EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN BUILDING A NEW STATE

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ABSTRACT

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN BUILDING A NEW STATE

By

William Joseph Kieffer

Men are drawn together by the demands of world progress and human development, but kept apart by differing concepts of justice and political order. Nations have to deal with the centers of world power to ensure their own survival. To do this effectively, an understanding of the social systems that generate power is paramount. As nations move into a post-Cold War era, only a knowledge of the major tenets of cultural-political systems will ensure a continued and expanding rapprochement between adversaries, like the United States and the People's Republic of China. Studying the formal educational system of China will provide Americans with such knowledge.

Focusing attention on the role of the schools in the Chinese People's Republic leads to an understanding of the belief structure Peking is attempting to incorporate into the cultural ethos. The school as a social institution is affected by and contributes to the functioning of other social institutions within the greater Chinese socio-political system. These other social institutions, specifically the government and the party, determine the

nature and extent of inputs, like the politically-determined aims of education and budgetary allocations, to educational institutions. Educational administrators, under party supervision, must then coordinate these inputs and oversee the educational process--method, structure, content, etc.--to train a politically-acceptable graduate. The outputs of the school system are the inputs to other social organs, like the People's Liberation Army, the government bureaucracy, and the party, which in turn communicate their changing needs to the schools. To understand the educational process is to understand the social qualities the political leaders hope to foster among the Chinese.

National and educational development has passed through four phases in the first 24 years of Communist rule on the mainland. The Period of Consolidation and Stabilization (1949-1957) encompassed the first years of securing political control and the First Five-Year Plan that was strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. The Period of the Three Red Flags (1958-1960) witnessed the Great Leap Forward, the People's Communes, and the Socialistic Main Line Thought. The Period of Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle (1961-1965) was a time of recuperation from natural disaster and human mismanagement and a time of struggle between two opposing forces within the Chinese leadership. The Period of the Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath (1966-1973) was one of political ferment and violent disruption, followed by efforts to return to a

productive equilibrium and yet incorporate the renewed political perspective of Maoism.

Since the schools were and are in integral part of the political and economic superstructure of Chinese society and therefore closely controlled by the Communist leaders, formal education was directly affected by the shifting ideological interpretations and the practical demands facing the government and the party. Whatever maneuvering required of the party by national and international events, the schools were called on to support and contribute to the "party line."

The design of Chinese education reflected both diversity and unity. Throughout the various periods numerous educational experiments conducted to accommodate different students and different curricula were underscored by the control or sanction of the all-powerful Chinese Community Party. Some of the educational variety was deliberately planned as a component of the party line, while other educational sub-systems reflected division within the party as to development strategy and attendant pedagogical requirements.

Chinese political leaders used the school system as an instrument to indoctrinate students in the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, to train expertise needed to develop the national economy, and to control large segments of the population. The purpose of formal education in China was not to develop the talents of individuals in the

sense of a liberal education, but rather to develop one's abilities for service to the state and the party.

This investigation contributes to the comparative educationists' understanding of the linkage between educational development and national policy in the People's Republic of China, to the Sinologists' awareness of the role of the school in building of a new state, and to interested students' knowledge of another social system and its educational component. Understanding among policy-makers, scholars, and citizens is the first requirement for human survival. To comprehend that world events are affecting an overwhelming majority of people of all nations is to realize the need for greater understanding of different peoples and of the forces that keep us apart. The demands of science, of a better life for everyone, and even of man's survival requires that all peoples come to realize that we are really but one people.

Hopefully this study will contribute to a greater understanding of the Chinese Communist cultural-political system, their objectives and methods.

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By

William Joseph Kieffer

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To

Po Li, Maxine, and Lincoln

PREFACE

Men are drawn together by the demands of world progress and human development, but kept apart by differing concepts of justice and political order. Nations have to deal with the centers of world power to ensure their own survival. To do this effectively, an understanding of the social systems that generate power is paramount. As nations move into a post-Cold War era, only a knowledge of the major tenets of cultural-political systems will ensure a continued and expanding rapprochement between adversaries, like the United States and the People's Republic of China. Studying the formal educational system of China will provide Americans with such knowledge.

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This investigation contributes to the comparative educationists' understanding of the linkage between

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In promoting a popular and a scholarly understanding of this challenge confronting men in a world of competing interests, academicians and area specialists must work in the face of limitations that obstruct a solution or even a commonly agreed upon definition of the problem. Every researcher is faced with one central question--what is truth? Scholars, both fledgling and renowned, work in full awareness that perceptions of truth vary. Such research limitations are at the crux of every methodology. Research methods must be designed to get at truth. Aside from the philosophical proposition surrounding the "knowability" of truth and whether there is but one truth, research limitations center on varied and knowable perceptions of truth(s).

The historical researcher deals with a very elusive version of truth, especially if studying a relatively closed system like the People's Republic of China. More than one witness to an event produces more than one version of the truth of that occurrence; secondary analyses can either reduce the variance of interpretations and bring what is known closer to the truth, or secondary analyses can have a multiplier effect on interpretations of truth.

All investigations are conducted within a constellation of limitations. The restrictive nature of the Communist system in China presents additional dimensions of difficulty in ferreting out the truth. Although reports, proclamations, and statistical data may be exaggerated, they do indicate trends that occur within both the subordinate and the superordinate systems. Varied and numerous secondary analyses add dimension to the raw data.

Any government--dictatorial or democratic--attempts to control and restrict the flow of information. Official documents or news releases reflect only the "general line" for public consumption and are readily available. Conversely, secret clauses and latent agreements are not even known to exist. Although official publications and proclamations of the Chinese Communists are in a sense propaganda designed to promote their revolution, facts and descriptions are held to be reasonably accurate so as to present an acceptable basis for research analysis.

The official publications and state-supplied data of any government should never be the sole source of information. One must recognize the paradox of such documents: states release information to manipulate target audiences; states also withhold information to manipulate those same audiences. Official data and reports are sometimes meager and often inconsistent; the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the reporting of facts require one to determine which sets of information are the more reasonable and the more believable. Despite disparities, such information is still worth considering.

Statistics supplied by the Chinese People's Government are always questionable, not only because the mechanisms of gathering basic data are of dubious efficiency and accuracy, but also such statistics are used to support the Communist cause. Because qualified, impartial foreign observers are not allowed to conduct first-hand, systematic analyses of the data or to carry out discriminating surveys to certify claimed achievements, researchers can only accept tentatively current data supplied by the authorities of the People's Government as one source of information. Discretion and caution, however, must be used when reviewing these data.

The analysis of any subordinate system functioning within a closed superordinate system is simplified by there being only one official line and no free press to oppose or challenge the government in searching out the

truth. Party control simplifies the issue by suppressing opposition and proclaiming that they alone have the truth.

In an attempt to reduce the error of measurement of historical interpretation, there are many sources of information from and about the Chinese mainland. In addition to the official documents and editorial comments that appear in authorized English-language publications from the Chinese Central Government Foreign Languages Press, such as People's China, Peking Review, and the Daily News Releases, there are secondary sources of information reported by government and non-government organizations of the Soviet Union, the Republic of China, India, Japan, England, and the United States. Various publications of Hong Kong-based associations--Union Research reports, China News Analysis, and the Far Eastern Economic Review--report and analyze in varying depth topics relevant to Chinese Communist education. And there are accounts by numerous foreign journalists and businessmen who visited the mainland that add to the resource-information pool.

Sources of information and materials are available in large quantities. The quality of information, however, is varied: some is used in support of a political position, and some used in scholarly analysis. The problem is one of choosing information provided in a wide range of materials.

The methodology used in this study was a documentary and literary analysis of both primary and secondary sources, focusing on the historical development of education and the

role of the school in the building of a Chinese Communist state.

This study is not solely concerned with the interpretation and analysis of primary documents, though they were used in the preparation and development of the thesis. Translations are claimed to be of less value than official Chinese materials, yet this researcher accepts the accuracy of the data in the English-language materials supplied by the Chinese government. Chinese materials (newspapers and documents) translated by non-Chinese sponsored agencies, like the Survey of China Mainland Press of the United States Consulate-General in Hong-Kong, were also used in support of the thesis; any translation inaccuracies in the meaning of the original text that may exist have not appreciably distorted the general argument.

Other major sources used were the extensive amounts of secondary materials, such as scholarly publications in professional journals (The China Quarterly, Comparative Education Review, and Phi Delta Kappan), news reports of the Western press (The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Times (London) Educational Supplement), news analysis publications (China News Analysis), various books on China and Chinese education (including those volumes that were collections of articles by noted scholars), in-depth analyses sponsored by professional groups (Union Research Institute and the American Academy of Political and Social Science), and occasional papers

and conference reports (found in Educational Resources Information Center--ERIC, and the Joint Publication Research Service--JPRS). Apart from the less scholarly and more opinionated writings, the secondary sources provided a wealth of data and interpretation.

In the midst of an overwhelming amount of information of varying interpretations, the disinterested researcher must demonstrate an element of trust in the credibility of the materials he finally uses. Faith in at least the partial accuracy of the information used is a matter of degree. At one extreme, if one does not demonstrate the least element of faith in either original documents or others' analyses of data, then no matter how worthy the study, the thesis will go unsupported. At the other extreme, if one believes all and trusts everyone, dubious scholarship results. It is therefore necessary for one to guard against extremes and decide for the purpose of developing a thesis what is believable and reasonable.

Through many hours of research, reading, writing, and re-writing, this treatise was developed from an analysis of a range of materials, with information mustered in support of the main thesis. In the end, it is but an "editorial commentary" on history.

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In reviewing the entire experience of graduate education, one realizes the important contributions made by others: scholarly influences, shared enthusiasms, and words of encouragement. Growth does not occur in isolation.

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SECTION I

PROLOGUE

"To an extent characteristic of no other institution, save that of the state itself, the school has the power to modify the social order."

John Dewey,
Moral Principles in Education

CHAPTER 1

AN OVERVIEW

The world is characterized, more now than ever before, by an increasing degree of economic and political interpenetration for an ever-growing number of people to an ever-expanding degree. Nations face massive internal socio-political unrest and are forced to participate in volatile international dynamics. Observers of contemporary world affairs can testify that "the social and political systems of the world are now affecting each other in fundamental ways, creating a fluid state of rapid change in international alignments and interrelationships."[1] In the face of challenges from an unstable international environment, there is concern by many for a peaceful and just world community based on an understanding of and an appreciation for other peoples, other cultures, and other

[1]Harold Taylor, The World as Teacher (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 4.

ideologies. It is most important, therefore, to study nations far removed from our own national heritage, especially if they play significant roles in world politics.

One of the most unexpected and welcomed international events of the last decade has been the Sino-American rapprochement. What has transpired since the Nixon trip to China is hopefully just the beginning. To insure solid judgments in the future regarding the nurturing of this nascent relationship, American politicians, statesmen, diplomats, scholars, educators, and the public need more information about and understanding of the People's Republic of China.

Few better ways exist that lead to an understanding of another nation than studying its formal educational system, for the schools' curricula embrace political ideology, social values, and national ethos. "All schools reflect the views of society about the way children should be brought up, the purposes of education, and the relations between school and society."[2] It is "because a nation seeks through education to mould the character of its citizens and so reflects its aims--political, social, economic, and cultural--[that] a study of its educational system . . . can contribute as richly to an understanding

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[2]Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 272.

of its aims in general as a direct study of its political polices."[3] China, with its socio-politico-economic concerns in shaping a Communist society, presents a distinctive national system to the rest of the world as to what the shape of their future could be, how a people are to build such a future, and the role of the school in the Chinese design. Not only is the Chinese culture distinctive, but so is the Chinese interpretation of communism in light of the particular problems that must be overcome if China is to take its self-perceived place in history. The combination of communism, the Chinese perspective, and the role of the school in its relationship with other institutions in carrying out national policy presents a functioning prototype worthy of attention.

The importance of understanding the role of the school in promoting the realization of the socio-politico-economic objectives in China's vision of the future is evident in light of (1) increasing world interdependency among nations, (2) China's emergence as a major force in international politics, and (3) the social engineering under way in the People's Republic of China since 1949. "There is no doubt that the Communist leaders fully appreciate the importance of education in their plan of building a new

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[3] I. L. Kandel, The New Era in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955), p. 13.

society."[4] One major concern emerging from this brief statement is "What is the impact of selected central policies of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Government on the development of education and the role of the school in China since 1949?" Because the educational system is an important means of achieving desired social ends, what are the aims of the formal school system for the Chinese Communist Party and how have these aims been implemented? How has the system of schools contributed to the realization of the Chinese Communist state and in what ways has the party influenced the functioning and the output of the schools?

The issue, then, centers on learning more about the culture and ideology that have produced a generation of Chinese who has been alien to and hostile toward America since the mid-twentieth century. The significance of learning more about the People's Republic of China, in the hope of making correct decisions in the building of a peaceful and just future, is self-evident when considering China's (1) growing military potential, (2) influence on Asian politics, and (3) unpredictable domestic affairs.

Scope of the Study

Owing to the magnitude of the relationship between the school and its parent social order, some parameters

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[4]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The New Education in Communist China," School and Society 71, no. 1839 (18 March 1950):167.

need to be established in the development of this thesis. The following concerns will serve as the boundaries of this study.

Geo-political Concerns

One of the contemporary issues of East Asia is the existence of two Chinas. One is the Republic of China under the control of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek on the island of Taiwan; the other is the People's Republic of China controlled by the Chinese Communist Party of Mao Tse-tung on the mainland of Asia. The scope of this inquiry is limited to the Communist-controlled mainland, for it has the greater potential for peace or war in the region, it is the most populous nation in the world, and its ideology is a most radical departure from Western-styled democratic governments.

Temporal Concerns

Except for an introductory section dealing with the role of educational institutions throughout much of China's history up to the Communist takeover, the focus of this study is directed to the era beginning on 1 October 1949, when the Communists took control of the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party, established in 1921, had suffered many defeats at the hands of both the Nationalists (or Kuomintang) and the Japanese until the end of the Second World War. It was not until late 1949, however, that

Mao Tse-tung claimed control of the country and established a Communist government in Peking. It was from this time that the Communist party could concentrate on building the kind of society it envisioned without being threatened with extinction or serious harassment by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

After the 1949 takeover, the educational system was used purposefully to shape the total society that occupied mainland China. The Communists had long realized the value of a school system as a major social institution to be used in promoting their objectives. But only with the takeover could they develop a nation-wide school system to fit their own purposes. Therefore, the major focus of this investigation starts on 1 October 1949.

Policy Concerns

Since education is an integral part of the social and political order of society, any shift in basic economic or political policy has a corresponding impact on education and the school system. In all but the most primitive of cultures, there is no ideological separation between the society and its formal schools; in the People's Republic of China, there is no separation between the society envisioned by the party and the goals toward which the schools actively strive. In fact, the school system in China is more responsive to government direction (and party proclamations) than are most other national school systems.



National policies affect educational development and the role of the school in a direct, and sometimes immediate, manner. The impact of national policies throughout the history of the People's Republic of China that are considered in this study include those of the major educational proclamations, budgetary allocations, and selected political, economic, and thought-reform strategies that have given shape to the schools and their educational programs.

Educational Concerns

The Chinese "have been subjected to the greatest educational and indoctrinal campaign launched by a modern state. Its scope and magnitude certainly defies comparison with the educational activities of Nazi Germany and even surpasses that of the Soviet Union."[5] Education goes well beyond the formal school system, for there are many activities that occur outside the limits of the formal school that are educational. Communist education includes propaganda and indoctrination, and it is dispensed through any and all media that have an impact on popular thinking--radio, newspapers, museums, cinema, opera, drama, literature, and the formal school system. Such multifarious educational efforts are planned, coordinated, and centrally

[5]Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), p. 1.

controlled. The Chinese educational system is a multi-channel communication network designed to reach every segment of the entire population--workers, peasants, students, soldiers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and people of all ages.

This study limits the focus of concern to only the formal educational efforts of the nation's school system--full-time and part-time elementary, secondary, and tertiary (post-secondary) education. Spare-time schools (primary, secondary, and higher education) sponsored by industrial institutions, winter-schools in the agricultural sector, evening schools, correspondence schools, short-term schools, television universities, and adult literacy classes have had a significant impact on millions of Chinese through providing basic literacy, numeracy, occupational skills, and political education. However important these educational programs may be, this study will focus, not on the spare-time schools or on literacy programs, but on the full-time and part-work, part-study institutions.

This student of Chinese education defines the formal school system as an organized network of direct interactions between teachers and students. Specifically-defined curricula give direction to the nature of instruction. Formal schools are structured around fixed orientations of time, personnel, place, requirements, and hierarchical promotion. Of little or no consequence to the essential institutional character of education is the

nature of the physical plant or the exact location of the teacher-student interaction (be it in a school building or a factory or a mine or a field) just so the surrounding facilities promote the curriculum, at best, and do not interfere with it, at worst.

The focus of this investigation is on the role of the formal school system as an instrument used to promote and achieve national policy goals as interpreted through the various periods of ideological exposition. The importance of the formal educational system is not lost on the leaders of the People's Republic of China. "Schools and universities . . . in China are used by the Communist government as major instruments in the furtherance of its own policies. Those policies will change: but the method of using the schools will remain."[6] The Communists have succeeded in making the school system an effective tool for achieving party objectives. This study examines the nature of that interaction.

Conceptual Concerns

Man's total social system encompasses the international cultural ecumene[7]; this is especially so in the

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[6]K. E. Priestly, "Education in the People's Republic of China: Beginnings," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), p. 58.

[7]For a discussion of cultural ecumene, see A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 379-395.

age of satellites, of trans-national migration of people, of cross-cultural communication of knowledge, of East-West exchange of ideas, and of increased awareness of and respect for the national ethos of other peoples. This cross-pollenization of cultures makes it difficult to describe any social system as total or comprehensive short of including all of mankind. To do so would be a monumental undertaking, if at all possible, because of the different ways and varying degrees that all nations and all peoples have influenced each other throughout history. In light of this world-community concept and of developing the thesis of this study, it will be necessary to accept the proposition that there are distinctive social systems drawn on cultural-political lines and that the world is but a collection of these associations.

The various cultural-political systems are the components of the world's total social system. In turn, these cultural-political entities are but networks of subordinate systems that usually complement each other, but sometimes are in a limited and defined adversarial relationship. (Because there is more control in a Communist state, there are fewer built-in adversarial relationships than in more democratic societies.) Consciously-created organizations, like the school system, and naturally-evolved associations, like the family, exist within the parameters of the larger, more comprehensive cultural-political system. This study focuses on the more formal organizations rather than on the more natural groupings.

All organizations must have reasonably compatible value patterns in order to exist within the same larger parent system; this is especially so for the deliberately-created institutions of a society. If institutions and the values they represent find themselves outside the limits of acceptability, they either die or are put to death. The nature of the service an institution renders changes as the definition of what is acceptable and what is not, changes.

The basic value orientation of the institution must be integrated and compatible with the ideology of the larger, more comprehensive system. The value pattern of the school system, for example, implies acceptance of the more comprehensive belief structure of the superordinate social system. The system of schooling in China, as in all societies, is a part of and a service to the parent society. By no means is the institutional boundary fixed and unchanging: as policy and ideological interpretations shift, the role of the school is reinterpreted so as to remain consistent with the new policy.

Schools serve and support the other institutions of the society and of the state. As part of the social superstructure and as transmitter of the culture, education in general and schools in particular reflect and serve the politico-economic interests of the ruling class. In an historical context, for example, the traditional educational system in China supported the Confucian ethic and

the scholar-gentry-official design of social control; the educational system produced "graduates" who supported the status quo of the larger social system. Education in the schools between the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1912) and Communist control of the mainland (1949) was affected by the search for a new ideology to bring China into the modern world. What exactly is a desirable institutional output in the Communist era is defined in national policy, which is either written by or sanctioned by the party. The party, as the repository of power in the People's Republic of China, determines the nature of the inputs and outputs of institutions, including the formal educational institutions. The schools' programs strive to fulfill the specific goals of the value pattern of the larger system they serve. In Communist China, education serves proletarian society.

To examine the nature and function of schooling in the Chinese People's Republic, a simple input-process-output model deals with the component forces centering on formal education. The inputs to the formal school system are outputs of other subordinate institutions within the same social system. The impact on education of some inputs from outside the institutional boundaries of the educational system are direct, such as the national and provincial budget allocations to the educational sector. Other inputs are less direct but still have an impact, such as the effect of political remolding of educationists on the schooling process.

The process of formal schooling encompasses (1) the changes in structure, content, and method resulting from various party-government directives, and (2) some of the problems facing the educational system. Trends and shifting emphases within educational institutions are developed in the framework of the thesis.

An examination of the outputs at the boundary of the formal educational system focuses on two concerns: quantity and qualities. Quantity relates the growth in number of graduates, their disciplines, and expertise. Qualities delineate the various types of characteristics the Chinese leaders wanted formal education to foster. Schools were to produce certain quantities of graduates with those values and attitudes the new Chinese leaders felt necessary in building a new state.

By identifying and discussing the various external and internal pressures and their resultant changes, the complex social function of schooling is organized into a manageable subject. The systems design refines the nature of the mutually supportive interrelationship between selected national policies and their impact on educational development vis-a-vis the role of the school in the Communist state.

The relationship between the internal organizational structure, content, and control of formal educational institutions in China and the external societal demands and restrictions on the schools define the role of the school

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in either maintaining the old, or building the new, Chinese state. Educational institutions in China provide graduates as an output. These outputs must contribute both to greater ideological goals and to more specific functions of other institutions. Consider the impact of education on men in light of Socialist goals: "If socialism does not work . . . it is not because the system is not good, but because human nature has not been changed to conform with the new system. Instead of modifying the system, it is more important to change man."[8] The Chinese schools are trying to educate for the "new Chinese man," who is both Red and Expert, obedient to the party, totally selfless, conscious of the class struggle, ideologically loyal, studies basic doctrine, and partakes in productive labor. Graduates are also inputs to other social organizations, such as the Red Army, the government bureaucracy, the Communist party, the People's Communes. In return for outputs, the schools--as institutions--must orchestrate inputs, such as administrative directives, financial resources, desirable personnel, designated curriculum and textbook content, and ideological interpretations. Such inputs to Chinese schools come either directly from the party or indirectly through the party from other subordinate systems.

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[8]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The New Socialist Man," Comparative Education Review 13, no. 1 (February 1969): 88.

The nature of the input-output exchange occurring at the boundary of the subordinate institution (the school) reveals much about the nature of the more comprehensive superordinate system, in this case, Chinese Communist society.

The educational goals of the school system are defined and legitimized by the total society, or more specifically, the controlling elements of the society. The circles of power use curricula to educate students in support of the socio-political ethos of the ruling group. In the People's Republic of China, the nature of the specific educational goals, as determined by the party, is reflected by the educational institution that is shaped by and contributes to the larger cultural-political system.[9]

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between selected official policies of the Chinese Communist Party and the role of schools in the national development of the People's Republic of China. By examining the function of the school as a socio-educational institution, the ideologico-educational nexus can be brought into sharper focus and students of East Asia will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the kind of social system evolving on the mainland of China.

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[9]Much of this conceptual framework is suggested by Talcott Parsons, in "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly 1, no. 1 (June 1956): 63-85; and 1, no. 2 (September 1956): 225-239.

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SECTION II

EDUCATIONAL ANTECEDENTS AND COMMUNIST CONTROL: AN INTRODUCTION

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H. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World

CHAPTER 2

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE EDUCATION: ANTECEDENTS TO COMMUNIST CONTROL

As a brief introduction to the evolution of and the linkage between educational development and national policy in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1973, this discussion focuses (1) on education as a social force in China, (2) on education and government in traditional Confucian society, (3) on the educational and cultural revolution that resulted from the coming of the West, and (4) on the philosophical foundation of Communist education. What appears in this chapter is designed to provide within a conceptual framework a basic understanding of education and the role of the school in the Chinese state before the modern era, of the problems facing education in the midst of social upheaval before the advent of Communist control of the mainland, and of selected Communist philosophers' educational beliefs. A summary of the various motifs based on the ideological struggle as reflected in

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educational development, and a temporal outline by period of the evolution of communism in China since 1949 rounds out the chapter.

Because of the scope of these topics, it is impossible to deal in depth with all the ramifications of each of the three major subject areas (2, 3, 4), while a short discussion of the fourth topic serves to introduce the major focus of this dissertation. An awareness of these educational trends is necessary to understand the history of the schools' part in Chinese civilization and its dual role as (1) a perpetuating force of a conservative philosophy of government and personal ethics, and (2) as a catalytic force for the social change that destroyed old China.

Education as a Social Force: A Conceptual Framework

Every nationally- or culturally-defined social system encompasses a network of subordinate systems that serve each others' needs and that maintain the socio-political milieu of the larger system. By being part of a sophisticated linkage, social institutions receive inputs from, and produce outputs for, other institutions. This exchange occurs within the parameters of acceptable conduct as defined by the ideology of the parent social system.

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As ideologies differ in their descriptions of a socio-political utopia, so do they differ in their definitions of appropriate institutional behavior. For example, the proper mode of institutional conduct in a democratic society is different from what is acceptable or even allowable in either a Socialist or a Fascist state. Whatever the definition of what is culturally acceptable and socially legal is across various national-cultural superordinate systems, all subordinate institutions comply with the imposed standards of the larger system and function within the boundaries of what is politically defined as appropriate and desirable.

Since much of the behavior of individuals is closely linked to institutional roles, ruling elites aim to define the direction and nature of institutions and their functions. The objective of government is to control the actions and sometimes the thoughts of the people who live within the geographical limits of a politically-defined space; the extent of government control is determined by the ideology which the political leaders espouse and the people support. In a totalitarian society, the leaders control nearly all institutions: the consciously-created, formal institutions, like an army or a school system; and the naturally-evolved, informal institutions, like extended families with attendant obligations or life patterns of rural agriculturalists.

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Formal education is one important subordinate system used by national leaders to disseminate among students what is considered to be the boundaries of acceptable-unacceptable conduct for both institutions and individuals. Since the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, formal education has been consciously used in attempting to shape the value patterns of millions of Chinese. Because formal educational institutions are such an influential force and a powerful political tool, the Communist leaders have paid close attention to the schools' functions.

The development of a politically-indoctrinated population and an educated-manpower resource focuses on the long-term functions of the national school system and its linkages with other social institutions. A planned social system requires a planned educational system. Practically every facet of Chinese society is planned for by the Communist party, including the school. China's national leaders have not neglected the development nor the use of the determinant force of formal education.

The social history of China reflects, in many respects, the history of education in China. Formal education is a significant social force that helps to shape the quality of life in a social system. National and cultural leaders of China have, throughout the periods of political development, focused on different roles of the school in building the kind of state the ruling elites envisioned as ideal.

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Schools serve society in at least three ways: transmit to students, young and old, greater awareness and knowledge of the culture--both as it is in fact and as it could be in the ideal; develop, through a system of instruction and examination, talent that serves to maintain the social system by providing leadership at various levels of the society; and at the higher educational levels, create new knowledge for the advancement of culture and of science. By exploiting a combination of any or all of these functions, political leaders use educational institutions to create the social milieu that best serves their goals.

The indigenous educational system of China helped preserve the status quo of society for centuries. There was, before the modern era, a mixture of formal and non-formal educational methodologies that focused on transmitting culture and on developing leaders, with little or no emphasis on creating new knowledge or new interpretations of old knowledge. From the Han Dynasty until the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1912 the social and cultural stability of China was largely attributed to the mode of education (memorization of the Confucian classics) and of selection (by the imperial civil service examination) of both scholar-officials who administered the government and of scholar-gentry who administered the society in extra-governmental domains.

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This cultural and social tranquility was destroyed by the coming of the West. The traditional educational system was unable to cope adequately with many of the challenges to the Chinese way of life that arose with the encroachment of the imperialist powers. Nineteenth century reformers realized the need to modify the nation's formal educational system if China were to adapt and survive. Under the pressure of the hard-line Confucianists, however, little accommodation was made to meet the new challenges. After the abdication of the last Manchu emperor in early 1912, the absolute necessity to change broke upon the Chinese system with such force that much of the political milieu was in disarray. The intellectuals and political leaders were searching for a new definition of being "Chinese" in the first half of the twentieth century. Modern Chinese educationists were in disagreement about transmitting culture to students, for the Confucian ethos was no longer appropriate and no new, well-defined social ideology was firmly established or universally accepted. Clearly, China's intellectuals were searching for a new national doctrine. The educational institutions, especially at the higher levels, were at the center of the search for (or creation of) a new political philosophy and a new educational philosophy during this period of continued encroachment by foreign powers and of internal confusion among political factions. The "creation of knowledge" in the form of searching for a new ideology

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for China and the "advancement of the Chinese culture" in the form of developing a new Chinese identity was a function the school system fulfilled to a far greater degree during this period of liberalism, which gave birth to communism in China, than it did in the past under the Confucianists or would in the future under the Communists.

The educational conditions during the war years (1937-1945) of both the Nationalist- and the Communist-controlled areas closely reflected the socio-political climate of the times. Though schools under the control of both political parties transmitted culture and attempted to develop leaders (it is unimaginable that they could have created any new knowledge during these times, under such adverse conditions), the primary aim was to survive in the face of the Japanese threat and hopefully build popular support for their respective political ideologies. During the late civil war years (1945-1949) the formal educational systems (Nationalist and Communist) remained very political as the respective regimes became locked in a life-and-death struggle. In addition to the regular functions of the school--transmission of culture, development of leadership, and creation of knowledge--a fourth function evolved as the civil war developed--the school as an immediate political tool.

The Communists were not interested in maintaining the old status quo; Mao's doctrine was based on the theory of continual social-class revolution. The social meaning

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of education changed from serving to perpetuate the old system to ensuring the permanent revolution. Formal education under Communist control resumed its traditional functions once the new regime was established as the undisputed master of the mainland. The new culture, or political ideology, was transmitted to students; the politically, and at times the academically, talented were nurtured so as to build support for the regime at all levels of society; and advanced scientific and technical knowledge was not so much created as it was copied from other industrialized nations and applied in the service of China's own development. The schools were again fulfilling the three tasks of formal educational institutions everywhere, plus serving as a political tool sharpened for immediate use.

Social and educational development within social systems are interrelated and interlaced. Schools are an integral part of society and are naturally affected by the internal struggles and tensions that develop in any dynamic social structure. Formal education, like other subordinate systems, is controlled by the state, and in the case of China by the Communist party. In a totalitarian state, schools are geared to meet party-state needs. Because of their concern for industrial and agricultural development, China's leaders include schools in their comprehensive state planning for economic development. Educational development is a requisite to economic growth and yet certain economic and social conditions are necessary for a

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modern educational system to contribute meaningfully to national progress. State planners are not willing to leave this reciprocity between economic and educational development to chance, but rather they consciously apportion inputs to the educational system, dictate the specific processes within the institution, and assign outputs (graduates) to specific tasks that serve state needs.

The elaborate state machinery quickly translates decisions, once made, into action. This is apparent in all spheres of party-state control, including the schools. Since there is no built-in government system of checks and balances, there is no public debate or criticism about the correctness of national policies. Government decisions are party decisions, and since there is only one party, the obstruction of policy-formation is minimal.

The one, overall aim of education, as defined by the party, is to serve the revolution in whatever manner the party decides. The schools are seen by the Communist leaders as a revolutionary instrument to promote party ends. Education had played and will continue to play a significant role in the ideological conversion and the education of the masses, and in promoting economic and political development. Communist education in China is an important social force controlled to serve party-defined objectives.

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Traditional Confucian Education: Historical Reflections

Without detailing every evolutionary phase of educational institutions throughout China's social history, the following brief commentary relates the main features of education and the role of the school in China's pre-modern ethos. Although different schools of thought--Taoism, Buddhism, Legalism--are part of the intellectual history of China, there can be little doubt that, as a generalization, Confucianism was the dominant philosophy throughout most of China's recorded history.

Confucian Education

Traditional Chinese education focused on mastering Confucian wisdom and morals. The Confucian classics and subsequent commentaries, which became the primary texts for the education of scholars, bureaucrats, and statesmen, preached a moral order based on humanistic responsibilities and obligations regarding man's interaction with family, friends, and the state. The basis of Confucian education was belief in the moral perfection of harmonious cooperation, respect, and obedience between ruler and subject, husband and wife, father and son, brothers, and friends.

There was undaunted confidence in the perfectibility of men through an education stressing virtue, kindness, and a proper ordering of man's relationships of both the family and the state. "Education [was] a process through which

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[1]Chang-t
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[2]Ibid., p

[3]Howard S
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man [realized] his intrinsic value and dignity as an individual human being and [sought] to arrive at a state of harmony with both humanity and nature."[1]

Greater importance was given to strength of character and a sense of Confucian morality than to one's social position by birth. "Throughout the ages, the Confucian ideal of leaving the reins of government and social control in the hands of the morally superior or educated members of the society persisted, thus making traditional Chinese society, at least in theory, an open one, the sole criterion for upward mobility being proved ability through education."[2]

The ideal Confucian state was based, not on laws, but on morality. Confucianism charged government with the responsibility of civilizing the people and developing their virtuous nature. The path to harmony was through peace, prosperity, and education. There was "a profound faith in the moral and political influences of education . . . that, from the 'Son of Heaven' (Emperor) down through the hierarchy of officials to the local magistrate, moral character . . . [would] prove to be contagious and [would] reform and govern the people chiefly through personal influence."[3] Since the moral state of the people was more

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[1]Chang-tu Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education," in Chang-tu Hu, ed., Chinese Education under Communism (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1962), p. 6.

[2]Ibid., p. 7.

[3]Howard S. Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institutions (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1951), p. 209.

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important than the form of their government, leaders nurtured human virtue rather than promote political change.

Learned scholar-officials administered the country by staffing the government bureaucracy. They alone had mastered virtue and wisdom through years of studying Confucian doctrine. A classical education prepared one to take the imperial civil service examination, the passing of which paved the way for scholars to take up an official government position. Being well versed in the Confucian ethic, "the educated few taught and promoted the virtue of filial piety, loyalty to the ruler, humanheartedness, faithfulness, and other Confucian ethical principles. The true value of education was in the belief that education provided the only avenue to moral superiority which, in turn, was regarded as the sole qualification for participation in government and social leadership."[4]

Ideally, scholar-officials applied their refined Confucian morality to politics and worked toward a perfectly-ordered state. Confucianism was both a political philosophy and a code of personal ethics that kept alive the mutual responsibilities and obligations of both the family structure and the imperial bureaucracy. The years of education required to pass the examination ensured the ideological continuity that served as the basis of state control, while the examination system itself guaranteed

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[4]Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education," p. 8.

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[5]William
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[6]Galt, A
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[7]Ibid.,

the perpetuation of Confucian teachings for centuries. There was little doubt as to the importance of the emperor's duty as Confucianism defined it: to oversee the political administration of the empire, to create a conducive climate for the fulfillment of man, and to orchestrate harmoniously the functioning of natural forces.[5]

Educational Development: Tradition and Evolution

Educational historians of China believe that it is not "unreasonable to assume that as early as 2000 B.C. there were some types of educational institutions."[6] During the Western Chou Dynasty (1111-771 B.C.) Chinese civilization must have included formal education as part of the culture.

"The education of officials was much advanced by the increasing tendency of the rulers to seek out educated men for service in the government" during the Eastern Chou Dynasty (771-256 B.C.).[7] The curriculum focused, not on the mastery of the Chinese classics, but on more practical needs, such as archery, horsemanship, reading, and writing. "The views of education held . . . by ancient Chinese thinkers were such that . . . practical affairs in the

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[5]William Theodore deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 1:183.

[6]Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institutions, p. 58.

[7]Ibid., pp. 76-77.

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lives of cultivated men all entered into the educative process, and that process was not entirely, perhaps not chiefly, a matter of schools. The common interests and activities of life made up the curriculum of education. At that time learning had not become bookish and scholastic, and education had its place as an intimate part of the process of social development."[8]

Before the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) the writings of Confucius had not been systematically incorporated in school curricula. But great change came with the Han era, for "the teaching and study of Confucian classics as taken up and developed during the Western Han period [206 B.C.-A.D. 20] determined the core of the curriculum in China . . . for a period of about 2,000 years."[9]

During the Han Dynasty scholars replaced the feudal aristocracy as a dominant force in China's social and governmental system. In the second century B.C., Confucianism was declared the official creed of the state. Men were selected for government service by a combination of recommendation, appointment, and examination, which firmly fixed the educational system in relation to the selection of state bureaucrats. "In China . . . the system of government . . . demanded educated men for official positions. But the government [had] never found it

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[8] Ibid., p. 101.

[9] Ibid., p. 212.

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necessary to establish a school system adequate to supply the total number of candidates for office required. The government [had] usually adopted means of selecting men for office in such a way as to stimulate private study and avoid the necessity of maintaining a comprehensive or complete schools system."[10] In 124 B.C. the central government created and supported an imperial university to educate promising men for government service. Because of the interests of Emperor Wu Ti, whose reign lasted from 141 to 87 B.C., "there developed a truly national or government system of education comprising central and local schools of different grades, an examination system connecting school education with civil service appointments, and with these systems corresponding administrative arrangements."[11] As the linkage between China's educational system and government became institutionalized, "the study of Confucian classics became a habit of the student class who thenceforth held tenaciously to the sayings of ancient sages and were afraid to advance new thoughts of their own. They made no attempt to supersede the civilization of early antiquity, and all they wished was not to fall too far away from it. As a result the thoughts of the scholar class

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[10] Ibid., p. 240.

[11] Ibid., p. 204.

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13 Galt,
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. . . no longer enjoyed the freedom necessary for all true advancement in civilization."[12]

Centuries later during one of China's most brilliant periods--the T'ang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.)--educational institutions and the civil service examinations were further developed. There were colleges in the capital under the control of the national university, public schools in the prefectures, and private schools throughout the nation. In 753 A.D. the Emperor Hsuan Tsang "decreed that throughout the whole realm the practice of recommending scholars by officials of local government should be discontinued, and that no scholars should be sent up to the capital except those who had passed through the schools."[13]

During the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) there appeared academies of higher learning, created by individual Neo-Confucian scholars, that replaced the Buddhist temples as the intellectual centers. (Chinese culture was strongly influenced by Buddhism from 220 A.D. to 960 A.D.) The reformer Wang An-shih (1021-1086 A.D.) promoted the expansion of government schools to rival the private Neo-Confucianist academies that dominated the quasi-formal educational pattern in that era.

The Neo-Confucian scholars held somewhat different positions within the broader parameters of their common

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[12]Ping Wen Kuo, The Chinese System of Public Education (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1915), p. 35.

[13]Galt, A History of Chinese Educational Institutions, p. 342.

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basic philosophy, yet they all gave instruction in the moral values to be followed in one's personal and family life, and in one's obligation to government. The aim of a Neo-Confucian education was to create a good moral climate among the people, to arouse personal convictions, and to develop strength of character. Regarding the requirements for government service, the Sung philosophers felt that "what had been and what still was required by the civil service examination was only the ability to write essays in the elegant literary style, and that . . . was no education in the true sense of the word."[14]

The Neo-Confucian philosopher-scholars believed that education was the primary concern of public administration, for only education could enlighten the people and make for a harmonious state. Their academies lasted through the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.), but as they gradually became government institutions, their previous dynamism faded. During the Ming period (1368-1644 A.D.) district- and prefectural-level government subsidized schools were established, more to administer regular local civil service examinations than to provide systematic education. Real education started at home for young students, with advanced training provided by either numerous private academies throughout the country, which began to wane

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[14]Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, 2 vols. (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), 1:68.

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in number and influence during the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912 A.D.), or by government colleges in the capital.

The educational system that extended into the Ch'ing Dynasty was not really a formal system at all, but more of a private network of arrangements wherein much of the education was of a tutorial nature between master and student. The formal portion of the educational structure was the civil service examination system; the informal portion, the teaching-learning experience, in either tutorial arrangements or the few government-sponsored institutions. For centuries the main thrust of student training was aimed primarily at passing the state examination as a means to a government post and not as gaining an intrinsically valuable education. Traditional Chinese education was neither public nor liberal. Higher education was cultivated by the Manchu government, not for its own sake, but as a means to an end--preservation of the state. Rote memorization paid more dividends than creative thought; as a result, "education in China, and the capabilities of the educated class, were largely limited by the type of examination system which controlled entrance to official life, and that in a bureaucratic society the alternatives to an official career were few and unattractive."[15]

The political hierarchy of scholar-officials trained to develop the positive nature of man through classical knowledge was doomed to eventual collapse in

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[15] deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 1:564.

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the face of foreign encroachments. The traditional educational system that the Ch'ing Dynasty inherited and attempted to sustain was characterized by (1) a formal examination system used to select rather than educate the elite, (2) a dual system with both a private and a public sector, (3) a classical and humanistic training divorced from practical matters, and (4) an inflexible and formalistic curriculum that stultified free inquiry.[16] "The orthodoxy of the traditional scholars interfered strongly with the ability of the social order to renew and to adjust itself to the changing conditions of the modern world."[17] An education oriented solely toward morality, humanism, and social harmony precluded the development of leaders who understood the social, economic, and political problems facing China after the 1840s.

Education and Revolution: Transitional Overview

For centuries the Chinese considered their civilization to be at the center of the universe, the best possible culture. A few medieval contacts with the rest of the world did not influence the Chinese way of life. Contacts with Europeans during the 1700s and early 1800s

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[16] Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education," p. 11.

[17] Chang-tu Hu, China, its people, its society, its culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 412.

