







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FAMILY ECONOMY AND DIVISION:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FAMILIAL RESPONSE
TO ECONOMIC CHANGE IN A RURAL TAIWANESE COMMUNITY

presented by

Ross Chiffelle Gardner

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FAMILY ECONOMY AND DIVISION:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FAMILIAL RESPONSE
TO ECONOMIC CHANGE IN A RURAL TAIWANESE COMMUNITY

By

Ross Chiffelle Gardner

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ABSTRACT

FAMILY ECONOMY AND DIVISION:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FAMILIAL RESPONSE
TO ECONOMIC CHANGE IN A RURAL TAIWANESE COMMUNITY

By

Ross Gardner

This study focuses on the changes in the socio-economic organization of rural-based Taiwanese families since the 1950s. The research concerns itself with the impact upon families when agriculture ceases to provide the primary source of income for families. Specifically, the paper examines the changes that have taken place in the family economy when farm property and farming become secondary to the ownership and operation of off-farm businesses and other kinds of off-farm work. And, because family property is enmeshed in the division of family assets, the paper also examines the changes that have taken place in the nature of family division.

Drawing from data collected in Taiwan, the paper traces the changes that have taken place among twelve rural-based families as they become less reliant upon agriculture for a livelihood. The findings indicate that as involvement in non-farm work becomes more important to family members, the availability of cash becomes the overriding concern of family members rather than the farm estate itself.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to Bernard and Rita Gallin for generously providing both their field data and long hours of patient advice. As teachers and researchers they both excel above and beyond the call of duty. I would also like to express my thanks to my committee members Joseph Spielberg and Iwao Ishino. They served as terrific sounding boards off of which I could bounce my ideas. Finally, special thanks go to my wife, Shu-man, who put up with my incessant questions about Taiwanese society and infernal moods.

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
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INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

With the end of World War II, Japan had laid the foundation for Taiwan's future development (Amsden 1979:348), and paved the way for the application of American aid and an American political force that was bent on proving to the world that swift and broad-based development of China could be achieved without the socialist methods employed by the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1949, under pressure from the United States Government, the newly exiled Kuo Ming Tang (KMT) enacted a land reform program which, by 1953, had succeeded in expropriating, with compensation, the holdings of landlords and restricted the population to ownership of maximum amounts of acreage. Within that short period, landlords as a class were virtually eliminated and replaced by a large majority of small-owner cultivators. Land reform, coupled with improvements in seed, fertilizer and cultivating techniques, helped boost agricultural production to record levels by the early 1960s.

Amsden (1979), in her account of Taiwan's economic history, points out that while the success of agriculture was due to direct actionfarmers' associations, hybrid rice and cash crop seeds), the government also actively extracted surpluses from agriculture once production levels had increased. The government, having successfully eliminated the only politically powerful force (i.e., landlords), had a direct link to, and control over, farmers. Once control was established,



MAP OF CHINA

Figure 1.1

the state was able to squeeze farmers by implementing a rice-fertilizer barter system which required farmers to exchange a set quota of rice for fertilizer, an exchange that was unfavorable to cultivators.

Surpluses from agriculture were then used to build Taiwan's infrastructure (roads, public works and schools) as well as to help finance new government-owned heavy industries.

Taiwan's industrial development, although at first urban-centered, gradually affected the rural areas.

In 1956, 73% of Taiwan's rural labor force was employed in agriculture, while slightly less than 7% was employed in manufacturing. By 1966, agriculture employed just 54% of the rural labor force; manufacturing 10%; commerce 5%; and services 19% (Ho 1979:81).¹

Beginning in the late 1950s, industry gradually spread from the major urban areas to secondary cities and suburban areas, finally reaching rural districts by the late 1960s and early 1970s. Industry decentralized for a number of reasons. Some manufacturing, for example, was dependent upon raw materials in the countryside and on markets located there (ibid.:81). In other instances, industrialists moved some of their operations out of the cities into the countryside to find cheaper labor and to establish systems of contract manufacturing with small, independent and labor-intensive satellite factories (most of which employed only family labor or no more than 10 to 20 wage laborers) (Anderson & Leiserson 1980:230).

While the gradual movement of service, manufacturing, and commercial industry out of the cities to secondary cities and rural

areas was facilitated by the near absence of physical and infrastructural barriers (the bulk of Taiwan's rural population is located along the western coastal plain) - it was the growing rural under-employed which provided the greatest incentive for that movement. According to Ho, by 1970, some "44% of the farms on Taiwan contained less than .5 hectares of cultivated land"(1979:88). Although the dearth of jobs in the countryside had the immediate effect of forcing young family members into the cities in search of work, this trend was stemmed by the outward movement of jobs and capital into the secondary cities and rural areas. As the amount of work to be found close to family farm compounds grew, increasing numbers of sons and daughters remained at home and started a business or commuted to work in a nearby factory.

In sum, the KMT enacted policies in the 1950s which initially promoted urban industrial and commercial development at the expense of agriculture and economic development in the countryside. Confronted with limited jobs and a declining land to man ratio, many rural inhabitants left their farming families and migrated to the cities in search of employment. By the 1970s, however, the movement of jobs and capital to the rural areas, enabled many migrants to return to their native villages and work.

Given the dramatic changes in Taiwan's countryside, in this thesis I will consider the ways in which the organization of rural-based Taiwanese families change in response to the pressures of the changing economy in which they are enmeshed? More specifically, to better understand the response of rural-based families to economic change I will examine two questions:

1) What is the relationship between the changes in Taiwan's rural economy since the 1950s, and family economy (defined below)?

2) What is the relationship between changes in the family economy and changes in family structure?

Essentially, the first question will examine the changes that take place in the family economy when farm property and farming become secondary to the ownership and operation of off-farm businesses and other kinds of off-farm work. And, because family property (both fixed and liquid) is inextricably entwined in family continuity and the division of family assets, the second question will address the changes that have taken place in the nature of family division (explained below).

LIMITATIONS

On a general level then, this paper will examine changes in the structure and function of rural-based families during the transition from a traditional agriarian based socio-economic system to one based on industrial capitalism in Taiwan (Medick 1976:292). Given the magnitude of of such an examination, the paper has a number of limitations:

1) It deals primarily with anthropological data collected on Taiwan from 1950 to the present. These several decades, I believe, provide a long enough period from which to see the transition from a farm-based economy to one based on industrial capitalism. The approximatley 35-year time period also is relatively unmarred by political, economic, or social upheaval on the island.

2) The study is restricted to primarily rural-based extended (stem and joint) families. Because of limited data available, I have

presented only a brief history of ten families. These ten case studies are presented to better acquaint the reader with the kinds of work families are involved in and, where possible, the nature of their economic and social organization and relationships. Although I often refer to the case studies to illustrate points or as examples, I remind the reader that I also draw extensively from other data not mentioned as part of the case studies.

3) Although I use secondary data collected from a number of communities around the island (so as to better round out my analysis of the family), I nevertheless reserve my conclusions and observations for only one rural community, Hsin Hsing, with suggestions for their possible application elsewhere. The Hsin Hsing data are, by far, the most complete information I have on families in Taiwan, so that village is the primary community to which my observations best apply.

4) Because of my interest in the economic organization and functions of the family, I have focused my attention on the type of work family members (primarily males)² are involved in and the economic relationships that exist between them. I concentrate on the nature of family property and how that property is used (if at all) for productive purposes. I also give attention to the use and management of the liquid assets (primarily cash) that a family may accumulate over time.

5) Finally, in my concern with the nature of familial social structure, I examine how the distribution of family assets among male heirs through the process of family division is influenced by and a reflection of the changing conditions of family economic life.

-In the rest of chapter one, I define the terminology used in this paper. I follow this with a general discussion of family economic and social organization in rural pre-1949 China.

-In chapter two I discuss selected families in the village of Hsin Hsing. For comparative reasons, I also introduce the views and opinions of several other social scientists who have studied the family in Taiwan.

-Chapter three offers my analysis of family division and family economy, followed by a short discussion.

-The Appendix offers ten case studies which I use to help illustrate points made in my analysis.

A NOTE ON THE ROMANIZATION

This thesis will use the Wade-Giles system of romanization. Where Chinese is used in quotations, I will use the romanization system of the author followed by the equivalent Wade-Giles form.

In 1980, 40 New Taiwan Dollars (NT\$40) was equivalent to approximately US\$1.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

In the anthropological literature that has come out of China and Taiwan over the years, a number of terms and labels used to describe the socioeconomic lives of the Chinese have emerged. Some of these terms are widely used and commonly understood by researchers, while other labels remain rather obtuse and confusing to most everyone. I believe the terminology used in what follows is for the most part

generally understood and accepted by the majority of researchers who have done work on Taiwan.

Two of the more important concepts used in this paper are "family economy" and "family division." While both terms are explained below, I would like to point out that the former term is a label created and used by western social scientists to describe a familial or domestic social and economic phenomenon foreign to ourselves, while the latter is a translation of the Chinese term fen-chia used when a family divides into its component household units.

THE CHINESE FAMILY

The family (chia) has generally been described as the basic unit of Chinese society. The chia, writes Rita Gallin, was traditionally based on an authoritarian hierarchy "of gender, generation, and age" which dominated the lives of family members (1985:77).³ Males held the highest status, as did those who were of the older generation; women, as Gallin points out, regardless of age, had the lowest status of all. The social ideology of filial piety or hsiao, legitimized the hierarchy of the family. A son or daughter who was filial, was a person of good character, a child who had chia chiao (family teaching). To be filial meant obedience and respect for those of the older generation, caring for ones parents in old age, and continued veneration of the parents after their death through ancestor worship.

FAMILY ECONOMY

Throughout history the family has also been characterized as a self-sufficient economic unit, consisting of those who are related by blood, marriage, adoption, and have a common estate and a common budget (Cohen 1946:184). In essence, a family's common budget and estate constitute the base for what is called the "family economy," and, depending upon the particular economic pursuit of family members, individuals will make use of the estate and budget to varying degrees.

The budget, for example, is a common account into which the liquid assets (primarily cash savings) of a family are placed. The budget is managed and administered by the family manager or chia chang (who is frequently one of the older male members of the family). This chia

chang (with or without the help of family members) decides when, how, and on what and whom the budget will be used. For the most part, funds in the budget are used by the family to pay for food, rent, medicine, clothing and other household expenses, religious festivals and rituals such as burials and weddings. Accumulated cash is also used for investments in such things as land, buildings, farm equipment and livestock. In cases where there is enough of a surplus, investments are frequently made in a small businesses or a son's education. The common account is then replenished by productive family members to the degree that,

when all the members are farmers tilling the household soil, this expresses itself in a joint cultivation of the land and joint reaping of the harvest. When some member of the family has a side income or when he lives apart and has a different occupation, it is his duty to place in the household account all clear profit accruing from these activities; that is, to hand it all over to the household accountant (Shiga 1978:112),

or chia chang.

The family estate, in contrast, refers to that body of fixed assets that legally belongs to the (male) members of a household, and to "which the process of family division is applicable" (Cohen 1976:59).⁴ What this means is that the chia estate is that property which is jointly used by the family and which, when the family divides, is distributed to the male heirs. Among agriculturally-based families, estate property (synonymous with inheritable property) might include farm land (either owned or tenanted), the farm house, outbuildings, tools and livestock.

For wealthier families or merchant families, common property would most probably include land, a business(es) owned by the family, buildings, and business stock.

For those families with very little property or accumulated liquid assets, the matter of budget or estate is obviously not an issue. But for the many families with accumulated assets, it is important to note that both the budget and estate were (and continue to be) used (or exploited) in accordance with the particular type of economy undertaken by the family or family members. As we shall see, families that are dependent upon farming or a business or wage labor for an income are likely to use the family estate and budget in different ways. For families primarily involved in farming for example, the estate is most important because of the land. The budget (cash), on the other hand, becomes more important when the family or family members enter off-farm occupations which require cash investments or expenditures.⁵

FAMILY DIVISION

The family, according to Levy, can include "a father and a mother, all their sons, their unmarried daughters, their sons' wives and children, the sons of their sons, the wives and children of the sons of the sons, and so on for many generations as possible" (1949:48). As a rule, sons remain a part of the chia and daughters marry out to join families of the husbands.

The Chinese family is also cyclical. When the first son in a conjugal family marries, family becomes a stem type (composed of the parents, one married son and his wife and children, and unmarried brothers and sisters). Following the marriage of the second son the

family reaches the joint stage (a family with parents, more than one married son, and their wives and children)(see figure 1.2). Eventually, for any number of reasons, the large family will divide into several units which may include conjugal, stem, and even joint, depending on the size of the original family. But "the precise point in time when division takes place is not fixed and has no direct connection with the death of the father of the household" (Shiga 1978:116).




Figure 1.2

SOME CHINESE FAMILY FORMS

Ideally, a formal family division involves an elaborate legal process. "Family division was a jural act;" writes Cohen "together with the partition of property there was termination of many kinds of obligations" (1976:74). Once a family agrees to divide (if the father is alive he must first give his consent), an arbiter is often called in to mediate in the equitable division of the family estate.⁶ The family land, business (if any), livestock, tools, buildings and residence are all divided among the male heirs. Also divided are the family's eating arrangements. Each new family builds its own kitchen

where they take their meals alone (see figure 1.3 of a Chinese farm compound).

Once division has taken place, the cycle begins again with sons and their wives and children setting up new chia (each conjugal unit is referred to as fang while undivided), and over time expanding to a stem or, perhaps, to the joint stage. The parents frequently share living quarters and meals with their sons' families, often on a rotating basis; families of this type are often referred to as rotating stem families.

As a rule, a "formal" or "de jure" (as described above) division occurs in those families that have property to divide. In some situations, however, family division may also occur among those families with little or no property. Or, on the other hand, families with property may not "formally" divide their property, but instead, its members may choose to separate from one another (perhaps taking those family assets useful to them) over a period of time leaving division to resemble a kind of "de facto" separation. Whatever the case, family division occurs at different times and, perhaps, in different forms; it does not always resemble an ideal type.

Finally, it is also important to point out that the wealth and income generated by a family varies in accordance with the family cycle. Conjugal families, for example, are labor poor while stem and joint families are labor rich. In larger families, the greater number of productive individuals outweighs the number of nonproductive family members (children), leaving more cash to be spent on investments.

Why do families divide? According to Freedman, the answer is complicated because division is usually due to a number of interconnected "economic, legal, moral, religious and, in a restricted

Source: Cohen 1976

Figure 1.3

A Typical Family Farm Compound

Note: B means bedroom
Scale - 1:200

sense, psychological"(1979:236) problems. These problems translate into conflict between brothers, fathers and sons, and mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. Wives in particular, have often borne the brunt of the criticism for breaking up families. Freedman has said that "when a married woman fought, she fought for herself, for her children, and for her husband" (1966:46), and when she was not fighting she was accused of scheming to sever the bond between her husband and his family.

Nevertheless, Freedman argues that the root of most disputes (leading to division) in the family are based on economic problems. Often, arguments arise between brothers, with each accusing the other of not contributing enough labor or remittances to the family economy. In other instances, a daughter-in-law might be reprimanded if a mother-in-law believes she is not doing her share of the cooking, cleaning, or work in the fields. Also not uncommon, are disputes over how and on whom the money in the budget should be spent. Siblings frequently level complaints against each other over children who eat too much, the cost of a nephew's education, or the amount of medicine or clothing purchased. Again, family division may be the only way for a family to resolve the conflict.

Of course, tensions in a family need not result in division. A strong and authoritarian father might be able to hold a family together well into the joint stage. In such cases, children restrain their bickering in deference to the parents, choosing to cooperate rather than fight. Eventually however, upon the death of a father, sons would divide.

In sum, then, although I agree with Freedman that family division is for the most part caused by economic problems in the family, I believe

it is important to look in more detail at the relationship between the nature of family economy and the nature of family division. Ideally we should also keep in mind that families run in cycles, that families may divide at any stage in the cycle, and that division may happen on both a formal "de jure" or informal "de facto" basis.

THE EXTENDED FAMILY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ESTATE IN PRE-1949 CHINA

I have chosen 1949 as an arbitrary date separating two periods of Chinese social history. This is not to say that all that occurred before the Chinese revolution was "traditional" and all that followed was "modern." But it is necessary to establish a baseline in order to distinguish between those who wrote about the family in pre-revolutionary China (for example, Kulp 1925, Fei 1939, Lang 1946, Levy 1949, Freedman 1958) and those who have observed and studied the family in Taiwan since that time.⁷

The following discussion on traditional China is limited. To establish some kind of baseline against which I can compare the changes in the family in Taiwan since the 1950s, I have prepared a very brief overview of the social and economic organization of rural agricultural based families before 1949. I will talk about family economy and family division, placing special emphasis on the relationship between the family estate, budget, and intrafamilial social organization.

