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The Voicer/Nonvoicer Distinction

A Dimension in the Experience of Conscious Thought

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10.01

THE VOICER/NONVOICER DISTINCTION
A DIMENSION IN THE EXPERIENCE OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHT

B)’

Kenneth L. Salzman

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Psychology

1983

ABSTRACT

THE UOICER/NONUOICER DISTINCTION
A DIMENSION IN THE EXPERIENCE OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHT

BY

Kenneth L. Salzman

People differ radically in how they experience
conscious mental life. Some experience explicit
dialogue between parts of their personality; others
experience mental life alone. The most common form of
dialogue is an internal ”voice“ playing the role of
conscience. However, for some the internal voice is
not a conscience and some have more than one internal
voice. The rest of us have no internal voice at all.

A review of the psychological literature reveals
an articulate replication of ordinary experience. Some
writers, including Freud and Klein, describe "superego"
in the same graphic personal terms used by voicers.
Others, including Fenichel and Kernberg, appear as
nonvoicers, describing superego in terms which are
vague and metaphorical (e.g. as the experience of moral
or ethical thought). They reconcile their own
experience with Freud’s writings by accepting the
universality of superego but treating superego as an
unconscious mechanism.

Across three empirical studies, an instrument to

assess people as voicer or nonvoicer was developed and

Kenneth L. Salzman

evaluated. In the final instrument, people read three
different written descriptions of the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction. Self assessment based on all three
descriptions has a reliability of 0.93. Eighty percent
of respondents describe their self assessment as “Sure"
or “Very sure”. In a college population, the split
between voicers and nonvoicers is nearly even.

Two empirical studies asked developmental
questions regarding hypotheses about the etiology of
the internal voice. (6.9., would children be more
likely to develop a conscience if their parents were
strict or angry?) No differences were found between
voicers and nonvoicers in these studies.

The last empirical study focussed on causal
consequences of having an internal voice. Most voicers
were found to be high in need for approval, although a
minority existed who were low in need for approval.
Uoicers high in need for approval try to do what is
expected of them; they are self-conscious, afraid of
authority figures, and slow and hesitant about decision
making. Voicers low in need for approval perceive
themselves as socially dominant; they bluff others, are

argumentative, and do not hesitate to break rules.

© Copyright by
KENNETH L. SALZMM
1983

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is my opportunity to express my gratitude, appreciation, and
respect for those who have assisted me in making the transistion from
student to colleague. A complete listing of such people, however, would
require far more room than can be given here to that task. I will,
then, only mention those to whom my debt is the greatest.

John Hunter, the chairman of this dissertation, has been far more
than that to me over the years. Teacher, counselor, guide, and good
friend, he has been an unflagging source of encouragement and support.
He builds a very comfortable nest for young birds to grow in, provides
the most excellent lessons by which they can learn, and even knows when
to throw them, gently, out of the nest. Thanks Jack, I can fly now.

To the professors who have helped, sometimes I suspect without
their knowing it, in my development as a clinician, Griff Freed, Rom
Kriauciunas, and Don Grumman to name a few, I express my deepest thanks
for a debt that cannot be repaid, but perhaps may be passed on.

without the secretaries of this university, I fear none of us would
survive. Especially to Suzy Pavick of the Psychology Graduate Office I
offer my thanks. She works with the supposedly competent, mature and
non-neurotic graduate students and makes them look the part. An
incredible task.

I don’t know how to thank my family, both immediate and extended.
Toby and Berna, wife and daughter, life, love and reason for being. I
will continue thanking them and the universe which made them possible

for the rest of my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables iv
List of Figures v
Chapter I Introduction and
Review of the Literature 1
Chapter 11 Overview of the
Three Empirical Studies 31
Study 1. Overview 31
Study 2. Overview 33
Study 3. Overview 34
Chapter III The Measurement of the
Uoicer/Nonvoicer Dimension 37
Study 1 40
Study 2 44
Study 3 50
Conclusion 52
Chapter IV The Voicer/Nonvoicer Distinction
and Developmental Hypotheses 54
Study 1 54
Study 2 60
Chapter V The Uoicer/Nonvoicer Distinction
and Consequent Variables 6?
Chapter VI Discussion 81
Recommendations for Research 84
Appendix A The Study 1 Instrument 90
Appendix B The Study 2 Instrument 92
Appendix The Study 3 Instrument 103

C
Appendix D
E

Appendix

Bibliography

The Apriori Factors and Their Items 116

The Final Factors of Study 3 and
Their Items 120

123

Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

Table

Table
Table
Table
Table

Table

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

LIST OF TABLES

Frequency of response to certainty
item in Study 1

Relationship of Certainty and
Voicer/nonvoicer items in Study 1

Responses to Voicer/nonvoicer and
Certainty items in Study 2

Correlations between the four self-
identification items in Study 2

Responses to Voicer/nonvoicer and
Certainty items in Study 3

Correlations between the four self-
identification items in Study 3

Correlations of itmes with self-
identification in Study 1

Means and Standard deviations for
Study 1

Correlations of demographic items
with Self-identification in Study 2

Correlations of items with Self-
identification for each of the four
forms in Study 2

Means and Standard deviations for
Study 2

Factor Correlation Matrix for

Study 3

Path analysis coefficients for
Study 3

Reproduced factor correlations for
Study 3

Observed minus predicted correlations
for Study 3

iv

42

42

48

49

51

52

58

59

61

63

65

60

75

75

76

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The a priori factors and their
hypothesized relations to the
voicer factor

Figure 2. Distribution of items in the
a priori vs the posteriori factors

Figure 3. Path diagram for Study 3 with
path coefficients indicated

68

71

74

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This thesis reports three studies of a distinction
in the most basic aspect of phenomenal experience: the
way that people experience their thought process.
Specifically, this thesis measures and explores the
distinction between people who experience thought as a
dialogue and those people for whom the thought
experience is a monologue. For example, there is a
difference in how people experience conscience. Some
people experience conscience as an “internal voice"
which tells them what to do and may even berate them if
they do wrong. Others experience conflict as they
review the consequences of some choice, but never have
the feeling of a dialogue between parts of the self.

I was first told of this distinction by a friend
who had been questioning all of his friends and
neighbors about their experience. My friend had come
across the distinction when he Jokingly suggested a
rather naughty course of action to a friend of his.
She replied that she could not do such a thing because
her conscience would torture her for days.

Upon questioning, my friend learned that she
experienced conscience as a ”little voice" which, quite

1

unbidden and not easily subdued, berated and insulted
her for her misbehavior. My friend had never
experienced such a thing. He began asking other people
about their experiences and discovered that about half
of his acquaintances had a “little voice" and half did
not.

My friend spoke to me about it and I reported no
voicing experience. I then began asking my friends and
quickly became convinced that there were two patterns
of experience in conscious thought. Many reported
their conscious experience in a manner which sounded
much like my own. Of those who did not, not all
identified with the specific description of an
accusatory and berating conscience, yet they readily
reported internal verbal dialogues which sounded
similar to the voicing phenomenon and quite alien to my
own experience of conscious thought. Each new person
provided new information or new descriptions of the
voicing experience or the experience of conscious
thought without a voicing phenomenon. I decided that
empirical research was needed to make sure that the
distinction was not fabricated in the course of
motivated conversation and to test some of the
hypotheses that had arisen from discussion of anecdotal

experiences.

Literature Search

I began the project by scanning and then searching
the psychological literature for something that might
have seemed sensitive to a "voicer/nonvoicer"
distinction. I have still found no such reference.
There are references to conscience, superego, verbal
vs. nonverbal thoughts and even internal dialogues, but
always these are described as universal phenomena
rather than descriptions of a dichotomy of experience.
It was as if psychologists were mirroring our findings
among our friends: voicers sometimes study or refer to
voicer phenomena but fail to recognize that there are
nonvoicers, and nonvoicers simply never consider the
possibility of a true internal dialogue.

Of the few references to what seemed to be the
voicing phenomenon, the clearest appear in the Gestalt
Therapy literature. Kempler (1973) referred to the
need for ”coordinated awareness” and symptoms being
created by “one part of the personality refusing to
accept another part.“ Kempler, however, never referred
to this process as a "voice" or internal verbal
process. Bauer (l976> did, however, stating that
introJected aspects of others give rise to “internal
dialogues“ and that these “internal objects“ must be
accepted and integrated in the ”total self system".

There is no indication, however, that these

conflicts and internal dialogues are restricted to only
a part of the population. To the contrary, dialogues
are described as universally held characteristics and
their resolution is said to result in the kind of
awareness which has been reported by nonvoicers. The
sense that internal dialogues, particularly negative
ones, might be present in psychologically stable and
healthy persons and that they might be entirely absent
in very distressed individuals is not apparent in the
literature.

In the Transaction Analysis school, Theobald
(1974) put forth the game “Hassle" to demonstrate that
the criteria for "games may be met in transactions
involving internal dialogue alone". Hassle is
described as a ”prolonged debate“ in which a decision
making process is blocked by a constant recycling of
the issues involved. Theobald did not make clear,
however, whether he perceived this internal dialogue as
a conscious process or whether he used the term in a
metaphorical sense. Furthermore, he described this
process as a pathological one which interferes with
effective functioning rather than being a part of it.

Other phenomena which may be related to the
voicing phenomenon are hallucinatory experiences,
multiple personality, and psychoses. while the case

descriptions are often quite close to those made by

voicers I have interviewed, they inevitably link the
voicing phenomenon to the pathology. Among our
friends, however, most voicers show no evidence of
pathology and some nonvoicers do.

Another concept similar to voicing is Jaynes’
(1976) description of the bicameral mind. Jaynes
described the bicameral mind as a condition of
consciousness marked by the absence of introspective
thought and dominated by auditory phenomena originating
from the right hemisphere of the brain. Jaynes’ thesis
states that there was a time when all human motivation
during times of stress or in novel situations came from
these phenomena. These auditory signals took the form
of voices from within which gave orders and
instructions, guiding the individual in their behavior.
Jaynes stated that these voices were believed to be
those of the gods, and that they were characterized as
without mercy or pity. His belief is that true
consciousness did not appear until the voices receded
as a result of the excesses of destruction which they
engendered in the world.

According to Jaynes, with the coming of this true
consciousness there was no longer a need or place for
the voices and they disappeared entirely, save for
contemporary throwbacks such as schizophrenia,

hypnotism, and religious frenzy. He argued that

civilization is impossible to the bicameral mind. It
was only after the demise of the bicameral mind that
humans were forced to introspect and take
responsibility for their behavior. The idea of a
voicing phenomenon such as we are investigating in
modern, conscious humans is directly contrary to
Jaynes’ theory.

The psychoanalytic concepts of introJection,
identification, conscience and superego seem related to
voicing, although the level of ambiguity connected with
these terms makes it difficult to establish this
relationship with certainty. Different writers give
considerably different treatments and emphases to these
concepts, sometimes to the extent that it is not clear
whether they are referring to the same concept at all.
In the literature reviewed, there were no clear
references to any phenomenon which resembled the
voicing phenomenon and was not described as a universal
trait.

The concepts of identification and introJection
seemed at first to be appropriate referents for the
voicing phenomenon. They describe the dynamic
processes whereby the traits and beliefs of others can
be incorporated into an individual’s structure, and in
particular the means by which parental superego

functions are transformed into the child’s superego.

Sanford (1955) pointed out, however, that there
has been little uniformity in the use of the terms
identification and introJection, and it is not clear
whether that situation has been much improved over the
last quarter century. The range of definition and use
of these terms makes it difficult to compare the
phenomena which they describe and harder still to
relate them to the phenomenon we are studying. The
fact that these terms describe processes leading to
states of being, rather than the actual states of
being, resulted in considerable uncertainty as to their
relationship to the voicing phenomenon. More
information was needed regarding the state itself
before much could be said about the means by which it
was brought about.

The terms conscience and superego are more often
used in describing behavior and experienced phenomena,
and therefore seemed more likely to be used to describe
an observed relationship to the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction. I hoped that the literature regarding
conscience and superego would point to an earlier
recognition of the kind of dichotomy we were observing,
or at least shed some light on the kind of experience
being reported by those acknowledging a voicing
phenomenon. There was, however, no such dichotomy

listed with regard to superego or conscience. worse

yet, the literature seemed to reflect a considerable
range of approach to and treatment of these concepts,
to the point where different authors appeared to be
talking about different concepts altogether. I will
attempt to review some of these approaches and how they
differ with regard to the voicing phenomenon.

In fictional literature, conscience is sometimes
referred to as a I'little voice" or anthropomorphized as
a little angel on one’s shoulder (or a cricket or fairy
godmother, all of which speak). There is even a
classic Disney sequence where a cartoon character has
two such "voices", one a helpful advisor and the other
an impish tempter. Is this merely a fantastical
representation of the abstract contest between good and
evil, or is the author of the sequence simply giving
image and form to a personal phenomenal process?
Certainly these images were similar to the descriptions
we had obtained from the voicers in our group.

Freud’s writings appear to closely link the
concepts of conscience and superego, and Freud is often
quite explicit with regard to the experience of the
phenomenon of conscience. Conscience is “a special
institution of the mind...it constantly watches the
real ego....“(1959, vol. 4, p. 52) and is thus both
part of yet apart from the ego. Conscience is, to

Freud, a major facet of mental life: "...we shall

count it, along with censorship of consciousness and
the testing of reality, among the great institutions of
the ego...'(1959, vol. 4, p. 157). It is not clear
that Freud made any distinction between conscience and
superego function, save perhaps that the former may be
only a special case of the latter. Schafer (1960)
states that

"Although originally synonymous with the

superego, the ego ideal was ultimately
conceptualized by Freud in a narrower sense
as one of- its functions along with

self-observation, conscience, censorship, and
the instigation of defense."

Freud has repeated references to the experiencing
of conscience or superego: (emphases are mine)

In masochism: "the sadism of the superego is
for the most part acutely perceived
consciously...“(1959, vol. 2, p. 267)

In the paranoid state: “Patients of this sort
complain that all their thoughts are known
and their actions watched and overlooked;
they are informed of the functioning of this
mental institution by voices which
characteristically speak to them in the third
person....This complaint is Justified--it
describes the truth; a power of this kind,
watching, discovering and criticizing all our
intentions does really exist: indeed, it
exists within every one of us in normal life.
The delusion of being watched presents it in
a regressive form...“(1959, vol. 4, pp.
52-53)

'The voices, as well as the indefinite number
of speakers, are brought into the foreground
again by the disease, and so the evolution of
conscience is regressively reproduced."(1959,
vol. 4, p. 53)

In melancholia: "...in this condition one
part of the ego sets itself over against the

10

other, Judges it critically, and, as it were,
looks upon it as an object...the critical

institution in the mind which is here split
off from the ego (demonstrates) its
independence in other circumstances...it is

the mental faculty called conscience that we

are thus recognizing....'(1959, vol. 4, p.

157) .

Freud seemed to conceptualize conscience, and
perhaps much of the superego function, as a conscious
process; a process which could and would be perceived
by the individual in an immediate sense. This is not
the case with other authors. For example, Freud stated
that the superego looks for opportunities in external
reality through which it may inflict punishment (1930,
p. 7?), a statement which describes well some of the
voicing experience. Schafer, however, explained that
it is more consistent

”to limit the function of the superego in

this respect to the testing of certain

aspects of inner reality and to see that

outward search as carried on by other ego
functions in the service of the need for
punishment induced by the superego.“(1960,

footnote p. 166)
where Freud had described the superego as taking
explicit action, Schafer described it as operating at a
much more subtle and even unconscious level. Freud’s
description of the superego and conscience seem to
relate well to the descriptions given by voicers.
Schafer’s "rewording" seems to better fit the

descriptions of conscience given by nonvoicers.

Schafer, however, did not seem to feel that he had made

11

any reinterpretation of Freud’s words.
This kind of rewording was not limited to Schafer.

Brenner (1974) saw conscience and the other functions

of the superego as “largely or completely
unconscious.”(p. 112) where the voicers describe
harshly critical haranguing from the voicing

phenomenon, and Freud talked of a ”division ... between
the critical faculty and the rest of the ego“(1959,
vol. 4, footnote p. 388), Brenner described conscience

in a much more abstract sense:

I'Disapproval by the superego has some
consequences which are conscious and hence
familiar to us and others which are
unconscious.... For example, we are all

familiar with the painful feelings of tension
which we call guilt or remorse, and we have
no hesitation in connecting it with the
operation of the superego ... feelings of Joy
or happiness and self-satisfaction (may) be
the result of the superego’s approval....
Such a ’virtuous’ glow, like its opposite, a
sense of guilt, is a familiar phenomenon.'(p.

120)

Brenner’s ”painful feelings of tension" are,
indeed, the kind of description of guilt or conscience
reported by nonvoicers, but he failed to make any
mention of the acutely perceived harassment the voicer
reports. Brenner noted that "Freud made ...
observations ... that the superego bears a close
relationship to auditory memories and in particular to

memories of the spoken word.'(p. 112) He went on to

nullify what might otherwise have been a rather close

12

reference to the voicing phenomenon by stating,

"Some intuitive perception of this fact is
probably responsible for the common figure of
speech which refers to the ’voice of

conscience’.”(p. 112)

The idea of a “voice of conscience" is far from an
intuitive or abstract concept for the voicer.

we may be observing here in Freud, Schafer, and
Brenner a phenomenon which also occurred among our
friends: those without the experience of the voicing
used the same language as those who did experience it,
yet they were referring to quite different concepts.
where the voicer refers to explicit, consciously
perceived events, the nonvoicer is describing implicit,
abstract processes. Since the words used were the
same, neither had any reason to question that the
speaker was referring to the same experience.

Prior to this study, my readings of Freud had
never suggested to me that a voicing phenomenon
existed, nor is it clear to me now that Freud thought
it was so. The voicers among my friends, however,
state that they always assumed that Freud was referring
to voicing in his discussions of conscience, and that
they had some difficulty understanding why so many of
the later writers kept using such abstract terminology
for the concepts.

I began scanning standard texts specifically for

13

references to the manner in which guilt, conscience or
superego function are perceived, and the relationship
described between the ego and the superego. I found
references which seemed to be suggestive of the
differences in meaning described above, but no
statement which described clearly either the voicer’s
explicit perception or the nonvoicer’s implicit sense.
In all of the discussions of superego and conscience,
there was no reference to a difference in kind, nature
or experiencing of these functions in the population at
large.

