MUSICAL WORLDS AND WORKS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSIC EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

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Music education has been greatly influenced in the past by the aesthetic philosophy of Bennett Reimer, and more recently, by the praxial philosophy as articulated by David Elliott. However, the writings of contemporary philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff offer an alternative to these two philosophies with several implications for music education. In assessing Wolterstorff's ideas and applying them to music education, extensive research was conducted in the history of aesthetic thinking as well as investigations into the valuing of art as high art. In addition, the emergence of modal logic as a branch of philosophy is included. The writings of Wolterstorff are investigated in great detail, especially those pertaining to art, art and action, art as memorial art, and modal logic. The study closes with a conclusion of the arts' roles in life, and the resultant effect on music education and curriculum. The roles of the arts as based on Wolterstorff's writings are those of the social realities of life, aesthetic contemplation, projection of worlds, art's embedding in action, and its role as a memorial. These roles generate the following conclusions: performance-works are

universals, composition consists of realizing a pre-existent kind as a work, works of art are instruments of action generated by the artist, world projection is a pervasive and important action artists perform, an institution of high art exists, the arts express the social realities of life, aesthetic contemplation is but one of many roles served by music, and art possesses a memorial function. Consequently, the specific effects of these axioms on music education are discussed in great detail.

This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my husband Dan for his constant support, encouragement, and help. He is truly my best friend.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE NECESSITY OF PHILOSOPHY TO MUSIC EDUCATION

Philosophy, music, and music education are, and have always been, intimately connected. Philosophy shapes, guides, and transforms music education, from composition of curriculum guides to choices of methodologies, from teacher-student interactions to administrative decisions regarding music programs. Leonhard writes:

> When we speak of a philosophy of music education, we refer to a system of basic beliefs which underlie and provide a basis for the operation of the musical enterprise in an educational setting.[1]

Indeed, philosophy is integrally involved in shaping the view society holds of music and music education. Thus, the formulation and selection of a philosophy are of the utmost importance in improving the practice of music education.

This observation, however, has been limited in its acceptance in the music education field. Jorgensen wrote that music teachers have often been left with the impression that "serious philosophy does not have much to say about what they do in their classrooms, that music education is primarily a practical rather

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[1] Charles Leonhard, "The Philosophy of Music Education-Present and Future," in *Comprehensive Musicianship National Conference: The Foundation for College Education in Music* (Washington: Music Educators' National Conference, 1965), 42.

than a philosophical activity, and that philosophy simply amounts to personal opinion." [2] Moreover, Schwadron[3] observed that teachers often find themselves committing to musical judgments and choices without thinking through why or how conclusions have been reached. He noted that music educators need to know the basic criteria that have guided the concepts and objectives associated with their curricula.

Jorgensen[4] explains that all aspects of teaching must be judged philosophically. If music teachers know why they teach and why they use the curricular approaches they do, they become more effective teachers because their attention becomes focused on the important issues. A substantive music education philosophy allows music educators to teach with confidence, because a philosophical basis is involved in every aspect of music education and in each judgmental choice made in the course of everyday teaching. In addition, philosophical formulation permits the music teacher to critically examine the many new ideas that develop within the profession. Perhaps most importantly, a clearly articulated philosophical view provides both an individual and collective vision of music education; for without vision people and professions perish.

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[2] Estelle Jorgensen, "Philosophy and the Music Teacher: Challenging the Way We Think," *Music Educators' Journal* 76 (1990): 18.

[3] Abraham Schwadron, *Aesthetics: Dimensions for Music Education* (Washington DC: Music Educators' National Conference, 1967).

[4] Jorgenson, *Philosophy and the Music Teacher,* 18.

Contemporary leaders in music education emphasize the importance of philosophy in a music education curriculum that effectively teaches children to value, participate, create, and experience the many facets of music. Reimer states:

> The need for a philosophy exists at two levels. First, the profession as a whole needs a formulation which can serve to guide the efforts of the group. The impact the profession can make on society depends in a large degree on the quality of the profession's understanding of what it has to offer which might be of value to society.[5]

Moreover, a sound philosophy of music education is grounded in a sound philosophy of music. Alperson[6] observes that if an adequate philosophy of music could be arrived at, then a base would be established upon which a philosophy of music education could be built. Elliott[7] writes that the nature of music education depends on the nature of music and that the questions 'what is music' and 'why is it important' must be answered. Indeed, philosophical questions about music education are partially composed of philosophical questions about the nature of music. These include inquiries such as: What is the value of music? What is the difference between good music and bad music? What is a musical work? The ancient Greeks struggled with these questions much the same as others have throughout the centuries since. Aristotle wrote in his treatise *Politics* that "It is not easy to determine the nature of music or why

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[5] Bennett Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 3.

[6] Phillip Alperson, "What Should One Expect from a Philosophy of Music Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 25 (Fall 1991).

[7] David Elliott, *Music Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

anyone should have a knowledge of it."[8] Indeed, it could be viewed that music is not only nonessential to human existence, but also lacks any practical utility as well. However, Aristotle still considered music as basic to education and wrote on its unique ability to affect and influence humankind. Reflecting on this very issue from a contemporary stand point, Alperson poses the question "How do we justify an expenditure of time and money for education about an activity which, on the surface of things, seems so utterly dispensable?"[9] Yet despite these observations, human beings continue to sing, play, listen, and value music. In addition, these concerns are translated into important questions concerning music education. They include: What role should music play in education? What kinds of music should be taught? How should music be taught? What is the role of performing and listening in a music curriculum?

Before one can concisely and thoroughly answer these and other philosophical questions about music and music education, one must understand exactly what philosophy *is*. Plato, quoting Socrates, wrote that the practice of philosophy involved one who is ". . ready and willing to taste every kind of knowledge. . . "[10] Rosenberg describes philosophy as something people do, an activity of reason.[11] Reimer defines philosophy as ". . . an underlying set of

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[8] Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. J. Barnes, ed. S. Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1339a 15.

[9] Alperson, "What Should One Expect from a Philosophy," 216.

[10] Plato, *The Republic,* trans.. J.L. Davies and D.J. Vaughn (London: Macmillan, 1895), 45.

[11] Jay F. Rosenburg, *The Practice of Philosophy: A Handbook for Beginners* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1984).

beliefs about the nature of one's field."[12] Alperson states that philosophy is ". . . sustained, systematic, critical examination of beliefs-it helps us comprehend and assess the presuppositions and content of our understanding of the world."[13] Elliott writes that philosophy ". . . is something people do by systematic doubting, logical analysis, and critical thinking."[14] Philosophy provides the foundation of basic beliefs about the nature and values of humanity and the universe in which it exists. Philosophy is inextricably intertwined in all curricular, procedural, and operational decisions made in music education. As a result, the choice of a particular philosophy to guide the music program is of paramount importance and warrants careful study and investigation.

Two philosophies of music are currently influential in the field and justify examination by today's music educators. They are the aesthetic philosophy of music and the praxial philosophy of music. Both will be addressed in the proceeding sections.

Current Philosophies in Music

The Aesthetic Philosophy

The aesthetic philosophy of music has been influential in the Western world for the last several hundred years, dating from the 18th century British

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[12] Reimer, *Philosophy of Music*, 2.

[13] Phillip Alperson, "Introduction" in *What is Music*, ed. Phillip Alperson (New York: Haven Pub., 1987), 3.

[14] Elliott, *Music Matters*, 6.

empiricists. In music education its influence has been pervasive. Alperson states "It is probably fair to say that music education in North America has been dominated by the idea of aesthetic education."[15]

Mark goes so far as to label the period between 1960 and the present as the historical period of *Aesthetic Education*.[16] During this time music education philosophical literature emphasized the importance of curricula and literature based on the aesthetic aspect of music. He notes that the first phase of this current period was based on the development and establishment of an aesthetically based philosophy of music. Music education in recent years has been influenced in numerous areas by aesthetic thinking. For example, aesthetics often became a required course for university music education graduate students, professional journals such as *Music Educators Journal* devoted entire issues to the concept, and for several years in the 1970s and early '80s the Silver Burdett company, one of the leading music textbook publishers in the United States, produced an entire elementary classroom music series specifically based on the principles of aesthetic education.[17]

Aesthetic education has customarily been associated with such phrases as "fine art," "works of art," "taste" and "aesthetic experience." Reimer lists several basic assumptions that provide the foundation for the concept of

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[15] Alperson, *What is Music,* 219.

[16] Michael Mark, "A New Look at Historical Periods in American Music Education," *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* 99 (1987).

[17] See among others the 1976 Centennial Edition.

aesthetic education.[18] First, the nature and value of music determine the nature and value of music education. In addition, the meaning and value of art are internal functions of artistic and cultural qualities. Music is valued for its expressive qualities; its meaning comes from its expressive form. Music education becomes the education of feeling while aesthetic education concentrates on an aesthetic experience that is intrinsic, disinterested, and distanced. The actual work of art is the object of the aesthetic experience. Finally, primary goals of music education include improving students' taste in music and developing their capacities as listeners who will be able to have an aesthetic experience.

While the word 'aesthetic' has ancient origins, its modern meaning evolved over the past 250 years. 'Aesthetic' comes from the classical Greek *aithesis* meaning sense-experience or perception, and was coined by G. Baumgarten (1714-1762) in 1735. He is often viewed as founding modern aesthetics. Other influential theorists from this era who contributed to aesthetic thought included Lord Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746). These two British philosophers' important contributions included the development of the role of taste and disinterestedness in the understanding of beauty and art. The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) expanded the ideas of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in his monumental study *Theory of Beauty and Taste.* These matters will be further discussed in Chapter Two.

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[18] Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music,* 226.

Another important milestone was the publication in 1746 of the treatise, *Les beaux arts re duit a meme principe* (The fine arts reduced to a single purpose) by French philosopher Charles Batteux. This document effectively accomplished two aims; the separation of the *fine* arts from the *mechanical* arts, and the unification of the fine arts of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and dance into one family.

Other important factors that contributed to the evolution of aesthetic theory included the rise of instrumental music. Goerh observes that the social transformation of Europe was a factor in musicians' increasing demands for economic independence and respect. As a result, they looked for a theory of music that would justify and explain the nature and value of instrumental music as a serious art form and self-sufficient entity. Aesthetics seemed to fit this need.[19] In addition, the increased popularity of Cartesian thought[20] fostered aesthetic principles. Numerous philosophers in the following centuries contributed to the continued growth of aesthetics, including Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Eduord Hanslick (1825-1904), Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), George Santayana (1859-1952), John Dewey (1863-1952), Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), Edward Bullough (1880-1934), Clive Bell (1881-1964), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), and Susanne Langer (1895-1983).

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[19] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[20] Cartesian thought focuses on the centrality of human beings to consciousness, named for the philosopher Descartes.

In the past forty years, many respected and influential music educators have advanced the values of aesthetic education. They include James Mursell, Harry Broudy, Charles Leonhard, Robert House, Abraham Schwadron, and especially Bennett Reimer with his *Philosophy of Music Education* (1970), (1989). This work was significant to American music educators in many ways. As mentioned earlier, curricula began to focus on the aesthetic qualities of music as advocated by Reimer. Several music textbook series published in the 1970's and 1980's by the Silver Burdett company were based on aesthetic education. These series also utilized Reimer as a consultant. Many undergraduate music education classes taught the importance of incorporating aesthetic thought when designing goals and objectives in everyday lesson planning. Finally, a course in aesthetics became *de rigor* for many graduate students in music education. Therefore, aesthetics influenced music education by influencing curriculums and methodologies, undergraduate music courses, and graduate studies. The shortcomings and weaknesses of the aesthetic philosophy, of which there are many, will be expanded upon in detail in Chapter Two.

The Praxial Philosophy of Music

In the last several years questions have been raised concerning aesthetic education, most specifically by David Elliott.[21] Elliott resolutely rejects the aesthetic view of music education. He believes that aesthetic thought focuses too

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[21] See Elliott, *Music Matters;* and numerous other publications.

narrowly on musical works as objects of contemplation and undervalues the very process of music itself. He charges that aesthetic education regards actual musical performance as merely a technique or skill, not as musical knowledge, and that aesthetic education places an emphasis on musical consumption rather than on active music-making. Elliott determines that aesthetic education seeks to develop music listeners while neglecting the importance of active involvement in actual music-making. He also states that requiring people to respond to primarily external experiences results in passive, disengaged observers.

Elliott has devised his own philosophy of music education, which he terms *praxial philosophy*. He defines praxial as being an action committed toward achieving goals. He writes that to "act artistically as a music maker is to engage in music making and music listening (and MUSIC) as *praxis*."[22] The praxial philosophy of music takes as one of its main components an idea put forth by Jean Piaget (1952) which states that there is no basic difference between verbal logic and the logic inherent in action. Piaget believed that the logic of action is more profound and primitive.[23] Elliott's philosophy embraces all forms of music-making. He claims that one of the primary advantages of music-making is that it involves a form of multi-dimensional thinking which in turn makes it a unique source of knowledge. He asserts that music-making should be the central end of all music education, for music-making lies at the heart of music

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[22] Elliott, *Music Matters*, 69.

[23] Jean Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children*, Tran. Margaret Cook (New York: International Universities' Press, 1952).

education. Therefore, students should learn musicianship through active music-making in appropriate curricular situations. He adds that musicianship involves the target use of surplus attention and is a source of optimal experience, or what he refers to as "flow."[24] The majority of Elliott's suppositions contain sound ideas and valid points. However, several of his formulations are weak. Elliott cites self-growth as a primary benefit of music education, stating: "Music making is a unique and major source of self-growth, self-knowledge, and flow"[25] and "Self growth, self-knowledge, and musical enjoyment are the aims of music education overall and the primary goals of every music teaching-learning episode."[26] Further, he contends: "The primary values of music education are the primary values of MUSIC: self-growth, self-knowledge, and optimal experience."[27] Self-growth and self-knowledge are vague "feel good" qualities that can be expanded to encompass almost any designation. Elliott frequently refers to the idea of optimal experience or "flow," an experience he says can be achieved through valid music-making. This quality is troublesome when applied as a unique characteristic of music. Optimal experiences exist for humans in many circumstances including mountain climbing, three-on-three basketball games, intense rounds of tennis, a stimulating game of chess, or hours

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[24] As proposed by psychologist Mihalyi Csikzentmihalyi in his book *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience,* (New York: Harper and Row 1990).

[25] Elliott, *Music Matters,* 221.

[26] Ibid., 222.

[27] Ibid., 229.

spent with the Nintendo. Why does music's ability to produce optimal experiences make it more important than any of the circumstances formerly mentioned? Finally, Elliott too thoroughly rejects all the concepts of aesthetic education. Music viewed as an object for an aesthetic experience is but *one* quality of music, certainly not exclusively as aestheticians have rigidly claimed in the past, but neither to be completely rejected as does Elliott.

In reviewing Elliott's work it becomes obvious that he holds up performance as the essential goal of music education. This can be an insufficient premise upon which to base a music education program because it is valued excessively at the cost of all other purposes of music. These observations describe some deficiencies in the praxial philosophy of music education.

Elliott's contribution to music education has great merit because he has exposed many of the shortcomings of aesthetic thought in American music education. He also offers a philosophy of his own with detailed plans for implementation. His theory is welcome to the many music educators who have become disenchanted with aesthetic education's emphasis on listening. However, Elliott replaces the myopic emphasis of aesthetic education on listening with an equally skewed view of music education as primarily performance. Both views fail to recognize the importance of the multiplicity of music's purposes and the corresponding responsibilities of music education.

An Alternative Philosophy

Nicholas Wolterstorff offers an alternative basis for formulating a philosophy of music and music education. He, too, questions the general view of aesthetic thinking, as Elliott does. Wolterstorff's reasoning affirms the importance of action in art as does Elliott, but his rationale differs from Elliott's and warrants serious contemplation by music educators.

Although Wolterstorff recognizes that the concept of aesthetic contemplation exists, he maintains that it is only one of many aspects of a work of art, and by no means the foremost. Art serves a multiplicity of purposes, each influential to music education. One important aspect of all works of art, according to Wolterstorff, is the human action involved in producing them, specifically that of world-making. World-making is the act of an artist projecting a world by producing an artifact, either aural or visual. Wolterstorff maintains that world-making is a quality that permeates every fine art. He identifies three areas concerned with world-making: The artifact involved in the performance of the projection, the nature of that projected, that is the worlds, and the actual action of projection itself. Wolterstorff differentiates between artifacts by labeling as occurrence-works those which can be performed, for example music or dance; labeling as object-works those arts of which there can be impressions, castings, or examples, such as sculpture or painting; and identifying those works which possess some qualities of both of the previous two areas, namely literary and dramatic works.

Wolterstorff attempts to formulate an ontological theory for these designations. He bases it in great part on Aristotle's observations of natural kinds. Wolterstorff declares that art works are a species of a kind, writing ". . . art works and natural kinds are ontological allies."[28] In addition, he reasons that works of art are not created but are already in existence. Artists discover their artifacts rather than invent them. These phenomena are investigated in depth in Chapters Three and Four. In summary, the thoughts Wolterstorff contributes significantly change accepted views of the purpose of the arts including music, as well as the role they play in society and education. These thoughts will be further explored later in the thesis.

Research Purpose and Questions

The purpose of the study is to examine and apply to music education the philosophical proposals put forth by Wolterstorff. Therefore the central problem is stated as:

> What are the implications of Wolterstorff's theories of art for music education?

This central problem divides into the following subproblems.

1. What developments in aesthetics set the stage for the emergence of Wolterstorff's ideas?

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[28] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Art in Action* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing, 1980.), 46.

2. What is Wolterstorff's theory of the ontology of art and works of art?
3. What are the background, nature, and values of world-projection?
4. How are music education and methods of music education affected by utilization of Wolterstorff's rationale, specifically regarding choices of curricula and methodologies and the relationship between music education and culture and society?

Procedure for Study

A general review of pertinent literature was compiled after formulating the research purpose and questions. Extensive study and research in several relevant areas was conducted, including the areas of the history and development of aesthetic thought, the social commentaries and critiques of aesthetic thought, the history and philosophy of modal logic, the writings and publications of Bennett Reimer, the writings and publications of David Elliott, and the writings and publications of Nicholas Wolterstorff. Note cards were compiled and then arranged in a logical order. Following a written compilation of pertinent facts and commentaries, summarizations and applications of Wolterstorff's principle suppositions were made to the field of music education by the author.

Design of the Study

Chapter One contains an introduction to the study, a brief survey of prevailing philosophies of music education, an examination of the problems the study hopes to cover, a biography of Nicholas Wolterstorff, a summary of his important publications, and definitions of important terms used in his work. Chapter Two briefly traces the evolution of thought on philosophical aspects of music; from the early Greeks through the publications of Bennett Reimer. Chapter Three discusses the distinction between art works and performances, the sharing of predicates and properties between art works and examples, the relationship between art works and kinds, and an interpretation of composition. Chapter Four examines the action, nature and substance of world-projection, the ontology of those worlds, the composition and essence of states of affairs, and the connection between actual and projected worlds. Chapter Five presents conclusions based on Wolterstorff's arguments. Chapter Six applies these conclusions to the relationship between music education, society and culture, and specifically to music education curriculum.

The following section will provide a detailed biography of Wolterstorff compiled from his curriculum vitae and a personal conversation. It will be followed by a brief summary of his pertinent writings on art and philosophy and a list of important terms and definitions used by Wolterstorff.

Biography

Nicholas Wolterstorff received his bachelor's degree from Calvin College, and his master's degree and doctorate in philosophy from Harvard University. He has taught at Calvin College, the Free University of Amsterdam, the University of Notre Dame, the University of Michigan, Princeton University, and the University of Chicago. He is currently the Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology and a Fellow of Berkeley College at Yale University where he teaches in the Divinity School. His honors and awards are numerous and include a term as a Wilde lecturer at Oxford University in England, a term as the Gifford Lecturer at St. Andrew's University, the Distinguished Alumni Award from Calvin College, Fellowships from the Evangelical Scholarship Initiative, the Center for Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame, the Institute for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. He has held offices in The American Philosophical Association and The Society of Christian Philosophers. Wolterstorff has published 12 books and 87 journal articles. His contributions to philosophy center on theology, aesthetics, education, and peace and social justice issues. Based on references and citations in his writings, influence has been exerted on his formulations by R. G. Collingwood, Andre Malraux, Saul Kripke, and Alvin Plantinga.[29]

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[29] Some may claim because of Wolterstorff's Calvinist upbringing and his long association with Calvin College, (the church college of the Christian Reformed Church), that Calvinist theology has played a major role in his philosophical outlook and formulations. In an informal conversation held with him in July of 1997, he acknowledges that while he has studied Calvinist theology, Calvinist thinking has *not* unduly influenced his views, and points to Plato as an influential factor on his philosophical development, especially regarding universals.

