirit of Berlin and the outlook on life of its population had forced him to drop his provincial ways. Although he always held the "masses" in contempt and repeatedly discussed his negative attitude toward them with others, he was careful to prevent his listeners from discovering this factor.

With the growth of popularity for the National Socialist movement in Germany and with Goebbels' reputation as an effective speaker, the audiences which attended to his speeches during the final election campaign and particularly after the party had won control of the nation reached staggering numbers. Thus, when Goebbels arranged a series of national holidays and celebrations during the early months of 1933, almost all of the people shared in these events. Those who could not attend in person were able to share in them vicariously through the German radio facilities. But Goebbels also continued to address small groups such as representatives from the press, the movie industry, the theatre, business, and industry in order to explain the policies and decrees of the new government.

During World War II, Goebbels' audiences continued to grow in size since he attempted to reach domestic and foreign listeners by means of the German radio facilities. Goebbels' domestic audiences during that period consisted of localized and national listeners. While the local-

ized audiences frequently were made up of party subleaders, munitions workers, and inhabitants of bombed-out areas, Goebbels' listeners on the national level came from all walks of life. His foreign listeners literally consisted of individuals from all parts of the world.

Although many of Goebbels' audiences were attracted to his speeches during World War II because he was an effective speaker, many individuals attended to his remarks because he controlled almost all forms of communication in Germany and was one of the few leaders of the party who made public appearances.

To understand the attraction and effect which Goebbels had for many of his German listeners it is important to note the social, economic, political and philosophic forces which had made them responsive to the speaker's cause. They were part of that German society which was referred to in this study as the pre-World War I generation. As a group they were affected by the industrial revolution and their youth opposed the aspirations of their own generation, as well as those that had preceded and followed them. These youths rebelled against the social norms and conditions of the time and sought reforms in terms of social, economic and political practices. Most of these youngsters were sons and daughters of "good" families who believed that their society was oblivious to truth, honor, and individualism. In their search for new directions and ideals they discovered the works of such men as Nietzsche, Turnvater Jahn, Arndt, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Fichte, Wagner, the Romantics, von Treitschke, Thomas Mann and a host of others. The composite of the ideas advanced by these writers and philosophers left the youth of the pre-World War I generation with the disquieting

notion that they had a special "mission" in life. They were told that their culture was immature, that they were to declare war upon the world, that physical fitness, nationalism, and German unity were inextricably interwoven, that the rights of the lower income groups needed to be assured, that Prussian militarism was the most effective means of safeguarding the nation, and most important of all, that the spiritual salvation and regeneration of a people was achieved through death.

With such notions many of these youth entered into the bitter experiences of World War I. They were gravely disillusioned when Germany lost the war. In their despondency they reacted to the Treaty of Versailles by calling its surrender terms "unbearable" and the Weimar Republic an "enforced" democracy. They further observed that the responsible individuals of their society failed to assume control of the nation, that the lower income groups were completely abandoned, and that economic instability not only threatened Germany with disaster but also the world. Consequently, many of the young men and women who had grown up under these circumstances perceived National Socialism to be a necessary extension of the viewpoints and events cited above.

Among these young people was Joseph Goebbels who was conscious of these factors when he addressed himself to his audiences. Thus, during the formative years of the party, while active in the Ruhr resistance movement, in Berlin, or while campaigning throughout the nation, Goebbels not only attacked the German government but all "foreign" innovations as well, and in most of these speaking situations he obtained the desired response from his listeners.

After the party had won control of the nation and during World War II, Goebbels began to employ new themes in his speeches. Thus, during the years from 1933 to 1939, he frequently confronted his listeners with the remarks, "It's great to be alive," and attempted to persuade the German people and the world at large that the Third Reich was a peaceful nation. The chief spokesman of the party was even successful in transferring his note of optimism to the early years of World War II, with the result that at the time of the "basic" speech he was forced to institute drastic changes in the attitudes of many of his listeners. In his own diary and while conversing with his aides in the Propaganda Ministry, Goebbels consequently bitterly reproached himself for not having prepared the German people for a "total war."

Joseph Goebbels' personal views concerning his audiences were revealed to some extent in his diaries and the remarks which he made to others. They are significant in relationship to his employment of his principles and methods of propaganda and persuasion. Throughout his career he favored the low income groups although he did speak to the more intellectual members of the German society, particularly towards the end of World War II. He further believed and repeatedly stated that in order to succeed politically a movement such as the National Socialist party first had to win the attention and support of the masses. He also believed that much could be learned about the moods and attitudes of the people by remaining in close, personal contact with them. Therefore, he insisted that a special section of the Propaganda Ministry be devoted to the evaluation of the mail which arrived daily.

In spite of the fact that Goebbels frequently gave vent to his contempt for the masses and criticized them for their "primitive" and "instinctive" behavior, he was most effective when addressing himself to mass audiences. Thus, as was suggested earlier, while Goebbels was active in the Ruhr resistance movement and while he spoke for the Peoples' Freedom party, a considerable number of German workers were influenced to join his cause while others were persuaded to make financial contributions. As Gauleiter of Berlin, Goebbels succeeded in reorganizing and strengthening the party. By becoming involved in local and national elections such as the Lippe Detmold campaign, he was further instrumental in helping the National Socialist party gain control of the nation.

