# THE PRUSSIAN ARMY AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

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ABSTRACT

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

By

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This study analyzes the composition and mentality of the Prussian army and its corresponding reaction to the revolution of 1848. It accepts, as given, the concepts of military professionalism as developed by a handful of Prussian military publicists in the first half of the nineteenth century and by Samuel Huntington in his The Soldier and the State. All agree in insisting on the need for the political neutrality of the truly professional soldier. From this point of departure, analysis shows that the response of the Prussian army to the revolution of 1848 is inexplicable in terms of a strictly professional attitude. The aristocratic leadership and rural composition of the army was much more important in determining its response to the essentially urban revolution of 1848. The study shows that the Prussian army acted in 1848 in the very way in which publicists said would be the result of implementing Bürger reform projects: The army showed itself to be something much different than a purely professional instrument of executive power. It developed its own politics.

Although there was a nucleus of professionalized officers in the army, the study shows the officer corps to be rather more of a

social status corporation, organized for other than purely military purposes. It shows that the common soldiers also were not always organized or trained purely for the profession of arms. Moreover, in 1848 the Prussian army was beset by some of the same political controversies within its ranks under the impact of revolution that occurred in the external world of Prussian and German society. Democrats, liberals, conservatives, reactionaries, and purely professional officers jostled for position within the officer corps in a strange caricature of the external world. Among the lesser soldiers and especially in the Territorial Guard, the immediate impact of the revolution also revealed or created ferment.

The officer corps of the army displayed a heretofore unknown talent among its officers in the art of political propaganda and maneuver, each faction appealing to various strata of Prussian civilian society. The winners in this struggle for position were those designated in the study as "old Prussians," officers who adamantly insisted on maintaining the army's lofty position in state and society and on retaining the current institutional organization. The "old Prussians," successfully invoking "honor" as their political slogan, succeeded also in closing the ranks of the army to the revolution through using all the means at their command; by dismissals, transfers, threats, courts of honor proceedings, and propaganda, they excluded, drove out, isolated, or shouted down those officers who sought to profit from the revolution in a manner inconsistent with the "old Prussian" norm. By the end of 1848, the officer corps and men had developed an esprit de corps which no amount

of liberal or democratic propaganda could penetrate, an esprit which was instrumental in the ultimate demise of civilian revolutionary activity and partly responsible for King Frederick William IV's resolution to effect a coup d' etat at the end of the year.

The quid pro quo for upholding the monarchy in 1848 was independence for the army. The Prussian constitution of 1848-1850 expressly exempted the army from its provisions.

Since the army archives were destroyed in 1945, the study has had to confine itself to extant printed sources, which include document collections, letters, diaries, memoirs, pamphlet literature, and newspapers. Methods of analysis used are historical and sociological.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

This is a study of a social institution in confrontation with political turmoil. Every casual reader of German history of the nineteenth century realizes the importance that the army played in Prussian society. Prussia was a military state founded by the Hohenzollerns and devoted to the interests of its military forces. A large share of Prussia's revenue went to her army. The kings were soldiers. The officers constituted the realm's first estate. Common soldiers ostensibly obeyed without question the commands of their hard-headed officers. Nearly every school-boy is familiar with Mirabeau's aphorism of the eighteenth century: "Every state has an army; but Prussia is an army that has a state." No one doubts that this was much unchanged in the nineteenth century.

It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that only one professional historian, Reinhard Höhn, has investigated the Prussian army during the revolutionary crisis of 1848.[1] Other students of Prussia's military

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[1]Reinhard Höhn, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid: Der Kampf des Bürgertums um das Heer, 1815-1850 (Leipzig, 1938). Archival sources for this study are almost non-extant. The German army archives were almost totally destroyed in 1945. However, nearly all of the sources which Höhn used are available. These included contemporary pamphlets, brochures, and newspapers. In addition, there are printed document collections, diaries, letters, and memoirs pertinent to this study. Some official regimental histories are also extant, but most of these are without value. Finally, there is a wealth of documented secondary material which may be drawn from with profit.

organization in the nineteenth century have swept past the revolution of 1848, using examples from that dramatic year of revolution in Europe only to document long-term tendencies of the army officers' corps.[2] And even Reinhard Höhn confines himself essentially to an examination of civilian literature which proposed military reform and officer literature which opposed such reform.

The general histories of the revolution are equally opaque about the army.[3] The reader of such histories is made aware of the hostility between soldier and civilian, of the fact that the very presence of troops helped to precipitate the March uprising of 1848 in Berlin, of the officer corps in the burgeoning spirit of reaction in late summer and more. Yet, with the exception of E. R. Huber's brief discussion,[4] the Prussian army appears on the scene in 1848 as a kind of deus ex machina whose first great sin was that it was not democratic and whose second

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[2]Chief among these are: Karl Demeter, Das deutsche Heer und seine Offiziere (Berlin, 1930) and Das deutsche Offizierkorps im Gesellschaft und Staat (Frankfurt a/M, 1963); Emil Obermann, Soldaten - Bürger - 'Militäristen, Militär und Demokratie in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1958); Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des 'Militarismus' in Deutschland (4 vols., Munich, 1954ff.), especially vol. I. An exception is Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (New York, 1956) who, however, leans heavily on Höhn for 1848.

[3]Chief among these are: Veit Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution von 1848-1849 (2 vols., Berlin, 1930-31); Rudolf Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte der Revolution von 1848 (Munich, 1948); Jacques Droz , Les Revolutiones allemandes de 1848 (Paris, 1957); Friedrich Engels, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany reprinted in Leonard Krieger (ed.), The German Revolutions (Chicago, 1967).

[4]E. R. Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (4 vols., Stuttgart, 1957-69), Vol. II, pp. 732-746.

great sin was that it (sometimes) obeyed orders. Was the Prussian army a passive instrument of executive power? For the sake of the liberal or democratic cause in Prussia, and in Germany, it would have been better if the army had been passive, if it had been, in fact, a highly professionalized institution, a pure instrument of executive power. Instead, the Prussian army itself was beset internally with many of the same controversies which existed externally in 1848. For the army was not organized as a purely professional group with a purely professional mentality. It was rather more a social and political organization.

If the army had in fact acted in 1848 along professional lines, there would be little purpose in this study. According to military publicists, the army was supposed to be an apolitical instrument of executive power, a "factor of order" in Prussian society. But can we take the publicists word for it, or was the Prussian army, as is more likely, guilty of the very sins against professionalism that the publicists argued would be the result of giving into Bürger demands for reforming the army? Instead of performing as a politically passive instrument of executive power, did the army not develop politically active forces of its own? Did civil-military relations conform to professional standards?

The focus of the present study, therefore, is on civil-military relations in Prussia. What were the relations of Prussian military institutions to state and society as they were influenced by Prussia's peculiar social system and by the social composition of the Prussian military? In analyzing these relationships, we will inevitably need to consider the more general problem of how armies ought to act in revolutionary situations. What part of the Prussian army's actions were

determined by the specifically Prussian political and social matrix to the exclusion of the dictates of modern military professionalism? The model of military professionalism--the ideal military type--is adapted from Samuel Huntington's analysis in his, The Soldier and the State and, where useful, from military publicists. How an army ought to act will be used as the basis for analyzing how the Prussian military in fact did act. Huntington's ideal professional soldier has expertise, responsibility to his client, the state, and a sense of responsibility to his fellow soldier--in short, corporativeness. Above all he obeys and executes orders and, though he is typically a conservative, he does not interest himself in political questions except where policies directly affect his professional competence.[5] It will become obvious below that this description of the ideal professional soldier did not fit the Prussian military establishment either before or during the revolution of 1848.

Assuming professional military logic as a given premise, this study will focus on the non-military response of the Prussian army to the revolution of 1848. It will focus on the activities of the Prussian army in 1848-1849 which cannot be justified in terms of a professional military function. By using Prussian military publicists own definitions of professionalism as well as the model of military professionalism developed by Samuel Huntington, we will examine whether Prussian military institutions in fact did operate on purely professional

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[5]Samuel B. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 1-17 and passim.

principles. Or can their response to revolution in 1848 be understood ultimately only in terms of domestic, social, and political considerations which are external to the model of pure military professionalism? In both contexts we will have to consider the social composition of the officer corps, its relationship to rural society, the shifting balance of power between country and city, the cognate problem of the relationship between inactive officers and active officers, the problem of maintaining military discipline at the time of a revolution whose conflicts were internalized within the army as well as externalized in the larger society of Germany and Prussia, and the devices by which the army sought to appeal to different classes of Prussian subjects for support, the appeal to the shopkeeper's mentality, the army's subtle exploitation of class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the Proletariat, the methods used in neutralizing dissidence and closing ranks during the revolution and the effect which this had on transforming the Prussian army into a much more tightly disciplined and much more class conscious institution than it had been at any time prior to 1848.

Prussian military institutions of 1848 evolved out of the reform period of 1807-1815. Since this falls within the topic of this study, the military reforms will be sketched in here briefly. They included reforms of the officer corps, introduction of universal military training and the formation of a citizens' territorial defense force.

Under the urgings of Generals Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, and others, King Frederick William III opened the officer corps to all social classes. Officership was said to be reserved for those possessing

military talent. In addition, a principle of self-regulation was given the various units of the officer corps. Each regimental officer corps was given the right to co-opt its own replacements. Similarly, each unit was given a court of honor, composed of officers of the unit, and directed by a council of honor, also composed of unit officers, to regulate internal matters of the corps. Courts of honor were supposed to oversee the personal deportment of individual officers.[6] More will be said of them below.

Conditions of service for the rank and file were also reformed. The reformers induced Frederick William to terminate the canton system of the eighteenth century and to nationalize his army; foreign recruits and a long-term serving army of common soldiers were no longer desired. The reformers wanted a citizen army. To implement this required the transformation of subject peoples into citizens. Hence the peasants were emancipated from serfdom while a municipal ordinance gave rights of self-administration to urban Prussia. Hence, also, the reformers carried through the legal abolition of corporal punishments in the army for disciplinary reasons; citizen soldiers were to be treated as men of honor and dignity.

In 1814, the war minister, General Hermann von Boyen, extracted an army law from the king which generally regulated Prussian military organization until the 1860's. The army law stated the military obligation for every able-bodied Prussian male from age 20 to 39.

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[6]Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 214-216; Craig, Politics, p. 42.

At age 20, every Prussian male was obliged to serve in the standing army for a period of three years. Upon completion of these three years, he entered the ready reserve for two more years. After his service, he passed into the Landwehr, a sort of territorial defense force.[7]

The Landwehr was an inspiration of Scharnhorst. He had conceived of a popular citizen's militia which was supposed to represent the nation in arms. The king and his more conservative advisors were absolutely opposed to such a radical concept and only when the uprising against Napoleon took place in 1813, was the king's hand forced. War Minister Boyen took advantage of the enthusiasm of victory over Napoleon in 1814 by having the Landwehr institutionalized in law.

Upon passing through the regular army and ready reserve, the Prussian citizen entered the first levy of the Landwehr for a period of seven years. After those seven years, he passed over to the second levy of the Landwehr for another seven years. The first levy was intended to maneuver two weeks annually with the regular army. During times of war, it was designed to go into the field with the regulars. The second levy was to have one week of exercise in the field annually. During times of war, men from the second levy were to occupy the fortresses. Finally, all Prussian males not serving in the regular army or Landwehr were liable to service in the Landsturm, a sort of patriotic uprising.[8]

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[7] Ibid., pp. 69-71.

[8] Ibid.

It was Boyen's intention that the Landwehr should be a military institution separate from the regular army with its own officers and training inspectors. He believed that the Landwehr could and should serve to reconcile the Burger to the Prussian state. Thus university students and educated Bürger who could afford their own equipment could enter the regular army as one-year volunteers in order to discharge their military obligation; ostensibly this was the only exception made to the universal obligation to serve. Upon completion of this one year service the volunteer passed into the Landwehr as an officer. Boyen also had a great faith in a voluntarism that would urge the Bürger, of a week-end or holiday, to repair to the local Landwehr armory--they were constructed throughout Prussia--and participate in target practice and the like.[9] In our discussion below, we will examine this institution more closely, as well as conservative distrust of the Landwehr idea. Similarly we will deal with the changes that occurred in this military organization both in its institutional arrangements and in its social composition in the years between the reforms and 1848. It is necessary here to note briefly the relationship of the Prussian army to other elements in Prussia in order to set the stage for the following chapters.

The officer corps of the Prussian army was intimately related to the other three ruling forces of the Prussian state, the king, the landed nobility, and the bureaucracy.

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[9]Friedrich Meinecke, Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1895-1899), Vol. I, pp. 347-348.

The officer corps belonged, with the king, to the "first estate in the land." The "king's coat" was the officer's coat, and the king was commander-in-chief (Oberster Kriegsherr) of the army. In our period, the king was Frederick William IV (1840-1859) the most perplexing of all Hohenzollerns, a romantic whose political views included a hazy desire to see Germany and Prussia reincarnate the medieval estates with society ordered in corporate hierarchies. This "Christian state" was to include a re-establishment of the Holy Roman Empire with a Habsburg on the throne and the King of Prussia as Heriditary Field Marshal. Few of his officers understood such a gothic impossibility.

On the other hand, Frederick William himself understood few of his officers. Military affairs usually bored him, an unusual matter for a Hohenzollern. He thus left over military matters, in most instances, to his brother, Crown Prince William. But Frederick William was still commander-in-chief insofar as the army was concerned.[10]

The army's officer corps was also intimately related to the landed nobility of the Prussian state, specifically to the owners of the so-called "Knights' Estates" (Rittergütterbesitzer) of East Elbian Prussia. The large land-owners concentrated considerable local economic and political power on their estates, but also nearly monopolized the important office of Landrat (County Commissioner) in the Kreis (County) government. They dominated the eight provincial diets of Prussia by a ratio of two to one. And they sent their sons into commanding positions in the civil bureaucracy and, most important to this study, into the

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[10]Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, pp. 29-35.

army officer corps.[11]

Lastly, the officer corps was related to the Prussian bureaucracy. The same social class dominated both officer corps and bureaucracy. Many civil servants were retired officers. And the bureaucracy was there, ever since its creation, chiefly to regulate the affairs of the Prussian state in order that the state might thrive and thus better support its military institutions.[12]

These relationships to the governing forces of the state were inimical to the development of professionalism as will be seen in detail in this study; they also help to explain the unprofessional behavior of the army in 1848.

The above ruling forces presided over a Prussian society that underwent considerable change in the generation since the Wars of Liberation. These changes include demographical change, industrialization, and a growth in the political consciousness of the lower classes.

Population in Prussia grew from 10,500,000 in 1817 to 14,000,000 in 1844. This growth put extreme pressure on the land where, in the East Elbian parts of the monarchy, the small rural proprietor had all but disappeared. The population change was especially reflected in urban growth; by 1848 Prussia had a number of relatively large cities--Berlin, Breslau, Cologne, and others.[13]

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[11]Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, Vol. I, pp. 191-93; Obermann, Soldaten, p. 106; Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction. Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1958), p. 59.

[12]Ibid., pp. 31-32; Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, p. 41.

[13]Hamerow, Restoration, pp. 49-55; Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany (3 vols., New York, 1959-69), Vol. III, pp. 7-8.

Industrial growth, which became marked in the 1840's, did not keep pace with the population. As a result, unemployment, low wages, and high food costs made life more precarious for the little man in the "hungry forties."[14]

Attendant to the population growth and urbanization of Prussia was the upswing of political consciousness of the ruled classes. A small but growing factory bourgeoisie espoused the principles of class-conscious liberalism. Somewhat lower in the social scale, many Bürger intellectuals developed a radical-liberalism based on "natural law." And other Bürger intellectuals were formulating principles of socialism on behalf of a swollen artisan class; factory proletariat, as such, constituted only a fraction of the working class by 1848.[15]

Uniting these various strands of political ferment among the urban classes of Prussia--and Germany-- was a rising consciousness of German disunity. German nationalism, a desire for political unity of the German people, was a common denominator in the aspirations of the urban classes.

Some of these ideas were first expressed on the political stage in Prussia in 1847. In that year, King Frederick William IV patched his gothic ideas of corporate bodies together and summoned the provincial diets to Berlin to sit together in a united diet.

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[14]J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914 (4th edition, Cambridge, 1966), pp. 82-120.

[15]Hamerow, Restoration, pp. 18, 32, 104; Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom. History of a Political Tradition (Boston, 1957), pp. 242-252, 296-303.

Meeting in April, 1847, liberals in the united diet were quickly disabused of the notion that Frederick William IV contemplated constitutionalism for Prussia: "Never will I permit a written sheet of paper to come between our God in heaven and this land." The liberals demanded periodic meetings of the united diet, legislative authority, and a written constitution. It was in the control of finances that the liberals sought to force the king's hand. Until Frederick William gave way on the issue of the constitution, the liberals refused to sanction a loan for the construction of a railroad between Berlin and Königsberg. There matters rested. In June, 1847, Frederick William sent the united diet home: No constitution, no railroad to Königsberg.[16]

With the closing of the united diet, this description of pre-revolutionary Prussia may also come to a close. It is necessary, in the next section, to examine a facet of civilian-military relations which will bear on our general theme.

Before examining the structure of the Prussian army and its confrontation with the revolution of 1848, it is necessary to describe how a professional army ought to behave in society and how it ought to respond to revolutionary turmoil. The demands of the Bürger from 1815 through 1849 with respect to reforming military institutions will provide a convenient vehicle for this description. It is a convenient vehicle for this description simply because a number of Prussian officers responded to Bürger demands for reform of military institutions

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[16]Hamerow, Restoration, pp. 90-93.

with arguments which had a distinctly professional logic. Prussian officers, therefore give us many of the criteria with which to analyze how the army in fact responded to political upheaval.

The central problem of the liberal Bürger--in the German sense of propertied or educated middle class--was to accomplish the "civilianization" or embourgeoisement (Verbürgerlichung) of the army; what the Bürger despised most was the aristocratic "caste spirit" he saw incorporated in the military.[17] All the liberal and democratic projects in 1848 which sought to reform, reorganize, or neutralize military institutions addressed themselves to this central problem. These projects included the demands that the military swear an oath to the constitution, that the standing army be abolished or reduced to a training cadre, that it be transformed into a citizen army with popularly elected leaders (Bürgerbewaffnung) or, more radical yet, be replaced by arming the populace itself (Volksbewaffnung). Other projects demanded that the too-narrow training in military schools be abolished, that the jurisdiction of military courts be restricted to purely military matters, that the regulatory courts of honor of the officer corps be abrogated, and that the rights of petition and free assembly be extended to off-duty soldiers. The Bürger also demanded the closing of the officer casino (before 1848, the casino was only an officers' mess) because they viewed it as only an institution designed

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[17]Höhn, Verfassungskampf, pp. XXI, 27. Verbürgerlichung, in its nineteenth century context had a two-fold meaning. In one sense, it meant simply the civilianization of the armed forces. In another sense, Verbürgerlichung had the connotation of changing the armed forces from their rural composition of noble officer and peasant enlisted man to an urban composition.

for the perpetuation of caste-spirit, the abolition of the secret conduct lists kept regularly on all officers because they viewed these as an inquisitorial method of keeping officers "in line," and the removal of the requirement that the soldier wear his uniform during off-duty hours.[18]

These projects and demands were developed, for the most part, in debates in the smaller German states that had constitutions before 1848--in Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Saxony--and became, by 1848, the common property of the German Bürger class in the big states, such as Prussia, as well. In 1848, the politicians in the Frankfurt Parliament sought to implement the more practicable of these projects in organic statutes designed to create a new German army. If Germany was to be united with a liberal constitution, the Frankfurt Parliament also sought to give Germany an unified army.[19]

Slogans cannot create or reform military institutions and the plain fact of the matter was that Germany had no unified military force but only a series of state armies varying in organization, size, competence, and tradition. The Frankfurt Parliament, composed of deputies from all over Germany, having diverse outlooks and projects, had necessarily to settle on compromise solutions in the attempt to create a military system which could at once satisfy the need for national defense and the Burger aim of Verbürgerlichung.

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[18]Ibid., pp. 16f, 32, 40, 43, 52f, 73-77. Few agreed what was to be understood by the Prussian Landwehr of 1813. The Burger, in general, construed it as a voluntary and spontaneous uprising, and looked upon the Landwehr of 1813 as proof that standing armies were unnecessary for national defence. The other arrangements such as courts of honor, etc., will be treated in detail below.

[19]Ibid., pp. 125-35.

Having created a Central Power consisting of an Imperial Vicar (Reichsverweser) in the person of the Habsburg Arch-Duke John and a cabinet, whose minister of war was a Prussian general, Wilhelm von Peucker, the Frankfurt Parliament sought to insure a modicum of control over the various German armies. On 16 July War Minister von Peucker issued a decree calling for all German armies to parade on 6 August in a ceremony of homage (Huldigung) to the Imperial Vicar. This was more a trial balloon than an attempt to secure control of the armies, since homage is not yet the same as an oath of obedience. It was also a failure since the German governments, and especially the Prussian king, Frederick William IV, forbade any ceremony of homage.[20]

The Frankfurt Parliament, nonetheless, went on with its constitution-making and a committee was organized to create organic statutes for a German military system. In December, 1848, the army draft law was ready. As Hohlfeld has remarked, the Frankfurt Parliament worked on this problem in an uncomfortable period--while Windischgrätz's army was advancing on Vienna, while Count Brandenburg and von Manteuffel were preparing and executing a coup d' etat in Prussia, while the democratic leader, Robert Blum was summarily executed in Vienna--in short, while the counter-revolution moved to crush the revolution. The Frankfurt army draft law was, thus, necessarily a compromise, intended, mostly, to attract the adherence of the Prussian monarchy. Accordingly, it was framed in parallel with the organization of the Prussian military system, all the more important since it was the unspoken assumption in Frankfurt that the king of Prussia should be elected hereditary

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[20]Ibid., pp. 286-288.

German emperor.[21]

In broad out-line, the projected German army, based on universal service, was to consist of four "Banners" or levies. The first Banner, the "Ready Army," was supposed to be the arms school for "the entire people." The "Ready Army" was to be based on a very short term period of active service for conscripts with an extended furlough system. After service in the first Banner, the citizen-soldiers were to be enrolled in the first levy of the Landwehr, the second Banner, for a period of seven years. Like its Prussian counterpart, this levy was to assemble for periodic exercises. From the second Banner, the citizen-soldier passed to the third Banner, the second levy of the Landwehr. Like its Prussian counterpart, the second levy of the Landwehr was designated for fortress duty during times of war. Finally, all able-bodied male citizens not on active duty were required to do service in the fourth Banner, the Bürgerwehr, a civic guard intended to preserve domestic peace. All four Banners were to be sworn to uphold the German constitution.

The proposed law, obviously, was intended to reduce regular officers' corps to the role of military instructors, a Lehrstand, in the words of one Frankfurt deputy. To highlight this intention were the added provisions calling for the abolition of military academies while military training for officers should be made available in the universities.[22]

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[21]Andreas Hohlfeld, Das Frankfurter Parlament und sein Kampf um das deutsche Heer (Berlin, 1932), pp. 12, 17.

[22]Ibid., pp. 125-34.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the Prussian king rejected the constitutional projects of the Frankfurt Parliament. Yet the constitution and the army draft law are indications of the intent of German moderate liberals and are thus a measure of what would have happened had the revolution been successful.

Attention should also be directed to the situation in Prussia in 1848 where, unlike the Frankfurt Parliament, the Prussian constituent assembly was in direct confrontation with a state power apparatus. While Frankfurt had the task of creating a German military system, where none existed, the Prussian National Assembly, in Berlin, faced a Prussian military system and command apparatus that was, essentially, still intact.

When the Prussian National Assembly met, King Frederick William IV had already promised, on the heels of the March uprising, that the army would be sworn to uphold the constitution which the Assembly and the crown were to contract. This satisfied the moderates in the Assembly, but not the left wing. The left held the position that a military oath to uphold the constitution was now meaningless. "Either it was there to remind the soldier of his duty, thus it contradicted [his] inner conviction, or it did not contradict and was [therefore] not necessary." (Deputy D'Ester). The left, thus, expressed the opinion that the true goal of the Bürgertum was to change the mentality of the army, in short the goal of Verbürgerlichung.[23]

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[23]Hohn, Verfassungskampf, p. 143.

To achieve this aim, a myriad of proposals were voiced in the National Assembly. The left demanded that the soldiers should have the right of petition and assembly when not under arms. Such rights, the democratic left believed, would drive liberal and democratic principles into the military forces. Further, the left demanded that the Prussian Cadet Houses be abolished so as to eliminate the source of the caste spirit of the officer corps. The left also sought to introduce the principle of popular election of officers, by the rank and file, into the military. And the left sought to place the military under the same civil and criminal law common to all Prussian citizens; the system of separate military courts would either be abolished or confined to the trial of strictly military offenses. The courts of honor, of course, were also to disappear. Finally, the left sought to effect the dissolution of the Royal Guard Corps; a monarch who proposed to be a people's king no longer needed such a unit.[24]

During the year of 1848, none of the above proposals was implemented. They were, however, popular proposals in the urban parts of Prussia and were discussed repeatedly. One may therefore assume that had the left been able to secure control of events, that the Prussian military establishment would have been radically reformed or even dissolved.

Practically speaking, only one innovation occurred in Prussia in 1848 with respect to military institutions--the creation of the Bürgerwehr. Those who were registered as bona fide Burger (those holding a patent, a Bürgerbrief) in Prussia were enrolled in the Bürgerwehr as a result of the March revolution. The Assembly subsequently enacted a law regulating

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[24]Ibid., pp. 143-151.

the Bürgerwehr. Although basically an organization for the preservation of internal order, the Bürgerwehr was also supposed to share in the task of national defense. The left envisaged the Bürgerwehr to be a step in the direction of a general arming of the people (Volksbewaffnung) which would hasten the disappearance of the standing army. The usual democratic trappings such as the election of officers were therefore incorporated into the Bürgerwehr law. Even here the essential aim of Verbürgerlichung of the army was foremost.[25]

This essential aim really resolved itself in the idea, propounded by the left, of changing the spirit or mentality of the officer corps. This was most vehemently expressed in the Assembly debates in May, 1848, and sporadically throughout the summer. It came to a head in August of 1848. In that month a regular army detachment shot and killed a number of Bürgerwehr men in Schweidnitz in Silesia. Action on this outrage was taken immediately in the National Assembly on 9 August when it adopted a resolution proposed by a left wing deputy from Breslau, Stein:

> The war minister, in an order to the army, shall express his desire that the officers shall abstain from reactionary agitations, that they shall not only avoid conflicts of any kind with civilians, but also, by advances to the Bürger and union with them, shall give evidence of their desire to cooperate, with honesty and devotion, in the realization of a constitutional legal system.

The Assembly also adopted an amendment offered by the deputy Schulz (from Wanzleben) which provided that those officers who found the Stein resolution in conflict with their own political views should be honor-

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[25]Ibid., pp. 143-151.

bound to quit the service.[26] Nothing better illustrates the desire of the democratic Prussian Bürger to transform the military establishment than this inquisitorial attempt to purge the officer corps of elements incompatible to the Bürger mentality.

The Prussian army had officers who responded to the civilian demands for reform. A handful of officers from the 1820's on, took up the pen to combat Bürger reform proposals. By 1848, the "mental powers" of the army had been mobilized, chiefly in response to the parliamentary debates on military reform that took place in the constitutional German states before 1848.[27]

Writing in 1821, for example, Colonel Blesson argued that the army is not outside of Bürger society but a special order (Stand) inside society, for which, thus, special regulations were required, applicable to the army but not to civil society.[28] To this another writer, Decker, added that the army was a "factor of order" in society, and it was in the "nature of the matter" that it should appear, to the outsider, as a "state within the state." But, the writers, argued, this made the army a special "order" not a caste.[29] Its functions were simply different from the functions of civilians.

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[26]Ibid., pp. 151-153. I use Gordon Craig's translation of this awkwardly worded resolution. Politics, pp. 114-115.

[27]Hohn, Verfassungskampf, pp. 121ff.

[28]Ibid., pp. 224; 254.

[29]Ibid., pp. 224, 257.

Lieutenant Colonel Karl Rudloff elaborated further on this point in a compendium which described, in detail, the legal position of the army in the state. For our purposes, however, Rudloff asserted that the chief legal duties of the army consisted in loyalty and obedience: "Honor comes after loyalty and obedience." And this loyalty and obedience are owed, ultimately, to the Commander-in-chief, the Supreme War Lord, the Prussian king. The army serves real persons and not the nebulous ideas of Fatherland or nation.[30]

The above was only one argument, however, against obliging the army to swear an oath to uphold a constitution. The principle argument had an undoubted professional basis. To oblige the army to an oath to a constitution, it was argued, was to place the army under a double oath, since the military was already under oath to obey the king. Under this double oath, circumstances could arise in which the soldier was ordered to perform a task in violation of his oath to the constitution. Which, then, was he to obey: the king or the constitution? If the conflict was clear, the soldier had only the alternative of resigning the service. This is precisely why the German Bürger made the demand for a constitutional oath--to remove from the king the power of violating the constitution. The military writers pointed out, however, that not all issues would be clear-cut. Must the soldier test the constitutionality of each order given him? Would this not drive into the army a principle of deliberation about orders and thus create factionalism and mutual distrust? But the army executes, it does not deliberate.

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[30]Ibid., p. 233.

An oath to the constitution would be the first step in the dissolution of the army.[31]

The military writers assumed as given the necessity for the existence of defense forces for both external and internal security--an assumption which the Bürger shared. According to the military publicists, however, this necessity could not be met by any form of a citizen's militia, be it called a Bürgerwehr or a general arming of the people. A citizen's militia lacked the necessary training, discipline, and cohesiveness needed for external defense--the more so if its leaders were selected on the basis of popular election instead of tested military skill. Such a force could not be expected to uphold internal order either since its members could be expected to sympathize with their fellow Bürgers. Only a professional force was useful for this purpose.[32]

Having, to their satisfaction, established the argument for the maintenance of standing army, the military publicists found it easy to push away the other civilian proposals. Cadet houses were defended because they produced "usuable" officers for the army.[33] Since the army was a "separate order," separate military courts were also defended as lying in the "nature of the matter."[34] The same reasoning held for the retention of the courts of honor: The officer's estate must be allowed to maintain its own internal integrity.[35] The same was argued

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[31]Ibid., pp. 207, 224.

[32]Ibid., pp. 258-259.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid., p. 239.

[35]Ibid.

for the retention of secret conduct lists; commanding officers needed to have records on the qualities of their charges. And since they added to the espirit de corps of the officer corps, the officer casinos were also to be retained. They provided a common meeting ground for officers and for inexpensive meals.[36]

Concomitant arguments were also made against extending rights of assembly and petition to the soldiers--this would only legalize deliberation in the armed forces and thus hasten their dissolution.[37]

Since these questions will be repeated in other contexts later, it is unnecessary to catalog any further points as they developed before 1848. What is important to observe, however, is that there was a clear thread of professionalism in the arguments of the military publicists. Such arguments, to be sure, did not find much hearing beyond the small circles of readers of military publications before 1848. But one may observe with Reinhard Hohn[38] that the "army" was "mentally armed" for the upheaval of 1848--if by "army" is taken to mean the small circle of writers and readers of military publications. At the very least, there was a treasury of thought-out arguments for the officer who cared to mine them in 1848. And the treasury was mined in 1848.

According to the army's own officer-publicists we arrive at the conclusion that the army was supposed to be purely an instrument of the executive, and, as such, ought to remain apolitical. We shall contrast

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., pp. 307-308.

the reality of 1848 to that general theory in this study. In the next chapter we propose to examine the level of professionalism in the Prussian army officer corps.

## CHAPTER II

## MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PRUSSIAN OFFICER CORPS

In the sense that most Prussian officers earned their living through military service, the Prussian officer corps may be said to be professional. Such a broad rendering of the term, professional, however, is scarcely useful and is misleading; one does not, for example, use the lable, "professional," to describe the services of a chimney-sweep simply because he earns a living in that manner. The concept of profession includes expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. In the military vocation, the officer may be said to be professional if he possesses and expands his knowledge of military science with a view to the "organizing, equipping, and training" of combat forces, of planning--in peace-time and war--the activity of these armed forces, and directing their operations. Further, the officer must possess a sense of responsibility to his client, the state, in the use of armed forces. And, finally, his sense of responsibility must also be directed toward fellow members of his own vocation; there is a corporate character implicit in any true profession.[1]

Military professionalism, so understood, did not exist before the nineteenth century. Before the French Revolution, officership was

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[1]Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 1-17.

ascribed to birth. In Prussia, the Junkers had an almost exclusive monopoly on officer positions. Talent and expertise played no role in the recruiting and precious little in the advancement of officers.

Professionalism entered the Prussian army only after the collapse of the old Prussian state and its army following the disaster at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806. This was accomplished at the urging of a small group of dedicated and talented officers--Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolman, Boyen, and Clausewitz, to name the more important figures in the reform movement. On 6 August, 1808, the reformers extracted from King Frederick William III a Fundamental Order which ordained that:

> A claim to the position of officer from now on be warranted in peace-time by knowledge and education, in time of war by exceptional bravery and quickness of perception. From the whole nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities can lay title to the highest positions of honor in the military establishment. All social preference which has hitherto existed is herewith terminated in the military establishment, and everyone, without regard for his background, has the same duties and the same rights.[2]

From 1808 on, any man of seventeen or over who had served three months could in theory take examinations at the regimental level for the rank of cornet or subaltern (Portepeefähnrich), provided that there were vacancies in the unit applied for (fourteen vacancies were authorized for each infantry regiment and eight for each cavalry regiment). For a cornet to advance to the rank of second lieutenant, he had also to

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[2]Rudolf Vaupel (ed.), "Die Reorganization des preussischen Staates unter Stein und Hardenberg," Zweiter Theil: "Das preussische Heer von Tilsiter Frieden bis zur Befreiung, 1807-1814," Publikationen aus den preussischen Staatsarchiven, Band 94 (Leipzig, 1938), p. 533. Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 30-31.

pass an examination before a central board, normally sitting in Berlin. And, as we have seen, a self-regulating principle was also adopted in the regiments; before the young man could become an officer, his fellow officers had to co-opt him into the regiment.[3]

To professionalize the officer corps, it was necessary, obviously, to facilitate the schooling of officer candidates and officers. The cadet houses of the eighteenth century continued to train sons of officers who had fallen during the Napoleonic wars. In addition, schools were created on the division level for the instruction of officer-candidates--the cornets. And, finally, a War Academy was founded, located in Berlin, whose purpose was to give to selected officers advanced courses in military science and cognate studies. From the most able officers in the War Academy were recruited the members of the Great General Staff.[4] These were auspicious beginnings.

Professionalization of the Prussian officer corps, however, was hardly a success by 1848. The officer corps of 1848, except for a change in social composition traceable to the Fundamental Order of 1848, was not a body of men to which Huntington's yardstick could apply. As a body, the officer corps was distinctly not professional. Apart from the technical services, only a small number of officers could honestly claim that they had seriously and successfully applied themselves to the study of military science and theory and these few were looked down upon, derisively, as book-worms and impractical, sometimes by the very officers

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[3]Craig, Politics, p. 44.

[4]Ibid., pp. 45-46.

who boasted about the professional attainments of the officer corps.[5] As a matter-of-fact, the vast majority of Prussian officers by no means found the officer's examination easy; passing the examination after sleepless nights of cramming, however, made them believe that they had a "well-earned right" to wear their splendid uniforms.

The obvious disdain that the typical officer had for education, for intellectual activity, and professional improvement was noted by a French observer in 1840, who remarked that "after the young man becomes an officer, all study of military science ceases; he lives socially and reads what goes with that."[6] This atmosphere of disdain for intellectual activities was, of course, contagious. In many cases, an officer otherwise capable of improving his mind and military knowledge, was hooted at for being "eager," for being a "striver," and normally gave up his ambition.[7] Such social pressure clearly arrested the development of professional expertise.

Social pressure also worked to the disadvantage of general education among the Prussian officers. Arid intellectual companionship drove many an officer into more intimate contact with civilian reading and discussion groups, although, some, such as the sensitive--if second-rate--poet, Lieutenant von Gaudy, left the service because of the lack of intellectual

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[5](Anon.), Bekenntnisse eines preussischen Offiziers (Hamburg, 1848), pp. 48f.

[6](Anon.), Das preussische Soldatenthum. Französische Ansicht. Von einem Reisenden (Leipzig, 1841), pp. 68f.

[7]Prinz Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben (4 vols., Berlin, 1897f), Vol. I, p. 70.

companionship.[8] Most intellectually alienated officers, however, remained with the service, finding intellectual outlets outside their regimental circles. In Berlin, for example, Lieutenants de la Chevallerie, von Kall, and Canabaeus were frequenters of the reading rooms of the Zeitungs-Halle, a newspaper that became pronouncedly democratic in 1848.[9] Others were to be found in the salon of Varnhagen von Ense. And in the Western Provinces, a number of officers flirted with proto-communist or socialist reading circles--notably the lieutenants Anneke, Willich, Beust, and Korff.[10]

If many officers had reason to be mentally alienated from the officer corps, they also had reason to be socially alienated. For the officer corps was more a social class than a professional group and the demands of class obstructed professional growth. The officer corps was openly referred to as an "estate," specifically the first estate in the land. All officers wore the "king's coat." Since the officer wore the "king's coat," he was supposedly capable of being presented at court--he was "Hoffähig." Even the highly placed professor was ostensibly ranked socially behind the lowest Prussian lieutenant. For this reason, higher noblemen of Prussia, Germany, and even other European states were eager to wear the Prussian uniform. Hence there was a total of 41 princes, 18 of whom held general rank, 11 dukes and arch-

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[8]Julius von Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, Briefe und Aufsätze des Generals der Cavallerie (Berlin, 1882), I. Theil, pp. 156f.

[9]Adolf Wolff, Berliner Revolutions-Chronik (3 vols., Berlin, 1854), Vol. I, pp. 91-93.

[10]W. Korff, Schon Wieder ein Ehrengerichtlicher Process! (Mannheim, 1847), p. 40.

dukes, 9 of whom were generals, and 298 barons and 196 counts in the officer corps.[11] In order to emphasize the exalted standing of the officer corps, the Hohenzollern monarchs themselves never appeared in public without an officer's uniform. In addition, the Hohenzollerns also appointed dignitaries and potentates of foreign lands to be honorary regimental chiefs.[12]

With such a glittering array of socially highly ranked personalities in the officer lists, it was natural to call the officer corps the first estate in the land. In order to maintain the fiction that all Prussian officers belonged to the same social level, some of the lesser (if usually wealthy) nobility were also made honorary chiefs of regiments. Von Boyen, von Krauseneck, von Pfuel, von Müffling, von Thile, von Wrangel, von Zieten, von Nostitz, von Columb, von Natzmer, and Count zu Dohna had reached this category by 1847.[13] For the Prussian system sought to emphasize the social and political pre-eminence of the officer corps in the state. The king frequently used officers as diplomats:

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[11]Rang-und Quartier-Liste der königlich preussischen Armee für das Jahr 1847. Nebst den Anciennetäts-Listen der Generalität, Stabs-und Subaltern-Offiziere (Berlin, 1847). Much of what follows is based on Franz C. Endres, "Soziologische Struktur und ihre entsprechenden Ideologien des deutschen Offizierkorps vor dem Weltkrieg," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, Vol LVIII (1927), with modifications.

