WALTER LIPPMANN AND HIS VIEWS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1914-1935

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ABSTRACT

WALTER LIPPMANN AND HIS VIEWS
OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1914-1935

By

Roger L. Zuercher

Walter Lippmann became keenly aware of American foreign affairs in the summer of 1914. From the beginnings of World War I to Italy's invasion of Ethopia in October of 1935, the Lippmann writing career showed his increased interest in international issues and revealed his varying degrees of influence on decision-makers. Lippmann's skill as an analyst and writer gained recognition throughout the country and his columns attracted the attention of national leaders such as Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.

Lippmann's writing in books, newspaper columns, and magazine articles about foreign policy issues is the subject of this study. The study seeks to show the philosophical underpinnings of Lippmann thinking, for it was these that gave Lippmann views unusual perspective. Finally, his relationship to national leaders received some assessment, although this part of the work was severely limited because of restricted access to Lippmann papers.

Lippmann writings on American foreign policy are plentiful, if not overwhelming in sheer volume. With the

exception of Lippmann's books, all of his printed public material is on microfilm at Yale University and the study of Lippmann columns in The New Republic, the New York World, and "Today and Tomorrow" columns constituted a major source of his foreign policy analysis. Lippmann Reminiscences in the Oral History Research Project at Columbia University provided further insight. In addition to certain newspaper and magazine articles, Lippmann books offered wider, more far-ranging views of the international community. The Colonel Edward M. House papers and the Henry L. Stimson collection, both at Yale University, furnished some personal letters of Lippmann.

Lippmann believed in the liberal tradition of the Western world. He argued that man should be free in mind and action in the face of changing circumstances. Lippmann thought man must be able to balance the liberties of individual man and the authority of men's governments. If men were to be creative and hopeful about their existence, they had to be politically free and economically independent. To Lippmann, democratic governments and capitalistic economies provided the best opportunities available for men to continue the traditions of the West.

During the first two years of World War I and throughout the 1920's, Lippmann favored cautious relations with Europe. But he also realized that if America's economic place in the world were to grow the United States would have to be deeply concerned about European, as well

as Asian, stability. He was appalled by the Treaty of Versailles. It served as a victor's peace through war guilt assignment, war reparations, and boundary line re-arrangement. The only hope for a world peace, he believed, was through the League of Nations that would adjust differences created by the end of the war and the peace settlement. As many others in the United States, Lippmann believed that the Washington Conferences treaties and war outlawry could be affective world peace instruments in the 1920's.

The Great Depression and its massive world consequences brought forces to surface in the international scene that revealed the importance of national self-interest around the world. Lippmann's disillusionment set in slowly--but certainly. The Western collective security system had broken down. Japanese actions in Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Ethopia proved that. Lippmann believed League enforcement simply did not have the backing of the members' will to use power. The United States, he argued, should concentrate on domestic economic recovery; stay out of Europe's unstable situation; and quietly maneuver Japan's aggressive intentions toward a power balance in the Far East. If worse came to worse, Anglo-American unity could be relied upon to restrict world dictatorships and protect Western institutions.

Lippmann writings in the 1930's showed him facing world economic and political forces that threatened to over-throw traditions of the West and replace them with highly nationalistic governments and economies. Lippmann responded by attempting to stimulate democracies to act rapidly, but their virtues of independence and liberty made them react sluggishly and the state of the economy remained poor. Lippmann recommended the increase of temporary state government control based on the public good. It would eliminate democratic excesses in the face of a potentially devastating crisis.

The scholar in a troubled world clarified issues and wrote of his findings with such clarity that he, himself, became a force in helping people understand and leaders act. But he failed to take his own advice in the 1930's of keeping distance from daily events. Events over-whelmed him and his recommended solutions brought dilemma and despair.

WALTER LIPPMANN AND HIS VIEWS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1914-1935

By

Roger L. Zuercher

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Roger L. Zuercher
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CHAPTER ONE

LIPPMANN'S EARLY YEARS AND HIS GROWING AWARENESS OF HUMAN NATURE, 1899-1914

In late July of 1914, Walter Lippmann had finished his brief tour of Belgium and he looked across the border into Germany. Lippmann felt great anticipation as he envisioned a quick trip across Germany that would end in Switzerland where he would happily walk mountain passes. To his surprise and pique, Lippmann found that the German border was closed. Belgium and Germany were near war.[1]

Lippmann, twenty-four years old in the summer of 1914, intended to enjoy the interim before taking a new position. In the early fall the young journalist would join the editorial staff of a new magazine that was designed to start " 'little insurrections in the minds of readers.' "[2] The first issue of The New Republic was scheduled for November of 1914.

Lippmann's early life included a loving family which consisted of a Jewish-German father, Jacob--a book-loving mother, Daisy--and an affectionate maternal grandmother.

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[1]Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1943), p. IX.

[2]Gregg M. Campbell, "Walter Lippmann: An Intellectual and Biographical Analysis of A Preface to Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1967), p. 96.

An only child, he was given the best of everything: love, books, private schools, and European travel. Years later Lippmann admitted that "it was possible for an American in those days to be totally unconscious of the world he lived in."[3] The secure cacoon wound about his early years spared him the impact of many forces that less fortunate youngsters would experience every day. The horror of broken furniture, frayed coats, and gray faces lined by life's miseries would not encroach upon Lippmann's experience until his Harvard years. Prior to July of 1914, he viewed Europe as a vacationland.[4] But when he stood in the lobby of the House of Commons on August 4, 1914 and heard Britain declare war on Germany, his cacoon of earlier, happy years fell away.[5] The world had impinged upon his private life--in a massive way.

One should not infer, however, that Lippmann experienced a young life devoid of discipline, ideals, and sensitivity. His world opened slowly but constantly, and he learned early to use experience. Although his family adored him, he did not indulge himself in family protection. He was not slothful about his school work and activities. He starred as a most capable student at Dr. Julius Sach's private school for

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[3]Lippmann, Shield of the Republic, p. IX.

[4]Francine Curro Cary, The Influence of War on Walter Lippmann, 1914-1944 (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1967), pp. 2-3.

[5]Lippmann, Shield of the Republic, p. IX.

boys (1896-1906) in New York city. He entered Harvard in 1906 and the next four years proved momentous to Lippmann, the hard-driving, highly disciplined, and brilliant student.

During his Harvard years, Lippmann came in contact with such magnificent minds as William James, George Santayana, and Graham Wallas. In addition, his classmates included Heywood Broun, Alan Seeger, Stuart Chase, John Reed, and T. S. Eliot.[7] Amidst this galaxy of thinkers and thinkers-to-be, he began to discover new designs of thought and types of action. His attitudes toward humans began taking different shapes as he visited with Professor Emeritus James and worked for George Santayana. Probably one of the greatest intellectual influences on Lippman's life was Graham Wallas' thinking. Lippmann never became a pragmatist, for Santayana had talked him out of that, but he became most interested in intellectual attempts to control man's irrationality.[8] Lippmann, following Wallas' thinking, believed men's lives would be bettered if they became aware of impulse and attempted to control it.

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[6]Carl Binger, "A Child of Enlightenment," Marquis Childs and James Reston, eds., Walter Lippmann and His Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1959), pp. 22-24.

[7]John Mason Brown, Through These Men: Some Aspects of Our Passing History (New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1956), p. 209.

[8]Ibid., p. 210.

Lippmann's acute interest in attempting to use man's reason to subdue irrationality and the human pain which it caused is best demonstrated when he witnessed the tragic poverty that a Palm Sunday fire in the Boston slums of Chelsea drove out onto the streets. He observed, first hand, a type of life that he had never seen before, and he was appalled. The irrationality of a national government, rooted in democracy, allowing these conditions to exist drove him to help establish the first Socialist Club at Harvard in 1909. He became its president.

Moving away from simply contemplating humanistic considerations and aesthetic values, which James and Santayana encouraged, Lippmann found a sympathetic spirit in Graham Wallas, who taught as a visiting lecturer at Harvard in 1910. Wallas had published Human Nature in Politics two years before his American trip and Lippmann read it. He attended Wallas' lectures and these inspired him to follow a portion of the Wallas characterization of life: man should be the center of politics but, unfortunately, man was perverse, illogical, and mercurial.[9] However, at age twenty, Lippmann showed no timidity about attempting to reform mankind's impulsive habits. With the vision of the Chelsea's bedraggled residents, hopelessly trying to save their pitiful belongings from fire, Lippmann set out, through the Socialist Club, to organize a reasonable program that would place

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[9]Campbell, Intellectual Analysis, pp. 39-40.

man at the center of politics and protect him from himself; that is, to free the finer instincts.[10]

Lippmann soon found great difficulty in sorting among many critical issues and arriving at two or three major concerns around which he could weave a reasonable program. What was to become one of his major struggles in his professional life became an immediate problem for his reform zeal in 1909. He had to balance intellect and emotion, for these seemed to be intricate parts of his social reform.[11] He quickly discovered that people were not much interested in saving themselves from impulse, let alone spare others.

The young reformer finished his course work at Harvard in 1909, a year ahead of schedule, and worked for George Santayana in 1910. In that same year, Lincoln Steffens came to Harvard looking for a recent graduate who would prove the muckraker's point that a college trained, bright, young man could be just as an effective reporter as the old "hard knock" professionals. Lippmann was his man and he left Boston Common, a new crusading magazine, to become a "cub" and "leg man" for Everybody's magazine. Lippmann would not forget Steffens' help on his writing style and the lessons learned about reportorial analytical methods that would get results.[12] He

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[10] Ibid., p. 33.

[11] Ibid., p. 44.

[12] William E. Leuchtenburg, "Introduction and Notes," Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (1914: rpt. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 2.

did well, but boredom set in and the "cub" wanted to move on. He believed that he had found an opportunity to pursue his Socialistic ideas when he consented to becoming the executive secretary to a newly elected Socialist mayor in Schenectady, New York. In order to leave Everybody's Lippmann gladly joined the Reverend George Lunn, Schenectady's new head of city government, in early 1912. He hoped that this New York city would become a model Socialist town. To his deep disappointment, he found that Lunn, like other mayors, had to "play politics," and that gas and water rates required much time and discussion.[13] Lippmann found also that to move public opinion one must be patient and willing to settle for small goals. If the public acted at all, it did so slowly. In May of 1912, he resigned his position to seek seclusion.

Lippmann reached a major turning point of his life in the summer of 1912. He found it necessary to retreat to the Maine woods to read and to think. He had been "politically active," so to speak, since 1909 when he had helped to found and direct the Socialist Club at Harvard. He had worked for the Boston Common, and he had been chosen by Lincoln Steffens to work for Everybody's magazine, an important honor for one so young. He participated in what he assumed would be a model Socialist city when he agreed to become Mayor George Lunn's secretary. By the summer of 1912, Lippman had faced several political instances of frustration and disappointment.

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[13]Campbell, Intellectual Analysis, p. 59.

People did not seem to be interested in lives regularly guided by reason and concern for others. Graham Wallas had written about men's impulsive behavior and Lippmann recognized the importance of the irrational element. He had hoped that Socialism with its concern for the welfare of all the people would find wide acceptance, but now he was ready to conclude that people cared little about social reform. He was disappointed too to find that the Socialists themselves were ill-prepared to lead. They bogged down in menial interests and lost their vision. Thus, a disillusioned Lippmann needed a rest from the cares of the world, and he sought privacy.

While at his retreat in Maine, Lippmann wrote A Preface to Politics and it was published the next year, 1913. Lippmann had learned to expect public indifference to American political affairs, but he was likewise determined to try to awaken some to major issues and stimulate them to action.[14] He wanted politics to center on man's needs rather than cater to worn-out creeds or crusty dogma. But he knew that by keeping man's necessities as the pivot for politics he was touching a shadowy and dangerously loaded area called impulse or the irrational. To attempt to form programs that would last any length of time on the constantly shifting grounds of man's impulse seemed folly at best.

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[14]Brown, Through These Men, p. 214.

Graham Wallas' influence is seen throughout A Preface to Politics as Lippmann constantly struggled with recognizing man as a willful animal. He searched for ways to control the animal's power and turn it into a positive force, a moral equivalent. Man's myths were expressions of will, Lippmann contended, and most often man used reason to serve irrational needs.[15] One must recognize individual man's irrationality, Lippmann argued, and he must also deal with many humans collected into a group which eventually formed public opinion.[16] By humans congregating and forming groups, the understanding and anticipated regulation of their impulses were compounded many times over.

Lippman perceived the rapidly changing political, moral, social, and economic conditions that the twentieth century brought. He was part of a progressive era that included Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. He felt, as many of the progressives did, that man could control his destiny--at least the present could be made more comfortable. But most of all, Lippmann explained, "the measure of our self-consciousness will more or less determine whether we are to be the victims or the masters of change."[17] In A Preface to

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[15]Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (1913; rpt. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 173 and 177.

[16]Ibid., p. 77.

[17]Ibid., p. 237

Politics, the twenty-three year old writer placed strong faith in an individual called a statesman. The statesman accepted human nature as it was, and noted that much of man's behavior was impulsive and irrational.[18] The statesman would be the one who helped to make man self-conscious and who would guide humans toward a better life.

Seemingly, a human facing the unthinking behavior of man might feel that his task of overwhelming impulse would be nearly insurmountable. But Lippmann and his statesman figure opted for an ordered existence. The statesman would be an intermediary between the people and the experts. The latter were to be trained formally as scientists, industrial organizers, engineers, architects, and educators who provided direction and organization for the people.[19] The statesman would help the people recognize issues and trigger their hope for a brighter tomorrow. At the same time, he kept the experts atune to the people's major needs.[20] In effect, the statesman became a catalyst who mixed the people and the experts, and that mix would be constructive by meeting serious human needs constantly.

Lippmann's ideal, then, was to expose that which seemed to be the basic energy of mankind: impulse, irrationality.

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[18] Ibid., p. 224.

[19] Ibid., p. 225.

[20] Ibid., p. 188.

By exposing it, man would attempt to clarify its major outlines. At best, humans would come to understanding about their individual or group motives, and set out to make them more reasonable. In A Preface to Politics, he placed great responsibility upon the statesman who delineated need, gathered power, and encouraged an ordered existence.[21]

When A Preface to Politics was published in January of 1913, it caused some stir in intellectual circles. In August of 1913, one reviewer expressed great faith in Lippmann's righteousness: the young author urged incentives for right conduct.[22] The next month an unsigned review in The Nation scathed Lippmann for "his rather juvenile and cocksure pronouncements on such things as art, morals, and religion."[23] Graham Wallas was deeply disturbed by his former student's first attempt at extended political analysis. Wallas devoted the preface of his next book, The Great Society (1914) to Lippmann:

PREFACE

Dear Walter Lippmann,

> This book develops the material of that discussion-course ("Government 31") which you joined during my stay at Harvard in the spring of 1910.

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[21] Ibid., p. 226.

[22] Wallace Rice, rev. of Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (1913), Dial, 55, 16 August 1913, p. 115.

[23] The Nation, 97, 11 September 1913, p. 242.

> Now that the book is finished, I can see, more clearly than I could while I was writing it, what it is about; and in particular what its relation is to my Human Nature in Politics (1908). I may, therefore, say briefly that the earlier book was an analysis of representative government, which turned into an argument against nineteenth-century intellectualism; and that this book is an analysis of the general social organization of a large modern state, which has turned, at times, into an argument against certain forms of twentieth-century anti-intellectualism.
>
> I send it to you in the hope that it may be of some help when you write that sequel to your Preface to Politics for which all your friends are looking.--
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> GRAHAM WALLAS.[24]

Obviously, Wallas experienced some guilt about leading Lippmann toward what his former mentor thought was a dangerous degree of anti-intellectualism.

Lippmann left the Maine woods and its seclusion. Especially, after the publication of A Preface to Politics, he had signaled that his retreat was over and successful. He stood ready, once again, to enter the arena where everyday life engaged ideals. Through Lincoln Steffens, he joined a group that met weekly at Mable Dodge's Fifth Avenue residence in New York. Its clientele included artists, musicians, and intellectuals. Here he had the pleasure of contact with other Socialists and likewise with men who had other intellectual interests. Lippman's zest for close reason and tight organization bridled at free-flowing discussions that touched

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[24]Graham Wallas, The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis (1914; rpt; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921), p. V.

upon many subjects during an evening. He suggested to Miss Dodge, in February of 1913, that each meeting have a theme such as magazine evening or psychoanalytic evening. She agreed reluctantly.[25]

Lippmann's commitment to public involvement increased as the winter of 1913 turned toward spring. He continued to read, however, and Henri Bergson, Frederick Nietsche, and Georges Sorel received much of his attention. He regularly attended the Dodge salon, and this kept him in contact with "Movers and Shakers" (Dodge's phrase for those who attended her salon), especially Socialists. He took part in labor demonstrations and wrote for The Masses.[26] Although he was becoming increasingly wary of Socialists, he joined "Big Bill" Haywood, Lincoln Steffens, and Emma Goldman in speech-making at Rutgers Square. They spoke in behalf of Frank Tennenbaum, a young radical of the day, who had been arrested in early 1913 for leading unemployed to churches and demanding housing.[27]

In that same year, 1913, Herbert Croly--reformer and author of a recent book The Promise of American Life (1909)--approached Lippmann and asked him to become one of the

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[25]Mable Dodge Luhan, Movers and Shakers: Volume Three of Intimate Memories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), p. 92.

[26]Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (Leuchtenburg), p. 4.

[27]Campbell, Intellectual Analysis, p. 95.

co-editors of a yet unnamed magazine. Lippmann accepted and in addition to himself and Croly--Walter Weyl (a fellow progressive and author), Francis Hackett who would become literary editor, and Philip Littell (a close friend and Harvard contemporary of Croly's) made up the first board of editors. The Willard Straights financed and helped direct the periodical's future. Straights' strong belief in America's promise led the young banker-diplomat and his wife to support generously the new publication.

What was to become The New Republic with its first magazine on November 7, 1914 also represented to Walter Lippmann another opportunity to clarify issues and to help solve human problems. In 1913 and 1914 he and the other New Republic editors worked at framing the reform and liberal philosophy which their magazine would represent. Herbert Croly and Walter Weyl had been in the vanguard of a political movement that came to national prominence with the presidential election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912.[28] The progressives, disappointed in President William Howard Taft's seeming lack of executive concern about progressive issues, looked forward to the leadership of Woodrow Wilson. Croly's The Promise of American Life (1909) and Weyl's New Democracy (1912) gave continued intellectual life to the progressive

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[28]Walter Lippmann, "Notes for a Biography," The New Republic, 63, 16 July 1930, p. 250.

movement, and The New Republic would keep the reform banner high. Lippmann happily joined such a dynamic and hopeful group.

Before The New Republic's first publication reached its readers, Lippmann had published his second book. Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (1914). He emphasized the impact of industrialism on society.[29] But a second and very important theme of Drift and Mastery showed Lippmann attempting to soften A Preface to Politics. The idea of throwing off secure traditions like laissez faire capitalism and nineteenth century liberalism scared some thinkers, and Drift and Mastery proved to be Lippmann's attempt to alleviate intellectual fears.

In broader terms, Drift and Mastery revealed Lippmann's philosophical wrestling with compromise and circumstances. Lippmann characterized the modern world, especially the United States, as one where humans were all immigrants. Industrial society had uprooted traditional authority.[30] Inherent within America's modern society were terrors, mostly subjective, that might paralyze constructive action unless issues were clarified and programs adopted. He found rebels

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[29]Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (Leuchtenburg), p. 13.

[30]Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, p. 118.

forgetting their purpose and yelling what they were not. He saw people struggling daily to be somebody, and concluded that humans had become victims of their own weaknesses.[31]

Lippmann severely criticized Woodrow Wilson, for the new president--as things turned out--represented the old liberalism. The President, Lippmann argued, wanted a "nation of villagers." Wilson wished to destroy trusts and re-establish business where competition kept all concerned honest. He contended that Wilson had forgotten the evils of the past.[32] At the same time the Socialists received Lippmann's sharp criticism. The Socialists, he charged, were trying to re-make America into the Europe of 1850. By doing so, they ignored America's contemporary circumstances. The Socialists, according to Lippmann, failed to deal with American trusts, unions, and foreign policy.[33]

Lippmann cautioned reformers that if they succeeded in destroying large portions of a society's tradition, they must be prepared for immediate substitution for that tradition. All too often, Lippmann contended in Drift and Mastery, liberals or reformers neglected to think through a philosophy and plan of action that would move a nation forward. They

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[31] Ibid., pp. 137-139.

[32] Ibid., p. 84.

[33] Ibid., p. 167.

often concentrated too heavily on rejecting what existed. Thus, when reformers' plans succeeded, they might create drift, and chaos would be near.[34]

Lippmann reaffirmed that man's affairs could be ordered to some degree--even in the face of a modern world that perpetually changed. He continued to recognize man's irrationality and the struggle that went on in men and among others, the most salient and continuous aspect of which was that of emotion and intellect vying for dominance. He recognized these elements as the possible major causes for America's unrest. But, he argued, Americans were fortunate to live in a democratic society where wrong was not a matter of life or death, but a difference between better and worse.[35] He returned to the past, which must have pleased some of his critics, and found that the present was temporary and that others had made mistakes as well.[36]

To Lippmann mastery meant that one substituted "conscious intention for unconscious striving."[37] He wrote: "Search the world as we find it, extricate the forces that seem to move it, and surround them with criticism and suggestion."[38] The only hope for world unity or America's

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[34] Ibid., pp. 24 and 126.

[35] Ibid., p. 62.

[36] Ibid., p. 162.

[37] Ibid., p. 148.

[38] Ibid., p. 18.

peace, as he saw it, lay in a method rather than a set of goals. The method included intellect, reason, criticism, analysis, and synthesis. He declared that reflection was the beginning of control and that other attributes would follow as they led one toward mastery.[39]

Yet, he was not prepared to be content with merely a scientific approach to understanding and directing society. He contended that man must couple scientific method to a morality that supported acceptable human action--rather than use moral codes which told people what was wrong. Science alone could not serve as the dynamic; reform relied on emotional appeals.[40]

Lippmann did not turn away from the statesman figure that he portrayed in A Preface to Politics. He saw the statesman in Drift and Mastery directing people to fine living: "to live ready, to lighten experience by a knowledge of its alternatives, to let no fact be opaque, but to make what happens transparent with the choices it offers."[41] The statesman continued to be a clarifier of issues, an awakener of men's potential, and a critic who tempered emotion with intellect and who softened intellect with emotion.

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[39] Ibid., p. 148.

[40] Ibid., pp. 152-156.

[41] Ibid., p. 174.

Lippmann's early years encompassed the change of centuries. American life, for those financially secure, in the 1890's and into the first dozen years of the twentieth-century provided an exciting and hopeful time. Industrialism stimulated material abundance beyond dreams. Inventions tumbled into existence one on top of the other. Cities grew and frontiers closed. The American spirit seemed to be caught up in material progress that meant comfort and no end of confidence for the rich and well-born. American nationalism became sharply evident when the United States decided in the spring of 1898 to save Cubans from Spanish domination. Cuba, the Philippines, and other Caribbean and Pacific islands came under America's umbrella of protection by 1903, and the United States officially became an empire.

Lippmann wrote, in retrospect, that in addition to this era of the fin de siecle being easy years for one to be unconscious of his times, he simply failed to grasp the consequences of the Spanish-American War. As a child of nine, he had been excited by Admiral George Dewey's victory in Manila Bay. He read eagerly of America's win in the Battle of Santiago, and he had learned from his grandfather that wherever the American flag was planted, "there tyranny must disappear."[42] After college and much reading about public affairs, he "remained quite innocent of any understanding

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[42]Lippmann, Shield of the Republic, p. viii.

of the Spanish American War." In fact, he came out of college in 1910 thinking that Theodore Roosevelt was a bit eccentric. "He kept harping on the Panama Canal and the navy." Lippmann felt that the money spent for canals and navies would be better spent on schoolhouses.[43]

Lippmann arrived at a philosophy early in his career which, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that all of life was an experiment. He learned from experience and he generally proved unafraid to change his position when facts dictated rearrangement. His Chelsea fire experience urged him toward Socialism, but by the late fall of 1914 he had decided that Socialists would not meet America's needs and he dropped them completely. William James, George Santayana, and Graham Wallas reaffirmed his belief that life could be lived reasonably, but it was Wallas who helped Lippmann see that man's nature thrived on the irrational. It was Wallas, in Human Nature in Politics, who suggested that the irrational could be put to constructive use, if properly served and guided. Wallas triggered Lippmann's thinking about man's condition and how to improve it.

During the Roosevelt and Taft administrations, Lippmann endeavored to formulate a philosophy and plan of action that placed man's nature and his finer instincts side by side. He was fortunate to live in a reform era where

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[43] Ibid., p. viii.

thought and action supported, and sometimes stimulated, his thinking and projected plans. Lippmann's faith in himself and man, in general, sustained his idealism when seeming dilemmas meant sure destruction of any program that would attempt to include reason, emotion, and imagination in controlled doses. He participated weakly in the arena from time to time, but it became obvious that his real niche would be in the tower where he could observe, think, and write without the clamor and dust of daily political demands and frustration. Lippmann needed the quiet and distance that an observer's post supplied. At the same time, however, he realized the need to be heard and considered if he were to have a modicum of influence.

Lippmann's joining the editorial staff of The New Republic in 1913 was not unpredictable, but it proved to be a major change in his intellectual stance. He had joined the respectable reformers. The progressives did not intend to change America's basic governmental or economic institutions. They wanted a more equitable distribution of the wealth that seemed to stick at the top and failed to trickle down. The respectable Willard Straights provided substantial funds to get the new publication started, and its editorial staff was hardly filled with "wild-eyed radicals." The New Republic provided Lippmann with the beginnings of an effective attachment to national, and eventually international, power.

The beginning of the Great War forced New Republic editors to consider new priorities. To move the understanding and attempted control of man's nature from an American setting to a world surrounding presented giant challenges to progressives and especially to Lippmann's statesman figure who extolled scientific method. Graham Wallas had warned Lippmann in 1910 that a "great war might soon break out and that if it did, it would probably smoulder on for thirty years." Lippman remembered that prediction and he doubted then that the war "would ever touch me or jeopardize the interests of the country."[44] Lippmann discovered to his dismay that the war came, and that it did, indeed, touch him and America's interests.

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[44] Ibid., p. IX.

CHAPTER TWO

LIPPMANN'S ATLANTIC: FROM MOAT TO HIGHWAY-- AUGUST, 1914 TO JUNE, 1917

With the war's beginning in August of 1914, The New Republic's staff "had to improvise a new philosophy on very short notice." In the first issue, which appeared on November 7, Herbert Croly, its senior editor, declared that American isolation was over and that American neutrality "was played out." He suggested further "that under certain circumstances, such as the threat of German victory, it would be necessary for America to enter the war." Walter Lippmann agreed.[1]

Lippmann had written previously in A Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery of a statesman figure who clarified issues, gathered power, and urged intellect's control of irrationality. At age twenty-five in the fall of 1914, it may have come to Lippmann's attention that he might have to assume the statesman's role. For the war created a need for one who could identify and help resolve the numerous and complex issues it had produced. The New Republic served as one of his major instruments for defining issues and for awakening

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[1] Lippmann, "Notes for a Biography," The New Republic, p. 251.

man's potential to control irrational behavior. From November of 1914 to June of 1917, Lippmann struggled with collective emotionalism that war visited, and the young journalist began a life's career of influencing national leaders who could curb destructive impulses of international scope.

The New Republic's editors, especially Lippmann, seemed confused in the fall and early winter of 1914. Their editorial convictions espoused a "policy of nonpartisan activity, a policy of refusing to state problems in terms of black and white, a policy of starting 'little insurrections in the minds of readers'....They believed in rational planning and control of the future."[2] But war overwhelmed their thinking. Was not violence, especially violence among nations, a massive breakdown in reason? Lippmann showed despair in the charter issue of The New Republic. He found the war in Europe engulfing the "reality of a nation," and he asserted dismally that "to live finely (was) a derelect hope." Lippmann declared, however, true to New Republic philosophy, that "the best argument against cannon is ideas." He remained aloof from the war, and urged America to avoid the horror of blindly stumbling into unnecessary violence.[3]

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[2]David W. Noble, The Paradox of Progressive Thought (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 5 and 37.

[3]Walter Lippmann, "Force and Ideas," The New Republic, 7 November 1914 in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ed., Walter Lippmann: Early Writings (New York: Liverright Publishing Corporation, 1970), pp. 4-5.

Preoccupied with logic and reason, Lippmann shunned the realities of war and asked philosophical questions: What does it mean to be aggressive? What is a war for freedom? What does it mean to be a chosen race?[4] A month later he continued to concern himself with matters other than the critical, practical problems of the day. He worried about the future and how peace could be made secure. Lippmann contended that Germany, Russia, and Japan should be democratized. Of central importance to understanding their aggression was the failure of these nations to respect the worth and dignity of human life. Democracies did not have correct answers to all problems, but they had high regard for the individual and invested more in each life than did non-democratic nations. If lives were valued more highly by all people, wrote Lippmann, war would seem senseless and national economies would support social reform more than war.[5] Unlike his co-editors who had written the previous week that "a nation does not commit the great sin when it fights. It commits the great sin when it fights for a bad cause," Lippmann had decided for the moment to stay above the flurry of war's arena.[6]

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[4]Lippmann, "Defining Terms," The New Republic, 21 November 1914 in Schlesinger, p. 7.

[5]Lippmann, "Life is Cheap," The New Republic, 19 December 1914 in Schlesinger, pp. 17-19.

[6]Noble, Paradox of Progressive Thought, p. 38.

A Lippmann "acquaintance," John Reed--also a traveling revolutionary--had returned to the United States in the fall of 1914. He and Lippmann had been classmates at Harvard and they extended their sometime friendship after graduation. Reed, who had just visited Europe and experienced the beginnings of World War I, looked forward to the first issue of The New Republic. He had his doubts about a collective belief that its editors shared, for Reed unlike Croly, Lippmann, or Weyel--"had a strong sense of the fallibility of human reason."[7] He read the first few issues and concluded that The New Republic's editors were confused about the war. They seemed to stay above the human condition and wrote logically.[8]

But there was a time in those confusing and critical months of late 1914 when Lippmann aimed specifically at President Woodrow Wilson's actions toward the belligerents. In the November 21 issue of The New Republic, he found Wilson's neutrality to be timid. He felt that since Germany had overrun neutral Belgium on August 3, that the United States should live up to its Hague Convention commitments and back its words with force. By force, Lippmann meant that the United States should use diplomatic leverage and world opinion to stop Germany's aggression. The young

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[7]Granville Hicks with the assistance of John Stuart, John Reed: The Making of a Revolutionary (1936; rpt; New York: Benjamin Blom, 1968), p. 171.

[8]Ibid., p. 172.

journalist feared that America's good intentions would be doubted internally unless the nation was willing to risk enforcement procedures.[9]

Lippmann attacked Wilson on similar grounds of good intentions when the President broke diplomatic precedent by refusing to recognize as de facto president Mexico's new dictator, General Victoriana Huerta. Wilson declared that Huerta did not have the Mexican people's support. America became deeply involved in Mexico's domestic situation and Lippmann wrote in November of 1914 that Wilson was well intentioned--but intentions were not enough for a sound policy. The young journalist declared that "Mr. Wilson has no Mexican policy, yet Mr. Wilson had interfered in Mexico."[10] Thus, Lippmann indicted Wilson: he was too timid toward Europe's affairs and he interfered too much in Mexico.

In those dreary late months of 1914, one sees Lippmann struggling with himself to compose a consistent and effective view of the war's belligerents. To be a man of peace who must advocate violence to maintain a nation's security must have been an awful situation. As John Reed suggested, to adhere to ideas while facing the mouths of smoking cannon

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[9]Lippmann, "Timid Neutrality," The New Republic, 21 November 1914, in Schlesinger, pp. 13-15.

[10]Lippmann, "Vera Cruz," The New Republic, 21 November 1914, in Schlesinger, p. 10.

seemed unreal. But as Lippmann saw it--to use out-and-out violence, a breakdown in reason, to achieve peace seemed equally unreal. Lippmann and most of The New Republic's editors were not pacifists, but neither were they militarists. They felt there was such a thing as "just force" but they also advocated "activism, internationalism, conscious control and cooperation."[11] Lippmann wanted neutrality in the first months of the war, but he obviously felt Germany was wrong when it invaded Belgium. He urged diplomatic corrective measures. Perhaps there existed a moderate, civil use of force that would not destroy the delicate fabric of thought that it had taken nations years to sew.

As long as the war in Europe remained a land war, Americans could safely stay above the conflict and be generally protected by the Atlantic moat.[12] But as belligerents vied for America's business and trade, control of the sea lanes became crucial. Initially, England's sea power appeared to be the most capable of the belligerents to transport and protect needed supplies to Great Britain from the United States. American neutrality became increasingly difficult as the months sped by and 1914 turned to 1915. The British

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[11] The New Republic, 12 December 1914, p. 7 in Noble, Paradox of Progressive Thought, p. 38.

[12] Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography (1936; rpt; Chicago: Quadiangle Books, 1972), pp. 91-92.

wanted trade to the Central Powers restricted and the Central Powers wanted the Allies cut off from the Atlantic life-line. The British mined the North Sea in late 1914 and early 1915, and the Germans announced submarine warfare on February 4, 1915. The Atlantic moat had become a highway that could fatten America's economic coffers and likewise bring the United States closer to the cataclysm.

Lippmann wrote frequently for The New Republic in 1915. Most of his articles, however, concerned domestic affairs. Subjects such as Freud, Rockefeller, and John Reed received note. His foreign policy comments were the basis of a book that he published in the fall.

