”‘60? 9% 206; 2 “#56 urn- ‘L . .... w. J. ... 5‘ u 7.. n.. 1 I. -.. V; K . . a. . . .. ~ “I .... 3.. g‘ ..... a. t .u T .2 «J .5 . e .s . pP~ fl P\ a... e V; Q. O‘v a h A «J .o. ox L. y. .3 u‘ v‘ \u. x. u.. .I.‘ ) 54 a. . . . .c .. 3 3 s . a: .3. .3. «J a. e .... .o‘ . n 5‘ is ca. Ax. tank 5‘» N. v! t v. ‘ C h e .. c e o. ‘5 ~§ n.. b. an s. 5‘ ‘5 tr :\ ‘s. of s . .. C. A: u . a . NJ, I. \ \J. \J. .( ¥n ts .. s . s :- 2. .. ‘ u .. 3. .q u ‘ u w d N. O u c . t ‘ ‘n ‘ ~ . a. . . Ru» ‘0. n . n~h . . no. t. . h .. in... -§ . u: I ‘. n. ‘ .~ 7.. .. s \s A: :- n . 0 . a u o \h s A. I ._ II- 5 I 6 5 OD» : c 0 ‘ f.» H. ABSTRACT MEET THE PRESS AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: TWAND THE ISSUES, 1952-1964 By Jules Rossman The underlying premise of this study was that the elici- tation and unbiased uncensored reporting of candidates' views on major issues are vital mass media functions. This study analyzed the advantages and methods of the panel interview format of MEET THE PRESS in fulfilling these functions during national elections from 1952 through 1964. The program was evaluated in terms of its fairness and of the ability of the format to elicit candidates' clear views on selected issues . Program contribution to candidates' ver- bal ethos was also studied. Primary sources included scripts of all program appearances by Democratic and Republican national candidates, and personal correspondence with guests and program personnel. An examination of program history, production and ques- tioning procedures, and comments from various sources revealed the program's fair treatment of guests. Questions, with few exceptions, were unbiased, bit the heart of issues, and clari- fied the ambiguous or evasive reply. Candidates were generally frank, except for questions involving candidacy, national security, or comment on other personalities. Lyndon Johnson was the most evasive in terms of suggesting rather than ['2 Jules Rossman directly stating a conclusion or accusation. On the issue of the cold war, candidates of both parties shared a distrust of Soviet leadership and recognized the need to maintain military superiority. Democrats in general favored a defensive strategy of containing Communism, while Republicans favored an offensive strategy, and a cautious, if not negative attitude, toward co-existence and cooperation in various areas. Although all candidates Opposed having Red China in the UN, Democrats were more anxious to seek cooperation and co- existence. Stevenson implied an eventual two-China UN solu- tion, an idea rejected by Republicans. In program appearances since 1963, Republicans Lodge, Nixon, Goldwater, and Miller, and Democrats Stevenson and Humphrey completely supported the extent of our Vietnam involvement under Johnson. Democrats, however, stressed limited military action and negotiations, while Republicans advocated military victory and rejected negotiations involving concessions. Also, Lodge, Nixon, and Humphrey only months before the major setback of the Commun- ist tet offensive of 1968 reported military and political progress. Only Democrats Sparkman and Kennedy questioned our involvements in Formosa and Indo-China and sending Americans to fight Asian wars. On the issue of federal reaponsibility and states' rights, Republicans Nixon, Goldwater, and Miller, and Demo- crats Sparkman and Kefauver advocated state control and pri- vate initiative in areas of education, welfare, and fair employment. All other Democrats, and Republican Lodge, O V. De. . u D... ‘v ;-;. ‘ u-‘~~‘ snug. 3‘" D 0-. . ~.. . o " .0. ,' ~ ‘ D .. ..-..,e _ '0‘ C 'O--. o 'o..-. o... . Jules Rossman favored federal action, but took moderate stands on Speedy implementation of FEPC, school desegregation, and fair hous- ing. The most inflexible conservative attitude on all issues was taken by Goldwater. Program prestige and format contributed to ethical proof. The nature of many questions elicited replies which had to appeal to democratic and Christian values, thus contributing toward candidate gghgg, Candidates used little emotional proof. Logical proof consisted mainly of evidence, with some reasoning from sign and example. Only Goldwater appeared to rely heavily upon causal reasoning. The development of all reasoning was restricted by limitations of time and could be subjected to tests of validity. Humphrey, Stevenson, Johnson, and Goldwater projected the sharpest images of good will. Their linguistic styles were humorous, colorful, and informal. The styles of Nixon and Kennedy were similar in their lack of warmth, humor, or colorful language. Intellectually, Stevenson displayed the most concern with definitions of terms, and Kennedy used sta- tistics and other facts extensively. The program in general fairly elicits candidates' frank views between and during election years. Improvements in areas of questioning regarding candidacy and comparison of candi- dates' views were suggested. To determine more adequately the program's contribution to political information, research is needed on the isolation and interaction of verbal and visual components of gghgs; and comparative studies are needed on similar network programs. THE a .u- “It; I‘.