Nicholas Wolterstorff's Important Publications Relating To Music

"Toward An Ontology of Art Works" ***Nous*** **9 (1975), 115-143.**

This article is an endeavor on Wolterstorff's part to construct an ontology of the fine arts. He examines distinctions between works of art and examples. He suggests that works of art are kinds, labeling them specifically norm-kinds. In addition, he explores in detail the concept of composition.

Art in Action. **Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1980.**

In this book Wolterstorff explores alternatives to the traditional Western mode of thinking about arts and aesthetics. He proposes a functional approach to the arts while viewing them with a Christian perspective. He discusses the universality, purpose, and structure of art, the current institution of high art, and its manifestations in aesthetic theory. Wolterstorff also examines the artist's medium, the nature of fittingness, the actions of world projection and its ontology, as well as the concept of norms in art including artistic and aesthetic excellence.

Works and Worlds of Art. **Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.**

In this book, specifically addressed to philosophers, Wolterstorff details what he considers to be one of the fundamental actions that works of art furnish:

that of world projection. He speaks about the ontology of works and worlds, and describes in great detail art works' projection of worlds. Wolterstorff utilizes mathematics to support his propositions.

"The Work of Making a Work of Music". In *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music.* Edited by Phillip Alperson. New York: Haven Publishing, 1987.

Wolterstorff discusses the elements that comprise the actual composition of a work of art, and the role action plays in its realization. He discusses and evaluates both the expressionist and aesthetic view of art. He looks at the importance of the social practice of art, involving an interplay between works, practices, and participants. He stresses the importance of music-making and briefly describes the ontology of a work of music.

"The Art of Remembering." *The Cresset* LV #78 (1992), 20-28.

Wolterstorff in great detail describes the role of art as a function of social and cultural memory. Art can act as a commemoration. It helps protect what is worthy of honor and praise, lament and outrage from being forgotten. It lends stability to what is carried forward from the past. This is one of the multiplicities of art's purposes.

Definitions

What follows is a limited set of definitions for terms frequently used by Wolterstorff.

Ontology: a branch of metaphysics dealing with being.

Universals: ideas based on general formulations of everyday life.

Performance-work:

a work of art which may be performed. See also occurrence-work.

Performance: the actual occurrence of a performance-work.

Object-work: entities of art of which there can be impressions, castings, or examples.

Object: the actual impressions, castings, or examples of object-works.

Art Works: performance-works and object-works.

Occurrence-Works:

a work of art which may be performed.

Kinds: a unique and separate group of types or sorts which have examples; a universal.

Norm-kind: a kind that is capable of having both correct and incorrect examples.

Sound-Sequence-Occurrence:

that which occurs when performing a musical work.

Causal Generation:

the action of a secondary act generating an end result by being caused by a primary act.

Count Generation:

the action of a primary act counting simultaneously as a secondary act.

Perceptible Artifacts:

works of art that are used to project worlds.

World Projection: the act of imagining a world distinct from the actual world, and then projecting that world fictionally for the consideration of others.

States of Affairs: a way things can or cannot be, or could be but are not; a proposition.

Possible States of Affairs:

states of affairs that can at some time occur.

Actual States of Affairs:

a subset of possible states of affairs which not only can occur, but do occur.

Impossible States of Affairs:

those states of affairs which cannot possibly occur.

Possible World: a state of affairs which either obtains or could obtain.

Closing

The offering of Wolterstorff's philosophy of art provides a welcome alternative to the current philosophies available to music educators. This thesis explores Wolterstorff's writings and gives attention not only to the practical applications of his thinking, but also to the philosophical complexities that underlie his formulations. A background study of the development of the aesthetic experience and the valuing of art as high art will be explored. An examination of the ontology of art and the conception of the generation of possible worlds will follow, along with Wolterstorff's own unique conclusions about art. The resulting application of Wolterstorff's ideas on music education will provide the present day educator with tangible guidelines that can significantly influence his or her teaching choices and provide a welcome alternative to the philosophies currently in vogue.

CHAPTER TWO

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE VALUING OF HIGH ART

Over the last three hundred years, two important concepts have influenced aesthetics and the view music education has held of this philosophy. They have also shaped the structure of the alternate views of other philosophers, including Wolterstorff. These two concepts are the aesthetic experience and the valuing of art as high art. An understanding of the origin of these concepts and the roles they have played in current aesthetic thinking and music education is key to understanding the specific theories of Wolterstorff. This chapter will explore the historical developments of the aesthetic experience and the valuing of art as high art, as well as discuss the viewpoints contemporary scholars hold based on these two phenomena.

The Aesthetic Experience

The notion of the aesthetic experience is generally regarded as having developed during the eighteenth century and refined during the nineteenth century. It developed in conjunction with the idea of aesthetic contemplation.

One who engages in aesthetic contemplation values an object of art for its sake alone. By incorporating specific *feelingful* attitudes and experiencing certain *moving* attributes, the observer, while observing an art object, undergoes a unique and meaningful response appropriately called the *aesthetic experience.* Various philosophers and educators have described this occurrence in fervent terms. Beardsley[1] describes Schiller in 1793 as defining the aesthetic experience as a time when observers find themselves in a condition of both utter rest and extreme motion resulting in a wonderful emotion for which reasoning has no conception and language has no name. Beardsley also summarized Schopenhauer's view from 1844 by noting ". . . he describes the experience as pure, unclouded knowledge of the Platonic Idea, which puts to sleep the restless craving of the Will and for a time deadens the pain of being."[2] In 1896, Santayana wrote "The greater dignity and range of aesthetic pleasure is thus made very intelligible. The soul is glad, as it were, to forget its connection with the body and to fancy that it can travel over the world with the liberty with which it changes the object of its thought."[3]

Many music educators have also referred to the power of the aesthetic experience. Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman in their influential book *Foundations of Music Education* claim that ". . . the result of aesthetic experiences is a richer and

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[1] Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present* (New York: MacMillan, 1966).

[2] Ibid.,268.

[3] George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty* (New York: Scribner's and Sons, 1896), 210.

more meaningful life."[4] Reimer writes in his *A Philosophy of Music Education* ". . . that the experience of art is related to the experience of life at the deepest levels of life's significance."[5] Clearly, traditional aesthetic thinking has placed high value on this response.

The emergence of the concept of aesthetic experience is in stark contrast to previous centuries of thinking, when music's value was often determined by its social uses in the prevailing cultures. The early Greeks used the word *Musike* to refer to an art form that incorporated poetry, music, and dance. Aesthetic enjoyment was not confined to contemplation. Indeed, Regelski notes that in Greek society ". . . everything 'musical' was closely related to ritual, ceremony, feasts and other praxis[6] done for ends (*telos*) other than the kind of 'making actions' (*teche*) we call workings."[7] Plato wrote that beauty in art was a mirror of the eternal Beauty found in the Forms.[8] According to Wolterstorff, at that time music was thought of as an "energetic art"[9] versus that of passive contemplation.

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[4] Harold F. Abeles, Charles R. Hoffer, and Robert H. Klotman, *Foundations of Music Education* (New York: Schirmer Book, 1984), 63.

[5] Bennett Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 52.

[6] Regelski uses the word praxis and praxial when referring to situations where art is tied to a practical aspect of life.

[7] Thomas Regelski, *Music as Praxis,* Paper presented as part of the symposium sponsored by the International Philosophy of Music Education Conference, Toronto, Ont., June 1994, 8.

[8] Plato, *The Republic,* trans. by. J.L. Davies and D.J. Vaughn (London: Macmillan, 1895).

[9] Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Work of Making a Work of Music," in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music,* ed. by Phillip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, 1987).

In the ensuing centuries, the concept of music or art as an object or as a 'work' only gradually emerged. St. Augustine (354-430), wrote *De Pulchro et Apto*[10] and *De Musica* during the fourth century and provided a bridge between the ancient Greeks and Thomas Aquinas. By virtue of his upbringing and education, he had read the ancient philosophers and transmitted and combined their ideas, becoming the first philosopher to establish a Christian view of aesthetics. In his treatises he attempted to answer questions on the nature and judgments of beauty, and the power of its attraction. According to Tartarkiewicz,[11] Augustine proposed the following fundamental points. First, beauty was conceived as proportion and measure; second, the distinction was made between sensuous and intellectual beauty, and third; the beauty of the physical world itself was established. Tatarkiewicz remarks "He handed on the Pythagorean notion of measure, the Platonic notion of absolute beauty and the Stoic notion of the beauty and harmony of the world."[12] Beardsley describes Augustine's key ideas as that of unity, equality, number and order.[13] Augustine wrote in *De Musica* "Number, the base of rhythm, begins from unity. It has beauty by equality and by similarity, and it has interconnection by order. All

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[10] This is translated as *On the Beautiful and the Fitting*, a lost treatise written when Augustine was 26 or 27, and later destroyed by him.

[11] Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, *History of Aesthetics*, vol. 1 (Paris: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1970), 52.

[12] Ibid., 57.

[13] Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 268.

nature requires order."[14] Augustine also added his own ideas about the conjecture of the theory of art and beauty, the analysis of rhythm, and the broadening of rhythm's definition. Augustine focused on the properties of the object rather than the subjective experience.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a pupil of Albert the Great, absorbed many of the leading ideas of Aristotle. Aquinas' concept of beauty was founded on the notion of earthly beauty, rather than the prevailing notion of divine beauty. He, too, emphasized the importance of the art object and discussed in his writings the ontology of beauty and goodness and beauty's relationship to proportion and form. He wrote that beauty was ". . . the object of cognitive power, for we call beautiful things which give pleasure when they are seen; thus beauty rests on proper proportion." [15] During the Renaissance, Neo-Platonic thinking reappeared. Beardsley[16] links Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), translator of Plotinus into Latin as well as the complete works of Plato, as being the spirit behind this movement. His thoughts are a compendium of ideas taken from Plato, Plotinus, Aristotle, and St. Augustine. His theory argued that beauty was incorporeal in the same way light is incorporeal; it is a product of more than sights and sounds. It is significant that a common theme appearing in those years prior to the rise of the British empiricists remained the focus of attention

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[14] Augustine, Saint, *De Musica*, trans. W.F. Jackson Knight (London: Hyperion Press, 1949) 122.

[15] Thomas Aquinas, Saint, *Summa Theologica* (Chicago: William Benton, Pub., 1952), 26.

[16] Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 119.

on both the attributes of the object and the extra-musical circumstances surrounding the object without focusing on the condition of the observer. This changed with the ending of the seventeenth century and the dawning of the eighteenth century.

The foundation for the development of the aesthetic experience was laid by an emerging empiricism. According to Goehr[17] two important factors influenced this development. First, Europe underwent a social transformation, which included a rising middle class along with the decline of the influence of the aristocracy, the beginnings of democracy, and the commencement of the Industrial Revolution. As a result, musicians and artists desired artistic and economic independence. Transforming musical thinking into an observer-centered conception furthered these goals. Second, there was a rise in the popularity and usage of instrumental music. Previously, vocal music had been considered an ideal form based on its practical usage in the church.[18] Therefore, a need existed for a theory that would justify instrumental music's nature and value as a self-sufficient art form. A theory stressing the importance of the aesthetic experience satisfied this requirement.

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[17] Lydia Goerh, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.).

[18] Vocal music, specifically that of chant, was the basis for Christian church music for much of its first millennium and beyond, and as a result influenced the importance of other forms of music. Instrumental music, in its infancy, was thus considered less worthy because of its lack of status in the Church.

The Eighteenth Century

Four developments in the 18th century molded the evolving notion of an aesthetic experience. They included the transformation of the idea of beauty, the emergence of the faculty of taste, the development of the concept of the sublime, and the evolution of the notion of disinterestedness. Each of these ideas came to be considered as components of the aesthetic experience.

Several circumstances contributed to the transformation of the idea of beauty. First, several concepts competed for the role occupied by beauty. These included the idea of the sublime and the picturesque. Second, philosophers became increasingly frustrated at their inability to formulate an adequate theory of beauty that satisfactorily answered all the questions posed by philosophy. Finally, there was a movement away from theories of art based upon one quality. Dickie summarizes:

> The significance of the eighteenth century for aesthetics may be roughly summarized as follows. Before the eighteenth century, *beauty* was a central concept; during the century it was replaced by the concept of taste; by the end of the century, the concept of taste had been exhausted and the way was open for the concept of the *aesthetic*.[19]

The second development, the emergence of the idea of a faculty of taste, was an important milestone in the development of the notion of aesthetic experience and utilized previous suppositions regarding the mental faculties. The *Doctrine of Mental Faculties* was a well-known treatise in the Medieval and Renaissance periods and theorized that human beings possessed different

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[19] George Dickie, *Aesthetics: an Introduction* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 32.

faculties for their various inherent capacities. For example, the vegetative faculty supposedly controlled nutrition and procreation, while the locomotive faculty controlled movement. The eighteenth century German philosopher Baumgarten was the first to suggest that art fell under both the sensory and the intellectual faculties and, as a result, was a matter of inferior cognition. The British philosophers who followed further refined Baumgartner's thinking and placed art under the domain of the sensory faculty only, calling it a phenomenon of *taste*. These British philosophers' views of taste will now be examined, ending with the theories of the great German philosopher, Kant.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury[20] (1671-1713) made several important contributions to the concept of taste. A student of Locke, he was unique in combining the Neo-Platonic philosophy of Plotinus with the empirical concepts of the British. His famous treatise was *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times* written in 1713. He declared one source existed as a single faculty of taste, which also functioned as a moral sense for judgments of behavior and as the basis for making judgments of beauty. He maintained that as a faculty, taste was universal, not relative. Finally, he equated the faculty of taste with an inward eye able to grasp an aesthetic object immediately without reasoning. This ability, he asserted, was intuitive, not cognitive or sensual. In addition, Shaftesbury believed that the reflective aesthetic experience involved

[20] Shaftesbury is considered a Janus figure because of his ability to combine the past with the future.

the use of good taste, which was the means by which the mind knew itself in a manner other than that of deliberative cognitive reasoning.[21]

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) and David Hume (1711-1776) were two important and influential British philosophers who also made significant contributions to the idea of taste. Beardsley notes that Hutcheson, a follower of Shaftesbury, published what is considered to be the first modern essay on philosophy in 1725.[22] In *An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, and Design,* Hutcheson attempted to discover just exactly what it was in an object that affected observers. He also maintained that the ability to perceive beauty constituted a 'sense'. He greatly influenced Hume. In *Of the Standard of Taste,* written in 1757, Hume observed that beauty and its rules cannot be rationally understood. He concluded that beauty is not a quality of an object but of the observer's sentiment.[23] Beauty, then, becomes a feeling linked by nature to certain qualities in an object, and the judgment of taste is the discriminating factor that allows this feeling to be perceived.

Archibald Alison (1757-1839) published *Essays of the Nature and Principles of Taste* in 1790. Beardsley [24] describes his accomplishments as one of the high points of achievement in the British empiricist movement. Indeed, his theory

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[21] Of interest is the gradual shift from emphasis on the action of art to the product itself, and then finally to the experience of the observer-no longer objective, but subjective in quality.

[22] Beardsley, *Aesthetics,* 185.

[23] See footnote 21.

[24] Beardsley, *Aesthetics,* 203.

greatly affected the development of the faculty of taste begun by Shaftesbury. Alison argued that the faculty of taste was that by which we perceive the beautiful[25] and the sublime. He observed that for the pleasure of taste to occur, imagination must be used in conjunction with a train of ideas of emotions.

Finally, the most critical contribution to the development of the concept of taste came from the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Rader[26] calls him the greatest figure in the interpretation of the beholder's response to the object. His two principal works concerning aesthetics are *Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and the Beautiful* published in 1764, and *Critique of Judgment* published in 1790. Kant believed that aesthetic satisfaction and the enjoyment of beauty were a condition of the mind. Kant's aesthetic judgment focused on the pleasure experienced by the subject. He believed that this pleasure is a property of the subject. As such, the experience, while subjective, is both stable and universal.

Kant's views on beauty can be summarized as follows:

1. An object is judged beautiful by the feelings of delight that the observer experiences.

2. Beauty is representative of the formal qualities present in an object; the object having been designed for no specific purpose.

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[25] By this time beautiful was synonymous with aesthetic.

[26] Melvin Rader, ed., *A Modern Book of Esthetics* (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979), 332.

3. When a subject experiences beauty, the subject responds to the formal qualities of the object.

4. Feeling generates the judgment of taste.

Kant wrote that the judgment of taste is essentially a singular judgment immediately accompanying intuition. He concluded that the judgment of taste differed from other judgments concerned with what is pleasurable or good. Indeed, the judgment of taste is contemplative, not cognitive. Kant divides the judgment of taste into twin components: the aesthetic judgment and the logical judgment. The aesthetic judgment is representative of subject and feeling,[27] while the logical judgment is representative of the object and its properties.[28] Thus, when Kant suggests that form and formal qualities are essential in triggering judgments of taste, form becomes a factor contributed by the mind and the judgment of taste becomes a product of subjective and mental processes.

Kant's pronouncements are significant because they incorporate past aesthetic thought while setting the foundation for 19th century aesthetics. As such, he formed a bridge between the two centuries.[29]

The third development is connected to the first. As noted earlier, the transformation of the theory of beauty included the recognition of factors, other than beauty, involved in the aesthetic experience. One of these characteristics was the sublime, which underwent a metamorphosis of meaning throughout the

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[27] An aesthetic judgment labels an object as pleasant, delightful, painful, etc.

[28] A logical judgment labels an object as red, large, loud, round, in a major key, etc.

[29] Similar to Shaftesbury and St. Augustine.

eighteenth century. The sublime had its official beginning in a work long but mistakenly attributed to a third century AD philosopher, Casssius Longinus. In reality, an unknown writer most likely wrote it in the first century AD. Titled *On the Sublime,* the essay sought to blend and balance the concepts of inspiration and rhetorical mastery. The powerful result was called the sublime, which the author of the essay admits cannot be defined. "Our persuasions we can usually control, but the influences of the sublime bring power and irresistible might to bear and reign supreme over every hearer."[30] The sublime was tied to the ". . . emergence in the late Seventeenth century of a powerful new feeling for nature, and for natural beauty. . . " [31] This quasi-religious experience eventually became considered to be the aesthetic experience of the sublime.[32] Shaftesbury was an important contributor to this recognition and the development. Beardsley summarizes Shaftesbury's contributions by noting that his "willingness to enjoy the look and feel of nature opened the eye to the delights of its wild and fearsome aspects . . . out of this broadening of appreciation grew the deeper concept of the sublime." [33]

Joseph Addison (1672-1719) described the effect of an art object on the observer and distinguished between beauty and the sublime. He also posed many of the questions that would form the basis for aesthetics in the next

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[30] Longinus, *On the Sublime,* trans. W. R. Roberts (New York: MacMillan Company, 1930), 58.

[31] Beardsley, *Aesthetics,* 182.

[32] Kant's famous phrase describing the circumstance is purposiveness without purpose.

[33] Beardsley, *Aesthetics,* 182.

century, discussing what he called the primary[34] and secondary[35] pleasures of the imagination. He commented on the secondary pleasures of the imagination by writing in the June 30th, 1712 edition of *The Spectator* "The pleasures of these secondary views of the imagination are of a wider and more universal nature than those it has when joined with sight."[36] In other words, art improves nature and observers tend to prefer the ideas of art to those of nature. Adams[37] notes that Addison added to earlier theorizing on the sublime when he wrote that disagreeable things portrayed aptly in art could please. Something could be beautiful *by* being sublime.

The evolution of the sublime continued with the contributions of Edmund Burke (1728-1797). Burke, like Addison before him, constructed his premises based on the empirical tradition of John Locke.[38] In 1757 he published *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful.* The body of Burke's treatise is concerned with the ideas of the sublime, the beautiful, and their comparisons. Burke distinguished between the beautiful

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[34] Primary pleasures are those resulting from the immediate experience of objects.

[35] Secondary pleasures are pleasures resulting from the ideas of such objects when the objects are not actually present to perception, but are represented to the observer.

[36] Joseph Addison, *The Spectator,* vol. 3, ed. By Henry Morley (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1883), 4.

[37] Hazard Adams, ed. *Critical Theory since Plato* (Chicago: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), 290.

[38] That is, all knowledge comes via sense experience and simple ideas are then combined into complex ones.

and the sublime by calling the beautiful a positive pleasure and the sublime the removal or diminution of pain resulting in delight. He wrote:

> But shall we therefore say that the removal of pain or its diminution is always simply painful? Or affirm that the cessation or the lessoning of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By no means. What I advance is this; first, that there are pleasures and pains of a positive and independent nature; and secondly that the feeling which results from the cessation or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblence to positive pleasure to have it considered of the same nature. . . Whenever I have occasion to speak of thise species of relative pleasure, I call it *Delight*.[39]

Kant, too, wrote extensively on the importance of the sublime and drafted his own definition for this attribute. He interpreted the sublime as being that which is absolutely great. This judgment is non-conceptual and non-cognitive. He described the sublime as occurring when imagination proves inadequate when compared to Reason and as a result there exists a realization of the magnificence of Reason itself. Thus, the sublime embodies pain in the awareness of the incongruity between imagination and Reason, but this pain turns to pleasure upon the realization of the greatness of Reason. In turn, Beardsley comments on the sublime by writing "It is our own greatness, as rational beings, that we celebrate and enjoy in sublimity."[40] The consequences of the emergence of the sublime as a component of the aesthetic experience were the dethronement of beauty from its controlling position in aesthetics and the expansion of the boundaries of the aesthetic experience.

