ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAR ISSUES TREATED BY FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT IN SELECTED SPEECHES, OCTOBER 5, 1937 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Ralph Louis Towne, Jr.

1961

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAR ISSUES TREATED BY
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT IN SELECTED SPEECHES
OCTOBER 5, 1937 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941
presented by

Ralph Louis Towne, Jr.

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D. degree in Speech

Kenneth Hance
David C Ralph
Major professor

Date May 4, 1961

O-169

ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAR ISSUES TREATED BY FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT IN SELECTED SPEECHES, OCTOBER 5, 1937 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

By

Ralph Louis Towne, Jr.

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1961

ABSTRACT

ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAR ISSUES TREATED BY
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT IN SELECTED SPEECHES,
OCTOBER 5, 1937 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

by Ralph Louis Towne, Jr.

The purpose of this study was to investigate President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's active interest in changing the attitudes of the American people concerning the relationships of the United States to the war which began in 1939. This study was inspired by the premises that, as early as 1937, Roosevelt was concerned about the likelihood of America's involvement in a large-scale war, that he was unusually sensitive to public opinion, and that he sought to influence the American public to view the situation as he saw it. It was also inspired by the absence of clear and definitive analyses of Roosevelt's position on this issue, by the seeming contradictions between his "private" and his public statements on this matter, and by the absence of clear indications of his influence upon the American mind concerning this issue.

The following five basic questions were investigated: (1) What was Roosevelt's attitude in October, 1937, about the imminence of general war in Europe and/or the Far East? (2) Would the impending war be a threat to the peace and security of the United States? (3) What attitudes of the public worried the

President in his "private" communications? (4) Were these "private" worries the major issues treated in the public speeches on international affairs from October 5, 1937, to December 7, 1941? (5) What methods did Roosevelt use to develop the war issues in his speeches?

By means of a detailed analysis of Roosevelt's "private" communications, his public speeches, relevant historical materials, and indexes of public opinion, the following answers were formulated.

To questions one and two, it was found that by 1937, Roosevelt felt that there was a strong probability of general war. The situation was serious, and the President was aware of it. His fear was of a holocaust abroad so general and all-consuming that it would necessarily involve the United States.

The "private" communications of Roosevelt provided answers to question three. Roosevelt expressed particular anguish about three dangerous attitudes which he felt that the public held. First, he believed the public to be unaware of the dangers of the situation. Secondly, he believed that a policy of isolationism would lead to our destruction. And, thirdly, a policy of "peace at any price" was anathama to Roosevelt; and he felt that many of the public desired such a policy.

In answer to questions four and five, thirty-two speeches which the President delivered between October 5, 1937 (date of the "quarantine" address in Chicago) and December 7, 1941, were analyzed. With the addition of one issue not noted in the "private" communication of Roosevelt, i.e., a frequent call for the unity of spirit and effort of America, each of the three, major,

"private" issues appeared as a major element of the public speeches.

Finally, it was found that Roosevelt's most repeated methods of development of each of the four issues were ten. He made appeal to: (1) The love of country, democracy, justice, and the like; (2) The security of individual groups such as labor, businessmen, educators, etc.; (3) The security of the individual, with descriptions of the horrors perpetrated by the Axis powers; (4) The belief in unsupported generalizations as to the validity, or lack of validity, of particular policies and attitudes; (5) The history and traditions of the United States; (6) The statements and actions of the great leaders of early America; (7) The discrediting of men in disagreement with him; (8) The call for sacrifice by the members of the audience; (9) The use of causal argument supported by historical example; and (10) The personal strength which he had with the people, with oft repeated "I."

ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAR ISSUES TREATED BY FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT IN SELECTED SPEECHES, OCTOBER 5, 1937 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

By

Ralph Louis Towne, Jr.

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Speech

1961

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to take this opportunity to deeply and sincerely thank Dr. K. G. Hance, Dr. David C. Ralph, Dr. W. R. Underhill, my Mother and friends.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The present dissertation is designed to accomplish a dual purpose. The first pertains to the immediate purpose of the work; the second will be clarified by examination of the long-range contributions of the study.

Purpose of the Study

Immediate Purpose

The immediate purpose of the dissertation is to discover the way in which Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to influence public opinion regarding the war issue in the years from October 5, 1937 (the delivery of the "Quarantine" speech in Chicago) to December 7, 1941 (the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor). More specifically, an examination will be made, first, to discover what beliefs concerning war participation by the United States Roosevelt wanted to secure from the American people through his public addresses; and, second, what methods in his speeches he used to win the public acceptance of the beliefs.

At no time in this study will answers to two further problems be proposed or implied. No consideration will be made of: (1) Roosevelt's personal "desire," or lack thereof, for the participation of the United States in the war, and (2) the President's activity, or lack thereof, concerned with

the maintenance of peace. This clarification is made necessary by, and with the full recognition of, the number of attempts designed to show that, for one reason or another, Franklin Roosevelt wanted the United States involved in a war. Furthermore, some studies contend that Roosevelt bent all his efforts to achieve that end. Although the investigation of these two problems might prove valuable, it is beyond the scope of the present work.

Long-Range Purpose

The present study should give us one phase of a much broader area of interest. Enough investigation of a similar nature, of other issues and other presidents, could produce further understanding of the role of the United States President in the management of public opinion in times of crisis. This dissertation will supply us with some material upon which to form future generalizations about this presidential function. Also, it will contribute one possible method of examination, so that future work can be more easily undertaken and completed.

Justification

Inherent Value

The Presidency of the United States is probably one of the most demanding and complicated public offices that the world has ever known. Particularly in times of crisis, the President is faced with the responsibility of making decisions which may not always be to the public's liking, although the decisions

may well reflect the best interests of the public. With the judicious use of "hindsight" we feel certain, today, that our participation in World War II was quite unavoidable. We are confident that sooner or later, Hitler and Tojo would have glanced in our direction with an eye to the conquest of one of the richest war prizes in world history. As of 1935-36, however, with the debate and passage of neutrality legislation, the controlling American sentiment concerning United States foreign policy was neutralism. Without too much worry about overstatement, one could defend the idea that isolationism might even be a more accurate and descriptive picture of the public attitude at that time than neutralism.

The setting was complete: the greatest crisis that history could yet devise, and a nation of people willing to build a twentieth century "Great Wall." In such a situation, what methods could the leader use, if his own belief so directed, to change the general attitude? What is his responsibility for doing the job?

The inherent importance of the present study, thus, lies in the magnitude of each factor involved, i.e., the Presidency of a country destined to become the major world protector of freedom, and a citizenry with the widely held opinion that "that is not our war." The question, in its simplest form, involves the age-old problem of getting individuals to accept their responsibilities. Daily we observe persons, be they statesmen, ministers, or teachers, who are trying to get people to do one thing, accept responsibility. An examination of the problem anew, in the worst of times, should extend our

insight.

Distinctiveness

As the literature is examined, one discovers that there are many works that deal with public opinion, a wealth of material that treats the field of propaganda, and many studies in persuasion. The investigations in public opinion and propaganda have been made, mainly, by men in sociology, political science, history, and closely allied disciplines. They try to discover and define the elements of propaganda, and they work to clarify the components governing public opinion. Also, on many issues (including World War II), studies yield much information concerning attitudes held by the public at a given time.

If, however, one tries to find a study which examines the practical application of propaganda and public opinion theory, either in its use or effect, one has a more difficult task. Very little study has been made of the practice and effect of the theories. We must, then, find the discipline that concerns itself with the use of the theory as well as with the creation of the theory alone.

This is where the person who is interested in public address and rhetoric can make a contribution. By combining the theories of control of public attitude with the theories of rhetoric and rhetorical analysis, a profitable result can be obtained. At least at the level of public utterance, the rhetorician can begin to discover what has been tried by different speakers; then, he can work to establish valid comments regarding the effect of the various techniques. With

history supplying the cases, and an extensive number of these cases studied by the rhetoricians, reliable recommendations can be evolved for future speakers.

As long as a contribution can be made by the student of public address, the question, then, is whether or not such a study has been made of Franklin Roosevelt and the war issue. Of the many works concerning this man that have been completed, only one seems to bear enough relationship to the problems of the present study to demand comparison and contrast. The work is the dissertation written by Earnest Brandenburg at the State University of Iowa in 1948, entitled An Analysis and Criticism of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Speeches on International Affairs Delivered Between September 3, 1939, and December 7, 1941.

Important enough is the excellent Brandenburg, two-volume, almost one thousand page dissertation, that it will now be examined to point out the major differences between it and the present project.

The primary differences between this study and the Brandenburg work are the following:

1. The most important distinction has to do with the basic purposes of the two works. As previously stated, the present dissertation examines Roosevelt's methods used to influence public opinion concerning American participation in World War II. The study will try to find the President's purposes when he dealt with the people's attitudes in his public utterances, and will try to examine his methods of achieving those purposes.

Brandenburg was interested in a classical study of seventeen speeches by Roosevelt on international affairs. Brandenburg studied the organization, style, delivery, arguments and proofs (These were the arguments and proofs of Roosevelt in answer to the major attacks that were made against him.), etc. The study is interested little, if at all, in inventional matters dealing with action and reaction. Brandenburg analyzes the attacks made on the President and his answer to the attacks. Little examination of Roosevelt's intent, and manner of execution, is made. Only slight examination of what Roosevelt wanted the public to be convinced is made. Thus, we see what the arguments were, but we are not given insight as to what the arguments were trying to accomplish. This, of course, is the entire basis of the present work.

2. The present dissertation has, at its base, an examination, and correlation, of the public statements of Franklin Delano Roosevelt concerning war participation with his thinking on the issues as he expressed it in: his available private correspondence, his closed-door committee sessions for which records are obtainable, biographies of him, autobiographies and biographies by and about close associates, notes to Congress, directives to various members of the official 'family', and any other sources that may reflect the more 'personal' views of the man on the issues. From this approach we come better to understand Roosevelt's attitudes as they found expression in his public utterances. If we can arrive at a clearer picture of the more 'private' statements of his

attitudes on a given issue, and compare these attitudes with the statements expressed in his public speeches, we shall be able more adequately to interpret the meaning and intent of the public addresses.

For the action-reaction analysis, the above comparison is even more significant when one remembers that the words which a speaker uttered may, or may not, necessarily reflect what he believed. A study of the content of a speech may, or may not, give insight into what the speaker wanted to accomplish with that speech. The speaker's "ulterior purpose" may, or may not, bear any similarity to the "specific purpose" for a given speech. We have only to think of the politician, talking to an audience of women in an election year, speaking on the "Joys of Motherhood," to realize this truth. Just because a man says one thing it should not be assumed he does not want something quite different. The more clearly we can understand the speaker's mind, the more accurately we can interpret the content of his speeches with regard to means and ends, action and reaction.

The rhetoricians have long known of the power of "suggestion." Much theorizing has been done on the subject. We know that a speaker may appear to be saying one thing, and actually we know that he is trying to accomplish something entirely different. With this possible use of "suggestion," much more than just the word-for-word meaning of the speech must be understood to have any kind of insight to the material of the speech. Much more must be examined to understand the speaker. Much more must be studied to arrive at conclusions

regarding the speaker's action and the meaningfulness of the audience response.

Thus, there is another major difference between the Brandenburg dissertation and the present study. For his purposes, he felt quite justifiably that the public statements of Roosevelt were the necessary factors that needed treatment. In contrast, the validity of the present work depends greatly on a comparison and contrast of Franklin Roosevelt's public and private opinions to find the similarities and any differences that exist.

3. To discuss Roosevelt's methods of changing "public opinion" without establishing a definition of "public opinion" would be folly. Therefore, the present study surveys the literature of public opinion to arrive at a definition. Also, it is helpful to name the process used by Roosevelt. At first glance it could either be called "persuasion" or "propaganda." A review of the literature is necessary to distinguish between the two terms so that the best title for the purposes of this study can be selected.

Both of these investigations are entirely foreign to the Brandenburg dissertation.

4. The time span of the present study involves a wider period than that of the dissertation by Brandenburg. Rather than beginning with the formal declaration of war in Europe in September of 1939, we have extended the span to encompass the highly significant speech given in Chicago on October 5, 1937. Thus, rather than seventeen speeches, the present dissertation tries to deal with thirty-two.

Limitations

The major limitation of the study outside of the central three, i.e., Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the speaker, the Second World War as the major issue, and the time span (October 5, 1937 to December 7, 1941), is in the speeches selected for analysis. They are thirty-two in number and the process of their selection will be treated in Chapter IV.

Special Abbreviations

For the purpose of brief footnoting, the following special abbreviations have been used:

FDRL--Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PPF--President's Personal File

PSF--President's Secretary's File

OF--Official File

Plan of Organization

To fulfill the purposes of the study, the following structure has been used:

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I, "Formulation of Terms"

- A. A definition of "Public Opinion" is made.
- B. Roosevelt's definition of "Public Opinion" is developed.
- C. The import of "Public Opinion" to Roosevelt and his sensitivity to it are studied.
- D. "Persuasion" and "Propaganda" are compared to arrive at a term for Roosevelt's efforts at changing the sentiments of the people.

CHAPTER II, "The Background and The Audience"

- A. World affairs, at the beginning of the period examined in the dissertation, are reviewed.
- B. Public attitudes about the world affairs as measured by opinion polls and legislative

activity are examined.

CHAPTER III, "Roosevelt's Thinking Regarding the War"

A. Roosevelt's private correspondence, memos, committee meetings, etc., are examined with the hope that such material might help to suggest his "thinking" on the possibility of European and Far Eastern war and the responsibility of the United States in such an eventuality.
B. An effort is made to discover the nature of the major issues on which Roosevelt felt the public opinion had to be changed.

CHAPTER IV, "Roosevelt's Speaking on International Affairs - October 5, 1937--December 7, 1941

A. A comparison of the issues of the speeches with the issues of the "private" materials is made to observe similarities and contrasts.
B. Roosevelt's methods of development of each issue are examined.

CHAPTER V, "Public Opinion Polls and Roosevelt's Speaking: A Correlation

A. A correlation is made of the many public opinion polls taken between October, 1937, and December, 1941, and Roosevelt's thirty-two public addresses treated in the dissertation.
B. The issues are examined in terms of the public opinion polls that would reflect each issue.

CHAPTER VI, "Summary and Conclusion"

A. The ideas of the dissertation are collected and reasserted.
B. Suggestions for further study are made.

With the use of this plan of organization, we shall now proceed with the study.

CHAPTER I

FORMULATION OF TERMS

As a man's efforts to influence public opinion are studied, two problems of terminology arise. First, some decision must be made concerning the meaning of "public opinion." Over what is the man trying to have an influence? And, secondly, the study would be advanced by having some term with which to name the process involved in the attempt to influence the opinions or attitudes. Under what central classification may we group findings as to the man's methods and approach? The present chapter is designed to answer these two questions so that, as the study proceeds, we can understand specifically what it is that Roosevelt tried to change when he worked to modify the attitudes of the public, and, also, so that we can clearly title the process involved in trying to modify the attitudes of the people by the use of the public platform.

Public Opinion

It is not a new observation that public opinion has been defined and redefined in many ways. One can gain insight into the range of attempted definitions for the term by examining Chapter I of William Albig's Modern Public Opinion.[1]

---

[1] Wm. Albig, Modern Public Opinion (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 1-16.

In this chapter Albig tries to point out some of the different approaches that have been taken, and attitudes that have been held, regarding the term. The conclusion that the reader can reach from the Albig investigation is that the term has many possible phases, and that a particular definition must be arrived at to suit the individual interests of the particular researcher. If one comprehensive definition is to be established for "public opinion", the definition must be of a general nature permitting much latitude to the individual critic to emphasize one or another phase of it to meet his individual needs.

About as generalized a statement as can be found for "public opinion" is that presented by Powell, who states that "we conclude, therefore, that public opinion is the judgment, attitudes, and beliefs of a group of people at a particular time and place."[2]

Though this begins to present a number of necessary characteristics of public opinion, there is some advantage to include a bit more specificity with regard to the kinds of things about which the attitudes are formed and to the matter of the meaning of "group". In other words, with what does public opinion concern itself, and are there reasonable limitations to the "public" under consideration? Albig states that "I have defined opinion as any type of expression about controversial subjects. And I have defined a public as any

---

[2]N. J. Powell, Anatomy of Public Opinion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p.4.

kind of group within which interaction on controversial subjects has occurred."[3]

Therefore, public opinion must concern itself with controversial subjects and groups of people who, in some sense, are in interaction on those subjects. With the addition of these two elements to the Powell definition, public opinion becomes "the expression by members of publics on controversial subjects."[4]

With this definition as a basis for consideration, it is of some interest to examine what Franklin D. Roosevelt felt public opinion to be. To whom was he appealing in his public address on the war issue? Would this concept of public opinion be compatible with the foregoing definition? And, lastly, was he sensitive to the responses of the group involved?

Roosevelt On The Definition Of Public Opinion

> As I have stated earlier such an individual [an administrator, legislator, executive, or similarly placed person] who is presumably responsive to public opinion has to assess public opinion as it comes to his attention in terms of the functional organization of society to which he is responsive. He has to view that society in terms of groups of divergent influence; in terms of organizations with different degrees of power; in terms of individuals with followings; in terms of indifferent people--all, in other words, in terms of what and who counts

---

[3] J. W. Albig, "The Determinants of Public Opinion," The Polls and Public Opinion (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1949), p. 112.

[4] Ibid.

in his part of the social world.[5]

The goal of any politician, and Roosevelt in particular, in the United States can be fulfilled successfully only if that politician is able to receive the support of the people at the polls. One element of public opinion, then, that is necessary to the politician is the approval of the public as that approval is registered by their voting. Another action that helps, particularly in the case of the chief executive of the country, is the pressure placed upon the legislators of the country by the people. That Franklin Roosevelt was able to win votes can be evidenced by his election to the office of President for four consecutive terms. That he was aware of the second factor can be illustrated by a letter from him to Mrs. Ogden Mills Reid in June of 1940.

> You tell me in your letter of May thirty-first that thinking Americans are a long way ahead of Congress. Of course they are. Congress is but a responsive legislative agency of the people. As the people think and speak the Congress acts.
>
> Otherwise, and I put the question in all fairness and friendliness, do you think there would be laws on the statute books today which insure bank deposits; provide for old age security; regulate wages and hours; enable the government to provide cheap power and light; protect the homes of those who live in our cities and on our farms and lend them money to build new homes and to promote the general welfare of the people in many other ways that were not possible until recent years?
>
> Do you think the Congress would be passing national defence measures, totaling more than four billion dollars and passing them almost unanimously unless thinking Americans were a long way ahead of our legislators?[6]

---

[5]Herbert Blumer, "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," American Sociological Review, XIII (1948), 547.

[6]Letter from FDR to Helen Mills (Mrs. Ogden Mills Reid), June 6, 1940, FDRL, PPF 897.

Roosevelt probably did not offer a concise definition of public opinion. To arrive at what he considered it to be, however, can be done with relative ease upon examination of a few of his remarks concerning it.

> One of our most difficult tasks has been to get news in factual form to the people of the United States [underlining my own]. This is true notwithstanding that factual reports relating to the world crisis and our own domestic affairs have been and are being prepared and given to the press and radio almost hourly.
>
> .....
>
> I did not speak on the radio the other Sunday evening because I wanted to. I spoke in order to give a report to the people of the United States [underlining my own]--to give them facts about the international situation and our situation at home--facts they needed because so many fanciful and confusing statements had been made regarding our national defence, our Army and Navy and the government itself.
>
> .....
>
> All of which brings me back to your opening thesis that "thinking among Americans is a long way ahead of Congress."
>
> To this I say:
>
> "Thank God!"
>
> Were it otherwise the very fabric of our democracy--which after all is government by public opinion--would be in danger of disintegration.[7]

It is fairly clear that Roosevelt felt the influential public opinion to be the "people of the United States." He would probably suggest that to him the "people of the United States" might be confined to the voting public, the people who, by their letters and finally their vote, were the selectors of

---

[7] Ibid.

American policy.

That this definition of public opinion by Roosevelt, i.e., the voting American public which asserts itself, in this case on the war issue, is consistent with our previously established concept of public opinion is clear. The two characteristics called for were an interacting group expressing itself and a controversial subject. The group is large to Roosevelt--the American voting public--but it is interacting and expressing itself at the polls and through the pressure it exerts on the Congress by the mails, pressure groups, etc. The group is not unreasonably large, however, when the size of the issue involved is recognized. The issue involves American participation in world affairs, isolationism vs. possible involvement in the impending European struggle.

Roosevelt's Interest In Public Opinion

For us to posit that any politician, any President of the United States could be completely insensitive to the state of public attitudes would, of course, be folly. At least to the time of office-taking the President has to care enough for the vote to win the necessary majority. Thus, it goes without saying that some interest in, and sensitivity to, public opinion is a basic requisite of any elected official. Upon examination of Franklin Roosevelt's interest in public opinion, however, we find an exceptional sensitivity to the feelings of the public. Frequently, in his private and public statements he evidences his awareness of, and interest in, public opinion.

In a statement on the NIRA in June of 1933 he says:

> Finally, this law is a challenge to our whole people. There is no power in America that can force against the public will such action as we require. But there is no group in America that can withstand the force of an aroused public opinion. This great cooperation can succeed only if those who bravely go forward to restore jobs have aggresive public support and those who lag are made to feel the full weight of public disapproval.[8]

To Ray Stannard Baker in 1935 Roosevelt wrote:

> There is another thought which is involved in continuous leadership--whereas in this country there is a free and sensational Press, people tire of seeing the same name day after day in the important headlines on the papers, and the same voice night after night over the radio. For example, if since last November I had tried to keep up the pace of 1933 and 1934, the inevitable histrionics of the new actors. Long and Coughlin and Johnson, would have turned the eyes of the audience away from the main drama itself! I am inclined to think that in view of the unfolding of the domestic scene and now of the foreign scene, you are right in your thought that the time is soon at hand for a new stimulation of united American action. I am proposing that very thing before the year is out.[9]

About Roosevelt's interest in public opinion Grace Tully comments that:

> Franklin Roosevelt had a profound respect for the judgment of the American people and for the power of public opinion. As a realist in the field of politics he knew full well that no force could gain more quick response from a legislative body than a spontaneous expression of public reaction, either pro or con.[10]

Louis Howe notes in an article for The American Magazine that:

the President has always insisted that he be sent daily a

---

[8]S. I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Randon House, 1938), II, Item 81, p. 254.

[9]Letter from FDR to Ray Stannard Baker, March 20, 1935, FDRL, PPF 2332.

[10]Grace Tully, FDR: My Boss (New York: Chas. Scribners Sons, 1949), p. 86.

> batch of letters picked at random from the miscellaneous mail. These letters which might well be handled by departments direct, but the President likes to see a cross section of the daily mail, and not infrequently answers, himself, some of the letters contained in this batch.[11]

Finally, we gain some awareness of Roosevelt's concern with public opinion from Rosenman. In his Working With Roosevelt he pictures for us various actions of Roosevelt being controlled by the attitudes of the people of the United States.

> But he had made a mistake that he seldom made--the mistake of trying to lead the people of the United States too quickly, and before they had been adequately informed of the facts or spiritually prepared for the event... "It's a terrible thing," he once said to me, having in mind, I am sure, this occasion [the responses to the 'Quarantine' Speech], "to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead--and to find no one there."
> Having gone too far out on a limb too fast, he decided the next day at his press conference that he had better get back, or at least not go out any further.[12]

Thus, we are able to judge, both from his own testimony and from the statements of some of his most intimate associates, that the President was quite interested in, and sensitive to, public opinion. He was not only interested in discovering it, but was also interested in controlling his actions by it.

Propaganda vs. Persuasion

After understanding the group to which the Chief

---

[11]Louis Howe, "The President's Mailbag, "The American Magazine, CXVII (June, 1934), 118.

[12]S. I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 167.

Executive was trying to appeal, what can we call the process involved in the appeal? When Roosevelt took to the platform in an effort to secure the support of the voting public for his beliefs on the "right" course of action for the United States in international affairs, what was he doing?

This question would frequently get one of two responses. Many men might answer that the President was trying to "propagandize" the public with a desire to secure their support. The responders would conclude that the process was one of "propaganda." Other people would suggest that Roosevelt was trying to "persuade" the American people to believe his views. This group would conclude that the process was one of "persuasion."

So loose have these two terms, "propaganda" and "persuasion" become in our language that some would view them as inseparable and synonymous. For this reason a comparison of the terms is in order to see whether or not a difference does exist. And, if a legitimate distinction is present, we shall, after making the comparison, be able to more accurately describe the process in which Roosevelt engaged.

To accomplish the comparison, material has been selected in the hope that it is the best, or at least the most representative, of the present-day literature available. Each of the two terms will be treated individually to describe their essential characteristics. Then, the comparison will be made to find similarities and differences. With the

completion of the comparison, definite conclusions will be drawn concerning the use of each term.

Elements of Propaganda

A. The Purpose of Propaganda

To most of the authors examined, the process of propaganda has as its purpose the changing of audience belief and attitude[13] for the influencing of action[14] to secure social control.[15] The propagandist wants control of the peoples' actions gained through a changing of their beliefs in the direction of his own beliefs so that he may control the given situation. Lerner's statement adds clarification to the purpose of propaganda. He says that "propaganda, in war or peace, is first and always an instrument of policy."[16]

B. The Propagandist

1. Often the idea is stressed that the propagandist

---

[13]D. Lerner, "Effective Propaganda: Conditions and Evaluation," Propaganda in War and Crisis, ed. by D. Lerner [Also see Hans Speier, "Morale and Propaganda," Propaganda in War and Crisis, p. 10, and F. C. Bartlett, "The Aims of Political Propaganda," Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. by D. Katz et al. (New York: Dryden, 1956), pp. 455-456.]

[14]Alfred Lee and E. Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1939), p. 15. [Also see D. Lerner, Ibid., p. 348.]

[15]L. W. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 75.

[16]D. Lerner, "Introduction," op. cit., p. xiii.

must clearly recognize his purpose.[17] Without the purpose clearly in mind, the experts feel and stress the inability of the propagandist to accomplish his task. "The Propagandist's maxim must be: know thy goals; know thy conditions."[18]

2. Very frequently the propagandist is considered to be a group, and most of the time the group is thought to be of some size like a national government or the like.
3. The prestige of the propagandist plays a big role in acceptance of the material that is being handed out by him.

C. The Propagandee

1. The experts are most consistent in discussing the propagandee (with the exception of Doob) in speaking of the audience as a mass, a large number of people. The idea states that "Propaganda is language aimed at large masses: it sends words, and other symbols such as pictures, through radio, press, and film, where they reach huge audiences."[19]

---

[17] H. D. Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda," Reader in Public Opinion and Communications, ed. by B. Berelson and M. Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 178. [Also see D. Lerner, "Effective Propaganda: Conditions and Evaluation," Ibid., p. 349.]

[18] D. Lerner, Ibid., p. 353.

[19] B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1946), p. 1.

2. As will be noted in the discussion concerned with the purpose of propaganda, audience beliefs and attitudes play a major role in propaganda. The audience must, therefore, be studied prior to the production of the propaganda to permit the propagandist to know where his auditors stand on the issue at hand. This is inclusive of primitive instincts and prejudices of the audience.[20] The study will also produce information concerning the important condition of the "predisposition" of the audience to accept the propagandist's point of view.[21]

D. The Propaganda Message

1. Substance of the message

a. All of the men speak of the message being composed of symbols. They generally show an understanding of symbol as inclusive of a relatively wide category of stimuli which will elicit responses commonly in large groups of people and, then, for the remainder of their discussion will dwell on the sub-category, words and language.

