x? .3:
i. .53.». .c:
.mfik‘i‘la;

.7
i

A. flaw
«

A) 1%.;

.‘a

. 1.: Phi. :
y.- Jv 1. v. .5
. www.m«hfia 8.9.13

. 43.J...W.m4.¢\~t.
uni-‘63.: 51.7.4.1“. !
..u.... _ 5 ‘Emflfimfifi
. nan... \Iwimfiu
. rhhfi».

x7

I

‘ c...o...1..wr‘. .

fit“. .- n.

...
.'|

 

.1,
$17;
-:+

V.‘

"V:‘

was

.v Orrin.

‘5

.‘fl’!’ .

.1:

. . twin.

6

a.
.1.

u
.\
9

5’?

up!

D
1

D
.
c
I

{IV it: -

.4I;O

l .0}... firrfl rd.

.ultlto («I'-

f..

VH9»

4550'le . .|

3.30."?

§a.rr§(l.l r

Inf...

1104.

.r<’ it an.—

(In

if”

“H ‘

trvun .

.f

n

a,

Q

17-.
. ma:
.1

be”? a
win». ‘

k...

.11.:an I 'H- . %

4

J. .5:

5
$3.2. .4.»
3,354 . 3

7
..

: . 13.15 ‘~\»

7.

[Jun
liar-..(1.

L40.
8‘ .

All!

.1! ”Hi.

to

 

THESIS
7.

 

 

llTIWWITI'IWWWIW/Wiiifl

3 1293 01707 5270

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS OF U.S. UNION WORKERS IN
SELECTED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN AID AND FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

presented by

FLORIDALMA CASTILLO

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY degmin RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

%fl%

hiajor professor

 

 

Date DECEMBER 2, 1997

 

MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771

 

LIBRARY

Mlohlgln State
Unlvorolty

 

 

 

PLACE IN RETURN BOX
to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.

 

DATE DUE | DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

l

 

p,

 

Ml 3: 9 EDD? AD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

we common-mu

ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS OF U.S. UNION WORKERS IN SELECTED
STATES TOWARD FOREIGN AID AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY
BY

Floridalma Castillo

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Resource Development
1998

ABSTRACT
ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS OF u.s. UNION WORKERS IN SELECTED
STATES TOWARD FOREIGN AID AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
FOREIGN AID POLICY
By

Floridalma Castillo

Foreign aid stimulates U.S. exports and creates jobs. It is estimated that for
every billion dollars Of exports about 20 to 30 thousand jobs are created in the U.S.
Almost 20 percent Of all U.S. jobs are export-dependent. Studies show that in the
1%05 about 1.4 million U.S. workers lost their jobs as a result Of the fallcff of export to
developing countries.

University surveys Observed that unionized workers in the Midwestern
states know very little about developing countries, specially about foreign aid given by
U.S. to these countries. Other research has found that peOpIeS’ beliefs toward U.S.
development aid and foreign assistance in general are based on general assumptions
rather than data.

This research seeks to help decision makers tO establish better foreign
aid and labor policies by providing information about attitudes and beliefs of unionized
workers in selected states toward foreign aid. The focus is on the workers’ support for

foreign aid programs by examining the moral advantages of foreign aid, its economic

cost or disadvantages, and the perceptions Of waste Of U.S. dollars in foreign aid
programs. These issues were tested based on four social psychological models of
public support for public policy. These are: 1) the saliency model, 2) the rational self-
interest model, 3) values model, and 4) the fairness model. In earlier studies, policies
have been tested by these four models in isolation from each other. This research
tested these models in an integrative form, not only by testing variables that relate to
each model but also by relating foreign aid policy to U.S. social programs. The results
Of this study show that the saliency model was not sufficient to explain this
relationship. However, the rational—self interest, values, and the fairness models
were sufficient to explain this relationship.

This author developed two statistical models, the General and the
Integrative, to test the relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid
and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The General model is a
good model tO explain the moral advantage and the economic cost or disadvantage Of
foreign aid, but it is not sufficient to explain workers’ perception Of waste Of U.S. dollars
toward foreign aid programs. The Integrative statistical model is sufficient to explain
these three main components Of workers’ support for foreign aid and their relationship
to their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

This dissertation provides valuable information regarding the target
audience that was not considered before in connection with foreign aid issues. In
addition, global policy interdependencies of develomd and developing countries as
they affect the American worker is an issue that has an enormous importance in

today‘s economies, particularly in the U.S. economy.

DEDICATION

TO my daughter Gizzel Pamela Moran-Castillo,
for her unconditional love, patience and constant encouragement.
To my parents, Alberto Castillo and Julia Castillo,
who from heaven are still sending the melody of love that

they planted in my heart.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. George Axinn, my dissertation
supervisor, for his support, understanding and wise suggestions. Also, I express
my appreciation to my committee members: Dr. Edilbert Montemayor, Dr. Scott Witter
and Dr. Michael Weber, for their constructive criticism and valuable suggestions.

lwould like to extend my appreciation to David Watson, Betty Barrett, Dale
Brickner and Tom Carroll, for their friendship and valuable ideas. Also, I want to
express my special thanks to the United States Agency for lntemational Development,
the School Of Labor and Industrial Relations, especially to the Worker Adjustment to
the Global Economy Project (WAGE) at Michigan State University, for making the
project’s survey data and information available to me to write this dissertation. In
addition, I want to thank Rick Dalebout, my friend, for his caring, understanding, and
for being there for me in my difficult moments.

Finally, I wish to express my deep and special thanks to my brothers, Sisters

and their families for being the stars that lighted my long days Of work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Objective
1.2 Research Background
1.3 Problem Statement
1 4 Research Hypotheses and Assumptions
1 5 Outline Of the Dissertation

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Definition of Foreign Aid
2.2 U.S. Foreign Aid Programs and Policy
2.2.1 Bilateral Aid
2.2.1.1 Development Aid
2.2.1.2 Food Aid
2.2.1.3 Security Assistance
2.2.1.4 Military Assistance
2.2.2 Multilateral Aid and Private Sector Assistance
2.3 Wories of Public Attitudes and Beliefs
2.4 Public Opinions toward Government Spending
2.5 Public Opinions toward Foreign Aid Programs

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 Data Source
3.2 The Survey Population and Instrument
3.3 Conceptual Definitions

cocow-x-s—x

£388

3.4
3.5
3.5.1

Statistical Methods
Statistical Models
Dependent and Independent Variables

3.5.1.1 Dependent Variables
3.5.1.2 Independent Variables

3.6
3.7
3.7.1
3.7.2
3.8

CHAPTER 4

Operational Definitions
Regression Equations
General Model
Integrative Model

Data Analysis

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS

4.1

4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.2

4.3

4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3

4.4
4.4.1
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.5

4.6

CHAPTER 5

Test Of the Four Psychological Models

Issue Saliency Model

Rational Self-Interest Model

Values Model

Faimess Model

Test of the Main Hypothesis

General Statistical Model

Moral Advantage Of Foreign Aid

Economic Disadvantage of Foreign Aid
Perception Of Waste Of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid
Programs

Integrative Model

Moral Advantage or Benefits of Foreign Aid
Economic Disadvantages of Foreign Aid
Perception Of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid
Programs

Comparative Analysis of 1991 -92 and 1995-96 Survey
Data

Conclusions

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

5.1
5.2
5.3

5.4

U.S. Foreign Aid Policy

Short-Run Foreign Aid Policy Implications
Long-Run Foreign Aid Policy Implications
Conclusions and Recommendations

vii

SB‘Q‘SESSSSS

7O
72
75
78
79
79
82

85
87

91

95

101

107
107
111
115

117

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Summary
6.2 Conclusions
6.3 Research Limitations
6.4 Recommendations for Further Research

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: WAGE PROJECT 1995-96 SURVEY

APPPENDIX B: CODE BOOK 1995-96 SURVEY

APPENDIX C: COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF 1991 -92 AND 1995-96
SURVEY

APPENDIX D: VARIABLES INCLUDED IN DIFFERENT MODELS
APPENDIX E: MULTIPLE REGRESSION - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

viii

125
125
128
132
133

135
143

150

155
158

161

Table 3.1

Table 4.1

Table 4.2

Table 4.3

Table 4.4

Table 4.5

Table 4.6

Table 4.7

Table 4.8 ..

Table 4.9

Table 4.10

LIST OF TABLES

Variables Included in Models

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with Travel lnfonnation Seeking Belief

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with Altruism toward Foreign Aid

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with Political Vrew Of Govemment Priorities

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with 7 Main Independent Variables

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with all Independent Variables

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with all Independent Variables

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with Six Independent Variables

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with Four Independent Variables

Correlation between Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid with Three Independent Variables

ix

69

72

74

77

81

87

91

Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
Figure 4.4
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
Figure 5.3
Figure 5.4
Figure 5.5

Figure 5.6

LIST OF FIGURES

Population by Race

Population by Level of Education

Government Priority

Developing Countries Affect U.S. Economy

Read Mailings and Publications from Unions
Credibility of Infonnation Sources

Priority Of Foreign Aid Programs

U.S. Economic Assistance Policy

U.S. Foreign Aid Policy to Buy American Products

Respondents AID Attitudes

103
104
105
106
119
120
121
122
123

124

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Objectives

The main research Objective is to provide information about unionized
workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs in selected states of U.S. in
1991 and 1995-96. Workers support for foreign aid is related to areas Of 1) moral
advantage or benefits Of foreign aid, 2) economic cost or disadvantages, and
3) perception of waste Of U. 8. dollars in foreign aid programs. Also, this study

provides some ideas for the future implications for U.S. foreign aid policy.

1.2 Research Background

J.H. Dunning wrote that around 1850, about 90 percent Of all goods and
services produced by companies in the world were made with components, materials
and labor brought from suppliers located within a mdius Of 100 miles and sold to
buyers within the similar distance. In Dre-industrial time the world economy was
mainly characterized by each country's self-sufficiency. Their main production of

outputs was tO meet their basic needs. Countries were engaged in international

trade when they had a goods surplus to exchange for those goods that they wanted
but could not produce. Govemments’ main involvement in world trade was at
time of war to protect their interests and the interests Of their producers in case Of
threats. Trade played a more important role in the global economy after the industrial
revolution (Dunning, 1993).

Today’s global economy is integrated by almost 200 countries in which
international trade is one Of the most important elements of such relations. According
to the Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project (WAGE), Michigan State
University,‘ the main characteristics Of today global economy are: 1) exchange Of
goods and services in multilateral trade which is essentially dominated by
transnational corporations; 2) high levels of foreign direct investment; 3) high levels of
tedwnolcgy development and transportation and communication systems; 4) low level
Of economic development Of poor countries, which is aggravated by population growth;
5) the increasing importance in the world market Of newly industrialized countries; 6)
the fall of communism and its economic impact in the global economy; 7) the formation
Of regional markets such as European unions and NAFTA and 8) unemployment and

shift in labor markets (WAGE, 1996).

 

'Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project (WAGE) was created by the School of Labor and Industrial
Relations, Michigan State University, with cooperation of faculty and statf at a Midwestern consortium universities.
The original modules of this project were written by Ronald Peters, University Of Illinois, David Spencer and Helen
Moshak, Indiana University, Alvin Lackey and Joel Rosenblit, University of Missouri, Alec Meiklejohn, University
of Michigan, George Hagglund and Noel Harvey, University of Wisconsin, F Ioridalma Castillo and Tom Carroll,
Michigan State University. Additional contributions were provided by Betty Barrett and Dale Brickner, Michigan
State University.

3

The U.S. market economy is changing in part as a result Of changes in
global economic forces. It is shifting from a huge production Of goods to a new
economic system Of services and technology development. For instance, the U.S.
Department Of Labor considers that in the next ten years, about 90 percent of the
total new jobs will be located in the service sector as a result Of global competition
(Department Of Labor, 1990). Also, World Bank data show that U.S. imports
of goods grew 908.03 percent from 1970 to 1991 (The World Bank, 1992). These
examples show some changes in U.S. economic and labor trends. But changes in
labor trends are also happening around the world. An ILO survey revealed
that, in industrial countries, 60 million workers have part-time jobs. Most are women,
many Of whom do not have protection or full-time benefits. This survey found that this
labor trend is also growing in developing countries, but not at the same scale as
industrial nations. In the U.S., part-time employees represent almost 20 perwnt Of the
total workers (AFL-CIO, 1995).

According to the Workforce 2000 Research Report, global competition
and global changes will influence two major forces Of change in workforce trends and
in U.S. industry The first force will affect labor markets and products in a shift from an
economy Of goods production to services, the development of a high level of
technology, and an increase of competition in labor markets, services and product
This report suggested that the second force will affect the process and internal

structure Of industries in the U.S., such as changes in job mix and changes in

demogmhic trends (Workforce Research Report, 1990). Katz and Kochan state that
new high-skilled jobs will be created, but the lack of training for these new jobs will
force workers to be unemployed or to take low-pay jobs (Katz an Kochan, 1992). This
will create pressure over the whole economy and labor market. This will be
conplemented with a higher shift of capital to developing countries. This phenomenon
is already happening, as Lappé and Collins indicated that almost 7 million jobs were
lost in the U.S. by plant closings between 1978 and 1982 because capital shifted to
other countries (Lappé and Collins, 1986).

There are linkages among the world‘s workers. Low-paying jobs in
developing countries affect the standard of living in the U.S. Data given by the
Department of Commerce show that in 1991 about 14 percent of U.S. population - or
35.6 million peOple - lived below poverty level. The gap between the highest 20
percent Of the U.S. population and the lowest 20 percent Of the population is getting
bigger (Department Of Commerce, 1991). The World Bank data show that in
1985 the top 20 percent Of the U.S. population had 41.9 percent of the income or
consumption, asopposedtothelowestZOpercentwith47percentofincomeor
consumption (The World Bank, 1992).

There are interdependencies among nations and strong linkages among
workers in the world. Transnational corporation's investment and foreign aid are
two important elements that make these linkages possible. Foreign direct

investment in the U.S. generates 3 million jobs and U.S. foreign direct investment in

5

other countries generates 6 million jobs (WAGE, 1996). Transnational corporations
tend to control the world’s investment and trade. They create 65 million jobs around
the world. The expansion Of today’s economy is mainly developed by transnational
corporations that control a third of the world’s productive assets. But, foreign aid is
also another source of controlling trade, investment and international political
decisions.

According to the WAGE Project, the main arguments for U.S. foreign aid
are: 1) aid to industrial and developing countries help them to expand their economies
which will provide an enormous market for U.S. products; 2) countries to which U.S.
aid is given are more likely to support U.S. international decisions and 3) foreign aid
helps to keep the world's peace and security by avoiding lntemational conflicts
(WAGE Project 1996). A U. N. resolution of 1970 called for countries to allocate 0.7
percent Of their GNP to provide foreign aid to developing countries. The U.S. provided
$11.337 billion for foreign aid in 1991/92. But that was only 0.2 percent Of its GNP.
The U.S. provides the lowest proportion of its GNP, after Ireland, of any Of the 21
member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Norway is the
highest provider of aid as a percentage of GNP, followed by other Scandinavian
countries and the Netteriands. According tO WAGE Project, almost 70 percent of U.S.
foreigi aid is spent in this country. However, the U.S. Administration mandated that all
foreigi aid will be tied tO U.S. purchases to protect jobs in this country (WAGE Project,
1996).

Foreign aid stimulates U.S. exports and creates jobs. It is estimated that for
every billion dollars Of exports, about 20 to 30 thousand jobs are created in the U.S.
Almost 20 percent of all U.S. jobs are export-dependent. A study done by the WAGE
Project shows that in the 19805 about 1.4 million U.S. workers lost their jobs as a
result Of the faIIOff in export to developing countries (WAGE Project, 1996).

This background statement illustrates the interdependencies among
countries and workers in the world. However, surveys and studies Show that some
U.S. workers have a lack of formal knowledge and have a misunderstanding about the
global economy. There are many myths and beliefs that have an impact on their
attitudes toward international issues, particularly foreign aid, trade, and transnational
corporations. The WAGE Project, School of Labor and Industrial Relations,
MSU, did a survey to evaluate this situation in 1991. This survey showed that
unionized workers in the Midwestern states do not know enough about developing
countries, especially about foreign aid given by U.S. to these countries. The survey
found that people's beliefs toward U.S. development aid and foreign assistance in
general are based on general assumptions rather than data (WAGE Project data,
1991). In addition, there is a lack of a national development education program to
prepare unionized workers to address the changes in the global economy. This is a
main concern for university labor educators who are aware of the changes in
international economic and labor trends. They tend tO believe that workers need to

have more information to respond tO this global competition and labor market

changes.

This research seeks to help decision makers to establish better foreign
aid and labor policies by providing information about attitudes and beliefs Of
unionized workers in selected states toward foreign aid. This study focus on
workers’ support Of US foreign aid programs by examining the moral advantages
Of foreign aid, the economic disadvantages of foreign aid, and the waste Of U. 8.
dollars in foreign aid programs. This research provides information regarding this
twget audience that was not considered before in connection with foreign aid issues.

In addition, global policy interdependencies of developed and developing
countries as they afiect American workers is an issue that has an enormous
importance in the U.S. economy.

Foreign aid policy impacts not only the U.S. economy by creating new
markets, jobs and products, but it also affects other countries' economies, especially
those Of developing countries. Therefore, workers' opinions, attitudes and beliefs may

have a future impact on U.S. lntemational aid and labor policies.

1.3 Problem Statement

Some studies have been done related to public opinion about foreign aid.
But, the literature review (see chapter 2) shows that specific research has not been
done about union workers beliefs and attitudes toward foreign aid and domestic

eccnornic programs. A published study related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward

foreign aid and how these can have some future implications for U. 8. foreign aid
policy has not been found. The work done by the WAGE project is directly related to
workers and the global economy, but it tends to focus on development of curriculum
material to be taught to union leaders and union workers in the Midwestern states in
future time.

Other literature focuses mainly on public opinions toward foreign aid but
not related to global economy, union workers or fairness issues. The American
Labor Federation (AF L-CIO) and the lntemational Labor Organization (ILO) have
done some research about U.S. workers, but that is connected to U.S. employment
issues. Therefore, this research looks at union workers support for foreign aid
programs in terms of three variables: 1) the moral advantages of foreign aid, 2) the

economic disadvantages Of foreign aid, and 3) the waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid

programs.

1.4 Research Hypotheses and Assumptions

The main assumptions of this research are: 1) there is a direct relationship
between individuals knowledge and changes in their attitudes, beliefs and behaviors;
2) individuals are able to change their behaviors and attitudes when these are
compatible with their beliefs; 3) individuals are free to make decisions in accepting
new knowledge or information or to reject it if they are not supported by their beliefs;

and 4) there is a consistency between one’s policy support and one’s values.

9

Based on these assumptions and studies about public attitudes toward welfare
programs, the main hypothesis Of this research is ”Unionized Workers’ Support
for Foreign Aid is related to Workers Attitudes and Beliefs Toward
Foreign Aid Programs. ”

Workers support for foreign aid is studied by the following main
Dependent Variables: 1) the moral advantages of foreign aid, 2) the economic
disadvantages of foreign aid, and 3) perception of waste Of U. S. dollars in foreign aid
programs. Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs are studied based on the
following main Independent Variables: 1) travel and information seeking beliefs,
2) trust of the sources of information, 3) altruism toward foreign aid, 4) political view of
govemment priorities, 5) concerns for third worid countries, 6) global interdependence,
and 7) foreign aid priorities.

1.4 Outline of the Dissertation

The remainder Of the dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 2
is a review Of relevant literature, and chapter 3 characterizes the research methods
used to measure attitudes and beliefs Of U.S. union workers in selected states toward
foreign aid. This chapter first provides a general description of four existing models to
test public attitudes toward government spending. Then, based on these models, an
integrative model is created tO measure union workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward

foreign aid. Chapter 4, presents the analysis and findings of this research. It discusses

10

the results Of union workers’ support for foreign aid programs. Also, results of moral
advantages Of foreign aid, its economic cost or disadvantages and perceptions Of
waste Of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs is provided. A general analysis Of future
implications Of union workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid on U.S. foreign
aid policy is developed in chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the general

findings and conclusions Of this research. It also presents some recommendations.

Chapterz

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is impossible to cover in this study all the theories that exist about foreign
aid and foreign aid policy. Policy literature, especially development policy, has a very
long history. It started with the philosophy of Plato (427—347 BC), and continues with
Aristotle’s thoughts (384-322 DC.) It was followed by the middle age philosophical
and theoretical principles Of Marx and theological thoughts of Aquinas and Augustine.
Then, the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries scholars appeared such as John
Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Malthus, and John Mill. Then by the second third
of the ninetwnth century, a new school Of thought dominated government policy, such
as Karl Marx, Veblen, and neO-Marxists. However, some of Marx's thoughts had
already existed for a long time. Today, aid in the context of development policy is
considered not only by economists, but also by political scientists, sociologists,
historians, psychologists, and others.

Considering this long literature history, only the most important arguments
were included for the purpose of this research literature review. However, new

approaches continue to develop. For instance, there are six rationales for providing

11

12

U.S. foreign aid tO other countries: 1) Political, 2) Economic, 3) Strategic, 4)
Moral/Humaiitaian, 5) Environmental, and 6) Comparative Advantage. Each Of these
approaches has its own reasons for providing aid to other countries, especially
developing countries. These rationales have some similarities to those theories
provided by this study in each Of the U.S. foreign aid programs. But, there are always
proponents and opponents in all public policy decisions. For instance, some of those
in favor Of foreign aid believe that elements such as water and air pollution, nuclear
waste, green house effect, ozone layer, and global warming are not only national or
political concerns. These issues will require intemational cooperation and funding
(Environmental Rational).

Proponents of the Comparative Advantage Rationale based their believes
in questions such as ; What would be lost in terms of national interests if U.S. cuts all
foreign aid?. If foreign aid is eliminated what other political tools the U.S. will be able
to use to implement American foreign policy? If U.S. fails tO provide foreign aid which
other comtries will ake its place?. How developing countries and other recipients will
react if US withdrew? Comparative advantage rationale believers said that until U.S.
finds a new substitute, the best available Instrument of foreign policy Is foreign aid
(WAGE, 1996). This is seen as a good tool to influence other governments decisions,
to open new markets to U.S. products, to create and maintain jobs in U.S. and
overseas, and to protect U.S. security interests. Foreign aid is also justified by the

economic, strategic, political, moral/humanitarian, and environmental rationales.

13

However each Of these arguments has, in theory, its own interests; in practice, these
interests overlap and conflict with each other. For instance, U.S. provided foreign aid
to Ethiopia when this government was friendly to the Soviet Union. Also, foreign aid
was provided to Central American region when some Of these governments were
oppressing their people’s, human rights and freedom.

Considering the quantity Of existing literature related to foreign aid and

foreign aid policy, a bibliography is provided at the end of this dissertation.

2.1 Definition of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid may be defined as any type of assistance that one country
provides to another. These resources could be financial in terms Of grants or loans
and may be provided by private and/or public agencies. They may include particular
commodities, food, machinery, equipment, military hardware and other supplies.2

According tO the Development Assistance Committee Of the OECD
Organization, foreign aid or assistance refers only to flows that qualify as “Official
development assistance” (ODA), i.e., loans or grants provided by the Official
government, loans or grants for economic and welfare development, and loans and
grants transfer under specific financial terms. Assistance may be provided in terms Of

commodities, training or any other type of technical, financial or economic aid.