During the writing of The Stakes of Diplomacy, there was much grist for Lippmann's mill. Germany's submarine warfare had proved to be effective. Allied ships went down with regularity and aboard some of those doomed vessels, American passengers died. The Allies announced a total blockade of the Central Powers on March 1, and the United States found neutrality even more precarious. When a German U-boat sank the Lusitania on May 7, American public opinion became more united--against Germany. Over one thousand people died in the Irish Sea as the Lusitania slipped to the bottom, and of those one thousand--one hundred and twenty-four were Americans. The Lusitania's sinking made total war, that which affected women and children, sharply visible to Americans for the first time.[13]

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[13] Ibid., p. 94.

By the fall of 1915 when The Stakes of Diplomacy first appeared, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan had resigned and Robert Lansing, a former counsel to the State Department, had become the new Secretary. Wilson's position toward German underwater warfare had stiffened, and the Arabic pledge gladdened American hearts. Germany's declaration of September 1 promised to warn and evacuate passenger liners before they were torpedoed.[14]

Much of Lippmann's fall publication which was the result of nearly a year's analysis of American foreign policy looked to the future. The young analyst contended that the major weakness of world diplomacy lay in its weak states. If only nations such as Africa, Turkey, China, portions of Latin America and the Balkans could be strengthened. Should they gain enough power to fend for themselves, then their cheap labor, raw materials, and political inexperience would not lure major powers to their borders.

Lippmann recognized in The Stakes of Diplomacy that the core of nations seeking overseas expansion rested on a nation's flag following its merchants' trade. The usual pattern of imperialism, according to Lippmann, was that financial groups entered a weak state, set up "national interests," and expected protection for their endeavors. The weak state proved incapable of defending international

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[14] Ibid., p. 96.

concerns within its borders, and the businessmen then turned to their home government. Patriotic demands with profit bases prodded the home government to help its merchants and political control of the weak state followed.[15] Somehow, Lippmann argued, world diplomacy must seek to organize virgin territory and backward people. They must be made strong enough to avoid being exploited.[16]

Unfortunately for Lippmann, his analysis of problems in world diplomacy faced serious difficulties. The grave questions of who should intervene, how should intervention be accomplished and for what reasons, appeared to be unanswerable. He had cited previously in The Stakes of Diplomacy and other writings the importance of emotion in human relations. To allow an open door solution for equal intervention in virgin territory, Lippmann suggested, seemed to ignore various self-interests that intervening nations would bring to a weak state. Lippmann realized, as well, that organizations such as The Hague and diplomatic procedures such as arbitration would have little constructive influence on strengthening weak states, and they surely had not worked in the past.[17]

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[15] Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1915), pp. 105 and 159.

[16] Ibid., pp. 87-88 and 166.

[17] Ibid., pp. 134-135.

Lippmann recommended, finally, that in order for world diplomacy to solve the task of obtaining permanent peace, that nations would have to be less nationalistic. They should use international forces like finance, commerce, labor, science, and human sympathy to diminish sovereignty and to weaken separatism. He urged that people be educated away from national loyalties and be encouraged to embrace federal citizenship. He saw democracies leading other world governments to a more ecumencial and sympathetic view of the human condition.[18] In effect, Lippmann sought a balance of needs and wants among the world's powers.

True to himself and to New Republic editorial beliefs, Lippmann's The Stakes of Diplomacy had looked ahead, beyond war, and projected a planned future based on the major serious problem of world diplomacy. By sorting among issues that flooded American leaders in 1914 and 1915, he served as a shadow to the statesman that he found important in Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery. His idea of a supreme cause of the world's unsettled condition and plan to soothe the uneasiness helped to preserve his and his co-editors' ideas that human reason might organize the world into a less abrasive situation. Thus, The Stakes of Diplomacy gave Lippmann the opportunity to stay above the fray, once again, and look off into the distance--hoping for a world free of war.

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[18] Ibid., pp. 189 and 228.

The Stakes of Diplomacy scrutinized the plight that war had brought to America's diplomacy, and characterized the tremendous power that an American president possessed as director of the nation's foreign affairs. Lippmann described the Chief Executive's control over the country's collective emotion. The President could stimulate American public opinion to flow into traditional foreign policy molds by using phrases such as "The Monroe Doctrine," "The Open Door," or "No Entangling Alliances." Wilson chose not to excite the press toward patriotism. A year prior to publication, Lippmann had chastized Wilson for not backing treaty commitments, but in his latest book he showed admiration for the President's restraint in not triggering public emotion over the Lusitania's sinking.[19] He had kept the United States out of war.

Lippmann's New Republic articles on foreign policy appeared again in December of 1915. He faced squarely problems that confronted America's efforts to remain neutral. At home, he recognized political power that German-Americans wielded. Germany, he wrote, knew that Americans could not speak as one voice, and they had counted on this happening. Lippmann deplored America's internal tolerance of varying opinions in time of war. He asserted in an unusually harsh

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[19] Lippmann, "Timid Neutrality," The New Republic, 21 November 1914 in Schlesinger, pp. 13-15. Lippmann, Stakes of Diplomacy, pp. 20 and 24.

dictum that a policy of "coercive Americanization" should be used. Lippmann continued his Realpolitik mood by declaring that the United States had "no consistent foreign policy and no consistent nationalism." Foreign policy had varied as situations arose and American nationalism was just raw material ready to be used.[20]

The New Republic editor blanched, however, when Ralph Barton Perry--a philosopher at Harvard and close friend of William James--had accused The New Republic of being pro-German and that the new journal had failed to deal with war guilt. Lippmann dismissed the charges as "nonsense," pointing out that the immediate concern of The New Republic was the world's postwar structure. Lippmann argued that hatred was a luxury, "a refuge of those who are too angry to think."[21] By contemplating the future and the conditions of peace after the war, one might avoid unproductive debates over relatively unimportant issues.

Lippmann repeated his earlier condemnation of what he called President Wilson's "timid neutrality," but he offered nothing in the way of constructive alternatives. He noted that the closing days of 1915 found Americans uneasy and uncertain about the nation's policies. The country, he said, moved in fits and starts--"rattle the saber--turn

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[20]Lippmann, "Hyphens and Frontiers," The New Republic, 4 December 1915, 5, pp. 116-117.

[21]Lippmann, "Are We Pro-German," The New Republic, 18 December 1915 in Schlesinger, pp. 23-25.

the cheek." In pursuing neutrality the President has expected us "to feel and feel and feel and never to use that feeling is to grow distracted and worrisome, and to no end." President Wilson was not providing leadership, Lippmann declared, and it was high time that he rally the nation and do something.[22]

During Lippmann's first year of examining America's foreign relations, he exemplified a young thinker struggling with what was and what ought to be. War, of course, increased the pressures that crises create, and Lippmann--not unpredictably, attempted to stay above the storm. He sought to apply reason to problems that stimulated humans to destroy one another in an organized and massive way. When considering daily difficulties which faced national leaders, he became realistic. America ought to back its international commitments with pressure diplomacy. She should not make agreements if she intended no enforcement risks. America ought to squelch its own dissenters during wartime, and the nation's leaders should take advantage of an unused nationalism. Above all, the President should lead the country toward something--the people needed an emotional rallying point.

Lippmann's brand of statesmanship became pronounced in 1914 and 1915 when he considered what ought to be. His cool light of reason shone brightly as he sorted among international

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[22]Lippmann, "Uneasy America," The New Republic, 25 December 1915, 5, pp. 195-196.

issues, found what he considered to be the key problem, and then proposed a solution. His idealism for the future contrasted darkly with his Realpolitik methods for daily conflicts. To be overwhelmed by war and its tearing of a nation's delicate fabric of thought, and then to advocate a "coercive Americanization" and manipulation of unused patriotism seems to come from a man who did not tolerate obstacles to his dream of a frictionless world. His tolerance ended when he turned his eyes from the future and looked at the gory present.

With the ideal of liberal elements providing a brave new world, The New Republic began 1916 with hope. Its editors, along with thinkers from England and France, supported international cooperation and began seeing countries bordering the Atlantic as a center for the new world order. With the ocean providing transportation and communication to most of the world's liberal governments, a new international organization did not seem out of reach.[23]

War events and diplomatic maneuvering occupied Woodrow Wilson. He persisted in mediating attempts through 1915 and 1916. For his efforts, he received a sharp reaction from the Allies: Wilson's mediation and their war aims did not match. The momentary victory signaled by the Sussex pledge heartened the President and Americans in general, but

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[23]Noble, Paradox of Progressive Thought, p. 40.

this May 4, 1916 declaration soon gave way to war's necessities. In a speech of May 27, 1916, to The League to Enforce Peace, the President made the momentous pronouncement that the United States was ready "to abandon its historic isolation and join in postwar League of Nations to prevent aggression and war." He especially asked in the same speech that the British lead the belligerents to mediation in order that the new League get under way.[24]

Lippmann extolled the President's announcement of America's willingness to join a League of Nations. The journalist had been asking for a rallying point and considerations for the future, and Wilson's declaration provided both. An unusual circumstance preceded the President's speech. Lippmann, in an unsigned New Republic article, had made "An Appeal to the President" on April 22. He had argued that neutrality had never been genuine. He asked how the Allies would make Germany keep its promises after the Teutons had been beaten into the ground, and he wondered prophetically if the United States would be willing to tie itself to the Allies and their peace.[25]

Soon after Wilson had announced that America would abandon its "historic isolation" Lippmann wrote happily

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[24]Link, Wilson: Brief Biography, p. 103.

[25]Lippmann, "An Appeal to the President," The New Republic, 22 April 1916 in Schlesinger, pp. 31-33.

that the President's "offer to join in a guaranty of the world's peace opens up the possibility of a quick and moderate peace." He saw Wilson's offer as a first move toward war's end.[26] Lippmann's April appeal had been answered.

But all was not well. France and England had been joined by Italy and Japan. The New Republic expressed frustration toward the latter two nations joining the liberals' cause to create a new world. Neither Italy nor Japan were liberal and they would not help world development.[27] Wilson faced an election in 1916 and he knew that he would have to avoid war and yet be ready if it came. The President decided that the way to avoid neutrality's pitfalls and war's increased "no-holds barred" approach was to end the conflict.[28] Unfortunately, the British turned down Wilson's mediation proposal that he had made in the spring. The Allies were more confident of a victory, and Germany occupied too much of Europe to begin a settlement. Wilson was gravely disappointed.[29]

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[26]Lippmann, "Mr. Wilson's Great Utterance," The New Republic, 3 June 1916 in Schlesinger, pp. 40-41.

[27]Noble, Paradox of Progressive Thought, p. 41.

[28]Link, Wilson: Brief Biography, pp. 105-109.

[29]Ibid., p. 103.

Lippmann remained mindful of the various currents of hope and despair that crisscrossed the Atlantic in 1916. His appreciation of Wilson's abandonment of strict neutrality did not raise false hopes that belligerents would crowd around the peace table. Lippmann believed each side would wait for the best possible military, economic, and political conditions before asking for war's end.

In the summer of 1916, Lippmann spoke before the Twentieth Annual Conference of The American Academy of Political and Social Science. He was one of several participants and they were to address themselves to the relationship between preparedness and foreign policy. For the most part, he summarized The Stakes of Diplomacy, but Lippmann emphasized a different idea about the path to the new liberal world order. He noted that "a world of stable, autonomous, interdependent democracies acting as the guardian of less developed peoples" would depend upon "the cooperation of the United States and Great Britain." He explained further that America's future was wrapped up in sea power and that Germany's present threat to that power was intolerable.[30]

Lippmann continued toward more realistic methods that would accomplish what he hoped would be a war-free world.[31]

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[30]Walter Lippmann, "What Program Shall the United States Stand for in International Relations?" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, LXVI (July 1916), pp. 63-64 and 66.

[31]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

He did not deal with neutrality as an abstract legal term; rather, he preferred to see it as a practical instrument of America's staying out of war. He now decried emphasis on neutral rights as a way of maintaining neutrality, and favored asserting neutral rights in such a way as to aid the Allies and help them win. He had recognized, as had the President, that Germany could win the war in 1916 and that such a victory would seriously endanger American interests and security. Lippmann felt, as Wilson obviously did, that an open Atlantic and control of its sea lanes were two essentials that Americans could not ignore. Thus, by the summer of 1916, a central feature of Lippmann's diplomatic proposals was an Anglo-American entente based upon the mutual interests of the two countries.[32]

Six months later, Lippmann and The New Republic became displeased with and a little suspicious of the Allies, England in particular. Lippmann declared in August that British and Americans had been together, but since then they had grown apart. "More and more war has ceased to look like a clean-cut fight between right and wrong, between democracy and absolutism, between public faith and international lawlessness." He accused the Allies of not stating their war aims. He wrote that the United States and England were historically entangled and that both countries had

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[32] Ibid., pp. 68-70.

experienced a love-hate relationship. They were both bound up in common destinies, and they needed more than ever, a basis for understanding.[33] Lippmann's colleagues were even more severe, charging that in prosecuting the war the Allies aimed more at influencing the balance of power than defeating the Germans.[34]

Lippmann's obvious attempt to clarify and solidify Anglo-American relations in December of 1916 underlined the importance that he gave to America's future lying in sea power. Without British friendship and naval force, control of the Atlantic would be nearly impossible. The young journalist kept the vision of a friction-free world in front of him and in 1916 he thought the most appropriate route to his ideal was through control of the Atlantic Ocean. His New Republic colleagues were not as kind to Great Britain or her allies, whom they believed were attempting to redress the balance of power in their favor, and so re-establish pre-World War I conditions that had culminated in the Great War.

To make things worse for Lippmann followers, the German government announced on December 12, 1916 that it was ready to negotiate an end to the war. Germany recognized the rift

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[33] Lippmann, "British-American Irritation," The New Republic, 9 December 1916 in Schlesinger, pp. 50-53.

[34] The New Republic, 30 December 1916, p. 230 in Noble, Paradox of Progressive Thought, p. 46.

between Britain and the United States, and it made the best of it.[35] The British government had shifted from Herbert Asquith's direction to that of Lloyd George's in the winter if 1916-17, and Germany's Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg had lost power at the same time. Germany's leadership had moved to the political right and the military took command.[36]

President Wilson faced a difficult situation. He had wanted to mediate, but not at the initiation of the German government. If he accepted the German invitation, then he appeared to favor German's position. If he ignored the announcement, the President would be seen as one avoiding a potential opportunity for peace. Wilson took a precarious measure on December 18 when he appealed to all belligerents to state their war aims. The Allies responded on January 12, 1917. Germany refused to answer, for on January 9, 1917--German leaders had decided secretly to use unlimited submarine warfare.[37]

Germany offering to negotiate the end of the war was a ruse that met several German needs. It hoped to accentuate the Anglo-American rift and to take advantage of English government changes. The Kaiser and his Cabinet, now under

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[35]Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 301.

[36]Ibid., pp. 324 and 301.

[37]Link, Wilson: Brief Biography, p. 110.

the military sway of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, stalled for time. They needed more submarines to effect the unlimited underwater warfare they proposed to carry out. Finally, the Germans gambled that their unexpected January 1917 move would catch America off-guard. Before the United States could prepare for war and send troops to Europe, the war would be over--with victorious Germany balancing the powers.[38]

Germany's "peace" offer, Wilson's response to all belligerents, and the Allied answer to the President left Lippmann in a daze. The Germans had refused to answer Wilson's war aims request and had not published their unrestricted submarine warfare intent. In a January 13 article for The New Republic, Lippmann's uncertainty shows dramatically. He wrote:

> Every man who looks candidly into his own mind knows that it is a haphazard collection of rumors and flashes, of sharp experiences, of jostling memories and hopes, odds and ends of fact, pale little schemes of history. Many people, to be sure, resent any such confession, and insist on walking about in patent leather certainties.39

He thought, at first, that the war had been fought for righteousness, but later it had turned to a war to the finish. The young writer asked agonizingly, what is the nature of this

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[38] Ibid., p. 110.

[39] Lippmann, "The Will to Believe," The New Republic, 13 January 1917 in Schlesinger, p. 58.

beast, world war? Lippmann argued again that America and England must join if the world were to see peace.[40] Lippmann had been visibly shaken, and he groped for reassurance. His own "patent leather certainties" about war and peace had been scuffed and torn.

Lippmann's frustrations over the war were not eased by developments in January and February, 1917. Woodrow Wilson, in an address to the Senate on January 22, explained America's views regarding the nature of the war. A stable Europe, he said, was of great importance to world security, but that stability should be based on a community of power, not a balance of power.[41] The President urged a "peace without victory," however unpleasant that might be. But to humiliate, as total victory by one side or the other would do, was to leave stinging memories. "Only a peace between equals can last."[42]

Lippmann took heart and praised the President's efforts toward organizing collective security rather than seeking armed isolation. He warned, however, that making peace would not be easy. Lippmann noted that there were nine Allies,

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[40] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[41] Selected Literary and Political Papers and Addresses of Woodrow Wilson (3 vols., New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1926-27), II, pp. 220-221.

[42] Ibid., p. 222.

four enemies, and a score of vitally interested neutrals. Numbers alone added up to complexity and difficulty. But Lippmann's idealism had not died, and he emphasized his world vision by writing that America was ready to join the world in "peaceful partnership."[43]

On January 31, Germany declared that after February 1 it would begin unrestricted submarine warfare in European waters and the eastern Mediterranean. The German response to the President's request for war aims disappointed the Chief Executive, and his diplomatic options left him with only one choice. He severed diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, but he vowed that he would continue to do everything possible to avoid open hostilities.[44]

Lippmann recovered quickly from his momentary disillusionment. He explained boldly in February that America's real intentions had been masked behind legality: "We have wanted to assist the Allies and hamper Germany, but we wanted also to keep out of the war." He contended that the United States had used an unneutral policy that could not be abandoned when things got dangerous. The New Republic editor emphasized that the United States had great interest in keeping the Atlantic highway open. America, he asserted,

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[43]Lippmann, "America Speaks," The New Republic, 29 January 1917 in Schlesinger, pp. 63-68.

[44]Link, Wilson: Brief Biography, p. 111.

was going to protect its interests, and union with England in order to protect the Atlantic from German take-over was justifiable. The Western community must stay intact if it were to lead Germany back to civilization.[45]

The month of March brought increased war problems to the President. Goods piled up on American wharves since Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare scared merchants out of European waters. The Zimmerman telegram enraged American public opinion: Germany offered to Mexico portions of America's Southwest if it would join Germany in the fighting when the United States declared war. Wilson supported armed neutrality in his March 5 inaugural address, and four days later he armed American merchantmen. Step by step the United States joined the Allied drumbeat.[46]

By March 19, President Wilson had decided that American belligerency was inevitable and close at hand. He knew that armed neutrality would lead to war. German submarines were succeeding in blocking ocean traffic, and Wilson feared German victory. In addition, the Chief Executive thought that America's entry would shorten the war. Most importantly for the future, the President recognized that American belligerency would give the United States a seat at the peace table.

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[45]Lippmann, "The Defense of the Atlantic World," The New Republic, 17 February 1917 in Schlesinger, pp. 71-75.

[46]Link, Wilson: Brief Biography, p. 111.

The President called for a special session of Congress on April 2, 1917. The stormy evening added even more seriousness to the President's 8:30 appearance. Wilson asked Congress for a war declaration against Germany.[47] By April 6 the Congress had consented to Wilson's request.

Lippmann had watched events accumulate as America moved toward belligerency in March and April. He praised the President's war request. Germany had had its opportunities for peace, but had rejected them. "The cause of the Allies is now unmistakably the cause of liberalism and the hope of an enduring peace." Lippmann declared that America, and indeed the entire world, owed a great debt to Woodrow Wilson.[48]

By the late winter and early spring of 1917, Lippmann had assumed views of America's role in the Great War that few could have predicted from his earlier thinking. Lippmann learned quickly from experience. Events that carried America from neutrality in thought as well as deed to a war to make the world safe for democracy also sharpened his appraisal of world realities. Lippmann believed in the late fall of 1914 that the best argument against cannon was ideas. In April of 1917, he applauded the President's war declaration and asserted that the cause of the Allies was the cause of liberalism.

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[47] Wilson's Selected Papers and Addresses, II, p. 238.

[48] Lippmann, "The Great Decision," The New Republic, 7 April 1917 in Schlesinger, pp. 80-82.

Lippmann's views on foreign policy shifted gradually in the years from 1914-1917. He was above all a thinker. He sought constantly to keep man's potential use of intelligence and corresponding ability to control his environment, both human and physical, as major concerns for a successful civilization. When he experienced, for the first time, a nation's delicate fabric of thought being ripped to pieces by war, the young journalist responded with horror and confusion. As months sped by and events swirled about, Lippmann's dream of a friction-free world was joined by increasingly realistic appraisals of frequent war-stimulated crises that seemed to make hopeless his vision of the future.

By the summer of 1916, Lippmann had reached a point in his assessment of foreign policy that showed him to be more than a "nay sayer." He had reached the conclusion that America's future included the unobstructed use of the Atlantic. Lippmann also argued that if the world had a chance of avoiding another Great War that liberal, democratic governments would have to lead others toward a new world order. The United States needed England's sea power to protect the Atlantic, and it needed support of other liberal governments having access to the Atlantic to help create a friction-free world.

The young writer, new to thinking about diplomatic affairs, suffered periodic disillusionment. As in the fall of 1914 when foreign concerns appeared to engulf the reality of a nation, the winter of 1916-17 found Lippmann overwhelmed

by international reality. The belligerents' special needs ignored America's interests, at least as Lippmann analyzed them. The Allies and the Central Powers meant to win crushing victories, and it seemed that the United States, if not ignored, was being used. He wavered and wrote critically of "patent-leather certainties."

Lippmann recovered quickly from his disillusionment. President Wilson acted decisively in the early months of 1917. The President, discarding sadly the cherished neutrality and mediation, had declared America's war aims, severed diplomatic relations with Germany, armed merchantmen, and declared war. After each of these events, Lippmann--in a point-counterpoint relationship--applauded the Chief Executive's action. In one article, almost as if in bold relief, he wrote "The Defense of the Atlantic World." This February 17 writing declared, as Lippmann saw it, America's intentions and methods toward resolving the Great War and planning for the future.

Considering Wilson's respect for the intellect and his university background, it would not be unreasonable to assume that he would make use of what some saw Lippmann as--an academic journalist. His issue-clarifying articles and books revealed a talented young man who gave much time to thinking and writing. Wilson's self-admitted newness to interest in foreign relations complemented Lippmann's youth and previous unconcern about America's diplomacy. The President and the young journalist sought a similar goal of world peace.

However, a basic difference in their methods (collective security or Anglo-American alliance) would soon come to the surface.

Lippmann contended years later that The New Republic and he, himself, had not more than the usual journalist-President relationship. He wrote:

> Our relations with Wilson were never personal. I don't think Croly ever saw Wilson when he was President; in the winter of 1916 I had two or three interviews, such as any journalist has with the President. Croly and I did begin to see something of Colonel House.... It was a curious relationship. Wilson was preparing to run for his second term; his main problem was the management of American neutrality. We discussed the problem perhaps once a fortnight with Colonel House. He never told us what the President was going to do. We never knew anything that hadn't appeared in the newspapers.... The paper was never the organ of the Wilson administration....Occasionally the President and Colonel House took an idea from The New Republic as they took it from many other sources.[49]

Whatever the relationship, rather than working against one another, the President's and Lippmann's ideas had begun to correspond with each other by the spring of 1916. And, the journalist--by accident or intent--had begun his long career of making his thinking felt at top national levels. What better way to make visions turn into reality.

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[49] Lippmann, "Notes for a Biography," The New Republic, p. 251.

CHAPTER THREE

IN THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE

Two weeks after America declared war on Germany, Lippmann spoke at another of those ever-present meetings sponsored by The Academy of Political and Social Science. The April 21st edition of the New York Times reported: "Walter Lippmann--Declares Germany Must Be Beaten--Others Advocate Altruism."[1] Along with several others, The New Republic editor had been asked to speak about "America's Relation to the World Conflict and to the Coming Peace." The Times portrayed Lippmann as a militarist. It had, however, recounted only his last few remarks of an extensive address.

To be sure Lippmann zealously supported the Allied war effort. He wanted world peace cushioned by liberalism, and he felt that President Wilson had taken the only appropriate action available to the United States in April of 1917: war. Lippmann's April 20th talk before the Academy audience traced America's tortuous path between the belligerents. The Chief Executive had

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[1] New York Times, 21 April 1917, p. 5.

searched constantly for mediation and peace, but to no avail.[2]

The Times failed to report Lippmann's account of the origins of the war. Germany, he explained, saw the Entente powers cutting off its national growth. German leaders looked to Asia Minor as their "place in the sun," but the road to the Turkish Empire went through the Balkans. Russia backed Serbia, a small country that was part of Germany's highway to Asia Minor, and England showed concern about Austria-Hungary. When Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated in late June of 1914, several explosive forces came together simultaneously.[3]

Germany felt that England should not intrude in her maneuvering in the Austro-Serbian dispute. But England remained concerned about Continental powers solving their differences. Germans contended that the rest of Europe should stay out of the Balkan conflict; thus, Lippmann wrote, Germany became an enemy of international order. To further Germany's outlaw image, the country's military,

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[2]Walter Lippmann, The Political Scene: An Essay on the Victory of 1918 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), pp. 84-85. The complete text of Lippmann's April 21, 1917 speech before the Academy of Political and Social Science appears in the appendix of The Political Scene. It also was reprinted as U. S. Senate Document No. 80, 65th Congress, First Session.

[3]Lippmann, The Political Scene, pp. 88-89.

already mobilized, marched through neutral Belgium to attach France.[4]

Lippmann argued in the Philadelphia address that Germany's disregard--even denial--of an existing society of nations showed the need for international cooperation. "Out of the necessities of defense against it [Germany's excessive nationalism] men have gradually formulated the ideals of a cooperative nationalism."[5] He declared hopefully that a world federation was possible, and that men's common interests would prove greater than special interests.[6] He asserted further that the war had loosed a revolution. The stakes of diplomacy involved all nations.[7]

At the end of May, 1917 the New York Times announced that Walter Lippmann had "been offered a place in the War Department as an aid to Secretary Baker." Lippmann joined others serving at a nominal salary or with those who volunteered their services.[8] The New Republic had to do without the thinking and writing of one of its original mainstays. He had entered the arena of international conflict.

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[4] Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[5] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

[6] Ibid., p. 98.

[7] Ibid., p. 99.

[8] New York Times, 30 May 1917, p. 2.

Lippmann became quickly involved in the War Department's efforts to coordinate civilian and military war efforts. Organized labor feared that management would take advantage of workers during the war. Food and raw material shortages had sent prices soaring. The labor force, depleted by men in the armed services, also created pressure for increased wages.

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker sought to alleviate the impending problem by appointing three men to a "Cantonment Adjustment Commission of the War Department to determine proper wages and working conditions for military projects." One appointee represented the army and another labor. Walter Lippmann "would represent the public interest in all negotiations between contractors and the building trade."[9] In effect, Lippmann had become a negotiator. His assignment in government-labor disputes offered a unique opportunity for public service.[10]

Being a government employee was not easy, Lippmann found. Newton Baker had not organized the War Department well, and communication continually broke down. Lippmann, along with Felix Frankfurter and others, had been crowded

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[9]U. S. War Department, Annual Reports, 1917, I, pp. 33-34 in Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 66-67.

[10]New York Times, 11 August 1917, pp. 1-2.

into "tiny cubicles that made it difficult for them to work efficiently."[11]

Events brewing at the White House and the Department of State in the late summer of 1917 would deeply affect Lippmann. Wilson and Lansing had been thinking, independently of one another, that the United States should prepare thoroughly for the peace. Wilson, however, placed Colonel House in charge of peace plans and kept the State Department's legalists out of the proceedings. Colonel House had been charged with seeing that America's case for peace was prepared with "full knowledge of the position of all litigants."[12]

During September House sought advice from several sources about personnel who ought to be included in the secret peace planning group. Two advisers, A. Lawrence Lowell (Harvard University's president) and Herbert Croly (The New Republic's editor-in-chief) made suggestions. Sidney Mezes, House's brother-in-law and president of the City College of New York, became director of the organization. President Wilson specifically asked that Lippmann be part of the group.[13] Wolcott H. Pitkin (American

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[11]Ralph Hayes (Secretary to Baker) to N. D. Baker, 20 September 1917, Hayes Papers in Beaver, Newton D. Baker, p. 80.

[12]Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 26-29.

[13]Ibid., p. 38.

adviser to the Siamese government), Archibald Cary Coolidge (Harvard professor of Eastern European history), and James T. Shotwell (Columbia University historian) composed the early nucleus of The Inquiry (Shotwell's title).[14]

Men such as George Louis Beer, David Hunter Miller, and Stanley K. Hornbeck became part of The Inquiry. All areas of study were to be considered: politics, geography, economics, and societies.[15] During the seventeen month existence of The Inquiry (September, 1917 to January, 1919), one hundred and fifty scholars wrote and collected nearly 2,000 separate studies and documents, and they made and used at least 1,200 maps.[16]

Members of The Inquiry faced complex organizational problems. Finding a practical method that kept personnel working together toward innumerable common goals proved difficult. Lippmann submitted an organization plan on November 13 to The Inquiry Director, Sidney Mezes. It contained eleven separate divisions and it underwent modification.[17] During December, Lippmann, secretary to The

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[14] Ibid., p. 41.

[15] Ibid., pp. 42 and 47.

[16] Ibid., p. X.

[17] Ibid., p. 85.

Inquiry, wrote priority lists for Colonel House and Mezes, and they received due note.[18]

As Lippmann worked for the peace planning group, he maintained a cordial correspondence with his former chief, Secretary Baker. Searching for ways to maintain a permanent peace after the war ended, he wrote to Baker on October 27, 1917, asking him to consider inaugurating a study of disarmament. He realized the potential for cheating in any program of disarmament, so he recommended that the study group be composed of men thoroughly grounded in "modern military science."[19] Baker replied within the week and warmly approved Lippmann's suggestion. Generals Tasker Bliss and Enoch H. Crowder had been assigned to the disarmament issue.[20]

In a note to Lippmann, Newton Baker thanked him for a copy of a letter Lippmann had sent to President Wilson on November 21. Baker agreed with his former associate that Germany must be made livable after the war--"to her own people as well as to the rest of the world." Secretary Baker added that after defeat German domestic conditions

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[18] Ibid., pp. 87-88. See also 19 December and 28 December 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Conference, 1919 (Washington, 1942), I, pp. 39 and 54.

[19] (27 October 1917), Foreign Relations Papers: Paris, 1919, I, pp. 12-13.

[20] (1 November 1917), Ibid., pp. 13-14.

should not be made intolerable. Baker warned, however, that "access to the resources of civilization can be tolerated only upon assurances that can be relied upon that such resources will be used in the interest of civilization when they are supplied."[21]

Inquiry considerations kept Lippmann busy and by late December of 1917 he, Mezes, and Miller presented to Colonel House a draft of suggested peace terms. The December 22nd document was revised, enlarged, and re-dated January 2, 1918. Colonel House then took "A Suggested Statement of Peace Terms" to President Wilson on January 4. Wilson and the Colonel worked over the statement and it became a large portion of the President's January 8th address to the Senate. The Fourteen Points had been born, with the Inquiry memorandum supplying information for points VI through XIV. The Chief Executive added points I through V, general principles upon which Wilson based his views of the postwar world.[22]

During the late winter and early spring of 1918, The Inquiry smoothed out some of its organizational problems. Amidst maps, studies, and personnel shifts, Lippmann found time on May 16 to write to Baker again. He explained his dismay at not being able to find first-rate men who could

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[21](23 November 1917), Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[22]Gelfand, The Inquiry, pp. 136-137. See (22 December 1917), Foreign Relations Papers: Paris, 1919, I, pp. 41-54 for The Inquiry report.

help with problems in "Russia, the Balkans, Turkey and Africa." Lippmann explained that "what we are on the lookout for is genius--sheer, startling genius and nothing else will do because the real application of the President's idea to those countries requires inventiveness and resourcefulness which is scarcer than anything." He indicated that he had been reading about how ignorance "on the part of peace commissioners in the past has lost causes which have been won on the battlefield. It isn't difficult to win a war and lose the peace."[23]

The Inquiry experienced a severe internal shake-up during the summer of 1918. It came after Isaiah Bowman, the Chief Territorial Specialist and Director of the American Geographical Society, wrote a letter to Sidney Mezes complaining that The Inquiry's organization was too loose. "The time has come," Bowman declared, "when there should be a stricter division of functions among the officers of The Inquiry and an exact definition of status and appointments. It is a source of growing embarrassment to remain as we are."[24] Within the month, The Inquiry had been reorganized and many of Mezes' duties had been given to an Executive Committee headed by Bowman.[25]

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[23](16 May 1918), Foreign Relations Papers: Paris, 1919, I, pp. 97-98.

[24](13 July 1918), Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[25](3 August 1918), Ibid., pp. 103-104.

As a result of the reorganization, Lippmann left The Inquiry and became a captain in the army's Military Intelligence. Lippmann, unhappy with Mezes, told Bowman in several conversations prior to the July-August shake-up that Mezes was lazy, stupid, and disorganized.[26]

Bowman also consulted with David Hunter Miller, technical adviser on international law, who complained bitterly of Lippmann, as well as of Mezes. "He said that he never knew of anyone who worked with Lippmann who did not 'hate' him." In late August Bowman told Colonel House "that Lippmann was a bad influence on The Inquiry chiefly through his tendency to disorganize whatever work was started by anyone else, taking men off work for his own special purposes."[27]

In confidence, House explained to Bowman why Lippmann had been chosen for The Inquiry:

> He said the administration had to cooperate with the extreme liberals of the country and that he could think of none who had so much influence and was at the time so easy to get along with as Lippmann, and he had therefore selected him to represent the Liberals ....He then stated that should Lippmann return he would plan with me just what work he should do and that probably

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[26]Attributed to Isaiah Bowman, "Notes on The Inquiry," 30 November 1918 in Gelfand, The Inquiry, appendix VI, pp. 351-352.

[27]Ibid., pp. 351-352.