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[39] Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1759), 51.

[40] Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 219.

Collinson defines disinterestedness, the fourth development, as the

> . . . absence of the kind of interest that relates to one's own advantage or disadvantage; or it can describe an impartial and unbiased attitude in which one has no personal ax to grind in a matter. It requires us to consider something on its own merits and not in relation to what might accrue from it ourselves: to be concerned with the object itself rather than with how it relates to oneself.[41]

Shaftesbury was instrumental in introducing the concept of disinterestedness. He noted that the enjoyment of beauty is entirely separate from the desire of possession. An illustration of this concept has become one of Shaftesbury's most famous examples. He wrote that one could be so taken with the beauty and majesty of the ocean that one would wish to command it and be its master. True aesthetic appreciation and experience would be missing. Dickie further comments on disinterestedness by writing:

> Since Shaftesbury's time it has been a staple of aesthetic theory that selfish or interested desires of which the desire for possession is the paradigm, are destructive of aesthetic appreciation. Some theorists have even concluded that selfish or practical desires are wholly incompatible with aesthetic appreciation.[42]

Kant also played a major role in the evolution of the concept of disinterestedness. He gave a detailed explanation of it in his *Critique of Judgment* observing that delight in beauty is free delight because, among other things, it is disinterested. In addition, Kant gives three aspects of disinterestedness: first,

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[41] Diane Collinson, "Aesthetic Experience" in *Philosophical Aesthetics,* ed. Oswald Hanfling (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 134.

[42] Dickie, *Aesthetics*, 52.

satisfaction is provided whether or not the perceived object in actuality exists, second, satisfaction occurs without a desire to possess, and third, satisfaction takes place without a personal interest.[43]

The eighteenth century established the aesthetic experience by analyzing a transformed concept of beauty, the use of taste, the sublime, and disinterestedness. This experience became the primary focus of aesthetics. Complex theories provided a cognitive framework for the dissemination of the new aesthetic creed. In addition, there was a gradual stress placed on the object as an end in itself and a corresponding shift from objective evaluation to subjective evaluation. Nineteenth century aesthetics contributed the ideas of loss of will and psychical distance.

The Nineteenth Century

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) believed that the loss of will was an important feature of the aesthetic experience. His aesthetic thoughts are based on his complex philosophy as a whole. His formulations are derived from one idea; the idea that the world as it is known and everything in it is the manifestation of one immense, driving force called *will.* Schopenhauer's philosophy describes the world as being will, and will being the world. In addition, everything that exists is an objectification of the universal and

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[43] Collinson "Aesthetic Qualities," 142-143, observes that some philosophers criticize Kant's perceived ambiguities in his account of disinterestedness. Collinson argues that it is a mistake to regard Kant's complexities as ambiguities.

perpetual struggle of the will as a whole. One of the only respites from the struggle of the will is aesthetic contemplation and the denial of will that comes with the accompanying aesthetic experience. When will is denied, there is a sense of losing oneself in the object, while individuality, perception, and existence are forgotten. In aesthetic perception, the subject is able to perceive and gain knowledge in a unique manner. Schopenhauer's philosophy, while complex, made an important contribution to observations about the aesthetic experience.

Psychical distance became a term widely used in the early twentieth century. The word was coined in a series of lectures given in 1907 at the University of Cambridge by Edward Bullough (1880-1934), in an attempt to define the aesthetic attitude. Psychical distance is the mental and emotional distance the subject maintains from the object when striving for an aesthetic experience. Rader defines the term as ". . . the spectator's awareness of the characteristics of the esthetic[44] object which are not those calling for a practical response."[45] Bullough maintained that an aesthetic experience was impossible without adequate distance. He sought to maintain a balance between participation and detachment, and low and high distance. The correct distance for an aesthetic experience depended on the characteristics of the object and on

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[44] Rader uses the English spelling for aesthetic.

[45] Rader, *A Book of Modern Esthetics*, 332.

the subject, and could be defined in the words of Bullough as the utmost decrease of distance without its disappearance.

The Contemporary Era

Several contemporary philosophers and educators have written on the aesthetic experience. Monroe C. Beardsley (1915-1985), Harry S. Broudy (1905-), Louis Arnaud Reid (1895-1986), Susanne Langer (1895-1983) and Bennett Reimer (1932-) all advocated the importance of the aesthetic experience.

Beardsley's writings point to several important standards of the aesthetic experience.[46] He initially wrote:

> I propose to say that a person is having an aesthetic experience during a particular stretch of time if and only if the greater part of his mental activity during that time is united and made pleasurable by being tied to the form and qualities of a sensuously presented or imaginatively intended object on which his primary attention is concentrated.[47]

He later came to the conclusion that the aesthetic experience can encompass more than the factor of being tied to form. Beardsley then formulated five components of an aesthetic experience. First is the quality of object directedness. Object directedness is a succession of mental states guided by the objective properties of a particular field upon which the subject's attention is fixed. The resultant feeling is one of satisfaction that things are working or have worked out in a *fittingly* manner. Second is the quality of felt freedom. Felt freedom

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[46] Beardsley was known for a theory of art criticism that he published in 1958.

describes the state of the subject as being free from perceived concerns of past or present issues. Moreover, there exists a sense of harmony and relaxation with the presented object so that it seems freely chosen. Third is the experience of detached affect[48] defined as a sense that the object being contemplated is emotionally removed or at a distance. Fourth is the concept of active discovery, which is in effect the application of critical thinking to the observing experience. Fifth is the concept of wholeness, a sort of Gestalt integration of the subject as a person, free from distracting influences with a corresponding sense of well-being and satisfaction. Beardsley later conceded that the aesthetic experience could in fact take place with the first component and at least three of the others: hopefully the fifth component would also be present.

Broudy[49] believed that the aesthetic experience, whether artistic or natural, is in its essence an image. This experience is primarily perceptual in nature. A complete aesthetic perception is obligated to encompass the object with all its components in its entirety.

In addition, Broudy maintained that the aesthetic experience results from the formal properties of the object. That is, certain formal structures capture and hold the subject's attention. This happens because when certain formal

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[47] Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, 81. After 1969, Beardsley questioned whether using pleasure as a qualification for an aesthetic experience was appropriate.

[48] This is similar to Bullogh's psychical distance.

[49] Harry S Broudy, "Arts in Education." Address delivered to the Annual Conference of the Pennsylvania Music Educator's Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1974. Quoted in Bennett C. Reimer and Jeffrey E. Wright, eds., *On the Nature of Musical Experience*, (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1992), 35.

configurations are encountered; they are reminiscent of the designs and rhythms found in nature.

Broudy further states that the aesthetic experience is a result of the expressiveness of the object. He added that there exist two features of expressivity: the metaphorical and the presentational. These features can be either direct or indirect.[50] Reid contended that in the aesthetic experience feeling was a form of cognition. Indeed, he thought of feeling as a mental happening, not an activity. He contrasted feeling with emotion by claiming that while feeling was a natural, basic concept, emotion was contrived. Feeling is internal while emotion is external. In an aesthetic experience, the object functions uniquely by expressing the subject's inner states of mind and body.

Reid also conceived of the aesthetic experience as the contemplation of the perceptual and imaginal aspects of an object.[51] In other words, aesthetic experience differs from ordinary perception. Reid also asserts that the aesthetic experience embodies some valuable meaning that moves, interests, and excites. By this means, objects are able to convey meanings that cannot be literally possessed. To the imaginative mind, the perceived object is able to express certain values. These values are not reducible to verbal language. Along with many others, Reid agrees that the aesthetic experience demands a certain amount of psychical distance. He claims there is unity and necessity of

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[50] Broudy refers to Suzanne Langer here in great detail in his original writings.

[51] See Louis Arnaud Reid, *A Study in Aesthetics* (New York:MacMillan, 1931), and his *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1960).

wholeness in the art object, as well as in the aesthetic experience. This unity becomes lost if the object is dissected into individual components.

Langer[52] was concerned with the nature of symbolism in the aesthetic experience. She described the symbols identified with the aesthetic experience as non-discursive: entities that represent forms of experience that cannot be verbally expressed. Art is identified with significant form, a form that symbolizes ideas of feeling. Therefore, forms of human feeling can be recognized in the aesthetic experience in a way that can never be described verbally.

Reimer views the aesthetic experience as an example of intrinsicality. That is, the aesthetic experience serves no utilitarian purpose and is an experience in and of itself. He also describes the experience of the observer as being disinterested and distanced. In addition, Reimer identifies it with the quality of empathy. The aesthetic experience is involved with expressive qualities rather than symbolic designations. The aesthetic experience reacts to formed material containing expressive qualities and then stimulating the subject's perception and reaction. These two kinds of behavior, aesthetic perception and aesthetic reaction, form essential components of the aesthetic experience.

Reimer writes:

> Aesthetic perceptual structuring consists of an interaction of the two. The perception and the interaction are simultaneous and interdependent. The

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[52] Susanne K Langer, *Feeling and Form* (New York: Scribner's, 1953).

> perception is not a separate process which later produces reaction but is inherently reactive in nature. What is perceived is perceived *as expressive,* the response being an integral part of the perception. The reaction does not take place in isolation. It is dependent on perception of expressive qualities or conditions, which can produce reactions in the first place.[53]

Several conclusions can be drawn from twentieth century aesthetic thought. It is obvious that contemporary philosophers and educators have been heavily influenced by the writings of aesthetic philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is evidenced by the inclusion of the concepts of disinterestedness, psychical distance, and the focus on a subjective view of the aesthetic experience in many commentaries on contemporary aesthetics and philosophies of art. In addition, several new factors have been added. These include the emphasis on the need for a *feelingful* perception of the object, the identification of the importance of an art object's formal properties in arousing an aesthetic response, and the contention that both the aesthetic experience and the object contain an inherent sense of unity. In other words, the unified whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In this respect, the aesthetic experience becomes a paradigm of Gestalt completeness.

Ultimately, the concept and significance of the aesthetic experience revolutionized the way the western world viewed and valued music both intellectually and philosophically. In three centuries the notion of aesthetic experience evolved from a collection of several loose suppositions to a position of paramount importance, exerting far-reaching effects on music education.

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[53] Reimer, Philosophy of Music, 107.

However, music educators are left to grapple with the persistent perplexity of whether or not the aesthetic experience should be the principal basis for a significant musical interaction.

The Valuing of Art as High Art

It is common in today's culture to markedly distinguish between genres of music. Jazz, classical, rock, rhythm and blues, ethnic, and religious musics are approached and valued differently. In addition 'experts' label these musics as great, good, or mundane. This qualitative branding is, and has been, firmly embedded not only in society, but in music education as well. In their influential book *Foundations and Principles of Music Education,* Leonhard and House succinctly summarized the contrasts between good and great music: "Good music and great music differ in two essential characteristics: 1. subtlety of expression and 2. abstractness of expression. Popular music, most hymns, semi-popular music, and most folk music lack subtlety."[54] Over the past three hundred years, many aestheticians have agreed with these sentiments and designated music that provided the greatest aesthetic experience as superior. Such music is considered most suitable for contemplation. Music is, and has been, valued and classified according to aesthetic judgments. A resulting hierarchy emerges, placing all other music below abstract *works* of art music.

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[54] Charles Leonhard and Robert House, *Foundations and Principles of Music Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 90.

Works become an important nomenclature for those art compositions that exist solely as objects of contemplation.

Before the advent of aesthetics, however, music played a very different role in its relationship to society and the individual. The following section traces the evolution of music from its praxial status as an integral part of everyday life to its position of transcendence and total separation from ordinary existence.

In ancient Greek civilization, music was used for the strengthening of noble character and conduct rather than providing aesthetic contemplation. Goehr explains the Greek attitude by writing: "Proper musical performance was never thought to be appropriate first and foremost for entertainment or leisure, because it was capable of representing society's values at large."[55] The Greeks valued the expressive properties of music because they contributed to performances and the activities associated with those performances. Hence, the primary purpose of music, according to the Greeks, was to affect and control listeners and performers. The concept of a musical 'work' was foreign to Greek philosophy.

With the rise of Christianity, the purpose of music changed. It now became a medium used to praise God through such forms as hymns, chants, songs, and motets. This music was text centered. The advent of medieval courts created a demand for secular songs and utilitarian music for dancing and socializing. One common quality of this early music was its conception in

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[55] Goehr, *Imaginary World,* 126. See also Plato's writings on ethos. This doctrine encouraged the moral and political indoctrination of the masses by using art.

response to *praxial* requirements. Indeed, these praxial requirements served as the basis for value judgments of worth and competence.

Classical views were revived in the Renaissance and proceeded to sever music's major tie to religion. In addition, the humanists of the Renaissance still believed in the power of music to convey human passion and influence human character. The idea of abstract musical works, however, remained nonexistent. "Melody lacking reference to anything valuable beyond itself had no acceptable function."[56]

Therefore, prior to the eighteenth century, music was regulated by extra musical concerns. Music was generally ritualistic or pedagogical in nature. All this changed with the emergence of aesthetics. Theorists separated music from outside aspects and declared art an end in itself. "All arts came quickly to be seen both as the motivation and as the end of a unique form of human experience-the pure aesthetic experience."[57]

During the eighteenth century, four important factors influenced the separation of music from praxial concerns. First, musical description became intimately entwined with the formalist and romantic theories that gained prominence. Second, there was a simultaneous movement from an extra-musical criterion of judgment to an absolute musical criterion of judgment. Third, with a rising middle class and an educated upper class, more people possessed the

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[56] Goehr, *Imaginary World,* 136.

[57] Ibid., 171.

conceptual equipment necessary for understanding the new theories put forth concerning aesthetic objects and contemplation. Fourth, according to Regelski[58] the increase of the *nouveau riche* brought with it an increase in the number of amateur musicians who played poorly. This resulted in the growth of the valuation of the musical 'expert' with a corresponding expansion of interest in the role of the listener-the paradox of the "passive participant."

Goehr comments on the state of fine art at the conclusion of the eighteenth century: ". . . the essence of fine art comprised the basic idea of severance with the transient, contingent world of mere mortals." [59] Goehr calls this the separability principle: a principle that extols the separation of fine arts from the world of everyday life. This principle defined the boundaries between art and nature, art and craft, civilized art and popular art, etc. The separability principle is significant because it ended over a millennium and a half of musical practice coupling music with praxial concerns. The ultimate outcome was the designation of serious classical music as works of art, with a corresponding separation from ordinary life and elevation to a higher state of other world existence.

During the nineteenth century, Romantic thinking emphasizing the transcendent influenced aesthetics. Works of music were viewed as having moved from the worldly and particular to the spiritual and universal; being

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[58] Regelski, *Music as Praxis*, 15.

[59] Goehr, *The Imaginary Musuem*,157.

intended exclusively for contemplation. In particular, abstract instrumental music was singled out as the perfect embodiment of transcendent meaning.[60] Romantic theorists believed that the greater the aesthetic content, the less the ordinary world intruded, and the more worthy the work of art. Lasch wrote that in the nineteenth century music came to be segregated from everyday life and ". . . surrounded with an aura of sanctity-this development coincided with the elevation of the performing artist and, above all the composer, to heroic status."[61] The Romantic period firmly incorporated the definitions of the 'high' art of the educated and culturally elite and the 'low' art of the inferior and more common class. Gans writes "The familiar opposition between 'high' and 'popular' culture, (was) born in the Romantic era. The traditional dichotomy has the residual value of differentiating between those who are 'cultured' and those who are not."[62] The Romantic perception of musical works also reflected the class conflicts of the nineteenth century. Green remarks,

> The ideology of aesthetic autonomy reached a peak in the 'great' tradition of nineteenth century bourgeois art, which portrayed a human essence as the transcendent, ideal realm of eternal and unchanging capacities over and above its weak and fickle manifestation in the reality of everyday life. The bourgeois aesthetic holds the cultural world as a spiritual realm of authentic

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[60] This is exactly opposite of the thinking that had dominated music since the Greeks. Textually based music had been considered ideal, with instrumental music a poor second.

[61] Christopher Lasch, "The Degradation of Work and the Apotheosis of Art." *Harper's*, February 1984, 42-43.

[62] Eric Gans, "Art and Entertainment," in *Perspectives on Musical Aesthetics*, ed. John Rahn (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 40.

> universal values over and above civilization and the material world of social utility.[63]

Wolterstorff likewise observes: "The Romantic Theory of Arts, I suggest, is best thought of as the ideology of our modern Western bourgeois institution of high art."[64] The desire existed to keep and preserve high art from contamination by the masses.

The emergence of these bourgeois issues also greatly influenced the post romantic period. "The post romantic era was marked, indeed, defined by heroic attempts to preserve the difference of a self-conscious cultural elite from submergence in the 'mass.'"[65] In addition, Wolterstorff[66] asserts that the post romantic era was obsessed with distinguishing between 'true' art and entertainment and between the beautiful and the merely attractive.

In the twentieth century, aesthetic philosophers and educators continued to write and elaborate on the importance of high art. They drew distinct boundaries between ordinary life and music, and the ecstasy associated with 'great' art and music. Clive Bell, a proponent of significant form,[67] described the rapture of art. He wrote in 1913 that "Art transports us from the world of man's

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[63] Lucy Green, *Music on Deaf Ears: Musical Meaning, Ideology, Education* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 111.

[64] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Art in Action* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing, 1980) 43.

[65] Gans, "Art and Entertainment," 43.

[66] Wolterstorff, *Art and Action*, 47.

[67] Bell believed that objects of art arouse a peculiar aesthetic emotion by means of significant form. Significant form itself is the unique combination of formal elements. Bell found in abstract music the very ideal of art.

activity to a world of esthetic exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from human interests; our anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life." [68]

The renowned Canadian philosopher, Sparshott, has reviewed several twentieth century philosophers' views of aesthetics and music. He assesses Carl Dahlhaus' *Esthetics of Music* and concludes that Dahlhaus advocates high art as the privilege of an educated few. Sparshott observes of Dahlhaus' beliefs "Music is to be arcane, a closed shop." [69] He also questions the work of T. W. Adorno and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and comments that both philosophers perceive the aesthetics of music as a sort of holiness.

Leonhard and House wrote on the importance of using only great works of art that are abstract in nature in music education. They note:

> Program music, along with film music, music written for ballet and music incidental to a play, is unlikely to be great music. None of these kinds of music result from purely thematic thinking and development. The composer supplements his musical idiom by imagined or actual situations, subjects, or events which hold a mood or specify an emotion. . . Great music does not give up moods and emotions but insight into the form and structure of human feelings. . . Great music expresses symbolically the life of feeling which cannot be expressed through language or any other medium of human expression[70] . . . If the music is expressive and has deep emotional import in its own right, it is great music. If it

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[68] Clive Bell, *Art* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1913) 27.

[69] Francis Sparshott, "Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds," in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music,* ed. by Phillip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, 1987), 40.

[70] In this respect they follow the thinking of Langer regarding the importance of great music symbolizing feeling.

> requires the program to gain import, it can only be inferior music."[71]

Broudy also wrote extensively on the importance of aesthetic judgment in differentiating serious art from popular art.

> Today when popular art serves a mass market, it is perforce designed to be assimilated without special training. For what then do we need the schools in the skills of impression? To properly perceive serious arts, of course. All I mean by serious art are objects that are produced with some concern for artistic merit and judged worthy of study by critics, scholars, and artists of a given period. Serious art tends to be esoteric, complex, artificial, sophisticated and the talk about it equally so. It thus tends to elude the general public that is not privy to what counts in perceiving and judging it.[72]

Broudy maintained that the proper authority should be consulted when determining which artistic creations are worthy of use in music education.

Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman likewise emphasize a tangible boundary between high and low art. They write "Art music deviates in its journey toward points of gratification and trends by a sometimes circuitous route; primitive music contains almost no uncertainties in its quick consummation of what is expected." [73]

In addition, the British philosopher and educator Swanwick[74] comments that the separation of the arts from the main business of life and education is

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[71] Leonard and House, *Foundations and Principles*, 93-94.

[72] Broudy, "Arts and Education," 8.

[73] Abeles, Hoffer, Klotman, *Foundations of Music Education*, 68.