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were mainly with traders confined to Canton by the late 1750s. Neither the Chinese culture nor their educational system was affected by contact with foreigners. In fact, "the educational system of China was entirely autochthonous; it was the creation of the Chinese people and owed nothing to outside help. If it had any deficiencies, the Chinese were unaware of them. It had worked for two millennia and, . . . would have worked for another two if left alone. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century not a Chinese would have believed that strife with the 'outer barbarian' would reveal its weakness and inadequacy."[18]

The continuing revolution of the Chinese culture and its educational system started not as a result of indigenous socio-political forces, but by the impact of the West on China's social system. The Opium War started decades of reform and revolution in China, which is not over yet.

Coming of the West

The Opium War (1839-1842) revealed the weakness of the imperial court to protect Chinese territory. Defeat had both immediate, negative results and long-term, positive consequences. China had to give the victors territory and certain rights, but even more importantly the Chinese lost prestige. Their exclusiveness was challenged, and

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[18] Victor Purcell, Problems of Chinese Education (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1936), p. 42.

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they were forced into contact with the outside world that eroded their cultural solitude. The opening of treaty ports to foreign commerce also brought the missionaries and the first penetration of Western learning into the Chinese culture. Defeat and concession generated the realization among some thinkers that stronger national powers existed and that if China hoped to survive, the development of scientific understanding, of heavy industry, and of a modern warfare capability was necessary.

The protracted struggle for enlightenment began with the advocacy among some Chinese intellectuals that Western ideas and learning ought to be applied to Chinese problems. Modern learning was employed to modernize and strengthen China's military forces in order to protect the empire and ensure national survival. Only enough Western education was to be introduced to ward off the foreign powers; the old tradition and culture was to remain unaltered. Several Western-styled educational institutons[19] specializing in various disciplines were created under imperial auspices: a polytechnic (1874), a telegraph college (1879), a military college (1885), a naval college

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[19]For a general survey of the modern schools established by the Chinese government between 1861 and 1894, and a detailed study of three of these institutions, see Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961).

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(1890), a medical college (1893), and others.[20] These schools existed to meet imperial needs (preparing China to deal with the West), and not to develop popular education. These institutions were a separate appendage to, not a substitution for, the indigenous educational system. The Chinese thought that Western education and modern science could be introduced without having to change their cultural principles and institutions.

The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) further emphasized the need for introducing Western intellectual thought and for fundamental educational reforms. Some Chinese knew that merely imitating Western technical education would not save China. They felt that the imperial court should institute more sweeping philosophical and institutional changes modelled after Japan and the West. Japan's victory humiliated the Chinese. Since progressive reformers believed that one cause of China's defeat was its antiquated educational system, the educational reform issue was again current. Petitions and memorials to the throne stressed the need for a modern school system and for the civil service examination essays to call for knowledge of China's modern needs, without which China could not better equip itself to deal with the foreign intruders. There was need for fundamental change, for "the State did not so much care for the organisation

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[20] Purcell, Problems of Chinese Education, p. 57; and E. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1937), p. 160.

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of education as reserve the right of entry for an old-fashioned examination giving access to public offices, thus strengthening the old system of teaching and filling public offices with bookish people incapable of understanding the practical needs of everyday life and still less the enormous changes in modern-world conceptions, the comprehension of which [was] indispensable to the economic and political independence of the country as well as to the speedy intellectual emancipation of its citizens."[21]

These efforts culminated in the Hundred Days of Reform (June-September, 1899)--a short-lived attempt by progressive literati to institute sweeping reforms. The few progressive thinkers and reformist intellectuals met with skepticism and resistance from the old-order Confucian scholars who had the power to influence imperial policy. The reactionaries recovered the momentum when the reform movement became entangled with a plot against the Empress Dowager, who reacted by imprisoning the Emperor and decapitating others. A few reformers escaped with their lives and modern educational reform suffered a temporary setback.

The renewed conservatism precipitated the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, during which many Westerners and Chinese Christians in North China were

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[21]C. H. Becker, et al., The Reorganisation of Education in China (Paris: League of Nations' Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1932), pp. 19-20.

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murdered. This political uprising, which was sanctioned by the Empress Dowager, generated a Western military reaction that again forced China to capitulate. The imperial court paid the Western powers an indemnity, much of which was returned to China and used for developing educational institutions. The ultimate impact of the Boxer Uprising was to encourage educational reform by implementing measures that were opposed a few years before.

Formal Chinese education underwent revolutionary changes with the beginning of the new century. The late Ch'ing educational reformers accomplished two tasks: the creation of a modern school system and the abolition of the examination system. The first national public educational system was patterned after the Japanese, because the Chinese felt that much of the success of Japan's victory over Russia (1904-1905) was due to Japan's adoption of Western learning. And what Japan could do, so could China.

During the years 1903-1905, after the government inaugurated the school system but before the abolition of the imperial examinations, the old-fashioned aspirants to government posts clung to the examination system and shunned the new government schools, while the modern-minded, restive youth sought admission to the longer-established foreign missionary or the newly-established modern schools. The officials became concerned about recruiting potential leaders into the government schools

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The monopoly of the examination system dissipated in the face of Christian missionary education, the flow of Chinese students studying abroad, and the growing demands for modern education. The government placed all its educational hopes with the new school system by abolishing the civil service examination system in 1905. A highly centralized and autocratically controlled Ministry of Education was established in 1906 to promote, coordinate, and supervise the evolving school system. Chinese political and educational leaders attempted to substitute modern nationalism for Confucianism as a cohesive social element, using the school system as the channel to instill nationalistic philosophy and sentiment.[22] The new formal educational structure produced revolutionists who challenged the old order, for the very nature of the school system brought young people together with increased social and intellectual interaction over long periods allowing for mutual exploration of a wide range of ideas that eventually caused the old order to collapse. While these government-sponsored changes were a reasonable response to external forces and internal demands, they came too late to stave off the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1912.

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[22]Cyrus H. Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 71.

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The old education was effective training for maintaining the status quo for centuries, while China was not intruded upon from the outside; but as an increasingly interdependent world of dynamic nations pulled China into the modern era, the humanistic and moralistic thoughts of Confucian education proved ever more inadequate. China's traditional institutions, which had served a series of dynasties and the entire civilization for centuries, revealed an inability to cope with the changes that resulted from the impact of the West. The centuries-old Chinese system was incapable of dealing with new challenges:

> Rules of propriety may contribute to the moral order, but they are plainly inadequate to cope with the complexity of modern commercial and industrial relations. Moreover, the Confucian concept of grand unity, which viewed the Chinese Empire as a cultural universe embracing all of humanity, is obviously unsuitable to the modern world of sovereign, independent states committed to power politics.[23]

The Missionaries

The contribution of missionaries and missionary education to China's cultural awakening cannot be overlooked. Missionaries shaped to some extent the protracted cultural revolution that resulted from the impact of the Occident by bringing Western knowledge and modern learning to China more quickly than would have otherwise been the case. "What the missionary did was not to be the primary

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[23]Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 7.

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cause but to help to determine the course of the transformation."[24]

Missionaries came to China with the Western traders and established schools both in the treaty ports and throughout the country. Among the more prestigious institutions founded by the missionaries were St. John's University (Shanghai) and Lingnan University (Canton).[25] The Christian school graduates found it difficult, if not impossible, to gain government employment because their education was not Confucian based and, therefore, did not prepare them for taking the imperial examinations. Mission school students were introduced to Western civilization and were provided with a knowledge of English. Consequently, there were a few Chinese with knowledge of the West and with an intellectual perspective that helped them grapple with the problems generated by the confrontation between the Chinese culture and the ambitious foreigners. "Chinese modernizers--patriots, statesmen, entrepreneurs, and ambitious young students--eagerly absorbed the Western knowledge dispensed in increasing measure through missionary literature and schools."[26] Many of the reformists had

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[24]Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Russell & Russell, 1929), p. 834.

[25]Purcell, Problems of Chinese Education, p. 53.

[26]Irwin T. Hyatt, Jr., "Protestant Missions in China, 1877-1890: The Institutionalization of Good Works," in Kwawg-Ching Liu, ed., American Missionaries in China (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1966), p. 93.

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received at least part of their education in missionary schools. A relatively small group of Western-educated intellectuals were influential in promoting cultural change and in heralding Chinese nationalism.

It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the Christian missionary education on China's national development, especially after the 1860s. But there can be little doubt that the missionaries did play a role worthy of attention.

Revolutionary Movements

The chaotic political and social condition for the period 1900-1950 impeded the development of an educational system that could adequately meet China's needs. The national unrest dampened the hopes of educational progress that accompanied the establishment of the Republic in 1912. This was a time for revolutionary movements.

Students in Chinese institutions and those who had returned to China after studying in Japan and the United States realized the need for a new educational system if China were to survive, yet they were frustrated by the lack of constructive progress due to the political turmoil in China. Many students of the early twentieth century started and participated in the "New Culture Movement" (1915-1922). The movement aimed at freeing the individual and the greater society from the cultural restraints of centuries-old Confucian absolute truths in the hope of

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generating liberal thinking and eventually equipping China to compete successfully with other nations. There were six general themes to the New Culture Movement: (1) to attack Confucianism; (2) to prosecute the Literary Revolution; (3) to proclaim a new philosophy of life; (4) to generate a discussion on science and the philosophy of life; (5) to promote the "doubting of antiquity" movement; and (6) to debate Chinese and Western cultural values.[27] If scientific or industrial progress were to occur in China, the old and restrictive Confucian philosophy that was blamed for holding China back for decades had to be overcome. Whether the New Culture Movement and its new ideologies of change would meet the needs of China was and still is an open question, but it clearly served to undermine traditional Chinese culture.

A more poignant expression of student-intellectual disenchantment with Chinese leaders and the lack of vision in the circles of power to improve China's internal chaos and deteriorating international position was the "May Fourth Movement" (1917-1921). Although it began as a protest against warlords compromising Chinese sovereignty, its internal momentum shifted toward a reaction against outcome of the Versailles Peace Conference when Japan was given, as a reward for declaring war on Germany, the old German concession of Shantung--a Chinese province. Even

[27] deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 151-152.

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ugh the May Fourth Movement was an expression of anti-
erialist sentiment and nationalistic pride, Western
ellectual thought continued to have an impact in China.
erimentalism, materialism, socialism, communism,
itivism, and the like, provided the building blocks of
Chinese intellectual reformation and also served as
forces that undermined the traditional cultural ideology
China.

The academic community provided much of the critical
for these revolutionary movements.[28] The motivating
e of these movements was the intellectuals' belief that
a needed a cultural and political redefinition. The
rtance of this intellectual ferment cannot be over-
ed:

> The May Fourth Movement [along with the New Culture Movement] was actually a combined intellectual and sociopolitical movement to achieve national independence, the emancipation of the individual, and a just society by the modernization of China. Essentially, it was an intellectual revolution . . . because it precipitated a mainly intellectual awakening and transformation . . . led by intellectuals. This also accelerated numerous social and political and cultural changes. The most important purpose of the movement was to maintain the existence and independence of the nation.[29]

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[28]Although there is some confusion in the literature
the exact difference between the New Culture Movement
he May Fourth Movement, and admittedly the two are
ely related and intertwined, this author would differ-
ate them as follows: The New Culture Movement focused
ndamental social and cultural change, while the May
h Movement focused on political events.

[29]Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Stanford:
ford University Press, 1960), pp. 358-359.

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In the first quarter of the twentieth century the nese educational system was influenced by the Japanese el, with subsequent modifications based on the French German systems, and by American political and educa- nal thought. "Although the imperial examination system been superseded by a public school system after 1905, t new Japanese modeled school system had put into ctice a uniformity and centralization which seemed to tinue the traditional stress on a restricted curriculum selection by elimination."[30] The popularity of the anese system among the Chinese decreased after 1915 n China was presented with the Twenty-one Demands, the ptance of which would have in effect subjected China Japanese colonization. The centralized, autocratic ational system (based on the Japanese educational l) eventually gave way to a more decentralized, demo- ic system (based on the American educational model).

In 1922 the Ministry of Education promulgated the ol Reform Decree after heated dialogue between the ressive education reformers and the ministry. Efforts eform education focused on redefining Chinese educa- al structure and aims in such a way as to square with democratic principles that served as the bases of the

[30]Barry C. Keenan, "Educational Reform and Politics arly Republican China," Journal of Asian Studies 33, 2 (February 1974): 226.

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king of liberal intellectuals in the ongoing reform
ments throughout this half century. The new educational
ite aimed at developing "a true republic in which
cratic education produced a democratic politics."[31]

The major contention between progressive and
ervative Chinese educators centered on the flexibility
e middle-school curricula. The educational objectives
e reformers were to develop individualism in students,
late the school to social progress, and to undermine
igidity of the school system as it had developed
1906, when the Ministry of Education was established.
promotion of individuality in the revised standards of
was interpreted specifically to mean flexibility in
peration of secondary education in order to introduce
practical, vocational instruction--relating the train-
the individual to existing social needs."[32] During
20s Chinese schools and educational reformers were
ly influenced by American educational thought and
an politico-ideological orientation.

The two-year visit (1919-1921) of John Dewey to
contributed significantly to refining the tenets of
ssive education for the reform movement in China.[33]
r contributions progressive education might have

[31] Ibid., p. 225.

[32] Ibid., p. 226.

[33] Ibid., p. 228.

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le to China, the impact of the May Thirteenth Incident
)25)--British-led police killed 13 Chinese demonstrators
Shanghai, touching off anti-foreign sentiment and a
e of nationalistic pride--doomed the hope of a more
ocratic political climate. The killing of Chinese
ilians and students by foreign forces sparked an
recedented spirit of nationalism. What developed in
cational circles and throughout the country was a focus
national strength and a militant anti-imperialism that
ed politics and education much as they had been before
9.[34] "New waves of nationalistic fervor swept the
ntry after 1925 and crushed [the] spirit of liberalism
substituted for it a form of dogmatic fanatical
ionalism" that permeated the educational system.[35]

In the midst of these developments the older and
conservative educators and national leaders of the
ucian tradition protested against the Western influ-
in school curricula. The students, it was claimed,
exposed to the spirit of reform and revolution; they
lenged school authorities and held strikes. Students
ed from previous graduates that they were not being
erly trained for employment, thus adding to the general
t. The old morality was ridiculed and the fabric of
se society was unravelling. The old Chinese

[34] Ibid., p. 236.

[35] Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China,
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losophy and way of life was undermined but not replaced
h anything meaningful.

In response, the Nationalist Government suspended
progressive education policy in 1928 and introduced
Yat-sen's Three People's Principles--nationalism,
ocracy, and socialism--as the core of the new educational
gram in schools. From 1928 to 1937 the Nationalists
orted substantial educational progress through increasing
bers of students and developing programs at all levels
the educational structure. The educational system was
in centralized, with the Ministry of Education wielding
administrative power. As the Nationalists attempted
xterminate the Communists and as the Japanese continued
ncroach on Chinese territory and integrity, the Nanking
rnment became increasingly intolerant of criticism of
onal policy from academic quarters. As a system of
s and informants developed within schools and univer-
es, freedom of expression by students, teachers, and
essors became increasingly restrictive.

ation Under the Communists--The Struggle

While the Nationalist Government developed its
ol system, the Communists also attempted to establish
ducational system during both the Chinese Soviet
olic (1931-1934) and the Yenan era (1936-1945). Little
nown of the educational efforts of the Soviet period;
is known of the schools in the liberated areas

ablished at the end of the Long March (1934-1935). The
cationists' professional way of life in North China,
ecially after the Japanese attacked and occupied much
the region (1937), was one of trying to overcome
rtages of everything needed to operate a school. Not
y did schools function in the face of limited security
the threat of imminent Japanese attack, but they also
to live with other restraints of life in a guerrilla
a. It was relatively easy for elementary school
dents to disperse quickly and return to their families
ing in the immediate area if the Japanese threatened
risal. The middle schools and universities were more
problem, for the higher-level schools were more
itutionalized with boarding students, some equipment,
eton libraries, and other educational paraphernalia.
in spite of these obstacles some middle schools and
ersities continued to function.

The curricula of the Communist schools in North
a were geared to develop urgently needed skills.
tical work was combined with study. Since education
linked with local needs and different areas had dif-
nt needs, there resulted a wide variety of local school
ems. Primary schools were far more numerous than
itutions at any other level. The "people manage,
c help" village primary schools taught simple

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racy and numeracy, as well as serving local conditions
vartime needs.[36]

ation Under the Nationalists--The Fall

During the opening years of the war in China
-1945), the Japanese armies deliberately attacked
estroyed educational institutions because they were
ls of Chinese national pride and cultural conscious-
Japanese troops demolished school buildings and
ment, and scattered students and teachers alike.[37]
schools migrated to the interior of China and came
the control of the Kuomintang (in West and Southwest
) or the Communists (in Northwest China), while other
ls came under Japanese control through the puppet
nments of East and South China.

The Ministry of Education of the Nationalist
ment reported from Chungking in 1939 that "altogether
China's 108 institutions of higher learning--univer-
, colleges, and technical schools--have literally
prooted and carried hundreds and in some cases

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[36]Michael Lindsay, "The Educational System: Early
ist Origins, 1939-1946," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed.,
ion and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International
s Group, 1969), pp. 32-33.

[37]For a description of the circumstances surround-
e closing of Chinese educational institutions by the
se, the relocation of universities, and some experi-
of students and teachers who remained behind to
nt the Japanese, see Hubert Freyn, Chinese Education
War (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1940).

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sands of miles away before being re-established . . . .
over, 17 less fortunate institutions had to close down
use of the hostilities, thus raising the number of
ese citadels of learning thus far affected by the war
total of 94. This leaves only 14 others, which [for
ous reasons] have still been able to carry on their
l academic activities without interference through
irst two years of the struggle."[38]

Those schools in the Kuomintang-controlled areas
ed under conditions that generated low-quality educa-
But then mere survival was more important than
mic standards. Faculties did not have access to
dicals, reference books, or new texts in order to
professionally up-to-date, while wartime tension was
conducive climate for serious academic pursuit. At
end, schools that had re-located in Western China
cape the Japanese wanted to return to their original
in Eastern China and begin anew. This return exodus
ted additional problems for the Nationalist Govern-
s it tried to gain control of the country and to
y the Communists.

The deteriorating economy and the national sentiment
by inflation of catastrophic proportions and the
ing civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese
st Party had an impact on the educational scene.

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[38]Hurbert Freyn, Chinese Education in the War
ai: Kelley & Walsh, Limited, 1940), pp. 11-12.

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first task of the returned institutions was to rebuild
ir physical plants, but with a shortage and high cost
building materials, the initial hopes of rebuilding did
materialize. Projects were postponed, existing inade-
te facilities became even more overcrowded, and the
e of improving academic standards faded.

After 1911, Chinese students became especially
ive in national politics. They were patriotic, ideal-
ic, impatient, public opinion leaders, and a source of
ional political consciousness. In the face of post-war
illusionment, deteriorating Chinese prestige, continued
il war with no anticipated peace, rampant inflation,
prospects of an unstable future, the students became
easingly tense, restless, frustrated, dissatisfied,
critical of governmental authorities. In the context
national disillusionment, the students, who were
ous for decisive action and rapid results, resorted to
kes in the hope of arousing popular attention and
rating supportive public sentiment. The students during
e four years (1945-1949) were in a rebellious mood;
r strikes merely contributed further chaos and confusion
ne national paralysis.

The potential for improving educational institu-
was closely linked to national economic life.
se of inflation and war expenditures, there was little
bility of improving educational standards in spite of
artially because of) increasing enrollments. Academic

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ards deteriorated as the years passed. Schools were
e to meet expenses as inflation encroached on their
ts. Because of higher fees, students often reacted
strikes, demonstrations, and protests. In exchange
nflated tuitions, the financially hard-pressed
nts received poor dormitory quarters, poor quality
unhealthy living conditions, and sinking standards
ucation. Although students received government
cial subsidies, the rate of inflation outpaced the
f subsidy increases.

Another problem facing schools at this time was
break of teacher strikes. Teachers struck for
salaries and, in some cases, to protest adminis-
n policy. Their pay was poor to begin with; infla-
nly further eroded faculty salaries. They were not
g enough from one teaching post to support self and
; many existed at a subsistence level, with all
going for the necessities of life. Professors
ed to taking several jobs as an economic necessity
enough to live. No money was available either from
titution or from the professors' own salaries to
e new books or recent journals; as a consequence,
ship and educational standards deteriorated. In
n, student ferment increased.

Post-war Chinese education was seriously challenged.
was there economic depression and inflation, but
itical tension caused by the Kuomintang prosecuting

ivil war many students opposed. Students were eager to
ress their political opinions on the national welfare
their disenchantment with the failure of the govern-
to deal effectively with the state of the nation.
teacher and student strikes erupted as a culmination
any forces. They were quick to vent their political
s. This volatile situation was exploited by agitators
both the right and the left for political reasons.[39]

It might be concluded that the fall of the
onalist Government and the Communist takeover was due
wo basic reasons: the more apparent cause was the
onal, physical weakness resulting from years of the
with Japan and the protracted civil war; but the more
ificant cause was the uncertainty and confusion among
Chinese intellectuals and students from 1912 until
[40] The issue centered on the

rejection of the traditional Confucian orthodoxy
[that] gave rise to cultural dislocation, aggra-
vated by the inability of Western-oriented
intellectuals to agree as to the means for
achieving Western ideals . . . . The painful
process of modernization of Chinese education
produced only a small group of individualistic
specialists, who were removed from the masses
and unable to exercise sufficient influence on
either politics or society, and thus 'materially

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[39]See Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The Educational Crisis
ina," Educational Administrative and Supervision 34,
(December 1948): 469-478.

[40]Kao Chien, "Progressive Education Undermined
," The Freeman 5, no. 6 (December 1954): 216.

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iminished the chance of democracy in China and
romoted, by default, the opposite cause.'[41]

tion at the Takeover--The Triumph

When the Communists came to power in late 1949,
did not have to start from the beginning to establish
rmal educational system. Modern schools were started
ina almost 50 years before, with the Nationalists
cising tight party control of schools and universities
roughly 25 of those years. The Kuomintang exercised
ct control over educational administration, curricula,
odology, textbook content, and both entrance and
uation examinations. The formal educational structure
fairly unified and standardized, relative to the
onal maladies of the 1940s.[42]

At the takeover, the Chinese Communists inherited
g-established network of educational institutions.
ommunists encouraged all schools and universities to
nue without interruption. The new leaders wanted to
ate as little resentment toward the new regime as
ble among students, teachers, administrators, and
ssors. Support for the Communists was not difficult
d because many, if not most, schools resented the
tang for their strict governmental control, repressive

[41]Hu, "Tradition and Change in Chinese Education,"

[42]Chiu-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress
a (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 156.

ficial restrictions, and student imprisonment, torture, l death. Initial working arrangements were easily rked out between the new leaders and educational insti- tions. Communist leaders were sympathetic toward schools ntinuing operation, for many of their own ranks were ther graduates from or former students of these institu- ons, including the Christian missionary institutions.[43]

Many of the public servants who worked for the omintang were asked to remain at their posts and to ntribute their skills in service to the new regime. This cluded teachers, professors, and educational administra- rs, though they were to receive in-service political aining in the new ideology.[44]

The major Communist criticism of pre-liberation ucation was that schools existed to serve the ruling ss while ignoring the needs of the laboring class, ch represented the vast majority of the Chinese popula- n. Amidst all the educational changes instituted by Communists, schools still exist to serve the ideals the ruling class. Only now the laboring class is not ored; in fact, the peasants and workers are at the al point of education in the People's Republic of China.

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[43] S. B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policy in a," Pacific Affairs 23, no. 1 (March 1950): 21-22.

[44] Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The New Education in unist China," School and Society 71, no. 1839 (18 March): 167.

Communist Education in China:

A Projective Format

The Chinese Communists consider education to be a
ificant part of their ideological revolution and the
ol system to have a prominent place in the long-range
ducation of the people and the short-range indoctrina-
of students. Education in general and the school
em in particular is a decisive force in reorienting
ents' thinking in terms of socialistic goals, of the
ese cultural heritage, of political socialization, and
beying party orders without question. To educate for
'new Chinese man," the previous educational system had
e modified to accommodate new goals. The school system
o be liberated from all foreign influences (especially
e of the West), while all non-Communist Chinese
nts had to be eliminated. The task of the school
m was and is to develop within students a national
as they prepare to become members of the political-
ological intelligentsia of the new order.

nist Philosophers

Contemporary Chinese leaders look to the sacred
of communism for direction. Lu Ting-yi, a long-time
spokesman on educational policy, for example, "found
e Communist Manifesto of 1848, that in future educa-
nd material production are to be combined, and in

S KAPITAL that such combination of education and labour the path of evolution for humanity."[45] Regarding the oublesome problem of intellectuals, Lenin knew that very ruling class [had] to win over the intellectuals."[46] ese tenets are still apparent today in Chinese Communist ıcational policy.

Mao is also an important contributor to Communist ology. His views on the role of education are central understanding the task of the school in China under his irmanship. Mao owes "to Confucius . . . the notion t education [is] the only way to improve the human ironment. Mao's accent on education--broadened to race propaganda, indoctrination, and 'though reform'--] reflected in his portrayal of himself as the Great cher. For, as he saw it, one of his major roles [is] remold the hearts and minds of China."[47] As to the role ormal education in pre-Communist China, Mao has a nite bias against the formal school, and considers wn schooling to have been a waste.[48]

But Mao and other Chinese revolutionaries believe a school system with the proper revolutionary program

[45] China News Analysis, no. 273, 24 April 1959, p. 5.

[46] As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 277, 1959, p. 5.

[47] Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution olution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 9.

[48] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

key instrument for radically altering society. ifically, "the ability of ideological education to ey a common sense of purpose [is] to become a basic ent of teaching curricula from elementary schools ugh universities."[49] Mao feels the task of the school o ensure that students acquire a proper political pective, for "not to have a correct political point iew is like having no soul."[50]

Although there is fundamental disagreement between a and the Soviet Union as to the interpretation of unism vis-a-vis present-day revolutionary policy, Mao n the past and still supports many of the basic posi- of Marx and Lenin. In May 1939, Mao stated that intellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail tegrate themselves with the workers and peasants. In inal analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary lectuals and non-revolutionary or counter-revolution- tellectuals is whether or not they are willing to ate themselves with the workers and peasants and ly do so."[51] And in July 1964, "education must serve arian politics and must be combined with productive

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[49]Richard H. Solomon, "From Commitment to Cant: lving Functions of Ideology in the Revolutionary ," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Ideology and Politics emporary China (Seattle: University of Washington 973), p. 64.

[50]"Quotations from Chairman Mao," China Pictorial, . 2, p. 23.

[51]Ibid., p. 22.

bour. The working people should master knowledge and
e intellectuals should become habituated to manual
bour."[52]

current Themes

The Chinese Communists rejected educational thought
om their own past (Confucianism was considered feudalis-
c) and most of contemporary Western ideology (except
xism-Leninism). For example, the Chinese leaders con-
ier the educational philosophy of John Dewey as bourgeois,
Dewey's education centered on individual growth and
velopment, and completely ignored politics and production.
ey's strategy would only perpetuate the "status quo of
italistic society."[53] For the new masters of China,
re is knowledge of only two areas central to education
schooling: the class struggle and the production
uggle.

The history of the formal educational system during
first 25 years of the People's Republic of China
ects several recurrent themes of a basic philosophical
re. These ideological motifs are and were always at
e. Through the tactical shifting of interpretation,
educational posture of the schools reflects the views

[52] Ibid., p. 23.

[53] Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Elementary Education in
nist China," China Quarterly, no. 10 (April-June
: 108.

paramount by either Mao and his supporters or other
ese Communist leaders who opposed Mao's views. Mao's
c educational stance reflects the values employed
ng the Yenan era--loyalty, egaliterianism, dedication,
erity, and no personal freedom. He assumes that
l-level solutions found workable in the rural, military
s of North China after 1936 are equally applicable to
ntire nation at peace and striving for national
opment. Mao's opponents feel that new methods are
ssary to meet new demands.

The themes around which the ideology-methodology
gle revolves are (1) egalitarianism-elitism, (2) cen-
zation-decentralization, (3) Red-Expert, and (4)
tion-labor. Briefly, egalitarianism is central to
continuing revolution; barriers separating people
fferent classes must be overcome. Yet in practical
how are planners and educators to incorporate
tarianism into schools and simultaneously assure
y education to meet manpower requirements? One
nge facing educators in China is to translate Mao's
tical (and desirable) egalitarianism into a practical,
-level application amidst the reality of developing
lized manpower for modernizing China. Mao often
es the elites produced by high-calibre educational
tions, yet such institutions are the only realistic
f producing sophisticated, technical and scientific
se required by a developing, dynamic, national

nomy. Those Chinese leaders recognizing and supporting development of expertise are labeled by Mao as enemies the people.

Closely related to the egalitarian-elite issue is centralization-decentralization controversy. Decenlization of the administration of education promotes litarianism, as more students are admitted to school. such local character of schooling seems to generate ous standards of academic excellence and a lower ity of education nation-wide. Mao argues that a central rolling bureaucracy does not facilitate the development ocal potential or talent, and that local educational rol promotes the development of skills needed to meet l agricultural and industrial production demands.

A third central theme focuses on the "Red and t" struggle. If schools educate students to be more than "expert," then the fervor of political education ctivities overshadows solid academic study and hinders development needed for modernization. Conversely, emphasis is on being "expert" as opposed to being the educational consequences are reversed. The le between the correct political orientation (redness) chnical-scientific competence (expertise) seems to be in the ends-means controversy.

Contiguous with the Red-Expert issue is the educad productive labor contention. If one is to be a y educated "red," then active participation in

oductive labor is essential. On the other hand, if
nools are to produce qualified "experts," as little time
possible should be devoted to outside manual labor and
much time as possible be given to academic pursuits.
course, strictly academic students become members of
hnical-scientific elites, thus undermining the egali-
ian principle. Mao prescribes a labor-education combi-
ion to subvert such elites and to promote egalitarianism.

Two themes of education in the People's Republic
China are without controversy: education is to be
trolled and led by the Chinese Communist Party, and
cation is to serve the people and not to promote personal
n.

Regarding the single, most dominant thrust of the
ools, one might ask, "What is the nature of the rela-
ıship between the continuing revolution on the Chinese
land and the function of education?" Theodore Hsi-en
posits an answer:

> The Communist revolution is a total revolution aiming to establish a new society and a new way of life. A new society presupposes new men with new minds, new ideas, new emotions, and new attitudes. Before a new way of life can prevail, the old way of life must be abolished. While the new generation is being molded according to the Communist ideology, older people with old minds and hearts must be remolded. The making and remaking of new men therefore becomes a fundamental task of the Communist revolution and the central aim of education.[54]

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[54]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "The New Socialist Man," rative Education Review 13, no. 1 (February 1969): 88.

pproaching the Thesis

With the clearly identified role for education in uilding a new society and the clearly assigned school ask of producing properly-oriented student generations, he various thrusts of the curricula sharply defined pecific attitudes and abilities developed throughout the tages of national policy and educational development. ome of the particular curricular objectives are geared immediate needs, such as education for national defense uring the Korean conflict generated among students housands of "volunteers" who went to fight American perialism and to aid Korea; other curricular goals are eared to specific international strategy, such as education d the Soviet model that at one time stressed their iendship with and aid to China, but after the Sino-Soviet lit, such an emphasis was no longer part of the curricula.

Other aspects of the schools' educational program phasize long-term needs, for example, education for alth to develop hygienic attitudes and practices among udents (and through them, their parents) as an attack on eases caused by the lack of popular but basic sanitary- lth measures. Also of perennial concern is education national construction, aimed at developing usable lls students can immediately employ upon graduation.

The major stages of Chinese Communist development er the takeover are grouped into four periods, based Peking's national and international policies of the

iime. Several significant events characterize each
eriod: the first (1949-1957) includes early consolida-
ion of power by the Communist forces, the Korean conflict,
he First Five-Year Plan, tightening control over the
asses, the initial Sino-Soviet friendship that began to
eteriorate, and various party-government strategies to
in over or to control the intellectuals;[55] the second
1958-1960) encompasses the Three Red Flags Movement--the
reat Leap Forward, the People's Communes, and the Social-
stic Main Line--the start of the Second Five-Year Plan,
ie withdrawal of Soviet technical experts, and the China-
dia border dispute; the third (1961-1965) incorporates
ina's becoming a nuclear power with the detonation of
omic bombs, a further shifting from heavy industrial to
ricultural development, planned increase in consumer
ods, worsening Sino-Soviet tensions, and temporary
phasis on being more "expert" than "red"; and the fourth
966-1973) is dominated by the Great Proletarian Cultural
volution cleansing of the Chinese Communist Party of the
worthy and the suspect, the rise and fall of Comrade
n Piao, and the nascent Sino-American rapprochement.

This investigation and interpretation of the
kage between national policy and educational development
lores the impact of party and government actions and

[55]The Chinese Communists consider anyone who does work with his hands and has had, at least, a formal ondary-level education to be an intellectual.

ecisions on the role of the school, and how the schools eciprocally contributed to the realization of national olicy. As the evolution of this linkage is traced hrough the various stages of national development, it hould be kept in mind that both party-government policy nd educational policy often reflect abrupt shifts that eem contradictory in nature. The lack of consistency n Communist education, in general, and Chinese educational olicy, in particular, merely reflects shifting interpre- tions of the contributions to be made by subordinate ystems. National policy occasionally undergoes an abrupt out-face, merely reflecting the dynamics of political ctions within the circles of power.

"Our duty is to hold ourselves responsible to the people."

Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

CHAPTER 3

PARTY POWER AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Power and authority, though related terms, do not e the same meaning. Power is the capacity of a person, roup, or a nation to achieve results, either by suasion or by force. Authority is legitimate power, is, the power source enjoys the sanction of either eal or a mythical consensus. Authority gives power the t to pursue certain goals; it does not mean that these s or the methods of achieving them are necessarily t.

What is right depends on whether one is an lutist--certain acts are always right or always wrong, atter what the circumstance--or a relativist--right wrong are determined by time, place, and circumstance. er of these positions is at the root of one's reac- toward and feelings about the Communist regime in People's Republic of China.

The special phenomena of power and authority are
damental to the relationship between the system of
trol and the system of formal education. On the
nese mainland since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party
been the repository of power, while the People's
ernment has had the authority to exercise that power
en it by the party. In this context Chinese leaders
e given much attention to the role of the school for
part in developing the new Communist state.

The Chinese Communist Party--The Power

The power source of any system, by definition,
trols the functioning of the component sub-systems.
Chinese Communist Party, as the source of power in the
ple's Republic of China, controls social institutions
changes their character and boundaries. Power is the
ilization of resources to achieve objectives, and the
y, like all institutions, employs power to achieve its
ed goals.

The one comprehensive goal of the party is to
lop a Communist state in China. This shall be accom-
hed through an alliance between urban, industrial
ers and rural peasants. The party exercises total
rol over national policy by indirectly dominating the
le's governments at all levels and in all regions of
country, and by directly controlling the disciplined
y organization that provides leadership for the

pple's Liberation Army (PLA) and for the areal governments roughout China, mission for the revolutionary elements of ciety, and direction for the masses.

The Chinese Communist Party is separate from the vernment of the People's Republic of China. The party its own distinctive identity, with self-contained inistrative machinery. No law other than the party stitution is recognized. The party looks upon the aratus of the state "as an administrative vehicle or ice available to it for its own purposes."[1] That is, party regards its own mission a higher canon than the te law of the government. In fact, the institutions of ernment spring from the decisions and authorization of party. "The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] frankly claims that the CPR [Chinese People's Republic] is only nvenient instrument of its own devising, which it finds ful for effecting the eventual transition to the class- society under its own leadership. Consequently, all ic policy of the CPR is guided by the tactical program he CCP. No anti-Communist sentiment is permitted to expression. The most rigorous controls are maintained policy and its administration. Every political device xploited to enable the CCP to retain an absolute

[1] H. Arthur Steiner, "The Role of the Chinese unist Party," The Annals of the American Academy of tical and Social Science 277 (September 1951): 59.

ıonopoly of leadership within the complex structure of he CPR."[2]

Party paternalism does not recognize, nor does it llow, any organized group that is not closely affiliated ith the party. In order that associations of students, omen, youth, peasants, laborers, teachers, etc., can be abeled revolutionary and thereby eligible to partake in ocal people's governments (pre-1967) or the revolutionary ommittees (post-1967), they must accept and comply with arty guidance. Close control is exercised through con- itutionally-prescribed procedures enabling the party to upervise the work of mass organizations. People are couraged to join party-controlled associations, which e, in fact, instruments of control and supervision. It in this way that the people are "organized" to comply th and promote the party line.

From the beginning of the Republic, "the Chinese mmunist Party [has been] the organized vanguard of the inese working class, the highest form of its [i.e., oletarian] class organization."[3] The size of the vanguard s always been small in relation to the population. Party mbership has never been more than four per cent of the al population of China, has always been highly selective, ghtly disciplined, and regularly purged of the unworthy.

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[2] Ibid., p. 57.

[3] U.S. Congress, House, "Constitution of the Chinese mmunist Party," Congressional Record, 81st. Cong., 1st. s., 1949, 95, pt. 15: A4775-A4779.

of the Tenth Party Congress (24-28 August 1973) the bership of the Chinese Communist Party stood at 28 lion, making it the largest Communist party in the ld.[4]

The party itself is tightly controlled from within, like the government, it practices democratic centralism. re is no intention of subjecting party policies, princi-s, or practices to mass scrutiny or to free elections. internal administrative structure of the Chinese nunist Party somewhat parallels that of the People's ernment. The organizational hierarchy--national, ional, provincial, county, municipal, town, district, --is centrally controlled through uniform rules that rn party operations from the top.

The impact of the party on the affairs of state in a is most significant, for party members are assigned lected to key government positions with the official onsibility of fulfilling government functions by ying out party directives. The link between party cy and government action is personal, not official. high-level officials, whether in the ministries or rovincial- or urban-level governments, were and are y members. The lower levels of the party-government llel also exemplify a close inter-relationship.

[4] China News Analysis, no. 932, 7 September 1973,

The central party organization (see Figure 3-1) enters around the National Party Congress, representing the lower levels of the party with a large assembly of delegates (approximately 1200 plus alternates) who are supposedly elected, but are actually hand-picked by the ontrolling bureaucrats.[5] The National Party Congress lects a Central Committee (90-195 plus alternates), which lects a Central Political Bureau (Politburo) (19-21 plus lternates), which in turn selects a Standing Committee 5-9) that is, in fact, the real power of the party and the ountry. The elected chairmanships of the National Party ongress, the Central Committee, the Central Political ureau, and the Central Secretariat were all held for many ears by Mao Tse-tung. Mao also served as the Chairman of he Central People's Government until 1958. Power flows rom the Standing Committee through the Politburo, through he Central Committee, through the National Party Congress, d through the Congress delegates to the entire party mbership and all the key posts of government. In this y, the personal power of Mao Tse-tung is exercised thin the party and the government.

[5]Steiner, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party," 62.

NOTE: Two excellent sources for further detailed formation on both the party and the government, see eodore H. E. Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist Regime: cuments and Commentary (New York: Frederick A. Praeger olishers, 1967) and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organi- tion in Communist China (Berkeley: University of Calif- nia Press, 1966).



ure 3-1. Chinese Communist Party organization.

rces: Adapted from Communist China: A Bibliographic Survey (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1971), p. 180; Donald W. Klein, "The Party and the Leaders," in The China Giant: Perspective on Communist China (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 50; and Current Scene 4, no. 15 (8 August 1966): 10.

There is no official linkage between government
ministration of the state and party determination of
licy. However unrelated party and government appear,
e party controls the elections of congressional candi-
es, the party controls government agencies by estab-
shing party committees therein, and the party controls
personal-corporate-political lives of the people
ough education. The party also attempts to influence
future through controlling the role of the school.

Since the takeover the party has passed through
eral evolutionary phases. The 1949-1957 period was
racterized by party unity and the beginning of Socialist
onstruction. The nation was unified under one leader,
dalism and imperialism were eliminated, and the party
ntified itself with the Chinese national-cultural
olution. During these years the party laid the founda-
n among the masses for its socialistic-nationalistic
ef structure.

The 1958-1966 period was one of party polarization.
Great Leap Forward signalled internal dissension in
camp of international communism, the Retrenchment
essed the moderate wing of the party attempt to direct
peration of the national economy, and the Two-Line
y Struggle centered on the increasing disunity within
Chinese Communist Party. These were years of polari-
on for party factions over the strategy for development
ommunism in China.

The 1966-1969 period encompassed the Cultural volution. During these years many long-time party aders were removed, and the party was thoroughly purged. ly about thirty per cent of the Central Committee members ected by the Eighth Party Congress (1956) survived the ltural Revolution to hold their posts in the Central mittee elected by the Ninth Party Congress.[6] The rsonality cult of Mao Tse-tung was also developed during Cultural Revolution. The noted historian and sinolo- t Chalmers Johnson claims that the cult of Mao Tse-tung developed (1) to fill the void created by a weak and ctured party leadership, (2) to build a power base to ble Mao to "attack and remove deeply entrenched Party ders who had become his political enemies," and (3) to ease his own vanity.[7] During the Cultural Revolution olutionary committees replaced the party structure and ernment organs at the provincial level as the foci of er and authority. The revolutionary committees repre- ted a three-way alliance: party-government cadre, the ple's Liberation Army, and elements of mass organizations resenting the people. The military was the main

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[6]Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University alifornia Press, 1972), p. 470.