> The best plan was to have Lippmann do some specific things directly for him (Colonel House).[28]

Despite these criticisms of Lippmann's working relations with his colleagues, others pointed out the value of his intellectual contributions. James Shotwell, Chief of the History Division and Librarian for The Inquiry, wrote years later, that Lippmann's "unique gift for clarifying the issues of politics...explains the importance of the role he played in interpreting and phrasing policy."[29] Sir William Wiseman, Chief of British Intelligence in the United States during the war, wrote that it was his impression that Lippmann furnished "'the abstract ideas which found their way into a good many of the memoranda of the American Delegation and ultimately into some of President Wilson's public speeches.'"[30]

Whatever Lippmann's strengths and weaknesses, he "jumped from the frying pan to the fire" when he left The Inquiry and joined Military Intelligence. Prior to The Inquiry's public reorganization, Colonel House had asked Lippmann to go abroad and help with political propaganda work. He was to establish liaison with British propagandists

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[28] Ibid., p. 352.

[29] James T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 4.

[30] "Wiseman Memorandum on The Inquiry," 5 June 1928 in Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (4 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), III, p. 171.

and together they were to consider the possibility of "piping propaganda into enemy countries."[31]

Lippmann's tenure as an official propagandist was brief. He sharply criticized George Creel's Committee on Public Information and the army,[32] calling for "'a new expert organization independent of the Creel Committee,'"[33] House reached the end of his patience with Lippmann's constant critical suggestions. He asked the new captain "'to discontinue sending them.'"[34] House's rebuke surprised Lippmann and the captain concluded his October 2nd response by noting: "'You know, of course, that I am a thousand times more interested in The Inquiry than in propaganda, and that I only went into it [propaganda] because I was told I was needed.'"[35]

Lippmann's propaganda work in Europe received notice in the United States, but not until after he had quit that effort and had become part of Colonel House's staff overseas (September 26, 1918). The New York Times reported on

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[31]Colonel Edward M. House to Lippmann, 7 July 1918 and Lippmann to House, 9 August 1918 in Cary, Influence of War, p. 45.

[32]Lippmann to House, 9 August 1918 in Cary, Influence of War, p. 45.

[33]Lippmann to House, 15 August 1918 in Cary, Influence of War, p. 46.

[34]House to Lippmann, 6 September 1918 in Cary, Influence of War, p. 46.

[35]Lippmann to House, 2 October 1918 in Cary, Influence of War, p. 47.

November 9 that the Germans were "impressed by our propaganda." American-directed propaganda efforts, published in a Paris printing house, had loosed a "bombardment of printers' ink on (the) foe." Captain Walter Lippmann served as editor of the American propaganda effort. Airplanes and balloons dropped leaflets on the enemy, and the information carried Wilson messages to Germans. German prisoners had been found with Allied propaganda leaflets tucked up their sleeves and in secret pockets. Loyal Germans, however, had returned many of the leaflets with "'Why continue the fight?'" printed on them.[36]

Lippmann's assertive criticism diminished after his appointment to Colonel House's European staff. House visited Paris in late October, his major purpose being to acquaint Allied leaders with Wilson's Fourteen Points. Germany had sued for peace early in October and President Wilson had corresponded diplomatically with German leaders since then. They had accepted Wilson's negotiation program.[37]

Lippmann and Frank Cobb, editor from the New York World, prepared clarifying statements of the Fourteen Points but it was Lippmann who did most of the work. He explained

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[36]New York Times, 9 November 1918, p. 5.

[37]Richard M. Watt, The Kings Depart: The Tragedy of Germany: Versailles and the German Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 33-34.

the first thirteen declarations, and Cobb elaborated on the fourteenth. Wilson approved their efforts.[38]

The War ended officially on November 11. The belligerents had accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points as a basic for peace. House and Lippmann expressed joy prior to the armistice because they both felt that gaining Allied approval of the Fourteen Points was a great diplomatic victory.[39] Lippmann wrote to House on November 7:

> Frankly, I did not believe it was humanly feasible, under conditions as they seemed to be in Europe, to win so glorious a victory. This is the climax of a course that has been as wise as it was brilliant, and as shrewd as it was prophetic.[40]

Woodrow Wilson wrote in penciled longhand his announcement to America that the war was over: "'The armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America has fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober friendly counsel and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.'"[41]

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[38]Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV, pp. 152-158.

[39]House to Wilson, 5 November 1918 in Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV, p. 188.

[40]Lippmann to House, 7 November 1918 in Cary, Influence of War, p. 49.

[41]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols., New York: Doubleday, 1939), VIII, p. 580.

The President's happy and hopeful message would be the beginning of the end for his dreams. Wilson went to war to secure peace. He would, as the winter days sped by, find that American leaders and European statesmen did not agree with all of his dream of a permanent peace based on international cooperation. Even his idea that he spoke for the common people would drift into unreality.

Wilson feared a victor's peace for he felt that it would "leave hatreds as the breeding ground of future wars."[42] He declared to a church-going, rain-soaked group wrapped in overcoats at Carlisle, England that "it is the conscience of the world that we are trying now to place on the throne that others tried to usurp."[43]

The Paris Peace Conference lasted six months and during that time Wilson experienced the cruel pressures of power politics. Among the twenty-seven countries present, England, France, Italy, and Japan--each a great power--were particularly interested in protecting their national interests. Collectively, they clashed with America's desires. In addition a giant spectre pervaded Conference thinking: revolutionary Russia.

In Russia the Bolsheviks had overthrown the Tsar and

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[42]Robert J. Bender, W. W.: Scattered Impressions of a Reporter Who for Eight Years "Covered" the Activities of Woodrow Wilson (New York: United Press Association, 1924), p. 38.

[43]Ibid., p. 47.

established a Communist government. The awful physical conditions inside the convulsed nation lent special appeal to European masses decimated by war. Both the Europeans and the Russians had something in common--devastation and needs for food, clothing, and housing. Both sought governments which would satisfy these immediate needs.

Russian communism terrified the Allies and confounded solution. President Wilson had sent William C. Bullitt on a special mission to Russia in early 1919, and Bullitt returned writing of approval for aid to the new Russia. He believed the Allies should help the Bolsheviks. As long as foreign intervention threatened the revolutionary government, Bullitt said, the Bolsheviks and their Russian opposition would be terrified.[44] But the director of America's food relief overseas, Herbert Hoover, lambasted the Bolsheviks for terrorist tactics. Hoover saw communism as a "withering blast" that could destroy the "frail plants of democracy." Hoover used food relief to nurture democratic growth.[45]

Japan had already sent troops into Siberia, ostensibly to protect Czecho-Slovakian war prisoners who wished to

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[44]William C. Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia: Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations--United States Senate (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919), p. 54.

[45]Herbert Hoover, America's Firest Crusade (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), pp. 1-2.

return home. But Wilson had reason to believe otherwise,[46] for diplomatic sources had conveyed to him the very general warning that the Japanese intended to promote their paramount interest in the Far East.[47]

After countless conferences, both public and private, the Treaty of Versailles was completed. It contained provisions designed to serve a variety of national interests, as well as a serious compromise of Wilson's ideal of a new international order. In a brief ceremony held on Saturday, June 28, 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, the treaty's vellum pages were signed. In a packed hall, filled with whispering reporters, whirring cameras, and cries of "Down in front!," the victors assigned a crushing defeat to the losers.[48] Wilson sailed on the George Washington the next day, returning home with a treaty which included his beloved League.

Having been an intimate part of the peace planning for nearly a year, Lippmann found himself with nothing to

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[46]Frank L. Polk (Counselor, Department of State) to the President, 24 July 1918, 25 July 1918, 2 August 1918 in Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, VIII, pp. 292, 297-298, 312-313.

[47]Roland S. Morris (American Ambassador to Japan) to the Secretary of State (Robert Lansing), 13 November 1918, 27 November 1918, 7 January 1918, Foreign Relations Papers: Paris, 1919, I, pp. 489-492 and 494.

[48]Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), pp. 366-369.

do in the Paris Conference, itself. He returned to the United States in January of 1919.[49] Apparently, while the Conference was in session (and prior to its beginning in January of 1919), Lippmann had been composing articles. They were published under the title The Political Scene, and demonstrated once more his talent to sort among contemporary issues, identify crucial problems, and offer potentially successful alternatives.

The Political Scene is a remarkable little book. Lippmann saw, as did few contemporaries, that the Great War's end had ushered in a world revolution. The Allied victory meant that the old strictures of monarchial power were gone forever. The Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs, and the Sultan and Tsar no longer held sway. A new power balance would have to be created. He recognized, as well, that Russia's new government presented challenges to the proposed new world.[50]

Lippmann asserted in The Political Scene that Wilson's Fourteen Points reflected the old order too much to be effective in a new world. They argued for rights of neutrals, sought boycotts, and recognized war as a normal institution, but they did not deal with the economic realities in Europe,

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[49] Cary, Influence of War, p. 50.

[50] Lippmann, The Political Scene, pp. 4-9.

or the shortage of ships, food, and materials that many European nations faced in 1919.[51]

Wilson's concept of a League changed after the great military battles of 1918. Before the spring of that year he had depicted it "as a useful annex to the structure of peace; thereafter he called it the central framework of the structure." Lippmann saw "a world-wide re-grouping in progress. It cannot be controlled by agreement alone. It requires a continuing series of decisions, and machinery for exerting them, and that is the essence of the League of Nations."[52]

The League's Covenant recognized world realities, Lippmann believed. A new Europe must arise from the rubble of the old, and the League would help the new order emerge. He declared in The Political Scene that the League Covenant "provides procedures which slow down impending tragedy's rhythm." He argued forcefully: "The faith is that no quarrel can grow big enough to justify war when the peoples who must do the fighting know about it soon enough."[53]

Lippmann accentuated his previously expounded idea that an Anglo-American Entente would provide a "pool of force," rather than a balance of power. The pool's basis included

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[51] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[52] Ibid., pp. 16 and 32.

[53] Ibid., pp. 35, 42-44.

the combined sea power of the two nations. It could be all powerful and not destroy the freedom of the country that used it. He argued that "protection of democracy... is built upon the joint administration of sea power by the British Empire and America. Our own Monroe Doctrine is built upon it from its inception to the present day."[54]

Lippmann also sounded warnings that President Wilson had raised false hopes. Perhaps his dreams could not be realized since he acted as singly as he did "in committing the nation."[55] The treaty turned out to be a patchwork of compromises, and the Covenant would prove to be difficult to amend. Lippmann explained that Article X of the Covenant encased the League in a formula, and it did not protect a nation's independence from economic penetration.[56]

Bolshevism, Lippmann wrote, grew only where a nation's government was disgracefully incompetent. He argued that Bolshevism gained strong support when a country's loyal opposition had been stifled. He contended, as well, that it was "extraordinarily easy to combat (Bolshevism) in a well-fed country."[57]

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[54] Ibid., pp. 42 and 49.

[55] Ibid., p. 53.

[56] Ibid., pp. 53-56.

[57] Ibid., p. 65.

Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire seemed ripe for political and economic take-over by Russia's new government--if one followed Lippmann's criteria as to what lay countries open to communism. He felt that the League would help crushed nations adjust to a new democratic world, but he also fretted that leaders at the Paris Peace Conference had not taken Bolshevism's threat seriously. The Allies showed fear, but not enough real concern existed to give it number one priority.[58]

In The Political Scene, Lippmann presented a solution to the threat that Bolshevism posed to the concept of a new world order that Western liberals cherished. Anticipating America's Cold War policies by nearly thirty years, he argued for a "sanitary cordon" in eastern Europe that would circle Russia's communism. The cordon would also give Germany, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary time to organize democratic governments. He knew that eastern European countries were hardly capable of withstanding severe pressure from either Russia or Germany, but Lippmann thought the effort was worth a try.[59]

Bolshevism was primitive and formless; it had no vital center, Lippmann wrote. Thus, one cannot fight conventional

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[58] Ibid., pp. 66 and 69.

[59] Ibid., pp. 70-72.

wars against its spread. In the late 1940's, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were based on a similar pattern of thought. In 1918-19 Lippmann sought to re-establish "bonds of economic interdependence between her [Russia's] fragments and the organized society of the west."[60]

Finally, the young editor contended that if liberal governments were to predominate in the post-World War I era, they would have to present "a solid area of...government under the aegis of the League." To conclude a peace based on bayonets would only play into the hands of Russian communism: it "feeds on discontent, poverty, and maladministration."[61]

By early spring of 1919, Lippmann was again an active member of The New Republic's staff. A September 3rd writing shows Lippmann complaining about President Wilson's vague idealism: to speak of peace and justice was not specific enough to influence effectively the seriousness of life at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson had not understood thoroughly European circumstances, and Lippmann indicted the President for separating aims and methods.[62] Two weeks later he ridiculed the Department of State. Personnel

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[60] Ibid., pp. 76-77.

[61] Ibid., pp. 75 and 81.

[62] "Assuming We Join," The New Republic, 3 September 1919 in Schlesinger, pp. 86-89.

were incompetent; their overseas dispatches were "embalmed in the State Department archives;" and it remained an organization of formality.[63]

In a brief and highly critical article of President Wilson, Lippmann declared that it was one year after the armistice and no constructive legislation had been passed in that time. He wrote that "the government of the United States resides in the mind of Mr. Wilson....If he is away the thinking apparatus is away." The journalist felt there had been an "abdication of leadership."[64]

Lippmann's writing about foreign affairs appeared in the summer of 1919 in The Yale Review and in November and December issues of The Atlantic Monthly. The earlier article concerned the Peace Conference itself. He outlined Wilson's problems, hopes, and errors. Clearly, Lippmann believed that the President's hopes were his problems and errors. Wilson felt that man "had an innate desire for righteousness." The war ended, however, and people's patriotism turned to self-interest. The President remained idealistic.[65] The Atlantic Monthly writings dealt with the question of liberty and the press. He contended that a

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[63]"For a Department of State," The New Republic, 17 September 1919, pp. 194-196.

[64]"Unrest," The New Republic, 20 November 1919, p. 315.

[65]"The Peace Conference," The Yale Review, VIII, July, 1919, pp. 717 and 720.

democracy's basis for effective operation depended upon the peoples' free access to information, and he asserted that many problems of the Paris Peace Conference arose from its secret sessions. The public could only speak after decisions had been made.[66]

In the last days of December, 1919, Lippmann wrote a book review of Harold Stearns' Liberalism in America (New York, 1919). The review turned out to be Lippmann's thoughts on liberalism. He found American liberals to be disorganized and without doctrine. Primarily, he asserted, they represented a "phase of transition away from the old party system." In a more positive light, Lippmann saw liberals as people aware "that the temper of tolerant inquiry must be maintained." In contrast to Stearns, the reviewer declared that as long as liberals stayed above battles, they would never have force in actual affairs.[67]

In the review Lippmann also accused liberals of shrinking from any great intellectual efforts. As an example, he found Wilson to be:

> an incurable improviser, and no idea is deeply rooted in him because no idea is thoroughly mastered. At Paris the Conservatives had a better grip on their case than did the

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[66] "The Basic Problem in Democracy," The Atlantic Monthly, November 1919, 124, pp. 625 and 627.

[67] Lippmann, rev. of Liberalism in America by Harold Stearns, The New Republic, 21, 31 December 1919, p. 151.

> liberals. They had worked harder.... They knew how to go past the fragile reason of men to their passions.

He felt that liberals could have consumated peace if they had only "grasped the mechanics of peace."[68]

Lippmann's views of American foreign policy from June of 1917 to December of 1919 reveal a thoughtful man, anguished by war, who was determined that Western democracies would not die. In April of 1917 Lippmann charged Germany with being an international outlaw, and he argued that its international credibility should be crushed. After his actual participation in the war effort, he realized quickly that crushing the enemy was less important than arranging a desirable peace.

By January of 1919, Lippmann experienced disillusionment. The war had ended and that was good, but its ramifications for the future were ominous. Wilson's idealism stood alone as self-seeking nations sought victory treasures. The Treaty of Versailles imposed harsh terms on broken Germany. Revolutionary Russia set out to spread its boundaries and beliefs into war-torn Europe. Japan had already served notice that its paramount interests included parts of mainland China and perhaps portions of Siberia. Lippmann's pleas for an Anglo-American entente which would serve as a pool of power that enforced the League of Nation's actions went unheeded. America's Senate and its President

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[68] Ibid., p. 151.

came to loggerheads over the treaty and the League's Covenant.

Lippmann could see the new world order dying before it had reached its youth. He needed a scapegoat and he found one: Woodrow Wilson. He criticized the President for being vague and unmethodical. The Chief Executive had allowed closed sessions at Paris and Wilson's steady faith in man's righteousness had led him blindly toward a vicious treaty. Wilson had been duped into compromising to save his League. The President had improvised once too often.

It must have been difficult for Lippmann to find himself participating but not influencing as much as he thought he should. His facile mind allowed him to sort among complexities that confounded others. He envisioned a new world structure wherein liberal democracies, backed by Anglo-American sea power, could secure permanent peace, and promote prosperity and happiness. Lippmann had pleaded for his cause, but it had been rejected, he thought, when the Treaty of Versailles came back to America in July of 1919 as an instrument of suppression and domination. To make things worse, the League and its Covenant came under fire because it linked the United States to evil, smouldering Europe. Thus, even the opportunity to right treaty wrongs (through the League) had been canceled. It was time for Lippmann to leave the heat of battle, and return to the tower.

CHAPTER FOUR

WALTER LIPPMANN AND A DECADE TINGED WITH FURY: THE 1920'S

For Walter Lippmann the 1920's presented a cluster of years that pressed him to construct and test a developing interpretation about man and man's relations with others. More importantly for this particular study, the decade of the 1920's shows Lippmann's reason and voice attempting to understand, correct, and re-direct complications arising from groups of men living in areas surrounded by national boundary lines. Their political, economic, and spiritual differences created tangles of human difficulties that threatened to rip apart civilizations domestically as well as internationally.

America's democracy was in bad need of repair in those years following the Great War. It seemed as if the United States was bent on limiting both freedom of thought and press. In a decade spotted with anger and hate, Americans witnessed the re-birth of a bigoted Ku Klux Klan. State suppression of ideas from newspapers and classrooms occurred. "Keep Europe out!" became the cry of those who were frenzied by non-paying Continental debtors and who feared radical political doctrines. Tariff walls rose and immigration quotas turned starkly restrictive. A spiritual drift had

set in and frantic searchings for certainty tinged the decade with fury and irrationality.

Lippmann professed to be a man leading two lives: one including books--the other encompassing newspapers. His books, he said, represented a world where he developed a philosophy and the columns served him as a "laboratory or clinic in which [he tested] the philosophy and kept it from becoming too abstract."[1] Lippmann sought to interpret events "in the light of some underlying pattern of forces, circumstances, and design." He believed that events characterized forces at work and that the forces had deep historical underpinnings. "Those forces," Lippmann claimed, "can best be discerned by a historical knowledge of the more or less enduring patterns of forces. They don't change nearly so much as the readers of the newspaper could imagine they did."[2]

As a young man of twenty-three, Lippmann believed that life was a never-ending process that constantly developed. "Society," he wrote, "was living and breathing and needed constant influxes of energy that only man's efforts at

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[1] James Reston, "The Mockingbird and the Taxicab," Sketches in the Sand (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 209.

[2] Lippmann, Reminiscences (2 vols., Oral History Research Collection, New York: Columbia University, 1956, 1964), II, pp. 232-233.

renewal could provide."[3] Nearly forty years later, Lippmann continued to view life as a continuously developing process filled with dimly perceived forces. By humans' very action and thoughts, they added to the forces themselves. One might use historical analogies to help man understand forces at work, but the analogies ought to be "held lightly--not held literally and held grimly."[4]

During the 1920's Lippmann's opportunities for developing his understanding of politics, for writing books and editing a major national newspaper, became reality. He left Herbert Croly's New Republic and joined Frank Cobb's editorial staff at the New York World in January of 1922. He had enjoyed The New Republic's intellectual atmosphere where people gathered, exchanged ideas, wrote, and planned for the future. The weekly publication in those days offered time for reflection and presented its writers with a relatively easy life compared to newspaper editors who met daily column deadlines.[5] When Lippmann became part of Cobb's World, he began writing three and four columns a week. The World's editorial demands obliged him to face daily national and world events with little time for reflection.

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[3]Lippmann, "The Most Dangerous Man in the World," Everybody's, 27 July 1912, pp. 100-101.

[4]Lippmann, Reminiscences, II, pp. 232-233.

[5]Ibid., I, p. 66.

Observing a new decade from a different observation post led Lippmann to re-shape his thinking. He wrote of the 1920's with alternate feelings of hope and despair for democracy's future and the world's peace. Lippmann witnessed several domestic events in America during the twenties that gave him considerable reason for dejection. American nationalism became a shrill cry and sought to keep ideas and people away from America's shores. Segments of the public began to search futilly for values and ways of life in a past that was no more.

Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer ferreted out radicals in 1919-1920 whom he believed threatened America's existence. The famed Palmer Raids netted supposed anarchists, socialists, communists, and innocent by-standers. The New Republic denounced Palmer's illegal round-ups and Lippmann reported his pride in the magazine's fight against Red hysteria. Looking back, he found it difficult to remember "the idiotic intolerance which descended upon the country in those days," but he felt "it was the most disgraceful exhibition of general cowardice and panic which any of us is likely to experience."[6]

In an attempt to preserve Protestant and Nordic dominance, the Congress determined that thousands of immigrants seeking new homes in the United States should be turned

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[6]Lippmann, "Notes for a Biography," The New Republic, p. 252.

away from American shores. Racial superiority became a major issue and President Warren Harding and Vice-President Calvin Coolidge felt America's racial superiority would be damaged if further race mixing continued.[7] In 1921 and 1924 Congress enacted immigration restriction laws that severely cut the annual flow of people coming to America to live. The 1924 National Origins Act banned East Asians entirely and reduced European immigration to two per cent of the 1890 census.

Lippmann explained in a New York World editorial that a need to restrict further immigration to the United States existed. Free land was gone; a standard of living ought to be maintained; and the American school system was already overburdened. Lippmann favored further immigration of Western Europeans because they adjusted more readily to American habits, but he felt the question of inferior or superior should be left to history.[8] Lippmann complained about the 1924 immigration quota legislation because it especially offended the Japanese and, in effect, it excluded only two hundred and forty Japanese per year. "The

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[7]Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 141-142.

[8]Lippmann, "Rather Vague Ancestors," New York World 9 April 1924. Unless otherwise indicated, Lippmann's writings in the World appear on the editorial page. Article titles identify his unsigned work. Lippmann added by-lines to World editorials in the Yale University Lippmann Collection that date from 24 March 1924 through 27 February 1931.

measure," he wrote, "in short, seeks to attain an insignificant result in a most offensive manner." Lippmann declared further that "the measure is unnecessary. It is brutal. It is dangerous. It does not cater to any real necessity of the Pacific Coast and it does not represent the real will of the American people."[9]

The Ku Klux Klan became a nationally significant political group in the 1920's and reached its zenith in 1925. Although the Klan's ideology included keeping blacks in their place and excluding Catholics and Jews from American society, it also represented a "traditional Protestant moralism" that saw itself threatened by changing values. Knights of the Invisible Empire were determined to fight secularism of the big cities: it was destroying their small town, rural, Protestant-dominated existence. Detroit, Indianapolis, Chicago, Kansas City, and Denver contained powerful Klan organizations. States such as Indiana, Ohio, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, California, Oregon, and Maine experienced varying degrees of Klan control during the 1920's.[10]

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[9]Lippmann, "Offensive and Foolish," The World, 11 April 1924. He wrote further editorials concerning the same topic; see "The Senate, A Mob," 16 April 1924; "Where Character Will Count," 17 April 1924; "The President's Ordeal," 19 April 1924.

[10]Lipset and Raab, The Politics of Unreason, pp. 116-122 and 111.

Portions of Lippmann's editorial reaction to the Ku Klux Klan appeared during the 1924 Presidential election. The Democratic nominee, John W. Davis, spoke against the Klan in Texas--a brave action. Lippmann urged President Coolidge and Vice-President Charles Dawes to assert their opinions against the Klan. "There is no place in American life for a secret political order built on religious and racial prejudice," Lippmann declared, "and an American President has no higher duty than to make that clear."[11] In another article Lippmann scathed Coolidge for his silence and Dawes for his volubility. They had praised the Klan with faint damns, and Lippmann charged they were looking for votes. He stated that the Klan must be repudiated nationally and that Coolidge-Dawes actions would not do. Such political tactics "were not good morals" and they "should not be good politics."[12]

In July of 1925 John Scopes, a young high school biology teacher, went on trial in Dayton, Tennesee for violating the state's law prohibiting the teaching evolution in public schools. Scopes was nearly forgotten as two nationally prominent figures fought over the issue of creation.

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[11]Lippmann, "Which Side Mr. Coolidge?" The World, 23 August 1924.

[12]Lippmann, "The Only Way With the Klan," The World, 26 August 1924.

Clarence Darrow, a famous Chicago lawyer and agnostic, defended Scopes. William Jennings Bryan, a three-time Presidential candidate and Fundamentalist, represented the prosecution. After the eleven day trial, Scopes was found guilty and a newspaper paid his fine.

During the "monkey trial"--as it came to be called--Lippmann wrote several articles. He thought Bryan was making a concerted effort to become important in American politics again, and that the great orator was using the religious issue to raise public interest. Bryan's campaign this time, Lippmann thought, was "the most menacing potentially that he has ever undertaken." Bryan sought to stimulate people to fight for their gods and this was always an awful spectacle.[13] Bryan had "started a religious crusade among the ignorant and illiterate which aims to arm Fundamentalism with the police power of the state." And in organizing this crusade "Mr. Bryan has committed spiritual treason against the people of the United States." Lippmann wrote, "Absurd? Of course the Dayton trial is absurd. But so was the trial of Galileo, and so was the inquisition in Spain. So is the Ku Klux Klan today. They are all absurd; but their absurdity is close to madness. They are a

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[13] Lippmann, "The Rise of Sectarian Politics," The World, 10 July 1925.

grotesque business tinged with fury, a tomfoolery with loaded weapons."[14]

Unlike John Scopes, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were charged in the spring of 1920 with murdering a paymaster in a Massachusetts factory. Sacco and Vanzetti were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. For the next seven years their lives hung in balance as various groups challenged the fairness of their trial. Many believed that testimony concerning their anarchial political activities prior to the alleged murder and robbery had prejudiced both the presiding judge and jury. The two men were executed in August of 1927.[15]

Lippmann and Heywood Broun, a popular World columnist, both agreed that the trial for the two Italian-born anarchists had not been free of prejudice. They saw trial evidence that was contradictory, confused, and inconclusive. Lippmann and Broun questioned these men's guilt. Broun approached the case emotionally, however, and Lippmann characteristically engaged in careful analysis of the proceedings. The World finally refused to print Broun's emotionally-laden charges against the trial's conduct and

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[14]Lippmann, "The Spiritual Treason of Bryan," The World, 15 July 1925. Other Lippmann editorials of special interest include: "The Foundations of Faith," 17 July 1925; "A Wandering Defense," 22 July 1925; "Shall There be a Specially Privileged Religion?" 24 July 1925.

[15]Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 226-227.

its findings. Broun left the paper.[16]

Lippmann explained since reasonable doubt existed that these men were guilty and that a trial filled with prejudice had taken place, Governor Alvin T. Fuller (Massachusetts) should stay the execution and erase all remaining doubt. The Governor would have to rise above existing political pressures to delay the state's punishment, but he must look to the future.[17] Lippmann urged that Sacco's and Vanzetti's sentences be commuted to life imprisonment. In this way, Lippmann felt, Governor Fuller could not possibly err.[18]

Some Americans looked overseas and found what they thought would be an ideal government. The World received many letters extolling the virtues of Italy's Fascism under the direction of Benito Mussolini. The letters explained how Mussolini and Fascism had made Italy prosper--how they had restored order and put people to work. They wrote how strong the government was and how much better it was than the weak, log-rolling, parliamentary system that had preceded it.

Lippmann responded to the letters approving of Italy's new leader and government by showing distrust for Mussolini

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[16]Brown, Through These Men, pp. 222-224.

[17]Lippmann, "Doubt That Will Not Down," The World, 19 August 1927.

[18]Lippmann, "No New Light Whatsoever," The World, 20 August 1927.

and his motives. Italy would have to expand to meet demands of a growing population, and this expansion threat would be a definite danger to European peace. Lippmann also noted that if Mussolini's Fascism were such a success then it should be unnecessary to pursue a policy of repression. He found Mussolini and the Fascists to be "men of violent and neurotic temper who would feel they were not red-blooded men if they approached this most delicate and difficult question [of maintaining power and gaining more territory to meet a growing population's needs] with patience and coolness."[19]

Lippmann experienced a troubled democracy attempting to thread its way between varying degrees of liberty and authority. It was when America lost its way and either extremes of liberty or authority dominated national life that serious troubles began. Democracy needed the essentials of the two elements that liberty and authority represented: the former allowed and encouraged renewal and the latter gave order and direction. Their equilibrium meant life to America's political economic well being. Anarchy or tyranny meant death.

The books Lippmann published in the 1920's sought more permanent answers to the problem of maintaining a successful balance between the best aspects of liberty and authority.

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[19]Lippmann, "The Danger of Fascism," The World, 23 December 1925.

America's domestic and international issues of the 1920's quickened Lippmann's search. In seeking solutions to problems before society, Lippmann was much more interested in finding answers which conflicting groups could accept than he was in presenting wholly intellectually viable solutions. Accomodation among conflicting interest groups was more important than the nature of the solution offered. He could see no other way--for goals that hardened into doctrine became brittle and fell away under life's constant thrashing about in continual change. Lippmann aimed at keeping problems clearly defined and options available that met the difficulties. A disinterested observer using reason as a basis for his scrutiny could keep citizens informed. They, in return, could see issues and choose solutions. Lippmann, however, was under no illusion that all people eagerly studied public problems and anxiously figured alternative answers. But if America's democracy were to function successfully its participants would have to share responsibility for maintaining a balance between liberty and authority.

Liberty and the News (1920) and American Inquisitors: A Commentary on Dayton and Chicago (1928) show Lippmann's concern about authority dominating liberty. During World War I, he witnessed and participated in news manipulation,

and he was uneasy about it.[20] Liberty and the News makes clear the link between citizens and their right to know. If the news were distorted, for whatever reason, the public had unclear and even false bases upon which to act. Lippmann saw the newspaper as democracy's bible and he felt journalism to be a high profession charged with a noble and essential task: to keep the truth before the people and their leaders.[21] He argued that "with a common intellectual method and common area of valid fact, differences may become a form of cooperation and cease to be irreconcilable antagonism."[22]

In 1928 his book American Inquisitors came off the press. He observed gloomily that papers had to be entertaining if they were to sell. Americans found news stories that treated serious events responsibly dull. Only the spectacles such as John Scopes' trial in Dayton, Tennessee and William McAndrew's trial in Chicago were of interest. Both involved state restriction of a teacher's intellectual

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[20]Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), p. 9. Lippmann's Men of Destiny (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927) contains reprints of magazine articles he wrote in the 1920's. One chapter concerned censorship and it followed Liberty and the News to a point. It was not hopeful that democrats were likely to accumulate facts, weigh evidence, and arrive at reasonable conclusion--pp. 100-106.

[21]Lippmann, Liberty and the News, p. 47.

[22]Ibid., p. 67.

obligations and rights. They were clearly two cases marking a new phase in the ancient conflict between freedom and authority.[23]

By returning to the classics in American Inquisitors and staging a Socratic dialogue between Thomas Jefferson and Socrates (with William Jennings Bryan interjecting at times), reason and revelation underwest exacting discussion.[24] Where revelation extended beyond human experience, reason derived from human experience and continued to develop and change according to the dictates of human experience. Reason could correct itself where revelation could not.[25] Modern man increasingly rejected the customs and traditions associated with the church. However, in rejection the old men often laid themselves open to false prophets [propagandists] and in the process of modernists exercising their liberty, they had turned it into intellectual and emotional anarchy. Their disbelief had become a destructive authority.[26]

Lippmann's book entitled Public Opinion (1922) is without doubt one of the most important treatises, perhaps the

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[23]Lippmann, American Inquisitors: A Commentary on Dayton and Chicago (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), pp. 4-8.

[24]Ibid., p. 38, ff.

[25]Ibid., pp. 64 and 40.

[26]Ibid., pp. 104, 118-120.

most important Lippmann ever wrote. He set as his task the analysis of how public opinion developed and the nature of public opinion. Along with Public Opinion's sequel, The Phantom Public (1927), he explored the public's perception of the line between liberty and authority that formed the power base from which its leaders operated. To keep the public vision clear and to interpret its will as a basis for effective action remained the major duties of news gatherers and national leaders.

Lippmann wrote in Public Opinion that the American democracy, as conceived by its Founding Fathers, possessed a structural weakness which developed into a critical debilitation as the nation grew. The success of Jeffersonian democracy depended upon a small, rural geographical area, about the size of a township, being led by a selected class.[27] Although America's politics developed a two party system and patronage which helped create peaceful change, it operated also in fear of an unseen environment. Thus, citizens in a democracy insisted upon self-determination and self-government where the environment remained familiar, but American views beyond the familiar were imprisoned by the parochial nature of their government. In addition, as man's civilized environments expanded and intertwined, it became

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[27] Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922: rpt; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. 169-170.

obvious that omnicompetent citizens constantly interested in political affairs were difficult to find.[28]

Public Opinion acknowledged that Men of Reason who helped to build the American experiment in the seventeenth and eighteenth century could not have foreseen inventions that tied together the nations of the world. But in order to avoid constant friction which was likely to occur among communities becoming aware of others, Lippmann noted that societies of the past had developed a central idea that each person had his special function to perform. Their duty would keep them out of conflict. Thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Dante wrote of such a device, and such contemporary economic systems as socialism and capitalism pursued a similar goal.[29]

Lippmann described another major problem confronting democracy. Since the world had been tied more closely together by steam vessels, railroads, telegraphs, telephones, and radio, the foreign environment obviously impinged upon democracy's circumstances. It was increasingly important that the world outside became intelligible to the average citizen who helped form American public opinion.