[12]Rang-und Quartier-Liste, 1847. The Electoral Prince of Hesse, Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, the Arch-Duke John of Austria, the Heriditary Grand Duke of Hesse, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the King of Wurttemberg, the Duke of Wellington, the Grand Duke of Baden, King William II of the Netherlands, Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, the Crown Prince Alexander of Russia, the Arch Grand Duke of Saxon-Weimar-Eisenach, the King of Hanover, Prince Carl of Bavaria, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, the Duke of Brunswick, the Duke of Nassau, as well as six Hohenzollerns were each honorary chiefs of Prussian regiments. These, of course, were not in the table of organization for seniority ranking.

[13]Ibid.

"That in counsels the feeling of a soldier should also speak out is an indispensable necessity in Prussia," Frederick William IV wrote.[14] Retired officers were often given the important civil post of Landrat, especially in the western provinces, but in East Elbia as well.[15] Thus the officer corps often had direct, as well as indirect, connection with caste rulership in the Prussian state. Retired officers were also often given positions in the civilian bureaucracy in order to supplement their pensions; at least 1088 retired officers were placed in postal, revenue, police, and customs service in the years between 1825 and 1843.[16] There was a direct attempt, in short, to cultivate an aristocratic spirit in the officer corps--an attempt to show that the officer belonged to the first estate in the land.

Those retired officers who had civilian positions remained under the benign jurisdiction of the military courts as well as under their unit's court of honor; hypothetically, the officer corps, in corpore, thus had a considerable influence over civil administration; the retired officer, employed as a civil servant, was expected to behave in conformity with the officer corps' unwritten code of honor.[17]

If membership in the first estate in the land was supposed to give the officer a high social standing in Prussia as well as fringe benefits that gave him privileges above the rest of Prussian society, so, too, did membership in the officer corps confer unique judical rights on the

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[15]Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, Vol. I, p. 180.

[16]Curt Jany, Geschichte der königlich Preussischen Armee (4 vols., Berlin, 1928-1933), Vol IV, p. 142, note.

[17]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, p. 213 and notes.

officer. For the individual officer had a unique legal position in Prussia as well as legalized privileges. Legally, military personnel were under the jurisdiction of two courts. In civil matters, they were under the usual civilian courts while in criminal and injury matters, they were under the jurisdiction of military courts.

In civil matters, officers were under the jurisdiction of the Obergericht (Superior Court) of the provinces in which they were garrisoned. This meant that the officer had the same legal rights as the nobility of the province. A cashiered officer, on the other hand, was put under the jurisdiction of the court to which he had belonged before entering service.[18] Hypothetically, that could mean that if a noble officer was cashiered, he lost nothing so far as his legal rights were concerned since he might possibly still retain the rights of the nobility, especially if he came from high or wealthy nobility; a cashiered non-noble officer, on the other hand, lost his privilege of belonging to the legally exempt. Membership in the officer corps obviously gave officers of the lesser noble and non-noble calsses a high legal standing in civil matters so long as they did not transgress the law with the same impunity as could, perhaps, the higher nobility.

The same could be said for the officer's standing in criminal matters. In criminal and injury cases, military personnel were under the jurisdiction of military courts. In criminal cases, the military courts excluded all other courts and were therefore the highest courts

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[18] Allgemeines Landrecht für die preussischen Staaten (Berlin, 1825), Theil 2, Titel 10, para 65-66. Karl G. Rudloff, Handbuch der preussischen Militairrechts, oder Darstellung der im preussischen Heer bestehenden Grundsätze über militairische Rechts- und Polizei-Verhaltnisse, Disziplin und Justizverwaltung. Mit Genehmigung Sr. Majestät des Königs (3 Theile, Berlin, 1826), I. Theil, pp. 29-32, 138.

in the land. Thus, if a civilian broke a law before entering service, the military court would take over the proceedings from the civil court; if the civil court had already passed sentence, the military court had to change this into military punishment. In riots, civilian police authorities normally had jurisdiction and right of investigation. However, if a military person was involved, the military courts were supposed to investigate. And although the military courts tried the accused soldier--officer and common soldier--against the General Laws of the Prussian States, the great elasticity in military punishments--in one case, punishment for civilian-military scuffles could bring the military offender two weeks to six years' imprisonment--and the fact that military offenders were tried by military courts in camera in which the judges usually had no legal training gave no assurance to civilians, soldiers, or officers that law enforcement was equitable.[19] Moreover, the fact that no officer could be punished without first being dismissed from service also helped make equality of justice a chimera. Finally, in a case among civilians, an officer who was called upon to testify as a witness did not even appear in the civilian court; he merely gave his testimony to a military court which then turned the testimony--ostensibly in authentic form--over to the civilian courts.[20] No cross-examination of the witness occurred; the king's officers, so

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[19]Ibid., pp. 145, 147, 148, 164. Hugo von Hasenkamp, Kritik der unter dem 3. April 1845, 20. Juli 1845, 16. Mai 1844 und 27. September 1845 erlassenen preussischen Militär - Straf - und ehrengerichtlichen Gesetze, Verordnungen und Kabinetts - Ordren (Leipzig, 1846), pp. 10-12.

[20]Rudloff, Handbuch, I. Theil, p. 170.

was the assumption, were honorable men. It is obvious that the Prussian judicial system was designed to protect the honor or appearance of the officer corps as well as to maintain its social predominance in the state. Although it is professionally valid to argue that the soldier should give up his civilian rights upon entry into the army, objections to proposals in 1848 demanding that the army be placed under common law and under the jurisdiction of civilian courts for all strictly non-military matters also neatly covered the officer's social status. For in pre-March Prussia, the officer obviously did not give up legal rights so much as he gained legal rights.

The caste character of the officer corps in the Prussian state was further accentuated by the institution of the court of honor, which had regulatory authority over the unwritten code of honor of the officer corps. The role of the courts of honor, ostensibly, was to allow the various unit officer corps to maintain their external appearance--their honor--before the public and before the other regimental officer corps. The officer corps were supposed to cleanse themselves of impurities that might damage their honor. According to the instructions of 1808, supplemented by the instructions of 1843, the officer was supposed to conduct himself in a manner befitting his exalted station. Not only was he to avoid excessive drinking, the contraction of debts, etc., but he was also to avoid keeping company with "dissolute females" and "people of ill repute." In practice, this meant that the officer was to avoid being seen in public with anyone not of his social rank; what he did behind curtains was normally of no concern to the court of honor, so long as it did not reflect on the honor of the corps. According to ex-

officer Friedrich Wilhelm Held, Berlin journalist and self-styled demogogue in 1848,

> The officer corps has large claims to honor, that is, to external apparent honor. The officer may gamble, may participate in Bacchanalia, may maintain a dancing girl as a mistress, may contract debts, in short may live as immorally as possible, but only among his peers. He may have no association with Bürger, with students, merchants, etc., because his honor, that is, appearance, would suffer from that. . . Genuine honor. . . is laughed at and scorned as pedantic.[21]

However exaggerated this may be, it is certain that very little of the officers' private lives was aired in public. Caste honor (as well as censorship) forbade public exposures of regimental affairs and of regimental officers. As Wilhelm Rüstow wrote, there was a "philistine horror of publicity" in the officer corps.[22] Hence, in order to avoid public trials, officers were placed under the jurisdiction of military courts. For this reason also, many units even had a special "slush fund" to help younger officers to stay out of debt.[23] Likewise, the commanding officer of a unit could turn down requests for a court of honor proceeding if he thought that too many of these would put his unit in a bad light vis a vis the other officer corps. And most officers preferred to keep the regimental secrets "in the family" lest their own units be suspect of indiscipline and hence fall into disgrace and, as a result, be short-changed in any royal favors, including promotions.

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[21]Locomotive: Zeitung für politische Bildung des Volkes (Berlin), #159, 10 October, 1848. On the courts of honor, Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, pp. 511-519.

[22]Wilhelm Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat vor und während der Revolution (1. Auflage, Königsberg, 1850), p. 102.

[23]An officer wrote confirming this to the Kölnische Zeitung, 1. Beilage, #236, 24 August, 1848.

Many regimental officer corps preferred, therefore, to tolerate their own deviant members, rather than cause an uncomfortable scandal; the honor of the unit demanded a "knightly" and homogeneous appearance. So, for example, in 1843, Major Wegener refused to grant a court of honor proceedings which Lieutenant Korff wanted to initiate against officers who had attended a farewell party for the division Auditor (legal advisor) Marcard in the Minden, Westphalia, garrison. Marcard, Korff alleged, was a drunkard and was immoral and hence unfitting company for officers. Major Wegener, however, told Korff that he wanted the whole matter to stay within the officer corps of the reserve battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment.[24] It was probably for such reasons that there remained a considerable number of non-conformist officers in the Prussian army up to 1848 and perhaps even thereafter.

A battalion or regimental commander could thus turn down requests for courts of honor proceedings; however, should he desire a court of honor proceedings, sufficient officers were usually at hand who would turn in denunciations against an alleged offender rather than risk having unfavorable "observations" made on their conduct report. And the boasted comradely spirit of the officer corps did not always exclude the desire to see a few vacancies in the seniority lists, especially after 30 years of peace when promotions had come to a near standstill. For a court of honor could vote to dismiss or cashier officers. And if the cashiered officers, together with wives and families, should thus lose their legal rights in Prussia, that was of no concern to the court of honor. A court of honor could even declare that an inactive or retired officer

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[24]Hasenkamp, Kritik, p. 32; Korff, Ehrengerichtlicher Process, pp. 5-11; See also Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere aus der preussischen Armee nach der Märzrevolution (Cologne, 1848), pp. 11-12.

should move away from a particular garrison area; whether the inactive officer could afford to move wife, children, and furniture was also of no concern to the court of honor. Indeed, Number 3 in the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung in 1848 made this quite clear when he wrote: "Whether such a judged officer is of good reputation or not in the other classes, worries quite as little as the slogans that have now again become fashion: Junkerdom and Pedantic [Zopf] extravagances."[25] The courts of honor, quite obviously, could be sources of fear to many career officers; an officer would have to possess considerable moral courage to dare run afoul of them. This fear was the undoubted reason for the anonymity of so much of officers' literature in 1848. Such social corporativeness, in any case, had little bearing on the corporativeness that Huntington cites as one of the marks of professionalism.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the aristocratic or "feudal" honor of the officer corps could interfere with, or regulate, the individual officer's private life insofar as the officer's private life became a public matter. But nowhere was this more glaring than in the limitations placed on an officer in choosing a wife. No officer was allowed to marry without the consent of his commanding officer, of his officer corps, and of the king. If his officer corps did not accept the proposed woman as being fit to be an officer's wife (she had to be noble or at least of good birth; a woman, for example, whose father was a shopkeeper and waited on his customers personally, was unfit to be an officer's wife.), the officer could not marry her and remain an officer.

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[25]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #9, 1 September, 1848.

It made no difference whether the woman in question was pregnant or not; to protect the honor of the officer corps, the law made it illegal to list an officer's mane in the baptismal record as being the father of an illegitimate child. If the officer was honorable enought to marry the woman he had made pregnant, a court of honor proceeding could force him out of the service while the king, as well, reserved the right to declare the marriage null and void.[26] How much this code of honor contributed to the moral standards of individual officers cannot be determined; what is certain is that the honor of the officer corps was rated much higher than the conventional or personal honor or morals of its individual members, to say nothing of those who were not members. It is not to be wondered that many non-noble officers would resent such inquisitorial interference in matters that should have been left private. Or that most Bürger preferred not to take up military life as a career.

The code of honor of the officer corps, as expressed through the courts of honor, could obviously seriously disable an officer in a legal and personal sense, if he ran athwart it. But the code of honor could go even further. Perhaps nothing illustrates more flagrantly the officer corps' exalted position in the Prussian state and its mentality than that expression of "feudal" honor, the duel. Since the councils of honor, which conducted investigations necessary for courts of honor proceedings, were normally under the control of the superior officer, the officers of a particular unit could or would not always recognize that the

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[26]Rudloff, Handbuch, I. Theil, pp. 41-44, 63. Allgemeines Landrecht, Theil I, Titel 2, Para 932; Ibid., Theil II, Titel I, Para 34.

council of honor could give satisfaction for an alleged insult or injury an officer may have received. The insulted officer might have felt compelled to duel despite the recommendations of the council; his comrades, he might feel, expected him to duel and he would be unworthy of the honor of the corps if he did not.[27] Thus, although the Hohenzollerns tried to abolish dueling, they continually met with resistance from the officer corps. Few superior officers, and, in the end, the Hohenzollerns too, wanted to see an officer unduly punished for defending his "honor." Indeed, failure to comply with the compulsion to duel was admitted as part of the grounds for the dismissal of Lieutenant Fritz Anneke in 1845. Hence the court of honor ordinances of 1843 prohibited duelling in one phrase and, by ordering the councils of honor to referee unavoidable duels (including those between officers and civilians), sanctioned it in another phrase.[28] Whereas civilians were forbidden to duel, and, if a death occurred in civilian duelling, the survivor was then subject to the death penalty, the officer could receive only five to ten years' fortress arrest for killing a fellow officer in a duel. In contrast, for killing a civilian in a duel, the officer could receive two years' fortress arrest; the law made it almost legal for officers to hack down "insulting" civilians, provided only that the civilians were "capable of giving satisfaction"--those lower classes not "capable of giving satisfaction" were either in danger of being hacked down without further ado, or turned over to the criminal courts. As Hugo von Hasenkamp put it, the value of the life of a civilian in relation to the value of the life of an officer in Prussia was thus legally estimated as standing

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[27]Hasenkamp, Kritik, p. 36.

[28]Ibid., pp. 39-40; Demeter, Das deutsche Heer, pp. 121ff.

in a ratio of 2:5 or 2:10. In cases of duelling between two officers where there was no death, both officers were liable to receive disciplinary punishment (fourteen days house arrest) but were not necessarily removed from the service so long as they did not by-pass the council of honor; if two civilians duelled, however, they were liable to criminal prosecution with possible loss of noble title (A threat that does not seem to have been carried out.) and ten years to life imprisonment. Finally, since the honor of the corps could compel an "insulted" officer to duel with a civilian, it thereby could compel the civilian to break the law and duel as well. In such cases, the punishment of the civilian was supposedly measured by the punishment given the officer, since the military courts were superior to the civilian courts. On the other hand, if a civilian challenged an officer to a duel, the civilian received full punishment. The law made it easy for officers to insult civilians, but difficult for civilians to challenge officers.[29]

The enormity of these discrepancies illustrates where the officer corps fit in Prussian society. If an officer refused to duel, he could be forced to leave the service. Released from the service, he could be thus deprived of the rights which his legal estate normally should have given him. In other words, if he did not duel, he was also punished as a civilian for not violating a law that was binding on civilians. The duel obviously made glaring the legal and social separation of the officer corps from Prussian society. The liberals in the united diet of 1847 made this bitterly clear. The Rhenish industrialist Hermann von

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[29]Hasenkamp, Kritik, pp. 37-40; Allgemeines Landrecht, Theil II, Titel 20, Para 687, Titel 20, Para 688; Rudloff, Handbuch, I. Theil, pp. 72, 208.

Beckerath stated then that,

> If the duel is declared to be a basic pillar of the officer's estate, I ask you then: Can a reconciliation between the military and the bourgeoisie be thereby furthered? Can we regard the duel as a basic pillar of the bourgeoisie? The basic pillar of the bourgeoisie is respect for law; But the law says: "Thou shalt not kill!"[30]

That such inequities were not simply hypothetical was also illustrated in practice. In 1844, a Lieutenant Leithold accused a lawyer of lèse majesté in Königsberg, challenged him, and killed him in a duel. Citizens of the city were up in arms demanding that the lieutenant be punished. King Frederick William IV intervened in favor of the officer and admonished the Bürger in Königsberg that if they persisted in defaming the army, he would punish Königsberg in that he would remove his favor from it. And the commanding general in Königsberg, Count zu Dohna, instructed the officers of the garrison to boycott ostentiatiously the area where the alleged insult had occurred.[31]

Quite apart from the duel as an expression of an officer's defiance of the law and of the Ten Commandments, as an expression of individual sovereignty, indiscipline, and insubordination, the duel itself was also an expression of the aristocratic spirit which the officer corps carried. In the years from 1832 to 1842, under the old provisions regarding dueling and especially under pressure from King Frederick William III, 29 cases of duelling were punished, an average of 2.6 per year; five duels had fatal results. With the ordinance of 1843, the

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[30]Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, p. 74.

[31]Ibid., p. 43; Craig, Politics, pp. 90f.

annual average of duelling officially recorded from 1843 to 1856 rose to 4.6.[32] The incidence of duelling clearly illustrates the exalted position that the officer corps had in state and society.

The superior position of the officer corps in state and society was also reflected in other contacts between civilian and officer corps. For the officer corps was a legal person and could act as such, as a plaintiff against civilians. For this reason, the fiction of spiritual unity in the officer corps was rigidly maintained; it is a fiction which has mesmerized observers into believing that the "army" had a political opinion rather than many opinions. In 1843, an anonymous brochure, "Supplementary Reminiscences of the Jubilee Celebration of the Albertines," was published in Königsberg. The brochure allegedly contained some sour remarks on the conduct of several officers at the celebration. The army corps commanding general, Count zu Dohna, called for the garrison officer corps to protest. After the cavalry and infantry officers had protested, a Major Enke appeared before his artillery unit and invited the officers there also to express their indignation. Neither the subordinates nor Major Enke had read the pamphlet; nonetheless they complied. The Königsberg Inquisitoriat, however, informed General Count zu Dohna that no action could be taken against the writer since he was anonymous. Moreover the entire officer corps had not been insulted, but only two unnamed lieutenants. However, if the lieutenants of the garrison protested action could be taken against the publisher. Dohna had the lieutenants assemble in the Casino the

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[32]Demeter, Das deutsche Heer, p. 296.

next day in order to sign the protest. All but one complied; the welfare of one publisher, more or less, was not worth risking the displeasure of General Dohna, who seemed to know when lieutenants should consider themselves insulted. Major Enke told the one officer who refused to sign, Lieutenant Hugo von Hasenkamp, that "signing the protest was a pure 'formality' and that a refusal to sign was tantamount to compromising him and the commanding general." Confusing legal and military considerations, Enke said that Hasenkamp's refusal to sign was "unmilitary." For his refusal to sign, Hasenkamp was transferred back to his parent unit (an intended demotion) in order to "avoid friction" in the Königsberg garrison; through his independent action, he had destroyed the "unity" of the officer corps there. Those officers who gave Hasenkamp a farewell dinner were forbidden to talk in public about the dinner afterwards, and the officers were forbidden, as well, to be present at the post-carriage to say goodby to Hasenkamp, lest the Königsbergers be led to believe that the officers were not, in "unity," behind their commander. In any event the protest was considered legitimate; the publisher of the brochure received two months imprisonment for printing an alleged insult of two unnamed lieutenants, a brochure which few, if any, lieutenants had read or were even allowed to read.[33] The incident obviously shows that the officer corps was a legal person and, as such, could initiate legal prosecution of civilians. And the incident dramatizes the fact that insulting the officer corps was tantamount to insulting the king--it was lèse majesté. The incident

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[33]Hugo von Hasenkamp, Darlegung der Gründe meines Austritts aus dem Militärdienst (Leipzig, 1845), pp. 1-15; Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution, Vol. I, p. 50.

also illustrates the position of the officer corps in the state. For, like the king who was himself an officer, the officer corps while it acted as a legal person in a prosecuting sense, could never itself become a defendant. As an anonymous officer wrote in 1848, the "army [officer corps] is the state in the same sense as Louis XIV could say of himself, L'etat, c'est moi."[34] And, finally, the incident demonstrates that the "opinion" of any unit's officer corps, as it was publicly expressed, was often the opinion of the commanding officer; the pronunciamentoes of 1848 must often be understood in this sense.

The officer corps, in terms of its position in the state, was thus supposed to be an exclusive and privileged group. Its esprit de corps, based in part on its position in the state, was distinctly aristocratic, just as its position in the state was aristocratic. One could hardly call the officer corps a "purely military" organization. "Purely military" arguments in favor of retaining separate military courts and the courts of honor do not very well mask social and political reality.

The distinctive position of the officer corps in the state was further emphasized by the uniform the officer wore. The uniform made the Prussian officer stand out in society and in the field. Through nuances in leggings, in cuffs, in lapels and epaullets, he was connected with the "knightly" tradition of the regiment to which he belonged. Indeed, the particular splendidness of a regimental uniform or of its

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[34](Anon.), Bekenntnisse eines Offiziers, p. III.

accessories was often expressly calculated to bring highly ranked nobility into the unit--an effort to increase the aristocratic respectability of the regiment. The Twelfth Hussar Regiment, for example, is said to have attracted a large number of counts because of a glittering uniform, while the Tenth Hussar, which was in the same brigade and in the same garrison, had a less "knightly" uniform and hence a less "respectable" officer corps.[35]

Unlike in France, where the uniform was usually worn only when the officer was on duty and hence signified only that the wearer was a professional man, the Prussian officer was obliged to appear in public at all times in uniform. For the uniform signified that the Prussian officer not only belonged to a supposedly professional group but also to a social class. The uniform, in any event, was not really designed for the profession of arms. Very few, if any, officers saw that with the innovation of the Tirailleur during the French Revolutionary Wars, the brightness and splendor of the Prussian officer's uniform no longer made it a militarily useful garb and that it made the officers--and their men--targets for enemy sharpshooters. But a resplendent uniform, adorned with the inevitable sword, gave the officer a certain "dash" for which many expected due admiration.

Because the uniform was supposed to be worn at all times, the officer could only appear in public in places where the uniform was suitable; the "king's coat" was not to be besmirched through association with classes socially unfit to wear it. As will be seen below, these classes were wide in membership. And because the uniform made the officer obvious, the system tried to make the officer modest and retiring;

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[35]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, I. Theil, pp. 76-127.

he was supposed to comport himself in such a way as not to cast bad reflections on his estate. In effect, most officers behaved coldly and correctly to lesser people in the Prussian monarchy, but the numerous exceptions when officers displayed overt arrogance to civilians betray the obvious caste spirit behind such demeanor. On the other hand, there is evidence that many officers, especially in the Rhineland where the uniform was not held in high esteem by civilians, had civilian clothing, and purposely wore them in order not to be conspicuous when they called on civilians who may not normally have been considered "fit" company for Prussian officers.[36] Bürger arguments that soldiers be allowed to wear civilian clothing when off-duty can hardly be said to have endangered the profession of arms.

The "feudal" spirit of the officer corps found its most significant expression in the hopes of the officer candidate to become a cavalry officer; horsemanship was, after all, a chief attribute of the cavalier. Hence, although the cavalry was still a useful arm in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was much overrated with respect to the other branches; "The cavalry is the arm of victory in the Prussian army," cavalry Lieutenant Colonel von Willisen naively proclaimed.[37] Unimportant nuances were made between curassiers (heavy cavalry) and dragoons (also heavy cavalry), while the Uhlans still relied on the

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[36]Walter von Bremen (ed.), Denkwürdigkeiten des preussischen Generals der Infanterie Eduard von Fransecky (Bielefeld/Leipzig, 1901), pp. 94-95, 111-112.

[37]Wilhelm I, Militärische Schriften weiland Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen Majestät (Auf Befehl Seiner Majestät des Kaisers und Königs herausgegeben von königlichen preussischen Kriegsministerium) (2 vols., Berlin, 1897), Vol. I, p. 373. William's sarcastic marginal comment to this statement: "Why say thereby that the infantry and artillery are not arms of victory?"

questionable value of the lance. The "better" "feudal" families sent their sons to cavalry regiments and they chose the heavy cavalry over the light cavalry, the cavalry over the infantry, and the cavalry and infantry over the technical branches--the engineers and artillery--which they left almost completely in the hands of non-noble officers. "Clumsy artillery" was the term that young cadets derisively used to their comrade cadets who chose (or were obliged to choose) the "unknightly" technical branches of service.[38]

Horsemanship was thus a leading attribute of the officer--aristocrat. Although the mania for horses had not risen to the bizarre heights of pre-World War I years, it nontheless had a visible effect on the professional virtuosity of the officers of non-cavalry units. Instead of devoting time to the study of modern warfare, many officers were inclined to make sure they appeared as accomplished riders. For example, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, an artillery officer in the Royal Guard, remarked that as a student at the War Academy in Berlin, he did nothing but "ride much and amuse" himself after lectures. Hohenlohe claims he rode as many as five horses a day, but also unjustifiably complains that the War Academy offered him nothing "practical" (technical?) when he attended the school in the early 1830's.[39] The non-cavalry officer obviously felt the need to prove himself to be as accomplished as the cavalry officer. Even a non-military soul and awkward horseman like King Frederick William IV felt obliged to give

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[38]Georg Jung, Der Berliner Cavaignac. Eine Entgegnung auf: Die Deutsche Central-Gewalt und die Preussische Armee (Berlin, 1848), p. 11, note. Cf. Demeter, Das deutsche Heer, p. 6.

[39]Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, pp. 160ff.

lip service to the "knightly" vogue of the horse, frequently exclaiming to his senior officers that he "came into the world with boots and spurs" and "that he was especially versed and at home in military things, in diplomacy, and in the breeding of horses [Pferdezucht]," a statement which, in its own cryptic way, sums up the Prussian spirit.[40] So closely identified was the horse with the aristocratic mentality that one democratic engineer officer made the preposterous proposal in 1848 that the cavalry should be abolished; the infantry, he opined, was a reflection of a democratically organized society!"[41]

The aristocratic mentality of the Prussian officer corps was especially pregnant in the social composition of the officer corps. Despite the Fundamental Order of 1808, over two-thirds of the officer corps still recruited itself from the old eighteenth century noble-officer families. Here the caste spirit of the officer corps found its essential core. The "feudal" families prided themselves as being "vassals" of the Hohenzollern monarchy; their uniformed sons thus held a privileged right to be the king's officers.

Frederick the Great had believed that the nobility made better officers than did the Bürger because the nobility had more "honor."

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[40]In General-Lieutenant Karl von Prittwitz's manuscript published under the title, Karl Ludwig v. Prittwitz, Berlin 1848. Monarchie, Militär und Märzrevolution. Bearbeited und herausgegeben von Gerd Heinrich. Dr. Heinrich and the Historische Kommission zu Berlin were kind enough to let me read the manuscript.

[41](Wilhelm Rüstow), Stehendes Heer und Volkswehr, ein Beitrag zu der Bewaffnungsfrage der Gegenwart -- von einem deutschen Offizier (Mannheim, 1848), pp. 4, 123.

The noble officer, Frederick opined, could not return to his family if he violated the honor of the family escutcheon, whereas the Bürger officer, even if he had been cowardly on the battlefield, could often count on being accepted in his family and on being able to pursue a normal Bürger profession. Despite the noble officers' shameful capitulations of fortresses to the French in 1806-1807, the Hohenzollerns of the 19th century shared Frederick the Great's estimation of the old Junker families, even if this meant a circumvention of the Fundamental Order of 1808. The Crown Prince William, for example, proposed that the state should provide Gymnasium education for the poorer Junker families in Prussia in order that officer candidates from these families could pass the officer examination. The Junker, William remarked, had an "inner fusion with the Prussian army" and if they were not helped, the army would be in "danger of losing that sentiment" which the Junkers had upheld for more than a Saeculum.[42] Although no Gymnasium education was given gratis to the Junkers, there were some deliberate if covert evasions of examination standards in their favor. Already in 1808, Frederick William III had admonished the examination commissions that "knowledge and scholarship are not the only qualification which mark a useful officer; presence of mind, ready perception, precision, correctness in his duty and propriety in his deportment are essential qualities which every officer must possess."[43] Moreover, examinations for the technical services, the candidates for which were largely non-noble,

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[42]Wilhelm I, Militärische Schriften, Vol, I, pp. 61-64, 494-496.

[43]Demeter, Das deutsche Heer, p. 80.

were more demanding than were those for the cavalry and infantry.[44] And in any event, in the latter branches, selection through cooptation served to exclude non-noble officers.

But the Hohenzollerns' estimation of the honor of the Junker officer was partly justified, at least in the sense that the honor of the Junkers sometimes meant unwavering loyalty to the pre-March political and social system and also unswerving bravery under fire. For example, when von Holzendorf heard that his son had been killed in the uprising on 18-19 March, 1848, he declared: "Then he is no longer my son!" Only after he learned that his son was not a revolutionary but had been killed accidentally, did he weep bitterly over his loss.[45]

In the sense of being authoritative, moreover, the Junker was uniquely suited to command. From birth to maturity, he was taught to believe that there were two classes in the world: The Junker who commanded and the other people who obeyed. Very few Junker officers really understood that their authority to command was supposed to be a function of their service rank and not of their class. Nothing in their training and experience suggested such a distinction. The Junker officer was born in a class separated from lesser men, was further separated from civilian society when he entered the cadet house at age 13, and, from 1819 to 1848, found an increasing number of noble officers as comrades when he entered a regiment at age 17 or 18. His world, in short, was rural, masculine, and noble; it was composed of

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[44]See the complaints which officers sent to the Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung von Staats-- und gelehrten Sachen, 2. Beilage, #116, 20 May, 1848 (Hereafter cited as Vossische Zeitung).

[45]Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte, p. 147.

the uniformed and uninformed.

The officer candidates who came out of the cadet houses received preference in the regiments as future officers. From 1815 up to the 1830's, the cadets were almost exclusively drawn from noble families. In 1808, Frederick William III had ordered that the sons of officers who had fallen in battle should receive preference in the cadet houses. These must have been almost exclusively noble since few non-noble officers had been in the Prussian army at the time of the battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806 and the large number of non-noble officers who came into the army during the Wars of Liberation were too young to be married or were not ranked high enough to be able to afford marriage and thus have sons.[46] Even after the sons of non-noble officers began trickling into the cadet houses, the preponderance of noble cadets prevailed; in 1848, the ratio of noble cadets to non-noble cadets was 2 to 1, which bespoke almost exactly the ratio in the officer corps itself. The chorus of Junker complaints that followed War Minister General Hermann von Boyen's refusal to fill sixty empty positions in the cadet houses in the 1840's testifies to the "inner fusion" of Junker families with Prussian officership.[47] It is obvious that Bürger demands in 1848 that cadet houses be abrogated completely were directed, not so much against the military as such, but against the social system which the cadet houses perpetuated.

A nobleman's possessions of a notoriously one-sided disciplinary

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[46]Demeter, Das deutsche Heer, pp. 16-17.

[47]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, pp. 551-552.

training in the cadet houses, however, was not the only criterion that made an acceptable officer candidate in the regiments. A regimental officer corps had the right to choose its own replacements through cooptation. The desire was present, in most units, to appear as respectable as possible, to have as many officers from the traditional warrior families as were available. The officer lists for 1847 reveal that a total of 4,116 noble officers could find their family names repeated in the lists. Just 1,102 noble names, repeated 2,3,4, and even 39 times in the lists, make up a total of 4,116 officers. Indeed 54 noble names alone account for 847 officers. Among these officers from the traditional officer families of Prussia were 16 von Alvenslebens, 19 von Arnims, 21 von Belows, 19 von Kamekes, 30 von Kleists, 16 von Puttkammers, 19 von Schmelings, 39 von Wedells, 18 von Winterfeldts, 17 von Witzlebens, and so forth.[48]

The similarities in the above names indicate both close and distant relationships. In addition to this, most noble officers in Prussia were related to other nobles through marriage. Thus, through marriage, von Natzmer was related to von Diest and to von Quast, von Griesheim to von Korff, von Schach to von Benningson, von Gravenitz to von Lützow, von Pfuel to von Luck, to von Sohrs, and to von Goertzke, and so forth. Large numbers of Prussian officers, it must be argued, were interrelated, and this interrelationship also had much to do with whom a specific officer corps might co-opt as a fellow officer. For an officer corps

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[48]Rang- und Quartierliste, 1847.

to reject an officer candidate who already had a relative in the service could easy be construed as an insult to the family name, especially if that family name had the prefix "von." So, for example, von Fransecky entered a regiment because his brother was already there.[49] Von Manteuffel's father placed his son Edwin in the 1st Guard Dragoon regiment because his former ward, Count Hermann Lynar-Lubbenau, was in that regiment.[50] And the Royal Hussar Guard Regiment could hardly reject young von Colomb without running the risk of insulting his father, General von Colomb.[51] Indeed, the "military" and aristocratic spirit of the Prussian officer corps often manifested itself in a form of nepotism; esprit de corps in the Prussian officer corps was to a large extent esprit de famille.

Esprit de famille, however, did not necessarily mean homogeneity of political convictions within the family, nor did it always result in expected adherence to duty. Field Marshal von Gneisenau's son had a much more provincial and conservative political conviction than did his German nationalist father.[52] And Captain von Natzmer of the 24th Infantry Regiment, though a member of an influential military dynasty in Prussia, was nonetheless found guilty of deserting his post in the Berlin armory in June of 1848. Contrary to Frederick the Great's opinion of Junker family "honor," it was largely because of family connections and

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[49]Bremen (ed.), Denkwürdigkeiten Fransecky, p. 63.

[50]Karl H. Keck, Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Edwin von Manteuffel (Bielefeld/Leipzig, 1890), p. 72.

[51]Otto Hoetzsch, "Die Stellung des Generals von Colomb zur Revolution in Posen und zu Willisen 1848," Zeitschrift fur Osteuropäische Geschichte (Vol. 4, 1913-1914), p. 369.

[52]See the anti-German nationalist sentiment of young Gneisenau in a letter he wrote to the Neue Preussische Zeitung, Beilage, #24, 28 July, 1848 (Hereafter cited as Kreuzzeitung).

pressure that Natzmer's punishment was commuted. Von Natzmer was given a chance to regain his "spurs" as an enlisted man in the Prussian military operations in Baden in 1849 and he subsequently retrieved his officer's patent.[53] It is not known that a non-noble officer received any such chance to retrieve his "honor."

An ex-Prussian officer, Wilhelm Rüstow, who was forced to leave the service after 1850 because he was found guilty of lèse majesté, argued in 1862 that the Prussian officer corps was an "establishment for the care of Junkers (Versorgungsanstalt für Junker)."[54] In a population of about 16,000,000 a relatively small grouping, totaling approximately 142,000 in all, was represented, in 1847, by 4,307 positions of a total of 6,316 in the officer corps, or 68.2% of the total. Reckoned from a ratio of 142,000 to 16,000,000, there should only have been about 57 or 58 noble officers, or about .009% had the Fundamental Order of 1808

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[53]Wolff, Berliner Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. III, pp. 358-374; Gustav von Diest, Meine Erlebnisse im Jahre 1848 (Berlin, 1898), p. 72.

[54]Wilhelm Rüstow, Die preussische Armee und die Junker (Hamburg, 1862), pp. 8-54. I use Rüstow's analysis for what follows, but have changed the figures so that they may apply to the officers' lists of 1847; Rüstow used the lists for 1861. Rüstow also gives the figure of 68,000 nobles for Prussia in the year 1861, a figure impossibly low even for that late year. According to Georg von Viebahn, there were 7,093 noble clans (Geschlechter) in Prussia. Viebahn estimates an average of four families for each clan and five persons for each family, making a total of 141,860 persons who belonged to the nobility in Prussia. Included in this number were the higher, titled nobility, the "knight's estate" owners, the immensely numerous and impoverished Junker, and the nearly peasant-like Szchlachta of Posen and West Prussia. Georg von Viebahn, Statistik des zollvereinten und nördlichen Deutschlands. In Verbindung mit den Herrn Oberberhauptmann von Decken, Special-kommissar Beutner I., Obforstmeister Maron, Hofgärtner Jager und Regierungs-Assessor Beutner II. unter Benutzung amtlicher Aufnahmen herausgegeben (3 vols., Berlin, 1858-1868), Vol. II, pp. 306-309.

been the sole criterion for the selection of officers. However, Rüstow allows that not all classes of the population can provide intelligent and capable officers. Taking the Prussian three-class suffrage of 1849 as a yard-stick, in which 153,808 voters were in the first class, 409, 945 in the second class, and 2,409,950 in the third class, Rüstow argues that officer material could probably come only from the families of the first two voting classes, since these represented, by and large, property and education in Prussia in the middle of the nineteenth century. These families amounted to approximately 2,500,000 persons, represented by the 563,753 voters in the first two classes. Rüstow places the nobility in the second voting class, which is much too favorable to the nobility since most had neither property nor education.[55] From this total of approximately 2,500,000 persons, the 142,000 nobles, when reckoned from this reasoning, should have placed approximately 353 or 354 officers in the army instead of the 4,307 which unofficial chicanery achieved. This chicanery, Rüstow argues, brought about the fact that at least one-quarter of the noble families in Prussia lived directly off the army budget, which was over one-half of the state budget, and to which their more affluent relatives, the large estate owners, because of tax privileges, contributed very little. Indeed, these latter profited from a large military establishment in that it provided them with a market where they could sell their mounts and grain. Prussian nobles, quite obviously, had a vested interest in placing their sons in the officer corps as well

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[55]Elsewhere Rüstow says that the Junker had an education that made them fit only to be Handwerker. Rustow, Preussische Armee, p. 8.

as in maintaining an army geared to uphold the existing social and political system as their political activity in 1848 demonstrated. No amount of "purely military" argument against Bürger reform proposals could obscure the existence of this military-agricultural complex.

The preponderance of the nobility in the officer corps was more than reflected in the rank structure. The non-nobles who remained in the officer corps were often left behind in promotion above the rank of major, a fact that probably discouraged many non-nobles, if they took the trouble to study the officer lists, from choosing a military career. On first glance, the percentage of non-nobles in the positions of staff officer to general officer in 1847 seems to be a bit more favorable to the non-nobles than was the over-all average; approximately 33.29% of these were non-noble as against 31.8% non-noble in the officer corps in all ranks.[56] But if the rank of major is left out of the account, where 44.48% were non-noble, only 16.5% of the officers from lieutenant colonel through the general ranks were of non-noble birth Exactly six non-nobles had reached the lowest general rank of major general. Table 1, derived from the officer lists of 1847, illustrates this.

