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CONSUMPTION, CONTRABAND AND COMMODIFICATION:
A HISTORY OF KHAT IN HARERGE, ETHIOPIA, c. 1930-1991.

By

Ezekiel Gebissa

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1997

ABSTRACT

CONSUIVIPTION, CONTRABAND AND COMMODIFICATION:
A HISTORY OF KHAT IN HARERGE, ETHIOPIA, c. 1930—1991.

By

Ezekiel Gebissa

During the nineteenth-century, Harer evolved as a major commercial center in eastern
Ethiopia, owing to its location at the cross-roads of trading routes and its political strength as an
independent state. Agriculture was the primary occupation of the Hareri, the city—dwellers, who
cultivated fruit trees, coffee, khat (catha edulis), spice trees and vegetables in gardens around their
walled-city. Further away, Oromo farmers cultivated cereal crops such as sorghum, maize, wheat,
and barley, suﬂicient for their own subsistence, and supplied the city with exportable commodities
such as ivory, ghee, coffee, tobacco and so forth.

The arrival of a railway to the foothills of the Harer highlands in 1902, the construction of
road networks and the introduction of commercial trucking in the 19203 and 19305, and the
inauguration air-transportation in the late 19403, initiated changes in the patterns of economic
activities described above. By the late 19505 and early 1960s, owing to faster transport, khat had
become the chief cash crop of the region, out-competing other crops for land, labor and capital. In
the 1970s, khat was the fastest-growing and the most proﬁtable occupation involving millions of
farmers, traders and other service-providers in the whole region.

This study argues that the change in the local system of production was spurred by land

scarcity caused by high population growth. In the absence of other economic sectors which could

i-l

absorb the region's demographic surplus, farmers increased their khat ﬁelds so that they could use
the proceeds from khat sales to purchase nonfarm commodities, pay taxes and make productivity
investments. Farmers who initially moved to towns to retail khat used their proﬁts to start nonfarm
occupations.

From the mid-19705 on, state intervention was responsible for the accelerated pace of
change. The Ethiopian government monopolized agricultural marketing and imposed restrictions
on the importation of consumer goods, thereby creating a critical shortage of consumer goods. Khat
and other primary goods were smuggled out and the proﬁt from their sales was used to smuggle the
commodities in short supply. The result was an unprecedented growth in cross-border trade. In the
1980s, the production and marketing of khat turned out to be a growth industry which employed
a large section of Harerge's population.

In sum, this dissertation accounts for the commodiﬁcation of khat and the consequent
transformation of the political economy of the Harerge region. By carefully collating interview data
with Ethiopian and European archival sources and bringing together the thinkings of several
authorities on peasant production and parallel markets, the study traces changes in the patterns of
khat production, marketing and consumption, analyzes farmers' responses to changes in the physical,

political and economic environments, and evaluates the role of the shrub in the expansion of

contraband trade.

Copyright by
EZEKIEL B. GEBISSA
1997

iv

Dedication

For my Father, who never lost faith in me.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support, cooperation, and
friendship I have received from so many individuals and institutions over the years. Perhaps
my ﬁrst debt is owed to my father, who always bad faith in me and encouraged me “to go all
the way for the highest possible degree.” I dedicate this dissertation to him for guiding me
and for being there when I needed him.

My intellectual debt is owed to Professors Harold Marcus and David Robinson, who
opened up the ﬁeld of African history to me, encouraged me to pursue it, and guided me
during the earliest stages of my graduate studies and this project. I am above all indebted to
Professor Marcus, my advisor and chairperson of my doctoral committee, who steadfastly
read many drafts of the dissertation, never wavered in his support, and showed unﬂagging
patience with me. Professor Marcus and I disagreed on many issues, but he never attempted
to impose on me his own views of history. Rather, he encouraged me to be imaginative,
critical, and creative, and allowed me the freedom to pursue my own thoughts and, of
course, rrristakes. I also want warmly to acknowledge the intellectual guidance and
continuing support of Professor Robinson, who not only thought me the art of doing history,
but also demonstrated to me the value of discipline, persistence and diligence. The members
of my doctoral committee, Professors Elizabeth Eldredge, John Hinnant, and David Walker
gave me valuable suggestions and comments which I gratefully acknowledge. In particular,
Iwish to express a sincere gratitude to Professor Eldredge for her pointed comments and for

being a source of inspiration and support over the years.

vi

During the course of my ﬁeld research, I incurred many intellectual debts and
received wonderful hospitality in Ethiopia and London. I owe thanks to all those unsung
employees of the provincial archives in Harerge who carried dusty ﬁles to me day after day
and to the workers of various government agencies in Harer and Dire Dawa who accorded
me generous assistance and warm hospitality. I also received inexhaustibly courteous and
informed assistance from the staff members of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis
Ababa University. Above all, I will always be indebted to my informants in Harerge who
accepted me in their midst and endured with grace my endless questions. I hope this
dissertation will reﬂect their hopes, aspirations and quest for a better life.

I wish speciﬁcally to thank the Rev. Mezgebu Fufa and his family for their loyal
friendship, boundless generosity and moral support. Rev. Mezgebu’s assistance in xeroxing
hundreds of documents, arranging interviews and providing me with a vehicle has greatly
enhanced the quality of the evidentiary materials on which this study is based. In London,
my brother Barnabas Daniel and his wife Hirut made my stay there enjoyable, productive and
memorable. I also gratefully acknowledge the solid ﬁnancial support from the Rockefeller
Foundation which covered my expenses in Ethiopia, Great Britain and France.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Meseret and my children, Haara and Kenna,
for making it possible for me to ﬁnd joy in both work and family. My wife and I had to
endure the difﬁcult responsibility of balancing the high-pressured, two-graduate student
family with the daunting task of raising children and work for living. To my family, and to
God, who charted my life course and helped me throughout, I owe much more than I can

ever say.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.

LIST OF FIGURES. .

Introduction.
CHAPTERS

One: The Harerge Highlands: A Macro-View of Economic Change,
18405-19205. . . . . . .

Two: Khat Production, Consumption and Marketing before the 19305:
A Historiographical Sketch. . .

Three: The Expansion of Khat Production: The Agrarian System, Population
Growth and Production Strategies, c.1935- c.1964. .

Four: The Political Economy of Consumption, c. 1935- c.1964.

Five: The Export Trade: Constraints, Contraband and Control,
1964-1974 .

Six: The Domestic Context: Consumption, Structures of Distribution
and Crop Competition, c.1964-1974 .

Seven: The Khat Boom: Production and Exchange in a Controlled Economy,
1 974- 1991 .

Eight: The Parallel Market: Causes, Scale and Structure.

Nine: Conclusion: Toward a khat-based development ? .

GLOSSARY. .

viii

ix

41

73

97

. 125

. 161

. 195

. 216

. 252

. 276

. 288

APPENDD( . . . . . . . . . . 289

LIST OF INFORMANTS . . . . . . . . . 290

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . 295

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. French Somaliland (Djibouti): Khat Imports, 1929-1932. ........................... 87
Table 2. French Somaliland (Djibouti): Khat Imports, 1952-1957. ........................... 141
Table 3. Aden Colony: Khat Imports, 1947-1957. .................................................. 143
Table 4. Khat Income Tax and Export Duty Rates as of

October 28, 1969. .................................................................................... 176
Table 5. Comparative Statistics of Export Duty and Income Tax

Revenues in birr ....................................................................................... 178
Table 6. Evaluation of the Irrigable Land and Khat Cultivated Areas.

Sample of Six Farming Households in Tula. ............................................ 220
Table 7. Evaluation of Irrigable Land and Khat Cultivated Areas.

Sample of Eleven Farming Households in Kako ....................................... 221
Table 8. Crop Production per Hectare ................................................................. 227
Table 9. KEAE Khat Exports in volume and Prices, 1979-1990 ........................... 241
Table 10. KEAE Balance Sheet, 1987-1990 ............................................................. 248

Table 11. A Comparison of Potential Demand and Actual Supply in

Four Lowland Awrajas of Harerge. .......................................................... 256

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Locational Map ......................................................................................... 43
Figure 2. Physical Map - Harerge ............................................................................. 44
Figure 3. Location of Tula and Kako ........................................................................ 116
Figure 4. Contraband Routes, 19605 ......................................................................... 166
Figure 5. The Structure of Khat Market in Harerge .................................................. 205
Figure 6. Contraband Routes, 19805 ......................................................................... 271

INTRODUCTION

Sources, Methodology and Historiography

This study traces the process of economic change in Harerge region, Eastern Ethiopia,
between mid-19305 and early 19905. It examines why farmers increasingly shifted from
cultivating coﬁee and food crops to growing khatl (catha edulis), a quasilegal psychoactive
shrub; and how farmers responded to and coped with changes in the physical, political and
economic environments. The study seeks to show how demographic, market and political
factors led to the emergence of khat as the leading agricultural commodity of the Harerge
region and how this development, in turn, augmented the scale of the unofﬁcial cross-border
trade in consumer goods. These changes were accompanied by new sets of conﬂicts,
cleavages and competition centering on the control of the production and marketing of khat.
The study also explores the consequences of the new cash crop for the regional economy
as a whole, for farmer-state relations, for the nature and balance of local social relations, as
well as for Harerge's physical, socioeconomic, and political landscapes.2

The region with which the study is concerned is the former Islamic emirate of Harer
which lost its status as an independent state when it was incorporated into the expanded

Ethiopian empire-state in 1887. Located to the east of the Great Riﬁ Valley which dissects

 

' Ihave counted at least ﬁfty names for khat. Farmers in Harerge use the Oromo word djima.
I will use the term khat because it is the most widely used name in the scientiﬁc literature and
publications of international and government institutions. For details, see Greenway, "Khat," The
East Aﬁican Agricultural Journal, 1947; Bertil Nelhans, Khat: a stimulating drug in East Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula, (Gotenborg, 1974), pp. 3-5.

2 There have been a number of changes in the administrative divisions of Ethiopia in recent
years. Unless otherwise indicated, in this dissertation, Harerge denotes the province that existed until
1987 and Harer refers to the provincial capital.

2

Ethiopia roughly into two halves and between the ﬁfth and eleventh degree of north latitude,
Harerge is not characterized by physiographic uniformity. It comprises a cross-section of the
vertical landscape that sweeps down from the Chercher and Harer plateaux, to the Danakil
Plains or the Awash valley to the north and north-east and the Ogaden Desert or the Shebelle
Plains to the southeast and south. The level of moisture is the controlling climatological
factor for the region's patterns of movement and settlement.

Before the turn of the twentieth-century, agriculture was the main economic
occupation of the city-dwellers who maintained gardens around the town. The main crops
were fruit trees, coffee, khat, spice trees and vegetables. Cereals such as sorghum, maize,
wheat, and barely were also produced for local consumption. Coffee was the single most
important agricultural commodity that was exported from Harerge. Khat was cultivated
mainly by the Hareri who retailed it in local markets. Only dried khat was exported to the
neighboring countries until the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway track reached the foothills of
Harer in 1902.

At the turn of the century, the consumption of khat for pleasure was limited to a
small, well-oﬁ‘ urbanite elite. Written and oral sources suggest that the main users were
religious leaders who chewed the leaves to stay awake and pray; long distance traders who
preferred to travel long distance at night; and farmers who chewed it for energy and fulﬁlled
their khat needs by growing the shrub alongside other crops.

Since the 19405 in particular, the demographic conﬁguration of users has changed
dramatically. In contemporary Harerge, only a tiny minority of the population, owing to

personal and medical reasons, refrain from chewing khat. Daily laborers, construction

3

workers, farmers, Quranic readers and reciters, students, long distance truck drivers and
cabbies, animal hunters, couriers, Muslim judges, men, women, and children, all chew khat.
The dramatic expansion in khat consumption has been accompanied by a signiﬁcant
increase in its economic importance. Responding to the demand generated by increased
consumption, a considerable number of farmers have abandoned the production of other cash
and food crops and transformed their plots and gardens into khat ﬁelds. Admittedly, khat
consumption is a result of a larger cultural transformation that has taken place in Harerge
in a relatively short period of time, but it is not my intention to examine the changing cultural
meanings that khat may have acquired. Rather, I would like to focus on the economy of khat
production and the extensive commercial networks that have sprung up to market the corp,
especially since the advent of modern road and air transportation.
This introduction has two main sections: the ﬁrst is essentially a narrative of my
research in which I will discuss my sources and methods. In the second section, I will situate

my study in the relevant historiographical and theoretical contexts.

A. The Research: Sources and Methodology

I began my research in Harerge by interviewing elderly people whom the community
designated as knowledgeable in the local history. Several of the individuals with whom I
came into contact were referred to me as conveyers of oral history. Not all of them were
scholars, or even literate, but most have historical interests or, to say the least, enjoy
participating in conversations about their history. My informants included ex-administrators

who had lived and worked in the region for several decades; judges who had presided over

4

commercial disputes; community leaders esteemed for their knowledge of history; merchants
involved in the export business and people who had worked for French and British ﬁrms and
nationals, and employees of the railroad company.

When I approached some of tho.ound out that they had their own ideas
about the correct conduct of historical inquiry. They had much to say about big events such
as the battle of Chelenqo, or big personalities such as Ras Mekonnen, Lz'j Iyyasu, emir
Abdullahi or emperor Haile Sellassie. Questions relating to the origins of khat and its spread
were often entertained with puzzlement. Some wondered why I was inquiring about a plant
rather than listening to tales of great deeds by great men. To my apparently "trivial" question,
most responded with a standardized answer: "khat has always been here. "

The fact that my informants had little to say about agriculture suggested to me that
generalized and technical inquiries cannot extract the type of information needed for my
study. It soon became clear to me that, when it comes to local history, people are more
responsive to queries about their personal involvement in events and processes and more
inclined toward telling individual experiences and life stories. So I quickly directed my
questions to inquiring about personal experiences.

In my eﬂorts to collect oral histories in the form of personal, localized reminiscences,
I usually encountered unique conceptions of historical description. In response to questions
about khat production and consumption before and during the Italian occupation, my
informants reminisced about political events in Addis Ababa or the ﬂight of Haile Sellassie.
While my requests for information concerning past events in Harerge and individual life

experiences did not coincide with conceptions in Harer of what historical inquiry should pay

5

attention to, I gleaned important information on distant and recent events from structured and
unstructured conversations.3 When Iput together the information I had gathered, a general
outline of the gradual change in the importance of khat emerged.

The interviews yielded information on several aspects of the growth of the khat
industry: the cultural constraints which earlier had prevented the expansion of khat
consumption and hence production; social processes which directly affected the status of
khat as a cash crop; the decline in importance and value of other cash crops; and problems
of agriculture arising from land scarcity caused by population increase. Having attained the
general picture of change, I proceeded to interview khat growing farmers for more detailed
information about the transformation in production patterns at village level.

Getting farmers to agree to an interview was not an easy exercise. When I expressed
my interest in the history of khat and requested interviews, potential informants responded
by asking me a series of questions. "Why are you interested in the history of khat? How is
your study going to improve our lives? Which government department do you work for?
The farmers are generally aware that their local histories need to be written, but they suspect
the motives of researchers seeking to reconstruct the local history. They have gone through
seventeen traumatizing years of military dictatorship (1974-1991), whose agents, posing as
researchers, extracted information and used against the farmers. Many farmers have therefore
become reticent about transmitting their history in order to escape the danger of their own

words.

 

3 One of my informants, Mohammed Abdulahi Ogsaday, told me to take note of what he was
telling me , insisting that his version is the way the history of the region should be written.

6

Others realize that reticence does not always guarantee safety. During the rule of the
military junta, otherwise known as the derg (committee), even silence was construed as
being uncooperative, a serious crime. It might mean obstructing the development policies of
a well-meaning government, which had set out to change the lives of its rural citizens for the
better. To avoid the double jeopardy, potential informants parroted the ofﬁcial government
position that food crop production must take precedence over the cultivation of cash crops.
When, for example, Itried to elicit explanations for the visible shift to cultivating khat, the
farmers hastened to point out that the production of coffee and other food crops was seriously
affected by rain shortages and crop diseases. The farmers swear that they do not actually
prefer cultivating khat and promptly promise that they will revert to cultivating food crops
if the rains returned and the government provided them with pesticides.

To win the conﬁdence of such cautious informants, I had to allay their suspicion.
Agricultural Extension workers were honest enough to tell me that I should avoid them if I
were to gain the conﬁdence of farmers. Fortunately, I became acquainted with a former
Peasant Association (PA) chairman, a popular and trusted ﬁgure in the area. I explained to
the ex-chairman that I had no political agenda that might disrupt khat production and
marketing and assured him that my work was meant to be read by people in universities, not
necessarily by Ethiopian government ofﬁcials. He was delighted that my work would
introduce khat overseas and, whenever he introduced me to other informants, he presented
me as someone whose work would help ﬁnd a foreign market for their product. With the PA
ex-chairman's introduction, farmers in the khat producing area I chose to study accepted me

as one of them and became willing to respond to my questions.

7

In most cases, I conducted interviews with farmers in khat ﬁelds between 9 a. m. to
12 noon and 3 p. m. to 5 p. m. in the aftemoon, the times the farmers take a break from their
work to chew khat. Other interviews were held in homes, mostly during the aﬁemoon chew
sessions known as bercha and on occasions such as mourning.

The interviews yielded crucial information on the production and exchange of khat
and on the social and economic transformation engendered by the commoditization of khat.
My informants had excellent capacity to describe the contemporary situation in regard to
khat's agronomy, cropping strategies and land use management. Memories about changes
in the physical environment which could suggest past cropping patterns, agricultural
practices and farming strategies were fragmentary and inconsistent. For instance, the farmers
I interviewed were unable to tell precisely when they or their parents began to expand the
cultivation of khat. Nor were they able accurately to describe when and how the demand for
khat started to grow.

It was my responsibility as a historian to sort out the jumbled up, non-chronological
narratives and reconstruct a coherent story of agricultural change. Such a task is impossible
to accomplish based only on the information I gathered from farmers. The interviews were
not particularly informative in regard to the historical development on khat marketing. For
a more detailed information on the expansion of the market for khat, I had to turn to the
traders who were involved in khat buying, selling and exporting.

From my experience with farmers, I had learned that building trust was a priority.
In approaching my potential trader informants, I had to enlist the assistance of people who

would acquaint me with long-standing khat traders. One informant referred me to another

8

and along the chain of reference I came in contact with a man educated in a local French
school in the 19205 and who was one of the founding members a company which exported
khat to Aden in the 19505. The person ultimately invited me to the aﬁemoon khat chewing
sessions at his home, where I conversed with many of his former colleagues.

Success in contacting khat-marketers did not mean that they easily gave up
information. Even though, I explained that I was interested in knowing how ordinary traders
marketed khat in the past, my informant's conception of history was such that they felt
obligated to relate about the participation of famous people in the khat business. It seemed
they were convinced that stories about the secret business engagements of members of the
royal family, government attempts to take over the khat trade, allegations that khat revenue
went exclusively to the emperor and so forth, were topics I should be interested in. Inquires
about the khat trade did not receive full and direct responses. Once again, my conception of
history and that of even the educated trader did not match.

Information regarding the state of khat trade started to surface when I redirected my
questions to asking personal histories. Khat traders who were engaged in the export business
in the 19405 and 19505, began to recollect stories about their involvement in the khat trade.
Their personal histories provided me with a general impression of the chronology of rises and
declines in khat value and demand as well as the different market places and directions of
khat ﬂow. In particular, the traders made me aware of the centrality of smuggling in
marketing khat.

In the ﬁnal analysis, the interviews yielded a mixture of memory and anecdote.

Concerning the period before the 19205, I was unable to ﬁnd many people who could clearly

9

recall that period. There are few old people around, but they are not in good enough health
to tell coherent stories. In any case, oral information on the period before the 19305 was
needed to provide background to my study and the lack of it was compensated for by other
genres of sources.

For the period 1920 on, however, it was possible to obtain eyewitness accounts from
elderly informants who remember how the khat trade was conducted. Most of the changes
I was trying to understand took place during their life times and they were able to lead me
through the major developments such as the construction of roads, the beginning of truck
transportation, the market place in Dire Dawa and the prominent traders who purchased khat
for export. Their stories were corroborated by travel accounts and the memoirs of some
EurOpeans who lived in Harer in the immediate period before the Italians.

We are fortunate to have many written works on Harer beginning around the turn of
the century. The arrival of the railhead in Dire Dawa attracted expatriate travelers who came
to Harer prospecting commercial possibilities for their ﬁrms or countries. These people
represented a variety of backgrounds, ranging from official government envoys to private
specialists, who came to sell their skills. Many have left behind accounts of their experiences
in the region. In the early 19305, the coming of the Italo-Ethiopian war also brought a good
number of expatriates, who reported on the political and economic conditions that were then
current in Ethiopia.

Because many of the writers were interested in economic matters, the earlier
accounts contained useful information on a wide range of commercial activities. Beyond

describing the prevailing business conditions in general terms, the writers detailed the rise

10

of Dire Dawa as a trading town and described market conditions, including the ﬂuctuation
of prices of exportable commodities. The reports yielded a remarkably complete picture of
Harer's decline as the region's major trading center and its replacement by Dire Dawa. They
also described the rise of coffee as a major export commodity and the consequent
experimental coffee plantations established by some expatriates. Khat-chewing was
mentioned in these reports as a peculiar habit of the residents of the region, whose farmers
maintained some khat trees in their gardens. The omission of a detailed account evidences
that khat was not a major cash crop and certainly no match for coffee in the pre-war period.

Harer was the seat of a British consul from c. 1906 until the Italian occupation. The
periodic reports successive consuls forwarded to the legation in Addis Ababa or directly to
the Foreign Office are available at the Public Record Office in London. I read through the
reports from Harer and Addis Ababa from 1906 to 1963. Documents from later years were
not declassiﬁed at the time of my research in 1994. Issues of political and diplomatic
importance, especially those affecting British relations with Ethiopia and with other
European colonial powers, dominate the content of these documents. There are occasional
economic reports which dealt with Ethiopia's domestic economic conditions in more general
terms. None of the periodic reports treats khat as a subject of particular importance, but one
occasionally ﬁnds passing remarks about its consumption and cultivation. Reports by
visiting agricultural experts also provide valuable insights which proved especially
signiﬁcant when used in establishing the economic background before the Italian period.

I had hoped to obtain a considerable amount of information in the Archives

Nationales de France in the Care F ranpaise des Somali materials. There were 124 cartons

11

on the former French territory in the De’pa d'Outre Mer at Aix-en-Provence. I looked
through the documents on Social and Economic Conditions, taxation and trade, hoping to
uncover at least statistical materials on khat imports into Djibouti. I found such statistics for
only 1929-31, but they seemed exaggerated and inconsistent with the traveler accounts and
the recollections of my informants. Though frustrated, I quickly realized that European
Archives were not the place to recover documentation about village-level changes.

For the period after 1941, the stories of my informants were supplemented in a very
signiﬁcant way by archival documents and administrative records from Harerge region. I
found letters, annual reports, investigative reports, meeting proceedings and varieties of other
documentation, produced by the provincial administrative body. The documents contained
information on a variety of subjects, including the politics of controlling the production and
exchange of khat, the appeals of khat farmers against the monopolization of the trade by a
few exporting companies, the petitions of traders for tax and export duty reductions and the
growth of contraband trade and the measures taken by the provincial government to curb it.
The archives also contained correspondence of the provincial government with the central
government, the khat exporting companies in Harer and Dire Dawa, and the khat importing
companies in Aden and Djibouti. These records detail the conﬂict that existed between the
different groups including the government who had interest in the exporting of khat.

I also examined the archives of the regional bureaux of the Ministries of Agriculture
(MAO) and Foreign Trade (WT) and collected materials I considered germane to my study.
For some years, I was only able to recover fragmented pieces of information on land use

because most of the district level records were looted during the violent change of

12

government in 1991 and sold to shopkeepers who used the papers for packaging. There are
credible reports that the rebel army deliberately set on ﬁre government records to symbolize
the end of an era.

The regional Ministry of Foreign Trade was created in 1979 and now holds a valuable
cache of records on the import and export conditions of Harerge region. The monthly,
quarterly and annual reports contain information on the state of the region's export trade, the
level of government intervention in the region's external trade, the problem of smuggling
and statistics on imported and exported commodities. There were discrepancies between
the ﬁgures produced by the MFT and those of the National Bank ofﬁce in Dire Dawa. As
the official foreign currency exchange control institution in Ethiopia, the National Bank
generates its data based on money remissions effected for licensed traders while the MF T
obtains them from the Customs Authority at the Dire Dawa train station. In most cases, the
National Bank ﬁgures are less than those of the MFT, suggesting that some traders export
khat and other primary commodities without using the service of the National Bank. For a
fairly accurate estimation of khat export, therefore, I relied on the MF T ﬁgures.

Export ﬁgures for the early postwar years were obtained from the main office of the
Customs Authority in Addis Ababa. From this ofﬁce, one would only expect to ﬁnd
national ﬁgures, but I was fortunate to ﬁnd, collect and compile export statistics for Harerge
region. The ﬁgures are published and the consistency that exists between the data generated
by the Customs Authority and the National Bank seems to suggest that the compilation of
data at the national level was more organized and the ﬁgures more reliable.

Another useful category of primary sources is comprised by recent development

13

surveys, technical materials and mirneographed research results carried out by the experts of
the Farming System Research (FSR) unit of the Hararnaya University of Agriculture and
several study reports written by the experts of the Office of Central Planning and
Development Council (OCPDC) for Harerge region. These sources were especially valuable
for my research in the areas of demographic and farm level technical changes, patterns of
land use and the commercialization of the regional agriculture. For the most part, the
information these sources yielded reinforced the oral information I gathered from my
informants regarding demographic grth and the measures taken by farmers to cope with
land shortages.

The archival sources that were used in this dissertation proved extremely important
in documenting the political dimensions of the khat industry. The sources were generated
for administrative purposes and contain information on issues affecting the production and
marketing of khat--decisions to increase taxes, efforts to curb smuggling, attempts to attain
control over khat marketing and so forth. From time to time, one detects inconsistencies in
statistics and facts but they could be cross-checked and veriﬁed. Most of the archival
materials from the imperial period that I consulted, especially the reports of ad hoc
commissions called to study a particular subject, minutes of administrative committee
meetings, which quoted interview materials ad verbatim, did not seem to exhibit political or
ideological bias. The ofﬁcial records are, therefore, of great value to this study

The various feasibility studies, evaluative reports, agricultural baseline studies
generated by derg era development institutions such agencies as the Ofﬁce of Central

Planning are casually dismissed as ideologically biased political documents. A careful

14

reading of the documents reveals that a distinction should be made between expert studies
and policy recommendations, which were, of course, tailored to suit the expectations of the
ideologically inﬂexible military leaders. In reality, the latter seem to bear no relationship
with the research ﬁndings on which they were ostensibly based. Most of the professional
works are thorough, systematic and methodologically sound and the research ﬁndings are

H I
reliable. Though mostly synchronic in conception, ’ the ﬁndings of these sources reinforced

\Lﬁ‘
\

“(113935, already been evident in farmers stories. Coupled with the farming systems studies
prepared by scholars associated with the Alemaya University of Agriculture, these
government documents provide a rich cache of sources which could be utilized carefully to
reconstruct the history of agricultural change in Harerge in the second half of the twentieth-
century.

When all of my sources were arranged in a chronological order, they provided a
comprehensive picture of the circumstances in which khat grew to be Harerge's most
important cash crop. Oral sources provided detailed information on farmers' choices,
cropping strategies, decision-making processes and responses to government policies they
considered intrusive. Conversations with traders yielded information on subjects such as the
infrastructure of smuggling, clandestine markets and actors in parallel markets which are
usually hard to document. More often, however, oral sources were static and inaccurate,
especially when the events described are in the distant past. Such deﬁciencies were made
up for by a careful reading of archival materials which provided a time line for the non-
chronological oral narratives.

Taken together, the oral sources, archival materials, government and empirical studies

‘\

15

enable us to answer the main question of this dissertation: why did farmers in Harerge to
switch from coffee and food crop cultivation to khat production? The available evidence
allows us to identify the factors which initiated the expansion of consumption, production
and marketing, and the overall change in the political economy of Harerge wrought by khat's
commodiﬁcation. We can also explore broader issues of agrarian change, the economics
of unofﬁcial cross-border trade and society-state relationships.

The sources have shaped my conception of farmers and traders as well as my
understanding of patterns and events in regard to the politics, socio-economic and
demographic changes experienced by the societies of the Harerge highlands. The preliminary
interpretations that emerged from the sources led me to deﬁne the objectives and

organization of my study.

B. The Aims

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation is about khat and its place in the political
economy of the Harerge region. There is no doubt that a cultural biography of khat could
produce a fascinating social history, but, in this study, I do not intend to present a narrative
of the social life of khat as a commodity. Rather, from a commodity perspective, I would
like to reconstruct the history of the people who cultivate and market khat. In other words,
this study concentrates on people, not on a thing. By focusing on the production,
exchange/distribution and consumption, I shall be able to trace and document the process
of khat's commoditization and changes in the overall economy.

To that end, the dissertation attempts to achieve three interrelated goals. The ﬁrst and

16

primary aim is systematically to examine the transformation of khat from a shrub cultivated
primarily to satisfy local consumption to a commodity produced to meet the seemingly
insatiable demand of consumers in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian peninsula. My
narrative will trace the process by which khat emerged from a particular social and cultural
context of production and consumption and linked its producers in a novel way to an
expanding regional market. Currently, khat is the fastest-growing and unquestionably the
most proﬁtable occupation involving millions of farmers, traders and other auxiliary service
providers in the whole region.

Second, I will investigate the social and economic effects on Harerge's Oromo
farmers of producing khat for far-off consumers. My objective here is not merely to narrate
how the Oromo communities were rapidly and inexorably subsumed by market forces.
Rather, I wish to stress that their active participation in the expansion of the khat industry
was part of their overall strategy to defend and enhance their livelihood against natural
processes and adverse state policies. Their situation has been complicated by a growing
population and a decreasing land base in heavily populated regions; the structural limitations
of and developmental policies implemented after the restoration of Haile Sellassie's
government in 1941 and after its replacement by a military regime in 1974; the shifting value
of Harerge's traditional exports, owing partly to price ﬂuctuations in the international market
and partly due to the draconian measures taken by the derg to monopolize the country’s
export market. Thus, the favorable attitude of the Oromo farmers toward khat cultivation
should be viewed within a larger context of social, economic and political changes, not as

a sudden decision made to respond to a proﬁtable market.

17

The third aim of this study is to examine how and in what speciﬁc contexts the
Oromo farmers contributed to the emergence and expansion of the market for khat. I shall
show that the Oromo farmers' options, choices, and strategies, centering on the cultivation
of khat, were structured by constantly changing political and economic processes in the
societies around the khat producing farmers. The changes include infrastructural
developments, the monetization of the economy and the evolution of an extensive
transcultural network of commercial relationships linking together different agro-economic
zones, ethnic groups and nations. Khat has played an important role in the contraband trade
among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia and the links it had created between farmers and
traders has been critical in sustaining the underground world of commerce in the region. In
this regard, khat has made Harerge a culturally distinct and economically unique region of
Ethiopia.

The aims of this study took shape as I grappled with and attempted to provide
satisfactory answers to key questions and concerns centering on khat's commoditization.
Chief among these were why the overwhelming number of Oromo cultivators in Harerge
shifted to its cultivation, how the structures of its marketing and why its consumption
expanded rapidly. What was needed to produce and distribute khat sufﬁciently and without
interruption? How were labor and other resources mobilized, allocated and used? How did
farmers explain diverting substantial resources to produce a commodity that was marketed
only regionally? My attempt to answer these questions inevitably led me to explore

theoretical issues beyond the conﬁnes of Harerge's Oromo community.

18

C. The Theoretical and Historiographical Contexts

Although this study is intended to be the social and economic history of khat, my
approach has been to view the plant as part of the cropping system in Harerge rather than as
a simple psychoactive substance illicitly grown for cash. The central idea of the study is to
analyze farmer agency--the decision farmers make individually and in the aggregate, their
management of changing social and political situations and agricultural contexts. As a study
of small-holder agriculture rather than peasant economy, this dissertation focuses, in part,
on farmers' seasonal, annual and long-terrn choices, agronomic practices and farm
management strategies. For these reasons, I prefer to view the actors here, following James
McCann, as farmers "to privilege their role as managers of the environment."4 In this
chapter alone, I will refer to rural producers as peasants, since that is the term generally used

in the literature being reviewed.5

Peasant Agriculture
Although peasants and agriculture comprise approximately seventy ﬁve percent of
\//\
Ethiopia's population and economy, peasant agriculture has not been given the scholarly
attention its importance may warrant. The literature has generally focused on such themes

as the impact of government policies on agricultural production, the failure of successive

Ethiopian governments to stimulate agricultural production, the constraints Ethiopian land

 

4James McCann, People of the Plow: An Agricultural History of Ethiopia, 1800-1990
(Madison, 1995), pp. 6-7.

5 For a review of the literature on African peasantry, see Allen F. Isaacman, "Peasants and
Rural Social Protest in Africa," African Studies Review 33: 2 (Sept. 1990), pp. 1-120.

19

tenure systems placed on agricultural production and the plight of the tiller at the hands of
land owners. In the pre-1974 period, the scholarly studies emphasized the impact of
govemment—sponsored experiments in commercial agriculture. After the revolution of 1974,
the focus largely shifted to measuring the extent to which the land reform proclamation of
1975 succeeded (or failed) in improving agricultural production and ameliorating the
condition of the peasantry.

Thus, in assessments of the world of Ethiopia's agriculture, peasants, the supposedly
active actors of the sector, remained largely inactive and invisible. In most studies, they
were depicted as victims of landlords and the environment, incapable of self-improvement
without government support and subsidies. The imperial government placed little importance
on peasant agriculture, favoring instead the development of the physical infrastructure and
commercial or mechanized agriculture, which led to peasants being evicted from their farm
lands and becoming landless rural laborers.

The literature also emphasizes that Ethiopia’s land tenure system hampered peasant
production, since either the government or the landowners, or both, heavily taxed produce.
The derg conﬁscated land and redistributed it among peasants, but failed to provide the tools
and materials necessary to increase production. Moreover, its policies of direct involvement
in the marketing of agricultural products provided further disincentives thus leading to
declining production. In the end, the studies conclude that the peasant remained in the

doldrums of subsistence agriculture.6

 

'5 Some economists have characterized the Ethiopian peasant as pursuing "farming practices

which are very much in the biblical tradition of his forefathers." Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Chole,
A Proﬁle of the Ethiopian Economy, (Addis Ababa, 1969), p. 112. Even Desalegn Rahmato, the

/

20

In portraying peasants as subsistence oriented, most students of Ethiopian agrarian
history simply accepted the conventional wisdom in peasant studies that peasants produce
just enough for their subsistence, are generally adverse to producing signiﬁcant surpluses for
the market, and consequently avoid entering into cash or exchange relations. According to
this conception, peasants operate in a non-capitalist mode of production, which revolves
around the intensive use of family labor, the non-accumulation or investment of capital, and
simple reproduction, that is, the quest for subsistence and replacement.7

One of the early proponents of this conception was Robert Redﬁeld, a prominent
anthropologist whose views dominated peasant studies in the 19505 and the subsequent three
decades. He conceptualizes peasants as rural cultivators with distinctive set of values,
attitudes and worldviews and maintains that they operate outside the orbit of market
exchange and lead a "traditional" way of life that contrasts with "modern" societies.8
Redﬁeld's typology was conceived within the context of an emerging "modernization

n9

theory, whose practitioners divide societies into modern and traditional camps, respectively

represented by the advanced capitalist societies and the less fortunate societies in the Third

 

putative expert on Ethiopian peasant agriculture, recently argued that "the logic of peasant production
centered around self-sustenance and the preservation of existing standards of life." Desalegn Rahmato,
"Peasant Agriculture under the Old Regime. " In Shiferaw Bekele, ed., Economic History of Modern
Ethiopia, 1 935-1974. Vol. 1, (Oxford, 1995), p. 170.

7 I have closely followed Harry Sanabria's discussion of the theoretical literature relevant to
coca production in Bolivia. Harry Sanabria, The Coca Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia
(Ann Arbor, 1993), pp. 6-9.

' Sydel Silverman,"The peasant concept in anthropology," The Journal of Peasant Studies,
7:1 (1979), pp. 49-57.

9 D. C. Tipps, "Modernization theory and the comparative study of societies: A critical
perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15:2 (1973), pp. 200-209.

21

World. The traditional/modem dichotomy was replicated in traditional societies by a
rural/urban distinction which corresponded to a developed/undeveloped dialectic. This line
of dualism is paralleled, in the rural areas of traditional societies, by a deep divide between
a dynamic, growth oriented (capitalist) agriculture and a stagnant, subsistence oriented
(peasant) agricultural sector.10 Modernization theory has been thoroughly criticized but the
notion that peasant economic behavior is driven by the logic of subsistence still persists in
some academic and policy-making circles.

In his The Theory of Peasant Economy,l ’ A. V. Chayanov also emphasized the
subsistence nature of peasant production. In his peasant theory, he presents the "family
labor farm" as the typical form of peasant enterprise which employed only nonwaged family
members. Because the farms are said to be divorced from the wider capitalist system,
Chayanov's critics described them as "an original, non-and anti-capitalist economic form."l2
Since wages were indeterminate, Chayanov argued, so, too, were proﬁts and economic rent,
and thus proﬁt was not a motivation and guide to peasant economic behavior. In the absence
of proﬁt, the peasant family worked only for subsistence. Within this analytical frame,

Chayanov then argued that levels and intensity of production were primarily a function of

the relationship between household size, labor availability, and a culturally acceptable

 

'° P. F. Klaren and T. J. Bossert, "Lost Promise: Explaining Latin American
underdevelopment," In idem, Promise of development: theories of change in Latin America,
(Boulder, 1986), pp. 9-10.

” A.V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (with new introduction by Theodore
Chignon). (Madison, 1986), p. 119.

'2 William Roseberry, "The ideology of domestic production," Labor, capital and Society
19:1 (1983), p. 73.

22

(determined) level of needs.13 Given unchanging needs and a stable household size, the
family farm will produce just enough to satisfy its needs, and no more. Put it diﬁerently, the
family farm has no propensity to accumulate surplus above and beyond that determined by
the availability of labor and culturally construed needs.”

The risk aversion and decision making literature in economic anthropology is another
genre which sees peasants as unable or unwilling to accumulate and as striving to remain
outside capitalist exchange and production relations. Analysts of this school focus on the
adoption of new agricultural techniques or higher-yielding crop varieties and short term
economic and ecological variables --current prices, input costs, expected yields, likelihood
of drought or too much rainfall-- on which individuals depend for decision-making; and
depict peasants as generally "risk-averters" who place a high premium on minimizing and
avoiding risky economic strategies and maximizing security of tenure and subsistence. From
this conclusion, they project that stubborn resistance to or deep aversion of high-risk
strategies leave peasants with no desire to produce surplus with high potential for

accumulation. ' 5

 

‘3 Chayanov, Peasant Economy, p. 12.

” James Millar, "A Reforrnulation of A.V. Chayanov's Theory of the Peasant Economy,"
Economic Development and Cultural Exchange, 8 (1970), pp. 219-221.

‘5 F. Cancian, "Risk and uncertainty in agricultural decision making." In P. F. Bartlett, ed.,
Agricultural decision making: Anthropological contributions to rural development, (New York,
1980), pp. 161-76; A. Johnson, "Security and risk taking among poor peasants: A Brazilian case
study." In George Dolton, ed., Studies in economic anthropology, (Washington, DC, 1971), pp. 144-
52; Cliﬁon R. Wharton, "Risk, uncertainty, and the subsistence farmer: Technological innovation and
resistance to change in the context of survival." In George Dolton, ed., Studies in Economic
Anthropology, (Washington, DC, 1971), pp. 151-177; M. Chibinik, "Double-edged risks and
uncertainties: Choices about rice loans in the Peruvian Amazon." In E. Cashdan, ed., Risk and
uncertainty in tribal and peasant economies, (Boulder, 1990), pp. 279-302.

23

Neo-Marxist studies of peasantries and agrarian change had been another category
of works that helped to perpetuate the image of a subsistence-oriented peasant. The genre
emerged as a direct critique of modernization theory and as an attempt to provide quite
different explanations for poverty and underdevelopment. The neo-Marxists argue that
persistent poverty in Third world countries is the result of surplus extraction by industrial
capitalist societies.'6 The outward ﬂow of wealth is replicated at different levels (nation-
state, rural regions, peasant communities, peasant households). Consequently, at the
economic unit or household level, peasants are simply unable to accumulate wealth, for their
surpluses are constantly being "drained away" by capitalists. Moreover, the neo-Marxists
argue that, because peasants are well aware of the fact that their insertion into capitalist
exchange and production relationships are ultimately detrimental to their livelihood, they
manifest a deeply rooted "aversion to" capitalism. On the issue that peasants strive to remain
outside the capitalist market, therefore, the neo-Marxists inadvertently ended up espousing
the views of modernization theorists.l7

An alternative perspective from which to gauge the heterogeneity of peasant goals
and livelihood strategies has been put forward in the literature on petty or simple commodity
production. These studies place more emphasis on the ever-shifting conditions under which
peasant opt to engage in a wider market system, the different types of relationships that they

forge within the wider economic circuits, the quite diverse responses by peasants to threats

 

'6 David Lehmann, "Two paths of agrarian capitalism, or a critique of Chayanovian Marxism,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28:4 (1986), p. 606.

‘7 Alain de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and reformism in Latin America, (Baltimore and
London, 1981), pp. 19-20; Lehmann, "Two paths", p. 603

24

to their livelihood, and the disparate consequences of these strategies and responses. In these
works, peasants are portrayed as being heavily engaged in producing agricultural or
nonagricultural commodities for market or exchange.

The peasant-producers operate in a sociopolitical environment in which the factors
of production-land, labor and capital--can circulate freely. They own or control their means
of production, they generally employ little or no wage labor, and the household retains its
role as the major decision-making unit.‘8 Some scholars have suggested four distinguishing
features of petty commodity production: l)"regular and excessive" production for market
exchange; 2) "small-scale private enterprise" in which the means of production are owned
or controlled by producers and labor is unpaid; 3) mutual independence of production units;
and 4) production is never to the exclusion of capital accumulation or proﬁt. ‘9

For this dissertation, the literature on petty commodity production offers distinct
advantages over the other approaches. First, the studies underline the fact that peasants do
not display an intrinsic disposition toward "subsistence," or an aversion to market, or toward
wealth or capital accumulation. Under appropriate conditions, peasants will intensify
production and accumulate surpluses. Second, they emphasize the different ways in which

peasants creatively confront and grapple with shifting political and economic conditions and

 

'8 D. Goodman and M. Redclift, From Peasants to Proletariat: Capitalist development and
agrarian transitions, (New York, 1982), pp. 81-84; Harriet Friedmann, "Postscript: Small
commodity production," Labor, Capital and Society, 19:1 (1986), p. 125; Roseberry, "Domestic
Production",
pp. 70-93; de Janvry, Agrarian Question, pp. 66.

'9 S . Cook and L. Binford, Obliging need: Rural petty industry in Mexican capitalism,
(Austin, 1990), p. 30.

25

contexts.20

The fact that large numbers of Oromo cultivators in Harerge have over the last half-
century massively taken up the cultivation of khat runs contrary to the well-entrenched
assumption that peasant agriculture is invariably subsistence-oriented. In Harerge, we rather
encounter cultivators who responded quickly, decisively and successfully to a range of state
policies that threatened their livelihood. Their response centered on vigorously pursuing a
strategy of producing a valuable commodity for the market--khat. Well aware of market
prices and returns and quite cognizant of the environmental, economic, and political risks
involved, the cultivators constantly and quite often successfully maneuvered around and
undermined state-sponsored avenues of production and exchange. Even though Harerge's
farmers were in large measure responding to state agricultural development policies that were
progressively undemrining their economic livelihood, they also went far beyond the goal of
simply satisfying their "subsistence needs" to accumulating wealth and capital.

Moreover, the strategies the khat-cultivating peasants in Harerge highlands pursued
entailed a great deal of risk. They faced, for instance, environmental threats such as drought
which is not uncharacteristic of the regional climate. In addition, the market for their new
commodity was unreliable due to the volatile politics of the Horn of Africa which
periodically escalates to violent conﬂicts and disrupts transportation. Nonetheless, the
gravest risk to the peasants' livelihood was not ecological, economic or the volatility of the

region's politics, but the political risk represented by repressive state policies, designed to

 

2° One disadvantage of the petty commodity production approach is that it does not distinguish
clearly between "peasan " or rural cultivators and other commodity producers, particularly when the
produced and exchanged commodities are non-agricultural.

26

curb or reverse the spread of khat cultivation and gain control over the cultivation of other
cash crops. It is in response to these policies that the Oromo farmers of Harerge elected to
switch to an alternative cash crop, khat, whose market viability was uncertain and which
could not be used for food.

Another area of the literature which appears to be relevant to the argument of this
dissertation is the issue of peasant resistance. In some studies, Ethiopia's peasant are
depicted as active agents protesting or rebelling against high taxes,21 sustaining rulers and
their armies22 and the expansion of the Ethiopian state.23 Peasants also resisted government
and merchant pressures to promote cash-crop production on an appreciable scale.“ In other
cases, a group of peasants took to the bush to plunder and settle scores with tax collectors.25

Although peasant social protest in Ethiopia cast peasants as active defenders of their
interests, there still remains a void in regard to conceptualizing peasant actions. To enhance

our understanding of Ethiopian peasants' resistance, two important points need to be stressed.

 

2‘ Donald Crummey, "Bandin and Resistance: Noble and Peasant in Nineteenth Century
Ethiopia. " In Sven Rubenson, ed, Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian
Studies, (Addis Ababa, East Lansing and Uppsala, 1984), pp. 263-77; Timothy F emyhough, "Social
mobility and dissident elites in Northern Ethiopia: the role of bandits, 1900-69." In Donald Crummey,
ed., Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa, (Portsmouth, 1986), pp. 151-172.

22 Merid Wode Aregay,"Millenarian Traditions and Peasant Movements in Ethiopia, 1500-
1855." In Sven Rubenson, ed, Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian
Studies, (Addis Ababa, East Lansing and Uppsala, 1984), pp. 25 7-62; James McCann, "The Political
Economy of Rural Rebellion in Ethiopia: Northern Resistance to Imperial Expansion, 1928-1935."
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 18:4 (1985), pp. 601-23.

23 McCann, "Political Economy"; idem, From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia: A
Rural History, 1900-1935, (Philadelphia, 1987).

2‘ Charles McClellan, "State Transformation and Social Reconstitution in Ethiopia: The
Allure of the South,"International Journal of Aﬁican Historical Studies, 17:4 (1984), pp. 657-75.

2’ Crummey, Banditry, pp. 133-149; Femyhough, "Social mobility," pp. 151-172.

27

First, rebellion is not the only way peasants defend themselves against intrusive forces.
Peasants calculate their potential gains and losses before they rise to achieve their goals
through violent means. Thus, our assessment of peasant protest should move away from the
narrow comprehension of rebellion to understanding the whole range of options and recourse
available to peasants. Second, the threat to the peasants' way of life is not always a powerful
state apparatus and its personnel, but also the forces of supply and demand, to which they
respond differently. This dissertation seeks to show that peasants have a variety of ways of
expressing discontent apart from violent protests.

One of the most inﬂuential interpretations in regard to peasant resistance has been
the "moral economy" paradigm which stresses the importance of collective subsistence,
economic security and survival. The moral economists posit three fundamental principles:
1) the village is viewed as a ritual and cultural writ, as an important setting for peasant
economic life and as the source of societal norms; 2) peasants operate on a "safety ﬁrst"
principle which emphasizes subsistence over proﬁt or accumulation; and 3) patron-client
exchanges are perceived to be based as much on reciprocity as in power and exploitation. In
essence, two moral principles are embedded in both the social patterns and injunctions of
peasant life--the norm of reciprocity and the right to subsistence; when these are violated,
peasants may rise in rebellion.26

On the subject of the impact of the intrusion of political and economic forces upon
peasant societies, the moral economists maintain that commercialization of agriculture and

the growth of the state erode a whole matrix of peasant institutions with their safety nets and

 

2“ James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven, 1976), pp. 1-12.

28
inevitably threaten the subsistence levels of peasants. Ultimately rural society becomes
stratiﬁed, leading to greater poverty and insecurity for the low-income strata. This
development essentially violates the two moral principles of reciprocity and subsistence and
creates a moment for peasant protest aimed at reinstating the institutions and values
threatened by the state and capitalism.

Lately, studies of peasants have used a political economy approach which is neither
of the neo-Marxist genre nor merely a broad rubric for studies of the political and economic
forces that have intruded upon peasants. Derived from the nineteenth-century neoclassical
school of thought that emphasized the primacy of the individual's desire for self-
irnprovement, the analysists view the individual peasant as a unit of analysis conceiving of
him/her as a self-interested, rational actor rather than a victim of "traditional culture" or the
"idiocy" of village society. By combining elements of economic theory, organization theory
and the literature on public choice, the political economists attempt to explain individual
choices and behavior as well as collective action in peasant movement.27

The approach recognizes that the consistent preference for more income strongly
shapes economic, social and political behavior and that income maximization is just one

1:28

avenue to pursue self-interes However, the rational individual is not conceived to be the

homo economicus of conventional economics for whom income is an overriding objective.

 

27 Robert Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization, (New Haven, 1976); Steven Bunker,
Peasants against the State: The Politics of Market Control in Bugissu, Uganda, 1900-1983 ,
(Urbana, 1987); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society
in Vietnam, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1979).

2‘ Bates, Rural Responses, pp. 2, 276.

29

To the extent that peasants are rational individuals, they have a far broader range of human
motivations beyond the economic including political empowerment, prestige, membership
in organizations and security of tenure and income. Moreover, recognition of individual
interests does not downplay the importance of group interest. While individual peasants are
viewed as units of analysis, they are not studied as "atomized" individuals, but also as
members of the group with which they interact.29

The political economists argue that peasant involvement in commercial agriculture
must be viewed in the context of responses to new opportunities. To be sure, peasant
movements are directed at the reshaping of traditional practices as well as the taming of
capitalism through improved terms of exchange for both labor and commodities. The latter
objective frequently involves the breaking of monopsonies held by merchants, landowners,
and even government agencies.

For this dissertation's arguments, the political economy approach provides a distinct
advantage over the moral economy one. It enables us to go beyond the positions espoused
by the forrnalists and substantivists30 in regard to the applicability of the laws of economics

to non-capitalist, non market societies. The assertion that peasants are averse to production

for wider marketing ventures is contradicted by the khat farmers of Harerge. They are aware

 

29 Robert Bates, Essays in the Political Economy of Rural Africa, (Cambridge, 1983), pp.
135-136, 140-145.

3° The fonnalists are universalist while the substantivists believe that market theory is
applicable only to capitalism. See Scott Cook, "The Obsolete "Anti-Market Mentality: A Critique of
the substantivist approach to economic anthropology," American Anthropologist 68 (1966), pp. 323-
245; "Our Obsolete Market Mentality, Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays on Karl
Polanyi, (1968), pp. 59-77.

30

that their involvement in wider market circuits has brought them reasonably good returns
and they are eager therefore to invest in non-farm enterprises. This realization allows us to
regard the farmer as a self-interested, rational decision maker who applies economic logic
to relations with markets, elites, and collective political action.

Two qualiﬁcations need to be made before concluding the comments on the nature
of peasant protests. First, to state that peasants could rationally respond to market
opportunities should not be taken to mean that market mentality is human nature. The
meaning of rationality must include the ability to choose between short-term proﬁt and long
term societal stability. Second, peasant resistance against the spread of capitalist relations
of production and exchange should not be interpreted as an intrinsic propensity to preserve
traditional structures. In some cases, peasants may strive to recreate and deploy indigenous

social arrangements to cope with changing social, economic and political exigencies.“

Markets, Traders and the State

Scholarly interest in trading by ofﬁcially unauthorized (unlicensed) partners who do
not comply with ofﬁcial marketing regulations is a comparatively recent phenomenon. A
few economists published articles in the thirties, forties and ﬁﬁies, in which they laid the

geometric microeconomic foundations for studying unofﬁcial market structures,32 but

 

3‘ Abner Cohen's work shows that "customs" were constantly reorganized (and recreated) in
contexts of ethnic and political conﬂicts. See Abner Cohen, Customs and Politics in Urban Africa:
A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns (Berkeley, 1969); See also Sidney Mintz, " A Note on
the deﬁnition of peasantries," Journal of Peasant Studies, 1 (1973), p. 97.

32 Kenneth E. Boulding, "A note on the theory of the black market," Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science 13 (1937), pp. 115-118; Martin Bronfenbrenner, "Price control
under imperfect competition," American Economic Review, 37 (1947), 107-120; Michael Michaely,

31

interest in the subject was not sustained. In the seventies, the introduction of price controls
and gasoline rationing in the United States motivated research on ﬁrm behavior under price
controls and consumer response to rationing33 and several articles on smuggling in the
developing nations were published.“ Since then, trading among legally unauthorized partners
and unofﬁcial market structures have been important themes in the development literature.

The most debated issue has been the nomenclature of unofficial marketing structures:
markets can be parallel, black, fragmented, segmented, underground or subterranean, hidden,
second, informal and so forth. Coined by Keith Hart in his 1971 study of informal income
opportunities for the urban unemployed in Ghana35 and popularized by the ILO in its World
Employment Programme mission reports,36 the "informal sector" became the favorite
terminology employed by researchers. Neither the phenomenon nor the concept was new

for anthropologists of non-industrial society who had discovered that goods and services

 

"A geometrical analysis of black market behavior," American Economic Review, 54 (1954), pp. 627-
637.

” Edgar Browning and William Patton Culbertson, Jr., "A theory of black markets under price
controls: competition and monopoly," Western Economic Journal, 12 (1974), pp. 175-189.

3‘ Jagdish Bhagwati and Bent Hansen, "A theoretical analysis of smuggling," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 87 (1973), pp. 172-187; Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N.. Srinvasan, "Smuggling
and trade policy," Journal of Public Economics, 2 (1973), pp. 337-389; Munir A. Sheikh, "Black
market for foreign exchange, capital ﬂows and smuggling," Journal of Development Economics, 3
(1976), PP-

9-26; Mark, Pitts, "Smuggling and Price disparity," Journal of International Economics, 11 (1981),
pp. 447-458.

3’ Keith Hart, "Informal income opportunities and urban unemployment in Ghana," Journal
of Modern Aﬁican Studies, 11 (1973), pp. 61-89; D. Mazumdar, "The urban informal sector," World
Development, 4 (1976), pp. 655-79.

3" For a review of the ILO reports see, Caroline 0. Moser, "Informal Sector or Petty
commodity Production: Dualism or Dependence in Urban Development," World Development, 6:9
(1978), pp. 1041-1064.

32

could be made, traded, swapped, and battered among informal networks without involving
ofﬁcially recognized enterprises.” Following Hart's work, though, researchers in a number
of related disciplines applied the informal sector concept to a diversity of empirical data, and
to many different contexts.38

For the proponents of the concept's analytical viability, the informal sector included
a varied range of economic activities and enterprises which elude the monitoring and usually
extractive capacity of the state. The paradigm was extended to cover an inﬁnite range of
activities and actors, but failed to present a cohesive concept. In addition to the informal
sector, there appeared at least sixteen other labels which attach to the activities in this area.39

Some critics rejected the informal sector concept as an inadequate approach which

 

37 Marshal Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, (Chicago, 1972).

38 For works on the informal sector in the United States and Britain see Louis A F erman,
Stuart Henry and Michele Hoyman, (Special editors), The Informal Economy, A Special Issue of The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 493 (1987).

39 Stuart Henry, "The Working Unemployed: perspectives on the informal economy and
unemployment," in idem, The Informal Economy, p. 465. In an attempt to make distinctions between
the different terminologies, researchers have suggested at least three categories. The irregular
economy, the social economy, sometimes further divided into a household economy and a communal
economy, and the underground, hidden or black economy. For detailed discussions see, L.A.
F errnan, L. Bemdt and E. Selo, "Analysis of the irregular economy: cash ﬂow in the informal sector,"
A report to the Bureau of Employment and training, Michigan Department of Labor, Institute of Labor
and industrial relations, the University of Michigan/Wayne State University, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
(1978); J. I. Gershuny and RE. Pahl, "The future of the informal economy," New Society, 3 January,
1980; S. Burns, The Household Economy, (New York, 1977). Other characterizations include, a
bazaar type economy by Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Economic
Modernization in two Indonesian Towns, (Chicago, 1963); and two juxtaposed systems of production,
one derived from capitalist forms of production, the other from the peasant system by T.G. McGee,

"Peasants in Cities: a paradox, a paradox, a most ingenious paradox," Human Organization, 32
(1973)

33

cannot explain the phenomenon."0 Others questioned its utility because of its failure to
recognize and clarify the differences and interrelations between small-scale (or simple)
commodity production and large-scale capitalist production.“ The latter, Marxist in
orientation, insisted that informal economic activities must be examined within the
framework of the mode of production analysis with a focus on the complex linkages between
and the ﬂow of surplus from non-capitalist to capitalist modes. This type of analysis stresses
the ways in which subordinated structures function for the reproduction of capitalist relations
of production, and attempts to determine the degree to which the former are conserved or
dissolved - i.e. how articulation with the dominant mode inﬂuences the reproduction of non-
capitalist relations of production.42 The informal non-capitalist sector, the petty commodity
form of production as the Marxists call it, included peasant agriculture and small-scale trade.

The complexity and heterogeneity of informal economic activities is partly the reason
why the debates over their nature and characteristics have not produced a terminology that

could aptly describe the phenomenon. Most of the labels connote illegality, marginality,

 

4° Caroline Moser, "The informal sector reworked: Viability and vulnerability in urban
development," Regional Development Dialogue, 5:2 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 135-178; L. Peattie, "An
idea in good currency and how it grew: The informal sector," World Development, 15:7 (July, 1987),
pp. 851-860.