FAMILY FARMS

Let us first consider how the estate, and its primary asset, land, fits into the social and economic organization of the

agriculturally-based family. We find that in an agrarian society "such as traditional China, landed property constituted the main resource of the domestic economy [family economy] and its role thus loomed large in determining the pattern of domestic organization" (Chen 1984:163). Land provided life for the family, and so it also became the most important form of wealth and property. Land took on both economic and symbolic value to the degree that "families would relinquish their holdings only when there was no other option for survival left" (Baker 1979:13).

Throughout the literature on traditional China, we frequently find references about the importance of land to the family. Rawski wrote that in Fujian Province "absentee landlords did not invest in land for profit so much as to ensure a stable income and reaffirm deep cultural value in owning land. Opportunities for accumulating wealth were much higher in activities such as moneylending and overseas trade" (1972:86). But as long as a family held land, "its members were secure, and other villagers held that family in high esteem" (Meyers 1970:97; see also Freedman 1966:33).

Although having land to farm was the most immediate concern of the family, there was always a degree of anxiety about a family's ability to hold on to it for the next generation. Household heads endlessly worried about maintaining the family line. With the continuation of the family name, ancestor worship would be maintained, thereby ensuring (for one generation at the least) that the after-life of the parents and the ancestors before them would not sink into oblivion. This need for continuity, and the fact that the older generation also worried about being taken care of in old age, led Myers to conclude that "the Chinese peasant believed that acquiring land was the most dependable way a

family's fortune could be improved and security provided for the sons. The more land a household head could transfer to his sons, the easier it was for sons to acquire land" (1970:115).

In contrast to the Japanese system of primogeniture in which the majority of land is given to the eldest son, the Chinese system of family division provided the mechanism for equitable distribution of land to all sons. One important advantage of this system was to spread wealth to many heirs in the hope that at least one would survive, prosper, and continue the descent line. While family division did not necessarily ensure a sufficient amount of land for several sons, it usually enabled all of them to establish a subsistence foothold. Depending upon access to other forms of work, farming and/or entrepreneurial ability, a small piece of land might enable sons to expand their holdings and accumulate capital (Greenhalgh 1984:534).

According to Rawski (1972), landed owners (and those with top-soil tenant rights) in selected coastal areas of pre-20th century Fuchien Province thrived primarily because of increasing land values, rapid market expansion, and the ability to diversify out of agriculture into occupations that gave them a higher return for their labor. Lin (1948), a Chinese sociologist, compiled a detailed family history of a Fuchien family from the late 1800 to mid 1900s that in many ways mirrors the conditions that Rawski has written about. This particular family (Hwang family, see Appendix, case 1), was able to become quite prosperous because it had access to the lucrative river trade between the port city of Fuchiu and the inland districts of the province. Access to good markets and success in business also allowed the family to diversify into other non commercial areas (such as government) that

were sources of increasing wealth and power. But the family's good fortune would not have been possible had not one of its enterprising family members left farming in his early years to sell peanuts to travelers along a country road. Had this individual not had the support of a family with access to land, it is doubtful that he could have become an entrepreneur.⁸

Suffice it to say, that for propertied agriculturally-based families, the estate (based on land) not only formed the backbone of the family economy but also was highly valued as inheritable property. For many peasant families, land was critical to the continued survival and reproduction of future generations. And, where there was enough land to be distributed to sons, the jural process of family division was employed to equitably provide a means of subsistence for each male heir.⁹

FAMILY BUSINESS

If land was so critical to the maintenance of a family and so important to its future success in off-farm activities, what happens when land becomes secondary to business property or interests? Put another way, what happens to family organization and the process of family division when family members work and participate in a business-based family economy?

As seen with the Hwang family (Appendix case 1), there were many rural agrarian based families that experienced upward mobility. Many families managed to accumulate enough capital to make an investment in some sort of off-farm enterprise, thereby allowing them to raise their standard of living.

The data from this era suggest that several things can happen to the family economy and family social organization when an off-farm enterprise begins to provide the bulk of a family's income. In terms of the family economy, the composition of the family estate and budget can change dramatically. Business property and assets which can take all forms and range widely in value are added to the estate (which may have only previously consisted of farm land, buildings, tools and livestock). On the other hand, the family budget (which may have previously functioned to do no more than pay for household expenses, weddings, burials and religious festivals) of these new business families, becomes very important for the continued maintenance of the family business. In contrast to before, the family budget may now serve as a reservoir in which cash income is accumulated, eventually to be used for investment in the family enterprise. Having a family budget becomes the one means by which family heads can accumulate and control the flow of income coming into the family, investing it where needed.

With such dramatic changes in the family economy can come equally dramatic changes in family structure and family division. The existence of business property can frequently complicate relationships within the family and help create confusion over ownership and rights to property. What happens for example when sons do not get along in the family? Are they likely to push for division as they might be inclined to do if the family economy were based on farming? Or would they, as Freedman has suggested, be less likely to push for division because a business cannot be divided without seriously damaging or destroying it altogether (1958:30). Business property, unlike farm property, is composed of cash and business stock which, if divided, may cause the ultimate destruction

of the business upon which all family members depend. As a result, sons would be less inclined to separate and more inclined to cooperate since division would only result in less for all.

Undoubtedly, such reasoning went through the minds of sons, who, no matter how unhappy they were living in joint families (that were dependent upon off-farm enterprises), decided to let things go on as they always had without pressing for division. Yet, one wonders whether such economic rationalizing on the part of sons was enough to overcome the friction that often developed in complex families. In The Golden Wing, for example, Lin (1948) pointed out that unhappy family members may insist on division regardless of the consequences. Such was the case when Dunglin's nephew pulled his share of the operating capital out of the family enterprise, seemingly in total disregard for the theory of utility maximization.

Whether sons chose to divide sooner or later in the business families of traditional China is not the major issue here. Instead, my point is to show that family economy and family organization changes and, often times, become more complex when the family becomes involved in off-farm work. Traditionally, family division has worked quite well as a fairly equitable means of distributing agricultural assets. Nevertheless, once a family is confronted with a new means of production (or a new means of earning an income), both the estate and budget change, further complicating the process of dividing property.

In the next chapter attention turns to what happens to families when their economies transform from an agricultural base to one based on off-farm work. Since most of the data come from field studies done in Taiwan since the 1950s, it is important that we keep in mind how change

in the island's economy affected the importance of, as well as the way estate and budget were used. Once we begin to see the changes that start to take place in the family economy, we can then begin to speculate about how those changes are reflected in the changing nature of family division for rural based extended families.

NOTES

- 1 The balance of percentages are unaccounted for by Ho.
- 2 My analysis concentrates on males in the family primarily because they are the ones who inherit property and who play a prominent role in the economic affairs and decision making of the household.
- 3 (Baker 1979:15 has interestingly arranged the pecking order in terms of generation, age, and sex).
- 4 Division also applies to the budget when it contains enough accumulated assets to be divided among sons.
- 5 Ebrey (1984) has found that Yuan Tsai, a scholar on the family in the Sung period, referred to the family as having immovable property or fixed assets (chan) and moveable property or liquid assets (tsai). With each kind of property there usually existed several methods of management and division.
- 6 In many cases the eldest son might be given a slightly larger share of the family property since he has been contributing his labor to the family for the longest period of time.
- 7 1949 was of course the year the ruling KMT fled to Taiwan. While few social and economic programs were enacted in that year, the early 1950s proved to be a time of great change on the island.
- 8 Bray (1983:25) has made an interesting analysis of rice-growing cultures and the development of capitalism in Asia.
- 9 In some ways land lends itself well to division. In other words, land in predominantly rice growing areas, can be divided again and again and still provide subsistence for successive generations (see Geertz 1966

and his work on agricultural involution and Bray 1984).

THE ECONOMY AND FAMILY IN CHANGE: HSIN HSING, TAIWAN:

1950s TO THE PRESENT

Since the mid 1950s, considerable research has been done on Taiwan by anthropologists, many of whom are from the United States. Much of the work has consisted of ethnographic village studies, the cumulative effect of which is a large collection of descriptive and interpretive material on the Chinese family.¹

Two of these researchers, Bernard and Rita Gallin, have conducted research in the small agricultural village of Hsin Hsing on the west central coast of the island. Their work in that village has covered almost a thirty year period starting with their first trip in the late 1950s. My own research is based on the Gallins data. Although their research about the nature of family economy and family division has not focused on the specific questions I pose, their data set is broad and extensive enough to answer them.

In this chapter, I will first discuss the social and economic changes that have occurred in the families of Hsin Hsing since the 1950s. I then briefly review the work of four anthropologists who have done research on the family in Taiwan. Two of these scholars, Cohen (1976) and Harrell (1982), are considered here because they have concentrated on the analysis of the structure and function of families in rural communities. They also offer some interesting family histories from the villages they have studied - some of which I have included as case studies in my appendix. Although the observations of these men do not directly address the questions I have outlined in this paper. I

believe that parts of their work are germane to my discussion and that they both significantly contribute to our knowledge of family economy and family division in Taiwan.

THE VILLAGE OF HSIN HSING:

ECONOMIC CHANGE

Hsin Hsing is a small agricultural village located in Changhua county not far from the coastal town of Lukang - a once prosperous port that declined with the silting of its harbor (see DeGlopper 1972). The people of the village are Hokkien (or Taiwanese) descendants of peoples from the Amoy region of Fujian Province on the mainland.

In the late 1950s when the Gallins lived in Hsin Hsing, the village was land poor. Although the Land Reform Program of 1953 reduced tenancy from a previous 58% of land cultivated to 27% by 1956, there was still only an average of .12 chia² of cultivated land per person in 1957 (Gallin & Gallin 1982a:209). Yet, agriculture provided the main source of income for the people of Hsin Hsing. The villagers normally grew two crops of rice and one crop of sweet potatoes. Vegetables were also grown for sale in the regional markets. A mixture of rice and sweet potatoes with little or no meat made up the daily diet of most people. "Only during festival occasions - religious or life cycle - or on occasions when harvesting or transplanting labor teams were fed did villagers eat poultry or more substantial amounts of meat and fish"(1982a:209).

In the late 1950s and early to mid 1960s, however, conditions began to change in Hsin Hsing. Increasing population pressure, diminishing

amounts of land to give to sons, and a dearth of local off-farm jobs to absorb the underemployed, caused a large number of villagers to migrate to the northern city of Taipei (and some to the southern city of Kaoshiung) in search of jobs. "For most villagers, the initial move to the city, whether motivated by pure economic necessity or by the desire to diversify the family's economic activities, [was] made to supplement the family's income from the land or from farm labor" (B. Gallin 1978:267), and it was expected of all migrants who still had families in the village to send money home whenever they could.

By the late 1960s, the village was better off economically, not because of greater returns to agricultural production, but primarily because of increasing remittances from relatives in the city.

Nevertheless, it was only in the early to mid 1970s that the local economy began to develop, due primarily to "(1) the abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system in 1972, (2) the implementation of the guaranteed rice price in 1973, and (3) the development of government policies to stimulate farm mechanization and rural industrialization that began in 1973"(Gallin & Gallin 1982a:211).

On a return trip to Hsin Hsing in the late 1970s, the Gallins found over 30 small enterprises in the village, with 40% of the local population working for themselves, and 55% working as salaried or wage laborers for entrepreneurs either in the village or within commuting distance (ibid.:216 & 217). In 1979, approximately 85% of the incomes of local villagers were derived from non-farm work, as opposed to the 1958 figure of only 15% (ibid.:215). And, of the 30 or so enterprises in the village, retail and service shops comprised 28% of the total, heavily dependent on family labor and were very labor intensive (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1
TYPES OF BUSINESSES LOCATED IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE
JANUARY - JUNE 1979

Type	Number	Total	%
Satellite Factories			
Toy and Novelty Items	1		
Iron Grill Work and House			
Structure	1		
Machine Stamping	1		
Iron Springs	1		
Gloves	1		
Sweaters	1		
Nylon Bags	1	7	19.0
Shops-Sales and/or service			
Retail Groceries	3		
Barber Shop	1		
Tailor Shop	1		
Chinese Medicine	1		
Motorcycle Repair shop	2		
Plumbing and Electrical	1		
Rice Drying	1	10	28.0
Other Businesses			
Rice Mill	1		
Puffed Rice	1		
Cement and Tile Flooring	1		
Truck Delivery	4		
Construction/Masonry	2		
Pig Raising	2	11	30.6
All Others		8	22.1
Total		36	99.7

Source: Gallin & Gallin 1982a p.215

Although returns from agriculture were higher in the 1970s than in the past, farming was still considered unprofitable, primarily because "agricultural profits simply cannot compare with the money to be earned as an entrepreneur or worker, and people attach higher importance to increasing their income than to farming"(1982b:150). Nevertheless, many of the older generation (both men and women above the age of 50), continued to farm the land because, among other things, "it was a source of food," and taxes would be levied against unused cultivatable land (Gallin & Gallin 1982a:218); in addition, those who continued to farm probably had few skills or were too old to sell their labor elsewhere. Younger men were rarely involved in farming by the late 1970s (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2
OCCUPATION BY SEX AND ENTREPRENEURS BY FAMILY TYPE
IN HSIN HSING 1979

	Total # of Families	Total # of People	Males over 16 Farm	Males over 16 Non Farm	Females over 16 Farm	Females over 16 Non Farm	Entrepreneurs Males
Nuclear	33	163	12	40	13	29	17
%	45.2	30	23.1	76	31	69	42*
Stem	27	194	17	31	6	17	7
%	36.9	35	35	64	26	73	22*
Joint	13	186	9	46	3	12	28
%	17.8	34	16	83	20	80	60*
Totals	73	543	38	117	22	58	52

Source: Gallin and Gallin, field notes and interviews.

* Percentage of males involved in non farm activities. Here entrepreneur is defined as those who own and manage an enterprise.

A significant amount of population movement also accompanied changes in the local economy of the area. In 1966, roughly 37% of the villagers lived outside of Hsin Hsing, most having migrated to the northern capital of Taipei. But by 1979 that figure had dropped 10 percentage points due, in part, to migration back to the village, and to the decisions of some young people not to move away from home to seek

jobs. Approximately 20% of the returnees to the village between 1970 and 1979, said that they were unable to make a living in the city; by 1979, over 30% of those who returned had already become entrepreneurs (1982a:225). The Gallins wrote, that for many migrants,

the city began to lose the aura of El Dorado and the countryside began to acquire one of promise. Some Hsin Hsing people lost interest in migration when nonagricultural ventures became practicable and off-farm jobs became available in the rural area. Some Hsin Hsing villagers found attraction in remigration when: (1) job security in the city became questionable and employment possibilities in the country demonstrable or (2) skills learned, contacts established, and capital accumulated in the city became actualizable in the country (ibid.:225).

FAMILY ECONOMY AND FAMILY DIVISION IN HSIN HSING

The 1950s:

Without a doubt, Hsin Hsing was not unlike most other agricultural villages in Taiwan in the 1950s. Very much a "traditional" community, the village had been somewhat insulated from areas not within its immediate marketing domain, mobility of its population was limited, and, of course, agriculture figured prominently in the social, economic, and political organization of the area. Many of the recurrent or cyclical religious festivals, for example, were connected with the agricultural cycle (Gallin 1966:255), and all villagers knew the importance of cooperation within and between the household (hu), the lineage (tsu or incipient lineage), and the village. "Cooperation among villagers frequently reflected collaborative efforts in the irrigation and exchange of labor systems. Similarly, village politics often were entwined with issues such as the management of the irrigation system (under the control of the Water Conservation Association) or the operation of the Farmers's Association" (Gallin & Gallin 1982a:209).

It was the small lineage (or tsu, as the villagers referred to the kin group), however, into which most people were grouped (note: Hsin Hsing is a multi lineage-village), and on which most people relied for help (Gallin: 1966:1127-136).

The tsu functioned as a ceremonial group, drawing its members together for ancestor worship and life-crisis rituals. But, the tsu also had political importance. The more powerful tsu within the village formed coalitions in an attempt to coordinate and to control village affairs and succeeded, in that elected offices

tended to be held by members of the larger tsu.

Unrelated families who had the same surname as an influential tsu often tried to identify themselves with the group to gain some of the socio- political benefits and security that accrued to its members, attesting to their power (1982a:208).

In the 1950s therefore, extensive kinship ties were quite important to the farmers, as were the more intimate connections of family.