 

2Unless otherwise stated, and in particular statistical data, this study adopts this definition of foreign aid which
also includes “Official development assistance” (ODA).

14

Credits, loans and grants for military use, and training for military purpose are
excluded from development aid definition (Development Cooperation, DAC Review,
1979; OECD, 1984. P. 188).

There are more definitions about foreign aid, some narrower than others.
For instance, Mosley said that overseas aid is “money transferred on concessional
terms by the governments of rich countries to the governments Of poor countries”
(Mosley, 1987. p. 3). McNeill considers that foreign aid “consists essentially in the
people Of one country providing assistance to the people Of another country, each
being represented by an agency.” (McNeill, 1981. P9).

Some international organizations tend to define foreign aid based on their
missions or objectives. For instance, the U.S. Agency for lntemational Development
(USAID) defines development assistance as “the functional accounts aimed at long-
term development in the fields of agriculture, rural development and nutrition,
population planning, health, child survival, AID prevention and control, education and
human resources development, the private sector, energy and environment, science
and technology, the development funds for Africa, and special assistance initiatives
and humanitarian and technical assistance for the former Soviet Republics”. In
addition, USAID includes in its development aid statistical data, funds for the
lntemational Narcotics Control programs and for the Peace Corps (United States

Agency for lntemational Development, 1992. p. 3).

15
2.2 U.S. Foreign Aid Programs and Policy

Trade, technology transfer and foreign aid have a long history. Trade was
developed when a group or tribe exchanged with another. It was extensive when the
Greek and Roman Empires dominated the world around 500 8.0. Trade was based
on one country’s supply of goods (skills and natural resources) and other country's
needs and capability to supply other goods (WAGE, 1996).

Technology transfer goes back to the time when human groups used to
move from place to place, canying some Of their animals and plants with them. It was
expanded through religious activities, military conquests, relationships among
families, and government programs (Axinn, 1988).

U.S. foreign aid history is fairly long. It started when the U.S., Germany and
France started to provide subsidies to their colonies before 1914. This kind of
overseas aid was known as budgetary subsidy, grant in aid or infant colony subsidies
(Mosley, 1987). A moral obligation was not tied to this kind of aid. However, history
shows that most Of these countries were interested in colonies’ raw materials,
especially during World War I. Under the stress Of the great world depression,
lntemational investment was contracted and protectionist policies were implemented
in 1931-32 by powerful nations. This was worsened by the lack Of loan repayments
from Latin American countries. Under these world conditions the first idea of
development was considered in the atmosphere Of political discussions (Mosley,

1987). However, the general idea of aid was already considered by Lord Milner,

16

British Colonial Secretary from 1919 to 1921. Mosley quotes Milner’s aid argument
as follows: “What these countries (la. the colonies) need... is economic equipment-
roads, railways, engines, tractors, and in some cases, notably the Sudan, irrigation
works. It would increase employment and purchasing power at home as well as in the
countries where the work Of development is proceeding... Their development is a
question of money - and money from outside” (Mosley, 1987. p.11).

The most important period Of U.S. foreign aid began in the late 1940s with
the Hany S. Truman Administration. After World War II, the U.S. immediately
provided assistance tO 16 Western European countries by using the Marshall Plan of
1949-52. Its purpose was to help them recover economically from the struggles of the
war. U.S. assistance was extended later to the Far East, South Asia, Middle East,
Latin America and Africa by starting the Point Four program in 1951 (Mason, 1964).
Foreign aid was channeled to these nations as technical and military assistance and
capital transfers to help them to develop (Axinn, 1988). However, the amounts of U.S.
foreign aid have been reduced over the years. For instance, in 1991, the U.S. foreign
aid amount was smaller ($9.4 billions) than U.S. spending on alcohol ($91.6 billions),
tobacco, toiletries, nondurable toys, hair/health, commercial amusements, and
seeds/plants Mage, 1996). Total foreign aid was less than one percent (0.98 %) of

the total U.S. budget in fiscal year 1993. (Agency for lntemational Development

17

FY 1993 Budget, 1992).3
Foreign aid may be Classified in two main categories: bilateral and

multilateral aid.

2.2.1 Bilateral Aid
Bilateral aid is an assistance given from one government to another.
Bilateral aid is divided in four groups: development aid, food aid, security

assistance, and military aid (Agency for lntemational Development, 1992).

2.7.1.1 Development Aid

Development Aid usually refers to long-term loans (low Interest) and grants
to assist comtries in areas of family planning, health, education, agriculture and other
agricultural related activities. Transfers are also available for technical assistance and
training (WAGE, 1996). According to the U.S. Agency for lntemational Development,
U.S. foreign assistance for development and humanitarian purpose represented 21
percent ($3.1 billion) of the total foreign aid budget ($14.8 billion) in 1993. In absolute
team, the largest amount of development assistance went tO Africa (30.3 %), followed
by Caribbean and Latin American countries (19.3%), and alter by Europe (16.7%) in

1993. However, analyzing this data on per capita basis, Europe received the highest

 

3Unless otherwise stated, Fiscal Year I993 represents foreign aid budget requested by the U .8. Agency for
International Development for I993.

18

amount ($2.11 per person), Africa followed as second ($1.61 per person), the
Caribbean md Latin Wrican region take the third place ($1.23 per person), followed
by the independent states of the former Soviet Union ($1.21 per person). Asian
countries received the lowest amount ($0.26 per person) (Agency for lntemational
Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

In regard to U.S. development assistance as an instrument Of foreign aid
policy, there are different arguments. Some writers are in favor Of U.S. development
aid as a foreign aid policy tool. They believe that developing countries need U.S. help
to develop. Although the Cold War has ended, it is in the U.S. interest to help less
developed countries tO develop successfully to ensure they will adopt future policies to
fulfill U.S. best purposes. Also, U.S. can afford tO help developing countries to reach
development since U.S. per capita GNP is high compared to these countries
($23,240). In addition, U.S. development funds are mainly spent by developing
countries in purchasing U.S. products and paying U.S. consultants. Also,
development aid promotes U.S. market expansion. New markets for U.S. products will
be taken away by other donors if U.S. does not provides this kind Of assistance.
Development aid also can help developing countries to reduce the negative impacts
that colonial powers and the imperialism Of the west created in those countries. It
helps to train workers from developing countries, who may be familiar with U.S.
technology. Also, some of these professionals may decide to stay or migrate to U.S.,

who will help the development of the U.S.. They may help to enrich the U.S. human

19

resources since they may have higher knowledge Of their countries. Also,
development aid is considered to be temporary, since countries can reach adequate
levels of sustainable growth over time, such as the cases Of Brazil and Korea (WAGE,
1996). Finally, development aid is important as a foreign aid policy instrument
since there are market failures that only a govemment aid policy can correct.
There are other scholars who are against development aid as a tool Of U.S.
foreign policy. They say that although developing countries may need development
assistance, U.S. aid funds are needed and better used in domestic programs.
Defenders Of this theory question the U.S. capability to provide this kind Of aid . They
ask the question, “How can U.S. help other countries when it has problems with
drugs, poverty, crime, and other social ills?”. They believe that U.S. has to give more
attention to these problems to be an example to be followed by developing countries.
In addition, some scholars said that developing countries may not be interested in the
kind of development that U.S. tries to impose on them. U.S. government sacrifices
middle class workers to pay high taxes to help developing countries with low per
capita GNP. This only helps developing country elites to get richer and the poor tO get
poorer. It is better to let the private market to take care of the losses, uncertainties,
and risks rather than middle class taxpayers. Therefore, it is better to help the U.S.
poor who may also increase domestic demand. Also, it may be true that other aid
donor will take U.S. markets away, but the U.S. products can be sold to those

countries which are interested in buying them. Another argument against

20

development aid is that U.S. does not have any obligation to correct errors that
colonial powers made since U.S. was not one Of them. Also, training provided to
developing countries staff may impact negatively the U.S. labor market. Job
Opportunities are reduced for U.S. citizens since professionals from developing
countries migrate to this country. Finally, development assistance programs are not

temporary since there is always an excuse to fund them (WAGE, 1996).

2.2.1.2 Food Aid

Food Aid is mainly provided as grants to help countries with school feeding
programs, relief work, emergency food shortages, and work projects. Also, food aid
may be sold for recipients local currency or for U.S. dollars. Food grants are given to
U.S. private voluntary organizations such as Red Cross or CARE, or to international
organizations such as the United Nations (WAGE, 1996). U.S. legislation recognizes
food aid as Public Law 480 (PL 480), but publicly is known as Food for Peace.
Public Law 480 is integrated with three titles. Title I is a program to sell U.S.
agricultural commodities to developing countries for local currency or U.S. dollars.
Title II represents a grant program for emergency, development or humanitarian relief.
This program is carried out by voluntary private/non private agencies such as the
Food Program from the United Nations and CARE. Title III is also a grant program. It

was established in 1990 with the purpose to provide food for development purpose to

21

selected developing countries4 (WAGE, 1996).

U.S. food aid (PL 480) represented 10 percent ($1.4 billion) Of the total
foreign aid budget ($14.8 billion) in 1993. The top regions to receive U.S. food
assistance in absolute terms were; Near East (19.1%), Asia (18.9 %), Latin
American and Caribbean region (17.6%), and Africa (11.4 %) in 1993. Egypt was the
top comtry to receive food in the Near East region (68%) in 1993. Egypt was also the
highest per capita food aid recipient ($2.75 per person). Therefore, the Near East
mgion, including Egypt, took the highest per capita food aid ($1.70 per person) among
all the regions. Europe is the region that received the lowest amount of U.S. food aid
in 1993 (1.7 %). However, Asia and Europe took the lowest place in average food per
capita ($0.14 and $0.09 per person, respectively). Latin American/Caribbean and
Africa had an average per capita food aid under fifty cents ($.46 and $.25 per person,
respectively) (Agency for lntemational Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

There are different Opinions toward food assistance as an instrument Of
domestic and foreign aid policy. Scholars that favor food aid policy believe that U.S.
citizens should not allow the hungry and poor starve to death when there is plenty Of
food in this nation. It is a U.S. Obligation to help the needy and poor. Food aid
benefits the U.S. by selling or donating surplus food tO countries with food shortages,
which reduces the U.S. high storing costs. Also, defenders of food aid believe that

U.S. may achieve its lntemational interest by using food aid as a foreign policy tool.

 

4This legislation can be found in Public Law 89-808 United States Statutes at Large 80, 1966. p. l526.

22

Food aid not only may help U.S. industry by promoting developing countries to provide
raw materials, but also may generate future industrial export demand. In addition,
food aid may create jobs in the U.S. agricultural and industrial sectors (WAGE, 1996).

There are other scholars that oppose to use food assistance as U.S.
foreign aid policy instrument. They say that food aid does not necessarily reach the
poor and needy. Also, U.S. food surplus aid programs promote niral migration to
urban areas since local farmers in developing countries are discouraged to produce.
Then, high levels of rural migration creates a labor surplus which pushes down wages.
This phenomenon promotes U.S. firms to move to developing countries since there is
abundance of cheap labor and cheap raw materials. Business reallocation may
impact U.S. industry since many plants will close their activities and U.S. jobs may be
lost. In addition, food aid does not necessarily promote imports of cheap raw
materials from developing countries since these products can be sold on the free
market which would allow buyers to get them at fair market price. Also, there is not
strong evidence that food aid programs promote export demand of U.S. products. But,
there is evidence that food aid contributes to changes in developing countries’
consumption patters and diets. This increases poor countries demand for certain
products which may not be produced domestically. Therefore, developing countries
may increase their food dependency (WAGE, 1996).

Some writers believe that food aid not only helps developing countries with

food shortages, but also it is used as a tool Of domestic policy interests. For

23

instance, Mason said; “Agricultural surplus disposal, which accounts for a sizable
fraction of U.S. aid, is primarily concerned with domestic interests. Japanese financial
assistance is frankly tied to commercial aims. SO also is the aid from a number of
countries. All this does not mean, Of course, that a purely disinterested desire to help
less developed countries plays no part in inducing foreign aid appropriations” (Mason,

1964. p. 4).

2.2.1.3 Securlty Assistance

A third type of bilateral aid is Security Assistance. The main purpose Of this
kind Of assistance is to protect U.S. political and strategic interests around the world.
This aid is transfemd in a form of cash to a nation’s budget or financial support is
provided to buy U.S. commodities. The U.S. makes this kind of aid available through
the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which has tO be used based on military base
rights. Security aid is also transfened to countries to forgive them from financial debts.

According to the U.S. Agency for lntemational Development, security
assistance is registered as development aid since some Of its funds are used in some
development projects (Agency for lntemational Devel0pment, 1992). Security aid
represented 22 percent Of the foreign aid budget in fiscal year 1993 ($3.2 billion).
However, U.S. Congress approved only $2.670 billion for security assistance from
$3.2 billion requested in 1993. The main proportion of U.S. security aid requested in
FY 1993 was provided to the Near East (68.1 %). Israel received almost 39 percent Of

24

the Near East security aid and Egypt took 26 percent of this aid. Both countries
together received 95 percent of the total security aid provided to the Near East in FY
1993. The second region that received a high proportion Of security aid in 1993 was
Latin American/Caribbean (LAC) region. LAC received almost 20.9 percent Of security
assistance, followed by Asia (4.7%), former Soviet Union (3.2%), Europe (2.5%), and
Africa (0.6%). However, on a per capita basis, Israel received the highest amount of
U.S. security aid ($263.29 per person), followed by Nicaragua and El Salvador
($33.16 and $29.35 per person, respectively). Egypt received a big amount Of security
assistance, but on a per capita basis, it took 4th place ($15 per person) (Agency for
lntemational Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

Defenders of security aid as a foreign aid policy instrument argue that this
kind Of assistance is needed to promote democracy in developing countries, respect
for human rights and freedom. Therefore, security aid promotes military and political
stability in those countries. Also, security assistance allows U.S. to have friendly
relationships with developing countries to influence their domestic and lntemational
policies and decisions. This will benefit U.S. in the long run, especially in United
Nations’ decisions. Therefore, security assistance is an important policy tOOl to
achieve the U.S. international interests. Although the Cold war ended, U.S. needs
allies to control the proliferation of nuclear weapon. This can be achieved by providing
security assistance to developing countries since it will allow U.S. to be involved in

these countries.

25

Considering that some of the security aid funds are used for development
purposes, some scholars believe that security aid helps tO promote U.S. exports of
commodities. Security aid is provided for debt forgiveness and to maintain U.S. military
base rigits. Therefore, this kind of aid helps to maintain U.S. jobs overseas and to get
support for U.S. military bases in other countries. For instance, the Agency for
lntemational Development reported that in 1996 it had 3065 employees. About 40
percent of these workers were located in Washington, DC. and 60 percent were
working abroad. Also, this agency had about 1,070 foreign employees working
abroad. All these workers were under USAID payroll (WAGE, 1996. p. 18).

Security aid also allows U.S. to provide debt forgiveness. For instance, the
U.S. gave Egypt a military debt forgiveness of $1.2 billion in 1990 and $1.855 billion in
1991. These amounts were part Of the U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA)
(Agency for lntemational Development, 1991, 1992). Also, U.S. Congress, since
1985, ordered that security assistance provided to Israel be at least equal to the
principal and interest Of its debt to the U.S.. Therefore, Israel has been forgiven from
all its debts to the U.S. (WAGE, 1996).

Scholars that oppose use of security aid as tool Of U.S. foreign aid policy,
believe that U.S. provides this kind Of aid to support authoritarian governments.
These regimes not only repress citizens freedoms, but also violate their human rights.
Also, security assistance is used to interfere with other countries policies. But

governments in developing countries know the game and try to take advantages from

26

all donors. In addition, security assistance only creates instability since countries are
pushed to achieve more development which already produces instability itself. Also,
developing countries use this aid to increase their military expenses which also
creates more instability.

Defenders Of this security aid argument also believe that U.S. can not buy
allies to help tO control the expansion Of nuclear warheads. U.S. ability to control the
production Of nuclear weapons is limited since any country can produce them secretly.
In addition, If security aid' is used as an instrument Of foreign policy to achieve U.S.
international interests, it is much better to transfer this function to the State
Department. Also, security aid as a tool Of foreign aid policy is not needed to fulfill
U.S. strategic purposes in getting rights to military bases overseas (WAGE, 1996).
Considering that the Cold War had ended, U.S. does not need military bases in

developing countries. It is time to let these countries mn their own policies.

2.2.1.4 Military Assistance

The last type of U.S. bilateral assistance is called Military Aid. The U.S.
provides loans with low-interest rates and grants to buy U.S. hardware such as
munitions, aircraft, and tanks . It also includes the provision Of military training or
technical assistance to friendly countries (WAGE, 1996).

Military aid represented 28 percent of the total foreign aid provided in FY

1993. The Near East got the highest proportion of military aid in 1992 and 1993.

27

About 77 percent was given to the Near East. Israel received almost 44 percent and
Egypt took 32 percent of the total military aid provided to this region. Europe and Latin
American/Caribbean followed with 16 and 5 percent, respectively. Asia and Africa
received the lowest proportion Of military aid in FY 1993 (1.3 % and 0.5 %,
respectively). The highest proportion of military assistance in per capita terms, was
provided to Israel ($395 per person) and Egypt ($24 per person) in 1993.. They were
followed by Europe ($2.92 per person) and Latin American/Caribbean ($0.48 per
person) (Agency for lntemational Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

Considering military assistance as an instrument of U.S. foreign aid policy,
there are writers who are in favor or against military assistance. Scholars who agree
to use military aid as an instrument of foreign aid policy, said that military aid helps
popular governments to stay in power by promoting democracy in government
institutions. Also, this kind Of aid encourages military and political stability in recipient
countries. For instance, the case of U.S. military aid provided to Israel to promote
peace and political stability with Palestine. Military aid is helping to keep peace in the
middle east. U.S. involvement in developing countries help to keep control Of those
countries that buy U.S. military equipment and hardware. In addition, military aid
provides training to citizens from developing countries. This aid will favor U.S. in the
long-run since they will support U.S. in world problems.

Scholars against using military aid as a tool Of foreign aid policy, believe

that U.S. is only promoting unpopular governments that repress citizens, violate

28

freedom and human rights. Also, military assistance helps developing countries to
increase military expenses by accumulating huge amounts Of military hardware.
Therefore, military and political instability increase in those recipient countries. In
addition, U.S. will not get support from developing countries in military world
actions. These countries may make their own political and military decisions when
they will be needed. Therefore, military aid only serves the U.S. political and military
interests. It is better to use all these resources to solve domestic problems, such as

crime, poverty and dnigs (WAGE, 1996).

2.2.2 Multilateral Aid and Private Sector Assistance

A second category of foreign assistance is known as Multilateral Aid. This
is the kind of aid provided to other countries through international organizations such
as the Worid Bank and the United Nations Specialized Agencies. Its main objective is
to achieve development. All the funds provided by donor govemments are collected
jointly and transferred to a particular government. This category also includes
foreign aid provided by some countries in the world, that is transferred to lntemational
agencies taking the form of contributions.

Multilateral aid is based on the assumption that countries have high desire
to strengthen the United Nations. It is also assumed that it is expensive and difficult to
create a particular aid administration in each country (Mason, 1964).

There is another type Of assistance which is provided by the private sector.

29

This aid refers to grants, loans or other types Of assistance transferred by private
organizations from one country to citizens or public/private organizations in another
nation. This kind Of assistance is transferred by voluntary or non-voluntary private
agencies. Most of this aid is provided based on private organization’s mission or on
recipient’s particular purpose or emergency.

U.S. foreign aid is extensive and has positive and negative effects in other
countries’ development processes. Statements in favor or against using specific
foreign aid programs as instruments of foreign aid policy were presented. Also,
positive and negative impacts were discussed in the context of foreign aid policy.
However, there are writers such as Cassen who believes that “lntercountry statistical
analyses do not show anything conclusive - positive or negative - about the impact of
aid on growth. Given the enormous variety Of countries and types Of aid, this is not
surprising... aid may or may not be strongly related tO growth, depending on the
circumstances” (Cassen, 1986). Also, Morgenthau believes that different types Of aid
have to be provided under different Circumstances, which need a very deep and
careful analysis (Morgenthau, 1966). While there are many different positions of
foreign aid and foreign aid policy, it is important to analyze the impacts of foreign
assistance in terms Of U.S. public policy.

Considering U.S. foreign aid as an instmment Of foreign policy, the main
question remains as to whether generosity and development were the essential

objectives Of U.S. foreign aid policy. Baldwin said that foreign aid is an instrument of

30

foreign policy whose Objective is tO fulfill the interests Of the aid giver (Baldwin,
1966). According tO Edward S. Mason, there are two different opinions with respect to
this issue. On the one side, are those scholars who believe that the main Objective of
foreign aid is U.S. security. It was a successful and planned tool to keep communism
away from the political and economic recovery Of Western Europe. It was also
implemented as an instrument to avoid third world non-communist countries to
become communists. On the other side, are those who believe that foreign aid is U.S.
disinterested generosity to help European nations and third world poor countries to
achieve economic development. However, they also believe that the flow Of foreign
aid has to be conditioned by the political development Of the recipient (Mason, 1964).

Considering that this research deals with foreign aid issues in the context
of public good, government spending and public policy, it is important to consider the
arguments provided by Paul Mosley. His statements and those mentioned before,
provide the main theoretical framework to support this study. Mosley believes that
governments’ foreign aid policy goes beyond the individuals’ compassionate
pu‘poses. U.S. foreign assistance has three main overlapping objectives. The first one
Is that foreign aid is seen by foreign and defense ministries as a means Of getting
third world countries military and political support. The second Objective is provided
by trade and employment ministries who see foreign aid as a means Of getting and
extending access to third world markets and a way to create more jobs. The third

Objective is given by development and finance ministries who consider that foreign aid

31

is a mean of creating growth in third world nations for the benefit Of the world
economy and particularly for those recipients. Mosley said that these foreign aid
objectives can be justified by five government foreign assistance functions. Three are
called universal functions and two particular functions. These five functions are based
on economic and political theories (Mosley, 1987).

Foreign aid universal functions are: distributive, allocative and stabilization.
These functions are supported by economic theory of government intervention in the
economy. Public goods that provide comfort, happiness or pleasure should be
provided by government (police protection and public parks). These public goods may
no exist if their provision were left tO the free market since this experiments in most
cases total market failure. Government intervention is also justify by the presence Of
partial market failure. This is observed when there are many free riders in the system.
These are consumers who use the service Of a public good but they do not want to
pay for it Partial market failure is also found when private providers Of public services
do not receive the capital benefits Of their work (control Of pollution). Another case Of
partial market failure is when beneficiaries may ignore the nature of the service
provided for them by private market (health care) (Mosley, 1987). Therefore, this
researcher believes that considering these market failures and foreign aid as a public
good, government foreign aid income redistribution function is justified in the world
economy. However, government distributive, allocative and stabilization foreign

aid functions are carried out in many cases with a low level of success. Most Of the

32

U.S. foreign aid programs show a low level Of efficiency and effectiveness.

According to Mosley, government also has two foreign aid functions
known as particular functions. These, different from universal functions, apply only to
specific nation and not for the whole world. These two particular functions refer to the
issue that bilateral foreign aid by one country can 1) buy political favors for that
country, and 2) promote exports from that country (Mosley, 1987).