Following the victory at the polls, Goebbels' audiences responded to his national holiday celebrations and ceremonies by changing the names of main streets and market places to those of party officials in almost every city and village. Consequently, most every community could boast at least one Hitler Platz or Hitler Strasse. Furthermore, the entire population of Germany joyfully participated in these events.

During World War II, Goebbels' listeners continued to respond favorably to his speeches. He was able to report in his diary that his speeches, even when the German military and social situation left much to be desired, were "received with considerable acclaim" or "made a deep impression" on his listeners.

Joseph Goebbels' "basic" speech, delivered on February 18, 1943, which is generally regarded as the most successful address of his career, serves to illustrate the relationship between the circumstances,

the occasion, and the audience in the speaking situation. As was the case in most other situations, there were external forces, as well as personal factors which influenced Goebbels to deliver the speech. Among the external forces were such matters as Hitler's refusal to speak until he could talk about a victory, the unprecedented and unbelievable military disaster at Stalingrad, and the failure of the Committee of Three and other responsible party leaders to rise to the occasion. In regard to the personal factors, Goebbels was influenced to deliver the "basic" speech because he felt responsible for the well-being of the German people, he perceived himself as the "spiritual physician of the nation," and he realized that his propaganda machine had failed to prepare the German people for disaster. Moreover, he seemed to recognize the fact that the people were in desperate need for leadership,-- a situation which was analogous to his own experiences as a member of the pre-World War I generation. Goebbels further believed that Hitler had neglected and had lost confidence in him since the Fuehrer had appointed the Committee of Three to develop a total war program. Consequently, Joseph Goebbels not only utilized this occasion to officially announce the fall of Stalingrad, but also to force Hitler to give him greater control over matters pertaining to internal governmental policies and actions. He further used the "basic" speech as a platform to launch his own total war program. To achieve these ends, Goebbels primarily relied upon realism and frankness. He reasoned that once the people had overcome the initial shock of the dire news they would respond by pledging their support for his total war measures. He further perceived the "basic" speech as an opportunity to demonstrate to the nation that he possessed

the composure and determination necessary to wage a demanding, total war. He staked everything on the "basic" speech in an effort to gain the desired response from his audience.

Goebbels' audience responded with wild enthusiasm while he delivered his "basic" speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin. In the days and weeks that followed many people volunteered to work in the munitions industry. Throughout the country, people discussed Goebbels' total war measures and many letters arrived at the Propaganda Ministry which indicated that there was approval for his actions. Although Hitler failed to award him the coveted powers he had sought, he commented favorably on the speech by describing it as a psychological masterpiece. Goebbels was cordially received on subsequent journeys to the front lines and in the bombed-out areas where he continued to address his audiences. But most important of all was the fact that the German people continued to place their trust and confidence in Goebbels long after they had forsaken all other party officials.

Joseph Goebbels' Principles and Methods of Propaganda and Persuasion.-- Underlying all of Goebbels' propaganda and persuasive attempts were a series of principles which he formulated and employed throughout his career as the chief spokesman for the National Socialist party in Germany. First among these was his belief that even though all mass media could be exploited to advantage, the spoken word was the most influential means of affecting others. Goebbels amply demonstrated this belief by delivering an enormous amount of speeches throughout his lifetime. Furthermore, he even insisted that written compositions should be constructed in such a manner that they could be recited in the speaking

situation.

A second principle which Goebbels advocated was that all propaganda should be designed to win the masses. Thus, he insisted that:

Propaganda must be so simple and uncomplicated as possible. ...Then, of course, it is repulsed by the intellectuals, which is fine since it is not meant for them but for the broad masses, and the more primitive and less subtle it is, the more it affects them.⁶

In enlarging upon his conception of the art of propaganda, Goebbels further compared its organization and arrangement with that of a symphony by Beethoven by explaining:

A symphony consists of different movements, of which each is controlled by a certain theme or Leitmotif. The good propagandist will put the motif at the beginning of the movement like the composer, which he then, in the further development of his composition develops through variations, modulations, harmonics, and changes. Soon it is carried by the bases, soon by the violincellos. Now it resounds in unison, is taken up by soft violins, the wood instruments carry it further, and finally it sounds once more fortissimo and engraves itself unforgettably in one's memory.⁷

Moreover, because he stressed simplicity of language and expression, Goebbels repeatedly insisted that arguments and ideas had to be reduced to the simplest forms in the speaking situation.

A necessary corollary to the above principle was Goebbels' contention that a speaker must speak the language of his audience. Because he addressed himself primarily to the low income groups of the German society, he concentrated his efforts upon developing systematic, well-organized speeches. In their development, it was pointed out earlier,

⁶von Oven, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 204-205.