Fenichel (1945) described:

“The ’inner punishment performed by the
superego’ is felt as an extremely painful
decrease in self-esteem and in extreme cases

as a feeling of annihilation.... The fear of

being punished ... by the superego is the

fear of annihilation through lack of these

(narcissistic) supplies."(p. 105)
There is no sense here of a punishing voice, an
explicit and conscious abuser within. Nor is there
later when he stated, “Self-esteem is no longer
regulated by approval or rejection by external objects,
but rather by the feeling of having done or not having
done the right thing."(p. 106)

Fenichel noted Freud’s and Abraham’s position,
”Thus the commands of the superego as a rule are

verbalized.“(p. 107) He also quoted Reik’s reference

to superego, "’The step within the ego’ is felt by the

14

child by ’hearing the inner voice of conscience’."(p.
10?) Both of these statements, he felt, referred to
the level and manner in which the superego was
constructed, rather than to the manner in which it was
experienced. He later translated this verbalization of
commands into a more abstract form: “Everyone
continually experiences slight ’conscience signals’
which regulate behavior and which are of far greater
importance as constituents of the so-called mood than
general anxiety signals are.“(p. 136) The only
non-quoted direct references made by Fenichel to
internal voicing is in his discussions of
schizophrenia.

Klein used distinctively different language in
describing the experiencing of superego behavior. Her
language evoked more concrete images of the conscience
and she was more explicit regarding the conscious
nature of the conscience.

"... the person’s conscience is a precipitate

or representative of his early relations to

his parents ... an agency which advances

against the rest of his ego certain

requirements, reproaches and admonitions....

Freud has since shown that the operation of

this superego is not limited to the conscious

mind, is not only what is meant by

conscience.“(1949, p. 248)

”... this early turning of one part of the

mind against the other -- this inherent

tendency to self-condemnation, which is the
root of conscience ..." (1975a, p. 321)

15

"An essential factor in repression is the

reprimanding and prohibiting aspect of the

super-ego ...“ (1975a, p. 86)

It is possible to interpret her language as being
metaphorical, yet when her descriptions are taken in a

literal sense, they match closely the types of

descriptions given by voicers of their experience.

'The persecutions and demands of bad
internalized objects; the attacks of such
objects upon one another; the urgent

necessity to fulfill the very strict demands
of the ’good objects’ and to protect and
placate them within the ego ... all these
factors combine to produce in the ego a sense
of being prey to contradictory and impossible
claims from within, a condition which is felt
as a bad conscience. The earliest utterances
of conscience are associated with persecution
by bad objects."(1975b, p. 267-268)

”The ego, supported by the internalized good
object and strengtherned by the
identification with it, projects a portion of
the death instinct into that part of itself
which it has split off -- a part which thus
comes to be in opposition to the rest of the
ego and forms the basis of the super-ego.
The super-ego thus acquires both protective
and threatening qualities. As the process of
integration ... goes on, the death instinct
is bound, up to a point, by the super-ego.
In the process of binding, the death
instinct influences the aspects of the good
objects contained in the super-ego, with the
result that the action of the super-ego
ranges from restraint of hate and destructive
impulses, protection of the good object and
self-criticism, to threats, inhibitory
complaints and persecution.... To some
extent, when development goes well, the
super-ego is largely felt as helpful and does
not operate as too harsh a
conscience."(1975a, p. 240)

One of her major breaks with the traditional

16

analytic approaches was over the issue of when the
superego developed as a structure. In particular, she
saw the sources of the superego, or more specifically
the conscience, as being rather apparent and distinct.
The traditional, and more abstract, view was that the
superego was an essentially unconscious structure
growing out of the resolution of the Oedipal crisis.
The sources of the superego were themselves more

abstract and vague: certainly not in the form of voices

within.
'... the superego precedes the Oedipus
complex and is initiated by the introjection
of the primal object. The super-ego
maintains its connection with the other parts
of the ego through having internalized

different aspects of the same good object...”
(1975a, p. 245)

'... the changes characteristic of the onset
of the latency period could be summarized as
follows: the relation with the parents is
more secure; the introjected parents
approximate more closely to the picture of
the real parents; their standards, their
admonitions and prohibitions are accepted and
internalized and therefore the repression of
the Oedipus desires is more effecitve. All
this represents a climax of the super-ego
development which is the result of a process
extending over the first years of
life."(1975a, p. 87)

"Fenichel has applied certain criteria which

differentiate the ’precursors of the
superego’ ... from the superego itself.
These precursors exist, he thinks, in a

scattered state and independently of one
another, and lack the unity, the severity,
the opposition to the ego, the quality of
being unconscious.... In my opinion such a
differentiation is incorrect in several

17

respects ... it is precisely the early

superego which is especially severe ... in no

period of life is the opposition between ego

and superego so strong as in early childhood

... the commands and prohibitions of the

superego are no less unconscious in the small

child than in the adult ... they are by no
means identical with the commands that come

from its real objects.'(1948, p. 198-199)

There is, however, no sense in Klein’s writings
that these characteristics of superego functioning are
experienced by only part of the population. Nothing in
her works seems to suggest the existence of nonvoicers,
those who simply do not experience a phenomenon of
internal commands and prohibitions in an explicit
sense.

Greenson (1972) made no reference to conscience or
any form of overtly verbal construct. when he
described the superego, he did so in language that
carried no sense of one aspect of the self commanding
or persecuting another. He referred to feelings rather
than actions or verbalizations within the mind.

“It is the superego that makes the ego feel

guilty even for the symbolic and distorted

discharges, so that they are felt consciously

as essentially painful. The superego may

also enter the neurotic conflict by becoming

regressively re-institutionalized, so that

the self-reproaches take on a drivelike

quality.”(p. 18)

Object relations theorists have concentrated

considerable attention on the internalization of

objects, both good and bad. They seemed a likely

18

source of comment on the voicing phenomenon, especially
since most object-relations theorists give much credit
to Klein as a major source of the principle ideas.
These authors, however, either seemed not to recognize
voicing as an explicitly experienced phenomenon, or
else gave no sense that such phenomena were not
universal.

Masterson (1976) makes reference to a
"sadistically cruel superego that persecutes the ego
until it breaks down“(p. 39), but does so only in
describing psychotic depression. His use of the, term
"sadistically cruel superego" and of the term
”persecutes" may be a reference to an explicitly
experienced voicing phenomenon, but may as well be only
the use of what have, since Freud and moreso since
Klein, become standard forms of reference to the
superego. This is an example of how the voicing
phenomenon could exist and be recognized by some
authors and ignored by others, yet with neither being
aware of the difference in their observations. what
serves as a concrete term for one author is an abstract
or allegorical term for the other.

Fairbairn (1976) restructured Freud’s conception
of the superego, incorporating most superego functions
into an aspect of the ego. This aspect was labelled

first the ”internal saboteur“ and then renamed the

19

'antilibidinal ego". Fairbairn’s discussions of the
internal saboteur all suggest that it is an unconscious
structure(p. 108) and unrelated to guilt. The internal
saboteur is not connected to the “moral sense“, which
remained the product of the superego. Guntrip(1976)
described the relationship between Freud’s superego and

Fairbairn’s antilibidinal ego.

”This Fairbairn at first called the internal
saboteur, and then the antilibidinal ego....
It is Freud’s ’sadistic superego’ ... these
functionings ... become mainly repressed and
unconscious": ”while the conflict between the
antilibidinal and the libidinal egos is
repressed and kept unconscious so far as
possible ... its effects can and do seep
through into consciousness as immature needs,
fears, loves and hates, and symptoms.... In
these patients, hostile self-attack and
punishing self-mastery are quite visible."
(p. 188-189)

"Freud’s term ’superego’ and Fairbairn’s term
’antilibidinal ego’ are valuable alternative
terms, each useful in different contexts
since they denote the same broad area of
psychic functioning (that of internalized
parental and social controls which have
become self-controls), though they are not
exactly identical. ’Superego’ covers a wider
range of phenomena than does ’antilibidinal
ego’. Roughly we may say that ’superego’
includes both ’sadism turned against the
self’ and ’mature morality’.... There is, as
it were, a ’superego’ larger than our own
individual ego, which should be represented
inside our psychic organization, not as a
harsh tyrant but as a supportive and friendly
authority. However, to whatever degree
anxiety and illness pervades our inner being,
this internal authority is a cruel dictator
in which all our rage and hate of a bad outer
world has become concentrated into
self-suppression and in particular aimed at

20

the suppression of our own libidinal needs.
For this particular aspect of the Freudian
’superego’ the term proposed by Fairbairn,

’antilibidinal ego’, ... is entirely
accurate.... The ’antilibidinal ego’ is
specifically ’against needs’ and is basically
an internalization of the outer world’s
intolerance of the needy infant who is
regarded as a nuisance to be kept quiet.“ (p.
182-183)

Thus Guntrip (1976) associates “antilibidinal ego" with
the more sadistic and suppressive aspects of Freud’s
“superego“, an introject of bad objects from the outer
world. Guntrip states that “So far as Fairairn’s
object-relations theory is concerned, internal objects
belong properly to the realm of the psychopathological,
since they are internalized in the first instance
because they are bad objects.‘l (p. 387)

Guntrip makes specific reference to ”... the angry
or over-authoritarian mother of a later period (i.e.
possibly from the cleanliness training period onwards)
who is experienced by the child as aggressive and
becomes the source of a sadistic ’superego’ ...“ (p.
106), thus both identifying a time frame for the
precursors to the superego and characterizing an
antecedent variable which is, at least in part,
responsible for the formation of a sadistic superego.
He also gives an account of the experienced nature of
this structure

I'Another patient ... exhibited the same
self-persecutory set-up verbally. whenever

21

she made any slight mistake, she would begin

shouting at herself at the top of her voice:

’You stupid thing! why don’t you think! You

ought to have known better!’ and so on, which

were in fact the very words her mother used

against her in daily nagging.“ (p. 191)

These are also the “very words“ reported by many
voicers as the sort of self-condemnation and criticism
they experience internally. Guntrip does not, however,
.explicitly acknowledge that these verbal assaults occur
internally. In addition, he suggests that they are
manifestations of pathological or ego-weak conditions
resulting from the introjection of the bad-object
parent.

Kohut (1971) seems to approach this issue in a
similar manner to Guntrip. On the one hand, he makes
references to prohibitions and admonitions of the
superego,

'... those aspects of the superego which

direct toward the ego the commands and

prohibitions, the praise, scolding, and
punishment that the parents had formerly

directed toward the child.'(p. 41)

Yet Kohut also seems to suggest that these functions
are to be considered as abstract concepts rather than
explicit experiences. It is under circumstances where
the basic structure is not functioning properly that
these concepts begin to take on a more direct and

immediate character.

“Ego, id, and superego are the constituents
of a specific, high-level, i.e. experience

 

22

distant, abstraction in psychoanalysis ..."
(p. iv)

"Just as the superego is the massively
introjected internal replica of the oedipal
object, so is the basic fabric of the ego
composed of innumerable internal replicas of
aspects of the preoedipal object.... The
innumerable, small, nontraumatic
disappointments in the perfection of the
preoedipal object account similarly for the
admixture of prestige (and thus power)
enjoyed by each of the minute prohibitions,
admonitions, and approving and guiding foci,
which form in their entirety the
drive-channeling and drive-neutralizing basic
fabric of the ego.”(p. 47-48)

”The internal structure ... now performs the
functions which the object used to perform
for the child--the well-functioning

structure, however, has largely been divested
of the personality features of the object.
Imperfections is this part of the process are
well known: the superego, for example,
usually shows traces of some of the human
features of the oedipal object, and the
drive-controlling basic fabric of the psyche
may work with specific personalized methods
of threat and seduction which are directly
derived from characteristics of preoedipal
objects ...“(p. 50)

where Guntrip and Kohut do not clearly refer to or
acknowledge voicing phenomena, Kernberg (1980) tends to
refute their existence. His major criticism of Klein’s
work is over her lack of theoretical discussion of the
development of the internal structures.

"Klein neglects the developmental aspects of
structural differentiation within both ego
and superego formation, and never explains
how ’internal objects’ are integrated into
ego and superego, how later developments
differ from earlier ones.... Segal (has)
attempted to meet the criticism ... Segal’s
structural analysis ... still appears to

23

leave open some questions regarding psychic
structure ... defines internal objects as
objects introjected into the ego; the ego
identifies with some of these objects, which

thus become assimilated into the ego,
contributing to its growth and
characteristics. Other objects remain

separate internal objects, and the ego
maintains a relationship with them. Segal
states that the superego is such an
object--thus equating, it seems to me, what
in ego psychology terms might be described as
object representations with so complex a
structure as the superego. Segal conveys the
impression that the tripartite structure is
but one instance of the develOpment of
relationships between internal objects and
the ego, with the additional confusing
implication that objects are both included in
the ego and relate to it at the same time.
Even granting that some of the problems of
these conceptualizations are semantic ... the

inescapable conclusion is that the earliest
internalized objects are treated as equal to
highly complex intrapsychic structures....'
(p. 42)

This seems to have stated the issue fairly clearly. If
we assume that Klein, and perhaps Segal, were writing
about voicing phenomena as if they were universals, and
that Kernberg was unaware of such phenomena, then it
would follow that Kernberg would view the structural
system as highly abstract, and would object to having
structures simultaneously contained within the ego and
being related to by it. Such a concept would appear
ungrounded, confusing and unnecessary. Klein, on the
other hand, would tend to describe the system in more
experiential terms and would, by simple observation,

determine that many elements of internal object

24

relations are directly and consciously experienced.
The concept of structures being contained within the
ego and also relating with it as separate objects would
not be a matter of conjecture, but rather empirical
fact. This would correspond with the descriptions of
voicers who are clear that the admonitions, threats,
and supportive statements of their "voices“ are
statements from the “self", yet use second and even
third person form of address.

Similarly, Kernberg’s description of Klein’s
position fails to convey the sense of a verbally
interactive relationship between aspects of the psychic

structure.

'The content of persecutory anxiety or
paranoid fears varies according to the level
of psychosexual development. There are,

first, oral fears of being devoured, then
anal fears of being controlled and poisoned;
these early contents later shift into oedipal
fears of castration.... These primitive
persecutory fears constitute the basis of
persecutory delusions in schizophrenia and
paranoid psychoses.”(p. 24)

'... even under ideal circumstances, there is
a certain contamination of the good objects
by the bad objects in the superego, thus
increasing internalized demands for
perfection. Under less than optimal
circumstances, such demands for perfection
deteriorate into the unremitting harshness of
infantile and childhood unconscious
morality." (p. 35)

Kernberg’s own position seems to remove these

superego functions from the conscious sphere when he

25

refers to "... the unconscious guilt feelings generally
characteristic of superego functioning."(p. 71) He
seems to further question the descriptions of superego
of Klein and Freud when he notes that “Fairbairn felt
that, because Freud had developed his structural model,
particularly his concept of superego, under the
influence of his study of mourning and melancholia, he
had overestimated both the importance of aggression in
psychopathology and the conflicts between later stages
of the superego and ego.”(p. 71)

Bion (1962) also seems to question Freud’s
conceptualization of consciousness, making an effort to
explain why Freud would describe consciousness as a
“sense-organ of psychic quality".

"... it is hard to believe that sense data,
as ordinarily understood, could bring much
material of value when the object of the
senses is an emotional experience of a
personality.... The sense may be able in a
state of fear or rage to contribute data
concerning the heart-beat, and similar events
peripheral, as we see it, to an emotional
state. But there are no sense-data directly
related to concrete objects. Hypochondriacal
symptoms may therefore be signs of an attempt
to establish contact with psychic quality by
substituting physical sensation for the
missing sense data of psychical quality. It
seems possible that it was in response to his
awareness of this difficulty that Freud felt
disposed to postulate consciousness as the
sense-organ of psychic quality.“(p. 53)

To the voicer, consciousness is a most immediate

experience, and may well be considered a kind of

26

sensory experience reflecting their internal state. To
the nonvoicer, emotions and other internal states are
felt only in terms of the senses to which Bion refers.
Hall and Lindsey (1957) reviewed the
psychoanalytic approach, and again did not make the
kind of description of superego, let alone conscience,
which appears in Freud’s writings. They went somewhat
further, however, by diminishing the objectification of
the ego by the superego. They described the
ego/superego system in a way that almost ruled out the
kind of routine criticism described by voicers, and
suggested that a consciously experienced phenomenon
related to superego functioning simply doesn’t exist.
'... the id, the ego and the superego ...
interact so closely with one another that it
is difficult, if not impossible, to
disentangle their effects....' (p. 32)
'... id, ego and superego are not to be
thought of as mannikins which operate the
personality. They are merely names for
various psychological processes which obey
different system principles. Under ordinary
circumstances, these different principles do
not collide with one another, nor do they
work at cross purposes. On the contrary,
they work together as a team under the
administrative leadership of the ego. The
personality normally functions as a whole
rather than as three separate segments.'(p.
35-36)
Here also was the presentation of internal conflict as

an abstract entity rather than a concrete experience.

"All of the conflicts within the personality can be

27

reduced to the opposition of these two forces (cathexis
and anticathexis).' (p. 44)

The psychoanalytic literature is thus ambiguous on
the voicing phenomenon. Some of the literature could
be interpreted as referring to such a phenomenon and
relating it to superego functioning, but there was no
indication that there might be a distinction in this
functioning which divided the population, i.e. that
some people might not experience this form of
functioning. Some of the literature seemed to be
rewording these concepts, making them more abstract and
less experiential, without any apparent sense that a
rewording was being done. There seemed to be no
reference to the kind of distinction in conscious
functioning which was being described by voicers and
nonvoicers.

Another group of theorists has done considerable
work on the issue of how best to represent thought.
They tend to separate out into two groups: multimodal
advocates and unimodal advocates. Those who advocate
multimodal descriptions of thought distinguish between
lexical (verbal) forms of thought and imaginal
(nonverbal) forms of thought. The unimodal theorists,
on the other hand, seem to take the position that
nonverbal thought is not thought at all, but rather

some form of conjecture about processes which are below

28

the level of conscious thought.

Gurova (1969), examining components of thought in
problem solving, concluded that. there exist two
distinct but interrelated modes of thinking. He
described one mode as concrete and the other as
imaginal, roughly parallelling the verbal/nonverbal
concepts of the multimodal theorists. Arnheim
(1970,1971) advocated the acceptance of two modes of
thought also, and labelled them verbal and visual.
Horowitz (1972) also followed the multimodal line, but
he broke the concept into three parts: enactive,
image, and lexical. He further asserted that these
modes involve distinct organizational properties which
distinguish one from the other, and involve differing
cognitive processes.

Grodzinski (1980) took the unimodal position,
insisting that human thought is verbal and that human
consciousness is, in fact, derived from this verbal
nature of thought. He argued that it is words which
provide the necessary abstractions characteristic of
thought. Images, he stated, are not true reflections
of human thought because they are too concrete. The
role of images in human thought is akin to the function
of illustrations in a book; they are secondary supports
for the main process.

In the study of these theorists, no references

29

were found to the notion that thought might not be a
unimodal process (though this was under some question)
and that the two modes tended to separate out over the
concept of internal verbalization. All of the
multimodal and unimodal theorists agreed that lexical
thought was one of the modes of thought. Multimodal
theorists went on to state that other, nonverbal, modes
existed as well. No one spent much time describing the
experience of thinking. There were no references to
the verbal thinking which gave any suggestion of the
kind of involuntariness described by the voicers, nor
any which appeared to distinguish between one track and
multiple track verbal processing described by
nonvoicers and voicers respectively. Here was the same
situation as had existed in the other literature, that
unimodal theorists and multimodal theorists alike
viewed the human population as having only one nature
with regard to thought. No one seemed to be suggesting
that the population was divided into two groups having
distinctively different experiences of conscious

thought.

