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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREATIVITY,
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE, AND SHAME

By

Brenden Readett

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology
1998

I’I|,-

ti}! 'Iil’l ’i I

ABSTRACT
The Relationship Between Creativity, Openness to Experience, and Shame
By

Brenden T. Readett

This study explored the relationship between creative ﬁmctioning, openness to
experience, and shame. Support was sought for a humanistic conceptualization of creative
functioning that highlights the close relationship between creativity and openness to
experience. Disconﬁrming evidence was sought for psychoanalytic conceptualizations of
creativity which portray creative ﬁanctioning as indicative of psychopathology. One
hundred and three undergraduate students were administered the Creative Functioning
Test, the Openness to Experience domain of the NEG-Personality Inventory, and the
Internalized Shame Scale. Creative ﬁmctioning was found to be signiﬁcantly correlated

positively with both openness to experience and level of internalized shame.

To my father.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Gershen Kaufman for all of his suport and aid in this
project. His theoretical understanding and editorial critiques have contributed to each
stage of this investigation. I am also grateﬁil for the encouragement provided by Dr.

Bertram Karon, and the attention to my statistics provided by Dr. Ralph Levine.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1
Literature Review and Research Design

Creativity
The Psychometric Orientation
The Psychoanalytic Orientation

The Humanistic Orientation

Openness to Experience
Shame
Psychoanalytic Theory
Aﬁ‘ect Theory
Shame Research
Research Objectives and Overview of Design

CHAPTER 2
Method

Subjects
Questionnaires and Measurement Techniques
The Creative Functioning Test

The NEG-Personality Inventory

vii

10

11

13

14

17

17

17

17

20

The Intemalized Shame Scale
Procedure

CHAPTER 3
Results

Demographics
Hypothesis

CHAPTER 4
Discussion

Conclusion

REFERENCES

APPENDICES
Appendix A: NBC-Personality Inventory
Appendix B: Intemalized Shame Scale
Appendix C: Research Consent

Appendix D: Feedback Sheet

21

22

23

23

23

27

33

35

4O

4O

43

45

46

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Means and Standard Deviations

Table 2: Summary of Correlations

24

26

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Hypothesized Path Model

Figure 2: Reformulated Path Model

viii

16

31

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This investigation aimed to explore the relationship between three constructs:
creativity, openness to experience, and shame. Psychoanalytic theorists have long
associated creativity with psychopathology, while humanistic theorists have viewed
creativity primarily as a sign of healthy psychological functioning. This investigation
hoped to contribute to this dialogue by demonstrating a positive relationship between
creative functioning and openness to experience, a variable associated with psychological
health, as well as a negative relationship between creativity and internalized shame, a
variable associated with psychopathology. Rogers's (1961) theory of creativity posits that
creative functioning rests on the individual's ability to remain open to his or her subjective
inner experience of aﬂ‘ect. Tomkins's (1963) affect theory and Kaufman's (1992,1996)
shame theory both argue that shame is a primary inhibitor of an individual's ability to
remain open to the experience of aﬂ‘ect. Based on these theories, openness to experience
is hypothesized to be an intervening variable linking shame and creativity. Shame is
hypothesized to impact creative ﬁrnctioning by directly inhibiting the individual's ability to
remain open to the experience of affect.

Creativity
The creative act always involves some element of mystery. Karl Popper (1959),
the father of modern-day philosophy of science, argues that creative inspiration is

ﬁrndamentally irrational, and therefore nothing systematic can be said about it. Popper

distinguishes between the "discovery" and the "justiﬁcation" of a new hypothesis, arguing
that science is properly concerned only with the latter. The actual process by which a
novel idea comes into being is viewed as irrelevant, and science should concern itself only
with substantiating or refuting the new hypothesis, once proposed. From this perspective,
the creative act is beyond the scope of scientiﬁc inquiry. In Popper’s view, not only is a
psychology of creativity irrelevant to the pursuit of scientiﬁc understanding but more
importantly, it is impossible.

Popper's position is not a new one. Plato was also of the opinion that the mystery
of creativity could never be captured by rational understanding. "A poet is holy, and never
able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no
longer in him . . . for not by art does he utter these, but by power divine" (Rothenberg,
1990). Even if the mystery of creativity is ultimately to remain impenetrable, a signiﬁcant
number of researchers and theorists have sought to look more closely at the process that
Popper claims is beyond the scope of scientiﬁc inquiry. Many diﬁ‘erent avenues of
investigation into the nature of creativity have been developed by researchers and explored
in a variety of settings. Nevertheless, a global deﬁnition of creativity has proven elusive.
In their review of current research on creativity, Mumford and Gustafson ( 1 98 8) suggest
that the lack of integration of creativity research ”may be attributed to the fact that, like
intelligence, creativity represents a highly complex and diﬂ‘use construct. " They point out
that the principal researchers in the ﬁeld conceptualize creativity quite diﬂ‘erently. For
example, Guilford (1950) deﬁned creativity in terms of the production of ideas,

MacKinnon (1962) as an attribute of personality, Cattell (1971) as a form of problem-

solving ability, and still others have focussed on actual measures of achievement.
Nevertheless, Kosslyn (1980) suggests that "it is not necessary to begin with a crisp
deﬁnition of an entity in order to study it. . . . It is hard to deﬁne something one knows
little about."

What is necessary is a clearly speciﬁed operational deﬁnition which contains a
methodology that can be systematically replicated, and a theory that directs research and
gives meaning to the ﬁndings. Creativity research to date has been guided by one of three
primary theoretical orientations: psychometric, psychoanalytic, and humanistic.