‘ MEET THE PRESS AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: THE CANDIDATES AND THE ISSUES, 1952-1964 By Jules Rossman A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Speech 1968 h ,i a I s’ f t E' Q l: I. a I 77‘ Copyri ght by JULES R0534”! 1969 i' " q I r:- 3. I k! I ‘ir-si 1.1m. Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Speech, College of Co-unicetion Arte, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. / /.J'/ I / Guidance Col-ante” ,g/C “id v _ Lat? , Chairman ’ \ 1H5 56:! \J . .. To Renee, Sheryl Denise, and Michelle Elise ii v .‘ . V Q r“ "'t.:-EC' ‘ " . 'chL QI ‘ "u \c“ _ rag-g.) ::~‘- em' a | n'“: t- " ~ “x u . ' .~'~20 .9;- ‘ .) c. \- ' . "‘:' e: \P". m.- uuo._. '. . d. "---I tar: aid V?” ’. c “- q ‘9; .'. , e o . u.‘\ ‘ . a. ”E q." : § 7 H. ' ‘ i. U . .‘I la ' ~ 0. fl. 0 “e Ct v. '\ g s. i, ..S u 0.. p u'“‘ . . o..-.( t. . . a. ‘c.. . . - n ‘s.,£ u s. ‘4. v. . "i‘ ‘ -.o M...€v: : ‘ m .3 —-.- ., :q“ ‘ -'§e. ‘ A ' s (4“ a ‘Q .\ :‘e v. ‘..‘n -'- "‘“~e a_ , ‘ ‘ l" I \.~ ..‘ ."‘. c .“““o ‘ o ' ‘¢ :v.‘, ‘ ‘ ‘~ ‘ ‘ . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study would not have been possible without the prompt and excellent cooperation of Mr. Lawrence Spivak, producer of MEET THE PRESS, and his secretaries Miss Lee Noseworthy and Miss Betty Cole. I would also like to thank the following for their helpful correspondence and comments.' Senator Barry Cold- water, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Former Vice-President Richard Nixon, Governor George Romney, and Senator John Sparkman. The comments of the following reporters and journalists were also helpful in determining the role of the panelist. Jack Bell of the Associated Press, former program moderator Ned Brooks, Pauline Frederick and Edwin Newman of NBC News, Ernest Lindley,and Richard Wilson of Cowles Publications. My appreciation also to my efficient advisors, Dr. Kenneth Hance and Dr. Walter Emery, for their always prompt and helpful criticism and c00peration from the very beginning. iii UH! Ne... ' "|{o .‘Ckr ‘- on (f) Chapter I II III IV TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ................................ l The Media and the Public ................. 18 THE MEDIA, POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW.. 3O The Press and the Campaigns .............. 30 The Matter of Objectivity ................ 47 Television and the News .................. 50 Television and the Campaigns ............. 68 Commercial Politicking ................... 76 Public Access to the News ................ 84 The "Live” Press Conference .............. 91 DIMENSIONS OF MEET THE PRESS ................ 106 Brief Factual Biography .................. 113 Formula for Success ...... . ............ 125 A Critical Look ....................... 135 Headliners. . .................... 143 The Program and Politics ................. 153 THE QUESTIONING PROCESS ..................... 164 The Candidacy ............................ 175 The Rhetoric of Campaigns ................ 183 Foreign Affairs ...... . .... ..... . ...... .. 196 Program Objectivity ....... . ............. . 206 SOME SELECTED ISSUES AND VIEWS .............. 213 Russia and "the Cold war" ................ 215 The Democrats......... ................ 216 Sparkman.................... ..... .. 216 Kennedy ....... .. ........ .. ........ . 217 Stevenson.......... ......... ....... 223 Humphrey........... ................ 229 The Republicans.... ................... 236 Lodge.......... .......... .. ...... .. 236 Nixon....... ..................... .. 242 Goldwater and Miller ..... .. ...... .. 245 Summary.. ............................ . 253 1H5 - C o'- ..‘o 9.. .Co Chapter Page Communist China and Asia ................. 254 The Democrats ......................... 254 Sparkman..... ...................... 254 Kennedy ............................ 