It is not surprising then, that up to and around the time of land reform when agriculture provided the main means of support for villagers, sons were still highly dependent upon their family estate for support and an occupation. If sons were fortunate enough to have parents with land they could get married and have children, and when the family divided each would hopefully have enough land to farm. In a very few cases, where a father was particularly adept at management and at keeping the peace between family members, there was the possibility that the family might survive to the joint stage. For the most part, however, sons with little or no land to inherit would often have to postpone marriage; in addition, because there were so few job opportunities within the family context or in the village, they were often forced to leave home in search of jobs, skills, and capital.

What was the condition of the family budget? For the most part the data reveal that most family budgets contained little in the way of assets. The meager surpluses from production that could be accumulated were placed in a common account from which all household and farming expenses were paid (this could include weddings, taxes, funerals,

fertilizer, etc.)). There rarely was enough of a monetary surplus in the budget for investments in business or even new farm machinery; the money was just not to be had.

In sum, the farm-based family economies in Hsin Hsing lacked the ability to produce much of an income for its members. But, because other avenues for employment and job security were scarce, family division remained the means by which property was distributed; property (land) could, perhaps, provide a foothold for a son who could work that property and make enough of an income to support a family.

The 1960s: A Period of Heavy Migration:

As the economy gradually improved in Taiwan, the cities were the first places to offer jobs. Seizing the opportunity to break out of the economically depressed countryside, many villagers left for the larger cities (mostly Taipei), leaving their families behind. On their first trips to the city, married men from stem or joint families left their conjugal units in the care of the larger chia, sending home money whenever they were lucky enough to work (Gallin 1978:267). If the migrant met with some success he would usually send for his wife and children. Unmarried men who went to the city would also send money home to their parents whenever possible. While in the city they would go from job to job, gaining skills and in some cases a wife. For many migrants, Taipei would eventually become a permanent home.

But for some migrants, on the other hand, farming remained an important means of livelihood, while off-farm jobs in the cities only acted to supplement family coffers. Finding it difficult to separate themselves from their natal homes in the village, men would frequently

return to farm when little urban employment was to be found or when planting and harvesting had to be done. This continued attachment to the chia explains Gallin, was caused not just by an economic dependency, but also by the many social and psychological needs which could not be met "without the help and relationships of familiar people from the village" (1978:277).

Despite all the doubt and uncertainty during these times, the lives of the villagers began to improve. For those families which chose not to divide, remittances from migrants and slightly better returns from agriculture enabled the family economy to expand. For once, the family budget held more than a minimum of cash, perhaps enabling the family to help finance an apprenticeship for another son, to provide travelling money for a potential migrant, or for the purchase of a new piece of farm machinery. Needless to say, the family estate, which for most families consisted of farm land, did not lose its value in the eyes of even migrant family members. Land remained critical to the welfare of these people because it represented the only buffer between failure in the city and abject poverty. As a result, while the opportunities of earning much more money in the cities acted to pull sons away from the poor life in the village, the security offered by farming necessitated that some kind of connection be maintained in the village.

The Effects of Migration on Family Division:

The push-pull effect on migrants to work in the city but remain attached to the village had a definite effect on the family. In a sense, the forces of migration presented some of the first challenges to the family's agriculturally-based social and economic organization.

Migration, after all, was indicative of the economic problems in the village and the lack of confidence people had in the farm family as an economic provider. But, as noted above, many migrants had a difficult time severing ties with the natal chia.

How then, given this situation did the family economy function? What were the effects on family division for the periods of heaviest migration? An examination of the nature of family division during the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, should provide answers to these questions.

In interviews done by the Gallins over a 25 year period, family members were asked when division in the family took place as well as the reasons for the separation. Of the approximately 24 family divisions (4 dates are unknown) in the village between 1956 and 1966, 11 occurred between the years of 1956 and 1961 and 9 between 1962 and 1966 (see Table 2.3). In the one category that singles out migration as a participant in family conflict (col.5 table 2.3), and leading to division, four of the interviewees expressed anger toward a brother or his family for not sending back enough remittances to the natal chia, or for keeping too much money as "private money." Since the "accused" were living away from home, no one in the family could really keep track of how much money was earned or spent.

Table 2.3
REASONS GIVEN FOR DIVISION IN HSIN HSING (1950-1966)

Years	1 No Conflict in Family	2 Conflict unrelated to*	3 No Reason	4 Hardship	5 Conflict Result of Son(s) Migration	Totals
1956-1961	3	2	1	1	4	11
1962-1966	5	1	1	1	1	9
Division Tot.	8	3	2	2	5	20

Source: Gallin and Gallin, field interviews and notes.

* migration.

Nevertheless, while most of the complaints about migrants came from those who lived in the village, it is doubtful that members of village-bound families were necessarily the ones who pushed for division since they benefited most from whatever remittances were sent. Excerpts from field interviews suggest that it is more likely that migrants in the city believed division was in their best interest for two reasons. First, division guaranteed rights to a portion of farmland in the event of failure in the city. Migrant's land (after division) could continue to be farmed and maintained (usually by relatives) in their absence, and they could also benefit directly by receiving a nominal "rent" for its use. Were migrants to remain members of undivided households, it is likely that they would not receive any of the proceeds from family members farming the estate land.

Second, migrants might favor division because it could release them from the burden of having to contribute their earnings to the family budget (controlled by the chia chang in Hsin Hsing).³ In the 1960s families in Hsin Hsing still needed cash to support the family. It was highly unlikely, therefore, that a migrant would have any hope of seeing much in the way of a return on the money that he remitted to the family economy. Unlike some of the larger diversified households in other Taiwanese villages (see case 5), remittances to the family budget by family members would have eventually benefited members because it would be reinvested in their enterprises. Nevertheless, for many families in Hsin Hsing of the 1960s, cash was still not plentiful enough to be used for investment purposes that could be beneficial to migrants; instead such cash was directed toward immediate consumption needs.⁴

Although the interview material on family division does not provide us with any absolutes - it does demonstrate that migration out of the village presented new problems for the functioning of the family economy (and specifically for common budgeting). Since the natal (or primary) family in Hsin Hsing had little to offer to these migrants in the way of money, the migrants themselves had to find work and generate their own financial base in the city. But because wages were low and expenses high, many migrants could barely save money, let alone remit any surplus savings to the family budget in Hsin Hsing. As a result, it is possible that much of the division that took place in the late 1950s and early to mid 1960s was not so much a product of sons' need of farm land (either for an income or just as a buffer against failure at an off-farm job), but a reflection of their desire to remove themselves from the obligation of remitting money to the family economy.

In sum, division of family property continued to be practiced in Hsin Hsing in the 1960s. And, while the aim of division continued to be the distribution of land as in "traditional" China, land was nevertheless increasingly less valued as a means of providing an income. It appears, then, that family division during this period might have also served for some migrants as a way of terminating obligations to provide money to the family budget. With the family divided, migrants would be able to conserve the cash from their wage labor jobs, and, at the same time, still have a piece of land that could be used in case of failure at an off-farm occupation.

The 1970s to the Present:

Although the increasing outflow of Hsin Hsing migrants coincided with an increase in the number of families dividing before reaching the joint stage, this phenomenon did not necessarily signal the beginning of the end of the Chinese complex family. In the 1970s, the Gallins found that the family regained its importance relative to the individual because it began to transform itself in response to changes in the economy. The extended family (joint-stem) once again became important, but in a form different from the "traditional" family. The large unit appeared to have modified, often with sons and daughters living and working away from home, earning an income, and remitting only that amount of money to the family budget that they could afford (i.e. there were no longer the extream demands made on sons to remit all of their surplus income Gallin & Gallin 1982b:148). This new flexibility in living and accounting was due to the fact that, "villagers believed that this type of family [modified joint as the Gallins call it] was an excellent mechanism for socioeconomic success in a changing world" and, in Hsin Hsing, "joint families managed to maintain themselves as single units by consciously modifying the structural arrangements of the family" (Gallin & Gallin 1982a: 231). Family members realized that economic diversification and extensive relationships with people outside the area still were considered requisites for achieving wealth and social status. Thus, a family that consisted of many potential workers, as well as other members who could perform those tasks necessary for the functioning of the family (i.e., supervision of children, care of land, and so

on), had a better chance of diversifying economically than did a family of small size (Gallin & Gallin 1982a:231).

Modification of the way the family structured its finances gradually gave individual family members (sons) greater freedom and opportunity to earn and keep the money they obtained from the off-farm jobs. And, if a son was in need of financial help, then the natal chia would be there to either bail him out of difficulty or provide him with the necessary capital to start out in life. This modification, according to the Gallins, allowed the profits to remain with the conjugal unit, but "the losses of failure were [to be] shared by the joint family and its treasury" (1982a:234).

The case studies from Hsin Hsing bear out this modification in the family. In 1969 for example, Li Seh-ming (case 6) opened his small spring manufacturing operation in the village with a brother-in-law who had just finished an apprenticeship in nearby Chang-hua city. At first, Li's lack of knowledge of machinery made work quite difficult. But by the mid-1970s, his business operation had become more sophisticated, and local villagers increasingly were hired to bend Li's springs on a part-time, piece rate basis.

While only one example, Li's small factory represented a new opportunity to the young on the local level. Many larger factories also opened in the area, enabling sons to work, to gain skills, and to save a little cash before entering the army. Following their service, instead of migrating to the cities, many sons for the first time were able to remain at home and work. For some this meant commuting to a

wage labor job in a factory nearby, returning home to their extended families in the evening. Sons who were involved in the wage-labor sector found it much easier to save money when they lived with a larger family - sharing with other members the cost of food and other minor expenses, while not having to pay for rent.

But most sons in Hsin Hsing who had gained valuable skills in the army or as apprentices or factory workers were not content with working for someone else. Of this group, many of whom were not yet married, there existed two options for future employment. They could either choose to start a small business away from their natal home or chose to remain with their larger family and open a business there. Either way, because initial capital outlays for these new businesses were relatively small, fathers were willing to help their sons by offering some kind of financing using money from the family budget, a rotating credit club, or a loan (i.e. from the local Farmers' Association).

In many cases, sons were encouraged to remain at home and work and to take advantage of the family budget and estate by using its buildings as a starting point for small enterprises. Family support enabled a few sons to become large-scale capitalists with enough business property to be able to offer their own sons (the third generation) managerial positions and shares in the operation they themselves built. In case 9, for example, Shih Yen-shan's son built his gasket business pretty much on his own. Although the father put up the initial capital, the business was never considered a "family enterprise." The money given him by the family is regarded as no more than a loan, and the elder son is obligated to pay it back to the parents. Aside from the debt he has incurred and the responsibility to care for his parents in their old

age, the first son really has no other responsibilities to his natal chia. This does not mean, however, that the first son did not feel pressure from the family to help his younger sibling find work; he offered his brother a job in his factory (a position that all knew would not last long because the first brother had outside partners so that the second brother would never have any shares in the company). There is little doubt that the first son considers his factory a family operation, but it will be one that the sons of his own conjugal family (fang) will help run and eventually own, not his brother or his brother's sons. Simply put, although the family budget helped finance the oldest son's factory, that money was not invested in a family enterprise.

Although larger capitalists such as Shih often rely on relatives to help manage a business, there seems to be a clear understanding that actual ownership remains in the hands of the one who created it. The property is very much "acquired" (see Sung 1981), in the sense that rights to ownership are limited only to the person who has established it. Nevertheless, at an earlier period, there might be some dispute over ownership in a business that was started with the funds from the natal chia. In the case of Huang Dung-lin (case 1), it was well understood that a portion of the business stock (exactly 1/2) was the property of his nephews. Because Huang Dung-lin had started the business when he had not yet divided from his brother, he had used family funds (no matter how meager), and he ate the food provided through the efforts of his older brother.

But while some people in Hsin Hsing had realized great success, few families were able to accumulate enough resources or to obtain

sufficient access to the commercial and industrial centers of the island to become owners of medium or large-scale capitalist enterprises. Nevertheless, some fathers continued to encourage their sons to take up different occupations. And, if sons chose to remain at home, they could take advantage of the intrafamilial economic, working, and living arrangements offered by a diversified and "modified" (Gallin & Gallin 1982a) type of family economy. In the case where a Hsin Hsing family chose to diversify its economy (as did the Kang's case 12), for example, the family head realized that adjustments had to be made and concessions given so that sons, armed with skills and, in some cases, their own savings, would not be alienated from the family because of too strict a family hierarchy or pressure to remit all profits from their work (see also Hu 1984:119).

Still, what about the fate of the family economy when sons chose to leave the family and seek an education or start a business away from home (see case 7, 9, 11)? First, the estate was not important to migrant sons as a place for starting a business, nor was land as important to them as insurance against possible failure at an off-farm job. This was because a great number of better paying jobs were available to sons in the mid to late 1970s than in the 1950s or 1960s. Thus, there was less likelihood they would return home to farm. In this sense, it appears that land (as a valued asset) may have entered its third and most tenuous phase as inheritable property.

Second, as in the 1960s, migrant sons needed cash to establish themselves in their new urban environment. In contrast to the 1960s, however, the natal chia usually was not as dependent on remittances from migrant sons to survive. As a result, the family economy remained

important to the younger generation as long as something could be extracted from it. I will explain this new development in the next sub-section.

The Need for Cash:

Theoretically, in traditional China, when a father spent money (or even when he didn't) on a son's education or when a son was given seed money to start a business, that son was under some obligation to remit all of his disposable income left over from his earnings at a job or from a business. Remittances from sons enabled the family budget to remain liquid. Liquidity meant investments could be made in new or existing household enterprises, thus, insuring the continued strength of the family economy.

In Hsin Hsing during the late 1970s and early 80s, however, the practice of remitting disposable income to the family budget seems to be happening with less frequency. This is not because sons are less filial. Instead, the family believes that the ideal of maintaining a family economy may be neither practical nor necessary. This is because high living expenses and other costs in the city are making it increasingly difficult for sons to maintain their own families away from home and to remit money to the family. As a result, some sons remit only enough money for their parents to use, thus meeting the responsibility to their parents.

The demand for cash by those sons starting out in life and the necessity of holding on to cash by those sons already established, is "squeezing" the family economy. Increasingly, for some families, a father's income is not enough to provide the necessary financing for

sons who want to continue with school, get married, or start a small enterprise. As a result a father and son can do a number of things to remedy the situation. The first, and perhaps least equitable way of handling the matter of cash distribution to sons, is for a father to give sons whatever is necessary as they grow up. Unfortunately, in a big family, this often leaves younger sons without any financial help when they reach adulthood because the cash that has gone out to sons over the years has not been remitted back into the family budget with equal vigor. As a result of their unregulated expropriation of the family's cash reserves, most older brothers may feel an "obligation"(i-wu) toward their younger siblings and therefore pool their savings or give a loan to finance a younger brother's marriage, education, or enterprise. In case 9, for example, we see that the older brother felt an obligation to his younger sibling; he lent him capital and provided him with business contacts to start his own gasket operation.

Giving away money to sons as soon as they reach adulthood apparently does not always appeal to the family head; this results in another and increasingly popular method of financing sons. In at least three cases (7,9,12), fathers have loaned their sons cash or helped their sons obtain loans instead of offering cash. Kang (case 7) borrowed NT\$45,000 from another villager and used NT\$20,000 of his own savings to finance his second son's motorcycle shop. Kang Ching-kun and Shih Yen-shan also borrowed money so that they could help their sons start a trucking business and an oil gasket business, respectively. All of these loans have to be paid back to the parents.

Most likely, the offering of loans to sons is a response to a number

of economic and social factors. Parents want to help out a son any way they can. But because a large portion of their property may be tied up in land and other fixed assets, they may find it difficult to gain access to the amount of liquid capital needed to help a son start a business. In some of the interviews, parents have also rationalized that giving a loan instead of cash gift to a son builds responsibility.

Finally, we have to assess the nature of family division for this time period. By the mid-1970s (and after) no formal or (de jure) type of family divisions took place in the village. Even when all sons remained at the family residence, working in wage labor or in their own small enterprises, family division served no practical purpose. For the most part, sons were not in need of family property to provide them with a means of production. Instead, most only wanted a place to live and a room or two in the family residence to conduct their work.

In Hsin Hsing today, the question of remaining part of a joint family becomes a relative one, which actually brings us back to the Gallins' concept of a modified joint family (Gallin and Gallin 1982a). Complex families that have modified their social and economic relationships to the point where they no longer really mutually participate in the family economy are, in reality, not complex families at all. Although there has been no formal division of property, brothers, much like their American counterparts, have slowly drifted away from each other. The parents, perhaps living with each son on a rotating basis, form a rotating stem family with each son with whom are living. The only money that may be exchanged between each son's conjugal unit and the rotating stem unit is cash that is to be used by the parents.