" See Harriet Friedmann, "Simple Commodity production and Wage Labor in the American
Plains," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (1978), pp. 71-100; idem, "Household Production and the
National Economy: Concepts for the Analysis of Agrarian Formations," Journal of Peasant Studies,
7 (1980), pp. 158-184.

‘2 G. Dupré and PP. Rey, "Reﬂections on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of
Exchange," Economy and Society 2:2 (May 1973), pp. 136-63; Maurice Godelier, "On One Deﬁnition
of Social Formation," Critique of Anthropology, 1 (1974), pp. 63-73; Claude Meillassoux, "From
Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology," Economy and Society
1:1 (1972), pp. 93-105.

34

corruption, extortion and bribery. In most cases, traders are portrayed in antagonistic relation
to the state. In fact, when circumstances are conducive, traders who take part in unofﬁcial
exchange activities prefer to operate in the "formal" or "legal" sector. However, the state
which has the ultimate power to delimit legitimate from illegitimate, keeps moving the
dividing line between the two spheres by raising taxes, introducing regulations and banning
products. Considering any action taken by governments to increase the enforcement
capability of the state as an assault on their independence, traders respond with active
counterstrategies rather than being victimized.

The participants in Harerge's contraband trade are involved in the production,
processing, transport and distribution of legal commodities. They are ordinary farmers,
traders and urban dwellers who seek to achieve and maintain a decent standard of living.
Their activities, at least in the sight of the local society, are by no means intrinsically
immoral or criminal. In our case, there is a considerable amount of documentation that
attests to traders' desire to maintain their legal standing. Illegality stems from the fact that
people who engage in such works ignore administrative codes, both by evading customs
authorities and by failing to obtain the licensing necessary to legitimize their work.

The informal economy or sector concept is applicable to the nature of contraband
trade in Harerge in the sense that it refers to traders who evade market regulations. The term
nevertheless seems, generally, designed more to characterize particular types of small ﬁrms
or individuals in various markets, legal or illegal, who work at very low productivity, than
to analyze market structures. The concept which seems to characterize the causes, contexts

and consequence of Harerge's contraband trade and unofficial market structures most

35

appropriately is parallel market.

The term parallel market has been difﬁcult to deﬁne, but there seems to be a
consensus about what it refers to. Based on a literature survey, David Lindauer has
suggested that "a parallel market is a structure generated in response to government
interventions which create a situation of excess supply or demand in a particular product or
factor market.""3 Researchers studying the phenomenon in developing nations utilize the
term parallel market to characterize and conceptualize unofficial market structures.“ In order
to clarify the applicability of parallel markets to Harerge's unofficial commercial activities
and market structures, it is important to discuss the causes and contexts in which parallel
markets arise and differentiate it from the myriad nomenclature utilized to describe the same
phenomenon.

For parallel markets to exist, ﬁrst, there must be a situation of excess supply or
demand in the creation of which the state plays a major role. Lindauer emphasizes that initial
government interventions in the market place and not the body of legal sanctions affecting
the unofficial market are the core determinants of the parallel market. A classic example is
the imposition of a control regime aimed at limiting the extent of a rise in price when there
is a supply shortage. The market does not clear at the control price and both producers and

consumers seek alternative channels of trade that would eliminate excess demand at higher

 

‘3 David Lindauer, "Parallel, Fragmented, or Black? Deﬁning Market Structure in Developing
Economies, World Development, 17:12 (1989), p. 1873.

“ Jean-Paul Azam and Timothy Besley, "General Equilibrium with Parallel Markets for
Goods and Foreign Exchange: Theory and Applications to Ghana," World Development, 17:12
(1989), 1921-1930; Michael L. Morris, "Ofﬁcial and Parallel Cereal Markets in Senegal: Empirical
Evidence," World Development, 17:12 (1989), pp. 1895-1906.

36

prices. Other examples include overvaluation of national currencies which generates a gap
in oﬁicial versus black market exchange rates, tariffs and quotas which inﬂuence the selling
prices of identical tradable goods that are legal or smuggled.45

Second, while the role of government is an important condition, more is involved
for there to be a parallel market. The form of government intervention determines the
existence of parallel market transactions and structures. Taxes and regulations are two major
forms of government intervention that can generate parallel markets. Domestic taxes, and
import and export duties create a situation favorable for parallel markets to emerge by
generating excess demand for commodities at illegal, pre-tax prices. Regulations (price
controls, import quotas, forced sale of commodities to marketing boards, etc) also can be
responsible for the creation of excess demand at ofﬁcial prices. Prohibitions give rise to
illegal markets since they prevent the existence of official markets, but they do not
necessarily create market parallelism. This interpretation suggests a distinction between
undergrormd economy, which includes all illegal economic activities, and parallel markets,
which may include illegal trade but, in most cases, in legal goods.

Here it is important to make a distinction between parallel and "black," the term most
frequently used to describe illegal economic activity. "Black" covers markets for prohibited
goods such as narcotics for which no legal market exists, and hence, the term is not merely
a synonym for "parallel." Experts distinguish between black goods, for which possession is
illegal, and black market, constituting illegal trade in goods that are themselves legal. The

issue of khat smuggling and hidden importation of consumer goods, which we will consider

 

'5 Lindauer, "Deﬁning Market Structures," p. 1874.

37

in this dissertation, is about black (parallel) market, not black goods.

The legality of parallel markets is more complicated by the fact that evasion of taxes
and duties leads to an accumulation of "black money," that is, "undeclared or illegally
acquired incomes held in the form of currency and other readily convertible assets.“6 Earned
as a result of government prohibitions, such incomes can lead to conditions of excess supply
in foreign exchange and, if the proceeds of illegal transactions must be "laundered," a parallel
market which is derived from "black money" may emerge. In principle, markets in which
buyers and sellers violate the "letter of the law" are illegal. However, parallel markets which
emerge to vent excess supply or demand generated by government actions should not
necessarily imply that unofﬁcial actions are illegal. Enforcement of the law and expected
penalties are important determinants of illegality, since, in some situations, governments
may overlook the law and permit those markets to operate freely.

As will be shown in later chapters, the smuggling out of primary products and the
smuggling in of consumer commodities in Harerge are more closely related to the
descriptions of parallel markets than the myriad characterizations that have emerged in the
literature on legally unauthorized transactions and structures. Given the casual and not
analytical manner in which the term "black" and "underground" markets are employed, a
clear demarcation between them and parallel markets is necessary. What makes Harerge's
smuggling activities parallel is that they were initiated by the same factors analysts described

as conditions necessary for the emergence of parallel markets: 1) excess demand or supply

 

‘6 S. Archaya and S. Madhur, "Informal credit markets and black money: Do they frustrate
monetary policy?" Economic and Political Weekly, 18:41 (October, 1983), pp. 1751-1756.

38

initiated by government actions; 2) government intervention is characterized by micro-level
policies (taxes, regulations, prohibitions and bureaucratic corruptions); 3) policies which
lead to the emergence of multiple markets; and 4) buyers and sellers exchange goods that
are legal.

One of the objectives of this study is to demonstrate the existence of close ties
between contraband and the khat trade. To escape the theoretical dead end created by the
conﬁrsion over terminologies, contraband trade will be used interchangeably with smuggling
to describe unauthorized transactions while the term parallel market is consistently used to
refer to structures that make smuggling possible. The term parallel market is preferred
because it denotes that Harerge's unofﬁcial transactions are illegal in the sense that the actors

fail to comply with government regulations but deal in goods that are legal.

D. Organization of the Dissertation

This study begins in the 19305, when Ethiopia was occupied by Fascist Italy. The
time was chosen not because of its political signiﬁcance but rather owing to the economic
impact of the occupation years. During the occupation, a number of roads were constructed,
commercial truck transportation was started and wage labor was introduced. Khat
distribution was directly affected by the construction of the road linking Dire Dawa to khat
growing areas on the Harerge highlands and facilitated the growth of khat consumption.

The growth of consumption and the consequent economic importance of khat was
faster under the derg. When the derg regime fell in 1991, the restrictions it had instituted

gradually began to ease, thus allowing for khat and other agricultural products to be marketed

39

more easily. The fall of the derg was a convenient turning point and therefore the cut off date
for this dissertation.

In chapter 1, my objective is to discuss the factors which over the long run inﬂuenced
the two themes of my dissertation: the productive (agriculture) and distributive (trade)
aspects of the khat economy in Harerge. To that end, I will present an overview of Harerge's
physical and human landscapes and analyze the effects of government policies and improved
inﬁastructure (the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway) on agricultural production and marketing.
Chapter 2 takes a step back and highlights the existing literature with a view to describing
the khat plant and its use historically. The chapter also examines the spread of khat
production, marketing and consumption before the 193 05. Together, chapters 1 and 2 will
provide background information and establish a framework for understanding the arguments
presented in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 analyzes the different, yet intersecting, processes of demographic,
socioeconomic and political changes that set in motion the growth of the khat market and
production during the early 19505 and thereafter. Chapter 4 examines how infrastructural
developments in the region facilitated transportation, thereby leading to an expansion of khat
consumption in Northern Somalia, Djibouti and in Harerge's lowlands. It also documents
the reactions of governments to the expansion of khat consumption and steps taken to control
its social repercussions. Chapter 5 takes up the question of how key political and economic
events as well as decisions by the state led farmers and traders to devise novel marketing
strategies. It will also show that the expansion of khat cultivation was closely intertwined

with an increase in cross-border trade with the neighboring countries.

40

Chapter 6 turns to the domestic scene and examines how the expansion of
consumption led to the emergence of new marketing structures and how farmers responded
to market difficulties experienced by the export sector. Chapter 7 examines the expansion
of khat production, marketing and cultivation in the context of how state development
policies, perceived as inirnical by farmers and traders, led to the expansion of Harerge's
alternative khat market. The ﬁrst part of the chapter documents the fact that the expansion
of khat cultivation was paralleled by a dramatic increase in contraband trade and, more
generally, a decline in coffee and food crop production in areas experiencing severe land
shortages. The second examines peasant strategies and decision-making processes in the
face of an attempt by the government to monopolize agricultural production and exchange
systems in order to dictate prices and control exports.

In chapter 8, I will turn to the interpretive aspect of the theme of parallel market.
The major aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that Harerge remained insulated from the
problems of agricultural production and marketing which had bedeviled other parts of
Ethiopia largely due to the ﬂowering unofﬁcial trade and parallel marketing structures. The
role of khat in the interaction and interdependence of Harerge's agricultural highlands and
the pastoral lowlands will also be evaluated. Finally, in chapter 9, I will note some of the
major economic implications of khat's growing importance for Harerge's society and

economy.

CHAPTER ONE

The Harerge Highlands: A Macro-view of Economic Change, 18405-19205

In Harerge, the spread of khat production as a commodity has not taken place
independently of agrarian policies enacted by successive governments. In the eighty or so
years before the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, the government of Harerge changed hands
at least four times--from the Emirate (to 1875) to Egyptian (1875-1885), to Ethiopian (1887-
193 5) and ﬁnally, Italian (1936-1941). The policies pursued by these governments
precipitated a fundamental change in patterns of landholding and in the system of agricultural
production and marketing, which, in turn, led to a decisive transformation of the
contemporary and subsequent political economy of the region. The arrival of the railway
track to Dire Dawa, a town founded at the foothills of the Harer highlands, was a signiﬁcant
event which altered the formation of exchange networks and distributional infrastructure for
the region's products.

In order fully to understand the complexity of the agrarian transformation which
eventuated in the commercialization of agriculture, particularly the commodiﬁcation of khat,
it is essential to explore the nature of change wrought by government policies and market
forces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries. In addition to a basic description
of the geographic and etlmographic landscapes of Harerge as they appeared in the early
decades of the twentieth-century, this chapter seeks to present an historical analysis of the
economic processes that led to changes in Harerge's system of production and trade which,

over the course of time, favored the rise of khat as a dominant cash crop. To that end, I will

41

42

analyze how agriculture and trade fared under various government policies. The chapter's
main theme suggests that coffee was the major cash crop which dominated the crop ﬁelds
and the items of trade. I will also demonstrate that the landholding system that evolved as
a consequence of government intervention led to land concentration, land scarcity and
eventually to a crisis in the agrarian system. In so analyzing the long term historical
processes, I will chart broad patterns of change in Harerge and set my study in the

appropriate historical and socio-economic context.

A. The Physical and Human Landscape1

The Harerge highlands form the middle and eastern section of the Ethiopian
Southeastern highland system which rises abruptly in the Bale province east of the Rift
Valley lakes, continues north through Arsi province, swings eastward into the Chercher and
Harer districts, and ﬁnally descends to the Issa steppes near the town of Jijjiga. The Harerge
highlands represent a topographic feature markedly different from regions both to the north
and south. From the northern escarpment, the highland is tilted north-west to south-east and
descends to the Shebbelle plains, which lie at 4500 to 5500 feet above sea level and then
gradually slopes to Somalia and the Indian Ocean. The north-facing slopes of the uplands

descend precipitously into the Awash valley and the hot, dry plains of the Southern Afar

 

' Unless indicated otherwise, my description of the physical geography of the Harerge region
is to a large extent based on two sources: Emilio Scarin, Hararino: Ricerche e Studi Geograﬁci
(Florence, 1942); Clarke Brooke, "Settlements of the Eastern Galla, Hararge Province, Ethiopia,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Nebraska, 1956. I drew heavily on these
sources because they treated the subject thoroughly and show the landscape as it appeared in the
thirties and forties, the period whichwith the initial period of my study.

Vs

43

 

 

ERITREA 1‘)“

   
  
 

SUDAN ADD“

GULF OF ADEN

SOMAUA

  
 
 

 

ADDIS ABABA

ETH

  

 

HGURE 1 l V
LOCATIONAL MAP V r)

 

44

 

SOMALIA

 

    
     

SOMALIA»

 

 

FIGURE 2

PHYSICAL MAP - HARERGE

45

Depression. In the south-west, except for several high mountains which rise to above
10,000 feet, the Southeastern highlands are relatively open plateau areas between 5500 and
8000 feet. Such high elevations nevertheless are not characteristic of the Harerge highlands
which include a number of valleys descending to the lower country surroundings. The
highlands may be divided into three major geographic regions: The Chercher or Western
highlands, the Gara Mula’ata massif and the Harer or Eastern highlands.

The Chercher or Western highlandszs For the most part lying between approximately
6500 and 8000 feet, the Chercher highlands are characterized by a complex surface
conﬁguration consisting of deep, protracted valleys and higher plateaux on both the north and
south-facing escarpments. On the northern escarpment, a few perennial streams follow steep,
narrow courses to the Awash basin and disappear after reaching the southern plains of the
Afar Depression. During heavy summer rains, water tumbles down the precipitous gorges,
carrying down to the foot of the escarpment a great load of alluvial material which is
deposited in stream beds and on ﬂood plains. Along the south-facing slope, drainage into the
Shebbelle plains from high valleys is accomplished by a number of perennial streams which
are tributary to the major rivers such as the Wabi Shebbelle and Genale Dorya.

The perennial character of many of the south-ﬂowing streams is a result of the greater
precipitation along the southern slopes of the highlands and the fact that many of the valleys
on the south side lead from high, broad basins and alpine meadows, which tend to hold

moisture throughout the year. In many places in the highlands, sufﬁcient water is collected

 

2 Chercher is a generic name applied to that part of the Harerge highlands approximately
between the plains of Badessa and the village of Chalanqo, a distance of about sixty-ﬁve miles or a
total area of approximately 2000 square miles.

46

and retained during the rainy season in shallow ponds called rarie. The water level drops
soon after the rains cease, but enough moisture is retained through the dry months to
maintain grazing for animals.

The Gara Mula'ata Massif: At the eastern end of the Chercher highlands, near the
hills of Qullubi, a spur of the Harerge highlands protrudes south for a distance of about forty
miles. The projected land mass is called the Gara Mula’ata. Two deep, well-deﬁned valleys
formed by two perennial rivers, the Water in the east and the Ramis rivers in the west,
isolate the Gara Mula'ata from the surrounding areas and the highest surfaces of the massif
are characterized by wide, elongated summits. From the ﬂat tops of the higher mountain,
ﬂanking slopes drop steeply for about 1500 to 2000 feet, but break sharply into broad
terraces at elevations about 8000 to 6000 feet above sea level, and ﬁnally descend abruptly
into the valleys on the east and west.

The Harer or Eastern highlands: About ﬁfteen miles east of Qullubi town, the Harer
highlands plunge to a saddle that narrows at the a place called "Ya Harer Bar." 3 Within a
distance of a mile south of the narrow pass, the saddle opens to the Harer or eastern
highlands which present a variety of morphologic features. Long and terraced valleys of
gentle slopes alternate between ﬂat topped mountains and elongated spurs. The valleys and
mountains are separated from the Afar Depression by the great series of faults of the northern
escarpment which drop suddenly for two or three thousand feet into the drier plains below.

Bounded in the west by the Gara Mula'ata spur, the Harer highland descends in a series of

‘

3 Literally "the gate of Harer." This pass is situated about ﬁfteen miles north west of the
Harer at the summit of the north-facing escarpment near the village of Dhangago, through which
Passes the road descending to Dire Dawa.

47

disconnected hills to the Mara Plain to the east, which lies at an elevation of about 5500 feet.
A few miles west of the Mara plain is the chain of the Gorahe Mountains, maximum
elevation 8747 feet, aligned north-west to south-east for a distance of twenty-ﬁve miles.

Along the southern slope, the Harer highland descends gradually into the Shebbelle
Plains, its drainage carried through the four valleys of the Water-Gobellie, the Erer, the
Dakata, and the Fafan rivers. As in the case of Chercher, no perennial streams ﬂow down
the steep northern slope of the Harer highland, except for a few ephemeral natural springs
which occur along the foothills which mark the southern wall of the Rift Valley. After heavy
rains in the highland, water carried to the southern margins of the Afar runs only a short
distance into the lower, warmer plains, due to the effects of evaporation and rapid inﬁltration
into the sandy cover.

In the Harer highland, two rain-fed lakes, Haramaya and Addele, are located about
twelve miles north west of the city of Harer. The lakes, less than two miles apart, are
separated by a low saddle. They occupy natural basins on the high plateau at about 6300 feet
elevation. Both lakes are shallow; the deepest, Haramaya, is about twelve feet during the
rainy season, and several feet less during the dry months of the year. Addele dries completely
every ﬁve or six years, while Haramaya contains water permanently. After heavy rains, when
the lakes reach their maximum level, water from Addele may drain into the wide plain to the
south.

On these interrnountain uplands live peoples of various ethnic composition including
the Oromo, the Hareri, the Somali and smaller groups such as the Argobba who live south

of the city of Harer and the pastoralist Afar who inhabit the largely low laying northern

48

margins of the highlands. Although the Hareri and the Somali are important economic actors
in the region, this study is more concerned with the Oromo, because they constitute more
than two-thirds of the inhabitants of the Harerge highlands and they have experienced
considerable change since they arrived there in the sixteenth-century.

The Harerge Oromo,4 sometimes referred to as the Eastern Oromo, reside in that part
of Harerge which stretches from the town of Gelemso in the west to the Qundudo mountain
range in the east. This area, roughly 200 miles, includes the districts of Harer Zuriya, Habro,
Gara Mula'ata, Wobberra, Gursum, Chercher, Dire Dawa and J ijjiga. Around 1530-40, the
Barentu, one of the Oromo moieties} migrated east from south-central Ethiopia, drove out
the inhabitants of the Harerge highlands toward the coast, and occupied the area south and
southeast of the Awash river. The new comers rejected the Quran and established their own
political institution, the gada system of government,6 which survived down to the late
nineteenth-century when it was dismantled by the Egyptians.7

The Oromo also formed a complex social organization which operated on the basis

 

‘ The ethnographic description of the Oromo is based on Asthma Giorgis, Atsma Giorgis and
His Work "History of the Galla and the Kingdom of Shoa. " Translated and edited by Bairu Taﬂa.
(Stutgart, 1987); G.W.B. Huntingford, The Galla of Ethiopia: The Kingdom of Kaﬂa and Janjero
(London, 1955); Demissie Gebre Michael, The Kottu of Ethiopia: An Introduction to the Eastern
Oromo, Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture Experiment Station Bulletin No. 68. Alemaya
College of Agriculture (1974).

5 The second moiety, the Borana, migrated and settled the south-western and western part of
present day Ethiopia.

5 For description of the gada, see, Asmarom Legesse, Gada: Three Approaches to the Study
of an Aﬁican Society (New York, 1973).

7 Muhammad Hassan, "The Relation between Harar and the Surrounding Oromo between
1800-1887," B.A. thesis, History Department, HSIU (1973), pp. 22-26.

49

of gossa, a patrilineage. Each gossa lived in a village settlement system called ganda which
is an agglomeration of 10 to 20 huts and a few tukkuls comprising 60-100 persons.8 Seven
major gossa can be identiﬁed among the Harar Oromo: Ittu, Anniya, Alla, Babbile, Obborra,
Jarso, and Nole. All claim to have descended from a distant common ancestor, Himbana,
son of Barentu, through his two sons, Anniya and Qallo. The latter fathered four sons, Alla,
Babbille, Daga and Obborra. Among these, Daga is the father of three sons, Nole, Jarso and
Hume, whose descendants became the most populous Oromo groups in Harerge. Today, the
descendants of the four sons of Qallo, known as Aﬁan Qallo, and the other Oromo lineages
inhabit the entire Harerge highlands: from the western part of Chercher to the Gara Mula'ata
Massif, along the northern escarpment of the Danakil Depression, to the most easterly
extensions of the Harer plateau near the head waters of the F afan and the Dakata rivers.
Only a century and a half ago, nearly half of the Oromo population on Harerge
highlands were pastoralist. The Hareri who had possessed a highly developed agricultural
economy long before the advent of the Oromo on the Harerge highlands claim to have taught
the Oromo how to farm. Their claim is justiﬁed to the extent that the Oromo who settled on
the immediate periphery of the town have borrowed speciﬁc crops from the town-dwellers.
By the 18405, only the Babbille and the mixed Oromo-Somali groups east of Harer had

adopted the agricultural practice of the Hareri.9 The majority of the Oromo took up

 

' Clarke Brooke, "The rural village in the Ethiopian highlands," The Geographical Review,
99:1 (1959), pp. 60-65. Demissie, The Kottu of Ethiopia, pp. 57-58.

9 Richard Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa. Edited with an introduction and additional
chpaters by Gordon Waterﬁeld. (New York, 1966), p. 170; R. Caulk, "Harar town and its neighbors
in the nineteenth century," Journal of African History, 3 (1977), p. 373. Haberland indicates that the
Oromo had possessed a mixed economy of cattle-breeding and the cultivation of barley in their
Country of origin long before they came into contact with the highland cultivators. Eike Von

50

agriculture as their main occupation as a consequence of their participation in exchange
relationship with the Hareri who took up trade after they were expelled from their farm lands
by the Oromo.

By the mid-nineteenth-century, the Oromo from as far as some thirty miles north-east
of the town were fully involved in market exchanges with Harer, supplying the town-
dwellers with much of the basic food requirement and with products which Hareri traders
exported. A number of Oromo lineages visited the town market with supplies of milk and
butter and other exportable products while the Alla from the west of Harer furnished coffee,
tobacco and safflower, which the town's merchants sent to the coast.10 Others hunted
elephant in the valleys south of Harer and brought the ivory to the Emir who monopolized
the trade.” In exchange, the Oromo received locally produced or imported cloths as well as
salt.12 The process of the Oromo's incorporation to Harer's economy was much accelerated
during the reign of the last Emir Muhammad ibn-Ali (1856-1875), who launched a
systematic effort to convert the Oromo to Islam and increase their involvement in

commercial agriculture. Emir Muhammad encouraged the planting of coffee, sugar-cane,

 

Haberland, Galla Sud-Athiopiens, (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 773-4.

'0 Yusuf Ahmed, "An Inquiry into some aspects of the economy of Harar and the records of
the household economy of the amirs of Harar 1825-1875," Ethnological Society Bulletin, University
College of Addis Ababa, 10 (1960), pp. 32-36.

” Burton, First footsteps, p. 193. The emirs' monopoly of the ivory trade was a long standing
one. In the early nineteenth-century, Salt reported that the ivory trade was controlled exclusively
done by the emirs or their agents. See H. Salt, A Voyage to Abyssinia, (London, 1814), p. lxx.

‘2 Hassan, "Harari Oromo Relation," p. 1; Caulk, "Harar town," pp. 373-374; Sidney
Waldron, "The Political Economy of Harari-Oromo Relationships, 1559-1874," Northeast African
Studies, 6:1-2 (1984), pp. 24-28; Burton, First footsteps, pp. 192-195.

it:

he

the

0
its ‘2

51

bananas and other commercial crops. The mutual economic dependence which the Hareri
and the Oromo around Harer town established at the market place gradually led to the
transformation of the latter from independent pastoralists to sedentary agriculturalists.

Nevertheless, the Oromo who inhabited the areas beyond thirty miles circumference
of Harer remained under their own "parliament" known as the Raba-Doril3 which comprised
of elected political and military ofﬁcials. Egyptian officials who visited the Gara Mula'ata
region, about thirty miles to the south-west Harer, found that much of the land there was
uncultivated and most Oromo were pastoralists. These Oromo, far from taking up
agriculture, were exerting pressure on the Hareri and the sedentary Oromo who farmed the
land closest to the walls of the town.” Their transformation to sedentary agriculture
occurred as the result of the Egyptian administration's consistent effort at increasing
agricultural production and their incorporation into the Ethiopian political system in the early
twentieth century.

The Hareri, who played such a crucial role in the transformation of the Oromo, are
the Semitic language-speaking inhabitants of the walled city of Harer. There are several

theories regarding their origin,” but the most likely is one that postulates that they represent

 

‘3 The Raba and Dori are the political and military wings of the Oromo system of government,
respectively. The Raba-Dori is essentially the confederated parliament of a number of gossa,
replicated at each level. For a detailed discussion of the Raba-Dori, see Hassan, "Harer-Oromo
relations," pp. 23-25; G. Douin, Histoire du Re‘gne Khe’dive Ismail, Tome III. (Cairo, 1941) pp. 608-
609; M. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptien sous Ismail et L’Ingé'ence Anglo-Franmise, 1863-1879 (Paris,
1933), p. 427.

“ Caulk, "Harer town," pp. 381-3 82. Sabry writes the Egyptians found it deplorable that so
much of the fertile land around Harer was left uncultivated. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptien, p. 422.

'5 Wolf Leslau, Ethiopians Speak: studies in cultural background, I Harari. (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 62-63.

52

remnants of the Harla, an autochthonous population which existed in the region prior to the
arrival of the Oromo. From the fourteenth to sixteenth-centuries, the Harla practiced a
highly deve10ped agricultural economy and lived in urban centers built of stone structures.
The majority of the Harla was likely to have been wiped out by war and famine in the
sixteenth-century following the invasions of the Oromo from the west and the Somali from
the east. It is probable that the present Hareri are remnants of the Semitic-speaking Harla,
who escaped away to Harer town which they fortiﬁed. There, they were able to preserve
their identity for centuries as traders supplying the surrounding Oromo with the consumer
goods they needed.“5

By the turn of the century, as the result of the trading relationship with the Oromo,
most Hareri had given up agriculture and taken up trade. Most were engaged in the irnport-
export trade with the coast. These Hareri traders used two main routes in the conduct of
trade with the coastal ports. The Berbera route, frequented by slave caravans, passed through
the Gadaboursi country, connecting Harer by way of J ijj iga and Hargessa to Berbera. The
Zeyla route passed across Geldessa, Biya Kaboba and then to the coast. The latter was
preferred by traders because it could be crossed in 15 days by commercial trafﬁc as opposed

to 25 days for Berbera.l7

 

‘6 On the Harla, see R.P. Azias and R. Chambard, C inque anne'es de recherches
arche’eologiques en Ethioipie (Paris, 1931), p. 35; Huntingford, The Galla, pp. 31, 174.

'7 Peter D. Coats, "Factors of Interrnediacy in Nineteenth-century Africa: The case of the Issa
of the Horn," in Thomas Labahn (ed) Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali
Studies, Vol. 1] (Hamburg, 1984), pp. 180-183. Shiferaw Bekele, "The Railway, Trade and Politics:
A Historical Survey, 1897-1935," MA thesis, History Department, Addis Ababa University, 1982,
pp. 1-5. For a detailed description of the caravan journey from Zayla to Harer see, Count Gleichen,
With the Mission to Menelik 1897 (London, 1971) First published in 1898, pp. 5-67.

53

The Zayla route had its share of problems. Merchants had to pass across Issa and
Oromo populated lands and goods had to be unloaded from the Issa camels onto Oromo
mules and donkeys for ﬁnal transport to Harer, since camels were not suited to the highland
journey. Moreover, the route was not the most secure, since, for the most part of the
nineteenth-century, the authority of the Emir was limited to Harer and its immediate
surroundings.

The group that played the most important role in the transit of Harer's trade was the
Somali who comprise an important minority population in the Harerge highlands. Some
Somali, who have taken commerce live in urban centers, but their greatest concentration is
found at the easterly end of the steppe west of J ijjiga town. The most easterly of the Somali
sub-clan in the highland region are the Gherri-Jarso and the Gherri-Babbille, who are
ethnically mixed Oromo and Somali, practicing agriculture using Oromo farming techniques
but possessing Somali social institutions.18

Further east in the dry, arid lands that extend to the coast of the Gulf of Aden live the
Issa. To their south, between the Berbera and the foothills of the J ijjiga Plain, the land is
inhabited by the Gadaboursi.19 Belonging to the Dir family, both of these clans are camel
herders, the Issa in particular occupying a structural niche in the chain of communication
and transportation that linked the general region of the Horn to overseas markets. In the

nineteenth-century, they serviced the export and import trade between the Harerge highlands

 

'8 Scarin, Hararino, pp. 33-52.

‘9 I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, 2nd ed. (London, 1982), pp. 7-14.

54

and Somali coastal ports by organizing a camel caravan led by the an abban .20

The institution of the abban, usually headed by Somali of the Issa clan at Zayla, who
was the guarantor or protector responsible for the security of the caravans, the goods and, the
life of the trader.2| For a predetermined fee, he arranged camels and men necessary for the
caravan and negotiated the giving of "gifts" to those whose cooperation might be necessary
for safe passage. Once the goods were loaded, the abban became responsible for their
delivery at the place of destination, at the coastal ports or in the interior.22 The abban
institution continued to serve the trade between the coast and the interior until the turn of the
twentieth century when some of the traﬁic was diverted to the F ranco-Etlriopian railway. As
we will see in later chapters, the contemporary contraband traders use the routes and
infrastructure of transportation pioneered by the abbans.

In the last decades of the nineteenth-century, the Hareri had not entirely become
urbanized traders, but the demographic pressure from the sedentary Oromo and their pastoral
kindred was forcing them increasingly to turn to trade. Most highland Oromo had not all
become sedentary agriculturalists, but those who lived within at least forty miles around the
city were trending toward agriculture as the result of the town market. The pastoral Somali

were strategically placed to take advantage of the trade between the coast and the interior by

 

2° 1. M. Lewis, "Trade and Markets in Northern Somaliland," in P. Bohannan and G. Dalton
(eds) Markets in Africa, 2nd printing (Evanston, 111., 1965), pp. 365-3 85; idem, Pastoral Democracy,
pp. 1-30.

2‘ Lewis, "Trade and Markets," p. 370.

22 Yusuf, "An Inquiry," 37, Coats, "Factors," p. 190. A description of the abban institution
for earlier period can be found in, M. Abir, "Brokerage and Brokers in Ethiopia in the ﬁrst half of the
19th Century," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 3 (1965), pp. 2-5; For a detailed description of the
organization of caravan see, Gliechen, With Menelik, pp 5-13, Appendix B.

55

monopolizing the means of transportation. By the time of the Egyptian occupation in 1875,
the three ethnic groups have worked out a modus operandi whereby the Hareri traded in the
agricultural commodities produced by the Oromo utilizing a means of transportation and

communication provided by the Somali.”

B. Trade, Agriculture and Factors of Production, 1875-1935

Because the Egyptians were fully aware of the commercial potential of Harer, they
were intent on developing and exploiting it.24 At the time of their occupation, however,
Harer’s long distance trade was in a depressed state, owing to the lack of security along the
trade routes leading to the coastal ports. Reports by European and other travelers
substantiate that the lack of security and water posed the greatest difﬁculties for caravan
journeys on the way to Harer and back to the coast. A more local problem was the lack of
currency which could have been used to overcome barter.25

Dming Rauf Pasha's tenure, a series of steps to monetize and monopolize commerce
in the Egyptian-controlled areas were taken to encourage and increase trade. Rauf Pasha

introduced Egyptian piasters to replace the mahallaq, the emir's currency which had no

 

23 Sebhat Gebrelgziabher, "Shiek Abadir's city," Yakatit, (Amharic weekly magazine) 16:1
(1985 E. C.), pp. 24-25, 36.

2" The Khedive's instruction to Rauf Pasha regarding the occupation of Harer clearly spell out
the motive of the conquest was to "d'établir la securité sur le routes qui menent au Harrar aﬁn de
tranquilliser les voyager et de faciliter 1e commerce de caravan." A.A. Reg. 2 Orders Superieurs, piece
82, p. 88, O. S. a Rauf Pacha, 16 Juilet 1875. Cited in Douin, Histoire du Régne, p. 602.

25 Jonathan Miran, "L'occupation Egyptienne de Harar, 1875-1885," Memoire de Diplome
dc Rechereche et d'etudes Applique'es Est-Aﬁicaines et Malgaches. Institut National des Langues et
Civilisations Orientales (Juin, 1983), pp. 71-72; Sabry, L’Empire Egyptien, p. 422.

56

determined value and therefore did little to discourage barter. Particularly interested in
acquiring control, Rauf put the coffee business in the hands of the Egyptian administration.
Coffee was to be purchased and sold in cash to facilitate trade and increase the quantity of
the currency in circulation. The introduction of Egyptian currency not only revived Harer's
trade but also helped to draw the region into the world economy through an expanding
Egyptian modern market sector.26

As for security the Egyptians built military posts along the most frequented Harer-
Geldessa-Zayla route in order to protect caravans from brigands and dug a number of water
wells. The village of Geldessa was almost reconstructed to accommodate more traders who
began to arrive there on a regular basis. With travel between Harer and its outlets made
easier and more secure, foreign trade increased dramatically. The market for Harer's
products expanded so much that the number of camel caravans jumped from 70 to 400 the
year the Egyptians seized Harer. Imports rose as more and more foreign traders settled in the
town and opened retailing shops.27

In their quest to raise revenue for the ﬁnancially beleaguered Khedivian state, the
Egyptian officers were as seriously committed to increasing agricultural production as they
were to trade. Reforming the land tenure system was therefore their policy priority and
arguably their most enduring accomplishment. Essentially following the emirate's

landholding system which overlapped with the administrative structure, the Egyptians

 

2‘ Sabry, L'Empire Egyptien, pp. 421-2. Miran, "L'occupation Egptéinne," pp. 71-72.

27 P. Paulitschke, "Le Harrar sous l'Administration Egyptienne, 1875-1885," Bulletin de la
Societe'Khe'diviale de Ge’ographie d'Egypte," 10 (1887), pp. 586-588.

57

appointed officials who were charged with the responsibility of collecting taxes. The
appointees were known as the malaq, the garad and the damin. The ﬁrst two terms were
conferred upon officials as a title, but in the course of time, they became also references to
the land under the jurisdiction of the ofﬁcial holding that title. Several garads and malaqs,
usually ﬁve or six, come under the jurisdiction of the damin, literally a guarantor, signifying
his responsibility for peace and order among his lineage. The damin also served as a liaison
between the emir and his subordinates.28

Although the Egyptians retained the emir's land tenure for tax collection purposes,
they allowed cultivators to acquire their own land. Prior to the Egyptians, farmers did not
have ownership rights over the land they worked and depended directly on the lands of the
garad and malaq. In order to ensure the continuous ﬂow of tribute, the Egyptian
administration granted cultivators a usufructuary right over the land they worked and the
right to transmit it to male heirs or to married female in the absence of male inheritors. The
farmer was required to pay taxes to the government based on his harvest, estimated by
ofﬁcials before threshing.

Once land was granted to farmers, the Egyptians took a series of measures to
augment production. Land which belonged to the pastoralist Oromo was expropriated and
sold to Egyptian ofﬁcers and powerful Hareri families, 29 who in turn leased it to Oromo

farmers. Local writings based on Oromo informants as well as contemporary records relate

 

2” Yusuf Ahmed, "An Inquiry," p. 23.

29 E. Sylvia Pankhurst, "Harer Under Egyptian Rule," Ethiopia Observer, 2:2 (1958), p. 56.
She refers to Adrien Zervos, L’empire d'Ethiopie: le miroir de l’Ethiopie moderne, 1906-1 935,
(Alexandria, 1936). No page given.

58

that the Egyptians encouraged farmers to plant coffee, as a result of which its cultivation
spread from Abadir (the environs of Harer city) to the entire districts of the Harer plateau.30
Coffee trees planted during this time are still found in the districts of Gursum, Gara
Mula’ata, Wobberra, and Chercher.31 The Egyptians also introduced to the Oromo new
vegetables and cereals, including grapes, potato, beet root, almond, peach and lemon trees.32

When Menilek seized Harer in 1887, therefore, he acquired not only a very rich
agricultural region but also a strategically-located commercial entrepot for much of
Ethiopia's eastern hinterland. The king's priority was to expand the state's extractive capacity
to increase revenue, but he also had the responsibility of sustaining the soldiers who forced
the emir into submission and who stayed on in Harerge to enforce the new order.

The Ethiopian state's ﬁscal and labor demands could be met by farming households
only if they could provide for their own sustenance and the reproduction of the village
economy. Ras Mekonnen, the ﬁrst EthiOpian ruler of Harer, fully realized that governmental
income and ultimately the power of the state was inextricably linked with the social
reproduction of the Harerge economies. While the administration had a vested interest in
protecting the internal capacity of the conquered communities and their claims to a certain
minimum of subsistence insurance, the Menilekian state, which had no ﬁscal capacity to

maintain a salaried army and bureaucracy, needed to provide for its soldiers. In other words,

 

3° Mohammed Moktar, "Notes sur le pays de Harrer," Bulletin de la société Khédiviale de
Ge’ographie 1:5 (1876), p. 382. Paulitschke, "Le Harrar," p. 588. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptien, p. 422.

3‘ , "Our coffee," (Amharic) Publication of the Ministry of C oﬂee & Tea Development (June,
1981 E. C.), p. 34-35.

32 Paulitschke, "L'Harar," p. 588.

59

the new regime was obligated to adjust its claims to the ability of its tributaries to pay.

The Ethiopian government declared the entire Harerge highlands a Crown Dominion,
thus arrogating to itself the legal right to divide and distribute land. The offices of the garad
and malaq were recognized and the lands of the office occupants left untouched. Fallow and
the former ruling families' lands were appropriated by the government and distributed to
soldiers, the gentry who were newly appointed as civilian administrators and the clergy who
followed the state in all its ventures to new territories in the south and south-west. Before
too long, there was not much fallow land left to satisfy government needs.

In 1894, Ras Mekonnen undertook a series of measures to ﬂee up more land to
transfer to his large retinue of soldiers and civilian administrators. For the purpose of
distribution, land had to be parceled out into measured plots. A land measurement unit
known as qalad (a rope 75 meters long) or gasha, meaning shield, used elsewhere in the
empire to measure land was introduced. In the vicinity of Harer, due to a relatively high
population density, one gasha out of the surplus holdings of eighty garads was conﬁscated
and registered as government domain. In the Gara Mula'ata and eastern Chercher, owing to
a relatively low population density, one gasha was carved out of the holdings of ten garads
and registered as crown land. To make sure that the indigenous farmers retained reasonable
amounts of land, the size of a qalad in Harer was reduced compared to the qalad size in
Shewa.33 When qalad land was available, it was distributed among soldiers and civil servants

as maderiya, in lieu of salary, and to a few voluntary emigrants as rest i.e., ownership by

 

’3 In Shewa, the size of one qalad was 7 measures long and 13 measures wide or 9 measures
long and 11 measures wide. In Harer, the size of the qalad was limited to 6 measures long and 9
measures wide. One measure is 75 meters long.

60

reason of settlement or long term use.

The Ethiopians quickly realized that, given Harer's alien landscape and a history of
independent statehood, cultural assimilation, rather than a protracted military occupation,
would be a more expedient way of integrating Harer into Ethiopia's political and socio-
economic fabric. Pursuant to this strategy, people from Shewa were encouraged to emigrate
and settle among the Hareri and Oromo cultivators. A considerable number of "Amhara"
arrived, especially in the wake of the rinder pest-induced famine of 1888-1892, which
devastated the Ethiopian highlands. No census data exist to show the number of "Amhara"
who settled in Harer but it is reasonable to assume that the number of the newcomers was
large enough to create a shortage of crown domains.“

The scarcity was especially acute in the vicinity of Harer, the area where the highland
population was concentrated. Ras Tefari Mekonnen, who was made governor of Harerge in
1910, ﬁgured out that the endowment of government land could be increased by placing a
ceiling on the holdings of the garad and malaq. Accordingly, an extensive land survey in
which a land measurement unit called jarib” was utilized was undertaken in 1912. Land
was measured and ceilings were placed on the holdings of the garads and malaqs at 600

(77.52ha) and 300 jaribs (38.76ha), respectively.36 Most of the surplus land that resulted

 

3" Negatu Wolde Giorgis, Planning and implementing the Development of Harerge Province,
(Mimeo. in Amharic), (Harer, 1952, E. C.) A 1938 estimate by the Italian Colonial Administration
puts the number of Amhara settlers at 300,000. F. Santagata, "Expanzzione commercial dell Harar,"
Italia d'OItremare, (June 1937), pp. 8-9.

35 One Jarib is 60 standard kend long by 60 wide which is equal to 1,296 sq. m. or 36 meters
by 36 meters. One kend equals 60 cm.

36 HPA-GC.1, "About the administration of land," Minutes of the General Assembly debate
on the question of land tenure, 1943 E. C.

61

from the measurement was designated "excess land of the garad," and was registered as
government land. Some portion of the land acquired in this manner was sold to the original
occupiers, who had the wherewithal while the rest was divided up and apportioned to new
settlers, assigned to military personnel and government ofﬁcials as maderiya or wages, or
donated to notable chiefs and favorites as rist or permanent holding.37

In 1919, the government sought to increase the number of tax-paying tenants and,
in order to attract new settlers, it reduced the rates of land tax set by the Egyptians. New
garads were appointed and tenants were settled in the sparsely populated Obborra and Metta
lands. As co-recipients of land along with the garads, the new tenants were entitled to
usufructuary ownership and the right to transfer the property to offsprings as long as they
paid their land use taxes.

The right to hand down use rights entailed the unintended consequence of
diminishing land size. After the Ethiopian conquest, more and more Oromo rejected
Christianity as the faith of their conquerors and embraced Islam.38 Young men began to take
as many as four wives, thus increasing the number of children born to a single father. In some
families, there were as many as eighteen children who could claim land on the death of their
father. When the family property was divided up, the inheritors received very small plots,

owing to the large number of recipients in a family. By the 19305, land scarcity was acute

 

’7 E. Brotto, Il regime della Terre nel Governo del Harar, (The Land Tenure System in the
Government of Hater). Trans. Asmarom Legesse and Zerabrook Aberra, (1966), p. 121.

38 Asthma Giorgis, History of the Galla, pp. 27-28.

62

in the Harer highland especially among the Nole.39

Cultivators attempted to ease the problem of land scarcity by employing several
mechanisms. Those who were settled on densely populated garads switched to the thinly
populated ones, where some garads admitted tenants who paid the customary bertcha, a
payment in sheep or cattle. Others became sharecroppers working for other tenants who
owned large tracts of lands. Still others migrated to the area west of Qullubi and east of the
Burqa river when the government in the 19105 began to create new garads in the uncultivated
areas. There were also a few instances in which sedentary agricultural Oromo communities
from Hater and Gara Mula’ata region migrated to the uninhabited areas of Chercher in the
Ramis valley and reverted to pastoralism. These processes, migration, sharecropping, and,
to a limited extent, reversion to pastoralism, continued well into the 19205.40

In 1923, Fitaurari Tekle Hawariat was appointed governor of Chercher. Having
established the entire Chercher region as Tefari Mekonnen's gult (absolute ownership right),
Tekle Hawariat had every piece of land measured into qalad. While the garad system of
eastern Chercher ended up being of the same size as the qalad of Harer, i.e., 9 ropes in length

and 6 in width (i.e., 30.37 ha), the burqa system"1 of western Chercher was established at 11

 

’9 Negatu, Planning, p. 17.

‘0 Mohammed Hassan, "Menelik's Conquest of Harar, 1887 and its effect on the political
organization of the surrounding Oromo up to 1900," Working Papers on society and history in
Imperial Ethiopia: The southern periphery from the 1880s to 1974. Edited by D. Donham and Wendy
James, Aﬁican Studies Center, Cambridge (1987). p. 237.

“ Until the 19205, in eastern Chercher, the garad system, mixed with the qalad system
predominated. In western Chercher, the communal system was transformed into the Burqa system in
which the Abba Burqa, meaning father (owner) of land, executed administrative functions similar to
those of the garad in the Harer and Gara Mula'ata regions.

1K

63

ropes in length and 7 in width (i.e., 43.30). The Abba Burqas were removed, and the gabbars
were made directly responsible to the government. Because coffee was an important crop in
this region, Tekle Hawariat raised land use taxes to more than six times what tenants paid
in Harer, thereby rendering the area an unattractive destination even for land-hungry
farmers.42

When Ras Tefari assumed the throne in 1930, he took a series of steps to ease the
problem of land shortage in Harer highlands. In September 1930, he issued an order which
required all lands in Harerge to be measured using the qalad measurement unit. In April
1931, the then governor Dejazrnatch Irneru measured all lands in Harerge province, leaving
the garad and the malaq with 600 and 300 jarib respectively. The remainder was measured
by the qalad unit, and the surplus was once again turned over to the government for
distribution among the new settlers under the auspices of a melkegna, a member of the gentry
who was awarded land for his service to the government. Here the distribution of land was
not limited to grants as wages (maderiya). Settlers from the rest of the empire were awarded
land for service to the government in lieu of pension (metoriya)."3

The Ethiopians implemented their land policies in the Eastern highland regions,
where the land was rich and densely inhabited. Whereas they had laid the foundations of
early colonial rule on the basis of traditional institutions, the new tribute requirements and
the very circumstances under which tributaries had to meet their new obligations forced the

Oromo communities to alter their life ways. The new overlords, the melkegna,

 

'2 Negatu, Planning, p. 16; Brotto, II regime, p. 28.

‘3 Brotto, Il regime, pp. 28-30.

64

commandeered peasant laborers for their own enterprises, bu -- unlike the emirs or the
Egyptians, who expected to be paid only in labor power--the melkegna demanded tribute in
labor, in kind and increasingly in cash. Alienation was rampant, on account of failure to pay
taxes and promises of taking care of aged title-holders and "ﬁiendship," a dubious
arrangement suggesting forced acquisition. In the process, more land came under the
possession of the church and powerful aristocrats including Ras Tefari who, in effect,
became the landlord with vast tracts of land in Chercher and most of Harerge highlands.“

The land policies which we have discussed had two implications for agricultural
production. First, land became concentrated in the hands of a patrimonial state which had
an insatiable appetite for more land. Ofﬁcials of the Ethiopian state and its supporters came
to possess large tracts of land and conﬁned the indigenous cultivators to their lineage lands
which diminished in size as population increased. Second, the governing elite possessed the
right of allocation and hence, controlled access to all lands. Consequently, land-hungry
farmers were discouraged from migrating to new lands, thus increasing population
concentration on lineage lands and diminishing the size of the land owned and worked by
farming families. In chapter 3, we will see that the difﬁculty of acquiring land, over the long
run, led to increasing fragmentation as tenant holdings were broken up as a consequence of

expropriation, population grth and inheritance by multiple heirs.

 

“ Brotto, Il regime, pp. 32-40; Tsehay Berhane Sellassie,"Developments in Land Tenure in
Harerge 1887-193 5," in Social Science Miscellania 5, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa
University. (n.d.), p. 4.

65

C. The Railway, Agriculture and Trade, 1902-1935

Rail transport led to a fundamental reorganization of the structure and orientation of
Harer's external trade. The volume of Harerge's export of agricultural products rose
signiﬁcantly compared to Ethiopia's past capacity and the new French port of Djibouti
became the principal outlet for Harerge's commerce."5 The railways created Dire Dawa as
the ﬁrst modern city in Ethiopia whose reason for existence was business. As a local dictum
testiﬁes,“ Dire Dawa was essentially a creation of the Chemin defer Franco-Ethiopien
(CFE), catapulted to a position of commercial prominence in a relatively short time. From
its inception, Dire Dawa played a crucial role in the region's economic activities as a major
transit center, a customs clearing station, the seat of major import-export ﬁrms and a major
market for the entire Harer region.

The establishment of Dire Dawa forced a major reorganization of the structure and
orientation of Harerge's trade. Export through Djibouti began to increase even before the
railway reached Dire Dawa. The value of exports registered a substantial increase ﬁ'om just
under 700,000 francs in 1900 to close to 7 million francs in 1902."7 In subsequent years, the

exports through Djibouti increased annually, doubling in 1903 and reaching 18 million francs

 

‘5 G. Mackereth, Economic conditions in Ethiopia, Department of Overseas Trade, No. 507,
(1932), p. 13-15; M. Perharn, The Government of Ethiopia, 2nd Ed. (London, 1969) p. 178.

‘6 Izih yallaw hullu babur ya tafaw naw, meaning, the train spat out everything that is
here.

‘7 Bulletin de Cornite’ d'Afrique (BCAF) 1901, p. 72; BCAF, 1902, p. 183. The publication
generally has no author and title.

66

in 1905 and 35 million francs in 1907.48 The general increase in trade is reﬂected in
speciﬁc items. Coffee increased almost ﬁve-fold, from 21,313 MT dollars in 1898 to
1,315,525 MT dollars in 1902. Figures are unavailable for the amount of skin exports prior
to the turn of the century, but, in terms of value, skin exports increased almost four-fold
from 141,643 in 1902 to 772,690 in 1904. After showing a remarkable increase in the last
years of the nineteenth-century, ivory exports declined gradually, owing to the depletion of
the animal stocks.

Despite the obvious statistical increase in the trade through Djibouti, the railway did
not completely displace the traditional infrastructure of trade. In the initial phase of
construction, the railway authorities had to rely on camel caravans to transport rails and
sleepers, water, telegraph poles, camping equipments, food, stones, lumber and so forth
along the construction lines. The Issa, who had earlier provided transportation for the Harer-
Zayla trade, took the opportunity to rent out their camels to the construction company.
Before the rail head reached Dire Dawa, Issa caravaneers, far from being supplanted by the
railway, intensiﬁed their participation as transporters of Djibouti's incipient trade."9

It was everyone's guess that once the railway reached Dire Dawa, it would become
the sole conduit of trade between the Gulf of Aden coast and Ethiopia's interior. The French

undertook the construction of the railway, believing that the resources in the Ethiopian

 

4‘ BCAF, 1903, p. 192; BCAF, 1906, pp. 79, 167; F0 401/10 Hohler to Grey, May 24,
1907.

‘9 BCAF: Nev. and Dec. 1899; See also T. L. Gilrnour, Abyssinia, the Ethiopian Railway and
the Powers (London, 1906), p. 17; Hughes. Le Roux, Méne’lik et nous, (Paris, 1902), p. 82.

67

interior would reward them economically and politically.50 Their activities were geared
toward expanding production, principally in the Harerge highlands, and channeling business
to the new port. Ever since the opening of the Suez canal and the rise of Aden as the
principal port in the region, the British had dominated the entire regional trade and were wary
that the French move might undercut their dominance. In 1899, the British minister in
Ethiopia, John Lane Harrington, warned his government that the establishment of the railway
at Djibouti would absorb most of Harer’s trade and result in serious economic consequences
for the British in Aden and Zeyla?l

In the end, neither the hope of the French nor the fear of the British materialized. A
number of circumstances prevented the railway from tapping the "rich" natural resources of
Harerge and channelling the entire trade to Djibouti. By the time the railhead reached Dire
Dawa, the company was in deep ﬁnancial trouble, and the tonnage available for transport
was so small that the company had to impose inordinately high freight charges. Calculations
based on contemporary publications show that there was a signiﬁcant difference of
transportation costs between the traditional caravaneers and the railway. The cost of
transporting all kinds of goods between Zayla and Harer was 39.5 dollars per ton by camel
and donkey, and 44.5 dollars if effected by camel all the way. The rail charges between Dire

Dawa and Djibouti varied according to the transported goods.52

 

5° M. Boucoiran, "La Situation Economique de L'Ethiopie," Renseignements Coloniaux et
Documents (1918), p. 192.

5' FO 403/298 Harrington to Grey, August 31, 1899.
’2 Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935, (Addis Ababa, 1968), p.

325. The calculation is based on a French publication Renseignements Coloniaux et Documents
(1906), pp, 193-196 and a British Parliamentary Paper, Diplomatic and Consular Report for 1905-6

68

The railway was not cheaper but it provided speed and convenience. Goods were
loaded on the train cars from the mules which brought them to Dire Dawa from the
highlands. Cumbersome goods such as corrugated iron sheets which were difficult to load
on camels or mules could now be imported without much trouble. However, the company's
decision to adopt exceedingly high carriage rates discouraged merchants from using the
trains.53 Traders found little reason to prefer the train, especially for non-perishable items
such as coffee and ivory which did not require rapid transport. As a result, caravans
originating in Harer continued somewhat unhindered to use the Issa transport service for their
trips to Zayla.“

The freight charges were high enough to put a damper on the level of export trade,
but the situation was worsened by the complex customs formalities. Traders and other
travelers were required to deal with "a most irritating bit of ofﬁcialdom" at Djibouti, Dire
Dawa and later Addis Ababa. One traveler described his railway experience as:

Having run the gauntlet [at Djibouti, at Dire Dawa, once again, everything

was] turned out of the train, opened, examined, and delayed,... cases once

having been opened are not properly fastened again, goods are pilfered from

them while they are lying about... and the remnants frequently arrive broken

and damaged... . Goods take almost as long to come from Jibouti to Addis

Ababa by rail as they did formerly by camel caravan, and the condition in
which they arrive is frequently little better.55

 

on the Trade of Abyssinia, (Cd. 3283-8) 88 (1907), p. 9.
’3 R. P. Skinner, Abyssinia of Today (London, 1903), pp. 99-101.
5‘ FO 403/255 Rodd to Salisbury, June 4, 1897.

55 C. F. Rey, Unconquered Abyssinia (London, 1923), pp. 213-215

69

Such inconveniences had a direct effect on the import-export trade, often
skyrocketing the prices of consumer goods in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. The high
transport costs were further inﬂated by various charges and customs dues at 12 per cent ad
valorem.” Given the very low purchasing power of the people, prices were invariably
unreachable. Excluding traders' proﬁts, prices increased between Djibouti and Addis Ababa
by 250 to 300 per cent on basic imported items such as abujedid.57

The absence of roads connecting production areas with the railway terminal was
another factor which stiﬂed the expansion of trade. There were practically no roads in the
Harerge highlands. The cart track originally built by Ras Mekonnen remained impassable
throughout the 19105 and 19205, all bridges over the numerous ravines and rivers having
been washed away. All transport of coffee and grain therefore was done by donkeys and to
a lesser extent by mules and headloading. Camels were rarely used as the climate did not suit
them.58

In the thirty years before the Italian occupation, export trade increased by almost
seven fold, from 3,367 to 28,497 tons. Coffee was the leading product, especially the
"Harari" variety whose exported quantity, until 1921, was ten times higher than the

"Abyssinian." After 1922, the latter began to show considerable increase in volume,

equaling the former in 1924 and surpassing it in 1927. Hides and skins exports increased

 

’6 Customs duties at Harer were 8 per cent ad valorem. This was another incentive for farmers
to prefer the Zayla-Harer route to the railway. British Parliament Sessional Papers, Report for the
year 1905-06 on the Trade of Abyssinia ( Cd.32-83-8) 88 (1907).

’7 J. Duchesne-Foumet, Mission en Ethiopia, 1901-1903 (Paris, 1908-09), pp. 282-8.

5” FO 368/1688 "Notes on the products of Harer Plateau" August, 1917.

70

even faster than coffee, doubling in quantity between 1910 and 1917 and trebling by 1925.59
From 1922 through the onset of the Great Depression, international coffee prices were
favorable and demand stayed high. In response, Hareri coﬂ‘ee exports increased form 4, 396
tons in 1922 to 8, 578 tons in 1934.60 Much of the increase in the volume of the exported
coffee was due to the augmentation of the share of the "Abyssinian" variety which was
harvested ﬁom wild coffee. The increase in "Hareri" variety was so moderate that it reﬂects
a decrease in internal consumption rather than increased production.61

Neither the railway company nor the Ethiopian government took steps to rectify the
practices which stiﬂed trade along the railroad line. Because the railway was the only modern
outlet, the CFE authorities were able to exact high charges on freight carried on their track
without fear of competition. In 1925, the company made a sweeping increase of 30 per cent
in freight rates, thereby causing a dramatic increase in the cost of shipment. Even at the old
rates, the rail charge for transporting skins ﬁom Addis Ababa to Djibouti alone considerably
exceeded ocean freight charges for the same amount of skins from Djibouti to New York.
Buyers at Djibouti and Aden could not pay more than the price ﬁxed by their European or
American buyers who would care less about the increase in freight charges. The amount of

skins exported from Ethiopia nevertheless remained steady, not due to increased utilization

 

59 Zervos, L'Empire, p. 159; Pankhurst, Economic History, pp. 335-337,430-431.

6° Harold Marcus, "The Infrastructure of the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis: Haile Sellassie, the
Solomonic Empire and the Wold Economy, 1916-1936," In Robert Hess (ed). Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Chicago, 1978), p. 559.