---

[20]G. S. Viereck, Spreading the Germs of Hate (New York: Horace Liveright, 1930), p. 4.

[21]D. Lerner, op. cit., p. 347.

b. Rather often there is a treatment of the "difference" between propaganda and education. Somehow or other, this always seems to lead to material designed for knowledge and understanding--education--and material designed for inculcated, unreasoned acceptance--propaganda.[22]

c. The material must stand out from its competing ground;[23] it must get the attention of the audience.[24]

2. Techniques

If the list of techniques discussed by the various writers were to be definitive, and each were individually discussed, the task of coverage would lack clarity. To avoid this objection, selection has been made, hoping to be only representative of the whole.

a. Repetition.[25]

---

[22]F. C. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 465. [Also see A. Lee, How to Understand Propaganda (New York: Rinehart, 1952), p. 17; B. F. Kamins, Basic Propaganda (Los Angeles: Houlgate House, 1951, p. 55; Wm. Albig, Modern Public Opinion, p. 292.]

[23]L. W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1948 p. 413.

[24]D. Lerner, op. cit., p. 347.

[25]L. W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda, pp. 317-318. [Also see B. F. Kamins, op cit., p. 68; H. Kumata and W. Schramm, "The Propaganda of the German Nazis, "Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (Univ. of Illinois Communication Center in conjunction with the U. S. Information Agency, Jan., 1955), pp 49 50.]

b. "We come to see that there are at least four major abuses of the laws of reasoning. There are suppression, distortion, diversion, and fabrication."[26]

c. "Concretely, the activity consists of 'camoflaging', 'coloring', 'creating', 'distorting', 'failing to specify', and 'suppressing', with the result that the material used in propaganda is 'biased', 'deceptive', 'exaggerated', not 'fair', 'inadequate', 'insidious', 'misleading', 'one sided', not plausible, and 'subtle'; or in other words, propaganda consists of 'interpretations', 'misinformation', 'smoke-screening', 'a skillful marshalling', and an 'indifference to truth'..."[27]

d. Use of slogans and humor.[28]

e. Use of stereotypes, rumors, and whispering campaigns.[29]

f. Use of universals, getting approval for some-

---

[26]F. E. Lumley, The Propaganda Menace (New York: The Century Co., 1933), p. 116.

[27]L. W. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Techniques, p. 75.

[28]Wm. Albig, op. cit., pp. 103-105.

[29]L. W. Doob, "Goebbel's Principles of Propaganda," Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. by D. Katz et al., p. 517. [Also see H. Kumata, op. cit., pp. 51, 52, & 55.]

thing because "everyone believes" or because "they say."[30]

Although only one or two authors have been cited for each technique, it should be remembered that except for items (b) and (c), the items were selected because they are generally considered by almost all experts on propaganda. Items (b) and (c) were included because between them there seem to be condensed into two short statements most of the descriptive adjectives used by other writers either wholly or in part to describe the techniques of propaganda. In most of the authors, the difference is simply that the terms are scattered throughout their works rather than being summarized as Lumley and Doob have done.

E. The Channels

Mass media seem to be the one consideration of the propagandist. He generally has in mind the radio, movies, TV, etc.

Elements of Persuasion

A. The Purpose of Persuasion

The general purpose of the persuasive speech is to win belief and/or secure action;[31] it is to change the

---

[30] L. W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda, p. 374.

[31] W. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 33.

psychological orientation of the listeners;[32] it is to "modify thought and action by manipulating the motives of men toward predetermined ends."[33] (See page 10, item A.)

B. The Persuader

1. The purposes, the propositions, of the persuader are of prime importance to the persuader; and on these he must be clear and accurate in expression.[34] It is the purpose of the speaker which distinguishes the persuasive speech, and therefore, the purpose is of prime importance.[35] (See page 10, item B, 1.)
2. The concept of size of the persuading force goes virtually unconsidered. It seems that the implication is that the persuader may vary in size from one individual to the large group. The greater part of the material does seem, though, to be written for consideration by the individual.
3. The "ethos" of the speaker is one of the major factors to be considered in the persuading of an audience.[36]

---

[32] R. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (2nd ed.; New York: Longmans, Green, 1957), P. 8.

[33] W. L. Brembeck and W. S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 24.

[34] W. Minnick, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

[35] R. Oliver, op. cit., p. 8.

[36] W. Minnick, op. cit., pp. 112-113. [Also see W. L. Brembeck and W. S. Howell, op. cit., pp. 244-260.]

The term "communicator credibility" has been used by at least one writer in the field.[37] (See page 11, item B, 3.)

4. Elements of the speaker's delivery are considered.

C. The Persuadee

1. No real specification as to size is made; this implies, as with the persuader, that the number may vary from one to many. The material seems to be directed to the "average" auditorium size audience.
2. Analysis of the audience and occasion play a significant role in the treatment of persuasion. Large sections (three chapters in Minnick, four chapters in Brembeck and Howell, three chapters in Oliver) deal directly with audience and/or occasion analysis while other materials are found throughout the remainder of the texts. These materials are designed to analyze desires, wants, values, and bodily needs of the persuadees that might be appealed to in the persuasive speech. (See page 12, item C, 2.)

D. The Persuasive Message

1. Substance

a. Treatment is apparent concerning the "getting and holding of attention."[38] Much stress is

---

[37] L. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale Univ. Pres, 1953), Chap. 2.

[38] W. Minnick, op. cit., chap. 3. [Also see R. Oliver, op. cit., chap. 6; and W. L. Brembeck and W. S. Howell, op. cit., chap. XIV.]

placed on the idea that without the attention of the auditors, no real persuasion can take place. (See page 13, item D, 1. c.)

b. The persuasive message itself should be composed of evidence and authoritative proof,[39] logical argument,[40] and emotional argument.[41] Thus, remembering the importance of "ethos", the three classic elements of persuasion appear, i.e., Logos, Pathos, and Ethos.

c. Organization of the materials is treated by each of the authors examined.

2. Techniques

All of the techniques in (a) of this section appear in the three texts in one form or another.

a. Suggestion, common ground, rationalization, repetition, word manipulations.

b. Oliver treats further "avoidance of direct attack," "camouflaging of direct attack", "directing appeal to self-interest."

c. "As we have said, effective persuasion usually

---

[39] R. Oliver, Ibid., chap. 9.

[40] W. Minnick, op. cit., pp. 149-170. [Also see R. Oliver. Ibid., pp. 224-245; W. L. Brembeck and W. S. Howell, op. cit., pp. 188-240; L. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, op. cit., p. 11.]

[41] W. Minnick, Ibid., pp. 223-228. [Also see R. Oliver, Ibid., pp. 256-257; W. L. Brembeck and W. S. Howell, Ibid., pp. 21-22.]

ties in the new and the old."[42]

d. Brembeck and Howell treat the "scapegoat", the "Big Lie", and the "strategy of terror" techniques by way of informing the student of possible approaches. Their point of view is that these techniques are "bad", and that the techniques are not to be used under what Brembeck and Howell choose to see as persuasion. They do accept the idea that "some" do use the techniques and they are desirous of limiting the further use by education of the student.

Comparison and Evaluation of Propaganda and Persuasion

It should be noted, first, and most important, that the basic purposes of propaganda and persuasion are similar enough, even in wording, to appear, for all intents and purposes, to be identical. The generalized purpose of each activity, if indeed they are truly two activities, is to change belief, attitudes, and actions of people. The present examination would indicate decisively that the purpose of the two activities is the same.

While there is a great deal of further over-lapping of many of the characteristics of propaganda and persuasion, there are at least three differences that seem worthy of note.

First, there is a difference when referring to the size

---

[42]C. R. Miller, The Process of Persuasion (New York: Crown Publishers, 1946), p. 36.

of the receivers of the propaganda and the persuasion. In this difference of size fits also the difference of the relative size of the propagandist and the persuader. The propaganda literature tends to consider the large agency or group when discussing the propagandist, while the authors of the persuasion materials seem to run the gamut from one to many with particular emphasis on the individual.

If this is the basis upon which division of propaganda and persuasion is to be made, it would be unfortunate for two reasons. First, when trying to decide among small, medium, large, really large, etc., one runs into the old problem of defining "how big is big." If the size description is adopted as the distinguishing characteristic, will we not eventually end up with "micro-persuasion," "macro-persuasion," "micro-propaganda," "macro-propaganda," etc.? Secondly, even though we do discover modification in theory to be necessary for differing size conditions, are these not simply qualifications rather than whole new classes of "things?"

The second apparent difference that seems possible when we contrast the two sets of characteristics given has to do with the major elements through which propaganda and persuasion operate. Authors in propaganda refer to the prestige of the source and the emotional (motivational) factors of the material as being the source of the influence of propaganda. The writers of persuasion theory tend to add a third factor, the use of logical argument. The propaganda experts tend to shy away from "understanding," while the persuasion theorists insist upon the

strength of understanding as an aid to produce the desired results.

The prime difficulty here seems to be the establishment of the old "conviction-persuasion," "mind-emotion" duality. We are far too aware of the meaningless argument that arises in this bifurcation to accept any distinction of propaganda and persuasion based on this difference.

A final possible distinction is certainly the most dangerous of the three. It is also the most difficult of the three to get one's hands on. While it is true that there is much defense of propaganda in the literature as being an amoral force, as being neither "good" nor "bad," as not involving value judgment terms, it is also true that the literature is replete with material which makes one doubt the validity of the amoral claims. The writers in propaganda have included in their descriptions of the techniques of propaganda such heavily "loaded" terms that it is hard to reach any conclusion other than that propaganda is an immoral force. Distortion, fabrication, suppresion, use of gossip, etc., begin to give one the feeling that propaganda should be feared by rational man. Add to that the Albig statement that:

> The propagandist may become a liar. He is often driven by the logic of events to more and more extreme falsehoods. He creates stories about the opposing leaders, falsifies statistics, creates news stories, starts rumors and in many ways falsifies the process of discussion.[43]

---

[43] Wm. Albig, op. cit., p. 323.

With such extreme cases of "loaded language" the propagandist endangers our desire for clear, objective research in the field. Though social utility is a valuable end, one tool for achieving this--propaganda--is lost to the thinking man on the grounds of morality.

On the other hand, the study of persuasion also can be thwarted and misdirected by considerations of morality. Though quite the opposite difficulty is present in persuasion literature, limitations on objective research are indicated. Propaganda investigations, and the interpretation of investigations, can be hampered by semantic reactions developed by the constant use of "loaded language." Persuasion research can be hampered by an insistence on merely brief investigation of phenomena because of the immorality involved. Granted, the warning presented by Brembeck and Howell concerning "The Big Lie" technique, etc., was made to the undergraduate students who might study the text. Is it not true, however, that this sort of thinking could extend itself even to the scholar trying to produce a definitive study of the process? When this occurs, is it not true that research might fail to be complete--might avoid exhaustive examination--so that a particular code of morality could be defended?

Thus, the separation of the two terms on the basis of distinctions of morality leaves much to be desired. As long as propaganda and persuasion have a common purpose, i.e., the influencing of people in their beliefs, attitudes and actions, what can we conclude regarding the definition of each

if morality is to be considered an issue? Simply stated, the distinction must be: "Anything I do to change beliefs, attitudes, and actions is persuasion: anything my enemy does is propaganda." Surely this cannot be a satisfactory position to accept.

Summary and Conclusions

When a comparison of the two terms, propaganda and persuasion, is made, little apparent difference is discovered in the two concepts. Though a distinction might be made in terms of size of audience considered, no inherent difference is made clear in the processes. A second distinction involves the unsatisfactory, classic dichotomy of intellect-emotion. The problem of definition in this distinction makes its use almost impossible. Finally, though it might be interesting for us to divide the concepts in terms of morality, it is a weak approach for two reasons. Literature in both fields offers claims of amorality. And, secondly, the distinction leads to calling the activity of the self or a friend one thing, and calling an enemy's similar activity something else. The present examination would lead us to conclude, therefore, that propaganda and persuasion are essentially synonymous terms for one and the same process.

This conclusion leaves us with only one further question. That is, which of the two terms would be the better to use?

There is one serious weakness in the term "propaganda"

for use in objective investigation. The difficulty lies in the materials that must be accepted along with the acceptance of the term itself. As indicated before, many of the methods attributed to propaganda have been named with symbols that seem to cause unfavorable semantic reactions even in the most objective of scholars. If this is true of the serious student, is it not even more true of the majority of people who will make use of the study? Propaganda, then, no matter how many claims are made for its essential amorality, is limited in usefulness. Good critical reading and investigation are difficult to make of the results of the study done in its name.

Persuasion, in contrast to this, offers a bit different and perhaps not insurmountable difficulty. In the face of equally strong claims of amorality for persuasion, we have found evidence of moral judgments concerning certain methods. If this attitude be extended too far, the danger could be a limiting factor on investigation of any matters that apparently are not in accordance with a particular moral code. When and if this occurs, research stops. So long as we guard against the possibility of such limitation being imposed on research, however, we have a useful term at our disposal.

Thus, in the present work, whenever there is an effort to influence public belief, attitudes, and/or action through speech, we shall be discussing the process of persuasion as commonly conceived and defined.

CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND AND THE AUDIENCE

The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the attitudes of the American public on international affairs in 1937. At the same time there will be a brief historical summary of the years immediately preceding this important date in order to provide insight into the attitudes of the public through a review of the major events upon which reactions were based. Investigation of this sort will lead to a basic understanding of the turmoil of the times and of the reactions of the American people to the difficult problems facing them. With this knowledge, we shall have a better grasp of the period in which Roosevelt acted and the people to whom he spoke. First, then, a description of the significant international events from 1931 to 1937 will be presented. After this, we shall examine public opinion on international affairs in 1937 in order to see what Roosevelt faced when he wanted to secure certain activity by the United States in its relationships with the rest of the world.

The Fabric of War: 1931--1937

The major events occuring from 1931 to 1937, with the benefit of hindsight, leave little doubt that a world struggle would be inevitable. Each of the events was serious, and there

were many of them happening on a world-wide scale.[1] Collectively, they all added up to only one possible result--World War II.

The problem which was later to turn into the Sino-Japanese War began in September, 1931. With the so-called explosion of the South Manchurian Railway outside of Mukden, Japan began her first invasion of Manchuria. Activity of an aggressive nature was continued by Japan through 1932. The problem was examined, finally, by the League of Nations; and the Japanese activity was condemned. As a result of this condemnation, Japan withdrew from the League in February, 1933.

In January of 1933 Hitler was elected as Chancellor of Germany. It will be remembered that Hitler was active all through the twenties in trying to gain political control of Germany both for himself and for his political party, the National Socialist Party, the Nazis. His actions led him in and out of jail, but gave him little political influence and strength during the prosperity of the twenties. With the beginning of the depression of the thirties he became more powerful, and finally was voted into the high office of Chancellor at the beginning of 1933.

June 14, 1933 marked the beginning of the ill-fated

---

[1]An excellent bibliography to aid in a detailed examination of the history of the period can be found in Allan Nevins, The New Deal and World Affairs; A Chronicle of International Affairs, 1933-1945 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951. pp. 315-321.

London Economic Conference. Representatives of nations from all over the world assembled to find answers to the depression. For a short time it looked as if there might be a collective international answer proposed to remedy the economic crisis. Problems involving high protective tariffs and the stabilizing of currencies were among the major issues on the agenda. Toward the latter part of June the conference came forth with a plan for the stabilization of the French franc, the British pound, and the American dollar. Under Professor Moley's assurance, the conference was led to feel that President Roosevelt and America would accept the proposal. It looked as if the economic conference was to have a bit of success. Then, on July the second, Roosevelt sent a message to the conference that denied that he, or America, would have anything to do with the proposed stabilization of currency. It was his feeling that the fluctuating dollar, and the consequent rising prices, were the answer to the American economic crisis. He, therefore, denied that he would support any proposals which would stabilize the American dollar. This communication came to the conference like a destructive bomb. The group felt that their hands were tied and that the only advisable course was to adjourn the meetings. Shortly after, the meetings broke up, and the conference ended in complete failure.

On October 14, 1933, Germany gave word that she wanted to resign from the World Disarmament Conference, which was to begin meeting again in Geneva on October 16, after a summer

break that began in June. Though the disarmament conference had been meeting for a long while without any really significant results during the meetings, at least, the member governments had not been in an armaments race. With Germany no longer present, however, the conference was of little or no value; and consequently, the United States withdrew in November. This action and similar events resulted in a virtual end of the meetings. Germany, at the same time, also withdrew from the League of Nations. Now, the League had lost Japan and Germany.

Germany, in 1934, began to evidence a more militaristic face. Hitler was interested in tightening his hold on the German state, and also there came the first evidence of Hitler's interference in the surrounding states. In June, 1934, the world was upset to hear of the large party purges that took place as Hitler attempted to consolidate his position. Then, in July, 1934, the Nazis in Vienna staged the famous Putsch which resulted in the murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor. While the Nazis were unsuccessful in taking over Austria at this time, the world was given its first clear evidence that Hitler was not content to sit inside the Germany that was established by the Versailles Treaty. All that blocked the Nazis in Austria was a movement of Italian troops to the border of the country.

Late in 1934--in December--the first action occurred in a movement that was to upset the world and the League of Nations for the next two years. In Ethiopia, at Walwal, the world saw the first clash between Italy, led by Mussolini,

and Ethiopia, led by Haile Selassie. After many battles, Ethiopia rapidly weakened; and on May 5, 1936, the conquest of Ethiopia was completed.

On March 16, 1935, Hitler gave up all pretense of restricting his activities in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, which had placed many arms and troop restrictions on its signers. In complete disregard of these restricting clauses, Hitler established a new German program of compulsory universal military training. With this action came the real beginning of the new military race for power.

Hitler, having broken various treaties including the Treaty of Versailles, next moved to the destruction of the Locarno Pact of 1925. Hitler gave the orders, and German troops marched to occupy the demilitarized Rhineland. Within three days following Saturday, March 7, 1936, the German military occupation of this area was completed.

Events began to move rapidly from this point. After all, there was less need, now, for any pretense at peaceful intention, though there were still many denials from Hitler that he had anything aggressive in mind.

The Spanish Civil War began in July of 1936. While most civil wars would not be of world-shaking importance, this conflict became extremely important because of the forces represented in the struggle. The Loyalists, supporting the Government in power, were to receive a deal of help from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while the Rebels, under the direction of the military leader, Franco, were to receive

their strength from Germany and Italy. Faced with the problem of allying itself with Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other, the rest of the world sat back to watch. By his support of France, Hitler was able to assure himself of the aid of Spain in his later activities.

October, 1936, brought the formal establishment of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Up to this time there had still been some hope for the isolation of Germany and the winning of the aid of Mussolini in curbing German activity, but now there was no more hope of that.

Hitler recognized Mussolini's claims in Ethiopia, and by this recognition prepared the way for the eventual German occupation of Austria two years later. For the German recognition of the Ethiopian claims, Italy withdrew her troops and protection from Austria, which permitted Hitler to infiltrate the government and, finally, make his triumphal entry into Vienna on the fourteenth of March, 1938.

Japan and Germany entered into an agreement in November, 1936, termed the "Anti-Comintern Pact," the purpose of which was to "fight the growth and movement of Communism." When Italy joined the pact in 1937, the Axis powers were united; and the inevitable die was cast for eventual war.

Recognition of the danger began the armaments race in earnest. In January of 1937, Britain instigated a five-year plan of rearmament; and during this five year period, she decided to spend $7.5 billion designed to assure her of

the ability to defend herself.

After a long lull, 1937 was the time for the resumption of Japan's warlike activities in China. Whereas in earlier years Japan had confined her efforts to Manchuria, now the attacks were on China proper; and as the battles increased, Japan moved closer and closer to British interests. On July 7, 1937, the Marco Polo bridge, near Peiping, was attacked, and with this event the Sino-Japanese War had begun. Shanghai was attacked in August and finally fell to Japan November 9th. On September 14th President Roosevelt invoked our neutrality legislation which forbade arms shipments to either side in government vessels. He also gave warning to private shippers of the dangerous situation.

Extensive air raids of many Chinese cities began toward the end of September. During the Japanese attacks on Nanking a United States gunboat, the U.S.S. Panay, was sunk along with three other American merchant vessels and British ships including the gunboat Ladybird and three patrol craft.

While our immediate interest in the historical outline of the period is an examination of the major warlike events through 1937, it would be a serious error to exclude at least one event of 1938. Though many serious situations occurred in 1938, like the fall of Canton and Hankow in October of that year, none is more serious, and more indicative of the desperate condition of the world than the Munich Conference in September. In spite of the misplaced hopefulness of Prime Minister Chamberlain, who was able to speak of

"peace for our time," there is little doubt that the full aggressive intent of Hitler was revealed to the world at Munich. It was not long before the world learned that no amount of concession could satisfy his appetites.

Thus, we have before us the major events from 1931 through 1937 which the American people were forced to observe and include in their thinking when forming their attitudes about the rest of the world and the place of the United States in that world. It is now our problem to examine these attitudes to see what the American public would have America do in the face of the ever-present threats.

American Attitude Concerning World Affairs-1937

The events that predicted, and were a part of, World War II came frequently and severely during the thirties. Early in the decade the threats to peace were intermittent; but as the period moved forward, the spectre of war grew and became more menacing. The American people were to find it ever more necessary to determine their place in world affairs.

Public Opinion Polls

Today, we have several means available to us to discover what the attitudes of the public were in the year preceding World War II. One primary method was made available in 1935. Beginning in that year the public opinion poll was developed as a means by which some idea of public sentiment could be learned. Since that time there has been a vast amount of study to improve the effectiveness of the polls; but even today men seriously question many aspects of the polls as

being a "true" measure of opinion. The present study cannot benefit by a review of the debate of the effectiveness of the tool. Rather, ours should be a guarded examination of the polls available to us with the assumed warning that perhaps no more than general trends should be read into the polls.

To aid in such an investigation, extensive use has been made of a collection, edited in 1951 by Hadley Cantril, of the public opinion polls taken between 1935 and 1946.[2] In this large collection are questions ranging from personal remedies for the common cold[3] and whether Americans feel that the British should dispense with titles[4] to subjects dealing with war, complicated political theories, and peace. In an effort to determine what America's place in the problems of the world was in the eyes of the United States citizen, we can examine the questions and answers on a number of subjects to see if a common conclusion can be reached.

Consideration of the policy of one nation's attacking another and America's response in such a case of attack was brought to the people. The following are the questions asked together with the responses to these questions:

> If one foreign nation insists upon attacking another, should the United States join other nations to compel it to stop?
>
> Yes 29%, No 71%, No Opinion 5%

---

[2]Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion: 1935-1946 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1951)

[3]Ibid., p. 354.

[4]Ibid., p. 868.

American Institute on Public Opinion (AIPO) Poll, October 6, 1935.[5]

Would you be willing to fight, or to have a member of your family fight, in case a foreign power tried to seize land in Central or South America?

Yes 17.4%, No. 73.8%, Don't Know 8.8%

Fortune (FOR) Poll, January, 1936.[6]

Would you be willing to fight, or to have a member of your family fight, in case the Philippines were attacked?

Yes 23.8%, No 66%, Don't know 9.4%

Fortune, January 1936.[7]

Would you be in favor of the United States defending any Latin American country from foreign attack?

Yes 28.7%, No 61.4%, Don't know 9.9%

Fortune, April, 1937.[8]

With regard to the important Spanish Civil War the polls indicated the following:

Are your sympathies with either side in the present Spanish Civil War?

Yes 21%, No 79%, No Opinion 2%[9]

---

[5] Ibid., p. 780.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] In the AIPO method of reporting, the "yes" and "No" percentages are frequently the percentages, on the basis of 100%, of those people having an opinion other than "No Opinion." In this poll then, 98% of the people questioned had a "yes" or "No" opinion (2%, "No Opinion") and the 21% "Yes" and the 79% "No" are of that 98%. In terms of the total asked (including the 2% with "No Opinion"), the figures would be: Yes-20.6%, No-77 4%, No Opinion-2%.

AIPO, May 10, 1937.[10]

Of the many questions concerning the Sino-Japanese situation that were asked of the American public, some of the following seem to give a fair interpretation of the American feeling.

> Should we withdraw all troops in China to keep from getting involved in the fighting, or should the troops remain there to protect American citizens?
>
> Withdraw 54%, Remain 46%, No Opinion 11%

AIPO, August 9, 1937.[11]

> Would you like to see the United States send more warships to China, or should it withdraw those now there?
>
> Send More 15%, Withdraw All 61%,[12] Make No Change 24%, No Answer 3%.

AIPO, December 13, 1937.[13]

> Which policy should the government follow with regard to American citizens in China--warn them to leave, and withdraw our soldiers and naval forces, or continue to maintain the present armed forces in China for their protection?
>
> Withdraw 70%, Stay 30%[14]

AIPO, December 28, 1937.[15]

---

[10] Cantril, Public Opinion: 1935-1946, p. 807.

[11] Ibid., p. 774.

[12] Compare with the poll of August in which the withdrawal figure was 54%.

[13] Cantril, Public Opinion: 1935-1946, p. 1074.

[14] In the August poll 11% gave No. Opinion. In the poll of December 13 the figure for No Opinion dropped to 3%. Notice in this poll (December 28, 1937) there is no "No Opinion" figure at all, and the "Withdrawal" response is now 70%.

[15] Cantril, op. cit., p. 1074.

An interesting paradox is noted when the subject of disarmament is examined. The first question below shows a favorable attitude for a conference to consider disarmament; however, when questioned as to whether America should, or should not, call such a conference, the opposite attitude is given.

Would you favor a new international conference to limit and reduce armaments?

Yes 57%, No. 43%, No Opinion 22%

AIPO, September 5, 1936.[16]

Should President Roosevelt call a world disarmament conference?

	Yes	No	No Opinion
April, 1937	31%	69%	19%
June, 1937	41%	59%	20%

AIPO.[17]

American attitude concerning the League of Nations was also one of denial.

If war in Europe is averted through the League of Nations, do you believe the United States should join the League?

Yes 29.8%, No 57.4%, Don't Know 12.8%

Fortune, January, 1936.[18]

Would you like to see the United States join the League of Nations?

---

[16] Ibid., p. 169.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 403.

Yes 33%, No. 67%, No Opinion 22%

AIPO, October 18, 1937.[19]

As to whether or not America should try to help the world situation by having President Roosevelt call peace conferences, the following responses were given:

Should President Roosevelt call a general conference of European rulers in the interest of peace?

Yes 34%, No 66%, No Opinion 22%

AIPO, August 29, 1936.[20]

Do you think it would do any good to have President Roosevelt bring together the heads of European nations in the interest of peace?

Yes 37%, No 63%, No Opinion 13%

AIPO, February 1, 1937.[21]

Should the President take this step [to bring together the heads of European nations in the interest of peace]?

Yes 37%, No 63%, No Opinion 23%

AIPO, February 1, 1937.[22]

Do you think the United States should offer to act as peacemaker in the war between China and Japan?