Is what we have seen in Hsin Hsing unique? To what degree do data from other areas in Taiwan support the Gallins' findings? In the next section, attention turns to the findings of other social scientists who have studied the family in rural Taiwan. The work of these researchers has provided a wealth of comparative data (some of which is included in the case studies in the Appendix) as well as some insightful observations concerning the relationship between family economy and social organization in Taiwan.

HSIN HSING IN COMPARISON

The Village of Yen-liao, Taiwan:

Myron Cohen, an anthropologist who first went to Taiwan in the mid 1960s, conducted research in the south-western Hakka village of Yen-liao. The majority of the community's 68 families (population of 705 in 1965) were owner cultivators, farming two crops of rice per year and in most cases a crop of tobacco. In contrast to other small agricultural communities in Taiwan, most Yen-liao families are licensed to grow tobacco, a cash crop that provides high returns and is protected "from market fluctuations by the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau, a government agency in total control of tobacco production" and marketing (Cohen 1976:48). Cohen found that "in comparison with other major crops in Yen-liao, tobacco production requires by far the heaviest labor input"(ibid.:48), but "the cash returns for crops comparatively high in value but more demanding in labor will largely be a function of the degree to which the work force is composed of family members" (1976:50).

Cohen contends that the timing of division is not necessarily preset

to occur when a family reaches its complex form (i.e., after sons marry). Instead, family division was often put off especially where "the continuation of family unity was encouraged by situations where the advantages, especially economic, derived from such unity outweighed those forthcoming for the parties concerned in the event of partition"(ibid.:73 emphasis added).

According to Cohen, rich and poor families adopted a number of strategies to avoid division. In the case of wealthier families, a household head might choose to diversify the family economy. Such diversification allowed sons either to remain with the primary chia and operate a business in a semi-autonomous fashion, or to leave the chia residence (to disperse) and operate a business away from home; sons may also pursue an education or become involved in politics, a government job, or academic position (see Cohen 1976:79).

For poor families, in contrast, dispersion of sons away from the chia was often a necessity since there were few opportunities for sons to make a living at home. In many cases children from poor families failed to find enough work and accumulate sufficient cash to send home as remittances (Cohen ibid.:81). But there was always the hope that one day remittances would begin, or that perhaps a successful son might return to invest his accumulated knowledge and wealth back into the family (Cohen 1976:80, Tang 1978:165). Whatever the outcome of a family members sojourn, the chia was distinguished "by the potential of its membership to rejoin the chia economy and household, as well as the possession of an estate" (Cohen 1976:81).

Certainly, in traditional China and, to some degree, in contemporary

Taiwan (see case #5 for Yen-liao and cases 1 and 10 for additional examples in Appendix), sons from wealthier families had little to say about their future occupations because fathers controlled the family purse and property. Nevertheless, as late as the mid 1970s, Cohen found that the chia in Yen-liao "continues to possess a very real social and jural unity even under the conditions of economic and residential fragmentation"(Cohen 1976:113).

In the final analysis, this unity has as its focus the chia estate; adult chia members not directly linked to the estate share with those who are, a deep interest in the joint holdings, for it is important to all of them that the maintenance of the common body of holdings be compatible with their own interests (ibid.:113).

One of the best examples of this unity, is the Huang family (see case #5) of Yen-liao. Although the family is partially dispersed and each son is involved in his own enterprise (the role of the second son as farmer of the family land does not usually constitute a separate enterprise), the Huang group nevertheless functions as a close unit economically, with the profits pooled in a common pot and redistributed where needed.

True, the Huang family's success in diversification into non-agricultural enterprises was due in part to Huang Yu-lai's role as a shrewd manager of both family assets and sons. But Cohen's main point when talking about this family, is to stress the interdependencies in the family economy, such that the family estate can be exploited by father and sons through the investment of capital and labor. The

Huangs, like many complex families, benefit more from the availability of accumulated capital that can be used for investment in preexisting and new enterprises than would otherwise be the case if division had occurred (Harrell 1982).

Ploughshare, Taiwan:

The small village of Ploughshare, located just south of the city of Taipei, was the site for a community study undertaken by Harrell (1982) in 1973 and in 1978. In 1973, mining ranked first as a source of wages for men, with factory work a distant second. The village was relatively agriculturally poor (land was insufficient and of poor quality) and cultivation of rice was at most a sideline occupation for a handful of people. Only a few families owned land and in 1973 a mere 16 men out of a total of 149 of employable age were involved in some kind of agriculture.

By 1978, coal mining gave way to work in small factories. The number of people who owned and operated their own businesses also increased dramatically. Most of these businesses were knitting factories; operations ranged from small (2 to 3 family workers working one knitting machine) to large ones, with several dozen hired workers working ten or more machines. Harrell credits the increase in the amount of factory work for raising the economic standards of the village (by providing wage labor jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities for a community that, before the 1970s, was quite poor by Taiwan standards).

Harrell (1982) found Cohen's observations about family economy and organization particularly relevant to Ploughshare. According to him, Cohen has demonstrated that family members will remain together longer

"when there is clear economic advantage for them to do so" (1982:153). But Harrell also adds that there is another side to this "model", that is families will divide sooner if it is to their economic advantage. Like Cohen, Harrell argues that brothers who remain together until the joint stage do so because they are all engaged in a common enterprise(s) that required capital investment; those families without a shared economic enterprise, would divide almost as soon as possible (ibid.:159).

To support his argument, Harrell contrasts the Cui (case 3) and Ong families (case 4). He predicts the Cui family (which consists of wage earners) will not last to the joint stage because none of its members is investing in the family economy. The Ongs, in contrast, are an entrepreneurial family that operates a knitting factory in which most family members are involved and all profits are invested in the family enterprise.

An important point made here (discussed in more detail in chapter III), is Harrell's analysis of the joint family that has little shared enterprise or investment. In two of the examples he gives of families that divided, both did so because of the divisive forces of migration. He says that because these families did not change from being a group of wage-earners to a group of capital investors, brothers left the village in search of work, never to become active in family affairs again (ibid.:161).

In both cases, economic opportunities elsewhere precluded brothers from remaining together as joint families. Neither of these was a case of absolute necessity or possible starvation, for there were always

jobs available in the coal mines and on the pushcart railways when the brothers were growing up, and it would have been perfectly feasible for them all to take such jobs, remain in the village, and form joint families. But the point is that there was no particular advantage in their staying (ibid.:162).

Thus, according to Harrell, when applying a model of economic advantage "to family organization in any particular community, we must consider the specific types of family economy found there, together with the pressures for early or late division that the economy can produce"(1982:154). There is

basically no difference between agriculture, commerce, and industry. The difference, rather, is between complex joint family, and those other types of economy, such as tobacco growing (Cohen 1969,165-ff), sweater knitting, or a whole range of economically diversified types, in which there is clear benefit in staying together(ibid.:170).

There is an "interrelationship between family organization and work" (ibid.:154) that, in the final analysis, reveals that brothers who remain members of their families to the joint stage, do so primarily because they are involved in "an enterprise that requires investment of capital" (ibid.:159). 5

HOW IMPORTANT IS FAMILY ECONOMY AS A FACTOR IN FAMILIAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION?

Cohen and Harrell's economic dialectic is very insightful. Yet, what are the other explanations of why families organize as they do? What are

some of the non-economic factors which account for the presence or absence of family division?

Sung (1981), claims that family organization is affected more by how and by whom a family obtains property rather than the composition of the family economy. Inherited property is corporately owned by the descent line "whose membership extends to deceased ancestors and future agnatic descendants" (Sung 1981:365). The family head, theoretically acts only as the trustee of the property and not as the owner. For example, if a father inherits land that has been in his family for a number of generations, that land belongs to the descent group (i.e., all males before and after him) and, therefore, the father is obligated to distribute the property evenly at the time of division.

(ibid.:366). This acquired property, or what was referred to as far back as the Sung dynasty as "individual property," (Ebrey 1984:104) contrasts with common or inherited property in that it is distributed to heirs with "reference to effort rather than geneology" (Sung 1981:367). As a result, very few or none of the rules that govern the transmission of inheritable property apply to the transmission of acquired property.

Oddly enough, Sung feels that among families with more acquired property (as opposed to inherited property), there is a greater likelihood of friction between family members which, may in turn, lead to an early division. He says, "brothers are less likely to quarrel if they are guaranteed equal shares by descent and do not need to negotiate the division of property acquired through joint but not necessarily equal efforts" (1981:377).

If, however, it is the family head who has managed to accumulate most of the property for an estate as, for example, Hwang Dung-lin had

done, would not this fact bring him greater authority and therefore greater control over the family? Would not sons feel it is in their best interests to cooperate with each other so as not to anger the family head and possibly jeopardize their share of the estate? It would appear, that acquired property might cause the greatest tensions when fathers and sons have collectively contributed to the acquisition of that property, thus both helping to build the family estate and budget. In such a case, the father's authority over his sons may be undermined because each son was an active participant in gaining family wealth, and would in turn be more vocal about whom and in what quantity property should be divided. Similarly, the father's authority is greatly reduced in cases where sons are working at off-farm jobs, and are no longer dependent upon the father as chief provider of an occupation; this is especially so when the land, formally the most common form of inheritable property, becomes less important to sons.

The question of acquired and inherited property is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the fact that social relationships within the family are greatly influenced by the kind of property acquired and by whom. I believe that in Cohen's and Harrell's research, not enough emphasis was given to this question. As a result, we are forced to accept the ever popular, but increasingly less plausible notion that all property, regardless of the way in which it was accumulated, is inherited through prescribed rites of family division.

Another view on the matter is that of Tang (1978), a Chinese sociologist in Taiwan, who has found that parental legal authority functions to inhibit partition of the joint family. In his studies he

found that fen-chia was usually prolonged because several fang (each married son's conjugal unit within the extended family) may have already been living separately, so that "the domestic conflict which stems from having a common residence does not have to be resolved by such a final division" (1978:137). These fang which, for the most part, have separate budgets, (although they "may continue to share in the estate of the chia"(ibid.:137)), leave the impression of being autonomous units. In reality, however, these fang represented what he called "pseudo smallness," whereby the "older generation aims at ensuring the continuation of amenities by retaining control over the economic resources of the family"(ibid.:138). This, he maintains, can be done because of the parent's legal authority over estate property (parents often provide the housing for their children as well as small businesses that were started by them), thus preventing division until the parents see fit (ibid.:154,160).

In illustrating his point about parental legal authority, Tang uses the case of Hwang Dunglin (case #1) and the troubles he encountered in maintaining a joint family in the face of increasing pressure from his nephew to divide. Although Dunglin was for years the family head and had made the family rich through his efforts, he had no more rights over his nephew's share of the estate (which included the family business) than he would otherwise have had if his brother was still alive. His lack of legal authority prevented him from stemming the breakup of the family, and his nephew well knew (and took advantage of the fact) that Dunglin could not lay claim to any more than half the shares of the family business. Tang writes that although "the presence of family resources may serve to induce the sons to remain with the chia as a

matter of self interest," it is actually the "power of the parents, reinforced by the state, which can actually deter them from dividing" (1978:148).

Essentially, Tang questions whether sons do have such far reaching rights over family property as is commonly believed by researchers. Pointing to the legal codes in the Republic of China as of the 1970s, Tang found that the state does not recognize "a joint trust in which the heirs have an inviolable equitable share so long as the parental members of the family survive" (ibid.:151).

Tang believes that for most families on Taiwan, the level of economic security of the chia depends on its structure. Families strive to "utilize whatever resources are available in order to increase the margin of economic security"(ibid.:91). Families can "utilize marginal employability of individuals for which there would be little or no demand in a competitive labor market, and for whom basic wage minimums would have to be met if nonfamily personnel were used" (ibid.:98). As a result, he points out that family property, such as buildings, are frequently used not only to house family members but also to provide sons and their family's with a place for business. Some family members, fully aware of their weak position in the labor market often have no choice but to remain at home and take part in the family economy.

In the next chapter, I present an analysis of selected families in Hsin Hsing by employing many of the ideas presented above. My analysis pays close attention to the relationship between family economy and family division as they often appear in different occupational contexts. In analyzing the linkages of both of these elements, I

believe it is easier to understand the response of families when their mode of production shifts from agriculture to that of off-farm work.

Notes

1 I would like to point out in this section that many of the views presented are in a sense extensions and/or modifications of those sinologists who preceeded them and wrote about "traditional" China on the mainland. At the time, Taiwan of the 1950s and 1960s was very similar to the mainland during the preceeding several decades. In addition, those anthropologists who did not and could not work on the mainland, had little choice but to draw upon the observations and work of the earlier China scholars to better understand social behavior in Taiwan. To date, this situation seems to have inhibited any radical departure from the old school's thinking about the nature of Chinese society, even when applied to Taiwan.

2 One chia equals 2.4 acres.

3 Unfortunately I have little in the way of evidence for this assertion. Sons would understandably be reluctant to admit that they no longer want to contribute money to the family. Nevertheless, the possibly exists that this may have been one reason for wanting division.

4 In his research of urban migrants in Tainan, Parish found that only about 5% of the respondents (as opposed to 80% in rural areas) inherited their occupation from their fathers. Thus, "persons who have migrated to the city, even more than other city dwellers, tend either to have had nothing to inherit, or have given up the opportunity to inherit their father's land, store, local clientel" (1978:303). If anything, what these findings might illustrate is the probable lack of family businesses and lack of farm land available to sons. Instead, conscious of the fact that there was little economic opportunity to keep them in the villages, young men went to the city to find employment on their

own.

5 Cook (1984b:22) has found that larger families in Oaxaca, Mexico bring more material advantages than disadvantages in labor intensive regions.

THE FAMILY ECONOMY FAMILY DIVISION NEXUS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter I present a more detailed analysis of family estate and family budget as they might appear in varying economic contexts. By making an analysis of this kind, the changes in the relationship between family economic organization and the nature of family division become more apparent.

We have to remember that the rapid changes that have taken place in rural Taiwan tend to blur many of the "ideal" images that we may have of Chinese families. And, because families are always changing in composition it is very difficult to categorize and label them. For better or for worse, I have disregarded my better judgement and gone ahead and organized three possible variations of family economy. My way of organizing is not meant to be definitive or comprehensive, rather, it is intended to offer some kind of framework from which we can get a better idea of how various economies are organized and function given the variations in the nature of work. With that done, I then integrate my findings concerning the nature of family division found in the presence of each economic type. With both these elements side by side, we perhaps can get a better idea of what kind of relationship exists between the two.

Again, all this chapter attempts to do is show that family economy is complex and demands more attention from scholars who write about the socio-economic relationships of the family. Basically as an example of this complexity, I want to draw attention to the fact that there may be

a definite relationship between family economy and family division (or the lack of it), and that some of the criteria that scholars have used in explaining this relationship may no longer provide an adequate explanation of how or why families change in contemporary Taiwan.

A GUIDE TO THE CASE STUDIES LISTED IN THE APPENDIX

I have prepared a listing of family members from the cases considered in this paper and listed in the appendix (see figure 3.1), to help the reader better visualize the occupational makeup of each group. In the first column (1), if we look at only the Hsin Hsing families, we find salaried positions are not held by very many individuals. This is probably because few such positions exist in Hsin Hsing village itself, and because such positions when outside the village, require the most education and the ability to pass government or company examinations. With the exception of the present younger generation in the village, educational possibilities past high school had been out of the question because of the expense of an education and because, at an earlier time, sons were needed to supplement the income of a family. Whether or not people with higher educations are found more frequently in complex families cannot be determined here; yet I would suspect that in some cases the parents in larger families might have the resources to direct a promising child toward a higher education at the expense of his less fortunate brothers and sisters who would have to support him (see Case 1, 5, and for Hsin Hsing Case 12).

In column two (2), wage workers in families are primarily unmarried sons, or unmarried daughters and wives, working in either small village factories or larger factories within commuting distance. As many of the

FAMILY CASE	SALARIED	WAGE	ENTREPRENEURS	ENTREPRENEURS	FARMING	ENTERPRISE					
NAME	#	J	1	f	2	TW/O W.LABOR 3	FW/W.LABOR 4	L	5	ITYPES	6
Hwang	J	#1	f	f			TH1N2S3SS	2	TH2N2S3S	TRice+Fish	
CUI	J	#3	f	f	TH12456S	f1SW				TKnitting	
ONG	J	#4	f	f			TH12S1DW1SW	\$		Tweaving Co.	
HUANG	J	#5	f	f		f3S4S			f2S	Tbrick,Trucking	
LI,	C	#6	f	f			THWDS	4	THWp	TSpring Co.	
K'ANG	C	#7	f	f	TH1S2D	f2S3S			THp	TMotcy.Repair	
SHIH	S	#9	f	f			f1S1SW	100	THf	TOil Seal	
SHEN	J	#10	f	f		f1S2S4S	TH3SS		TH3Sp	TR.Mill,Drug Wh.	
										TFrogs	
HUANG	J	#11	f	f		f1S1SW 234SS			THp	TTradCo.IronBar	
K'ANG	J	#12	f	f		f2S3S4S2SW3SW	f1SW	6	THp	TSewing, Electr.	
										TTrucking, Motor cy.	
										TPigs, Peas, Chickens.	