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[56]These seem to have been mostly veterans of the Wars of Liberation who had achieved this grade through 32 years of peace. According to one ex-engineer officer who wrote a Berlin newspaper in May, 1848, "dozens" of engineers--mostly non-noble--were suddenly promoted to major in 1841 (probably as a result of pressure from Hermann von Boyen then entering his second term as war minister), but none of these promoted were given the salary of major. Vossische Zeitung, 2. Beilage, #116, 20 May, 1848.

TABLE 1

| | Noble | Non-noble | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All officers | 4307 | 2209 | or | 31.80% |
| 2nd Lieutenant | 2370 | 1028 | | 30.22% |
| 1st Lieutenant | 667 | 302 | | 31.16% |
| Captain | 664 | 377 | | 33.04% |
| Major | 302 | 242 | | 44.48% |
| Lieutenant Colonel | 56 | 22 | | 28.20% |
| Colonel | 98 | 32 | | 24.60% |
| Major General | 71 | 6 | | 7.79% |
| Lt. General | 61 | 0 | | 0.00% |
| General | 17 | 0 | | 0.00% |
| General Field-Marshal | 1 (The Duke of Wellington) | 0 | | 0.00% [57] |

Had the Fundamental Order of 1808 been applied rigorously, there should only have been one or two noble general officers. Had Rüstow's yard-stick been applied, there should have been only about eight or nine general officers. Had the promotions of non-nobles been on a parity with the over-all ratio of non-noble officers, there should have been around 50 non-noble officers of general rank. Instead, less than two-hundred nobles, in key command posts, dominated the first estate in the land.

Supposedly the non-noble officers who achieved general rank were subsequently ennobled, presumably to enhance their aristocratic qualities. However, the six non-noble generals noted above had not yet reached this blissful status; so far as can be determined, Lieutenant-General Karl von Reyher, who worked himself out of the enlisted ranks to become a general, and who was subsequently ennobled, was the only officer to whom official apologists could point as evidence that generalship was open to

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[57] Rang- und Quartierliste, 1847.

talent and that non-noble generals were ennobled. It is obvious that many non-noble officers would have been favorably inclined toward certain phases of the revolution if they could find better career chances as a result. That, of course, the military publicists could better promise than could the Frankfurt Parliament or the Prussian National Assembly.

The urge to emphasize the respectability of the individual units was to be found, further, in the distribution of non-noble and noble officers throughout the regiments. The officer lists of 1847 reveal that the non-noble officers were represented, almost overwhelmingly, in the technical services--the artillery and engineers. The noble officers, on the other hand, were clustered around the Guard regiments, the heavy cavalry, the light cavalry--since these were the most aristocratic and "knightly" branches--and the infantry, in that order. Table 2 will bring this out more clearly.

TABLE 2

| Branch of Service | Noble officers | Non-noble officers | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Line Infantry | 2129 | 760 | or | 26.30% |
| Guard Infantry | 461 | 8 | | 1.70% |
| Line Light Cavalry | 472 | 95 | | 16.46% |
| Line Heavy Cavalry | 330 | 46 | | 12.25% |
| Guard Cavalry | 211 | 4 | | 1.86% |
| Line Artillery | 188 | 628 | | 76.96% |
| Guard Artillery | 62 | 38 | | 38.00% |
| Engineers | 52 | 155 | | 74.87% [58] |

Of course there were local exceptions to the rule, but the "feudal" spirit of the officer corps explains these exceptions. Where there was

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[58] Ibid.

a large number of non-nobles in a cavalry or infantry regiment, this was usually so because these regiments were located in garrisons deemed undesirable by the nobility. The noble officer preferred to be in Berlin or Potsdam where he could reflect in the shining light of his War Lord and where he could be seen in court society. Failing that, the noble officer preferred a garrison in a small--perhaps dreary by other standards--town in East Elbian Prussia (but not Polish Posen) where he could traffic with his relatives, owners of large landed estates. The typical Prussian officer felt extremely uncomfortable in Westphalia or in the Rhine Province, perhaps because the people there were more mature politically and socially than in East Elbia, or perhaps because there was a large Catholic population and a dearth of social intercourse with people of the same social rank. Even where the officer tried to cultivate associations with the "better" classes of the population in the Rhine Province, for example, he was often rebuffed because of the stiffness that had been hammered into him in the cadet houses.[59] A non-noble officer, Lieutenant Julius Hartmann, wrote from the Rhine Province in 1845: "I would not like to be an officer in garrison here. The general respect which our estate enjoys in the eastern provinces, the obligingness with which every circle and every family receives him there, is very much absent here."[60] Hence, officer corps in the Rhine

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[59](Anon.), Soldatenthum. Französische Ansicht, pp. 71ff. Valerian Graf Pfeil said that in the Rhine Province, "in many families. . . the officer is never called anything other than a potato-hungry Prussian, and of the son of the same family who is fulfilling his military obligation, it is said: "He is with the Prussians." Der Reactionär. Eine politische Schrift für alle treue Preussen. Den Offizieren der preussischen Armee gewidmet (Breslau, 1849), p. 37.

[60]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, I Theil, pp. 197-208.

Province, in Westphalia, and also in Posen, had to settle for non-noble officers and even for officers of deviant political opinions in order to have full complements in the regiments, while in East Elbia, the officer corps were usually well over complement. So, for example, the 25th Infantry Regiment in Cologne-Deutz had 34 noble officers and 45 non-noble officers, whereas the 24th Infantry Regiment, garrisoned in East Elbia, had 72 noble officers and only 13 non-noble. Similarly, the 2nd Dragoon Regiment, stationed in East Elbia, had 28 noble officers and only 2 non-noble, whereas the 4th Dragoon Regiment in the Rhine Province had 19 noble officers and 8 non-noble. The fact that the Commissar of Spirit in the Prussian army, Crown Prince William, was honorary chief of the 2nd Dragoons may also help to explain the discrepancy.[61] Ironically, although Prussian policy makers clearly regarded a volcanic France to be the greatest potential enemy of Prussia and Germany, the aristocratic mentality of the officer corps contributed to a relative undermanning of the western frontier; according to the social criteria that classified "good" officers in the Prussian system, many of the allegedly worst officers were in the west.[62] Obviously the watch at the court was more important than the watch on the Rhine. Indeed, to be transferred to the western provinces was usually looked upon as a sign of royal disfavor. For example, General Karl von Wedel writes of his transfer in 1830 to the Fortress Saarlouis on the French frontier at the time of the July Revolution in Paris, that "my transfer to such

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[61] Rang- und Quartierliste, 1847.

[62] See Prince Karl's estimate of officers in the Rhenish garrisons in Demeter, Das deutsche Heer, p. 257.

a removed place was looked upon as a disfavor for which no grounds were known. . ."[63] Such was the unprofessional attitude of those in whom the preservation and defence of Prussia was entrusted.

Where non-noble officers were to be found in the Guard regiments, this was usually meant as a sop to the Fundamental Order of 1808, or, more often, as the table shows, these were in the Guard artillery--a Bürger arm, which noble officers commonly felt to be below their social rank. General von Strotha is supposed to have said before the revolution that he "regretted that there were not more nobility in the artillery; to be sure, not just impoverished nobility, but also wealthy nobility, because without them, nothing can become of the artillery."[64] It is unclear whether Strotha meant to enhance the artillery socially or militarily, but doubtful whether he was capable of making such a distinction.

The cleavage between noble and non-noble officers was not the only social cleavage in the officer corps. The statement attributed to von Strotha is testimony that there was also a social cleavage among the noble officers of the Prussian officer corps--that is, a cleavage between wealthy and poor nobles and between higher and lesser nobles. This

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[63]Curt Troeger (ed.), Lebenserinnerungen des Generalleutnants Karl von Wedel. Zweiter Teil: 1810-1858 (Berlin, 1913), pp. 177-178.

[64]Heinrich v. Poschinger (ed.), Unter Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Denkwürdigkeiten des Ministers Otto Freiherrn v. Manteuffel (3 vols., Berlin, 1901ff.), Vol. I, p. 23, note. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen wrote in 1897 that the artillery, "since its origins as such, since the beginning of the century [sic], was handled as an upstart; only in the last few years did a few personalities, by exception, succeed in working themselves up and become fully recognized also in the presence of officers of the infantry and cavalry." Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, p. 137.

cleavage, too, expressed itself in the distribution of officers in the officer corps. For wealth--private wealth--and high social rank were desiderata in the Prussian officer corps; the officer corps was not entirely an "Institution for the care of Junkers" in the sense that Rüstow expressed it. This was particularly so in the Royal Guard and in the cavalry, where the officer was often expected to be a gentleman of affairs. So, for example, a regimental commander in the Guard cavalry often insisted that the officer candidate in his regiment be able to show a considerable amount of private wealth before he could be accepted as an officer in the regiment.[65] This was true, also, for other Guard units as well. An unimpeachable source, in this connection at least, the reactionary Kreuzzeitung, wrote in 1848 that the high salary paid them that allowed Guard officers "to eat ice cream at Kranzler. . ." was not so important as the ". . . significant supplements which their parents, who for the most part are wealthy, send them"[66] Thus, a mediatized nobleman, Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, had to send his second son, Prince Kraft, to the Guard artillery, "much to his pain," because his first son was already in the Guard cavalry, and he could not afford to place another son there.[67] That the lavish outlays for uniforms, court functions, balls, and operas were bad for the morale of more impecunious officers in the Guard is also evident. Although a higher salary was given to Guard officers than to Line officers (for social

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[65]Rüstow, Preussische Armee, pp. 45-46; (Anon.), Soldatenthum. Französische Ansicht, p. 68.

[66]Kreuzzeitung, $114, 10 November, 1848.

[67]Heinz Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 287.

reasons), one officer, a Lieutenant von Gaudy, was "driven to the Line" in the 1830's because of large debts he had incurred in trying to keep up with the respectable ice-cream eaters in the Guard.[68] But private wealth, too, was often required, as well as noble parentage, in order to gain entrance into the Line cavalry. The cavalry officer was obliged to provide his own mounts; this quite naturally crowded the poorer nobility into the infantry and the infantry had hence also to be called "knightly," in order to protect the collective egos of the poorer nobility who had no horses. Naturally, non-noble officers seldom had a chance to make claims to the more "knightly" arm. Including the Guard and Line cavalry, there was a total of 1013 noble officers as against only 145 non-noble in 1847; the right to carry the title "Rittmeister" (cavalry captain) instead of simply "Hauptmann" (captain) was a social asset that few non-noble officers were given. It need not be wondered that the most bitter opposition to the revolution of 1848 came from these services.

Little can be said about the social origins of the non-noble officers in the Prussian officer corps. Most of the non-noble officers were very likely the sons of those non-noble officers who entered the service during the Wars of Liberation; other non-nobles would have found it difficult to enter the cadet houses, which provided the most certain way to a career as an officer. A few may have come from the more well-to-do Bürger classes, from the families of state and city officials, and from the families of non-noble large estate owners in East Elbia. The son

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[68]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, I Theil, p. 156.

of a peasant or of an artisan had little chance of becoming an officer. Very few came from the western provinces; Rhinelanders, for example, had very little taste for Prussian military service. Even in the recruiting of non-noble officers, the officer corps tended to be exclusive.

It is, of course, in the nature of a military organization to be exclusive, separate from civilian society, but as was natural in Prussia, the system overshot its mark. The exclusiveness of the Prussian officer corps was consciously cultivated. The uniform itself set the officer apart from other Prussians. Each unit had a court of honor designed to watch over the exclusive honor of the officer corps. Senior officers were expected to control the behavior of younger officers when off duty. The practical necessity of younger officers to eat in the unit Casino further separated them from civilian contacts; the Prussian system deliberately kept the salaries of junior officers low in order to oblige them to eat inexpensive meals in the Casino with their comrades. With some exceptions in the western provinces, officers who were married were expected to entertain not only their comrades, but also superior officers as well. The expenses for such entertainment must certainly have curtailed these officers' financial ability to establish contact outside of their uniformed environment. As has been seen, it brought the officer's family under the control of the officer corps; the officer's wife had to be socially acceptable.

Pertinent here is the intention of the system to cultivate the exclusivity of the officer corps; for the exclusivity of the officer corps was directly related to the maintenance of corps spirit. The system consciously sought to discourage individual or independent

thinking among the officers, and to keep them away from outside influences. The officer was supposed to think in terms of the corps; the slogan, "all for one and one for all," was seriously meant. Even in self-training, this ideal was stressed. Thus, in the 24th Infantry, for example, the commanding officer refused to allow several interested officers permission to play with the war game that King Frederick William III had given the regiment. The war game was available for use only when the entire regimental officer corps participated; that was His Majesty's intention when he gave the war game to the regiment, the officer explained.[69] Even if it interfered with professional training and betterment, the attempt was to condition the officer to be dependent on his officer corps in both personal and professional life. The individualist doctrines of nineteenth century liberalism could hardly find a more clear antithesis than the corps spirit of the officer corps. But in connection with the latter, some remarks should be made, namely with respect to the political mentality of the officer corps.

Though they normally remained aloof from politics, many officers tended to look down on the king's civilian political advisors and officials. This attitude naturally engendered the belief that the officer could handle political and administrative matters better than the civilians. In 1847, for example, General von Natzmer observed that "Prussia should have only military diplomats."[70] And an inactive lieutenant, Ludwig von

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[69]Franz von Zychlinski, Geschichte des 24ten Infanterie-Regiments. Zweiter Theil von 1816-1838 (Berlin, 1857), pp. 175-176.

[70]Gndomar Ernst von Natzmer (ed.), Unter den Hohenzollern. Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Generals Oldwig von Natzmer. Aus der Zeit Friedrich Wilhelms IV. I. Teil: 1840-1848 (Gotha, 1888), pp. 169-170.

Blum, boasted in 1848 that inactive officers best filled civilian positions in the state service, "for who was capable as a soldier will also be capable in any other position."[71]

It was only natural that the political spirit that existed in the officer corps would tend to be conservative and royalist. The Hohenzollerns saw to that. For the Prussian standing army was not a popular army as was boasted but a dynastic instrument. The Hohenzollern spoke of "My Army," "My Regiments," "My Guards," "My Officers." And hence the political creed expected of the Prussian officer: He was the executive instrument of the dynasty. He formed the pillar of iron that supported the dynasty. This mentality was most pronounced in the Royal Guard, but it existed in the Line as well.

The Prussian system made it a matter of honor that officers should hold only certain political opinions. This was done through example and through the unit courts of honor, whose purpose was slightly revised in 1843. In 1843, it was declared as ruinous to honor, "such a manner of living which, through an incorrect choice of association, can be prejudicial to the good name of the brotherhood [Genossenschaft]," whereas the previous prescriptions, which were still tacitly followed, had only stated criteria such as "indecent associations of the officers with dissolute females" or "association with people of ill repute" to be ruinous to honor. The new ruling Hugo von Hasenkamp rightly pointed out, no longer had purely social overtones; a political implication was

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[71]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #93, 8 July, 1849.

also involved. It could be understood to mean that officers were to avoid the company of any person who did not harbor the political views that the king was said to harbor.[72] And so, in fact, was it understood.

In 1845, Lieutenant Fritz Anneke was placed before a court of honor in Wesel for alleged communist activities. He was accused and dismissed from the service for having participated in discussion groups and for reading Friedrich Engel's and Moses Hess' "notorious" Gesellschaftsspiegel and the "atheistic," democratic Triersche Zeitung among other equally grievous offenses. An apparently trumped up charge that Anneke had refused to recognize an obligation to duel clinched the proceedings against him.[73] Whether such sins seriously affected Anneke's ability as an officer will not be examined here. But subsequently, a comrade of Anneke, Lieutenant Korff, was also arraigned on the charge that he had given a non-commissioned officer a copy of the Gesellschaftsspiegel (which was a censored, hence permitted publication) to read. However, the non-commissioned officer denied this before the court of honor. In addition, however, Lieutenant Korff was also accused, and subsequently dismissed from service, on the charge that he had spoken with Anneke while the proceedings against Anneke were under way. That Korff was of the same general political convictions as Anneke need not be denied; Korff admitted that himself. But Korff was dismissed from the service, officially, because he had cultivated association with Anneke before Anneke had been tried by the court of honor. In other words, from this ruling, a fellow officer, Anneke, was not company fit for an officer

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[72]Hasenkamp, Kritik, p. 31

[73]Joseph Hansen (ed.), Rheinische Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte der politischen Bewegung, 1830-1850 (2 vols., Cologne, 1919), Vol. II, pp. 385f.

because of his unorthodox political views. The ruling against Korff ended with the simple assertion that Korff did not show enough "tact" in his associations.[74] Likewise, a one-year volunteer, Friedrich Hammacher, was given "three days strict arrest" for "tactlessness" for having spoken with Anneke, and upon his release from active service, was turned over to the Landwehr as an enlisted man instead of, as was normal for a one-year volunteer, as a Landwehr officer; Hammacher, so his Attest stated, had "become doubtful recently."[75] In all, twelve officers were removed from the service by 1848, all for having had connections with Anneke.[76] An officer, obviously, was not supposed to consort with another officer if the latter had unconventional opinions.

It would be extravagant to insist that the officer corps had a strongly developed political spirit if judged from these examples. The officers of the Wesel garrison did not particularly like Anneke, but, for the most part, they did not seem to have had anything against him. Nor did Korff's comrades particularly dislike Korff. They did what the division Auditor, Marcard, and the division commander wanted them to do: They voted to have Korff dismissed from service and subsequently avoided all contact with him and with Anneke, though Anneke was still listed as "Lieutenant a.D. (Lieutenant out of service)," which normally should have meant that he still had "honor" and was still acceptable company for an active officer. But "the officer corps of the 7th Artillery Brigade," Anneke wrote, "was morally broken after such

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[74]Korff, Ehrengerichtlicher Process, pp. 28f, 58-67.

[75]Alex Bein, Friedrich Hammacher; Lebensbild eines Parlamentariers und Wirtschaftsführers, 1824-1904 (Berlin, 1932) p. 12.

[76]Hansen, Rheinische Briefe, Vol. II, pp. 385f, 505.

a measure. . . They broke off all connections; they knew me no more."[77] "Honor," in short, could be used as a tool to enforce political conformity or acquiescence in the officer corps. It is well to keep this in mind when examination of the turbulent months of 1848 is undertaken. For if the Prussian army was "morally armed" with professional literature, it is safe to say that the army was even more heavily armed in a political and social sense to combat the revolution.

After the above analysis of the Prussian officer corps it is clear that the Prussian officer corps falls far short of any useful definition of military professionalism. The officer corps was a socio-political class and, with some exceptions presently to be noted, not really a professionalized body of men.

Given the above as characteristic of the officer corps as a whole, it must still be said that there was a growth of professionalism in the Prussian army after the reform period. It was slow and barely traceable. The War Academy may be identified as the breeding ground of professionalism in the Prussian army. Ever since it was founded in 1810, however, the War Academy was beset with controversy. What type of education should officers receive? On the one hand were the advocates of a strictly polytechnic, professional schooling, who wished, therefore, to have excluded from the curriculum anything not relevant to military purposes. On the other hand were those officers, in the tradition of the reformers, who believed that an officer's education should also include the more broadening arts and sciences. In effect, the controversy was never settled and the War Academy tried to be at once a pro-

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[77]Fritz Anneke, Wie's jetzt im preussischen Heere aussieht (Mulheim, 1848), p. 10.

fessional school and a quasi-university. The curriculum consisted of professional courses dealing with military tactics, military history, strategy, topography, cartography, unit managment, and the like. But it also included non-military courses such as physics, chemistry, French language, survey of philosophy, general history, German and foreign literature, natural science, and Hegelian philosophy.[78]

There is no way to measure its performance as a liberal arts school; certainly Prussia produced officers in the nineteenth century who were possessed of a broad, even humanistic, education, though these were comparatively few. It is thus a relatively moot point that the school may have produced officers with too much broad education to meet the more narrow requirements of the military profession. There is, similarly, no adequate measure of the War Academy's performance in turning out officers with a genuine professional outlook. But there are some indications. The chief of these lie in the production of military literature. A publication of E.S. Mittler und Sohn, publishers of much of the military literature produced in Prussia, the Journal for Art, Science and History of War, (Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte des Krieges), reviewed titles in the following categories from 1824 to 1861:

I. Historical works.

A. 21 larger works over ancient war history.
B. 15 larger works over medieval war history.
C. 65 larger works over modern war history.
   1. 8 (32 campaigns) of the seventeenth century.
   2. 32 of the eighteenth century.
   3. 25 of the nineteenth century.

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[78]Louis von Scharfenort, Die königlich preussische Kriegsakademie, 1810-1910 (Berlin, 1910), pp. 1-65.

D. 93 descriptions of battles, 38 sieges and blockades, 10 river crossings, 33 special histories of single corps, 55 memoirs or essays (Denkschriften), 55 biographies, 63 character sketches and curiosities.

II. Actual military science including over 600 works on artillery, engineer, infantry, cavalry, horses, General Staff, sea-power supply and quartering, instructions and schools, regulations, training, field service, maneuvers, exercises, marches, general conduct of war, general tactics, and more.

III. Auxiliary sciences, including over 80 works in geography, mathematics, physics, ballistics, and chemistry.[79]

Serial publications such as the Militair-Wochenblatt and, of course, the literary response of Prussian officers to civilian reform proposals before 1848 add to this military literature. Most of this literature must be attributed to the fact that Prussia had an institute of military science incorporated in the War Academy.

Most difficult to assess is the impact of Karl von Clausewitz on the professional growth of the officer corps. As a director of the War Academy from 1818 to 1830, he advocated the elimination of non-polytechnic subjects from the curriculum, but his superiors did not agree to this. His duties as director related to administration, not to curriculum. His written works, edited by his widow after 1831, were appreciated only slowly. His masterpiece, On War, was unfinished and Clausewitz himself doubted that his readers would always be able to see the distinctions he made between war on an absolute and abstract level and war in reality.

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[79]Thedor Freiherr von Troschke, Die Militair-Litteratur seit den Befreiungskriegen, mit besonderer Bezugnahme auf die "Militair-Litteratur-Zeitung" während der ersten 50 Jahre ihres Bestehens von 1820-1870 (Berlin, 1870) pp. 90-118.

His insistence that war--and hence armies--must be controlled by political goals is, and was, easily lost to the reader. We know that the great captains of the wars of German unification had mis-read Clausewitz as did, for example, Helmuth von Moltke, as shown in his conflict with Bismarck in the War of 1870.[80] Probably very few officers read more than excerpts from Clausewitz and then simply to cram for the General Staff examination. While preparing for such an examination, Lieutenant Julius Hartmann wrote his father:

> I have not yet got down to studying, but I do hope to catch up with it and familiarize myself with Clausewitz again; one finds there always much food for thought, at the same time with ready results.[81]

From a man who found it more important to be seen attending opera in Berlin than to attend to study, this is testimony to the importance of Clausewitz: He gave "ready results" to cramming officers, thus became a common intellectual bond among the more professional-minded.

Military literature, of course, is the product of a professional elite for the edification of the professional elite. In Prussia, this elite came, almost exclusively, from the more gifted officer-student in the War Academy who subsequently entered, usually, the General Staff. Many also found duty assignments in the war ministry, the Adjutantur, or in command positions. Or they were assigned to teaching in the cadet schools, the division schools, or the War Academy itself. Among these officers there was a genuine sense of accomplishment and a feeling

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[80]Craig, Politics, pp. 204-216.

[81]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, I Theil, p. 208.

of solidarity with one another; the private letters of a von Moltke, von Roon, Hartmann, and Fischer could be cross-indexed with reference to the admiration they held for each other or for common acquaintances who had received similar educations.[82] There was, in short, a kind of esprit de corps within an esprit de corps, recognizably professional in nature, a by-product of successful application to the study of military science.

Few of the officers who achieved this goal found the way easy. Social considerations and obstructions impeded the growth of professionalism, problems which have been considered in detail above. Financial problems were also difficult, both for the Prussian state and for the individual officer. The Prussian state was hardly wealthy and could, therefore not always subsidize the aspiring officer: only fifty officers were admitted annually to the War Academy. But the state did make it possible for the occasional, talented but impecunious officer to advance in a professional career. One should consider the career of Albrecht von Roon, a man of obscure social origin, who started with absolutely no financial resources, relying on the small salary of a junior officer supplemented by an occasional gift of socks and underwear from relatives. Through Spartan efforts, Roon worked his way through the military schools, entered the General Staff, and, upon publishing a geographical study, could finally count on a fairly comfortable income. By 1848, Roon had

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[82]On Griesheim, Moltke's opinion in Helmuth von Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten (8 vols., Berlin, 1891-1893), Vol IV, pp. 122, 148; Roon's opinion in Albrecht von Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten (2 vols., Gerlin, 1905), Vol. I, p. 154; Hartmann's opinion in Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, Briefe und Aufsätze des Generals der Cavallerie. II Theil, p. 123. On Fischer, Roon's opinion in Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol, I, p. 202; Hartmann's opinion in Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, I Theil, p. 197.

the rank of major, a wife, and six children; by contrast, many officers in his own age had scarcely made it to first lieutenant and could count on retiring from the service as men who could not afford families.[83] The officer corps was full of such military celibates.

Or, to name one more example of the possibilities open to an officer aspiring for a professional career, the example of Helmuth von Moltke. Moltke entered Prussian service from the Danish army in 1822. Like Roon he went through the schools and entered the General Staff. To achieve entry into the Staff, Moltke undertook the translation of Gibbon's work on the Roman Empire both to demonstrate his breadth and to earn the necessary money to insure acceptance. He was nonetheless still obliged to borrow money so that he could afford to buy horses and pay for stall rent in Berlin. Otherwise he could not become a Staff officer. Moltke did not doubt that he was making a proper investment even if he had to impoverish himself in doing so.[84] Similar examples of officers taking advantages of career opportunities through professional study could be shown in the careers of a Fransecky, a Hartmann, a Griesheim, a Stosch, and more. Prussia had a growing nucleus of professionally-spirited officers by 1848.

The professionally orientated officers, however, were in no real commanding position in the Prussian military system. If the General Staff may be said to have been the stronghold of professionalism, it must also be pointed out that the General Staff did not have the command

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[83]Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 1-86.

[84]Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 78, 90.

position in 1848 that it won during the wars of unification. In 1848, the General Staff was not even competing very well for power with the War Ministry, the Adjutantur, or the Military Cabinet of the king, all institutions guided by officers whose professional orientation was on a lower level. And the plain truth was, study and professionalization were still regarded with suspicion and distrust in the Prussian army. We must still conclude that the Prussian officer corps was not a professionally orientated body. It had, of course, a military function which consisted chiefly in the role of command. For officers constitute the supervisory leadership of an army. It is necessary, therefore, before moving into 1848, to consider the nature of the forces that the officers supervised--the conscripts and Landwehr.

## CHAPTER III

## CONSCRIPTS AND LANDWEHR

Ordinarily it is not useful to apply the concepts of professionalism to the trade which conscripts and non-commissioned officers ply. They lack two of the three basic criteria of professionalism. While they may be corporate, they do not share in responsibility nor, apart from routinized drill, do they have expertise.[1] Even so, in a consideration of the professional level of the army, it is of importance to examine the origins, training, and organization of men in order to test whether such dispositions effectively implement the aims of professional military organization. Examination of these dispositions indicate that the latter was only partly true of the Prussian organization.

Before considering the organizational problems of the ranks and of the Landwehr, however, it is useful briefly to explore a social problem in connection with these people insofar as they came from those parts of Prussia which had experienced the military organization of the eighteenth century--namely East Elbian Prussia.

In eighteenth century Prussia, the rural masses had provided the core of the rank and file. Prussia was divided into a number of cantons, each supporting a regiment with men. An elaborate furloughing system had evolved so that the men had only a few months per year of active service. Nevertheless, the cantonist was habituated into a royalism that

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[1]Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 17-18.

transcended his submission to his local seignor. At the same time, he was constantly reminded of his duty as a soldier, even while on furlough. He recognized in his commanding officers the same social class as he recognized in his seignor. Landwehr men in the nineteenth century who came from this stratum thus found little changed in their military obligation except that they often had non-noble officers and they had a shorter period of exercise during the year. In this stratum there was much of that voluntarism which Boyen had hoped to find in the Landwehr; these men readily took to holiday target shooting and other spare-time exercises.

Eighteenth century military organization excluded the Bürger of Prussia, both from the ranks and from the officer corps. For this and other reasons, a sizable portion of the soldiers of the eighteenth century was recruited abroad. The practice developed of allowing these people extended free time during the year while their officers pocketed their pay. The soldiers were placed on Freiwächter status meaning that they were allowed to pursue their trades in handicraft industry where they were quartered. Military discipline thus easily slid over into early factory discipline, a phenonemon which undoubtedly passed Prussia through the difficulties of industrial organization in its early stages.[2] The phenomenon is difficult to trace in the first half of the nineteenth century because of the relative backwardness of Prussian industry. We do know, however, that there were no large-scale labor difficulties in

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[2]Otto Büsch, Militärsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen, 1713-1807 (Berlin, 1962), pp. 17-20, 21-48, 113-134, 167-170.

the transformed industries of Prussia to 1848. But the uprising of the Silesian weavers in 1844 shows that discipline in the traditional industries was disappearing.

An integral goal of the reformers after 1806 also was to bridge the separation of town from country characteristic of the eighteenth century. The legislation which changed the class character of land ownership is one indication of this. So, too, was the Fundamental Order of 1808, which opened the officer corps to men from the Bürger class. And Boyen meant to overcome this separation of town and country even further with the army law of 1814 which ordained a universal obligation to serve and also created the Landwehr. Universal military service was supposed to apply to all insofar as service in the regular army was concerned. And Landwehr duty was supposed to reconcile the Bürger to the state and to military institutions.

Possibly an honest implementation of Boyen's law for a generation would have achieved the goal of Verbürgerlichung of the army. The officer class would have been swamped both in the training of civilians as in the expansion of the officer corps which such a system would have necessitated. But Boyen's law was never really so implemented. In the first place, the universal desire for peace and repose after the heroic era of liberation drained away enthusiasm for military service. The fact that peace had returned, seemingly permanently, removed the pressing need for a large military establishment. Financial problems, too, made such a law impracticable of implementation; Prussia was not a wealthy state. And finally, in the atmosphere of restoration and reaction after 1815, political reasons could be found to pervert the implementation of

Boyen's law. For example, the Duke of Mecklenburg, commanding general of the Royal Guard, complained that the Landwehr idea was tantamount to arming the revolution.[3] And few of the older officers had any confidence in an army that was not based on long-term service; the three year service was too short to insure a reliable force. These arguments and fears died only slowly.

As a result of all these considerations, Prussia had something considerably less than the universal military service called for in Boyen's law; although Prussia's population grew from about 10,500,000 in 1817 to about 14,000,000 in 1844, the size of the regular army remained at a fairly constant 120,000 in strength.[4] This being so, Prussian authorities had a considerable body of able-bodied citizens from which to choose those who actually were drawn in. It was inevitable, therefore, in view of the rural composition of the officer corps, that the rank and file would also be of rural origin.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, even a faithful application of Boyen's law would have produced an army predominantly rural in extraction. Prussia was, in 1848, still five-seventh's rural.[5] From a standpoint of social welfare it may also have been desirable to provide gainful employment to rural Prussia via military service; population pressure on the land grew in intensity in the years before

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[3]Ritter, Staatskunst, Vol. I, p. 138.

[4]Actually 119,877 in 1817 and 121,720 in 1844. Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, pp. 492-493.

[5]Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte, p. 22.

1848, and compulsory military service was one way to alleviate it. But more important, however, were the prejudices of Prussian officers in favor of the country recruit. Boyen himself showed this prejudice when he organized recruiting districts so as to place the military obligation more heavily on the villages than on the towns and cities. For example, the population of Landwehr recruiting areas should each have been about 77,000 based on 1817 population, had the areas been uniformly apportioned. Instead, the recruiting areas varied in size from 46,000 to 101,000 in population; in other words, rural areas had up to twice the liability for military service of urban areas. The rural areas, and especially East Elbia, were heavily drawn from in both regular army and Landwehr recruiting. Boyen was sure that the countryside produced healthier specimens for military duty than did the city, a belief which can in no way be substantiated by evidence.[6] Most noble officers shared this rural bias. In all justice to the benighted peasant, however, it must be pointed out that the Bürger did little to offset this belief. The Bürger had a definite aversion to military service and did his best to avoid it. One account demonstrates that people in the Prussian military system did what they could to accomodate the Bürger; in the Prussian Rhine Province, one Bürger after another was rejected for military service for alleged reasons of physical unfitness; the Bürgers found it easy to bribe army mustering doctors

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[6]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, p. 189.

who, in the Prussian system, were ranked among the common soldiers.[7] If Bürger intellectuals clamored for a Verbürgerlichung of the army, their fellow Bürger did little toward accomplishing such an end. To our knowledge, only a very few of the deputies who sat in the Frankfurt Parliament or in the Prussian National Assembly in 1848 could claim to have served in the army. It is unfortunate that official statistics are unavailable, but it must nevertheless be asserted that the Prussian army had a higher percent of men of rural extraction than even the fact that Prussia was five-sevenths rural would have indicated. This is of important consequence since rural Prussia simply did not share the German nationalist enthusiasm and liberal mentality of urban Prussia.

Despite these problems and considerations, the Prussian system did make an attempt to give military training to a larger population, in part as a grudging concession to Boyen's law and, more important, because it was necessary to have a trained nucleus for the Landwehr. In order to accomplish this, the three-year compulsory service was reduced so that more men could be trained over a period of time. Since 1833, the term of service in Line regiments was reduced to two years by administrative provision. This provided immediately a larger ready

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[7]It was remarked, in 1826, that not one son of a rich merchant from Elberfeld, Barmen, and area had fulfilled military obligations. In the 1850's, 150 youths were convicted of offering bribes to avoid military service. Even service as one-year volunteers was shirked until the authorities began to apply pressure. In 1851 only nine volunteers came from the area in and around Düsseldorf; in 1853, only five. After pressure was applied, however, these numbers began to grow: In 1854 there were 31, in 1855 there were 42, and in 1857 there were 56 one-year volunteers from the Düsseldorf area alone. Friedrich Zunkel, Der Rheinisch-Westfälische Unternehmer, 1834-1879 (Cologne and Opladen, 1962), pp. 86-87.

reserve, since these reservists now served three years instead of two before passing into the Landwehr. Ostensibly, at least, this increased the strength of the Line with trained soldiers by one-third. It also increased the training tasks, at least of the junior officers and non-commissioned officers in the Line. Whether such increased training tasks improved their professional capabilities is a moot point.

Crown Prince William personally and vehemently disapproved of reducing the three year service to two years, in the belief that men trained for two years were not as reliable as those trained for three. Prince William was more interested in having a military force conditioned for purposes of defending internal order than he was in an army capable of national defense.[8] Although admittedly an army consisting of men serving a longer term should be more reliable (in a political sense), it is nonetheless difficult to see why two years of service would produce men measurably inferior to those serving three years. William believed that three-year service would serve to divorce men more thoroughly from civilian habits and sympathies, all the more important because of the "liberal and communist danger."[9] And he was concerned lest two years of service would not habituate men enough to military life and thus not incline some of them to re-enlist for an extended tour and become material for non-commissioned ranks.[10] Considering the political leadership of Prussia, these are assuredly valid professional arguments. But

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[8]Wilhelm I, Militärische Schriften, Vol. I, p. 190.

[9]Ibid.; Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, p. 80.

[10]Wilhelm I, Militärische Schriften, Vol. I, p. 190.

they lose much of their weight when consideration is given the Royal Guard, William's own military and parade machine of the 1840's.

The Royal Guard maintained the legal three-year term of service for its conscripts. Guard officers and non-commissioned officers thereby had a lighter training load than did the Line. The previous chapter should explain why this was done unless one is prepared to argue that the men of the Line were less willing and less able to defend royal prerogative than was the Guard. More will be said about this below.

To be sure it may very well make good military sense to have an elite force in the army, one more intensely trained than the rest. If that had been the rationale for the privileges and special position given the Guard, criticism would be captious and out of place. But the Guard's special privileges had no real professional foundation. The Guard was organized for social and court functions. Parades and honorific tasks constituted its main tasks. It was for these tasks that men were recruited and trained. In order to explain this it will be necessary to describe briefly, Prussian recruiting patterns.

Prussia was divided into eight administrative provinces, each of which might logically have supported an army corps including Line and Landwehr units. But administrative logic could not square the varying population sizes of the eight provinces with the fact that Prussia had nine army corps, including the Guard. There was, thus, an overlap between civil administration and army administration, as some army corps were obliged to recruit in several administrative provinces. A number of soldiers, thus, were obliged to serve in provinces away from their homes.[11] In addition, some unit transfers were effected, though

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[11]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, pp. 122-123.

not, as it has been asserted,[12] because of a desire to separate army further from society but from the genuine human and political desire to Prussianize the conscripts--to make Rhinelanders acquainted with Brandenburg, Pomeranians with Westphalia, etc. To be sure, the effect was to create a further alienation of civilian and soldier: East Prussians did not usually fraternize well with Rhinelanders. But such transfers of units were seldom in any case because of financial stringencies.[13] And, indeed, Prince William, to cite one, was opposed to such troop exchanges because they produced hardships for married officers and non-commissioned officers.[14]

Since the Garde du Corps constituted an army corps without any corresponding administrative province, it found its replacements distributed through the eight provinces of Prussia. No figures are available to show whether the Guard's recruiting was equally distributed through the eight provinces. It was well-known, however, in fact a matter of public notoriety, that the Guard grabbed the more robust and taller specimens of Prussian humanity.[15] The Line was allowed what was left-over, often, indeed, poor left-overs, physically speaking.

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[12]Craig, Politics, p. 92; Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, p. 60.

[13]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, p. 526.

[14]William I, Militärische Schriften, Vol. I, pp. 43-44.

[15]The democratic Kladderadatsch lampooned the "Langen Kerls" by planting a letter in its columns: "Anzeige: Wird unser altes Militär nicht bald zuruckkehren? Oder glaubt man wirklich dass die durch Entfernung der Garden entstandenen schmerzlichen Lücken durch Leute dieser Grösse erfüllt werden können? [Signed] Therese Werner. Louise Gedicke. Emma Speerer." Kladderadatsch, #1, 7 May, 1848.

An observer noted in 1841 that if compared to the Austrian soldiers in the Federal Fortress of Mainz, the Prussian soldiers (Line) there looked quite puny and scrawny; the observer also remarked that the Prussians did much more service, more duty, could carry a heavier load than their Austrian counterparts.[16] Be that as it may, the primacy of the Guard in the selection of recruits must evidently have deprived the Line of much valuable potential material for non-commissioned officers.[17] One could hardly rate this in agreement with professional military considerations.

However, tall men in the army may have very little military use for they are larger targets for sharpshooters; but this may not be a very serious objection to them. Even so, the Guard's preference for the "Langen Kerls" is evidence that they were desired, not for military purposes, but for parades.