6' U. S. Department of Commerce, Ethiopia: Commercial and Economic Survey, US.
Department of Commerce, Trade Information Bulletin, No, 476. (Washington DC, 1927), pp. 7-9.

71

of the railroad but because export cargoes were diverted to other carriers.62

Operating under enormously high freight rates, in conjunction with inefficient
Customs administration and in competition against a relatively cheaper indigenous transport
system of caravaneers, the Djibouti-Dire Dawa failed to draw much of the anticipated
agricultural potential of Ethiopia's interiors.‘$3 Nevertheless, it was not completely
inconsequential. Prior to the railway, high value trade items were preferred for export to
make a margin of proﬁt, which otherwise would be consumed by transportation cost in the
case of bulky and heavy products. Among the railway's most visible effects is the fact that
merchants were able to export bulky merchandises. This situation favored the export of

coffee which had a stable and promising demand.

D. Conclusion

The effect of the railway must be reckoned in conjunction with the political and
economic changes that took place during the half century before the railway reached Dire
Dawa in 1902. By the mid-nineteenth century, about two-thirds of Harer Oromo, speciﬁcally,
those living beyond forty miles circumference of the city, were pastoralists. Those who lived
within the forty miles took up agriculture as the result of their contacts with Islam and
markets. The town of Harer offered the Oromo the opportunity to produce for the market and

Islam made them dissociate themselves from their pastoralist kin and accept the Hareri

 

62 US. Department of Commerce, Ethiopia: Commercial and Economic Survey, (1918), p.

63 Report for the Year 1905-06 on the Trade of Abyssinia, (Command. 3283-8) 88 (1907), pp.
8-11, 26. Shiferaw, "The Railway," pp. 8-16.

72

Emir's suzerainty. The policies of Emir Mohammed, the Egyptian administration and the
Ethiopian government brought the rest of the Oromo into contact with the market in Harer
and gravitated them into abandoning pastoralism and take up agriculture. The railway and
the establishment of Dire Dawa consummated this process by linking the Harerge Oromo
with larger productive regions within Ethiopia and wider market areas in the Horn of Aﬁica.

The Ethiopian policy of land alienation, the inﬂux of settlers from Shewa and the
inevitable natural increase of the highland population were bound to lessen the land for
agriculture and pasturage. There are consistent allusions in oral information as well as in
some contemporary references that, by the 193 05, the sedenterized Oromo were faced with
land shortages, particularly in the environs of Harer. The primary response of farmers to land
scarcity was to turn to sharecropping or migrate to areas where the problem was less acute.
The presence of a considerable numbers of Nole and Alla lineages among the Ittu is a clear
indication of the migration of the former to an area then dominated by pastoralists or
unclaimed. While other Oromo have resorted to sharecropping, most began to cultivate cash
crops to increase the productivity of their lands. Coffee as well as ﬁ'uits and vegetables were
some of the crops which the Oromo farmers produced for market. The cash crop that later
came to overshadow coffee's economic predominance in Harerge, khat, remained completely
insigniﬁcant during the time covered in this chapter. Focusing primarily on the same period,
the next chapter will attempt to explain why khat remained a less signiﬁcant marketable

commodity during the several decades before the 19305.

CHAPTER TWO

Khat Cultivation, Use and Trade before the 19305:

A Historiographical Sketch

Since medieval times, khat was known and used in the Red Sea region at least for
medicinal purposes and for religious and cultural celebrations. In the early twentieth-century,
some Europeans unsuccessfully attempted to popularize khat-derived drugs. For users
accustomed to more potent drugs such as opium, cannabis or coca derivatives, khat is an
ineffectual stimulant which can not produce the desired high.l One must chew large
amounts of khat leaves, whose taste westerners may ﬁnd repulsive, to experience a
minimum level of excitement.2 Thus, the demand for khat in the Western world has always
been substantially low and its social and economic effect minimal. Interest remained
consequently insufﬁcient to provide scholars and researchers the incentive necessary to
undertake detailed investigations of khat.

The existing literature on khat, be they travelers' accounts, official publications or
scientiﬁc researches, invariably cast khat as a harmful, addictive drug. Guided by this
presupposition, the writings have tended to emphasize the supposedly deleterious effects
which the consumption and production of khat have had on the individual, society and on
the economy of the country where the plant is grown and consumed. From the vantage point

of the farmers who cultivate it, however, khat is an integral part of their cropping system,

 

' Burton, First Footsteps, pp. 196-7.

2 Harold Ingrarns, Arabia and the Isles (New York, 1966), p. 106.
73

74

indeed the most lucrative cash crop they harvest. My analysis of how the cultivation and
marketing of khat gradually assumed a central position in Harerge's and Ethiopia's political
economy follows the perspective of the farmers.

This chapter aims to provide background to khat's commodiﬁcation by analyzing the
changes that occurred in the patterns of khat production, distribution and consumption before
the 19305. It begins with a brief discussion of khat's early history and its use. Bearing in
mind that the spread of the khat culture in Ethiopia can only be understood within a larger
context, I will devote a few pages to examining the spread of khat cultivation and
consumption in the Red Sea region. Then I will present a historical overview of the
expansion of the production, marketing and consumption of khat in Ethiopia. Finally, I will

present a brief account of the contemporary situation.

A. Khat Cultivation and Use in the Red Sea Region3

Based on the current knowledge about khat, no one can specify how the stimulating
properties of khat were discovered. The earliest sources on this subject are popular stories
whose claims range from divine revelation to Muslim saints,4 to a story of a shepherd who

observed khat's intoxicating effects on his goats, tried it himself and experienced alertness?

 

3 For a detailed treatment of the subject see, Abraham D. Krikorian, "Kat and its Use: an
historical perspective," Journal of Ethnopharmacologr, 12 (1984), pp 115-178.

‘ Bob Hill, "Cat (catha edulis)," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 3 (1965), pp. 13-15.

5 Amare Getahun and AD. Krikorian, "Chat : Coffee's rival from Harar, Ethiopia: Botany,
cultivation and use." Economic Botany, 27 (1973), p. 354; John Spencer Trimingham, Islam in

Ethiopia, (London 1952), p. 228n.; Shelagh Weir, Qat in Yemen: consumption and social change,
(London, 1985), p. 73.

75

The evidence for khat's place of origin is equally inconclusive. Some stories hold that khat
was brought to Yemen from Ethiopia, 6 while others reverse the direction of diffusion. 7There
are documents which espouse the former postulate, but they are not supported by
undisputable evidence.8 Historically, there have been constant communications across the
Red Sea, and khat leaves could have been transported back and forth by any number of
traders, missionaries, refugees or settlers. While it is difﬁcult to pinpoint the original habitat
of khat, there is a general consensus that the practice originated in the southern Red Sea
region.

There are a nmnber of written accounts which deal with the subject of the beginning
of khat consumption. A document entitled Pharmacy in the Healing Art (c.1050) suggests
that khat was known in Turkestan and Afghanistan as early as the beginning of the 11th
century. However, khat was not mentioned in a pharmacopeia written at a slightly earlier
period. The discrepancy was probably due to the fact that khat's importance was conﬁned to
a few areas where the author was not able to reach. The lapse makes it harder to ascertain
whether or not khat existed in the Afghan-Turkestan area at such an early date. Still, an
article written in 1910 by an analytical chemist working for the Afghan government has

recorded that catha edulis was used in Kabul as a tea to combat fatigue and for medicinal

 

6 Burton, First Footsteps, pp. 77, 80-87; A. Rihani, Arabian Peak and Desert: Travels in
al-Yemen, (Boston, 1930), pp. 37ff.

7 John G. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise: The institutionalized use of the drug qat in North
Yemen, (Dordrecht, 1987), p. 62; Weir, Qat in Yemen, p. 73.

8 Mancioli, M. and A. Parinello, "Il qat (catha edulis). La clinica T erapeutica, 43: 2 (269),
31 Ottobre, 1967.

76

purposes.9 It is possible that khat may well have been introduced from Arabia by some
pilgrims on their way back from Mecca and was used as decoction in a few areas in the
whole Turkestan-Afghanistan area.

In a thirteenth-century manuscript entitled The Book of Compound Drugs (c.1237)
khat is identiﬁed as a plant prescribed for "euphorizing purposes" and for the "relief of
melancholia and depressive symptoms." A marginal note in one of its pages indicates that
"khat is a shrub of Kilwa (modern East African coast) [and in] Yemen, [it is] popularly
known as kafta."'° Because the marginalia does not appear in other copies of the manuscript,
experts suspect that the comment was a posthumous addendum by an anonymous person.”
It may well be the case that khat was used as a stimulant or for medicinal ptuposes in the
Iran-Afghanistan area as early as the twelfth century, but it is important to note that the
prevalent mode of khat use at this time was decoction, not chewing.

By the time Europeans began to notice khat in the seventeenth-century, its use in
modes other than chewing was widespread in the Middle-East and the entire Red Sea region.
The French orientalist Barthelemy d'Herbelot de Molainville (1625-1695), in his posthumous
Bibliotheque Orientale (1697), describes three types of beverages, under the generic name
Cahuah & Cahveh, used by the people of southern Arabia. The ﬁrst was called Cahuaht al

Catiat, which must be a corruption of the Arabic al-kahwa al-katiaya, meaning khat coffee.

 

9 F. Owen, "Catha Edulis," Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry, 29 (1910), p. 1091.

'0 Tigani El-Mahi, A Preliminary Study on khatntogether with the institutional history of
coﬂee as a beverage in relation to khat, WHO Regional office for the Eastern Mediterranean, WHO
document EM/RC 11/10 MS., Mimeo. (1961).

” Maxirne Rodinson, "Esquisse d'une monographie du Qat," Journal Asiatique, 265 (197 7),
p. 76.

77

The second Cahuah al-Caschriat, is more than likely to be the contemporary beverage
kishir made of coffee husks and widely used in the Middle East; and the third, Cahuah al-
Bunnait is obviously a corrupted form of the Arabic bun, which is a coffee drink made of the
beans.‘2

D'Herbelot's rather ambiguous description is probably due to the author's lack of
ﬁrst-hand experience of the khat-growing areas. His contemporary Jean de la Roque (1661-
1745), however, did travel to Arabia Felix (Yemen) in quest of coffee. In his Voyage de
l'Arabie Heureuse (1716), La Roque intimated that the inhabitants of Aden had become such
avid coffee drinkers that they had abandoned another drink made with the leaves of a certain
plant called khat. La Roque was not familiar enough with khat to be able to introduce it to
his European audience in terms they could understand, but he was sure that it was not tea. ‘3

These accounts did not provide a clear knowledge about khat and its use. It was only
after the publication of Carsten Niebuhr's Travels through Arabia and other countries of the
East (1792) that Europeans learned much about khat. Niebuhr, who was the only survivor
of a Danish expedition to Arabia, identiﬁed khat as a new genus peculiar to Arabia. 1
Moreover, he fully described its widespread consumption by south Arabians. Niebuhr was
unable fully to explain why the Arabs chewed the buds and leaves of the plant, whose taste

was so "disagreeable," except to suppose that it was fashionable. He simply recorded the

 

'2 A. D. Krikorian,"Khat and its use: an historical perspective. Journal of
Ethnopharmacologr 12 (1984), p. l 18.

‘3 J. de la Roque, A Voyage to Arabia the Happy, By way of the Eastern Ocean, and the straits
of the Red-Sea; Performed by the French for the ﬁrst time, AD. I 708, I 709, I 710 (London, 1726),
p. 252.

78

chewers' reasoning that khat facilitated digestion and fortiﬁed the body against infectious
disease although he did notice that khat chewing had a "parching effect on the constitution."“'
In 1775, Niebuhr edited and posthumously published the work of the expedition's botanist
Petrus F orsskal under the title Flora Aegvptiaco-Arabica. Except for giving the Latinized
name catha and explaining that khat was propagated from cuttings, Forsskal's description
was in many respects similar to that of Niebuhr's.

Around the second half of the nineteenth-century, khat is said to have become an
important cash crop in Yemen. Cultivated on well-maintained and well-irrigated terraces,
khat was apparently the most important crop of J ebel Sabir whose leaves were collected and
sold in local markets. At this time, khat was an item of domestic commerce and was not
exported to distant places because its leaves must be eaten fresh. Contemporary sources show
that best quality khat yielded greater proﬁts than coffee.15 In Yemen proper, a well-off

chewer could consume ﬁve or six francs' worth of khat a day.“5

B. Khat Production, Consumption and Marketing in Ethiopia
On the Ethiopian side of the Red Sea, we ﬁnd scanty reports about the consumption
of khat before the nineteenth-century. The earliest such reference is in a contemporary

account of Amde Syon's (r. 1314-1344) military campaign undertaken against Sebra'din of

 

‘4 C. Niebuhr, Travels through Arabia and other Countries of the East, Translated into
English by Robert Heron, vol. 2 (Dublin, 1792), p. 353.

‘5 P.E. Botta, "Notice sur un voyage dans l'Ararbie Heureuse," Paris. Museum National
d’Histoire Naturelle de Paris. Archives 2 (1841), pp. 63-88.

'6 F. Fresnel, "L'Arabi vue en 1837-1838," Journal Asiatique 5 (1871), pp. 13-14.

79

Ifat around 1330. In the emperor's chronicle, Sebra'din is quoted as saying, "I will take up
my residence at Mar‘ade, the capital of his [Amde Syon] kingdom, and I will plant chat there
because the Muslims love the plant."17 The story suggests the use of khat was a familiar

practice among Muslim communities in east-central Ethiopia around the mid-fourteenth

century.

Khat was also mentioned in the fourteenth-century Voyages of the Eyes in Kingdoms
of Different Countries by Ibn Fadl Allah al-Umari (1301-1348), who refers its popular
consumption in Ethiopia and describes its physiological effects in terms quite familiar today.
Quoting an account given to him by an Ethiopian scholar, al-Umari describes khat as one of
Abyssinian trees which,

bears no link, but one eats the young tender shoots. It stimulates cleverness and gives
happiness; it allows one to almost go without eating, drinking or having sexual
intercourse. Everyone eats it, but especially those searching for knowledge, or those
who have serious problems, or those who seek to prolong their wakefulness so as to
make a journey or to carry out work.... A Muslim from Abyssinia went to Yemen
and was presented to the king [al-Mu'ayyad Da'ud], who accepted him as a friend.
The Abyssinian entreated him to ask a favor, and the king requested some leaves of
the qat tree; he forthwith sent someone to Abyssinia who brought back a stalk. This
was planted in Yemen and ﬂourished. When the time came to harvest the leaves, the
king asked the Abyssinian how the plant was used and he explained to him the effects
it produced. On learning that it banished the desire to eat, to drink or to have sexual
relations, the king a1 Mu'ayyad saidz‘And what other pleasures are there in this life
except these? I will never eat it! Those three things are all I spend my wealth on;
how could I use something which deprived me of just those pleasures I enjoy?18

 

‘7 The chronicle has been translated into English by G. W. B. Huntingford, The Glorious
Victories of ’Amda Syon, King of Ethiopia (Oxford, 1965), pp. 55-56; The French translation is by
J. Perruchon, "Histoire des Guerres d"Amda Syon Roi D'Ethiopie," Traduite de l'Ethiopien. Journal
Asiatique 14 (1889), p. 331; Trimingham, Islam, p. 228.

‘3 M. Gaudefoy-Demombynes, Translation of Ibn Fadl Allah al-‘Umari, Masalik al-absarﬁ
mamalik al-amsar, (Paris, 1927), pp. 11-13. This particular quote was also translated from the French
Weir, Qat in Yemen, 1985, p. 72.

80

The famous ﬁfteenth-century historian al-Maqrizi, who wrote a history of the Muslim
sultanates in Ethiopia, corroborates al-Umari's story in many respects. Furthermore, al-
Maqrizi's rendition suggests a fairly extensive use of khat in Ethiopia in the fourteenth-
century and depicts some of its behavioral and experiential effects. It is probable that Al-
Maqrizi might have drawn on al-Umari but his description provides more insights into the
effect of khat on chewers. Writing about a plant from Zayla (in modern Somalia), al-Maqrizi
states:

These leaves when eaten are effective in enhancing intelligent performance and in
effecting a recall of forgotten events. However, while they produce an appreciable
sense of hilarity in the taker, they materially depress the appetite for food and the
desire for sex, and strongly repel sleep. The people of the locality are fond of these
leaves and are habitually attached to them. The habit is even more conspicuously rife
among intellectuals.”

For several centuries after al-Maqrizi's description, most of the lmowledge about khat
was based on European traveler's reports from Yemen. Whatever little information about
khat that came out was from French travelers and scientists. Frequent reports on khat from
several of its citizens prompted the French government to send a formal scientiﬁc expedition
to the Red Sea region under the leadership of Lieutenant Charlemagne Théophile Lefebvre.
The expedition, undertaken between 1839-1843, produced an impressive documentation on
natural history, in which khat was treated. The section on botany conﬁrmed that specimens

of khat collected in Ethiopia's Tigre and Shoa provinces belonged to the genus Catha which

Forsskal had identiﬁed from his collection of the ﬂora of Yemen more than half a century

 

‘9 El-Mahi, "A preliminary study on khat," p. 3.

81
before.20

From the 18405 on, we ﬁnd constant references to khat and its use in various parts
of Ethiopia. In 1843, Charles Beke reported that coffee and khat were growing wild in
southern Abyssinia. Citing Niebuhr's Travels, Beke also identiﬁed khat as a favorite Arab
intoxicant used as some sort of tea, suggesting that an infusion was made out of khat and
consumed as beverage. From this information, one could infer that chewing khat was not
widespread in southern Ethiopia at the time of Beke's visit.2| However, the use of khat as tea
was widely practiced during William Cornwallis Harris visit to the court of Sahle Sellassie
of Shewa. In his The Highlands of Aethiopia, Harris wrote that, in Ifat, the fresh leaves of
khat were chewed and used as an astringent medicine, boiled with milk or water, and drunk
as a beverage. He also spoke of the leaves being plucked and dried in the sun.22 It is
probable that the dried leaves were meant for use in regions distant from the production
areas.

One of the more widely cited works on mid-nineteenth century Harer is Richard
Burton's First Footsteps in East Africa (1894). A keen observer and a ﬁne reporter, Burton
characteristically provided a detailed and insightful account of a khat chewing party in Harer.
He reported that khat chewing sessions took place every day between 9 and noon, and he

described one such party thrown by the Treasurer of the Emir of Harer and attended by

 

2° Théophile Lefebvre et a1, Voyage en Abyssinie exe’cute’ pendant les anne’es I839, I841,
I842, 1843 (Paris, 1845-1851), pp. 134-135.

2‘ Charles Beke, "On the countries South of Abyssinia," Journal of the Royal Geographical
Society 13 (1843), p. 263.

22 W. Cornwallis Harris, The Highlands of Aethiopia (London, 1844), vol 3. pp. 334-335.

82

several dignitaries, including the Prime Minister. It is interesting to note that, at this chew
session, fresh khat leaves were pounded in a wooden mortar and the paste was distributed
among the attendees who rolled the substance for consumption purposes. This mode of usage
had not been witnessed in other khat chewing areas and must have been peculiar to Harer.
Burton's description suggests that the custom of chewing was largely practiced by the elite
class or group. Also recorded in Burton's account was the Ulema's notion that khat was
"food for the Pious" and an intellectuals' rationalization that it had special properties of
"enlivening the imagination, clearing the ideas, cheering the heart, diminishing sleep, and
taking the place of food."23 These statements show that different social groups chewed khat
for different reasons.
If the use of khat was fairly widespread among the Hareri elite at the time of
Burton's visit, by the time the Egyptians occupied Harer in 1887 it was a commonplace
practice among the pious Muslims of the city and its environs. Mohammed Moktar, an
ofﬁcer in the Egyptian army, gives a most detailed account worth quoting at length:
As an intoxicating substance they chew the leaves of a tree which they call kat. They
believe that this tree has the ability to strengthen the body to repel sleep and they

. attribute aphrodisiac qualities to it. (They have a curious manner of using it and it
seems to me that it would be of interest to relate it here.

Towards nine o'clock in the morning, all the guests go to their hosts; there
they sit in a circle and begin to read the ﬁrst chapters of the Quran, and address all
sorts of praises to the Prophet. This done, the master of the house gives each a ﬁstful
of kat leaves which they chew in eager rivalry, in order to be able to swallow them
more easily. If the master of the house is rich, they drink milk; if he is poor, they
drink water. After this the same ceremony begins again, reading the Quran, praises
to the Prophet, receiving and chewing of a fresh ﬁstful of kat, and this goes on until

11 o'clock. As I asked one of them why they were reading the Quran in this way and
celebrating, with the eating of kat, the praises to the Prophet, he answered me.

 

23 Burton, First Footsteps, pp. 196-197.

83 _

‘We read the Quran and we bow to the Prophet because this plant is known
to the saints and it permits us to keep vigil long through the night in order to worship
the Lord.‘

I had to admit that the response was rather ingenious... . I do not know the
real properties of khat; this is certain, that Diabe, my servant, aged 23 years, and of
a sanguine temperament, fell sick with dysentery, and was only cured with khat,... I
learned myself that it was an excellent remedy against dysentery.“

Moktar's description shows that, by the 18805, khat chewing and the accompanying
rituals had assumed the characteristics currently observable in Harer. It also indicates that
khat was used as medicine and that chewing was closely associated with religious

Observances.

C. Khat in Harerge Region

At the beginning of the twentieth-century, chewing was evidently rife but largely
conﬁned to the affluent Hareri elite who had surplus income to spend on khat. The price
which the city-dwellers paid for khat was relatively high compared to other cash crops, 1
pound of khat leaves selling for one dollar. Nevertheless, farmers kept growing food crops
and planting coffee.25 At least three factors explain the continued cultivation of coffee,
vegetables and food crops around the city of Harer instead of the apparently lucrative khat.
First, the number of consumers who did not grow their own supply was too few to create a

proportional rise in demand. Second, the lack of rapid transportation prevented khat from

 

2‘ Moktar, "Notes sur le pays," pp. 369-372.

2’ A British Diplomatic and Consular Report which reported that farmers planted khat for sale
in the city also shows that, in a couple of years before 1900, 150,000 coffee trees were planted in the
Chercher districts. Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Reports for the year 1898-1900 on the Trade
of Adis Abbaba and Harar, p. 83.

84

reaching a wider consumer pool. Third, most of the khat trees were owned by absentee
farmers who lived within the city wall and maintained gardens around the city. One study
suggests that the surrounding Oromo did not obtain access to khat until the battle of
Chelenqo in 1887, when the widows of the Hareri men killed in the war, unable to maintain
their khat orchards, employed Oromo farmers as tenants to tend their khat ﬁelds. The Oromo
thereafter distributed the plant among their kin, thus beginning the spread of khat on a larger
scale.26

The massive conversion of the Oromo to Islam in the late nineteenth-century was an
important factor in accelerating the spread of consumption among them. Oromo oral
informants unanimously report that they acquired the khat plant and the habit of chewing it
from the "Adere," as they prefer to call the Harari. This story is consistent with the general
phenomenon that the Oromo adopted agriculture from the Harari. The Oromo, who
remained pastoralists and animists until the middle of the nineteenth-century, did not have
much to do with coffee, vegetables and cereals, let alone with khat. It was only after they
became sedentary farmers and accepted Islam that khat chewing spread among them. In other
words, the Oromo started khat cultivation in the process of their shift from pastoralism to
sedentary farming and its consumption spread among them along with their massive
conversion of Islam in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries.

By 1910, khat chewing was a widespread practice among the Islarnized Oromo,
among whom the leaf quickly attained positions of social, cultural and religious importance.

Non-Muslims, however, considered khat chewing as a sign of conversion to the Islamic

 

2° r1111, "Chat," p. 13.

85

faith. For the Christian "Amhara" colonists, the consumption of khat was a mark of apostasy.
In 1916, one of the accusations leveled against Lij Iyasu, Menelik's designated successor, was
his alleged indulgence in chewing khat with Muslims during one of his visits to Harer in the
early 19105.27 Khat was considered so evil that one "Amhara" governor of Chercher,
F itaurari Teklehawariat, made eradicating the crop one of his top policy priorities.
Immediately after he was appointed as the Govemor-General of Chercher,
Taklehawariat ordered the Oromo to uproot their khat plants and replace them with coffee
trees. He also placed a high sales tax on khat transactions to moderate the market. Fearing
rebellion, his subordinates, the malkagna, appealed to Ras Tafari to reverse the decision.
Pointing to the apparent debilitating effect of khat on the human body, Takla Hawariat
argued that chewing would lead to reduced productivity, diminished reproductive capacity
and increased mental problems. Hi5 efforts at eradication failed nonetheless, since he came
to believe that it would be ﬁ'uitless to carry out the destruction of khat only in Chercher while
the shrub was permitted to be cultivated in the adjacent Gara Mula’ata and Harer regions.28
Taklehawariat's concern was also shared by a British agricultural expert who visited
Harer in 1917. In his report, the expert bemoaned khat as a plant whose "evil inﬂuence"
must be curbed. His bias aside, the report contained important information that, by the late
19105, khat had become an integral part of the cropping system of the Harerge highlands.

Propagated from cuttings, khat was not pnmed or irrigated, although it received some

 

’7 Hasen Ali, "A short biography of Bejirond Takla Hawariat," Senior Essay, Department of
History, Addis Ababa University. (1985), p. 12.

2‘ "The Autobiography of Fitaurari Takla Hawariat," deposited in the History Department,
Addis Ababa University. pp. 66-67.

86

cultivation. There were different varieties of khat, coarse and ﬁne leaves, which were
plucked off for the purpose of consumption. Most of the harvest was said to be consumed
locally, but a certain amount was sent to Dire Dawa and thence to Djibouti.29

There is no available statistical evidence that shows the amount of khat exported
from Harer prior to the late 19205.30 Oral sources conﬁrm that, until the turn of the century,
fresh khat leaves were sold in local markets and, because of the absence of a speedy means
of transportation, only the dried leaves were exported to places far away from the areas of
production. It was only after the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad reached Dire Dawa in 1902,
that small amounts of fresh khat began to be exported by rail to Djibouti, and thence, by
dhow to Aden.“

In the late twenties and early thirties, the amount of khat exported to Djibouti seemed

to have caught the attention of the government so as to appear in the official trade statistics

 

29 F0 368/ 1688. Notes on the Products of Harar Plateau, Abyssinia. A Report by Dudley S.
Corlett, August, 1917. The Report was later published under the same title in The Poona Agricultural
College Magazine , pp. 161-170.

3° In his "An Inquiry into the Economy of Harer..., 1825-1875,"Yusuf Ahmed suggests that
280 camel loads of khat had been exported from Harer to Aden annually. He cites Burton, First
Footsteps, p. 299, to support his conclusion. In actuality, what was contained in Burton's account was
a quotation from an article by James Vaughan, "Notes on the drugs observed at Aden, Arabia,"
Pharmaceutical Journal, 12:5 (1852). Vaughan's commentary was on the importation of khat into
Aden from Yemen, not from Ethiopia. See also Charles Moser, "The Flower of paradise: the part
which khat plays in the life of the Yemen Arab", Geographical Journal. 93 (1917), pp. 177-182.

3'Richard Pankhurst states that, around World War I, khat exports from Harer were about 30
tons a year. Economic History of Ethiopia, p. 204. To support his assertion, Pankhurst cites
numerous sources, although none of them suggests any khat export from Ethiopia, let alone giving
actual numbers. Curiously, most of the cited authors visited Ethiopia and had their accounts
published long before 1914. To cite a few, Harris, The Highlands of Aethiopia, 11, (London, 1844),
pp. 423-4; Moktar,"Notes sur le pays...," (1877), p. 269; L. Robecchi-Bricchetti, Nell' Harar (1896),
pp. 129-33; J. W. Jennings and C. Addison, With the Abyssinians in Somaliland (London, 1905),
p. 54.

87

of the French colony. There, the majority of khat chewers were Arab merchants and
employees of the port facilities. Djibouti's Arab population in the mid 19305 numbered more
than 4,000.32 In 1929, the total amount of khat imported into Djibouti was 13 tons valued
at 322, 755 francs. In 1931, the amount more than doubled to 29 tons valued at 795, 852
francs, while in the following year Djibouti imported 25 tones of khat worth 344,244 francs.
Some of this khat was imported from Yemen, and some was smuggled from Ethiopia
through British Somaliland by Somali traders. Khat was imported to British Somaliland
illegally across the border by overland transportation because, since 1921 khat had been
banned in the British colony. Traders nonetheless continued to choose this route to avoid the

high cost of train transportation. 33

TABLE 1: French Somaliland (Djibouti) : Khat imports 1929-1932

 

 

1929 1931 1932
(vol) (value) (vol) (value) (vol) (val)
Somaliland 6048 109087 479 9,867 - -
Aden 189 3,894 18793 392997 1560 16087
Ethiopia 6854 209774 9830 392998 3379 83430
Total 13091 322755 29102 795852 25076 344244

 

Source: Compiled from AOM, Carton 341 Dossier 1, Carton 342 Dossier 7 and Carton
342 Dossier 11. Volume is in Kgs and value is in French francs.

 

’2 Rene Hachette, "L'lrnportance de la COte FranHaise des Somalis," Revue Geographic et
Industrielle de France, 2 (1936), in AOM, Carton, 341, Dossier l.

33 Archives d'Outre Mer (AOM), Importations, Colonic de la C (18 des Somalis, Carton 342
Dossier 7 and Carton 346 Dossier 11.

88

The increase in khat trade in the late twenties was assisted by the construction of
roads that connected several areas of khat production to the railway terminal. Beginning in
the mid-twenties, Ras Tafari, then de facto ruler of Ethiopia, took a personal interest in
promoting road building in several areas of the empire, but mostly in Harerge.“ The paving
of the important Hater-Dire Dawa road was completed in 1931, while the Ethiopian side of
a track connecting Harer to Hargessa was completed in 1932. 35 By 1934, it was possible to
travel by car from Harer to Dader in the Chercher district.“S Feeder roads were also
completed connecting the Harer-Dire Dawa road to districts such as Gara Mula'ata and the
Harer-Asba Taferi road with Bedessa, Hirna and Kunni.37

The roads were used by expatriate merchants who resided in Dire Dawa and Harer
mainly to transport coffee to the railway station by wheeled carts. Yemeni coffee traders
reasoned that a lucrative khat business was possible, and they purchased the product in Dire
Dawa and, after processing it, they exported the leaves by train to Djibouti and thence to
Aden. The khat for export was purchased from farmers who brought their product to the
town.38

Although in the early thirties khat had become a major cash crop in Harer, the volume

of its export was relatively small. Several reasons contributed to the diminished level of

 

3" F0 371/ 16996 Barton to Simon, Ethiopia: Annual Report, 1932, January 12, 1933.
3’ F0 371/ 16101 Barton to Simon, Ethiopia: Annual Report, 1931, January 10, 1932.
3" FO 401/34 Barton to Simon, March 31, 1934.

37 F0 401/24 Dunbar to Chamberlain, March 23, 1928; F0 401/34 Barton to Simon February
18, 193 3.

38 Interview: Yassin Usman, Dire Dawa, February 20, 1994.

89

the khat export business. The major roads were built and owned by Emperor Haile Sellassie,
a man whom Sir Sidney Barton, British Minister in Addis Ababa in the early 19305,
described as "better at building roads than at putting them to the best use."39 His
representatives demanded exorbitant road tolls, thus causing the two or three jitneys that
existed then to charge passengers as much as 10 dollars for a single journey between Harer
and Dire Dawa. The high cost made automobile transport utterly unaﬂ‘ordable for Ethiopian
traders. The Harer-Jijiiga-Hargessa road had been built and owned by Lij Mesﬁn Keleme
Work and Co. and only the Indian merchant Mohammadally had could afford to have his
trucks use the road.40 Moreover, roads and bridges were frequently washed out during rainy

seasons thus, the khat trade remained constricted. 4‘

C. Khat Varieties, Contemporary Usage and Pharmacology

It is only logical to assume that the increased market for khat leaves would encourage
the introduction of modern agricultural techniques. Nevertheless, the cultivation and
harvesting methods of khat have remained relatively unchanged over the centuries.
Seedlings can be planted year round, but most cultivation occurs between January and
March. Growing to a height of approximately four feet, a properly cultivated plant will yield
its ﬁrst crop within two to three years and remain productive for up to seventy-ﬁve years.

Three to four annual crops are common, but the scant use of fertilizers, extensive cultivation

 

39 F0 371/ 16101 Barton to Simon, Ethiopia: Annual Report, 1931, January 1932.
4° FO 401/30 Barton to Henderson, March 31, 1931.

4' FO 401/30 Barton to Henderson, December 31, 1930.

90

techniques and the absence of adequate irrigation may hamper yield signiﬁcantly. To
minimize damage, all harvesting is done by hand, picking each branch individually. Leaves
close to the ground and those falling during harvest are later packed separately and sold as
inferior quality (see market brands below).

Khat shrubs thrive best in highland areas. The plant can be raised at elevations
ranging from 5,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level. Optimum conditions include cultivation
at altitudes ranging from 5,000 to 6,500 feet above sea level, an average temperature
between 650 F and 85’ F and good drainage. Interestingly, this ideal khat ecology is best
suited to the cultivation of coffee. Khat, however, is less susceptible to disease and insects
than coffee and other highland crops. Although khat shrubs are extraordinarily adapted to
highland ecologies, it is important to note that intense and continuous harvest could kill the
plant in the long run. Until improvements in transportation facilities opened up
market outlets in some neighboring countries, most of Harerge's khat went for domestic use
and markets. The price consumers paid for the leaves depended on the type and market
brand which, in the course of time, came to be associated with effectiveness in producing
hilarity. Chewers identify several types of khat, although based on cultural practices,
farmers distinguish essentially two basic varieties of khat: dima, medium-sized reddish
leaves and dalotta, small, pale, yellowish leaves.42 Dalotta is less acidic in taste and is
preferred by local chewers for its greater effectiveness. The dirnma variety is said to be

physiologically sturdy and more lasting than the dalotta and, as the result, came to be

 

‘2 There are two more varieties, goba and addi, which are, because of their insigniﬁcance
in terms of market value and popularity, not classiﬁed as major types.

91

exported in greater quantity than the dalotta.

At the market place, khat is classiﬁed under a variety of names signifying quality.
The long, tender leaves which bud after the previous year's harvest are referred to as uratta
and may be harvested at any time of the year. The young tender shoots are known as Uratta-
quertii, and the slender, leathery ones are called uratta-quddaa. Iffor some reason the uratta
is left unharvested for more than six month, the new shoots grow to be a new market brand
known as haddaara, or Haafaa or Ijaanaaqqaa. Ifharvested while its leaves are young and
tender, haddaara khat is referred to as haddaara-querti, whereas late-harvested, rough,
leathery leaves are known as haddaara-quddaa. Leaves that have grown to full maturity are
called quertii. Sometimes a leafhopper called "quddaa" feeds on the khat leaves at the querti
stage and retard the maturing process. The farmer stimulates new growth by manuring,
weeding and shoring up. The renewed leaves are called quddaa, which is considered of high
quality and therefore has a very high market value. A poor quality khat with older leaves are
left on the tree so that women may harvest and retail them in local markets. This type is
referred to as faaqaa, or tacharo or chaballa. If the rains stop before the yormg shoots, the
uratta, grow to maturation, the plant becomes retarded and start to die out. If, however, the
rains come back or irrigation is made possible, the plant resumes growth, but no longer is

considered to provide uratta, but Kara-bulla.43

 

‘3 My description is based on extensive interviews with informants in Harer. Informants:

Ahmed Bakar, Haramaya, May 05, 20 and 27, 1994; Abdurahman Emer, Bate, May 10 1994;
Abdulahi Ahmed, Ganda Issa, May 5, 1994; Mohammed Yuyu, Ganda Issa, May 11, 1994. Cf.
Getahun and Krikorian, "Chat : Coffee's rival from Harar", pp. 361-363. P.C.M. Jansen, Spices,
condiments and medicinal plants in Ethiopia. their taxonomy and agricultural signiﬁcance,
(Wageningen 1981), pp. 161-165.

92

As far as usage is concerned, the common method of consumption is chewing. Fresh
khat, that is leaves picked two or three days previously at the most, which have kept their
moisture, are appreciated by chewers because the more tender and juicy the leaves, the easier
it is to chew them and consequently attain the desired state of euphoria. When fresh khat
leaves were unobtainable, either a kind of paste made from powdered leaves is ingested or
an infusion made by boiling the dried leaves is drunk. Around the turn of the century,
caravan transport was slow, and consequently, khat was necessarily consumed dry by those
who lived in places distant from the production areas. Very rarely is khat smoked as tobacco
or cannabis, although the ends of the twigs and leaves are sometimes crushed and rolled in
cigarettes.“

Khat has historically served the same function as such mild stimulants as kola in
West Africa"5 and coca among the indigenous people of Latin America.46 It is chewed to
reduce fatigue and sensations of hunger and thirst--the leaves are extremely bitter and this
is probably the property that relieves thirst. Contemporary chewers explain that it has always
been customary for political and religious leaders and individual to give visitors khat as a
sign of politeness,“ while individual hosts were expected to provide a handful of the leaves

to ﬁiends and guests as a sign of hospitality. Among the Oromo, births, marriages, religious

 

“ United Nations, "Khat," Bulletin on Narcotics, (1956). p. 11. Greenway, "Khat," p. 99.
‘5 Paul Lovejoy, Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade, 1 700-1900 (Zaria, 1980).

‘6 Catherine J. Allen, "To be Quechua: the symbolism of coca chewing in highland Peru,"
American Ethnologist, 8 (1981), pp. 157-171.

‘7 Burton, First Footsteps, pp. 196-197.

93

festivals were celebrated by chewing khat and on occasions such as funerals48 and naming
ceremonies, khat leaves were presented as gifts. During the popular wadaja ritual --a
ceremony of group prayer performed at times of illness, death, or calamity--large amounts
of khat are consumed by the participants.

On all of these occasions, khat is chewed until the consumer experiences a
pleasurable state of mind called mirqana so that he could participate in the activities
continuously without displaying any sign of fatigue. Small groups of farmers assemble at
various places near ﬁelds each morning to rest, converse, and chew the leaf for an hour or
two before noon. Khat chewing is always accompanied by the drinking of water or an
infusion of coffee husks or milk in order to reduce dryness of the mouth and assist the
extraction of the juice. As a rule, only male adults take khat regularly. Khat was also highly
regarded by Muslims who report that the plant was a kutamomia (that which is blessed by
God and given to men through His favor) which was chewed, especially throughout the
nights of Rhamadan."9

Khat's active ingredients are alkaloids which stimulate the central nervous system.

Experience suggests that the amount of the chemicals in the leaves varies with production

 

‘8 Andargachew Tesfaye, "The Funeral Customs of the Kottu of Hater," University College
of Addis Ababa, Ethnological Society Bulletin, 7 (1957), pp. 37-39.

‘9 Clarke Brooke, "Khat: Its production, and trade in the Middle East," Geographical Journal,
126 (160), pp. 52-53. Demissie, The Kottu, pp. 93-95. Brooke and Demissie were told by Oromo
informants more or less the same story regarding the social and religious signiﬁcance of khat in Harer
during the time of their research in the early 19505 and early 19705, respectively. Robecci-Bricchetti
also reported a similar story seventy years before Brooke. Robecci-Bricchetti, Nell 'Harrar, p. 133.

94

area and variety.50 The effect on users also varies from person to person. One consumer
suggested to me that he chewed khat not to stay awake or to get high but because he enjoys
chewing, indicating that many users are more interested in the social aspect of chewing with
friends than in the religious dimension or the simple experience of getting high. Others claim
that, contrary to the general perception that khat is a sleep repellent and appetite suppressant,
they have gone to sleep or have felt hungry and thirsty while chewing the leaves.

There is very little consensus among scientiﬁc researchers regarding the physical and
psychological effects of khat. The prevalent assumption is that khat chewing is socially and
medically hazardous. Such a conclusion does not take into account the reasons that farmers
cite as positive, including relief from hunger, fatigue and thirst, and as a remedy for hundreds
of ailments. The active ingredients in khat that have so far been isolated are cathin and
cathinone.51 The latter is said to affect the central nervous system and isolated brain tissues
in a manner analogous to the effects of amphetamine.52 Some scientists and health
professionals believe that these substances are addiction-forming drugs which, if used over

a long period of time, could lead to massive deterioration in the health of the chewer53 to

 

5° In the Harer plateau of Eastern Ethiopia, farmers claim that dimma khat grown in the
immediate vicinity of the city of Harer is more effective and quicker in inducing hilarity than the
dalotta khat grown in the far western areas of the Chercher highlands.

5‘ R. Stockrnan, "The Pharmacological action of Catha edulis and its alkaloids," Journal of
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics 35 (1913), p. 251.

’2 P. Kalix, " The pharmacology khat and of the khat alkaloid cathinone," in B. Shahandeh,
R. Geadah, A. Toungue, E. Toungue and J. Rolli, (eds), The health and socio-economic eﬂects of
khat use: Proceedings of an international conference on khat. (Lausanne, 1983), pp. 140-3; R. M.
Brenneisen, "Catha edulis Forsk. (Khat): the natural amphetamine," pp. 43-47.

’3 Abdullahi S. Elrni, "The Chewing of khat in Somalia," Journal of Ethnopharmacology 8
(1983), p. 165. H. Halbach, "Medical aspects of the chewing of khat leaves," Bulletin of the World

95

madness“ and even deaths. Others indicate that users may become psychologically
dependent but argue that it is more appropriate to speak of habituation than addiction.56
According to the United Nations Expert committee on Addiction Producing Drugs, khat
should not be classiﬁed within the accepted deﬁnitions of a narcotic or addiction producing
drug.S7 Only France and recently the United States have decided to ban the legal importation

of khat on grounds that khat is a addictive drug.58

D. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that, even though the precise time and exact place of
origin can not be speciﬁed, khat has been cultivated in the Red Sea region for several
centuries. On the Ethiopian side, particularly in central-eastem part of the country, khat has
been grown since the middle of the fourteenth-century. Nevertheless, the cultivation was not

widespread because of cultural restrictions against the uncontrolled propagation of the plant.

 

Health Organization 47 (1972), 21-29; Dr. Kervingant, "The consumption of khat in French
Somaliland," Bulletin on Narcotics, 11 (1959), p. 42.

5" J. C. Carothers. "Mirra as a cause of insanity." The East Aﬁican Medical Journal (1945),
pp. 4-6. Carothers views are often mentioned as racist and his charactrization of khat (mirra) as a
cause of insanity is questionable.

’5 R. B. Heisch, "A case of poisoning by Catha Edulis," The East African Medical Journal
(1945), pp. 7-9.

56"The Medical and social problems of khat in Djibouti," Bulletin on Narcotics (1957), 34-36;
Kervingant, "The consumption of khat in French Somaliland," p. 42; H. Halbach, "Medical aspects
of the chewing of khat leaves," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 47 (1972), 21-29; Jansen,
Spices, pp. 156-171.

57 United Nations, Bulletin on Narcotics, (1957), pp. 34-3 6.

58 The New York Times, December 14, 1995. p. A8.

96

The Hareri people believed that khat was a sacred plant given only to Muslims.
Consequently, they jealously guarded it from reaching the Oromo whom they considered
lowly and inﬁdels. It was after Harer's defeat at the battle of Chelenqo in 1887 that khat
spread on a large scale among the Oromo of Harerge. The latter phase of the spread of khat's
cultivation was assisted by the rapid pace of the islamization of the Oromo following the
domination of Harer by Christian Shewans. Hence, khat was used as a cultural marker of
political domination by the Harari and of political resistance by the Oromo.

The expansion of the culture of khat consumption is closely related to improvements
in the marketing and trading of the chewable leaves. Better transportation facilities came
with the railroad that connected Dire Dawa with Djibouti and later with the introduction of
trucking in the 19305, especially during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. The next chapter
will analyze the expansion of khat's cultivation within the context of the agrarian system, the
changing social process within and around Harerge's farming societies and strategies farmers

devised to cope with the changes.

CHAPTER THREE

The Expansion of Khat Production:

The Agrarian System, Population Growth and Production Strategies, c.1935- c.1964

In the late 19305 and early 19405, agriculture in Harerge highlands involved ﬁeld
cropping, horticulture and cultivation of perennials. The economic mainstay of the
population centered on the cultivation of sorghum, other grains, fruits, root and leguminous
crops. Coffee was the main cash crop and constituted more than half of Ethiopia's total
export until the mid-19205. Harerge's share of coffee export continued to increase in the
subsequent decade, despite high rail charges, inadequate farm-to-market transportation
systems and a lack of direct access to world markets.1 During the Italian invasion, coffee
production failed drastically, only to rise again after the liberation. International market
prices and conditions remained favorable throughout the 19405, thereby helping coffee to
dominate the export commodity sector of Harerge's economy.

In the early 19505, when coffee prices fell, production started to decline. Farmers
began to replace their coffee trees with khat.2 The latter quickly gained a sizeable market in
Harerge's urban centers as well as in Aden colony, French and British Somalilands. By the
early 19605, khat not only became a major part of the cropping system in Harerge, but also

accounted for 5.3 percent of Ethiopia's total export returns, ranking ﬁfth among all

 

' F. Santagata, L'Harar: territorio di pace e di civilitti, (Milano, 1940), pp. 33-78.

2 W. J. Darby et a1. "Khat," In Ethiopian Nutrition Survey, a survey by the interdepartmental
committee on Nutrition on National Defense, Washington DC. (1959), p. 169.

97

98

commodity groups. It furnished a large percentage of government revenue and contributed
almost ﬁfty percent of the total cash income of farming families. The khat business provided
employment for a considerable number of the inhabitants of the major urban centers. By the
early 19605, khat was an important cash crop on which farmers, traders and the government
depended for income.

This chapter seeks to analyze khat's transformation from a limited domestic crop to
a cash crop sold in local markets and, then, to the most proﬁtable export commodity. The
essential questions we pose are those the farmers, traders and consumers asked themselves.
How can I make the best use of the land that I have? What cultivation pattern and cropping
balance would enable me to provide for my family? How can I increase the yield from my
land to keep abreast with the growing number of my family? These seem to be rather simple
queries, matters of straightforward answers, but therein lies the main problem of this study.

The difﬁculty is the material needed to answer many of these questions is inadequate.
Interview materials are fragmentary, non-chronological and often silent on important issues.
Quantitative data are not available, and the few statistics that exist are notoriously inaccurate.
Administrative records are devoid of information relating to agriculture, land use patterns
and population distribution. This chapter will nonetheless attempt to extrapolate answers
from various data to the central question of khat production in Harerge. I will argue that
population growth, the expansion of rapid transport and communication facilities and the
monetization of the regional economy were responsible for the commodiﬁcation of khat.
This argument shifts emphasis from the notion that market forces alone brought about the

commodiﬁcation of khat and proposes a more balanced approach that looks at change from

99

the perspectives of production, consumption and marketing.

My analysis will begin by describing the agrarian system and by delimiting the place
of khat in that system in the late 19305 and early 19405. This will be followed by an
explanation of how the limitations on the reproductive capacity of the agrarian system led
to the expansion of khat cultivation. Then I will discuss farmers' responses to land scarcity

and explain the advantages of cultivating khat.

A. The Changing Role of Khat in the Agrarian System

When analyzing the process of khat's commodiﬁcation and the place the crop has
acquired within Harerge's agrarian system, it is essential to bear in mind two fundamental
issues regarding the plant's ecology. First, the khat plant thrives best in well-drained soils
at 5,000 to 8000 feet elevation. Situated within this elevation range the Chercher (western)
highland, the Gara Mula’ata massif and the Harerge (eastern) highland, have always been
major centers of khat production. In these regions, producers consumed nearly half of the
khat they harvest and sold the rest to urban dwellers. Except for the Hareri, most of the
consumers were ethnically and linguistically distinct from the producers and live chieﬂy in
the semi-arid Shebbelle and Awash plains. Thus, khat historically has been exchanged across
ecological ﬁontiers that have also been cultural frontiers.

Second, khat is well suited to areas where perennials and annuals also grow best.
One of the major perennials, coffee, unlike khat, is tied to world market structures and has
been an important source of foreign exchange. As the result, successive Ethiopian

governments have preferred to encourage the production of coﬁ‘ee as the main cash crop and

100

food crops for consumption over khat. From the stand point of local farmers, however, khat
is not a peculiar leaf used by a few "addicts" but an important crop in their farming system
and a commodity grown for consumption and the market. Over the last four decades,
economies of scale and returns on investments have favored khat and Harerge's highland
farmers have increasingly turned to its production on a large scale.

In the late 19305 and early 19405, Harerge's agricultural economy3 centered on the
cultivation of sorghum, which occupied greater acreage than other cultivated plants and
yielded more than the combined total of all other grains.4 The crop owed its popularity to
its adaptability to a variety of ecological conditions, the relatively simple cropping techniques
necessary for its cultivation, and its multiple utility. The grain is used as the basic food, the
stalks for animal feed and for building small structures, and the roots as fuel and the
remaining parts of the stalk and leaves were scattered on plowed ﬁelds as fertilizer.5
Relatively little of the grain was sold, since Oromo farmers preferred to store any surplus as
insurance in case of crop failure. Despite price variations and ﬂuctuations, a quintal of
sorghum during the harvest time in November and December, sold for about 7.50 birr (at the

time US $1= 2.50 birr) at the threshing ground. A month later the price could climb to 10.00

 

3 The starting point of this discussion would be Colonel Comyn-Platt's observation. In 1935,
traveling along the Harerge-Dire Dawa highway, he observed that "there were miles of cultivation
together with ﬂocks and herds that occupy a scattered population to be seen on either side. They are
the Gallas (Oromo), the best agriculturalists in the land [who] have lived and toiled in these parts, the
cradle of their birth." T. Comyn-Platt, The Abyssinian Storm (London , 1935) p. 71.

" Santagata, L'Harar, pp. 33-61.
5 L. Miller and Telahun Makonnen, Organization and Operation of Three Ethiopian Case

Farms, Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture Experiment Station Bulletin no. 35. (Dire Dawa,
1965), p. 19.

101

birr, and in June and July a quintal could be sold for 15.00 birr, with better prices in Dire
Dawa if farmers had donkey transport.6

Corn, the second-most important crop, was normally sown with sorghum in April
and May, but one fast-growing cultivar was planted in early June in gardens or in late May
with fast-maturing varieties of sorghum. In most farms, corn occupied less of the cultivated
ﬁelds and the average yield was low, probably 2 to 3 bushels per acre. In a good year, sole-
cropped corn yielded 15 to 25 bushels per acre. Because it was more productive in higher
and wetter areas than in lower and drier regions, corn yield as well as the acreage rapidly
decreased above 7,000 feet elevation. Like sorghtun, com was used for human consumption
and its stalks for animal feed, construction, fuel and fertilizer.

The association of these two crops allowed for distribution of risks and extended
availability of food and fodder. Sorghum suffered from none of the diseases which afflicted
other cultivated grasses, but was often damaged by severe frost. Corn was harvested in
October, before the frost set in, thus sparing a farming household from losing the entire
annual harvest. When, on the other hand, a drought or exceedingly heavy rains occurred,
com was damaged but sorghum survived. Furthermore, corn provided the farming household
with food at the end of the rainy season, when stored sorghum was used up. More preferred
as food, the harvested sorghum was stored for the remaining part of the year. To feed
livestock, oversown corn and sorghum ﬁelds were regularly thinned, providing daily green

fodder during the rainy season. Once dried, corn leaves rotted and disintegrated rather

 

‘5 Clarke Brooke, "The Durra Complex in the central highlands of Ethiopia," Economic
Botany, 12:2 (1978), p. 199. The research for this article was done in the early 19505 as part of the
author's dissertation ﬁeldwork.

102

quickly, thus sorghum leaves were used as fodder until the next season.7

Barley and wheat were important highland crops at elevations above approximately
7,500 feet. At lower areas, they occupied relatively small acreage, chieﬂy small ﬁelds and
in plots planted late in the sowing season after a partial failure of sorghum. As rotation
crops, barley and wheat were usually planted in June and harvested four months later in
October, a full month or two before the major sorghum harvest. In lower elevation areas,
they served as substitutes when the two coarse grains failed to yield due to soil exhaustion,
catastrophic damage to young plants or pests. Moreover, when ﬁelds were left unsown in
April and May, owing to labor scarcity, farmers put in wheat and barley in July and collected
the harvest before sorghum harvesting season.

The major leguminous crops common to all villages in the Harerge highlands were
fenugreek and beans. Their importance lay in their early maturity and low moisture
requirements. These legumes were interplanted with sorghum and corn and required no
additional labor investment in seed bed preparation, hoeing, and thinning. In most areas, two
harvests were taken between April and December. Most of the fenugreek was used in food
preparation, and beans were sold for as high as birr 15 per quintal. Very little fenugreek were
sold. In some areas, especially to the east and south of Harer, peanuts were planted with
grain sorghum and corn and much of it was sold in markets in small and major towns.

Farmers planted perennials such as coffee and khat. In the 19405, rising demand
made coffee a cash crop of choice, and the good price of those years enriched producers. In

the immediate decade before the Italian occupation, Ethiopia's coffee annual export averaged

 

7 Ibid.

103

15, 000 tons and showed a steady rise in volume, reaching 18,000, 19,000 and 20,000 tons
in 1934, 1935 and 1936, respectively. The value considerably exceeded the volume ﬁgures
obtained in those years,8 and rising prices led to increased production in Harerge, particularly
in the Chercher highlands.

The occupation years saw a precipitous decline in coffee production. In fact, there
were no export in 1938 and 1940 altogether.9 Following the liberation, coffee exports began
to rise in response to war time high prices and demand. Harer’s coffee in particular beneﬁted
from the Middle East's willingness to pay inﬂated prices. Consequently, Ethiopian coffee
export reached a total of 2 to 3 million sterling in 1944-45, and much of this came from
Harerge. War time inﬂationary prices provided farmers the incentive to increase coffee
production. The proﬁtability of the coffee business in the 19405 was so attractive that high
ranking Ethiopian government ofﬁcials, including emperor Haile Sellassie, started to engage
in it.'°

Throughout the 19405, coffee was ﬁrst in importance among the cash crops of the
Harerge highlands. In the densely populated Harer highland, it had enjoyed a similar status
in the pre-war period. During the occupation, Italian price controls discouraged the small

cultivator from increasing or even maintaining previous levels of production. In 193 8, Emilio

 

8 F0 371/53561 Cook to Bevin, May 22, 1946

9 R. Pankhurst, "A Chapter in Ethiopia's Commercial History: Developments during the
Fascist Occupation," Ethiopia Observer 14:1 (1971), p. 64.

'° A German national called Frederick Hall was employed by the emperor to operate in his
behalf. He installed a coffee cleaning machine in Harer and the factory functioned under monopoly
rights to handle all the coffee produced in the province. FO 371/80232, Reports from Harar consulate
by Major Pink, March 9, 1950.

104

Scarin reported seeing extensive ﬁelds of unharvested, ripened coffee in the vicinity of Harer.
Thousands of acres were cleared of coffee trees and planted with cereal and other crops.
Much of Hareri coffee, which constituted a signiﬁcant portion of Ethiopia's coffee exports,
came mainly from the Chercher highland.”

Before the Italian invasion, khat was a part of the cropping system of the Harerge
highlands, but it did not occupy a signiﬁcant portion of the crop ﬁelds. In Chercher, khat
was often bench-terraced and always planted on the contours, especially in the area between
Deder and Hirna.12 Christian settlers despised khat chewing and entered into sharecropping
agreements only with those farmers who rented their lands to cultivate grains. Moslem
Oromo farmers grew their own khat and sold small amounts in Harer town.'3

In the early 19405, because domestic and foreign demand remained low, farmers had
very little incentive to expand their khat plantations. Whatever little demand that existed
in urban centers was satisﬁed by the production in the Harerge highlands, not in the more
distant Chercher. One legitimate question in this regard that might be asked is why farmers
in Harerge did not revert to coffee production to participate in the expanding coffee market
of the 19405. The existence of coffee trees that are about forty years old around Harer in the
present suggests that some farmers did start planting coffee in the mid-19405. Nevertheless,
since it took at least ﬁve years for coffee trees to yield harvests, the time span of less than a

decade was not sufficient for Harerge highland farmers to have joined the coffee boom, for

 

” Scarin, Harar, p. 102
'2 FO 371/53461 Scrivener to De La Wart, March 15, 1946.

'3 Santagata, L'Harar, p. 67-68

105

the price slump started in 1951. More importantly, by the early 19505, as we shall see in the
next chapter, improvements in transportation facilities in the region had made khat a very
competitive and viable cash crop which farmers preferred to coffee.

Although coffee was planted extensively in Chercher, perennials did not occupy
large portions of acreage and labor in Harer highlands. Most farming families were inclined
toward producing food crops for household consumption, although they planted mostly tree
crops to generate cash to cover taxes, clothing and other non-farm goods. This strategy was
predicated on and worked well as long as there was enough land to which cultivation might
be extended.

By the 19405, however, arable land was not readily available. The land tenure system
that evolved over more than ﬁve decades had reduced the amount of land available for
cultivation. In the next few pages, I will discuss the limitations on maintaining the cropping
patterns presented above, analyze the various ways in which farmers responded to the
problem of land scarcity and argue that the expansion of khat cultivation in the 19405

represented the farrners' strategic response to the crisis within the agrarian system.

B. Population Grth and Land Scarcity
The province of Harer occupied an area of 259,800 square kilometers and, in 1941,
contained a population of approximately 1 million." The distribution of population was

conspicuously uneven due largely to the geographical and topographical characteristics of

 

'4 According to Santagata's estimate of 1938, Harerge's population was 1.5 million. This
ﬁgure includes the provinces of Arsi and Bale. If we subtract, the population of these provinces which
he estimated at 185,000, we will get a total population of 1.2 million. See Santagata, L'Harar, p. 92.

106

the province. The Shebbelle and the Awash plains were sparsely populated by various
pastoralist Somalis who occupied vast areas with their cattle while the Harer and, to a lesser
extent, the Chercher highlands were densely settled by agriculturalists. Thus, the
distribution of population did not relate to the potential productivity of the land. The latter
was plentiful where population densities were low, whereas labor abounded where land was
scarce. The resource imbalance worsened with natural population increases, presaging
adverse effects for the agrarian system.