The Psychometric Orientation

Tire psychometric approach to creativity research has focussed primarily on
cognitive abilities, and it developed directly out of the study of intelligence. Binet ( 1908)
coined the term "divergent thinking” to represent that type of "creative" thinking that does
not conform to established rules. Guilford (1967) developed methods of testing this
dimension by measuring an individual's ability to use well-known objects like a brick or a
newspaper in unusual ways. Most researchers familiar with the creativity literature would,
when employing a typical "creativity test" use one of several popular tests of divergent
thinking such as Guilford's. Nevertheless, these tests have been criticized on a variety of
grounds. Psychometric tests of creativity incur the risk of confounding creativity with a
certain "pseudo-creative" attitude, often associated with verbal ﬂuency (Smith and
Carlsson, 1990). Ward (1974) argues that it is inappropriate to claim that test
performance is indicative of creativity. He argues that the tests generally measure a much

narrower range of abilities. Furthermore, the construct validity (both concurrent and

predictive) of many creativity tests has been seriously questioned by Jordan (1975),
Goolsby & Helwig (1975), Bastos (1974), Kazelskis (1972), and Holland (1968).
Nevertheless, it is still not uncommon within the psychometric orientation to administer
blunt methods with low criterion correlations in ambitious projects on creativity.

Perhaps the most signiﬁcant limitation of divergent thinking tests is their exchrsive
focus on cognitive activities such as problem solving. Many theorists view creativity as a
dynamic process or as a by-product of a certain way of viewing internal and external
reality. In these approaches, cognitive activities play only a small and often less signiﬁcant
role. As a result, divergent thinking tests are limited to a narrow range of theoretical
constructions of creativity.
The Psychoanalytic Orientation

Aristotle reportedly said that no, “great genius was without a mixture of insanity"
(Andreasen, 1978). Freud clearly believed that psychoanalytic theory supported and
conﬁrmed this idea. In A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (1916.17), Freud gave
the following account of art and the artist:

The artist has also an introverted disposition and has not far to go to

become neurotic. He is one who is urged on by instinctual needs which

are too clamorous; he longs to attain honor, power, riches, fame, and the

love of women; but he lacks the means of achieving these gratiﬁcations.

So, like any other with an unsatisﬁed longing, he turns away ﬁom reality

and transfers all his interest, and all his libido, too, on to the creation of his

wishes in the life of fantasy, from which the way might readily lead to neurosis.

(1916, p.75)
Thus for Freud, creative activity is a result of the artist's psychopathology and inability to

function within everyday reality. In "Creative Writers and Daydreaming,” Freud (1908)

suggests that the writer's gift corresponds to an ordinary person‘s daydreams or fantasies.
Freud's main thesis is that a piece of creative writing, like a daydream, is both a
continuation of and substitute for what was once the play of childhood, thus linking
creativity to regressive types of thinking. In his book on jokes, Freud (1905c) suggested
that jokes allow for the discharge of some pleasure which is otherwise not permitted to the
individual, and primary processes play a crucial role in creative endeavors. In this way,
Freud laid the groundwork for the generally accepted psychoanalytic notion that creativity
is driven by the artist's psychopathology and involves some type of regression to more
primitive modes of thinking.

Some research supports the idea that creative functioning is linked to the ability to
access earlier modes of ﬁrnctioning. Research using the Creative Functioning Test (CFT),
which is based on a percept-genetic theory of creative functioning (Smith & Carlsson,
1990), has shown that subjects who scored high on creativity using the CFT demonstrated
the ability to communicate more easily with early childhood memories than lower scoring
subjects. Typically, these memories were markedly sensual and represented both positive
and negative emotions (Smith & Van Der Meer, 1994).

Many students of creativity, in the spirit of Hartmann (1939), have considered
adaptive regression as an important prerequisite for the generation of new ideas. Kris
(1952) in perhaps the most important psychoanalytic work on creativity to date, coined
the concept of "regression in the service of the ego.” His primary hypothesis is that “the
integrative functions of the ego include self-regulated regression and permit a combination

of the most daring intellectual activity with the experience of passive receptiveness. " It is

important to note that this formulation is already a signiﬁcant departure from Freud's
original understanding of creative genesis. Unlike Freud, who believed that the creative
act was the result of internal forces completely outside of the ego's control, Kris argues
that the creative act is actually in the service of the ego and is therefore to some degree
self-regulated. The precise nature of the role of intention in the creative process, however,
remains obscure. Furthermore, Kris's term "ego regression," which implies primitivization
of ego functions, retains to a large degree the ﬂavor of Freud's earlier emphasis on the
pathological sources of the creative act. In the insane artists that Kris describes,
regression is a central pathological characteristic and a sign of permanent withdrawal ﬁ'om
reality-oriented activity.

An important alternative position is that of Rothenberg (1979). In what seems to
be an attractive synthesis of psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology, Rothenberg
argues that during the creative act, the unconscious is intentionally and consciously
accessed. This conscious activity is seen to be at least partly motivated by an attempt to
gain control over unconscious material or its reﬂections in the external world. Rothenberg
states:

The acid test regarding mental illness has to do with the processes directly

responsible for creations. If mental illness were to impinge on these

processes or, even more pertinent, if these processes had psychopathological

roots, we could demand that the question be closed. But the speciﬁc creative

processes I have described are not psychopathological in origin; they are at

the opposite end of the spectrum. (1990, p.23)

The relationship between creativity and mental illness continues to be a

controversial issue within psychoanalysis. Discussing this topic, Karon states the

following:

Artistic creation is not regression, but a complex ego ﬁrnction that all of

us have, but only some of us develop to a high degree of efﬁciency as a

means of coping with internal and external reality. It is not the case that

one has to be psychopathological to be artistically gifted, but rather that if

one has severe problems and is an artist, one uses this ego function to cope

with one's problems. (1994, p. 1)

The Humanistic Orientation

In contrast to the emphasis on pathological mechanisms in creative genesis so
characteristic of psychoanalytic formulations, a number of prominent theorists have
viewed creativity as a sign of healthy psychological functioning. Rogers argues as follows:

The mainspring of creativity appears to be the same tendency which we

discover so deeply as the curative force in psychotherapy - man ’s tendency

to actualize himself to become his potentialities. . . This tendency may

become deeply buried under layer alter layer of encrusted psychological

defenses, and awaits only the proper conditions to be released and expressed.

