This is to certify that the

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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

presented by

FLORIDALMA CASTILLO

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY degree in RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

George H. Afin
Major professor

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ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS OF U.S. UNION WORKERS IN SELECTED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN AID AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

By

Floridalma Castillo

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ABSTRACT

ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS OF U.S. UNION WORKERS IN SELECTED STATES TOWARD FOREIGN AID AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

By

Floridalma Castillo

Foreign aid stimulates U.S. exports and creates jobs. It is estimated that for every billion dollars of exports about 20 to 30 thousand jobs are created in the U.S. Almost 20 percent of all U.S. jobs are export-dependent. Studies show that in the 1980s about 1.4 million U.S. workers lost their jobs as a result of the falloff of export to developing countries.

University surveys observed that unionized workers in the Midwestern states know very little about developing countries, specially about foreign aid given by U.S. to these countries. Other research has found that peoples' beliefs toward U.S. development aid and foreign assistance in general are based on general assumptions rather than data.

This research seeks to help decision makers to establish better foreign aid and labor policies by providing information about attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states toward foreign aid. The focus is on the workers' support for foreign aid programs by examining the moral advantages of foreign aid, its economic

cost or disadvantages, and the perceptions of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs. These issues were tested based on four social psychological models of public support for public policy. These are: 1) *the saliency model,* 2) *the rational self-interest model,* 3) *values model, and* 4) *the fairness model.* In earlier studies, policies have been tested by these four models in isolation from each other. This research tested these models in an integrative form, not only by testing variables that relate to each model but also by relating foreign aid policy to U.S. social programs. The results of this study show that the saliency model was not sufficient to explain this relationship. However, the rational-self interest, values, and the fairness models were sufficient to explain this relationship.

This author developed two statistical models, *the General and the Integrative,* to test the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. *The General* model is a good model to explain the moral advantage and the economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid, but it is not sufficient to explain workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars toward foreign aid programs. *The Integrative* statistical model is sufficient to explain these three main components of workers' support for foreign aid and their relationship to their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

This dissertation provides valuable information regarding the target audience that was not considered before in connection with foreign aid issues. In addition, global policy interdependencies of developed and developing countries as they affect the American worker is an issue that has an enormous importance in today's economies, particularly in the U.S. economy.

DEDICATION

To my daughter Gizzel Pamela Moran-Castillo,

for her unconditional love, patience and constant encouragement.

To my parents, Alberto Castillo and Julia Castillo,

who from heaven are still sending the melody of love that

they planted in my heart.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Objectives

The main research objective is to provide information about unionized workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs in selected states of U.S. in 1991 and 1995-96. Workers support for foreign aid is related to areas of 1) *moral advantage or benefits of foreign aid*, 2) *economic cost or disadvantages, and* 3) *perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.* Also, this study provides some ideas for the future implications for U.S. foreign aid policy.

1.2 Research Background

J.H. Dunning wrote that around 1850, about 90 percent of all goods and services produced by companies in the world were made with components, materials and labor brought from suppliers located within a radius of 100 miles and sold to buyers within the similar distance. In pre-industrial time the world economy was mainly characterized by each country's self-sufficiency. Their main production of outputs was to meet their basic needs. Countries were engaged in international

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trade when they had a goods surplus to exchange for those goods that they wanted but could not produce. Governments' main involvement in world trade was at time of war to protect their interests and the interests of their producers in case of threats. Trade played a more important role in the global economy after the industrial revolution (Dunning, 1993).

Today's global economy is integrated by almost 200 countries in which international trade is one of the most important elements of such relations. According to the Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project (WAGE), Michigan State University,[1] the main characteristics of today' global economy are: 1) exchange of goods and services in multilateral trade which is essentially dominated by transnational corporations; 2) high levels of foreign direct investment; 3) high levels of technology development and transportation and communication systems; 4) low level of economic development of poor countries, which is aggravated by population growth; 5) the increasing importance in the world market of newly industrialized countries; 6) the fall of communism and its economic impact in the global economy; 7) the formation of regional markets such as European unions and NAFTA and 8) unemployment and shift in labor markets (WAGE, 1996).

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[1]Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project (WAGE) was created by the School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University, with cooperation of faculty and staff at a Midwestern consortium universities. The original modules of this project were written by Ronald Peters, University of Illinois, David Spencer and Helen Moshak, Indiana University, Alvin Lackey and Joel Rosenblit, University of Missouri, Alec Meiklejohn, University of Michigan, George Hagglund and Noel Harvey, University of Wisconsin, Floridalma Castillo and Tom Carroll, Michigan State University. Additional contributions were provided by Betty Barrett and Dale Brickner, Michigan State University.

The U.S. market economy is changing in part as a result of changes in global economic forces. It is shifting from a huge production of goods to a new economic system of services and technology development. For instance, the U.S. Department of Labor considers that in the next ten years, about 90 percent of the total new jobs will be located in the service sector as a result of global competition (Department of Labor, 1990). Also, World Bank data show that U.S. imports of goods grew 908.03 percent from 1970 to 1991 (The World Bank, 1992). These examples show some changes in U.S. economic and labor trends. But changes in labor trends are also happening around the world. An ILO survey revealed that, in industrial countries, 60 million workers have part-time jobs. Most are women, many of whom do not have protection or full-time benefits. This survey found that this labor trend is also growing in developing countries, but not at the same scale as industrial nations. In the U.S., part-time employees represent almost 20 percent of the total workers (AFL-CIO, 1995).

According to the Workforce 2000 Research Report, global competition and global changes will influence two major forces of change in workforce trends and in U.S. industry. The first force will affect labor markets and products in a shift from an economy of good's production to services, the development of a high level of technology, and an increase of competition in labor markets, services and product. This report suggested that the second force will affect the process and internal structure of industries in the U.S., such as changes in job mix and changes in

demographic trends (Workforce Research Report, 1990). Katz and Kochan state that new high-skilled jobs will be created, but the lack of training for these new jobs will force workers to be unemployed or to take low-pay jobs (Katz an Kochan, 1992). This will create pressure over the whole economy and labor market. This will be complemented with a higher shift of capital to developing countries. This phenomenon is already happening, as Lappé and Collins indicated that almost 7 million jobs were lost in the U.S. by plant closings between 1978 and 1982 because capital shifted to other countries (Lappé and Collins, 1986).

There are linkages among the world's workers. Low-paying jobs in developing countries affect the standard of living in the U.S. Data given by the Department of Commerce show that in 1991 about 14 percent of U.S. population - or 35.6 million people - lived below poverty level. The gap between the highest 20 percent of the U.S. population and the lowest 20 percent of the population is getting bigger (Department of Commerce, 1991). The World Bank data show that in 1985 the top 20 percent of the U.S. population had 41.9 percent of the income or consumption, as opposed to the lowest 20 percent with 4.7 percent of income or consumption (The World Bank, 1992).

There are interdependencies among nations and strong linkages among workers in the world. Transnational corporation's investment and foreign aid are two important elements that make these linkages possible. Foreign direct investment in the U.S. generates 3 million jobs and U.S. foreign direct investment in

other countries generates 6 million jobs (WAGE, 1996). Transnational corporations tend to control the world's investment and trade. They create 65 million jobs around the world. The expansion of today's economy is mainly developed by transnational corporations that control a third of the world's productive assets. But, foreign aid is also another source of controlling trade, investment and international political decisions.

According to the WAGE Project, the main arguments for U.S. foreign aid are: 1) aid to industrial and developing countries help them to expand their economies which will provide an enormous market for U.S. products; 2) countries to which U.S. aid is given are more likely to support U.S. international decisions and 3) foreign aid helps to keep the world's peace and security by avoiding international conflicts (WAGE Project, 1996). A U. N. resolution of 1970 called for countries to allocate 0.7 percent of their GNP to provide foreign aid to developing countries. The U.S. provided $11.337 billion for foreign aid in 1991/92. But that was only 0.2 percent of its GNP. The U.S. provides the lowest proportion of its GNP, after Ireland, of any of the 21 member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Norway is the highest provider of aid as a percentage of GNP, followed by other Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. According to WAGE Project, almost 70 percent of U.S. foreign aid is spent in this country. However, the U.S. Administration mandated that all foreign aid will be tied to U.S. purchases to protect jobs in this country (WAGE Project, 1996).

Foreign aid stimulates U.S. exports and creates jobs. It is estimated that for every billion dollars of exports, about 20 to 30 thousand jobs are created in the U.S. Almost 20 percent of all U.S. jobs are export-dependent. A study done by the WAGE Project shows that in the 1980s about 1.4 million U.S. workers lost their jobs as a result of the falloff in export to developing countries (WAGE Project, 1996).

This background statement illustrates the interdependencies among countries and workers in the world. However, surveys and studies show that some U.S. workers have a lack of formal knowledge and have a misunderstanding about the global economy. There are many myths and beliefs that have an impact on their attitudes toward international issues, particularly foreign aid, trade, and transnational corporations. The WAGE Project, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, MSU, did a survey to evaluate this situation in 1991. This survey showed that unionized workers in the Midwestern states do not know enough about developing countries, especially about foreign aid given by U.S. to these countries. The survey found that people's beliefs toward U.S. development aid and foreign assistance in general are based on general assumptions rather than data (WAGE Project data, 1991). In addition, there is a lack of a national development education program to prepare unionized workers to address the changes in the global economy. This is a main concern for university labor educators who are aware of the changes in international economic and labor trends. They tend to believe that workers need to have more information to respond to this global competition and labor market

changes.

This research seeks to help decision makers to establish better foreign aid and labor policies by providing information about attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states toward foreign aid. This study focus on workers' support of US foreign aid programs by examining *the moral advantages of foreign aid, the economic disadvantages of foreign aid, and the waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.* This research provides information regarding this target audience that was not considered before in connection with foreign aid issues.

In addition, global policy interdependencies of developed and developing countries as they affect American workers is an issue that has an enormous importance in the U.S. economy.

Foreign aid policy impacts not only the U.S. economy by creating new markets, jobs and products, but it also affects other countries' economies, especially those of developing countries. Therefore, workers' opinions, attitudes and beliefs may have a future impact on U.S. international aid and labor policies.

1.3 Problem Statement

Some studies have been done related to public opinion about foreign aid. But, the literature review (see chapter 2) shows that specific research has not been done about union workers beliefs and attitudes toward foreign aid and domestic economic programs. *A published study related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward*

foreign aid and how these can have some future implications for U.S. foreign aid policy has not been found. The work done by the WAGE project is directly related to workers and the global economy, but it tends to focus on development of curriculum material to be taught to union leaders and union workers in the Midwestern states in future time.

Other literature focuses mainly on public opinions toward foreign aid but not related to global economy, union workers or fairness issues. The American Labor Federation (AFL-CIO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have done some research about U.S. workers, but that is connected to U.S. employment issues. Therefore, this research looks at union workers support for foreign aid programs in terms of three variables: 1) the moral advantages of foreign aid, 2) the economic disadvantages of foreign aid, and 3) the waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.

1.4 Research Hypotheses and Assumptions

The main assumptions of this research are: 1) there is a direct relationship between individual's knowledge and changes in their attitudes, beliefs and behaviors; 2) individuals are able to change their behaviors and attitudes when these are compatible with their beliefs; 3) individuals are free to make decisions in accepting new knowledge or information or to reject it if they are not supported by their beliefs; and 4) there is a consistency between one's policy support and one's values.

Based on these assumptions and studies about public attitudes toward welfare programs, the main hypothesis of this research is *"Unionized Workers' Support for Foreign Aid is related to Workers Attitudes and Beliefs Toward Foreign Aid Programs."*

Workers support for foreign aid is studied by the following main Dependent Variables: 1) *the moral advantages of foreign aid*, 2) *the economic disadvantages of foreign aid*, and 3) *perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.* **Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs** are studied based on the following main Independent Variables: 1) *travel and information seeking beliefs*, 2) *trust of the sources of information*, 3) *altruism toward foreign aid*, 4) *political view of government priorities*, 5) *concerns for third world countries*, 6) *global interdependence*, and 7) *foreign aid priorities.*

1.4 Outline of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature, and chapter 3 characterizes the research methods used to measure attitudes and beliefs of U.S. union workers in selected states toward foreign aid. This chapter first provides a general description of four existing models to test public attitudes toward government spending. Then, based on these models, an integrative model is created to measure union workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. Chapter 4, presents the analysis and findings of this research. It discusses

the results of union workers' support for foreign aid programs. Also, results of moral

advantages of foreign aid, its economic cost or disadvantages and perceptions of

waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs is provided. A general analysis of future

implications of union workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid on U.S. foreign

aid policy is developed in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the general

findings and conclusions of this research. It also presents some recommendations.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is impossible to cover in this study all the theories that exist about foreign aid and foreign aid policy. Policy literature, especially development policy, has a very long history. It started with the philosophy of Plato (427-347 B.C), and continues with Aristotle's thoughts (384-322 B.C.). It was followed by the middle age philosophical and theoretical principles of Marx and theological thoughts of Aquinas and Augustine. Then, the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries scholars appeared such as John Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Malthus, and John Mill. Then by the second third of the nineteenth century, a new school of thought dominated government policy, such as Karl Marx, Veblen, and neo-Marxists. However, some of Marx's thoughts had already existed for a long time. Today, aid in the context of development policy is considered not only by economists, but also by political scientists, sociologists, historians, psychologists, and others.

Considering this long literature history, only the most important arguments were included for the purpose of this research literature review. However, new approaches continue to develop. For instance, there are six rationales for providing

U.S. foreign aid to other countries: 1) Political, 2) Economic, 3) Strategic, 4) Moral/Humanitarian, 5) Environmental, and 6) Comparative Advantage. Each of these approaches has its own reasons for providing aid to other countries, especially developing countries. These rationales have some similarities to those theories provided by this study in each of the U.S. foreign aid programs. But, there are always proponents and opponents in all public policy decisions. For instance, some of those in favor of foreign aid believe that elements such as water and air pollution, nuclear waste, green house effect, ozone layer, and global warming are not only national or political concerns. These issues will require international cooperation and funding (Environmental Rational).

Proponents of the Comparative Advantage Rationale based their believes in questions such as ; What would be lost in terms of national interests if U.S. cuts all foreign aid?. If foreign aid is eliminated what other political tools the U.S. will be able to use to implement American foreign policy?. If U.S. fails to provide foreign aid which other countries will take its place?. How developing countries and other recipients will react if US withdrew?. Comparative advantage rationale believers said that until U.S. finds a new substitute, the best available instrument of foreign policy is foreign aid (WAGE, 1996). This is seen as a good tool to influence other governments decisions, to open new markets to U.S. products, to create and maintain jobs in U.S. and overseas, and to protect U.S. security interests. Foreign aid is also justified by the economic, strategic, political, moral/humanitarian, and environmental rationales.

However each of these arguments has, in theory, its own interests; in practice, these interests overlap and conflict with each other. For instance, U.S. provided foreign aid to Ethiopia when this government was friendly to the Soviet Union. Also, foreign aid was provided to Central American region when some of these governments were oppressing their people's, human rights and freedom.

Considering the quantity of existing literature related to foreign aid and foreign aid policy, a bibliography is provided at the end of this dissertation.

2.1 Definition of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid may be defined as any type of assistance that one country provides to another. These resources could be financial in terms of grants or loans and may be provided by private and/or public agencies. They may include particular commodities, food, machinery, equipment, military hardware and other supplies.[2]

According to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD Organization, foreign aid or assistance refers only to flows that qualify as "official development assistance" (ODA), i.e., loans or grants provided by the official government, loans or grants for economic and welfare development, and loans and grants transfer under specific financial terms. Assistance may be provided in terms of commodities, training or any other type of technical, financial or economic aid.

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[2]Unless otherwise stated, and in particular statistical data, this study adopts this definition of foreign aid which also includes "official development assistance" (ODA).

Credits, loans and grants for military use, and training for military purpose are excluded from development aid definition (Development Co-operation, DAC Review, 1979; OECD, 1984. P. 188).

There are more definitions about foreign aid, some narrower than others. For instance, Mosley said that overseas aid is "money transferred on concessional terms by the governments of rich countries to the governments of poor countries" (Mosley, 1987. p. 3). McNeill considers that foreign aid "consists essentially in the people of one country providing assistance to the people of another country, each being represented by an agency." (McNeill, 1981. P.9).

Some international organizations tend to define foreign aid based on their missions or objectives. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) defines development assistance as "the functional accounts aimed at long-term development in the fields of agriculture, rural development and nutrition, population planning, health, child survival, AID prevention and control, education and human resources development, the private sector, energy and environment, science and technology, the development funds for Africa, and special assistance initiatives and humanitarian and technical assistance for the former Soviet Republics". In addition, USAID includes in its development aid statistical data, funds for the International Narcotics Control programs and for the Peace Corps (United States Agency for International Development, 1992. p. 3).

2.2 U.S. Foreign Aid Programs and Policy

Trade, technology transfer and foreign aid have a long history. Trade was developed when a group or tribe exchanged with another. It was extensive when the Greek and Roman Empires dominated the world around 500 B.C.. Trade was based on one country's supply of goods (skills and natural resources) and other country's needs and capability to supply other goods (WAGE, 1996).

Technology transfer goes back to the time when human groups used to move from place to place, carrying some of their animals and plants with them. It was expanded through religious activities, military conquests, relationships among families, and government programs (Axinn, 1988).

U.S. foreign aid history is fairly long. It started when the U.S., Germany and France started to provide subsidies to their colonies before 1914. This kind of overseas aid was known as budgetary subsidy, grant in aid or infant colony subsidies (Mosley, 1987). A moral obligation was not tied to this kind of aid. However, history shows that most of these countries were interested in colonies' raw materials, especially during World War I. Under the stress of the great world depression, international investment was contracted and protectionist policies were implemented in 1931-32 by powerful nations. This was worsened by the lack of loan repayments from Latin American countries. Under these world conditions the first idea of development was considered in the atmosphere of political discussions (Mosley, 1987). However, the general idea of aid was already considered by Lord Milner,

British Colonial Secretary from 1919 to 1921. Mosley quotes Milner's aid argument as follows: "What these countries (i.e. the colonies) need... is economic equipment- roads, railways, engines, tractors, and in some cases, notably the Sudan, irrigation works. It would increase employment and purchasing power at home as well as in the countries where the work of development is proceeding... Their development is a question of money - and money from outside" (Mosley, 1987. p.11).

The most important period of U.S. foreign aid began in the late 1940s with the Harry S. Truman Administration. After World War II, the U.S. immediately provided assistance to 16 Western European countries by using the Marshall Plan of 1949-52. Its purpose was to help them recover economically from the struggles of the war. U.S. assistance was extended later to the Far East, South Asia, Middle East, Latin America and Africa by starting the Point Four program in 1951 (Mason, 1964). Foreign aid was channeled to these nations as technical and military assistance and capital transfers to help them to develop (Axinn, 1988). However, the amounts of U.S. foreign aid have been reduced over the years. For instance, in 1991, the U.S. foreign aid amount was smaller ($9.4 billions) than U.S. spending on alcohol ($91.6 billions), tobacco, toiletries, nondurable toys, hair/health, commercial amusements, and seeds/plants (Wage, 1996). Total foreign aid was less than one percent (0.98 %) of the total U.S. budget in fiscal year 1993. (Agency for International Development

FY 1993 Budget, 1992).[3]

Foreign aid may be classified in two main categories: bilateral and multilateral aid.

2.2.1 Bilateral Aid

Bilateral aid is an assistance given from one government to another. Bilateral aid is divided in four groups: development aid, food aid, security assistance, and military aid (Agency for International Development, 1992).