⁷Ibid., Vol. I, p. 273.

they followed the classic German high school composition.

Another principle which Goebbels employed in the speaking situation and which he discussed in his book, Battle for Berlin, was his insistence that the public speaker must know the soul of man. The contemporary student of rhetoric and public address will readily identify this principle by the more familiar terminology as "audience analysis." Joseph Goebbels first became aware of the significance of this principle when he was appointed Gauleiter of Berlin, where he became aware of the difference between the audiences which he had confronted in the Rhineland-Westphalia district and those he addressed in the capital city. Thereafter, he made every effort to analyze his audiences prior to delivering his speeches. He attached great importance to the voluminous mail which reached his Propaganda Ministry. He further arranged many speaking situations, among them the "basic" speech, at which the listeners could gain entry into the meeting place by tickets only. In such situations his intent was to increase the probability that his auditors were more sympathetic to his cause.

Goebbels further advanced the principle that a speaker's cause was more important and had no relation to his personal convictions. In previous chapters, as well as in an earlier section of this chapter, it was pointed out that Goebbels frequently appeared to be indecisive and inconsistent in his remarks and actions as a public speaker. Mention was made of the fact that he endorsed and attacked the National Socialist party, that he paid homage to and vehemently denounced President Hindenburg, and that he publicly persecuted the Jews although he was never anti-semitic by conviction. In his personal relations with his

friends and Hitler, he demonstrated a similar behavior.

Joseph Goebbels' most significant principle, which he consistently applied in the speaking situation, was his belief that any means available to the speaker could be employed to obtain the desired response from his listeners. He discussed this principle at great lengths in at least two speeches by insisting that a propaganda or persuasive attempt could not be considered "good" or "bad" but rather that it could be judged effective only if it had achieved the desired response from the individuals for whom it was intended. Consequently, a number of his own attempts to influence others failed to meet the moral and ethical standards of his society. Thus, it was pointed out in one instance that Goebbels advised his aides in the Propaganda Ministry to employ "poetic truth" when necessary. In another situation he told Wilfred von Oven that "propaganda, just like art, does not have the assignment to be objectively true. If one wanted to let the facts speak for themselves then every form of propaganda would be unnecessary."⁸ Yet, Goebbels also maintained that in the speaking situation, "truth...should be used as frequently as possible,"⁹ and he employed it when the circumstances permitted or demanded its application. It was perhaps for this reason that H. R. Trevor-Roper observed that Goebbels "was respected for his intelligence, his administrative efficiency, and his personal integrity..."¹⁰

⁸ von Oven, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 282.

⁹ Leonard Doob, "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda," In Wilbur Schramm, ed., The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), p. 525.

¹⁰ Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 17.

There were a great number of propaganda techniques which Joseph Goebbels employed in his career as the chief spokesman for the National Socialist party. An examination of these indicates that there was a relationship between his experiences as a speaker and the variety of techniques which he employed.

Joseph Goebbels' first real experience in delivering political speeches occurred when he joined the Ruhr resistance movement in 1923. When he offered his services he was given the task of delivering agitational speeches against the French occupation forces. During this period he followed a rigorous speaking schedule by addressing audiences several times a day. Because of the frequency of his speaking, the content and themes of his speeches were almost always the same. He learned to organize party cells, to romanticize and idealize the exploits of his fellow resistance members, and to publicize his own activities.

But it was in Berlin that Goebbels gained the most experience and learned to employ a great variety of propaganda techniques. He drew upon his experiences obtained in the Rhineland-Westphalia district and while in the employment of Wieggershaus and Strasser. He organized publicity campaigns for the party, conducted mass demonstrations, and provoked and badgered his listeners. He invaded the "Red" district of Berlin, arranged ceremonial meetings embellished with pageantry, invented the "Speaker's guard," and the "ceremony of the flag bearers." He saw to it that endless torch parades were conducted in the city, flooded Berlin with posters and placards, and publicized the activities of Horst Wessel as he had done with Albert Leo Schlageter in the Ruhr. When the party was banned from the streets of Berlin, he ordered the membership underground. He formed clubs which were reminiscent of the party cells

in the Rhineland-Westphalia district. When he was personally prohibited from speaking, he founded a party newspaper, spoke outside of the restricted area, and attended the meetings of other parties where he spoke during the forum period. To avoid further curtailment of his speaking he entered the election campaign for the Reichstag. He was intent upon obtaining enough seats in the Reichstag to use it as an additional platform for his speaking. When the results of this campaign proved favorable, he became involved in other election campaigns and by 1929 began working towards winning control of the nation.