Parades were the chief pastime of the Prussian Guard. All contemporary evidence testifies to this. In emulation of the Guard, parades were also a large occupation of the Line. Parades in themselves have a function in military training, for they accustom men to act as a unit under command. With the Guard, however, parades were more an end than a means. Guard recruits, for example, who were ordered to clear the barricades in Berlin in March of 1848 had not even been trained to use fire-arms, although they had been in service for at least sixteen

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[16](Anon.), Soldatenthum. Französische Ansicht, pp. 51-53.

[17]This assertion is made on the crude assumption, validated by personal experience, that armies prefer non-commissioned officers who are physically imposing on enlisted men.

weeks.[18] One certainly ought to square this with Prince William's assertion that he could make "dressierte recruits" out of men in six to ten weeks.[19] Evidently Potsdam parades were a chief purpose of the Prussian Guard. In the Line, this was less true.

But this was not all; the Guard was not alone in lacking military good sense. The Prussian War Ministry had purchased Dreyse needle guns in 1841 and stock-piled them in the Berlin Landwehr Armory. The attack on the armory by Berlin radicals in June of 1848 revealed the rifle to the general public. Accordingly, because the "secret" was out, the needle gun was issued to the troops fighting in the war against Denmark. Only then was it discovered that no instructions had been printed or issued regulating the use of the needle gun.[20] The observer may well wonder what earthly purpose a "secret" weapon has if no one knows how to use it; the War Ministry was evidently as little guided by rational, professional considerations as was the Guard.

There was another difference between the Guard and the Line, a difference having to do with the discipline of men. According to a

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[18]General-Lieutenant von Meyerinck, "Die Tätigkeit der Truppen während der Berliner Märztage des Jahres 1848," Militärwochenblatt (Beiheft, 1891), 110. Meyerinck remarks about the First Garde Infantry Regiment: "The recruits were serving in the fifth month and had hardly shot with blank cartridges [Platzpatronen]." On page 154, we are told of the Guard Uhlans: "The recruits had not yet had pack instructions." See also Prittwitz, Berlin, 1848.

[19]Wilhelm II, Militärische Schriften, Vol. II, p. 14. Elsewhere William remarks: "But neither in 8, 10, nor 16 months does one train a soldier who is one in spirit--that is, one who does not act from fear of punishment but rather from inner conviction as it is taught him." Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 176f.

[20]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #1, 7 July, 1848; #30, 29 November, 1848.

law of 1808, corporal punishment could no longer be inflicted for purposes of disciplining common soldiers. The soldier was supposed to have "honor," according to this ruling. This did not mean, however, that corporal punishment of men had disappeared. For breach of conduct a soldier could be assigned to a second class; in this class, he could be bodily punished for infraction of discipline. An exemption was made for the Royal Guard where no second class existed. A Guard soldier earmarked for disciplinary punishment was transferred to the second class of the Line.[21]

It should be understood that no unit wished to have a large number of men officially assigned to the second class. Such evidence of poor discipline or ineffective leadership had to be avoided. Thus, although no measure is available to determine frequency of incidents, corporal punishment of a sort still remained alive outside of second-class soldiers. Instances exist where officers are reported to have whipped men with the flat of their sabers in order to control them.[22] And in any event, there were usually non-commissioned officers to inflict bodily punishment on the men.[23]

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[21]Ferdinand Ledebur, Die Geschichte des deutschen Unteroffiziers (Berlin, 1939), p. 208.

[22]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848; Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, pp. 423-442.

[23]Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, Aufzeichnungen aus seinem Leben und Wirken, 1795-1877 (2 vols., Schwerin, 1903), Vol. II, p. 24, provides a charming example of this. An acquaintance of his, of peasant stock, informed Gerlach that on his first day in the army, he was twice boxed by the unit cook because he had not taken a knife with him with which to peel potatoes. The man informed Gerlach that he had benefitted from such arbitrary treatment. Gerlach mused on what an incisive understanding the man had about "freedom."

Among the soldiers from the older parts of the monarchy-Brandenburg, Pomerania, the Old Mark, etc.--such inflictions were taken as a matter of course and long usage--or misusage. That was less true of Rhenish recruits or men from the larger cities. This fact no doubt explains officer preference for country bumpkins in the army: They were easier to kick around.[24] But by and large, most of the men in the prussian army brought a built-in subservience and docility with them into service.

There was a peculiar stiffness in the life of the common soldier in Prussia. Like the officer, he always wore his uniform in public and was, thus, conscious of being in constant surveillance by possible superiors. He was not allowed to smoke in public streets (which was true for civilians also, but not officers). Instead of rendering a simple salute to officers, he was obliged to stand stiffly at attention facing an officer (Frontmachen) when any such appeared on the street.[25] His officers usually addressed him in the personal, patronizing form, "Du," a form used to address menial servants and animals. Only a very few officers used polite form of address, "Sie," while many more still employed eighteenth century usage, the third person, "Er," in discourse with common soldiers.[26] If the common soldier had "honor," it was not piped from the same fountain at which officers imbibed.

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[24]See Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (Revised edition, New York, 1959), p. 156.

[25]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #82, 31 May, 1849; Pfeil, Der Reaktionär, pp. 33-35.

[26]Examples in Ibid., pp. 35-36; Bremen (ed.), Fransecky, p. 64; Kladderadatsch, #11, 16 July, 1848.

The Prussian army even refused its lower ranks access to reading material until 1833. In that year, Louis Schneider, "that patriotic and military actor," against the desires of several officers, began publishing a weekly newspaper, Der Soldatenfreund (Soldier's Friend) designed for the rank and file. Why there should have been resistance to Schneider's paper is hard to imagine. The newspaper did little more than to further the brainwashing (Verdummung) of the conscripts. Officers' resistance to the paper, for that reason, quickly vanished.[27]

As usual, the Prussian system overshot its mark; instead of obedience, discipline, and subordination, the recruits were required to render super obedience, super discipline, and super subordination. And those showing best these "qualities" were made non-commissioned officers.

Non-commissioned officers are the back-bone of any army and the Prussian army was no exception. In Prussia, they came from the "Capitulanten," men who re-enlisted after their first tour of duty. In Prussia, the typical non-commissioned officer served for sixteen to twenty years, including the years he served as a private soldier. As a non-commissioned officer he performed the actual task of training the recruits, of managing company organization, and of inculcating discipline.[28] And the Prussian government was grateful for his services. Upon leaving the army, many non-commissioned officers found minor posts

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[27]Louis Schneider, Aus meinem Leben (Berlin, 3 vols., 1879ff), Vol. I, pp. 113-120.

[28]Ledebur, Deutsche Unteroffiziere, p. 195.

in the civil service. In the years from 1823 to 1843, 21,775 discharged privates and non-commissioned officers were installed in civil service posts in the Monarchy, a goodly proportion in the postal services.[29] Unquestionably the habits of obedience to officers were thus also infused into the lower ranks of the civil service. Even on this level, the authority of the officer was imposed in Prussia.

Such, in brief sketch, was the status of the lesser people in the Prussian army. There remains to be considered, in the next section, the Landwehr.

Boyen had intended the Landwehr of both levies to be completely separated from the regular army, with its own organization and officer corps. His belief that the Landwehr could serve as a force to reconcile the Bürger with military institutions was an ideal that only a few of his fellow officers shared.[30] Thus with Boyen's resignation from his first ministry in 1819, with the growing tide of reaction in Europe, and with the obvious evidence that the Landwehr was no paragon of military efficiency, the relationship of the Landwehr to the regular army was revised. The Landwehr was subordinated to the regular army. Landwehr units were subjected to regular army inspection. Regular army officers were assigned to all high commands. Landwehr brigades were reduced to sixteen, two for each corps area, and were incorporated, together with the regular units, into divisions with regular army commanders.[31]

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[29]Jany, Geschichte der preussischen Armee, Vol. IV, p. 142, note.

[30]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, pp. 382-383.

[31]Craig, Politics, p. 75.

After 1819, financial shortages led the government to reduce the annual exercise period of the Landwehr from two weeks to one week for the first levy, while exercises for the second levy were eliminated entirely. In the years after Boyen's resignation, thus, the Landwehr had ceased to have equal and separate status vis a vis the regular army. Indeed, only the first levy still maintained itself as an essential part of the military establishment; the second levy was only a legal fiction as was the so-called Landsturm. It is, however, necessary to examine the first levy and its officers more closely.

To begin with, the officers. These may be divided into regular army officers and Landwehr officers. Regular army officers staffed all ranks above company level. A large proportion of Landwehr company and squadron commanders were also regular army officers, and for a number of reasons, including privilege, salary increments, and disciplinary considerations. In a long period of peace, where promotions were extremely slow, the regular army first lieutenant was privileged above the secretary from a civil bureaucracy who might otherwise have secured the position of Landwehr company commander; the Line first lieutenant obviously needed the extra money as much as the bureaucratic secretary or other Bürger Landwehr officers. The Landwehr officer in any case, Prince William asserted, lacked military training, and, more important, aristocratic "Point d' Honneur." By 1841, regular army officers commanded 176 of 416 Landwehr companies and 96 of 104 cavalry squadrons.[32]

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[32]Meinecke, Boyen, Vol. II, pp. 213f and notes; Wilhelm I, Militärische Schriften, Vol. I, p. 169.

The professional argument against having Landwehr men elect their own officers thus had other implications; the regular officer did not want to chance losing a position that gave him extra income.

It is also true, as William asserted, that the Landwehr officer was inferior to the regular army officer because he lacked training. The Landwehr officer came from the class of civilians known as one-year-volunteers. Upon completion of his one-year service, he entered the Landwehr, normally as a second lieutenant. He usually was a poor officer. Landwehr men were much more disciplined and orderly when commanded by Line officers, much more spontaneous and impertinent under Landwehr officers, whom they commonly, and rightly, regarded as men who had shirked their duties.[33]

Yet even this could hardly justify William's or the Line officers' mistrust of the Landwehr officer. In the year that the volunteer served, he could have been made a competent commander of men. General Fransecky, for example, makes it fairly clear that a second lieutenant in the regular army was routinized into day-to-day service life within one year[34] and there is no reason why the one-year volunteer should not have reached the plateau of routinization as quickly had not the Prussians spent so much time with parades. The junior officer did not have so much to learn in mid-nineteenth century conditions.[35]

There was also a political reason for having regular officers command Landwehr companies and squadrons. Boyen's retirment in late 1847 from his second term in the War Ministry, although ascribable to old

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[34]Bremen (ed.), Fransecky, pp. 84-85.

[35]Following the opinion in Ritter, Staatskunst, Vol. I, p. 137.

age, was also partly due to his objection to Prince William's insistence that all Landwehr units have regular army officers as commanders, "because of the communist and liberal threat."[36] For a medley of reasons, financial, social, military, and political, thus, the regular army had arrogated to itself a considerable hold of commanding positions in the Landwehr by 1848. There remains the Landwehr men to be considered.

In the immediate years after 1814, the Landwehr was composed of highly unreliable, untrained men. Since every able-bodied male in Prussia between the ages of 20 and 32 was supposed to belong to the Landwehr's first levy, if he was not serving in the regular army or reserve, the Landwehr in 1848 could also be called a body of untrained men if taken in its entirety. But more than a generation had elapsed between 1814 and 1848 and many thousands of men had passed through the regular army and entered the Landwehr as well-drilled men. For this reason, the Landwehr had a solid nucleus of drilled soldiers in 1848, in most regiments much more adequate than their numerical strengths required. A system of selection during mobilization periods could thus be, and was, devised.

Control of Landwehr rosters resided in the county (Kreis) government. The Landrat had the task of screening men when the Landwehr was called to the colors. He could thus usually insure that a numerically adequate, militarily drilled, and politically reliable force was raised.[37]

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[36]Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I, p. 80.

[37]Stenographische Berichte uber die Verhandlungen der zur Vereinbarung der preussischen Staats-Verfassung berufenen Versammlung (Berlin, 1848), p. 107. Information based on Lieutenant Colonel Griesheim's explanations to the assembly. The stenographic report of the Prussian Assembly was published variously in three and more volumes, but the pages are numbered consecutively, and further citations from this source will refer to pages only.

Exceptions to this rule existed only in the larger towns and cities of Prussia and in the Rhine Province. Since the Landrat was a representative of the Junker class or was often a retired regular officer, the same class that commanded the army also had a good measure of control over Landwehr mobilization.

Even so, the officer class in Prussia had a gnawing fear of the Landwehr--with some small justification--in the event of internal disorder. The officer class feared that the Landwehr would prove politically unreliable just because there were significant urban elements (but not over two-sevenths) in the Landwehr, or because a large number of Landwehr men had been too long removed from regular military service. This will be considered in subsequent chapters.

Of the regular army soldier, the officer corps could be reasonably certain as political interest grew among the Bürger class of Prussia in the 1840's. But regular officers feared the Landwehr most evidently because they had not yet established complete control over all Landwehr units. The revolution of 1848 intervened before complete control could be established. In the next part, examination will be made of the impact of the revolution of 1848 on the Prussian army and of the response of the army to that upheaval.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE PRUSSIAN ARMY AND THE MARCH REVOLUTION

In this chapter we come to the confrontation of the army with the revolution itself. It is profitable at this point to sketch in an overview of the revolution, together with its main turning points as they affected civil-military relations.

When Frederick William sent the united diet home in 1847, he by no means squelched the liberals' desire for a constitution in Prussia. That desire was reawakened and quickened with the outbreak of revolution in Paris in February of 1848. The events in Paris quickly found repercussions in Germany and in Prussia. Everywhere demonstrations forced the lesser German princes to appoint liberal governments. On 14 March, an uprising in Vienna forced the retirement of Prince Metternich, symbol of reaction in Europe. In Prussia, demonstrations took place in the major cities of the monarchy. In Berlin itself these demonstrations set off a series of clashes between soldier and civilian that culminated in the uprising of 18-19 March. The news of Metternich's dismissal and the increasing animosity between soldier and Berliner moved Frederick William to grant, belatedly, the liberal demands of 1847. Failure to couple these demands with a withdrawal of troops from Berlin produced the fateful scene at the palace square on 18 March where two accidental shots fired by the soldiers sent the Berliners scurrying off to erect barricades. An afternoon and night of fighting on the

barricades, with the troops generally victorious, ended, however, in a muddle of orders and counter-orders which culminated with the withdrawal of troops from Berlin. There followed a great humiliation for the king in the palace square as thousands of enraged Berliners forced the king to pay homage to the dead barricade fighters.

The March revolution wrenched from the king wide-reaching political concessions. Prussia was to receive a constitution contracted between the king and an elected assembly. Likewise, a German parliament was to be elected to create a constitution for a united Germany. Both constituent bodies, elected on universal male suffrage, opened their sessions in late May, 1848. In addition to these concessions, Frederick William IV ordered troops to engage Denmark on behalf of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, whose struggle against Denmark was a cause popular for German nationalists.

The high tide of the revolution was reached in June. On 14 June, a Berlin crowd invaded the Landwehr Armory in search of weapons; order was restored only after large reinforcements of Berlin's newly created Bürgerwehr were employed. The storming of the Landwehr Armory had the distinct effect of discrediting, among the propertied classes, the Bürgerwehr as an instrument of order. This lesson was brought home even more closely when news came to Germany of the uprising of the workers in Paris just ten days later. In the same month, Ludolf Camphausen, who had formed a ministry in March, resigned his post because the Prussian Assembly refused to consider his draft constitution. David Hansemann and Rudolf von Auerswald formed a new ministry to replace that of Camphausen.

In July of 1848, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution began to take form. In that month a number of Junkers and officers began publishing the Kreuzzeitung and the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung and otherwise attempt to shape public opinion. Likewise a large number of political organizations called variously Prussian Vereine, Patriotic Vereine, veterans' organizations, were created. In August a large number of landowners convened in Berlin in the so-called "Junker's Parliament" in order to formulate strategies for the defense of their "well-earned rights." And in August, too, an army detachment, seemingly deliberately, shot down a number of Bürgerwehr men in Schweidnitz. And, finally, the king terminated his war with Denmark with the Truce of Malmoe.

The Schweidnitz shooting produced the Stein resolution and Schulz amendment calling for the removal of political reactionaries from the officer corps. Because the Auerswald-Hansemann ministry failed to implement the desires of the Prussian Assembly, it was forced to resign in September. General von Pfuel subsequently formed a ministry to replace the Auerswald-Hansemann ministry. Pfuel liquidated the Stein affair in a compromise superficially satisfactory to both Assembly and officer corps.

The ministerial crisis in Prussia was contemporaneous with a crisis in the Frankfurt Parliament where the left wing overthrew a provisional cabinet for having accepted the Malmoe armistice. The parliament subsequently made itself unpopular with the masses of Frankfurt for accepting the armistice, and, in early September a mob bestially murdered two Prussian deputies, General von Auerswald and Prince Lichnowsky.

More than anything else, the Frankfurt murders discredited the democratic cause in Germany.

From September through October and into November, the forces of revolutionary action and the forces of counter-revolution were on a collision course. In October occurred the second Viennese revolution when the more radical elements seized power in the city. The Viennese revolution was followed quickly by counter-revolution as General Windischgrätz led an army to capture Vienna at the end of October. In the meanwhile, radicals from all parts of Germany converged on Berlin, where in October a "democratic congress" was held. Crowds in Berlin were agitated to such a fever pitch as to attempt to coerce the National Assembly to adopt a resolution instructing the Prussian crown to send military aid to the beleaguered Viennese radicals; the resolution failed by a narrow margin.

But in the same month, Frederick William decided to terminate the Pfuel ministry and appoint a coup d' etat ministry. The coup d' etat ministry, led by Count von Brandenburg and Otto von Manteuffel, was appointed on 5 November. Brandenburg immediately recessed the National Assembly and announced it would reconvene in the provincial town of Brandenburg. At the same time, General von Wrangel entered Berlin at the head of 13,000 men, proclaimed a state of siege, and set about disarming the Bürgerwehr. On 5 December Brandenburg dissolved the bickering Assembly in Brandenburg and promulgated (oktroyiert) a constitution. In so far as Prussia was concerned, the revolution was over.

On the German scene, the parliament at Frankfurt continued to deliberate even though the forces of the old regime were now back in

the saddle in Germany's two power centers, Vienna and Berlin. In April, the Frankfurt Parliament adopted a German constitution and elected the king of Prussia as hereditary emperor. The king, as is well known, rejected the constitution. The subsequent uprisings that took place in the Prussian western provinces, in Dresden in Saxony, and in Baden were all speedily subdued, chiefly by the Prussian army.

Such, in narrative outline, was the scene which the rest of this study will focus on. The following chapters will include an examination of the impact of the March revolution on the Prussian army, the way in which the army confronted the revolution from May to November, how it dealt with political problems within its own ranks, and, finally some observations on the long-term results of the revolution on the army.

The March revolution of 1848 produced a radical if temporary shift in political and social values in Prussia. The values of constitutional monarchy replaced that of absolute monarchy. In place of Prussian particularism, German national-mindedness became temporarily dominant, as urban values and urban leadership momentarily replaced rural-mindedness in a Prussia still five-sevenths rural. Although class snobbery continued to exist within urban Prussia, the conflicting ideals within a social class loosely labeled as Bürger replaced the ideals of caste as they had existed in the Vormaerz; even though party lines can be discerned which split the forces seeking to profit from the March revolution, these party lines were submerged in the general enthusiasm that attended the March revolution. Democrats, liberals, socialists, communists, constitutional monarchists, republicans, haute and petite

bourgeoisie, journeymen, Germans and Poles joined to acclaim the brotherhood of peoples and the new constitutional era then thought to be dawning in Prussia, in Germany, in Europe.

Implied in the apparent triumph of the new ideals was the denunciation of the old. Denounced was the tutelage of the Prussian bureaucracy. Denounced was the oligarchic rule of the Prussian nibility. Denounced, above all, was the Prussian army that had championed the old order.

For the most part, the Prussian Bürger exhonerated their king from these denunciations; they ceased to identify Frederick William IV with his hated army. On the morrow of 19 March, after the humiliating scene at the Berlin Palace grounds, the Prussian Bürger looked on Frederick William as a people's king, no longer the head of a reactionary military. All the more the revolutionaries in Berlin vented their spleens against the king's brother, Crown Prince William. In Prince William, the Kartätschenprinz--the "grape-shot prince"--the Berlin revolutionary saw personified everything that was hated about the old military state. The prince was obliged to shave his beard and, under disguise, leave Berlin to seek refuge in England, where Frederick William gave him a face-saving "mission" to report to the English court on the constitutional changes contemplated in Prussia and to "study" the English constitution. Rage at him was so wide-spread and deeply felt that only the inscription, "National Property," hastily scrawled on the walls, saved his palace from being demolished after the March days. The prince had been commander of the Royal Guard before the March days, and, to the revolutionary Berliner, this compounded his guilt.

Most of all military formations, the revolutionary Berliner hated the Guard, this "Praetorian Guard" that had separated king from people, this "raw Soldateska" that had so recently been guilty of inflicting unspeakable brutalities on the freedom fighter. No reconciliation between Guard and "people" seemed possible. Only a few voices were to be heard that would counsel moderation and reconciliation or that would defend a once haughty Prussian army whose officer corps had been the first estate in the land. A demoralized dynastic army was of no use to an elated (and essentially urban) Volk enjoying the warm sunshine of the "Spring-time of peoples."

The concessions which Frederick William IV was obliged to make to the March revolution seemed to confirm the triumph of the Bürger and to ratify the permanent denigration of the Prussian army and of its officer corps. On 19 March, the king authorized the establishment of a Bürgerwehr to maintain order in Prussia; the crown expressly provided that the regular army would be used for domestic purposes only as a last resort and only at the request of the Bürgerwehr or of muncipal authorities. On 21 March, King Frederick William IV announced that the achievement of German unity was Prussian policy: "Prussia is henceforth merged into Germany," it was proclaimed. On the same day, the king ordered the army to wear the German tri-color as a symbol of this policy--the very same colors which the Guard had recently fought against on the Berlin barricades. On 22 March, he promised a delegation from Breslau that an assembly based on the "broadest" suffrage would contract a constitution with the crown; the widest freedoms were to be legalized, including freedom of speech, press, religion, and the

rights of assembly and petition. Moreover, he promosed that he would require the army to swear an oath of loyalty to the constitution; the army, too, was to be incorporated into the new Prussian legal system. On 22 March, to the consternation and dismay of the many Polonophobes in the officer corps, Frederick William promised a Polish delegation that a national reorganization of the province of Posen would be undertaken. Finally, on 25 March, the king told the assembled officers of the Guard in Potsdam that his concessions had been made freely and he enthusiastically announced that he felt as safe in Berlin under the protection of the Bürgerwehr as he did in the midst of his Guard. The angry rattle of sabres that greeted these words testifies to the bitterness of the Royal Guard at what had transpired.[1] To observers, it looked as though the Prussian state, with its military virtues, had died. Liberal, democratic, bourgeois, national, and urban values had, it seemed, replaced aristocratic, rural, and caste values.

The following sections will deal with this episode in Prussian-German history. For a period all-too-brief, it appeared as though civilian and urban values had replaced the military, social, and political values of the Prussian officer corps. This revolution in ideas had the temporary effect of downgrading the social elite of the officer corps and of raising the more educated into temporary prominence. There was, in addition, a perceptible shift to the political left on the part of a small number of officers. The following sections will seek to clarify these broad considerations.

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[1]Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke (15 vols., Berlin, 1924ff), Vol. XV, p. 22; Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben Leopolds von Gerlach (2 vols., Berlin, 1892), Vol. I, pp. 148-149; Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 122.

So long as the issue between the old order and revolution was joined, the Prussian officer corps and army were well suited to deal with domestic disturbance, especially one of revolutionary proportion. In European revolutions, the capital city has played a key role: Paris in 1789, 1830, 1848, 1871; Vienna and Berlin in 1848, Petrograd in 1905 and 1917. In the case of 1848 in Prussia, it was precisely at and near the capital city, Berlin, that the troops deemed best qualified to oppose an insurrection--specifically the Royal Guard--were garrisoned. From the standpoint of violent confrontation, the forces of the old order, as represented in the Royal Guard and its officer corps, were nowhere else so crassly opposed to the forces of the new as they were in Berlin. Here, on 18-19 March, 1848, the military duty to restore domestic tranquility agreed most closely with the officer corps' prescribed political and social mentality. In the barricade struggles of 18-19 March, it should have appeared as though the Hohenzollerns' fusion of social and political criteria in the selection of officer material had vindicated itself. Among the officers of the Royal Guard, there was none of that conflict between individual conscience and professional duty that occurred among non-Guard officers and which occurs so often in domestic disturbance.

Although it is very possible that civil war generates more animosity than does international war, the elan with which the Royal Guard moved into combat on 18 March betrays a willingness to follow desired and desirable orders; the Guard officer regarded the uprising more as an emuete than as revolution, more as social war than as civil war. The Royal Guard did not regard the barricaded Berliner as a

fellow citizen. No Guard officer acted so unmilitarily as did, for example, Lieutenant Orges of the 4th Artillery Brigade, who appeared in civilian clothing during the night of 18-19 March and attempted to convince the soldiers that they should not fire on their fellow countrymen. No Guard officer turned in a request for release from service during the barricade fighting as did Orges because he could not reconcile duty with conscience.[2]

Although, with some exceptions to be noted below, the Guard officer corps performed its military function well in the barricade struggle, examination makes it clear that it did this because of its social and political mentality and not because of attention to professional considerations. As long as the corps was engaged in combat with the Berlin Bürger, it was a relatively militarily useful instrument. When, however, orders were given to disengage from the fight and to accept new political conditions, the Guard showed itself to be an unsuitable military instrument. If the cardinal virtue of a professional soldier is obedience to orders and service to his client, the Guard failed the test.

It is understandable that even professionally-minded officers would be dismayed at an order to disengage and retreat from a struggle in which they had been victorious, although the commanding officer, Lieutenant General Karl von Prittwitz, had proposed exactly this to the king, and for sound military reasons: Prittwitz was worried about troop morale. Few officers--including Prittwitz--understood Frederick

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[2]Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. I, pp. 177-180.

William's political reasoning behind his desire to cease the engagement in Berlin. Few officers understood that continued fighting in Berlin seriously jeopardized Frederick William's German policy and, indeed, could jeopardize the continued existence of the Prussian state.[3] It is understandable that even--and perhaps especially--the professionally-minded officer would fail to see the broader political implications of a continued struggle in Berlin's streets. Thus even the professionally-minded officer grumbled at the decision to cease fire and to withdraw.

The bitterness of the Guard officer corps, its laxness in maintaining discipline in the ranks, and its attitude toward the king and his concessions, however, demonstrate that social and political mentalities and considerations far transcended a normal professional dismay. Bitterness toward a "canaille" becoming more and more impudent had already made the Guard officer nearly incapable of performing his duty--specifically that of maintaining discipline in the ranks. Despite subsequent boasting to the contrary, a large part of the Guard officer corps had been in serious dereliction of duty with regard to the discipline of the soldiers. Already before the March days, Major Albrecht von Roon observed that the officers in Berlin were having difficulty controlling their men.[4] On one occasion, even whipping the men with his own sabre could not help the commander of a small cavalry detachment prevent his men from riding and chopping down peaceful and

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[3]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848; Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte, pp. 58-59.

[4]Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 122.

defenseless Berliners.[5] In general, nevertheless, Guard officers, with few exceptions, favored letting the men strike back at real and alleged insults; it was supposedly better for the morale of the men and it did not tax the disciplinary obligations of the officers. Thus, when the fighting began on 18 March, Lieutenant General von Prittwitz remarked that it was "extremely beneficial" for the men to be able to come to blows with the Berliner at the end of a long "trial of patience" to which the officers had not wanted to submit themselves or their men.[6] This disregard for strict discipline in the Guard was most serious after the troops had been ordered to disengage from the barricades and ordered to vacate the palace grounds and return to their quarters on 19 March. For example, Major von Koschkull, commander of the 1st Battalion of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment, loudly and feverishly declared in the Kaserne on 19 March, in the presence of his officers and men, that he would resign from service after such an ignoble retreat.[7] Completely abandoning the men, who were burning to strike at the Berliners, to the care of equally inflamed non-commissioned officers, the majority of officers from the same regiment, as well as from other units, also immediately deserted the Kasernen in civilian clothing in order to attend to their personal affairs in Berlin; the men were left with the impression that their officers were deserting them in a critical

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[5]Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. I., pp. 422-423; Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Felix Rachfahl, "König Friedrich Wilhelm IV. und die Berliner Märzrevolution im Lichte neuer Quellen," Preussische Jahrbücher (Vol. 110, Berlin, 1902), p. 450.

moment. The chorus of praise for the discipline of the soldiers which later gushed forth from officers' pens was really largely a smoke screen designed to cover up the professional negligence of the officers concerned. Where the men maintained discipline, this was thanks to the work of the non-commissioned officers, not that of the Guard officers. For many officers of the Guard were quite incapable of controlling even themselves, to say nothing of controlling their men. Thus, General Leopold von Gerlach wrote on 21 March in Spandau that, "the officers, especially those of the Regiment Alexander, [were] very excited, resolute in the freshest memories of the Berliner insults, not to put up with a peaceful retreat."[8] That this bellicose attitude was not entirely due to sensitivity over wounded military honor is evident.

The bitter humiliation which came over the officer corps as a result of the retreat from Berlin and of the king's concessions was supposedly reflected in the threats of mass resignation of officers that occurred after the March days, threats which had a distinct influence on the king's subsequent policies. Evidence shows that these threats came from the socially highly placed officers and from those with private wealth; wounded military honor played only a secondary role. Lieutenant General von Prittwitz noted on 22 March that a number of officers were contemplating leaving the service and that a few minor princes had in fact already done so. The wealthier officers, Prittwitz also noted, offered to subsidize their more impecunious

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[8]Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 147.

comrades in order to entice them into a mass resignation.[9] According to one account, which is probably greatly exaggerated, sixty-five officers of the Guard subsequently turned in requests for release from service after the March days.[10] Evidence points to no other threats to resign from service, with the exception of the Tenth Hussar Regiment.[11] In the aftermath of the March revolution, only the social and the well-heeled elite seriously contemplated precipitating mass mutiny. As Prittwitz remarked, the officers "feared that they would be toppled from the high position they had previously taken" in the state.[12] Not military considerations, but fear of social and political demotion conditioned the Guard's reaction. Although Prittwitz was able to hold the Guard officer corps together, the mediatized nobles, Pomeranian Junkers, and Grandees of the Mark in the Royal Guard obviously made it plain that a disintegration of the officer corps was an agreeable alternative to an intact officer corps that had lost its social and political position in the state. The professional agruments subsequently put out by military publicists that the army should not be obliged to swear an oath to the constitution because this would

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[9]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848.

[10]Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, p. 70.

[11]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, p. 57. The Tenth Hussar had 21 noble and 6 non-noble officers according to the officers' lists for 1847. The fact that the Hussars were light cavalry and hence normally had less well-to-do officers suggests that there may have been more attempts to resign in the heavy cavalry, which was rated higher socially and which required of the officer a more expensive outlay of horses and equipment; the officer in the heavy cavalry was quite often a man of independent means.

[12]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848.

make of it a deliberating body and hence disintegrate it should be understood in this context as well as in its valid military context. To have obliged the officer corps of the Royal Guard to swear allegiance to a constitution was tantamount to destroying its legal and social position in the Prussian state. Disintegration as a result of deliberation over orders did not concern the Guard--deliberation already existed--but rather the implication that an oath to the constitution would put the Guard on a socially and legally equal basis with the Prussian--German Bürger was the Guard's concern.

Having failed to precipitate mass mutiny in the officer corps, the reactionary hot-heads and social fat-cats of the Guard set about to alienate their comrades from the king. Whether this was done in an effort to steer the king back into an acceptable political course, whether it was done to prepare the Guard officer corps--and the officers of the line--to accept a praetorian revolt, or whether it was simply a visceral reaction to the March days need not be determined here. Certainly there were enough rumors abroad of a pending coup d' etat in late March[13] and, for that matter, sporadically throughout 1848.

Although it had been Lieutenant General von Prittwitz's own order, contrary to the intentions of the king, which had withdrawn the troops from the palace grounds on 19 March, which had left the king nearly helpless before the enraged Berlin revolutionaries, and which precipitated the series of concessions which the king had made thereafter, Prittwitz, by implication, induced the Guard officers to believe that

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[13]See, for example, the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, #89, 29 March, 1848.

the king himself had ordered their retreat from Berlin.[14] The Guard was led to believe that the king lacked the will to continue the conflict. Thus the king was made to appear as if he had betrayed the officer corps; he had, in effect, lost caste with the Guard. And by becoming a "people's king," the king separated himself from his Guard, and ceased to be a real War Lord. Hence, the distrust with which many senior officers regarded their unsoldierly king in the Vormaerz was translated into rage and disrespect among most officers of the Guard after the March days. Even the younger officers of the Guard, as well as many Line officers, believed that the king remained "very subdued" and that "for a long time," he sat staring "unconsciously and listlessly."[15] Such disloyalty to the Supreme War Lord hardly bespeaks the professional outlook.

If the opinion makers in the Guard thus set aside the king as War Lord, they found a psychological substitute in Crown Prince William. Revolutionary Berlin's most hated personality easily became the Guard's most revered deity. Songs were written idolizing the Crown prince. Troops were taught to sing of his virtues. Letters and articles were sent to newspapers identifying the "army" with William. In a matter of weeks, the Guard insinuated that it had always had an intense love for the prince, a sentiment that few had talked about before the March days.[16] The Guard suddenly discovered in the prince a generalissimo and strategic genius which the actual talents of William's parade-mongering hardly justified. The more the civilian population attacked

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[14]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848; Rachfahl, "König Friedrich Wilhelm IV.," passim.

[15]Hoetzsch, "Die Stellung des Generals von Colomb," p. 369.

[16]Diest, Meine Erlebnisse, 1848, p. 71.

the crown prince, the more the Guard praised him, and the more the crown prince was praised, the lower the king sank in the esteem of the officers of the Royal Guard. Thus, as late as 3 June, 1848, when a public controversy over the return of Prince William to Prussia was at its peak, when the Guard's professed adoration of William had risen to the point of canonization, General Leopold von Gerlach observed that among the Guard officers, "rage and disrespect for the king were still prevalent."[17] And that the intensity of the Guard's attachment to the prince struck deep roots was demonstrated on 8 June when Hans von Schleinitz, a Guard lieutenant, received a severe beating from a Berlin crowd whom Schleinitz had incensed when he foolishly gave a loud cheer for the crown prince after William left the Prussian National Assembly.[18]

Because of the rift thus created between him and his Guard officers, a large part of Frederick William IV's efforts during the revolutionary months of 1848 was devoted to an attempt to bridge that breach and to prevent any intermediate person from coming between him and his officers. Not only was this reflected in Frederick William's adamant refusal to conduct his military policies through the person of a responsible war minister and the state ministry, as in the case of the debacle in Posen in March and April, where Frederick William gave orders to the commanding general in Posen independently of his war minister and contrary to the policies of the state ministry and of

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[17]Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 164.

[18](Anon.), Personnen und Zustande Berlins seit dem 18. März 1848. Ein Beitrag zur künftigen Geschichte Preussens. Erstes Heft (Leipzig, 1849), p. 27; Fedor von Zobeltitz, Aus dem Papieren der Familie von Schleinitz (Berlin, 1905), p. 335.

his own royal commissar, General Karl von Willisen, whom the Guard generals despised.[19] It was also reflected in the gnawing fear of the king's close friend, General Leopold von Gerlach, that the king would reappoint William to command the Guard after the crown prince's beard had grown back enough to allow him to return to Prussia in June 1848. Gerlach obviously feared the possibility of a Praetorian revolt on the part of the Guard.[20]

The attitude and disposition of the Royal Guard to the March revolution, to the king, and to the crown prince demonstrate the precariousness of the Hohenzollern military system, based as it was on social and political considerations in the selection and indoctrination of officer material. To be sure, the Guard performed its military function more or less adequately in the barricade struggle though there is no reason to believe that any other Prussian formation might not have done as well. A Line artillery officer and incidentally a doctor of philosophy, Lieutenant Wilhelm von Brockhusen, even gives evidence that officers who did not share the mentality of the Royal Guard were nonetheless reliable officers in their military capacity. Disturbed by the death of a close friend, Lieutenant Hermann Tüpke, Brockhusen wrote a pamphlet, "To All Berliners," in which he defended the army against the violent press attack made on it after the March days. Lieutenant Tüpke, Brockhusen wrote, had been an instructor in the cadet corps for three years, was a person schooled in Hegelian philosophy

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[19]Brandenburg, König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen, pp. 40-43, 52-53, 83, 96-99.

[20]Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 151, 168.

and in mathematics. Tüpke had deliberately sought death as a way to reconcile his political convictions with his duties as a Prussian officer. Volunteering for a post with the 1st Guard Regiment, Tüpke placed himself deliberately and continuously under fire. Shot on the morning of 19 March, he died on 23 March. On his death bed, Tüpke declared that "the officer stands in contradiction to the spirit of the times; this contradiction must be removed." Tüpke hoped that his death would serve as "mid-wife" to the new era. So Lieutenant Brockhusen broke out in anguish to the Berliners;

> Also he [Tüpke] fought against you, as did many other men of honor, in spite of the fact that they harbored the same views as you! . . . He was not the only one who encouraged the soldiers to storm the barricades and is nevertheless still happy because of your present victory. I know of many who fought against you who are nevertheless known to me as free-thinking men, even as republicans. They all fought in loyalty to their oath, since they were sworn only to your king . . . Soon the form of the oath will be changed and the compulsion which forced us, against our better feelings, to carry out orders which betrayed the people, will cease. [My italics] [21]

Although Brockhusen thus indirectly gives good argument against having a dynastic instrument such as the Prussian army swear an oath of allegiance to a constitution (italicized above), he also gives good evidence that the military virtues of discipline and obedience did not need the social and political underpinnings that characterized the Prussian officer corps. Indeed, the political opinions which the Hohenzollerns had expected the officer corps to harbor now backfired on them. Having been indoctrinated for years into "absolutist" thinking,

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[21]Wilhelm von Brockhusen, An sämmliche Berliner (Berlin, 1848), quoted in Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. I, pp. 420-421.

the Guard officer corps now showed itself to be "more royal than the king." As such, the Guard officer corps was a problematic military instrument for a king who, however temporarily, proposed to be a constitutional monarch. The Guard even threatened mass resignation should the king command it to take up posts in common with the newly-created Bürgerwehr and maintain order in Berlin.[22] The Guard officers demonstrably showed that they were opposed to any social or political leveling as might be implied in constitutional arrangements.