2.2.1.1 Development Aid

Development Aid usually refers to long-term loans (low Interest) and grants to assist countries in areas of family planning, health, education, agriculture and other agricultural related activities. Transfers are also available for technical assistance and training (WAGE, 1996). According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. foreign assistance for development and humanitarian purpose represented 21 percent ($3.1 billion) of the total foreign aid budget ($14.8 billion) in 1993. In absolute terms, the largest amount of development assistance went to Africa (30.3 %), followed by Caribbean and Latin American countries (19.3%), and after by Europe (16.7%) in 1993. However, analyzing this data on per capita basis, Europe received the highest

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[3]Unless otherwise stated, Fiscal Year 1993 represents foreign aid budget requested by the U.S. Agency for International Development for 1993.

amount ($2.11 per person), Africa followed as second ($1.61 per person), the Caribbean and Latin American region take the third place ($1.23 per person), followed by the independent states of the former Soviet Union ($1.21 per person). Asian countries received the lowest amount ($0.26 per person) (Agency for International Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

In regard to U.S. development assistance as an instrument of foreign aid policy, there are different arguments. Some writers are in favor of U.S. development aid as a foreign aid policy tool. They believe that developing countries need U.S. help to develop. Although the Cold War has ended, it is in the U.S. interest to help less developed countries to develop successfully to ensure they will adopt future policies to fulfill U.S. best purposes. Also, U.S. can afford to help developing countries to reach development since U.S. per capita GNP is high compared to these countries ($23,240). In addition, U.S. development funds are mainly spent by developing countries in purchasing U.S. products and paying U.S. consultants. Also, development aid promotes U.S. market expansion. New markets for U.S. products will be taken away by other donors if U.S. does not provides this kind of assistance. Development aid also can help developing countries to reduce the negative impacts that colonial powers and the imperialism of the west created in those countries. It helps to train workers from developing countries, who may be familiar with U.S. technology. Also, some of these professionals may decide to stay or migrate to U.S., who will help the development of the U.S.. They may help to enrich the U.S. human

resources since they may have higher knowledge of their countries. Also, development aid is considered to be temporary, since countries can reach adequate levels of sustainable growth over time, such as the cases of Brazil and Korea (WAGE, 1996). Finally, development aid is important as a foreign aid policy instrument since there are market failures that only a government aid policy can correct.

There are other scholars who are against development aid as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. They say that although developing countries may need development assistance, U.S. aid funds are needed and better used in domestic programs. Defenders of this theory question the U.S. capability to provide this kind of aid . They ask the question, "How can U.S. help other countries when it has problems with drugs, poverty, crime, and other social ills?". They believe that U.S. has to give more attention to these problems to be an example to be followed by developing countries. In addition, some scholars said that developing countries may not be interested in the kind of development that U.S. tries to impose on them. U.S. government sacrifices middle class workers to pay high taxes to help developing countries with low per capita GNP. This only helps developing country elites to get richer and the poor to get poorer. It is better to let the private market to take care of the losses, uncertainties, and risks rather than middle class taxpayers. Therefore, it is better to help the U.S. poor who may also increase domestic demand. Also, it may be true that other aid donor will take U.S. markets away, but the U.S. products can be sold to those countries which are interested in buying them. Another argument against

development aid is that U.S. does not have any obligation to correct errors that colonial powers made since U.S. was not one of them. Also, training provided to developing countries staff may impact negatively the U.S. labor market. Job opportunities are reduced for U.S. citizens since professionals from developing countries migrate to this country. Finally, development assistance programs are not temporary since there is always an excuse to fund them (WAGE, 1996).

2.2.1.2 Food Aid

Food Aid is mainly provided as grants to help countries with school feeding programs, relief work, emergency food shortages, and work projects. Also, food aid may be sold for recipient's local currency or for U.S. dollars. Food grants are given to U.S. private voluntary organizations such as Red Cross or CARE, or to international organizations such as the United Nations (WAGE, 1996). U.S. legislation recognizes food aid as Public Law 480 (PL 480), but publicly is known as Food for Peace. Public Law 480 is integrated with three titles. Title I is a program to sell U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries for local currency or U.S. dollars. Title II represents a grant program for emergency, development or humanitarian relief. This program is carried out by voluntary private/non private agencies such as the Food Program from the United Nations and CARE. Title III is also a grant program. It was established in 1990 with the purpose to provide food for development purpose to

selected developing countries[4] (WAGE, 1996).

U.S. food aid (PL 480) represented 10 percent ($1.4 billion) of the total foreign aid budget ($14.8 billion) in 1993. The top regions to receive U.S. food assistance in absolute terms were; Near East (19.1%), Asia (18.9 %), Latin American and Caribbean region (17.6%), and Africa (11.4 %) in 1993. Egypt was the top country to receive food in the Near East region (68%) in 1993. Egypt was also the highest per capita food aid recipient ($2.75 per person). Therefore, the Near East region, including Egypt, took the highest per capita food aid ($1.70 per person) among all the regions. Europe is the region that received the lowest amount of U.S. food aid in 1993 (1.7 %). However, Asia and Europe took the lowest place in average food per capita ($0.14 and $0.09 per person, respectively). Latin American/Caribbean and Africa had an average per capita food aid under fifty cents ($.46 and $.25 per person, respectively) (Agency for International Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

There are different opinions toward food assistance as an instrument of domestic and foreign aid policy. Scholars that favor food aid policy believe that U.S. citizens should not allow the hungry and poor starve to death when there is plenty of food in this nation. It is a U.S. obligation to help the needy and poor. Food aid benefits the U.S. by selling or donating surplus food to countries with food shortages, which reduces the U.S. high storing costs. Also, defenders of food aid believe that U.S. may achieve its international interest by using food aid as a foreign policy tool.

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[4]This legislation can be found in Public Law 89-808 United States Statutes at Large 80, 1966. p. 1526.

Food aid not only may help U.S. industry by promoting developing countries to provide raw materials, but also may generate future industrial export demand. In addition, food aid may create jobs in the U.S. agricultural and industrial sectors (WAGE, 1996).

There are other scholars that oppose to use food assistance as U.S. foreign aid policy instrument. They say that food aid does not necessarily reach the poor and needy. Also, U.S. food surplus aid programs promote rural migration to urban areas since local farmers in developing countries are discouraged to produce. Then, high levels of rural migration creates a labor surplus which pushes down wages. This phenomenon promotes U.S. firms to move to developing countries since there is abundance of cheap labor and cheap raw materials. Business reallocation may impact U.S. industry since many plants will close their activities and U.S. jobs may be lost. In addition, food aid does not necessarily promote imports of cheap raw materials from developing countries since these products can be sold on the free market which would allow buyers to get them at fair market price. Also, there is not strong evidence that food aid programs promote export demand of U.S. products. But, there is evidence that food aid contributes to changes in developing countries' consumption patters and diets. This increases poor countries demand for certain products which may not be produced domestically. Therefore, developing countries may increase their food dependency (WAGE, 1996).

Some writers believe that food aid not only helps developing countries with food shortages, but also it is used as a tool of domestic policy interests. For

instance, Mason said; "Agricultural surplus disposal, which accounts for a sizable fraction of U.S. aid, is primarily concerned with domestic interests. Japanese financial assistance is frankly tied to commercial aims. So also is the aid from a number of countries. All this does not mean, of course, that a purely disinterested desire to help less developed countries plays no part in inducing foreign aid appropriations" (Mason, 1964. p. 4).

2.2.1.3 Security Assistance

A third type of bilateral aid is Security Assistance. The main purpose of this kind of assistance is to protect U.S. political and strategic interests around the world. This aid is transferred in a form of cash to a nation's budget or financial support is provided to buy U.S. commodities. The U.S. makes this kind of aid available through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which has to be used based on military base rights. Security aid is also transferred to countries to forgive them from financial debts.

According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, security assistance is registered as development aid since some of its funds are used in some development projects (Agency for International Development, 1992). Security aid represented 22 percent of the foreign aid budget in fiscal year 1993 ($3.2 billion). However, U.S. Congress approved only $2.670 billion for security assistance from $3.2 billion requested in 1993. The main proportion of U.S. security aid requested in FY 1993 was provided to the Near East (68.1 %). Israel received almost 39 percent of

the Near East security aid and Egypt took 26 percent of this aid. Both countries together received 95 percent of the total security aid provided to the Near East in FY 1993. The second region that received a high proportion of security aid in 1993 was Latin American/Caribbean (LAC) region. LAC received almost 20.9 percent of security assistance, followed by Asia (4.7%), former Soviet Union (3.2%), Europe (2.5%), and Africa (0.6%). However, on a per capita basis, Israel received the highest amount of U.S. security aid ($263.29 per person), followed by Nicaragua and El Salvador ($33.16 and $29.35 per person, respectively). Egypt received a big amount of security assistance, but on a per capita basis, it took 4th place ($15 per person) (Agency for International Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

Defenders of security aid as a foreign aid policy instrument argue that this kind of assistance is needed to promote democracy in developing countries, respect for human rights and freedom. Therefore, security aid promotes military and political stability in those countries. Also, security assistance allows U.S. to have friendly relationships with developing countries to influence their domestic and international policies and decisions. This will benefit U.S. in the long run, especially in United Nations' decisions. Therefore, security assistance is an important policy tool to achieve the U.S. international interests. Although the Cold war ended, U.S. needs allies to control the proliferation of nuclear weapon. This can be achieved by providing security assistance to developing countries since it will allow U.S. to be involved in these countries.

Considering that some of the security aid funds are used for development purposes, some scholars believe that security aid helps to promote U.S. exports of commodities. Security aid is provided for debt forgiveness and to maintain U.S. military base rights. Therefore, this kind of aid helps to maintain U.S. jobs overseas and to get support for U.S. military bases in other countries. For instance, the Agency for International Development reported that in 1996 it had 3065 employees. About 40 percent of these workers were located in Washington, D.C. and 60 percent were working abroad. Also, this agency had about 1,070 foreign employees working abroad. All these workers were under USAID payroll (WAGE, 1996. p. 18).

Security aid also allows U.S. to provide debt forgiveness. For instance, the U.S. gave Egypt a military debt forgiveness of $1.2 billion in 1990 and $1.855 billion in 1991. These amounts were part of the U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Agency for International Development, 1991, 1992). Also, U.S. Congress, since 1985, ordered that security assistance provided to Israel be at least equal to the principal and interest of its debt to the U.S.. Therefore, Israel has been forgiven from all its debts to the U.S. (WAGE, 1996).

Scholars that oppose use of security aid as tool of U.S. foreign aid policy, believe that U.S. provides this kind of aid to support authoritarian governments. These regimes not only repress citizens freedoms, but also violate their human rights. Also, security assistance is used to interfere with other countries policies. But governments in developing countries know the game and try to take advantages from

all donors. In addition, security assistance only creates instability since countries are pushed to achieve more development which already produces instability itself. Also, developing countries use this aid to increase their military expenses which also creates more instability.

Defenders of this security aid argument also believe that U.S. can not buy allies to help to control the expansion of nuclear warheads. U.S. ability to control the production of nuclear weapons is limited since any country can produce them secretly. In addition, if security aid is used as an instrument of foreign policy to achieve U.S. international interests, it is much better to transfer this function to the State Department. Also, security aid as a tool of foreign aid policy is not needed to fulfill U.S. strategic purposes in getting rights to military bases overseas (WAGE, 1996). Considering that the Cold War had ended, U.S. does not need military bases in developing countries. It is time to let these countries run their own policies.

2.2.1.4 Military Assistance

The last type of U.S. bilateral assistance is called Military Aid. The U.S. provides loans with low-interest rates and grants to buy U.S. hardware such as munitions, aircraft, and tanks . It also includes the provision of military training or technical assistance to friendly countries (WAGE, 1996).

Military aid represented 28 percent of the total foreign aid provided in FY 1993. The Near East got the highest proportion of military aid in 1992 and 1993.

About 77 percent was given to the Near East. Israel received almost 44 percent and Egypt took 32 percent of the total military aid provided to this region. Europe and Latin American/Caribbean followed with 16 and 5 percent, respectively. Asia and Africa received the lowest proportion of military aid in FY 1993 (1.3 % and 0.5 %, respectively). The highest proportion of military assistance in per capita terms, was provided to Israel ($395 per person) and Egypt ($24 per person) in 1993.. They were followed by Europe ($2.92 per person) and Latin American/Caribbean ($0.48 per person) (Agency for International Development, FY 1993 Budget, 1992).

Considering military assistance as an instrument of U.S. foreign aid policy, there are writers who are in favor or against military assistance. Scholars who agree to use military aid as an instrument of foreign aid policy, said that military aid helps popular governments to stay in power by promoting democracy in government institutions. Also, this kind of aid encourages military and political stability in recipient countries. For instance, the case of U.S. military aid provided to Israel to promote peace and political stability with Palestine. Military aid is helping to keep peace in the middle east. U.S. involvement in developing countries help to keep control of those countries that buy U.S. military equipment and hardware. In addition, military aid provides training to citizens from developing countries. This aid will favor U.S. in the long-run since they will support U.S. in world problems.

Scholars against using military aid as a tool of foreign aid policy, believe that U.S. is only promoting unpopular governments that repress citizens, violate

freedom and human rights. Also, military assistance helps developing countries to increase military expenses by accumulating huge amounts of military hardware. Therefore, military and political instability increase in those recipient countries. In addition, U.S. will not get support from developing countries in military world actions. These countries may make their own political and military decisions when they will be needed. Therefore, military aid only serves the U.S. political and military interests. It is better to use all these resources to solve domestic problems, such as crime, poverty and drugs (WAGE, 1996).

2.2.2 Multilateral Aid and Private Sector Assistance

A second category of foreign assistance is known as Multilateral Aid. This is the kind of aid provided to other countries through international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Specialized Agencies. Its main objective is to achieve development. All the funds provided by donor governments are collected jointly and transferred to a particular government. This category also includes foreign aid provided by some countries in the world, that is transferred to international agencies taking the form of contributions.

Multilateral aid is based on the assumption that countries have high desire to strengthen the United Nations. It is also assumed that it is expensive and difficult to create a particular aid administration in each country (Mason, 1964).

There is another type of assistance which is provided by the private sector.

This aid refers to grants, loans or other types of assistance transferred by private organizations from one country to citizens or public/private organizations in another nation. This kind of assistance is transferred by voluntary or non-voluntary private agencies. Most of this aid is provided based on private organization's mission or on recipient's particular purpose or emergency.

U.S. foreign aid is extensive and has positive and negative effects in other countries' development processes. Statements in favor or against using specific foreign aid programs as instruments of foreign aid policy were presented. Also, positive and negative impacts were discussed in the context of foreign aid policy. However, there are writers such as Cassen who believes that "Intercountry statistical analyses do not show anything conclusive - positive or negative - about the impact of aid on growth. Given the enormous variety of countries and types of aid, this is not surprising... aid may or may not be strongly related to growth, depending on the circumstances" (Cassen, 1986). Also, Morgenthau believes that different types of aid have to be provided under different circumstances, which need a very deep and careful analysis (Morgenthau, 1966). While there are many different positions of foreign aid and foreign aid policy, it is important to analyze the impacts of foreign assistance in terms of U.S. public policy.

Considering U.S. foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy, the main question remains as to whether generosity and development were the essential objectives of U.S. foreign aid policy. Baldwin said that foreign aid is an instrument of

foreign policy whose objective is to fulfill the interests of the aid giver (Baldwin, 1966). According to Edward S. Mason, there are two different opinions with respect to this issue. On the one side, are those scholars who believe that the main objective of foreign aid is U.S. security. It was a successful and planned tool to keep communism away from the political and economic recovery of Western Europe. It was also implemented as an instrument to avoid third world non-communist countries to become communists. On the other side, are those who believe that foreign aid is U.S. disinterested generosity to help European nations and third world poor countries to achieve economic development. However, they also believe that the flow of foreign aid has to be conditioned by the political development of the recipient (Mason, 1964).

Considering that this research deals with foreign aid issues in the context of public good, government spending and public policy, it is important to consider the arguments provided by Paul Mosley. His statements and those mentioned before, provide the main theoretical framework to support this study. Mosley believes that governments' foreign aid policy goes beyond the individuals' compassionate purposes. U.S. foreign assistance has three main overlapping objectives. The first one is that foreign aid is seen by foreign and defense ministries as a means of getting third world countries military and political support. The second objective is provided by trade and employment ministries who see foreign aid as a means of getting and extending access to third world markets and a way to create more jobs. The third objective is given by development and finance ministries who consider that foreign aid

is a mean of creating growth in third world nations for the benefit of the world economy and particularly for those recipients. Mosley said that these foreign aid objectives can be justified by five government foreign assistance functions. Three are called *universal functions* and two *particular functions.* These five functions are based on economic and political theories (Mosley, 1987).

Foreign aid universal functions are: distributive, allocative and stabilization. These functions are supported by economic theory of government intervention in the economy. Public goods that provide comfort, happiness or pleasure should be provided by government (police protection and public parks). These public goods may no exist if their provision were left to the free market since this experiments in most cases total market failure. Government intervention is also justify by the presence of partial market failure. This is observed when there are many free riders in the system. These are consumers who use the service of a public good but they do not want to pay for it. Partial market failure is also found when private providers of public services do not receive the capital benefits of their work (control of pollution). Another case of partial market failure is when beneficiaries may ignore the nature of the service provided for them by private market (health care) (Mosley, 1987). Therefore, this researcher believes that considering these market failures and foreign aid as a public good, government foreign aid income redistribution function is justified in the world economy. However, government distributive, allocative and stabilization foreign aid functions are carried out in many cases with a low level of success. Most of the

U.S. foreign aid programs show a low level of efficiency and effectiveness.

According to Mosley, government also has two foreign aid functions known as *particular functions*. These, different from universal functions, apply only to specific nation and not for the whole world. These two particular functions refer to the issue that bilateral foreign aid by one country can 1) buy political favors for that country, and 2) promote exports from that country (Mosley, 1987).

There are more arguments about foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Some scholars are classified as: radical right, radical left, and middle side thinkers. Writers can be included in each category based on their view toward foreign aid. For instance, radical rights focus on government foreign aid allocative function. Some of these scholars, such as Bauer and writers for the London Times and Sun, believe that overseas aid will decrease the cost of leisure in relation to recipient government's efforts. Therefore, recipient countries will reduce the amount of effort to promote their own development. Also, foreign aid misguide recipient countries by interfering with their economic policies and confuses them toward self-sufficiency issues. Bauer believes that foreign aid is the cause that recipient governments expropriate multinational companies and nationalize their businesses. A quote of his beliefs is as follows: "almost all recipients of foreign aid restrict the inflow and development of private foreign capital. During the last decade or so these restrictions have increasingly developed into expropriation of foreign capital, often accompanied by the expulsion of the owners and their employees. As a result, the inflow of foreign

aid is matched by an outflow of both domestic and foreign private capital" (Bauer, 1965. pp. 45-6).

Defenders of foreign aid radical left theory base their arguments on government redistributive function. They believe that foreign aid that is provided now to poor countries in the form of income only makes it more difficult in the long run to redistribute power to the poor. They also believe that foreign aid not only decreases the propensity to save in recipient governments, but also capital intensity is increased.

Foreign aid policy is also analyze by the called Middle side thinkers. They use a combination of allocative and redistributive foreign aid functions. Middle side defenders believe that foreign aid create not only negative effects on recipient countries, but also it has positive impacts. There are gaps that foreign aid donors have to fill, but their positive impacts can not be disregarded.

There are other writers who believe that U.S. foreign aid policy can not be analyzed independently from political issues and other public policy options. For instance, a quote from Robert L. Lineberry said "the analysis of public policy requires the discovery, specification, selection, and evaluation of alternatives for settling public problems" (Lineberry, 1977. p.9). Schattschneider believes that in policymaking, political power is an important instrument that brings the right to impose a particular problem definition , especially in terms of policy problems and alternatives. This relationship can be observed in his quote "Political conflict is not like an entercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in advance on a definition of the

issues. As a matter of fact, the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power" (Lineberry, 1977. p.24). Therefore, the definitions of foreign aid problems, priorities and foreign aid policy, depend on how policy and decision makers define policy problems. It is easy to remember how U.S. foreign aid priorities were transformed dramatically with the falling of communism in the Former Soviet Union. Huge amounts of money in a form of foreign aid were sent to Russia to support free market activities and to promote democratic institutions. Thus, in a world in which resources are finite, rational policymaking must make choices among policy options. These actions may be oriented to domestic public policy or foreign aid policy.

