EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ' » T. [7 . NATIONAL PIILIIII IN THE - PEOPLES REPUBLIG 0E CHINA ' IIIE IIoLE or IIIE SCHOOL IN BUILDING A NEW SIAIE I DIESEIIEIIIIII IoI Ihe DEgIEe III PI'I D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY . WILLIAM JOSEPH KIEFFER ‘ ’ ‘ ' '1 I an . 5 e 1 x J '7” a This is to certify that the . - ' fl thesis entitled a. Educational Development and National Policy in the People's Republic of China: The Role of the School in Building a New State presented by William Joseph Kieffer has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Educational Administratior Major professor Date Dec. 20, 1974 -- . J." 0-7639 ' -' " W @65in ABSTRACT EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN BUILDING A NEW STATE BY William Joseph Kieffer Men are drawn together by the demands of world progress and human development, but kept apart by differing concepts of justice and political order. Nations have to deal with the centers of world power to ensure their own survival. To do this effectively, an understanding of the social systems that generate power is paramount. As nations move into a post—Cold War era, only a knowledge of the major tenets of cultural-political systems will ensure a continued and expanding rapprochement between adversaries, like the United States and the People‘s Republic of China. Studying the formal educational system of China will pro- vide Americans with such knowledge. Focusing attention on the role of the schools in the Chinese PeOple‘s Republic leads to an understanding of the belief structure Peking is attempting to incorporate into the cultural ethos. The school as a social institu— tion is affected by and contributes to the functioning of other social institutions within the greater Chinese socio— political system. These other social institutions, specifically the government and the party, determine the William Joseph Kieffer . nature and extent of inputs, like the politically-determined aims of education and budgetary allocations, to educational institutions. Educational administrators, under party supervision, must then coordinate these inputs and oversee the educational process—-method, structure, content, etC.-—- to train a politically—acceptable graduate. The outputs of the school system are the inputs to other social organs, like the People's Liberation Army, the government bureau— cracy, and the party, which in turn communicate their changing needs to the schools. To understand the educa- tional process is to understand the social qualities the political leaders hope to foster among the Chinese. National and educational development has passed through four phases in the first 24 years of Communist rule on the mainland. The Period of Consolidation and Stabili— zation (1949—1957) encompassed the first years of securing political control and the First Five-Year Plan that was strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. The Period of the Three Red Flags (1958—1960) witnessed the Great Leap Forward, the People's Communes, and the Socialistic Main Line Thought. The Period of Retrenchment and the Two—Line Party Struggle (1961—1965) was a time of recuperation from natural disaster and human mismanagement and a time of Struggle between two opposing forces within the Chinese leadership. The Period of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (1966—1973) was one of political ferment and violent disruption, followed by efforts to return to a William Joseph Kieffer productive equilibrium and yet incorporate the renewed political perspective of Maoism. Since the schools were and are in integral part of the political and economic superstructure of Chinese society and therefore closely controlled by the Communist leaders, formal education was directly affected by the flmfting ideological interpretations and the practical demands facing the government and the party. Whatever maneuvering required of the party by national and inter— national events, the schools were called on to support and contribute to the "party line." The design of Chinese education reflected both diversity and unity. Throughout the various periods mmwrous educational experiments conducted to accommodate different students and different curricula were underscored by the control or sanctiOn of the all-powerful Chinese Community Party. Some of the educational variety was dEUberately planned as a component of the party line, mule other educational sub—systems reflected division within the party as to development strategy and attendant pedagogical requirements. Chinese political leaders used the school system as an instrument to indoctrinate students in the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mac, to train expertise needed to develop the national economy, and to control large segments of the population. The purpose of formal education in Guna was not to develop the talents of individuals in the fi_———— William Joseph Kieffer sense of a liberal education, but rather to develop one‘s abilities for service to the state and the party. This investigation contributes to the comparative educationists' understanding of the linkage between educa-— tional development and national policy in the People‘s Repmflic of China, to the Sinologists' awareness of the role of the school in building of a new state, and to huerested students' knowledge of another social system and its educational component. Understanding among policy- nmkers, scholars, and citizens is the first requirement for human survival. To comprehend that world events are affect— ing an overwhelming majority of people of all nations is to realize the need for greater understanding of different peoples and of the forces that keep us apart. The demands of science, of a better life for everyone, and even of mars survival requires that all peoples come to realize that we are really but one people. Hopefully this study will contribute to a greater mfierstanding of the Chinese Communist cultural-political System, their objectives and methods. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN BUILDING A NEW STATE' BY William Joseph Kieffer A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Administration and Higher Education 1974 TO Po Li, Maxine, and Lincoln ii PREFACE Men are drawn together by the demands of world progress and human development, but kept apart by differing concepts of justice and political order. Nations have to deal with the centers of world power to ensure their own survival. To do this effectively, an understanding of the social systems that generate power is paramount. As nations move into a post-Cold War era, only a knowledge of the major tenets of cultural—political systems will ensure a continued and expanding rapprochement between adversaries, like the United States and the People‘s Republic of China. Studying the formal educational system of China will provide Americans with such knowledge. Focusing attention on the role of the schools in the Chinese People's Republic leads to an understanding of the belief structure Peking is attempting to incorporate into the cultural ethos. The school as a social institution is affected by and contributes to the functioning of other social institutions within the greater Chinese socio— political system. These other social institutions, speci— fically the government and the party, determine the nature and extent of inputs, like the politically—determined aims of education and budgetary allocations, to educational institutions. Educational administrators, under party Supervision, must then coordinate these inputs and oversee the educational process-—method, structure, content, etc.-- to train a politically—acceptable graduate. The outputs of the school system are the inputs to other social organs, like the People's Liberation Army, the government bureau- cracy, and the party, which in turn communicate their changing needs to the schools. To understand the educa— tional process is to understand the social qualities the political leaders hope to foster among the Chinese. National and educational development has passed through four phases in the first 24 years of Communist rule on the mainland. The Period of Consolidation and Stabili— zation (1949-1957) encompassed the first years of securing political control and the First Five—Year Plan that was strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. The Period of the Three Red Flags (1958—1960) witnessed the Great Leap Forward, the People‘s Communes, and the Socialistic Main Line Thought. The Period of Retrenchment and the Two—Line Party Struggle (1961-1965) was a time of recuperation from natural disaster and human mismanagement and a time of struggle between two opposing forces within the Chinese leadership. The Period of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (1966—1973) was one of political ferment and violent disruption, followed by efforts to return to a productive equilibrium and yet incorporate the renewed political perspective of Maoism. Since the schools were and are an integral part of the political and economic superstructure of Chinese society iv and therefore closely controlled by the Communist leaders, formal education was directly affected by the shifting ideological interpretations and the practical demands facing the government and the party. Whatever maneuvering required of the party by national and international events, the schools were called on to support and contribute to the “party line." The design of Chinese education reflected both diversity and unity. Throughout the various periods numerous educational experiments conducted to accommodate different students and different curricula were underscored by the control or sanction of the all-powerful Chinese Community Party. Some of the educational variety was deliberately planned as a component of the party line, while other educational sub—systems reflected division within the party as to development strategy and attendant pedagogical requirements. Chinese political leaders used the school system as an instrument to indoctrinate students in the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, to train expertise needed to develop the national economy, and to control large segments of the population. The purpose of formal education in China was not to develop the talents of individuals in the sense of a liberal education, but rather to develop one's abilities for service to the state and the party. This investigation contributes to the comparative educationists' understanding of the linkage between educational development and national policy in the People's Republic of China, to the Sinologists‘ awareness of the role of the school in building of a new state, and to interested students' knowledge of another social system and its educational component. Understanding among policy- makers, scholars, and citizens is the first requirement for human survival. To comprehend that world events are affecting an overwhelming majority of people of all nations is to realize the need for greater understanding of differ— ent peoples and of the forces that keep us apart. The demands of science, of a better life for everyone, and even of man's survival requires that all peoples come to realize that we are really but one people. In promoting a popular and a scholarly understanding of this challenge confronting men in a world of competing interests, academicians and area specialists must work in the face of limitations that obstruct a solution or even a commonly agreed upon definition of the problem. Every researcher is faced with one central question—what is truth? Scholars, both fledgling and renowned, work in full awareness that perceptions of truth vary. Such research limitations are at the crux of every methodology. Research methods must be designed to get at truth. Aside from the philosophical proposition surrounding the "knowability“ of truth and whether there is but one truth, research limita- tions center on varied and knowable perceptions of truth(s) . vi 'r‘ rcv e: The historical researcher deals with a very elusive version of truth, especially if studying a relatively closed system like the People's Republic of China. More than one witness to an event produces more than one version of the truth of that occurrence; secondary analyses can either reduce the variance of interpretations and bring what is known closer to the truth, or secondary analyses can have a multiplier effect on interpretations of truth. All investigations are conducted within a constella— tion of limitations. The restrictive nature of the Communist system in China presents additional dimensions of difficulty in ferreting out the truth. Although reports, proclamations, and statistical data may be exaggerated, they do indicate trends that occur within both the subordi— nate and the superordinate systems. Varied and numerous secondary analyses add dimension to the raw data. Any government~—dictatorial or democratic-~attempts to control and restrict the flow of information. Official documents or news releases reflect only the “general line" for public consumption and are readily available. Con- versely, secret clauses and latent agreements are not even known to exist. Although official publications and proclamations of the Chinese Communists are in a sense PrOpaganda designed to promote their revolution, facts and descriptions are held to be reasonably accurate so as to present an acceptable basis for research analysis. The official publications and state-supplied data of any government should never be the sole source of infor- mation. One must recognize the paradox of such documents: states release information to manipulate target audiences; states also withhold information to manipulate those same audiences. Official data and reports are sometimes meager and often inconsistent; the discrepancies and inconsis— tencies in the reporting of facts require one to determine which sets of information are the more reasonable and the more believable. Despite disparities, such information is still worth considering. Statistics supplied by the Chinese People's Govern— ment are always questionable, not only because the mechanisms of gathering basic data are of dubious efficiency and accuracy, but also such statistics are used to support the Communist cause. Because qualified, impartial foreign observers are not allowed to conduct first-hand, systematic analyses of the data or to carry out discriminating surveys to certify claimed achievements, researchers can only accept tentatively current data supplied by the authorities of the People's Government as one source of information. Discretion and caution, however, must be used when review- ing these data. The analysis of any subordinate system functioning within a closed superordinate system is simplified by' there being only one official line and no free press to Oppose or challenge the government in searching out the viii truUL Party control simplifies the issue by suppressing opposition and proclaiming that they alone have the truth. In an attempt to reduce the error of measurement of historical interpretation, there are many sources of infor— mation from and about the Chinese mainland. In addition to the official documents and editorial comments that appear in authorized English-language publications from the Chinese Central Government Foreign Languages Press, such as People's China, Peking Review, and the Daily News Releases, there are secondary sources of information reported by government and non-government organizations of the Soviet Union, the Republic of China, India, Japan, England, and the United States. Various publications of Hong Kong— based associations-—Union Research reports, China News Analysis, and the Far Eastern Economic Review-—report and analyze in varying depth topics relevant to Chinese Communist education. And there are accounts by numerous foreign journalists and businessmen who visited the main— land that add to the resource-information pool. Sources of information and materials are available in large quantities. The quality of information, however, is varied: some is used in support of a political position, and some used in scholarly analysis. The problem is one of choosing information provided in a wide range of materials. The methodology used in this study was a documentary and literary analysis of both primary and secondary sources, focusing on the historical development of education and the ix “Uh ”N.\ RI role of the school in the building of a Chinese Communist state. This study is not solely concerned with the inter* pretation and analysis of primary documents, though they were used in the preparation and development of the thesis. Translations are claimed to be of less value than official dfinese materials, yet this researcher accepts the accuracy of the data in the English—language materials supplied by the Chinese government. Chinese materials (newspapers and documents) translated by non—Chinese sponsored agencies, like the Survey of China Mainland Press of the United States Consulate—General in Hong—Kong, were also used in support of the thesis; any translation inaccuracies in the meaning of the original text that may exist have not appreciably distorted the general argument. Other major sources used were the extensive amounts of secondary materials, such as scholarly publications in professional journals (The China Quarterly, Comparative Education Review, and Phi Delta Kappan), news reports of the Western press (The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Times (London) Educational Supplement), news analysis publications (China News Analysis), various books on China and Chinese education (including those vohmes that were collections of articles by noted scholars), in—depth analyses sponsored by professional groups (Union Research Institute and the American Academy Of Political and Social Science), and occasional papers and conference reports (found in Educational Resources Information Center-~ERIC, and the Joint Publication Research Service-—JPRS). Apart from the less scholarly and more opinionated writings, the secondary sources provided a wealth of data and interpretation. In the midst of an overwhelming amount of informa— tion of varying interpretations, the disinterested researcher must demonstrate an element of trust in the credibility of the materials he finally uses. Faith in at least the partial accuracy of the information used is a matter of degree. At one extreme, if one does not demon— strate the least element of faith in either original docu— ments or others' analyses of data, then no matter how worthy the study, the thesis will go unsupported. At the other extreme, if one believes all and trusts everyone, dubious scholarship results. It is therefore necessary for one to guard against extremes and decide for the purpose of developing a thesis what is believable and reasonable. Through many hours of research, reading, writing, and re—writing, this treatise was developed from an analysis Of a range of materials, with information mustered in support of the main thesis. In the end, it is but an 'editorial commentary" on history. xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many professional colleagues and personal friends provided encouragement, assistance, and understanding during the research for and the writing of this study. I am thankful for the Opportunity to have studied under faculty members representing several disciplines; they provided an awareness of various analytical perspectives of social and historical phenomena. The continuous encoure agement of fellow graduate students, in both history and education, provided motivation throughout the year devoted to this work. I am indebted to the members of my doctoral committee-~Dr. Cole S. Brembeck, Dr. Walter F. Johnson, Dr. Herbert C. Rudman, and Dr. Kwan-wei So-eeach of whom had a different perspective and a well-recognized expertise to bring to the study. I am especially grateful for the assistance given by two committee members: Dr. So for his knowledge of Chinese studies, for his methodolOgical con- cerns, and for his careful reading of the manuscript; and to the chairman of the committee, Dr. Rudman, for his initial encouragement and support in the selection of this topic, for his knowledge of Communist education, and for his continual and persistent editorial guidance. xii Ms. Karen Hearin was instrumental in completing the task within a reasonable length of time; her typing dddl through innumerable working drafts was indefatigable. The sacrifices and understanding on the part of mnys family should not be overlooked. The many hours of research in the library and the not—to—be—disturbed hours atlume is time away from wife and children-—time that can never be replaced» In reviewing the entire experience of graduate ahmmtion, one realizes the important contributions made tw'others: scholarly influences, shared enthusiasms, and : vmmds of encouragement. Growth does not occur in isolation. xiii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE O O C O O O O O O O O O O 0 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii SECTION I--PROLOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Chapter 1. AN OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . 2 Scope of the Study . . . . . . . . . 5 SECTION II--EDUCATIONAL ANTECEDENTS AND COMMUNIST CONTROL: AN INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . 17 Chapter 2. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE EDUCATION: ANTECEDENTS TO COMMUNIST CONTROL . . . . 18 Education as a Social Force: A Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Traditional Confucian Education: Historical Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Education and Revolution: Transitional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Communist Education in China: A Projective Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Chapter 3. PARTY POWER AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA . . . . . 70 . . 71 The Chinese Communist_Party~—The Power The Chinese People's Government-— The Authority . . . . . . . . . . 79 xiv SECTION III--COMMUNIST EDUCATION IN CHINA . . Chapter 4. CONSOLIDATION AND STABILIZATION The Times: 1949— 1957 . . . . Inputs to the Educational System . Process Within the Educational System Outputs of the Educational System . . Conclusion . . . . . . . Chapter 5. THE THREE RED FLAGS . . . . The Times: 1958—1960 . . . . . . Inputs to the Educational System . . Process Within the Educational System . Outputs of the Educational System . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 6. RETRENCHMENT AND THE TWO—LINE PARTY STRUGGLE . . . . . . . . . The Times: 1961— 1965 . . . . . Inputs to the Educational System . . Process Within the Educational System . Outputs of the Educational System . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . Chapter 7. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH . . . . . . . . . . . The Times: 1966— 1973 . . . . . Inputs to the Educational System . . Process Within the Educational System . Outputs of the Educational System . . Conclusion . . . . . . . Chapter 8. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . XV Page 89 90 91 101 112 132 154 157 157 166 175 197 210 213 213 219 227 239 251 253 254 265 276 300 314 319 339 LI ST OF TABLES Expenditures in Millions of Yuan . . Summary of Expend State Expenditure for the People's Republic of China, 1950—1957. Expressed in Million Yuan and Per Ce Expenditures for Education in the People's Republic of Chi itures, 1953-1957 . . nt . . . . . . . na, 1950—1957 . . . Enrollments and Graduates, 1948*1960 . Students and Graduates of Higher Education Proportion of Students of Worker and Peasant Origin to Total (Percentage of Number of Graduat Higher Learning State Budget Allo (in Millions of Increase in Kinde Student Enrollmen Graduates During Red Flags . Number of Higher Discipline for Higher Education Higher Education Number of Students Total in Each Category) es from Institutes of o o o o o a o cations: 1958, 1959, 1960 Yuan and Percentages) rgartens (in Thousands) t by Level: 1957—1960 the Period of the Three Education Graduates by 1958 . . . . . . Enrollment, 1961—1965 Graduates, 1961-1965 . Page 111 111 113 114 121 130 144 151 174 183 184 209 209 240 250 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 3-1 Chinese Communist Party Organization . . . . 76 3-2 Structure of the Chinese People' 5 Government (1949— 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . 83 3-3 National Level Government Organization of the People's Republic of China . . . . . . . 84 4-1 The Chinese Communist School System, 1951 . . 119 5-1 Educational Structure of the People's Republic of China, 1958—1959 . . . . . . . . . 178 xvii SECTION I PROLOGUE HUI "To an extent characteristic of no other institution, save that of the state itself, the school has the power to modify the social order." John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education CHAPTER 1 AN OVERVIEW The world is characterized, more now than ever before, by an increasing degree of economic and political interpenetration for an everegrowing number of people to miever—expanding degree. Nations face massive internal socio—political unrest and are forced to participate in volatile international dynamics. Observers of contem— porary world affairs can testify that "the social and political systems of the world are now affecting each other in fundamental ways, creating a fluid state of rapid change hiinternational alignments and interrelationships."1 In the face of challenges from an unstable international environment, there is concern by many for a peaceful and just world community based on an understanding of and an appreciation for other peoples, other cultures, and other lHarold Taylor, The World as Teacher (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), P- 4- ideologies. It is most important, therefore, to study nations far removed from our own national heritage, especially if they play significant roles in world politics. One of the most unexpected and welcomed interna- tional events of the last decade has been the Sine—American rapprochement. What has transpired since the Nixon trip to China is hopefully just the beginning. To insure solid judgments in the future regarding the nurturing of this nascent relationship, American politicians, statesmen, diplomats, scholars, educators, and the public need more information about and understanding of the People's Republic of China. Few better ways exist that lead to an understanding of another nation than studying its formal educational system, for the schools' curricula embrace political ideology, social values, and national ethos. I'All schools reflect the views of society abOut the way children should be brought up, the purposes of education, and the relations between school and society."2 It is "because a nation seeks through education to mould the character of its citizens and so reflects its aims--political, social, economic, and cultura1—-[that] a study of its educational system . . . can contribute as richly to an understanding 2Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 272. "*‘“ of its aims in general as a direct study of its political polices."3 China, with its socio‘politico—economic con“ cerns in shaping a Communist society, presents a distinc— tive national system to the rest of the world as to what the shape of their future could be,- how a people are to build such a future, and the role of the school in the Chinese design. Not only is the Chinese culture distinc- tive, but so is the Chinese interpretation Of communism in light of the particular problems that must be overcome if China is to take its self—perceived place in history. The combination of communism, the Chinese perspective, and the role of the school in its relationship with other institu— tions in carrying out national policy presents a functioning prototype worthy of attention. The importance of understanding the role of the school in promoting the realization of the socio—politico— economic objectives in China's vision of the future is evident in light of (1) increasing world interdependency among nations, (2) China's emergence as a major force in international politics, and (3) the social engineering under way in the People's Republic of China since 1949. “There is no doubt that the Communist leaders fully appreciate the importance of education in their plan of building a new 3I. L. Kandel, The New Era in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955) , p. 13. society."4 One major concern emerging from this brief statement is "What is the impact of selected central policies of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Government on the development of education and the role of the school in China since 1949?" Because the educational system is an important means of achieving desired social ends, what are the aims of the formal school system for the Chinese Communist Party and how have these aims been implemented? How has the system of schools contributed to the realization of the Chinese Communist state and in what ways has the party influenced the func— tioning and the output of the schools? The issue, then, centers on learning more about the culture and ideology that have produced a generation of dflnese who has been alien to and hostile toward America since the mid—twentieth century. The significance of learning more about the People's Republic of China, in the hope of making correct decisions in the building of a peaceful and just future, is self—evident when considering Gdna‘s (1) growing military potential, (2) influence on Asimipolitics, and (3) unpredictable domestic affairs. Scope of the Study Owing to the magnitude of the relationship between the school and its parent social order, some parameters 4Theodore Hsi—en Chen, "The New Education in Commnust China," School and Society 71, no. 1839 (18 March 1950):167. need to be established in the development of this thesis. The following concerns will serve as the boundaries of this study. Geo-political Concerns One of the contemporary issues of East Asia is the existence of two Chinas. One is the Republic of China under the control of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek on the island of Taiwan; the other is the People's Republic of China controlled by the Chinese Communist Party of Mao Tse—tung on the mainland of Asia. The scope of this inquiry is limited to the Communist-controlled main— land, for it has the greater potential for peace or war in the region, it is the most populous nation in the world, and its ideology is a most radical departure from Western— styled democratic governments. Temporal Concerns Except for an introductory section dealing with the role of educational institutions throughout much of China's history up to the Communist takeover, the focus of this study is directed to the era beginning on 1 October 1949, when the Communists took control of the mainland. The Gfinese Communist Party, established in 1921, had suffered many defeats at the hands of both the Nationalists (or Kuomintang) and the Japanese until the end of the Second World War. It was not until late 1949, however, that Mao Tse-tung claimed control of the country and established a Communist government in Peking. It was from this time that the Communist party could concentrate on building the kind of society it envisioned without being threatened with extinction or serious harassment by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. After the 1949 takeover, the educational system was used purposefully to shape the total society that occupied mainland China. The Communists had long realized the value of a school system as a major social institution to be used in promoting their objectives. But only with the takeover could they develOp a nation—wide school system to fit their own purposes. Therefore, the major focus of this investigation starts on 1 October 1949. Policy Concerns Since education is an integral part of the social and political order of society, any shift in basic economic or political policy has a corresponding impact on education and the school system. In all but the most primitive of cultures, there is no ideological separation between the society and its formal schools; in the People's Republic of China, there is no separation between the society envisioned by the party and the goals toward which the schools actively strive. In fact, the school system in China is more respon— sive to government direction (and party proclamations) than are most other national school systems. .‘ H'— National policies affect educational development and the role of the school in a direct, and sometimes immediate, manner. The impact of national policies throughout the history of the People's Republic of China that are considered in this study include those of the major educational proclamations, budgetary allocations, and selected political, economic, and thoughtereform strategies that have given shape to the schools and their educational programs. Educational Concerns The Chinese "have been subjected to the greatest educational and indoctrinal campaign launched by a modern state. Its scope and magnitude certainly defies compari— son with the educational activities of Nazi Germany and even surpasses that of the Soviet Union."5 Education goes well beyond the formal school system, for there are many activities that occur outside the limits of the formal school that are educational. Communist education includes propaganda and indoctrination, and it is dispensed through any and all media that have an impact on popular thinking-— radio, newspapers, museums, cinema, opera, drama, literature, and the formal school system. Such multifarious educa— tional efforts are planned, coordinated, and centrally . 5Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism u1China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1989)) P- l. ,controlled. The Chinese educational system is a multi« channel communication network designed to reach every seg— ment of the entire population——workers, peasants, students, soldiers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and people of all ages. This study limits the focus of concern to only the formal educational efforts of the nation's school system-— full—time and part-time elementary, secondary, and tertiary (post-secondary) education. Spare—time schools (primary, secondary, and higher education) sponsored by industrial institutions, winter—schools in the agricultural sector, evening schools, correspondence schools, shortvterm schools, television universities, and adult literacy classes have had a significant impact on millions of Chinese through providing basic literacy, numeracy, occupational skills, and political education. However important these educational programs may be, this study will focus, not on the spare—time schools or on literacy programs, but on the full—time and partework, part—study institutions. This student of Chinese education defines the formal school system as an organized network of direct interactions between teachers and students. Specifically— defined curricula give direction to the nature of instruc- tion. Formal schools are structured around fixed orienta— tions of time, personnel, place, requirements, and hierarchical promotion. Of little or no consequence to the essential institutional character of education is the lO nature of the physical plant or the exact location of the teacher-student interaction (be it in a school building or a factory or a mine or a field) just so the surrounding facilities promote the curriculum, at best, and do not interfere with it, at worst. The focus of this investigation is on the role of the formal school system as an instrument used to promote and achieve national policy goals as interpreted through the various periods of ideological exposition. The impor- tance of the formal educational system is not lost on the leaders of the People's Republic of China. "Schools and universities . . . in China are used by the Communist government as major instruments in the furtherance of its own policies. Those policies will change: but the method of using the schools will remain."6 The Communists have succeeded in making the school system an effective tool for achieving party objectives. This study examines the nature of that interaction. Conceptual Concerns Man's total social system encompasses the inter- national cultural ecumene7; this is eSpecially so in the 6K. E. Priestly, "Education in the People's Republic of China: Beginnings," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education ind Communism in China (Hong Kong: International SW Group, 1969), p. 58. 7For a discussion of cultural ecumene, see A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 379-395. 11 age of satellites, of tranS*national migration of people, of cross—cultural communication of knowledge, of East-West exchange of ideas, and of increased awareness of and respect for the national ethos of other peoples. This cross—pollenization of cultures makes it difficult to describe any social system as total or comprehensive short of including all of mankind. To do so would be a monue mental undertaking, if at all possible, because of the different ways and varying degrees that all nations and all peoples have influenced each other throughout history. In light of this world-community concept and of developing the thesis of this study, it will be necessary to accept the proposition that there are distinctive social systems drawn on cultural—political lines and that the world is but a collection of these associations. The various cultural—political systems are the components of the world's total social system. In turn, these cultural—political entities are but networks of subordinate systems that usually complement each other, but sometimes are in a limited and defined adversarial rela- tionship. (Because there is more control in a Communist state, there are fewer built-in adversarial relationships than in more democratic societies.) Consciously-created organizations, like the school system, and naturally—evolved associations, like the family, exist within the parameters of the larger, more comprehensive cultural-political system. flfis study focuses on the more formal organizations rather than on the more natural groupings. 12 All organizations must have reasonably compatible value patterns in order to exist within the same larger parent system; this is especially so for the deliberately- created institutions of a society. If institutions and the values they represent find themselves outside the limits of acceptability, they either die or are put to death. The nature of the service an institution renders changes as the definition of what is acceptable and what is not, changes. The basic value orientation of the institution must be integrated and compatible with the ideology of the larger, more comprehensive system. The value pattern of the school system, for example, implies acceptance of the more comprehensive belief structure of the superordi- nate social system. The system of schooling in China, as in all societies, is a part of and a service to the parent society. By no means is the institutional boundary fixed and unchanging: as policy and ideological interpretations shift, the role of the school is reinterpreted so as to remain consistent with the new policy. Schools serve and support the other institutions of the society and of the state. As part of the social superstructure and as transmitter of the culture, education in general and schools in particular reflect and serve the Politico-economic interests of the ruling class. In an historical context, for example, the traditional educa- tional system in China supported the Confucian ethic and 13 the scholar-gentry-official design of social control; the educational system produced "graduates“ who supported the status quo of the larger social system. Education in the schools between the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1912) and Communist control of the mainland (1949) was affected by the search for a new ideology to bring China into the modern world. What exactly is a desirable institutional output in the Communist era is defined in national policy, which is either written by or sanctioned by the party. The party, as the repository of power in the People's Republic of China, determines the nature of the inputs and outputs of institutions, including the formal educational institutions. The schools' programs strive to fulfill the specific goals of the value pattern of the larger system they serve. In Communist China, education serves prole— tarian society. To examine the nature and function of schooling in the Chinese People's Republic, a simple input-process- output model deals with the component forces centering on formal education. The inputs to the formal school system are outputs of other subordinate institutions within the same social system. The impact on education of some inputs from outside the institutional boundaries of the educational system are direct, such as the national and provincial budget allocations to the educational sector. Other inputs are less direct but still have an impact, Such as the effect of political remolding of educationists on the schooling process. 14 The process of formal schooling encompasses (l) the changes in structure, content, and method resulting from various party—government directives, and (2) some of the problems facing the educational system. Trends and shift— ing emphases within educational institutions are developed in the framework of the thesis. An examination of the outputs at the boundary of the formal educational system focuses on two concerns: quantity and qualities. Quantity relates the growth in number of graduates, their disciplines, and expertise. Qualities delineate the various types of characteristics the Chinese leaders wanted formal education to foster. Schools were to produce certain quantities of graduates with those values and attitudes the new Chinese leaders felt necessary in building a new state. By identifying and discussing the various external and internal pressures and their resultant changes, the complex social function of schooling is organized into a manageable subject. The systems design refines the nature of the mutually supportive interrelationship between selected national policies and their impact on educational development vis-a—vis the role of the school in the Communist state. The relationship between the internal organizational structure, content, and control of formal educational institutions in China and the external societal demands and restrictions on the schools define the role of the school m eit state. as an greate of otl on mer not wc but be with l is mo] trying Red ax 0011501 and {:5 Such i 15 nxeither maintaining the old, or building the new, Chinese state. Educational institutions in China provide graduates as an output. These outputs must contribute both to greater ideological goals and to more specific functions of other institutions. Consider the impact of education on men in light of Socialist goals: "If socialism does not work . . . it is not because the system is not good, but because human nature has not been changed to conform with the new system. Instead of modifying the system, it is more important to change man."8 The Chinese schools are trying to educate for the "new Chinese man," who is both Red and Expert, obedient to the party, totally selfless, conscious of the class struggle, ideologically loyal, studies basic doctrine, and partakes in productive labor. Graduates are also inputs to other social organizations, such as the Red Army, the government bureaucracy, the Communist party, the People's Communes. In return for outputs, the schools--as institutions—-must orchestrate inputs, such as administrative directives, financial resources, desirable personnel, designated curriculum and textbook content, and ideological interpretations. Such inputs to Chinese schools come either directly from the party or indirectly through the party from other sub— ordinate systems. 8Theodore Hsi—en Chen, “The New Socialist Man," Comparative Education Review 13, no. 1 (February 1969): 88. 16 The nature of the input—output exchange occurring at the boundary of the subordinate institution (the school) reveals much about the nature of the more comprehensive superordinate system, in this case, Chinese Communist society. The educational goals of the school system are defined and legitimized by the total society, or more specifically, the controlling elements of the society. The circles of power use curricula to educate students in support of the socio—political ethos of the ruling group. In the People's Republic of China, the nature of the specific educational goals, as determined by the party, is reflected by the educational institution that is shaped by and contributes to the larger cultural—political system.9 The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between selected official policies of the Chinese Communist Party and the role of schools in the national development of the People's Republic of China. By examining the function of the school as a socio- educational institution, the ideologico—educational nexus can be brought into sharper focus and students of East Asia will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the kind of social system evolving on the mainland of China. ‘__________________ 9Much of this conceptual framework is suggested by Talcott Parsons, in "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization," Administrative W 1, no. 1 (June 1956): 6’3-85; ”and 1, no- 2 (September 1956): 225—239. EDUCATI ONA‘ SECTION II EDUCATIONAL ANTECEDENTS AND COMMUNIST CONTROL: AN INTRODUCTION 17 ll AN'I As a brie linkage between e in the People's R discussion focuse China, (2) on edu Gonfucian society revolution that r (4) on the philos h'hat appears in t aconceptual fram and the role of 1: Men era, of th‘ 0f social upheava 0f the mainland, . Educational belie based on the idea "For good or for evil, China is now part of the family of nations." H. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the western World CHAPTER 2 THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE EDUCATION: ANTECEDENTS TO COMMUNIST CONTROL As a brief introduction to the evolution of and the linkage between educational development and national policy in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1973, this discussion focuses (l) on education as a social force in China, (2) on education and government in traditional Confucian society, (3) on the educational and cultural revolution that resulted from the coming of the West, and (4) on the philosophical foundation of Communist education. What appears in this chapter is designed to provide within a conceptual framework a basic understanding of education and the role of the school in the Chinese state before the mOdern era, of the problems facing education in the midst 0f Social upheaval before the advent of Communist control 0f the mainland, and of selected Communist philosophers' educational beliefs. A summary of the various motifs based on the ideological struggle as reflected in 18 educational deve: of the evolution out the chapter. Because c sible to deal in of the three majc discussion of the uajor focus of th educational trend of the schools' p role as (l) a per phy of government catalytic force f Ulina. Every nat SYSten encompasse: serve each others Political milieu 1 asapliisticated 1: 1hints from, and 1 This exchange occ1 conduct as definec sistcn. 19 educational development, and a temporal outline by period of the evolution of communism in China since 1949 rounds out the chapter. Because of the scope of these topics, it is impos— sible to deal in depth with all the ramifications of each of the three major subject areas (2, 3, 4), while a short discussion of the fourth topic serves to introduce the major focus of this dissertation. An awareness of these educational trends is necessary to understand the history of the schools' part in Chinese civilization and its dual role as (l) a perpetuating force of a conservative philoso— phy of government and personal ethics, and (2) as a catalytic force for the social change that destroyed old China. Education as a Social Force: A Conceptual Framework Every nationally— or culturally-defined social system encompasses a network of subordinate systems that serve each others' needs and that maintain the socio— Political milieu of the larger system. By being part of a SOphisticated linkage, social institutions receive inPuts from, and produce outputs for, other institutions. fins exchange occurs within the parameters of acceptable conduct as defined by the ideology of the parent social sYStem. ‘ As ideal, mic-political tions of appropr the proper mode , society is diffe allwable in eitl ever the definit. socially legal i: ordinate systems the imposed stand within the bound: appropriate and ( Since mud linked to institi the direction an< tions. The objec actions and sonnet within the geogra Space; the extent the ideology whic People support. cOutrol nearly a] formal institutic the naturally—evc families with att rural agricultura 20 As ideologies differ in their descriptions of a mxfio-political utopia, so do they differ in their defini- tions of appropriate institutional behavior. For example, the proper mode of institutional conduct in a democratic axfiety is different from what is acceptable or even afllowable in either a Socialist or a Fascist state. What— ewer the definition of what is culturally acceptable and socially legal is across various national—cultural super- cmdinate systems, all subordinate institutions comply with the imposed standards of the larger system and function vfithin the boundaries of what is politically defined as appropriate and desirable. Since much of the behavior of individuals is closely linked to institutional roles, ruling elites aim to define the direction and nature of institutions and their func— tions. The objective of government is to control the actions and sometimes the thoughts of the people who live vfithin the geographical limits of a politically-defined space; the extent of government control is determined by the ideology which the political leaders eSpouse and the people support. In a totalitarian society, the leaders anumol nearly all institutions: the consciously—created, flnmml institutions, like an army or a school system; and the naturally—evolved, informal institutions, like extended families with attendant obligations or life patterns of rural agriculturalists. — Formal 8| used by national is considered to able conduct for the creation of 1 formal education to shape the vain Because formal ec‘ ential force and leaders have paic‘ The deve] population and an the long-term fun its linkages with social system req Practically every hi the Communist national leaders the use of the de The socia respects, the his ‘ tion is a signifi‘ quality of life in i leaders of China 1 ‘ dElelopnent, focu: y blfilling the kind 1 is ideal. 21 Formal education is one important subordinate system used by national leaders to disseminate among students what is considered to be the boundaries of acceptable-unaccept- able conduct for both institutions and individuals. Since the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, formal education has been consciously used in attempting to shape the value patterns of millions of Chinese. Because formal educational institutions are such an influ— ential force and a powerful political tool, the Communist leaders have paid close attention to the schools‘ functions. The development of a politically—indoctrinated population and an educated-manpower resource focuses on the long-term functions of the national school system and its linkages with other social institutions. A planned social system requires a planned educational system. Practically every facet of Chinese society is planned for by the Communist party, including the school. China's national leaders have not neglected the development nor the use of the determinant force of formal education. The social history of China reflects, in many respects, the history of education in China. Formal educa- tion is a significant social force that helps to shape the quality of life in a social system. National and cultural leaders of China have, throughout the periods of political development, focused on different roles of the school in building the kind of state the ruling elites envisioned as ideal . kuwledge of the could be in the instruction and tain the social levels of the so levels, create I) hire and of sci or all of these tional instituti serves their goa The indig Preserve the stat was, before the n formal educationa sitting culture a no emphasis on or tions of old know fall of the Ch'in stability of Chin education (memori selection (by the bOth scholar-offi all of scholar—gez eMia-governments 22 Schools serve society in at least three ways: tranSmit to students, young and old, greater awareness and knowledge of the culture—-both as it is in fact and as it could be in the ideal; develop, through a system of instruction and examination, talent that serves to main— tain the social system by providing leadership at various levels of the society; and at the higher educational levels, create new knowledge for the advancement of cul— ture and of science. By exploiting a combination of any or all of these functions, political leaders use educa- tional institutions to create the social milieu that best serves their goals. The indigenous educational system of China helped preserve the status quo of society for centuries. There was, before the modern era, a mixture of formal and non— formal educational methodologies that focused on trans— mitting culture and on developing leaders, with little or no emphasis on creating new knowledge or new interpreta— tions of old knowledge. From the Han Dynasty until the fall of the Ch'ing Dynastyzh11912 the social and cultural stability of China was largely attributed to the mode of education (memorization of the Confucian classics) and of selection (by the imperial civil service examination) of both scholar-officials who administered the government and of scholar—gentry who administered the society in extra—governmental domains. Thisc hytheooming 0 system was unab challenges to encroachment of turd reformers tonal educatio survive. Under horever, little challenges. Aft uperor in early broke upon the of the political and political 1e. of being “chines century. Modern about transmittir ethos was no long social ideology r accepted. Clear: for a new nation: especially at the Search for (or or draw educational tinned encroachme anusion among v llovledge" in the E, 7 U r 23 This cultural and social tranquility was destroyed by the coming of the West. The traditional educational system was unable to cope adequately with many of the challenges to the Chinese way of life that arose with the encroachment of the imperialist powers. Nineteenth cene tur9 reformers realized the need to modify the nation's formal educational system if China were to adapt and survive. Under the pressure of the hard-line Confucianists, however, little accommodation was made to meet the new challenges. After the abdication of the last Manchu emperor in early 1912, the absolute necessity to change broke upon the Chinese system with such force that much of the political milieu was in disarray. The intellectuals and political leaders were searching for a new definition of being "Chinese" in the first half of the twentieth century. Modern Chinese educationists were in disagreement about transmitting culture to students, for the Confucian ethos was no longer appropriate and no new, well—defined social ideology was firmly established or universally accepted. Clearly, China's intellectuals were searching for a new national doctrine. The educational institutions, especially at the higher levels, were at the center of the search for (or creation of) a new political philosophy and a new educational philosophy during this period of con— tinued encroachment by foreign powers and of internal confusion among political factions. The "creation of knowledge" in the form of searching for a new ideology i for China and th the form of deve tion the school during this peril oomunism in Chin Confucianists or The educa {1937-1945) of b: controlled areas climate of the t both political p develop leaders created any new adverse conditio face of the Jap Sopport for their the late civil we tional systems (i Political as the life-and-death si tions of the schc 0f leadership, an: evolved as the ci iddlsdiate politic The Comrm the old status qr 0f continual soc: 24 for China and the "advancement of the Chinese culture" in the form of developing a new Chinese identity was a func- tion the school system fulfilledto a far greater degree during this period of liberalism, which gave birth to communism in China, than it did in the past under the Confucianists or would in the future under the Communists. The educational conditions during the war years (1937-1945) of both the Nationalist- and the Communist- controlled areas closely reflected the socio-political climate of the times. Though schools under the control of both political parties transmitted culture and attempted to develop leaders (it is unimaginable that they could have created any new knowledge during these times, under such adverse conditions), the primary aim was to survive in the face of the Japanese threat and hopefully build popular support for their reSpective political ideologies. During the late civil war years (1945-1949) the formal educa- tional systems (Nationalist and Communist) remained very political as the respective regimes became locked in a life~and-death struggle. In addition to the regular func- tions of the school—~transmission of culture, development of leadership, and creation of knowledge--a fourth function evolved as the civil war developed—-—the school as an immediate political tool. The Communists were not interested in maintaining the old status quo; Mao's doctrine was based on the theory 0f continual social-class revolution. The social meaning fi- oi education cha system to ensuri tion under Comu tions once the n raster of the ma ideology, was tr and at times the as to build supp and advanced sci< such created as ‘ nations and appl sent. The schoo‘ of formal educat, as a political tr Social a1 slitmus are inter intecral part of internal struggle social structure nate systems, is Of China by the sChocls are gear their concern fo china's leaders State planning f dE‘Ielopment is a Certain economic 25 i of education changed from serving to perpetuate the old system to ensuring the permanent revolution. Formal educa- tion under Communist control resumed its traditional func- tions once the new regime was established as the undisputed master of the mainland. The new culture, or political ideology, was transmitted to students; the politically, and at times the academically, talented were nurtured so as to build support for the regime at all levels of society; and advanced scientific and technical knowledge was not so much created as it was copied from other industrialized nations and applied in the service of China's own develop— ment. The schools were again fulfilling the three tasks of formal educational institutions everywhere, plus serving as a political tool sharpened for immediate use. Social and educational development within social systems are interrelated and interlaced. Schools are an integral part of society and are naturally affected by the internal struggles and tensions that develop in any dynamic social structure. Formal education, like other subordi- nate systems, is controlled by the state, and in the case of China by the Communist party. In a totalitarian state, schools are geared to meet party—state needs. Because of their concern for industrial and agricultural development, China's leaders include schools in their comprehensive state planning for economic development. Educational development is a requisite to economic growth and yet certain economic and social conditions are necessary for a fi ndern education national progres leave this recip development to c tion inputs to t specific process outputs (graduat needs. The elab decisions, once : all spheres of p since there is n and balances, th the correctness , are party decisil the obstruction 1 The one, the party, is to the party decide leaders as. a rev Education had pl cant role in the 0f the masses, a flavelopment. Co SUcial force con |—————'—**TA -- - ~wms-H- ' 2 6 1 modern educational system to contribute meaningfully to national progress. State planners are not willing to leave this reciprocitybetween economic and educational development to chance, but rather they consciously'appor- tion inputs to the educational system, dictate the specific processes within the institution, and assign outputs (graduates) to specific tasks that serve state needs. »The elaborate state machinery quickly translates decisions, once made, into action. This is apparent in all spheres of party-state control, including the schools. Since there is no built-in government system of checks and balances, there is no public debate or criticism about the correctness of national policies. Government decisions are party decisions, and since there is only one party, the obstruction of policy-formation is minimal. The one, overall aim of education, as defined by the party, is to serve the revolution in whatever manner the party decides. The schools are seen by the Communist leaders as. a revolutionary instrument to promote party ends. Education had played and will continue to play a signifi~ cant role in the ideological conversion and the education of the masses, and in promoting economic and political development. Communist education in China is an important social force controlled to serve party-defined objectives. Without educational insi the following b: of education and modern ethos. I Taoism, Buddhism history of China generalization , throughout most Confucian Educat- Traditio confucian wisdom Subsequent come for the educatio Preached a moral and obligations friends, and the its belief in th tion, respect, a husband and wife There wa 0f men through a aProper orderin did the state. 