[74] Keith Swanwick, *Music, Mind, and Education* (New York: Routledge, 1988).

quite common.[75] He notes that the arts have been observed to occupy the leisure part of education. In fact, he writes that the arts are frequently seen as creating dream-worlds into which people escape from reality. "The implication is clear; some of the arts are dreamlike, or at least 'playful', they are otherworldly."[76]

The Institution of High Art

However, not all contemporary philosophers and educators look on the existence of high art and its accompanying elitism from the aesthetic perspective. Wolterstorff has made several cogent observations about the institution of art as it exists in the Western world. In addition, he has developed a discerning analysis of the role of high art in today's society. He identifies the existence of an *institution of art* and defines it as ". . . characteristic arrangements and patterns of action whereby works of art are produced in that society, whereby they are made available for use by members of that society, and whereby members of that society are enabled to make use of them."[77] Wolterstorff describes an

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[75] While many aesthetically oriented educators of this century have tended to reinforce the power and position of high art, a notable exception has been Bennett Reimer. He decries the power of elitism.

> The elitist notion that aesthetic experiences are only for some people carries over into the equally elitist idea that aesthetic experiences can be gotten-or should be gotten-from only some kinds of art. . . This condescending attitude denigrates much of the world's art as well as the people who delight in it. It assumes that some human feelings are serious and some are not so that some people can have worthwhile feelings and some cannot so they only respond to art which is not worthwhile. . . If they had appropriate respect for art as art they would realize that *all* art does the same thing and that *all* art can be and should be judged by the same criteria for success. Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music,* 111.

[76] Swanwick, *Music, Mind and Education,* 59.

[77] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 21.

institution of high art as emerging out of the institution of art. He identifies three kinds of art in today's society: *High art* for the cultural elite, *Works of popular art,* for all those outside of the cultural elite, and *Works of the tribe,* works shared by both the elite and the non-elite.

Wolterstorff characterizes the institution of high art as ". . . oriented around the perceptual contemplation of art and then, especially, around perceptual contemplation for the purpose of aesthetic delight."[78] He describes certain aspects of the institution of high art, including the necessity of an immense repertoire of constantly changing, new and novel works. This becomes essential in part because the passive cultural elite find themselves jaded and bored with a steady diet of similar works of art. In addition, the use of a *critic* becomes necessary in order to explain and evaluate the emerging radical works. Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the institution of high art is its concept (inherited from the nineteenth century) of complete separation from ordinary life. Lasch[79] contends that high art is doubly segregated from everyday life because first, it has little association with ritual, work, or social life, and second, its glorification has gone hand in hand with the notion that it is a leisure time activity for the leisure class, or cultural elite. In fact, Wolterstorff notes that "To one who contemplates, life is a distraction."[80] Composer John Cage asserts

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[78] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 21.

[79] Lasch, *The Degradation and Apotheosis of Art.*

[80] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 27.

that "When we separate music from life what we get is art (a compendium of masterpieces)."[81]

In addition, the existence of the institution of high art has led to the glorification of art as a quasi-religion. Lasch observes that art has become an object of worship.

> In modern society art is not an object of indifference. In some quarters, at least, it is an object of worship. It has come to enjoy the esteem formerly reserved for religion. It has been cut off from the rest of life and put on a pedestal. It has been relegated to the museum and to the concert hall (and the concert hall as has been pointed out, has become a museum in its own *right*), not because it is considered unimportant but because its adoration can best take place in an atmosphere uncontaminated by everyday concerns."[82]

Wolterstorff compares the aesthetic contemplation of the art lover with the religious experience of the mystic. He maintains that art for art's sake has attained divinity, with art becoming a 'religion.' "Anyone who, with open eyes, reads the writing about art from the last two centuries cannot help but be struck by the religiosity of it."[83] He concludes ". . . as the Christian religion lost its grip on the minds and hearts of Western humanity, some filled the gap with faith in the present and future wonders of science and technology, while others filled it with Art--art understood now as *opera perfecta et absoluta.*"[84]

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[81] John Cage, *Silence; Lectures and Writings* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 44.

[82] Lasch, *The Degradation and Apotheosis of Art*, 42.

[83] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 127.

[84] Ibid.

Finally, the institution of high art continues to illustrate the class difference between those who are culturally elite and those who are not. Sparshott[85] observes that some views of aesthetics assume that music exists to be appreciated by a group of privileged consumers for whom musicians work. He suggests that a degree of exploitation is present. Green writes: "Aesthetic ideology hankers after a dignity of the human being that transcends all material difference and justifies social conditions by postulating a superior spiritual realm."[86]

In conclusion, the twentieth century has seen common acceptance of the notion of art music as a form of high art, both superior and transcendent to all other music, and existing primarily for aesthetic contemplation. This phenomenon is a direct break with pre-eighteenth century Western thinking and practice. The mode of reasoning typifying high art has influenced music education in the formulation of its goals, objectives, and curricular choices. Swanwick describes this effect.

> Music teachers. . . have exercised this power by fencing off idioms sanctioned by school and college, defining some musics negatively compared with the western classical tradition, seeing them as undeveloped, primitive, or culturally inaccessible: first in repeats to jazz, rock, and pop, now with reference to other musical traditions, especially those of Africa and Asia. . . Teachers, musicians and, until recently, western musicologists have tended to subscribe to cultural labeling, perhaps too easily believing certain idioms to be intrinsically inferior, or possibly undeveloped-

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[85] Sparshott, "Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds," 40.

[86] Green, *Music on Deaf Ears*, 113.

> a more compassionate if patronizing view-or, at least none of their business.[87]

Colwell observes that the aesthetic education movement has left its mark on the music education profession. He writes "It [the aesthetic movement] has been enculterated into music education thought. The technical, formal, sensuous, and expressive dimensions of music are seriously considered in the improvement of performance."[88]

Some contemporary educators and philosophers are calling for a reexamination of the far-reaching influence the notions of aesthetic judgment and experience, and the valuing of art as high art have exercised. Musical experience is more abundant than this. Indeed, the aesthetic philosophy as it is understood today is the result of a relatively brief time period when compared to the previous centuries of human musical involvement. The philosophy of aesthetics has important things to say to music, musicians, and music education, but dangers and distortions result when aesthetics becomes the only view allowed influence. Music education is ripe for the formulation of a theory that is more inclusive and responsive to present concerns and yet still embraces the rich roles music has played in the past.

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[87] Swanwick, *Music Mind and Education,* 103.

[88] Richard Colwell, "Music and Aesthetic Education: A Collegial Relationship," *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 20 (1986): 37.

CHAPTER THREE

WOLTERSTORFF'S ANALYSIS OF THE ONTOLOGY OF ART

Wolterstorff's analysis of the ontology of art lays the groundwork for his ideas on the value and importance of art in society. These ideas are important because they grapple with the very core of art including the questions of what is art, what is a musical work, what is the work's relationship to music, what does it mean to perform, and what is composition. The answers to these questions make it possible to then theorize about the relationship between music, music education, and society. In addition, this chapter analyzes in depth Wolterstorff's view on untenable yet widespread views of art and aspects of the sharing of predicates. An examination is also made of the role of art as a universal as it affects the issues of performance and composition. However, it is first important to define three philosophical terms that form the basis for Wolterstorff's theory on the fundamental being of musical works. Those terms are ontology, universals, and set theory.

Definitions

Ontology

Ontology is a branch of metaphysics. Metaphysics describes the basic nature of reality or being: It is an exploration of the meaning of existence. It includes the subjects of space and time, causality, identity and change, possibility and necessity, and universals and particulars. Ontology is the study of being and thus consists of such issues as the nature of existence and the categorical structure of reality. This includes all that is commonly shared by entities that are material, such as humans, rocks, and fish; and immaterial, such as time and space. Formal ontology is more specific and is called the science of *certain sorts* of entities. These entities are the forms of objects in the world. Ontology has played a role in the evolution of metaphysics. It traces its origin to Aristotle and his books *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. *Physics* deals with material entities while *Metaphysics* discusses what is beyond or behind the physical world, that is, immaterial entities. In these books, Aristotle conceived the science of metaphysics as having as its subject matter all beings and their being as such. As a result, metaphysics became identified as the 'first philosophy' because it encompassed the most basic principles that form a foundation for all other sciences.[1] Ontology descended from this first philosophy of metaphysics as the theory of existent being. The word ontology, while possessing Greek roots, was

[1] Another name for this form of metaphysics is *metaphysical generalis*, the science of the most general concepts or categories of being.

formally introduced by the German philosopher Rudolf Göckel (1547-1628) in his treatise on scholastic philosophy and its attendant terminology,[2] *Lexicon philosophicum,* written in 1613. The philosophy of ontology gained prominence through the influence of another German philosopher, Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Formal ontology made its appearance in a treatise entitled *Logical Investigations* written by the philosopher Husserl[3] from 1913-1921 in which he formulated a pure theory of objects. Formal ontological categories were established for such classifications as objects, states of affairs, properties, and geneses. These formal categories exhibit entire regions of being. In addition, formal ontology defines the different formal structures found in being. A hierarchy exists in these formal structures. The first level consists of the material ontology relating to the natural world of spatio-temporally extended things including the theories of space, time, causality, material, body, and other such entities. The second level consists of the material ontology of organic entities. The material ontology of minds constitutes the third level while the fourth level consists of the material ontology of cultural and institutional formations. Because of art's spatio-temporal qualities, one can place Wolterstorff's analysis of art works in category one.

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[2] Scholasticism is a form of medieval philosophy based on the authority of the Church fathers and on Aristotle.

[3] Husserl saw the discipline of formal ontology as a complement to formal logic. Formal ontology equaled the science of certain sorts of entities in the world. Formal logic was conceived in the same fashion.

Universals

The word *universal* has possessed a wide variety of meanings. It has also played an important role in metaphysics. In addition, universals exercise a major influence on Wolterstorff's theory of the ontology of an art work.

Examining several meanings of the word *universal* is helpful in arriving at a single, usable definition for the purposes of this thesis. One definition states that universals are the features objects share with each other. Another definition characterizes the universal as an entity that exists on the basis of concepts possessed by general words such as "white" and "horse." A third defines the universal as an adjective contrary to the adjective "individual."

According to Wolterstorff, universals are ideas based on general concepts of everyday life. They exist beyond time and space and share a unique relationship with individuals, also known as particulars, examples, or in the case of musical works, performances. They differ from concepts in that concepts possess a finite beginning, originating in the mind, while universals exist eternally.

"Horse" provides an appropriate illustration of a universal. Horses are recognized by means of preconceived features that horses are expected to possess: a mane, a tail, and four legs. These attributes make a horse a horse. The quality of "horseness" can be said to possess these attributes. Indeed, all horses must possess "Horseness" in order to be a horse. The possession of this quality distinguishes horses from pigs, goldfish, and cockatoos. An important feature of

"Horseness" is that it can be copied innumerable times. In other words, "Horseness" can have an indefinite number of examples. "Horseness" or "Horse" is a universal.

In another example, red is a readily recognizable color. However, the question occurs as to exactly what red denotes. The answer is that red names a universal; the concept of "Redness" which is demonstrated as the color seen in countless examples of red. Red is a universal.

A further example of universals is the example of individual names versus a general designation. "Daniel" and "Emily" each name individuals. "Man" and "Woman" name universals of which Daniel and Emily are examples, as were Plato, Leibniz, Langer, and all the examples of men and women living, deceased, or yet to be born. Universals exist beyond time and space.

Three types of problems surrounding universals have persisted through the centuries: first, the problem of definition, or what universals really are; second, the problem of existence, or whether or not they exist; and third, the problem of exemplification, or examining what the relationship is between individuals and universals. The three schools of thought that attempt to provide answers to these questions are Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. For the purposes of this thesis, Realism will be discussed in depth while the two other schools will be briefly summarized.

Plato is considered to be the founder of Realism. Drawing on original thinking by the Pythagoreans, Plato addressed the idea of universals in his

treatise *Parmenides*. In this discourse a young Socrates put forth the idea of the theory of the Forms.[4] Under questioning, he proposed that particulars or individuals have properties imitating the Forms. From that moment on, universals became a hotly debated topic in metaphysics, and Realism began to develop new and complex answers to puzzling questions.

Realism defines universals as things capable of indefinite repetition, while particulars are those things that are not. For example, there is the universal Dog with endless examples that are found in countless neighborhoods throughout the world, yet there is only one particular dog named Rover living next door.

As mentioned previously, because of their unique and single nature, universals cannot be located in space or time. If they could, they would then possess the logical impossibility of being in many different places at one and the same time. For example, the universal "Dog" has examples found next door, 400 years ago, in the United States and simultaneously in Egypt. Obviously it cannot be located in time or space.

Realists allege that universals and particulars share a different and unique relationship. It can be defined as that of *sui generis*: not identical with any ordinary relationship. Armstrong maintains, "It is generally said a particular

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[4] Plato's Theory of Forms is also referred to as his Theory of Ideas. The Forms are self-sufficient in being. All else that has being derives from the Forms, and in fact are reflections of the Forms' perfection. Because of the Forms' self sufficiency, they exist independently of particulars.

instantiates or exemplifies the relevant universal." [5] In other words, the particular, or example, is an actualizing agent for the universal.

In addition, Realists believe that universals exist for which there are no particulars, such as *Unicorn, Squared Circle,* and *Leprechaun.* Universals, while relying on particulars for actualization, demonstrate some degree of independence from particulars.

Conceptualists follow the thinking of Aristotle. They believe that universals exist inseparably from the world of particulars. In other words, universals are thoughts and ideas constructed by the mind. This view was popular with the British empiricists of the 18th century. Unfortunately, two significant problems arise from this viewpoint. First, while this theory explains the thinking and meanings associated with the ideas and concepts of the human mind, it does not address the question of the world itself as it exists separately. Second, it does not explain how the idea or concept forms initially in the mind.

Those subscribing to the Nominalist school do not believe in the existence of universals in the sense of "Horseness" or "Redness." Nominalism was represented in the Middle Ages by the philosopher William Ockham (1290-1347) and in the twentieth century by Nelson Goodman. Class nominalists base their formulations on set theory. Classes or sets of particulars are substituted for kinds. In other words, to possess the quality of horseness is to belong to the set whose members possess horseness.

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[5] D.M. Armstrong, "Universals," in *A Companion to Metaphysics,* ed. by Jaegwon Kim, and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University. 1995), 506.

Predicate nominalists base their distinctions on predicates. If different objects have the same predicate, they belong to the same kind. Examine the following two sentences: The apple is red. The wagon is red. Because both subjects have as their predicate 'red' according to predicate nominalists both objects belong to the class of objects that are red. A major drawback to nominalism is its lack of accounting for the initial identification of a set member or class. How does one know whether a set member possesses horseness, or whether an object is indeed red? Acknowledgment of universals would readily solve these problems.

Wolterstorff advocates the Platonist viewpoint of Realism. He maintains that universals are *kinds* or types, which our linguistic structure recognizes, such as Lion, Red, or Horse. There are natural kinds of other sorts such as Peasant Dance, Scottish Lullaby, or Bird Song. Indeed there is a kind known as Bach's *Brandenberg Concerto #6*. Wolterstorff's views on this subject are explored in depth in the next several pages.

Set Theory

Sets are one of the most general and fundamental notions found primarily in mathematics, and secondarily in philosophy. Sets are simply a collection of objects, such as numbers, colors, food groups, or human beings. There exists the set of all prime numbers. There exists the set of all things colored red. There exists the set of graduate students who play the piano. Objects in a set are called

members or elements of the set. Indeed, there can be subsets of a set, such the subset of graduate students who play the piano and also play the clarinet.

According to McLeish,[6] twentieth century mathematicians Ernest Zermelo (1871-1953) and Adolf Abraham Fraenkel (1891-1965) have modernized concepts in set theory due to the application of axiomatization. They formulated twelve axioms, which assert the existence of various theorems such as the null set and the infinite set, the construction of new sets from old sets, and the properties of sets. Set theory today is a product of logic and formalism. It is often used in philosophy as a contraindication for universals.

Wolterstorff's View on the Ontology of Art

A close examination of a musical performance reveals an unusual situation. For when a musical work[7] is performed, two distinct entities are involved. There is a distinction between *what* is performed and what is a *performance* of something. One can compare this situation to that of Emily gazing into a mirror. Two distinct entities exist, one of Emily and one of Emily's image. They look alike, yet possess significant differences. One of the entities is Emily, the other a mere reflection. One can also use musical examples. Bach's *Minuet in G* from the Anna Magdalena Notebook has been performed on countless

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[6] Kenneth McLeish, ed. *Key Ideas in Human Thought* (London: Clay Ltd., 1993), 323.

[7] For the remainder of the chapter, three terms will be used interchangeably: art works, musical art works, and performance-work.

occasions by a variety of pianists possessing a variety of skills. The work *Minuet in G* exists distinct from all the performances given of it. "That which is performed on a given occasion is distinct from the performance of it."[8] In what ways are these two entities distinct? A closer examination of the differences between the two entities helps answer this question. First, it is important to note that the thing performed and the performance diverge in several specific properties. For example, there is the property of "being composed by." This is a property that only a work can possess. A performance cannot. Only the work *Minuet in G* is composed by Bach, not any of its performances. Likewise, only the work *Ecoissaise* is composed by Beethoven, its performances are not. On the other hand, the time and place of a performance are a property of the performance, not of the work. "Played on Tuesday at 3:00 PM" describes a performance, not the *Minuet in G*. Acoustic effects are also a property of a performance. Performing the *Minuet in G* on an out of tune piano results in an out of tune performance; the work itself is not out of tune. To return to the analogy of the mirror, if the mirror is cracked, then the reflection of Emily will possess a long jagged line despite the fact that Emily herself does not. Second, the concepts of identity and diversity provide a distinct difference between the *performance* and the work *performed*. These concepts state that that which is performed on one occasion may be identical with, yet distinct from, that which is performed on another. For example, Daniel could perform the *Minuet in G* on

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[8] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1980), 35.

two separate occasions. Two distinct performances result although only one musical work is used. However, it is obvious that *distinct* performances of one work cannot be identical. Therefore these two distinct performances cannot both be identical with the work *Minuet in G*. Stated in mathematical terms, A and B cannot both be identical to work W because A does not equal B, but is distinct from B. $A \neq W$ and $B \neq W$.

As a result of divergent properties and the concept of identity and diversity, it is logical to assert that works are not simply occurrences of performances, nor are performances identical with works. Two separate entities exist.

Wolterstorff's Examination of the Untenable Views of Art

Through the centuries various theories have evolved concerning the ontology of art. Wolterstorff[9] not only deems several of these views untenable, but examines the reasons why as well.

The first view holds that art work can be identified with physical objects, in music's case the actual score of written notes and directions. However, upon closer examination, several problems arise with this designation. If a work of music is to be identified with a score, the question arises, which score? In the case of the *Minuet in G* there certainly exist thousands and thousands of scores (perhaps more as this is a popular pedagogical piece). Such a formulation is at

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[9] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 42-45.

odds with the idea of *a* work of art. Perhaps it is the autograph score alone that can be identified with the work of art. This, too, is problematic. Such a designation would mean that if the autograph score were somehow destroyed, then the work would cease to exist. It raises problems for those works of music for which there is no autograph score. For all intents and purposes it would mean that those works of art did not exist. Such a conclusion appears illogical. Finally, a great deal of music used in the world does not have and never has had a score. Most indigenous music is passed orally from generation to generation. It exists without a score. Therefore, the view that art work can be identified with a physical object has been disproved.

A second viewpoint states that art works are entities of consciousness.[10] A work of art assumes the status of a thing imagined. Perhaps the most important argument contrary to this position is the logical deduction that, therefore, when no one is thinking or imagining a particular work of art, it disappears or winks out of existence. The logical application of this deduction is that works spend their time fading in and out of existence depending upon whether or not they are the object of someone's thoughts or imagination. This hardly seems likely. Wolterstorff writes "But from the proposition that an art work can be composed simply by 'imaging' it, without benefit of voice or limb, it does not follow that it

[10] This idea has been associated with the philosopher R. G. Collingwood.

depends for its existence (thereafter) on being consciously imagined by someone or other."[11]

A third untenable view of works of art is the idea that they are members of sets. There are several reasons why such a conclusion is implausible. First, a set possesses its members *essentially*.[12] It cannot have either more or less or different members than it has essentially. A musical work of art exists much differently. *Minuet in G* may have 5, 5,000, or 5,000,000 performances. An art work exists whether it has few, many, or even no performances. This is directly opposed to a set's ontology. Second, according to set theory logic, if Set α, which has no members, exists and Set β, which has no members, exists, then Set α = Set β. However, illogical consequences result when this reasoning is applied to works of art. For Work γ could exist such that it had no performances, and Work δ could exist such that it had no performances. However, to say that Work γ = Work δ is patently false and obviously illogical. Therefore, art works are not sets of their examples.

What is needed is a clear definition of the ontological status of musical art works, perhaps more accurately labeled *performance-works* and their performances. Wolterstorff writes that a performance-work can be said to be ontologically a Universal or *Kind*. He defines performances as sound-sequence-

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[11] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 44.