Population census data are not available to undertake a quantitative analysis of the
relationship between demographic changes and agricultural production in Harerge in the
19405, but there are various estimates which could help paint a hazy picture of population
densities. An Italian study of Harerge highlands, published in 1942, puts population density
in the higher elevations at 60 persons per square kilometer and in the middle range altitudes
at 100 persons per square kilometer.l5 Italian population ﬁgures must be treated with caution
because most have tended to minimize Ethiopia's population. Compared to later estimates,
this particular Italian ﬁgure for Harer seems an obvious underestimation.

Calculating on the basis of ﬁgures obtained form the voter registration for the ﬁrst
parliamentary elections of 1956, an Ethiopian geographer, Mesfm Wolde Mariam, argued
that Harerge's rural densities were over 100 persons per square mile in some areas. This

conclusion, which the author believes is a conservative estimate, would mean that population

 

'5 Scarin, Hararino, p. 95

107

in Harerge had doubled in little more than a decade.'6 Since the Ethiopia's annual rate of
population increase in the 19405 and 19505 was only 1 percent, Harerge's population could
not have doubled in a decade.

Mesfm's projections were corroborated by estimates given by Clarke Brooke, an
American geographer who conducted ﬁeld work in Harerge in the early 19505. The study
indicated the existence of a relatively dense population on the plateau areas lying between
5500 and 8000 feet elevation. According to the researcher, Harerge's average rural
population density was 150 per square mile with local variations from 75 to 400 per square
mile. Areas estimated to be the most densely populated, i.e., greater than 150 per square
mile, were situated between approximately 5800 to 7200 feet, speciﬁcally in Karsa,
Haramaya, Gara Mula’ata, and Kombolcha districts, the vicinity of Fedis, and the areas
east of Harer as far as Kocher west of J ijjiga. The average density of rural population in the
Chercher highlands was approximately 75 per square mile. '7

Although these estimates were not based on accurate census data, they point to the
fact that Harerge's rural population had greatly increased in the ninety to hundred years
before the 19405, corresponding to the transformation of the Harer Oromo ﬁ‘om livestock
herding to sedentary agriculture. Studies in other parts of Aﬁica indicate that the impact of
a growing population density on the pattern of land use becomes apparent when population

rises to a point where farming communities enlarge their cultivated areas to the extent that

 

'6 Mesﬁn W. Mariam, "An Estimate of the Population of Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer,
1961, p. 138. Censuses taken later repeatedly conﬁrmed the accuracy of Mesﬁn's estimates.

‘7 Clarke Brooke, "The Rural Village in the Ethiopian Highlands," Geographical Review,
January, 1959, pp. 61-62.

108

there is no longer sufficient land to permit effective bush fallowing. It has been suggested
that this may be expected to occur when the density reaches 150-220.18 According to the
evidence shown above, over extensive areas of the Harerge highlands, this density was
reached in the late 19405.

In the 19405, nearly all of the Harerge Oromo were agriculturalists and occupied vast
areas of Harerge. Sedenterization put pressure on the resource base of the region, especially
on land. New lands for crop production and livestock management, once generously
sufﬁcient nearly everywhere in the highlands, were sparse in most parts of the zones
favorable for agriculture.19 There were changes in land use management, relative variations
in the size of holdings and land shortages. These changes were symptoms of high
population density, as the result of which land became more limited in relation to labor.

Aggravating the problem of land scarcity were the landholding and inheritance
systems. In chapter 1, we have seen that the allocation of land to settlers, the Orthodox
church, civilian as well as military ofﬁcials had decreased the land available to the Oromo
farmers. In the late 19305, there were an estimated 300,000 new settlers in Harerge to
whom land was assigned. It is not difﬁcult to imagine the severe strain emigration would
bring on arable land and on production levels, but additional pressure was brought on by the
land privatization scheme introduced by the restored Ethiopian government. Intent on

increasing revenue and enlarging its political constituencies, the government assigned land

 

'8 A. T. Grove, "Population Densities and Agriculture in Northern Nigeria," in K. M. Barbour
and R. M. Prothero, eds., Essays on African Population (London, 1961), pp. 115-36.

'9 Interview: Mummed Ahmed Umer, Ganda Issa, Haramaya, May 9, 1994; Hajji Mtune Kiko,
Bate, Haramaya, May 20, 1994.

109

in lieu of pensions (metoriya) to individuals who served during the war and in various
government capacities. Others, who had been previously granted government land,
converted their holdings to a free hold.”

The result was concentration of land in few hands. Whereas land had been divided
into measured (qalad or gasha) and unmeasured lands (shibetta), between 1947 and 1952,
new measurement schemes converted to qalad to hectares (1 qalad= 40 ha). According to
the new measurement, out of a total of 733,059 hectares of measured land in Harerge, there
was 537, 084 hectares of gebar land (73%), 73,110 hectares of maderia (10%), 54,131
hectares of semon (8%) and 68,734 hectares of government land (9%). A detailed analysis
of land ownership statistics shows that a total of 1,042 hectares were shared among 21percent
of the total number of land owners, with an average size of 0.0044 hectares. About 3.4
percent of the land was shared among 44% of the land owners, with an average size of less
than 40 hectares, while roughly the same number of owners, or 44.6 percent, possessed 13.4
percent of the total land. More interestingly, 25 persons alone or 0.2% of the total number
of land owners, possessed 74.6 percent of the total land (measured and unmeasured) or

1,245,915 hectares. On closer examination, one ﬁnds that 95.4 percent of the total land was

 

20Under the new system, private lands comprised several type of holdings. The main
categories included the gebar meret, land over which the holders exercised the right to transfer either
through sale or inheritance; maderia lands, originally granted by the government in lieu of salary and
recognition public service but which holders gradually converted to freehold; and the rist-gult, lands
which were generally granted to dignitaries with distinguished service to the government. Lands which
the Ethiopian Orthodox church acquired through grants and transfers were generically referred to as
semon and were held as private property. Any property which was not classiﬁed under one of the two
main categories was by deﬁnition government property.

110

owned by two individuals whose share broke down to 78.3 percent and 21.7 percent.”

Land that was previously designated as shibetta was renamed kuter geber land. This
type of land was scattered throughout Harerge province, just as were the measured hectare
lands, but the kuter geber was more typical in Harerge highlands than in Chercher, where
the average holding was considerably larger. As in the case of hectare land, quter geber was
also concentrated in few hands. An analysis of the kuter geber land in general indicates that
95.4 percent of the land owners possessed less than 1 kuter geber land, of which only 25.4
percent had an average size holding amounting to 0.5 kuter geber. A mere six people, or .01
percent of the owners, commanded close to 64.4 percent of the total kuter geber land. Of
these, one person alone had a share of about 99.3 per cent, or 63.9 per cent of the total kuter
geber land, which is held in the form of rist-gult.22

The concentration of land in the hands of few individuals had two closely related
implications for agriculture. Landlords controlled access to a non-negligible part of the
arable land, estimated as close to 25 percent of the total arable land at the time. Second, as
population increased, land scarcity became a major factor inﬂuencing farming strategies.
In most cases, absentee landlords rented out their lands under tenancy agreements which took
several forms of sharecropping. Yet, because their land properties were also a source of
fodder, timber and fuel, landlords were not always eager to employ sharecroppers. They

derived income from selling the mentioned resources, often letting local people to use them

 

2' Seleshi Wold-Tsadik, Land ownership in Harerge province, Imperial Ethiopian College of
Agriculture Experiment station Bulletin no. 47 (Dire Dawa, 1966), pp. 18-19.

22 Ibid., pp. 13-20.

111

for charges of 6 to 10 birr per cow. This two factors accounted for the diminishing size of
lands from which farming families were expected to earn subsistence.

Just as the concentration of land in a few hands limited access to land, the Oromo
inheritance system also adversely affected land use and agricultural productivity. The Oromo
were patrilineal, with property passing from fathers to sons or daughters in the extreme case.
Sons took precedence over daughters, though the latter are not entirely excluded from the
system. When a holding was to be divided, the portion received by daughters is much
smaller, often 1/ 6th than that of the sons. Normally at death, therefore, land was transferred
to the heirs of the cultivator. This was probably a residual of a communal system of
landholding that had governed the pastoralist Oromo and those who lived beyond the
administrative reach of the emirs of Harer.

In a society where population grth rate is high, a partible inheritance system
frequently results in a break up of land since the inherited land must be shared between sons
at the farmer's death. A common consequence is yield reduction which often leads to a
subsistence problem for the entire agrarian system. Historically, pre-industrial farming
societies have responded to land scarcity and the subsequent reduction in yield either by

increasing productivity or limiting the rate of population growth. 23

 

23 David Grigg, Population Growth and Agrarian Change: An historical perspective,
(Cambridge, 1980), pp. 29-47.

112

C. Farrners' Responses to Land Scarcity

In Harerge, farmers' attempted to increase productivity by augmenting the cultivated
ﬁelds through vegetation clearing or, to put it in the farrners' words, "claiming land ﬁ'om
the forest." It is probable that woodland was at one time much more extensive in the
Harerge highlands than it was in the 19405. The growth of the sedentary population with its
increasing needs for crop land, wood for structures and fuel, and the practices of unrestricted
browsing reduced the wooded areas to patches on the plateaux between 7000-8000 feet
elevation where most of the population live.”

If we take the district of Kombolcha, for instance, land clearing was a long standing
phenomenon that seems to have intensiﬁed in the 19405. Terracing and manuring were
practiced to a limited extent, but in nearly every settlement, land clearing for cultivation
purposes was in far greater evidence than the techniques of preservation. Large parts of the
hill areas and the slopes are today covered with very old terraces which are currently
abandoned or left to fallow. An examination of aerial photographs taken in the early sixties
shows that the landscape has not changed signiﬁcantly since that time, thus clearly indicating
that most of the land clearing activities in this area were completed by the early 19605. The
normal cycle of fallowing before land is recleared for cultivation ranged from ﬁfteen to forty
years. This means, land clearing started before the 19405 and signiﬁcantly reduced, if not

stopped altogether, in the early 19605.25

 

2' Brooke, "Settlements," pp. 171-172.

25 Georges Risoud, Evolution of the Peasant Agriculture in the Eastern Harerge highlands:
Development Prospects," Farming Systems Research, Alemaya University of Agriculture, Mirneo,
(Alemaya, 1987), p. 17.

113

Where vegetation clearing was not possible, farmers increased their cultivated ﬁelds
through reduction of the fallow areas. This practice was prevalent in the 19505 and was most
intensive in the regions smrounding Harer town. Studies conducted in the mid-19805 on the
farming systems of Tula and Kako, two villages north of Harer, show that, thirty years
before, fallow areas used to represent approximately 26 percent of the total arable land in the
afore-mentioned localities. In the early eighties, fallow land dropped to 10 percent of the
arable area in Kako and 22 percent in Tula. Taken together, fallow area in the two regions
fell by an average of 15 percent in forty years. The fact that the landscape has not changed
much since the early 19605 suggests that the reduction in fallow areas occurred before the
19605 when the process apparently stopped.”

Studies from other African regions show that, after the disappearance of reserve land,
further intensiﬁcation must take the form of increased inputs of manure or fertilizers, labor,
or changes in farming practices in order to keep production abreast with population increase.
But for intensiﬁcation to take place, it has been suggested that population density must reach
a critical level of 200—250 persons per square mile.27 As indicated earlier, this point was
reached in some places in Harer highlands in the 19505, but intensive cultivation was not
much in evidence there probably due to the lack of increased inputs. Manure resources fell
below the level necessary for maintaining soil fertility because of the decline in the number

of livestock caused by reduced grass fallowing. The end result was a signiﬁcant drop in

 

2° Ibid., p. 22.

” W. Allan, The African Husbandman (London, 1965). See his formulation of critical
population density.

114

production. Harerge's farmers, showing little tendency for outrnigration, resorted to
deforestation, parceling of farm lands, and farming on marginal lands. Their response to land
scarcity and declining production was extensiﬁcation of cultivation as long as land was
available 28

Intensive cultivation was limited to dry season production. Beginning in the early
19605, farmers turned to cash crops owing to their ability to irrigate their lands during dry
seasons. Dry season production was for the most part limited to the production of perennials.
In the 19605, it was not unusual to see irrigated vegetable gardens, ﬁ'uit and coffee orchards
in the vicinity of Harer, but generally irrigation was used in khat production which, as we
will see below, was more proﬁtable by any measure. Extensive use of irrigation was made
possible by water pumps which farmers were able to purchase from khat proﬁts.”

The three strategies outlined above were essentially temporary tactical responses to
a long term problem. Extensiﬁcation was an effective solution only as long as sufﬁcient
arable land existed, intensiﬁcation required inputs such as fertilizers which were not readily
available and irrigation solved farming problems only where there was enough water. To put
it simply, these strategies eased or put off the problem of land scarcity but did not eliminate
it completely. The agrarian system remained under severe demographic pressure, despite the

overall augmentation of the land area, reduction of fallowing time and some improvements

 

” Demissie G/Michael, Land Tenure in Bate, Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture
Experiment Station Bulletin No. 49, (Dire Dawa, 1966). 7-14. Central Statistical Ofﬁce. 1972,
p. 32.

” M. E Quenemoen, Darrell Watts and Yack Mosley, The Economics of Irrigation with small
pumps in the Chercher Highland, Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture Experiment Station
Bulletin, no. 58. (Dire Dawa, 1968), pp. 25-43.

115
in farming techniques.

The effective strategy proved to be the shift to high cash-income perennial crops.
Coffee never recovered its pre-World War H status as the premier cash crop in the Harerge
highlands, even under the favorable market conditions of the 19405. For the areas close to
Dire Dawa and the farming regions within 15 miles on both sides of the Harer-Dire Dawa
highway, khat was the cash crop of choice for most farmers. Increasing demand for khat
from the Horn of Aﬁica and Arabian peninsula, which will be discussed in the next chapter,
had stimulated production, but the shift to khat cultivation was one in a series of decisions
that farmers made at the farming system level in response to the limitations population
pressure imposed on the agrarian system. To substantiate this assertion we may look at two
areas where the agrarian landscape has changed completely as the result of expanded khat
cultivation. These are Tula and Kako, located about 5 miles to the north and 10 miles to the
northeast of Harer, respectively.

In Tula, khat had been under cultivation for a long time. Nineteenth and twentieth-
centuries travelers' have consistently reported observing khat ﬁelds in the district. In the early
19405, as farmers did elsewhere in Harerge, Tula farming communities devoted much of
their land to the cultivation of sorghum, corn and other grains but grew some khat for
consumption and for retail in Harer market. Interviews with elderly farmers indicate that, in

the early 19405, khat began gradually to replace the customary sorghum-maize cropping

116

 

 

 

 

 

   

2 4 6 0
’3’.“ “a,“
2 4 3 O ’, KAKO ,-
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N. .7 3030
KOMBOLCHA
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FIGURE 3
LOCATION OF TULA AND KAKO

l 1 7

pattern.30

One study shows that the cultivated land in Tula belonging to six farming families
increased by 36 percent between the time of inheritance ( 19405) and the 19805. In 1986, khat
covered 40 percent of the arable land and 68 percent of the total cultivated area. The shrub
was sole cropped on less than 10 percent of the total cultivated area, whereas it grew on 50
to 55 percent of the reclaimed hillside areas. If one considers the total ﬁeld under
cultivation, hillsides or other areas, khat is grown in association with other crops on more

than 80 percent of the planted areas."

A similar study of the cropping patterns at Tula
shows that farmers began to plant khat trees on land that used to be under food crops in the
19405. The substitution process lasted less than two decades. From the mid-19505 onwards,
Tula farmers continued to expand khat plantation but at a much slower pace and in
association with cereal and root crops.32

In Kako, the story is slightly different. According to oral information, khat was not
cultivated there on a signiﬁcant scale until the 19205. Coffee was the main cash crop,
reaching its production peak in the late 19305. A few farmers still own some coffee trees

planted by their parents, but in general, it has been replaced by khat. A study of the cropping

patterns of eleven farming households in Kako shows that the area covered by khat increased

 

3° This replacement scheme was canied out by the generation which preceded my informants
who established a family approximately ﬁfty years ago. The present informants inherited land with
some khat at the time of marriage but, rather than maintaining subsistence farming, increasingly
shifted to cultivating the more proﬁtable khat. Interview: Mumed Ahmed Umar, Ganda Issa,
Haramaya, May 9, 1994; Mussa Botto, Ganda Gole, Haramaya, May 23, 1994.

3' Herve Wibeaux, Agriculture in the Highlands of Harerge, Kombolcha area: Study of Six
Farms, Farming Systems Research, Alemaya University of Agriculture, 1986. pp. 42-44.

32 G. Risoud, Evolution of Peasant Agriculture, p. 38.

118

an average of 55 percent in a matter of a generation. At the time of inheritance or the time
the present generation established families (the 19405), khat constituted 17 percent of the
arable land belonging to the eleven families. In 1986, khat covered 23 percent of the area
under cultivation. The expansion of khat cultivation stopped in Kako from the late 19705
onwards due to the adoption of potato and vegetable crops. Khat plantation grew by 6
percent in less than three decades.33

The difference in the pace of change between Tula and Kako is a function of their
geographical location. Tula is closer to Harer, and farmers were able to make daily trips to
the main market there. After the completion of the Harer-Dire Dawa road, Tula farmers were
able to sell their khat along the highway (see chapter 5 for the purchasing methods of khat
in the 19505). The selling price was much higher on the roadside markets than in the small
local markets such as Kombolcha because the purchasers were agents of large exporters
based in Dire Dawa. The effect of Tula's geographical proximity was in evidence even in
the early 19805. 3"

The process of change in these two areas reveals some important issues in the
agrarian system. First, the evolution of the cropping patterns points to an underlying logic
that informed farmers' decisions regarding farming strategies. The intensiﬁcation of
cultivation as exempliﬁed in the development of association of crops and the increasing
emphasis on cash crops, reveal that most farming families in Harerge had a shared notion of

maintaining food self-sufficiency while enhancing the farming system's capacity to produce

 

33 Ibid., p.40.

3" Wibeaux, Agriculture of Harerghe, p. 120.

119

for the market and to maximize cash income. It also points to the importance of speedier
transportation in the development of khat plantations. It is no coincidence that, areas
emphasizing the cultivation of khat are those regions that lie on both sides of the Harer—Dire
Dawa road.35

A closer look at the agrarian system shows a general trend toward a gradual
expansion of the land committed to khat cultivation. Between 1954 and 1961, the acreage
devoted to khat production in Harerge more than doubled, from 7,400 to 17,300 acres; and
these ﬁgures presumably excluded those farms where khat was intercropped with other
staples."S As demand slowly grew for two decades after the Italians were expelled, farmers
extended their khat ﬁelds by planting the shrub on hillsides and on marginal lands where
erosion was severest. On good arable lands, where erosion was not a major problem, staple
crops were cultivated by most farming families in order to meet their household food
requirements. Photographs taken in the 19505 show that most hillsides in the districts of
Haramaya, Kombolcha, Harer and the eastern extremity of the Chercher highlands and the
entire area of the Dhengego Mountains were covered by khat trees planted on terraced
benches, while the lower plains were devoted to sorghum, corn, vegetables and grazing
ﬁelds. Such cropping patterns are evidence that, in the late 19405 and 19505, the cultivation
of khat was extended to marginal lands, not at the expense of food crops.

It is not incorrect to assume that khat was a crop which provided the technical answer

to the problem of severe land shortages which had dogged the agrarian production system

 

3’ Kombolcha, Haramaya and Hundene districts as well the Dhengego Mountain.

3" Getahun and Krikorian, "From Coffee to chat," pp. 357, 370.

120

for a long time. Derek W. A. Peters, a British Colonial Service scientist who visited khat
plantations in the Harerge region in the early 19505 explained why farmers' preferred khat
as their main cash crop. One reason was the shrub's proven ability to provide long term
yields. The scientist observed many khat ﬁelds where the main crops were obtained from
trees that were about thirty years old. Farmers also extended the productive life of khat trees
to more than seventy ﬁve years by yearly pruning and protecting them from indiscriminate
animal browsing .37

The second reason for khat's success was related to the agrarian system's labor
allocation patterns. Basically, khat needed little maintenance, taking little labor away from
other crops during the annual crop calendar. Normally, the cultivation, shoring up and
manuring of khat trees occurred during months when the farmers would be idle otherwise.
The heaviest amount of labor in khat's annual maturation cycle was, as today, guarding
against theft at night, a time farmers do not need for other productive purposes. Only the
cultivation of irrigated khat slightly overlapped with seed bed preparation, sowing and
cultivation of other crops, although the practice was not widespread in the early ﬁfties.
Where khat was irrigated, the labor loss to other crops was more than compensated for by
the extremely high price paid for the leaves during the dry season. As a commodity well

integrated into the production cycle of other crops, khat provided farming families with

 

’7 D. Peters, "Khat: Its history, botany, chemistry and toxicology," Pharmaceutical Journal,

169 (1952), p 16. Similar claims are echoed by the present generation of farmers who describe khat

as an insurance crop. They express gratitude to their fathers who planted and handed down khat ﬁelds

to them and vow to follow in the footsteps of their parents and hand down khat ﬁelds to their children.

Khat thus allowed farmers raise cash income over several generations without endangering the
subsistence requirement of the family, an almost a universal claim of my informants.

121

necessary cash income without requiring much additional labor input and without disrupting
the agricultural calendar.38

Thirdly, khat exhibited characteristics innate to a classic cash crop. It was easily sold
and often fetched high proﬁts throughout the year. In this regard, it contrasts sharply with
coffee. In the ﬁrst place, coffee prices were declining in the 19505, and the crop became less
marketable than khat. Khat held a competitive edge over coffee in providing at least two
crops a year or up to ﬁve crops if irrigation was used. In the case of coffee, a good harvest
year was followed by a year of dormancy. Put another way, an investment in coffee did not
promise an annual return every year, leaving the farmer unable to purchase non-farm
commodities.”

Research has constantly shown that farmers think that khat brings better returns on
investment than other crops. Two studies canied out in the early and late 19605 have shown
that khat accounted for 30-50 percent of the total annual family cash income and 40-60
percent of the total value of family's home-produced foods. The study of the latter period was
done in a district where khat trees occupied only 13 percent of the cultivated land. When
asked what revenue they received from one khat tree, farmers have told researchers that they

earned at least birr 10.00 yearly, as compared to birr 1.00 from coffee."o My informant Hajji

 

3” For annual cropping calendar and labor usage pattern, see C. Langlais, M. Weill and H.
Wibeaux, Farming Systems Research: preliminary report and ﬁiture programme, Alemaya University
of Agriculture , Mimeo., May 1984, appendix. Additional information obtained from: Informants:
Mumed Ahmed Umar, May 12, 1994, Ganda Issa, Haramaya; Abdullahi Ahmed, Ganda Issa,
Haramaya, May 10, 1994. ; Mumed Munan, Ganda Lucha, Haramaya, May 07, 1994.

39 Interview: Abdulhafez Yusuf, Gand Lucha, Haramaya, May 5, 1994.

4° Getahun and Krikorian, "Chat from Ethiopia," p . 357; Tilahun and Miller, Organization
and Operations, p.

122

Abdi Baker has responded to a similar question in the following way."I

Q: How much coffee and how much khat can you collect from one tree of each?
Hajji Abdi: In the best year you could harvest 5 kg of coffee and 1 kg of khat.

Q: and for how much can you sell 1 kg of each?

Hajji Abdi: When prices are good, we sold 1 kg of coffee for birr 10 and 1 kg
of uratta khat for birr 500.

Q: So it is more proﬁtable to plant khat?

Hajji Abdi: Ohhhh! you are comparing a slave to a free man, to tell you the
truth. Coffee is slavery, khat is freedom. Look, if we harvest coffee this time
of the year, we can come back to it only next year or two years from now.
What is the coffee farmer to do in the interim; eat the earth? The khat farmer
can harvest every month. Coffee is useless. Our fathers cultivated coffee
because, in their days, there was no foreign market for khat, and they all died

of lice (they were destitute). None of them had even a shirt. We, their sons
live like ferenjis (foreigners).

The fourth advantage of cultivating khat was the shrub's adaptability to a wide range
of soil conditions and rainfall areas. Peters found that khat was cultivated on terraced
hillsides, interspersed with coffee trees. On lands that sloped rather gradually, khat was
intercropped with sorghum, meaning that, in the late forties and early ﬁfties, khat did not
compete for land with food crops, because it was cultivated on marginal lands where major
grains did not do well on them. Intercropping, therefore, allowed for a more productive
land use management in a way consistent with the overall farming strategy of maximizing
cash income while maintaining food self-suﬁiciency."2

Finally, khat had a remarkable capacity to resist diseases and drought. Peters

 

4' Interview: Hajji Abdi Baker, Ganda Lucha, Haramaya, April 4, 1994.

‘2 Interview: Ahmed Amit, Ganda Gole, Haramaya, May 5, 1994; Khalifa Hajji Ali Boru,
Ganda Lucha, Haramaya, May 6, 1994; Ganda Lucha, Haramaya.

123

observed that the trees relied entirely on rainfall, since the use of irrigation was quite
minimal. For khat, the incidence of rain in one season rather than the amount of the annual
rainfall was the important element for success. In times of protracted droughts, farmers
usually removed all leaves on the khat plant as a measure against excessive transpiration and
induced the plant to dormancy until the rains came back. Moreover, Peters observed that no
disease appeared to afﬂict the khat tree, even when the adjacent coffee trees were seen

dying."3

D. Conclusion

Under most circumstances, an expansion of cash crop cultivation is explained in
terms of demand and marketability. The ability to reach distant consumers might well have
been key to the rapid expansion of khat cultivation and marketing, but focusing on market-
based explanations alone may be ignoring the rationale of production that motivates farmers
at the farm level. Agricultural change is not necessarily a function of forces independent
from the farm ﬁeld. Farmers' decision to shift to a new cash crop must be seen within the
context of the advantages and opportunities the new crop offers to improve the agrarian
system's reproductive capacity.

Yet, this assertion should not be misconstrued to mean that external forces do not

play any role. No producer will produce a commodity for which there is no demand.

 

'3 Peters, "Khat," p. 16. The disease resistant nature of khat became even more important
after a coffee berry disease (CBD) swept through much of East Aﬁica in the 197 05. Whereas most
coffee trees died, nothing happened to khat. Interviews: Dejene Ayele, Harer, Coffee Processing
Expert, March 4, 1994; Te'ame Tiku, Harer, Coffee Protection Expert. Harer, March 4, 1994; Debebe
Assefa, Agricultural Extension Expert, Harer, March 4, 1994.

124

F arrners make the choice of what kind of crop they should plant at any particular time based
on the realities of the farming system. Demand is not the only factor, but one among many,
that inﬂuences the decision-making process. Therefore, the argument about the expansion
of production must be presented in conjunction with an argument about change in the scope
and pattern of consumption which led to more demand that stimulated production. In the next

chapter, I will discuss the spread of the culture of khat chewing in the Horn of Africa region.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Political Economy of Khat Consumption, c.1935- c.1964

Khat has been consumed in the Red Sea region for at least a millennium and in some
parts of Ethiopia (including Harerge - the focus of this study) for at least 700 years. At this
early stage, it was produced mainly for household consumption, for gift or expression of
hospitality, for alertness and for conviviality at religious and social occasions. It is likely
that some quantity was used for barter in small regional markets. The majority of users
have been Muslims who, for religious reasons eschewed alcohol, and chewed khat to stay
alert during long nights of prayer. The area of consumption was determined by the
perishability of the leaves, which lost their desirable properties if transported for more than
two days. The leaves were safely transported by donkeys and human porters to a distance
of ﬁfty miles or so from the production areas, which effectively became the radius within
which they were consumed. In the absence of rapid means of delivery, the stimulant was
used and appreciated by well-off people and those who produced it for their consumption
until, in the twentieth-century, modern transportation made it easier to move khat over
greater distances.

The recent increase in khat consumption is the result in part of improved
transportation systems which had gradually expanded since the turn of the century. Rapid
transport facilitated the delivery of ﬂesh khat and consequently increased demand in the
Horn of Aﬁica. This chapter will attempt to account for the emergence of khat as the most

desired stimulant in that region by analyzing the socio-econorrric changes which the societies

125

126

in Northern Somalia, Djibouti and Eastern Ethiopia experienced since the 19305.

The analysis begins with a discussion of construction of road networks and beginning
of commercial trucking which facilitated the delivery of fresh khat to areas where it had not
been available before. Then it outlines the spread of khat consumption within and outside
Ethiopia, shifts to discussing the economic implications of and government reactions to a
fast growing consumption and concludes by detailing the struggle to control the lucrative

khat industry.

A. Developments in Transport Infrastructure

Until the Italian occupation, Harerge's agricultural highlands had not been effectively
connected with the main transit town of the region, Dire Dawa. The Harer-Dire Dawa road
was initially paved in the 18905 for wheeled cart operation, but gullied by ﬂoods, it remained
virtually impassable and unutilized by motor trafﬁc until the 19405, and no commercial
vehicles operated between Harer and Dire Dawa. The unirnpressive performance of the Dire
Dawa-Djibouti railway, which has been discussed in chapter 1, was arguably due to the lack
of a modern transportation infrastructure which connected the production areas of Harerge
with the railroad terminus and the major market center.

The lack of transport was particularly detrimental to khat trade. Djibouti was
privileged to receive train-delivered khat, although transporting the leaves to Dire Dawa was
still a problem. The main towns in the Ogaden lowlands did not receive fresh khat until they
were connected, in the 19305, by motorable tracks to the production areas. Consumers in

J ijj iga, whose location was not remote from production areas, received some fresh khat from

127

such areas as Gursum and the environs of Harer town. One of the areas which later became
a major khat consumption center, British Somaliland, also remained out of reach except for
a few border towns such as Tugochale, Teferi Beri, and Awkelef.l

This situation began to change during the Italian invasion. The fascists wasted no
time in initiating their program to make the new colony economically productive and
attractive for settlement. The most spectacular achievement was the road construction
project. Ethiopia's road system consisted of only 35 miles of all-weather road in 1935. In
only ﬁve years, the Italians built 4, 347 miles of roads, of which 2,145 miles were hard
surfaced. Harerge was given special attention in the Italian public works program Improved
earth roads were built from Addis Ababa through Awash and Dire Dawa to Djibouti, and
from Dire Dawa through Harer to Jijjiga and to Hargessa in British Somaliland. Secondary
roads were extended to small towns of the province with a network of roads that connected
Asba Teferi, Kombolcha and Grawa to the main highway. An all-weather road connecting
with the Harer-Dire Dawa highway was constructed through the highlands, affording Karsa,
Kulubi, and Dadar access to the major communication routes.2

These roads interlinked various khat-producing areas with the major distribution
centers of Harer, Dire Dawa and Jijjiga where farmers sold the stimulant to traders who
distributed it throughout the province and to neighboring countries. The linking of Hargessa

with Jijjiga and the Harerge highlands had signiﬁcant implications for the consumption of

 

lInterview: Hajji Mohammed Abdurahman , Dire Dawa, 03-26-94; Hajji Dawud Abdo, Dire
Dawa, 03-26-94.

2 M Perharn, The Government of Ethiopia, (London, 1969), p. 182. J. Barker, "Developments
in Ethiopia's Road System," Geography 59:2 (1974), p. 150.

128

khat, which now reached Djibouti within forty-eight hours of harvest with the freshness and
potency of the stimulant intact. In the next pages, we will consider the process of the

expansion of consumption in the Horn of Aﬁica beginning with the British Somaliland.

B. The Spread of Consumption in Horn of Aﬁica and Arabian Peninsula

Before the 19305, khat consumption in British Somaliland was insigniﬁcant. In
Hargessa, the main town of the Protectorate, there was reportedly only one person who was
known to chew khat. During World War II, khat consumption not only increased in the
border towns but also extended deep into the protectorate including Hargessa, despite the ban
on khat importation since 1921.3 Two interrelated developments were critical for the
expansion of khat consumption: the connection of the Protectorate with the khat production
areas of the Harerge highlands by modern transportation and the migration of a considerable
number of Somali pastoralists to urban centers.

By the 19305, Somaliland had not seen much economic restructuring in the
pastoralist sector after more than half a century of British colonial rule. In the inter-war
years, roads were improved and maintained through the use of convict labor and paupers.
The roads permitted quicker transport by trucks for Somali mutton and goat skins that were

particularly prized in Europe and United States for women's gloves and luxury leather

 

3 One study based on extensive research data claims that there was only one khat chewer in
Hargessa in 1934. The person is identiﬁed by name, and it is reported that authorities allowed him to
import khat from Jijjiga. The claim may be exaggerated, since there is no evidence that could
corroborate the oral information. Nevertheless, it points to the limited level of khat consumption in
Hargessa before the Italian invasion. Abdulahi Sheikh Elmi, "Khat: history, spreading and problems
in Somalia," in Thomas Labahn, ed., Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali
Studies, (Hamburg, 1984), p. 274.

129

goods.4

Between August 1940 and March 1941, the Somaliland Protectorate fell under Italian
occupation. The interlude created additional trans-frontier trade opportunities for Somali
traders in the area of supplying foodstuffs for the protectorate's townships which had suﬂ‘ered
severe food shortages due to British coastal blockade. The pastoralist areas faced less
privation owing to a couple of years of above-average rainfall, but the herders experienced
an acute shortage of clothes. Somali traders took advantage of supplying both needs,
especially after several expatriate traders abandoned their shops and ﬂed the protectorate for
good shortly after the Italians arrived. The Somali's trading ventures were facilitated by the
roads the Italians built, and trans-frontier trade increased dramatically, especially after the
British occupation of Ethiopia.5

When the Italians occupied Jijjiga every small Somali trader who could obtain
transport, rushed goods there and sold them to the fascist troops at enormous proﬁts. Within
a year, many traders were taking caravans across the border and doing very well. Traders
purchased motor vehicles: the number imported into the protectorate jumped from six
private cars and forty-nine commercial trucks in 1933, to sixteen private and two-hundred
thirty lorries in 1937. During the same year, a total of 51 commercial and 316 private
vehicles were licensed to operate, and no less than 600 Somalis were directly engaged in the

operation as drivers and mechanics. Before 1940, most of these operations were conducted

 

‘ Abdi Ismail Sarnatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986,
(Madison, 1989), pp. 22-57

5 Somaliland Protectorate Annual Report, 1936 (London, 193 7), p. 27

130

by the more experienced Indian ﬁrms, but no less than 150 trucks were owned by Somalis
who in many instances sold the bulk of their livestock to invest in motor vehicles. The
Bedford, Dodge and Chevrolet trucks participated in running proﬁtable enterprises which
transported skins, live sheep and goats to Berbera and brought back mail, merchandise,
foodstuffs and passengers. By 1942, itinerant Somali traders were present in virtually every
village and in the vicinity of livestock markets where they bartered tea, cloth, dates, rise, and
sugar to the pastoralists in the Hand and the Ogaden.“

By 1940, Somalis who beneﬁtted from the brisk business used their money to
acquire plots in Hargessa and build residential houses and business shops. Restaurant and
bars started to cater to Somalis who had taken advantage of employment opportunities and
had become government clerks, interpreters, teachers and petition-writers. For young Somali
males, the business enterprises and occupational alternatives offered escape from the
hardships pastoral life.7

As Somalis moved to townships, they formed social clubs and self-help societies
whose membership consisted of the new intelligentsia. Their goal was to promote interest
in secular education, to exhort Somalis to overcome clan divisiveness in the name of Islamic
unity and to seek appropriate privileges for civil servants. Over time, traders, coffee shop
owners, personal servants of British officials, truck drivers, and the foreign educated elite

began to develop new interests and aspirations. They subscribed to the ideal of a united and

 

6 Ibid, p. 28

7 Charles L. Geshekter, "Anti-colonialism and class formation: the eastern Horn of Africa,
1920-1950," Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies (Hamburg, 1983),
p. 242.

131
independent Somalia.

In their clubs, the intelligentsia discussed politics and began to chew khat. Young
men began to participate in regular afternoon chew sessions. Truck drivers carrying goods
and passengers to and from towns as far west as J ijjiga, near the khat-producing Harerge
highlands, began to rely on khat to stay awake during long trips and transported fresh sprigs
on their return trip, thus making fresh khat readily available to town dwellers. Pastoralists
who recently settled in towns fought the boredom of town life by socializing at chew
sessions. As the number of consumers increased, the amount of imported khat grew
dramatically in a short time. In 1928, approximately 750 bundles were imported into the
protectorate and by 1936 the "known" amount had increased ﬁve fold to 4000.8 Much of
the khat need in the protectorate was met by smugglers who now had the beneﬁt of speed as
against the pre-war experiences of camel transportation, but the amount of smuggled khat
is unknown.

In the post WWII nationalist atmosphere, chewing became especially popular among
small groups of poets, whose poetry emphasized social solidarity, community of purpose
and political matters. Chewing khat for hours quickly acquired symbolic signiﬁcance of
solidarity and resistance in a period of heightened aspiration for independence and self-rule.
The custom of chewing together from a common bundle of twigs came to represent an
important ritual of friendship, mutual trust and social cohesion. Pastoralist Somalis who

previously associated the poets with Europeans because of their western manners and styles

 

8 Somaliland Protectorate annual Report, 1930. (London, 1931), p. 17; and Somaliland
Protectorate Annual Report, 1936 (London, 1937), p. 13.

132

came to view these poets as wise counselors of the youth. In 1948, concerned by the
association of chewing with politics and the effect of smuggling on the protectorate's
economy, the British Administration tried to proscribe khat importation through tighter
control measures. The effort back-ﬁred, and more and more Somalis started consumption
as chewing became symbolic of one's reﬁrsal to accept colonial authority. The law was later
rescinded, but khat chewing became an expression of the aspiration for independence as long
as the British stayed there?

Started in such a manner, khat chewing remained a social habit for most Somalis
until the 19805. Urban consumption of khat continued to rise throughout the 19605 and
19705. Its trade was so lucrative that farmers who had left rural areas for urban centers began
to return to the cultivation of khat ﬁ'om the mid-sixties onwards. As the income earning
power of khat became increasingly known in the late seventies, even members of the urban
elite, such as merchants and government officials, moved back to rural areas to proﬁt from
the new found "rrriracle" crop. Khat consumption remained widespread until 1983, when the
government of Siad Barre banned its production and importation in 1983.'0

In the post-WW 11 period, the French colony of Afars and Issas or Djibouti also
came to import a signiﬁcant quantity of Harerge's khat. Khat had been consumed there since
the creation of the port in the late nineteenth century. The initial khat chewers in Djibouti

were mostly Yemeni Arabs who, from the founding of the port, constituted a substantial

 

9 Geshekter, "Anti-colonial," p. 245.

‘0 Abdi I. Samatar, "The predatory state and the peasantry: Reﬂections on rural development
policy in Somalia," Aﬁica Today, 3rd Quarter (1985), pp. 50-52.

133

element of the city's population. They traded proﬁtably in slaves and ﬁrearms at Obock and
Tadjoura before Europeans installed themselves along the Red Sea coast in the late
nineteenth-century. When the French transferred their capital from Obock to Djibouti in
1896, the Arab communities followed and, in a short time, accumulated large fortunes
through trading and investing in urban real estate. New immigrants, mainly from Yemen,
also became prosperous through hard-work, thrift and self-deprivation and added to the
already numerically substantial Arab community.

For Yemeni Arabs, khat chewing had been a long-standing and widespread cultural
practice over many centuries. When they emigrated to other places, Yemenis took the
custom to their destinations." While it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a concrete evidence that the
Yemeni were the original khat users in Djibouti, there is ample indication that khat was the
only luxury common to Yemeni real estate owners, retail shop vendors, and manual laborers.
In the context of Djibouti's hot climate and Islamic prohibition of alcoholic consumption,
most well-off Arabs were willing to spend a considerable amount of money on this rare
commodity. Over time, khat chewing spread to Djibouti's Afars, Issas and the Somali
residents. In the French territory, Arabs were culturally inﬂuential. The African
population viewed them as Allah's chosen people and their tongue as the sacred language of

the Quran, and adopted Arabic manners, one of which was khat chewing.12 By the 19405,

 

” Yemeni Jews who migrated to Israel after 1948, have continued to consume khat and have
cultivated the tree there. Lany Derﬁrer, "High on Gat: Gat chewing, an old Yemenite custom, is
making a mark on Israeli Society," The Jerusalem Post, International edition. November 16, 1996.
pp. 16-17.

'2 Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, (Stanford, 1968),
p. 32. The authors provide further description of Arabic inﬂuence among the native population of
Djibouti. pp. 31-33.

134

most accounts claim that chewing was an ubiquitous ritual practiced by the majority of the
city's residents.

In the years before the completion of the Djibouti-Dire Dawa railway, Yemen
probably supplied much of Djibouti's khat needs because a dhow ﬁ'om Aden was capable
of conveying fresh khat more quickly than carnel-delivered produce from Harerge highlands.
After the arrival of the railway to Dire Dawa, Harer khat was made available in the Djibouti
market in greater quantity. No data is available to show the number of chewers in Djibouti,
but the import statistics indicate that consumption had been rising steadily ever since fresh
khat began to be imported from Harerge. (See Table 1 and 2 ).

In the 19505, Djibouti and British Somaliland; though unofﬁcially, imported
signiﬁcant amounts, but Aden Colony was by far the largest importer of Harerge's khat.
Since the evidence on khat consumption in Southwestern Arabia is inconclusive and
conﬂicting, it is neither possible nor necessary to pinpoint the begirming of chewing in
Aden. Most experts believe that Southwestern Arabia was the original place where khat
chewing started and written records suggest that khat was chewed in Yemen in the
fourteenth-century.l3 By the sixteenth-century, khat chewing seems to have become
established in the highlands of Yemen and the legitimacy of consuming the stimulant was

14

under debate among Muslim scholars who visited or lived there. The Danish explorer,

Niebuhr, reported that, during his journey through Yemen in 1762, the locals were chewing

 

‘3 See for example, Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, chapter, 111; and Weir, Qat
Consumption and social change, pp. 71-101.

” Daniel Martin Varisco, "On the Meaning of Chewing: The Signiﬁcance of Qat in the
Yemen Arab Republic," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 18 (1986), p. 3.

135
khat continually.

During the early days of British rule, there was considerable trade from north Yemen
to Aden. In 1844, a small number of sellers were licensed by the Govemment to bring khat
from the Yemen and distribute it in the port city. Khat prices were exceptionally high, and
often increased by as much as 1000 percent between the farm and market, because of the
fact that a few merchants controlled the supply systems and dictated prices on consumers and
producers. The elite and lower classes of the Aden populace consumed diﬂerent varieties
of khat brought into the city from different production areas in the interior. In the late 18605,
khat imports accounted for 6 percent of the total value of overland imports to Aden.”

Khat consumption in Aden soared with the economic recovery and improvements in
transportation facilities after World War II. The rise is also attributable to the great increase
in the population of the Colony with massive immigration of Yemenis from the south of
Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. In the 19505, the port city of Aden had a cosmopolitan
population of about 140,000, of which 75 percent was Arabs of north Yemeni origin--
individuals who had left their homelands either in search of employment, or to escape the
repressive government of the Irnams for the relatively politically free Aden. In 1956, the
Arabs, along with the Somali, who constituted about 8 percent of the population, consumed
nearly 4 million pounds of khat.l6

Another area of expanding khat consumption was the Harerge lowlands. As we have

seen, the culture of chewing spread among the highland Oromo farmers only in the early

 

'5 R. J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, 1838-1967, (London, 1975), pp. 58, 121.

'6 Weir, Qat in Yemen, p. 171 fn 4; Gavin, Aden, p. 445, App. B.

136

decades of the twentieth century. Whereas we ﬁnd that khat was used in rural areas to
generate energy to do farm labor, in urban centers, it remained mainly a leisure habit. In
Harer town, khat chewing has been commonplace, at least since the early twentieth century,
and came to be considered as a mark of being ya harer lij (one who's from Harer). In other
highland towns, khat consumption grew with the development of essentially "peasant towns."
Khat farmers migrated to small villages located along the Harer-Dire Dawa highway to start
up new businesses. In the process, the villages grew to towns and served as market centers.
In the 19505, as we will see in chapter 6, quite a few farmers left their holdings for urban
centers in order to make room for landless relatives. Former farmers in Haramaya and
AwWoday considered chewing khat as an indispensable ritual.l7

Spurring the growing consumption in Harerge lowlands was the establishment of
modern institutions with salaried civil servants after 1941. Ever since the annexation of
Harerge, the government structure had been staffed by the Christian "Amhara" and remained
so throughout the existence of the imperial regime. These officials were initially disdainful
of khat chewing as a form of entertainment, preferring to spend their leisure time drinking
local ale (Tela) and honey wine (Tej).l8 The alcoholic beverages were, however, not a
suitable entertainment to the hot towns of the lowlands and hard to ﬁnd in the Ogaden,
where the only available stimulant was khat. The local residents of these towns spent the hot
afternoons chewing khat and socializing and the civil servants followed suit. Thus, khat

chewing spread to the Christian "Amhara" population in Harerge as a pastime habit, quite

 

'7 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the justiﬁcations for khat chewing.

’8 Interview: Avidas Tarzian, Addis Ababa, August 8, 1994.

137

distinct from its long time cultural and religious signiﬁcance for Muslims.”

In order fully to understand the spread of the culture of chewing, it is necessary to
conduct an in-depth research in the entire Horn region with the view to study the changing
cultural meanings that khat use may have acquired. From the vantage point of a researcher
on the production side, it appears that the ability to reach consumers with rapidity and a
general cultural change have been factors which were responsible for the expansion of
consumption. I have attempted to demonstrate how improvements in transportation and a
consequent urbanization led to a dramatic rise in consumption in Djibouti and British
Somaliland. In this section we will turn to the activities which linked producers and

consumers, i.e., the marketing and trading of khat.

C. Structures of Khat Marketing

In the realm of marketing, the physical properties of the commodity cany more
weight in determining value than the state of demand and supply or issues of cultural change
which were germane to the discussion of the production and consumption aspects. Khat has
a very short "shelf life." In this regard, khat is unlike other psychoactive substances. For
example, kola nuts were consumed in substantial quantities throughout West Aﬁica,
especially in Muslim areas, before the advent of modern transportation in the region. The
perishability of the nuts determined the limits of its trade, but kola retained its properties

much longer than khat. Carefully packaged nuts were transported a thousand kilometers by

 

‘9 Interview: Balamberas Ahmed Tewﬁq Mohammed, Harer, Feb. 23, 1994; Getahun and
Krikorian, "Chat, coffee's rival," p. 374.

138

animal caravans, suggesting that the nuts stayed intact for at least three months.” The active
in khat ingredients which stimulate chewers seem to disappear quickly once the twigs and
leaves are cut. For this reason, most users prefer khat that has been harvested within the
previous forty-eight hours. The marketing of khat increased after the 19405, owing to
improvements in transportation inﬁastructure and increased demand and market for khat.
Within Harerge province, before the advent of trucking, Dire Dawa was the main
market center of commercial khat before the Italian road building connected the town with
the khat producing areas. In those days, farmers are said to harvest khat around 6 pm. and
set out on foot the same night with headloads or donkeyloads of the leaf to reach the market
in Dire Dawa early in the morning. At the town's market place, called chat terra, khat was
sold and then processed by the exporter's employees, who plucked off the leathery leaves,
trimmed the long stems and expertly packed the good khat into handful-size bunches called
akara. The bunches were then wrapped in banana leaves which helped to retain the khat's
natural moisture and freshness and then taken to the train station for shipment to Djibouti.
Farmers who reached Dire Dawa late found themselves obliged to sell their khat at very low
prices to local chewers. Since khat could not be stored for the next market day, the farmers
were usually left with no alternative but to sell their khat at whatever price the purchasers

offered. For this reason, farmers describe the khat market before the Italians as

 

” Paul Lovejoy, "Kola Nuts: The 'Coffee' of the Central Sudan," In eds.. Jordan Goodman,
Paul E. Lovejoy and Andrew Sherratt, Consuming Habits: Drugs in History and Anthropology,
(London, 1995), p. 105.

139
discouraging.”

The khat market in J ijjiga was twice the distance to Dire Dawa ﬁ'om the production
areas. Merchants purchased khat in the town and dispatched it by camels in two directions.
The ﬁrst route headed for the towns in the Ogaden and the second went further east to border
towns within the then British Somaliland?2 Since its import was banned, demand was met
through regular smuggling from Harerge. Because there is no record of transactions
conducted outside the legal realm, it is almost impossible to put ﬁgures on the amount of
khat that entered Somalia through illegal channels. For the period after legalization,
however, we can extrapolate from the income statistics of the Somaliland Protectorate,
which, in 1959, collected an average monthly revenue of $ 14,000 in khat import taxes.23
An Ethiopian government record shows that Somalia levied import taxes at a rate of US
$1.00 per kilo gram, suggesting that as much as 168 tons of khat was annually imported
from Harerge into the Protectorate in the late 19505.

After the war, Djibouti's khat import also increased signiﬁcantly, mainly due to the
improved Harer-Dire Dawa road and the increased utilization of automobiles for
transportation (see Table 2). The new means of transportation enabled farmers to transport
khat to the Dire Dawa market place and return home in a matter of hours and traders to

purchase fresh khat, which they dispatched by night train to Djibouti for next morning

 

” Interview: Ahmed Amit, Ganda Gole, Haramaya, May 5, 1994; Yusuf Harnmo, Haramaya,
May 17, 1994.

22 Interview: Mussa Botto, Ganda Gole, Haramaya, May 23, 1994; Rayirna Sali, Ganda Gole,
Haramaya, May 23, 1994.

23 Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 57.

140

consumption.” This pattern of delivery proceeded until 1949, when air transportation
between Dire Dawa and Djibouti started.

A plane daily brought 600 kilogram of khat to Djibouti, most of which was consumed
there with small quantities delivered to a few villages near the city which could be quickly
reached by road. Within a short time, the imported amount nearly doubled while its value
tripled. In 1952, imports reached a level of approximately 21,900 kilogram per month (750
kg per day). According to government estimates, an additional 10 percent of the official
ﬁgure was smuggled into the country, bringing the total to approximately 23,000 kg per
month. This amount was consumed by the city's khat users.

Khat arrived in Djibouti in bunches weighing 280 grams each. In 1952, a total of
85,000 bunches arrived daily, corresponding to the total amount given in kilograms. Except
for a slight drop in 1954, khat imports into Djibouti rose generally steadily throughout the
19505. Imports rose sharply in 195 3, coinciding with the increments in the total wages paid
out to workers. Apparently, the ﬂuctuation in import ﬁgures was attributable to the
availability of money rather than a decline in the number of people who consumed khat.
Statistics from Djibouti show a general upward swing in khat imports, reaching 410.2 tons

in 1957, costing Djiboutians 328,160,000 DF or 1.5 million dollars.”

 

2" Interview: Yasin Usman, Dire Dawa, February 20, 1994; Duressa Feyissa, Dire Dawa,
February 24, 1994.

25 Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 55.

141

TABLE 2: French Somaliland (Djibouti): Khat Imports, 1952-1957

 

 

Year Volume (tons) Value (in'000 dollars)
1952 230.4 649.7
1953 281.3 794.7
1954 263.7 805.6
1955 302.5 974.1
1956 314.2 1,180.6
1957 410.2 1,542.4

 

Source: Adopted from, Brooke,"Khat in the Middle East," p. 55.

Khat was very expensive in Djibouti. This fact is more apparent when seen in the
context of the port city's population and khat prices at retail levels. The small bundles were
bought ﬁ'om the Ethiopian producer for 20 DF and sold to the consumer at almost 200 DF,
a rise of 900 percent. Statistics ﬁom the early 19505 show that Djiboutians paid almost 14.5
million DF ($68,103) every month. This translates to an annual expenditure of DF
172,800,000 ($812,160) for a population of 18,000, including women and children. A
calculation on the basis of the 1953 ﬁgure, which could be taken as an average ﬁgure, would
indicate that the average per capita expenditure on khat was 9,600 DF ($45).26 This amount
of expenditure was certainly high for a country where the minimum wage reached 35 DF
only in 1966, after a combined increase of 34 percent in eight years.”

In 1956, Djibouti's expenditure on khat reached twice the amount of 1953. The per

 

” Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, p. 164. Anonymous, "Medical and social problems," p.
35; Cf. Kervingnat, "The consumption of khat in French Somaliland," p. 42.

” The minimum wage was raised 5 percent in 1958, 8 percent in 1961, 6 percent in 1963, 5
percent in 1964, and 10 percent in 1966. Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, p. 218.

142

capita consumption for that year was approximately 38 lbs, representing an estimated retail
expenditure equivalent to $ 87 per person. A year later these ﬁgures rose to a per capita
consumption of 50 lbs, at a per capita cost of $95 or $ 1.7 million for the total population.
This was a staggering Stun for a population barely over 20,000 and whose wage levels were
low. One way of getting a sense of what the population spent on khat is to compare it with
expenditure on food, 8,000 DF compared to 9,600 DF for khat. It can be estimated that a
wage earner spent at least 40 percent of his income on the stimulant.”

Djibouti was not the only place where khat market increased with of the introduction
of air transportation. With regular air cargo service, Aden Colony became the major market
for Ethiopian khat, ninety ﬁve percent of which came from Harerge. Before October 1949,
nearly all of the khat consumed in the Colony was imported from the Yemen Protectorate.
As the sole supplier, Yemen's export to Aden had risen from 280.4 tons in 1935 to 1097.8
tons in 1949. Perhaps owing to better taste or stirnulative capacity, air-transported Ethiopian
khat quickly gained consumer preference in Aden and came to enjoy a far greater market than
was ever reached by the Yemeni variety.” In a little more than a year after the initial

shipment, Ethiopia displaced Yemen as the leading exporter, and the relative position of

 

” The ﬁgures in the text are my own calculations based on data obtained ﬁ'om the following
articles. The value of khat were given in Djibouti francs and were converted, where necessary, to US$
based on the 19505 rate: DF 100 = $ 0.47. Anonymous, "The medical and social problems," p. 35.
A 1956 survey had suggested that Issa and Afar wage earners spent about half of their monthly pay
for the purchase of khat. Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, p. 215.

” It is difﬁcult to pin down the reason for the popularity of Ethiopian khat, besides
speculating that preference had much to do with the stimulating quality of the chewable leaves. Khat's
quality varies with different conditions of climate, soil, elevation and cultivation techniques and it is
perhaps a combination of all of these that may account for the overwhelming preference for Ethiopian
khat in Aden.

143

Yemen in the Aden market thereafter declined. In 1956, Aden imported 1502.3 tons of
Ethiopian khat at a cost of 4.6 million dollars, as compared to 216.4 tons ﬁ'om Yemen

valued at 793,000 dollars or 12.5 percent of the total khat imports.

TABLE 3: Aden Colony: Khat Imports, 1947-57

 

 

From Ethiopia From Yemen Average unit

Year metric tons '000 dollars metric tons '000 dollars value in $
1947 - - 819.7 271.6 16.8
1948 - - 972.6 319.2 16.8
1949 NA - 1097.8 481.6 22.4
1950 311.1 227.6 721.4 527.6 38.0
1951 1113.1 1037.4 418.0 385.8 45.3
1952 1257.0 1074.1 412.8 349.3 42.2
1953 1481.4 1925.9 545.9 694.4 64.6
1954 1494.5 3198.3 481.4 1062.0 110.3
1955 1211.6 3731.9 248.2 764.5 156.8
1956 1502.3 4627.2 216.4 792.6 156.8
1957 235.8 726.4 170.6 525.4 156.8

 

Source: Adopted from Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 56. The 1957 ﬁgures
recorded only to April 1, the date Ethiopian khat was banned in Aden Colony.

Export ﬁgures show that the amount of khat imported into Aden doubled in less than
a decade. Khat imports which were 819.7 (all from Yemen) in 1947, reached 1,502.3 tons
in 1956. The increase in value was twenty times greater in 1956 than in 1947. Calculated
on the basis of the city's population, estimated to be 140,000 in 1956, the per capita
consumption of khat for that year was 12.2 kilograms, representing a per capita expenditure

of $38.7, totaling $5.4 million dollars for the city's population. During the same years, the

144

declared import unit value of khat increased by 900 percent, from $16.80 to $156.8. Such
a sharp rise was due to a high coast of air-transportation and frequently increasing taxes and
duties on both the Ethiopian and Aden side.30

In response to the rapidly growing demand, Ethiopia's khat export earnings increased
commensurately. We have data that show the general trend of Ethiopia's khat export. In
1946, only 26 tons of khat was exported from Ethiopia and eamed 14,000 birr ($5,644.80).
A decade later, the export amounted to 1,618 tons valued at 6,996,000 birr ($2,820,384).
By 1963, the total export volume had quadrupled, reaching 4,802 tons, while earnings rose
approximately threefold. In less than two decades, khat was transformed from a crop
cultivated by farmers, to supplement a family's cash income, to Ethiopia's ﬁfth largest export
commodity.

The export earnings from khat were obviously beneﬁcial to Ethiopia's balance of
payments, but, since khat was exported by private businessmen, the government's share of
the khat business came from duties and taxes. Figures are hard to come by, but we can make
a rough estimate of the revenue from taxes by basing our calculation on customs revenue
statistics. For most of the 19505, the Ethiopian customs levied 1.0 birr per kilogram of
exported khat.” At this rate, the Ethiopian Treasury had collected 26,000 birr in 1946. Just

one year after air-transportation started, the amount had climbed to 368,000 birr and, by

 

3° Calculated based on, Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 54-55.

3‘ HPA.KF-2, Negatu Mekuria, Harerge's Bejirond to Dej. Workineh Wolde Amanuel,
Harerge's Inderassie, Harer, Sept. 5, 1952 E. C.