Although the Guard remained bodily intact, the social and political ideas which found their highest embodiment in the Guard were, for the time being, set aside to make room for the new era. A revolution had occurred and values were reversed. The War Lord had announced that the basic ideas of the March revolution were also his. Newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, parades, and demonstrations acclaimed the new values. Prussia had entered the era of public opinion formation. It is thus not surprising that there was a regrouping within the officer corps. Officers who had been at a disadvantage in the pre-March establishment now sought to take advantage of the new conditions in Prussia in order to improve their careers. Officers formerly lower in status than the Royal Guard now stepped into the lime-light. There was, in the Prussian officer corps, a perceptible shift to the left on the heels of the March revolution. Apart from the Royal Guard, the Prussian officer corps, however grudgingly, accepted constitutionalism and the idea of a united Germany, however vague these notions were

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[22]Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 141; Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, p. 78.

before party lines began to clarify such programs. The following sections will be chiefly concerned with the impact of the March revolution on the non-Guard officer corps.

Perhaps the declaration of sixty officers of the 25th Infantry Regiment in the Cologne garrison indicates the normal reaction of the Line officer to the March revolution and the king's concessions. Unlike the Guard, these officers showed no disloyalty to their War Lord. The sixty officers declared their unconditional adherence to their oath to the king, while adding that when the time came for them to swear an oath to the constitution as well, it would then be up to each officer to decide whether to stay in service or not.[23] Although this "wait-and see" attitude was not unlike that of the Royal Guard, it was more sincerely apolitical; it is fair to assume that in its context--22 March--these officers were prepared to accept a constitutional change, even if such a change was distasteful to them. Major Albrecht von Roon best typifies this attitude: "All powers into the new ship, even if with broken hearts," he wrote his wife.[24] And though there was little clarity with regard to the content of constitutionalism in March of 1848, Lieutenant-Colonel von Bagensky, eldest officer of the 2nd (King's) Infantry Regiment, expressed the sentiments of a substantial segment of the officer corps in March. Von Bagensky wrote two long articles, 23 and 24 March, to the Berlin Vossische Zeitung, in which he protested against the defamation of the army:

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[23]Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere, pp. 1-30; Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, pp. 657-658.

[24]Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 135.

> Both sides [Bagensky wrote] fought for their convictions--the regiment for its honor of arms and for its oath . . . The army of the Fatherland was brought up and trained in the beliefs of its fathers: That the king and Fatherland are one. . . . The army is sad in this moment because its loyalty is misunderstood; its belief is shaken, because it is separated from the Fatherland! It is prepared to swear an oath to the constitution; it longs for this moment. For then we will be once again a unity which has been forcibly separated: People and Army![25]

Thus a large number of Prussian officers was prepared to accept what seemed then to be inevitable, however distasteful it may have been to them; the career officer could not lightly give up his career on social or political principles, especially when his own chief had announced that the new principles were also his. It is also significant that an old and obviously conservative, senior officer--Lieutenant Colonel von Bagensky--could accept the idea that an oath to the constitution was inevitable. And in all events, the vast majority of Prussian Line officers in March of 1848 did not want to commit themselves irretrievably but wanted, simply, to adopt an apolitical attitude of "wait-and-see."

Not all of the Line officers were willing to abide with an apolitical attitude, however. The March revolution had called the ideals of caste into question and the king had granted, by inference, equal rights to all Prussian citizens. A significant number of officers meant to take advantage of such a state of affairs in order to improve their career chances and also to insure their legal status under the proposed new

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[25] Vossische Zeitung, #73, 27 March, 1848, #74, 28 March, 1848.

conditions; if the first estate in the land was to lose its social and legal predominance as such, these officers proposed to secure their rights as constitutional citizens. Most of these eccentric officers were or became democratically orientated, and they stepped forth in groups as well as individually. The following paragraphs will be concerned, chiefly, with these officers and with their aspirations and hopes, and ought certainly to demonstrate that the Prussian officer corps which faced the revolution of 1848 was not the closed corporation and "rock in the sea" of disintegrating society which official legend and promunciamento subsequently made of it. Though the officer corps was not as strongly affected internally by revolution as was the civil service, much of the same tensions occurred.

Partly as a consequence of the recruitment criteria which have been examined above and partly because of the higher intensity of political ferment in the western provinces, groups of officers with democratic leanings were to be found primarily in the Rhine Province where several groups of officers expressed the desire to have the army participate in the benefits which Frederick William had promised Prussia. For example, a group of four officers in the 25th Infantry Regiment in Cologne refused to adhere to the declaration which their comrades made. Second lieutenants Wülfing, Bernigau, Faltin, and Nithak declared that since the king was now supposedly identified with the people and since the army had been ordered to help maintain order only on the requisition of the Bürgerwehr, the case appeared impossible that they would have to use arms against the Bürgertum; if this case did arise, they would be unable to follow an order to use weapons against

the people. The four officers assured, however, that they would take up arms to protect lives and property at the request of the Bürgerwehr. And they insisted, as well, that the army should not be excluded from the political rights which the Prussian Bürger now enjoyed. Five more officers, second lieutenants Müller, Leonhard, Adamski, Stawitzki, and von Pelzer, refused to sign the declaration of the sixty officers because the declaration also contained an indictment of lieutenants Wülfing, Bernigau, and Faltin.[26]

On 28 March, the liberal Kölnische Zeitung printed an editorial which called for a reorganization of the Prussian army, saying inter alia, that the aim should be that the army "merge into the people" and that soldiers should have the same rights of assembly and petition as other Prussian citizens.[27] In answer to this, the next day, 29 March, another group of officers in Cologne assembled and agreed on the following petition which was sent to the state ministry in Berlin. This group of officers wanted a liberation if not indeed a democratization of the army. They wanted:

1. The army to be sworn to the constitution.
2. Removal of the so-called legal privileges of the [officers'] estate for all not strictly military transgressions.
3. Revision of the military punitive codes and articles of war by the Reichstag. [Presumably the Prussian Assembly was meant.]
4. Security from arbitrary treatment and, to that end, the promulgation of a service regulation.
5. Abolition of the secret conduct lists.
6. The same for the courts of honor.
7. The same for the "familiar Du" [for enlisted men].

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[26] Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offizier, pp. 1-30; Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, pp. 657-658.

[27] Kölnische Zeitung, #88, 28 March, 1848. See also Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, p. 658.

8. The right to make complaints without going through channels.
9. Promotion through election.
10. The right to wear civilian clothes when not on duty.
11. The right of election to the parliamentary bodies.
12. Permission to re-enter [the service] for such officers who had been dismissed from the service because of caste prejudice [Standesvorurteilen].
13. Security from arbitrary discharge from the service.[28]

Points 12 and 13 of the above petition are apparent references to ex-lieutenants Fritz Anneke and August Willich, the latter of whom had also agitated among the officers of the Cologne garrison early in March. Willich had agitated among artillery officers, his former comrades, which suggests that the above petitioning officers were artillerists.[29]

A day after this petition had been reported, on 30 March, twenty officers of the Deutz garrison, across the Rhine, petitioned the ministry, asking that the election law which was to be laid before the Prussian united diet in April be extended to the standing army, "so that every state citizen, whatever position he might have, may exercise the same rights." The twenty officers expressed the desire, "as citizens of the state, to merge into the people."[30] And in Aachen, finally, the pressure of the revolution also cracked the caste and professional spirit of the officer corps garrisoned there. In Aachen,

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[28]Kölnische Zeitung, Beilage, #89, 29 March, 1848. Also Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, p. 658.

[29]Ibid., p. 502 and note 5.

[30]Ibid., p. 658; Kölnische Zeitung, #95, 14 April, 1848.

on 14 April, nineteen lieutenants of the 34th Infantry and 4th Dragoon regiments petitioned the war ministry asking that the military be placed in a position of complete equality with all citizens and that the army's oath to the constitution be consumated as soon as the constitution was ready. In addition, the nineteen lieutenants wanted an immediate abolition of the courts of honor and the secret conduct lists, since, in the new conditions in Prussia, these placed the officers in an equivocal position in relation to other citizens in the state. Moreover, they called for the immediate institution of "an elected commission at which all troop contingents and charges should be represented for deliberation of necessary reforms in the army." Finally, the nineteen lieutenants specified a general agenda for such a commission; they called for the commission to discuss five general points:

1. General reorganization of the army, as soon as possible, with special consideration of a fusion of Line and Landwehr according to Scharnhorst's principles.
2. Application of civil law to the affairs of the military with the single exception of [strictly] military affairs and crimes whose public judgment is to remain with a military jury.
3. Abolition of all middle authorities which are not tactically needed and necessary, whereby alone the necessary independence of the troop commander can be continued and extended. Likewise, simplification of the administrative work in relation to all branches of the military administration.
4. Redistribution of salary among the officers so that income is [relatively] equalized, but modified according to seniority in a suitable increase of 5 [per cent or Taler?] for [each] 5 years [of service] for the subaltern charges; likewise better pay for the younger non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

5. Rapid edition of an unchangeable service regulation so that the subordinates will be in a position where they know their duties and rights.[31]

The initial impact of the March revolution, in summary, thus revealed that among the Prussian officers were small local groups of democratically-minded junior officers as well as officers who were merely dissatisfied with general service conditions. Significantly, these elements were all in the Rhine Province, testimony both to their low social status within the Prussian officer corps and to the intense political ferment in the western provinces.

In addition to these small minority groups who identified themselves with some of the revolutionary aspirations, there were isolated individual officers throughout the monarchy who had the unheard of temerity to voice political and military opinions contrary to the "old Prussian" norm as well as contrary to the professional dictate that soldiers should stay out of politics. These included artillery lieutenants Orges, Tüpke, Oelze, and von Brockhusen, on duty in Berlin, Ducker in Stettin, Jung in Schweidnitz, Steinhardt in Cologne, engineer lieutenants Wernick in Pillau, Rüstow in Königsberg, and Bluhm in Stettin, infantry lieutenants von Beust in Wesel, de la Chevalerrie and von Wiedburg in Berlin, Wegnern and Lens in Pillau, and infantry captain, Czudnechowsky, in Konigsberg.[32]

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[31]Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, p. 659; Höhn, Verfassungskampf und Herreseid, p. 324, note 2.

[32]Vossische Zeitung, 1. Beilage, #69, 22 March, 1848; Anneke, Wie's Jetzt im preussischen Heere aussieht, pp. 4-5, 9, 15; Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #10, 8 September, 1848, #16, 16 October, 1848; Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat (zweite Aufl., Zurich, 1851), pp. 189-195; Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, p. 179.

There must have been a good many other single examples, but information about them is scarce. The officer lists for 1847, 1848, 1849, and 1850 reveal very little information on this point as Table 3 shows. Names shown as "Dismissed" or "Separated," etc., appear on several of the lists and thus the numbers given in each year give no reliable clue. In addition, many of the officers, for example the junior officers in Aachen, who wavered in the spring of 1848, are still on the lists in 1850, apparently in good standing. At least so far as the officer lists are concerned, the officer corps, as a whole, did a good job of keeping "secrets in the family."

TABLE 3

| | 1847 | 1848 | 1849 | 1850 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Struck from the lists | | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Dismissed | 9 | 16 | 2 | 1 |
| Separated | 24 | 32 | 36 | 36 |
| Removed from the officer estate | 5 | 7 | 3 | 4 |
| Dismissed from service | 8 | 6 | 25 | 23 |
| Condemned as traitor | | | 1 | 1 |
| Totals | 46 | 62 | 68 | 66 |

[33]

On first glance, it would be thought that the majority of the renegade officers were new in the service and hence more susceptible to democratic or radical propaganda for that reason. This does not bear true, however. New second-lieutenants, for the most part, had an enthusiasm for the uniform, coupled with submissiveness to authority and an eagerness to prove themselves as worthy officers which only an

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[33] *Rang- und Quartierliste*, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1850.

extended period of routinization in service could blunt. The officers who openly deviated from the expected norm had been in the service for quite some time. Lieutenant von Brockhusen had 11 years of service as an officer. As officers, lieutenants Wülfing and Nithak each had 12 years, Lieutenant Adamski had 9 years, Lieutenant Oelze had 13 years, Lieutenant von Wiedburg, 12 years, Lieutenant Jung, 10 years, and so forth.[34] To these periods of service must also be added the years spent in cadet schools and the several preparatory years as cornet which most spent in their Line units. The democratic officers obviously had been separated from civilian life for a long time and must each therefore have had a circle of friends in their respective officer corps. The non-conforming lieutenants, therefore, were all in their late twenties or in their thirties; they were, in short, mature men. Hence none of them wanted to leave the service. Lieutenant Rüstow, who had been an officer since 1840, claims that the democratic officers stayed in the service because they felt it to be their duty to try to reform the army from within.[35] This professed devotion to military reform does not obscure the significance of Lieutenant Wülfing's statement: "We were morally pressured to renounce a profession [Stand] for which we had sacrificed the best years of our lives, to which, I believe I am entitled to say, we had belonged honorably."[36] Despite their objection to the caste-spirit of the

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[34]Ibid., 1848.

[35]Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat (1. Aufl.), pp. 3, 114-116.

[36]Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere, p. IV.

officer corps, these officers, therefore, did not wish to leave the service simply because they had devoted so much time to it. In addition to their general political notions, hence, it is not surprising that there were so many demands to make an officer career more agreeable for officers in the lower grades, as the petitions, cited above, indicate. It is safe enough to assume that the vast majority of the junior officers in the Prussian army sympathized with the demands for a service regulation, for less arbitrary treatment from superior officers, for higher pay, for quicker promotions (nearly one-third of the second lieutenants in 1848--1032 of 3174 had been officers from ten to twenty-five years.[37]), and for the abolition of the hated secret conduct lists and courts of honor.[38] Moreover, there were a good many officers in the higher grades whose political opinions could not be questioned insofar as they adhered to the norm expected, who seemed nevertheless sincerely ready to swear an oath to a constitution, however questionable this may have been from a professional standpoint; Lieutenant Colonel von Bagensky, cited above, was not the only higher officer who was pained by the glaring legal and social separation of the army from Prussian society which the March revolution had made so much more obvious.

With the possible exception of the technical services, most officers, however, if they had any opinion in discord with the "old Prussian" norm, usually kept it to themselves, or expressed it only privately and carefully or anonymously. Most officers were normally afraid to express opinions

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[37]Rang- und Quartierliste, 1848.

[38]See (Anon.), Bekenntnisse eines preussischen Offiziers, passim.

which they thought their comrades might not share. For example, the ex-Danish officer, Captain Helmuth von Moltke, who, as a General Staff officer in Coblenz, must have known of the ferment in the Cologne garrison, wrote his relatives on 29 March that he welcomed what was occuring in Germany insofar as he saw "in the present conditions the single possibility of a united Germany arising," though Moltke was concerned for the preservation of law and order and expressed the usual liberal fear of the proletariat. But, he added, "Europe is reconstructing itself according to nationalities, all that is alien will fall away; if we only receive all the Germans again, we would be richly compensated." Moltke desired a "central-power" for Germany as quickly as possible. But he closed his letter with a request not to disclose its contents, "because of the arguments" in it.[39] If a non-"Stock-Preussen" and intelligent officer like Moltke was afraid to have his views made public, the more typical Prussian officer, if he was capable of harboring such thoughts, must have been doubly afraid of airing views that did not conform with the norm.

If the numbers of deviant officers cited above are compared to the total number of officers--over six thousand--they appear grossly insignificant. But it cannot therefore be concluded that the rate of open non-conformity was relatively small and insignificant to the officer corps as a whole. For, as has been argued above, a larger number of officers sympathized with the non-conformists either because they sympathized with some of the demands made or because they sympathized

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[39]Eberhard Kessel (ed.), Helmuth von Moltke, Briefe 1825-1891. Eine Auswahl (Stuttgart, 1959), pp. 233-236.

with them personally--that is, were regimental comrades of the non-conformists. The continued casting of aspersions against the "dismissed lieutenants" which appears in official and semi-official literature testifies to the concern which many officers had that the "dismissed lieutenants" and the non-conformists represented a serious threat to the social and political unity of the officer corps.[40] For the length of time that the errant officers had spent in military service demonstrates the continued susceptibility of many officers to outside pressures alien to corps spirit. And in a period such as March, April, and May of 1848, when there was hardly a conservative press, when literary and public opinion was permeated with ideas for liberal and radical reform, the dissenting officers' activity must have appeared as symptoms of disintegration even more so than did the attempts of Guard and cavalry officers to quit the service. For example, the radical Fritz Anneke wrote from Cologne on 28 March that:

> The local soldiers--men, non-commissioned officers, and younger officers--emancipate themselves more and more. They hold assemblies, make petitions, etc.[41]

The conservative editor of the enlisted man's weekly, Der Soldatenfreund, former actor Louis Schneider, claims he got the idea for starting the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung for officers because he met officers in Schleswig-Holstein speaking "in a tone as if the armies no longer had the task to oppose the general swindle of revolution, but rather, where possible,

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[40]For example, Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #7, 18 August, 1848, #10, 8 September, 1848.

[41]Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, p. 662, note 2.

to place themselves at the head of popular progress."[42] Even to that "patriotic and military actor," Louis Schneider, the officer corps did not look like a "rock in the sea" of revolutionary turbulence, which official legend later made of it.

With the officer corps of the Royal Guard temporarily removed from social predominance in Prussia, with most of the Line in grumbling acquiescence to the new conditions, and with the emergence of a public opinion that militated against the social ideals heretofore dominant in the officer corps, an educated grouping came into a tentative and uneasy prominence in the Prussian army. These officers were by no means social look-alikes. It is not accurate to label them as entirely professionally-minded, although such officers were also included. Nor were these officers single-minded in political convictions; some were moderately liberal, others moderately conservative, still others extremely conservative if not reactionary. They represented an intellectual stratum of the officer corps--men with university backgrounds, General War Academy training, officers of the General Staff and the War Ministry. Their service ranks ranged from lieutenant to lieutenant general.

The emergence of a popular public opinion, in part, explains the emergence of this group. Officers with known liberal sympathies, whether such sympathies proved spurious or not, were needed to give the officer corps a respectable--if fraudulent--image to a public busy

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[42]Schneider, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. II, pp. 203-205.

in asserting new social and political values. Thus Lieutenant General Karl von Reyher, a reputed liberal, and a person who had come from "the people" and who had achieved high military rank and also noble status in the Prussian system, was made interim war minister in March, 1848. Similarly, Major General Karl von Willisen, a known Polonophile and renowned military theorist, was appointed royal commissar in charge of pacifying Polish Posen, while his brother, the allegedly liberal Lieutenant Colonel Adolf von Willisen, enjoyed a certain influence in the royal entourage. Likewise, although not in the immediate context of the March revolution, a reform-minded officer, Major General von Peucker, was installed as imperial war minister of the German Central Power created in Frankfurt in June. Moreover, officials in the war ministry began projecting a military renovation in Prussia that called for a reshuffling of the Royal Guard, in an effort to make that corps look like a more popular organization.[43] And, finally, part of the Guard was sent to Schleswig, there to go through the motions of fighting on behalf of a popular German national cause against Denmark. Spring of 1848 was the season when part of "old Prussia" put on a liberal mask.

Since the king had announced his constitutional and German national intentions, it was also deemed necessary that officers stand for election to the Frankfurt Parliament and to the constituent assembly in Berlin. The war ministry asked picked officers to run for seats in both bodies. Again, these officers represented an intellectual stratum, and, in some cases, they were liberal-minded. They included

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[43]Wilhelm I., Militärische Schriften, Vol. II, p. 39, note.

officers such as Colonel Heinrich von Brandt, Major General von Peucker, Lieutenant Colonel Karl von Griesheim, Major Fischer, General Auerswald, Lieutenant General von Reyher, Major Teichert, Major Vogel, Lieutenant Julius Hartmann, Lieutenant von Sydow and Captain Zimmermann, all of them possessing an education far above the norm for Prussian officers. If a debate over the future of Prussian military institutions was pending, the system made obvious that clear thinking officers were to be preferred.

The reputedly liberal lieutenant General von Reyher voiced the probably typical attitude that many of these officers took with regard to the German question. A candidate for the Frankfurt Parliament, Reyher declared himself in favor of establishing a German Kaiser provided that that office went to the Prussian king. Otherwise, he would accept a loose federal union with a president. In any case, the Bundesfeldherr had to be a Prussian officer.[44] Since he was war minister, Reyher's statement should have set the norm for officer-politicians. For many, this was true. Colonel Heinrich von Brandt, for example, announced that he accepted constitutionalism but avoided compromising himself in that he proclaimed no program nor principles, but merely said he would do his "duty" if elected.[45]

But some officers by no means adhered to this conservative attitude, particularly not over constitutional questions. Some of them were pro-

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[44]Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. II, p. 423.

[45]Heinrich von Brandt (ed.), Aus dem Leben des Generals der Infanterie z. D. Dr. Heinrich von Brandt. Dritter Theil: 1848-1857 (Berlin, 1882), pp. 176-177.

nouncedly liberal, in phraseology at least. Lieutenant Julius Hartmann, of the General Staff, wrote his fiancee on 11 May describing the proceedings at one election assembly at which officers presented themselves for election:

> After a general, a major stepped up. I must admit I was beside myself, as I heard him speak; to tell the people that one has a brother who was a journeyman carpenter, that in the future no Guards and no cadet houses should exist; to lay down to the people in wornout sentences a political confession for which the threads which would give coherence to the whole could not be recognized. . ![46]

Similarly, in campaigning for the Prussian Assembly, Lieutenant von Sydow of the General Staff announced that he philosophically favored a reduction of the standing army, institution of a popular militia, and a reduction of the military budget. However, Sydow considered that a reduction of the standing army was currently impossible. Hence he favored an extended furlough system, perhaps a reversion to eighteenth century practice. Obviously showing disdain for the Guard, Sydow said he wanted to see no more splendid parades, no huge inspection trips, and that no more allowances should be given to commanders in order that they might play host at expensive dinners. Finally, Sydow wanted "caste pride" to be removed from the officer corps so that "military honor would not be esteemed higher than Bürger honor."[47] Other officers made similarly liberal speeches. Despite his complaint

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[46]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, pp. 85-86. Possibly this was Major Teichert, who did get elected to Frankfurt and was known as an "enemy of the Guard." See Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #6, 11 August, 1848, and Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. II, p. 423.

[47]Ibid., pp. 423-424.

about the unnamed major, Lieutenant Hartmann also made an election speech which could hardly be said to have adhered to the old caste norm. In an election speech which he made in Freienwald am Oder where he attempted to get elected to the Frankfurt Parliament, Hartmann said that he spoke out "boldly" for himself and that

> The Aristocrats, the Counts and Gentlemen were amazed that an officer could have such liberal ideas; however, he has them and if one still wants to save anything now, they must be set through. [My italics][48]

Although these political officers did not always agree, the group, as a whole, had definite leanings to the left, at least in contrast to what had been acceptable before the March revolution. And the words of some of the new spokesmen indicate an inherent and even professional dislike of the Royal Guard and for its caste values. In general, it could be said that these few officers did not object to the officer corps being regarded as the first estate in the land; but they wanted such a classification to be in agreement with the Fundamental Order of 1808.

To round out the story of the impact of the March revolution on the army, brief attention should be given to the common soldiers and to the Landwehr. Generalization is almost impossible on this subject, although the rural nature of the men and Landwehr should be kept in mind. In general, however, with the exception of Berlin-born recruits, the regular soldiers and Landwehr men of East Elbian stock were much

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[48]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, pp. 88-89.

more antagonistic to the revolution than were those in the west. But there were also examples of indiscipline among the troops in Berlin as well as in Posen, where discipline was difficult because national animosities between Germans and Poles complicated the situation.

The troops that fought in Berlin were almost wholly loyal to the old order. Indeed, one should label them as super-loyal to the old order. Men mostly not native to Berlin, mostly rural in origin, had little incentive to befriend Berliners whom they had recently fought and who had been the source of troop discomfort for an unbearable time. One contingent, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Infantry (king's) Regiment, which Prittwitz had removed from the street-fighting on 18 March because it had been "head shy" proved that its poor record in fighting Berliners was in no measure an indication of sympathy for the Bürger.[49] Given the duty of transporting prisoners to Spandau, these men visited the most unspeakable brutalities on their captives, most of whom appeared on 19th March disheveled, beaten, and in need of medical treatment. No doubt the men of the unit merely sought to retain the "knightly" reputation they had lost at the barricades, but it is certainly justifiable to indict their officers for permitting--probably encouraging--such needless brutality.[50]

Instances of undisciplined brutality also occurred in Posen when troops were employed to suppress Polish insurgents. These were rooted chiefly in national animosities, and occurred preeminently in mustered

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[49]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848.

[50]Ibid. Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. I, pp. 184-191.

Landwehr units. Officers found it impossible, at first, to prevent the mistreatment of Polish prisoners by the Landwehr men of German stock. Even General von Willisen, a known Polonophile, who had been sent as royal commissar to pacify and reorganize the province, had to be protected from Prussian Landwehr men's assaults, while the commander of the army corps in Posen, General von Colomb, enhanced his popularity with the Germans of the city of Posen by refusing to allow Willisen into the city. The Polish-German animosity also was the cause of a high number of desertions on the part of Polish-speaking soldiers in the army and Landwehr.[51]

Gradually, however, as the regular soldiers and Landwehr accustomed themselves to field duty, discipline returned. By mid-May, the instances of desertion disappeared, the German Landwehr men were restored to discipline, and the province reasonably pacified. But in the early weeks after the March uprising, Prussia's Polish province provided a very sore point in the body-politic, to say nothing of the body-militair.[52]

From a political standpoint, the Posen affair is interesting chiefly because of its relationship to Prussia's foreign policy. Under the Camphausen ministry, in April of 1848, the foreign ministry under Arnim briefly pursued the policy of allying with the Second French Republic and using the Posen episode to initiate war with Imperial Russia, a cause most popular with revolutionary Germans in the spring of 1848. Military officers held mixed opinions on such a policy, one which King Frederick William IV did his best to thwart. Most of the

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[51]Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, pp. 61, 63, 81-82.

[52]Brandt, Ibid.

"old Prussian" conservatives abhorred the thought of a war against Tsarist Russia in alliance with Republican France on behalf of "insolent" Poles and German democrats. But not all: Some conservative officers believed a war against Russia would be useful since in such a war the authorities would have a chance of hurling their own rebellious "scum against the enemy" and be rid of them for good.[53] Clearly, the situation in Posen and Prussia's position in the spring of 1848 created a divided house in Prussia's military establishment.

The March revolution of 1848 had a very different impact in the western provinces, chiefly in the Rhineland. There, the Prussian army appeared to be in trouble. At the outbreak of the revolution in Paris in February, Prussia had called up its reserves. They were quickly found to be infected with revolutionary enthusiasm. In Trier, on 13 March, for example, thus before the uprising in Berlin, reservists were openly wearing the French tricolor and they "sang the Marsellaise."[54] Lieutenant General August von Thile, commanding in Coblenz, was obliged to withdraw march orders he had given the 29th Infantry Regiment on the grounds that the men and reserves were unreliable;[55] in most cases, it was found necessary to dismiss the reservists. On March 25, shortly after the uprising in Berlin, a large number of active soldiers assembled in Cologne and there agreed on a petition to the division commander, which asked for the abolition of the articles of war, discontinuance of the practice of addressing the men with "Du" or "Er," introduction

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[53]Hoetzsch, "Die Stellung des Generals von Colomb," p. 364.

[54]Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, pp. 484, 569-571.

[55]Ibid., pp. 667, 688-689.

of jury trials in military courts, amnesty for convicted soldiers, and less parade exercises in favor of more field service.[56] The latter petition was wholly apolitical, only service-connected, but it is interesting to observe that rank and file soldiers could see more military practicability in field exercises than in parades.

In retrospect, the stirrings among the rank and file in the Rhineland appear to be little more than a tempest in a tea-pot. But to contemporaries, they seemed significant. Anneke's observation has already been noted above. More telling, even than Anneke, however, is the report that the Chief of Staff of the army corps on the Rhine, Lieutenant Colonel von Hoepfner wrote to the war minister on 29 March:

> Our confidence in the soldier has completely disappeared since the reserves were drawn in. . . The use of Rhenish soldiers against the Bürger appears wholly impossible. We have had experiences which we had not held possible in the Prussian army.[57]

This was the kind of information, unquestionably, upon which the Prussian authorities founded the necessity of putting on a popular mask.

There remains the problem of the Landwehr. The Landwehr was officially inactive, except for Posen, in the spring of 1848--that is, it was not mobilized. Still, in a number of places in the monarchy, Landwehr men gathered at their local armories at the summons of a few political leaders in order to discuss both political and service-connected questions.[58] Although not mobilized, hence technically civilian, they did gather as Landwehr members and at a Landwehr armory,

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[56]Ibid., pp. 656-657.

[57]Ibid., pp. 688-689.

[58]Stenographische Berichte, p. 63; Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. III, pp. 51-52; Schneider, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. II, pp. 46-47.

creating, thus, a problem insoluable in terms of civil-military behavior: Should one construe them as ordinary citizens assembling for political purposes, which was legal, or should they be construed as soldiers assembling for political discussion, which was illegal? Whatever the answer, the Landwehr assembly in Berlin, to take the best documented example, well illustrates the grounds which made conservative officers distrust the Landwehr. In Berlin, on 30 April, a Landwehr non-commissioned officer, August Brass, initiated the assembly. Hundreds of men attended, and a sizeable majority, led by Brass, resolved on an address to the Camphausen ministry demanding free election of Landwehr officers, the formal form of address, "Sie," care for dependants of mobilized Landwehr men, care for Landwehr invalids, and that no Landwehr mobilization be carried out until the regular army had marched away. Landwehr men again assembled on 4 May. The area Landwehr commander, General von Webern, tried to intervene, whereupon the "Brass" party insisted it was not a control assembly. Fisticuffs ensued and Line and Landwehr officers were chased out of the building. Brass called for another meeting on 10 May at which the question of a general arming of the people was discussed. At this meeting, too, the question of the return of Prince William to Prussia was debated. By the first week of May, thus, the "Brass" party was in the way of creating a democratic nucleus in the Berlin Landwehr, men clearly inclined to insubordination.[59]

More will be said about the above problem in another context. What is clear is that in at least one large city in Prussia, a substantial segment of the Landwehr was well on the way to becoming

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[59]Ibid., pp. 46-78.

revolutionized. If the attitude of the reserves in the Rhineland give any indication, this must have been true in the larger cities there, too. Well might conservative officers have mistrusted the Landwehr in the spring of 1848.

Under the impact of the March revolution, the officer corps made a perceptible shift to the political left, at least in phraseology. For a brief period, the social and political values prized in the Vormärz had been set aside. This meant that the beneficiaries of the pre-March system--chiefly the Guard and cavalry--were temporarily submerged from view. For the most part, officers of the Line prepared themselves, albeit grudgingly, to accept the new conditions, while a significant minority set about to profit from them. Likewise, an educated element--torn between moderately liberal and conservative factions--emerged to try to represent the officer corps to the general public. And, finally, although stirrings among conscripts, reserves, and Landwehr were not widespread, they seemed so to responsible officers in the spring of 1848. If immediately given a forceful liberal leadership, which the faint-hearted liberal Camphausen ministry, appointed in March, failed to supply, the Prussian army--sans part of the officer corps of the Guard and cavalry--may well have been incorporated into a constitutional state. But Ludolf Camphausen was more concerned about the establishment of "order" than he was in the establishment of liberal principles. The officer corps received no political leadership from the Camphausen ministry; the officer corps hence provided its own politics.

## CHAPTER V

## THE POLITICS OF THE OFFICER CORPS
## I: THE QUEST FOR POPULARITY

In its function as an instrument of royal power, the Prussian army contributed heavily in making the revolution of 1848 a failure. The power of the army made it possible for Frederick William to defeat democratic constitutionalism in Prussia and also defeat the national aspirations of the German middle classes. Military units were used to restore order in Posen in the spring of 1848. Military units were used to quell a radical uprising in Frankfurt in September, 1848. Military units were used to restore order in Cologne and in Silesia in September and October, 1848. Under General von Wrangel, regular army forces were used to disperse the Prussian constituent assembly in November while Berlin was declared to be under a state of siege (martial law). In 1849, when uprisings broke out in the Rhineland and in Saxony's capital, Dresden, in support of the Frankfurt Parliament's German constitution, Prussian army units--regular and Landwehr--suppressed them. In the spring of 1849, Prussian forces helped to put down the third Baden revolution. The use of military forces, in short, ensured the failure of the revolutions of 1848 and 1849. Although such action was of an obvious political nature, the Prussian army acted--albeit more or less willingly--under orders; it acted as an instrument of royal policy.

Prussian military writers in the Vormärz referred to the army as a "factor of order" in the state. To some extent, it remained such a factor in 1848-1849. The mere presence of military units during 1848 did much to make the more radical advocates of direct action temper their activities; fear of a possible military intervention did much to dampen enthusiasm of Bürger and proletarians for revolutionary enterprise.[1] Even without direct intervention, therefore, the Prussian army contributed to a moderation and hence failure of the revolution of 1848.

In this sense, in terms of its appropriate military function, the army can be said to have been a political factor. It is not correct in this sense, however, to speak of the politics of the officer corps or army. A completely apolitical military instrument would have performed similarly--and perhaps even better.

But Prussian officers were not entirely apolitical in 1848. The revolution dragged officers onto the political stage. Although publicists constantly reminded them to stay out of politics and although the war ministry at a very early stage, April, 1848, explicitly told them that for an executive instrument the conditions of service or the political structure of the state were not subjects for deliberation, such admonitions and direct orders failed. Old political indoctrinations made it difficult to remain silent, military professionalism made it difficult to remain aloof, and the possibility of creating better career chances made it attractive to step forward politically.

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[1]So Roon observed in a letter to his wife on 6 August, 1848. N. M. Elster, Graf Albrecht von Roon (Berlin, 1938), p. 191.

In the following chapters, an examination of the politics of the Prussian officer corps will be undertaken. The present chapter will deal primarily with the politics of the individual officers in connection with the norm that the "old Prussians" set. What was acceptable to this norm may be construed as the politics of the corps even though it might be manifested in the action of a given individual. The succeeding chapter will establish more closely what was acceptable and what was unacceptable to the corps norm as set by the "old Prussians." In chapter five we are concerned with how the officer corps faced the revolution outside of its ranks; in chapter six we will be concerned with how the officer corps dealt with political strivings within its own ranks. Both are very much interrelated phenomena.

Here it may be said that the politics of the officer corps was based on "honor." "Honor," in its highest manifestation, was a slogan that covered the real material interests of a social caste determined to maintain its position in the state and in society. "Honor" was a rather nebulous concept so far as the Prussian officer corps was concerned. It was of a corporate nature, and, as has been seen, "honor" had social and political implications that sometimes fused with its military facet; generally speaking, however, social honor and political honor were, in practice, of a higher order than military honor. In fact, "honor" was a highly unprofessional ethic in the Prussian army. From a professional standpoint, honor should be subordinate to obedience, discipline, and loyalty. In the Prussian officer corps it clearly was not subordinate.

"Honor" had its highest embodiment in the most "respectable" units of the officer corps, and, normally, in the highest ranking officers;

high-ranking officers were said to have reached the "highest places of honor." It is thus not incorrect to call the politics of the social and ranking elite the politics of the officer corps; what was socially and politically honorable to the Guard, for example, was expected to be the norm for the other units as well as for individual officers.

Yet, as the preceding chapter has shown, this norm was not always followed by individual officers nor even by whole units. Too often honor got in the way of political good sense, adherence to duty, or political conviction. And in any case, the recruitment criteria and distribution of socially esteemed officers made it clear that not all Prussian officers imbibed equally in the fount of honor. This was also quite clear in 1848.

The March revolution had revealed four major political groupings in the officer corps. These included officers who may be classified as democrats, as qualified (or spurious) liberals, as moderate conservatives, and as "old Prussians." (In the slogans of the times, the latter were also called "reactionaries," "Blacks and Whites," and "aristocrats;" even the word "camarilla" was often indiscriminately used as an all-inclusive term to designate this broad grouping.) These four groupings can be broken down into further sub-groupings, and, as was also true of the revolutionary forces outside the army, there were overlaps between the major groupings. Moreover, to these major political groupings in the officer corps must also be added the large number of apolitical officers; as has been argued, many of these latter probably hoped to profit from the outcome of the revolution even if they remained politically inactive.

In general, however, the slogans and projects for German national unity, for constitutional arrangements, for military reform, as well as the civilians' bitter attack on the Prussian military system brought Prussian officers into political action. As has been seen, with a few scattered exceptions, the democratic officers were predominantly in the Rhineland and most were second lieutenants; chiefly the democratic officers looked to the revolutionary leaders outside of the army for support. The liberal or pseudo-liberal officers were normally those who had War Academy or other educational backgrounds. They were also, generally speaking, either non-Stock-Preussen, or, perhaps, from the nobility of the province of East Prussia. This grouping shaded over into a moderately conservative grouping, also often from a higher intellectual stratum. Liberal and moderately conservative officers were of all ranks. In general, the liberal and moderately conservative officers sought to reconcile the military institutions with the proposed constitutional state--with Prussia and with Germany, though most of these officers were more Psussian-centered than German nationalists; they also tended to be quite professional-minded. The "old Prussians," finally, included most of the higher and wealthier nobility and found their chief support in the affluent Junkers of Brandenburg and Pomerania as well as a tenuous foothold among the intellectuals of the army. Like the liberal and moderately conservative grouping, they also included officers of all ranks. Chiefly because they were afraid of losing their traditional position in the state, the "old Prussians" sought to negate as much of the revolution and the king's concessions as possible. In the end, they also sought to secure a position of independence in the state as compensation for supporting established royal prerogative. They

were not, however, entirely reactionary; although many "old Prussians" had a nostalgic yearning for the Prussia that existed before the revolution, most believed that a complete return to the old political order was impracticable. Even so, the moral basis of the politics of the "old Prussians" emanated from the mentality of the Guard officer--in other words, the "old Prussians" were distinctly aristocratic.

The only thing that superficially united all these strivings in the officer corps was a novel and half-sincere employment of liberal and democratic methods of influencing public opinion in order to achieve political goals. The politics of the officer corps was thus exercised not only in trying to influence the king, but also through an appeal to public opinion. The adoption of liberal or democratic methods can be seen in officers' and enlisted men's petitions, through public demonstrations, through literary activity and through political association with civilian groups.

The "old Prussians" reestablished immediate influence on the king within a week after the Berlin March days when the king retired from Berlin to Potsdam. Through threats of mass mutiny, the Guard officer corps adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude which had the long-term effect of making the king's concessions, as they might have applied to the army, null and void. The Guard's deification of Prince William--now the true focus of "honor"--had the same effect; by September, 1848, King Frederick William expressed the fear that if he did not quickly effect a counter-revolution, the Guard would depose him and proclaim William as king.[2] In summary, so far as the king was concerned, the Guard's "politics"

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[2]Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 193.

were confined to the task of upholding the Guard's position in the state and of establishing an independent position for the officer corps as a whole.