Yes 19%, No 81%, No Opinion 8%

AIPO, December 13, 1937.[23]

---

[19] Ibid., p. 458.

[20] Ibid., p. 372.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 1135.

Finally, of interest to us is the response given to the following direct question concerning American involvement in European struggles:

> If another war like the World War (World War I) develops in Europe, should America take part again?
>
> Yes 5%, No 95%
>
> AIPO, February 14, 1937.[24]

The similarity of response in each of the presented polls is clear. Whether the individuals being questioned were asked their attitudes concerning American participation in the League of Nations, or whether the questions asked concerned the use of American good offices in behalf of peace, the responses were the same and negative. Whether the questions dealt with American defense of Central and South America and the Philippines, or whether they treated the protection of United States citizens in China, the public objected to positive action by the United States. The conclusion suggested by the results of the surveys, though the results should not be blindly accepted, is that there was evidently a strong isolationist attitude in the country in 1937.

Congressional Activity

Another indication of an isolationist sentiment in the public feeling during the thirties can be arrived at with a brief review of some of the legislation passing through our Congress during the period. Because of our representative form

---

[24] Ibid., p. 966.

of government, reflections of public opinion can be seen when examining the activities of the elected officials.

The Johnson Act

One important piece of legislation indicating the ascendancy of isolationist feeling in America was the Johnson Act of 1934, which made it illegal for any American money to be invested in the bonds of countries that were having difficulties in paying their war debts to the United States. America began to shut its doors and mind to the problems of the rest of the world. Nevins, in looking at the Johnson Act, has the following to say:

> The best course seemed simply to turn a shrugging back upon it [the restless forces of upheaval active in the world]. It was easier to try to shut it all out; to turn to the comfortable theory that the United States might live to itself alone.
>
> The first clear token of the new temper was the passage of the Johnson Act in April, 1934. Senator Hiram Johnson, whose hatred of alien forces matched his boundless ignorance of them, and whose old-time progressivism made him especially antagonistic to international finance, prepared a bill to punish by heavy fine or imprisonment the purchase or sale of all bonds issued by foreign governments defaulting on their war debts.
>
> .....
>
> The bill was an exhibition of spleen, designed not to protect American investors but to injure foreign nations. It offered an impediment to world recovery, for it blocked the extension of credits on which a revival of world trade might partly depend. Nevertheless, it passed both houses with little opposition, and despite the grave objection stated by the Treasury and State Departments, was signed by President Roosevelt.[25]

---

[25]Allan Nevins, The New Deal and World Affairs: A Chronicle of International Affairs, 1933-1945, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

The World Court

The second important indication of isolationist feeling was shown by the Congress in its treatment of the World Court. On January 5, 1935, Roosevelt called for the United States to join the Court; the subject was debated in the Senate during the month of January, and on January 29, the Senate defeated the motion voting nay, thirty-six, and aye, fifty-two. Thus, the United States had turned its back on the World Court.

Neutrality Legislation

Of primary importance in showing the isolationist sentiment in America during the thirties are the neutrality debates and legislation of 1935-1937. The isolationists debated and won, with the result that America withdrew from the world and tried to hide within her own borders. In late August, 1935, Key Pitman's neutrality bill passed. This legislation insured that the President, in any state of war between two or more countries, had to place an embargo on "arms, munitions, and implements of war" against <u>all</u> belligerents. Furthermore, the bill held that any American who traveled on belligerent ships did so at his own peril. The President was given no discretionary powers to determine the guilt of an aggressive action. The country could no longer offer help of any kind even if it meant the destruction of an innocent country.

The 1935 legislation was to be in force until February, 1936, when it had to be reenacted. Those disturbed by the Act might rally forces. But in February, 1936, the legislation

was extended to May 1, 1937, with almost no change of any of its clauses. Thus the major fight had been postponed.

As the time drew near for the 1935-1936 Act to expire, new debate was begun. Some men were anxious to permit the President to use his discretion to determine against whom to enforce embargos in the case of conflict between foreign powers. These men found themselves in direct opposition to a large number who not only favored the reenactment of the old legislation, but who were desirous of even more rigorous measures to assure complete American non-intervention. The final bill adopted on May 1, 1937, was most satisfactory to the second of these two groups, the isolationists, for it embodied all of the essential features of the 1935 legislation and it was even more restrictive concerning American travel on belligerent ships. It held that, henceforth, it would be <u>illegal</u> for Americans to travel on such ships. Also the 1937 legislation went one step further in the isolation of America. It added the famous, or infamous, "cash and carry" clause, the purpose of which was to restrict even the non-embargoed goods. This reflected the realization that not only "arms, munitions, and implements of war" were necessary to a country involved in war. The "cash and carry" clause placed two restrictions on non-embargoed goods sold to belligents. First, they were not to be carried in American ships; second, before the goods left this country, they had to be fully paid for in cash by the purchasing country.

Surely, at this time, the isolationist influence was

strong. Every effort was made to make it impossible for the United States to have any dealings with any warring power. Langer and Gleason observe that:

> Seemingly no loophole had been left through which the country could again be drawn into conflicts of other nations. Here, indeed, was isolationism in action. Though cogent arguments were advanced against so startling a break and against the whole notion that the United States could or should in all cases remain neutral, it can hardly be disputed that public opinion warmly supported the neutrality legislation and expected highly beneficial results from it.[26]

The Ludlow Amendment

One final legislative attempt should be remembered to impress upon us the influence of the isolationists. Two days after the Japanese attack on the Panay (December 12, 1937) the Ludlow Amendment, which would have required a national referendum on any declaration of war except in cases of invasion, was brought to the House of Representatives for debate. So worried by the possibility of war for the United States, and so determined to remain aloof, were some people that in January, after some extensive debate, the amendment nearly passed the House. It failed by only twenty-one votes, with a vote of 188 Ayes and 209 Nays. With the near passage of the Ludlow Amendment, isolationist influence was at its height.

Summary and Conclusion

Upon examination of the public opinion polls taken from their inception in 1935 through 1937, we find much public desire

---

[26] Wm. L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), p. 14.

to build a self-contained and isolated country. Whenever it became a case of using the moral and/or physical force of the United States as a weapon to try to insure world peace and harmony, large numbers of people rejected the idea. Add to these findings the major legislative activities in international affairs during the period, and we can see the strength of a sizable isolationist bloc in America in 1937. As many citizens observed the growing tensions in the world, they drew only one conclusion as to the responsibilities of the United States: at all costs the country must avoid any involvement with the problems of the world. This, indeed, was the America that Franklin Roosevelt saw. This was the America that he had as an audience for his speeches. This was the America to which he must speak.

CHAPTER III

ROOSEVELT'S THINKING REGARDING THE WAR

It is our problem in the present chapter to determine, if possible, the President's attitudes concerning the threat of Germany, Italy, and Japan to the peace of the world. Was there a serious threat to the peace offered by the three nations? What was the likelihood of war in Europe and/or the Far East? What threat did such an impending war offer to the United States? And, finally, in the face of the large, or at least loudly vocal, isolationist bloc in America, what should American attitude be toward the problem? This final question, of course, poses one of the basic questions of the dissertation. That is, of what was Roosevelt trying to persuade the American public with regard to the war threat?[1] Such an examination of Roosevelt's thinking on these important questions will help to suggest the intent behind the speeches to be analysed in Chapter IV.

---

[1]As in the Brandenburg dissertation most of the emphasis has been to show Roosevelt as an international thinker. Also, Roosevelt's general thinking with regard to the Neutrality Acts of 1935-37 has been examined effectively by men like Thomas Greer in his What Roosevelt Thought [See Bibliography]. However, in terms of the specific questions just described, little or no organized investigation has been made.

While it is true that in the early years of the New Deal, Roosevelt had his mind occupied the greater part of the time with domestic matters, it is also true that his thinking ranged frequently to international affairs. Although the substance of most of his activity concerned problems of a national nature which grew out of the depression, it should not be forgotten or ignored that Roosevelt was keenly aware of the world turmoil that was building through the thirties. He, slowly but surely, became convinced of the seriousness of the world-wide upheaval; and more than that, he became significantly distressed about the direct threat to the peace of the United States.

Method of Analysis

Many hundreds of pieces of personal correspondence, confidential memos and letters to members of the official family, stenographic records of highly confidential committee meetings along with the memoirs of intimate associates, of Roosevelt's were examined. Careful tabulations were made to determine, first, how imminent, to Roosevelt in 1937, was war in Europe and the Far East, and what threat this posed to him with regard to American peace and safety. Second, each time he showed concern in the private statements about the public's attitudes on international affairs, tabulated note was made of this concern in terms of the particular attitude that worried him. The remainder of the chapter will be used to show the results of this analysis.

European and Far Eastern Crisis

In this section of the chapter, we shall be interested in tracing Roosevelt's attitudes, as expressed in his private correspondence, to discover how imminent he felt European and Far Eastern war to be at the time of his presenting the "Quarantine" speech in Chicago in 1937. The President began with a few expressions of his concern in 1933, and these expressions developed to be rather extensive comments by 1937. By an examination of his private correspondence, we shall try to watch the ideas and thinking grow and mature in Roosevelt's mind as the pressures of the international situation became more acute.

The future threat of Germany and Japan to world peace begins to be reflected in the President's correspondence early in his first term of office. To Robert W. Bingham, the American Ambassador to the Court of St. James, in November, 1933, Roosevelt wrote:

> Do write me and tell me how you think things are going on the other side. I am, of course, concerned about this German situation and the many repercussions it will have. Walter Lippmann made the interesting suggestion the other day that 92 per cent of the population of the world is ready for peace in permanent form and for progressive disarmament to support that peace. Eight per cent of the world population, made up of the Germans and the Japanese, seem to be blocking an otherwise unanimous desire.[2]

It should be noticed that no serious indication of later war is offered in the letter to Bingham. At this point, Roosevelt simply offers the observation that the Germans and the Japanese

---

[2]Letter from FDR to Robt. W. Bingham, Nov. 13, 1933, FDRL, PPF 716.

belong to an eight per cent who should be watched. The President offers the same more or less vague worry to Ruth Morgan, who along with Carrie Chapman Catt, helped to start the yearly Conference on Cause and Cure of War. In December, 1933, he wrote to "Dear Ruth" saying that:

> Eleanor tells me that it may be of service to you to have a very private and confidential thought from me [underlining my own] in regard to World Peace, so that you may be prepared for the meeting in January. The situation in Europe changes from day to day, with France and Germany as principal chess players and England watching carefully to see that neither side gets ahead of the other. The same is true to a certain extent, of Italy. Therefore, you will see that for the moment, peace in Europe is primarily a political matter at this time. In regard to the Far East, you know, of course, the general attitude of the Japanese Government today.[3]

To George Earle, also in December of 1933, Roosevelt expressed the hope that German "sanity of the old type that existed in the Bismarck days when I was a boy at school in Germany will come to the front again."[4] George Earle, at the time, was Minister to Vienna for the United States. It is interesting that Roosevelt concludes his letter to Earle with the thought that "I only hope that the present very real danger will not extend to Vienna."[5] What must have been the President's feelings when the Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss occured in Vienna just six months later in July of 1934? Notice, too, should be taken of the expression "very real danger." It

---

[3]Letter from FDR to Ruth Morgan, Dec. 22, 1933, FDRL, PPF 919.

[4]Elliott Roosevelt (ed.), FDR: His Personal Letters (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), III, 379.

[5]Ibid.

is something that is still entirely bound up with Germany as we can see from the hope that it does not extend itself to Austria. Still vague in the expression of the President is the idea of to whom there is a "very real danger."

In 1934 we begin to find Roosevelt expressing a personal fear concerning developments in Europe and the Far East. He seems to begin to personalize a reaction to the world events, and he seems to find and express a response of fear. To George K. Briggs in February of 1934, Roosevelt indicates that he is a "bit shivery about the international situation, East and West."[6]

The President, in a letter dated August 25, 1934, to William Dodd, the Ambassador to Berlin, states in more precise terms the definition of his fear, but still there is no real definition of the war possibility in specific statement. In his letter to "My dear Dodd" he said the following:

> I am glad indeed to have your letter even though your situation cannot exactly be called a rosy one. It confirms my fear that the drift in Germany, and perhaps in other countries in Europe, is definitely downward and that something must break within the next six months or a year.
>
> Harry Hopkins is back today and he is equally pessimistic.[7]

Again we find Roosevelt becoming a bit more pessimistic about the condition of the world when he wrote to Doctor Nicholas Murray Butler on the twenty-sixth of September, 1934,

---

[6]Letter from FDR to Geo. K. Briggs, Feb. 26, 1934, FDRL, PPF 402.

[7]Letter from FDR to Wm. E. Dodd, Aug. 25, 1934, FDRL, PPF 1043.

that:

> You and I will continue to preach peace and to live up to our preachings, but I sometimes think we are sowing seed in exceedingly rocky ground--at least for the moment."[8]

Notice should be taken of the fact that in his letter to Dr. Butler, Roosevelt is upset, but still he is able to offer the qualification "at least for the moment." We, then, see that the President, during 1934, was beginning to be downcast by the news from abroad; but at the same time, he was able to see a possible better day for the problems of Europe.

During 1935, Roosevelt received many letters from his ambassadors in Rome, Paris, Berlin, and London, most all of which were anything but optimistic in expression. As an example of the kind of comment that the President was getting from his representatives in the European capitals, it is valuable to examine a few of the remarks from a long, five page letter to "My dear Chief" from Breckinridge Long, America's Ambassador to Italy in 1935. Long's letter was sent to the President February 21, 1935, and it made the following observations:

> There is no doubt in my mind that Europe is headed straight for war. Italy is practically on a war basis today.
>
> .....
>
> In continuation of the thought expressed in my last letter to you under date of February 15, I am more and more convinced that these people expect war in Europe during 1936--if not sooner--and that they are ready for it.

---

[8]Letter from FDR to Doctor Nicholas Murry Butler, Sept. 26, 1934, FDRL, PPF 445.

. . . . . .

In any event, Italy is preparing for what she thinks is a certain eventuality. While no responsible statesman in Italy will admit it, I am just as certain of it as I am that I am sitting in this chair.

If this develops in Europe within the next twenty months, Japan will start to over-run the East.

. . . . . .

I am not an optimist about the future of Europe. From where I sit there are only visible preparations for the conflict, which all recognize as being indicative of the future of Europe. All agree that if it should come it would be epoch-making. The only difference in the opinions which are permitted to be expressed is to the proximity or imminence of the movement.[9]

The tone of this letter is not at all unusual or more extreme than most of the letters that came to the President from the capitals of Europe from 1935 on to the outbreak of the war. It is significant for us to realize the nature of these letters for they help us to understand what Roosevelt was reading and to what he was agreeing when he expressed his assent to ideas of his ambassadors. For instance, in Roosevelt's response to the above letter from Long, the President wrote:

Those letters of yours are extraordinarily interesting even though they are pessimistic in tone. I fear I must agree with you about the general situation [Compare with the Long letter to understand fully what the general situation with which Roosevelt agreed was.] We, too, are going through a bad case of Huey Long and Father Coughlin influenza--the whole country aching in every bone. It is an internal disease, not external as it seems to be in Europe.

These are without doubt the most hair-trigger times the world has gone through in your life time or mine. I do not even exclude June and July, 1914, because at that

---

[9]Letter from Breckinridge Long to FDR, Feb. 21, 1935, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; Italy, 1933-41, 1945; box 10, Folder: Breckinridge Long.

> time there was economic and social stability, with only the loom of a war by Governments in accordance with preconceived ideas and prognostications. Today there is not one element alone but three or more.[10]

A handwritten letter from William E. Dodd to the President on July 29, 1935 had the following comments:

> My hope is that England, France (and perhaps the U. S.) can crowd Italy out of Africa through League pressures, that Russia and the [word unreadable] Balkan states will lend support and thus isolate Japan and Germany. If not, World War--terrible horrorism is fairly certain.[11]

To this letter from Dodd, Roosevelt answered:

> Many thanks for that interesting letter of yours. I am very glad to have your slant on the much mixed situation. A year ago I was fairly optimistic--today I am the opposite.[12]

And the European picture continued to blacken so that Roosevelt was able in February, 1936, to write Jesse I. Strauss, Ambassador to France, that:

> One cannot help feeling that the whole European panorama is fundamentally blacker than at any time in your life time or mine [Compare with the expression of the thought to Long in March, 1935, pg. 50 of this chapter]. In 1848 revolution in a dozen countries synchronized because of a general European demand for constitutional representative government; But at that time economics, budgets, foreign exchange and industrialism were not in the picture and the problem was ten times more simple than it is today. In 1914 the situation was eighty per cent military, and again vastly simpler than today.
>
> As I have told you, I have been increasingly concerned about the world picture since May, 1933. There

---

[10]Letter from FDR to Breckinridge Long, Mar. 9, 1935, Ibid.

[11]Letter from Wm. E. Dodd to FDR, July 29, 1935, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; Germany, 1933-39, 1941; Box 6, Folder: Wm. E. Dodd, 1933-37.

[12]Letter from FDR to Wm. E. Dodd, Aug. 14, 1935, Ibid.

> are those who come from England and France and Germany [not his ambassadors, by the way] who point to the fact that every crisis of the past three years has been muddled through with as [sic] hope that each succeeding crisis will be met peacefully in one way or another in the next few years. I hope that point of view is right, but it goes against one's common sense.
>
> The armament's race means bankruptcy or war--there is no possible out from that statement.
>
> You are in the best listening post [Paris] in what may be the last days of the period of peace before a long chaos, and I am very happy, indeed, to have your careful judgment after these two and a half years of observation.[13]

Roosevelt had written this letter to Strauss as an acknowledgement to a lengthy, handwritten letter from Strauss that was delivered directly to the President. The picture that Strauss drew of France "after two and a half years of observation" was truly not heartening. He found decay in France everywhere he looked--decay intellectually and morally. Business was described as bad with a constant fear of Germany plaguing everything. Strauss had all but lost hope for the French future and felt that some final catastrophe was bound to happen--and soon.

The President, it can be seen by his response to Strauss, was now speaking in more direct terms about the predictability of the coming war. He becomes much less vague and guarded when he speaks of the problems at hand. He now even speaks of muddling through each crisis as going against "one's common sense."

As the letter to Strauss on the thirteenth of February

---

[13]Letter from FDR to Jesse I. Strauss, Feb. 13, 1936, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; box 4, folder: Jesse I. Strauss, 1933-36.

sounds worried and expresses the disbelief that reason will ultimately prevail, so does a letter shortly after, on February 22, to Breckinridge Long say the same.

> We all watch the daily news from Europe with, I think, the feeling each day that the next will bring a major explosion. On the other hand, day succeeds day without anything happening so some people are rather definitely concluding that each recurring crisis will iron itself out and that nothing really serious will happen. I cannot wholly share this opinion.[14]

If the idea that each crisis would "iron itself out and that nothing really serious" would happen was not "wholly" shared by the President, what does this lead us to conclude concerning Roosevelt's thoughts on the possibility of war? We can begin to conclude that by this time, i.e., February, 1936, Roosevelt began to feel that war was becoming a more possible thing.

The idea that Roosevelt was questioning expert opinion, as it was hinted at in the Strauss and the Long letter, finds explicit statement in a letter to Dodd in March, 1936.

> Since you wrote on March third everything seems to have broken loose again in your part of the world. All the experts here, there and the other place say "There will be no war." They said the same thing all through July, 1914, when I was in the Navy Department. In those days I believed the experts. Today I have my tongue in my cheek.[15]

To James M. Cox, Roosevelt wrote as he was returning from the successful Buenos Aires Conference at the end of 1936

---

[14]Letter from FDR to Breckinridge Long, Feb. 22, 1936, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; Italy, 1933-41, 1945; Box 10, Folder: Italy, 1933-38.

[15]Letter from FDR to Wm. Dodd, March 16, 1936, FDRL, PPF 1043.

that: "Nevertheless, I am still most pessimistic about Europe and there seems to be no step that we can take to improve that situation."[16]

The year 1937 brought the closing link in the President's thinking. Prior to this time Roosevelt had been indicating increasing fear and increasing possibility of war. During 1937, and from this year onward, probability rather than possibility entered the correspondence. In May of 1937, Roosevelt wrote William Phillips in Rome the following:

> The more I study the situation, the more I am convinced that an economic approach to peace is a pretty weak reed for Europe to lean on. It may postpone war but how can it ever avert war in the long run if the armaments process continues at its present pace--or even for that matter at a slower pace? The answer they all give to any plea for reduction in armaments is that millions of workers would be thrown on the street. How do we make progress if England and France say we cannot help Germany and Italy to achieve economic security if they continue to arm and threaten, while simultaneously Germany and Italy say we must continue to arm and threaten because they will not give us economic security.
>
> Anything, of course, that postpones war is that much to the good. The progress of the disease is slowed up but the disease remains--and will probably [underlining my own] prove fatal in the next few years.
>
> Such are my feelings after a successful fishing trip in which I was able to get sufficiently far away from the forest to look at it as a whole without being lost among the individual trees.[17]

---

[16]Letter from FDR to James M. Cox written aboard the USS Indianapolis, Dec. 9, 1936, PPF 53.

[17]Letter from FDR to Wm. Phillips, May 17, 1937, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; Ital, 1933-41, 1945; Box 10, Folder: Wm. Phillips, 1937-38.

And by September, 1937, Roosevelt was fearful enough to write Baron Tweedsmuir, Governor General of Canada, that "I do not dare be away from Washington long because of the international clouds."[18]

We can, certainly, see that Roosevelt had developed a long way from 1933 in his anguish regarding the European and Far Eastern situation. What had started in his statements in his private correspondence as "eight per cent" blocking an otherwise unanimous desire for peace turned by the end of 1937 into a probable conflict. By the time of the "Quarantine" speech at Chicago's new Outer Drive, Roosevelt found it impossible to be long absent from Washington because of the "international clouds." We can complete the picture of the probability of war with one other sort of expression that is even more extreme. This form we find in a letter to William Phillips in September, 1938. Finally, we find in this letter the expression of the inevitability of the conflict.

> Dear Bill:
> Yours of September first has reached me just as the the papers state you are again deferring your trip home. I think you are wise, because Chamberlain's visit to Hitler today may bring things to a head or may result in a temporary postponement of what looks to me like an inevitable [underlining my own] conflict within the next five years.19

Roosevelt post-dates the inevitability idea even a

---

[18]Letter from FDR to The Right Hon. Baron Tweedsmuir, Sept. 24, 1937, FDRL.

[19]Letter from FDR to Wm. Phillips, Sept. 15, 1938, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; Italy, 1933-41, 1945; Box 10, Folder: Italy, 1933-38.

bit earlier when he was meeting in a "very confidential" conference with the Democratic and Republican leaders of Congress on September 20, 1939. With his own statement we can take ourselves back one year and a half. He said to the Congressional leaders that:

> Now, I won't say anything about guesses in the past, but the fact does remain that we have, for over a year, a year and a half, been feeling more and more that the situation in Europe....was headed almost inevitably toward war....more and more, we have felt that the crisis would come on this fall, late. Well, it has.[20]

Probably, then, late in 1937 and certainly by early 1938, the President indicated privately that he was reasonably certain that war would come to Europe. The question that now presents itself to us has to do with the place of the United States in this "inevitable" conflict. What did Roosevelt feel was the American position toward the coming struggle? Could our position be one of withdrawal, or would we have to participate in one way or another with the impending war?

American Involvement

The problem of pointing clearly to Roosevelt's thinking on the necessity of American involvement in any European or Far Eastern struggle is a bit more complicated than the discovery of the President's thinking on the probability of war. Faced with a country which had strong isolationist influences, Roosevelt seems to have been more cautious in his

---

[20]Conference of the President with Democratic and Republican leaders of Congress preceeding the opening of a special session of Congress, Sept. 20, 1939, FDRL, of 1561. These notes were originally marked Very Confidential.

expression of his thinking on just how far America should participate in foreign conflict.

That there has been a quantity of research which concludes that Roosevelt was an internationalist in his thought there can be no doubt. Many writers have traced the early European summer schooling of Roosevelt, his job with Wilson as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, his various expressions both public and private on many occasions, etc., to show the strong leanings the man had toward a belief in internationalism as the best policy for the United States. On this point there certainly can be little dispute. However, though we have numerous assurances that the President was, in general, an internationalist in his belief, there is little investigation that deals with his attitude concerning the particular issue of the necessity of American war involvement in struggles outside the United States. Surely, we could picture a man who would, in general, hold internationalist beliefs, but find that on any particular issue he would tend to say that the United States could afford to stay at home. If this be true, then simply showing Roosevelt's basic nature to be internationalist would not give us satisfactory evidence of his attitude concerning any particular issue, and particularly one as complicated and serious as the necessity for American involvement in a European struggle. It will now be our purpose to discover the President's attitude on this particular issue.

As early as 1935, Roosevelt began to express his feelings in his correspondence when he wrote the following to Colonel Edward House:

> You may be interested to know that some of the Congressmen and Senators who are suggesting wild-eyed measures to keep us out of war are now declaring that you and Lansing and Page forced Wilson into the war![21] I had a talk with them, explained that I was in Washington myself the whole of that period, that none of them were there and that their historical analysis was wholly inaccurate and that history yet to be written would prove my point. The trouble is that they belong to the very large and perhaps increasing school of thought which holds that we can and should withdraw wholly within ourselves and cut off all but the perfunctory relationships with other nations. They imagine that if the civilization of Europe is about to destroy itself through internal strife, it might just as well go ahead and do it and that the United States can stand idly by.[22]

The implication of the comments to House involves the problem of "can and should the United States move into itself," and Roosevelt seems to imply that this is impossible. Also in 1935, in writing to Bishop Oldham, Roosevelt seems to indicate the impossibility of living unto ourselves:

---

[21]The Nye Committee which studied the munitions industry at one time worked to show that a cabal consisting of House, Lansing (then Secretary of State), and Page (Ambassador to Britain) tried to get Wilson to permit loans to the Allies and thus get the United States economically involved with the outcome of the war.

[22]Letter from FDR to Edward M. House, Sept. 17, 1935, FDRL, PPF 222.

> Permit me to tell you how deeply I appreciate your letter of October 31, 1935, and how completely I share your desire that America, as you express it, should not let the world down in the crisis now confronting it. I heartily subscribe to your statement "that the only sure way for us to keep out of war is to have no war anywhere, as the only assurance that your own house will not go down in the conflagration is to take effective steps to prevent all fires." The initiation taken by the United States on many occasions in promoting international peace efforts both before and after the World War were all predicated on the thought that world peace represents the only ultimate security against involvement in war.[23]

Here, as in the House letter, we see Roosevelt suggesting that any war, any place, would offer the possibility of American involvement. Neither of these statements is, however, specific in its wording and thought. It is the same sort of generalized recognition of a problem that we found in 1933 and 1934, when Roosevelt was looking at the vague threats abroad. To Madame Sandoz in Switzerland, Roosevelt offers the same sort of implied awareness when he writes that "We in this country, like you in Switzerland, are very determined to keep out of war if that is a possible thing."[24] The vague hint of interest to us, of course, is given by the phrase "if that is a possible thing."

In 1937 Roosevelt was still speaking in generalized terms in his correspondence, but he indicates to us one of the threads of his speaking attack that was to come in a

---

[23]Letter from FDR to The Right Reverend G. Ashton Oldham, Nov. 14, 1935, FDRL, PPF, 418.