It is this tendency which is the primary motivation for creativity as the

organism forms new relationships to the environment in its endeavor to

most fully be itself. (1961, p.350)

Rogers presents three Inner Conditions of Constructive Creativity. The ﬁrst is
openness to experience which is described as the opposite of psychological defensiveness.
Openness to experience is characterized by a lack of rigidity, a permeability of boundaries
in concepts, beliefs, perceptions, and hypotheses, as well as a tolerance for ambiguity.
Rogers's second condition is an internal locus of evaluation. Here, Rogers suggests that
creativity is a byproduct of a person's relationship with his or her own inner experience,
particularly his or her relationship to affect. The third is the ability to toy with elements
and concepts. Rogers's theory emphasizes the fact that creativity can ultimately be

understood only as an expression of the speciﬁc individual. "Reality exists in a multiplicity

of confusing facts and impressions, but 'I' bring structure to my relationship to reality; I
have 'my' way of perceiving reality, and it is this (unconsciously?) disciplined personal
selectivity or abstraction which gives to creative products their aesthetic quality” (Rogers,
1961, p.349). Thus according to Rogers, creativity is fostered by particular ways of
relating to one's self and one‘s inner experience, speciﬁcally in terms of openness and
sensitivity to affect-laden thoughts and aﬂ‘ect states.
Openness to Experience

A signiﬁcant degree of empirical research has supported Rogers's hypothesis that
creativity is a ﬁrnction of the individual's ability to be open and sensitive to subjective inner
experience. The most substantiated relationships in the research literature are those
between access to affect-laden thoughts and divergent thinking (Dudek & Verreault,
1989; Pine & Holt, 1960; Russ, 1988b) and openness to aﬂ‘ect states and divergent
thinking (Isen et al., 1987; Lieberman, 1977; Russ & Grossmann-McKee, 1990).
Research further demonstrates that children and adults who have access to aﬂ‘ect-laden
thoughts and fantasy are more creative than individuals who are less able to access this
realm of experience. Research shows that access to aﬂ‘ect-laden material and internal
aﬂ‘ect states relates to the personality traits of tolerance of ambiguity and openness to
experience as measured by the Openness to Experience domain of the NEG-Personality
Inventory (McCrae & Costa, in press). These personality traits have also been shown to
relate to divergent thinking (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Thus, the open attitude toward
one's inner experience as described by Rogers has been demonstrated to relate to some of

the key personality traits associated with creativity.

The domain of openness to experience has been gaining increasing attention as an
important construct of personality. This construct shares central features with the
traditional understanding of the creative personality. One landmark study on the creative
personality using the Adjective Check List (Gough, 1979) found that highly creative
people report themselves to be clever, inventive, reﬂective, and unconventional. Low
scorers on creativity describe themselves as commonplace, conservative, and as having
narrow interests. These items are consistent with the personality characteristics
repeatedly identiﬁed in the literature as correlates of creativity, including aesthetic
sensitivity, broad interests, independence of judgment, and tolerance for ambiguity
(Barron & Harrington, 1981). It is possible to interpret most of these traits as
components of a broad domain of personality identiﬁed as openness to experience
(McCrae & Costa, 1985b). Factor analyses of creativity questionnaires, adjective rating
scales, and Q-sort items all point to a ﬁve-factor model of personality similar to the
taxonomy offered in 1963 by Norman (McCrae, 1987). Beyond Neuroticism,
Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness is a ﬁfth domain, Openness to
Experience, which includes intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, liberal values, and
emotional differentiation.

Shame

Shame theory (Kaufman, 1992, 1996) provides an explanation for why some
individuals are more capable of consciously accessing affect-laden inner experience than
others. Those who have difﬁculty remaining open to their inner experience, and are

therefore conceivably inhibited creatively, are likely to be suﬂ‘ering ﬁ'om the eﬂ‘ects of

internalized shame.

Shame has been understood theoretically in a number of ways, but systematic
investigation of shame has only recently begun. The two primary theoretical perspectives
on shame originate in Freudian psychoanalytic theory and Tomkins's aﬂ‘ect theory.
Psychoanalytic Theory

In psychoanalytic theories of shame, the primary human motivational force is seen
to be either libidinal drives or interpersonal relationships. In each case, aﬂ‘ect is seen to
play a subordinate role. Freud originally understood shame to be a reaction formation
against morally forbidden, sexually exhibitionist impulses and drives (Miller, 1985). Miller
argues that this view is too narrow, and that the experience of shame is not limited solely
to bodily concerns. The sources and effects of shame are much more generalized than
Freud's formulation of shame seems to allow.

Wurrnser (1981) argues that shame results from a failure to meet the standards set
by internalized images. Although Wurrnser recognizes that our culture often equates
shame with sexual exposure, he argues that shame often involves a broader experience of
weakness or failure. For example, shame can be triggered by appearing weak or dirty or
defective in one's own eyes. A person's original shame traumas can result in a profound
sense of unloveability, and can also generate various forms of psychopathology. In this
way, Wurrnser believes that shame conﬂicts are the root cause of much severe
psychopathology.

Some psychoanalytic theorists have understood shame as an outgrowth of

interpersonal experience. Lewis (1987a, 1987c) suggests that shame is a "super-ego

10

experience" which alerts the self that "its basic aﬂ‘ectional ties are threatened" (Lewis,
1987c). Shame is described as a state of self-devaluation which results from experiencing
vicariously the negative evaluation of the self by another. Thus, shame necessarily
develops out of relationships with others, and is seen to be originally caused by a failure of
the central attachment bond. But shame is nevertheless viewed in the context of super-
ego functioning.

Affect Theory

In contrast to the stress placed upon physiological drives and interpersonal
relationships characteristic of psychoanalytic theories of shame, Tomkins's (1963, 1987)
theory of affect conceptualizes affect as the primary innate motivational force in human
beings. Tomkins has envisioned nine innate aﬁ‘ects: interest--excitement, enjoyment--joy,
surprise-startle, distress—anguish, fear-terror, anger—rage, shame—humiliation, dissmell,
and disgust (Tomkins, 1987). The primary site of affect expression is the face, and aﬂ‘ect
is viewed primarily as facial behavior. It is ﬁ'om the facial expression of aﬂ‘ect that
conscious awareness of affect is informed. The facial response to shame is characterized
by hanging the head, lowering or averting the eyes, and blushing.

Shame is viewed by Tomkins as an auxiliary affect (Tomkins, 1987a) which
modulates the expression of some other presently occurring positive aﬂ‘ect, notably
interest or enjoyment. Thus in Tomkins's view, shame always requires the prior
experience of positive aﬂ‘ect. Kauﬁnan (1992,1996) has expanded Tomkins's theory of
shame and clariﬁed the mechanism by which shame exerts its inhibiting eﬂ‘ects.