2.3 Theories of Public Attitudes and Beliefs

There are different kinds of theories to explain public attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and learning. Some of these theories are based on philosophical, phenomenological or psychological principles.

Many cognitive theories establish that individuals keep internal consistency in their beliefs, opinions, attitudes and behaviors. But, discrepancies appear in their internal consistency when new knowledge or information is available to them that contradict their behavior (Leon Festinger, 1957). Therefore, individuals tend

to change the behavior to match their beliefs or they can decide to ignore the new knowledge or information (Vining and Ebreo, 1990). Much research has been done related to cognitive theories. But, the purpose of this study is not to create or discuss these theories but to use them mainly as a reference to support research assumptions.

2.4 Public Opinions toward Government Spending

There are some studies on public attitudes toward government spending but they mainly focus on social welfare and other domestic programs. However, these studies represent the main theoretical framework for this research. For instance, a study done by Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. from the University of California, and Kenny J. Whitby from the University of South Carolina examined the relationship of race and class to attitudes toward government spending priorities. They created a theoretical model to explain race and class differences in mass attitudes. They found that higher class status has a relatively strong conservative effect on white views and a relatively mild conservative effect on black political attitudes about government spending on social programs (Gilliam and Whitby, Social Science Quarterly, Volume 70, Number 1, March 1989).

William G. Jacoby from the University of South Carolina in his study of public attitudes toward government spending found that public attitudes toward spending in nonwelfare programs do not correspond to preferences about

spending on welfare programs. Therefore, the effects of spending attitudes differ substantially, depending upon the particular type of program under consideration (Jacoby, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 1994, pp. 336-61).

Another important study of public support is the one done by Sara Zuckerbraun from the University of Chicago. She believes that it is important to consider public support for government environmental spending within the context of tradeoffs with other social programs. She considers that most of the models of public support for government spending analyze policies in isolation. Zuckerbraun believes that to explain support for the environment the salience and self-interest models are not sufficient. Value-based theories of political attitudes are significantly related to environmental government spending. However, she thinks that it is important to consider the notion of fairness-based tradeoffs to explain citizens' support for government environmental spending. A model of fairness is essential to consider in public policy analysis (Zuckerbraun, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1994, pp. 179-197).

2.5 Public Opinions toward Foreign Aid Programs

The WAGE project at Michigan State University in its 1996 curriculum materials, found out that the degree of support for foreign aid programs

depends largely on how the question is asked. They indicated that surveys over the years show that just over half the population support foreign aid when the question is generally in terms of helping the less developed countries. When the question is asked in terms of priorities, the majority say that it is more important to take care of U.S. problems first before spending money on foreign aid. They also indicated that most of the surveys show that people do not know much about foreign aid programs and other countries in the world. Their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid are mainly based on personal beliefs and perceptions about the issue (WAGE Project, 1996).

A complete analysis of foreign aid is reported in the 1984 OECD Review of Development Cooperation. This reviews the history of public opinions in 17 donor countries of which 10 countries are from the European Economic Community (EEC). It is pointed out that people's opinions depend heavily on how the questions are worded. The Review states that according to Ohlin, agreement is much easier to obtain for government spending, be it foreign aid or other public policy programs, as long as the question is somewhat abstract and general. If the same question is formulated in two different ways, people's opinions immediately changed (OECD, 1984). For instance, public opinion immediately shifts and gets controversial if a question includes taxes, costs or amount provided to an individual. Also, the OECD research found that there is correlation between people's positive attitudes toward foreign aid and higher level of education. Foreign aid for humanitarian/moral purpose

had people's support from the 10 European Community donors (OECD, 1984)

There are two other recently published studies about foreign aid. The first one is "A Review of Existing Survey Data Regarding American's Views on U.S. Leadership and Foreign Assistance," by Belden and Russonello in May 1994. The second survey was done in 1995 by Steven Skull from the University of Maryland. This research focuses on Americans and foreign aid. The first study reviewed data from 1986 to 1994. They found that when a question was formulated to ask whether U.S. should provide foreign aid, only 47 % approved it. But, when the question was formulated in terms of Why should U.S. be involved in foreign aid, Americans do agree on humanitarian, environmental and economic reasons. They all supported foreign assistance for disaster relief and feeding the hungry and poor. The study found that Americans believe that U.S. has to share responsibilities of foreign aid with other nations rather than to be the leader (Belden and Russonello, 1994). This answer clearly showed a lack of information about U.S. foreign aid programs. Considering the amount of foreign aid as a percentage of each country's GNP, the United States ranks next to last out of the 20 industrial countries in 1992. The U.S. is party to a United Nations resolution agreeing to provide 0.70 percent of its GNP but it only provides a fourth of this amount. The top donors of foreign aid as percentage of nations' GNP are Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, France and Canada.

The second survey done by Skull, pointed out that a strong majority of

Americans believe that the United States is spending too much on foreign aid. But, this attitude is based on the assumption that the U.S. is spending vastly more than it is in fact. Asked what an "appropriate amount" would be, the median level proposed is 5 times present spending levels (Skull, 1995). The U.S. development aid in 1991 was far less than American spending on items like alcohol, tobacco, toiletries, nondurable toys, hair/health preparations and amusements .

A 1991-92 and 1995-96 evaluation surveys of union workers done by Workers Adjustments to the Global Economy project at Michigan State University showed that most of them do not know much about some issues of the U.S. foreign aid programs, global economy and developing countries (WAGE, 1991 and 1996). The surveys found that union workers get information most frequently from their union papers and less frequently from newsmagazine. Both surveys agree that there is lack of information about developing countries and foreign aid, particularly among women. A quote from WAGE project said "In 1992, Michigan State University's School of Labor and Industrial Relations conducted a survey of 349 union members from the Midwest that asked a number of questions about U.S. foreign aid programs. The results showed that most respondents said they did not know very much about the Third World countries and their problems, or how the U.S. might benefit from assisting them. They also indicated that they did not know very much about the organizations that provide assistance to these less developed countries" (WAGE, 1996. p.16).

Chapter 3

RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Data Source

The data used in this study were generated during evaluation surveys done by the Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project (WAGE) in 1991-92 and 1995-96, in which the author of this dissertation served as a Graduate Research Assistant. These data have not been analyzed and presented in the form used here in any other publication. Pilot training programs were also provided by this project to unionized workers and union leaders during the life time of the project. These training activities were used to pilot test curriculum material and to get comments from participants to suggest improvements.

The School of Labor and Industrial Relations (SLIR) at Michigan State University carried out WAGE development educational project . It was funded by MSU/USAID from 1991 to 1996. It was developed in cooperation with a consortium of five Midwestern universities to create curriculum material to teach unionized workers in the Midwestern states about the global economy and labor issues. The plan was to extend this curriculum material to a national level in the future. Also, constant project

evaluations were done by experts outside of this project. Some of the data from the pilot training, surveys and project evaluations not published elsewhere, were used in this study.

This dissertation utilized some data from the WAGE Project as secondary data. That project had done two surveys for evaluation purposes. One was done in 1991 and another in 1995-96. However, some data were analyzed in 1992 and 1996 by staff of that project. The dates of collection are recorded as 1991-92 and 1995-96. This dissertation uses data taken directly from questionnaires (see Appendix A) provided by WAGE project in both evaluation surveys.

3.2 The Survey Population and Sample Instrument

The states of Michigan, Minnesota, Alabama, California, Missouri, Illinois, Kansas, Wisconsin, Ohio, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Arkansas and Tennessee were selected by WAGE project for the 1991 survey. The data were analyzed in 1992 for project evaluation purposes. But, this research analyzes and compares the data from these states for a different purpose. Also, WAGE project did a survey and collected data from the states of Michigan, Minnesota, Alabama and California in 1995-96. These data were also used in this dissertation.

Several writers, such as Jacobs, Ary , and Razaviech recommend the use of a sample as large as possible since there is not a simple rule to determine sample size (Ary, Jacobs, and Razaviech, 1985). Therefore, the population size of this

dissertation is represented by WAGE project aggregated data from a total of 569 unionized workers from 14 States of U.S. (WAGE total sample size). However, this data set was separated in two survey groups since the 1991-92 questionnaires were not available. Therefore, the main sample size of this study is represented by WAGE project 1995-96 survey data from a total of 214 unionized workers from the States of Michigan, Minnesota, Alabama and California. However, aggregated data from 1991-92 and 1995-96 surveys (569 participants) are used specifically for comparison purposes. The 1991-92 survey interviewed 355 union workers who represented 34 individual national/international unions from 13 states of U.S. However, only 349 respondents completed the demographic data. The 1995-96 survey interviewed 214 union workers who represented 56 individual national/international unions from 4 States of the U.S. While these unions represent workers from different industries and services, these surveys include only those workers who attended university classes and training programs as a part of their extension programs. Therefore, the sample of unionized workers was not drawn at random from the total population of workers registered at the U.S. union institutions, and does not claim to represent them.

Considering that these surveys were conducted by labor educators from labor and industrial relations extension programs in specific training places, these surveys are classified as convenience surveys or purposive surveys. All the questionnaires provided by the WAGE project were answered and returned. The 1995-96 survey was based on labor educator planned education activities during fall

of 1995 and winter of 1996 as a part of their extension programs. The sample represents unionized workers who attended labor courses and training classes in fall 1995 and winter 1996. This time period left other workers out of the survey. However, labor classes and training programs are not only open to all unionized workers, but also they are optional for all unionized institutions.

Respondents to the surveys were asked in 1991-92 and 1995-96 to provide demographic data and to answer 21 questions related to foreign aid issues (see Appendix A). Respondents answered questions about union affiliation and membership, education levels, sources of information exposure, perceived reliability of information sources, government priorities, foreign aid programs priority, personal demographic data (age, sex, race, state they live in), as well as questions concerning their attitudes toward domestic and foreign aid policy. The surveys had an overall response rate of 100 percent, including those respondents who only answered some particular questions. This high response rate is the result of the nature of the target audience and specific sites of university labor extension programs.

It was mentioned that the data collection instrument used by WAGE project was a questionnaire. It was designed to be applied using teacher-classroom technique. The questionnaire was designed to gather specific information from a specific target audience; union workers, enrolled in Universities labor classes. The instrument used a format of open ended questions that focused on union workers opinions toward Domestic and foreign aid programs.

The two main criteria met by the WAGE project questionnaire were validity and reliability. This instrument was first tested with a group of union workers in a labor class. It was initially evaluated by WAGE project staff in 1991. This instrument was modified based on workers' feedback. The questionnaire was then modified again in 1995 according to suggestions provided by WAGE project staff. The suggested changes centered on questions update and terminology. However, these further modifications did not change the main purpose of the questions. It was planned that the 1991 and 1995 questionnaires must keep consistency with each other to establish comparison patterns.

The validity of the data was further improved by comparing the questions from the WAGE project questionnaire with other questionnaire questions provided by outside research organizations, such as the Agency for International Development. The purpose of this comparison was to observe similarities and differences in foreign aid survey results.

3. 3 Conceptual Definitions

The concept of "Global Economy" will be used in this research. This concept refers mainly to the issues of transnational corporations, international trade and foreign aid.

Conceptual definitions for this research were developed based on different sources, such as the Economics Dictionary (Barcelona, España, 1992) and the New

Webster's Dictionary and Roget's Thesaurus. Also, other source definitions were used, such as Peter Dicken, David W. Pearce, and Jeremy J. Wardford. The following concepts are used in this research:

Attitudes: Posture or position that influence behavior.

Beliefs: Assent of the mind that influence behavior. Persuasion; creed; opinion. They affect individuals internal consistency to influence behavior. Individual's behaviors normally match their beliefs.

Foreign Aid: is any type of assistance provided from one country to another. It is given as grants or loans and could be public or private in nature. They could be commodities such as food, equipment, supplies and military hardware.

Global Economy: Refer mainly to the issues of transnational corporations, international trade and foreign aid and how these are internationalize and functional integrated among countries.

International Trade: Is an economic activity in which people or nations sell and buy goods and services by paying in the domestic or international market with a national or international currency.

Policy: Government intervention in a country's economy to allocate resources to achieve efficient outcomes. Interventions may include, foreign aid, subsidies, price control, physical output targets, exchange controls, ownership controls, and investments.

Transnational Corporations: Are businesses that own and control operations in more than one country. They operate globally to achieve market growth and profit accumulation through foreign direct investment.

3.4 Statistical Methods

This dissertation uses SPSS and Excel programs to do statistical analysis of the 19991-92 and 1995-96 evaluation survey data. Tables and graphs were prepared based on data drawn from questionnaires from the WAGE project to identify changes in workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid from 1991 to 1996. A code book was created by the author of this dissertation to label, value, and classify survey variables. This survey codebook was used to process raw data in SPSS and Excel for windows.

A comparative analysis was also carried out by the author based on WAGE 1991-92 and 1995-96 surveys. Also, some variables from the 1994 survey done by Belden and Russonello and a 1995 survey done by Steven Skull from the University of Maryland were used as comparison to observe patterns of change in U.S. public opinions and attitudes on foreign aid. Considering that the WAGE project's questionnaire contains 21 questions, 88 variables were initially identified as a part of the first statistical equation. Then, a factor analysis was carried out to determine the main variables that are related to the major variables of this study: 1) moral advantages of foreign aid, 2) the economic disadvantages, and 3) the waste of U.S.

dollars in foreign aid programs. Kleinbaum and Kupper quote that factor analysis "is a multivariable method that has as its aim the explanation of relationships among several difficult-to-interpret, correlated variables in terms of a few conceptually meaningful, relatively independent factors" (Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978. p. 376).

Considering that variables used by this research have different scales, means for the 1991-92 and 1995-96 survey variables were established to create workability and reliability of the data. Multiregression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were developed to observe the significance of the variables and to test reliability. Important statistical techniques used in this dissertation to establish relationships among variables were the probability of the correlation coefficient (p), correlation coefficient (r), and the squared of the sample correlation coefficient or coefficient of determination(r^2).

Scales of measurement were created for each of the variables based on the 1995-96 WAGE project main questionnaire. Dependent and independent variables were classified and tested based on four social psychological models provided by Sara Zuckerbraun's study: the saliency model, the rational self-interest, the values, and the fairness model (Zuckerbraun, 1994). Each model was tested independently to observe its applicability to workers' attitudes and beliefs, and foreign aid issues. Then, all four of these models were combined to test and to identify those variables to be used in a general and integrative models of workers' support for foreign aid programs.

3.5 Statistical Models

The main hypothesis was tested based on an integrative approach provided by this dissertation. This model resulted from combining four social psychological models of public support for public policy: *the issue saliency model, the rational self-interest, the values, and the fairness model.* The *issue saliency model* is based on the assumption that the media impacts and creates sympathies on public interest. *The rational self-interest model* assumes that there is a direct relationship between individual's benefits and policy support. *The values model* assumes a relationship between one's policy support and one's values, and suggest that citizens are responsive to issues about fairness when they consider public policy (Zuckerbraun, 1994).

The literature review (Chapter 2) discussed a variety of different models that were used to study public support for government spending. However, this study is partially based on four psychological models provided by Sara Zuckerbraun from the University of Chicago. Her study was done based on government environmental spending in nine nations as a part of the International Social Survey Program.

Zuckerbraun states that tradeoffs of public support for government environmental spending must be considered within the context of other social programs. She quotes "our observation of environmental support suggests that it may be useful to consider the tradeoffs that people make in their support for different

government policies. We have noticed that often opposition to environmentalism comes from those who believe that other interest may suffer....More generally, it may be the case that those who support government funding of health, education, unemployment, and housing will oppose government-funded environmental policies if they believe that public funds will be diverted from these other programs to the environment" (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 180).

Zuckerbraun presents a general analysis of existing psychological models that explain government public spending. She bases her analysis of government environmental spending on her *fairness model*. Zuckerbraun believes that saliency and rational self-interest models are not sufficient to explain public support for the environment and government spendings. Also, she said that value models of political attitudes are good approaches to explain government environmental spending. However, all these models are used to explain public support for governmental spending not only in isolation from each other, but also isolate public policies. Therefore, she suggest her fairness-based tradeoffs model as an alternative to explain public support for government environmental spending. This is a good approach to analyze public policy, especially environmental policy (Zuckerbraun,1994. pp. 179-197).

Zuckerbraun believes that opposition to support for government environmental spending sometimes comes from people who believe that funds will be taken away from some important programs, such as education, housing, health,

unemployment. Therefore, they think their other interests will suffer. Also, those who believe that environmental policies threaten their industries, jobs and livelihoods tend to oppose to environmentalism. Therefore, it is important to analyze government environmental spending in relation with other government policies. Zuckerbraun wrote "Traditionally, these three models of support for public policy have been tested by considering policies in isolation... Prosocialist values were associated with higher levels of support for environmental spending, while probusiness and governmental social responsibility values were associated with less support. However, those endorsing both prosocialist and government responsibility values were less likely to endorse spending on the environment at the expense of other social programs. Therefore, our observation of environmental support suggests that it may be useful to consider the tradeoffs that people make in their support for different government policies" (Zuckerbraun, 1994, pp.179-180). In this context, this dissertation incorporated U.S. public domestic programs to the analysis of union workers' support for government foreign aid spendings.

3.5.1 Dependent and Independent Variables

The main hypothesis of this research is **"Unionized Workers' Support for Foreign Aid is related to Workers Attitudes and Beliefs Toward Foreign Aid."** Workers' support for foreign aid was analyzed as a regression equation where the three major dependent variables were grouped as: 1) *the moral advantages of foreign*

aid (benefits), 2) *the economic disadvantages of foreign aid (costs),* and 3) *the perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.* The independent variables represented the unionized workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. The literature review provides a variety of different models that were used to study public support for government spending. However, this study is partially based on four psychological models provided by Zuckerbraun's paper. Her study was done based on government environmental spending in nine nations.

3.5.1.1 Dependent Variables

Workers' support for foreign aid (Y') is studied based on three Dependent Variables: 1) *moral advantages of foreign aid (Y1),* 2) *economic disadvantages of foreign aid (Y2),* and 3) *perceptions of waste of U.S. dollars (Y3)* (see table 3.1).

The variable of *moral advantages of foreign aid* (Y1) was integrated by three factors or subvariables based on items on the survey instrument. These were : 1) aid is essential for other countries self-sufficiency (a16), 2) We ought to help the hungry or poor (b16), and 3) helping other countries makes them more stable (d16) (see Appendix A or table 3.1).

The variable of *economic disadvantages of foreign aid* (Y2) was integrated by four factors or subvariables which were based on four questionnaire items. These were: 1) too mixed up with other countries affairs (c16), 2) help countries that will

compete with U.S. (e16), 3) need to solve U.S. problems first before helping other countries (f16), and 4) we will benefit in the long run not now (i16) (see Appendix A).

The variable of *perception of waste of U.S. dollars* (Y3) was integrated by two subvariables based on two questionnaire items: 1) aid is misused by foreign governments (g16), and 2) large part of aid is wasted by U.S. (h16) (see Appendix A).

3.5.1.2 Independent Variables

The WAGE project (1991-92 and 1995-96) surveys gathered data on a variety of factors expected to influence foreign aid, especially economic aid for development. The focal issue of this dissertation is unionized workers attitudes and beliefs (X_i). In this case, independent variables were identified and classified based on each model of public support for public policy found in Zuckerbraun's paper.

Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs (X_i) are studied based on seven Independent Variables. These variables are: 1) *travel and information seeking beliefs* (X_1); 2) *trust of sources of information* (X_2); 3) *altruism toward foreign aid* (X_3); 4) *political view of government priorities* (X_4); 5) *concerns for third world countries* (X_5); 6) *global interdependence* (X_6); and 7) *U.S. foreign aid priorities* (X_7). Each of these Independent Variables is integrated by other factors or subvariables . These Independent Variables were grouped based on survey questions. They were classified based on each psychological model requirements. These factors or subvariables were established based on the survey questionnaire which are identified

with the letter Q. All these independent variables were used in the General Model to test the null hypothesis. Some of these variables were also used in the Integrative Model. But, individual independent variables were used to test each of the four psychological models. Therefore, the most important variables provided by the factor analysis are described here. However, these names represent a short description of the specific variable label used in the code book (see Appendix A for a description of each question, table 3.1 and Appendix B for variables description and labels):

The variable of *travel and information seeking beliefs* (X_1) was integrated by two factors or subvariables based on seven items of the survey instrument. These two factors were: 1) information travel belief news media (Q1-Q4), and 2) information travel belief institutions (Q5-Q7) (see table 3.1). This independent variable was used to test the Saliency model.