256 Stevenson ...... . ................... 261 Humphrey ........................... 266 The Republicans.. ..................... 272 Lodge....... ....................... 272 Nixon .............................. 280 Goldwater and Miller ............... 285 Summary .......... . ................. 287 Federal Responsibility and States Rights. 288 The Democrats ...... . .................. 289 Sparkman and Kefauver ........ ...... 289 Kennedy ...................... . ..... 293 Stevenson... ................ . ...... 295 Humphrey ....... . ................... 297 Johnson .............. . ............. 301 The Republicans ..... . ............... .. 304 Lodge .............................. 304 Nixon........ ...................... 307 Miller ............................. 312 Goldwater .......................... 314 Summary and Remarks ................... 321 VI THE PROGRAM AND ETHOS ....................... 324 Program Ethos....... ..................... 328 Program Format ........................ 328 The Questioning Process ............... 330 Summary ..... .......... ................ 346 Candidate Ethos..... ...... . .............. 346 Adlai Stevenson.......... ...... .. ..... 347 John F. Kennedy ........ ..... .......... 361 Lyndon Johnson............ ............ 376 Hubert H. Humphrey ....... ..... ........ 385 Richard M. Nixon ..... ... .............. 405 Barry Goldwater.... ..... . ............. 415 Summary Remarks......... .......... ....... 430 VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... . .............. 432 Pro ram Si ificance and Ob'ectivit ..... 4 ThegQuestigfiing Process....g.......¥..... 432 The IssueSOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ..... 0.0.0.0.... 436 Candidate Ethos........... ...... ......... 447 Conclusions.............. ............... . 452 BIBLIOGRAPHY... ................. . ....................... 457 -O 0‘ ......ou ‘ . u . ,. o u — s u n v o a . . , a \ . _ _ ~ 0 . . ._ _. 5 $ ‘ . O O - a e . . u n . g . - . u . o ' I o \ , .uaoooIOO I .0- "v - .5». . 33:8: 9 £36 9.. L:..e: ...}- o‘.\.o .t ..o '0 O. Chapter APPENDIX ..... .00... Letter Letter Letter Letter Letter from from from from from .. ............... . .............. 465 Barry Goldwater ................. 465 Hubert Humphrey ..... . ........... 467 Henry Cabot Lodge... .......... .. 468 Richard Nixon ..... ...... ........ 469 George Romney ................... 470 vi ml \ CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular govern- ment without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a tragedy, or perhaps both. 1 James Madison In analyzing a work of art, the critic must inevitably determine the artist's intent and how well he has succeeded. In analyzing a product of the mass media, it is necessary to determine its function and how well it has fulfilled it. Since the media have several functions, each one has its own particular criteria against which it can be evaluated. This study is executed in the firm belief that the most important function of the mass media is that of informing the public on the vital social and political issues of the day. It is most important because it is the only function related to the First Amendment of the Constitution, guaranteeing a free press and free speech to satisfy the "public right to 2 know.’ How well the media fulfill this function is a subject deserving of serious study and criticism. 1William Rivers, The Mass Media (New York: Har er & Rowe, 964) p. 3, quoti1Cr from The Writings of James Madison, ed. by Gaillard Hunt, v. 4, p. 398. .‘H‘ {51% 2 The ”right to know“ is especially important in the area of political communication. Never before have issues facing our national leaders been so complex in scope and meaning. There is a plethora of facts, Opinions, and deci- sions to report and clarify to the public. In Freedom and Communication Dan Lacy writes: Wise policies are possible only to the extent that the public understands them and will support them. . .Never until today, in consequence, has the necessity of a continual education of the pOpula- tion at large with respect to major issues been of such critical importance.2 The Town Hall issues of territorial eXpansion during our country's early beginnings are modernized by the inter- national issues Of ideological expansion. Local disputes over state rights are now overshadowed by the more imposing issue of human rights for the world community. he people must get adequate information to reach sound judgments and decisions on South Asia, the Atlantic community, the balance of payments, China, outer space, and Civil Rights. Through the electronic media the dialogue between na- tional leaders and the people has assumed new global signifi- cance. The eyes and ears of a tense and concerned world are focused on every fact and statement about the fact emitted from Washington. The press can report the news, but the .government makes it. Executive and congressional Opinions, 2Dan Lacy, Freedom and Communication (Urbana: Univer- sity of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 17. V u re. -. 