145

1963, it had reached 4,802,000 birr.32

Taxes were also collected in Harerge's various sub—provinces from the khat
transactions made within the country. The aggregate ﬁgures are not available, especially for
the 19405, when the Ethiopian government was not organized enough to keep records.
Fortunately, we have ﬁgures showing the amount of taxes collected between 1948 and 1952
E. C. ( 1955/56-1959/60). The ﬁgures show tremendous ﬂuctuation, perhaps reﬂecting
corruption or poor book keeping, but they do represent a rough estimate of the amount of
the tax revenue from khat. During the ﬁve years for which we have records, the government
collected a total of 12.3 million birr, or an average annual revenue of 2.5 million birr.33

In 1962, the combined total of export duties and taxes on domestic transactions
amounted to more than 7 million birr or $ 3 million. The revenue from khat was three times
the amount of the total land tax collected in 1962 for the entire Harerge province which was
2.4 million birr?" Ethiopia's total revenue for the same year was 218.8 million birr. It is
therefore not difficult to imagine the political implications of the dramatic economic gain for

the exporting side and the potential problem for the importing side.

 

’2 See Appendix Table for the export quantities. The estimates are based on calculation of
the export quantity and the 1 birr duty per kg of khat.

33 HPA.KF-l, Khat Tax Bureau to Harerge Provincial Administration Ofﬁce, Report on the
revenue collected from khat between 1948 and June 30, 1952 E. C. Harer, August 21, 1952 E. C.
Another document shows birr 855,423.50 was collected from July to October of FY 1952 EC. It is
fair to assume that an average of birr 2.5 million was collected in tax revenue annually in the 19505,
if the mentioned amount was collected in four months. HPA.KF-l, Harerge's Bejirond to the Minster
of Finance Mahteme Sellassie Wold Masqal, Nov. 25, 1952 E. C.

3" Seleshi Wolde-Tsadik, Land Taxation in Harerge Province, Imperial Ethiopian College of
Agriculture Experiment Station Bulletin no. 48. (Dire Dawa, 1966), p. 11.

146

D. Government Reactions

From the standpoint of the Aden and Djibouti governments the rapid growth of khat
consumption and trade was socially and economically dangerous. During the early 19505,
the Aden Colony Government's concern about the rapid increase of khat imports and its
implications for the colony's balance of payments was evident in the editorials of Adeni
newspapers and in the Legislative Council debates. Initially the government attempted to
limit imports by imposing a heavy duty and a high local tax, as a way of discouraging
imports without causing social convulsion. The effort brought in large revenues for the
government, but did not curb the rise in consumption. As we have seen, high taxes and
duties on khat succeeded not in reducing imports, but rather in raising the consumers prices.
The continued sterling ﬂow from Aden to Ethiopia, therefore, remained a matter of serious
concern for the Colony's government and merchants. Pressed by constituencies, the Aden
Legislative Council requested the government to impose restrictions on khat imports from
Ethiopia. Accordingly, importation of Ethiopian khat was banned as of April 1, 1957.
Health reasons were cited to justify the ban but contemporary sources are agreed that the
main reason was to prevent hard currency resources from draining into Ethiopia.”

The Ethiopian government considered the loss of revenue so serious that it took
dramatic measures to force the Aden government to reverse its decision. One such measure
was the revoking of Aden Airway's license to operate its commercial ﬂights to Addis Ababa.

The Aden government did not ﬂinch for more than one year, even though it was evident that

 

3’ SD 875.00/7-957, American Embassy to State Department (SD), Weekly Economic
Review, April 15, 1957.

147

the ban was ineffectual. Khat continued to be imported without restrictions into the Colony
from Yemen and Ethiopian khat was smuggled on a large scale and sold in border areas, a
short distance ﬁom the city of Aden. Only the Aden Government seemed to be affected by
the ban, sustaining a heavy loss of revenue from taxes and duties on the leaf. A Commission
of Inquiry was called in February 1958 to study the matter. Its report conﬁrmed the
conventional wisdom that the ban was not working satisfactorily and recommended its
repeal. Consequently, the government rescinded the import ban on June 24, 1958 and, in its
place, instituted a system of licensing as a measure of control over imports and prices.”

The effects of Aden's short-lived ban on Ethiopian khat was mitigated by the action
taken by another British dependency. Before the 19505, the British Administration fought
against khat smuggling vigorously. Smugglers were jailed, even shot, their trucks tossed
into the sea, but none of those actions stopped the illegal ﬂow of khat into the territory. As
the result, shortly after khat was prohibited in Aden Colony, the Somaliland Protectorate
removed a long-standing ban on the leaf. A decree was promulgated in 1957 to repeal the
1921 law and provided for importing only by surface conveyance. Importation by air was
proscribed in order to keep the market at a reasonably small level. The restriction did not
have much effect because most of the khat market centers in the protectorate were only a
short distance away from the production areas of Harerge highlands.”

The French Government encountered problems in Djibouti similar to those of Aden

 

” Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 57.

37 Elmi, "The Chewing of khat in Somalia, pp. 166-167; Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East,"
p. 57.

148

in regard to khat imports and consumption. As in Aden, several measures were taken
progressively to reduce the level of imports and consumption but none proved successful.
The Djibouti administration imposed taxes on khat sales for the ﬁrst time in 1952 in an effort
to discourage merchants from engaging in khat business. Contrary to the anticipated effect,
ofﬁcial imports held steady and consumption tripled in three years, thereafter showing
growth with increases in the minimum wage. Although successive governors inveighed
against the evils of khat and took measures to limit importation or consumption, their efforts
only increased smuggling and the loss of government revenue. The governors were unable
to take more eﬁective measures, fearing that prohibition would alienate the Ethiopian
government and result in reduction of revenue for the Djibouti government. Only smugglers
stood to proﬁt from a ban on khat imports. The territorial assemblymen were reluctant to
take any legislative measure because they did not want to risk their political future by voting
to forbid the importation of khat.38

When it became clear that the colony government was unable to take any measure to
halt the increasing imports and consumption of khat, the French government felt obligated
to step in and do something. Accordingly, Paris placed khat on its list of narcotics in 1957,
and proscribed the import, export, production, possession, trade and use of it in any form in
French administered territories,” despite the UN World Health Organization declaration that

khat did not fall within the standard deﬁnitions of addiction-producing drugs."0 The

 

3“ Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti, p. 164.
” Journal Oﬂiciel, 5 Avril, 1957.

4° WHO, Technical Report Series, 116 (1957).

149

Ethiopian government made its displeasure known by declaring its view that khat was not
in any sense a narcotic drug that should be purged from international trade. Aware of
Djibouti's economic dependence on Ethiopia for which it was the chief port and eastem
terminus of the F ranco-Ethiopian Railway, the Govemor-General of the French Territory of
Afars and Issas (F TAI) resisted the implementation of the decree in his territory. The decree
was thus executed into law in Metropolitan France, but khat imports and consumption in
Djibouti continued unabated.“

The Ethiopian government opposed the Aden and Djibouti govemments' attempt to
prohibit the importation of khat for good reasons. In addition to the revenue that accrued to
its treasury, khat was a proﬁtable freight for Ethiopian Airlines. In 1957, khat represented
about 12 percent of its total revenues--about $45,000 per month."2 As an important source
of income for farmers, khat was also viewed as a politically stabilizing commodity. This
view is expressed in several administrative letters and documents, in which government
officials speculated that the loss of khat revenue might lead to discontent and provoke
rebellion.43 Furthermore, the Ethiopian government used the revenue from khat to fund
development programs and security efforts in Harerge's politically troubled lowland regions,

the Ogaden and the Haud and Reserve Areas.

 

“ Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 56.
‘2 SD 875.00/4-557, Embassy to State Department, Weekly Economic Review, April 5, 195 7.

‘3 I-IPA.GC-1, Tarnirat Yigezu to HIM Haile Sellassie, June 23, 1956 E. C; HPA.GC-1,
Tarnirat Yigezu to Yilma Deressa, June 12, 1956 E. C.

150

E. Khat Revenues, Politics and Conﬂicts

Predominantly inhabited by Somalis, the Ogaden and the Haud were transferred from
British to Ethiopian rule successively in 1948 and in 1954. The Ethiopian government did
very little to integrate the regions economically , although it did coopt a few Somali leaders
into the national goveming structure. The isolation created a favorable condition for Somali
nationalists to incite Ogaden residents against the Ethiopian government through broadcasts
from Mogadisho and Hargessa and by using Somali pastoralists who had grazing rights
within Ethiopian territory according to the 1897 and 1954 treaties between Ethiopia and
Britain.“

Several skirmishes between Ethiopian and Somali forces demonstrated that economic
integration was more important than token political inclusion. In the context of this new
attitude, the Ethiopian government was inclined toward investing in the economically
neglected regions. However, the tax base in Harerge was insufﬁcient for the realization of
development projects in the Ogaden. The only available funds derived from the tax revenue
raised by the Khat Tax Collection Agency, which operated under the direct auspices of the
Central Treasury. Regional administrators did not have jurisdiction over the agency's

resources since all revenues were transferred to Addis Ababa.“ Any withdrawal, even if

 

“ HPA.GC- 1, Aemero Sellassie Abebe, Deputy Inderassie of Harerge to General Abiy Abebe,
Minster of Interior, Feb. 15. 1953 E. C.; HPA.GC-l, Capt. M.G. Alexander, IESF Advisor, to Deputy
Governor of Harer, January 23, 1953 E. C.

‘5 HPA.KF-l, Aemero Sellassie Abebe, deputy Inderassie of Harer, to Zenebe Haile, Vice
minster of ﬁnance. August 30, 1952 E. C. The Inderassie argues that according to Negarit Gazetta,
First Year, No. 1, he, not the Central Treasury, should be in charge of the khat revenue in his
province. Kiﬂe Irgetu, shortly after his appointment as Inderassie of Harer addresses the same issue
in a letter to HIM Haile Sellassie. HPA.KF-l, Dej. Kiﬂe Irgetu to HIM Haile Sellassie, Sept. 13, 1952
E. C.

151

borrowed by the regional administration to cover occasional ﬁnancial shortfalls, had to be
authorized by Emperor Haile Sellassie."6

A number of documents show that the emperor used khat revenues to ﬁnance the
integration of the Ogaden and the Haud into the administrative structure of Ethiopia."7 In
1959, the Ogaden received 2, 033, 685 birr of khat money for administrative, security and
development expenses. Khat revenues were used for the annual budgets of Jijjiga, Kebri
Dehar and Adal-Issa sub-provinces, for construction of oﬁce buildings for such
administrative institutions as court houses, police headquarters, govemors' residences,
customs offices all over the Ogaden as well as for building schools, health dispensaries and
roads.48 The start-up capital for establishments such as the Ogaden Water Works
Development Corporation and the Lowlands Road Construction Agency was also obtained
from khat revenue."9

Such was the signiﬁcance of the khat business that Addis Ababa foresaw that

 

‘6 HPA.KF-l, Harerge's Bejironed to Minster of Finance Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Mesqel,
Nov. 25, 1952 E. C. The Bejironed explains that spending has always outrun revenue and requests
the Minster to seek authorization for 19,000 birr from khat revenue to make up for a shortfall faced
by the regional administration. HPA.KF-l. Dej. Kiﬂe Irgetu to HIM Haile Sellassie, August 27, 1952
E. C.

‘7 Rumors are rampant that the Duke of Harer, who was reportedly more involved in business
or accumulation than other members of the royal family, had extensive ﬁnancial interest in khat.
Indeed, there are allusions in contemporary documents to the royal family's involvement in khat
business but no concrete substantiation. SD 875.00/7-2456, Embassy to State Department,
Conﬁdential Annex to Economic Review of the Year 1956.

‘3 HPA.KF.1, Auditor's Report to the Ministry of Finance on the Khat revenue and
administrative expenditure, 1951-52. September 30, 1953 E. C.; HPA.KF-l, Aemero Sellassie Abebe,
Deputy Inderassie of Harerge to Balm. Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Masqal, June 17, 1952 E. C.

‘9 HPA.KF-l, Aemero Sellassie Abebe, Deputy Inderassie of Hater to Zenebe Haile, Vice
minster of ﬁnance. August 30, 1952 Eth. C.

152

domestic revenue would be augmented if the government gained greater control over the
organization and management of its export. No concrete measures were taken to take over
the khat business, although those implemented were clearly intended gradually to assert
control over khat export, particularly to Aden.

Until 1960, khat was exported to Aden by individual businessmen operating private
ﬁrms under licenses from the Dire Dawa municipality. Some of the private khat exporters
were local Somali and Oromo traders, but most were Yemeni Arabs. Over the course of
time, the Arabs, long involved in Harer's import-export trade, became the principal khat
exporters to Aden.” As the khat business increased in the 19505, more and more Adeni
merchants came to Dire Dawa to take part in the growing trade, leaving their relatives to run
the operations on the Aden end. Kinship played an important role on the exporting side,
giving a competitive edge to the local exporters in regard to purchasing good quality khat.
This differences engendered a competition between the local and expatriate exporters and
eventually produced an atmosphere of intense rivalry in which the khat business was
conducted.5 '

Determined to win, the expatriates invited non-khat traders to join them and establish
a khat-exporting company with the aim to monopolize the trade and force out their
competitors. With the assistance of a few local associates, the expatriates announced the
establishment in 1960 of a company named the Chat Exporting Company of Dire Dawa

(CECDD), with a capital of 18,000 birr. Customarily, licenses were delivered by the Dire

 

5° Interview: Hajji Mohammed Abdurahman, Dire Dawa, March 26, 1994.

5' Interview: Hajji Dawud Abdo, Dire Dawa March 26, 1994.

153

Dawa Municipality, but in the case of the new company, the issuer was the Ministry of
Trade and Tourism in Addis Ababa.52

CECDD was essentially a private enterprise, owned and operated by shareholders,”
and expected to work in partnership with an importing agency, the Qat Importing Company
Limited (abb. CHATCO) based in Aden. The Aden govemment granted the latter the
exclusive license of importation and wholesale distribution to retailers. In fact, since
CHATCO was owned and managed by the relatives of the Arabs who had established
CECDD in Dire Dawa, it may well be described as a subsidiary of the latter.” For business
purposes, however, the two companies operated as though they were different private
companies.”

The Ethiopian government granted the CECDD a license to ﬁrnction as the sole khat
exporter to Aden because it desired to gain control over the quality of the exported leaf and
to prevent a repeat of the sanitation deﬁciencies which had led to the 1957 ban. For about
a year, the company enjoyed a near-monopoly over khat export to Aden. Meanwhile, conﬂict

arose between the company shareholders and the private exporters who were left out of the

 

’2 The officials of the company included local traders such as Abdu Selam Hajji
Musa (deputy general Manager) and Arabs named Mohammed Hussien al-Besiri, Hussien

Rubah (president), Said Besiri (accountant). Interview: Hajji Mohammed Abdurahman, Dire
Dawa, March 26, 1994.

5’ HPA.KF-l, "The by-laws of the Khat Exporting Company of Ethiopia," 1952 E. C.

5" HPA.KF-Z, Head of Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Unit of Harerge Police to the
Inderassie, Oct. 29, 1953 E. C.

’5 HPA.GC-l, Ali Rabi, Managing Director of CHATCO to the Managing Director of
CHATHA, "View Points of the Board of Directors of the Qat Importing Co. Ltd Aden on the Present
Situation," July 25, 1962.

154

franchise. Ethiopian exporters blamed the "Arabs," who constituted the majority of the
company's shareholders and managers, for allegedly attempting to sabotage the trade.
Farmers accused the company of offering depressed prices, degrading the quality of khat and
coercing them into selling at lower prices.”5 The situation is said to have harmed farmers
and the khat business in general to the extent that candidates for parliament during the
election of 1960 used the "khat problem" as a campaign issue by promising farmers to end
their predicaments.57

Police and intelligence reports reveal that the imperial government was concerned
about the political overtones of the "khat problem" and that officials felt the issue must be
resolved before it escalated.” One year after the establishment of the CECDD, HIM Haile
Sellassie instructed the then Minister of Trade and Tourism Yilma Deressa to replace the
leadership of the company with "people whose loyalty to the emperor and the country was
unquestionable." Accordingly, the minster announced the dissolution of CECDD and the
establishment of a new company to "save the work from total break down." An Armenian
called Katching Boghossian was appointed as general manager and a certain Yirgashewa

Meteleya as his deputy. The new appointees took over the assets and workers of the defunct

 

5" HPA.KF-2, Graz. Bizuneh Wolde Mariam, Governor of Gara Mula'ata sub-province to the
Provincial Administration Office. Oct. 6, 1954 E. C.; HPA.KF-2, Lt. Colonel Bereket Gebre Medhin,
Police Commandant of Harerge Province to the Inderassie, July 12, 1953 E. C.

’7 HPA.KF-2, Lt. Colonel Seyoum Gessesse, Police Commandant, to Dej. Kiﬂe Irgetu,
Inderassie of Harerge, May 1, 1952 E. C.

5‘ HPA.KF-Z, Brigadier General Mekonnen Deneke, Minster of State for Public Security to
Dej. Kiﬂe Irgetu, Inderassie of Harerge, August 1, 1953 E. C.

155

company, now called the Khat Exporters Company of Harer (abb. CHATHA).” The action
was hailed by the local exporters and government officials for "wresting the business from
the Arabs who were intent on undermining Ethiopia's economy."”

The new company differed from its predecessor in several important ways. It was
established by an edict, run by government appointed managers and was supervised by the
Ministry of Trade and Tourism. It was essentially a govemment-run enterprise. Unlike
CECDD, which operated without a written contract with the importing company, the new
company signed an agreement with the exporting agency daily to export a minimum of 3,000
kilograms during most of a year and 6,200 kilograms during the summer (Ethiopian winter),
the rainy season when khat becomes available in large quantities. The writing of a contract
was an indication that the relationship between the two companies was not based on kinship,
trust or understanding, as was the case with the previous one, but strictly on business?l

Meanwhile, the business of exporting khat to Djibouti and Northern Somalia

remained in private hands. The operations of the private ﬁrms was quite distinct ﬁom the

companies especially in their purchasing mechanisms. Agents purchased khat in village

 

‘9 Ethiopia Dimts (The Voice of Ethiopia), Amharic Daily, Sept. 25, 1953 E. C.; HPA.GC-l,
Appeal to the Inderassie of Harerge, signed by forty nine shareholders of CECDD, Oct. 7, 1953 EC.

6° HPA.KF-2, Second Lieutenant Tsegaye Azene, Dire Dawa Police detective to Police
Commandant of Dire Dawa sub-province. December 1, 1953 E. C.; HPA.KF-3, Report of nine
witnesses against the company and the recommendations of the Police Commandant Seyoum Gessesse
to the Inderassie. Sept. 9, 1952 E. C.

6‘ HPA.GC. 1, Agreement between Qat Importing Co. of Aden and Chat Exporting Co. of
Harar, October 27, 1962.

156

markets, alongside the Harer-Dire Dawa highway, and on individual farms.62 In the course
of time, these agents developed an efficiently working relationship with farmers which
enabled them to purchase khat futures. The producers preferred this type of customer-buyer
relationship because it provided them decent prices and eliminated the uncertainties at the
Dire Dawa market. Farmers traveled to the company's purchasing center not just for the
prices it offered but because the Djibouti and Somalia markets did not have the capacity to
absorb the entire available supply.63

Despite its efforts, the company operations remained ineffectual. CHATHA failed
to meet the quality and quantity demand of CHATCO, giving rise to mistrust between the
companies. Correspondence reveals that CHATHA was organizationally unable to fulﬁll its
contractual commitments. It did not have purchasing stations close enough to the producing
areas to be able to buy sufﬁcient khat to meet Aden's demand.64 CHATHA regularly failed
to dispatch the daily minimum of 3,000 kilograms of khat and the brand preferred in Aden.
During the months of June and July 1963, according to the agreement, 6,200 kilograms of
khat had to be sent to Aden, but, CHATHA dispatched an average of 3000 kilograms. There

was no day when CHATHA shipped a consignment whose weight met the agreed-upon

 

‘2 HPA.GC-l, Katching Boghossian, General Manager of CHATHA to General Manager of
CHATCO. Aden, August 1, 1965.

63 Interview: Amin Usman Mohammed, Ganda Issa, Haramaya, May 17, 1994; Mume Ahmed,
Fala'ana, Kombolcha, June 08, 1994.

6‘ HPA.GC-l, Ali Rabi, Managing Director of CHATCO to the Governor-General of Harer
Province, April 8, 1963.

157

amount.65 CHATCO protested that the terms of the contract were violated by CHATHA's
failure to ship the agreed-upon quantity but also in exporting inferior quality khat. The latter
responded by claiming that its failure was due to lack of rain, which should be regarded as
an act of God.”5 CHATCO was well aware that Djibouti and Hargessa were supplied with
the best quality khat from Harerge and could not accept CHATHA's claim of force
majeure.” On February 13, 1962, it refused khat worth Shs. 49,855 from CHATHA, because
the produce was declared "unﬁt for human consumption."68 On the next day, despite
CHATCO's warning that no khat be shipped to Aden without further instruction, CHATHA
dispatched khat worth Shs 33,097.20, which passed inspection. CHATCO paid for the
latter, but deducted the air freight charges for the condemned khat. In the process,
CHATHA lost close to Shs 50,000.”9

Negotiations began in Aden between Mr. Ali Rabi of CHATCO and Mr. Katching

Boghossian of CHATHA. With assistance from high level Ethiopian government ofﬁcials,

 

6’ HPA.GC- 1 , Ali Rabi to the Manager of CHATHA, On the lack of adaptation to agreement,
May 1, 1962; HPA.GC-l, Statement showing quantities of khat demanded by CHATCO, minimum
provided by agreement, quantities of khat exported by CHATHA. May 1 to August 10, 1962.

6" HPA.GC-l, K. Boghossian and Teferi Lemma to Mustafa Refat and Saeed Haitham,
Representatives of CHATCO, August 28, 1962.

‘7 HPA.GC-l, Ali Rabi to the Managing Director of CHATHA, View points on the Board of
Directors of CHATCO on the Present situation, July 25, 1962; HPA.GC-l, Mustafa Refat and Saeed
Haitham, Accredited Representative of CHATCO to Deputy Governor of Harer, Sept. 4, 1962;
HPA.GC-l, Comparative statement to show the quantities of Ethiopian chat exported to Djibouti by
Individual Importers [sic] during CHATHA's alleged force majeure. enclosure item 26, July 2, 1962.

6‘ HPA.GC-l, Telegram from CHATCO to CHATHA, Feb 13, 1962. HPA.GC-l, H. R.
Robertson to CHATCO, Medical certiﬁcate, Aden Municipality, Feb. 13, 1962.

69 HPA.GC-l, H. R. Robertson, Officer of Health of Aden Municipality to CHATCO,
Certiﬁcate of Health, Feb. 14, 1962; HPA.GC-l, Abdulkader Yassin Kaid, Agent for CHATHA to
General Manager of CHATCO, March 1 1, 1962.

158

the two men hammered out an agreement wherein CHATHA agreed to improve the quality
and quantity of its exported khat. To that end, CHATHA agreed to establish purchasing
sites in the towns of Harer, Haramaya, Langie and Chelenqo,” but they did not help
CHATHA to overcome its ineffectiveness. The business relationship between the companies
further deteriorated when CHATHA repeatedly dispatched delayed khat on Fridays which
was a holiday in Aden.71

Meanwhile, the Aden press was calling for the banning of Ethiopian khat. By 1963,
the Pan-Arabist ideology championed by Gamal Abdel Nasr was gaining root in the region,
and the newspapers and mass media reﬂected its resonance in Aden. Ethiopia's alleged
ﬁiendship with Zionist Israel and its continuous ability to drain away Aden's wealth became
an issue of national debate. The print media and radio programs pressed hard for the
substitution of Ethiopian khat by imports from the "brotherly neighbor" country of Yemen.72

During the negotiations, CHATCO threatened to stop importing khat unless the
Ethiopians agreed to import ﬁsh and salt in exchange. The Ethiopians rejected the condition
claiming that there was no market for those commodities within the country. The two

companies' failure to strike a deal, coupled with a resentful Adeni public opinion, forced

 

7° HPA.GC-l, Ali Rabi, Managing Director of CHATCO to the Governor-General of Harar
Province, Aden, April 8, 1963.

7' HPA.GC-l, Negatu Mekuria, Deputy General Manager of CHATHA to Kegnaz. Demissie
Teferra, deputy Inderassie of Harerge, Nov. 23, 1955 Eth.C; HPA.GC- 1 , Ali Rabi, Managing Director
of CHATCO to the General Manager of CHATHA, Aden, July 14, 1963.

72 Al-Qalam AI-Adani, A motion by a municipal councillor, Feb. 13, 1963; no. 477; Al-Ayam,
Editorial, no. 683, Oct. 26, 1960. HPA.GC-l, Tilahun Abebe, Director of Dire Dawa Customs to Lt.
Colonel Solomon Kedir, Assistant Minster for Ethiopian Customs, Report on Aden Radio broadcast
on the khat situation, June 3, 1956 E. C.

159

CHATCO to quit importing Ethiopian khat on June 1, 1963.73

In October of the same year Ethiopia's khat business suffered another blow. In 1963,
the Somalis felt that Ethiopia was politically weak as manifested in the attempted coup d'etat
of December 1960 and militarily unprepared in view of the fact that Ethiopian forces were
on United Nations assignment in the Congo. Somalia's leaders decided that the time was ripe
for recovering their land and liberating their kin ﬁom Ethiopian domination and sent forces
into Ethiopian territory. The hostilities that ensued prevented the transportation of khat and
other trade to Somalia and even hampered trading activities in the Ogaden and the Haud. In
1964, Ethiopia declared a State of Emergency and banned the export of khat into Somalia,
hoping that supply shortages would lead to discontent and destablization within Somalia.
Only Djibouti was left to import Ethiopian khat. The termination of exports to Aden and
Northern Somalia marked the end of the ﬁrst phase of expansion of the production and

marketing of khat.”

E. Conclusion

While khat chewing has long had a symbolic meaning for Harerge's religious and
cultural elites, that meaning has changed as new social groups took up the habit. The
changing meaning of chewing must be examined in the context of the overall socio-economic

and cultural developments in the Horn of Africa, including the integration of the societies

 

73 HPA.GC-l, Kegnaz. Bekure Wolde Giorigis, Governor of Dire Dawa sub-province, to
Harerge Provincial Administration Ofﬁce, June 5, 1956 E. C.

7‘ HPA.GC-2, Fit. Tewahade Woldeyes, Governor of Harer sub-province to Harerge
Provincial Administration Office, Oct. 19, 1957 E. C.

160

there into the modern cash economy. It is nonetheless important to note that chewing began
among different societies for different reasons: for some chewing was a long-standing
cultural ritual (Yemeni); for others, it is an expression of nationalism and deﬁance(
Somalis); and for still others, it was the only available pastime (Christian Ethiopians) .
Clearly, khat's perishability was a decisive factor in the process of the shrub's
commodiﬁcation. It determined price, making the leaves so expensive that average
consumers in Djibouti spent as much as 40 percent of their incomes on khat. The fact that
importing countries had to expend a signiﬁcant amount of capital on khat affected their
balance of payments and led to initiatives to ban the trade. For the exporting country, the
khat trade generated revenues which could be used for accomplishing important political
goals. Attempts at restricting consumption led to conﬂicts among governments, between
consumers and their governments and among traders who sought monopoly over the trade
and those who wanted to get a share of the lucrative business. The policies of restricting
consumption, for balance of payments purposes or for other political reasons eventually led
to a permanent ban on importation, in the case of Aden, and a suspension, in the case of
Northern Somalia. In the next chapter, we will consider how khat fared under the

circumstances of diminished export outlets in the 19605 and early 19705.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Export Trade:

Constraints, Contraband and Control, 1964-1974

The dynamic growth of Harerge's khat production in the 19505 and early 19605
slowed considerably after 1964. The industry faced a series of problems stemming from the
sudden demise of the Aden market and the trade embargo imposed in the aftermath of the
Ethio—Somali conﬂict of 1964. Reacting to diminishing demands and falling prices, farmers
slowed cultivation of khat and, in effect, suspended the two-decade old process of replacing
Harerge's long standing sorghum-coffee cropping complex with khat plantations. Exporters
and domestic dealers scrambled to open up new markets but did not ﬁnd a viable
replacement for the role khat had formerly played in their economic life. For the
government, the declining khat market meant a substantial loss of revenue and a diminished
capacity to deal with the existing security problems and the potential political unrest arising
ﬁom economic dislocation.l

The disappearance of foreign markets and the consequent loss of incomes and
revenue set the stage for a competition over the infrastructure of khat production and
exchange. Focusing on the period between the declaration of a State of Emergency (SOE)
in Harerge province in 1964 and the overthrow of Haile Sellassie's government in 1974, this

chapter examines the reaction of farmers, traders and the government to and the implications

 

1 I-IPA-GC. 1, Lt. Colonel Tamirat Yigezu, Inderassie of Harerge to HIM Haile Sellassie. June
23, 1956 E. C; HPA-GC.1, Lt. Colonel Tamirat Yigezu, Inderassie of Harerge to Finance Minster
Yihna Deressa, June 12, 1956 E. C.

161

162
of a relatively smaller khat industry for the region's political economy. It opens with the state
of affairs just after the 1964 Ethio-Somali skirmishes, shifts to examining traders' responses
to increased state intervention in the khat economy, and concludes with a discussion of the
political and economic implications of increased smuggling.

These apparently disparate analyses are tied together by the main argument of the
chapter. Arormd the mid-19605, prompted by political considerations, security concerns and
the need to raise revenues, the Ethiopian government imposed restrictions on the khat trade
and raised taxes. Every measure that the government took distorted the marketing process,
blurred the distinction between legal and illegal transactions and gave rise to a structure of
distribution that bypassed or paralleled ofﬁcial marketing channels. My narrative will show
that the expansion of khat distribution through unofﬁcial channels was a direct consequence

of government actions.

A. The Aftermath of Ethio-Somali Hostilities of 1964

Before 1964, the Aden market alone constituted a 20 million birr industry. Ethiopian
Airlines, the Khat Exporting Company of Harer, the Ethiopian Customs, each collected
annually approximately 5 million birr from exporting khat to Aden while the same amount
was reportedly shared by Harerge's farmers and traders. Estimates indicate the government
sustained an annual revenue loss of around 2.7 million birr in export duties from the khat

exports to Northern Somalia2 and another 2.4 million birr in income taxes ﬁom domestic

 

2 This ﬁgure is calculated based on reports that 7,000 to 8,000 kg of khat was smuggled
daily into Somalia. Since customs taxes were at a rate of 1 birr per kg of khat at the time, we could
extrapolate that the revenue loss for the year would be around the amount given in the text.

163

transactions? Under the terms of the State of Emergency, a few traders were permitted daily
to supply consumers in J ijj iga with 200 kilograms of khat, but all traders were barred from
marketing khat in areas east of the town. For farmers, the loss of income was compounded
by a drought and pest infestation which destroyed other crops in 19644 and diminished land
use tax revenue for the government.5

The demise of foreign markets was obviously a serious blow to Harerge's economy,
but its consequences were not only economic. Provincial administration officials feared that
the economic dislocation caused by the loss of income would trigger rural unrest at a time
when the government's capacity to respond was seriously constrained. In an effort to avert
what they perceived to be a potentially dangerous event, provincial ofﬁcials urged the
national government to try and reopen the Aden market, but its efforts did not produce a
positive result. As we have seen in chapter 4, Aden's decision to ban Ethiopian khat was
based largely on the political and economic concerns of the Aden government rather than on
the organizational ineffectiveness of CHATHA claimed by the Adeni importers. Thus, the
Adeni market was permanently closed, leaving khat traders to look elsewhere for business.

Even when Aden was an active importer, it was Northern Somalia which took most

 

3 HPA-GC.2, The Governor of Jijjiga and Colonel Yilma Teshome, Chief Administrator of
the SOE for the northern part of the Harerge to Major General Abebe Gemeda, Dej. Workineh Wolde
Amanuel and Bejirond Negatu Mekuria. October 8, 1962 EC. The letter indicates that the Internal
Revenue Department used to collect 6,000 to 7,000 birr in income taxes daily. The ﬁgure in the text
is a calculation based on the average ﬁgure of 6,500 birr.

4 Miller and Mekonnen, Organization and Operation, p. 19.

5 HPA-GC.2, Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Harerge's Inderassie to the Commander of the Third
Command and Chief Administrator of the SOE. February 30, 1957 EC.

164

of the khat from Gursum, Harer Zuria and Wobbera awrajas (sub-provinces).‘s In the years
before the Ethio-Somali hostilities, Hargessa and the Ogaden lowlands consumed
approximately 7,000 kilograms daily. This movement was discontinued when the State of
Emergency proscribed all kinds of commercial or traditional exchanges and barred traders
from operating in the area east of Jijjiga and the Ogaden country. Only Djibouti continued
daily to import 6-7,000 kilogram of khat, but the amount was not sufﬁcient to absorb the
surplus created by the disappearance of the other two foreign markets.

Clearly, the reopening of the Hargessa and Ogaden markets was critical for the
economic stability of the region. Farmers and ofﬁcials, especially of those regions whose
economic well-being depended on a ﬂourishing Hargessa market, submitted petitions to the
provincial administration, requesting the lifting of sanctions so as to facilitate the
unencumbered ﬂow of khat.7 Nevertheless, the petitions were often overlooked because
political considerations appeared to take precedence over economic gains. The SOE was
intended to curb subversive political activities, foster social discontent within Somalia by
creating shortages of consumer necessities and prevent the Mogadishu regime from
launching another attack on Ethiopia. It was particularly felt that withdrawing khat from

Somalis might serve to incite them against their government? For political reasons, therefore,

 

6 HPA-GC.2, Gugsa Abegaz, Director of Harer Zuriya sub-province and the Municipality
to the Office of the Provincial Administration, February 24, 1957 E. C. The Director cites that his
office was overwhehned by petitions from farmers for the opening of the Hargessa route. There are
numerous such appeals in my own possession.

7l-IPA-GC.2, Fit. Tewahade Woldeyes, Governor of Harer Zuria sub-province to Office of
Provincial Administration, October 19, 1957 E. C.

8HPA-GC.2, Brigadier General Abebe Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division
and Chief Administrator of the SOE to Lt. Colonel Tamirat Yigezu, Inderassie of Harerge, December

165
no effort was made immediately to reopen the Northern Somalia market.

Before too long, it became clear that the embargo would not achieve its political
objective. Khat was not an ordinary commodity which consumers use when it is available
and let go when it is hard to obtain. Though the intensity has not been determined by
researchers, khat is proven to possess properties akin to most psychoactive substances; its
users get "hooked" to the extent that their physical and social functioning capacities become
impaired when the stimulant is not taken. It is therefore impossible to prevent users ﬁom
going to great lengths and paying higher prices to obtain the substance they need. The
prohibitions imposed by the SOE, and the demand generated thereof, gave rise to a situation
favorable for dealing khat, if unlawfully, in the restricted areas. The business involved risks;
the risk of being caught and punished for selling illegally, the costs of avoiding detection and
diseconorrries of trading in smaller quantities. But prices were probably higher than for khat
sold in the official market, thus encouraging traders to smuggle khat to the restricted areas.

The smugglers frequently used three major routes. Originating in Jijjiga smugglers
headed northwest to Djibouti, then veered southeast into Somalia. Others took a
southeasterly direction from J ijj iga, appearing to head in the direction of the Ogaden country,
but quickly turned northeast to reach Hargessa. Border guards usually concentrated on the
most frequented crossing points but were unable to control the entire border areas. Due to
the increased risk involved in the smuggling effort, khat may have become expensive, but

there was no evidence that it was in short supply in Somalia during the time the SOE was in

 

13, 1957 EC. This is a strategic document in which the General evaluated the state of the SOE.

166

 

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effect.

Although it was increasingly evident that the embargo was tmdermined by ubiquitous
parallel market activities, the government was unable to curb them, essentially due to three
factors. First, army, police and customs ofﬁcers were in no position to gain even a

semblance of control over the vast Ethio-Somali border area which stretched over more than

 

9HPA-GC.2, Fit. Demissie Tefera to Dej. Kiﬂe Irgetu, Minster of State for Public Security,
January 21, 1957 EC. For theoretical consideration of the relationship between increased risk and
prices see, Christine Jones and Michael Roemer, "Editors' Introduction: Modeling and Measuring
Parallel Markets in Developing Countries," World Development, 17:12 (1989), pp. 1861-1870.

 

167

1610 kilometers long. It is difficult for any government to maintain an effective control
over such a vast stretch of land, but the Ethiopian government was particularly fettered by
the poor state of logistical capability. Contemporary correspondence reveal that the Customs
Department had a limited number of poorly paid ofﬁcers and a couple of aged vehicles
which frequently broke down.”

More importantly, official efforts were severely hampered by the fact that law
enforcement officials were not able to single out and apprehend contraband traders. For the
Somali's, the political boundary was not a barrier capable enough to block passage. As
pointed out in chapter 1, Issa and Gadaboursi Somalis possessed a history of participation
in the long standing exchange between Harerge and the coastal ports in which they engaged
as intermediaries, providing transportation services for merchants. In the process, they had
acquired indispensable knowledge of the geography and caravan routes and had established
intricate, kinship-based commercial networks with their kindred inside Somalia.”

Furthermore, the capacity of authorities was further undermined by corruption which
allowed traders to engage in contraband activities with impunity. Law enforcement officials
allowed smugglers to violate the terms of the SOE in exchange for bribes. Corruption led
to the proliferation of untaxed transactions and resulted in a sharp decline in government

revenue, thereby diminishing the capacity of state institutions eﬁ‘ectively to deal with tax

 

‘0 I-IPA-GC.2, Minutes of the Khat Commission of Inquiry, May 19. 1962. HPA-GC.2,
Beshir Shiek Abdi, Governor of Jijjiga to Harerge Provincial Administration Office, April 8, 1957
E. C.

lllnterview: Yasin Usman, Dire Dawa, February 2, 1994; Mesﬁn Asfaw, Harer, March 15,
1 994.

168

evasion. Khat trade was not deemed a violation of the law before the restrictions were
implemented. Even after the SOE sanctions were imposed, transactions that took place west
of J ijjiga were perfectly legal and a few traders were permitted daily to bring in 200
kilograms of khat into the town. Illegal khat transaction occurred only when the exchange
took place in areas east of Jijjiga. Consumers who resided east of J ijjiga were supplied by
traders who took the risk of breaking the law. This is a clear case example of a govermnent
deﬁning the legality or illegality of commercial transactions.

Even though contraband trade had undercut the viability of the SOE, the ofﬁcial
attitude toward the embargo did not change until November 1964 when Brigadier General
Abebe Gemeda, the Chief Administrator of the SOE toured the areas under his command.
While visiting J ijj iga, the General observed that the embargo only succeeded in undermining
"free trade," thus denying farmers and traders the right to sell their khat in the open market
and preventing the government from levying taxes on legal transactions. He noted that the
embargo had not weakened Somalia's economy, nor thwarted subversive activities, nor
incited rebellion in Somalia. Furthermore, it was proved that the army was unable to secure
the entire border and prevent smuggling, nor were intelligence officers able to weed out
persons with subversive intentions from a population that was linguistically and ethnically
akin to the citizens of the purported enemy, Somalia. Simply, the historical and
contemporary realities of the region militated against the SOE's ability to achieve the

expected political objectives.”

 

‘2 HPA-GC.2, Brigadier General Abebe Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division
and Chief Administrator of the SOE to Lt. Colonel Tamirat Yigezu, Inderassie of Harerge, December
13, 1957 EC.

169

After observing the failure of the embargo, General Abebe made recommendations
that marked a strategic shift regarding the mechanisms of dealing with Somalia. The
general argued for the unrestricted ﬂow of khat into Somalia. In his view, khat could be
used best as a "weapon" against Somalia's population and economy, not by denying
consumers the substance they needed, but by supplying it in unlimited quantities. He
reasoned that khat was a hamrful substance that would turn Somalia into a country of
physically unﬁt and psychologically incompetent citizens who would not be able to become
an effective ﬁghting force. In addition, he reckoned that the money Somalis spent on khat
would devastate their country's economy by draining money into Ethiopia, which would also
beneﬁt from export taxes on the business. Based on these considerations, he recommended
that the khat embargo be lifted completely and immediately.”

In February 1965, General Kebede Gebre, the newly appointed inderassie (the
emperor's representative), concurred with some of General Abebe's analysis and abolished
the 200 kilogram limit on J ijjiga's quota and permitted unlimited quantities of khat to be
taken to the town. However, he left in place the ban on shipping khat to regions east of
Jijjiga. In leaving the geographic restriction intact, the inderassie reasoned that the free
movement of people between the two countries would increase subversive activities against
Ethiopia. The partial lifting of the ban, however, proved inconsequential, since most of the
khat consuming population resided in areas east of Jijjiga in such border towns as

Togochale, TeferiBer, Harshin, Dehatahil, Hartishiek, as well as in such Ogaden towns as

 

‘3 Ibid.

170
Dagahabur, KebriDehar, Aware, Misraanshamo and Gode. '4

Dissatisﬁed with the partial lifting of the khat embargo, General Abebe
recommended that traders be issued municipal ID cards and be permitted to exchange as
much khat as they could handle within Ethiopia's borders.” Viewed against the backdrop
of the embargo's negative economic impact on farmers, traders and the government and its
failure to achieve the political goals for which it was instituted, the proponents of the SOE
were left with no justiﬁable recourse to advocate the maintenance of the status quo. In June
1965, a decision was made to extend the area in which khat was to be traded beyond J ijjiga,
right to the border with Somalia. The embargo against Somalia, however, was left in place
as long as the SOE remained in force.”

Between June 1965 and October 1967, the khat business proceeded more or less
smoothly. Officials determined that it was time for the govemment to derive as much
revenue as possible from the business. Although as a policy principle, Addis Ababa
refrained from direct involvement in commodity production and marketing, the failure of the

quasi-independent company that used to export khat to Aden left behind an enduring bias

 

1" HPA-GC.2. Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Harerge's Inderassie, to Brigadier General Abebe
Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division and Chief Administrator of the SOE and Fitaurari
Tewahade Woldeyes, Governor of the Harer sub-province and mayor of the city. February 30, 1957
EC.

”HPA-GCZ, Brigadier General Abebe Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division
and Chief Administrator of the SOE, to Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Inderassie of Harerge, May 9,
1957 E.. C.

‘6 HPA-GC.2. Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Harerge's Inderassie, to Fitaurari Tewahade
Woldeyes, Governor of the Harer sub-province and mayor of the city. February 30, 1957 E.C.; HPA-
GC.2, Brigadier General Abebe Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division and Chief
Administrator of the SOE to Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Inderassie of Harerge, June 11, 1957 E. C.

l7 1
toward market-based exchange operations. Moreover, khat played too important a role in
the ﬁnances of the state to be left free of government involvement. In the next section, I will
examine state intervention in khat business which needs to be understood in two ways: the
level of revenue it extracted, and the means by which it did 50. Obviously both aspects are
interrelated since the actual amount of revenue ﬂowing into the state purse was determined
to a large extent by the efficiency of collecting it. The process was in itself a function of the
mechanisms that were used to ensure that few loopholes existed. Two government
departments, the Customs and the Internal Revenue, were charged with the responsibility of

collecting export duties and income taxes on domestic khat transactions.

B. Taxation, Traders and the State

Before trade was disrupted by war in 1964, there existed two types of taxes on khat
trade. Export taxes were levied at a rate of 1.00 birr per kilogram of khat, while traders paid
0.50 birr in income taxes on domestic transactions. Both rates applied to the entire Harerge
province, whether khat was exported from Dire Dawa to Aden and Djibouti or through J ijj iga
to Hargessa in Northern Somalia. During the period the SOE remained in effect, the
collection of these taxes was suspended in the entire area east of J ijjiga. Official khat export
was permitted only in the Dire Dawa section, where the Customs Department continued to
collect export duties. In the following pages, I will examine the competition over khat-

revenue in both the J ijjiga and Dire Dawa sectors, beginning with the former.

172

The J ijj iga Sector

As we have seen earlier, traders were permitted to resume their domestic khat trade
in June 1965, even though export to Somalia remained illegal under the terms of the SOE.
Traders began to supply khat to such border towns as TeferiBer, Togochale and Harshin,
paying the 0.50 birr per kilogram income tax. The proximity of these towns to Somalia held
out the possibility that khat could be smuggled across the border without payment of export
taxes. In face of this possibility, an additional 0.06 birr per kilogram export duty was
imposed on all khat that was meant for consumption in regions east of Jijjiga. Since khat
was not officially exported to Somalia, the Customs Department had no role in the Jijjiga
sector, and the nominal export duties (i.e., 0.06) were to be collected by the Internal
Revenue Department. Traders were thus required to pay a total of 0.56 per kilogram in both
income and export taxes. '7

The export duty rate reduction was meant to encourage legal trade and weaken the

18

smuggling that had ﬂourished during the period the embargo. The reduction of taxes by
44 percent was so attractive that many traders willingly paid the stipulated amount and
operated legally. In the Dire Dawa section, the rate of both income and export taxes
remained unchanged. The Customs Department continued to levy 1.00 birr per kilogram on

khat that was exported to Djibouti while the Internal Revenue Department collected income

 

‘7 HPA-GC.2, Minutes of a Meeting of the committee assigned to study Income tax
conditions in Harerge, September 19, 1962 E. C.

‘8 HPA-GC.2, Abate Astatke, Director of Jijjiga Customs, to Brigadier General Abebe
Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division and Chief Administrator of the SOE, October
5, 1957 EC.

173
taxes at a rate of 1.00 birr per kilogram on domestic transactions.”

The new tax arrangement presented two major problems. First, legality ended once
khat cleared through the tax post at Harer, since most of the khat that was meant for domestic
consumption was actually taken across the border after only 0.56 birr was paid on each
kilogram of khat. Second, for traders originating in areas east of Harer, the new tax structure
meant a free—ride to any destination. Traders who set out from Gursum awraja paid no taxes,
whether they sold their khat within Ethiopia or in Somalia.” Customs officials believed that
smuggling was depriving the state of a substantial portion of its rightﬁrl revenue. They
estimated that the new policy resulted in a loss of an estimated 93,000 birr in just two months
and argued for the reinstatement of formal export taxes. But as long as the SOE remained
in effect, it was practically impossible to collect export taxes on the Jijjiga side.”

In January 1966, the provincial administration took two measures to prevent further
revenue loss. The tax collection post was moved from Harer to Jijjiga because the latter was
deemed to be strategically situated to control the movement of traders. Gursum officials
were authorized to levy taxes on khat that originated in their awraja. Income taxes were
collected at Fugnanbirra, the capital of Gursum, at a rate of 1.00 birr per kilogram of khat.

Under the new arrangement, traders headed for the Ogaden or Northern Somalia were

 

” Before 1964, the combined rate of export and income taxes was 1.00 per kg. After the
export tax rate was reduced to 0.06 birr, traders paid only 0.56 birr per kg of khat. The reduction
amounted to 44 %.

” HPA-GC.2, Bejirond Zewde Awoke, Harerge's Treasurer, to Kegnazrnatch Tesfaye
Wondimagegnehu, Governor of Gursum sub-province, January 16, 1958 EC.

” I-IPA-GC.2, Abate Astatke, Director of Jijjiga Customs to Brigadier General Abebe
Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division and Chief Administrator of the SOE, October
5, 1957 E. C..

174
occasionally forced to pay income tax twice, once at Fugnanbirra and then at J ijj iga, before
they reached their destinations.”

In October 1966, the provincial administration stepped in to thwart smuggling. A
decision was made to equalize income tax rates paid at J ijjiga with that of the Dire Dawa
sector, where income and export taxes had been 1.00 birr per kilogram of khat since 1960.
The proponents of a uniform taxation structure argued that contraband trade was nonexistent
before 1964 when tax rates were the same around the entire province and called for the
reinstatement of the status quo ante in order to end unofﬁcial trading activities. The nominal
0.06 birr export tax and the 0.50 birr income tax were consequently abolished and replaced
by a ﬂat 1.00 per kilogram of income taxes regardless of the destination of the merchandise.
In effect, taxes went from a total of 0.56 to 1.00 birr, whether khat was meant for domestic
consumption or illegally exported to Somalia.”

The new rate was not popular with traders, since, in determining the rate at which
taxes were levied, officials apparently paid no attention to the fact that khat prices were
seasonal and extremely volatile. One kilogram of khat which sold for, for example, ﬁve
birr during dry seasons, when only irrigated khat was available, would hardly fetch 2 birr
during rainy seasons. Traders frequently complained about a tax regime that did not take into
consideration the nature of the business and petitioned the government for the return of the

tax rates to the 0.56 birr level. They also complained about the redundancy, confusion and

 

” I-IPA-GC.2, Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Harerge's Inderassie to the Treasurer (Bejirond)
of the Province, January 20, 1958 E. C.

23 HPA-GC.2, A memorandum for Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Inderassie of Harerge,
October 14, 1959 EC.

175

inconvenience created by the decision to collect taxes in several places. Notwithstanding
the problems, the khat business prospered and the revenue collected at J ijjiga and Gursum
rose sharply, reaching a comparatively high level of 1.6 million birr in 1967-68.”

Meanwhile, relations between Ethiopia and Somalia improved and occasioned the
dissolution of the SOE. In a communique’ announced on September 18, 1968, the two
countries declared that they have agreed to restore trade. The agreement provided for the
resumption of legal khat exportation to Somalia and meant that the Customs Department
could begin to levy taxes at the old rate of 1.00 birr per kilogram. Accordingly, income tax
was suspended in the Jijjiga section, since a double tax might have forced legal traders to
go underground and lead to revenue decline. The reinstatement of the previous system, i.e.,
the collection of income taxes by the Internal Revenue Department and export duties by the
Customs Department, was restored as a temporary arrangement, and a commission was
appointed to study and propose a uniform tax structure for the entire province.”

The commission thoroughly examined the process of khat marketing, studied the
relevant tax laws and observed the existing practices of tax collection in Harerge. Based on
its interpretation of the laws and its ﬁndings about marketing systems, transportation costs
and price differentials between speciﬁc areas, the commission recommended the adoption
of a region-speciﬁc, rather than a province-wide tax structure. Accordingly, in both Dire

Dawa and J ijjiga sections, the export tax was ﬁxed at 1.00 birr per kilogram of khat plus a

 

2" HPA-GC.2, Bejirond Negatu Mekuria, Harerge's Treasurer to Dej, Workineh Wolde
Amanuel, Harerge's Inderassie, September 5, 1962 EC.

25 HPA-GC.2, Dej. Workineh Wolde Amanuel to Fitaurari Kebede Wadaju, May 5, 1962
EC.

176
2 percent transaction fee. In the Jijjiga sector, so as to discourage smuggling, an additional
income tax of 0.45 birr per kilogram was introduced.

On the Dire Dawa section, there were traders who used chartered planes to supply
consumers in Ogaden towns such as Dagahbour, KebriDehar, Kelafo and Gode. The khat
trade here was, therefore, different from other domestic operations which used only vehicles.
Taking into account that air-transportation was more expensive and that khat prices were
consequently higher in the Ogaden than other places, traders who supplied this region were
made subject to 0.55 birr per kg of khat, 0.05 cents higher than the income tax rate stipulated

for other domestic operations. ”

TABLE 4: Khat income tax and Export duty rates as of October 28, 1969.

 

 

Sector Customs Internal Revenue Transaction
(Birr/kg) (Birr/kg) Fee
Jijjiga (export) ' 1.00 0.45 2 %
(domestic) -- 0.50 --
Dire Dawa (export) 1.00 -- 2 %
(domestic) -- 0.55 --

 

Under the new tax structure, traders who exported khat to Northern Somalia were
required to pay a total of 1.45 birr in export and income taxes plus 2 percent transaction fee

per kilogram of khat. The increase was 158 percent higher than the 0.56 birr rate. The initial

 

26HPA-GC.2, Lt. General Kebede Gebre, Harerge's Inderassie to the sub-provinces of J ijjiga
and Degahbour, to the Director of Customs of the northern provinces and to Internal Revenue
Administration offices of the sub-provinces, October 26, 1969 E. C.

177
reaction of traders was to submit petitions to the provincial administration, requesting that
the new export duty and income tax rates revert at least to the rate that existed in 1964, i.e.,
1.00 birr per kilogram. In their petitions, they put the provincial administration on notice that
strike would be imminent, if their demands were not met.”

The end of the embargo was expected to lead to a sharp increase in the revenue
collected by the Customs and Internal Revenue Departments. To the surprise of officials,
collections declined, suggesting a major slump in the khat export business. By the end of
November 1969, one month after the new tax rates were put into effect, the Customs and
Internal Revenue Departments collected a little more than 114, 000 birr, showing a 5.2
percent decrease from the 120,000 birr collected by the Customs Department alone during
the same month of the previous year.” Regardless of the loss, the government pressed ahead
with the enforcement of the new tax rate. Neither the revenue drop nor the mounting
petitions from traders were sufficient to nudge the government into revising its decision.

Towards the end of 1969, the official khat industry began to exhibit signs of a
dramatic decline. In the six months after the new taxes were implemented, the amount of
export tax revenue collected by Customs Department dropped from 830,053 birr to 542, 512
birr, nearly 35 percent compared to the same months of the previous year. The loss in export

taxes was somewhat compensated for by the reinstituted income tax revenue which brought

 

” HPA-GC.2, The appeal of thirty-two khat traders to Dej. Workineh Wolde Amanuel,
Inderassie of Harerge, October 30, 1962 EC. Twenty of the thirty two petitioners were women. HPA-
GC.2, The appeal of nine khat traders to the Office of the Governor of Jijjiga sub-province, April 26,
1962 EC.

” HPA-GC.2, Beshir Shiek Abdi, Governor of J ijj iga, to Colonel Yilma Teshome,
Commander of the 10th Infantry Division and Chief Administrator of the SOE in the Northern Section
of the province. March 27, 1962 EC.

178
in 239,202 birr collected by the Internal Revenue Department. The monthly break down of
the revenue statistics showed that the loss in tax revenue climbed each month, clearly
signaling that the khat industry was facing a serious problem.” The fact that income taxes
registered a consistent increase while export duties spiraled downwards month after month
unambiguously indicated that more traders were opting for the lower income tax rates,

although it cannot be said that they were not smuggling.

TABLE 5: Comparative Statistics of Export duty and Income tax revenues in birr.

 

 

Months 1968-69(A) 1969—70 (B) Difference (A&B) Income Taxes
Oct] 8-30 63,832 37,333 26,499 16,462
November 120,100 79,287 40,812 34,953
December 127,982 91,801 36,180 40,474
January 156,391 108,524 47,866 47,852
February 176,770 1 17,862 58,908 51,972
March 184,975 107,701 77,274 47,488
Total 830,053 542,512 287,541 239,202

 

Source: HPA-GC.2, Bejirond Belete Gebre to Harerge Provincial Administration, April
12, 1962 EC.

Solid quantitative, evidence is lacking on the speciﬁc reason for the drain on
government revenue, but there is evidence that the number of the licensed export traders was

consistently declining, suggesting a weakening ofﬁcial export market. In October 1969, just

 

29 I-IPA-GC.2, Belete Gebre, Director of Customs of the Easter Regions to the Ofﬁce of
Harerge's Provincial Administration. April 12, 1962 EC.

179
before the new tax rates were implemented, there were more than 100 licensed private traders
in khat export business. By April 1970, there were only 5 such traders, all of whom were
women.30 In May, all khat traders, most of whom were Somalis, declared that they had
stopped exporting khat to Somalia, claiming bankruptcy and citing the government's failure

‘ Authorities interpreted the action of

to act on their petitions to repeal the new tax rates.3
the traders as a "strike"32 and even suspected sabotage by Somali government agents. The
khat issue had obviously become a political problem.

In fact, the authorities were never convinced that the traders' petitions were genuine
appeals for reductions of unaffordable taxes rates. The latter's obvious display of wealth,
such as vehicle purchases for private and business uses, led to the government's insistence
on maintaining the new tax rates. Ofﬁcials were convinced that khat traders were " getting
rich" by defrauding the government, primarily because of smuggling which was allowed

to go unchecked. Revising the tax rate was never considered as a means to curb contraband

trade activities. Most ofﬁcials instead wanted to crack down on the smugglers.33

 

30Women submitted the majority of petitions to the provincial administration requesting the
resumption of the "Hargessa" route. Women retailed khat in local markets, traveling only short
distances from the town of J ijjiga. The proceeds allowed women to make money they could spend
independently of their husbands and fathers. The prohibition deprived them of the right to do
independent business and forced them to revert to their role of taking care of the family. Another
explanation could be that men were able to engage in contraband trade while women were obligated
to stay close to their families.

31HPA-GC.2, Telegram from Assefa Aboye, Director of J ijjiga Customs to Dej. Workineh
Wolde Amanuel, May 6, 1962 EC.

32 The Amharic term for a strike, adma, connotes conspiracy, not just a strike in demand of
minor adjustment in wages, working conditions and so forth.

33 HPA-GC. 2, Report of the Khat Commission of Inquiry submitted to Dej. Workineh
Wolde Amanuel, May 9, 1962 EC. p. 6.

1 80

Even though the government was committed to increasing revenue and stamping out
parallel market exchanges, it did not possess the institutional, logistical and ﬁnancial
capacity necessary to secure the border areas and control the activities of contraband traders.
Under—paid, poorly trained and inappropriately equipped government personnel were unable
to curtail the activities of experienced and well-organized contraband traders. The latter’s
brand new, faster and dependable pick-up trucks were able to traverse the sandy, ﬂat lands
between J ijjiga and the Somali border with little or no interference from government control

3“ Official documents from lower echelon ofﬁcials are full of complaints about

apparatus.
the lack of personnel, ﬁnance, communication equipments and dependable means of
transportation. In April 1970, just before khat traders went on "strike", there were only
twelve police ofﬁcers in J ijjiga, equipped with only one poorly maintained vehicle.35

It is probably true that the new tax rate was so high that it forced licensed traders to
opt for parallel markets. In the early 1970s, smuggling obviously owed a great deal to the
traders' increased capacity to evade customs posts. Licensed traders also shrewdly
manipulated the new tax structure to expand the parallel market for khat. The new tax
collecting arrangement gave overlapping jurisdiction to the Customs and Internal Revenue

Departments to levy their respective taxes at J ijjiga. The arrangement was meant to reduce

the chances of traders crossing over to Somalia without paying export duties, but it seems

 

3‘ HPA-GC.2, Beshir Shiek Abdi, Governor of Jijjiga to Colonel Yilma Teshome,
Commander of the 10th Infantry Division and Chief Administrator of the Northern Section of the
SOE. March 27, 1962 E. C.