He preceded each new election campaign, whether local or national, with a flood of posters. He organized and carefully instructed selected party speakers who were sent to all parts of the country. He scheduled all of Hitler's personal appearances, as well as his own. He arranged giant mass demonstrations, tent meetings, and torch light processions throughout the country. Goebbels also employed all of the mass media at his disposal for propaganda purposes. Among these was the party newspaper of which copies were distributed free when they could not be sold. When the party finances permitted, he further made sound films which were shown in the market places of all larger cities. On many occasions Goebbels accompanied Hitler and delivered the introductory speech to set the mood and atmosphere for Hitler's address. He employed this technique especially in the final election campaign prior to the party's victory at the polls, when he was permitted to use the German broadcasting facilities for the first time. On one of these occasions, while broadcasting a mass meeting from Cologne, Goebbels even requested that the cathedral bells should be rung to enhance the atmosphere. When his

request was denied it was reported that he supplied his own sound system and succeeded in convincing his audience at Cologne and throughout Germany that the cathedral bells were actually ringing.

But perhaps Goebbels achieved his greatest victory in the Lippe Detmold elections which the National Socialists won by an overwhelming majority. In this instance, no other party had given serious attention to the district. However, Goebbels recognized its potential propaganda value and exploited it to the fullest.

After the party had gained control of the nation, Goebbels continued to make use of his principles and methods of propaganda. He was determined to involve as many people as possible in the National Socialist victory celebrations. Hence, he invented national holidays, spoke on the party anniversaries, Hitler's birthday, and even utilized the First of May, which had been the traditional holiday of the Socialist workers. Goebbels' mass demonstrations were held in Berlin and Munich, at which he usually introduced the Fuehrer, who in one instance appeared in the company of President Hindenburg. To insure the success of such events, Goebbels laid the groundwork weeks in advance. Entire cities were decorated with flowers and flags, the broadcasting facilities were used to relay the events to all parts of the country where similar audiences had been assembled, but the center of attention, as the Gauleiter had intended, was always the speaker.

During World War II, Goebbels' ingenuity and application of his methods of propaganda was taxed to the utmost. Although he continued to draw upon his successful experiences from the past, the nature of the war required continual readjustments of the methods he had used on pre-

vious occasions. Thus, during the first three years when the military campaigns progressed favorably for Germany, Goebbels introduced his news bulletins over the radio with fanfares. During the same period he attempted to undermine enemy morale by means of propaganda. He had leaflets dropped in enemy territory, promoted the publication of prophecies and articles in neutral newspapers, and utilized loudspeakers at the front lines to intimidate the enemy forces. For domestic consumption he sent propaganda companies into the field who made motion pictures of actual combat conditions and other significant events to be shown back home.

However, when the military situation began to deteriorate from the German point of view, Goebbels was forced to make a series of readjustments. Because he could not afford to make irresponsible statements, he began to rely more and more upon the party speakers who were less restricted in their speaking. As the tension and frustration level began to rise among the German population, Goebbels redirected their aggression by inventing two fictitious characters whom he criticized severely, by involving the people in winter clothing drives and courtesy campaigns and other such activities. In his speeches Goebbels began to single out the Jews as the responsible individuals for the war, he made much of the enemy air raids by labeling them "terror attacks," and he began to exploit the "unconditional surrender clause" which had grown out of President Roosevelt's meeting with Prime Minister Churchill at Casa Blanca.

To safeguard his own prestige and reputation Goebbels appeared on a weekly radio program, had his most effective articles read over the radio, and saw to it that his name appeared in the newspapers at regular

intervals. He also personally directed the rescue operations in the bombed-out districts of the country, provided food and shelter whenever possible for the needy, and visited both the front lines and the destroyed areas of the homeland as frequently as possible.

Joseph Goebbels' last two significant attempts at influencing the German people by means of propaganda occurred shortly before the end of World War II. In the first instance he wrote an article entitled, "The Year 2,000," in which he predicted a desolate and grim future for the German population if the war was lost. He realized his final propaganda attempt when he committed suicide, for he was firmly convinced that his death would be of greater consequence to his cause than being captured alive.

Although the Reichsminister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda never appears to have discussed or defined the term "persuasion," he did make use of persuasive techniques in his speeches. Thus, many of his addresses were developed with one or more of the following ends in mind: (1) to affect his audience by addressing himself to their needs and wants, (2) to win his listeners' belief for his cause and propositions, (3) to build audience attitudes and opinions, and (4) to motivate his listeners to action.

Goebbels' speech entitled, "In the Front Row," serves to demonstrate his attempt to affect his audience by addressing himself to its needs and wants. To achieve this end he primarily relied upon ethical statements which were designed to indicate that he had compassion and understanding for the people who had sacrificed their homes, property, and lives in the heavy enemy air raids. He further appealed to their emotions, arousing

hatred and anger within his listeners, and promised quick retaliation.

The Reichsminister's speech delivered on Christmas Eve 1941, exemplifies his use of two persuasive ends in the speaking situation. In this instance he not only attempted to affect his audience by addressing himself to its needs and wants, but also attempted to win his listeners' belief for his cause and propositions. Again he primarily relied upon emotional appeals when attending to their needs and wants. Furthermore, he affected their emotions by vividly describing the German countryside to the soldiers and listeners the world over. He spoke of the "German family at home," of "service to the country," and about "the pioneers of Germanism in the war." In addition Goebbels employed logical reasoning and evidence, some expository material, and ethical statements to win his listeners' belief for his cause and propositions.