There are more arguments about foreign aid as an instrument Of foreign
policy. Some scholars are classified as: radical right, radical left, and middle side
thinkers. Writers can be included in each category based on their view toward foreign
aid. For instance, radical rights focus on government foreign aid allocative
function. Someofthesescholars, suchas Bauerandwritersforthe London Timesand
Sun, believe that overseas aid will decrease the cost Of leisure in relation to recipient
governrrent’s efforts. Therefore, recipient countries will reduce the amount of effort to
promote their own development. Also, foreign aid misguide recipient countries by
interfering with their economic policies and confuses them toward self-sufficiency
issues. Bauer believes that foreign aid is the cause that recipient governments
expropriate multinational companies and nationalize their businesses. A quote of his
beliefs is as follows: “almost all recipients of foreign aid restrict the inflow and
development Of private foreign capital. During the last decade or so these restrictions
have increasingly developed into exprOpriation Of foreign capital, often accompanied

by the expulsion of the owners and their employees. As a result, the inflow Of foreign

33

aid is matched by an outflow Of both domestic and foreign private capital” (Bauer,
1965. pp. 45-6).

Defenders of foreign aid radical left theory base their arguments on
government redistributive function. They believe that foreign aid that is provided now
to poor countries in the form of income only makes it more difficult in the long run to
redistribute power to the poor. They also believe that foreign aid not only decreases
the propensity to save in recipient governments, but also capital intensity is increased.

Foreign aid policy is also analyze by the called Middle side thinkers. They
use a combination Of allocative and redistributive foreign aid functions. Middle side
defenders believe that foreign aid create not only negative effects on recipient
countries, but also it has positive impacts. There are gaps that foreign aid donors
have to fill, but their positive impacts can not be disregarded.

There are other writers who believe that U.S. foreign aid policy can not be
analyzed independently from political issues and other public policy options. For
insta'lce, a quote from Robert L. Lineberry said “the analysis Of public policy requires
the discovery, specification, selection, and evaluation of alternatives for settling public
problems“ (Lineberry, 1977. p.9). Schattschneider believes that in policymaking,
political power is an important instrument that brings the right to impose a particular
problem definition , especially in terms of policy problems and alternatives. This
relationship can be Observed in his quote “Political conflict is not like an

er'lteroollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the

34

issues. As a matter Of fact, the definition Of the alternatives is the supreme instniment
Of power, the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is
involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country,
because the definition of alternatives is the Choice Of conflicts, and the Choice Of
conflicts allocates power" (Linebeny, 1977. p.24). Therefore, the definitions of foreign
aid problems, priorities and foreign aid policy, depend on how policy and decision
makers define policy problems. It is easy to remember how U.S. foreign aid priorities
were transformed dramatically with the falling Of communism in the Former Soviet
Union. Huge amounts of money in a form of foreign aid were sent to Russia to support
free market activities and to promote democratic institutions. Thus, in a world in which
resources are finite, rational policymaking must make choices among policy options.

These actions may be oriented to domestic public policy or foreign aid policy.

2.3 Theories of Public Attitudes and Beliefs

There are different kinds Of theories to explain public attitudes, beliefs,
behaviors, and learning. Some of these theories are based on philosophical,
phenomenological or psychological principles.

Many cognitive theories establish that individuals keep intemal consistency
in their beliefs, Opinions, attitudes and behaviors. But, discrepancies appear in
their internal consistency when new knowledge or information is available to them

that contradict their behavior (Leon Festinger, 1957). Therefore, individuals tend

35

to Change the behavior to match their beliefs or they can decide to ignore the new
knowledge or information (Vlning and Ebreo, 1990). Much research has been
done related to cognitive theories. But, the purpose of this study is not to create or
discuss these theories but to use them mainly as a reference to support research

assumptions.

2.4 Public Opinions toward Govemment Spending

There are some studies on public attitudes toward government spending
but they mainly focus on social welfare and other domestic programs. However,
these studies represent the main theoretical framework for this research. For
instance, a study done by Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. from the University of California,
and Kenny J. Whitby from the University of South Carolina examined the
relationship Of race and class to attitudes toward govemment spending priorities.
They created a theoretical model to explain race and class differences in mass
attitudes. They found that higher class status has a relatively strong conservative
effect on white views and a relatively mild conservative effect on black political
attitudes about government spending on social programs (Gilliam and Whitby,
Social Science Quarteriy, Volume 70, Number 1, March 1989).

William G. Jacoby from the University Of South Carolina in his study of
public attitudes toward government spending found that public attitudes toward

spending in nonwelfare programs do not correspond to preferences about

36

spending on welfare programs. Therefore, the effects of spending attitudes differ
substantially, depending upon the particular type of program under consideration
(Jacoby, American Journal Of Political Science, Vol. 38, NO. 2, May 1994, pp. 336-
61).

Another important study Of public support is the one done by Sara
Zuckerbraun from the University of Chicago. She believes that it is important to
consider public support for government environmental spending within the context
of tradeoffs with other social programs. She considers that most Of the models Of
public support for government spending analyze policies in isolation. Zuckerbraun
believes that to explain support for the environment the salience and self-interest
models are not sufficient. Value-based theories of political attitudes are significantly
related to environmental government spending. However, she thinks that it is
important to consider the notion Of faimess-based tradeoffs to explain citizens’ support
for govemment environmental spending. A model Of fairness is essential to
consider in public policy analysis (Zuckerbraun, Journal Of Social Issues, Vol. 50,

No.3, 1994, pp. 179-197).

2.5 Public Opinions toward Foreign Aid Programs
The WAGE project at Michigan State University in its 1996 curriculum

materials, found out that the degree Of support for foreign aid programs

37

depends largely on how the question is asked. They indicated that surveys over
the years Show that just over half the population support foreign aid when the
question is generally in terms Of helping the less developed countries. When the
question is asked in terms of priorities, the majority say that it is more important to
take care of U.S. problems first before spending money on foreign aid. They also
indicated that most of the surveys show that people do not know much about
foreign aid programs and other countries in the world. Their attitudes and beliefs
toward foreign aid are mainly based on personal beliefs and perceptions about the
issue (WAGE Project, 1996).

A complete analysis Of foreign aid is reported in the 1984 OECD Review of
Development Cooperation. This reviews the history Of public opinions in 17 donor
countries of which 10 countries are from the European Economic Community (EEC).
It is pointed out that people's opinions depend heavily on how the questions are
worded. The Review states that according to Ohlin, agreement is much easier to
Obtain for government spending, be it foreign aid or other public policy programs, as
long as the question is somewhat abstract and general. If the same question is
formulated in two different ways, people’s opinions immediately changed (OECD,
1984). For instance, public opinion immediately shifts and gets controversial if a
question includes taxes, costs or amount provided to an individual. Also, the OECD
research found that there is correlation between people’s positive attitudes toward

foreign aid and higher level of education. Foreign aid for humanitarian/moral purpose

38

had people’s support from the 10 European Community donors (OECD, 1984)

There are two other recently published studies about foreign aid. The first
one is “A Review of Existing Survey Data Regarding American's Vlews on U.S.
Leadership and Foreign Assistance,” by Belden and Russonello in May 1994. The
second survey was done in 1995 by Steven Skull from the University Of Maryland.
This research focuses on Americans and foreign aid. The first study revimd data
from 1986 to 1994. They found that when a question was formulated to ask whether
U.S. should provide foreign aid, only 47 % approved it. But, when the question
was formulated in terms of Why should U.S. be involved in foreign aid,
Americans do agree on humanitarian, environmental and economic reasons. They
all supported foreign assistance for disaster relief and feeding the hungry and
poor. The study found that Americans believe that U.S. has to share
responsibilities of foreign aid with other nations rather than tO be the leader
(Belden and Russonello, 1994). This answer clearly shmd a lack Of information
about U.S. foreign aid programs. Considering the amount Of foreign aid as a
percentage Of each country's GNP, the United States ranks next to last out Of the
20 industrial countries in 1992. The U.S. is party to a United Nations resolution
agreeing to provide 0.70 percent Of its GNP but it only provides a fourth Of this
amount. The top donors of foreign aid as percentage of nations’ GNP are Nonlvay,
Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, France and Canada.

The second survey done by Skull, pointed Out that a strong majority Of

39

Americans believe that the United States is spending too much on foreign aid.
But, this attitude is based on the assumption that the U.S. is spending vastly more
than it is in fact. Asked what an “appropriate amount” would be, the median level
proposed is 5 times present spending levels (Skull, 1995). The U.S. development
aid in 1991 was far less than American spending on items like alcohol, tobacco,
toiletries, nondurable toys, hair/health preparations and amusements .

A 1991-92 and 1995-96 evaluation surveys Of union workers done by
Workers Adjustments to the Global Economy project at Michigan State University
shovvedthatmostofthemdonotknowmuchabout some issues Ofthe U.S. foreign aid
programs, global economy and developing countries (WAGE, 1991 and 1996). The
surveys found that union workers get information most frequently from their union
papers and less frequently from newsmagazine. Both surveys agree that there is lack
of information about developing countries and foreign aid, particularly among women.
A quote from WAGE project said ”In 1992, Michigan State Universitys School Of Labor
and Industrial Relations concluded a survey of 349 union members from the Midwest
that asked a number Of questions about U.S. foreign aid programs. The results
showed that most respondents said they did not know very much about the Third
World countries and their problems, or how the U.S. might benefit from assisting them.
They also indicated that they did not know very much about the organizations that

provide assistance tO these less developed countries” (WAGE, 1996. p.16).

Chapter 3

RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Data Source

The data used in this study were generated during evaluation surveys done
by the Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project (WAGE) in 1991-92 and
1995-96, in which the author Of this dissertation served as a Graduate Research
Assistant. These data have not been analyzed and presented in the form used here
in any other publication. Pilot training programs were also provided by this project to
unionized workers and union leaders during the life time of the project. These
training activities were used to pilot test curriculum material and to get comments from
participants to suggest improvements.

The School Of Labor and Industrial Relations (SLIR) at Michigan State
University carried out WAGE development educational project . It was funded by
MSUIUSAID from 1991 to 1996. It was developed in cooperation with a consortium of
five Midwestern universities to create curriculum material to teach unionized workers
in the Midwestem states about the global economy and labor issues. The plan was to

extend this curriculum material to a national level in the future. Also, constant project

40

41

evaluations were done by experts outside of this project. Some of the data from the
pilot training, surveys and project evaluations not published elsewhere, were used in
this study.

This dissertation utilized some data from the WAGE Project as secondary
data. That project had done two surveys for evaluation purposes. One was done in
1991 and another in 1995-96. However, some data were analyzed in 1992 and 1996
by staff Of that project. The dates of collection are recorded as 1991-92
and 1995-96. This dissertation uses data taken directly from questionnaires (see

Appendix A) provided by WAGE project in both evaluation surveys.

3.2 The Survey Population and Sample Instrument

The states of Michigan, Minnesota, Alabama, California, Missouri, Illinois,
Kansas, Wlsconsin, Ohio, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Arkansas and
Tennessee were selected by WAGE project for the 1991 survey. The data were
analyzed in 1992 for project evaluation purposes. But, this research analyzes and
compares the data from these states for a different purpose. Also, WAGE project did
a survey and collected data from the states of Michigan, Minnesota, Alabama and
California in 1995—96. These data were also used in this dissertation.

Several writers, such as Jacobs, Ary , and Razaviech recommend the use
of a sample as large as possible since there is not a simple rule to determine sample

size (Ary, Jacobs, and Razaviech, 1985). Therefore, the population size Of this

42

dissertation is represented by WAGE project aggregated data from a total of 569
unionized workers from 14 States of U.S. (WAGE total sample size). However, this
data set was separated in two survey groups since the 1991-92 questionnaires were
not available. Therefore, the main sample size of this study is represented by WAGE
project 1995-96 survey data from a total of 214 unionized workers from the States of
Michigan, Minrmota, Alabama and California. However, aggregated data from 1991-
92 and 1995-96 surveys (569 participants) are used specifically for comparison
purposes. The 1991-92 survey interviewed 355 union workers who represented 34
individual national/lntemational unions from 13 states of U.S. However, only 349
respondents completed the demographic data. The 1995-96 survey intervimd 214
union workers who represented 56 individual national/lntemational unions from 4
States of the U.S. While these unions represent workers from different industries and
services, these surveys include only those workers who attended university classes
and training programs as a part of their extension programs. Therefore, the sample of
unionized workers was not drawn at random from the total population of workers
registered at the U.S. union institutions, and does not claim to represent them.
Considering that these surveys were conducted by labor educators from
labor and industrial relations extension programs in specific training places, these
surveys are classified as convenience surveys or purposive surveys. All the
questionnaires provided by the WAGE project were answered and returned. The

1995-96 survey was based on labor edumtor planned education activities during fall

43

of 1995 and winter of 1996 as a part of their extension programs. The sample
represents unionized workers who attended labor courses and training classes in fall
1995 and winter 1996. This time period left other workers out of the survey. However,
labor classes and training programs are not only open to all unionized workers, but
also they are optional for all unionized institutions.

Respondents tothesurveyswereasked in 1991-92 and 1995-96 to provide
demographic data and to answer 21 questions related to foreign aid issues (see
Appendix A). Respondents answered questions about union affiliation and
membership, education levels, sources of infomtation exposure, perceived reliability of
information sources, government priorities, foreign aid programs priority, personal
demogaphic data (age, sex, race, state they live in), as well as questions concerning
their attitudes toward domestic and foreign aid policy. The surveys had an overall
response rate of 100 percent, including those respondents who only answered some
particular questions. This high response rate is the result of the nature of the target
audience and specific sites of university labor extension programs.

It was mentioned that the data collection instrument used by WAGE
project was a questionnaire. It was designed to be applied using teacher-classroom
technique. The questionnaire was designed to gather specific information from a
specific target audience; union workers, enrolled in Universities labor classes. The
instrument used a format of open ended questions that focused on union workers

opinions toward Domestic and foreign aid programs.

44

The two main criteria met by the WAGE project questionnaire were validity
and reliability. This instrument was first tested with a group of union workers in a labor
class. It was initially evaluated by WAGE project staff in 1991. This instrument was
modified based on workers’ feedback. The questionnaire was then modified
again in 1995 according to suggestions provided by WAGE project staff. The
suggested changes centered on questions update and terminology. However, these
further modifications did not change the main purpose of the questions. It was
planned that the 1991 and 1995 questionnaires must keep consistency with each
other to establish comparison patterns.

The validity of the data was further improved by comparing the questions
from the WAGE project questionnaire with other questionnaire questions provided by
outside research organizations, such as the Agency for lntemational Development.
The purpose of this comparison was to observe similarities and differences in foreign

aid survey results.

3. 3 Conceptual Definitions

The concept of "Global Economy" will be used in this research. This
concept refers mainly to the issues of transnational corporations, international
trade and foreign aid.

Conceptual definitions for this research were developed based on different

sources, such as the Economics Dictionary (Barcelona, Espafia, 1992) and the New

45

Webster’s Dictionary and Roget’s Thesaurus. Also, other source definitions were
used, such as Peter Dicken, David W. Pearce, and Jeremy J. Wardford. The following
concepts are used in this research:

Attitudes: Posture or position that influence behavior.

Beliefs: Assent of the mind that influence behavior. Persuasion; creed; opinion. They
affect individuals internal consistency to influence behavior. lndividual's behaviors
normally match their beliefs.

Foreign Aid: is any type of assistance provided from one country to another. It is
given as grants or loans and could be public or private in nature. They could be
commodities such as food, equipment, supplies and military hardware.

Global Economy: Refer mainly to the issues of transnational corporations,
international trade and foreign aid and how these are intemationalize and
functional integrated among countries.

lntemational Trade: Is an economic activity in which people or nations sell and buy
goods and services by paying in the domestic or international market with a national or
international currency.

Policy: Government intervention in a country's economy to allocate resources to
achieve efficient outcomes. Interventions may include, foreign aid, subsidies, price
control, physical output targets, exchange controls, ownership controls, and

investments.

46

Transnational Corporations: Are businesses that own and control operations in
more than one country. They operate globally to achieve market growth and profit

accumulation through foreign direct investment.

3.4 Statistical Methods

This dissertation uses SPSS and Excel programs to do statistical analysis
of the 19991 -92 and 1995-96 evaluation survey data. Tables and graphs were
prepared based on data drawn from questionnaires from the WAGE project to identify
changes in workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid from 1991 to 1996. A
code book was created by the author of this dissertation to label, value, and classify
survey variables. This survey codebook was used to process raw data in SPSS
and Excel for windows.

A comparative analysis was also carried out by the author based on WAGE
1991-92 and 1995-96 surveys. Also, some variables from the 1994 survey done by
Belden and Russonello and a 1995 survey done by Steven Skull from the University of
Maryland were used as comparison to observe patterns of change in U.S. public
opinions and attitudes on foreign aid. Considering that the WAGE project‘s
questionnaire contains 21 questions, 88 variables were initially identified as a part of
the first statistical equation. Then, a factor analysis was carried out to determine the
main variables that are related to the major variables of this study: 1) moral

advantages of foreign aid, 2) the economic disadvantages, and 3) the waste of U.S.

47

dollars in foreign aid programs. Kleinbaum and Kupper quote that factor analysis “is
a multivariable method that has as its aim the explanation of relationships among
several difficult-to-interpret, correlated variables in terms of a few conceptually
meaningful, relatively independent factors” (Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978. p. 376).

Considering that variables used by this research have different scales,
means for the 1991-92 and 1995-96 survey variables were established to create
workability and reliability of the data. Multiregression analysis and analysis of
variance (ANOVA) were developed to observe the significance of the variables and to
test reliability. Important statistical techniques used in this dissertation to establish
relationships among variables were the probability of the correlation coefficient (p),
correlation coefficient (r), and the squared of the sample correlation coefficient or
coefficient of deten’nination(r’) .

Swiesofmeaswementwerecreatedforeachofthe variablesbased onthe
1995-96 WAGE project main questionnaire. Dependent and independent variables
were classified and tested based on four social psychological models provided by
Sara Zuckerbraun’s study: the saliency model, the rational self-interest, the values,
and the fairness model (Zuckerbraun, 1994). Each model was tested independently
to observe its applicability to workers’ attitudes and beliefs, and foreign aid issues.
Then, all four of these models were combined to test and to identify those variables

to be used in a general and integrative models of workers’ support for foreign aid

programs.

48

3.5 Statistical Models

The main hypothesis was tested based on an integrative approach provided
by this dissertation. This model resulted from combining four social psychological
models of public support for public policy: the issue saliency model, the rational self-
interest, the values, and the fairness model. The issue saliency model is based on the
assumption that the media impacts and creates sympathies on public interest. The
rational self-interest model assumes that there is a direct relationship between
individuals benefits and policy support. The values model assumes a relationship
between one’s policy support and one’s values, and suggest that citizens are
responsive to issues about fairness when they consider public policy (Zuckerbraun,
1994).

The literature review (Chapter 2) discussed a variety of different models that
were used to study public support for government spending. However, this study is
partially based on four psychological models provided by Sara Zuckerbraun from the
University of Chicago. Her study was done based on government environmental
spending in nine nations as a part of the lntemational Social Survey Program.

Zuckerbraun states that tradeoffs of public support for govemment
environmental spending must be considered within the context of other social
progra'ns. She quotes “ow observation of environmental support suggests that it may

be useful to consider the tradeoffs that people make in their support for diffemnt

49

government policies. We have noticed that often opposition to environmentalism
comes from those who believe that other interest may suffer....More generally, it may
be the case that those who support government funding of health, education,
unemployment, and housing will oppose govemment-funded environmental policies if
they believe that public funds will be diverted from these other programs to the
environment” (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 180).

Zuckerbraun presents a general analysis of existing psychological models
that explain government public spending. She bases her analysis of government
environmental spending on her fairness model. Zuckerbraun believes that saliency
and rational self-interest models are not sufficient to explain public support for the
environment and government spendings. Also, she said that value models of political
attitudes are good approaches to explain government environmental spending.
However, all these models are used to explain public support for governmental
spending not only in isolation from each other, but also isolate public policies.
Therefore, she suggest herfaimess-based tradeoffs model as an alternative to explain
public support for government environmental spending. This is a good approach to
analyze public policy, especially environmental policy (Zuckerbraun,1994. pp. 179-
197)

Zuckerbraun believes that opposition to support for govemment
environmental spending sometimes comes from people who believe that funds will be

taken away from some important programs, such as education, housing, health,

50

unernploynnnt Therefore, they think their other interests will suffer. Also, those who
believe that environmental policies threaten their industries, jobs and livelihoods tend
to oppose to environmentalism. Therefore, it is important to analyze government
environmental spending in relation with other government policies. Zuckerbraun wrote
“Traditionally, these three models of support for public policy have been tested by
considering policies in isolation... Prosocialist values were associated with higher
levels of support for environmental spending, while probusiness and governmental
social responsibility values were associated with less support. However, those
endorsing both prosocialist and government responsibility values were less likely to
endorse spending on the environment at the expense of other social programs.
Therefore, our observation of environmental support suggests that it may be useful to
consider the tradeoffs that people make in their support for different government
policies” (Zuckerbraun, 1994, pp.179-180). In this context, this dissertation
incorporated U.S. public domestic programs to the analysis of union workers’ support

for government foreign aid spendings.

3.5.1 Dependent and Independent Variables

The main hypothesis of this research is “Unionized Workers’ Support for
Foreign Aid is related to Workers Attitudes and Beliefs Toward Foreign Aid.”
Workers’ support for foreign aid was analyzed as a regression equation where the
three major dependent variables were grouped as: 1) the moral advantages of foreign

51

aid (benefits), 2) the economic: disadvantages of foreign aid (costs), and 3) the
perception of waste of U. S. dollars in foreign aid programs. The independent variables
represented the unionized workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. The
literature review provides a variety of different models that were used to study public
support for government spending. However, this study is partially based on four
psychological models provided by Zuckerbraun’s paper. Her study was done based

on government environmental spending in nine nations.

3.5.1.1 DependentVariables
Workers’ support for foreign aid (Y’) is studied based on three

Dependent Variables: 1) moral advantages of foreign aid (Y1), 2) economic
dsadvantages of foreign aid (Y2), and 3) perceptions of waste of U. 8. dollars (Y3) (see
table 3.1).

The variwle ofmoraladvantages offoreign aid(Y1) was integrated by three
factors or subvariables based on items on the survey instrument. These were : 1) aid
is essential for other countries self-sufficiency (a16), 2) We ought to help the hungry
or poor (MG), and 3) helping other countries makes them more stable (d16) (see
Appendix A or table 3.1).

The variable of economic disadvantages of foreign aid (Y2) was integrated
by four factors or subvariables which were based on four questionnaire items. These

were: 1) too mixed up with other countries affairs (c16), 2) help countries that will

52

compete with U.S. (e16), 3) need to solve U.S. problems first before helping other
countries (f16), and 4) we will benefit in the long run not now (i16) (see Appendix A).
The variable of perception of waste of U. 8. dollars (Y3) was integrated by

two subvariables based on two questionnaire items: 1) aid is misused by foreign

governments (916), and 2) large part of aid is wasted by U.S. (h16) (see Appendix A).