35 HPA-GC.2, Beshir Shiek Abdi, Governor of Jijjiga to Colonel Yihna Teshome,
Commander of the 10th Infantry Division and Chief Administrator of the Northern Section of the
SOE. March 27, 1962 E. C.

181
no amount of tinkering with the taxation structure had much effect. Traders were still able
to get around the tax structure and the means of collection and smuggle khat into Somalia.
After purchasing khat in the vicinity of Harer, traders headed directly for the
customs' post at Jijjiga, labeling their consignment "for domestic consumption." Several
hundred kilograms of khat daily passed through the tax collection points after income taxes
were paid at the rate of 0.50 birr per kilogram as required by the new law. Past Jijjiga, it
was ahnost impossible to track down and ensure that the leaves were consumed within the
limits of the declared destination. In fact, most of the khat that was ostensibly intended for
domestic consumption was transported to Somalia on three routes. A few miles out of
J ijjiga, the ﬁrst route branched off south and went to Kebribeyah, where it broke into several
roads leading into Somalia. The second turned northward to LefaIssa, where it diverged in
different directions and crossed the border. Still others remained on the J ijjiga-Hargessa
route, proceeding to Togochale and crossing into Somalia through the guarded border points
(see ﬁgure 4). In such cases, complacent ofﬁcials allowed the traders to transfer khat to

their clients from Somalia in return for graft.36
Unlicensed traders participated in the parallel markets but pursued different strategies
to "beat the system." The unlicensed traders were not allowed to operate officially, that is,
they were not permitted to clear through the tax collection post at J ijjiga. Thus, they avoided
J ijjiga and the tax collection post there altogether and reached the border crossing points

without paying taxes of any kind. They therefore differed from the licensed traders who

 

36 HPA-GC. 2, Report of the Khat Commission of Inquiry submitted to Dej. Workineh
Wolde Amanuel, May 9, 1962 EC. p. 6; HPA-GC.1, Beshir Shiek Abdi, Governor of Jijjiga, to
Harerge Provincial Administration Ofﬁce, May 30, 1962 EC.

182

usually paid the lower rate income tax, although in most cases they smuggled the khat out.
The unlicensed traders frequented four routes to reach the border: the ﬁrst originated in
regions south of Harer, passed through Aroresa and Hartisheik and entered Somalia at
Awkelef; the second started off in regions south of Harer, passed through Chinahasen and
went directly to TeferiBer; the third branched off from the Harer—Jijjiga road before reaching
J ijjiga, went north-east through LefaIssa and crossed the border at TeferiBer or went south-
east through Kebribeyah and Harshin on to Somalia; and the fourth proceeded through
Golulcha, on to Sheble and then through Gogti into Somalia (Figure 4). For transport, some
used donkeys, camels and porters to transport khat, but most utilized Land Rover trucks .37

Once the commodity was smuggled into Somalia, the marketing of khat was no
longer unofﬁcial. Import duties were paid and the operation became a well organized
process controlled by a few personalities. In the early 1970s, a person called Abdi Sheriff
reportedly ran a khat smuggling ﬁrm which owned twenty-eight Land Rovers and an
unspeciﬁed number of camels and donkeys. The individual participated in the khat parallel
market in two ways. On the one hand, his agents purchased khat from EthiOpian smugglers
and distributed it in Somalia. On the other, his vehicles provided transportation within
Ethiopia for contraband traders. While in Ethiopia, these vehicles usually operated at night
in order to avoid being detected, but even daylight was not quite a hindrance to their

movement. The vehicles possessed registration plates for both countries and changed them

 

37 I-IPA-GC.2, Report of the Khat Commission of Inquiry, Submitted to Dej. Workineh Wolde
Amanuel, Inderassie of Harerge, May 19, 1962 EC. pp. 6-7.

1 83

as necessary.38

The infrastructure of the parallel market was well organized but, as is the case with
all hidden exchanges, we have far less information about the unofﬁcial transactions than we
would like. The lack of suggestive statistics makes it hard to know the magnitude of the khat
parallel market, but estimates may be drawn from the ﬁgures of the oﬁicial market. In the
late 19605, 7,000-8,000 kilograms of khat was ofﬁcially exported to Somalia every day.39
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the quantity of khat exported through unofﬁcial
channels was larger than the ofﬁcial one. For instance, the amount that daily cleared
through J ijjiga as a supply for residents of Ogaden towns reportedly exceeded their need by
more than 5,000 kilograms.40 This ﬁgure excludes the khat that never reached the Customs
post at J ijjiga, having been taken by smugglers directly to the border crossing points. Ifwe
assumed that the quantity of the smuggled khat was half the amount of the ofﬁcial, it means
a combined total of approximately 12,000 kilograms (8,000 official + 4,000 unofﬁcial) of
khat entered Somalia daily. Following the "strike" of May 1970, no khat ofﬁcially cleared
through Jijjiga and consumers in Somalia were in all likelihood supplied through unofficial
channels. Based on the above ﬁgure, it is possible to estimate that approximately 360 tons

of khat were smuggled into Somalia monthly during the "strike."

 

38HPA-GC.2, Belayneh Abebe, Acting Director of J ijjiga Customs, to Dej. Werkineh Wolde
Amanuel, Inderassie of Harerge, May 3, 1962 EC. HPA-GC.2, Dej. Workineh Wolde Amanuel to
Major General Abebe Gemeda, Commander of the Third Infantry Division, May 5, 1962 EC.

39HPA-GC.2, Telegram ﬁ'om the Governor of J ijjiga to C01. Yilma Teshome, Major General
Abebe Gemeda, Dej. Workineh Wolde Amanuel and Bejirond Negatu Awoke, October 8, 1962 E.C.

‘0 HPA-GC.2, Fitaurari Meharene Minda, Deputy Inderassie of Harer, to the Third Infantry
Division Command, October 19, 1962 E. C.

184

In Somalia, a kilogram of khat fetched as much as 5.00 birr during low supply
seasons. At an average price of 2.00 birr per kilogram, Somali consumers spent an estimated
9 million birr on khat annually. The high value suggests that, by the early 19705, the khat
industry had become the main source of income and employment for farmers, traders and
those who provided auxiliary services as truck drivers, porters, packers and brokers.4| As
will be shown in chapter six, hundreds of people also depended on the proceeds from khat
to purchase consumer commodities in Somalia to smuggle into Ethiopia. The khat business
was so central to Harerge's economy that a disruption would inevitably weaken the ofﬁcial
market, strengthen the parallel ones and adversely affect the region's politics and economic
well-being.42

The fear of dislocation and political instability made the khat issue a matter of
national concern. An emergency meeting attended by Ato Mulatu Debebe, the Minster of
State for Finance, Colonel Solomon Kedir, the Vice Minster of State for Customs and Dej.
Workineh Wolde Amanuel, Harerge's inderassie, planned and launched an effort to
encourage the traders to resume their activities and avert any potential political unrest. The
plan approached the problem of smuggling from two important, if contradictory, directions.
The ﬁrst grew out of the thinking that a more organized, well-equipped and better ﬁnanced
force would gain control over the contraband trade. The second was borne out by perhaps

a reluctant recognition that taxes had become heavy, redundant and cumbersome. In regard

 

‘1 GebreMichael, The Kottu of Harerge, p. 92.

‘2 HPA-GC. 2, Report of the Khat Commission of Inquiry submitted to Dej. Workineh Wolde
Amanuel, May 9, 1962 EC. p. 1.

1 85

to the ﬁrst approach, a campaign against contraband trade was immediately launched while
the issue of taxes was referred to a commission set up to study the problem and recommend
solutions.43 To implement the ﬁrst part of the plan, which capitalized on physical controls,
customs officers, Ministry of Finance police personnel and army troops were brought in to
J ijiiga from Harer Zurya, Gursum and Wobbera awrajas and were deployed along the major
smuggling routes, speciﬁcally in the towns of Togochale, LefaIssa, Haroressa, Mekanisa and
the Dahital-Hartisheik area. Six transport vehicles were assigned to the service of the task
force.44

The bulk of the ofﬁcial correspondence on the subject reveals that the campaign was
ineffectual from the outset. The Ethiopian government did not have the resources needed to
overwhelm the contraband traders. To illustrate, I will present sample letters written at
various times during the three years when the campaign was being conducted. The ﬁrst was
written immediately before the traders' "strike" of May 1970.

The magnitude of khat that transits out through contraband channels is

considerable. It has weakened the legal khat market and undercut those

traders who [abide] by the law, preventing them from fulﬁlling their legal

obligations and operating officially. It is important that the vehicles that were

assigned to the Ministry of Finance police be sent [to us] as soon as possible.

[Ifthis is not done] the "normal" traders would join the contraband sector and
government revenue would disappear.45

 

43HPA-GC.2, Dej. Workineh Wolde Amanuel to Mammo Taddesse, Minster of Finance, May
10, 1962, E. C; HPA-GC.2, Lt. Colonel Solomon Kadir, Vice Minster of State for Customs to Mr.
Mammo Taddesse, Minster of Finance, May 11, 1962 EC.

‘4 HPA-GC.2, Minutes of the meeting of the committee to control contraband trade, Harer,
may 6, 1962 E.C.; Belayneh Abebe, Acting Director of Jijjiga Customs, to Dej. Workineh Wolde
Amanuel, May 3, 1962 E . C.

45 HPA-GC.2, Fitaurari Beshir Shiek Abdi to Col. Yihna Teshome, Dej. Workineh Wolde
Amanuel, Major General Abebe Gemeda, and Bejirond Negatu Mekuria, April 12, 1962 EC.

186

Another letter written two months into the "strike" and a month after the start of the
campaign states:

Members of the Ministry of Finance police who were assigned to control the

khat wealth that is being smuggled out have no vehicle to move around

with and they have not been paid per diem [since the campaign got

underway]. Contraband traders have taken advantage of the lapse and have

increased their activities. [Please] dispatch the vehicles that were reportedly

purchased for the purpose [of the effort to stop contraband trade] and make

the per diem paid to the police personnel as soon as possible.46

The third letter was written three years after the "strike" and the start of the campaign.
It was composed by an apparently ﬁ'ustrated police commander to remind high level oﬁicials
that "it is impossible for a police officer who has only two feet to chase and catch a khat-
loaded, "four-footed" vehicle which has escaped without paying taxes."47 Clearly the policy
of physical control failed because the smugglers "beat the system" which did not possess the
efﬁciency, equipment and personnel necessary to gain control over border and smuggling.
The ﬁrst approach, therefore, failed to force traders into the ofﬁcial sector.

Meanwhile, the Khat Commission of Inquiry began its investigations in May 1970
to determine the causes of smuggling and the traders "strike." The commissioners toured
the porous border areas, carried out extensive interviews with elders, farmers, traders

(mostly women), and concerned government ofﬁcials. The commission's ﬁnal report cited

higher taxes, the loopholes in the newly implemented tax collection system, and the

 

‘6 HPA-GC.2, Colonel Yilma Teshome to Colonel Solomon Kedir, Dej. Workineh Wolde
Amanuel, Major General Abebe Gemeda, Bejirond Negatu Makuria , the Director of Customs for
Eastern Provinces and the Governor of J ijjiga, July 12, 1962 E. C.

4"HPA-GCJ, The Commandant of Ministry of Finance police of Wobbera sub-province to
Office of Wobbera's Treasurer, January 26, 1965 E. C.

187

contraband traders' improved travel capability as the principal reasons for the growth of
smuggling and the consequent decline in tax revenues.48

Qualitative evidence, such as the views of traders, farmers, local leaders and
government ofﬁcials which were quoted ad verbatim and included in the minutes of the
commission's deliberations, bear out the fact that higher tax rates precipitated the traders'
"strike." Furthermore, a work sheet showing the expenses borne by traders as khat traveled
from the producer to the consumer, also included in the commission's report, revealed that
the new tax rates absorbed all potential proﬁts. Even though the evidence showed that tax
rates were responsible for the "strike," the commissioners concluded that it was the
unchecked expansion of contraband trade that frustrated traders and forced them out of their
trade. Their recommendation, predictably, advocated bolstering physical controls and
improving the government's institutional and logistical capabilities to secure the border and
to apprehend and punish illegal traders. "9

The then Minster of Finance Mammo Taddese rationalized that cunning traders had
brilliantly manipulated the rate differential between income taxes and export duties to evade
taxes, thereby increasing the quantity of the khat that was smuggled into Somalia. At J ijj iga,
traders paid the lower income tax and cleared the tax collection post, pretending to be
suppliers for domestic consumers but mostly transported their khat into Somalia. Since they

avoided paying the higher export duty, the Finance Minister reasoned that the logical

 

48 HPA-GC.2, Report of the Khat Commission of Inquiry, Submitted to Dej. Workineh
Wolde Amanuel, Inderassie of Harerge, May 19, 1962 EC. pp. 1-10.

“HPA-GCZ, Minutes of the deliberations of the Khat Commission of Inquiry, J ijj iga, May
7, 1962 E. C. pp. 1-53.

188
solution to the parallel market problem was to make the abused income tax rate prohibitive
and reduce export taxes rates in order to encourage legally exported khat. Accordingly, he
reduced the export tax rate from 1.45 birr to 1.25 and raised income tax rates from 0.50 birr
to 0.65 birr per kilogram of khat. 5°

Because the net change was insigniﬁcant (0.05 birr), these adjustments did not
change the behavior of traders. The effort to secure the border, as pointed out earlier, was
ineffectual, and traders preferred the still lower income taxes (at 0.65 birr) rather than the
export duties (1.25 birr). Careful examination of the records of the provincial administration
from 1970 to 197 4 reveals that the cat-and-mouse game between the government and traders,
which was actually a competition over the khat industry, was as intensive as ever. Inter-
departmental correspondences show the continued inability of government to secure the
border and to curb illegal commercial activities owing to the inadequacy of equipments and
personnel.

In terms of achieving control over the parallel markets, the government did not
match the resources of the contraband traders. Nor did the negligible export tax reduction
convince khat exporters and domestic dealers to return to the ofﬁcial sector. When its effort
failed in the border areas, the government resorted to squeezing as much revenue as possible
from small khat retailers who operated in urban centers. The retailers in urban areas were
mostly women, who had never been required to pay taxes. Provincial archives from the

early 19705 are replete with reports of intimidation, physical harassment and imprisonment

 

5° HPA-GC.2, Alrnazneh Workie, Vice Treasurer of Harerge to the Internal Revenue
Departments of Harerge's Seven sub-provinces, July 2, 1962 EC.

189
of small traders on account of their failure to pay taxes.51
In the early 19708, the khat business in the Jijjiga sector faced new and serious
challenges from the Somali side. Following the October 1969 military coup d'etat in
Somalia, demand for khat dropped, perhaps owing to a general economic slow down caused
by political uncertainties and the fact that unpaid civil servants were unable to buy khat. The
main reason for declining demand was nevertheless the increment of import duties on khat
ﬁom Ssh 6.06 to Ssh 10.50 per kilo gram.52
The decision to raise import duties to prohibitive levels was part of the new Somali
government's stance against the consumption of khat, particularly that which was imported
from Ethiopia. The military leaders capitalized on the popular dislike of Ethiopia to end a
habit they considered to be harmful to Somali society and economy. In November 1971, a
cholera epidemic was reported in Ethiopia, and the Somali government seized the moment
to suspend the importation of khat. The ban was lifted two months later, but future
importations were placed under strict government control. All the khat imported from
Ethiopia was directed to one place, Nebodid, where government inspectors examined quality,

and customs officials levied duties at the rate indicated above.53

 

51HPA-KF.1, Women khat retailers in Harer town to the Provincial Administration Office,
March 3, 1966 E.C.; HPA-KF.1, A petition signed by thirty-two representatives of Harer women
protesting higher taxes to the Provincial Administration Office, August 23, 1966 E.C.; HPA-KF.1,
Women khat traders in Deder town to the Administrator of Wobbera awraja, April 30, 1967 E.C.;
HPA-KF. 1, Women khat traders in Jijjiga town to the Administrator of Jijjiga awaraja, September 18,
1968 EC.

52 HPA-GC.2, Belete Gebre, Director of Customs for Eastern Provinces to Dej. Workineh
Wolde Amanuel, November 4, 1963 E. C.

53HPA-GC.2, Fitaurari Meharene Minda, Deputy Inderassie of Harerge, to Bitwoded Zewde
GebreI-Iiwot, Minster of Interior, November 9, 1963 E. C.

190

In the J ijjiga sector, khat was a pawn in the contentious political relationship between
Ethiopia and Somalia. Depending on circumstances, both governments used khat as either
a source of revenue or as a "weapon" against one another's economy. More often, political
considerations rather than economic merits, inﬂuenced the formulation of policies
concerning the marketing of khat. In the early 1970s, Harerge's khat economy suffered from
a coincidence of policies in both Ethiopia and Somalia which centered around controlling
the movement, marketing and use of the commodity. The evidence, at least ﬁom the
Ethiopian side, shows that the level of government intervention in the marketing of khat
remained unresolved until the mid-19708. By the time of the imperial regime's downfall in
1974, despite the relentless appeals from traders for tax reductions, 5“ tax rates remained

high and parallel market activities were not brought under control.

The Dire Dawa Sector

The difﬁculties of the Jijjiga market diverted traders to the Dire Dawa section. Since
the late 19205, when khat began to be exported in signiﬁcant quantities, Dire Dawa had been
the main market center for purchase, processing and shipment to Djibouti. The market did
not suffer the difﬁculties which had beleaguered Aden and Hargessa, perhaps because of its
organizational and operational efficiency. Dire Dawa's khat export was dominated by a few
well-organized private exporters who also controlled the market in Djibouti. In the 19603

and 19708, the businesses were technically privately owned enterprises, but the owners

 

5‘ HPA-GC.2, Nine licensed khat traders to the ofﬁce of Governor of J ijiiga sub-province,
April 26, 1962 EC.

191

operated through a Djibouti based consortium named Association des Importateurs et des
marchands de kath (AIMK). By 1975, the consortium had ﬁfty-one members who
maintained agents in Dire Dawa.55

The consortium kept other exporters from gaining ground in the Dire Dawa market,
primarily because of its exclusive access to air transportation and its distribution network in
Djibouti . The AIMK contracted with Ethiopian Airlines daily to dispatch 3,600 kilograms
of khat, and the airline agreed not to accept khat shipments from other exporters. Once khat
arrived in Djibouti, members of the consortium received their share of khat and distributed
it to retailers.56

In addition to their monopoly over transportation and the market in Djibouti, the
AIMK exporters also maintained a unique business relationship with khat farmers in
Kombolcha and the northeastern part of Haramaya where the dallota khat variety, popular
in Djibouti, grew abundantly. The agents of the exporters bought khat on the farm, offered
farmers prices higher than the market and furnished their own transport to Dire Dawa. The
exporters thus established a special relationship with producers. With their control of
production, access to air-transportation and the distribution networks in Djibouti, members

of the consortium established a near monopoly position in the Dire Dawa sector. ’7

 

55HPA-GC.2, Mohamed Sougal Bahdon, President de l'Association Djibouti to the Director
General of the Ministry of Commerce, Dire Dawa, November 28, 1975.

56 HPA-KF.1, Manager of Operations of Ethiopian Airlines to the branch oﬁice of the
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism in Harerge, April 3, 1966 E.C.; HPA-KF.1, Khat Traders
in Dire Dawa to the Minster of Trade, Industry and Tourism, October 12, 1967 EC.

57HPA-GC.1, A petition from the Farmers of Dire Tiara, Kombolcha district, addressed to the
Governor of Harer Zurya awraja, August 25, 1966 EC.

192

In the mid-19705, a few traders unsuccessfully attempted to establish a competing
organization in Dire Dawa.58 They failed because of three reasons: ﬁrst, producers refused
to sell khat to the new "company's" agents.59 Secondly, the new exporters were unable to
penetrate the market in Djibouti, since it was controlled the representatives of the AIMK
there. Thirdly, the new "company" could not get the Ethiopian Airlines to agree to transport
its khat shipment.

Supplied by air-transport, Djibouteans consumed a fresh, potent but expensive khat.
High-price commodities often favor the rich, but, in Djibouti, even poor men spent as much
as 40 percent of their incomes on khat. In the 19603, Djibouti annually spent 800 million DF
on khat, or the equivalent of half the territory's revenue. In 1965, some youth clubs carried
out a week long campaign, with the assistance of the mass media, against khat use, but their
efforts did not diminish the habit. A year later, Djibouti's Governor Saget forbade the
importation and sale of khat in the Territory, but succeeded only in provoking popular
discontent."O Khat consumption did not show any sign of tapering off as the result of these

actions.

 

58 HPA-GC.1, The appeal of six traders to Samuel Teferra, Governor of Dire Dawa sub-
district and Mayor of the town, April 20, 1967 EC.

59 HPA-GC.1, Hajji Abdurahiman Ali and Hajji Bakar Ali, representatives of the people of
Kombolcha to Fitaurari Kebede Wedaju, Vice Inderassie of Harerge, August 24, 1966 EC.

60 Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn, pp. 164-5.

193
C. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the ways in which the Ethiopian
govemment sought control over khat-generated wealth and the manners in which traders
resisted policies they considered to be instances of intolerable state intervention in
agricultural marketing. The production and marketing of khat was a big business which
provided opportunities for proﬁt. The growth in scale of the business provided an
unparalleled occasion to enhance state revenues and prompted attempts to control it, ﬁrst
through trading monopolies and later, through taxes and duties.

There were several occasions of concerted action to improve the conditions of trade,
including the unprecedented tactic in the local political history of successﬁrlly organizing
a "strike." In the main, however, the challenges traders presented against unpopular policies
centered around trying to circumvent or by-pass the machines put in place to extract
revenues. The policy to impose and increase tax rates led to a new growth industry,
smuggling. In their efforts to avoid what they thought to be unfair obligations to the
government, traders wereaided by institutions such as kinship and indigenous commercial
networks which the government was not able to penetrate. Still, the traders' main advantage
was the government's own inability to implement its own policies.

Analysis of the genesis and development of capacities of the Ethiopian state or even
its policies on khat is beyond the scope of this chapter and indeed this dissertation.
Nevertheless, the khat policies and the ways the government went about implementing them
raise important questions about state capabilities. The struggle between the government and

traders over khat marketing showed that the Ethiopian government did not have the

194

resources necessary to implement its policies, especially in terms of controlling contraband
trade. It is apparent that policy formulation does not guarantee its effective implementation.
The series of policy measures that the government took became objects of struggle and those
groups not favored by the state were interested in avoiding as much as possible government
control and the implementation of its policies. There is no unidirnensional continuum by
which state capacity could be measured. Still, as Joel Migdal states, "social control for the
state entails more than insinuation or penetration of its agencies into society, more even than
just successful extraction of resources. It includes the ability to appropriate resources for
particular purposes and to regulate people's daily behavior."6' With regard to its khat
policies, the imperial state was less than able to do so and it may appropriately be labeled as
"weak."

The difficulties faced by the export market ranging from market monopoly to
government intervention appear to have created tremendous inconveniences for traders but
brought little change to the production levels of the commodity. In addition to the
unofﬁcial markets, domestic consumption absorbed the surplus production created by the
demise of ofﬁcial markets. In the next section, I will examine the extent of domestic

consumption and its role in the overall khat market in the 19608 and early 19708.

 

6' Joel S. Migdal, Strong states and Weak States: State-society Relations and State
capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, 1988), p. 61.

CHAPTER SIX

The Domestic Context:

Consumption, Structures of Distribution and Crop Competition, c.1964-1974.

The decade preceding the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 witnessed a rapid expansion
of khat consumption in Harerge. Since no systematic consumer survey has ever been
undertaken, it is difﬁcult to document the process, but circumstantial evidence suggests that
consumption greatly increased during the 19608. Older informants generally perceive a
dramatic contrast between the widespread consumption of khat during that decade and pre-
World War II levels. Middle aged informants recollect the proliferation of khat parties in
most towns in the region. By the early 19708, more men and some women were spending
aftemoons chewing khat with ﬁiends in private homes and tea houses.l Informants relate
that it was common to see construction workers, students, truck drivers and cabbies, laborers,
and shopkeepers, irrespective of their religious afﬁliation, chewing khat. In the 19408 and
19508, this was a much rarer sight.2

The informant recollection is supported by written evidence. In 1960, Clarke Brooke
reported that "Ethiopian Christians [in Harerge] abhor[ed] the leaf, . [ In contrast, khat

occupied] a position of considerable importance... among the Moslem agricultural Eastern

 

' Interviews: Khat chewers who were students in the 19608 remember that chewing khat
became fashionable during their high school years. They relate that they developed the habit then,
because they felt chewing was a matter of identity or a duty.

2 Interviews: Girma Andarge, Dire Dawa, February 23, 27, 1994. Duressa Feyissa, Dire
Dawa, February 24, 1994.

195

196

Galla [Oromo].3 A decade later, Demissie Gebre Michael painted a different picture when
he wrote "[ khat] use has spread so much that, in Harerge Province, many age groups of both
sexes, Christian as well as Muslims, consume a lot of chat."" Conﬁrming Gebre Michael's
observation, Getahun and Krikorian penned in 1973 that "[khat chewing] now cuts through
many faiths, social levels, and age groups... . Men and women on the farm and people in
towns, whether they be civil servants or business men, are to be seen taking time to chew
chat. The number of school boys chewing it is very high."5 In a matter of a decade, therefore,
khat chewing had become an ubiquitous practice involving all of Harerge's demographic
divisions.

Until the late 19608, most of the areas where con8urnption increased were under a
State of Emergency and trade was prohibited. The demand created thereof was met by
smuggling. The market outlet, albeit illegal, made it possible for khat to remain part of the
cropping system and an important cash earner for farmers. Nevertheless, smuggling was
unlawful and the market opportunities it created were risky, unreliable and unsustainable.
In response, farming families adopted new strategies which included the intensive use of
resources and diversiﬁed cultivation of crops which could be used for both market and
consumption purposes. Smuggling also led to the emergence of new internal marketing
structures and necessitated modiﬁcations in production strategies. I will now detail the

summary just given with qualitative and quantitative data, although the latter are difﬁth to

 

3 Brooke, "Khat in the Middle East," p. 50.
‘ GebreMichael, The Kottu of Harerge, p. 95.

’ Getahun and Krikorian, "Chat: Coffee's rival," p. 371.

197

obtain and unreliable when available.

A. Domestic Consumption and the Proliferation of Market Centers

One marked evidence of the increase in khat consumption in the 19608 was the
expansion of khat markets in size and number. The Dire Dawa retail market became second
only to Harer, although the latter was frequented by retailers who sold their khat directly to
urban consumers. Distribution was facilitated by the completion, in 1963, of the Miesso-
Dhengago road, which was constructed to connect the Harer-Dire Dawa highway to the
coffee producing regions of Chercher. The widespread use of motor vehicles on these roads
enabled producers in distant areas of Chercher to bring their khat to the Dire Dawa market.‘5

The importance of the Meisso-Dengego road was enhanced by the construction of
two feeder or farm-to-market roads, which connected AsbeTeferi to Gelemso and Kobo to
Deder. J itneys, pick-up tracks and automobiles were able to make increased use of the road,
enabling farmers to reach the market in Dire Dawa and Harer faster and inexpensively. For
instance, aﬁer the completion of the road, the cost for transporting a quintal of khat from
Kobo to Dire Dawa dropped from 8.00 birr to 3.00 birr. The new roads enabled traders to
travel to production areas and purchase khat in local markets and along the road. In the early
19708, farmers had told researchers that the road had helped them slightly to increase khat

production.7

 

6 Lakew Birke, A Stuabz of the Development Impact of the Miesso-Dengego Road, Department
of Agricultural Economics and Business, Haile Sellassie I University, College of Agriculture,
February, 1973. pp. ii-iii, 15, 64.

7 Ibid., pp. 30, 64.

198

Without the road and faster transportation, khat production could not have increased
at all. The completion of the road coincided with Aden's rejection of Ethiopian khat and the
diminution of demand for the commodity. It could be said that the road moderated the
effects of the loss because increased accessibility and faster and convenient transportation
augmented local consumption and compensated for the export market. Yet falling costs of
transportation did not see a decrease in khat prices or much ﬁnancial beneﬁt for farmers
because the market was dominated by a few merchants based in Dire Dawa who, as exclusive
exporters to Djibouti, possessed the power to set prices.8

During the second half of the 19608, new khat markets appeared throughout the rural
areas and others were enlarged. In the years before 1964, company ofﬁcials preferred to
purchase khat in Dire Dawa in order to shift to farmers the cost of damage to khat during the
speedy transport. By staying in Dire Dawa, however, purchasers grew unable to compete
for the best quality khat with independent buyers who offered higher prices on farm sites.
Eventually, the company failed to meet the qualitative and quantitative demands of Adeni
consumers.

The Djibouti exporters made a conscious decision to avoid the mistakes of the
defunct exporting company, CHATHA, by maintaining the quantity and quality of khat
. delivered each day. For them, sustaining the market was more important than trying to
maximize their proﬁt margins. The exporters dispatched hired buyers to the highlands to
purchase khat directly from farmers. Haramaya, a town which was located mid-way between

Dire Dawa and the producing regions, was then the largest wholesale khat buying market

 

' Ibid., p. 64.

199

center in Harerge highlands. Donkey-loads of khat were carried here from the surrounding
areas, and , after a brisk moming market, khat was transported east to Dire Dawa and west
through Harer to Jijjiga.9

Throughout the 19608, Haramaya remained the largest khat market. Meanwhile, at
a place called AwWoday on the Harer-Dire Dawa road, an enterprising Somali set up a
small café to cater to travelers to and from Harer. Soon a small but bustling khat market
sprang up next to it. Small grocery shops were set up so that farmers could return home with
necessities bought with the proceeds of their khat sales. Thus, the café's site was quickly
transformed into a commercial town, which, by the late 19608, became a large market center
where khat was purchased and disseminated throughout the province.‘0 Produce was
brought there from Haramaya and Kombolcha districts and ﬁom Deder and Wobbera or
Gara Mula’ata areas. Most of the khat that originated in Haramaya-Kombolcha areas went
to Dire Dawa and thence to Djibouti while leaves from Wobbera-Gara Mula’ata districts
were dispatched to J ijjiga, whence it was ofﬁcially and unofﬁcially exported to Northern
Somalia. "

AwWoday quickly surpassed Haramaya as the leading khat market center. A study

conducted in 1973 on the marketing of agricultural products in Haramaya district shows that

 

9 Interview: Luye Said, Haramaya, Ganda Limay, May 26, 1994.
'0 Interview: Mumed Ahmed Umer, Haramaya, May 9, 1994.

" Marc Weill, "Marketing of Agricultural Products in Harar Highlands Hararghe
Administrative Region, Ethiopia) with Special reference to Kombolcha Woreda." Unpublished

Mimeographed material, Department of Agricultural Economics, Alemaya Collage of Agriculture
(December, 1984), pp. 25-26.

200

85 percent of the khat marketed that year was exchanged in AwWoday while 10 and 15
percent were sold in large city markets and on the farm, respectively.” Informants suggest
that, while Haramaya was preferred than traveling to Dire Dawa, it was not a conducive place
for a khat market to ﬂourish. The fact that municipal ofﬁcials taxed khat transactions which
took place within the city was cited as one reason which caused buyers and sellers to avoid
the city. The main reason for the decline of Haramaya was the perception of the Muslim
producers and marketers that the town had become incompatible with khat. As an
administrative center, Haramaya was populated by Christian "Amhara" civil servants, who
preferred to consume a locale ale, "tella," rather than engaging in khat chewing. Pubs were
opened to cater to these residents and people usually got drunk there. My informants insisted
that khat was too sacred a leaf to mix with alcoholic beverages. Thus, the predominantly
Muslim khat farmers felt it dutiful to shift to the new market place at AwWoday, away from
the exacting municipality and the "deﬁling tella."'3

As the leading market center for khat, AwWoday became a destination for young men
who were looking for new opportunities. Migration to urban centers became desirable for
young men because it was creative, adventurous and future-oriented, and released
demographic pressure on land. By the 19608, population densities in rural areas were so high
that farming was becoming less and less attractive. In response, siblings often made

arrangements among themselves in which some of them migrated to towns to retail khat, a

 

'2 Lakew Birke, A Survey of the Marketing Methods and Facilities in Alemaya District, Haile
Sellassie I University, College of Agriculture, (Dire Dawa, 1974), pp. 15-16.

'3 Interview: Hajji Hassan Mohammed, Haramaya, May 5, 1994.

201

percentage of whose proceeds was remitted to the producers. Khat selling thus enabled
young males to get a foothold in urban centers and look for non-agricultural opportunities.”

The migratory process was thus facilitated by the opportunities it created in both
agriculture and trade. Farmers were able to maintain a fair size of land for cultivation by
merging the share of their siblings who had migrated to urban centers. In the early 19708,
the urbanized farmers began taking up other businesses apart from retailing khat, investing
their proﬁts mostly in small shops which carried commodities that were in demand in the
rural areas such as textiles, batteries, salt, cooking oil, sugar, blankets and so forth. A few
were able to set up gas stations while others drove taxis between Harer and Dire Dawa and
other towns in the region.15

The farmer-traders retained the right to return to their share of land, although there
is no evidence that any reverted to farming. As they ventured into other businesses, they
severed ties with their rural lands and became traders par excellence. Those who moved to
small towns on the highlands continued to be active in the khat business but those who
moved to Dire Dawa went into other businesses. In the 19608, the grong network of
government-built roads facilitated the increased use of motor vehicles for freight and
passenger services. Over time, the migrants were able to accumulate capital and branch off
to other businesses, mainly ownership of transport business, gas stations and the urban real

estate industry. For such businessmen, retuming to the farm was not an option; in fact, they

 

"' Interview: Mumed d Ahmed Umer, Haramaya, May 9, 1994; Luye Said, Haramaya, May
26, 1994.

'5 Interview: Mumed Ahmed Umer, Haramaya, May 9, 1994.

202

became the consumers who purchased khat for their own consumption. '6

B. The Evolution of the Internal Marketing Structure

The sale of khat was enabled by a complex structure of marketing which emerged
after the dissolution of CHATHA, the company which, before the slump of the mid-19608,
dominated the export to Aden. Individual exporters came to dominate the business and the
new structure involved three types of intermediary buyers: purchasing agents, brokers and
independents. The agents worked for the exporters and operated mainly with fimds supplied
by the latter. Most of the exporters were expatriates, Arabs and Djibouteans, but there were
also some Ethiopian Somalis. The agents came to such market places as Haramaya and later
AwWoday, but did not actually buy khat directly from producers. They hired brokers to
whom they advanced cash for the purchase of khat. The purchased khat was transferred to
the agent who would pay the broker and give him further advance, a cycle repeated day after
day.

By contrast, independent buyers often operated independently of the exporters in the
sense that they were not tied down to one ﬁrm and received no advances. They bought khat
with their own capital and sold it to the exporters. Some money-lenders also acted as

independent buyers, extending credit to farmers before harvest seasons on the understanding

 

'6 Interview: Yusuf Hammo, Haramaya, May 5, 1994. See similar processes of migration,
accumulation and mobility in Sara Berry, Fathers Work for their Sons: Accumulation, Mobility and
Class Formation in an Extended Yoruba Community (Berkeley, 1985); idem, No Condition is
Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in sub-Saharan Aﬁ'ica (Madison, 1993).

203
that they would purchase crops at an agreed-upon price.'7

This marketing system favored traders because it gave them the power to determine
prices. Besides the exporters, there were no alternative buyers who could have fostered
competition and raised prices. With no serious competition, the exporters were able to
dictate prices and take much of the proﬁt from the khat business.

Next to the exporters, the purchasing agents and brokers proﬁted from the business.
Studies dealing with agricultural marketing ahnost invariably inveigh against what was
considered to be unduly large number of middlemen who prospered by defrauding producers.
Both ofﬁcials and farmers, reportedly, disparaged the middlemen, but they were not able to
do business without them. The "khat brokers," or middlemen, were an indispensable part of
the business; merchants relied on their services in collecting produce from the thousands of
small growers and farmers enjoyed the marketing services and loans (in the form of crop
advances) they provided. '8

Although exporters and traders beneﬁted the most, the character of the market,
speciﬁcally the perishability of the commodity and its consequent price volatility, did not
allow for the emergence of large-scale enterprises dominated by big merchants. It is
probably no exaggeration to state that the lack of technology of preservation and the
inadequacy of transport infrastructure kept the khat business fairly "democratized." Price

speculation or market manipulation was not possible with a commodity whose "shelf life"

 

'7 Interview: Ahmed Bakar, Haramaya, May 20, 27, 1994; Hajji Mohammed Abdurahman,
Dire Dawa, March 26, 1994; Hajji Hassan Abdo, Dire Dawa, March 26, 1994.

'8 Birke, A Survey of the Marketing Methods, p. 6.

204

was not more than two days. Nor was the producer able to predict in which direction prices
would turn in the absence of information regarding the prevailing market conditions. The
only workable marketing strategy was to sell the product as quickly as possible at prices
which seemed to yield reasonable proﬁt. A trader cannot expect consistency at the market
place for there is no guarantee that the price offered for a certain kind of khat one day would
hold for the next day. Prices were set by the quantity of khat that had reached the market
place at a particular time. If a producer arrived late at the market place, he would have to
sell his khat at a lower price, thus forcing prices down, or face a danger of losing it all when
his khat wilted.l9

The marketing system which beneﬁtted traders began to change as farmers who had
moved to urban centers increased their involvement in the marketing process. The farmer-
traders initially sold khat produced on their family farms, but subsequently became general
agents. Since the farmer-traders were more trusted by khat farmers, they successfully
installed themselves between the producers and the agents of big exporters and the market
place brokers, thereby forming another layer of middlemen in the complex structure of khat
marketing.20 By the early 19708, one could say, there were essentially two types of
middlemen in the khat marketing system: the khat buyers called Abba T allaba and the
farmer-traders who came to be known as kabkabi. Both had a stake in the khat business, but

each represented conﬂicting interests in relation to prices.

 

'9 Interviews: Hajji Hassan Ahmed, Haramaya, May 18, 1994; Hassan Abdo, Haramaya, May
18, 1994; Abdo Shanqo, Haramaya, May 19, 1994.

2° Interview: Mumed Ahmed Umer, Haramaya, May 9, 1994.

205

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E r ,, _-,,_ L __ - E r _- D has
I .7 --- W ._ +i i— “b‘i—’ '7 i" ——"_“L‘—'i — —‘L‘_"_ I
‘ I

i To ; FARMER j {l FAEMERJ L FARMER I Ti FARMERl ,
:AwWoday T j i i i j
I' 5-7 I‘“ _ ' i— '
i , pm i KABKABI ' I KAB KABI : iINoERENoENT BUYERsi
i. r L- imigélﬂnenﬁrﬁeraf i..- ﬂ(middlemen/broke_ri) i (farm-gate buyers)
I transaction _I n“ i "T I
‘ takes place i 77' ﬁ_ _J ABBA TALLABA

7-8pm (hired buyer)
it “Transfer of khat to the agent r I 1‘
I .Previous night ayment ‘ WAKIL I__.._r A,mﬁ-
L's made 8’ Pm l (exporter's agent) :
1‘ To Dire Dawa by trucks . ,1 -— I —~- ,

l I
I6'7am ,i_________ - EXPORTERL

.' Processing. packing. mixing. labelling, and routing
I

 

i To Djibomi by p lane ,' DIRE DAWA AIRPORTI
I 9-IO am ._____ I __
' r" I

I

I DJIBOUTI IMPORTERS J

L.

In Djibouti about I I am i

 

 

 

'RETAILERS

L__

FIGURE 5:

THE STRUCTURE OF KHAT MARKETING IN HARERGE

206

The Abba Tallaba was paid by his employer, the exporter's agent, otherwise called
the Wakil, at a ﬁxed rate on the basis of the weight of the khat they purchased or negotiated
to buy. Their incomes depended on their ability to drive prices down so that they have more
money leﬁ in their hands to purchase more khat. On the other side of the transaction
worked the kabkabi, who were the principal agents for farmers at the market place. They
were paid a commission of 5-10 percent of the proceeds from the khat they sold by farmers
who sought their services.” Since their income depended on the price they negotiated, the
kabkabi had a vested interest in driving prices up and ensuring that farmers received better
prices for their produce. Both the Abba Tallaba and the kabkabi, therefore, approached
setting prices from opposing perspectives. The conﬂicting interests of both created
competition, negotiation and a condition for market forces to decide prices.

Even though the new structure dominated the marketing process, independent buyers
continued to be active in the khat business. Because they purchased khat directly from the
farmers and operated with their own money, the independent buyers by-passed the kabkabi
and the Abba Tallaba who were responsible for determining daily khat prices. The
independent's leverage in the marketing process stemmed from the fact that they purchased
futures and collected the produce themselves, sparing the farmer the cost of farm-to-market
transportation and the uncertainties of ﬁnding a buyer at the market place. Independent

buyers became most active during in dry seasons when khat was scarce, and beat other

 

2' Interview: Hajji Mume Kiko, Haramaya, May 20, 1994.

207

traders due to the futures they had purchased.22
Domestic dealers often used a different and less complicated mechanism of
purchasing khat. The kabkabi were the main intermediaries in the domestic system as well,
serving farmers as agents. The transaction of khat intended for domestic consumption
usually took place in open market places where the kabkabi transferred the produce to
wholesale buyers. There were a number of khat markets in various towns, but the trade
centered in Dire Dawa, Haramaya and AwWoday. The wholesale buyers distributed to
retailers in the major town centers, the latter category was particularly dominated by women.
Farmers' wives sold at low price poor quality khat known as "Faaqa" directly to consumers.23
There are no records that show how much khat was sold at the market place daily.
Nevertheless, the ﬁnancial signiﬁcance of khat to farming families is beyond dispute. In
1972-73, for instance, 135 farming households sold 40,000 birr worth of farm crops, 59
percent of which comprised of stimulants, khat and coffee. Khat was the greater part of the
value of stimulants, amounting to 22,000 birr, or approximately 55 percent of the total crop
value. Although coffee had been an important cash crop in this area before the Italian
invasion, by the early 19708, it had fallen to insigniﬁcance. It is interesting to note that the
entire coffee crop was marketed while only 52 percent of the khat was sold. Despite the

differential, coffee accounted for a mere 7 percent of the stimulant category?" The fact that

 

22 Interviews: Yousuf Hammo, Haramaya, May 17, 1994; Mume Ahmed, Kombolcha, June
6, 1994.

23 Interviews: Ibrahim Dawe, AwWoday, May 30, 1994; Mahdi Abdule, AwWoday, May 30,
l 994.

2" Birke, A Survey of the Marketing Methods, p. 13.

208

only 52 percent of the total khat production accounted for 93 percent of the value of the
marketed stimulant crops reveals a signiﬁcant modiﬁcation in the farming strategy pursued
by most farming families.25 In the next section, I will discuss these adjustments and the logic
of production which informed the decisions farmers made in regard to land use, labor

allocation and cropping patterns.

C. Modifying Production Strategies

Some studies carried out in the late sixties suggest that declining markets and
unfavorable price situations had caused many farmers to abandon their khat ﬁelds26 or halt
further plantings of new trees.27 Some statistical data do not support the assertion that khat
was being abandoned. The evidence indicates that the uncertainties associated with khat
marketing affected producers' attitudes and called into question the viability of the farming
strategy which they had developed to cope with land scarcity. Oral information suggests that
the most immediate and visible change in the farming system was the conversion of khat
ﬁelds from predominantly cultivating the dimma to the dallota variety. Before 1964, the
former was preponderant in the khat ﬁelds because it was popular in Aden and Northern
Somalia. Following the collapse of the foreign markets, demand for the dimma variety

declined drastically, and farmers in Haramaya, Kombolcha and Hundene woredas uprooted

 

2’ Ibid., p. 14.

2° Tilahun Mekonnen, Economic and Sociological Characteristics of Peasants Families at
Alemaya, The Chercher Highland, Haile Sellassie I University, College of Agriculture, Department
of Agricultural Economics and Business, (August, 1974), p. 3.

27 Miller and Mekonnen, Organization and Operation, p. 19.

209

their dimma khat and replaced it with the dallota variety more popular in Djibouti. The Gara
Mula’ata-Wobbera region, which joined the khat market in a signiﬁcant way quite belatedly,
continued to produce the dimma variety for local markets and Northern Somalia.28

The switch from dimma and dallota represented an informed, conscious and forward-
looking response to changing market situations, though, to the unknowing observer, it might
have appeared as an effort to eradicate khat. In fact, the events of mid-19608 accentuated the
vulnerability of the khat market and reinforced farrners' doubts about wholesale adoption of
cash crops even if proﬁts were high. Despite the surge in the khat market in the 19508, food
crop production remained the dominant farming activity, and, in the early 19708, farm land
grew extremely scarce. The average family held between 0.5 to 1.5 hectares. The Oromo
farmers of Harerge highlands believed that they could use their land to the best advantage
and provide some crop insurance by growing several food crops together.” One study,
whose research was conducted in 1968-69, summarizes Harerge's cropping pattern as:

Mixed cultivation is the general practice employed in the area. On the

average about 70 percent of the ﬁelds were interplanted with two or three

kinds of crops. Single cropping is an exception rather than the rule. It is not

uncommon to see as many as ﬁve kinds of crops interplanted in a ﬁeld. The

most usual crops that are found interplanted are sorghum, corn, chat, beans

and sweet potatoes.30

The planting of diverse crops indicates the premium placed on food self-sufﬁciency.

Sorghum occupied 33 to 53 percent of most farnilies' farm land, followed by com and khat.

 

2" Interviews: Mume Ahmed, Kombolcha, June 8, 1994; Abdulahi Ahmed, Haramaya, May
10, 1994; Amin Usman Mohammed, Haramaya, May 9, 1994.

29 Miller and Mekonnen, Orgam‘zation and Operation, pp. 18-19.

3° Mekonnen, Economic and Sociological Characteristics, p. 8.

210
A sizeable area of the cropland was also devoted to growing sweet potatoes, a few Irish
potatoes, onions and vegetables. Most surveys of the consumption patterns of Harerge's
farming households show that almost all their sorghum and corn and two-thirds of the khat
were consumed on the farm."

The frnding of a 1965 study on two farming communities reveals the direction of
change in the agrarian system of Harerge highlands in the early 19608. Most of the farming
households maintained khat orchards in their cropping system, usually intercropped with
other food crops, with the orchards occupying the largest percentage of land on the smaller
farms, those with land areas of less than 0.50 hectares. Intercropping was also intensive on
smaller farms. Larger lands of approximately 4.50-4.99 hectares maintained exclusive khat
orchards but devoted more land to the production of cereals.32 The common theme in both
large and small lands' cropping systems was that most farming families subscribed to the
notion of maintaining food self-sumciency and avoiding monoculture. Diversiﬁcation was
adopted as an insurance against land scarcity, disease and pest infestations, but it was also

evident that, the smaller one's land got, the greater the tendency to increase the production

of khat.33

 

3' K. C. Davis, Ahmed Mohammed and W. A. Wayt, Farm Organization of T erre and Galmo
Villages: Harer Province, Ethiopia, Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts,
Experiment Station Bulletin no. 42 (October, 1965), p. 23.

32 Ibid., pp. 13-16

33 Ibid., pp. 12-16.

211

Cash was needed to cover the household's expenditure on capital goods (tools, seeds,
livestock), consumer products (fuel, clothing, household utensils) and taxes.” Khat provided
sufficient funds to cover these expenses and for some savings. As part of a diversiﬁed
cropping system, khat not only ﬁtted well into the environment and the agricultural cycle of
small-farm households, but also provided a regular source of income to meet household
expenditure with a comparatively low labor investment.” Khat also consistently maintained
a price advantage over other crops. For example, it yielded ten times the return of coffee.36
Khat's gross return per hectare ranged from $1163 to 3900:"7 as compared to sorghurn's $264
on average.38

Despite the impressive return, khat prices were subject to severe seasonal
ﬂuctuations, the result not only of the logic of demand and supply but also of the nature of
the commodity, the availability of rains and occasional government intervention in the
market. In 1964, for example, when the government restricted export to Northern Somalia,
prices plummeted drastically, demonstrating that, while potential incomes were high, there

were signiﬁcant elements of risk and uncertainty in expanding the cultivation of khat. Not

 

3" Ibid., see table 3a of household expenses on pp. 25-26.

3’ Interviews: Mumed Ahmed Umar, Haramaya, May 9, 1994; Yousuf Hammo, Haramaya,
May 17, 1994; Mume Ahmed, Kombolcha, June 8, 1994. Leonard F. Miller, Input-Output Data for
Chat and Sorghum Production, Harer Highlands, Ethiopia, Imperial Ethiopian College of
Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, Unpublished Mimeographed Material, August 1965. Quoted in
Quenemoen, Watts and Mosley, The Economics of Irrigation, pp. 42-43.

3'5 Getahun and Krikorian, "From Coffee to Chat," p. 370.
37 Quenemoen, Watts and Moseley, Economics of Irrigation, p. 25.

3" Gebre Michael, The Kottu of Harerge, p. 89; Quenemoen, Watts and Mosley, Economics
of Irrigation, p. 25; Birke, A Survey of Marketing Methods, p. 14.

212
only were prices volatile but the market itself was unstable and unreliable. Market
unpredictability was one reason for the primacy of food self-sufﬁciency in farming
strategies.

Khat's relative proﬁtability should have made other cash crops unattractive and
unsuccessful. Nevertheless, in an effort to even out ﬂuctuations and retain more value ﬁom
their own labor power, producers diversiﬁed the cash crops they cultivated on their farms.
From the mid-19608 on, there was increasing cultivation of vegetables, particularly of
potato, especially in areas where irrigation was possible. While the use of motor water
pumps facilitated irrigation, the opening of the Djibouti market for Harerge's vegetables
created demand. In the late 19608, most farmers in Haramaya's Yatu valley and in
Kombolcha's F ala'ana region had increased potato cultivation on their farms through
irrigation from such streams as Lega I-Iida and Lega Jeneta.39 Although Harerge was the
nearest source of supply, Djibouti imported vegetables ﬁom Eritrea and Europe on grounds
that Harerge's vegetables did not meet its quality standards. In 1963, Haramaya's farmers
established Farmers' Marketing Cooperative to ensure quality control and began exporting
vegetables to Djibouti.40

By the late 19608, vegetable production was the second highest cash earner for farm

households, a logical response to the uncertainties of the khat market. Vegetables,

 

’9 Lemma Arity, "A Regional Study of Hara Maya based on the studies of the Alemaya
college of Agriculture." Senior Essay, Department of Geography, Haile Sellassie I University, 1969,
p. 56.

‘° V.F. Aman, Organization and Operation of a Marketing Cooperative in Ethiopia, Imperial
Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts Experiment Station Bulletin no. 43 (Addis
Ababa, 1965), pp. 3-5.

213
particularly potatoes, enjoyed a much longer "shelf life" than khat. If market prices happen
to be low, the tubers could remain in the soil for a few weeks. In this way, potato provided
income the whole year around because it could be harvested at any time of the year if
irrigation was available. In providing a continuous cash ﬂow, potato possessed the
characteristics farmers liked about khat. 4'

Potatoes also were important as an alternative food crop during times of acute food
shortages. Planted in April, short cycle varieties matured in July, before the ﬁrst green maize
crops were ready to be harvested. The crop remained in the soil from August to May,
providing badly needed food during a period when the grain stocks might be low. Put
another way, both sweet and Irish potatoes provided a food bridge between the two annual
cereal harvests.42

Potato's growing importance as a cash crop did not mean the end of khat expansion.
Land use ﬁgures at least suggest that the expansion of khat continued, despite all the
difﬁculties the export market encountered throughout the 19608. In the early 19708, 26,800
hectares were devoted to khat in Harerge, a phenomenal grth compared to the 7009
hectares given for 1961. The land use pattern in the various awrajas reveals the relationship
between khat cultivation and land shortages as well as the proximity of farm areas to
transport. In Chercher province, where population pressure was not so much of a problem
and transportation had not been available until 1963, coffee remained the predominant

perennial crop, accounting for 11 percent of the total cultivated area, while khat represented

 

4' Arity, "A Regional Study," p. 56; Wibeaux, Agriculture in Harerghe, p. 50.

‘2 Wibeaux, Agriculture in Harerghe, pp. 51-55.

214
only 3 percent. Sorghum and maize accounted for 65 percent of the total area under
cultivation. ‘3 In Harer Zuriya, the sub-province with the highest population density and
better transportation facilities, khat occupied 13 percent of the total area under cultivation
compared to coffee's 3 percent and 81 percent of the area under perennial crops compared
to coffee's 19 percent. Sorghum and maize constituted 79 percent of the total area under
cultivation, suggesting that food crop production remained important.“

The land use statistics indicate that the disappearance of export market did not affect
the overall trend in the direction of expanding khat cultivation. The growth indicates that
demand did not slacken enough to warrant suspending or abandoning the production of khat,
despite the loss of foreign markets. Two factors explain the continued expansion of
production. First, khat continued to be smuggled and, second, domestic consumption

increased substantially.

D. Conclusion

This chapter has shown, though not in any conclusive way, that farmers do not
necessarily watch market conditions in determining farming strategies. The security, or the
subsistence, imperative of the family comes ﬁrst when farmers make decisions about

selecting crops, allocating land and deciding how much of the produce to sell. Farmers did

 

'3 The ﬁgure for khat was given by Getahun and Krikorian. The author provided this ﬁgure
for Ethiopia, not speciﬁcally in reference to Harerge. Since they conducted their research in Harerge,
I presume that the hactarage referred to the areas of their research. What casts more doubt on the
credibility of the numbers is not only its extremely low estimate but also that Getahun and Krikorian
relied on T. Hagos, Chat in Ethiopian Economy which I could not get hold of to verify.

“ Central Statistical Oﬂice, Results of the National Sample Survey, Second Round:, Land
Area and Utilization. vol. 5 (Addis Ababa, 1975), p. 77.

215
not transform their croplands to khat plantations just because there was demand for it. They
cultivated sufﬁcient khat to meet their cash requirements. In Harerge, food crops were
generally not marketed. More than 95 percent of the grains, leguminous and root crops were
produced for household consumption. The fact that food crop production remained
dominant, despite the increasing demand for khat, points to the limited power of the market
in dictating farming strategies and production levels.

Until the mid-19708, the expansion of khat cultivation in Harerge was not quite at
the expense of food crop production. The only crop which khat apparently displaced was
coffee. My informants have told me that their parents and they have cut down coffee trees
and replaced them with khat."5 As we have seen in chapter 4, when the market for the
commodity was expanding in the 19508 and early 19608, khat cultivation was extended to
marginal lands. From the mid-19608 on, khat cultivation proceeded with emphasis on
interplanting the shrub with other crops. The logic of production in the 19608 and early
19708 was based on how best to utilize the resources available in the face of land scarcity,
uncertain markets for cash crops and increased government intervention in order to meet the

subsistence need of the family and obligations to government.

 

'5 Interview: Nuriya Sheik Ibrahim, Haramaya, May 6, 1994; Ismael Mohammed,
Kombolcha, June 10, 1994.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Khat Boom:

Production and Marketing in a Controlled Economy, 1974-1991

Before the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, khat's commoditization was initiated and
sustained by a convergence of events and processes. In response to population pressure
farmers families introduced new crop varieties, intensive cultivation techniques and
diversiﬁcation. They also took advantage of improved road networks and other
infrastructural developments and increased the production of high-value cash crops. The
internal (demographic pressure) and external (infrastructural improvements) factors together
produced a dynamic force of socio-economic change which led to a profound transformation
in Harerge's agrarian system.

From the mid-19708 on, the process of agricultural transformation was accelerated
by the changes in agricultural production and marketing policies which followed the
overthrow of Haile Sellassie's government. Under the imperial regime, land and access were
concentrated in the hands of landlords; and marketing and pricing of agricultural products
were generally left to the market. The post-irnperial government, however, abolished the
rights of the gentry and increased the level of state intervention in the marketing and pricing
of agricultural commodities.

In the decade that followed the revolution, the production and marketing of khat
assumed new patterns and signiﬁcance. In 1975, khat constituted 6.6 of the total land under

cultivation. In less than a decade, this proportion doubled and, by 1983, khat was credited

216

217

with 13 percent or 96, 445 hectares of the total cultivated land. The volume of domestically
marketed khat rose from around 1.3 thousand tons in the early 19608 to an estimated 4.8
thousand tons in the late eighties.l In 1975, foreign exchange earnings from khat, which
long had hovered around 5 million birr, reached 32 million birr in 1984 and peaked at 36
million in 1989. In the early eighties, revenues from income taxes averaged 23 million birr
per year? Some experts have suggested that, by the mid-19808, khat was the "second largest
Ethiopian export, after coffee."3

This chapter attempts to account for the dramatic change in the status of khat as a
marketable commodity. The ﬁrst section will describe the effects of land redistribution on
cash crop production and explain why most farming families preferred growing khat over
other cash crops. The second section examines the marketing policies of the Provisional
Military Administrative Council (PMAC), speciﬁcally how stricter control over coffee
marketing and pricing encouraged farmers to shift to the then less regulated khat. A third
section presents an overview of increased government involvement in khat marketing after
1979, and explains why, in spite of strong government support, a govemment—run khat export

enterprise failed to out-compete private traders.

 

1 Income tax revenues were 9,462,529 and 2,600,000 in 1987/88 and in 1963, respectively.
Calculation on the basis of income tax rates which was 0.50 birT/kg, will give us the estimated amount
of officially transacted khat that is shown in the text.