The variable of *trust of sources of information* (X_2) was integrated by two factors or subvariables which were based on eight questionnaire items. These two factors or subvariables were: 1) trust of media information (a8-e8), 2) trust institutions information (f8-h8).

The variable of *altruism toward foreign aid* (X_3) was integrated by three factors or subvariables based on five questionnaire items. These two subvariables were: 1) others have so little (c20), 2) aid is self interest (d20), 3) aid cuts immigrants (e20) (see table 3.1). These factors were used to test the Rational self-interest model.

The variable of *political view of government priorities* (X_4) was integrated by

two factors or subvariables based on eight items of the survey instrument. These two factors were: 1) national priorities (a9, c9-f9, h9), and 2) international priorities (b9, g9) (see table 3.1). This independent variable was used to test the Fairness model.

The variable of *concerns for third world countries* (X_5) was integrated by two factors or subvariables which were based on five questionnaire items. These two subvariables were: 1) not know enough (a19, c19), and 2) U.S. self-interest (d19-f19) (see table 3.1)

The variable of *global interdependence* (X_6) was integrated by two factors or subvariables based on six questionnaire items. The two factors were: 1) third world competition (a21, b21, d21, f21), and 2) third world benefits U.S. workers (e21, g21) (see table 3.1).

The variable of *U.S. foreign aid priorities* (X_7) was integrated by two factors or subvariables based on six questionnaire items. The two factors were: 1) primary needs program (a15, b15, f15), and 2) secondary needs program (c15-e15, g15) (see table 3.1 and Appendix A). These factors were used to test the values model.

3.6 Operational Definitions

This study creates operational definitions based on WAGE project 1991-92 and 1995-96 questionnaires. Also, scales of measurement were developed based on research main hypotheses. Therefore, the following operational definitions are

used to measure the most important dependent and independent variables that served to test the main hypothesis of this dissertation:

Workers' support for foreign aid (Y')

Workers' support for foreign aid is the main dependent variable. It was measured based on question sixteen (Q16) of the WAGE project questionnaire. It represents statements of economic aid for development (Qa16-Qi16). These statements were converted to 9 subvariables or factors. These factors were divided in three groups of responses to create the three main dependent variables that explain workers' support for foreign aid. These groups of responses were grouped based on similar characteristics of each factor. The three main independent variables were called: 1) *Moral advantagesof foreign aid (Y1)*, b) *Economic disadvantage of foreign aid (Y2)*, and 3) *Perceptions of waste of U.S. dollars (Y3)*. A scale to measure each participant's respond was created as follows:

```
1=SA     (Strongly agree)
2=SWA    (Somewhat agree)
3=NAD    (Neither agree/disagree)
4=DSW    (Disagree somewhat)
5=SD     (Strongly disagree)
```

Each participant's response was computed independently, and an individual mean was created for each participant's response and for a set of items. Then, a multiple regression analysis of the data and a comparative analysis of means

of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 surveys were done. Each set of factors was grouped based on code book scales to measure each main dependent variable. The mean scale for each main dependent variables is as follows:

1=SA   (Strongly agree)
2=SWA   (Somewhat agree)
3=NAD   (Neither agree/disagree)
4=DSW   (Disagree somewhat)
5=SD   (Strongly disagree)

Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs

Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid is the main independent variable. This variable is formed by seven independent variable (X_1-X_7). It was measured based on some statements from the WAGE project questionnaire. These statements are: 1-9 (Q1-Q9),15-16 (Q15-Q16), 19-21 (Q19-Q21). These questions were transformed into independent variables. Scales to measure each variable was created based on this dissertation code book (see appendix B).

Considering that each variable has different scale of measurement, means for each participant's response and for each set of independent variables were developed. A total of 13 factors or subvariables were grouped in seven main independent variables. Each variable may have from 1 to 8 statements (see table 3.1). Therefore, it will be to extensive to provide all the measurements. An example is provided for the statement # 8 from the WAGE project questionnaire (Qa8-Qh8), and

for the set of variables that integrate its main independent variable, trust of information

(X2).

Scale for a participant's response (Scale of 1-10)

1 = Low (Not at all reliable)
5 = SW (Somewhat reliable), middle point of reliability
10= High (Totally reliable)

Scale for a set of responses (Mean - scale 1-10)

1 = Low (Not at all reliable)
5 = SW (Somewhat reliable), middle point of reliability
10= High (Totally reliable)

All the means from the main independent variables were tested to establish

if there was a relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes

and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

3.7 Regression Equations

Two statistical models were created to test the null hypothesis, *the General
and the Integrative models*. Each of these two models is integrated by three
regression equations. However, the General Model is expressed in one general
regression equation. Some of the variables contained in the General Model were
used to test each of the four psychological models.

3.7.1 General Model

A general model to test the four psychological approaches was created. It

only represents an example of the variables considered in the four psychological models. However, each of these four models has its own statistical equation. Nevertheless, a multiregression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were done to observe if this general model will explain the relationship between unionized workers support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. Considering that each of the four models has an specific objective ad variables, statistical tests were done to establish a relationship between unionized workers support for foreign aid and model's objective. However, this general statistical equations does not represent the final model suggested to test the main hypothesis of this study since some of the variables were disregarded based on level of correlation, dispersion coefficient, and multicollinearity analysis. A general representation of the variables used to test these models in its general equation form is as follow:

(3.1) $Y' = f(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \beta_6 X_6 + \beta_7 X_7 + E)$

$\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4, \beta_5, \beta_6, \beta_7...\beta_i$ = Regression coefficients

E = Error component (how far away an individual's response is from the population regression line = $E = Y - (\beta_0 + \beta_i X_i)$)

Y' = Workers' support for foreign aid (Y_1, Y_2, Y_3)

X_i = Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs ($X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7$)

This general statistical equation was tested for each of the three main Dependent Variables. It main purpose was to observe if there was a relationship between the main Dependent Variables and all of the independent variables. Also, this regression equation was used as an example of the possible variables to be included in each psychological model. However, each of these psychological models was tested based on each individual regression analysis. Each regression equation was based not only on specific variables provided by the general statistical model but also by the main factors of each model. The results are presented in Chapter 4. Then, a multiple regression analysis was carried out to test the reliability of each of the four models. Each psychological model was analyzed to identify those that can be applied to workers support for foreign aid programs. Correlation analysis was done to test correlation among variables and the validity of each model. Coefficients of correlation were determined to establish relationships among variables and dispersions.

3.7.2 Integrative Model

After testing each psychological model, a more specific new polynomial integrative model was created with less number of independent variables. This model uses only nine factor rather than 13 used in the General Model. These nine factors were converted to nine variables to make the test of the null hypothesis much easier. The Integrative statistical model was divided in three regression equations to test the

Dependent Variables: 1) *Moral advantage of foreign aid,* 2) *The economic disadvantage of foreign aid,* and 3) *The perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.* Then, these equations were tested to explain the strengths of the selected variables. They were fitted with Least-Squares procedure. These regression equations represent the final statistical model that was used to test the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs (main hypothesis). These regression equations are (see table 3.1):

(3.2) $Y_1 = f\,(\beta_0 + \beta_{21}X_{21} + \beta_{31}X_{31} + \beta_{41}X_{41} + \beta_{52}\,X_{52} + \beta_{62}\,X_{62} + \beta_{71}X_{71} + E)$

(3.3) $Y_2 = f\,(\beta_0 + \beta_{12}X_{12} + \beta_{22}X_{22} + \beta_{52}\,X_{52} + \beta_{72}X_{72} + E)$

(3.4) $Y_3 = f\,(\beta_0 + \beta_{22}X_{22} + \beta_{52}\,X_{52} + \beta_{72}X_{72} + E)$

$\beta_0,\ \beta_{1k},\ \beta_{2k},\ \beta_{3k},\ \beta_{4k}, \ldots \beta_{ik}$ = Regression coefficients

E = Error component (how far away an individual's response is from the population regression line = $E = Y - (\beta_0 + \beta_i X_i)$)

Y' = Workers support for foreign aid (Y_1, Y_2, Y_3)

Y_1 = Moral Advantage or Benefits of Foreign Aid

Y_2 = Economic Cost or Disadvantage of Foreign Aid

Y_3 = Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid programs

X_{ik} = Unionized workers attitudes and beliefs (X_{1k}, X_{2k}, X_{3k}, X_{4k}, X_{5k}, $X_{5k}X_{6k}X_{7k}$)

X_{12} = Information Travel Belief Institutions

X_{21} = Trust of Media Information

X_{22} = Trust Institution Information

X_{31} = Altruism toward Foreign Aid

X_{41} = Government National Priorities

X_{52} = Interest: Concerns for Third World

X_{62} = Benefits: Global Interdependence

X_{71} = Primary Program: Foreign Aid Priorities

X_{72} = Secondary Program: Foreign Aid Priorities

Analysis of variance, correlation coefficient and multiple regression analysis were carried out to observe the significance of the models, their validity and to express the degree of relationship between variables. The statistical results from this analysis are provided in Chapter 4. Borg considers that the correlation coefficient has the advantage of allowing researchers to measure interrelationships simultaneously of a big number of variables (Borg, 1988). However, according to Bhattacharyya and Johnson, the correlation coefficient only helps to understand the relationship between two variables but it does not explain relationships of cause-and-effect (Bhattacharyya and Johnson, 1977).

Kleinbaum and Kupper say "the correlation coefficient (r) is an often-used statistic that not only provides a measure of how two random variables are associated in a sample but has properties that relate it closely to straight-line regression"

(Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978. p.71). They also explain that analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) "consists of several estimates of variance. These estimates, in turn, can be used to answer the principal inferential questions of regression analysis" (Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978, p. 83). Kleinbaum and Kupper also believe that "multiple regression analysis can be looked upon as an extension of straight-line regression analysis(involving only one variable) to the situation where there are any number of independent variables to be considered" (Kleinbaum and Kupper, 1978. p. 131).

The three Dependent Variables were tested to establish union workers' support for foreign aid programs. Independent variables were also tested to explain workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid.

3.8 Data Analysis

This study utilized two types of data: 1) secondary data from the WAGE project 1991-92 and 1995-96 based on the questionnaires; and 2) evaluative data from the training provided by WAGE project to pilot curriculum material. However, a deeper analysis of the data is provided in Chapter 4.

Table 3.1 Variables Included in Models

Variable	Label	Meaning
DEPENDENT: Workers' Support for Foreign Aid (Y')		
moraladv	Moral Advantage	Moral advantages or benefits of foreign aid
eccost	Economic Cost	Economic Disadvantages or cost of foreign aid
waste$	Waste dollars	Workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs
INDEPENDENT: Workers' Attitudes and Beliefs toward Foreign Aid Programs (Xs)		
travinfsb	Travel and information seeking beliefs	Workers travel and beliefs of seeking information from news media and formal institutions
trust	Trust of sources of information	Workers trust of information provided by the news media and formal Institutions
altruism	Altruism toward foreign aid	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward helping others and themselves
govtprio	Political view of government priorities	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government spending on national and international programs
concthw	Concern for third world countries	Workers knowledge about third world and foreign aid organizations; and U.S. workers' interest in third world countries
globinter	Global Interdependence	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward third world competition and workers benefits from third world
faprio	Foreign aid priorities	U.S. foreign aid spent on third world primary and secondary need programs

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Moral Advantage or Benefits of Foreign Aid (Y1)

a16	Self-sufficiency	Foreign aid is essential for other countries self-sufficiency
b16	Help hungry poor	We ought to help the hungry or poor in third world
d16	Aid makes stable	Helping other countries makes them more stable

Table 3.1 - (Cont'd)

Variable	Label	Meaning

Economic Disadvantages or Cost of Foreign Aid (Y2)

c16	Too mixed up in	U.S. is to mixed up with other countries affairs
e16	Help competition	Foreign aid helps countries that will compete with U.S.
f16	Solve own problems	We need to solve U.S. problems first before helping other countries
i16	To our benefit	We will benefit in the long run not now

Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs (Y3)

| g16 | Aid is misused | Aid is misused by foreign governments |
| h16 | U.S. bureaucracy Wastes | Large part of aid is wasted by U.S. bureaucracy |

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Travel and Information Seeking Beliefs (X1)

| INBMEDIA | Information travel belief news media | Workers travel and belief of seeking information from the news media |
| INBINSTI | Information travel belief institutions | Workers travel and belief of seeking information from formal institutions (unions and Universities) |

Trust of Sources of Information (X2)

| TRUSTMED | Trust of media information | Workers trust of information provided by the news media, such as TV news, magazines, newspapers |
| TRUSTINS | Trust Institutions Information | Workers trust of information provided by formal institutions such as unions and universities |

Table 3.1 - (Cont'd)

Variable	Label	Meaning
Altruism toward Foreign Aid (X₃)		
c20	Other have so little	Workers' feelings that others have so little when they have so much
d20	Aid is self interest	Helping third world countries is in workers self-interest because they will buy American products
e20	Aid cuts immigrants	Helping third world countries will cut down the number of immigrants to the U.S.
Political View of Government Priorities (X₄)		
NATIPRIO	National Priorities	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government spending on domestic or national programs
INTEPRIO	International Priorities	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government spending on international programs
Concerns for Third World Countries (X₅)		
KNOWLEDG	Not know enough	Workers knowledge of third world countries and foreign aid organizations
INTEREST	U.S. self-interest	U.S. workers interest in third world countries
Global Interdependence (X₆)		
COMPETIT	Third world competition	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward third world competition
BENEFITS	Third world benefits U.S. workers	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward benefits that third world countries provide to them
Foreign Aid Priorities (X₇)		
PRIMARYP	Primary needs program	U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries primary needs program (food, infant mortality, etc)
SECONDP	Secondary needs program	U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries secondary needs program (investment, debt relief)

Chapter 4

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the data analysis and major research findings obtained in this study. This chapter is divided in four major sections. The first section presents the statistical analysis and results from testing unionized workers support for foreign aid based on four psychological models. The second part of this chapter addresses the research hypothesis and its main components. Inferential statistics, analysis of variance, and regression results were used for data analysis based on SPSS and Excel statistical programs. The third section of this chapter presents a comparative analysis of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 survey data. The last section provides the main conclusions regarding the main hypothesis.

4.1 Test of Four Psychological Models

This dissertation tested four psychological models provided by Sara Zuckerbraun's paper "Fairness Motivations and Tradeoffs Underlying Public Support for Government Environmental Spending in Nine Nations." However, this

research is limited by the fact that her paper does not provide all the measures to test all the essential aspects of each of the theoretical models. Zuckerbraun said "We are limited by the existing measures in this unique crossnational public opinion database. Our situation is limited further by the fact that the four models we have presented are not mutually exclusive... In light of this, and considering the absence of measures to test all of the critical components of each of the models, we use the following logic to help us in determining the relative usefulness of each of the models in explaining public support for environmental policy" (Zuckerbraun, 1994. pp. 183-184).

It is important to observe that many engineering and mathematical studies have high multiple correlation of determination (R^2). Their variables are more easy to measure since the variability of the data is very small. Their squared correlation coefficients are close to 1. However, social studies tend to observe lower squared correlation coefficients since individual's factors are very relative and hard to measure. The highest multiple correlation coefficients of determination that are observed in some social science studies are 0.4 and 0.5 (Demopolo, 1997). Therefore, considering the sensitivity of issues dealing with workers attitudes and beliefs, this dissertation established acceptable multiple correlation coefficients that fall between 0.2 and 1. A multiple correlation coefficient of determination close to 0.5 will represent a strong relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and any independent variable.

4.1.1 Saliency Model

According to Iyengar and Kinder public support for environmental concerns rise or fall based on current salience of an issue (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Nisbett and Ross believe that many psychological studies show that public judgements are determined by salience and memorability of the topic. For instance, after the Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez disasters happened, support for the environment increased immediately (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181). The Saliency model is based on psychological evidence of public support for government spending. According to Zuckerbraun this model "predicts that public opinion is responsive to publicity surrounding dramatic environmental events" (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181). A main assumption of this model is that news media and news from formal organizations impact people judgements and create sympathies of public interest. However, Zuckerbraun's findings showed that the issue salience is not sufficient to explain support for the environment.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:

Ho: Travel information seeking belief does not influence

unionized workers support for foreign aid

The saliency model was tested in my research based on one independent variable, *Travel information seeking belief.* This variable has two factors: 1) information travel belief news media and 2) information travel belief institutions

(see page 52). Table 4.1 presents the main results of the multiple correlation coefficients and analysis of variance (ANOVA) done in this dissertation. A correlation coefficient of 0.137 at $\alpha=.05$ was established between unionized workers support for foreign aid and travel information seeking belief . Therefore, a weak positive correlation was established between those two variables. Information travel belief news media and Information travel belief institutions only explain 1.9 percent of the variation (coefficient of multiple determination 0.019) in unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that travel information seeking belief does not influence unionized workers support for foreign aid was not rejected at $\alpha=0.05$ since the significant value of F (p) = 0.155 > $\alpha=0.05$ (see table 4.1). Then, the alternative hypothesis was not accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the Saliency model is not sufficient to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs on the basis of these two variables.

Table 4.1 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with Travel Information Seeking Belief

	Y' (R)	R^2	$F_{2,197}$	Sig. F (p)
X_1	0.137*	0.019	0.1885	0.155

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X1: Travel Information Seeking Belief

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R^2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.1.2 Rational Self-Interest Model

The main assumption of this psychological model is based on the notion that people's support for government spending is directly related to individual's benefits. Zuckerbraun said "A second model of public opinion about the environment posits that rationality, the economists' term for the pursuit of one's own interests, is a determinant of environmental support" (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181).

Zuckerbraun's findings showed that the Rational Self-Interest model provided weaker evidence of rationality based on individual-level public opinion. However, aggregated data showed that individuals do not perceive the immediate and personal benefits they may enjoy from a better environment. She concludes that the Rational Self-Interest model is not sufficient to explain support for the environment.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:

Ho: Altruism toward Foreign Aid does not influence

unionized workers support for foreign aid

The Rational Self-Interest model was tested in my research based on one

independent variable, *Altruism toward Foreign Aid.* This variable has three factors: 1) Other have so little, 2) Self interest, and 3) aid cuts immigrants. Table 4.2 contents the main results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple regression coefficients done by the author. A significant (α=.05) correlation coefficient of 0.462 was established between unionized workers support for foreign aid and altruism toward foreign aid. Therefore, a moderate positive correlation was established between those two variables. Thus, an increase in one unit of altruism toward foreign aid (self-interest), it is expected that the support for foreign aid programs will increase about 0.439 (β_1=0.439); holding the other variables. Altruism toward foreign aid approximately explains 21.3 percent of the variation (coefficient of multiple determination 0.213) in unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that altruism toward foreign aid does not influence unionized workers support for foreign aid was rejected at α=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.000 < α=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the Rational Self-Interest model is sufficient to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs. I conclude that unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are concerned with issues of self-interest and self benefits by cutting immigration.

Table 4.2 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with Altruism toward Foreign Aid

	Y' (R)	R²	$F_{1,193}$	Sig. F(p)
X₃	0.462*	0.213	52.388	0.000

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X₃: Altruism toward Foreign Aid

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
    of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.1.3 Values Model

The main assumption of the Values model is that public support for social policy is influenced by individual values. A political culture shapes people values, which, in turn, impacts public support for social programs. According to Davidson and Thomson, people's values may vary from country to country. Their research shows that sets of values or common value structures have been found across countries (Davidson and Thomson, 1980). Zuckerbraun said that according to T.W. Smith, public opinion in countries with a socialist or social democratic government favors a full gamut of social spending, directed to a comprehensive welfare state and income equalization. In contrast, liberal/capitalist countries are more likely to

see the welfare state as a limited safety net, complain of high taxes, and favor equality of opportunity and education, as opposed to equality of income" (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 181-182).