[12] Possessing members essentially means that a set must have as its member precisely and exactly what is determined by its definition. For example, in Set A, the set of Correctly Formed Cats, all cats that are correctly formed must belong to that set. If there is even one correctly formed cat that ends up not existing, then Set A does not exist. A new set would exist.

occurrences or events which take place at locations, begin and end at certain times, and have temporal parts, i.e. a performance can be half over or three-quarters over at a certain time. These definitions generate a significant difference between the two entities of a performance-work and its performances. Note that the occurrence of a performance work is an *event,* while the performance-work itself is not. In spite of this difference an important aspect of their relationship is highlighted by the fact that the performance work is perceived through the occurrence or event of the performance [13]". . . only thus does one perceive the work.[14]"

In examining the first definition, it may be observed that the statement that performance-works are universals or kinds holds significant repercussions. Perhaps the most important reason art work can be called kinds is that it shares the same relationship with its performances or examples as other universals or kinds do with their particulars. The universal and its examples' relationship are characterized by the circumstances of multiple occurrences of examples of the kind taking place. Despite this fact, fewer or lesser members have no effect on the status of the universal. There is also a sharing of predicates and properties. Finally the ability to possess properly and improperly formed examples exist.

A comparison of the kind Person with the kind Art work is illustrative. A Person has billions of examples. If one or two fewer people existed, the kind

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[13] That is, a performance-work is perceived through a performance.

[14] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art,* 41.

Person would be unaffected. Person and an example, Renee, share many predicates[15] including walks upright, has hair, and uses two arms. If Renee were to break one of her arms, and proceeded to have it in a sling, it would be unusable. Renee would be incorrectly formed (for a while), yet she would still be an example of Person. Correspondingly, there are thousands of performances of *Minuet in G* every year. If there were two fewer performances, the work itself would remain completely unaffected. Both the work and the performances share many predicates including the predicates of being in the key of G major, possessing A:B: form, and having 32 measures. Finally, if the first two F sharps occurring in the piece were played as F naturals, the performance, while incorrect, would still be considered a performance of the *Minuet in G.*

Wolterstorff contributes two important observations about art work as kinds. The first is that by the nature of multiple occurrences of their examples, art work, or performance-works, are known as *natural kinds.* Because these works can have correct and incorrect forms, they are also known as *norm-kinds.* These terms will be defined and discussed in the next section.

The Sharing of Predicates

The exact nature of musical art works becomes clearer when the sharing of predicates is closely examined between these works and their examples.

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[15] A predicate refers that which is said of a subject. A subject/predicate sentence is a sentence in which something is predicated of the subject. In the sentence *Sugar is sweet, "is sweet"* is the predicate.

Several quotations from Wolterstorff illustrate this relationship. "Since the days of Aristotle, philosophers have observed between *natural kinds* and their *examples* that there is also a massive sharing of predicates." [16] and "From the start, one feels that there is some connection between a predicate being true of the examples of an art work and its being true of the work."[17] He also observes, "In this linguistic fact of the massive sharing of predicates between art works and their examples lay a clue as to the nature of art works."[18]

Figure 1 denotes a practical example of the sharing of predicates. Note that the two entities, while very similar, remain distinct. They share many predicates including having three angles, having three lines, being a triangle, having one line parallel to an edge and being two-dimensional. Likewise a musical art work shares many predicates with its examples. These could include being in the key of C minor, having a three part form, or having a duple meter.

However, not all predicates are shared. Some are true only of the kind, and some are true only of the example. Referring back to Figure 1, note that triangle A has a line in contact with the floor line, while triangle B has an angle in contact with the floor line. Triangle A has two angles in contact with the floor line, while Triangle B has only one. Triangle A has the majority of its volume concentrated at its bottom, while Triangle B has the majority of its volume

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[16] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 46.

[17] Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Towards an Ontology of Art Works" *Nous* 9 (1975), 123.

[18] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 46.



Figure 1

Figure 1 - Sharing of predicates

concentrated at its top. The same situation applies to musical art work. For example, if Daniel played the *Minuet in G* on an out-of-tune piano, the performance itself would be out of tune, while the work *Minuet in G* would not. If Daniel performed the piece on Tuesday, 'on Tuesday' would also be a predicate of the performance, but not of the work. 'Is composed by Bach' is a predicate of the work *Minuet in G*, but not of the performance. A performance has no composer; it is an event. Repeatedly performed is a predicate of the performance, not of the work. Existing simultaneously is a predicate of the work, but not of the performance.[19] Note that in recognizing the established situation that not all predicates can be true of works, it can be said that when predicate P cannot be true of work W, then P is said to be excluded by W. Therefore a seemingly appropriate formula states: For every predicate P which is not excluded by W, P is true of W if P is true of every performance of W. However, upon closer examination, it becomes obvious that this formula does not work. For example, the *Minuet in G* has as its penultimate melodic note an F sharp. Some students miss this F sharp, playing an F natural instead. The predicate 'has an F natural' becomes a predicate of this performance but not of the work. If all the performances resulted in an F natural as the penultimate melodic note, then the predicate of F natural would be true of every performance, but not of the work. The solution to this dilemma is to add

[19] As mentioned previously, performances have a temporal quality. Works, because they are not events and exist beyond time and space, have the peculiar quality of existing with all their parts simultaneously.

predicate P which the word correct to the word performance in the formula. It becomes: For every not excluded by W, P is true of W if P is true of every correct performance of W. A predicate by its very nature generally represents a corresponding property. 'Is in the key of G major' is related to the property of *being* in the key of G major. Likewise, 'is out of tune' is related to the property of being out of tune. While predicates are often shared between kinds and their examples, whether corresponding properties are shared is another question. This relationship between kinds, their examples, shared predicates, and their properties may be divided into three main groups. If sharing a predicate between a kind and an example also implies sharing the property, the relationship is labeled a *univocal* relationship. Figure 2 illustrates a univocal relationship. If, however, the shared predicates exhibit a systematic connection between properties; in other words, they are related but different, the relationship is called *analogical.* Figure 3 represents this relationship. Finally, if the shared predicates possess no shared properties or even a systematic connection, then the relationship is labeled *equivocal,* represented by Figure 4. Knowing which relationship natural kinds share is important in describing the ontological substance of musical art works. By examining a particular situation, a determination may be made regarding the kind of relationship holding between natural kinds and their examples, and art works and their examples.

Examine the kind, Dog, its examples, and the predicate 'barks'. 'Barks' is true of Dog and of all correctly formed examples of Dog. Barking as we know it

is a sound occurrence that can be caught on tape. It is an event. However, this actual sound occurrence property of barking is different for Dog than it is for the examples of Dog. The act of Dog barking is not a sound occurrence, nor an event, nor can it be caught on tape. Universals exist beyond time and space. The predicate 'barks' stands for one meaning when possessed by the kind and another, though related, meaning when shared by its examples. Therefore, the relationship between a natural kind and its examples is analogical in nature.

An examination of art works and their predicates reinforces this designation. In Beethoven's *Ecoissaise* the first sound occurrence in a performance is a B. In other words, the first note to occur or sound is B. However, in the musical art-work *Ecoissaise*, while the first note is B, it does not sound. The predicate 'B is the first note' stands for a different but related property when applied to the kind *Ecoissaise* than when applied to the performance *Ecoissaise*.

In conclusion, art works and their examples participate in an analogical relationship between their shared predicates. This also holds true for natural kinds.

> In general for those cases in which the sharing of predicates between a kind and its examples follows the general pattern which we have formulated, the predicates are used analogically in exactly the way in which they were seen to be used analogically in the corresponding cases for artwork.[20]

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[20] Wolterstorff, "Towards an Ontology," 128.



Figure 2

Figure 2 - Univocal Relationship



Figure 3

Figure 3 - Bivocal Relationship



Figure 4

Figure 4 - Analogical Relationship

The Kind of Kind an Artwork Is

When a musical work is performed, in most cases a sound occurrence is produced.[21] In fact, a musical work can be described as a norm-kind whose examples, if any,[22] are sound-sequence-occurrences: ". . . musical works (that) have as its examples various occurrences of sound sequences. It is a kind whose examples are sound-sequence-occurrences." [23]

A nagging question concerning this observation is whether *sound-sequence-occurrence*is an adequate description of an example, or whether examples should be defined as a certain kind of *performance*. Two views of a work may be deduced from the previous observation. First, musical work W is identical with the kind whose examples are sound-sequence-occurrences that come fairly close to one exemplifying the properties normative within W. The second observation is a subset of the first. It states that musical work W is identical with the Kind whose examples are sound-sequence-occurrences produced by a person performing or playing W.

The principal difference between these two definitions questions whether an example of a work W is limited to those occurrences that are intended performances. Several philosophical issues obfuscate a correct choice. For example, one wonders about the status of a work played by a player piano.

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[21] John Cage's 4'22" and other compositions of a similar ilk not withstanding.

[22] Note that a musical work that has not been composed yet exists as a kind but has no examples. This will be covered later in the thesis.

[23] Wolterstorff, "Towards an Ontology," 129.

What about a breeze blowing through a garden causing chimes to play *Frere Jacques*? Could these sound-sequence-occurrences be considered performances of works? Are they examples of kinds? Wolterstorff considers the worthiness of each definition in light of these issues. He concludes both definitions have merit.

Performance Issues

Performance was defined earlier as being a sound-sequence- occurrence brought about by the act of performing. However, such a performance must be intentionally produced. It cannot be mistakenly improvised. A pianist who sits down to improvise at a piano bar and quite by accident comes up with the Bach *Fugue in c minor* [24] from the Well Tempered Clavichord is *not* performing a work: ". . . one cannot, in that way, inadvertently perform a work. One performs a work if, and only if, one believes that one is performing the work."[25]

Actual performing is much more than merely following the specifications of the score. First, when a composer composes a piece of music, he or she is making several assumptions about the performer that are not present in the score. One of these presumptions is the knowledge of style and tradition that influence the presentation and performance of a piece. For example, the *note inegales* of the French Classical tradition, the issues of detachment and

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[24] As unlikely as this may be.

[25] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 74.

articulation of the Baroque period, and in the 20th century questions of jazz rhythms are generally not included with the score, but knowledge of them can be necessary for a correct performance of a work. Second, a composer can perform an original that is written in his or her head (a feat Mozart was supposedly capable of performing) without committing the piece to paper. No score exists to mandate the performance, yet the work is still performed. The same reasoning applies to the prodigious amount of indigenous folk music that remains unscored yet is performed frequently. A work is still performed when a folk song is rendered despite lack of written directions. What becomes required for a performance of a work is knowledge of what it means to produce a correct example of the work, and action on this knowledge to produce a sound-sequence-occurrence.

One more important commentary: It is not necessary, when attempting to produce a sound-sequence-occurrence, that one succeed completely. As noted previously, musical works are a subset of norm-kinds. According to a norm-kind, one may have incorrectly formed examples, and still possess an example of the kind. This is also true of musical works. One may make mistakes when performing an example of a work, and still regard the performance as an example. Naturally, there are limits on how seriously one can fail and still have performed that work, but such limits are indefinite. "To perform a musical work W is to aim to produce knowledge of what is required of something if it is to be

a correct example of W and to succeed at least to the extent of producing an example of W."[26]

Composition

Wolterstorff's view of composition is highly influenced by the idea that musical works are kinds, and as a result, exist beyond time and space. Wolterstorff examines the idea that composition is the act of selecting sets of properties which sound-sequence-occurrences exemplify. Wolterstorff prefers instead to examine a musical work's essence as a norm-kind. When such an examination is made, an obvious deduction results. In composing, the composer selects properties of sounds for purposes of their serving as *criteria* for judging *correctness of occurrence*. "At the end of the composer's activity, sound-sequence-occurrences can be correct or incorrect by reference to that just selected set of criteria for correctness."[27]

Wolterstorff compares inventing a game to composing a musical work. For example, the inventor of a game selects certain properties which the action-sequence-occurrence exemplifies, and in doing so makes a game. A composer also selects certain properties for a sound-sequence-occurrence and in doing so makes a work. The inventor has an ideal as to what is a well-played occurrence of a game; for example, the best strategy for winning. These views are a matter

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[26] Wolterstorff, "Toward an Ontology," 133.

[27] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 62.

of his or her judgment and opinion. So too the composer has similar views about what constitutes a well-played performance of his or her work. The corollary to these ideas regarding composition is the fact that improvisation cannot be composition for ". . . (it is) in selecting a set of properties as criteria for correctness of occurrences (that) the composer composes a work."[28]

Universals, and therefore musical works, by definition exist beyond time and space. They do not fade in and out of existence, nor do they have beginnings and endings. On the contrary, they last forever. "Quite obviously a consequence of this is that properties, and so too kinds do not become or perish."[29] As a result, works are considered to exist even when not being performed. Wolterstorff concludes that composing consists of bringing about a preexistent kind into a work. In other words, compositional activity is a matter of discovering combinations of sounds and then determining that these discoveries constitute the correctness conditions of performance.

Composing is not bringing into existence what one composes, nor is it creating. Conversely it is about discovering an entity that *becomes* a work. As such, innumerable entities currently exist that have not yet been composed.

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[28] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 64.

[29] Ibid., 88.

Summary

Ontology, universals, and set theory are three important terms used when discussing Wolterstorff's view of the ontology of art. Ontology is a form of metaphysics that deals with the science of being. A universal is an idea based on general concepts of everyday life that exist beyond time and space and share a unique relationship with individuals also known as particulars or examples. Set theory is a fundamental notion found in mathematics and psychology. Sets are a collection of objects.

A distinct difference exists between a performance and a work. A work shares with performances the concept of divergent properties and the concept of identity and diversity. Wolterstorff disregards what can be termed untenable views of art. These include the identification of a work with a physical object, a thing imagined, and with a member of a set. Performance works are in fact classified as universals or kinds. As such they participate in a unique relationship with their performances or examples including that of multiple occurrences, the sharing of predicates and properties, and the ability to possess correctly and incorrectly formed examples. Because of these attributes, performance-works are known as norm-kinds. Art works and their examples participate in an analogical relationship on the basis of their shared predicates.

A performance is a sound-sequence-occurrence brought about by an act of intentional performing. It can be correctly or incorrectly formed. Wolterstorff describes composition as the selection of sets of properties which sound-

sequence-occurrences exemplify; composition is a selected set of criteria for correctness. Because universals exist beyond time and space, composing consists of bringing about a pre-existent kind into a work.

CHAPTER FOUR

WORLDS AND WORLD PROJECTION

Some of Wolterstorff's most fascinating work involves the philosophical implications of world-projection, possible worlds, and the belief that art is action. He advances several radically new ideas. While a general survey of philosophy related to the concept of possible worlds reveals associations with the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of the mind, Wolterstorff's application of the possible world framework, or modal logic, to a theory of art is nothing less than brilliant. A brief survey of possible world philosophy with an examination of Leibniz's and Plantinga's contributions and observations follow. Wolterstorff's writings will then be analyzed.

Possible Worlds

Possible worlds have been defined in several ways. One definition says that possible worlds are the way things might have been or could have been. Another states that a possible world is the complete way a world's events could

have gone. Finally, Plantinga[1] perhaps best defines a possible world as a state of affairs, one which either obtains[2], is real, is actual, or *could have* obtained. Our actual world becomes one among many. Kripke[3] compares the occurrence of possible worlds to the occurrences of the possibilities found when throwing two dice. When they are thrown, there are 36 possible states that could result. If everything in the world is ignored but the dice, each throw could be referred to as a possible world. Obviously, only one of these miniature worlds is the *actual* world, that being the state that comes up when the dice are actually thrown. The other worlds are possible, but they do not obtain or occur. Kripke observes that "Possible worlds are little more than the miniworlds of school probability blown large."[4] By school probability he refers to the simple games of chance played by students in elementary school. Possible worlds consist of the infinite number of ways the world might have been, also referred to as entire world states or histories.

Ancient philosophy did not recognize possible worlds philosophy. Possible world philosophy or modality is found in the twelfth century formulations of John Duns Scotus (1265-1308). He wrote on the intuitive idea of modality as referential multiplicity. He was later joined by William Ockham (1290-1347) and John Buridan (1299-1358). These philosophers wrote on natural

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[1] Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 146.

[2] To 'obtain' is to occur.

[3] Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford Blackwell Press 1980), 16.

[4] Ibid., 18.

necessity and natural possibility. Because of the influence of the doctrine of divine omnipotence, it was concluded that all possibilities were realizable through divine power.[5] The medieval theory of modality influenced the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and it was with him that the idea of possible worlds came to fruition.

Leibniz

Leibniz was a German philosopher who played a transitional role as a rationalist thinker and writer in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He contributed immeasurably to the philosophy of possible worlds. Leibniz was a man of many interests, especially those of a philosophical and mathematical nature;[6] he also contributed to the fields of theology, jurisprudence, physics, linguistics, medicine, etymology, political and economic history, technology, and architecture. He was the co-inventor of calculus. Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza influenced Leibniz philosophically. Leibniz was without a doubt a universal genius.

In his treatise, *Monadology,* Leibniz states that an infinity of possible worlds exist of which only one is actual. He used the term *monde* (world) and *univers* (universe) to mean the entire sequence and collection of all existing

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[5] Also known as *potentia Dei absoluta.*

[6] Because of his scholastic background he is considered a member of the German Protestant Scholastic movement. This movement was dominated by Aristotelianism. However, Leibniz's metaphysical system can be characterized as a synthesis of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Cartesianism.

things. He defined a world as including all possible entities and particular circumstances for that specific world. Leibniz also described possible worlds as possessing the property of compossibility.

The term compossibility[7] describes a situation where two concepts are both possible if and only if they belong to the same possible world. For example, the concept "Pegasus is a winged horse," is possible in the world where "There are actual winged horses." These two concepts are compossible because they can both occur in the same world. On the other hand, if the second concept were replaced by "There do not exist winged horses," it would obviously not be compossible with the first concept. By this token, every possible world becomes a set of mutually compossible, completely individualized concepts. Such a world can be described as *maximal.* Compossibility necessitates that in every possible world, each individual concept is interlocked with each of the other concepts in that world; they are then described as mirroring each other. As a result, every individual in a particular world is uniquely related to all the other individuals of that world. Leibniz uses the Biblical character Adam to illustrate this idea. In evaluating the individual concept of Adam, consider the sentence "Adam is the father of Cain." Being the father of Cain is an essential property of Adam. In fact, if Adam had *not* been the father of Cain, then Adam would have been radically different. In actuality, Adam, as he is known, would not have existed. The interlocking quality of

[7] This concept was inherited from Scholasticus.

Adam with Cain is so important that it would have prevented the existence of Adam without Cain. Likewise, if Cain had not been the son of Adam, Cain, because of the interlocking quality with Adam, could not have existed. The relationship between the concepts of Adam and Cain are connected in a complex manner; so too are Cain and Abel, and so too every collection of concepts in each possible world.

Leibniz observed that there are great differences between the actual world and possible worlds, one being that while all such worlds exist, only the actual world obtains or actually occurs. Another of those differences is that between necessary and contingent truths. Some statements or truths can be true of *all* possible worlds. For example, the notions that in base 10, 2+2=4 and that a right angle contains 90 degrees are true in all possible worlds. Likewise the fact that all bachelors are single is also true of all possible worlds. These statements are *necessary* truths. Other statements are not true of all worlds. For example, the fact that Bach composed the *Minuet in G* is true of our actual world, but not of all worlds, for it is conceivable that Bach could have chosen *not* to compose the *Minuet*. Statements that are not true of all possible worlds are called *contingent* truths. These classifications are important because a major difference between the actual world and various other possible worlds is the fact that certain statements are true of the actual world but not of a possible world and vice versa.

Leibniz's papers were largely unpublished until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the early part of the twentieth century, the renowned philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), and the French philosopher Louis Couturat (1868-1914) focused attention on his works.

Leibniz was a brilliant theoretician. By establishing certain concepts about possible worlds, especially concerning compossibility and necessary and contingent truths, Leibniz was able to influence later philosophers. In fact, his writings on possible worlds proved highly influential in the twentieth century field of modality. They laid the groundwork for Wolterstorff's theorizing on the role of art and the projection of worlds.

The Twentieth Century

In the twentieth century, possible world philosophy has figured prominently in modal logic. Major philosophers who have helped develop a theory of modal logic along with semantic interpretations include Jaako Hintikka (1929-),Saul Kripke (1940-), Richard Montague (1930-1971), David Lewis (1941-), and Alvin Plantinga (1932-). A mathematical framework has soundly supported the theory. It is divided into two schools of thought. The Possibilist School believes in a plurality of universes that exist in the same sense that the actual world exists. The actual world is a part of reality. All other worlds are spatially and temporally distinct from the actual world, though they range over the same reality. Lewis represents this school. The Actualist School believes that possible worlds are merely that; only possible ways things might

have been done. All possible worlds remain uninstantiated[8] except for the actual world. Plantinga and Kripke represent this school. Possible world philosophy or modal logic remains an exciting and thought provoking area of philosophy.