3.5.1.2 Independent Variables

The WAGE project (1991-92 and 1995-96) surveys gathered data on a
variety of factors expected to influence foreign aid, especially economic aid for
development. The focal issue of this dissertation is unionized workers attitudes and
beliefs (Xi). In this case, independent variables were identified and classified based
on each model of public support for public policy found in Zuckerbraun’s paper.

Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs (Xi) are studied based on seven
independent Variables. These variables are: 1) travel and information seeking beliefs
(X1); 2) trust of sources of information (X2); 3) altruism toward foreign aid (X3);
4) primal view of government priorities (X4); 5) concerns for third world countries (X5);
6) global interdependence (X6); and 7) U. 8. foreign aid priorities (X7). Each of
these independent Variables is integrated by other factors or subvariables . These
Independent Variables were grouped based on survey questions. They were
classified based on each psychological model requirements. These factors or

subvariables were established based on the survey questionnaire which are identified

53

with the letter O. All these independent variables were used in the General Model
to test the null hypothesis. Some of these variables were also used in the Integrative
Model. But, individual independent variables were used to test each of the four
psychological models. Therefore, the most important variables provided by the factor
analysis are described here. However, these names represent a short description of
the specific variable label used in the code book (see Appendix A for a description of
each question, table 3.1 and Appendix B for variables description and labels):

The variable of travel and information seeking beliefs (X1) was integrated by
two factors or subvariables based on seven items of the survey instrument. These
two factors were: 1) information travel belief news media (01-04), and 2) information
travel belief institutions (05-07) (see table 3.1). This independent variable was used
to test the Saliency model.

The variable of trust of sources of information (X2) was integrated by two
factors or subvariables which were based on eight questionnaire items. These two
factors or subvariables were: 1) trust of media information (a8e8), 2) trust institutions
information (f8-h8).

The variable of altruism toward foreign aid (X3) was integrated by three
factors or subvariables based on five questionnaire items. These two subvariables
were: 1) others have so little (C20), 2) aid is self interest (d20), 3) aid cuts immigrants
(e20) (see table 3.1). These factors were used to test the Rational self-interest model.

The variable of political view of govemment priorities (X4) was integrated by

54

two factors or subvariables based on eight items of the survey instrument. These
two factors were: 1) national priorities (a9, c9-f9, h9), and 2) lntemational priorities
(b9, 99) (see table 3.1). This independent variable was used to test the Fairness
model.

The variable of concerns for third world countries (X5) was integrated
by two factors or subvariables which were based on five questionnaire items. These
two subvariables were: 1) not know enough (a19, c19), and 2) U.S. self-interest
(d19-f19) (see table 3.1)

The variable of global interdependence (X6) was integrated by two factors
or subvariables based on six questionnaire items. The two factors were: 1) third world
competition (a21, b21, d21, 1’21), and 2) third world benefits U.S. workers (e21, 921)
(see table 3.1).

The variable of U. 8. foreign aid pnbrities (X7) was integrated by two factors
or subvariables based on six questionnaire items. The two factors were: 1) primary
needs program (a15, b15, f15), and 2) secondary needs program (c15-e15, 915) (see

table 3.1 and Appendix A). These factors were used to test the values model.

3.6 Operational Definitions
This study creates operational definitions based on WAGE project 1991—
92 and 1995-96 questionnaires. Also, scales of measurement were developed based

on research main hypotheses. Therefore, the following operational definitions are

55

used to measure the most important dependent and independent variables that served

to test the main hypothesis of this dissertation:

Workers’ support for foreign aid (Y')

Workers’ support for foreign aid is the main dependent variable. It was
measured based on question sixteen (Q16) of the WAGE project questionnaire. It
represents statements of economic aid for development (Qa16—Qi16). These
statements were converted to 9 subvariables or factors. These factors were divided in
three groups of responses to create the three main dependent variables that explain
workers’ support for foreign aid. These groups of responses were grouped based on
similar characteristics of each factor. The three main independent variables were
called: 1) Moral advantagesof foreign aid (Y1), b) Economic disadvantage of foreign
aid ( Y2), and 3) Perceptions of waste of U. 8. dollars (Y3). A scale to measure each

participant’s respond was created as follows:

1=SA (Strongly agree)
2=SWA (Somewhat agree)
3=NAD (Neither agree/disagree)
4=DSW (Disagree somewhat)
5=SD (Strongly disagree)

Each participant’s response was computed independently, and an
individual mean was created for each participant’s response and for a set of items.

Then, a multiple regression analysis of the data and a comparative analysis of means

56

of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 surveys were done. Each set of factors was grouped
based on code book scales to measure each main dependent variable. The mean

scale for each main dependent variables is as follows:

1=SA (Strongly agree)

2=SWA (Somewhat agree)

3=NAD (Neither agree/disagree)

4=DSW (Disagree somewhat)

5=SD (Strongly disagree)
Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs

Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid is the main
independent variable. This variable is formed by seven independent variable (X1-X7).
it was measured based on some statements from the WAGE project questionnaire.
These statements are: 1-9 (Q1-Q9),15-16 (015-016), 19-21 (019-021). These
questions were transformed into independent variables. Scales to measure each
variable was created based on this dissertation code book (see appendix B).

Considering that each variable has different scale of measurement, means
for each participant’s response and for each set of independent variables were
developed. A total of 13 factors or subvariables were grouped in seven main
independent variables. Each variable may have from 1 to 8 statements (see table
3.1). Therefore, it will be to extensive to provide all the measurements. An example is

provided for the statement # 8 from the WAGE project questionnaire (QaB-Qh8), and

57

for the set of variables that integrate its main independent variable, trust of information
(X2).

Scale for a participant's response (Scale of 1-10)

1 = Low (Not at all reliable)

5 = SW (Somewhat reliable), middle point of reliability

1O= High (Totally reliable)

Scale fora set of responses (Mean - scale 1-10)

1 = Low (Not at all reliable)

5 = SW (Somewhat reliable), middle point of reliability

10= High (Totally reliable)

All the means from the main independent variables were tested to establish
if tiers was a relationship between workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes

and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

3.7 Regression Equations

Two statistical models were created to testthe null hypothesis, the General
and the Integrative models. Each of these two models is integrated by three
regression equations. However, the General Model is expressed in one general
regression equation. Some of the variables contained in the General Model were

used to test each of the four psychological models.

3.7.1 General Model

A general model to test the four psychological approaches was created. It

58

only represents an example of the variables considered in the four psychological
models. However, each of these four models has its own statistical equation.

Nevertheless, a multiregression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were
done to observe if this general model will explain the relationship between unionized
workers support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
programs. Considering that each of the four models has an specific objective ad
variables, statistical tests were done to establish a relationship between unionized
workers support for foreign aid and model’s objective. However, this general statistical
equations does not mpresent the final model suggested to test the main hypothesis of
this study since some of the variables were disregarded based on level of correlation,
dispersion coefficient, and multicollinearity analysis. A general representation of the

variables used to test these models in its general equation form is as follow.

(3.1) Y' = f (Bo+j31X1+132X2+83X3+B4X4+85X5+86X6+B7X7+E)

[30, B1, [32, [33, B4, 85, Be, B7...Bi = Regression coefficients

E = Error component (how far away an individual’s response is from the population
regression line = E =Y-(Bo+BiXi))

Y: = Workers’ support for foreign aid (Y1, Y2, Y3)

Xi =Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7)

59

This general statistical equation was tested for each of the three main
Dependent Variables. It main purpose was to observe if there was a relationship
between the main Dependent Variables and all of the independent variables. Also,
this regression equation was used as an example of the possible variables to be
included in each psychological model. However, each of these psychological models
was tested based on each individual regression analysis. Each regression equation
was based not only on specific variables provided by the general statistical model but
also by the main factors of each model. The results are presented in Chapter 4.
Then, a multiple regression analysis was carried out to test the reliability of each of
the four models. Each psychological model was analyzed to identify those that can be
applied to workers support for foreign aid programs. Conelation analysis was done to
test correlation among variables and the validity of each model. Coefficients of
correlation were determined to establish relationships among variables and

dispersions.

3.7.2 Integrative Model

After testing each psychological model, a more specific new polynomial
integrative model was created with less number cf independent variables. This model
uses only nine factor rather than 13 uwd in the General Model. These nine factors
were converted to nine variables to make the test of the null hypothesis much easier.

The Integrative statistical model was divided in three regression equations to test the

60

Dependent Variables: 1) Moral advantage of foreign aid, 2) The economic
disadvantage of foreign aid, and 3) The perception of waste of U. 8. dollars in foreign
aid programs. Then, these equations were tested to explain the strengths of the
selected vaiables. They were fitted with Least-Squares procedure. These regression
equations represent the final statistical model that was used to test the relationship
between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs
towad foreign aid programs (main hypothesis). These regression equations are (see

table 3.1):

(3.2) Y1 = f (80+821X21+831X31+B41X41+852 X52 +8 62 X62+B71X71+E)
(3.3) Y2 = f (Bo+B12X12+B22X22+1352 X52+B72X72+E)

(3.4) Y3 = f ([30+822X22-l-1352 X52 +872X72+E)

Bo, B1k, 82k, 83k, B4k,...Bik = Regression coefficients

E= Error component (how far away an individual’s response is from the population
regression line: E=Y- (Bo+BiXi))

Y’ = Workers support for foreign aid (Y1, Y2, Y3)

Y1 = Moral Advantage or Benefits of Foreign Aid

Y2 = Economic Cost or Disadvantage of Foreign Aid

Y3 = Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid programs

Xik =Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs (X1k, X2k, X3k, X4k, X5k,X5kX6kX7k)

X12 =lnforrnation Travel Belief Institutions

61

X21 =Trust of Media Information

X22 =Trust Institution Information

X31 =Altruism toward Foreign Aid

X41 =Govemment National Priorities

X52 =lnterest: Concerns for Third World

X62 =Benefits: Global Interdependence

X71 =Primary Program: Foreign Aid Priorities

X72 =Secondary Program: Foreign Aid Priorities

Analysis of variance, correlation coefficient and multiple regression
analysis were carried out to observe the significance of the models, their validity and
to express the degree of relationship between variables. The statistical results from
this analysis are provided in Chapter 4. Borg considers that the correlation coefficient
has the advantage of allowing researchers to measure interrelationships
simultaneously of a big number of variables (Borg, 1988). However, according to
Bhattacharyya and Johnson, the correlation coefficient only helps to understand the
relationship between two variables but it does not explain relationships of cause-and-
effect (Bhattacharyya and Johnson, 1977).

Kleinbaum and Kupper say “the correlation coefficient (r) is an often-used
statistic that not only provides a measure of how two random variables are associated

in a sample but has properties that relate it closely to straight-line regression”

62

(Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978. p.71). They also explain that analysis-of-variance
(ANOVA) ”consists of several estimates of variance. These estimates, in turn, can be
used to answer the principal inferential questions of regression analysis” (Kleinbaum
and Kupper, 1978, p. 83). Kleinbaum and Kupper also believe that “multiple
regression analysis can be looked upon as an extension of straight-line regression
analysis(involving only one variable) to the situation where there are any number of
independent variables to be considered” (Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978. p. 131).
The three Dependent Variables were tested to establish union workers’
support for foreign aid programs. Independent variables were also tested to explain

workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid.

3.8 Data Analysis

This study utilized two types of data: 1) secondary data from the WAGE
project 1991-92 and 1995-96 based on the questionnaires; and 2) evaluative data
from the training provided by WAGE project to pilot curriculum material. However, a

deeper analysis of the data is provided in Chapter 4.

63

Table 3.1 Variables Included in Models

 

Variable Label Meaning

 

DEPENDENT: Workers’ Support for Foreign Aid (Y ’)

moraladv Moral Advantage Moral advantages or benefits of foreign aid

eccost Economic Cost Economic Disadvantages or cost of foreign aid

waste$ Waste dollars Workers’ percepfion of waste of U.S. dollars in
foreign aid programs

INDEPENDENT: Workers’ Attitudes and Beliefs toward Foreign Aid Programs (Xe)

travinfsb Travel and information Workers travel and beliefs of seeking information
seeking beliefs from news media and formal institutions

trust Trust of sources of Workers trust of information provided by the news
information media and formal Institutions

altruism Altruism toward Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward helping others
foreign aid and themselves

govtprio Political view of Workers’ attitudes and befits toward government
government spending on national and international programs
priorities

concthw Concern for third Workers knowledge about third world and foreign
world countries aid organizations; and U.S. workers’ interest in third

wortd countries

globinter Global Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward third world
Interdependence competition and workers benefiB from third world

faprio Foreign aid U.S. foreign aid spent on third world
priorities primary and secondary need programs

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

 

a16 Self-sufficiency Foreign aid is essential for other countries self-
sufficiency
b16 Help hungry poor We ought to help the hungry or poor in third world

d16 Aid makes stable Helping other countries makes them more stable

 

64

Table 3.1 -(Cont’d)

 

Variable Label Meaning

 

E 'Q'dv! QIIE'!°!CII

c16 Too mixed up in U.S. is to mixed up with other countries affairs

e16 Help competition Foreign aid helps countries that will compete with
U.S.

f16 Solve own problems We need to solve U.S. problems first before helping
other countries

i16 To our benefit We will benefit in the long run not now

 

g16 Aid is misused Aid is misused by foreign governments
h16 U.S. bureaucracy Large part of aid is wasted by U.S. bureaucracy
Wastes

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

 

INBMEDIA Information travel belief Workers travel and belief of seeking information
news media from the news media

INBINSTI Information travel belief Workers travel and belief of seeking information
institutions from formal institutions (unions and Universities)

W132)

TRUSTMED Trust of medic Workers trust of information provided by the news
information media, such as TV news, magazines, newspapers

TRUSTINS Trust Institutions Workers true of information provided by fennel

lnforrnation institutions such as unions and universrlres

 

Table 3.1 -(Cont’d)

65

 

 

Variable Label Meaning

Ell . | IE . 5'!!!“

C20 Other have so little Workers’ feelings that others have so little when they
have so much

d20 Aid is self interest Helping third world countries is in workers self-
interest because they will buy American products

e20 Aid cuts immigrants Helping third world countries will cut down the
number of immigrants to the U.S.

NATIPRIO National Priorities Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward government
spending on domestic or national programs

INTEPRIO lntemational Priorities Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward government
spending on lntemational programs

WWW

KNOWLEDG Not know enough Workers knowledge of third world countries and
foreign aid organizations

INTEREST U.S. self-interest U.S. workers interest in third world countries

Wilt.)

COMPETTT Third world competition Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward third world
competifion

BENEFITS Third world benefits Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward benek that

U.S. workers third world countries provide to them

E i [IE 'I' [Hi

PRIMARYP Primary needs program U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries'
primary needs program (food, infant mortality, etc)

SECONDP Secondary needs U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries

program secondary needs program (Went, debt relief)

 

Chapter 4

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the data analysis and major
research findings obtained in this study. This chapter is divided in four major
sections. The first section presents the statistical analysis and results from testing
unionized workers support for foreign aid based on four psychological models. The
second part of this chapter addresses the research hypothesis and its main
components. Inferential statistics, analysis of variance, and regression results were
used for data analysis based on SPSS and Excel statistical programs. The third
section of this chapter presents a comparative analysis of the 1991-92 and 1995-96
survey data. The last section provides the main conclusions regarding the main

hypothesis.

4.1 Test of Four Psychological Models
This dissertation tested four psychological models provided by Sara
Zuckerbraun’s paper “Fairness Motivations and Tradeoffs Underlying Public

Support for Government Environmental Spending in Nine Nations.” However, this

66

67

research is limited by the fact that her paper does not provide all the measures to
test all the essential aspects of each of the theoretical models. Zuckerbraun said
“We are limited by the existing measures in this unique crossnational public opinion
database. Our situation is limited further by the fact that the four models we have
presented are not mutually exclusive... In light of this, and considering the absence
of measures to test all of the critical components of each of the models, we use the
following logic to help us in determining the relative usefulness of each of the
models in explaining public support for environmental policy” (Zuckerbraun, 1994.
pp. 183-184).

It is important to observe that many engineering and mathematical studies
have high multiple correlation of determination (R2). Their variables are more easy
to measure since the variability of the data is very small. Their squared
correlation coefficients are close to 1. However, social studies tend to observe
lower squared correlation coefficients since individuals factors are very relative and
hard to measure. The highest multiple correlation coefficients of determination that
are observed in some social science studies are 0.4 and 0.5 (Demopolo, 1997).
Therefore, considering the sensitivity of issues dealing with workers attitudes and
beliefs, this dissertation established acceptable multiple correlation coefficients that
fall between 0.2 and 1. A multiple correlation coefficient of determination close to
0.5 will represent a strong relationship between unionized workers’ support for

foreign aid and any independent variable.

68

4.1.1 Saliency Model

According to lyengar and Kinder public support for environmental concerns
rise or fall based on current salience of an issue (lyengar and Kinder, 1987).
Nisbett and Ross believe that many psychological studies show that public
judgements are determined by salience and memorability of the topic. For instance,
after the Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez disasters happened, support for the
environment increased immediately (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181). The Saliency
model is based on psychological evidence of public support for government
spending. According to Zuckerbraun this model “predicts that public opinion is
responsive to publicity surrounding dramatic environmental events” (Zuckerbraun,
1994. p. 181 ). A main assumption of this model is that news media and news from
formal organizations impact people judgements and create sympathies of public
interest. However, Zuckerbraun’s findings showed that the issue salience is not

sufficient to explain support for the environment.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:
Ho: Travel information seeking belief does not influence

unionized workers support for foreign aid

The saliency model was tested in my research based on one independent
variable, Travel information seeking belief. This variable has two factors: 1)

information travel belief news media and 2) information travel belief institutions

69

(see page 52). Table 4.1 presents the main results of the multiple correlation
coefficients and analysis of variance (ANOVA) done in this dissertation. A
correlation coefficient of 0.137 at 01:05 was established between unionized
workers support for foreign aid and travel information seeking belief . Therefore,
a weak positive correlation was established between those two variables.
lnforrnation travel belief news media and lnforrnation travel belief institutions only
explain 1.9 percent of the variation (coefficient of multiple determination 0.019) in
unionized workers’ support for foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that travel
information seeking belief does not influence unionized workers support for foreign
aid was not rejected at or=0.05 since the significant value of F (p) = 0.155 > or=0.05
(see table 4.1). Then, the alternative hypothesis was not accepted. Therefore,
it is concluded that the Saliency model is not sufficient to explain unionized workers’

support for foreign aid programs on the basis of these two variables.

Table 4.1 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with Travel Information Seeking Belief

 

Y’ (R) R‘ F2197 Sig. F (p)

 

X1 0137* 0.019 0.1885 0.155

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X1: Travel Information Seeking Belief

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

70

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient of
Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.1.2 Rational Self-Interest Model

The main assumption of this psychological model is based on the notion
that people’s support for government spending is directly related to individuals
benefits. Zuckerbraun said “A second model of public opinion about the
environment posits that rationality, the economists’ term for the pursuit of one’s own
interests, is a determinant of environmental support” (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181).

Zuckerbraun’s findings showed that the Rational Self-Interest model provided
weaker evidence of rationality based on individual-level public opinion. However,
aggregated data showed that individuals do not perceive the immediate and
personal benefits they may enjoy from a better environment. She concludes that
the Rational Self-Interest model is not sufficient to explain support for the

environment.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:

Ho: Altruism toward Foreign Aid does not influence

unionized workers support for foreign aid

The Rational Self-Interest model was tested in my research based on one

71

independent variable, Altruism toward Foreign Aid. This variable has three factors:
1) Other have so little, 2) Self interest, and 3) aid cuts immigrants. Table 4.2
contents the main results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple
regression coefficients done by the author. A significant (or=.05) correlation
coefficient of 0.462 was established between unionized workers support for foreign
aid and altruism toward foreign aid. Therefore, a moderate positive correlation was
established between those two variables. Thus, an increase in one unit of altruism
toward foreign aid (self-interest), it is expected that the support for foreign aid
programs will increase about 0.439 (131:0.439); holding the other variables.
Altruism toward foreign aid approximately explains 21.3 percent of the variation
(coefficient of multiple determination 0.213) in unionized workers’ support for
foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that altruism toward foreign aid does not
influence unionized workers support for foreign aid was rejected at cr=0.05 since
Sig. F (p) = 0.000 < or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted.
Therefore, it is concluded that the Rational Self-Interest model is sufficient to
explain unionized workers’ support for foreign aid programs. I conclude that
unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are concerned with issues of self-

interest and self benefits by cutting immigration.

72

Table 4.2 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with Altruism toward Foreign Aid

 

Y’ (R) R2 F1,193 Sig. F(p)

 

X3 0462* 0.213 52.388 0.000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X3: Altruism toward Foreign Aid

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.1.3 Values Model

The main assumption of the Values model is that public support for social
policy is influenced by individual values. A political culture shapes people values,
which, in turn, impacts public support for social programs. According to Davidson
and Thomson, people’s values may vary from country to country. Their research
shows that sets of values or common value structures have been found across
countries (Davidson and Thomson, 1980). Zuckerbraun said that according to T.W.
Smith, public opinion in countries with a socialist or social democratic government
favors a full gamut of social spending, directed to a comprehensive welfare state

and income equalization. in contrast, liberal/capitalist countries are more likely to

73

see the welfare state as a limited safety net, complain of high taxes, and favor
equality of Opportunity and education, as opposed to equality of income”
(Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181-182).

Considering that this model deals with individual values to support social
policy, this dissertation selected a variable of U. S. Foreign Aid Priorities to test the
Value model. This variable has two factors: 1) Primary needs program and 2)
Secondary needs Program (see page 52). The result of this test reflects the value
factors that U.S. unionized workers have toward providing foreign assistance to
third world countries to cover primary or secondary needs. It provides evidence of

workers support toward social policy, especially foreign aid policy.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:
Ho: U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities in terms of workers’ values do

not influence unionized workers support for foreign aid

Table 4.3 presents the main results from testing this null hypothesis. A
(or=.05) correlation coefficient of 0.45 was established between unionized
workers support for foreign aid and U.S. foreign aid priorities in terms of workers’
values. Therefore, a moderate negative correlation was established between those
two variables. The response of the main independent variable of U. 8. foreign aid
Priorities in terms of each factor was in the same direction. For instance, an

increase in one unit of U.S. foreign aid primary needs program, it is expected that

74

the support for foreign aid programs will decrease about -0.169 (B1=-0.169); holding
the other variables. Also, an increase in one unit of U.S. foreign aid secondary
needs program, the support for foreign aid programs will decrease about -0.062
(B=-0.062); holding the other variables. U.S. foreign aid priorities approximately
explains 20.3 percent of the variation (coefficient of multiple determination 0.203)
in unionized workers’ support for foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that
U.S. foreign aid priorities in terms of workers’ values does not influence unionized
workers support for foreign aid was rejected at cr=0.05 since Sig. F(p)=0.000
<or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded
that the Values model is sufficient to explain unionized workers’ support for foreign
aid programs. It can be established that workers value factors play an important
role in supporting government foreign aid policy. Unionized workers in selected
states of U.S. are concern with social policy that provides foreign aid to third world
countries to satisfy primary and secondary needs such as infant mortality, family

planning, food surplus, training, and debt relief.