[24]Letter from FDR to M. Jeanne Rosat-Sandoz, Dec. 12, 1935, FDRL, PPF 199.

letter to Harrison J. Conant, State Librarian of Vermont. He wrote that:

> I am grateful to you for your letter, and I fully agree with you in regard to the real perils of the international situation. I am disturbed by it and by its daily changing events. Soon I think the Nation will begin to appreciate the ultimate dangers of isolating ourselves completely from all joint efforts toward peace.[25]

Certainly, then, one thread in the speeches of the President after this point was to make the Nation well aware of the "ultimate dangers" involved in cutting ourselves out of the major flow of the world events.

On March 17, 1938, Cordell Hull spoke before the National Press Club in Washington, and he records the following about the speech in which he was trying:

> ...to state our position [on the international stresses]. The world was racing hell-bent toward destruction, and it was essential to show the extent of our concern and to make it clear that we had to be taken into account in world developments [underlining my own]. The address was widely broadcast in the United States and the British Isles, along with translations in five other languages. The President went over the address and approved it in advance, writing on my copy:
>
> C. H.
>
> Grand!
>
> F. D. R.[26]

Roosevelt, then, had placed his stamp of approval on positive, forward action rather than forcing the Secretary of State to live with a completely hands-off policy. He takes

---

[25]Letter from FDR to Harrison J. Conant, Oct. 2, 1937, FDRL, PPF 4896.

[26]Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), I, 576.

another forward step in that he is willing to express the end of neutralism with his letter to William Phillips in September of 1938. At the end of the first paragraph below he begins to imply even possible physical involvement. This is interesting in that he felt the need to withdraw a bit at the end of the second paragraph.

> You are right in saying that we are an emotional people over here in the sense that we do not easily lose our heads, but as we get the idea that the future of our form of government is threatened by a coalition of European dictators, we might wade in with everything we have to give.
>
> If a war starts now the situation here will be very different from 1914. In that year, while the great majority of Americans were inclined to sympathize with the Allies, there was an honest effort, led by the President, to remain neutral in thought. And also there was a good deal of German sympathy. Today I think ninety per cent of our people are definitely anti-German and anti-Italian in sentiment--and incidentally, I would not propose to ask them to be neutral in thought. I would strongly encourage their natural sympathy while at the same time avoiding any thought of sending troops to Europe.[27]

Just after the Munich Conference in 1938, Elliott Roosevelt went to see his father for advice as to whether or not he should buy control of a radio station in Texas. The younger Roosevelt told his father that he was worried and wanted advice because of the apparent possibility of war. Elliott Roosevelt asked his father about the possibility of that eventuality, and received the following answer:

> "We're all working hard to see that that's the case [that America can stay out of the inevitable European conflict]. We're all as anxious as the dickens to make sure we stay out. We all have the highest hopes, the

---

[27]Letter from FDR to Wm. Phillips, Sept. 15, 1938, FDRL, PSF, I. Diplomatic Correspondence; Italy, 1933-41, 1945; Box 10, Folder: Italy, 1933-38.

> highest hopes." He [the President] paused for a moment, and fussed with a gadget on his desk, frowning abstractedly. "Look," he said suddenly, "in your place I'd go ahead on your radio project as fast and hard as I could. You've no reason to give it up because of a few newspaper headlines. Get on the ball and keep on it. I'm sure you'll do well."
>
> That was that. On my way home to Texas, I tried to figure out that sudden, almost too-confident assurance, and wondered if there were anything between the lines, so to speak. But September and October of 1938 were still months when most of us Americans were several hundred light-years from reality; eventually I shrugged my shoulders, decided I should forget about Europe and get to work in Texas. Which I did.[28]

That the American form of government was threatened "by a coalition of European dictators" in Roosevelt's mind, there can be little doubt after reading the secretary's notes on the Conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee on January 31, 1939.[29] During the conference Roosevelt states that for almost three years there was rather definite information as to the intentions of Germany, Japan, and Italy. He could say that for about three years there was "in the making a policy of world domination." As the conference notes continue, the President shows how much a threat the German-Italian-Japanese axis was to the United States by tracing out the progress of the possible war that he saw. He envisioned the English and French chances of holding Hitler to be a fifty-fifty bet--no better than a fifty-fifty bet! With the fall of the European powers would come the fall of the colonial governments of Africa, about ninety-five per cent of Africa. The next step described by Roosevelt was the fall, country by

---

[28] Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. 4 & 5.

[29] See Appendix A.

country, of South and Central America. He, then, asked the Senators to remember the distance from the Yucatan to New Orleans, or from Tampico to St. Louis or Kansas City, all with the implication that the distance was short and the threat was very real.

During a later part of the conference we find Roosevelt concluding that it is to our interests to help Britain and France as much as possible so that they could remain independent. He also rejects all forms of neutrality with:

> I think it was Arthur Krock who said, "Isn't this unneutral?" Yes, it might be called that. But I will do everything I possibly can do, as Chief of the Army and Navy and head of the Executive Department, to prevent any munitions from going to Germany or Italy or Japan. Why? Because self-protection is part of the American policy. And I will do everything I can to maintain the independence of these other nations by sending them all they can pay for on the barrelhead, to these about forty or fifty now independent nations of the world. Now, that is the foreign policy of the United States. (Applause).[30]

While there is the hope for peace for Europe and America being reiterated constantly throughout the conference, and while the very last alternative ever to be arrived at in Roosevelt's mind was the use of American fighting forces, there was even the hint of that as the last ditch possibility.

> At the same time, we are going to keep our secrets of national defense, which will be only disclosed to the [the Allies] in the event of our entering into a war ourselves. Now that is pretty remote.[31]

It should be remembered that the possibility is here suggested even though he was talking to Senators, the men who

---

[30] Ibid., p. 9.

[31] Ibid., p. 10.

were very likely to leap on any such implication with great gusto for the coming elections in 1940, etc. War was suggested, however, as a possibility for the United States. The implication of the whole conference was that the freedom of England and France was so important to the safety of the United States that anything which was necessary to keep them independent would have to be done by us even if it meant, as a last resort, sending troops.

Constantly, then, came the strong rejection of the policy of neutrality for the United States; and certainly, too, by frequent implication was suggested that the war which was sure to come might have to become an American war.

What Roosevelt Would Have the Public Believe

Our prior investigations of Chapter II have shown us that in 1937 and 1938 there was a strong bloc within the American public which leaned strongly toward a policy of isolation of the country in the struggles that were building in the rest of the world. In the present chapter, we have tried to show two major elements thus far: (1) that Roosevelt, by the end of 1937, was reasonably pessimistic in his thinking about world affairs and thought European war probable, and (2) that he saw this conflict to be a serious threat to the safety and freedom of our country, so much a threat that we could not turn our backs on it even if it would lead us, finally, to our own military involvement. We can, now, try to find out what general issues, as indicated by his private correspondence and

conferences, were at the heart of Roosevelt's speeches from 1937 with the "Quarantine" address to Dec. 7, 1941.

As the President stated in his letter to Conant[32] and in numerous other places, he was working, first, for a general recognition of the danger of the coming threat to peace. In the January Conference of the Military Affairs Committee he clearly worded the thought when he said:

> I don't think we want to frighten the American people. That is one thing we don't want to do, frighten the American people at this time or any time. We want them to gradually realize what is a potential danger....[33]

Thus, he believed, the American people must be taught to see and understand the possibilities. They could not go on and disregard the real dangers.

The second element of which the American people must be convinced was that they must see the folly, as Roosevelt saw it, of trying to carry on the policy of neutrality. In Roosevelt's mind it was absolutely imperative that we not be neutral in the struggle. The whole safety and security of the United States rested on that premise. To Colonel House on October 19, 1937, Roosevelt wrote with regard to the "Quarantine" speech that:

> I hope you liked the Chicago speech and the repercussions across the water. As usual, we have been bombarded by Hearst and others who say that an American search for peace means of necessity, war. I thought, frankly, that there would be more criticism and I verily believe that as time goes on we can slowly but surely make

---

[32]See pp. 59 & 60 of this chapter.

[33]See Appendix A, p. 147.

> people realize that war will be a greater danger to us if we close all the doors and windows than if we go out in the street and use our influence to curb the riot.[34]

This third and final idea in the American mind that Roosevelt indicated a need to change was the thought that this country should accept "peace at any price." On several occasions he stressed the need to fight against such a philosophy. To Rev. Peabody of Groton School in October of 1937 the President wrote that:

> This is the first chance I have had to thank you for that much appreciated telegram [a telegram from Peabody complimenting Roosevelt on the "Quarantine" speech]. As you know, I am fighting against a public psychology of long standing--a psychology which comes very close to saying "Peace at any price."[35]

And again in clear, definite terms, Roosevelt states his fight against the belief of "peace at any price" in his letter of December 23, 1937, to Joseph Tumulty, former Secretary to Woodrow Wilson.

> In subsequent years, largely as a result of Republican propaganda and the growing disregard for all treaties, our talk turned more and more to the "peace at any price" theory. That is what I have to combat at the present time.[36]

Summary and Conclusions

As the months and years passed from 1933, the international clouds thickened; and Roosevelt, the acute observer, became ever more fearful of the possibility of European war until,

---

[34]Letter from FDR to Edward House, Oct. 19, 1937, FDRL, PPF 222.

[35]Letter from FDR to the Rev. Endicott Peabody, head of the Groton School, Groton, Mass., Oct. 16, 1937, FDRL, PPF 398.

[36]Letter from FDR to Joseph P. Tumulty, Dec. 23, 1937, FDRL, PPF 153.

finally by the end of 1937, he was able to see an inevitable struggle in the not too distant future. When he thought of the crisis, it was particularly disturbing to him because of the severe challenge that he saw to the United States. He found America's fate so tightly bound to England and France, and Hitler's threat so great, that he rejected all idea of isolationism as an answer for our country.

The President, too, was aware of the public attitudes during the period; and he found in himself the need to alter these opinions in at least three significant ways. First, he looked around him and found a general apathy to the events abroad, and he felt the need to bring an awareness of the situation to the people so that, gradually, they might be brought to understand the seriousness of the European situation in terms of American safety. Second, he expressed the folly, to him, of the policy of isolation of America, and he felt the need to make the public agree with him that the only possible way of keeping the United States out of the war, if indeed that was possible, was by helping the Allies in every way possible. Finally, he was distressed by the growth of a public psychology saying "peace at any price," and he felt the need to "combat" that psychology.

CHAPTER IV

ROOSEVELT'S SPEAKING ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OCTOBER 5, 1937--DECEMBER 7, 1941

In the preceding three chapters, we have laid the groundwork for the analysis of the public speeches of Franklin Roosevelt on international affairs. The major difficulties of terminology have been examined, the historical foundation has been set, and the intent of the speaker has been considered. It is now appropriate that we make inquiry into the ideas and their development in Roosevelt's public speeches.

Method of Analysis

Each of the thirty-two speeches treated, the selection of which will be discussed in the immediately following section of the present chapter, was carefully analyzed to discover, (1) the issues that were dealt with in each speech, and (2) the method of development of each issue.

First, then, work sheets were kept on which each issue that Roosevelt treated was recorded by speech and page number. Similarities were noted; and the four issues, later treated in this chapter, were isolated to be the basic substance of the ideas treated by Roosevelt in his public address.

Following this, new sheets were kept on which tabulation was made to discover the methods of development that

were used by Roosevelt to win the approval of each point of view by the American people. Extensive treatment was made of each speech, and the effort was made to record each method used. The methods were then analyzed, similarities noted, and grouped into the classes that are treated in this chapter.

The Speeches to Be Treated

Between October 5, 1937, the date of the delivery of the "Quarantine" speech in Chicago, and December 7, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt delivered in excess of sixty speeches that, at least in part, were concerned with international affairs.[1] As the sixty-plus speeches, public letters, and proclamations are investigated, however, it becomes clear that all of them are not of equal importance and character. Because of the differences and because of the large number available, limitation in terms of number and quality suggests itself.

Ten speeches can be eliminated from full consideration because of the limited importance of foreign affairs to the speeches.[2] In these ten speeches, the major purpose of each is not a discussion of matters external to the United States; but, rather, each one of the ten deals with some particular phase of an internal problem or problems. In these ten speeches only the briefest sort of comment is made on international affairs.

---

[1]See Appendix B, Group I, pp. 177 & 178.

[2]See Appendix B, Group II, p. 178.

It is interesting to note that most of the comments on world affairs that are made in these ten addresses have to do with the necessity of the United States' maintaining a strong defense. The strong defense that is suggested is almost always defined in terms of the particular audience interests that are present at the presentation of the speech, e.g., to the Teamsters on September 11, 1940, national defense was stressed in terms of the labor force; while at the dedication of the new Franklin D. Roosevelt school in Hyde Park, New York, on October 5, 1949, the strength of the defense of the country was mainly in terms of education. All of the remarks call for a strong country to face the crisis of dictatorship in the world--dictatorship which was such a serious threat to freedom and democracy.

Another set of speeches and public letters, nine in number, will not be considered because they do not have the people of the United States as their basic or most important, audience.[3] While the people are being addressed at least part of the time, the major audience of the speeches and letters is some other person, group, or groups. In this series of nine public statements, for instance, are four addresses to the Pan-American countries. In these four addresses is stressed the unity of the western hemisphere; and the remarks are mainly addressed to the delegates of other countries in South and Central America and Canada. One public telegram and one public

---

[3]See Appendix B, Group III, p. 178.

letter are addressed to the Chancellor of Germany, Adolf Hitler. Another public letter is addressed to the Polish President.

Of the nine public statements by Roosevelt just discussed, there is one that had as its audience a group of Americans. It is the commencement address delivered at West Point, June 12, 1939. The address is, however, not made to the American public as a whole as was the commencement address at the University of Virginia, June 10, 1940, but instead, was given to the graduating seniors of West Point. It is presented in their terms and is quite clearly not meant for the general public either in language or idea.

There is another group of six speeches that will not be considered even though they have a great deal to do with international affairs and obviously are directed to the entire American public.[4] These are the six speeches directly connected with the politics of the Presidential election of 1940. In any political campaign address the major purpose, almost by definition, must recognizably be to win votes. The basic intent, therefore, though it may be an ulterior purpose in terms of much of the content of the speech, is one not similar to that of the other speeches under consideration.

Finally, then, the speeches to be considered are thirty-two in number and are selected to include the large

---

[4]See Appendix B. Group IV, p. 179.

majority of statements to the American public by Franklin Roosevelt from October 5, 1937 to December 7, 1941.[5] In the present chapter the interest is in tracing the President's public remarks on international affairs during that period of time and to put these public statements into a comparison with his more private thinking as developed by Chapter III.

Overview of the Speeches

Because of the materials assembled in Chapter III, it should not be surprising to find at least three major issues being treated in the speeches. In the thirty-two speeches, the President did, in truth, address himself to: (1) creating an awareness in the public mind of the considerable dangers to the United States of the struggles in Europe and the Far East, (2) convincing, or attempting to convince, the people that isolationism (apparently synonymous in Roosevelt's mind with the neutralism that was defined by the 1935-1937 Neutrality Acts) was a poor policy for America to follow in her relations with the nations of the world, and (3) struggling against those who would accept "peace at any price" (equated in Roosevelt's mind with "appeasement") with the Axis powers.

In addition to these three major issues, there is at least one more major problem to which the President gives a great deal of attention. It becomes apparent when one gives even the briefest examination to the speeches, and it grows of necessity rather naturally out of the first three issues. If

---

[5]See Appendix B, Group V, p. 179.

the United States was in serious danger, and if isolationism was not a good policy to be followed by the country and, finally, if no agreement could be made with Hitler and the rest of the Axis powers, then a large quantity of united effort would have to be expended by the citizens; thus, the fourth issue dealt with by Roosevelt was that involved in the building of a spirit of strong national unity so that morale would be high enough among the people to permit the expenditure of the energy of America necessary to defeat Germany, Italy and Japan either by aid to the allies in great quantity, or even, if need be, direct American participation in the struggle.

With these four issues in mind, an analysis can be undertaken to understand the development of each through the four year period in the thirty-two speeches.

Development of the Four Issues

Awareness of the Danger

In terms of the relative importance of the four issues that were at the heart of the Roosevelt speeches, if frequency and length of appearance are any indication, as certainly they are, the "awareness" issue ranks second only to the President's efforts to build a unity of American spirit. At least twenty-four of the thirty-two speeches under investigation had major emphasis placed on the issue.

Near the very beginning of the "Quarantine" speech in Chicago, Roosevelt suggested that, because of what he saw

around him in the world, "....I, as the responsible executive head of the Nation, have chosen this great inland city and this gala occasion to speak to you on a subject of definite national importance."[6] That subject was, first, the threat to the world and, more particularly, to America. With no attempt at attenuation, the President defined the threat of the Axis powers as being an attack against all that was decent in the world and an attack against civilization itself.

> To paraphrase a recent author "perhaps we forsee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book (and) <u>every</u>[7] picture, (and) <u>every</u> harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenseless--all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed."
>
> If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that <u>America</u> may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere <u>will not</u> be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.
>
> <u>No</u>, if those days come "there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in vast chaos."[8]

---

[6] FDRL, Speech Files; from the speech of October 5, 1937, pp. 1 & 2. With his speech manuscripts, it was Roosevelt's habit to ad-lib during their delivery. The manuscripts that I have used show this improvization as taken down by a stenographer. Further footnotes to sections of speeches will merely indicate the date of the speech and the pages of the manuscript quoted.

[7] Parantheses indicated material deleted from the speech at the time of delivery. Underlining indicates materials added during delivery. The manuscripts used were those at the FDRL as corrected by the secretary who used this system of notation.

[8] October 5, 1937, p. 3.

As the President began to build the necessary recognition of the seriousness of the situation, he did truly speak with great power and intensity. Further, he put the whole of civilization before the eyes and ears of the Nation. To him, all that was good, all that was just, all that was human, would be tested. No nation could avoid the threat. The American people had to come to recognize the threat, and Roosevelt made his presentation in the "Quarantine" speech in unveiled form.

Two things about the President's presentation in October of 1937, should be observed at this time. First, the strength of the statement should be noticed. He did not make simple allusions about the threat of the Axis powers, but did, rather, speak in the strongest sort of language about the whole destruction of civilized man. He made that reference in as direct and forceful a way as could be done. This is significant because of the variations from the approach immediately observable in the speeches of the next year and a half or two years.

The second observation that is of particular note is that of the subject matter treated. Mr. Roosevelt spoke in October of 1937 in terms of the "eternal verities" as being the points at issue. He spoke not in terms of the immediate physical danger so much as in terms of the danger to truth, justice, art, honor, and the well-organized life embodying each of these factors. The further examination of the speeches from 1937 to 1941 will show a variation from this approach to

the "awareness" issue.

The Intensity of the Statement

Strongly did Roosevelt present the danger to the world of the Nazi state as he saw it at the time of the "Quarantine" speech. In no uncertain terms did he make clear the extent and severity of the danger. However, after the Chicago address, the President began, for approximately the next two years, to attenuate the position as stated in the October, 1937, speech. While the "awareness" issue was dealt with frequently in 1938 and 1939, his treatment of it does not evidence the vigor that is in the "Quarantine" address. On October 12, 1937, for instance, Roosevelt's treatment of the issue is the following:

> The development of civilization and of human welfare is based on the acceptance by individuals of certain fundamental decencies in their relations with each other. And, equally, the development of peace in the world is dependent similarly on the acceptance by nations of certain fundamental decencies in their relations with each other.
>
> Ultimately, I hope each nation will accept the fact that violations of these rules of conduct are an injury to the well-being of all nations.[9]

On January 3, 1938, the President said:

> In addressing the Congress on the state of the Union present facts and future hazards demand that I speak clearly and earnestly of the causes which underlie events of profound concern to all.
>
> In spite of the determination of this Nation for peace, it has become clear that acts and policies of nations in other parts of the world have far-reaching effects not only upon their immediate neighbors but also on us.[10]

---

[9] October 12, 1937, p. 12.

[10] January 3, 1938, p. 1.

Again, in his address of January 4, 1939, Roosevelt said:

> Storms abroad directly challenge three institutions indispensible to Americans, now as always. The first is religion. (It) Religion is the source of the two others--democracy and international good faith.[11]

And, finally, in his speech of September 3, 1939, the "awareness" issue was presented as follows:

> You must master at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations between nations. When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.[12]

Thus, from the presentation of the October 5, 1937, speech, Roosevelt tended to "pull in his horns" with regard to the preparation of America for the danger from abroad. While it is true that the issue was discussed during 1938 and 1939, it was not until 1940, and not until May 16, 1940 to be specific, that the real strength came again to Roosevelt's presentation of the issue. Specific materials from the May 16th address and of the speeches following will not be examined at this time, but rather will follow in the next section. For our purposes, now, it will be enough to know that the President introduced his discussion of American danger in the May 16, 1940, address to a joint assembly of the Congress with the following:

> These are ominous days--days whose swift and shocking developments force every neutral nation to look to its defenses in the light of new factors. The brutal force of modern offensive war has been loosed in all its horror. New powers of destruction, incredibly swift and deadly.

---

[11] January 4, 1939, p. 1.

[12] September 3, 1939, p. 3.

> have been developed, and those who wield them are ruthless and daring. No old defense is so strong that it requires no further strengthening and no attack is so unlikely or impossible that it may be ignored.
>
> Let us examine, without self-deception, the dangers which confront us. Let us measure our strength and our defense without self-delusion.[13]

The attempted strength of the argument during 1938 and 1939 is probably most clearly evidenced by a comparison of the materials discussed in the Military Affairs Committee meeting at the White House on January 30, 1939 (See Appendix A) and the speeches of 1938 and 1939. In the Committee meeting, Roosevelt was extremely specific concerning the immediate danger. Yet, in his public utterances, the material discussed in the Committee session is never made public until the May 16, 1940, speech.[14]

After May, 1940, however, and until December 7, 1941, Roosevelt's statements on possible American danger were frequent and not softened for any reason. The statements were hard-hitting as well as being very explicit. So interesting is the change that occurred after the Chicago address in 1937 and ran through 1939 that it will be examined for possible causes later in this chapter.

The Kinds of Approach

Beginning with the "Quarantine" speech, and running to the speech of May 16, 1940, the basic appeals used by Franklin Roosevelt to build an awareness to the danger in the American

---

[13] May 16, 1940, p. 1.

[14] See pp. 79 & 80 of this chapter, footnote 15.

people were almost entirely bound up with the broader aspects of life--the great values of life--the basic values such as truth, honor, brotherhood, justice, and the like. To this list were added religion, democracy and good faith in his speech of January 4, 1939. This emphasis on the "eternal truths" continued, and almost all argument was advanced in this fashion until May 16, 1940.

The change that took place in Roosevelt's line of approach to the issue on May 16th is decided. While it certainly is fair to say that the broader human goals were still referred to after this date, other much more immediate factors entered the President's treatment of the issue. Rather than to speak and limit himself entirely to the greater values, he began to show the immediate danger to life and property made on the United States by Germany and the other Axis powers.

> Motorized armies can now sweep through enemy territories at the rate of two hundred miles a day. Parachute troops are dropped from airplanes in large numbers behind enemy lines. Troops are landed from planes in open fields, on wide highways, and at local civil airports!
>
> .....
>
> Lightning attacks, capable of destroying airplane factories and munition works hundreds of miles behind the lines are a part of the new technique of modern war.
>
> .....
>
> Let me analyze for a moment. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were reasonably adequate defensive barriers....
>
> But the new element--air navigation--steps up the speed of possible attack to two hundred or three hundred miles an hour.
>
> Furthermore, it brings the new possibilities of the use of nearer bases from which an attack or attacks on the American Continents could be made. From the fiords of Greenland

it is 4 hours by air to Newfoundland; 5 hours to Nova Scotia, to New Brunswick (and), to the Province of Quebec; and only 6 hours to New England.

The Azores are only 2000 miles from parts of our eastern seaboard and if Bermuda fell into hostile hands it (is) would be a matter of less than 3 hours for modern bombers to reach our shores.

From a base in the outer West Indies, the coast of Florida could be reached in 200 minutes.

.....

On the other side of the continent, Alaska, with a white population of only 30,000 people, is within 4 or 5 hours of flying distance to Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma, (and) Portland.[15]

Now, in addition to the more far-reaching goals being treated, President Roosevelt added the immediate threat of bombing, infiltration, and land attack. Through all his speaking on the "awareness" issue from this point on, he built his case very carefully by using a blend of both of these two approaches. However, as the condition of the war in Europe worsened, Roosevelt directed his arguments more closely to the real individual problems of various persons and groups. On May 27, 1941, the President singled out, and spoke directly to many specific groups of people; and, in the process of selection of the group interests, he included almost every American.

They [the Nazis] plan...to strangle the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada.

The American laborer would have to complete with slave labor in the rest of the world. Minimum wages, maximum hours? Nonsense: Wages and hours (would be) fixed by Hitler. The dignity and power and standard of living of the American worker and farmer would be gone.

---

[15]May 16, 1940, pp. 1-3.

> Trade unions would become historic(al) relics, and collective bargaining a joke.
>
> Farm income?...The American farmer would get for his products exactly what Hitler wanted to give. (He would) The farmer would face obvious disaster and complete regimentation.
>
> .....
>
> The whole fabric of working life as we know it--business and manufacturing, mining and agriculture--all would be mangled and crippled under such a system. Yet to maintain even that crippled independence would require permanent conscription of our manpower; it would curtail the funds we spend on education, on housing, on public works, on flood control, on health....[16]

One by one, with individual interests in manufacturing, labor, farming, etc., Roosevelt laid the danger squarely at the feet of each and every American.

As proof for all these claims, Roosevelt used examples of the "horrible Nazi menace" in other sections of the globe. He described the starving Belgians, the tortured Poles, and the "rape" of Czechoslovakians. He constantly set up a contrast of the driving motives of freedom and democracy on the one hand with the forces that moved the dictators on the other. Roosevelt was even able, on several occasions to use Hitler's own words to condemn the motives of the Hitler's state.

> The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

---

[16]May 27, 1941, p. 15.

> It was only three weeks ago their leader stated this: "There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other." And then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: "Others are correct when they say: With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves....I can beat any other power in the world." So said the leader of the Nazis.[17]

Thus, the effort to build awareness in the American people of the danger of the threat of the Axis powers was done, first, by showing that Hitler and the other dictators offered serious conflict to all the ideals that American citizens held sacred, second, by showing that the threat was not some dim shadow, but actually quite immediate in terms of the distances and speed of modern warfare; and, third, by showing by actions and even testimony of the leaders of the Axis powers that all described horrors were possible.

Isolation is Folly

The "Quarantine" address has been so named because of Roosevelt's famous analogy which he drew between a contagious disease and the worsening of the world situation.

> It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
> And mark this well! When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of its patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.[18]

---

[17]December 29, 1940, p. 2.

[18]October 5, 1937, p. 6.

In the same speech came Roosevelt's famous words: "America hates war. America--America hopes for peace. Therefore America actively engages [underlining my own] in the search for peace."[19] Here was, in truth the defiance of a policy of isolationism for America. With his words "actively engages" Roosevelt clearly put himself against the people who would have America build a wall around itself and turn its back on the problems of the world. The question, now, is what were the basic and most important threads of development of this issue.