The environment itself proved difficult to describe, Lippmann wrote in Public Opinion, for it was mostly unseen,

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[28] Ibid., pp. 181, 171, 173.

[29] Ibid., pp. 165-167.

often puzzling, and usually fleeting.[30] To make matters worse, some observers of foreign environments, notably propagandists, had a stake in reporting only certain sets of circumstances, and so distorted truth.[31] Difficulties also arose because the average citizen spent little time each day examining the newspaper, and he read most often stories unconcerned with political issues. Moreover, human language was inadequate to report environment accurately and foreign language translations presented serious obstacles to understanding.[32]

One of Public Opinion's greatest contributions to comprehending man in groups was its discussion of stereotypes. Lippmann felt these proved to be habits of one's eyes, an understanding of which was essential to the perception of how public opinion was formed. He declared that people had been taught to see certain things or to imagine specific types of circumstances.[33] These patterns of stereotypes linked people to their environment--seen and unseen. Lippmann noted great danger in attacking the habits of eyes, for stereotypes gave people their sense of value about

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[30] Ibid., p. 17.

[31] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[32] Ibid., pp. 40-43.

[33] Ibid., pp. 54-57.

themselves. He argued that a perfect stereotype preceded the use of reason since it imposed characteristics on data before it reached intelligence.[34]

Lippmann saw serious danger in relying totally on stereotypes when dealing with national or international issues. Americans had seen through stereotypes of progress and development for generations. The focus upon ever-increasing production and material progress prior to World War I had resulted in a failure on the part of Americans to give adequate thought to the problem of achieving peace in a world of sovereign states. It would no longer suffice for man to devote almost exclusive attention to domestic problems, Lippmann explained. Satisfactory advances in the solution of those problems did not remove the conflicts among rival national economies. The time had come when Americans must recognize that their own fate and the fate of the nation depended upon international developments.[35]

Public Opinion showed that a person's view of the world was largely, if not wholly, a subjective matter related directly to one's experiences, interests, and prejudices, or as Lippmann put it, to one's angle of perception. Capitalists saw one thing and socialists another. Their point of view had been determined by stereotypes which, in turn, had

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[34] Ibid., pp. 63-65.

[35] Ibid., pp. 69-75.

been accepted and arranged by man's nature. Lippmann described man's mind, his instinct, and the various selves in one personality as extremely complex and in some cases beyond man's present understanding. The perceptions upon which man acted depended upon fleeting, constantly changing images which the mind had created.[36] Man's action depended upon which self at that particular instant saw the issue, and instinct had little understanding at the time except to know there was such a thing.[37] Men would pursue their interests, but how was not fatally determined. "Man can set no term upon the creative energies of men."[38]

At the center of man's morals, Lippmann wrote, rested a core of stereotypes that determined which set of facts one would see and in what light they would be seen. He argued that America's ideal view of human nature prompted its progress. At the same time a society that looked for such ideals also helped itself find them.[39] Moral codes involved "a picture of human nature, a map of the universe, and a version of history," and--Lippmann warned--myth had never contained the critical power to separate its truths

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[36] Ibid., p. 103.

[37] Ibid., p. 112.

[38] Ibid., p. 121.

[39] Ibid., p. 76.

from errors.[40] The codes became more complicated as Lippmann saw several different types within one man: those for personal, economic, professional, family, and religious activities. Again, the real difference of how one acted and believed arose from his angle of perception.[41]

Lippmann turned away from discussing democracy and its individual citizens in Public Opinion when he began considering common will and democracy's leaders. Lippmann asked, "How does a simple and constant idea emerge from this complex of variables?"[42] He answered by describing the power of an emotional stimulus that could effectively coalesce public opinion. He used President Wilson's Fourteen Points as an example of an emotional stimulus which satisfied several different types of needs that the Allied and Central Powers had.[43] The Fourteen Points "were a daring attempt to raise a standard to which almost everyone might repair."[44]

A small group of leaders tended to control world affairs, Lippmann argued. By virtue of their position and authority, these men who had wide and frequent contact with the world at large had some realistic picture of that larger

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[40] Ibid., p. 80.

[41] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[42] Ibid., p. 125.

[43] Ibid., pp. 132-135.

[44] Ibid., p. 136.

world. The masses could only have a vague and generalized view of the larger world. However vague and generalized the view, uncomplicated by realities, it would direct their behavior.[45] But the leaders also recognized that only when an emotional symbol activated the people could they exercise effectively their powers. These symbols, substitute for realities, Lippmann observed, elicited emotions. They blotted out details and replaced reality and in so doing substituted a conception that led to action. The symbol allowed masses to escape their own inertia.[46] In foreign affairs few people were privileged to see reality. The conception of far away places had little relationship to realities. Therefore, leaders could shape these conceptions of the people so as to suit their own purposes.[47]

After describing the great difficulties in operating a democracy, Lippmann's portrayal of contrived consent smacked of authoritarianism. He wanted to balance the idea of a foreign policy elite running foreign policy by constructing a group of information specialists which intelligently reported the environment to public administrators; however, the information gatherers would not be tied to

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[45] Ibid., p. 136.

[46] Ibid., pp. 145-146.

[47] Ibid., pp. 154-158.

newspapers which were generally linked to advertising interests.[48] Public Opinion proposed to avoid the noble role of standardized newspaper reporting that his earlier Liberty and the News supported. Lippmann explained that democracy's problems went deeper than the press could go.[49] Thereby, the public at large was excluded from determining foreign policy. This marked a radical departure from traditional democratic thought.

Lippmann argued that knowledge came from the environment and that men built wisdom from their search for truth in the outside world. If they turned inside themselves to find truth and wisdom, he wrote in Public Opinion, they accumulated only prejudices.[50] The public would have to be re-educated about how to think, but that would take years, and crises occurred in minutes.[51] Lippmann suggested, finally, that self-knowledge led to desire for a friendlier world. In a great leap of faith from democracy's problems to solutions offered, Lippmann stated that man must live as if good will would work--that man must use intelligence, courage, and effort to pursue the good life for all men.[52]

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[48] Ibid., pp. 203 and 250-251.

[49] Ibid., p. 228.

[50] Ibid., p. 249.

[51] Ibid., pp. 255-256 and 260.

[52] Ibid., p. 262.

Public Opinion by-passed the public and lay the problem of operating democratic America at the feet of public administrators and information specialists. In sharp contrast to the tenets of the democratic faith, Lippmann placed his faith in the leaders who knew best. The people were relegated to mere followers because they had yet to be taught how to think. Lippmann attempted to balance the authority with some liberty when he asked the average democrat to believe in man's good will and look forward to a promising future.

In The Phantom Public: A Sequel to "Public Opinion" (1927), Lippmann reaffirmed that democracy's leaders should continue to act on basic public issues as they had in the past. However, he now spelled out an important role for the public. Its role was to intervene in public affairs when leaders became arbitrary and did not behave as the public believed they should.[53] The public, Lippmann asserted, aligned itself with individuals who actually governed and showed its will only as a check of "the use of force in a crisis, so that men, driven to make terms, may live and let live."[54] Actually, Lippmann clarified democracy's past workings by urging leaders who were acquainted with wider environments to continue their direction and by seeing the

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[53] Lippmann, The Phantom Public: A Sequel to "Public Opinion" (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), pp. 103 and 144-145.

[54] Ibid., p. 62 and 74.

public as a watchdog of leaders' behavior. With democracy's leaders acting on issues and with the public curbing national leader's unusual behavior, Lippmann attempted to keep clear the thin line between liberty and authority.

The Phantom Public sharply challenged the democratic theorists who had viewed the public as sovereign. America had been founded on the idea that reason was useful, Lippmann contended, and the public could be helpful in creating an atmosphere wherein reason could be exercised. He declared that the public did not need to act on all public affairs, and that in many cases it would be best in the public would not act.[55] Lippmann felt that few instances existed where the public (outsiders) had as much information and knowledge of options as its leaders (insiders). The public's role in democracy should be defined: its powers and limits. It needed direction, but it also should be put in its place. Lippmann feared "the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd" as much as he loathed arbitrary dictatorial behavior from national leaders.[56]

The Phantom Public showed a difficult, complex relationship among the people, their leaders, and the outside world. Reformers had made the mistake of seeing American society as

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[55] Ibid., pp. 147, 134-141.

[56] Ibid., p. 155.

an organic whole and they ignored the innumerable variety of relations which occurred naturally from democrats pursuing their individual desires and of the individuals mixing with others.[57] To add more variety, the world outside most people's experience imposed further concerns which often were understood only through imagination.

If democracy's leaders were to govern effectively, power had to be centralized--and this centralization created further distance between the governors and the governed. Where the governors saw a type of whole and tended to generalize through abstraction and bureaucracy, the governed experienced daily varieties of the whole and tended "to mistake a local prejudice for a universal truth."[58] With increasing distance occurring between the people and their leaders and with an imagined environment creating more serious issues which demanded quick action, Lippmann thought the people would have to accept the organic whole view of society and suppress their individual desires. Or they could revolt.[59] Order must precede law before the latter's authority was free to allow liberty. Lippmann asserted, as well, that domestic tranquility meant more effective relations overseas.[60]

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[57] Ibid., pp. 156-157 and 172.

[58] Ibid., pp. 180-181.

[59] Ibid., p. 186.

[60] Ibid., pp. 194 and 196.

In late January of 1929 William Allen White, the prominent Republican editor of the Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, wrote to Henry S. Canby, an editor for Book-of-the-Month Club. White asked that Lippmann's soon-to-be-published Preface to Morals be selected as the next month's chief offering. He wrote:

> I think it is Lippmann's high tide. It is a serious book but beautifully written and simply written. There isn't a paragraph in it that the average intelligent American cannot understand and to me that is everything about a book.61

White also sent a note to Lippmann. The January 21st letter related to Lippmann that the Emporia Gazette editor had read Preface to Morals in proof for the Book-of-the-Month Club. He felt that it was Lippmann's highwater mark and White wrote he was happy that Lippmann's latest book was his best. White observed that after reading the book he had an urge to write to Lippmann and ask him to leave the newspaper business and become a literary light. But now that Lippmann had been advanced to Editor-in-Chief of the World, he supposed that it was probably better that Lippmann stay where he was. Lippmann could move the masses through his editorial rather than be a philosopher "and appeal to

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61 William Allen White to Henry S. Canby, 21 January 1929 in Walter Johnson, ed., Selected Letters of William Allen White, 1899-1943 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), pp. 290-291.

the leadership of the country and the world."[62]

In the same note, however, the Kansas editor declared that Lippmann's Preface to Morals would move the masses and appeal to their leadership. The book was easy reading. "Your sentences and paragraphs are as crystalline as Emerson. You have a great talent and your life is well before you....I envy you the happiness of the coming years which I have seen myself in passing them."[63]

Lippmann's tenth book, Preface to Morals, was published in May of 1929. It became a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and ran through six editions before the year had passed.[64] Among the many favorable reviews, even acerbic Edmund Wilson praised Preface to Morals as "beautifully organized, beautifully clear."[65]

The book showed a dissolving ancestral order. Man, Lippmann asserted, had a great need to believe and truths of organized religion had for generations satisfied man's desire to

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[62]William Allen White to Walter Lippmann, 21 January 1929 in Ibid., p. 291.

[63]Ibid., pp. 291-292.

[64]Roderick Nash, The Nervous Generation: American Thought, 1917-1930 (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), p. 112.

[65]The New Republic, 59, 10 July 1929, p. 210.

find certainty.[66] But Americans had lost their security because the "acids of modernity" had destroyed it. People seemed unsure of their relationship to God, to government, and of their own individual relationship to the world.[67] Industrial progress had wiped out America's continuity with its rural past. The city's growth increased alienation from one another, and people had started crossing what was once considered almost sacred lines between various economic and social classes. A horror of the loss of association set in.[68]

Lippmann argued in Preface to Morals that man needed surroundings or dispositions which did not change--for their order assured man of eternal order. A loss of piety or patriotism threw believers into a maelstrom where the world's meaning drowned in emotional and intellectual chaos.[69] It was religion's purpose to give man a picture of the world with which he could relate successfully--where he could find value.[70] The school, the church, the family, and the state had become specialized and separate under the impact of

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[66]Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), pp. 36 and 40.

[67]Ibid., p. 56.

[68]Ibid., pp. 61 and 66.

[69]Ibid., p. 63.

[70]Ibid., p. 131.

modernity. Where various institutions and their absolutes once worked together, dissolution had begun.[71] People had a blur of choices, Lippmann wrote, and they were somewhat dithered by them.[72] He argued that the modern intellect tended to deny what ought to be true was necessarily true.[73]

The apparent loss of American society's usual vestiges of authority, Lippmann observed, in turn led to the belief that passions should flow and selves should be fulfilled. Liberal reformers had sought to change man's external environment in order that man's innate goodness could shower forth. They had ignored the ages' wisdom that the human condition could be bettered only if man's internal being and his external conditions were changed and harmonized. Modernity's answer of "liberty" of the passions and "liberty" to fulfill self flew in the face of the past's authority.[74]

Preface to Morals argued that the goals men set for themselves were a product of their beliefs about the nature of the world and human nature. These beliefs were now disintegrating and when these old beliefs changed men must also change their goals.[75] The humanism which Lippmann

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[71] Ibid., pp. 112-119.

[72] Ibid., p. 110.

[73] Ibid., pp. 136-137.

[74] Ibid., pp. 152-158.

[75] Ibid., p. 143.

supported rested on man's knowledge of human psychology and science, and it aimed "to come to terms with the needs which created those fictions (faiths)." Lippmann declared, "In this book I take the humanistic view because, in the kind of world I happen to live in, I can do no other."[76]

Lippmann believed that man should revise his desires in the light of his understanding of reality provided by science and psychology. Lippmann carefully noted Sigmund Freud's and Sandor Ferenczi's [a Hungarian colleague of Freud's] revealing analysis of the nature of man. But, he argued that their studies dealt only with the pathological states of man's maturation.[77] Lippmann was concerned with the last stage of human development where it recovered harmony between itself and the environment. Harmony had been lost when the human left infant stage and began the long process of adjusting its desires to realities of the world. Lippmann argued that unhappily some men in high places, in charge of the mechanics of civilization, had remained attached to old habits where their wishes were law "and they knew neither necessity nor change."[78]

Lippmann conceived of humanism as a higher form of

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[76] Ibid., p. 144.

[77] Ibid., pp. 173-180.

[78] Ibid., p. 184.

religion devoted to the art and theory of the internal life.[79] Humanism asked man to formulate a way of life that grew from his own resources and did not depend upon "supernatural rules, commands, punishments, and compensation." Modern man, Lippmann declared, faced awful dilemmas: he wanted to believe but could not; he needed commands but there was no commander; Lippmann's proposed religion of spirit would suit modern man's needs, but it was beyond him.[80] Modern man's desires had to be re-educated because the old certainties guaranteed by ancient authority were dissolving.

Lippmann's main contention was that the old problem of disbelief had spread to so great an extent that it demanded immediate serious concern. Old religion met aberrations as they occurred and, in effect, governed from day to day. The high religion, which Lippmann proposed as useful, aimed at re-education of desires that caused the profound unrest which kept America in turmoil. High religion was no longer a spiritual luxury that could be enjoyed by the few; its mass application became an imperative.[81]

Lippmann observed that the industrial revolution and

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[79] Ibid., p. 195.

[80] Ibid., p. 198-203.

[81] Ibid., p. 208.

urban growth had sped the United States toward a spiritual crisis. However, Lippmann had faith that the society's developing strengths allowed solution. Lippmann's high religion relied on a disinterested mind that gave credence to science's detached inquiry.[82] Modern America's spiritual troubles forced its leaders to be more tolerant of others' beliefs and also set them to searching for harmony that would accommodate seemingly conflicting goals.[83] Humanism's core, high religion, encouraged tolerance and search.

Modern society's very diversity and separation of functions and aims had made it interdependent and sensitive to potential crises. Severe problems, Lippmann wrote, immediately disoriented a complex civilization which depended upon all of its separate but critical parts working together. Power, Lippmann asserted, had become distributed and qualified so that it was exerted by interaction--not by command.[84]

In contrast to a politician who sought to satisfy constituents' immediate desires, Lippmann called for a statesman to help people recognize their hidden and long term interests. The statesman made people more aware of their environment--their relation to it--and options available

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[82] Ibid., pp. 221 and 238.

[83] Ibid., p. 271.

[84] Ibid., pp. 272 and 275.

when the two interacted. By facing his followers with reality, the statesman re-educated their desires. The statesman's detached position of disinterestedness allowed him to rise above agitations of the moment and gain insight from collected knowledge and objective analysis.[85] Lippmann failed to explain why and how statesmen were to be disinterested. His faith that they would become so certainly could not be justified by history nor by the behavior of statesmen Lippmann knew from experience.

Lippmann addressed himself to the powers-that-be. He called them moralists and observed in Preface to Morals that their roles in society had changed. They could no longer stand on their rock of truth and survey the chaos of modern America. The development of science and the growth of the industrial revolution had caused man's inner springs of being to change and his conduct had been altered. Youthful brashness and the cult of intellectual disbelievers were signs of an America in transition. The moralists had to face the often frustrating and sometimes convulsive shifts.[86]

The moralist, Lippmann declared, had to begin interpreting man's needs. He could no longer teach the revealed--he would have to reveal what could be taught. Lippmann

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[85] Ibid., pp. 280-283.

[86] Ibid., pp. 315-317.

wrote that the moralist should seek and explain insight rather than preach. Most importantly, the moralist could no longer assert "the good" and expect people to abandon "the wrong." He would have to prove the goodness of moral assertions. The moralist would have to help man reform his needs in a world unconcerned with man's happiness.[87]

As Lippmann's book title displayed, its author intended no more than to provide a preface to further inquiry. If a civilization were to exist in a world filled with conflicting goals, the civilization itself should create a clear idea of what is represented. In order to fulfill the promise of its representation, its ideals had to be clearly defined. It must have an imaginative concept of good. The type of clarity and definition that Lippmann asked for could only be rooted in knowledge, and knowledge, Lippmann affirmed, was a principle of order and certainty. It helped define intellectual stability and it also provided spiritual and emotional security. Knowledge added dignity to man's existence.[88]

By recognizing the need for change, Lippmann sounded an alert in Preface to Morals that the old was dissolving; people sought the new; and they needed a place or idea from

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[87] Ibid., pp. 318-320.

[88] Ibid., pp. 322-323.

which to begin. He argued that man should carefully examine the past's wisdom for usable portions that would help the present. He asked that man recognize the importance of the relatively new science of psychology because it offered potential insight into man's complex inner being. Lippmann supported the use of reason and detachment which would help him sort the important and the unimportant, the permanent and the temporary. America was in crisis, and if one could not find answers in its environment, he would have to look to himself.[89]

America attempted to return to normalcy, to ideas and values long outdated, which revealed the country's spiritual crisis. President Harding's phrase echoed what citizens wanted. But when they set out to re-establish the certainty that world war had disrupted, their sureness turned into a rummaging which eventually developed into a frantic search. Four years of war had changed the world.

Lippmann's role in American life became clearer in the 1920's; he had become a careful critic without portifolio. As in his first book, Preface to Politics (1913), his tenth one, Preface to Morals (1929), placed man at the center of human affairs. During those sixteen years that his first ten books were written and published, Lippmann developed a philosophy which urged man toward reason and asked him to

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[89] Ibid., pp. 323-327.

see life as a developing process.

The 1920's presented a decade that needed a voice which showed Americans hovering near extremes of authority and liberty. Lippmann's reason and detachment asked man to strike a balance between them. He wanted men of good will to be able to live happily together. To take authority without liberty meant dictatorship, and to use liberty without authority meant anarchy. Freeing oneself of blind obedience to old institutions and encrusted dogma which no longer served man's humane needs was a task Lippmann assigned to knowledgeable and reasonable men. Likewise, adherance to the new and faddish that served no end except to signal need for significant change aroused Lippmann's ire.

Sharp contradictions in Lippmann's writings are readily apparent. In Public Opinion he forcefully challenged the belief that few others besides scientific experts could achieve an understanding of the larger world. The stereotypes of the majority bore little resemblance to reality. In Preface to Morals Lippmann takes quite a different view of man's capacity to understand both himself and the society in which he lives. Now Lippmann emerges as a man of faith. Men could understand. Lippmann's new faith rests on the miracle of scientific study. Let man put the scientific method to use and man could achieve a correct picture of both himself and the world about him.

Only one of Lippmann's first ten books reached a wide popular audience during its initial publication. But

Lippmann's impact upon the people and their leaders hardly depended upon his monographic efforts. His newspaper and magazine writings touched the larger streams of conscious running through national life. Although Preface to Morals sold thousands of copies in 1929, his writings for The New Republic and Vanity Fair, for instance, helped to widen his influence. From 1922 through early 1931 he wrote for the New York World, and his twelve hundred editorials allowed his philosophy to be tested in American intellectual and political life. A critic who cherished common sense and reason and who asked people to live in harmony and good will had much to write about in the 1920's.

CHAPTER FIVE

WALTER LIPPMANN AND WAR'S END, THE 1920'S

The world of diplomacy revealed intense nationalism in the 1920's. World War I reordered power arrangements, and nations anxiously sought security. War bled England white. France scurried from one ministry to the next in search of security from what appeared to be an inevitable German reconstruction. Russia stumbled in its effort to stabilize a communist government at home and spread Marxism abroad. Japan's sun rose over recently acquired territory in the Far East. Latin Americans began severe pressuring for their independence from unwanted paternalism of the United States. And the United States--an economic giant with its newly won creditor-nation status--refused to join the League of Nations, insisted upon repayment of war debts, and raised tariff barriers.

President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States early in July of 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles. Walter Lippmann, having returned from the Paris Peace Conference six months earlier, was again editing and writing for The New Republic. He and the magazine's Editor-in-Chief, Herbert Croly, did not agree upon what positions The New Republic should take regarding the Versailles Treaty. Croly found it vindictive and wholly inconsistent with the Fourteen

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Points. Lippmann did not like the treaty but he was willing to accept an amended version of it in order to inaugurate the League of Nations. Croly maintained his argument and Lippmann eventually agreed, much to his later regret.[1] The New Republic denounced the Treaty of Paris.

Lippmann saw the public images of Allied leaders change as war ended and peace was sought. Postponed self-interests had begun to stir in the warring nations as peace came closer in 1918. "Britain the Defender of Public Law, France watching at the Frontier of Freedom, America the Crusader" felt their war images fray out. "Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George ceased to be the incarnation of human hope, and became merely the negotiators and administrators for a disillusioned world."[2]

Wilson's wartime administration created public opinion which supported American war efforts. But there was no such endeavor in preparing the United States for peace.[3] The Allies won a total victory over the Central Powers, and the peace that followed demanded a new pattern of international relations. Leaders who understood change and people who developed habits of tolerance would be

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[1] Lippmann, Reminiscences, I, pp. 18 and 12.

[2] Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 8.

[3] Ibid., p. 30.

necessary, for only they could refocus energy and rearrange accomodating goals.[4]

Lippmann wrote that the Paris Peace Conference did not contain the substance of peace. Solely territorial and materialistic issues were pursued and they triggered emotion. Germany's treaty with Russia, signed at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, had broken the hypnotic effect of war: peace was possible and people's minds began to wander. The Fourteen Points meant to counter the negative effects of Russia's revelation of the secret treaties in December of 1917, and they also were to ameliorate the effects of the Brest-Litovsk conference in early 1918. But the ideals of the Fourteen Points crumbled as victorious Allies began dividing the spoils in January of 1919.[5] The end of war, not the beginning of peace, set the diplomatic tone for the next generation.

As the 1920's passed, Lippmann adhered faithfully to the belief that the American democracy could survive postwar buffetings, and perhaps help lead other nations away from potential international collisions. He aimed to keep his readers informed about foreign affairs, and he wanted to direct American leaders away from applying American answers for world problems. In America, as elsewhere in the world,

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[4] Ibid., p. 73.

[5] Ibid., pp. 134-135.

self-interest increased after World War I, and the unfortunate excesses of nationalism prompted domestic irrationality and unilateral alternatives for international issues.

Even the best of American statesmen would have had a difficult time conducting successfully America's foreign relations during the 1920's. Democracy's limitations upon its leaders and the intricate diplomatic problems of the decade drove Lippmann toward gloom. He wrote that Americans were witnessing "stupendous happenings" by which they would be deeply affected. They had a choice: to live in a world filled with creativity and invention or to live in one paralyzed by hate and despair. After France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr in January of 1923, he noted sadly that "we are conscious and we are helpless."[6] Americans, he thought, were likely to continue their bad habit of personifying nations and applying moral qualities. A nation, he declared, was a complex organization that defied easy or permanent characteristics.[7] Rather than assess guilt or assign blame, Lippmann asked his readers to think clearly. He asserted that historic wrongs were never righted--that they remained endless and should be forgotten. He noted as well that guilt was personal and could not be passed from one generation to

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[6]Lippmann, "States of Mind About the Ruhr," Vanity Fair, 32, April 1923, p. 64.

[7]Ibid., p. 64.

the next. Lippmann asked readers to see the world as a process and suggested that the peace-makers at Paris in 1919 did not or could not recognize this.[8]

France and Belgium ostensibly invaded the Ruhr because Germany had defaulted on her reparations payments, and Lippmann was greatly concerned about the debts-reparations issue. Its influence on European economic and political stability was crucial. Americans wanted to be repaid the money they had loaned to the Allies to prosecute the war. But the indebted nations felt that the United States should negotiate the debt, which amounted to twelve billion dollars. After all, while Americans profited, Europeans died.[9]

Lippmann reported that debt-collecting depended on ability and willingness to pay.[10] He argued that the debts were interlocked and would require an international solution since several nations were involved.[11] Lippmann contended that French payments to the United States and Great Britain were tied to Germany's reparations payments to France.[12]

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[8] Ibid., p. 64.

[9] L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1968), p. 194.

[10] Lippmann, "Equality in Debt Collecting," The World, 10 December 1924.

[11] Lippmann, "Debts and Navies," The World, 16 December 1924.

[12] Lippmann, "A Decent Respect for the Opinions of Mankind," The World, 2 January 1925.

He reported on January 17, 1925 that England had asked that all Allied debts be canceled. Winston Churchill, the British chancellor of the exchequer, knew Continental debts were worthless, with probably only fractions of them collectable. Rather than demand the impossible Churchill gracefully surrendered them and "purchased Continental goodwill with the sacrifice." President Coolidge, Lippmann thought, would have to move fast and gracefully: either make debts payable or erase them.[13]

Lippmann's proposal of an international solution to the problem of intergovernmental indebtedness, and his declaration that Germany's reparations payments deeply influenced Allied debt payments received sharp reinforcement as he analyzed the Dawes Report through the spring and summer of 1924.

The Dawes Committee was an international body composed of Americans, French, Italians, British, and Belgians. American economic experts included Charles G. Dawes, Owen D. Young, and Henry Morton Robinson. They met with other committee members from January through the early part of April, 1924. The major point of the Dawes Report consisted of making Germany once again an economically viable country capable of paying its reparations. Germany would receive Allied help in reconstructing its devastated country, and

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[13]Lippmann, "Churchill's Drum-fire," The World, 17 January 1925.

she would then make reasonable reparations payments spread over a definite period of time. The Germans needed a two-hundred-million-dollar loan to get started and, at the behest of President Coolidge, the private banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company loaned one hundred and ten million dollars.[14]

Lippmann favored the Dawes plan, but he perceived many problems. His major criticism must have lanced the French heart, for Lippmann declared that if Germany were to pay the huge Allied-imposed reparations it would have to recover its former strength. Do the Allies, especially France, want a strong Germany?[15] He understood French fear of a reconstructed Germany, but he felt that America and England were better suited to control Germany's growth than was France.[16] Lippmann believed that the Dawes repayment plan was too high and that Germany would most certainly default in two or three years.[17] He noted, also, that Germany must be willing to pay the reparations if she wished to stay out of trouble with

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[14]Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, pp. 200-201.

[15]Lippmann, "Fundamentally Just and Acceptable," The World, 18 April 1924. See also "French Counter Claims," The World, 27 April 1924.

[16]Lippmann, "Poincare Defected," The World, 13 July 1924.

[17]Lippmann, "The Issues at London," The World, 19 July 1924.

other countries. France, Lippmann advised, should consider negotiating with rather than dictating to Germany on the question of reparations.[18]

Walter Lippmann also examined carefully international maneuvers aimed at establishing future world peace. If the world were to stay peaceful, he asserted, a structure providing collective security was needed. In an editorial of October, 1925, he wrote:

> Everybody in Europe knew the pledges of peace in the [League of Nations] Covenant were meaningless because no human power could preserve an order in Europe based on the domination of France, the permanent prostration of Germany and the outlawry of Russia. So the pledges in the Covenant faded and were almost forgotten.19

Much of Lippmann's thinking about American foreign policy and its relationship to the world's rapidly changing alliances centered on the efforts of Continental powers to organize and regain some semblance of power in the West. The signatories of the League of Nations attempted to operate their international organization while the United States offered alternatives to the League structure. A naval disarmament conference, proposed by the United States, met in Washington late in 1921 and early in 1922. Nine

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[18]Lippmann, "The Consent of Germany," The World, 29 July 1924.

[19]Lippmann, "Locarno," The World, 21 October 1925.

countries attended the Washington Conference, which was an obvious attempt by the United States to substitute disarmament for League membership.[20] The participants concluded a number of treaties dealing with naval disarmament and territorial guarantees in the Far East. Lippmann felt that land armaments must also be controlled, but he acknowledged that curbing armies was a sensitive topic, for it affected the internal security of nations. Lippmann thought that the major problem of peace-keeping was assuring weaker nations that they would not have to face alone armies of stronger countries. He argued that at any serious hint of international aggression, consultation should begin while the world's public was alerted.[21]

European-inspired agreements, intended ultimately to strengthen League operations, predictably encountered American opposition. In 1923 Europeans proposed a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance which gave greater power to the League Council than was authorized by the League's Constitution. Opponents managed to defeat key provisions on definitions of violations and enforcement procedures. The following year the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was drawn up. The Geneva Protocol used League machinery more effectively than would have been the

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[20] Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, p. 79.

[21] Lippmann, "The Problem of Peace," The World, 5 September 1924.

case under the defeated Draft Treaty, contained better definitions of violations, and bound signatories to apply effective sanctions. The Geneva Protocol also provided "that aid should be given by each state 'in the degree which its geographical position and particular situation as regards armaments allows.'" The United States rejected the Protocol, but the League of Nations, in Fifth Assembly (October, 1924) approved it.[22]

Lippmann wrote approvingly of the Geneva Protocol. He believed that European powers would join for their own protection, that the League was reviving Wilsonian idealism, and that America's security was deeply affected by the Protocol.[23]

In November, 1924, Great Britain's government passed into the hands of the Conservatives, whose leaders opposed the Protocol, and Calvin Coolidge was elected President of the United States. It was possible that Coolidge and his Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, believed that American public opinion favored their position on foreign policy.

During 1925, Lippmann urged Americans to forgive their

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[22]Dexter Perkins, "On the Sidelines: The Department of State and American Public Opinion" in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats (Seventh Printing, 2 vols., New York: Atheneum, 1972), I, pp. 288-290.

[23]Lippmann, "Touching American National Security," The World, 13 September 1924.

European debtors and continue to practice forgiveness.[24] He did not think that Europeans were defrauding the United States, but he believed that Americans should take the initiative and move to rebuild and restore the economic system of the world.[25] As squabbling over debts and reparations continued, Lippmann demanded that we stop the arguments, sidestep the old irreconcilables who meant to keep us out of world organizations, and get on with world affairs.[26]

Europe persisted in composing itself and set out to guarantee national boundaries through a series of agreements which became the treaties of Locarno. By these agreements, concluded in 1925, France, Belgium, Italy, Britain, and Germany strengthened the principles of collective security by binding themselves not to go to war against one another, to arbitrate all disputes, and to help one another in case one of the members was attacked while censuring a treaty violation.[27]

Lippmann reported that the Locarno treaties were more indicators [than controllers] of a stabilizing balance of power in Europe. The French President, Raymond Poincare, had fallen and liberals were unifying the country.

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[24]Lippmann, "Making Trouble in Europe," The World, 8 June 1925.

[25]Lippmann, "The Poor Lamb," The World, 18 December 1925.

[26]Lippmann, "The Last Stand of the Battalion of Death," The World, 19 December 1925.

[27]Perkins, "On the Sidelines" in Craig and Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats, I, p. 293.

The German mark had stabilized, and the increasing collaboration between French and German businessmen helped Europe toward economic stability.[28] The Locarno treaties, Lippmann observed, did "not defy the law of gravity of international affairs;" they simply recognized that German influence in Europe must be at least equal to that of the French. He believed that the Locarno treaties, by reconciling the aspirations of the negotiators at Versailles with existing realities, were the products of great statesmanship.[29]

Lippmann wrote that the League had managed to stop a Balkan war; for the first time in seven years, it had found strength to do so. Why? The Locarno treaties had provided a powerful base for European action. Rather than the great powers (England, France, and Germany) taking sides, they unified.[30]

As early as August of 1923, one finds Lippmann writing about war outlawry, which he regarded as an undesirable substitute for the collective security of the League. Lippmann explained that Republicans such as Senator William Borah sought to outlaw war as a subterfuge to avoid the

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[28]Lippmann, "Locarno," The World, 21 October 1925.

[29]Lippmann, "Peace in Sight," The World, 22 October 1925.

[30]Lippmann, "The League's First Great Victory," The World, 28 October 1925.

League and the World Court. They ignored existing diplomatic devices used to accommodate opposing views. He urged that America support the League and the World Court to which at least fifty nations then belonged.[31] Over a year later he reported that the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations had decided to make war a crime and turn the whole world against an aggressor. Lippmann regarded this move as "the most ambitious, the most courageous, and the most nobly inspired specific plan of peace ever laid before mankind."[32] He hoped and may have believed, that the United States by agreeing to outlaw war, was taking a major step to avoid international cooperation.