Key:

*=army
 p=part time
 f=full time
 N=nephew
 L=# of laborers
 \$=family business

1S=eldest son
 2D=sec. eldest daughter
 H=household head
 W=head's wife
 1SW=eldest son's wife

owned or operated by more than one family member

Sources: Case Studies Listed in appendix

#1 (Lin 1948), #3,4 (Harrell 1982), #5 (Cohen 1976), #6 and below (Gallin & Gallin: field interviews 1979, 1982)

Figure 3.1
OCCUPATIONS OF FAMILY MEMBERS IN TAIWAN AND CHINA:
A GUIDE TO CASES LISTED IN THE APPENDIX

cases indicate, unmarried sons often work in factories or apprentice for a trade before being drafted for their required two years of military duty. Following the service, many continue to build on their skills and save enough money so they can start their own small enterprises and marry (Stites 1982:141-146; notes that few men continue to be factory workers unless they are in a special foreman position). In practice, a married woman's earnings would be used only by her family unit (husband's fang if living in a stem or joint arrangement); but if the entire family is experiencing financial difficulties, the disposition of her earnings is more in question. As a result, a woman who is able to work will make additions to her private money (ssu-fang chian or sai-khia in Taiwanese)¹ drawing from it whenever she or her fang need money for investments, clothes, and sundries (R. Gallin 1985:83). In 1979, this stood in contrast to the earnings of husbands who, as members of families with a common budget and sharing a common residence, were required to contribute a portion of their earnings to the joint family for living expenses, ritual and ceremonies, and maintenance.

The third and fourth columns (3) (4), that of family enterprises with and without wage labor respectively, are perhaps the most important categories to this study and unfortunately, often the most difficult to document. Unlike the single family type of enterprise controlled by Huang Dung-lin (case 1), many of the small businesses in the Taiwan of today are not as well delineated as to who owns or manages or even works in those enterprises. This is mainly because many complex families have highly diversified economies and residentially dispersed groups, so that many of the sons operate businesses in a semi-autonomous fashion, while still belonging to undivided family units.

FAMILY ECONOMY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO FAMILY DIVISION:THREE POSSIBLE TYPES

A quick look at the families in figure 3.1 actually reveals very little about the organization of rural families in Taiwan. These families can be either closely bound economically or they may share only the slightest amount of economic contact. For some families, sons may remain highly involved in the economic affairs of the family and the fathers may dominate and manage family members as though they were his employees in business. In other families, sons may rarely participate in the family economy once they have reached adulthood and fathers may never have to do more than decide when a daughter should marry. Likewise, in some families, individuals may decide to divide from each other as soon as each son is married, while in others, sons may never even consider family division a relevant issue.

What accounts for this wide variation in family structure and function? Cohen (1976) and Harrell (1982) point to the "economic" factors motivating family unity. Essentially, they feel that sons weigh the costs and benefits of remaining involved in the family economy before reaching a decision on whether to divide. Tang (1978) and Sung (1981) on the other hand, tend to stress the "cultural and political" factors responsible for familial social organization.

In this chapter, my own approach to the family may also seem decidedly economic to the reader. Yet, by examining the nature of family economy in varying economic contexts (such as agriculture, business, etc.), I hope to be able show in greater detail the relationship between the changes in Taiwan's local economy and family

economy as well as the relationship between changes in family economy and family structure (as indicated by the changes that occur in family division).

If you recall, my short definition of family economy in chapter one mentions the existence of a family budget (which includes the cash savings liquid assets of a family) and a family estate (a family's fixed assets). I also said that depending upon the nature of the occupations of family members, both budget and estate may vary in the way they are used by family members. In addition to this it is necessary to mention at least three other factors to be taken into consideration so as to better understand the nature of family economy. First, an individual's occupation does not always remain the same throughout life, nor do members of a family always share the same kinds of work. Second, people must be responsive to the economy (local, regional, national, and global). What this means is that the family budget and estate frequently fluctuate; changing as a result of design or circumstances. For example, the family budget and estate for any one chia changes when family members enter into a new occupation, change occupations, accumulate or spend cash, and buy or sell land or a business. Third, family income and expenditures (family wealth) vary in accordance with the family life cycle. Conjugal families, for example, are less able to earn and save money because of the smaller number of productive adults and the larger number of young children. A large portion of the family income has to be used for consumption needs leaving little for savings. Stem and joint families, on the other hand, usually benefit from having a proportionately larger number of workers, enabling the family to accumulate capital and make investments. As a result, more complex

families have been able to accumulate more property and start their own businesses than those families which are just in the formative stages of the family life cycle.

In figure 3.2, I have layed out the particular nature of, and relationship between, the family estate and budget within a broad occupational context. I have then designated two general categories of family economy (1.Estate-Based and 2. Budget-Based) under which fall three subtypes ("farm-based economies;" "business-based economies;" and "diversified economies"). I have settled on these two categories, primarily because they mirror the importance of the estate and budget for the three subtypes. This is not to say, however, that estate-based family economies (EBFEs) lack a budget or that budget-based family economies (BBFEs) lack an estate (this I will explain below).

Having discussed the relationship between the budget and estate, I then talk about their relationship to family division for each economic category. I discuss whether family division is likely to occur on a formal level ("de jure") or whether division is more likely to happen informally over the life cycle of the family or be ignored all together ("de facto").²

1.ESTATE-BASED FAMILY ECONOMY:EBFEs

Generally, family economies which are estate-based display a specific economic and organizational character. In EBFEs, the estate forms the primary means of livelihood (or production) for most if not all family members.³ Family members also function as a collective and coordinated labor unit working the family estate and the estate, in turn, provides an income, and in many cases, future employment for the

1. ESTATE-BASED FAMILY ECONOMY

Farm-Based Economies:

E^I Estate (land for farming) is important for production and is easily partitioned.

B^i Budget (liquid assets) serves the major purpose of pooling income for the payment of expenses, but is not important for investment in the estate.

D^E Division is de jure and usually occurs earlier in the family cycle.

Business-Based Economies:

E^I Estate (the family operated business) is important for production and other commercial activity but is not easily partitioned.

B^I Budget important for investment in estate and for the maintenance of the family business.

D^L Division is de jure and usually occurs later in the family cycle.

2. BUDGET-BASED FAMILY ECONOMY

Diversified Family Economies:

E^i Estate may be important as a place for entrepreneurial activity; it exists on a unitized level and is easily partitioned.

B^I Budget is important and is sometimes used for investment in the family estate.

d^E Division is de facto and usually occurs earlier in the family cycle.

E= Family Estate

B= Family Budget

I= Higher level of importance

i= lower level of importance

D= de jure division

d= de facto "

E= early division

L= late division

Figure 3.2
THREE POSSIBLE VARIATIONS OF FAMILY ECONOMY
IN HSIN HSING TAIWAN: 1950-1980

younger generation. Because of the nature of their work and common living arrangements, the family must have a manager/boss (a chia chang/lau ban) or one person who organizes the family workforce and makes the important business decisions in the family.

Farm-based families:

Whenever alternate means of earning a livelihood are scarce, the dependence upon land for an income (subsistence) in agriculturally-based families has, in part, helped to create a rigid hierarchy of patriarchal authority. Because the senior male in the family manages the family estate (land), he also manages and controls those who depend upon land (i.e., family members). This family head (chia chang) not only delegates work to family members but he also strictly controls the family budget. Since family members are usually not paid a "salary," individuals may have to approach the chia chang and ask not only for approval to purchase commodities but also for the cash with which to do it.

Although the budget is controlled by the family head, the amount of cash or liquid assets (accumulated assets can also be in kind, rice, wheat, etc.) held are usually not large. As a result, the budget often holds barely enough to pay for taxes, festivals, living expenses, and the purchase of basic commodities. Those families able to accumulate extra cash might invest in land or a small business; such upward mobility would often launch the family into another category of family economy (i.e. business-based, diversified, etc.).

The farm-based economy is almost always associated with the kind of economic conditions that existed for most rural families in "traditional China." Similarly, for many Taiwanese families in the 1950s and early 1960s, farming continued to provide the majority of income for extended households. Even today, we can find that within some families, the same kinds of traditional economic and social relationships persist especially where sons are directed into farming by their fathers while other sons are encouraged to take off-farm occupations. The sons involved in agriculture, however, rarely enjoy the same kind of economic freedom as their siblings who are not farmers.

The second son of Huang Yu-lai (case 5) and the third son of Shen Huo-yen (case 10), for example, were the only married sons in these two families to become farmers while their brothers, some of whom also lived at home, were involved in off-farm work. Unlike their brothers, however, the farming sons shared an intimate working and economic relationship with their fathers (the chia chang) who were also farmers. As was frequently the case in traditional farm families on the mainland, the father (as head of the "farm" economy) did not give his farming sons a salary or even pocket money for such mundane things as cigarettes. Their siblings on the other hand, not having gone into farming did not have their fathers interfering in their work nor did their fathers necessarily demand every cent they earned. Instead, at the very least, fathers would allow sons involved in off-farm work to keep enough of their earnings so that they could purchase medicine, clothing, and other small items for their own conjugal units.

What are the implications for family division in the presence of a

farm-based economy? On a general level, where there was a lack of job opportunities in off-farm work (as in certain areas of traditional China and Taiwan in the 1950s), agricultural production on the family farm provided the main means of livelihood for the family. This dependence upon the family land (estate) as a provider of income and a occupation for sons once they reached adulthood, necessitated that some kind of equitable and jural division of property be enacted when the family decided to separate. Even where a family may have developed well into the the joint stage, sons would inevitably split, and that separation would require the careful accounting procedures and property distribution that a formal family division would provide. Since the estate could be easily partitioned, the family does not hesitate to call in an outside arbitor who would settle debts, and make a legal and, usually binding division of the family property (e.g., land, rooms in a farming compound, tools, and, of course, eating arrangements). Because of this type of division, I have given it the label "early de jure".⁴

If this kind of division were more likely to happen in traditional China or in the Taiwan of the 1950s and 1960s, what about division in families that continue to be farm-based today? Unfortunately, there are few examples of extended farm-based families where more than one son continued in farming. I would expect that if there were such cases, then a de jure type of family division might continue to be important. But, for those other families that are partially farm-based (families with two-tiered economies) or where sons have already left the chia (such as the Huang's (case 5) or the Shen's (case 10), I doubt that division would be so important to sons, especially where most of them are already involved in their own off-farm jobs. In cases such as

these, the father has essentially left the farm or even a small business to one son, and since most farms are small and not terribly lucrative, I doubt there would be any objections from the other brothers who have other means of livelihood (unfortunately the limited available data from Hsin Hsing do not provide enough information on this issue).

Business-based family economies:

What distinguishes this second subtype from the farm-based economy above is the that a single primary off-farm business (there can also be secondary businesses linked with the primary one) provides the majority of income for the family (see case 1 and 4). But, as with many farm-based groups, business-based families are also operated as financial units with family managers (usually the family head), who assign tasks to family members and who control the family budget.

Business-based family economies are usually started by the family head and often grow large enough to: 1) absorb most if not all of the family labor, 2) offer sons the opportunity of an occupation that can support their own conjugal families after they are married, 3) discourage sons from seeking off-farm work elsewhere because other types of off-farm work would not bring such high returns, 4) employ a number of wage laborers. The business usually requires keen management skills as well as knowledge about specialized equipment; unlike an estate composed primarily of farm land, the business estate may be made up of business stock (e.g. toilet paper, paper towels, wine, watches, video cassetts, washing machines), and/or machinery (e.g. arc welders, mechanics tools, lathes, metal stampers, ohmmeters). Consequently, such an estate is a much more complicated operation to own, run, and divide.

In families in which members share a residence as well as work, the budget is organized to handle the usual domestic (household) expenses; in this regard, the budget differs little in the way it is put to use in agricultural families. But, unlike agriculturally-dominated family economies, the family budget also serves to accumulate cash savings to be used for investment in the family estate. Accumulated cash is primarily used to purchase more land, reinvest in the family enterprise, in other off-farm businesses, or in a son's education. Even for those sons living away from home and earning money, all disposable income earned, is to be remitted to the family; after all, sons are investing in the family enterprise and expect to get their share of the family estate at the time of division. Suffice it to say, when a family's budget becomes something more than just a means of holding money for consumption needs and becomes an important means of producing more wealth through the investment of liquid assets, then, the family budget itself may become as valued as the estate as a means of capital acquisition.

What about family division in business-based families? In families that are dependent upon a primary business for their income, family division may not be such a clear-cut or uncomplicated matter. For one thing, because the family has a single major enterprise that supports most, if not all, family members, there may not be an easy way to divide the estate without destroying the enterprise itself. Wong (1985:65) believes that usually family enterprises of this sort are the creations of self-made entrepreneurs coming from the less complex family type (i.e., heads of their own conjugal households). He says, gradually, the

young successful businessman builds his business and family to become a father-entrepreneur; such a man, Wong continues, has total authority over his enterprise and is unhindered by relatives (since it was he who started his enterprise after separating from his natal chia). After the sons have reached maturity, and "after the father-entrepreneur has relinquished control, the centralized family firm enters the third phase of its evolution and gradually becomes segmented"(1985:64).

Wong points out, however, that the move toward segmentation is dependent upon "what is being divided - whether it is the chia estate itself, the profits that it yields, or the responsibility for managing it" (1985:64). Sons who are active in, and dependent on, the family firm for a livelihood would probably resist the division of the family and (business) for fear of losing valuable business capital.⁵ Wong states,

Industrial and commercial assets are usually in the form of integrated entities that would cease to function once split. Even where subdivision is feasible, efficiency and productivity will suffer as a result because of an economy of scale is often involved (1985:65).

Essentially, it is Wong's belief that control over the estate lies primarily with the family head. Unlike most farm land, business property in this context is often acquired by the chia chang (see Sung 1981), giving him more control over the sons. Firmer control over the estate, coupled with the fact that sons might be less anxious to divide business assets, leads to a situation not conducive to early family division, or, in fact, any kind of family division as drastic as that

for agricultural families. Nevertheless, the stakes are too high for most sons not to want to distribute the family assets at some point (most likely after the fathers death), making a late "de jure" type of division inevitable.

2.BUDGET BASED FAMILY ECONOMY:BBFEs:

Contrary to the label applied to this category, many BBFEs do have an estate of some sort. Many families have assets in land and land may provide some income for the family. Nevertheless, the income generated from farming is usually secondary to income generated by off-farm work (in the form of home-based businesses or income from wage labor). As a result, the estate may become more important for its farm buildings and residences because it can provide a place for entrepreneurs in the family to do business.

What then is the difference between BBFEs and Business-based family economies? In BBFEs, there is the absence of a primary productive unit for which most family members labor. Sons in the family, often with the help of the older generation, use whatever they can salvage from the estate to establish for themselves a small business. In this sense, the entrepreneur creates his own occupation (means of production) where there had been none before; he does not rely on the family estate to provide him with an occupation as might be the case in farm-based or business-based family economies.⁶

Without a doubt, the value of an estate as a place for doing business is important for those just starting out in business or for those who simply wish to keep their living expenses at a minimum. Nevertheless, having access to and sharing a common budget may be a

more compelling reason for sons to remain together as part of a family economy. Unlike the estate the budget has no physical boundaries. It can be used by those who wish to remain at the family residence or those who choose to work and live elsewhere. Accumulated capital held in the budget is particularly useful in a industrializing capitalistic economy because it can be used to finance the many activities and occupations which necessitate the use of cash. Having cash or access to a source of cash in Taiwan's increasingly capitalist economy, provides a greater chance of upward mobility than having access to a farm estate.

Diversified family economies:

In the literature available to us, sinologists frequently talk about the diversified family economy in both traditional and contemporary contexts. From Cohen's writings (1976) in the village of Yen-liao in the mid and late 1960s, we get a good idea of what a diversified family must have been like in traditional China and in Taiwan of the 1950s and 1960s.