2 Eastern Ethiopia Zone Planning Ofﬁce, Bulletin of the Socio-economic conditions in the
zone, Harer, June, 1976 EC, p. 8 and appendix 9 and 10.; Ministry of Agriculture, General
Agricultural Survey Preliminary Report, 1 983-84 (1 976 E. C) Harerge, vol. 2 Addis Ababa, October,
1984. PMAC Customs and Excise Authority, Annual External Trade Statistics, 1960-1991.

3 Clapharn, Transformation and Continuity, p. 186.

218

A. Land redistribution, Khat Production and Agricultural Productivity

In February 1975, the PMAC proclaimed a land reform law which eventually
abolished tenancy, revoked the titles and rights of landlords and provided for the
redistribution of land among farming households. Peasant Associations (PAS) were formed
and entrusted with the task of implementing the law and were given considerable latitude in
deciding the speciﬁc procedures of distributing land. The PAs followed a variety of
methods which resulted in local variations in the size and quality of plots. Overall, however,
most farming households were given usufructuary rights over the land they cultivated,
although in some cases, the holdings were insufﬁcient to sustain a household. The new
system comprised predominately user-operated small farms, and a few cooperatives with a
PA administering collectively-owned lands.4

In Harerge province, the problem of scarcity was eased but not eliminated by forest
clearing, reduction of fallow periods and the incorporation of marginal lands. Redistribution
did not provide a lasting remedy for land scarcity, but the ending of tenancy removed
structural constraints on the region's agriculture in a sense that farmers were freed from
sharecropping arrangements which favored the production of grains over tree crops and were
empowered to make decisions regarding the cropping patterns on their individual plots. The

fact that land reform did not solve the main problem of Harerge's agriculture stimulated

 

4 Desalegn Rahmato, Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia,(Uppsala, 1984), pp. 37-44; Kidane
Mengisteab, Ethiopia: Failure of Land Reform and Agricultural Crisis, (New York, 1990), pp. 97-
107; For local distribution analysis see, Mulugeta Gashaw and Minilik Tibebe Sellassie, Ethiopian
Village Studies, Hadele Keke, Kersa Woreda, Harerghe, June 1995, pp. 6-7.

219

farmers to pursue new strategies of raising productivity.5

The redistribution of land augmented cultivation areas, eased population pressures,
and provided capital for increasing productivity. Many farming families took up the
production of marketable commodities by using irrigation to increase productivity and the
levels of dry season production . However, not every area in Harerge was endowed with
water resources, and there were not enough irrigable lands to distribute equally among all
farmers. Not surprisingly, the distribution of irrigable land favored PA oﬂicials and wealthy
farmers,6 inevitably producing disparities and social conﬂicts. PAs sought to reduce major
conﬂicts by scheduling and rationing water and by encouraging intercropping.7 In the 19808,
after more than a decade of effort, irrigable areas in Harerge did not exceed 25 percent of
the arable lands.8

Farmers dealt with water scarcity by building new reservoirs, collection basins and
new canals. Some farmers used whatever proﬁts they made from the irrigated crops to
purchase pumps for their own use and to rent out. In that sense, it is possible to say

mechanical irrigation revolutionized the use and management of land and water, the scarcest

 

5 What one farmer informant from Fala'ana, Kombolcha, told me sums up the main dynamic
of agrarian change in Harerge. He said: "one who has land, relies on his land to produce enough for
his families' sustenance. One who has less land, innovates to overcome his predicament." Mume
Ahmed, Fala'ana, June 8, 1994.

6 Bernadette Risoud, Creation and Development of A Producer' Cooperative: Innovations
and interactions; The case-study of Tula in Harerge Highlands, Farming Systems Research, Alemaya
University of Agriculture, Alemaya, 1988. p. 11.

7 Wibeaux, Agriculture in the Highlands of Harerghe, p. 54.

8 Harrnen Storck et al, Farming Systems and Farm Management Practices of Small-holders
in the Harerghe Highlands (Keil, 1991), pp. 16-17, 63-64.

220

resources of the agrarian system.9 By the early 19808, most farming families in Harerge
pursued irrigation as an important strategy for increasing agricultural productivity.

Prior to the Ethiopian revolution, these irmovations were not commonplace.
Landlords owned much of the irrigable lands and sold water to farmers from their storage
basins (kuré). In Kombolcha, for instance, the cost for a single watering was between 25-30
birr, depending on the size of one's plot.‘0 After 1975, farmers expanded both their arable
and irrigable lands by appropriating lands and kurés previously owned by landlords and by
employing innovative ways of utilizing the available water resources. According to one
recent study, farmers residing in Tula and Kako increased their irrigable lands by nearly 119
percent in less than twenty years. The increase was lower in Tula, where water resources
were poorer, amounting to 72 percent, while, in Kako, it was a remarkable 167 percent. By
1986, irrigable areas in these two localities represented approximately an average total of

30 percent of the total cultivated land (see Tables 5 and 6)."

 

9 Quenomoen, Watts and Mosley, The Economics of Irrigation, p. 25. During my research,
water pump renting had become a full-ﬂedged business for some individuals. Owners not only rented
the pumps out but also established repair shops to serve those who had their own pumps.

10 G. Risoud, Evolution of Peasant Agriculture, p. 22.
11 Storck, et al, Farming Systems in Harerge Highlands, p. 63. In some places, irrigated

more than half of their cultivated areas. The number of farmers irrigating between a quarter and half
of their cultivated also considerable.

221

TABLE 6: Evolution of the Irrigable Land and Khat Cultivated Areas in Hectares.
Sample of Six Farming Households in Tula

 

Farm Arable land Arable land Irrigable land Irrigable land Khat area Khat

at inheritance in 1987 at inheritance in 1987 at inheritance in 1987

 

A 0.42 0.42 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.45
B 2.16 2.81 0.15 0.75 0.69 0.95
C 2.02 2.25 0.00 0.11 1.12 1.12
D 1.46 2.10 0.32 0.77 0.20 0.84
E 1.62 2.20 0.60 0.60 0.30 0.30
F 0.50 0.50 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.40
Ave. 1.36 1.71 0.25 0.43 0.50 0.68

 

Source: G. Risoud, Evolution of Peasant Agriculture, p. 23.

TABLE 7: Evolution of the Irrigable Land and Khat Cultivated Areas in Hectares.
Sample of Eleven F arming Households in Kako'2

 

Farm Arable land Arable land Irrigable land Irrigable land Khat area Khat
area

at inheritance in 1987 at inheritance in 1987 at inheritance in 1987

 

A 0.61 0.71 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.29
B 1.17 1.48 0.29 0.33 0.15 0.21
C 0.60 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21
D 0.80 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.25
E 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.35
F 1.10 1.10 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.31
G 1.80 1.00 0.00 0.43 0.21 0.21
H 0.86 1.03 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.28
I 0.89 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00
J 0.44 0.82 0.00 0.44 0.15 0.25
K 1.34 1.39 0.57 1.07 0.72 0.72
Ave. 0.96 1.20 0.09 0.24 0.18 0.28

 

Source: G. Risoud, Evolution of Peasant Agriculture, p. 24.

 

12 The two tables on the expansion of arable and irrigable lands show change over the last
forty to ﬁfty years. The average age of the household that were studied was 65. Assuming each
farmer established a family at the age of 20-25, the time of inheritance for all households would be
forty to ﬁfty years ago.

222

It is important to note that the increase in irrigable lands shown in the tables occurred
in districts where dry season production was insigniﬁcant before 1975. For farmers whose
lands were located nearby large lakes such as Lakes Haramaya, Adele and F inkile, irrigation
was an important technique in the production of khat and vegetables.” Until the mid-sixties
cash crops nevertheless played a supplementary role in the agrarian system, since most
farmers were involved primarily in rain-fed grain production for food self-sufficiency. The
cr0pping pattern was to plant up to 90 percent of the land with grains, utilizing intercropping
and multicropping methods. Non-grain crops such as sweet potatoes, fenugreek and beans
were grown on small sections of individual farms; but these, like grains, were stored for
consumption rather than for market. Khat was the most popular of the cash crops, preferred
probably because of the existence of more advantageous production techniques and a

14

sophisticated marketing system. Although in the post-war period, khat's importance
increased steadily, the proportion of land devoted to it did not surpass 10 percent of the total
cultivated lands until the early 19808.'5

Khat's signiﬁcance lay not so much in the size of the land it occupied but in its

productivity. Farmers optimized their return, especially during dry seasons when khat prices

 

13 Lakew Birke, A Credit Study of I 00 Members of A lemaya Farmers Cooperative Society,
1965. Experiment Station Bulletin No. 46, Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical
Arts, June 1966. p. 7.

14 E. Westphal, Agricultural Systems in Ethiopia, (Wageningen, 1975), pp. 108-118.

15 Ministry of Agriculture, General Agricultural Survey. Another document puts the
proportion of cultivated land under khat l7 %. Desta Degefu and Masresha Yimer, Conditions of
Social Security in Harerge, (in Amharic). Prepared for Eastern Ethiopia Planning Ofﬁce. Harer,
February, 1979 EC. p. 30.

223

usually rose to 10 times the rainy season values. Inigation intensiﬁed khat production by
extending harvest periods and increasing yield per unit. In areas where irrigation was not
possible, farmers increased khat production by putting more land under cultivation, often at
the expense of other crops. As Tables 5 and 6 show, the area growing khat increased much
faster than the increase in the total cultivated land. In fact, one can say, the growth in the size
of irrigable lands devoted to khat production were made possible by the increases in the size
of arable lands.'6

In the early 19708, inigation became even more important following the introduction
of a new potato cultivar by the Ministry of Agriculture. As both food and cash crop, potato
quickly became a strong competitor with khat for irrigable land, labor, water and fertilizer
resources. In the early eighties, some farmers were able to obtain an annual return of as
much as 12,000 birr per hectare from potato. This level of productivity was rare and was
attained only by a few farmers who had permanent access to irrigation water. The average
gross return for most farmers was 7,600 birr per hectare. During the same period, there were
reports of a gross return from khat of 6,500 birr per hectare in Kombolcha wereda and a
higher 9,600 birr for the entire Harer Zuria awraja.17 Considering the actual sales of 50-60
percent of the total production, farmers commonly netted 4,500 birr per hectare from khat.

In terms of return on investment per hectare, therefore, potato was more proﬁtable than

 

16 G. Risoud, Evolution of Peasant Agriculture, p. 22, 33.

17 D. Aehling-Kriesel and Kiﬂe Lemma, F arming Systems Development Survey Report.
Ministry of Agriculture. People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Field Document TCP/ETH/6659.
1989.

224
khat.l8

Despite potato's apparent proﬁtability, most farmers remained interested in khat.
First, the lack of capital for investments in seeds and fertilizer made high input potato
management impossible. Although it is true that Harerge's farmers possessed more cash than
farmers in other parts of Ethiopia, the amount of cash they were able to allocate for
productivity investments was limited. High input potato cultivation could take up as much
as the entire annual cash income of a farming family. Attractive as the proﬁt from potato
might have seemed, farmers were not willing to embark on such a risky investment strategy.

Second, investment in potato was extremely risky, owing to the crop's susceptibility
to severe climate shifts and blight. The chances of crop failure from blight damage was
lower during dry seasons and it could be eliminated through increased use of irrigation.
However, irrigation water was not as readily available as was needed to maintain dry season
potato production.

Third, potato required watering every eight days and the available resources in
Harerge highlands were not suﬁcient to meet such a high demand. Only a few farmers, PA
leaders or those having high social status, had consistent access to irrigation water.19 Aware
of the cost of feuding over scarce water supply, farmers took little interest in extensive

potato cultivation, especially the improved variety (large potato), which was extremely

 

l8 Wibeaux, Agriculture in the Highlands of Hararghe, p. 64.

19 B. Risoud, Creation and Development, pp. 10-1 1. The Producers's Cooperatives(PC) were
legally empowered to evict non-member farmers if they decided that the individual farm was
necessary for the PC. There are examples where PC leaders have appropriated fertile and irrigable
lands from non-members but for themselves.

225
sensitive to water scarcity?0

In contrast, khat offered two cultivation advantages. First, it was more drought-
resistant, requiring water every 30 to 35 days. During dry seasons, khat leaves were pruned,
and the trees kept in a state of "dormancy" so as to restart vegetative growth with the ﬁrst
rains. Ideally, two irrigations were necessary to make the trees sprout, but an adequate level
of harvest was gained even with a small amount of water. Sometimes, however, farmers
wait to bring their khat into production at the time of high market prices. With khat
cultivation, farmers were able to make maximum use of the scarce water and resources to
minimize social conﬂicts that were frequent during dry seasons?‘

Second, khat needed relatively little fertilizer, and labor investment. Cherrrical
fertilizers were generally avoided because they led to crop etiolation. Cultivators mostly
relied on the use of animal manure and household waste. In terms of labor input, since
more than 70 percent of the khat in Harerge highlands was grown in association with food
crops, the shrub beneﬁtted from the labor and technical investments made on the other crop.
During rainy seasons when heavy farm work occurred and khat prices were low, farmers
consumed the bulk of khat and sold relatively small amounts. During dry seasons, they
raised the proportion of the marketed khat as high as 60 percent of the total production
because of favorable prices. Moreover, since, in dry seasons, the intensity of agricultural

work decreases, farmers chewed less and sold more khat.22

 

20 Wibeaux, Agriculture in the Hararghe Highlands, p. 50-54.
21 Interview: Mume Ahmed, Fala'ana, June 8, 1994.

22 Wibeaux, Agriculture in the Hararghe Highlands, pp. 42-49.

226

Potato cultivation in association with khat continued on a signiﬁcant scale for two
reasons. First, under the PAs' irrigation water management program, sole-cropped khat
ﬁelds were ineligible for irrigation water. In other words, irrigating khat was contingent
upon the production of food crops. In order to maintain their eligibility for irrigation water,
farmers had to cultivate khat in association with food crops. Thus, potato was interplanted
with khat. Second, potato was used as both a food and a cash crop. At low-input level, the
beneﬁt of cultivating potato lay in its short maturation cycle. It ripens more quickly than
grain crops, three months rather than seven to ten in the latter case. When investments were
made in seeds and fertilizer, potato gave the highest return in the shortest period of time,
particularly on irrigated farms where the potential return was higher and the risk of failure
lower.23

Indeed the PAs required khat to be intercropped in order to increase food crop
production, but farmers complied for their own reasons. Intercropping with khat allowed
for the complementary use of both water and nutrients in space usually characterized by
differential root depth and spread. It also reduced the impact of adverse conditions on the

eco-system by providing shelter, conserving soil moisture and decreasing soil erosion?"

 

23 Ibid, pp. 50-55.

24 Addis Tiruneh, "Gender Issues in Agroforestry," Paper prepared for the workshop 'Land
Tenure and Land Policy' in Ethiopia, Institute of Development Studies, Addis Ababa, 5-6 May, 1994,
p. 6.

227

TABLE 8: Crop Production per Hectare

 

 

 

 

 

Crop Yields (quintal/ha) Prices Grin/kg)' Gross return (birr/ha)
Sorghum and/or minimum : 9 0.6 550
maize maximum : 25 1.5 ’ 3,750
average : 19 1 .0 1,900
Low input minimum : -- 0.5 2,250
potato maximum : -- 1.0 4,500
average : 45 0.75 3,350
High input minimum : -- 0.5 7,600
potato maximum : -- 1.0 17,600
average : 200 0.75 12,000
Khat2 minimum : 3.5 0.5 200
maximum : 7.5 30.0 22,500
average : 5.0 8.6 4,300

 

Source: Wibeaux, Agriculture in the Harerghe Highlands, p. 62. 1. Prices are the purchasing
prices of food crops in 1986. The extreme volatility reﬂects seasonal variation. 2. Yields are
based on measures taken from intercropped farm. The value of the intercropped crop is
therefore added. Since khat could be sold throughout the year, the minimum/maximum gross
returns do no reﬂect actual estimates, but assumptions based on seasonal ﬂuctuations.

More importantly, intercropping was an insurance technique. Planted together with
preferred food crops, khat ensured that some proﬁt was returned from the effort put into the
preparation of the land. In 1986, a farmer who interplanted khat with cereals was able to
produce on average 4,3 00 birr from khat sales and some 12 quintals of maize or sorghum,
worth 1,200 birr per hectare. After 10 percent was paid to the kabkabi for his brokage, the

farmer took home 3,900 birr in cash.” Based on the average grain price of 1.00 birr per

 

25 In recent years, the price differential with potato from high-input management farms has
widened in favor of khat with per hectare proﬁt for 1994, the year I conducted research in the area,
exceeding potato value by over twenty times. The collapse of the post-imperial regime in 1991, has
created an opportunity for the expansion of the unofficial export market.

228
kilogram, if a producer purchased grain with the proceeds from khat harvested from one
hectare, he/she could buy 51 quintals or grain worth 5,100 birr. Ifthe same land were to be
planted entirely with sorghum or maize, the farmer could expect to get a maximum yield of
19 quintals or 1900 birr (see Table 8 above).

The increasing importance of khat is an example of the integration of the region's
agriculture into the market economy. In the late 19808, khat prices remained high, most
probably due to the existence of foreign demand, but also due to the fact that farmers
obtained higher land productivity by growing the shrub than by cultivating food crops.
Describing why farmers preferred growing khat, rather than grains, one informant explained
to me in the following words.

AB: We are alive today, thanks to khat. If khat wasn't here, we would have
all died of hunger, deprivation and lice (disease).

EG: Do you mean that growing khat is better than cultivating grains,
vegetables and beans ?

AB: Yes ! we survived the affliction brought on us by drought, disease and
land scarcity because we cultivated khat. Let me ask you this; what part of
a honey bee's body is the seat of its soul ?

EG: I don't know, perhaps its wings.

AB: O....h, no. Don't you know where the seat of a honey bee's soul is. It is
its buttocks. Ifthat part of its body got damaged, the honey bee is dead.
EG: Alright, explain your point to me.

AB: This khat tree is the soul of the entire farming community in Harerge.
Khat is for us what the buttocks are for the bee. No one can live without a
soul and we cannot live without khat. If khat is eradicated [say, by someone's
order], alas, all the inhabitants of this land will vanish at once. No one really
cares about sorghum or even vegetables any more. These days people eat
rice, pasta and chicken.

EG: Where do you get rice and pasta ? Do you buy them in the town markets?
AB: Yes, but, you know, the town is here, the countryside; the countryside
has become the modern town. The old ones are ancient relics. We have stores
here in the countryside. There are farmers who have trucks to bring stuff here.
Why do we need to go to the old towns?

EG: Weren't you, as farmers, supposed to get your food ﬁ'om your grain

229

silos?

AB: You are right. And that used to be the case. But khat has changed every

thing.26

The high return on investment and the perception of farmers described above indicate
a marked change in the logic of production which informed farrners' decisions in regard to
cropping patterns and the use of the available resources for production purposes. The logic
of food self-suﬂiciency, which underpinned farrners' production strategies in the sixties and
seventies, lost its signiﬁcance after the 1984 drought. Foreign food assistance was intended
for drought victims, but items such as rice, pasta and cooking oil were put up for sale in
local markets.27 When assistance ended, contraband traders took up the task of supplying
the food items that were in demand?8 In addition, the derg's grain marketing policies, which
were designed to make grains available for city-dwellers at lower prices, had no mechanism
of preventing farmers from purchasing them. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation's
(AMC) prices were, of course, higher than the farmers' production costs but far lower than

the return from khat sales. As long as food was available in the market, farmers were willing

to commercialize their small-holder agriculture. Before the revolution the logic of

 

26 Interview: Hajji Abdi Baker, April 6, 1994, Ganda Lucha, Haramaya. Many of my
informants have told me similar stories about khat. The particular informant quoted here has an
original way of explaining to me the agricultural situation and farmers strategies.

27 Interviews: Abdulahi Shebo, Ganda Lucha, Haramaya, May 4, 1994; Abdalla Kassim,
Ganda Kollobo, Kombolcha, June 8, 1994; Ahmed Abdullahi Ale, Ganda Saqaa Sharifa, Kombolcha,
June 7, 1994.

28 During my research there, the Harer markets were ﬂooded with packed foods that were
dispatched to the Middle East during the Gulf War for the United States military. The military
supplies were reportedly brought to Harerge by contraband traders whose operations extended to
Saudi Arabia. Expatriates who lived in Harerge were able to buy cheese, crackers, biscuits, that were
otherwise unavailable there.

230
production was to maintain self-sufficiency while progressively increasing cash crop
production without jeopardizing food crop production. The new logic of production of the
19808 was to increase cash crop production as long as there was suﬂicient food in the market
and cash crops yielded suﬂicient cash29 In both cases, the food security of the farming
household was paramount. Even the commitment to cash crop production was premised on
the basic assumption of maintaining a secure source of food.

There is a down side to greater dependence on cash crops. Khat prices ﬂuctuate
widely and quickly due to the law of supply and demand. Rain-fed khat mostly comes into
production during rainy seasons in the whole region and must be sold at a low price. The
level of income from khat, therefore, depends on the possibility of irrigation in order to
obtain production at periods of low supply . The scarcity of water for irrigation makes it
impossible for all farmers to succeed in dry season production. Besides, it is impossible to
predict what the future of khat will be. The government's attitude has been ambiguous,
condemning khat as a social scourge that must be destroyed,30 while beneﬁtting form export
duties and from taxes on khat.31 Moreover, Djibouti and Somalia alone may not present a
sustainable foreign demand for khat. At this juncture, however, as my informant Hajji Abdi

Bakar remarked, the khat phenomenon explains how the commercialization of agriculture

 

29 Interviews: Mumed Ahmed Umar, Ganda Issa, Haramaya, May 4, 1994; Abudulahi Shebo
Ganda Lucha, Haramaya; Beker Tahir, Ganda Sido, Kombolcha, June 6, 1994; Ismael Mohammed,
Ganda Kollobo, Kombolcha, June 10, 1994; Suﬁan Abdullahi, Ganda Lucha, Haramaya, May 8,
1994.

30 Degefu and Yimer, Social Welfare in Harerge, pp. 33-36.

31 Weill, "Marketing Agricultural Products," p. 30; Storck et al., Farming Systems in
Hararghe, pp. 101-102.

231

sustained the region's demographic weight of the more than 400 inhabitants per square

kilometer.“Z

B. Marketing Agricultural Commodities in a Controlled Economy

After seizing power in 1974, the military government charted a "socialist pa " for
Ethiopia and implemented policies which placed the marketing and pricing of agricultural
commodities under tightly controlled government agencies. The derg's policies contrasted
with those of the imperial regime whose involvement in the economy was limited to
establishing marketing standards and procedures, quality control and, at times, protecting
producer prices.” Perhaps the most important policy initiative which affected the khat
industry was the government's endeavor to assume greater control over the production,
marketing and pricing of coffee, khat's main competitor for land and labor.

The derg's ideological commitment to socialist marketing principles was an
important factor, but events also played a signiﬁcant role in the evolution of the post-1974
coffee policy. In 1975, a severe frost destroyed 50 percent of Brazil's coffee, thereby
providing windfall gains for Ethiopia's beans which had a tradition of selling well whenever
Brazilian coffee failed. In the following years, coffee prices remained favorably high due

to the continued decline in Brazil's market shares.“ The Ethiopian government sought to

 

32 Tiruneh, "Gender Issues in Agroforestry," p. 4.

33 Befekadu Degefe and Tesfaye Tafesse, "The Marketing and Pricing of Agricultural
Products in Ethiopia," in Ethiopia: Rural Development Options. Edited by Siegfried Pausewang,
F antu Cheru, Stefan Brune and Eshetu Chole (London and New Jersey, 1990), pp.112-120.

34 Keith Grifﬁn, (ed) The Economy of Ethiopia, (London, 1992), pp. 78-80

232
obtain greater foreign currency earnings by augmenting coffee production. The intention of
the government was aptly captured in a letter written in 1977 by a high ranking ofﬁcial:

Ethiopia produces about 200,000 tons of coffee annually. However, only

a fraction of that amount is exported. This is primarily due to the lack of

coordination and control in the process of transferring coffee from the areas

of production to world markets. These inefﬁciencies of the imperial regime

should never be carried over to the new socialist Ethiopia. The Council of

Minsters has decided to export at least half of the produced amount, that is,

100,000 tons a year.”

Owing to a combination of political and environmental factors, however, coffee
production did not keep abreast with international demand. The government decided
therefore to put in place a system which could maximize the proportion of coffee available
for export and restrict the amount of domestic consumption and marketing. With coffee
production in the hands of small-holder producers, it was clear that control of distribution
was a more expedient method of acquiring the desired quantity of coffee than controlling
production. In order to inﬂuence the course of coﬂee marketing, the government created in
1978 the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation (ECMC). The institution was given an
initial mandate of buying coffee at prices geared to international market values,36 but soon

gained a much broader authority which included: 1) the imposition of restrictions on the

activities of licensed private traders; 2) the establishment of ofﬁcial price structure at which

 

35 MOI-RHP.1, Minster of Trade Ashagre Yigletu to the Ministry of Interior, January 5, 1970
E. C.

36 The ECMC was established in 1975 under the National Coﬂ‘ee Board, mainly to further
the government's objective of participating in coffee marketing, especially the export business. In
1978, the NCB became the Coffee and Tea Development and Marketing authority which subsequently
was elevated to the status of the Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development (MCTD). ECMC then
made a quasi-autonomous agency operating under MCTD.

233

the ECMC bought coffee and formed a reference point for controlling prices in the private
sector; and 3) the introduction of a system of physical controls on coffee movement to
prevent the diversion of coffee to the domestic market and its exports through illegal
channels.37

The ECMC quickly controlled more than 80 percent of the oﬁicially handled exports.
A substantial domestic demand existed but private traders were prohibited from selling
coffee to domestic consumers. As was the case under the imperial regime, coffee auctions
continued to take place, but prices at the so-called auctions were ﬁxed by the Ministry of
Coffee and Tea Development. Taxes on coffee were raised substantially and the forms in
which they were collected multiplied. After surtax, transaction tax, export duty and coﬁee
cess were paid, the total tax amount reached about half of the f.o.b. export prices. In a
carefully documented study of coffee marketing under the PMAC policies, Dercon and
Ayalew have demonstrated that the strict and high-tax control regime created strong
incentives to smuggle it into the neighboring countries.38

With its strict system of controls, the government was able to achieve its goal of
increasing Ethiopia's market share. The volume of exports increased ﬁ'om 47,058 metric
tons in 1977 to 93,029 metric tons in 1983. The growth in exports resulted not from

increased production but, by and large, from the draconian squeeze on domestic

 

37 ULG Consultants, Coffee Marketing, Processing, Transport and Storage Study, Vol. 3,
Unpublished Report prepared for the Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development, (1986), p. ll.A.l-
l 1.A.2.

38 Stefan Dercon and Lulseged Ayalew, "Smuggling and Supply Response: Coffee in
Ethiopia," World Development, 23 (1995), pp. 1798-99.

234

consumption. In fact, as production continued to experience a sharp decline, Harerge's
contribution to Ethiopia's total coﬁ‘ee exports dropped dramatically, from 8,420 metric tons
in 1976 to 2,260 tons in 1983, and reached its lowest level at 604 tons in 1985. In terms of
the hectareage, coffee which occupied 6.6 percent of the area under cultivation in 1975,
dropped to 4.4 in 1983.39

The decline in production points to farmers' reaction to physical controls, price
ﬁxing and prohibitive taxes. Recent studies on coffee production problems in Harerge have
identiﬁed a variety of factors that affected coffee production. In a 1991 study, Girum
Tamirayehu attributed coffee's production difficulties to:

High [coffee] cess, purchase and export monopoly, high price paid for 'chat'

..., coffee pests, the lower price paid to farmers, incompatible and unstable

economic policies, food shortages leading to the replacement of coffee land

by food crops and the competition of 'chat' (Catha edulis) which provides

regular cash throughout the year have made substantial contributions to the

decline of coffee production in Harerge."0

Since the late 19708, coffee production clearly faced a number of challenges,
ranging from pest infestations to government intervention in its marketing and pricing.
Farmers acknowledge that drought and diseases (coffee berry disease CBD) have discouraged

them from planting coffee. One farmer showed me where he had replaced (and was in the

process of replacing) coffee trees with khat plant. Asked about why he and other farmers in

 

39 Eastern Ethiopia Zone Planning Ofﬁce, Bulletin of the Socio-economic conditions in the
zone, Harer, June, 1976 E. C. p. 8 and appendix 9 and 10; Customs and Excise Authority, Annual
External Trade Statistics, 1960-1991.

40 Girum Tarnirayehu, "Coffee Production Problems and Cultural Practices in Harerge," In
Mesiﬁn Ameha, ed., Proceedings of the First Workshop on Production Constraint Assessement of
C oﬂee, Tea and Spices (CTS), (Mimeo.) Jimma, November, 1991. pp. 1-2.

235

his area had reduced the land under coffee cultivation, one informant replied with a series
of rhetorical questions. He said:

can you take one kilo of coffee to Harer [and sell it there]; can you take a kilo

of coffee to Dire Dawa and get a fair price. Look ! we were made thieves. We

were reduced to stealers of our own property. Now what would you do if you

were in my shoes ? What would you do with a commodity that was made

worthless by the government? Wouldn't you decide to abandon its cultivation

and try to do something else for living 7‘"

The common theme in Tamirayehu's study and my informant's explanation is that
the government's control of the marketing of coffee drove farmers in Harerge to abandoning
its production. The price at which the ECMC purchased coffee was below production costs
and discouraged farmers. The situation left farmers with only two options: protest the price
ﬁxing policy or withdraw from producing the crop."2 My informant's rhetorical questions
suggest that coffee farmers made a conscious decision to increase their khat plantations
rather than continue to plant a cash crop which got diseased, fetched low prices and whose
marketing was monopolized by the government. Farmers then preferred khat because
government intervention in the industry was limited to collecting taxes and levying export

duties. However, soon the policy of socializing production and exchange would extend to

khat, too.

 

41 Interview: Mume Ahmed, Fala'ana, Kombolcha, June 8, 1994.

42 According to Albert Hirshman's theory, when deterioration occurs in organizations or
members become dissatisﬁed, two alternative responses are available: exituleaving the organization
or switching to a competing product, and voice--agitating for change in policy, practice, or output
from within. Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in ﬁrms,
organizations and states (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 1-55.

236

C. Traders versus the State

When the revolution began in 1974, there were fewer than forty ﬁve merchants who
daily dispatched a total of 3,600 kilograms of khat to Djibouti. Despite the new
government's avowed goal of restructuring agricultural production and exchange along
socialist lines, the business of exporting khat remained in private hands for the ﬁrst seven
years of the revolution. From the government's perspective, khat was not so strategic a
commodity as grains or coffee were. In fact, any attempt at changing the existing pattern
of exporting khat was seen as potentially disruptive of a business which generated so much
revenue and foreign exchange earnings. Thus, the government apparently saw no reason to
increase its involvement in the marketing and/or pricing of khat.

The khat export business was dominated by a handful of prominent merchants. In
a political environment inspired by the new government's professed commitment to standing
up for "the rights of the majority, not the privilege of the few,""3 the merchant's grip on khat
export business did not go unchallenged. Immediately after 1975, there was a sudden surge
in the number of applications for licenses for khat export. There was also an organized
derive to make the khat business "communal" and give it an "Ethiopian character?“ The

effort to end the domination of the business by a few merchants was so strong that it was

 

43 Reading through the applications one can vividly see resonances of the revolutionary
motto of the leaders of the revolution. What the applicants were demanding was to be permitted to
export khat since the "the period when a few elite dominated the country's means of production was
a by-gone era."

44 The phrase "Ethiopian character" insinuated that the export business was dominated by
Djibutians, whom the organizers called "French citizens. "HPA-GC.1, Six resident-traders of Dire
Dawa to Samuel Teferra, Governor of Dire Dawa, Issa and Gurgura awraja, April 20, 1967 EC.

237
brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council
(PMAC), Ethiopia's new head of state. As has been the tradition with the problems of khat
marketing, the matter was referred to a commission appointed by the chairman of the ruling
military council.

In its report, the commission acknowledged that the existing khat export system was
contrary to socialist principles and recommended the establishment of a new company
comprised of small traders. However, the challenge to the oligarchic status of the khat export
business did not bear fruit immediately. The private exporters protested strongly against the
establishment of a competing organization, claiming that their enterprise provided work for
1,000 Ethiopians and earned close to 15 million birr in foreign currency for the country.
They also warned that creating a new company without the consent of the importing agency
in Djibouti could result in a misunderstanding between the two companies and a disruption
of the export business.” The private operation was thus permitted to continue as long as the
tax revenue and foreign currency earnings continued to ﬂow into the treasury. The upshot
of this episode was that, while the marketing and pricing of other agricultural products were
brought under stricter government control, the khat business managed to remain a relatively
free business."'5

The tolerance of private khat exports was short lived. With the post-imperial

government's commitment to building "a strong independent economy along socialist lines,"

 

45 I-IPA-GC.1, Testimonies of Hajji Hussien Roble and Ato Abduselarn Hajji Mussa in the
Minutes of the Committee that studied the conditions of khat trade, July 10, 1967 EC.

46 HPA-GC.1, Minutes of the Committee that studied the conditions of khat trade, July 10,
1967 EC.

238

it was only a matter of time before market-based operations were abolished. To achieve its
goal of restructuring the external trade in a way that would speed up the "socialist
transformation of commerce," the government split the Ministry of Trade into the Ministry
of Domestic trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The division meant differentiation of
responsibility for procuring, processing and exporting of commodities for domestic and
foreign markets. According to proclamation 179/72 which established it, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade was charged with the responsibility of "putting the country's export trade on
a socialist course by increasing the role of governmental and public organizations in the
export trade sector, while streamlining, controlling and guiding the activities of private
exporters.”7

Whereas the private export operation of khat was a target for nationalization, the need
to control khat export was given an added impetus by the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-78.
Considering the ﬂourishing khat business as a source of employment for war victims and the
families of ofﬁcers who were disabled or died in the war, the government sought to gain
control over the export sector and began organizing a govemment-run khat exporting
company.48 In March 1980, the Khat Exporters Association of Ethiopia (KEAE) was
established under the direct supervision of the Minister of External Trade. According to
the ofﬁcial statement which ordered its creation, the KEAE's main stated goals were: 1) to

give order to the disorderly individual-based export operations; 2) to make the export

 

47 MFT-CF.1, Eastern Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Trade Annual Report for the years 1972-
1983 EC.

48 Interview: Captain Taddesse Debele, GM of the KEAE (1994), Dire Dawa, February 23,
1994.

239

business fall in line with the socialist philosophy; and 3) to give the khat export trade an
Ethiopian character and leadership. The charter of the KEAE stipulated that the association
would be run by a Board of Directors, suggesting that the enterprise was a non-govemmental
private enterprise."9

In reality, the government exercised power and inﬂuence over the association. The
General Manager was appointed by the Minster of Foreign Trade, who also controlled one
of the association's bank accounts?" The association was required to submit weekly
performance reports to the regional representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade?1
Finally, the Minster of Foreign Trade reserved for himself the authority of selecting and
ﬁring members of the association. At the time of its creation, the association had 263
members, including 128 from the previous organization.52

The KEAE was also granted some important privileges often accorded to other semi-
govemmental institutions. Its members were exempted from customs, transaction and
income taxes on all of the khat they exported and on 37.50 kilogram of leaf they sold within

the country.53 PAs were assigned quotas to supply the association with the khat it needed

 

49 EHAA-KF.1, Minutes of the meeting chaired by the Vice Minster of Foreign Trade
convened to establish the KEAE, March 13, 1972 EC.

50 EHAA-KF.1, Minster of Foreign Trade to the KEAE, August 15, 1972 EC.

51 EHAA-KF .1, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Trade to Eastern Harerge
Branch Office, July 17, 1972 EC.

52 EHAA-KF.1, The Minster of Foreign Trade to the Eastern Ethiopia Branch Omce, August
15, 1972 EC.

53 EHAA-KF.1, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Trade to Eastern Harerge
Branch Ofﬁce, July 17, 1972 EC.

240

for export. As its forenmners, the CECDD and the CHATHA, only the KEAE was allowed
to use Ethiopian Airlines to transport khat to Djibouti. The Ethiopian government
negotiated and signed contracts on behalf of the association with the government of
Djibouti“ by which the Societé Géné‘al d’Importation de kaht (SOGIK), Djibouti's
importing company, was bound daily to import 3, 670 kilograms of khat from KEAE and
not to buy from other exporters. The creation of the association was clearly the ﬁrst step
along the road to state monopoly of the khat export business.

Yet the derg's own policy of using the khat business for political purposes had created
an army of legally permitted khat traders who were not members of the association. When
Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977, law enforcement personnel, whose peace time duties
included safeguarding the Ethio-Djibouti railroad, were called into active duty for the more
pressing task of ﬁghting the war. The government sought to have local residents protect the
railroad track in exchange for a permission to supply khat to consumers along the line. The
government also permitted more people to supply khat and other consumer necessities to
people in the Ogaden to counter the message of Somali solidarity. At the time, it was
thought that the threat of cutting off supplies would convince the Ogadeni to stay within
Ethiopia.55

After the war, the practice of supplying the Ogaden and the areas which had been

under Somali occupation continued with the aim of convincing refugees to return to their

 

54 Eastern Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Trade, Report on the State of the Province's Foreign
Trade, (in Amharic) Dire Dawa, 1982 EC. pp. 4-6. (State of Foreign Trade hereafter)

55 Interview: Beshir Shiek Abdi, Harer, March 3, 1994. In 1977, Beshir Shiek Abdi was
deputy governor of Harerge province.

241

homes. The haphazard way of supplying khat and other commodities was systematized and
given an institutional veneer. In November 1979, the government granted licenses to 581
Ethiopians and 1,579 Djiboutians to travel back and forth to Djibouti with fruits and
vegetables worth 100 birr and import into Ethiopia various commodities valued at 100 birr
duty-frees". These commuter-traders were permitted ofﬁcially to conduct a limited import-
export but quickly became engaged in the business of unoﬁicially exporting khat and
smuggling in consumer commodities.”

The war thus created a favorable condition for the expansion of unofﬁcial trade in
khat. The transfer of Ministry of Finance Police and other law enforcement personnel to
active duty weakened border control structures considerably. For instance, at the conclusion
of the crisis, there were only 10 operational checkpoints out of the 34 that existed before the
war, and they were so poorly managed that border patrolling was completely abandoned.58
Unlicensed traders inﬁltrated through the porous border while the licensed commuter-traders
increasingly used the train to Djibouti to smuggle khat there. A 1980 study estimated the
number of such traders at over 4,000, only half of whom were licensed?9

The KEAE thus operated in a very competitive business which required speed and

 

56 MFT-CF. 1, Eastern Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Trade Annual Report for the years 1972-
1983 EC.

57 Interviews: Beshir Shiek Abdi, Deputy Governor of Harerge at the time, Harer, March 3,
1944; Captain Taddesse Debele, GM of the KEAE, Dire Dawa, February 2, 1994.

58 A Comprehensive Report on Contraband trade activities and the "Taiwan" Contraband
market, mirneo. (in Amharic), Harer, August, 1988, pp. 4-6.

59 Minutes of the meeting of Harerge Province's high level ofﬁcials to discuss why
contraband trade was on the increase, Harer, October, 13, 1971 EC.

242
efﬁciency. During the ﬁrst two years, the association faced organizational problems ranging
from inexperience, the lack of sufﬁcient start-up capital and procurement difﬁculties to
sabotage by controllers, weighers, and processors who were retained from the deﬁmct private
enterprises for their expertise but who were reportedly unhappy with the govemment-run
business. Membership, as well as the amount of khat the association exported, did not
increase substantially and no annual budget was adopted to facilitate its operations. The
organization did not get off to a strong start in becoming the dominant khat exporter in

Harerge?"

TABLE 9: Khat Exports in volume and prices in birr, 1979-1990

 

 

Year Exported khat in kg Total export value Unit export price
1979/80 255,238 6,107.618 11.00
1980/81 2,399,392 26,393,317 11.00
1981/82 2,799,320 30,792,523 11.00
1982/83 2,816,143 30,977,573 11.00
1983/84 2,937,636 32,313,992 1 1.00
1984/85 2,768,441 30,452,856 11.00
1985/86 2,662,603 29,288,633 1 1.00
1986/87 2,575,229 28,327,523 11.00
1987/88, 2,000,716 22,007,876 1 1.00
1988/89 2,358,497 27,793,120 1 1.784
1989/90 2,518,821 30,461,256 12.00

Total 26,391,936 294,916,287 11.17
Average 2,583,670 28,880,867 1 1.17

 

Sources: Khat Exporter 's Association of Ethiopia: Progress and Prospects, 1983 EC.
Eastern Ethiopia MFT, Annual Report for the years 1972-1983 BC.

 

60 Abraham Gebremariam, Abebe Kebede and Yoseph Gebrehiwot, Khat Exporter’s
Association of Ethiopia: Progress and Prospects, 1983 EC.

243

Commencing in 1982, however, the KEAE started to perform well. A new
agreement was reached with SOGIK in which the amount of khat exported daily was raised
to 8 tons. By 1990, membership in the association had reached 810 and the number of
employees working for the company grew to 1,500. Between 1980 and 1990, the KEAE
exported 26, 391 tons and earned 295 million birr in foreign currency, in contrast to 28,424
tons of coffee valued at 143 million birr and 69,649 tons of vegetables worth 37 million birr
which were exported from Harerge during the same period. Measured primarily against the
ofﬁcial economic indicators, by the end of the eighties, khat had become Harerge's most
important cash crop (see Table 9).

The association's success was largely due to government support at various levels
of the export process. In the area of procurement, PAs and awraja administrators were made
responsible for ensuring that the association had purchased khat directly from farmers in
quantities sufﬁcient to comply with the terms of its contract. The association maintained
buying stations in Wobbera and Habro awrajas and farmers were prohibited from selling
khat to private traders before the association's quota was met. Traveling with khat in a
direction not leading to those buying stations was considered a felony."1 Parallel to the
coercive procurement methods, a public relations campaign was periodically conducted to
persuade farmers about the virtues of selling khat to the KEAE. Wole Chekol, the Minster
of Foreign Trade in the 19808, once told farrners' representatives:

selling your khat to the KEAE is an act of economic and political patriotism
because your country beneﬁts from the foreign exchange earnings and our

 

61 HPA-KF. 1, The Governor of Gara Mula’ata to the to the Provincial Administration Office,
September 18, 1981 EC.

244

economic adversaries will lose their leverage against our economy.

Moreover, the KEAE is a consistent customer, unlike the contraband dealers

who buy khat wherever they ﬁnd it inexpensively.62

The government also protected the association against competition from private
traders, especially in curbing the ability of unofﬁcial traders to smuggle khat and distort the
existing price structure. Undoubtedly, the post-imperial regime had a better institutional
capacity and reach than its immediate predecessor to control smuggling. In addition to the
traditional Customs Department and the Ministry of Finance Police, the new regime had at
its disposal an array of institutions in its effort to centralize the export economy. Ministries
and departments which, to various degrees and from various perspectives, had an interest
in the khat industry included the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the PAs, the Urban Dwellers
Associations (UDA), the various level organs of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the
Workers Control Committees (WCC) and the Provincial Administration. In some cases,
units of the military ( 502"d Brigade, 9th and 11th Infantry Divisions) were deployed to
combat unofficial trade activities."3

Despite the backing of this bureaucratic leviathan and its reliance on the
govemment's coercive procurement strategy, the KEAE did not achieve its goal of gaining

dominance in the khat export business, owing largely to its inability to compete with

 

62 Interview: Captain Taddesse Debele, GM of the KEAE (1994), Dire Dawa, February 23,
1994.

63 HPA-KF.2, The Deputy Chairman of the Harerge regional PA to all the 8 awraja PAs
December 25, 1978 EC; I-IPA-KF .2, The GM of KEAE to the Chairman of Dire Dawa awraja
Workers Control Committee, February 11, 1978 EC; HPA-KF.2, Commander of the 11th
Revolutionary Infantry to the Provincial Administration August 6, 1978 EC. EHAZ-KF.1, Eastern
Harerge Shengo (parliament) to Harer Zuria awraja Administration, January 15, 1983 EC.

245

private traders in parallel markets. According to the contract agreement between KEAE and
SOGIK, the latter paid a ﬁxed price per kilogram of khat, thus hindering the KEAE from
paying producers a competitive price for high quality khat. In 1985, for instance, while ﬁrst
grade khat sold for 20 to 30 birr in Dire Dawa market, the association was scrambling all
over the khat production areas to ﬁnd produce of similar quality for 2-3 birr. After
transportation and processing costs were added to the stated purchasing price, the
association would end up paying more than the 1 1 birr per kilogram of khat that SOGIK was
obligated to pay by the contract.“ On the other hand, SOGIK could not raise the amount
of khat it would accept from KEAE because demand in Djibouti was saturated by supplies
through unoﬂicial channels. Unlicensed traders could sell ﬁrst grade khat for less than the
association's price, inducing more consumers to prefer smuggled khat. Their competitive
advantage came for the fact that they incurred no expenses for tax and duties on both
Ethiopian and Djibouti sides.65 The association's reliance on state institutions to compensate
for its inability to compete in the free market did not give it the advantage necessary to
overcome the competition from unofﬁcial traders.

The foregoing discussion clearly shows that the competition between KEAE and
private traders was very strong. Solid quantitative evidence on the activities of private
traders who for the most part operated in parallel markets is hard to ﬁnd. It is nevertheless

possible to explain the association's weaknesses and disadvantages in the competition with

 

64 Kidanemariam Gebreegziabher and Abay Asfaw, A Study on the State of Illicit Trade in
Harerge Region, Office of Central Planning for Eastern Ethiopia, Harer, August, 1980 EC, p. 25.

65 Gebremariam, Kebede, and Gebrehiwot, The Khat Exporter's Association, p. 13.

246
private exporters by closely examining the relationship between the ofﬁcial khat price and
supply ﬁgures.

Table 9 shows the value of khat for the years 1981/82 to 1985/86 to be higher than
the decade's average, whereas the volume of the exported product remained more or less the
same. This is ironic that the overall value was higher, given the fact that khat price per unit
remained unchanged during those years. In 1990, however, the amount of the exported khat
dropped from the 1985/86 level by 56,500 kilograms, or by 2.19 percent, notwithstanding
the 7.6 percent unit price increase made that year. Admittedly, the slight increase in unit
prices from 11.784 to 12.00, the market liberalization policy of 1990 and the improvements
the company made in its procurement and marketing systems contributed signiﬁcantly
toward increasing the value of the exported khat. The inverse parallel trends in the price-
supply relationship points to structural constraints which prevented the company from being
an effective competitor in the market place.

First, the company was unable to devise a mechanism which could stimulate farmer
response to price incentives in order to obtain good quality khat in sufficient quantities. Its
failure was perhaps due to several factors, some of which were beyond the association's
control. Khat is a perennial crop and substantial lags (two to four years) exist before newly
planted trees can be harvested. Therefore, price increases often do not result in more
production. Likewise, price increases before harvest season could hardly stimulate
production (and therefore supply) for the simple reason that farmers do not have the
resources necessary to increase investment and productivity. The fact that supply remained

virtually unchanged in the second half of the 19808, especially after the unit price increases

247

in 1988 and 1990, is evidence that farrners' response to price incentive was inelastic.

Second, the association's inability to increase supply may have resulted in demand
leveling off in Djibouti. Some surveys, though not scientiﬁc studies, estimate
approximately 15,000 kilograms of khat was consumed in the port-city every day, nearly 40
percent of which was supplied through unofﬁcial channels. The absence of competition
from an organized khat supplier, rising prices in Djibouti (60 birr per kilogram in 1990) and
the lack of a substitute for Ethiopian khat provided an ideal situation for the association to
command greater market share. With efﬁciency and competitiveness, the association could
have worked to expand the size of the market or gained ground on the parallel market
suppliers. In Djibouti's case, however, demand might have leveled off as the result of weak
supply response to rising demand and prices. In the late 19808, it was apparent that
unofficial traders were gaining more share in the Djibouti market."5

Third, because the KEAE had to abide by its contract with the importing company,
it was unable to out-compete private exporters for a larger market share in Djibouti. During
high production months, when private traders who supplied J ijji ga and the Ogaden tended
to purchase untrirnmed khat for as high as 4-5 birr, the association was able to pay
competitive prices and obtain good quality khat for export. When khat became scarce in dry
seasons, private traders could pay as high as 10 birr for a kilogram and pass on the
additional cost to consumers. Constrained by its ﬁxed-price agreement with SOGIK, the
association was unable to pay competitive prices.

The association was gradually marginalized by the close commercial relationship

 

66 Ibid., p. 5

248
between smugglers and producers and by rising purchasing and processing expenses. In
1989/90, purchasing expenses constituted 76.54 percent of the value of 1 (AwWoday)
kilogram. The cost included expenditure on purchasing (65%), taxes (36%) and
transportation (5.54%). Purchasing expenses per kilogram rose from 7.22 birr in 1984/85
to 9.06 in 1989/90, increasing on average by 10.63 percent each year. This increase was in
part due to unforeseen expenses including the imposition of taxes in 1986 on KEAE
members and increases in stipends for purchasers, checkpoint guards and transportation
costs. In 1984/85, the processing cost per kilogram of khat was 1.74 birr. By 1989/90, at
an average annual grth rate of 21.11 percent, it had climbed to 4.26 birr. Of all the

expenses per unit of khat, processing costs were the fastest in growing.‘57

TABLE 10: KEAE Balance Sheet, 1987/88-1989/90

 

 

1987/88 1988/89 1989/90

Total AwWoday khat 1,725,505 1,571,29 1,578,777
Processed khat per

kilo AwWoday khat 1.159 1.50 1.595
Exported khat 2,000,716 2,258,479 2,518,721
Unit price 1 1 1 1.784 12
Earned income 22,007,876 27,793,120 30,461,256
Expense per kilo khat 12.18 11.42 13.32
Total expenditure 21,016,648 17,944,230 21,029,308
Proﬁt/loss 991,228 9,848,890 9,431,948

 

Source: Gebremariam, Kebede and Gebrehiwot, The Khat Exporter's Association, p. 17.

 

67 Gebremariam, Kebede and Gebrehiwot, The Khat Exporter's Association, p. 15.

249

An analysis of the association's balance sheet shows that the cost of preparing khat
for export rose sharply between 1984 and 1990 while, as we have seen, the price SOGH(
paid for 1 kilogram of khat remained 11 birr until it was increased to 11.784 in 1988.
Distributed over the years after the establishment of the association in 1980, the price
increase of 1988 amounted to less than 0.10 birr per year. Had the unit price increase not
been made that year and in the subsequent years, the company would have declared
bankruptcy and long gone out of business.

If the structure of marketing and the association's ways of operating were obstacles
to its own success, how did it manage to remain aﬂoat throughout the eighties ? The
answer lies in the manner in which khat was purchased from producers and sold to
consumers. As a general practice, khat was sold in bundles called akara, a bunch of khat
which usually weighed 1.5 kilogram or more at the farmgate. When the akara khat is
processed, the weight obviously decreased but never fell below 1 kilogram. In 1987/88, the
KEAE drew on average only 1.15 ﬁ'om each akara purchased from farmers, which was
lower compared to other years. Without the slight increase in selling price per kilogram of
khat that year, the association would have run 3,761,598 birr in the red. If the same
analysis was done for the subsequent years, the company would have gone under as the
result of the discrepancy between rising production costs and selling prices which was never
adjusted for inﬂation. Between 1988 and 1990, however, the association was lucky
enough to extract from each akara an average of 1.5 exportable khat. It is therefore safe to
say that the association succeeded to remain in the competitive khat export business by

defrauding the producers.

250
F. Conclusions

The evidence presented in this chapter support my argument that the phenomenal
expansion of Harerge's khat production in the 19808 was primarily due to the land
proclamation law of 1975, which permitted farmers to make their own decision of crops
grown. Farmers also employed innovative farming strategies which helped to maximize
productivity. It appears that Harerge's agriculture entered a qualitatively different phase
when farmers began to purchase food and grow khat on land that otherwise would have
been devoted totally to food crops. Khat's traditional rival cash crop, coffee, lost the
competition for land, labor and capital investments when the derg government decided to
monopolize its marketing while at ﬁrst leaving khat to the market.

The decision that farmers made to grow khat at the expense of food crops belies the
assertion that farmers are totally unresponsive to market opportlmities. The evidence shows
that Harerge's farmers made their decision to expand khat after careful consideration of their
farming resources, the market situations and the viability of investment in khat. The shift
to khat cultivation was a decision to cope with land scarcity and declining production.
Harerge's farmers showed their willingness to abandon subsistence production in favor of
cash crops which provided better returns on their investments. They sought to maximize
their income and then invested it in nonagricultural economic activities. They made their
choices based not solely on short term market incentives, but also on political,
environmental and family considerations.

This chapter has also shown that farmers make strategic decisions to safeguard the

long term welfare of their household rather than to obtain a temporary cash proﬁt. In truth,

251

farmers who practice low input farming management have few resources with which to
respond to price incentives. In a general way nonetheless it is possible to say Harerge's
farmers shifted to the production of khat because it was more proﬁtable than other crops.
But such a blanket statement obfuscates the complexities of farmers' decision-making
processes. The massive increase in khat production in the 19808 was due less to the simple
cash proﬁt that khat brought than its ability to provide money to buy more and better food.
The availability of altemative food source was therefore as crucial as the cash obtained from
khat sales. It seems safe to say that Harerge's farmers did show some responsiveness to
proﬁt (not always cash) and shifted to cultivating the more proﬁtable khat without violating
the important principle of ensuring the availability of food.

Government policy was also an important factor in fanners' decision to increase the
cultivation of khat at the expense of food crops. In all, increased government intervention
in the production and exchange of agricultural products defeated the ultimate goal of more
productivity and revenues and dampened farmers enthusiasm for increasing productivity or
production. Farmers who practice low input agronomy are particularly apprehensive of
government intervention. In areas where farmers have alternative marketing sources, it is
difficult for a government to impose a command economy. Policy makers may be well-
advised to take notice of the ﬁndings of this research that farmers and traders have novel
ways of getting around government plans if they ﬁnd them to be a threat to their economic

well-being.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Parallel Markets: Causes, Scale and Structure

Throughout its recent history, Harerge has maintained stronger economic links with
the coast areas rather than with the hinterland. In the 19808, this economic relationship was
characterized by the hidden export of primary products and the import of consumer
commodities. The value of this activity is somewhat difﬁcult to calculate, but several
studies and documents estimate smuggling to be as much as 1.05 billion birr a year. Such
a high ﬁgure is not completely implausible, considering the ubiquity of contraband goods
all over Ethiopia, from Dire Dawa's "taiwan" market to Addis Ababa's "marcato" and to
small town kiosks in the western provinces.

In terms of proportion, khat constituted half the value of the products that were
smuggled out.1 Most of Harerge's farming communities were awash with khat-generated
money, and smuggling provided employment for a considerable number of urban residents.
No published scholarly work has yet been published on the contraband phenomenon in
Harerge, although there are passing remarks in a few works dealing with broader political
and economic issues. Perhaps the most succinct description of the relationship between khat
and contraband trade was given by Christopher Clapham, a long time observer of Ethiopian
politics, who wrote in 1987 that,

Hararghe constitutes, to an extent impossible to appreciate without personal
observation, an economy based on chat. Farmers can make about 3,000 birr

 

' Getachew Eshete, "Contraband Trade in Ethiopia: Major Highlights," A Paper Presented
to a Seminar on Contraband Trade, Addis Ababa, July 1995, p. 8.

252

253

a year from the crop, putting them well above the standard of living of

highland peasants in other parts of the country. Allied to the chat market, and

ﬁnanced by it, is a ﬂourishing trade in contraband goods brought in from

Djibouti, with the result that Hararghe forms a kind of free trade zone within

a socialist state. The economic frontier of Ethiopia stands in effect on the

Hararghe/Shoa border at Awash, and the region as a whole stands in the

sharpest contrast to the problems of agricultural production and marketing in

other parts of the country?

This chapter attempts to account for the role of khat in Harerge's parallel market and
explain how in the 19808 the expansion of contraband trade stimulated khat production and
marketing. As such, this chapter will present an analysis of contraband trade activities as an
alternative to the problems of agricultural production and marketing, as farrners' response
to an interventionist government policies and as an autonomous employment opportunity in
the context of limited enterprenurial ventures. As part of a discussion of the infrastructure
of khat, I will note how contraband trade activities undermined the ﬁscal, judicial and

political credibility of many state institutions. I will begin by discussing the context in which

contraband trade ﬂourished in the 19808.

A. The National and regional economic Context

In Harerge, the realm of economic activities that lie beyond a government's taxing,
regulating and measuring capacity is referred to as contraband. The term has a connotation
of illegality, although the goods that are involved in the commercial transactions are perfectly
legal. Authorities intend to collect unpaid dues and taxes and enforce pertinent regulations,

rather than to stop the output being produced or exchanged. Thus, illegality stems from the

 

2 Clapham, Transformation and Continuity, p. 186.

254

contraband traders' conscious evasion of taxes and regulations. In a way, the contraband
trade is an alternative form of work for those whose livelihood were threatened by
government intervention.

The boundary between legal and illegal commodity exchanges in Ethiopia was
delineated by the Customs proclamation of 1947 which deﬁned contraband trade as "any
importation or exportation of goods with the intent to defraud the revenue or to evade any
prohibition of restrictions on, or regulation as to the importation and exportation."3 Further,
"all smuggled goods, all goods imported in contravention of any prohibition, restriction or
regulation, all goods that are dutiable found in any Aircraft or other means of conveyance
which have not been declared to the customs ," were categorized as contraband.4 From
a legal standpoint, even the cultural exchanges that had gone on for centuries between
Harerge highlands and the coastal regions came under the broad rubric of contraband,
although they had perfectly been legal before the proclamation. In that sense, contraband
has been around in Harerge, at least as deﬁned by the law, since the early 19408. Ironic as
it may seem, as Neville Williams suggested more than three decades ago, it is the creation
of Customs as a government institution responsible for regulating and collecting duties on

export trade that gives rise to contraband trade.5

 

3 Customs Proclamation No. 145/47. The Criminal Code goes further deﬁning what
constitutes contraband trade and retailing the penalties imposed on any person found guilty of
smuggling.