In his speech entitled, "Hitler over Germany," to which Goebbels also referred as, "The Day of the Awakening Nation," he demonstrated his three-fold attempt to affect his audience by addressing himself to their needs and wants, to win the listeners' belief for his cause and proposition, and to build his audience's attitudes and opinions. On this occasion he made use of logical reasoning and evidence to demonstrate the consistency of his remarks, common-bond statements and reference remarks to win the attention of his audience, and ethical statements to integrate himself with his listeners. Goebbels also made use of vivid descriptive material and emotional and motivational appeals in an attempt to influence his audience's attitude and opinions in regard to the National Socialist party.

Joseph Goebbels' "basic" speech is perhaps the best example of his

use of persuasive techniques in the speaking situation. On this occasion, while attempting to affect his audience by addressing himself to their needs and wants, he proposed his total war measures and utilized ethical statements to show that he had compassion and understanding for their problems. In order to win his listeners' belief for his cause and propositions he relied upon logical reasoning and evidence. Thus, he demonstrated not only that his arguments apparently were sound in their construction, but also that a relationship existed between the past history of the war and the situation at the time of the "basic" speech. To build desirable audience attitudes and opinions, Goebbels employed emotional appeals, ethical remarks and refutation. While his emotional appeals were intended to arouse the anger and hatred of his listeners against all enemies of the German Reich, his ethical remarks were designed to convince his auditors that he was an honest, reliable, and trustworthy speaker. His use of refutation further served to dispel the fears of his listeners and improve their morale. To motivate his audience to action, Goebbels purposely developed his speech in a climactic order. He also employed a great variety of motivational appeals, engaged his audience personally in the speaking situation by using a "yes-response" technique towards the end of the speech by means of ten questions, and ended his address with a familiar quotation which he had used as the title of his speech. In addition to the factors cited above, Goebbels employed a number of other persuasive techniques in the speech. Among these were a great number of phrases containing the pronoun "we" which he used when directly speaking to his listeners. He also used frequent restatements and enumerations. In the introduction of the

"basic" speech he further employed common-bond statements, rhetorical questions, and reference remarks to capture the attention of and integrate himself with the audience. Finally, among the stylistic aspects which contributed to the persuasiveness of the speech were such factors as figures of speech, familiar sayings, simple language, repetition, colloquial expressions, and quotations.

Joseph Goebbels was an individual who rose from obscurity to international prominence during the years from 1923 to 1945 as the chief spokesman for the National Socialist movement in Germany. He made few contributions to the cause which he advocated by the originality of his thoughts or even through the power of the principles and methods of his propaganda and persuasion. Rather, his achievements in the public speaking situation stemmed from the power of the man and the historical and contemporary situation in which he found himself and which he exploited to advantage.

To his discredit is the fact that he was instrumental in creating the Third Reich with its disastrous consequences primarily through the use of the spoken word.

To his credit is the fact that he was the only individual among the National Socialist party leadership who at times exhibited real concern for the German people and attended to their welfare.

APPENDIX

Goebbels' Speaking Engagements from January 1, 1932 to May 1, 1933:¹

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1932			
1/1	Spandau	S. A. Men	1
1/4	Märchenbrunnen	Party Organization	1
1/5	Berlin	District Party Leaders	1
1/7	Hamburg	General Assembly	1
1/8	Berlin/Sportpalast	Mass Demonstration	1
1/9	Essen	Party Members	1
1/11	Berlin	District Party Leaders	1
1/13	Friedenau		1
1/15	Frankfurt/Oder		1
1/16	Königsberg		1
1/22	Chemnitz	3 Assemblies & S. A. Men	4 (Friday)
1/24	Berlin/Sportpalast	Workers' Assembly	1
1/25	Berlin	Party Functionaries	1
1/26	Berlin	Eulogy at Prof. Schwartz's Grave	1
1/27	Bremen	Attack on Brüning	1
1/29	Berlin	Eulogy at Hitler-Youth Norkus' Grave	1
2/2	Berlin München	Nazi Club Leaders District Leaders of Germany	(Monday) 2 (Tuesday or Wednesday)
2/3	München		1
2/8	Berlin/Hotel Prinz Albrecht		1
2/12	Hannover	General Assembly	1
2/13	Dresden	Party Members	1
	Chemnitz/Marmor Palast	Administrators	1 (Sunday)
2/18	Berlin/Hotel Prinz Albrecht	General Assembly	1
2/19	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	1
2/22	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly of Party Members- West, East, North	1
2/23	Berlin/Reichstag	"The Party of Deserters" (Against Brüning)	
	Berlin/Sportpalast	To Central & Southern Districts	2
2/24	Berlin/Reichstag	Plenum Debates	?

¹Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, (München: Franz Eher, Nachf., 1941), p. 3ff.