In their search for international security outside the League of Nations, American leaders began to feel uneasy about the disarmament agreements of the Washington Conference in 1921. Cruiser competition increased dramatically, as did the power and influence of Japan in the Far East. In late 1923 the English stepped up their building of cruisers and began fortifying Singapore. In 1925 President Coolidge and his new Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, found themselves facing a growing demand, in

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[31]Lippmann, "The Outlawry of War," Atlantic Monthly, 132, August 1923, pp. 245-246; 251 and 253.

[32]Lippmann, "War is Crime," The World, 2 October 1924.

Congress and among the people, to build more cruisers. But the President and Kellogg waited and sought disarmament at Geneva in the summer of 1927.[33] They failed because the British would not agree to further disarmament.

An important consequence of the failure at Geneva was a turning of attention to an international agreement to outlaw war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed on August 28, 1928, raised some hope that a new era of world diplomacy had arrived. Skepticism existed, however, that this simple and vague declaration would eliminate war as an instrument of national policy, or that it could force disputants to settle arguments peacefully.

A month before the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact [also called the Pact of Paris], Lippmann published a long article in the Atlantic Monthly that showed him searching for a political equivalent to armed conflict. War, he lamented, settled great human questions and thus far man had not found an instrument of peace that produced similar significant answers.[34] For different nations, Lippmann said, war had produced solutions to a variety of problems--social, economic, and political.[35] It continued to be viewed as a

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[33]Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, pp. 134, 139, 141-148.

[34]Lippmann, "The Political Equivalent of War," The Atlantic Monthly, CXLII, July 1928, p. 181.

[35]Ibid., p. 182.

means to provide security.[36] Any attempt to outlaw war, Lippmann contended, required the recognition of certain truths about international relations. The status quo changed constantly and to date no one had found a peaceful way to change international relations, or to determine what was good and what was bad. Lippmann argued that the most stable society was one where change remained easiest. Peaceful change occurred, he believed, through arbitration and judicial settlement which rested on extant rights.[37] If peace were to be workable and permanent, Lippmann observed, existing powers would also have to be convinced that peace was in their interest,[38] that change was inevitable, and that they might help guide it.[39]

On the day that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed, Lippmann wrote that peace would not be found in the mechanism of international machinery; it would be found only in the habit of consultation and cooperation. He felt, however, that the treaty had some potential for keeping the peace. Nations involved in international disputes could now shun war and go to the conference table without losing face.[40]

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[36] Ibid., p. 183.

[37] Ibid., p. 185.

[38] Ibid., p. 186.

[39] Ibid., p. 187.

[40] Lippmann, "The Signing of the Treaty," The World, 28 August 1928.

In late December of 1928, Lippmann, with the thought in mind that Woodrow Wilson would have been seventy-two, had he lived, observed that Wilson's faith that peace was the concern of all nations had lived beyond the man himself. It had risen above Wilson's weaknesses and his enemies since those who opposed the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations now led support Senate approval for the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Wilson's new world order where universal public conscience would be mobilized against aggression seemed to be close at hand. Lippmann argued forcefully that it was "because the Pact of Paris is fortified by the covenants and practices at Geneva that the world at large has any faith in its promises."[41]

The Senate approved the Kellogg-Briand Pact in January of 1929. Defensive war, however, was not outlawed. Lippmann wrote that in effect "nations renounce war as an instrument of national policy only where no national interest is at stake."[42]

Lippmann contended that opposition to the Kellogg-Briand Pact originated with those who felt America should do as it pleased in foreign affairs. They advocated unlimited national sovereignty. He doubted if the Senate realized it

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[41] Lippmann, "Woodrow Wilson," The World, 28 December 1928.

[42] Lippmann, "The Treaty Ratified," The World, 1 January 1929.

but the Kellogg-Briand Pact had whittled away the various corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine. Within a year, he said, it would reduce the Monroe Doctrine to its original intent: that of keeping Europe out of the western hemisphere and securing America's self-defense.[43]

The First World War gave Latin Americans an opportunity to enhance their position in the eyes of Western leaders. Thirteen Latin countries broke diplomatic relations with Germany. Eight declared war, and two [Brazil and Cuba] actually participated. But ten Latin American nations signed the Treaty of Versailles, and joined the League, action which caused leaders in the United States to pause and contemplate.[44]

The failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles stirred Latin American suspicions of "Yankee" intent toward them. Latins suspected that "Uncle Sam" planned to resume his imperialistic ways. They had hoped that League membership would help protect them from future intervention by the United States, but Latin hopes died quickly as they saw the League of Nations "adopt a 'hands-off' attitude in most western hemisphere disputes." The international

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[43]Lippmann, "Back to Monroe," The World, 17 January 1929.

[44]Fred Wellborn, Diplomatic History of the United States (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Company, 1970), p. 304. See also J. Fred Rippy, Latin America: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 518-520.

organization feared the power of the United States, especially in the Western hemisphere.[45]

Attempting to work through the Pan American Union, Latins proposed at the Fifth Conference in Santiago, Chile in 1923 "an agreement for the settlement of conflicts between American states that provided for a commission of inquiry to investigate controversies with the purpose of avoiding and preventing hostilities." The proposed agreement, in treaty form, was not ratified.[46] Five years later at the Sixth Pan American Conference, held in Havana, the Latin Americans proposed that "'no state may intervene in the internal affairs of another.'" At the time the United States was deeply committed to interventionism in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Mexico. Charles Evans Hughes, United States representative to the Conference, declared that his government had the right to protect its nationals when Latin America failed to fulfill its duties. Consideration of the Latin American proposal was postponed, and "Uncle Sam" maintained domination of the Pan American Union.[47]

Latin Americans felt more than the political dominace of the United States. The war years had decimated their

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[45]Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), pp. 150-151.

[46]Ibid., p. 151.

[47]Ibid., pp. 152-153. See also Wellborn, Diplomatic History, p. 305.

European money markets, and their trade went to the United States. As a creditor nation the United States could afford to make loans to her Latin neighbors, some of whom could provide her with needed materials. Accordingly, American private investment in Latin America, which in 1900 amounted to $35 million, reached $1,960 million by 1929. From 1913 to 1927, the value of United States trade with Latin American nations increased over eighty per cent. Since Latins depended upon trade as their breath of life, their increased reliance on trade with the United States allowed further control of Latin destinies.[48]

America's concern for its economic and political well-being after the Spanish-American War had heightened its leaders' sensitivity about Latin American affairs. One cannot deny the importance of Latin America's economic draw to private investors in the United States, and many of their profit-directed economic maneuvers required the political and military protection of the American government.

However, even when attempting to correct past mistakes, the United States government found itself entangled in a web of diplomatic difficulties. Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, sought to moderate American control in Haiti

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[48] Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence on United States Policies to the End of World War II (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1968), pp. 186-187.

and ended its influence in the Dominican Republic. But Hughes operated slowly and kept American national interest uppermost.[49] To withdraw from Nicaragua and leave it permanently meant an unstable country close to the Panama Canal. To allow the Mexican government to nationalize millions of dollars of American oil investment meant severe domestic pressure placed upon a President given to let things ride. Calvin Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg exhibited uncommon wisdom, however, when they chose Dwight Morrow as American Ambassador to Mexico in 1927. Morrow's significantly soothing relationship with Mexican officials marked the beginning of a new era in United States-Latin American relations.

Lippmann writings of the 1920's show considerable interest in United States-Latin American relations. Although most of his work centered on American-European problems, he was quick to anger when he felt the President and his Secretary of State had deliberately misled the public about Nicaragua and Mexico.

Nicaragua had been in constant turmoil since 1909 when its flamboyant dictator José Santos Zelaya had been overthrown--with American help. From this point in time

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[49] Ibid., p. 195. See also Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America: From the Beginnings to the Present (Third Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 813.

until Lippmann exploded in several 1926-1927 articles, the United States supported various conservative Nicaraguan leaders who did not enjoy the majority of their people's support, but who experienced substantial American aid. To secure access to the Panama Canal and to ward off other countries who might want to build a second canal through Nicaragua, the United States propped up Nicaraguan leadership which remained sensitive to American needs.

After the war, the United States continued its intervention in Nicaragua by supervising the 1920 presidential election. The newly-elected president, Diego M. Chamorro, enjoyed office for three years and died, and a new man had to be chosen as Nicaragua's president in 1924. In a fraud-filled election a Conservative, Carlos Solórzano, was chosen and a Liberal, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa, became his vice president.[50]

Since Solórzano won the election with only a twenty thousand vote majority, one could be sure that the presidential loser would not exemplify an attitude of losing gracefully. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes was exasperated by Nicaraguan constant troubles. He recognized the new Nicaraguan president and arranged for American marines there to come home. Within weeks of the one hundred man marine force leaving Nicaragua in

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[50]Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, p. 105.

1925, Solórzano had been persuaded to resign and his vice president [Sacasa] left the country.[51]

As Sacasa sought foreign help to institute his leadership in Nicaragua, the 1924 election loser--Emiliano Chamorro (Conservative)--became Nicaragua's new president. The United States supported Chamorro and exile Sacasa found Mexican help for his bid to take over Nicaragua. Eventually, Adolfo Diaz [a Chamorro Conservative] was chosen president of Nicaragua and his request for the return of American marines to help fight Sacasa's revolt was granted in 1927.[52]

President Coolidge sent Henry L. Stimson as a personal agent to Nicaragua to "'straighten the matter out.'" By April of 1927, Stimson--a former Secretary of War and a governor general of the Philippines at the time of his mission--had established a coalition government in Nicaragua under American supervision. Rebel bands disarmed; a local constabulary was formed; and Nicaragua planned a United States supervised 1928 election. In spite of a high rebel's (Augusto Cesar Sandino) refusal to support the coalition government, the November 4, 1928 presidential election came off without a hitch and General José María Moncada became the new president.[53]

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[51]Callcott, The Western Hemisphere, pp. 200-201.

[52]Ibid., pp. 200-201 and Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, pp. 105-106.

[53]Callcott, The Western Hemisphere, pp. 201-202.

Lippmann recognized American interests in the Caribbean, but the United States had lectured Europeans about their overseas imperialism, and he thought it was time that Americans, too, recognized their empire. Americans could no longer see their country as a "great, peaceable Switzerland." No one, he declared, in Europe or South America believed America was neutral in Nicaraguan affairs. They all knew that Nicaragua's government was a creature of the State Department of the United States, and that Nicaragua had been part of the American empire for fifteen years.[54]

The White House announced that American marines and bluejackets had landed in Nicaragua, but that they were not taking sides. Lippmann reacted to the White House announcement by writing that if President Coolidge believed this he was badly misled. The United States had taken sides by occupying the rebel capital and by blockading the rebel port. He suspected that the Administration report really meant that Coolidge and Kellogg had blundered into something they did not know how to finish.[55]

Lippmann accused the President and Secretary of State of trying to mislead the public when they proclaimed

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[54]Lippmann, "An Unconscious Empire," The World, 29 December 1926.

[55]Lippmann, "The Official Spokesman on Nicaragua," The World, 30 December 1926.

neutrality in Nicaragua. The marines were there now and the pretense was over. The decision to send marines had been made in secret and no explanation was offered--except that they were a legation guard. He felt a "shocking lack of candor" had taken place. America's action in Nicaragua had unified Latin American opinion against the United States, and Coolidge had sowed seeds of hate for years to come.[56]

In May of 1927, Lippmann continued his drumfire against the administration's masked motives in Nicaragua. He stated that the United States would not have involved itself in Nicaragua if Mexico had not supported rebel forces there. Lippmann complained that the President and Secretary of State had never explained what we were doing in Nicaragua, and that they had frankly misled people about what had been done and what was intended.[57]

As American problems mounted in Nicaragua during the 1920's, they also increased sharply in Mexico. Mexican Chiefs of State had not proved to be nearly as friendly as Nicaragua's cooperative dictators. In May of 1917 Mexico had adopted a new constitution. Its adoption meant law to the Mexicans at home and several elements of reform

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[56]Lippmann, "The Official Spokesman on Nicaragua," The World, 30 December 1926.

[57]Lippmann, "Responsibilities in Nicaragua," The World, 18 May 1927.

that concerned businesses from abroad. "It featured nationalism, the concept of property as a social function, land reform, and labor legislation."[58]

Mexico's newly-elected president in 1920 was General Alvaro Obregón. His September election left his official recognition to the recently elected American President, Warren Harding. Obregón would not guarantee economic protection for foreign land and mineral investment and the United States postponed its diplomatic recognition of the new leadership of Mexico. In August of 1923, Obregon consented to a gentlemen's accord [Bucareli Agreement] that article twenty-seven of Mexico's 1917 Constitution would not be applied retroactively. Thus, American business investment would be protected. The United States then offered de jure diplomatic recognition to Mexico's three year-old government.[59]

In August of 1923, President Harding died and Calvin Coolidge finished the President's term. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes remained until March of 1925. Coolidge became President in his own right in 1924 and he chose Frank B. Kellogg to be his new Secretary of State. It was

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[58]Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, pp. 112-113.

[59]Ibid., p. 114.

their combined lack of understanding (and perhaps interest) about Mexico coupled to the American Ambassador's to Mexico (James R. Sheffield) tenure that helped create an increased stiff-necked attitude of the Mexicans in 1925. Sheffield did not like the Mexicans and his feelings quickened to hostility toward the United States from the new Mexican president, Plutarco Elías Calles. Soon after Calles' 1924 election, the Mexican government began regulating "the Constitutional provisions of the petroleum laws."[60] In addition, a new land law required foreign investors in Mexico to divest themselves of majority land holdings. The Bucareli Agreement of 1923 seemed to be no longer binding and American investors wanted federal government help.[61]

As Secretary Kellogg began acting on American business complaints over Mexico and its tough new President, Plutarco Elías Calles, he chose a tactic which caused Lippmann "to roast" the Secretary. Kellogg reported that communists were active in Mexico and their Bolshevism had caused Mexican turmoil. Lippmann defined Kellogg Bolshevism as anything that American business interests did not like. Oil and only oil alone was the source of outcry against Bolshevism. "If Calles surrendered tomorrow and gave the oil companies

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[60]Callcott, The Western Hemisphere, p. 197.

[61]Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, p. 114.

everything they want," Lippmann jibed, "the officials of the State Department would put on their best spats and sing Christmas carols about peace on earth and good-will to men." The United States should make it clear that it would not support doubtful American land or oil claims in Mexico and that in return the American government would not expect Mexican court harassment of legal American investment.[62]

During the remainder of January [1927] Lippmann continued to indict Kellogg for using Bolshevism as a cause of American-Mexican unrest. He also urged that the President and Secretary explain to Americans what the country's policy was toward Mexico as well as Nicaragua. Lippmann thought President Coolidge should be personally more in touch with the Mexican situation where he might find adequate justification for Mexicans resuming control of their land and resources. He argued that Americans could not conquer Latins, but they might try winning them.[63]

In an April issue of Foreign Affairs, Lippmann wrote that Mexico was one nation of several that had been caught

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[62]Lippmann, "Toward Peace with Mexico," The World, 8 January 1927.

[63]Lippmann, "If You Want Peace--" The World, 13 January 1927. See also: "A Crime Against Peace," 14 January 1927; "The Ultimate Question," 15 January 1927; "The Monroe Doctrine," 19 January 1927.

up in the rising tide of nationalism.[64] He argued that America's old methods of controlling Latins through the Monroe Doctrine and dollar diplomacy were no longer useful.[65] He found the Mexican revolution had arisen from Mexican conditions and had attempted to cure Mexican evils. The problem was, Lippmann explained, that a new Mexican government based on social and economic reform began running crossways to foreign investments.[66] In addition, Kellogg and Coolidge insisted upon the legal rights of foreign investors in Mexico, and this said to Mexican reformers that foreign investors had frozen Mexico's internal status quo.[67] Lippmann believed business to be flexible because it wanted to make profit overseas, but, he argued, the invested nation also sought to be free of foreign control.[68] Indirectly, Lippmann suggested American business-Mexican government accommodation. Directly, he asked the American government to avoid hurting Mexican pride and to stop enunciating large principles.[69]

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[64]Lippmann, "Vested Rights and Nationalism in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, V, April 1927, p. 353.

[65]Ibid., pp. 354-356.

[66]Ibid., p. 357.

[67]Ibid., pp. 359-360.

[68]Ibid., p. 362.

[69]Ibid., p. 363.

Lippmann argued that American foreign policy should be clearly re-defined and justified. He asked Americans to believe that they represented an empire and that they were members of a world power--and not citizens any longer of a "virginal republic in a wicked world."[70] Lippmann had argued previously that one of the major reasons for America's unsuccessful diplomatic relations with Latin America was that the United States had rank amateurs in the Latin American Division of the State Department.[71] He continued this theme in a late April (1927) World editorial when he compared American representatives to China and to Latin America. Since representatives to China had more experience working in China, he found the China Desk far superior, Lippmann wrote, though American intent in China was different from what it was in Mexico. The United States wanted to sell in China, but it went to Mexico to take. He saw a strong missionary interest in China, where there was hardly any of this in Mexico.[72] One might surmise that America's gentler attitude toward China occurred because she

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[70]Lippmann, "America as an Empire," Vanity Fair, 32, April 1927, p. 128.

[71]Lippmann, "Our Amateur State Department," The World, 9 March 1927.

[72]Lippmann, "Our Two Diplomacies," The World, 29 March 1927.

wished to accommodate Chinese traders and would-be Christians. In Mexico, foreign investors sought only profit.

Coolidge speeches increased Latin fears when the President praised American economic power and thought the Latins ought to be proud of it too.[73] Latins also drew back when Coolidge's April, 1927 announcement that potential American political involvement was a reality when an American citizen went overseas. The citizen was an extension of national sovereignty.[74] Amid these jarring notes, the President made a grand ambassadorial appointment. Dwight Morrow had been designated Ambassador to Mexico. Lippmann knew Morrow personally, and he felt the assignment was most fortunate. Morrow liked challenges.[75]

Morrow traveled to Mexico in the fall of 1927, and he went with carte blanche negotiation powers. The new ambassador mixed with the people and met directly with top government officials. Morrow's great personal charm won President Calles over, and before the next spring had arrived the Mexican courts had favored American oil investors with several positive decisions. Morrow, however,

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[73]Lippmann, "Babbitry," The World, 4 May 1927.

[74]Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, p. 246.

[75]Lippmann, "A New Ambassador to Mexico," Vanity Fair, 32, December 1927, p. 84.

supported the Mexicans more than he backed American oil investors.[76] His quick and successful settlement of the Mexican-American oil dispute brought him congratulatory note from Lippmann in April of 1928:

> Public feeling is tremendously enthusiastic about this settlement. There is a disposition in some quarters to ascribe it to some private magic which you have at your disposal and not to realize the enormous amount of brain-work and careful negotiation which it has involved.77

Sixteen months before Morrow arrived in Mexico, the Catholic churches had closed their doors to public services (July 31, 1926). The age-old dispute between church and state had once again flared. By the time Morrow had made his Ambassadorial presentation to President Calles, fighting and bloodshed had occurred between government forces and Catholic rebels. Morrow's previous study of church-state relations drew him into a vortex of what seemingly was none of his business. In a little over a year's time, Morrow had helped negotiate the opening of the churches (June 30, 1929) and getting the Mexican government to admit that it did not intend to destroy the Catholic church. Morrow knew this was not a permanent settlement, but he had smoothed the way

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[76] Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, pp. 246-249.

[77] Lippmann to Dwight Morrow, ? April 1928 in Harold Nicholson, Dwight Morrow (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), p. 332.

toward cooperation and possibly successful negotiation between church and state.[78]

Lippmann called Morrow's work with the Mexican government and the Catholic church "a masterpiece of diplomacy,"[79] He observed that Morrow realized the Mexican problem would never be solved unless Mexico's government and the Catholic church came to an agreement. It was a strange affair where Morrow, with Lippmann's help, "conducted the correspondence between the hierarchy and the Mexican government, in which he wrote the letters for both sides."[80] Lippmann rated Morrow "as high as any American public man I've ever known."[81]

As Dwight Morrow completed his successful church-state negotiations in Mexico, the first serious test of the Kellogg treaty began. In the summer of 1929, China and Russia broke diplomatic relations over control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. This situation had been brewing since 1927 when Chian Kai-shek, Chinese Nationalist leader, threw out communists and Soviet agents. Determined to become the

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[78]Nicholson, Dwight Morrow, pp. 341-346.

[79]Lippmann, "The Force of Sincerity," The World, 25 June 1929.

[80]Lippmann, Reminiscences, I, pp. 125-126.

[81]Ibid., p. 127.

ruler of all of China, Chiang decided that his former Russian friends and mentors had to go. In 1928 Chiang and Chang Hsueh-liang, the Manchurian leader, joined and they forced the Russians out of Manchuria by July of 1929. Russia presented an ultimatum and China rejected it, and by July 20, both nations had severed diplomatic relations. Both had signed the Kellogg pact.[82]

America's new Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, believed that it was in the national interest of the United States to activate the newly-signed Kellogg Pact. Stimson received assurances from China and Russia that they would not attack one another except in the case of self-defense. He also received approval for his action of invoking the Kellogg-Briand Pact from England, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan (July 26, 1929).[83]

By late July, 1929 negotiations had stopped between Russia and China. The latter meant to retrieve its old treaty rights, and the former was determined to enforce its legal rights based on the Peking Treaty of 1924. The Soviets made several raids into Manchuria, and on November 17, 1929, a well organized Russian army invaded Manchuria.

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[82] A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), pp. 389-391.

[83] Ibid., pp. 393-395.

Chang Hsueh-liang surrendered and the Soviets regained the status quo prior to the July Chinese-stimulated upheaval.[84]

Lippmann's commentary about the Chinese-Russian dispute does not carry the authority which he normally asserted when regarding European or Latin American affairs. He described the Far Eastern argument as a "baptism of fire" for the Kellogg Pact, and he argued that the burden of leadership in this particular case which involved the Paris Agreement belonged to the United States. After all, America had persuaded others to sign the Pact.[85] He hoped the whole thing would blow over, but other nations must be wary, for the small conflict could develop into a major war. He urged the President to mobilize world opinion and to pressure both disputants for a peaceful settlement.[86]

Stimson's diplomacy received Lippmann plaudits. It had "gained time for the much slower impulses of reason and accommodation to gather and assert themselves." Lippmann noted that Russian legal rights in Manchuria should predominate, but China's rising nationalism was involved. Somehow

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[84] Ibid., pp. 395-396.

[85] Lippmann, "Baptism of Fire," The World, 17 July 1929.

[86] Lippmann, "The Threat of War and the Duty of the Government," The World, 19 July 1929.

accommodation must be found without resort to violence. Russia would have to recognize Chinese nationalism, scrap its legal rights, and seek commercial and political cooperation. The Soviets, Lippmann argued, would be unable to stop the rise of nationalism.[87] Lippmann wrote to Secretary Stimson and complimented him for "preserving the peace in Manchuria" and for giving "a vitality to the Pact of Paris which it could not otherwise have had."[88] As Lippmann wrote to Stimson, Chinese-Russian negotiations broke down.

Eleven days after the Russian army had taken over Manchuria Lippmann wrote that the Manchurian question was a most perplexing one. Both the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris signatories had assumed that peace violators would be highly organized sovereignties and would belong to the community of nations. China did not possess a highly organized government and Russia had not been recognized as part of community of nations by all concerned. Neither seemed particularly sensitive to world opinion, and it was not certain that their troops were under full control. Lippmann stated, however that "Fortunately Japan, which is the great power nearest the scene, can be counted upon without question to do her part in

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[87] Lippmann, "Peacemaking," The World, 24 July 1929.

[88] Lippmann to Stimson, 29 July 1929 in Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

keeping the trouble within bounds."[89]

Lippmann views of American foreign policy in the 1920's attempted to create clear outlines of issues in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East. One cannot doubt where his major interest lay. Europe's picture for American viewers remained the sharpest and stimulated much Lippmann advice. His suggestions about forgiving and forgetting debts and reparations seemed idealistic when one considers American public opinion and the federal government's aim to enforce repayment. European wonderment at America's remaining outside the League of Nations led Lippmann to describe the Continent as proceeding on its own to secure collectively its welfare. The newly-earned economic power of the United States was not supported by its political or military commitments overseas. Instead, the United States sought disarmament, at first, to circumvent membership in "that world organization," and world powers reluctantly joined American-proposed disarmament. War outlawry became another American act to avoid the League, but in effect, as Lippmann noted, the Pact of Paris could not have been promising without the previous work of the League.

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[89]Lippmann, "The Manchurian Question," The World, 28 November 1929.

Lippmann's interests in Latin America and the Far East run a second and distant third for his attention. What strikes one as most important about Lippmann views of Nicaragua and Mexico is his explosive reaction to what he considered deliberate misleading of public opinion by high government officials. The attempt of Secretary of State Kellogg to link Mexican-American friction to Bolshevism caused Lippmann to counter Kellogg allegations by writing several articles refuting Bolshevism as an absurdity. When President Coolidge and Kellogg attempted to portray American involvement in Nicaragua as neutral, Lippmann reported Nicaragua had been part of the American empire for the past fifteen years. His concern about Mexico was accentuated when his good friend Dwight Morrow became American ambassador to that country in August of 1927. Lippmann writings about Mexico represented an accurate portrayal of reality, and his options of asking for fewer enunciations of large principles and for fewer barbs against Latin pride helped create a climate where Dwight Morrow could work "his magic."

Lippmann's cloudier picture occurred when he wrote about the Far East. He saw rising nationalism in both Mexico and China, but where he knew the particulars in Mexico, they escaped him in the Chinese-Russian fracas of 1929. Where he saw a Mexican problem arising out of Mexican conditions, he saw only Russian legal rights and Chinese nationalism clashing over a railroad that ran

through some distant land. And Japan stood by waiting--as a friend of peace. Lippmann's answer for the Far Eastern problem was to use a world-imposed solution that supposedly would stop war and pressure disputants to negotiate.

Lippmann is truly a man of European roots, and his writings of the 1920's convey his respect for Continental intellectual traditions. His major concern in the 1920's was to help the West rebuild physically, economically, and politically in order that it direct the world toward peaceful cooperation. He saw American involvement in European reconstruction as essential. For there were those who feared the cultural breakdown of Western civilization. The educated suffered most in a war-torn land. Because they did not represent the wealthy or the powerful, and when their nations' economies disintegrated, the educated's suffering was critical. It took generations, Lippmann wrote, to build traditions of learning and "acquired sensitiveness." Leisure time would be lost as nations tried to free themselves of war's effects, and in the process many of the educated and their culture would be destroyed. Lippmann asserted that Europe and America were vitally linked, and the Continent needed help.[90]

Lippmann has viewed his work as interpreting events

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[90]Lippmann, "Secretive Idealists," Vanity Fair, 32, June 1923, pp. 39 and 106.

"in the light of some underlying pattern of forces, circumstances, and design." He has seen himself as:

> trying to find forces which the events were making visible. Those forces can best be discerned by a historical knowledge of the more or less enduring patterns of forces. They don't change nearly so much as the reader of the newspaper could imagine they did.
>
> We're in the grip of great forces that we dimly apprehend, but whose nature can't be defined absolutely until a long time has passed. We'll always be in that position in a sense. Nobody will ever catch up with it, but what you do and think about things now contributes to the forces themselves.
>
> That aspect of course involves reading a great deal of history as well as having a good deal of experience and using for hypotheses historical analogies held lightly--not held literally and held grimly.91

Nationalism, power balances, alliance rearranging, anger, fear, and greed were present in one degree or another throughout international relations in the twenties. France feared German reconstruction. England took special exception to the Kellogg Pact. The United States kept itself secure by maintaining a friendly Nicaraguan government. China and Russia fought while Japan waited. The League, the Washington Conference treaties, and the Pact of Paris all contained loopholes in order that signatories may follow their national interest and protect themselves.

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91 Lippmann, Reminiscences, II, pp. 232-233.

Lippmann asked his readers to see the world as a process, with a next day's future. He counseled that nations should constantly examine and clarify their goals. He urged that nations learn to accommodate one another's policy definitions and national desires by encouraging the habit of consultation and cooperation. It would be his and his fellow journalists' role to keep people informed, to set facts in relation to one another, and to signal change. Forces existed, but they were illusive and they formed patterns which needed constant scrutiny and interpretation. By keeping sight of events and trying to read their design, the journalist and reader may be able to detect change and prepare for tomorrow's headlines.

But one wonders for whom Lippmann wrote in the 1920's--to whom did he direct the results of his investigations? From reading his monographs published then, a reader learned that a small group of people conducted the world affairs and that it was probably best that the masses were called into play only when crises arose. Mass decisions seemed always slow and generally based on ignorance. His former circle of national political figures such as Newton D. Baker, Colonel Edward M. House, and President Woodrow Wilson had been out of office for sometime. Lippmann rarely mentioned President Harding and though he knew President Coolidge personally, Lippmann had little respect for his intellectual energy. He respected Charles Evans Hughes, but there is no

available evidence to support the idea that Lippmann thinking had impact on Hughes. Lippmann loathed Frank B. Kellogg. Perhaps it was the challenge of his work that kept Lippmann writing when there was no obvious power toward which he directed thinking and expected some positive result. Or, perhaps, he was building relationships which carried the potential of developing into effective political action.

CHAPTER SIX

A DREAM AMONG SHADOWS

At Columbia University in the spring of 1932, Walter Lippmann delivered a Phi Beta Kappa address entitled "The Scholar in a Troubled World," and it marked Lippmann's frustration with the times. He argued that men with ability to clarify issues and offer potential solutions were badly needed in the American democracy, but Lippmann lamented that if learned men left their towers of quiet and detachment, they would become hopelessly enmeshed in the world's "constant moments of emergency."[1] He said the scholar could do little anyway. Crises came and went, and the troubled world had more need of long views.[2]

At the time Lippmann spoke at Columbia, the Scripps-Howard chain had owned the New York World for over a year, and Lippmann had joined Ogden Reid's New York Herald Tribune where the "Today and Tomorrow" columns began in the fall of 1931. Joseph Pulitzer's World went down hard in February of 1931. The depression was deepening and the paper's twenty-five hundred employees, many loyal to the independent World,

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[1] Lippmann, "The Scholar in a Troubled World," Atlantic Monthly, CL, August 1932, pp. 151-152.

[2] Ibid., p. 152.

attempted to buy the dying publication.[3] They were too late and pledges of money from across the United States for their purchase sadly supported a failing cause.

Lippmann had talked to the World's owner, Herbert Pulitzer, in the summer of 1930 about relinquishing his editor-in-chief position.[4] Lippmann observed years later that the World tried to be too many things to too many people, and its economic position suffered considerably since it went into the depression with no reserve.[5]

Even though Lippmann moved from a paper known for its independence to one markedly conservative, Ogden Reid guaranteed his continued independence of thought.[6] The column would appear four times a week and Lippmann insisted that it have the same type-form and page position. He signed the column and its syndication brought it to a national audience.[7] Lincoln Steffens happily noted that Lippmann had begun writing for the Herald Tribune. Wall Street, Steffens

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[3]See James W. Barrett, ed., The End of the World: A Post-Morteum By Its Intangible Assets (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1931).

[4]New York Times, 27 February 1931, p. 4.

[5]Lippmann, Reminiscences, I, p. 124 and II, p. 139.

[6]David Elliot Weingast, Walter Lippmann: A Study in Personal Journalism (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1949), pp. 21-22.

[7]Lippmann, Reminiscences, II, p. 144.

wrote, needed "a voice and a mind."[8] It now had both. Colonel Edward M. House congratulated Lippmann for becoming part of the New York Herald Tribune. The Colonel felt the Herald Tribune was a great newspaper and that Lippmann's presence would increase its stature.[9]

The Lippmann role as an observer of men's affairs became increasingly important as the Great Depression strengthened its hold on the world economy. Since American entry into World War I, he had been an ardent supporter of an Atlantic community led by the United States and England. It was this dream of an Anglo-American alliance directing world affairs toward political peace and economic cooperation which under-girded much of Lippmann thinking about foreign affairs in the 1930's.

Unfortunately, the dream experienced problems repeatedly from historic forces that blew it into harmless puffs of romantic vision. In an article written to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the publication Foreign Affairs, Lippmann reviewed the past ten years. He explained President Woodrow Wilson's analysis of the new world order after the end of the Great War. In the Fourteen Points, Lippmann

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[8]Lincoln Steffens to Ella Winter, 27 September 1931 in Ella Winter and Granville Hicks, eds., The Letters of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), II, p. 908.

[9]House to Lippmann, 7 September 1931 in House Papers, Yale University Library.

argued, Wilson charted the forces with which postwar world would concern itself.[10]

The President, Lippmann wrote, recognized nationalism as an important historic force that governed international behavior. Lippmann contended, however, that Wilson was never a pure nationalist. By including a life-long ideal of the United States in the Fourteen Points, the President believed that free trade and laissez faire economic relations among states would weaken nationalism's influence. The President intended that the League should serve as an international communications and consultative center. It also would serve as a committee of nations called together in event of crisis.[11]

Unfortunately, politically independent nations in an economically interdependent world resulted in tremendous friction. In attempting to deal with the problems, Lippmann argued, League weaknesses became accentuated.[12] The British reverted to protectionism and democracies in general sought to protect their home markets. Diplomats confronted questions of markets and private trading. The chief preoccupation of diplomacy, Lippmann noted, would be "with the attempt to manage politically the division of labor in the world economy."

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[10]Lippmann, "Ten Years: Retrospect and Prospect," Foreign Affairs, XI, October 1932, p. 51.

[11]Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[12]Ibid., p. 52.

He concluded that men no longer had the choice of living privately or living together.[13] Fierce economic nationalism had become a fact of international life.