Considering that this model deals with individual values to support social policy, this dissertation selected a variable of U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities to test the Value model. This variable has two factors: 1) Primary needs program and 2) Secondary needs Program (see page 52). The result of this test reflects the value factors that U.S. unionized workers have toward providing foreign assistance to third world countries to cover primary or secondary needs. It provides evidence of workers support toward social policy, especially foreign aid policy.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:

Ho: U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities in terms of workers' values do

not influence unionized workers support for foreign aid

Table 4.3 presents the main results from testing this null hypothesis. A $(\alpha=.05)$ correlation coefficient of 0.45 was established between unionized workers support for foreign aid and U.S. foreign aid priorities in terms of workers' values. Therefore, a moderate negative correlation was established between those two variables. The response of the main independent variable of U.S. foreign aid priorities in terms of each factor was in the same direction. For instance, an increase in one unit of U.S. foreign aid primary needs program, it is expected that

the support for foreign aid programs will decrease about -0.169 (β_1=-0.169); holding

the other variables. Also, an increase in one unit of U.S. foreign aid secondary

needs program, the support for foreign aid programs will decrease about -0.062

(β=-0.062); holding the other variables. U.S. foreign aid priorities approximately

explains 20.3 percent of the variation (coefficient of multiple determination 0.203)

in unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that

U.S. foreign aid priorities in terms of workers' values does not influence unionized

workers support for foreign aid was rejected at α=0.05 since Sig. F(p)=0.000

<α=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded

that the Values model is sufficient to explain unionized workers' support for foreign

aid programs. It can be established that worker's value factors play an important

role in supporting government foreign aid policy. Unionized workers in selected

states of U.S. are concern with social policy that provides foreign aid to third world

countries to satisfy primary and secondary needs such as infant mortality, family

planning, food surplus, training, and debt relief.

Table 4.3 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities

	Y' (R)	R^2	$F_{2,192}$	Sig. F
X7	0.45*	0.203	24.422	0.000

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X7: U.S. Foreign Aid Priorities

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.1.4 Fairness Model

According to Zuckerbraun this model has not been used in studies on public opinions toward environmental policy. According to Rasinki, the main assumption of the fairness model is that when people consider public policy, they are responsive to fairness factors (Rasinki, 1987). Zuckerbraun said that this model was used to establish the impact of distributive fairness factors by testing tradeoffs people are willing to make for or against government environmental spending (Zuckerbraun, 1994). Citizens' environmental tradeoffs were compared to other social programs spending. Zuckerbraun's results show that "The results indicate that support for increased spending of the environment is moderately associated with support for increased spending for other social causes, especially health and education. The exception is defense" (Zuckerbraun, 1994. p. 187).

Considering that the fairness model deals with the distributive function of government spending, this dissertation selected the U.S. government spending on domestic and abroad programs.

The null hypothesis in my research for this model was:

H_0:   Political View of Government Priorities does not

influence unionized workers support for foreign aid

The Fairness model was tested based on one independent variable, *Political View of Government Priorities*. This variable has two factors: 1) Government national priorities and 2) Government international priorities. Table 4.4 presents the main results from testing the null hypothesis by using multiple regression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA). This table shows that a ($\alpha=.05$) correlation coefficient of 0.21 was established between unionized workers support for foreign aid and political view of government priorities. Therefore, a moderate correlation was established between those two variables. The independent variable of political view of government priorities had different responses based on its two main factors: national and international priorities. For instance, an increase in one unit of U.S. government national priorities, it is expected that the support for foreign aid programs will increase about 0.0455 ($\beta_1=0.0455$); holding the other variables. Also, an increase in one unit of U.S. government international priorities, the support for foreign aid programs will decrease about -0.0893 ($\beta=-0.0893$). The general independent variable of political view of government priorities approximately explains 4.4 percent of the variation (coefficient of multiple determination 0.044) in unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs. The null hypothesis that the political view of government

priorities aid does not influence unionized workers support for foreign aid was rejected at $\alpha=0.05$ since Sig. F (p) = 0.01 < $\alpha=0.05$. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the Fairness model is a good model to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs. I conclude that unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are concerned with issues of government spending on domestic and international programs. About 16 percent (from a total of 4.4 %) of the variability of workers support for foreign aid is explained by government spending on international aid programs. However, this variable relates in a negative way to workers support for foreign aid policy.

Table 4.4 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with Political View of Government Priorities

	Y' (R)	R²	F₂,₁₉₅	Sig. F(p)
X₄	0.21*	0.044	4.469	0.01

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

X₄: Political View of Government Priorities

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
   of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.2 Test of Main Hypothesis

The main null hypothesis in my research was:

Ho: Unionized workers' support for foreign aid is not related to

workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

This main hypothesis was tested based on two statistical models. The first

model is called "General Model," and the second "Integrative Model." The three

main Dependent variables used in each model to measure unionized workers'

support for foreign aid are: 1) *Moral advantage of foreign aid*, 2) *Economic*

Disadvantage (cost), and 3) *Perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid*

programs. The general statistical model was created from which three general

regression equations were tested (see Chapter 3, regression equation 3.1) Each

of these three regression equations includes all the variables provided by the factor

analysis.   However, after testing them, three new regression equations were

created (see Chapter 3, regression equations 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4).   These new

equations represent the Integrative model.   This include only those specific

variables that showed significant relationship with each main Dependent Variable.

Therefore, this first analysis of the null hypothesis includes multiregression and

ANOVA results that refers to the first general statistical model which includes all the

variables of this study (see regression equation 3.1 in Chapter 3). For a specific

view of all the independent variables that are included in these regression

equations, see Chapter 3, Independent Variables, p. 52)

4.3 General Statistical Model

The General Statistical model explains the relationship between *unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs*. This model was tested based on three main Dependent variables: 1) *Moral advantage of foreign aid*, 2) *Economic Disadvantage (cost)*, and 3) *Perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs*. Each of these three dependent variables was tested based on 7 main Independent Variables. A total of 13 factors or subvariables obtained from the factor analysis were included in those 7 main independent variables to represent workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The test of each of the main Dependent Variables is as follow:

4.3.1 Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid

This is one of the main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid. The relationship of *Moral advantage of foreign aid* with the independent variables expresses one way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

The statistical analysis shows that there is strong relationship between *workers moral advantage of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs*. Table 4.5 shows that there is a significant correlation coefficient of 0.686 between moral advantage of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs.

Therefore, a strong correlation was established between those two variables at $\alpha=.05$. It was observed that there were independent variables that provided positive increments to workers' support for foreign aid programs, but there were others that related negatively. Those variables that created a positive increment in workers moral advantage of foreign aid are: information travel belief institutions, trust institutions information, altruism toward foreign aid programs, government national priorities, knowledge of third world, competition and benefits in global interdependence (see page 52). This means that if there is an increase in one unit of these independent variables, it is expected that the moral advantage or support for foreign aid programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other variables. The independent variables that decreased the moral advantage or support for foreign aid programs are: Information travel belief news media, trust of media information, government international priorities, interest concerns for third world, and secondary foreign aid priorities. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, the moral support for foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount .

Considering that we have a strong coefficient of multiple determination ($R^2=$ 0.471), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this general regression equation approximately explain 47.1 percent of the variation in unionized workers moral advantage or support for foreign aid. The null hypothesis that the unionized workers' support for foreign aid is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected based on workers moral

advantage of foreign aid. It was rejected at $\alpha=0.05$ since Sig. F (p) = 0.000 < $\alpha=0.05$. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the first General Model of Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are positive concerned with issues of government spending on domestic programs, U.S. benefits and competition, information and trust provided by formal institutions (unions, universities), altruism, and knowledge about third world countries. On the other hand, unionized workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U.S. are related in a negative way to issues, such as: trust and information provided by the general news media, government spending on international programs, interest about third world countries, and secondary foreign aid priorities (training, investment, and aid to small businesses). Therefore, the more government spending in these issues the less moral support unionized workers give to foreign aid.

Table 4.5 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with 7 main Independent Variables

	Y' (R)	R^2	$F_{13,166}$	Sig. F(p)
X$_s$ (13)	0.686*	0.471	11.357	0.000

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

Y' = F(Y1) = Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid

Xs (13): Includes 7 main independent variables (13 factors or subvariables (see p. 52)

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
    of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.3.2 Economic Disadvantage of Foreign Aid

This is the second of the main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid. The relationship of *Economic Disadvantage (cost) of foreign aid* with the independent variables express another way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

The statistical analysis shows that there is strong relationship between *workers economic disadvantage of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.* Table 4.6 shows that there is a significant correlation coefficient of 0.462 between economic disadvantages or cost of for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a strong correlation was established between those two variables at α=.05. It was observed that there were independent variables that provided positive increments to workers' support for foreign aid programs, but there were others that related negatively. Those variables that

created a positive increment in workers economic cost of foreign aid are: information travel belief news media and institutions, altruism toward foreign aid programs, political priorities of government national and international foreign aid programs, knowledge of the third world, U.S. interest in the third world countries, competition and benefits in global interdependence, and primary and secondary foreign aid priorities. This means that an increase in one unit of each of these independent variables, it is expected that the economic cost or disadvantage for foreign aid programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other variables. There were only two independent variables that decreased the economic cost of foreign aid programs: trust of news media and trust of institutions. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, the economic cost for foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount.

Considering that we have a moderate coefficient of multiple determination (R^2= 0.213), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this general regression equation approximately explain 21.3 percent of the variation in unionized workers' economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid. The null hypothesis that the unionized workers' support for foreign aid is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected base on workers economic disadvantage or cost of foreign aid. It was rejected at $\alpha=0.05$ since Sig. F (p) = 0.0001 < $\alpha=0.05$. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the first General Model of Economic Disadvantage or Cost of Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized

workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S., especially in terms of economic cost of foreign aid, are concerned with issues of government spending on domestic programs, U.S. benefits and competition, information from news median and formal institutions (unions, universities), altruism, government spending on national and international programs, foreign aid used in third world countries for primary and secondary needs programs; and knowledge and interest about third world countries. These factors actually increased the cost of foreign aid. On the other hand, unionized workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U.S. are related in a positive way to issues, such as: trust of news media and formal institutions. Workers have better attitudes and beliefs toward these two factors since they decrease the economic cost of foreign aid. Therefore, the most government spending on ways that people can trust more news media and formal institutions, such as universities and unions, the smaller is the economic cost of foreign aid.

Table 4.6 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with all Independent Variables

	Y'=f(Y2)	R²	F13,166	Sig. F(p)
Xs (13)	0.46*	0.21	3.457	0.0001

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

Y' = f (Y2) = Economic Cost or Disadvantage of Foreign

Xs (13): Includes 13 independent variables grouped in 7 main
             Independent variables (see p. 52)

⋆ : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R^2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.3.3 Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs

This is the last of the main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid. The relationship of the *Perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs* with the 7 main independent variables express a third way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

The statistical analysis shows that there is a small relationship between *workers perceptions of waste of U.S. dollars of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.* Table 4.7 shows that there is a small correlation coefficient of 0.324 between unionized workers perceptions of waste of U.S. dollars for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a weak correlation was established between those two variables at α=.05. Nevertheless, it was observed that there were independent variables that provided increments to workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs, but there were

others that reduced that perception. Those variables that created a increment in workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid are: information travel belief news media, trust of news media, altruism toward foreign aid programs, government national priorities, knowledge and interest of third world countries, competition and benefits in global interdependence; and foreign aid spent on secondary programs. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, it is expected that workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other variables. The independent variables that decreased workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars are: Information travel belief institutions, trust institution information, government international priorities, and primary foreign aid priorities. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, the perception of waste of U.S. dollar in foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount.

Considering that we have a weak coefficient of multiple determination (R^2= 0.105), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this general regression equation approximately explain 10.5 percent of the variation in unionized workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid. The null hypothesis that the unionized workers' support for foreign aid is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was not rejected based on workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid. It was not rejected at α=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.126 > α=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis was rejected. Therefore, it is concluded that the first General Model of Workers

Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs is not sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are not concerned with issues of waste of government spending on foreign aid programs.

Table 4.7 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with all Independent Variables

	Y'=f(Y₂)	R²	F₁₃,₁₆₅	Sig. F(p)
Xs (13)	0.324*	0.105	1.491	0.126

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

Xs (13): Includes 7 main independent variables (13 factors or subvariables) (see p. 52)

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.4 Integrative Statistical Model

The Integrative model was created based on three main Dependent variables: 1) *Moral advantage of foreign aid*, 2) *Economic Disadvantage (cost)*, and 3) *Perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs*. Three specific

regression equations were tested (see Chapter 3, regression equations 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4). Each of these three new regression equations represents the Integrative model. These equations include only those specific variables that showed significant relationship with each main Dependent Variable. The results of this Integrative model are as follows:

4.4.1 Moral Advantage or Benefit of Foreign Aid

Moral advantage or benefit of foreign aid is one of the main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid. The relationship of Moral advantage of foreign aid with the independent variables express one way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

It was observed that only 6 independent variables were significant to explain unionized workers moral advantage or benefit of foreign aid rather than 7. These six independent variables used a total of six factors or subvariables rather than 13 factors used by the General model. These variables were: 1) Foreign aid primary program (PRIMARYP), 2) Trust of media information (TRUSTMED), 3) Government national priorities (NATIPRIO), 4) Altruism toward foreign aid (ALTRUISM), 5) Interest for third world (INTEREST); and 6) Benefits in global interdependence (BENEFITS).

The main null hypothesis that the unionized workers' support for foreign aid is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was

rejected based on workers moral advantage of foreign aid. It was rejected at $\alpha=0.05$

since Sig. F (p) = 0.000 < $\alpha=0.05$. Then the alternative hypothesis that there is a

strong relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and

beliefs was accepted.

Table 4.8 presents the results of the statistical analysis . This shows that

there is strong relationship between *workers moral advantage of foreign aid and*

their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. A significant correlation

coefficient of 0.6748 was established between moral support for foreign aid and

their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a strong correlation was established between

those two variables at $\alpha=.05$. It was observed that there were three independent

variables that provided positive increments to workers' support for foreign aid

programs, but there were others that related negatively. Those variables that

created a positive increment in workers moral advantage of foreign aid are: altruism

toward foreign aid programs, government national priorities; and benefits in global

interdependence. This means that an increase in one unit of these independent

variables, it is expected that the moral advantage or support for foreign aid

programs will increase about certain amount; holding the other variables (see

Appendix E for specific values of βs). The independent variables that decreased the

moral advantage or support for foreign aid programs are: trust of media information,

interest concerns for third world; and secondary foreign aid priorities. This means

that an increase in one unit of these independent variables, the moral support for

foreign aid programs will decrease a certain amount.

Considering that we have a strong coefficient of multiple determination (R^2= 0.4554), I can conclude that the six independent variables included in this integrative regression equation approximately explain 45.5 percent of the variation in unionized workers' moral advantage or support for foreign aid. Therefore, it is concluded that the first Integrative Model of Moral Advantage or Benefit of Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are positive as related to issues of government spending on domestic programs, benefits that U.S. workers get in global interdependence; and altruism toward foreign aid. Therefore, the most foreign aid is spent on these programs, the most support unionized workers give to U.S. foreign aid . On the other hand, unionized workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U.S. are related in a negative way to issues, such as: level of trust of information provided by the general news media, interest about third world countries; and foreign aid spend on secondary priorities, such as training in third world countries, foreign investment; and foreign aid provided to small businesses in third world countries. Therefore, the more government spending in these issues the less moral support unionized workers give to U.S. foreign aid.

Table 4.8 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with Six Independent Variables

	Y'=f(Y₁)	R²	F₆,₁₇₄	Sig. F(p)
Xs (6)	0.6748*	0.4554	24.252	0.000

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

Y' = F(Y₁) = Moral Advantage of Foreign Aid

Xs (6): Includes 6 independent variables (6 factors or subvariables) (see p. 52)

* : Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.4.2 Economic Disadvantage or Cost of Foreign Aid

This is the second of the main Dependent Variables of the Integrative model used to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid. The relationship of *Economic Disadvantage or Cost of foreign aid* with the independent variables express another way of establishing the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

In this regression equation only 4 independent variables were significant to explain unionized workers economic disadvantage of foreign aid rather than 7. This regression equation uses four independent variables which are integrated by

4 factors or subvariables rather than 13 factors used in the General model. These variables were: 1) Foreign aid secondary program (SECONDP), 2) Information Travel Belief Institutions (INBINSTI), (2) Trust of Institutions information (TRUSTINS), and 4) Interest for third world (INTEREST).

Based on statistical analysis, there is moderate relationship between *workers economic disadvantage or cost of foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.* Table 4.9 shows that there is a significant correlation coefficient of 0.4217 between economic disadvantages or cost of for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a strong correlation was established between those two variables at $\alpha=.05$. It was observed that only the variable of workers trust' of information provided by formal institutions had an inverse impact on foreign aid cost or disadvantage. But, there were thee variables that related positively. This means that an increase in one unit of trust of information provided by formal institutions such as universities and unions, it is expected that the economic cost or disadvantage for foreign aid programs will decrease about -0.059689 ($\beta_i = -0.059589$); holding the other variables. There were three independent variables that increase the economic cost of foreign aid programs: foreign aid spend on secondary programs(training, investment, foreign aid to small businesses in third world countries),interest concerned to third world countries, and information travel belief institutions, such as information provided by unions and universities. This means that an increase in one unit of each of these independent variables, the economic cost for foreign aid programs will increase by 0.4568, 0.1797, and 0.1539

respectively (see Appendix E for multiregression analysis and β_s values).

Considering that we have a moderate coefficient of multiple determination ($R^2 = 0.1778$), I can conclude that all the independent variables included in this Integrative regression equation approximately explain 17.78 percent of the variation in unionized workers' economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid. However, this percentage is smaller to the initial minimum value of 0.2 proposed by this dissertation. This may be explained by the existence of other variabilities in the data that are not explained by this regression analysis. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that the unionized workers' support for foreign aid is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected base on workers economic disadvantage or cost of foreign aid. It was rejected at $\alpha=0.05$ since Sig. F (p) = 0.0000 < $\alpha=0.05$. Then the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, it is concluded that the Integrative Model of Economic Disadvantage or Cost of Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S., especially in terms of economic cost of foreign aid, are concerned with issues of government spending on foreign aid secondary programs, information provided by formal institutions (unions, universities); and interest about third world countries. These factors actually increased the cost of foreign aid or create an economic disadvantage toward foreign aid. This means that unionized workers'

support for foreign aid programs is going to be affected by the increase of this economic cost since U.S. will be more mixed up with other countries affairs, will help more others that will compete more with U.S. workers, and U.S. will not benefit now but in the long run. Therefore, to increase workers support for foreign aid programs may imply to reduce the economic cost or disadvantages of foreign aid programs. On the other hand, unionized workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U.S. are related in a different way to the issue of workers trust of information provided by formal institutions, such as unions and universities. Workers have better attitudes and beliefs toward this factor since it decreases the economic cost of foreign aid. Therefore, the most government spending on programs that relate to people trust of formal institutions, such as universities and unions, the smaller is the economic cost of foreign aid. Workers' support for foreign aid programs will increase if their trust in information increases.

Table 4.9 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with Four Independent Variables

	Y'=f(Y2)	R^2	$F_{4,183}$	Sig. F(p)
Xs (4)	0.4217*	0.1778	9.8965	0.0000

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

Y' = f (Y2) = Economic Cost or Disadvantage of Foreign

Xs (4): Includes 4 independent variables (4 factors or subvariables) (see p. 52).

$_\star$: R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R^2 = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient
  of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.4.3 Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid

Perception of waste of U.S. dollar in foreign aid programs is the last of the

three main Dependent Variables used to explain unionized workers' support for

foreign aid. The relationship of this main Dependent Variable with the independent

variables express one way of establishing the relationship *between unionized*

workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid

programs.