27 , Traditional Confucian Education: Historical Reflections Without detailing every evolutionary phase of eflucational institutions throughout China's social history, the following brief commentary relates the main features cf education and the role of the school in China's pre— nmdern ethos. Although different schools of thought-— Taoism, Buddhism, Legalism-—are part of the intellectual lflStory of China, there can be little doubt that, as a generalization, Confucianism was the dominant philosophy throughout most of China's recorded history; Confucian Education Traditional Chinese education focused on mastering Cbnfucian wisdom and morals. The Confucian classics and subsequent commentaries, which became the primary texts flnrthe education of scholars, bureaucrats, and statesmen, pueached a moral order based on humanistic responsibilities and obligations regarding man's interaction with family, friends, and the state. The basis of Confucian education was belief in the moral perfection of harmonious coopera- thxn respect, and obedience between ruler and subject, lumband and wife, father and son, brothers, and friends. There was undaunted confidence in the perfectibility of men through an education stressing virtue, kindness, and a.proper ordering of man's relationships of both the family muithe state. "Education [was] a process through which — an [realized] vidual human be harmony with be Greater ter and a sense position by bit ideal of leaving in the hands of the society per: society, at lea: for upward mobii The idea but on morality. responsibility c their virtuous 11 Peace, prosperit faith in the mar . - . that, from the hierarchy 0 Character . . . raform and gover influence. "3 Si sity. 1952), p. 221339” 3Howard Institutions (10 28 man [realized] his intrinsic value and dignity as an indi— vidual human being and [sought] to arrive at a state of harmony with both humanity and nature."1 Greater importance was given to strength of charac— ter and a sense of Confucian morality than to one's social position by birth. "Throughout the ages, the Confucian ideal of leaving the reins of government and social control in the hands of the morally superior or educated members of the society persisted, thus making traditional Chinese society, at least in theory, an open one, the sole criterion for upward mobility being proved ability through education."2 The ideal Confucian state was based, not on laws, but on morality. Confucianism charged government with the responsibility of civilizing the people and developing their virtuous nature. The path to harmony was through peace, prosperity, and education. There was “a profound faith in the moral and political influences of education .. . that, from the 'Son of Heaven' (Emperor) down through the hierarchy of officials to the local magistrate, moral character . . . [would] prove to be contagious and [would] reform and govern the people chiefly through personal influence."3 Since the moral state of the people was more lChang-tu Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education,“ in Chang—tu Hu, ed., Chinese Education under Communism (New York: Teachers College, Columbia Univer- sity. 1962), p. 6. 2Ibid., p. 7. 3Howard S. Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institutions (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1951), p. 209. ilportant than nurtured hunan learned hystaffing the mastered virtue Confucian doctr. take the imperia of which paved 1 government posit ethic, 'the edu< of filial piety, faithfulness, at true value of ed provided the on] turn, was regarc‘ nation in govern Ideally, Confucian morali itrfectly-ordere Philosophy and a the mutual respo % family structure of education reg ideological cont control, while t W 4311, "TI PI 8. 2 9 , important than the form of their government, leaders nurtured hurhan virtue rather than promote political change. Learned scholareofficials administered the country by staffing the government bureaucracy. They alone had mastered virtue and wisdom through years of studying Confucian doctrine. A classical education prepared one to take the imperial civil service examination, the passing of which paved the way for scholars to take up an official government position. Being well versed in the Confucian ethic, "the educated few taught and promoted the Virtue of filial piety, loyalty to the ruler, humanheartedness, faithfulness, and other Confucian ethical principles. The true value of education was in the belief that education provided the only avenue to moral superiority which, in turn, was regarded as the sole qualification for partici- pation in government and social leadership."4 Ideally, scholar-officials applied their refined Confucian morality to politics and worked toward a perfectly-ordered state. Confucianism was both a political philosoPhy and a code of personal ethics that kept alive the mutual responsibilities and obligations of both the family structure and the imperial bureaucracy. The years of education required to pass the examination ensured the ideological continuity that served as the basis of state control, while the examination system itself guaranteed 4Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education,“ p. 8. the perpetuatio There was littl eperor's duty . political admin ducive climate ; orchestrate ban Educational Deva Tradition and En Educatic not 'unreasonabl there were some hiring the Wests civilization mus 0f the culture. "The edr the increasing t men for service Dynasty (771-25E the mastery of t needs, such as a 'the views of at thinkers were 51 5wiirian Tradition, 2 vol ' 1960)! 1:183. 6Galto E Lippi, p. 58. 71bid. . the perpetuation of Confucian teachings for centuries. tfimre was little doubt as to the importance of the emperor's duty as Confucianism defined it: to oversee the political administration of the empire, to create a con— ducive climate for the fulfillment of man, and to orchestrate harmoniously the functioning of natural forces.5 Educational Development: Tradition and Evolution Educational historians of China believe that it is not "unreasonable to assume that as early as 2000 B.C. there were some types of educational institutions."6 During the Western Chou Dynasty (1111—771 B.C.) Chinese civilization must have included formal education as part of the culture. "The education of officials was much advanced by the increasing tendency of the rulers to seek out educated men for service in the government" during the Eastern Chou Dynasty (771—256 B.C.).7 The curriculum focused, not on the mastery of the Chinese classics, but on more practical needs, such as archery, horsemanship, reading, and writing. "The views of education held . . . by ancient Chinese thinkers were such that . . . practical affairs in the 5William Theodore deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2-vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 1:183. 6Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institu— tions, p. 58. "““~‘ 7rbid., pp. 76—77. lives of cultiv process, and chiefly, a mat activities of 1 it that time 1e tin, and educa the process of Before writings of Con porated in sch the Han era, fo classics as take period [206 B.C. curriculum in CI years.“9 During t aristocracy as a governmental sy clanism was dec hre selected f Itconmendation, fixed the educa of state bureau government e O ' Positions. But ———‘_ifl"‘ ' wuss"- 31 lives of cultivated men all entered into the educative process, and that process was not entirely, perhaps not chiefly, a matter of schools. The common interests and activities of life made up the curriculum of education. At that time learning had not become bookish and scholas- tic, and education had its place as an intimate part of the process of social development."8 Before the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 220) the writings of Confucius had not been systematically incor- porated in school curricula. But great change came with the Han era, for "the teaching and study of Confucian classics as taken up and developed during the Western Han period [206 B.C.-A.D. 20] determined the core of the curriculum in China . . . for a period of about 2,000 9 years." During the Han Dynasty scholars replaced the feudal aristocracy as a dominant force in China's social and governmental system. In the second century B.C., Confu— cianism was declared the official creed of the state. Men were selected for government service by a combination of recommendation, appointment, and examination, which firmly fixed the educational system in relation to the selection 0f state bureaucrats. "In China . . . the system of government . . . demanded educated men for official positions. But the government [had] never found it _.__ 81bid., p. 101. 91bid., p. 212. for office in s and avoid the In complete school government crea educate promisi the interests 0 III to 87 B.C., government syst schools of diffe ing school educa with these syste rents. '11 As ti and government 1 Confucian classi henceforth hel ages and were they made no at thiiquity, and from it. As a necessary to establish a school system adequate to supply the total number of candidates for office required. The government [had] usually adopted means of selecting men for office in such a way as to stimulate private study and avoid the necessity of maintaining a comprehensive or complete schools system."10 In 124 B.C. the central government created and supported an imperial university to educate promising men for government service. Because of the interests of Emperor Wu Ti, whose reign lasted from 141 to 87 B.C., "there developed a truly national or government system of education comprising central and local schools of different grades, an examination system connect- ing school-education with civil service appointments, and with these systems corresponding administrative arrange— ments."11 As the linkage between China's educational system and government became institutionalized, "the study of Confucian classics became a habit of the student class who thenceforth held tenaciously to the sayings of ancient sages and were afraid to advance new thoughts of their own. They made no attempt to supersede the civilization of early antiquity, and all they wished was not to fall too far away from it. As a result the thoughts of the scholar class M loIbid., p. 240. llIbid., p. 204. periods--the T' institutions developed. The control of the prefectures, an In 753 A.D. the the whole realm officials of 10 that no scholar: those who had pa During i appeared acadenL‘ Neo~Confucian s< as the intellect influenced by B reformer Wang eXpansion of go hnfucianist ac 1915 , p. 35. 13G6“! Itstitutions, pv 33 .. . no longer enjoyed the freedom necessary for all true advancement in civilization."12 ' Centuries later during one of China's most brilliant periods—~the T'ang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.)—-educational institutions and the civil service examinations were further developed. There were colleges in the capital under the control of the national university, public schools in the prefectures, and private schools throughout the nation. In 753 A.D. the Emperor Hsuan Tsang "decreed that throughout the whole realm the practice of recommending scholars by officials of local government should be discontinued, and that no scholars should be sent up to the capital except those who had passed through the schools."13 During the Sung Dynasty (960—1279 A.D.) there appeared academies of higher learning, created by individual Nee-Confucian scholars, that replaced the Buddhist temples as the intellectual centers. (Chinese culture was strongly influenced by Buddhism from 220 A.D. to 960 A.D.) The reformer Wang An—shih (1021—1086 A.D.) promoted the expansion of government schools to rival the private Neo— Confucianist academies that dominated the quasiwformal educational pattern in that era. The Nee-Confucian scholars held somewhat different positions within the broader parameters of their common ____________________ . 12Ping Wen Kuo, The Chinese System of Public Educa— thn (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1915). p. 35. 13 Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institutions 342. N, p. basic philosoph moral values to life, and in on a Nee-Confucian climate among t and to develop requirements f0 felt that "what the civil servil essays in the e. education in th. The Neo' that education l tration, for on make for a barn the Yuan Dynast} became governmer faded. During 1 and Prefectural. QStabliShed’ mo: vice examinatior Real education 5 i dvanced trainir dC - themes thrOu C 14 high 2 Vols. 34 basic philosophy, yet they all gave instruction in the moral values to be followed in one's personal and family life, and in one's obligation to government. The aim of a Neo-Confucian education was to create a good moral climate among the peOple, to arouse personal convictions, and to develop strength of character. Regarding the requirements for government service, the Sung philosophers felt that "what had been and what still was required by the civil service examination was only the ability to write essays in the elegant literary style, and that . . . was no education in the true sense of the word."14 The Neo—Confucian philosopher—scholars believed that education was the primary concern of public adminis— tration, for only education could enlighten the people and make for a harmonious state. Their academies lasted through the Yuan Dynasty (1271—1368 A.D.) , but as they gradually became government institutions, their previous dynamism faded. During the Ming period (1368-1644 A.D.) district— and prefectural—level government subsidized schools were established, more to administer regular local civil ser— vice examinations than to provide systematic education. Real education started at home for young students, with advanced training provided by either numerous. private academies throughout the country, which began to wane u T Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-COnfucian hought, 2 vols. (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957)? lnmrnber and i 1912 A.D.), or The edu dr'ing Dynasty more of a priva the education or student. The f was the civil s Portion, the te tutorial arrang institutions. training was ai: m“ as a means intrinsically v. education was 11. was cultivated ] sake, but as a 1 tote memorizati, “result, "e‘ the educated Cl; examinatiOh sYsr life, and that : to an official ( The P01i trained to deve Cl 1 “310611 knowls 5 35 in number and influence during the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644— 1912 A.D.), or by government colleges in the capital. The educational system that extended into the firing Dynasty was not really a formal system at all, but more of a private network of arrangements wherein much of the education was of a tutorial nature between master and student. The formal portion of the educational structure was the civil service examination system; the informal portion, the teaching-learning experience, in either tutorial arrangements or the few government—sponsored institutions. For centuries the main thrust of student training was aimed primarily at passing the state examina- tion as a means to a government post and not as gaining an intrinsically valuable education. Traditional Chinese education was neither public nor liberal. Higher education was cultivated by the Manchu government, not for its own sake, but as a means to an end—-preservation of the state. Rote memorization paid more dividends than creative thought; as a result, "education in China, and the capabilities of the educated class, were largely limited by the type of examination system which controlled entrance to official life, and that in a bureaucratic society the alternatives to an official career were few and unattractive.“15 The political hierarchy of scholar-officials trained to develop the positive nature of man through classical knowledge was doomed to eventual collapse in 15deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 1:564. the face of for tional system i attempted to so examination sys elite, (2) a do; sector, (3) a c from practical istic curricula orthodoxy of th with the abilit itself to the c in education or and social harm Who understood leis facing Chi 36 Uneface of foreign encroachments. The traditional educa- tdonal system that the Chfing Dynasty inherited and attempted to sustain was characterized by (l) a formal examination system used to select rather than educate the elite, (2) a dual system with both a private and a public sector, (3) a classical and humanistic training divorced from practical matters, and (4) an inflexible and formal- istic curriculum that stultified free inquiry.16 "The cuthodoxy of the traditional scholars interfered strongly wiuithe ability of the social order to renew and to adjust itself to the changing conditions of the modern world."17 An education oriented solely toward morality, humanism, and social harmony precluded the development of leaders who understood the social, economic, and political prob— lems facing China after the 18403. Education and Revolution: Transitional Overview For centuries the Chinese considered their civili— zation to be at the center of the universe, the best gxmsible culture. A few medieval contacts with.the rest cm'the world did not influence the Chinese way of life. Cbntacts with Europeans during the 17005 and early 18005 16Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education," P. 11. 17Chang—tu Hu, China, its people, its society, its cmlture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 412. were nainlY "1 17505. Neithe system was aff 'the education it was the cre to outside hel; were unaware o and, . . . wou. Up to the mide would have hel; would reveal i' The cor and its educat; indigenous See: the we“ on Ch: decades of refc We! let. The Opj h dd both imms d1 tive COHSEQUenc and certain rig 10st prestige. w my London- 1th P- 42, ‘ Ke(Jan 37 were mainly with traders confined to Canton by the late 17505. Neither the Chinese culture nor their educational system was affected by contact with foreigners. In fact, "the educational system of China was entirely autochthonous; it was the creation of the Chinese people and owed nothing to outside help. If it had any deficiencies, the Chinese were unaware of them. It had worked for two millennia and,. . . would have worked for another two if left alone. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century not a Chinese would have believed that strife with the 'outer barbarian' would reveal its weakness and inadequacy.“18 The continuing revolution of the Chinese culture and its educational system started not as a result of indigenous socio—political forces, but by the impact of the West on China's social system. The Opium War started decades of reform and revolution in China, which is not over yet. Coming of the West The Opium War (1839-1842) revealed the weakness of the imperial court to protect Chinese territory. Defeat had both immediate, negative results and long-term, posi— tive consequences. China had to give the victors territory and certain rights, but even more importantly the Chinese lost prestige. Their exclusiveness was challenged, and l8Victor Purcell, Problems of Chinese Education (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1936), p. 42. they were forc eroded their c ports to forei and the first Chinese cultur realization am powers existed development of and of a moder: The pa With the advoc. Western ideas . Problems. Mods Stren‘lthen Chi] ehpire and ensr education was . POWers; the Oil unaltered. Set 19 tons SPeCial; college (1879) I 38 they were forced into contact with the outside world that eroded their cultural solitude. The opening of treaty ports to foreign commerce also brought the missionaries and the first penetration of Western learning into the Chinese culture. Defeat and concession generated the realization among some thinkers that stronger national powers existed and that if China hoped to survive, the development of scientific understanding, of heavy industry, and of a modern warfare capability was necessary. The protracted struggle for enlightenment began with the advocacy among some Chinese intellectuals that Western ideas and learning ought to be applied to Chinese problems. Modern learning was employed to modernize and strengthen China's military forces in order to protect the empire and ensure national survival. Only enough Western education was to be introduced to ward off the foreign powers; the old tradition and culture was to remain unaltered. Several Western-styled educational institu— tons19 specializing in various disciplines were created under imperial auspices: a polytechnic (1874), a telegraph college (1879), a military college (1885), a naval college 19For a general survey of the modern schools established by the Chinese government between 1861 and 1894, and a detailed study of three of these institutions, see Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961). [1890). a medi schools existe deal with the ' These institut substitution f Chinese though could he intros principles and The de 1895) further , intellectual t] reforms. Some technical Educ; the j“PP-rial ca Phical and 11131 thellest. Jap‘. Progressive re: defeat was its tional reform : memorials to ill 39 (1890), a medical college (1893), and others.20 These schools existed to meet imperial needs (preparing China to deal with the West), and not to develop popular education. These institutions were a separate appendage to, not a substitution for, the indigenous educational system. The Chinese thought that Western education and modern science could be introduced without having to change their cultural principles and institutions. The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894- 1895) further emphasized the need for introducing Western intellectual thought and for fundamental educational reforms. Some Chinese knew that merely imitating Western technical education would not save China. They felt that the imperial court should institute more sweeping philoso— phical and institutional changes modelled after Japan and the West. Japan's victory humiliated the Chinese. Since progressive reformers believed that one cause of China's defeat was its antiquated educational system, the educa— tional reform issue was again current. Petitions and memorials to the throne stressed the need for a modern school system and for the civil service examination essays to call for knowledge of China's modern needs, without which China could not better equip itself to deal with the foreign intruders. There was need for fundamental change, for "the State did not so much care for the organisation 20Purcell, Problems of Chinese Education, p. 57; and E. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western BPIld (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1937), p. 160. of education a fashioned exam thus strengthe public offices standing the p less the enorm the comprehens economic and p. as to the Spee. citizens. "21 These Reform (June-s. Pregressive 11' few ngressim ”iii Skepticis: scholars Who he The reaCtiOnar; movement becam. Dowager! Who I‘ decapitating 0‘ lives and mOde; SEtbaCk. The rer Rebellion at t] it esterners and 40 of education as reserve the right of entry for an old- fashioned examination giving access to public offices, thus strengthening the old system of teaching and filling public offices with bookish people incapable of under— standing the practical needs of everyday life and still less the enormous changes in modern-world conceptions, the comprehension of which [was] indispensable to the economic and political independence of the country as well as to the speedy intellectual emancipation of its citizens.“21 These efforts culminated in the Hundred Days of Reform (June-September, 1899)«-a short—lived attempt by progressive literati to institute sweeping reforms. The few progressive thinkers and reformist intellectuals met with skepticism and resistance from the oldsorder Confucian scholars who had the power to influence imperial policy. The reactionaries recovered the momentum when the reform movement became entangled with a plot against the Empress Dowager, who reacted by imprisoning the Emperor and decapitating others. A few reformers escaped with their lives and modern educational reform suffered a temporary setback. The renewed conservatism precipitated the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, during which many Westerners and Chinese Christians in North China were 21C. H. Becker, et al., The Reorganisation of Education in China (Paris: League of Nationst Institute Of Intellectual Co—operation, 1932), pp. 19—20. murdered. Thi by the Empress reaction that imperial court much of which ing educationa Boxer Uprising implementing m Formal changes with t Ch'ing educati creation of a 2 the examinatio tional System . the Chinese fe viCtOIY over It tion of Wester: °°uld China, During inaugurated thr of the imperia‘ t0 90Vemment ] shlmned the ne‘ mi mded, res tiw EStabliShed f0] 41 murdered. This political uprising, which was sanctioned by the Empress Dowager, generated a Western military reaction that again forced China to capitulate. The imperial court paid the Western powers an indemnity, much of which was returned to China and used for develop- ing educational institutions. The ultimate impact of the Boxer Uprising was to encourage educational reform by implementing measures that were opposed a few years before. Formal Chinese education underwent revolutionary changes with the beginning of the new century. The late Ch'ing educational reformers accomplished two tasks: the creation of a modern school system and the abolition of the examination system. The first national public educa— tional system was patterned after the Japanese, because the Chinese felt that much of the success of Japan's Victory over Russia (1904—1905) was due to Japan‘s adop‘ tion of Western learning. And what Japan could do, so could China. During the years 1903-1905, after the government inaugurated the school system but before the abolition of the imperial examinations, the old-fashioned aspirants to government posts clung to the examination system and shunned the new government schools, while the modern— minded, restive youth sought admission to the longer— established foreign missionary or the newlyvestablished modern schools. The officials became concerned about recruiting potential leaders into the government schools so they would Manchus. The mc in the face of of Chinese stu demands for mc its educationa abolishing the ihighly centr Of Education w and supervise cal and educat nationalism f0 “Sing the SCho iStic PhiIOSOp tional Structu the Old order, bIOught Young intellectm i mutual exNOra caused the Old sponsored Chan. forces: and int. Off the fall 0: \ 22 idler,1 Chicuru: Nu i v.7 “a r 42 so they would not become adversaries of the rule of the Manchus. The monopoly of the examination system dissipated in the face of Christian missionary education, the flow of Chinese students studying abroad, and the growing demands for modern education. The government placed all its educational hOpes with the new school system by abolishing the civil service examination system in 1905. A highly centralized and autocratically controlled Ministry of Education was established in 1906 to promote, coordinate, and supervise the evolving school system. [Ehinese politi— cal and educational leaders attempted to substitute modern nationalism for Confucianism as a cohesive social element, using the school system as the channel to instill national- istic philosophy and sentiment.22 The new formal educa- ] tional structure produced revolutionists who challenged the old order, for the very nature of the school system brought young people together with increased social and intellectual interaction over long periods allowing for mutual exploration of a wide range of ideas that eventually caused the old order to collapse. While these government- Sponsored changes were a reasonable response to external forces and internal demands, they came too late to stave off the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1912. 22Cyrus H. Feake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 71. The 01 hiring the st intruded upon interdependent the modern era Confucian educ traditional in dynasties and revealed an in resulted from Chinese system RillES of p order, but With the c industrial concept of EmPire as umanity, world of s. to Power p. The Missionarir The 00: education to Cl looked. MiSSiu CUltUral reVQly 43 The old education was effective training for main- taining the status quo for centuries, while China was not intruded upon from the outside; but as an increasingly interdependent world of dynamic nations pulled China into the modern era, the humanistic and moralistic thoughts of Confucian education proved ever more inadequate. China's traditional institutions, which had served a series of dynasties and the entire civilization for centuries, revealed an inability to cope with the changes that resulted from the impact of the West. The centuries—old Chinese system was incapable of dealing with new challenges: Rules of propriety may contribute to the moral order, but they are plainly inadequate to cope with the complexity of modern commercial and industrial relations. Moreover, the Confucian concept of grand unity, which viewed the Chinese Empire as a cultural universe embracing all of humanity, is obviously unsuitable to the modern world of sovereigné independent states committed to power politics. The Missionaries The contribution of missionaries and missionary education to China's cultural awakening cannot be over- looked. Missionaries shaped to some extent the protracted Cultural revolution that resulted from the impact of the Occident by bringing Western knowledge and modern learning to China more quickly than would have otherwise been the case. "What the missionary did was not to be the Primary 23Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the TWentieth Century (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 7. cause but to l mation."24 Missic and establishe throughout the institutions i University (St The Christian impossible, tc Education was Prepare them f school student and were Provi quently, there best and With grapple With t between the Ch nChiIlese moder- and ambitious knowledge diSp literature and 24 MissiOns Kenn 44 cause but to help to determine the course of the transfor- mation."24 Missionaries came to China with the Western traders and established schools both in the treaty ports and throughout the country. Among the more prestigious institutions founded by the missionaries were St. John's University (Shanghai) and Lingnan University (Canton).25 The Christian school graduates found it difficult, if not impossible, to gain government employment because their education was not Confucian based and, therefore, did not prepare them for taking the imperial examinations. Mission school students were introduced to Western civilization and were provided with a knowledge of English. Conse— quently, there were a few Chinese with knowledge of the West and with an intellectual perspective that helped them grapple with the problems generated by the confrontation (between the Chinese culture and the ambitious foreigners. :literature and schools. :"Chinese modernizers—-patriots, statesmen, entrepreneurs, rand ambitious young students—~eagerly absorbed the Western l 2know1edge dispensed in increa81ng measure through missionary "26 Many of the reformists had 24Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Russell & Russell, 1929), p. 834. 25Purcell, Problems of Chinese Education, p. 53. 6Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr. "Protestant Missions in China, 1877— 1890: The Institutionalization of Good Works," in Kwan—Ching Liu, ed., American Missionaries in China dCambridge, Mass. East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1966), p. 93. received at It schools. A re intellectuals change and in It is Christian miss ment, especial doubt that the attention. R a W The ch Period 1900-19 Sistem that Go bitional unres that accomPani- This Was a timu Studen- returned to Ch; States refilizey China Were to 5 of COnStructive China' Many st started an (1 par and the Create: centuries.ol d C l u 45 received at least part of their education in missionary schools. A relatively small group of Western-educated intellectuals were influential in promoting cultural change and in heralding Chinese nationalism. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the Christian missionary education on China's national develop- ment, especially after the 18605. But there can be little doubt that the missionaries did play a role worthy of attention. Revolutionary Movements The chaotic political and social condition for the period 1900—1950 impeded the development of an educational system that could adequately meet China's needs. The national unrest dampened the hopes of educational progress that accompanied the establishment of the Republic in 1912. This was a time for revolutionary movements. Students in Chinese institutions and those who had returned to China after studying in Japan and the United States realized the need for a new educational system if China were to survive, yet they were frustrated by the lack of constructive progress due to the political turmoil in China. Many students of the early twentieth century started and participated in the "New Culture Movement" (1915-1922). The movement aimed at freeing the individual and the greater society from the cultural restraints of centuries—old Confucian absolute truths in the hope of generating iii to compete suc six general ti attack Confuci tion; (3) to I: generate a dis life; (5) to p and (6) to deb If scientific China: the old “’35 blamed for Overcome. Whe ideOIOsies of . and still is an undermine trad: A more disenchantmeflt in the CirCles and deterioratj Fourth MoVement Protest against i . out°°ue of the film i as a new In 27 2:151‘152 deBar: if y 4. b igenerating liberal thinking and eventually equipping China {to compete successfully with other nations. There were isix general themes to the New Culture Movement: (1) to 1attack Confucianism; (2) to prosecute the Literary Revolu— tion; (3) to proclaim a new philosophy of life; (4) to generate a discussion on science and the philoSOphy of life; (5) to promote the "doubting of antiquity" movement; and (6) to debate Chinese and Western cultural values.27 If scientific or industrial progress were to occur in China, the old and restrictive Confucian philosophy that was blamed for holding China back for decades had to be overcome. Whether the New Culture Movement and its new ideologies of change would meet the needs of China was md still is an open question, but it clearly served tot mdermine traditional Chinese culture. A more poignant expression of student—intellectual isenchantment with Chinese leaders and the lack of vision n the circles of power to improve China's internal chaos nd deteriorating international position was the "May ourth Movement" (1917—1921). Although it began as a rotest against warlords compromising Chinese sovereignty, ts internal momentum shifted toward a reaction against t itcome of the Versailles Peace Conference when Japan was .ven, as a reward for declaring war on Germany, the old .rman concession of shantung——a Chinese province. Even M 27 deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 151-152. though the May imperialist se intellectual 1 Experimentalis positivism, ar the Chinese ir the forces the of China. The at mass for these force of these China needed a illllortance of Stthd; The M2 Culture Mr eCtual and {iational j l{idiuidual “011 of cu FeVOIUtiOI intellect1 by iIltelle Social and “iii imPOI 47 ugh the May Fourth Movement was an expression of anti— erialist sentiment and nationalistic pride, Western ellectual thought continued to have an impact in China. arimentalism, materialism, socialism, communism, itivism, and the like, provided the building blocks of (Chinese intellectual reformation and also served as fforces that undermined the traditional cultural ideology China. The academic community provided much of the critical 28 :for these revolutionary movements. The motivating e of these movements was the intellectuals' belief that a needed a cultural and political redefinition. The rtance of this intellectual ferment cannot be over— ed: . The May Fourth Movement [along with the New Culture Movement] was actually a combined intell— ectual and sociopolitical movement to achieve national independence, the emancipation of the individual, and a just society by the moderniza— tion of China. Essentially, it was an intellectual revolution . . . because it precipitated a mainly intellectual awakening and transformation . . . led by intellectuals. This also accelerated numerous social and political and cultural changes. The most important purpose of the movement was to maintain the existence and independence of the nation.29 28Although there is some confusion in the literature J the exact difference between the New Culture Movement :he May Fourth Movement, and admittedly the two are ely related and intertwined, this author would differ— ite them as follows: The New Culture Movement focused indamental social and cultural change, while the May :h Movement focused on political events. 29Chow Tse—tsung, The MayiFourth Movement (Stanford: ford University Press, 1960), pp. 358-359. Education Dur. In the Chinese educa‘ model, with 51 and German sy: tional though‘ had been super that new Japar practice a un: continue the 1 and selection Japanese syst: when China was acceptance of tOJaPanese cc model) eventue Critic SYStem In 192 School Re fol-m ProgressiVe Ec' to refom educ . 303 b he sits u (FEbruar 48 nation During the Republic-«The Rise In the first quarter of the twentieth century the nese educational system was influenced by the Japanese e1, with subsequent modifications based on the French IGerman systems, and by American political and educa— nal thought. "Although the imperial examination system been superseded by a public school system after 1905, t new Japanese modeled school system had put into ctice a uniformity and centralization which seemed to tinue the traditional stress on a restricted curriculum selection by elimination."30 The popularity of the inese system among the Chinese decreased after 1915 1 China was presented with the Twenty—one Demands, the :ptance of which would have in effect subjected China rapanese colonization. The centralized, autocratic mtional system (based on the Japanese educational d) eventually gave way to a more decentralized, demo— ic system (based on the American educational model). In 1922 the Ministry of Education promulgated the o1 Reform Decree after heated dialogue between the ressive education reformers and the ministry. Efforts eform education focused on redefining Chinese educa“ a1 structure and aims in such a way as to square with democratic principles that served as the bases of the 30Barry C. Keenan, "Educational Reform and Politics arly Republican China," Journal of Asian Studies 33, 2 (February 1974): 226. thinking of l movements thrr statute aimed democratic ed' The rm. conservative I of the middle of the reform to relate the the rigidity < Since 1906, w] IThe promotior 1922 was inte: the Operation here PraCtica: in of the in, the 19203 Chi: Strongly inflr America“ poliu The tr China contribu ProgreSsiVe ed WhateVer cont] 49 ;ing of liberal intellectuals in the ongoing reform 3ents throughout this half century. The new educational ite aimed at developing "a true republic in which iratic education produced a democratic politics.“31 The major contention between progressive and ‘rvative Chinese educators centered on the flexibility 5e middle—school curricula. The educational objectives e reformers were to develop individualism in students, late the school to social progress, and to undermine igidity of the school system as it had developed 1906, when the Ministry of Education was established._ promotion of individuality in the revised standards of has interpreted specifically to mean flexibility in peration of secondary education in order to introduce oractical, vocational instruction-—relating the train— 5 the individual to existing social needs."32 During '205 Chinese schools and educational reformers were 1y influenced by American educational thought and an politico-ideological orientation. The two—year visit (1919—1921) of John Dewey to contributed significantly to refining the tenets of 33 ssive education for the reform movement in China. 2r contributions progressive education might have 31Ibid., p. 225. 321bid., p. 226. 33Ibid., p. 228. made to China (1925) --Bri ti: in Shanghai, ‘ \ rave of natiou democratic p0. civilians and unprecedented educational c. on national s fused politic: 1919.34 "New country after and Substitute nationalism" . In the more Conserva' Confucian trar cure in S C1100: here exposed 1 challenged Sc] learned fr 0m i Pr Operly trair unreSt. The ( Chinese sociei 341 , mg 35 50 ie to China, the impact of the May Thirteenth Incident QS)--British-led police killed 13 Chinese demonstrators §Shanghai, touching off anti—foreign sentiment and a e of nationalistic pride—-doomed the hope of a more poratic political climate. The killing of Chinese ilians and students by foreign forces sparked an recedented spirit of nationalism. What developed in cational circles and throughout the country was a focus national strength and a militant antinimperialism that ed politics and education much as they had been before 9.34 "New waves of nationalistic fervor swept the ntry after 1925 and crushed [the] spirit of liberalism ‘substituted for it a form of dogmatic fanatical ionalism" that permeated the educational system.35 In the midst of these developments the older and a conservative educators and national leaders of the ucian tradition protested against the Western influ— in school curricula. .The students, it was claimed, exposed to the spirit of reform and revolution; they lenged school authorities and held strikes. Students red from previous graduates that they were not being erly trained for employment, thus adding to the general :t. The old morality was ridiculed and the fabric of se society was unravelling. The old Chinese 34Ibid., p. 236. 35 . . , . . Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China, l philosophy an with anything In re the progressi‘ Sun Yat-sen's democracy, an program in sc reported subs numbers of st 0f the educat alain central fu11 administ l0 exterminat- t0 encroach o: Goverument be national poli. Spies and inf. Sities’ freed. Professors be. Ed While school SYStem in EducatiOna; Republic (193; is known of t] more is known 51 losophy and way of life was undermined but not replaced h anything meaningful. In response, the Nationalist Government suspended progressive education policy in 1928 and introduced Yat-sen's Three People's Principles—~nationalism, scracy, and socialism——as the core of the new educational gram in schools. From 1928 to 1937 the Nationalists arted substantial educational progress through increasing Jers of students and developing programs at all levels ahe educational structure. The educational system was in centralized, with the Ministry of Education wielding . administrative power. As the Nationalists attempted exterminate the Communists and as the Japanese continued mcroach on Chinese territory and integrity, the Nanking rnment became increasingly intolerant of criticism of onal policy from academic quarters. As a system of s and informants developed within schools and univer- es, freedom of expression by students, teachers, and essors became increasingly restrictive. ation Under the Communists--The Struggle While the Nationalist Government developed its 31 system, the Communists also attempted to establish iucational system during both the Chinese Soviet )lic (1931-1934) and the Yenan era (1936-1945). Little rown of the educational efforts of the Soviet period; is known of the schools in the liberated areas 52 .ablished at the end of the Long March (1934-1935). The cationists' professional way of life in North China, ecially after the Japanese attacked and occupied much the region (1937), was one of trying to overcome rtages of everything needed to operate a school. Not y did schools function in the face of limited security the threat of imminent Japanese attack, but they also to live with other restraints of life in a guerrilla . It was relatively easy for elementary school ents to disperse quickly and return to their families ing in the immediate area if the Japanese threatened isal. The middle schools and universities were more Lproblem, for the higher-level schools were more itutionalized with boarding students, some equipment, eton libraries, and other educational paraphernalia. in spite of these obstacles SOme middle schools and ersities continued to function. The curricula of the Communist schools in North were geared to develop urgently needed skills. ical work was combined with study. Since education inked with local needs and different areas had dif— t needs, there resulted a wide variety of local school ms. Primary schools were far more numerous than tutions at any other level. The “people manage, c help" village primary schools taught Simple lite and @ ness equi: Many unde: Chin. SChm gover 53 " racy and numeracy, as well as serving local conditions vartime needs.36 ation Under the NationalistSv—The Fall During the opening years of the war in China —l945), the Japanese armies deliberately attacked estroyed educational institutions because they were ls of Chinese national pride and cultural conscious— Japanese troops demolished school buildings and —~4r==:4~—u~««e—se;~»w~» w»~wm--e-~«-..---——w~ j 37 ‘ went, and scattered students and teachers alike. schools migrated to the interior of China and came the control of the Kuomintang (in West and Southwest ) or the Communists (in Northwest China), while other ls came under Japanese control through the puppet iments of East and South China. The Ministry of Education of the Nationalist 1ment reported from Chungking in 1939 that “altogether China's 108 institutions of higher learning-—univer- i , colleges, and technical schools-«have literally prooted and carried hundreds and in some cases 36Michael Lindsay, "The Educational System: Early ist Origins, 1939—1946," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., ion and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International s Group,—_1969) . pp- 32-33- 37For a description of the circumstances surround' e closing of Chinese educational institutions by the e, the relocation of universities, and some experi» f students and teachers who remained behind to t the Japanese, see Hubert Freyn, Chinese Education War (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1940). Afi“ thou More beca Chin to a vari: norm the exis tion acad. Peri. stay not a war': t0 e: Site: gene: ment deSt: 54 ! sands of miles away before being re—established . . . . Ever, 17 less fortunate institutions had to close down use of the hostilities, thus raising the number of ese citadels of learning thus far affected by the war total of 94. This leaves only 14 others, which [for rus reasons] have still been able to carry on their :1 academic activities without interference through ‘irst two years of the struggle."38 1 Those schools in the Kuomintang—controlled areas Ed under conditions that generated low-quality educa— But then mere survival was more important than mic standards. Faculties did not have access to dicals, reference books, or new texts in order to professionally up-to-date, while wartime tension was conducive climate for serious academic pursuit. At end, schools that had re—located in Western China :ape the Japanese wanted to return to their original in Eastern China and begin anew. This return exodus ted additional problems for the Nationalist Govern— s it tried to gain control of the country and to y the Communists. The deteriorating economy and the national sentiment by inflation of catastrophic proportions and the ring civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese st Party had an impact on the educational scene. 38Hurbert Freyn, Chinese Education in the War ai: Kelley & Walsh, Limited, 1940), pp. 11—12. The thei of t not quat hope acti isti hati disi civi and ] ihcn andr anxir Stril gene] these their to th tions BeCar Possl' 55 :first task of the returned institutions was to rebuild ir physical plants, but with a shortage and high cost building materials, the initial hopes of rebuilding did materialize. Projects were postponed, existing inade- te facilities became even more overcrowded, and the e of improving academic standards faded. After 1911, Chinese students became especially ive in national politics. They were patriotic, ideal— ic, impatient, public opinion leaders, and a source of ional political consciousness. In the face of post—war illusionment, deteriorating Chinese prestige, continued i1 war with no anticipated peace, rampant inflation, prospects of an unstable future, the students became :easingly tense, restless, frustrated, dissatisfied, critical of governmental authorities. In the context Lnational disillusionment, the students, who were ous for decisive action and rapid results, resorted to kes in the hope of arousing popular attention and rating supportive public sentiment. The students during 3 four years (1945—1949) were in a rebellious mood; r strikes merely contributed further chaos and confusion 1e national paralysis. The potential for improving educational institu— : was closely linked to national economic life. se of inflation and war expenditures, there was little bility of improving educational standards in spite of artially because of) increasing enrollments. Academic star unah budq with for stud food of e fina rate an 0 high trot tion earn; fahi: i“Cor reso: t0 ea the ; PUrch SChod r9act 56 ards deteriorated as the years passed. Schools were a to meet expenses as inflation encroached on their :5. Because of higher fees, students often reacted strikes, demonstrations, and protests. In exchange rflated tuitions, the financially hard—pressed its received poor dormitory quarters, poor quality unhealthy living conditions, and sinking standards rcation. Although students received government :ial subsidies, the rate of inflation outpaced the pf subsidy increases. Another problem facing schools at this time was break of teacher strikes. Teachers struck for salaries and, in some cases, to protest adminis- n policy. Their pay was poor to begin with; infla- nly further eroded faculty salaries. They were not 3 enough from one teaching post to support self and ; many existed at a subsistence level, with all going for the necessities of life. Professors ed to taking several jobs as an economic necessity L enough to live. No money was available either from dtitution or from the professors' own salaries to e new books or recent journals; as a consequence, ship and educational standards deteriorated. In n, student ferment increased. Post-war Chinese education was seriously challenged. r was there economic depression and inflation, but .itical tension caused by the Kuomintang prosecuting 57 .vil war many students opposed. Students were eager to ess their political opinions on the national welfare their disenchantment with the failure of the govern- ,to deal effectively with the state of the nation. teacher and student strikes erupted as a culmination any forces. They were quick to vent their political s. This volatile situation was exploited by agitators both the right and the left for political reasons.39 It might be concluded that the fall of the analist Government and the Communist takeover was due no basic reasons: the more apparent cause was the anal, physical weakness resulting from years of the with Japan and the protracted civil war; but the more Lficant cause was the uncertainty and confusion among thinese intellectuals and students from 1912 until 40 The issue centered on the rejection of the traditional Confucian orthodoxy 'that] gave rise to cultural dislocation, aggra— ated by the inability of Western—oriented ntellectuals to agree as to the means for chieving Western ideals . . . . The painful rocess of modernization of Chinese education roduced only a small group of individualistic pecialists, who were removed from the masses nd unable to exercise sufficient influence on ither politics or society, and thus 'materially 39See Theodore Hsi—en Chen, “The Educational Crisis ina," Educational Administrative and Supervision 34, (December 1948): 469-478. ;40 Kao Chien, "Progressive Education Undermined The Freeman 5, no. 6 (December 1954): 216. E_d_th the a fr in r €er str: net] grar was not: a l< The 00nd gen Poss Prod 58 iminished the chance of democracy in China and momoted, by default, the opposite cause.‘ rtion at the Takeover——The Triumph When the Communists came to power in late 1949, did not have to start from the beginning to establish :mal educational system. Modern schools were started rina almost 50 years before, with the Nationalists :ising tight party control of schools and universities roughly 25 of those years. The Kuomintang exercised :t control over educational administration, curricula, >dology, textbook content, and both entrance and ation examinations. The formal educational structure hirly unified and standardized, relative to the mal maladies of the 19405.42 At the takeover, the Chinese Communists inherited g-established network of educational institutions. ommunists encouraged all schools and universities to nue without interruption. The new leaders wanted to ate as little resentment toward the new regime as >le among students, teachers, administrators, and psors. Support for the Communists was not difficult d because many, if not most, schools resented the tang for their strict governmental control, repressive 41Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education," 42Chiu—sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress 5 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 156. 59 , icial restrictions, and student imprisonment, torture, ldeath. Initial working arrangements were easily :ked out between the new leaders and educational insti- :ions. Communist leaders were sympathetic toward schools itinuing operation, for many of their own ranks were :her graduates from or former students of these institu- ans, including the Christian missionary institutions.43 Many of the public servants who worked for the >mintang were asked to remain at their posts and to rtribute their skills in service to the new regime. This :luded teachers, professors, and educational administra— 3, though they were to receive in-service political fining in the new ideology.44 The major Communist criticism of pre—liberation wation was that schools existed to serve the ruling ss while ignoring the needs of the laboring class, ch represented the vast majority of the Chinese popula- n. Amidst all the educational changes instituted by Communists, schools still exist to serve the ideals the ruling class. Only now the laboring class is not )red; in fact, the peasants and workers are at the 11 point of education in the People's Republic of China. 43S. B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policy in a," Pacific Affairs 23, no. 1 (March 1950): 21-22. 44Theodore Hsi—en Chen, “The New Education in unist China," School and Society 71, no. 1839 (18 March ): 167. 60 Communist Education in China: A Projective Format The Chinese Communists consider education to be a ificant part of their ideological revolution and the 01 system to have a prominent place in the longvrange ducation of the people and the short«range indoctrina— of students. Education in general and the school em in particular is a decisive force in reorienting ents' thinking in terms of socialistic goals, of the ese cultural heritage, of political socialization, and To educate for aeying party orders without question. 'new Chinese man," the previous educational system had modified to accommodate new goals. The school system :0 be liberated from all foreign influences (especially a of the West), while all non—Communist Chinese ants had to be eliminated. The task of the school m was and is to develop within students a national as they prepare to become members of the political- ological intelligentsia of the new order. nist Philosophers Contemporary Chinese leaders look to the sacred of communism for direction. Lu Ting-yi, a long-time spokesman on educational policy, for example, “found 2 Communist Manifesto of 1848, that in future educa— rnd material production are to be combined, and in 61 S KAPITAL that such combination of education and labour {the path of evolution for humanity."45 Regarding the oublesome problem of intellectuals, Lenin knew that very ruling class [had] to win over the intellectuals."46 hse tenets are still apparent today in Chinese Communist acational policy. Mao is also an important contributor to Communist blogy. His views on the role of education are central Iunderstanding the task of the school in China under his irmanship. Mao owes "to Confucius . . . the notion t education [is] the only way to improve the human ironment. Mao's accent on education—~broadened to race propaganda, indoctrination, and 'though reform'-- ] reflected in his portrayal of himself as the Great :her. For, as he saw it, one of his major roles [is] "47 emold the hearts and minds of China. As to the role ormal education in pre—Communist China, Mao has a nite bias against the formal school, and considers >wn schooling to have been a waste.48 But Mao and other Chinese revolutionaries believe a school system with the proper revolutionary program 45China News Analysis, no. 273, 24 April 1959, p. 5. 46A5 quoted in China News Analysis, no. 277, 1959, p. 5. 47Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution plution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p.'97— 48:[bid., pp. 35*36. 62 key instrument for radically altering society. ifically, "the ability of ideological education to ey a common sense of purpose [is] to become a basic ent of teaching curricula from elementary schools "49 Mao feels the task of the school ugh universities. 3 ensure that students acquire a proper political pective, for "not to have a correct political point iew is like having no soul."50 Although there is fundamental disagreement between a and the Soviet Union as to the interpretation of inism vis-a-vis present-day revolutionary policy, Mao -n the past and still supports many of the basic posi— of Marx and Lenin. In May 1939, Mao stated that intellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail tegrate themselves with the workers and peasants. In inal analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary lectuals and non—revolutionary or counter-revolution— rtellectuals is whether or not they are willing to ate themselves with the workers and peasants and 1y do so."51 And in July 1964, "education must serve arian politics and must be combined with productive 49Richard H. Solomon, "From Commitment to Cant: lving Functions of Ideology in the Revolutionary ," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Ideology and Politics am ora China (Seattle: University of Washington .973), p. 64. 50"Quotations from Chairman Mao," China Pictorial, . 2, p. 23. ’lrbid. , p. 22. 63 bour. The working people should master knowledge and h intellectuals should become habituated to manual current Themes The Chinese Communists rejected educational thought 3m their own past (Confucianism was considered feudalis- :) and most of contemporary Western ideology (except :xism—Leninism). For example, the Chinese leaders con— der the educational philosophy of John Dewey as bourgeois, : Dewey's education centered on individual growth and helopment, and completely ignored politics and production. my's strategy would only perpetuate the “status quo of 53 dtalistic society." For the new masters of China, re is knowledge of only two areas central to education schooling: the class struggle and the production uggle. The history of the formal educational system during first 25 years of the PeOple's Republic of China .ects several recurrent themes of a basic philosophical me. These ideological motifs are and were always at e. Through the tactical shifting of interpretation, educational posture of the schools reflects the views 521bid., p. 23. 53Theodore Hsi—en Chen, "Elementary Education in 1nist China," China Quarterly, no. 10 (April-June : 108. 