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAM
This research project had two main objectives:
The first and perhaps most obvious was to develop a

means of measuring the presence of the voicing

30

phenomenon (or demonstrating the lack thereof) and
minimizing the persuasive impact of the experimenter in
the interview process. The second objective, assuming
the measurement objective was met, was to relate the
voicing phenomenon to some conceptual/theoretical base
and thus provide a starting point for future research
and exploration of the concept.

Two approaches were taken to the latter goal. One
effort attempted to determine antecedent conditions
which might cause voicing behaviours to develop. Child
rearing practices of subjects’ parents, memory style of
the subject, and an assortment of demographic variables
were examined. In a different direction, possible
consequences of the voicing phenomenon were studied. A
number of variables were selected which seemed likely
to be affected by having or not having an internal
voice. Among these were conformity, social dominance,
and decisiveness.

The following chapters report on these studies,
beginning with an overview of the procedures and
followed by more detailed descriptions of the findings

in each area.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW OF THE THREE EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Three separate empirical studies have been done.
Each study used a separate sampling of subjects and
none of them used as subjects any of the colleagues or
friends with whom the voicing phenomenon had been
originally explored. This chapter will provide a brief
overview of the objectives, subjects and procedures of
each of the studies. Chapter III will explore in
detail the pursuit of the measurement objective across
the studies. Chapter IV will describe the search for
related antecedent variables which was made in the
first two studies. Chapter V will discuss the
consequent variables used in the third study and the
results of a causal analysis of that data. Chapter VI
will conclude with a discussion of the overall findings
of this project and some recommendations for further

study.

STUDY 1. OVERVIEw

The first study was a feasibility study. Could a
phenomenal description be written so that subjects
would identify themselves as "voicer“ or "nonvoicer"?
In addition to testing the description, a number of

31

32

items were constructed to explore some of the
antecedent hypotheses we had generated. This study was
also an exploratory study containing a series of
questions for voicers which inquired into the nature,
duration, number and gender of the perceived
"voice(s)'. This latter information was collected so
that we might increase our ability to describe the
phenomenon and thus improve upon' our measurement
instrument.

The subjects for the first study consisted of
twenty-six social science undergraduates at Michigan
State University and an additional fourteen other
adults, mostly professionals: acquaintances who had
never discussed this concept prior to taking the
questionnaire. This latter group was used both to
widen the age range and for the breadth, depth and
candor of feedback they could provide.

The entire questionnaire comprised two pages, one
for the description and one for the items (See Appendix
A). The subjects were given the questionnaire on an
informal basis. The students took it as a group after
a regular class, and the other adults took it
individually. Very few questions were raised, and no

one seemed to have much difficulty with the instrument.

33

STUDY 2. OVERVIEU

In the first study, the self-identification was
based on only one description. Thus, there was no
measure of the reliability of the identification.
Also, several subjects and friends expressed
dissatisfaction with one or more elements of the
description used. Consequently, two new descriptions
of the voicer/nonvoicer distinction were added to the
questionnaire. The objective of this revision and
expansion was to assess the reliability and resolution
of the measurement instrument.

The second study followed up the efforts of the
first study in terms of the antecedent hypotheses also;
the very general questions of the first study were made
more specific. The second study also included the
exploratory questions about the experience of the
“voice" that were used in the first study.

The second study questionnaire was given to 165
undergraduate students at Michigan State University.
These were students from two introductory psychology
classes who were given the questionnaire during the
latter half of the class period.

The second study used the questionnaire containing
three descriptions (see Appendix B) and the
self-identification items for each description as well

as a fourth identification based on the subject’s

34

global assessment. There were then several items
seeking feedback and comments about the descriptions
and the terms used in those descriptions. The rest of
the questionnaire was substantially the same as used in
the first study, save for the expansion of the
antecedent hypothesis items. A cover letter was added
to the questionnaire which introduced the project to
the subject.

The questionnaire took longer to complete, having
nearly tripled the amount of reading required, but
still resulted in very little confusion or difficulty.
The results showed the instrument to have substantial
reliability, although most of the developmental

hypotheses were disconfirmed.

STUDY 3. OVERVIEw

The third study made only a slight change in the
test instrument, primarily by changing the order of
presentation of the descriptions. The search for
correlates of the voicer/nonvoicer distinction shifted
to the testing of consequent hypotheses. The shift was
from trying to ascertain what might have produced the
voicing phenomenon to trying to determine factors which
might be affected by or be the result of the voicing
phenomenon. Thus, the questions used in the first two

studies were replaced by a new set of items which are

35

discussed in detail in Chapter V.

Study 3 utilized the undergraduate psychology
student pool at Michigan State University for its 147
subjects. Subjects signed up to complete the
questionnaire which was administered to groups of
between twenty and fifty students at the end of the
day.

The students were given the questionnaire (see
Appendix C), which was again headed by a cover letter
introducing them to the nature of the material to
follow. The three descriptions were then presented,
each one followed by the self-identification items.
These were followed by self-identification questions
based on the subject’s global assessment. There were
then several items requesting feedback on the
descriptions. Subjects again reported little
difficulty with this questionnaire. The rest of the
questionnaire was composed of seventy-three items
chosen to measure fifteen a priori factors. These
items and their factors can be found in Appendix D.

The three studies each had elements of refinement
and testing of the primary measurement instrument: the
descriptions and the accompanying self-identification
items. Studies 1 and 2 pursued the testing of
antecedent hypotheses while Study 3 focussed instead on

consequent hypotheses. Results will be presented for

36

each objective separately; i.e. a chapter on
measurement, then a chapter on developmental
hypotheses, and then a chapter on the impact of the

voicer difference on other personality traits.

‘.

tl.‘illvl

‘

a.

.livlid.‘

 

 

CHAPTER III

THE MEASUREMENT OF THE VOICER/NONVOICER DIMENSION

This project began with informal discussions
among friends and colleagues. The procedure used among
friends had been to describe the voicing phenomenon and
then ask the friend whether they identified with that
process. This direct approach had the advantage of
clarity but raised questions concerning the influence
of the questioner upon the responses. The most similar
noninterview measurement strategy is to present a
written description of the voicing phenomenon and then
ask the subject for a self-description (if possible)
and a confidence rating.

The person who first recognized the
voicer/nonvoicer distinction wrote a summary of the
original discovery and included some of the
speculations he had made about it since then. This
narrative description was not unlike the descriptions
we had been using among our friends.

The original written description seemed to be too
informal and specific for our ‘purposes. It was
rewritten to provide a greater emphasis on general
description of the phenomenon rather than citing
specific cases. Proper names were also eliminated and

37

38

the description was shifted from first person to third
person. This modification of the original was the
description used in Study 1.

After the first study, colleagues and friends
raised a number of comments and concerns regarding both
the Study 1 description and the original description.
These comments were directed at the balance and the
clarity of the descriptions.

Some who identified themselves as voicers
expressed concerns that the descriptions were somewhat
derogatory in tone, particularly with the use in the
original description of the term ”little voice“. The
voicing phenomenon, they said, felt like a natural
aspect of their thinking and had little or no character
of coming from the “outside“. They wanted a
description which emphasized this aspect and which
referred to more of their thinking than just the
voicing.

Some who identified themselves as nonvoicers
expressed different concerns about the original and
Study 1 descriptions. while they were fairly sure they
were not voicers, they really had no clear alternative
description with which they could identify. They
thought that the lack of a positive identification made
it harder for them to be sure. They wanted a

description which would give greater balance concerning

(T

“

...

a.

 

 

 

39

voicers and nonvoicers.

Some colleagues from the philosophy department
expressed concern about the language used in the
descriptions. They felt the terms used were too
ambiguous and that the descriptions could use a lot of
"tightening up". They wanted a description which was
concise and direct, without digressions into personal
examples and experiences.

A third description was written in an attempt to
satisfy the concerns and desires of the various critics
of the first two descriptions. It became clear,
however, that this new description also had its
critics. There was no clear criterion for selecting
one version over another. In fact, there was good
reason not to do so. The three descriptions used
together could serve as multiple measurement of the
voicer/nonvoicer distinction and thus provide a means
of assessing the reliability of each description.

The multiple measure instrument for Study 2 asked
for four self-identifications. The first three were in
response to each of the three descriptions considered
separately. The fourth self-identification was based
on having read all three descriptions.

This multiple measurement instrument encountered
some difficulty which was traced to the order in which

the descriptions were presented. The descriptions were

40

reordered for Study 3. All three descriptions can be
found as the beginning of each questionnaire in

Appendices B and C.

STUDY 1
Method

The first study essentially tested the feasibility
of using a written description to ellicit
self-identification on the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction. This study used the revised version of my
friend’s original draft. The description was followed

by the question:

If you had to answer one way or the other, would
you say you were a:

Voicer Nonvoicer

This item was immediately followed by the question:

How confident are you about your answer?

Very confident 1 2 3 4 5 Not at all confident

By using both of these items, we could obtain a
forced-choice self-identification with one of the two
groups and a measure of how much certainty the subject

placed in the choice they made.

.}‘ 11'
[It

 

 

 

 

41

This instrument was given to twenty-six social
science undergraduates at Michigan State University and

an additional fourteen professional acquaintances.

Results

Nearly two thirds of this sample identified
themselves as voicers, showing that subjects did make
differential responses to the instrument. Table 1
below indicates the degree of certainty the subjects
expressed with regard to their self-identification. As
can be seen from the table, most subjects showed a high
degree of certainty in their self-identification.

The expressed degree of certainty was higher for
voicers than for nonvoicers. The correlation of 0.39
between certainty and voicer/nonvoicer, as shown in
Table 2, reflects this relative uncertainty of the
nonvoicers as a group.

when questioned after the study, subjects
generally felt the description was easy to read,
interesting and understandable. A few subjects felt
the description was too ambiguous. Some subjects who
had identified themselves as nonvoicers complained of
the lack of description of what nonvoicers were and
stated that this had been a source of uncertainty for

them.

42

Table 1.
Frequency of response to certainty item in Study 1

Very confident scored as 5
Not at all confident scored as 1

SCORE 5 4 3 2 1
Voicer 14 9 1 0 1 N=25 F=4.4O
Nonvoicer 5 4 2 2 2 N=15 H=3.53
TOTAL 19 13 3 2 3 N=40
Table 2.

Relationship of
Certainty and Voicer/nonvoicer items in Study 1

Self-ID Voicer Nonvoicer
Certainty

1 or 2 23 9 32
3, 4 or 5 2 6 8 r=0.39

25 15 40

43

A survey of the voicers regarding the nature of
their “voice" was also made. Among the twenty-five
voicers, five reported more than one voice, with a
number of others stating that the one I'voice"
represented, sounded like, or spoke for more then one
perspective or character. Two voicers reported voices
of the opposite gender, eight more said they were
unsure of the gender and many reported difficulty
distinguishing among male, female and 'self' gender in
their thoughts. There was a broad mix of
characterizations of the voicing both in terms of
situations which might result in voicing and in terms
of the kinds of things “said”. There seemed to be a
tendency for the older subjects to be more likely to
report that the nature of the voice(s) had changed over
the years, always in the direction of increased

cooperation and maturity.

Discussion

The primary measurement questions were answered in
this first study. Subjects did sort themselves out
according to a voicer/nonvoicer distinction on the
basis of a written description. Furthermore, most did
so with a high degree of certainty that they were

correctly identifying themselves.

44

STUDY 2
Method

The second study sought to improve upon the
measurement instrument in two ways: 1) Develop three
alternate descriptions responding to the comments and
criticisms from subjects and colleagues, and 2) Use all
three descriptions developed as well as a global
response to provide a multiple measure reliability
check and to compare the effectiveness of the various
descriptions.

The first description presented was the newest
”philosophical" version, followed by the questions:

1) Now that you have read this description, how
would you classify your mode of thought:

Explicit Conscious Thought
Implicit Conscious Thought

2) How confident do you feel about this judgement:

42:7 .4227 .£::7 (2:7 2:27
Very Sure Sure Hesitant Doubtful Just Guessing
The second description was the original

description my friend had written, followed by the

questions:

1) From what you have read above, would you say
that some of your thoughts take the form of an internal
"voice“?

I have an Internal Voice
I have had no such experience

45

2) How confident do you feel about this judgement?
A227 .2227 4227 2227' 2227
Very Sure Sure Hesitant Doubtful Just Guessing
The third description was the revised description
used in Study 1, followed in turn by the questions:

1) Now that you have read this description, how
would you classify yourself?

Voicer Nonvoicer

2) How confident do you feel about this judgement?

A227 A227 £227 £227 2227
Very Sure Sure Hesitant Doubtful Just Guessing
The subject was then asked for a global

assessment:

1) How would you characaterize your own mode of
thought?

Explicit Conscious Thought Implicit Conscious Thought
/ /Internal voice / /No internal voice
Voicer Nonvoicer

2) How confident do you feel about this judgement?

A227 2227 A227 A227 .2227
Very Sure Sure Hesitant Doubtful Just Guessing

Subjects were then asked which label they
preferred and which description had been most helpful.
Finally, subjects were asked for feedback on the
instrument’s clarity and tone plus any other comments
or criticisms they might have.

The questions following the descriptions reflect

46

the variation of approach that each version had taken
to the phenomenon. The philosophical version describes
modes of thought and concentrates as much attention on
the implicit (nonvoicer) mode as on the explicit
(voicer) mode and refers to these modes as distinct
“types". It further avoids an emphasis on the voicing
phenomenon itself, referring to it as merely one way of
describing the internal verbal dialogue. The “voice” is
referred to as one of several ”thought tracks“ which
occur in parallel or simultaneous fashion.

In contrast to this, the original version refers
entirely to the voicing phenomenon, referring to it as
an internal voice and making no real effort to describe
two types. The question is not “what are you?”, but
rather ”what have you experienced?"

The revised version used in Study 1 falls somewhat
between the other two. while its main emphasis is on
the voicing experience, it also suggests a typology and
uses the labels "voicer" and “nonvoicer“. The subjects
are told, both in a cover letter to the experiment and
in the presentation of the global assessment questions,
that these three descriptions are all describing the
same concept, but from varying perspectives.

The use of the multiple forms set the stage for
answering some questions about the reliability and

nature of the voice/nonvoice results. If subjects

47

consistently identify with one or the other side of the
distinction across all three forms of the description

and in their global assessment, e.g. if these four sets

of responses are highly correlated, then the
self-identifications are not due to random or
idiosyncratic interpretations of particular phrases in

any one description.

Results

Table 3 displays the analysis of responses to the
identification and confidence questions. There are
more voicers expressing uncertainty about their
identification in Study 2 than there were in Study 1.
The mean voicer certainty in Study 1 was 4.4, while in
Study 2 the mean certainties for the four facets were
3.5, 4.0, 3.9 and 3.7. In Study 1, 92% of the voicers
marked “sure” or ”very sure“ on the certainty question.
In Study 2 only 65% of the voicers responded “sure" or
"very sure“ to the global certainty question. Thus,
voicers were less certain of their identification in
response to the expanded instrument.

Nonvoicers showed a smaller but opposite movement.
Their average certainty in Study 1 was 3.5 and in Study
2 improved to 3.8, 4.1, 4.0 and 3.9 for each successive
self-identification. In Study 1, 60% of nonvoicers

were 'sure' or "very sure" while in the global facet of

48

Study 2, 64% were in these categories. For both
voicers and nonvoicers, the poorest certainty levels
were recorded in response to the philosophical version
of the description, which appeared first in the
instrument. Even on this facet, however, 60% of the
sample responded “sure“ or I'very sure" to the question
and only 11% responded in the “doubtful" or “just

guessing“ categories.

Table 3.
Responses to Voicer/nonvoicer and Certainty items
in Study 2
Percent responding
Mean very sure or sure
Form of description certainty V NV Total
Philosophical 3.65 56 63 60
Original 4.05 78 83 80
Study 1 3.97 75 76 75
Global response 3.80 65 64 65

Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the four
self-identification questions. The philosophical
version has a low correlation to either of the other
two descriptions and correlates only 0.52 with the
global identification. The other two descriptions are
highly correlated with one another and with the global

identification.

49

Table 4.
Correlations between the four self-identification items
in Study 2
(Communalities in the diagonal)

Philosophical Original Study 1 Global

Philosophical .20 .31 .39 .52
Original .67 .87 .77
Study 1 .92 .91
Global .97

In general, the feedback received from subjects
indicated that the concepts were interesting. Many
were excited and expressed eagerness to discuss them
further. The instrument appeared easy to take and to
administer, requiring no explanations or clarifications
from the experimenter. Nearly all of the negative
feedback was focussed on the philosophical description.
Subjects reported that it was difficult to read and
somewhat confusing. Several stated that they were not
sure how the concepts of the philosophical description

paralleled those of the other two descriptions.

Discussion

The primary measurement objectives were met.
Subjects did consistently identify with one or the
other side of the voicer/nonvoicer distinction across

all four identifications, although there seemed some

50

weakness with the philosophical description. The
results of Study 1 were also confirmed in the high
certainty levels reported.

The philosophical description was the weakest form
presented and it seemed to depress the certainty scores
of voicers. It was definitely the most difficult to
read, since it used the most formal and abstract
language. It seemed possible that one major source of
this form’s weakness was in its order of appearance.
As the first description, it presented the most
difficult material with the least preparation or
introduction to the concept. It was hypothesized that
the philosophical description would work better if it

were not presented first.

STUDY 3
Method

The third study sought to check out the impact of
a different ordering of the descriptions. In Study 3,
the original description was _presented first since
subjects in Study 2 perceived it to be the most
informal and easiest to read of the three forms. The
philosophical version was placed second to separate the
original description and its revision, the Study 1

description.

51

Results

Table 5 displays the analysis of responses to the
identification and certainty questions for Study 3.
The certainties across all four identifications are
very high, with 68 to 90% of subjects responding that
they are ”sure“ or ”very sure“ of their
identifications. No more than 2% of the subjects
responded in the "doubtful“ or '”just guessing”

categories.

Table 5.
Responses to Voicer/nonvoicer and Certainty items
in Study 3
Percent responding
Mean very sure or sure
Form of description certainty V NV Total
Philosophical 3.89 69 68 69
Original 4.04 72 73 73
Study 1 4.09 71 90 82
Global response 3.99 75 83 80

Table 6 presents the correlation matrix of the
four self-identification questions in Study 3. As in
Study 2, the philosophical description has the lowest
correlations with the other forms, but these are higher
in Study 3 than they were in Study 2. The remaining
correlations are all very high, ranging from 0.83 to

0.97.