A more direct influence on the king's political mentality, however, came from his immediate surroundings--from the officers of the court. Already on 29 March, a "ministere occult," which contained a mixed group of officers and civilians, pietists, professors, and high state and court officials, had been formed under the leadership of General Leopold von Gerlach. The "ministere occult"--the actual camarille--included General von Gerlach, his brother Ludwig von Gerlach, General von Rauch, Captain von Manteuffel, and the court officials, von Massow and von Keller. On 29 March, General von Gerlach, Massow, and Keller succeeded in persuading the king to remain in Potsdam instead of returning to Berlin. The camarilla, through General von Gerlach's daily contact with the king, henceforth succeeded in separating the king from his legally appointed cabinet ministers, who were obliged to travel back and forth from Berlin to Potsdam in order to contact His Majesty.[3] Although on numerous occasions the ministers--notably the Finance Minister, David Hansemann--pressed for the removal of these extra-legal influences on the king, Gerlach and his cabal remained.[4] Virtually nothing of any permanence was or could be accomplished without the king first consulting the camarilla. The camarilla succeeded in isolating the king from the influence of Berlin, from the persuasions of the several ministeries, and,

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[3]Ibid., pp. 149-150; Fritz Hartung, "Verantwortliche Regierung, Kabinette und Nebenreigierungen im konstitutionellen Preussen, 1848-1918," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, Vol, XLIV (Berlin, 1832), pp. 5-9.

[4]Brandenburg, König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen, pp. 96-99, 149-150; Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 163-164.

in the end, succeeded also in removing the one quasi-liberal officer in the king's immedate entourage, Colonel Adolf von Willisen, younger brother of General Karl von Willisen. Colonel von Willisen's attempts to reconcile the king with the Berliners were effectively nullified.[5]

The camarilla did not stop at simply trying to influence the king through its daily insinuations, flattery, sycophancy, and denunciations, however. In July, the camarilla founded a newspaper, the Neue Preussische Zeitung (Kreuzzeitung) and demonstrated not only a willingness but an ability to adopt liberal or democratic political methods in an attempt to influence public opinion. Through its adoption of the Landwehr cross for its masthead, the Kreuzzeitung made symbolic its appeal to the popular element of the Prussian military system. Through serious and intellectual discussion, through anecdotes, through wit and humor, the Kreuzzeitung entered the political competition to shape public opinion. Through its political argument, slanders, half-truths, out-right lies, and character assassinations, the Kreuzzeitung also showed that the "old Prussians" were willing to adopt popular methods of persuasion but not liberal convictions or restraints. Within a few weeks after its opening issue, the Kreuzzeitung was known among intelligent observers to be a champion of the conditions of pre-March Prussia, an "officers' newspaper," and a thinly veiled advocate of counter-revolution if not indeed reaction.

If a joint officer-civilian camarilla cooperated in the founding of a counter-revolutionary newspaper which was run by a civilian front, so too did a joint civilian-officer group cooperate in founding

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[5]Ibid., pp. 151, 167, 181, 212.

an army newspaper which was operated by a front of officers. In July, a "Verein of German Officers and Military Officials" founded the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, which was dedicated to combat "all attacks on the honor" of the officer corps and to "ward off" all "revolutionary nonsense" wherever such appeared.[6] Although the paper was really founded by an unemployed actor, Louis Schneider, and staffed by only six men, not all of whom were officers, and whose contributors did not exceed 60-80 officers in the course of 18 months, the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung attempted to arrogate to itself the right to represent the unofficial opinion and "the spirit" of the army. At the same time, this "Verein of German Officers and Military Officials," by calling itself "German" (and by calling its newspaper "Deutsche,") attempted to mesmerize its readers with the fiction that "the army" had German national sentiments. Although the staff almost continually warned its officer readers that the "army" should abstain from politics, it also continually voiced its own opinions of military reform, of constitutionalism, and of political personalities. And although the names of contributors to the Wehr-Zeitung were ostensibly held in confidence by the staff, other officers wrote contrary political opinions in the Wehr-Zeitung;[7] possibly this was partly an effort of the Wehr-Zeitung staff to ferret out non-conformity in the officer corps,[8] and possibly it was an effort to do its best to

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[6]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #1, 7 July, 1848.

[7]Ibid., #3, 21 July, 1848, #4, 28 July, 1848, #9, 1 September, 1848, #13, 29 September, 1848, are examples of this.

[8]For circumstantial evidence of this, see Ibid., #16, 11 October, 1848.

convince the reader that the staff had partly accepted the idea of open debate, or it may even have been lax editing.

Though a certain amount of free-wheeling in political debate was acceptable to the Wehr-Zeitung staff, the staff also displayed a desire not only to keep the participants of such free-wheeling debate unknown to the public, but also to keep it strictly within the ranks of the officer corps and away from the external political stage; on the external stage, strict adherance to the "old Prussian" norm, as defined by the Wehr-Zeitung staff, was expected. This was best demonstrated when the staff of the Wehr-Zeitung "instructed" an officer, Rittmeister Schimmel, who had been elected to the Prussian Assembly in a by-election in October, 1848, what his proper political stand should be; the fact that Rittmeister Schimmel followed the dictates of his own conscience rather than the dictates of the Wehr-Zeitung staff was extremely vexing to the latter.[9]

That the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung was an organ that voiced the view-point of the Royal Guard is reasonable to assume. Its founder, Louis Schneider, had mingled with Guard officers in Schleswig before founding the paper.[10] Staff statements such as "the army stands or falls with the Guard" imply an affinity to that unit.[11] One staff member's boastful pride in having served for 33 years in Prussia's

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[9]Ibid., #20, 25 October, #31, 2 December, 1848.

[10]Schneider, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. II, pp. 176-183

[11]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #9, 1 September, 1848.

"Zopf" period indicates an attachment to the social advantages of the old system.[12] Proximity to and love for Guard parades at Potsdam supply further evidence.[13] And the fact that its six member staff bore most of the expenses for the publication of the Wehr-Zeitung[14] does not, obviously, indicate that the newspaper emanated from units overloaded with impecunious officers; no doubt it was cheaper to publish a newspaper than to try to subsidize comrades into mass mutinies.

In addition to the officers of the Kreuzzeitung and the Wehr-Zeitung, there were other "old Prussian" officers who contributed their pens to the literary attempt at shaping public opinion in Prussia in 1848. The most notorious and brilliant among them was Lieutenant Colonel Karl von Griesheim, Director of the General War Department of the War Ministry. The frequent change of war ministers in 1848 gave to Griesheim an unusual political influence which he did not hesitate to exercise. Griesheim is one more example of the rise to prominence of officer intellectuals, although, politically, he may be classified with the "old Prussians." Under cover of anonymity, Griesheim sought to thwart the March ministry's policy in Posen in April, 1848, with a brochure detailing arguments against a Prussian war with Russia;[15] a General Staff officer,

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., #118, 4 October, 1849.

[14] Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. III, p. 529 and note.

[15] (Griesheim), Über den Krieg mit Russland (Berlin, 1848).

Konstantin von Voigts-Rhetz supplemented Griesheim's brochure with two of his own.[16] In July, Griesheim produced another anonymous broadside, "The German Central-Power and the Prussian Army," in which he thundered out the "army's" opinion of a draft law for a unified German military establishment, which had been inadvertently published in Frankfurt. Griesheim's broadside appeared amidst the controversy which ensued after the Imperial War Minister, Prussian General von Peucker, had decreed that Germany's armies were to pay homage to the Imperial Vicar (Reichsverweser), the Austrian Arch-Duke John.[17] Continuing to hide behind anonymity, Griesheim also published a brochure in September, 1848, against the projected plans of the Prussian Assembly to introduce the principle of popular election of officers in the Landwehr.[18] In November, Griesheim wrote "Only Soldiers Help against Democrats,"[19] and in

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[16]Konstantin Bernhard von Voigts-Rhetz, Aktenmässige Darstellung der polnischen Insurrektion im Jahre 1848 und Beleuchtung der durch dieselbe enstandenen politischen und militairischen Fragen (Posen, 1848). Voigts-Rhetz, Die strategische Bedeutung des Grossherzogtums Posen bei einem Krieg Russlands gegen Preussen und Oesterreich. Eine militärische Denkschrift (Berlin, 1848).

[17](Griesheim), Die deutsche Central-Gewalt und die preussische Armee (Berlin, 1848).

[18](Griesheim), Über den schädlichen Einfluss der für die Landwehr in Aussicht gestellten Wahlen der Vorgesetzten durch die Untergebenen (Berlin, 1848).

[19](Griesheim), Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten (Berlin, 1848).

December, he wrote another critique of the Frankfurt Parliament's draft army law.[20] More will be said of this literature below.

It need not be argued that the "old Prussians" entered the literary competition for the shaping of public opinion with liberal convictions of fair play, however. Throughout 1848, demands for the prohibition of democratic newspapers, pamphlets, and placards were voiced.[21] In April, 1848, Colonel Heinrich von Brandt instructed his soldiers to "thrash soundly" anyone who distributed "revolutionary" literature to them.[22] And in June, 1849, Colonel von Witzleben publicly threatened the editorial staff of the democratic Triersche Zeitung that he would declare them open game for his subordinates if the newspaper did not retract statements it had made about his troops.[23] The frequent, unprovoked attacks that soldiers made on civilians who had democratic literature in their possession testifies to the efficacy of these admonitions and threats.

It would be superficial, however, to judge from the literary activity of the "old Prussians" that the "army" or even the officer corps formed a unified front, based on comradeship, against the revolution. Jealousy existed even among the "old Prussian" officers.

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[20](Griesheim), Kritische Bemerkungen über den Entwurf des Wehr-Ausschusses der Reichs-Versammlung zu einem Gesetz über die Deutsche Wehr-Verfassung (Berlin, 1848).

[21]Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, pp. 228-229.

[22]Ibid., p. 77.

[23]Neue Kölnische Zeitung für Bürger, Bauern und Soldaten (Cologne), #132, 10 June, 1849. Also Kladderadatsch, #24, 17 June, 1849.

As director in the war ministry, Griesheim, for instance, did his best to thwart the appearance and success of the Wehr-Zeitung and refused to authorize it financial assistance from the ministry.[24] The Wehr-Zeitung staff repaid Griesheim by writing snide and untrue deprecations of his professional accomplishments,[25] evidence, perhaps, that the socially highly placed did not appreciate the arrogant upstart. Similarly, our designation, "old Prussian," is not intended to obscure the differences that existed between the brothers Gerlach, close to the king, and Prince William. The crown prince, assuredly a right-winger like the Gerlachs, did not, however, share the pietism, the corporate notions of organizing society, nor the belief in the nearly theocratic "Christian state" of the Gerlachs. The crown prince may be regarded as a "state-conservative"--that is, as one who was pragmatic in the interest of preserving and increasing state power by rationalizing institutions in the tradition of the eighteenth century. If simplification is permissible, it could be said that the Gerlach brothers were closer to Frederick William IV's romanticized medieval outlook while William adhered to the eighteenth century patterns as set down by Frederick William I and Frederick II.[26] These differences

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[24]Schneider, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. II, p. 118.

[25]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #1, 7 July, 1848. See also Albrecht von Roon, "Zur Erinnerungen an General-Major von Griesheim," Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt für Januar 1854 (Berlin, 1854), pp. 11-12 and notes.

[26]Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, Vol. II, pp. 331-339, 334-345.

became of importance only after the Brandenburg coup d' dtat in November and December of 1848. From the liberal or democratic standpoint, they are still "old Prussians," even if they give evidence that the officer corps was not a united front.

Even more important for our study, however, was the fact that other officers--and ex-officers--also entered literary competition with the "old Prussians." These included officers who may be classified as moderately conservative, as liberal, and as democratic.

A number of officers who may be classified as conservative or quasi-liberal were proponents of military reform, and through the medium of the press, called for reform. An anonymous officer called for the removal of the secret conduct lists, for the abolition of sinecures in the army, and for a more favorable promotion procedure for the lower ranks.[27] An inactive officer, Lieutenant Colonel von Forstner, argued that a service regulation for the army was indispensable in order to protect soldiers and officers from the arbitrary treatment of superiors.[28] The Prussian Major General von Peucker, appointed to serve as Imperial Minister of War, wrote that a shortened term of service was feasible for the proposed unified German army.[29]

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[27](Anon.), Bekenntnisse eines preussischen Offiziers.

[28]Alexander von Forstner, Einige Worte über die anonym erschienene Schrift: Die Deutsche Centralgewalt und die preussische Armee (Berlin, 1848).

[29]General-Major von Peucker, Beiträge zur Beleuchtung einiger Grundlagen für die künftige Wehrverfassung Deutschlands (Frankfurt a/M, 1848).

And a retired officer from Oldenburg and a former Bundestag plenipotentiary, Colonel Mosle, caused considerable concern among the "old Prussians" when he publically concurred with von Peucker's ideas.[30]

A brochure published by a "liberal officer" in Saarlouis caused even more concern for the "old Prussians." Expressing pleasure at the lifting of censorship which allowed "those excelling in intelligence" to discuss military reform, the "liberal officer" catalogued the greatest grievances of the junior officers, including the demands for abolition of the conduct lists, of the Guard, of the courts of honor, of the cadet houses; he also repeated the demands for a service regulation, promotion by election, raise in pay and the right to wear civilian clothes when off duty. To the consternation of the Wehr-Zeitung staff liberal officers wrote articles in that paper which agreed with the officer from Saarlouis.[31] It was clear, in any event, that there was an internal struggle within the officer corps among officers who sought a reordering of the army by appealing to forces outside the army.

Most serious as far as the "old Prussians" were concerned, however, was the literary production of the democratically orientated officers

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[30](J.L. Mosle), Grundzüge einer Wehrverfassung nach den Bedürfnissen der Zeit von einem alten deutschen Offizier (Frankfurt a/M, 1848). See the comments on this in (Griesheim), Über die Dauer der gesetzlichen Dienstzeit in der preussischen Armee (Berlin, 1848).

[31](Anon.), Was thut der preussischen Armee Noth, von einem liberalen Offizier (Saarlouis, 1848). Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #9, 1 September, 1848, #15, 7 October, 1848, #21, 28 October, 1848, #29, 25 November, 1848. The pamphlet suggests that the officer was really a democrat, as that term was understood in 1848.

and of the "dismissed lieutenants." These included exposés of regimental secrets such as brochures published by active, inactive, and ex-lieutenants Orges, Wülfing, Brockhusen, Rüstow, Anneke, and Willich.[32] The democratic officers and ex-officers also publicly accused the "old Prussians" of being unpatriotic as Lieutenant Otto de la Chevallerie accused Griesheim when the latter published his polemic against Frankfurt.[33] De la Chavallerie also openly accused the "old Prussians," in this case, the officers of the Royal Guard, of harboring disloyalty and hatred for the king and even of wishing for the king's death; even democratic officers sought a favorable position with respect to Frederick William.[34] Democratic officers and ex-officers also called for reform of the army. These included Lieutenant Wilhelm Rüstow who published several brochures calling for the abolition of the standing army and for its replacement by a popular militia,[35] de la Chevallerie, who opined that the election of officers would be the salvation of Prussia,[36] and ex-Lieutenant Hugo

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[32]Orges, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des preussischen Militair-Systems, cited in Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik Vol. I, pp. 177-180; Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere; Brockhusen, An sämmliche Berliner; Anneke, Wie's jetzt im preussischen Heere aussieht; August Willich, Im preussischen Heer! -- Ein Disciplinar verfahren gegen Premier-Lieutenant v. Willich (Mannheim, 1848).

[33]Otto de la Chevallerie, Der 6. August in Schleswig (Hamburg, 1848).

[34]Otto de la Chevallerie, Lithograph. Corresp. Berlin 20 Sept. Brem. Zeit. vom 22. Sept., 1848, Nr. 260. Quoted in Adolf Stahr, Die preussische Revolution (Oldenburg, 1849), p. 500, note.

[35](Rüstow), Stehendes Heer und Volkswehr; Huldreich Schwertlieb, (pseud. for Rüstow), Der Krieg der Zukunft. Einige Worte an die junge Generation (Leipzig, 1848).

[36]Otto de la Chevallerie, Das vereinbarte Militar-Avancement (Berlin, 1848).

von Hasenkamp, whose temporary assignment in the Prussian ministry interior gave added weight to his wide-sweeping proposals for military reform.[37] Finally, democratic officers also joined in the popular cry for war against Russia; Lieutenant von Brockhusen, for instance, published anti-Russian polemics throughout 1848 and into 1849.[38]

Literary production of the democratic officers was not confined to brochures, however. Newspapers were also published. Ex-Lieutenant Friedrich Held published Locomotive in Berlin and ex-Lieutenants Anneke and Beust cooperated in publishing a daily newspaper in Cologne for "Bürger, Peasants, and Soldiers," in which many army exposés, whether true or fictional, were frequently printed. Democratic officers occasionally wrote letters to Anneke's paper as well as to others, most notoriously, to Karl Marx's Neue Rheinische Zeitung.[39] In summation, from a literary standpoint, the democratic officers, as well as liberal, conservative, and "old Prussian" officers entered the market place for the purchase or conquest of public opinion. What career advantages a democratic officer like Rüstow hoped to gain in calling for the abolition of standing armies is, however, difficult to plumb.

If Prussian officers adopted "democratic" and "liberal" methods in the attempt to create a favorable public opinion, they were also

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[37]Hugo von Hasenkamp, Die Reorganisation der Armee und die preussische Verfassung. Zwei Aufsätze (Berlin, 1849).

[38]Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #29, 29 June, 1848; Kölnische Zeitung, #224, 11 August, 1848.

[39]Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #23, 28 June, 1849; Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #29, 29 June, 1848, #45, 15 July, 1848.

not above adopting the methods of petitioning the state authorities for redress of grievances or for innauguration of reform or other desiderata. As has been seen, several groups of officers with democratic tendencies petitioned the ministry shortly after the March uprising. Although a ministerial edict subsequently forbade soldiers to petition, this example was not lost on the "old Prussians." In August, the Charlottenburg chapter of the Patriotic Verein and a Veteran's organization, taking advantage of their close connections with the forces of the old order, circulated a petition through the Prussian Landwehr which called for the nomination of Prince William to the post of "Generalissimo" of the Prussian army; an official in the military administration saw to it that the petition was also mailed post-free under the rubric "Militaria" to the regular Line units in order to collect the "voluntary" signatures of non-commissioned officers and soldiers.[40] No doubt the fact that many retired non-commissioned officers were in the postal service expedited this petition through the mails. Very few paid any attention to the Wehr-Zeitung's rather professional admonition that this petition constituted a dangerous precedent for the fulfillment of one of the Bürger demands, namely that men should have the right to elect their officers.

If the "old Prussians" were not above showing popular strength through forbidden petitioning, they were also not above calling for soldier councils either. A group of officers in Glogau demonstrated in April, 1848, that men of "honor" were no more above using this form

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[40] Kölnische Zeitung, #243, 2 September, 1848, #251, 10 September, 1848. Also Kreuzzeitung, #40, 16 August, 1848.

of political activity than were the democratic officers in Aachen. They proposed that committees of officers, non-commissioned officers, men, and "friends of the army" be set up in each garrison area. The committees were to defend the army's "honor" from civilian attack, safe-guard the "well-earned rights" of the Prussian officers, and attempt to secure better pension and disability conditions for soldiers, Landwehr men, and the civilian dependents of the armed forces.[41]

Even if the war ministry rightly forbade the creation of soldier committees, officers were not thereby effectively steered away from participating in or instigating public demonstrations in other ways. Although he had placed the city of Posen under martial law, Lieutenant General von Colomb did nothing to prevent Germans in Posen from making public and mass street demonstrations against the person of General von Willisen, whose pro-Polish policies alienated Posen Germans and "old Prussian" officers. Similarly, even though the city authorities of Potsdam expressly forbade it, the officers of the Guard staged an illumination of the city in honor of Prince William when the latter returned to Prussia in June; these same officers also held an inane and servile torch-light pageant on the Spree where they serenaded the prince.[42] Nor were the "old Prussians" above guiding Landwehr men into political street demonstrations. Major General von Webern, for example, finally secured a majority of Landwehr men loyal to the old

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[41]Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, pp. 185-192.

[42]Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, pp. 83-85.

order to offset the faction in the Berlin Landwehr led by the non-commissioned officer, August Brass. In a public speech to the assembled Landwehr men, on 24 May, he referred to the March revolution as the work of "Sch. . . Kerls" and exclaimed that the "barricade heroes" deserved to be hanged. Von Webern then instigated a procession of the off-duty Landwehr men, who were accompaned by armed Landwehr officers (in crass violation of the law of 2 April, 1848, which prohibited armed political demonstrations) to Minister President Camphausen's hotel in order to give him three cheers for his decision to recall the Prince of Prussia from England; at this occasion, the Landwehr men also sang Guard Lieutenant von Gaudy's song in honor of the prince, an absurd and mushy doggerel that had long been the object of democratic mockery. With this demonstration of the politics of "honor," General von Webern successfully offset the agitation of Landwehr NCO August Brass.[43]

A variation on this tactic was also applied in Soldin where local off-duty Landwehr men planned to hold a meeting in order to discuss their grievances. Failing in an illegal attempt to prohibit the meeting, Major von Haiduck sought to exploit rural versus urban antagonisms in order to rig the results of the meeting. The rural Landwehr men were advised to come equipped with a knout and beforehand take a couple of good shots of cognac since fist-fighting was expected at the

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[43]Schneider, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. II, pp. 46-89; Wolff, Berliner Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. III, pp. 51-60. See the lampoon of Lieutenant Gaudy's song in the democratic Kladderadatsch, #3, 21 May, 1848.

meeting.[44] The "old Prussians" were not only willing to adopt democratic methods; they were evidently prepared to adopt revolutionary tactics as well.

"Old Prussian" officers, however, were not alone in attempting to use off-duty Landwehr men for political demonstrations. A democratic officer, Lieutenant von Ducker, attempted the same thing in November in Kolberg, with considerably less success, when he tried to agitate the Landwehr men against Brandenburg's coup d' etat ministry.[45]

The insincere and unprofessional adoption of democratic or liberal methods of forming public opinion was also to be seen in the associations which officers cultivated with civilians. As has been seen, many of the "better" regiments were garrisoned in small towns throughout East Elbian Prussia in close proximity to the noble officers' "respectable" kin-folk, the owners of large estates. These officers continued to traffic with their honorable neighbors and were directly involved in the political activity which arose from such contacts. For example, a mixed company of officers and Junker land owners sent a letter to the Landrat of Oberbarnim Kreis, Graf Haeseler, who forwarded it to the Kreuzzeitung. The letter supported Minister President General von Brandenburg's coup d' etat in November.[46] As can be inferred from this, officers also normally continued to maintain unofficial as well as official associations with highly-placed civilian officials--many of whom were ex-officers--throughout Prussia.

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[44] Stenographische Berichte, p. 63.

[45] Höhn, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid, p. 324.

[46] Kreuzzeitung, #121, 18 November, 1848.

With the revolution, however, new forms of association were created. These included a wide variety of political and patriotic associations. Officers were active, for example, in many of the veteran's associations founded in 1848. These, typically, chose as their motto the "old Prussian" slogan, "With God for King and Fatherland," and had many retired officers as well as Junker land owners in their membership.[47] Officers had a similar relationship to the Patriotic Vereine for Constitutional Monarchy and the Prussian Vereine which were also founded in 1848 and which carried the same slogan. Membership in the Patriotic and the Prussian Vereine generally consisted of those closely identified with the old regime--nobility, ex-officers, highly placed state officials in or out of active service, and officials from city administrations. One officer, the commandant at Schweidnitz where the Burgerwehr men were shot down in August, General Rollaz du Rosay, founded one of the chapters of the Patriotic Vereine.[48] In Königsberg, von Plehve, colonel of cavalry, was chairman of the local chapter of the Prussian Vereine.[49] The excessive praise of the Prussian military system published by these organizations demonstrates that the position that the Patriotic and Prussian Vereine took toward the first estate in the land was highly deferential; among other things, they denounced the Prussian Assembly for its "attack" on officers' honor during the Stein crisis.[50] And the coop-

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[47] Ibid., #18, 21 July, 1848.

[48] Ibid., #37, 12 August, 1848; Stenographische Berichte, p. 715.

[49] Kölnische Zeitung, #266, 28 September, 1848.

[50] For example, Denkschrift betreffend den Stein'schen und Schulz-Wanzleben'schen Antrag vom 9. August. Im Auftrage des patriotischen Vereins zu Berlin verfasst von einem Berliner Bürger und Vereins-Mitglied (Berlin, 1848).

eration of the Patriotic Verein, a veterans' association, and the military administration in the Landwehr petition has already been noted.

The political character of the above associations was already apparent to the democrats in the summer of 1848; it was even more apparent after the coup d' etat of the Brandenburg-Manteuffel Ministry in November and December, 1848, when these organizations deluged Prussian newspapers with enthusiastically servile statements approving of the coup. And, although General von Wrangel supposedly suspended all political clubs in Berlin in November, these particular associations were allowed to continue to meet in Berlin; Wrangel was not about to suspend "honorable" clubs. The democrats may have been better advised to demand that officers should not have the right of association. Or, at the very least, demand that officers behave professionally.

But officers were to be found in other organizations as well. Because these clubs contained the "good" Bürger, liberal or moderately conservative officers often tolerated the constitutional clubs which were formed in 1848. Liberal-constitutionalists--the right wing of the Prussian National Assembly--were closely, if not always organically, connected with the constitutional clubs. In addition, men of property, lesser officials of the state and city administrations as well as members of the academic community were represented in the constitutional clubs. In essence, the constitutional clubs represented "property and education" in Prussia. As the summer of 1848 wore on and it became fashionable for the constitutional clubs to discuss more

and more their members' yearning for "order," the appearance of a uniform within the club, particularly in the East Elbian provinces, tended to increase the club's estimation of self. Although most officers had to show a disinclination for intimate association with the liberals, officers did not necessarily jeopardize their careers if they occasionally visited the constitutional clubs or consorted with the level of society which they represented. General von Natzmer, for example, cultivated unofficial contact with the right wing of the Prussian Assembly during the Stein crisis in September, 1848.[51] In late November, Lieutenant Hartmann was a nightly visitor to gatherings of state officials, Bürger, and members of the right wing of the Prussian Assembly; "political beliefs and antipathies" were exchanged at these gatherings.[52] In general, however, those officers who did attend formal meetings of constitutional clubs usually remained reserved and non-committal; in one case, officers present at a meeting of a "Political Club" (The names often varied.) in Coblenz ostentatiously announced their withdrawal when the group resolved that the Prussian army should pay homage to the Reichsverweser in Frankfurt.[53]

Much more active than the quasi-liberal or moderately conservative officers were those officers who frequented the democratic clubs and large assemblies. Lieutenant Adamski, temporarily assigned to a Landwehr battalion in Aachen, participated actively in popular assemblies there.[54] Engineer Lieutenant Bluhm was a popular figure in

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[51]Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 199.

[52]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, p. 180.

[53]Kölnische Zeitung, #221, 11 August, 1848.

[54]Anneke, Wie's jetzt im preussischen Heere aussieht, p. 8.

assemblies of merchants and shipowners in Stettin.[55] In Schweidnitz, Lieutenant Jung of the 5th Artillery Brigade was elected president of the local democratic club to which he also invited the soldiers of the garrison.[56] Artillery Lieutenant von Ducker was elected president of a democratic club in Colberg.[57]

Unlike the quasi-liberal and moderately conservative officers, the democratic officers did not always put "honor" above political conviction. An inactive General Staff officer, First Lieutenant Techow, convinced the commander of the detachment detailed to stand guard in the Berlin armory, Captain von Natzmer, to vacate the armory and allow the Berlin mob possession of it when the latter assaulted the armory in June, 1848.[58] Engineer Lieutenant Rüstow called out a huge assembly of people in Königsberg to declare their support of the Frankfurt Parliament in August.[59] A number of officers wrote to the leaders of the left wing in the Prussian Assembly announcing their support of the Stein motion; a Lieutenant Osse of the Munster garrison even sent the left Deputy Benedikt Waldeck proposals for military reform during the Stein crisis in September.[60] Several recently inactivated officers, Lieutenants Faltin and de la Chevallerie, went so far

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[55] Ibid., p. 9.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Rüstow, Der deutsche Militarstaat (2. Aufl.), pp. 189-195.

[58] Wolff, Revolutions-Chronik, Vol. III, pp. 370-374.

[59] Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #82, 22 August, 1848.

[60] See Stenographische Berichte, pp. 1042-1046; Höhn, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid, p. 326.

as to organize a "Military Reform Club" in Berlin in late September and, in an attempt to make the army unusuable for counter-revolution, conducted a vigorous if vain program of fraternization with the troops in and around Berlin,[61] while, as has been seen, Lieutenant Ducker attempted to organize Landwehr protest against the Brandenburg-Manteuffel Ministry in November. Finally, Lieutenant von Wiedburg wrote exposés and "gravely compromised" the "king's cause" in open remarks in the presence of his troops when they entered Berlin in November, 1848.[62] Democratic officers obviously showed that they did not have "honor" in the sense that the "old Prussians" did. And they were no more professionally motivated than, say, the Royal Guard.

In the adoption of liberal or democratic tactics it has been seen that the officer corps was superficially united. It has also been noted that the political goals of Prussian officers were diffuse. However, since the "old Prussians" came out victorious in the end, it is necessary to examine briefly the political tactics and arguments which they applied.

The political tactics of the "old Prussians" were rather simple. They were essentially an appeal to the intentions of the so-called "good" Bürger. This appeal was effected, in part, through discrediting the democrats. The officers who took to the pen throughout 1848 nearly all professed acceptance of constitutionalism. The king had proclaimed his intention of contracting a constitution with the Prussian people;

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[61] Kreuzzeitung, #81, 3 October, 1848.

[62] Ibid., #122, 19 November, 1848; Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, p. 179.

since the word "constitution" had a rather nebulous meaning, it was relatively easy for the "old Prussians" to appear to comply. By becoming ostensibly "constitutional," the "old Prussians" found a foot-hold with the liberal bourgeoisie--the so-called "good" Bürger--while the handful of more sincerely liberal officers in contact with the liberal bourgeoisie worked to buttress this impression. Indeed, in April, 1848, the ostensibly "liberal" war minister, Lieutenant General von Reyher, advised the army corps commander in Posen, Lieutenant General von Colomb, to be prepared to work closely with the property holders against "communist" elements.[63] There were thus those who were also prepared to exploit class conflict between bourgeois and proletariat.

The Blacks and Whites also appealed to the national aspirations of the liberal bourgeoisie. A part of the Royal Guard marched off to go through the motions of doing battle with Denmark and became thereby partially identified with a popular national cause, an identification which officer-publicists frequently pointed out.[64] The "old Prussians" similarly were able to capture the sympathy of part of the liberals in Posen by claiming to protect German nationality and culture in opposition to the insurgent Poles. Von Griesheim was not above using the words of one of the liberals' national heroes, Ernst Moritz Arndt, in order to give weight to his arguments against a restoration of Poland or a war with Russia: "The German who works

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[63]Hoetzsch, "Die Stellung des Generals von Colomb," pp. 360-361.

[64]See, for example, Kreuzzeitung, #5, 6 July, 1848. Even the democrat, ex-Lieutenant von Hasenkamp contributed to this. Die Reorganisation der Armee, pp. 18-19.

for Poland's restoration is either a Dummkopf, or a fool, or a rogue!"[65]

Connected to the appeal to the "good" Burger was the appeal to the shop-keeper's spirit. Berlin merchants, for example, were constantly reminded that they lost considerable income with the Royal Guard's removal from the city; one publicist claimed that the Guard alone spent two million Taler annually in the city.[66] In addition, other officers pointed out to the Bürger that duty with the Bürgerwehr cost the Prussian Bürger inestimable wealth in terms of time, energy, and profits; it would be cheaper to have the army preserve order.[67] To an extent, moreover, the Blacks and Whites convinced many "good" Bürger that the slump in business activities and trade was a result of the revolution and more, of the continued revolutionary agitations of the street democracy. General von Wrangel held a parade in Berlin in September at which he also addressed the Berliners, telling them how "sad" Berlin looked, "grass was growing in the streets," the shops were loaded with wares, though no one was buying them. With "order," Wrangel promised, all this would change and prosperity would return to the "good" Bürger.[68] As if to fulfill this prophecy, there was an exaggerated shopping spree on the part of wealthier officers and nobles when Wrangel's troops occupied Berlin in November and he

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[65](Griesheim), Über den Krieg mit Russland, p. 16.

[66]Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, Beilage, #113, 22 April, 1848. See also Kreuzzeitung, #114, 10 November, 1848.

[67]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #5, 4 August, 1848, #7, 18 August, 1848.

[68]Wrangel's speech summarized in Kreuzzeitung, #72, 22 September, 1848.

declared a state of siege.[69]

Inversely related to this appeal to the "good" Bürger was the discrediting of the not-so-good. The "old Prussians" were normally quite careful, at first, to avoid denunciation of the democrats using that name. Instead, they availed themselves of more prejorative terms. The "good" Bürger was warned of "Pöbel tyranny" and of the danger of anarchy; the Blacks and Whites piously announced their support of constitutionalism and their resolute opposition to "Reaction and Republicanism." More sincerely constitutional-minded officers did the same.[70]

As the summer of 1848 wore on, the forces of "honor" began to switch from their attach on republicans to an attack on the democrats. Democrats were called really republicans in disguise. Less and less was there a distinction made between the anarchy of the streets on the one hand and the democrats in the Frankfurt Parliament and the Prussian Assembly on the other hand. All these called themselves democrats, a situation which made it easy for the "old Prussians" to gloss over such distinctions; the democracy or anarchy in the streets helped to make the word "democrat" a pejorative.[71]

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[69]Friedrich Steinmann, Geschichte der Revolution in Preussen. Zwolf Bücher preussischer Geschichte fur das deutsche Volk (Berlin, 1849), p. 564.

[70]See the announcement of a mixed group of officers and civilians who, apparently quite sincerely, expressed this view shortly after the March Revolution in the Vossische Zeitung, 1. Beilage, #104, 5 May, 1848.

[71]See Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte, pp. 83-93. Even Stadelmann avails himself of the term, "Pobel," in his analysis.

The turbulent events of the revolution helped the "old Prussians" immensely in their appeal to the "good" Bürger. Already before the March days, the bogey-man of communism had frightened the possessing classes; the liberal bourgeoisie viewed the socialist-democratic demands which were made in Cologne on 3-4 March with a fright out of all proportion to the ability of the handful of radicals that existed who wanted to secure such a program. The Hecker Putsch in Baden in April, 1848, caused further anxiety to the advocates of "order." The slaughter of workers in Paris in June added to the spectre as did the storming of the armory in Berlin on 14 June. Finally, the continued ferment in the streets of Berlin, Cologne, Breslau, and other Prussian cities, the September massacres in Frankfurt, and the October revolution in Vienna also contributed to a growing longing for order and quiet among the propertied classes. These were events that encouraged the "old Prussians" as much as they frightened the fanatics for "order" among the propertied classes.[72]

The politics of "honor" had much less success in trying to associate certain liberal goals with democracy or republicanism in order thus to discredit them. Chief among these were the liberal demands for a united Germany and for obliging the military forces to swear loyalty to the German and/or Prussian constitutions. Griesheim's brochure, "The German Central-Power and the Prussian Army," explicitly argued that a united Germany would lead to republicanism and suggested

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[72]See, for example, Gerlach's comments with regard to the uproar in Mainz in May, 1848. Gerlach hoped that this would have the same effect on the troops in the Rhineland as did the March Revolution on the troops in Berlin. Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 163.

that the national desire for German unity was really a democratic plot on the part of West and South German Catholicism;[73] these arguments found moderate success only among the bourgeoisie of East Elbian Prussia.

Even less successful were the arguments against the proposed oath of loyalty to the constitution which the army was supposed to render. A pseudonym, "Helenus," wrote a pamphlet in July in which he unsuccessfully tried to insinuate that the liberal goal of making the army responsible to the constitution was ascribable to the democrats and republicans.[74] Similar representations appeared in the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung and in civilian newspaper articles which officers wrote.[75] These arguments had little effect on the liberals who continued into late 1849--early 1850 to demand that the army swear loyalty to the constitution, although they did impress the Patriotic and Prussian Vereine after 1849; these latter, partly out of sincerity, partly out of ignorance, and partly for tactical reasons, publicly pronounced throughout 1848 that the army should be sworn to the constitution.[76]

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[73](Griesheim), Central-Gewalt, p. 6.

[74]H. Helenus (pseud.), An das preussische Volk und dessen Vertreter: Gegen den Eid des Heeres auf die Verfassung (Berlin, 1848).

[75]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #1, 7 July, 1848; Kreuzzeitung, Beilage, #25, 29 July, 1848; Berlinische Nachrichten von Staates- und gelehrten Sachen (Berlin), Beilage, #173, 27 July, 1848. Hereafter cited as Spenersche Zeitung.

[76]See, for instance, the pamphlet prepared by the Patriotic Verein to counteract the attempts at fraternization which the democrats had undertaken in the Prussian army; the pamphlet informs the soldier that he will be sworn to the constitution. An das Heer (Berlin, 1848).

Against the liberal and democratic demands for military reorganization, professionally-minded officers among the "old Prussians," basing their arguments on the writings of pre-March military publicists, adopted arguments from the "purely military" standpoint. These arguments have already been examined elsewhere.[77] By their very nature, however, they supported the institutional arrangements of the pre-March system. But even officers who might be classified as quasi-liberal or moderately conservative, gave support to arguments taken from military reasoning. For example, an infantry officer, Lieutenant E. von Sydow, wrote that he understood the "well meaning" demands for reform of the army to mean demands for more defense for less expenditure. Von Sydow thought that the attacks on the army were due to unclear and erring notions about the military and did not really stem from rancor. Sydow agreed that the army needed reform, but argued that this must be carefully thought through. He also agreed that a limited election of sub-altern officers in the Landwehr would not hurt its military efficiency but argued that this was problematic at best.[78]

But the "old Prussians" did not stop simply at criticizing plans for military reform; they also made of the existing system a virtue,

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[77]In Hohn, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid.