According to Kaufman (1996), the expression of any aﬂ'ect, positive or negative,

11

can be responded to in ways that then permanently link it to shame.

As a result of shame's unique binding eﬂ‘ects, expression of the

shamed, hence forbidden, aﬂ‘ect may become completely silenced,

disguised, replaced by a more acceptable affect or entirely hidden

from view. When all aﬂects meet with shaming, a total affect—

shame bind results, and affect per se becomes shameﬁrl. (1996, p.60)

Kauﬁnan suggests that the internalization of shame in the form of an "affect-shame bind"
is ultimately responsible for an individual's inability to consciously access his or her affect-
laden inner experience.

The speciﬁc mechanism by which shame becomes internalized according to
Kauﬁnan is based upon script theory (Tomkins, 1987b). According to script theory,
individuals internalize their experience through imagery, and this imagery when combined
with aﬂ‘ect is stored in memory as a scene. These scenes then become the basis of
personality (Kauﬁnan, 1996). When an affect, drive, or interpersonal need is followed by
shaming, shame binds are created. The creation of a shame bind involves an internalized
connection between shame and a particular aﬂ‘ect, drive, or interpersonal need. Once a
shame bind has been formed, it is stored in memory in the form of a scene. Later
recurrence of the shame-bound aﬂ‘ect, drive, or interpersonal need will then reactivate the
original scene, thereby spontaneously eliciting shame. Because the affect, drive, or
interpersonal need is now always experienced in conjunction with shame, its expression
becomes restricted. With regard to creative ﬁrnctioning, Tomkins succinctly argues, a

person ‘Vvho is constantly aﬁaid or ashamed or distressed cannot also be interested in the

exploration of novelty” (1963, p.353).

12

Shame Research

Chang (1988) examined the relationship between shame and self-esteem. Shame
was assessed by using the Intemalized Shame Scale (Cook, 1984), and self-esteem was
assessed by means of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and a six item
scale by Cheek and Buss (1981). Chang reported a correlation of -.90 between the
Intemalized Shame Scale and both of the self-esteem scales. In addition, Chang examined
the correlation of the shame and self-esteem scales with a large number of external
variables including depression, anxiety, and anger. Finding the pattern of correlations to
be nearly identical for the shame and self-esteem measures, Chang concluded that shame
and self-esteem, as measured in his investigation, are ”not only almost perfectly correlated,
but also parallel in their correlations with outside variables. They are unidimensional by
both the test for internal consistency and the test for external consistency (or parallelism).
It is, therefore, proposed that shame and self-esteem are the same dimension. That is,
there is only one dimension of shame and self-esteem” (p.87).

Other research has demonstrated the close link between shame and
psychopathology. A recent study by Akashi (1994) demonstrates the pervasive role
played by shame in the psychopathology of a clinical population. The psychopathology
variables were obtained ﬁom administering the Brief Symptom Checklist (Derogatis,
1992). Akashi found signiﬁcant correlations between shame and all categories of
psychopathology on the SCL-SO. Shame has also been shown to play a central role in the
etiology of bulimia nervosa (F rish-McCreery, 1991). In this study, bulimics reported

signiﬁcantly higher levels of shame than non-bulimics. Also, bulimics rated the

13

interpersonal needs theorized by Kaufman (1996) as signiﬁcantly more shameful than non-
bulimics. Shame has also been signiﬁcantly correlated with depression. Izard and
Schwartz (1986) found that among children, college students, and adults, the common
core of emotions in depression included sadness, inner-directed hostility, and shame.
Hoblitzelle (1987) found a signiﬁcant correlation between the Intemalized Shame Scale
and the Beck Depression Inventory. Additional research has pointed to the role of shame
in obsessive-compulsive disorder, interpersonal sensitivity, anxiety, hostility, psychoticism,
phobic anxiety, and paranoid ideation.
Research Objectives and Overview of Design

From the theoretical perspective of affect theory, it can be hypothesized that a high
level of internalized shame will negatively impact an individual's ability to remain open to
affect-laden experience, and therefore will inhibit his or her creative ability. Research
within the psychometric tradition has demonstrated a relationship between creativity and
openness to experience (McCrae, 1987). The present study will contribute to this
understanding by measuring creativity using the Creative Functioning Test, which is a
method more suited to psychoanalytic and humanistic understandings of creative
functioning (Smith & Carlsson, 1990). The present study aims to show that shame limits
an individual's ability to function creatively by disrupting his or her ability to consciously
experience aﬂ‘ect. Thus, openness to experience is hypothesized to be an intervening

variable linking shame and creativity.

14

Hypotheses

1. It is predicted that creative functioning as measured by the CFT will be positively
correlated with openness to experience as measured by the Openness to Experience
domain of the NEO-PI.

2. It is predicted that openness to experience as measured by the Openness to Experience
domain of the NEO-PI will be negatively correlated with the level of internalized shame as
measured by the 188.

3. It is predicted that the level of internalized shame as measured by the ISS, and creative
functioning as measured by the CFT will be related by way of the intervening variable of
openness to experience as measured by the Openness to Experience domain of the NEO-

PI. This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1.

15

Figure l

Hypothesized Path Model

     
   

OPENNESS
TO EXPERIENCE

 

SHAME

l6

CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Subjects

The subjects were 102 undergraduate students recruited ﬁ'om the undergraduate
psychology subject pool at Michigan State University, a large midwestem university. The
subjects in the undergraduate subject pool each received one-half hour credit toward extra
credit points in their psychology class in return for participating in this study.