52

Table 6.
Correlations between the four self-identification items
in Study 3
(Communalities in the diagonal)

Philosophical Original Study 1 Global

Philosophical .29 .48 .51 .51
Original .75 .83 .83
Study 1 .94 .97
Global .93

The feedback obtained from subjects was generally
more positive than in Study 2. In particular, there
was a marked reduction in comments regarding difficulty

with the philosophical description.

Discussion

Study 3 replicates the main findings of both prior
studies, both in regard to the consistency of subjects’
self-identifications and the expressed confidence in
their choices. The reordering of the descriptions had
a markedly positive effect on subjects’ confidence in

their global assessments.

CONCLUSION
These three studies have shown that subjects will
make self-identifications on the basis of a written

6
description of the voicer/nonvoicer concept, and most

53

do so with considerable certainty. They make
consistent choices over varying forms of the
description. The instrument as it was finally

constituted in Study 3 appears to be a consistent and
reliable means of measuring the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction. It is, in addition, easy to administer,

self-explanatory, and easy to take.

CHAPTER IV
THE VOICER/NONVOICER DISTINCTION

AND DEVELOPMENTAL HYPOTHESES

The first two studies explored a number of
hypotheses related to the development of the voicing
phenomenon. The principle hypothesis was that the
voicing phenomenon was an extreme form of the
psychoanalytic superego concept and represented a
highly active conscience resulting from the
introjection of or identification with a particularly

bad object.

STUDY 1
Method

As test of this hypothesis, Study 1 used items
relating to parental strictness, level of childhood
family interaction, religiosity, gregariousness,
emotionality, happiness and self-criticism. All of the
above items were in the form of a Lickert five-point
differential.

Two additional items were added relating to
possible manifestations or descriptions of voicing.
These asked about subjects’ history of having a
childhood imaginary playmate and subjects’ tendency to

54

55

speak aloud to themselves. There were also some
demographic items covering gender, birthdate, birth
order, family size, and ethnic and religious

background.

One further item was developed to check out a
possible relationship between voicing and memory style.
This item was an outgrowth of master’s thesis research
(Salzman, 1973) which showed people divided into three
groups based on their style of memorization. There
appeared to be two effective and distinct styles which
had been labelled graph processing and list processing.
These were characterized by the use of imagery and the
use of verbal rote memorization respectively. A third
and less effective style, associative processing,
seemed to be the one used by people who had not yet
developed a facility for either of the other styles.
It was suspected that the list processing related to
the voicing phenomenon and we wished to check this out.
However, the procedures used in the master’s study for
distinguishing memorization styles were complex and
time-consuming. A single multiple-choice item was
written which probed directly at the issue and appeared
likely to correlate strongly with the results of the
more elaborate procedure.

It was the intent of the first study to map out

areas of further study. If any of the items correlated

56

well with the voicer/nonvoicer distinction, more
attention would be put toward verifying and validating

the relationships. (For items see Appendix A)

Results

The correlations of the self-identification as a
voicer or nonvoicer with the other items in Study 1 are
shown in Table 7. The item "Are you often tempted to
speak aloud to yourself?" correlated 0.68 with a
self-identification of voicer. This was the only
significant correlation at the .01 level between any of
the items and the voicer/nonvoicer distinction. As
noted in Chapter III, voicers were more likely to be
certain of their identification than nonvoicers and
this is reflected in the correlation of 0.35 between
Voicer and Certainty. Those reporting European
ancestry tended not to identify themselves as voicers
(r=-0.40) while those who were brought up as Catholics
did so (r=0.33). Those who used an Image memory style
tended to be nonvoicers (r=-O.32), as was expected, but
the expected relationship between Rote memory style and
Voicer was not present (r=0.04). Of all the
developmental variables, only “Not currently
self-critical" was correlated with the Voicer variable
(r=-0.35). The item related to having had an imaginary

childhood playmate failed to correlate with the

57

voicer/nonvoicer distinction.

Sample size may have been a major potential
contributor to these results. A sample of only forty
subjects requires a correlation of .31 to achieve
statistical significance. Variables whose population
correlations are below this level would be difficult to
detect. Furthermore, a small sample is likely to
produce small variances among individual variables,
which would tend to deflate the size of observed
correlations. Items with zero variance make
computation of a correlation coefficient impossible.
Table 8 presents the means and standard deviations for

the items in Study 1.

58

Table 7.

Correlations of
in Study 1

* indicates zero variance for the

Voicer
Certainty
Male-female
Birthdate month
day
year
Birth order
Family size
Race caucasian

black

oriental

other

Europe

Asia

America

Africa

Other

Catholic

Protestant

Jewish

Other

Social Sci

Natural Sci
Humanities
Business

Education

Other

None

Image

Mnemonic

Rote

Parent permissive
Not interactive

Not emotional

Not religious

Many friends

Very unhappy

Not self-critical
Minimal interactive
Not emotional

Not religious

Many friends

Very unhappy

Not self-critical
Imaginary playmate

Talks to self

National
Ancestry

Religion

Major

Memory
style

Childhood
family

Current
family

items with Self-identification

item

Voicer

1.00
0.35
0.15
-0.24
-0.16
-0.00
0.05
0.24
-0.17
0.12
x
0.12
-0.40
0.13
-0.04
s
0.13
0.33
-0.25
-0.03
-0.06
-0.06
s
0.13
-0.25
0.24
-0.05
0.13
-0.32
0.21
0.04
-0.02
0.12
0.02
-0.18
0.07
-0.16
-0.03
-0.04
-0.29
0.03
0.05
0.11
-0.35
0.17
0.68

p<.05

p<.05

p<.05

p<.05

p<.05

p<.01

59

Table 8.
Means and Standard deviations for Study 1
Means Standard
deviations

Voicer .625 .484
Certainty 4.075 1.191
Male-female .625 .484
Birthdate month 6.300 3.607
day 16.050 9.211
year 49.850 8.064
Birth order 2.000 1.177
Family size 3.846 2.155
Race caucasian .947 .223
black .026 .160
oriental .000 .000
other .026 .160
National Europe .636 .481
Ancestry Asia .030 .171
America .606 .489
Africa .000 .000
Other .030 .171
Religion Catholic .263 .440
Protestant .553 .497
Jewish .132 .338
Other .053 .223
Major Social Sci .632 .482
Natural Sci .000 .000
Humanities .026 .160
Business .105 .307
Education .184 .388
Other .053 .223
None .026 .160
Memory Image .525 .499
style Mnemonic .400 .490
Rote .150 .357
Childhood Parent permissive 2.974 .891
family Not interactive 2.300 1.122
Not emotional 2.692 .938
Not religious 2.846 1.251
Many friends 3.625 1.088
Very unhappy 2.375 1.088
Not self-critical 2.825 1.070
Current Min. interactive 2.400 1.200
family Not emotional 2.425 .997
Not religious 3.650 1.459
Many friends 3.400 1.091
Very unhappy 2.200 .927
Not self-critical 2.525 .894
Imaginary playmate .300 .458
Talks to self .675 .468

60

STUDY 2
Method

The items of the Study 2 questionnaire were
substantially the same as those in Study 1 (See
Appendix 8). Some of the items were expanded or
augmented to make them somewhat more specific. The
item ”Parents very strict” was changed to the two items
“Mother very strict” and ”Father very strict".
Similarly, the items ”Very emotive” and “Very happy”
were replaced with “Father often angry“, “Mother often
angry", “Self often angry“, “Father generally happy",
“Mother generally happy" and "Self generally happy“.

An additional question relating to the ease of
making arbitrary decisions was included to test the
effectiveness of one of the questions often used in the
earlier interviewing phase of this study. This was a
multiple-choice item regarding the ease of selecting
for purchase one statue from among a group of identical
statues. Our experience had suggested that this type
of task posed a considerable problem for voicers and
little or no problem for nonvoicers.

The sample size issue of Study 1 was dealt with by
increasing the sample to 167 subjects, all Michigan

State University undergraduate psychology students.

61

Results
The correlations between the self-identification,
as measured by the global assessment, and the

demographic items are shown in Table 9.

Table 9.
Correlations of demographic items with
Self-identification in Study 2
* indicates zero variance for the item

Demographic items Global 1.0.
Voicer
Race caucasian -0.13
black 0.03
oriental -0.08
other 0.11
National Europe -0.13
Ancestry Asia x
America 0.08
Africa -0.08
Other 0.11
Religion Catholic 0.00
Protestant -0.09
Jewish 0.06
Other -0.04

Table 10 displays the correlations between the
self-identifications and the remaining items in the
survey. The means and standard deviations are shown in
Table 11. The significant correlations which had
appeared in Study 1 with the demographic items were not
replicated, which suggests that the earlier
correlations were the result of sampling error. Only
two items correlated significantly with the

voicer/nonvoicer distinction. Voicers are more likely

62

to 1) talk out loud to themselves and 2) have had an
imaginary childhood playmate. All of the remaining
items failed to show significant correlations.

In contrast to Study 1, there were none of the
problems associated with small sample size.
Consequently, the hypotheses relating characteristics
of the subjects’ childhoods and families to the
voicer/nonvoicer distinction were all rejected.
Similarly, the effort to produce a quick identification
using the choosing-a-statue question failed. Nor was a
relation found, as had been in Study 1, between memory
style and voicing. There did not appear to be a simple
and direct antecedent variable which would correlate

with the voicer/nonvoicer distinction.

Since the antecedent variables had failed to map
out areas for further study, an effort was made to
shift perspective and search for factors which might be
the result of, rather than precursors to, the voicing

phenomenon. Chapter V reports on this effort.

63

Table 10.
Correlations of items with Self-identification

for each of the four forms in Study 2
(decimal points omitted)

Items Voicer
Philos Orig Study 1 Global

Philos. voicer 100 31 39 52
certainty 13 ~6 ~5 ~5

Original voicer 31 100 87 77
certainty 11 6 9 10

Study 1 voicer 39 87 100 91
certainty 14 9 4 3

Global voicer 52 77 91 100
certainty 13 11 12 10

Preferred ECT/ICT 4 ~22 ~22 ~13
label Internal voice ~1 -2 1 ~4
Voicer ~1 -8 ~7 ~8

Preferred Philosophical 0 ~6 ~5 ~8
form Original 5 7 10 7
Rewritten -11 ~12 ~15 -7

Combination ~2 ~5 ~4 -2

Problems/ Vague ~10 -9 ~5 ~3
comments Derogatory 1 ~3 ~10 ~7
Insufficient 14 8 7 13

Other ~3 7 3 3

Male-female -12 15 12 4
Age 4 -2 2 3
Memory Image 14 2 7 8
style Mnemonic ~10 ~8 -8 -8
Rate 1 11 4 3

Choose Just take one ~8 ~11 -13 ~11
statue Have trouble 1 7 13 9
Other 7 2 ~4 , ~1

Imaginary playmate 4 20 23 19
Talks to self 18 20 27 32
Childhood Fa. permissive ~3 6 4 8
Mo. permissive 12 ~7 -7 ~10

Fa. not angry 1 3 0 0

No. not angry 10 1 4 3

Self not angry -10 -4 0 3

Fa. unhappy ~3 8 7 4

Mo. unhappy -7 13 9 2

Self unhappy 2 8 5 2
Noninteractive 8 5 1 ~3

Not religious 1 8 5 0

Many friends 3 ~2 0 0
Unsuccessful 6 -5 ~9 ~12

Not self-critical ~2 ~12 ~6 ~6

64

Table 10 (cont.).

Items Voicer
Philos Orig Study 1 Global

Current Min. interactive 5 3 2 ~1
life Poor in school 1 12 5 -3
Rarely angry 1 ~1 ~6 ~3

Not religious 4 2 4 ~4

Many friends 8 8 6 10

Very unhappy -6 7 6 ~3

Not self-critical 0 ~10 ~5 0

Date rarely -3 16 15 14

65

Table 11.
Means and Standard deviations for Study 2

Items Means Standard
deviations

Philosophical voicer .561 .496
certainty 3.645 .899

Original voicer .530 .499
certainty 4.036 .744

Rewritten voicer .500 .500
certainty 3.976 .819

Global voicer .522 .500
certainty 3.804 .805

Preferred ECT/ICT .606 .489
label Internal voice .268 .443
Voicer .213 .409

Preferred Philosophical .421 .494
form Original .472 .499
Rewritten .459 .498

Combination .321 .467

Problems/ Vague .436 .496
comments Derogatory .291 .454
Insufficient .242 .429

Other .291 .454

Male-Female .512 .500
Age 22.213 4.221
Race Caucasion .802 .159
Black .031 .030

Oriental .006 .006

Other .049 .047

National European .432 .245
origin Asian .000 .000
American .228 .176

African .006 .006

Other .031 .030

Religion Catholic .346 .226
Protestant .364 .232

Jew .068 .063

Other .043 .041

Memory Image .385 .487
style Mnemonic .404 .491
Rote .311 .463

Choose Just take one .646 .478
statue Have trouble .267 .442
Other .112 .315

Imaginary playmate .178 .383
Talks to self .554 .497

66

Table 11 (cont.).

Items Means Standard
deviations

Childhood Father permissive 2.855 .957
Mother permissive 3.019 .918

Father not angry 3.321 1.162

Mother not angry 3.209 1.038

Self not angry 3.333 1.001

Father unhappy 2.706 1.040

Mother unhappy 2.596 .999

Self unhappy 2.538 .993

Not interactive 2.406 1.195

Not religious 2.870 1.305

Many friends 3.306 1.209

Unsuccessful 2.156 .919

Not self-critical 2.205 .947

Current Min. interactive 2.652 1.227
life Poor in school 1.900 .784
Rarely angry 3.263 1.009

Not religious 3.646 1.297

Many friends 3.438 1.076

Very unhappy 2.463 .908

Not self-critical 2.273 .984

Date rarely 2.869 1.320

CHAPTER V
THE VOICER/NONVOICER DISTINCTION

AND CONSEQUENT VARIABLES

The first two studies had explored a number of
hypotheses related to possible causes of the voicing
phenomenon. None of these hypotheses' were confirmed,
and a new direction of study was taken. In Study 3,
the emphasis was moved from variables which might have
been antecedent to the voicing phenomenon to those
which might be consequences of the ivoicer/nonvoicer
distinction. Several factors were derived from
anecdotal data and subjective observations. Study 3 had
two primary goals: objectify the anecdotal and
subjective variables in order to obtain measurable
correlates, and clarify the relationships between these
variables and the voicer/nonvoicer distinction.

Over the course of the early exploration and the
first two studies, there had been a great deal of
opportunity to talk with friends, colleagues and
subjects about their experiences and their observations
of the concepts involved in this research. There
seemed to be considerable agreement about a number of
characteristics related to voicers and nonvoicers. The
nature of these characteristics and, more importantly,

67

68

the nature of their relationship to the voicing
phenomenon was not clear. The exploratory nature of
the research to this point suggested the need for a
general survey instrument which would probe as directly
as possible at the factors which appeared related to
voicer/nonvoicer. An instrument was developed to meet
this need. Figure 1 lists these apriori factors and
their hypothesized relationships .to the voicer/

nonvoicer distinction.

A PRIORI FACTORS HYPOTHESIZED TO CORRELATE
POSITIVELY NITH VOICER
Social dominance
Conformity
Spotlight/embarassment
Focus (on detail)
Orderly
Imaginary playmate
Authority shy
Others’ certainty
Talking to self doesn’t disturb flow
Involuntary mind
Do right

A PRIORI FACTORS HYPOTHESIZED TO CORRELATE
NEGATIVELY NITH VOICER
Provocative/argumentative
Independence
Decisive
Ouickness

Figure 1.
The a priori factors and their hypothesized
relations to the voicer factor

The most direct means of probing these factors was

to construct items specific to them, though some of the

69

factors coincided with some previously developed and
tested scales which were incorporated into the
instrument. For each of the factors, at least three
items were constructed in order to provide a
reliability check and prepare for the confirmatory
factor analysis which was to follow. Appendix D shows

the factors and the items which were included in each.

Method

The third study used all three voicer/nonvoicer
descriptions in the manner of the second study. The
order of these descriptions was changed as mentioned in
Chapter 4 so that the most readable description was
placed first. The descriptions were each followed by
self-identification questions and by requests for
global self-identifications. The remainder of the
instrument consisted of the seventy three true-false
items compiled to probe the fifteen apriori factors.
The instrument for Study 3 is shown in Appendix C.

The instrument was given to 147 MSU undergraduate

students in groups of between twenty and thirty.

Results
A confirmatory factor analysis (Hunter and
Gerbing, 1982) was performed on the items which

comprised the apriori factors. Items were assigned to

70

clusters according to three criteria: items within a
given cluster correlate in such a way as to form a
Spearman Rank 1 matrix: items within a given cluster
correlate with items outside their cluster and with
other clusters in a parallel manner, that is the
correlations with variables outside their cluster are
directly proportional to one another; items within a
cluster are similar in content. The correlations were
corrected for attenuation with reliabilities of items

appearing in the diagonal of the correlation matrix.

In this manner, the cluster scores represent
statistically "true" scores, with measurement error
removed.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of items in the
apriori factors and their clustering as a result of the
confirmatory factor analysis. The tight arrangement of

the marks on the diagonal of Figure 2 confirms the

apriori groups, though with some cleaning up of the
individual clusters, or factors. Of the original
seventy-three items in the inventory, fifty-five were

retained in the final clusters. The voicer/nonvoicer
distinction and the certainty response remained as

factors of their own.

7’1

POSTERIORI 501 503 505 512 507 508 506 504 510 514 513 511 509 502 ReJect

APRIORI
Decisive ////

Buick ///
Independence //

Spoil ight/ //
enharessnent
Doright //

Conforsitr

Prooocative/ /
argunentatioe
Authority
shy
Social
dainance
Others’
certainty
Orderly

Talkself

Involuntary
sind
Focus

Iseginary
play-ate
voicer

Ill
/
// / //
/ l/l /
/ /
Ill / l7]
/ //l /
///
l/ / //
/ [I
ll/
/ // /
// l7 - [I
////
///
////

POSTERIORI FACTORS LIST

501 8 OUICK
502 8 VOICER
503 8 RULEBREAKER

504 8 SOCIAL DONlNANCE

505 8 NEED APPROVAL
506 8 ADIRORITY SHY
507 8 DO EXPECTED

500 8 ARSUER

509 8 INASINARY PLANHATE

510 8 POOR BLUFFER

511 8 HARD TO SLEEP

512 8 SELF CONSCIOUS

513 8 TALKING TO SELF AFFECTS THINKINB
514 8 ACTIVE HEAD

Figure 2.

Distribution of items in the
Apriori vs the Posteriori Factors

72

Table 12 shows the correlation matrix of the
factors derived from the confirmatory factor analysis.
whereas the first two studies failed to provide any
correlates for the voicer/nonvoicer distinction, this
study shows a number of related factors. In
particular, the Voicer/nonvoicer factor is most
strongly correlated with Active Head (r=.81),
moderately correlated with Self-consciousness (r=.29),
Need for approval (r=.26), Indecisive (r=.24), and

Imaginary playmate (r=.24).