Certainly, one of the most frequent approaches used by Roosevelt to fight isolationism was that of simple straightforward denial of the validity of the isolationist approach. Over and over again statements in the Roosevelt speeches can be found like the following:

> I want our great democracy to be wise enough to realize that aloofness from war is not promoted by unawareness of war. In a world of mutual suspicions, peace must be affirmatively reached for. It cannot just be wished for. And it cannot just be waited for.[20]

In January, 1939, the President said:

> We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world which observe the sanctity of treaties and good faith in their dealings with other nations cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. No, they cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations--acts which automatically undermine all of us.[21]

---

[19] Ibid., p. 8.

[20] October 12, 1937, p. 11.

[21] January 4, 1939, p. 4.

Finally, after much of his battle against the isolationists in the country was won, Roosevelt still included the same sort of feelings in his statement:

> We Americans have already weighed and considered these questions carefully and thoughtfully. We Americans have announced our determination that, with all our resources and all our power, we shall help those who block the dictators in their march toward domination of the world.[22]

Another whole series of oft restated arguments against isolationism are constructed around the thought that the idea of isolationism is actually foreign to the history and tradition of the United States. Usually when Roosevelt used this approach, he included another factor that comes very close to trying to establish a causal connection between isolationism (or neutralism as defined by the 1935-1937 Neutrality Acts) and war. Although these arguments are advanced indirectly on numerous occasions, particularly after the middle of 1939, the clearest and most obvious presentation of the two interlocked theses, i.e., that historically American policy has not been one of isolationism and that, by use of historical example, there is a direct positive causal relation between a policy of isolation and American entry into war, is that which is found in the Roosevelt speech of September 21, 1939, to the Congress of the United States. In this address, which was delivered to an extrodinary session of Congress that had been called by the President for the purpose of

---

[22]March 29, 1941, p. 5.

amending the Neutrality Act of 1937, Roosevelt began by saying:

> I have asked the Congress to reassemble in extraordinary session in order that it may consider and act on the amendment of certain legislation, which, in my best judgment, so alters the historic foreign policy of the United States with foreign nations.[23]

From this point, the President took the next three or four pages of the speech to "Review...in a spirit of understatement" the world events that occurred between 1931 and 1939, which "review" set the mood of the rest of the speech as being one of ways and means to avoid war for the United States. Roosevelt concluded his "review" and then moved to an examination of American history. He presented his discussion in the following way:

> Go back a little; Beginning with the foundation of our constitutional government in the year 1789, the American policy in respect to belligerent nations, with one notable exception, (has been) was based on international law. Be it remembered that what we call international law has always had as its primary objective the avoidance of causes of war and the prevention of the extension of war.[24]

A bit further on in the speech Roosevelt added:

> The step I recommend [removal of the embargo provisions in the Neutrality legislation] is to put this country back on (the) a solid footing of real and traditional Neutrality.[25]

To establish the contention that the policy of isolationism is a cause of war, Roosevelt advanced the following

---

[23]September 21, 1939, p. 1.

[24]Ibid., pp. 5 & 6.

[25]Ibid., p. 11.

historical example as proof:

> The single exception to which I refer was the policy adopted by this nation during the Napoleonic Wars, when, seeking to avoid involvement, we acted for some years under the so-called Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts. That policy turned out to be a disastrous failure--first, because it brought our own nation closer to ruin, and second, because it was the major cause of bringing us into active participation in European wars in our own War of 1812. And it is merely reciting history to recall to you that one of the results of the policy of embargo and non-intercourse was the burning in 1814 of part of this Capitol in which we are assembled today.[26]

The Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937 are then placed under direct condemnation with:

> On July fourteenth of this year, I asked Congress in the cause of peace and in the interest of real American neutrality and security to take action to change that Act. I now ask again that such action be taken in respect to that part of the Act which is wholly inconsistent with ancient precepts of the laws of nations--the embargo provisions. I ask it because they are, in my opinion, most dangerous to American neutrality, American security and, above all, American peace.[27]

The final major line of argument that Roosevelt used to develop his attack on isolationism makes use of his efforts in behalf of the threat offered America by the Axis powers. The thread of the argument seems to be: first, that the threat to the United States was great, which he developed as has been examined earlier in this chapter; and, then, second, if the threat was great, we could hide from our responsibilities, but we must meet the threat head on, as it were. At the University of Virginia on June 10, 1940, Roosevelt clearly presented the

---

[26] Ibid., p. 6.

[27] Ibid., p. 7.

argument when he said:

> Perception of the danger, danger of our institutions may come slowly or it may come with a rush and a shock as it has to the people of the United States in the past few months. This perception of danger, danger in a world-wide [sic] area--it has come to us clearly and overwhelmingly--we perceive the peril in a world-wide arena, an arena that may become so narrow that only the Americas will retain the ancient faiths.
>
> Some indeed still hold to the now somewhat obvious delusion that we of the United States can safely permit the United States to become a lone island, a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force.
>
> Such an island may be the dream of those who still talk and vote as isolationists. Such an island represents to me and tc the overwhelming majority of Americans today a helpless nightmare, the helpless nightmare of a people without freedom; yes, the nightmare of a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying masters of other continents. [28]

Here, then was the use of the "awareness" issue to give strength to the idea that isolationism was impossible. While the same relation occurs many other times in the thirty-two speeches, perhaps one more example will suffice to make the point clear. On January 6, 1941, Roosevelt said:

> I have recently pointed out how quickly the tempo of modern warfare could bring into our very midst physical attack which we must <u>eventually</u> expect if the dictator nations win this war.
>
> There is much <u>loose talk of our immunity</u> [underlining my own] from immediate and direct invasion from across the seas.[29]

From this point in the speech Roosevelt built the case against the possible success of a policy of isolation.

Roosevelt indicated clearly in what contempt he held

---

[28] June 10, 1940, p. 2.

[29] January 6, 1941, p. 4.

the policy of isolationism when he presented the analogy of the long-necked bird.

> Summing up this need of looking ahead, and in words of common sense and good American citizenship, I hope that we will have fewer American ostriches in our midst. It is not good for the ultimate health of ostriches to bury their heads in the sand.[30]

Peace at Any Price

Though it has been noted with the "awareness" issue that there was time-lag between the time when Roosevelt stated in his private correspondence, conversations, etc., that an idea should be presented to the public and the time that the idea was actually included in the public address, it is well to recognize this point again with the "peace at any price" or "appeasement" issue. While he did, as shall be seen shortly, treat the issue early and constantly from October 5, 1937, on, it is interesting to note that the approach to the issue was relatively indirect for a long time and that the phrases "peace at any price" and/or "appeasement" were never used by Roosevelt until sometime in 1940. In an examination of all of the sixty-two speeches that have any mention of affairs international from October, 1937, to December, 1941, the author can find no use of either expression until September 11, 1940, in a speech to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers. The argument seems to have been treated, but the terminology is quite different from that in his private statements until the September 11th address.

---

[30]January 3, 1940, p. 6.

Later in the chapter, explanation will be attempted to explain this phenomenon; our present concern will be with the methods used by Roosevelt to get the point accepted by the public.

Probably the most frequent argument built by the President against the idea of "appeasement," or "peace at any price," or a negotiated peace with Germany, was the effort to build the feeling that the German state--the Hitler state--was completely untrustworthy with respect to its handling of its treaty obligations. Roosevelt tried to show, by oft repeated examples, that Hitler's word was simply not to be trusted. The whole pattern for this argument is set out in the "Quarantine" speech as follows:

> It is true that they [the problems of the world] involve definite violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenent of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. And we have signed both of the last two.[31]

For greater effect Roosevelt joined this theme of lawlessness with a constant contrasting of the aims of dictatorship and the aims of democracy. He set up the Axis powers as being on the side of death and destruction and all that any of his audience would consider to be the worst characteristics. From this evidence of lawlessness and invidious comparison the implication was drawn, until September 1940, that negotiation with such an evil force was impossible. The pattern is clearly presented in the statements by Roosevelt in his speech of October 26, 1938, to the Herald Tribune Forum.

---

[31] October 5, 1937, p. 6.

> No one who lived through the grave hours of last month [the Munich Conference was in September of 1938] can doubt the longing of most of the peoples of the world for an enduring peace. Our business now is to utilize the desire for peace to build principles which are the only basis of permanent peace.
>
> It is becoming increasingly clear that peace by fear has no higher or more enduring quality than peace by the sword.
>
> There can be no peace if the reign of law is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification of sheer force.
>
> There can be no peace if national policy adapts as a deliberate instrument the threat of war.
>
> There can be no peace if national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the dispersion all over the world of millions of helpless and persecuted wanderers with no place to lay their heads.
>
> There can be no peace if humble men and women are not free to think their own thoughts, to express their own feelings, to worship God.
>
> There can be no peace if economic resources that ought to be devoted to social and economic reconstruction are to be diverted to an intensified competition in armaments which will merely heighten the suspicions and fears and threaten the economic prosperity of each and every nation.[32]

After Roosevelt permitted himself the use of the terms "appeasement" and "peace at any price", the line of argument is no longer left to implication, but is stated directly. His attack on the "appeasers" was strong, making use of great Americans, particularly Abraham Lincoln. To the Herald Tribune Forumin October, 1940, Roosevelt said:

> In closing this forum on the subject, "Saving Democracy," I can think of no better text than the final words of the speech which Abraham Lincoln gave in Cooper Institute in New York City February 27th, 1860.
>
> Lincoln was then speaking to an audience to whom he was a stranger. Represented in the audience, said the New York Tribune of that day, was the "intellectual and moral culture" of the city. Lincoln warned them against the fear-mongers and the calamity howlers--the "appeasers" of that troubled time, <u>appeasers</u> who were numerous and

---

[32]October 26, 1938, p. 1.

influential. He said:

> "Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government, nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it."[33]

The pattern of the argument can be seen and understood by the examination of the following material taken from the State of the Union address in January, 1941:

> No realistic American can expect from a dictator's peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion--or even good business. Such a peace would bring no security for us or for our neighbors. "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty or safety.
>
> As a nation we may take pride in the fact that we are soft-hearted; but we cannot afford to be soft-headed. We must always be wary of those who with sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal preach the "ism" of appeasement.[34]

Roosevelt combined his thoughts on German lawlessness and German atrocities with one more factor that appears frequently--Roosevelt's frequent characterization of the advocate of a negotiated peace as one who is deluded. He was always quick to show the deluded attitudes growing forth from timidity and fear; and, as the years passed, Roosevelt began to suggest that the delusion led some persons dangerously close to being traitors to the best interests of the United States.

> There are some timid ones among us who say that we must preserve peace at any price--lest we lose our liberties forever. To them I say <u>this</u>: never in the history

---

[33]October 24, 1940, p. 1.

[34]January 6, 1941, p. 3.

> of the world has a nation lost its democracy by a successful struggle to defend its democracy....
>
> There is, of course, a small group of sincere, patriotic men and women whose real passion for peace has shut their eyes to the ugly realities of international banditry and to the need to resist it at all costs. I am sure they are embarrassed by the sinister support they are receiving from enemies of democracy in our midst--the Bundists, (and) the Facists, and Communists, and every group devoted to bigotry and racial and religious intolerance.[35]

Or, again, in his Labor Day Address on September 1, 1941, Roosevelt said:

> The task of defeating Hitler may be long and arduous. There are a few appeasers and Nazi sympathizers who say it cannot be done. They even ask me to negotiate with Hitler--to pray for crumbs from his victorious table. They do, in fact, ask me to become the modern Benedict Arnold and betray all that I hold dear--my devotion to our freedom--to our churches--to our country. This course I have rejected--I reject it again.[36]

Unity for America

The fourth and final issue that was a major element in Roosevelt's speeches on international affairs grows very directly out of his thinking on the other three issues. It may be phrased as follows: If one grants that the world situation was as serious a threat to the United States as Roosevelt would contend, and, if one, then, conceives of only three possible courses of action for the United States, i.e., (1) isolation in terms of complete non-intercourse with the rest of the world, or (2) negotiation with the Axis powers, or (3) strong efforts to assure the defeat of the Axis, and, finally, if one rejects the first two of these three courses of action as being impossible

---

[35] May 27, 1941, p. 14.

[36] September 1, 1941, pp. 4 & 5.

for the United States, then one is left, as Roosevelt was, with the necessity of adopting a policy that would aid greatly in the defeat of Hitler. As the position of the Allied powers became ever worse during the early years of the war, more and more aid from the United States was necessary; and America had, after all, two jobs to do. Production had to be expanded so that it could produce enough to supply France, Britain, et al., and a good strong defense for America had also to be built.

As each day of the war in Europe passed, it brought bigger and bigger demands on the United States for the implements of war. In March, 1941, the Lend-Lease Bill passed; and from that point on, industrial America was swamped with orders from abroad that had to be filled, and filled fast, if the Axis were to be defeated. To achieve this tremendous productive effort, most Americans had to be at least willing, if not eager, to expend all their efforts to achieve the ends. There could be no stinting of effort. There could be no plants retired because of strikes. There could be nothing but around-the-clock activity of every bit of the American productive genius. For this to come about, the people had to forget private worries, private inconveniences, private grievances, and, to achieve this sort of tireless devotion, a national unity had to be welded, the likes of which had rarely existed in any country in any period in history.

To attempt to build the necessary unity, Roosevelt made use of three major techniques in his public speaking. First,

he made use of the basic love in the people of freedom, democracy, their individual liberties, their country. On April 19, 1938, Roosevelt said:

> Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations--disappeared not because the people of these nations disliked democracy, but because they had grown tired of unemployment and insecurity, of seeing their children hungry while they sat helpless in the face of government confusion, government weakness,--weakness through lack of leadership in government. Finally, in desperation, they chose to sacrifice liberty in the hope of getting something to eat. We in America know that our own democratic institutions can be preserved and made to work. But in order to preserve them we need to act together, to meet the problems of the Nation boldly, and to prove that the practical operation of democratic government is equal to the task of protecting the security of the people.[37]

About two years later, on May 26, 1940, in a radio address, the President expressed the thought as follows:

> These dividing forces (are) I do not hesitate to call undiluted poison. They must not be allowed to spread in the New World as they have in the old. Our moral, (and) our mental defenses must be raised up as never before against those who would cast a smokescreen across our vision.
>
> The development of our defense program makes it essential that each and every one of us, men and women, feel that we have some contribution to make toward the security of our (country) nation.
>
> At this time, when the world--and the world includes our own American Hemisphere [Notice the quick reference to help dispel isolationist thought]--when the world is threatened by forces of destruction, it is my resolve and yours to build up our armed defenses.
>
> We shall build them to whatever heights the future may require.
>
> .....
>
> It is the task of our generation, yours and mine. But we build and defend not for our generation alone. We de-

---

[37]April 14, 1938, p. 8.

> fend the foundations laid down by our fathers. We build a life for generations yet unborn. We defend and we build a way of life, not for America alone, but for all mankind. Ours is a high duty and a noble task.[38]

In this passage, Roosevelt was appealing to the highest ideals of man; and he was calling for a unity to carry on the great crusade to save America and mankind. Roosevelt's speech of October 15, 1940, shows the approach clearly. He stated it in the following way when he spoke on Registration Day for the first peace time draft that this country had had:

> On this day more than sixteen million young Americans are reviving the three hundred year old American custom of the Muster. They are obeying that first duty of free citizenship by which, from the earliest Colonial times, every able-bodied citizen was subject to the call for service in the national defense. It is a day of deep and purposeful meaning in the lives of all of us. For on this day we Americans proclaim the vitality of our history, the singleness of our will and the unity of our nation.
>
> We prepare to keep the peace in this New World which free men have built for free men to live in.
>
> .....
>
> Calmly, without fear and without hysteria, but with clear determination, we are building guns and planes and tanks and ships--and all the other tools which modern defense requires
>
> .....
>
> In the days when our forefathers laid the foundation of our democracy, every American family had to have its gun and know how to use it. Today we live under threats, threats of aggression from abroad, which call again for the same readiness, the same vigilance. Ours must once again be the spirit of those who were prepared to defend as they built, to defend as they worked, to defend as they worshipped.[39]

---

[38]May 26, 1940, pp. 14 & 15.

[39]October 15, 1940, p. 1.

America had truly to become "the arsenal of democracy."[40]

The second major technique used by Roosevelt to build national unity was that of calling for sacrifices by the people. He reminded the people often of the sacrifices made by our forefathers, and then he asked the people to be willing to make the same sort of sacrifice. The approach is very reminiscent of another great leader of the same period who could offer his people nothing but "blood, sweat, toil and tears." Roosevelt, though he frequently used the technique, probably was strongest in the statement of the sacrifice in his speech of March 15, 1941, a radio address made at the White House Correspondents' dinner, a speech that was later broadcast around the world in seven different languages. He said:

> Here in Washington, we are thinking in terms of speed and speed now. And I hope that that watchword--"speed and speed now"--will find its way into every home in the nation.
>
> We shall have to make sacrifices--everyone of us. The final extent of those sacrifices will depend (up) on the speed with which we act NOW!
>
> I must tell you tonight in plain language what this undertaking means to you--to you in your daily lives.
>
> Whether you are in the armed services; whether you are a steel worker or a stevedore; a machinist or a housewife; a farmer or a banker; a storekeeper or a manufacturer--to all of you it will mean sacrifice in behalf of your country and your liberties. Yes, you will feel the impact of this gigantic effort in your daily lives. You will feel it in a way (which) that will cause, to you, many inconveniences.
>
> You will have to be content with lower profits, lower profits from business because obviously your taxes will be higher.
>
> You will have to work longer at your bench, or your plow, or your machine (.), or your desk.

---

[40]December 29, 1940, p. 13.

> Let me make it clear that the nation is calling for the sacrifice of some privileges, (but) not for the sacrifice of fundamental rights. And most of us will do (that) it willingly. That kind of sacrifice is for the common national protection and welfare; for our defense against the most ruthless brutality in all history; for the ultimate victory of a way of life now so violently menaced.
>
> A half-hearted effort on our part--that will lead to failure. This is no part-time job. The concepts of "business as usual," (and) of "normalcy," must be forgotten until the task is finished. (That is) Yes, it's an all-out effort--and nothing sort of an all-out effort will win.
>
> Therefore, we are (now) dedicated, from here on, to a constantly increasing tempo of production--a production greater than we now know or have ever known before--a production that does not stop and should not pause.
>
> (And so,) Tonight, I am appealing to the heart and to the mind of every man and every woman within our borders who love liberty. I ask you to consider the needs of our nation and this hour, (and) to put aside all personal differences until (our) the victory is won.[41]

Much of the rest of the speech continued in the same tenor as that in the small portion presented here. It was a speech designed to build a strong, united America; and Roosevelt, in order better to build the single-mindedness, drew heavily on the idea of sacrifice.

The third and final means used by Roosevelt with a relative frequency to build American unity was his dependence on his own personal strength with the people. He couches this kind of persuasive device almost entirely in terms of the first personal pronoun, I, which he used a great deal. One clear example of this technique was that used by Roosevelt in his "arsenal of democracy" speech, December 29, 1940.

> I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they ever yet made to increase our production of all the imple-

---

[41] March 15, 1941, pp. 5 & 6.

> ments of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.
>
> As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.[42]

In connection with the Defense Savings Campaign, President Roosevelt made a brief speech on April 30, 1941, the purpose of which was to get a united action by the American people so that they would buy Defense Bonds. The speech offers a good example of Roosevelt's personal approach to the issue of unity. He said:

> This character of the campaign is national in the best sense of the word--for it is going to reach down, we hope, to the individual and the family in every community, and on every farm, in every state and every possession of the United States.
>
> It is national and it is homey at the same time. For example, I am buying not one stamp but (twenty) ten stamps each to go into a little book(s) for each of my ten grandchildren. And the first (Defense) Savings Bond is being made out in the name of Mrs. Roosevelt as beneficiary.
>
> .....
>
> And so my fellow Americans, I ask you to demonstrate again your faith in America by joining me in investing in the new Defense Savings and Stamps. I know you will help.[43]

Finally, in a broadcast address from the Mayflower Hotel in Washington in celebration of "Navy and Total Defense Day," the President, ad-libbing the first highly personal comment, said the following:

---

[42] December 29, 1940, pp. 13 & 14.

[43] April 30, 1941, pp. 1 and 3.

> In the light of a good many years of personal experience, I think that it can be said that it can never be doubted that the goods will be delivered by this nation, whose Navy believes in the tradition of "Damn the torpedoes; full speed ahead!"[44]

Possible Causes of the 1938-39 Lull

Roosevelt presented a good, strong statement of the dangers to America inherent in the European situation, and also presented a decisive pronouncement concerning his estimation of a policy of isolationism for the United States. Then, he appears to have softened the position a noticeable amount through most of 1938 and 1939. Also, he did not use the phraseology of "peace at any price", or "appeasement," in his public statements until long after they appeared with rather high frequency in his private correspondence and conferences. The problem is now to try to arrive at sufficient reasons to explain this apparent lag in treatment on Roosevelt's part. It is hoped that the materials presented in the following discussion will be descriptive of the major causes. While it must be recognized that they may not be as all inclusive as may be desired, suffice it to say that the effort has been made to be as complete and fair as possible.

Fear of Leading too Fast

One possible explanation of the apparent retreat from the position of the "Quarantine" address is indicated to us by several of Roosevelt's intimates, including Cordell Hull and

---

[44]October 27, 1941, p. 5.

Samuel Rosenman. These men tell us in their observations that Roosevelt might have felt, because of many of the reactions to his Chicago speech that were adverse, that he was pushing the American people too fast--pushing them before they were ready to follow. Rosenman wrote of the Chicago address:

> The reins of resolute leadership which the President took up on that March day in 1933 he never dropped or even slackened until the day of his death. Sometimes he got out too far in advance, as in the "Quarantine" speech of 1937 [underlining my own]. But never was he content merely to follow.[45]

That the idea of being too far ahead of the people might have contributed to slowing Roosevelt down is testified to by Hull in his Memoirs.

> The reaction against the Quarantine idea was quick and violent. As I saw it, this had the effect of setting back for at least six months our constant educational campaign intended to create and strengthen public opinion toward international cooperation.[46]

Rosenman, in quoting Sumner Welles, wrote the following:

> Sumner Welles has written me of the President's feeling about the reaction to his speech [the "Quarantine" address]:
> "I also recall very well talking with the President about public reaction to the Chicago speech. He was surprised by the volume of the attacks made upon it....You yourself knew him so much better than most that you will understand what I mean when I say that I think that the negative course he pursued thereafter was due as much to his peculiar individual reaction of silence in the face of disaster or bitter disappointment--provoked in this case by the lack of vision as well as personal disloyality of some of those who should have made themselves heard--as to any feeling on his part that politically it might be expedient to ride out the storm." [47]

---

[45] S. I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952), pp. 91 & 92.

[46] Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co.,1948), I, p. 545.

[47] Rosenman, op. cit., p.167.

Rosenman continued in his book a paragraph or two later by quoting Roosevelt as saying:

> "It's a terrible thing," he [Roosevelt] once said to me, having in mind, I am sure this occasion [the Chicago speech], "to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead--and to find no one there."[48]

Fear of Scaring the People

Closely tied to the former cause, but still involving another factor, was Roosevelt's fear of scaring the American people. Even though Dorothy Borg shows that public reaction to the "Quarantine" speech was not as bad as is often assumed,[49] the intimates of Roosevelt indicate that he thought the reaction to be adverse. Just this interpretation by a man who was very sensitive to public opinion would be enough to make him react. If this is true, and when it is remembered that the adverse reaction was to a speech much of which was designed to show the people the possible danger, then, it would not be hard to see that Roosevelt might have interpreted some of the bad reaction as fear of the danger presented. As shown in Chapter III, he cautioned the Senators attending the Military Affairs Committee meeting at the White House on January 31, 1939, that "that is one thing we don't want to do, frighten the American people."[50]

---

[48] Ibid.

[49] Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quartely, LXII (1957), pp. 405-433.

[50] Chapter III, p. 20, footnote 32.

To William Allen White as late as December 14, 1939, Roosevelt expressed his fear of scaring the people. After an extensive description of the worsening world situation, the President wrote:

> Therefore, my sage old friend, my problem is to get the American people to think of conceivable consequences without scaring the American people into thinking that they are going to be dragged into this war.[51]

Possible Mediation and Munich

There is evidence to indicate that Roosevelt would not have been at all unhappy to arrange a conference in 1938 or 1939, with the United States serving as go-between for the purpose of mediating differences between the Axis powers and the rest of the world. To Hitler, Roosevelt sent a long cablegram on April the fourteenth, 1939, that included the following:

> I am convinced that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of governments.
>
> Because the United States, as one of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, is not envolved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be willing to make such a statement of policy to me as the head of a nation far removed from Europe in order that I, acting only with the responsibility and obligation of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of your Government may take.
>
> .....
>
> Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world an immediate measure of relief.
>
> I propose that if it is given, two essential problems

---

[51]Letter from FDR to William Allen White, December 14, 1939, FDRL, PPF 1196, p. 2.

> shall promptly be discussed in the resulting peaceful surroundings, and in those discussions the Government of the United States will gladly take part.[52]

In another letter to Hitler on August 24, 1939, just a few days before Hitler's march into Poland, Roosevelt again offered the services of the United States as mediator. He wrote:

> I need hardly reiterate that should the Governments of Germany and of Poland be willing to solve their differences ...the Government of the United States still stands prepared to contribute its share to the solution of the problems which are endangering world peace in the form set forth in my message of April 14.[53]

For one nation to offer its good offices to settle disputes of other nations while, at the same time, be offering severe criticism of one of the disputants, is impossible; and Roosevelt knew it. During 1938 and 1939, as has been shown, he was interested in mediating the conflicts of Europe and the Far East, and would, therefore, very naturally, feel hesitant to suggest too strong a complaint with the Axis powers.

There was also, in September of 1938, the Munich Conference. Free peoples of all parts of the world placed high hopes in the results of the conference; thus again, Roosevelt could not afford to gamble on damaging the results of Munich by vigorous condemnation of Germany. Rather, he had to wait to find out what course of action Germany would take after the conference.

---

[52]FDRL, PSF; Folder: Italy: Mussolini-Hitler, 1939, Box 45.

[53]FDRL, OF-463-C; Poland, World War, 1939: April-August, 1939.

Domestic Struggles of 1938-39

Until 1937 Roosevelt had never suffered any real political set-backs; but, beginning with the Supreme Court fight which started with a Presidential message on February 5, 1937, the New Deal began to feel a few difficulties. Between 1933 and 1936, there had been some recovery from the critical depression. However, the later part of 1937 and the first half of 1938 brought a severe return of many of the conditions earlier experienced by the country. Along with the "recession" came some loss of faith in the New Deal. "Inevitably it struck a damaging blow at the prestige of the Roosevelt administraction."[54]

Moreover, the more conservative wing of the Democratic party which, had grown in strength; and in consequence by 1938, Roosevelt was forced to take to the campaign trail in an effort to defeat certain members of the House and Senate. Despite his efforts, however, little result of his efforts to "purge" the party was felt. At the same time the Republicans also gained in both houses of Congress.