Plantinga

Alvin Plantinga's ideas have contributed to the development and enhancement of modal logic. He was a professor of philosophy for many years at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, later taking a position in the philosophy department at the University of Notre Dame. He has made several important contributions to possible worlds philosophy.

Plantinga examines the differences between actuality and possible worlds. He writes that the actual world is a subset of the set of all possible worlds. A proposition is true in the actual world *if* it is true. It is true in world W if it *would have been* true if W had been actual. He observes that while objects or individuals *exist* in possible worlds, some entities exist only in *some*, but not all possible worlds, while others, such as the number five, exist in all possible worlds. "To say that an object x exists in a world W is to say that if W had been actual, x would have existed; more exactly x exists in W if it is impossible that W obtain and x fail to exist."[9].

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[8] Meaning physically realized.

[9] Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity*, 46.

Plantinga also covers existence in actual and possible worlds. Existence-in-world-*W* is explained in terms of W. To say that Renee exists in *W* is not to say that she exists, but that she *would have* if *W* had been actual.

The actual world, called α, is a state of affairs that actually obtains. If it had happened that another world other than α had been actual, then α would not have obtained; it would be a possible state of affairs, still existing but not actual. "There are any number of merely possible worlds-each of them exists-exists in the actual world-although none is actual."[10]

It is significant that none of the merely possible worlds is in fact actual, but *each is actual in or of itself.* Plantinga writes, "Each world *W* has the property of actuality in *W* (and no where else). For any world *W*: *W* (and *W* alone) would have been actual, had *W* been actual; this is sufficient for *W*'s being actual in *W*."[11]

Finally, the actual world α is distinguished from other worlds because α *is* actual while other worlds are not. This concept combined with the concept of state of affairs can be expressed as the following formula: State of affairs *S* is actual in a world *W* if *S* would have been actual had *W* been actual, or if it is not possible that *W* obtain and *S* not obtain.

In conclusion, Plantinga is an important twentieth century philosopher whose writings on possible worlds greatly influenced Wolterstorff.

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[10] Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity,* 48.

[11] Ibid., 46.

Count Generation Versus Causal Generation

The aesthetic tradition has held that the correct approach to art mandates the abstracting of the art object from any contextual action and then focusing on the object alone. Art is to be valued and regarded for its own sake as an object of contemplation. Wolterstorff, on the other hand, maintains that works of art are both objects and instruments of *action*. He believes that the viewing of art as an action-oriented entity has played a role in human history dating back to the earliest of times.

Wolterstorff begins his examination of the works and worlds of art, and the role action plays, by examining the unique occurrence of doing one action by the projection of another[12]. For example, Daniel could speak to Emily and say "Please play the piano." On the surface, it appears that one action has taken place. However, by carefully dissecting what has happened, it becomes obvious that two actions have taken place. The first action is that of merely *uttering* words that happened to be 'Please play the piano.' The second action is that of making a request to play the piano. The first action of uttering can take place by using any words. It is the uttering itself that is important. The second request could also be made in another manner, using sign language, gesture, or written

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[12] John Seale (1969) has put forth these ideas in his book *Speech Acts*. He states "speaking a language is performing speech acts; acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises. . . " (p. 16), and "The speech act or acts performed in the utterance of a sentence are in general a function of the meaning of the sentence" (p. 18). Further speech act linguists have elaborated on these thoughts.

notation. However, in the incident described, Daniel performed action two (making a request) by performing action one (uttering certain words in English). It can be said that Daniel *generated* the action of issuing a request to play the piano by uttering the words "Please play the piano."

Wolterstorff concludes that if action A generates action B, then actions A and B are simultaneous. Therefore, by Daniel uttering the English sentence, he issued a request simultaneously to play the piano. This situation can be reduced to a mathematical statement:

For some person/agent P[13] generated ψ-ing by ϕ-ing at some time t. Let it be said then that the act of P's ϕ-ing which took place at t, generated an act of P's ψ-ing.

The incident given as an example is an instance of what can be called *count*-generation. Uttering the sentence counts the same as issuing a request. With this fact in mind, the mathematical formula can be re-written.

A person/agent P *count* generates ψ-ing by ϕ-ing at some time t

According to Wolterstorff[14], the following diagram results when this formula is analyzed.



[13] The entity of a team could be substituted for the person P.

[14] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 13.

Another situation exists whereby playing Beethoven's *Ecoissaise* well, Emily pleased her piano teacher. Again, a situation-generated action exists. By performing the action of playing the Beethoven well, Emily generated the action of pleasing her piano teacher. In this case, however, the second action is NOT count-generated, for Emily *caused* the event of pleasing her piano teacher by playing the *Ecoissaise*. The mathematical formula for this incident would read:

Person/agent P *causally* generated ψ-ing by ϕ-ing at time t

i.) P generated ψ-ing by ϕ-ing at time t AND

ii.) P's act of performing the action of ϕ-ing causes event E such that P's ψ-ing is identical with an act of P's bringing about E.

Thus, the musical work *Ecoissaise* functions as an instrument of action, or in other words, an action for which a musical work serves as an object that generates the performance of some other action. The following diagram illustrates the role of the musical object.

o caused the event of pleasing her teacher

|

|

|

Emily o performed the Beethoven *Ecoissaise*

As a result, the artist generates a variety of actions when a work is performed. Indeed, works of art become instruments of generated action and they *function* in the performance of generated action.

Two important incidents have been examined on a small scale. Another event will be examined that illustrates the variety of actions generated by the artist, the role played by world projection, and world projection's difference from other actions.

Daniel:

1. plays the keys of the piano and generates the action of
2. a performance of Tansman's *La Balle*. By doing so he also
3. represents a bouncing ball and
4. projects a possible world which contains a special kind of bouncing ball. In addition he:
5. gives aesthetic delight to his mother
6. bores his sister
7. exercises his fingers
8. reveals his fondness for fast passages

Some actions he or she hopes to generate, some he or she does not. Some are intentional, some unintentional. The process, however, is very important. Action #2 has the piece *La Balle* as an object of performance. Actions #3, #4, and #7 are count-generated. Here Daniel's performance counts as representing a bouncing ball, projecting a world in which there is a bouncing ball, and as an opportunity to exercise his fingers. Action #5, giving aesthetic delight to his mother, is causally-generated, as is #6 boring his sister. Daniel's performance

causes these events. Finally action #8 is an action of self-revelation: ". . . self-revelation is neither a causally-generated nor a count-generated action. Always self revelation is generated, never is it performed foundationally. But other analysis shows that the connection between self revelation and some action whereby someone generates it fits neither the pattern of causal-generation nor that of count-generation. It is more complex than either."[15]

The previous analysis holds many implications for art and specifically music. First, musicians in performing a musical work generate a variety of distinct actions: some being count-generated, some being causally-generated, and some being of a self revelatory nature. Thus, works of art are instruments in the performance of generated actions. That is, they function in their *own* performance of generated actions. More basically, as in action #2, is the phenomenon of works of art acting as objects of action. In this kind of relational activity, two entities are involved in the action: the entity which performs the action, and the entity which acts as the object of the action. Central to the ways in which works of art play a role in action is their serving as *objects* of action. Figure 5 illustrates these roles of a work in action. Second, the action role of musical works can be divided into two categories: that of use and that of function. The musical work becomes an object of action when it is used, and it becomes an *instrument* of action when it generates other action. Action #2 serves as the object of use, while the other actions serve in the role of function. Finally,

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[15] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 21.

the work plays an important role in the generation of a world of the work. "He takes up a stance toward the world of the work. It may be an assertive stance. It may be an optative or an interrogative stance. But over and over what we discover is that it is a fictive stance." [16]

States of Affairs and Possible Worlds

Wolterstorff defines a projected world of a work of art as a state of affairs. A state of affairs can be defined as a way things can or can't be, or could be but aren't. Examples of states of affairs include Napoleon invading Russia and the river Moldau running through Czechoslovakia. These states of affairs are true: Napoleon did invade Russia, and the Moldau does run through Czechoslovakia. These states of affairs not only exist, they hold or obtain as well. Consider now the state of affairs whereby Napoleon is a female, and the river Moldau runs through France. These states of affairs, while not actually occurring, could have happened. Napoleon could have been born as a woman. The river Seine could have been named the Moldau. These states of affairs can be labeled as *possible states of affairs*. They exist, are possible, but do not occur. *Actual* states of affairs are subsets of *possible* states of affairs. They not only *can* occur, but *do* occur. They are also called *facts*. A fact can be defined as a state of affairs which actually occurs. There also exists states of affairs which are impossible. For

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[16] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Art in Action* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing, 1980), 134.

example, the state of affairs can exist such that Leprechauns are real. It is obviously impossible for this proposition to actually occur. Likewise, the state of affairs whereby Pegasus lives can exist, but does not occur. It is impossible. There is a distinct difference between the concepts *existing* and *existence,* and *occurring* and *occurrence.* A *possible* state of affairs exists, and could occur. An actual state of affairs exists and does occur. An impossible state of affairs exists and not only does not, but cannot occur. "Existence, being reality, comprises impossibility and mere possibility along with actuality."[17] Figure 6 is a diagram illustrating these states of affairs. Wolterstorff writes:

> . . . the projected world of a work is a state of affairs, usually a complex state of affairs, sometimes an extraordinary complex one. It is a way things can or cannot be. Normally it is a possible though non-actual state of affairs the artist presents to us as a way things could be but aren't. . . The world of a work of art is a state of affairs possible or impossible as the case may be.[18]

Whether states of affairs are true of a projected world *and* of the actual world is an important question. An answer to it depends on the elements involved. For example, the state of affairs "Pegasus is a winged horse" exists. This statement is true in the projected world of Greek mythology and is also true of the actual world. If there was an example in this world of Pegasus, he would be a winged horse. But when examining the state of affairs "Pegasus never lived," it becomes obvious that while this statement is true of our actual world, it would be false in the projected world of Greek mythology, for Pegasus was an

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[17] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 131.

[18] Ibid., 131.



Wolterstorff's Diagram

Figure 5

Figure 5 - Roles of a Work in Action

important living entity there.

In conclusion, Wolterstorff observes that states of affairs, like artworks, have always existed; to compose a world of art is not to create it. "Those states of affairs constituting the world of the work existed before and apart from the (composer). . . so here, too, materials with which the artist (musician) makes a selection and so brings forth an ordered composition. He masters by selecting."[19]

The Action of World Projection

The work of art or the artifact is both an instrument and an object of action. In fact, works of art perform an enormous variety of actions as shown previously. "Artistically man acts."[20] This idea is significant considering that aesthetic inquiry has tended to view art in a contemplative vein versus one of action. Wolterstorff maintains "I shall take as my basic concept of world projection that of an action performed by human beings, an action performed always by way of performing some other action."[21] The action of world projection is accomplished by means of an artifact utilized by a human being. Human beings perform projections because they possess the ability and imagination to visualize a different world from the actual one. They are then

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[19] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, viii.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., 200.



Figure 6 - States of Affairs

Wolterstorff's Diagram

Figure 6

able to project this world differently for the benefit and consideration of others. For example, a pianist projects a world consisting of a whimsical entity performing a charming walk when performing Debussy's *Gollywog's Cakewalk.* An orchestra projects an intriguing, primitive world of ancient Russia when performing Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring.* A mother projects a safe, comforting world where all the pretty little horses guard baby when she sings the lullaby *All the Pretty Little Horses.* Music is being used in a fundamentally significant manner when it is used to project a world.

The work projected by the artist is called the *world of the work.* The world of the work demonstrates the ability of the artist to imagine a world and project it fictionally for the consideration of others. The world of a work of art is for all practical purposes generally incompatible with the actual world. Both cannot occur simultaneously. Indeed, some portions of the projected world may actually occur, but never the entire world. Thus, a work of art may comprise a segment of the actual world, but it never comprises all of it. As a result, the projected world in most cases remains distinct from the actual world.

The ability to project demonstrates a different role for the artist than tradition has claimed, different from the ancient classical vision of art as an imitation of reality and different from the Romantic vision of the artist as a repudiator of reality. Instead, the artist projects worlds in different stances and different moods: worlds that are assertively and fictionally projected. A brief

formula summarizes it as follows: the artist projects world W by performing action ϕ. This theory of art is a theory of action.

Wolterstorff makes several other observations about world projection. First, the projected world truly exists, though it does not occur. "The artist, in his projection of worlds. . . is dealing with what does actually exist."[22] Second, states of affairs included in projected worlds are true or false in the actual world and third, projected worlds are anchored to entities in the real world.

Benefits of World Projection

"World projection is perhaps the most pervasive and important of the actions that artists perform by means of their artifacts. . . And in their being so used we human beings over and over find their fundamental significance and worth."[23] The significance of world projection is not the fact that humans have the ability to make claims about the actual world, but that they have the ability to imagine a world distinct from the actuality and then project this world for the consideration and benefit of others. "Works of art. . . literally or metaphorically exemplify forms."[24] Indeed, such a world projected by the artist/musician is an alternative to the actual world, ". . . the outcome of

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[22] Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art*, 356.

[23] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 121.

[24] Ibid., 137.

envisagement, not just of reportage."[25] In reality, the world of a work of art is a *mixture* of envisagement and reportage. Important benefits are derived from works of art based on the phenomenon of the worlds being true and false to actuality; that is, being a world alternative to our actual world. Wolterstorff specifically identifies six of these benefits that humans derive from world projection. They consist of concreteness, illumination, truth and falsehood, provocation of emotions, modeling, and communication.

Concreteness

Humans have always needed a sense of concreteness for their beliefs and for certain aspects of their culture. Throughout the history of the human race there has lingered in the human psyche a persistent dissatisfaction with holding on to national glories, religion, and past history solely through memory. Instead, there has been a drive to solidify such beliefs and memories into something tangible and significant. Therefore, artists frequently project a world that significantly reflects what the surrounding community believes is important and true, not just one that has caught their fancy. "The artist, counting himself as a member of his people, serves its cause by projecting worlds true in significant respects to his people's self-image, serving in that way, too, more to confirm than to illumine."[26] There exists a conviction that

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[25] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 144.

[26] Ibid., 145.

what is valuable and important should be embodied in art, music, drama, and dance. People in earlier cultures instinctively believed that representing something somehow realized it. That belief remains at work today. Wolterstorff notes, "Surely what above all gripped the Greeks watching the tragedies of their dramatists was that there before their eyes were being unfolded the stories and histories so important to them as a people." [27] The same may be said of the ballads sung and played by the troubadours, the great chants of the early Byzantine Church, and the operas of Mozart.

Illumination

Illumination takes place when the artist attempts to *show* the public something about actuality in an effort to alter their convictions, awaken their consciousness, or energize them to action. While it was used in the past, this is especially a practice of the contemporary artist who in this day and age attempts not to confirm others in conviction but to alter their convictions and/or express the artist's own vision along with the vision of the cultural elite. Often this vision depicts truth in a way that the cultural elite finds real and important as opposed to that of the bourgeoisie. "The consequences of the works of artists who aim to produce works true in significant respects to what

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[27] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 144.

they themselves in distinction from their society find real and important is often that others find their convictions altered."[28]

Truth and Falsehood

Worlds of works of art can be either true or false in regards to actuality. A work can be highly valued both for its truth and just as equally for its falsehood. A work can be valued for its falsehood in regards to reality because people often desire to escape the boredom, drudgery, and unpleasantness found there. Wolterstorff observes, "There is that about our world which distresses us."[29] Many people have found wondrous delight in the falsehoods that abound in Tchaikovsky's *The Nutcracker* and Rimsky-Korsakov's *Scheherazade*. Likewise, the insights conveyed by a piece such as Penderecki's *Threnody in Memory of Victims of Hiroshima* are an example of the powerfulness of truth, when projected by a world.

Provocation of Emotions

Aristotle recorded the fact that dramatic tragedy evokes emotions. Apprehension of projected worlds likewise evokes emotions and in turn contributes to that which humans find gripping and compelling. This ability to provoke emotions is mysterious and powerful. It is very difficult to explain

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[28] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 146.

[29] Ibid., 147.

why a certain piece of music, such as Barber's *Adagio for Strings,* can move a listener to tears, while others such as Tschaikovsky's *1812 Overture* arouses feelings of grandeur and awe. Regardless of the reasons why, this ability is profound and remains a powerful attribute of world projection.

Modeling

Modeling is a long observed property, summarized in detail by Plato in his Doctrine of Ethos. When person A observes Person B performing actions, Person A develops the same ability or models it. A similar situation can exist with Person A observing world projection WP and modeling the emotion presented. This attribute is exhibited when a weary worker turns to the easy listening station for the ride home. Those behind a military coup often have the local radio station playing martial music. Modeling can be either positive or negative in its effect.

Communication

"By means of projecting a world, the artist communicates with his audience. By fictionally projecting an alternative world the artist makes an assertion about our actual world."[30] The act of communicating to the audience is an extremely valuable tool and certainly one that is discussed with great frequency. "Listen to what the music says" is an oft heard admonition from

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[30] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 149.

music teachers. Most, if not all, worlds of works of art communicate with the individual, whether it be a message of peace, God's eternal love, or joy and happiness. Likewise, sadness, anger, hatred, and madness can also be communicated. How such communication takes place has been the subject of countless inquiries, yet it remains for the most part a mystery.

Summary

Possible worlds are defined as a state of affairs. This concept has been highly influential, playing a significant role in modal logic. Leibniz helped develop the concept of possible worlds. He also wrote on compossibility, and necessary and contingent truth.

The world of art is a world of action. An action is said to 'generate' if it counts as another action or if it causes an action. The first action is called a count-generation, the second is called causal-generation.

Wolterstorff designates works of art as being artifacts that serve as either objects or instruments of action. The artist by using an artifact generates a variety of actions, some count-generated and some causally-generated. Other actions may be those of self-revelation. One important action is that of world projection.

A projected world of a work of art is a state of affairs. States of affairs can be either possible or impossible. If possible, they either hold or obtain, or

remain merely possible. All states of affairs exist, however, only some actually occur.

The action of world projection takes place with the artist using an artifact. It is action oriented. The artist projects worlds in different stances and modes. The action of world projection provides many benefits for the human race. It presents a different concept of the artist than was previously held by society.

Wolterstorff's application of modal logic to the arts is a brilliant marriage of philosophy and music. It provides a logical and unique perspective on the role of action in art, for in actuality the role of action in art has existed *ipso facto* throughout civilization. Wolterstorff's casting of art in the role of action was revolutionary for 1980 and helped influence many following music philosophers and researchers including Alperson,[31] Goehr,[32] Regelski,[33] and Elliott.[34]

There is one important weakness in Wolterstorff's theory. He maintains that pure music, or music without a referential context, does not project worlds. Upon examination, the human psyche is structured by more factors than those involved in the obvious worlds invoked by referentialism. Some of these factors

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[31] Phillip Alperson, "Introduction: The Philosophy of Music," in *What Is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music*, ed. by Phillip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, 1987).

[32] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[33] Thomas Regelski, *Music as Praxis*, Paper presented as part of the symposium sponsored by the International Philosophy of Music Education Conference, Toronto, Ont., June 1994.

[34] David Elliott, *Music Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

factors include emotional states, psychological components, intellectualism, and sensual elements. Plato, with his Doctrine of Ethos, was one of the first to recognize the efficacy of emotional states projected/aroused by art. Pure worlds of joy, fear, and sadness, among other emotions are projected and received by artists/performers/composers and listeners by pure pieces of music in a highly personalized manner. Some examples include Bach's organ *Toccata in F Major, Dorian Toccata in D Minor,* and Barber's *Adagio for Strings.* Psychological worlds can be anchored in the quality of the sublime, written about in great detail by Longinus, Addison, Burke, and Kant. Examples of pieces projecting such non-referential worlds include Varese's *Poeme electronic,* Cage's *Water Music,* and William's pop instrumental *Classical Gas.* Intellectualism projects complex worlds that abstractly delight the cognition. They include music such as fugues, sonatas, canons, and others. Examples include Schoenberg's *Drei Klavierstucke,* Machaut's *Ma fin est mon comencement,* and a jazz scat solo. Finally, sensual worlds[35] utilize the physical senses present in cognition. Musical examples include Beethoven's *Symphony #5 in C Minor,* and Ravel's *Bolero.* Worlds structured by emotional experience, psychological elements, intellectual involvement, and sensual reaction such as those projected by pure music may differ somewhat from the worlds projected by referential music, but remain worlds none-the-less.

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[35] According to Aschenbrenner and Isenberg (1965), Santayana separates the cognitive powers into the divisions of sensation, perception, and apperception.

Using the context of art as action, and with the rich possibilities that accompany world projection, is a new, exciting, and unique manner in which to view the arts. Wolterstorff has built his case on centuries of philosophical thought interwoven in part with a mathematical framework. It is significant that his theories so directly repudiate the concepts of aesthetic attitude and disinterestedness. Moreover, the notion of world projection is both a radical and humanizing way to view artistic endeavors. As Wolterstorff writes "But even in one age, in one culture, the projection of worlds enters in countless significant ways into the fabric of our human existence."[36]

[36] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 150.