It was observed that only 3 independent variables were significant to explain

unionized workers moral advantage or benefit of foreign aid rather than 7. The

regression equation used only used 3 independent variables which were integrated

by 3 factors or subvariables rather than 13 factors used by the General model.

These variables were: 1) Foreign aid secondary program (SECONDP), 2) Trust of

institutions information (TRUSTINS); and 3) Interest for third world countries

(INTEREST).

The main null hypothesis that the unionized workers' support for foreign aid

is not related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was

rejected base on workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid

programs. It was rejected at α=0.05 since Sig. F (p) = 0.0053 < α=0.05. Then the alternative hypothesis that there is a strong relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs was accepted.

The statistical analysis (table 4.10) shows that there is a moderate relationship between workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. A correlation coefficient of 0.2589 was established between perception of waste of U.S. dollars and their attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, a moderate correlation was established between those two variables at α=0.05. It was observed that there were two independent variables that provided increments to workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs, but there was one variable that decreased it. Those variables that created an increment in workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars are: interest in third world countries, and government secondary priorities. This means that an increase in one unit of workers interest in third world countries or in government spending on secondary programs (investment in third world countries, help to small businesses in third world countries and training to foreigners), it is expected that the perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs will increase about 0.10568 and 0.07107, respectively; holding the other variables (see Appendix E for multiple regression and βs values). Workers' trust in information provided by formal institutions (universities and unions) was the only variable that decreased the perception of waste of U.S. dollars. This means that an increase in one unit of workers trust in formal institutions, the perception of waste of U.S.

dollars will decrease by -0.053717.

A small coefficient of multiple determination (R^2= 0.06703) indicate that the three independent variables included in this integrative regression equation approximately explains 6.7 percent of the variation in unionized workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid. Therefore, it is concluded that the Integrative Model of Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid is sufficient to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. However this value is smaller that the 0.2 value established by this study, the null hypothesis was rejected based on analysis of variance (ANOVA). It is important to remember that the General Model with 7 main variables (13 factors or subvariables) was not good to explain the relationship between workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

I conclude that attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. in terms of waste and misused of U.S. dollars in foreign aid are in small amount concerned with issues of government spending on foreign aid secondary programs, interest for third world countries; and trust in information provided by formal institutions. Therefore, to increase workers' support for foreign aid programs may imply to reduce the perception of misused or waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs. On the other hand, unionized workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in selected states of U.S. is related in a different way to the issue of workers trust of information provided by formal institutions, such as unions and

universities. Workers have better attitudes and beliefs toward this factor since it

decreases their perception of government waste of money in foreign aid.

Therefore, the most government spending on programs that relate to people trust

of formal institutions, such as universities and unions, the smaller is the perception

of waste of foreign aid. Workers' support for foreign aid programs will increase if

their trust in institutions information increases.

Table 4.10 Correlation between Unionized Workers Support for Foreign aid with Three Independent Variables

	Y'=f(Y3)	R²	F3,183	Sig. F(p)
Xs (3)	0.2589*	0.067	4.3827	0.0053

Y' : Unionized Workers Support for Foreign Aid

Y' = F(Y3) = Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid

Xs (3): Includes 3 independent variables (3 factors or subvariables) (see p. 52)

* : R value. Significant at the p=0.05 level.

R² = Squared Correlation Coefficient or Multiple Coefficient of Determination

p = represents the smallest level of α at which the results are significant

4.5 Comparative Analysis of 1991-92 and 1995-96 Survey Data

The results presented here suggest that in the 1995-96 WAGE survey about

38 percent of the workers (from the total of 214) were female and 62 percent were males. About 79 percent Caucasian, 8 percent Afro-American, 6 percent Hispanic and 2 percent Native American (see Figure 4.1). On the other hand, the 1991-92 survey indicated that 23 percent were females and 77 males (from a total of 355). Both groups agree somewhat to support foreign aid programs. About 86 percent were Caucasian, 6 percent Afro-American, 3 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent Native American. The average age of workers surveyed in 1995-96 was 41.8 years old (range 23-69) and 41.5 years old in 1991-92 (range 23-69). It was observed that younger union workers tend to give support to foreign aid but in less proportion than older workers (range 23-69). This may be explained by the fact that older workers are more familiar with foreign aid programs than younger workers.

Study results show that more educated workers (graduate level study and bachelors degree) support foreign aid programs in less proportion than workers who have less educational experience (high school or less) (see Figure 4.2). This may be explained by the fact that more educated workers know about the level of success or failure of U.S. foreign aid programs and how business relocation impact them. Also, they tend to travel more outside of the U.S. for pleasure reasons. On the other hand, workers with low level of educational experience may not know enough about foreign aid programs and foreign aid organizations. Therefore, researchers and policy makers may consider these issues to maintain and improve future support for foreign aid policy. Foreign aid policy may change by involving more younger workers and by providing more non-formal labor education classes.

This is a target population that in the future may provide higher support for foreign aid programs if the right tools are available to them.

This dissertation also used results from studies of public opinion about foreign aid done by Belden and Russonello in 1994 to observe changes in workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. They found that there was a small decline in support of foreign aid from the American public from 54 percent in 1986 to 47 percent in 1994. They indicated that U.S. people support foreign assistance essentially for disaster relief and feeding the hungry and poor. Also, other programs got their support, such as protects the environment, helps prevent the spread of AIDS, deals with drug trafficking, and provides family planning and birth control. Some of their findings are similar to those of this dissertation. However, they only provide information expressed in percentages rather than testing hypotheses. For instance, Americans recognize that there are mainly needs in the U.S. that need to be covered first, such as unemployment, crime, and poverty in the U.S. (see Figure 4.3).

Belden and Russonello said "As we near the end of this century, Americans see the interests of the countries of the world as connected, particularly in the areas of economics, population, and environment" (Belden and Russonello, 1994. p. 14). This dissertation results show that in 1995-96, about 45 percent of union workers (from a total of 214) agree somewhat that developing countries affect U.S. economy, about 32 percent were great deal agree, and only 21 percent were not very much agree (see Figure 4.4). Also, there is a continued perception of the

ineffectiveness of foreign aid programs.

Americans believe that U.S. government and foreign governments are responsible of foreign aid programs failure. Belden and Russonello pointed out that Americans believe that religious organizations are more effective than U.S. government, the United Nations and private organizations to delivery foreign aid. However, the United Nations is considered as more efficient among all the organizations since it is able to reach the largest quantity of people at the lowest cost (Belden and Russonello, 1984. p. 12). Therefore, it is important to understand these similar patterns of Americans and union workers' attitudes toward foreign aid programs since they may have short and long-term future policy implications, especially in deciding who will delivery effectively and efficiently future foreign aid programs

4.6 Conclusions

Based upon the statistical analysis as presented above, I can conclude that the Saliency psychological model is not sufficient to explain the relationship between *workers' support for foreign aid and workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid*. However, the Self-Interest, Value, and Fairness models were sufficient to explain the relationship between those two major variables.

This dissertation also provided two new models to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The General model and the Integrative model. A

multiple regression analysis and an analysis of variance were done to test the validity and reliability of each model. The statistical results show that the General model was satisfactory to explain only two of the three regression equations, *Moral advantage and Economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid*. But, it was not sufficient to explain the relationship of *Workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs*. On the other hand, the Integrative model only used significant variables (only those with high significant value) to explain the relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. This model was sufficient to explain the three main Dependent variables that constitute that relationship. Therefore, *the Moral advantage, the Economic cost or disadvantage; and the Perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs* provided good regression equations to test the main null hypothesis. The Integrative model results show that this model is sufficient statistical model to be used to explain workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and their support for foreign aid programs.

FOREIGN AID SURVEY 1996

Population by Race

Native Amer.
1.9%

Afro-Amer.
8.4%

Hispanic
6.1%

Missing
4.2%

Caucasian
79.4%

FIGURE 4.1 POPULATION BY RACE

FOREIGN AID SURVEY 1996

Population by Level of Education

GRADUATE LEVEL STUDY
2.3%

BACHELORS DEGREE
7.5%

LESS THAN 4 YEARS
7.9%

ASSOCIATES DEGREE
9.3%

2 YRS. OR LESS UNIV.
34.1%

Missing
1.4%

H.S. OR LESS
37.4%

FIGURE 4.2 POPULATION BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

FOREIGN AID SURVEY 1996

Government Priority

FIGURE 4.3 GOVERNMENT PRIORITY

N=214

FOREIGN AID SURVEY

Developing Countries Affect U.S. Economy

OTHERS AFFECT US

FIGURE 4.4 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AFFECT U.S. ECONOMY

N=214

Chapter 5

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

The literature review provided a variety of opinions about U.S. foreign aid policy. This chapter only refers to those main points that relate to future implications for U.S. foreign aid policy. This chapter is divided in four sections. The first section refers to the U.S. foreign aid policy from the point of view of this dissertation. The second part refers to the short-run foreign aid policy implications based on the results of this study. The third section gives a general view of the main long-run foreign aid implications. The last part of this chapter provides the main conclusions and recommendations.

5.1 U.S. Foreign Aid Policy

U.S. foreign aid history shows that government spending on foreign aid programs is based on a public goods concept. This is the kind of good that people enjoy and everybody has to pay for it. An important characteristic of a public good is that this may not exist if its provision was not left to the government (Smith, 1986). Considering U.S. foreign aid as a public good, it is observed that it started

as a paternalistic way to help other countries. It also was used as an important instrument of foreign policy to gain markets, political power and security. Then, foreign aid became a more sophisticated policy tool. It is now used as an instrument to balance economies, to redistribute wealth, and to correct market failures. These are the three main assumptions of foreign aid policy as a public good.

This dissertation considers, different from other writers such as Mosley, that the distributive assumption of government foreign aid is based on the principle that government and multilateral agencies are the main formal institutions that can carry out the redistribution of wealth between rich and poor countries, but they are not the only ones. A foreign aid policy may be combined with international trade to avoid a paternalistic view that income from rich to poor countries must be transferred automatically to improve their life condition. World Bank data show that the biggest amount of foreign aid is transferred mainly by government and multilateral agencies. For instance, voluntary agencies only transferred 2.9 percent of the average total flow of resources to developing countries during the period of 1970-85 (World Bank, 1985). Therefore, more participation of private organizations is needed to improve U.S. foreign aid policy, especially in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the programs.

Another important assumption of foreign aid as a public good is that in most developing countries market imperfections exist for loan finance and capital investment. In most of these countries, the whole financial market system tends to

benefit those who are in power and rich. Also, government officials in developing countries may help to sustain the system of privileges and favors. Therefore, the participation of international governments and organizations is important in making financial resources available to the poor. This allocative assumption of foreign aid is an important element to support a public foreign aid policy since private markets fail to fulfill this function. This study considers that multiple market failures in international investment is observed when private organizations fail to make significant development investment in poor countries. Investors believe that there is high risk in these economies. Foreign investment in developing countries is not attracted to them since these countries experience low capital yields, low levels of education, low productivity, lack of infrastructure, small domestic markets, lack of skilled manpower, poor information, poor credit markets, low capability to pay, and their national incomes mainly derive from agriculture and animal husbandry. Therefore, international investors see a more attractive opportunity cost for investing in developed countries rather than poor countries. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa only 16 percent of the total capital flows were from non-official sources in 1983 (World Bank, 1983).

For all these market imperfections, government foreign aid policy is needed to ensure better allocation of individual and private sector investments. Foreign assistance in this context takes the form of indirect investment.

A third assumption of foreign aid as a public good is based on Mosley's foreign aid government stabilization function. This function is based on the

assumption that foreign aid flows can increase world aggregate demand and remove unemployment, especially in developed countries. This foreign aid function is supported by Keynes theory of increasing government spending during times of economic depression. Markets fail in many cases to reduce unemployment in depression. For instance, Britain suffered a trend of increasing unemployment since 1945 as a result of market imperfections (Mosley, 1987). The author of this dissertation considers that aggregate demand policy may be implemented to decrease unemployment.

Government foreign aid policy may be directed to expand aggregate demand which can be implemented to stimulate output production. Capital is transferred as a result of foreign aid programs which can expand aggregate demand by increasing export demand which depends on world output. Total output can be expanded by increasing foreign aid. Developing countries will have more capital flow to increase export demand and to decrease their instabilities. Instability reduction may stimulate growth in private foreign capital investment in these countries. Therefore, government spending in the form of foreign aid may stabilize capital availability in poor countries by reducing the effects of capital fluctuations and removing panic and euphoria in international capital markets. World depressions and recessions can be even more aggravated by reducing foreign aid. For instance, long-tem export credits to sub-Saharan Africa dropped from $1.25 billion to $250 million between 1980 and 1983 (World Bank, 1985). This action impacted the 1980s recession even harder in this particular area. However, it is important to establish

that in many cases this capital transfers to developing countries only benefits those that already have capital and control over the economy.

The increase of export demand in many cases is used to buy products that are used by a small rich elite. Therefore, the poor may no have access to this flow of capital, even though the world output may increase in terms of aggregate demand. The U.S. foreign aid policy needs to be more flexible to make international capital available to the poor by making the use of capital more flexible.

5.2 Short-Run Foreign Aid Policy Implications

The empirical results presented in this dissertation are not sufficient to establish important short-run foreign aid policy implications. The inferential statistics suggest that workers' support for foreign aid is related to workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. International organizations started to consider some programs related to workers' attitudes and beliefs. For instance, the Agency for International Development (USAID) already started to be concerned about this target population. A good example is the Worker Adjustment to the Global Economy Project which was financed by USAID and its main objective was to develop a curriculum material to teach unionized workers about economic issues, including foreign aid. Nevertheless, researchers and policy makers need to ensure that foreign aid information is communicated in a way that workers understand, believe, and associate with it. Also, foreign aid policy information may be

disseminated to other level of learning, such as non formal education and high school, and general public.   Workers are concerned about foreign aid programs and may are able to support or oppose to future U.S. foreign aid or trade policy. Considering that the sample of unionized workers used by this study is not too large, it is expected that in the short run they may not impact tremendously U.S. foreign aid policy. It is observed that large policy changes may come from general U.S. strategic, security and political interest around de world rather than from unionized workers. However, this is not to deny that workers constantly lobby at Congress when programs threat their jobs and standard of living.

Workers use their own union news media to communicate to other workers those issues related to foreign aid. For instance, Thomas R. Donahue, the AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer states "As investment capital has become more mobile and transportation and communications infrastructure have improved, it is now easier than it was even a few years ago for industrial production to shift to those parts of the world where the workforce is poorly and easily exploited" (AFL-CIO, 1995)[5].

AFL-CIO supports foreign aid as policy tool for the objective of protecting labor unions and workers' rights. WAGE project said "AFL-CIO stresses the need for aid to be delivered through support of private voluntary agencies in place of government-to-government assistance" (WAGE, 1996. p.7).

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[5] This quote is part of the Donahue's speech given for commemorating the 75th anniversary of the International Labor Organization in 1994. It is also found on the cover page of the AFL-CIO document "Multinational Corporations, Expanding Influence in the 1990s, 1995.

Policy makers should utilized the high trust that unionized workers have in their own labor institutions and universities to gain higher support for foreign aid programs. A comparative analysis of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 WAGE project survey data shows that about 93 percent of the union workers read union materials a few times a week or every time they are received in 1996 compared to 92 percent in 1992 (see Figure 5.1 and Appendix C). Also, about 42 percent of union workers attend two to four university-based labor education classes in 1996 compared to 44 percent in 1992. Therefore, their main sources of information are the materials provided by their unions and universities. Also, this comparative analysis shows that there is a similar pattern on workers' trust of information. For instance, workers' trust on university-based labor education received the highest means, 7.2 in 1996 and 7.1 in 1992. This was follow by the AFL-CIO with means of 6.7 in 1996 and 6.6 in 1992. About 43.1 percent of workers said they trust universities and unions information compared to 26.2 percent of workers that trust national TV news and print media in 1996 (see Figure 5.2). Therefore, policy makers may include more foreign aid issues in university-based labor education classes.

Unionized workers are also concerned with government political priorities of foreign aid programs. This study results show that workers are able to support foreign aid programs if priority is given first to domestic problems, such as public education, controlling crime, unemployment, trade deficit, and helping U.S. poor. Policy makers need to give attention to these attitudes and beliefs for future U.S. foreign aid policy. They may ignore some of these issues since in the short-run

they may not have high future foreign aid implications. But, in the long-run they will be in elections agenda.

The statistical analysis shows that unionized workers are concerned with benefits that foreign aid provide to them. In the short-run they may pressure policy makers to deal with issues of jobs, trade, and plant reallocation. For instance, the U.S. administration was forced to tie one hundred percent of the foreign aid to trade. Unionized workers through their National Labor Committee pressured the General Accounting Office (GAO) to audit USAID and other government agencies to verify if they were providing foreign aid to U.S. private businesses in Central America to relocate their plants and lay off U.S. workers in 1992 (CBS-TV and ABC-TV, 1992). Then, Congress amended the Foreign Aid bill to include Section 599 which relates to avoid expenditures of foreign aid on enterprises to relocate outside of the U.S. and projects and activities that violate workers' rights (United States Congress, 1992, p. 106).

The comparative analysis of 1995-96 and 1991-92 surveys shows that the pattern of means for these two surveys were almost the same for both years. Unionized workers from 14 states are able to support foreign aid programs if funds are used to education and family planning/birth control (Means 8 and 7.8 respectively), provide countries with surplus food (Means 7 and 6.9, respectively), and help countries lower infant death rates (Means 7 and 6.8, respectively) (see Figure 5.3). They do not support foreign aid to encourage U.S. investment in other countries, provide debt relief, and provide foreigners with university training in U.S.

Workers may impact short-run private and public policy. They use strikes and collective bargaining to pressure private businesses and government institutions to give attention to some of the issues they mentioned in this study. Local businesses and multinational corporations policy implementation are pressured by national and international union organizations. For instance, a quote from AFL-CIO said " From November 1990 to April 1992, the United Steel-workers of America (USWA), with the support of the AFL-CIO and its Industrial Union Department (IUD), conducted a comprehensive and successful campaign against the Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation (RAC) on behalf of the 1,700 members of USWA Local 5668 in Ravenswood, W. Va. Throughout the campaign, critical assistance was provided by a variety of international labor allies" (AFL-CIO, 1995. p. 18) For instance, they believe that foreign aid is a waste of U.S. dollars when it is used to provide training to workers or to support businesses in third world countries since they will compete with them. Therefore, policy makers must be aware of these issues to increase workers support for foreign aid policy.

5.3 Long-Run Foreign Aid Policy Implications

The findings presented here are not sufficient to suggest that workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid may impact long-run foreign aid and trade policy. It is impossible to measure the amount of the impact since workers' attitudes and beliefs are very complex issues that may change over time. But, researchers and policy makers need to ensure that unionized workers concerns are taken into

consideration for future foreign aid policy support.

A comparative analysis of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 WAGE survey data (see Appendix C) indicates that about 61 percent of union workers (214 workers) were opposed to the U.S. giving economic assistance to other countries in 1996 and about 61.6 percent (355) opposed in 1992 (see Figure 5.4). However, when workers were asked whether they were in favor or opposed to U.S. giving economic aid for development projects such as health care, education, and agriculture to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, about 59.3 percent were in favor in 1996 and about 62 percent were in favor in 1992. Also, union workers were asked in 1996 if it was a good or bad policy to give U.S. foreign aid to buy U.S. products, 88 percent of workers said that it was a good policy and 9.3 percent indicated that it was bad policy (see Figure 5.5). It is important that policy makers focus foreign aid programs to these development projects and international trade since they will have better support from union workers for future policy implementation. However, it is necessary to have a more flexible foreign aid policy to be able to reach those that are really in need. This may have long-run foreign aid policy implications since approaches currently utilized by policy makers and foreign aid agencies are too rigid.

The results of this study show that about 17.8 percent of the respondents (from a total of 214 workers) do not know enough about third world countries and about 15.4 percent of workers said they do not know about foreign aid organizations, and 22.8 percent think their help is useless (see Figure 5.6). This

suggests that unionized workers need to have more information available about foreign aid programs and organizations. Policy makers can promote domestic programs to make this information available to union workers. This may increase future support for foreign aid policy in the long-run.