Table 12.
Factor Correlation Matrix for Study 3
(decimals omitted)

501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514
501 100 24 ~44 ~20 59 28 15 ~8 27 18 26 52 ~1 43
502 24 100 ~9 ~4 26 19 11 ~4 24 ~7 5 29 ~18 81
503 ~44 ~9 100 48 ~48 ~24 ~28 49 0 ~56 ~12 ~39 1 ~14
504 ~20 ~4 48 100 ~48 ~17 ~15 20 3 ~40 8 ~34 ~10 17
505 59 26 ~48 ~48 100 62 47 ~12 ~5 13 11 70 4 39
506 28 19 ~24 ~17 62 100 15 ~11 3 17 ~7 43 24 16
507 15 11 ~28 ~15 47 15 100 ~13 ~17 13 1 44 7 ~7
508 ~8 ~4 49 20 ~12 ~11 ~13 100 ~5 ~26 ~8 4 16 ~10
509 27 24 0 3 ~5 3 ~17 ~5 100 6 14 12 ~7 33
510 18 ~7 ~56 ~40 13 17 13 ~26 6 100 15 12 0 ~14
511 26 5 ~12 8 11 ~7 1 ~8 14 15 100 31 1 25
512 52 29 ~39 ~34 70 43 44 4 12 12 31 100 I 20
513 ~1 ~18 1 ~10 4 24 7 16 ~7 0 1 1 100 ~21
514 43 81 ~14 17 39 16 ~7 ~10 33 ~14 25 20 ~21 100

5018HOTOUICK 5088AR81£R
$28VMOQ :m9snumwmrnmmns
503 8 RULEBREAKER 510 8 POOR BLUFFER

504 8 SOCIAL DMIN‘NCE 511 8 HARD TO SLEEP

505 8 NEED APPRWAL 512 8 SELF CMSCIOUS

506 8 AUTHORITY 8117 513 8 TALKING T0 SELF AFFECTS THINKING
507 8 DO DIRECTED 514 8 ACTIVE HEAD

73

Figure 3 shows one possible set of theoretical
relationships between the factors produced by the
confirmatory factor analysis. This figure is in the
form of a path analysis diagram which shows both causal
links (arrows pointing from the causative or antecedent
factor to the caused or consequent factor) and the
strength of each of the links. If a factor has only
one antecedent, then the strength of the link (the path
coefficient) is the correlation between the factor and
its antecedent. If the factor has two or more
antecedents, then the path coefficients are the beta
weights produced by doing a multiple regression of the
factor on its antecedents. Normally, the path analysis
diagram is derived directly from an apriori theoretical
model. In this case, however, there were no existing
theories which appeared to apply to the
voicer/nonvoicer distinction. The path diagram shown
in this study was derived from a combination of
hypotheses developed over the course of the study and
directions suggested by the correlations themselves.

A path analysis was performed on the factor
correlation matrix and based on the theoretical model
in Figure 3. Tables 13-15 show the path coefficients,
the reproduced correlation matrix and the error
(observed minus predicted) correlation matrix for the

path model shown in Figure 3.

74

$2.

78

   
 

  

509
IMAGINARY
PLAYMATE

 
 
          

15

2
501
NOT QUICK
38
70 62 72-47

514
ACTIVE
HEAD

     
    
  

 

  
   

04

          
   
 

     

SOCIAL
DOMINANC. 506
AUTHORITY
SHY EXPECTED

 

 
      

POOR
BLUFFER

   

508
ARGUER
Figure 3.

Path diagram for Study 3
with path coefficients indicated

502
509
514
505
504
503
510
508
512
506
507
501

502
509
514
505
504
503
510
508
512
506
507
501

502

\IN

OOOOOOOOOQLO

75

Table 13.
Path analysis coefficients for Study 3
(decimals omitted)

509 514 505 504 503 510 508 512
O O O O O O O 0
O O O O O O O O

15 O O O O O O O
0 39 O O O O O O
O 42 ~64 O O O O O
O 0 ~33 33 O O O O
O O O -17 -48 O O O
O O O O 49 O O O
O O 70 O O O O, O
O O 62 O O 0 O O
O O 47 O O O 0 O
O 25 38 0 ~23 O O 0

Table 14.

Reproduced factor correlations for Study
(decimals omitted)

509 514 505 504 503 510 508 512

24 81 32 14 ~6 1 -3 22
100 33 13 6 ~2 O ~1 9
33 100 39 17 ~7 1 ~4 27
13 39 100 ~48 ~48 31 ~24 7O
6 17 ~48 100 48 ~40 24 ~33
-2 ~7 -48 48 100 ~56 49 -34
O 1 31 ~40 ~56 100 ~27 22
~I ~4 ~24 24 49 -27 100 ~17
9 27 70 ~33 ~34 22 ~17 100
8 24 62 ~29 ~30 19 ~15 43
6 18 47 ~22 -23 15 ~11 33
14 42 59 ~25 ~43 24 ~21 41

506 507 501
O O O
0 O O
O O O
O O O
O O 0
O O O
O O 0
O O O
O O O
O O O
O O 0
O O O

3

506

20

24
62
~29
~30
19
~15
43
100
29
36

507

15

18
47
~22
~23
15
~11
33
29
100
28

501

34
14
42
59
~25
-43
24
~21
41
36
28
100

76
Tflfle 15.

Observed minus predicted correlations for Study 3
(decimals omitted)

502 509 514 505 504 503 510 508 512 506 507 501

502 O O O -5 ~18 ~3 ~7 ~1 7 -1 ~4 -10
509 O O 0 ~18 ~2 3 5 ~4 3 ~5 ~23 13
514 O O O 0 O ~7 ~14 -6 ~8 ~9 -25 2
505 ~5 ~18 O O O 0 ~18 12 O O O 0
504 ~18 -2 O O O O O ~4 ~1 12 8 4
503 ~3 3 ~7 O O 0 O O ~6 6 ~5 ~2
510 ~7 5 -14 ~18 O O 0 1 ~10 ~2 ~2 ~6
508 ~1 ~4 ~6 12 ~4 O 1 O 20 4 ~2 13
512 7 3 ~8 O ~1 ~6 ~10 20 O ~1 11 11
506 ~1 ~5 ~9 O 12 6 ~2 4 ~1 0 ~14 ~9
507 -4 -23 ~25 O 8 ~5 ~2 ~2 11 ~14 0 ~12

501 ~10 13 2 O 4 ~2 ~6 13 11 ~9 ~12 0
THE SUM OF SOUARED DEVIATIONS 18 0.50

x2812.21 df=66~17849 p).50

In the reproduction of the correlations from the
path diagram, the estimated correlation from the model
depends on the length of the causal paths which go into
that estimate. The longer the causal path, the greater
the cumulated error in the estimate of the predicted
correlation. For a sample size of 147 and using the
average reliability of .60, the standard error of each
correlation should be about .15 if the model fit the
data exactly and all errors were due to sampling error.
The path diagram shown in Figure 3 provides a
reasonable fit with the data of Study Three. The
Chi-square for the matrix in Table 15 is 12.21 (df=49
p).50) which suggests no significant departure from

model predictions. It should be noted that the diagram

77

shown in Figure 3 is not necessarily the only diagram
which would fit the available data. In theory, there
could be many alternate diagrams which could also
provide an adequate fit. There is currently no
methodology which can develop all possible well-fitting
diagrams, nor is there a statistical means of
determining a best-fitting diagram. The diagram
presented here constitutes one interpretation of the
data available. The fact that the path analysis shows
this diagram to fit the data indicates that this
interpretation is not contradicted by the data.

The Voicer/nonvoicer distinction is an exogenous
variable in this model, i.e. a variable which is causal
for the other variables but not caused by them. This
is in keeping with the objectives of this study which
sought to determine consequences of the voicing
phenomenon rather than antecedents. The model also
shows that most of the effects of the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction are channeled through the Active head
factor. This suggests that the characteristics which
were believed to be related to voicers were the more
direct result of the Active head factor which was, in
turn, largely the product of the Voicer/nonvoicer
factor.

The path diagram suggests that being a voicer

directly influences whether or not a person experiences

78

some kind of "talking going on in my head". This is
even more the case if they had had an imaginary
childhood playmate. This internalized voicing, along
with a need for approval and a tendency to be
rule-bound, appears to slow down the decision-making
process. The internalized voicing also directly
affects the need for approval. Both the indecisiveness
and the enhanced need for approval were characteristics
which had been noted in voicers in general, and it was
no surprise to see them related to the phenomenon thus
in the data. It was somewhat surprising, however, to
see the positive relationship between voicing and
social dominance, rulebreaking, bluffing and arguing.
Up to this point, the emphasis had been on viewing the

voicing phenomenon as a manifestation of a hostile and

domineering superego-like function. The major
characteristics observed had been those of
indecisiveness, submissiveness, insecurity and the

like. Now the data shows the presence of a substantial
minority of what might be termed dominant voicers.
These are people who experience the voicing phenomenon
yet have a low need for approval. They feel confident
and secure in social situations, even to the point of
enjoying arguments and bluffing for their own sake.
This character pattern of a self-assured voicer was not

anticipated.

79

A number of theories could serve to explain the
self-assured voicer. Such a character pattern could be
the result of a maturation of the hostile, accusing
voice into a more helpful and supportive one. This
supportive voice could then serve as a foundation of
inner strength and security. Another possibility is
that the individual has reached some kind of
accomodation with the hostile voice, turning its
criticism outward and adopting its tyrannical nature.
Yet another possibility which would fit the data is
that the self-assured voicer and the submissive voicer
are but two aspects of each individual voicer, with the
relative proportions of dominance and submissiveness

varying over time.

Conclusions

The search for consequent variables was
considerably more fruitful than that for antecedent
variables. Most of the variables which had been
hypothesized to correlate with the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction did so. Furthermore, the path analysis
indicated that the voicer/nonvoicer distinction is, in
fact, causally antecedent to the other variables. This
supports the supposition which had begun this study,
that there was a phenomenon of conscious experience

which meaningfully separated people into two groups and

80

which was the cause of a number of observable
characteristics. The voicer/nonvoicer distinction
determines the extent to which a person experiences
active internal voicing. This, in turn, has a
significant effect upon their levels of need for
approval, ability to make quick decisions, tendency
towards bluffing and being argumentative, willingness
to confront authority figures and self-consciousness.
The positive correlations with social dominance,
rulebreaking, bluffing and arguing provided a new
development in the study of the voicer/nonvoicer
distinction. The data appear to indicate two groups
among voicers, one which is rather shy and retiring and
another which is more assertive. The presence of a
significant number of assertive voicers had not been
suspected prior to this study, and suggests even more
strongly that the voicer/nonvoicer distinction does not
represent an impedement to effective behavior, but

rather a channel or style by which character develops.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

This project began with an observation of what
seemed to be a phenomenon of conscious thought shared
by only a part of the population. This distinction
between people may be described as the experiencing of
thought as a dialogue for some and as a monologue for
others. The dialogue of conscious thought is often
portrayed as an internal voice, an aspect of the self
which advises and/or berates the individual. For
voicers, those who experience the internal voice,
conscience is an explicit conscious phenomenon. The
internal voice typically uses the second person form of
address, is not voluntarily called into being, and is
not voluntarily silenced. For nonvoicers, those who do
not experience an internal voice, conscience is an
abstract concept. There is no internal dialogue, no
inner verbal experience referring to them in the second
person. It is not uncommon for the nonvoicer to
experience periods in which there is no conscious
verbal thought, while this is most unusual for the
voicer. Once this distinction was observed, it became
possible to describe it to others and establish that

81

82

people seemed able to identify strongly with one or the
other of the types of thought, but not both.

The goals of these studies were twofold: to
provide a means of measuring the presence or absence of
the phenomenon in a given individual, thus showing both
that it exists and that it is not universally
experienced, and to establish some connections between
the phenomenon and other variables to provide some
direction for future research.

I The first of these goals met with clear success,
and the ability to distinguish between voicers and
non-voicers on the basis of a fairly brief
paper-and-pencil, self-identification questionnaire is
well established. Voicers and non-voicers make the
respective self-identifications reliably and with a
strong sense of certainty regarding their decision.
Furthermore, the college population appears to be
roughly evenly split between voicers and non-voicers.

The second of the goals, that of making an initial
connection between the voicer/non-voicer dimension and
other relevent variables, met with mixed results. No
factor was found which seemed to be a determinant of
the voicing phenomenon, but a number of factors were'
shown to be dependent on this dimension.

Efforts to identify the voicing as a particularly

hostile introjected object failed to do so. Voicers

83

were no more likely to identify their parents (or
either parent) as hostile or angry than were
non-voicers. This may be due to some form of
compensation to provide a balancing of the introjected
parent. It appears more likely, however, that there is
simply no real difference between voicers and
non-voicers in terms of the harshness of their parents:
that the voicing phenomenon is not “created by“ an
unusually severe parent, but is rather a natural
occurence which, when present, may well use the
parental anger and harshness as a model for its action.
In the absence of the voicing, the parental anger and
harshness simply takes on a more abstract form within
the psychic structure. Similarly, efforts to identify
the voicing as a consequence of lonely, unhappy or
traumatic childhood did not succeed. The
voicer/non-voicer dimension appeared to be independent
of all the antecedent variables measured. It is thus
not clear at this time whether the voicing phenomenon
is biologically determined, genetically determined,
environmentally determined, or determined by some
combination of all of these.

Though no determining factors were found for the
voicer/non-voicer dimension, the dimension was found to
be a causal factor for a number of other variables.

The voicing is related in childhood to having an

84

imaginary playmate and in adulthood to internal
verbalizations and constant mental activity. Voicers
appear to split into two groups, one group dependent,
self-conscious and unsure of themselves, having
difficulty making decisions and facing authority
figures, and the other group feeling more secure,
socially dominant, decisive and prone to being

argumentative and not governed by rules.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH

The factors which produce the voicer/nonvoicer
dimension are still unknown. It is unlikely that these
factors are as simple as the presence or absence of
angry parents, or the relative happiness of one’s
childhood. It seems equally unlikely, however, that
there would be no connection between the
internalization of early objects and at least the
nature and quality which characterizes a person’s
internal voice. Several possible approaches into this
concern are possible. The use of a more extensive
life-history questionnaire would provide a more
conclusive statement regarding the correlations between
the voicer/nonvoicer dimension and the variables of
early life. From the reports of voicers who state that
they have experienced the phenomenon for as long as

they can remember, and from the work of Klein who so

85

firmly places the development of superego functioning
in the first few years of life, it seems reasonable to
focus on the events of these first few years as the
likely factors involved in the origin of the
distinction between voicers and nonvoicers. One line
of approach might be to follow a life-history
questionnaire of subjects who have responded to the
voicer/nonvoicer instrument with a survey of their
parents seeking information regarding the subject’s
temperament as an infant. This data might also prove
useful in determining possible reasons for the observed
split among the voicers between the insecure and the
socially dominant types.

If there are biological factors involved in the
development of the voicer/nonvoicer dimension, then
they are likely to be somewhat difficult to uncover
since the current instrument can be used effectively
only on young adults and the biological factors
involved would be working in early infancy. A genetic
study could be run which would administer the
voicer/nonvoicer instrument to members of a family
tree. A broader range of subjects should also be run
to determine if there are any racial or ethnic
precursors to the voicing phenomenon. The subject
population of these studies was above average in

intellegence, and this factor, too, should be

86

considered as being potentially related to the
development of the voicer/nonvoicer dimension.
Finally, it would be possible to include the
voicer/nonvoicer instrument in among the tests in
longitudinal studies starting in early infancy, or
simply to seek out the subject populations of such
studies and administer the instrument separately from
the study. Assuming that access to the original data
of such a longitudinal study could be obtained, it
would be possible to test some of the hypotheses
connecting early infancy to the presence of the voicing
phenomenon in adults.

There are more clear-cut lines of research opened
in terms of expanding and enhancing the network of
variables which are affected by the voicer/nonvoicer
dimension. Of particular interest would be the
clarifying of the characteristics which distinguish the
insecure voicers from the socially dominant ones.
Having established a “beachhead' of sorts, it is
somewhat easier to begin to tie in the voicer/nonvoicer
dimension with existing research instruments. Prior to
the last of the three studies in this project, choosing
any instrument, such as the MMPI or the 16 PF, seemed
to risk getting nonsignificant and/or uninterpretable
results, in part due to the ambiguity of the scales

themselves. The desire to “nail down" at least some

87

aspects of the voicer/nonvoicer dimension led to the
development of a new questionnaire probing directly at
variables determined from subjective observation. With
some of these variables now confirmed by the new data,
it should be easier to relate the results of more
formalized instruments to the constellation of factors
resulting from the voicer/nonvoicer dimension.

An area of particular interest not directly
covered in these studies is the relationship of guilt
to the voicer/nonvoicer dimension. There is certainly
a relation, if only in content and character, between
the voicing phenomenon and the more traditional
concepts of conscience. This leads readily to the
question of whether there are two forms of conscience,
that experienced by voicers and that experienced by
nonvoicers. If conscience, and by extension guilt, are
not unimodal concepts but rather divided into
voicer-conscience/guilt and nonvoicer-conscience/guilt,
then there might be considerable variation in the
individual response to “guilt inducing“ situations. If
such variation exists, then there would need to be a
reworking of some of the theoretical formulations
surrounding conscience and guilt. One such formulation
made by Mowrer(1970) suggests that the sociopath-normal
dichotomy needs to be expanded to include sociopaths,

normals, and neurotic normals (i.e. people with

88

conscience who nevertheless commit crimes). The
presence of voicers who are rulebreakers, though not
apparently neurotic, might produce a fourth category.
The presence of nonvoicers, potentially lacking a
conscience in the traditional sense, who fail to commit
crimes based on enlightened self-interest may produce
yet another category. In either case, the addition of
the voicer/nonvoicer dimension serves to enhance the
descriptive nature of such theories and, in combination
with data relating the voicer/nonvoicer dimension other
aspects of social behavior, may help to link .these

theories with observed behavior.

CONCLUSION

what began as a chance observation has resulted in
the demonstration of a dimension of human experience
which has been previously overlooked, yet one which
exists as a causal factor for a number of personality
characteristics. It describes a fundamental aspect of
conscious experience which is present from early

childhood through adult life. Its existence poses

serious questions for traditional approaches to
cognitive structure and the mechanisms of
internalization and introjection. The differences

between voicers and nonvoicers suggest the need to

question the assumption that everyone experiences

89

consciousness in much the same way, and they offer some
new perspectives on a broad range of human experiences,
most especially those of conscience and guilt. The
voicer/nonvoicer distinction provides some insights
into potential communication problems, especially over
issues of internal experiences, and gives some new
meanings to previously "common" terms.