Cohen mentions that among wealthier families, the family head would often decide to diversify the family economy rather than concentrate his family's productive effort on only one business (as in a business-based family economy). Such a strategy would entail directing sons into different occupations which could be based either at home or in a nearby town or city. As a result, occupational decisions made by Yen-liao fathers on behalf of their sons often have

crucial bearing on the chia group's subsequent residential and economic arrangements. Many of these decisions concern the son's education, which in some

cases can be terminated because of his father's poverty or need for labor; in others the education can be managed so that his future employment will be assured, while at the same time family expenditures will be minimized (1976:99).

In the case of Huang Yu-lai's family (case 5), the eldest son was encouraged to continue school, with his tuition paid with funds from the family budget (the second son was directed to help his father with the farming in order to help the family meet their expenses). Huang's third son, after having failed his exams, was eventually given a new brick factory to run. The fourth son, also acting as family manager of sorts, was put in control of a small transport company.

In this particular case (5), the family started off with very little in the way of an estate that was particularly useful for business. Instead, whatever estate existed served most importantly to provide the initial means of obtaining the necessary capital from which to invest in the first son's education. Once the son became established in his government job, his salary was then put back into the family budget and invested in small enterprises for the next son. With the added profits from each additional enterprise, the budget was again used to invest in an enterprise for the remaining sons, establishing, if you will, a small estate for each son to own, operate and provide occupational security when they become older and have families.

Cohen points out, that even those sons who lived away from the chia residence (here we should stress any male family member), would, in the long run, serve to spread a family's assets and reduce financial risks, and frequently functioned to build a political power base for the chia

(Cohen 1976:78-80). The linkage between the dispersed family member and the chia was maintained, in part, because all family members were required to remain in close economic and social contact with the natal family. For most, there was also the stipulation that all surpluses from wages or profits from a business or wage must be remitted to the family head (chia chang), and that no one individual would make an important business decision without first consulting with other members.⁷

TIME/PLACE VARIATION AND ITS AFFECT ON DIVERSIFIED ECONOMIES

Located near one of the largest manufacturing and marketing zones in the island (Kao-hsiung/Ping-tung region), individuals in Yen-liao were able to open small-scale businesses (many of them satellite factories and shops) at home while others could commute to wage labor jobs in nearby factories. As a result, there was rarely any need for individuals to leave their natal chia to find work. Instead, the family could remain as a residential unit sharing living expenses, labor, and the profits that they made. Basically, it made good sense for sons to remain together in an economic unit and it made very little sense for them to divide and try to make a living independent of the chia.

In Hsin Hsing of the 1960s, the Gallins had also found that many of the diversified families organized their economic lives in a manner similar to diversified families in Yen-liao. But, as mentioned in chapter II, a lack of off-farm employment opportunities in the village forced most Hsin Hsing family members to leave the village to find work. As already mentioned, demands for remittances on the part of the

natal chia forced many migrants to live on the margin of poverty.

For most migrants who remained part of a diversified family there was the added problem of not being able to see a likely return on their "investment" in the chia economy for some time to come. As a result, many of these migrants continued to favor division because that would mean an end to their obligation of having to remit funds back to the family budget (remittances would continue however to cover the expenses of the parents).

By the mid 1970s however, the Gallins noticed that more employment opportunities in the village marketing area lured migrants back from the city as well as encouraged sons just reaching adulthood to remain at home and work (see case 12). The Gallins also found that many diversified families had "modified" their social and economic organization (1982a). They noted that there was rarely the requirement that family members remit all of their disposable income to the family budget. This greater flexibility in budgeting removed the obligation to contribute one's disposable income to the family budget and therefore helped to eliminate one of the primary reasons for family division.

THE AFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND PROPERTY ACQUISITION ON FAMILY DIVISION

Generally speaking, the senior generation in a family has always wanted to remain in control of a family's economic activities. This not only ensures greater prestige in the eyes of their peers but it also helps to ensure that parents will have a greater say in what is done with them in their old age. Diversification of the family economy can,

however, create problems for the older generation because it removes the younger generation from a dependence upon the estate for a livelihood.

8

As a result, some parents in Hsin Hsing in the 1970s used their control over the family budget as a means of maintaining that control. By offering sons money to start an education or to establish a business, sons are obligated to show deference to their parents. Parents have also been known to use money from the family budget to purchase a residence in the city where their migrant children work. The children unwilling to pass up free rent, go and live in the residence bought by the parents (see case 7 and Tang 1978). By purchasing property which is useful to migrant sons, the parents can retain some authority in the family.

On the whole, however, it appears that the authority of the parents is greatest when their children are just starting out in their professions. They can provide them with a place to do business if they remain at home and they can provide cash or help them obtain loans when they need financing for an education or business. But once sons begin earning their own income, however, parental authority may begin to decline. Even when sons live at home and operate a home based-business, there is no guarantee that they will stay once they manage to accumulate enough money to live on their own. In case 12 for example, Kang's third son took his wife, children and electrical business away from the natal chia after he had become quite successful. This was done, I believe, primarily because the business in Hsin Hsing was limited and he could function quite easily on his own without having to share living expenses with other family members.

Is there any confusion over property rights when a entrepreneur in a diversified family economy creates his own business enterprise? As far as I know, property created through entrepreneurial effort is considered acquired property (see Sung 1981). In other words, no one in a family has a claim to property acquired or created by someone else in the family. Even in cases where the family has helped a son establish a business (cases 5, 7, 9, 11, 12), there does not appear to be any great worry over who will get what part of the estate; basically, what you've earned, managed, or built is what you get. If a son has met with little or no success in business, then that does not mean that we will be given a share of another sons operation. Instead, that son is more likely to be helped out by his siblings who might offer a loan to get started again in some other kind of work.

In sum, what happens to family division in a diversified economy? By the 1970s, family division for such families seems to have been considered too bothersome and complicated (ma fan) for anyone to want to go through. Because the family estate has generally lost much of its value for sons and because of changes in the budgeting arrangements, most individuals feel there is little to be gained by going through the process of a formal division.⁸ We have to remember, that for family members in Hsin Hsing (many of whom are eager to leave the village in search of work elsewhere), cash has become one of the most important things one can inherit. But, because sons usually need cash as soon as they reach adulthood, family money is given out gradually. By the time all sons are provided for, there is usually little or no cash left in the family coffer making division of liquid assets unnecessary. It is primarily for these reasons, I have labeled division for this economic

subtype as "de facto."

In concluding this section, the reader should remember a number of important things about the technique of labeling and categorizing used here. First of all, the three types of family economy mentioned are not meant to characterize every type of family economy. Secondly, while some families seem to share characteristics of one type of family economy as well as the characteristics of another, we should not dismiss them as deviant types or attempt to fit them into a single category where they do not belong. It is the nature of family economies to change and to adapt to their own constraints and demands, as well as the constraints and demands imposed from the economic world exterior to them.

DISCUSSION

The data collected by the Gallins in Hsin Hsing in the last thirty years tend to be supported by many of the observations of Cohen. Harrell, Tang and others (Sung 1981, Hu 1984, Freedman 1958) presented in chapter II. Cohen was one of the first to illustrate the important connections between changes in the economy and changes in family social organization. It is Cohen's belief, relates another anthropologist, that the perpetuation of the complex family

depends on whether inclinations to separate are overridden by the economic disadvantages of partition. Family division would be particularly disadvantageous where the family estate consists of separate enterprises managed by specialists. Only when families remain an economic unit can capital and labor be shifted easily and economically (Pasternak 1981:153).

I would hesitate to say, however, whether Cohen would go so far as Harrell and embody his views under the rubric of an "economic model" (Harrell 1982: 154), where family organization is dictated primarily by economic constraints. Harrell's "cost-benefit" rational, I believe, tends to trivialize family relationships. His insistence on making investment the critical factor in determining whether or not families continue to remain together after the joint stage seems to ignore the point so well illustrated by the Gallins: that the family has over time modified its social and economic organization thereby allowing family members to stay within, and take advantage of, familial social and economic networks and support systems without having to "invest" all

fruits of their labor in the family economy.

Closely tied to this idea of shared investment is the question of family division. Harrell (1982) believes that in the absence of capital investment or family-run enterprises, there is little reason for the family to stay together; therefore they would divide. Certainly in Hsin Hsing of the 1950s and 1960s, the absence of a strong family economy and the pressure from the natal chia for remittances from migrants worked against family unity. In the 1970s, however, few family divisions took place in the village, but not necessarily because of shared capital investments or because there was a family enterprise at stake.

Because of the changes in the nature of family economy in the 1970s, there is little evidence that sons had much of a vested interest in the economic activity of their natal families. Few families had investments large enough to warrant any interest on the part of sons. Even in the case where a brother managed to build up an enterprise (such as the gasket business case 9), other family members (of his generation) hold no rights over that property. Today, when sons start businesses with family financing, the estate (the business) they create is considered acquired and not inherited property (Sung 1981). It is only when a father has built a business of his own (as with a business-based family economy), that sons might feel they have some kind of vested interest in the family economy, and would therefore choose to remain part of the family economy.

Suffice it to say, the increase in off-farm work has led to dramatic changes in the family economy in Hsin Hsing. These changes in family economy, have in turn, resulted in changes in the nature of family division .

Briefly, the data indicate that when family members are dependent

upon the family estate for an income as with a farm or family-owned business, the estate remains important as inheritable property. And, because the estate is valued by heirs, the estate will have to be divided at some point in the family life cycle, making the jural process of family division inevitable.

But, where farming is the most important mode of production for the family, family division may be much simpler to execute and may occur earlier than when dividing a business. The reason for this lies in the fact that: a) a single family business often cannot continue to function when its labor, management and budget are fragmented, and b) a father who has built up a business through his own effort usually enjoys greater authority over family members and can easily delay the division of the family property for as long as he wishes. Farm land, on the other hand, is much more malleable than a family business and can be put to productive use even after it is divided among heirs.⁹

Division of land in farm families may also occur at an earlier period in the family life cycle. Unlike business property, land is often passed down from generation to generation (all males are coparceners of land). As a result, parents often act as only the trustees of the family land and not necessarily as the owners of land. This particular status, in turn, often limits the degree of authority parents have over sons and therefore limits their ability to stave off division.

Still, what happens to family structure when the estate ceases to be of importance to family members? Interestingly, family division may continue to be desirable to some family members especially when migrants feel it is in their own best interest to remove themselves from having to contribute to the family budget (as was the case in Hsin Hsing during

the 1960s). Only in the 1970s do we find a marked absence of family division in the village. The reason for this change was due to three factors: a) land no longer was as important to sons as a hedge against failure at an off-farm job, b) there was a lack of large family-run businesses in the village, c) extended families had modified their budgeting arrangements so that sons could keep the money they earned without having to contribute all of their savings to the family budget (Gallin & Gallin 1982a).

Finally, with the gradual decline in the importance of the family estate came the gradual increase in the importance of the family budget. Cash was used to finance an education for sons, and, by the 1970s, was increasingly used to finance small off-farm enterprises. In this way, the family budget, and not the estate, provided the means by which the unemployed or underemployed could create their own means of production.

The need for cash on the part of family members has, without a doubt, necessitated some kind of social and structural adjustments in the family. Certainly, family members become less and less dependent upon each other once each has become established in his own occupation. Still, for many individuals in the countryside (and urban areas) today, economic security remains illusive. Small-scale entrepreneurs, for example, often barely make enough money to finance their operations because competition from other small-scale producers is so great. Operating on a piece-work basis, many satellite factories remain vulnerable to fluctuations in both domestic and international markets. And, because these small businesses operate independently, center factories are not hampered by a unionized work force, nor for example,

do they have to provide medical benefits for their sub-contractors. As a result, many family members remain socially and economically interdependent, because there is simply not the extra margin of security available to members in times of hardship.

Notes:

1 Ssu fang chian is money given to a young woman by her parents before marriage. The money is meant to be used only by her, however, she may frequently use the money to help her own conjugal unit.

2 Not coincidentally, the reader may also notice that in the various stages of Taiwan's development, there may only exist certain kinds of work for rural-based families. Complex families that were bound to an agricultural existence in the Taiwan of the 1950s, for example, tended to organize their social and economic relationships along more traditional patterns. But, as Taiwan's economy changed so did the kinds of work available to farmers, enabling many to become involved with wage labor and small enterprises. As a result, the patterns of familial economic and social organization that may have been in place previously, had to change to accommodate the changes in work, or there would be the chance that relationships between family members would suffer (Gallin and Gallin 1982a).

3 Here I am primarily referring to males in the family and sons in particular.

4 When the estate begins to lose its importance for those sons who have found a means of livelihood not based on the use of the estate, a father's influence and authority over his non-farming sons may decline. For this reason, fathers perhaps believe that there may be at least two means by which they can try and maintain the status-quo. One method is to gently guide (or coerce) a son into taking up the plough alongside the father. By having at least one son involved in agriculture so that

his dominant, paternalistic relationship with his son.

Another means by which a chia chang can maintain some authority, is to transform or to build an estate that is attractive (or "marketable" in that the estate would have to offer a job opportunity and/or the possibility of inheriting a business or part of one) to sons. In contemporary Taiwan especially, sons who no longer want to be farmers may only consider remaining part of an extended family when the family has something to offer in the way of employment or help for a future off-farm occupation. And, if a father should be so lucky as to establish a lucrative business that can absorb the labor of his sons as they grow up, those sons may find it difficult not to remain a part of a family economy which gives more economic rewards than anything he can hope to find in the "outside world". This argument of mine may in some ways parallel that given in R. Gallin:1985.

5 Wong's argument goes into a deeper exploration of Freedman's queries about what happens to business-based families when it comes time for division. In his article he basically supports Freedman's claim that families with business property tend to remain together longer than those based upon agricultural property (also see Cohen:1976).

6 BBFEs found in the 1960s perhaps come the closest to what Cook calls "endofamilial" accumulation. He points out that "in many small rural industries of the Oaxaca Valley [Mexico], the capital/labour relationship has developed to a point where simple capitalist accumulation occurs but usually in such a way that the wage level, as well as the level of accumulation, are so low as to require subsidization from the workers' household units to ensure soci


and Friedman 1984 for some interesting interpretations on the relationship between capitalism and households).

7 It is important to note that diversified family economies are not exclusively based upon entrepreneurs living and working at a common residence. Family members may also work in wage labor jobs in nearby factories or they may work as managers in trading companies in the cities. What makes these individuals part of a diversified economy is if they remit most, if not all their disposable income to the family budget or if they remain active in economic transactions with fellow family members (such as giving or receiving loans, investing in a brother's firm, etc.). In other words, there has to be more involvement in the economic affairs of the whole family, than just occasionally sending home money every month to help support the parents.

8 Parental authority is in part based upon having an estate which is valued by sons.

9 Huang (1984) points out, that most farm families are dependent upon a vast network of "horizontal" (nonfamilial) relationships to help in the planting and harvest seasons. So, regardless of whether families are large or small, most units will enlist the help of fellow villagers during periods when extra labor is needed.

Approximate Locations of Three Community Studies in Taiwan



A= Ploughshare Village

B= Hsin Hsing Village

C= Yen Liao

Figure 4.1

MAP OF TAIWAN

Case #1

Family Name: Hwang*

Location: Fuchien Province, People's Republic of China

Set in the late 1800s and early 1900s, Lin (1949) has documented the history of the Hwang family over a forty year period. During this time, the author was able to follow the family through two family divisions, providing us with a very sensitive portrayal of family life. The family was located in a small agricultural village near the Min Chiang River about 80 miles from the port city of Fuchien Province in China.

Lin begins his study with the death of the father and grandfather of two young brothers, Dungmin (the elder) and Dunglin (the younger). Although the brother's father was the first to die, the family did not divide until the death of the family head, the old grandfather. The farmland acquired by the grandfather was divided among the surviving two uncles, with their two nephews taking the third share.

Following division, seven people were left to farm one-third of the original land. Family members now consisted of Dunglin, Dungmin, their mother and Dungmin's wife, two small boys and one girl. For a few years following the division, family fortunes declined because of an ever increasing demand on their land brought on by a growing family and the lack of family labor.

In time, however, the yet unmarried Dunglin struck out on his own by first selling peanuts to travelers in the village. Within a few years, Dunglin entered into a partnership with his older brother-in-law Chang Fenchow, selling wine, peanuts and traditional medicines in the port

city of Hukao only two miles from his village. The small shop was financed by the savings of both men. Fenchow (the older of the two) served as general manager and dispenser of medicines and Dunglin was in charge of selling the other commodities. Fenchow's oldest son served as an accountant and a apprentice/cook.

Agriculture soon ceased to be the only means of support for the Hwang family as the Hukao store gradually expanded it's business. Nevertheless, "as the family had not been officially divided, the capital and money income of the store, as well as the family lands and their produce, were still held in common property" (Lin, 1948:13) and both brothers (Dungmin and Dunglin) took an interest in the other's work and behaved as equal partners in managing the family finances.