5.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

This research shows that workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs observed a similar pattern. Changes in union workers' attitudes and beliefs were observed, as a result of training provided by WAGE project to test curriculum material. Therefore more educational programs about foreign aid policy and global economy need to be promoted. Considering that the statistical analysis done by this dissertation shows that there is a relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes ad beliefs toward foreign aid programs, labor educators, union organizations and international foreign agencies have to understand this relationship and to invest their resources in this kind of programs. It is important to understand the results of this research if it is expected to establish a national education program for unionized workers. Therefore, the results presented here are important for researchers who want to understand the whole complexity of labor, global and foreign aid issues.

Policy makers must try to understand American beliefs and reactions to U.S. foreign aid programs. This dissertation provides important tools to improve union workers support for foreign aid. But, short and long-term policy implementation

must consider workers positive and negative views of foreign aid issues. A more flexible foreign aid policy may help domestic and international financial agencies to understand and to invest in U.S. labor education programs. However, it is important to remember that foreign aid policy must be developed and implemented in combination with U.S. domestic programs.

FOREIGN AID SURVEY 1996

Read Mailings and Publications from Unions

Missing
2.3%

NEVER
.9%

LESS OFTEN THAN THAT
3.7%

FEW TIMES A WEEK
4.2%

EVERY TIME I RECEIVE
88.8%

FIGURE 5.1 READ MAILING AND PUBLICATIONS FROM UNIONS

FOREIGN AID SURVEY 1996

Credibility of Info Sources

RELY CONG
9.7%

GRP LIKE CARE
10.8%

NATL TV NEWS
13.1%

CLINTON ADMIN
11.2%

UNIVLED
14.7%

AFLCIO
13.7%

INTL NATL UNION
13.7%

NATL PRINT MEDIA
13.1%

FIGURE 5.2 CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION SOURCES

FOREIGN AID SURVEY

Priority of Foreign Aid Programs

FIGURE 5.3 PRIORITY OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS

N=214

FOREIGN AID SURVEY 1996

U.S. Economic Assistance Policy

FIGURE 5.4 U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE POLICY

N=214

FOREIGN AID SURVEY

U.S. Foreign Aid Policy to Buy American Products

Missing
2.8%

Good Policy
87.9%

Bad Policy
9.3%

FIGURE 5.5 U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY TO BUY AMERICAN PRODUCTS

N=214

FOREIGN AID SURVEY

Respondents AID Attitudes

HELP U.S. FIRST
10.8%

MY HELP USELESS
22.8%

NOT INTERESTED
23.0%

NOT KNOW ENOUGH
17.8%

AID NOT REACH PEOPLE
10.3%

NOT KNOW ORGS
15.4%

FIGURE 5.6 RESPONDENTS AID ATTITUDES

N=214

Chapter 6

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The first five chapters of this dissertation have dealt with the introduction and problem statement, literature review, research methods, the analysis of the data and research results, and future implications for U.S. foreign aid policy. This final chapter provides a summary of the study, assess the major conclusions derived from this research effort, study limitations, and makes recommendations concerning further research.

6.1 Summary

The main objective of this research was to investigate the extend to which there was a relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid in selected states of U.S. and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. To this end, two surveys from the WAGE project, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University, were used as a source of secondary data. However, the 1995-96 survey data represents the main focus of this dissertation. The 1991-92 survey data were used essentially for comparison purposes. The

data were carefully organized and coded in this study. This author was part of the research team of these projects, working as a Graduate Assistant for a period of four years. Therefore, I have considerable understanding of the complex process of dealing with workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid.

This dissertation was divided into different parts. First, there was a literature review of the most important theories and frameworks related to attitudes and beliefs and government spending, including past and present studies of public opinions toward foreign aid. Second, the survey data were coded to be used in SPSS and Excel statistical computer programs. Multiple regression analysis and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were carried out based on these computer programs.

This research required two kinds of information for the analysis. Workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid required information concerning psychology and political science. Workers' support for foreign aid demanded information about economics and U.S. domestic and foreign policy .

Different approaches have been used to explain public opinion toward government spending. These are discussed in the referenced literature as the *welfare approach, saliency model, self-interest approach, value model, fairness model, and other political psychology approaches, such as the Enthclass model.* It is also recognized in the literature, that few general descriptions of unionized workers were available. Therefore, it is not surprising that a specific model of the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs does not exist. Thus, the first part of the

main objective of this dissertation was to test four psychological models of public support for public policy: *the saliency model, self-interest model, values model, and fairness model.* These models were used by Sara Zuckerbraun to test government spending on the environment (Zuckerbraun, 1994). These models were used in this dissertation to observe the capability of each model to explain unionized workers' support for foreign aid based on their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. *The issue saliency model* was the only one that was ruled out as sufficient to explain worker's support for foreign aid. However, each of these four models explains only part of the relationship between workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and their support for these programs. These models analyze government spending and public support for public policy not only in isolation from each other, but also public policies are considered in isolation.

The second part of the main objective of this dissertation was to develop two new comprehensive linear models. A *General Model* was created to integrate these four psychological approaches in one statistical model. This model was divided in three linear regression equations to test workers' support for foreign aid based on the *moral advantage of foreign aid, economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid, and the perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs* (see Appendix D)) This model was sufficient to explain the moral advantage and the economic cost of foreign aid, but it was statistical insufficient to explain workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollar in foreign aid programs. Therefore, a statistical

Integrative Model was developed to explain this relationship. Three main linear regression equations were used to test the main hypothesis of this study. This model contents only significant variables to explain the relationship between worker's support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid (main hypothesis).

The statistical results show that the Integrative Model is sufficient to explain unionized workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and their support for foreign aid programs. This model has sufficient statistical significant to explain the moral advantage or benefits of foreign aid, the economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid, and workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs. Strong correlation coefficients were established between workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid and moral advantage, economic cost, and perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs at $\alpha = 0.05$. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there was not relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs was rejected. Thus, the alternative hypothesis was accepted for each of these three statistical regression equations and for the Integrative model as a whole.

6.2 Conclusions

The main conclusions derived from this present research are the following:

1.   It was feasible to test four psychological models: saliency, self-interest, value, and fairness model. These models were used to test the relationship

between unionized worker's support for foreign aid in selected states of U.S. and workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The last three models were useful in explaining this relationship. But, the saliency issue model was not sufficient to explain it. However these models only provide part of the story. Each of these four models only explains one small part of workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. They are isolated from each other and they test isolated public policy.

2. It was statistically feasible to build two new linear statistical models: the General and Integrative models. The General model was useful but not enough to explain the relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. The Integrative model was sufficient and significant to test the null hypothesis since it rejected the null hypothesis in its three main regression equations.

3. A comparative analysis of the 1991-92 and 1995-96 WAGE project surveys data and Belden and Russonello study results, allowed the author to establish patterns of unionized workers supports' for foreign aid. Similar patterns were observed on workers attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid. However, some small changes in their attitudes and beliefs were observed after WAGE project provided training to some of the unionized workers to test curriculum material.

4. Based on the Integrative model, attitudes and beliefs of unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are positive with regard to issues of government

spending on domestic programs, such as public education, crime, unemployment, helping the poor in the U.S., and reducing the trade and budget deficit. Also, they are concerned with issues of trust. Workers have high reliability on sources of information provided by formal institutions such as the AFL-CIO, national and international unions, and university-based labor education programs. Trust of information provided by formal institutions (unions and universities) tends to increase highly workers' support for foreign aid. Another issue that unionized workers are concerned with is the benefits workers get from foreign aid. They believe that raising living standards in third world countries through economic aid will benefit them and U.S. economic interests may be improved if third world countries become richer. Unionized workers' support for foreign aid programs is directly positive related to these issues. They are able to increase their support for foreign aid if these factors are considered first.

5.   The Integrative model results show that unionized workers in 14 selected states of the U.S. have negative attitudes and beliefs toward issues such as *trust on information provided by the news media*. This refers to information given by U.S. House of Representatives or the Senate, the national TV news program networks, U.S. government administrations, the major national print media and some voluntary organizations. These issues tend to decrease workers' support for foreign aid programs. Also, workers are negatively concerned with the issue of *interest about third world countries*. They are not really that interested in third

world countries, but they are interested in helping people in the U.S. before people in other countries. They feel that the problems of the third world countries are so great that their help can not make a difference. The issue of workers' interest in third world countries tends to decrease workers' support for foreign aid programs.

6. Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid are also related in a negative way to issues of *information belief institutions and foreign aid secondary priorities.* Information belief institution refers to how often workers read mailings and publications from their unions and how often they participate in university-based labor education classes. This issue does not refer to trust of the sources of information. These two issues tended to increase the economic cost or disadvantage of foreign aid, and to decrease the level of support for foreign aid programs. This may be as a result that unionized workers tend to concentrate their information sources mainly on their unions and universities. These organizations may not provide a lot of information about foreign aid programs since this study results show that workers said they do not know so much about foreign aid organizations and third world countries. However, they recognized that they will get benefits from foreign aid given to these countries.

7. The last issue that has negative impact on workers' support for foreign aid programs is the *U.S. government spending on foreign aid secondary priorities.* Workers' support for foreign aid is decreased when U.S. government uses funds on programs, such as supporting small businesses started by local people in

third world countries; providing debt relief to poor countries owing debts to the U.S. government or U.S. banks; using foreign aid money to encourage U.S. businesses to invest in developing countries; and giving people from other countries university training or other training in the U.S. Therefore, the more government spending in these programs the less moral support unionized workers give to foreign aid and the higher is the economic cost of foreign aid and the higher is workers perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs.

6.3 Research Limitations

This research had some limitations. It did not cover all the issues related to foreign aid, global economy, and unionized workers since there is enormous the amount of information available. Therefore, the main issues that were covered are based on WAGE project surveys data. The main target population was represented by unionized workers from 14 selected states of U.S., who attended university-based labor education classed as a part of their labor extension programs in 1991-92 and 1995-96. These are mainly purposive or convenience surveys. Therefore, the inferential results of this dissertation do not claim to represent all the union workers registered in U.S. national and international labor organizations. It only represents a sample of the unionized workers who attended those specific classes.

Another limitation of this research is that it includes mainly unionized workers. Attitudes and beliefs of U.S. non-unionized workers may be different from those who

were the subject of this study.

Finally, this dissertation made conclusions and recommendations based on inferential statistics. Psychological models and Linear regression equations with Least-Squared fits may not be the best way to explain the relationship between workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs. However, this author tested non-linear models to find better statistical tools, but these did not add any more significance than those of the linear multiple regression equations. Attitudes and beliefs are very complex issues to measure. But, this dissertation presented at least two new statistical models, the General and the Integrative models, to explain the relationship between unionized workers' support for foreign aid and their attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid programs.

6. 4 Recommendations for Further Research

Studies done by Brehm and Cohen have shown that individuals are social entities of change and many of their actions are not easy to predict by using common sense or psychological elements (Brehm and Cohen, 1992). This dissertation observed similar patterns of worker's attitudes and beliefs toward foreign aid in both WAGE project surveys. Also, a comparative analysis done by this author show that these results are similar to those provided by Belden and Russonello in their review of survey data regarding American's views on U.S. leadership and foreign assistance. However, small changes in union workers' attitudes and beliefs were observed after the WAGE project provided training to unionized workers to test curriculum material.

Therefore, it is suggested that resources may be better spent in long term education with high action participation of workers in the design and implementation of programs.

Considering that these states may be expected to be used as the core for a future national union worker's program, it is important to have more data and information available about these and other states to help decision makers to avoid future mistakes. Just as past research has focused on the citizens opinions and beliefs toward foreign aid and the change in priorities for the use of U.S. money, future research should focus on the impacts that changes in American attitudes, opinions and beliefs toward foreign assistance have in their organizations, communities, and society. This kind of knowledge will help policy makers to introduce changes in those policies that are getting obsolete.

This research also highlights the need for further investigations of those issues that had positive or negative impacts on workers' support for foreign aid. These results provide empirical evidence that unionized workers in selected states of U.S. are deeply concerned about those issues. However, a challenge to researchers is to develop new data and models that accurately reflect the attitudes and beliefs of U.S. union workers toward foreign aid programs and foreign policy. This study provides useful information which may be used in the design of more flexible, effective, and efficient foreign aid policies. Using the positive attitudes and beliefs that unionized workers from these selected states of U.S. have toward national and international policies, may promote the establishment of better policies.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

WAGE PROJECT 1995-96 SURVEY INSTRUMENT

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
School of Labor and Industrial Relations

We are working on a series of lessons about strategic planning topics to help working people understand issues such as foreign trade and aid to other countries. This survey will be used to see which areas which we need to focus our attention on. Please answer the questions carefully. We have written questions we hope will provide a range of different information levels. Do the best you can but do not worry if some questions seem quite difficult.

Thank you for completing this survey. Your information will be kept confidential and will only be reported as part of the figures for the entire group of people taking this survey throughout the country.

Age _____

Sex: Female _____ Male _____

Race (Optional):

       Caucasian _____ Hispanic _____

       Afro-American _____ Asian _____

       Native American _____

Name of Union to Which You Belong _____

Local You Belong To _____

Total Years of Union Membership _____

Total Years of Union Office or Leadership _____

State You Live in _____

Site Where this Survey was Administered _____

Educational Experience

High School Diploma or Less ____

College: Less Than Two Years   ____
                       Associate's Degree   ____
                       Less Than Four Years ____
                       Bachelors Degree   ____
                       Graduate Level Study ____

Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can. Circle the letter or put an X on the line where appropriate to answer the questions.

1.   **Have you ever traveled outside the United States excluding Canada?**

        yes   ____   no   ____

2.   **What was your primary reason for traveling?**

    a.   Business
    b.   Education
    c.   Military Service
    d.   Work Abroad
    e.   Pleasure

3.   **How often would you say that you read or look at a news magazine, like Time or Newsweek?**

    a.   Almost every week
    b.   Once or twice a month
    c.   Less than once a month
    d.   Never

4.   **How often would you say that you watch a national television news program?**

    a.   Almost every evening
    b.   A few times a week
    c.   Less often than that
    d.   Never

5.   **How often do you read a daily newspaper?**

    a.   Nearly every day
    b.   A few times a week
    c.   Less often than that
    d.   Never

6. **How often do you read mailings and publications from your union?**

    a.   Every time I receive them
    b.   A few times a week
    c.   Less than once a month
    d.   Never

7. **How often do you participate in university-based labor education classes?**

    a.   Four or more times a year
    b.   Two to Three times a year
    c.   Less than once a year
    d.   This is my first class

8. **The term Third World is used to mean those countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Eastern Europe and even the former Soviet Union, whose economies and standard of living are less developed than the United States, many European countries, and other countries that are richer, and whose economies are fully industrialized.**

Here are some groups that provide information about Third World countries. Using any number from 1 to 10 with 1 meaning "not at all reliable" and 10 meaning "totally reliable," indicate how reliable you think each group is in providing information on the Third World.

    a.   Members of the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    b.   Ads and mailings from groups such as CARE and Save the Children
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    c.   The national TV news programs (that is; ABC, CBS, NBC networks)

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    d.   The Clinton Administration

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    e.   The major national print media (i.e. the New York Times, TIME or, NEWSWEEK)

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    f.   Your national/international union
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

g.   The AFL-CIO and its programs/materials

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

h.   University-based labor education programs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9.   **Using a scale where 1 means lowest priority and 10 means top priority, how would you rate these issues the government has to deal with?**

a.	Public education	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
b.	International arms control	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c.	Dealing with crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d.	Unemployment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
e.	Helping the poor in the U.S.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
f.	Reducing the trade deficit	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
g.	Reducing poverty and hunger in other countries	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
h.	Reducing the national budget deficit	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10.   **Are you generally in favor of or opposed to the U.S. giving economic assistance to other countries?**

a.   in favor   b.   opposed

11.   **Do you think the U.S. government is doing more than it should, about the right amount, or less than it should to fight poverty in other parts of the world?**

a.   more than it should
b.   about the right amount
c.   less than it should

12.   **From what you have heard or read, would you say the economies of Third World countries affect the U.S. economy a great deal, somewhat, not very much, or not at all?**

a.   a great deal
b.   somewhat
c.   not very much
d.   not at all

13. **Sometimes when the United States gives aid to foreign countries it requires that the aid money be used to buy American products. Do you think this is a good policy or a bad policy?**

        a. a good policy   b. a bad policy

14. **Assume you are in charge of aid for development to other countries. Using a number from 1 to 10 on a scale where 1 is lowest priority and 10 is top priority., please tell me how a high priority you would give each of these areas:**

    ____ a. African countries
    ____ b. Arab countries
    ____ c. Asian countries
    ____ d. Israel
    ____ e. Latin American and Caribbean Countries
    ____ f. Eastern Europe
    ____ g. Countries of the former Soviet Union

15. **You have ranked those countries that would have the highest priority. Now read this list of kind of aid programs and indicate how important you consider each to be. On a scale where 1 means lowest priority and 10 means top priority, pick a number between 1 and 10 to show how you would rank these types of aid:**

    a.   Providing other countries with surplus food

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    b.   Programs that help countries lower infant death rates

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    c.   Giving people from other countries university training or other training in the U.S.

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    d.   Programs to support small businesses started by local people in those countries

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    e.   Providing debt relief to poor countries owing debts to the U.S. government or U.S. banks
        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    f.   Education on family planning and providing birth control

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    g.   Using aid money to encourage U.S. businesses to invest in those countries

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

16. **The following are statements about economic aid for development, please indicate which most represents how you feel.**

strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree somewhat	strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5

_____ a. Aid is essential if other countries are to become self-sufficient

_____ b. Wherever people are hungry or poor, we ought to do what we can to help them.

_____ c. Aid programs get us too mixed up with other countries affairs.

_____ d. Helping other countries develop will make them more stable.

_____ e. It is against U.S. interests to help developing countries because they will compete with us economically and politically.

_____ f. We need to solve our own poverty problems in the U.S. before we turn attention to other countries.

_____ g. Aid is frequently misused by foreign governments.

_____ h. A large part of aid is wasted by the U.S. bureaucracy.

_____ I. If the U.S. helps Third World countries, we will benefit in the long run.

17. **Do you tend to strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with these statements:**

strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree somewhat	strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5

_____ a. The U.S. should limit the number of immigrants entering the country because they compete with American for jobs.

_____ b. The U.S. should help farmers in other countries learn to growth their own food, even if it means they buy less food from the U.S.

_____ c. The U.S. should not give any kind of assistance to countries that do not have free elections or that are ruled by dictators.

_____ d. The U.S. should give Third World countries less aid and leave them alone go they can develop in their own ways.

18. **Think about the issues in this survey and indicate whether you tend to favor or oppose U.S. giving of economic assistance for development projects such as health care, education, and agriculture to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?**

        a. Favor   b. Oppose

19. **Read each statement and indicate how each one describe you.**

strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree somewhat	strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5

____ a. I don not know enough about Third World countries and their problems.

____ b. I feel a lot of foreign aid never gets to the people who need it.

____ c. I do not know very much about organizations that run programs to help those countries.

____ d. I am not really that interested in Third World countries.

____ e. I feel that the Third World's problems are so great that my help can't make a difference.

____ f. I am more interested in helping people in the United States before people in other countries.

20. **Read the following statements and indicate how you feel about each of them.**

strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree somewhat	strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5

____ a. Because we live in a rich country, Americans have a responsibility to help improve conditions in poorer countries.

____ b. Helping poor countries will make the world safer.

____ c. I feel bad that others have so little when we have so much.

____ d. Helping Third World countries is in our self-interest because as they develop they will buy American products.

____ e. Helping Third World countries become self-sufficient will cut down the number of immigrants to the United States.