This thesis is only a beginning into the research
of a basic characteristic of human conscious thought.
The three studies reported herein provide future
researchers with a ready means of measuring the
voicer/nonvoicer distinction, and give some initial
indications of the relationship of this variable to

other personality characteristics.

Appendix A

The Study 1 Instrument

90

A DISCOVERY ABOUT CMSCIWSHESS

i would like to share a discovery that was made about two years ago. Two
people were talking and the first Joklngly made a reference to some naughty thing
the second might do. "Oh. i couldn’t do that," the second replied. "my conscience
would torture ms for days. it would just call me names for hours on and.” The
first person was curious about this and initiated a long conversation in which both
made a startling discovery. The first person learned that the second did have an
internal voice and could discuss matters with this voice. The second was astounded
to learn that the first person had no such voice and experienced thinking as a
conscious. nonverbal, "silent" process of internal thought generation. The closest
the first person ever came to having a voice was in the act of mentally playing a
role or practicing a speech, but this subvocsiizstion was very different in
character from the second's internal voice.

Over the next two years. both people discretely questioned their closest
friends to determine whether others did or did not have internal voices that
"talked to than.“ The number of people smnplsd was very small. less than twenty
people. but there were sane interesting correlates. About half of the people ques-
tioned reported having an internal voice and half reported none. People with an
internal voice, "voicers". indicated that the voice is nearly always active. except
when they are engaged in reading or other similarly engrossing thought. Smoothing
is always "going on" in their minds. for they are either intently thinking or they
are listening to or interacting with their voice. 0n the other hand. the people
without an internal voice. "non-voicers". often experience periods where their
minds are just blank. with nothing going on at a conscious level. When the internal
voice exists. it can be of any sex; there can be more than one internal voice. or
the internal voice may take on different attitudes; the internal voice can be a
"conscience" (Judging), "friend" (supportive), or s"davii" (gosdingiz the female
voicers tended to report more constant activity of their internal voices while the
male voicers reported distinct activity only in times of worry or stress; voicers
could not recall ever not having an internal voice: voicers regard the internal
voice as important to than and as one of the control features of their mental life.
Hon-voicers give the appearance of being somewhat more rationally minded than
voicers. though they are not free frat irrationality; voicers give the appearance
of being more intuitively minded than non-voicers. though not exclusively so.

i wonder whether while reading this you have cons to feel yourself associated
to some extent with either of these groups. Please bear in mind that all of the
abovsmentionsd “facts" are really no more than generalizations made from s very
small sample. For any really meaningful stats-unto to be mods. it is essential
that a larger sample be measured. This is why i me coming to you now with s ststs~
msnt and a request.

STATEMENT: There appears to be an aspect of himsn mental life which is not the
smns for all people, but separates them into two groups. The members of one group
have lived with and had as an integral part of their existence on internal voice.
They can. for instance. very naturally view conscience as a real thing, speaking to
than or advising them from within their own minds and view feeling guilty as a
period of chastismasnt and berating by the voice. The members of the other group
have lived without any such partner or sux'lillsry cognitive process. Conscience
to than would be simply an abstract set of ethical and moral bsilsfs. and feeling
guilty would be a period of general distress. Heithsr group is "abnormal"; voicers
are not hailuclnstlng and non-voicers are not deficient. Hslthsr group is "better"
or "worse" than the other, they are simply different.

REQUEST: it is understood that examining ons's msntsl life is at ths smns time
exciting and sensitive. Vlth this in mind, i ask you to help me by filling out ths
questionnaire ss openly and honestly as possible. Confidentiality will be msin-
talnsd, but we ask that you include your nuns and phone Mber so that we might
contact you later for more information. If anything not on the questionnaire seams
relevant to you in regard to this issue. please include it in the space indicated.

91

INTERNQL VOICE QUESTIONNAIRE

If you had to answer one way or the other, would you say you were a:

 

 

Uoicer ......... Non-voicer---------
How confident are you about your answer?
Very confident l 2 3 4 5 Not at all confident
Sex: Male---- Female--
Date of birth: Month--- Day----- Year ----- .-
Order of birth (first born, second, etc.):--------
Number of children in family:---------

Ethnic background (racial, national. etc.):
Religious background:
Profession (if student, major and year):
If you had to memorize a compley chemical formula, would you rather:
develop an image of the relationships between the various elemerts of
the formula
invent various memory tricks te.g. mnemonics) to help remember it
memorize the formula by rote, as it is given
How would you rate the following in terms of your childhood?

 

 

 

Parents very strict l 2 3 4 5 Parents very permissive
Much family interaction 1 2 3 4 5 Min. family interaction
Very emotive i 2 3 4 5 Not at all emotive
Religion stressed l 2 3 4 5 Religion ignored
Solitary 1 2 3 4 5 Many friends

Very happy 1 2 3 4 5 Very unhappy

Uery self-critical i 2 3 4 5 Not at all self-critical

How would you rate the following in terms of your current life?
Much family interaction 1 5 Min. family interaction

 

 

 

 

2 3 4

Very emotive l 2 3 4 5 Not at all emotive

Religion stressed i 2 3 4 5 Religion ignored

Solitary i 2 3 4 5 Many friends

Very happy i 2 3 4 5 Very unhappy

Very self-critical l 2 3 4 5 Not at all self-critical
Did you have an imaginary childhood playmate? Yes------ No- -
Are you often tempted to speak aloud to yourself? Yes No
(OPTIUWAL: if yov are willing to be included in a follow-up study)

Name Phone

Address

 

If there are any ideas, facts or questions which you feel are relevent to this
study, please write them on the back of this questionnaire.

If your answer to the first question was “Non-voicer", you have completed this
questionnaire. Thank you very much.

VOICERS: How many voices would you say you had?

is there a speCific gender (male or female) to your voices? If so, what is it?
How would you characterize your voice?
what kinds of things are said, and in what tone of voice?

Has the nature of your voice or your interaction with it changed over the years?
If yes, in what way?

is there any time your voice is more likely to manifest itself? if yes. when?
If no, because it is generally always apparent or because it is rarely apparent?

sThe singular of voice will be used throughout to save time. grammar, and our
typist. Thank you very much.

Appendix B

The Study 2 Instrument

922

la friend and l have been studying and arguing about certain mental
processes. in are now ready to quit studying our close friends and ask how
things appear to other people. He have put together this survey which des-
cribes what we are looking at. Our perceptions and descriptions differ
slightly, and there are, therefore. three separate descriptions enclosed.
Please read the descriptions. bearing in mind that they are all attempting
to describe the same phenomenon. All three of the write-ups ask you whether
you can identify with the described phenomenon. so would like you to
respond to the descriptions in two ways. After you read each description,
classify yourself on the basis of your reading of that description only. Then
after reading all three descriptions classify yourself again on the basis
of your overall understanding. If, after reading all of them, you are
still unable to identify yourself. I would like to discuss the concept with
you for a few minutes if you would be willing to give me your phone umber.
Any questions or comments on this survey or on the phenomenon would be most

appreciated cmy phone number is 485-5151 after 5:00).

mm: sou s. .
/'/

92%-

len Selrman

93

A.DI$COVEI! AJOUT CONSCIOUS THOUGHT

It has been generally believed that the experience of conscious thought
is essentially the same for everyone. Recent evidence, however. seams to in-
dicats that there is at least one aspect of conscious thought which is not the
same for all people and separates than into two groups: the two ways people
experience conscious thought appear to be quite distinct. Hhat follows are
descriptions of the two modes of thought, but please keep in mind that these
descriptions are based on a fairly small group of people and may be inaccurate
to some degree. Although statements are phrased as fact, remember that they
are really tentative conclusions and observations drawn from a small sampling
of the population. Also be aware that one description is likely to seem familiar.
while the other may appear foreign, alien, or even provoke incredulity.

The people of one group experience conscious thought as a nonverbalired
process by which concepts are juggled, merged, redefined and reordered, out of
which are produced conclusions and new views. Thinking is a real process but
is not readily subject to description, as it is a flow of concepts and relations
which, though usually governed by rules of logic and reason. is not generally
perceived as a step-by-step operation. It is difficult for a member of this
group to examine the thinking at a given moment because the train of thought
becomes interrupted by such introspection and cannot be easily put into words.
Values are frequently held as subjective constructs, established by decision,
rather than by any sense of an objective absolute. "Conscience" refers to an
abstract set of ethical and moral beliefs, and guilt is perceived as a general
feeling of distress. The members of this group often experience periods where
there is no particular line of thought. especially conscious verbal thought,
going through their minds. In response to the question, "Uhat are you thinking
about?" they may. in all honesty and candor, answer, "Nothing," although some
may say instead, ”Oh. hundreds of things." Both are true in that there is no
single topic, theme, or subject occupying their conscious minds at the time.
yet they are aware of their surroundings and current events. There is an impor-
tant difference for this group between thinking and verbalization of thought.
Since the single strongest characteristic of this process is its nonverbal
nature. it is called implicit conscious thought.

‘The members of the other group experience conscious thought as a clearly
verbal process, i.e.. one which is carried out in a word-by-word fashion.
Several distinct lines of thought may occur at the same time producing a
multiplicity of perspectives, positions and attitudes regarding any subject
under consideration. Thinking is a real process and can be described readily,
but difficulty often arises over the fact that there are actually several
thoughts running on parallel tracks simultaneously, sometimes taking the form
of an internal dialogue. lach track is a logical process, but the conclusions
drawn on one track do not necessarily prevent contradictory conclusions being
drawn at the same time on other tracks. Hhile introspection of the thinking
process may disrupt one or more lines of thought. it is not generally dis-
ruptive to the process itself. Since the thinking is done on a verbal level.
a train of thought can quite easily be put into words by members of this group.
Values are frequently held as having an absolute nature, although competing
values can both be held at once. Conscience is often experienced as one of
the "voices” in their dialogue speaking to them or advising them from within
their own minds. Peeling guilty is typically perceived as a period of internal
chastisement from such a voice or parallel thoughttrsck. It is not unusual
for a thought track to be uncomfortable to the individual and to spontaneously

94

take on a kind of independent existence, i.e., the individual feels unable to
stop the thought or ignore its presence. Although there are restful periods,
the members of this group rarely, if ever, fail to experience at least one
distinct train of thought at any given time. There is generally some kind of
background thinking, e.g., music or counting, which is nearly always active.
Por this group, thinking and internal verbalization of thought are the same
process; the characteristic of this group is a verbalised, multitracked thought
process which is frequently experienced as an internal dialogue. Since the
single strongest characteristic of this process is its verbal nature, it is
called explicit conscious thought.

I wonder whether, while reading this, you have come to feel yourself
associated to some extent with either of these groups. You may feel that you
belong, in some ways, to both groups. It is true that everyone uses both
implicit and explicit conscious thought to some degree, but they can be
separated into groups because one or the other processing style will be dominant
for each individual. Each person uses one style very naturally and without
conscious effort, while the other style will feel somewhat less natural and
require more conscious direction and control. Please remember that all of the
abovedmentioned "facts" are no more than generalizations made from a very
small sample. For any really meaningful statements to be made, it is essen-
tial that a larger sample be measured. This is why l as coming to you now with
the following statement and request.

STATEMENT: There appears to be two types of conscious functioning, and
for each person one type seems to predominate, separating people into two groups.
The members of one group think primarily in a nonverbal manner and thus find
it difficult to delineate exactly their trains of thought, hence they are
said to have implicit conscious thought (lCT). The members of the other group
think primarily in a highly verbalised manner and have very little difficulty
delineating their trains of thought, hence they are said to have explicit
conscious thought (BCT). Neither group is "abnormal:" people with ICT are
not laking rigor or accuracy; people with ECT are not lacking depth, nor are
their dialogues or internal voices hallucinations. lsither group is ”better"
or "worse" than the other, they are simply different.

REQUEST: It is understood that examining one's mental life is at the same
time exciting and sensitive. With this in mind, I ask you to help me by
filling out the questionnaire as openly and honestly as possible. Confiden-
tiality will of course be maintained, but 1 ask that you include your name,
address and phone number if you are'willing to be contacted later for more

information. Please feel free to include your comments or ideas on the
back of the form.

ggestions:
1. low that you have read this description, how‘would you classify your mode
of thought:
[If U '
lxplicit Conscious Thought Implicit Conscious Thought

2. low confident do you feel about this judgement?

U U U L7 U
very

sure hesitant doubtful just
guessing

95

A 018M331 AIOUT CONSCIUCE

Priends:

1 would like to share a discovery with you that I made about two years ago. One
afternoon I was sitting and talking to Martha 1 , and l jokingly made a
reference to some naughty thing that she might do. lisrtha replied, "Oh, I
couldn't do that, my conscience would torture me for days." At that reference
to "torture" my curiosity was piqued and I asked her, "lihat do you mean by
torturel What exactly does go on in your head when your conscience tortures
you?" And then she told me the most astounding things that I have ever heard
(though about half of you will not be surprised): She said, "lie would just
call me awful names for hours on end." And that floored me because what I
understood her to say was that she heard a little voice in her head that talked
to her. And, after a long conversation, this turned out to be exactly true:

her conscience was a distinct male voice that would spew out a stream of insults
such as "filthy, worthless, dirty, ungrateful, etc."

Then, after awhile, I made a confession to hartha that stunned her as much as
her's had surprised me. I told her that I had never heard any kind of voice

in my head, not mine, not anybody's (though about half of you will not be
surprised to hear that). To me the word "conscience" has never been any

more than a metaphor for "thinking about the ethical consequences of an act."
And by "thinking" I mean a silent process of internal thought generation.

Only if I am playing a role or practicing a lecture do I engage in the subvocal
speech that sounds to me like my own voice speaking (which, of course, it is).
Hertha asked me, "no you mean that your head is just blank with nothing going'
on?" And I replied that was often true, though silent thought is still thought.

In the two years since then 1 have been slowly checking through everyme that

I know well enough to ask such a personal question. Pirst, I told my wife
about Hertha. And Ronda said, "Of course, everybody has a conscience." And

1 said, "but you mean a little voice in your head that is always talking to
you?" She said, "is doesn't always talk, only when he wants to tell me what to
do or what to say or what not to do or what to be afraid of or...." After

she really started listening, for the next several months, she told me that

he only shuts up if she is reading or doing a lot of heavy thinking (i.e.,-
math problmns or related introspection, etc.). Otherwise, her head is rarely
blank, one of th- is almost always talking.

All in all, about half my friends have "little voices" that talk to th- in
their heads. and half of my friends do not. Some of those who have "little
voices" have voices of the opposite sex, some have voices of the same sex, and
some say that they can't really tell. bong my friends, women are more likely
to have a little voice, and those women who do have a little voice say that it
is frequently vocal. lily male friends are more likely to say that their little
voice only cause out in times of stress or worry, when they get messages such
as "You can‘t do that, that's terrible," or "if you weren't so stupid, you
would have had that thesis done months ago." Everyone who I've met who has a
little voice says that it goes as far back in time as they can r-ember
(including my son, who at 5 could not rssmnber not having a little voice).

96

lor is the development a simple matter of family. Hy son has a little voice
but my daughter does not. And, by the way, some people have more than one
little voice. They have a little "devil" as well as a "conscience," i.e.,
some people hear a little voice that eggs them on to try new and "scary" or
"be " things that might be fun or might bring pleasure. In any case, almost
everyone who had a little voice regards it as important to than (whether for
good or for ill) and as one of the central feature of their mental life.

Are people without little voices more rational? Among the msall and highly
select set of people that are my imediate friends the answer is "yes."

Those of us without little voices are much less susceptible to extreme mood
shifts, and are much less likely to be blatantly inconsistent with our values
from one time to another. After all, there is only one voice to speak to

our affairs. In particular, from the sample that I've known, those of us who
have no little voice are much less likely to get angry, very much less likely.
But, on the other hand, during the last 2 years 1 have gotten angry at people
whom I've never met (such as Richard Nixon and the people who went to censor
violence from TV and....), I've worried over future events that are outside

my power to control ("They never publish anything of mine"). I have furiously
overworked, and then been highly depressed because I overwork, etc. So, I

too on subject to irrational notional states, to acting for the moment against
my own long-term interests, to making thoughtless remarks, and all the other
foibles of other members of the human race. It's just that I don't have a
little voice to tell me "You shouldn't feel like that, that's bad," or "You
should call your parents more often, you ungrateful child," or "How dare they
do that to you? liho do they think they are?" You don't have to take that
crap...." Instead, I simply go through life alone.

All ANNOUNCMT

On the basis of my experience, 1 do know that l have two momentous announce-
ments to make. First, to those who have no little voice. Lots of people
"hear" a little voice which tells th- what they should do, what they should
not do, and whether their past acts and feelings are good or bad. Purthermore,
this is no hallucination. These people know perfectly well that the little
voice is inside their head and that no one else can hear it. noreover, they
are perfectly normal people. You can easily live 13 years with one and never
guess what's going on inside their head. They never stop to tell you about

the little voice because "everyone has one" and, when they do refer to it, they
call it "I" or 'hs," etc.

To those of you who have a little voice (or more): lots of us don't. If you
ask a person what he's thinking and he says "nothing" it may be true. If

a person tells you, "I never feel guilty about the past," or "I rarely get
angry," or "I get annoyed, but I never get mad" then there is a very good
chance that he is telling the simple truth. There are a lot of us who have
no true conscience in the old-fashioned sense of the word. Yet we are not
uncontrollable beasts or monsters. I may be pretty weird, but I have a friend
without a little voice who is impeccably conservative in dress and life style,
and who is described by everyone as "warm, soft-hearted, and friendly."

9*?

THE NEED FOR IISEARCB

There is only one statement above which is beyond doubt. There are two kinds
of people; i.e., those who have a little voice and those who do not. Every
other statement above is based on the unsystmpatic study of fewer than 20
people. And those people are all either my close friends or friends of my
close friends and do not even begin to approach a random sample of Americans,
much less humanity at large.

Thus, virtually every question that there is to ask about the little voice or
its absence is still completely unanswered. If some of the crude hypotheses
that 1 stated above seem more than tentative, than I apologise for my writing
style. I am enthusiastically interested in the answers and like most people,
I tend to overrate the generality of my experience.

VB RANT YOU
And, so we come to you, dear friend. we would like to know where you stand
on this question and we would like to know anything that you might think.might

be relevant about yourself in regard to this issue. So, if you will and can,
we would dearly love to have you fill out our questionnaire.

Qgestions:

1. from what you have read above, would you say that some of your thoughts
take the form of an internal "voice"?

C7 U

I hear an internal "voice" I have had no such experience
2. how confident do you feel about this judgement?

v£E§ sé;z’ heségznt douétful jé§Z
sure guessing

98

A DISCOVERY ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS

1 would like to share a discovery that was made about two years ago.