[78]E. von Sydow, Stehendes Heer, Kriegsbudget und Volksbewaffnung. Mit besonderer Beziehung auf Preussen als Beitrag zur Wehrfrage der Gegenwart (Berlin, 1848). Apparently writing before the armory in Berlin was stormed on 14 June, Sydow lauded the Bürgerwehr, and even thought it was a little bit too active, due, he believed, to presence of too many "spectre seers" in its ranks. It is impossible to escape detecting a well-meaning attitude to the Prussian liberals' cause in von Sydow's didactic arguments.

which liberal-minded officers did not. In his "German Central-Power and the Prussian Army," a brochure most representative of the "old Prussian" arguments, Griesheim boasted that Prussia had the best military system in Europe, "led by an officer corps which no other [officer corps] excels in intelligence, courage, and general as well as soldierly education." Even the fact that the Prussian army had no service regulation was elevated into virtue: Prussia "possesses no so-called service regulation in which its 'spirit would be laced into Spanish jack boots." Griesheim's polemic likewise insisted on the fundamental incompatibility of Prussia's "heroic" and martial tradition with Frankfurt's plan for an imperial German army, and lamented that the Frankfurt Parliament's draft army law was calculated to "destroy the Prussian army as such." The king's words, "Prussia is henceforth merged into Germany," Griesheim brushed aside as "over-hasty:" "the Prussian army can and will never merge into a German imperial army. . . Much more, the German imperial army must merge into the Prussian army."[79]

Griesheim's broadside was only the most effective example of a growing stream of praise that gushed from the pens of military men, from the Deutsche Wehrzeitung, from the Kreuzzeitung, and from the proclamations of the denunciatory organizations that called themselves Patriotic or Prussian. The Prussian army's desultory activity against Denmark was exalted as "heroic;" the suppression of the Poles in Posen the same. Of all the "elements that uphold the state," only the

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[79](Griesheim), Central-Gewalt, pp. 9-10, 12-19, 27-29.

army stood there, "pure," and "upright," "unblemished" by the "rust of thirty three years of peace." How accurate this excessive praise was has already been seen.

The vaunted mental or spiritual unity of the army--of the officer corps--proved to be a myth not only in the unofficial politics of Prussian officers as it was reflected in petitioning, demonstrations, associations, and literary production, however. The officers who entered the official political stage either as appointees of the king or as elected representatives in Frankfurt or Berlin also displayed a disunity in objective and spirit. Most characteristic in this connection is the way officers in political roles met conflicts between the demands of the political roles and the demands that their duty as soldiers was to obey orders or adhere to the spirit of the "old Prussians." This conflict was present when officers acted as responsible ministers in Prussia and it existed for the handful of officers elected to the Frankfurt Parliament and the Prussian Assembly.

In actuality, only one officer, Lieutenant General Count von Brandenburg, bastard son of King Frederick William II and uncle of Frederick William IV, placed his role of soldier simply and unequivocably above his role as responsible minister and he may here be used as a model; although Brandenburg had differences of opinion with the king, these were not publicly revealed. Hans Viktor von Unruh, who was president of the Prussian Assembly when Brandenburg was appointed minister-president in November, writes that Brandenburg viewed the formation of a ministry "not as a political act but rather as the

execution of an order given by the king." When Brandenburg ordered the recess of the assembly, Unruh tried to remind him that since this was a ministerial act, the assembly was justified to discuss whether the ministry was entitled to take such a step. Brandenburg answered this with all the simplicity of the apolitical soldier: "That is a royal order therefore above all doubt!"[80]

The earlier war ministers were not so straighforward. In April War Minister von Reyher cooperated, if unwillingly, with Camphausen's ministry in the question of Posen and a projected break with Russia, much to the indignation of the king, the camarilla, and the Guard.[81] Probably for this reason, he was replaced by Lieutenant General von Kanitz, who became intrim war minister. In June, 1848, Lieutenant General von Schreckenstein replaced Kanitz. Perhaps no man more represented the chronic ineptitude of officers to be politicians. Caught between the persistent interpellations of the Assembly on the one hand, which vexed him no end, and the admonitions of the king on the other hand, Schreckenstein managed to maintain popularity with the "old Prussians" of the officer corps and the Kreuzzeitung only at the expense of failing to establish himself as a meaningful political figure to the Assembly. In private conversations, he was gruff and had an exaggerated aristocratic demeanor to most civilians. In cabinet meetings, he joined chorus with the civilian ministers

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[80]Hans Viktor von Unruh, Skizzen aus Preussens neuester Geschichte (Magdeburg, 1849), p. 116.

[81]Brandenburg, König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen, pp. 40-43.

against the ubiquitous Potsdam camarilla. But in the Assembly, his speaking ability was limited to spasmodic assurances to the Assembly that he would do his duty without ever telling the Assembly what his duty was; all other forensic matters he left over to the officer who represented him, General von Brandt. Even in the first debate over the Stein motion on 9 August, he failed to mount the speaker's rostrum and when the Stein affair came to a head on 4-7 September, he only made a perfunctory announcement in which he told the Assembly that he was in favor of doing his duty. Indeed, the liberal civilians in the ministry gave more persuasive and informed arguments in defense of the officer corps than did Schreckenstein. Although he was the hope of the "old Prussians," Schreckenstein resigned along with the rest of the ministry in September when the Assembly voted its lack of confidence in the ministry. Despite the king and despite the camarilla, Schreckenstein in fact acted along parliamentary principles in the end although he had done nothing to win the Assembly's confidence and had shown no grasp at all of constitutional or parliamentary principles; even so, he would not assume responsibility of being minister, despite the king's wishes, when he did not have the confidence of the Assembly. No officer disappointed his class and his king more: "I gave him a chance to be immortal," Frederick William is said to have remarked in later years: "But he scorned it."[82]

Yet, in one sense, he served his class well. For it was Schreckenstein who adamantly blocked all attempts by the ministry and

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[82]Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, pp. 202-208; Stenographische Berichte, pp. 1035-1102.

the Assembly to reorganize Prussia's system of local government. The Kreis government, headed by the Landrat, was too important a political system for the Junker class for Schreckenstein to give over to democratic or liberal reorganization. As war minister he was also all too aware of the relationship of the Landrat to Landwehr mobilization.[83] But Schreckenstein's services in this matter were eclipsed in the heat of debates over the Stein affair.

The most perplexing and the officer worthy of the most sympathy among the officers on the official political stage in 1848 was Lieutenant General von Pfuel, who succeeded Schreckenstein as war minister in September, 1848, and took over, as well, the portfolio of minister-president. A veteran of the Wars of Liberation, penetrated by the spirit of the reform era of 1806-1819, Pfuel was recognized as an innovator in army gymnastics and as an accomplished military writer. In the army, he was often regarded with suspicion, for he was genial and easy-going; he was, for example, favorably inclined to both the letter and the spirit of Boyen's Landwehr law. The king regarded him as a good diplomat; he was sent to represent Hohenzollern interests in Switzerland in 1847-1848, appointed military governor of Berlin before the March days in an effort to placate the "good" Bürger, and sent to Posen to take over General Karl von Willisen's position and to draw a line of demarcation between Germans and Poles in that province.[84]

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[83]Stahr, Preussische Revolution, p. 357; Kurt Utermann, Der Kampf um die preussische Selbstverwaltung im Jahre 1848, Historische Studien, Heft 325 (Berlin, 1937), pp. 37-38, 54-55, 61-62.

[84]Natzmer, Unter den Hohenzollern, I Theil, p. 153 and note. Brandenburg, König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen, pp. 96-99.

His attempts to conciliate the German Bürger does not indicate, however, that Pfuel was not a soldier. When attempts at conciliation and placation did not succeed, Pfuel did not hesitate to use armed force as a last resort. Thus, in the days before 18 March, he tried every means possible of pacifying excited Berliners without blood-shed, but did not hesitate to use the ultima ratio when such attempts failed.[85] The same was also true in Posen, where he banned the practice of "branding" Polish prisoners with indigo (for which he had unfairly received the name of "Pfuel von Höllenstein" from Karl Marx), but did not hesitate to have such prisoners' foreheads shorn, thus to identify them; nor did he hesitate to employ armed forces against the insurgent Poles.[86] Likewise, as minister, Pfuel was quick to authorize the use of armed force to quell disorders in Silesia in October, and he also recommended the use of troops in Berlin if the Bürgerwehr should fail to maintain order.[87] In some respects, it looked as though left deputy Georg Jung was right in terming his ministry the "Ministry of Armed Reaction," when Pfuel stepped before the Assembly in September.

But Pfuel was everything but a reactionary. He began his ministerial period by cooperating with the leader of the Center, Hans Viktor von Unruh, and, to the consternation of most of the "old Prussians," liquidated the Stein crisis by issuing an edict to the

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[85]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848.

[86]Hoetzsch, "Die Stellung des Generals von Colomb," pp. 358-361.

[87]Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, pp. 297ff; Karl Haenchen (ed.), Revolutionsbriefe 1848: Ungedrucktes aus dem Nachlass König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. von Preussen (Leipzig, 1930), pp. 178-180.

officers in a phrasing that satisfied all factions in the Assembly. Moreover, Pfuel argued to the king that the constitution (Chartre Waldeck) would have to be accepted exactly as it came out of plenary sessions. He also threatened to resign his ministry if the king persisted in deriving his authority from "God's Grace," and made good his threat when the king rudely and arrogantly addressed well-wishers on his birthday, 15 October, using this formula.[88] Remaining in his offices until 31 October, Pfuel, as deputy in the Assembly, even voted yes to the Assembly's motion that Prussia should undertake to have the German Central Power support the Viennese radicals against the forces of Windischgrätz. And Pfuel did not hesitate to evade the rioting mob outside the Prussian Assembly's building, by joining the Assembly's most outspoken foe of the army, left deputy Jung, and his wife for a cup of tea until the crowds dispersed--something for which the "old Prussians" never forgave him.[89] Finally, because he well knew that General von Brandenburg had been appointed minister-president in order to stage a coup d' etat, Pfuel, as responsible minister, refused to counter-sign the royal order that appointed Brandenburg; Pfuel's minister of interior, Eichmann, supplied the counter-signature, a demonstration that Prussian officers were sometimes more friendly to legality and liberty than were Prussian bureaucrats, of whom Eichmann was a leading representative.[90] Pfuel

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[88]Ibid., pp. 191-192, 199, 211-216; Unruh, Skizzen, pp. 75-76.

[89]See Brandt's description of the expressions of horror and disbelief in General von Rauch's voice when he heard of Pfuel's visit with Jung. Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, p. 308.

[90]Aaron Bernstein, Aus dem Jahre 1848. Historische Erinnerungen. Fortsetzung der Märztäge (Berlin, 1873), p. 117.

clearly placed his political responsibilities above his role as officer.

The same problem faced the officers who were elected as deputies to Frankfurt and to Berlin. Those elected to Frankfurt were, in general, among the more educated and intelligent officers of the army. These included General Maria von Radowitz, General von Auerswald, Rittmeister von Boddien, Major Teichert, and Lieutenant Bock. Although these men acted somewhat as a drag-chain to the schemes of the Frankfurt academicians with regard to the unification or formation of a German imperial army, they worked in a spirit of compromise and were instrumental in the formulation of the final draft law, which provoked the general consternation of a large number of Prussian officers, including Prince William, Griesheim, Hoepner, and Brandt, to name but a few.[91] Only one of the Frankfurt officers, Lieutenant Bock, placed his role as a politician above his duty as a Prussian officer, however. On the grounds that the Prussian government was exceeding its legal rights, Bock refused, at first, to obey the royal order of May, 1849, which was given to Prussian deputies at Frankfurt, to cease deliberating with the German Parliament; Bock considered himself in a political capacity in Frankfurt and not in a military capacity.[92] In the Berlin

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[91]Wilhelm I, Militärschriften, Vol. II, especially page 25; (Hoepfner), Betrachtungen zu dem der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung zur Berathung vorliegenden Entwurf eines Gesetz über die deutsche Wehrverfassung (Berlin, 1848); (Griesheim), Kritische Bemerkungen über den Entwurf des Wehr-Ausschusses der Reichs-Versammlung zu einem Gesetz über die Deutsche Wehr-Verfassung (Berlin, 1848). Brandt, Aus dem Leben des Generals, pp. 263f.

[92]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #101, 5 August, 1849.

assembly, Rittmeister Schimmel, much to the despair of the Wehr-Zeitung staff, acted similarly. Schimmel refused to recognize the legality of Brandenburg's order to recess the assembly until the assembly could take time to deliberate on the order.[93]

In the realm of politics, thus, Prussian officers displayed a thoroughly confused picture in 1848. Because of the social composition, lack of homogeneity and uneven levels of education of the officer corps, Prussian officers' political efforts were characterized by tendencies that diverged in several directions. Because of the favorable position of the "old Prussians," however, the Prussian officer corps came out of the revolution of 1848 with an overriding mentality in opposition to the revolution and in opposition to the ideas of liberalism and democracy. This was so because the "old Prussians" were directing their attentions on internal matters in the officer corps as well as on the external political world. They were also immunizing the officer corps and army to revolutionary infection. This will be examined in the next chapter.

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[93]Ibid., #20, 25 October, 1848, #31, 2 December, 1848, #35, 16 December, 1848.

## CHAPTER VI

## THE POLITICS OF THE OFFICER CORPS

## II: CLOSING THE RANKS

A problem common to European armies in revolutionary periods is the problem of remaining a reliable instrument of policy. An army disintegrated or torn apart by revolutionary ferment is obviously not such an instrument. Since it is the aim of at least the extreme revolutionary elements to attempt to win over the armed forces to the revolutionary cause, or in any event, to neutralize the armed forces, any attempt to immunize the armed forces from revolutionary ferment has necessarily political implications. This was especially so in 1848-1849 where the failure of the revolutionary forces to win over the Prussian military establishment was a direct factor in the revolution's essential collapse; although the March revolution had shaken the unity of the military establishment, it remained, in its essentials, intact.

From March, 1848, a number of possibilities were open to the army--or, rather, the officer corps. The army could, in the first place, simply disintegrate and dissolve. This was the apparent wish of many highly placed Guard officers in March who saw their status threatened. Paradoxically, it was also the wish of a number of democratic officers, as we have seen. It was not, however, a serious proposition to the great bulk of officers. A second possibility, that of placing

the army in the vanguard of revolution and modernization, occurred to only a few Prussian officers as a desirable course. The third possibility, the one adopted, was to oppose the revolution and to support the dynasty; the quid pro quo for supporting the dynasty was the placing of the officer corps into a status of independence as a force in Prussia. But in opposing revolution external to itself, the army needed also to oppose revolution that had crept into its own ranks.

During the period of uncertainty from March to August or September, there were officers who sought to take advantage of the revolution to set through reform projects of their own with respect to the structure of the army. Without sorting out democrats and liberals and their relationships to the revolution external to the army, we can deal here with two classifications of officers and their material desires within the army. In the first place were those who sought an enhanced status for the professionally schooled officer. In the second place were those who otherwise looked for better career possibilities. The view point of a number of lower staff officers have been given in the preceding chapters with respect to the first category. When von Sydow called for a dissolution of the Guard and the elimination of high expense accounts for higher officers, he was evidentally not so much concerned with saving the taxpayers' revenues, as he announced. Much more, he was angling for a redistribution of army expenses so as to enhance the career possibilities of the more professionally talented officers. The Guard officer or general officer thus was threatened in his interests in a very substantial way by his own comrade in arms. With the Royal Guard

dissolved, the displaced officer, should he choose to remain in the service, would have had to take his career chances in the same lists as the Line officer, at the same pay, and in the same social status. It is not to be wondered that the Guard officer was leery of the professionalized upstart, whom he often believed guilty of democratic notions.

A similar inference can be drawn from the projects of those officers who proposed methods for quicker promotions in the junior ranks or equalization of pay or outright blanket pay raises. The revenues of Prussia simply would not have been adequate for such innovations. The money would have had to come from existing allocations at the expense of the privileged stratum of the officer corps and military administration.

A hope for the improvement of career possibilities was thus a common denominator among Prussian officers. In the long run, the "old Prussians" were more adept in promising such improvement to the junior officers than were anyone else, either within the army or outside of it. Most professionally minded officers as well as the run-of-the-mill careerist found a better chance for improving their careers in opposing the revolution in all its works. Since revolution had entered the fortress, it was necessary to close the ranks to the revolution; the army must be made and kept immune from revolution. This was true for the common soldiers and Landwehr as well as officer corps.

Immunization from revolution included physical separation of men and officers from revolutionary ferment and a concomitant heightening

of a sense of unity within the establishment. Where physical separation was impracticable, an intensified corps spirit was inculcated. For the men, this meant the creation and maintenance of a unit esprit de corps. For officers it meant the acceptance of a norm upheld by the Guard and other "old Prussians." Since corps spirit found its highest manifestation in the socially prominent, it was the norm set by the Guard which was inculcated into officers. Since the Guard had the highest embodiment of "honor," its concept of this caste notion was also construed as the proper norm. "Honor" was the chief slogan used in closing the ranks of the officer corps to revolution; "dishonorable" was anyone not conforming to that "honor," whether politically or socially. It is necessary, hence, to determine to what extent the esprit of the Guard and its concomitant concept of honor penetrated the other groupings, corporate and individual, of the officer corps.

In order to determine this, however, brief examination of the process by which the neutralization or immunization of soldiers and Landwehr were accomplished is called for. For this process throws light on the general mentality of the Prussian officer, as well in a military as in a social and political sense.

The soldiers and Landwehr men presented only a temporary problem, objectively speaking, to Prussian officers. To be sure, reserves called to duty in the Rhineland before the March days proved to be unreliable and had to be released. In Cologne, a large group of common soldiers and non-commissioned officers respectfully submitted a

petition to their commanding general requesting redress of service-connected grievances.[1] On the whole, however, Prussian conscripts remained relatively uninfected by revolution. The revolution of 1848, insofar as its dominant ideals were concerned, was essentially urban. The vast majority of Prussian conscripts were rural in origin, and the typical reaction of rank and file in the Line to agitation was not unlike that of the Guard soldier. Reports of civilian-soldier scuffles were frequent in urban Prussia after the March days.[2]

The Prussian Landwehr posed a more difficult problem, especially in urban areas. Away from the surveillance of officers, these part-time soldiers could be and were exposed to fraternization and revolutionary agitation. Even so, urban Landwehr units were few; despite seven months of radical agitation, only a handful of units balked in November, 1848, when the crown mobilized the Landwehr. Several units mutinied in 1849, when Frederick William rejected the imperial crown and the German constitution. But the Prussian Landwehr was generally non-revolutionary probably because it was largely rural in composition.

The problem of immunization of the Landwehr was also partly solved by selective mobilization. In May, General Staff Major Albrecht von Roon suggested to a close friend in the war ministry, Major Fischer, that reliable units of the Landwehr be called to the colors before they become overly exposed to political fermentation.[3]

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[1]Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, pp. 569-571, 656, 657, 667, 688-689.

[2]Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, #111, 20 April, 1848, #113, 22 April, 1848. Kölnische Zeitung, #106, 15 April, 1848.

[3]Elster, Roon, p. 166.

Similarly, since in the Prussian system the Landrat maintained records of Landwehr men in his own Kreis, a selective process which weeded out unreliable men could be, and was, followed in a Landwehr mobilization.[4] And it was largely for this reason that War Minister Lieutenant General Roth von Schreckenstein opposed Prussian democratic projects for the introduction of local self-government.[5] It is in any case not surprising that when the king called the Landwehr to colors in November, he could assemble a relatively reliable force. Without institutional safeguards the little man in rural Prussia could hardly have been expected to do anything but comply with the mobilization.

With minor exceptions, kind treatment of soldiers and Landwehr men was a facet of 1848. Units were given frequent bonuses in pay in 1848-1849. Caste-orientated organizations such as the Veterans', Patriotic, and Prussian Vereine donated food and drink to soldiers and Landwehr men. The money-bags of the growing party of "order" among the property-conscious bourgeoisie opened wider and wider in the course of 1848 for cognac for the men.[6] Officers were unusually concerned for the well-being of their men, particularly in the crisis days of October and November. That well-being took on a rather unsurprising aspect: Fanny Lewald remarks that she had never seen so

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[4]See Stenographische Berichte, p. 107.

[5]Stahr, Preussische Revolution, pp. 355-357.

[6]Examples of this are numerous. See, for example, Kölnische Zeitung, Beilage, #268, 30 September, 1848, Beilage, #275, 8 October, 1848; Kreuzzeitung, #82, 4 October, 1848, #84, 6 October, 1848, #98, 22 October, 1848.

many drunken soldiers in Berlin streets as in late November, 1848.[7] While it makes good sense, militarily speaking, to keep the morale of the soldiers high in times of turmoil, it is a sad reflection on the Prussian system that such magnamimous treatment of the little people occurred only when the caste position of the officer corps was at stake.

Good morale was related also to an increase in esprit de corps which officers infused in their men. This was done chiefly by creating in the soldiers a pride in their units. The frequent inter-regimental scuffles that occurred in 1848 testify to the efficacy of such indoctrination; one such scuffle between the 24th Infantry Regiment and a unit of the Royal Guard is said to have come about because of the Guard's taunts to the men of the 24th that "even houses have numbers."[8]

It is probably true that such a rise in unit esprit de corps would have led to soldier-civilian scuffles without further agitation on the part of officers. But officers did little to hide their opinions of what was occurring in the streets, clubs, assemblies, and pubs of Prussia. Thus a rising esprit de corps among the rank and file contributed to increased soldier-civilian antagonisms. And the common soldier--especially the non-commissioned officers--could take advantage of the elasticity of punishments provided for soldiers in civilian-soldier scuffles; the soldier could simply explain to

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[7]Fanny Lewand, Erinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1848 (2 vols., Braunschweig, 1850), Vol. II, p. 331.

[8]Kölnische Zeitung, #254, 14 September, 1848.

his commanding officer that civilians had insulted his "beloved" officers, and he could thereby count on lenient treatment.[9]

Unquestionably, a certain element of morale and esprit de corps had to be injected into the ranks in order to hold them reliable; the mechanical discipline allegedly true of the eighteenth century may not, by itself, have been efficacious enough. Even so, the example set by the 24th Infantry Regiment should temper such an observation. The 24th Regiment was brought into Berlin for garrision duty on 29 March. The men had been recruited, for the most part, from Berlin and it was thought that there might be a good relationship between the 24th and Berliners. This proved to be true. Men of the 24th strolled the streets of Berlin amiably and frequented street gatherings and mass assemblies. Their officers lost caste among other Prussian officers because of the "democratic" behavior of their men; in higher circles the regiment was regarded a disgrace.[10] Yet none of this prevented elements of the 24th Regiment from effectively and ruthlessly subduing uprisings in Iserlohn in 1849.[11] Possibly the unit was only seeking

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[9]Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen gives an example where a soldier was given only three days arrest as punishment for being in a violent scuffle with civilians. All the soldier had to say was, "Even if gallows and the wheel threaten me, I will still strike down anyone who insluts my officers." A more phony concern for officers could hardly be imagined. Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, p. 87.

[10]Robert Springer, Berlins Strassen, Kneipen und Klubs im Jahre 1848 (Berlin, 1850), pp. 157-158.

[11]Franz Ludwig Nohl, Der Iserlohner Aufstand. Ein Tatsachenbericht (Iserlohn, 1850. Herausgegeben vom Kulturamt der Stadt Iserlohn in Verbindung mit dem Stadtarchiv und dem Heimatverein. Schriftenreihe Haus der Heimat, Iserlohn, 1849), pp. 19ff. According to Nohl, the officers strove to hold back the soldiers "from murder and plundering."

to reestablish its chivalrous reputation, but it is nonetheless noteworthy that seven months in Berlin had not destroyed it as a military force. The example of the 24th Regiment only gives added validity to the assertion that the Prussian system esteemed virtues far transcending the purely military.

The relationship between officers and men gives one more reason why the typical Prussian officer disliked the revolution. He was forced to pay more attention to his duties than he did in ordinary times. Such expanded attention, even if probably unnecessary, obliged the officer to forego many of the amenities that he enjoyed in normal times. Reading brochures to his men, distributing pamphlets, collecting signatures for "spontaneous" unit declarations, and acting especially "fatherly" to his men all made inroads on his patience, while extended field exercise--a device to separate units from civilians--and frequent unit transfers interrupted his pattern of life and expectations. Officer-soldier relationship was one element in a growing hatred of the revolution in the officer corps.

Growing hatred of the revolution was directly related to the increasing pressure placed on the units of the officer corps. This pressure, properly speaking, came from those elements of the officer corps which have been labeled as "old Prussians." The pressure was of a moral nature, based on "honor." It was a moral pressure exercised by senior officers and other exponents of "honor." It was exercised through coercion, threats, isolation of non-conforming officers, unpleasant duty, untimely transfers, and propaganda, tempered by cajoling

and promises of better things to come. It was a moral pressure whose object was to impress the spirit of the Royal Guard onto the rest of the officer corps. It was a pressure calculated to make the "army stand or fall with the Guard."

For the Guard had "honor." Immediately after the March days, the king of Hanover wrote a letter to Lieutenant General von Prittwitz which Prittwitz read daily to the Guard officers. King Ernst August informed the officers that the corps had honor because he, Ernst August, was still proud to be a Prussian general. The Hanoverian urged the officers that resignation from the service would be premature; Frederick William IV's March concessions were still only unfulfilled promises.[12] The Guard, in effect, was led to believe that the king's promises might not in the end affect the officer corps' position in the state. Although he had lost caste with the Guard, Frederick William IV buttressed this supposition. The king moved to Potsdam amidst his Guard on 30 March and did not return again to Berlin, to stay, until after the Guard did. And Frederick William adamantly refused to shed his uniform despite the urging of several of the March ministers, notably David Hansemann and Heinrich von Arnim. Despite the Berlin Bürgerwehr's request that he review a Bürgerwehr parade in May in the same uniform as the Bürgerwehr (civilian clothes), Frederick William reviewed the parade wearing the uniform of a Guard general;[13] in the end, Frederick William, too, was

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[12]Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848.

[13]Haenchen, Revolutionsbriefe 1848, pp. 102-103. See also Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 181.

a Hohenzollern. Not only did this symbolism stamp royal approval onto the mentality of the Guard; Frederick William also expressly defended the Guard before his March minister, Ludolf Camphausen, and he advised him to see to it that "patriotic" articles be printed in the newspapers.[14]

The honor of the Guard thus remained as criterion for the officer corps. It was made reasonably clear, as well, that the king did not intend to alter the status of the officer corps. Nothing that would undermine this status was undertaken and it was not until the Stein crisis in September, 1848, that the Prussian constituent assembly made a serious attempt to implement part of the March concessions; the Stein motion, in that it required officers to abstain from reactionary agitation, may be regarded as one way of implementing the king's promise in March that the army would be sworn to the constitution. But in the meantime, the "old Prussians" had transmitted the mentality of the Guard to the officer corps. This will be examined below.

The transmission of the Guard's mentality to the officer corps was accomplished through the threats of courts of honor proceedings, untimely transfers, and removal and isolation of "dishonorable" officers. Accompanying these pressures was a systematic infusion of an exaggerated esprit de corps, the inculcation of pride in service,

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[14]Brandenburg, König Friedrich Wilhelms I. Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen, pp. 52-53.

and an ever increasing and bombastic praise of Prussian military institutions and traditions. As was a trademark with Prussians, the job was not only done, it was overdone.

Yet difficulties beset the "old Prussians" in performing the job of "purifying" the officer corps. Frederick William had announced constitutional and German policies in March, a fact that made it problematic to disown officers who thought that the royal promiser should or would keep his word. Likewise, a free-wheeling press stood ready to inform the public of chicaneries in the officer corps. But the concept of honor was flexible enough to offset most difficulties. Such flexibility proved useful because a watchful press made the normal means of "purification"--chiefly through courts of honor proceedings and transfers--inconvenient.

As has been pointed out elsewhere, the court of honor was an uncertain instrument for the preservation of conformity in the several officer corps. Too frequent use of the courts of honor could reflect adversely on the reputation of a given unit. In addition, the creation of a free press in Prussia circumscribed the use of the court of honor. There were enough newspapers at hand ready to report irregularities in the way an officer corps handled a court of honor proceeding. Democratic or otherwise non-conforming officers could be fairly certain of having part of the press support their cause. As well, officers removed from the service could also subsequently publish their own accounts of the investigations, as did, for example, Lieutenant Wülfing of the 25th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant von Beust of the 17th Regiment, Lieutenants Nithak and Adamski of the 25th

Regiment, and others.[15] And this example had already been given in 1846, 1847, and early 1848 by lieutenants Fritz Anneke, Hermann Korff, August Willich, and Hugo von Hasenkamp.[16] These officers had made it quite obvious that the allegedly unanimous opinion of an officer corps was quite often an artifice manufactured through the manipulations of a few officers and that the majority of the officers in many officer corps usually went along with what their superiors wanted, not necessarily because that was their own opinion too, but often because they had no crystalized opinion in the first place. In any event, no unit wanted to have its "family secrets" revealed to the public. It is probably for this reason that "old Prussian" officers hated a free press and particularly an impudent democratic press. It is not surprising, therefore, that when a state of siege was proclaimed in Cologne in September, 1848, Colonel Kaiser the Second City Commandant, suspended all of the democratic and radical newspapers. In November, 1848, General von Wrangel did the same thing in Berlin. And while Berlin, Breslau, and many other cities in Prussia were under states of siege from November, 1848 until after February, 1849, the "old Prussians" took advantage of the relative absence of a free-wheeling press and initiated a ruthless purge of the officer corps.[17]

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[15] Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere; Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #15, 15 June, 1848; #56, 26 July, 1848, #146, 18 November, 1848; Kölnische Zeitung, #307, 15 November, 1848.

[16] As, for example, Korff, Ehrengerichtlicher Prozess, Hasenkamp, Darlegung der Grunde, Willich, Im preussischen Heer!

[17] Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat (2. Aufl.), pp. 189-190, claims that over 300 officers were arraigned in this period. Scattered stories in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, the Neue Kölnische Zeitung, and the Kölnische Zeitung in the first months of 1849 seem to corroborate this. But the officers' lists are almost mute on this point.

But if the courts of honor were relatively little used instruments during the revolutionary months of 1848, the fear of them was effective in keeping many officers from publicly voicing an opinion contrary to "honor."

The same, in general, may be said for the practice of transferring non-conforming officers from one unit to another in an effort to make them conform or leave the service. In the early weeks and months of the revolution, this method of disciplining deviant officers was used. For example, First Lieutenant Steinhardt of the 4th Artillery Brigade was transferred from Deutz to Torgau because he had been president of a so-called "officers' club" in Cologne before the war ministry prohibited such activity. Steinhardt, as well, had been active in the "elections in the sense of constitutional liberalism" and was elected as an elector to the Frankfurt Parliament. Steinhardt had just previously been transferred to Deutz from Erfurt, in an assignment that normally lasted three years. He had transported his large family to Deutz as well, at considerable personal financial cost, which, however, was of no concern to the "honor" of the garrison in Deutz.[18] There are other examples of these politics of honor. The Polish-born Lieutenant Adamski of the 25th Infantry Regiment had been assigned to a Landwehr battalion in Aachen. In Aachen, he asked for a transfer to Posen, where he wanted to help in reorganizing the province. This was refused him. He was sent back to his parent unit in Deutz, ostensibly because he had asked for a transfer, but

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[18]Anneke, Wie's jetzt im preussischen Heere aussieht, p. 15.

apparently really because he had participated actively in popular assemblies in Aachen. The transfer back to Deutz cost Adamski the 22 Taler extra salary per month which his position in the Landwehr in Aachen had carried with it. Because he had also refused to sign a statement indicting his comrades, Wülfing, Bernigau, and Faltin, Adamski was then temporarily transferred from Deutz to Bonn, presumably because there was a "more loyal spirit" in Bonn.[19] Similarly, in the IV Army Corps area, Engineer Lieutenant Bluhm was suddenly transferred from Stettin to Graudenz. Bluhm had become quite popular in Stettin and had been particularly in demand in the assemblies of merchants and ship owners there. Bluhm was transferred because his superior officer, Major Lenz, denounced him for signing his name to an address and for participating overzealously in the May elections.[20] And in the V Army Corps area, Lieutenant Jung of the 5th Artillery Brigade in Schweidnitz was made president of a democratic club there and invited the soldiers of the garrison to an assembly to discuss military reforms. The Inspector of Artillery dressed him down for this before the assembled officer corps and transferred him, with a scant 24 hours notice, to Posen. Because the local citizens protested against this, the commanding officer, General Rollaz du Rosey, summarily ordered Jung to board a carriage and leave immediately.[21] Finally, from Berlin, Dr. Phil. Lieutenant Wilhelm von Brockhusen was abruptly transferred back to his parent unit, the 7th Artillery

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[19] Ibid., p. 8.

[20] Ibid., p. 9.

[21] Ibid.

Brigade, presumably for writing the pamphlet, "To all Berliners," after the Berlin March days.[22]

The practice of transferring renitent officers from one unit to another was thus used in the officer corps during the earlier weeks of the revolution. But the press and the left in the Prussian constituent assembly were very quickly aware of this practice, very often because they were informed of the practice by the officers involved. Those officers who were arbitrarily transferred about were exactly those officers who had become popular with the democrats in the area from which they were transferred; the democratic press and clubs could not help but divine the reasons for the transfers. Necessarily this obliged commanders to restrain themselves in this practice. So, for example, when the officer corps of the 25th Infantry Regiment pressed for the permanent transfer of the five officers, Lieutenants Adamski, Leonhard I, von Pelzer, Stawitzki, and Müller, who had refused to adhere to the declaration of 60 officers of the regiment, the war minister, Roth von Schreckenstein, wrote on 19 August that "the officers do not seem to be so gravely involved and a transfer in these dimensions would excite too great attention."[23] No doubt, ten days after the constituent assembly had first adopted the Stein motion, such a wide-spread disciplinary transfer would have given extra evidence to the democrats' arguments that the officer corps harbored reactionary tendencies.

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[22]Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #172, 19 December, 1848.

[23]Hansen, Rheinische Briefe und Akten, Vol. II, pp. 657-658.

Even if commanding officers had to restrain themselves in the practice of transferring officers for political reasons, however, other excuses could be found. According to Wilhelm Rüstow, it was simply said that the services of the officer to be transferred were indispensable in the new unit. The officer would then be transferred to the new unit where he would be left completely unoccupied in his "indispensable" capacity.[24] Or they may have experienced an affair like Lieutenant von Brockhusen. Von Brockhusen, who was transferred back to his parent unit in Münster after writing the broschure "To All Berliners," received a cool reception in his unit. In the 7th Artillery Brigade, the question was brought up whether Brockhusen, who had intimated that he had republican acquaintances in the officer corps, should be placed before a court of honor. This was rejected, however. The commanding officer, Major Leonhard, however, subsequently reproved Brockhusen for writing articles against Russia and for signing his name to them; as a Prussian officer, he should not attack a "friendly power" in this way, he was told. But Brockhusen continued to write his Russophobe bromades. In November, his commanding officer told him that he would be discharged as an invalid if he did not cease to attack Russia. Allegedly, the commanding officer said that he "would request that he be placed at disposition because he was not useable in the service. Through too much studying, he has lost practical perception."[25]

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[24]Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat (2. Aufl.), p. 121.

[25]Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #172, 19 December, 1848.

It is obvious that commanders preferred to exert moral pressure on an errant officer in order either to silence him or to force him to leave the service, rather than risk the publicity inherent in a court of honor investigation or in outright transfers. In other words, it was more usual to attempt to isolate an unwanted officer. The example of what happened to lieutenants Wülfing, Bernigau, Faltin, and Nithak in the 25th Infantry Regiment also illustrates this. Courts of honor proceedings against the first three were only initiated after publicity had been given the matter or after several months of pressure had failed. The "Junkers" of the 25th Regiment, according to Wülfing, "avoid us, in part greeted us no more at all, and sought to treat us in every way as undesirables."[26]

In addition to such corporate pressure, which was normal or to be expected in the Prussian officer corps, those officers--the "old Prussians"--who sought most to prevent the officer corps from being affected by the revolution, were helped by the literary efforts of the more gifted officers, by the newly-founded mouth-piece of the Junker party, the Kreuzzeitung, and by other manufactured public opinion. The Kreuzzeitung quickly arrogated to itself the reputation of being a semi-official newspaper and became a must in most of the coffee houses and hostelries frequented by officers.[27] An increasing number of units subscribed to the Wehr-Zeitung in the months of 1848

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[26]Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere, p. 11.

[27]Major von Roon wrote his wife that he was going to have his landlord in Coblenz subscribe to the Kreuzzeitung so that it would be available for all his tenants and guests. Roon warmly recommended the Kreuzzeitung to his wife, and, it may be presumed, to his comrades at Coblenz. Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 169.

and 1849; the Wehr-Zeitung put a convenient text-book in the hands of superior officers with which they could "instruct" their subordinate officers. In many units, the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung was read to the assembled officer corps; one group in Danzig complained at first, when the Wehr-Zeitung was still a weekly, that it had too much material in it and that it would be better if it came out twice-weekly, with only half the material.[28] Apparently some officers found it tiring to read or listen to an issue being read to them at one muster or roll call.

A similar procedure was followed with the brochures penned by Griesheim, notably with his "German Central Power and the Prussian Army." Griesheim's broadside was stamped with officiality since it was printed in the Decker Geheime Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, which published most official pronouncements. It was sent out to the army units, two copies to each company, to be read at muster, since "the soldier too, would like to hear about himself."[29] The same procedure was followed with other "patriotic" brochures. Finally to the fulminations of the Kreuzzeitung, the Wehr-Zeitung, and the brochures oozing from the ink pots of the "old Prussians" must be added the pro-

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[28]Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat (2. Auflage.), p. 146. See also Kreuzzeitung, Beilage, #46, 23 August, 1848, where it may be inferred that the popularity of the Wehr-Zeitung was slow in being established. Despite Rüstow's complaint that it was a textbook for the "absolutists," it appears likely that many officers were unaware of the Wehr-Zeitung for quite some time; it received no financial support from the war ministry, at least not in 1848.