[7]Chalmers Johnson, "The Changing Nature and Locus uthority in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, China: Management of a Revolutionary Society ttle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 70.

nefactor in the reshuffling of power that resulted from e Cultural Revolution, a situation about which Mao was t entirely satisfied.[8]

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1969-73) the Chinese Communist Party was rebuilt, with the appearance of some former members who had been purged. e revolutionary committees remained part of the governing chinery, though the dominant influence of the military thin the revolutionary committees dissipated. At the th (April, 1969) and the Tenth (August, 1973) Party gresses, Mao reaffirmed his position on the need for manent revolution.

It will be of interest to keep these stages of ty development in mind as one examines the phases of cational development in China. The emphasis of party er cannot and does not shift without a corresponding act on the mission of the schools.

The Chinese People's Government--
The Authority

The following analysis focuses on the foundations overnmental authority and where the responsibility for al education rests within the administrative structure.

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[8]Rice, Mao's Way, p. 472.

ıase One: 1949-1954

The "Proclamation of the Central People's Governent"[9] was the official act declaring the People's Republic China on 1 October 1949. The Chinese People's Political nsultative Conference (CPPCC)[10] was the political body at oversaw the formation of the new republic and that ayed an important role in the first phase of Communist ntrol of the Chinese mainland. The CPPCC developed and acted the "Common Program"[11] as a provisional constituon, providing the Communist leaders with a framework for vernment action. The authority of the new government sted on the Common Program, which claimed that the CPPCC presented the will of the people. It also stated that

> Pending the convocation of the All-China People's Congress . . . the Chinese People's Political Consulcative Conference shall exercise the functions and powers of the All-China People's Congress, enact the Organic Law of the Central People's Government . . ., elect the Central People's Government Council . . . and vest it with the authority to exercise state power. (Art. 13, par. 2 of the Common Program)

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[9] Vidya Prakash Dutt, ed., East Asia: China, Korea, an, 1947-50 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1958), 180-182.

[10] The CPPCC was a coalition of political groups with resentatives from the Chinese Communist Party, from all ocratic parties and people's organizations, from all ions of the nation, from the PLA, from all national orities, from overseas Chinese, and from all other riotic democratic elements. This united front, in fact, dominated by the Communist party.

[11] Theodore H. E. Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist ime: Documents and Commentary (New York: Frederick A. eger Publishers, 1967), pp. 34-45.

addition, the Common Program outlined government policy
garding the military, the economy, culture and educa-
n, minority peoples, and foreign policy.

The "Organic Law of the Central People's Govern-
t"[12] delineated the machinery of government. The
tral People's Government Council, the members of which
e elected by the CPPCC, assumed leadership of the state
aratus; the newly-created Government Administrative
ncil, as the highest executive body for state adminis-
tion, carried out the directives of government. The
mittee of Cultural and Educational Affairs directed the
of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of
lic Health, the Ministry of Education, the Academy of
nces, the Press Administration, and the Publications
nistration.

e Two: 1954-1967

The first phase of government authority ended on
eptember 1954 as the CPPCC, whose delegates were
cted by political consultation, passed out of existence
provisional legislature and the First National People's
ress, whose delegates were elected by the people (but
oved by the party), convened and passed the 1954
stitution of the People's Republic of China."[13] That
itution replaced the Common Program of the CPPCC.

[12] Ibid., pp. 46-51.

[13] Ibid., pp. 75-92.

The National People's Congress is the highest organ state authority in the People's Republic of China. (See gure 3-2.) It elects its own Standing Committee, a emier of the State Council, and a Chairman of the People's ublic of China as head of state. The State Council laced the Government Administrative Council. "The te Council of the People's Republic of China, that is, Central People's Government, is the executive of the hest organ of state power; it is the highest adminis- tive organ of state." (Art. 47, 1954 Constitution) The te Council gives direction to, and coordinates the work the various mechanisms of government administration, luding those that focus on cultural, social, and educa- nal work. (See Figure 3-3 for national-level government anization.)

se Three: After 1967

Although the national-level government structure is to have remained basically the same before, during, after the Cultural Revolution, in 1967 the lower-level le's congresses and people's councils were discredited dissolved. Since 1967-1968 revolutionary committees functioned as both party and government at the incial levels and lower. Hierarchical subordination the channels of responsibility between the PLA, the ral Government, and the party are not yet entirely r.



Figure 3-2. Structure of the Chinese People's Government (1949-1967).

Sources: Adapted from Peter S. H. Tang, Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 176; and James R. Townsend, "The Government," The China Giant: Perspective on Communist China (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 58.



Figure 3-3. National Level Government Organization of the People's Republic of China.

Sources: Adapted from Current Scene 4, no. 15 (8 August 1966), p. 11 and Communist China: A Bibliographic Survey (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1971), p. 170.

Government Control and Administration of Education

The party, which uses education as a political tool, controls the school system through both governmental administrative machinery and party personnel and committees. The intensity of party concern for education is evidenced by having the Chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, Lu Ting-yi, serve also as the chief party spokesman on educational matters for many years. Policy decisions affecting education and schooling are made, in the main, on political grounds and not on pedagogical considerations.

The educational administrative structure facilitates speed and flexibility to accommodate policy implementation and change. To deviate from party or government directives is to be anti-Socialist and anti-revolution. Even during periods of decentralized control of education, the few central Government directives are to be followed. No matter the extent of government decentralization, the party in control.

Whereas the administration of national educational programs was conducted under the direction of the Committee Cultural and Educational Affairs within the Government Administration Council before 1954, the new structure created by the 1954 Constitution and organic laws called for the Committee to be replaced with an Office of Cultural and Educational Affairs within the State Council to

coordinate the work of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Public Health, and other commissions and bureaux.[14]

At the national level, the Ministries of Education and Higher Education oversee formal schooling. Before the Cultural Revolution, the Department of Education (provincial level) and the Bureau of Education (Hsien or municipal level) were the organs of administration, with regional-level educational organizations controlled and supervised by the next higher administrative level and by the people's committees of the party at the same level. Since the Cultural Revolution, revolutionary committees perform party-government administrative functions.

The Office of Culture and Education in the State Council oversees the work of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. The Ministry of Education controls, organizes, plans, and supervises most formal education in China. This involves the administration and organization of schools, curricula, textbooks, methodology, and supervision of primary schools, general and technical secondary schools, adult education, teacher training, general education in part-time schools, and nurseries and kindergartens.

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[14]Chiu-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), pp. 80-85.

The Ministry of Higher Education was created by Government Administration Council in November 1952 to meet future needs for educational expansion and ialization. (The Ministry of Higher Education was ished in 1958 as a consequence of Mao's decentraliza- scheme. It was re-established in 1964, but was olved during the Cultural Revolution.) The direct onsibilities of this ministry extended to composite ersities (teaching arts, humanities, and science), -secondary polytechnic institutes, specialized colleges, higher technical and research institutes. Ministry onsibilities extended to policies of admissions, nce, personnel, curriculum, methods, and new depart- s and programs.

Before the Cultural Revolution there were some r modifications in the hierarchy of control. For ple, Sun Yat-sen University was controlled by the stry of Higher Education, by the Bureau of (Higher) tion of the Kwangtung Provincial Government, and the party.[15] Many schools of specialized training were, ast partially if not wholly, administered by various Council ministries. For example, the Ministry of ulture had its own technical college(s) and research tutes that dealt with the specific problems of ulture.

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[15] Ibid., p. 195.

The Central Government controls education, and so the party. The local party committees provide leader- within the schools by controlling school-related party nizations (such as the Young Pioneers), by controlling various (higher) educational conferences, by control- for many years the system of unified enrollment inations, and by controlling job assignment of uates.[16] The party has the final word on any adminis- ive or pedagogical matter. The party decides which hers are appointed and promoted, which students receive larships, what students will study which subjects, e they will study, who is to graduate, and where they be assigned after graduation.

The machinery of control, either the imperial inations of traditional China or the Communist govern- 's Ministry of Education and party committees, articu- desired social and technical goals to the school em to ensure that graduates serve both society and the ers' visions of the future. As part of the apparatus vernment, the school system is a tool to implement ogical and technical education.

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[16]Del Weber, "Education as a Tool of Power," Phi Kappan 41, no. 9 (June 1960): 389.

SECTION III

COMMUNIST EDUCATION IN CHINA

The East Shines Red
The Sun Arises

(From the Chinese song
The East Shines Red.)

CHAPTER 4

CONSOLIDATION AND STABILIZATION

An examination of the interrelationships between Chinese Communist social system and the institutions t comprise it reveals an exchange of inputs and outputs t, taken together, defines the Chinese People's Republic. h institutions as the school, the army, the party, and government, reflect the values and goals of their ent social system as well as each fulfilling specialized ds that serve to maintain the entire social order. An estigation of the political and economic forces active hin the Chinese social system defines the parameters hin which the educational system functions. The nature the foreign relations one socio-political system (China) with other systems (the Soviet Union or the United tes) also has an impact on the nature of formal educa-n. A brief overview of the major domestic and foreign ues facing Peking during the Period of Consolidation and ilization reflects the general atmosphere in China from to 1957.

The Times:
1949-1957

Interrelated forces, domestic and foreign, generate
of perspectives for understanding the nature of the
tionships between component systems that exist within
larger system. The following brief commentary focuses
major historical events occurring within the Chinese
al system that had an impact on the functioning of the
cational system. The 1949-1957 historical overview,
those to appear in the remaining chapters of this
ion (namely, 1958-1960, 1961-1965, and 1966-1973),
es to develop a temporal framework centering on
cted domestic and foreign issues of the period. Because
pace limitations, the number of topics and their analy-
is limited. However brief, the statements provide a
e of the times and of the dynamic forces at work within
ese society from 1949 to 1957. The impact of these
es on the role of the school is examined in greater
il in the input-process-output portions of the chapter.

stic Issues

Political and economic concerns usually embrace a
procal causality and are, therefore, difficult to
rate. For purposes of this analysis, however, an
trary division is made, with attention directed to
cted arenas on the 1949-1957 domestic front in China.

Economic Considerations. The economic condition f any superordinate system has a direct impact on the evelopment of the educational sector. The extent to hich a government can invest financial resources in the chool system is affected by the health of the economy. he development and control of both the economic and the ducational sectors often experience a parallel evolution. hat was the state of the economy and what were some of he challenges facing the Communists in 1949-1957 that indered or helped the development of the formal educational ystem?

The problems facing the People's Government in the irst state-planning period (1949-1952) were staggering: nflation was rampant, much of the industrial infra-struc- ure was in ruin, experienced technical and managerial xpertise was in short supply--in a word, the economy was isorganized. Although a beginning was made, little com- rehensive planning, either economic or educational, was ossible due to the unavailability of essential statistics, e absence of qualified planning personnel, and the lack governmental machinery for effective control.

Without being overly concerned about party loyalty, e Communists utilized existing qualified personnel to ing stability to the shattered economy and order to the srupted educational system. In spite of added problems ated by the Korean War, inflation was stopped, taxation unified, production was restored, prices were controlled,

the economy was stabilized, and the schools were reopened. Both the private business and private education sectors continued to operate for a time after the takeover, though the state increased its control over all economic and educational activities. By late 1952 the private commercial class was destroyed as a political force within the Chinese power structure, and private educational institutions were either completely controlled by the state or had been forced out of existence.

In 1952 the "rehabilitation period" ended and the "construction period" began. The Ministry of Higher Education and the State Planning Commission were both established with full ministerial rank, while planning-control procedures became increasingly specialized and centralized. The economic and educational sectors were brought under increasingly effective control, a prerequisite to a Socialist society.

The Chinese strategy for planned economic and educational development was based on the Soviet pattern. Though the Russian economic model--an urban focus with labor-saving and capital-intensive growth patterns--proved inappropriate for China's situation, the Soviet education model was of some value. The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) emphasized heavy industry and especially steel production, relegating agricultural development to a position of lesser importance. The rationale for this imbalance was that progress in the agricultural sector

pended upon industrial development. This imbalance was
flected in the numbers of college and university grad-
tes produced across the disciplines. Those trained in
gineering were in far greater quantity than those in
riculture. The agricultural policies of the First Five-
ar Plan promoted cooperative farming practices, moving
ward collectivization on an ever-larger scale. Changes
agriculture were more social than technological. The
inese used the Soviet kolkhoz (collective farms) as
eir model for agricultural organization.

Egalitarian appeals to ensure an equitable sharing
austerity were part of the social and political control
chanisms of consumption. Capital goods had priority
r consumer goods, and investment over consumption.
ular economic and educational sacrifices were forced
the name of patriotism and ideology. This balancing
economic rationality with social justice also had an
cational dimension: planning rationality required the
ining of highly-educated experts in fields essential
economic development, while social justice required the
lusion of as many students as possible in the school
tem. The Communists greatly expanded the number of
dents at the primary level and also concentrated on
roving educational quality at higher levels.

In the orchestration of human resources, raw
erials, and financial considerations, development plans
erienced difficulties. With state planning came

ns of consciously balancing both the economy and
ucational needs. Without the forces of the market-
:o make allocation decisions, there resulted dispro-
ıal development rates, delays, and internal supply-
inconsistencies that required occasional re-evalua-
of expectations and revisions of projected targets.
uable planning experience was gained and Chinese
rial and educational growth were unprecedented
the Period of Consolidation and Stabilization.

Political Considerations. The political concerns
the superordinate system were also major forces
educational development. Like the economics-
on reciprocity, the impact of political considera-
n education is worth noting.

The history of the People's Republic of China began
lly on 1 October 1949, when Mao proclaimed control
mainland for the Chinese Communist Party. The
tedly rapid Kuomintang (or Nationalist Party)
e left the Communists with the immediate problem
rolling and absorbing large numbers of non-Communist
ratic administrators and military personnel. In
the need to conquer a remnant Kuomintang military
perhaps a million, the Communists enjoyed a
of goodwill, support, and tolerance from the
y population (including the academic community).
ese Communists had to consolidate nation-wide
with but a small number of politically-reliable

re. Along with the military, students were used to
olidate the party's control over the masses in the
y months of the new regime. Educational institutions
to be used as long-term mechanisms of control.

Within four months of the takeover several nations
gnized the People's Government as the sole official
ority, though it was not until October 1950 that
unist forces advanced into Tibet to complete the
ication of China. The years 1949-1952 were devoted to
olidating Communist power over the expanses and the
itudes of China through reorientation and reorganization
he forces of social control, including the school
em.

Since Communist power rested on peasant support,
land question was central to consolidating control.
g the years of bitter struggle before 1949, Mao
ated land redistribution among the peasants so as to
popular support for the rural areas for the embattled
eleaguered Communist party. On 30 June 1950 the Land
m Act was passed, officially signalling the nation-wide
tribution of land among the peasantry. Out of the
1952 land issue developed a movement against the land-
. Schools suspended classes to permit students to
ke in the struggle against landlords--a front-line
tion for politics experience. In 1951-1952 landlords
ublicly criticized, ridiculed, tried, and occasionally
death. Elimination of the landlord class, which had

ited the peasants for centuries, was a major step in
oying the old society and in building the new Chinese
l system.

Nineteen fifty-two was a year for regimentation.
new regime proceeded to change the boundaries of
institutions, policies outlining party-government
ations were proclaimed. The Three-Anti Campaign
st corruption, waste, and bureaucracy) and the
nti Campaign (against bribery, embezzlement, tax
n, and theft of state property and of state economic
s) established the parameters of what the new regime
o be unacceptable behavior. These movements were
f the trend of promoting effective government
zation and greater party control of social institu-
nd of the country.

Two major domestic events focused on the policy
intellectuals. In May 1956, Lu Ting-yi, chief of
paganda Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and chief party spokesman on
onal policy, made the important "Let All Flowers
ogether, Let Diverse Schools of Thought Contend"
Intellectuals were invited to air their discontent
criticize lesser party-government policies and
el. The persuasive tactic would hopefully encourage
tuals to support the regime and to contribute their
e for the enrichment of China. The intellectuals
first hesitant to accept such an invitation, fearing

ɔssible consequences. After Mao renewed the "Hundred
rs" pronouncement later in 1957, the intellectuals
ıded with vigor. The momentum of their criticism
ıelmed and threatened the Communist leadership, for
ıtellectuals demanded freedom of expression and
ted the party's power monopoly.

The regime reacted decisively by launching an
ightist Movement (or Rectification Campaign) on 22
957. The failure to ideologically re-educate and
political, literary, academic, and cultural intel-
ls (including students) was evident by their out-
criticism of basic party-government policies and
ship. Bourgeois values and attitudes were still
, requiring strong counter-measures. Many
ists" were removed from their positions and sent to
ıntryside. They became known as Xiafang (Hsia-fang)
ectuals, that is, those intellectuals who were
ferred downward" to either labor camps or rural
s for further thought remolding and ideological
g.

Mao felt the causes of discontent were rooted in
ized bureaucratic control, which had fostered
is thinking and the development of elites. While
to counter the demands for liberalism and the ills
aucratic administration, Mao instituted a more
alized governance system--the communes. Greater
ıce was given to ideological reliability than to

nnical competency. During the years 1949-1957 stress placed on being "expert"; in the following period 58-1960) this shifted to being "red."

eign Issues

In an increasingly interdependent world, the nature he relationships between national-cultural super- nate systems affects the functioning of subordinate ems. Chinese education, for example, was affected by ng's attitudes toward the Soviet Union, the Korean War, the United States.

The day after the People's Republic of China was gurated, the Soviet Union recognized the Peking govern- The Sino-Soviet relationship that developed (and deteriorated) had a tremendous influence on China and se educational development. Chinese technicians went e Soviet Union for specialized training; students both countries were exchanged; Soviet and Chinese rs visited each other's country for talks. Soviet ssors and educational materials, military advisors quipment, and industrial experts and machinery came Russia to assist China in practically every sphere of opment. To further demonstrate good faith, the USSR ferred to China Japanese properties the Soviet Army in Manchuria after World War Two, and Moscow provided with financial credits to help the industrializa- efforts. Chinese students were continually reminded friendship between China and the Soviet Union.

On 25 June 1950, North Korean troops invaded South
beginning the Korean War. Four months later (25
r), the Communist Chinese Volunteers (many of whom
ewly-recruited students) entered the war in support
th Korea and in defense of the territorial integrity
na. The Chinese involvement, coming so soon after
keover, produced much personal and economic hardship
na. To rally popular support, the government launched
ti-America, Aid-Korea Campaign, which extended into
hools. On 27 July 1953, representatives of the United
s, the Korean People's Army, and the Chinese People's
eers signed an armistice agreement at Panmunjom.

Though the Sino-Soviet friendship was characteristic
1949-1957 period, tensions that eventually under-
this relationship began early in the period. Stalin
n 3 March 1953, and Sino-Soviet relations were never
me again. Although the First Five-Year Plan was a
of strong Soviet influence in China, events in
--de-Stalinization and the policy of co-existence
e West--signaled the beginning of the Sino-Soviet
which did not take on serious proportions for
years.

In June 1957, General Lung Yun of the National
Committee denounced the Soviet Union for removing
dustrial equipment from Chinese territory (Manchuria)
he Second World War and for permitting China alone to
its Korean War expenses. As charges and

r-charges increased Sino-Soviet tensions, the Chinese
increasingly isolated internationally. The Chinese
turning inward for the solutions to their problems,
ing that neither assistance nor sympathy could be
among the nations of the world.

Inputs to the Educational System

Approaching Chinese education from a systems
is perspective requires an examination of the inputs-
s-outputs of the subordinate system. Specifically,
puts to the education system, the educational
s that occurs within schools, and the institutional
s are the focus of the systems model perspective to
e education. The politico-economic milieu of the
rdinate system of China within which subordinate
s functioned was examined briefly earlier in this
r.

But what of the educational system inputs that
educationists had to orchestrate in order to
the desired outputs? By examining the interactions
ubordinate systems, it becomes apparent that the
ies of the sub-systems often overlap. Many of the
nputs, such as the aims of education and budgetary
ions, were and are determined by political considera-
nd not by pedagogical reasoning. The function of
cational system was determined by other social
ions, namely the government and the party.

of Education

Since the party had full control of the educational
n, political leaders could direct school activities
stablish educational aims. The direction of the
educational system was determined by political
on and provided for in the 1949 Common Program and
1954 State Constitution, which included the
ing:

Articles of the Common Program Relating to Education

ticle 41: The culture and education of the People's Republic of China are new democratic, that is, national, scientific and popular. The main tasks of the cultural and educational work of the People's Government shall be the raising of the cultural level of the people, training of personnel for national construction work, liquidating of feudal, compradore, Fascist ideology and developing of the ideology of serving the people.

icle 42: Love for the fatherland and the people, love of labor, love of science and the care for public property shall be promoted as the public spirit of all nationals of the People's Republic of China.

icle 43: Efforts shall be made to develop the natural sciences to place them at the service of industrial, agricultural and national defence construction. Scientific discoveries and investions shall be encouraged and rewarded and scientific knowledge shall be popularized.

icle 44: The application of a scientific historical viewpoint to the study and interpretation of history, economics, politics, culture and international affairs shall be promoted. Outstanding works of social science shall be encouraged and rewarded.

icle 46: The method of education of the People's Republic of China is the unity of theory and practice. The People's Government shall reform

the old educational system, subject-matter and teaching methods systematically, according to plan.

ticle 47: In order to meet the widespread needs of revolutionary work and national construction work, universal education shall be carried out, middle and higher education shall be strengthened, technical education shall be stressed, the education of workers during their spare time and education of cadres who are at their posts shall be strengthened, and revolutionary political education shall be accorded to young intellectuals and old-styled intellectuals in a planned and systematic manner.

e other articles of Section V (Cultural and Educaonal Policy) of the Common Program deal with the le of literature and art (Art. 45), sports, health, d medical work (Art. 48), and news reporting (Art.).

Articles of the 1954 Constitution Relating to Education

ticle 94: Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to education. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the state establishes and gradually extends the various types of schools and other cultural and educational institutions. The state pays special attention to the physical and mental development of young people.

icle 95: The People's Republic of China safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation, and other cultural pursuits. The state encourages and assists creative work in science, education, literature, art, and other cultural pursuits.

The formal school system was to teach as many

s as possible to be literate and numerate, to relate

ortance of working with one's hands and the dignity

r, to develop basic agricultural and industrial

that were immediately applicable outside the

to promote nationalism and political consciousness,

each the fundamentals of communism and the importance
he Youth Movement, and to instill responsibility and a
e of duty to the state.

In short, the entire school system was to be
dinated and integrated with the political and economic
es of national reconstruction. Formal schooling in
a was a deliberately created institutional sub-system
passing on and modifying the culture of the larger
em. To ensure that graduates (institutional outputs)
educated in the values of the superordinate system
rained to fill manpower needs of other subordinate
ems, the aims of the school were dictated by and closely
tored by the Communist party.

rnal Demands

Sociologists have long maintained that varying
mstances within a social system make demands on its
nent institutions that either strain or interrupt the
nal institutional process. In China, as elsewhere,
ls were often called upon to assist in meeting the
enges to the social system or to help in the modifi-
n of its institutions' boundaries. Political elements
nal to the educational system made demands upon the
ls requiring students to participate in numerous
ents and campaigns. Such external demands are herein
dered to be inputs to the educational system. The
wing paragraphs focus on four examples of external

nds made on Chinese formal education that caused
uption of its internal process.

During 1949 secondary (or middle) school students
recruited for Communist military and civilian service.
ents joined the Service Corps and went with the
le's Liberation Army (PLA) to South China to serve
new cause by working with the people and convincing
to aid and accept the Communists. Once the liberation
he mainland was relative complete, students returned
chool.

During the Korean War, secondary school students
again recruited for military service. The impact of
war on the formal educational system was serious, for
le schools became recruitment centers for "volunteers"
ght American imperialism. Potential university candi-
s going off to war diminished the secondary school
lation qualified for higher education. One can only
se that the best academic students, in fact, went on
e university and the less qualified students were the
who went to war.

Following the Korean War a reaction set in against
ontinuing political pressure for students to engage
t-of-school activities. "Directives published in the
ng People's Daily, official organ of the Chinese Commu-
party's Central Committee, [called] for a sharp dimuni-
in the amount of social and political work the students
rofessors must do outside of schools and demanded

enewed emphasis on 'fulfilment of school education as primary task.'"[1] Party cadre had pressured students teachers into taking part in time-consuming political social activities, which took them away from their lemic duties. The People's Daily called for a ngthening of schools through student commitment to r programs, ending the extracurricular work demands. ents were admonished to "learn, learn, and learn again" rder to help build a new Chinese state.

Teachers and professors came under pressure from es outside the school. From 1949 to 1951, non-unist intellectuals (that is, reactionaries) were rated if they did not cause any trouble; it was believed could be remolded ideologically. Beginning in late , however, intellectuals were subjected to continuous icism and dialectical struggle. In the autumn of 1951 Ideological Reform movement started, as "a many-sided k upon intellectual freedom and integrity of China's mic institutions."[2] Professors became the targets of k, were publicly denounced, and sometimes removed their academic posts.

School teachers and university professors were cted to ideological remolding in order that they too

[1] New York Times, 27 August 1951, p. 2.

[2] A. Doad Barnett, Communist China: The Early 1949-55 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, pp. 125-126.

ve in the Communist leadership and pass this faith
their students. Universities were converted into
trination centers and were destroyed as the hub of
endent thought. It was during this period that
al revolutionary universities (such as the North
People's Revolutionary University in Peking and the
China University of Political Science and Military
es in Shanghai) were developed to re-educate intel-
als (including teachers, administrators, and profes-
who were trained in the Kuomintang era) and to
rinate candidates for jobs in the new regime.[3] If
rs of children were to be good teachers, they also
be good Marxists. And that required ideological
ing, purifying their thoughts, studying the new
cal theory, and copying the Soviet educational system.

A major policy shift occurred in 1956-1957 with the
l Flowers Campaign and its aftermath. The party
l from a policy of strictly enforced intellectual
xy to one of (temporary) relaxation of such controls
ermit and encourage free speech and limited criti-
f the government and its program.

To permit "divergent schools of thought to contend"
China's development might advance in many fields,

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[3]Richard Arens, "Education in Communist China from
The Period of Policy Formation," Journal of East
Studies 5, no. 3 (July 1956): 322; and Theodore
en, Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals
ng: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 17-18.

e Chinese leaders proclaimed that "if there is only one
wer in bloom, no matter how good the flower may be,
[will] not lead to prosperity."[4] Rapid progress
ld result only from free competition of ideas, from
ilizing all forces, from learning from one another,
from strength through unity.

This ideological campaign had an impact on the
cational front. Students voiced their complaints about
educational authorities, the shortcomings of the school
tem, and the party. University students complained of
strain they suffered from having to study too many
jects too intensely. Students also criticized the poor
lity instruction they were receiving. Teachers in turn
lained of poor quality facilities and interference by
y cadre untrained in educational concerns.

The deluge of criticism resulting from the Hundred
ers Campaign was so severe that the reaction of the
y was swift and decisive. In late June 1957, the
y launched the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957-1958),
stating a hard-line policy. The main targets of the
red Flowers backlash were educational, cultural,
rary, political, and academic critics of the government
the party. Many in these circles were not party

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[4]Lu Ting-yi, "Let All Flowers Bloom Together, Let
rse Schools of Thought Contend," in Stewart Fraser,
Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First
de (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965),
29.

ibers, some were; many were removed from their posts,
e were sent to labor camps.[5]

The party decreed that educators were to engage in
ual labor in order to get closer to the laboring
ses. Political indoctrination was further emphasized
school curricula in an effort to overpower bourgeois
nking with the correctness of Communist ideology. A
-study, part-work curriculum was introduced into the
ular schools and universities in a move to unite theory
practice, mental labor with physical labor, education
production. Definite work programs were incorporated
school curricula designed to increase industrial and
cultural production along with training more skilled
ers. This was to be the character of formal education
ng the Period of the Three Red Flags.

Budget

The designation of financial resources, as an output
e subordinate system (the treasury), represents a
ficant input to other subordinate systems (the
ary, the government bureaucracy, capital investments,
tion, etc.). The amount of money allocated by the
al Government to budgetary categories and the percent-
of the total allocation across the categories reflect
mportance leaders place on the various sectors.

[5]Chiu-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), pp. 225-226.

The 1950 state budget, presented at the end of 1949, d an expenditure structure wherein the military received .8 per cent of the allocated funds, administration ceived 21.4 per cent, and culture-education-public alth only 4.1 per cent.[6] The army was actively subduing e remaining Kuomintang forces, while administration forts focused on consolidating the power of the new gime. The more immediate task was establishing nation- de government authority to ensure control, not educating e people. The development of culture and education was less important during the first year than was securing m control for the future of the Communist regime through itary and administrative measures.

After two years of economic strain caused by the ean War, the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan duced a more optimistic economic outlook. The following les (4-1 and 4-2) show the amount spent and the alloca- n percentages on the various categories for the entire od of the First Five-Year Plan. Although education did receive the funding that economic construction or onal defense and administration did, it was the third category. The relative position of education remained ly consistent. Considering the Communists' goal of rnization, territorial defense, and administrative

[6] E. F. Szczepanik, "Four Years of Fiscal Policy in unist China," in E. Stuart Kirby, ed., Contemporary a, 6 vols. to date (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University s, 1956), 1: 76.

control, it is understandable that the first two categories received priority.

Table 4-1. Expenditures in Millions of Yuan

Budgetary Items	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
Economic Construction	8,650	12,360	13,760	15,910	13,720
Education/Cultural/ Social Services	3,360	3,460	3,190	4,590	4,840
National Defence & Administration	7,800	7,970	8,660	8,780	7,960
Repayment of Loans, etc.	1,680	840	1,120	1,290	1,610
Reserve	---	---	---	---	660
TOTAL	21,490	24,630	26,730	30,570	28,790

Table 4-2. Summary of Expenditures, 1953-1957

Budgetary Items	Percentage of Budget	Millions of Yuan
Economic Construction	48.7	64,400
Education/Culture/Social Services	14.7	19,440
National Defence & Administration	31.1	41,170
Repayment of Loans and Other	5.5	7,200
TOTAL	100.0	132,210

Source: For Tables 4-1 and 4-2, from Wang Tze-ying, "Financing the Five-Year Plan," People's China 20 (16 October 1957): 13-14.

The budgetary control of education-culture-social ervices is of prime concern. Most official Communist ublications group these three state functions together, ithout designating the financial allocations between them. ocial includes state pensions and retirement programs, linics and medical services, and other forms of social lfare. Cultural focuses on the cinema, radio, newspapers d magazines, opera, sports, museums, libraries, art, terature, parades, etc. Educational includes full-time hools, spare-time schools, winter schools, adult literacy asses, and vocational and general education within the rmal school structure.

Table 4-3 presents state expenditure data (amounts d percentages) across all categories for the period der consideration (1950-1957). Table 4-4 details both e amounts spent and the allocation percentages of various ucational expenditures for the same period.

Process Within the Educational System

Educational process as defined here includes the ucture of the formal schools, official pronouncements ecting education, the distinguishing characteristics of ferent kinds and levels of schools, and the numbers of dents in the various formal educational programs.

Yuan and Per Cent.

	Total Expenditure	Economic Construction		Social Cultural Educational		National Defence		Government Administration		Other	
		Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
1950	6,810	1,740	25.5	750	11.1	2,830	41.5	1,310	19.3	180	2.6
1951	11,900	3,510	29.5	1,340	11.3	5,060	42.5	1,750	14.7	240	2.0
1952	16,790	7,630	45.4	2,280	13.6	4,370	26.0	1,730	10.3	780	4.7
1953	21,490	8,650	40.2	3,360	15.7	5,680	26.4	2,120	9.9	1,680	7.8
1954	24,630	12,360	50.2	3,460	14.1	5,810	23.6	2,160	8.7	840	3.4
1955	26,920	13,760	51.1	3,190	11.9	6,500	24.1	2,150	8.0	1,320	4.9
1956	30,580	15,910	52.1	4,600	15.0	6,120	20.0	2,660	8.7	1,290	4.2
1957	29,020	14,910	51.4	4,640	16.0	5,510	19.0	2,270	7.8	1,690	5.8

Source: From State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 23-24.

Budget Items/Year	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957
Total State Budget (Millions of Yuan)	6,808	11,902	16,787	21,488	24,632	26,920	30,573	29,020
Education Budget								
Million of Yuan	---	813	1,123	1,832	1,883	1,761	2,075	2,906
Percent of State Budget	---	6.8	6.7	8.5	7.6	6.5	6.8	10.0
Higher Education								
Millions of Yuan	---	114	205	426	468	399	557	637
Percent of Ed. Budget	---	14.0	18.3	23.3	24.9	22.7	26.8	22.3
Secondary Education								
Millions of Yuan	---	140	394	722	743	691	1,043	---
Percent of Ed. Budget	---	17.2	35.1	39.4	39.4	39.2	50.3	---
Primary Education (Kindergartens & Nurseries)								
Millions of Yuan	---	560	500	633	649	649	432	---
Percent of Ed. Budget	---	68.8	44.5	34.6	34.5	36.9	20.8	---
Other: Spare-time Schools, Cultural Studies, Literacy Classes, Adult Courses								
Millions of Yuan	---	---	24	51	23	22	42	---
Percent of Ed. Budget	---	---	2.1	2.7	1.2	1.2	2.0	---

Source: From Leo A. Orleans, Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961), pp. 16-17.

NOTE: 2.345 yuan = $1 U.S.

After the Takeover

The Kuomintang collapsed sooner than the Communists had expected, catching the new rulers without any comprehensive plans for taking over the reins of power or any blueprint for a nation-wide educational system. Although the Communists had demonstrated ingenuity in their educational efforts in the blockaded Border Regions of North China, they did not encounter the complex problems of a national educational system until they took power in late 1949.[7] Even though they might have been initially unprepared for assuming the responsibility for the educational subordinate system, within two years of the takeover several educational conferences were held and new school programs were instituted.

The Communists martialed their educational forces quickly and took immediate action to reshape the nation-wide school system to serve their purposes. For example, during the last three months of 1949 the new Chinese leaders held two important conferences in an attempt to form a national educational policy: the North China Higher Education Committee[8] decided to introduce new, compulsory, politically-oriented courses into the curriculum, and the First National

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[7] K. E. Priestley, "Education in the People's Republic of China: Beginnings," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), pp. 49-50.

[8] S. B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policy in China," Pacific Affairs 23, no. 1 (March 1950): 26.

tional Work Conference[9] stressed the importance of tion in meeting national needs. Steps were taken to ol higher education on a national basis: all institu- of higher education were placed under the centralized ol of the Ministry of Education.

These first conferences signaled the beginning of educational system for China. Not only would the nt change, but so would the boundaries of the educa- l subordinate system. The First All-China Higher tion Conference[10] in June-July 1950 proclaimed that rsity studies were to be closely coordinated with al agricultural and industrial needs. Curricular ns reflected the educational pronouncements of the Program. All academics were to serve the people and problems. Education for education's sake was no an acceptable academic philosophy.

Education for immediate political needs was embodied People's Universities and the short-lived Revolu- y Universities (these last institutions began dis- ing in 1951). These institutions not only lessened essure on the long-established, more academic sities to change immediately, but they also provided es who served as government functionaries to help

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[9] Priestly, "Education in the People's Republic of . . ," p. 54.

[10] Ibid., p. 70; and "Resolutions of the First l Conference on Higher Education," in Stewart Fraser, inese Communist Education (Nashville: Vanderbilt ity Press, 1965), pp. 92-97.

uild support among the people in order to capitalize on
ilitary victories and consolidate nation-wide control for
ne Communists. The People's Universities admitted only
udents with at least three years' revolutionary experience;
ie revolutionary universities had no entrance requirements,
it the curriculum focused on 3-6 month intensive political
struction. The unmistaken worker-peasant class character
the students revealed that contributions to the revolu-
on were more important in student selection than was
rmal academic ability. Revolutionary fervor and political
ientation were to compensate for a less-than-adequate
holarly preparation. Graduates were employed in land
form, tax collection, and other political work. Though
e quality of education had to have been in question, the
in concern of these institutions was simply to produce,
the shortest time possible, reasonably loyal and
nimally competent people to man the lower levels of the
ate machinery during the first years of the new regime.

e Decree

The haphazard, unsystematic reorganization of educa-
on ended on 1 October 1951 when the Government Adminis-
tive Council issued a decree--Decisions Concerning the
orm of the Educational System--that defined and coordi-
ed in greater detail the entire educational system of
na. The decree reaffirmed and synchronized the previous
years' educational efforts. The reformed (pre-1949)

schools and the newly-created (post-1949) schools were integrated. This comprehensive reorganization was an elaborate multi-track structure that coordinated educational efforts to provide short-term training for present-day needs and also gave attention to better educational standards for long-range development. (See Figure 4-1.)

Pre-school nurseries and kindergartens were initiated, allowing more mothers freedom to work in organized state development projects. The previous elementary school structure of four years primary and two years upper primary was unified into one consolidated five-year course; this experiment lasted for two years, after which time it was aborted and elementary education returned to the previous two-part, six-year format.

Promotion to secondary level, both regular and vocational, was by examination and open to all who passed. Examinations, as in other social systems, came to be used to control the flow of students through the educational system.) Both secondary- and higher-technical education was to be a major characteristic of the new educational system, and students were pressured to specialize early and take practical courses that could contribute to national construction.

The decree also had an impact on higher education. University departments were reorganized and regrouped for more balanced higher education specialization program. The curriculum and methodology of every college and



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Class

gure 4-1. The Chinese Communist School System, 1951.

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urce: Liu Shih, "China's New Educational System," People's China 4, no. 11 (1 December 1951): 6.

versity department were prescribed in complete detail. dent wastage was reduced by disallowing transfers to er departments within the university once one was istered.

The decree established firm age limits for each el of the formal school system up to higher education, firm time limits for specialized schools and higher ational institutions. Temporal limits were placed on

tudents to ensure maximum usage of scarce educational
esources.

rimary and General Secondary Education

Between 1949 and 1953 there was an official effort
o expand primary and secondary education enrollments.
uring this period the number of primary schools increased
per cent, and the number of primary school students
creased by 100 per cent.[11] Expansion of elementary
ucation was relatively inexpensive. Middle schools were
re expensive, however, and their growth failed to keep
ce with the primary-level expansion. Consequently, a
all percentage of the elementary school graduates, at
st, were able to attend junior middle school.

However impressive the growth statistics in Table
5 may be, close examination of these data reveal an
ternally uncoordinaated growth pattern. The inability
the secondary-level institutions to accommodate most
er-level graduates was a potentially explosive situation.
primary-school graduates with hopes of continuing their
cation could not be admitted to junior middle school
unless assigned specific tasks, they could have become
olitically disruptive element.

[11] China News Analysis, no. 46, 6 August 1954, p. 3.

Year	General Secondary					Specialized Secondary			Higher Education	
	Enrollment	Graduates	Enrollment of Junior	Enrollment of Senior	Graduates	Enrollment of Normal	Enrollment of Voc.	Graduates	Enrollment	Graduates
1948-49	---	2,387	---	---	280.0	---	---	72	---	21,000
1949-50	24,391	2,829	831.5	207.2	296	151.7	77.1	75	117,000	18,000
1950-51	28,924	4,232	1067	238	284	159.4	97.8	57	137,000	19,000
1951-52	43,154	5,942	1383.7	184.4	221	219.8	162.9	68	153,000	32,000
1952-53	51,100	9,945	2230.5	260.5	454	345.2	290.4	118	191,000	48,000
1953-54	51,664	10,136	2571.6	359.5	644	369	299.4	169	212,000	47,000
1954-55	51,218	10,254	3109	478.0	969	308	300	235	253,000	55,000
1955-56	53,126	12,287	3320	582	939	219	318.1	174	288,000	63,000
1956-57	63,464	12,307	4188.5	366.1	1299	273.4	337	146	403,000	56,000
1957-58	64,279	16,225	4340	780	1313	320.0	458	191	441,000	72,000
1958-59	86,400	---	7340	1180	---	620.0	850	213	660,000	62,200
1959-60	90,000	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	810,000	---
	In Thousands		In Thousands			In Thousands				

Source: From Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Manpower," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), pp. 368-371.

By 1953 the drive for universal elementary education ad slowed. Rather than expand educational facilities, the overnment chose to discourage young people and their parents rom expecting education beyond basic literacy and numeracy. 1953-1954 propaganda campaign was designed to convince oth parents and students of the worth of productive labor ver continued schooling. Those already graduated were ncouraged to move into industry and agriculture, and dis- ouraged from expecting additional formal education. The urpose of education was not to prepare students for further chooling, but was to prepare them for contributing to the conomic and political construction of China.

The Central Government was not in the financial sition at the start of the First Five-Year Plan to continue pporting such rapid enrollment growth rates as had curred during the first years. The demands of indus- ialization, the major focus of the First Five-Year Plan, strained China's financial resources designated for ucation.

By 1954 many schools were closed, many village hools were no longer government supported, and many hools continued to function with double and triple shifts, ger classes, and night sessions. Schools suffered from onic shortages of desks and textbooks, inadequate plants staffs, and low educational standards.

The Ministry of Education permitted the re-estab- hment of private schools in 1954, after having eliminated

private educational sector in 1952. Factories, unions, mers, and local governments were encouraged to establish ir own schools. Out of this movement grew the min pan ools (operated by the people), which were controlled by hsien education bureaus, were run by the peasant-worker ups, were self-supporting, and required students to work. se schools were a forerunner to the formal school system t evolved during the Period of the Three Red Flags.

Rural primary education was helped greatly by being ked with the rapid growth of agricultural cooperatives 1955-1956, for the government gave the cooperatives the ponsibility of establishing and supporting rural primary ols. The leaders felt that the agricultural cooperative ement could never be successful without a minimally erate rural populace.