More specifically, Lippmann laid great responsibility for the international situation of 1932 upon the shoulders of America's past three Republican administrations. The previous twelve years included a composite of half a dozen major foreign policies that had resulted in disaster. These policies encompassed "non-intercourse with foreign nations, the uncompromising protection of American rights abroad, the collection of the last red cent of all foreign debts, prohibition of imports, and prohibition of loans to foreigners."[14] A later article showed some change in the policies Lippmann believed at fault. He wrote of aggressive expansion of American manufacturers abroad and "the decision to finance this expanded export trade by large-scale foreign lending" at a time when the United States pursued a high tariff policy.[15]

The American Congress, Lippmann wrote, felt these guiding principles were what the American people desired. Admittedly, each policy could not be pursued to its ultimate.

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[13] Ibid., p. 53.

[14] Lippmann, "Five Points of Illusion," Vanity Fair, 32, May 1932, p. 45.

[15] Lippmann, "A Reckoning: Twelve Years of Republican Rule," Yale Review, XXI, June 1932, pp. 651-652.

There would always be some intercourse with other nations and all imports were not stopped.[16] Lippmann argued that the several policies named provided "a composite of folly." One might argue for one separately or for two or three together, but to support all of them collectively meant contradiction and crisis.[17] "What kind of statesmanship," he asked, "is it which encourages a people to become the banker of an unstabilized world? If it were wise to let Europe stew in its own juice, it was folly to invest enormously in Europe. If it was wise to invest, then common prudence required that the diplomatic-power of the United States be used to provide some security for those investments."[18]

Lippmann argued:

> Unless the country reverses the policies of the last twelve years, unless it embarks upon policies which will enable goods to be exchanged in international trade, unless it uses its influence to help stabilize Europe and to provide a basis of economic security, we face, it seems to me, a long and protracted period on which we must write off much capital investment and find new occupations for those who as a result will be permanently unemployed.[19]

Lippmann declared that after nearly two centuries of capitalism men remained "unconvinced that trade is exchange." If men continued to ignore that relations involved exchange,

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[16]Lippmann, "Five Points," Vanity Fair, p. 45.

[17]Lippmann, "A Reckoning," Yale Review, p. 653.

[18]Ibid., p. 654.

[19]Ibid., pp. 658-659.

they would remain helpless. After World War I America's newly-found creditor nation status did not deter the country from trying to sell overseas more than it bought. Adjustment was at hand and marked "a change in the relationship of two continents," he wrote, and "the great transitions of history are never smooth."[20] The Republican administration had begun a definite strategic retreat in June of 1931, Lippmann noted, but its major problem was what to keep of the old policies and what to throw away. Economics stimulated Hoover toward reassessments, but he kept tariffs and aggressive export policies.[21] In an effort to float the ship off the rocks, the President maintained two of the heaviest parts of the cargo.

Americans wanted a politically stable world in which they could trade and transact business securely. Republican leaders faced American public opinion in the 1920's that demanded political disentanglement from European affairs.

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[20]Lippmann, "Five Points," Vanity Fair, p. 72.

[21]Lippmann, "Introduction: Panoramic View," The United States in World Affairs, 1933 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1934), pp. XII-XIII. Lippmann, William O. Scroggs and others wrote volumes for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1930, 1931, and 1932. These volumes were meant to bridge a gap between later studies of scholars and events' contemporaries. The writers had the advantage of a few months' time and space after the happenings in which to write their ideas of the past year. See The United States in World Affairs: An Account of American Foreign Relations, 1931 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932); also see The United States in World Affairs: An Account of American Foreign Relations, 1932 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933).

But America's role as the chief economic leader in world trade held the reluctant country close to Continental political concerns. In an effort to accommodate the American public, its Republican leaders of the twenties joined the Atlantic community in various efforts to meet domestic needs and increase overseas profits.

The League of Nations, the Washington Conference treaties of 1921-1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were all products of Western powers attempting to maintain world leadership. Under the banners of collective security and armament limitation, they wanted to lead the world toward the Atlantic community's views of international peace.

Economic nationalism doomed the Atlantic community to years of stress in the 1920's. Disarmament, world governing bodies, and war outlawry tended to mask real intent. Rivalry and an obsession with short term economic interests characterized the decade. Naval races continued. The League provided only meager hope for amicable settlements of an eventual crisis.

The Great Depression began in the late 1920's and its effect throughout the 1930's increased nations' desires to shore up their own affairs at home. Domestic plights of unemployment, inflation, and stock market collapse demanded attention. But the Depression, Lippmann asserted, was only part of the world crisis. At an Economic Club dinner held in New York City in the late winter of 1930, The World's editor argued that the international situation could never

stabilize as long as the United States declined to say how it would use its power.[22] "The outstanding fact about the position of the United States as a world power at this moment," Lippmann said, "is that public opinion is not yet thoroughly aware that America is a world power."[23]

At the end of March 1930, Lippmann participated in a conference at Yale University on the subject of Anglo-American relations. The lead paragraph of the New York Times article reporting conference happenings began:

> The forging ahead of the United States to a position of international leadership while the rest of the world looks on with both admiration and anxiety was portrayed here today by British and American authorities.[24]

Lippmann characterized both America and England "as hesitant and bewildered as to how to adjust themselves to the modern world."[25]

Lippmann declared at New Haven that both American and British opinion on great issues in foreign policy stood divided. No one at the Yale conference, the editor argued, could foresee if Great Britain was "moving toward a policy of international reorganization or toward a policy of

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[22]New York Times, 7 March 1930, p. 48.

[23]Ibid., p. 48.

[24]New York Times, 30 March 1930, p. 6

[25]Ibid., p. 6.

withdrawal and increasing isolation."[26] During the past two years the British had been moving away from involvement in Continental affairs.

The London Naval Conference, as Lippmann saw it, represented a chance for an Anglo-American led Atlantic alliance to pursue international peace. Conference planning had begun in the summer and fall of 1929. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, newly-elected Labor party leader, met in early October with President Herbert Hoover at the Presidential summer retreat, Rapidan. Their meeting resulted in a relaxation of increasingly tense relations between England and the United States. Debts and reparations issues, as well as a spirited naval arms race had caused friction. Both MacDonald and Hoover sought friendly relations between their countries, and at Rapidan they began serious progress toward that end.[27]

Hoover believed that one of the cornerstones of American foreign policy was the elimination of friction with Great Britain.[28] War had been legally outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact as an instrument of international policy, and

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[26] Ibid., p. 6.

[27] Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1957), pp. 69, 83-85.

[28] Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), II, p. 342.

a much sought-after naval arms limitation seemed to be a logical next step toward a secure world peace. At Rapidan, President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald agreed that Anglo-American naval parity coupled to their pressure for naval armament reduction in France, Italy, and Japan would well serve the cause of peace.

Before Ramsay MacDonald left America in October of 1929, the British government had issued invitations to the United States, France, Italy, and Japan asking them to attend an international conference which would consider naval armaments. They were to begin meeting on January 21, 1930. All accepted.

Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson headed the American delegation to London. Other delegates included Charles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy--two senators: Joseph T. Robinson (Democrat) and David A. Reed (Republican)--three ambassadors: Charles Dawes, Hugh Gibson, and Dwight Morrow. They were, indeed, a very distinguished group.

As the delegations assembled, the London Conference must have seemed a great opportunity for England and America to reaffirm their friendship and lead a newly revitalized Atlantic alliance toward peace and security. After all, Stimson and MacDonald already knew that naval parity would be no problem for their respective governments.[29] France,

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[29]Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression, p. 85.

Italy, and Japan might be somewhat reluctant to tie their stars to English and American dreams, but they would agree.

National self-interest crossed the dream of a peaceful and united Atlantic community. In December of 1929 France made known its wants for the up-coming London Naval Conference. The French related to Washington officials that they would need a large naval building program in lieu of English and American unwillingness to guarantee security on the Continent. France, in an effort to gain British and American commitments, demanded a higher naval ratio and made any lowering of this demand contingent upon a consultative pact. Anglo-American parity was threatened.[30]

Japan also sought increased naval ratios in order to secure its rightful position in the Far East. Japanese pride had been wounded at the Washington Conference in 1922 when Japan's assigned naval parities classified it as a second-rate power.[31]

Anglo-American differences over parity between large and small cruisers, and the Japanese search for increased parity slipped into the background as the conference proceeded. Negotiations deadlocked. The chief difficulty was France's insistence on a consultative pact. The United States refused

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[30](23 February 1930), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, I, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 29.

[31]Henry L. Stimson and George Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947-1948), pp. 168-170.

to accept the French proposal. A consultative pact entered into in return for France lowering her demands for a strong navy would obligate the United States morally to come to the defense of France in the event of attack.[32]

Stimson reported to Joseph Cotton, Acting Secretary of State, that the real issue was the French search for a "security pact of mutual military assistance." The press, said Stimson, in the reporting of such American newspapers as the Baltimore Sun, the World, and the New York Times was wrong for attacking the President's lack of support for a purely consultative pact. Stimson declared that France would not be happy with just that type of agreement. The pact would involve more than simple consultation.[33]

Although pressure groups such as the Foreign Policy Association and peace advocates in general urged President Hoover to consider discussion of the French-proposed consultative pact, the President remained staunchly opposed.[34] Stimson, personally, felt a consultative pact might be discussed, but it would have to be separated from the London Naval Treaty. The French, Stimson wrote, at least wanted

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[32](3 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, pp. 40-41.

[33](10 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, p. 56.

[34]William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 84. See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 170 and (25 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, p. 82.

Britain's role in the League of Nations clarified. The consultative pact could provide a forum where English views of their relationship to the Continental security system would be defined.[35]

In order to break the conference deadlock, Stimson told the British on March 24 that the United States would show friendly interest in seeking a solution to the French-British problem. If England agreed to French demands for guaranteed security, then the United States--Stimson asserted--might find a consultative pact acceptable. But America could not accept responsibility for action.[36]

The Secretary received Presidential criticism for opening the American door to discussion of a consultative pact, but Stimson's offer to the British helped the conference toward conclusion.[37] Within two weeks the conferees had made compromise proposals and the London Naval Treaty became partial reality on April 22. The treaty that delegations returned to their governments asked that capital

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[35](23 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, pp. 78-79.

[36]Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 170-171. See also (26 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, p. 83.

[37](26 and 28 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, pp. 86 and 89-90. See also (31 March 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, pp. 96-97 for a message from President Hoover to Briand and Tardieu expressing sympathy for the French Continental position. The President believed also that the American public was not ready for an all-out security agreement which the French wanted.

shipbuilding of all five major powers stop until December of 1936, and that some capital ships be scrapped. Submarines were to adhere to rules of international law which also governed the activities of surface vessels. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan agreed to control of auxiliary ship construction through tonnage ratios. Japan gained a more favorable ratio than 5-5-3 in cruisers and destroyers, and achieved equality in submarines.[38] After some difficulty, the United States Senate approved the treaty on July 21, 1930.

Walter Lippmann wrote nearly forty newspaper editorials for the New York World about the London Naval Conference. He greeted its opening with pleasure and felt that conference success would mean "that the respective destinies of nations shall be adjusted through conference and consent."[39] Lippmann also declared that the vision of 1919 had not been lost. The old rhetoric had been stripped away, and "in place of a world of separate national states each accountable only to itself, there is in actual being a world in which no government any longer dares to deny its responsibility to the community of states."[40]

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[38](10 April 1930), Foreign Relations Papers, 1930, I, p. 106.

[39]Lippmann, "At the Outset," The World, 22 January 1930.

[40]Lippmann, "Vision of 1919," The World, 23 January 1930.

By late February, Lippmann wrote of gloom settling over the London Conference. Nationalistic demands and a French domestic political crisis had slowed progress, but it was not time to write off the negotiations. There remained room for concessions.[41] Lippmann urged President Hoover to take the American public into his confidence and explain parity problems and the issue of the French-proferred consultative pact. The President needed the American public on his side if the Senate were to consider a possible political agreement. Hoover, himself, must change his thinking about the consultative pact, for he had helped condition Senators against its acceptance.[42] Lippmann continued to see the conference as a "stupendous event in the perspective of history, and that it provided a firm foundation for the Anglo-American future."[43]

Lippmann's World editorials gave regular attention to American reluctance to discuss a consultative pact. Understandably, he wrote, the French sought political and military international agreements that would help guarantee French security. Likewise, the American Senate rejected any agreement that would mortgage the national future. But the

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[41]Lippmann, "The Gloom at London," The World, 26 February 1930.

[42]Lippmann, "Speaking Out on the Conference," The World, 27 February 1930.

[43]Lippmann, "Parity Reduction," The World, 5 March 1930.

consultative pact, Lippmann argued, would ask no more than what the American government would do in case of war emergency. It would consult with others.[44] Lippmann declared that a consultative agreement would also strengthen the Kellogg-Briand Pact.[45]

The date of Mr. Hoover's first anniversary in the White House prompted Lippmann to assess the Hoover administration. Hoover revered large-mindedness in office, and he gathered disciplined and intelligent men in the Department of State. But, for some reason, the President--who moved so easily among intellectuals and businessmen--became timid when confronting politicians. His loss of control of Congressional Republicans revealed this, Lippmann wrote, and therefore endangered the London Naval Conference proceedings and possibly the "tranquillity of international relations for years to come."[46]

The London Conference remained stalemated through most of March and Lippmann pressured the President. Hoover appeared to be gambling, Lippmann asserted, that England, France, and Italy would soon tire and compromise. But their leaders could not return home as failures--anymore than

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[44]Lippmann, "An American Contribution to the Sense of Security," The World, 28 January 1930.

[45]Lippmann, "The French and Japanese Statements," The World, 15 February 1930.

[46]Lippmann, "Mr. Hoover's First Anniversary," The World, 4 March 1930.

Stimson could bring back a political agreement that guaranteed French security. The President should act soon and clearly by offering "a bold public invitation...to discuss ways and means of strengthening the Kellogg Pact."[47]

In the middle of March, Lippmann revealed a telling argument in support of the United States considering a consultative pact. As a result of World War I, the French became the spokesman for continental Europe. Throughout the 1920's America had not accepted any guarantee that obligated the United States to protect European security. But, Lippmann wrote, experience had shown that the United States could not ignore the European system. Through the League of Nations, led by England and France, the European security system could be effectively destroyed if America's traditional call of neutral rights in event of war were used. England would not risk a war with America if the United States chose to break a naval blockade, which was a major sanction of the European system. A consultative pact allowed nations to voice their interests and give League members some direction.[48]

Lippmann was delighted with Secretary Stimson's offer to the British on March 24. The French stood willing to

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[47]Lippmann, "The Word is with Mr. Hoover," The World, 22 March 1930.

[48]Lippmann, "Can We Concede This Much," The World, 13 March 1930. See also "The Great Decision," 27 March 1930 and "The London Naval Conference: An American View," Foreign Affairs, VIII, July 1930, pp. 515-516.

work through the League, but League success depended greatly upon English power and its will to use that power. Great Britain was hesitant as long as it did not know the intent of American foreign policy. Stimson's courageous offer immediately changed the stalemated atmosphere at the conference, and it finished its business within a month.[49]

Lippmann viewed the conference and the resulting treaty as a success. It involved intricate relations where few men understood many of the problems. But the conference advanced "the understanding of the problem by clarifying some of the issues and indicating tentatively some of the solutions." MacDonald and Hoover had not contemplated difficulties with the French and they raised false hopes for armament reduction. The President failed to inform Americans about major issues at the conference. The delegation, itself, Lippmann praised. It remained patient, gathered insights, and proved itself courageous by the eleventh hour offer to Great Britain about the consultative pact.[50]

Lippmann's many editorials during the course of negotiations brought a letter of praise from Secretary Stimson.

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[49]Lippmann, "The Great Decision," The World, 27 March 1930 and "The London Naval Conference," Foreign Affairs, July 1930, pp. 515-516.

[50]Lippmann, "The London Naval Conference," Foreign Affairs, July 1930, p. 517. See "Senator Wagner and the Treaty," The World, 23 July 1930 for further assessment.

The Secretary wrote:

> Ever since my return from London I have been meaning to write you again of my appreciation for your constant, strong and intelligent support during the long negotiations. The State Department cabled me daily extracts of the editorial opinion of the prominent newspapers, and I regularly found in yours the most accurate and careful analysis of the situation and the most thoughtful views as to policy....I can only say that it makes the position of Foreign Secretary very much more easy to have behind one such discriminating journalistic work. Thank you very much.[51]

The summer of 1931 witnessed disaster for America's beleaguered President. Japan created an incident in South Manchuria which eventually became a fully developed crisis for American leaders and especially for the West's self-assumed role of keeping world peace. In addition to the Manchurian Crisis, President Hoover faced an increasingly serious economic situation at home. Bank closings numbered three hundred and five in September and the next month their number shot up to five hundred and twenty-two.[52] Unemployment included over four million Americans in 1930 and in

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[51] Stimson to Lippmann, 23 May 1930 in Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[52] Gorton Carruth and Associates, ed., The Encyclopedia of American Facts and Dates (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 489-490.

1931 four million more had lost their jobs.[53] In an effort to alleviate a portion of the depression's effect overseas, Hoover invoked a one year moratorium on debts and reparations payments due the United States. The Japanese-Chinese dispute that began on a Friday evening, September 18, added greater anxiety to an already heavily burdened President.

The incident at Mukden in South Manchuria seemingly arose, at first report, over Chinese soldiers who had allegedly blown up a part of the South Manchurian Railway track. Japanese troops who controlled the railroad through treaty rights of 1905 shot and killed Chinese soldiers and brought in more troops. The affair appeared to be of little consequence initially, but Japanese aggression increased, and on October 8 they bombed Chinchow.

The Mukden Incident represented the culmination of long standing antagonism between China and Japan in Manchuria. The rise of Chinese nationalism in the 1920's led to Chinese efforts to extend effective control over Manchuria. In the late 1920's the Kuomintang nationalists set out to destroy Japanese influence in Manchuria. They attempted to establish a system of railroads that paralleled Japan's South Manchurian Railway. The Chinese intended to destroy Japanese rail business. As recently at the summer of 1931, a

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[53] The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (Stamford, Connecticut: Fairfield Publishers, Inc., 1965), p. 73.

Japanese army captain, in civilian clothes, had been shot by the Chinese. The so-called "Nakamura butchery case" greatly intensified an already tense situation between Japan and China. In addition, Chinese immigration into Manchuria had been encouraged and a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in that fateful summer of 1931 had been most effective.

Some Japanese believed they needed South Manchuria as a part of their defensive perimeter, as well as space for an expanding population and a source of raw materials for Japanese industry. They recognized the attention of the newly formed Russian Communist government to North Manchuria, but they saw South Manchuria as the first points of interest.

Japan's moderate civil government of the 1920's suffered insistent pressure from Japanese military representatives. Both had equal access to the Emperor, but each saw Japan acquiring its "place in the sun" through different strategies. The civil representatives wished to join the West and seek Asian leadership with Western cooperation. The military faction wanted Japan to assert its strength in the new realities of Asian circumstances, take Manchuria, make the Chinese good customers, and create strong defenses against Russian thrusts. They would then ask the West to cooperate.[54]

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[54]For background concerning the Far Eastern Crisis, see Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression, Chapters 8-11. Akira Iriye's Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), Chapter 7 is an excellent essay.

Secretary Stimson expressed displeasure with the Japanese-Chinese fighting in a September 24, 1931 diplomatic note to both governments. He asked that they refrain from further hostilities and that they adhere to international agreements binding both nations to settle disputes peacefully.[55]

By the middle of October, an American representative, Prentiss Gilbert, sat at the council table of the League of Nations as it met in Geneva to consider the Manchurian problem. Some speculation existed that the presence of Gilbert at League meetings meant the United States had joined the international body. Secretary Stimson made it clear that Gilbert was to involve himself in League discussions only when the Kellogg-Briand Pact became an issue. But uneasiness about the League's including the United States in the whole scale of Manchurian disucssion caused Stimson to order Gilbert on October 19 to stop attending executive sessions and to sit away from the council table.[56]

The League met again in November, after its October request to the warring Asians to stop fighting and asking

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[55](24 September 1931), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Far East, 1931, III, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 58. For a detailed analysis of Stimson's views of the Far Eastern Crisis, see the Secretary's The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936.

[56]Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression, pp. 141-142.

Japan to withdraw troops from occupied areas by November 16. Stimson sent General Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador to the Court of St. James', to the Paris conference.[57]

The General stayed in a Paris hotel and did not attend League sessions. He met a continuous string of diplomatic callers who sought advice. Days sped by, callers to the Dawes' suite at the Ritz continued, and little was accomplished in League sessions.[58] Chinese and Japanese positions had hardened. Finally, on December 10, the League Council decided to accept a Japanese proposal to organize an investigative commission that was to be sent to Manchuria. The commission would be a fact-finding body.

In a Paris note dictated on December 11, Ambassador Dawes looked back to mid-November when he arrived in Paris and thought that a Lippmann article in the New York Herald of December 6 was a good summary of the Manchurian situation. Lippmann had noted Japanese expansion in South Manchuria, and he emphasized Japanese insistence upon spreading its control. Lippmann cited League declarations asking Japan to stop further military occupation in South Manchuria, but Japan refused.[59]

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[57] Ibid., pp. 143-144.

[58] Ibid., pp. 146-149. See also Charles G. Dawes, Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939), pp. 410-430 for the General's account of his stay in Paris.

[59] Charles G. Dawes, Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain, pp. 412-413.

Lippmann faced a complex situation in the Far East and his previous intellectual and political propensities little prepared him for understanding Japanese aggression in Manchuria. He saw through European eyes, so to speak, and felt that the Far Eastern problem could seriously affect the peace-keeping machinery of the West. Rather than deal with the issues between China and Japan, Lippmann wrote about animosities between two countries and their effect on the West. His initial editorial response to the Manchurian problem found him happily pointing out that America would consult with other world powers when an international incident arose.[60]

In a letter exchange with Lippmann, Secretary Stimson expressed pleasure with the journalist's public support of American policy toward the League and the Manchurian incident. Stimson explained to Lippmann that United States representatives had been sent to Mukden and the Secretary had insisted upon the full cooperation of Baron Shidehara, the Japanese foreign minister. Shidehara agreed. Stimson also noted that President Hoover "was so desperately busy with the critical domestic situation just at present that

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[60]Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow, The Manchurian Problem: A Test and Demonstration of American Policy," 29 September 1931. Hereafter Lippmann's "Today and Tomorrow" columns will be cited only by his name, column title, and date. Yale University has allowed use of microfilm which contains "Today and Tomorrow" articles. The New York Herald Tribune and the Washington Post regularly printed Lippmann columns.

the initiative in all foreign affairs is falling much more heavily than usual upon me." The Secretary welcomed Lippmann's advice. Lippmann expressed appreciation of Stimson's approval of his support, and the editor believed that difficulties in the Far East were by no means at an end.[61]

In the middle of October, Lippmann observed that both Japan and China had legitimate needs. He wrote, though, that the Orientals should realize the West wanted to help them satisfy their clashing demands; however, the world would not countenance flouting of its moral authority. Lippmann declared united diplomatic efforts would avoid further fighting.[62]

The presence of Prentiss Gilbert at the League council table received little notice from Lippmann, but he felt that the appointment of General Dawes to the League's Paris meeting on November 16 showed the world that America was serious about the Manchurian problem. Never fully explaining why Dawes' presence in Paris was an important sign, Lippmann continued that unchecked Japanese aggression in the Far East meant international disaster for the Western peace machinery, treaty rights, and written agreements. Lippmann

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[61]Lippmann to Stimson, 29 September 1931; Stimson to Lippmann, 30 September 1931; Lippmann to Stimson, 1 October 1931 in Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[62]Lippmann, "A Great Precedent Established," 13 October 1931 and "The Far Eastern Crisis," 14 October 1931.

argued that the old diplomacy where the word of each nation depended upon its individual strength paralleled the new diplomacy where nations drew from a collective pool of power that supposedly gave more importance to all pool members' agreements.[63] Ultimately, both the old and the new depended upon enforcement.

With the old order crumbling before his eyes, Lippmann continued to ask the West to be patient and keep public opinion informed.[64] In spite of the West's treaty system and League of Nations, Japan steadily advanced in South Manchuria. Neither the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor the Nine Power Treaty stopped Japan. Neither League proclamations nor American remonstrance checked the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria. The West faced events beyond its control, but Lippmann's dream of an Anglo-American led Western civilization pointing the way toward a peaceful world died slowly.

President Hoover and Secretary Stimson initially sought cooperation with Great Britain, as well as giving continued support to the League in the fall and early winter of 1931.[65] The British preferred to work through the League, of which they were a member, and America had to be satisfied with a representative on what was soon to be known as the Lytton Commission.

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[63]Lippmann, "General Dawes Goes to Paris," 13 November 1931.

[64]Lippmann, "Japan's Offending," 20 November 1931.

[65]Hoover, Memoirs: The Cabinet and the Presidency, II, p. 367.

Gloomy at the prospect of League success, Lippmann wrote on December 1 that the West should have used force to stop Japanese aggression. Since the great powers of the West had little interest in Manchuria, they preferred distance rather than action. But in the process of satisfying individual national needs, the West's peace-keeping system had been shown to be faulty. He concluded, rather fitfully, that the best the west could do was to support international law and order.[66]

President Hoover and Secretary Stimson had discussed development of a non-recognition doctrine that former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan had applied to Japan's twenty-one demands in 1915. In those days, the Wilson administration indicated it would not recognize diplomatically the fruits of aggression. Hoover and Stimson set out on the same course. It was a moral weapon.[67]

Lippmann wrote a "get tough" letter to Stimson shortly before Christmas of 1931: publish American-Japanese diplomatic correspondence; encourage Kellogg Pact and Nine Power Treaty signatories to protest Japanese treaty violations; declare that Japan's proceedings in Manchuria

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[66] Lippmann, "Western Objectives in the Far East," 1 December 1931.

[67] Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 231 and 234; see also Hoover, Memoirs: The Cabinet and the Presidency, II, pp. 372-373.

after September 18 would not bring world diplomatic recognition. Since force was barred by the great powers of the West, Lippmann concluded, the West should then sit back and wait. Japan would be on the defensive.[68]

One might assume that Lippmann had anticipated the January 7, 1932 publication of the non-recognition doctrine, but a Stimson response to the Lippmann "get tough" note revealed that the Secretary and journalist had discussed previously the potential policy.[69] An identic note went to China and Japan on January 7. The non-recognition doctrine became official American policy.

Five days prior to the disclosure of non-recognition doctrine, Japan took over Chinchow. January 28 found Japan attacking Shanghai, China's largest international settlement. Lippmann wrote in early February that the West's weaknesses had been laid bare. Its peace-keeping authority had broken down. He lamented that the West stood divided and distracted and its collective power was therefore inoperative.[70]

The continued Japanese aggression in Manchuria seriously shook Lippmann's ideal of a Western alliance based on free trade, respect for treaty covenants, and belief in the

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[68]Lippmann to Stimson, 22 December 1931 in Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[69]Stimson to Lippmann, 29 December 1931 in Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[70]Lippmann, "At Shanghai: American Policy," 2 February 1932.

potential effectiveness of the League of Nations. Rather than righteous force used to meet Japan's determined aggression, the West huddled and mumbled about moral sanctions.

Lippmann lashed out at the "stupid internal quarrels" that had paralyzed the West. He wrote petulantly that the United States did not want war with Japan because of the Shanghai incident. It only wanted to protect its nationals in the international settlement. America did not wish to invoke the Nine Power Treaty or the Kellogg Pact.[71]

Lippmann could not rid himself of interpreting Asian problems by measuring their influence on the West. The Orientals seemed bent on pursuing goals appropriate for their part of the world, and they had little concern with Western reaction. For Lippmann, peace of the world meant a peace as seen through Western eyes. Japan's new order in Asia ignored American and European efforts to order Asia, and Lippmann wrote that the Orientals had taught the West a lesson: the peace of the world depended upon "overcoming the anarchy of unlimited national states." They also showed the West how its own internal rivalries and suspicions crippled unified effort.[72]

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Lippmann, "Unity at Shanghai; the Conference at Geneva," 3 February 1932.

Lippmann left the United States on the evening of February 3. On assignment for the Herald Tribune, he visited Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, and Geneva. For at least the next month, he cabled his articles from the Continent.[73]

By the middle of February, Manchuria had supposedly revolted from China's control, and within a month Japanese diplomatic recognition of Manchuko took place. Secretary Stimson believed a strong public statement concerning the American position toward Japan's continued aggression was needed. His contemplated forthright views about the Far Eastern Crisis emerged in a public letter to Senator William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[74]

With the Presidential consent and Borah's foreknowledge, Stimson's "Borah letter" became public on February 24, 1932. The letter meant to encourage China, enlighten the American public, exhort the League, stir up the British, and warn Japan.[75] Stimson traced the traditional policy of America toward the Far East from John Hay's Open Door through Charles Evans Hughes' Washington Conference Treaties to Frank B. Kellogg's Pact of Paris. He noted that Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Shanghai had broken its obligations to the world's peace-keeping system. The Secretary

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[73]Insert in Lippmann, "Shanghai: The Joint Proposal," 4 February 1932.

[74]Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 246-249.

[75]Ibid., p. 249.

reaffirmed the non-recognition doctrine and asked other nations to assume the same stance. China, after all, had the right to develop its independence.[76]

Secretary Stimson's public letter to Senator Borah stimulated Lippmann's writing of several columns over the next year. When the letter became public, Lippmann was in Rome and had a difficult time obtaining the full text. After he finally received it, Lippmann indicated that the letter might cause serious misgivings in European capitals. Its major principle, that of binding Europeans [as they saw it] to not revising illegally the existing constitution of Europe, would cause alarm.[77]

Lippmann argued that asking all countries to subscribe to the non-recognition doctrine was fine for those territorially satisfied. Great Britain, France, the United States, and perhaps Russia would be happy. But all other nations might find the obligation hard to accept and awkward to refuse.[78]

Lippmann asserted that Stimson's proposals in the Borah letter would freeze existing frontiers that normally

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[76]For the complete text of the letter, see (23 February 1932), Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 168-173.

[77]Lippmann, "The Stimson Letter in Europe," 2 March 1932.

[78]Ibid.

underwent change through force when a government objected to shifting frontiers. The journalist noted that presently there was no pacific way of changing boundaries if a country refused to give up territory.[79]

It was not the nature of things to be fixed rigidly, Lippmann declared, and international society would have to provide means for peaceful change. Peace mechanisms had not solved the problem of creating peaceful change, and that was why the machinery itself was so fragile and so little trusted. Many countries in international society were unhappy with their places and they would have a difficult time accepting Stimson proposals.[80]

On March 11, Lippmann was back in Geneva and reported that the League of Nations had adopted the non-recognition doctrine. It had suspended the League covenant, in effect, and reconstituted itself under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. If League members had remained under their own covenant, he wrote, they would have had to oppose forcefully Japan's aggression in the Far East. But none of the great powers accepted boycotts or war. League peace-keeping apparatus had broken down. America's January 7 non-recognition proposal had become world-wide (as the Borah letter of

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

February 23-24 asked), and saved face for the West and possibly saved the situation.[81]

Lippmann wrote that the League's adopting the non-recognition doctrine kept alive all of Japan's obligations not to resort to aggression and allowed League members to suspend their duty to protect China against Japanese aggression. "Yet this is the best possible outcome given all the circumstances."[82]

Lippmann's response to the "Borah letter" showed a man of the West witnessing a Western-oriented foreign policy that would potentially harm Western countries. The non-recognition doctrine froze the status quo and created potential upheaval emanating from territorially dissatisfied nations. Lippmann did not know what to do. Japan's aggression continued and the West stood helpless. Seemingly, he might have realized that the limits of foreign policy had been reached. Instead, he wrote looking through Western eyes, asking Orientals to knuckle under to moral suasion.

Several months later, after a Lippmann January 12, 1933 article critical of the Hoover administration's handling of the publication of the non-recognition doctrine, Stimson wrote to Lippmann and--in part--explained that the January 7 publication of the American-initiated non-recognition

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[81] Lippmann, "A World Policy in the Orient," 11 March 1932.

[82] Ibid.

doctrine avoided asking other countries to support the policy before it became reality and suffering the real possibility of several refusals. Likewise, the Borah letter became necessary because the Secretary felt that to have invited other Nine Power Treaty signatories to agree jointly to his proposals would have meant further protest. Stimson concluded: "There are times in this world when boldness constitutes the safest policy, and this was pre-eminently one."[83]

The Lytton Commission finished its investigation of the grievances of Japan and China over the September 18, 1931 Mukden Incident. The Commission completed its five month study in October of the same year. Lippmann wrote that the reception accorded the report had been deeply impressive.[84]

The Lytton Report asked China and Japan to join in a peace conference for settlement of all their differences. It recommended that China's sovereignty be restored and that Manchuria be accorded a measure of autonomy. Thus, Chinese territorial integrity received protection, the journalist declared, and Japanese concern about Manchuria's

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[83] Stimson to Lippmann, 12 January 1933 in Stimson Collection, Yale University Library.

[84] Lippmann, "The Lytton Report and American Policy," 5 October 1932.

strategic position gained recognition.[85]

Lippmann recommended that Secretary Stimson accept the Lytton Report and that the Secretary revise his belief about force not being acceptable as a method of international change. Since the United States would not join the League of Nations, which was meant to head off aggression before it became serious, American policy should accept Lytton recommendations. Lippmann noted a Stimson speech at Philadelphia where the Secretary said that America's chief interest in the Far East was to maintain "'the authority of the great peace treaties.'" Lippmann agreed with Stimson sentiment and felt that the Lytton Report supported it.[86]

In a February 22, 1933 column, Lippmann explained that if the report of the Committee of Nineteen was accepted by the League of Nations, then Japan's actions on and after September 18, 1931 would be condemned by world opinion. "The moral isolation of Japan," he wrote, "is unparalleled in the history of the modern world." World opinion was not likely to stop Japanese advances, but the world could wait. The League, Lippmann thought, had regained lost prestige.[87]

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.; See also "Manchuria: The American Interest," 22 November 1932.