[29]De la Chevallerie, Der sechste August, pp. 5-6; Stahr, Preussische Revolution, p. 382, note.

nouncements and denouncements of the Patriotic and Prussian Vereine. When applicable, these were also sent out to the garrisons to be read and posted in Casino and Kaserne; as coincident would have it, on the same date that Griesheim wrote his attack on the German Central Power, 23 July, the Patriotic Verein in Berlin intoned that anyone who worked for German unity was a traitor to Prussia.[30]

The literary efforts of gifted officers, of the Junker party, and the political efforts of the Prussian, Patriotic, and Veteran Vereine thus gave a boost to the "old Prussian" officers in their efforts to seal off the officer corps and army to the revolution. By making it unpatriotic sincerely to desire German unity, the "Blacks and Whites" were able to frighten into silence those officers who might have given ear to such desires. Anyone who had a good word to say about the South Germans was deemed unpatriotic. By identifying German unity with republicanism, it was easy to accuse nationalist-minded officers of being dishonorable. By praising the institution of the officer corps and the Prussian military system, those junior officers who desired an improvement of their lot were made afraid to speak out lest they be accused of being disloyal or discontented gold-bricks. By making it an offense against the honor of the officer corps to have a desire for change, the liberal-minded officers and the apolitical officers were made afraid to speak out and voice their own opinions, or at least, to hide behind anonymity. And finally, the excessive praise of the Prussian army went far toward

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[30] Ibid., p. 391.

raising esprit de corps in the several units. In the course of time, even the erstwhile liberal officer was afraid to associate anymore with those officers who were outspoken in their opinions. For example, General Staff Lieutenant Julius Hartmann, who for awhile claimed himself to be a liberal officer, wrote his financee on 17 June, 1848, shortly after the Berlin mob had stormed the armory; an old friend of Hartmann, an inactive General Staff Lieutenant Techow, had convinced the commanding officer in the armory, Captain von Natzmer, to desert his post. Hartmann wrote:

> I have long known [Techow], who was commanded to the General Staff. I always considered him to be a man of honor, resolute, vigorous and intelligent. Recently, however, he had completely turned to the radical party and he went so far that I avoided all intercourse with him.[31]

It must be remarked that the turmoil of the revolutionary months supplemented the moral pressure exerted by the "old Prussians." Shortly after the barricade fighting in Berlin in March, Captain Zimmermann of the General Staff remarked that the March uprising had made of him, a life-long liberal, a conservative.[32] The twin pressures of "honor" and revolutionary turmoil also converted the thinking of nationalist-minded officers. Moltke, who had greeted the possibility of a united Germany in March, cooled off visibly thereafter. Transferred to a more "loyal" area, Magdeburg, in May, he was fundamentally in agreement with Griesheim's broadside against

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[31]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, p. 105.

[32]Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, #12, 22 September, 1848.

the German Power, although he did not approve of Griesheim's vehemence and he also acclaimed the election of the Reichsverweser, the Austrian Arch-Duke John. Extremely sympathetic and impatient with the Prussian constituent assembly from the outset, Moltke, by September, also gave up all hope for German unity coming from the "screamers in Frankfurt" after the mob in Frankfurt had massacred two Prussian deputies.[33]

The exaltation of esprit de corps in the officer corps and its attendant literary offensive also provided career-making opportunities for such liberal officers who made their political conversions in time. A pre-March liberal in the General Staff, Lieutenant Julius Hartmann, had confidently accepted the possibility of war with Russia should Germany develop into a constitutional monarchy; in April, evidently under the influence of Griesheim's pamphlet concerning war with Russia, he emotionally confided to his fiancée that he would resign from service rather than go to war against Russia,[34] a curious statement for a professional officer to make. Himself a Hanoverian, Hartmann readily ignored the Catholic Prussian Rhineland and Wesphalia (and Posen) and agreed with Griesheim's fulminations that only a protestant North Germany with exclusion of the South Germans was possible of unification.[35] Avoiding his former comrades who had

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[33]Kessel, Moltke. Briefe, pp. 233-236, 238-240; Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, pp. 119-121, 123-125, 126-131; Vol. IV, pp. 161-163.

[34]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, pp. 10-11, 21-23, 71.

[35]Ibid., pp. 146-149, 61-62.

become too radical for him and proclaiming himself not to be a political chameleon, Hartmann subsequently took to writing articles for the Kreuzzeitung, which he described to his financee as being the newspaper closest to his own political fundamentals. His literary productivity--expositions on officers' "honor"--, possibly coincidentally, brought him into contact with Generals von Gerlach and Rauch who promised to introduce him to the Russian Ambassador and also advised him to seek "connexions."[36] Hartmann excused the coup'd etat of November on the condition that it should be judged solely by its success or failure,[37] an arresting example of a turn in thinking on the part of an officer who had once supported, if quietly, legal and constitutional principles. No doubt it was also the coincidence of "connexions" that he was promoted to captain in January, 1849, the youngest captain in the officer corps. Hartmann, as he confided to his sweet-heart, had the "sentiment of his estate"--at least after June, 1848.[38] An open display of the "sentiment of the estate," thus, could provide career-making chances for the officer who identified that sentiment quickly enough, and could thus help to increase the moral pressure on other officers--especially on the renegades.

The sharp rise of esprit de corps must have made the moral pressure which was exerted on the renegade officers quite fierce. Although several, such as Lieutenant Beust and other followers of ex-lieutenants Anneke, Willich, and Korff were already radically committed and pro-

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[36]Ibid., pp. 144-149.

[37]Ibid., pp. 172-175.

[38]Ibid., pp. 80, 197, 198.

vided an attraction to the non-conforming officers still in the service, the moral pressure exerted on the active officers must have itself contributed heavily to their radicalization. Lieutenants Wülfing, Bernigau, Faltin, de la Chevallerie, Rüstow, Adamski, Jung, von Brockhusen, Caspary, and Osse had all been able, before the March revolution, to reconcile their political convictions (if they had any) with their duties as officers; they all had considerable time in active service. But threats of disciplinary action, of forfeiture in pay, mental alienation from an exalted esprit de corps, disagreeable duty assignments, and outright insults drove these officers into ever more radical involvement with the revolution. Wülfing left the army in July, 1848, served for a while as attaché to the legation to Bern for the Frankfurt Parliament.[39] Lieutenant Bernigau, who left the service at the same time, subsequently became involved in the uprising in Baden in 1849 where he was among those who suffered the penalty of death under the drum-head military courts of Prince William.[40] Faltin and de la Chevallerie helped organize a "Military Reform Club" in Berlin in September, 1848, and engaged in a vigorous if vain attempt, through fraternization, to make the Prussian army usless in the event of a coup d' etat.[41] Von Brockhusen, who had insisted on his (and others') ability to reconcile political convictions with an oath of obedience, openly defied the cold treatment

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[39] Wülfing, Austritt dreier Offiziere.

[40] Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. II, p. 302.

[41] Kreuzzeitung, #81, 3 October, 1848.

he received in his own unit and persisted in publishing anti-Russian messages throughout 1848 and into 1849. In 1849, Brockhusen and a comrade, Lieutenant Caspary, had alienated themselves sufficiently from their superiors and ingratiated themselves enough to local democrats that they were both elected as democratic deputies to the Prussian lower house in January, 1849, after Brandenburg's coup d' etat.[42] The pressure placed on Lieutenant Wilhelm Rüstow was so great as to make him lose all sense of discretion when he wrote his polemic, "The German Military State Before and During the Revolution," a brochure, which, especially coming from a Prussian officer, was almost indisputably lèse majesté; Rüstow, in any event, was arraigned, tried, and convicted on that charge.[43]

The pressure must have been equally devastating on officers who kept their opinions to themselves. Lieutenant Böing in the 5th Artillery Brigade in Neisse left the army on 21 November, after the coup d' etat ministry of Brandenburg-Manteuffel had been appointed. Böing apparently had been relatively discreet about his opinions during the revolutionary months; in any case, he had not compromised himself. But upon resignation from the service, he complained that the army was continuing to maintain an alien position in the state in order to remain an instrument of "absolute will." Böing complained, as well, that it had become impossible to reform the army. Government orders, literature from the Decker Bucherei, and the "position of the lofty Kreuzzeitung, which Böing called an "official" newspaper, had

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[42]Neue Kölnische Zeitung, #21, 26 January, 1849, #22, 27 January, 1849.

[43]Rüstow, Der deutsche Militärstaat (2. Aufl.), Vorrede.

made reform impossible and this "shows itself further in the almost unbearable praising [Lobhudelei] of the Prussian military establishment, even at the most unimportant affairs, which are all exploited in order to demonstrate the superiority and incorrigibleness of the military arrangements and military discipline."[44]

While the pressure on the errant officers pushed them further to the left, this pressure was nonetheless unevenly distributed or applied. Where large groups of officers had wavered in March and April, such as those officers in Cologne, Deutz, and Aachen who had petitioned the ministry, moral pressure was hard to exert. Although no more was heard from these officers after the ministry had forbidden political activity, they remained in the service. It may be concluded that where there were like-minded officers in a unit, a good amount of political non-comformity was tolerated, provided it did not become too undisguised.

This is reflected, too, in comparing the fates of renegade officers in infantry and cavalry units with that of renegades in the technical branches. Cavalry and infantry officers bold enough to step forward with unorthodox ideas were much more quickly dealt with than were officers in the technical branches. Wülfing, Nithak, Faltin, Bernigau, and Adamski of the 25th Infantry Regiment were almost immediately the subjects for disciplinary action. So too was Lieutenant von Wiedburg, an infantry officer in Berlin, when he "gravely compromised" the "king's cause" before his troops in November.[45] In contrast,

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[44]Neue Kölnische Zeitung, #21, 26 January, 1849; #22, 27 January, 1849.

[45]Hartmann, Lebenserinnerungen, II Theil, p. 179; Kreuzzeitung, #122, 19 November, 1848.

Lieutenant Jung of artillery remained in the service until mid-1849, though a subject of controversy since April, 1848. Lieutenant von Brockhusen of artillery was not dismissed until 1849 and then chiefly because he signed his name to his anti-Russian discourses--thereby identifying, also, his unit. And, most notoriously, although he was the known author of a number of "tactless" brochures, and although he led mass democratic assemblies, Lieutenant Rüstow of the engineers was called to task, officially, only after having published his work on the "German Military State Before and During the Revolution;" to excuse this tardy action, his superior officers pronounced that they had regarded Rüstow as a potentially talented officer once the "ferment" in his mind had ceased.[46]

The examples of these and other officers gives evidence that the moral pressure exerted on the officer corps did not entirely penetrate the technical services, one more proof to the social elite, that the artillery and engineers lacked "honor." Indeed, "in the name of the artillery garrisoned here," one artillery officer in Cologne wrote the Kölnische Zeitung saying that it was a "lie and a slander" that the soldiers in the artillery were being taught the "Prussian spirit."[47] And even among those officers in the technical branches who left the service for political reasons, consideration was shown. Not a few of these were given pensions or rights to a civil service job; no such consideration was given the non-conforming officer of the cavalry or infantry.

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[46]Troschke, Die Militair-Litteratur, pp. 202-203.

[47]Kölnische Zeitung, #123, 24 May, 1849.

Despite the aberrations of the technical branches and renegade democrats, the moral pressure generated by the "old Prussians" was strikingly successful. By September, 1848, the majority of Prussian officers had adopted the mentality of the Guard. By September, the Line, as well as the Guard, was threatening the king with mutiny should the specific March concessions that touched the status of the officer corps be implemented. Where the Guard had been practically alone in these threats in March, "honor" now pointed to such a conclusion for the Line also. Although only the social elite had objected to the king's promise in March that the army would be sworn to the constitution, Line officers in September joined in the objection when the Stein motion, in effect, proposed to implement the king's promise. Major von Roon well states the dilemma that the Line officer had been pushed into after having been bombarded by fulminations of "honor" and after having repeated such formulae himself. Married, a father of six, Roon had placed two sons in a Prussian cadet house in the summer of 1848.[48] Impoverished, he and his family had no other source of income or support than in a military career. But as the Stein crisis came to a head in September, Roon wrote his wife saying that he had been thinking of resigning from the service but,

> Still, I cannot decide for that, if I consider how small my means are and how great the duties are which the existence of my [family] imposes on me.. . . The nearer the possibility comes to me, the harder it seems to take the Wanderstab in hand and cut all at once all bonds, all the thousand threads with which our existence is tied to the homeland. But a time can come where it is not only permitted but where it may be required and perhaps this time is no more all too far away.[49]

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[48]Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, p. 159.

[49]Ibid., pp. 190-191.

Thus could "honor" make the sober, sensible family man lose common sense and seriously contemplate giving up a career to which he had devoted his life.

When intelligent career officers such as Roon and Moltke[50] began to contemplate resignation from the service, the time for a coup d' dtat was near. If he wanted to retain his officer corps, Frederick William IV had to put to an end any supposition that the March concessions would be faithfully carried out. An end was put to such suppositions.

Where it was politically most important, the pressure of the "old Prussians" was most effective. It was most effective on King Frederick William IV. Not, to be sure, in his German policy per se; Frederick William continued to entertain his gothic ideas with regard to restoring the Holy Roman Empire until at least the Punctation of Olmütz in 1851. But so far as his attitude toward liberal constitutionalism was concerned, there can be no doubt of the efficacy of the pressure which the "Blacks and Whites" exerted. Indeed, so far as the camarilla was concerned, the pressure was overdone. In late 1848, Frederick William was intent on withdrawing all of the concessions he had made in March, a breach of word which the camarilla, not necessarily to its moral credit, worked against; the camarilla was not adverse to removing the concessions, but its members were agreed that, for the sake of legal decorum, these should be withdrawn in

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[50]Moltke was prepared to emigrate to Australia. Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, p. 127.

collaboration with a representative body whose composition could be made amenable through the proper "electoral geometry."[51] Still, it must be argued that the king's mentality in this matter was indicative of the efficacy of "the army's" pressure on its nominal Kriegsherr.

The same might be said for the king's rejection of the imperial crown in 1849. Faithful to the overexaggerated expressions of "honor," Frederick William could no more accept an imperial crown from the bourgeoise liberals at Frankfurt in 1849 than could the Royal Guard bear the "dishonor" of mounting posts in Berlin in March, 1848, in common with the Bürgerwehr. By way of contrast, officers, such as Frederick William's brother, Crown Prince William, and General von Brandenburg (Hohenzollerns both), sure of their standing in the Royal Guard, could, with reservations, have accepted such an opportunity, even if it came "from the gutter"--not, however, because they were German nationalists, but because they had their eyes on the main chance: An opportunity to expand Hohenzollern and Prussian prestige and power.[52] But a king who constantly covered up his ignorance in military matters and his inexpertness as a horseman with inappropriate jokes and extravagant boasting was obviously too anxious

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[51]Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte, pp. 149f; Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 223, 224, 244-245, 261-262.

[52]Ibid., p. 272; Hohlfeld, Das Frankfurter Parlament, p. 26, note 26; Haenchen, Revolutionsbriefe 1848, p. 313.

about his status in the officer corps to entertain such thoughts.[53] Having lost caste with the Guard in March, 1848, Frederick William subsequently adopted superficialities of the "Prussian spirit" with all the servile humility that a new second lieutenant in the Royal Guard could display to his commanding officer. With the king coordinated, the ranks may be said to be closed.

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[53]Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, p. 4; Prittwitz, Berlin. 1848. In defending the Royal Guard before Camphausen, Frederick William wrote the latter on 27 April, 1848: "Then, however, I must make you aware, best Camphausen, that there is a certain limit in yielding, which no king of Prussia, who is thus a born soldier, above all if he, as I, have been in 15 battles, can* step over. To that, above all, belongs the notion to separate me from my loyal, beloved, brave Guards, just because Berlin, or much more, a minority of Berliners want to have it thus! ! ! That would be my moral death, for in the opinion of the entire army (which has enthusiastically acclaimed the heroic bravery of the Guards on the 18th), I would have ceased to be an officer." Brandenburg, König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen, pp. 52-53.

*Frederick William underlined "can" five times. Frederick William did not specify the 15 battles he had been in. Perhaps he was counting the potato rebellion of 1847 and the March revolution.

# CHAPTER VII

## CONCLUSIONS

Some concluding remarks on the confrontation of military forces with the revolution of 1848 should include examination of the Stein crisis of August-September, 1848, the campaign against swearing the army to the constitution in 1849-1850, the coup d' etat of late 1848, a summary of our findings in the study, and the long-term results of the revolution of 1848 on the mentality of the Prussian army.

To begin with, the Stein affair. Contemporaries regarded the shooting at Schweidnitz in August, which produced fourteen dead Bürgerwehr men, as a deliberate test of strength engineered by the Prussian military. No proof of this exists. Yet the public facts of the incident deserve brief comment.

The war ministry announced that authorities investigating the incident had concluded that the soldiers fired on the civilians "without command" after first being fired upon by "rabble." The affair was a "regrettable" incident.[1] Clearly the ministry believed that the king's officers could do no wrong. What the ministry did not make public was that the contingent of soldiers were what German nationalists derisively called "Wasserpolacken," in other words, soldiers who could hardly have shared in the German nationalist

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[1]Report summarized in Kreuzzeitung, #94, Beilage, 18 October, 1848.

enthusiasm of the Schweidnitz Bürgerwehr.[2] Their commanding officer, Captain Skrbensky, was also of Polish stock. The soldiers had loaded their weapons in secret before they accosted the Bürgerwehr, a clear violation of an old, and still binding, law which required officers to warn civilians that the soldiers would be ordered to load their weapons.[3] It is impossible to maintain that the soldiers fired "without command" and at the same time praise officers for their ability in disciplining men. The fact that Skrbensky was transferred to a position in the war ministry after the incident and promoted to major in January, 1849, takes all credibility out of the war ministry's investigation of the affair.[4] Yet even an intelligent officer like Moltke swallowed the results of the "investigation."[5]

Not so the politicians in the Prussian Assembly. These adopted the Stein Resolution by an overwhelming majority and the Schulz Amendment by a majority of one vote. The Assembly also voted lack of confidence in the Auerswald-Hansemann Ministry in September because the ministry refused to implement the wishes of the Assembly; the ministry resigned. The Stein Resolution thus produced a crisis of the highest magnitude. It is of interest to dissect the Stein Resolution and the Schulz Amendment.

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[2]Wilhelm Blos, Die deutsche Revolution. Geschichte der deutschen Bewegung von 1848 und 1849 (Stuttgart, 1891), p. 374.

[3]Stahr, Preussische Revolution, p. 455; Unruh, Skizzen, p. 55.

[4]Kreuzzeitung, #98, 22 October, 1848; Neue Kölnische Zeitung für Bürger, Bauern, und Soldaten (Cologne), #13, 17 January, 1849. Rang- und Quartierliste, 1849.

[5]Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV, pp. 125-126.

The first part of the Stein Resolution asked the war minister to order officers to cease all reactionary agitation. However one wishes to define the word, "reactionary," such a demand should not have had any effect on a truly professional army, since a truly professional officer would have eschewed all political agitation anyway. And, indeed, the war ministry under von Reyher had already admonished officers as early as April, 1848, to abstain from deliberation of political affairs. But really to implement this demand it would have been necessary to command the officers to quit talking about "honor."

The second part of the Stein Resolution insisted that officers should join with the Bürger in creating a constitutional order. This obviously asked officers to do something outside of their vocation of arms. But with whom among the Bürger were they to cooperate? Should they join the Constitutional Club? The Democratic Club? Marx's Communist League? How were officers to help create a constitutional order? This was an altogether impossible demand, in any case, because precisely the political left which had supported the Stein Resolution, wanted nothing to do with any save the most radical of Prussian officers. In Königsberg, as an example, democrats formed a political club which they promptly deserted in droves when officers showed up at a meeting--and this, during the Stein crisis.[6] And a member of the left wing of the Prussian Assembly, Father J.A.J. Hansen, who supported the Stein Resolution, himself complained that the

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[6]Kreuzzeitung, #42, Beilage, 18 August, 1848.

Assembly suspected him of being a reactionary simply because the military governor of Berlin, Major General von Aschoff, was a friend of his.[7] As Hans Viktor von Unruh said, just as no one could oblige him to traffic with officers when he did not wish to, so no one could oblige officers to traffic with democratic or liberal Bürger if they did not choose to do so.[8]

The Schulz Amendment enjoined the war minister to tell the officers that anyone who could not reconcile his political convictions with constitutionalism should be honor-bound to quit the service. This was unquestionably inquisitorial, an effort at thought control. The officer's own political conviction ought not to be a condition of service. Nor should junior officers be encouraged to test the political convictions of their superiors, thus to disobey orders from a superior suspected of harboring reactionary thoughts. Inquisitorial or not, however, it was only applying to the officer corps what the reactionaries themselves applied to deviant personalities in the officer corps. But to make it a matter of honor to leave the service because of reactionary political beliefs was to twist a moral code out of recognizable shape. "Honor" was a reactionary concept hardly suited to drive reactionaries out of the army. And even if successfully implemented, the Schulz Amendment might have had surprising results. Under the existing law, any officer who left the service

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[7] J.A.J. Hansen, Briefe aus der preussischen Nationalversammlung, 1848-1849 (Saarbrücken, 1931), p. 323.

[8] Stenographische Bericht, p. 1211.

under honorable conditions was obliged to join the Landwehr.[9] In theory, the Schulz Amendment might simply have transferred a reactionary caste and not destroyed it.

The Stein Resolution together with the Schulz Amendment was a way of implementing the promised oath to the constitution. It sought to make the army immune from anti-constitutional strivings--precisely what an oath was supposed to accomplish. It is thus surprising that moderate liberals could denounce the Schulz Amendment as inquisitorial and still voice approval of an oath to the constitution. Apparently, in politics the phraseology of a measure is more important to some men than the substance.

For the Prussian liberals continued through 1848-1849 to demand that the army render a constitutional oath. In 1849, the "old Prussians" engaged in a long and successful literary campaign to remove this promise from Frederick William's March concessions.[10] When at last the Prussian constitution was complete, in 1850, the document explicitly stated, "an oath by the army to the constitution will not take place."[11] The only soldier in Prussia sworn to the constitution was the war minister. And gradually, the war minister was stripped of real powers over the army in the 1850's, 1860's, and 1870's, real power residing, instead, in the military cabinet and the General Staff. The war minister soon became, in

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[9]See the letter printed in Spenersche Zeitung, #228, Beilage, 29 September, 1848.

[10]Höhn, Verfassungskampf, pp. 343ff.

[11]Ibid., p. 358.

the eyes of Prussian officers, little more than the whipping boy [Prügelknabe] of the Prussian Landtag and, later, the German Reichstag.[12]

The main professional argument against having the army swear an oath to the constitution hinged upon the problem of deliberation in the ranks. Soldiers should execute orders without deliberating over their legality. Even the democrats did not always question this: In Article-32 of the draft constitution of the Prussian constituent assembly (Chartre Waldeck) one reads: "No armed corps may deliberate."[13] And this draft constitution was in print weeks before the Stein crisis!

The Stein crisis was liquidated in a compromise effected between Hans Viktor von Unruh, leader of the right-centre in the Prussian Assembly, and General von Pfuel, who took over the Prussian ministry and war ministry after the Auerswald-Hansemann ministry resigned.[14] In a decree issued to the army, Pfuel simply enjoined the commanding officers to exercise "good deportment" [Einvernehmen] with respect to the Bürger,[15] a decree which was essentially meaningless; an aristocratic caste was simply incapable of anything more than cool or "correct" behavior to social "inferiors." It was meaningless, likewise, because by the time of the Stein crisis, the "old Prussians" had succeeded in tightening the "moral" unity of the military forces. "Old Prussian" commanders were now sure of their officers and men

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[12]Craig, Politics, pp. 217-231, passim.

[13]Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, Vol. II, p. 734.

[14]Unruh, Skizzen, pp. 75-76.

[15]Stenographische Bericht, pp. 1210-11.

and were prepared to set aside brusquely any who did not conform; as Roon wrote his wife from Coblenz in the Rhine Province, he did not doubt that the troops there would do their duty if properly led.[16] Roon later added that there were a "few incompetent leaders" but these would be swept aside when the need arose.[17]

That "need" arose in November, 1848. On 2 November, General Count von Brandenburg began to form a new ministry to replace that of General von Pfuel. On 9 November, Brandenburg announced the recess of the National Assembly which was also to be removed from Berlin to reconvene in the small provincial town of Brandenburg. On 10 November, General von Wrangel entered Berlin with a force of 13,000 men as martial law was declared throughout Prussia. The Bürgerwehr was disarmed. At the same time, the Landwehr, first levy, was called to colors. On 5 December, the Brandenburg ministry sweetened its harsh measures by promulgating a liberal constitution and dissolving a bickering National Assembly.

The war minister in the Brandenburg-Manteuffel ministry, General von Strotha, in a general order to the army of 25 November, 1848, instructed the commanding officers to act with ruthless energy in mobilization and in implementing the state-of-siege.[18] The top commanders complied. Where officers balked, they were quickly removed.

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[16]Roon, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 159-161, 171-172.

[17]Ibid., p. 202.

[18]Strotha's general order printed, inter alia, in Kölnische Zeitung, #318, 28 November, 1848.

In Berlin, a Lieutenant Wiedburg was hustled away in chains for disloyalty;[19] a Colonel von Sommerfeld was relieved of command for not showing vigor in his tasks;[20] a Major Herwarth was taken to Spandau accused of insubordination.[21] In Königsberg, a Captain Czudnachkowski was imprisoned for preaching resistance to the Brandenburg Ministry.[22] In Pillau three lieutenants were arrested for attempting to impede the Landwehr mobilization.[23] And in Kolberg, General von Ledebur was relieved of command and dismissed for not preventing the formation of a "military club" antagonistic to the Brandenburg ministry.[24] The men of "honor" meant business. Where the men balked, draconic measures were applied. In Berlin and Potsdam soldiers who for any reason seemed insubordinate were taken away in irons.[25]

In the Landwehr, equally thorough if more careful methods were applied. In most places, corps commanders called only for volunteers, even older men from the second levy in order to assure loyal Landwehr contingents.[26] Where Landwehr men balked in allowing themselves to be mobilized, as in Liegnitz, they were quickly swamped by hordes of

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[19]Kreuzzeitung, #122, 19 November, 1848.

[20]Freie Blätter (Cologne), #13, 29 November, 1848.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Kreuzzeitung, #125, 2nd Beilage, 23 November, 1848.

[23]Ibid., #128, 1st Beilage, 26 November, 1848.

[24]Freie Blätter, #18, 13 December, 1848.

[25]Wolfgang Forster (ed.), Prinz Friedrich Karl von Preussen. Denkwürdigkeiten aus seinem Leben (9th edition, Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1910), pp. 73-75.

[26]Kreuzzeitung, #121, Beilage, 18 November, 1848; #125, 1st Beilage, 23 November, 1848.

rural Landwehr men known for their loyalty.[27] There were no unit mutinies in late 1848 as occurred in the spring of 1849.

Army officers cooperated closely with civil service officials in the coup d' etat. The Regierungs-Präsident at Trier advised Brigade Commander, Major General von Brune, that his troops be instructed to destroy all revolutionary placards and posters found.[28] Newspaper sources demonstrate troop compliance in this request. In Posen, Rittmeister von der Osten contributed his entire cavalry squadron to help a local Landrat intercept letters mailed by Assembly deputies to their constituents.[29] The cooperation of the army and civil service in the field reflected closely the cooperation of the General, Brandenburg, with the civil servant, Manteuffel, in the ministry.

Accompanying the appointment of the Brandenburg ministry, the coup d' etat of November-December, the promulgation of a constitution, and the army mobilization was a torrential outburst of newspaper articles in support of the measures taken. The Prussian Verein, the Patriotic Verein, assorted groups of Junker landholders, officers and men bombarded the newspapers of Prussia with enthusiastically submissive approvals of Brandenburg's measures.

This "spontaneous" outburst of public opinion ("Adresse Wirtschaft" in Anneke's description) was a deliberate undertaking.[30] Prussia's

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[27]Ibid., #133, Beilage, 2 December, 1848.

[28]Kölnische Zeitung, #321, 1 December, 1848.

[29](Anon.), Im Polen-Aufruhr 1848-1849. Aus den Papieren eines Landrats von . . . (Gotha, 1898), pp. 255-256.

[30]Neue Kölnische Zeitung, #99, 1 May, 1849.

"most servile of subjects [allerunterthänigster Unterthan]," Otto von Bismarck, himself expressed to his wife, "better 6 addresses each with 6, than one with 36 signatures." And he urged the continued swelling of newspapers with "patriotic" readers' contributions.[31]

Officers, instead of being apolitical, payed into this manufacture of public opinion in the first place by writing personal or collective letters to newspapers, but in the second place by producing unit declarations from their men. Both Anneke's and Marx's newspapers in Cologne report a rather amusing if apocryphal story of how such declarations came into print:

> How does one bring the soldiers of an entire battalion to give a declaration which is perhaps approved by only a few? The battalion commander reprooves the captains about the spirit of their companies; the latter ask at muster: "Who was at the [popular] assembly on Saturday?" -- General silence. -- Captain: "Since no one answers, I may assume that none of you was there. Who then approves of the views expressed there?" -- General silence. -- "Since no one answers, I assume that you all disapprove of these viewpoints. We must make this known in a declaration; I will pay the cost. Who is against this declaration should step forward. -- Since no one has stepped forward, the matter has been unanimously approved."
>
> Richt short and sweet, nicht wahr?[32]

By these and other means, the soldiers were encouraged (or commanded) to supplement public opinion. Prussian conscripts had come a long way from the day when Louis Schneider had first attempted to publish his soldier's periodical.

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[31]Herbert von Bismarck (ed.), Fürst Bismarcks Briefe an seine Braut und Gattin (Stuttgart, 1900), p. 121.

[32]Neue Rheinische Zeitung, #119, 18 October, 1848; Neue Kölnische Zeitung, #1, 3 January, 1849.

In this hodge-podge of drivelings from the "old Prussian" press, one slogan caught on. In December, 1848, Colonel Griesheim published his doggerel, "Only Soldiers Help Against Democrats [Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten]." Eight lines of Griesheim's tour de force allude to "unclean spirits" "howling throughout the land" until the "maestro takes the cross in a steady hand" and, presto! -- they retreat ignobly at the "first roll of the drums!" "Gegen Demokraten helfen nur -- Soldaten!"[33] Soldiers were drilled into repeating several verses of this "poem" and, nearly overnight, the title phrase was on the lips of thousands.[34] The king used it in letters to friends. And the king of Hanover expressed the opinion that even Goethe had never written finer lines.[35]

Such a drilled in political attitude also produced rather distasteful displays. The king's appointment of Strotha to be war minister gave many officers and men his opinion of the Prussian Assembly. "He will blow snot at them," one non-commissioned officer told Lieutenant Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, referring to Strotha's notorious habit of clearing his nose without a handkerchief.[36]

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[33]Also heulen durch das Land
Die unsaubern Geister,
Bis das Kreuz mit fester Hand
Drüber schlägt der Meister.
Bei dem ersten Trommelklang
Fahren sie davon mit Stang!
Gegen Demokraten
Helfen nur -- Soldaten!
Partly reproduced in Valentin, Deutsche Revolution, Vol. II, p. 474.

[34]Rüstow, Deutscher Militärstaat (1. Auflage, Konigsberg, 1850), pp. 128-129.

[35]Haenchen, Revolutionsbriefe, p. 323.

[36]Hohenlohe, Aus meinem Leben, Vol. I, p. 97.

The Brandenburg ministry refused to place a guard on the recessed Assembly's archives and allowed the soldiers occupying the Assembly building to rifle the archives while they "played National Assembly."[37] This attitude against the democrats was reflected elsewhere as well. In Frankfurt on the Oder soldiers of the 8th and 10th regiments and Landwehr men nearly demolished the meeting place of a democratic club to the very apparent satisfaction of the Kreuzzeitung.[38] And in Andernach in the Rhine Province, to mock German-wide memorial services for the democrat, Robert Blum, who had been executed in Vienna in November, soldiers of one unit slaughtered an alley-cat, distributed printed (Who paid for the printing?) obituary notices to the local Bürger, and conducted mock funeral rites for the deal animal.[39] Arrogance had triumphed in Prussia.

With the coup d' etat in Prussia at the end of 1848, the revolution, insofar as it threatened the position of the army, was over. To be sure there were some scattered Landwehr mutinies in Berlin and in the Rhineland in the spring of 1849 after Frederick William IV rejected the imperial crown. But these mutinies were ruthlessly and speedily suppressed. The Prussian army was employed to suppress uprising in Saxony, the Rhineland, and Baden in 1849 and acted with dispatch in these assignments. These events are beyond the scope of

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[37](Anon.), Preussen, Berlin und die neue Revolution. Geschichte der neuesten Ereignisse in Preussen und Berlin, mit Aktenstücken und anderen Beilagen. Erstes Heft (Mannheim, 1848), p. 62.

[38]Kreuzzeitung, #119, 16 November, 1848.

[39]Ibid., #129, 28 November, 1848, #132, 1 December, 1848.

this study, however, since they reveal nothing in the Line or Landwehr that has not been remarked upon in the foregoing sections.

It is now time to summarize our findings in this study. We have seen the revolution of 1848, in one facet, as being a collision of two forces: A liberal and democratic Bürger class, essentially urban, clamoring for power at the expense of a martial class, essentially rural. Bürger demands, developed from 1815 on, came to a head in 1848. Besides national unity and constitutional reforms, the German and Prussian Bürger demanded reform of military establishments with the goal of civilianizing and bourgeoisifying (Verbürgerlichung) them. In opposing these demands, military writers developed some highly professionalized arguments with respect to army institutions and their relationships to state and society. Briefly they may be summarized as assertions that the army is an instrument of executive power which must be so organized and trained; as an instrument of power it must eschew political debate.

Despite these prescriptions, we have demonstrated that the army was organized in such a way as to make the assertions of the professional publicists inapplicable. We have seen that the officer corps was recruited and organized in such a way as to drive home the conclusion that Prussian officers constituted rather more a social and political class than a professionalized instrument; there was only a small nucleus of officers to whom professional attributes could be ascribed. Because of the officer corps' social composition and mentality its reaction to the revolution of 1848 can hardly be

explained from professional grounds alone but must be explained in terms of its relationship to Prussian society as a whole. The same thing, generally, must be said to be true of the rank and file soldiers and Landwehr. The rural nature of these institutions have more to do with their reactions to the revolution than their simple military command-obey relationship to officers.

Under the impact of the March revolution, officer corps and men reacted, generally, according to their position. The officer corps of the Guard showed signs of disintegrating in March on the heels of the March concessions through fear of social demotion. The great bulk of the officer corps, however, adopted a temporizing attitude. A number of officers, furthermore, proved to have democratic and liberal leanings. And more officers voiced grievances with respect to service conditions. Generally, the common soldiers proved to be uninfected by the March revolution, except for a number of Landwehr men in Berlin and reserves in the Rhineland. Momentarily, however, the March revolution seemed to indicate that the bulk of the army--sans Guard and a few other officers--would have acquiesced in constitutional conditions.

The revolution, in the meantime, dragged officers into overt politics in 1848. Despite professional injunctions against it, the army became something more than a mere instrument of executive power as officers tried to set forth their own political projects. Peculiar of officer corps politics in 1848 was its adoption of liberal and democratic methods of appealing to public opinion. "Old Prussians" were as adept in this method as were liberal and democratic officers and proved victorious where it counted most: on the king and on the representatives of the old regime with whom they all

were so intimately related. But they also enjoyed success with a considerable segment of the Bürger class. The army partly identified itself with popular German nationalist causes in Posen and Denmark. It appealed to the property owners as a bulwark against "communism." "Old Prussian" officers appealed to the shop-keeper mentality. Conversely, "old Prussians" were also not above exploiting rural animosities against the city.

While the "old Prussian" officers appealed to society external to the army, they also attended to internal affairs of the army. From the early weeks of the revolution they applied pressure on the officers and men who had deviated from the norm prescribed by the social elite. The catch-all slogan in closing the ranks to the revolution was "honor." "Honor" came to mean, in a political sense, the denunciation of the revolution in all its works and all its goals. This was also accompanied by an increasing flood of praise of all Prussia's military arrangements in a very patent effort to raise esprit de corps and to silence those officers who had service grievances. The increase in the esprit de corps of the army and its relationship to a spirit of reaction indirectly produced the Stein crisis of August-September when the Prussian National Assembly attempted to purge the officer corps.

We have argued that the Stein Resolution and Schulz Amendment were little more than attempts to implement a promised oath by the army to the constitution. The Stein crisis, thus, resulted in an increased pressure on the part of the officer corps on Frederick William to have done with the revolution. This Frederick William accomplished with the appointment of the Brandenburg-Manteuffel ministry in November.

The price that the "old Prussians" exacted for their support of the monarchy in 1848 was independence. The army was not touched by Prussia's constitution. From 1848 on, likewise, the army was independent of the king. Still nominally War Lord and commander-in-chief, the Prussian king had nonetheless to recognize the officer corps as an independent entity in the land. No king--Frederick William IV, William I, Frederick III, or William II-- could long persist in a policy if the war minister or chief-of-staff claimed that the "army" disapproved.[40]

The revolution of 1848 had very little other impact on the Prussian army over the long run. There were, to be sure, some months of excitement and consternation. There were officers and men who became casualties of the revolution. But in its composition and mentality, the army was little changed when it withdrew from active politics after 1849.

Perhaps the only result of the revolution on the mentality of the army was that it produced a general hardening of the arteries. Liberalism and democracy were absolutely excluded from the permissible values of the officer corps and men. If the army had been a state-within-the state before the revolution, it was all the more crassly so after the revolution when Prussia became ostensibly a constitutional state. This continued to be true in Prussia, Imperial Germany, and during the period of the Weimar Republic; writing his history of the Prussian army in the late 1920's, Curt Jany could still gloat with

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[40]Ritter, Staatskunst, Vol. I, pp. 180-181.

approval over Griesheim's "Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten."[41]

The anachronistic concept of "honor" also persisted in the officer corps into the twentieth century, even in the super-professionalized army of post World War I Germany. Not, however, to any benefit of the officer corps. It was through an intelligent if perverse invocation of this unprofessional caste ethic that Adolf Hitler was able to force the resignation of his war minister, General Werner von Blomberg--who had married a woman of "bad" reputation--and thereby secure direct control of Germany's armed forces for himself. "Honor" was a serviceable moral ethic in caste resistance to democracy; it was not appropriate in resistance to dictatorship.

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[41]Jany, Preussische Armee, Vol. IV, p. 170.

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Pamphlet literature is always suspect for the writers usually have an axe to grind. Even so, pamphlets are not to be ignored for a number of reasons. In the first place, they supply us with information otherwise unavailable since the destruction of archival material in 1945. In the second place, if used with caution, they still convey the spirit of political or personal conflict, certainly a matter of importance to this study; there is no reason to disparage this literature in its entirety simply because it often smacks of the sour-grape whinings of "dismissed lieutenants." That was the "old Prussian" style of 1848. To our knowledge, no officer consciously lied about facts in pamphlet literature even if much of the material presented was based on hearsay or casino quatsch.


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Enough of this newspaper has been said in the text. It took off its "German" mask in 1850. In that year it styled itself as the Preussische Wehr-Zeitung. That had personal consequences for me. I sought the paper under its 1848-1849 name. It took inter-library loan over ten months to find the paper, finally, at Harvard University. At Harvard it was catalogued as the Preussische Wehr-Zeitung. I sincerely hope that this note will warn other investigators in the field. For when I started the search, I was already aware of the change in names.

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This newspaper, along with the Deutsche Wehr-Zeitung, ranks as the outstanding organ of the "old Prussians." In format and in journalistic style, it is a first rate newspaper. As a source, it is reliable only in that it expresses a definable political mentality. However, like Kladderadatsch or Karl Marx's newspaper, it sometimes displays a remarkable insight into contemporaneous issues.

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