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1932			
2/24	Breslau	General Assembly	1 or 2?
2/25	Berlin/Reichstag	Attack on Brüning	
	Berlin-East	General Assemblies	6
2/26	Dresden/Zirkus & Exposition	General Assembly	1
2/27	Berlin/Zirkus Busch	General Assembly	1
3/1	Magdeburg	General Assemblies	3
3/2	Essen	General Assembly	1
3/3	Köln (Cologne)	General Assembly	1
3/4	Düsseldorf/Tonhalle	General Assembly	1
3/5	Marlenfelde	General Assembly	
	Lichtenrade	General Assembly	
	Berlin	S. A. Headquarters	3
3/6	Spandau	General Assembly	1
3/7	Märchenbrunnen	General Assembly	
	Pankow	General Assembly	
	Wedding	General Assembly	3
3/8	Berlin/Zirkus Busch and Tennishallen	General Assembly	
		General Assembly	2
3/9	Berlin/Lustgarten and Sportpalast	General Assembly	
		General Assembly	2
3/11	Hamburg by telephone on train	General Assembly	
	Sagebiel	General Assembly	
	München	Reply to Brüning's speech	3
3/19	München	District Leaders' Meeting	1
3/21	Berlin	Officials & Press Con- ference	1
3/22	Berlin	Officials of District Berlin	1
4/4	Wiesbaden	General Assembly	
	Frankfurt/Festhalle	General Assemblies	
	Berlin/Lustgarten	Mass Demonstration	6 (Sunday)
4/5	Weimar/Thüringer Halle	General Assembly	
	Jena/Volkshaus	General Assembly	2
4/6	Aachen	Center Party Meeting	1
4/7	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	1
4/8	Berlin/Tiergartenhof	General Assembly	
	Zehlendorf	General Assembly	2
4/9	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	
	Stettin	Attack on Brüning	2
4/11	Berlin/Neuen Welt	Officials of Party (Fund- raising campaign)	1
4/12	Elbing/in Factory	General Assembly	
	Königsberg/Haus der Technik	General Assembly	2
4/15	Berlin/Sportpalast	Debate with Brüning's recorded speech	1
4/16	Berlin/Norden (North)	General Assemblies	3

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per day
1932			
4/19	Neukoln/Rudow,	Workers' Group	
	Karlshorst, Nieder-	Workers' Group	
	Schoneweide	Workers' Group	4
4/23	Berlin/Lustgarten	General Assembly	1 (Wednesday)
	Bohmischen Braunhaus,	General Assembly	
	Weissensee, Hohenschon-	General Assembly	
	hausen, Friedrichsfelde	General Assembly	
	Kaulsdorf, Mahlsdorf,	General Assembly	
	Marzhan	General Assembly	
	Wedding/Pharussale	General Assembly (2 times)	9
4/24	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	1
4/30	Berlin/Bockbrauerei	Old Guard (Nazi)	1
5/9	Tegel	General Assembly	2
5/28	Berlin/Tennishallen	General Assembly	1
	Oldenburg	General Assembly	? (Thursday)
	Horumersiel	General Assembly	?
	Mooriam/Riesenreit-		
	halle	General Assembly	
	NorderHam	General Assembly	
	Wildeshausen	General Assembly	(Friday)
	Oldenburg	General Assembly	
	Jener & Rustringen	General Assemblies	6 (Saturday)
5/30	Berlin/Tennishallen	"District Day"	1
5/31	Gustrow	General Assembly	1
6/1	Rostock	General Assembly	1
6/2	Parchim	General Assembly	1
6/4	Wismar	General Assembly	1 (Friday)
	Neukloster	General Assembly	
	Waren	General Assembly	2
6/5	Schoneberg	S. A. Evening	1
6/9	Leipzig	General Assembly	1
6/11	Friedrichshagen	General Assembly	
	Treptow	General Assembly	
	Frohnau	General Assembly	
	Spandauer Berg	General Assembly	
	Dahlem	General Assembly	5
6/15	Nidda	Mass Demonstration	1
6/16	Wiesbaden/Mainz	General Assembly	
	Bingen	Center Party Members	2
6/17	Alsfeld	S. A. Demonstration	
	Lauterbach	S. A. Demonstration	2
6/20	Langen	General Assembly	(Saturday)
	Gross-Gerau	General Assembly	
	Weimar/Weimar Halle	Officials of District Thuringia	
	Hoppegarten	General Assembly	
	Adlershof	General Assembly	5
6/23	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	1
6/24	Wittenberg	General Assemblies	2