There were still few secondary schools of any kind ural areas by 1957; most middle schools were concentrated rban centers. The Ministry of Education instituted an riment called "hat-wearing" schools, that is, junior le schools were added (or placed on top, like a hat) to cted rural primary schools. This permitted students to nd middle school in some rural areas and still be on to assist with farm chores. These schools were cheaper both parents and state: parents did not have to send r children to school in distant urban centers and lose r labor on the farm; the state did not have to build

ntirely new middle school plants. "Hat-wearing" schools llowed for easier dispersal of post-elementary education.

After the Hundred Flowers and Rectification Campaigns, the government reaffirmed its control over schools nd took steps to change radically the nature of education n China. (See the Period of the Three Red Flags.)

orker-Peasant Middle Schools

Growing out of the concern for increased education as the establishment in 1950 of the three-year, short-term iddle school, a unique feature of the 1949-1957 period. he usual six-year middle school course for youngsters was educed to a three-year middle school for adults. The party lected students (1) of worker-peasant backgrounds, (2) tween 18 and 35 years of age, (3) with academic promise,) with the correct political perspective, and (5) with an ementary school education. Many students found the rapid ce of academic study difficult. The curriculum emphasized ecialized subjects that had immediate utility in industry agriculture.

The aim of this program was to prepare graduates university. In 1953 the first graduating class went on her to a Chinese institution of higher learning or to ther study in the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1953, such schools were established, with some 20,000 students.[12]

[12] Daily News Release, no. 1381, 23 July 1953, p. 149.

y mid-1954 there were 87 worker-peasant middle schools with 4000 graduates that summer) and 54,000 students in ne fall, half of whom were new students.[13]

In spite of the rapid growth of the worker-peasant iddle schools, there was not much optimism among Chinese iucationists as to the future of these schools. In elative terms, their impact could have been only minimal. ot much was heard about these schools after the First ve-Year Plan, for a 1955 directive ordered their gradual nversion into ordinary high schools.

condary Vocational Education

Education is to serve the needs of China (the perordinate system) and one of the more fundamental needs, en as now, is industrialization. With Peking's involve- nt in the Korean War, the more pragmatic, specialized, ort-term education won favor over the longer liberal arts eparation. By the time the First Five-Year Plan got under , however, a longer-term specialized, vocational educa- on was a central concern to the planners of China's elopment.

In 1950 there were 507 technical secondary schools, 80 per cent of the middle schools were of the ordinary e, that is, for all-round education with great emphasis political studies, current events, and science. The

[13] Daily News Release, no. 1731, 8 September 1954, 76.

:dinary middle (or secondary) school was designed to
:epare students for higher education.

In July 1951 the Minister of Education revealed
ans to increase the number of intermediate technical
hools and to reorganize the curriculum.[14] This three-
ar plan was to overhaul, totally, secondary technical
aining facilities in order to prepare larger numbers of
termediate-grade technicians. By 1954 there were 650
condary technical schools offering 157 specializations.

These secondary technical schools were developed
to a coordinated system wherein curricular offerings were
signed to meet national construction needs. These special
:ational middle schools included polytechnics, preparatory
dical schools, trade schools, and normal schools. Grad-
:es were to contribute their technical and managerial
)ertise to the army, industry, public health, teaching,
:.

Central administrative control was to promote better
e of all facilities and of existing manpower. Old
:ondary technical schools were regrouped and new ones
'e built. All specialized in well-defined fields. This
gram in technical knowledge and practical training
tured close cooperation among the staff. The resulting
llective atmosphere facilitated joint instructional

[14]"Trends in Chinese Education," The World Today 7, 11 (November 1951): 483.

ctivities and mutual staff assistance by pooling knowledge nd expertise.

Because the Chinese leaders recognized that formal ocational education was an integral part of the First ive-Year Plan, secondary technical education was at state xpense after the fall of 1952. Students received govern- ent subsidies. Graduates either went to work for immediate eturn on the educational investment, or went on to higher echnical education for a more long-term and higher return nvestment.[15]

One problem facing vocational educational training China was that, at best, only one per cent of the imary school students were receiving a secondary voca- onal education.[16] Certainly the educational direction was propriate, but the magnitude of the effort was insufficient meet China's needs. (See Table 4-5.)

Vocational education reached an important juncture 1957. Throughout the Five-Year Plan the number of udents with basic middle-level technical skills had creased, yet the vocational sub-system suffered from a ortage of qualified teachers (many had to be drawn away om their posts in industry) and from low-level academic

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[15]Tsang Chao-lun, "Training Technicians for Indus- alization," People's China 8 (16 April 1954): 11-13.

[16]R. F. Simpson, "The Development of Education in nland China," Phi Delta Kappan 39, no. 3 (December 7): 89.

tandards (when instruction was left to unqualified
achers).

Actions taken the next year (1958) struck at the
ry core of China's vocational education philosophy.

gher Education

One key to China's industrialization was the number
d quality of higher education graduates that contributed
gh-level technical and managerial expertise to the
velopment effort. Early reforms in higher education
flected political and economic necessities of national
covery and power consolidation. These changes included
tensive politico-ideological education, increased
hnical specialization, and a uniform governance system
centralized control.

In 1952 the Ministry of Higher Education was created
the entire post-secondary education system was subse-
ntly reorganized, showing strong Soviet influence. Old
versities were split up to destroy their identity;
versity departments were consolidated to eliminate dupli-
ion and to concentrate resources. The number of compre-
sive universities (that is, institutions teaching arts,
anities, and sciences and offering a more theoretical
cation to prospective professors and researchers) was
uced; the 65 universities in 1950 were reduced to only
y 1953. Emphasis was placed on developing the quality
number of specialized technical institutes: polytechnics,

ono-technical institutes, specialized colleges, etc. Most
nstitutions concentrated on a particular field or discip-
ne, developing into specialized centers of high standing.

By 1953 higher educationists were more concerned
th the quality of education than with the quantity of
udents being educated. Higher education was, in the main,
r students with academic ability (bourgeoisie) and not
e proletariat who lacked adequate preparation. A nation-
de "unified enrollment plan" of annual quotas that
cluded nearly all higher educational institutions was in
eration by the summer of 1953. The Ministries of Education
l Higher Education decided how many freshmen were to be
nitted and what they would study, to ensure fulfillment
the state plan. (Many students resented having their
eers controlled by the state.) To study at a university
institute meant to study a detailed, pre-planned course,
h definite time constraints, a standardized content, and
a uniform method. Students received a highly-specialized
nnical training in particular skills needed by the
ional development plans. Many students spent their
mers working at factories, farms, construction sites,
government offices. More students were directed to
dy science, engineering, medicine, and education, and
er to study fine arts, political science, or law. (See
e 4-6.)

Throughout this period higher education experienced
problems. Secondary-school graduates were not

Classification	No. of Students Entering in the five-year Period	% by classification	No. of Graduates in the five-year Period	% by classification	No. of Students in School in 1957	% by classification	% Increase 1957 over 1952
Engineering	214,600	39.5	94,900	33.6	177,600	40.9	268.8
Agriculture & Forestry	41,800	7.7	18,800	6.6	37,200	8.6	240.7
Finance & Economics	16,400	3.0	25,500	9.0	12,700	2.9	57.9
Political Science	10,600	2.0	4,800	1.7	9,300	2.1	242.3
Health	57,600	10.6	26,600	9.4	54,800	12.6	221.4
Physical Education	6,000	1.1	2,800	1.0	3,600	0.8	1,107.7
Pure Science	32,600	6.0	13,800	4.9	27,100	6.2	283.4
Liberal Arts	29,300	5.4	21,600	7.6	20,400	4.7	150.9
Teaching	130,700	24.0	70,400	24.9	89,000	20.5	282.0
Arts	3,700	0.7	3,800	1.3	2,900	0.7	79.3
Total	543,300	100.0	283,000	100.0	434,600	100.0	227.4

Source: Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Scene 1949-1967 (South Orange, N. J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1965), p. 540.

equately prepared to undertake further study at higher
vels. And the quality of higher-education graduates was
adequate to meet state needs. The performance of students
all levels fell short of expectations. Professors were
properly placed in unsuitable positions, they complained
too much time required for meetings and administrative
ties, and of low pay, shortened vacations, and overwork.
iversities operated under the handicap of widespread
ortages: reference books, educational materials and
uipment, adequate plant facilities, and qualified assis-
nts, professors, and educational administrators.

Many of the problems which festered quietly for so
ng, finally emerged in newspapers and journals by 1955.
ere were charges that the educational sector of the First
ve-Year Plan was retarded and performance was below
ectations. Students were criticized for having poor
siques, questionable politics, and inferior knowledge.
se charges prompted new admissions criteria: increased
ndards of physical fitness, rigorous political affilia-
ns, better entrance examination scores, and more attention
proper social-class background.

Once again the Central Government relaxed its rigid
tralized control over higher education in 1955-1956,
wing administrators of higher educational institutions
independence and initiative, giving professors fewer
nistrative duties, and putting less pressure on students.

At the close of the period (1957) the Communists re concerned with the political calibre and family origin higher-level students. Academic standards gave way to litical considerations. The intellectual atmosphere was noralized, making the orderly acquisition of skills and owledge difficult. Social class origins dictated which ofessors were employed and promoted, and which students re admitted, promoted, and graduated. These policies tered the nature of university life.

Political and economic development of the Chinese erordinate system made demands on the formal higher educa- nal subordinate system. The nature of the expected con- butions from the educational sector is revealed by the racter of the higher educational institutions in China the number of students in the various disciplines. Leo Orleans reports Ministry of Education statistics for 7: the 239 higher educational institutions were composed 52 normal colleges, 50 technical institutes, 39 medical leges, 34 agricultural institutes, 46 institutes of other cialties, and only 18 comprehensive universities.[17]

Outputs of the Educational System

Educational development and institutional output ng this period (1949-1957), as in other times, was

[17]Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Man- r," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism hina (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), 73.

rectly related to the national policies of the new govern-
nt. Education communicated to the people what was expected
them and then helped them live up to those expectations.
hool curricula were closely tied to the socio-politico-
onomic aims of communism, focusing on the importance of
pular welfare, not "selfish" individual gain, and on dis-
pline, not freedom.

Education developed into a means of control second
ly to the People's Liberation Army. Educational policies
d school programs played a significant role in propagating
e new ideology, in building support for the economic and
cial programs, and in perpetuating a Communist regime.
e state developed and used its monopoly of education and
e schools as an instrument of policy coordination, popular
pport, and general reform.

One subordinate system serves the needs of other
ordinate systems within the boundaries of the larger
ial system; the output of the schools (inputs to other
titutions) reflects the socio-political characteristics
Communists hope to develop through formal education.

lities of Educational Output

The quality of formal education in any nation is
ficult to evaluate because of the subjective nature of
phenomena. China, being a relatively closed society,
es any commentary on educational quality very tenuous.
refore, a judgment of the "quality" of schooling based

on rational, statistical evidence is not considered in this study. The various "qualities" a formal school graduate was supposed to have learned focused on the kind of citizen the Chinese leaders had hoped to develop through education.

Education for Patriotism. Marxism-Leninism defines basic units of people, not as nations, but as economic classes based on means of production. Despite the trans-national character of Marxism and its visions of a future world communism, the Chinese Communists used schools to develop a strong sense of patriotism. Chinese have long had a deep pride in their cultural heritage, but never before had there been a true sense of popular pride in a modern Chinese political state. The Communists realized that to have a strong nation, the Chinese people had to be wielded into a coherent political force. Education for patriotism contributed to that objective.

Students were taught who to idolize, who to love, and who to hate--necessary for a sense of patriotism. For example, schools, colleges, and universities stressed an appreciation of and respect for the People's Liberation Army and a loyalty to its leaders--Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. Exotic glorification of the PLA was designed to counter reverse the traditional Chinese scorn of soldiers and [18] Military victories and national heroes generated patriotism, especially among the young.

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[18] Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "New China: New Texts," Far Eastern Survey 19, no. 112 (December 1950): 323.

Since education cannot be separated from politics and remain ideologically correct, patriotism in Chinese schools during the Korean War stressed the "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign. During this crisis the new regime needed the kind of complete loyalty to the Communist cause that a patriotic education could provide. Chinese schools developed a willingness among the students to serve the state's needs. Much of the proper attitudinal foundation for complete control of the Chinese people was developed through education for patriotism.

Education for National Defense. Schools emphasized the need for national defense and glorified the soldier as a national hero. As the curricula developed, students were assured exposure to politics and current international events. With Chinese involvement in the Korean War in October 1950, these concerns became especially acute.

The government, in general, and the school, in particular, attempted to develop correct attitudes toward war and defense by promoting antagonistic anti-American sentiment and an aid-Korea sympathy. The government used the schools as manpower resource pools to strengthen the Chinese army in recruiting "volunteers" to fight in Korea. The Ministry of Education ordered the establishment of recruitment committees in each county or city to mobilize students for "basic military training."[19] School administrators

[19] New York Times, 10 December 1950, p. 9.

stressed the importance of military preparedness and foresaw the possibility of suspending classes to facilitate recruitment. Students who volunteered and were scheduled to graduate received their diplomas without examination. The school also paid their travel expenses to the recruiting station.

Even after the Korean War, the attitude of "readiness to come to the defense of China" was a theme, not only of schools, but also of youth organizations. An official of the New Democratic Youth League of China stated that "the young people of New China not only should be active builders of Socialism, but heroic defenders of our great motherland and world peace."[20]

China's relative isolation in the international community, involvement in the Korean War, and protracted struggle over Taiwan generated statements, proclamations, and programs that laid the foundation of education for national defense.

Education for Integration and Unity. The Chinese Communists no longer allowed education to divorce theory from practice. The unity of thought and action emphasized that only valuable theory served materialistic and practical ends. Knowledge was useful only when it led to the solution of production problems in industry, agriculture, and national defense. Education was brought closer to life's

[20] Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 802, 6 May 1954, p. 22.

nditions. Utilitarian education stressed problems facing
ina. Schooling focused on uniting national needs and
udent potential.

Stress was placed on the integration and unity of
tellectuals and the working class. Intellectuals pre-
ously remained in their ivory towers and detached from
e problems of society. Academic safe-havens were attacked
d destroyed; intellectuals were supposedly brought into
e service of the people. The privileged classes were to
ercome their disdain for manual labor by getting their
nds soiled through work.

A politically-promoted nation-wide attitude of
elligerent determination to overcome obstacles"[21] under-
ored the unity of combined strength sufficient to destroy
ressive forces. Collective and cooperative efforts could
fect more progress by each person helping others, each
filling a different function, and all working harmoni-
ly together.

Unity and integration characterized the operation of
schools: group discussions combined intellectual
ength of the members; students were encouraged to study,
k, and play in common; the previously adversarial roles
teachers and students were to become cooperative. Close
munication between all parties was the new ethic.

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[21]Chen, "New China: New Texts," p. 323.

ndividual activity was interpreted as an expression of ndividualism and therefore subject to reprimand.[22]

Education for Reform. The success of the Communist egime depended to a great extent on the support it eceived from students and intellectuals in China. Educa-ion for reform was aimed primarily at the intellectuals, ny of whom were academics. Much attention was directed ideological conversion and at gaining the endorsement as many teachers, students, authors, administrators, ofessors, and other intellectuals of the Kuomintang era possible.

In October 1951 Mao Tse-tung stated that "ideolo-cal remoulding, first of all of the different type of tellectuals, is one of the most important conditions for mpleting our democratic reforms in various fields and r the gradual industrialisation of our country."[23] An eological reform campaign was launched stressing the stematic and intensive study of the tenets of communism. se teachers who refused to be reformed were declared ctionary and were sent to labor in rural areas under the ng Feng movement. (The term Cheng Feng first appeared 1942; it stands for Cheng-tun san-feng: to correct or

[22] Arens, "Education in Communist China from 1949- . . .," p. 317.

[23] Liu Shih, "China's New Educational System," ple's China 4, no. 11 (1 December 1951): 7.

to improve the three spirits of study, culture, and the party. In short, it means ideological reformation.)

Early in 1952 Mao again noted the importance of intellectuals: "I wish us victory on the front of ideological remolding among various circles of society, and first and foremost among the intellectuals."[24] By September 1954, 75 per cent of secondary education teachers and administrators had taken part in a rotating system of indoctrination and education to reform their thoughts.[25]

The failure of the liberal Hundred Flowers campaign sparked a hard-line policy of thought reform, beginning immediately with the Anti-Rightist Movement. Because intellectuals were targets of such movements is testimony to the partial failure of education for reform. In educational institutions, older staff who were trained in the Kuomintang era remained ideologically suspect, with little trust or responsibility placed with them.

Education and the Soviet Model. When the Chinese Communists took over in late 1949, the influence of American pedagogy on Chinese education came to an end. In its place, the Chinese praised Soviet leadership for continuing the struggle against aggression and imperialism, for carrying forward the Communist revolution, and for their friendship

[24] As quoted in Arens, "Education in Communist China from 1949-51: . . .," p. 316.

[25] Chang-tu Hu, China; its people, its society, its culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 423.

nd assistance in constructing a new China. Russian pro-
essors taught in Chinese universities; Chinese university
tudents went to the Soviet Union for advanced training.
uring the First Five-Year Plan, 10,000 Chinese students
eceived advanced education outside China, mostly in
ussia. (The Russians felt this training ensured a long-
erm Chinese dependence upon Soviet methods and equipment.[26])

The primary schools foreign language program sub-
ituted Russian for English. Middle schools reduced the
mber of hours devoted to studying English and substituted
ssian. The universities still taught English as a foreign
nguage, although Russian was introduced. Many university
udents studied Russian in order to translate Soviet
ientific, industrial, and other textbooks and reference
oks into Chinese.

The newly-introduced Chinese People's Universities
re based on the Soviet experience. Even the Academia
nica (Chinese Academy of Science), the national research
stitute of China, was patterned after the Soviet Academy
Science. Soviet theories in biological and natural
ences gained prominence among Chinese scientists. The
rt-term schools for workers and peasants were modeled
er the RABFAKS (short-term worker-peasant schools) from
Russian experience in 1918-1928.[27]

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[26]Simpson, "The Development of Education in Main-
d China," p. 89.

[27]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "New Schools for China,"
rent History 22, no. 130 (June 1952): 333.

In return for Russian newspapers, films, pictorial xhibits, and thousands of volumes of publications, Chinese tudents were taught to appreciate the Soviet Union.[28]

Education for Technical Training and Economic evelopment. Schooling was designed to serve the practical eeds of the state. Schools were more integrated with ociety than previously; knowledge was pressed into service or national development by contributing directly to ecovery and modernization.

From 1949 to 1951 education focused on meeting ort-term needs of economic reconstruction; after 1 tober 1951, an educational decree inaugurated a long- nge, more comprehensive education for technical training d economic development. Higher educational institutions cused on scientific and technological specialization so to furnish expertise to other subordinate systems of inese society. Liberal education was overshadowed by e heavy emphasis on vocational training.

The activities of educational institutions were, eally, synchronized with economic development. "The New

[28]For more detail on Russia's impact on China's ucation, see Stewart Fraser, "Notes on Sino-Soviet -operation in Higher Education, 1950-1960," in E. L. ench, Melbourne Studies in Education 1961-1962 (Victoria: lbourne University Press, 1964); Cheng Chu-yuan, "Role of e Soviet Union in Developing Scientific and Technical npower in Communist China," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., ucation and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International udies Group, 1969); and Stewart E. Fraser, "China's ternational, Cultural, and Educational Relations; With lected Bibliography," in Chang-tu Hu, Aspects of Chinese ucation (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 59).

Democratic government is bringing about a rapid increase in the productive power of China. Preparations . . . made to advance China's economy toward industrialisation . . . makes it necessary to train large numbers of cadres, including cadres with special and technical training."[29]

As the First Five-Year Plan got underway in 1953, the Chinese realized that one of the prerequisites for the success of national development was the training of an adequate number of technical and managerial personnel. Two members of a Soviet press delegation who visited China in 1954 reported that "the People's Government and the Communist Party of China display an enormous concern for the training of new cadres of intelligentsia, capable of carrying knowledge to the people, able to carry out an elaborate program of socialist-economic transformation. Particular attention, moreover, will be given to the training of engineers and technicians for the rapidly developing industry. The erection of new institutes and the expansion of the old are going on in almost all large centers of China."[30]

Education for All. After 1949 education in China was no longer reserved solely for the privileged classes and denied the common people. Schools opened their doors to peasants, workers, soldiers, and their offspring. The

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[29]Liu Shih, "China's New Educational System," p. 6.

[30]A. Hzizgan and H. Plyuschch, "The Higher School in China," Educational Outlook 30, no. 1 (November 1955): 127.

ercentage of students with worker-peasant family back-
rounds was larger at the elementary level (about 80 per
ent) and smaller at the higher levels of schooling. (See
able 4-7.) Over the years the number of students with
roletarian origins gradually displaced those of the
ourgeoisie.

The student-body composition was a political concern.
ravda reported in 1954 that "the [Chinese] government gives
articular attention to the social structure of the students,
nd looks after them in order that higher education can
nroll as many as possible of those who were born peasants
nd workers."[31] Higher educational institutions were
rdered to give special classes for students of workers and
easants who were less able academically.

Not only were their children given a greater chance
r education, but workers, peasants, and soldiers them-
lves were given an opportunity to attend literacy classes,
are-time schools, and worker-peasant middle schools. All
ese educational systems had equal status with the formal
hool system, and therefore led all the way to the
iversity.

An effort was made to provide a Communist education
the national minorities. This often entailed first
veloping a written form for many of their languages, and
en producing appropriate textbooks and other educational
terials. Non-Han (or non-Chinese) minorities were

[31] Ibid., p. 130.

Table 4-7. Proportion of Students of Worker and Peasant Origin to Total Number of Students (Percentage of Total in Each Category)

Year	Institutes of Higher Learning	Technical Middle Schools	Middle Schools
1951	19.1	56.6	51.3
1952	20.5	57.1	56.1
1953	21.9	55.9	57.7
1954	---	58.8	60.7
1955	29.0	62.0	62.2
1956	34.1	64.1	66.0
1957	36.3	66.6	69.1
1958	48.0	77.0	75.2

ource: State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 200.

dmitted to Chinese schools; later they had their own chool systems and nationality academies.

In the education-for-all atmosphere, the Communists ıde a special appeal to Chinese students and professionals :udying or working abroad to return to their motherland, ntribute their expertise, and partake in the revolution. e university designated for overseas Chinese was moved to nton in 1958, a second overseas Chinese university was tablished in Fukien in 1960. Both institutions educated e returned students in the new ideology before being sent assigned positions.

With emphasis on equal rights, women attended the formal school system in increasing numbers.

Education for Health. One of the lesser known, but still important, thrusts of Chinese schools was an education for personal and public health. Cleanliness and hygiene lessons were included in curricula in compliance with Mao's expressed concern for "health above all" and with the patriotic Sanitation campaign reflecting efforts to improve public health. The objective of these efforts was to alter popular conceptions of personal health and social living conditions.

Chairman Mao encouraged the youth of China to achieve good health, good study, and good work." "To be physically strong" was necessary to better serve production and the motherland. The Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government directed that particular attention be paid to students' health. In response to this general concern for individual well-being, schools expanded their physical training and sports facilities and instituted daily open-air physical education programs and sporting meets. Education for health stressed good health, strong bodies, and a collective social discipline--prerequisites for military service, productive labor, and communal well-being.

Education for Politics. Education and politics are inseparable. If communism is to work, the school system must build support of the new ideology. Education is an

ndoctrination process of spreading the Communist creed to
ll people and cleansing their minds of feudal, bourgeois,
nd reactionary thoughts. The Communists realized that
udents in China had an acute political consciousness.
ecause of the prestige students had as intellectuals, their
litical commitment was of tremendous importance. "The
w regime is relying on the students as the chief source
d vehicle of popular support."[32]

During the months immediately after the takeover,
e content of education in the formal school system under-
nt revolutionary change. As an instrument of politics,
rmal education closely reflected the Communist purpose of
eological reconstruction. Schools aimed at strengthening
e proper political interpretation of selected economic
rces that determined the nature of society. Political
cation permeated all levels of the formal educational
ucture. Students were told of the past injustices of
itical domination and oppression by the Nationalists,
of the current enslavement and economic exploitation by
colonial powers.

In addition to the regular Marxist-Leninist politi-
education, regularly scheduled classes were at times
ended so students could become directly involved in
tics and participate in special political campaigns
sing on public criticisms and confessions, or on

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[32]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Red Education in China,"
ent History 19, no. 107 (July 1950): 14.

attacking American imperialism or bureaucratic corruption or landlordism.

Students were taught to serve, not the privileged few, but the working class. But not all students came to realize the aims of the revolution. Several thousand college students either quit or were expelled in 1953-1954, some because of "inferior political quality."[33]

The school system was creating an indoctrinated cadre needed for Socialist construction. Teachers were considered "first-class agents" for dispensing party influence, party control, and Communist ideology.[34] Education for politics can be summed up in a few words: "The schools are being used as one of the most effective means of spreading . . . [the new ideology] . . . in order to produce a population with a new outlook, new loyalties, new attitudes, new aspirations, new habits, and new values of life," and that "the schools shall spare no effort to inculcate the new ideology and to produce ardent supporters for the new social, political, and economic revolution."[35]

Education for Participation and Control. The Chinese used control through participation to enforce party discipline and to assure ideological unity. Schools were

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[33] New York Times, 30 October 1955, p. 28.

[34] Arens, "Education in Communist China from 1949-51 . .," p. 319.

[35] Chen, "Red Education in China," p. 14.

themselves controlled and were used to control students. The organizational climate of educational institutions promoted acceptance of party control and expectation of participation.

Like other social institutions, schools were controlled in their every function: the state forced acceptance of detailed departmental curricula, time tables, textbooks, holiday schedules, tuitions and fees, and selection, assignment, and promotion of teachers and administrators. The state also controlled student activities to the finest detail: collective living arrangements, extracurricular activities, practical work experience during the summer, and participation in special political movements. Decisions on the number of students and the fields they would study were determined by the kinds of expertise needed and in what quantity. Students were not free to pursue their own occupational aspirations; the state-plan needs took precedent over the individual's wishes. The organized control of students in school and university played a significant role in state planning.

Control of schools and universities shifted from administration solely by a principal or president to governance by a representative council that included teachers, administrators, workers, and students. Despite the more democratic school governance, the party had firm control amidst the greater participation. Key school administration positions were filled by approved personnel

(selected more for their political commitment than for their educational expertise).

The party often made appeals to the idealistic Chinese youth to participate in national movements, for example, the Service Corps and the Red Guard. Internal group pressure among students forced participation in self-criticism and confessions; students were pressured to conform and to participate. To keep silent was to be accused of harboring reactionary, anti-revolutionary, and individualistic thoughts. Controlled and supervised participatory activity revealed deviation from the party line and from the thought-action unity.

Contiguous with the role of the school in this matter was the youth movements in China. The Young Pioneers, the China New Democratic Youth League, and the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth ensured that students were controlled through participation in suitable social work, political activities, cultural exposure, and recreational and athletic activities.

Education in the new China was not designed to serve individual interests but rather to promote the Socialist revolution. The state controlled educational institutions to ensure that students participate in the revolution and develop an acceptance of state control and participation throughout their life.

Quantities of Educational Output

The second dimension of evaluation focuses on the quantity of output produced by the school and university system. Information relating the numbers and kinds of graduates across the educational disciplines is analyzed in the commentary and in Tables 4-6 and 4-8. These numbers and percentages reflect the importance given by the regime to the various disciplines in light of what is perceived to be the national need.

A Numerical Analysis. The overall strategy of the Chinese government was to provide schooling for as many students as possible, especially elementary education for the children of the workers and peasants. But varying circumstances within the social system required tactics of temporary delay and occasional shifting of the responsibility for schooling among different government sectors.

Primary school enrollment data reflect a doubling between 1949-1950 and 1952-1953, then for three academic years there was little change, and for the school years 1955-1956, 1956-1957, and beyond there was another upsurge in the number of students attending elementary schools. (See Table 4-5.) The discrepancy between the number of primary school graduates and the number of students enrolled in the three-year junior middle school demonstrates just how few elementary school students were able to continue their education at the next higher level. This same discrepancy

... of Graduates from Institutes of Higher Learning.

Year	Engineering	Agriculture	Economics & Finance	Medicine	Natural Sciences	Pedagogy	Liberal Arts
Pre-Liberation Peak Year	4,792	2,064	2,969	1,236	1,701	3,250	2,736
1949	4,752	1,718	3,137	1,314	1,584	1,890	2,521
1950	4,711	1,477	3,305	1,391	1,468	624	2,306
1951	4,416	1,538	3,638	2,366	1,488	1,206	2,169
1952	10,213	2,361	7,263	2,636	2,215	3,077	1,676
1953	14,565	2,633	10,530	2,948	1,753	9,650	3,306
1954	15,596	3,532	6,033	4,527	802	10,551	2,683
1955	18,614	2,614	4,699	6,840	2,015	12,133	4,679
1956	22,047	3,541	4,460	5,403	3,978	17,243	4,025
1957	17,162	3,104	3,651	6,200	3,524	15,948	4,294

Source: From State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 196.

NOTE: Data include only the main faculties of the institutes of higher learning.

exists between the junior and the senior middle school and again between secondary schools (both general and specialized) and higher education enrollments.

The Chinese educational leaders were faced with two major challenges: sheer numbers of students, and the distribution of the students across the levels of the school system. It was politically expedient to increase elementary school enrollments in order to extend literacy and numeracy to the masses. It was technically and scientifically necessary to develop education at the higher levels. And it was necessary for economic development to increase and improve secondary education both as a channel for directing and educating the best students from the lower to the higher levels and as a sub-system to train middle-level manpower.

Behind the fluctuations of enrollment statistics and the official proclamations of education for all is the perpetual struggle between the quantity and quality of formal education in the context of both the limited financial resources of the Central Government and the egalitarian-elitist controversy among the Communist theorists.

A Content Analysis. The total number of students and graduates would not be the whole truth, for of equal significance is the nature of the distribution of graduates across the disciplines. It is important to realize that students were and are more or less controlled, as the Communists attempt to manipulate every element of Chinese society and economic development. The higher a student

progressed in the educational structure, the more he or she was subject to direct control by the state because of his or her training and expertise. Higher level students were selected and directed to a particular course of study, and once graduated they were assigned a position by the state. "In New China, each student [knew] exactly what role he [was] going to fill in the whole splendid edifice of national construction. Upon graduation each student [was] allotted the work best suited to his ability."[36]

Table 4-6 details the total number of higher education students and graduates and their percentages by discipline, and Table 4-8 details information on the number of higher education graduates by year from the entire first period (1949-1957). These data show engineering, education, and medicine to be the three priority sectors. Since industrial development was of prime concern during the Period of Consolidation and the First Five-Year Plan, great stress was placed on developing engineering skills. For example, People's China reported that in 1949 there were 21,460 college graduates, 22.15 per cent of them majoring in technical subjects; in 1952 there were 32,629 college graduates, with 31.42 per cent in technical subjects; and in 1956 there were 65,563 college graduates, and 34.82 per cent were technical subject majors.[37]

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[36] Daily News Release, no. 1350, 17 June 1953, p. 123.

[37] Chang Chien, "360,000 College Graduates in Eight Years," People's China 16 (16 August 1957): 19.

Naturally the Chinese planners managed educational esources such that graduates would have expertise in those reas most needed by other subordinate systems in the over-ll development of the Chinese superordinate system. From he evidence presented in the enrollment statistics, it is pparent which sectors planners felt to be the more crucial o the development of the planned socio-economic super-rdinate system of China under communism.

Conclusion

These early years of the new regime were to be the ransition era of China's development from the feudal past o the final state of the Socialist revolution. Though his, in fact, was not the case, much progress was made. A ew selected observations by Professor J. A. Lauwerys of is 1957 visit to mainland China prove interesting when mpared with those of his 1947 visit. In 1947 the people re poorly fed, with access to meagre, if any, medical rvices; armies and brigands robbed and plundered the pulace; the land was ravaged by 50 years of civil disorder d foreign invasion. China in 1957 was very different: reets were orderly, beggars no where to be seen; towns re clean, with no observable signs of acute poverty; ople were dressed decently; there was no evidence of food rtages; and the general standard of living, although low, better than that of 1947 and was rising.[38]

[38] Times Educational Supplement, 2196, 21 June 1957, 895.

Policies of the period (1949-1957) were designed to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party, strengthen the new Chinese government, and to coordinate and control the Chinese people. To accomplish these objectives, the new leaders did not use force alone. The government was both dictatorial and democratic: force, coercion, violence, terrorism, and punishment were used to suppress counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries, while indoctrination, culture, art, literature, propaganda, and education were used to activate popular democratic forces in support of the proletarian revolution.[39] Although persuasion was backed by coercion, the Chinese leaders preferred popular, voluntary support of the new ideology. To be sure, police force and firing squads were used, but to convert the masses into active supporters of the Communist cause, suasion was the primary means. Force was necessary to win over the dissident elements, but popular education was necessary to rule the masses.

The Chinese Communist Party--small, but well-organized--realized the potential of education in winning over the people and in producing properly-oriented citizens to give their full support. These first years of Communist rule established a clear role of the school in developing the new Chinese state. Education and schooling focused more

[39]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education and Propaganda in Communist China," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 277 (September 1951): 135.

on indoctrination than on developing understanding, more on social utilization of the individual than on his personal development, and more on the cognitive than the affective. Education, both in school and out, emphasized the desired character of the New China and the reformed Chinese man.

Whatever criticism may be leveled against the leaders or their political and social doctrines, the Chinese government did bring peace and provided leadership out of pre-1949 difficulties. The government realized that only by reorienting the role of the school could progress occur. The school system was used to help mobilize and train people to increase production, to build social unity, and to promote loyalty to the new China. "In relation to the rapid expansion of education in China, there are a number of policy issues which any government, Communist or not, would have to deal with. What distinguishes the new regime from others is the energy and decisiveness with which these issues are being tackled."[38]

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[38] Times Educational Supplement 2196, 21 June 1957, p. 895.

"To leap is not to walk on
two feet;
it is to jump and to skip."

(Chui-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China.)

CHAPTER 5

THE THREE RED FLAGS

As each subordinate system reflects the nature of its parent superordinate system, so do the schools in China reflect the conditions in Chinese society. The politico-economic milieu of this period was alive with expectation and enthusiasm for leaping to communism and to industrial maturity through exerted human effort. The essence of the period rests in the mobilization of the masses and deployment of manpower on a massive scale. Within a year or two of their inception, however, many of the economic and educational policies proved counter-productive and were suspended.

The Times:
1958-1960

The Hundred Flowers liberalism (1957), temporary as it was, revealed the failures of previous attempts to re-educate and indoctrinate China's intellectuals. The

Rectification Campaign, a swift reaction disguised as remedial ideological training, turned into a nation-wide attack on intellectuals held to be deviants, rightists, or revisionists. Many were dismissed from their posts in the party, government, university, or wherever found.

As a continuation of Mao's belief in uninterrupted revolution, the Three Red Flags movement was launched in 1958: The Red Flag of the Great Leap Forward focused on industrial development; the Red Flag of the People's Communes promoted the commune as the chief rural social and production unit; and the Red Flag of Socialistic Main Line aimed at advancing the Socialist revolution and the construction of a Communist society.

Domestic Affairs

This three-year period witnessed many domestic achievements and changes. In industry, the first car was manufactured; in science, the first atomic reactor became operative; in politics, Mao (then 65 years old) retired as Chairman of the Republic and Liu Shao-ch'i was elected to the post; and in education, rising enrollments were coupled with the communization movement and the work-study curricula were enforced. Ideologically, Chinese national policy aimed to proletariatize the intellectuals and intellectualize the proletariat.[1] Higher-level schools were to produce graduates who were both "Red and Expert."

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[1]Robert D. Strom, "The Other China: Color It Red," Peabody Journal of Education 42 (September 1964): 97.

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Economic Consideration. The economic portions of the Red Flags campaign, that is, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes, were drives for increased austerity and more strenuous work. There was to be no lessening of pressure nor time to consolidate the gains of the First Five-Year Plan. Official efforts aimed to increase popular fervor in order to complete the socialization of China in one great leap. The Great Leap Forward was to develop the Chinese industrial capacity as rapidly as possible so as to rival that of England and Germany within a decade. Steel production was at the center of the industrial efforts, as evidenced by the short-lived but ubiquitous backyard furnaces.

The first People's Commune, Weihsing (Sputnik), was established in late April 1958. On 29 August of that year the party's Central Committee adopted a resolution establishing People's Communes, formally launching the Great Leap Forward in agriculture. By the end of December, 99.1 per cent of all peasant households had joined the People's Communes (26,578 communes averaged 4,637 households each.)[2] The rapid organizing of peasant living-working units into communes facilitated the tremendous growth in rural primary education. Even though there was a temporary retreat from the commune movement in early 1959, the responsibility for

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primary education had already been passed to rural production units and there it stayed.

Millions of workers, peasants, and students were mobilized to participate in frantic work schemes. National economic mobilization created resources by encouraging or forcing the people to work for low or no wages. Rural farmers, urban workers, and students everywhere were subjected to a semi-military discipline so as to ensure more effective production and easier regulation of consumption. Such regimentation and control of manpower, along with crude human and natural resource allocation and inefficient production methods, resulted in tremendous hardship on the economy, on the educational system, and on the people.

Both the educational and the economic sectors employed the "walking on two legs" strategy, that is, the simultaneous development of resources in different areas of potential. In the economic sector, for example, official efforts focused on both industrial and agricultural development, on both heavy and light industry, on both large and small enterprises, and on both foreign and indigenous modes of production. Education was closely geared to China's economic efforts, as the schools not only provided students to work in the various development projects, but also designed their courses of study to educate in the areas of greatest need. The activity in the economic and educational sectors generated by the "walking on two legs" strategy reflected the enthusiasm and the frantic thrust toward

greater national agricultural-industrial production and educational progress in 1958.

The Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) shifted emphasis from the near-total commitment to the development of heavy industry of the First Five-Year Plan toward more concern for rural and agricultural development. National economic growth was more closely related to agricultural development, just as educational growth was linked to rural progress. The communes were given the responsibility for providing education to primary-school aged children.

Strains and imbalances across various sectors of the economy were caused by poor planning and party mismanagement. Severe complications resulted from floods and droughts in the summer of 1959 and were followed by several growing seasons of inclement weather--having a severe and disruptive impact on the food supply. Under the pressure of economic and social disorder, the Backyard Furnace campaign was slackened and the Rural Communization movement was compromised by the partial revival of agricultural cooperatives. The Second Five-Year Plan ended in failure because of natural calamities and human error. The Third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) did not start immediately at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan; in fact, it was not even announced until 1964-1965.

Political Considerations. Political education for socialism during this period aimed to convert the ideological

hold-outs, to resolve any remaining skepticism, to undermine complacency or conservatism, to give "experts" a socialistic zeal, and to warn of rightist tendencies and bourgeois thinking.

One of the more important target audiences of the Socialistic Main Line was the intellectuals, for Mao had complained about the lessening of ideological commitment and political activities by students and intellectuals. The rationale behind the socialistic education drive was "to remold the old thoughts of the intellectuals and enhance the socialist awakening of the students."[3]

The disposition of the state toward intellectuals fluctuated between uneasy acceptance and open attack; especially vulnerable were the more outstanding scholars who were trained in the West and therefore suspect. The need to crush their spirit of independent thinking became evident with the Hundred Flowers experiment. The Rectification counter-attact that lasted into 1958 focused on more intensive and extensive political indoctrination, public self-criticism, and forced participation in the Xiafang movement (that is, to be transferred to the grass-roots level to do physical labor[4]). Intellectuals were sent to farm and factory to labor with, live with, and learn from

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[3]H. Arthur Steiner, "The Curriculum in Chinese Socialist Education: An Official Bibliography of 'Maoism,'" Pacific Affairs 31 (September 1958): 286.

[4]"The Meaning of Xiafang," Peking Review, no. 2, 13 January 1959, p. 5.

the proletariat. Most were sent for one month a year; the more reticent for longer. Political reliability took precedent over technical proficiency in the "Red and Expert" protracted struggle. Teachers and university professors were also sent to rural areas to engage in manual labor in order to forge the thinking of "experts" into that of reliable "reds," because the events of the previous two years (1956-57) revealed the woeful state of "redness" among the "experts." The ideal Xiafang intellectual would "surrender his heart" to the party and the cause.

In 1959 the party retreated from its anti-intellectualism of the 1958 Great Leap strategy and focused efforts on "wooing the intellectuals." Although the work-study curricula were still part of the over-all reformation strategy, the extremes of previously frenzied intellectual reform movements (such as the Cheng Feng and Xiafang were lessened.[5] The thinking of the old-line intellectuals was compatible with the Communist cause, yet their expertise was indispensable to China's progress. In the midst of China's scientific, technological, and industrial under-development, the intellectuals were the key to further growth.

The party was concerned about the two elites in China: the intellectual elite, which was not progressive;

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[5]China News Analysis, no. 273, 24 April 1951, p. 7.

and the progressive elite, which was not intellectual.[6] Party tactics at the beginning of the Three Red Flags period were to ensure that "redness" triumph over the shortcomings of "expertness." Economic hardships in 1959-1960 tempered such aspirations. For economic recovery and development purposes, it was more important to make the already existing "experts" into believing "reds," than the reverse.

In early 1960, a new phase of the continuous revolution in learning began--the "Study Mao Tse-tung" movement. The Red Flag of the Socialistic Main Line had come to fruition. Mao's thoughts were to become the party line. People were to apply Mao Tse-tung thought to everyday living and thereby achieve success. Much of the related literature of the period focused on heroic figures who had died young; their integrity, self-worth, and morals were supposedly derived from studying the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

Foreign Affairs

China's military involvement shifted from Korea (all Chinese People's Volunteers were withdrawn by November 1958) to Taiwan and Ladakh. Peking wanted to liberate Taiwan from the grip of Chiang Kai-shek, but the U.S. was resolved to protect "free" China. Much controversy was generated over the offshore islands (Quemoy and Matsu) and the U.S. Seventh Fleet's presence in the Formosa Strait.