‘ The Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia, vol 1, as quoted in Meskerem, Monthly Magazine, 16
(1976 E.C.), p. 40; Negarit Gazetta 10, 1935 EC.

5 Neville Williams, Contraband Cargoes: Seven Centuries of Smuggling, (London, 1961),
p. 1-28.

255

In the ﬁfties and sixties, the imperial regime attempted to curb contraband trade
through the use of a system of controls characterized by thorough searches of traders at
numerous checkpoints on the major routes leading to and at border crossing points. Licensed
private traders imported consumer goods such as cigarettes, cosmetics, textile, wrist
watches, shoes and so forth, but their capacity was too limited to satisfy the region's demand
much less that of the neighboring provinces. In the two decades preceding the downfall of
the imperial regime, contraband trade expanded as an innovation to evade redundant
checkpoints and excessive taxes and in response to the rising demand for consumer
commodities that were not available in the country in sufficient quantities.

In the 19808, contraband trade was much larger in volume and value, different in its
causations and sophisticated in its operations. The most important factor accounting for its
growth was the wide disparity between supply and demand of basic consumer goods such
as clothing and food products created by changes in the Ethiopian society. In the decades
since the expulsion of the Italians, Ethiopian society had undergone signiﬁcant demographic
and socio-economic changes. The growth of modern state institutions and the expansion of
private ﬁrms had produced a sizeable urban population and had monetized the economy,
thereby profoundly altering consumption patterns. The demand for commodities generated
thereof was not met by domestic manufacturing, and the country's import-substitution policy
did not favor the importation of the commodities in demand to make up for supply shortfalls.
The gap between demand and supply was especially wide in the lowlands and border areas

of Harerge.

256

TABLE 11: A Comparison of potential demand and actual supply of commodities for

Four lowland awrajas, Harerge's in '000 birr

 

 

Awraja 1987/88 1988/89
(1) (2) (3) (4) (II (2) (3) (4)
Kebri demand 14648 909 4424 19981 15824 922 4552 21297
Dehar supply 531 1008 135 1674 486 369 59 914
% 3.6 110.1 3.0 8.4 3.1 40.1 1.3 4.3
Warder demand 40047 2410 1 1039 53497 43032 2489 1 1404 56923
supply 896 420 89 1406 259 366 21 645
% 2.0 17.0 - 2.0 - 14.0 - 1.0
Gode demand 14345 822 4124 19290 15361 847 4219 20426
supply 658 755 135 1547 506 565 57 l 130
% 4.0 91.0 3.0 8.0 3.0 66.0 1.0 5.0
Kelafo demand 14632 836 4055 19523 16679 866 4174 21718
supply 556 356 96 1008 415 80 63 559
% 3.0 41.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 9.0 1.0 2.0
Total demand 83671 4978 23 642 1 12200 90894 5124 24346 1203 65
supply 2641 2358 455 5634 1693 1380 203 3248
% 3.0 50.0 2.0 5.0 1.0 2.6 - 2.0

 

Source: Kebede et al., The Causes and Characteristics of Illicit Trade, p. 59. (1) Food products
comprised mainly sugar, ﬂour, pasta/macaroni, rice and cooking oil. (2) Other commodities
included mainly soap, detergent, matches, battery cells; (3) Textiles were mainly abujedid, poplin,
garments. (4) Total demand for l, 2, and 3.

257

In the early eighties, government and public institutions were responsible for
distributing consumer necessities in four lowland awrajas of Harerge. According to
ﬁgures generated by the regional Ofﬁce of Planning, the amount of goods government
institutions were able to distribute was rather low.‘5

The ﬁgures shown above indicate that there was an enormous gap between demand
and supply. The estimated total demand for consmner goods for 1987/ 88 was 122 million
bin for the four awrajas while the amount of goods distributed by govemment distribution
enterprises was worth 5.6 million or just 5 percent of the projected demand. Such a wide
gap indicates not just the inadequacy of the system of distribution but also the enormity
of the problem even if a serious effort were to be made to meet the need for consumer
commodities in the lowlands.

Corroborating the trend shown by the ﬁgures is a study conducted in 1982 under
the auspices of the Minster of Interior which found out that Harerge's lowland awraj as and
border areas hardly received consumer necessities from the Ethiopian side. The study
conﬁrmed that consumer commodities were in short supply in Harerge's lowlands not only
due to the inability of domestic manufacturers to produce in quantities commensurate with
demand, but also due to the distributional ineﬁciencies of cumbersome government
organizations. The Ethiopian Domestic Distribution Corporation (EDDC), the government

agency which distributed consumer goods, maintained a few distribution outlets in the

 

" I do not know how these ﬁgures were generated. They are used here not as accurate
measurements of demand and supply in Harerge's lowlands, but as indicators of trend in the
relationship between demand and supply. Abebe Kebede, Abebe Mekonnen, Mesﬁn Shiferaw, Samia
Yusuf and Teferi Tilahun, The Causes and Characterstics of Illicit Trade and Future Trends in in
Eastern Ethiopia, Dire Dawa, December, 1982 EC. pp. 59-60.

258

lowland towns, but by-passed most border communities. Private traders attempted to
supply these remote towns but their prices often remained beyond the reach of the residents
there. In order to obtain the goods they needed, the lowland residents forged close
commercial ties with the communities in Somalia and Djibouti with whom they were
ethnically afﬁliated.7

Shortages of consumer necessities were also evident throughout Ethiopia.
Conventionally, when domestic production could not satisfy the existing demand, imported
goods would make up for the shortfalls. In the eighties, however, the Ethiopian
government pursued a monetary policy which denied private exporters access to the
cormtry's foreign currency resources. The only way private traders were pemritted legally
to import consumer commodities was the Franco Valuta (FV) arrangement which allowed
for private imports which did not involve oﬁicial remission of hard currencies ﬁom the
National Bank of Ethiopia.8

The franco valuta arrangement was not without restrictions. Commodities such as
electronic appliances, woolen garments, perfumes, cigarettes and so forth were classiﬁed
as luxury products and excluded from the list of irnportable goods, even though no hard
currency from Ethiopia was involved in the process of importing. Moreover, even when

official imports were allowed, private traders were subjected to onerous taxes and

 

7 Ministry of Interior, "The demand for and distributional difﬁculties of consumer
commodities in border awrajas and recommended solutions," A report to the Minster of Interior, (in
Amharic), Addis Ababa, 1975 EC.

3 Dejene Aredo and Abduraheman A., "A Study of the Contraband Trade in Eastern
Ethiopia," Unpublished document, Economics Departement, Addis Ababa University, n.d., p. 4.

259

payments. In 1982, in addition to a 219 percent sur tax and 5 percent import levy, the
National Bank of Ethiopia, the Maritime and Transit Authority, the Port Authority charged
service and storage fees. When all was added up, a private trader ended up paying up to
269 percent in taxes and service fees before any consumer goods had cleared through
customs.9

Prices on goods imported in this way soared to unaffordable levels when they
reached the market. The ordinary Ethiopian consumer preferred the less expensive
contraband goods, thereby creating high demand for such smuggled commodities as
electronic equipment, fashion accessories, ﬁrearms, clothing, food products and
household items. It is hard to know the accurate proportion of the goods that were actually
imported, but it is possible to project estimates from the quantities of seized goods. In
1987, for instance, the Ethiopian Customs Authority seized goods worth 37.5 million birr,
of which textiles, clothing (new and second-hand) and footwear constituted a remarkable
68.6 percent, foodstuﬁ and drinks 4.0 percent, and electronic appliances, cosmetic
products, cigarettes and matches together almost 15 percent. '" By the Customs
Department's estimation, the proportion of the seized goods was somewhere between 1 to
10 percent of the goods actually smuggled. This means, in 1987, goods worth between
375 million and 3.8 billion were smuggled into Ethiopia. An average of these apparently

extreme ﬁgures seems to correspond to the 1.05 billion birr estimated quantity of goods

 

9 Hagos Gebre, "Contraband Trade in Ethiopia," Unpublished document prepared for the
Oﬂice of National Committee for Central Planning, (in Amharic), Addis Ababa, November 1981 EC.
pp. 7-8.

'0 Aredo and Abduraheman, "A Study of the Contraband Trade," p. 3.

260

smuggled into the neighboring countries of Somalia and Djibouti.11

Statistics indicate that at least 44.6 percent of the total seizures came in Harerge
region. At a 1 percent seizure rate, consumer goods that entered Harerge would be worth
167.3 million birr while at 10 percent, value rose to 1.7 billion.‘2 These ﬁgures obviously
do not represent the precise value of smuggled goods, but they are not arbitrary either.
They are projections based on seizure statistics, and, if anything, they show trends. It is
obvious that the gap between the lowest and highest projections was large, but even at the
lowest projection of 167.3 million birr, the contraband trade was a very signiﬁcant
business, unmatched by the oﬁicial export trade from Harerge which peaked at 75 million
birr in 1983.‘3

The foregoing examination of the national and regional economic contexts was
meant to outline the circumstances that led to an unprecedented expansion of contraband
trade activities in the 19808. It has been shown that the economic policies of the post-
imperial regime were so contrary to free-market exchanges and transactions that they
created supply shortages in consumer commodities. Traders took advantage of the
situation to supply the residents of Harerge highlands and the rest of Ethiopia with the
goods in demand. The next section will attempt to establish the link between the hidden

export of khat and the unofficial import of consumer goods and, thereby explarring how the

 

” Ofﬁce of Planning Committee for the Western Harerge Administrative Area, Guidelines
to Control Contraband Trade in Livestock in Western Harerge Administrative Area, Mimeo. (in
Amharic), Asbe Teferi, July 1981 E.C.), pp. 6-9; OPCWH, Contraband Trade in Western Harerge
hereafter.

l2Eshete, "Contraband Trade in Ethiopia," p. 5.

'3 MFT-CFJ, Annual Report of the Eastern Ethiopia Branch Office for 1979 EC.

261

contraband undertaking was ﬁnanced under a strictly controlled foreign exchange regime.

B. Khat and the Development of Parallel Markets

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Clapham is correct in suggesting
that the unofﬁcial importation of goods was ﬁnanced by the unofficial exportation of khat
to the extent that, according to seizure statistics of 1987, the stimulant accounted for 50
percent of the primary products smuggled out of Ethiopia. The projection based on seizure
statistics does not hold true for Harerge. Most of the local sources that I have consulted
show that live animals (cattle, sheep and goats as well as camel) constituted the largest
proportion (66.9 %) of the smuggled out products, followed by khat (28.5%), and coﬁee
(4 %). "'

Except for khat, all other products were smuggled into the neighboring countries
and then reexported. Live animals, especially sheep and goats, were shipped to the oil rich
countries of the Arabian peninsula and sold there for hard currency. Coffee was purchased
in Harerge and smuggled into Djibouti, making that country a coffee exporter even though
it grew none. The proceeds from the sales of these commodities were used to purchase
such consumer goods as textiles, electronic appliances, footwear, wrist watches, battery
cells, fragrances, incense sticks, cigarettes and so forth for smuggling back into Ethiopia.‘5

Buyers who ultimately smuggled out live animals or coffee paid much higher prices to

 

'4 OCPWH, Contraband Trade in Western Harerge, pp. 6-9; Kebede et al, Illicit Trade in
Eastern Ethiopia, pp. 67-75.

'5 HPA-KF.2, Chief of Security for Harerge to the Office of the Chief Regional Administrator,
October 29, 1975 EC.

262

producers than the respective government institutions which had the legal priority to
purchase those commodities. In 1983, for example, an ox bull was sold for 11,000 Somali
Shillings, or 1,100 birr, in Somalia, almost ten times higher than the price the Ethiopian
Meat Corporation offered?6 Likewise, the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation offered
coffee producers on average 41 percent of the f.o.b. value.17 The depressed values offered
by the government institutions were reasons enough for producers to prefer having
unofficial traders as their favored customers.

Khat smuggling was particularly attractive because of the enormous differential
between producer and consumer prices. Throughout the eighties, as we have seen, the
highest price the KEAE afforded to pay for one kilogram of khat was 7.50 birr. Even this
amount was reached 1990, only after SOGIK raised the price it paid to 12 birr per
kilogram. For most of the 19808, the KEAE paid producers an average of 3 birr for a
kilogram of khat while ﬁrst grade (uratta and kuda) product was sold in Djibouti for as
high as 120 bin. The third grade (querti) khat which the KEAE exported was sold in
Djibouti by SOGIK for an average 60 birr for a kilogram. At an average producer price
of 5 birr and consumer price of 80 birr, khat prices rose by a remarkable 1500 percent
between the farm gate and the Djibouti market?8

Traders preferred khat smuggling primarily for the proﬁt they made in a single run

 

'6 HPA-KF.2, The Chief Administrator of Garamulata to Harerge region's Administration
Ofﬁce, May 11, 1975 EC.

'7 Gebre, "Contraband Trade in Ethiopia," p. 6.

'8 Gebreegziabher and Asfaw, Illicit Trade in Harerge, pp. 23-25

263

across the border. It also served yet another important purpose of enabling traders to earn
their "own foreign currency" with which they used to ﬁnance the imports of consumer
goods in short supply at home. The practice of earning one's own foreign currency was
widespread throughout the late seventies and eighties, but it became especially important
after May 1988, when the utilization of the franco valuta arrangement was banned,
allegedly due to too much luxury commodities entering the country and the government's
conclusion that the system beneﬁted smugglers more than ordinary consumers. '9

In the eighties, therefore, khat smuggling was more than an attempt to evade high
taxes, excessive regulations and bureaucratic corruptions. It was also a means to get access
to hard currencies with which to import much needed consumer commodities: the volume
of the goods that were smuggled out was determined by the value of the goods that were
smuggled in. The ubiquity of unofficially imported consumer goods in Harerge and the
rest of Ethiopia suggest that a signiﬁcant amount of capital was involved, but since
smuggling took place outside the oﬁicial sector, they do not show in the national statistics.
It is difficult to determine precisely how much khat was exported and how much foreign
currency was obtained therefrom.

It is possible, however, to collate suggestive statistics and obtain a reliable estimate
of the amount of khat smuggled into Djibouti in the late 19808 and the value of goods
imported in exchange. According to a 1987 survey, 5,350 kilogram of khat was smuggled

daily into Djibouti by train passengers, licensed commuter-traders and contraband traders

 

'9 Aredo and Abduraheman, "A Study of Contraband Trade," p. 4; Gebre, "Contraband
Trade in Ethiopia," p. 7—8.

264
known locally as kotebelé ?" This ﬁgure is modest and entirely credible for three reasons.
First, on May 29, 1980 EC. (June 6, 1988), the regional administration mobilized
government as well as public institutions and conducted a surprise search along the railway
line and along the major contraband routes. On that day, 9,710 kilogram of khat intended
to be smuggled into Djibouti alone was conﬁscated?‘ Second, the survey ﬁgure is
consistent with the 15,000 kilogram of khat that was estimated to be consumed in Djibouti
daily throughout the 19808. The KEAE supplied 8-9,000 kilograms, and the rest was
supplied through smuggling. Third, the estimate is fairly close to the World Bank estimate
of 8,000 kilograms per day which was smuggled out of Ethiopia?2 Local sources indicate

L...
that 10,000 kilograms of khat cleared through the Jijjiga customs, out of which 4,000 was

\ vw\/“\,/’W\.-r \r ‘5 W ‘

 

 

smuggled daily into Somalia through Harshin, Togochale and TeferiBer and another 4,000
kilograms was clandestinely taken to Djibouti through Durdur, Dikil and Dewale”. The
total is exactly the same as the World Bank estimate which, unlike the local sources, had
taken into account surveys done on the situation in the receiving countries.

It is important to note that local sources and a survey of World Bank experts agree
that a total of 8,000 kilograms of khat was daily smuggled into Djibouti and Somalia. On

the basis of this ﬁgure, 2,920,000 kilograms of khat was smuggled out of Ethiopia in

 

2"The name refers to unlicensed traders who travel back and forth to Djibouti climbing on
train tops to get free passage. They have been the main conduits of contraband since probably the late
19508, when the volume of the trade increased considerably.

2' Kebede et al, Illicit Trade in Eastern Ethiopia, pp. 67.
22 World Bank, Ethiopia: Export Action Program, June, 1987, p. 47.

23 Kebede et al, Illicit Trade in Eastern Ethiopia, pp. 67, 81.

265

1987/ 88 and perhaps throughout the 19808. At an average rate of 60 birr per kilogram,
which is the lowest Djibouti price paid for a third grade khat, the value of smuggled khat
was 175,200,000 birr. This amount, it must be noted, was calculated on the lowest price
per unit and must be seen as a fairly accurate estimate of the value of khat smuggled out
of Ethiopia.24

This sum is the birr equivalent of either Djibouti francs or Somalia shillings with
which the traders were paid for their khat. Occasionally, the traders exchanged their francs
or shillings to US dollars, but in most cases, they purchased consumer goods to smuggle
back to Ethiopia. The 175 million birr ﬁgure quoted above reﬂects the Djibouti market
price for khat, not the actual value of the consumer commodities sold in Ethiopia. Even
at a modest proﬁt rate of 20 percent, the goods that were smuggled into Ethiopia were
worth 210 million bin or USS 42 million at the black market rate of 5 birr which prevailed
during much of the 19808.25

These are surprising ﬁgures. Perhaps many will suspect their accuracy citing the
size of the ofﬁcial economy. Although as shown above, ﬁgures generated in different
situations were cross-checked and have shown remarkable consistency, the ﬁnal result
must be viewed within two important contexts. First, during the eighties, the parallel,
rather than the official market, was ﬂourishing rapidly in Harerge. The contraband trade

was the response of Harerge's population to widespread un- and under employment and

 

2‘ Ibid., p. 68.

2’ At the ofﬁcial exchange rate of 2.07 birr for the dollar, the value of goods smuggled to
Ethiopia in 1987/88 would be 101 million.

266

the falling value of real wages. Although some of the capital that circulated in the parallel
market was owned by a few wealthy merchants, a considerable number of Ethiopians were
involved in smuggling. Second, although threatened by coercive action, the parallel
market was self-sustaining and capable of generating high rates of accumulation, and
existing as a semi-autonomous economic system. In other words, the size of unofﬁcial
markets need not be compared and expected to be smaller than the ofﬁcial one.
Smuggling is a risky business with the possibility, however, of unequaled rates of
return. Proﬁt came to smugglers not only from the sale of khat and other primary
commodities but also from the sale of the consumer commodities sold back in Ethiopia.
Although the government suffered loss of tax revenue and foreign currency, the contraband
trade industry helped to alleviate supply shortages of consumer commodities. An
estimated 1,253 kotébelé and 600 commuter-traders directly participated in smuggling and
a considerable number of people found employment in the industry as brokers, porters,
khat processors and drivers. In indirect ways, local governments also beneﬁtted from the
contributions the contraband traders made toward various development projects. Between
1985/86 and 1986/87, the city of Dire Dawa collected 3.6 million in contributions from
traders while the transportation and hotel industries in the city expanded in response to

rising demand?"

 

2" The smuggled goods were sold in Dire Dawa in the "taiwan" supermarket and in private
stores. The owners paid taxes and made several contributions toward building schools, government
ofﬁces and assisting drought victims. Kebede et al, Illicit Trade, p. 7 7.

267

C. The Infrastructure of Contraband Trade

Harerge's parallel markets generated considerable employment as the result of the
dynamic circulation of capital and commodities. Rural households in Harerge became
enmeshed within a parallel market economy in which they contributed twice to capital
accumulation: ﬁrst, as producers of khat leaves, but in a process where much of the value
is appropriated at stages closer to the point of consumption; and second, as conspicuous
consumers of contraband goods used to launder proﬁts back into the country. Although
farmers were not the foremost beneﬁciaries of the khat prosperity of the 19808, they had
improved their standard of living considerably.

Those who chose the risky, but highly lucrative, path of contraband trade in Harerge
were not necessarily, as one might suspect, traders of dubious reputation. The ﬁrst
category of participants were established merchants, some of whom were of considerable
means. They were not involved in physically smuggling goods, but they provided the
initial capital to purchase khat and extended advances to people who did the work of
physically delivering the product. Unlike the smuggling of live animals, which was a
well-organized operation, the khat business was not tightly controlled by the big
merchants. Since most khat smuggling was done by small operators and its beneﬁts were
somewhat evenly distributed.

The khat smugglers formed another principal category, and they came from diverse
socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. Some were engaged in the business full-time,
delivering khat to destinations in the neighboring countries and transporting back consumer

goods. Comprising this group were urban school dropouts, and young men who had left

268

home to escape National Military Service. Most of them came to Dire Dawa from other
provinces and joined the only occupation which required no qualiﬁcations or licensing.
The other full-timers were members of the Issa ethnic group who inhabited the area
stretching from Afetessa in Dire Dawa, along the railway road to Dewele at the Ethio-
Djibouti border. The Issa have always participated in the trade across their land, mainly
as transportation providers and were considered "professionals" and known as kotébelé.
In 1978, the number of Issa who regularly participated in the contraband trade was
estimated to be 2000.27

Then there were people who obtained permits to conduct limited import-export
trade during and after the Ethio-Somali war of 1977. In 1978, approximately 600
disabled veterans of the war were permitted to travel to Djibouti with fruit and vegetables
worth 100 birr each and, in exchange, import into Ethiopia various commodities of the
same value duty-free?8 At the time, about 1200 Djibouti nationals were given laissez
passers to travel to Ethiopia and import the same amount of ﬁ'uit and vegetables. Over the
course of time, these commuter-traders found khat to be more proﬁtable and became
increasingly engaged in smuggling it. In 1980, in order to curtail their involvement in
parallel markets, the government required the commuter-traders to obtain licenses in order
to export farm products, fruits and vegetables, spices and processed food products worth

500 birr and to import consumer goods with the exclusion of cosmetics, jewelry, wrist

 

27 Tesfamichael Gebremedhin, The KEAE's Chief Inspector's report on the state of illicit khat
trade along the Djibouti railway line, Mimeo. (in Amharic), October 8, 1979 EC.

2" Minutes of the meeting of the Harerge Administrative region's high level oﬁicials to discuss
why Contraband Trade was on the increase, Harer, Tikimt 13, 1971 E. C.

269

watches, liquor, woolen textiles, tape recorders, radios, cameras and various kinds of
incenses?9

The excluded merchandise comprised those in high demand. Since there were no
facilities in place to weigh or measure, the commuter-traders were able to import or export
goods far greater than the ofﬁcially permitted level. Data indicate that the commuter-
traders were deeply involved in the contraband trade. Between 1982/ 83 and 1984/ 85, the
commuters oﬁcially exported between 2.5 million kilograms of Mt and vegetables. The
commuter-traders traveled to Djibouti more than twice a week but even so, the amount of
fruit and vegetables each commuter-trader took on single trip was only 13.5 kilograms,
76.5 kilograms less than what an individual trader was legally permitted to export?" It is
unlikely that the traders were taking with them an amount insuﬁcient even to pay for their
transportation much less to sustain their livelihood. In 1981, the government repealed the
law that pemritted limited import-export by commuter-traders, but since the mechanism
of enforcing the regulation was inadequate, the change did not do much to stop the
commuters from taking part in the unofﬁcial trade.31

The third group of smugglers were current and former employees of the Ethio-

 

2" Ministry of Foreigr Trade, "Guidelines for regulation of import-export trade," Dire Dawa
1980 EC.

3" That the traders were not actually acting within the legal limit can be demonstrated by the
following calculation. A. the amount of ﬁ'uits and vegetables exported between 1982-1984 was
2,531,899 kg; B. the number of commuter-traders was 1,800; C. the average number of trips to
Djibouti per week 2; 2 trips x 52 weeks = 104 trips. a -:- b x c = 13.5. Gebreegziabher and Asfaw,
Illicit trade in Harerge Region, p. 17.

3' Taiwan market, " inter alia; Gebreegziabher and Asfaw, Illicit Trade in Harerge Region,
p. 18.

270

Djibouti railway company, the Ministry of Finance Police and Customs Department.
Except for the former employees of these institutions, those who participated in smuggling
included the train engineers, station masters, passenger inspectors and the railroad
company's security personnel. Members of the police and Customs workers rarely
participated in actually smuggling goods but played a vital role in allowing smugglers to
smuggle goods in return for gaft.32

Most of the smuggled khat was processed in Dire Dawa, although from the mid-
19808 on, Shinnille and Melka Jebdu, two villages which gew to being major commercial
hubs, also served as processing sites. Melka Jebdu is located south of Dire Dawa and
Shinille was a small train station on the railway line to Djibouti”. In the eighties, the two
villages gew to a town status as more people migrated there, built residences and
established new businesses. The towns were used by smugglers as a staging center and
transfer points for the in-coming and out-going contraband goods. In these two towns and
in Dire Dawa, smugglers processed khat in private homes, in coffee and tea parlors and

in hotel rooms?"

 

32 Kebede et al, Illicit Trade in Eastern Ethiopia, pp. 82-83; Eshete, "Contraband Trade in
Ethiopia," p. 4; Gebremedhin, The State of Illicit khat trade, pp. 10-11

33 Ministry of Foreigr Trade Branch Ofﬁce for Eastern Ethiopia, "Report on the state of the
Province's foreign trade," 1982 EC, pp. 6, 14. MFTEE, "The state of foreign trade," hereafter;
Ministry of Foreign Trade Branch Ofﬁce for Eastern Ethiopia, "A report on ways to control
contraband trade at the train station and safeguard the train, February 8, 1981 E. C., pp. 4-5. MFTEE,
"Control contraband trade" hereafter.

3" MFTEE, "Control contraband trade," p. 4.

271

 

 

DJIBOUTI
9'
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iw/ HARERL_____ #,,__l-:"""'°A

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SOMALIA

 

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g s o M A I. I A
Como ROUTES — _
HIGHWAYS _____. . \
RAILWAY LINE uuuuuuuu \" - . \
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Figure 6

Routes of Smuggling, l9805

 

272

To transport the processed khat to the border, smugglers used the Djibouti-bound
train most of their way. Some khat originated in Dire Dawa, where a few of the smugglers
jumped over the fence surrounding the train station and boarded locomotives, while a few
others climbed on the train as soon as it left the station and before it picked up speed. Most
of the khat processed in Dire Dawa and Melka Jebdu was gathered at Shinille after being
transported there by pick-up trucks, pack animals and human porters. In accordance with
its schedule, the train stopped at Shinille brieﬂy and smugglers got on board with their
khat.35

From Shinnille, the smugglers traveled to Laserat, 150 kilometers away, where
most of the khat was unloaded and taken 30 to 40 miles to Durdur, on the Djibouti border,
or 20 to 30 kilometers to the Somali border. At the borders, khat was transferred to clients
who rushed the leaves to Djibouti by speedy trucks. The remaining khat was taken to
Ayisha, a small station, where the train stopped for 10 minutes, and Dewele, a major
irnmigation and customs center, where searches were supposedly thorough and complete.
The kote’belé disembarked the train before it entered Aisha and crossed the border on foot.
Others, mainly the commuter-traders with laissez passer and licences, and the railway
company, the customs and police personnel managed to get through the search process at
Dewele. Some khat, of course, was conﬁscated but most was successfully smuggled. The
experienced smugglers were so conﬁdent about clearing through customs search that one

surprised KEAE inspector said, "the smugglers do not seem to be aware that smuggling

 

3’ Gebremedhin, The State of illicit khat trade, pp. 1-6; MFTEE, "Control contraband trade"
pp. 10-1 1 .

273

contraband goods in contravention of the law was punishable."36

In the 19808, the use of the railway for contraband trade purposes increased
considerably. The fact that people who were supposed to control smuggling participated
in the business made it easier for the contrabandists to use the train as the main means of
transporting goods in and out of Ethiopia. Passenger ( named Litorina and Hassanjog) and
freight (F altum) cars were frequently used for transporting the smuggled khat. The traders
opened up and stored their khat in the ceilings and the walls of locomotives to hide them
from authorities. Officials who were supposed to combat contraband were won over by
smugglers through bribery, nepotism and direct involvement in the unoﬂicial trade. In the
whole drama of smuggling, the unofﬁcial traders seemed to have more say over the
railroad operations than law enforcement officials.37

Corruption was in part responsible for the gowth of the contraband trade because
it led to lapses in inspection at the at the Dire Dawa station and at Dewale, the last stop
before the train proceeded into Djibouti's territory. As for the areas in between, oﬁicials
deliberately overlooked contraband activities. After October 1978, there was a policy that
unofficially imported goods were to be conﬁscated only at the border point. Once the
goods were within Ethiopian territory, people were free to buy and sell the unofﬁcially
imported goods. The main contraband goods markets at Dire Dawa ("taiwan"), Melka

J ebdu, J ijjiga and Harer, were sold in outdoor markets with no interference from law

 

36 Ibid., p. 17.

3' MFTEE, "Control contraband trade" pp. 10-11.

274

enforcement.38 The major customs post where goods were thoroughly searched and
conﬁscated was at Awash, thus deﬁning the economic frontier which desigrated Harerge,
as Clapham put it, as "a free trade zone within a socialist state."

The government adopted this policy for two main reasons. First, in the late
seventies, Harerge was emerging from war devastation, and contraband trade was seen
as a source of employment for young men and women who otherwise would have engaged
in prostitution and robbery. Secondly and more importantly, there was a concern that,
if the unofficial trade was prohibited, the Issa who sold khat and used the money to
purchase rice, sugar, tea and other necessities would retaliate by damaging the railway line,
thereby causing gaver economic harm than they would have inﬂicted simply by smuggling

goods.39

D. Conclusion

Contraband trade brought to Harerge economic changes which have had sigriﬁcant
repercussions on regional employment and income. By the end of the eighties, Harerge's
rapidly expanding khat economy which, to a sigriﬁcant extent, ﬁnanced the import of
contraband consumer goods had incorporated a sigriﬁcant protion of the province's
population. The segnent of the population which gained part or all of its income from khat

related activities was larger than that employed by the few factories that existed in the

 

3" Zelleke Beyene, Chief Administrator of Harerge, Minutes of the High Level Committee
which studied the Problem of Contraband Trade, February 13, 1971 E.C.

3" Gebremedhin, The State of Illicit khat trade, pp. 19-20.

275

region. Those who depended on the khat economy and the related parallel market activities
were khat cultivators; truck-owners and truck drivers; trimmers who prepared khat for
export; smugglers; and retailers.

In Harerge thus contraband trade became an integal part of the regional economy
and made positive contributions. Those who believed that the parallel market was
antithetical to economic development because it denied government the revenue they
deserved may be surprised by the contributions it made to Harerge's economy. The parallel
markets sector provided employment to people who would otherwise crowd cities and
cause social problems. More importantly, it served as a lubricant in easing tensions
stemming from state intervention. This chapter has shown that there is more to be gained
from contraband trade's positive contributions to the socio-economic well-being of the

region than the revenue it denied the government.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion: Towards a Khat-based Development?

In the previous chapters this dissertation has examined a number of issues related to
khat's commodiﬁcation. I began the dissertation by outlining its three major and interrelated
aims. These were: (1) to explain the ﬁmdamental and interrelated political, social and
economic processes which led to the emergence of khat as Harerge's main cash crop; (2) to
account for farmers' decision-making processes and the strategies they deployed to defend
their interests; and (3) to examine the different ways and contexts in which farmers, in
concert with traders, contributed to the expansion of khat market, in spite of the limitations
state intervention had imposed on them.

My study therefore focused on and traced three aspects of change, I. e., khat's
transformation from a tree gown on small gardens to being the predominant crop in the
ﬁelds (production); from a substance chewed by few people at social and religious
occasions to the most conspicuous social habit (consumption); and ﬁom a crop sold in local
markets to supplement cash income for farmers to the most proﬁtable cash crop in Harerge
region (marketing). In the process, I have attempted to describe the profound agicultural
transformation that has taken place in Harerge. In this chapter, I will sum up khat's impact

on farrners' quality of life and comment on the viability of the choice farmers have made.

276

277
A. Assessing Change

Khat has always occupied an important role in Harerge's social and cultural
institutions. In the context of this dissertation, it is important to recognize that its production
and distribution has led to conﬂict among traders, ethnic goups, farmers and ofﬁcials.
Hareri farmers jealously kept the shrub from spreading to the Oromo until the late
nineteenth-century, when they hired the latter to work their khat orchards. In the early
twentieth-century, government ofﬁcials attempted to eradicate khat in order to "liberate
farmers from its evil inﬂuence." Since the 19508, khat has been Harerge's most proﬁtable
cash crop and its consumption the most pervasive social habit. Governments, especially
those on the importing side, have favored controlling the industry in the hope of attaining
dominance over their respective economies and the population's behavior. The efforts
ﬁzzled out in the face of the stiff resistance put up by farmers and traders.

The rapidity with which khat consumption expanded in the Red Sea region was made
possible by the construction of transport and communications networks (roads, railway line,
international air port at Dire Dawa) which were originally intended to develop export crops
other than khat and enhance agicultural productivity. Modern transportation helped to
open up foreign markets for the leaf, allowing farmers quickly and decisively to respond
to declining production, falling coffee prices, demogaphic pressure and land scarcity and
state interventions. After analyzing available goals and potential risks, they pursued
strategies appropriate to rapidly shifting political and economic contexts. Despite numerous
obstacles, they expanded and intensiﬁed khat cultivation and provided a steady supply of

the leaf to meet the needs of consumers in the Horn of Aﬁica and Southem Arabia.

278
Constantly striving to outrnaneuver unfair and intrusive policies , khat-cultivating farmers
have in different ways powerfully shaped the agarian structure of Harerge.

The seemingly insatiable demand for khat in the countries of the Horn of Aﬁica and
the Arabian peninsula has been responsible for driving up both the price and levels of khat
production. In 1994, on a normal day, an estimated 225 buyers come to the evening market
and 350 persons to the early morning market at the AwWoday market center. My own
survey indicates that each buyer collected khat ranging between 60 and 700 kilogams.
Calculated on the basis of these ﬁgures, an average 218, 500 birr worth of khat changed
hands at the market place. This ﬁgure translates to 79.8 million birr spent annually on
purchasing khat only in AwWoday. Production, likewise, has reached staggering
proportions, increasing from an annual average of 70 metric tons in 1961 to 9, 644 in 1985.1

Correlated with the khat industry is a ﬂourishing parallel market, which the state
stignatizes as illegal and illegitimate. The khat economy has fed other illegal activities such
as smuggling and money laundering to the point that the unofficial sector in Harerge is now
more important than the official. Harerge's parallel markets are estimated to involve
approximately 1 billion bin and khat smuggling accounts for about a ﬁfth of it.

The conversion of khat to a commodity of high, concentrated value has created an
opportunity for Harerge's farmers to improve their standard of living when most rural
Ethiopians were experiencing a decline. For example, in Harerge, fewer people were seen

in threadbare and patched clothes; many wore imported jeans and shoes. Electriﬁcation has

 

' Ministry of Foreigr Trade Eastern Ethiopia branch Ofﬁce, “Foreigr Trade Activities in
Harerge Province,” (in Amharic), Dire Dawa, 1992 E. C.

279
reached some homes in rural areas, and appliances such as tape players and television sets
may be found in small town shops and even in some farm homes. For the most part the
products enter the country as contraband goods and their sale serves to repatriate some of the
khat proﬁts back into the country.

The availability of khat-generated money is displayed in ostentatious ways. There
seems to be plenty of money for celebrating social occasions in manners hitherto unseen in
Harerge's rural areas. In the late 19808, many farmers have become owners of jitneys,
pick-up trucks and taxis. The staple food of ordinary people has also changed. Instead of
the lafiso (bread) made of sorghum, people eat rice, pasta and canned food. Some families
reabsorbed people who could not make it in cities, hiring them as drivers for their
commercial vehicles. Farmers generally radiated self-conﬁdence, although some were
unsure of the sustainablity of the market for the leaf. The majority of farmers beneﬁted from
the high price of their khat, the only commodity whose price kept abreast with inﬂation and,
which, during the command economy of the late 19708 and 19808, evaded government price
controls.

The investment of wealth on vehicles was an ideal choice in an economic and
politically risky environment. In an economic context marked by inﬂation and lack of
investment opportunities, the strategy of buying vehicles functioned as a shield against the
accelerated erosion of the purchasing power of local currency. Compared to other options,
investing in vehicles was an especially attractive option for farmers because it was a reliable
means of generating and accumulating additional wealth. Farmer-owned commercial

vehicles were visible on Harerge's main highways, where they transported passengers and

280

agicultural products including khat, to and from Dire Dawa, Harer, J ijj iga and other towns.

The khat industry represents a lifeline for many of the rural and urban poor who have
employment in some aspect of the business. While farmers have become increasingly
dependent on khat production for their survival, a sigriﬁcant number of the urban
unemployed beneﬁt from engaging in the distribution of the leaf. The trade has been
particularly liberating for women who participate in the retailing of the substance. Most of
the small retailers who purchase khat at AwWoday market and sell in small bunches in
nearby towns are women. F armers' wives sell the poor quality "faqaa" variety directly to
consumers and use the proceeds to purchase merchandise for themselves and their families.
They say that "khat had made them ﬁnancially independent."2

Petty employment in buying, transporting and selling khat leaves for legal as well as
illicit markets has been a traditional occupation for many Harerge residents living at
subsistence level. In 1979, when the government permitted some persons to purchase and
transport up to 100 birr worth of khat leaf to Djibouti, there was a weekly movement of at
least 4, 000 people into the khat purchasing areas. The low price offered in omcial markets
caused many farmers and traders to opt for the alternative illegal markets and, by the 19808,
the amount of khat smuggled into the neighboring territories had reached ahnost half the
officially exported amount and far geater in terms of value.

Khat has also presented new economic opportunities for other social goups,

particularly commercial intermediaries already engaged in a range of market activities. They

 

2 Kimya Ahmed, Ganda Limay, Haramaya, June 2, 1994; Nuriya Mohammed, Ganda
Kollobo, Kombolcha, June 6, 1994; Kemero Ali, Haramaya, May 27, 1994

281

obtained khat from producers, smuggled the produce into neighboring countries, and used
the proceeds to supply contraband consumer durables and even basic foodstuffs. Capital
generated from clandestine economic activities which has performed such an inﬂuential role
in shaping the character of the regional economy, appropriates the high proﬁts from trading
khat. Much of the proﬁt is used to ﬁnance a parallel market economy which has created
employment opportunities for more people than the public and manufacturing sectors
combined.

The commodiﬁcation of khat has perhaps beneﬁtted farmers directly in providing a
temporary solution for the apparently intractable problem facing Harerge's agiculture--land
shortage. Land is a scarce commodity and it is not likely that more will become available
in the future. In Harerge, particularly in the eastern central districts, as much as 90 percent
of the land is cultivated and average household land size has dwindled to 0.84 hectares in
1990 compared to 1.1 hectares in 1980 and 1.5 hectares in 1965.3 As we have seen (chapter
7), in the 19808, the average yield per hectare for sorghum was 19 quintals. Since it is
impossible to survive on this quantity of sorghum, farming households ﬁnd it imperative to
maximize the productivity of the available land.

Khat is part of the diversiﬁed cropping system that ﬁts well both into the environment
and the agicultural cycle of small-farm households without being too demanding of labor.

Harvested at least three times a year, it provides a regular source of income to meet

 

3 P. Poschen, "An Evaluation of the Acacia albida-based agoforestry practices in the
Harerghe highlands of Eastern Ethiopia." In ed. P. K. R. Nair, Agroforestry Systems in the
Tropics (Dordrecht, 1989), 385-400; Badeg Bishaw, "Determining Options for Agoforestry
systems for Harerghe Highlands, Ethiopia," Ph.D. Dissertation, Oregon State University, 1993.

282

household expenditure. Khat has also consistently maintained price advantages over other
crops. In the eighties, it yielded three times the returns on sorghum, ten times the returns
on coﬁee and nearly twice the returns on low input management potato. More recent ﬁgures
suggest that this price differential has widened further, with per hectare proﬁt from khat
exceeding all other crops, making govemment-sponsored substitution progarns unattractive
and unsuccessful.4

The most enduing impact of khat is the fact that its trade provided badly needed
capital for individuals to leave their farms and look for nonagicultural opportunities
elsewhere. The transport businesses, brick factories, ﬁlling stations and small shops which
have sprouted all over Harerge highlands are results of khat generated capital. These
ventures have enabled farmers to extricate themselves from land which has over the years
become extremely scarce and diminished the possibility of many becoming small-holder,
self-sufﬁcient farmers. In this regard, khat has done what the policy planners never imagined
they could do for farmers, i.e., moving them to nonagicultural occupations, thereby easing
demogaphic pressure and land scarcity. It is interesting to note that farmers pursued
diversiﬁed occupational strategies to cope with the challenges of agiculture whereas policy
makers envisioned policies which sought to ﬁx the existing problems of agiculture and
perpetuate small-holder farms.

The commercialization of Harerge's agriculture did not lead to the spread of capitalist

relations of production and the transformation of farmers into wage laborers. Household

 

" At the time of my research in 1994, I met farmers who had sold 1 kg of khat for 1,100
birr that year.

283
production had remained the dominant form under the rubric "petty commodity production."
Households essentially secure their social reproduction from the cultivation of the leaf, but,
despite the appearance of conspicuous consumption, the production process itself is not
capitalized. Once capital acquires khat, the marketing process is accompanied by an
exponential rise in prices and contributes to circuits of primitive accumulation elsewhere.
The draining away of proﬁt still characterizes the production of khat in Harerge.

The disproportionate distributional rewards resulting from involvement in the khat
industry are today increasingly apparent in the Harerge region. For the majority of the
primary producers and traders in rural and urban centers, access to basic services is heavily
restricted and consumption needs are met only by involvement in illicit activities. Despite
their windfall, most khat producers still do not enjoy the beneﬁt of clean drinking water or
all-encompassing rural electriﬁcation schemes, while health posts, schools, and roads in the
region are seriously deﬁcient in number and quality.

The khat boom cannot oﬂer more than a lifeline to survival for hundreds and
thousands of the rural and urban poor, nor can it represent a suitable route for regional
development. The market for the product is limited and precarious. At present, one cannot
expect that the consumption of khat, which has been conﬁned to the Red Sea region for
many centuries, will expand and develop to an international market. Even the existing
market could face serious problems emanating from policy changes in the receiving countries

and cause a major economic problem for the producers in Harerge.

 

284

B. Prospects for the Future

The prosperity that khat cultivation generated has been a two-edged sword. While
it has provided some concrete, short-term beneﬁts to farmers' and other segnents of
Harerge's impoverished unemployed and a certain degee of respite from economic
devastation and (political) crisis, it did not open an avenue leading to structurally sound and
sustainable development. Harerge's farmers have managed to create an agarian system
which can sustain an extremely high population, the density of which, in some places,
reaches 400 people per square kilometer. However, if one pays close attention to the
sequential and cumulative impacts, the relationship between past and present local and
broader options, actions and strategies, the prognosis of Harerge's agiculture does not
promise a stable future. Harerge's high population density has resulted in an expansion
of the cultivated lands, at the expense of gazing lands, thereby decreasing the quantity of
fodder for animals. In addition, the development of cash crops and the consequent
commercialization of Harerge's agiculture have reduced the land cultivated with maize and
sorghum, and, therefore, the quantity of fodder which can be obtained from these two crops.

The shortage of fodder, in tum, has led to reductions in the number of livestock a
household can keep and, hence, in the amount of manure that may be collected.
Customarily, the limited amount of manure is applied in priority to cash crops. Even though
food crops have always occupied much of the cultivated land, they received only chemical
fertilizer when available. The disproportional allocation of manure has caused a decrease
in the humus content of the soils and the productivity of the land. In many places, erosion

has washed away the top soil and farmlands have become impoverished. Having nearly

285

exhausted its top soil, Harerge's agiculture is on a precarious balance. If no solution is
found, it is likely that the region's agiculture will face in the near future a very serious
ecological crisis.

The high population density has also resulted in the diminution of household land
size, making it necessary to intensify the use the available land. Apart from extensive
cultivation, reclamation of new lands and reduction of fallow periods and gazing lands,
farmers achieved their goals by increasing the proportion of high-income cash crops relative
to food crops. Khat and potato were prominent cash crops in the agarian system, selected
by farmers because of the fact that both crops could be sold and used for home consumption.
In this regard, potato has a crucial role to play in the overall balance of the agarian system.
For example, when the supply of gain from outside Harerge was sharply reduced in the
summer of 1984, farmers and urban dwellers overcame the shortfall by supplementing their
diet with potato.

Khat competes for land with food crops and the proportion each crop occupies is
determined by the farmer. On the one hand, khat has a higher return on investment, but it
makes the farmer totally dependent on the market. On the other hand, food crops provide
the farmers with household security. Each farmer makes his decision regarding the
proportion of khat and food crops to be planted based on family needs, farmland size and
market conditions.

Although farmers choose the crops to plant, external factors also inﬂuence their
decisions. For food crops to play the major role of security, farmers have to cope with

climatic variability and changing conditions of production, i.e., pests and disease attacks,

286

market conditions, change from one year to another. In the face of these uncertainties,
farmers aim to minimize the consequences of variability in the overall environment of
production and to maximize the production of each crop. The avoidance of risks and the
attainment each year of a sufﬁcient and stable production appears to be as important for
farmers as the proﬁt from selling cash crops.

To achieve their objectives, farmers use crops that respond to environmental changes
differently, rely on crops that provide them cash at different periods of the year and allow
them to minimize the effects of failure on their food supply. Their objective is to adapt
themselves to any unforeseeable change, be it a drop in prices or a crop failure. Markets are
not the only determinants of the cropping pattern.

The analysis of the regional agiculture shows that the presence of a variety of crops
in Harerge is not just a matter of happenstance or the adaptability of those crops to the
agroecological environment. The types of crops found in the region are chosen and
combined by the farmers themselves because each crop plays a particular role in the overall
agriculture. The combination of the cultivated crops and the proportion of each crop gown
is the direct result of the farrners' choice and the logic of production they followed.

If one looks at the case of Harerge closely, the distinction between cash crops and
food crops is rather blurred, because farmers have chosen to produce crops that can be
consumed or sold. Accordingly, farmers have chosen to produce khat and vegetables and
to buy gain. In the 19808, the derg's policy of holding gain prices low to beneﬁt urban
consumers encouraged farmers to gow more proﬁtable cash crops and purchase the less

expensive cereals. For the moment, farmers say khat is their "miracle crop" which has

287
enabled them to survive hard times. Yet they are keenly aware that the choice they have
made is not a viable, long-term solution for the region's agiculture.

This study has shown how independent-minded farmers cope with environmental,
political and economic adversities. Government policies which centered around prescribing
the strategies farmers must follow, without taking into account the views of farmers
themselves, have not succeeded in bringing about agarian transformation. It seems
Harerge’s farmers have ﬁgured out a successﬁrl rural development strategy. Most use their
cash wealth to enter nonfarm life, but they have limited knowledge of the opportunities that
are available. Policy makers could beneﬁt the farmers by helping them identify and invest
their own money in workable, nonfarm economic activities rather than insisting on the
perpetuation of small-holder agriculture. Harerge’s agicultural and developmental problems
cannot be solved by allocating “land to the tiller,” for it is no longer available. The only
solution to agicultural problems emanating from land scarcity is what Harerge’s farmers

have already ﬁgured out: shift to nonfarm economies.

Awraja
Bejirond

Dej azmatch

Derg

F itaurari

Inderassie
Kella
Kuter gebir
Lij

Qegrazmatch

Qalad

Ras

Shibetta

Woreda

GLOSSARY

Administrative unit; sub-province.
Honorary title given to treasury officials.

Military title; literally, “Commander of the gate.” Conferred on members
of the Ethiopian aristocracy.

Amharic term for committee. Used to refer to the military regime which
ruled Ethiopia from 1974-1991.

Military title; literally, “Commander of the vanguard. Conferred on the
nobility and commoners.

Title of nobility; literally, “representative ‘of the emperor.”’
Toll-gate.

Unsurveyed or unmeasured land, usually held by farmer-operators.
Royal title; literally, “child.”

Military title; literally, “Commander of the right ﬂank.” Conferred on
Commoners.

A piece of rope used for land measurement. Also denotes a measured plot
of land.

Military title; literally “head.” The highest military rank given to
the nobility and commoners.

A designation of a plot of land found in Harerge.

Administrative unit; district.

288

Appendix A

Appendix A
Coffe and Khat Exports from Harerge, 1936-1991.

 

 

Coffee Khat
Year Volume Value Volume Value
(tons) ('000 birr) (tons) ('000 birr)
1936 11,883 12,153 -- --
1937 7,052 12,031 15 7
1938 15,228 18,326 26 13
1946 -- -- 26 14
1947 -- 853 81 43
1948 -- 818 204 147
1949 -- 1,082 186 183
1950 -- 1,088 368 246
1951 -- -- 470 723
1952 -- -- 768 1,44
1953 -- ~- 1,176 1,806
1954 -- -- 1,228 5,058
1955 -- -- 1,522 6,556
1956 -- -- 1,618 6,996
1957 -- 1,229 821 3,601
1958 -- 971 1,386 4,782
1959 -- 979 2,300 7,317
1960 -- -- 2,149 6,900
1961 -- -- 2,690 8,686
1962 -- -- 3,856 10,444
1963 -- -- 4,798 12,541
1964 -- -- 1,966 5,051
1965 -- -- -- --
1966 -- -- 799 2,170
1967 -- -- 854 2,921
1968 -- -- 842 3,003
1969 -- -- 1,212 5,009
1970 7,238 18,897 607 1,747
1971 5,358 12,283 1,931 4,042
1972 7,964 19,384 2,751 4,267
197 3 7,934 20,453 2,059 3,838
1974 6,907 21,041 2,335 5,538
1975 5,816 17,667 2,504 5,425
1976 8,420 45,046 3,384 7,808
1977 4,109 49,207 747 5,335

290

 

1978 -- -- 1,062 6,625
1979 2,355 16,213 1,997 13,978
1980 3,103 25,625 1,874 19,379
1981 1,254 11,057 2,581 28,480
1982 1,072 10,654 2,824 31,067
1983 2,260 18,646 2,805 30,854
1984 2,663 17,881 2,904 32,028
1985 604 6,152 2,804 31,424
1986 659 9,695 2,699 28,348
1987 804 11,355 2,863 32,157
1988 544 6,643 2,182 20,881
1989 807 8,461 2,868 36,334
1990 1,228 15,210 2,425 31,760
1991 1,281 12,577 1,184 15,228
Sources: PMAC, Customs & Exise Authority. WW, 1960-

1991.

National Ban_k of Ethiopia, Dire Dawa Branch.

PO 371/53465.

11 i Mini f , 13 (1958).

LIST OF INFORMANTS (SAMPLE)

Abdalla Kassirn, 54, June 7, 1994. Khat farmer, Igagena PA, Ganda Kollobo, Kombolcha.
Abdi Beker, 60, April 6, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Lucha, Haramaya.

Abdo Shanqo, 52, May 19, 1994. Khat farmer/employee Haramaya University of
Agriculture, Bate worke PA, Haramaya.

Abdulahi Ahmed, 64, May 17, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Issa, Bate Worke PA, Haramaya.
Abdulahi Shebo, 70, May 25, 1994. Coffee/khat farmer, Ganda Lucha, Deda PA, Haramaya.
Abdulahi Mussa, 62, June 9, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda F ala'ana, Kadir PA, Kombolcha.
Abdulahi Mumed, 70, 5-18-94. Retired khat farmer, Ifa PA, Haramaya.

Abdule Yusuf, 64, June 8, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Lencho, Kayrensa PA, Kombolcha.

Abdurahman Emer, 43, May 17, 1994, Khat farmer/Employee of Alemaya Agicultural
Univerisity; former Chairman of Bate worke PA. Ganda Issa, Haramaya.

Abebe Mekonnen, Dire Dawa. February 2, 1994. Coordinator, Dire Dawa Autonomous
Region Planning Ofﬁce, Participated in several government mandated researches on

illegal trade in the region; a very knowledgeable professional.

Ahmed Abdulahi, 50, June 7, 1994. Khat/coffee farmer, Ganda Saqa Sharifa, Samte PA,
Kombolcha.

Ahmed Beker, 40, May 21, 27, 1994. Khat trader/farmer, Haramaya.
Ahmed Amit, 61, May 25, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Gole, Haji Walta'a PA, Haramaya.
Ahmed Tewﬁq Mohammed, (Balambaras) 68, March 23, 1994, Member of Parliament

(1950-1954 E.C.), Woreda administrator of Garamulata, later Chercher, Dire Dawa
and later Awraja administrator of Garamulata.

291

292
Amin Usman Mahmud, 45, 5-17-94. Khat farmer, Ganda Issa, Bate Worke PA, Haramaya.

Avedis Terzian, c. 80, August 8, 1994. Addis Ababa. An Armenian businessman and
community leader. Son of Sarkis Terzian, one of the ﬁrst Armenians to locate in
Ethiopia in the late nineteenth-century.

Beker Tahir, 53, June 6, 1994. khat/coffee farmer, Ganda Sido, Samte PA, Kombolcha.

Beshir Shiek Abdi (F itaurari), 68, March 24, 1994. Woreda administrator of Ferfer, awraja
governor of Dagahbour and later of Jijjiga, Deputy governor of Harerge region
(1975-1991).

Dawd Abdo (Hajji), 60, Dire Dawa, March 26, 1994. Businessman, former khat exporter,
member of the Khat exporting company in the 19508.

Debebe Asefa, Harer, March 4, 1994. Team Leader of Agicultural Extension, Ministry of
Coffee and Tea Development.

Dejene Ayele, Harer, March 3, 1994. Processing Expert, Ministry of Coffee and Tea
Development.

Duressa F eyissa, 73, February 24, 1994, Dire Dawa, Worked for the French with the RR
company since 1941. Moslem and Oromo (from Wollega). Also participated in the
illegal trade during the 19708. Well versed in the events since 1941.

Girma Andarge, 84, Dire Dawa, February 23, 27, 1994. Metal Worker, Worked with the
Italians during the occupation in Harer. Remembers most things that happened as far
back as the time of the regency.

Hassan Mohammed (Hajji), 50, March 19, 1994. Khat farmer, Bate Worke PA, Haramaya.

Ibrahim Dawe, 40, May 30, 1994. Khat trader (Kebkebi), AwWoday khat marketing center.

Ibrahim USAF, 60, June 9, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Feline, Kafrr PA, Kombolcha.

Ishmael Mohammed, 60, June 7, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Caleb, Igagena PA, Kombolcha.

Kassim Said Ali Terre, 50, May 18, 1994. Khat farmer/trader/driver, Ifa PA, Haramaya.

Khalifa Hajji Ali Born, 53, May 24, 1994. Khat farmer/widely traveled abroad, Ganda
Lucha, Deda PA, Haramaya.

293

Kimiya Ahmed, 40, May 28, 1994. Khat farmer's wife, Ganda Limay, Bate Worke,
Haramaya.

Kemero Ali, 50, May 27, 1994. Khat trader's wife, Haramaya town..
Luye Said, 64, May 26, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Limay, Bate Worke PA, Haramaya.

Mesfm Asfaw, Harer, March 15, 1994. Senior Expert of the South-Eastem Rangelands
Project.

Mohammed USAF, 58, May 25, 1994. Coﬁ‘ee/Khat farmer, Ganda Lucha, Deda PA,
Haramaya.

Mohammed Abdurahman (Hajj i), 60, March 26, 1994. Fresh out of Alliance Francais school
in Dire Dawa, he joined chat exporting business in 1951. Left khat exporting when
the CHATHA was established because he did not like the government meddling in
the trade. He became an employee of the Djibouti-Ethiopian railway as Secretary
General in 1961 until his retirement in 1989. He knows well the details of chat trade
for the time he was involved in it.

Mohammed Abdulahi Ogsaday, 74, February 22, 1994. Coffee exporter. Began exporting
coffee from Dire Dawa in 1944.

Mohammed Yuyu, 41, May 17, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Issa, Bate Worke PA, Haramaya.
Mume Kiko (Hajji), 59, May 20, 1994. Khat farmer, Haji Walta'a PA, Haramaya.

Mume Ahmed, 55, June 6, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Fela'ana, Kakko PA, Kombolcha.
Mumed Munan, 71, May 24, 1994. Coffee/khat farmer, Ganda Lucha, Deda PA, Haramaya.

Mumed Ahmed Umar, 72, May17, 1994. Khat farmer, Ganda Issa, Bate Worke PA,
Haramaya.

Mumet Abdule, 75, May 25, 1994. Coffee/chat farmer, Ganda Lucha, Deda PA, Haramaya.
Mussa Botto, 88, May 23, 1994. Khat farmer, Genda Gole, Mula'ata PA, Haramaya.

Nuriya Sheik Ibrahim, 48, May 24, 1994. Khat farmer's wife, Ganda Lucha, Deda PA,
Haramaya.

Nuriya Mohammed, 46, June 7, 1994. Khat farmer's wife/transport vehicle operator and
kiosk owner, Ganda Caleb, Igagena PA, Kombolcha.

294
Rayima Sali, 75, May 23, 1994. Khat farmer's wife, Ganda Gole, Mula'ata Pa, Haramaya.

Said Ali Terre, 50, May 18, 1994. Somali Khat buyer, was at the farm to negotiate the
purchase of khat for that night. Interviewed at Ifa PA, Haramaya.

Suﬁan Abdulahi, 55, May 24, 1994. Khat farmer, Genda Lucha, Deda PA, Haramaya.

Taddesse Debele, (Captain) February 23, 1994, Dire Dawa, General Manager of the Khat
Exporters Association of Ethiopia (KEAE).

Te'ame Tiku, March 4, 1994. Protection Expert, Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development.

Yassin Usman, 50, February 21, 1994, Dire Dawa, Currently, Fruit and vegetable exporter;
previously khat exporter in the 19608 and early 708 to Aden.

USAF Hamo, 75, May 18, 1994. Retired khat farmer, Ifa PA, Haramaya.

On May 26, 1994, a goup of 20 khat farmers and their wives were interviewed at Ganda
Lucha, Bate Worke PA, in Haramaya.

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