2'. .. I . ‘. .. .-:'t’.-'. .- .. O~ . o‘. ‘- ‘u _ -... . ‘. .(’ .- . . g _ . ’v H‘s ‘ ‘.h k - ‘" s C ~ .y- .,_fl' \ ~.' "I, ~. g ‘: §,- '-“\-.. ‘ ~-: -- ~ . \ h~ .» 'q '. -.. v. k. . e~“ _‘. o . §.. . o \ -§'. 5' o -‘ . g a Q‘rh ... “' . e. - 3 speeches, and decisions are a matter of deep concern in a world of instantaneous communication. The instantaneous communication of facts was vividly demonstrated during the tragic week-end of the Kennedy assassination in 1963. The story was carried into more than ninety percent Of American homes so quickly that over half of all Americans heard the news before the President was pro- nounced dead, only thirty minutes after the shooting. Within forty-eight hours, the print and electronic media reported the Dallas story so thoroughly that the Warren Com- mission in ten months and with unlimited resources did not alter the basic outlines of what the media had reported.3 The communication of ideas is also instantaneous. Understanding of these ideas is essential to judge fully the implications of any Official action. ESpecially during the years Of political campaigns is this understanding so related to our democratic process. No individuals assume greater importance than those with the potential of occupying our nation's highest offices. Unfortunately, however, there is little contact between our elected representatives and their constituents. There is little opportunity between, during, and after campaigns to become familiar with their views and Opinions on vital issues. It is imperative, therefore, that their comments, suggestions and feelings on these issues receive truthful, accurate, and 3William Rivers in "The Press and the Assassination," in The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public, ed. by Bradley Greenberg and Edwin Parker (StanfOrd: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 1965) p. 52. 'ini .. . v v, I - - I ..4- o .. ..— - ' ‘0 ‘un ... a "-"H' '9 men \— u .-..‘f Do—ook..- ‘ - o ... V. . 4 “.. "‘e-.... . I ... .... ... ' r ' ‘ “."‘ ‘o. in ‘ .- ~.... .. ._~ ‘ . ...... 0.. .. l I .g; -_. z“ . ‘ ‘.‘.. . ' u. u "e- . ., -- ." . . ...-... t. ‘ . O C. ’ . . \b- V .~‘*-s- . ‘I . ' .....- ‘ :9 .0 I Q’... ‘~‘~: x. .l 9 r .‘ V - a o .v . ‘0‘... 2' - . ~ : u 9.- ‘\ c.“ ... ‘ A comprehensive reporting. There can be no errors in trans- lation or in analysis. Limitations, however, within and from without the media make it increasingly more difficult for the public to know the facts and what these individuals say or think about the facts. Concentrated ownership of the media, the methods of receiving and reporting news, the problems of political broad- casting and the Fairness Doctrine, the lack of Objectivity in news selection and editing, and the problems of new management, all contribute to an infringement on the public's ”right to know.” Television has played an increasingly important role in an attempt to lessen this communication gap. The Kennedy- Nixon Debates of 1960, the emergence of the “live” press conference under John Kennedy, and the interview format pio- neered by MEET THE PRESS have done much to remove the nebulous area which exists between what is said and what is reported. "Live" face to face confrontation between the politician and the public removes the possibility of misquoting, selective omission, or faulty clarification by the media Of important statements of fact and Opinion. What is said and the manner in which it is said are seen and heard directly. The impor- tance of communicating this type Of verbal information was expressed by William Ernest Hocking, a member Of The Commis- sion on Freedom Of the Press: "H. .. .xv .5 .. ..x oe§ . .e \u .. r: u. I Phi -- ~u ... a. «a. LS .. . . g C -\‘ t p \ .... . b . a .. is I ‘ ... .. \ .. . i. . . ..~ ‘ h . .. .... .C e c . 5 .~\ .. s L‘ e p a . .. u . . u. o s ¢ -s\ ..e .. s n . s . s . s ~ \ s n.