CHAPTER FIVE
WOLTERSTORFF'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ART

The arts, whether designated or known by a different name, have always been with the human race. Fifteen thousand years ago, prehistoric men and women left the art of their culture on cave walls. From the earliest of recorded times, in Egyptian hieroglyphics and wall paintings, and Babylonian cuneiform, references are made to music. Music has flourished in all known human circumstances. The early Native Americans possessed an enormous repertoire of songs for every event in life, from songs for healing to songs for dancing and for influencing the weather and the hunt. African-Americans enslaved for over three hundred years culled a complete repertoire of work and freedom songs, as well as spirituals. Likewise, the pioneers of the nineteenth century sang among other music, play-party and traveling songs and included white American spirituals in their worship. Today, everyone from the tiniest tot on up joins in singing the *Happy Birthday Song,* while people young and old line up to participate in the "chicken" dance at weddings and bow their heads mournfully at the sound of a solitary trumpet playing taps. Indeed, the peoples of the earth

have included the arts generally, and music specifically, as part of their basic cultures for millennia, valuing it in a multiplicity of practical, tangible ways.

This chapter examines Wolterstorff's firm belief that the purpose of art is not confined to one role, but has existed and exists today in a variety of roles. His notions exist contrary to those constituting the institution of high art. This institution will be examined in the following section.

Current State of the Institution of High Art

As described in detail in Chapter Two, the valuing of art as high art has enormous implications for society. Wolterstorff observes that interaction with art today generally means playing a concrete role in what he labels the social *institution of high art*. "Each of us comes into contact with culture, be it art or whatever, only within a specific society at a definite point in its history, within a specific social *institution*."[1]

The institution of high art, based on the valuing of art as high art, generates some positive effects in the form of delight gained from aesthetic contemplation. However, according to Wolterstorff, the negatives asserted by the institution are pervasive. Indeed, with harsh words he characterizes it as an agent of oppression.

> Not just the individuals who work within it but the institution of high art itself shares fully in the fullness of our human condition. The underlying

[1] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdman's Publishing, 1980), 77.

> dynamics of the institution constantly lead to oppression, to distortion of vision, to deflection from responsibility. The institution's insatiable appetite for additional works drives its agents into acts of plunder and rapacity. . . The institution's interrogation leads to repudiate or ignore the claims of mankind in general on the services of the artist.[2]

In actuality, art has become separated from social realities because of a driving desire to place art *above* society. Wolterstorff views high art as possessing a certain religiosity and sanctity. In addition, there are those who paint autonomous high art as somehow nobler and better than art based on practicality and tangibility. High art is seen and valued as *transcending* the alienation of everyday society by allowing participants to rise to a higher realm of being. This higher realm is deemed free from the social responsibilities of society. As such, many artists and musicians today have abandoned the works of the tribe, and instead serve the institution of high art. Wolterstorff identifies a vast gulf of mutual indifference between the producers of high art and the human tribe.

In this light, Wolterstorff comments that a composer currently is seen as a solitary, almost reverent figure, alone with his or her own intellect and with the means of composition, apart from and above the ordinary person. Unfortunately, this view, while romantic, ignores many important and tangible features of reality: the very real role human needs and sensibilities play in civilization and in the production of the arts. Works of art in actuality embody social reality. This is true no matter how individual the work, or how

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[2] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 192.

autonomous the function. In fact, social realities are embedded in musical works. These social realities constitute the identity of the works.

Wolterstorff also describes art as a social practice. A social practice is an ongoing activity into which new members are inducted. Practices have histories and traditions. Wolterstorff labels the fine arts as paradigmatic examples of social practices for three reasons. First, the arts are an ongoing activity requiring skill and knowledge for their practice. Second, novice musicians and artists begin their careers generally by learning this skill and gaining this knowledge from those already established in the practice, as well as incorporating evaluative standards. Third, standards of excellence operate within the practice, whereby some are regarded as better than others. Understanding the nature of musical works requires an understanding of the role of the social practice of music. Indeed, when a musician composes or performs a piece of music, he or she does so not as a solitary figure, but as an individual participating in a social practice. "Nonetheless, the goals and standards she uses to govern her composition will in good measure have been imbued in her by way of her induction into the social practice of (making a work of art) at a certain time in the history of that practice and at a certain place."[3] Music as a social practice serves many purposes in life including the expression of various social realities, the projection of worlds, the expression of

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[3] Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Work of Making a Work of Music" in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music,* ed. Phillip Alperson (New York: Haven Publications, 1987), 112.

art as action, and its service as memorial art. These will be discussed in detail in the coming sections.

The Roles of Art

The Role of Art as a Social Reality

Various social realities reflect the complexities of human life. These include grief, emotion, knowledge, and aesthetic contemplation among others. All are expressed by art. They are summarized below:

1. The role of expressing grief. Examples of music expressing grief include Mozart's *Requiem in C minor*, the hymn *Were You There* and the folk ballad *Frankie and Johnny.*

2. The role of evoking emotion other than grief. Examples of music evoking emotion other than grief include the hymn *Amazing Grace,* the folk song *I've Got That Joy,* and Beethoven's *Symphony No. 5 in C minor.*

3. The role of praising important people and events. Examples of music praising important people include Saint Saens' *Christmas Oratorio,* Copland's *Young Mr. Lincoln,* the hymn *How Great Thou Art,* and the sixties pop hit *Abraham, Martin, and John.*

4. The role of communicating knowledge. Examples of music accomplishing this role include the traditional *Alphabet Song,* the Broadway musical *Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat,* and the children's song *The Angel Band.*

5. The role of providing aesthetic contemplation. Examples of music fulfilling this role include Mozart's *Symphony No. 40 in G minor,* Schubert's *Quintet in A major,* and Mahler's *Symphony No. 4.*

6. The role of providing accompaniments for work and play. Examples include the work song *The Erie Canal,* the folk song *Little Red Wagon,* and the lullaby *All the Pretty Little Horses.* Wolterstorff summarizes the importance of social realities and art by writing "The purposes of art are the purposes of life."[4]

The Role of Art and Aesthetic Contemplation

It is significant that aesthetic contemplation is but one of the many roles art serves. Wolterstorff maintains that aesthetic contemplation is NOT the most valuable action performed by art, in direct contrast to what has been the prevailing belief. He writes, ". . . that works of art are composed and presented to the public for their perceptual contemplation. Virtually every statement concerning the purpose of the arts which comes from the hands of our aestheticians, our art theorists, and critics makes this assumption."[5] This assumption does not reflect humanity's historical past. The statues and idols found in prehistoric Mexico were used for worship, not contemplation. Likewise, burial art in ancient Egypt was meant not for aesthetic gazing, but for safeguarding the soul to the next world. Finally, the songs and dances of

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[4] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 4.

[5] Ibid., 104.

primitive people were not intended for reflection, but were performed by all to influence the gods, the harvest, and the weather. In all three of these examples, art is used for a means other than that of contemplation. Such practical usage gives art a rich and vital purpose. Music is used in a similar manner today to tangibly calm frayed nerves, celebrate important life events, and assist in the worship rituals associated with organized religion. Aesthetic contemplation is only one of many roles assumed by art. "But to elevate the action of aesthetic contemplation above all other functions of art--for that I see no justification."[6]

There has existed a corresponding tendency to use aesthetic contemplation as the basis of a definition of art. "Indeed, a good many theorists have gone beyond recognizing the expressive function of art to attempt to define art in terms of its expressive function as have a good many gone beyond recognizing the aesthetic function to attempt to define art in terms of that function."[7]

The Role of Art as Projector of Worlds

As detailed in Chapter Four, one of the most important roles played by art is that of projector of worlds. By confirming a world true in significant respects to what the community believes is true, by confirming its self image and recreating remembered history, by giving men and women a sense of

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[6] Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980), xiv.

[7] Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Art of Remembering," *The Cresset* LV#78 (1992): 20.

concreteness in regards to cultural significance, the projection of worlds greatly benefits the human race. As such, the projection of worlds can be called one of the most important and pervasive actions performed by artists. Artists are able to make claims about the actual world as well as imagine a world distant from reality. They solidify in a tangible manner the most important aspects of civilization. In addition, projection illumines by awakening, releasing, and energizing those who participate in the projection. World projection portrays truthfulness and falsehood, evokes emotions, models value systems, and communicates with an audience. World projection is a major contributor to the stabilization of the civilized world and the establishment of societal identity.

The Role of Art and Action

As cited in Chapter Four, the role of art is, by its very nature, embedded in action. Wolterstorff observes that artifacts are objects and instruments of intentional action. Objects are embedded in action by means of their actual generation and that action is extended in the projection of worlds.

By the use of action, human beings create artifacts for their utilization in response to surrounding realities. One of the fundamental values of an artistic creation lies not in the inherent action of creation itself, but in the fact that such action provides people with instruments and objects of action generally. Hence, Wolterstorff claims that an aesthetic theory, which rejects the embeddedness of art in action, either distorts the arts, or is unable to find their true meaning.

Indeed, the aesthetic theory distorts the arts when compared to Wolterstorff's conclusions in three important ways. First, aesthetics focuses on art as the object of contemplation while Wolterstorff focuses on action-generated artifacts that are themselves objects of action. While the aesthetic theory stresses the importance of aesthetic qualities in works of art and the overall importance of the aesthetic experience, Wolterstorff stresses the importance of the multiplicity of values of art. Finally, while the aesthetic theory emphasizes the importance of the individual aesthetic experience, Wolterstorff emphasizes the centrality of art to the very existence of civilization.

The Role of Art as Memorial Art

Communities throughout history have had traditions consisting of the passing on of significant stories, music, and visual artifacts from one generation to another. This can be described as social remembering, memories of significance that are held in common by a particular community. Wolterstorff describes a community's general approach to this tradition as consisting of three important components:

1. The mode of interpretation: the interpretive component of tradition. This interpretation is governed by reality, experience, and responsibility, and can be called a *vision of meaning*. The tradition's actual expressions of lament, joy, exultation, or some other emotion, are an example of the mode of interpretation.

2. The style of expressing the interpretation: the way the vision of meaning is embodied as it incorporates the style of life. This embodiment can be expressed as a dance, song, instrumental work, or other artistic entity.
3. The story of interpretation: the story's inclusion of aspects of the formation of the community and its subsequent history. This is expressed through the form of the interpretation with all its stylistic features.

Art, then, is the most significant way a community keeps its social memory. It possesses a memorial function that Wolterstorff claims is as vital as that of the aesthetic function. As a result, art as memorial art is linked to social remembering. It can be defined as a commemorative object which enhances memories. For example, Britton's *Ceremony of Carols*, enhances the memory of the birth of Jesus. Ive's *Three Places in New England* enhances the memory of New England. Memory enhancement is important to society, according to Wolterstorff, because it fulfills a desire to praise or honor, and it recognizes something that is worthy of praise or honor. Commemoration is a function of the enhancement of social memory.

Three things are most likely to be commemorated. The first consists of episodes, events, or persons from history. An example of this type of commemoration is Tschaikovsky's *1812 Overture*, and Penderecki's *Threnody in Memory of Victims of Hiroshima.* The second consists of episodes, events, or persons from mythology. Examples include the works *Dido and Aeneas* by Purcell and *Pellieas et Melisande* by Debussy. Finally, highly embroidered

versions of historical episodes are preserved. Examples include Mussorgsky's *Boris Godinov* and Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring*. Concerning this third point, Wolterstorff concludes "Indeed, accurate history is often destructive of commemoration: the desire to keep the commemoration going often requires co-opting or exiling the historians."[8]

Commemoration is important to the human race. Wolterstorff observes that it exercises influence on culture and adds to the richness and permanency of civilization. Commemoration differs from the occasion of 'keeping in mind' and 'recalling.' It is in fact an embodiment or an incarnation. Wolterstorff writes that commemoration not only expresses community, but expands and intensifies it as well. In addition, commemoration introduces stability into the importance of the past and helps carry the past into the future. It also helps retain what is deserving of honor, praise, lament, and outrage. As what is commemorated fades into the past, memories remain strong in the present. ". . . commemorations, looking back, introduce endurance into a sea of forgetfulness. . . (they) are instruments of social power. Those who control the commemorations shape the community."[9]

A great deal of music is memorial in nature, commemorating both people and episodes. Copland's *Young Mr. Lincoln,* Handel's *Messiah,* Mussorgsky's *Pictures at an Exhibition,* the early English ballad *Robin and Marian,* and

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[8] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 24.

[9] Ibid., 25.

Schoenberg's *A Survivor from Warsaw* are important instances of commemoration.

Wolterstorff also comments on an interesting point observed in some memorial art. There sometimes exists a curious deletion of historical time. For example in the hymn, *Away in the Manger,* the first verse paints events that while long past are occurring in the present tense.

> Away in a manger, no crib for a bed,
> The little Lord Jesus lay down his sweet head,
> The stars in the sky look down where he lay,
> The little Lord Jesus asleep on the hay.

This also happens in the Easter hymn, *Alleluia,* where Jesus Christ is proclaimed as having risen today.

> Jesus Christ is risen today, Alleluia
> Our triumphant holy day, Alleluia
> Who did one upon the cross, Alleluia
> Suffer to redeem our loss, Alleluia.

Finally, Wolterstorff writes "Communities live by memory and hope. Both are in constant danger of decaying." [10] Communities throughout history have attempted to keep memory as well as hope alive by publishing and reading narratives, by performing and listening to recitals and works of music, and by using memorials in everyday life. Art and music keep alive the significant persons and events that form the basis for what Wolterstorff calls civilization's collective memories and commemorations.

> Our globe has today become the home of a vast pluralistic society, filled with tensions among nations, among religions, among races, among

[10] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action,* 28.

> genders. In both the perpetuation of these tensions, and the healing of these tensions, our stories are among the principal actors; and our stories in turn are kept alive by our art.[11]

Summary

Wolterstorff maintains that the purposes of art are varied, rather than confined to one single intent. He assesses the social institution of high art and notes that while some good is gained from aesthetic contemplation, in general it is a harsh agent of oppression separated from the social realities of life. Wolterstorff describes contemporary artists and musicians as having abandoned works written for what he terms the tribe to serve the institution of high art. In fact, a considerable gulf separates high art from the works of the tribe. This is epitomized by the view held in the recent past of composers as being solitary figures above and beyond society and social reality.

Wolterstorff contends that works of art constitute a social practice, that is an embodiment of social reality. The purposes of this social practice include the expressions of social reality, the projection of worlds, the expression of action, and the role of memorial art.

Social reality includes the expressions of grief, emotion, knowledge and aesthetic contemplation. It is significant that aesthetic contemplation is listed as one of a number of purposes, but not as the primary purpose. The projection of worlds helps stabilize civilization and establish societal identity. The role of art

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[11] Wolterstorff, *Art in Action*, 28.

by its nature is embedded in actions by means of its actual generation and subsequent projections.

Finally, Wolterstorff notes that art as memorial art has existed throughout history as a form of social remembering. The tradition of preserving important and significant stories, music, and visual artifacts consists of the mode of interpretation, the style of expressing the interpretation, and the story of interpretation. Art as memorial art acts as commemoration which not only expresses community, but intensifies it as well as introduces stability to the past in order to preserve it for the future. Communities have attempted to keep memory and hope alive by utilizing the arts in all their many uses. The understanding and acceptance of art's multiplicity of purpose is essential in understanding art and its influences as well as the great implications art holds for education.

Wolterstorff's ideas create an opportunity for serious thought for the contemporary music educator. They are well-reasoned, logically argued, and clearly stated. In addition, they are based on history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology, and as such form a theory with a sense of Gestalt. In a critical light, have tremendous implications for music education. These will be detailed in Chapter Six. His views are, however, are at tremendous odds with aesthetic perspectives. Wolterstorff stresses art as an action based, action generated entity. Aesthetics has stressed the value of disinterested contemplation. Wolterstorff stresses the multiplicity of music's purposes and the importance of recognizing each purpose individually. Aesthetics stress the

attainment of aesthetic experience as a result of aesthetic contemplation. This purpose becomes *the* purpose of art. Finally, Wolterstorff emphasizes the universality of the arts and their basic role in life and in civilization. The result of aesthetic theory has been the transformation of art into a high institution beyond the reach of common people. In conclusion, Wolterstorff's ideas provide a startling contrast to the mores that have guided music education over the past half century. His insights give direction to a more vital, inclusive, and relevant theory of art.

CHAPTER SIX

IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSIC EDUCATION

Nicholas Wolterstorff's philosophy has important implications for understanding the role of music education in society and for developing music curricula. As noted previously, the aesthetic movement has primarily influenced contemporary music education for the last 30 years. As a result, the aesthetic movement has also influenced curriculum. The application of Wolterstorff's ideas to music education and curriculum, however, presents an alternative viewpoint. This chapter examines the major points of Wolterstorff's thinking. Application will be made to the fields of music education concerning the areas of enduring quality, active quality, the preservation of cultural identity and social history, the evocation of emotion, and the multiple roles of music. The chapter concludes with the application of Wolterstorff's ideas to curriculum

Summary of Wolterstorff's Philosophy

1. Performance-works are universals.

A performance-work is a kind or universal, existing beyond time and space. It has a unique relationship with its individual performances. These performances act as the work's examples.

2. Composition consists of realizing a preexistent kind as a work.

Compositional activity is a matter of discovering combinations of sounds and setting requirements for correctness. Consequently, the composer is not a god-like creator, rather he or she is performing an important and vital service to society.

3. Works of art are instruments of action generated by the artist.

Wolterstorff adamantly states that works of art are, in fact, embedded in action. This element of action is one of the most important features of art. Art has existed historically as an action-oriented entity since the earliest of recorded times. In their role as generators of works, artists imbue them with action from their very inception.

4. World projection is a pervasive and important action artists perform.

Through world projection, fundamental significance and worth is found. With the projections of worlds that are distinct from actuality, forms, feelings, affinities and contrasts are made available for others' considerations. These projections assist society through the means of concreteness, illumination, evocation of emotion, modeling, and communications.

5. An institution of high art exists.

The institution of high art has separated from the social realities of the human race resulting in the placement of art above and beyond society. Many current artists and musicians serve the institution of high art, and its views tend to be unquestioningly accepted as mainstream, artistic thinking.

6. The arts express the social realities of life.

Social realities include grief, emotion, knowledge, aesthetic contemplation, praising of important people and events, and providing of accompaniments for work and play. It is through art that these realities are given a tangible form.

7. Aesthetic contemplation is only one of many roles served by music.

Aesthetic contemplation is not superior to other purposes of art. Curricula, philosophies, and methodologies based on aesthetic contemplation as the primary goal of art lack depth by rigidly focusing on only one of art's many facets. In fact, the multiplicities of roles performed by art are equally important and vital.

8. Art possesses a memorial function.

Art is a form of social remembering. By commemorating worthy events and people, the enhancement of societal memory takes place. This enhancement is important because it not only influences culture, but strengthens civilization as well.

Implications for Music Education, Culture, and Society

Music education does not exist in a vacuum. It impacts both culture and society, which in turn impact music education. These eight points formulated by the author from Wolterstorff's thinking influence views of music education, culture, and society in the areas of enduring quality, active quality, the preservation of cultural identity and social history, the evocation of emotion, and the role of music, according to the author. These areas will be now be discussed.

Enduring Quality

Music possesses an enduring quality that can be traced to the role of the work as a universal. As such, the musical work exists beyond time and space. These distinctive qualities endow music with the trait of timelessness, or in other words, endurance. It is in part music's ability to last from generation to generation and from era to era that has made it invaluable to humankind. Indeed, music has been used by all peoples to commemorate important events, significant persons, and lifetime milestones from generation to generation. Because music is such a vital and lasting force in civilization, music education is indispensable to society's cultural needs. As a human society, our important events, significant persons, and lifetime milestones are embodied in musical rites and compositions. This is as essential for modern society as it was for the ancient Egyptians, the early Chinese dynasties, the great Mayan cultures, and all other civilizations that have graced the earth. In American society, too, music is

intimately associated with many rituals of human significance. A passing of a birthday requires the singing of the *Happy Birthday Song*. The entrance of the President of the United States is announced by the playing of *Hail to the Chief*. Sporting events are usually preceded with the singing of the *National Anthem*. Beloved Christmas carols are sung and resung year after year. Adolescents regard as a rite of passage the listening to and advocating of alternative music sometimes startlingly different from that of their parents. Seniors anticipate with relish their graduation march to the sounds of *Pomp and Circumstance*. Many brides still choose the tired strains of Wagner with which to walk down the aisle. Finally, funerals almost always include a hymn or song that was a favorite of the deceased, or is judged capable of bringing comfort and hope to the surviving family and friends. The cultural and civilizing effects of music are a force that cannot be ignored or peremptorily shoved aside. Music as such is lasting and enduring.