Table 4.3 Correlation between Unionized WorkersSupport for
Foreign aid with U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities

 

Y’ (R) R’ F2192 Sig. F

 

X7 045* 0.203 24.422 0.000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

75

X7: U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.1.4 Fairness Model

According to Zuckerbraun this model has not been used in studies on
public opinions toward environmental policy. According to Rasinki, the main
assumption of the fairness model is that when people consider public policy, they
are responsive to fairness factors (Rasinki, 1987). Zuckerbraun said that this model
was used to establish the impact of distributive fairness factors by testing tradeoffs
people are willing to make for or against government environmental spending
(Zuckerbraun, 1994). Citizens’ environmental tradeoffs were compared to other
social programs spending. Zuckerbraun’s results show that “The results indicate
that support for increased spending of the environment is moderately associated
with support for increased spending for other social causes, especially health and
education. The exception is defense” (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 187).

Considering that the fairness model deals with the distributive function of
government spending, this dissertation selected the U.S. government spending on

domestic and abroad programs.

76

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:
Ho: Political View of Government Priorities does not

influence unionized workers support for foreign aid

The Fairness model was tested based on one independent variable,
Political View of Government Priorities. This variable has two factors: 1)
Government national priorities and 2) Government international priorities. Table
4.4 presents the main results from testing the null hypothesis by using multiple
regression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA). This table shows that a
(or=.05) correlation coefficient of 0.21 was established between unionized workers
support for foreign aid and political view of government priorities. Therefore, a
moderate correlation was established between those two variables. The
independent variable of political view of government priorities had different
responses based on its two main factors: national and lntemational priorities. For
instance, an increase in one unit of U.S. government national priorities, it is
expected that the support for foreign aid programs will increase about 0.0455
(B1=0.0455); holding the other variables. Also, an increase in one unit of U.S.
government international priorities, the support for foreign aid programs will
decrease about 00893 (B=-0.0893). The general independent variable of political
view of government priorities approximately explains 4.4 percent of the variation
(coefficient of multiple determination 0.044) in unionized workers’ support for

foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that the political view of government

77

priorities aid does not influence unionized workers support for foreign aid was
rejected at or=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.01 < or=0.05. Then the alternative
hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the Fairness model is a
good model to explain unionized workers’ support for foreign aid programs. I
conclude that unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are concerned with
issues of government spending on domestic and lntemational programs. About 16
percent (from a total of 4.4 %) of the variability of workers support for foreign aid is
explained by government spending on international aid programs. However, this

variable relates in a negative way to workers support for foreign aid policy.

Table 4.4 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign
aid with Political View of Government Priorities

 

Y’ (R) R‘ F2195 Sig. F(p)

 

X4 021* 0.044 4.469 0.01

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X4: Political View of Government Priorities

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

78
4.2 Test of Main Hypothesis
The main null hypothesis in my research was:
Ho: Unionized workers’ support for foreign aid is not related to

workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

This main hypothesis was tested based on two statistical models. The first
model is called “General Model,” and the second “Integrative Model.” The three
main Dependent variables used in each model to measure unionized workers’
support for foreign aid are: 1) Moral advantage of foreign aid, 2) Economic
Disadvantage (cost), and 3) Perception of waste of U. 8. dollars in foreign aid
programs. The general statistical model was created from which three general
regression equations were tested (see Chapter 3, regression equation 3.1) Each
of these three regression equations includes all the variables provided by the factor
analysis. However, after testing them, three new regression equations were
created (see Chapter 3, regression equations 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4). These new
equations represent the Integrative model. This include only those specific
variables that showed significant relationship with each main Dependent Variable.
Therefore, this first analysis of the null hypothesis includes multiregression and
ANOVA results that refers to the first general statistical model which includes all the
variables of this study (see regression equation 3.1 in Chapter 3). For a specific
view of all the independent variables that are included in these regression

equations, see Chapter 3, Independent Variables, p. 52)

79

4.3 General Statistical Model

The General Statistical model explains the relationship between unionized
workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
programs. This model was tested based on three main Dependent variables: 1)
Moral advantage of foreign aid, 2) Economic Disadvantage (cost), and 3) Perception
of waste of U. 8. dollars in foreign aid programs. Each of these three dependent
variables was tested based on 7 main Independent Variables. A total of 13 factors
or subvariables obtained from the factor analysis were included in those 7 main
independent variables to represent workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid

programs. The test of each of the main Dependent Variables is as follow:

4.3.1 Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid

This is one of the main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized
workers’ support for foreign aid. The relationship of Moral advantage of foreign aid
with the independent variables expresses one way of establishing the relationship
between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs
toward foreign aid programs.

The statistical analysis shows that there is strong relationship between
workers moral advantage of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign
aid programs. Table 4.5 shows that there is a significant correlation coefficient of

0.686 between moral advantage of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs.

80

Therefore, a strong correlation was established between those two variables at
or=.05. It was observed that there were independent variables that provided
positive increments to workers’ support for foreign aid programs, but there were
others that related negatively. Those variables that created a positive increment in
workers moral advantage of foreign aid are: information travel belief institutions,
trust institutions information, altruism toward foreign aid programs, government
national priorities, knowledge of third world, competition and benefits in global
interdependence (see page 52). This means that if there is an increase in one unit
of these independent variables, it is expected that the moral advantage or support
for foreign aid programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other
variables. The independent variables that decreased the moral advantage or
support for foreign aid programs are: Information travel belief news media, trust of
media information, government international priorities, interest concerns for third
world, and secondary foreign aid priorities. This means that an increase in one unit
of these independent variables, the moral support for foreign aid programs will
decrease a certain amount .

Considering that we have a strong coefficient of multiple determination (R2:
0.471), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this general
regression equation approximately explain 47.1 percent of the variation in
unionized workers moral advantage or support for foreign aid. The null hypothesis
that the unionized workers’ support for foreign aid is not related to workers attitudes

and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected based on workers moral

81

advantage of foreign aid. It was rejected at or=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.000 <
or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded
that the first General Model of Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid is sufficient to
explain the relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid and their
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. I conclude that attitudes and
beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are positive concerned with
issues of government spending on domestic programs, U.S. benefits and
competition, information and trust provided by formal institutions (unions,
universities), altruism, and knowledge about third world countries. On the other
hand, unionized workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states
of U.S. are related in a negative way to issues, such as: trust and information
provided by the general news media, government spending on lntemational
programs, interest about third world countries, and secondary foreign aid priorities
(training, investment, and aid to small businesses). Therefore, the more
government spending in these issues the less moral support unionized workers give

to foreign aid.

Table 4.5 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with 7 main independent Variables

 

Y’ (R) R’ F13,1ee Sig. F(p)

 

X: (13) 0.686” 0.471 1 1 .357 0.000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

82

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid
Y’ = F (Y1) = Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid

Xs (13): Includes 7 main independent variables (13 factors or subvariables
(see p. 52)

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.3.2 Economic Disadvantage of Foreign Aid

This is the second of the main Dependent Variables used to explain
unionized workers’ support for foreign aid. The relationship of Economic
Disadvantage (cost) of foreign aid with the independent variables express another
way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign
aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

The statistical analysis shows that there is strong relationship between
workers economic disadvantage of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward
foreign aid programs. Table 4.6 shows that there is a significant correlation
coefficient of 0.462 between economic disadvantages or cost of for foreign aid and
their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a strong correlation was established between
those two variables at 01:05. It was observed that there were independent
variables that provided positive increments to workers’ support for foreign aid

programs, but there were others that related negatively. Those variables that

83

created a positive increment in workers economic cost of foreign aid are:
information travel belief news media and institutions, altruism toward foreign aid
programs, political priorities of government national and international foreign aid
programs, knowledge of the third world, U.S. interest in the third world countries,
competition and benefits in global interdependence, and primary and secondary
foreign aid priorities. This means that an increase in one unit of each of these
independent variables, it is expected that the economic cost or disadvantage for
foreign aid programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other
variables. There were only two independent variables that decreased the economic
cost of foreign aid programs: trust of news media and trust of institutions. This
means that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, the economic
cost for foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount.

Considering that we have a moderate coefficient of multiple determination
(R’= 0.213), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this
general regression equation approximately explain 21.3 percent of the variation in
unionized workers’ economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid. The null
hypothesis that the unionized workers’ support for foreign aid is not related to
workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected base on
workers economic disadvantage or cost of foreign aid. It was rejected at or=0.05
since Sig. F (p) = 0.0001 < or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted.
Therefore, it is concluded that the first General Model of Economic Disadvantage

or Cost of Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized

84

workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states
of U.S., especially in terms of economic cost of foreign aid, are concerned with
issues of government spending on domestic programs, U.S. benefits and
competition, information from news median and formal institutions (unions,
universities), altruism, government spending on national and lntemational
programs, foreign aid used in third world countries for primary and secondary needs
programs; and knowledge and interest about third world countries. These factors
actually increased the cost of foreign aid. On the other hand, unionized workers’
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U.S. are related in a
positive way to issues, such as: trust of news media and formal institutions.
Workers have better attitudes and beliefs toward these two factors since they
decrease the economic cost of foreign aid. Therefore, the most government
spending on ways that people can trust more news media and formal institutions,

such as universities and unions, the smaller is the economic cost of foreign aid.

Table 4.6 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with all Independent Variables

 

Y’=f(Y2) R‘ F13,1ee Sig. F(p)

 

X8 (13) 0.46* 0.21 3.457 0.0001

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

85

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid
Y' = f (Y2) = Economic Cost or Disadvantage of Foreign

X3 (13): Includes 13 independent variables grouped in 7 main
Independent variables (see p. 52)

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.
R’ = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.3.3 Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs

This is the last of the main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized
workers’ support for foreign aid. The relationship of the Perception of waste of U. 8.
dollars in foreign aid programs with the 7 main independent variables express a
third way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers’ support for
foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

The statistical analysis shows that there is a small relationship between
workers perceptions of waste of U. 8. dollars of foreign aid and their attitudes and
beliefs toward foreign aid programs. Table 4.7 shows that there is a small
correlation coefficient of 0.324 between unionized workers perceptions of waste of
U.S. dollars for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a weak
correlation was established between those two variables at 01:05. Nevertheless,
it was observed that there were independent variables that provided increments to

workers’ perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs, but there were

86

others that reduced that perception. Those variables that created a increment in
workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid are: information travel
belief news media, trust of news media, altruism toward foreign aid programs,
government national priorities, knowledge and interest of third world countries,
competition and benefits in global interdependence; and foreign aid spent on
secondary programs. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent
variables, it is expected that workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign
aid programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other variables. The
independent variables that decreased workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars
are: Information travel belief institutions, trust institution information, government
lntemational priorities, and primary foreign aid priorities. This means that an
increase in one unit of these independent variables, the perception of waste of U.S.
dollar in foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount.

Considering that we have a weak coefficient of multiple determination (R2:
0.105), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this general
regression equation approximately explain 10.5 percent of the variation in
unionized workers’ perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid. The null
hypothesis that the unionized workers’ support for foreign aid is not related to
workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was not rejected based
on workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid. It was not rejected at
or=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.126 > or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was

rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that the first General Model of Workers

87

Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs is not sufficient to
explain the relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid and their
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. I conclude that attitudes and
beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are not concerned with

issues of waste of government spending on foreign aid programs.

Table 4.7 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with all Independent Variables

 

Y’=f(Y2) R’ F13,1es Sig. F(p)

 

Xs (13) 0.324" 0.105 1.491 0.126

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X3 (13): Includes 7 main independent variables (13 factors or subvariables)
(see p. 52)

,. : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.4 Integrative Statistical Model
The Integrative model was created based on three main Dependent
variables: 1) Moral advantage of foreign aid, 2) Economic Disadvantage (cost), and

3) Perception of waste of U. 8. dollars in foreign aid programs. Three specific

88

regression equations were tested (see Chapter 3, regression equations 3.2, 3.3,
and 3.4). Each of these three new regression equations represents the integrative
model. These equations include only those specific variables that showed
significant relationship with each main Dependent Variable. The results of this

Integrative model are as follows:

4.4.1 Moral Advantage or Benefit of Foreign Aid

Moral advantage or benefit of foreign aid is one of the main Dependent
Variables used to explain unionized workers’ support for foreign aid. The
relationship of Moral advantage of foreign aid with the independent variables
express one way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers’
support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

It was observed that only 6 independent variables were significant to explain
unionized workers moral advantage or benefit of foreign aid rather than 7. These
six independent variables used a total of six factors or subvariables rather than 13
factors used by the General model. These variables were: 1) Foreignaid primary
program (PRIMARYP), 2) anst of media information (T RUSTMED), 3) Government
national priorities (NATIPRIO), 4) Altruism toward foreign aid (ALTRUISM), 5)
Interest for third world (lNTEREST); and 6) Benefits in global interdependence
(BENEFITS).

The main null hypothesis that the unionized workers’ support for foreign aid

is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was

89

rejected based on workers moral advantage of foreign aid. It was rejected at cr=0.05
since Sig. F (p) = 0.000 < or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis that there is a
strong relationship between workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and
beliefs was accepted.

Table 4.8 presents the results of the statistical analysis . This shows that
there is strong relationship between workers moral advantage of foreign aid and
their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. A significant correlation
coefficient of 0.6748 was established between moral support for foreign aid and
their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a strong correlation was established between
those two variables at 01:05. It was observed that there were three independent
variables that provided positive increments to workers’ support for foreign aid
programs, but there were others that related negatively. Those variables that
created a positive increment in workers moral advantage of foreign aid are: altruism
toward foreign aid programs, government national priorities; and benefits in global
interdependence. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent
variables, it is expected that the moral advantage or support for foreign aid
programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other variables (see
Appendix E for specific values of Be). The independent variables that decreased the
moral advantage or support for foreign aid programs are: trust of media information,
interest concerns for third world; and secondary foreign aid priorities. This means
that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, the moral support for

foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount.

90

Considering that we have a strong coefficient of multiple determination (R2:
0.4554), I can conclude that the six independent variables included in this
integrative regression equation approximately explain 45.5 percent of the variation
in unionized workers’ moral advantage or support for foreign aid. Therefore, it is
concluded that the first Integrative Model of Moral Advantage or Benefit of Foreign
Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers’ support for
foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states
of U.S. are positive as related to issues of government spending on domestic
programs, benefits that U.S. workers get in global interdependence; and altruism
toward foreign aid. Therefore, the most foreign aid is spent on these programs, the
most support unionized workers give to U.S. foreign aid . On the other hand,
unionized workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U .S.
are related in a negative way to issues, such as: level of trust of information
provided by the general news media, interest about third world countries; and
foreign aid spend on secondary priorities, such as training in third world countries,
foreign investment; and foreign aid provided to small businesses in third world
countries. Therefore, the more government spending in these issues the less moral

support unionized workers give to U.S. foreign aid.

91

Table 4.8 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with Six Independent Variables

 

Y’=f(Y1) R’ Fe,174 Sig. F(p)

 

Xs (6) 06748" 0.4554 24.252 0.000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid
Y’ = F (Y1) = Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid

Xs (6): Includes 6 independent variables (6 factors or subvariables) (see p. 52)

,, : Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.4.2 Economic Disadvantage or Cost of Foreign Aid

This is the second of the main Dependent Variables of the Integrative model
used to explain unionized workers’ support for foreign aid. The relationship of
Economic Disadvantage or Cost of foreign aid with the independent variables
express another way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers’
support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

In this regression equation only 4 independent variables were significant to
explain unionized workers economic disadvantage of foreign aid rather than 7.

This regression equation uses four independent variables which are integrated by

92

4 factors or subvariables rather than 13 factors used in the General model. These
variables were: 1) Foreign aid secondary program (SECONDP), 2) Information
Travel Belief Institutions (INBINSTI), (2) Trust of Institutions information
(TRUSTINS), and 4) Interest for third world (INTEREST).

Based on statistical analysis, there is moderate relationship between
workers economic disadvantage or cost of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs
toward foreign aid programs. Table 4.9 shows that there is a significant correlation
coefficient of 0.4217 between economic disadvantages or cost of for foreign aid and
their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a strong correlation was established between
those two variables at 01:05. It was observed that only the variable of workers
trust’ of information provided by formal institutions had an inverse impact on foreign
aid cost or disadvantage. But, there were thee variables that related positively.
This means that an increase in one unit of trust of information provided by formal
institutions such as universities and unions, it is expected that the economic cost
or disadvantage for foreign aid programs will decrease about 0059689
(Bi = 0059589); holding the other variables. There were three independent
variables that increase the economic cost of foreign aid programs: foreign aid
spend on secondary programs(training, investment, foreign aid to small businesses
in third world countries),interest concerned to third world countries, and information
travel belief institutions, such as information provided by unions and universities.
This means that an increase in one unit of each of these independent variables, the

economic cost for foreign aid programs will increase by 0.4568, 0.1797, and 0.1539

93

respectively (see Appendix E for multiregression analysis and Bs values).

Considering that we have a moderate coefficient of multiple determination
(R2: 0.1778), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this
Integrative regression equation approximately explain 17.78 percent of the
variation in unionized workers’ economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid.
However, this percentage is smaller to the initial minimum value of 0.2 proposed
by this dissertation. This may be explained by the existence of other variabilitles
in the data that are not explained by this regression analysis. Nevertheless, the null
hypothesis that the unionized workers’ support for foreign aid is not related to
workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected base on
workers economic disadvantage or cost of foreign aid. It was rejected at or=0.05
since Sig. F (p) = 0.0000 < or=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted.
Therefore, it is concluded that the Integrative Model of Economic Disadvantage or
Cost of Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized
workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states
of U.S., especially in terms of economic cost of foreign aid, are concerned with
issues of government spending on foreign aid secondary programs, information
provided by formal institutions (unions, universities); and interest about third world
countries. These factors actually increased the cost of foreign aid or create an

economic disadvantage toward foreign aid. This means that unionized workers’

94

support for foreign aid programs is going to be affected by the increase of this
economic cost since U.S. will be more mixed up with other countries affairs, will
help more others that will compete more with U.S. workers, and U.S. will not benefit
now but in the long run. Therefore, to increase workers support for foreign aid
programs may imply to reduce the economic cost or disadvantages of foreign aid
programs. On the other hand, unionized workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward
foreign aid in selected states of U.S. are related in a different way to the issue of
workers trust of information provided by formal institutions, such as unions and
universities. Workers. have better attitudes and beliefs toward this factor since it
decreases the economic cost of foreign aid. Therefore, the most government
spending on programs that relate to people trust of formal institutions, such as
universities and unions, the smaller is the economic cost of foreign aid. Workers’

support for foreign aid programs will increase if their trust in information increases.

Table 4.9 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with Four Independent Variables

 

Y’=f(Y2) R' F2163 Sig. F(p)

 

X8 (4) 0.4217" 0.1778 9.8965 0.0000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid
Y’ = f (Y2) = Economic Cost or Disadvantage of Foreign

Xs (4): Includes 4 independent variables (4 factors or subvariables)
(see p. 52).

95

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R’ = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.4.3 Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid

Perception of waste of U. 8. dollar in foreign aid programs is the last of the
three main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized workers’ support for
foreign aid. The relationship of this main Dependent Variable with the independent
variables express one way of establishing the relationship between unionized
workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
programs.

It was observed that only 3 independent variables were significant to explain
unionized workers moral advantage or benefit of foreign aid rather than 7. The
regression equation used only used 3 independent variables which were integrated
by 3 factors or subvariables rather than 13 factors used by the General model.
These variables were: 1) Foreign aid secondary program (SECONDP), 2) Trust of
institutions information (TRUSTINS); and 3) Interest for third world countries
(INTEREST).

The main null hypothesis that the unionized workers’ support for foreign aid
is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was

rejected base on workers’ perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid

96

programs. It was rejected at or=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.0053 < or=0.05. Then the
alternative hypothesis that there is a strong relationship between workers’ support
for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs was accepted.

The statistical analysis (table 4.10) shows that there is a moderate
relationship between workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid and
their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. A correlation coefficient of
0.2589 was established between perception of waste of U.S. dollars and their
attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a moderate correlation was established between
those two variables at or=0.05. It was observed that there were two independent
variables that provided increments to workers’ perception of waste of U.S. dollars
in foreign aid programs, but there was one variable that decreased it. Those
variables that created an increment in workers’ perception of waste of U.S. dollars
are: interest in third world countries, and government secondary priorities. This
means that an increase in one unit of workers interest in third world countries or in
government spending on secondary programs (investment in third world countries,
help to small businesses in third world countries and training to foreigners), it is
expected that the perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs will
increase about 0.10568 and 0.07107, respectively; holding the other variables (see
Appendix E for multiple regression and Bs values). Workers’ trust in information
provided by formal institutions (universities and unions) was the only variable that
decreased the perception of waste of U.S. dollars. This means that an increase in

one unit of workers trust in formal institutions, the perception of waste of U.S.

97

dollars will decrease by -0.053717.

A small coefficient of multiple determination (R2: 0.06703) indicate that the
three independent variables included in this integrative regression equation
approximately explains 6.7 percent of the variation in unionized workers’
perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid. Therefore, it is concluded that the
Integrative Model of Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid is
sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign
aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. However this value
is smaller that the 0.2 value established by this study, the null hypothesis was
rejected based on analysis of variance (ANOVA). It is important to remember that
the General Model with 7 main variables (13 factors or subvariables) was not good
to explain the relationship between workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in
foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states
of U.S. in terms of waste and misused of U.S. dollars in foreign aid are in small
amount concerned with issues of government spending on foreign aid secondary
programs, interest for third world countries; and trust in information provided by
formal institutions. Therefore, to increase workers’ support for foreign aid programs
may imply to reduce the perception of misused or waste of U.S. dollars in foreign
aid programs. On the other hand, unionized workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward
foreign aid in selected states of U.S. is related in a different way to the issue of

workers trust of information provided by formal institutions, such as unions and

98

universities. Workers have better attitudes and beliefs toward this factor since it
decreases their perception of government waste of money in foreign aid.
Therefore, the most government spending on programs that relate to people trust
of formal institutions, such as universities and unions, the smaller is the perception
of waste of foreign aid. Workers’ support for foreign aid programs will increase if

their trust in institutions information increases.

Table 4.10 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for
Foreign aid with Three Independent Variables

 

Y’#(Y3) R’ F3,183 Sig. F(p)

 

Xs (3) 0.2589” 0.067 4.3827 0.0053

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Y’ : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid
Y’ = F(Y3) = Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid

X6 (3): Includes 3 independent variables (3 factors or subvariables)
(see p. 52)

,, : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of or at which the results are significant

4.5 Comparative Analysis of 1991-92 and 1995-96 Survey Data

The results presented here suggest that in the 1995-96 WAGE survey about

99

38 percent of the workers (from the total of 214) were female and 62 percent were
males. About 79 percent Caucasian, 8 percent Afro-American, 6 percent Hispanic
and 2 percent Native American (see Figure 4.1). On the other hand, the 1991-92
survey indicated that 23 percent were females and 77 males (from a total of 355).
Both groups agree somewhat to support foreign aid programs. About 86 percent
were Caucasian, 6 percent Afro-American, 3 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent
Native American. The average age of workers surveyed in 1995-96 was 41.8 years
old (range 23-69) and 41.5 years old in 1991-92 (range 23-69). It was observed
that younger union workers tend to give support to foreign aid but in less proportion
than older workers (range 23-69). This may be explained by the fact that older
workers are more familiar with foreign aid programs than younger workers.