\ 5 It is the business Of the preSs to communicate to the public, newsaand opinions, emotions and beliefs. The significance of MEET THE PRESS lies in its contribu- tion to political information. MEET THE PRESS is the pioneer ' By its nature and format the "press conference of the air.‘ program serves as a forum of Opinion, criticism, and testing of information by national and international leaders. Their words in unchanged direct form are available to the public who seeks them as an aid in the electoral decision-making process. Since the program's debut in 1945 many similar type programs have evolved. The two major survivors are FACE THE NATION on the Columbia Broadcasting System, and ISSUES AND ANSWERS on the American Broadcasting Company. It is common for all three of these programs to make headline news by nature of their format and guests. To the political candi- date exposure on this type of program is a necessity. To appreciate fully the importance of this Spontaneous type of confrontation between candidate and public it is first necessary to explore certain questions with regard to the media in our society and their functions. We can then exa- mine the state of the media today in fulfilling their functions, and the limitations imposed on them. It is in the capability to overcome some of these limitations that MEET THE PRESS can be analyzed. The program potentially meets the need for a —~ 4William Ernest Hocking, Freedom of the Press: A Frame- 'work of Principle, A report from The Commission on Freedom Of the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947) p. 210. 6 method of accurate, unbiased solicitation of the views of our political figures. How the program meets this need is the subject of this study. This accuracy of reporting pOIitical information is most crucial in the electronic media. Television has in increasing measure diSplaced older media as a primary source of informa- tion. NeWSpapers now rarely publish extras; on the contrary, front pages often refer to news emerging from television inter- view programs, such as MEET THE PRESS. Moreover, surveys have shown that the public believes television more than any other medium with regard to news credibility. A recently published poll by Roper Associates, Inc. compared public attitudes toward television and other media between the years 1959 and the present. Three questions from this study have relevance to this paper because of their con- cern with the informational aspects of the media. The first question was worded as follows: First, I'd like to ask you where you usually get most of your news about what's going on in the world today-~from the newspapers or radio or television or magazines or talking to peOple--or where? Television was selected as the major source of informa- tion by sixty-four percent Of those interviewed. NeWSpapers claimed fifty-five percent and radio twenty-eight percent.6 ‘ 5Emergingjrofiles of Television and Other Mass Media: Public Attitudes, Afreport by Roper Research Associates, published by The Television Information Office, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York. p. 7. 61bid. it next rele'; Eere are ! cazgaigts fall. F: best acqu. city (:Jr the cazzi ”is-m. percent a .221: best saurze 3? 312m sele:: 3.333121% to 33:35 farther l c 2:.‘h- e . ““59! {8.615 7 The next relevant question concerned the elections of 1966: Here are some questions about the election campaigns that took place this summer and fall. From what source did you become best acquainted with the candidates for city (town) and county Offices? 'What about the candidates for state Office? Thirty-two percent of the respOndents considered television as their best source of information for local Office, but fifty percent selected television for state office.8 A 1964 study pertaining to the Presidential elections also revealed that the farther a candidate was removed from "here in town" the stronger television was as a source of political . information.9 A third question concerned the relative credibility of the various media. If you got conflicting stories or differ- ent reports Of the same news story from radio, television, the magazines and the- newspapers, which of the four versions would you be most inclined to believe-- the one of radig or television or magazines or newspapers? Forty-one percent of those interviewed gave television first preference. Newspapers received only twenty-eight percent, and radio received seven percent. ‘When asked which of the 71b1d., p. 8. 81bid. 91bid., p. 9. 1°Ib1d., p. 11. o o‘.'~.. .o , . ' - . ,- :‘b.' I p-oqu . _ . . .7. .‘ ‘ o .‘ ~...,.. .. .‘-- . e.- o a "--o)‘ cne‘ o .. . 'n. o ‘o. ‘ e , v. . 