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[6] China News Analysis, no. 277, 22 May 1959, p. 5.

The other region of controversy was on the Tibetan-Indian border. Premier Chou En-lai announced the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in March 1959; there began a military clash between China and India in the border area of Ladakh in September 1959. TASS, the official news agency of the Soviet Union, claimed neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute. This proclamation of neutrality was unprecedented in Sino-Soviet relations and was a surprise to China and to the world.

The evolution of Sino-Soviet relations during this time proved both curious and unpredictable. Khrushchev and Chinese leaders held discussions in Peking and reasserted their ideological unity in the summer of 1958; their joint declaration indicated for the first time China's co-equal status with the Soviet Union. By early autumn 1959 after he had visited America, Khrushchev again visited Peking. This time the Russians claimed that war was no longer an acceptable means of settling international disputes. There was a dichotomy of interpretation of Communist doctrine between Peking and Moscow. There was no joint communique when the Soviet leader left Peking on 4 October 1959, indicating strained relations.

While Stalin was being denounced in Moscow, he was being praised in Peking. The mutual Sino-Soviet discontent came into the open in April 1960; in May China supported Khrushchev on the U-2 Incident; but in July all Russian technical experts, professors, and other assistance personnel were withdrawn from China. Industrial-plant

installation contracts and joint university-research projects were cancelled.

Through a series of international meetings of Communist officials from many countries, the Soviet Union maneuvered to isolate China from the other Communist-bloc countries. Open rupture between the two Communist giants did not occur until 1963. China was preparing to "go it alone" as best she could. The Sino-Soviet split was a blow to Chinese industrial and educational development, but most of all to their own psychological balance and sense of security.

Inputs to the Educational System

The Three Red Flags had a significant impact on educational development, and in turn, the schools played an especially important role in the unfurling of the Three Red Flags. During this period (1958-1960) the school system changed considerably: The Red Flag of the Great Leap Forward called on schools to establish farms and factories, on students to engage in productive labor, on factories to establish schools, and on workers to study; the Red Flag of the People's Communes called on the communes to organize schools to provide education to youth and adults in the rural areas first, and in the urban centers later; and the Red Flag of the Socialistic Main Line focused on political reliability and "putting politics in command" to build a Socialist society.

Aims of Education

After the Hundred Flowers experience the boundaries and the nature of the educational system were altered. Although the aims of education for this period were generally the same as outlined for the 1949-1957 period, political considerations forced the regime to focus on more specific aims for the schools. The educational system was redesigned to provide better, faster, and more economical schooling to more students,[7] while satisfying the growing demands for education and moving to meet the critical labor situation.

Plans for the Great Leap Forward started taking shape in late 1957. By early 1958 party organs produced a plan that dealt with combating the lack of political reliability among intellectuals (including academicians) and with ensuring proper work-study orientation of students, teachers, professors, and educational administrators. As part of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese educational philosophy was formally refined on 19 September 1958 when the party's Central Committee and the Government State Council jointly issued the Directives on Educational Work.[8] This

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[7] Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 2284, 24 June 1960, p. 9.

[8] "The Directive of the CCP Central Committee and the State on Educational Work," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), pp. 554-566.

document outlined the direction of education in terms of production, politics, and proletarianism.[9]

The first state directive, or aim of education, focused on students' labor perspective by combining education and productive labor. "Education and production" replaced "education for production" in 1958. The rationale was found in the writings of Lenin: "Without coordination between the education of the younger generation and productive labor, the ideal of the future society will be unthinkable. Neither teaching and education divorced from productive labor, nor education and productive labor if they are not simultaneously carried out will lead to the attainment of the higher degree of perfection required by the modern technological levels and scientific knowledge."[10]

The Central Committee and the State Council also prescribed that education serve political ends. Previously many educationists were not favorably disposed toward either Communist political doctrine or Communist educational practices. Before the Great Leap Forward many teachers felt education to be their domain, while the party should concentrate on politics. Educators, few of whom were party members, opposed the party policy of meddling in education and in the operations of schools. Communist cadre were not professionally qualified to direct academic progress or to

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[9]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Chinese Communist Education: The Three P's," Far Eastern Survey 29, no. 6 (June 1960): 86.

[10]As quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, no. 2284, p. 9.

administer educational institutions. During the Period of the Red Flags there was pressure to change this attitude through "putting politics in command" and through stressing the importance of studying and accepting Mao's interpretation of Communist doctrine. In response to, or as a protective reaction against, party pressure, the number of teachers to become party members increased as did the number of students who joined the Communist Youth League and the Young Pioneers.[11] Politics and indoctrination were reaffirmed as a major theme of formal instruction. The educational system was given a specific mission by the party and the government--that of serving state needs and proletarian politics.

A third educational concern expressed by the party and the government focused on proletarianism. Class distinction, an unacceptable social phenomenon is a Communist society, was to be undermined by combining the interests of intellectuals with those of workers by means of a work-study movement. Intellectuals, including students, administrators, teachers, and professors were to engage in manual labor and become more like the proletariat, while workers and peasants were to study and become the new proletarian intelligentsia.

The aims of education during the Period of the Three Red Flags helped define the parameters of the frenetic

[11]For an example in one school, see Times Educational Supplement, 2394, 7 April 1961, p. 667.

state of mass enthusiasm and belief in accomplishing the impossible through production, politics, and proletarianism. The central planning authorities attempted to mobilize and regiment China's manpower on an unprecedented scale.[12] The schools were central to achieving the economic and political objectives of the superordinate system of China during the production drives that were characteristic of the Great Leap Forward.

External Demands

Within the superordinate system the functioning of other subordinate systems contiguous with the formal educational system indirectly provided inputs that either hindered or helped the schools to fulfill their assigned goals. The policies that defined the boundaries of subordinate systems often shifted, having an impact on the role of the schools.

By the end of 1957 the Maoists felt that education during the First Five-Year Plan had been too elitist, focusing more on developing experts than on training reds. In 1958 Mao's thoughts began replacing Marxist classics in the basic curriculum, and the bookish education of past years was condemned as bourgeois.

In 1959 the educational system began to show strains of too much change in too short a time. There was

[12] China News Analysis, no. 280, 12 June 1959, p. 1.

concern about the impact of the 1958 educational "great leap" on the teaching-learning quality in schools. The entire formal educational system was approaching a state of disarray. Educational policy began to shift. Academics again became more important than productivity, though manual labor was still part of the curricula. Students were admonished to undertake more serious studies, to think more, to study hard, and to pursue individual projects.

The academic climate was freer of political constraints and was more serious in 1959, though professors remained reluctant to express opinions openly. Leaders tried to create a peaceful climate in which intellectuals could work, for it was realized that China needed the best minds available in order to overcome development problems. Students were told to "learn politics from the party and learn academics from the learned," even though the professors may not have been party members. There was an easing back on the political fervor, for China was experiencing added difficulties stemming from economic mismanagement and natural calamities. In school, studying became more serious and theory was once again emphasized. Ideology was still part of the curriculum, but not stressed to 1958 extremes.

The Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960, leaving much damage. There must have been much political ferment within the party, for many Chinese leaders were skeptical

of over-emphasizing student participation in manual labor when they should have been studying. Liu Shao-ch'i, then the Chairman of the Republic, had not been in full support of the Great Leap strategy of frantically driving toward immediate socialism. Liu addressed students as to their role: "Today the main thing in your school is study, and only a part of your time will be dedicated to labour. Today in the universities the main thing is study, while in factories and farms the main thing is labour. Only in the future will the two come close to each other, to become finally one."[13]

The Liu Shao-ch'i position of developing expertise needed for economic growth and the Mao Tse-tung position of ensuring that students were first equipped with the proper political perspective reflected the elitist-egalitarian struggle. During the First Five-Year Plan the elitist-expertise position overshadowed the egalitarian-redness position. In 1958 the two positions were reversed. Beginning in 1959 the demands of the superordinate system again dictated the need for expertise over redness; this trend continued until 1962-1963, when the Two-Line Party Struggle between elitism and egalitarianism characterized the years immediately before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

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[13]As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 273, 24 April 1959, p. 7.

The Budget

In spite of the "big leap forward" in total state budget expenditures between 1957 (29,000 million yuan) and each fiscal year of the Red Flags period (see Table 5-1), the percentage designated for the Education-Culture-Social allocation fell from the 1953-1957 figure of 14.7 per cent (see Table 4-2) to 10.6 per cent in 1958, 11 per cent in 1959, and 12.3 per cent in 1960. (The 1960 figure included state expenditure for science, about one per cent of the entire budget.) Although the Education-Culture-Social allocation dropped from the 1957 sum of 4,840 million yuan to 4,350 million yuan in 1958, the amount designated for this expenditure increased in 1959 and 1960.

The expenditure for primary and secondary education dropped from 2,269 million yuan in 1957 to 2,253 million yuan in 1958, and for higher education from 637 million yuan in 1957 to 599 million yuan in 1958.[14] The smaller education budget of the central government reflected the state decentralization policy of shifting educational costs to more local governments, and of the remuneration for student-labor as part of the work-study curricula to help finance the schools.

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[14]Leo A. Orleans, Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961), pp. 16-17.

Table 5-1. State Budget Allocations: 1958, 1959, 1960
(in Millions of Yuan and Percentages)

Budget Categories	1958		1959		1960	
	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage
Economic Construction	26,270	64.11	31,700	61.0	42,910	61.3
Education/Culture/Social (and Science for 1960)	4,350	10.62	5,730	11.0	8,620	12.3
National Defense	5,000	12.21	5,800	11.2	5,800	8.3
Administration	2,270	5.54	2,690	5.2	3,170	4.5
Other (Loans, Aid, Reserve, Credit, etc.)	3,070	7.52	6,090	11.6	9,520	13.6
Total	40,960	100.00	52,010	100.0	70,020	100.0

Sources: 1958--from China News Analysis, no. 280, 12 June 1959, p. 2.
1959--from Peking Review, no. 17, 29 April 1959, p. 26.
1960--from Peking Review, no. 14, 5 April 1960, p. 25.

Process Within the Educational System

The nature and the boundaries for formal education underwent alteration as a result of the Three Red Flags. New kinds of schools appeared; the Ministry of Higher Education disappeared. There were many more students in school; there was less time for study. The Great Leap Forward in education increased the number of students in school, but had a negative impact on educational quality.

Educational Administration

The Ministries of Education and Higher Education in Peking were directly responsible for Chinese educational development until early 1958. Elementary and secondary education were administered by the Ministry of Education, and post-secondary education by the Ministry of Higher Education. This highly centralized administration of education gave way to decentralization as a result of Mao's efforts to apply the Yenan strategy of basing political strength on meeting local needs and on egalitarianism. On 10 February 1958 the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished and the direct administration of higher educational institutions were transferred either to regional, provincial, or municipal governments, or to the Ministry of Education.

The regional, provincial, and municipal party leaders were in charge of and responsible for adapting educational programs under their control to regional and

local conditions. With the decentralization of management by mid-1958, Peking relinquished some of its authority over education to authorities of lower-level governments. The Ministry of Education and other ministries of the Central Government had transferred to more local governments between 50 and 75 per cent of the higher educational institutions, secondary technical schools, and schools training skilled workers. By fall, 31 per cent of the secondary-level and 34 per cent of the primary-level schools were managed at the local level.[15] At the higher education level, 187 of the 227 regular universities of China were turned over to local administrations.[16] This educational decentralization accompanied the establishment of agricultural communes and was necessary if the part-work, part-study curricula were to succeed, especially in light of the sundry local needs, resources, and potential.

With the decentralization of the administration of formal education, various levels of government undertook the responsibility for different levels of instruction. Almost every production brigade had its own kindergarten and primary school; every People's Commune had its own junior middle school; every county its own senior middle school; every administrative region its own secondary technical

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[15] O. Fisher, "Education in Communist China," School and Society 87, no. 2156 (20 June 1959): 303.

[16] Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 1841, 27 August 1958, p. 12.

school; and every province, major municipality, and autonomous region its own institutes of higher education.[17]

Amidst this major decentralization of educational management, the Communist party remained in firm control. Party leadership was accentuated, but government management was dissipated. Although the party was not part of the official governmental chain of command, it still had the power to decide on the nature and direction of all educational matters. The Chinese Communist Party retained control over the nation-wide system by ensuring close-range party supervision of every phase of the schools' operation and by placing reliable cadre in key positions in the school administrative structure. The party maintained control to ensure that education would contribute to the proletarian revolution.

Educational Finance

Educational economics was of major concern in this period. The Central Government freed itself from the financial burden of funding universal education by capitalizing on the communization program. Local communes, rural and urban, were responsible for financing and maintaining their own schools up through the secondary level, with the central, provincial, and major municipal governments looking after higher education. Primary and secondary educational

[17] New York Times, 9 December 1959, p. 15.



Figure 5-1. Educational Structure of the People's Republic of China, 1958-1959.

Source: Chang-tu Hu, China; its people; its society; its culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 419.

finance was the responsibility of lower-level governments, while higher educational institutions were the responsibility of higher-level governments.

In an attempt to provide education for all students of school age and to save money, the Central Government not only shifted the financial responsibility for formal education to communes, factories, and lower governmental units, but the half-work, half-study curricula were promoted to alleviate some of the costs involved in operating a school. In addition to paying fees, students participated in productive labor, which was credited to the school. Schools' financial capabilities moved toward self-support through student productive labor, yet the overall financial responsibility was borne by the lower-level governments.

By putting students on a partial-work schedule, the state ensured that more students received an education without having to spend state money to build additional classrooms or support the existing operations. Private elementary and middle schools were encouraged so as to take some of the enrollment pressure off the public educational system.

Though state financial responsibility shifted to local authorities, the party did not give up its control.

Student Productive Labor

The educational philosophy of the Great Leap Forward was "learn by doing." Before 1958 students engaged

in labor activities during vacations or non-school hours. With the establishment of half-work, half-study curricula that linked students, teachers, and administrators with the worker-peasant class, active participation in productive labor became a regular, integrated part of the formal educational program in schools. Students were to assist in the planned development of industry and agriculture by contributing their labor directly to production efforts, and at the same time, learning technical skills.

Factories and farms provided skilled laborers and agriculturalists to oversee student work. Many students resented the part-work, part-study schedule, however, because students were often used as unskilled labor. The amount and value of what students learned from participating in manual labor was questioned. Some high-echelon party leaders felt that if students of today were to be the leaders of the future, then students should "get back to serious study," for they seemed to benefit little from laboring at backyard furnaces and manuring fields.

Many educational institutions started their own ancillary farms, small factories, workshops, and backyard furnace complexes. The People's Daily reported that over 21,000 secondary schools and higher education institutions had already, by late 1958, established more than 151,000 factories.[18] By mid-1959 the amount of time students were

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[18]As cited in China News Analysis, no. 273, 1 November 1958, p. 5.

to devote to productive labor was fixed: elementary-school students but a few hours per week, secondary-school students a few days every month, and university and college students a few months a year.[19]

The integration of productive labor and education surpassed previous school training in industrial or agricultural skills. Participation in productive labor became part of the curricula at all educational levels; work tasks varied with student age and capabilities. Students were sent either to communes to sow and harvest crops, plant trees, build reservoirs and roads, or to factories to take an active part in the manufacture of various products. The entire student body and faculty of the Peking Agricultural University, for example, went to rural areas for one year and joined organized farm teams engaging in agricultural production.[20]

As a complementary and parallel effort, factories and farms were encouraged to establish schools, permitting workers and farmers to achieve literacy and numeracy, and to learn the proper political perspective. Some large industrial complexes set up an entire school system from primary to higher education; smaller factories and workshops joined together to establish primary schools.

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[19]Robert D. Barendsen, "Educational Changes in Chinese Areas," Social Life 43, no. 1 (September 1960): 20.

[20]Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Scene, 1949-1967 (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), p. 548.

Amidst the campaign of combining work and study, the hope was to wield school and farm or school and factory into a single learning-production unit. It was important to develop among students a readiness to sacrifice for, and a willingness to contribute without question their expertise to, the economic development of China. The long-term aim of Communist education was to relate education directly to manual labor in order to completely interlock education and production.

Educational Growth

School enrollments greatly expanded during the Period of the Three Red Flags. Every level of education experienced unprecedented expansion. Nursery schools numbered 3.2 million units with over 47 million students by 1958, up from 2700 units with 99,000 students in 1951.[21] Kindergartens also grew over this same period with a big leap in 1958.

The nursery-kindergarten movement was closely linked with the industrial and agricultural communes. The growth of rural communes from 1958 and of urban communes from 1960 facilitated the rapid expansion of these child-care units. The growth of kindergartens, nursery schools, and child-care centers was all part of the child-welfare

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[21]Wasyl Shimoniak, Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), p. 406.

Table 5-2. Increase in Kindergartens (in Thousands)

Year	Number of Units	Number of Students
1950	1.8	140
1952	6.5	424
1957	16.4	1,088
1958	695.3	29,501

Source: State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 202.

program that released mothers from home and family duties so they could join the state work force.

Enrollments took a "big leap forward" in 1958 (see Table 5-3), a small leap forward in 1959, and practically no advance in 1960. In the first year of the Three Red Flags there was much enthusiasm about the Great Leap Forward as reflected in the jump in the enrollment figures. The increase continued in 1959, but at a slower pace, with 1960 showing little overall increase.

In spite of the impressive attendance gains made at all levels of formal education, a more realistic perspective of the entire educational structure is reflected in enrollment figures across the various levels. Even though there were over 96 million students in elementary and secondary schools in 1958, 86.4 million were in elementary school. And of the remaining ten million, 7.34 million were in general junior-middle school and an even smaller 1.18 million in senior-middle school (see Table 4-5). This

Table 5-3. Student Enrollment by Level: 1957-1960.

Level	1957	1958	1959	1960
Primary	64,279,000	86,400,000	90,000,000	90,000,000
Secondary	7,059,000	9,990,000	12,900,000	---
Higher Education	441,000	660,000	810,000	810,000

Sources: For 1957 and 1958, State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 192; for 1959, "Economic and Social Statistics of Mainland China, 1958-1959," in E. Stuart Kirby, ed., Contemporary China, 6 vols. to date (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1961), 4: 181; and for 1960, as reported by the Ministry of Education in the People's Daily on 9 April 1960, as cited in China News Analysis, no. 334, 5 August 1960, p. 5.

disparity in the distribution of students enrolled in school was rooted in national policy of striving for universal primary education.

The middle school students were a very small percentage of both the total school population and of their age group. This disparity was even more apparent at the higher education level.

The colleges and universities admitted 280,000 new students in 1960, and graduated 135,000. The net increase of 145,000 students represents a decline in enrollments from 1959 (with a net increase of 150,000) and 1958 (with a net increase of 210,000).[22] The nation-wide uniform admissions policy was replaced by locally-determined criteria.[23]

New Schools

In 1958 Mao started an educational revolution. During the Period of the Three Red Flags there evolved new kinds of educational institutions. The administration of the educational system passed to local authorities control of finances, admission, curricula, methodology, etc., and along with this decentralization there was much

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[22] I Wo-Sheng, "Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962), 1: 71.

[23] Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 267-268.

experimenting with various school practices and entirely new kinds of institutions.

Many whole-day schools (mostly in urban areas) and min pan schools (mostly in rural areas) were converted to half-work, half-study institutions. The half-work, half-study schools were an economic necessity, for the central government was without the financial capability of affording rapid enrollment expansion. These schools not only freed the state from the financial burden of paying for these new programs, they also extended basic education to millions of rural students who otherwise would have been without the opportunity.

The agricultural cooperatives and communes were responsible for the agricultural junior middle school, a rural half-farming, half-study institution. These schools were modeled after (but not to be confused with) technical-vocational secondary schools in agriculture. The curriculum combined formal instruction (half-study) with practical training in Chinese agricultural methods (half-farming). Such schools, the first two of which were established in March 1958, allowed peasant children to remain in rural areas to contribute their labor to agricultural production and still get a basic education. Their enrollments increased from 2 million in 1958, to 2.19 million in 1959, and to 2.9 million in 1960.[24] These

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[24]Lu Hsu-yen, "Education," in Communist China 1963, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 11; and U.S. Department of Commerce--Office of Technical

institutions were the result of the new agricultural thrust of the Second Five-Year Plan and of the rural communization program.

With the Great Leap Forward there appeared the boarding school, providing students with the opportunity to rid themselves of old family thinking, while mothers were free to partake in productive labor. Many Chinese educators were claiming that boarding schools provided the best education possible, for every aspect of the student's collective existence was closely supervised. The collective spirit of the social environment required students to live, study, work, eat, play, and think together.

Some parents did not like their children leaving home so young to live and study in primary boarding schools, fearing that the children would not be looked after properly. Parents also resisted this move to break up the family. A Chinese newspaper editorial claimed that "the boarding-school system [had] the advantage of removing children from what in some cases [were] the bad ideological environment of homes and surrounding them with the influence of good Communist training."[25] The Chinese argued that children in a Communist society were best raised and educated by the

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Services, trans., Seiji Keizai Soran (Political-Economic Handbook on China) (Tokyo: Association for Asian Political-Economic Studies, 1962), pp. 8-9 in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), Education in Communist China 17, 188-2985, February 1963.

[25]As quoted in New York Times, 7 January 1959, p. 13.

state. To support further the boarding school trend, educationists claimed that boarders did better academic work in school than other students.

The number of full-time higher educational institutions increased from 230 to 1065 in 1958.[26] This increase came at the time when the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished. In response to the Great Leap Forward, Red and Expert Universities appeared everywhere. These newly-created institutions were to train politically-reliable cadre in various skills through short-term courses, through regular school sessions, and through working with skilled craftsmen. Much of the students' time was spent in productive labor. The educational objective of the Red and Expert Universities was to make students more "expert" in their productive skills and more "red" in their loyalty. Many of these institutions disappeared after 1960.

Educational Problems

The rapid expansion of education during the Great Leap Forward amplified the host of problems that plagued Chinese schools for years. During the Three Red Flags period all previous shortages--qualified students, teachers, and administrators; and adequate educational materials and physical plants--were intensified as millions of new students were added to the school rolls. All these

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[26]Robert D. Barendsen, "Education in China: A Survey," Problems of Communism 13 (July-August 1964): 23.

shortages and their attendant problems had an adverse effect on the quality of instruction.

All the problems facing Chinese education were serious, but the most critical was the shortage of qualified teachers. Though the higher educational system was geared to training large numbers of teachers, their numbers still were not enough to meet the rising demand. The need was so critical that politically reliable industrial workers and demobilized soldiers became teachers with only a minimum of ad hoc training. Summer workshops were conducted to improve the ability of teachers already in the schools. Because so many new teachers were needed and recruited in such a short time, their overall level of education and training left a great deal to be desired.[27]

Part of the teacher shortage could be blamed on official anti-intellectual attitudes. Teachers did not enjoy high prestige as they had in the old days; in fact, they were periodically criticized and humiliated in public. Many otherwise prospective teachers lost interest in the profession.

The shortage of qualified teachers was especially troublesome in vocational schools. These educational institutions needed as teachers the same managerial and technical expertise as did agricultural and industrial development projects. To place technically qualified personnel in the

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[27] China News Analysis, no. 334, 5 August 1960, p. 4.

vocational schools to teach would deny their services to the agricultural and industrial sector, but to place them in industry and agriculture meant that their knowledge and experience was denied vocational-technical students. Many of the other teachers in these schools were of poor quality and if the better qualified personnel were demanded on the development projects, the students in vocational schools received poor-quality instruction before they went into the field.

Another educational problem centered on the focal point of the educational system--the student. Elementary and secondary schools were striving to improve the quality of instruction so their graduates would be better qualified to study in university and eventually make contributions to national development. Higher education suffered from the lack of a sufficient number of qualified general secondary school graduates applying to college and university. Higher education felt the impact of the race between quality education and education for the masses (quantity education). In spite of the apparent need for qualified applicants to higher education, recently discharged soldiers, long-time veterans, reliable persons from the party or the government or state enterprises, overseas Chinese students, and returned students to China from foreign countries were admitted through lower entrance examination standards than was required for other applicants, so long as they were recommended by the proper organization and were party

activists.[28] The political criterion of applicants was a counter force to quality higher education.

The quality of education during these three years was initially down-graded, followed by moves to improve and offset the damage that resulted from the Great Leap Forward in education. During the initial enthusiasm in 1958 there was little respect for higher education, intellectuals were again prime political suspects. Being "expert" was far less important than being "red." The greatly expanded enrollments in 1958 strained the existing facilities and personnel. In 1959 the system attempted to adjust to the changes, though enrollments still rose. Educational expansion slowed in 1960 as part of a trade-off between quantity and quality. (See Table 5-3.) Student admissions to higher education became more selective and applicants had to meet refined criteria: academic qualifications of the applicant, entrance examination results, technical and professional needs of the nation, social status (a landlord or bourgeois family background was detrimental), political status and record, and age.[29] These steps were taken to improve the quality of students admitted to higher education.

Another compounding weakness that reduced the university graduates' impact on national development was the assignment of manpower. The placement procedure

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[28] I Wo-Sheng, "Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, pp. 71-72.

[29] Chiu-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), pp. 197-198.

reflected inefficient estimates of projected manpower needs. Some sectors were oversupplied with graduates, others undersupplied. Some graduates were not working in the area for which they were trained, others were working in areas without proper training.[30] Once assigned a post, engineering graduates were found to be but "little more than skilled technicians" and science graduates but "advanced laboratory technicians."[31]

The effectiveness of the educational system was further infringed upon by party requirements and qualifications. Teachers, students, and administrators were no longer only teaching, studying, and administering, but they were all engaging in some form of manual labor. Qualifications for responsibility were changed: recent university graduates would become assistant department heads because of their party membership, even though their academic level and teaching-administrative ability was poor. Many educational institutions were still "beehives of dogmatism" rather than full-fledged schools. The remnants of a Western concept of higher education had almost disappeared.

Every educational institution was totally under the control of the party: teacher-student-administrator

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[30]Leo A. Orleans, "Quality of Education," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), pp. 96-98.

[31]Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Manpower," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), p. 385.

appointment and promotion, curricular development, and the whole of the educational policy were the sole domain of the authority of the party.

As to the quality of education during this impressive expansion, there can be little doubt that it was low. The shortage of qualified teachers, inadequate physical plants, insufficient number of classrooms, lack of qualified educational administrators, incredible rates of increased student enrollment, total party control of education, and the amount of time given over from study to productive labor--all had a negative impact on the quality of education during the Great Leap Forward and after.

New Educational Directions

Natural calamities, described as "unprecedented in the last one hundred years," and mismanagement of development programs caused the Great Leap Forward to collapse in 1960. Either in anticipation of, or in reaction to, the crumbling "grand strategy," both the Minister of Education, Yang Hsiu-feng, and the Director of the powerful Propaganda Department of the party's Central Committee, Lu Ting-yi, announced to the National People's Congress in April 1960 plans for major educational changes. These modifications can be grouped into five categories: compression, unification, acceleration, modernization, and experimentation. Although these reforms were only propósed changes and not declarations of official government strategy, many were implemented.

Compression.--The number of years spent in primary and secondary full-time schools was to be reduced. A party spokesman stated that it was their "preliminary intention . . . to reduce the number of years of full-time middle and elementary school education to approximately 10."[32] Since Chinese youngsters began primary school at age seven, by the time they graduated from senior middle school at 17 they were "full manpower units" and able to enter the mainstream of production. Because China's development required all available educated manpower, students were to graduate two years early and thereby not waste themselves for two years in school. These changes were not to affect educational quality, however, for better teaching would permit compression of twelve years of education into ten without a loss. In fact, "the academic level [was to] be slightly raised to ensure that middle school graduates would have an academic level commensurate with that of present-day students in the first year of a university."[33]

Unification.--Primary and middle school education were to be thought of as one ten-year unified system and not as two separate phases--one elementary and the other

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[32]As cited in Robert D. Barendsen, "Planned Reforms in the Primary and Secondary School System in Communist China," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), pp. 153-154.

[33]I Wo-Sheng, "Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, p. 61.

secondary. The proposed curricula and methodology were based on the unified school cycle.

Acceleration.--Subjects taught in school were to be combined and taught in a lower grade. Some subjects were merged by condensing content; for example, elementary school history, geography, and natural science were to be simplified and combined into one subject. Some courses were relegated to the next lower level; for example, junior middle school arithmetic and algebra were to be taught at the primary level, selected senior secondary courses taught at the junior secondary level, and some college-level science and mathematics subjects taught at the senior secondary level. Key courses (science, mathematics, and language) were introduced earlier and taught at an accelerated pace. Streamlining was necessary to reduce redundance by eliminating unnecessary cyclic repetition. "All repetitions of the same subject, in primary school, junior and senior middle school, should be omitted."[34]

Modernization.--Science and mathematics were key subjects of the curriculum, giving students knowledge of and training in areas pertinent to technical development. Courses that political leaders considered less important either received less attention or were dropped from the curriculum altogether.

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[34]China News Analysis, no. 334, 5 August 1960, p. 3.

Teaching materials were to be modernized and the quality of instructional standards upgraded. Normal school education was to be improved as part of better teacher training. During the 1960 summer vacation, a nation-wide educational improvement campaign was conducted, including teacher-training classes, compilation of new textbooks, and other measures. Nursery schools and kindergarten programs were to be improved. And school systems were to be introduced to modern educational media wherever possible.

Experimentation.--Because educational authorities were encouraged to experiment with several aspects of the formal educational system, many different patterns evolved. Since school reform was the responsibility of local-level authorities, a variety of experiments resulted from taking account of local, but varied, conditions and constructing an appropriate school system that matched areal conditions and educational potential. Even the examination system within the primary and secondary levels varied, making it difficult for the Central Government to support a uniform national reform program.

The entire educational reform program, as proposed, was to be gradually implemented over the next ten to twenty years. The economic situation in 1960 prevented another educational era of unprecedented expansion, for the national economy was exhausted by the Great Leap Forward and the agricultural disasters of 1959-1961. Since ambitious education plans were not possible in 1960 due to

the economic difficulties facing China, official government action to deal with education in a comprehensive manner had to be postponed for the time being.

Outputs of the Educational System

Many graduates of educational institutions during the Three Red Flags period had only a brief but intense exposure to the educational qualities the leaders felt to be important. Because this period was only three years, the last two of which were of a different tempo than the first, no graduate from any formal school had been educated in the qualities described below during his or her full educational career. But all graduates had some exposure and were therefore aware of the current national policy.

The Qualities of the Educational Output

The values and attitudes graduates were to possess centered around qualities of education that reflected the character of the Chinese society at that time. Some of the qualities the educationists had hoped to develop in students were unique to the period, such as education for the Great Leap Forward and education for Red and Expert. Other qualities were but extensions of previous concerns with a slightly different interpretation or emphasis, such as education for political action and education for increased productivity. As with all stages of development, educational qualities reflected both features that were linked

with a particular period and features that were carried over from previous periods but with modifications to fit the times.

Education for the Great Leap Forward. Throughout Chinese history, the illiterate working masses were always apart from the limited but sophisticated intelligentsia. When the Communists came to power on the Chinese mainland, this polarization was challenged. With the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes the educational structure was so modified as to transform intellectuals (including students and professors) into laborers, and farmers and workers into intellectuals. Schools and universities became production centers; communes and factories became schools. These modifications were carried out in the name of creating an army of proletarian intellectuals.

In addition to the work-study curricula providing schools with increased financial self-help, student labor contributed to national development. Chinese schools, colleges, universities, and technical institutes made direct, immediate, and substantial contributions to the national economy.[35] The success of the Great Leap Forward depended, in part, on each individual's contribution to collective national action. To students this meant working

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[35]Stewart Fraser, "Education, Indoctrination, and Ideology in Communist China, 1950-1960," in Stewart Fraser, ed., Chinese Communist Education: Records of the First Decade (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), p. 61.

for productive ends, studying for scientific and technical expertise, and pursuing education for economic and political progress. Specifically this was education to serve the people, to serve proletarian politics, to serve productive labor, to serve the Socialist cause, and to serve the Great Leap Forward.

If the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes were to succeed, in fact if Chinese development were to succeed, educated people were needed. The entire economy required scientific, technical, and administrative expertise if it were to develop. National progress called for more education, and being at the heart of the development scheme the Great Leap Forward called for more education for more people.

Education for Increased Productivity. The one overwhelming characteristic of the school during the Great Leap Forward was the combination of education and labor. Full-time schools at all levels adopted work-study curricula; a portion of each student's time was devoted to productive labor in farms, factories, or workshops. The skills-development curricula were not just laboratory exercises or an occasional field trip, but rather students and teachers became members of the work force and actively participated in the production of usable commodities and services.

Liberal education had no place in the strategy to overcome the barriers between manual and mental labor.

Schools and universities, now centers of both learning and production, were to develop students who were not only politically alert and professionally qualified, but also capable of and willing to pursue both mental and manual work.[36]

There were four objectives to student participation in productive labor: to activate the reserve of young manpower, to develop a proletarian perspective among students, to learn to respect manual labor, and to prevent students from becoming isolated from the working class.[37]

The school system was an integral part of the Second Five-Year Plan; the students would help increase production and, it was hoped, even solve problems and improve techniques of production. The combination of education and productive labor was in full keeping with Communist ideology, for Engels claimed in the Communist Manifesto that such a combination is one of the most effective mechanisms for transforming the basic conditions of pre-Communist society to a full Communist society.[38]

Education for Political Action. No mass movement neglects students, teachers, professors, or educational

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[36]Barendsen, "Educational Changes in Chinese Areas," pp. 19-20.

[37]Chang-tu Hu, "Recent Trends in Chinese Education," International Review of Education 10, no. 1 (1964): 16.

[38]Chen, "Chinese Communist Education: The Three P's," p. 87.

administrators. All were required to partake in political activities; no one was allowed to remain apart from politics. Students and teachers were assessed by their degree of scholarship and their political acumen. Educated Chinese citizens, by Communist definition, were politically active and ideologically sound; they were beyond merely understanding class struggle, they were in fact active class warriors.

The notion that only the educated knew what was best for themselves was totally rejected. Only the Communist party knew what was good and all educators were to accept party leadership in all matters regarding education.

If education were to serve politics and, ultimately, the proletarian-socialist revolution, educators at all levels were required to foster political consciousness, class consciousness, class alignments, and the class struggle.[39] For this reason, political and ideological courses were the most stressed element of the curriculum, especially during 1958. Political education (or ideological indoctrination) was a thought reform process that tolerated no passive students--political neutrality was not an option. Students and teachers, as intellectuals, were pressured into criticism of others and self-criticism as part of thought reform and the Red Flag of the Socialistic Main Line.

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[39] Ibid.

The Chinese Communists were "not satisfied with passive obedience or the mere absence of opposition. They demanded support and whole-hearted participation."[40] Groups pressured individuals to reveal their inner thoughts; groups demanded conformity by pressuring for pledges of loyalty. One's ideologically inconsistent thoughts were attacked, while activism in the class struggle was the ideal.[41]

Education for political action was the application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in China. At this stage of ideological interpretation, that meant "putting politics into command" and striving to be both "Red and Expert."

Education for Red and Expert. The major thrust of educational efforts during 1958-1960 was to develop a "Red and Expert" proletarian intelligentsia. There appeared during this time specially-created Red and Expert schools and universities. These institutions were established by street organizations, communes, civic groups, armed forces units, and industrial enterprises. They were often staffed by workers and peasants and soldiers with little formal education themselves.[42]

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[40]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "New Citizens for a New Society," Current History 49, no. 289 (September 1965): 155.

[41]Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education," The New Leader 42 (4 May 1959): 16.

[42]Orleans, "Education and Scientific Manpower, p. 366.

The Red and Expert schools were created by organizations that had also established regular schools. The Red and Expert curricula included intense political indoctrination to develop Socialist-minded cadre, and some technical courses that related directly to the sponsoring organization. If the Red and Expert institution was to be part of a commune educational system; for example, the technical subjects might include agricultural cooperatives, farm animals, chemical fertilizer, water conservancy, in addition to the political courses that were usually taught by the local party secretary.[43]

The leaders knew that long-term agricultural progress would depend on educating youth to working in agriculture. Although Red and Expert schools and universities were in response to an increased need for education especially in rural areas, these institutions were not limited to the countryside. The urban counterpart was the school and university sponsored by industrial enterprises to educate their own workers. Again the curricula reflected the nature of the factory, and the instructional staff chosen from among the engineers, technicians, and skilled workers.[44]

Even though the Chinese contended that neither industrial nor agricultural production decreased and that

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[43]Chang-tu Hu, China: its people, its society, its culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1960), p. 431.

[44]Ibid., p. 432.

better educated workers produced more, there was little mention of the Red and Expert institutions after 1960.

Education for a Communist Morality. Schools were to instill a Communist morality in all students. Mao sought the active support of the staffs of educational institutions to politicize thoroughly students into accepting without question the wisdom and politics of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao clarified the task of educators in his famous speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People": "Our educational policy must enable everyone who gets an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a cultured, socialist-minded worker."[45]

An education for a Communist morality focused the attention of teachers and students on accepting and supporting a number of basic tenets. Total obedience to the party was at the heart of the new morality in China; this included a willingness to fight and die for socialism or to contribute one's expertise for a lifetime wherever the party deemed it most useful. Individuals were encouraged to dedicate themselves to serve the Socialist revolution and to renounce their own personal ambitions. It was bourgeois morality that focused on the individual, but Communist morality focused on the people.[46]

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[45] As quoted in Current Background, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 458, 20 June 1957, p. 15.

[46] Theodore H. E. Chen, "Elementary Education in China," China Quarterly no. 10 (April-June 1962): 108.

To assist in the development of the Socialistic Main Line, schools fostered the development of a Communist morality as part of a Socialist education. To prosecute successfully the continuing Chinese revolutions in technology, economics, culture, politics, and ideology, "moral education [inspired] . . . self-discipline, born of a deep political consciousness and a realisation of the individual's duty to the proletarian-socialist cause."[47]

Education for Science. From the days of the New Culture Movement, when Mr. Science had a special appeal to the Chinese as one solution to their problems, to the Period of the Three Red Flags, when science and technology were needed for China's development, official educational policy aimed at developing science as a necessary tool of progress. Educational efforts to develop in the masses a modern perception of the environment and to undermine their long-held superstitions included "stripping science of its mystery" and "storming the gates of science."[48] In addition to developing popular attitudes toward science, there was attention given to the specialized training of scientists as the key to industrial and military equity with the world's advanced nations.

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[47] Ibid., p. 110.

[48] Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education in Communist China: Aims, Trends, and Problems," in Ruth Adams, ed., Contemporary China (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), pp. 269-270.

During the Period of Consolidation and Stabilization the best university graduates in science were sent mainly to the Soviet Union for advanced training, but as Sino-Soviet tensions increased the number of students exchanged decreased. Educators and development planners realized the necessity for training manpower in needed technical and scientific competencies and for developing science education. The Chinese leaders gave attention to and paid for extremely expensive, high-level scientific education, experimentation, and research.

Once the Soviets pulled their experts out of China, the Chinese were on their own. If China were to have an atom bomb, she would have to complete it with Chinese expertise. As China moved toward becoming a nuclear power, a special, high-quality education and research facility was created. In September, 1958 the Chinese University of Science and Technology was opened, offering 13 fields of advanced science and technology to 1600 students. This new institution maintained close communication with the Chinese Academy of Science and other research institutes that trained China's best scientists.

At less advanced levels of formal instruction, the science curriculum was modernized and accelerated. The narrowly-trained Chinese scientist was able to adapt the technical processes from the advanced nations to China's needs for greater overall development.

Education for "Walking on Two Legs." The "walking on two legs" strategy in education provided for both a rudimentary education for as many students as possible and a quality education for a small number of politically- and academically-qualified students. China had to "walk on two legs" if she were to progress educationally: one leg to provide some schooling to the masses, a second leg to ensure that the best students received the best education possible in the best Chinese schools. Mass schooling minimally satisfied the popular demands for education (one leg) and also served as a channel for continued indoctrination (second leg). Because highly trained and competent personnel were needed as captains of development in industry, agriculture, medicine, bureaucracy, education, the military, etc., quality educational institutions enrolled politically reliable but academically superior students.

The university "walked on two legs": most students went to Red and Expert Universities, fewer went to regular universities. The curricula "walked on two legs": formal instruction and productive labor. The government "walked on two legs": shifting financial responsibility to other government units but ensuring that education was expanded.

A brief analysis of education reveals a "walking on many legs" strategy, a rational policy for the problems facing China. Schools were operated by industrial plants, by communes, by mines, by street organizations, and by every level of government. There were both general and

vocational education, both youth and adult education, both school and home study, and both free and fee-based education.[47] All these educational programs contributed to the development of teaching and learning among the various segments of the population.

Quality of Educational Output

The statistics on graduates from educational institutions for this period are incomplete. The data that are available give but a very sketchy picture of numerical output for 1958-1960. Figures for 1958 are available, but for 1959 and 1960 little is known. Amidst the confusion of the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath, statistics were probably difficult to collect. One might question whether the Chinese themselves have these data.

A Numerical and Content Analysis. The only year for which comprehensive data are available is 1958. Primary school graduates for 1958 increased by 33 per cent over 1957, secondary school graduates increased only about 4 per cent over 1957, and higher education graduates increased by about 30 per cent. (See Table 4-5.) For 1959, only the higher education graduates were reported; this statistic reflected a decline of about 14 per cent. A tremendous increase of more than 200 per cent in the number of higher education graduates between 1959 and 1960 indicated that

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[49] Orleans, "Quality of Education," p. 82.

the graduates of the hundreds of Red and Expert Universities and of special two-year courses (begun in 1958) helped to inflate the figure. (See Table 5-4.)