64 Sparamount by either Mao and his supporters or other ese Communist leaders who opposed Mao's views. Mao's 3 educational stance reflects the values employed fig the Yenan era—-loyalty, egaliterianism, dedication, arity, and no personal freedom. He assumes that L—level solutions found workable in the rural, military 5 of North China after 1936 are equally applicable to entire nation at peace and striving for national .opment. Mao's opponents feel that new methods are :sary to meet new demands. The themes around which the ideologyvmethodology 'gle revolves are (l) egalitarianism—elitism, (2) cen- zation-decentralization, (3) Red—Expert, and (4) tion—labor. Briefly, egalitarianism is central to continuing revolution; barriers separating people fferent classes must be overcome. Yet in practical how are planners and educators to incorporate :arianism into schools and simultaneously assure :y education to meet manpower requirements? One nge facing educators in China is to translate Mao's tical (and desirable) egalitarianism into a practical, ~leve1 application amidst the reality of developing lized manpower for modernizing China. Mao often :es the elites produced by high—calibre educational rtions, yet such institutions are the only realistic if producing sophisticated, technical and scientific se required by a developing, dynamic, national 65 pnomy. Those Chinese leaders recognizing and supporting :development of expertise are labeled by Mao as enemies the people. Closely related to the egalitarian—elite issue is gcentralization—decentralization controversy. Decen— lization of the administration of education promotes iitarianism, as more students are admitted to school. isuch local character of schooling seems to generate Lous standards of academic excellence and a lower ‘ity of education nation-wide. Mao argues that a central rolling bureaucracy does not facilitate the development ocal potential or talent, and that local educational rol promotes the development of skills needed to meet 1 agricultural and industrial production demands. A third central theme focuses on the "Red and 't" struggle. If schools educate students to be more than "expert," then the fervor of political education ctivities overshadows solid academic study and hinders development needed for modernization. Conversely, mphasis is on being "expert" as opposed to being the educational consequences are reversed. The 1e between the correct political orientation (redness) chnical—scientific competence (expertise) seems to be : in the ends—means controversy. Contiguous with the Red-Expert issue is the educa- d productive labor contention. If one is to be a y educated "red," then active participation in .«.- 3.335,; 66 >ductive labor is essential. On the other hand, if 10015 are to produce qualified "experts," as little time possible should be devoted to outside manual labor and much time as possible be given to academic pursuits. course, strictly academic students become members of :hnical—scientific elites, thus undermining the egali— ian principle. Mao prescribes a labor—education combi- ion to subvert such elites and to promote egalitarianism. Two themes of education in the People's Republic China are without controversy: education is to be trolled and led by the Chinese Communist Party, and cation is to serve the people and not to promote personal 3. Regarding the single, most dominant thrust of the pols, one might ask, "What is the nature of the rela- rship between the continuing revolution on the Chinese land and the function of education?" Theodore Hsi—en posits an answer: The Communist revolution is a total revolution aiming to establish a new society and a new way of life. A new society presupposes new men with new minds, new ideas, new emotions, and new attitudes. Before a new way of life can prevail, the old way of life must be abolished. While the dew generation is being molded according to the Iommunist ideology, older people with old minds rnd hearts must be remolded. The making and emaking of new men therefore becomes a funda— ental task of the Communist revolution and the entral aim of education. 54Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The New Socialist Man," rative Education Review 13, no. 1 (February 1969): 88, 67 @proaching the Thesis With the clearly identified role for education in uilding a new society and the clearly assigned school ask of producing properly—oriented student generations, he various thrusts of the curricula sharply defined pecific attitudes and abilities developed throughout the tages of national policy and educational development. ame of the particular curricular objectives are geared 3 immediate needs, such as education for national defense Jring the Korean conflict generated among students lousands of "volunteers" who went to fight American rperialism and to aid Korea; other curricular goals are ered to specific international strategy, such as education d the Soviet model that at one time stressed their iendship with and aid to China, but after the Sine-Soviet lit, such an emphasis was no longer part of the curricula. Other aspects of the schools' educational program phasize long-term needs, for example, education for 313E to develop hygienic attitudes and practices among Idents (and through them, their parents) as an attack on :eases caused by the lack of popular but basic sanitary— lth measures. Also of perennial concern is education national construction, aimed at developing usable 115 students can immediately employ upon graduation. The major stages of Chinese Communist development er the takeover are grouped into four periods, based ?eking's national and international policies of the 68 ime. Several significant events characterize each eriod: the first (1949-1957) includes early consolida- ion of power by the Communist forces, the Korean conflict, he First Five-Year Plan, tightening control over the asses, the initial Sine—Soviet friendship that began to eteriorate, and various party—government strategies to 55 the second in over or to control the intellectuals; 1958-1960) encompasses the Three Red Flags Movements-the heat Leap Forward, the People's Communes, and the Social— 5tic Main Line--the start of the Second Five-Year Plan, re withdrawal of Soviet technical experts, and the China— rdia border dispute; the third (1961-1965) incorporates ina's becoming a nuclear power with the detonation of omic bombs, a further shifting from heavy industrial to ricultural development, planned increase in consumer ods, worsening Sine-Soviet tensions, and temporary phasis on being more "expert" than "red"; and the fourth 966-1973) is dominated by the Great Proletarian Cultural Jolution cleansing of the Chinese Communist Party of the vorthy and the suspect, the rise and fall of Comrade r Piao, and the nascent Sine—American rapprochement. This investigation and interpretation of the kage between national policy and educational development lores the impact of party and government actions and 55The Chinese Communists consider anyone who does work with his hands and has had, at least, a formal undary—level education to be an intellectual. 69 ecisions on the role of the school, and how the schools eciprocally contributed to the realization of national olicy. As the evolution of this linkage is traced hrough the various stages of national development, it hould be kept in mind that both party-government policy ad educational policy often reflect abrupt shifts that aem contradictory in nature. The lack of consistency 1 Communist education, in general, and Chinese educational >licy, in particular, merely reflects shifting interpre- rtions of the contributions to be made by subordinate stems. National policy occasionally undergoes an abrupt out-face, merely reflecting the dynamics of political ctions within the circles of power. "Our duty is to hold our- selves responsible to the people." Mao Tse—tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse—tung CHAPTER 3 PARTY POWER AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Power and authority, though related terms, do not a the same meaning. Power is the capacity of a person, coup, or a nation to achieve results, either by suasion or by force. Authority is legitimate power, : is, the power source enjoys the sanction of either pal or a mythical consensus. Authority gives power the .t to pursue certain goals; it does not mean that these 5 or the methods of achieving them are necessarily t. What is right depends on whether one is an 1utist—-certain acts are always right or always wrong, atter what the circumstance-—or a relativist——right wrong are determined by time, place, and circumstance. er of these positions is at the root of one's reac— 3 toward and feelings about the Communist regime in >eop1e's Republic of China. 70 71 The special phenomena of power and authority are rdamental to the relationship between the system of rtrol and the system of formal education. On the ,nese mainland since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party been the repository of power, while the People's ernment has had the authority to exercise that power en it by the party. In this context Chinese leaders e given much attention to the role of the school for part in developing the new Communist state. The Chinese Communist Party-~The Power The power source of any system, by definition, trols the functioning of the component sub«systems. Chinese Communist Party, as the source of power in the ple's Republic of China, controls social institutions changes their character and boundaries. Power is the Llization of resources to achieve objectives, and the :y, like all institutions, employs power to achieve its :ed goals. The one comprehensive goal of the party is to lop a Communist state in China. This shall be accom- hed through an alliance between urban, industrial ers and rural peasants. The party exercises total rol over national policy by indirectly dominating the 1e's governments at all levels and in all regions of country, and by directly controlling the disciplined y organization that provides leadership for the 72 ople's Liberation Army (PLA) and for the areal governments roughout China, mission for the revolutionary elements of ciety, and direction for the masses. The Chinese Communist Party is separate from the vernment of the People's Republic of China. The party ; its own distinctive identity, with self-contained finistrative machinery. No law other than the party stitution is recognized. The party looks upon the aratus of the state "as an administrative vehicle or ice available to it for its own purposes."1 That is, party regards its own mission a higher canon than the te law of the government. In fact, the institutions of arnment spring from the decisions and authorization of party. "The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] frankly :laims that the CPR [Chinese People's Republic] is only >nvenient instrument of its own devising, which it finds ful for effecting the eventual transition to the class— (society under its own leadership. Consequently, all ic policy of the CPR is guided by the tactical program he CCP. No anti—Communist sentiment is permitted to expression. The most rigorous controls are maintained policy and its administration. Every political device xploited to enable the CCP to retain an absolute lH. Arthur Steiner, "The Role of the Chinese anist Party, " The Annals of the American Academ of :ical and Social Science 277 (September 1951): 59. 73 onopoly of leadership within the complex structure of he CPR. "2 Party paternalism does not recognize, nor does it llow, any organized group that is not closely affiliated ith the party. In order that associations of students, men, youth, peasants, laborers, teachers, etc., can be beled revolutionary and thereby eligible to partake in cal people's governments (pre—l967) or the revolutionary mmittees (post-1967), they must accept and comply with Frty guidance. Close control is exercised through con- :itutionally—prescribed procedures enabling the party to mervise the work of mass organizations. People are wouraged to join party—controlled associations, which e, in fact, instruments of control and supervision. It in this way that the people are "organized" to comply th and promote the party line. From the beginning of the Republic, "the Chinese mmunist Party [has been] the organized vanguard of the inese working class, the highest form of its [i.e., oletarian] class organization."3 The size of the vanguard 3 always been small in relation to the population. Party rbership has never been more than four per cent of the :al population of China, has always been highly selective, Jhtly disciplined, and regularly purged of the unworthy. 2Ibid., p. 57. 30.8. Congress, House, "Constitution of the Chinese unist Party," Congressional Record, 8lst. Cong., lst. S-, 1949, 95, pt. 15? A4775—A4779. 74 of the Tenth Party Congress (24-28 August 1973) the ership of the Chinese Communist Party stood at 28 lion, making it the largest Communist party in the ld.4 The party itself is tightly controlled from within, like the government, it practices democratic centralism. e is no intention of subjecting party policies, princi- , or practices to mass scrutiny or to free elections. internal administrative structure of the Chinese unist Party somewhat parallels that of the People's :rnment. The organizational hierarchy-«national, .onal, provincial, county, municipal, town, district, .--is centrally controlled through uniform rules that rn party operations from the top. The impact of the party on the affairs of state in a is most significant, for party members are assigned lected to key government positions with the official onsibility of fulfilling government functions by ying out party directives. The link between party :y and government action is personal, not official. high—level officials, whether in the ministries or :ovincial— or urban-level governments, were and are I members. The lower levels of the partyvgovernment ‘ .lel also exemplify a close inter~relationship. 4China News Analysis, no. 932, 7 September 1973, 75 The central party organization (see Figure 3—1) enters around the National Party Congress, representing be lower levels of the party with a large assembly of elegates (approximately 1200 plus alternates) who are upposedly elected, but are actually hand—picked by the ontrolling bureaucrats.5 The National Party Congress lects a Central Committee (90-195 plus alternates), which lects a Central Political Bureau (Politburo) (19—21 plus lternates), which in turn selects a Standing Committee 5-9) that is, in fact, the real power of the party and the auntry. The elected chairmanships of the National Party angress, the Central Committee, the Central Political Jreau, and the Central Secretariat were all held for many Bars by Mao Tse—tung. Mao also served as the Chairman of re Central People's Government until 1958. Power flows tom the Standing Committee through the Politburo, through e Central Committee, through the National Party Congress, d through the Congress delegates to the entire party mbership and all the key posts of government. In this y, the personal power of Mao Tse—tung is exercised thin the party and the government. 5Steiner, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party," 62. NOTE: Two excellent sources for further detailed formation on both the party and the government, see eodore H. E. Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist Regime: :uments and Commentar (New York: Frederick A. Praeger alishers, 1967) and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organi- tion in Communist China (Berkeley: University of Calif: ria Press, 1966). 76 National Party Congress Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee Military Affairs Committee Central People's Liberation Control Army (Militia and Commission J Security Forces) Central Z{///fl Secretariat I Areal I Party Cadre & Administration ’ Central Organs (1949-1967) I (1949-1967) I l Revolutionary Committees After 1967 lure 3-1. Chinese Communist Party organization. ICES: Adapted from Communist China: A Biblioggaphic Surve (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1971 , p. 180; Donald W. Klein, "The Party and the Leaders," in The China Giant: Perspective on Communist China (Glenview, I11.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 50; and Current Scene 4, no. 15 (8 August 1966): 10. 77 There is no official linkage between government ninistration of the state and party determination of licy. However unrelated party and government appear, a party controls the elections of congressional candi— :es, the party controls government agencies by estab— thing party committees therein, and the party controls a personal-corporate—political lives of the people fough education. The party also attempts to influence- 1future through controlling the role of the school. Since the takeover the party has passed through eral evolutionary phases. The 1949—1957 period was racterized by party unity and the beginning of Socialist onstruction. The nation was unified under one leader, dalism and imperialism were eliminated, and the party ntified itself with the Chinese national-cultural :lution. During these years the party laid the foundav 1 among the masses for its socialistic—hationalistic .ef structure. The 1958-1966 period was one of party polarization. Great Leap Forward signalled internal dissension in camp of international communism, the Retrenchment essed the moderate wing of the party attempt to direct peration of the national economy, and the Two—Line y Struggle centered on the increasing disunity within Chinese Communist Party. These were years of polari— on for party factions over the strategy for development ommunism in China. 78 The 1966-1969 period encompassed the Cultural volution. During these years many long-time party aders were removed, and the party was thoroughly purged. 1y about thirty per cent of the Central Committee members acted by the Eighth Party Congress (1956) survived the Ltural Revolution to hold their posts in the Central mfittee elected by the Ninth Party Congress.6 The sonality cult of Mao Tse-tung was also developed during : Cultural Revolution. The noted historian and Sinolo- t Chalmers Johnson claims that the cult of Mao Tse-tung developed (1) to fill the void created by a weak and ctured party leadership, (2) to build a power base to ble Mac to "attack and remove deeply entrenched Party ders who had become his political enemies," and (3) to ease his own vanity.7 During the Cultural Revolution olutionary committees replaced the party structure and arnment organs at the provincial level as the foci of er and authority. The revolutionary committees repre— :ed a three-way alliance: party-government cadre, the >le's Liberation Army, and elements of mass organizations resenting the people. The military was the main , 6Edward E. Rice, Mao's Wa (Berkeley: University :alifornia Press, 1972), p. 47%. ‘ 7Chalmers Johnson, “The Changing Nature and Locus .uthority in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, China: Management of a Revolutionary Society ttle: University of Washington Press, 1971Y] p. 70. 79 efactor in the reshuffling of power that resulted from Cultural Revolution, a situation about which Mao was entirely satisfied.8 In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1969- 3) the Chinese Communist Party was rebuilt, with the ppearance of some former members who had been purged. revolutionary committees remained part of the governing d :hinery, though the dominant influence of the military :hin the revolutionary committees dissipated. At the th (April, 1969) and the Tenth (August, 1973) Party gresses, Mao reaffirmed his position on the need for manent revolution. J It will be of interest to keep these stages of ty development in mind as one examines the phases of cational development in China. The emphasis of party er cannot and does not shift without a corresponding ct on the mission of the schools. The Chinese People's Government-- The Authority The following analysis focuses on the foundations 'overnmental authority and where the responsibility for ral education rests within the administrative structure. 8Rice, Mao's Way, p. 472. 80 ' iase One: 1949—1954 The "Proclamation of the Central People's Govern— ant"9 was the official act declaring the People's Republic FChina on 1 October 1949. The Chinese People's Political nsultative Conference (CPPCC)lo was the political body at oversaw the formation of the new republic and that ayed an important role in the first phase of Communist ntrol of the Chinese mainland. The CPPCC developed and 11 acted the "Common Program" as a provisional constitu- on, providing the Communist leaders with a framework for vernment action. The authority of the new government sted on the Common Program, which claimed that the CPPCC presented the will of the people. It also stated that Pending the convocation of the All—China People's Congress . . . the Chinese PeOple's Political Consulcative Conference shall exercise the func— tions and powers of the All-China People's Con— gress, enact the Organic Law of the Central People's Government . . ., elect the Central 1 People's Government Council . . . and vest it ‘ with the authority to exercise state power. (Art. 13, par. 2 of the Common Program) ‘ 9Vidya Prakash Dutt, ed., East Asia: China, Korea, an, 1947—50 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1958), 180-182. 10The CPPCC was a coalition of political groups with resentatives from the Chinese Communist Party, from all ocratic parties and people's organizations, from all ions of the nation, from the PLA, from all national prities, from overseas Chinese, and from all other riotic democratic elements. This united front, in fact, pdominated by the Communist party. 11Theodore H. E. Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist ime: Documents and Commentary (New York: Frederick A. Eger Publishers, 1967), pp. 34-45. 81 addition, the Common Program outlined government policy parding the military, the economy, culture and educa— pn, minority peoples, and foreign policy. The "Organic Law of the Central People's Govern— 1:“12 delineated the machinery of government. The tral People's Government Council, the members of which e elected by the CPPCC, assumed leadership of the state aratus; the newly—created Government Administrative ncil, as the highest executive body for state adminis- tion, carried out the directives of government. The nittee of Cultural and Educational Affairs directed the c of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Lie Health, the Ministry of Education, the Academy of ences, the Press Administration, and the Publications .nistration. §_Two: 1954—1967 The first phase of government authority ended on eptember 1954 as the CPPCC, whose delegates were cted by political consultation, passed out of existence provisional legislature and the First National People's ress, whose delegates were elected by the people (but oved by the party), convened and passed the 1954 "13 stitution of the People's Republic of China. That titution replaced the Common Program of the CPPCC. lzIbid., pp. 46—51. 13Ibid., pp. 75-92. 82 The National People's Congress is the highest organ state authority in the People's Republic of China. (See yure 3-2.) It elects its own Standing Committee, a amier of the State Council, and a Chairman of the People's public of China as head of state. The State Council >laced the Government Administrative Council. “The :te Council of the People's Republic of China, that is, Central People's Government, is the executive of the hest organ of state power; it is the highest adminis— tive organ of state." (Art. 47, 1954 Constitution) The te Council gives direction to, and coordinates the work the various mechanisms of government administration, luding those that focus on cultural, social, and educa- nal work. (See Figure 3-3 for national—level government anization.) 3e Three: After 1967 Although the national-level government structure s to have remained basically the same before, during, after the Cultural Revolution, in 1967 the lower-level 1e's congresses and people's councils were discredited dissolved. Since 1967—1968 revolutionary committees functioned as both party and government at the incial levels and lower. Hierarchical subordination the channels of responsibility between the PLA, the ral Government, and the party are not yet entirely If. 83 .3ofl>swawv ccflso #mHCSEEOU so w>HpommmHmm mmSBOB .m mmEmo cam “ora .m smflmuom paw oapmosoo wuwuoumnsuoum m.deoom .mm .m .Abwma .msmmfioo paw smfimouom .upoow .Ahmma .Hmmmmum .m Mofiuopmum .HHH upscaw mambo one =.ucofismo>ow owe: "snow 302v mowOflHom "mmpoe guano anssEEoo .mcms .m .m Hopmm Eonm condone .Anmmalmvmav quESHo>ow m.meoom omMCHSU wsu mo onoposuum GOHuuon Hmasmom :uuwufio: Sb cwmono "mmmuwcoo m.wHaowm mmmuncoo m.uH.omm Hw>cqr0Hmmm souw kuuwam “Haussoo m.wamoom unsoo w.deooL & d A n i mumuoumhauoum wwwuwcoo Hw>wq uwso mmwuwcoo m.onowm m.oHdowm nunsom scum ammono. ouwm aw>mgrunfiny Scum twuowaw "mmcnwcou m.deowm > "Haussou m.wHeowm MM Hm M3 M3 3 o a o i i wumMOumusuonm unsoo wmemsoo Hw>oA w mmwuwsoo w.deowm n.0Hooom m.meowm donate Scum cowozu uoWwM Hw>wawcooww scum twuuwam "wwwuwcoo m.oadoom "Hmocsoo m.deomm dfin I d A o a m 3 a o l cumuouwusooum unsoo wcaocmum mumum we new: macemmflssoo w.deomm m maaowm "0mm wo smahfiwfio tam moanumHCHE waoudsm uwaASm uwsom oumum mo smmuo wEdedm uswacuw>oo m.MHdomm Hwhudwu o.1.1)11.)) 1..."... "Aumzv wmwuwcoo m.waoomm emcoaumz .mrm unseen mdfismc3oe Hausa .mszoe ..umeo Hangofiasz “Hm>oq uwwmm mwfiuflamafiuwasz .mofiucsoo "Hw>mq chase meUHo Hmfiumdm .cOwam ocu=< .Hmwosfi>oum "Hw>wa vsoowm HNsOHumz hid, umwousom 84 .wfihm can no psofiphmmmn umflcdafiou tum HH .wsflso mo oaaosmom m.oamomm who no sOHHMNHsmmHo usoscuo>ow Ho>on Hoseaumz muunuo on can muwuww< macawwawm Hausa mo xsmm mm>wnuu4 mumum samuam Hmuwumaumum wumum huuuw< msmz mambo 3oz moHufl0m< dedumnm wuflflhwwflou aumum wsuumaw kuasco ounwuwa amsoaumz .m .Aomma uwsmsd my mH .0s .v msoom unwhmso EOHM pmummps muesamam wuwum mdoaumawm Hmusumso How mdcfimmwsfloo u.U.o .GOpmsflammgv m>nsm one an onfinam a "mango .rrrlrrrrrrrr- umwOHsom .Illllldlllllllllll .mrm musmflm va wuguag=m unasumz mamfiumumz wugpaasm uOfimfl ShuwzvnH hpumsvcH anuwfimno mamfiuwuuz mo HOHuMUOHd< hwzcm amuonuuwHu a soaunswaowm enemas vnuu w Suumvvaw casuxoh SEL< wfiuwh wumum GOHuMUHE=EEOu GOHuchonfln unowmmfiz muusvoum [many a mumom m.uHacwm uwumfioanan cauu=v< Awoaowo hhummuoh whmfiawmm wuswwwa ousuanuanw< ho chowumz ho mmHszHZHE ho VfiHwHZHx wNHMHmHZHZ meowumuacbssoo w zuumsvna now uuwwuc AHUZDOU mh<8m coaumusvm w musuHSU Maw 0u«WWo Shumouom a «usudauwnm< you ouwwmo Mow uuwwwo How wuwvuo UUNHOHWHDUOHA w.mHnomm wswunam «case we adapsnom m.mHnoum can No cmahwwfiu muhsov m.uaeo¢h manhnum wwuuflfifia) m:4::aa3 85 overnment Control and Administration f Education The party, which uses education as a political .001, controls the school system through both governmental dministrative machinery and party personnel and committees. he intensity of party concern for education is evidenced having the Chief of the Propaganda Department of the ntral Committee, Lu Ting-yi, serve also as the chief rty spokesman on educational matters for many years. olicy decisions affecting education and schooling are made, n the main, on political grounds and not on pedagogical ansiderations. The educational administrative structure facilitates peed and flexibility to accommodate policy implementation 1d change. To deviate from party or government directives i to be anti-Socialist and anti—revolution. Even during :riods of decentralized control of education, the few mtral Government directives are to be followed. No tter the extent of government decentralization, the party in control. Whereas the administration of national educationaL ograms was conducted under the direction of the Committee Cultural and Educational Affairs within the Government ministration Council before 1954, the new structure sated by the 1954 Constitution and organic laws called the Committee to be replaced with an Office of Cultural Educational Affairs within the State Council to 86 oordinate the work of the Ministry of Culture, the inistry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, he Ministry of Public Health, and other commissions and ureaux.l4 At the national level, the Ministries of Education nd Higher Education oversee formal schooling. Before the ultural Revolution, the Department of Education (provin— ial level) and the Bureau of Education (Hsign or municipal evel) were the organs of administration, with regional— evel educational organizations controlled and supervised y the next higher administrative level and by the people's 3mmittees of the party at the same level. Since the altural Revolution, revolutionary committees perform arty—government administrative functions. The Office of Culture and Education in the State )uncil oversees the work of the Ministry of Education and m Ministry of Higher Education. The Ministry of Educa- .on controls, organizes, plans, and supervises most formal Mcation in China. This involves the administration and ganization of schools, curricula, textbooks, methodology, d supervision of primary schools, general and technical condary schools, adult education, teacher training, eral education in part-time schools, and nurseries and dergartens. l4Chiu—sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in 'na (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), Pp- 80—85. 87 The Ministry of Higher Education was created by Government Administration Council in November 1952 to a meet future needs for educational expansion and .ialization. (The Ministry of Higher Education was .ished in 1958 as a consequence of Mao's decentraliza— scheme. It was re—established in 1964, but was olved during the Cultural Revolution.) The direct onsibilities of this ministry extended to composite rsities (teaching arts, humanities, and science), Lsecondary polytechnic institutes, specialized colleges, higher technical and research institutes. Ministry onsibilities extended to policies of admissions, ace, personnel, curriculum, methods, and new depart— 5 and programs. Before the Cultural Revolution there were some : modifications in the hierarchy of control. For ale, Sun Yat—sen University was controlled by the :try of Higher Education, by the Bureau of (Higher) rtion of the Kwangtung Provincial Government, and the party.15 Many schools of specialized training were, ast partially if not wholly, administered by various Council ministries. For example, the Ministry of ulture had its own technical college(s) and research tutes that dealt with the specific problems of ulture. lsIbid. , p. 195. -I~lflee< 88 The Central Government controls education, and so the party. The local party committees provide leader- within the schools by controlling school—related party nizations (such as the Young Pioneers), by controlling various (higher) educational conferences, by control- for many years the system of unified enrollment inations, and by controlling job assignment of uates.l6 The party has the final word on any adminis— hve or pedagogical matter. The party decides which hers are appointed and promoted, which students receive larships, what students will study which subjects, a they will study, who is to graduate, and where they be assigned after graduation. The machinery of control, either the imperial. inations of traditional China or the Communist govern« '5 Ministry of Education and party committees, articu— desired social and technical goals to the school :m to ensure that graduates serve both society and the :rs' visions of the future. As part of the apparatus >vernment, the school system is a tool to implement ogical and technical education. l6Del Weber, "Education as a Tool of Power," Phi Kappan 41, no. 9 (June 1960): 389. SECTION III COMMUNIST EDUCATION IN CHINA 89 . ".-. _ mu— The East Shines Red The Sun Arises (From the Chinese song The Eagt ShineS'Red.) CHAPTER 4 CONSOLIDATION AND STABILIZATION An examination of the interrelationships between Chinese Communist social system and the institutions t comprise it reveals an exchange of inputs and outputs t, taken together, defines the Chinese People's Republic. h institutions as the school, the army, the party, and government, reflect the values and goals of their ent social system as well as each fulfilling specialized ds that serve to maintain the entire social order. An stigation of the political and economic forces active in the Chinese social system defines the parameters in which the educational system functions. The nature he foreign relations one socio-political system (China) with other systems (the Soviet Union or the United es) also has an impact on the nature of formal educa- h. A brief overview of the major domestic and foreign res facing Peking during the Period of Consolidation and tilization reflects the general atmosphere in China from to 1957. 90 91 The Times: 1949-1957 Interrelated forces, domestic and foreign, generate L of perspectives for understanding the nature of the rtionships between component systems that exist within larger system. The following brief commentary focuses rajor historical events occurring within the Chinese .al system that had an impact on the functioning of the :ational system. The 1949-1957 historical overview, those to appear in the remaining chapters of this :ion (namely, 1958-1960, 1961—1965, and 1966—1973), res to develop a temporal framework centering on acted domestic and foreign issues of the period. Because space limitations, the number of topics and their analy— is limited. However brief, the statements provide a e of the times and of the dynamic forces at work within ese society from 1949 to 1957. The impact of these es on the role of the school is examined in greater il in the input-process—output portions of the chapter. stic Issues olitical and economic concerns usually embrace a procal causality and are, therefore, difficult to rate. For purposes of this analysis, however, an trary division is made, with attention directed to :ted arenas on the 1949-1957 domestic front in China. 92 Economic Considerations. The economic condition f any superordinate system has a direct impact on the evelopment of the educational sector. The extent to hich a government can invest financial resources in the chool system is affected by the health of the economy. he development and control of both the economic and the ducational sectors often experience a parallel evolution. hat was the state of the economy and what were some of he challenges facing the Communists in 1949—1957 that indered or helped the development of the formal educational ystem? The problems facing the People's Government in the irst state—planning period (1949—1952) were staggering: nflation was rampant, much of the industrial infra-struc— ure was in ruin, experienced technical and managerial xpertise was in short supply——in a word, the economy was isorganized. Although a beginning was made, little com- rehensive planning, either economic or educational, was msible due to the unavailability of essential statistics, e absence of qualified planning personnel, and the lack governmental machinery for effective control. Without being overly concerned about party loyalty, a Communists utilized existing qualified personnel to Lng stability to the shattered economy and order to the :rupted educational system. In spite of added problems ated by the Korean War, inflation was stopped, taxation unified, production was restored, prices were controlled, 93 the economy was stabilized, and the schools were reopened. Both the private business and private education sectors continued to operate for a time after the takeover, though the state increased its control over all economic and educational activities. By late 1952 the private commer- :ial class was destroyed as a political force within the Shinese power structure, and private educational institu— :ions were either completely controlled by the state or had been forced out of existence. In 1952 the "rehabilitation period" ended and the ’construction period“ began. The Ministry of Higher :ducation and the State Planning Commission were both stablished with full ministerial rank, while planning- ontrol procedures became increasingly specialized and entralized. The economic and educational sectors were rought under increasingly effective control, a prerequi— ite to a Socialist society. The Chinese strategy for planned economic and ducational development was based on the Soviet pattern. hough the Russian economic model-«an urban focus with abor-saving and capital-intensive growth patterns-~proved uappropriate for China's situation, the Soviet education adel was of some value. The First Five-Year Plan (1953— 957) emphasized heavy industry and especially steel :oduction, relegating agricultural development to a >sition of lesser importance. The rationale for this balance was that progress in the agricultural sector 94 . pended upon industrial development. This imbalance was flected in the numbers of college and university grad- tes produced across the disciplines. Those trained in gineering were in far greater quantity than those in riculture. The agricultural policies of the First Five- ar Plan promoted cooperative farming practices, moving ward collectivization on an ever—larger scale. Changes agriculture were more social than technological. The Lnese used the Soviet kolkhoz (collective farms) as air model for agricultural organization. Egalitarian appeals to ensure an equitable sharing austerity were part of the social and political control :hanisms of consumption. Capital goods had priority 2r consumer goods, and investment over consumption. rular economic and educational sacrifices were forced the name of patriotism and ideology. This balancing economic rationality with social justice also had an cational dimension: planning rationality required the ining of highly-educated experts in fields essential conomic development, while social justice required the usion of as many students as possible in the school em. The Communists greatly expanded the number of ents at the primary level and also concentrated on oving educational quality at higher levels. In the orchestration of human resources, raw rials, and financial considerations, development plans rienced difficulties. With state planning came m ' ..;__._.._._» ,1, 1, 95 ms of consciously balancing both the economy and icational needs. Without the forces of the market- :0 make allocation decisions, there resulted dispro— ral development rates, delays, and internal supply- inconsistencies that required occasional re-evalua— pf expectations and revisions of projected targets. .uable planning experience was gained and Chinese 'ial and educational growth were unprecedented the Period of Consolidation and Stabilization. Political Considerations. The political concerns the superordinate system were also major forces educational development. Like the economics- on reciprocity, the impact of political considera— n education is worth noting. The history of the People's Republic of China began 11y on 1 October 1949, when Mao proclaimed control mainland for the Chinese Communist Party. The tedly rapid Kuomintang (or Nationalist Party) a left the Communists with the immediate problem rolling and absorbing large numbers of non—Communist :atic administrators and military personnel. In E the need to conquer a remnant Kuomintang military 3 perhaps a million, the Communists enjoyed a of goodwill, support, and tolerance from the ry population (including the academic community). rese Communists had to consolidate nation—wide with but a small number of politically—reliable 96 re. Along with the military, students were used to solidate the party's control over the masses in the -y months of the new regime. Educational institutions a to be used as long—term mechanisms of control. Within four months of the takeover several nations gnized the People's Government as the sole official ority, though it was not until October 1950 that unist forces advanced into Tibet to complete the 'cation of China. The years 1949-1952 were devoted to lidating Communist power over the expanses and the 'tudes of China through reorientation and reorganization 1e forces of social control, including the school am. Since Communist power rested on peasant support, .and question was central to consolidating control. rg the years of bitter struggle before 1949, Mac :ated land redistribution among the peasants so as to ,popular support for the rural areas for the embattled eleaguered Communist party. On 30 June 1950 the Land m Act was passed, officially signalling the nation—wide tribution of land among the peasantry.’ Out of the 1952 land issue developed a movement against the land- . Schools suspended classes to permit students to Fe in the struggle against landlords—~a front—line olitics experience. In 1951-1952 landlords ion for ublicly criticized, ridiculed, tried, and occasionally death. Elimination of the landlord class, which had 97 ted the peasants for centuries, was a major step in ying the old society and in building the new Chinese system. Nineteen fifty-two was a year for regimentation. new regime proceeded to change the boundaries of institutions, policies outlining party-government ations were proclaimed. The Three—Anti Campaign st corruption, waste, and bureaucracy) and the ti Campaign (against bribery, embezzlement, tax h, and theft of state property and of state economic 5) established the parameters of what the new regime 3 be unacceptable behavior. These movements were E the trend of promoting effective government ration and greater party control of social institu- rnd of the country. Two major domestic events focused on the policy intellectuals. In May 1956, Lu Tingvyi, chief of paganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and chief party spokesman on onal policy, made the important "Let All Flowers ogether, Let Diverse Schools of Thought Contend" Intellectuals were invited to air their discontent :riticize lesser party—government policies and 31. The persuasive tactic would hopefully encourage Ltuals to support the regime and to contribute their e for the enrichment of China. The intellectuals first hesitant to accept such an invitation, fearing 98 ossible consequences. After Mao renewed the "Hundred Es" pronouncement later in 1957, the intellectuals aded with vigor. The momentum of their criticism helmed and threatened the Communist leadership, for rtellectuals demanded freedom of expression and ;ed the party's power monopoly. The regime reacted decisively by launching an ightist Movement (or Rectification Campaign) on 22 957. The failure to ideologically re—educate and political, literary, academic, and cultural intel— ls (including students) was evident by their out- criticism of basic party—government policies and ship. Bourgeois values and attitudes were still , requiring strong counter-measures. Many Lsts" were removed from their positions and sent to 1ntryside. They became known as Xiafang (Hsia-fang) ectuals, that is, those intellectuals who were ferred downward" to either labor camps or rural :s for further thought remolding and ideological g. Mao felt the causes of discontent were rooted in ized bureaucratic control, which had fostered is thinking and the development of elites. While to counter the demands for liberalism and the ills aucratic administration, Mao instituted a more alized governance system--the communes. Greater ice was given to ideological reliability than to 99 nnical competency. During the years 1949-1957 stress placed on being "expert"; in the following period 58-1960) this shifted to being "red." eign Issues In an increasingly interdependent world, the nature he relationships between national-cultural super- nate systems affects the functioning of subordinate ems. Chinese education, for example, was affected by ng's attitudes toward the Soviet Union, the Korean War, the United States. The day after the People's Republic of China was Jurated, the Soviet Union recognized the Peking goVern— The Sino—Soviet relationship that developed (and : deteriorated) had a tremendous influence on China and :se educational development. Chinese technicians went e Soviet Union for specialized training; students both countries were exchanged; Soviet and Chinese rs visited each other's country for talks. Soviet ssors and educational materials, military advisors quipment, and industrial experts and machinery came Russia to assist China in practically every sphere of 3pment. To further demonstrate good faith, the USSR Eerred to China Japanese properties the Soviet Army in Manchuria after World War Two, and Moscow provided p with financial credits to help the industrializa— pfforts. Chinese students were continually reminded : friendship between China and the Soviet Union. 100 On 25 June 1950, North Korean troops invaded South beginning the Korean War. Four months later (25 :r), the Communist Chinese Volunteers (many of whom ewly-recruited students) entered the war in support 'th Korea and in defense of the territorial integrity ,na. The Chinese involvement, coming so soon after _keover, produced much personal and economic hardship na. To rally popular support, the government launched ti—America, Aid—Korea Campaign, which extended into hools. On 27 July 1953, representatives of the United s, the Korean People's Army, and the Chinese People's eers signed an armistice agreement at Panmunjom. Though the Sino—Soviet friendship was characteristic 1949—1957 period, tensions that eventually under~ this relationship began early in the period. Stalin 1 3 March 1953, and Sine—Soviet relations were never me again. Although the First Five—Year Plan was a of strong Soviet influence in China, events in -—de—Stalinization and the policy of co-existence re West——signaled the beginning of the Sino—Soviet which did not take on serious proportions for (years. In June 1957, General Lung Yun of the National Committee denounced the Soviet Union for removing dustrial equipment from Chinese territory (Manchuria) he Second World War and for permitting China alone to its Korean War expenses. As charges and 101 :r-charges increased Sine-Soviet tensions, the Chinese e increasingly isolated internationally. The Chinese turning inward for the solutions to their problems, ing that neither assistance nor sympathy could be among the nations of the world. Inputs to the Educational System Approaching Chinese education from a systems is perspective requires an examination of the inputs— s-outputs of the subordinate system. Specifically, eggs to the education system, the educational s that occurs within schools, and the institutional s are the focus of the systems model perspective to 3 education. The politico-economic milieu of the rdinate system of China within which subordinate ; functioned was examined briefly earlier in this But what of the educational system inputs that : educationists had to orchestrate in order to : the desired outputs? By examining the interactions ubordinate systems, it becomes apparent that the ies of the sub—systems often overlap. Many of the nputs, such as the aims of education and budgetary ions, were and are determined by political considera— id not by pedagogical reasoning. The function of :ational system was determined by other social :ions, namely the government and the party. 102 of Education Since the party had full control of the educational n, political leaders could direct school activities ;tablish educational aims. The direction of the educational system was determined by political on and provided for in the 1949 Common Program and . 1954 State Constitution, which included the ing: Articles of the Common Program Relating to Education ticle 41: The culture and education of the People's Republic of China are new democratic, that is, national, scientific and popular. The main tasks of the cultural and educational work of the People's Government shall be the raising of the cultural level of the people, training of person- nel for national construction work, liquidating of feudal, compradore, Fascist ideology and developing of the ideology of serving the people. ticle 42: Love for the fatherland and the people, love of labor, love of science and the care for public property shall be promoted as the public spirit of all nationals of the People's Republic of China. icle 43: Efforts shall be made to develop the natural sciences to place them at the service of industrial, agricultural and national defence construction. Scientific discoveries and investions shall be encouraged and rewarded and scientific knowledge shall be popularized. 'cle 44: The application of a scientific historical viewpoint to the study and interpretation of history, economics, politics, culture and inter— national affairs shall be promoted. Outstanding works of social science shall be encouraged and rewarded. cle 46: The method of education of the People's Republic of China is the unity of theory and practice. The People's Government shall reform 103 the old educational system, subjectematter and teaching methods systematically, according to plan. ticle 47: In order to meet the widespread needs of revolutionary work and national construction work, universal education shall be carried out, middle and higher education shall be strengthened, technical education shall be stressed, the education of workers during their spare time and education of cadres who are at their posts shall be strengthened, and revolutionary politi- cal education shall be accorded to young intel- lectuals and old-styled intellectuals in a planned and systematic manner. a other articles of Section V (Cultural and Educa- >nal Policy) of the Common Program deal with the Le of literature and art (Art. 45), Sports, health, 1 medical work (Art. 48), and news reporting (Art. Articles of the 1954 Constitution Relating to Education :icle 94: Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to education. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the state establishes and gradually extends the various types of schools and other cultural and educational institutions. The state pays special attention to the physical and mental development of young people. icle 95. The People' 5 Republic of China safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation, and other cultural pursuits. The state encourages and assists creative work in science, education, literature, art, and other cultural pursuits. The formal school system was to teach as many as possible to be literate and numerate, to relate rtance of working with one's hands and the dignity , to develop basic agricultural and industrial hat were immediately applicable outside the to promote nationalism and political consciousness, each the fundamentals of communism and the importance he Youth Movement, and to instill responsibility and a of duty to the state. In short, the entire school system was to be inated and integrated with the political and economic s of national reconstruction. Formal schooling in was a deliberately created institutional sub—system assing on and modifying the culture of the larger . To ensure that graduates (institutional outputs) educated in the values of the superordinate system rained to fill manpower needs of other subordinate éms, the aims of the school were dictated by and closely :ored by the Communist party. rnal Demands Sociologists have long maintained that varying mstances within a social system make demands on its vnent institutions that either strain or interrupt the ‘nal institutional process. In China, as elsewhere, ls were often called upon to assist in meeting the enges to the social system or to help in the modifi— of its institutions' boundaries. Political elements al to the educational system made demands upon the s requiring students to participate in numerous nts and campaigns. Such external demands are herein ered to be inputs to the educational system. The ing paragraphs focus on four examples of external 105 rnds made on Chinese formal education that caused huption of its internal process. During 1949 secondary (or middle) school students recruited for Communist military and civilian service. ents joined the Service Corps and went with the 1e's Liberation Army (PLA) to South China to serve new cause by working with the people and convincing to aid and accept the Communists. Once the liberation he mainland was relative complete, students returned :hool. During the Korean War, secondary school students again recruited for military service. The impact of car on the formal educational system was serious, for Le schools became recruitment centers for "volunteers" -ght American imperialism. Potential university candi— 5 going off to war diminished the secondary school .ation qualified for higher education. One can only .se that the best academic students, in fact, went on e university and the less qualified students were the who went to war. Following the Korean War a reaction set in against ontinuing political pressure for students to engage t-of—school activities. "Directives published in the ng People's Daily, official organ of the Chinese Commu- party's Central Committee, [called] for a sharp dimuni‘ in the amount of social and political work the students rofessors must do outside of schools and demanded 106 anewed emphasis on 'fulfilment of school education as primary task.'"1 Party cadre had pressured students teachers into taking part in time-consuming political social activities, which took them away from their lemic duties. The People's Daily called for a hngthening of schools through student commitment to .r programs, ending the extracurricular work demands. ents were admonished to "learn, learn, and learn again" rder to help build a new Chinese state. Teachers and professors came under pressure from as outside the school. From 1949 to 1951, non— unist intellectuals (that is, reactionaries) were rated if they did not cause any trouble; it was believed could be remolded ideologically. Beginning in late , however, intellectuals were subjected to continuous Lcism and dialectical struggle. In the autumn of 1951 Ideological Reform movement started, as "a many-sided 3k upon intellectual freedom and integrity of China's 2 Professors became the targets of mic institutions." k, were publicly denounced, and sometimes removed their academic posts. School teachers and university professors were :ted to ideological remolding in order that they too 1New York Times, 27 August 1951, p. 2. 2A. Doad Barnett, Communist China: The Early 1949-55 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, pp. 125—126. 107 ve in the Communist leadership and pass this faith their students. Universities were converted into trination centers and were destroyed as the hub of endent thought. It was during this period that al revolutionary universities (such as the North People's Revolutionary University in Peking and the China University of Political Science and Military as in Shanghai) were developed to re-educate intel- 118 (including teachers, administrators, and profes— Iho were trained in the Kuomintang era) and to :rinate candidates for jobs in the new regime.3 If ers of children were to be good teachers, they also the good Marxists. And that required ideological ing, purifying their thoughts, studying the new cal theory, and copying the Soviet educational system. A major policy shift occurred in 1956-1957 with the 1 Flowers Campaign and its aftermath. The party 1 from a policy of strictly enforced intellectual >xy to one of (temporary) relaxation of such controls rermit and encourage free speech and limited criti— f the government and its program. To permit "divergent schools of thought to contend" China's development might advance in many fields, 3Richard Arens, "Education in Communist China from , The Period of Policy Formation," Journal of East Studies 5, no. 3 (July 1956): 322; and T eo ore .en, Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals ng: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 17—18. 108 a Chinese leaders proclaimed that “if there is only one mer in bloom, no matter how good the flower may be, ([will] not lead to prosperity."4 Rapid progress le result only from free competition of ideas, from ‘ilizing all forces, from learning from one another, (from strength through unity. This ideological campaign had an impact on the cational front. Students voiced their complaints about educational authorities, the shortcomings of the school tem, and the party. University students complained of strain they suffered from having to study too many jects too intensely. Students also criticized the poor Lity instruction they were receiving. Teachers in turn >1ained of poor quality facilities and interference by :y cadre untrained in educational concerns. The deluge of criticism resulting from the Hundred ers Campaign was so severe that the reaction of the y was swift and decisive. In late June 1957, the y launched the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957—1958), stating a hard—line policy. The main targets of the red Flowers backlash were educational, cultural, rary, political, and academic critics of the government the party. Many in these circles were not party 4Lu Ting—yi, "Let All Flowers Bloom Together, Let rse Schools of Thought Contend,“ in Stewart Fraser, Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First 33 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965): 29. 109 here, some were; many were removed from their posts, e were sent to labor camps.5 The party decreed that educators were to engage in ual labor in order to get closer to the laboring Ses. Political indoctrination was further emphasized school curricula in an effort to overpower bourgeois iking with the correctness of Communist ideology. A :—study, part—work curriculum was introduced into the ilar schools and universities in a move to unite theory 1 practice, mental labor with physical labor, education r production. Definite work programs were incorporated {school curricula designed to increase industrial and cultural production along with training more skilled ers. This was to be the character of formal education mg the Period of the Three Red Flags. Budget The designation of financial resources, as an output re subordinate system (the treasury), represents a ficant input to other subordinate systems (the ary, the government bureaucracy, capital investments, tion, etc.). The amount of money allocated by the al Government to budgetary categories and the percent- of the total allocation across the categories reflect nportance leaders place on the various sectors. 5Chiu—sam Tsang, Sociepy, Schools, and Progress in (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), PP- 2254226. 110 The 1950 state budget, presented at the end of 1949, .d an expenditure structure wherein the military received .8 per cent of the allocated funds, administration ceived 21.4 per cent, and culture-education—public alth only 4.1 per cent.6 The army was actively subduing e remaining Kuomintang forces, while administration forts focused on consolidating the power of the new yime. The more immediate task was establishing nation- 1e government authority to ensure control, not educating 5 people. The development of culture and education was i'less important during the first year than was securing 7m control for the future of the Communist regime through itary and administrative measures. After two years of economic strain caused by the ean War, the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan iuced a more optimistic economic outlook. The following Les (4-1 and 4—2) show the amount spent and the alloca- r percentages on the various categories for the entire .0d of the First Five«Year Plan. Although education did receive the funding that economic construction or onal defense and administration did, it was the third category. The relative position of education remained 1y consistent. Considering the Communists' goal of rnization, territorial defense, and administrative 6E. F. Szczepanik, "Four Years of Fiscal Policy in Jnist China," in E. Stuart Kirby, ed., Contem orar a, 6 vols. to date (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 5, 1956), l: 76. 111 control, it is understandable that the first two categories eceived priority. Table 4—1. Expenditures in Millions of Yuan Budgetary Items 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Economic Construction 8,650 12,360 13,760 15,910 13,720 Iducation/Cultural/ Social Services 3,360 3,460 3,190 4,590 4,840 Iational Defence & Administration 7,800 7,970 8,660 8,780 7,960 epayment of Loans, etc. 1,680 840 1,120 1,290 1,610 eserve --— -—— -—— --— 660 om. 21,490 24,630 26,730 30,570 28,790 Table 4—2. Summary of Expenditures, 1953-1957 Percentage Millions idgetary Items of Budget of Yuan onomic Construction 48.7 64,400 ucation/Culture/Social Services 14.7 19,440 tional Defence & Administration 31.1 41,170 payment of Loans and Other 5.5 7,200 TAL 100.0 132,210 urce: For Tables 4—1 and 4—2, from Wang Tze—ying, "Financing the Five-Year Plan,“ People's China 20 (16 October 1957): 13-14. 112 The budgetary control of education—culture-social arvices is of prime concern. Most official Communist iblications group these three state functions together, rthout designating the financial allocations between them. £231 includes state pensions and retirement programs, .inics and medical services, and other forms of social 1fare. Cultural focuses on the cinema, radio, newspapers d magazines, opera, sports, museums, libraries, art, terature, parades, etc. Educational includes full-time ools, spare—time schools, winter schools, adult literacy sses, and vocational and general education within the rmal school structure. Table 4-3 presents state expenditure data (amounts 1 percentages) across all categories for the period ier consideration (1950—1957). Table 4-4 details both * amounts spent and the allocation percentages of various , cational expenditures for the same period. Process Within the Educational System Educational process as defined here includes the ucture of the formal schools, official pronouncements cting education, the distinguishing characteristics of erent kinds and levels of schools, and the numbers of ents in the various formal educational programs. 113 .emrmm .em .ioeme .mmmss mommsmsoq smfiouom umcwxomv mummy uownw s08 ..mEoo .scousm Hsuaumflumpm muoum Eoum .quHSOm m.m omm.a w.b onm.m o.mH oam.m o.mH ovmev v.Hm oam.va omo.mm hmma N.v omN.H b.m omm.m 0.0m omaew o.mH oom.v H.Nm oam.ma ommeom mmma m.¢ omm.H o.m omH.m H.em oom.m m.HH oma.m H.Hm omn.ma omm.wm mmmH v.m owm b.m omaem m.mm oam.m H.va omv.m N.om omm.NH omm.