[87] Lippmann, "The Verdict of the League," 22 February 1933.

Two days later Lippmann's confidence in the League was rewarded: the world organization adopted the Lytton Report. Japan stood indicted.

Lippmann appreciated deeply the roles that President Hoover and Secretary Stimson played in attempting to maintain the integrity of the West. Determined Japanese aggression during the course of the Far Eastern Crisis presented a severe challenge to Western civilization's attempted maintenance of treaty obligations and world peace. In the same column that stimulated Secretary Stimson's cautiously critical letter of January 12, 1933, Lippmann wrote:

> From what I learned at Geneva and in the chief capitals of Western Europe last winter, I am satisfied that but for President Hoover and Secretary Stimson the whole post-war machinery of peace would have collapsed in an ignominious surrender before the Japanese aggression....They kept alive at a moment when a gale threatened to blow it out, the small flame of international solidarity in behalf of the law and order of the world.88

Unfortunately for Lippmann views and Western desires that Japan bow before the bar of world opinion, the Japanese gave little credence to moral condemnation. The same day that the League accepted and approved the Lytton Report, Japan served notice that it would leave the League. On March 4, 1933 Jehol became part of Manchuko and Japan's

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88 Lippmann, "The Stimson Doctrine," 12 January 1933.

occupied territory extended to the Great Wall.[89] Japanese appetite knew no bounds and the affective limits of Western foreign policy had been reached.

Lippmann neglected to take his own advice and he experienced partially what he predicted would happen to a scholar who left his quiet tower and joined a troubled world. Even the world that he thought existed exploded as he watched. Lippmann lost perspective as he enmeshed himself in the "constant moments of emergency." The world of 1931-1932 befuddled a scholar-journalist who was known for his perceptive analysis of men's affairs. More journalist than scholar, Lippmann found himself overwhelmed by massive forces that he desperately tried to understand.

The Lippmann dream of Western civilization being led by England and America toward world cooperation and peace died partially under the shadow of Asian nationalism that held little regard for Western goals. Lippmann's deep roots in Western culture left him totally unprepared to confront blatant aggression in defiance of signed international agreements. To worsen matters, Japanese behavior in Manchuria and China after September 18, 1931, showed the collective power of the West unable to act successfully.

The London Naval Conference revealed a divided West. The conference showed the age-old and continuously massive

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[89]Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), pp. 328-329.

force of nationalism. Self-interest, power gathering and balances of great powers off-set any international concern for peace. Lippmann recognized the forces at work, but he continued to plump for reason and understanding where intellect predominantly directed men's affairs. Twenty months after the successful conclusion of the London Naval Treaty, and during the Manchurian crisis, Lippmann wrote world peace did not depend upon disarmament and tonnage ratios; rather it depended upon "overcoming the anarchy of unlimited national states."

But to write of reason and understanding in foreign affairs during an era of the Great Depression must have seemed at best distant romanticism to many Lippmann readers. Millions of Americans suffered in those years of the 1930's, and American leadership had to concern itself with alleviating that suffering. With a world depression dominating countries' domestic concerns, it was little wonder that increased nationalism dominated the world scene.

Lippmann's usually clear vision clouded over as the Great Depression took hold of national economies. His European orientation weakened his understanding of Asian problems--for he saw the world through a Western telescope. He became a prisoner of crushing events that urgently needed a long view. The scholar in a troubled world had become a journalist without a dream.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A MAD, SAD WORLD

The tumble of increasingly complex events revealed forces of nationalism operating in the early 1930's. The minimum success of the London Naval Conference stood under the shadow of the obvious European political insecurity stimulated by French fear of Germany's search for power and stability. Japanese aggression in Manchuria showed a determined nation bent on pursuing its own Asian interests. But, more so, Japan's success on the China Mainland accentuated the West's serious weakness in placing its lukewarm faith in collective security as a primary control of world order. The League of Nations, along with the United States, had failed miserably in stopping a direct challenge to its authority.

Despite President Hoover's efforts to relieve American economic ills, the Great Depression continued. Unemployment of the nation's labor force shot up from 4,340,000 in 1930 to 12,830,000 in 1933.[1] The price index of the gross national product (in 1929 dollars) dropped from 96 in 1930

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[1] The Statistical History of the United States, p. 73.

to 75 in 1933.[2] In 1930 the United States imported $3,500,000,000 worth of gold, silver, and merchandise. By 1933 import value skidded to $1,703,000,000.[3] In those four years from 1930 to 1933, American exports exceeded imports by a yearly average of nearly $448,000,000. Looking through America's economic window to the political and economic turbulence in Europe and Asia, the world, indeed, looked dark.

Lippmann views of American foreign policy in the 1930's began a quickened and emphatic philosophical drumbeat. In June of 1930, he told the Radcliffe graduating class that he believed the United States to be the recipient of the torch of power passed from the old world to the new. Lippmann warned that the new graduates faced a difficult period of adjustment. The oldsters were confused and could not bestow the traditional lines of authority surrounded by certitude.[4]

Western civilization, as contemporaries knew it, had been formed in Europe's cradle, Lippmann continued. It developed there, was transplanted to the new world, and took root. The moral and cultural center of the West grew especially under the protection and stimulation of what became

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[2] Ibid., p. 139.

[3] Ibid., p. 537.

[4] Lippmann, "Address Delivered at Commencement, 1930," Radcliffe Quarterly, July 1930, pp. 94-95.

the most powerful nation in the world. Lippmann declared to the Radcliffe graduates that America's one hundred and twenty million people generated great energy, and the question confronting them was not whether to approve the London Naval treaty or whether to join the League of Nations. Rather, the American obligation was to "take part in the great task of establishing once more some central and controlling ideals of human living."[5]

In late March, a year later at a dinner in his honor, Lippmann emphasized that the United States had become a world power--almost suddenly and most possibly without seeking the status. The members of the American Academy of Political Science heard their honored guest explain that after World War I America rejected the treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Tariff walls went up. Immigration quotas furthered international restriction, and strangely enough the United States sought and expected more export trade. The nation was befuddled, for it had become a world power almost in spite of itself.[6]

Lippmann described a fog of detail that constantly tumbling events created, and he noted that interpreters of the American experience in world politics no longer could

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[5] Ibid., pp. 94-95 and 97.

[6] Lippmann, "The Press and Public Opinion," Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, June 1931, p. 162.

penetrate the fog with ideas such as "the Monroe Doctrine," "the Open Door," "No Entangling Alliances," "Renunciation of War," or "America First." These phrases were simply inadequate.[7]

The United States, Lippmann said, had changed--as had the world. The mechanical and industrial revolution had uprooted traditional values and institutions, and Americans should recreate new standards by which they judge themselves and others. The national economy, he argued, ought to be resilent enough to protect and expand national interests. Likewise, the American mind carried cultural inheritance from the Renaissance and Enlightenment. It included dissenters and pioneers, and developed democracy and nationalism--forces that encouraged the fight against dogmatic rules of life.[8]

To be concerned with how things were done, as much as what was done, Lippmann said, remained central to Western thought. One taught tolerance, for instance, by being tolerant. One sought justice through just methods. He said the search for truth and the spirit in which it was conducted was more important than the results. Lippmann warned of a hidden future with only surprise to be expected, and he described Americans as explorers in an unknown land. To

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[7] Ibid., pp. 162-163.

[8] Ibid., pp. 163-166.

survive and progress meant following the heart of Western liberalism: "remaining free in mind and action before changing circumstances." Lippmann recognized that the capacity to act resolutely while maintaining a skeptical mind was a supremely difficult and delicate attainment. He concluded that the world needed the gifts of the liberal spirit if world conditions were to be brought under control.[9]

In the spring of 1932, Lippmann's attempts to keep focus on large issues surrounded by the Great Depression and a forthcoming Presidential election led him to write: "It may be that it is beyond the power of the human mind to comprehend so intricate a drama played on so vast a stage."[10] By mid-summer Lippmann had recovered some of his optimism. He countered views that Western civilization approached its end. Traditional things seemed to be crumbling--that was true--but Lippmann believed future historians may view the age as one of renewal. He saw rigid accumulations of hardened consequences of misjudgements scaling off. The depression was not one of collapse, but rather it revealed a "furious purge." The journalist felt deep and permanent change in human life or national existence rarely occurred;

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[9] Ibid., pp. 167-169.

[10] Lippmann, "A Whole View of the Crisis," 7 April 1932. This column was a book review and recommended Sir Arthur Salter's Recovery: The Second Effort (1932) as an able effort to diagnose the "large picture."

nothing human was eternal, but significant change in the human condition proved difficult. "Thus no one springtime lasts very long, and no winter; and though nothing endures, the sap rises again to renew mortality."[11]

By late spring of 1933, a dejected Herbert Hoover had left the White House and an ebullient New Yorker, Franklin Roosevelt, neared the end of his first one hundred days as President. The opening day of the London Economic Conference found Lippmann speaking to graduating seniors at Union College. The June 12th gathering at the Union chapel overflowed available pews, and undergraduates crowded around open windows and near the side door to hear Lippmann.[12]

The journalist's measured phrases sketched reasons for great world changes that began in the postwar era. He described the London Economic Conference and the world disarmament meeting as continuations of the peace conference ending World War I. Lippmann believed President Roosevelt faced a needed attempt to conclude successfully Woodrow Wilson's work. The world badly needed secure and proper order. Embodied in the Fourteen Points, Wilson's ideal of political nationalism combined with economic internationalism found people unwilling to accept those proposals. Leaders of democracies discovered their constitutencies exerting

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[11]Lippmann, "Crisis and Renewal," 22 July 1932.

[12]Lippmann, Union Alumni Monthly, July-August 1933, p. 252.

increased pressure for security, prosperity, and order. Accordingly, Lippmann told the audience, the United States rejected economic internationalism and sought self-sufficiency.[13]

In order to escape the impact of unknowables such as business cycles, price fluctuations, and the violence of destructive competition, people believed they should regulate their societies much more than before. Lippmann declared, "'What we are witnessing today is the fusion of nationalism with collectivism, of the philosophy of protection and the ideal of a planned economy.'" He doubted that countries were heading for total economic nationalism--since no nation was self-contained, but he felt nations would protect what they best produced or manufactured and would export surpluses. They would import only what they needed. Liberal internationalism of the nineteenth century, whose last great apostle was Woodrow Wilson, no longer prevailed in human affairs in the 1920's.[14]

Accordingly, Lippmann contended that a chief difficulty which faced great powers attending the opening of the London Economic Conference was that their leaders had had little time "'to think out clearly the international meaning of

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[13] Ibid., pp. 252-255.

[14] Ibid., pp. 255-257.

the domestic policies which [the Conference] is pursuing.'"[15]

In an appeal for sympathy from the young, Lippmann asked Union graduates to recognize that oldsters who were presently leaders had been ill-prepared for a devastating war, a bad peace, and economic catastrophe. He ended his address by hoping the graduates would be able to secure peace. It was likely, Lippmann thought, that in the ages of great change the young were pushed to the front rapidly, and they must hurry and get ready.[16]

The London Economic Conference began on June 12 and continued through July 27, 1933. Prior to his appearance on the Union campus, Lippmann had "blown hot and cold" on success for the London meeting. In April he favored the proposed sessions for they would stimulate people to thinking positively. He warned world leaders, however, that if people were not put back to work, they would go to war. Lippmann also believed foreign leaders should recognize that a new deal of Presidential government prevailed in Washington. Congress no longer dominated America's national politics as it had in the 1920's. Finally, the May meeting of world leaders in Washington should work out some agreements

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[15] Ibid., pp. 257-258.

[16] Ibid., pp. 258.

that would ensure success of the Conference. England, the United States, and France held the world's economic cards and their joining on stabilization of currency, for instance, would go a long way toward relieving economic as well as political tension.[17] The United States left the gold standard on April 19 and Lippmann changed position by advocating economic retreat. He argued that the United States should separate itself from artificial export surplus and avoid trade rivalry. Lippmann believed American leaders must shore-up the domestic economy before attempting to solve international problems. Buying power at home, he believed, meant better business abroad.[18]

As Secretary of State Cordell Hull crossed the Atlantic for the opening of the Conference, Lippmann admitted that problems created by the Great Depression would only yield to international solution. He thought, however, that a conference where sixty-seven nations and three thousand delegates met could only consider simple questions. Lippmann doubted that a conference "at this stage of the world depression [was] wise." Chances of success seemed small and costs of failure great. He preferred individual agreements among countries most concerned about specific issues.[19]

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[17]Lippmann, "The Washington Conservatives," 14 April 1933.

[18]Lippmann, "American Economic Nationalism," 16 May 1933.

[19]Lippmann, "Concerning a World Economic Conference," 3 June 1933.

A June 14 Lippmann column struck President Roosevelt as especially important. When he sent Raymond Moley, Assistant Secretary of State, off to the London Conference on a special mission in late June, the President left Moley with some vaguely remembered Lippmann advice: seek international cooperation that was positive--not just cooperation that produced negative stability.[20]

As the Economic Conference went into its second week, Lippmann traveled to London. The journalist's days were filled with activities that produced nearly a daily column as June turned to July. When he arrived Lippmann found the American delegation divided and demoralized.[21] And his interpretation was not unexpected since the old internationalist, Secretary Hull, had been shorn practically of every economic bargaining device that the Secretary saw as necessary to keep world economies going. President Roosevelt, with pressing American needs arising from Great Depression

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[20]Raymond Moley, After Seven Years: A Political Analysis of the New Deal (rpt: 1939, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), pp. 236-237. The Lippmann column was "What Kind of Cooperation," 14 June 1933. FDR's daily Presidential routine included skimming five newspapers: The New York Times and Herald Tribune, The Washington Post and Herald, and the Baltimore Sun. Two columnists he paid particular attention to were Frank Kent and Walter Lippmann. (Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (4 vols., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), IX, pp. 274-275.)

[21]Lippmann, "The Issues at London," 27 June 1933.

troubles, had stripped Hull of any disarmament talk.[22] Sessions at Geneva had been in progress since February of 1932. Roosevelt would not consider tariff reductions for the moment because a balky Congress had just experienced a hundred days of approving Presidentially-instituted legislation.[23] Lippmann described the Conference as he predicted--too large and too public for necessary hard negotiating.[24] He recommended that the United States and England join in devaluing their currency, accompanied by provisional stabilization.[25]

Lippmann met John Maynard Keynes at the London Conference. Keynes, an economic expert and a member of the British delegation, had proposed a "simultaneous devaluation of national currencies within a range of 20 to 33 per cent." Lippmann admired Keynes' daring and characterized him as "the leading economic thinker of our generation."[26]

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[22]Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, 30 May 1933 in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs (3 vols., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), I, pp. 187-188.

[23]Cordell Hull, Memoirs (2 vols., New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), I, pp. 248 and 250. Nixon, FDR, I, pp. 219-220.

[24]Lippmann, "Notes on the Conference," 28 June 1933.

[25]Lippmann, "Statesmanship and Speculation," 30 June 1933.

[26]Lippmann, "The Keynes Plan," 29 June 1933. Lippmann noted in Reminiscences, II, pp. 153 and 155 that Keynes was "like a man of the renaissance," and he declared, "I regard my friendship with Keynes as one of the most happy friendships of my life."

Secretary Hull and his delegation had been involved with British representatives concerning currency stabilization. Negotiations had not moved rapidly and Moley's special mission intensified pressures. Moley, whom Hull disliked, met with British delegates himself and sent a July 1 joint proposal for currency stabilization to Roosevelt.[27] The idea of gold bloc countries and silver advocates joining and restoring the gold standard as an international exchange value prompted Roosevelt to send what came to be known as his July 2nd "bombshell note." The President rejected any attempt to peg temporarily international currency, and he lectured the delegates about their far wider purposes of being in London.[28]

Lippmann supported the President's rejection of the joint declaration. Americans might have felt that Roosevelt had not accepted price raising, which--of course--he did accept.[29] Lippmann did not approve of the "high and mighty" language that FDR used to reject the July 1 proposal. If the President believed the Conference should or could look for larger issues to consider, he was sadly out of touch

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[27]William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, to Roosevelt, 1 July 1933 in Nixon, FDR, I, pp. 266-267.

[28]Roosevelt to William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, 2 July 1933 in Ibid., pp. 268-269.

[29]Lippmann, "The Rejected Declaration," 3 July 1933.

with the situation. Roosevelt's temperamental behavior had totally demoralized America's London delegation, Lippmann wrote, and the delegation should be replaced.[30]

The Conference ought to adjourn, Lippmann recommended, and avoid further clashes. For the time being, present views were just different. American domestic economic recovery was Roosevelt's primary concern, as it should be, and its recovery was the key to world recovery.[31] He thought the Conference should adjourn in a "decent spirit" that would provide for continuing discussion. In the meantime, the recess would give managed economies an opportunity to work.[32] The Conference, in effect, had been reduced to considering what it could consider.[33] The United States was wise in ruling out the money question and it seemed logical to adjourn the London meetings. No real, hard decisions could be made at the dying sessions.[34]

As Lippmann sailed home on July 19, he reflected on Conference happenings. The journalist found much more

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[30]Lippmann, High and Mighty Language," 5 July 1933.

[31]Lippmann, "The Conference Should Adjourn," 4 July 1933.

[32]Lippmann, "Toward a Decent Adjournment," 6 July 1933.

[33]Lippmann, "The Conference Continues," 8 July 1933.

[34]Lippmann, "The Logic of Adjournment," 12 July 1933.

truth and constructive options being bantered about in London corridors than in meeting rooms. Since the United States operated on such an immense economic system, he believed Europeans, rightly or wrongly, looked to America for solutions. The American experiment of Roosevelt crossing an economic chasm on a tight rope fascinated world viewers, but as observers watched the United States, the Conference stalled. Lippmann concluded it would take administrative genius to make American economic recovery a reality.[35]

Lippmann took note of arguments about economic nationalism ruining the London Conference, but he thought that was too easy an answer. It must be assumed, he believed, that nations made international agreements when those agreements were in their self-interest. Lippmann argued that the pooling of national advantages was really internationalism.

When the major powers of the world gathered--England, France, and the United States--they had few advantages to share. Their domestic economic programs must be allowed to develop before international agreements could be entered into. Nations had to take care of themselves first, he argued, but he also noted that buying and selling across frontiers was hardly out of date.[36]

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[35]Lippmann, "Post-Impressions," 19 July 1933.

[36]Lippmann, "Economic Nationalism," 20 July 1933.

By July 23 the Conference "was twitching toward its end. Hull could not keep it going any longer." It ended on July 27.[37]

The lack of positive results arising from the London Economic Conference and the flood of negative conclusions flowing from its dramatized frictions symbolized American involvement in foreign relations during the first three years of the 1930's. International cooperation among the democracies appeared feeble at best and dead at worst. Lippmann knew international cooperation was needed to help cure depression ills, but his writings of the spring and summer of 1933 show him mostly advocating American economic nationalism. "Physician, heal thyself" appeared as his most prominent advice.

Lippmann's attitude did not run counter to the liberal philosophy he had described earlier in the 1930's To remain free in mind and action in the face of changing circumstances supported his approval of Roosevelt's rejection of the July 1 note from Moley. The President meant to be free of international agreements that might restrict his potential moves to alleviate depression-ridden Americans. And since the United States was the major creditor nation in the world, its improved economic health meant better economic

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[37]Herbert Feis, 1933: Characters In Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 258.

health overseas. The best the United States could do at the time was to model hopefulness for the rest of the world.

Events surrounding the London Economic Conference had not been encouraging. Peace and prosperity faded as the new Reichs Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, withdrew German representation from the World Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in the fall of 1933. Hitler's action was not unexpected. As soon as the Nazi leader had replaced the old and worn out Paul von Hindenburg, Lippmann saw need for the moderating force of an experienced dictator, Mussolini, to curb the romantic and cruel excesses of Hitler's Nazis.[38]

Lippmann recognized immediately the danger of Nazi-led Germany with its setting in the midst of a scared and insecure Europe. The easier parts of reconciliation between Germany and European victors occurred in the 1920's, but frontier concerns were never easy and only those remained in 1933.[39] Lippmann saw the German National Socialists as reactionaries whose mentality endangered civilization. The Nazis, he thought, were repeating past mistakes through the use of terror, and yet they sought equality with other world powers. They would receive the latter only when

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[38]Lippmann, "Hitler and Mussolini," 9 February 1933.

[39]Lippmann, "Forebodings of War," 16 March 1933.

they stopped their cruelties and obtained world respect.[40] The journalist believed peace lay in defense of the status quo, for gradual revisionism was no longer possible with only boundaries at stake. To cure European political tension emanating from shifting power balances, the depression would have to end. Germans, as others, had been barbarized in their struggle for employment and a higher standard of living.[41]

Throughout the late winter and spring of 1933, Lippmann complemented his views of critical foreign issues in Europe by discussing democracy's virtues. He argued that democracies represented a mature form of government and that democrats needed information and courage to make their governments run effectively. Lippmann asserted, as well, that democracies tended toward dictatorship when crises appeared and spotlighted democratic weaknesses.[42] He denied that dictatorships were sweeping the world--that view was an optical illusion. Dictators took over popular government when the latter showed weakness. Democratic forms of government were not easy to establish, Lippmann observed.

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[40]Lippmann, "Ghosts from the Past," 31 March 1933.

[41]Lippmann, "The Present Basis for Peace," 28 April 1933.

[42]Lippmann, "Democracy and Dictatorship," 24 February 1933.

but when established they assumed characteristics of toughness and durability.[43]

One of Lippmann's most perceptive news articles and one which best illustrated his philosophical stance in 1933 appeared on May 11. He warned that in troubled times issues which normally remained undisturbed came to the surface and were discussed. Lippmann feared the level of civilized discussions would fall to the point of separating theory and experience. He contended that the complexity of operating successful human governments demanded a mix of both. Indeed, the world confronting humans presented old and new--past and future. Both elements of tradition and freshness were needed. Lippmann believed that no man should rule other men unless he had been steeped in the human tradition. History taught humility and man learning day-to-day from experience needed to test his insights against tradition. He urged his readers to stay alert, be collected, and ready to change.[44]

Generally, throughout the remaining summer months, Lippmann reported an aggressive Germany, readying itself for war. He thought Hitler and the Nazis unprepared for war, but the danger was that they thought they were ready. The

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[43]Lippmann, "The Strength of Democracy," 30 March 1933.

[44]Lippmann, "States of Mind," 11 May 1933.

Nazis might strike at a nation fully prepared to strike back.[45] In an answer to Roosevelt's May 16 note asking for international cooperation and disarmament, Hitler had responded two days later in a speech to the Reichstag. He would adhere to treaty arrangements, the League Covenant, and the MacDonald plan for supervision of German armament. Lippmann wanted to believe, but Nazi book burning, Jew-baiting, and general terror made him skeptical.[46] He hoped the Four Power Pact of May signed by Germany, France, Italy, and England would meet Europe's need for security by collective guarantee of German boundaries.[47] By mid-October Lippmann hopes for peace in Europe began flickering away. Germany's highly nationalistic foreign policy became clear as she quit the disarmament conference and left the League.[48]

Lippmann visited President Roosevelt during the first week in November and wryly observed how "8 per cent of the population of the entire world, i.e., Germany and Japan, [was] able, because of imperialistic attitude, to prevent peaceful guarantees and armament reductions on the part of the other 92 per cent of the world." Roosevelt wrote of

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[45]Lippmann, "The Burning of the Books," 12 May 1933.

[46]Lippmann, "Hitler's Speech," 19 May 1933.

[47]Lippmann, "The Four-Power Pact," 18 July 1933.

[48]Lippmann, "The Disarmament Crisis," 17 October 1933.

his conversation with Lippmann to the American Ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd, and gloomily observed that he sometimes felt world conditions were getting worse.[49]

One bright light appeared in American foreign relations when the United States gave diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933. Lippmann had urged the President-elect in February to consider such a move.[50] An October "Today and Tomorrow" column continued its support of diplomatic recognition of Russia for that great land mass lay between the two major trouble spots in the modern world--East Asia and Central Europe. Lippmann believed the Soviets wanted peace and that it would be to the world's advantage to have a recognized world power supporting peace between Japan and Germany as they rattled sabers.[51]

But few such lights existed in American foreign relations in 1933. Lippmann's concern about dictatorships sweeping the world became more prevalent in his writing as

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[49]Roosevelt to William E. Dodd, Ambassador to Germany, 13 November 1933 in Nixon, FDR, I, p. 485. On December 28, 1933, the President made a speech in Washington that employed Lippmann's observation. [The United States Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 207.]

[50]Lippmann, "The Recognition of Russia," 3 February 1933.

[51]Lippmann, "Relations With Russia," 25 October 1933.

the end of the year approached. He wrote that the major crisis in American life was one of spirit. "Moral unity among free men" needed revival. Peace hung in the balance, Lippmann declared, almost as to himself for he too needed to believe, that "the forces of order in the world [were] still more powerful than the forces of chaos"--but the former must be united. Americans might save themselves by exertion and the world by example.[52]

Lippmann knew resolving the crisis of American spirit would be as difficult to alleviate as it would be to sort complexities of the European scene. War seemed a real possibility unless a new peace conference were called. German ambitions linked to the rise of Hitler marked the transition from postwar to prewar, he thought, and peace potential was less and less as powers maneuvered for advantages.[53]

For the first time Lippmann recommended that the United States take no part in negotiations or conclude an alliance of any kind which involved America in European power balances. The United States must stay neutral in event of war. Lippmann admitted he knew few answers to the many world problems, but he argued the problems must be defined more concretely. He observed that historically when

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[52]"Walter Lippmann on 'World Trends,' " Cornell Alumni News, 30 November 1933, pp. 97-98.

[53]Lippmann, "America and the Possible War," 26 December 1933.

England became involved in war, the United States also became involved. A problem of neutrality was that America and Great Britain shared common interests. Lippmann noted that the combined power of the two countries was far stronger than any one European nation's power to defy.[54]

Reviving the Western confidence in its political and economic institutions would be no easy task--especially as European dictatorships were in their ascendancy during Roosevelt's first administration. Throughout the years of 1934 and 1935, Lippmann views of European diplomacy described a timid West attempting to restrain the expansion programs of Hitler and Mussolini, but it never went to the point of going beyond words to action in order to enforce covenants or treaties. Lippmann wrote of a new era in diplomacy where force, power, and self-help came into vogue with the rise of Adolf Hitler. It was a mad, sad world.[55] Lippmann complained of being unable to pierce the fog of censorship over Europe, and disliked being forced to guess. But one thing he remained sure of was that tension and instability characterized the European crisis with Nazi Germany at the center.[56]

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[54] Ibid.

[55] Lippmann, "The Balance of European Forces," 23 February 1934.

[56] Lippmann, "Fog Over Europe," 21 June 1934.

In the spring of 1934, America's Appointed Minister to Austria, George Messersmith, had transmitted to the Department of State a report by Douglas Miller, Acting Commercial Attaché in the United States Embassy [Austria]. Miller's assessments of Germany and the Nazis noted that Germans wanted a greater share of the world's wealth. He thought Germany wished to be the largest and most powerful nation in the world--perhaps with the intention of dominating the entire globe.[57] The Nazis' main goal, Miller observed, was to retain absolute control of the German people, and in order to do this they made extravagant promises, bombarded Germans with propaganda through the media, parades, flags, and uniforms, and used force.[58] Miller described the Nazis as belligerent and aggressive, and he believed they wanted to be feared and envied. Their main weapon against enemies, he declared, was humiliation.[59] Concerning foreign relations of the National Socialists, Miller wrote, they wanted more power and more territory in Europe. If these elements were not relinquished peacefully, they would use force.[60]

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[57]Appointed Minister to Austria Messersmith to the Under Secretary of State Phillips , 21 April 1934 enclosed "Memorandum to the Embassy: Main Purposes the Nazis," 17 April 1934 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, pp. 211-212.

[58]Ibid., p. 213.

[59]Ibid., pp. 213-214.

[60]Ibid., p. 214.

Lippmann believed Germany had gone beyond the pale of law and order when Hitler murdered some of his own followers in late June of 1934 [Ernst Rohm and Storm Trooper followers]. Hitler's will and use of arbitrary violence had become the governmental authority in Germany. Lippmann described Germans as hard working, efficient, competent people, but they were unable to maintain a normal standard of living in the face of the Great Depression and the Nazis took over. Nazi foreign policy, Lippmann wrote, had convinced Europe that another war was possible. Sadly miscalculating, he argued that Germany depended so heavily on imports in order to live that its dependence upon international good will would drive Germany back toward internal constitutional order.[61]

The European alignment of power shifted to meet the Nazi expansion threat. France and Russia made an agreement in June of 1934 to help one another in case of attack. England and France finally joined in hope that their united and overwhelming power would stop Germany. The English saw the development of the Nazi airplane as a real threat and the June 30 Nazi purge convinced British Conservatives that facing armed German rulers would bring horror. Italy tended toward the British-French alliance because Mussolini feared a Nazi take-over in Austria. Lippmann believed

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[61]Lippmann, "Germany," 3 July 1934.

Nazi ambitions forced this type of European system, but he also thought it to be a crisis system and only temporary. Once Germany re-established a constitutional government, it would find economic and political partners.[62]

To compound complexities in the international scene, in the spring of 1934, it was rumored that Japan and Germany were unusually close. Both had common characteristics of leaving the League of Nations, preparing militarily, and seeking national expansion.[63] Speculation ran that they might even have concluded a secret alliance. Japan apparently had "taken the more active part in establishing these relations but she met with a ready response from Germany, especially from the Nazi government." The friendly relations between the two countries were based entirely on self-interest.[64]

Lippmann began writing about Japan's renewed vigor in the Far East as early as January of 1934. Japanese propaganda which plumped for naval parity with the United States and Great Britain meant to commit Japanese opinion and public men to an impossible task. Japan wanted a free hand in Asia and wished to set the tone for the upcoming

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[62]Lippmann, "The European Alignment," 25 July 1934.

[63]Dept. of State, Peace and War, text, p. 16.

[64]Memorandum by the United States Military Attaché, (Hugh W. Rowan and Jacob W. S. Wuest), Berlin, 17 March 1934 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, p. 222.

naval armaments meeting in 1935. Lippmann agreed that the Washington Conference treaties of 1921-22 needed review, but he rejected Japanese naval parity with England and America--especially after the Manchurian incident. He argued that it would not be wise to call the naval conference if Japan insisted upon its present position. Lippmann believed Japan was isolating itself from the rest of the world--a dangerous sign.[65]

Former Secretary of State Henry Stimson wrote to Lippmann about the above mentioned January 23 article on the naval conference, and Stimson said he was glad to read the article and that "it is very timely." Lippmann replied directly:

> I am glad that you thought my article was timely. I am not sure but we ought to go further and serve notice on the Japanese Government privately that there is no chance whatever of parity, and that we don't want a Naval Conference if they are going to ask for it.67

Lippmann saw both Nazi Germany and Japan stimulating a world armament race in their respective hemispheres. After the winter of 1931-32, Japan had decided her best

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[65]Lippmann, "The Japanese Propaganda," 23 January 1934.

[66]Stimson to Lippmann, 23 January 1934 in Stimson Papers, Yale University Library.

[67]Lippmann to Stimson, 25 January 1934 in Stimson Papers, Yale University Library.

interests would be accomplished through force. Likewise, the Nazis had already begun preparing Germans for war. And the British and Americans, Lippmann believed, would be better off if they recognized that because issues were serious countries would not disarm. The best thing for the United States to do in Europe was to do nothing, Lippmann declared, but in the Far East America ought to be capable of constructive action through quiet diplomatic procedures.[68]

In the middle of April, 1934 a spokesman for the Japanese foreign office, Eiji Amau, clarified his country's views of foreign aid to China. Amau asserted that Japan had special responsibility for keeping peace in Asia and that Japan would reserve the right to decide what kind of aid other powers might extend to China. The Japanese wanted to see China preserve its national integrity, restore order, and achieve unification; history, Amau asserted, showed that China could do this through its own independent efforts. He declared, therefore, that Japan opposed foreign powers' technical or financial assistance to China. Japan believed, as well, that China was attempting to frustrate Japanese destiny by using foreign influence in Asia.[69]

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[68]Lippmann, "The Race of Armament," 15 March 1934.

[69]Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938: From the Manchurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 76.

Lippmann reacted calmly to the Amau Doctrine, as it came to be called. Japan meant to isolate China by showing the latter that she had no friends in the West. Japan had challenged the principles of the Nine Power Treaty.[70] He recognized that Japan would submit only to its own evaluation of the Japanese role in Asia and that it would also judge Chinese rights. Japanese power, Lippmann pointed out, was unlimited in the Far East, but before the United States, who had no special economic interest in China, could agree to armament limitation it must know exactly Japan's methods and goals.[71] Lippmann believed the treaty structure of 1922 in need of change, but he also thought the United States would not stand irrevocably upon treaty commitments that no longer expressed facts. However, America had the right to ask Japan to consult others before acting overseas, and that Japan would be expected to act in good faith.[72]

Secretary of State Hull spoke of dangers of the international situation in an address at Washington on May 5, 1934.

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[70]Lippmann, "The Japanese Declarations and American Policy," 25 April 1934.

[71]Lippmann, "The Japanese Policy," 1 May 1934.

[72]Lippmann, "Towards Peace in the Orient," 4 May 1934.

[73]Address delivered by the Secretary of State at Washington, 5 May 1934 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, pp. 217-218.

The Secretary said that dictators were replacing democracies.[73] Hull believed nations had narrowed their vision and sought self-sufficiency.[74] Citizens experienced constant emergencies and were being taxed beyond their limits. And worst of all, Hull feared the development of a military spirit that might lead to war.[75] He repeated similar warnings a month later in Williamsburg, Virginia, but added another reason for grave apprehension abroad: the armaments race.[76]

Between the time of Secretary Hull's two addresses, Lippmann wrote of how American Presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt had sought to protect world peace through disarmament. Lamentably, though, after three naval armament limitation conferences and one world disarmament conference, the only armament race stopped was between England and the United States.[77]

Lippmann separated his views of armaments and limitations into two camps: the Atlantic and the Pacific. Each required different policies. The United States had nothing

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[74] Ibid., p. 218.