Music education helps preserve this heritage by including traditional folk songs In today's multi-media saturated society, if not for musically inclusive programs such as *Barney* and *Gullah Gullah Island,* and the rich and varied musical curricula of some pre-schools and grade schools, such American folk songs as *Here We Go Looby Loo, Yankee Doodle, Mr. Sun, I've Been Working on the Railroad, Sandy Land, The Eency Weency Spider,* and many others would soon vanish from the American repertoire. Offering the students of today the musical riches of the traditional past allows them to compare the shared commonality of

the human experience through the centuries, encounter the depth and unchanging face of that experience in the light of daily life, and relish it in their own lives.

Active Quality

As stated by Wolterstorff, art by its very nature is action-oriented. The artist generates art by using action. Action is accomplished by means of an artifact utilized by a human being. One of the principal actions generated by the artifact is that of world projection. Projections are performed by human beings because they possess the ability and imagination to visualize different worlds. In addition, action pervades art's roles in society. Hence, art needs to be experienced as action by action. The advent and popularity of recorded music has led to a trend of focusing some music education philosophies on listening skills.[1] However, the fact that music is at its most basic generated by action decisively influences music education and the important effect such music education has on society.

Music has never been a true, passive spectator sport, despite the effect the advent of recorded music has had. Indeed, despite the propensity of recent generations to devote a majority of their musical activity to the listening of recorded music, they are often drawn into active participation anyway. This can be witnessed by observing those who sing along with songs on the radio, snap

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[1] Bennett Reimer. *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989).

fingers, tap toes, dance either alone or in a group to instrumental music, sway, hum, or display other similar actions to all kinds of music. These movements only further highlight the natural proclivity of music to be generated, oriented, and conceived by action.

In addition, the action of projecting worlds is an action inherently possessed by music. Music education makes best use of this projection when it allows students to experience it by action itself, that is allowing the experience to occur primarily through active participation. Such means should be valued over passive consumption in the music education program.

Preservation of Cultural Identity and Social History

The arts play an important role in the preservation of culture. They do not stand above nor apart from society, but rather comprise a basic component of what is important to human consciousness. Human consciousness includes cultural identity and social history, and is passed on from generation to generation affecting civilization. Hence, as stated previously, musicians do not operate in a vacuum, and music does not exist solely for its own sake. Music's existence, importance, and meaning are tied to human practice and life. It is through this practice and life that music plays a variety of roles in preserving cultural identity and social history. These roles include expressing social memories and emotions, contemplating aesthetically, commemorating significant people and events, and accompanying work and play, among others. They encompass the social realities of life. In fact, music is uniquely qualified to

preserve cultural identity and social history because in a special and unique manner it provides solidity through sound for memories and attributes that lack tangible substance of their own. As such, music is basic to the fabric of life. Music education plays an important role in the value of cultural identity and social history as presented by music in three important ways. First, by introducing music from many sources, ethnicities, histories, and peoples, a sense of cultural identity and diversity can be taught, valued, and appreciated. Multicultural perspectives are not a luxury, but a necessity in today's global society because of improved communications and expanding world markets. As a result people of diverse backgrounds and origins encounter each other on a daily basis.

Second, the performance of music associated with the rituals of the world's great religions offers a tremendously abundant opportunity for students to be exposed to the evolution of civilization and its values. The growth and proliferation of religious cultures has included the growth and proliferation of a myriad of music, from great masterpieces and beautiful chants to uplifting folk-hymns and gospel song. This music is ideal for performance. Unfortunately, such a recommendation is likely to run counter to the beliefs of those who would claim that such teaching violates the separation of church and state as found in the Constitution.

Finally, in the last century and a half, popular music, or "pop" has often reflected the social morays and historical climate of the period of its inception.

For example, the song *When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again* reflected the angst of the Civil War, while the song *I Want a Girl Just Like the Girl That Married Dear Old Dad* from the turn of the century spoke frankly about the expected societal state of marriage. *Alice Blue Gown* was connected to the political figure Theodore Roosevelt and his daughter in the early twentieth century. The many songs made popular by Shirley Temple helped lift the hearts of a Depression weary generation and fortified a national identity. The mellow harmonies of the Andrews Sisters and their hit *Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy* helped millions of Americans weather World War II. The confusion of the Cold War was reflected in the confusion caused by the introduction of rock and roll in the 1950's. In addition the popularity of the song *Davy Crockett* helped perpetuate the image of the strong and righteous American. Likewise, the chaos of the Vietnam War produced popular protest songs such as *Where Have All the Flowers Gone* and *One Tin Soldier*, as well as the forceful sounds of acid rock. In the eighties, the explosion of country music and such hits as *I'm Proud To Be an American* reflected the fact that it was once again socially acceptable to profess patriotism. Finally, the current decade has seen the advent of hip hop, techno wave, and rap music, (with its roots in the inner city, reflect frustration, anger, and despair). It is obvious that popular music mirrors much about humankind. Music education can not dismiss it from the curriculum nor ignore its existence. Pop music has been and will continue to be a paradigm of social history and cultural identity

handed down from generation to generation. As such, it deserves a place in the music education program.

Evocation of Emotions

The evocation of emotions has been attributed to the arts for two and a half millenniums ranging from Plato and Aristotle to the present day philosopher Peter Kivy[2]. This is a powerful attribute. While aesthetic delight is an important component of the human psyche, so too are the passions found in grief, joy, elation, sadness, and anger. The experience of these emotions is common to all peoples in all civilizations and its expression is a unique characteristic of the arts. Music education should be a vehicle whereby such diverse aspects of music are experienced and where the unique ability of music to evoke emotion is explored and cherished. The human psyche is equipped not only with an intellectual component, but with an emotional component as well. This fact influences pedagogical methods despite the propensity for certain educational factions to recognize only the teaching of facts. Indeed, Reimer notes that "All of human experience is permeated with subjective responsiveness (feeling)."[3] By addressing the emotional side of the human animal, music education reaches where few educational endeavors do. The stark pain of some rap music, the triumphant glory of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony,* the bitter

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[2] Kivy is well-known for his writings on the representational aspects of music.

[3] Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education,* 46.

anguish of a well-played blues riff, the stark despair of the Beatle's *Eleanor Rigby*, and the sentimental tugging of heartstrings by Pachelbel's *Canon in D* are all examples of emotions to be experienced first-hand by music education students. Of course it is understood that students' emotions will themselves vary. More importantly, the question remains whether education is ready and willing to address such issues. In any case, exploitation of emotion remains a valid and viable aspect of music education.

The Role of Music

The existence of a diversity of roles for music is a powerful and pervasive idea. In the recent past there has been an attempt to pigeonhole art as only for art's sake. This has resulted in art becoming high art reserved for aesthetic contemplation alone. The truth is that art in general, and music in particular, is not only for contemplation, but also for dancing, for putting babies to sleep, as background for movies, for weddings, for telling stories, for projecting worlds, for worshipping a Deity, for burying the dead, and many other human purposes found in most civilizations. Music encompasses this entire sphere of purposes. Music education must avoid narrowness and rigidity in confining music to one class or for one purpose only. Through goals and objectives, as well as curriculum choices, music education must stress the multiplicity of music's roles. Many music education philosophers have myopically stressed one role as superior to every other whether it be an aesthetic role or a performance role.

Lost is the fact that music serves many roles; not to the exclusion of any other, but each one valuable to each other and to civilization and humankind. Music education must incorporate numerous musical roles if it is to be true to music's nature. Philosophies and methodologies that center on only one of music's roles must be rejected in favor of curricula that seek to teach the multiplicities of music. This is especially applicable to both the general music class and the performance class. General music classes and vocal and instrumental ensembles that concentrate only on one aspect of music whether it be performance, listening, the great masterpieces, jazz, pop hits, or pop-type music are missing a great deal of what is valuable in music. Horizons must be expanded to include all types and kinds of music without the imposition of a hierarchy based on an artificially cultivated "taste." Religious music of a wide variety of beliefs needs to be studied and performed on a purely investigative basis, keeping an eye to the separation of Church and State. Many more applications are possible, but perhaps the predominant fact remains that music has a multiplicity of purposes to which music education cannot blind itself.

Several salient points are given as recommendations to music education programs. First, the inclusion of ethnically varied traditional music, which reflects important events, significant people and lifetime milestones, is important. Second, there must be an avoidance of passive listening and learning, especially in the general music class with an emphasis instead on active participation. Third, music from many sources, ethnicities, histories, and peoples should be included in music performed by students. Fourth, music

from the world's religions should be utilized. Fifth, popular music is an important component of music and therefore should be an important aspect of a music education program. Sixth, philosophies and methodologies that center on only one aspect of music such as primarily listening or primarily performance should be rejected in favor of methods more widely diverse.

Applications of Wolterstorf's Summarizations to the Curriculum

1. Performance works are universals.

A basic component of classroom musical activity is the performance-work and its examples. The Renaissance motets of Thomas Morley performed by the high school chamber choir, the beginning band arrangements of *Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star,* and the pentatonic folk songs sung by the third grade Kodaly music class are all instances of performance-works and their examples forming an integral part of the curriculum. As discussed earlier, performance-works by their very nature are universals and extend beyond time and space. Since all music consists of performance-works and examples, all music shares a basic ontology. In other words, all music has the same essence of being--that of a universal. Therefore, all music shares a basic sense of equality. As such, different kinds of music need to be valued and included in the music program. The music education curriculum must be culturally diverse, including music from other various ethnicities and socio-economic backgrounds. These include African-American spirituals, traditional African folk tunes, contemporary

Gospel, Hispanic folk songs, worksongs of the migrants, high art of the Hispanic colonial world, Asian folk tunes and religious chants, Native American healing and hunting songs, jazz and popular music, as well as the rich repertoire of Western and Eastern European cultural idioms. The idea of the equality of diverse music plays an important role for the American music educator, because in America many cultural identities converge in contemporary society.

In addition, music of historical significance must be used. "Historical" means not only high art concerns such as those emphasized by the academic institutions of music history, but also those containing the roots of our common experience such as folk ballads and music associated with historical eras such as the pioneer era and the depression. Styles include such repertoire as play-party songs, Italian madrigals, Hebrew chant, plainsong, Southern hymn tunes, and many others. The music education curriculum cannot focus on high art alone. It cannot be the exclusive domain of the elite, but must instead serve the goals and objectives of general society's culture and civilization.

2. Composition consists of realizing a pre-existent kind.

Composition involves working with kinds or universals. As such these compositions exist beyond time and space. Hence, a composer is not a lonely god-like figure involved in creation. He or she instead sets specifications for the correctness of a work. Composition is an art attainable by and relevant to all students and becomes a necessary aspect of the curriculum that cannot be

ignored. Students should not only perform and listen to examples of performance-works, they should compose them as well. By participating in composition, students can solidify in sound the social realities of *their* life and *their* school community.

Composition has been valued differently by other music educators. Reimer[4] describes composition as a major means for musical experience. He proposes that composition become a third curriculum, joining the already established curricula of general music and performance. In each curriculum, the designated activity becomes primary, and all else secondary. Therefore, in the general music curriculum, listening would be primary while performing and composing would be secondary; in the performance program, performing would be primary while listening and composing would be secondary; and in the composition curriculum, composing would be primary while listening and performing would be secondary. Elliott sees composition as subservient to performing and improvising; ". . . that performing and improvising. . . ought to be the foundational and primary forms of music making taught and learned in music education programs."[5] On the other hand, using Wolterstorff's rationales as a basis, composition should be included in the curriculum *in conjunction* with both performing and active listening.

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[4] Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education*, 46.

[5] David Elliott, *Music Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

3. Works of art are instruments of action generated by the artist.

Because works of art are so heavily embedded in action, music education itself needs to be based on and in action. A curriculum whose primary focus is passive consumption of music is contrary to music's integral character and detrimental to the student. It makes no difference whether one is referring to a performance class or a general music class. Members of both need to have action in music as a primary goal. In fact, general music classes have too long had a reputation as a music appreciation class based on passive listening and the memorization of concepts about music. General music must equally incorporate not only active listening, but singing, playing, moving, composing, and improvising as standard practices of the curriculum. This differs from what both Reimer and Elliott have called for. As stated previously, Reimer believes in a general music class based on listening, while Elliott believes in the primacy of performing and improvising.[6]

4. World projection is a pervasive and important action that artists perform.

World projection involves qualities of concreteness, illumination, modeling, and communication. The role of concreteness is that of tangibly ensconcing in sound those historical and cultural aspects of human history that have significance and worth. What is valuable and important is embodied in all

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[6] This differs from the previously mentioned references by Elliott and Reimer because composition should be on an *equal footing* with listening and performing, rather than subservient to these two activities.

of art. Music education can explore this quality in particular by the study and performance of operas and musicals. The early operas of Monteverdi and others of the *Camerata* give wonderful insight, not only to the early Baroque and its exploitation of the *affections,* but also to the stories of the great Greek mythologies. *Le nozze di Figaro* by Mozart illustrates in detail the historical clash between aristocracy and the lower classes. *George M!* describes the life and times of one of America's early twentieth century popular composers, while *Evita* charts the course of the famous Argentinean despot. Actual class performance of songs, arias, and medleys, along with active listening to the scores of musicals and opera, are certainly a most appropriate task for the junior or senior high general music class. In addition, the study and use of non-referential music also projects worlds worthy of investigation. The tender beauty of a Mozart piano sonata, the vivid passion of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony,* the undulating sensuousness of sitar music, and the improvisatory runs of a jazz bass player all project worlds recreated internally.

Illumination takes place when music is used to alter convictions or present a vision of how things could be. Again, the study and performance of operas and musicals are highly beneficial. Operas and musicals portray vividly in sound and action the human passions and moral consequences (or lack thereof), and a clear vision of a different world from the one we inhabit. The musical or opera could be studied in class and a medley of songs could be performed in choral form. Another viable option for students is to investigate

and sing a variety of protest songs from the 1960's and then compose their own songs reflecting current issues that affect them today. Likewise, a special choral concert could concentrate on songs from the African American heritage--spirituals, freedom songs, civil rights movement songs, contemporary gospel, and hiphop.

Modeling involves the imitation of certain perceived qualities in areas of everyday life and behavior. As noted previously, Plato referred to this activity in the arts as the Doctrine of Ethos. The effects of modeling must be monitored carefully when selecting repertoire. Use of inappropriate lyrics including those espousing overt violence, advocating of youth suicide, rape, or murder, obvious degradation of women, and other social evils are never to be used in the music education curriculum. However, this is most certainly not a call for trite, shallow, "feel good," moralistic music that sermonizes to young people in a way that repels rather than attracts. Music in the music education curriculum must possess honesty and integrity, both for the student and the teacher.

Communication by music can best be accomplished by an emphasis on excellence in performance, whether done vocally, chorally, instrumentally, or through composition. This emphasis on excellence extends not only to the high school choral program, but down to the earliest music classes as well. The first grade Kodaly class singing a simple folk song can be taught, at this early age, the fundamentals of proper singing: good posture, use of head voice, correct breathing, and appropriate diction. Indeed, sloppiness in performance, little attention to detail, and acceptance of mediocrity are all examples of failing to

communicate the powerful messages music carries. The best communication is brought forth by an emphasis on the truly *musical* nature of music, the emotions it engenders, and the finer points of musical deliverance that create an atmosphere of excellence.

Music education curriculum must provide the opportunity for projected worlds to convey to students these wide variety of effects inherent in the world's being.

5. An institution of high art exists.

A curriculum based only on the tenets of the institution of high art is a curriculum that is rigid and myopic. Wolterstorff's reoccurring theme is that of the recognition of a multiplicity of arts purposes. This necessitates the use of an artistic repertoire which is broadly-based, culturally diverse, and class inclusive. This can be achieved by utilizing a diversity of music including abstract and referential music, contemporary and avant-garde music, sacred and secular music, and traditional and popular music. What is of primary importance is the broadening and deepening of the repertoire employed by the curriculum--narrow and rigid repertoire parameters fail to utilize the powerful influence projected worlds hold for music education and civilization at large.

6. The arts express the social realities of life.

The social realities of life are given tangible form in art. When art is viewed as such, it becomes clear that music education cannot be seen only in terms of intellectual conceptualizations and designated behaviors. The use of emotion can be highlighted as a important component of the social realities. Music is a vital, pulsating art alive with the emotion of the human race. The hypnotic rhythms of Black South African song, the gentle, tranquil melodies of Korean lullabies, and the tender beauty of Dufay's motets are all appreciated fully only in the context of the emotion felt by performers and listeners. This emotion is not conducive to a conceptual hierarchy. In actuality, verbal conceptualization often misses the very essence of music. The music curriculum needs to be designed with the importance of emotion in mind. In addition, music education does not fit tidily into Tyler's rationale of curriculum. New models of criteria for designing music curricula are necessary in order to incorporate music in all its social realities.[7]

Other social realities about which music can teach include the celebration of important people and important events, the commemoration of certain customs, the embellishment of common rituals, and the highlighting of important holidays. The school becomes a microcosm of the larger society and it can fruitfully incorporate through music education its own social realities. This includes encouraging students to compose their own music with which to mark

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[7] Indeed, Elliott does exactly that.

special occasions such as the annual open house, grandparents day, or an awards or recognition ceremony, recognizing December holidays and their associated rituals by utilizing Christmas and Hanukkah songs,[8] listening to and singing Chinese folk songs as the Chinese New Year approaches, recognizing Black History Month with a special program of Gospel music, and providing traditional music at graduation.

7. Aesthetic contemplation is only one of many roles served by music.

The aesthetic experience is only one of the many diverse purposes of music. However, if music education focuses on aesthetic education exclusively as a primary goal, it becomes rigidly narrow in scope and decidedly ethnocentric. Despite the fact that Mark[9] recognizes the dominant role aesthetic education has played in the past thirty years this time period has been relatively short when compared to the centuries of the past. Music is valued for its cultural history and social identity, its ability to project worlds both distinct and distant from our own, and its capacity to remember and commemorate. The music education curriculum must value and utilize all of music's purposes. This includes incorporating a diverse and balanced repertoire of music, employing action as the basis of the curriculum, including composition as an important part of the curriculum's activities, combining the function of world projection and its

[8] This runs counter to the trends in some school districts of strictly prohibiting any holiday song with any religious reference.

implications with long-range lesson planning, and allowing the curriculum to reflect the social realities of life as it is found in the school and the community. The *Tanglewood Declaration* of 1967 called for precisely the same objectives when it stated in item two that "Music of all periods, styles, forms, and cultures should be expanded to involve music of our time in its rich variety, including currently popular teenage music and avant-garde music, American folk music, and the music of other cultures."[10]

8. Art possesses a memorial function.

Because art acts as an instrument of social remembering, it performs a vital role in the preservation of society, culture, and history. Hence, the role of curriculum in music education is of critical importance in our survival as a civilization with a remembered past that shapes the future. Its significance cannot be taken lightly, nor can it be relegated to the realm of nonessentiality in today's schools. The music education curriculum must include in its repertoire, music which speaks to our common histories. Methodologies which stress only contemporary music, or only pentatonic music, or only classical music, run the risk of overlooking this essential component of art. Both inclusivity and diversity must be hallmarks of the curriculum.

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[9] Michael Mark, "A New Look at Historical Periods in American Music Education," *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* 99 (1987).

[10] Robert A. Choate, ed. Documentary Report of the Tanglewood Symposium, (Washington DC: Music Educators National Conference, 1968), 139.

This quality can be taught by introducing the role of ritual in music and stressing the unique relationship ritual and music have had both in the past and also in the present. This could be accomplished by the study and performance of various Mass settings, the study and performance of various Buddist and Hindu chant settings, by performing, actively listening, and analyzing those pieces of music associated with specific events or people in the past. For example, Haydn's *Lord Nelson Mass*, Beethoven's *Eroica Symphony*, Dion's *Abraham, Martin and John*, the traditional *Battle Hymn of the Republic*, the folk song *The Erie Canal*, and Tchaikovsky's *1812 Overture* would all provide appropriate opportunities for understanding the role of art as a memorial. In addition, encouraging the composition by students of memorial music that reflects the life and history of the school or individual class is an excellent occasion for students to first hand grasp the power of the memorial function of music and the role it can play in their lives.

In conclusion, Wolterstorff has given music education a significant theory of art. It is both succinct in its intent and broad-based in its scope. He possesses a wide, global view of the arts and their involvement in the life and history of humankind. Art is cast in a role more basic and necessary to our survival as a people than has been done in the past. In doing so he connects art not only with our past, but with our future as well. Wolterstorff's marriage of modal and ontological philosophy with artistic theory has produced an end result that generates tremendous possibilities for music education. Many educators have

been searching for a clearly articulated, and logically based foundation upon which to base a music teaching philosophy and curriculum. Wolterstorff fulfills this need in a far-reaching and sound manner.

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