¢m vmma m.h owm.H m.m oma.m «.mm omm.m h.mH omm.m m.ov omm.m omv.am mmmH h.v own m.oa omn.H o.mm onm.v m.MH omm.m «.mw omm.n omn.ma Nmma o.N oem n.va omh.H m.me omo.m m.HH ovm.a m.mN oam.m oom.HH Hmma m.m omH m.ma oamea m.Hv ommem H.HH omn m.mm ownea OHm.w omma a ussosa w 0.565 a 0595. a £595.. a 5:595. musuflpsmoxm Hosso sowpoHPmflsHEU4 mosmmon Hmcowumospm EOHuUSmeGOU Hopoa ucoesuo>ow HosOHpcz Houspaso DAEocoom awauom ounfiwnu HQnH UQM CMDN 114 .m.s as u sees mem.~ "msoz .hHrmH .mm .anmH .c0wpmpssom wosowOm stofismz ".U.Q .soumcflnmmzv mcfloo uchsEEoo as soflumosom cam Mozomsmz Hmsofiwmomoum .mcmoauo .d ooq Scum "mOHDOm rrr o.m N.H N.H b.m H.N III III pompsm .pm mo “Gounod III we mm mm Hm em III III can» mo msoaaaflz mmmHDoo “HUpd .mmmmmao momuopfiq .mmwpsem assesses .maooaom weflurohcdm "Hoopo rrr w.om m.mm m.vm m.vm m.vv w.mw Irr uwmtsm .pm mo “Gounod III- va mew mew mmm com com rrr smsw mo mSOHHHHz Amoflummusz w mswuncmHGUCHmv soflumoopm mnmfiwum rll m.om «.mm e.mm v.mm H.mm m.nH III pompsm .pm mo useonwm rrr mwo.H Ham men mmh vmm ova rrr snow mo chAHHHz coaumospm mumpcooom m.NN m.mm h.mm m.vm m.mm m.mH o.vH III pompsm .pm mo unwosom hmw 5mm mmm mme mmv mom vHH III snow mo mGOHHHHz seapo056m Honmflm 0.0H m.m m.m m.b m.m n.m m.w III ummcsm oumum mo unmouom moa.m muo.m Hon.a mmmea Nmm.H MNH.H mam rrr snow mo :OHHHfiz uwmpsm soflumospm Assam Mo mcoflaaflzv omo.mm memeom omm.mm Nmmevm mmv.HN hmh.ma Nom.HH mom.o pompsm upmum Hmuoe hmma wmmH mmmH vmmH mmma NmmH HmmH ommH waw\mE®uH #wmwsm éfter the Takeover The Kuomintang collapsed sooner than the Communists had expected, catching the new rulers without any compre— hensive plans for taking over the reins of power or any blueprint for a nation—wide educational system. Although the Communists had demonstrated ingenuity in their educa— tional efforts in the blockaded Border Regions of North China, they did not encounter the complex problems of a national educational system until they took power in late 1949.7 Even though they might have been initially unpre- pared for assuming the responsibility for the educational subordinate system, within two years of the takeover several educational conferences were held and new school programs were instituted. The Communists martialed their educational forces {uickly and took immediate action to reshape the nation-wide :chool system to serve their purposes. For example, during :he last three months of 1949 the new Chinese leaders held W0 important conferences in an attempt to form a national ducational policy: the North China Higher Education 8 ommittee decided to introduce new, compulsory, politically— riented courses into the curriculum, and the First National H 7K. E. Priestley, "Education in the People's apublic of China: Beginnings," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Egpation and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International :udies Group, 19697, pp. 49‘50. 88. B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policy in China," ngic Affairs 23, no. 1 (March 1950): 26. rtional Work Conference9 stressed the importance of .tion in meeting national needs. Steps were taken to '01 higher education on a national basis: all institu— of higher education were placed under the centralized 01 of the Ministry of Education. These first conferences signaled the beginning of educational system for China. Not only would the it change, but so would the boundaries of the educa- L subordinate system. The First All—China Higher tion Conference10 in June—July 1950 proclaimed that Esity studies were to be closely coordinated with ral agricultural and industrial needs. Curricular s reflected the educational pronouncements of the . Program. All academics were to serve the people and problems. Education for education's sake was no an acceptable academic philosophy. Education for immediate political needs was embodied People's Universities and the short-lived Revolu— y Universities (these last institutions began dis— ing in 1951). These institutions not only lessened assure on the long—established, more academic sities to change immediately, but they also provided :es who served as government functionaries to help 9Priestly, "Education in the People's Republic of I C I" p. 54. 10Ibid., p. 70; and "Resolutions of the First .1 Conference on Higher Education," in Stewart Fraser, .inese Communist Education (Nashville: Vanderbilt ity Press, 1965), pp. 92-97. 117 hild support among the people in order to capitalize on Llitary victories and consolidate nation-wide control for re Communists. The People's Universities admitted only tudents with at least three years' revolutionary experience; re revolutionary universities had no entrance requirements, rt the curriculum focused on 3—6 month intensive political etruction. The unmistaken worker-peasant class character "the students revealed that contributions to the revolu- ‘on were more important in student selection than was rmal academic ability. Revolutionary fervor and political ientation were to compensate for a less—than—adequate holarly preparation. Graduates were employed in land form, tax collection, and other political work. Though e quality of education had to have been in question, the in concern of these institutions was simply to produce, the shortest time possible, reasonably loyal and aimally competent people to man the lower levels of the ate machinery during the first years of the new regime. a Decree The haphazard, unsystematic reorganization of educa— rn ended on 1 October 1951 when the Government Adminis— :tive Council issued a decree-—Decisions Concerning the ’orm of the Educational System——that defined and coordi— ed in greater detail the entire educational system of ha. The decree reaffirmed and synchronized the previous years' educational efforts. The reformed (pre—1949) 118 :chools and the newly—created (post-1949) schools were .ntegrated. This comprehensive reorganization was an daborate multi-track structure that coordinated educa— ional efforts to provide short—term training for present— ay needs and also gave attention to better educational tandards for long-range development. (See Figure 4-1.) Pre—school nurseries and kindergartens were itiated, allowing more mothers freedom to work in fganized state development projects. The previous ‘ementary school structure of four years primary and two ears upper primary was unified into one consolidated Lve—year course; this experiment lasted for two years, Fter which time it was aborted and elementary education eturned to the previous two-part, six-year format. Promotion to secondary level, both regular and cational, was by examination and open to all who passed. xaminations, as in other social systems, came to be ad to control the flow of students through the educa— Dnal system.) Both secondary- and higher—technical 1cation was to be a major characteristic of the new rcational system, and students were pressured to special— rearly and take practical courses that could contribute national construction. The decree also had an impact on higher education. versity departments were reorganized and regrouped for are balanced higher education specialization program. curriculum and methodology of every college and 119 Research Institutes 5 I 4 3 Universities, Institutes, and 2 Colle es 1 Technicums g 3 . . era . 6 Senior Vocational Senior g 5 Middle Middle Schools §::::;term Spare—time r 4 School (Polytechnic, Mid. Sch. ‘W-E‘TI Peasant . 3 Junior Normal, Middle Junior 2 Middle ' Medical, School Spare—time p 1 School ; Others) Mid. School 2 Short—term Spare-time . Worker- Primary 3 Primary SChOOl Peasant Schools 1 Primary Sch. Nurseries and Kindergartens e :lass pure 4-1. The Chinese Communist School System, 1951. rrce: Liu Shih, "China's New Educational System," People's China 4, no. 11 (1 December 1951): 6. versity department were prescribed in complete detail. dent wastage was reduced by disallowing transfers to er departments within the university once one was Lstered. The decree established firm age limits for each :1 of the formal school system up to higher education, firm time limits for specialized schools and higher ational institutions. Temporal limits were placed on 120 tudents to ensure maximum usage of scarce educational BSOUI‘CGS . rimary and General Secondary Education Between 1949 and 1953 there was an official effort > expand primary and secondary education enrollments. rring this period the number of primary schools increased Iper cent, and the number of primary school students creased by 100 per cent.11 Expansion of elementary ucation was relatively inexpensive. Middle schools were re expensive, however, and their growth failed to keep ce with the primary—level expansion. Consequently, a all percentage of the elementary school graduates, at at, were able to attend junior middle school. However impressive the growth statistics in Table 5 may be, close examination of these data reveal an :ernally uncoordinaated growth pattern. The inability the secondary—level institutions to accommodate most er-level graduates was a potentially explosive situation. primary-school graduates with hopes of continuing their cation could not be admitted to junior middle.school unless assigned specific tasks, they could have become alitically disruptive element. 11China News Analysis, no. 46, 6 August 1954, p. 3. 121 cos msuousH .msouw mmprWMSWMm ow =.Hw30msmz OHMHDGOAUm p .Hmmmum . . "msom msomv one mtsmmsona CH no CH Ewwsssfioo so coflumospme .Hhmrmwm cam :oHumospm ..tm .msmmauo .m own so .QQ . Hm "mousom mesaammmmrmmrrrrrrrr.rrrrhrrhrrrrrrrrrrhrrrr mpcmmsone sH omrmmmfi mmrwmmH mmrhmma hmrmmma mmrmmmfl mmlvmma vmrmmma mmermH mmermH Hmromma omrmvmfi mvrwvmfl Hows --- ooo.ees --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ooe.om . MHN omm o.o~m rrl omHH owns or: oov.wm oow.mm 000 com . mama own owmv mmw.wH mnm.vm ooo.mh oooeaev HmH wmv o omm . . . ooo.wm ooo.moe ova hmm w.mmm mama H.mmm m mmHv pom NH vmv mm oooemw oco.mmm vpa H.wam mam mmm mmm ommm 5mm NH mNH mm ooo.mm ooo.mmm mmm oom mom mmm o.mnw mon va.oH wameam . . ooo.hw ooo.NHN mmH v.mmm mwm vww m.mmm m Hth mmH.oa vow Hm oooemw ooo.HmH mHH v.0mm N.m¢m vmv m.omm m.om~m mem.m ooa.Hm ooo.mm oooemma mm m.NmH m.mHN HNN «.vwa. h.mmma Nvm.m emH.mv ooo.ma ooo.sma em m.sm «.mma «mm mmm sees ~mm.e emm.w~ ooo.mH coo.haa mp H.hh n.HmH mam N.hom m.Hmm mmm.m Hmm.vm ooo.HN rrr Nb III III 0.0mm III III 5mm.m rrl mwum psofi rsmwww .oo> Hmfihoz IDMMWM Howcwm “Cacao IDMMWM IHHWWMW Ispmuo IHHousm Umo ucwfiaaousm mo usoEHHossm Gowfimoscm Honmwm mumpfioowm prHHMHowmn .llhllldlllhlhllllllllr “RainwaJD: n11wr1)lII:’ 122 By 1953 the drive for universal elementary education ad slowed. Rather than expand educational facilities, the overnment chose to discourage young people and their parents tom expecting education beyond basic literacy and numeracy. 1953-1954 propaganda campaign was designed to convince 3th parents and students of the worth of productive labor 7er continued schooling. Those already graduated were rcouraged to move into industry and agriculture, and dis— >uraged from expecting additional formal education. The rrpose of education was not to prepare students for further :hooling, but was to prepare them for contributing to the onomic and political construction of China. The Central Government was not in the financial sition at the start of the First Five-Year Plan to continue pporting such rapid enrollment growth rates as had curred during the first years. The demands of indus— ialization, the major foous of the First Five-Year Plan, strained China's financial resources designated for ication. By 1954 many schools were closed, many village 10015 were no longer government supported, and many rools continued to function with double and triple shifts, :ger classes, and night sessions. Schools suffered from 'onic shortages of desks and textbooks, inadequate plants istaffs, and low educational standards. The Ministry of Education permitted the re—estab— hment of private schools in 1954, after having eliminated 123 2 private educational sector in 1952. Factories, unions, -mers, and local governments were encouraged to establish 1r own schools. Out of this movement grew the gig pan ools (operated by the people), which were controlled by hgigg education bureaus, were run by the peasantvworker ups, were self-supporting, and required students to work. se schools were a forerunner to the formal school system t evolved during the Period of the Three Red Flags. Rural primary education was helped greatly by being ked with the rapid growth of agricultural cooperatives L955-1956, for the government gave the cooperatives the ponsibility of establishing and supporting rural primary >ols. The leaders felt that the agricultural cooperative ement could never be successful without a minimally rrate rural populace. There were still few secondary schools of any kind 'ural areas by 1957; most middle schools were concentrated mban centers. The Ministry of Education instituted an riment called "hat-wearing" schools, that is, junior 1e schools were added (or placed on top, like a hat) to cted rural primary schools. This permitted students to nd middle school in some rural areas and still be on to assist with farm chores. These schools were cheaper both parents and state: parents did not have to send r children to school in distant urban centers and lose r labor on the farm; the state did not have to build 124 ntirely new middle school plants. "Hat-wearing" schools llowed for easier dispersal of post-elementary education. After the Hundred Flowers and Rectification Cam— aigns, the government reaffirmed its control over schools nd took steps to change radically the nature of education n China. (See the Period of the Three Red Flags.) Drker-Peasant Middle Schools Growing out of the concern for increased education as the establishment in 1950 of the three—year, short—term .ddle school, a unique feature of the 1949—1957 period. re usual six-year middle school course for youngsters was rduced to a three—year middle school for adults. The party :lected students (1) of worker—peasant backgrounds, (2) tween 18 and 35 years of age, (3) with academic promise, ) with the correct political perspective, and (5) with an ementary school education. Many students found the rapid ce of academic study difficult. The curriculum emphasized scialized subjects that had immediate utility in industry agriculture. The aim of this program was to prepare graduates 7 university. In 1953 the first graduating class went on :her to a Chinese institution of higher learning or to 'ther study in the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1953, such schools were established, with some 20,000 students.12 M“— lzDaily News R_elease, no. 1381, 23 July 1953, p. 149. 125 y mid—1954 there were 87 workervpeasant middle schools with 4000 graduates that summer) and 54,000 students in re fall, half of whom were new students.13 In spite of the rapid growth of the worker-peasant dele schools, there was not much optimism among Chinese ducationists as to the future of these schools. In elative terms, their impact could have been only minimal. rt much was heard about these schools after the First .ve-Year Plan, for a 1955 directive ordered their gradual nversion into ordinary high schools. condary Vocational Education Education is to serve the needs of China (the perordinate system) and one of the more fundamental needs, an as now, iS industrialization. With Peking's involve- It in the Korean War, the more pragmatic, specialized, art—term education won favor over the longer liberal arts operation. By the time the First FiveeYear Plan got under 3 however, a longer-term specialized, vocational educa- m was a central concern to the planners of China's elopment. In 1950 there were 507 technical secondary schools, 80 per cent of the middle schools were of the ordinary e, that is, for all—round education with great emphasis golitical studies, current events, and science. The 76 13Daily News Release, no. 1731, 8 September 1954, 126 'dinary middle (or secondary) school was designed to repare students for higher education. In July 1951 the Minister of Education revealed ans to increase the number of intermediate technical l4 hools and to reorganize the curriculum. This three— ar plan was to overhaul, totally, secondary technical aining facilities in order to prepare larger numbers of termediate-grade technicians. By 1954 there were 650 condary technical schools offering 157 specializations. These secondary technical schools were developed to a coordinated system wherein curricular offerings were signed to meet national construction needs. These special :ational middle schools included polytechnics, preparatory iical schools, trade schools, and normal schools. Grad- tes were to contribute their technical and managerial >ertise to the army, industry, public health, teaching, Central administrative control was to promote better 2 of all facilities and of existing manpower. Old ondary technical schools were regrouped and new ones e built. All specialized in well-defined fields. This gram in technical knowledge and practical training tured close cooperation among the staff. The resulting lective atmosphere facilitated joint instructional 14"Trends in Chinese Education," The World Today 7, 11 (November 1951): 483. 127 ctivities and mutual staff assistance by pooling knowledge nd expertise. Because the Chinese leaders recognized that formal cational education was an integral part of the First 've-Year Plan, secondary technical education was at state pense after the fall of 1952. Students received govern— nt subsidies. Graduates either went to work for immediate turn on the educational investment, or went on to higher schnical education for a more long-term and higher return rvestment.15 One problem facing vocational educational training rChina was that, at best, only one per cent of the imary school students were receiving a secondary voca- onal education.16 Certainly the educational direction was propriate, but the magnitude of the effort was insufficient meet China's needs. (See Table 4—5.) I Vocational education reached an important juncture 1957. Throughout the-Five—Year Plan the number of dents with basic middle-level technical skills had creased, yet the vocational sub—system suffered frOm a >rtage of qualified teachers (many had to be drawn away am their posts in industry) and from low—level academic 15Tsang Chao-lun, "Training Technicians for Indus- .alization," People's China 8 (16 April 1954): 11-13. 16R. F. Simpson, “The Development of Education in nland China," Phi Delta Kappan 39, no. 3 (December 7): 89. 128 :andards (when instruction was left to unqualified :achers). Actions taken the next year (1958) struck at the ry core of China's vocational education philosophy. gher Education One key to China's industrialization was the nUmber 3 quality of higher education graduates that contributed gh-level technical and managerial expertise to the relopment effort. Early reforms in higher education Elected political and economic necessities of national :overy and power consolidation. These changes included :ensive politico-ideological education, increased rhnical specialization, and a uniform governance system 'centralized control. In 1952 the Ministry of Higher Education was created the entire post—secondary education system was subse— ntly reorganized, showing strong Soviet influence. Old versities were split up to destroy their identity; versity departments were consolidated to eliminate dupli— ion and to concentrate resources. The number of compre- sive universities (that is, institutions teaching arts, snities, and sciences and offering a more theoretical sation to prospective professors and researchers) was Iced; the 65 universities in 1950 were reduced to only >y 1953. Emphasis was placed on developing the quality ‘number of specialized technical institutes: polytechnics, 129 >no-technical institutes, specialized colleges, etc. Most rstitutions concentrated on a particular field or discip- ne, developing into specialized centers of high standing. By 1953 higher educationists were more concerned th the quality of education than with the quantity of udents being educated. Higher education was, in the main, r students with academic ability (bourgeoisie) and not a proletariat who lacked adequate preparation. A nation— ie "unified enrollment plan“ of annual quotas that :luded nearly all higher educational institutions was in oration by the summer of 1953. The Ministries of Education I Higher Education decided how many freshmen were to be ritted and what they would study, to ensure fulfillment the state plan. (Many students resented having their eers controlled by the state.) To study at a university institute meant to study a detailed, pre—planned course, h definite time constraints, a standardized content, and a uniform method. Students received a highly—specialized hnical training in particular skills needed by the Lonal development plans. Many students spent their ners working at factories, farms, construction sites, government offices. More students were directed to 1y science, engineering, medicine, and education, and er to study fine arts, political science, or law. (See he 4-6.) Throughout this period higher education experienced problems. Secondary—school graduates were not 130 .ogm .m .Ammma .wmoum mafiwum>fisb Hamm soumm ".b .2 .mmsmuo Susomv hme rmvma osmom caumoaon.mafi ”mambo messsfioo .mosoamz .2 soon p cm mGMB .m .m kumm "mOHsOm e.s~m o.ooa eoe.eme o.ooe ooo.mm~ o.ooe oom.msm asses m.ms e.e oom.m m.H oom.m e.o oos.m mesa o.mm~ m.em ooo.mm m.e~ eoe.oe o.e~ ooe.oma masseuse m.oma s.e oee.om e.» ooe.em e.m oem.mm mesa Hayseed e.mmm m.e ooa.s~ m.e oom.me o.e eoe.mm mosseom muse s.eeH.H m.e eoe.m o.H ese.” H.H oee.e monuments Hsoemsne e.H- e.~e oom.em e.m ooe.em p.0H ooe.em spasms m.~em H.m oom.m s.a oom.e o.~ ooe.eH oosmnom Hmonnaaoe m.em m.m oos.ma e.m oom.mm o.m ooe.eH mossosoos w wosmcfim >.oe~ e.m oom.sm m.e ooe.mH , 5.5 oom.ae ssumwuoe s mnsuasoflumd m.mem m.ee eoe.hsa m.mm oom.em m.mm ooe.eam msnsoonemsm mmmH coaumo hmma GM soaumo powhmm sOHumo COHHom coauoo Hw>o oamamwwao Hoonom rflwflwmmao HchIm>flm IHMHmmMHo Hmohlm>flm Iflwflmwmau Amos as a as we a we» as so a one as commuosH wuswcsum mmumspmuw msfluwusm w mo .02 mo .02 muswbsum Ho :07... "F 131 equately prepared to undertake further study at higher vels. And the quality of higher—education graduates was adequate to meet state needs. The performance of students all levels fell short of expectations. Professors were properly placed in unsuitable positions, they complained too much time required for meetings and administrative ties, and of low pay, shortened vacations, and overwork. iversities operated under the handicap of widespread artages: reference books, educational materials and lipment, adequate plant facilities, and qualified assis— rts, professors, and educational administrators. Many of the problems which festered quietly for so rg, finally emerged in newspapers and journals by 1955. are were charges that the educational sector of the First e—Year Plan was retarded and performance was below ectations. Students were criticized for having poor siques, questionable politics, and inferior knowledge. se charges prompted new admissions criteria: increased ndards of physical fitness, rigorous political affilia— 35, better entrance examination scores, and more attention )roper social-class background. Once again the Central Government relaxed its rigid :ralized control over higher education in 1955-1956, wing administrators of higher educational institutions independence and initiative, giving professors fewer nistrative duties, and putting less pressure on students. 132 At the close of the period (1957) the Communists re concerned with the political calibre and family origin higher-level students. Academic standards gave way to litical considerations. The intellectual atmosphere was noralized, making the orderly acquisition of skills and )wledge difficult. Social class origins dictated which )fessors were employed and promoted, and which students :e admitted, promoted, and graduated. These policies :ered the nature of university life. Political and economic development of the Chinese terordinate system made demands on the formal higher educa- lnal subordinate system. The nature of the expected con— butions from the educational sector is revealed by the racter of the higher educational institutions in China the number of students in the various disciplines. Leo Orleans reports Ministry of Education statistics for 7: the 239 higher educational institutions were composed 52 normal colleges, 50 technical institutes, 39 medical leges, 34 agricultural institutes, 46 institutes of other :ialties, and only 18 comprehensive universities.l7 Outputs of the Educational System Educational development and institutional output .ng this period (1949—1957), as in other times, was l7Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Man- .r," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism lhina (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), 3. .rectly related to the national policies of the new govern- snt. Education communicated to the people what was expected ’them and then helped them live up to those expectations. hool curricula were closely tied to the socio—politico— onomic aims of communism, focusing on the importance of pular welfare, not "selfish" individual gain, and on dis- pline, not freedom. Education developed into a means of control second 1y to the People's Liberation Army. Educational policies 1 school programs played a significant role in propagating a new ideology, in building support for the economic and :ial programs, and in perpetuating a Communist regime. a state developed and used its monopoly of education and 2 schools as an instrument of policy coordination, popular >port, and general reform. One subordinate system serves the needs of other rordinate systems within the boundaries of the larger ial system; the output of the schools (inputs to other titutions) reflects the socio—political characteristics Communists hope to develop through formal education. lities of Educational Output The quality of formal education in any nation is ficult to evaluate because of the subjective nature of phenomena. China, being a relatively closed society, as any commentary on educational quality very tenuous. :efore, a judgment of the "quality" of schooling based 134 on rational, statistical evidence is not considered in this study. The various "qualities" a formal school graduate was supposed to have learned focused on the kind of citizen the Chinese leaders had hoped to develop through education. Education for Patriotism. Marxism-Leninism defines >asic units of people, not as nations, but as economic dasses based on means of production. Despite the trans— ational character of Marxism and its visions of a future orld communism, the Chinese Communists used schools to evelop a strong sense of patriotism. Chinese have long ad a deep pride in their cultural heritage, but never before ad there been a true sense of popular pride in a modern The Communists realized that to linese political state. [V8 a strong nation, the Chinese people had to be wielded to a coherent political force. Education for patriotism Itributed to that objective. Students were taught who to idolize, who to love, who to hate—-necessary for a sense of patriotism. For mle, schools, colleges, and universities stressed an eciation of and respect for the People's Liberation Army * and a loyalty to its leaders--Mao Tse—tung and Chu Teh. otic glorification of the PLA was designed to counter averse the traditional Chinese scorn of soldiers and “.18 Military victories and national heroes generated tism, especially among the young. 18Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "New China: New Texts,“ History 19, no. 112 (December 1950): 323. 135 Since education cannot be separated from politics and remain ideologically correct, patriotism in Chinese schools during the Korean War stressed the "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign. During this crisis the new regime needed the kind of complete loyalty to the Communist cause that a patriotic education could provide. Chinese schools ieveloped a willingness among the students to serve the ;tate's needs. Much of the proper attitudinal foundation for complete control of the Chinese people was developed hrough education for patriotism. Education for gational Defense. Schools emphasized he need for national defense and glorified the soldier as national hero. As the curricula developed, students were ssured exposure to politics and current international vents. With Chinese involvement in the Korean War in :tober 1950, these concerns became especially acute. The government, in general, and the school, in par- .cular, attempted to develop correct attitudes toward war d defense by promoting antagonistic anti—American senti— nt and an aid—Korea sympathy. The government used the hools as manpower resource pools to strengthen the Chinese rw in recruiting "volunteers" to fight in Korea. The listry of Education ordered the establishment of recruit- rcommittees in each county or city to mobilize students "basic military training."19 School administrators 19New York Times, 10 December 1950, p. 9. 136 stressed the importance of military preparedness and foresaw the possibility of suspending classes to facilitate recruit— ment. Students who volunteered and were scheduled to graduate received their diplomas without examination. The school also paid their travel expenses to the recruiting station. Even after the Korean War, the attitude of “readi« ness to come to the defense of China“ was a theme, not only of schools, but also of youth organizations. An official of the New Democratic Youth League of China stated that "the {oung people of New China not only should be active builders >f Socialism, but heroic defenders of our great motherland md world peace."20 China's relative isolation in the international ommunity, involvement in the Korean War, and protracted truggle over Taiwan generated statements, proclamations, nd programs that laid the foundation of education for ational defense. Educatianfor Integration and Unity. The Chinese >mmunists no longer allowed education to divorce theory om practice. The unity of thought and action emphasized at only valuable theory served materialistic and practi— 1 ends. Knowledge was useful only when it led to the lution of production problems in industry, agriculture, national defense. Education was brought closer to life's 20Survey of China Mainland Press, United States sulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 802, 6 May 1954, p. 22. 137 >nditions. Utilitarian education stressed problems facing dna. Schooling focused on uniting national needs and .udent potential. Stress was placed on the integration and unity of tellectuals and the working class. Intellectuals pre— ously remained in their ivory towers and detached from e problems of society. Academic safe—havens were attacked d destroyed; intellectuals were supposedly brought into a service of the people. The privileged classes were to arcome their disdain for manual labor by getting their Ids soiled through work. A politically—promoted nation-wide attitude of alligerent determination to overcome obstacles"21 under— >red the unity of combined strength sufficient to destroy aressive forces. Collective and cooperative efforts could Yect more progress by each person helping others, each .filling a different function, and all working harmoni— ‘ly together. Unity and integration characterized the operation of ‘schools: group discussions combined intellectual ength of the members; students were encouraged to study, k, and play in common; the previously adversarial roles teachers and students were to become cooperative. Close nunication between all parties was the new ethic. 21Chen, "New China: New Texts," p. 323. 138 ndividual activity was interpreted as an expression of 1dividualism and therefore subject to reprimand.22 Education for Reform. The success of the Communist agime depended to a great extent on the support it aceived from students and intellectuals in China. Educae .on for reform was aimed primarily at the intellectuals, ny of whom were academics. Much attention was directed ,ideological conversion and at gaining the endorsement as many teachers, students, authors, administrators, ofessors, and other intellectuals of the Kuomintang era possible. In October 1951 Mac Tse—tung stated that “ideolo- cal remoulding, first of all of the different type of tellectuals, is one of the most important conditions for npleting our democratic reforms in various fields and "23 An : the gradual industrialisation of our country. aological reform campaign was launched stressing the stematic and intensive study of the tenets of communism. )se teachers who refused to be reformed were declared Lctionary and were sent to labor in rural areas under the fig Feng movement. (The term Cheng Feng first appeared 1942; it stands for Cheng—tun san—feng: to correct or 22Arens, "Education in Communist China from 1949- ll . . ., p. 317. 23Liu Shih, "China's New Educational System," ple's China 4, no. ll (1 December 1951): 7. 139 to improve the three spirits of study, Culture, and the party. In short, it means ideological reformation.) Early in 1952 Mac again noted the importance of intellectuals: "I wish us victory on the front of ideolo— gical remolding among various circles of society, and first 24 By September 1954, and foremost among the intellectuals." 75 per cent of secondary education teachers and administra— tors had taken part in a rotating system of indoctrination and education to reform their thoughts.25 The failure of the liberal Hundred Flowers campaign sparked a hard-line policy of thought reform, beginning immediately with the AntivRightist Movement. Because Lntellectuals were targets of such movements is testimony :o the partial failure of education for reform. In educa- :ional institutions, older staff who were trained in the :uomintang era remained ideologically suspect, with little must or responsibility placed with them. Education and the Soviet Mgggl. When the Chinese Ommunists took over in late 1949, the influence of American edagogy on Chinese education came to an end. In its place, he Chinese praised Soviet leadership for continuing the truggle against aggression and imperialism, for carrying orward the Communist revolution, and for their friendship 24As quoted in Arens, "Education in Communist China tom 1949-51: . . .," p. 316. 25 Chang—tu Hu, China; itsgpeople, its society, its 11ture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 423. 140 nd assistance in constructing a new China. Russian pro— essors taught in Chinese universities; Chinese university tudents went to the Soviet Union for advanced training. uring the First Five—Year Plan, 10,000 Chinese students eceived advanced education outside China, mostly in issia. (The Russians felt this training ensured a long— arm Chinese dependence upon Soviet methods and equipment.26 ) The primary schools foreign language program sub- :ituted Russian for English. Middle schools reduced the mber of hours devoted to studying English and substituted ssian. The universities still taught English as a foreign nguage, although Russian was introduced.' Many university udents studied Russian in order to translate Soviet ientific, industrial, and other textbooks and reference oks into Chinese. The newly—introduced Chinese People's Universities re based on the Soviet experience. Even the Academia 1ica (Chinese Academy of Science), the national research stitute of China, was patterned after the Soviet Academy Science. Soviet theories in biological and natural .ences gained prominence among Chinese scientists. The >rt-term schools for workers and peasants were modeled :er the RABFAKS (short-term worker—peasant schools) from Russian experience in 1918—1928.27 26Simpson, "The Development of Education in Main— d China," p. 89. 27Theodore Hsi—en Chen, "New Schools for China,“ rent History 22, no. 130 (June 1952): 333. 141 In return for Russian newspapers, films, pictorial Xhibits, and thousands of volumes of publications, Chinese tudents were taught to appreciate the Soviet Union.28 Education for Technical Training and Economic evelopment. Schooling was designed to serve the practical aeds of the state. Schools were more integrated with >ciety than previously; knowledge was pressed into service »r national development by contributing directly to :covery and modernization. From l949 to 1951 education focused on meeting ort-term needs of economic reconstruction; after 1 tober 1951, an educational decree inaugurated a long— nge, more comprehensive education for technical training d economic development. Higher educational institutions cused on scientific and technological specialization so to furnish expertise to other subordinate systems of inese society. Liberal education was overshadowed by 3 heavy emphasis on vocational training. The activities of educational institutions were, aally, synchronized with economic development. “The New 28For more detail on Russia's impact on China's 1cation, see Stewart Fraser, "Notes on Sin0*Soviet -operation in Higher Education, 1950-1960," in E. L. . anch, Melbourne Studies in Education 1961-1962 (Victoria: Lbourne University Press, 1964); Cheng Chu—yuan, "Role of a Soviet Union in Developing Scientific and Technical lpower in Communist China," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., 1cation and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International 1dies Group, 1969); and Stewart E. Fraser, TChina's :ernational,Cultura1, and Educational Relations; with Lected Bibliography," in Chang—tu Hu, Aspects of Chinese 1cation (New York: Teachers College, Columbia UniverSity, >9). 142 Democratic government is bringing about a rapid increase in the productive power of China. Preparations . . . made to advance China's economy toward industrialisation . . . makes it necessary to train large numbers of cadres, including cadres with special and technical training."29 As the First Five—Year Plan got underway in 1953, the Chinese realized that one of the prerequisites for the success of national development was the training of an adequate number of technical and managerial personnel. Two members of a Soviet press delegation who visited China in 1954 reported that “the People's Government and the Communist Party of China display an enormous concern for the training 3f new cadres of intelligentsia, capable of carrying know— Ledge to the people, able to carry out an elaborate program >f socialist-economic transformation. Particular attention, mreover, will be given to the training of engineers and echnicians for the rapidly developing industry. The erec— ion of new institutes and the expansion of the old are oing on in almost all large centers of China."30 Education for All. After 1949 education in China as no longer reserved solely for the privileged classes nd denied the common people. Schools opened their doors 3 peasants, workers, soldiers, and their offspring. The 29Liu Shih, "China's New Educational System,“ p. 6. 30A. Hzizgan and H. Plyuschch, "The Higher School'in lina," Educational Outlook 30, no. 1 (November 1955): 127. 143 percentage of students with worker—peasant family back- 'rounds was larger at the elementary level (about 80 per ent) and smaller at the higher levels of schooling. (See able 4—7.) Over the years the number of students with roletarian origins gradually displaced those of the ourgeoisie. ‘ The student—body composition was a political concern. EEKQE reported in 1954 that “the [Chinese] government gives articular attention to the social structure of the students, 1d looks after them in order that higher education can 1roll as many as possible of those who were born peasants 31 Higher educational institutions were 1d workers." rdered to give special classes for students of workers and :asants who were less able academically. Not only were their children given a greater chance r education, but workers, peasants, and soldiers them- lves were given an opportunity to attend literacy classes, are—time schools, and worker-peasant middle schools. All ese educational systems had equal status with the formal hool system, and therefore led all the way to the iversity. An effort was made to provide a Communist education the national minorities. This often entailed first reloping a written form for many of their languages, and :n producing appropriate textbooks and other educational :erials. Non—Han (or non-Chinese) minorities were 3lIbid., p. 130. 144 Table 4-7. Proportion of Students of Worker and Peasant Origin to Total Number of Students (Percentage of Total in Each Category) Institutes Technical of Higher Middle Middle Year Learning Schools Schools 1951 19.1 56.6 51.3 L952 20.5 57.1 56.1 L953 21.9 55.9 57.7 .954 --- 58.8 60.7 .955 29.0 62.0 62.2 .956 34.1 64.1 66.0 957 36.3 66.6 69.1 958 48.0 77.0 75.2 ource: State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 200. imitted to Chinese schools; later they had their own :hool systems and nationality academies. In the education-for—all atmosphere, the Communists lde a special appeal to Chinese students and professionals :udying or working abroad to return to their motherland, tntribute their expertise, and partake in the revolution. e university designated for overseas Chinese was moved to nton in 1958, a second overseas Chinese university was tablished in Fukien in 1960. Both institutions educated e returned students in the new ideology before being sent assigned positions. 145 With emphasis on equal rights, women attended the formal school system in increasing numbers. Education for Health. One of the lesser known, but till important, thrusts of Chinese schools was an education or personal and public health. Cleanliness and hygiene essons were included in curricula in compliance with Mao‘s xpressed concern for "health above all" and with the atriotic Sanitation campaign reflecting efforts to improve JbliC health. The objective of these efforts was to alter )pular conceptions of personal health and social living anditions. Chairman Mao encouraged the youth of China to achieve [ood health, good study, and good work." "To be physi— tlly strong" was necessary to better serve production and .e motherland. The Chinese Communist Party and the People's vernment directed that particular attention be paid to udents' health. In response to this general concern for dividual well—being, schools expanded their physical aining and sports facilities and instituted daily open-air ysical education programs and sporting meets. Education r health stressed good health, strong bodies, and a Llective social discipline——prerequisites for military rvice, productive labor, and communal well-being. Education for Politics. Education and politics are :eparable. If communism is to work, the school system ;t build support of the new ideology. Education is an 146 ndoctrination process of spreading the Communist creed to 11 people and cleansing their minds of feudal, bourgeois, 1d reactionary thoughts. The Communists realized that :udents in China had an acute political consciousness. ecause of the prestige students had as intellectuals, their »litical commitment was of tremendous importance. "The w regime is relying on the students as the chief source d vehicle of popular support."32 During the months immediately after the takeover, a content of education in the formal school system under— . at revolutionary change. As an instrument of politics, :mal education closely reflected the Communist purpose of aological reconstruction. Schools aimed at strengthening : proper political interpretation of selected economic "ces that determined the nature of society. Political .cation permeated all levels of the formal educational ucture. Students were told of the past injustices of itical domination and oppression by the Nationalists, of the current enslavement and economic exploitation by colonial powers. In addition to the regular Marxist—Leninist politi— education, regularly scheduled classes were at times )ended so students could become directly involved in .tics and participate in special political campaigns )sing on public criticisms and confessions, or on 32Theodore Hsi-en Chen, “Red Education in China,“ ent History 19, no. 107 (July 1950): 14. 147 attacking American imperialism or bureaucratic corruption or landlordism. Students were taught to serve, not the privileged few, but the working class. But not all students came to realize the aims of the revolution. Several thousand :ollege students either quit or were expelled in 1953'1954, zome because of "inferior political quality."33 The school system was creating an indoctrinated ‘adre needed for Socialist construction. Teachers were onsidered "first-class agents" for dispensing party influ- nce, party control, and Communist ideology.34 Education or politics can be summed up in a few words: “The schools re being used as one of the most effective means of preading . . . [the new ideology] . . . in order to pro— Jce a population with a new outlook, new loyalties, new :titudes, new aspirations, new habits, and new values of .fe," and that "the schools shall spare no effort to Lculcate the new ideology and to produce ardent supporters >r the new social, political, and economic revolution."35 Education for Participation and Control. The inese used control through participation to enforce party scipline and to assure ideological unity. Schools were 33New York Times, 30 October 1955, p. 28. 34Arens, "Education in Communist China from 1949-51 . .," p. 319. 35Chen, "Red Education in China," p. 14. 148 themselves controlled and were used to control students. The organizational climate of educational institutions promoted acceptance of party control and expectation of participation. Like other social institutions, schools were con— trolled in their every function: the state forced accept- ance of detailed departmental curricula, time tables, text- books, holiday schedules, tuitions and fees, and selection, assignment, and promotion of teachers and administrators. The state also controlled student activities to the finest detail: collective living arrangements, extracurricular activities, practical work experience during the summer, and participation in special political movements. Decisions on the number of students and the fields they would study were determined by the kinds of expertise needed and in .what quantity. Students were not free to pursue their own occupational aspirations; the state—plan needs took precedent over the individual‘s wishes. The organized 2control of students in school and university played a significant role in state planning. Control of schools and universities shifted from administration solely by a principal or president to governance by a representative council that included :eachers, administrators, workers, and students. Despite :he more democratic school governance, the party had firm :ontrol amidst the greater participation. Key school ldministration positions were filled by approved personnel 149 (selected more for their political commitment than for their educational expertise). The party often made appeals to the idealistic Shinese youth to participate in national movements, for example, the Service Corps and the Red Guard. Internal [roup pressure among students forced participation in self— criticism and confessions; students were pressured to con- orm and to participate. To keep silent was to be accused f harboring reactionary, anti—revolutionary, and individ- alistic thoughts. Controlled and supervised participatory ctivity revealed deviation from the party line and from he thought—action unity. Contiguous with the role of the school in this itter was the youth movements in China. The Young Pioneers, 1e China New Democratic Youth League, and the All-China ederation of Democratic Youth ensured that students were untrolled through participation in suitable social work, litical activities, cultural exposure, and recreational d athletic activities. Education in the new China was not designed to serve dividual interests but rather to promote the Socialist volution. The state controlled educational institutions ensure that students participate in the revolution and zelop an acceptance of state control and participation :oughout their life. 150 Quantities of Educational Output The second dimension of evaluation focuses on the quantity of output produced by the school and university system. Information relating the numbers and kinds of yraduates across the educational disciplines is analyzed -n the commentary and in Tables 4-6 and 4‘8. These numbers 1nd percentages reflect the importance given by the regime D the various disciplines in light of what is perceived o be the national need. A Numerical Analysis. The overall strategy of the hinese government was to provide schooling for as many tudents as possible, especially elementary education for me children of the workers and peasants. But varying chumstances within the social system required tactics of amporary delay and occasional shifting of the responsibility tr schooling among different government sectors. Primary school enrollment data reflect a doubling tween 1949—1950 and 1952-1953, then for three academic ars there was little change, and for the school years 55-1956, 1956-1957, and beyond there was another upsurge the number of students attending elementary schools. e Table 4—5.) The discrepancy between the number of mary school graduates and the number of students enrolled the three—year junior middle school demonstrates just how elementary school students were able to continue their ration at the next higher level. This same discrepancy .mnHCHmoH Hosmflz Mo mmpnuflumcfl wnu mo wmfiuasomm GfimE osu Mano onnaosfi sumo "MBOZ .maH .m .Aowma .mmoum mommsmsmq cmflmuom "mCflMwmv mnmow Dmmuw COB ..mEoo .dmmusm HMOflpmwbmum opmpm Eouh "wousom som.o moo.mH omm.m oom.o Hmo.m ooa.m moa.sa anon mmo.o mo~.sa oso.m moo.m oo¢.o Ham.m soo.~m omma mso.a mma.NH mao.m oso.o moo.s «Ho.~ ono.oa mmoH moo.m Hmm.oH moo smm.s mmo.o mmm.m oom.ma «mos , m oom.m omo.o mms.H oso.~ omm.oH mmo.~ mom.aa mmoa i oko.a kko.m mam.m omo.m mom.s Hon.“ mHN.oH «mas ooH.~ oom.a woa.a oom.m omo.m omm.a oaa.o Hmma oom.m omo oov.a Hom.a mom.m sse.u Hak.o omoa . mama Hmm.~ ooo.a «mm.a sam.a kma.m oas.a owe a moo oms.m omm.m Hos.a om~.H ooo.m soo.m mas.v owmmwnwmww I!!! : Hummsflmsm m whys amommoom moosofiom mnfloflth mososfim w unabasoflumd ms. H Hwnflq Housumz moHEosoom omcHHHHUDJ 4D44n514d J.) 1:)\:.JI-.1\.D¢....1 1:34. 152 exists between the junior and the senior middle school and again between secondary schools (both general and special— ized) and higher education enrollments. The Chinese educational leaders were faced with two major challenges: sheer numbers of students, and the distribution of the students across the levels of the school system. It was politically expedient to increase elementary school enrollments in order to extend literacy and numeracy to the masses. It was technically and scientifically necessary to develop education at the higher levels. And it was necessary for economic development to increase and improve secondary education both as a channel for directing and educating the best students from the lower to the higher levels and as a sub—system to train middle—level manpower. Behind the fluctuations of enrollment statistics and the official proclamations of education for all is the perpetual struggle between the quantity and quality of _formal education in the context of both the limited finan— _cial resources of the Central Government and the egali— tarian-elitist controversy among the Communist theorists. A Content Analysis. The total number of students and graduates would not be the whole truth, for of equal significance is the nature of the distribution of graduates across the disciplines. It is important to realize that students were and are more or less controlled, as the Communists attempt to manipulate every element of Chinese society and economic development. The higher a student 153 progressed in the educational structure, the more he or she was subject to direct control by the state because of his or her training and expertise. Higher level students were selected and directed to a particular course of study, and once graduated they were assigned a position by the state. "In New China, each student [knew] exactly what role he [was] going to fill in the whole splendid edifice of national construction. Upon graduation each student [was] allotted the work best suited to his ability."36 Table 4—6 details the total number of higher educa— tion students and graduates and their percentages by discipline, and Table 4—8 details information on the number of higher education graduates by year from the entire first period (1949-1957). These data show engineering, education, jand medicine to be the three priority sectors. Since industrial development was of prime concern during the lPeriod of Consolidation and the First Five-Year Plan, great istress was placed on developing engineering skills. For gexample, People's China reported that in 1949 there were 121,460 college graduates, 22.15 per cent of them majoring :in technical subjects; in 1952 there were 32,629 college igraduates, with 31.42 per cent in technical subjects; and :in 1956 there were 65,563 college graduates, and 34.82 per cent were technical subject majors.37 3613.-nix; News Release, no. 1350, 17 June 1953, p. 123. [ 37Chang Chien, "360,000 College Graduates in Eight Years," People's China 16 (16 August 1957): 19. 154 Naturally the Chinese planners managed educational esources such that graduates would have expertise in those reas most needed by other subordinate systems in the over— 11 development of the Chinese superordinate system. From be evidence presented in the enrollment statistics, it is pparent which sectors planners felt to be the more crucial a the development of the planned socio—economic super— rdinate system of China under communism. Conclusion These early years of the new regime were to be the ransition era of China‘s development from the feudal past a the final state of the Socialist revolution. Though his, in fact, was not the case, much progress was made. A aw selected observations by Professor J. A. Lauwerys of 1s 1957 visit to mainland China prove interesting when 1mpared with those of his 1947 visit. In 1947 the people 1re poorly fed, with access to meagre, if any, medical hrvices; armies and brigands robbed and plundered the 1 fipulace; the land was ravaged by 50 years of civil disorder 1? foreign invasion. China in 1957 was very different: 1%eets were orderly, beggars no where to be seen; towns re clean, with no observable signs of acute poverty; aple were dressed decently; there was no evidence of food 1>rtages; and the general standard of living, although low, better than that of 1947 and was rising.38 1 11 1 1 1 38Times Educational Supplement, 2196, 21 June 1957, 895. '1 1 7 14“ 155 Policies of the period (1949—1957) were designed to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party, strengthen the new Chinese government, and to coordinate and control the Chinese people. To accomplish these objectives, the new leaders did not use force alone. The government was both dictatorial and democratic: force, coercion, violence, terrorism, and punishment were used to suppress counter- revolutionaries and reactionaries, while indoctrination, culture, art, literature, propaganda, and education were used to activate popular democratic forces in support of the proletarian revolution.39 Although persuasion was backed by coercion, the Chinese leaders preferred popular, voluntary support of the new ideology. To be sure, police force and firing squads were used, but to convert the masses into active supporters of the Communist cause, suasion was (the primary means. Force was necessary to win over the dissident elements, but popular education was necessary to irule the masses. The Chinese Communist Party-—small, but well— 3rganized——realized the potential of education in winning aver the people and in producing properly-oriented citizens ;0 give their full support. These first years of Communist ‘ule established a clear role of the school in developing .he new Chinese state. Education and schooling focused more 39Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education and Propaganda n Communist China," The Annals of the American Academ of olitical and Social Science 277 (September 1951): 135. 156 on indoctrination than on developing understanding, more on social utilization othhe individual than on his personal development, and more on the cognitive than the affective. Education, both in school and out, emphasized the desired character of the New China and the reformed Chinese man. Whatever criticism may be leveled against the leaders or their political and social doctrines, the Chinese government did bring peace and provided leadership out of pre—l949 difficulties. The government realized that only by reorienting the role of the school could progress occur. The school system was used to help mobilize and train people to increase production, to build social unity, and to promote loyalty to the new China. "In relation to the rapid expansion of education in China, there are a number of policy issues which any government, Communist or not, would have to deal with. What distinguishes the new regime from others is the energy and decisiveness with which these issues are being tackled."38 38Times Educational Supplement 2196, 21 June 1957, p. 895. "To leap is not to walk on two feet; it is to jump and to skip.“ (Chui—sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China.) CHAPTER 5 THE THREE RED FLAGS As each subordinate system reflects the nature of its parent superordinate system, so do the schools in China reflect the conditions in Chinese society. The politico— economic milieu of this period was alive with expectation and enthusiasm for leaping to communism and to industrial maturity through exerted human effort. The essence of the period rests in the mobilization of the masses and deploy- ment of manpower on a massive scale. Within a year or two of their inception, however, many of the economic and educational policies proved counter-productive and were suspended. The Times: 1958-1960 The Hundred Flowers liberalism (1957), temporary as it was, revealed the failures of previous attempts to re-educate and indoctrinate China's intellectuals. The 157 158 Rectification Campaign, a swift reaction disguised as remedial ideological training, turned into a nation—wide attack on intellectuals held to be deviants, rightists, or revisionists. Many were dismissed from their posts in the party, government, university, or wherever found. As a continuation of Mao's belief in uninterrupted revolution, the Three Red Flags movement was launched in 1958: The Red Flag of the Great Leap Forward focused on industrial development; the Red Flag of the People's Communes promoted the commune as the chief rural social and production unit; and the Red Flag of Socialistic Main Line aimed at advancing the Socialist revolution and the con— struction of a Communist society. Domestic Affairs This three—year period witnessed many domestic achievements and changes. In industry, the first car was manufactured; in science, the first atomic reactor became operative; in politics, Mao (then 65 years old) retired as Chairman of the Republic and Liu Shao—ch'i was elected to the post; and in education, rising enrollments were coupled with the communization movement and the work-study curricula were enforced. Ideologically, Chinese national policy aimed to proletariatize the intellectuals and intellec- tualize the proletariat.l Higher-level schools were to produce graduates who were both "Red and Expert." 1Robert D. Strom, "The Other China: Color It Red," Peabody Journal of Education 42 (September 1964): 97. 158 Rectification Campaign, a swift reaction dnguised as remedial ideological training, turned into a nation-wide attack on intellectuals held to be deviants, rightists, or revisionists. Many were dismissed from their posts in the party, government, university, or wherever found. As a continuation of Mao's belief in uninterrupted revolution, the Three Red Flags movement was launched in 1958: The Red Flag of the Great Leap Forward focused on industrial development; the Red Flag of the People‘s Communes promoted the commune as the chief rural social and production unit; and the Red Flag of Socialistic Main Line aimed at advancing the Socialist revolution and the con- struction of a Communist society. Domestic Affairs This three—year period witnessed many domestic achievements and changes. In industry, the first car was manufactured; in science, the first atomic reactor became operative; in politics, Mao (then 65 years old) retired as Chairman of the Republic and Liu Shao—ch'i was elected to the post; and in education, rising enrollments were coupled with the communization movement and the work-study curricula were enforced. Ideologically, Chinese national policy aimed to proletariatize the intellectuals and intellec- tualize the proletariat.l Higher-level schools were to produce graduates who were both "Red and Expert." 1Robert D. Strom, "The Other China: Color It Red," Peabody Journal of Education 42 (September 1964): 97. 