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1932			
6/25	Berlin	Eulogy at S. A. Man Köster's Grave	
	Schlachtensee	General Assembly	
	Grunau	General Assembly	
	Frankfurter Allee	General Assembly	4
6/26	Potsdam	General Assembly	
	Reinikendorf	General Assembly	2
6/27	München	District Leaders	1
6/29	Berlin/Tennishallen	General Assembly	1
7/1	Kiel	General Assembly	
	Altona	Party Members	2
7/3	Dessau	Mass Demonstration	1
7/8	Berlin/Sportpalast	Workers' Assembly	1
7/10	Berlin/Lustgarten	Mass Demonstration	
	Suburbs of Berlin	General Assemblies	4
7/12	Elberfeld	General Assembly	
	Düsseldorf/Maschinen- halle	General Assembly	
	Krefeld	General Assembly	3
7/13	Gelsenkirchen	General Assembly	
	Essen	General Assembly	
	Dortmund	General Assembly	3
7/14	Elberfeld/Stadium	General Assembly	
	Oberhausen	General Assembly	
	München-Gladbach	General Assembly	3
7/15	Köln/Stadium	General Assembly	
	Bonn	Tent Assembly	
	Koblenz	General Assembly	
	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	4 or 5
7/16	Lichtenfelde	General Assembly	
	Lichtenrade	General Assembly	
	Neutempelhof	General Assembly	3
7/17	Wittenberg	General Assembly	1
7/18	Berlin	First Radio Speech	
	Steglitz	General Assembly	
	Halensee	General Assembly	
	Neuköln	General Assembly	4
7/19	Berlin	General Assemblies	
	Spandau	General Assembly	4
7/20	Apolda	General Assembly	
	Jena	General Assembly	
	Gotha/Schlossplatz	General Assembly	3
7/21	Zwickau	General Assembly	
	Chemnitz	General Assembly	
	Freiburg	General Assembly	3
7/22	Berlin/Tennishallen	General Assembly	1
7/24	Augsburg	General Assembly	
	Berlin	General Assembly	
	Wedding	General Assembly	
	Schöneberg	General Assembly	4

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1932			
7/27	Cuxhaven	General Assembly	?
7/28	Stolp	General Assembly	
	Kolberg	General Assembly	?
7/29	Weissensee	General Assembly	
	Siemenstadt	General Assembly	2
8/12	Berlin	Instructions to Press and Political Officials	1
8/27	Hasenheide	Party Members	1
9/2	Berlin/Kriegsverein- shaus	Business Cells	
	Schöneberg	Party Organization	2
9/3	Berlin/Grunewald	District Troop	1
9/4	Hermisdorf	General Assembly	
	Reinickendorf	General Assembly	2
9/7	Berlin/Tennishallen	"Against the Barons"	1 (Monday)
9/9	Berlin	Eulogy at Monument in Graveyard for Fallen S. A. Men	1
9/10	Treptow	S. A. Men	1
9/15	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	1
9/16	Berlin/Kriegsverein- shaus	General Assembly	
	Gesundbrunnen	General Assembly	2
9/19	Wien/Engelmann Arena	General Assembly	1
9/23	Kiel	General Assembly	
	Friedrichshain	General Assembly	2
9/24	Berlin/Herrenhaus	Nazi Officials	
	Zehlendorf	Party Members	
	Dahlem	Party Members	3
9/25	Schönholz	Workers' Rally	
	Spandau	S. S. Group	
	Hasenheide	S. S. Group	3
9/28	Breslau/Jahrhundert- halle	General Assembly	1
10/4	Berlin/Tennishallen	General Assembly	
	München/Zirkus Krone	Mass Demonstration	2 (Tuesday)
10/9	Berlin/Bulowplatz	S. A. Evening	
	Chemnitz	Officials of Saxony	1 or 2? (Saturday)
10/12	Berlin/Neuen Welt	Officials	1
10/13	Rostock	General Assemblies	2?
10/14	Schwerin	General Assembly	
	Pritzwalk	General Assembly	2
10/15	Leipzig/Ausstellungs- hallen	General Assembly	1
10/17	Berlin	Ceremony for New Officers	1
10/20	Berlin/ Neuen Welt	Mass Demonstration	1 (Wednesday)
	Ognabrück	Giant Tent Rally	
	Munster/Munsterlander- halle	General Assembly	2

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1932			
10/21	Moabit	General Assembly	
	Weissensee	General Assemblies	
	Niederschonhausen	General Assembly	
	Berlin/Neuen Welt	General Assembly	5
10/22	Stuttgart/Festhalle	General Assembly	
	Senningen	General Assembly	
	Trossingen	General Assembly	
	Offenburg	General Assembly	5?
10/23	Halensee	General Assembly	
	Mariendorf	General Assembly	
	Spandau	General Assembly	3
10/24	Berlin/Sportpalast	Party Guard	
	Böhmisches Haus	General Assembly	
	Marchenbrunnen	General Assembly	
	Kriegsvereinshaus	General Assembly	4
10/25	Berlin/Sportpalast	General Assembly	
	Görlitz	General Assembly	
	Liegnitz	General Assemblies	5?
10/28	Frankfurt/Oder	General Assembly	(Wednesday)
	Kustrin	General Assembly	(Wednesday)
	Hamburg	General Assembly	3 (Thursday)
10/29	Berlin	General Assemblies	
	Spandau	Party Guard	5
10/30	Neuköln/Stadium	S. A. Assembly	
	Schönholz	S. A. Assembly	
	Wilmerdorf/Viktoria- garten	S. A. Assembly	3?
10/31	Dresden/Stadium	General Assembly	
	Neustrelitz	General Assembly	
	Stettin	General Assembly	3
11/1	Braunschweig	General Assembly	
	Schöneberg	General Assembly	2
11/2	Gesundbrunnen	General Assembly	
	Tempelhof	General Assembly	
	Mariendorf	General Assembly	
	Südende	General Assembly	4
11/4	Wittenau	General Assembly	
	Schonholz	General Assembly	
	Pankow	General Assemblies	
	Berlin/Tennishallen	General Assembly	6
11/14	Berlin	Comradeship Evening	1
11/19	Berlin	Comradeship Evening	1
11/25	Berlin/Tennishallen	Administrators	1
11/27	Weimar/Weimar Halle	Administrators	1
11/30	Eisenach	Election campaign	
	Apolda	Election campaign	2
12/1	Berlin	General Assembly	
	Arnstadt	General Assembly	
	Blankenburg	General Assembly	3?
12/2	Weimar	General Assembly	?
12/4	Karlshorst	Administrators	1

Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1932			
12/12	Brandenburg Berlin	District Day	2?
12/15	Berlin	Administrators' Assembly	1
12/18	Hagen	Administrators	
	Essen/Zirkus	Administrators	
	Münster	Administrators	(Sunday)
	Düsseldorf/Tonhallen- säle	Administrators	4
12/22	Berlin/Pharussale Kriegsvereinshaus	Christmas Celebration	2
12/23	Berlin/Vossstrasse	Co-Workers of Goebbels	1

1933			
1/4	Salzuflen Herford	Mass Demonstration	1?
1/5	Berlin/Sportpalast	Last Rites for Hitler- Youth Wagnits and Attack Upon Schleicher Cabinet	1
1/7	Berlin/Lustgarten	Mass Demonstration	1
1/8	Spandau	District Day	
	Lichterfelde	District Day	2
1/9	Lippe District	General Assemblies	3
1/10	Lippe Detmold District	General Assemblies	3
1/12	Lippe Detmold District	General Assemblies	2 (Wednesday)
1/13	Lippe Detmold District	General Assemblies	
	Unnamed Village	General Assembly	3
1/14	Lippe District/3 farm villages	General Assemblies	3
1/15	Neuköln	S. A. Men	1
1/16	Weimar	District Leaders Meeting	?
1/20	Berlin/Sportpalast	Administrators	1
1/25	Gleiwitz	General Assembly	
	Beuthen	General Assembly	2
1/28	Rostock	Student Organization	1
2/2	Berlin	District Leaders	
	Potsdam	General Assembly	2
2/3	Ulap	Hitler-Youth Assembly	1
2/5	Berlin	Eulogy at Grave of S. A. Man Maikowski and Police Sargeant Zauritz	1
2/9	Berlin	Informative to District Leaders and Press Repre- sentatives of Berlin	
	Tennishallen	Administrators	2 (Monday)
2/10	Berlin/Sportpalast	Introduction to Hitler's Radio Speech	1
2/12	Potsdam/Schlosshof Steglitz	General Assembly	2
2/15	Stuttgart	Introduction to Hitler's Radio Speech	1


Date	Place	Audience	No. of times per Day
1933			
2/17	Dortmund/Westfalen- halle	Introduction to Hitler's Radio Speech	1
2/18	Essen/Ausstellungs- hallen	General Assembly	1
2/19	Köln/Ausstellungs- hallen	Introduction to Hitler's Speech- Demonstration	1
2/20	Berlin/Tennishallen	General Assembly	1
2/23	Hannover	Mass Demonstration in Tent	2
2/24	Frankfurt/Festhalle		2
2/24	Berlin/Sportpalast	Attack on Socialist Party	1
3/1	Breslau/Jahrhundert- halle	Introduction to Hitler's Radio Speech and Demonstration	1
3/2	Berlin/Sportpalast Autohalle	Demonstration Demonstration	2?
3/4	Hamburg Königsberg	Demonstration "Day of the Awakening Nation"	2
3/6	Berlin/Sportpalast	Party Guard	1
3/11	Berlin/Lustgarten Ausstellungshallen	Mass Demonstration Introduction to Hitler's Speech	2
3/13	Berlin	Co-Workers of District Berlin	1
3/15	Berlin	Press Conference	1
3/22	Potsdam	Reichstag Demonstration	?
3/28	Berlin/Kaiserhof	Representatives of Movie Industry	1
3/31	Berlin/Tennishallen	Administrators	1
4/1	Berlin/Lustgarten Müggelbergen	Bismark Memorial	2?
4/6	Berlin/Propaganda Ministry	"On Freedom of Press"	1
4/8	Berlin/Sportpalast	S. A. Men Demonstration Introduction to Hitler's Speech	2
4/20	Berlin/Städtische Oper	Hitler's Birthday Radio - Hitler's Birthday	2
4/25	Rheydt/Gymnasium	Students of High School which Goebbels attended in youth	
5/1	Köln	Radio Speech	3 (Monday)
5/1	Berlin/Lustgarten Tempelhofer Feld	Children Giant Nazi Rally	2

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