Study results show that more educated workers (graduate level study and
bachelors degree) support foreign aid programs in less proportion than workers
who have less educational experience (high school or less) (see Figure 4.2). This
may be explained by the fact that more educated workers know about the level of
success or failure of U.S. foreign aid programs and how business relocation impact
them. Also, they tend to travel more outside of the U.S. for pleasure reasons. On
the other hand, workers with low level of educational experience may not know
enough about foreign aid programs and foreign aid organizations. Therefore,
researchers and policy makers may consider these issues to maintain and improve
future support for foreign aid policy. Foreign aid policy may change by involving

more younger workers and by providing more non-formal labor education classes.

100

This is a target population that in the future may provide higher support for foreign
aid programs if the right tools are available to them.

This dissertation also used results from studies of public opinion about
foreign aid done by Belden and Russonello in 1994 to observe changes in workers
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. They found that there was a small decline
in support of foreign aid from the American public from 54 percent in 1986 to 47
percent in 1994. They indicated that U.S. people support foreign assistance
essentially for disaster relief and feeding the hungry and poor. Also, other
programs got their support, such as protects the environment, helps prevent the
spread of AIDS, deals with drug trafficking, and provides family planning and birth
control. Some of their findings are similar to those of this dissertation. However,
they only provide information expressed in percentages rather than testing
hypotheses. For instance, Americans recognize that there are mainly needs in the
U.S. that need to be covered first, such as unemployment, crime, and poverty in the
U.S. (see Figure 4.3).

Belden and Russonello said “As we near the end of this century, Americans
see the interests of the countries of the world as connected, particularly in the areas
of economics, population, and environment” (Belden and Russonello, 1994. p. 14).
This dissertation results show that in 1995-96, about 45 percent of union workers
(from a total of 214) agree somewhat that developing countries affect U.S.
economy, about 32 percent were great deal agree, and only 21 percent were not

very much agree (see Figure 4.4). Also, there is a continued perception of the

101

ineffectiveness of foreign aid programs.

Americans believe that U.S. government and foreign governments are
responsible of foreign aid programs failure. Belden and Russonello pointed out that
Americans believe that religious organizations are more effective than U.S.
government, the United Nations and private organizations to delivery foreign aid.
However, the United Nations is considered as more efficient among all the
organizations since it is able to reach the largest quantity of people at the lowest
cost (Belden and Russonello, 1984. p. 12). Therefore, it is important to understand
these similar patterns of Americans and union workers’ attitudes toward foreign aid
programs since they may have short and long-term future policy implications,
especially in deciding who will delivery effectively and efficiently future foreign aid

programs

4.8 Conclusions

Based upon the statistical analysis as presented above, I can conclude that
the Saliency psychological model is not sufficient to explain the relationship
between workers’ support for foreign aid and workers attitudes and beliefs toward
foreign aid. However, the Self-Interest, Value, and Fairness models were sufficient
to explain the relationship between those two major variables.

This dissertation also provided two new models to explain the relationship
between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs

toward foreign aid programs. The General model and the Integrative model. A

102

multiple regression analysis and an analysis of variance were done to test the
validity and reliability of each model. The statistical results show that the General
model was satisfactory to explain only two of the three regression equations, Moral
advantage and Economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid. But, it was not
sufficient to explain the relationship of Workers’ perception of waste of U. 8. dollars
in foreign aid programs. On the other hand, the Integrative model only used
significant variables (only those with high significant value) to explain the
relationship between workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs
toward foreign aid. This model was sufficient to explain the three main Dependent
variables that constitute that relationship. Therefore, the Moral advantage, the
Economic cost or disadvantage; and the Perception of waste of U. 8. dollars in
foreign aid programs provided good regression equations to test the main null
hypothesis. The Integrative model results show that this model is sufficient
statistical model to be used to explain workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign

aid and their support for foreign aid programs.

 

812
5382.0

103

mos... >m ZO_._.<._Dn_Oa F6 wEDGE

 

.x. we
2:321

 

 

 

see
83.2

comm >9 c2538

mmmw >w>m3w 0?. 29me".

a3
.3522
am. e

.35 25oz

104

ZO.._.<ODDw ".0 4w>m._ >m ZO.._.<i.Dn.On_ Né wing“.

 

«3.3
.22: www.— mo .9"; N

 

 

«evfin
mmmg m0 .w.I

«and
mwmwwo ww...<.00mm<

 

£55
wm<m> v 25.: www..

 

 

are. p
2.8.5.

 

$95
mwmwmo meJwIO<m

 

cosmoscm. 6 _o>o._ >9 5.6.2.6;

camp >m>m3m n:< 29me“.

«and
>DDPm .._w>w._ wh<30<m0

IOS

VFNHZ

>._._mO_¢n_ Hzmszmm>00 né mung”.

 

3.5.5 EoEEo>oO

mag >m>m3w n:< ZOEEOH.

(0.4

- ob

.o.w

10.0—

(orufiiH 'IMO'I) eieos - ueew

106

 

 

e FNuZ
>20200m M4: Puma“? agar—.2300 OZEOJEO 1v NKDOE

m: POW—“2 wmmIPO

Hoe 320 ficzfiEom cosE a? 82 =e «a .62 9.8.2

  

E

 

.iow

tom

tom

-ov

 

om

 

>Eocoow .mj Beta. onczoo ac.ao_m>on_

>m>m3w o_< zomEon.

)ueored

Chapter 5

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

The literature review provided a variety of opinions about U.S. foreign aid
policy. This chapter only refers to those main points that relate to future
implications for U.S. foreign aid policy. This chapter is divided in four sections.
The first section refers to the U.S. foreign aid policy from the point of view of this
dissertation. The second part refers to the short-run foreign aid policy implications
based on the results of this study. The third section gives a general view of the
main long-run foreign aid implications. The last part of this chapter

provides the main conclusions and recommendations.

5.1 U.S. Foreign Aid Policy

U.S. foreign aid history shows that government spending on foreign aid
programs is based on a public goods concept. This is the kind of good that people
enjoy and everybody has to pay for it. An important characteristic of a public good
is that this may not exist if its provision was not left to the government (Smith,

1986). Considering U.S. foreign aid as a public good, it is observed that it started

107

108

as a paternalistic way to help other countries. it also was used as an important
instrument of foreign policy to gain markets, political power and security. Then,
foreign aid became a more sophisticated policy tool. It is now used as an
instrument to balance economies, to redistribute wealth, and to correct market
failures. These are the three main assumptions of foreign aid policy as a public
good.

This dissertation considers, different from other writers such as Mosley, that
the distributive assumption of govemment foreign aid is based on the principle that
government and multilateral agencies are the main formal institutions that can carry
out the redistribution of wealth between rich and poor countries, but they are not the
only ones. A foreign aid policy may be combined with lntemational trade to avoid
a paternalistic view that income from rich to poor countries must be transferred
automatically to improve their life condition. World Bank data show that the biggest
amount of foreign aid is transferred mainly by government and multilateral
agencies. For instance, voluntary agencies only transferred 2.9 percent of the
average total flow of resources to developing countries during the period of 1970-85
(World Bank, 1985). Therefore, more participation of private organizations is
needed to improve U.S. foreign aid policy, especially in terms of efficiency
and effectiveness of the programs.

Another important assumption of foreign aid as a public good is that in most
developing countries market imperfections exist for loan finance and capital

investment. In most of these countries, the whole financial market system tends to

109

benefit those who are in power and rich. Also, government officials in developing
countries may help to sustain the system of privileges and favors. Therefore, the
participation of lntemational governments and organizations is important in making
financial resources available to the poor. This allocative assumption of foreign aid
is an important element to support a public foreign aid policy since private markets
fail to fulfill this function. This study considers that multiple market failures in
lntemational investment is observed when private organizations fail to make
significant development investment in poor countries. Investors believe that there
is high risk in these economies. Foreign investment in developing countries is not
attracted to them since these countries experience low capital yields, low levels of
education, low productivity, lack of infrastructure, small domestic markets, lack of
skilled manpower, poor information, poor credit markets, low capability to pay, and
their national incomes mainly derive from agriculture and animal husbandry.
Therefore, lntemational investors see a more attractive opportunity cost for
investing in developed countries rather than poor countries. For instance, in sub-
Saharan Africa only 16 percent of the total capital flows were from non-official
sources in 1983 (World Bank, 1983).

For all these market imperfections, government foreign aid policy is needed
to ensure better allocation of individual and private sector investments. Foreign
assistance in this context takes the form of indirect investment.

A third assumption of foreign aid as a public good is based on Mosley’s

foreign aid government stabilization function. This function is based on the

110

assumption that foreign aid flows can increase world aggregate demand and
remove unemployment, especially in developed countries. This foreign aid
function is supported by Keynes theory of increasing government spending during
times of economic depression. Markets fail in many cases to reduce unemployment
in depression. For instance, Britain suffered a trend of increasing unemployment
since 1945 as a result of market imperfections (Mosley, 1987). The author of this
dissertation considers that aggregate demand policy may be implemented to
decrease unemployment.

Government foreign aid policy may be directed to expand aggregate demand
which can be implemented to stimulate output production. Capital is transferred as
a result of foreign aid programs which can expand aggregate demand by increasing
export demand which depends on world output. Total output can be expanded by
increasing foreign aid. Developing countries will have more capital flow to increase
export demand and to decrease their instabilities. Instability reduction may
stimulate growth in private foreign capital investment in these countries. Therefore,
government spending in the form of foreign aid may stabilize capital availability in
poor countries by reducing the effects of capital fluctuations and removing panic
and euphoria in international capital markets. World depressions and recessions
can be even more aggravated by reducing foreign aid. For instance, long-tam
export credits to sub-Saharan Africa dropped from $1.25 billion to $250 million
between 1980 and 1983 (World Bank, 1985). This action impacted the 19803

recession even harder in this particular area. However, it is important to establish

111

that in many cases this capital transfers to developing countries only benefits those
that already have capital and control over the economy.

The increase of export demand in many cases is used to buy products that
are used by a small rich elite. Therefore, the poor may no have access to this flow
of capital, even though the world output may increase in terms of aggregate
demand. The U.S. foreign aid policy needs to be more flexible to make
international capital available to the poor by making the use of capital more

flexible.

5.2 Short-Run Foreign Aid Policy Implications

The empirical results presented in this dissertation are not sufficient to
establish important short-run foreign aid policy implications. The inferential
statistics suggest that workers’ sopport for foreign aid is related to workers attitudes
and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. lntemational organizations started to
consider some programs related to workers’ attitudes and beliefs. For instance, the
Agency for lntemational Development (USAID) already started to be concerned
about this target population. A good example is the Worker Adjustment to the
Global Economy Project which was financed by USAID and its main objective was
to develop a curriculum material to teach unionized workers about economic issues,
including foreign aid. Nevertheless, researchers and policy makers need to ensure
that foreign aid information is communicated in a way that workers understand,

believe, and associate with it. Also, foreign aid policy information may be

112

disseminated to other level of learning, such as non formal education and high
school, and general public. Workers are concerned about foreign aid
programs and may are able to support or oppose to future U.S. foreign aid or trade
policy. Considering that the sample of unionized workers used by this study is not
too large, it is expected that in the short run they may not impact tremendously U.S.
foreign aid policy. It is observed that large policy changes may come from general
U.S. strategic, security and political interest around de world rather than from
unionized workers. However, this is not to deny that workers constantly lobby at
Congress when programs threat their jobs and standard of living.

Workers use their own union news media to communicate to other workers
those issues related to foreign aid. For instance, Thomas R. Donahue, the AF L-
CIO Secretary-Treasurer states “As investment capital has become more mobile
and transportation and communications infrastructure have improved, it is now
easier than it was even a few years ago for industrial production to shift to those
parts of the world where the workforce is poorly and easily exploited” (AFL-CIO,
1995)?

AFL-CIO supports foreign aid as policy tool for the objective of protecting
labor unions and workers’ rights. WAGE project said “AFL-CIO stresses the need
for aid to be delivered through support of private voluntary agencies in place of

govemment-to-govemment assistance” (WAGE, 1996. p.7).

 

’ This quote is part of the Donahue’s speech given for commemorating the 75th anniversary of the
International Labor Organization in 1994. It is also found on the cover page of the AFL-CIO
document “Multinational Corporations, Expanding Influence in thel 9903, 1995.

113

Policy makers should utilized the high trust that unionized workers have in
their own labor institutions and universities to gain higher support for foreign aid
programs. A comparative analysis of the 1991—92 and 1995-96 WAGE project
survey data shows that about 93 percent of the union workers read union materials
a few times a week or every time they are received in 1996 compared to 92 percent
in 1992 (see Figure 5.1 and Appendix C). Also, about 42 percent of union workers
attend two to four university-based labor education classes in 1996 compared to
44 percent in 1992. Therefore, their main sources of information are the materials
provided by their unions and universities. Also, this comparative analysis shows
that there is a similar pattern on workers’ trust of information. For instance,
workers’ trust on university-based labor education received the highest means, 7.2
in 1996 and 7.1 in 1992. This was follow by the AFL-CIO with means of 6.7 in
1996 and 6.6 in 1992. About 43.1 percent of workers said they trust universities
and unions information compared to 26.2 percent of workers that trust national TV
news and print media in 1996 (see Figure 5.2). Therefore, policy makers may
include more foreign aid issues in university-based labor education classes.

Unionized workers are also concerned with government political priorities of
foreign aid programs. This study results show that workers are able to support
foreign aid programs it priority is given first to domestic problems, such as public
education, controlling crime, unemployment, trade deficit, and helping U.S. poor.
Policy makers need to give attention to these attitudes and beliefs for future U.S.

foreign aid policy. They may ignore some of these issues since in the short-run

114

they may not have high future foreign aid implications. But, in the long-run they will
be in elections agenda.

The statistical analysis shows that unionized workers are concerned with
benefits that foreign aid provide to them. In the short-run they may pressure policy
makers to deal with issues of jobs, trade, and plant reallocation. For instance, the
U.S. administration was forced to tie one hundred percent of the foreign aid to
trade. Unionized workers through their National Labor Committee pressured the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to audit USAID and other government agencies
to verify if they were providing foreign aid to U.S. private businesses in Central
America to relocate their plants and lay off U.S. workers in 1992 (CBS-TV and ABC-
TV, 1992). Then, Congress amended the Foreign Aid bill to include Section 599
which relates to avoid expenditures of foreign aid on enterprises to relocate outside
of the U.S. and projects and activities that violate workers’ rights (United States
Congress, 1992, p. 106).

The comparative analysis of 1995-96 and 1991-92 surveys shows that the
pattern of means for these two surveys were almost the same for both years.
Unionized workers from 14 states are able to support foreign aid programs if funds
are used to education and family planning/birth control (Means 8 and 7.8
respectively), provide countries with surplus food (Means 7 and 6.9, respectively),
and help countries lower infant death rates (Means 7 and 6.8, respectively) (see
Figure 5.3). They do not support foreign aid to encourage U.S. investment in other

countries, provide debt relief, and provide foreigners with university training in U.S.

115

Workers may impact short-run private and public policy. They use strikes
and collective bargaining to pressure private businesses and government
institutions to give attention to some of the issues they mentioned in this study.
Local businesses and multinational corporations policy implementation are
pressured by national and international union organizations. For instance, a quote
from AF L-CIO said “ From November 1990 to April 1992, the United Steel-workers
of America (USWA), with the support of the AFL-CIO and its Industrial Union
Department (IUD), conducted a comprehensive and successful campaign against
the Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation (RAC) on behalf of the 1,700 members of
USWA Local 5668 in Ravenswood, W. Va. Throughout the campaign, critical
assistance was provided by a variety of international labor allies” (AF L-CIO, 1995.
p. 18) For instance, they believe that foreign aid is a waste of U.S. dollars when it
is used to provide training to workers or to support businesses in third world
countries since they will compete with them. Therefore, policy makers must be

aware of these issues to increase workers support for foreign aid policy.

5.3 Long-Run Foreign Aid Policy Implications

The findings presented here are not sufficient to suggest that workers’
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid may impact long-run foreign aid and trade
policy. It is impossible to measure the amount of the impact since workers’ attitudes
and beliefs are very complex issues that may change over time. But, researchers

and policy makers need to ensure that unionized workers concerns are taken into

116

consideration for future foreign aid policy support.

A comparative analysis of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 WAGE survey data (see
Appendix C) indicates that about 61 percent of union workers (214 workers) were
opposed to the U.S. giving economic assistance to other countries in 1996 and
about 61.6 percent (355) opposed in 1992 (see Figure 5.4). However, when
workers were asked whether they were in favor or opposed to U.S. giving economic
aid for development projects such as health care, education, and agriculture to
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, about 59.3 percent were in favor in
1996 and about 62 percent were in favor in 1992. Also, union workers were asked
in 1996 if it was a good or bad policy to give U.S. foreign aid to buy U.S. products,
88 percent of workers said that it was a good policy and 9.3 percent indicated that
it was bad policy (see Figure 5.5). It is important that policy makers focus foreign
aid programs to these development projects and lntemational trade since they will
have better support from union workers for future policy implementation. However,
it is necessary to have a more flexible foreign aid policy to be able to reach those
that are really in need. This may have long-run foreign aid policy implications since
approaches currently utilized by policy makers and foreign aid agencies are too
rigid.

The results of this study show that about 17.8 percent of the respondents
(from a total of 214 workers) do not know enough about third world countries and
about 15.4 percent of workers said they do not know about foreign aid

organizations, and 22.8 percent think their help is useless (see Figure 5.6). This

117

suggests that unionized workers need to have more information available about
foreign aid programs and organizations. Policy makers can promote domestic
programs to make this information available to union workers. This may

increase future support for foreign aid policy in the long-run.

5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

This research shows that workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
programs observed a similar pattern. Changes in union workers' attitudes and
beliefs were observed, as a result of training provided by WAGE project to test
curriculum material. Therefore more educational programs about foreign aid policy
and global economy need to be promoted. Considering that the statistical analysis
done by this dissertation shows that there is a relationship between unionized
workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes ad beliefs toward foreign aid
programs, labor educators, union organizations and international foreign agencies
have to understand this relationship and to invest their resources in this kind of
programs. It is important to understand the results of this research if it is expected
to establish a national education program for unionized workers. Therefore, the
results presented here are important for researchers who want to understand the
whole complexity of labor, global and foreign aid issues.

Policy makers must try to understand American beliefs and reactions to U.S.
foreign aid programs. This dissertation provides important tools to improve union

workers support for foreign aid. But, short and long-term policy implementation

118

must consider workers positive and negative views of foreign aid issues. A more
flexible foreign aid policy may help domestic and lntemational financial agencies
to understand and to invest in U.S. labor education programs. However, it is
important to remember that foreign aid policy must be developed and implemented

in combination with U.S. domestic programs.

119

9.92: 20K... mZOF<03m=m 02¢ 0233: cam r.» $.50.“—

 

.xbdm
m>.m0wm _ m2... >mw>m

 

acme

xmm>> < mmsz... 3m“.
«and

...<...... 25.: zmto www...
cam.

mm>mz

sand

9.3.5.

 

 

 

32:: E2. 20.60.33. new 35:2). comm.

mam? >m>m3w 0.4. ZOEEOH.

120

mung—Dow zOF<E¢Omz_ no PPS—mammo N6 950....—

 

 

«1.?
SOME .rZEn. .C.<Z

 

2.5.0.1 ZOPZ...O . I
$59

20.2: ..._.<2 1....2.

o\o for
m>>mz >._. .....<Z

 

semi.
o_o:<

 

o\om.ow
mm<0 mx... nEO

 

 

Jeni
8:223

 

o\on.m
OZOO >4mm

828m 6.5 a 3:285

mmmr >w>m3w n._< ZOEEOH.

121

v _. Nuz
w2<m00¢m n=< 20_m¢Ou_ ".0 >.:¢O_m_n_ Md meGE

memes. E9005 0?.

02_Zz<..n. >i__.2<u. wwwz_w3m .2004 I...<mn. ._.z<n.z_
...Zm:>_._.mw>z_ .wj awn—mm hmmo GZ_Z.<E... >.ZD QOOu. mDJmmDm
. l ‘ .

  
 

o

i l l -8

mEmaoE c_< c990”. .6 brocn.

>w>m3m D.< ZOEEOH.

(0i ufiiH ‘i MO1) eieos - ueew

122

 

 

 

5 wNflZ
>032 moz<hm_mm< QEOZOOW .m.= 5.» $50....—

200 Cm“.

8030 age“. 3.3.5.

 

tom

105

tom

tom

 

oow

 

46:0“. mocm.m.mm< o.Eocoom .mj

mam? >w>m3m n:< ZGEEOH.

tueored

123

VFNHZ

whoa—Dom... 2<UEmE< >Dm 0... >030... n=< szEOn .m.= m6 mmDGE

 

 

mam?

6:8 860

OVIm.NI ‘. ilIi ll. .‘ III ‘ ‘ ¥ 7 ‘1‘ I I l Dwmm
o 6.6“. new
9:822

Beaten. cmo_.oE< >3m 918:8 E< c920”. .mj
>m>m3m o_< 20_m.m_On.

v PNHZ
mmnatt< o_< mhzmonmmmm 9m mKDGE

9.00.2
omemmmmez_a02

 

www.m—
mOmO >>OZv. ._.OZ

2 || 1
I “<on F

m...n.Om.n. IU<mm ._.OZ O_<

   

Jan...
mmmewD aim... >5.

semi .

IODOZm. >>OZv. ...OZ sowdr

mefi. .mj nij

83...... ea. acmecoammm
>m>m3m o_< zemEE

Chapter 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The first five chapters of this dissertation have dealt with the introduction
and problem statement, literature review, research methods, the analysis of the
data and research results, and future implications for U.S. foreign aid policy. This
final chapter provides a summary of the study, assess the major conclusions
derived from this research effort, study limitations, and makes recommendations

concerning further research.

6.1 Summary

The main objective of this research was to investigate the extend to which
there was a relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid in
selected states of U.S. and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.
To this end, two surveys from the WAGE project, School of Labor and Industrial
Relations, Michigan State University, were used as a source of secondary data.
However, the 1995-96 survey data represents the main focus of this dissertation.

The 1991-92 survey data were used essentially for comparison purposes. The

125

126

data were carefully organized and coded in this study. This author was part of the
research team of these projects, working as a Graduate Assistant for a period of
four years. Therefore, I have considerable understanding of the complex process
of dealing with workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid.

This dissertation was divided into different parts. First, there was a literature
review of the most important theories and frameworks related to attitudes and
beliefs and government spending, including past and present studies of public
opinions toward foreign aid. Second, the survey data were coded to be used in
SPSS and Excel statistical computer programs. Multiple regression analysis and
analysis of variance (ANOVA) were carried out based on these computer programs.

This research required two kinds of information for the analysis. Workers
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid required information concerning
psychology and political science. Workers’ support for foreign aid demanded
information about economics and U.S. domestic and foreign policy .

Different approaches have been used to explain public opinion toward
government spending. These are discussed in the referenced literature as the
welfare approach, saliency model, self-interest approach, value model, fairness
model, and other political psychology approaches, such as the Enthclass model. It
is also recognized in the literature, that few general descriptions of unionized
workers were available. Therefore, it is not surprising that a specific model of the
relationship between unionized workers’ support for foreign aid and their attitudes

and beliefs toward foreign aid programs does not exist. Thus, the first part of the

127

main objective of this dissertation was to test four psychological models of public
support for public policy: the saliency model, self-interest model, values model,
and fairness model. These models were used by Sara Zuckerbraun to test
government spending on the environment (Zuckerbraun, 1994). These models
were used in this dissertation to observe the capability of each model to explain
unionized workers’ support for foreign aid based on their attitudes and beliefs
toward foreign aid programs. The issue saliency model was the only one that was
ruled out as sufficient to explain worker’s support for foreign aid. However, each
of these four models explains only part of the relationship between workers
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and their support for these programs.