159 Economic Consideration. The economic portions of the Red Flags campaign, that is, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes, were drives for increased austerity and more strenuous work. There was to be no lessening of pressure nor time to consolidate the gains of the First Five—Year Plan. Official efforts aimed to increase popular fervor in order to complete the socializa— tion of China in one great leap. The Great Leap Forward was to develop the Chinese industrial capacity as rapidly as possible so as to rival that of England and Germany within a decade. Steel production was at the center of the indus— trial efforts, as evidenced by the short-lived but ubiqui— tous backyard furnaces. The first People's Commune, Weihsing (Sputnik), was established in late April 1958. On 29 August of that year the party's Central Committee adopted a resolution estab— lishing People's Communes, formally launching the Great Leap Forward in agriculture. By the end of December, 99.1 per cent of all peasant households had joined the People's Communes (26,578 communes averaged 4,637 households each.)2 The rapid organizing of peasant living-working units into communes facilitated the tremendous growth in rural primary education. Even though there was a temporary retreat from the commune movement in early 1959, the responsibility for 2State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 43. 159 Economic Consideration. The economic portions of the Red Flags campaign, that is, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes, were drives for increased austerity and more strenuous work. There was to be no lessening of pressure nor time to consolidate the gains of the First Five—Year Plan. Official efforts aimed to increase popular fervor in order to complete the socializa- tion of China in one great leap. The Great Leap Forward was to develop the Chinese industrial capacity as rapidly as possible so as to rival that of England and Germany within a decade. Steel production was at the center of the indus— trial efforts, as evidenced by the short-lived but ubiqui— tous backyard furnaces. The first People's Commune, Weihsing (Sputnik), was established in late April 1958. On 29 August of that year the party's Central Committee adopted a resolution estab— 1ishing People's Communes, formally launching the Great Leap Forward in agriculture. By the end of December, 99.1 per cent of all peasant households had joined the People's Communes (26,578 communes averaged 4,637 households each.)2 The rapid organizing of peasant living-working units into communes facilitated the tremendous growth in rural primary education. Even though there was a temporary retreat from the commune movement in early 1959, the responsibility for 2State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 43. 160 primary education had already been passed to rural produc- tion units and there it stayed. Millions of workers, peasants, and students were nwbilized to participate in frantic work schemes. National economic mobilization created resources by encouraging or forcing the people to work for low or no wages. Rural farmers, urban workers, and students everywhere were sub— jected to a semi—military discipline so as to ensure more effective production and easier regulation of consumption. Such regimentation and control of manpower, along with crude human and natural resource allocation and inefficient production methods, resulted in tremendous hardship on the economy, on the educational System, and on the people. Both the educational and the economic sectors employed the "walking on two legs" strategy, that is, the simultaneous development of resources in different areas of potential.' In the economic sector, for example, official efforts focused on both industrial and agricultural develop— ment, on both heavy and light industry, on both large and small enterprises, and on both foreign-and indigenous modes of production. Education was closely geared to China's economic efforts, as the schools not only provided students to work in the various development projects, but also designed their courses of study to educate in the areas of greatest need. The activity in the economic and educational sectors generated by the "walking on two legs" strategy reflected the enthusiasm and the frantic thrust toward 161 greater national agricultural-industrial production and educational progress in 1958. The Second Five—Year Plan (1958—1962) shifted emphasis from the near-total commitment to the development of heavy industry of the First Five-Year Plan toward more concern for rural and agricultural development. National economic growth was more closely related to agricultural development, just as educational growth was linked to rural progress. The communes were given the responsibility for providing education to primary-school aged children. Strains and imbalances across various sectors of the economy were caused by poor planning and party mis— management. Severe complications resulted from floods and droughts in the summer of 1959 and were followed by several growing seasons of inclement weather—-having a severe and disruptive impact on the food supply. Under the pressure of economic and social disorder, the Backyard Furnace cam— paign was slackened and the Rural Communization movement was compromised by the partial revival of agricultural cooperatives. The Second Five—Year Plan ended in failure because of natural calamities and human error. The Third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) did not start immediately at the end of the Second Five—Year Plan; in fact, it was not even announced until 1964-1965. Political Considerations. Political education for socialism during this period aimed to convert the ideological 162 hold—outs, to resolve any remaining skepticism, to undermine complacency or conservatism, to give “experts" a socialistic zeal, and to warn of rightist tendencies and bourgeois thinking. One of the more important target audiences of the Socialistic Main Line was the intellectuals, for Mao had complained about the lessening of ideological commitment and political activities by students and intellectuals. The rationale behind the socialistic education drive was "to remold the old thoughts of the intellectuals and enhance the socialist awakening of the students."3 The disposition of the state toward intellectuals fluctuated between uneasy acceptance and open attack; especially vulnerable were the more outstanding scholars who were trained in the West and therefore suspect. The need to crush their spirit of independent thinking became evident with the Hundred Flowers experiment. The Rectifica— tion counter—attact that lasted into 1958 focused on more intensive and extensive political indoctrination, public self-criticism, and forced participation in the Xiafang movement (that is, to be transferred to the grass-roots level to do physical laborg). Intellectuals were sent to farm and factory to labor with, live with, and learn from 3H. Arthur Steiner, "The Curriculum in Chinese Socialist Education: An Official Bibliography of 'Maoism,'" Pacific Affairs 31 (September 1958): 286. 4"The Meaning of Xiafang, 13 January 1959, p. 5. Peking Review, no. 2, 163 the proletariat. Most were sent for one month a year; the more reticent for longer. Political reliability took precedent over technical proficiency in the "Red and Expert" protracted struggle. Teachers and university professors were also sent to rural areas to engage in manual labor in order to forge the thinking of “experts" into that of reliable "reds," because the events of the previous two years (1956—57) revealed the woeful state of "redness“ among the “experts." The ideal Xiafang intellectual would "surrender his heart" to the party and the cause. In 1959 the party retreated from its anti« intellectualism of the 1958 Great Leap strategy and focused efforts on "wooing the intellectuals." Although the work- study curricula were still part of the over—all reformation strategy, the extremes of previously frenzied intellectual reform movements (such as the Cheng Feng and Xiafang were lessened.5 The thinking of the old—line intellectuals was compatible with the Communist cause, yet their expertise was indispensable to China's progress. In the midst of China's scientific, technological, and industrial under- development, the intellectuals were the key to further growth. The party was concerned about the two elites in China: the intellectual elite, which was not progressive; 5China News Analysis, no. 273, 24 April 1951, p. 7. 164 and the progressive elite, which was not intellectual.6 Party tactics at the beginning of the Three Red Flags period were to ensure that "redness" triumph over the shortcomings of "expertness." Economic hardships in 1959- 1960 tempered such aspirations. For economic recovery and development purposes, it was more important to make the already existing "experts" into believing "reds,“ than the reverse. In early 1960, a new phase of the continuous revolu- tion in learning began--the "Study Mao Tse-tung“ movement. The Red Flag of the Socialistic Main Line had come to fruition. Mao‘s thoughts were to become the party line. People were to apply Mao Tse~tung thought to everyday living and thereby achieve success. Much of the related literature of the period focused on heroic figures who had died young; their integrity, self-worth, and morals were supposedly derived from studying the thoughts of Chairman Mao. Foreign Affairs China's military involvement shifted from Korea (all Chinese People's Volunteers were withdrawn by November 1958) to Taiwan and Ladakh. Peking wanted to liberate Taiwan from the grip of Chiang Kai—shek, but the U.S. was resolved to protect "free“ China. Much controversy was generated over the offshore islands (Quemoy and Matsu) and the U.S. Seventh Fleet's presence in the Formosa Strait. 6China News Analysis, no. 277, 22 May 1959, p. 5. 165 The other region of controversy was on the Tibetan— Indian border. Premier Chou En-lai announced the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in March 1959; there began a military clash between China and India in the border area of Ladakh in September 1959. TASS, the official news agency of the Soviet Union, claimed neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute. This proclamation of neutrality was unprecedented in Sino-Soviet relations and was a surprise to China and to the world. The evolution of Sino—Soviet relations during this time proved both curious and unpredictable. Khrushchev and Chinese leaders held discussions in Peking and reasserted their ideological unity in the summer of 1958; their joint declaration indicated for the first time China's co—equal status with the Soviet Union. By early autumn 1959 after he had visited America, Khrushchev again visited Peking. This time the Russians claimed that war was no longer an acceptable means of settling international disputes. There was a dichotomy of interpretation of Communist doctrine between Peking and Moscow. There was no joint communique when the Soviet leader left Peking on 4 October 1959, indi— cating strained relations. While Stalin was being denounced in Moscow, he was being praised in Peking. The mutual Sino-Soviet discontent came into the open in April 1960; in May China supported Khrushchev on the U—2 Incident; but in July all Russian technical experts, professors, and other assistance person- nel were withdrawn from China. Industrial-plant 166 installation contracts and joint universityeresearch projects were cancelled. Through a series of international meetings of Communist officials from many countries, the Soviet Union maneuvered to isolate China from the other Communist-bloc countries. Open rupture between the two Communist giants did not occur until 1963. China was preparing to “go it alone“ as best she could. The Sino~Soviet split was a blow to Chinese industrial and educational development, but most of all to their own psychological balance and sense of security. Inputs to the Educational System The Three Red Flags had a significant impact on educational development, and in turn, the schools played an especially important role in the unfurling of the Three Red Flags. During this period (1958—1960) the school system changed considerably: The Red Flag of the Great Leap Forward called on schools to establish farms and factories, on students to engage in productive labor, on factories to establish schools, and on workers to study; the Red Flag of the People's Communes called on the communes to organize schools to provide education to youth and adults in the rural areas first, and in the urban centers later; and the Red Flag of the Socialistic Main Line focused on political reliability and "putting politics in command" to build a Socialist society. Aims of Education After the Hundred Flowers experience the boundaries and the nature of the educational system were altered. Although the aims of education for this period were gener- ally the same as outlined for the 1949—1957 period, political considerations forced the regime to focus on more specific aims for the schools. The educational system was redesigned to provide better, faster, and more economical schooling to more students,7 while satisfying the growing demands for education and moving to meet the critical labor situation. Plans for the Great Leap Forward started taking shape in late 1957. By early 1958 party organs produced a plan that dealt with combating the lack of political reliability among intellectuals (including academicians) and with ensuring proper work-study orientation of students, teachers, professors, and educational administrators. As part of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese educational phil— osophy was formally refined on 19 September 1958 when the party‘s Central Committee and the Government State Council jointly issued the Directives on Educational Work.8 This 7Surve of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 2284, 24 June 1960, p. 9. 8"The Directive of the CCP Central Committee and the State on Educational Work," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 19695, pp. 554-566. 168 document outlined the direction of education in terms of production, politics, and proletarianism.9 The first state directive, or aim of education, focused on students' labor perspective by combining educa- tion and productive labor. "Education and production“ replaced "education for production" in 1958. The rationale was found in the writings of Lenin: "Without coordination‘ between the education of the younger generation and produc— tive labor, the ideal of the future society will be unthink— able. Neither teaching and education divorced from produc- tive labor, nor education and productive labor if they are not simultaneously carried out will lead to the attainment of the higher degree of perfection required by the modern technological levels and scientific knowledge."10 The Central Committee and the State Council also prescribed that education serve political ends. Previously Heny educationists' were not favorably disposed toward either Communist political doctrine or Communist educational practices. Before the Great Leap Forward many teachers felt education to be their domain, while the party should con- centrate on politics. Educators, few of whom were party members, opposed the party policy of meddling in education and in the operations of schools. Communist cadre were not professionally qualified to direct academic progress or to 9Theodore Hsi—en Chen, "Chinese Communist Education: The Three P's," Far Eastern Survey 29, no. 6 (June 1960): 86. loAs quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, no. 2284, p. 9. 169 administer educational institutions. During the-Period of the Red Flags there was pressure to change this attitude through “putting politics in command" and through stressing the importance of studying and accepting Mao's interpretation of Communist doctrine. In response to, or as a protective reaction against, party pressure, the number of teachers to become party members increased as did the number of students who joined the Communist Youth League and the Young Pioneers.ll Politics and indoctrination were reaffirmed as a major theme of formal instruction. The educational system was given a specific mission by the party and the government-—that of serving state needs and proletarian politics. A third educational concern expressed by the party and the government focused on proletarianism. Class dis— tinction, an unacceptable social phenomenon is a Communist society, was to be undermined by combining the interests of intellectuals with those of workers by means of a work— study movement. Intellectuals, including students, admin- istrators, teachers, and professors were to engage in manual labor and become more like the proletariat, while workers and peasants were to study and become the new proletarian intelligentsia. The aims of education during the Period of the Three Red Flags helped define the parameters of the frenetic 11 For an example in one school, see Times Educa— tional Supplement, 2394, 7 April 1961, p. 667 170 state of mass enthusiasm and belief in accomplishing the impossible through production, politics, and proletarianism. The central planning authorities attempted to mobilize and regiment China's manpower on an unprecedented scale.12 The schools were central to achieving the economic and political objectives of the superordinate system of China during the production drives that were characteristic of the Great Leap Forward. External Demands Within the superordinate system the functioning of other subordinate systems contiguous with the formal educational system indirectly provided inputs that either hindered or helped the schools to fulfill their assigned goals. The policies that defined the boundaries of sub* ordinate systems often shifted, having an impact on the role of the schools. By the end of 1957 the Maoists felt that education during the First Five-Year Plan had been too elitist, focusing more on developing experts than on training reds. In 1958 Mao's thoughts began replacing Marxist classics in the basic curriculum, and the bookish education of past years was condemned as bourgeois. In 1959 the educational system began to show strains of too much change in too short a time. There was 12China News Analysis, no. 280, 12 June 1959, p. 1 —_——'_TT" '7’ 171 concern about the impact of the 1958 educational "great leap" on the teaching-learning quality in schools. The entire formal educational system was approaching a state of disarray. Educational policy began to shift. Academics again became more important than productivity, though manual labor was still part of the curricula. Students were admonished to undertake more serious studies, to think more, to study hard, and to pursue individual projects. The academic climate was freer of political con- straints and was more serious in 1959, though professors remained reluctant to express opinions openly. Leaders tried to create a peaceful climate in which intellectuals could work, for it was realized that China needed the best minds available in order to overcome development problems. Students were told to “learn politics from the party and learn academics from the learned," even though the profes- sors may not have been party members. There was an easing back on the political fervor, for China was experiencing added difficulties stemming from economic mismanagement and natural calamities. In school, studying became more serious and theory was once again emphasized. Ideology was still part of the curriculum, but not stressed to 1958 extremes. The Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960, leaving much damage. There must have been much political ferment within the party, for many Chinese leaders were skeptical 172 of over—emphasizing student participation in manual labor when they should have been studying. Liu Shao-ch'i, then the Chairman of the Republic, had not been in full support of the Great Leap strategy of frantically driving toward immediate socialism. Liu addressed students as to their role: "Today the main thing in your school is study, and only a part of your time will be dedicated to labour. Today in the universities the main thing is study, while in fac— tories and farms the main thing is labour. Only in the future will the two come close to each other, to become finally one."13 The Liu Shao—ch‘i position of developing expertise needed for economic growth and the Mao Tse-tung position of ensuring that students were first equipped with the proper political perspective reflected the elitist— egalitarian struggle. During the First Five-Year Plan the elitist—expertise position overshadowed the egalitarian~ redness position. In 1958 the two positions were reversed. Beginning in 1959 the demands of the superordinate system again dictated the need for expertise over redness; this trend continued until 1962-1963, when the Two—Line Party Struggle between elitism and egalitarianism characterized the years immediately before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. l3As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 273, 24 April 1959, p. 7. V 7 _‘Ji,;i-"'" 173 The Budget In spite of the "big leap forward" in total state budget expenditures between 1957 (29,000 million yuan) and each fiscal year of the Red Flags period (see Table 5—1), the percentage designated for the Education—CulturevSocial allocation fell from the 1953*1957 figure of 14.7 per cent (see Table 4—2) to 10.6 per cent in 1958, 11 per cent in 1959, and 12.3 per cent in 1960. (The 1960 figure included state expenditure for science, about one per cent of the entire budget.) Although the Education—Culture-Social allocation dropped from the 1957 sum of 4,840 million yuan to 4,350 million yuan in 1958, the amount designated for this expenditure increased in 1959 and 1960. The expenditure for primary and secondary education dropped from 2,269 million yuan in 1957 to 2,253 million yuan in 1958, and for higher education from 637 million yuan in 1957 to 599 million yuan in 1958.14 The smaller education budget of the central government reflected the state decentralization policy of shifting educational costs to more local governments, and of the remuneration for student-labor as part of the work-study curricula to help finance the schools. _ l4Leo A. Orleans, Professional Manpower and Educa— tion in Communist China (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961), pp. 16—17. .mm .e .oooa Hausa m .om .e .omoa eases on .e .omoa mane NH .ea .oc .30H>om mcfixom SCHMIlome .hH .oc .3ofl>mm mcfixom Eonmulmmma .omm .oc .mflmwamcd mzoz msflnu Eouwllmmma "mmOHSOm 1 .m o.ooH omo.oe n o.mH omm.o 1 W m.e osa.m m.o ooo.m w m.ma omo.o .1 m.Ho oao.ma 0.00H m.HH N.m N.HH o.HH o.Hm oaosmm omo.m ooo.m ooo.m omn.m consam oo.ooa mm.h wm.m HN.NH mw.oa Ha.vm ommsov chasm onw.m ooosm ommsv Ohmsmm Hence A.ouo .uflpono .w>Hmmmm .UH4 .msmoqv Hmsuo sounosumasesoa omsmmoo Hmcoflpmz some now wocmflom came HMH00m\oHopHSU\c0flumoncm COH#ODHUmflOU OHEOGOOW wmmusmouwm pssoad mmmucwouom unsosd omoucoouom unsoem owma mmmH mmma mmfluomoumo pmmcsm ommH .mmmH Amommuswonmm can can» we chHHHHE cflv .omoa "mQOHumooaas bootsm spasm .Hlm THQMB 175 Process Within the Educational System The nature and the boundaries for formal education underwent alteration as a result of the Three Red Flags. New kinds of schools appeared; the Ministry of Higher Education disappeared. There were many more students in school; there was less time for study. The Great Leap Forward in education increased the number of students in school, but had a negative impact on educational quality. Educational Administration The Ministries of Education and Higher Education in Peking were directly responsible for Chinese educational development until early 1958. Elementary and secondary education were administered by the Ministry of Education, and post—secondary education by the Ministry of Higher Education. This highly centralized administration of education gave way to decentralization as a result of Mao's efforts to apply the Yenan strategy of basing political strength on meeting local needs and on egalitarianism. On 10 February 1958 the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished and the direct administration of higher educational institutions were transferred either to regional, provin— cial, or municipal governments, or to the Ministry of Education. The regional, provincial, and municipal party leaders were in charge of and responsible for adapting educational programs under their control to regional and 176 local conditions. With the decentralization of management by mid-1958, Peking relinquished some of its authority over education to authorities of lower—level governments. The Ministry of Education and other ministries of the Central Government had transferred to more local govern— ments between 50 and 75 per cent of the higher educational institutions, secondary technical schools, and schools . training skilled workers. By fall, 31 per cent of the secondary-level and 34 per cent of the primary-level schools were managed at the local level.15 At the higher education level, 187 of the 227 regular universities of China were turned over to local administrations.16 This educational decentralization accompanied the establishment of agricultural communes and was necessary if the part—work, part—study curricula were to succeed, especially in light of the sundry local needs, resources, and potential. With the decentralization of the administration of formal education, various levels of government undertook the responsibility for different levels of instruction. Almost every production brigade had its own kindergarten and primary school; every People's Commune had its own junior middle school; every county its own senior middle school; every administrative region its own secondary technical 150. Fisher, "Education in Communist China,“ School and Society 87, no. 2156 (20 June 1959): 303. 16Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate—General, Hong Kong, no. 1841, 27 August 1958, p. 12. 177 school; and every province, major municipality, and auto- nomous region its own institutes of higher education.17 Amidst this major decentralization of educational management, the Communist party remained in firm control. Party leadership was accentuated, but government management was dissipated. Although the party was not part of the official governmental chain of command, it still had the power to decide on the nature and direction of all educa— tional matters. The Chinese Communist Party retained control over the nation—wide system by ensuring close-range party supervision of every phase of the schools' operation and by placing reliable cadre in key positions in the school administrative structure. The party maintained control to ensure that education would contribute to the proletarian revolution. Educational Finance Educational economics was of major concern in this period. The Central Government freed itself from the financial burden of funding universal education by capital“ izing on the communization program. Local communes, rural and urban, were responsible for financing and maintaining their own schools up through the secondary level, with the central, provincial, and major municipal governments looking after higher education. Primary and secondary educational 17New York Times, 9 December 1959, p. 15. Figure 5‘1. Source: of China, Chang—tu Hu, China; culture (New Haven: Research Institutes 1——= —————— 2 1 I i _ _ _________ a 34 'Universities and Colleges -_—-—H— 2 Technical Expert 1 College‘ I Colle es i8 6 Senior Vocational Short— Sr. S—T Red & 12 5 Middle Middle (Poly- Term Mid.8éh. Expert 15 4 _Schools technic, Worker(3-A Yrs) . 3 Junior Normal, & Peas Jr. S-T Middle 1“ 2 Middle ant Mid. Sch. Schools 5’ 1 Schools _Mid.Sc.(3—4Yrs. 6 i3 5 Primary Spare—Time Primary 4 g 3 Schools Schools (No Year Limit) 2 7 5. 1 1 5 4 Kindergartens and 3 Nurseries Age Class Educational Structure of the People‘s Republic 1958«l959. its people; its society; its Hraf Press, 1960). P. 419. Li 179 finance was the responsibility of lower-level governments, while higher educational institutions were the responsibility of higher-level governments. In an attempt to provide education for all students of school age and to save money, the Central Government not only shifted the financial responsibility for formal educa- tion to communes, factories, and lower governmental units, but the half—work, half-study curricula were promoted to alleviate some of the costs involved in operating a school. In addition to paying fees, students participated in pro— ductive labor, which was credited to the school. Schools' financial capabilities moved toward self-support through student productive labor, yet the overall financial responsibility was borne by the lower-level governments. By putting students on a partial-work schedule, the state ensured that more students received an education without having to spend state money to build additional classrooms or support the existing operations. Private elementary and middle schools were encouraged so as to take some of the enrollment pressure off the public educational system. Though state financial responsibility shifted to local authorities, the party did not give up its control. Student Productive Labor The educational philosophy of the Great Leap Forward was "learn by doing." Before 1958 students engaged in labor activities during vacations or non-school hours. With the establishment of half—work, half—study curricula that linked students, teachers, and administrators with the worker-peasant class, active participation in produc— tive labor became a regular, integrated part of the formal educational program in schools. Students were to assist in the planned develOpment of industry and agriculture by contributing their labor directly to production efforts, and at the same time, learning technical skills. Factories and farms provided skilled laborers and agriculturalists to oversee student work. Many students resented the part—work, part-study schedule, however, because students were often used as unskilled labor. The amount and value of what students learned from participating in manual labor was questioned. Some high-echelon party leaders felt that if students of today were to be the leaders of the future, then students should “get back to serious study," for they seemed to benefit little from laboring at backyard furnaces and manuring fields. Many educational institutions started their own ancillary farms, small factories, workshops, and backyard furnace complexes. The People's Daily reported that over 21,000 secondary schools and higher education institutions had already, by late 1958, established more than 151,000 factories.18 By mid-1959 the amount of time students were 18As cited in China News Analysis, no. 273, 1 November 1958, p. 5. 181 to devote to productive labor was fixed: elementary- school students but a few hours per week, secondary-school students a few days every month, and university and college students a few months a year.19 The integration of productive labor and education surpassed previous school training in industrial or agri« cultural skills. Participation in productive labor became part of the curricula at all educational levels; work tasks varied with student age and capabilities. Students were sent either to communes to sow and harvest crops, plant trees, build reservoirs and roads, or to factories to take an active part in the manufacture of various products. The entire student body and faculty of the Peking Agricultural University, for example, went to rural areas for one year and joined organized farm teams engaging in agricultural production.20 As a complementary and parallel effort, factories and farms were encouraged to establish schools, permitting workers and farmers to achieve literacy and numeracy, and to learn the proper political perspective. Some large industrial complexes set up an entire school system from primary to higher education; smaller factories and workshops joined together to establish primary schools. 19Robert D. Barendsen, "Educational Changes in Chinese Areas," Social Life 43, no. 1 (September 1960): 20. 20Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Scene, 1949—1967 (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), p. 548. 182 Amidst the campaign of c0mbining work and study, the hope was to wield school and farm or school and factory into a single learning-production unit. It was important to develop among students a readiness to sacrifice for, and a willingness to contribute without question their exper- tise to, the economic development of China. The long-term aim of Communist education was to relate education directly to manual labor in order to completely interlock education and production. Educational Growth School enrollments greatly expanded during the Period of the Three Red Flags. Every level of education experienced unprecedented expansion. Nursery schools numbered 3.2 million units with over 47 million students by 1958, up from 2700 units with 99,000 students in 1951.21 Kindergartens also grew over this same period with a big leap in 1958. The nursery-kindergarten movement was closely linked with the industrial and agricultural communes. The growth of rural communes from 1958 and of urban communes from 1960 facilitated the rapid expansion of these child- care units. The growth of kindergartens, nursery schools, and child—care centers was all part of the childewelfare 21Wasyl Shimoniak, Communist Education: ‘Its History, Philosophy and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), p. 406. 183 Table 5-2. Increase in Kindergartens (in Thousands) Year Number of Units Number of Students 1950 1.8 140 1952 6.5 424 1957 16.4 1,088 1958 695.3 29,501 Source: State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 202. program that released mothers from home and family duties so they could join the state work force. Enrollments took a "big leap forward“ in 1958 (see Table 5-3), a small leap forward in 1959, and practically no advance in 1960. In the first year of the Three Red Flags there was much enthusiasm about the Great Leap Forward as reflected in the jump in the enrollment figures. The increase continued in 1959, but at a slower pace, with 1960 showing little overall increase. In spite of the impressive attendance gains made at all levels of formal education, a more realistic perspec— tive of the entire educational structure is reflected in enrollment figures across the various levels. Even though there were over 96 million students in elementary and secondary schools in 1958, 86.4 million were in elementary school. And of the remaining ten million, 7.34 million were in general junior-middle school and an even smaller 1.18 million in senior-middle school (see Table 4—5). This 184 .m .m .ommH pmsmsm m .emm .oc .mHmNHmod msoz mcflso ca nouwo mm .omma Hfiumm m so Madam m.mamomm on» cw sowuconnm mo wuumflcwz may we nouuommu mm .ommH How can mama "v . Home .mmmum wufimhm>flco whom mcom muo Eousoo ..oo .MQHHM pnmsum .m ca ssmmmalmmma .mcHoU panacea: mo moaumfluopm umcox msomv dump ou .mao> m .ocflno Hoeoom pom owsocooms .mmmH mom «mma .m .Aomma .mmonm mmmcsmccq cmemnom "mcwxomv mumow umouo cos ..msoo .smmnom Honeymwumum ououm .mmma com hmma Hom "moousom ooo.oeo ooo.oao ooo.ooo ooo.aee condenses “moose In- ooo.ooo.ma ooo.oao.o ooo.ono.s sunccooom ooo.ooo.oo ooo.ooo.oo ooo.ooe.oo ooo.os~.eo seasons coma mmma mmmH nmma Ho>oq .oooasemoa "Hm>ma an ucmsaaoucm someone .mum dance ‘11 185 disparity in the distribution of students enrolled in school was rooted in national policy of striving for universal primary education. I The middle school students were a very small per- centage of both the total school population and of their age group. This disparity was even more apparent at the higher education level. The colleges and universities admitted 280,000 new students in 1960, and graduated 135,000. The net increase of 145,000 students represents a decline in enrollments from 1959 (with a net increase of 150,000) and 1958 (with a net increase of 210,000).22 The nationewide uniform admissions policy was replaced by locally—determined criteria.23 New Schools In 1958 Mao started an educational revolution. During the Period of the Three Red Flags there evolved new kinds of educational institutions. The administration of the educational system passed to local authorities control of finances, admission, curricula, methodology, etc., and along With this decentralization there was much 22I Wo-Sheng, "Education_in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962),l: 71. 23Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educa— tional Fact in Communist China,“ in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a RevolutiOnary Society éSeattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 267- 68. 186 experimenting with various school practices and entirely new kinds of institutions. Many whole-day schools (mostly in urban areas) and pig pap schools (mostly in rural areas) were converted to half—work, half-study institutions. The half-work, half— study schools were an economic necessity, for the central government was without the financial capability of afford— ing rapid enrollment expansion. These schools not only freed the state from the financial burden of paying for these new programs, they also extended basic education to millions of rural students who otherwise would have been without the opportunity. 1 The agricultural cooperatives and communes were 1 responsible for the agricultural junior middle school, a rural half—farming, half-study institution. These schools were modeled after (but not to be confused with) technical— vocational secondary schools in agriculture. The curri— culum combined formal instruction (half-study) with prac— tical training in Chinese agricultural methods (half— farming). Such schools, the first two of which were established in March 1958, allowed peasant children to remain in rural areas to contribute their labor to agricul- tural production and still get a basic education. Their enrollments increased from 2 million in 1958, to 2.19 million in 1959, and to 2.9 million in 1960.24 These 24Lu Hsu—yen, "Education,“ in Communist China 1963, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 11; and U.S. Department of Commerce—-Office of Technical 187 institutions were the result of the new agricultural thrust of the Second Five-Year Plan and of the rural communiza- tion program. With the Great Leap Forward there appeared the boarding school, providing students with the opportunity to rid themselves of old family thinking, while mothers were free to partake in productive labor. Many Chinese educators were claiming that boarding schools provided the best education possible, for every aspect of the student‘s collective existence was closely supervised. The collective spirit of the social environment required students to live, study, work, eat, play, and think together. Some parents did not like their children leaving home so young to live and study in primary boarding schools, fearing that the children would not be looked after properly. Parents also resisted this move to break up the family. A Chinese newspaper editorial claimed that "the boarding- school system [had] the advantage of removing children from what in some cases [were] the bad ideological environment of homes and surrounding them with the influence of good 25 Communist training." The Chinese argued that children in a Communist society were best raised and educated by the Services, trans., Seiji Keizai Soran (Political-Economic Handbook on China) (Tokyo: Association for Asian Political- Economic Studies, 1962), pp. 8-9 in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), Education in Communist China 17, 188-2985, February 1963. 25 As quoted in New York Times, 7 January 1959, p. 13. 188 state. To support further the boarding school trend, educationists claimed that boarders did better academic work in school than other students. The number of full—time higher educational institu- 26 This increase tions increased from 230 to 1065 in 1958. came at the time when the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished. In response to the Great Leap Forward, Red and Expert Universities appeared everywhere. These newly- created institutions were to train politically-reliable cadre in various skills through short—term courses, through regular school sessions, and through working with skilled craftsmen. Much of the students' time was spent in produc- tive labor. The educational objective of the Red and Expert Universities was to make students more "expert" in their productive skills and more “red“ in their loyalty. Many of these institutions disappeared after 1960. Educational Problems The rapid expansion of education during the Great Leap Forward amplified the host of problems that plagued Chinese schools for years. During the Three Red Flags period all previous shortages-~qualified students, teachers, and administrators; and adequate educational materials and physical plants—-were intensified as millions of new Students were added to the school rolls. All these 26Robert D. Barendsen, "Education in China: A Survey,“ Problems of Communism l3 (JulyeAugust 1964): 23. 189 shortages and their attendant problems had an adverse effect on the quality of instruction. All the problems facing Chinese education were serious, but the most critical was the shortage of quali— fied teachers. Though the higher educational system was geared to training large numbers of teachers, their numbers still were not enough to meet the rising demand. The need was so critical that politically reliable industrial workers and demobilized soldiers became teachers with only a minimum of ad hoc training. Summer workshops were conducted to improve the ability of teachers already in the schools. Because so many new teachers were needed and recruited in such a short time, their overall level of education and training left a great deal to be desired.27 Part of the teacher shortage could be blamed on official anti—intellectual attitudes. Teachers did not enjoy high prestige as they had in the old days; in fact, they were periodically criticized and humiliated in public. Many otherwise prospective teachers lost interest in the profession. The shortage of qualified teachers was especially troublesome filvocational schools. These educational insti— tutions needed as teachers the same managerial and technical expertise as did agricultural and industrial development projects. To place technically qualified personnel in the 27China News Analysis, no. 334, 5 August 1960, p. 4. vocational schools to teach.would deny their services to the agricultural and industrial sector, but to place them in industry and agriculture meant that their knowledge and experience was denied vocational-technical students. Many of the other teachers in these schools were of poor quality and if the better qualified personnel were demanded on the development projects, the students in vocational schools received poor-quality instruction before they went into the field. Another educational problem centered on the focal point of the educational system-«the student. Elementary and secondary schools were striving to improve the quality of instruction so their graduates would be better qualified to study in university and eventually make contributions to national development. Higher education suffered from the lack of a sufficient number of qualified general secondary school graduates applying to college and university. Higher education felt the impact of the race between quality educa- tion and education for the masses (quantity education). In spite of the apparent need for qualified applicants to higher education, recently discharged soldiers, longetime veterans, reliable persons from the party or the government or state enterprises, overseas Chinese students, and returned students to China from foreign countries were admitted through lower entrance examination standards than was required for other applicants, so long as they were recommended by the proper organization and were party 191 activists.28 The political criterion of applicants was a counter force to quality higher education. The quality of education during these three years was initially down-graded, followed by moves to improve and offset the damage that resulted from the Great Leap Forward in education. During the initial enthusiasm in 1958 there was little respect for higher education, intellectuals were again prime political suSpects. Being "expert“ was far less important than being "red." The greatly expanded enrollments in 1958 strained the existing facilities and personnel. In 1959 the system attempted to adjust to the changes, though enrollments still rose. Educational expan- sion slowed in 1960 as part of a trade-off between quantity and quality. (See Table 5‘3.) Student admissions to higher education became more selective and applicants had to meet refined criteria: academic qualifications of the applicant, entrance examination results, technical and professional needs of the nation, social status (a landlord or bourgeois family background was detrimental), political status and record, and age.29 These steps were taken to improve the quality of students admitted to higher education. Another compounding weakness that reduced the university graduates' impact on national development was the assignment of manpower. The placement procedure 281 Wo-Sheng, "Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, pp. 71-72. 29Chiu-sam Tsang, Society! Schools,‘and Progress in China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), pp. 197-198. 192 reflected inefficient estimates of projected manpower needs. Some sectors were oversupplied with graduates, others undersupplied. Some graduates were not working in the area for which they were trained, others were working in areas without proper training.30 Once assigned a post, engineer— ing graduates were found to be but "little more than skilled technicians" and science graduates but "advanced laboratory technicians.“31 The effectiveness of the educational system was further infringed upon by party requirements and qualifica- tions. Teachers, students, and administrators were no longer only teaching, studying, and administering, but they were all engaging in some form of manual labor. Qualifica- tions for responsibility were changed: recent university graduates would become assistant department heads because of their party membership, even though their academic level and teaching—administrative ability was poor. Many educa“ tional institutions were still "beehives of dogmatism" rather than full-fledged schools. The remnants of a Western concept of higher education had almost disappeared. Every educational institution was totally under the control of the party: teacher-student-administrator 30Leo A. Orleans, "Quality of Education,“ in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1939), pp. 93—98. 3J‘Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Mann power," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 19395, p. 85. 193 appointment and promotion, curricular development, and the whole of the educational policy were the sole domain of the authority of the party. As to the quality of education during this impres- sive expansion, there can be little doubt that it was low. The shortage of qualified teachers, inadequate physical plants, insufficient number of classrooms, lack of quali— fied educational administrators, incredible rates of increased student enrollment, total party control of educa- tion, and the amount of time given over from study to productive labor—~all had a negative impact on the quality of education during the Great Leap Forward and after. New Educational Directions Natural calamities, described as "unprecedented in the last one hundred years," and mismanagement of deve10p— ment programs caused the Great Leap Forward to collapse in 1960. Either in anticipation of, or in reaction to, the crumbling "grand strategy," both the Minister of Education, Yang Hsiu-feng, and the Director of the powerful Propaganda Department of the party‘s Central Committee, Lu Tingwyi, announced to the National PeOple's Congress in April 1960 plans for major educational changes. These modifications can be grouped into five categories: compression, unifi- cation, acceleration, modernization, and experimentation. Although these reforms were only propdsed changes and not declarations of official government strategy, many were implemented. 194 Compression.--The number of years spent in primary and secondary full-time schools was to be reduced. A party spokesman stated that it was their "preliminary intention . . . to reduce the number of years of full-time middle and elementary school education to approximately 10. "32 Since Chinese youngsters began primary school at age seven, by the time they graduated from senior middle school at 17 they were "full manpower units" and able to enter the mainstream of production. Because China's development required all available educated manpower, students were to graduate two years early and thereby not waste themselves for two years in school. These changes were not to affect educational quality, however, for better teaching would permit compression of twelve years of educa- tion into ten without a loss. In fact, "the academic level [was to] be slightly raised to ensurethat middle school graduates would have an academic level commensurate with that of present-day students in the first year of a university."33 Unification.—-Primary and middle school education were to be thought of as one ten—year unified system and not as two separate phases-~one elementary and the other . 32As cited in Robert D. Barendsen, "Planned Reforms in the Primary and Secondary School System in Communist China," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education'and COmmunism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), PP. 153-154. . 331 Wo-Sheng, “Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, p. 61. 195 secondary. The proposed curricula and methodology were based on the unified school cycle. Acceleration.-—Subjects taught in school were to be combined and taught in a lower grade. Some subjects were merged by condensing content; for example, elementary school history, geography, and natural science were to be simplified and combined into one subject. Some courses were relegated to the next lower level; for example, junior middle school arithmetic and algebra were to be taught at the primary level, selected senior secondary courses taught at the junior secondary level, and some college-level science and mathematics subjects taught at the senior secondary level. Key courses (science, mathematics, and language) were introduced earlier and taught at an accel- erated pace. Streamlining was necessary to reduce redun— dance by eliminating unnecessary cyclic repetition. "All repetitions of the same subject, in primary school, junior and senior middle school, should be omitted."34 Modernization.—~Science and mathematics were key subjects of the curriculum, giving students knowledge of and training in areas pertinent to technical development. Courses that political leaders considered less important either received less attention or were dropped from the curriculum altogether. 34China News Analysis, no. 334, 5 August 1960, p. 3. 196 Teaching materials were to be modernized and the quality of instructional standards upgraded. Normal school education was to be improved as part of better teacher training. During the 1960 summer vacation, a nation—wide educational improvement campaign was conducted, including teacher—training classes, compilation of new textbooks, and other measures. Nursery schools and kindergarten programs were to be improved. And school systems were to be introduced to modern educational media wherever possible. Experimentation.——Because educational authorities were encouraged to experiment with several aspects of the formal educational system, many different patterns evolved. Since school reform was the responsibility of local-level authorities, a variety of experiments resulted from taking account of local, but varied, conditions and constructing an appropriate school system that matched areal conditions and educational potential. Even the examination system within the primary and secondary levels varied, making it difficult for the Central Government to support a uniform national reform program. The entire educational reform program, as proposed, was to be gradually implemented over the next ten to twenty years. The economic situation in 1960 prevented another educational era of unprecedented expansion, for the national economy was exhausted by the Great Leap Forward and the agricultural disasters of 1959*1961. Since ambitious education plans were not possible in 1960 due to 197 the economic difficulties facing China, official government action to deal with education in a comprehensive manner had to be postponed for the time being. Outputs of the Educational System Many graduates of educational institutions during the Three Red Flags period had only a brief but intense exposure to the educational qualities the leaders felt to be important. Because this period was only three years, the last two of which were of a different tempo than the first, no graduate from any formal school had been educated in the qualities described below during his or her full educational career. But all graduates had some exposure and were therefore aware of the current national policy. The Qualities of the Educational Output_ The values and attitudes graduates were to possess centered around qualities of education that reflected the character of the Chinese society at that time. Some of the qualities the educationists had hOped to develop in students were unique to the period, such as education for the Great Leap Forward and education for Red and Expert. Other qualities were but extensions of previous concerns with a slightly different interpretation or emphasis, such as education for political action and education for increased productivity. As with all stages of development, educa- tional qualities reflected both features that were linked /.. Ha 7W .,l,,,,__‘ A'— "newfigeae" _, 198 with a particular period and features that were carried over from previous periods but with modifications to fit the times. Education for the Great Leap Forward. Throughout Chinese history, the illiterate working masses were always apart from the limited but SOphisticated intelligentsia. When the Communists came to power on the Chinese mainland, this polarization was challenged. With the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes the educational structure was so modified as to transform intellectuals (including students and professors) into laborers, and farmers and workers into intellectuals. Schools and universities became production centers; communes and factories became schools. These modifications were carried out in the name of creating an army of proletarian intellectuals. In addition to the work-study curricula providing schools with increased financial self-help, student labor contributed to national development. Chinese schools, colleges, universities, and technical institutes made direct, immediate, and substantial contributions to the 35 national economy. The success of the Great Leap Forward depended, in part, on each individual's contribution to collective national action. To students this meant working 35Stewart Fraser, "Education, Indoctrination, and Ideology in Communist China, 1950—1960," in Stewart Fraser, ed., Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade (NashVille: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), p. 61. 199 for productive ends, studying for scientific and technical expertise, and pursuing education for economic and political progress. Specifically this was education to serve the people, to serve proletarian politics, to serve productive labor, to serve the Socialist cause, and to serve the Great Leap Forward. If the Great Leap Forward and the PeOple's Communes were to succeed, in fact if Chinese development were to succeed, educated peOple were needed. The entire economy required scientific, technical, and administrative expertise if it were to develop. National progress called for more education, and being at the heart of the development scheme the Great Leap Forward called for more education for more people. Education for Increased Productivity. The one over- whelming characteristic of the school during the Great Leap Forward was the combination of education and labor. Full- time schools at all levels adopted work—study curricula; a portion of each student‘s time was devoted to productive labor in farms, factories, or workshops. The skills- development curricula were not just laboratory exercises or an occasional field trip, but rather students and teachers became members of the work force and actively participated in the production of usable commodities and services. Liberal education had no place in the strategy to overcome the barriers between manual and mental labor. 200 Schools and universities, now centers of both learning and production, were to develop students who were not only politically alert and professionally qualified, but also capable of and willing to pursue both mental and manual work.36 There were four objectives to student participation in productive labor: to activate the reserve of young man- power, to develop a proletarian perspective among students, to learn to respect manual labor, and to prevent students from becoming isolated from the working class.37 The school system was an integral part of the Second Five-Year Plan; the students would help increase production and, it was hoped, even solve problems and improve techni- ques of production. The combination of education and productive labor was in full keeping with Communist ideology, for Engels claimed in the Communist Manifesto that such a combination is one of the most effective mechanisms for transforming the basic conditions of pre-Communist society to a full Communist society.38 Education for Political Action. No mass movement neglects students, teachers, professors, or educational 36 pp. 19.-200 37Chang—tu Hu, “Recent Trends in Chinese Education," International Review of Education 10, no. 1 (1964): 16. ' 38Chen, "Chinese Communist Education: The Three P s," p. 87. Barendsen, "Educational Changes in Chinese Areas," 201 administrators. All were required to partake in political activities; no one was allowed to remain apart from poli— tics. Students and teachers were assessed by their degree of scholarship and their political acumen. Educated Chinese citizens, by Communist definition, were politically active and ideologically sound; they were beyond merely understanding class struggle, they were in fact active class warriors. The notion that only the educated knew what was best for themselves was totally rejected. Only the Com- munist party knew what was good and all educators were to accept party leadership in all matters regarding education. If education were to serve politics and, ultimately, the proletarian—socialist revolution, educators at all levels were required to foster political consciousness, class consciousness, class alignments, and the class struggle.39 For this reason, political and ideological courses were the most stressed element of the curriculum, especially during 1958. Political education (or ideological indoctrination) was a thought reform process that tolerated no passive students--political neutrality was not an option. Students and teachers, as intellectuals, were pressured into criticism of others and self-criticism as part of thought reform and the Red Flag of the Socialistic Main Line. 39Ibid. 202 The Chinese Communists were "not satisfied with passive obedience or the mere absence of opposition. They demanded support and whole-hearted participation."4o Groups pressured individuals to reveal their inner thoughts; groups demanded conformity by pressuring for pledges of loyalty. One's ideologically inconsistent thoughts were attacked, while activism in the class struggle was the ideal.41 Education for political action was the application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.in China. At this stage of ideological interpretation, that meant "putting politics into command" and striving to be both "Red and Expert." Education for Red and Expert. The major thrust of educational efforts during 1958-1960 was to develop a "Red and Expert" proletarian intelligentsia. There appeared during this time specially-created Red and Expert schools and universities. These institutions were established by street organizations, communes, civic groups, armed forces units, and industrial enterprises. They were often staffed by workers and peasants and soldiers with little formal education themselves.42 40Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "New Citizens for a New Society," Current History 49, no. 289 (September 1965): 155. 41Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education," The New Leader 42 (4 May 1959): 16. 42 Orleans, "Education and Scientific Manpower, p. 366. 203 The Red and Expert schools were created by organiza- tions that had also established regular schools. The Red and Expert curricula included intense political indoctrina- tion to develop Socialist-minded cadre, and some technical courses that related directly to the sponsoring organiza- tion. If the Red and Expert institution was to be part of a commune educational system; for example, the technical subjects might include agricultural cooperatives, farm animals, chemical fertilizer, water conservancy, in addition to the political courses that were usually taught by the local party secretary.43 The leaders knew that long—term agricultural progress would depend on educating youth to working in agriculture. Although Red and Expert schools and univer- sities were in response to an increased need for education especially in rural areas, these institutions were not limited to the countryside. The urban counterpart was the school and university sponsored by industrial enterprises to educate their own workers. Again the curricula reflected the nature of the factory,and the instructional staff chosen from among the engineers, technicians, and skilled workers.44 Even though the Chinese contended that neither industrial nor agricultural production decreased and that _ 43Chang—tu Hu, China: its people, its society, its culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 431. 