> President Roosevelt's influence was sufficient to retire the chairman of the House Rules Committee, John J. O'Connor of New York, but Southerners were less responsive. Senators Tydings of Maryland, George of Georgia and Smith of South Carolina all won in their primary contests to retain their Senate seats and their committee posts. Though the 1938 returns left the Democrats with their majorities in both houses, Republicans increased their representatives from 89 to 172 and their senators from 15 to 23.

---

[54] O. T. Barck and N. M. Blake, Since 1900 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 573.

> After 1938, the New Deal slowed down until, by January, 1939, the President himself declared that the reform phase of his administration had ended.[55]

As the domestic opposition swelled, Roosevelt might well have been wary about creating more opposition for himself by advocating objectionable foreign policies.

"Appeasement" and "Peace at any Price"

It is true that the hesitancy of Roosevelt to use the two terms, "appeasement" and "peace at any price," publically until long after he was using them privately does involve each of the foregoing four causes; but, with this particular problem of presentation, there is another important consideration to be made to help explain the delay.

The basic difficulty appears to be in what is being suggested if one denied the possibility of "appeasement," or "peace at any price," when the two terms, as we have seen, were equated in the President's mind with negotiation. Roosevelt, when he objected to "peace at any price," was objecting to the possibility of negotiation with the Germans. Though it is true that he hoped the Munich Conference might succeed, it is not fair to assume that he believed such negotiation would be successful. Rather, after examination of his correspondence and conferences, the opposite belief is evidenced. He appears to have held little belief in the possibility of negotiation.

If this is true, one must recognize the alternative.

---

[55] L. M. Hacker and H. S. Zahler, The United States in the 20th Century (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, Inc., pp. 443 & 444.

If negotiation was impossible, then, about the only alternative was the utter defeat of the Axis powers; and for this must come the active participation of the United States at least as a source of supply if not, finally, as a direct participant. Because this position was so extreme, the direct statement of the terms of the argument could not be presented until late in the "educational" process. Thus, it seems that Roosevelt did not use "appeasement" or "peace at any price" because of the nature of the implications involved in their use.

Summary and Conclusions

In the present chapter, thirty-two speeches by Franklin Roosevelt between October 5, 1937, and December 7, 1941, were examined to understand the development of arguments on international affairs. Four arguments were examined: (1) the building of an awareness of the danger that the Axis powers offered to the people of America, (2) the condemning of a policy of isolationism as folly, (3) the impossibility of appeasement of the Axis powers, and (4) the strengthening of American unity.

Great strength of statement was noticed in the "Quarantine" address, but this position was attenuated through 1938 and 1939.

At lease four causes seem to have been operative that help explain the softened public remarks of the President during the period. First, he felt that he had gotten too far ahead of large groups of the people and therefore found it necessary to back-track until the public could be brought along with him.

Second, he had a fear of scaring the American people and did not wish so to do. Third, some hope that the United States might use its good offices and some hope that the Munich Conference might prove successful in bringing peace prevented Roosevelt from offering severe condemnation of either side of the foreign disputes. And, fourth, with increased struggle at home, Roosevelt may not have wanted to make his problems any more complex.

In addition to these four causes, there is another factor that helps explain the President's hesitancy to use the two terms "appeasement" and "peace at any price." The added difficulty involved stems from the dire implications involved when one concludes that negotiation with an aggressive power that offers a serious threat is impossible. If no treaties can be trusted, and if no agreements are possible, the bad results are not difficult to understand.

With regard to techniques used by Roosevelt to accomplish his persuasion of the American people, a number of approaches were used by Roosevelt. As each issue was treated, the major approaches to each were examined. No implication was intended that would, or could, lead one to the conclusion that the two or three methods discussed with each issue were the only ones used by the President. The effort was to discover the really major methods of approach to each issue.

Also one should not conclude that because a particular method was discussed as being of particular importance to one

issue, that the same method was never used with any of the other issues. What is hoped is that with the examination of the major methods of persuasion used to develop each issue, the substance of Roosevelt's technique of persuasion in terms of invention was reviewed.

The major techniques appear to be ten in number. They are: (1) Appeal to love of democracy, justice, truth, America, etc.; (2) Appeal to the security of individual groups in America; (3) Appeal to the people with descriptions of the horrors, dis-honesty, and the like, of the dictators, using examples and testimony of the Axis leaders as proof of the claims; (4) Denial of the validity of a particular issue by direct statement of generalization with little or no support of any kind; (5) The use of history and traditions of the United States; (6) Closely related to no. 5, the use of the great American historical figures like Abraham Lincoln, etc.; (7) Particularly with the policy of isolationism, the use of causal argument designed to show that a policy of isolationism would lead our country to war, and by way of further proof, the use of additional historical example; (8) the use of some arguments that were designed to discredit any people who disagreed with the ideas presented by placing these people, first, in a class of "deluded" persons, and, finally, almost in a class of traitors; (9) the strong use of the call for sacrifice on the part of the people to secure the defeat of the hated forces that threatened them; and (10) the frequent

reliance on personal arguments that were designed by using the first personal pronoun "I" and calling for belief in the same things in which "I" believe.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND ROOSEVELT'S SPEAKING: A CORRELATION

One major evidence of public reaction to various issues was developed in 1935 with the beginning of nation-wide public opinion polls. In Chapter II the polls were used to suggest opinion as of October, 1937. In this chapter the polls will be used to notice any changes that occurred in the public attitudes from October, 1937, to December 7, 1941. It goes without saying that no direct relation necessarily exists between the results recorded for any sampling of public opinion and any given speech event, but some interesting speculations might be advanced with a positive correlation of attitude change measured by many public polls and numbers of speeches given by any one speaker. Even in the extensive comparison, however, any direct causal connection is almost beyond proof; and, yet, some sort of interesting implications might be indicated by a high positive correlation. It is the purpose of this chapter to make as many comparisons as possible between the public opinion polls on international issues between October 5, 1937, and December 7, 1941, and the speeches given by President Roosevelt during the same period.

Three meaningful problems almost immediately present themselves, each of which must be considered if such a compar-

ison is to be made effectively. These three problems are not inherent in the public opinion poll-taking process, but, rather, the problems grow out of the situation imposed by having to work with polls that were taken in the past by others, rather than by the use of polls taken for a particular purpose which would be given certain direction by the person doing the particular study. Given this privilege, i.e., to take one's own samplings of public opinion, a continuous and consistent picture could be more successfully drawn.

The first of the three problems deals with a simple problem of chronology. To suggest most successfully the highest degree of positive correlation between the results of the polls and the speeches, it would be best to have a poll taken just prior to any given speech followed up with a poll taken just following the speech. The close time relationship between the polls and the speech would help to eliminate many of the other intervening variables that might well have more influence on opinion than the given speech. Without the immediate interest of the pollsters in the effectiveness of a speech, or series of speeches, there is no such direct correspondence between polls and speech dates; and from this fact comes the first difficulty of the present correlation. Whenever possible, the dates of polls and speeches will be concurrent; however, at other times, there will have to be a wider space of time between the polls and the speeches than is strictly desirable.

The second problem that must be faced is that of the

rare occasion when one issue will be questioned by the pollsters in one form for such an extended period of time as that under consideration in this study. Similarity of questions does exist; but, to have the same question(s) posed for four and a half years is almost unheard of at least in terms of international affairs. Correlation, then, must be set for considerably shorter time spans with all the inherent difficulties involved.

Finally, the third serious difficulty in constructing the correlations is offered by the nature of the questions asked of the public by the pollsters. It would have been of great help had the polls reflected directly the four major issues of this dissertation without the necessity for any interpretation to fit the ideas of the polls into the categories of the issues, but such is not the case. Thus, some effort must be made to align the questions with Roosevelt's four major issues. When this interpretation is done, two of the four issues are most frequently treated by the pollsters: (1) awareness of the danger, and (2) attitudes toward isolationism.

With an eye toward finding polls that correspond closely in date to the Roosevelt speeches, with an effort to find reasonably long range polls, and with some interpretation of the questions asked of the public in terms of the four major issues considered by President Roosevelt, a comparison can begin.

Roosevelt's Audience: Its Size

Before an examination is made of the public opinion polls that deal with the four major issues, it would be well to have some idea as to how many people listened to, or read, any given speech by the President. Such polls were taken for three of Roosevelt's speeches; and one poll, taken in April of 1939, was concerned with the number of people who attended, in general, to the fireside chats.

Did you hear President Roosevelt's recent fireside chat April 14, 1938 on government spending?

Yes 34%, No 64%, No answer 2%

AIPO[1]

Do you listen to President Roosevelt's fireside chats over the radio?

Usually 24.1%, Sometimes 38.6%, Never 37.3%

FOR, April, 1939[2]

Did you happen to listen to President Roosevelt's radio speech Sunday night (December 29)?

Yes 59%, read about it in the papers 16%, had both heard and read it 1%

These three groups were asked: In general, do you agree or disagree with the views he expressed?

Didn't know about the speech 24%

---

[1]Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion: 1935-1946 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 587.

[2]Ibid.

Agree with views 61%, Disagree with views 9%,
No Opinion on views expressed 6%

AIPO, December 31, 1940[3]

Did you happen to listen on the radio to President Roosevelt's fireside chat Tuesday night (May 27)?

Yes, part of it 14%, Didn't listen but read it 10%,
Yes 52%, No 24%

AIPO, May 29, 1941[4]

Thus, the numbers listening to, or reading, Roosevelt's speeches were relatively high. There, of course, is no way to know how many more people, who did not hear or read the speeches themselves, were made aware of the speeches by friends and associates. All in all, it certainly can be said that when Roosevelt spoke, probably the majority of the country was made aware of the materials of the speeches.

Awareness of the Danger

Now, a correlation of the public opinion, as measured by the polls, and the speaking of Roosevelt, can be treated with an examination of each of the issues and the polls that are applicable to each. For the rest of the chapter, the polls will be listed on the left side of the page with the intervening speeches recorded on the right side of the page.

---

[3] Ibid, p. 588.

[4] Ibid. All the footnotes that refer to the location of a public opinion poll are from the Cantril volume; and, therefore, the footnote references will, henceforth, simply reflect the page number.

Do you think there will be another war?

Yes 73%, No 27%=100%[5]
No Opinion 8%

AIPO, July 12, 1937[6]

Oct. 5, 12, 1937
Jan. 3, April 14, 1938

Do you think Eng. & Fr. will have a war against Germ. within the next twelve months?

Yes 55%, No 45%

AIPO, Sept. 13, 1938[7]

Do you think that this settlement [to allow Germ. to annex Sudeten German areas in Czechoslovakia] (agreed to by Eng., Fr., Italy, and Germ.) will result in peace for a number of years or in a greater possibility of war?

---

[5]As listed in the Cantril volume the results were: Yes ...73% No...27%=100% No Opinion...8%. Many of the other polls were listed the same way. The "Yes" and "No" percentages give the percent of the people that had an opinion. Thus, in this poll, the "Yes" percentage of 73% is 73% of the 92% that expressed an opinion. So that all of the polls will indicate the same basis of comparison, however, through the remainder of the present chapter, any of these partial figures will be converted to percentages that include the people who felt that they could give no response. It is hoped that this method of reporting the poll results will lead to easier comparison on the part of the reader.

[6]p. 780.

[7]p. 781.

Peace 40%, War 60%

AIPO, Oct. 1, 1938[8]

Do you think the settlement reached in the European crisis will result in peace for a number of years or in a greater possibility of war?

Peace 22.1%, War 62.9%
N. Op. 15%

AIPO, Oct. 17, 1938[9]

Do you believe there will be a war between any of the big European countries this year?

Oct. 26, 1938
Jan. 4, 1939

Jan. 10'39 Yes 44, No 56%

Jan. 12, 1939

Mar. 21'39 Yes 51%, No 49%
May 2'39 Yes 32%, No 68%
July 17'39 Yes 23%, No 63%

AIPO[10]

With the infrequence of Roosevelt's speaking during 1938 and 1939, little can be noted from this particular series of studies. There is, however, a trend indicated by the AIPO studies of March 21, May 2, and July 17, 1939, that will

---

[8] p. 781.

[9] p. 781.

[10] p. 781.

again he indicated later. That is, there is an extended period of time without any speeches by Roosevelt, and at the same time, there is an apparent decline in the "awareness" of the public concerning the possibility of war.

To particularize it more for America, the following polls were taken:

Oct. 5, 12, 1937
Jan. 3, April 14, 1938

If Eng. and Fr. have a war with Germ. and Italy, do you think the U. S. can stay out? A comparable cross-section was asked: If Eng. & Fr. have a war with Germ. & Italy, do you think the U. S. will stay out? Results were combined.

Yes 54%, No 46%

AIPO, July 27, 1938[11]

If Eng. and Fr. have a war against Germ. & Italy, do you think the U. S. will be drawn in?

Yes 60.5%, No 28.5%
N. Op. 11%

AIPO, Sept. 23, 1938[12]

If there had been a general war in Europe [at the time of the Munich crisis] do you think the U. S. would eventually have been drawn in?

---

[11] p. 966.

[12] p. 966.

Jan. 4, 12, 1939

Yes 76.2%, No 14.6%
Don't Know (D.K.) 9.2%

FOR., Jan., 1939[13]

If Eng. & Fr. go into war against Germ. & Italy, do you think the U.S. can stay out?

Yes 57%, No. 43%

AIPO, Aug. 20, 1939[14]

Here again is an interesting negative trend in time. There is a building of public opinion toward American involvement in a European struggle through January, 1939. The next speech of Roosevelt's dealing with the subject in any major way was on September 3, 1939; thus, from January to September nothing of much was publically said by Roosevelt and there is a corresponding decrease in public "awareness" as shown by the August 20th poll, where the 76.2% figure had dropped to 43% (indicated in the August poll by the "No" vote because the question was reversed).

After the beginning of the war in Europe the polls indicated the following:

Do you think the U. S. will go into the war in Europe or do you think we will stay out of the war? A comparable cross-section was asked the

---

[13] p. 1074.

[14] p. 966.

question with the alternatives in the reverse order. Results were combined.

Sept. 3, 1939

Will go in 46%, Will stay out 54% (Oct. 10, 1939)

Will go in 32%, Will stay out 54%, N. Op. 14% (Oct. 18, 1939)

AIPO[15]

Do you think the U. S. will go into the war in Europe if it lasts another year, or do you think we will stay out of the war?

Go in 26%, Stay our 62%
D.K. 11%, No ans. 1%

AIPO, Nov. 15, 1939[16]

Regardless of what you hope, what do you think the chances are that the U. S. will be drawn into this war?

Jan. 3, 1940

Sure 9.9%
Probable 29.2%
50-50 22.8%

Unlikely 22.2%
Impossible 4.0%

D. K. 11.9%

FOR, Jan. 1940[17]

---

[15] p. 969.

[16] p. 970.

[17] p. 970.

Mar. 16, May 16, May 26,
June 10, Sept. 2, Oct. 24,
Oct. 29, 1940.

Sure 14.7%
Probable 33.3%
50-50 22.0%

Unlikely 19.3%
Impossible 1.4%

D. K. 9.3%

FOR, Nov., 1940[18]

For the first time, positive correlation can be offered between Roosevelt's speaking and the public opinion poll results. The difference between the results of the poll of November 15, 1939, and the poll of January, 1940, is significant and there was one Roosevelt speech during the period; and there was another significant rise in "awareness" of the danger of the United States by November of 1940 with eight of Roosevelt's speeches intervening.

Finally, there are two sets of studies that range over 1940 and 1941 that give a further chance for correlation with the speeches. Both sets of polls have to do with the possible effect on the United States of a defeat of England and France by the Axis powers. The first of the two sets of polls was as follows:

Set I

If Germany should defeat England, France, and Norway (and Sweden) in the present war, do you think Germany

---

[18] p. 970.

would start a war against the United States in the next few years? A comparable cross-section was asked the same question with the omission of "in the next few years." Results were combined. (AIPO) (June 25'40, July 20'40, Sept. 17'40, Sept. 30'40, Dec. 10'40, Mar. 12'41, Mar. 29'41, May 6'41, July 10'41). If Germany and Italy should defeat England in the present war, do you think Germany and Italy would start a war against the United States within the next ten years? "Britain" was substituted for "England" in the May'41 question. (OPOR, AIPO) (Nov. 19'41). If Germany should defeat England and Russia in the present war, do you think Germany would start a war against the United States within the next ten years? (OPOR)[19]

	Yes	Yes emphatically	No	No emphatically	N. Op.	
AIPO Apr.9'40	45.9		44.1		10	Mar. 16'40
						May 16'40
						June 10'40
AIPO June 25' 40	54		36		10	
OPOR July 20' 40	55		34		11	
						Sept. 2'40
AIPO Sept. 17' 40	28	33	19	12	8	
	61		31			
AIPO Sept.30' 40	28.7	30.5	17.4	10.4	13	
	59.2		27.8			
						Oct. 15,24, 29, 1940
OPOR Dec.10' 40	60		31		9	
						Dec. 29'40
						Jan.6'41
						Jan.20'41
OPOR Mar.12' 41	61		29		10	
						Mar.15'41
OPOR Mar.29' 41	62		31		7	
						Mar.29'41
						Apr.30'41

[19] p. 775.

	Yes	Yes emphatically	No	No emphatically	N. Op.	
AIPO May 6'41	62		29		9	May 27'41 June 20'41
OPOR July 10'41	65		24		11	Sept. 1,11, 26'41 Oct.9'41 Oct.27'41 Nov.11'41
OPOR Nov.19'41	70		22		8	

The second of the two series of polls that deal with the hypothetical premise of the possible loss of the war by the Allies was the following:

Set II

Suppose the United States does not go into the war, and Germany defeats England [and France]; do you think you, personally, would be affected by this Germany victory [no part of question indicated good or bad effects]?[20]

	Yes	No	N. Op.	D. K.	
					May 16' 40
AIPO May 23'40	64	24	12		
					May 26'40 June 10'40
AIPO June 11'40	58	27	15		
OPOR July 20'40	67	24		9	
					Sept. 2'40
AIPO Sept. 17'40	65	23		12	
					Oct. 15'40 Oct. 24'40 Oct. 29'40
OPOR Dec. 11'40	72	19		9	
					Dec. 29'40
AIPO Dec. 31'40	71	21		8	
					Jan. 6'41 Jan. 20'41

[20] p. 1186.

	Yes	No	N. Op.	D. K.	
AIPO Jan. 22'41	72	20		8	
OPOR Jan. 28'41	70	19		11	Mar. 15'41
OPOR Mar. 29'41	73	16		10	

Particularly with Set I, there is a direct advance of the "awareness" results following speeches by President Roosevelt, an advance that was built from 45.9% on April 9, 1940, to 70% on November 19, 1941. Set II, also, offers a continuous positive correlation, which, however, is not so striking as in Set I. Part of the difference is probably explainable in terms of the public attitude that was expressed at the beginning of the two studies, i.e., in answer to the second of the two questions, the public gave a good "awareness" response (64%) in May of 1940, whereas to the first question in April, 1940, the positive response was only 45.9%. The amount of change possible in getting to 70% was more for the first group; and, therefore, the change to the first of the two questions would necessarily be of greater significance.

One change of public attitude reflected in the second set of polls should be noticed particularly because it is at odds with a positive correlation. On May 23, 1940, 64% of the public polled responded that a German victory would have a personal effect on them. Then, after two speeches by Roosevelt, on May 26 and June 10, 1940 the figure dropped to 58%. To be consistent with a positive correlation, the figure

should actually have risen from 64% rather than dropping to 58%. At present, the author is able to suggest no satisfactory answer for this decline of public sentiment.

Attitudes Toward Isolationism

More satisfactory for our purposes were the polls that were taken to indicate the public sentiment with regard to feelings of isolationism. The issue of the polls has clearly to do with isolationism. Little interpretation is necessary. For instance, some polls were taken to determine the public's willingness to take action against Japan, and the polls indicated the following:

> Would you like to see the U.S. send more warships to China, or should it withdraw those now there?
>
> Send more 15% , Withdraw all 61%, Make no change 24%, No answer 3%
>
> AIPO, Dec. 13, 1937[21]

> In view of the present Japanese attacks upon Amer. in China, do you think we should withdraw entirely from China or that we should take steps to make them respect our right?
>
> Jan. 3, 1938
> April 14, 1938
>
> Withdraw 53.9%, Take steps 29.9%, Neither 5.1%, D. K. 11.1%

---

[21] p. 1074.

FOR, April 1938[22]

Should the U. S. take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan?

Oct. 26'38, Jan. 4'39, Jan. 12'39, Sept. 3'39 Sept. 21'39, Jan. 3'40 Mar. 16'40, May 16'40 May 26'40, June 10'40 Sept. 2'40

Yes 38%, No 45%, N. Op. 17%

AIPO, September, 1940[23]

Do you think the time has come for us to take strong measures against Japan?

Oct. 15, 24, 29'40

Yes 49.4%, No 24.2%
D. K. 26.4%

FOR, November, 1940[24]

Should the U. S. take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking war with Japan?[25]

Dec. 29'40, Jan. 6'41 Jan. 20'40, Mar. 15'41 Mar. 29'41, April 30'41 May 27'41, June 20'41

	Yes	No	N.Op.
OPOR July 10'41	51	31	18
AIPO Oct. 22'41	64	25	11

Sept. 1'41, Sept. 11'41 Sept. 26'41, Oct. 9'41

Oct. 27'41 Nov. 11'41

---

[22] p. 1074.

[23] p. 1076.

[24] p. 1076.

[25] p. 1076.

	Yes	No	N. Op.
OPOR Nov.19'41	64	23	13
AIPO Nov. 25'41	69	20	11

Three polls tested the feelings of the American public with respect to the defense of Canada by the United States. The results were the following:

If Canada is actually invaded by any European power, do you think the U. S. should use its army and navy to aid Canada?

	Yes	No	D. K.	
Sept. 22'39	68	25	7	Jan. 3'40, Mar. 16'40, May 16'40
May 23'40	87	13		May 26'40, June 10, 40, Sept. 2'40, Oct. 15'40, Oct.24'40, Dec. 29'40 Jan. 6'41, Jan. 20'41, Mar. 15'41 Mar. 29'41
Apr. 25'41	90	5	5	

AIPO[26]

When American defense of South and Central America was questioned, the following responses were elicited from the public:

---

[26] p. 772.

Would you be in favor of the U. S. defending by force any Latin American country from foreign attack?

Yes 28.7%, No 61.4%, D.K. 9.9%

FOR, April, 1937[27]

Should the U. S. go to war to help any South American country that is attacked by any European or Asiatic country? A comparable cross-section was asked: Should the U.S. help to defend any South American country that is attacked by any European or Asiatic country?

Oct. 5'37, Oct. 12'37
Jan. 3'38

Yes 29.7%, No 60.3%
N. op. 10.0%

AIPO, March 14, 1938[28]

If a nation in Europe or Asia tries to take land in any part of North or South America outside the U.S., should we go to war to prevent it?

Apr. 14'38
Oct. 26'38

Yes 45%, No 45% N.Op 10%

AIPO, December 2, 1938[29]

If Brazil, Chile, or any other South American country is actually invaded by any European power, do you think the U. S. should fight to keep the

---

[27] p. 780.

[28] p. 780.

[29] p. 781.

European country out? (AIPO) (Dec. 10'40, Mar. 29'41, Nov. '41) If Brazil, Argentina, Chile, or any other Central or South American country is actually attacked by any European power, do you think the U. S. should fight to keep that European power out? (OPOR, NORC)[30]

	Yes	No	Depends: No Ans.	D. K.	
AIPO Sept.22'39	46.1	40.9	13		Jan. 4'39, Jan.12' 39, Sept.3'39, Sept.22'39
OPOR Dec.1p'40	77.3	14.9	8		Jan.3'40, March 16'40, May 16'40 May 26'40, June 10 '40, Sept. 2'40 Oct.15'40, Oct. 29 '40
OPOR Mar.29'41	80.8	13.2	6		Jan.6'41, Jan.20 '41, Mar.15'41
NORC Nov.,'41	82.8	5.1	3.8	8.3	Mar.29'41, Apr.30 '41, May 27'41 June 20'41 Sept. 1'41, Sept. 11'41, Sept. 26'41 Oct.9'41, Oct.27'41

Whether it be to take stronger measures against Japan, or to offer Canada defense in case of attack, or to have the United States ward off attack on Central and South America, a clear and direct correlation between a public attitude of willingness and Roosevelt's public speaking is present. Opinion changed from December, 1937, to November 25, 1941, from 15% to 69% as to whether or not the United States should be more forceful in its treatment of Japan; three polls that dealt with the

---

[30] p. 782.

American defense of Canada changed from 68% on September 22, 1939, to 90% on April 25, 1941; and, attitudes in favor of the United States defense of Central and South America grew from 28.7% in April, 1937, to 82.8% in November, 1941. There is, in each case, a decided and constant growth of public support for a policy of participation by the United States rather than the maintenance of a belief in a policy of complete isolation.

Beginning in 1939 there are a whole series of polls that were designed to test the American attitude as to whether or not the public felt that American shipping should carry supplies to the Allies.

Should our government allow American ships to carry goods anywhere or should our ships be kept out of war zones?

Carry anywhere	Keep out of war zones
16%	84%

AIPO, August 20, 1939[31]

Should Eng. & Fr. be required to carry the goods away in their own ships?

Sept. 3'39

Yes 90.2%, No 5.8%, N. Op. 4%

AIPO, September 11, 1939[32]

The Neutrality Law prevents American ships from traveling

---

[31] p. 1127.

[32] p. 1127.

in the war zones in Europe. Should this law be changed so that American ships can carry war supplies to Eng. & Fr.?

Sept. 21'39, Jan. 3 '40, Mar. 16'40 May 26'40

Yes 18%, No 74%, Undecided 8%

AIPO, May 29, 1940[33]

In order to help Eng., should the Neutrality Law be changed so that American ships can carry war supplies to Eng.?

June 10'40

	Yes	No	D.K.	No Ans.
July 20'40	35%	54%	10%	1%
Aug. 22'40	40%	47%	13%	

AIPO[34]

Since the English have lost many ships, they may not be able to come and get the war materials we make for them. If this proves to be the case, should American ships with American crews be used for this purpose [be used to carry war materials to Eng.]?

Sept.2'40, Oct. 15'40 Oct.24'40, Oct.29'40 Dec.29'40

Yes 42%, No 45%, undecided 13%

AIPO, December 31, 1940[35]

---

[33] P. 1127.

[34] P. 1127.

[35] P. 1127

Do you think American merchant ships with American crews should be used to carry war materials to Britain?

Jan. 6'41, Jan. 20'41
Mar. 15'41, Mar.29'41

Yes 30%, No 61% N.Op. 9%

AIPO, April 8, 1941[36]

If it appears certain that Britain will be defeated unless we use part of our navy to protect ships going to Britain, would you favor or oppose convoys?

Favor 71%, Oppose 21%, N.Op 8%

AIPO, April 8, 1941[37]

Should the U.S. navy be used to guard ships half way across the Atlantic Ocean, when the ships are carrying war materials to Britain?

Yes 49%, No 43%, N.op 8%

AIPO, April 25, 1941[38]

Do you think the U.S. navy should be used to convoy (guard) ships carrying war materials to Britain?

Apr. 30'41

May 20'41 yes 52%, No 40%
N. Op. 8%

May 27'41

May 29'41 Yes 55%, No 38%
N. Op. 7%

---

[36] p. 1128.

[37] p. 1128.

[38] p. 1128.