Questionnaires and Measurement Techniques
The Creative Functioning Test (CFT)

In contrast to the traditional measures of creativity based upon divergent thinking
ability, the CFT views creativity as a " generative or productive way of experiencing
reality, including the perceiver‘s own self” (Smith and Carlsson, 1990, p.5). This model of
creativity assumes that the generative quality of the creative individual’s perception of
reality is facilitated by open communication between diﬁ‘erent levels of inner experience.
“Primitive or unadapted types of experience and mental ﬁrnctioning should be accessible
to reconstruction and re-use, and in this lies the chance to start anew and break away ﬁom
ingrained patterns of experience,” according to Smith and Carlsson, (1990, p.6). This
model assumes that creative ﬁmctioning is fundamentally a process of perception during
which the creative individual pays attention not only to the objective (intersubjective)
reality, but can also make conscious subjective ideas and alternative notions of reality
based on their own subjective experiences and interpretations (Smith, 1981). As a result

of this emphasis on the relationship between the self and reality, the CFT is well suited to

17

psychodynanric and humanistic formulations of creativity. "The psychometric tradition has
focused on problem solving and other cognitive activities, viewed in the light of trait
psychology, while our studies have emphasized relations between the experienced self and
the experienced outside reality in a process perspective” (Smith and Carlsson, 1990,
p.216).

Early research using the CFT clearly demonstrates the sensitivity of this instrument
to the dimension of subjective inner awareness. In the investigation by Smith and
Carlsson, (1990), subjects were induced to focus either on external stimuli or their own
internal mental processes. One group was given placebo pills and informed that the pills
would induce relaxation and increase sensitivity to one’s inner mental life. The other
group was given placebo pills and informed that the pills would increase concentration and
alertness to outside stimulation. Results showed that subjects in the relaxation group
generated signiﬁcantly more alternative interpretations of the presented stimulus on the
CFT than the concentration group, thus indicating the sensitivity of the CFT to level of
inner awareness.

The CFT is carried out by presenting the subject with a gradually prolonged
stimulus using a tachistoscope. A thematic picture is ﬁrst presented in an ascending series
of exposure times beginning with subthreshold values. At a given exposure time that is
long enough for the subject to successfully identify the picture, the series is presented with
descending exposure times. By subsequently diminishing the exposure time, the
experimenter eventually erodes the basis for a correct perception. During this stage of the

test, some subjects chug tightly to the conventional meaning of the picture, while others

18

return to idiosyncratic interpretations. To remain encapsulated in the established meaning
of the picture, that is, to be unable or unwilling to choose alternative interpretations, is
seen to characterize the individual lacking in creativity. In contrast, the creative individual
is seen to be more likely to abandon his or her correct stimulus interpretation and instead
accept more unﬁnished and subjective ones. The developers of the test state that the
“methodology allows us systematically to observe processes ‘behind’ everyday perception,
optimally the entire process from its roots in the individual’s early, primitive experience to
its culmination in an objective reﬂection of reality” (Smith and Carlsson, 1990).

Because the correct interpretation acquires a strongly authoritative stamp, once the
perceiver has learned the correct meaning, he or she is greatly tempted to retain it, not
indulging in subjective or deviant interpretations. According to Smith & Van Der Meer
(1994), the creative individual goes beyond the established version of the stimulus
meaning and demonstrates the courage to break convention and challenge his or her own
anxiety.

The CFT protocols can be scored in both the ascending and descending directions.
However, results of the descending series correlate with the most clearly creative features
of personality (Smith & Danielsson, 1982). In the present study, only the descending
series was scored. The degree to which the correct stimulus meaning is abandoned
provides the criterion of scoring, and this yields three scoring levels: High, Medium, and
Low creativity (Carlsson, 1990). Test-retest reliability is reported to be .80, and interrater
correspondence has been reported to be .92 (Smith and Carlsson, 1990).

High creativity: the subject interprets the whole picture in a completely different

19

way during one or several exposures.

Medium creativity: only part of the picture is interpreted differently, or the
interpretation is rather vague, or only implies plastic changes in the contents of the picture.
Low creativity: at the most the subject reports that the picture gets dimmer,

darker, or disappears piece by piece.
The Openness to Experience Domain of the NED-Personality Inventory (NEO-Pl)
The NEO-PI is a 181-item questionnaire developed through factor analysis to ﬁt a
ﬁve-dimensional model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1985b). An earlier version of the
test, the NEO Inventory (McCrae & Costa, 1983a), measured traits in the three domains
of neuroticism, extroversion, and openness to experience. Recent modiﬁcations (McCrae
& Costa, 1987) have added two new scales to measure agreeableness and
conscientiousness. Internal consistency and 6-month test-retest reliability for the
Neuroticism, Extroversion, and Openness scales range from .85 to .93 (McCrae & Costa,
1983a). The Openness to Experience domain assesses proactive seeking and appreciation
of experience for its own sake as well as toleration for and exploration of the unfamiliar.
In this way it closely approximates the dimension of novelty-seeking derived ﬁ'om
Tomkins's formulation of excitement as the primary aﬂ‘ect underlying creativity. High
scorers on this domain tend to be curious, have broad interests, are creative, original,
imaginative, intellectually curious, emotionally responsive, sensitive, empathic, and value
their own feelings. These characteristics also correspond to Rogers's theoretical construct
of openness to experience. Low scorers tend to have a narrow range of emotions, are less

sensitive to beauty, prefer the familiar, follow strict routines, are narrow minded, and do

20

not enjoy intellectual challenges.

Research relating the NEO-PI to divergent thinking (McCrae, 198 7) demonstrated
that the Openness to Experience domain was positively related to ﬁve out of the six
measures of divergent thinking used in the investigation. The only divergent thinking test
which did not correlate signiﬁcantly to Openness to Experience was the Obvious
Consequences test. McCrae believes that this ﬁnding is the exception that proves the rule.
The Obvious Consequences test calls for common and unoriginal responses which require
certain cognitive skills such as general ﬂuency, but are not reﬂective of creative or
imaginative thinking. Therefore it is not surprising that they are unrelated to openness.
By contrast, the Remote Consequences test, which requires novel responses and
imaginative thinking, is signiﬁcantly correlated with the Openness to Experience domain of
the NEO-PI. No research has been conducted to date examining the relationship between
creative functioning and the Openness to Experience domain of the NEO-PI using a
creativity test suited to the psychoanalytic and humanistic theories of creativity.