44Ibid., p. 432. - ._._-w—-— 204 better educated workers produced more, there was little mention of the Red and Expert institutions after 1960. Education for a Communist Morality. Schools were to instill a Communist morality in all students. Mao sought the active support of the staffs of educational institutions to politicize thoroughly students into accept— ing without question the wisdom and politics of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao clarified the task of educators in his famous speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradic- tions Among the PeOple": "Our educational policy must enable everyone who gets an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a cultured, socialist-minded worker."45 An education for a Communist morality focused the attention of teachers and students on accepting and supporting a number of basic tenets. Total obedience to the party was at the heart of the new mOrality in China; this included a willingness to fight and die for 'socialism or to contribute one's expertise for a lifetime wherever the party deemed it most useful. Individuals were encouraged to dedicate themselves to serve the Socialist revolution and to renounce their own personal ambitions. It was bourgeois morality that focused on the individual, but Communist morality focused on the peOple.46 —_.h 45As quoted in Current Background, United States Consulate—General, Hong Kong, no. 458, 20 June 1957, p. 15. 46Theodore H. E. Chen, "Elementary Education in China," China Quarter1y_no. 10 (April—June 1962): 108. 205 To assist in the development of the Socialistic Main Line, schools fostered the development of a Communist morality as part of a Socialist education. To prosecute successfully the continuing Chinese revolutions in techr nology, economics, culture, politics, and ideology, "moral education [inspired] . . . self-discipline, born of a deep political consciousness and a realisation of the indi— vidual's duty to the proletarian—socialist cause."47 Education for Science. From the days of the New Culture Movement, when Mr. Science had a special appeal to the Chinese as one solution to their problems, to the Period of the Three Red Flags, when science and technology were needed for China's development, official educational policy aimed at developing science as a necessary tool of progress. Educational efforts to develop in the masses a modern perception of the environment and to undermine their long-held superstitions included "stripping science of its mystery" and "storming the gates of science.“48 In addition to developing popular attitudes toward science, there was attention given to the specialized training of scientists as the key to industrial and military equity with the world's advanced nations. 47Ibid., p. 110. 48Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education in Communist China: Aims, Trends, and Problems," in Ruth Adams, ed., antemporaryChina (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), pp. 269—270. 5_’ I 206 During the Period of Consolidation and Stabilization the best university graduates in science were sent mainly to the Soviet Union for advanced training, but as Sino- Soviet tensions increased the number of students exchanged decreased. Educators and development planners realized the necessity for training manpower in needed technical and scientific competencies and for developing science education. The Chinese leaders gave attention to and paid for extremely expensive, highelevel scientific education, experimentation, and research. Once the Soviets pulled their experts out of China, the Chinese were on their own. If China were to have an atom bomb, she would have to complete it with Chinese expertise. As China moved toward becoming a nuclear power, a special, high~quality education and research facility was created. In September, 1958 the Chinese University of Science and Technology was opened, offering 13 fields of advanced science and technology to 1600 students. This new institution maintained close communication with the Chinese Academy of Science and other research institutes that” trained China's best scientists. At less advanced levels of formal instruction, the science curriculum was modernized and accelerated. The narrowly—trained Chinese scientist was able to adapt the technical processes from the advanced nations to China's needs for greater overall development. 207 Education for “Walking on Two Legs." The "walking on two legs" strategy in education provided for both a rudimentary education for as many students as possible and a quality education for a small number of politically— and academically-qualified students. China had to "walk on two legs" if she were to progress educationally: one leg to provide some schooling to the masses, a second leg to ensure that the best students received the best education possible in the best Chinese schools. Mass schooling minimally satisfied the popular demands for education (one leg) and also served as a channel for continued indoctrina— tion (second leg). Because highly trained and competent personnel were needed as captains of development in indus- try, agriculture, medicine, bureaucracy, education, the military, etc., quality educational institutions enrolled politically reliable but academically superior students. The university “walked on two legs": most students went to Red and Expert Universities, fewer went to regular universities. The curricula "walked on two legs“: formal instruction and productive labor. The government “walked on two legs": shifting financial responsibility to other government units but ensuring that education was expanded. A brief analysis of education reveals a “walking on many legs" strategy, a rational policy for the problems facing China. Schools were operated by industrial plants, by communes, by mines, by street organizations, and by every level of government. There were both general and 208 vocational education, both youth and adult education, both school and home study, and both free and fee-based educa- tion.47 All these educational programs contributed to the development of teaching and learning among the various segments of the population. Quality of Educational Output The statistics on graduates from educational insti— tutions for this period are incomplete. The data that are available give but a very sketchy picture of numerical output for 1958-1960. Figures for 1958 are available, but for 1959 and 1960 little is known. Amidst the confusion of the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath, statistics were probably difficult to collect. One might question whether the Chinese themselves have these data. A Numerical and Content Analysis. The only year for which comprehensive data are available is 1958. Primary school graduates for 1958 increased by 33 per cent over 1957, secondary school graduates increased only about 4 per cent over 1957, and higher education graduates increased by about 30 per cent. (See Table 4—5.) For 1959, only the higher education graduates were reported; this statis- tic reflected a decline of about 14 per cent. A tremendous increase of more than 200 per cent in the number of higher education graduates between 1959 and 1960 indicated that 49Orleans, "Quality of Education," p. 82. 209 the graduates of the hundreds of Red and Expert Universities and of special two—year courses (begun in 1958) helped to inflate the figure. (See Table 5—4.) Table 5-4. Graduates During the Period of the Three Red Flags Year Primary Secondary Higher Education 1958 16,225,000 1,504,000 72,000 1959 --- ——— 62,200 1960 --— --- 135,000 Source: Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Manpower," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and'Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), p . 368-371; and I Wo—Sheng, "Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research—Institute, 1962), 1: 71. The Chinese government released comprehensive statistics of the breakdown of higher education graduates across the disciplines for only one year. Table 5-5. Number of Higher Education Graduates by Discipline for 1958. Engi- Agri- Economics Medi- Natural Educa- Liberal neering culture & Finance cine Science tion Arts 17,499 3,513 2,349 5,393 4,645 31,595 4,131 Source: State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), P. 196. 210 By late 1960 there were approximately 625,000 college and university graduates in China out of a popula— tion of 600 million; this is about one per cent of the urban work force. This percentage is low compared to the 6 per cent for the Soviet Union and 12 per cent for the United States for the same statistic.50 Conclusion The development of China needed an ever increasing number of educated personnel to staff the bureaucracy, command the army, and run the economy. If China were to be a world power, a fully-integrated industrial economy was necessary. Since technical development hinges on literate workers and, in the long term, on an educated mass, the school system had a special function in the overall Chinese strategy for progress. Because of external pressures, the worsening Sino— Soviet relations, internal trends, spreading revisionism, and bourgeois thinking, Mao launched the Three Red Flags in 1958. At the heart of the rapid industrialization and communization drives was the frenetic state of mass enthu— siasm and a belief in achieving the impossible through exerted human effort. The planning authorities attempted to mobilize and regiment China's manpower on an unprecedented scale. The schools had a central role in the party's campaign to generate mass fervor in order to counter the 50New York Times, 28 December 1960, p. 15. 211 shortage of human and material resources needed in the development process. The multifarious school system that emerged from the Great Leap Forward in education accommodated increased numbers of students, generated increased numbers of graduates, created new kinds of schools, instituted work— study programs, and focused on a Red and Expert paradigm. The effect of these new directions stifled creativity and compromised the quality of education. Many of the programs instituted during these years were not properly planned for and suffered from the lack of qualified leadership. Opposition to the dissatisfaction with Mao's policies——industrial, agricultural, educational-— emerged before the Great Leap Forward collapsed. Academi- cians criticized this educational revolution because of its impact on educational standards, but political zealots praised the changes because they ended the exclusive academic orientation of China's schools. In 1958 the agricultural and industrial sectors failed to reach their production targets, while the educa— tional sector surpassed the target number of students to be admitted to school. In 1959 the party admitted to the exaggerated production statistics and revised them down— Ward. Also in 1959, a period of relaxation from the tensions of the previous year's efforts, the educational system attempted to adjust to all the changes thrust upon it. Leaders came to realize that quantitative educational development was of little consequence without parallel efforts to improve educational quality.51 During 1959 and 1960 China suffered from a disrupted economy and unfavorable weather conditions. In the face of these challenges, schools pressured students to study more seriously; serious academic education became more important than student participation in productive labor. Under the weight of the collapsing Great Leap Forward, the temporary halt in the rural communization program, the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, two years of crop failure, and people on the edge of starvation, the counter measures that evolved and were implemented were not of a pure Maoist tradition. The resurgence of elitism and expertise over egalitarianism and redness precipitated the Two-Line Party Struggle. The solutions to the 1958-1960 excesses that appeared in the following period (1961-1965) continued the struggle of determining the national policy for the educational system. 51 . Hu, “Recent Trends in Chinese Education,l p. 14. "By the early 19605, Mao had perceived that he was making little headway in his revitalization of a revolu- tionary China." (Stanley Karnow, Mao and China.) CHAPTER 6 RETRENCHMENT AND THE TWO-LINE PARTY STRUGGLE Following the Great Leap Forward and its collapse, the Chinese social system entered a Period of Retrenchment. The country needed time to recuperate from the strains it endured during the Three Red Flags period and to overcome the economic problems in the early 19605. The Chinese leaders closed factories and schools, suspended construc— tion projects, stopped recruiting rural labor for the urban work force, and generally reappraised the nation's human and material resources. After retrenchment (1961-1962) a struggle between two party factions as to the correct development strategy for China evolved to new heights. The Times: 1961-1965 More exciting and eventful were the years both before and after the Period of Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle. These years were important, however, to 213 214 China's recovery from the excesses of the preceding period and for setting the stage of the events to follow. The regime issued guidelines in 1962——adjustment, strengthening, soundness, and high-quality-—that characterized Chinese efforts of this period to redirect official policy, to regroup economic forces, and to re—evaluate the nation's potential and strategy for overcoming development problems. During these years observers witnessed an internal party conflict that resulted in the most disruptive event in the history of the Chinese People's Republic—-the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Domestic Issues On the domestic front, activities were more eventful in the political than in the economic sphere. The economy was attempting to recover from the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and the crop failures of 1959, 1960, and 1961. Some political leaders had voiced opposition to the Great Leap strategy and advocated a more balanced approach to solving China's problems. Economic Considerations. Increased consumer demand, the pressures of population expansion, two years of poor agricultural productivity, the nation—wide food emergency, and the realization that agriculture was central to China's economy had persuaded the party‘s Central Committee in January 1961 to shift a majority of government resources from focusing primarily on industrial development to 215 agricultural development. In 1961—1962 national policy was modified by planning capital construction projects more carefully, by putting greater emphasis on the agrarian sector, and by marketing more consumer goods. The main thrust of the industrial sector was to mechanize agricul- ture; resources were invested in the production of chemical fertilizer and insecticides, and in farm imple- ment facilities. Three years of natural disaster (1959— 1961) had caused severe problems for the national economy, making rapid and massive industrial expansion out of the question.1 The Second Five-Year Plan ended in 1962; it was less of a success than the First Five-Year Plan. The claimed achievements during the first years of the plan (including the Great Leap Forward) were offset by subse- quent industrial and agricultural production problems. There was but little industrial growth between 1958 and 1965.2 The economy was in such disarray that the Third Five-Year Plan did not begin until 1966. Political Considerations. To counter the popular discontent that resulted from the Great Leap Forward and lTheodore Herman, "Trends in Chinese Agriculture," Current History 45, no. 265 (September 1963), pp. 165-166. 2Choh-ming Li, "China's Industrial Development, 1958—63," in Choh-ming Li, ed., Industrial Development in Communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)?— p. 3; and Jan Deleyne, The Chinese Economy (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973), p. 24. 216 its aftermath, the party inaugurated a class education campaign in the early 1960s. This movement was couched in the philosophy of the class struggle, focusing on a commit- ment to the Communist ideology and to Mao's revolution. The aim of the education campaign was to raise class con- sciousness by making people aware of the pre-liberation evils, exploitation, oppression, and corruption compared to the post-liberation Socialist amenities.3 Schools were included in the class education move- ment. Students studied Marxism-Leninism, the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, and comparative histories of pre« and post- 1949 China. Older peOple were brought into the schools to relate to students their personal recollections of injus— tices of the Kuomintang era. The Communist party also provided appropriate teaching materials that accentuated the differences between the two regimes. The curricula focused on historical analyses of past evils and present glories. Class education was merged with the Mao-sponsored Socialist Education Movement (1962«1966). This new movement aimed at purifying the ideology, attacking revisionism that was again gaining strength, reasserting Socialist controls over the economy and the society, placing politics in command again, criticizing minor party officials, rectifying hsien-level politics, and attacking bureaucratism, 3Theodore H. E. Chen, "New Citizens for a New Society," Current History 49, no. 289 (September 1965), p. 158. 217 commandism, and conservatism.4 Students and teachers were also involved in the Socialist Education Movement. After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese leaders directed a more balanced approach to national development. In agriculture, for example, farmers were permitted private plots on which to grow produce that was sold in the rural markets for individual profit. Such measures, however, were in oppo« sition to Mao's concept of collective responsibility in a Communist society. The Socialist Education Movement was designed, among other things, to pressure farmers to exert more effort on communal-land projects and less on their own private plots, even though these individual plots stimulated agricultural recovery. Between 1963—1965, as the economy gained relative stability, the two—line party conflict within the Central Committee took on greater proportions. Mao would probably have preferred an immediate purge of all rightists in the party, for they insisted on hierarchical authority struc- tures, attempted to run the state for their own purposes, and advocated the capitalist line. The targets of recti— fication were party members in positions of power. The revisionist-revolutionist confrontation was but a portent of the Cultural Revolution (1966—1969). 4Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, Ssu—Ch'in : The Socialist Education Movement of 1962—1966 (Berkeley: University of California-—Center for Chinese Studies, 1968), p. 48. 218 Foreign Issues Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate throughout this period. Khrushchev denounced China's aggressive Taiwan policy and the People's Daily attacked Khrushchev for giving in to U.S. pressure on the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Hostility betWeen the two regimes mounted to an unprecedented degree for these former allies. Red Flag, an official publication of the party's Central Committee, attacked Soviet revisionism, and Pravda, an official publication of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attacked the Chinese for their withholding support from the policy of peaceful coexistence. Editorial combat continued between the state—sponsored presses of China and the Soviet Union. China held that a divided international Communist movement was better than a revisionist one. In response, the Soviet Union excluded China from its communiques to the Communist parties of other nations. One month after Khrushchev compared Mac with Hitler, Khrushchev fell from power (14 October 1964). Within three weeks' time, Chou En—lai went to Moscow by Soviet invita— tion for talks with the new Kremlin leader. But Brezhnev was unable to accommodate Peking's more doctrinaire posi— tion and nothing was resolved between the two Communist powers. Both nations were able to cooperate in their efforts to support North Vietnam. The Chinese permitted E 219 Soviet war materials for Hanoi to pass through China. In 1965, China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, warned the United States of China's intention to enter the war if the U.S. invaded North Vietnam. Chinese scientific achievements had international- political importance. On 16 October 1964 and again on 14 May 1965 China detonated atomic devices and thereby joined the nuclear club. This scientific accomplishment had obvious military significance, but it also provided Peking with prestige in the world community. Inputs to the Educational System The various inputs to the educational system affected the instructional process of the schools. There were direct inputs affecting the internal conduct of an institution, such as party decrees on education, and there were indirect inputs that permeated the educational system in a less—clearly prescribed manner, such as the political atmosphere generated by the social conditions and the major political issues being debated at the time. Both the direct and the indirect inputs had an impact on the func— tioning of the educational system. During the Period of Retrenchment and the Two—Line Party Struggle the inputs were less easily discernable than during other periods. First, there were fewer official proclamations about the exact party line regarding education during these years (1961-1965). Second, the aims of 220 education and the official philosophy of education during the time when the government was trying to bring the country out of its economic difficulties and during the struggle over the means and ends of communism in China had to be extrapolated from the general political situation. And third, after 1960 the Central Government of the People's Republic of China no longer released comprehensive statis- tical information on the allocation of financial resources across budget categories. The clearlyedefinable input factors were fewer and less precise than at previous times. Aims of Education Though there were no high—level government proclama- tions clearly delineating a new set of educational aims for the early 19605, they can be extrapolated from the general debate about, and direction of, education during that time. After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, when govern- ment policy aimed to "consolidate and readjust" because of adverse economic and social conditions, the aims of formal education were modified to conform with the political perspective of the party faction that had temporarily gained control. Ch'en Yi, the long—time Foreign Minister and a high party officer, said in 1961 that the student's first duty was to study in order to become professionally qualified and "as long as students . . . [studied a] pro— fession and [contributed] to the construction of socialism, 221 there [was] no objection to their taking little part in 5 This statement reflected a shift political activities." in basic educational policy within the circles of power from quantity to quality and from political indoctrination to practical academics. Students were to demonstrate their "redness" by acquiring "expertness"; political consciousness was replaced by technical competence in the curricula; and "SOphistication in policies . . . [was] a matter of secondary importance."6 Educationists stressed academic excellence and encouraged students to pursue scholarly interests. Quality education overshadowed education for egalitarianism, for politics, and for productive labor. Although labor and politics were still part of the curri- cula, they were of less importance than previously. This tactical shift in educational policy of rewarding scholarship was counter to Mao's beliefs that ' "manual work moulds the mind," that "man is educated in struggle," and that man learns from reality, not books.7 Rapid expansion of enrollments and a revolutionary educa- tion of the Great Leap Forward gave way to a more orderly, gradual progress through teaching and learning that focused on quality scholarship. 5A5 quoted in China News Analysis, no. 617, 24 June 1966, p. 3. . 6Chang—tu Hu, "Recent Trends in Chinese Education," in International Review of Education 10, no. 1 (1964), p. 17. 7As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 554, 5 March 1965, p. 1. fliwli_r-.~... .._‘__.—r7 in - v. -1 222 In December 1962 the Ministry of Education instructed the provincial governments to provide for "little treasure pagoda" schools. These were special institutions reserved for the better students, staffed by the best teachers, and received the best educational equipment. These schools were established for the children of high-echelon govern— ment officials and PLA officers.8 General secondary schools and universities again focused on theory more than immediately applicable skills, on preparing students for advanced education rather than on developing manpower to meet short—term needs, and on academic performance over political enthusiasm. Enrollment selection for higher-level schools became more competitive than they had been during the Great Leap Forward. The major aim of education in 1961 and 1962 was to educate quality students through rational, academic pro- grams that were based on a realistic appraisal of China's limitations, potentials, and needs, as seen by those who were later accused of revisionism and capitalism. The Period of Retrenchment gave way to the Two-Line Party Struggle in the September 1962 meeting of the Central Committee. The class struggle was revived as the party line, but did not affect the schools until the following spring. Ideological training re—emerged as an important 8Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educa- tional Fact in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Mana ement of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 277—278. 223 part of the curricula; formal education was directed to devote more attention to class consciousness and political education. With more effort directed to developing "redness" among students, educational quality again suffered. In August 1964 the Central Committee issued the "Two Educational Systems and Two Systems of Labor" direc— tive, which established two educational tracks and two kinds of labor for different students. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lu Ting-yi supported this measure in the hope of accommodat- ing their educational philosophy with that of the Maoists. Liu and Lu had enough political support to force through a policy that assured the better students of attending regular full—time schools providing quality instruction with few, if any, productive-labor or political-activity demands. The directive formally resurrected the half—study, half-work schools that had disappeared from the educational scene in 1959.9 The work-study schools were for the chil- dren of workers and peasants who had little hope of becoming serious students or of being admitted to higher levels of education. Liu Shao-ch'i argued that the dual-track system was not contrary to Maoist educational philosophy, but Mao did not support the scheme. Mao held that work—study students 9William F. Dorrill, "Power, Policy,and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," in Thomas W. Robinson, ed., The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 59. 224 had a more acute labor“ and class—consciousness than full— time students, and therefore only a work-study education for all students could guarantee a revolutionary political outlook. The aims of education from 1963 to 1965 centered around the Two—Line Party Struggle. Liu Shao—ch'i advo- cated strong academic programs to educate quality graduates with sophisticated expertise to solve China's industrial and agricultural problems. Mao Tsevtung held that the most important quality formal education could nurture in students was a proper political perspective. During the Two-Line Party Struggle, "redness and expertness" were at the center of the issue. The aims of education during these years (1963—1965) reflected these two philosophical positions and the confusion that surrounded the struggle. External Demands The social and economic conditions in China con- tinued to deteriorate in the early 19605, forcing the Central Committee to proclaim a general retreat. The frenzied expansion that characterized the Great Leap Forward gave way to a more rational policy of consolidation and retrenchment. Out of necessity the government and the party turned much of their attention to problems that centered on agricultural production and adequate food supplies. 225 Although the party was still in control of the educational system, the attention of officials was directed to matters more important to ensuring China's survival. The general policy of retrenchment had an impact on the role of the school during 1961-1962. "Party leaders [had] found that centralized economic planning and concentration on political molding of students [could] not by themselves raise the standard of education and provide China with the necessary trained manpower for national development.“10 Requirements to adhere strictly to the educational dictates of the party were relaxed. This situation permitted the educationists to exert more of their influence on the instructional process. They naturally took steps to improve the quality of educa— tion. For example, the older intellectuals (many had been trained in the West during the Kuomintang era) were brought back to teach, and teachers were given more time to prepare their lessons and required to participate less in political activities and productive labor. Less rigid party control resulted in increased academic proficiency. By 1963 the general economic condition in China had improved and the party reinstituted tighter control of the educational system. Within the realm of politics there erupted a debate between two lines or party factions, which once again changed the direction of formal education in 10Chang-tu Hu as quoted in the Christian science Monitor, 8 April 1963. 226 China. One group of Chinese leaders, lead by Mao Tse-tung, felt that since the students of that period had grown up after the takeover, they had little real understanding of the class struggle or first-hand experience of oppression and exploitation. Therefore, only a revolutionary educa- tion with a strong work—study curricula and political education for all students could provide the graduates with a Communist morality. The other faction in the two—line struggle, led by Liu Shao-ch'i, was labeled "revisionist“ by the Maoists. The revisionists argued that quality education took precedent over quantity and that the acquisition of sub— stantive knowledge was more important to the future of China than students' participation in political or labor activities. Many educationists supported the Chairman of the Republic, Liu Shao—ch'i, because his educational philosophy more closely reflected their own. These two contrasting positions of educational philosophy reflected a more fundamental disagreement between Mao and Liu and their respective supporters regarding the "correct" Communist path for China. Because Liu Shao-ch'i was Chairman of the Republic, he had the political strength to insist on his position in the face of Mao's opposition. Mao had to struggle to maintain his own power and domi- nance within the party. The educational system reflected ramifications of the struggle within the party. Productive labor and 227 political indoctrination were again at the center of the work—study curricula by 1964. The revisionists challenged Mao's educational philosophy by favoring a reduction of political education, military exercises, and student participation in productive labor for the regular, full- time curriculum. The curricular activities to which they objected were the very core of Maoist education.11 The Two-Line Party Struggle set the stage for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During these years (1961-1965) the two opposing party factions built their political support around antagonistic interpretations of the means to be used to achieve communism in China. The revisionists had acquired so much support that they seriously threatened Mao's leadership and control. The Cultural Revolution resolved that issue, at least temporarily. Process Within the Educational System The educational process that took place during the Retrenchment and the Two—Line Party Struggle reflected the general policies of the government and the party as they evolved after the Great Leap Forward and amidst the poli— tical ferment that led to the Cultural Revolution. llMunro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," p. 272. 228 Trends The general direction of education during this period was first a retreat from, then a gradual re-emergence of, Mao's educational policy. After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese educationists moved to correct some of the excesses by instituting serious academic pro- grams. Many low-quality schools were dissolved, others were merged with better institutions. The number of schools and of students declined (the 1960-1961 enrollment statistics were one million less than the 1959—1960 fig— ureslz), the work-study curricula were greatly reduced (but not entirely eliminated) in the regular schools, classroom discipline was restored and enforced, respect for teachers was encouraged--all as part of the Central Commit- tee's national police of retrenchment, consolidation, and readjustment. Talented students received special attention, the number of specialized subjects taught increased, attention was given to improving teacher quality, the time both teachers and students spent at productive labor was reduced, teachers gained a greater voice in local educational matters, many factory-school and farm-school linkages were discon— tinued, and the official line advocated student and teacher dedication to quality academics. 12Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1969," (Occasional Paper 7: Ameri- can Historical Association-History Education Project, 1972), p. 27. (Eric: Ed/063/212) 229 The “Red and Expert" dualism reversed itself from the Three Red Flags period; in fact, the Ministry of Educa- tion between July 1961 and August 1962 attempted to eliminate labor altogether from the curricula.13 And many of the 1958 work—study schools were dissolved by the more conservative administration. Many of the min-pan schools did not meet quality education standards and were closed.14 Many of the rules were relaxed in 1961—1962, allowing students to read a range of older novels not permitted in the curricula earlier. Ideological education and political activities were greatly restricted, while student and teacher participation was not enforced. The "golden age of reason in education“ (1961-1962) came to an end with a re-emergence of Maoist education (1963— 1965). The Communist party resurrected productive labor and a strong political indoctrination program. Part—work, part—study schools reappeared in 1964, integrating theory and practice, teaching and production. Teachers and students were subjected to and took part in criticism of their political beliefs; they were pressured to “surrender their hearts" to the revolution and to the party. China experienced a struggle between two party fac- tions. In support of their position, the revisionists l3Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," p. 281. 14Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., Inc., 1973), p. xxxvii. 230 advocated an education based on hard work, quality instruc- tion, and talented students at higher educational levels. The revolutionists attacked this posture because such tactics developed administrative-technical elites, which was contrary to Mao's more puritanical interpretation of communism. The entire educational system was transferred to a half-work, half-study curricula in December 1965, ending the two—track school system.15 There was little chance of conciliation between Mao and Liu, for their basic positions negated each other's solution to China's problems. In fact, they perceived different problems. For three years the two party factions struggled, ending in effect with Mao declar- ing war on the revisionists in 1966. Agriculture Middle Schools The publicity that accompanied the establishment of the agriculture middle schools during the Great Leap For— ward had disappeared after 1960. The third anniversary of these institutions in March 1961 was not even announced in the Chinese media. As a result of the food crisis, the strains in the agricultural sector, and the growing influ- ence of the Liuists, the agricultural middle schools were curtailed and modified. 15People's Daily, 6 and 11 December 1965, as cited in Donald Munro, "Dissent in Communist China," Current Scene 4, no. 11 (1 June 1966): 5. 231 The agriculture middle schools were intended to combine formal study with practical training in agricultural production so as to train needed junior technicians in agriculture. The curriculum varied across climatic and geographic regions, but included four basic subject areas. Political study included the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the class struggle, and political literature. Language study included calligraphy, focusing on the most commonly used characters the students would encounter in their future work in agriculture. Mathematics courses included the use of the abacus, accounting, and measuring. And agricultural knowledge included crOp rotation, poultry, water conser- vancy, stock—breeding, food creps, or whatever topics were most relevant to the agricultural region in which the school was located. The on-the—spot instructional methodo- logy and the use of experimental plots were combined with work experience on farms.16 These schools extended post-elementary education to many rural primary school graduates. The agriculture middle school, which was really just a junior middle school, not, only absorbed many rural youth, but they were self—support— ing institutions. Half the students‘ time was spent work— ing, which was credited to the schools' accounts. l6Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," in Communist China 1963, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 12; and Selections from China Mainland Magazines, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 475, 21 June 1965, p. 8. .p‘. ) 232 After 1960 many agricultural middle schools insti- tuted a 5-7 schedule: five months of formal instruction during the slow agricultural season and seven months of 17 By the end of continuous labor during the busier months. this period, the agriculture middle school schedules demonstrated a practical flexibility. "The time for study and the time for labor [were] arranged flexibly according to whether it [was] the busy farming season or the slack farming season. On the principle of spending more time on study during the slack season and less time during the high season and closing the school for vacation during the very busy season, . . . the year [was divided] into several periods for study according to the farming season."18 Although beset with problems--a depressed agricul- tural sector in 1959, 1960, and 1961 (accompanied by a shift away from the work—study concept among educationists)—- the agricultural middle school did set the stage for the return of the half-work, half-study schools in 1964-1965. Primary and Secondary Education The Chinese claimed near universal primary education in urban areas during this period; rural school enrollment, however, had to have been somewhat less than universal. 171 Wo-sheng, "Education," in Communist China 1961, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962), 2: 203-205. 18Selections from China Mainland Ma azines, United States ConsulateeGeneral, Hong Kong, no. 4 5, 21 June 1965, p. 7. 233 Cities, towns, and large villages had the resources to provide an elementary education to the students concentrated in these areas. Many rural schools, however, were closed early in the 19605 because of their low academic standards, because many rural areas were hard pressed economically, and because Central Government leadership shifted from quantity to quality education. At the elementary as well as the secondary level, the implementation of quality education included boarding schools and full-day sessions. The secondary school was an important but weak link in the educational system, for the middle schools still could not accept all the primary-level graduates who wanted to continue their education (only one—tenth of the primary school students went on to secondary schoollg), nor could higher education find enough middle-school graduates academically qualified to study at the college and univer- sity level. During the early 19605 the Ministry of Education took steps to improve the quality of academic instruction. For instance, attention was given to updating the science and mathematics curricula. Much of the efforts to improve the quality of education were offset by pressures from Maoist factions to reinstate the work-study curricula. Many full—day schools were changed into half—work, 19C. H. G. Oldham, "Science and Education in China," in Ruth Adams, ed., Contemporary China (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), P. 285. 234 half—study schools, beginning in 1963 and continuing through 1964 and 1965. Full—day schools20 prepared graduates to continue their schooling at the next higher level, while half-work, half—study schools21 prepared students to take up semi- skilled urban industrial or rural agricultural jobs immediately after graduation. The work-study schools were especially important in the rural areas, for this was where the vast majority of people lived and where the largest proportion of students attended school. The work— study schools in the countryside related rural life to agricultural production needs and tried to convince rural students to remain in the countryside and engage in agriculture rather than going on to school in the cities. The half—farming, half—study schools and the min-pan village schools not only instituted an educational scheme that reflected one political philosophy in the party struggle (1963-1965), but it was also a practical solution to the production and financial problems attendant with the Maoist objective of expanding education. More students could attend school and still contribute to 0F For an extensive discussion of fu11——day schools from 1949 through this period, see R. F. Price, EdUCation in Communist China (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), chapter 4. 21See Robert D. Barendsen, Half-Work, Half-Study Schools in Communist China (Washington, D.C.: U.S.‘OffICe of Education, 1964). 235 productive labor, while the Central Government did not have to finance the education of the larger number of students. Enrollment figures for this period were very sketchy. A Canadian visitor to China reported the statis- tics for the middle of this period at 90 million students in the six grades of elementary school, 9 million in the six grades of academic middle school, and 3 million in the vocational-technical-agricultural middle school.22 Teachers The Communist party considered the teachers a significant force in shaping the minds of China's students and through them the nation's future. During periods of intense ideological education, the political reliability of teachers was more important than their intellectual capacity; during times of relaxed ideological fervor, teaching ability took precedent over political perspective. The need for teachers had always out-paced China's capacity to train minimally-qualified instructional person— nel for all levels of education. The gap was at times filled with academically unqualified personnel, but who had the correct political outlook. The problems of teachers in China were both academic and political. Many teachers were inadequately trained for their jobs and almost all had to work with poor— quality instructional materials and facilities. The I 22As.cited in New York Times, 30 June 1963, p. 7E. 235 productive labor, while the Central Government did not have to finance the education of the larger number of students. Enrollment figures for this period were very sketchy. A Canadian visitor to China reported the statis- tics for the middle of this period at 90 million students in the six grades of elementary school, 9 million in the six grades of academic middle school, and 3 million in the vocational—technical-agricultural middle school.22 Teachers The Communist party considered the teachers a significant force in shaping the minds of China's students and through them the nation's future. During periods of intense ideological education, the political reliability of teachers was more important than their intellectual capacity; during times of relaxed ideological fervor, teaching ability took precedent over political perspective. The need for teachers had always out—paced China's capacity to train minimally-qualified instructional person— nel for all levels of education. The gap was at times filled with academically unqualified personnel, but who had the correct political outlook. The problems of teachers in China were both academic and political. Many teachers were inadequately trained for their jobs and almost all had to work with poor— quality instructional materials and facilities. The l 22 As.cited in New York Times, 30 June 1963, p. 7E. 236 curricula were often dominated by political indoctrina- tion and productive labor, requiring their participation. Teachers were periodically harassed by activist students and party cadre for their political views and classroom presentations. The entire ideological function of the schools was supervised by the party; the teachers had to be continually conscious of their political conduct. Teachers were often criticized and attacked during periods of political ferment for their statements made during times of less tension. Having to function within changeable political climates, teachers were not always able to serve the best academic interests of their students and of the nation.23 Higher Education After 1960 there was an abrupt shift in higher educational policy that reflected a turning away from the methods and aims of the Great Leap Forward. The Red and Expert Universities that were created in 1958-1960 dis— appeared in this period; academic programs came to emphasize quality education for scientific and technical advancement; students spent more time on academics and less on produc- tive labor activities. The older and more experienced professors took over from the younger scholars the teaching 23For more information on teachers in China, see R. F. Price, Education in Communist China (London: Rout- ledge & Kegal Paul, 1970), chapter 6; and Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: InternationalfiStudies Group, 1969), section 3. 237 and research in the universities; in addition, the time Spent by older professors in meetings and at administrative chores was greatly reduced. With increased time for study, intensive academic programs offered a wider variety of courses. Greater freedom in the classroom permitted discussion of non- Communist works. Among the foreign languages offered in higher education, English was emphasized. In fact, a knowledge of Russian or English was required for university entrance--no exceptions.24 While college and university enrollments dropped (see Table 6-1), the required years of study increased to 5-6 years.25 With increased attention to quality academics, Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters felt that rationality had returned to higher education in light of the challenges facing China. As Mac began to muster his political forces and challenge Liu's position, certain aspects of higher educa- tion shifted. Professors were no longer permitted to select their best students for post-graduate work, while privileges and preferences increasingly went to students who were politically progressive, ideologically reliable, and either party or league members. The old intellectuals 24China News Analysis, no. 476, 12 July 1963, p. l. 25Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education in Communist China: Aims, Trends, and Problems,“ in Ruth Adams, ed., Contemporary China (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 267. 238 in academia privately complained of the increased emphasis on ideological correctness over technical competency.26 During 1964-1965 the institutions of higher educa- tion were converted to halfework, half-study curricula. The productive labor portion of higher education focused on farming and rural development in the hope of forming student attitudes favorable to living and working in the countryside. In 1965 higher educational institutions established branches in rural areas and offered short-courses to stu- dents who would not otherwise have had an opportunity for such an experience and to students who needed additional professional training. These extension-education programs integrated classroom theory with practical experiences in real-life conditions. Such programs were continued after the Cultural Revolution as part of life-long education, which could have a significant impact on rural medical, educational, and agricultural development. In 1965 political instructors were placed in higher educational institutions to provide political leadership to the school committee, to oversee political education, and to conduct politico-ideological activities among the students. Chinese leaders felt the political instructors were necessary because of the students' failure to acquire the proper political consciousness. Academic studies had 26Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 1954- 239 been more important than political activities; students had not been dedicated to the class struggle. Academicians had valued their freedom to analyze thoughts independently, had resisted pressure to think collectively, and had balked at having to function within the prescribed parameters of accepted Communist doctrine. The political instructors were to remedy these and other shortcomings.27 The Chinese Were reticent to reveal enrollment statistics for this period, but some figures were available as estimates by Western observers of higher education in China. (See Table 6‘1.) Political ferment intensified in higher education, in education generally, and in society as a whole until the eruption of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 that called for a complete purging and reconstruction of the party, of politics, and of education. Outputs of the Educational System During the Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle the outputs of the educational system were influ— enced by the political and economic forces of the period. The economic crisis was the major influence on education during 1961-1962; political considerations came to be the main educational concern during 1963-1965. Throughout the 27Fang Cheng, "Communist China's Education in 1965," in Communist China 1965, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1967), 2: 142—144. 240 Table 6—1. Higher Education Enrollment, 1961-1965. Year Number of Students 1961 955,000 1962 820,000 1963 —-- 1964 -—- 1965 700,000 Sources: l961--Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Sceneyy1949-l967 (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), p. 544; 1962--Dona1d J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 285; and l965-—James Stuart Duncan, "Education in Communist China," NEA Journal 55 (February 1966), p. 37. ‘— first two years there was a shift toward improving the quality of instruction in an attempt to use more efficiently the educational resources of China. In the last three years, politics encroached on academic quality. The Qualities of Educational Output The various qualities the educational process imbued students with reflected the economic needs, political activities, and international events of this period. In addition to carrying over many of the educational qualities from previous periods, the changed tempo of life in China called forth new attitudes and values. -241 Education for Military Trainiag, All schools were required to hold regular classes in military training. Elementary martial skills became part of the primary school curriculum, with middle schools and higher educational institutions undertaking more advanced military training. As part of the schools' general physical fitness program, swimming, mountain climbing, and running, along with other sports of military value, required student par— ticipation. Students and teachers were taught communica— tions (hand-signal, lightvsignal, radio transmitting and receiving, and radio direction finding), marksmanship (gun components, maintenance and cleaning, and firing live ammunition), grenade throwing, bayonet—fencing, sniping, night marching, combat shooting, and other tactics of a people's war. Middle school and college students were sent to junior Eighth Route Army camps during their summer vacations. In addition to regular drill and specialized technical skills, students who went to naval units were given instruc- tion in electrical engineering, gunnery, and radar opera— tions; students who went to army units were given instruc— tion in artillery and infantry; and students who went to air defense units received instruction in anti—chemical warfare and ground crew operations. Education for military training began in 1964 and was expanded in 1965. In addition to creating a “resist— America, aid-Vietnam" sentiment, students were to learn v-1A14- -— 1 242 politics from and acquire a "revolutionary tradition" from the P.L.A. The schools and the military devoted more time to equipping the nation's students with martial attitudes, knowledge, techniques and training.28 Education for Excellence. The educational policies of the Great Leap Forward were reversed in the early 19605. Educational concerns had shifted from quantity to quality. Students were to get back to serious study and serve the revolution by being expert in a chosen discipline. In the fall of 1962, "teaching according to calibre“ had emerged, wherein special attention was given to better students and special help given to slower students. Those with better academic records and strong intellectual interests were required to do more work than other students.29 Students were educated according to academic calibre and not personal political status. Since different students had different cognitive styles and learning abilities, educationists moved in the directions of developing every— one's potentials. Education for the development of excellence in all students was not "education for the talented" by eliminating 28Fang Cheng, "Education,“ in Communist China 1964, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Inst1tute, 1965), 2: 34-36; and Fang Cheng, “Communist China's Education in 1965," 2: 147—150. 29I Wo—sheng, "Education in Communist China During 1962 and a Comparison with Education in the Soviet Union," in Communist China 1962, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute Limited, 1963), 1: 183-185. 243 the majority and developing only the few, as was the case before 1949. In 1962 the majority of students were receiving a basic education, while those of Special ability were receiving special attention. After 1962—1963, higher educational institutions did not haveto accept candidates of lower standards solely because they were recommended by party or government units; in fact, all students who applied to university or college were screened by entrance examinations, with no exceptions.30 University admission policy was highly selective by 1965. Each candidate had to meet three criteria: good health, good ideology, and good scholarship. Although academic programs were compromised by work—study and by political activities, students in higher education were better qualified and did higher quality work than during 1958-1960. Individualized academic programs were interpreted as anti-Maoist because of their potential for elitism, yet collective thinking stifled the better students. The internal forces within formal education and especially higher education were at cross purposes because academic programs could not be both collective (for political reasons) and individualized (for academic reasons). Educators had to compromise one for the other, or both. 30 China News Analysis, no. 471, 7 June 1963, p. 6. 244 Education for World Communication. As Sine-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Chinese rejected the Soviet Union as a model for further emulation. Russian-oriented subjects and educational materials were eliminated from the curricula. Russian language was no longer the first foreign language studied in school. Turning away from Russia was a political reaction; turning toward a limited awareness of other nations was an expedient decision. Because China could no longer look to the Soviet Union for assistance, Peking had to seek elsewhere for the solutions to development problems——namely to the indus— trialized nations. To make use of scientific and technical information generated by the world's industrial powers, China developed the language ability of students in order to translate works from other languages to Chinese. In 1961 English became the first foreign language in the Chinese primary, secondary, and tertiary institu- tions. In addition, German, Spanish, French, and Japanese were added to the curricula of selected institutions.31 In May 1961 the People's Daily expressed the importance of language study: Language "is the tool with which men exchange ideas. Students should not only study their own national language well, they should also learn foreign languages well too."32 311 Wo—sheng, "Education," in Communist China'l961, 2: 200-201; and Lu Hsu-yin, "Education,“fin‘communist'China 1963, 2: 11. ff‘ " 32As cited in I Wo-sheng, "Education," in Communist China 1961, p. 193. . __ .—_.——.- ..__.——.r—-—’i N .vmma mewsu umHsDEEoo s .cowumoscmfichcmno mammllemma an ”N .Ammma .wuouwumcH noucmmom coch "mcom mcomv .mHo> m .mmmd mchO mecsaeoo =.comwmosom= .cewlswm cqlumoma um .m .mmma Mash NH .mwe .oc .mwmmmmcd mzwz cmwcollmmma ocm Homa "moousom ooo.o>H mmma ooo.oom coma 000.0 000.00 000.mm 000.sa 000.0H 000.ss 000.00m mean 000.» .000.0m 000.se 000.0m 000.HH 000.am 000.0sa some --- 000.0e 000.se 00000H -1- 000.em 000.~0H Heme nonpo muocoooa ccwowooz muouaooflumm mocweow mmoccemcm moumsomnw Hcmw .mmmauaema .mmpmstmuo soapsoasm “madam .mue masse 251 The percentage of higher education graduates with proletarian backgrounds continued to increase. During the First Five-Year Plan the graduates with a worker-peasant background represented but 20 per cent of the total number of higher education graduates. By the Retrenchment— Struggle period, this figure had risen to between 50 to 55 per cent. The number and percentage of graduates who were party or league members had also risen--to 62 per cent by 1963.41 Conclusion As has been indicated previously, two major features characterize this period: retrenchment and struggle. Retrenchment was an economic necessity, for China was facing disaster in the agricultural sector. And since the Chinese economy was in the main agrarian, with the vast majority of the population living in rural areas, the droughts and floods of 1959, 1960, and 1961 had serious national reper— cussions. The methods employed during Retrenchment to see China through these bad times were political suicide from Mao's point of view. Ideological commitment would not solve the grave challenges Peking had to deal with if China were to survive. Once the crisis was over and the economy gained strength, the revolutionaries again applied pressure to reinstate the doctrine—-“politics in command." 41Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," in Communist‘China 1963, 252 A struggle ensued between the rightists and the leftists, or between the revisionists and the revolution- aries. The issue centered on the method to be used to achieve communism in China. One faction, led by Liu Shao-ch'i, advocated expertness, learning, serious aca- demics, urban development--based at least in part on the Soviet model. The opposing faction, led by Mao Tse-tung, advocated redness, politics, practical training of immed- iate use, rural development—-creating the Chinese model. The struggle that occurred evolved into the Cultural Revolution. "The reform of the old educational system . . . is an extremely important task of the current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." (Peo le's'Dail , Octo er .) CHAPTER 7 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH Domestic politics of the late 19605 and foreign affairs of the early 19705 placed Peking at the center of world attention to a degree unprecedented since the take9 over. The Cultural Revolution modified the boundaries of social institutions to promote the development of communism in China. International relations between Communist China's old friend, the Soviet Union, and old enemy, the United States, underwent unexpected changes. The dynamics of the Cultural Revolution produced chaos among the social insti- tutions of the Chinese superordinate system; the relation— ships between the centers of power and authority of the Soviet, the American, and the Chinese social systems shifted the balance of power in Asia. Before 1970 the domestic scene underwent a revolution unlike any in history; after 1970 China's admission to the United Nations and Peking's relations with the Russians, the Japanese, and the 253 254 Americans indicated an awareness of the need for participa- tion in the world order. The Times: 1966-1973 Great progress and great change characterized these years. This was a period of contrasts. China, basically an agrarian society, not only further developed its nuclear capability but also launched a satellite. China, one of the centers of world communism, came to blows with the Soviet Union in 1969. China, known historically to have treasured age—old traditions, underwent a Cultural Revolu— tion that supposedly dispelled any remnant of the past. China turned inward and made revolutionary changes, and turned outward to develop more moderate relations with other world powers. Domestic Affairs The Great Leap Forward focused primarily on altering economic forces and affected the political structure only indirectly; the Cultural Revolution focused primarily on altering political forces and affected the economic struc- ture but slightly. Although both events disrupted the social order, the Great Leap Forward was much.shorter, and was of a less profound and lasting impact than the Cultural Revolution. Nearly all institutions within the Chinese super— ordinate system were affected by the Cultural Revolution. 255 The economy was slowed, the schools were closed, the party was purged, and the military gained a dominant position in Chinese politics. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the most socially disruptive and politically insecure period in the history of the Chinese People's Republic. In the aftermath of these events, the social system began to return to a quieter pace of continuing revolution. Mao had triumphed over his political enemies, the army was 'eased out of its locus of political power, and the party was rid of unworthy, anti-Maoist elements. Economic Considerations. In the midel9605 economic policy planners were facing several issues, among them population growth, agriculture versus industry, and increased military expenditures. Chinese leaders had become aware of the impact of demographic factors on the rate of overall development, for "unless population growth [were] brought under control, any improvement in the standard of living [would] be retarded in spite of the growth of production."1 Various social measures were imple- mented to curb birth rates, including discouraging romantic entanglements among students and forbidding marriage before graduation. Agriculture, the foundation of the Chinese economy, had to share the economic spotlight with industry, again a E lYuan-li Wu, "The Third Five-Year Plan: An Economic Dilemma," Current History 51, no. 301 (September 1966): 160. 256 major contender for government—allocated resources. Because of a Soviet threat to the north and the possible escalation of the Vietnam conflict to the south, the military demanded larger resource allocations to keep its conventional forces modern and to develop a nuclear capability. The Third Fiveerar Plan (1966—1970) began in January 1966, but soon became lost in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards were admonished not to inter- fere with production. In December, 1966, however, the struggle reached the factories and communes because "anti— Maoist groups extended material benefits to workers . . . thus encouraged them to fight against the Cultural Revolu— tion."2 The Red Guards responded by invading the economic sector. The struggle that ensued between Red Guards and workers seriously disrupted industrial production, the transportation system, the distribution of goods, and rural commune activities. The disruption of normal economic activity characterized at least the first years of the Cultural Revolution. The Japanese Foreign Office estimated in March 1971 that China's economy had achieved pre-Cultural Revolution alevels by 1969 and that further gains were made in 1970.3 2Chu-yuan Cheng, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Economy," Current History 53, no. 313 (September 1967): 154. 3Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic of China from October 1,1949 (Totowa, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1972), p. XII. .—__.—_ .. _.._.. M,_—,.__.l_ .1 _ . A. .. _, . .. ....-.__._ 257 Western analysts judged that the Chinese economy recovered from the disturbances and quickly moved on to new produc- tion heights by 1971. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971- 1975) reflected a pragmatic policy of "orderly progress, consolidation, and balanced development"; and according to Red Flag it focused on "heavy industry as the ultimate development goal, [the] foundation [of which] would be laid through rapid development of agriculture and light indus~ tries."4 The decentralization of industrial production was a post—Cultural Revolution policy. The Chinese strategi— cally deployed industrial complexes by dispersing factories, workshops, and personnel to rural areas throughout the country. The policy of strategic deployment had both military and economic significance. The geographical redis« tribution of industry was a protective measure against possible enemy attack. It was also to take full advantage of local resources and "to create a small but complete industrial system in every province in the process of economic development."5 The political decision to disperse industrial production had the economic advantage of promot~ ing development throughout the country by reversing the natural trends that tend to concentrate geographically both wealth and expertise in urban areas. 4Kuan—I Chen, "The Outlook for China's Economy,“ Qgrrent History 63, no. 573 (September 1972): 105. 5Cheng, A Chronology of the People's‘Republic . . . p. XII. I 258 Political Considerations. -Since the takeover two schools of thought had been struggling against one another within the Chinese Communist Party as to the proper method of national development. At issue was whether social institutions were to serve the interests of the proletariat or the elites at the expense of the masses. Liu Shao-ch'i, Lu Ting-yi,and their supporters were accused by Mao Tsestung of manipulating the bureau— cracy and the means of production in the interest of an elite, and of entrenching class privilege in the Chinese social structure. The elitists were charged with concen— trating the best resources--human and materia1—-in urban centers to develop a capacity for directing and overseeing a modern industrial sector as a means to China's national development. Such a strategy fostered bureaucratic centralism,focused on capital—intensive projects, generated competition among individuals, developed elites, and put "technology in command." Emphasis on technical development, as Opposed to social transformation, had an impact on the Ination's schools. An educational system to serve such a policy would require the best schools to provide many years of quality instruction in the disciplines related to urban, industrial production. The few students in such a system would be separated from the masses, from physical work, and from the real world—-at least, so charged the supporters of Mao Tse-tung. Such an educational structure would produce 259 elites who, in the past, had refused to comply with the dictates of a proletarian dictatorship and had challenged the very foundation of Mao's perpetual revolution. Urban schools would be unable to deal with rural problems; students from the countryside would be denied a quality education of equal calibre. Entrance requirements to quality schools favored students with a literate home environment and placed applicants with a worker—peasant background at a disadvantage. Such schools could only promote class privilege.6 Mao Tse-tung attacked Liu's philosophy and strategy because it aimed at developing a technical and administra- tive elite, which had no place in the Communist social structure. The class struggle and the production struggle were to be combined, while institutions that separated the two (and promoted selected class privileges) were attacked. Mao's political and economic development strategy centered on local differences, diversity, and experimentation. National development depended on solving rural problems with simple techniques that were immediately applicable, and on labor-intensive projects. To implement Mao's policy required a diverse school system to meet the varied rural conditions across China. To resolve the disagreement among the national leaders over the nature of the party's basic goals and 6Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionarnyducation in China: Qgcuments and Commentary_(White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1973), p. xxxii. 260 5 strategies, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. He felt that the real struggle within China's institutions centered on the ideological perspective of the leaders and the peeple. The solutions to other issues-- economic, military, etc.--would be determined by the out— come of the ideological revolution. Fearing revisionism and an interuption of China's permanent revolution, Mao moved to ensure an “ideologically pure, revolutionary environment," emphasizing "indoctrina— 7 Out of this re-education tion and spiritual revival." would be found solutions to China's problems. The thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and his basic philoso- phy were central to the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution. "It was to prevent such a 'capitalist restoration' in China that the Maoists sought to change the outlook of society by establishing the absolute authority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."8 The incident that sparked the Cultural Revolution centered on the criticism of Wu Han's theatrical production, Hai Jui Dismissed from Office. This play about the injus~ tice done a loyal public official for his honest criticisms by the sovereign during a past dynasty drew a strong parallel to Mao's dismissing Marshall P'eng Te—huai, 7William F. Dorrill, "Power, Policygand Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,“ in Thomas W. Robinson, ed., The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of—California Press, 1971), p.‘797 8 Ibid. 261 Minister of Defense. (Mao felt that P'eng was antagonistic to the Maoist philosophy, and therefore Should not OCCUPY such an important post.) An article that appeared in a Shanghai newspaper on 10 November 1965 criticized Wu Han and the play. This seemingly unimportant criticism at the time, in fact, sparked the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The ideological struggle became entwined with the power struggle within the party. There develOped an extensive purge, not only of the party to the highest echelons, but also of many institutions central to Chinese society. Along with party and government officials, university presidents, mayors, artists, teachers, journalists and other intellectuals were removed from their posts. To undermine the power of the revisionist-capitalist authorities, Mac was willing to disrupt the functioning of China's social institutions, including formal education. The most revolutionary elements of the movement were the Red Guards--the vanguard of the Cultural Revolution. Their chief contribution was in attacking the established order based on revisionist—capitalistic tenets and in forcing a re—examination of China's social institutions. In essence, the Red Guards served a destructive function, necessary for revolutionary transformation. (Mao held that there was "no construction without destruction.") In August and September of 1966 the Red Guards became increaSs ingly disruptive and violent. In December they denounced 262 anti-Maoist elements within the party, singling out Liu Shao-ch'i as the "Khrushchev of China." (Liu was offi- cially stripped of his government post and party membership in October 1968.) Red Guard violence and terrorism got out of hand in 1968; the army was called upon to restore order by moving on the schools and destroying the Red Guards' power base. In the process the army, under the direction of Lin Piao, established itself as a political force c105e to central decision—making. Since the government and the party had been dis— credited, government in the provinces, municipalities, and institutions rested in the authority of the revolutionary committees--a three—way alliance of power between the PLA, trusted party cadre, and the people. These committees replaced bourgeois thinking with diversity, experimentation, and the thoughts of Chairman Mac. Mac had strengthened his own brand of communism, at least temporarily. As part of the total revolution, class struggle and ideological reform were central to shifting the human patterns of thought and behavior. The transition to communism would be hastened by liquidating bourgeois, reactionary, and revisionist elements from the society. The revolution consisted of two stages: destruction and construction. Attention turned toward restructuring the party and writing two new party constitutions in the late 19605 and early 19705. Mao's aim was twofold in perpetuat- ing the Cultural Revolution: "to change the structure of 263 power in society, and to carry out an irreversible trans— formation in the pattern of thought and behaviour of the Chinese people."9 During the Cultural Revolution10 many high—ranking party leaders were purged, while Lin Piao, Minister of Defense and long-time party member, emerged as Mao's chosen 5uccessor-—to be the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin was reported killed, however, in a plane crash as he was fleeing to the Soviet Union after being involved in an assassination plot against Mao Tse-tung. On 26 A December 1973 Mac was 80 years old and yet no successor to the old guard had been clearly designated. The question of succession bears directly on the direction China will take in the post-Mao era. Foreign Affairs Although the Chinese and the Soviets were thrown together by their mutual interests in Vietnam, Moscow accused Peking in 1966 of interfering with the overland flow of war material from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam. QStuart R. Schram, "Introduction: The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authorityj Participation and Cultural Chan e in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) p. 85. . 10For additional and more detailed information on the Cultural Revolution, see Edward E. Rice, Mao' 5 Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Stanley Karnow, Mao and China, From Revolution to Revolution (New York: The Vikingi Press, 1972); and Richard Baum and Louise B. Bennett, eds. China in Ferment (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice— Hall, Inc., 1971). 264 The Chinese continued to blast the Russians as traitors to the Communist world revolution and'to be in the imperialist camp of the West. Moscow accused Mao of promoting his own personality cult as the basis of dictatorship in China. Sino-Soviet tensions, initially generated over different interpretations regarding the speed and manner of promoting world revolution, reached the point of military skirmishes and intimidation. Armed border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops first occurred in March, 1969. In August, Peking warned the peOple to prepare for conflict because the Soviet Union was mobilizing for war against China. The Soviets countered with the warning that atomic weapons would be used if war did break out. Kosygin changed the direction of events by stopping in Peking after attending Ho Chi'Minh's funeral in Hanoi. The border clashes ceased and Sine-Soviet negotiations started in October 1969. The exchange of ambassadors in 1970 defused the imminently explosive confrontation. Whereas the Sine—Soviet conflict was a curious turn of events between two ideological giants of the Communist camp, the Sine-American rapprochement was a surprising move toward reconciliation between two ideological enemies of different camps. The long—time archenemy of the Chinese Communists, the United States, established closer ties with Peking. Washington softened its position toward Peking by permitting increased trade with, and by allowing American citizens to travel on, the Chinese mainland. The single, 265 most important event of the new policy turnabout was the American presidential visit to China in February 1972. Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka also improved Tokyo- Peking relations by visiting the Chinese capital in September 1972. Both the U.S. and Japan had been considered by the Communists to be China's foremost enemies. Did the events of the early 19705 indicate that Peking's perceptions of the world had changed? China was growing in strength, was an increasingly important regional power, and was an economic, if not a political, model toward which the underdeveloped world might look. Peking's admission to the United Nations was the crowning glory of China's international achievements. With such an advantageous international posture, only the future will reveal how China will reSpond to and use this potential to improve Peking's standing among nations. A policy of "revolutionary pragmatism" may ensure a place for Peking in the dynamic international order and will permit China to remain true to Mao's continuing revolution. Inputs to the Educational System Although the Cultural Revolution was a confusing event in China's national experience, the social and educa- tional aims of the party were more clearly delineated in the aftermath. Some of the inputs to the formal educational system were unknown, such as Central Government budget allocations and local educational expenditures, and some 266 inputs were clearly stated, such as the aims of education and the manner in which the schools were to serve the political state. The political debate about education also had an impact on how the schools were to function.11 The struggle reached such an intensity that the schools were closed, some of them for four and five years; once reopened, the schools struggled to fulfill the party's educational objectives. Aims of Education The educational system was a prime target of the Cultural Revolution, and well it should have been because schools produced the successors to the revolution in China. Next to the party, the schools underwent more sweeping reforms than did other social institutions. Mao felt that "there must be a revolution in education and [that] prole- tarian politics must lead"12 in order to eliminate vestiges of bourgeois, revisionist, and feudal influence in the schools. The educational revolution was to eliminate the evils of the past and the threats of the present. (The May 7 Directive and the Sixteen-Point Directive, along with . 11For a Communist analysis of the political debate about education from the takeover through the early years of the Cultural Revolution, see "Chronology of the Two-Road Struggle on the Educational Front in the Past Eighteen Years," in Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China: Documents=\and.'Commentary (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1973), pp. 5- 50; or in Chinese Education 1, no. 1 (Spring 1968): 3958. 12As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 723, 20 August 1968, p. 2. 267 other documents, generated discussion in both the Chinese and western press about the aims and design of education.) The Cultural Revolution aimed at smashing the bour- geois intellectual domination of the educational system. Chief opponent of Mac was Liu Shao-ch'i who was accused of urging students to study hard in order to become officials. After the Cultural Revolution the young were educated in the importance of the collective good and not trained to become a member of the elite to exploit the proletariat. Intellectual achievement was no longer an aim of education; social consciousness became the focal point of formal education. Individualism was not the best ethic in a Communist society. Rather, a basic educational aim was to fight selfish interests, to develop collectivism, and to focus on the needs of the people. Education concentrated on developing among students the attitude of serving the people, not one's self. Education after the Cultural Revolution was designed to overcome seVeral differences that were perceived as barriers to Mao's national development strategy. Education was to abolish the inequality that sprang from the geographic discrimination between urban and rural areas, to eliminate the status difference between mental and manual labor, and to undermine the administrative advantage of academics (intellectuals) over the proletariat (workers and peasants). Education was the means to break down these barriers that 268 separated people; it was not the means of becoming a member of the elite. Education was to equip students to participate in and contribute to the society and the economy. In carrying out this objective, Chinese schools related education to community needs. “Mao Tse—tung had argued that schooling should be integrated with works—both to educate students in the grass-roots realities of China's economy and to prevent them from feeling superior to workers and peasants."13 Knowledge imparted in school was judged by its social usefulness. One charge leveled at formal education during the Cultural Revolution was that it was irrelevant to the problems of the real world and that it was divorced from China's needs. In addition to teaching subject matter directly related to the world of work, all students had to combine a practical labor experience with their formal classroom instruction. Under the direction of revolutionary committees, school and practical work were integrated for all students. The primacy of political education was reassured. Not only were there courses that focused on political activities and the thoughts of Mao Tse—tung, but the entire curricula had a political flavor with every subject reflect— ing the continuing revolution against vested interests. Education was political because the primary task of the schools was to develop the political reliability of the 13Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1972. 269 young. Achievement was based more on ideological purity and political indoctrination than on intellectual agility and academic ability. Proletarian politics was the very heart of Communist education after the Cultural Revolution. The ultimate aim of education in the Chinese PeOple's Republic was and is to change society from a selfish and competitive environment to a selfless and cooperative human condition. External Demands Mao Tse-tung moved to regain control of the party in the face of the challenge to his leadership by the revision— ists. Drastic measures were necessary because many of the party's Central Committee members supported Liu and his development strategy. Apart from purging the party, the Cultural Revolution focused on educational reform. The tempo of the Socialist revolution in education was set by the May 7 Directive-—a letter sent by Mao Tse-tung to Lin Piao of 7 May 1966. In the letter Mao stated that “while [students'1main task is to study, they should also learn other things. They should study not only literature but also industry, agriculture, and military affairs; they should also criticize the bourgeoisie. The period of school- ing must be shortened and education must be revolutionized. The atmosphere in which the bourgeois intellectuals control our schools must not be allowed to continue any longer.“14 l4PeOple's Daily (25 October 1967), as cited in Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. 65.66. 270 The Directive also urged that proletarian education include the class struggle as the main subject, and that teaching, productive labor and scientific research be combined.15 Also in May the "big character poster" campaign, which touched off the debate about the educational system, started at Peking University and quickly spread to other institutions. Mao followed with his own posters—"bombard the headquarters"-«igniting the onslaught of criticism of top party leaders accused of suppressing the_revolution. The Tsinghua University middle school poster--"to rebel is justified"—-established the atmosphere in which the Red Guards conducted their part of the Cultural Revolution. Schools were closed in June 1966 to facilitate revolutionizing the educational system. This State Council decision freed students to "make revolution.“ Red Guard units attacked anti-Maoist elements and pursued the party line (that is, the Cultural Revolution) with increased violence and exercised their Mao-sanctioned “right to rebel." In transforming China's political, social, and educational institutions, the Red Guards criticized, attacked, and terrorized party officials, government bureaucrats, intels lectuals, and educationists. On August 1966 the Sixteen-Point Decisions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was adepted sub— sequent to the Cultural Revolution being made the party _‘ 15Peking Review, no. 20, 14 May 1971, p. 4. 270 The Directive also urged that proletarian education include the class struggle as the main subject, and that teaching, productive labor and scientific research be combined.15 Also in May the "big character poster" campaign, which touched off the debate about the educational system, started at Peking University and quickly spread to other institutions. .Mao followed with his own poster—«"bombard the headquarters"--igniting the onslaught of criticism of top party leaders accused of suppressing the revolution. The Tsinghua University middle school poster-~"to rebel is justified"--established the atmosphere in which the Red Guards conducted their part of the Cultural Revolution. Schools were closed in June 1966 to facilitate revolutionizing the educational system. This State Council decision freed students to "make revolution.“ Red Guard units attacked anti-Maoist elements and pursued the party line (that is, the Cultural Revolution) with increased violence and exercised their Mao-sanctioned "right to rebel." In transforming China's political, social, and educational institutions, the Red Guards criticized, attacked, and terrorized party officials, government bureaucrats, intel— lectuals, and educationists. On August 1966 the Sixteen-Point Decisions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was adopted sub- sequent to the Cultural Revolution being made the party 15Peking Review, no. 20, 14 May 1971, p. 4. 271 line. This program, which provided guidelines to revolu- tionary activities, contained an educational statement: In the great proletarian cultural revolution a most important task is to transform the old educational system and the old principles and methods of teaching. In this great cultural revolution, the phenomenon of our schools being dominated by bourgeois intellec- tuals must be completely changed. In every kind of school we must apply thoroughly the policy advanced by Comrade Mao Tse—tung, of educa- tion serving proletarian politics and education being combined with productive labor, so as to enable those receiving an education to develop morally, intellec- tually and physically and to become laborours with socialist consciousness and culture. The period of schooling should be shortened. Courses should be fewer and better. The teaching material should be thoroughly transformed, in some cases beginning with simplifying complicated material. While their main task is to study, students should also learn other things. That is to say, in addition to their studies they should also learn industrial work, farming and military affairs, and take part in the struggles of the cultural revolution as they occur to criticize the bourgeoisie.16 In December 1966 students were ordered by both the State Council and the Central Committee to return to school, but there was no response. Six months before, in June, senior middle schools and universities were officially sus- pended to permit the students to make revolution. Primary and junior middle schools also suspended operation and their students took part in the Red Guard movement. Six months was felt to have been enough time to complete the necessary reforms. 16PekingyReview, no. 33, 12 August 1966, p. 10. 272 Throughout 1967 the students were repeatedly asked to return to school, for the Red Guards had outlived their usefulness. Violence increased as the students roamed the country; the situation got out of hand. Mao attempted to get China's youth under control again by redirecting their revolutionary spirit to bring the Cultural Revolution to the classroom. Primary and middle school students partially complied with the back-to-school orders: students spent only an hour or two each day in school to study Mao's quotas tions, with the rest of the day devoted to revolutionary activities in the streets. Students were in no mood to obey teachers after having defied authorities for several months. The Red Guards from higher educational institutions refused to return to school after one year of revolutionary activity. Many were far from their home universities, and while in distant cities looking for anti-Maoist elements to denounce, they provoked resentment from the local people. Confrontations occasionally erupted in violence. There was also political factionalism among rival Red Guards, who often did battle with one another. Each faction claimed they were following the party line and that others were rightists, revisionists, and enemies of the Cultural Revolution. Conditions in some schools that were operating became so unruly that the army was called in to establish order. Chairman Mao's March 7 (1968) Directive ordered the army to "give political and military training in the universities, middle schools, and higher classes of primary ._“‘.n.......-_.,_., or. _. __.— 273 schools . . . [to] help in reOpening school classes, strengthening organization, setting up the leading bodies on the principle of the 'three-in-one' combination."l7 It was too much to ask students to return voluntarily to a quiet academic routine after traveling widely and doing whatever they chose without being held responsible for their acts. Students were unwilling to surrender their freedom to teachers they had publicly denounced and maltreated. Many students refused to listen to their teachers--resulting in lack of discipline in school. The back-to-school movement went slowly and the government was unable to get schools Operating smoothly for some time. The violence between Red Guard factions racked many schools; campuses became the battlegrounds for rival groups. Several students died in the violent clashes that occurred in the universities in Peking in the summer of 1968.18 The PLA had initially been directed to avoid violent confrontations with the Red Guard. When the students became too disruptive and unresponsive to party directives, the army took action. In March 1968 Mac directed the military and the workers' Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams to restore order in the schools and to establish revolutionary committees to administer the educational institutions in 17People's Daily (8 March 1968) as quoted in Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. 107. 18 New York Times, 8 July 1968, p. 2. _._...—__._. i. ,. m ' _. . .. . _..~r_._,r_.i_H,_.H_iH _._t.__._i_*___fii,__~_. .- 274 a compliance with the party line.19 In effect, the army had taken over by dominating the revolutionary committees of educational institutions from primary school to university. In 1968 the destructive stage of the revolution ended and the construction phase began. In fact, the real revolution in Chinese education began in 1968; it was inspired by the May 7 Directive. Mao's revolutionary education focused on popularization of locally established and supported primary and junior middle schools. This pro- gram was designed to save central government financial resources, to destroy the domination of schools by bour- geois intellectuals, to coordinate education with productive labor, and to ensure that China's youth were never separated from the proletariat.20 The Cultural Revolution ended with the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969: politics returned to a quieter pace of revolution. The Red Guards were disbanded and attention turned to serious educational reform. Many Red Guards saw returning to school as a compromise with the old system and were reluctant to surrender the power they had won during the previous years. Over 200,000 students, teachers, and administrators were sent to farms and to 19 xxiv-xxxi. 2osm'. Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1969," (Occasional Paper 7: American Historical Association—-History Education Project, 1972), pp. 40—43. (ERIC: ED/063/212) Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. 275 factories to labor with and learn from the working class. The recalcitrants, like the rightists before them, were identified, separated, and sent to PLA forced-labor farms to cleanse their thoughts. By 1970 schools at all levels were again open. Tsinghua University, China's foremost polytechnic and once the model institutions of higher education, resumed classes in 1970. Yet classes in many other universities did not begin until 1972. Because criticism remained part of the political scene, and students and professors were still being shipped off for ideological remolding, 1970—1972 was an experimental period for the universities. There were fewer students attending universities, the length of courses was cut in half, buildings were in disrepair, and soldiers were posted in the universities.21 During the Cultural Revolution and the immediate aftermath, several tens of thousands of specialists had not trained at colleges and universities, thus denying this expertise to national development. This was a severe blow to a nation that proclaimed self—reliance in development. Since 1970 the Chinese leaders have been concerned about the indifference exhibited by those in positions of responsibility toward education. "Those who regarded educational matters as of secondary importance have been rebuked, and they have been reminded that 'if education 21China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, 276 does not follow the pace of economic development, the speed of economic development will be slowed down.”22 Process Within the Educational System A central aim of every nation's educational system is to cultivate political leaders and cultural successors. The left wing of the Chinese Communist Party was dissatis- fied with the direction of political, economic, and educa- tional development in the first half of the 19605 and precipitated the Cultural Revolution to rectify the situa- tion. To secure their own future, the party leftists pre- ferred giving an education to the politically trustworthy who might not be academically gifted rather than educating talented students who could not be trusted. To reverse the trends of the early 19603 the old educational system had to be destroyed and a new Maoist system constructed. One aim of the Cultural Revolution was to create a new educational structure capable of pro-. ducing graduates who would spearhead the continuing Socialist revolution. Many urban primary and secondary schools were closed for two years (1966-1968), and when they reopened there was little guidance on specific educational matters. (The Ministries of Education and Higher Education had been dissolved during the Cultural Revolution.) The colleges 22John Gardner and Wilt Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., AuthOrity,‘Partici- pation, and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 267. 277 and universities were closed for at least three years (1966-1969), and when they reopened classes did not get under way until 1970, or in some cases 1972. The resumption of normal operations at educational institutions went slowly for a number of reasons: student discipline threatened teacher security, school plants needed repair because they had been used as dormitories by the traveling Red Guards, and the old textbooks were unacceptable for the bourgeois-revisionist ideas they contained. After the Cultural Revolution education was in a state of confusion, for schools in different areas had different experiences during the years 1966-1969. For example, all urban schools had been closed for at least two years, but many rural schools had remained in operation throughout the Cultural Revolution. The emphasis on localism also generated a variety of educational programs, many of which were reminiscent of pre—l966 programs. One reason for this was that new textbooks and teaching materials had not been quickly developed when the school reopened. A number of changes, however, had been proposed in 1967 that provided general guidelines to the post—Cultural Revolution educational system: abolish examination, reduce the number of years spent in school, fully implement half- work, half-study curricula, all students to receive military training, curricula to emphasize Maoism, political control 278 of schools, and students to partake in productive labor in lieu of summer and winter vacation.23 Out of the national turmoil, political instability, and economic disruption, the ideology was purified, the party cleansed, the national purpose clarified, and the educational system restructured. Mao's Charges Mao had long distrusted both the more orthodox educational system and the intellectuals it produced. He accused the intellectuals of political backsliding, espec- ially after the Hundred Flowers campaign. Old professors were attacked for not completely accepting the doctrine of Mao, for corrupting China's youth with anti-Maoist ideas, and for favoring students with a bourgeois back— ground over those with a proletarian upbringing. Mao's educational strategy met with resistance in the early 19603. WOrk—study schools were closed on a massive scale, urban schools received the largest state subsidies, and educationists proved inflexible and unable to adjust to varied local conditions. He charged that schools, which were influenced by Liu Shao—ch'i, over“ emphasized conventional (theoretical) subjects, scholarly achievement, and good grades. Academic standards main- tained by bourgeois educationist forced many students from 23Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China . . .," p. 41. 279 peasant families to drop out of school. ‘Mao attacked formal education for not meeting China's immediate needs, for overemphasizing the abstract, for educating too many students to an unnecessarily high degree, and for develop’ ing elitist attitudes among students.24 Mao feared that schools would graduate people who felt superior to the masses, and who made a clear distinc« tion between the elite and the proletariat, and between intellectual and manual labor. If changes were not made, the schools would produce a ruling class that would use the educational system to ensure their own privileged position in society.25 Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution as a struggle against an opposing party faction and against the educa- tional system that had develOped in support of his politi- cal opponents. Maoist education focused on training more peOple in ways that Mao felt to be more appropriate to China's needs and to support his interpretation of communism. The Cultural Revolution destroyed schools as breeding grounds for bookish elites, who were by definition divorced from the realities of the daily struggle of the masses. The educational system that grew out of the chaos (1966-1968) was to produce graduates who would be both "Red and Expert." h 24Gardner and Idema, “China's Educational Revolu— tion," p. 259, p. 264. 25Stewart E. Fraser, "Educational Development Stemming from the Cultural Revolution," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), p. 544. Administration The revisionists had centralized administrative control of the school system through the Ministries of Education and Higher Education, which the revolutionists claimed were bureaucracies staffed by anti—revolutionary elitist professionals. Party leftists charged that an inflexible educational system had resulted from bureau- cratic regulations and a standardized routine, which created static modes of Operation that were unable to prosecute the continuing revolution. The Ministers of Education and Higher Education were relieved of their posts in June 1966. The ministries were replaced with a work group (Science and Education) established in the State Council to keep the educational system progressing in-a prescribed direction. The unifying factor during this period was no longer the bureaucracy, but rather the ideology of Mao's thought.26 During the Cultural Revolution a new type of educa- tional leadership emerged. At the highest levels the Central Committee oversaw ideological education, while the State Council looked after general educational administra- tion. At the intermediate levels, the education departments of provincial, hgien, and municipal revolutionary committees carried on more specific and detailed educational tasks. The decentralization of control and financial responsibility put production brigades in charge of rural primary schools, 26Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 281 rural communes were responsible for middle schools, neigh— borhood or street committees controlled urban primary schools, and factories and urban communes controlled secondary schools in the cities.27 Regarding the administration of schools, Mao felt that In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education, it is essential to have working—class leadership; it is essential for the masses of workers to take part and, in co-operation with Liberation Army fighters, bring about a revolu- tionary "three-in-one" combination, together with the activists among the students, teachers, and workers in schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution in education through to the end. The workers' propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism- transformation in the schools, and they will always lead the schools. In the countryside, the schools should be managed by the poor and lower- middle peasants--the most reliable ally of the working class.23 In February and March 1967 army teams entered urban schools to prevent anarchy, and from July 1968 worker propaganda teams supported by the military began function— ing as an administrative apparatus. In the countryside there was no uniform procedure, resulting in wide local variation of administration.29 27Gardner and Idema, "China’s Educational Revolu— tion," p. 268. 28As cited in Pekinngeview, no. 35, 30 August 1968, p. 2. 29Marianne Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform During the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, no. 42 (April-June 1970): 35. 282 As the power of the Red Guards diminished and large numbers of students were sent to rural and border areas, schools began to reorganize with the propaganda teams, revolutionary committees, and the PLA in control. The establishment of a new administration to oversee educational reform went slowly because the propaganda team/ revolutionary committee members were not professional educators, nor did all the teachers and administrators enthusiastically support the efforts Of the team that had taken over their function. During 1969 there developed a disillusionment with the Cultural Revolution and its results. In the schools, tension increased between the administrative revolutionary committees and the teachers and students. The controlling body of primary and secondary schools was the three—ineone propaganda teams, which.were composed'of poor and lowerhmiddle peasant activists, commune and brigade cadre, and revolutionary teachers and students. These committees Operated at the direction Of the revolutionary committee of that area and were backed by the PLA. The management Of higher educational institutions—- there were 40 comprehensive universities in China in October 197230--was not left to the educationists. Mao 30China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, 283 Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams were sent to the univer- sities in 1968 to establish revolutionary committees to administer higher education.31 Students The schools of every nation produce successors to each generation of leaders. The importance of the school as a social institution and the education of the nation's students in relation to China's future did not escape the political leaders. Schools were a major target of the Cultural Revolution and the students were the revolution- aries. Of the total student population, only a minority were Red Guards; many were only occasionally active, but the majority took no part at all in the Cultural Revolution. Within the ranks of the Red Guard movement, there was division, internal factional fighting, andchaos. The Red Guards were organized in military units, but were undis- ciplined and uncontrollable. They organized around educa- tional institutions, using schools as their headquarters. The PLA helped organize the Red Guards and army men led some of the first Red Guard marches across China to prosecute the Cultural Revolution and to emulate the 32 Red Army. The Red Guards undertook to destroy the 31Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolun tion," p. 279. 32China News Analysis, no. 715, 5 July 1968, p. 2; and Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 250. 284 remnants of revisionism in China; in the process they attacked the schools and universities. They criticized teaching methods, subject matter, and their teachers' political perspectives. They charged that books and academics were in command and not politics, and that too much time and effort was spent on reading and lecturing and not enough on the realities of Chinese society. In 1968 millions of urban youth who were proving troublesome were sent to rural areas and sometimes to remote frontier regions to engage in agriculture, land reclamation, flood control, and other productive labor activities. This action was taken to discipline the Red Guards and to stop the bloody fighting that had erupted between Red Guards and workers and between Red Guard fac- tions. Mao furnished a more doctrinaire rationale: "It is very necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be reeeducated by the poor and lower-middle peasants."33 Between 1968 and 1970 many students whose education had stopped in 1966 were graduated and sent to rural areas; educational institutions had to make way for students who had come of age during the Cultural Revolution. The Western press reported in 1971 and again in 1972 that hundreds of thousands of educated urban youth were resettled 33Peking Review no. 52, 27 December 1968, p. 6. 285 in the countryside.34 Many of the ex—student trouble—makers were sent to PLA farms to take part in military discipline and productive labor, and to be watched by the army. The young intellectuals who were resettled in rural areas were unhappy at the prospect of spending a lifetime in the coun— tryside engaged in rural labor.35 During the Cultural Revolution, Students lost the benefits of systematic study, and the country lost that expertise that could have contributed to China's develop~ ment. This forfeiture of years of formal education was impossible to make up, though the rationale was that only schooling was lost and not education. The basis of Mao's social order was the proletariat, whose sons and daughters had not done well in school before 1966. They lacked the advantage of literate parents and an intellectual home environment. Once the schools reopened, howeVer, applicants with bourgeois family backgrounds were discriminated against in favor of students from poor worker» peasant families. School fees, which were once beyond the financial capability of the poor, were abolished. Students who attended school immediately after the Cultural Revolu- tion were less able to do quality academic work because 34New York Times, 2 October 1972, p, 6; and Christian Sc1ence Monitor, 14 August 1971. 35For more detail, see Martin Singer, "Educated Youth and the Cultural Revolution in China," in Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, no. 10 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan--Center for Chinese Studies, 1971). 286 ' preference was given to the children of the poor and the working class, because the increase in poorly qualified students was not matched with an increase in highly quali— fied teachers, and because students had been away from the discipline of study for at least a couple of years. The primary criteria for admission and advancement were social Origin, not intellectual ability, and the proper political perspective, not academic quality. The admissions policy to higher education reflected an attempt to gain students who could be both “Red and —n.._. 4 Expert." Mao stated that the "students must be selected from among workers and peasants who [had] practical experi— ence," yet the entire selection procedure was based on the principle of "voluntary application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership, and a re-check by the "36 university authorities. Although great stress was placed on a student's history of political activism and participation in the production struggle, there was room in the selection procedure for demanding (by the university authorities) at least a minimal academic qualification. The number of students in higher education was estimated in January 1973 to be only 40,000--and many of these in short-term professional training programs.37 Like 36Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate—General, Hong Kong, no. 5102, 28 March 1972, p. 42. 37 China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, p. 4. 287 the graduates from all levels of education, the higher education graduate was expected to return to his or her original work unit. The university graduate could also be assigned to whatever post the authorities decided best served the "unified state plan."38 The reason given by all students for studying was the same--"to raise my ability to serve the people." Teachers Teachers are at the focal point in the transforma— tion of any educational system. Throughout the modern 5 history of China there have never been enough teachers to meet the overwhelming demand for formal education; during the Communist era, there have never been enough teachers who actively support and believe in Mao's doctrine. As the Red Guards attacked the schools, teachers were accused of being "mental aristocrats" and of neglecting Maoist pedagogy. The Cultural Revolution in education focused on purging the ranks of China's teachers of rightists, counters revolutionaries, and other bad elements. In the first six months of the Cultural Revolution many professors were dis- missed and their role diminished. The Red Guards undercut whatever elite status teachers and professors enjoyed previously. A constant vigilance was kept on the political perspective of all educationists. +i 38Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolu« tion," p. 281. 288 Red Guard students rebelled against all authority. As they became uncontrollable, educationists became frightened. Professors, teachers, and administrators were denounced on wall posters, paraded in dunce caps, and humiliated at mass struggle meetings. The Cultural Revolution was an unpleasant experience for the teachers; they did not want to teach students who had criticized, demeaned, reviled, and hounded them. Teachers were afraid of what would happen if they tried to establish and enforce discipline in schools, especially after the beatings“— ideological and physical—-the Red Guards had administered early in the Cultural Revolution. Serious discipline problems were anticipated and teachers' morale slumped. When the government and the party started ordering students to return to school in 1967, teachers refused to go back without a guarantee for their personal safety. They wanted teacher—control in the schools, not student- control. As schools resumed, teachers were protected against student wrath by soldiers posted in the schools. -Professors and teachers, who were exposed to revisionism and who had a capitalistic-bourgeois world perspective, were provided with an opportunity to remold themselves ideologically and to rededicate themselves to serve the party and the people. Educationists attended "May 7" Cadre schools in large numbers.39 Klaus Mehnert, 39The official mechanism for political re-education was the "May 7" Cadre schools that were established in 1968. Government and party cadre, including educationists, went to these schools to examine and remold their political 289 noted Sino-Soviet expert, visited a "May 7“ school near Peking in the winter of 1970—1971; he found that among the 1255 students there, 700 were educators (teachers, school directors, librarians).4o Many teachers who had served before the Cultural Revolution were back at their posts when schools reOpened. Peking's People's Daily stated that only 20 per cent of all professors, teachers, and other cadre at Peking's educational institutions had been ousted during the Cul— tural Revolution.41 After having participated in manual labor and confessed to their erroneous attitudes, most old professors were back on their university teaching staff. As the educational system evolved after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leaders again realized the impor— tance of teachers and attempted to regain their support by perspectives, to criticize their own thinking, to develop and strengthen their empathy with the working class, to study Mao Tse-tung, to participate in group discussion and study, and to engage in agricultural or industrial labor. It was only through such a remolding experience that teachers, professors, and school administrators were liberated from their erroneous thinking before taking up their managerial, technical, administrative, or teaching jobs. Intellectuals who had made "mistakes" could be returned to useful positions if they were remolded and re-educated. For more detail, see China News Analysis, no. 779, 24 October 1969, pp. 1-7; "The May 7 Cadre School,“ Peking Review no. 19, 12 May 1972, pp. 5-7; and Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way_(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 484—486. ' 40Klaus Mehnert, China Returns (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 62. 41 As cited in the New York Times, 1 March 1968, p. 17. 289 noted Sino-Soviet expert, visited a "May 7“ school near Peking in the winter of 1970-1971; he found that among the 1255 students there, 700 were educators (teachers, school directors, librarians).40 Many teachers who had served before the Cultural Revolution were back at their posts when schools reopened. Peking's People's Daily stated that only 20 per cent of all professors, teachers, and other cadre at Peking's educational institutions had been ousted during the Cul- tural Revolution.41 After having participated in manual labor and confessed to their erroneous attitudes, most Old professors were back on their university teaching staff. As the educational system evolved after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leaders again realized the impor~ tance of teachers and attempted to regain their support by perspectives, to criticize their own thinking, to develop and strengthen their empathy with the working class, to study Mao Tse-tung, to participate in group discussion and study, and to engage in agricultural or industrial labor. It was only through such a remolding experience that teachers, professors, and school administrators were liberated from their erroneous thinking before taking up their managerial, technical, administrative, or teaching jobs. Intellectuals who had made "mistakes" could be returned to useful positions if they were remolded and re-educated. For more detail, see China News Analysis, no. 779, 24 October 1969, pp. 1-7; "The May7Cadre School,“'Peking Review no. 19, 12 May 1972, pp. 5-7; and Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 484-486. ' 40Klaus Mehnert, China Returns (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 62. 41As cited in the New York Times, 1 March 1968, p. 17. 77 290 Sponsoring provincial and municipal teachers' conferences, by demanding student discipline, by giving teachers more time to improve their professional skills, and by admitting 42 ‘These measures were designed to the value of expertise. to improve teacher morale, to change the minds of those who wished to leave the profession, and to attract new recruits. The party attempted to deal with the teacher shortage by emphasizing supplementary short—term teacher training programs, by requiring experienced teachers to guide younger teachers, by directing attention to normal colleges (provincial level) and normal schools (hsign and municipal levels), and by holding teachers' meetings for professional development. There were several barriers to supplying qualified teachers: not enough qualified staff for the normal schools and colleges, inadequate in-service training, and the teachers were required to accept remolding and to engage in productive labor.43 To combat the teacher shortage, new teachers were recruited by the thousands from poor and lower-middle peasants, demobilized military men, and educated youth who graduated before and during the Cultural Revolution. Pro— duction brigade workers went into the schools to teach politics and production skills, while teachers went to work 42Charles Behlen, "Studies in Maoism," Far Eastern Economic Review, 67, no. 8 (19 February 1970): 19-21. 43See Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," pp. 272—274. 291 9 in production. Many different peOple had an opportunity to teach under the principle "learn skills from the workers, learn farming from peasants, and learn fighting from soldiers."44 Not only did workers teach, but teachers worked. Mao said that “it [would] not do to have teachers move only their lips and not their hands."45 In the early 1970s the old teachers and professors who had reformed were back teaching, but they were not placed in positions of responsibility. Having been trained in pre-Communist days, they were never fully trusted. Examinations The revolutionists charged that examinations rewarded only those students with bourgeois family backgrounds and discriminated against students of worker—peasant origins. "The old examination system placed school marks in command. It excluded children of workers and peasants and trained 46 successors for the bourgeoisie," and that "the system Of examinations and enrollment for the institutions of higher learning . . . [had] failed . . . to free itself from the stereotype of the bourgeois system of examinations."4.7 44Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China . . .," p. 45. 45As quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1972. 7*— 46Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong,no, 3724, 23 June 1966, p. 6. 47 Ibid., p. 2. 292 The competitive entrance examination as an admission procedure was eliminated by government decree in 1966 and replaced with a procedure whereby college and university applicants had to have first worked 2—3 years in industry or in agriculture, be recommended by workmates, approved by the party leadership, and finally selected by the univer- sity as politically and academically qualified. Even examinations to determine mastery of subject- matter during the regular course of instruction were no longer a major criterion for promotion. Professors could no longer eliminate the poorer students by examination. With reduced emphasis on examination, the assessment of student abilities proved a fascinating problem. Upon occa— sion examinations were taken by groups of students who freely discussed the questions with each other and did so with Open books. Marks were determined by teachers and students together with revolutionary political attitudes weighing heavily in the grading process. The competitiveness of examinations was de-emphasized; tests were used to promote cooperation between students. [The faster learners helped the slower students with their lessons. Teachers complained about the new test philosophy and procedure, pointing out that educational standards were reduced and that the classes were paced by the slowest 48 students. Even though examinations were condemned during 48 Seybolt, Revolutionary Education inChina, p. xxxvi. \ l . 293 the Cultural Revolution as an instrument for developing successors within the ruling class, teachers continued to pressure the Chinese leadership as to the importance of examinations and tests for student promotions and university entrance. Entrance examinations were in effect reinstated by late 1972, only under the title "investigations of cultural knowledge."49 The use of subject-matter tests, especially in high school, had not yet been settled by the closing months of 1973. The teachers championed the examinations as essential in maintaining minimum academic standards. The examination issue and apparent trends back toward academic normalcy after several years of revolution4 ary experimentation reflected a broader trend toward social normalcy. Curriculum The Old educational system that emphasized the development of experts by stressing knowledge and academic scholarship had proven counter to Mao's concept of a Com- munist social structure because it alienated students from practical work. During the Cultural Revolution critics felt that too much emphasis was placed on the systematic acquisition of knowledge and that students thought only of their own future. Mao held that China needed more literate 49Christian Science Monitor, 26 September 1972; and New York Times, 27 August 1973, p. 6. 