These models analyze government spending and public support for public policy
not only in isolation from each other, but also public policies are considered in
isolation.

The second part of the main objective of this dissertation was to
develop two new comprehensive linear models. A General Model was created to
integrate these four psychological approaches in one statistical model. This model
was divided in three linear regression equations to test workers’ support for foreign
aid based on the moral advantage of foreign aid, economic cost or disadvantage
of foreign aid, and the perception of waste of U. 8. dollars in foreign aid programs
(see Appendix D)) This model was sufficient to explain the moral advantage and
the economic cost of foreign aid, but it was statistical insufficient to explain workers’

perception of waste of U.S. dollar in foreign aid programs. Therefore, a statistical

128

Integrative Model was developed to explain this relationship. Three main linear
regression equations were used to test the main hypothesis of this study. This
model contents only significant variables to explain the relationship between
worker’s support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid
(main hypothesis).

The statistical results show that the Integrative Model is sufficient to explain
unionized workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and their support for
foreign aid programs. This model has sufficient statistical significant to explain the
moral advantage or benefits of foreign aid, the economic cost or disadvantage of
foreign aid, and workers’ perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid
programs. Strong correlation coefficients were established between workers’
attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and moral advantage, economic cost, and
perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs at or =0.05. Therefore,
the null hypothesis that there was not relationship between workers’ support for
foreign aid and workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was
rejected. Thus, the alternative hypothesis was accepted for each of these three

statistical regression equations and for the Integrative model as a whole.

6.2 Conclusions
The main conclusions derived from this present research are the following:
1. It was feasible to test four psychological models: saliency, self-interest,

value, and fairness model. These models were used to test the relationship

129

between unionized worker’s support for foreign aid in selected states of U.S.
and workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The last
three models were useful in explaining this relationship. But, the saliency
issue model was not sufficient to explain it. However these models only
provide part of the story. Each of these four models only explains one small
part of workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. They are
isolated from each other and they test isolated public policy.

It was statistically feasible to build two new linear statistical models:
the General and Integrative models. The General model was useful but not
enough to explain the relationship between workers’ support for foreign aid
and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The Integrative
model was sufficient and significant to test the null hypothesis since it
rejected the null hypothesis in its three main regression equations.
A comparative analysis of the 1991—92 and 1995—96 WAGE project surveys
data and Belden and Russonello study results, allowed the author to
establish patterns of unionized workers supports’ for foreign aid. Similar
patterns were observed on workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid.
However, some small changes in their attitudes and beliefs were observed
after WAGE project provided training to some of the unionized workers to
test curriculum material.

Based on the Integrative model, attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in

selected states of U.S. are positive with regard to issues of government

130

spending on domestic programs, such as public education, crime,
unemployment, helping the poor in the U.S., and reducing the trade and budget
deficit. Also, they are concerned with issues of trust. Workers have high
reliability on sources of information provided by formal institutions such as the
AF L-CIO, national and lntemational unions, and university-based labor
education programs. Tmst of information provided by formal institutions (unions
and universities) tends to increase highly workers’ support for foreign aid.
Another issue that unionmd workers areconcernedwith is the benefits workers
get from foreign aid. They believe that raising living standards in third world
countries through economic aid will benefit them and U.S. economic interests
may be improved if third world countries become richer. Unionized workers’
support for foreign aid programs is directly positive related to these issues.
They are able to increase their support for foreign aid if these factors are
considered first.

The Integrative model results show that unionized workers in 14 selected states
of the U.S. have negative attitudes and beliefs toward issues such as trust on
infonnation provided by the news media. This refers to information given by
U.S. House of Representatives or the Senate, the national TV news program
networks, U.S. government administrations, the major national print media and
some voluntary organizations. These issues tend to decrease workers’ support
for foreign aid programs. Also, workers a'e negatively concemed with the issue

of interest about third world countries. They are not really that interested in third

131

world countries, but they are interested in helping people in the U.S. before
people in other countries. They feel that the problems of the third world
countries are so great that their help can not make a difference. The issue of
workers’ interest in third world countries tends to decrease workers’ support for
foreign aid programs.

Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid are also related in a negative
way to issues of information belief institutions and foreign aid secondary
priorities. lnfonnation belief institution refers to how often workers read mailings
and publications from their unions and how oflen they participate in university-
based labor education classes. This issue does not refer to trust of the
sources of information. These two issues tended to increase the economic
cost or disadvantage of foreign aid, and to decrease the level of support for
foreign aid programs. This may be as a result that unionized workers tend to
concentrate their information sources mainly on their unions and universities.
These organizations may not provide a lot of information about foreign aid
programs since this study results show that workers said they do not know so
much about foreign aid organizations and third world countries. However, they
recognized that they will get benefits from foreign aid given to these countries.
The last issue that has negative impact on workers’ support for foreign aid
programs is the U. S. government spending on foreign aid secondary priorities.
Workers’ support for foreign aid is decreased when U.S. government uses funds

on programs, such as supporting small businesses started by local people in

132

third world countries; providing debt relief to poor countries owing debts to the
U.S. government or U.S. banks; using foreign aid money to encourage U.S.
businesses to invest in developing countries; and giving people from other
countries university training or other training in the U.S. Therefore, the more
government spending in these programs the less moral support unionized
workers give to foreign aid and the higher is the economic cost of foreign aid

and the higher is workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid

programs.

6.3 Research Limitations

This research had some limitations. It did not cover all the issues related to
foreign aid, global economy, and unionized workers since there is enormous the
amount of information available. Therefore, the main issues that were covered are
based on WAGE project surveys data. The main target population was represented by
unionized workers from 14 selected states of U.S., who attended university-based labor
education classed as a part of their labor extension programs in 1991-92 and 1995-96.
These are mainly purposive or convenience surveys. Therefore, the inferential results
of this dissertation do not claim to represent all the union workers registered in U.S.
national and international labor organizations. It only represents a sample of the
unionized workers who attended those specific classes.

Another limitation of this research is that it includes mainly unionized workers.

Attitudes and beliefs of U.S. non-unionized workers may be different from those who

133

were the subject of this study.

Finally, this dissertation made conclusions and recommendations based on
inferential statistics. Psychological models and Linear regression equations with Least-
Squared fits may not be the best way to explain the relationship between workers’
support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.
However, this author tested non-linear models to find better statistical tools, but these
did not add any more significance than those of the linear multiple regression
equations. Attitudes and beliefs are very complex issues to measure. But, this
dissertation presented at least two new statistical models, the General and the
Integrative models, to explain the relationship beMen unionized workers’ support for

foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

6. 4 Recommendations for Further Research

Studies done by Brehm and Cohen have shown that individuals are social
entities of change and many of their actions are not easy to predict by using common
sense or psychological elements (Brehm and Cohen, 1992). This dissertation
observed similar patterns of worker’s attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in both
WAGE project surveys. Nso, a comparative analysis done by this author show that
these results are similar to those provided by Belden and Russonello in their review
of survey data regarding American’s views on U.S. leadership and foreign assistance.
However, smallchangm inmionworkers’attitudesandbeliefswereobserved afterthe

WAGE project provided training to unionized workers to test curriculum material.

134

Therefore, it is suggested that resources may be better spent in long term education
with high action participation of workers in the design and implementation of programs.

Considering that these states may be expected to be used as the core for a
future national union workers program, it is important to have more data and
information available about these and other states to help decision makers to avoid
future mistakes. Just as past research has focused on the citizens opinions and beliefs
toward foreign aid and the change in priorities for the use of U.S. money, future
research should focus on the impacts that changes in American attitudes, opinions and
beliefs toward foreign assistance have in their organizations, communities, and society.
This kind of knowledge will help policy makers to introduce changes in those policies
that are getting obsolete.

This research also highlights the need for further investigations of those
issues that had positive or negative impacts on workers’ support for foreign aid.
These results provide empirical evidence that unionized workers in selected states
of U.S. are deeply concerned about those issues. However, a challenge to
researchers is to develop new data and models that accurately reflect the attitudes
and beliefs of U.S. union workers toward foreign aid programs and foreign policy.
This study provides useful information which may be used in the design of more
flexible, effective, and efficient foreign aid policies. Using the positive attitudes and
beliefs that unionized workers from these selected states of U.S. have toward
national and international policies, may promote the establishment of better

policies.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

WAGE PROJECT 1995-96 SURVEY INSTRUMENT

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
School of Labor and industrial Relations

We are working on a series of lessons about strategic planning topics to help working people
understand issues such as foreign trade and aid to other countries. This survey will be used to see
which areas which we need to focus our attention on. Please answer the questions carefully. We have
written quesdions we hope will provide a range of different information levels. Do the best you can but
do not worry if some questions seem quite difficult.

Thank you for completing this survey. Your information will be kept confidential and will only be
reported as part of the figures for the entire group of people taking this

survey throughout the country.

A09 __

Sex: Female __ Male __

Race (Optional):
Caucasian __ Hispanic __
Afro-American __ Asian _
Native American __

Name of Union to Which You Belong

 

Local You Belong To

 

Total Years of Union Membership
Total Years of Union Office or Leadership

 

StateYouLivein

 

SheWherethisSurveywasAdministered

 

135

l

(A)

6
Educational Experience
High School Diploma or Less

College: Less Than Two Years
Associate's Degree
Less Than Four Years
Bachelors Degree
Graduate Level Study

Please answerthe following questions as honestly as you can. Circle the letter or put an X on
the line where appropriate to answer the questions.

1. Have you ever traveled outside the United States excluding Canada?

yes no
2. What was your primary mason for traveling?
a. Business
b. Education
c. Military Service
d. Work Abroad
e. Pleasure
3. How often would you say that you read or look at a news magazine, like Tine or
Newsweek?
a. Almost every week
b. Once or twice a month
c. Less than once a month
d. Never
4. How often would you say that you watch a national television news program?
a. Almost every evening
b. A few times a week
c. Less often than that
d. Never
5. How often do you read a daily newspaper?
a. Nearly every day
b. A few times a week
c. Less often than that
d. Never

137

How often do you read mailings and publications from your union?

Every time i receive them
A few times a week

Less than once a month
Never

9.0.6!»

How often do you participate in university-based labor education classes?

Four or more times a year
Two to Three times a year
Less than once a year
This is my first class

9.0.5!”

The term Third World is used to mean those countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, Eastern Europe and even the former Soviet Union, whose economies and
standard of living are less developed than the United States, many European countries,
and other countries that are richer, and whose economies are fully industrialized.

Here are some groups that provide information about Third World countries. Using any
number from 1 to 10 with 1 meaning ”not at all reliable" and 10 nnaning "totally

reliable," indicate how reliable you think each group is in providing infonnation on the
Third World.

a. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

b. Ads and mailings from groups such as CARE and Savethe Children
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

c. The national TV news programs (that is; ABC, CBS, NBC networks)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

d. The Clinton Administration
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
e. The major national print media (re. the New York Times, TIME or,
NEWSWEEK)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

f. Your national/international union
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10.

11.

12.

138

g. The AFL-CIO and its programs/materials
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

h. University-based labor education programs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Using a scale where 1 means lowest priority and 10 means top priority, how would you
rate these issues the government has to deal with?

a. Pubiiceducation 12345678910
b. lntemational arms control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c. Dealingwithcrime 12345678910
d. Unemployment 12345678910
e. HelpingthepoorintheU.S. 12345678910
f. Reducing metradedeficit 12345678910
9. Reducing poverty and hunger in

othercountries 12345878910
h. Reducing the national budget deficit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910

Are you generally in favor of or opposed to the U.S. giving economic assistance to
other countries?

a. in favor b. opposed

Do you think the U.S. govemment is doing more than it should, about the right amount,
or less than it should to fight poverty in other parts of the world?

a. more than it should
b. about the right amount
c. less than it should

From what you have heard or read, would you say the economies of Third World
countries affect the U.S. economy a great deal, somewhat, not very much, or not at all?

a. a great deal
b. somewhat

c. not very much
d. not at all

13.

14.

15.

139

Sornet’anes when the United States gives aid to foreign countries it requires that the aid
money be used to buy American products. Do you think this is a good policy or a bad
policy?

a. a good policy b. a bad policy

Assume you are in charge of aid for development to other countries. Using a number
from 1 to 10 on a scale where 1 is lowest priority and 10 is top priority., please tell me
how a high priority you would give each of these areas:

a. African countries

b. Arab countries

c. Asian countries

d. israel

e. Latin American and Caribbean Countries
f. Eastern Europe

_ 9. Countries of the former Soviet Union

You have ranked those countries that would have the highest priority. New read this
list of kind of aid programs and indicate how important you consider each to be. On a
scale where 1 means lowest priority and 10 means top priority, pick a number between
1 and 10 to show how you would rank these types of aid:

a. Providing other countries with surplus food
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

b. Programs that help countries lower infant death rates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c. Giving people from other countries university training or other training in
the U.S.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d. Programs to support small businesses started by local people in those

countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
e. Pravidingdebtrelieftopoorcountries owing debtstothe U.S. government or
U.S. banks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
f. Education on family planning and providing birth control
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

g. Using aid money to encourage U.S. businesses to invest in those countries

12345678910

140

16. The following are statements about economic aid for development, please indicate
which most represents how you feel.

strongly somewhat neither agree disagree strongly
agree agree nor disagree somewhat disagree
1 2 3 4 5

a. Aid is essential if other countries are to become self-sufficient
b. Wherever people are hungry or poor, we ought to do what we can to help them.
c. Aid programs get us too mixed up with other countries affairs.
d. Helping other countries develop will make them more stable.

a. it is against U.S. interests to help developing countries because they will compete with us
economically and politically.

f. We need to solve our own poverty problems in the U.S. before we turn attention to other
countries.

9. Aid is frequently misused by foreign governments.
h. A large part of aid is wasted by the U.S. bureaucracy.

I. If the U.S. helps Third World countries, we will benefit in the long run.

17. Do you tend to strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly

disagree with these statements:

strongly somewhat neither agree disagree strongly
agree agree nor disagree somewhat disagree
1 2 3 4 5

a. The U.S. should limit the number of immigrants entering the country because they compete
with American for jobs.

b. The U.S. should help farmers in other countries ieam to growth their own food, even if it
means they buy less food from the U.S.

c. The U.S. should not give any kind of assistance to countries that do not have free elections
or that are ruled by dictators.

d. The U.S. should give Third World countries less aid and leave them alone go they can
develop in their own Ways.

18.

19.

20.

141

Think about the issues it this survey and indicate whether you tend to favor or oppose
U.S. giving of economic assistance for development projects such as health care,
education, and agriculture to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

a. Favor b. Oppose

Read each statement and indicate how each one describe you.

strongly somewhat neither agree disagree strongly
agree agree nor disagree somewhat disagree
1 2 3 4 5

. ldon not know enough about Third World countries and their problems.

. i feel a lot of foreign aid never gets to the people who need it.

. I do not know very much about organizations that run programs to help those countries.
. I am not really that interested in Third World countries.

. i feel that the Third World's problems are so great that my help can't make a difference.

. i am more interested in helping people in the United States before people in other countries.

Read the following statements and indicate how you feel about each of them.

strongly somewhat neither agree disagree strongly
agree agree nor disagree somewhat disagree
1 2 3 4 5

. Because we live in a rich country, Americans have a responsibility to help improve conditions

in poorer countries.

. Helping poor countries will make the world safer.
. I feel bad that others have so little when we have so much.

. Helping Third World countries is in our self-interest because as they develop they will buy

American products.

. Helping Third Worid countries become self-sufficient will cut down the number of immigrants

to the United States.

21.

142

Read the following statements and indicate how you feel about each one.

strongly somewhat neither agree disagree strongly
agree agree nor disagree somewhat disagree
1 2 3 4 5

a. Competition from other countries affects decisions in my work place.

b. Workers in Third World countries compete with me and my co-workers.

0. Language in our collective bargaining agreement stems from consideration of global

competition.

d. Economic aid to a small business in Third World country does not affect me.

e. Raising living standards in Third World countries through economic aid will benefit me.

f. Competition from workers/companies in Third World nations is a threat to myjob security.

g. U.S. economic interests may be improved if Third World countries become richer.

h. Negotiation results in my work place are affected by conditions in Third World nations.

i. Gathering information about conditions in Third World countries is part of the preparation for

contract negotiations in my union.

_j. A candidate's view on economic aid to Third World countries influences my decision to vote

for that person.

. if my union tells me that a specific governmental policy is wrong i trust that position.

Thank you for once again for participating in this survey.

FCNVAGE

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

 

CODE BOOK 1995-96 SURVEY

VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL VARIABLE VALUES

Order Order1 1-214

Rec Record 1-2

id lD Number 500-713

age Age 16-99

sex Sex 1 =Female
2=Male

race Race 1 =Caucasian
2=Hispanic
3=Afro-American
4=Asian
5=Native American

union Union Belong to 1-56

Codes of Variable: Union - Union Belong to

AFCME

iBFO (F iremanlOilers)

UPIU

AFGE

SEIU

URW

UAW

GRSEBA GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT ASSOCIATION

APWU

RWDSU

METAL POLISHERS, BUFFERS, PLATERS, AND

VOmAwN-e

-<ooo

 

143

144

 

ALLIED WORKERS

11

KCEA KENT COUNTY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 12

AFT

iBT (Teamsters)

MSEAIAFSCME

USWA

OPEIU

MEA

NALC

AFGM

GMP GLASS MOLDERS AND POLISHERS
lAM

IBEW

ACTWU

lCWU

SCHDEU SAGINAW COUNTY HEALTH
DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES UNION

Alw

BBF (Boilermakers)

UGWA (Garmet Workers)

IUE (lntemational Union Electrical Workers)
IAFF

OCAW

ALUMINUM, BRICK, GLASS WORKERS
CWA

CSEA

AFT

UFCW UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL
WORKERS UNION

GREIU EMPLOYEES INDEPENDENT UNION
SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS
DC It GRAPHIC COMMUNICATION UNION
OTHERS

local Local Belong to
ymember Tot Yrs Member
yoffice Tot Yrs Un Offic
edu Educ Exper

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37
38
39
40
41
42-55

000001 -600000

01 -99

01 -99

1=H.S. or Less

2=2 Yrs. Or less Univ
3=Associate’s Degree

145

 

trav Travel Outside U.S.

(If Response is No, Ten Next Question is Blank)

reason Primary Trav Reason

newsmag Read Newsmag

tvnews Watch Tvnews
daily Read Paper

umail Read Union Paper
ulec Univ Labor Ed

4=Less than 4 years
5=Bacheior’s Degree
6=Graduate Level Study

1 =Yes
2=No

1 =Business
2=Education
3=Military Service
4=Work Abroad
5=Pleasure

1 =Never

2=Less than once/month
3=Once or twice/month
4=Almost every week

1 =Never

2=Less often than that
3=Few times a week
4=Almost every evening

1 =Never

2=Less often than that
3=Few times a week
4=Nearly every day

1 =Never

2=Less often than that
3=Few times a week
4=Every time i received

1=This is first class
2=Less than once/yearly
3=Two or three/yearly
4=Four or more/yearly

 

146

 

a8
b8

d8
e8
f8

98
h8
a9
b9
c9
d9
e9

99
h9

a10

a11

a12

Rely Cong

Grp Like CARE

Natl TV News

Clinton Admin

Natl Print Media

Natl intl Union
AFL—ClO

Univled

Pub Ed Priority

Intl Arms Cont

Deal with Crime
Unemployment

Help U.S. Poor

Lower Trade Def
Lower Poverty Othr Ctr
Lower Natl Budget Def

Pro Con1 Aid

More Less Fight Pov

Others Affect U.S.

1 =Low 1 0=High
1=Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1 =Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1 =Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1 =Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1 =Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1 =Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1=Low 10=High
1 =Favor

2=Oppose

1 =More than

2=About Right
3=Less than

1 =Not at all

2=Not very much

3=Somewhat
4=Great deal

 

147

 

a13 Aid Buy U.S. Prod 1=Good policy
2=Bad policy
a14 African Ctries 1 =Low 10=High
b14 Arab Ctries 1 =Low 10=High
c14 Asian Ctries 1 =Low 10=High
d14 Israel 1=Low 10=High
e14 Lat Amer Carib 1 =Low 10=High
f14 East Europe 1 =Low 1 0=High
g14 Soviet Union 1=Low 10=High
a15 Surplus Food 1=Low 10=High
b15 Infant Death 1=Low 10=High
c15 Univ Training 1=Low 10=High
d15 Local Business 1=Low 10=High
e15 Debt Relief 1=Low 10=High
f15 Family Planning 1=Low 10=High
g15 U.S. Investment 1=Low 10=High
a16 Self-Sufficiency 1 =Strongly Agree (SA)
2=Somewhat Agree (SWA)
3=Neither Agree/Disagree (NAD)
4=Disagree Somewhat(DSW)
5=Strongly Disagree (SD)
b16 Help Hungry Poor (The same var. values as a16)
c16 Too Mixed Up in “
d16 Aid Makes Stable “
e16 Help Competition “
f16 Solve U.S. Own Problems “
g16 Aid is Misused “
h16 U.S. Bureaucracy Wastes “
i16 To Our Benefit “
a17 Limit immigrants “
b17 Help Others Grow More “
c17 Support Democracies “
d17 Give Less/Leave Alone “
a18 Pro Con2 Aid 1=Favor

2=Oppose

 

148

 

a19

b19
c19
d19
e19
f19

a20

b20

d20
e20

state

Not Know Enough

Aid Not Reach People
Not Know Orgs

Not Interested

My Help Useless
Help U.S. First

Responsibility to Help

Help Makes World Safer
Others Have so Little
Aid is Self-Interest

Aid Cuts Immigrants

State of Residence

1=Strongly Agree (SA)
2=Somewhat Agree (SWA)
=Neither Agree/Disagree (NAD)
4=Disagree Somewhat(DSW)
5=Strongly Disagree (SD)

1=Strongly Agree (SA)
2=Somewhat Agree (SWA)
3=Neither Agree/Disagree (NAD)
4=Disagree Somewhat(DSW)
5=Strongly Disagree (SD)

=Michigan
=Missouri
=lllinois
=Wisconsin
=Minnesota
=Ohio
=Kansas
=Nebraska
=Pennsylvania
1 0=Connecticut
1 1 =Alabama

1 2=Arkansas
13=Tennessee
14=Califomia

(OQVOIUI-th-b

 

149

 

COMPUTER DATA PROGRAMS AND FILES

1991-92 SURVEY DATA

Data File - PMDATADEV

Systems File - PMDEV.SYS

SPSSX Command F iie - PMSPSXDEV
SPSSX Computation File - PMDEV.SPS
First Set of Data 1-123

Second Set of Data 135- and higher

1995-96 SURVEY DATA

Data File - AIDSURVEY96.SAVE
SPSS for Windows 3.5 and 95
Excel for Windows 4.0

Total Set of Data 1-214

ID Numbers 501-713

 

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 1991-92 AND 1995-96
WAGE PROJECT SURVEY DATA

Survey Data from a Sample of 214 Subjects in 1996 and 355 in 1992

Demographic Data (214 workers in 1996 and 349 in 1992)

Population Results are in Percentages

Age 1996 1992 Sex 1996 1992 Race 1996 1992
23 to 25 = 2 2 Female = 38 23 Caucasian - 79 86
26 to 30 = 11 5 Male = 62 77 Afro-American = 8 6
31 to 35 = 14 19 Hispanic - 6 3
36 to 40 = 15 24 Native American-I 2 5
41 to 45 = 18 20

46 to 50 = 19 16

51t055= 10 8
56to60= 6 4

over60 = 1 2

Average Age in 1996 = 41.8 years old [range 23 - 69]

Average Age in 1992 = 41.5 years old [range 23 - 69]

150

Participants from the Following States:

151

Results are in Percentages

1 996

Michigan 80
Minnesota 6
Alabama 7
California 7
Missouri

lllinois

Kansas
Wisconsin

Ohio

Nebraska
Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Arkansas
Tennessee

1992

41

less than 1 %
less than 1 %
0

27

16.

i

4

3

1

1

Less than 1 %
Less than 1 %
Less than 1 %

Union Affiliation and Membership Statistics

56 in 1996 and 34 in 1992 individual nationallinternational unions
represented with the most representation coming from the following:

1 996
USWA 22
AIW 2
UAW 20
IAM 2
UPIU 3
SEIU 3
AFGM 4
OPEIU 12

BBF

Average years of union membership in 1996
Average years of union membership in 1992

Average years in union office in 1996
Average years in union office in 1992

1 992
45
1 1
9
3
3

Less than 1% 4

14.6 years [range 0 - 40]
16 years [range 0 - 51]

6.4 years [0 - 35]
6.8 years [0 - 33]

Education Levels

1996 1992
High School Diploma or Less = 37 44
2 Years or Less of University Study = 32
4 Years or Less of University Study = 8
Associate Degree = 9
Bachelor’s Degree = 8 5
Graduate Level Study = 2

Sources and Levels of lnfonnation Exposure

1996 1992
Read News Magazines
Every Week = 34 29
Less than Once a Month = 31 34
Once or Twice a Month = 25
Never Read Magazines = 9
Read Newspaper
Every Day = 56 68
Few Trmes a Week = 29
Less Often than that = 13
Never Read Newspapers = 2 3
Watch a National Television News Program
Almost Every Month = 59
Few Times a Week = 27
Less Often than that = 12
Never = 1

93 % read union materials a few times a week or every time they are received in 1996.
92 % read union materials a few times a week or every time they are received in 1992.