The Intemalized Shame Scale

The Intemalized Shame Scale (IS S) was developed to measure enduring, chronic
shame that has become an internalized part of one's identity (Cook,1989). The 188
consists of 30 Likert-scaled items that yield two basic scale scores. The two scales include
a 24-item shame scale and a 6-item self-esteem scale. The scale was initially developed in
1984 and since that time has been administered to over 3,000 subjects in both clinical and
non-clinical settings (Cook, 1990). Extensive reliability and validity studies have resulted

in four revisions of the scale. Alpha reliability coemcients for the most recent version

21

range from .94 for the shame scale and .88 for the self-esteem scale. Test-retest reliability
coeﬂicients range from .71 to .84. A series of studies comparing the 188 with three other
self-concept/self-esteem measures led to the conclusion that the 188 was measuring "a
trait that contributed more to the development of emotional problems than did low self-
esteem alone" (Cook, 1988). Research using the 188 has repeatedly demonstrated a
strong positive relationship between the level of internalized shame and psychopathology
(Rybeck, 1991; Allen et al., 1993; Druschel, 1993; Firestone, 1991; Tangney, 1992).
Procedure

All subjects completed the Creative Functioning Test, the Openness to Experience
domain of the NEO-PI, and the Intemalized Shame Scale. After signing a consent form,
each subject was ﬁrst administered the Creative Functioning Test. The stimulus for the
test was a still life picture of a vase of ﬂowers sitting on a table, and was presented using a
tachistoscope. Five exposures of the stimulus were presented on the ascending series, and
ﬁve exposures were presented on the descending series. Subjects were asked to report
what they saw after each exposure. Following the Creative Functioning Test, subjects
were asked to complete the Openness to Experience domain of the NEO-PI and the
Intemalized Shame Scale. Administration of these two questionnaires was randomized to
control for any effects of order. Following the administration of these questionnaires, the
subjects were given a sheet outlining the theory of the study and a description of the

variables. All subjects were then given an opportunity to ask further questions.

22

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Demographics

The total number of subjects recruited for this study was 102. Three subjects did
not complete all of the items contained in the questionnaires and were eliminated from the
subsequent analyses. Of the remaining sample, 28 were men and 71 were women. They
ranged in age from 17-22 years (mean=19.20 years).

Hypotheses

The relationships between creative functioning (CFT), openness to experience
(NEO), and internalized shame (188) were analyzed using correlational analysis. The
means and standard deviations for the CFT, the Openness to Experience domain of the
NEO-PI, and the 188 are reported in Table 1. The mean score on the Openness to
Experience domain of the NEO-PI was 53 and the standard deviation was 6. The mean
score on the Intemalized Shame Scale was 28 and the standard deviation was 17.
Hwothesis l

The correlations between scores on the CFT and the Openness to Experience
domain of the NEO—PI are reported in Table 2. Consistent with the ﬁrst hypothesis, the

results indicated a strong positive correlation (r=. 59, p<.01) between creative ﬁrnctioning

23

Table 1

Summary of Means and Standard Deviations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Std.
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
CFT 99 1.00 3.00 2.141 .869
OPENNESS 99 23 .00 80.00 61.778 11.056
ISS 99 1.00 88.00 28.232 16.968

 

24

 

as measured by the CFT and openness to experience as measured by the Openness to
Experience domain of the NEO-PI.
ijothesis II

The correlations between scores on the ISS and the Openness to Experience
domain of the NEO-PI are reported in Table 2. Consistent with the second hypothesis,
results indicated a small relationship between the Openness to Experience domain of the
NEO-PI and level of internalized shame as measured by the ISS. Although this
relationship did not reach statistical signiﬁcance at the p>.05 level (r--.06), the inference
probability for this relationship was calculated to be .72, indicating a likely relationship
between these variables as hypothesized.
Hypothesis Ill

Contrary to the hypothesized model, creative ﬁmctioning as measured by the CFT
and the level of internalized shame as measured by the ISS were signiﬁcantly positively

correlated (F22, p<.05).

25

Table 2

Summary of Correlations, Reliabilities, and Confidence Intervals

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CFT OPENNESS ISS
CFT 1.000 .70 .38
.70" .26“
.48 .07
OPENNESS .591” 1.000 .11
-.060
.22
ISS .224“ -.059 1.000

 

**=p<.01
*=p<.05

Note: Correlations above the diagonal are corrected for attenuation

26

 

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

This investigation attempted to lend support to a humanistic formulation of
creativity as a healthy human ability, while reﬁtting a psychoanalytic conception of
creativity as a pathological regressive process. Paradoxically, the results of this study
support both the humanistic and psychoanalytic understandings of creativity. Creativity
was found to be positively correlated with both openness to experience and the level of
internalized shame. Therefore, the question of whether creativity is indicative of healthy
functioning or psychopathology remains obscure. Nevertheless, the ﬁndings of this
investigation have important implications for creativity theory, shame theory, and the
openness to experience dimension of personality.

Beginning with Freud, who ﬁrst formulated the creative process in terms of a
pathological ﬂight from reality, psychoanalytic theorists have generally viewed the work of
the artist as an expression of unconscious wishes and regressive thinking, and therefore as
appropriate material for interpretation within a psychoanalytic context. Contrary to the
hypothesis of this investigation, the results of this study indicate a signiﬁcant positive
relationship between shame and creativity. This ﬁnding can be seen as supporting a
psychoanalytic understanding of creativity by demonstrating a positive relationship
between creative functioning and the level of psychological pathology.

In contrast to such a view, other theories have instead suggested that creativity is
an adaptive process, one which results directly from psychological health. Many of these

theories have hypothesized that creativity requires a certain openness or sensitivity to

27

one’s self and the world. Rogers (1961) theorized that the ﬁrst inner condition of
creativity is openness to experience. For Rogers, openness to experience is characterized
by “being openly aware of one’s feelings and attitudes as they exist at an organic level.”
This results in greater awareness of what exists at this moment in oneself and in the
situation, rather than the distortion of reality to ﬁt a pattern which the individual already
holds (Rogers, 1961). As formulated by Rogers, a primary characteristic of individuals
who are open to their experience is their lack of psychological defensiveness. Thus,
openness to experience allows the creative individual to be free from the psychological
defensiveness that may otherwise reinforce old patterns, thereby restricting the individual’s
ability to view inner and outer reality from a fresh perspective. Unlike Freud (1916) who
believed that creativity involved a ﬂight from reality due to the pathological needs of the
artist, Rogers believed that creativity is a movement toward reality made possible by the
artist’s exceptional degree of openness to inner as well as outer experience. The results of
this study indicate a strong positive relationship between creative functioning and
openness to experience. This ﬁnding lends direct support to Roger’s humanistic theory of
creativity and to one of the main hypotheses of this investigation.