[75] Ibid., pp. 218-219.

[76] Address delivered by the Secretary of State at Williamsburg, Virginia, 11 June 1934 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, pp. 231-232.

[77] Lippmann, "While the World is Arming," 17 May 1934.

to contribute directly to Europe's critical situation, but he argued that by keeping the American navy stronger than Japan's, the Japanese might be more inclined to limit their political hand in Asia. Should this happen, Lippmann surmised, the United States could then refine its position and naval agreements might be possible. He pointed out that the Washington Conference of 1921-22 did in fact favor Japanese military concerns since its agreements limited England's and America's naval building to far below their potential. Lippmann believed the Washington treaties needed revision because world conditions had changed since then, but he wanted Japan to understand that her unrestrained hand in Asia would never be allowed. Her navy must be restricted.[78]

Since the United States could do nothing about Europe's armament race and possible war, Lippmann argued, America should prepare for neutrality. To stay out of war was one thing, he declared, but trading with belligerents and friends was another. Lippmann believed it was probably impossible to stay out of an important war.[79]

Throughout much of the remainder of 1934, Lippmann's writings about American foreign affairs centered on the defense of democracy and capitalism. He believed many had

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

begun serious questioning of the value of democracy, but the Nazi regime of arbitrary power supported by terror and violence must have shown people an undesirable alternative to democracy. Hitler's one-man rule which suppressed free speech and demanded a national "oneness" of thought obviously clashed with democracy's endless political debates and acceptance of a variety of views. Democracy, Lippmann believed, better expressed the marvelous variety of human experience; accordingly, Nazis philosophy and tactics flew in the face of majority rule that allowed and encouraged minority expression. Hitler's regime did not tolerate opposition and drove opposition underground.[80]

In May of 1934, Lippmann delivered the Godkin lectures at Harvard. The lectures were published in August as a small volume entitled The Method of Freedom. Lippmann set out to discover what guided men's political behavior in the midst of public disturbance and when great pressure for private security prevailed.[81] He sought measures that had the best chance of "restoring and maintaining order in the regime of liberty."[82]

Domestic and international disorder which received

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[80]Lippmann, "The Vindication of Democracy," 5 July 1934.

[81]Lippmann, The Method of Freedom (New York: Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 24.

[82]Ibid., p. X.

large impetus from the Great Depression had brought state control to the political front as an answer to disorder. Laissez faire capitalism appeared to be dead and the conscious and planned operation of government on national economies and private lives of citizens grew to considerable proportions.[83] It had been discovered that government may influence the business cycle and also affect people's standard of living.[84]

Lippmann described what he called a "directed economy" and absolute collectivism. They resembled a military regimen which operated in wartime and peacetime alike with an aura of constant emergency created through manipulated public opinion. Freedom of choice no longer existed in a directed economy for it allowed economic excess.[85]

Lippmann criticism of the directed economy aligned him with the critics of the New Deal who focused their attacks on big government at a time when the New Dealers made big business their target. His early admirers of the New Republic days had parted company with their early hero. They saw in Roosevelt's welfare state a government that listened to pleas of the unemployed and disadvantaged labor as a return to democratic ideals.

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[83] Ibid., pp. 25 and 28.

[84] Ibid., p. 35.

[85] Ibid., pp. 39, 41-43.

Lippmann's answer to a directed economy was his idea of a "compensated economy" which maintained a balance between individual enterprise and choice. Yet Lippmann was no exponent of a laissez-faire economy prizing private enterprise no matter what the cost to public welfare. He sought to correct the abuses and overcome the disorder of capitalism by asking people to recognize that initiative may be evil as well as good. Lippmann proposed that the state "encourage initiative when it is socially beneficent and to discourage it when it is not."[86] He feared that the social order was too intricate for a multitude of individual decisions not sufficiently enlightened to keep the economy as a whole in working order. Any serious breakdown in the economy would unleash forces that might destroy it.[87]

The compensated economy ran counter to the workings of a capitalist democracy, but--Lippmann argued--an absolute democracy may be an unworkable way to organize political power.[88] He believed a government of democracy did not lend itself to foresight and independence, because it failed to take long views. In critical times, democracy's weaknesses of being unable to operate simply and swiftly paralyzed its

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[86] Ibid., p. 46.

[87] Ibid., p. 48.

[88] Ibid., p. 78.

people.[89] The compensated economy would function as private pressure groups did in prosperity--the state in critical times would balance the economy as the general interest dictated. However, later critics of Lippmann's position saw in him a man isolated from the masses of unemployed and the economic realities of the moment. They feared likewise his advocacy of central control believing that the issue was who was to exercise this control.

In Lippmann's compensated economy, the middle class dominated because it avoided the extremes of the rich and the poor. The middle class believed in private property, which was the source of liberty, and in private transaction. It was most likely to be independent of the state because its livelihood depended upon personal security rooted in private property and vested rights--not upon acts of officials.[90]

The Method of Freedom shows a man steeped in Western tradition facing a crisis. His main object, in those critical times, was to restore and preserve the delicate balance between liberty and authority. For Lippmann a democratic government and a capitalistic economy normally allowed man to remain free in mind and action in the face of changing circumstances, but this type of liberalism was

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[89] Ibid., p. 84.

[90] Ibid., pp. 99-100.

threatened as democracy and capitalism failed to react effectively to depression difficulties. In order to restore the world he best knew and respected, Lippmann recommended a strong central control, guided by the public good and meant to regenerate the virtues of democracy and capitalism.

Lippmann's "Today and Tomorrow" columns stopped in July and began in November of 1934. Presumably he went on vacation during part of that time. September and October found him in Europe. When he returned, Lippmann reaffirmed what he had believed to be Europe's economic case earlier in the summer. The European situation was critical, he had said, and few signs of economic recovery were visible.[91] Five months later and after a trip to Europe, Lippmann noted that deflation had paralyzed private initiative and reduced the European standard of living. A struggle for existence had been provoked among classes, regions, and nations. He indicated that the United States continued with its economic problems, but they were of a less tragic kind. Americans were not threatened by war. They enjoyed a margin of safety because of their material resources, and they participated in an unusually sound government.[92]

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[91] Lippmann, "The European Crisis and American Policy," 13 July 1934.

[92] "Lippmann Returns Gloomy over Europe," New York Times, 22 November 1934, p. 19.

Although democracy and capitalism were under severe criticism, Lippmann believed a "patched up" democracy during crisis times was infinitely better than Nazi dictatorship. Economic and political conditions in Europe had not improved and the programs of the dictators were not supplying necessary solutions. American recovery programs appeared to be working feebly. Unemployment roles in the United States listed over a million fewer workers in 1934 than the previous year's listing.[93] The price index of America's gross national product [in 1929 dollars] rose five points in 1934.[94] But an excess of imports $742,000,000 occurred during the past twelve months.[95]

Lippmann believed that the last few months of 1934 had witnessed a subtle and underlying change in the Western world. The early years of the 1930's found people predicting the doom of Western social order. They believed its basic tenets of personal liberty and independent property and governments accountable to free men must give way to the machine age and highly deified politicians. Even democrats had begun to doubt democracy and capitalism; however, the spell of doubt had been broken.[96]

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[93] The Statistical History of the United States, p. 73.

[94] Ibid., p. 139.

[95] Ibid., p. 537.

[96] Lippmann, "A Spell is Broken," 4 December 1934.

From his recent trip abroad, Lippmann heard men in private conversation say that certain European countries had some very strong governments backed by military force and psychological support, but they lacked substantial economic resources, markets, advanced technical organization, and "the indestructible free energies of the outer capitalistic-democratic world." They could not make good their promises to the people. The dictators would do well to wait on capitalistic recovery then in progress. But they would have to be satisfied with the fact that great decisions would be made in Washington, London, and Paris.[97]

The glamour of the collectivist autocracies was gone, Lippmann wrote. Capitalism had survived and lived as an order in human affairs constantly changing. The real question was how much, at what points, in what ways "the existing system of predominantly free enterprise could be helped to make its readjustment, [could] be stimulated and restrained, its errors--and deficiencies compensated, and thus brought into working balance."[98]

Lippmann concluded his writing about the world scene of 1934 with assessments of Japan and Europe. He believed that

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[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid. For similar sentiments in regard to democracy and the West, see "Watchman, What of the Night?" 1 January 1935 and "In Defense of Liberalism," Vanity Fair, November 1934, 32, pp. 24 and 80.

Japan meant business in the Far East--far more so than England or America. Japan must expand--he declared--because of a growing population, the need to industrialize, and the need for materials and markets. She had been prepared to fight in Asia since 1931 and no one else was. The Japanese relied on the assumption that while others doubted Japan would fight, but the danger existed that they would overplay their hand and provoke resistance.[99]

The American Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a comprehensive appraisal of the situation in Japan to Secretary Hull on December 27, 1934. Ambassador Grew's note supported the Lippmann December 8 assessment, but Grew portrayed the predominant attitude in Japan as "swashbuckling." Japan meant to rule the world.[100] He saw liberal thought in Japan--so often described as lying just below the nation's surface ready to rise at any moment--as largely "inarticulate" and "impotent and probably would remain so for some time to come."[101] Grew warned that unless America was willing to subscribe to "Pax Japonica" in the Far East the United States should build its navy to treaty strength and keep up with Japan regardless of cost.[102] He declared it was

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[99]Lippmann, "Security in the Far East," 8 December 1934.

[100]Grew to Hull, 27 December 1934 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, pp. 239-240.

[101]Ibid., p. 241.

[102]Ibid., p. 242.

"criminally short-sighted" to discard from calculation the possibility of eventual war with Japan. The best way to avoid war was to prepare for it.[103]

Lippmann's end-of-the-year analysis [1934] of the European situation did not envision Hitler declaring war. The Nazi dictator ruled an unstable Germany and he would have to put weapons in the hands of his political enemies if he went to war. Lippmann placed great faith in Mussolini's supposed desire and ability to maintain status quo on the Continent. Lippmann reasoned that it would be in the self-interest of Italy, France, and England to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, for instance. War danger could be postponed or removed.[104] Developments would demonstrate the error of Lippmann calculations.

Lippmann believed that England and France should recognize to some degree Italy's status as a great power. They could do this by conceding an increase of an African colonial empire to Italy. It was folly to refuse, Lippmann

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[103] Ibid., p. 244. A January 22, 1935 "Today and Tomorrow" column, "A New Deal in Japanese-American Relations," continued Lippmann's hopeful tone that Japan would recognize the potential naval power of the United States and England. He noted also that England and Russia had far greater economic interests in Asia than America had. United States interests in the Far East did not require that she be the sole protector of the West's interests there.

[104] Lippmann, "War or Peace in Europe," 13 December 1934.

argued, because European peace was much more important.[105]

The other half of the equation for recognition of Italy as a great power asked if Italy were prepared to act as a great power, or would Mussolini play a lone hand in the Balkans finding only small advantages? Lippmann thought Mussolini to be "sufficiently a good European to rise to the occasion."[106]

Policy of this sort, Lippmann wrote, rested on the idea that the only way to keep peace was to unite nations in defense of existing frontiers; otherwise, war would be provoked. "Whoever wished peace must, therefore, accept the present political constitution of Europe," Lippmann declared.[107]

The year 1935 proved to be a bad one for Lippmann analysis. Two series of important events, one in the spring and one in early fall defied Lippmann predictions. On March 10 Marshall Hermann Goering made public that Germany had established a substantial air force [in violation of the Versailles treaty]. March 16 found Hitler openly denouncing disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty. He also began universal conscription.[108] Contrary to Lippmann expectations

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[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 14.

that Mussolini would act as a world leader and that he would see that Italy had more to gain from peace than war, Italian troops, true to year-long rumors, invaded Ethopia on October 3. It was a mad, sad world.

Lippmann's initial reaction to Nazi Germany's military expansion announcements was an attempt to create understanding by showing that Germany had been the victim of a bad peace. Since the Paris Peace Conference other moves against Germany fostered further ill will. France had built a series of alliances aimed at preventing Germany from expanding. An "iron ring" of armament surrounded Germany which it saw as restrictive while others saw it as defensive.[109]

Germany defied the allies by rearming, and Hitler took what the allies offered at a high price. The allies faced dilemmas, for if they did not react to Germany rearming, they would appear impotent and the Germans would look stronger. If armaments were increased, enormous war risks would be involved. If the allies accepted the facts and negotiated, they would postpone the crisis without softening it.[110]

The European crisis, Lippmann argued in a later column, deeply affected the United States. In December, 1934 world price and wage deflation continued and world trade reached its lowest ebb since the beginning of the depression.

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[109]Lippmann, "The European Crisis," 19 March 1935.

[110]Ibid.

Intensified competition heightened, and nations turned inward to develop home markets; however, Lippmann wrote, expenditures on public works and armaments were wholly inadequate to promote recovery. Thus domestic economic pressure helped to produce the Manchurian crisis, the Abyssinian adventure, and Nazi rearmament with guns toward Europe.[111]

The United States had gone off the gold standard and faced deflation abroad, but militarism had come to the political front in Europe and Asia and the United States confronted the difficult issue of defining neutrality toward potential violence in Europe. England and France directed their energies toward the European economic and political crisis and the United States opposed Japan alone in the Far East.[112]

Lippmann argued that America, Great Britain, and France should settle deflation and war debts. The United States ought to lift its embargo on American capital going overseas. Effective neutrality needed sufficient force to back it up, Lippmann believed, but neutrality was not simply a matter of doing nothing. American citizens and commerce would roam the world and interests would inevitably be damaged. In the Far East Lippmann declared that the United States must be frank and firm with Japan. Since there was

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[111]Lippmann, "The American Interest in the European Crisis," 23 March 1935.

[112]*Ibid.*

no possibility of collective action in Asia, America must keep its navy superior to that of Japan's. Finally, Lippmann proposed that American economic recovery at home was very important, as was American security, but--he warned--Americans should not be buried in their own "chicken feed."[113]

A month after Germany's military announcements about rearming, Lippmann published a lengthy article in Foreign Affairs about Anglo-American relations. Ostensibly, Lippmann meant to dispel the illusion that the United States supported an isolationist foreign policy while England appeared to be internationalist.[114]

Lippmann believed that the ideal of Anglo-American co-operation was to preserve the peace of the world. Both the United States and England had no disputed common frontiers. Commercial rivalry existed in some parts of the world, but with no serious political consequences. Neither government sought extension of its empire, and both were in the process of restricting overseas holdings. Thus Great Britain and America had fundamentally the same views about foreign policy based on an underlying community of interest and speech and tradition.[115]

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[113] Ibid.

[114] Lippmann, "Britain and America: The Prospects of Political Cooperation in the Light of Their Paramount Interests," Foreign Affairs, April 1935, 13, p. 363.

[115] Ibid., pp. 363-365.

But, yet, England and the United States stood apart because they possessed different vital interests. America protected itself on a two-ocean front with its center in Panama. The United States could not, therefore, accept equal partnership with England in maintaining Western Europe's status quo. Britain had deep interest in protection of its homeland and defense of its line of communications with India and the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. She also had large economic holdings in China.[116]

The Manchurian affair of 1931-32 put the West's collective security system to the test, and it showed that Great Britain and France were not willing to uphold the system when their vital interests were not involved. As the British and French did in Manchuria, the United States must do in Europe--hold back. Therefore, Lippmann wrote, it made no sense to discuss Anglo-American relations in such stereotyped phrases as "American isolation" and British internationalism." For American policy was governed by vital interests--just as British policy was.[117]

Lippmann meant, he said, to show the difficulty in promoting cooperation between the United States and England, but he sought understanding in order to remove misunderstandings. What policy the United States should adopt, for

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[116] Ibid., pp. 365-367.

[117] Ibid., p. 368.

instance, in Asia was no more clear than what policy Britain should adopt toward the Continent.[118]

The type of international cooperation that Lippmann thought would be effective involved as it always did in diplomacy the risk of war, "and not merely consultation, observation, and negotiation undertaken with the reservation that if words fail, nothing further be done." Most likely, neither England nor the United States would undertake that type of cooperation until Britain felt secure in Europe and America felt secure in Asia. Defense of each country's vital interests "compels them to concentrate their energies." But if they could not cooperate politically, they might consider economic cooperation where currency could be stabilized, trade barriers removed, and trade promoted. "Good will finds good work to do," Lippmann asserted. The habits of cooperation might be confined to economic considerations until political conditions were ready for the policy of promoting peace.[119]

Stanley Baldwin returned to power in June of 1935, and the British Prime Minister represented to Lippmann a man deeply devoted to democracy and liberalism. Baldwin wanted peace and he guided a powerful nation which carried large

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[118] Ibid., p. 370.

[119] Ibid., p. 371.

sway over various dangerous world trouble spots: Central Europe, Eastern Asia, and Africa.[120]

Foreign policy observers, Lippmann continued, believed that European peace depended upon Anglo-French cooperation. And their cooperation would attract others. Nazi Germany would respect a united Continent, he believed, since Hitler only respected force.[121]

Anglo-American relations were not bad, Lippmann continued, but they could be better. The two countries ought to understand one another more clearly and seek parallel action. Lippmann wanted English opinion to know that responsible American opinion understood their point of view. It might also help if British opinion understood America.[122]

England concluded a naval agreement with Germany in June of 1935. The German fleet tonnage was not to exceed thirty-five percent of the British fleet tonnage. A bewildering development at first thought, wrote Lippmann, but he saw it as a brilliant coup on Britain's part. German naval armaments had been attached to England's navy. Great Britain had tied German hands, and allowed Nazi propaganda to treat the agreement as a German triumph. Other powers could deal

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[120]Lippmann, "The Return of Stanley Baldwin," 11 June 1935.

[121]Ibid.

[122]Ibid.

with England, after the treaty, and know what Germany was doing. In a similar fashion, Lippmann implied, America might try opening relations with Japan.[123]

For much of the remainder of the year, Lippmann focus on foreign policy issues settled on Italy and Ethopia and American neutrality legislation. As early as September of 1934 the State Department received word from America's Ambassador to Italy, Breckinridge Long, that Italy appeared to be making war preparations, possibly toward Ethopia. Long believed, however, that Italy would not begin an unprovoked attack against Abyssinia.[124] The Ambassador reported again in mid-February 1935 that Italy was definitely making war preparation for an extensive campaign in Ethopia. Supplies and military forces moved clandestinely.[125]

Lippmann wrote of a shattered dream in July 1935. The impending Ethopian war marked the end of the international system established by the victors of World War I. The system failed to stop Japan in Manchuria. It did not enforce military clauses in the Versailles treaty against Germany, and it was unable to stop Italy in Ethopia. The Western victors showed no will to defend the peace settlement with force and they lacked wisdom to save it by

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[123]Lippmann, "Naval Policies," 25 July 1935.

[124]Long to Hull, 28 September 1934 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, pp. 234-235.

[125]Long to Hull, 14 February 1935 in Ibid., p. 247.

concessions. "They have believed in their wishes," he wrote, and they sought to combine the advantages of imperialism with conveniences of pacifism.[126]

Lippmann struggled with feelings that Italy ought to be at least morally condemned. He reported that some felt the United States should exert moral authority in defense of elementary human rights and of the sanctity of treaties. But how would America condemn Italy's potential aggression? Through the League? The United States was not a member. Through the Kellogg Pact? No judicial machinery existed for assessing guilt. The United States, if it acted, would have to do so unilaterally.[127]

The defense of civilized ideals, Lippmann believed, depended upon far-sighted policy--not upon protest where violence threatened. He argued that diplomatic combinations backed by force and the willingness when deeply challenged to use that force was the only way to stop tyranny. Only when people felt secure and prosperous would freedom and reason flourish.[128]

In early August Lippmann predicted Italy would invade Ethopia within a month. The forces for making war were

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[126]Lippmann, "The Shattered Dream," 11 July 1935.

[127]Lippmann, "American Ideals in the Outer World," 23 July 1935.

[128]Ibid.

ascendant over those for making peace. He feared the spread of war to Central Europe where maintenance of the balance of power had depended so heavily on Mussolini.[129]

The United States would remain neutral and its policy should be made very clear to Europe. No specific danger threatened the United States, Lippmann wrote, but precedents would be set by American action that would have great weight on potential European moves. The United States wanted its honor and trade intact and it wished to remain neutral and impartial, but neutrality was nearly impossible when naval powers faced one another. Therefore, the United States should adhere to tradition and make no special pronouncement for this specific war.[130]

Lippmann urged, however, that America prohibit shipping in American bottoms of munitions to either belligerent and/or prohibit shipment in American vessels of munitions outside of the western hemisphere. American citizens traveling outside the western hemisphere on ships carrying munitions ought to be prohibited, too. Lippmann advocated, as well, that the State Department and Congress form an informal committee in continuous existence that would make tentative drafts of legislation for serious situations.[131]

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[129]Lippmann, "The Approaching War and American Policy," 8 August 1935.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Ibid.

Words flowed from the White House. Roosevelt instructed Hull to cable Long in Rome. The Ambassador was to seek an interview with Mussolini at the earliest possible moment. Long would indicate to Mussolini that the President hoped the differences between Italy and Ethopia could be settled "without resort to armed conflict." An outbreak of hostilities in the present world could stimulate a calamity which could "adversely affect the interests of all nations."[132]

Congressional and Presidential concern over appropriate neutrality legislation became intense in July and August of 1935. With Italy poised to strike and with an already powerful isolationist sentiment in the country, the August 31 Neutrality Act seemed appropriate and none too soon for some. The act prohibited the shipment of arms, munitions, and implements of war to belligerent countries. It barred American bottoms from carrying arms, munitions, and war implements for use in warring nations. The act required licensing of persons engaged in manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war. Lastly, it restricted travel by American citizens on ships of belligerents during war.[133]

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[132] Hull to Long, 18 August 1935 in Dept. of State, Peace and War, p. 266.

[133] Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935 in Ibid., pp. 266-271.

Lippmann's "Today and Tomorrow" columns stopped in late August of 1935, and his first reaction to the August 31 Neutrality Act appeared in early December. By that time Mussolini had invaded Ethopia [October 3] and the new legislation had an opportunity for testing. In a two part series, Lippmann assessed American neutrality.

Statements by Roosevelt and Hull in October and November required scrutiny, Lippmann wrote. The President and Secretary used moral pressure to replace legal stricture denied by Congress in August.[134] Lippmann believed the rules of American neutrality had been changed radically after Italy went to war--and to Italy's disadvantage. He thought this was a dangerous precedent. Lippmann argued that neutrality policy had been framed to fit a specific problem, and that it would not be suitable for a large war. It would be economically disastrous to the United States.[135]

Lippmann labeled the Italian invasion of Ethopia a "peculiar war." England and France withheld affective sanctions against an obviously aggressive Italy. Why? Both

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[134]Lippmann, "Developments in Neutrality," 5 December 1935. Roosevelt and Hull had called upon American businessmen to avoid trade in war materials with belligerents. The President and Hull asked American business to avoid excessive trade with Italy and Ethopia, and there was some hint that if American business--which especially supplied oil, copper, and scrap to Italy--did not comply with the government's request, violators' names might be published. (Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 24-25).

[135]Lippmann, "Bad Law from a Hard Case," 7 December 1935.

French and British vital self-interests guided their policies. They needed Italian help against potential German expansion. England and France followed realistic lines, Lippmann observed, but they failed to see far enough ahead. He feared irreparable harm to European peace had taken place.[136]

The League of Nations failed to apply sanctions on oil--the most important commodity necessary for Mussolini's quick victory over Ethopia. But Lippmann cautioned readers against peremptory judgement of League action. He noted that it was well known that Mussolini had planned to attack Ethopia for a year, and nothing was done to stop him. Mussolini also had indicated that if oil were cut off from his country, he would consider that an act of war. League members did not want war, and Mussolini knew it. When the League had an immensely superior force which it was willing to use against aggressors, it would then come of age, Lippmann wrote. Peaceful sanctions were part of its adolescence.[137]

For the first time in many centuries, Lippmann declared, a challenge to the essential traditions of civilized society had occurred. Arbitrary will vied with the rule of law. The appetites of men struggled mightily with desires of

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[136]Lippmann, "The Peculiar War," 17 December 1935.

[137]Lippmann, "The League's Coming of Age," 24 December 1935.

consideration for others. What was surprising was that so many men favored the challengers. And many of these men represented the learning and wisdom of civilization itself. Men of authority, steeped in the human tradition, must rise to protect selves from willful selves. Lippmann felt little reason for despair--for once men understood the issue they would rally and gather forces.[138]

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[138]Lippmann, "The Paramount Issue," 26 December 1935. Lippmann's book, The New Imperative (New York: Macmillan Company, 1935) contains essays written in the spring of 1935. It expresses the need to balance liberty and authority in the modern world. The book re-enforces Lippmann's Method of Freedom (1934) which argues that liberty and authority might be balanced when the economy adjusted to new circumstances.

CHAPTER EIGHT

LOOKING BACKWARD

To understand the importance of Walter Lippmann's views of American foreign policy from the beginning of World War I to the middle of the Great Depression, one should take into account the magnitude of his audience and his possible impact on national leaders. During the twenty-one years under study, Lippmann wrote twelve books, published dozens of magazine articles, and wrote hundreds of newspaper columns.

Lippmann's New Republic years, interrupted by service in the federal government, and his editorship of the New York World brought his thinking to a limited number of readers. But with the inauguration in 1931 of his "Today and Tomorrow" columns in the New York Herald Tribune, Lippmann thought became available through a syndicated press that reached one hundred and twenty-six American dailies with a total circulation of eight million readers in 1933.

One suspects that it was Lippmann's self-assumed role of reporting daily issues and surrounding them with perspective, insight, and potential solution which made him attractive to national leaders and gave him an unusually influential attachment to power. His positions as journalist and author provided the time he needed to write books which helped him clarify an on-going philosophy and offered the opportunity

for him to test his thinking in news writing. Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt made use of Lippmann's analytical powers, and Colonel House, as well as Secretary Stimson appreciated his intellectual talents.

Lippmann's intent as a writer and thinker went beyond the usual journalistic pale. He may well have assumed the role of the statesman figure he described in many of his books. A Preface to Politics (1913), Drift and Mastery (1914), Public Opinion (1922), and Preface to Morals (1929) pictured men in society who searched the world as they found it--extricated forces that seemed to move it--and surrounded those forces with criticism and suggestion. The ideal statesmen, according to Lippmann, sought to clarify issues and awaken men's potential to handle them. Lippmann had great faith that man could know himself well enough that he would be able to meet, understand, and somewhat control problems involved in relations with other men and other nations. The statesman figure would be capable of rising above man's daily frays, and could thereby furnish perspective and insight.

Lippmann attached himself to realities, but he did so on his own terms. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, he earned an annual income of six figures, and this substantial earning allowed him a life of discipline which he chose for himself. He traveled across the United States at least once a year and his frequent addresses at colleges and to other

groups gave him access to regional thinking. An annual trip to Europe kept him informed about European politics particularly and Western international issues generally. Although he was born and reared in New York City, it was not just family attachment that kept him there until 1938. He believed the financial center of the United States to be on Wall Street, and economics dominated the decades of the 1920 and 1930's.[1]

Lippmann's highly developed ability to write clearly and focus readers' attention on international issues of the day supported his desire to have impact on the thinking of national leaders, but he also developed a "trick of the trade," as he called it. He set out to find individuals and groups who could be depended upon as faithful mirrors of what everyone was thinking.

> There are some marvellous mirrors, men and women who reflect, virtually without any distortion due to thought or information of their own, the state of mind of the impressive people in their trade or social group. They are indispensable to public men and journalists.2

Thus Lippmann maintained prolific correspondence with intellectual and political leaders of the day. He entertained and was entertained at luncheons and dinners where he gathered information and insight.

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[1]Lippmann, Reminiscences, II, p. 145.

[2]Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow: A Trade Secret," 2 May 1935.

Lippmann's foreign policy views were governed first and foremost by his beliefs in democracy and capitalism as the best ways to regulate human relations within a nation and with other countries. When it became clear, for instance, in early 1917 that Germany meant to control major Atlantic sea lanes, Lippmann stopped writing about neutral rights and began discourse on defense of the Atlantic Alliance.

Nations that bordered the Atlantic between the United States and Great Britain served, Lippmann believed, as the main sources of Western tradition. He thought that if traditions of the West, such as individual liberty, concern for others, open commercial competition, and governments responsible to free men, were to be preserved, Britain and the United States would have to control the Atlantic and provide a pool of naval power upon which other Atlantic nations could draw when they needed it. In his sense of major powers enforcing Atlantic needs, he contradicted Woodrow Wilson's hopes of collective security, where all member nations pooled their naval power, helping the world toward peace.

Lippmann traced the reasons for the economically and politically tumultuous decade of the 1930's to a "bad peace" which began in 1919. Democracy and capitalism represented to Lippmann opportunities for free political and economic

exchange among humans. They allowed choice and inventiveness, but the Versailles treaty imposed only policies of indictment and repression. He hoped that the League of Nations would help countries adjust to a new democratic world. The League, Lippmann believed, would provide machinery for continuous efforts to meet changing economies and political structures. But the leading democracies, subject to fears of insecurity and future potential war entanglements, attempted to protect themselves by limiting international contact. The free flow of goods, money, and ideas was constricted by high tariffs, immigration restriction, and unstable currencies in the 1920's.

Never fully delineated, the line between authority and liberty blurred even more after World War I as political extremists started to dominate world governments, especially in the West. Lippmann tried constant defining and bolstering of democratic and capitalistic forms in the 1920's and 1930's, but forces of fear, revenge, and greed had been released. France wanted security against a restoration of German power. The American Senate chose not to sign the peace treaty or join Wilson's League. A Great Depression visited economic ruin upon the world and its tragic impact supplied dictators with excuses to create or increase their powers. Treaties, war outlawry, or armament limitation conferences meant little to Hitler or Mussolini.

Lippmann argued in 1928 that the world faced a

constantly changing status quo and no peaceful way had been found to change international relations. He saw no morality in foreign affairs and if good or bad "won," it was because force was on its side. If peace were to exist, powers would have to see peace as to their advantage.

Lippmann's assessment of American foreign affairs in the 1930's included the idea that a division of labor had occurred in the world economy and global political structures had to adjust. Since Lippmann believed that the most stable society was one where change was the easiest, he supported democratic nations and capitalistic economies. The West contained the nucleus of democratic and capitalistic nations, but the Great Depression had forced many toward more centrally controlled societies in an effort to offer quick remedies for depression ills.

If democracies continued their highly nationalistic foreign policies, Lippmann argued, they would encourage Germany, Italy, or Japan to seek their self-interests through overseas expansion. Japan invaded Manchuria. Germany flaunted its violations of the Versailles treaty, and Italy marched on Ethopia. The West retaliated with words or weak sanctions. As Lippmann feared, domestic self-interest overruled international cooperation, and world economic recovery was stymied.

The London Naval Conference and the London Economic Conference demonstrated America's need to soothe the fears

and insecurity of Americans. As England and France, the United States set out to cure its own economic illness first. Lippmann, in something of a turn-about, believed this to be a correct course since America was the leading creditor nation in the world. Its good health would spread to other nations, he thought. Domestically, the New Deal symbolized the increased centralization of American government, but Lippmann feared Roosevelt's growing personal power.

Democracy and capitalism appeared incapable of solving Great Depression problems or stopping dictators. But Lippmann continually praised democracy and capitalism in the 1930's--for they seemed to be the only institutions that had come close to preserving man's individual liberty and, at the same time, allowed enjoyment of the benefits of society. If the Great Depression were to end, he thought societies would have to loosen central government control, lower tariffs, stabilize currencies, and encourage trade. He favored temporary state help to individuals in economic distress. But moreso, he wanted restoration of democratic government and a capitalistic economy where nations and their people ideally remained free in mind and action in the face of changing circumstances.

Lippmann believed that only by maintaining an affective balance between liberty and authority could the inherent civility of man continue growth. It was, however, his

proposed cures for world ills that brought Lippmann severe criticism. His scheme of a compensated economy to redress democracy's ills was abstruse and did not deal with the real issue: getting people back to work. He simply did not know what to do when democracy and capitalism failed to function properly when facing crises.

Lippmann came to distrust capitalistic democracies when they confronted emergencies. His thinking of the 1930's was much clearer when he addressed himself to political issues, but when Lippmann offered economic analyses, his study directed him toward an elitism. He wished to preserve the middle class virtues of property and economic independence in a land with over ten million unemployed. Excesses of democracy where too many unenlightened voices argued for dozens of solutions, Lippmann believed, had paralyzed the United States.

Lippmann was caught in a dilemma. He had proposed that the benefits of democracy and capitalism rested on their abilities to allow change and to free creative energies--the very elements needed, he argued, that were necessary for world governments to adjust successfully to changing economic conditions. But democracies and capitalistic economies did not keep the commonweal upper-most. In their race for trade, they too reverted to satisfying clamoring constituencies. Lippmann responded by advocating a "regimen of liberty." The compensated economy and its middle class

leaders would restore democrats' vision by insisting upon the public good as the touchstone for economic operations. In his desperation Lippmann advocated a vaguely defined increased central power to restore economic liberty.

Lippmann's duo-role as a journalist and philosopher brought him fame and infamy. As an editor he admirably isolated and reflected on major foreign policy issues of the day. His discussions of American-European issues occupied most of his attention since he believed that the greatest dangers, and at the same time the greatest potential solutions, for world problems lay in the Atlantic Community. But the philosophical aspect of Lippmann's thinking which attracted so many to his work was a two-edged sword. His columns and books gave perspective and insight, but they also presented some questionable solutions to issues that he raised. The scholar in a troubled world was able to clarify issues and tender hope for improvement, but he had to be content with few effective answers.

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