At the age of 24, Dunglin was married and soon had a young son and baby daughter. Shortly there after, the two brothers decided to divide their households, even though the new division would mean extra work for both families (Lin has not told us however of any problems either between brothers or wives that may have prompted a seemingly financially undesirable division).

A year following the division between the two brothers, Dungmin died. His wife, two young sons and two young daughters were left without their main means of support, so the family was reunited as one household. This left Dunglin "as the only adult man to whom a family of three women and six children could look for support" (1948:16), and forced him to rent most of the family land while he worked hard at the Hukao store. Although the family was hard pressed, all members contributed to generate extra income through the weaving of cloth from hemp and selling what handicrafts they could make.

The family, now led by Dunglin was to continue to expand but remain as a unit for many years to come. The store also developed by adding more lines (selling rice and salted fish), while more extensive business contacts were made in the city of Fuchiu. Dunglin's two nephews were soon old enough to start farming, and so there came to be less of a burden on Dunglin as the number of family members reached productive age.

Dunglin's sons were all younger than those of his brother's, and, therefore, did not enter into the family workforce as soon as their cousins. The oldest of Dunglin's four sons was to have an academic career, and eventually went to college in Foochow. The second and third eldest sons were more or less groomed to be farmers so that they could take care of farm production and manage family affairs in the village along side their older cousins. As with the eldest son, the youngest boy was encouraged to pursue an education; he too spent much of his time in school and eventually went to college.

The division of labor among all the adult (old enough to engage in productive work) males in the Hwang family did not necessarily relegate anyone to a specific occupation. Dungmin's oldest son (Dunglin's oldest nephew), although primarily a farmer, also managed most of the farm operations as well as serving as head of the Hwang household while his uncle was in the Hukao store. Eventually however, he was able to remove himself from the responsibilities of farming and go work at the store in Hukao. Dunglin's second and third sons were also primarily occupied with farming during their early productive years, but their positions never seemed to be terribly crucial to the family fortune. Following the next family division, their services were soon desired elsewhere in

activities which were probably more important (profitable) to the family. The eldest son of Dunglin, although more involved in the academic world, was nevertheless important for establishing a number of important relationships with the wealthy and powerful of Fuchiu. Following the division between Dunglin and his nephews however, he too became more involved in the family business.

Division between Dunglin and Dungmin's fang:

Increasing tension between brothers and cousins and dissatisfaction about the way family capital was being spent led to an eventual split between Dunglin's household (or fang) and that of his two nephews. A short passage by Lin sums up the situation quite well.

Eldest Go (Dunglin's eldest nephew) now could well stand upon his own feet. He began to demand that, instead of following his uncle's desire to build up an ever-larger and stronger family, the family should now be divided, so that he could obtain a large portion of the (family) property and set up for himself. Eldest Go was of course the first-born of Dungmin, who was in turn the eldest son. In that division of a family the first born had a legal right to an extra portion of the joint property as a special recognition of his primogeniture"(1948:123).

Another reason for the nephew's desire to divide arose from his concern that Dunglin's youngest son would use up much of the family capital in pursuit of his education.

An arbiter was called in to help negotiate the division which was

theoretically between Dunglin and his dead brother Dungmin. Farm land (more land had been accumulated as family wealth increased), household possessions, living quarters, and farm buildings were all divided between the two families. Although both families were to continue to live in the same house, they would set up two hearths (lit. feng hwo or separate fire) and eat separately with only Dunlin's old mother as a common link.


Aside from the partitioning of farmland and households, there were also two other important matters which were to prove to be a source of conflict. The first involved the division of shares in the Hukao store. Demanding his rights of primogeniture, the oldest nephew insisted on an equal partitioning of shares even though the business was founded and originally financed by Dunglin. The business like land, was considered by the nephew as common property -- but unlike land, a business cannot always be parcelled out and still maintain it's productive capacity.

The second matter concerned the division of accumulated capital. Dungmin's nephew, fearing that too much money had already been siphoned off on the education of his younger cousins, moved that all cash savings be divided equally. If the family's cash were to only be used to finance farming and ceremonial matters (some of the most important needs for money by a farm family), then there probably would not have been much objection to the division of cash. Dunglin, however, was a businessman and he knew the store could function more effectively with a larger cash reserve. The availability of capital meant that a retailing business could make quick purchases when prices were best. Lack of capital would give the business, in contemporary terms, a cash flow

problem.

The Hwang family continued as it had right up until the Japanese invasion made it's presence felt in the city of Fuchiu. But, before this war was to totally disrupt and finally break the family, we are able to obtain a clear picture as to how members of the Hwang family responded to the changing nature of their family economy. Land and the opportunity to farm it was to prove to be the base upon which Dunglin could start his business. Following his brothers death and the reunification of the family, Dunglin had to maintain the family on his store receipts, yet if his business failed the land would have still been there as insurance against starvation.

*Source: (Lin 1948)



Case #3

Family Name: Cui*

Location: Northern Taiwan

Unlike the many other villages being studied at that time, Ploughshare's economy was based primarily on wage labor jobs offered in the local coal mines and, more recently, upon factory work in and around the community. Because of Ploughshare's hilly location, tea had originally been (early 1900s) the main source of work for most of the villagers. Tea production, however, soon gave way to a series of other low profit cash crops, and eventually with the changes in market and price demands, coal mining rose as the more important means of employment up until the mid 1970s.

Harrell characterized many of the families in Ploughshare as having been quite poor before the addition of small-scale factories and wage labor jobs in the mid 1970s. One of the families described by Harrell, had no land when Ciu A-bi, an adopted daughter-in-law, married her "brother", a coal miner in the early 1900s. The couple had four sons, yet misfortune prevented them from having a joint family. The oldest son died shortly after marriage, the second son died before he was able to marry, and the third son "rather than taking in a wife, followed a course common to many poorer people in this area: he married in to his wife's family" (1982:160). After the death of the father in the 1940s, the mother remained with her fourth son, Tho, and his wife and children (she eventually had six boys and one girl).

By 1973, "their household income depended entirely on wages. Tho worked the coal mines" (1982:161), his eldest son worked in a knitting mill, the second son was a laborer in a paper factory in a nearby town.

and the third son was encouraged to continue school because of his scholastic ability. The fourth son was apprenticed to an electrician in a city to the south while the remaining children stayed at home because they were too young to work. Earning NT\$6,000 a month, the family was quite poor by Taiwan standards.

When Harrell returned to Ploughshare in 1978, "increased labor power and higher wages"(1982:161) had improved the family's economic position. The father and eldest son were working in the coal mines (coaling brought slightly higher wages than weaving), while the son's wife worked on a weaving machine he had recently bought. The fourth son gave up his apprenticeship and was now working in the mines with his father and elder brother, and the fifth and sixth sons had begun work in factories close to the village. While the family had not yet divided at this stage, Harrell concluded that "unless they change from a wage-earning to a capital investing family economy, there will be no compulsion for them to remain together for long" once they have reached the joint phase (1982:161).

*Source: (Harrell 1982)

Case #4

Family Name: Ong*

A second family Harrell chose to describe was, unlike the first, quite wealthy. Although quite poor as a young man, Ong Cui-hieng (the family head) managed to turn his small savings into one of the larger knitting operations in Ploughshare. Cui-hieng was lucky enough to have sons, and clever enough to know how family labor could be used to the fullest.

In 1961, Cui-hieng sent his two sons (recently returned from military duty) to learn the knitting trade at a factory in San Chung, a Taipei suburb. Eventually they returned home after earning enough money to purchase one knitting machine; which they then worked around the clock. By saving most of what they earned, the family soon expanded their operation by purchasing twenty-two machines, a truck, and a retail outlet (1982:95).

One son used the truck to transport the yarn from the manufacturer and the finished product to an exporter or to the family retail store in Taipei which was operated by an unmarried daughter. A second son knitted and managed the other knitters, while a third son provided his supervision and labor to the enterprise. With a business that was also quite seasonal, Cui-hieng's wife and a daughter-in-law found their place in the enterprise by taking charge of a "large group of village women who worked upstairs in the house for low wages, sewing pieces of cloth into finished garments that were to be sold to exporting firms during the summer months"(1982:69). During the busier winter months, the family was able to sell their clothing to buyers in their Taipei store, while work was frequently put out to other village families on a piece-

rate basis.

Profits from the business , were more than enough to sustain the 19 or so family members in a more than comfortable way. Surplus capital was used for operating costs, expanding the business, and for financing debts on several five story shophouses in Taipei.

Like many other wealthy families, family division has not yet happened (this was in '78) nor was there any implication of division in the near future. Following some of the same rational as Cohen, Harrell sees division as being detrimental to the family business and that a split would only mean the deterioration of each brother's standard of living. Also, because the family business is only one enterprise, it would be difficult for each brother to sort out his particular role in the operation let alone continue to operate as a separate business unit (1982:165). He concludes,

If the brothers were to divide, they would have to sort out these roles somehow, but it is doubtful whether any of them would be able to earn as much money or manage their affairs as efficiently with four budgets, four separate household economies, and four smaller businesses. It seems safe to say that they will stay as a joint family for many years to come (1982:165).

*Source: (Harrell 1982)

Case #5

Family Name:Huang*

Location: Southwest Taiwan

The farming village of Yen-liao in southwest Taiwan, was the site of Myron Cohen's very important study of Chinese families. His research lasted for one year in 1964, returning several times in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Cohen was interested in the organization and the economies of larger more complex farm families - of which Yen-liao seemed to have more than it's share when compared to similar communities in Taiwan. Yen-liao was an agriculturally rich area where "most members of Yen-liao's local agnatic groups reside in U-shaped compounds, as do similar groups elsewhere in Mei-nung" county (1976:21).

Yen-liao, in Hakka means tobacco-house, reflecting the predominance of Tobacco production in the area. First introduced to Mei-nung county in 1938, 37 of the 60 landowning families had taken up tobacco cultivation (rice still is the major crop for most families) by 1964. In comparison with other major crops grown in Yen-liao, tobacco requires by far the heaviest labor input, and in turn pays some of the highest cash returns to farmers (tobacco is protected from market fluctuations by the government's Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau). Likewise, Cohen found that the cultivation of tobacco "results in a very substantial increase in the economic value of the those family members who work the family farm"(1976:50).

One such well-to-do family involved in tobacco production was the Huang family. Like other families with moderately successful agricultural enterprises, Tobacco offered an avenue or base for the

family to accumulate wealth. Cohen claims that

"in the final analysis it is the series of opportunities provided by the chia estate that provides the framework and support for a stem household's transformation into one of a joint form, and the continued development of the family is most assured in situations where the chia estate expands as the chia group grows more complex (1976:126).

Thus, the father, Huang Yu-lai, "owes his his family's prosperous condition to a lucrative job landed by his eldest son during the Japanese period" (ibid.:126). During the later years of the Japanese occupation, Yu-lai allowed his son to continue his education as far as possible (the second son was old enough to help his father in the fields) and in time, the son was able to find a government position in nearby Pingtung county. The first son in turn, remitted a large portion of his salary to his father who would use the cash to invest in land and small enterprises for each of his sons.

While the two older sons worked the third son was pushed to continue on with his studies, but he unfortunately failed the examination that would have propelled him on to a higher-level school (ibid.:130). Cohen explains that the exhausted son had become "chou-kong" (book crazy) and that he became incapacitated for several years. In the meantime, money was being saved and invested because of the first son's job, farming revenues and the expanded work force provided by the older son's wives also contributed to family pot. Eventually the third son recovered providing the father an other opportunity to use his capital by building a small brick factory and placing the son in charge of its operation.

Upon completion of his education at agricultural school (following the end of the Pacific War), the fourth son was ready for a position in one of the family enterprises. The family decided upon starting a transport company "with the purchase of two trucks, and the management of this operation was given over to the fourth son"(1976:130). At about the same time, family capital was also used to buy land near the first son's home in Pingtung county upon which they built a dormitory for students at a nearby agricultural school.

The logistics of managing and coordinating the family enterprises were handled mostly by the fourth son. Since all of the sons except the oldest lived in the family compound (this is inferred), the fourth son also acted as the "main liaison between the primary household and the branch established by the first son in the south"(1976:130), transferring funds and information by motorcycle between the two households. Management of the farm on the other hand, increasingly fell to the second son as Yu-lai became older.

Nevertheless, Yu-lai as head of the family, has remained in firm control (responsibilities have decreased with age) of the family funds. As his four sons turn over the income gained from each enterprise they manage, Huang distributes cash as required by each for his business or for other large expenditures. Although many of the smaller business decisions are handled by the father or (later by the fourth son), the more important business decisions are almost always made by joint agreement between sons and father (due to the father's lack of knowledge about certain types of business). While this kind of economic organization may appear to leave sons with little autonomy - Cohen has found that the brothers involved with non-agricultural enterprises are

still able to function without day-to-day allotments of cash for living expenditures. Such is not the case however with the second farmer son. Unlike his brothers, he shares an even more intimate economic relationship with his father (who also is a farmer), such that he does not have any access to cash for even the most mundane things.

Interestingly enough, in Cohen's description there is little mention of an impending family division. Instead, there is the constant reaffirmation of how financially interdependent (for investment purposes) these four sons are, and that if there were a partition capital would be split four ways. "None of the resultant families would have the (financial and maybe labor) wherewithal to make the contemplated investments on its own. It is safe to say that the limited investment possibilities would not bring total returns as great as those derived from the unified investments of the family as now constituted" (1976:224).

* Source: (Cohen 1976)

Case #6

Family Name: Li*

Location: Western Taiwan

Fourty-six year old (in 1979) Li seh-ming is the head of a conjugal family in the village of Hsin Hsing. During World War II his father died in a forced labor camp in South East Asia leaving he and his two younger brothers to be raised by a relative in the village. In 1960 he married, and one year later he and his brothers divided the family. Shortly thereafter, his two brothers moved to Taipei leaving Li in charge of .2-.3 chia of undivided rented land (land that he continues to farm to the present). In 1979, Li had three teenaged children; an 18 year old daughter, and two sons aged 15 and 13.

Sixteen years ago (1969), Li entered the spring manufacturing business with a brother-in-law who had recently apprenticed in a spring factory in Chang-hua city. To start the company little capital was necessary because the two planned on starting with only a few home made pieces of machinery and no hired labor. The more technical knowhow in the form of machining and tool designs, came from a engineering shop in a nearby town. About 4 or 5 years ago his partner, left the company to start his own spring business in Yung ping county; both men said they parted on good terms.

In a interview in 1979, Li said that in the early 70's it was difficult to get enough workers to help out in his business. He said people wanted to get away from the heavy work, because it was too much like farm work, so they either migrated to the cities or got better paying factory jobs in nearby towns. Li commented that he was also hampered by his own lack of technical skills (and probably capital) at

the time, and so did not feel comfortable enough to buy more sophisticated machinery.

During the late 70's, however, Li had about six people working in his factory making springs on a piece-rate basis. Two to three of his workers were relatives or family members; his wife and children helped out whenever they could, a nephew was paying off a monetary debt that his father had incurred, and another nephew was just interested in learning a skill before entering the army. The other workers (mostly from Hsin Hsing), either worked at the factory or at home. Wang Tsai-t'ien for example, has a few simple tools in his home and his family bends springs after their regular work during the day. Wang says that few people want to work in a small factory the size of Li's because they do not get payed enough nor do they get health insurance or the other benefits that larger factories give.

The larger factories that Li subcontracts for are located in the cities of Taipei and Taijung to the north. These companies deliver the raw materials (wire) and specifications by truck only to return at a later date to pick up the finished product. The primary destination for the springs was the United States market.


In follow up interviews in 1982, the Gallins found that the Li factory had been hit by the economic recession as had numerous other factories in Taiwan. He seemed to have lost a few workers, possibly trading in the higher costs of labor for some new automatic machines he had just purchased. Unlike some other small manufacturers, however, Li's business was quite solvent so there was no immediate threat of bankruptcy. The Gallins noted that his success and that of a few other small manufacturers in the village might be due to being well informed

of trends in foreign markets as well as just good business sense (Li and his friends were all well versed in the economic affairs of the world).

Although information about Li's two other brothers is quite sketchy, the Gallins were able to catch up with the third son's wife who had moved from Taipei back to Hsin Hsing in 1982. She said that her husband (the youngest brother) ran a rather large electric switch manufacturing company in the city. A few years ago, he and a friend started the factory but were now considering moving the operation to Indonesia (lower labor costs) where he was now negotiating the details.