Two people were talking and the first jokingly made a reference to some naughty
thing the second might do. "Oh, I couldn't do that," the second replied,

"my conscience would torture me for days. It would just call me names for hours
on and." The first person was curious about this and initiated a long conver-
sation in which both made a startling discovery. The first person learned

that the second did have an internal voice and could discuss matters with this
voice. The second was astounded to learn that the first person had no such
voice and experienced thinking as a conscious, nonverbal, "silent" process of
internal thought generation. The closest the first person ever came to having
a voice was in the act of mentally playing a role or practicing a speech, but
this subvocalization was very different in character from the second's internal
voice.

Over the next two years, both people discretely questioned their closest
friends to determine whether others did or did not have internal voices that
"talked to than." The ember of people sampled was very small, less than 20
people, but there were some interesting correlates. About half of the people
questioned reported having an internal voice and half reported none. People
with an internal voice, "voicers," indicated that the voice is nearly always
active, except when they are engaged in reading or other similarly engrossing
thought. Something is always "going on" in their minds, for they are either
intently thinking or they are listening to or interacting with their voice.

On the other hand, the people without an internal voice, "nondvoicers," often
experience periods where their minds are just blank, with nothing going on at

a conscious level. iihen the internal voice exists, it can be of any sex:

there can be more than one internal voice, or the internal voice may take on
different attitudes; the internal voice can be a "conscience" (judging).
"friend" (supportive), or a "devil" (goading): the fuels voicers tended to
report more constant activity of their internal voices while the male voicers
reported distinct activity only in times of worry or stress: voicers could

not recall ever not having an internal voice; voicers regard the internal voice
as important to them and as one of the central features of their mental life.
Ion-voicers give the appearance of being somewhat more rationally minded than
voicers, though they are not free from irrationality; voicers give the appear-
ance of being more intuitively minded than non-voicers, though not exclusively so.

I wonder whether while reading this you have come to feel yourself associated
to some extent with either of these groups. Please bear in mind that all of
the above-mentioned "facts" are really- no more than generalizations made from
a very small sample. Por any really meaningful statements to be made, it is
essential that a larger sample be measured. This is why I am coming to you
now with a stat-sent and a request.

STATEMENT: There appears to be an aspect of lumen mental life which is
not the same for all people, but separates than into two groups. The members
of one group have lived with and had as an integral part of their existence
an internal voice. They can, for instance, very naturally view conscience as
a real thing, speaking to them or advising them from within their own minds
and view feeling guilty as a period of chastisement and berating by the voice.
The embers of the other group have lived without any such partner or auxil-
iary cognitive process. Conscience to them would be simply an abstract set of

-2-

ethical and moral beliefs, and feeling guilty would be a period of general
distress. Neither group is "abnormal:" voicers are not hallucinating and
non-voicers are not deficient. Neither group is "better" or 'hiorse" than
the other, they are simply different.

REQUEST: It is understood that examining one's mental life is at the
same time exciting and sensitive. liith this in mind, I ask you to help me
by filling out the questionnaire as openly and honestly as possible.

Questions:
1. Now that you have read this description, how would you classify yourself?

C7 [.7

Voicer Nonvoicer
2. low confident do you feel about this judgment?
very sure hesitant doubtful just
sure guessiu

Qgestions About Overall Assessment
You have now read three descriptions of the same phenomenon with three
sets of labels.

1. flow would you characterise your own mode of thought?

£7 C7

x

{plicit conscious thought Eplicit conscious thought
Internal voice No internal voice
Voicer Ion-voicer

2. Row confident do you feel about this judgmaent?

U L7 U
very sure hesitant doubtful just
sure guessing

3. ilhich label do you prefer for yourself?

1(10

-3-

4. Vhich description.was most helpful in figuring out what we are talking about?
A) A.Oiscovery about Conscience

b) A Discovery about Consciousness
C) A Discovery about Conscious Thought
O) Combination of the above (please specify):
5. lie would like to see any criticism that we might use in writing a new

description of the phenomenon.

(a) Do you think any of the descriptions were particularly vague?

(b) no you think any of the descriptions was either derogatory or
complementary in tone?

(c) *** Nest important *** Is there anything important that was
left out of all three descriptions?

(d) Any other comments on the descriptions?

101

stocmszm quasrtoss

Your sex: tale __ P-alen.

Date of birth: Nonth Year
Iirth order in family (let a 5, 2nd ’of 7, only child, etc):

 

Ethnic background (national, racial):

 

Religious background:

 

Profession (if student, major and year):

 

If you had to mmsorise a complex chenical formula on short notice, which method
would you be most successful usiu?

Develop an image of the relationships between the various elesents

of the formula

Invent memory tricks (e.g., mn-onics)
Namorize the formula as given by rate

 

Assime you are in a gift shop and want to buy a certain statue: there are
five of these statues on the shelf , identical in every respect including
color, sire, condition and price. liould you:
just take one off the shelf after, at most, a cursory check to make
certain they are the same
have trouble deciding snot; them and spend some time looking for
any criterion by which to choose one over the others
other (please specify)

 

Did you have an imaginary childhood playmate? Yes No
Are you often tmapted to speak aloud to yourself? Yes No

Now would you rate the following in terms of your childhood?

lather very strict l 2 5 4 5 Father very permissive
Nether very strict l 2 5 4 5 Nether very permissive
Pather often angry I 2 5 4 5 Tether rarely aury
Nether often angry I 2 5 4 5 Nether rarely angry
Self of ten angry l 2 5 4 5 Self rarely angry
Pather generally happy I 2 5 4 5 Pather generally unhappy
Nother generally happy I 2 5 4 5 Nether generally unhappy
Self generally happy 1 2 5 4 5 Self generally unhappy
Nuch family interaction 1 2 5 4 5 Ninimal family interaction
Religion stressed l 2 5 4 5 Religion ignored
Solitary l 2 5 4 5 Nsny friends
Generally successful I 2 5- 4 5 Generally unsuccessful
Very self-critical l 2 5 4 5 lot at all self-critical
Now would you rate the following in terms of your current life?
Nuch family interaction 1 2 5 4 5 Ninimal family interaction
Doing well in school I 2 5 4 5 Doing poorly in school
Self often angry I 2 5 4 5 Self rarely angry
Religion stressed l 2 5 4 5 Religion ignored
Solitary l 2 5 4 5 Nany friends
Very happy I 2 5 4 5 Very unhappy
Vary self-critical l 2 5 4 5 lot at all self-critical
Date often I 2 5 4 5 Date rarely

1(12

Does your thinking ever sees like an internal voice speakiu to you?
Yes No

 

Ifyes:
Soweanyvoiceswouldyousayyouhad?

 

 

Is there a specific gender (male or female) to your voice‘? If so what is
it?

 

 

 

E would you characterize your voice?

 

 

 

 

 

What kinds of things are said, and in what tons of voice?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sea the nature of your voice or your interaction with your voice changed
over the years? If yes, in what way?

 

 

 

 

 

 

latchers any time when your voice is more likely to manifest itself? If
yes, when?

 

 

 

If no. is it because it is generally always apparent or because it
is rarely apparent?

 

 

Rae the nature of your thinking process chewed over the years? If yes. in
what way?

 

 

 

 

 

 

OPTIONAL: ifyouarewillin tobeincludsdinafollow-up study
Name: Phone:

 

Address:

 

rammvmm

0 The singular of voice will be used throughout to save time, gran-er and our
typist.

Appendix C

The Study 3 Instrument

103

a ‘rlend and I have been studying and arguing aiout certain mental
processes. 3e are now ready to quit studying our close friends and ask
how things appear to other people. 3e have put together this survey
which describes what we are looking it. Our perceptions and descriptions
differ slightly, and there are, therefore, three separate descriptions
attached. Please read the descriptions, bearing in mind that they are all
attempting to describe the same phenomenon. All three of the write-ups
ask you whether you can identify with the described phenomenon. we would like
you to respond to the descriptions in two ways. After you read each description
classify yourself on the basis of your reading of that description only.
Then after reading all three descriptions classify yourself again on the basis
of your overall understanding. Following this is a questionnaire which we
would like you to complete to give us some additional information about
characteristics which might be related to the phenomenon.

Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you are free to
discontinue your participation at any time without rscrimination. All

results will be completely confidential and your anonymity will be preserved.

THANK YOU

27.4. see. 9t

Ran Salzman

If you have any question} or consents regarding this study, you may

contact me directly. Ny phone number is 485-5151 (after 5:30).

104

A DISCOVER! ABOUT CONSCIZNCB

Friends:

I would like to share a discovery with you that I made about two years ago. One
afternoon I was sitting and talking to Hartha In , and I jokingly made a
reference to some naughty thing that she might do. Hertha replied. "Oh, I
couldn't do that, my conscience would torture me for days." At that reference
to "torture" my curiosity was piqued and I asked her, "What do you mean by
torture? What exactly does go on in your head when your conscience tortures
you?" And then she told me the most astounding things that I have ever heard
(though about half of you will not be surprised): She said. "He would just
call me awful names for hours on end." And that floored me because what I
understood her to say was that she heard a little voice in her head that talked
to her. And, after a long conversation, this turned out to be exactly true:

her conscience was a distinct male voice that would spew out a stream of insults
such as "filthy, worthless. dirty. ungrateful. etc."

Then. after awhile, I made a confession to Martha that stunned her as much as
her's had surprised me. I told her that I had never heard any kind of voice

in my head. not mine, not anybody's (though about half of you will not be
surprised to hear that). To me the word "conscience" has never been any

more than a metaphor for "thinking about the ethical consequences of an act."
And by "thinking" I mean a silent process of internal thought generation.

Only if I am playing a role or practicing a lecture do I engage in the subvocal
speech that sounds to me like my own voice speaking (which, of course, it is).
Hertha asked me. ”Do you mean that your head is just blank.with nothing going
on?" And I replied that was often true, though silent thought is still thought.

In the two years since then I have been slowly checking through everyone that

I know well enough to ask such a personal question. first, I told my wife
about Martha. And Ionda said. “Of course. everybody has a conscience.” And

I said. ”but you mean a little voice in your head that is always talking to
you?" She said. ”He doesn't always talk. only when he wants to tell me what to
do or what to say or what not to do or what to be afraid of or...." After

she really started listening. for the neat several.months, she told me that

he only shuts up if she is reading or doing a lot of heavy thinking (i.e..-
math problems or related introspection. etc.). Otherwise. her head is rarely
blank, one of them is almost always talking.

All in all, about half my friends have ”little voices” that talk to them in
their heads, and half of my friends do not. Some of those who have "little
voices" have voices of the opposite sex, some have voices of the same sex. and
some say that they can't really tell. Among my friends, women are more likely
to have a little voice, and those women who do have a little voice say that it
is frequently vocal. Hy male friends are more likely to say that their little
voice only comes out in times of stress or worry, when they get messages such
as "You can't do that, that's terrible," or "If you weren't so stupid, you
would have had that thesis done months ago." Everyone who I've met who has a
little voice says that it goes as far back in time as they can remember
(including my son, who at 5 could not remember not having a little voice).

105

-2-

Nbr is the development a simple matter of family. My son has a little voice
but my daughter does not. And. by the way. some people have more than one
little voice. They have a little "devil" as well as a "conscience," i.e.,
some people hear a little voice that eggs them on to try new and "scary" or
"bad" things that might be fun or might bring pleasure. In any case, almost
everyone who had a little voice regards it as important to them (whether for
good or for ill) and as one of the central feature of their mental life.

Are people without little voices more rational? Among the small and highly
select set of people that are my immediate friends the answer is "yes."

Those of us without little voices are much less susceptible to extreme mood
shifts. and are much less likely to be blatantly inconsistent with our values
from one time to another. After all, there is only one voice to speak to

our affairs. In particular, from the sample that I've known, those of us who
have no little voice are much less likely to get angry, very much less likely.
But. on the other hand, during the last 2 years I have gotten angry at people
whom I've never met (such as Richard Nixon and the people who want to censor
violence from TV and....). I've worried over future events that are outside

my power to control ("They never publish anything of mine"). I have furiously
overworked, and then been highly depressed because I overwork, etc. So, I

too am subject to irrational emotional states. to acting for the moment against
my own long-term interests. to making thoughtless remarks, and all the other
foibles of other members of the human race. It's just that I don't have a
little voice to tell me "You shouldn't feel like that, that's bad." or ”You
should call your parents more often. you ungrateful child." or "how dare they
do that to you? Who do they think they are?" You don't have to take that
crap...." Instead. I simply go through life alone.

On the basis of my experience, I do know that I have two momentous announce-
ments to make. First, to those who have no little voice. Lots of people
"hear" a little voice which tells them what they should do, what they should
not do. and whether their past acts and feelings are good or bed. Furthermore,
this is no hallucination. These people know perfectly well that the little
voice is inside their head and that no one else can hear it. Moreover. they
are perfectly normal people. You can easily live 13 years with one and never
guess what's going on inside their head. They never stop to tell you about

the little voice because "everyone has one" and. when they do refer to it, they
call it "I" or "me," etc.

To those of you who have a little voice (or more): lots of us don't. If you
ask a person what he's thinking and he says "nothing" it may be true. If

a person tells you, "I never feel guilty about the past,” or "I rarely get
angry," or "I get annoyed, but I never get mad" than there is a very good
chance that he is telling the simple truth. There are a lot of us who have
no true conscience in the old-fashioned sense of the word. Yet we are not
uncontrollable beasts or monsters. I may be pretty weird, but I have a friend
without a little voice who is impeccably conservative in dress and life style.
and who is described by everyone as "warm, soft-hearted, and friendly."

106

-3-

TBZ NEED FOR RESEARCH

There is only one statement above which is beyond doubt. There are two kinds
of people; i.e., those who have a little voice and those who do not. Every
other statement above is based on the unsystematic study of fewer than 20
people. And those people are all either my close friends or friends of my
close friends and do not even begin to approach a random sample of Americans.
much less humanity at large.

Thus, virtually every question that there is to ask about the little voice or
its absence is still completely unanswered. If some of the crude hypotheses
that I stated above seem more than tentative, then I apologise for my writing
style. I am enthusiastically interested in the answers and like most people.
I tend to overrate the generality of my experience.

9! “ANT TOO
And. so we come to you, dear friend. we would like to know where you stand
on this question and we would like to know anything that you might think.might

be relevant about yourself in regard to this issue. So, if you will and can.
we would dearly love to have you fill out our questionnaire.

tions:

1. From what you have read above. would you say that some of your thoughts
take the form of an internal "voice"?

L7 L7
I hear an internal "voice" I have had no such experience

2. Bow confident do you feel about this judgement?
_' 7 7 7 7
i£§§ i553 hesitant douétful j£3t

sure . 'gueeeing

107

‘A DISCOVER! ABOUT CONSCIOUS THOUGHT

It has been generally believed that the experience of conscious thought
is essentially the same for everyone. Recent evidence. however, seems to in-
dicate that there is at least one aspect of conscious thought which is not the
same for all people and separates them into two groups: the two ways people
experience conscious thought appear to be quite distinct. Hhat follows are
descriptions of the two modes of thought, but please keep in mind that these
descriptions are based on a fairly small group of people and may be inaccurate
to some degree. Although statements are phrased as fact, remember that they
are really tentative conclusions and observations drawn from a small sampling
of the population. Also be aware that one description is likely to seem familiar,
while the other may appear foreign, alien, or even provoke incredulity.

The people of one group experience conscious thought as a nonverbalised
process by which concepts are juggled, merged, redefined and reordered, out of
which are produced conclusions and new views. Thinking is a real process but
is not readily subject to description. as it is a flow of concepts and relations
which, though usually governed by rules of logic and reason, is not generally
perceived as a step-by-step operation. It is difficult for a member of this
group to examine the thinking at a given.moment because the train of thought
becomes interrupted by such introspection and cannot be easily put into words.
Values are frequently held as subjective constructs, established by decision,
rather than by any sense of an objective absolute. "Conscience" refers to an
abstract set of ethical and moral beliefs, and guilt is perceived as a general
feeling of distress. The members of this group often experience periods where
there is no particular line of thought, especially conscious verbal thought,
going through their minds. In response to the question, "What are you thinking
about?" they may, in all honesty and candor, answer, "Nothing," although some
may say instead, "0h, hundreds of things." Both are true in that there is no
single topic, theme, or subject occupying their conscious minds at the time,
yet they are aware of their surroundings and current events. There is an impor-
tant difference for this group between thinking and verbalization of thought.
Since the single strongest characteristic of this process is its nonverbal
nature, it is called implicit conscious thought.

The members of the other group experience conscious thought as a clearly
verbal process, i.e., one which is carried out in a word-by-word fashion.
Several distinct lines of thought may occur at the same time producing a
multiplicity of perspectives, positions and attitudes regarding any subject
under consideration. Thinking is a reel process and can be described readily,
but difficulty often arises over the fact that there are actually several
thoughts running on parallel tracks simultaneously, sometimes taking the form
of an internal dialogue. Each track is a logical process, but the conclusions
drawn on one track do not necessarily prevent contradictory conclusions being
drawn at the same time on other tracks. While introspection of the thinking
process may disrupt one or more lines of thought, it is not generally dis-
ruptive to the process itself. Since the thinking is done on a verbal level,

a train of thought can quite easily be put into words by members of this group.
Values are frequently held as having an absolute nature, although competing
values can both be held at once. Conscience is often experienced as one of

the “voices" in their dialogue speaking to them or advising them from within
their own minds. Peeling guilty is typically perceived as a period of internal
chastisement from such a voice or parallel thouglx track. It is not unusual
for a thought track to be uncomfortable to the individual and to spontaneously

108

-2-

take on a kind of independent existence. i.e., the individual feels unable to
stop the thought or ignore its presence. Although there are restful periods,
the members of this group rarely, if ever, fail to experience at least one
distinct train of thought at any given time. There is generally some kind of
background thinking, e.g., music or counting, which is nearly always active.
For this group, thinking and internal verbalization of thought are the same
process; the characteristic of this group is a verbalised, multitrscked thought
process which is frequently experienced as an internal dialogue. Since the
single strongest characteristic of this process is its verbal nature, it is
called explicit conscious thought.

I wonder whether, while reading this, you have come to feel yourself
associated to some extent with either of these groups. You may feel that you
belong, in some ways, to both groups. It is true that everyone uses both
implicit and explicit conscious thought to some degree, but they can be
separated into groups because one or the other processing style will be dominant
for each individual. Each person uses one style vary naturally and without
conscious effort, while the other style will feel somewhat less natural and
require more conscious direction and control. Please remember that all of the
above-mentioned "facts" are no more than generalizations made from a very
small sample. For any really meaningful statements to be made, it is essen-
tial that a larger sample be measured. This is why I am coming to you now with
the following statement and request.

STATEMENT: There appears to be two types of conscious functioning, and
for each person one type seems to predominate, separating people into two groups.
The members of one group think primarily in a nonverbal manner and thus find
it difficult to delineate exactly their trains of thought, hence they are
said to have implicit conscious thought (ICT). The members of the other group
think primarily in a highly verbalized manner and have very little difficulty
delineating their trains of thought, hence they are said to have explicit
conscious thought (ECT). Neither group is "abnormal:" people with ICT are
not laking rigor or accuracy; people with ECT are not lacking depth, nor are
their dialogues or internal voices hallucinations. Neither group is "better"
or "worse" than the other, they are simply different.