'kv '- l “ u' y - . y. ‘ n u ‘q ‘u.u .‘.-. "ze -‘ c an C‘w‘ ”“ \4 e ::..~ 1‘-‘° . l n a s _, 5 “ ~. -Ji .‘: \w \- . ' -‘ § 3"" «a ‘ O. ‘ . .‘: \ . \.‘ ." ack-_ ‘1 5‘. ‘ V ‘. o.‘ . \ 8 four media they would be least inclined to believe, only five percent rated television as the one they would be least in- clined to believe.11 Because of this built-in credibility factor and the fact that television is becoming the most important source of national political information, programs such as MEET THE PRESS assume added significance. They overcome the barriers of secondhand reporting and the accompanying risks in accuracy. MEET THE PRESS was titled “the fifty-first state" by the late President John F. Kennedy during a 1960 campaign speech. In some years it has made headlines in as many of thirty-nine out of fifty-two weeks. The program has elicited much praise and criticism. Historical analysis of the program's contributions can best be told in terms of the kind of news it has made, the comment it has elicited, and the awards it has received over the years for successfully fulfilling its informative function. A brief selective commentary will, therefore, demonstrate the nature of the program as a channel of political information. It will include representative newsmaking programs and the praise and criticism, which the program has elicited over the years. A second analysis will concern itself with the kind of information and the methods the program uses in eliciting this information. Its form and substance as revealed through program 111bid., p. 12. '- I ... “- '1 ‘ " c 11.x: 'f (f A! . I. s._ 9 scripts are evidence Of the program's ability to get to the heart of important issues and direct answers to urgent questions. The analysis must deal with such areas as the kinds of questions asked, the issues pursued, and the stra- tegy of questioning. Direct and important answers require important and correctly phrased questions with no inherent biases or false presumptions. The kinds Of questions a candidate must answer and the manner in which he answers serve another function in this type Of format. Both Of these factors contribute toward the tele- vision image the candidate projects. Altnough this study focuses on what is said, it is well to keep in mind the impor— tance Of how it is said. It must be an accepted premise that the "live" Spontaneous format of this program is an important factor of its success. In a letter to this author, Lawrence Spivak, creator and producer of the program, stated: Experience has proven that it is more difficult to evade answering an informing and challenging question when it is known that millions of people are watching and listening. As a result, the television press conference frequently produces news difficult to get at in other ways. Impor- tant also is the fact that the camera close-Up permits the viewer to judge for himself the added meaning of a hesitation, a smile, a frown, important nuances some- times undetectable even tolieporters in regular press conferences. This image-making power Of television has been exten- sively treated in the numerous works dealing with political 12Letter from Lawrence Spivak, June 17, 1967. ......0~4 ..---. \u-e- u. . . fl ‘ . I.- -\ 3.. oh any: . s ."r 'F ‘~--_-- ~--~ - U n .. . _' -' P s ... on. .‘. ‘1'. ..." In>,“ ' u -- _ ... . so.--“ \ . Iv '. .. - .I ~ I. .' I '-o .. A.-. ‘- -.t. .. , \., v a. a. ...C- . . ‘ - _ . . .... ‘-., .- ~— I. a ‘~~.‘. o '- .-.°--- ' I ~. - .. _ ‘-.' " ‘ .- . v.“ ‘- .. a g . \_., . I.” ... , -. g o. ’ x . ‘ s I ‘-~ . I “‘E ._, ‘ ., ,‘. 7" I -.5.' "ob ‘ " S t" ~ ¢~ -Q . - . ~. \.-'._' . . ‘, ‘ ‘ o t-, ,~, . ‘- I- s\ C - u ' ~ ‘.. . ..g . .. ‘- .-~. I_ ‘. s ‘0 - “ . 'I O' V ‘4 .- ‘e o. u w. . C ‘. - ~ 0 “ i ‘ K. ‘- ‘ '0 - .. , .. . u, . ‘ o - . 4 .. .- - _§ ‘ u “\ L Q . , ‘ a - ‘ s‘ s \ ' _ . -. _ . -. so ‘ ‘ . ‘ h 10 broadcasting. In 1955, Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall realistically stated: We must choose able and personable candi- dates who can “sell themselves" because television hI3 changed the course of campaigning. And so it has. The 1951 Senate Crime Investigation Hearings gave the Democrats a Vice-Presidential candidate in Estes Kefauver. In 1952 Adlai Stevenson was relatively unknown on the national scene. Within weeks through television he was a familiar figure. Richard Nixon's famous ”Checkers" speech in October of 1952 brought about an amazing reversal of poli- tical fortune. The television influence was dramatically demonstrated during the