The results of this study thus paradoxically appear to support both the humanistic
and psychoanalytic theories of creativity. Creativity was found to be positively correlated
with internalized shame, a variable associated with psychopathology, and also with
openness to experience, a variable associated with psychological health. However, other
research involving the instrument used to measure the level of internalized shame in this

study may provide an explanation for this apparent paradox. Utilizing a pre-post

28

experimental design, Meola (1988) found that scores on the Intemalized Shame Scale
actually increased signiﬁcantly as predicted, in comparison to the control group, after
subjects attended a course designed to facilitate shame awareness while also increasing
self-esteem. This ﬁnding was interpreted to mean that scores increased on the Intemalized
Shame Scale as a direct result of the subject’s ability “to identify shame and consciously
diﬂ‘erentiate internal patterns of experience which are shame producing” (Meola, 1988,
p.45).

Therefore, it could be argued that people vary in thier ability to asses their level of
unconscious shame. As a result, some of the subjects in the present investigation who
evidenced a high score on the Intemalized Shame Scale may have done so as a result of an
increased awareness of shame rather than because of an actual high level of internalized
shame. This idea is congruent with Roger’s theory of creativity in which the level of
awareness is associated with creative functioning, and it may further explain the positive
relationship between shame and creativity found in this study.

In addition to explaining the apparent paradox observed in this investigation, the
distinction between the level of awareness of shame and the actual level of internalized
shame itself suggests the need to expand shame research in order to more explicitly
include this distinction. One of the cornerstones of shame theory is the commitment to
the central importance of making conscious all aspects of inner and outer experience.
Kaufman (1991) states that a “conscious self is able to experience in ﬁrll awareness all of
the distinctly different components of the self, including affects, needs, drives, and

purposes” (p.11). In later referring speciﬁcally to shame and other negative affects,

29

Kauﬁnan argues that, “conscious access to the entire range of affects is essential” (p.56).
Although shame theory already includes the distinction between conscious and
unconscious shame, there have as yet been no attempts to formulate an empirical measure
of this dimension. Therefore, any measure of shame that does not take this distinction into
consideration is vulnerable to contamination between the level of awareness of shame and
the actual level of internalized shame. Future research using projective tests that assess an
individual’s level of shame independent of the individual’s level of conscious awareness of
shame may provide further insight into this distinction.

A second possible interpretation of the data suggests that a different path model
may be more accurate than the one hypothesized in this investigation. This model is
illustrated in Figure 2. This model suggests that both shame and oppenness to experience
contribute independently to creative genesis.

The results of this investigation also contribute to the dialogue concerning the
nature of creativity research itself. Most traditional psychometric researchers of creativity
employ creativity tests that primarily focus on cognitive activities such as problem solving.
For example, the most famous and widely used creativity test within this tradition is
Guilford’s (1967) test of divergent thinking. Like other psychometric tests of creativity,
this test measures the level of achievement and therefore cannot explain how an individual
achieved a given level, nor the strategies used during the actual creative process.
However, the creative functioning test used in the present investigation is based on a
psychodynanric understanding of the creative process:

We depart from the cognitive test tradition within which creativity usually

30

Figure 2.

Reformulated Path Model

    
   

  

CREA'HVE
FUNCTIONING

  
   

OPENNESS
TO EXPERIENCE

31

has been deﬁned, and place the term, at least partly, in the context of a

psychology of perception. We thus speak of creativity as a generative or

productive way of experiencing reality including the perceiver’s own self.

In accordance with other researchers in the ﬁeld with an orientation toward

psychodynamics, we assume that the generative quality of the reality contact

is favored by open communication between diﬂ‘erent levels of experience.

(Smith and Carlsson, p5, 1990)

The results of the present study support this dynamic view of creativity by demonstrating a
strong correlation between creative functioning and openness to experience. By
highlighting this important relationship, this study further points to the limitations of
traditional psychometric approaches to creativity that do not take into account the role of
openness to inner experience in creative genesis.

Furthermore, this study also adds weight to the general recognition of openness to
experience as a central domain of personality. Previous research has demonstrated a
positive relationship between openness to experience and divergent thinking ability
(McCrae, 198 7). However, no research has been conducted to examine the relationship
between openness to experience and creativity using a creativity test that is suited to a
psychodynamic or humanistic formulation of creative functioning. The results of this
investigation clearly demonstrate a relationship between openness to experience and
creative genesis, and also point to several promising directions for future research. At this
point, research on the domain of openness to experience has focussed on describing such
characteristics of this dimension as curiosity, emotional responsiveness, the tendency to
value feelings, and the level of empathy. The underlying cause for why these

characteristics tend to group together and correlate with openness to experience remains

an important theoretical as well as empirical question. In addition, there has been little

32

empirical investigation into what conditions might cause or facilitate the development of
openness to experience within an individual. Clearly, this construct of personality
promises to be a ﬁuitful domain for ﬁrture psychological research.
Conclusion

The present study sought to examine the relationship between creative ﬁmctioning,
openness to experience, and shame. The aim of the study was to provide support for a
humanistic formulation of creativity while providing evidence against a psychoanalytic
conceptualization of creativity. The results of this study demonstrate a signiﬁcant link
between creativity and openness to experience as hypothesized by humanistic theories of
creativity. The results also indicate a signiﬁcant relationship between creativity and the
level of internalized shame, thereby lending support to psychoanalytic theories of creativity
which associate creative functioning with psychopathology. The results of this study
suggest the need to revise creativity theory to include both the positive and negative
aspects of psychological functioning. Creative functioning may rest on the ability to

consciously tolerate the entire range of both positive and negative aﬂ‘ects.

33

REFERENCES

34

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38

APPENDICIES

39

Appendix A
NED-Personality Inventory

Instructions;

Please make all your answers on the answer sheet. Do not write in this test
booklet. This questionnaire contains 48 questions. Read each carefully. For each
statement, mark the one response which best represents your opinion. Please make sure
your answer is in the correctly numbered space. You will answer using the following
categories.