Table 5-4. Graduates During the Period of the Three Red Flags

Year	Primary	Secondary	Higher Education
1958	16,225,000	1,504,000	72,000
1959	---	---	62,200
1960	---	---	135,000

Source: Leo A. Orleans, "Education and Scientific Manpower," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), pp. 368-371; and I Wo-Sheng, "Education in Communist China in 1960," in Communist China 1960, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962), 1: 71.

The Chinese government released comprehensive statistics of the breakdown of higher education graduates across the disciplines for only one year.

Table 5-5. Number of Higher Education Graduates by Discipline for 1958.

Engi-neering	Agri-culture	Economics & Finance	Medi-cine	Natural Science	Educa-tion	Liberal Arts
17,499	3,513	2,349	5,393	4,645	31,595	4,131

Source: State Statistical Bureau, comp., Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 196.

By late 1960 there were approximately 625,000 college and university graduates in China out of a population of 600 million; this is about one per cent of the urban work force. This percentage is low compared to the 6 per cent for the Soviet Union and 12 per cent for the United States for the same statistic.[50]

Conclusion

The development of China needed an ever increasing number of educated personnel to staff the bureaucracy, command the army, and run the economy. If China were to be a world power, a fully-integrated industrial economy was necessary. Since technical development hinges on literate workers and, in the long term, on an educated mass, the school system had a special function in the overall Chinese strategy for progress.

Because of external pressures, the worsening Sino-Soviet relations, internal trends, spreading revisionism, and bourgeois thinking, Mao launched the Three Red Flags in 1958. At the heart of the rapid industrialization and communization drives was the frenetic state of mass enthusiasm and a belief in achieving the impossible through exerted human effort. The planning authorities attempted to mobilize and regiment China's manpower on an unprecedented scale. The schools had a central role in the party's campaign to generate mass fervor in order to counter the

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[50] New York Times, 28 December 1960, p. 15.

shortage of human and material resources needed in the development process.

The multifarious school system that emerged from the Great Leap Forward in education accommodated increased numbers of students, generated increased numbers of graduates, created new kinds of schools, instituted work-study programs, and focused on a Red and Expert paradigm. The effect of these new directions stifled creativity and compromised the quality of education.

Many of the programs instituted during these years were not properly planned for and suffered from the lack of qualified leadership. Opposition to the dissatisfaction with Mao's policies--industrial, agricultural, educational--emerged before the Great Leap Forward collapsed. Academicians criticized this educational revolution because of its impact on educational standards, but political zealots praised the changes because they ended the exclusive academic orientation of China's schools.

In 1958 the agricultural and industrial sectors failed to reach their production targets, while the educational sector surpassed the target number of students to be admitted to school. In 1959 the party admitted to the exaggerated production statistics and revised them downward. Also in 1959, a period of relaxation from the tensions of the previous year's efforts, the educational system attempted to adjust to all the changes thrust upon it. Leaders came to realize that quantitative educational

development was of little consequence without parallel efforts to improve educational quality.[51]

During 1959 and 1960 China suffered from a disrupted economy and unfavorable weather conditions. In the face of these challenges, schools pressured students to study more seriously; serious academic education became more important than student participation in productive labor.

Under the weight of the collapsing Great Leap Forward, the temporary halt in the rural communization program, the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, two years of crop failure, and people on the edge of starvation, the counter measures that evolved and were implemented were not of a pure Maoist tradition. The resurgence of elitism and expertise over egalitarianism and redness precipitated the Two-Line Party Struggle. The solutions to the 1958-1960 excesses that appeared in the following period (1961-1965) continued the struggle of determining the national policy for the educational system.

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[51]Hu, "Recent Trends in Chinese Education," p. 14.

"By the early 1960s, Mao had perceived that he was making little headway in his revitalization of a revolutionary China."

(Stanley Karnow, Mao and China.)

CHAPTER 6

RETRENCHMENT AND THE TWO-LINE PARTY STRUGGLE

Following the Great Leap Forward and its collapse, the Chinese social system entered a Period of Retrenchment. The country needed time to recuperate from the strains it endured during the Three Red Flags period and to overcome the economic problems in the early 1960s. The Chinese leaders closed factories and schools, suspended construction projects, stopped recruiting rural labor for the urban work force, and generally reappraised the nation's human and material resources. After retrenchment (1961-1962) a struggle between two party factions as to the correct development strategy for China evolved to new heights.

The Times: 1961-1965

More exciting and eventful were the years both before and after the Period of Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle. These years were important, however, to

China's recovery from the excesses of the preceding period and for setting the stage of the events to follow. The regime issued guidelines in 1962--adjustment, strengthening, soundness, and high-quality--that characterized Chinese efforts of this period to redirect official policy, to regroup economic forces, and to re-evaluate the nation's potential and strategy for overcoming development problems. During these years observers witnessed an internal party conflict that resulted in the most disruptive event in the history of the Chinese People's Republic--the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Domestic Issues

On the domestic front, activities were more eventful in the political than in the economic sphere. The economy was attempting to recover from the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and the crop failures of 1959, 1960, and 1961. Some political leaders had voiced opposition to the Great Leap strategy and advocated a more balanced approach to solving China's problems.

Economic Considerations. Increased consumer demand, the pressures of population expansion, two years of poor agricultural productivity, the nation-wide food emergency, and the realization that agriculture was central to China's economy had persuaded the party's Central Committee in January 1961 to shift a majority of government resources from focusing primarily on industrial development to

agricultural development. In 1961-1962 national policy was modified by planning capital construction projects more carefully, by putting greater emphasis on the agrarian sector, and by marketing more consumer goods. The main thrust of the industrial sector was to mechanize agriculture; resources were invested in the production of chemical fertilizer and insecticides, and in farm implement facilities. Three years of natural disaster (1959-1961) had caused severe problems for the national economy, making rapid and massive industrial expansion out of the question.[1]

The Second Five-Year Plan ended in 1962; it was less of a success than the First Five-Year Plan. The claimed achievements during the first years of the plan (including the Great Leap Forward) were offset by subsequent industrial and agricultural production problems. There was but little industrial growth between 1958 and 1965.[2] The economy was in such disarray that the Third Five-Year Plan did not begin until 1966.

Political Considerations. To counter the popular discontent that resulted from the Great Leap Forward and

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[1]Theodore Herman, "Trends in Chinese Agriculture," Current History 45, no. 265 (September 1963), pp. 165-166.

[2]Choh-ming Li, "China's Industrial Development, 1958-63," in Choh-ming Li, ed., Industrial Development in Communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 3; and Jan Deleyne, The Chinese Economy (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973), p. 24.

its aftermath, the party inaugurated a class education campaign in the early 1960s. This movement was couched in the philosophy of the class struggle, focusing on a commitment to the Communist ideology and to Mao's revolution. The aim of the education campaign was to raise class consciousness by making people aware of the pre-liberation evils, exploitation, oppression, and corruption compared to the post-liberation Socialist amenities.[3]

Schools were included in the class education movement. Students studied Marxism-Leninism, the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, and comparative histories of pre- and post-1949 China. Older people were brought into the schools to relate to students their personal recollections of injustices of the Kuomintang era. The Communist party also provided appropriate teaching materials that accentuated the differences between the two regimes. The curricula focused on historical analyses of past evils and present glories.

Class education was merged with the Mao-sponsored Socialist Education Movement (1962-1966). This new movement aimed at purifying the ideology, attacking revisionism that was again gaining strength, reasserting Socialist controls over the economy and the society, placing politics in command again, criticizing minor party officials, rectifying hsien-level politics, and attacking bureaucratism,

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[3]Theodore H. E. Chen, "New Citizens for a New Society," Current History 49, no. 289 (September 1965), p. 158.

commandism, and conservatism.[4] Students and teachers were also involved in the Socialist Education Movement.

After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese leaders directed a more balanced approach to national development. In agriculture, for example, farmers were permitted private plots on which to grow produce that was sold in the rural markets for individual profit. Such measures, however, were in opposition to Mao's concept of collective responsibility in a Communist society. The Socialist Education Movement was designed, among other things, to pressure farmers to exert more effort on communal-land projects and less on their own private plots, even though these individual plots stimulated agricultural recovery.

Between 1963-1965, as the economy gained relative stability, the two-line party conflict within the Central Committee took on greater proportions. Mao would probably have preferred an immediate purge of all rightists in the party, for they insisted on hierarchical authority structures, attempted to run the state for their own purposes, and advocated the capitalist line. The targets of rectification were party members in positions of power. The revisionist-revolutionist confrontation was but a portent of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969).

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[4]Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966 (Berkeley: University of California--Center for Chinese Studies, 1968), p. 48.

Foreign Issues

Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate throughout this period. Khrushchev denounced China's aggressive Taiwan policy and the People's Daily attacked Khrushchev for giving in to U.S. pressure on the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Hostility between the two regimes mounted to an unprecedented degree for these former allies. Red Flag, an official publication of the party's Central Committee, attacked Soviet revisionism, and Pravda, an official publication of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attacked the Chinese for their withholding support from the policy of peaceful coexistence. Editorial combat continued between the state-sponsored presses of China and the Soviet Union.

China held that a divided international Communist movement was better than a revisionist one. In response, the Soviet Union excluded China from its communiques to the Communist parties of other nations.

One month after Khrushchev compared Mao with Hitler, Khrushchev fell from power (14 October 1964). Within three weeks' time, Chou En-lai went to Moscow by Soviet invitation for talks with the new Kremlin leader. But Brezhnev was unable to accommodate Peking's more doctrinaire position and nothing was resolved between the two Communist powers.

Both nations were able to cooperate in their efforts to support North Vietnam. The Chinese permitted

Soviet war materials for Hanoi to pass through China. In 1965, China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, warned the United States of China's intention to enter the war if the U.S. invaded North Vietnam.

Chinese scientific achievements had international-political importance. On 16 October 1964 and again on 14 May 1965 China detonated atomic devices and thereby joined the nuclear club. This scientific accomplishment had obvious military significance, but it also provided Peking with prestige in the world community.

Inputs to the Educational System

The various inputs to the educational system affected the instructional process of the schools. There were direct inputs affecting the internal conduct of an institution, such as party decrees on education, and there were indirect inputs that permeated the educational system in a less-clearly prescribed manner, such as the political atmosphere generated by the social conditions and the major political issues being debated at the time. Both the direct and the indirect inputs had an impact on the functioning of the educational system.

During the Period of Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle the inputs were less easily discernable than during other periods. First, there were fewer official proclamations about the exact party line regarding education during these years (1961-1965). Second, the aims of

education and the official philosophy of education during the time when the government was trying to bring the country out of its economic difficulties and during the struggle over the means and ends of communism in China had to be extrapolated from the general political situation. And third, after 1960 the Central Government of the People's Republic of China no longer released comprehensive statistical information on the allocation of financial resources across budget categories. The clearly-definable input factors were fewer and less precise than at previous times.

Aims of Education

Though there were no high-level government proclamations clearly delineating a new set of educational aims for the early 1960s, they can be extrapolated from the general debate about, and direction of, education during that time. After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, when government policy aimed to "consolidate and readjust" because of adverse economic and social conditions, the aims of formal education were modified to conform with the political perspective of the party faction that had temporarily gained control.

Ch'en Yi, the long-time Foreign Minister and a high party officer, said in 1961 that the student's first duty was to study in order to become professionally qualified and "as long as students . . . [studied a] profession and [contributed] to the construction of socialism,

there [was] no objection to their taking little part in political activities."[5] This statement reflected a shift in basic educational policy within the circles of power from quantity to quality and from political indoctrination to practical academics.

Students were to demonstrate their "redness" by acquiring "expertness"; political consciousness was replaced by technical competence in the curricula; and "sophistication in policies . . . [was] a matter of secondary importance."[6] Educationists stressed academic excellence and encouraged students to pursue scholarly interests. Quality education overshadowed education for egalitarianism, for politics, and for productive labor. Although labor and politics were still part of the curricula, they were of less importance than previously.

This tactical shift in educational policy of rewarding scholarship was counter to Mao's beliefs that "manual work moulds the mind," that "man is educated in struggle," and that man learns from reality, not books.[7] Rapid expansion of enrollments and a revolutionary education of the Great Leap Forward gave way to a more orderly, gradual progress through teaching and learning that focused on quality scholarship.

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[5]As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 617, 24 June 1966, p. 3.

[6]Chang-tu Hu, "Recent Trends in Chinese Education," in International Review of Education 10, no. 1 (1964), p. 17.

[7]As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 554, 5 March 1965, p. 1.

In December 1962 the Ministry of Education instructed the provincial governments to provide for "little treasure pagoda" schools. These were special institutions reserved for the better students, staffed by the best teachers, and received the best educational equipment. These schools were established for the children of high-echelon government officials and PLA officers.[8]

General secondary schools and universities again focused on theory more than immediately applicable skills, on preparing students for advanced education rather than on developing manpower to meet short-term needs, and on academic performance over political enthusiasm. Enrollment selection for higher-level schools became more competitive than they had been during the Great Leap Forward.

The major aim of education in 1961 and 1962 was to educate quality students through rational, academic programs that were based on a realistic appraisal of China's limitations, potentials, and needs, as seen by those who were later accused of revisionism and capitalism.

The Period of Retrenchment gave way to the Two-Line Party Struggle in the September 1962 meeting of the Central Committee. The class struggle was revived as the party line, but did not affect the schools until the following spring. Ideological training re-emerged as an important

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[8]Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 277-278.

part of the curricula; formal education was directed to devote more attention to class consciousness and political education. With more effort directed to developing "redness" among students, educational quality again suffered.

In August 1964 the Central Committee issued the "Two Educational Systems and Two Systems of Labor" directive, which established two educational tracks and two kinds of labor for different students. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lu Ting-yi supported this measure in the hope of accommodating their educational philosophy with that of the Maoists. Liu and Lu had enough political support to force through a policy that assured the better students of attending regular full-time schools providing quality instruction with few, if any, productive-labor or political-activity demands. The directive formally resurrected the half-study, half-work schools that had disappeared from the educational scene in 1959.[9] The work-study schools were for the children of workers and peasants who had little hope of becoming serious students or of being admitted to higher levels of education.

Liu Shao-ch'i argued that the dual-track system was not contrary to Maoist educational philosophy, but Mao did not support the scheme. Mao held that work-study students

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[9]William F. Dorrill, "Power, Policy, and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," in Thomas W. Robinson, ed., The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 59.

had a more acute labor- and class-consciousness than full-time students, and therefore only a work-study education for all students could guarantee a revolutionary political outlook.

The aims of education from 1963 to 1965 centered around the Two-Line Party Struggle. Liu Shao-ch'i advocated strong academic programs to educate quality graduates with sophisticated expertise to solve China's industrial and agricultural problems. Mao Tse-tung held that the most important quality formal education could nurture in students was a proper political perspective. During the Two-Line Party Struggle, "redness and expertness" were at the center of the issue. The aims of education during these years (1963-1965) reflected these two philosophical positions and the confusion that surrounded the struggle.

External Demands

The social and economic conditions in China continued to deteriorate in the early 1960s, forcing the Central Committee to proclaim a general retreat. The frenzied expansion that characterized the Great Leap Forward gave way to a more rational policy of consolidation and retrenchment. Out of necessity the government and the party turned much of their attention to problems that centered on agricultural production and adequate food supplies.

Although the party was still in control of the educational system, the attention of officials was directed to matters more important to ensuring China's survival. The general policy of retrenchment had an impact on the role of the school during 1961-1962. "Party leaders [had] found that centralized economic planning and concentration on political molding of students [could] not by themselves raise the standard of education and provide China with the necessary trained manpower for national development."[10] Requirements to adhere strictly to the educational dictates of the party were relaxed.

This situation permitted the educationists to exert more of their influence on the instructional process. They naturally took steps to improve the quality of education. For example, the older intellectuals (many had been trained in the West during the Kuomintang era) were brought back to teach, and teachers were given more time to prepare their lessons and required to participate less in political activities and productive labor. Less rigid party control resulted in increased academic proficiency.

By 1963 the general economic condition in China had improved and the party reinstituted tighter control of the educational system. Within the realm of politics there erupted a debate between two lines or party factions, which once again changed the direction of formal education in

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[10] Chang-tu Hu as quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 8 April 1963.

China. One group of Chinese leaders, lead by Mao Tse-tung, felt that since the students of that period had grown up after the takeover, they had little real understanding of the class struggle or first-hand experience of oppression and exploitation. Therefore, only a revolutionary education with a strong work-study curricula and political education for all students could provide the graduates with a Communist morality.

The other faction in the two-line struggle, led by Liu Shao-ch'i, was labeled "revisionist" by the Maoists. The revisionists argued that quality education took precedent over quantity and that the acquisition of substantive knowledge was more important to the future of China than students' participation in political or labor activities. Many educationists supported the Chairman of the Republic, Liu Shao-ch'i, because his educational philosophy more closely reflected their own.

These two contrasting positions of educational philosophy reflected a more fundamental disagreement between Mao and Liu and their respective supporters regarding the "correct" Communist path for China. Because Liu Shao-ch'i was Chairman of the Republic, he had the political strength to insist on his position in the face of Mao's opposition. Mao had to struggle to maintain his own power and dominance within the party.

The educational system reflected ramifications of the struggle within the party. Productive labor and

political indoctrination were again at the center of the work-study curricula by 1964. The revisionists challenged Mao's educational philosophy by favoring a reduction of political education, military exercises, and student participation in productive labor for the regular, full-time curriculum. The curricular activities to which they objected were the very core of Maoist education.[11]

The Two-Line Party Struggle set the stage for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During these years (1961-1965) the two opposing party factions built their political support around antagonistic interpretations of the means to be used to achieve communism in China. The revisionists had acquired so much support that they seriously threatened Mao's leadership and control. The Cultural Revolution resolved that issue, at least temporarily.

Process Within the Educational System

The educational process that took place during the Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle reflected the general policies of the government and the party as they evolved after the Great Leap Forward and amidst the political ferment that led to the Cultural Revolution.

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[11] Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," p. 272.

Trends

The general direction of education during this period was first a retreat from, then a gradual re-emergence of, Mao's educational policy. After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese educationists moved to correct some of the excesses by instituting serious academic programs. Many low-quality schools were dissolved, others were merged with better institutions. The number of schools and of students declined (the 1960-1961 enrollment statistics were one million less than the 1959-1960 figures[12]), the work-study curricula were greatly reduced (but not entirely eliminated) in the regular schools, classroom discipline was restored and enforced, respect for teachers was encouraged--all as part of the Central Committee's national police of retrenchment, consolidation, and readjustment.

Talented students received special attention, the number of specialized subjects taught increased, attention was given to improving teacher quality, the time both teachers and students spent at productive labor was reduced, teachers gained a greater voice in local educational matters, many factory-school and farm-school linkages were discontinued, and the official line advocated student and teacher dedication to quality academics.

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[12]Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1969," (Occasional Paper 7: American Historical Association-History Education Project, 1972), p. 27. (Eric: Ed/063/212)

The "Red and Expert" dualism reversed itself from the Three Red Flags period; in fact, the Ministry of Education between July 1961 and August 1962 attempted to eliminate labor altogether from the curricula.[13] And many of the 1958 work-study schools were dissolved by the more conservative administration. Many of the min-pan schools did not meet quality education standards and were closed.[14] Many of the rules were relaxed in 1961-1962, allowing students to read a range of older novels not permitted in the curricula earlier. Ideological education and political activities were greatly restricted, while student and teacher participation was not enforced.

The "golden age of reason in education" (1961-1962) came to an end with a re-emergence of Maoist education (1963-1965). The Communist party resurrected productive labor and a strong political indoctrination program. Part-work, part-study schools reappeared in 1964, integrating theory and practice, teaching and production. Teachers and students were subjected to and took part in criticism of their political beliefs; they were pressured to "surrender their hearts" to the revolution and to the party.

China experienced a struggle between two party factions. In support of their position, the revisionists

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[13] Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," p. 281.

[14] Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., Inc., 1973), p. xxxvii.

advocated an education based on hard work, quality instruction, and talented students at higher educational levels. The revolutionists attacked this posture because such tactics developed administrative-technical elites, which was contrary to Mao's more puritanical interpretation of communism. The entire educational system was transferred to a half-work, half-study curricula in December 1965, ending the two-track school system.[15]

There was little chance of conciliation between Mao and Liu, for their basic positions negated each other's solution to China's problems. In fact, they perceived different problems. For three years the two party factions struggled, ending in effect with Mao declaring war on the revisionists in 1966.

Agriculture Middle Schools

The publicity that accompanied the establishment of the agriculture middle schools during the Great Leap Forward had disappeared after 1960. The third anniversary of these institutions in March 1961 was not even announced in the Chinese media. As a result of the food crisis, the strains in the agricultural sector, and the growing influence of the Liuists, the agricultural middle schools were curtailed and modified.

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[15] People's Daily, 6 and 11 December 1965, as cited in Donald Munro, "Dissent in Communist China," Current Scene 4, no. 11 (1 June 1966): 5.

The agriculture middle schools were intended to combine formal study with practical training in agricultural production so as to train needed junior technicians in agriculture. The curriculum varied across climatic and geographic regions, but included four basic subject areas. Political study included the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the class struggle, and political literature. Language study included calligraphy, focusing on the most commonly used characters the students would encounter in their future work in agriculture. Mathematics courses included the use of the abacus, accounting, and measuring. And agricultural knowledge included crop rotation, poultry, water conservancy, stock-breeding, food crops, or whatever topics were most relevant to the agricultural region in which the school was located. The on-the-spot instructional methodology and the use of experimental plots were combined with work experience on farms.[16]

These schools extended post-elementary education to many rural primary school graduates. The agriculture middle school, which was really just a junior middle school, not only absorbed many rural youth, but they were self-supporting institutions. Half the students' time was spent working, which was credited to the schools' accounts.

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[16]Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," in Communist China 1963, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 12; and Selections from China Mainland Magazines, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 475, 21 June 1965, p. 8.

After 1960 many agricultural middle schools instituted a 5-7 schedule: five months of formal instruction during the slow agricultural season and seven months of continuous labor during the busier months.[17] By the end of this period, the agriculture middle school schedules demonstrated a practical flexibility. "The time for study and the time for labor [were] arranged flexibly according to whether it [was] the busy farming season or the slack farming season. On the principle of spending more time on study during the slack season and less time during the high season and closing the school for vacation during the very busy season, . . . the year [was divided] into several periods for study according to the farming season."[18]

Although beset with problems--a depressed agricultural sector in 1959, 1960, and 1961 (accompanied by a shift away from the work-study concept among educationists)--the agricultural middle school did set the stage for the return of the half-work, half-study schools in 1964-1965.

Primary and Secondary Education

The Chinese claimed near universal primary education in urban areas during this period; rural school enrollment, however, had to have been somewhat less than universal.

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[17] I Wo-sheng, "Education," in Communist China 1961, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962), 2: 203-205.

[18] Selections from China Mainland Magazines, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 475, 21 June 1965, p. 7.

Cities, towns, and large villages had the resources to provide an elementary education to the students concentrated in these areas. Many rural schools, however, were closed early in the 1960s because of their low academic standards, because many rural areas were hard pressed economically, and because Central Government leadership shifted from quantity to quality education. At the elementary as well as the secondary level, the implementation of quality education included boarding schools and full-day sessions.

The secondary school was an important but weak link in the educational system, for the middle schools still could not accept all the primary-level graduates who wanted to continue their education (only one-tenth of the primary school students went on to secondary school[19]), nor could higher education find enough middle-school graduates academically qualified to study at the college and university level.

During the early 1960s the Ministry of Education took steps to improve the quality of academic instruction. For instance, attention was given to updating the science and mathematics curricula. Much of the efforts to improve the quality of education were offset by pressures from Maoist factions to reinstate the work-study curricula. Many full-day schools were changed into half-work,

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[19]C. H. G. Oldham, "Science and Education in China," in Ruth Adams, ed., Contemporary China (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 285.

half-study schools, beginning in 1963 and continuing through 1964 and 1965.

Full-day schools[20] prepared graduates to continue their schooling at the next higher level, while half-work, half-study schools[21] prepared students to take up semi-skilled urban industrial or rural agricultural jobs immediately after graduation. The work-study schools were especially important in the rural areas, for this was where the vast majority of people lived and where the largest proportion of students attended school. The work-study schools in the countryside related rural life to agricultural production needs and tried to convince rural students to remain in the countryside and engage in agriculture rather than going on to school in the cities.

The half-farming, half-study schools and the min-pan village schools not only instituted an educational scheme that reflected one political philosophy in the party struggle (1963-1965), but it was also a practical solution to the production and financial problems attendant with the Maoist objective of expanding education. More students could attend school and still contribute to

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[20]For an extensive discussion of full-day schools from 1949 through this period, see R. F. Price, Education in Communist China (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), chapter 4.

[21]See Robert D. Barendsen, Half-Work, Half-Study Schools in Communist China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1964).

productive labor, while the Central Government did not have to finance the education of the larger number of students.

Enrollment figures for this period were very sketchy. A Canadian visitor to China reported the statistics for the middle of this period at 90 million students in the six grades of elementary school, 9 million in the six grades of academic middle school, and 3 million in the vocational-technical-agricultural middle school.[22]

Teachers

The Communist party considered the teachers a significant force in shaping the minds of China's students and through them the nation's future. During periods of intense ideological education, the political reliability of teachers was more important than their intellectual capacity; during times of relaxed ideological fervor, teaching ability took precedent over political perspective.

The need for teachers had always out-paced China's capacity to train minimally-qualified instructional personnel for all levels of education. The gap was at times filled with academically unqualified personnel, but who had the correct political outlook.

The problems of teachers in China were both academic and political. Many teachers were inadequately trained for their jobs and almost all had to work with poor-quality instructional materials and facilities. The

[22] As cited in New York Times, 30 June 1963, p. 7E.

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curricula were often dominated by political indoctrination and productive labor, requiring their participation. Teachers were periodically harassed by activist students and party cadre for their political views and classroom presentations. The entire ideological function of the schools was supervised by the party; the teachers had to be continually conscious of their political conduct. Teachers were often criticized and attacked during periods of political ferment for their statements made during times of less tension.

Having to function within changeable political climates, teachers were not always able to serve the best academic interests of their students and of the nation.[23]

Higher Education

After 1960 there was an abrupt shift in higher educational policy that reflected a turning away from the methods and aims of the Great Leap Forward. The Red and Expert Universities that were created in 1958-1960 disappeared in this period; academic programs came to emphasize quality education for scientific and technical advancement; students spent more time on academics and less on productive labor activities. The older and more experienced professors took over from the younger scholars the teaching

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[23]For more information on teachers in China, see R. F. Price, Education in Communist China (London: Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1970), chapter 6; and Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), section 3.

and research in the universities; in addition, the time spent by older professors in meetings and at administrative chores was greatly reduced.

With increased time for study, intensive academic programs offered a wider variety of courses. Greater freedom in the classroom permitted discussion of non-Communist works. Among the foreign languages offered in higher education, English was emphasized. In fact, a knowledge of Russian or English was required for university entrance--no exceptions.[24]

While college and university enrollments dropped (see Table 6-1), the required years of study increased to 5-6 years.[25] With increased attention to quality academics, Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters felt that rationality had returned to higher education in light of the challenges facing China.

As Mao began to muster his political forces and challenge Liu's position, certain aspects of higher education shifted. Professors were no longer permitted to select their best students for post-graduate work, while privileges and preferences increasingly went to students who were politically progressive, ideologically reliable, and either party or league members. The old intellectuals

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[24] China News Analysis, no. 476, 12 July 1963, p. 1.

[25] Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Education in Communist China: Aims, Trends, and Problems," in Ruth Adams, ed., Contemporary China (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), p. 267.

in academia privately complained of the increased emphasis on ideological correctness over technical competency.[26]

During 1964-1965 the institutions of higher education were converted to half-work, half-study curricula. The productive labor portion of higher education focused on farming and rural development in the hope of forming student attitudes favorable to living and working in the countryside.

In 1965 higher educational institutions established branches in rural areas and offered short-courses to students who would not otherwise have had an opportunity for such an experience and to students who needed additional professional training. These extension-education programs integrated classroom theory with practical experiences in real-life conditions. Such programs were continued after the Cultural Revolution as part of life-long education, which could have a significant impact on rural medical, educational, and agricultural development.

In 1965 political instructors were placed in higher educational institutions to provide political leadership to the school committee, to oversee political education, and to conduct politico-ideological activities among the students. Chinese leaders felt the political instructors were necessary because of the students' failure to acquire the proper political consciousness. Academic studies had

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[26]Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 1964.

been more important than political activities; students had not been dedicated to the class struggle. Academicians had valued their freedom to analyze thoughts independently, had resisted pressure to think collectively, and had balked at having to function within the prescribed parameters of accepted Communist doctrine. The political instructors were to remedy these and other shortcomings.[27]

The Chinese were reticent to reveal enrollment statistics for this period, but some figures were available as estimates by Western observers of higher education in China. (See Table 6-1.)

Political ferment intensified in higher education, in education generally, and in society as a whole until the eruption of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 that called for a complete purging and reconstruction of the party, of politics, and of education.

Outputs of the Educational System

During the Retrenchment and the Two-Line Party Struggle the outputs of the educational system were influenced by the political and economic forces of the period. The economic crisis was the major influence on education during 1961-1962; political considerations came to be the main educational concern during 1963-1965. Throughout the

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[27]Fang Cheng, "Communist China's Education in 1965," in Communist China 1965, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1967), 2: 142-144.

Table 6-1. Higher Education Enrollment, 1961-1965.

Year	Number of Students
1961	955,000
1962	820,000
1963	---
1964	---
1965	700,000

Sources: 1961--Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Domestic Scene, 1949-1967 (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), p. 544; 1962--Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 285; and 1965--James Stuart Duncan, "Education in Communist China," NEA Journal 55 (February 1966), p. 37.

first two years there was a shift toward improving the quality of instruction in an attempt to use more efficiently the educational resources of China. In the last three years, politics encroached on academic quality.

The Qualities of Educational Output

The various qualities the educational process imbued students with reflected the economic needs, political activities, and international events of this period. In addition to carrying over many of the educational qualities from previous periods, the changed tempo of life in China called forth new attitudes and values.

Education for Military Training. All schools were required to hold regular classes in military training. Elementary martial skills became part of the primary school curriculum, with middle schools and higher educational institutions undertaking more advanced military training.

As part of the schools' general physical fitness program, swimming, mountain climbing, and running, along with other sports of military value, required student participation. Students and teachers were taught communications (hand-signal, light-signal, radio transmitting and receiving, and radio direction finding), marksmanship (gun components, maintenance and cleaning, and firing live ammunition), grenade throwing, bayonet-fencing, sniping, night marching, combat shooting, and other tactics of a people's war.

Middle school and college students were sent to junior Eighth Route Army camps during their summer vacations. In addition to regular drill and specialized technical skills, students who went to naval units were given instruction in electrical engineering, gunnery, and radar operations; students who went to army units were given instruction in artillery and infantry; and students who went to air defense units received instruction in anti-chemical warfare and ground crew operations.

Education for military training began in 1964 and was expanded in 1965. In addition to creating a "resist-America, aid-Vietnam" sentiment, students were to learn

politics from and acquire a "revolutionary tradition" from the P.L.A. The schools and the military devoted more time to equipping the nation's students with martial attitudes, knowledge, techniques and training.[28]

Education for Excellence. The educational policies of the Great Leap Forward were reversed in the early 1960s. Educational concerns had shifted from quantity to quality. Students were to get back to serious study and serve the revolution by being expert in a chosen discipline. In the fall of 1962, "teaching according to calibre" had emerged, wherein special attention was given to better students and special help given to slower students. Those with better academic records and strong intellectual interests were required to do more work than other students.[29]

Students were educated according to academic calibre and not personal political status. Since different students had different cognitive styles and learning abilities, educationists moved in the directions of developing everyone's potentials.

Education for the development of excellence in all students was not "education for the talented" by eliminating

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[28]Fang Cheng, "Education," in Communist China 1964, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 34-36; and Fang Cheng, "Communist China's Education in 1965," 2: 147-150.

[29]I Wo-sheng, "Education in Communist China During 1962 and a Comparison with Education in the Soviet Union," in Communist China 1962, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute Limited, 1963), 1: 183-185.

the majority and developing only the few, as was the case before 1949. In 1962 the majority of students were receiving a basic education, while those of special ability were receiving special attention. After 1962-1963, higher educational institutions did not have to accept candidates of lower standards solely because they were recommended by party or government units; in fact, all students who applied to university or college were screened by entrance examinations, with no exceptions.[30]

University admission policy was highly selective by 1965. Each candidate had to meet three criteria: good health, good ideology, and good scholarship. Although academic programs were compromised by work-study and by political activities, students in higher education were better qualified and did higher quality work than during 1958-1960.

Individualized academic programs were interpreted as anti-Maoist because of their potential for elitism, yet collective thinking stifled the better students. The internal forces within formal education and especially higher education were at cross purposes because academic programs could not be both collective (for political reasons) and individualized (for academic reasons). Educators had to compromise one for the other, or both.

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[30] China News Analysis, no. 471, 7 June 1963, p. 6.

Education for World Communication. As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Chinese rejected the Soviet Union as a model for further emulation. Russian-oriented subjects and educational materials were eliminated from the curricula. Russian language was no longer the first foreign language studied in school. Turning away from Russia was a political reaction; turning toward a limited awareness of other nations was an expedient decision.

Because China could no longer look to the Soviet Union for assistance, Peking had to seek elsewhere for the solutions to development problems--namely to the industrialized nations. To make use of scientific and technical information generated by the world's industrial powers, China developed the language ability of students in order to translate works from other languages to Chinese.

In 1961 English became the first foreign language in the Chinese primary, secondary, and tertiary institutions. In addition, German, Spanish, French, and Japanese were added to the curricula of selected institutions.[31] In May 1961 the People's Daily expressed the importance of language study: Language "is the tool with which men exchange ideas. Students should not only study their own national language well, they should also learn foreign languages well too."[32]

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[31] I Wo-sheng, "Education," in Communist China 1961, 2: 200-201; and Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," in Communist China 1963, 2: 11.

[32] As cited in I Wo-sheng, "Education," in Communist China 1961, p. 193.

In spite of English having originated in the capitalist nations, the Chinese leaders declared that language had no class character. Good Communists were then safe from possible charges of studying bourgeois subject-matter. It was expedient for the Chinese to develop a foreign language manpower resource to translate non-Chinese materials and thereby make available to China the scientific and technical progress of the world's experts.

In addition to gaining technical and scientific information from the industrialized nations, the Chinese could use their language abilities for political purposes, specifically to help oppressed people protect themselves from the imperialist powers and to communicate with the nations of the world as China improved its international stature. Languages are an important means of developing linkages with peoples the world around; the Chinese moved to exploit that linkage.

Education for Productive Labor. After 1960 student participation in productive labor projects was greatly reduced, though it remained part of the curricula. Some educationists, in their enthusiasm for quality education, neglected student labor in favor of more teaching-studying time. During the Retrenchment period, neither schools nor university departments went en masse to the rural areas to work for a term in agriculture. There was also less

time spent in political activities, which had so often disrupted students' formal schooling.[33]

This trend changed in the summer of 1963. Productive labor reappeared as a major force within the curricula and was described as the best possible class education. Student labor was a means to ideological reformation and political consciousness. In addition to sending students to the countryside to labor in farming at regular intervals, middle school graduates were required to work for one or two years before going on to higher education.

By 1965 teachers and students were averaging two months of productive labor a year. In addition to regular fixed times for working in communes, factories, and construction projects, there were "shock missions" of secondary and university students and faculty who went to the countryside during heavy work periods, namely planting and harvesting. Peasants preferred the neophite students not come to help, for they caused too much confusion during these busy times. While there, students participated in the Socialist Education Movement by helping with the writing of local histories of families and villages, and by learning from the peasants.[34]

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[33] China News Analysis, no. 476, 12 July 1963, p. 2.

[34] Fang Cheng, "Communist China's Education in 1965," 2: 144-147.

Education for Class Consciousness. Since many students had been born after the takeover, they had never experienced exploitation or oppression by the Kuomintang. Steps were taken to make students aware of the history of the class struggle. The five old veterans--workers, party members, cadre, soldiers, and poor peasants--were brought into the classroom to relate to students living conditions under the Kuomintang. The veterans were used because they had "all experienced two social systems and [were] the participants and witnesses of class struggle, and, therefore, to use their own personal experiences and what they have seen and heard to teach teenagers and children [was] to conduct [the] most penetrating and most lively class education" possible.[35]

While students participated in productive labor in rural areas, they took part in Socialist education by helping to write the histories of families, villages, communes, or factories. They learned and wrote about the evictions, usury, child-selling, infanticide, starvation, rapes, and killings during the Kuomintang era--this information being furnished by the old veterans. Writing histories and biographies sharpened class consciousness.[36]

Teachers "paid particular attention to conducting class education for teenagers and children in relation to

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[35] Selections from China Mainland Magazines, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 437, 5 October 1964, p. 37.

[36] David Crook, "Educating the Youth in China," Eastern Horizon 4, no. 7 (July 1965): 51-52.

the socialist education movement" by using the first-hand struggle experiences of the old revolutionaries and guerrilla fighters and by using films, exhibits and newspaper accounts.[37]

Education for class consciousness was intensified because of the students' attitudes that prevailed, as described, for example, by the party deputy secretary of Tsinghua University in 1963: students were indifferent about politics, were more interested in themselves than in the collectivity, were desirous of living and working in cities as opposed to villages or border areas, and were more interested in more schooling than in manual and political work. In pursuing their own happiness, they had developed bourgeois attitudes.[38] To remedy this trend, "class education . . . was widely carried out in all colleges and secondary and primary schools throughout the mainland" starting in 1963.[39] Since then, class consciousness has been a central feature of Chinese education.

Quantities of Educational Output

After 1960 annual comprehensive education statistics were not released by the Central Government. Information on

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[37] Selections from China Mainland Magazines, no. 437, p. 38.

[38] China News Analysis, no. 476, 12 July, 1963, p. 3.

[39] Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," in Communist China 1963, 2: 1.

the number of graduates from all levels of Chinese educational institution is available. Consequently, there is little that can be said about the quantitative output for 1961-1965.

A Numerical Analysis. There is little or no data on primary or secondary school graduates. The information available on higher education graduates is not only sparse, but probably exaggerated and must be so considered. Although the data that are available is sparse, the figures are still worth considering. (See Table 6-2.) Hopefully the Chinese government will release more comprehensive educational statistics for this period at a later time.

Content Analysis. At the university level, China was educating only 13 out of ever 10,000 population. China had developed its higher educational resources since 1949, but compared to the nations Peking was trying to surpass in industrial production, the relative output of China's higher educational institutions was unfavorable. Out of every 10,000 population, Canada educated 72, Japan 73, the Soviet Union 107, and the United States 186.[40]

The meaning of "university graduate" in China was not entirely clear. The Chinese certainly meant graduates from a regular university, but the term probably also included graduates from 2-3 year colleges, evening colleges, advanced correspondence courses, and other supplementary programs.

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[40] New York Times, 30 June 1963, p. 7.

Table 6-2. Higher Education Graduates, 1961-1965.

Year	Graduates	Engineers	Science	Agriculture	Medicine	Teachers	Other
1961	162,000	54,000	---	10,000	19,000	49,000	---
1962	170,000	59,000	11,000	20,000	17,000	56,000	7,000
1963	200,000	77,000	10,000	17,000	25,000	46,000	3,000
1964	200,000						
1965	170,000						

Sources: 1961 and 1962--China News Analysis, no. 476, 12 July 1963, p. 5; 1963--Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," Communist China 1963, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 7; 1964--Fang Cheng, "Education," Communist China 1964, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1965), 2: 40; 1965--People's Daily (11 August 1965) as cited in Chiu-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 194.

The percentage of higher education graduates with proletarian backgrounds continued to increase. During the First Five-Year Plan the graduates with a worker-peasant background represented but 20 per cent of the total number of higher education graduates. By the Retrenchment-Struggle period, this figure had risen to between 50 to 55 per cent. The number and percentage of graduates who were party or league members had also risen--to 62 per cent by 1963.[41]

Conclusion

As has been indicated previously, two major features characterize this period: retrenchment and struggle. Retrenchment was an economic necessity, for China was facing disaster in the agricultural sector. And since the Chinese economy was in the main agrarian, with the vast majority of the population living in rural areas, the droughts and floods of 1959, 1960, and 1961 had serious national repercussions.

The methods employed during Retrenchment to see China through these bad times were political suicide from Mao's point of view. Ideological commitment would not solve the grave challenges Peking had to deal with if China were to survive. Once the crisis was over and the economy gained strength, the revolutionaries again applied pressure to reinstate the doctrine--"politics in command."

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[41] Lu Hsu-yin, "Education," in Communist China 1963, 2: 7.

A struggle ensued between the rightists and the leftists, or between the revisionists and the revolutionaries. The issue centered on the method to be used to achieve communism in China. One faction, led by Liu Shao-ch'i, advocated expertness, learning, serious academics, urban development--based at least in part on the Soviet model. The opposing faction, led by Mao Tse-tung, advocated redness, politics, practical training of immediate use, rural development--creating the Chinese model. The struggle that occurred evolved into the Cultural Revolution.

"The reform of the old educational system . . . is an extremely important task of the current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."

(People's Daily, 25 October 1967.)