AIPO[39]

Do you think the U.S. navy should be used to convoy these [ships carrying materials to Britain] as far as Iceland?

June 20'41

Yes 75%, No 15%, N.Op. 8%, D.K. 2%

AIPO, July 29, 1941[40]

Should the Neutrality Act be changed to permit American merchant ships to be armed?

Sept. 1'41, Sept. 11'41
Sept. 26 '41

Yes 72%, No 21%, N.Op. 7%

AIPO, October 1, 1941[41]

Congress has voted to change the Neutrality Act to permit American merchant ships with American crews to carry war materials to Britain. Do you approve, or disapprove?

Oct. 9'41, Oct. 27'41
Nov. 11841

Approve 66%, Disapprove 25%
N. Op. 8%

AIPO, November 25, 1941[42]

Again, as with the polls that were designed to test the public's willingness to defend the Western Hemisphere, there is a decided positive growth in the American willingness to offer support England and France. The importance of this series of

---

[39] P. 1128.

[40] P. 1128.

[41] P. 1128.

[42] p. 1128.

of polls is, of course, that more than just the Western Hemisphere was being considered. The public had to concern itself with its willingness to help Europe.

At least in terms of the questions asked, then, by November, 1941, the majority of the American public was no longer willing to respond with attitudes that defended a policy of isolationism for the United States. This change of attitude was one that had grown steadily from 1937 to 1941, and the polls show the change of thinking to come at times after public addresses by President Roosevelt.

Attitudes Concerning the Possibility of Negotiation with the Germans

No polls seem to have been taken which reflect this particular issue.

Unity of America

Only one series of polls appears, in any way, to have anything to do with the unity issue. The public was asked the following questions concerning Selective Service, and the responses to the questions may give implication about a unity of spirit.

> Should every able-bodied American boy twenty years old be required to go into the army or navy for one year?

	Yes	No	Undecided: D.K.: N. Op.	
Dec. 2'38	37%	63%		Jan. 4'39, Jan. 12'39
May 2'39	38%	57%	5%	Sept. 3'39
Sept.19'39	57.9%	37.1%	5%	Sept.21'39, Jan.3'40 Mar. 16'40
May 14'40	46.5%	46.5%	7%	May 16'40, May 26'40 June 10'40
June 11'40	60.2%	33.8%	6%	Sept. 2'40, Oct. 15'40
Oct.19'40	70.7%	22.3%	7%	

AIPO[43]

Do you think that boys between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, who are out of high school, should spend one year in a training camp learning things useful to our defense program?

Oct. 24'40, Oct.29'40 Dec. 29'40

Yes 79%, No 14%, D. K. 7%

AIPO, December 31, 1940[44]

While in the total of the seven polls there is the same direct change of American attitude in the direction desired by Roosevelt, there is, here, another one example of the results of public attitude change running counter to the direction advocated by Roosevelt. The percentage of those polled on September 19, 1939, who would accept the idea of compulsory military service for young men was 57.9%. From

---

[43] p. 458.

[44] p. 463.

September, 1939, to May 14, 1940, when the next poll was taken, Roosevelt had made three speeches that involved international affairs: September 21, 1939, Jan. 3, 1940, and March 16, 1940. However, rather than an increased percentage in support of the issue, the percentage actually lessened from 57.9% to 46.5%. So, once again, another example of a negative trend of the results of public opinion polls and the public speeches by President Roosevelt is seen.

Summary and Conclusions

There is no doubt that there is a high and impressive correlation between the change of public attitude, as measured by public opinion polls, and the speaking done by President Roosevelt. The strongest, most positive correlation is with the neutrality issue. There was a noticeable willingness on the part of the public to give a less and less isolationist response with decided shift indicated after Roosevelt had discussed the problem.

In at least two cases, there was also a negative trend in time that should not be ignored. Two questions that dealt with the "awareness" issue were brought to the public on several occasions when the President had not spoken to the public for a while. The public attitude, during each of these two periods, evidenced a steady retrogression of "awareness."

Two major exceptions were noted to the positive correlation of polls with speeches. On these two occasions, the President did apparently get a negative response in that

the public offered less agreement with the issue than prior to the speech or speeches. Because of the many factors that are possible by way of explanation, no real attempt at solution for the reaction seems possible.

The sizeable danger of claiming a direct causal connection between a change of public attitude (if indeed that is what public opinion polls measure) and any given speech (es) should be carefully remembered when a person interprets such a correlation as has been made. The author means to imply no such direct causal relation. The real point of interest is the significantly high, positive correlation that exists between the results of the polls and the speeches by Roosevelt. Certainly, it is difficult to look at such high correlation without suggesting that Roosevelt probably had a considerable degree of success with his public speaking, and that his public speaking was, again probably, one of the major factors responsible for changes indicated by the polls.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

One way to study persuasive methods involves the investigation of a particular speaker who is anxious to influence public opinion on some significant issue. Before the study of specific methods can be undertaken, however, a number of basic elements must be obtained and/or investigated: (1) a man considered to be a successful speaker, (2) an issue important enough to be significant, and (3) an audience with attitudes on the issue with which the persuader disagrees, and (4) a knowledge, in so far as is possible, of the speaker's intent to change the audience attitudes. These four factors lay at the foundation of one approach to the investigation of the methods of persuasion; and if determined, they can help lead to the success of such a study.

It was with the first of these four factors in mind, i.e., a man considered to be a successful speaker, that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was selected for analysis. While many can be found who either staunchly support or severely attack a particular policy envisioned and enacted by this man, many can be found who either call him hero or bungling opportunist, few, if indeed any, can be found who would deny

his ability as a speaker on the platform. Whether a man be a devotee or enemy of Franklin Roosevelt, and only very few seem not to be one or the other, almost none are there who do not concede that he had an immense ability to speak his thoughts effectively.

It was, then, necessary to find a significant issue about which Roosevelt did considerable speaking. Even to imagine that it was difficult to locate a major crisis to which Roosevelt addressed himself from the public platform during his long and active career would belie the truth. Not few but many crises arose, and Roosevelt found words for most all of them. The problem was one of selection, not of discovery.

As soon as the idea of significance of the issue was stressed, however, the problem of selection became easier. Head and shoulders above all of the difficulties faced by Roosevelt looms the Second World War--a war that involved more human and material resources, more creative and destructive talents, than any other one effort in the history of man. Certainly, here was the necessary "significant" issue.

The selection of an audience on which the persuasive techniques of Roosevelt might have been used demanded that a group be found that held views covering the imminence of the coming war that differed from those of the President. In terms of significance to Roosevelt, the most important audience was, of course, the American people, on whom he depended to remain in office and also to implement his policies.

After examination of the attitudes of the people of the 1930's on the international responsibilities of the United States, probability suggests that there were large numbers of people who held that their country should not participate in any of the struggles of the powers of Europe or the Far East--that the United States should discontinue all of its intercourse with warring nations. This isolationist attitude of the audience, the American people, was directly in opposition to a great deal of Roosevelt's basic philiosophy in foreign affairs.

Finally, some decisions were necessary concerning speaker intent which is a factor involving three fundamental questions. First, what is a method by which to get at Roosevelt's thinking? Second, if that thinking can be suggested, did he have a concern with public opinion and a desire to modify it? And, third, if he had the concern and the desire to change the attitudes, what beliefs was he particularly interested in changing?

These three questions along with three more (listed below as 4, 5, and 6) form the central problems studied in the dissertation. The basic six questions of the study are:

1. What is a method by which to get at Roosevelt's thinking?
2. Did Roosevelt have a concern with public opinion and a desire to modify it?
3. What beliefs of the public was the President particularly interested in changing?

4. Did the same issues that appeared in Roosevelt's "private" communication appear in the public speeches?
5. What were Roosevelt's most frequently used methods when he tried to change the public attitudes on the issues?
6. What sort of audience response to the speeches can be suggested?

Answers to these six questions were at the heart of the present study and follow, now.

What is a method by which to get at Roosevelt's thinking?

To answer the first question, it was assumed that Roosevelt's "private" remarks might more nearly reflect accurately his thoughts than did his public statements. To get at his "private" remarks, many hundreds of his "personal" letters, conferences, and memos were examined with the hope that the number of such "personal" expressions would be large enough to give weight to any consistent trends that were noted. After as many examples of "Private" materials were collected as was practicable, correlation of the remarks began to form answer to questions two and three.

Did Roosevelt have a concern with public opinion and a desire to modify it?

Roosevelt's interest in public opinion was relatively simple to portray, and also there was little difficulty in the attempt to indicate his desire to modify the public attitudes. He seems to have been quite sensitive to the beliefs of the people, and did, on numerous occasions, indicate his earnest hope that he could change the beliefs when those beliefs differed radically from what he felt they ought to be to secure the peace and security of the country.

What beliefs of the public was the President particularly interested in changing?

His "private" record reveals three major issues which the President was particularly anxious to deal with so that the public opinion might be changed.

1. He seems, first, to have been disturbed by what he saw as the public's lack of recognition of the dangers from abroad.
2. Next, he objected to the isolationists and their entire answer to the world situation; he felt isolationism to be a policy of folly; and he felt that it would lead the country to destruction.
3. Last of all, his correspondence would indicate that he felt that negotiation with the Axis powers was impossible and that the attempt at such negotiation accepted a philosophy of "peace at any price" for

the United States. This sort of philosophy was anathema to Roosevelt's thought.

Did the same issues that appeared in Roosevelt's "private" communication appear in the public speeches?

In answer to the fourth of the six primary questions, it was found that each of the three issues that were derived from the more private expressions of Roosevelt did, in fact, appear as the basis of argument in his public statements. These three issues, along with one additional element, that of building a unity of spirit in the American people, were at the heart of Roosevelt's public speeches on international affairs. It was noted, however, that after a strong statement of the danger of American involvement and the impracticability of isolationism in the "Quarantine" speech, Roosevelt's remarks were softened for the next two years. Fear of being too far ahead of the people to lead them properly, fear of alarming the people unduly, hope for peace through the Munich Conference, and domestic legislative difficulties were proposed as possible explanations of the attenuated statements of 1938 and 1939. Also, the dire implications of a denial of the possibility of negotiation served to hold Roosevelt in check on the strong expression of distaste for "peace at any price."

What were Roosevelt's most frequently used methods when he tried to change the public attitude on the issues?

To answer the fifth question, which deals with Roosevelt's methods of building the case for each of the four issues, tabulations were made to find the major approaches to each issue made by him. Ten methods account for the major direction of Roosevelt's attempts at persuasion. He made appeals to:

1. Love of country, democracy, justice, and the like;
2. The security of individual groups such as labor, businessmen, educators, etc;
3. The security of the individual, with descriptions of the horrors perpetrated by the Axis powers;
4. Belief in unsupported generalizations as to the validity, or lack of validity, of particular policies and attitudes;
5. The history and traditions of the United States;
6. The statements and actions of the great leaders of early America;
7. The use of causal argument supported by historical example;
8. The discrediting of men in disagreement with him;
9. The call for sacrifice by the members of the audience; and
10. The personal strength which he had with the people, with the often repeated "I."

What sort of audience response to the speeches can be suggested?

It does not need restating that it is always a difficult problem to pin-point exactly the audience response to a given speech or group of speeches. The most significant single complicating factor is, of course, the number of possible intervening variables that may have their effect on the people. Almost never can the scholar say with certainty what the real result was. In 1935, though, another tool came into being on an impressive scale that surely can help to arrive at decisions as to audience response, Even with all their weaknesses, the public opinion polls, when long range correlations are possible, do begin to help suggest the probability of certain relationships being in favor of one or another conclusion.

With the foregoing as a basic assumption, many polls were correlated with the speaking of Roosevelt to see if any trends could be noted. Over and over, there was a shift in public opinion (as measured by the polls) in favor of Roosevelt's position after one or more speeches had been given--a definite positive correlation. Also interesting was an occasional situation where no speeches were given by Roosevelt for an extended period of time and where the results of the polls show a shift against the position held by the President--a negative trend in time. From these two observations, some indication of positive response to the speeches of Roosevelt strongly suggests itself.

Suggestions for Further Study

1. More work needs to be done to draw the direct connection between Roosevelt's thinking and his "private" communication. Many materials at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park are still not open to the student; and these materials may give further insight as they become available. This connection must be established, because as more Presidential libraries become available to the students of the country, more and more can be done with speaker intent in the area of persuasion. Also interviews with intimates of the President would add a great deal to clarify the speaker intent.

2. A great deal more should be done to make better use of the public opinion polls to get a listener response. The present study only begins this work.

3. Roosevelt's signing and support of the 1935-37 Neutrality Legislation should be examined and contrasted with his later dislike and distrust of the legislation. Out of this should come a comparison of his public statements on world affairs before and after the October 5th "Quarantine" address and, also, should come a greater understanding of his relation to the issues involved.

4. The persuasive methods of Roosevelt on other major crisis of his administration should be examined. The Tennessee Valley Authority, the National Recovery Act, the proposed 1937 changes in the Supreme Court, etc., come immediately to mind. Any of the domestic crises which he fought so vigorously during the thirties would lend themselves to the same sort of analysis.

5. It would also be valuable to trace Roosevelt's persuasive activity when he spoke and wrote for audiences other than the people of the United States. In such situations, what were his approaches and how did they differ from the methods used with the American people?

6. Another very profitable direction for further study grows out of the primary limitation of this study, i.e., the limitation of treating the man, Roosevelt. The same sort of design could be brought to any other President of the United States and any other major issue which that President had to face. Certainly, the situation most parallel to this dissertation that one thinks of immediately is Woodrow Wilson and World War I. The comparison of the two men in the two situations with their two sets of techniques would be fascinating. From such a comparative study might well come some conclusions as to the definite responsibility of the President to prepare the people for crisis by the use of the public platform.

APPENDIX A

Originally marked "Extra Confidential"
Conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee,
Executive Offices of the White House,
January 31, 1939, 12:45 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT:

Morris (Senator Sheppard) came in this morning and we got talking about national defense and the general world problem and Morris thought it would be a good idea to all sit around the table, meeting and talking about some defense problems.

Of course, as you know, I am very much exercised over the future of the world--that is, about the size of it--and I do not belong to a school of thought that says we can draw a line of defense around this country and live completely and solely to ourselves. I always think of what happened in another Administration. I think it was in 1807, before Bob Reynolds was born. (Laughter) There was a hell of a row going on on the other side--Europe. At that time, there wasn't any South America, practically. And there wasn't any Africa and there wasn't any Asia, so far as the civilized world went. It was just the United States and Europe. It was a very much more limited area and all the trade of this country was with Europe and the Mediterranean and the Baltic.

There was a terrible row going on on the other side between Dictator Napoleon and the Anti-dictators--people were against dictators--who were led at that time sometimes by the Austrians, sometimes by the Germans, sometimes by the British. This thing had been going on about nine years and it was a very, very tight squeeze as to which one was going to win. They had been fighting off and on since 1798.

In 1807, the British, trying to strangle Napoleon, issued what was known as the "Orders in Council" and the Orders in Council forbade American ships, American commerce of any kind, to trade with any port or nation which was dominated by Napoleon and his armies.

Well, of course this country was developing but it had to live, really, in part by its foreign trade--not wholly but in part. The Congress at that time went clear up through the roof. They said, "My God, this is an awful outrage! What right have the British to keep our ships from trading with the Napoleonic countries?" And there was a great deal of debate about it.

A few months later Napoleon, who was finishing one of his Italian campaigns--he had overrun Italy--issued what was known as the "Decree of Milan" in which Napoleon forbade any American commerce between the United States and any of the anti-Napoleon nations.

Well, there was Scandinavia and Germany and other countries in the Baltic, Russia and England, and those countries in the Mediterranean which Napoleon had not yet overrun.

Our people here said, "My God, what can we do? The British won't let us trade with the Napoleonic countries and Napoleon won't let us trade with the other countries." So Congress did what it thought was a very intelligent thing--it passed the Non-intercourse and Embargo Acts, which said to American shipping, "By God, as long as these fellows issue decrees we will issue a decree that no American commerce can trade with anybody."

Of course the damned thing didn't work. In the first place, it was practically unenforcible and, in the second place, the country began to strangle. Strangulation began to set in immediately after the Non-intercourse and Embargo Acts were passed. In the history of our country, these years represented the first serious years of unemployment. There were thousands and thousands of idle men walking the streets, not only on the Seaboard but also in some of the country districts which were dependent to a certain extent on the Seaboard, which no longer had purchasing power. It was the same old story--you might translate it in terms of 1938 just as easy. All the ships were tied up and we began to strangle andthe unemployment problem originated for the first time.

The net result was that, after trying this out for a long time, we got into the War of 1812, largely because we had accepted strangulation by legislation. By legislation we accepted the Decree of Milan, the Orders in Council of England--not only accepted them but made them worse because we made it illegal, from our point of view, to do anything.

Well, so much for an illustration from history.

The reason? Mind you, this must be confidential because I know the rule of every President is that if you tell more than two Senators it gets out. Try to keep it as confidential as you can. There is no slur intended--we know it means back here in the family. I don't think we want to frighten the American people. That is one thing we don't want to do, frighten the American people at this time or any time. We want them to gradually realize what is a potential danger, and I always translate things, as Jack Garner taught me, in terms of the past. It is a fair way of putting most things.

Beginning about three years ago, there was rather definite information as to what the ultimate objective of Hitler was. Not Mussolini so much, but Hitler. Mussolini was pretty shrewd; but we always felt that if Mussolini found his bread was not buttered on the Hitler side, he would throw him over.

Well, about three years ago we got the pretty definite information that there was in the making a policy of world domination between Germany, Italy and Japan. That was when the first anti-Comintern Pact was signed. That Pact was published, but there was added to it what might be called a "gentlemen's agreement" which was not covered (in the pact), which was that those three nations would, before taking any international step, consult together. They would move simultaneously or they would take turns in aggressive operations

against other nations. So it is not a new story at all. But, during these years, that pact has been strengthened almost every month, not only by aggression but by a better understanding between the three of them. There exists today, without any question whatsoever--if I were asked to prove it I could not prove it, of course--what amounts to an offensive and defensive alliance. What Hitler said yesterday would come as a shock to a good many people. There isn't anything new in what he said that we haven't known for a year or two.

There are two ways of looking at it. The first--from our point of view--the first is the hope that somebody will assassinate Hitler or that Germany will blow up from within; that somebody will kill Mussolini or he will get a bad cold in the morning and die, or that the Kingdom (of Italy) will blow up from within; that the militaristic elements of Japan will go so far that the Japanese people will say, "We can't stand that tightening of the belt much longer; we have got to do something; we won't fight or march or do what we are told." That is one way of looking at it, trusting that an assassin will get them or that the thing will blow up of its own accord.

One answer to that is that that was the policy of Europe against Napoleon for quite a long time, but it took seventeen years, 1798 to 1815, before they finally threw him out. Well, we have had only six years of this present consolidation for purposes of aggression in the world. We have had only six years of it.

The other attitude toward it is that we must try to prevent the domination of the world--prevent it by peaceful means. Now, it may come to you as a shock and it should not be talked about out loud because the country would not understand it in those terms: What is the first line of defense in the United States? What is our ability not only to defend ourselves against attack on our own continental limits but also our right to treat with the rest of the world and to avoid putting up a very high barbed wire fence all around us?

The first line of defense of the United States in the Pacific is a series of islands, with the hope that through the Navy and the Army and the airplanes we can keep the Japanese --let us be quite frank--from dominating the entire Pacific Ocean and prevent us from having access to the west coast of South America.

That is the problem. We will never be attacked by the Chinese or from the Philippines or Siam or Burma. It is all a question of defending against Japan. We cannot say it out loud; it may be considered as unfriendly.

On the Atlantic, our first line is the continued independent existence of a very large group of nations--their continued, independent existence. Now, what are they? Just remember those words, "continued, independent existence" with the connotation of continued independence. Now, "independence" for nations means "independence;" it does not mean "domination," military or economic, by some other nation.

At the present time Finland is an independent nation;

Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark--that is seven--Holland with her colonies makes eight, Belgium with her colonies is nine. Hungary and Czechoslovakia--question mark: Are they independent nations at the present time? That is a question and you can argue it both ways. Eleven. Poland? Poland I call a "mugwump" nation because so far it has sat successfully on the top of a fence with its mug on one side and its wump on the other, hoping and praying that they won't be attacked by either Russia or Germany. Now, there is twelve. Go on down the line. Rumania? How far is it independent? It is scared pink. Bulgaria, fourteen. Greece, fifteen. Yugoslavia, sixteen. Turkey and Persia, eighteen.

Now, they are all, with those possible exceptions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania, they are practically independent nations but they won't be independent if the German and Italian military strength and successful moves by Hitler and Mussolini, jointly and severally, keep on. They will lose their independence.

Then you have got France and England, which are still independent nations.

When Anthony Eden was here I asked an awful lot of questions. I said, "What would have happened if on the twenty-eighth of September, instead of having 1400 planes--suppose you had had 4,000? Suppose France, instead of having 500 planes, which is the official number given us in confidence--they are down in the books for 2,000 or 2,500--suppose they had had 2,500 or 3,000 planes? And suppose Germany

had the same number she actually did have, over 9,000, and Italy 3,000, which she did have. In other words, suppose the combined British and French air fleets on the twenty-eighth of September had been around four or five thousand planes to the other fellow's twelve or fifteen thousand, what would happen?"

"Well, there would not have been any Munich." That is right; there would not have been any Munich.

But, as the situation was then and as it is today--now we are coming down to hard facts--if this wild man--well, some people say it is paranoia, other people say he is a Joan of Arc, a man who conceives himself to be as Schuschnigg said after the famous visit to Berchtesgaden, he said that Hitler, walking up and down the room for about eight hours, pounding the table and making speeches, only mentioned two people in his entire conversation. One was Julius Caesar and the other was Jesus Christ. He kept on talking about those people in such manner as to indicate that he believes himself to be a reincarnation of Julius Caesar and Jesus Christ.

What can we people do about a personality like that? We would call him a "nut." But there isn't any use in calling him a "nut" because he is a power and we have to recognize that.

Now, if he insists on going ahead to the westward as he had intimated on various occasions--it may be Holland, or it is very possible he may have abandoned that for this spring's operation and he may move to the eastward, down the Danube and over to the Ukraine. He may, in conjunction with Italy, be planning a westward and southern move, that is to say, towards

the Mediterranean area and against Holland. Well, it is anybody's guess but that has substantial backing in circles that know a good deal about foreign affairs.

If that takes place and the British and French and all the other nations which are still independent decide to fight, then you come to a question of arms.

We cannot assume that they would defeat Germany and Italy. The best opinion is that it is a fifty-fifty bet, and that is too serious to be overlooked. It is a fifty-fifty bet that they would be put out of business and that Hitler and Mussolini would win. If they win, it would be primarily because of the air force, the great preponderance, which would drive England and France under ground. Their own air force would be practically wiped out within a comparatively short period of time. It would mean that their factories, including their airplane factories, which, of course, are in a very small area--you could put the whole of England into the State of New York and you could put France very easily into the area of New England--would be put out of commission in short order.

Now if, on this fifty-fifty bet they were driven under ground and could not get munitions, et cetera, and airplanes to keep the fight going, the chances are they would have to yield.

Then, here is our next proposition: If they had to yield, it would mean, as a military force in Europe, they would no longer count. Meanwhile, of course, we are peacefully out of it. Grand. We are out of it. We are not shipping our

surplus wheat, cotton or anything.

Now, when there is domination of Europe, the next step, of course, is that all the small nations would drop into the basket of their own accord because it is silly for them to resist. They would be wiped out otherwise. Africa automatically falls. That is obvious, because Africa is 95% colonial.

Those nations which fell would become demilitarized.

Then the next perfectly obvious step, which Brother Hitler suggested in the speech yesterday, would be Central and South America. Hitler would dominate Europe and would say to us in the Argentines, "Awfully sorry, but we won't buy your wheat, meat or corn unless you sign this paper." And the paper that the Argentine is asked to sign says, "Number one, we will take your corn and pay for it in our goods and we will pay for your cattle in our goods and we will pay for your wheat in our goods and we will select the goods. Then, next you have got to turn over all your military defenses and training to our officers. Oh, yes, you can keep the flag."

Well, if we were Argentine, we would sign because if we were forbidden to export our cattle, wheat and corn to Europe we would go bust.

And then next would come Brazil. You have already got a nucleus; there are 250,000 Germans in there. If you ask me for supporting evidence about Brazil, I will tell you that I would not give it to you. Why? Because we have sources of information which, if disclosed to the Committee or anybody else, would immediately stop. I will simply give you the

straight facts. We have definite knowledge today that in Brazil the Germans have an organization which, probably on pressing a button from Berlin, would be put into operation and would constitute, even today, a very serious threat to the Brazilian Government. You would have a new government in Brazil completely dominated by Germany and Italy and Japan. There are a great many revolutionists in Brazil with a very excellent organization from the military and revolutionary viewpoint, and they are right in with the Germans and Italians. That is a very possible thing. The same thing, of course, would be possible in other places.

Venezuela? Well, Venezuela and Miami are, as I remember it, about two hours and fifty-five minutes apart.

Colombia? There are no military defenses in any of those countries against an European nation like Germany or Italy or two of them combined. Their military defense is nil. Colombia, from Cartagena across to the Panama Canal, as I remember it, is a matter of about fifty minutes for bombing planes. About fifty minutes. The Germans have 1,500 bombing planes that can go from Germany to Colombia inside of forty-eight hours. We have, I think, about eighty that can go down there.

Those are the simple facts. You know what the Mexican situation is. Central America? Properly equipped and with the knowledge of how to get the right people to do it for us, we could stage a revolution in any Central American government for between a million and four million dollars.

In other words, it is a matter of price.

Those are things you ought to regard. How far is it from Yucatan to New Orleans or Houston? How far from Tampico to St. Louis or Kansas City? How far?

Now, do not say it is chimerical; do not say it is just a pipe dream. Would any of you have said six years ago, when this man Hitler came into control of the German Government, Germany busted, Germany a complete and utter failure, a nation that owes everybody, disorganized, not worth considering as a force in the world, would any of you have said that in six years Germany would dominate Europe, completely and absolutely? That is why we cannot afford to sit here and say it is a pipe dream. Now, it is not a question, necessarily, of the internal position of the United States. It is the gradual encirclement of the United States by the removal of first lines of defense. That is in Europe and the Mediterranean area. I do not mention Persia and Turkey; they are, at the present time, under the domination of the Germans. People may not have heard of it, but it is. Turkey, with its new man who succeeded Attaturk--nobody knows, it is too soon to tell, but probably Turkey will fall again under the German sway.

In any event, if they cut the other line of defense, they all fall into the basket because why? Well, for the same reason that the Argentinians had to sign a paper that was given to them in order to get their wheat and cattle and corn out of their own country.

I spoke to you about alarming the public. There is

one other thing that we have to guard against. You all read that the Administration was going to make recommendations for this huge rearmament program. You read in the papers that it would be two billion dollars as the amount that I was going to recommend over and above the regular annual appropriations. Of course those of you who have learned not to believe what you read in the papers were not worried. However, there were a great many Americans worried by the two-billion-dollar armament program and, as December approached, we began to see the papers saying, "The President is being forced to make it a smaller program. He is only going to ask for a billion and a half." And then, about Christmas time you read that the President had been forced to cut the program from a billion and a half to a billion and that the President was going to ask, instead of for fifteen or twenty thousand planes, he was going to ask for five or six thousand additional planes. And then, finally, the first week in January, the truth came out.