Since family division in 1961, Li has not had much contact with his brothers. What contact they do have (economic or otherwise) is rather strained, and, as we can see with the nephew who is paying off his father's debt, the borrowing of cash by a relative is not taken lightly. What seems clear from this family is that the relationship between brothers after division remain fairly distant, and, because these brothers entered into their businesses after division (property rights are limited only to the land that was passed down by their father), the businesses that each son has built remain under their own administration.

* Source: Gallin & Gallin, Fieldnotes from Hsin Hsing, Taiwan



Case #7

Family: K'ang*

K'ang Shui-Po (age 48 in 1979), a mason/construction worker, lives in Hsin Hsing with his wife and two daughters. He also has three sons, two aged 24 and one 21 year old, and a daughter aged 27. When very young K'ang's father adopted him from a man in the village surnamed Shr. In 1950 K'ang married and in 1958 he and his five brothers formally divided leaving each with about .3 chia of farm land.

While living in Hsin Hsing in the 1950s, K'ang was doing construction work in the village (odd jobs, brick work, etc.) but business was always slow. One day, an old friend in the construction business from Taipei asked K'ang to help him organize a construction team in the city. In the late 1960s he and his wife took up the offer and moved to Taipei where they shared a small apartment with three other migrant families from the Hsin Hsing area.

The work group that was finally formed was composed of five masons, all of whom were related to each other as either ching-chi or hsiang-ching (relatives or from the same village). These men worked as freelance construction workers or subcontractors by bidding on a portion of a masonry job on a construction project. When the group gets a job they then hire a number of day laborers (floating laborers who sometimes live in the uncompleted building until the building is finished) to help them do the work.

K'ang says there are a number of construction work groups that compete for bids throughout the city. Each group gradually builds a reputation for itself because of the quality of its workmanship and being able to get a job done on time. Construction companies at times

prefer one group over another despite lower bids if it feels good craftsmanship is important. He says this often leaves many groups with so called "urine jobs," especially when business is off.

In the mid and late 1970s, the K'angs like many temporary migrants returned off and on to the village, finally settling permanently in their ancestral house in Hsin Hsing. They said that in the late 70s there were many more construction jobs in the rural areas because new factories were being built and more people were putting up new concrete one and two story houses. The upswing in rural construction coincided at that time with the movement of businesses to the countryside in search of cheaper labor.


By 1979, K'ang's eldest daughter was working in a textile factory in Taipei sending home most of her earnings to her father so that she could save money for her dowry. One of his 24 year old twins had finished his apprenticeship as a baker and was working in a bakery in nearby Lukang. At that time he was still living at home and gave all of his earnings to his father. The other 24 year old had also recently finished a motorcycle repair apprenticeship in nearby Hsi-Hu village. Wanting to be his own boss (tang lac pan), the twin had just negotiated to buy a motorcycle repair shop in a suburb of Taipei that a friend (also in the motorcycle repair bus.) had recommended. K'ang Shui-po loaned him the NT\$65,000 needed to purchase the business (NT\$45,000 was borrowed from a wealthier fellow villager and the remaining NT\$20,000 came from K'ang's own savings). The son is responsible for the debt and therefore sends money home to pay the loan off and so that his father can save some money for his marriage.

The third son, also having recently completed a motorcycle repair

apprenticeship (but waiting to go into the army), was to help the second son in his shop. Apparently both men and their sister will live together in a Taipei apartment recently bought by their father but not yet constructed. Like many buyers of new apartments in the city, an individual starts payments on the property with the agreement that the last payment will be made upon completion of the building.

From the interviews, it appears that the apartment is family property and not the property of the three who will live there. Unlike the motorcycle shop, the apartment is being payed for from family funds and the children will not have to pay rent. Instead, the parents hope the children send home remittances. For the meantime, however, it is likely that the children's "payments" will be relatively small since they are all just getting started.

* Source: Gallin & Gallin, Field notes and Interviews



Case #9

Family Name:Shih*

Born in 1920 to a father who was registered as a coolie (Japanese Household Registration or Hu Ko), Shih Yen-shan was one of nine children. He married in 1944, and by the end of World War II his father died. Shih and his wife eventually had five children, two of them boys, aged 26 (married) and 23. Although registered in the village Hu Ko as a tenant farmer until 1968, and thereafter as unemployed, he was nevertheless an active farmer in 1979 with .3 chia of his own land and .2 chia of rented land intermittently sown with rice, sugar cane, and snow peas.

Shih's eldest son was the family standout. After completing junior-middle school and attending a vocational high school (but did not graduate), he worked for a rubber gasket manufacturer for a few years before entering the army. After completing his service, he and a few friends (also similarly trained) started their own gasket factory in the city of Chang-hua, located about one hour and-a-half north of Hsin Hsing. His parents helped raise the necessary capital by joining rotating credit clubs; their son has his own budget and is responsible for the debt, and covers it with money he sends home every month (the size of the loan is unknown) to his family.


The gaskets the first son produces are used in motorcycles and automobiles and sold in both domestic and foreign markets. In 1979 the company had expanded with a hired work force of 20-30 workers and in 1982 they had about 100 workers paid on a wage basis.

Soon after the business was started, the younger son went to work for his brother and his partners. It was not long, however, before

friction developed between the younger brother and the partners; a situation only remedied by an offer on the part of the older brother to set the younger up in the gasket business in Hsin Hsing. With loans from his brother amounting to NT\$1,000,000 and a promise to pay back the debt with 10% of monthly profits, the second son bought machines and started his operation in 1982. At that time he was able to hire no more than four workers (even though he had eight machines) because he could not find enough cheap labor. His new wife, mother and father-in-law also helped whenever possible.

Like other factories in the area, the second son's factory functioned as a satellite factory to the center plants in Chang-hua as well as a sub-satellite factory to his brother's operation. As a rule these center factories would send orders and specifications to each plant each day, often times transporting the raw materials by truck in the morning and then picking up the finished product at night (then to be packaged or shipped from the center factory). But when the first brother's factory grew to be so large, the partners bypassed the center factories and arranged the ordering and shipping themselves.

In the most recent interviews no mention of division was ever made most likely because there is no need for it. The older brother has his own very lucrative enterprise and the younger brother seems well on his way to establishing one of his own. Aside from a small amount of farm land that the father uses, there is no joint ownership of property and no budget shared between the two brothers.



Shih Family

Case#10

Family Name: Shen

Shen Huo-Yen is a 54 year old owner/operator of a rice mill and rice brokerage company in Hsin Hsing. He and his three brothers divided after his father's death in 1959. Although not clear from the data, it is assumed that his father owned a rather large portion of land (listed as land owner in village Hu Ko), and that Shen probably inherited a good portion of what is now 1.4 chia of farm land.

In 1966 with a small amount of savings, Shen started his mill business as a small operation. In time (the business was able to become profitable with the the deregulation of rice prices by the government in 1960s), the business gradually grew as he bought much of the rice from local farmers and sold the milled product to wholesalers in Taipei. In 1979, Shen operated the mill with two hired men from the village and his third son who he wanted "to remain inside the family" and carry on the business. The son, along with his wife and children live with the family in Hsin Hsing, and although he manages the mill, he does not get a salary, nor does he have a separate family budget. Apparently if the son even wants money for a small item as cigarettes, he has to ask his father for it; a family economy that is not unlike that of agricultural families in traditional China.

Shen's youngest son (aged 21) was just drafted into the army, while his first, second, and fourth sons (all married except for the last) work as drug and "Sani-Flush" wholesalers in Taipei. Up until 1978, apparently all three brothers were working together in the business which was originally started by the oldest brother (aged 36). The


reason for the split between the brothers is not clear, but all insisted the reason was not because they could not get along. In fact, following the division each agreed to conduct their wholesale business in a designated part of the city and not to interfere with the other's clients. All sons live separately, have separate budgets and send money home occasionally. When asked whether any brother gets financial help from the father or any of the brothers - they replied, "If a son wants to expand his business, he has to find capital on his own."

In the 1982 interviews, the Gallins found that Shen had taken up raising frogs in a pool he constructed on his land. As in the west, frog legs are considered a delicacy in Taiwan and are eaten primarily at wedding feasts. Shen said his milling business was beginning to suffer because more and more farmers were using their own small electrified machines to mill rice they would use at home. He said unhusked rice lasts longer so people don't mill all their rice in bulk as they once used to.

Also in the interviews, the Gallins learned that the sons in Taipei pooled their money and sent their parents on a trip to Hong Kong. They said that the third son was not asked to contribute because that would be like asking their father to pay for the trip himself. The sons still regard the third son's budget as still part of their father's because he works in the family enterprise(s) and farms the land. Interestingly, no one in the family has yet talked of division. Once the father dies, however, it is not very likely that the brothers would go through the process. To divide the family property would not necessarily bring the brothers extra wealth but it would certainly cause the third son to lose part of his livelihood. Although traditionally

all brothers are due a portion of the family estate, the third son (if it came to division) would no doubt argue that he helped acquire much to the property and therefore the property could not be considered inheritable. For a family to drag itself through such litigation would be looked down upon and the villagers would probably consider the migrant brothers as greedy (because they are doing quite well themselves in the city).

* Source: Gallin & Gallin Interview material



Case #11

Family Name: Huang*

Born in 1921, Huang Chin-chen (his father is the brother of Huang Ching-hai) heads a joint household composed of his wife and five sons, the two oldest of whom are married and have children. Huang divided from his three brothers in 1944 because he could not get along with them; the rest eventually divided from each other in 1966 (the practice of a family going through more than one division is not very common in Hsin Hsing; but it nevertheless does occasionally occur). Huang owns .5 chia of land in Hsin Hsing and farms it on a part time basis.

In 1979 the oldest son (aged 33) ran a small trading company in Taipei with two partners. The company handles various kinds of merchandise for both domestic and foreign markets. Interviews suggest the family may have provided some of the start up capital for the business. The second, third and fourth sons operate an iron window and door grill business (used to prevent thefts in homes), also located in Taipei. The third son (aged 26), chief operator of the business, first learned the trade when his mother took him to apprentice under a relative also in the business. When, after several years work, the son expressed the desire to open his own grill shop, his mother put the idea off saying that he had not yet learned enough.


Eventually, however, the son became his own lau ban (boss), and started a grill shop most likely with funds provided by his family (this is felt to be the case because his mother was able to keep him working under the tutelage of the relative when he no longer wanted to do so). His two brothers joined him in the business a short time thereafter.

All the Taipei brothers and their families live and eat together in

the same building that also houses the grill shop. The brothers pool their money to maintain their own collective household (food, utilities) in Taipei as well as providing help for the parents. What money they have left over they keep for their own family's use.

In their interviews with the brothers, the Gallins found that most of them thought the living arrangements were working quite smoothly. But, when asked how much each son contributes to the family fund, the second son accused his eldest brother of not contributing enough money to the family's "public money" that the parents must use. This response angered the third brother who said "how can you say our older brother does not contribute enough - especially when his business is losing money?" When asked about the nature of their businesses, they replied what goes on in another brother's business is not a concern of theirs. One might choose to speculate that the reason for the animosity toward the eldest brother is because of the class differences between them. Despite the fact that the trading company is losing money, the elder brother is (according to the Gallins) considered to be quite successful in his white collar job; a situation which may have created resentment on the part of the brother who is involved in a "dirty hands" business.

In 1975, Huang Chin-chen and his wife were already semi-retired so they went to live with their sons in Taipei. Mrs. Huang kept busy taking care of the grandchildren, but the sons in the grill shop refused to let their father help because they felt the work was too strenuous. Although he did busy himself some of the time by taking care of the family finances, he nevertheless felt bored and useless. In 1979, both parents returned to Hsin Hsing and farming on a part time basis.



Huang Family

Case #12

Family Name: Kang*

Kang Ching-Kun is a 56 (1979) year old father of five sons and two daughters. The three oldest sons aged 34, 30, and 26 are all married and have children. The two daughters have married out, and the youngest son, aged 21, was still in the army in 1979. Kang is the household head of this joint family, works as a civil servant in Hsin Hsing and farms his .4 chia of land on a part time basis.

His eldest son is the most educated of his children. After having gone through agricultural high school he got a job with the local Farmer's Association (F.A.) where he now works as a semi-professional veterinarian. Recently he has also formed a snow pea processing operation, using virtually every villager in the town to prepare the peas for shipment during the harvest. The second son, having sold his motorcycle repair business (in 1982) to his fourth brother, recently decided to start a small trucking operation. His original repair shop was provided with start-up money that his father had borrowed (from what source is not clear), and he ran the business for about 14 years following his graduation from junior middle school and an apprenticeship in the nearby town of Yuan-Lin. The shop was located on the street side of the Kang house, where he repaired and sold Japanese motorcycles "bought" with promissory notes from a distributor. The new trucking business is listed in the village register as tse-yung (self use), and is operated in a semi-cooperative fashion with the son of another villager. The third son does much of the trucking for "Springman Li" case 6). Both men operate their businesses in different areas to avoid competition, but help each other when clients have large orders. Up

until 1982, the third son also operated a lucrative plumbing and electrical repair shop in another part of the Kang house; it was later moved to another village. All sons contribute money to the family treasury for household expenses (food, maintenance, utilities etc.) but keep a portion for their own conjugal family (fang) to use for their own expenses.

In the 1979 interviews, Kang said that he had planned for his sons to study different things because sons in the same business would create competition and resentment. But he also felt sons should remain together as an economic unit and share the advantages of a larger money supply from which to invest. Although he realized that the family head had to do a balancing act to maintain peace in the family, he also felt that for sons to go out and start a business alone was too high a risk. He believed that with the family together: 1) sons could use the father's influence and contacts to promote their businesses, 2) they could make use of family buildings and other property to start their operations, 3) sons could all help each other (for example, sons could give each other loans without interest). Kang said that although each son's fang could "take care of itself on a day by day basis," a son's business could not entirely stand alone because it would soon gobble up all the profits that it was able to accumulate (in 1979 he said all of this, and by 1982 two of his son's fang had already moved away from home).

Along with more or less directing each son into separate professions, Kang also felt that choosing a wife for his sons was just as important. Daughters-in-law he felt should be skilled, hard working, and able to make money in the job market. The most outstanding

daughter-in-law is the first son's wife; a women who started a small sewing business with NT\$140,000 from her ssu fang chian (private money) and NT\$10,000 in savings from selling dresses. She was originally a sewing instructor at the F.A. and then a dressmaker with a small shop on the street side of the Kang house.

In the late 70s a man stopped by her business and asked whether she would be interested in sewing slippers for his company. At that time she used her NT\$150,000 to buy two sewing machines, and with about ten workers began turning out about 400 slippers per day (payed by piece rate) with an average monthly profit of \$NT100,000. In 1982, she had expanded into making gloves for export and was seriously considering dealing directly with the trading companies rather than being only a satellite subcontractor for the larger center factories. If she were to deal directly with the trading companies she would have to expand her operation to 50 workers and add a packaging detail; all of which would require about a NT\$800,000 investment. Fears of being unable to meet such a large payroll as well as a shortage of people to work for her that she could trust (only relatives would do) to take over the supervisory positions, would probably prevent her from pursuing her idea. In addition, her new pig and chicken raising business which she started with the help from her husband, will also occupy whatever time she has left over from her sewing business and her other duties (as cooking, cleaning, etc.) that she shares with her other sisters-in-law.


The second daughter-in-law (DIL) also has a satellite sewing business, but smaller than that of the first DIL. The third daughter-in-law has a seasonal dress-making business, as well as pig raising (about 60 pigs) operation that was also started with help from

her eldest brother-in-law. The oldest son also helps his wife and sister-in-law market their pigs through the F.A., as well as advising them on the proper time to sell their product.

Although the first daughter-in-law originally financed her business from her Sai Khia and savings, she now belongs to five money lending clubs (rotating credit clubs) which she probably uses to finance her business or to gain interest from her profits. Interestingly, none of the profits from the daughters-in-law's businesses are contributed to the family budget. The money they earn is for the use of their conjugal families only. Instead, it is husband's earnings which are used to help pay household expenses.

As of 1982, no mention has been made of family division. The estate itself (land and buildings) has no real value to family members except for the fact that it provides a home and a place for business to be conducted. The estate is not a family business in itself, so there is no need for it to be divided.

Source: Gallin & Gallin. Field notes and interviews



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GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY

List of Characters in Order of Appearance in Text

fen chia	分家
chia	家
chia chiao	家教
chia chang	家長
fang	房
chan	產
tsai	財
chia	甲
hu	戶
tsu	族
i wu	義務
ssu fang chian	
(sai khia)	私房錢
lau ban	老闆
ma fan	麻煩
ching chi	親戚
hsiang ching	鄉親
dang lau ban	當老闆
hu ko	戶口
tse yung	自用