294 workers and agriculturalists and fewer well—educated bureau- crats. Consequently, Maoist pedagogy focused on immediately applicable practical knowledge that was directly relevant to the nation‘s economic needs. Criticism focused on the academic nature of the curriculum, the number of years spent in school, the bookish methodology, the emphasis on rote learning, and the lack of time devoted to the study of politics.50 A school program such as this would develop intellectuals removed from everyday affairs and from the masses. There was little constructive educational reform while the schools were closed during the Cultural Revolution. When the lower-level schools began opening, the teachers and administrators were passive, even reticent, to take the responsibility to begin developing a curriculum in such a mercurial political situation. What was right on one day might be wrong the next. Teachers protected themselves from being discredited later by doing only enough to meet the minimum requirements. The major document that defined rural educational development after the Cultural Revolution was “Draft Programme for Primary and Middle Schools in [the] Chinese "51 Countryside. This program was drafted by the Lishu county revolutionary committee in Kirin Province, 50Bastid, "Economic Necessity . . .,“ p. 19. 1Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, no. 4418, 19 May 1969, pp. 9—15. 295 ’ appeared on the first page Of the PeOple's Daily (12 May 1969) and was continually discussed in the paper for several months thereafter. This draft program, intended as a nation-wide example, also included curricular recom- mendations: Primary School Politics Language Arithmetic Revolutionary literature and art Military training Physical culture Productive labor Secondary School Mao Tse-tung Thought (included modern Chinese history, contemporary Chinese history, and the history of the two-line party struggle) Basic knowledge for agriculture (included , mathematics, physics, chemistry, and economic geography) Revolutionary literature and art (included language) Military training (included Mao's concepts of people's war) Physical culture Productive labor52 As urban and rural curricula gradually took shape under party-government directives, schools gave less atten— tion to the more conventional academic studies and more to politics, production, and military training. The academic content of the curricula was trimmed to that which had practical value in meeting China's needs. Some courses were dropped and others combined, while overall curricular 52Ibid., p. 13. 296 F development focused on more sciences than arts, more applied subjects than pure theory, and more group study than individual progress. The primary and secondary curricula after the Cul— tural Revolution focused on several areas of concern. History, geography, and philOSOphy were considered frills and either greatly reduced or dropped altogether. Many courses were shortened. Political education included the thoughts of Mao Tse—tung, the class struggle, and knowledge of who to trust and who to suspect (Soviet revisionism and American imperialism). Mathematics and science courses were related to practical production methods. Manual labor was accommodated in the part-work, part-study schedule. Military training included bayonet drills, pitching grenades, and long marches. Mao's doctrines were incorporated into all courses. All lessons were political lessons. All subject matter had a political tinge. “Politics was in command again. Politi- cal neutrality was not acceptable. One had to be politically. ideologically, and morally committed in order to survive. The criterion by which a course was judged was whether it contributed to the general educational level, political development, productive contribution, or military preparedness of China's human resources. The schooling process was and is to equip students with the necessary knowledge and skills needed to build a Socialist society. Because the forces of economic 297 development cannot be denied forever by political fiat, Chinese education began showing signs of moving toward a more conventional curricula by 1972. The primary and middle levels of education began to return to pre-Cultural Revolution designs.53 Shortened Education Before 1966 there were six years of primary, three years of lower secondary, and three years of upper second— ary; after 1969 there were five years of primary, two 54 years Of lower secondary, and two years of upper secondary. The usual twelve years were cut to nine because during the Cultural Revolution the school system was criticized for being too long. After the Cultural Revolutiongraduates left school three years earlier than they had before 1966. The Communists claimed, however, that the three years less schooling had no impact on educational standards, for only the irrelevant subjects were eliminated. At the university level, applicants had to work for two or three years before applying to higher educational institutions. Once admitted, students found that the four 53Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 513; and New York Times, 25 September 1972, p. 3. 54Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolu- tion," p. 268. 298 year programs before 1966 were reduced to two- and three— year programs as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Work-Study The half-work, half—study curricula were started during the Great Leap Forward, fell on hard times and.were practically abandoned as the country tried to recover from the excesses of 1958—1959. WOrk-study again appeared in 1963 with the resurgence Of Maoist forces. By 1965 many provinces and municipalities had their own bureaus to promote and administer the half-work, half—study educational programs. After the Cultural Revolution the work-study curricula were implemented nation—wide. In the urban areas, primary school students parti- cipated according to their ability: they cleaned parks, roads, compounds, and neighborhoods; they provided drinking water to drivers and conductors on bus and train stOps.55 The primary focus of the half-work, half-study program was the secondary school. Factories operated schools and accepted students from nearby institutions, providing a place for students to participate in labor. In rural areas, primary and secondary school students were required to engage in productive labor, usually agriculture. Half—cultivation, half-study schools 55Chiussam Tsang, Society! Schgpls, and Progress in China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 170} 299 were Operated by production brigades and communes in the countryside. Chinese school officials estimated that 30 per cent of school time was devoted to agricultural, industrial, and military activities.56 School farm and factory production helped pay for educational costs. Student labor largely displaced state capital grants; work-study defrayed some of the expenditure of Operating the school. The financial burden on the local community was reduced. Although schools moved toward financial self-reliance, the state (provinces), did play a role in alleviating local inequalities to pro— mote universal primary education. There was also much experimenting with.work-study programs in higher education. Many institutions of higher education were colleges in name only. The counterpart to the college-run factory was the factory-run college that provided little more than spare—time education, like the much publicized Shanghai Machine Tool (Lathe) Factory as an alternative to regular higher educational institutions.57 Mao stated in 1958 that "it is still necessary to have —— 56As reported in the Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1972. 57According to Mao's "Instruction of Shanghai Lathe Factory" Of 21 July 1968, workers would become engineers without going to college, through using experienced workers as teachers and through participation in manual labor. By 1973 the spectacular achievements of this institution had not materialized and the publicity projected lessened. For more detail, see China News Analysis, no. 723, 30 August 1968, p. 2; and no. 931, 24 August 1973, p. 6. 300 universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, but prole- tarian politics in command, and . . . [to train] technicians from among the workers. Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study.“58 At the foundation of the integration of formal schooling with real world problems through the half-work, half-study curricula was an educational system based on "the intellectualization of the working people and the ‘ cultivation of labour habits and attitudes in the intel- lectuals."59 Outputs of the Educational System The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the educa- tional system caused disruption of the flow of graduates, but clearly delineated the characteristics of future graduates. All urban schools were closed and no one graduated as part of the regular academic procedure. Students were summarily graduated, however, to make room for those who came of age while the schools were closed. The educational qualities of these graduates were in 58As quoted in Peking Review no. 31, 2 August 1968, p. 3. 59 Tsang, Society, Schoolstand Progress in China, p0 1850 301 question because they had been exposed to revisionist concepts. The values and attitudes (qualities) graduates developed during the educational process were more clearly circumscribed as a result of the Cultural Revolution. During the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the number of graduates was not revealed, but the qualities the graduates possessed by virtue of their exposure to the new educational system more closely reflected Mao's philoso- phy of educational, political, and economic development. Qualities of Educational Output An important phase Of the Cultural Revolution focused Specifically on the qualities of the outputs of the educational system. Besides the changes in the party, educational reforms may be the most profound legacy of the Cultural Revolution that will affect fundamentally China's development through future generations of students. The various qualities the educational process imbued students with reflected the economic needs, political activities, and international events of this period. Many of the qualities of education were extended through the various periods, such as education for politics (l949—1957) was carried forward to education for political action (1958-1960), to education for class conSciousness (1961- 1965), and finally to education for renewed'attitudes. And on the economic front, education for technical and economic 302 development in the first period (1949-1957) evolved into education for development strategy in the last (1966—1973). Conversely, the development Of some attitudes in earlier periods were completely disclaimed later. For example, education and the Soviet model (l949-1957) in effect, become education for revolution that denounced Soviet revisionism and rejected Moscow's interpretation of the world Communist movement. The changing character of the values and attitudes developed in the educational process throughout the history of the Chinese PeOple's Republic reflects the changing demands put on the schools by shifting political interpre— tations and economic necessities. Education for Renewed Attitudes. Regarding the educational systems in less develOped countries, history has shown that "far from serving as a preparation for tackling the country's most urgent tasks, the schools Often end up producing an elite which feels itself to be far 60 This observation had above any practical involvement." long been a criticism of the leftist elements in the party and was one reason for the Cultural Revolution. Mao hoped to rectify the separation of the elites from the masses by insisting that the educational system renew the emphasis 60Richard Jolley, "Manpower and Education," in Dudley Sears and Leonard Jay, eds., Development in a Divided World (Harnomdsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 209. 303 on the tenets of Maoist doctrine and discredit those of the revisionists. The schools have always been a means of developing new attitudes or sustaining old ones. Regarding the role of the schools during and after the Cultural Revolution, "the educational process [was] seen as a means of producing attitudinal change as much as, if not more than, inculcat— ing specific skills and techniques."61 The leaders of the Cultural Revolution attempted to develop a willingness to. believe in, comply with, and follow through on struggle— criticism-transformation. The attitudes among students were essential to carrying through the Cultural Revolution in education, which focused on struggle against anti—Maoists, against revisionists, and against the bourgeois domination of the school system; criticism of those (intellectuals) who had gone astray in their perspectives and practices, and self-criticism of one's own purity of mind; and trans- formation of the educational system into a truly Maoist social institution. (Transformation was the construction stage of the revolution). In beginning the 19708, the Maoists felt that the acquisition of facts in school was less important than the development of revolutionary attitudes and values, and foremost among these was education to follow through with the Cultural Revolution by serving the social good. 61Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolu— tion," p. 270. 304 Education was to develop positive attitudes toward produc- tive labor, the collective good, military preparedness, and the rural way of life. Attitudes Specifically attacked were those that lead toward elitism and officialdom. Education for Revolution. With Mao's victory over his ideological enemies within the party, the leftist doctrine of the three great revolutions—-strugg1e for production, class struggle, scientific experimentation-— became the focal point of education in post-Cultural Revolution schools in China. Students were required to partake in productive labor and were required to partici- pate in the class struggle, while schools throughout the nation engaged in experimenting with different modes of education that best served local circumstances. Since continual revolution was at the center Of political education in the schools, Soviet revisionism was denounced and attacked. By focusing on the young, the leftists were hopeful of developing a versatile and responsible generation of successors who would be politi— cally aware, committed to China's continual revolution, and vigilant against Soviet betrayal of pure Marxism—Leninism. Education and the Military. The military started playing a major role in the schools during the Two-Line Party Struggle; the army trained students who later became Red Guards. The army also organized and led the first contingencies of Red Guards across the Chinese countryside. A__>,l 305 As Red Guard violence got out of hand, the army restrained the students in their course of conducting the Cultural Revolution. Order was restored to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution by the military. The army moved into and stayed in the schools for several years to ensure student discipline. The PLA exercised a leading role in the administra- tion Of the schools by dominating the three-in—one commit— tees. This was part of the general trend throughout the country whereby the military exercised increasing power in the government of the party and the nation. The strong military influence was evident in military-styled organization in the schools. Students were organized into squads and platoons, while the titles of principal and dean were drOpped in favor of lieutenant and major. The organization of China's educational institutions were modelled after the PLA.62 The military continued to conduct training classes as a regular part of the curriculum. As the influence of the military on the direction of national affairs later began to decrease (1973), it will be of interest to future students of Chinese affairs to note if military training in schools and "learning from the PLA" continued as a central policy directive. 628bi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China . . .," p. 45. 306 Education and ExperimentatiOn. The national policy regarding educational development, as defined by Mao Tse- tung, focused on experimentation so that local schools could best serve local conditions. Educational experimenta- tion after the Cultural Revolution included several innova- tions that meet different needs in the development process. In selected fields, people receive education to a degree necessary to function at a minimal level and later receive additional training as the circumstances warranted. Indeed , the evidence suggests that the Chinese are moving towards the institutionalization of 'life-time' education whereby people can be given additional training as and when 63 Little hard evidence they need it, regardless of age." is available as of this writing on these educational experiments, but such life-time training schemes could serve China's needs in a very real way. Kwangtung Province had, by the end of 1970, 416 short-course institutions as part of the Four Kinds Of New-Type Schools.64 There were industrial schools estab— lished in factories, agricultural schools established in in communes and brigades, health work schools established in hospitals, and normal schools established in units of 63Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolu— tion," p. 262. 64Hsueh Yu, "Communist China's Education in 1970," in Communist China 1970 (Hong Kong: Union Research Insti- tute, 1971), pp. 336-337. 307 the educational revolution that provide 3—6 months of short-term training to thousands of students. Kiangsi Province instituted more than a hundred Communist Labor Universities. The aims of these experimental schools were to develop Red experts with increased technical knowledge and a strong belief in Mao's revolution, to develop revolutionaries in rural education, to train edu- cated laborers in the class struggle, and to deve10p within them a social consciousness.65 The leaders of China sanctioned experimentation with the educational system in order to develop new ways to combine theory and practice in the service of China's needs. By breaking away from the typical educational systems that grew up in other less developed nations, China's school system can become a central force in promoting progress. Education for All Young People. For many years the Chinese had a policy of working for universal elementary education. But after 16 years of control, the Central Government had still not achieved this goal, for on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, many youngsters had never been to school. Some 30 million school-aged children were not in school and most of these in the rural areas.66 Even after the Cultural Revolution, this was a major policy goal. 6SIbid., pp. 334-336. 6Surveyof China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 3475, 11 June 1965, p. 14. 308 "There [were] general indications that the Chinese [were] interested in universal primary and secondary education, and development [had] been rather rapid in terms of the additional number of schools built and the growth in the intake of students."67 To popularize elementary and secondary education was important in giving to the masses some of what they have long wanted-—education for their children. The urban areas had nearly universal primary educa— tion. Therefore, major attention was directed at extending rural education to many more youngsters. It was the countryside that possessed the greatest potential for change with its large reservoir of latent talent and mass support of the Maoist revolution. To make the rural masses literate and numerate was necessary for mass participation in China's development strategy. A minimally-educated peasantry would more easily accept and adopt innovations introduced from higher levels of government. Even after the Cultural Revolution, with increased attention given to primary schools and despite claims, it was still questionable that elementary education was universal.68 Education for Develgpment Strategy. School pro- grams in the post-Cultural Revolution era were designed to 67Yu, "Communist China's Education in 1970," p. 305. 68New York Times, l4.May 1972, p. 4. 309 deal with some of the educational problems of a developing nation. Mao's educational strategy focused more on the vocational than the academic, more on the rural than the urban, and on projects that were more labor intensive than capital intensive. Considering the assets and liabilities of China's development posture, many of the proposals were realistic. Some Western economists hold that the labor market in less develOped nations does not function to the benefit 69 The of "national priorities for future development." economy of a developing nation does not provide sufficient incentives for the educated and the skilled to be put to the best use in terms of development priorities. In most of the world's less developed countries there is an imbalance between the skills needed for develop- ment and the skills made available through both the educa- tional system and the market place. Much of the work undertaken by the educated does not contribute to develop- ment; rural needs go unmet because most professionals and educated congregate in the cities and often remain unemployed. The Chinese Communists apparently solved the urban migration problem by assigning graduates to jobs wherever the state deems proper. Most graduates go to the country— side and to places far from Peking, such as Sinkiang and 69Jolley, “Manpower and Education,“ p. 220. L___ a ._.reli_r e 310 Hainan, to engage in agriculture or industrial work in the satellite complexes. To avoid a large number of under- employed highly-trained professionals, the new educational system had fewer students in higher educational institu— tions than before 1966. Those in colleges and universities were educated in subjects that were of value to the development effort, thereby reducing social and economic waste. Manpower resources were developed by concentrating on lower- and middle-level technicians in the labor force and training them in vocational skills. The real question regarding education in a develop- ing economy is what should be taught in the schools and how should these subjects be taught? Because the economy of developing nations is overwhelmingly agricultural, the educational system should be geared to the needs and problems of the rural population. In China, Maoist peda— gogy deals with this issue. Education in less developed countries should serve five objectives;70 (1) Manpower—-schools should train people for tasks required for national development; (2) Social Role—-schools should influence the social structure such that opportunities to contribute to the national culture present themselves; (3) Attitudes—-schools should develop among students pragmatic attitudes, like commitment, 70Ibid., pp. 213—216. — w w 311 involvement, thrift, sacrifice, and hard work that are enormously important to development; (4) Rural Perspective-- schools should relate education to development needs of rural areas because "the need to relate the school system to rural development is perhaps the most important and difficult single educational reform facing developing countries“;71 and (5) Research—-higher-level schools should direct research to problems of the national economy and not in areas that generate only international prestige. The Chinese educational system of the early 19705 moved in the directiOn of dealing with these five Objec- tives in a positive manner. Quantities of Educational Output The Central Government did not release comprehen- sive enrollment or graduation statistics during or after the Cultural Revolution. There are, consequently, few hard statistics to analyze. Much information about enrollments (and therefore, future graduates) comes from claims by the Chinese and from statements by visitors to the mainland. Numerical and Content Analysis. Because some rural primary schools had continued to operate during the Cultural Revolution, there must have been some regular graduates from the elementary level. No hard data is available, 7lIbid., p. 216. _.__ 312 however, on the number of schools in this category, the number of students involved, or the number of graduates during these years. Because secondary schools and universities were located in urban areas and were a central element in the Cultural Revolution, they had no regular student bodies or graduating classes during this period to report on. With the urban schools being closed, there were no bona fide graduates from.these institutions. Many who were students when the Cultural Revolution started were force— ably graduated, to make room-for new students and to get rid Of the student troublemakers. The People's Daily reported that in 1968 there were 60-70,000 university graduates, nearly all of whom were sent 72 to work on army labor farms. Those who were graduated received graduation certificates, not academic degrees. Because of the educational chaos during the Cul- tural Revolution, there can be little doubt that much valuable expertise was lost, in that it was simply not trained. One Western estimate placed the loss to China at 6,000 Ph.D.s between 1966 and 1969.73 The Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1970 estimated China's loss: “150,000 ¥ 72As cited in China News Analysis, no. 772, 5 September 1969, p. 6. 73As cited in the Christian Science Monitor, 5 September 1970. 7 313 engineers, 100,000 teachers and 50,000 physicians who would have entered the manpower pool during this period went without training."74 To compound this loss, university attendance after the Cultural Revolution was much reduced. According to visitors to post-Cultural Revolution China, the number of elementary and secondary enrollments were greatly increased. Thus, the number of graduates from these levels had to be greatly increased as these students finished their education. At the higher educa— tional level, however, enrollments were down considerably. For example, at Sun Yatwsen University, a Kwangtung Provin- cial institution, before the Cultural Revolution there were 4700 students, but only 547 after.75 The story was the same at China's other universities of long standing.76 The imbalance between higher and lower levels of formal education was worse in the early 19705 than it had ever been before the Cultural Revolution. As China achieves greater development in industry and agriculture and moves into the mainstream of international affairs, it shall be interesting to note how Peking will deal with the increased demand for highly-trained experts, a demand that will most probably outstrip the ability of the school system to raise 74Charles M. Martin, "China: Future of the Univer- SitYI" Science and Public Affairs: Bulletin Of the'Atomic §gientists 27, no. 1 (January 1971): 11. 75Christian Science Monitor, 28 August 1971. 76See Ross Terrill, 800,000,000:_ The Real China (Boston: Little, Brown and COmpany, 1971), p. 12 . 314 the general level of education of the masses. In effect, the demands of economic development may require the forma- tion of an elite relative to the masses. How will the school system respond to such a challenge in light of Mao's belief in the need to educate the masses in order to eliminate the need for an elite? Conclusion The role of the schools was a central theme in the years of struggle between rival party factions. The Cul- tural Revolution decided the issue, at least temporarily. The educational questions of what (subject matter), how (methodology), and for whom (character of the student body) were settled in Mao's favor. A rural-local-flexible (as opposed to urban-centralized—highly structured) educational posture characterized the schools immediately after the Cultural Revolution. To Western observers and to comparative education- ists, the role of the school in China may seem unorthodox, but conditions on the mainland are different from those of industrialized nations and call for different educational goals and methods. The Communists recognize that education in less developed nations usually does not prepare gradu- ates for development tasks. Peking took steps to ensure that the same does not happen in China. Schools were an integral part of the development strategy. Social, economic, and political development incorporated educational change; 315 reciprocally, education supported the entire change process Of developing the Chinese Communist social system. Such a planned.system took cognizance of longnterm, national development needs over immediate preferences and aspirations of citizens. "Social needs education is designed to meet may be different from those recognized by "77 The Chinese scheme was designed to ensure individuals. that the needs of national development were met before those of individuals., Mao's system of education-—basic education the masses will find useful, Specialized training for but a f few in order to meet special situations--had a better chance to succeed than did his reforms of the Great Leap Forward. The reforms of the late 19503 were confronted by an already well-established system and were unable to survive the hard times China faced in 1959-1961. The.Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, first aimed to destroy the old system before constructing a new one. Education in the late 19603 and early 19703 was not an appendage to a pre-existing structure, but an entirely new structure.78 In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution the moderates (including Chou En—lai) exerted some influence over the educational system. Certainly the Chinese Communists did not disclaim the need for and value of Mao's * 77Jolley, “Manpower and Education," p. 217. 78Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolu- tion," pp. 285~86. 316 proletarian line, but the moderates tempered political zeal with the realization that the schools must also develop expertise needed for economic develOpment.79 China's universities were showing signs of beginning to swing back toward better academically-prepared applicants and away from those with worker-peasant—soldier backgrounds.80 With the moves to re-establish examinations to . improve academic achievement and the appearance Of teachers conferences to promote egprit de corps and professional competence, the educational system in 1972 was taking on some of the trappings of pre—Cultural Revolution era. Did the reappearance of teachers' conferences indicate a bye passing of the three-in-one committees that controlled the schools after the Cultural Revolution (but who found it difficult to take constructive action in building a new educational system)? Does this signal the end of the three-in-one committees' usefulness? And if so, does it indicate a shift in educational policy? It was reported in the western press in 1973 and early 1974 that new internal party tensions were brewing. The tightening of the ideological reins, renewed vigilance against reactionary tendencies, and the attention given by the People's Daily_to a lZ-year old schoolgirl's 79 pp. l_20 80New York Times, 25 September 1972, p. 3; and Tillman Dufdin, James Reston, and Seymour Topping, NeW'YOrk Times: Report from'Red China (New York: Quadrangle—BEEEET' ‘719 1), p. 280. ’ China News Analysis, no..906, 12 January 1973, 317 denunciation of her teacher for promoting the restoration of bourgeois control indicate that the lessons of the Cultural Revolution were well remembered in the face of pressure from the moderates to permit the dynamics of internal Chinese politics to seek more of an equilibrium. The direction of political events in the future is bound to have an impact on the educational system. Do educational changes follow social changes or are the schools instrumental in initiating political, economic, and social modifications? Certainly there are no lasting social changes until their underlying philosophy is absorbed into the culture and become part of the people's belief structure. The Chinese Communists have used the formal educational system to support larger social changes. The success of sweeping social modifications does not depend solely on the effectiveness of the educational system to promote and disseminate the new philosophy, for there are other social institutions within the Chinese social system that have an impact on the direction and shape of that society. But no long-term change will ever succeed without the support of the educationists. The schools are instrumental in promoting the modification of any social system. National progress depends, in the end, on the development of human resourceSs— the people. In post—Cultural Revolution China, with Mao's emphasis on the rural masses, students were being better equipped for work and life in rural areas than were pre- 1966 students. 318 The burden on the people was not lessened by the priorities of the Central GOvernment and the party-- social progress and stability over individual justice and freedom--but the long—term prospectus for the masses, in terms of material well being, was more positive than at any time in China's past. The role of the school was central in developing this national capability. The issues surrounding justice and freedom will have to be settled within the context of the Chinese value structure and social system. Again, the role of the school will be central in defining the place of the individual in the new Chinese state. "The ultimate aim for which all communists strive is to bring about a socialist and communist society." Mao Tse-tung, Selected WOrks of Mao Tse-t'ung. - CHAPTER 8 EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY Since the Communists gained control of mainland China, education has played a central role in the develop— ment of this Oriental Socialist state. National policy has always defined the contribution the schools were to make; in turn, the schools have functioned to fulfill national policy objectives. Whatever the direction of Central Government efforts, the reciprocity between national policy and educational development has been a constant in the equation of school-and—state in a Communist society. During the first quarter century of the Chinese People's Republic, ideology has been central to Peking‘s vision of the future. The various historical phases as described and discussed in this study have demonstrated the zig-zag path of ideological interpretation of Communist doctrine. The history of China's national development since 1949 has not been a smooth, linear progression. Rather, the 319 320 periods of progress in one direction were interrupted by shifts in the party's internal balance of power and the resultant redefinition of national policy. For example, the thrust of the First Five-Year Plan was altered by the policies of the Great Leap Forward, and the progress of the early 19603 was interrupted by the growing party struggle that erupted into the Cultural Revolution. The educational patterns of these periods were changed as the ideology was redefined in the struggle between the centers of power within the party. The schools, like other social institutions in China, exist to serve the national policy as defined by the party. Formal education was adapted to meet the short— and long-term political and economic needs of the nation. When the party moderates had the stronger influence over policy, economic development needs were primary in the determination of the schools' mission. When the revolu— tionists (Maoists) had control, the "correct“ political perspective and ideolOgical indoctrination determined the nature of the schools' programs. Whichever faction had control, formal education served the national policy as defined. As to the future, predictions are always dangerous because unanticipated events, even accidents, often disrupt projections. Regarding national policy in the Chinese People's Republic, however, it is safe to assume that Peking's directives shall continue to shift periodically 321 because ideological interpretation of Marxism as applied to China will not remain static. And as the truth of Communist ideology continues to elude Chinese leaders, the thrust of national policy, and in turn educational development, will continue on its zig-zag course. Ideology, national policy, and educational develop- ment will, in the future, fluctuate because the Chinese are still attempting to define their own identity in the context of a Socialist state. To survive and function in the dynamic international arena and to give stability to China's internal affairs, the leaders must continue to shape national policy to meet new challenges as they arise. Whatever these challenges and whatever the policies generated in response, the educational system will continue to serve the ideology that is so fundamental to the society and the state. Phases of Educational Development The history of formal education in the Chinese PeOple's Republic has passed through several stages since 1949. Throughout these phases of educational (and national) development, the various political forces that interpreted the ideology and set the tone of the national environment shifted between the moderates and the extremists (of the left). Since the schools so closely reflect national policy, educational development has gone through several Stages in coordination with differing ideological 322 interpretations. The shifting focus of the schools' mission generated changes in curriculum, methodology, personnel, and structure. The first years (1949-1952) were a period of_gaining administrative control Of the mainland and of consolidating party strength to manipulate the educational system. After the initial three years of reorganization and reorientation, the educational system stressed strong academic preparations to meet the economically-oriented needs of the First Five— Year Plan. During the years 1953-1957, when relative stability prevailed, Chinese Schools and Peking's industrial- planning were strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. During this time the educational system.was highly centralized through the Ministries of Education and Higher Education. Specialized technical institutes replaced many comprehensive universities. The quality of education and the training of experts received more attention than the political perspec— tive of students in School. Being academically talented was more important than was being a dedicated Communist. The Hundred Flowers experience revealed the failure of the educational system and the ideological remolding campaigns to develop the prOper political outlook among the nation's students and intellectuals. The Great Leap Forward signaled a change in the direction and character of educae tion stressing the political qualifications of students and extending education (indoctrination) to as many students as possible. The number of schools and students increased 323 rapidly in 1958—1959. Being a good Communist was more important during these years than was being a good academician. The educational system was decentralized by passing control to local authorities in the hope of ensur— ing egalitarianism. Students attended school, not to prepare themselves for the next higher level of education, but rather to work at a practical task to meet local needs. The Great Leap Forward was a period of policy excesses and natural disasters. The early 19603 witnessed another reverse in national policy in an attempt to rescue the country from the brink Of economic disaster by retrenchr ing the nation's resources. Many of the educational experi— ments of 1958-1960 were dismantled, with increased emphasis on academic preparation in schools in order to produce needed expertise. The Two-Line Party Struggle that followed influenced the educational system by moving toward two school systems-v one academically oriented to produce experts to meet the economic develOpment needs perceived by the party moderates, the other work-study oriented to meet diverse local needs perceived by the party extremists. The Maoists also placed far more stress on the political education of students than did the moderates. This struggle erupted in the Cultural Revolution, which.was an attempt by Mao to eliminate his political enemies in the party and to ensure the dominance of his ideological interpretation. Schools and universities were 324 closed from one to four years, with regular, productive, academic classes suspended for even longer periods. Stu- dents were organized into Red Guard units, the chief pro- ponents of a thorough cultural revolution to remove all vestiges of anti-Maoist forces. During the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution I(l969-l973) the educational system began functioning again. Mao's national policy stressed the role in ideology over the requirements of industrial development, which placed the schools squarely in the service of the cultural revolu— tion. The requirements of internal economic development were beginning to reappear, forcing the schools to com- promise their ideological purity as prescribed by Mao. Each of these stages of educational development paralleled a phase of national policy. The zig-zag pattern of progress in developing China's schools reflects the alternating interpretation of ideology as Peking faced natural, domestic, and international challenges through the years. As the dynamics of the world's social orders continue to generate the need for change, so will China's national policies change to meet the new challenges. The next big challenge facing the Chinese People's Republic will be the direction of the national policy in the post-Mao era. The educational system will, accordingly, be affected by whatever party policy and ideological inter- pretation evolves. Formal education will continue to ful— fill its special mission. 325 a a Education for-a Special MissiOn The goal of every reVOlution is to destroy the old order and to establish a new one. In the case of China, Mao's continuing revolution aims to destroy all remnants of Confucianism, feudalism, and capitalism, and to estab- lish a proletarian social order. Despite the vicissitudes of politics wherein educational institutions have had to change direction quickly, major tenets have emerged that are characteristic of the schools' mission in the Chinese People's Republic. The rulers of China have designed and implemented educational programs that complement the national policy of social revolution and industrial progress. The special mission of the schools is a complex one, incorporating several different areas of concern. Though the themes of Chinese education often overlap, they all contribute to the national effort of building a new state. Political. The ideological purpose of education in China was and is to develop and perpetuate communism. The efforts of educationists (under the close supervision of the party) have been to increase and improve literacy, numeracy, and the prOper political perspectives-political literacy supercedes linguistic literacy. In order that education serve proletarian politics, schools must nurture a political perspective based on MarxismeLeninism, the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the class struggle, and party policies. Students must be imbued with.the reVolutionary 326 spirit and devoted to national construction, the revolution, the party, the PLA, and the Communist cause. Students are taught to be aware of deception byChina'S enemies: Ameri- can imperialism, Western capitalism, and Soviet revisionism. Students are also told who to love: Chairman Mao, the people, and China. In fulfilling the mission of the schools, Chinese educationists aianJindoctrinate each new student generation in the Chinese Communist ideology, and to equip them intellectually and physically to execute Mao's continuing cultural revolution. Economic. The Chinese attempt to create attitudes among students that will further the nation's economic development and industrial-agricultural progress. The Maoist curricula ensure that education be combined with. productive labor. Although this is used as a political tool, it does have economic implications. Students not only contribute their labor to productive enterprises while they are still enrolled, but they are also supposedly learning a skill that is immediately applicable once the student graduates from school. In addition to giving students know- ledge Of agricultural and productive methods, the schools try to encourage a Socialist work attitude and a love of labor so as to improve the long—term rate of production. And the unification Of theory and practice has an economic advantage, Specifically solutions to real-world problems. ___._......_.f_.~—---_- ' 327 Social. Schools in China were not and are not concerned about the wellibeing of the individual or the advancement of personal independence. Rather,formal educa— tion is designed to serve the needs of the state, of the people, and of the party. Students are taught the impor- tance of the collective spirit Of cooperation and discip- line in the pursuit of the public interest. The curricula also attack old myths, superstitions, and prejudices that stand in the way of social and industrial progress, and replace these Old thought patterns with scientific thinking. Personal. Education in China focuses on personal morality in relation to building socialism. Students are exposed to codes of conduct that encompass devotion to duty, loyalty to country, obedience to the constitution, respect for the national leaders, acceptance of criticism, obligation to defend China, altruistic social conduct, and pride in national heritage. Role models exhibit honesty, frugality, persistence, prudence, diligence, collective consciousness, and class solidarity. Each student is to make the elements of this social ethic his or her own personal ethic. Academic. In addition to developing attitudes, schools are also concerned with the transmission of certain kinds of knowledge as a means of national development. The academic themes of the Communist educational system center on bodies of knowledge that are political and pragmatic: 328 traditional Chinese history, culture, and important per— sonages; knowledge Of the history, institutions, and leaders of Chinese communism; and basic knowledge of sci— ence, technology and public health practices.1 A liberal education in a Western sense is considered a product of decadent bourgeois thinking, and has no place in the new Socialist state. Education is to serve the revolution, not to liberate the individual. Throughout the stages of Chinese educational develop— ment under communism, the school has exhibited these themes, which characterize its special mission. Both the form (organization) and the substance (content) of education in the Chinese People's Republic have always been SO designed and controlled as to meet whatever needs the party and the government deem urgent or in their interests. As a politi- cal instrument to modify Chinese society, the school focuses on building a national confidence and self-reliance among the students, China's future leaders. This is the special mission of the schools in China. The Educational System and Internal Contradictions Although Communist education is a planned and con- trolled social force with a significant impact on the form and substance Of society in China, the functioning of the —‘ 1Charles P. Ridley, Paul H. B. Godwin, and Dennis J. Doolin, The Making of a Model Citizen in'Cpmmunist'China (Stanford: The Hoover Institution PreSs of Stanford University, 1971), p. 93. 329 formal educational system contains incompatible operational Objectives. For example, Chinese leaders have occasionally forced (on political grounds) a nation-wide increase in the number of schools and students in spite of a severe short— age of qualified teachers. Such.demands made on educational institutions generate countervailing forces that negate quality education. : Schools have often been caught between the politi- cally-inspired enthusiasm of the moment and Slower—paced academic progress; educational institutions have been charged with obstructing the revolution and then subjected to attack and modification. The political elements that support the Slower and more academically-rational approach to educational development were often in conflict with other party elements that advocated the faster, more politically—oriented and ideologically-rigid method of development and problem solving. The ideal balance for Communist education is based on technical competence and qualified expertise in discip- lines and skills essential to national construction, com— bined with a commitment to Mao Tse-tung, his interpretation of Communist doctrine, and a belief in the supremacy of politics. The continual struggle between being "red" and being "expert" was and is at the root of Shifting educa— tional policy. To be both "Red and Expert" is the ideal combination, but varying interpretations of China's needs by different factions of higher-echelon Communist leaders 330 force a choice between more or less ideological dogmatism, doctrinarism, politics, and productive labor or a pursuit of academic quality and excellence through a problem- solving perspective based on a realistic perception of the world. The shifting emphasis between “Red and.Expert“ can be summarized as a balance between political trustworthi— ness and competent expertise. ‘ The forces working at cross purposes have been and continue to be basically two: the development of a modern industrialized state based on a core of professional, administrative, and technically-skilled people who can be defined as an elite; and the new Chinese person totally committed to carrying through Mao's continuing revolution. This basic choice has a direct impact on the schools' curricula, structure, personnel, administration, and opera- tional climate. In pursuing the more stable and slower method, resources are allocated to educate the better but fewer students; on the other hand, the revolutionary approach is to educate minimally and indoctrinate thoroughly as many students as possible. Will the schools be used to develop and perpetuate a national elite or to educate for and practice egalitarianism? This is the either-or choice of the Chinese Communist political and educational leaders. Springing from this basic choice are a host of contradictory forces amidst which the schools must function. The educationists are more interested in quality education; the political leaders more interested in quantity education 331 (or indoctrination). The choice centers on the political question of the allocation of resources. In addition to the size of the student population and its rate of increase being a countervailing force to quality education in China, there is the issue of productive—labor demands and politi— cal-activities participation that consumes students' time and diverts energy away from serious academic study. The Communists have attempted to accommodate both by condensing subjects, shortening courses, and reducing study—time requirements; with an inadequate number of qualified teachers, such actions spell disaster for the quality of academic-professional education. Party and government educational planners face a crucial choice, whether to force the better students to work for months and lose valuable time studying, or to allow the more academically inclined to develop a technical- scientific expertise needed for national development and defense. The quality of teaching and research conducted by professors and scholars is also affected by their being required to participate in productive labor. Because of the increased pressure of part—work, part-study curricula, much time is wasted in developing academic quality among students and faculty. Because of Mao's continual revolution and the dynamics of the class struggle, the problems resulting from conflicting forces have never been truly solved. The formal educational process is subjected to periodic revision of 332 content and method to meet new problems or to serve alter- nating political definitions. This created state of excite- ment and sustained tension discourages political complacency among the students and focuses their attention on future challenges rather than past victories. Another internal inconsistency that shall never be resolved rests in the effect of education upon man. Although the Chinese Communists viewthe school as a sophisticated instrument to promote conformity, the very nature of formal education tends to Spawn heterodox perceptions of the world and man's role therein. Schooling at the lower levels can be more indoctrination than liberal education. But if formal education is to contribute to China's economic progress, the training of experts must be more than politi- cal education. The advanced education Of intellectuals and Skilled experts must go beyond indoctrination and specialized technical training. Beyond a point, education nurtures analytical minds. Critical thinking is necessary if the state is to meet China's long—term needs. Such foresight.and planning requires rational judgments by experts who have received a quality education. The problem endemic to Communist education is that truly educated peOple, with critical perspectives of the world, have no place in a Communist society, yet they are absolutely necessary for that society's industrial and agricultural progress. 333 Educational Forces of CohesiOn and Disarray Other social institutions impinge upon formal educa— tion and generate forces of internal cohesion and disarray in the functioning of the school system. The forces of cohesion concentrate the energy of the educational system on clearly definable and limited goals, with a greater likelihood of achieving them; the forces of disarray dis- perse that energy on sundry objectives, with a lesser likelihood of achieving them. Cohesive forces tend to pull the elements of a system together, while the disarray Of elements within a system results from forces that undermine a unified institutional thrust. The forces of cohesion focus the various inputs and the desperate elements of a dynamic system on an internal process wherein all factors contribute to the achievement of the desired output. The forces of disarray within an institution have an opposite impact on both the process and the output. To illustrate, urban and rural modes of formal education can be interpreted in light of the forces of cohesion and disarray. Educating a manpower pool for the urban, industrial sector forces the schooling process toward a unified function, for industrial skills are the same everywhere. For example, operating a lathe or making steel is the same whether in North or South.China. Con- versely, educating for the rural, agricultural sector disperses institutional energy because of the variety of 334 climatic and geographical conditions across China's land- scape that must be accounted for in the nation-wide curri— cula. Agricultural conditions are not similar in North and South, or East and West China. Industrial education tends toward a unified internal pedagogical process, and agricultural education tends toward a diversified process. Centralized party leadership of formal education is clearly a force of cohesion in the schools of China, while decentralized management of the nation's schools is a force of disarray. The administration of national-level resources by the Central Government is a force of cohesion, while the administration of educational resources by local governments is a countervailing force Of disarray. From the Communist perspective, educating people to participate in Socialist development has a cohesive effect on educational forces because institutional energy is expended on bringing people together in the support of one doctrine. Educating individuals, on the other hand, dissipates institutional energy because of the diverse interests across people. Not only do varied talents and cognitive styles have to be accommodated if students are educated toward self—development, but the limited resources of the system would be less efficiently used. People educated in the service of one cause--communism—-are easier to control than are individuals educated in the service of their own potentials, as is the case in democratic societies. 335 An analysis using the forces of cohesion and dis‘ array is also applicable to the manner in which the Chinese Communists meet the short-term.andlongvterm development needs of education. Better overall planning anticipates long-term needs and provides for meeting these needs by investing resources that eventually yield educational dividends. Short—term needs are, by definition, unantici- pated and resolved only through immediate expenditures that yield only results, not dividends. Investment and planning are cohesive forces that affect the educational subordinate system, and short-term expenditures are forces of disarray in that they solve immediate problems but do not serve to concentrate long—range institutional energies on the over- all production Of outputs. What is a desirable output of the educational system depends on political perspective. By manipulating the forces of disarray, the supporters of Mao Tse-tung and his philOSOphy hope to ensure egalitarianism and to deny the development of an elite that might otherwise command the social system for its own purposes. Mao's opponents in the party try to manipulate the forces of cohesion in order to develop an expertise that can carry out the tasks of an agriculturally- and industrially-advanced society. The Roles of the School in Building a New State There can be little doubt as to the importance of the linkage between the educational system and other social 336 institutions. FOrmal education has a special mission unlike any other institution within the Chinese social system. Schools are tools used to train experts, develop mass support, and control many of the younger generations. Schools train personnel for the economic, social, political, military, cultural, and other sectors of national life within the boundaries of the parent social system. Most, if not all, the trained expertise that staff the infrastructure of all formal institutions have passed through, and to varying degrees have been affected by, formal education. In the Chinese People's Republic schools were and are specifically designed to provide needed, specialized, technical and administrative personnel, without which a modern economy and society is impossible. In building a new state the schools do more than train needed expertise to staff the various social insti- tutions. Schools also attempt to develop a base of support among the masses for the political regime in power. A belief in China, in the Communist doctrine, and in the political leaders is generated among students, which is the reason for trying to get as many young, impressionable minds as possible into school and exposed to formal party teachings. Schools lay the foundation of long-term popular control through indoctrination. It is the chief institution available to the political leaders to ensure long-term mass support. The PLA can force immediate compliance with \ 337 political directives, but only mass support makes the regime safe from internal popular insurrection. Schools are also institutions of control. If students are in school and under the supervision of teachers and party cadre, their conformity can be manipulated. This is especially important for urban youth who are highly con— centrated in an environment that offers opportunity for non—constructive activities. In rural areas, youth are more scattered and involved in agricultural work. As an instrument of control, schools equip students through the work-study curricula to move into jobs upon graduation; \ in fact, graduates have strong pressure put upon them to go to the job assigned them. This procedure of training in school and job assignment after graduation is a mechanism to control the educated portion of the populace. The influence of the party is everywhere felt in the formal educational system, as it is in the other social institutions within the Chinese social structure. Party control is a major feature in the various educational experiments that are conducted during periods of national development. Amidst educational variety there is the unity of political control; whatever the nature of the school system, the party looks after its political and educational interests. Without such an extensive control, the educa— tional system can not be brought completely into the service of the state and the party. 338 The relationship between the party and the school system raises some interesting questions about the effec— tiveness of the political leaders to change the character of man by designing his formal education. In spite of the control exercised by the party, how responsive have the Chinese people been to continual indoctrination? What have been the points of conflict and of accommodation between the relatively new Communist dogma and the cen— turies-old Chinese ethos? As part of the control— indoctrination mechanism, how effective has the educational system been in building a new state? In fact, is the "education" of Socialist man most effectively conducted in the schools, no matter how completely controlled by the party? 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