CHAPTER 7

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Domestic politics of the late 1960s and foreign affairs of the early 1970s placed Peking at the center of world attention to a degree unprecedented since the take-over. The Cultural Revolution modified the boundaries of social institutions to promote the development of communism in China. International relations between Communist China's old friend, the Soviet Union, and old enemy, the United States, underwent unexpected changes. The dynamics of the Cultural Revolution produced chaos among the social institutions of the Chinese superordinate system; the relationships between the centers of power and authority of the Soviet, the American, and the Chinese social systems shifted the balance of power in Asia. Before 1970 the domestic scene underwent a revolution unlike any in history; after 1970 China's admission to the United Nations and Peking's relations with the Russians, the Japanese, and the

Americans indicated an awareness of the need for participation in the world order.

The Times: 1966-1973

Great progress and great change characterized these years. This was a period of contrasts. China, basically an agrarian society, not only further developed its nuclear capability but also launched a satellite. China, one of the centers of world communism, came to blows with the Soviet Union in 1969. China, known historically to have treasured age-old traditions, underwent a Cultural Revolution that supposedly dispelled any remnant of the past. China turned inward and made revolutionary changes, and turned outward to develop more moderate relations with other world powers.

Domestic Affairs

The Great Leap Forward focused primarily on altering economic forces and affected the political structure only indirectly; the Cultural Revolution focused primarily on altering political forces and affected the economic structure but slightly. Although both events disrupted the social order, the Great Leap Forward was much shorter, and was of a less profound and lasting impact than the Cultural Revolution.

Nearly all institutions within the Chinese superordinate system were affected by the Cultural Revolution.

The economy was slowed, the schools were closed, the party was purged, and the military gained a dominant position in Chinese politics. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the most socially disruptive and politically insecure period in the history of the Chinese People's Republic. In the aftermath of these events, the social system began to return to a quieter pace of continuing revolution. Mao had triumphed over his political enemies, the army was eased out of its locus of political power, and the party was rid of unworthy, anti-Maoist elements.

Economic Considerations. In the mid-1960s economic policy planners were facing several issues, among them population growth, agriculture versus industry, and increased military expenditures. Chinese leaders had become aware of the impact of demographic factors on the rate of overall development, for "unless population growth [were] brought under control, any improvement in the standard of living [would] be retarded in spite of the growth of production."[1] Various social measures were implemented to curb birth rates, including discouraging romantic entanglements among students and forbidding marriage before graduation.

Agriculture, the foundation of the Chinese economy, had to share the economic spotlight with industry, again a

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[1]Yuan-li Wu, "The Third Five-Year Plan: An Economic Dilemma," Current History 51, no. 301 (September 1966): 160.

major contender for government-allocated resources. Because of a Soviet threat to the north and the possible escalation of the Vietnam conflict to the south, the military demanded larger resource allocations to keep its conventional forces modern and to develop a nuclear capability.

The Third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970) began in January 1966, but soon became lost in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards were admonished not to interfere with production. In December, 1966, however, the struggle reached the factories and communes because "anti-Maoist groups extended material benefits to workers . . . thus encouraged them to fight against the Cultural Revolution."[2] The Red Guards responded by invading the economic sector. The struggle that ensued between Red Guards and workers seriously disrupted industrial production, the transportation system, the distribution of goods, and rural commune activities. The disruption of normal economic activity characterized at least the first years of the Cultural Revolution.

The Japanese Foreign Office estimated in March 1971 that China's economy had achieved pre-Cultural Revolution levels by 1969 and that further gains were made in 1970.[3]

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[2]Chu-yuan Cheng, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Economy," Current History 53, no. 313 (September 1967): 154.

[3]Peter Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic of China from October 1, 1949 (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1972), p. XII.

Western analysts judged that the Chinese economy recovered from the disturbances and quickly moved on to new production heights by 1971. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) reflected a pragmatic policy of "orderly progress, consolidation, and balanced development"; and according to Red Flag it focused on "heavy industry as the ultimate development goal, [the] foundation [of which] would be laid through rapid development of agriculture and light industries."[4]

The decentralization of industrial production was a post-Cultural Revolution policy. The Chinese strategically deployed industrial complexes by dispersing factories, workshops, and personnel to rural areas throughout the country. The policy of strategic deployment had both military and economic significance. The geographical redistribution of industry was a protective measure against possible enemy attack. It was also to take full advantage of local resources and "to create a small but complete industrial system in every province in the process of economic development."[5] The political decision to disperse industrial production had the economic advantage of promoting development throughout the country by reversing the natural trends that tend to concentrate geographically both wealth and expertise in urban areas.

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[4]Kuan-I Chen, "The Outlook for China's Economy," Current History 63, no. 573 (September 1972): 105.

[5]Cheng, A Chronology of the People's Republic . . ., p. XII.

Political Considerations. Since the takeover two schools of thought had been struggling against one another within the Chinese Communist Party as to the proper method of national development. At issue was whether social institutions were to serve the interests of the proletariat or the elites at the expense of the masses.

Liu Shao-ch'i, Lu Ting-yi, and their supporters were accused by Mao Tse-tung of manipulating the bureaucracy and the means of production in the interest of an elite, and of entrenching class privilege in the Chinese social structure. The elitists were charged with concentrating the best resources--human and material--in urban centers to develop a capacity for directing and overseeing a modern industrial sector as a means to China's national development. Such a strategy fostered bureaucratic centralism, focused on capital-intensive projects, generated competition among individuals, developed elites, and put "technology in command." Emphasis on technical development, as opposed to social transformation, had an impact on the nation's schools.

An educational system to serve such a policy would require the best schools to provide many years of quality instruction in the disciplines related to urban, industrial production. The few students in such a system would be separated from the masses, from physical work, and from the real world--at least, so charged the supporters of Mao Tse-tung. Such an educational structure would produce

elites who, in the past, had refused to comply with the dictates of a proletarian dictatorship and had challenged the very foundation of Mao's perpetual revolution. Urban schools would be unable to deal with rural problems; students from the countryside would be denied a quality education of equal calibre. Entrance requirements to quality schools favored students with a literate home environment and placed applicants with a worker-peasant background at a disadvantage. Such schools could only promote class privilege.[6]

Mao Tse-tung attacked Liu's philosophy and strategy because it aimed at developing a technical and administrative elite, which had no place in the Communist social structure. The class struggle and the production struggle were to be combined, while institutions that separated the two (and promoted selected class privileges) were attacked. Mao's political and economic development strategy centered on local differences, diversity, and experimentation. National development depended on solving rural problems with simple techniques that were immediately applicable, and on labor-intensive projects. To implement Mao's policy required a diverse school system to meet the varied rural conditions across China.

To resolve the disagreement among the national leaders over the nature of the party's basic goals and

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[6]Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1973), p. xxxii.

strategies, Mao launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. He felt that the real struggle within China's institutions centered on the ideological perspective of the leaders and the people. The solutions to other issues--economic, military, etc.--would be determined by the outcome of the ideological revolution.

Fearing revisionism and an interuption of China's permanent revolution, Mao moved to ensure an "ideologically pure, revolutionary environment," emphasizing "indoctrination and spiritual revival."[7] Out of this re-education would be found solutions to China's problems.

The thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and his basic philosophy were central to the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution. "It was to prevent such a 'capitalist restoration' in China that the Maoists sought to change the outlook of society by establishing the absolute authority of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."[8]

The incident that sparked the Cultural Revolution centered on the criticism of Wu Han's theatrical production, Hai Jui Dismissed from Office. This play about the injustice done a loyal public official for his honest criticisms by the sovereign during a past dynasty drew a strong parallel to Mao's dismissing Marshall P'eng Te-huai,

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[7]William F. Dorrill, "Power, Policy, and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," in Thomas W. Robinson, ed., The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 79.

[8]Ibid.

Minister of Defense. (Mao felt that P'eng was antagonistic to the Maoist philosophy, and therefore should not occupy such an important post.)

An article that appeared in a Shanghai newspaper on 10 November 1965 criticized Wu Han and the play. This seemingly unimportant criticism at the time, in fact, sparked the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The ideological struggle became entwined with the power struggle within the party. There developed an extensive purge, not only of the party to the highest echelons, but also of many institutions central to Chinese society. Along with party and government officials, university presidents, mayors, artists, teachers, journalists and other intellectuals were removed from their posts. To undermine the power of the revisionist-capitalist authorities, Mao was willing to disrupt the functioning of China's social institutions, including formal education.

The most revolutionary elements of the movement were the Red Guards--the vanguard of the Cultural Revolution. Their chief contribution was in attacking the established order based on revisionist-capitalistic tenets and in forcing a re-examination of China's social institutions. In essence, the Red Guards served a destructive function, necessary for revolutionary transformation. (Mao held that there was "no construction without destruction.") In August and September of 1966 the Red Guards became increasingly disruptive and violent. In December they denounced

anti-Maoist elements within the party, singling out Liu Shao-ch'i as the "Khrushchev of China." (Liu was officially stripped of his government post and party membership in October 1968.) Red Guard violence and terrorism got out of hand in 1968; the army was called upon to restore order by moving on the schools and destroying the Red Guards' power base. In the process the army, under the direction of Lin Piao, established itself as a political force close to central decision-making.

Since the government and the party had been discredited, government in the provinces, municipalities, and institutions rested in the authority of the revolutionary committees--a three-way alliance of power between the PLA, trusted party cadre, and the people. These committees replaced bourgeois thinking with diversity, experimentation, and the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

Mao had strengthened his own brand of communism, at least temporarily. As part of the total revolution, class struggle and ideological reform were central to shifting the human patterns of thought and behavior. The transition to communism would be hastened by liquidating bourgeois, reactionary, and revisionist elements from the society. The revolution consisted of two stages: destruction and construction. Attention turned toward restructuring the party and writing two new party constitutions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Mao's aim was twofold in perpetuating the Cultural Revolution: "to change the structure of

power in society, and to carry out an irreversible transformation in the pattern of thought and behaviour of the Chinese people."[9]

During the Cultural Revolution[10] many high-ranking party leaders were purged, while Lin Piao, Minister of Defense and long-time party member, emerged as Mao's chosen successor--to be the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Lin was reported killed, however, in a plane crash as he was fleeing to the Soviet Union after being involved in an assassination plot against Mao Tse-tung. On 26 December 1973 Mao was 80 years old and yet no successor to the old guard had been clearly designated. The question of succession bears directly on the direction China will take in the post-Mao era.

Foreign Affairs

Although the Chinese and the Soviets were thrown together by their mutual interests in Vietnam, Moscow accused Peking in 1966 of interfering with the overland flow of war material from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam.

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[9]Stuart R. Schram, "Introduction: The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 85.

[10]For additional and more detailed information on the Cultural Revolution, see Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Stanley Karnow, Mao and China, From Revolution to Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972); and Richard Baum and Louise B. Bennett, eds. China in Ferment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971).

The Chinese continued to blast the Russians as traitors to the Communist world revolution and to be in the imperialist camp of the West. Moscow accused Mao of promoting his own personality cult as the basis of dictatorship in China. Sino-Soviet tensions, initially generated over different interpretations regarding the speed and manner of promoting world revolution, reached the point of military skirmishes and intimidation. Armed border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops first occurred in March, 1969. In August, Peking warned the people to prepare for conflict because the Soviet Union was mobilizing for war against China. The Soviets countered with the warning that atomic weapons would be used if war did break out.

Kosygin changed the direction of events by stopping in Peking after attending Ho Chi'Minh's funeral in Hanoi. The border clashes ceased and Sino-Soviet negotiations started in October 1969. The exchange of ambassadors in 1970 defused the imminently explosive confrontation.

Whereas the Sino-Soviet conflict was a curious turn of events between two ideological giants of the Communist camp, the Sino-American rapprochement was a surprising move toward reconciliation between two ideological enemies of different camps. The long-time archenemy of the Chinese Communists, the United States, established closer ties with Peking. Washington softened its position toward Peking by permitting increased trade with, and by allowing American citizens to travel on, the Chinese mainland. The single,

most important event of the new policy turnabout was the American presidential visit to China in February 1972.

Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka also improved Tokyo-Peking relations by visiting the Chinese capital in September 1972. Both the U.S. and Japan had been considered by the Communists to be China's foremost enemies. Did the events of the early 1970s indicate that Peking's perceptions of the world had changed?

China was growing in strength, was an increasingly important regional power, and was an economic, if not a political, model toward which the underdeveloped world might look. Peking's admission to the United Nations was the crowning glory of China's international achievements. With such an advantageous international posture, only the future will reveal how China will respond to and use this potential to improve Peking's standing among nations. A policy of "revolutionary pragmatism" may ensure a place for Peking in the dynamic international order and will permit China to remain true to Mao's continuing revolution.

Inputs to the Educational System

Although the Cultural Revolution was a confusing event in China's national experience, the social and educational aims of the party were more clearly delineated in the aftermath. Some of the inputs to the formal educational system were unknown, such as Central Government budget allocations and local educational expenditures, and some

inputs were clearly stated, such as the aims of education and the manner in which the schools were to serve the political state. The political debate about education also had an impact on how the schools were to function.[11] The struggle reached such an intensity that the schools were closed, some of them for four and five years; once reopened, the schools struggled to fulfill the party's educational objectives.

Aims of Education

The educational system was a prime target of the Cultural Revolution, and well it should have been because schools produced the successors to the revolution in China. Next to the party, the schools underwent more sweeping reforms than did other social institutions. Mao felt that "there must be a revolution in education and [that] proletarian politics must lead"[12] in order to eliminate vestiges of bourgeois, revisionist, and feudal influence in the schools. The educational revolution was to eliminate the evils of the past and the threats of the present. (The May 7 Directive and the Sixteen-Point Directive, along with

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[11]For a Communist analysis of the political debate about education from the takeover through the early years of the Cultural Revolution, see "Chronology of the Two-Road Struggle on the Educational Front in the Past Eighteen Years," in Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1973), pp. 5-60; or in Chinese Education 1, no. 1 (Spring 1968): 3-58.

[12]As quoted in China News Analysis, no. 723, 20 August 1968, p. 2.

other documents, generated discussion in both the Chinese and western press about the aims and design of education.)

The Cultural Revolution aimed at smashing the bourgeois intellectual domination of the educational system. Chief opponent of Mao was Liu Shao-ch'i who was accused of urging students to study hard in order to become officials. After the Cultural Revolution the young were educated in the importance of the collective good and not trained to become a member of the elite to exploit the proletariat. Intellectual achievement was no longer an aim of education; social consciousness became the focal point of formal education.

Individualism was not the best ethic in a Communist society. Rather, a basic educational aim was to fight selfish interests, to develop collectivism, and to focus on the needs of the people. Education concentrated on developing among students the attitude of serving the people, not one's self.

Education after the Cultural Revolution was designed to overcome several differences that were perceived as barriers to Mao's national development strategy. Education was to abolish the inequality that sprang from the geographic discrimination between urban and rural areas, to eliminate the status difference between mental and manual labor, and to undermine the administrative advantage of academics (intellectuals) over the proletariat (workers and peasants). Education was the means to break down these barriers that

separated people; it was not the means of becoming a member of the elite.

Education was to equip students to participate in and contribute to the society and the economy. In carrying out this objective, Chinese schools related education to community needs. "Mao Tse-tung had argued that schooling should be integrated with work--both to educate students in the grass-roots realities of China's economy and to prevent them from feeling superior to workers and peasants."[13]

Knowledge imparted in school was judged by its social usefulness. One charge leveled at formal education during the Cultural Revolution was that it was irrelevant to the problems of the real world and that it was divorced from China's needs. In addition to teaching subject matter directly related to the world of work, all students had to combine a practical labor experience with their formal classroom instruction. Under the direction of revolutionary committees, school and practical work were integrated for all students.

The primacy of political education was reassured. Not only were there courses that focused on political activities and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, but the entire curricula had a political flavor with every subject reflecting the continuing revolution against vested interests. Education was political because the primary task of the schools was to develop the political reliability of the

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[13]Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1972.

young. Achievement was based more on ideological purity and political indoctrination than on intellectual agility and academic ability. Proletarian politics was the very heart of Communist education after the Cultural Revolution.

The ultimate aim of education in the Chinese People's Republic was and is to change society from a selfish and competitive environment to a selfless and cooperative human condition.

External Demands

Mao Tse-tung moved to regain control of the party in the face of the challenge to his leadership by the revisionists. Drastic measures were necessary because many of the party's Central Committee members supported Liu and his development strategy. Apart from purging the party, the Cultural Revolution focused on educational reform. The tempo of the Socialist revolution in education was set by the May 7 Directive--a letter sent by Mao Tse-tung to Lin Piao of 7 May 1966. In the letter Mao stated that "while [students'] main task is to study, they should also learn other things. They should study not only literature but also industry, agriculture, and military affairs; they should also criticize the bourgeoisie. The period of schooling must be shortened and education must be revolutionized. The atmosphere in which the bourgeois intellectuals control our schools must not be allowed to continue any longer."[14]

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[14] People's Daily (25 October 1967), as cited in Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. 65-66.

The Directive also urged that proletarian education include the class struggle as the main subject, and that teaching, productive labor and scientific research be combined.[15]

Also in May the "big character poster" campaign, which touched off the debate about the educational system, started at Peking University and quickly spread to other institutions. Mao followed with his own poster--"bombard the headquarters"--igniting the onslaught of criticism of top party leaders accused of suppressing the revolution. The Tsinghua University middle school poster--"to rebel is justified"--established the atmosphere in which the Red Guards conducted their part of the Cultural Revolution.

Schools were closed in June 1966 to facilitate revolutionizing the educational system. This State Council decision freed students to "make revolution." Red Guard units attacked anti-Maoist elements and pursued the party line (that is, the Cultural Revolution) with increased violence and exercised their Mao-sanctioned "right to rebel." In transforming China's political, social, and educational institutions, the Red Guards criticized, attacked, and terrorized party officials, government bureaucrats, intellectuals, and educationists.

On August 1966 the Sixteen-Point Decisions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was adopted subsequent to the Cultural Revolution being made the party

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[15] Peking Review, no. 20, 14 May 1971, p. 4.

line. This program, which provided guidelines to revolutionary activities, contained an educational statement:

> In the great proletarian cultural revolution a most important task is to transform the old educational system and the old principles and methods of teaching.
>
> In this great cultural revolution, the phenomenon of our schools being dominated by bourgeois intellectuals must be completely changed.
>
> In every kind of school we must apply thoroughly the policy advanced by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, of education serving proletarian politics and education being combined with productive labor, so as to enable those receiving an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and to become laborours with socialist consciousness and culture.
>
> The period of schooling should be shortened. Courses should be fewer and better. The teaching material should be thoroughly transformed, in some cases beginning with simplifying complicated material. While their main task is to study, students should also learn other things. That is to say, in addition to their studies they should also learn industrial work, farming and military affairs, and take part in the struggles of the cultural revolution as they occur to criticize the bourgeoisie.[16]

In December 1966 students were ordered by both the State Council and the Central Committee to return to school, but there was no response. Six months before, in June, senior middle schools and universities were officially suspended to permit the students to make revolution. Primary and junior middle schools also suspended operation and their students took part in the Red Guard movement. Six months was felt to have been enough time to complete the necessary reforms.

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[16] Peking Review, no. 33, 12 August 1966, p. 10.

Throughout 1967 the students were repeatedly asked to return to school, for the Red Guards had outlived their usefulness. Violence increased as the students roamed the country; the situation got out of hand. Mao attempted to get China's youth under control again by redirecting their revolutionary spirit to bring the Cultural Revolution to the classroom. Primary and middle school students partially complied with the back-to-school orders: students spent only an hour or two each day in school to study Mao's quotations, with the rest of the day devoted to revolutionary activities in the streets. Students were in no mood to obey teachers after having defied authorities for several months.

The Red Guards from higher educational institutions refused to return to school after one year of revolutionary activity. Many were far from their home universities, and while in distant cities looking for anti-Maoist elements to denounce, they provoked resentment from the local people. Confrontations occasionally erupted in violence. There was also political factionalism among rival Red Guards, who often did battle with one another. Each faction claimed they were following the party line and that others were rightists, revisionists, and enemies of the Cultural Revolution.

Conditions in some schools that were operating became so unruly that the army was called in to establish order. Chairman Mao's March 7 (1968) Directive ordered the army to "give political and military training in the universities, middle schools, and higher classes of primary

schools . . . [to] help in reopening school classes, strengthening organization, setting up the leading bodies on the principle of the 'three-in-one' combination."[17]

It was too much to ask students to return voluntarily to a quiet academic routine after traveling widely and doing whatever they chose without being held responsible for their acts. Students were unwilling to surrender their freedom to teachers they had publicly denounced and maltreated. Many students refused to listen to their teachers--resulting in lack of discipline in school. The back-to-school movement went slowly and the government was unable to get schools operating smoothly for some time. The violence between Red Guard factions racked many schools; campuses became the battlegrounds for rival groups. Several students died in the violent clashes that occurred in the universities in Peking in the summer of 1968.[18]

The PLA had initially been directed to avoid violent confrontations with the Red Guard. When the students became too disruptive and unresponsive to party directives, the army took action. In March 1968 Mao directed the military and the workers' Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams to restore order in the schools and to establish revolutionary committees to administer the educational institutions in

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[17] People's Daily (8 March 1968) as quoted in Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. 107.

[18] New York Times, 8 July 1968, p. 2.

compliance with the party line.[19] In effect, the army had taken over by dominating the revolutionary committees of educational institutions from primary school to university.

In 1968 the destructive stage of the revolution ended and the construction phase began. In fact, the real revolution in Chinese education began in 1968; it was inspired by the May 7 Directive. Mao's revolutionary education focused on popularization of locally established and supported primary and junior middle schools. This program was designed to save central government financial resources, to destroy the domination of schools by bourgeois intellectuals, to coordinate education with productive labor, and to ensure that China's youth were never separated from the proletariat.[20]

The Cultural Revolution ended with the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969; politics returned to a quieter pace of revolution. The Red Guards were disbanded and attention turned to serious educational reform. Many Red Guards saw returning to school as a compromise with the old system and were reluctant to surrender the power they had won during the previous years. Over 200,000 students, teachers, and administrators were sent to farms and to

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[19]Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. xxiv-xxxi.

[20]Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1969," (Occasional Paper 7: American Historical Association--History Education Project, 1972), pp. 40-43. (ERIC: ED/063/212)

factories to labor with and learn from the working class. The recalcitrants, like the rightists before them, were identified, separated, and sent to PLA forced-labor farms to cleanse their thoughts.

By 1970 schools at all levels were again open. Tsinghua University, China's foremost polytechnic and once the model institutions of higher education, resumed classes in 1970. Yet classes in many other universities did not begin until 1972. Because criticism remained part of the political scene, and students and professors were still being shipped off for ideological remolding, 1970-1972 was an experimental period for the universities. There were fewer students attending universities, the length of courses was cut in half, buildings were in disrepair, and soldiers were posted in the universities.[21]

During the Cultural Revolution and the immediate aftermath, several tens of thousands of specialists had not trained at colleges and universities, thus denying this expertise to national development. This was a severe blow to a nation that proclaimed self-reliance in development.

Since 1970 the Chinese leaders have been concerned about the indifference exhibited by those in positions of responsibility toward education. "Those who regarded educational matters as of secondary importance have been rebuked, and they have been reminded that 'if education

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[21] China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, p. 1.

does not follow the pace of economic development, the speed of economic development will be slowed down.'"[22]

Process Within the Educational System

A central aim of every nation's educational system is to cultivate political leaders and cultural successors. The left wing of the Chinese Communist Party was dissatisfied with the direction of political, economic, and educational development in the first half of the 1960s and precipitated the Cultural Revolution to rectify the situation. To secure their own future, the party leftists preferred giving an education to the politically trustworthy who might not be academically gifted rather than educating talented students who could not be trusted.

To reverse the trends of the early 1960s the old educational system had to be destroyed and a new Maoist system constructed. One aim of the Cultural Revolution was to create a new educational structure capable of producing graduates who would spearhead the continuing Socialist revolution. Many urban primary and secondary schools were closed for two years (1966-1968), and when they reopened there was little guidance on specific educational matters. (The Ministries of Education and Higher Education had been dissolved during the Cultural Revolution.) The colleges

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[22]John Gardner and Wilt Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 267.

and universities were closed for at least three years (1966-1969), and when they reopened classes did not get under way until 1970, or in some cases 1972.

The resumption of normal operations at educational institutions went slowly for a number of reasons: student discipline threatened teacher security, school plants needed repair because they had been used as dormitories by the traveling Red Guards, and the old textbooks were unacceptable for the bourgeois-revisionist ideas they contained. After the Cultural Revolution education was in a state of confusion, for schools in different areas had different experiences during the years 1966-1969. For example, all urban schools had been closed for at least two years, but many rural schools had remained in operation throughout the Cultural Revolution. The emphasis on localism also generated a variety of educational programs, many of which were reminiscent of pre-1966 programs. One reason for this was that new textbooks and teaching materials had not been quickly developed when the school reopened. A number of changes, however, had been proposed in 1967 that provided general guidelines to the post-Cultural Revolution educational system: abolish examination, reduce the number of years spent in school, fully implement half-work, half-study curricula, all students to receive military training, curricula to emphasize Maoism, political control

of schools, and students to partake in productive labor in lieu of summer and winter vacation.[23]

Out of the national turmoil, political instability, and economic disruption, the ideology was purified, the party cleansed, the national purpose clarified, and the educational system restructured.

Mao's Charges

Mao had long distrusted both the more orthodox educational system and the intellectuals it produced. He accused the intellectuals of political backsliding, especially after the Hundred Flowers campaign. Old professors were attacked for not completely accepting the doctrine of Mao, for corrupting China's youth with anti-Maoist ideas, and for favoring students with a bourgeois background over those with a proletarian upbringing.

Mao's educational strategy met with resistance in the early 1960s. Work-study schools were closed on a massive scale, urban schools received the largest state subsidies, and educationists proved inflexible and unable to adjust to varied local conditions. He charged that schools, which were influenced by Liu Shao-ch'i, overemphasized conventional (theoretical) subjects, scholarly achievement, and good grades. Academic standards maintained by bourgeois educationist forced many students from

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[23]Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China . . .," p. 41.

peasant families to drop out of school. Mao attacked formal education for not meeting China's immediate needs, for overemphasizing the abstract, for educating too many students to an unnecessarily high degree, and for developing elitist attitudes among students.[24]

Mao feared that schools would graduate people who felt superior to the masses, and who made a clear distinction between the elite and the proletariat, and between intellectual and manual labor. If changes were not made, the schools would produce a ruling class that would use the educational system to ensure their own privileged position in society.[25]

Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution as a struggle against an opposing party faction and against the educational system that had developed in support of his political opponents. Maoist education focused on training more people in ways that Mao felt to be more appropriate to China's needs and to support his interpretation of communism. The Cultural Revolution destroyed schools as breeding grounds for bookish elites, who were by definition divorced from the realities of the daily struggle of the masses. The educational system that grew out of the chaos (1966-1968) was to produce graduates who would be both "Red and Expert."

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[24]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 259, p. 264.

[25]Stewart E. Fraser, "Educational Development Stemming from the Cultural Revolution," in Stewart E. Fraser, ed., Education and Communism in China (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1969), p. 544.

Administration

The revisionists had centralized administrative control of the school system through the Ministries of Education and Higher Education, which the revolutionists claimed were bureaucracies staffed by anti-revolutionary elitist professionals. Party leftists charged that an inflexible educational system had resulted from bureaucratic regulations and a standardized routine, which created static modes of operation that were unable to prosecute the continuing revolution. The Ministers of Education and Higher Education were relieved of their posts in June 1966. The ministries were replaced with a work group (Science and Education) established in the State Council to keep the educational system progressing in a prescribed direction. The unifying factor during this period was no longer the bureaucracy, but rather the ideology of Mao's thought.[26]

During the Cultural Revolution a new type of educational leadership emerged. At the highest levels the Central Committee oversaw ideological education, while the State Council looked after general educational administration. At the intermediate levels, the education departments of provincial, hsien, and municipal revolutionary committees carried on more specific and detailed educational tasks. The decentralization of control and financial responsibility put production brigades in charge of rural primary schools,

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[26]Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. xxvii-xxviii.

rural communes were responsible for middle schools, neighborhood or street committees controlled urban primary schools, and factories and urban communes controlled secondary schools in the cities.[27]

Regarding the administration of schools, Mao felt that

> In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education, it is essential to have working-class leadership; it is essential for the masses of workers to take part and, in co-operation with Liberation Army fighters, bring about a revolutionary "three-in-one" combination, together with the activists among the students, teachers, and workers in schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution in education through to the end. The workers' propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation in the schools, and they will always lead the schools. In the countryside, the schools should be managed by the poor and lower-middle peasants--the most reliable ally of the working class.[28]

In February and March 1967 army teams entered urban schools to prevent anarchy, and from July 1968 worker propaganda teams supported by the military began functioning as an administrative apparatus. In the countryside there was no uniform procedure, resulting in wide local variation of administration.[29]

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[27]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 268.

[28]As cited in Peking Review, no. 35, 30 August 1968, p. 2.

[29]Marianne Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform During the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, no. 42 (April-June 1970): 35.

As the power of the Red Guards diminished and large numbers of students were sent to rural and border areas, schools began to reorganize with the propaganda teams, revolutionary committees, and the PLA in control.

The establishment of a new administration to oversee educational reform went slowly because the propaganda team/revolutionary committee members were not professional educators, nor did all the teachers and administrators enthusiastically support the efforts of the team that had taken over their function. During 1969 there developed a disillusionment with the Cultural Revolution and its results. In the schools, tension increased between the administrative revolutionary committees and the teachers and students.

The controlling body of primary and secondary schools was the three-in-one propaganda teams, which were composed of poor and lower-middle peasant activists, commune and brigade cadre, and revolutionary teachers and students. These committees operated at the direction of the revolutionary committee of that area and were backed by the PLA.

The management of higher educational institutions--there were 40 comprehensive universities in China in October 1972[30]--was not left to the educationists. Mao

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[30] China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, p. 5.

Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams were sent to the universities in 1968 to establish revolutionary committees to administer higher education.[31]

Students

The schools of every nation produce successors to each generation of leaders. The importance of the school as a social institution and the education of the nation's students in relation to China's future did not escape the political leaders. Schools were a major target of the Cultural Revolution and the students were the revolutionaries.

Of the total student population, only a minority were Red Guards; many were only occasionally active, but the majority took no part at all in the Cultural Revolution. Within the ranks of the Red Guard movement, there was division, internal factional fighting, and chaos. The Red Guards were organized in military units, but were undisciplined and uncontrollable. They organized around educational institutions, using schools as their headquarters.

The PLA helped organize the Red Guards and army men led some of the first Red Guard marches across China to prosecute the Cultural Revolution and to emulate the Red Army.[32] The Red Guards undertook to destroy the

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[31]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 279.

[32]China News Analysis, no. 715, 5 July 1968, p. 2; and Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 250.

remnants of revisionism in China; in the process they attacked the schools and universities. They criticized teaching methods, subject matter, and their teachers' political perspectives. They charged that books and academics were in command and not politics, and that too much time and effort was spent on reading and lecturing and not enough on the realities of Chinese society.

In 1968 millions of urban youth who were proving troublesome were sent to rural areas and sometimes to remote frontier regions to engage in agriculture, land reclamation, flood control, and other productive labor activities. This action was taken to discipline the Red Guards and to stop the bloody fighting that had erupted between Red Guards and workers and between Red Guard factions. Mao furnished a more doctrinaire rationale: "It is very necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants."[33]

Between 1968 and 1970 many students whose education had stopped in 1966 were graduated and sent to rural areas; educational institutions had to make way for students who had come of age during the Cultural Revolution. The Western press reported in 1971 and again in 1972 that hundreds of thousands of educated urban youth were resettled

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[33] Peking Review no. 52, 27 December 1968, p. 6.

in the countryside.[34] Many of the ex-student trouble-makers were sent to PLA farms to take part in military discipline and productive labor, and to be watched by the army. The young intellectuals who were resettled in rural areas were unhappy at the prospect of spending a lifetime in the countryside engaged in rural labor.[35]

During the Cultural Revolution, students lost the benefits of systematic study, and the country lost that expertise that could have contributed to China's development. This forfeiture of years of formal education was impossible to make up, though the rationale was that only schooling was lost and not education.

The basis of Mao's social order was the proletariat, whose sons and daughters had not done well in school before 1966. They lacked the advantage of literate parents and an intellectual home environment. Once the schools reopened, however, applicants with bourgeois family backgrounds were discriminated against in favor of students from poor worker-peasant families. School fees, which were once beyond the financial capability of the poor, were abolished. Students who attended school immediately after the Cultural Revolution were less able to do quality academic work because

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[34] New York Times, 2 October 1972, p. 6; and Christian Science Monitor, 14 August 1971.

[35] For more detail, see Martin Singer, "Educated Youth and the Cultural Revolution in China," in Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, no. 10 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan--Center for Chinese Studies, 1971).

preference was given to the children of the poor and the working class, because the increase in poorly qualified students was not matched with an increase in highly qualified teachers, and because students had been away from the discipline of study for at least a couple of years. The primary criteria for admission and advancement were social origin, not intellectual ability, and the proper political perspective, not academic quality.

The admissions policy to higher education reflected an attempt to gain students who could be both "Red and Expert." Mao stated that the "students must be selected from among workers and peasants who [had] practical experience," yet the entire selection procedure was based on the principle of "voluntary application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership, and a re-check by the university authorities."[36] Although great stress was placed on a student's history of political activism and participation in the production struggle, there was room in the selection procedure for demanding (by the university authorities) at least a minimal academic qualification.

The number of students in higher education was estimated in January 1973 to be only 40,000--and many of these in short-term professional training programs.[37] Like

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[36] Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 5102, 28 March 1972, p. 42.

[37] China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, p. 4.

the graduates from all levels of education, the higher education graduate was expected to return to his or her original work unit. The university graduate could also be assigned to whatever post the authorities decided best served the "unified state plan."[38]

The reason given by all students for studying was the same--"to raise my ability to serve the people."

Teachers

Teachers are at the focal point in the transformation of any educational system. Throughout the modern history of China there have never been enough teachers to meet the overwhelming demand for formal education; during the Communist era, there have never been enough teachers who actively support and believe in Mao's doctrine. As the Red Guards attacked the schools, teachers were accused of being "mental aristocrats" and of neglecting Maoist pedagogy.

The Cultural Revolution in education focused on purging the ranks of China's teachers of rightists, counter-revolutionaries, and other bad elements. In the first six months of the Cultural Revolution many professors were dismissed and their role diminished. The Red Guards undercut whatever elite status teachers and professors enjoyed previously. A constant vigilance was kept on the political perspective of all educationists.

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[38]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 281.

Red Guard students rebelled against all authority. As they became uncontrollable, educationists became frightened. Professors, teachers, and administrators were denounced on wall posters, paraded in dunce caps, and humiliated at mass struggle meetings. The Cultural Revolution was an unpleasant experience for the teachers; they did not want to teach students who had criticized, demeaned, reviled, and hounded them. Teachers were afraid of what would happen if they tried to establish and enforce discipline in schools, especially after the beatings--ideological and physical--the Red Guards had administered early in the Cultural Revolution. Serious discipline problems were anticipated and teachers' morale slumped.

When the government and the party started ordering students to return to school in 1967, teachers refused to go back without a guarantee for their personal safety. They wanted teacher-control in the schools, not student-control. As schools resumed, teachers were protected against student wrath by soldiers posted in the schools.

Professors and teachers, who were exposed to revisionism and who had a capitalistic-bourgeois world perspective, were provided with an opportunity to remold themselves ideologically and to rededicate themselves to serve the party and the people. Educationists attended "May 7" Cadre schools in large numbers.[39] Klaus Mehnert,

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[39]The official mechanism for political re-education was the "May 7" Cadre schools that were established in 1968. Government and party cadre, including educationists, went to these schools to examine and remold their political

noted Sino-Soviet expert, visited a "May 7" school near Peking in the winter of 1970-1971; he found that among the 1255 students there, 700 were educators (teachers, school directors, librarians).[40]

Many teachers who had served before the Cultural Revolution were back at their posts when schools reopened. Peking's People's Daily stated that only 20 per cent of all professors, teachers, and other cadre at Peking's educational institutions had been ousted during the Cultural Revolution.[41] After having participated in manual labor and confessed to their erroneous attitudes, most old professors were back on their university teaching staff.

As the educational system evolved after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leaders again realized the importance of teachers and attempted to regain their support by

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perspectives, to criticize their own thinking, to develop and strengthen their empathy with the working class, to study Mao Tse-tung, to participate in group discussion and study, and to engage in agricultural or industrial labor.

It was only through such a remolding experience that teachers, professors, and school administrators were liberated from their erroneous thinking before taking up their managerial, technical, administrative, or teaching jobs. Intellectuals who had made "mistakes" could be returned to useful positions if they were remolded and re-educated.

For more detail, see China News Analysis, no. 779, 24 October 1969, pp. 1-7; "The May 7 Cadre School," Peking Review no. 19, 12 May 1972, pp. 5-7; and Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 484-486.

[40]Klaus Mehnert, China Returns (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 62.

[41]As cited in the New York Times, 1 March 1968, p. 17.

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[41]As cited in the New York Times, 1 March 1968, p. 17.

sponsoring provincial and municipal teachers' conferences, by demanding student discipline, by giving teachers more time to improve their professional skills, and by admitting to the value of expertise.[42] These measures were designed to improve teacher morale, to change the minds of those who wished to leave the profession, and to attract new recruits.

The party attempted to deal with the teacher shortage by emphasizing supplementary short-term teacher training programs, by requiring experienced teachers to guide younger teachers, by directing attention to normal colleges (provincial level) and normal schools (hsien and municipal levels), and by holding teachers' meetings for professional development. There were several barriers to supplying qualified teachers: not enough qualified staff for the normal schools and colleges, inadequate in-service training, and the teachers were required to accept remolding and to engage in productive labor.[43]

To combat the teacher shortage, new teachers were recruited by the thousands from poor and lower-middle peasants, demobilized military men, and educated youth who graduated before and during the Cultural Revolution. Production brigade workers went into the schools to teach politics and production skills, while teachers went to work

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[42]Charles Behlen, "Studies in Maoism," Far Eastern Economic Review, 67, no. 8 (19 February 1970): 19-21.

[43]See Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," pp. 272-274.

in production. Many different people had an opportunity to teach under the principle "learn skills from the workers, learn farming from peasants, and learn fighting from soldiers."[44] Not only did workers teach, but teachers worked. Mao said that "it [would] not do to have teachers move only their lips and not their hands."[45]

In the early 1970s the old teachers and professors who had reformed were back teaching, but they were not placed in positions of responsibility. Having been trained in pre-Communist days, they were never fully trusted.

Examinations

The revolutionists charged that examinations rewarded only those students with bourgeois family backgrounds and discriminated against students of worker-peasant origins. "The old examination system placed school marks in command. It excluded children of workers and peasants and trained successors for the bourgeoisie,"[46] and that "the system of examinations and enrollment for the institutions of higher learning . . . [had] failed . . . to free itself from the stereotype of the bourgeois system of examinations."[47]

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[44]Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China . . .," p. 45.

[45]As quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1972.

[46]Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 3724, 23 June 1966, p. 6.

[47]Ibid., p. 2.

The competitive entrance examination as an admission procedure was eliminated by government decree in 1966 and replaced with a procedure whereby college and university applicants had to have first worked 2-3 years in industry or in agriculture, be recommended by workmates, approved by the party leadership, and finally selected by the university as politically and academically qualified.

Even examinations to determine mastery of subject-matter during the regular course of instruction were no longer a major criterion for promotion. Professors could no longer eliminate the poorer students by examination. With reduced emphasis on examination, the assessment of student abilities proved a fascinating problem. Upon occasion examinations were taken by groups of students who freely discussed the questions with each other and did so with open books. Marks were determined by teachers and students together with revolutionary political attitudes weighing heavily in the grading process. The competitiveness of examinations was de-emphasized; tests were used to promote cooperation between students. The faster learners helped the slower students with their lessons.

Teachers complained about the new test philosophy and procedure, pointing out that educational standards were reduced and that the classes were paced by the slowest students.[48] Even though examinations were condemned during

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[48]Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, p. xxxvi.

the Cultural Revolution as an instrument for developing successors within the ruling class, teachers continued to pressure the Chinese leadership as to the importance of examinations and tests for student promotions and university entrance. Entrance examinations were in effect reinstated by late 1972, only under the title "investigations of cultural knowledge."[49] The use of subject-matter tests, especially in high school, had not yet been settled by the closing months of 1973. The teachers championed the examinations as essential in maintaining minimum academic standards.

The examination issue and apparent trends back toward academic normalcy after several years of revolutionary experimentation reflected a broader trend toward social normalcy.

Curriculum

The old educational system that emphasized the development of experts by stressing knowledge and academic scholarship had proven counter to Mao's concept of a Communist social structure because it alienated students from practical work. During the Cultural Revolution critics felt that too much emphasis was placed on the systematic acquisition of knowledge and that students thought only of their own future. Mao held that China needed more literate

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[49] Christian Science Monitor, 26 September 1972; and New York Times, 27 August 1973, p. 6.

workers and agriculturalists and fewer well-educated bureaucrats. Consequently, Maoist pedagogy focused on immediately applicable practical knowledge that was directly relevant to the nation's economic needs.

Criticism focused on the academic nature of the curriculum, the number of years spent in school, the bookish methodology, the emphasis on rote learning, and the lack of time devoted to the study of politics.[50] A school program such as this would develop intellectuals removed from everyday affairs and from the masses.