REQUEST: It is understood that examining one's mental life is at the same
time exciting and sensitive. Hith this in mind, I ask you to help me by
filling out the questionnaire as openly and honestly as possible. Confiden-
tiality will of course be maintained, but I ask that you include your name,
address and phone number if you are willing to be contacted later for more
information. Please feel free to include your comments or ideas on the
back of the form.

Questions:
1. Now that you have read this description, how would you classify your mode
of thought:
L7 L]
Explicit Conscious Thought Implicit Conscious Thought

2. How confident do you feel about this judgement?

UU'UU

very sure hesitant doubtful just
guessing

lCV?

A DISCOVER! ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS

I would like to share a discovery that was made about two years ago.

Two people were talking and the first jokingly made a reference to some naughty
thing the second might do. "Oh, I couldn't do that," the second replied,

"my conscience would torture me for days. It would just call me names for hours
on and." The first person was curious about this and initiated a long conver-
sation in which both made a startling discovery. The first person learned

that the second did have an internal voice and could discuss matters with this
voice. The second was astounded to learn that the first person had no such
voice and experienced thinking as a conscious, nonverbal, "silent" process of
internal thought generation. The closest the first person ever came to having
a voice was in the act of mentally playing a role or practicing a speech, but
this subvocalization was very different in character from the second's internal
voice.

Over the next two years, both people discretely questioned their closest
friends to determine whether others did or did not have internal voices that
”talked to them." The number of people sampled was very small, less than 20
people, but there were some interesting correlates. About half of the people
questioned reported having an internal voice and half reported none. People
with an internal voice, "voicers," indicated that the voice is nearly always
active, except when they are engaged in reading or other similarly engrossing
thought. Something is always ”going on" in their minds, for they are either
intently thinking or they are listening to or interacting with their voice.

On the other hand, the people without an internal voice, "non~voicers," often
experience periods where their minds are just blank, with nothing going on at

a conscious level. when the internal voice exists, it can be of any sex:

there can be more than one internal voice, or the internal voice may take on
different attitudes; the internal voice can be a ”conscience" (judging).
"friend" (supportive), or a "devil" (gosdins); the female voicers tended to
report more constant activity of their internal voices while the male voicers
reported distinct activity only in times of worry or stress; voicers could

not recall ever not having an internal voice: voicers regard the internal voice
as important to them and as one of the central features of their mental life.
Nondvoicers give the appearance of being somewhat more rationally minded than
voicers, though they are not free from irrationality; voicers give the appear-
ance of being more intuitively minded than nonpvoicers, though not exclusively so.

I wonder whether while reading this you have come to feel yourself associated
to some extent with either of these groups. Please bear in mind that all of
the above-mentioned "facts" are really no more than generalizations made from
a very small sample. For any really meaningful statements to be made, it is
essential that a larger sample be measured. This is why I am coming to you
now with a statement and a request.

STATEMENT: There appears to be an aspect of human mental life which is
not the same for all people, but separates them into two groups. The members
of one group have lived with and had as an integral part of their existence
an internal voice. They can, for instance, very naturally view conscience as
a real thing, speaking to them or advising them from within their own minds
and view feeling guilty as a period of chestisement and berating by the voice.
The members of the other group have lived without any such partner or auxil-
iary cognitive process. Conscience to them would be simply an abstract set of

ethical and moral beliefs, and feeling guilty would be a period of general
distress. Neither group is "abnormal;" voicers are not hallucinating and
nondvoicers are not deficient. Neither group is "better" or "worse" than
the other, they are simply different.

REQUEST: It is understood that examining one's mental life is at the
same time exciting and sensitive. With this in mind, I ask you to help me
by filling out the questionnaire as openly and honestly as possible.

ggestions:
I. Now that you have read this description, how would you classify yourself?

1: C7

Voicer Nonvoicer
2. how confident do you feel about this judgement?
DUE/U

very sure hesitant doubtful just
sure guessing

Qgestions About Overall Assessment
You have now read three descriptions of the same phenomenon with three
sets of labels. -

1. how would you characterise your own mode of thought?

U

ESbSAZJEfconscious thought .euiéonscious thought
Internal voice No ternal voice
Voicer Nondvoicer

2. How confidant do you feel about this judgement?

UUUUH
very sure hesitant doubtful just
sure guessing

3. If you were unsure of your identification in any of the descriptions, was
this because:

.£::7 I felt I was much like both types described.

'£::7 I felt nothing like one of the types, but the other didn't
describe me very well either.

5 I felt nothing like either type.
t 7 Other (please explain)

11 l

-3-

6. Which description was most helpful in figuring out what we are talking about?
A) A Discovery about Conscience
D) A Discovery about Consciousness
C) A Discovery about Conscious Thought
D) Combination of the above (please specify):
5. We would like to see any criticism that we might use in writing a new

description of the phenomenon.

(a) Do you think any of the descriptions were particularly vague?

(b) Do you think any of the descriptions was either derogatory or
complementary in tone?

(c) '** Most important *** Is there anything important that was
left out of all three descriptions?

(d) Any other comments on the descriptions?

Please complete the following: B Male 5 Female

My age at my last birthday was

 

Please answer TRUE or FALSE to the following items:

Ff

HHHHHHH

HHHHH

H

»a

-n 'u 'o on

'o vs -u

l.
2.

3.

S.
6.

8.
9.
10.
ll.
12.

13.
16.
15.
l6.
17.
18.

1°.

20.

21.

I usually avoid doing something that might provoke criticism.

There are times when I get so annoyed with myself over something
that I think about it even while I do other things.

I feel distress if I have to choose between things that are about
equal in value or worth.

I wear what I want without much concern for how others might look
.t We '

I find it hard to do anything that my parents would disapprove of.
I feel comfortable being different from those around me.

You can't develop a general view without getting the facts first.
I like to say things that will shock other people.

I often notice that I am talking to myself out loud.

I am frequently struck by how certain others are of themselves.

I usually try to do what is expected of me.

If I had two new sweaters, I would find it hard to choose which
one to wear.

I rarely lose count of something I'm doing.

I like to argue if the other person doesn't get mad.

It really bothers me if I have to visit a professor in their office.
When I relax, I can just let my mind drift.

I don't really care all that much whether people like me or dislike me.
I feel that I can dominate a social situation.

Sometimes I'm enjoying an argument so much the: I don't realize
the other person is taking it seriously.

I hate to answer TRUE or PALSE questions because things just aren't
that simple.

I had an imaginary childhood playmate.

., *1 hi

’i

HHHH

H

H

HHHHHHH

Brit-led

"I

t: 'o

”1’"

’0

'I'I'I'fl"

,y

26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

31.,

32.

33.

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
£1.

42.

63.

45.

46.

113

I'd rather be thought of as intelligent than sociable.
I like to plan my day's activities in detail.
I'm more a listener than a talker.

f I were in a cabin in the woods, I wouldn't mind getting "1°retsai
n front of a window without closing the shades.

P- 04

It bothers me to break rules, even when I know I won't get caught.
Arbitrary decisions are usually easy to make.
I try to do what is fitting and appropriate.

Uhen I am alone, I have to be doing, reading or watching something
or else I'm liable to fall asleep.

You can't develop a general view without getting the facts first.

I usually maintain my original position even when my superiors
disagree.

I feel that I can control a social situation even though it may not
be obvious to others.

I like doing things in which I have to act quickly.

I sometimes argue for the opposite of what I believe in, just for
the fun of the argument.

I'd rather lose a few points on a test than stand up to the teacher.
Other people are generally no more sure of themselves than I am.

It is generally best to do things in the approved way.

I am slow in making up my mind.

When I'm out in public, I wonder if I'm the only one who is nervous.
I only talk to myself out loud when I wish to think rigorously.

Before I do something, I try to consider how my friends will react
to Its

When getting dressed, I almost always put the same shoe on first.
When I go to bed, I can quickly "shut off" my mind and fall asleep.
I used to "invent" companions to play with when I was a child.

I feel comfortable acting unconventionally if an important issue
is involved.

I hate having to make hurried decisions.

*5

8*!

H

W)

H

"1

”'1

.3)

b7.

58.

S3.

54.
55.
56.

57.

58.
59.
60.

61.

62.

63.
64.

65.

114

I'll fight for a few points on a test, even if they won't change
my grade.

when working out a problem, I try first to get clear on the details
and facts involved.

Making up imaginary childhood companions for when I was alone just
never occurred to me.

I easily change my mind after I hear what others have to say.
It is pretty hard to adjust to change.
Talking to myself out loud restricts my thinking to a single subject.

Before I raise my hand in class, I always worry about what other
classmates might think of my question.

I'm pretty good at "bluffing".
I'd rather pay a parking ticket by mail than fight it in court.
I don't make as many compromises as most people.

When I go to bed, I find I spend a lot of time reviewing the past
day and/or planning the next before I fall asleep.

I feel comfortable acting unconventionally.
It is hard for me to decide to leave where I am at any given time.

I feel I need to do well on this questionnaire, even though no one
will know that it is mine.

I'm likely to discontinue doing something that others think not
worthwhile.

If I control a social situation, it is important to me that it not
be obvious to others.

I feel embarassed if I go skating, dancing or bowling in public.
I sometimes will start driving before I've decided where I'm going.

Most people are better able to bluff their way through a discussion
than I am.

Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things
'3 not supposed to.

when working out a problem, I try first to get a general overview.

Talking to myself out loud doesn't affect my normal flow of thought.

Then I take a stand I tend to hold to it, particularly if others
disagree.

115

H
"I

70. I don't mind speeding if there are no police aroung.
T F 71. I don't like taking a walk unless I'm walking to somewhere specific.

72. Uhen I'm in public, I am often afraid that people can tell how nervous
I “file

’31

D"

73. Then I am alone, there is nearly always some kind of talking going
on in my head.

Thank you for completing this questionnaire.

Appendix D

The Apriori Factors and Their Items

CLUSTER UAR #

SOCIAL DOMINANCE

46
84
4o

54

76
CONFORMITY
63
59
23
33
50
72

83

116

Appendix D
ITEM

I’m more a listener than a talker.

If I control a social situation, it
is important that it not be obvious
to others.

I feel that I can dominate a social
situation.

I feel that I can control a social
situation even though it may not be
obvious to others.

I’m pretty good at ”bluffing“.

Before I do something, I try to
consider how my friends will react
to it.

It is generally best to do things in
the approved way.

I usually avoid doing something that
might provoke criticism.

I usually try to do what is expected
of me.

I try to do what is fitting and
appropriate.

I easily change my mind after I hear
what others have to say.

I’m likely to discontinue doing
something that others think not
worthwhile.

SPOTLIGHT EMBARASSMENT

26

75

47

80

94

I wear what I want without much
concern for how others might look at
me.

Before I raise my hand in class, I
always worry about what other
classmates might think of my
question.

If I were in a cabin in the woods, I
wouldn’t mind getting undressed in
front of a window without closing
the shades.

I feel comfortable acting
unconventionally.

when I’m in public, I am often afraid
that people can tell how nervous I
am.

61

85

FOCUS

89

70

29

52

when I’m out in public, I wonder if
I’m the only one who is nervous.

I feel embarassed if I go skating,
dancing or bowling in public.

when working out a problem, I try
first to get a general overview.

when working out a problem, I try
first to get clear on the details
and facts involved.

You can’t develop a general view
without getting the facts first.

You can’t develop a general view
without getting the facts first.

PROUUCATIVE/ARGUEMENTATIUE

69

91

56

30
36

41

INDEPENDENCE
2.8

78

39

88

53

44

67

I’ll fight for a few points on a
test, even if they won’t change my
grade. '

when I take a stand I tend to hold to
it, particularly if others disagree.

I sometimes argue for the opposite of
what I believe in, Just for the fun
of the argument.

I like to say things that will shock
other people.

I like to argue if the other person
doesn’t get mad.

Sometimes I’m enjoying an argument so
much that I don’t realize the other
person is taking it seriously.

I feel comfortable being different
from those around me.

I don’t make as many compromises as
most people.

I don’t really care all that much
whether people like me or dislike
me.

Sometimes I rather enJoy going
against the rules and doing things
I’m not supposed to.

I usually maintain my original
position even when my superiors
disagree.

I’d rather be thought of as
intellegent than sociable.

I feel comfortable acting
unconventionally if an important
issue is involved.

118

ORDERLY
45 I like to plan my day’s activities in
detail.
64 when getting dressed, I almost always
put on the same shoe first.
35 I rarely lose count of something I’m
doing.
IMAGINARY PLAYMATE
66 I used to ”invent“ companions to play
with when I was a child.
71 Making up imaginary childhood

companions for when I was alone Just
never occurred to me.

43 I had an imaginary childhood
playmate.

AUTHORITY SHY

37 It really bothers me if I have to
visit a professor in their office.

57 I’d rather lose a few points on a
test than stand up to the teacher.

77 I’d rather pay a parking ticket by

mail than fight it in court.

OTHERS’ CERTAINTY

58 Other people are generally no more
sure of themselves than I am.

87 Most people are better able to bluff
their way through a discussion than
I am.

32 I am frequently struck by how certain

others are of themselves.

TALKSELF
74 Talking to myself out loud restricts
my thinking to a single subject.
31 I often notice that I am talking to
myself out loud.
90 Talking to myself out loud doesn’t
affect my normal flow of thought.
62 I only talk to myself out loud when I
wish to think rigorously.
DECISIvE
49 Arbitrary decisions are usually easy
to make.
86 I sometimes will start driving before
I’ve decided where I’m going.
93 I don’t like taking a walk unless I’m

walking to somewhere specific.

QUICK

INVOLUNTARY MIND

DORIGHT

81

42

34

25

55

6O
73

68

79

95

51

38

65

24

82

92

27

48

It is hard for me to decide to leave
where I am at any given time.

I hate to answer TRUE or FALSE
questions because things Just aren’t
that simple.

If I had two new sweaters, I would
find it hard to choose which one to
wear.

I feel distress if I have to choose
between things that are about equal
in value or worth.

I like doing things in which I have
to act quickly.

I am slow in making up my mind.

It is pretty hard to adJust to
change.

I hate having to make hurried
decisions.

When I go to bed, I find I spend a
lot of time reviewing the past day
and/or planning the next before I
fall asleep.

when I am alone, there is always some
kind of talking going on in my head.

when I am alone, I have to be doing,
reading or watching something or
else I’m liable to fall asleep.

when I relax, I can Just let my mind
drift.

when I go to bed, I can quickly “shut
off“ my mind and fall asleep.

There are times when I get so annoyed
with myself over something that I
think about it while I do other
things.

I feel I need to do well on this
questionnaire, even though no one
will know that it is mine.

I don’t mind speeding if there are no
police around.

I find it hard to do anything that my
parents would disapprove of.

It bothers me to break rules, even
when I know I won’t get caught.

Appendix E

The Final Factors of Study 3 and Their Items

120

Appendix E
An * indicates that the item was reverse scored.

501 NOT QUICK

60 I am slow in making up my mind.

68 I hate having to make hurried decisions.

55 i I like doing things in which I have to act
quickly.

34 If I had two new sweaters, I would find it hard
to choose which one to wear.

25 I feel distress if I have to choose between

things that are about equal in value or worth.
49 * Arbitrary decisions are usually easy to make.
81 It is hard for me to decide to leave where I am
at any given time.

502 VOICER

2 Self ID (Jack’s)

4 Self ID (Philosophical)

6 Self ID (Rewritten)

8 Self ID (Global)

503 RULEBREAKER

48 * It bothers me to break rules, even when I know I
won’t get caught.

88 Sometimes I rather enJoy going against the rules
and doing things I’m not supposed to.

80 I feel comfortable acting unconventionally.

47 If I were in a cabin in the woods, I wouldn’t

mind getting undressed in front of a window
without closing the shades.

92 I don’t mind speeding if there are no police
around.

67 I feel comfortable acting unconventionally if an
important issue is involved.

30 I like to say things that will shock other
people.

504 SOCIAL DOMINANCE

40 I feel that I can dominate a social situation.

54 I feel that I can control a social situation
even though it may not be obvious to others.

505 NEED FOR APPROVAL

75 Before I raise my hand in class, I always worry
about what other classmates might think of my
question.

53 * I usually maintain my original position even
when my superiors disagree.
23 I usually avoid doing something that might

provoke criticism.

121

72 I easily change my mind after I hear what others
have to say.

83 I’m likely to discontinue doing something that
others think not worthwhile.

2B * I feel comfortable being different from those
around me.

27 I find it hard to do anything that my parents

would disapprove of.
91 * when I take a stand I tend to hold to it,
particularly if others disagree.

506 AUTHORITY SHY

69 * I’ll fight for a few points on a test, even if
they won’t change my grade.

57 I’d rather lose a few points on a test than
stand up to the teacher.

37 It really bothers me if I have to visit a
professor in their office.

77 I’d rather pay a parking ticket by mail than

fight it in court.

50? DO EXPECTED

33 I usually try to do what is expected of me.
50 I try to do what is fitting and appropriate.
59 It is generally best to do things in the

approved way.

508 ARGUER

41 Sometimes I’m enJoying an argument so much that
I don’t realize the other person is taking it
seriously.

36 I like to argue if the other person doesn’t get
mad.
56 I sometimes argue for the opposite of what I

believe in, Just for the fun of the argument.

509 IMAGINARY PLAYMATE

66 I used to “invent" companions to play with when
I was a child.
43 I had an imaginary childhood playmate.

71 * Making up imaginary childhood companions for
when I was alone Just never occurred to me.

510 POOR BLUFFER

76 a I’m pretty good at "bluffing".

87 Most people are better able to bluff their way
through a discussion than I am.

511 HARD TO GET TO SLEEP

79 when I go to bed, I find I spend a lot of time
reviewing the past day and/or planning the next
before I fall asleep.

122

65 * when I go to bed, I can quickly “shut off" my
mind and fall asleep.

512 SELF CONSCIOUS

63 Before I do something, I try to consider how my
friends will react to it.

61 when I’m out in public, I wonder if I’m the only
one who is nervous.

94 when I’m in public, I am often afraid that
people can tell how nervous I am.

39 * I don’t really care all that much whether people
like me or dislike me.

26 * I wear what I want without much concern for how

others might look at me.

513 TALKSELF AFFECTS THINKING

74 Talking to myself out loud restricts my thinking
to a single subJect.

90 * Talking to myself out loud doesn’t affect my
normal flow of thought.

514 ACTIVE HEAD

95 when I am alone, there is always some kind of
talking going on in my head.

31 I often notice that I am talking to myself out
loud.

24 There are times when I get so annoyed with

myself over something that I think about it
while I do other things.

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