Of course there was never any intention on the part of the President to ask for two billions or a billion and a half or a billion. It was just a plain common or garden variety of lie. And yet I have seen it said on the floor of the Senate that I was compelled to reduce my program. I am not saying who did it nor am I calling anybody a liar. But the plain fact is that we do need things certainly and immediately for our national defense. And that means, these days, with respect to building the smaller type of things, like destroyers, and cruisers, that can be built quickly in the

event of war, we have got to be able to go on a mass production basis rather quickly. At the time of the World War, obviously we needed a great many small ships and destroyers, which were the best and most useful for convoy purposes. With them we were able to put people over in France and see that they were not torpedoed on the way over. But we did not have mass production methods to turn out destroyers and it was not until after the war broke out that we began to start mass production. But, even with the blueprints made, you cannot start mass production by simply passing a law or by giving an order. It took us until the following December before we could start the shipyards on a mass production basis and it was not until the summer of 1918, which was a year and three or four months after the war started, that the destroyers started to come out.

Then we had a thing called the "Liberty engine," which was a grand thing, a beautiful engine. We did not begin to get those until the summer of 1918, until a year after we started. In order to save the record, we had some American planes that were really not all tuned up but they did actually fly over the lines between the first of November, 1918, and the eleventh of November. They actually got four or five American-built planes up over the lines a year and a half, more than a year and a half, after we got into the war.

Today we do not know a thing about the mass production of airplanes. We think the Germans have enough mass production factories to turn out forty thousand planes a year on a three-

shift basis. Now, that is pretty serious. Don't haggle! If you think it is thirty thousand, all right, it is only thirty thousand. Don't haggle over it. Whether it is thirty thousand or thirty-five thousand or forty thousand a year, it is just so many more that the Germans can turn out as compared with the figure of what we can do.

At the present time we think that with our present airplane factories--mind you, we cannot prove it because we have not done it--if we put them on a mass production basis we can turn out nine or ten thousand planes a year. None of them has ever been in mass production, so we do not know.

Therefore--now I am coming down to the present program--we do not want to build Government plants to turn out airplanes but we do want to see if the privately-owned plants are capable of mass production. We want to test them out. We want them to be given enough orders to make mass production necessary, to see if it would work. Therefore, and, mind you, there is nothing new in this, beginning about a year and a half ago--more than that, nearly two years ago--the British were very much worried about their defensive strength. They started their own airplane program and they sent various people over here, from time to time, to see whether they could give orders in this country and, as you know, away back there they did give small orders, trial orders more than anything else. The French sent various people over here a year or a year and a half ago. They sent people over here to see whether they could buy planes over here. And

they have had individuals--we had representatives of the French Government for the last year and a half, and from the British Government for the last two years, figuring out what kind of planes they wanted to buy and whether they could pay for them, et cetera and so on.

After Munich, on the twenty-eighth of September, the British had a fit. They were scared; absolutely panicky, and they sent people over and actually gave orders for planes. I do not know how many they are buying over here, but I think it is three or four hundred.

The French, with their system of government changing cabinets every morning before breakfast, they started in with the idea of God knows how many they are going to buy. It was a grand idea and we said, "The more the merrier. Come on in. Come on in and put our factories on a mass production basis. Fine."

So, finally it got serious enough for them, on this third or fourth try to earmark this five million dollars out of the French treasury to buy planes in this country. We said, "Grand, and there are two very simple reasons for saying grand. In the first place, our factories at the present time are idle. If you put your orders in now they will be substantially completed before our orders get in this spring to come." That is one reason. That is the domestic reason. And the second is this: Now we don't tell them but we know it; We want France to continue as an independent nation. We don't want France to have to yield to this, that

and the other thing because if France yields and England yields, there won't be any independent nation in Europe or Africa or anywhere else. Therefore, it is to our interest, quite frankly, to do what we can, absolutely as a matter of peace, peace of the world, to help the French and British maintain their independence. Literally, their independence is threatened today.

I think it was Arthur Krock who said, "Isn't this unneutral?" Yes, it might be called that. But I will do everything I possibly can do, as Chief of the Army and Navy and head of the Executive Department, to prevent any munitions from going to Germany or Italy or Japan. Why? Because self-protection is part of the American policy. And I will do everything I can to maintain the independence of these other nations by sending them all they can pay for on the barrel-head, to these about forty or fifty now independent nations of the world. Now, that is the foreign policy of the United States. (Applause)

That is the real answer. You need not worry who authorized that order or the other order. I am frankly hoping that the French will be able to get the fastest pursuit planes we can turn out. There are half a dozen companies in this country that turn them out. I hope they will get the best heavy and medium bombers they can buy in this country. It is not a question of secrecy. We have just one secret and that is the question of a bomb sight that has not been disclosed to the French and won't. And I hope to God they get the planes

and get them fast and get them over there in France. It may mean the saving of our civilization.

SENATOR SHEPPARD:

How about your memorandum?

THE PRESIDENT:

Do you see that pad? (Indicating pad on desk) I use up one of those every couple of days. I have always used it and did it in the Navy Department. They became quite familiar in Washington as the Assistant Secretary's chits. I used them in Albany for four years and then down here they became the President's chits. They are memorandums to heads of departments, heads of agencies, the Director of the Budget. Sometimes they are in longhand, sometimes they are letters, sometimes they are typewritten memorandums, and they are signed by initials.

They go out from here in great numbers and we carry on a large part of the daily interrelationship of different branches of the Government by the chit method. I get chits back from members of the Cabinet.

Now, those chits are not public property and they won't be public property. They are purely a portion of the executive machinery and therefore no chit, no interdepartmental memoranda are a part of the public record, especially when it comes down to questions of the routine or normal running of the Government.

If you were in this chair you would find, for example, that the Department of Justice requires a tentative opinion from the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture. They

send each other chits back and forth and generally they straighten it out. That is part of the process of Government. Those chits are nobody's business, so long as the final determination has to be a matter of record. That final determination has to be a matter of record, but, in arriving at the final determination of any question of government, the machinery is not of interest to anybody and it is not going to be.

Now, we exchanged on this particular thing all kinds of memorandums, with an objective, which is to help any government which we know, on the doctrine of chances, will never be an enemy of ours. We will help them to rearm against the threat of dictators in this world. It is our policy. At the same time, we are going to keep our secrets of national defense, which will be only disclosed to them in the event of our entering into a war ourselves. Now that is pretty remote.

Any other thoughts, Morris (Senator Sheppard)?

SENATOR SHEPPARD:

I think you have covered it. I know you have been very frank with us and I appreciate it.

THE PRESIDENT:

I cannot overemphasize the seriousness of this situation.

SENATOR SHEPPARD:

It clears up a lot of things we did not know. Any members who would like to ask a question?

THE PRESIDENT:

You see these things, all this constant reference to Bullitt, for example. Bullitt is only one of a number of people who enter into this picture. He is one of a hundred. The picture is made up of a little here and there and all over Europe, the Far East, South America, the State Department, the Army, the Navy, and everything else. Bullitt is just one little cog in a very big wheel.

SENATOR REYNOLDS:

It [sic] it is not out of order, I would like to direct an inquiry. You have spoken of the tremendous trade penetrations that Hitler has been making and is making, as a matter of fact, as we all know, in, you might say, the republics that lie to the south of us.

There has been extensive penetration but, of course, as you know, they have been particularly extensive in Brazil, Guatemala and Salvador, and he was in Colombia until they walked out.

In Mexico they are there and the Mexicans, which I have alleged is a Red government, they have confiscated $400,000,000. worth of oil properties. The loss incident to their seizure of agricultural lands was to the extent of about $175,000,000. and about $25,000,000. worth of personal property. The estimates of the total were $750,000,000.

We know that Hitler unquestionably is endeavoring to find a foothold in our sister government across the Rio Grande. We are told that he has now made a barter

arrangement with the government to the south of us for $17,000.000. worth of oil, $10,000,000. of which is to be in trade--that is $10,000,000. in barter and the other $7,000,000. has not yet been decided upon. They do say that a great deal of the oil had belonged originally to American investors and the British as well and that some of that oil has already gone.

I have recently introduced a resolution in the Senate calling for an investigation of the situation and I ask your opinion about that in the presence of these members of the Military Affairs Committee only for the reason that you have made specific mention of the dangerous penetration of Hitler.

He has unquestionably made them in South America and he is now getting so very close to our own United States that it is rather alarming, and I ask if you do not think, in view of this tremendous penetration being made by Hitler and backed up by the Japanese on the West Coast and by the Italians principally on the East Coast, if it would not, in view of the world conditions and Hitler's mastery of Europe at the present time and his inclinations and ambitions to get to the south of us, if you do not think it would be a good idea for all of us to really ascertain something as to what is going on in Mexico with particular reference to the interests of Hitler and the other dictators?

THE PRESIDENT:

I will answer it with a question, Bob. Suppose we find

all the facts you mention are true, what the hell are you going to do about it?

SENATOR REYNOLDS:

We can do this: We have been very generous to Mexico in this past year. There are more than 300,000 American tourists who go down into Mexico from the north, down the West Coast and through the new highway and by way of Vera Cruz and Tampico. Those American tourists leave many, many millions of dollars with the Mexicans. In addition to that, we are the greatest purchaser of silver from Mexico. We buy more from them than from any other country in the world.

We could, in a sense, endeavor to penalize them.

THE PRESIDENT:

All right, suppose we did not buy any Mexican silver. We are buying today, in small amounts, much less than we did. If we stopped buying Mexican silver, they would sell it to somebody else, possibly for a smaller sum. And suppose you told all the American tourists that they could not go into Mexico. My small boy would say, "So what?"

Then what happens? The President of Mexico would, I am inclined to think, sell more oil to Italy and Germany to make up for that amount. There isn't very much more you could do. What could you do?

SENATOR REYNOLDS:

As a matter of fact, as things stand now, if you are going to take that position--

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing)

As a matter of fact, here is the thing we are facing: Every government in the world has the right to expropriate property. Our point of view is that if a government condemns property and takes it, it has got to pay for it. That is the American point of view, to pay a reasonable sum for it. Mexico has agreed to pay a reasonable sum for it. Today the situation is solely a question of getting them to pay it. You know, the Latin American is terribly slow. You cannot send an American down to Mexico and expect him to do a job in a day. There was one went down last August and he came in on a plane and went to the Mexican Government and said, "I am representing certain oil companies and I want to straighten this thing out. I want to leave tomorrow night on the plane and I think we can straighten it out in forty-eight hours. Let's go to it."

And the Mexicans said, "It is awfully sweet of you; won't you stay with us?" He accomplished nothing.

Pat Hurley went down about a month ago and he has the right point of view because when he went down there he did not say, "This has got to be done in forty-eight hours," and he made real progress.

This is a thing that should not be talked about out loud; Donald Richberg is going down to represent a number of oil companies within a week or ten days. He is going down and he is taking his wife and he is going to take a house in Mexico City. And so now we are getting to a point, I think, on this oil question with the Mexican Government. It will take time

but they will work out some method for reasonable and fair payments to these American companies.

The American companies, in the beginning, followed the lead of the British companies, "Give us back our properties." The Mexican Government said, "We are awfully sorry but we have taken the title to your properties," and, for a long time, the American and British Governments would not talk about compensation. What we are all talking about, we are helping our American companies to work out some kind of an arrangement with the Mexican Government by which our own companies will go back to their wells and their development work. They won't claim the title, but they will be paid for their expenses in the actual operation of the wells, they will be paid for their necessary money put in on development work and, from the oil that comes out of the ground, they will be paid on some kind of percentage basis for the title to the property. In other words, the money they had put in.

There is only one question which we can all visualize and that is whether they should be paid for prospective profits or not, and I do not think the Mexican Government will pay them for prospective profits. I think they will reimburse them for everything they had in up to the time of seizure of the properties.

Well, I had a case during the time I was practising in New York. There was a man who had bought a block near a new subway station way out in the outskirts and he bought this block for about half a million dollars. Then the City came

along and condemned that property. They wanted to put through a tunnel. They said, "You paid half a million dollars for it; here is half a million dollars." I represented this man and I went to the court and said, "This is damned unfair because, when the subway is completed that fellow's property is going to be worth over a million dollars." I did not stand a chance. The court said, "You paid half a million dollars, only one half a million. You did it only two weeks ago. We are going to pay you half a million dollars back with the interest and the costs." And that is all the courts would give you. They would not give you the prospective profits.

And the Mexicans, because they are Mexicans, it will take a long, long time to work out, but it will be worked out.

Now, you say that no Americans can go into Mexico and that no silver can be bought. We will buy the same silver but it will go to London first and then will come back to the United States.

In other words, the negotiations are going on in Mexico and the oil companies are reasonably satisfied and making progress and that is why, on the Mexican thing, I think frankly, as a matter of policy, it may be better to let the thing simmer for a while.

SENATOR LEWIS:

There is a little matter I would like to clear up. Did you intend to leave the impression that it was the duty of this Government to help protect and maintain the independence of these nations you described and that it is our duty to help

them maintain it by whatever efforts may be necessary to do it?

THE PRESIDENT:

No. No. Listen: I probably saw more of the war in Europe than any living person. Now, that sounds like an amazing statement. I went over in the spring of 1918 to tie the naval operations together in Europe and I spent the whole summer over there. I went over on a destroyer and stopped at the Azores. which was our first naval base. I covered the coast of England in destroyers and subchasers. I saw the grand fleet at Scapa Flow and the mining operations, the laying of mines. I covered the whole coast of France, which we practically took over on anti-submarine work. I spent days on the Belgian front, on the British front, on the French front and on the American front. I was an observer in the push up to the Vesle. I saw the operations in Italy.

Therefore, you may be quite sure that about the last thing that this country should do is ever to send an army to Europe again.

QUESTION:

I would like to ask a question: In view of our national defense policy, which you announced so clearly and which I won't say I like, but relating to Mexico, is it not true that Mexico is a fair example right now of the benefits of that policy of shipping planes into a friendly country? (The question here became indistinct.) Isn't it a fact that if Mexico were unable to get American planes--

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing)

You mean that Germany would send planes to Mexico?

QUESTION:

Yes.

THE PRESIDENT:

I think they would, especially if Mexico is segregated completely from the United States.

After all, this is one family. It is not a question of Democrats and Republicans; it is a national problem.

QUESTION:

Do you know how much of the American planes sold to Mexico got out of Mexico and into the hands of those not friendly?

THE PRESIDENT:

We think practically none. We do not think any planes have gone out of Mexico to Germany. In the beginning of the Spanish War, I don't think there is any question but what fifteen or twenty planes actually got into Government Spain. I do not think any of those planes got into Franco Spain because, at that time the Mexican Government and the Spanish Government were working together like that (indicating by juxtaposing two fingers).

SENATOR REYNOLDS:

[sic] It is reported from reliable sources that in the five-year program of the Brazilians they are going to make an expenditure of $100,000,000. and that between $60,000,000. and $70,000,000. of that expenditure has been or will be allotted

to Germany and about $20,000,000. to Great Britain and a very small portion of the amount to the United States of America. I make this statement in the form of a question that, in view of what you stated as to the 250,000 Germans in Brazil, I wonder if that has anything to do with the tremendous amount they give to Germany in this armament program rather than giving it to the United States, where they have the highest degree of friendship?

THE PRESIDENT:

Number one, it is a question of cost, because they can buy things abroad at about half the price they can buy them for here. It is the same way on a Navy ship; you can buy them ir Italy, France, England, anywhere for about half the cost over here.

If I were President of Brazil, I think I would hesitate to build up my airplane armament in Brazil if they were officered by and run by Germans and Italians, for fear there would be a revolution. Those are the chances they take in buying munitions, in that they may be used by enemies of the Government.

QUESTION:

Is this the permanent policy which has heretofore been in effect, to take care of the United States Army and Navy before the latest developments are sold to anybody else?

THE PRESIDENT:

I will give you the simple fact. If we can get this French order through--the contract has been already tentatively signed--these planes, nearly all of them will be delivered by

this fall. In other words, the preliminary stage of manufacture will begin immediately and be carried all through the rest of the winter and spring and the assembly work will be completed--for instance, this order which just got here this morning for Martin bombers, there will be twenty delivered in June, twenty-five in July, thirty-five in August and thirty-five in September.

QUESTION:

Aren't they [sic] planes already in production?

THE PRESIDENT:

No. these are not. The Martin bomber, they have not completed the first plane and it has never been tested by us. Now, on the fifteenth of March, on these Wright bombers, we are having our test and we will probably choose one or two or three of the types and put them into production. Now, that means that on these French orders that the preliminary work will be out of the way and that they will move those same workers into our orders for 3,000 planes.

One thing I said to Morris (Senator Sheppard), which I think is awfully important and I know it is a slight departure from the customary appropriation. We put in for substantially $210,000,000. worth of planes. I hope, in writing the bill, that you will say, "for not less than 3,000 planes." If you put the words "not less than," I will get a lot more. If you put the words, "Three thousand," in as a definite number, I will have to pay more for the planes and I will only get 3,000. In other words, if you use "not less than 3,000 planes," I will be able to do a lot of Scotch and Dutch bickering to

get more planes for less money. That is a departure from the ordinary appropriation bill but I think it will work fine. If I can get 3,000 planes for the same money, it will be worth while.

APPENDIX B

Group I

October 5, 1937--"Quarantine" Speech, Chicago, Illinois.
October 12, 1937--Radio Address.

January 3, 1938--Annual Message to Congress.
April 14, 1938--Fireside Chat.
June 24, 1938--Fireside Chat.
June 30, 1938--Address to the NEA.
August 18, 1938--Dedication of bridge, Kingston, Ontario.
August 18, 1938--Dedication of bridge, Clayton, New York.
October 27, 1938--Herald Tribune Forum.
December 5, 1938--University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

January 4, 1939--Annual Message to Congress.
January 12, 1939--Message to Congress.
April 14, 1939--Pan-American Union.
April 14, 1939--Telegram to Hitler.
June 12, 1939--Graduation Address at West Point.
August 24, 1939--Letter to Hitler.
August 24, 1939--Letter to the President of Poland.
September 3, 1939--Fireside Chat.
September 5, 1939--Proclamation of Neutrality, No. 2348.
September 21, 1939--Message to Congress.

January 3, 1940--Annual Message to Congress.
March 16, 1940--Radio Address.
April 15, 1940--Address to the Pan-American Union.
May 10, 1940--Radio Address and American Science Congress.
May 16, 1940--Message to Congress.
May 26, 1940--Fireside Chat.
June 10, 1940--Graduation Address at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
July 19, 1940--Acceptance of Nomination, Chicago, Illinois.
September 2, 1940--Newfound Gap, Tennessee.
September 11, 1940--To the Teamsters.
September 16, 1940--Statement at the signing of the Selective Service Act.
September 20, 1940--University of Pennsylvania.
October 5, 1940--At school dedication in Hyde Park, New York.
October 12, 1940--Dayton, Ohio on Columbus Day.
October 23, 1940--Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
October 24, 1940--Herald Tribune Forum.
October 28, 1940--Madison Square Garden.

October 29, 1940--Comments on drawing the first Selective Service Number.
October 30, 1940--Boston, Massachusetts.
October 31, 1940--Bethesda, Maryland.
November 1, 1940--Brooklyn Academy of Music.
November 2, 1940--Cleveland, Ohio.
December 29, 1940--Fireside Chat.

January 6, 1941--Annual Message to Congress.
January 20, 1941--Inaugural Address.
March 15, 1941--White House Correspondent's Dinner.
March 29, 1941--Jackson Day Address from the USS Potomac.
April 30, 1941--Radio Address.
May 27, 1941--Unlimited National Emergency Proclaimed.
June 20, 1941--Message to Congress.
July 7, 1941--Message to Congress.
August 21, 1941--Message to Congress.
September 1, 1941--Radio Address on Labor Day.
September 11, 1941--Fireside Chat.
September 26, 1941--Radio Address.
October 9, 1941--Message to Congress.
October 27, 1941-Navy Day Speech.
November 11, 1941--Radio Address on Armistice Day.

Group II

June 24, 1938
June 30, 1938
August 18, 1938--Clayton, New York.
December 5, 1938

September 11, 1940
September 16, 1940
September 20, 1940
October 5, 1940
October 31, 1940
November 4, 1940

Group III

August 18, 1938, Kingston, Ontario.
April 14, 1939, Pan-American Union.
April 14, 1939, Telegram to Hitler.
June 12, 1939
August 24, 1939, Letter to Hitler.
August 24, 1939, Letter to the President of Poland.

April 15, 1940
May 10, 1940
October 12, 1940

Group IV

July 19, 1940
October 23, 1940
October 28, 1940
October 30, 1940
November 1, 1940
November 2, 1940

Group V

October 5, 1937
October 12, 1937

January 3, 1938
April 14, 1938
October 26, 1938

January 4, 1939
January 12, 1939
September 3, 1939
September 21, 1939

January 3, 1940
March 16, 1940
May 16, 1940
May 26, 1940
June 10, 1940
September 2, 1940
October 15, 1940
October 24, 1940
October 29, 1940
December 29, 1940

January 6, 1941
January 20, 1941
March 15, 1941
March 29, 1941
April 30, 1941
May 27, 1941
June 20, 1941
September 1, 1941
September 11, 1941
September 26, 1941
October 9, 1941
October 27, 1941
November 11, 1941

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Opinion, Persuasion, and Propaganda

Books

Albig, J. W. "The Determinants of Public Opinion." The Polls and Public Opinion. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1949.

_____. Modern Public Opinion. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956.

_____. Public Opinion. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939.

Berelson B., and Janowitz, M. (eds.). Reader in Public Opinion and Communication. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953.

Brembeck, W. L., and Howell, W. S. Persuasion: A Means of Social Control. New York: Prentice-Hall, In., 1952.

Cantril, Hadley (ed.). Public Opinion, 1935-1946. Princeton University Press, 1951.

Creel, George. How We Advertized America. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920.

Doob, Leonard W. Propaganda, Its Psychology and Techniques. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935.

_____. Public Opinion and Propaganda. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1948.

Graves, William B. (ed.). Readings in Public Opinion. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1928.

Hargrave, John. Words Win Wars. London: Wells, Gardner, Darton and Co., 1940.

Hovland, L. I., Janis, I. L., and Kelley, H. H. Communication and Persuasion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.

Kamins, B. F. Basic Propaganda. Los Angeles: Houlgate House, 1951.

Katz, D., Cartwright, D., et al. Public Opinion and Propaganda. New York: Dryden, 1954.

Kumata, H., and Schramm, W. "The Propaganda of the German Nazis," Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory. Urbana: University of Illinois Communication Center, 1955.

Lasswell, H. D. Propaganda Techniques in the World War. New York: Peter Smith, 1938.

_____. Public Opinion in War and Peace. Washington: National Educational Association, 1943.

Lavine, H., and Wechsler, J. War Propaganda and the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940.

Lee, A. M., and Lee, E. B. (eds.). The Fine Art of Propaganda. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939.

Lee, A. M. How to Understand Propaganda. New York: Rinehart, 1952.

Lerner, D. (ed.). Propaganda in War and Crisis. New York: Geo. W. Stewart Publishers, Inc., 1951.

Lowell, A. L. Public Opinion in War and Peace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923.

Lumley, F. E. Means of Social Control. New York: Appleton-Century, 1925.

_____. The Propaganda Menace. New York: The Century Co., 1933.

Miller, Clyde R. The Process of Persuasion. New York: Crown Publishers, 1946.

Minnick, Wayne C. The Art of Persuasion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957.

Mock, James R. Words that Won the War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

Oliver, Robert T. The Psychology of Persuasive Speech. (2d ed.). New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957.

Peterson, H. C. Propaganda for War. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939.

Powell, N. J. Anatomy of Public Opinion. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.

Schramm, W. The Process and Effects of Mass Communication. Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1955.

Smith B. L., Lasswell, H. D., and Casey, R. D. Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946.

Viereck, G. S. Spreading the Germs of Hate. New York: Horace Liveright, 1930.

Articles

Blumer, Herbert. "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling," American Sociological Review, XIII (1948).

Roosevelt and International Affairs

Books

Barck, O. T., and Blake, N.M. Since 1900. New York: Macmillan, 1952.

Beard, Chas. A. American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940: A Study in Responsibilities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946.

_____. President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.

Bradley, Phillips. Can We Stay out of War. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1936.

Brogan, Denis W. Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.

Churchill, Winston. The Gathering Storm. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948.

Davis, Forrest, and Lindley, E. K. How War Came: An American White Paper; from the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942.

Department of State. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. Washington, 1943.

Dodd, William E., and Dodd, Martha (eds.). Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1941.

Ellis, L. Ethan. A Short History of American Diplomacy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951.

Farley, James A. Jim Farley's Story: the Roosevelt Years. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948.

Feis, Herbert. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

Greer, Thomas H. What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt. East Lansing, Michigan: The Michigan State University Press, 1958.

Hacker, L., and Zahler, H. S. The United States in the 20th Century. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948.

Ickes, Harold I. The Secret Diary of Harold I. Ickes. 3 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953-1954.

Johnson, Walter. The Battle Against Isolation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

Langer, William L., and Gleason, S. Everett. The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.

_____. The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953.

Lindley, Ernest K. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Career in Progressive Democracy. Revised Ed. New York: Blue Ribbon Books, Inc., 1934.

Moley, Raymond. After Six Years. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939.

Morgenstern, George. Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1947.

Nevins, Allan. America in World Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942.

_____. The New Deal and World Affairs: A Chronicle of International Affairs, 1933-1945. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.

Nevins, Allan, and Hacker, Louis M. The United States and Its Place in World Affairs. Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1943.

Perkins, Dexter. America and Two Wars. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1944.

_____. The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-1945. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Perkins, Frances. The Roosevelt I Knew. New York: The Viking Press, 1946.

Rauch, Basil. Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor; A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy. New York: Creative Age Press, 1950.

Roosevelt, Elliott. As He Saw It. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946.

_____(ed.). F.D.R.: His Personal Letters. 4 vols. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947-1950.

Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1933-1941: Franklin D. Roosevelt's Unedited Speeches and Messages. New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1942.

Rosenman, Samuel I. (ed.). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vols. I-V, New York: Random House, 1938. Vols. VI-IX, New York: Macmillan, 1941. Vols. X-XIII, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.

_____. Working With Roosevelt. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. Revised edition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.

Tansill, Chas. C. Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1952.

Tugwell, Rexford G. The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957.

Tully, Grace. FDR: My Boss. New York: Chas. Scribners Sons, 1949.

Welles, Sumner. The Time for Decision. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944.

Articles

Borg, Dorothy. "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quartely, LXIII (1957), 405-433.

Cole, Wayne S. "American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIII (March, 1957), 595-617.

_____. "Senator Key Pitman and American Neutrality Policies, 1933-1940," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (March, 1960), 644-662.

Howe, Louis. "The President's Mailbag, "The American Magazine, CXVII (June, 1934).

Unpublished Material

Brandenburg, Earnest S. "An Analysis and Criticism of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Speeches on International Affairs Delivered Between Sept. 3, 1949 and December 7, 1941." Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Department of Speech, State University of Iowa, Aug. 1948.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park, New York.