There was little constructive educational reform while the schools were closed during the Cultural Revolution. When the lower-level schools began opening, the teachers and administrators were passive, even reticent, to take the responsibility to begin developing a curriculum in such a mercurial political situation. What was right on one day might be wrong the next. Teachers protected themselves from being discredited later by doing only enough to meet the minimum requirements.

The major document that defined rural educational development after the Cultural Revolution was "Draft Programme for Primary and Middle Schools in [the] Chinese Countryside."[51] This program was drafted by the Lishu county revolutionary committee in Kirin Province,

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[50] Bastid, "Economic Necessity . . .," p. 19.

[51] Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, no. 4418, 19 May 1969, pp. 9-15.

appeared on the first page of the People's Daily (12 May 1969) and was continually discussed in the paper for several months thereafter. This draft program, intended as a nation-wide example, also included curricular recommendations:

Primary School

- Politics
- Language
- Arithmetic
- Revolutionary literature and art
- Military training
- Physical culture
- Productive labor

Secondary School

- Mao Tse-tung Thought (included modern Chinese history, contemporary Chinese history, and the history of the two-line party struggle)
- Basic knowledge for agriculture (included mathematics, physics, chemistry, and economic geography)
- Revolutionary literature and art (included language)
- Military training (included Mao's concepts of people's war)
- Physical culture
- Productive labor[52]

As urban and rural curricula gradually took shape under party-government directives, schools gave less attention to the more conventional academic studies and more to politics, production, and military training. The academic content of the curricula was trimmed to that which had practical value in meeting China's needs. Some courses were dropped and others combined, while overall curricular

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[52] Ibid., p. 13.

development focused on more sciences than arts, more applied subjects than pure theory, and more group study than individual progress.

The primary and secondary curricula after the Cultural Revolution focused on several areas of concern. History, geography, and philosophy were considered frills and either greatly reduced or dropped altogether. Many courses were shortened. Political education included the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the class struggle, and knowledge of who to trust and who to suspect (Soviet revisionism and American imperialism). Mathematics and science courses were related to practical production methods. Manual labor was accommodated in the part-work, part-study schedule. Military training included bayonet drills, pitching grenades, and long marches.

Mao's doctrines were incorporated into all courses. All lessons were political lessons. All subject matter had a political tinge. Politics was in command again. Political neutrality was not acceptable. One had to be politically. ideologically, and morally committed in order to survive.

The criterion by which a course was judged was whether it contributed to the general educational level, political development, productive contribution, or military preparedness of China's human resources.

The schooling process was and is to equip students with the necessary knowledge and skills needed to build a Socialist society. Because the forces of economic

development cannot be denied forever by political fiat, Chinese education began showing signs of moving toward a more conventional curricula by 1972. The primary and middle levels of education began to return to pre-Cultural Revolution designs.[53]

Shortened Education

Before 1966 there were six years of primary, three years of lower secondary, and three years of upper secondary; after 1969 there were five years of primary, two years of lower secondary, and two years of upper secondary.[54] The usual twelve years were cut to nine because during the Cultural Revolution the school system was criticized for being too long.

After the Cultural Revolution graduates left school three years earlier than they had before 1966. The Communists claimed, however, that the three years less schooling had no impact on educational standards, for only the irrelevant subjects were eliminated.

At the university level, applicants had to work for two or three years before applying to higher educational institutions. Once admitted, students found that the four

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[53]Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 513; and New York Times, 25 September 1972, p. 3.

[54]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 268.

year programs before 1966 were reduced to two- and three-year programs as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

Work-Study

The half-work, half-study curricula were started during the Great Leap Forward, fell on hard times and were practically abandoned as the country tried to recover from the excesses of 1958-1959. Work-study again appeared in 1963 with the resurgence of Maoist forces. By 1965 many provinces and municipalities had their own bureaus to promote and administer the half-work, half-study educational programs. After the Cultural Revolution the work-study curricula were implemented nation-wide.

In the urban areas, primary school students participated according to their ability: they cleaned parks, roads, compounds, and neighborhoods; they provided drinking water to drivers and conductors on bus and train stops.[55] The primary focus of the half-work, half-study program was the secondary school. Factories operated schools and accepted students from nearby institutions, providing a place for students to participate in labor.

In rural areas, primary and secondary school students were required to engage in productive labor, usually agriculture. Half-cultivation, half-study schools

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[55]Chiu-sam Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 170.

were operated by production brigades and communes in the countryside.

Chinese school officials estimated that 30 per cent of school time was devoted to agricultural, industrial, and military activities.[56] School farm and factory production helped pay for educational costs. Student labor largely displaced state capital grants; work-study defrayed some of the expenditure of operating the school. The financial burden on the local community was reduced. Although schools moved toward financial self-reliance, the state (provinces) did play a role in alleviating local inequalities to promote universal primary education.

There was also much experimenting with work-study programs in higher education. Many institutions of higher education were colleges in name only. The counterpart to the college-run factory was the factory-run college that provided little more than spare-time education, like the much publicized Shanghai Machine Tool (Lathe) Factory as an alternative to regular higher educational institutions.[57] Mao stated in 1958 that "it is still necessary to have

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[56] As reported in the Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1972.

[57] According to Mao's "Instruction of Shanghai Lathe Factory" of 21 July 1968, workers would become engineers without going to college, through using experienced workers as teachers and through participation in manual labor. By 1973 the spectacular achievements of this institution had not materialized and the publicity projected lessened. For more detail, see China News Analysis, no. 723, 30 August 1968, p. 2; and no. 931, 24 August 1973, p. 6.

universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, but proletarian politics in command, and . . . [to train] technicians from among the workers. Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study."[58]

At the foundation of the integration of formal schooling with real world problems through the half-work, half-study curricula was an educational system based on "the intellectualization of the working people and the cultivation of labour habits and attitudes in the intellectuals."[59]

Outputs of the Educational System

The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the educational system caused disruption of the flow of graduates, but clearly delineated the characteristics of future graduates. All urban schools were closed and no one graduated as part of the regular academic procedure. Students were summarily graduated, however, to make room for those who came of age while the schools were closed. The educational qualities of these graduates were in

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[58]As quoted in Peking Review no. 31, 2 August 1968, p. 3.

[59]Tsang, Society, Schools, and Progress in China, p. 185.

question because they had been exposed to revisionist concepts. The values and attitudes (qualities) graduates developed during the educational process were more clearly circumscribed as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

During the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the number of graduates was not revealed, but the qualities the graduates possessed by virtue of their exposure to the new educational system more closely reflected Mao's philosophy of educational, political, and economic development.

Qualities of Educational Output

An important phase of the Cultural Revolution focused specifically on the qualities of the outputs of the educational system. Besides the changes in the party, educational reforms may be the most profound legacy of the Cultural Revolution that will affect fundamentally China's development through future generations of students.

The various qualities the educational process imbued students with reflected the economic needs, political activities, and international events of this period. Many of the qualities of education were extended through the various periods, such as education for politics (1949-1957) was carried forward to education for political action (1958-1960), to education for class consciousness (1961-1965), and finally to education for renewed attitudes. And on the economic front, education for technical and economic

development in the first period (1949-1957) evolved into education for development strategy in the last (1966-1973).

Conversely, the development of some attitudes in earlier periods were completely disclaimed later. For example, education and the Soviet model (1949-1957) in effect, become education for revolution that denounced Soviet revisionism and rejected Moscow's interpretation of the world Communist movement.

The changing character of the values and attitudes developed in the educational process throughout the history of the Chinese People's Republic reflects the changing demands put on the schools by shifting political interpretations and economic necessities.

Education for Renewed Attitudes. Regarding the educational systems in less developed countries, history has shown that "far from serving as a preparation for tackling the country's most urgent tasks, the schools often end up producing an elite which feels itself to be far above any practical involvement."[60] This observation had long been a criticism of the leftist elements in the party and was one reason for the Cultural Revolution. Mao hoped to rectify the separation of the elites from the masses by insisting that the educational system renew the emphasis

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[60]Richard Jolley, "Manpower and Education," in Dudley Sears and Leonard Jay, eds., Development in a Divided World (Harnomdsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 209.

on the tenets of Maoist doctrine and discredit those of the revisionists.

The schools have always been a means of developing new attitudes or sustaining old ones. Regarding the role of the schools during and after the Cultural Revolution, "the educational process [was] seen as a means of producing attitudinal change as much as, if not more than, inculcating specific skills and techniques."[61] The leaders of the Cultural Revolution attempted to develop a willingness to believe in, comply with, and follow through on struggle-criticism-transformation. The attitudes among students were essential to carrying through the Cultural Revolution in education, which focused on struggle against anti-Maoists, against revisionists, and against the bourgeois domination of the school system; criticism of those (intellectuals) who had gone astray in their perspectives and practices, and self-criticism of one's own purity of mind; and transformation of the educational system into a truly Maoist social institution. (Transformation was the construction stage of the revolution).

In beginning the 1970s, the Maoists felt that the acquisition of facts in school was less important than the development of revolutionary attitudes and values, and foremost among these was education to follow through with the Cultural Revolution by serving the social good.

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[61]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 270.

Education was to develop positive attitudes toward productive labor, the collective good, military preparedness, and the rural way of life. Attitudes specifically attacked were those that lead toward elitism and officialdom.

Education for Revolution. With Mao's victory over his ideological enemies within the party, the leftist doctrine of the three great revolutions--struggle for production, class struggle, scientific experimentation--became the focal point of education in post-Cultural Revolution schools in China. Students were required to partake in productive labor and were required to participate in the class struggle, while schools throughout the nation engaged in experimenting with different modes of education that best served local circumstances.

Since continual revolution was at the center of political education in the schools, Soviet revisionism was denounced and attacked. By focusing on the young, the leftists were hopeful of developing a versatile and responsible generation of successors who would be politically aware, committed to China's continual revolution, and vigilant against Soviet betrayal of pure Marxism-Leninism.

Education and the Military. The military started playing a major role in the schools during the Two-Line Party Struggle; the army trained students who later became Red Guards. The army also organized and led the first contingencies of Red Guards across the Chinese countryside.

As Red Guard violence got out of hand, the army restrained the students in their course of conducting the Cultural Revolution. Order was restored to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution by the military. The army moved into and stayed in the schools for several years to ensure student discipline.

The PLA exercised a leading role in the administration of the schools by dominating the three-in-one committees. This was part of the general trend throughout the country whereby the military exercised increasing power in the government of the party and the nation.

The strong military influence was evident in military-styled organization in the schools. Students were organized into squads and platoons, while the titles of principal and dean were dropped in favor of lieutenant and major. The organization of China's educational institutions were modelled after the PLA.[62] The military continued to conduct training classes as a regular part of the curriculum.

As the influence of the military on the direction of national affairs later began to decrease (1973), it will be of interest to future students of Chinese affairs to note if military training in schools and "learning from the PLA" continued as a central policy directive.

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[62]Shi Ming Hu, "Education in the People's Republic of China . . .," p. 45.

Education and Experimentation. The national policy regarding educational development, as defined by Mao Tse-tung, focused on experimentation so that local schools could best serve local conditions. Educational experimentation after the Cultural Revolution included several innovations that meet different needs in the development process.

In selected fields, people receive education to a degree necessary to function at a minimal level and later receive additional training as the circumstances warranted. Indeed , the evidence suggests that the Chinese are moving towards the institutionalization of 'life-time' education whereby people can be given additional training as and when they need it, regardless of age."[63] Little hard evidence is available as of this writing on these educational experiments, but such life-time training schemes could serve China's needs in a very real way.

Kwangtung Province had, by the end of 1970, 416 short-course institutions as part of the Four Kinds of New-Type Schools.[64] There were industrial schools established in factories, agricultural schools established in in communes and brigades, health work schools established in hospitals, and normal schools established in units of

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[63]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," p. 262.

[64]Hsueh Yu, "Communist China's Education in 1970," in Communist China 1970 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1971), pp. 336-337.

the educational revolution that provide 3-6 months of short-term training to thousands of students.

Kiangsi Province instituted more than a hundred Communist Labor Universities. The aims of these experimental schools were to develop Red experts with increased technical knowledge and a strong belief in Mao's revolution, to develop revolutionaries in rural education, to train educated laborers in the class struggle, and to develop within them a social consciousness.[65]

The leaders of China sanctioned experimentation with the educational system in order to develop new ways to combine theory and practice in the service of China's needs. By breaking away from the typical educational systems that grew up in other less developed nations, China's school system can become a central force in promoting progress.

Education for All Young People. For many years the Chinese had a policy of working for universal elementary education. But after 16 years of control, the Central Government had still not achieved this goal, for on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, many youngsters had never been to school. Some 30 million school-aged children were not in school and most of these in the rural areas.[66] Even after the Cultural Revolution, this was a major policy goal.

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[65] Ibid., pp. 334-336.

[66] Survey of China Mainland Press, United States Consulate-General, Hong Kong, no. 3475, 11 June 1965, p. 14.

"There [were] general indications that the Chinese [were] interested in universal primary and secondary education, and development [had] been rather rapid in terms of the additional number of schools built and the growth in the intake of students."[67] To popularize elementary and secondary education was important in giving to the masses some of what they have long wanted--education for their children.

The urban areas had nearly universal primary education. Therefore, major attention was directed at extending rural education to many more youngsters. It was the countryside that possessed the greatest potential for change with its large reservoir of latent talent and mass support of the Maoist revolution. To make the rural masses literate and numerate was necessary for mass participation in China's development strategy. A minimally-educated peasantry would more easily accept and adopt innovations introduced from higher levels of government.

Even after the Cultural Revolution, with increased attention given to primary schools and despite claims, it was still questionable that elementary education was universal.[68]

Education for Development Strategy. School programs in the post-Cultural Revolution era were designed to

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[67] Yu, "Communist China's Education in 1970," p. 305.

[68] New York Times, 14 May 1972, p. 4.

deal with some of the educational problems of a developing nation. Mao's educational strategy focused more on the vocational than the academic, more on the rural than the urban, and on projects that were more labor intensive than capital intensive. Considering the assets and liabilities of China's development posture, many of the proposals were realistic.

Some Western economists hold that the labor market in less developed nations does not function to the benefit of "national priorities for future development."[69] The economy of a developing nation does not provide sufficient incentives for the educated and the skilled to be put to the best use in terms of development priorities.

In most of the world's less developed countries there is an imbalance between the skills needed for development and the skills made available through both the educational system and the market place. Much of the work undertaken by the educated does not contribute to development; rural needs go unmet because most professionals and educated congregate in the cities and often remain unemployed.

The Chinese Communists apparently solved the urban migration problem by assigning graduates to jobs wherever the state deems proper. Most graduates go to the countryside and to places far from Peking, such as Sinkiang and

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[69]Jolley, "Manpower and Education," p. 220.

Hainan, to engage in agriculture or industrial work in the satellite complexes. To avoid a large number of under-employed highly-trained professionals, the new educational system had fewer students in higher educational institutions than before 1966.

Those in colleges and universities were educated in subjects that were of value to the development effort, thereby reducing social and economic waste. Manpower resources were developed by concentrating on lower- and middle-level technicians in the labor force and training them in vocational skills.

The real question regarding education in a developing economy is what should be taught in the schools and how should these subjects be taught? Because the economy of developing nations is overwhelmingly agricultural, the educational system should be geared to the needs and problems of the rural population. In China, Maoist pedagogy deals with this issue.

Education in less developed countries should serve five objectives:[70] (1) Manpower--schools should train people for tasks required for national development; (2) Social Role--schools should influence the social structure such that opportunities to contribute to the national culture present themselves; (3) Attitudes--schools should develop among students pragmatic attitudes, like commitment,

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[70] Ibid., pp. 213-216.

involvement, thrift, sacrifice, and hard work that are enormously important to development; (4) Rural Perspective--schools should relate education to development needs of rural areas because "the need to relate the school system to rural development is perhaps the most important and difficult single educational reform facing developing countries";[71] and (5) Research--higher-level schools should direct research to problems of the national economy and not in areas that generate only international prestige.

The Chinese educational system of the early 1970s moved in the direction of dealing with these five objectives in a positive manner.

Quantities of Educational Output

The Central Government did not release comprehensive enrollment or graduation statistics during or after the Cultural Revolution. There are, consequently, few hard statistics to analyze. Much information about enrollments (and therefore, future graduates) comes from claims by the Chinese and from statements by visitors to the mainland.

Numerical and Content Analysis. Because some rural primary schools had continued to operate during the Cultural Revolution, there must have been some regular graduates from the elementary level. No hard data is available,

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[71] Ibid., p. 216.

however, on the number of schools in this category, the number of students involved, or the number of graduates during these years.

Because secondary schools and universities were located in urban areas and were a central element in the Cultural Revolution, they had no regular student bodies or graduating classes during this period to report on. With the urban schools being closed, there were no bona fide graduates from these institutions. Many who were students when the Cultural Revolution started were forceably graduated, to make room for new students and to get rid of the student troublemakers.

The People's Daily reported that in 1968 there were 60-70,000 university graduates, nearly all of whom were sent to work on army labor farms.[72] Those who were graduated received graduation certificates, not academic degrees.

Because of the educational chaos during the Cultural Revolution, there can be little doubt that much valuable expertise was lost, in that it was simply not trained. One Western estimate placed the loss to China at 6,000 Ph.D.s between 1966 and 1969.[73] The Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1970 estimated China's loss: "150,000

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[72]As cited in China News Analysis, no. 772, 5 September 1969, p. 6.

[73]As cited in the Christian Science Monitor, 5 September 1970.

engineers, 100,000 teachers and 50,000 physicians who would have entered the manpower pool during this period went without training."[74] To compound this loss, university attendance after the Cultural Revolution was much reduced.

According to visitors to post-Cultural Revolution China, the number of elementary and secondary enrollments were greatly increased. Thus, the number of graduates from these levels had to be greatly increased as these students finished their education. At the higher educational level, however, enrollments were down considerably. For example, at Sun Yat-sen University, a Kwangtung Provincial institution, before the Cultural Revolution there were 4700 students, but only 547 after.[75] The story was the same at China's other universities of long standing.[76]

The imbalance between higher and lower levels of formal education was worse in the early 1970s than it had ever been before the Cultural Revolution. As China achieves greater development in industry and agriculture and moves into the mainstream of international affairs, it shall be interesting to note how Peking will deal with the increased demand for highly-trained experts, a demand that will most probably outstrip the ability of the school system to raise

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[74]Charles M. Martin, "China: Future of the University," Science and Public Affairs: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27, no. 1 (January 1971): 11.

[75]Christian Science Monitor, 28 August 1971.

[76]See Ross Terrill, 800,000,000: The Real China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 120.

the general level of education of the masses. In effect, the demands of economic development may require the formation of an elite relative to the masses. How will the school system respond to such a challenge in light of Mao's belief in the need to educate the masses in order to eliminate the need for an elite?

Conclusion

The role of the schools was a central theme in the years of struggle between rival party factions. The Cultural Revolution decided the issue, at least temporarily. The educational questions of what (subject matter), how (methodology), and for whom (character of the student body) were settled in Mao's favor. A rural-local-flexible (as opposed to urban-centralized-highly structured) educational posture characterized the schools immediately after the Cultural Revolution.

To Western observers and to comparative educationists, the role of the school in China may seem unorthodox, but conditions on the mainland are different from those of industrialized nations and call for different educational goals and methods. The Communists recognize that education in less developed nations usually does not prepare graduates for development tasks. Peking took steps to ensure that the same does not happen in China. Schools were an integral part of the development strategy. Social, economic, and political development incorporated educational change;

reciprocally, education supported the entire change process of developing the Chinese Communist social system.

Such a planned system took cognizance of long-term, national development needs over immediate preferences and aspirations of citizens. "Social needs education is designed to meet may be different from those recognized by individuals."[77] The Chinese scheme was designed to ensure that the needs of national development were met before those of individuals.

Mao's system of education--basic education the masses will find useful, specialized training for but a few in order to meet special situations--had a better chance to succeed than did his reforms of the Great Leap Forward. The reforms of the late 1950s were confronted by an already well-established system and were unable to survive the hard times China faced in 1959-1961. The Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, first aimed to destroy the old system before constructing a new one. Education in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not an appendage to a pre-existing structure, but an entirely new structure.[78]

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution the moderates (including Chou En-lai) exerted some influence over the educational system. Certainly the Chinese Communists did not disclaim the need for and value of Mao's

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[77]Jolley, "Manpower and Education," p. 217.

[78]Gardner and Idema, "China's Educational Revolution," pp. 285-86.

proletarian line, but the moderates tempered political zeal with the realization that the schools must also develop expertise needed for economic development.[79] China's universities were showing signs of beginning to swing back toward better academically-prepared applicants and away from those with worker-peasant-soldier backgrounds.[80]

With the moves to re-establish examinations to improve academic achievement and the appearance of teachers' conferences to promote esprit de corps and professional competence, the educational system in 1972 was taking on some of the trappings of pre-Cultural Revolution era. Did the reappearance of teachers' conferences indicate a by-passing of the three-in-one committees that controlled the schools after the Cultural Revolution (but who found it difficult to take constructive action in building a new educational system)? Does this signal the end of the three-in-one committees' usefulness? And if so, does it indicate a shift in educational policy?

It was reported in the Western press in 1973 and early 1974 that new internal party tensions were brewing. The tightening of the ideological reins, renewed vigilance against reactionary tendencies, and the attention given by the People's Daily to a 12-year old school girl's

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[79] China News Analysis, no. 906, 12 January 1973, pp. 1-2.

[80] New York Times, 25 September 1972, p. 3; and Tillman Durdin, James Reston, and Seymour Topping, New York Times: Report from Red China (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 280.

denunciation of her teacher for promoting the restoration of bourgeois control indicate that the lessons of the Cultural Revolution were well remembered in the face of pressure from the moderates to permit the dynamics of internal Chinese politics to seek more of an equilibrium.

The direction of political events in the future is bound to have an impact on the educational system. Do educational changes follow social changes or are the schools instrumental in initiating political, economic, and social modifications? Certainly there are no lasting social changes until their underlying philosophy is absorbed into the culture and become part of the people's belief structure. The Chinese Communists have used the formal educational system to support larger social changes. The success of sweeping social modifications does not depend solely on the effectiveness of the educational system to promote and disseminate the new philosophy, for there are other social institutions within the Chinese social system that have an impact on the direction and shape of that society. But no long-term change will ever succeed without the support of the educationists.

The schools are instrumental in promoting the modification of any social system. National progress depends, in the end, on the development of human resources--the people. In post-Cultural Revolution China, with Mao's emphasis on the rural masses, students were being better equipped for work and life in rural areas than were pre-1966 students.

The burden on the people was not lessened by the priorities of the Central Government and the party--social progress and stability over individual justice and freedom--but the long-term prospectus for the masses, in terms of material well being, was more positive than at any time in China's past. The role of the school was central in developing this national capability. The issues surrounding justice and freedom will have to be settled within the context of the Chinese value structure and social system. Again, the role of the school will be central in defining the place of the individual in the new Chinese state.

"The ultimate aim for which all communists strive is to bring about a socialist and communist society."

Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.

CHAPTER 8

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY

Since the Communists gained control of mainland China, education has played a central role in the development of this Oriental Socialist state. National policy has always defined the contribution the schools were to make; in turn, the schools have functioned to fulfill national policy objectives. Whatever the direction of Central Government efforts, the reciprocity between national policy and educational development has been a constant in the equation of school-and-state in a Communist society.

During the first quarter century of the Chinese People's Republic, ideology has been central to Peking's vision of the future. The various historical phases as described and discussed in this study have demonstrated the zig-zag path of ideological interpretation of Communist doctrine. The history of China's national development since 1949 has not been a smooth, linear progression. Rather, the

periods of progress in one direction were interrupted by shifts in the party's internal balance of power and the resultant redefinition of national policy. For example, the thrust of the First Five-Year Plan was altered by the policies of the Great Leap Forward, and the progress of the early 1960s was interrupted by the growing party struggle that erupted into the Cultural Revolution. The educational patterns of these periods were changed as the ideology was redefined in the struggle between the centers of power within the party.

The schools, like other social institutions in China, exist to serve the national policy as defined by the party. Formal education was adapted to meet the short- and long-term political and economic needs of the nation. When the party moderates had the stronger influence over policy, economic development needs were primary in the determination of the schools' mission. When the revolutionists (Maoists) had control, the "correct" political perspective and ideological indoctrination determined the nature of the schools' programs. Whichever faction had control, formal education served the national policy as defined.

As to the future, predictions are always dangerous because unanticipated events, even accidents, often disrupt projections. Regarding national policy in the Chinese People's Republic, however, it is safe to assume that Peking's directives shall continue to shift periodically

because ideological interpretation of Marxism as applied to China will not remain static. And as the truth of Communist ideology continues to elude Chinese leaders, the thrust of national policy, and in turn educational development, will continue on its zig-zag course.

Ideology, national policy, and educational development will, in the future, fluctuate because the Chinese are still attempting to define their own identity in the context of a Socialist state. To survive and function in the dynamic international arena and to give stability to China's internal affairs, the leaders must continue to shape national policy to meet new challenges as they arise. Whatever these challenges and whatever the policies generated in response, the educational system will continue to serve the ideology that is so fundamental to the society and the state.

Phases of Educational Development

The history of formal education in the Chinese People's Republic has passed through several stages since 1949. Throughout these phases of educational (and national) development, the various political forces that interpreted the ideology and set the tone of the national environment shifted between the moderates and the extremists (of the left). Since the schools so closely reflect national policy, educational development has gone through several stages in coordination with differing ideological

interpretations. The shifting focus of the schools' mission generated changes in curriculum, methodology, personnel, and structure.

The first years (1949-1952) were a period of gaining administrative control of the mainland and of consolidating party strength to manipulate the educational system. After the initial three years of reorganization and reorientation, the educational system stressed strong academic preparations to meet the economically-oriented needs of the First Five-Year Plan. During the years 1953-1957, when relative stability prevailed, Chinese schools and Peking's industrial-planning were strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. During this time the educational system was highly centralized through the Ministries of Education and Higher Education. Specialized technical institutes replaced many comprehensive universities. The quality of education and the training of experts received more attention than the political perspective of students in school. Being academically talented was more important than was being a dedicated Communist.

The Hundred Flowers experience revealed the failure of the educational system and the ideological remolding campaigns to develop the proper political outlook among the nation's students and intellectuals. The Great Leap Forward signaled a change in the direction and character of education stressing the political qualifications of students and extending education (indoctrination) to as many students as possible. The number of schools and students increased

rapidly in 1958-1959. Being a good Communist was more important during these years than was being a good academician. The educational system was decentralized by passing control to local authorities in the hope of ensuring egalitarianism. Students attended school, not to prepare themselves for the next higher level of education, but rather to work at a practical task to meet local needs.

The Great Leap Forward was a period of policy excesses and natural disasters. The early 1960s witnessed another reverse in national policy in an attempt to rescue the country from the brink of economic disaster by retrenching the nation's resources. Many of the educational experiments of 1958-1960 were dismantled, with increased emphasis on academic preparation in schools in order to produce needed expertise.

The Two-Line Party Struggle that followed influenced the educational system by moving toward two school systems--one academically oriented to produce experts to meet the economic development needs perceived by the party moderates, the other work-study oriented to meet diverse local needs perceived by the party extremists. The Maoists also placed far more stress on the political education of students than did the moderates.

This struggle erupted in the Cultural Revolution, which was an attempt by Mao to eliminate his political enemies in the party and to ensure the dominance of his ideological interpretation. Schools and universities were

closed from one to four years, with regular, productive, academic classes suspended for even longer periods. Students were organized into Red Guard units, the chief proponents of a thorough cultural revolution to remove all vestiges of anti-Maoist forces.

During the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1969-1973) the educational system began functioning again. Mao's national policy stressed the role in ideology over the requirements of industrial development, which placed the schools squarely in the service of the cultural revolution. The requirements of internal economic development were beginning to reappear, forcing the schools to compromise their ideological purity as prescribed by Mao.

Each of these stages of educational development paralleled a phase of national policy. The zig-zag pattern of progress in developing China's schools reflects the alternating interpretation of ideology as Peking faced natural, domestic, and international challenges through the years. As the dynamics of the world's social orders continue to generate the need for change, so will China's national policies change to meet the new challenges.

The next big challenge facing the Chinese People's Republic will be the direction of the national policy in the post-Mao era. The educational system will, accordingly, be affected by whatever party policy and ideological interpretation evolves. Formal education will continue to fulfill its special mission.

Education for a Special Mission

The goal of every revolution is to destroy the old order and to establish a new one. In the case of China, Mao's continuing revolution aims to destroy all remnants of Confucianism, feudalism, and capitalism, and to establish a proletarian social order. Despite the vicissitudes of politics wherein educational institutions have had to change direction quickly, major tenets have emerged that are characteristic of the schools' mission in the Chinese People's Republic. The rulers of China have designed and implemented educational programs that complement the national policy of social revolution and industrial progress.

The special mission of the schools is a complex one, incorporating several different areas of concern. Though the themes of Chinese education often overlap, they all contribute to the national effort of building a new state.

Political. The ideological purpose of education in China was and is to develop and perpetuate communism. The efforts of educationists (under the close supervision of the party) have been to increase and improve literacy, numeracy, and the proper political perspective--political literacy supercedes linguistic literacy. In order that education serve proletarian politics, schools must nurture a political perspective based on Marxism-Leninism, the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, the class struggle, and party policies. Students must be imbued with the revolutionary

spirit and devoted to national construction, the revolution, the party, the PLA, and the Communist cause. Students are taught to be aware of deception by China's enemies: American imperialism, Western capitalism, and Soviet revisionism. Students are also told who to love: Chairman Mao, the people, and China. In fulfilling the mission of the schools, Chinese educationists aim to indoctrinate each new student generation in the Chinese Communist ideology, and to equip them intellectually and physically to execute Mao's continuing cultural revolution.

Economic. The Chinese attempt to create attitudes among students that will further the nation's economic development and industrial-agricultural progress. The Maoist curricula ensure that education be combined with productive labor. Although this is used as a political tool, it does have economic implications. Students not only contribute their labor to productive enterprises while they are still enrolled, but they are also supposedly learning a skill that is immediately applicable once the student graduates from school. In addition to giving students knowledge of agricultural and productive methods, the schools try to encourage a Socialist work attitude and a love of labor so as to improve the long-term rate of production. And the unification of theory and practice has an economic advantage, specifically solutions to real-world problems.

Social. Schools in China were not and are not concerned about the well-being of the individual or the advancement of personal independence. Rather, formal education is designed to serve the needs of the state, of the people, and of the party. Students are taught the importance of the collective spirit of cooperation and discipline in the pursuit of the public interest. The curricula also attack old myths, superstitions, and prejudices that stand in the way of social and industrial progress, and replace these old thought patterns with scientific thinking.

Personal. Education in China focuses on personal morality in relation to building socialism. Students are exposed to codes of conduct that encompass devotion to duty, loyalty to country, obedience to the constitution, respect for the national leaders, acceptance of criticism, obligation to defend China, altruistic social conduct, and pride in national heritage. Role models exhibit honesty, frugality, persistence, prudence, diligence, collective consciousness, and class solidarity. Each student is to make the elements of this social ethic his or her own personal ethic.

Academic. In addition to developing attitudes, schools are also concerned with the transmission of certain kinds of knowledge as a means of national development. The academic themes of the Communist educational system center on bodies of knowledge that are political and pragmatic:

traditional Chinese history, culture, and important personages; knowledge of the history, institutions, and leaders of Chinese communism; and basic knowledge of science, technology and public health practices.[1] A liberal education in a Western sense is considered a product of decadent bourgeois thinking, and has no place in the new Socialist state. Education is to serve the revolution, not to liberate the individual.

Throughout the stages of Chinese educational development under communism, the school has exhibited these themes, which characterize its special mission. Both the form (organization) and the substance (content) of education in the Chinese People's Republic have always been so designed and controlled as to meet whatever needs the party and the government deem urgent or in their interests. As a political instrument to modify Chinese society, the school focuses on building a national confidence and self-reliance among the students, China's future leaders. This is the special mission of the schools in China.

The Educational System and Internal Contradictions

Although Communist education is a planned and controlled social force with a significant impact on the form and substance of society in China, the functioning of the

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[1]Charles P. Ridley, Paul H. B. Godwin, and Dennis J. Doolin, The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China (Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press of Stanford University, 1971), p. 93.

formal educational system contains incompatible operational objectives. For example, Chinese leaders have occasionally forced (on political grounds) a nation-wide increase in the number of schools and students in spite of a severe shortage of qualified teachers. Such demands made on educational institutions generate countervailing forces that negate quality education.

Schools have often been caught between the politically-inspired enthusiasm of the moment and slower-paced academic progress; educational institutions have been charged with obstructing the revolution and then subjected to attack and modification. The political elements that support the slower and more academically-rational approach to educational development were often in conflict with other party elements that advocated the faster, more politically-oriented and ideologically-rigid method of development and problem solving.

The ideal balance for Communist education is based on technical competence and qualified expertise in disciplines and skills essential to national construction, combined with a commitment to Mao Tse-tung, his interpretation of Communist doctrine, and a belief in the supremacy of politics. The continual struggle between being "red" and being "expert" was and is at the root of shifting educational policy. To be both "Red and Expert" is the ideal combination, but varying interpretations of China's needs by different factions of higher-echelon Communist leaders

force a choice between more or less ideological dogmatism, doctrinarism, politics, and productive labor or a pursuit of academic quality and excellence through a problem-solving perspective based on a realistic perception of the world. The shifting emphasis between "Red and Expert" can be summarized as a balance between political trustworthiness and competent expertise.

The forces working at cross purposes have been and continue to be basically two: the development of a modern industrialized state based on a core of professional, administrative, and technically-skilled people who can be defined as an elite; and the new Chinese person totally committed to carrying through Mao's continuing revolution. This basic choice has a direct impact on the schools' curricula, structure, personnel, administration, and operational climate. In pursuing the more stable and slower method, resources are allocated to educate the better but fewer students; on the other hand, the revolutionary approach is to educate minimally and indoctrinate thoroughly as many students as possible. Will the schools be used to develop and perpetuate a national elite or to educate for and practice egalitarianism? This is the either-or choice of the Chinese Communist political and educational leaders.

Springing from this basic choice are a host of contradictory forces amidst which the schools must function. The educationists are more interested in quality education; the political leaders more interested in quantity education

(or indoctrination). The choice centers on the political question of the allocation of resources. In addition to the size of the student population and its rate of increase being a countervailing force to quality education in China, there is the issue of productive-labor demands and political-activities participation that consumes students' time and diverts energy away from serious academic study. The Communists have attempted to accommodate both by condensing subjects, shortening courses, and reducing study-time requirements; with an inadequate number of qualified teachers, such actions spell disaster for the quality of academic-professional education.

Party and government educational planners face a crucial choice, whether to force the better students to work for months and lose valuable time studying, or to allow the more academically inclined to develop a technical-scientific expertise needed for national development and defense. The quality of teaching and research conducted by professors and scholars is also affected by their being required to participate in productive labor. Because of the increased pressure of part-work, part-study curricula, much time is wasted in developing academic quality among students and faculty.

Because of Mao's continual revolution and the dynamics of the class struggle, the problems resulting from conflicting forces have never been truly solved. The formal educational process is subjected to periodic revision of

content and method to meet new problems or to serve alternating political definitions. This created state of excitement and sustained tension discourages political complacency among the students and focuses their attention on future challenges rather than past victories.

Another internal inconsistency that shall never be resolved rests in the effect of education upon man. Although the Chinese Communists view the school as a sophisticated instrument to promote conformity, the very nature of formal education tends to spawn heterodox perceptions of the world and man's role therein. Schooling at the lower levels can be more indoctrination than liberal education. But if formal education is to contribute to China's economic progress, the training of experts must be more than political education. The advanced education of intellectuals and skilled experts must go beyond indoctrination and specialized technical training. Beyond a point, education nurtures analytical minds. Critical thinking is necessary if the state is to meet China's long-term needs. Such foresight and planning requires rational judgments by experts who have received a quality education. The problem endemic to Communist education is that truly educated people, with critical perspectives of the world, have no place in a Communist society, yet they are absolutely necessary for that society's industrial and agricultural progress.

Educational Forces of Cohesion and Disarray

Other social institutions impinge upon formal education and generate forces of internal cohesion and disarray in the functioning of the school system. The forces of cohesion concentrate the energy of the educational system on clearly definable and limited goals, with a greater likelihood of achieving them; the forces of disarray disperse that energy on sundry objectives, with a lesser likelihood of achieving them. Cohesive forces tend to pull the elements of a system together, while the disarray of elements within a system results from forces that undermine a unified institutional thrust. The forces of cohesion focus the various inputs and the desperate elements of a dynamic system on an internal process wherein all factors contribute to the achievement of the desired output. The forces of disarray within an institution have an opposite impact on both the process and the output.

To illustrate, urban and rural modes of formal education can be interpreted in light of the forces of cohesion and disarray. Educating a manpower pool for the urban, industrial sector forces the schooling process toward a unified function, for industrial skills are the same everywhere. For example, operating a lathe or making steel is the same whether in North or South China. Conversely, educating for the rural, agricultural sector disperses institutional energy because of the variety of

climatic and geographical conditions across China's landscape that must be accounted for in the nation-wide curricula. Agricultural conditions are not similar in North and South, or East and West China. Industrial education tends toward a unified internal pedagogical process, and agricultural education tends toward a diversified process.

Centralized party leadership of formal education is clearly a force of cohesion in the schools of China, while decentralized management of the nation's schools is a force of disarray. The administration of national-level resources by the Central Government is a force of cohesion, while the administration of educational resources by local governments is a countervailing force of disarray.

From the Communist perspective, educating people to participate in Socialist development has a cohesive effect on educational forces because institutional energy is expended on bringing people together in the support of one doctrine. Educating individuals, on the other hand, dissipates institutional energy because of the diverse interests across people. Not only do varied talents and cognitive styles have to be accommodated if students are educated toward self-development, but the limited resources of the system would be less efficiently used. People educated in the service of one cause--communism--are easier to control than are individuals educated in the service of their own potentials, as is the case in democratic societies.

An analysis using the forces of cohesion and disarray is also applicable to the manner in which the Chinese Communists meet the short-term and long-term development needs of education. Better overall planning anticipates long-term needs and provides for meeting these needs by investing resources that eventually yield educational dividends. Short-term needs are, by definition, unanticipated and resolved only through immediate expenditures that yield only results, not dividends. Investment and planning are cohesive forces that affect the educational subordinate system, and short-term expenditures are forces of disarray in that they solve immediate problems but do not serve to concentrate long-range institutional energies on the overall production of outputs.

What is a desirable output of the educational system depends on political perspective. By manipulating the forces of disarray, the supporters of Mao Tse-tung and his philosophy hope to ensure egalitarianism and to deny the development of an elite that might otherwise command the social system for its own purposes. Mao's opponents in the party try to manipulate the forces of cohesion in order to develop an expertise that can carry out the tasks of an agriculturally- and industrially-advanced society.

The Roles of the School in Building a New State

There can be little doubt as to the importance of the linkage between the educational system and other social

institutions. Formal education has a special mission unlike any other institution within the Chinese social system. Schools are tools used to train experts, develop mass support, and control many of the younger generations.

Schools train personnel for the economic, social, political, military, cultural, and other sectors of national life within the boundaries of the parent social system. Most, if not all, the trained expertise that staff the infrastructure of all formal institutions have passed through, and to varying degrees have been affected by, formal education. In the Chinese People's Republic schools were and are specifically designed to provide needed, specialized, technical and administrative personnel, without which a modern economy and society is impossible.

In building a new state the schools do more than train needed expertise to staff the various social institutions. Schools also attempt to develop a base of support among the masses for the political regime in power. A belief in China, in the Communist doctrine, and in the political leaders is generated among students, which is the reason for trying to get as many young, impressionable minds as possible into school and exposed to formal party teachings. Schools lay the foundation of long-term popular control through indoctrination. It is the chief institution available to the political leaders to ensure long-term mass support. The PLA can force immediate compliance with

political directives, but only mass support makes the regime safe from internal popular insurrection.

Schools are also institutions of control. If students are in school and under the supervision of teachers and party cadre, their conformity can be manipulated. This is especially important for urban youth who are highly concentrated in an environment that offers opportunity for non-constructive activities. In rural areas, youth are more scattered and involved in agricultural work. As an instrument of control, schools equip students through the work-study curricula to move into jobs upon graduation; in fact, graduates have strong pressure put upon them to go to the job assigned them. This procedure of training in school and job assignment after graduation is a mechanism to control the educated portion of the populace.

The influence of the party is everywhere felt in the formal educational system, as it is in the other social institutions within the Chinese social structure. Party control is a major feature in the various educational experiments that are conducted during periods of national development. Amidst educational variety there is the unity of political control; whatever the nature of the school system, the party looks after its political and educational interests. Without such an extensive control, the educational system can not be brought completely into the service of the state and the party.

The relationship between the party and the school system raises some interesting questions about the effectiveness of the political leaders to change the character of man by designing his formal education. In spite of the control exercised by the party, how responsive have the Chinese people been to continual indoctrination? What have been the points of conflict and of accommodation between the relatively new Communist dogma and the centuries-old Chinese ethos? As part of the control-indoctrination mechanism, how effective has the educational system been in building a new state? In fact, is the "education" of Socialist man most effectively conducted in the schools, no matter how completely controlled by the party? These questions are not easy to answer nor are the answers simple, but they are worth considering as students of East Asia witness the unfolding of the Communist state in China.

If a school system had not existed when the Communists took control of China, they would have had to create one in order to fulfill all the functions and services the schools perform. Formal education, as a social institution, is multi-purpose in the role it plays in the development of a new state. Because the school system is central to the life of the nation, it will continue to play a key role in the People's Republic of China.

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