Stmnglﬂlisagree Disagree Neutral Agree Stranglegree

Mark “SD” if the statement is deﬁnitely false or you strongly disagree.

Mark “12” if the statement is mostly false or you disagree.

Mark “E” if the statement is about equally true or false, or if you cannot
decide, or if you are neutral on the statement.

Mark “A” if the statement is mostly true or you agree.

Mark “SA” if the statement is deﬁnitely true or you strongly agree.

There are no “right” or “wrong” answers, and you need not be an “expert”
to complete this questionnaire. The purpose of th’n experiment will be best served if
you describe yourself and state your opinions as accurately as possible.

Please read each item carefully and mark the one answer that best corresponds to
your agreement or disagreement. Answer every item. Note that the answers are
numbered down the columns on the answer sheet, and make sure your answer is marked in
the correctly numbered space.

I have a very active imagination.

Aesthetic and artistic concerns aren’t very important to me.

Without strong emotions, life would be uninteresting to me.

I’m pretty set in my ways.

I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas.

I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only conﬁrse and mislead
them.

7. I try to keep all my thoughts directed along realistic lines and avoid ﬂights of fancy.
8. I am sometimes completely absorbed in music I am listening to.

99:59.19?"

40

Appendix A (cont)

9. I rarely experience strong emotions.

10. I think it’s interesting to learn and develop new hobbies.

11. I ﬁnd philosophical arguments boring.

12. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reﬂect the needs of a changing

world.

13. I have an active fantasy life.

14. Watching ballet or modern dance bores me.

15. How I feel about things is important to me.

16. Once I ﬁnd the right way to do something I stick to it.

17. I enjoy solving problems or puzzles.

18. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues.

19. I don’t like to waste my time day dreaming.

20. I am intrigued by the patterns I ﬁnd in art and nature.

21. I seldom pay much attention to my feelings of the moment.

22. I often try new and foreign foods.

23. I sometimes loose interest when people talk about very abstract, theoretical matters.

24. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have
may be valid for them.

25. I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and exploring all its possibilities,

letting
it grow and develop.

26. Poetry has little or no eﬂ‘ect on me.

27. I experience a wide range of emotions or feelings.

28. I prefer to spend my time in familiar surroundings.

29. I enjoy working on “mind-twister” type puzzles.

30. I believe that loyalty to one’s ideals and principles is more important than “open-

mindedness”

31. IfI feel my mind starting to drift offinto daydreams,1usually get busy and start
concentrating on some work or activity instead.

32. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that diﬂ‘erent environments produce.

33. Sometimes I make changes around the house just to try something different.

34. I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the human

condition.

35. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people’s life styles.

41

 

Appendix A (cont)

36. As a child I rarely enjoyed games of make believe.

37. I ﬁnd it easy to empathize - to feel myself what others are feeling.

38. On a vacation, I prefer going back to a tried and true spot.

39. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity.

40. I think that if people don’t know what they believe in by the time they are 25, there is
something wrong with them.

41. I would have difﬁculty just letting my mind wander without control or guidance.

42. Certain kinds of music have an endless fascination for me.

43. Odd things - like certain scents or the names distinct places - can evoke strong

moods
in me.

44. I follow the same route when I go someplace.

45. I have a wide range of intellectual interests.

46. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave
of excitement.

47. I believe that the “new morality” of permissiveness is no morality at all.

48. I enjoy reading poetry that emphasizes feelings and images more than story lines.

42

Appendix B
Intemalized Shame Scale

DIRECTIONS: Below is a list of statements describing feelings or experiences that you
may have from time to time or that are familiar to you because you have had these feelings
and experiences for a long time. Most of these statements describe feelings and
experiences that are generally painful or negative in some way. Some people will seldom
or never have had many of these feelings. Everyone has had some of these feelings at
some time, but if you ﬁnd that these statements describe the way you feel a good deal of
the time, it can be painful just reading them. Try to be as honest as you can in responding.

Read each statement carefully and circle the number to the left of the item that indicates
the frequency with which you ﬁnd yourself feeling or experiencing what is described in the
statement. Use the scale below.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Scale
0 1 2 3 4
NEVER SELDOM SOMETIMES OFTEN ALMOST
ALWAYS
0 l 2 3 4 1. I feel like I am never quite good enough.
0 l 2 3 4 2. I feel somehow left out.
0 l 2 3 4 3. I think that people look down on me.
0 1 2 3 4 4. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a success.
0 l 2 3 4 5. I scold myself and put myself down.
0 l 2 3 4 6. I feel insecure about others opinions of me.
0 l 2 3 4 7. Compared to other people, I feel that I never measure up.
0 1 2 3 4 8. I see myselfas being very small and insigniﬁcant.
0 I 2 3 4 9. I feel I have much to be proud of.
0 l 2 3 4 10. I feel intensely inadequate and full of self doubt.
0 l 2 3 4 11. I feel as if] am somehow defective as a person, like there is

something basically wrong with me.

43

 

QQOGQGGQGGOOGOGGGGC

nun—munm—t-n—h-t—H—t-Ii—r-u—u

NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN

UUUUUUUWUUUUUUUUUWW

hbhbhhAh-hbhbbbshhbhh

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
l7.
l8.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Appendix B (cont)

When I compare myself to others I am just not as important.
I have an overpowering dread that my faults will be revealed.
I feel I have a number of good qualities.

I see myself striving for perfection, only to fall short.

I think that others are able to see my defects.

I could beat myself with a club when I make a mistake.

On the whole, I am satisﬁed with myself.

I would like to shrink away when I make a mistake.

I replay painﬁrl events over and over in my mind.

I feel I am a person on an equal plane with others.

At times I feel like I will break into a thousand pieces.

I feel as if I have lost control over my body and my feelings.
Sometimes I feel no bigger than a pea.

At times I wish the earth would open up and swallow me.

I have this painful gap in me that I haven’t been able to ﬁll.

I feel empty and unfulﬁlled.

I take a positive attitude toward myself.

My loneliness is more like emptiness.

I feel like there is something missing.

"illillllllll'lllli