21.   Read the following statements and indicate how you feel about each one.

strongly agree 1	somewhat agree 2	neither agree nor disagree 3	disagree somewhat 4	strongly disagree 5

_____ a. Competition from other countries affects decisions in my work place.

_____ b. Workers in Third World countries compete with me and my co-workers.

_____ c. Language in our collective bargaining agreement stems from consideration of global competition.

_____ d. Economic aid to a small business in Third World country does not affect me.

_____ e. Raising living standards in Third World countries through economic aid will benefit me.

_____ f. Competition from workers/companies in Third World nations is a threat to my job security.

_____ g. U.S. economic interests may be improved if Third World countries become richer.

_____ h. Negotiation results in my work place are affected by conditions in Third World nations.

_____ I. Gathering information about conditions in Third World countries is part of the preparation for contract negotiations in my union.

_____ j. A candidate's view on economic aid to Third World countries influences my decision to vote for that person.

_____ k. If my union tells me that a specific governmental policy is wrong I trust that position.

Thank you for once again for participating in this survey.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

CODE BOOK 1995-96 SURVEY

VARIABLE	VARIABLE LABEL	VARIABLE VALUES
Order	Order1	1-214
Rec	Record	1-2
id	ID Number	500-713
age	Age	16-99
sex	Sex	1=Female 2=Male
race	Race	1=Caucasian 2=Hispanic 3=Afro-American 4=Asian 5=Native American
union	Union Belong to	1-56

Codes of Variable: Union - Union Belong to

AFCME	1
IBFO (Fireman/Oilers)	2
UPIU	3
AFGE	4
SEIU	5
URW	6
UAW	7
GRSEBA GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL EMPLOYEE BENEFIT ASSOCIATION	8
APWU	9
RWDSU	10
METAL POLISHERS, BUFFERS, PLATERS, AND	

ALLIED WORKERS		11
KCEA KENT COUNTY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION		12
AFT		13
IBT (Teamsters)		14
MSEA/AFSCME		15
USWA		16
OPEIU		17
MEA		18
NALC		19
AFGM		20
GMP GLASS MOLDERS AND POLISHERS		21
IAM		22
IBEW		23
ACTWU		24
ICWU		25
SCHDEU SAGINAW COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES UNION		26
AIW		27
BBF (Boilermakers)		28
UGWA (Garmet Workers)		29
IUE (International Union Electrical Workers)		30
IAFF		31
OCAW		32
ALUMINUM, BRICK, GLASS WORKERS		33
CWA		34
CSEA		35
AFT		36
UFCW UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION		37
GREIU EMPLOYEES INDEPENDENT UNION		38
SHEET METAL WORKERS		39
INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS		40
DC II GRAPHIC COMMUNICATION UNION		41
OTHERS		42-55
local	Local Belong to	000001-600000
ymember	Tot Yrs Member	01-99
yoffice	Tot Yrs Un Offic	01-99
edu	Educ Exper	1=H.S. or Less
		2=2 Yrs. Or less Univ
		3=Associate's Degree

		4=Less than 4 years 5=Bachelor's Degree 6=Graduate Level Study
trav	Travel Outside U.S.	1=Yes 2=No

(If Response is No, Ten Next Question is Blank)

reason	Primary Trav Reason	1=Business 2=Education 3=Military Service 4=Work Abroad 5=Pleasure
newsmag	Read Newsmag	1=Never 2=Less than once/month 3=Once or twice/month 4=Almost every week
tvnews	Watch Tvnews	1=Never 2=Less often than that 3=Few times a week 4=Almost every evening
daily	Read Paper	1=Never 2=Less often than that 3=Few times a week 4=Nearly every day
umail	Read Union Paper	1=Never 2=Less often than that 3=Few times a week 4=Every time I received
ulec	Univ Labor Ed	1=This is first class 2=Less than once/yearly 3=Two or three/yearly 4=Four or more/yearly

a8	Rely Cong	1=Low	10=High
b8	Grp Like CARE	1=Low	10=High
c8	Natl TV News	1=Low	10=High
d8	Clinton Admin	1=Low	10=High
e8	Natl Print Media	1=Low	10=High
f8	Natl Intl Union	1=Low	10=High
g8	AFL-CIO	1=Low	10=High
h8	Univled	1=Low	10=High
a9	Pub Ed Priority	1=Low	10=High
b9	Intl Arms Cont	1=Low	10=High
c9	Deal with Crime	1=Low	10=High
d9	Unemployment	1=Low	10=High
e9	Help U.S. Poor	1=Low	10=High
f9	Lower Trade Def	1=Low	10=High
g9	Lower Poverty Othr Ctr	1=Low	10=High
h9	Lower Natl Budget Def	1=Low	10=High

a10	Pro Con1 Aid	1=Favor 2=Oppose
a11	More Less Fight Pov	1=More than 2=About Right 3=Less than
a12	Others Affect U.S.	1=Not at all 2=Not very much 3=Somewhat 4=Great deal

a13	Aid Buy U.S. Prod	1=Good policy	
		2=Bad policy	

a14	African Ctries	1=Low	10=High
b14	Arab Ctries	1=Low	10=High
c14	Asian Ctries	1=Low	10=High
d14	Israel	1=Low	10=High
e14	Lat Amer Carib	1=Low	10=High
f14	East Europe	1=Low	10=High
g14	Soviet Union	1=Low	10=High

a15	Surplus Food	1=Low	10=High
b15	Infant Death	1=Low	10=High
c15	Univ Training	1=Low	10=High
d15	Local Business	1=Low	10=High
e15	Debt Relief	1=Low	10=High
f15	Family Planning	1=Low	10=High
g15	U.S. Investment	1=Low	10=High

a16	Self-Sufficiency	1=Strongly Agree (SA)
		2=Somewhat Agree (SWA)
		3=Neither Agree/Disagree (NAD)
		4=Disagree Somewhat(DSW)
		5=Strongly Disagree (SD)

b16	Help Hungry Poor	(The same var. values as a16)
c16	Too Mixed Up in	"
d16	Aid Makes Stable	"
e16	Help Competition	"
f16	Solve U.S. Own Problems	"
g16	Aid is Misused	"
h16	U.S. Bureaucracy Wastes	"
i16	To Our Benefit	"

a17	Limit Immigrants	"
b17	Help Others Grow More	"
c17	Support Democracies	"
d17	Give Less/Leave Alone	"

a18	Pro Con2 Aid	1=Favor
		2=Oppose

a19	Not Know Enough	1=Strongly Agree (SA) 2=Somewhat Agree (SWA) 3=Neither Agree/Disagree (NAD) 4=Disagree Somewhat(DSW) 5=Strongly Disagree (SD)
b19	Aid Not Reach People	"
c19	Not Know Orgs	"
d19	Not Interested	"
e19	My Help Useless	"
f19	Help U.S. First	"
a20	Responsibility to Help	1=Strongly Agree (SA) 2=Somewhat Agree (SWA) 3=Neither Agree/Disagree (NAD) 4=Disagree Somewhat(DSW) 5=Strongly Disagree (SD)
b20	Help Makes World Safer	"
c20	Others Have so Little	"
d20	Aid is Self-Interest	"
e20	Aid Cuts Immigrants	"
state	State of Residence	1 =Michigan 2 =Missouri 3 =Illinois 4 =Wisconsin 5 =Minnesota 6 =Ohio 7 =Kansas 8 =Nebraska 9 =Pennsylvania 10=Connecticut 11=Alabama 12=Arkansas 13=Tennessee 14=California

COMPUTER DATA PROGRAMS AND FILES

1991-92 SURVEY DATA

Data File - PMDATA.DEV

Systems File - PMDEV.SYS

SPSSX Command File - PMSPSX.DEV

SPSSX Computation File - PMDEV.SPS

First Set of Data 1-123

Second Set of Data 135- and higher

1995-96 SURVEY DATA

Data File - AIDSURVEY96.SAVE

SPSS for Windows 3.5 and 95

Excel for Windows 4.0

Total Set of Data 1-214

ID Numbers 501-713

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 1991-92 AND 1995-96
WAGE PROJECT SURVEY DATA

Survey Data from a Sample of 214 Subjects in 1996 and 355 in 1992

Demographic Data (214 workers in 1996 and 349 in 1992)

Population Results are in Percentages

Age	1996	1992	Sex	1996	1992	Race	1996	1992
23 to 25 =	2	2	Female = 38		23	Caucasian	= 79	86
26 to 30 =	11	5	Male = 62		77	Afro-American	= 8	6
31 to 35 =	14	19				Hispanic	= 6	3
36 to 40 =	15	24				Native American= 2		5
41 to 45 =	18	20						
46 to 50 =	19	16						
51 to 55 =	10	8						
56 to 60 =	6	4						
over 60 =	1	2						

Average Age in 1996 = 41.8 years old [range 23 - 69]

Average Age in 1992 = 41.5 years old [range 23 - 69]

Participants from the Following States:

Results are in Percentages

	1996	**1992**
Michigan	80	41
Minnesota	6	less than 1 %
Alabama	7	less than 1 %
California	7	0
Missouri		27
Illinois		16
Kansas		5
Wisconsin		4
Ohio		3
Nebraska		1
Pennsylvania		1
Connecticut		Less than 1 %
Arkansas		Less than 1 %
Tennessee		Less than 1 %

Union Affiliation and Membership Statistics

56 in 1996 and 34 in 1992 individual national/international unions represented with the most representation coming from the following:

	1996	**1992**
USWA	22	45
AIW	2	11
UAW	20	9
IAM	2	3
UPIU	3	3
SEIU	3	
AFGM	4	
OPEIU	12	
BBF	Less than 1%	4

Average years of union membership in 1996	= 14.6 years [range 0 - 40]
Average years of union membership in 1992	= 16 years [range 0 - 51]
Average years in union office in 1996	= 6.4 years [0 - 35]
Average years in union office in 1992	= 6.8 years [0 - 33]

Education Levels

	1996	1992
High School Diploma or Less	= 37	44
2 Years or Less of University Study	= 34	32
4 Years or Less of University Study	= 8	
Associate Degree	= 9	
Bachelor's Degree	= 8	5
Graduate Level Study	= 2	

Sources and Levels of Information Exposure

	1996	1992
Read News Magazines		
Every Week	= 34	29
Less than Once a Month	= 31	34
Once or Twice a Month	= 25	
Never Read Magazines	= 9	
Read Newspaper		
Every Day	= 56	68
Few Times a Week	= 29	
Less Often than that	= 13	
Never Read Newspapers	= 2	3
Watch a National Television News Program		
Almost Every Month	= 59	
Few Times a Week	= 27	
Less Often than that	= 12	
Never	= 1	

93 % read union materials a few times a week or every time they are received in 1996.
92 % read union materials a few times a week or every time they are received in 1992.

42 % attend two to four university-based labor education classes each year in 1996.
44 % attend two to four university-based labor education classes each year in 1992.

Sources and Levels of Information Exposure

{Scale 1 - 10, with 10 being most reliable]	Mean 1996	Mean 1992
University-based labor education	7.2	7.1
AFL-CIO	6.7	6.6
National print media	6.4	6.4
National television news	6.4	6.4
National/International unions	6.7	6.4
Mailings from groups like CARE	5.3	5.0
Congress	4.8	4.4
Clinton Administration	5.5	
Bush Administration		3.0

Perceived Reliability of Information Sources

[Scale 1 - 10, with 10 being highest priority]	Mean 1996	Mean 1992
Public Education	7.5	7.7
Unemployment	7.0	7.5
Crime	7.3	7.0
Reducing the trade deficit	6.7	6.8
Helping the poor in the U.S.	6.3	6.7
Reducing the national budget deficit	6.6	6.6
International arms control	6.7	6.4
Reducing poverty/hunger in other countries	5.3	4.9

Priority Government Should Give to the Following Issues

[Scale 1 - 10, with 10 being highest priority]	Mean 1996	Mean 1992
Education on family planning/birth control	8	7.8
Provide countries with surplus food	7	6.9
Programs that help lower infant death rates	7	6.8
Programs to support small businesses	5	5.0
Provide university training or other training in U.S.	5	4.6
Provide debt relief	4	3.6
Encouraging U.S. investment in other countries	4	3.5

Measuring Attitudes

The following statements are a sample of attitude questions contained in the survey.

The mean response to the statement is in bold at the end of the statement.

[1= strongly agree; 2 = somewhat agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat disagree;

5 = strongly disagree]

	1996	1992
16e) It is against U.S. interests to help countries in the Third World because they will compete with us economically and politically.	3.2	3.5
16l) If the U.S. helps the Third World, we will benefit in the long run.	2.6	2.6
19a) I don't know enough about Third World countries and their problems.	2.5	2.5

19c) I don't know very much about organizations that run programs to help

those countries. **2.2** **2.2**

19d) I am not really interested in Third World countries. **3.3** **3.3**

  21a) Competition from other countries affects decisions in my work place. **2.3** **1.9**

21c) Language in my collective bargaining agreement stems from

consideration of global competition. **3.0** **2.9**

21d)Economic aid to a small business in a developing country does not

affect me. **3.5** **3.6**

21e) Raising living standards in developing countries through economic

aid will benefit me. **2.9** **2.9**

21f) Competition from workers in developing nations is a threat to job security. **2.7** **2.3**

21g) U.S. economic interests may improve if developing nations become richer. **2.6** **2.6**

Other Items

Are you generally in favor of or opposed to the U.S. giving economic assistance to other countries?
61 % are opposed in 1996   **62 % are opposed in 1992**

Indicate whether you tend to favor or opposed U.S. giving of economic assistance for development projects such as health care, education, and agriculture to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?   **59.3% are in favor in 1996**   **62% are in favor in 1992**

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

Table 3.1 Variables Included in Models

Variable	Label	Meaning
DEPENDENT: Workers' Support for Foreign Aid (Y')		
moraladv	Moral Advantage	Moral advantages or benefits of foreign aid
eccost	Economic Cost	Economic Disadvantages or cost of foreign aid
waste$	Waste dollars	Workers' perception of waste of U.S. dollars in foreign aid programs
INDEPENDENT: Workers' Attitudes and Beliefs toward Foreign Aid Programs (Xs)		
travinfsb	Travel and information seeking beliefs	Workers travel and beliefs of seeking information from news media and formal institutions
trust	Trust of sources of information	Workers trust of information provided by the news media and formal Institutions
altruism	Altruism toward foreign aid	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward helping others and themselves
govtprio	Political view of government priorities	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government spending on national and international programs
concthw	Concern for third world countries	Workers knowledge about third world and foreign aid organizations; and U.S. workers' interest in third world countries
globinter	Global Interdependence	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward third world competition and workers benefits from third world
faprio	Foreign aid priorities	U.S. foreign aid spent on third world primary and secondary need programs

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Moral Advantage or Benefits of Foreign Aid (Y1)

a16	Self-sufficiency	Foreign aid is essential for other countries self-sufficiency
b16	Help hungry poor	We ought to help the hungry or poor in third world
d16	Aid makes stable	Helping other countries makes them more stable

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Table 3.1 - (Cont'd)

Variable	Label	Meaning
Economic Disadvantages or Cost of Foreign Aid (Y2)		
c16	Too mixed up in	U.S. is to mixed up with other countries affairs
e16	Help competition	Foreign aid helps countries that will compete with U.S.
f16	Solve own problems	We need to solve U.S. problems first before helping other countries
i16	To our benefit	We will benefit in the long run not now
Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs (Y3)		
g16	Aid is misused	Aid is misused by foreign governments
h16	U.S. bureaucracy Wastes	Large part of aid is wasted by U.S. bureaucracy

SUBVARIABLES OR FACTORS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable	Label	Meaning
Travel and Information Seeking Beliefs (X1)		
INBMEDIA	Information travel belief news media	Workers travel and belief of seeking information from the news media
INBINSTI	Information travel belief institutions	Workers travel and belief of seeking information from formal institutions (unions and Universities)
Trust of Sources of Information (X2)		
TRUSTMED	Trust of media information	Workers trust of information provided by the news media, such as TV news, magazines, newspapers
TRUSTINS	Trust Institutions Information	Workers trust of information provided by formal institutions such as unions and universities

Table 3.1 - (Cont'd)

Variable	Label	Meaning

Altruism toward Foreign Aid (X3)

c20	Other have so little	Workers' feelings that others have so little when they have so much
d20	Aid is self interest	Helping third world countries is in workers self-interest because they will buy American products
e20	Aid cuts immigrants	Helping third world countries will cut down the number of immigrants to the U.S.

Political View of Government Priorities (X4)

NATIPRIO	National Priorities	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government spending on domestic or national programs
INTEPRIO	International Priorities	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward government spending on international programs

Concerns for Third World Countries (X5)

KNOWLEDG	Not know enough	Workers knowledge of third world countries and foreign aid organizations
INTEREST	U.S. self-interest	U.S. workers interest in third world countries

Global Interdependence (X6)

COMPETIT	Third world competition	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward third world competition
BENEFITS	Third world benefits U.S. workers	Workers' attitudes and beliefs toward benefits that third world countries provide to them

Foreign Aid Priorities (X7)

PRIMARYP	Primary needs program	U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries primary needs program (food, infant mortality, etc)
SECONDP	Secondary needs program	U.S. foreign aid spent on third world countries secondary needs program (investment, debt relief)

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Equation No. 1   Dependent Variable: MORALADV   Moral Advantage

---

Block No. 1   Method: Enter

TRUSTMED ALTRUISM NATIPRIO INTEREST BENEFITS PRIMARYP

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1.	PRIMARYP	Primary Program: Foreign Aid Priority
2.	TRUSTMED	Trust of Media Information
3.	NATIPRIO	Gov't National Priorities
4.	ALTRUISM	Altruism Toward Foreign Aid
5.	INTEREST	Interest: Concerns for Third World
6.	BENEFITS	Benefits: Global Interdependence

Multiple R   .67485
R Square   .45542
Adjusted R Square   .43664
Standard Error   .63190

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	6	58.10343	9.68390
Residual	174	69.47822	.39930

F =   24.25220   Signif F =   .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TRUSTMED	-.131268	.031908	-.238120	-4.114	.0001
ALTRUISM	.181183	.060604	.196345	2.990	.0032
NATIPRIO	.042417	.018647	.101483	2.275	.0241
INTEREST	-.240974	.062802	-.254247	-3.837	.0002
BENEFITS	.215728	.060953	.235698	3.539	.0005
PRIMARYP	-.099567	.026529	-.228536	-3.753	.0002
(Constant)	3.164030	.418942		7.552	.0000

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MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Equation No. 2 Dependent Variable: ECCOST Economic Disadvantage/Cost

---

Block No. 1   **Method: Enter**

INTEREST   INBINSTI   TRUSTINS   SECONDP

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1. SECONDP   Secondary Program: Foreign Aid Priority
2. TRUSTINS   Trust Institutions Information
3. INTEREST   Interest: Concerns for Third World
4. INBINSTI   Information Travel Belief Institutions

Multiple R	.42172
R Square	.17785
Adjusted R Square	.15987
Standard Error	.54306

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	4	11.67422	2.91856
Residual	183	53.96833	.29491

F = 9.89646   Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
INTEREST	.179797	.045253	.272719	3.973	.0001
INBINSTI	.153970	.071103	.149258	2.165	.0316
TRUSTINS	-.059689	.019460	-.207056	-3.067	.0025
SECONDP	.045683	.021001	.148352	2.175	.0309
(Constant)	1.682144	.274190		6.135	.0000

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS - INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Equation No. 3   Dependent Variable: WASTE$ Perception of Waste of U.S. Dollars in Foreign Aid Programs

---

Block No. 1   Method: Enter

INTEREST   TRUSTINS   SECONDP

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1.	SECONDP	Secondary Program: Foreign Aid Priority
2.	TRUSTINS	Trust Institutions Information
3.	INTEREST	Interest: Concerns for Third World

Multiple R	.25891
R Square	.06703
Adjusted R Square	.05174
Standard Error	.78272

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	3	8.05530	2.68510
Residual	183	112.11582	.61265

F =   4.38273   Signif F =   .0053

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T	
INTEREST	.105681	.064190	.118424	1.646	.1014	
TRUSTINS	-.053717	.028143	-.136633	-1.909	.0579	
SECONDP	.071070	.030163	.169083	2.356	.0195	
(Constant)	1.388936	.296436		4.685	.0000	

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