42 % attend two to four university-based labor education classes each year in 1996.
44 % attend two to four university-based labor education classes each year in 1992.

Sources and Levels of information Exposure

{Scale 1 - 10, with 10 being most reliable] Mean 1996 Mean 1992
University-based labor education 7.2 7.1
AFL-CIO 8.7 6.6
National print media 6.4 6.4
National television news 6.4 6.4
National/international unions 6.7 6.4
Mailings from groups like CARE 5.3 5.0
Congress 4.8 4.4
Clinton Administration 5.5

Bush Administration 3.0

153

Perceived Reliability of Information Sources

[Scale 1 - 10, with 10 being highest priority] Mean 1998 Mean 1992
Public Education 7.5 7.7
Unemployment 7.0 7.5
Crime 7.3 7.0
Reducing the trade deficit 6.7 6.8
Helping the poor in the U.S. 6.3 6.7
Reducing the national budget deficit 6.6 6.6
lntemational arms control 6.7 6.4
Reducing poverty/hunger in other countries 5.3 4.9

Priority Government Should Give to the Following issues

[Scale 1 - 10, with 10 being highest priority] Mean 1996 Mean 1992
Education on family planning/birth control 8 7.8
Provide countries with surplus food 7 6.9
Programs that help lower infant death rates 7 6.8
Programs to support small businesses 5 5.0
Provide university training or other training in U.S. 5 4.6
Provide debt relief 4 3.6
Encouraging U.S. investment in other countries 4 3.5

Measuring Attitudes

The following statements are a sample of attitude questions contained in the survey.
The mean response to the statement is in bold at the end of the statement.

[1=- strongly agree; 2 a somewhat agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat disagree;

5 = strongly disagree]

1996 1992
16s) it is against U.S. interests to help countries in the Third Worid because
they will compete with us economically and politically. 3.2 3.5
16l) If the U.S. helps the Third World, we will benefit in the long run. 2.6 2.6

19a) i don’t know enough about Third World countries and their problems. 2.5 2.5

154

19c) I don't know very much about organizations that run programs to help

those countries.

19d) I am not really interested in Third World countries.

21 a) Competition from other countries affects decisions in my work place.

21 c) Language in my collective bargaining agreement stems from

consideration of global competition.

21d)Economic aid to a small business in a developing country does not

affect me.

219) Raising living standards in developing countries through economic

aid will benefit me.

211) Competition from workers in developing nations is a threat to job security.

219) U.S. economic interests may improve if developing nations become richer.

Other Items

Are you generally in favor of or opposed to the U.S. giving economic assistance to other countries?

61 % are opposed in 1996 62 % are opposed in 1992

Indicate whether you tend to favor or opposed U.S. giving of economic assistance for development

2.2

3.3

2.3

3.0

3.5

2.9

2.7

2.6

2.2

3.3

1.9

2.9

3.6

2.9

2.3

2.6

projects such as health care, education, and agriculture to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin

America? 59.3% are in favor in 1996 62% are in favor in 1992

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

Table 3.1 Variables Included in Models

41.

Variable Label Meaning

 

DEPENDENT: Workers’ Support for Foreign Aid (Y')

moraladv Moral Advantage Moral advantages or benefits of foreign aid

eccost Economic Cost Economic Disadvantages or cost of foreign aid

wages Waste dollars Workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in
foreign aid programs

lNDEPENDENT: Workers’ Attitudes and Beliefs toward Foreign Aid Programs (Xe)

travinfsb Travel and information Workers travel and beliefs of seeking infon'nation
waking beliefs from news media and formal institutions

trust Trustofsourcesof Workerstrustofinformationprevidedbythenews
information media and formal Institutions

altruism Altruism toward Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward helping others
foreign aid and themselves

govtprio Political view of Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government
government spending on national and lntemational programs
priorrlres

conclhw Concemforthird Workersknowledgeaboutthirdworldandfereign
wortdcountries aidorganizatlons;andU.S.mrkers’lntered'mthid

world countries

globinter Global Workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward third world
lnbrdependence competition and workers benelis from third world

faprio Foreign aid U.S. foreign aid spent on third world
priorities primary and secondary need programs

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

 

a16 Self-sufficiency Foreignaidisesseniiaiforothercouniriesself-
sufficiency
b16 Helphungrypoor Weoughttohelpthehungryorpoorlnthfidworld

d16 Aid makes stable Helping other countries makes them more stable

 

155

156

Table 3.1 -(Cont’d)

 

Variable Label Meaning

 

 

c16 Too mixed up in U.S. is to mixed up with other
countries affairs
e16 Help competition SOéeign aid helps countries that will compete with
f16 Solve own problems We need to solve U.S. problems first before helping
other countries
i16 To our benefit We will benefitinthe long run notnow

 

g16 Aid ismisused Aidismisused byforeign governments
M6 308. bureaucracy Large part of aid is wasted by U.S. bureaucracy
astes

SUBVARIABLES OR FACT 0R8 OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

 

lNBNEDlA lnfonnation travel belief Workers travel and belief of seeking irfonnation
news media from the news media

INBINSTI lnfonnation travel belief Workers travel and belief of seeking information
institutions from formal institutions (unions and Universities)

 

TRUSTllED and of media Workerstrustof information provided bythe news
information media. such as TV news, magazines, newspapers
TRUSTINS Trust institutions Workers trust of information provided by fonnai

Information institutions such as unions and universities

 

Table 3.1 -(Cont’d)

157

 

 

Variable Label Meaning

III I I IE . 5'”)!!!

C20 Other have so little Workers’ feelings that others have so fltle when they
have so much

d20 Aid is self inbrest Helping third world countries is in workers self-
intered because they will buy American products

e20 Aid cuts immigrants Helping third world countries will cut down the

 

NATIPRIO National Pnorrtres

INTEPRIO lntemational Priorities

9 I II'IIII II]: I' [Iii]

KNOIM.EDG Not know enough

lNTEREST U.S. self-interea

WW

COMPETIT Third world competifion

BENEFITS Third world benefits
U.S. workers

E . E'IEI Iii [III]

PRIMARYP Primary needs program

SECONDP Secondary needs
program

number of immigrants to the U.S.

Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government
spending on domestic or national programs

Workers' attitudes and befiefs toward govemment
spendrng‘ on Irrtemafiona' l programs

Workers knowledge of third world countries and
foreign aid organizations

U.S.workersinterestinthirdwortdcountries

Workers’attihrdesand beliefstowardthirdworld
competition

Workers’ attitudes and befiefs toward benefisthat
thirdworldcourrtriesprovidetothem

U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries
primary needs program (food. infant mortality, etc)

U.S.forebnaidspentonthirdworldcountries
secondaryneeds program (rrvesh'nentdebtrelet)

 

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Equation No. 1 Dependent Variable: MORALADV Moral Advantage

 

Block No. 1 Method: Enter
TRUSTMED ALTRUISM NATIPRIO iNTEREST BENEFITS PRIMARYP
Listwlse Deletion of Missing Data

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1. PRIMARYP Primary Program: Foreign Aid Priority
2. TRUSTMED Trust of Media lnforrnation
3. NATIPRIO Gov’t National Priorities
4. ALTRUISM Altruism Toward Foreign Aid
5. iNTEREST interest: Concerns for Third World
6. BENEFITS Benefits: Global Interdependence
Multiple R .67485
R Square .45542
Adjusted R Square .43664
Standard Error .63190
Analysis of Variance

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 6 58.10343 9.68390
Residual 174 69.47822 .39930
F a 24.25220 Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable 8 SE 8 Beta T Sig T
TRUSTMED -.131268 .031908 -.238120 4.114 .0001
ALTRUISM .181183 .060604 .196345 2.990 .0032
NATIPRIO .042417 .018647 .101483 2.275 .0241
INTEREST -.240974 .062802 -.254247 -3.837 .0002
BENEFITS .215728 .060953 .235698 3.539 .0005
PRIMARYP -.099567 .026529 -.228536 -3.753 .0002
(Constant) 3.164030 .418942 7.552 .0000

 

158

159

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Equation No. 2 Dependent Variable: ECCOST Economic Disadvantage/Cost

 

Block No. 1 Method: Enter
INTEREST lNBINSTl TRUSTINS SECONDP
Listwlse Deletion of Missing Data

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1. SECONDP Secondary Program: Foreign Aid Priority
2. TRUSTINS Trust institutions information
3. INTEREST Interest: Concerns for Third World
4. INBINSTI lnfonnation Travel Belief Institutions
Multiple R .42172
R Square .17785
Adjusted R Square .15987
Standard Error .54306
Analysis of Variance

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 4 1 1 .67422 2.91856
Residual 183 53.96833 29491
F = 9.89646 Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable 6 SE a Beta T Sig T
INTEREST .179797 045253 .272719 3.973 .0001
INBINSTI .153970 .071103 .149258 2.165 .0316
TRUSTINS -.059689 .019460 -.207056 -3.067 .0025
SECONDP .045683 .021001 .148352 2.175 .0309

(Constant) 1.682144 .274190 6.135 .0000

 

160

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Equation No. 3 Dependent Variable: WASTES Perception of Waste of
U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs

 

Block No. 1 Method: Enter
INTEREST TRUSTINS SECONDP
Listwlse Deletion of Missing Data

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1. SECONDP Secondary Program: Foreign Aid Priority
2. TRUSTINS Trust Institutions lnforrnation
3. iNTEREST Interest: Concerns for Third World
Multiple R .25891
R Square .06703
Adjusted R Square .05174
Standard Error .78272
Analysis of Variance

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression. 3 8.05530 2.68510
Residual 183 11211582 .81265
F = 4.38273 Signif F a .0053

Variables in the Equation

Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
iNTEREST .105681 .084190 .118424 1.646 .1014
TRUSTINS -.053717 .028143 -.136633 -1.909 .0579
SECONDP .071070 .030163 .169083 2.356 .0195

(Constant) 1.388936 296436 4.685 .0000

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AF L-CIO. Multinational Corporations, Expanding Influence in the 19903, Economic
Research Department, 1995.

Ary, D.; L.C. Jacobs; and Razaviech, A Introduction to Research in Education, 3rd
editions. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1985.

Axinn, George H. “lntemational Technical Interventions in Agriculture and Rural
Development: Some Basic Trends, Issues, and Questions”, Agriculture and
Human Values, Volume V, numbers 1 and 2, Florida: ISSSN, Winter- Spring,
1988.

Baldwin, David, A. Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Analysis.
New York: Praeger, 1966.

Banfield, Edward C. "American Foreign Aid Doctrines", in Why Foreign Aid?, Robert
A. Goodwin (ed) pp. 1031, Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963.

Bauer, P.T. Dissent on Development, Revised Edition, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1976.

Belden and Russonello. A Review of Existing Survey Data Regarding Amen'can's Views
on U. 8. Leadership and Foreign Assistance. Research and Communications,
Washington DC, 1994.

Bhattacharyya, G. And Johnson, R. Statistical Concepts and Methods. New York: John
erley & Sons, 1987.

Borg, Walter R. And Gall, M.D. Education Research: An Introduction. New York: David
McKay Company, Inc., 1989.

Brehm, Jack W. and Arthur R. Cohen. Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance. New
York: John Vlfiley & Sons, inc, 1962.

161

162

Burki, Shahid Javed and Robert L. Ayres. "A Fresh Look at Development Aid".
Finance and Development, March 1986:6-10.

Cassen, Robert, Richard Jolly, John Sewell and Robert Wood (eds). Rich Country
Interests and Third World Development, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.

and Associates. Does Aid Work?: Report to an intergovernmental Task
Force, New York: Oxford University Press. 1986.

Clarke, Oliver. Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy (WAGE). Implications of
Development AID Issues for Industrial Relations. Michigan State University,
Michigan, 1996.

Contee, Christine E. What Amen'cans Think: Views on Development and U. 8. Third
World Relations, Washington DC: Overseas Development Council, 1987.

Davison, A R., and Thomson, E. “Cross Cultural Studies of Attitudes and Beliefs”. in
HQ Triandis & R. W. Brislin, Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol 5,
pp. 25-71. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1980.

Demopolo, F. Personal consultation for this dissertation statistical analysis. Statistical
Consulting Service, Department of Statistics and Probability, Michigan State
University, Michigan, 1997.

Department of Commerce. Poverty in the United States: 1991. Current Population
Reports. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.

Development Assistance Committee, OECD. DAC Review 1979. Development Co-
operation, OECD, 1984.

Dicken Peter. Global Shift: The Intemationalizalion of Economic: Activity. Second
Edition. New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1992.

Dunning John. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. England: Addison-

163

Wesliey, Workingham, 1993.

Festinger, Leon. A Theoryof Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1957.

Eberstadt, Nicholas. Foreign Aid and American Purpose. Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988.

Frame, Nancy. Statement Before the Senate Hearing on HR. 5368, Senate Committee
on Appropriations, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs, Fiscal Year 1993, 102nd. Congress Second Session, May 12,
1992, pp. 271-276, S. Hrg 102-947, Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1992.

Gilliam, Franklin D. And Whitby Kenny J. “Race, Class, and Attitudes toward Social
Welfare Spending: An Ethclass Interpretation”. Social Science Quarterly,
Volume 70, Number 1. Texas: University of Texas Press, March 1989.

Goldwin, Robert A (ed) Why Foreign Aid? Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963.

Hadjian Ant and Lorraine Tritto. The World's Largest lndustn‘al Corporations. Fortune,
July 26, 1993.

Hayter, Teresa and Catherine Watson. Aid Rhetoric and reality, London: Pluto Press,
1985.

Interaction. Ideas and Inbrmatr'on about Development Education, No.22, Winter/Spring
1992, Washington, DC: Interaction, 1992.

Iyengar, S., and Kinder, D. R. News that Matters, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987.

Jacoby, eriiam G. “PublicAttitudes toward Government Spending”. American Journal
of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 336-61. Texas: University of Texas
Press, May 1994.

 

164

Katz Hany C. and Kochan Thomas A. An Introduction to Collective Bargaining and
Industrial Relations. McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1992.

Kleinbaum, David G. And Kupper, Lawrence L. Applied Regression Analysis and Other
Multivariable Methods, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1978.

KIine—Robach Ruth. Citizens Involvement in Waste Management Initiatives: The
Relationship between over Action and Cognitive Dissonance. A Research
Prospectus, RD 803, 1992.

Krueger, Anne 0., Constantine Michalopoulos and Vemon W. Ruttan. Aid and
Development, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

Lappé, Frances, Moore, Schurrnan, Rachel, Schurman , Danaher, Kevin. Betraying the
National Interest, New Yorlc Grove Press, 1987.

Lappé, Frances, Moore, and Collins Joseph. World Hunger, Twelve Myths. New York:
Grove Press, 1986.

Laudicina, Paul A World Poverty and Development: A Survey of American Opinion,
Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1973.

Lewis, Howard III. Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on lntemational Finance
and Monetary Policy, One Hundred and Second Congress, Second Session,
May 20, 1992, p. 35, S. Hrg. 102801, Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1992.

Lineberry, Robert L. American Public Policy, What Government Does and What
Difference It Makes, Northwestem University, New York Harper and Row
Publishers, 1977.

Love, Alexander R. Efibrts and Policies of the Members of the DAC Development
Cooperation: Aid in Transition 1993 Report. Paris: OECD, 1994.

 

16S

Manrique, Gabriel G. and Tucker, Stuart K Costs to the United States of the Recession
in Developing Countries, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council,
1984.

Martinez, Jose E. Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on lntemational Finance
and Monetary Policy, One Hundred and Second Congress, Second Session,
May 20, 1992, pp. 74-77, S. Hrg. 102-801, Washington DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1992.

Mason, Edward S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, New York and Evanston: Council
on Foreign Relations, Harper and Row Publishers, 1964.

Mason, Robert D. And Lind, Douglas A Statistical Techniques in Business and
Economics, Eighth Edition, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1993.

Mtewa, Mekki. Public Policy and Development Politics, Washington, DC: University
Press of America, Inc, 1980

McCamant, John. Comparative Public Policy, Issues, Theories, and Methods,
University of Denver, New York: Sage Publications, Inc, Halsted Press
Division, John Willey and Sons, 1975.

McNamara, Robert 8. "Address to the Board of Governors, Copenhagen, Denmark",
September 21, 1970, reprinted in World Bank, The McNamara Years at the
Wor1d Bank: Major Policy Addresses of Robert S. McNamara, 1968-1981,
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

McNeill, Desmond. The Contradictions of Foreign Aid, London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981.

Morgenthau, Hans J. "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid", in Why Foreign
Aid?, Robert A Goodwin (ed) pp. 70-89, Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.,
1963.

Mosley, Paul. Foreign Aid, lts Defense and Reform, U.S.: The University Press of

Jr

166

Kentucky, 1987.

New Webster's Dictionary and Roget's Thesaurus. Abridged Edition, Paradise Press,
Inc, Miami, Florida, 1995.

Ohlin, Goran. Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, Paris: Development Center, OEC D,
1966, as cited in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Development Cooperation: 1984 Review, Paris: OECD, 1984, p.126.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Development Cooperation:
1984 Review, Paris: OECD, 1984.

OECD, Development Assistance Committee. DAC Review 1984. Development Co—
operation, OECD, 1984.

Pearce David W. and Warford Jeremy J. World lMthout End. Oxford University Press,
Inc, September 1994.

Pincus, John. Economic Aid and lntemational Cost Sharing, The Rand Corporation,
Maryland: The johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

Powlick, Philip J. “The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,”
lntemational Studies Quarterly, Volume 39, number 4. U.S.: lntemational
Studies Association by Blackwell Publishers, December, 1995.

Skull, Steven. American’s Opinion on U. 8. Foreign Aid. Maryland: University of
Maryland, 1995.

Smith, Allan. Economic of Public Choice Class Notes, College of Agricultural
Economics, Michigan State University, Michigan, Vlfinter, 1986.

Spence, W W. Behavior Theory and Conditioning, New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1966.

167

Spence, Kenneth W. Behavior Theory and Learning, State University of Iowa, New
Jersey: Prentice - Hall, Inc, 1960.

Tinker, Frank A 'The Navaho Experience". Challenge, December, 1960, pp.26-30, as
quoted by Banfield in Goldwin, Robert A (ed.) Why Foreign Aid?, Chicago:
Rand McNally & Co, 1963.

The Economic Dictionary. Spanish edition. Barcelona, Espafia: Tipografia Nacional,
1992.

The World Bank The McNamara Years at the World Bank: Major Policy Addresses of
Robert S. McNamara, 1968-1981, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1 981 .

, World Development report, 1991. NY: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Tucker, Stuart. "Update: Costs to the United States of the Recession in Developing
Countries," Working Paper No. 10, Washington, DC: Overseas
Development Council, 1986.

United States Agency for lntemational Development. Congressional Presentation,
Fiscal Year 1993, Main Volume & Summary Tables. Washington DC:
Agency for lntemational Development, 1992.

United States Agency for lntemational Development. Congressional Presentation,
Fiscal Year 1993, Statistical Annex. Washington DC: Agency for
lntemational Development, 1992.

United States Agency for lntemational Development. Congressional Presentation,
Fiscal Year 1991, Statistical Annex. Washington DC: Agency for
lntemational Development, 1991.

168

United States Agency for lntemational Development. "Foreign Aid: What's in It for
You?", AID Highlights, Vol. 4, No.1 , Winter 1987, Washington DC: Agency
for lntemational Development, 1987.

United States Department of Commerce. Poverty in The United States: 1991, Current
Population Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 181, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration,
Bureau of the Census, 1992.

Vining, J. and A Ebreo, What Makes a Recycler? A comparison of recyclers and
nonrecyclers, Environment and Behavior, 1990.

White, John. The Politics of Foreign Aid, London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1974

Wolfe, Martin. 'The Development Advomte's Debating Manual", Development: Journal
of the Society for lntemational Development, 1992:2z54-56.

Wiggins, James W. And Schoeck, Helmut. Foreign Aid Reexamined, A Critical
Appraisal, Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1958.

Woodworth, John. "NAFT A Offers Chance for More Trade, Jobs". Forum Column,
Columbia Missourian, June 28, 1993.

Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy. FY 1991 Development Education Grant
Application. School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State
University, Michigan: 1991.

Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy (WAGE). A Dynamic Learning Program for
Union Leaders, Educators, and Workers, Labor and Industrial Relations,
Michigan State University, Michigan: Michigan State University Board of
Trustees, 1996.

Workforce Research Report “Workforce 2000". Washington, DC: Labor Research
Department, 1 990.

 

169

Zuckerbraun, Sara. “Fairness Motivations and Tradeoffs Underlying Public Support for
Government Environmental Spending in Nine Nations”. Journal of Social
Issues, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1994, Pp. 179—197. The Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues, 1994.

MICHIGAN srms UNIV. LIBRARIES
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllWINlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
31293017075270