Kennedy-Nixon debates of 1960. On the Monday morning following the election President Kennedy himself declared, "It was telev1sion more than anything else that turned the tide."14 More important than mere exposure, however, it is the candidate's expression at any particular moment and his overall image which are determinant factors in the personality he pro- jects. The following two reactions to the Debates illustrate the point. Nixon might be defeated not by Kennedy nor by Kruschev but by Klieg, who invented the lights they use on TV. Under the harsh re entless glare, Kennedy looked seraphic, and Nixon looked like home made Sin...and among the sixty million viewers there must be plenty who are swayed by appearances. 13"The Changing Face of Politics," Newsweek, March 14, 1955, p. 28. 14Theodore H. White, The Making_of a President (New York: Pocket Books, 1961), p. 353. vol" . ... ... .. ..i a." to. us use .55 . .- .. .e . .\ . .h . .\ . c . .. ... pt» . . .5. .. o be ..a ..L . .... a... . ... a _. ..v . . 5 55 .~ . ... .e .. _o .. a. .. ... . .. ~ ,. .. as ... .._ . e .s.... ..I .s...-.....:a.~‘a ... 5e . u~§ ..~ - ' 11 There is a danger of course that Kennedy may win on light and shadow as Eisenhower won on five stars. In the fourth debate the director showed only two reaction shots, and both of these came when Nixon was engaged in an earnest and angry plea. Kennedy was shown both times with a broad and relaxed grin on his face. Does the TV camera give an advantage to the performer who is best able to pro- ject an image of himself and to manipulate his viewers most skilfully? Or, has the eye Of the camera become the probing eye, capably showing us the man as he %s beneath the image he is trying to adopt?1 Another example of television 3 probing eye was revealed during the famous McCarthy investigations according to NBC executive Frank Stanton. It was through television that the public came to know Senator Joseph McCarthy, his voice, his sarcasm, the caustic way he dealt with witnesses. Television, face to face with persons in an important critical situa- tion can convey the quality of fact and feeling that leads far more deeply than print--to understanding. The fact and feeling are not always available together, far less frequently in the print media now than when journalism7benefitted by a strong literary tradition. Before over emphasizing the visual aSpect, however, it must be pointed out that it is the combination of words and pictures which formsthe image. This is Specially important 15Gerald Johnson, "In Search of Identity," The New Republic, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 20. - 16William Hamilton, ”The Victory Was Video's," Christian Ce tur , Nov. 30, 1960, p. 1410. 17J. Edward Gerald, Social ReSponsibility of the Pregg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 125. -. _ ..l _ ... 0‘ . . . . . . .n o. v. o .. .. an . . 9 c s .... t P . .- . . . nx. - us .4- . a. - Q In. .I .r n.\ Q h.‘ ..i ... 12 if we consider the factors of selective exposure and selective perception, which greatly affect the impact of any media mess- age on the viewer. A viewer's partisanship plays a strong role in the for- mation of his conclusions as to the image the candidate pro- jects. Therefore, it is almost impossible to separate entirely what a candidate says from how he says it. Jack Gould, tele- vision critic Of The New York Times, commenting on television technique and politics stated: If a viewer thinks a politician's script is wanting, the performance may seem wanting as well. If the script 13 good the performance may seem better than it really is. 0 Then, emphasizing the importance of the verbal aspect he con- tinues, "In the art of government, one word can be more impor- tant than a thousand pictures."19 The program, for this reason, provides an interesting testing ground for those who aspire to high Office and the press confrontations that accompany the office. The candidate's handling of spontaneous questions and his adeptness at con- trolling personal reaction are put to the test before a scrutinizing public. How might the Eisenhower image have fared on the program considering his early difficulties with the press? Once in response to persistent queries about the McCarthy forays 18Jack Gould, ”TV Technique on the Political Stage," New York Times Magazine, April 25, 1954, p. 12. 191bid., p. 44. . ~ . . a. -- - .. u w" “,. O“"‘ ."_ p. --.. o» “" ... . n a ‘ - n , o -oa -ON . ~--. -..- . .. --. .... “... v I - ”n,- a-0 . 0‘. n .v 0 .fi-n ...‘.. .' .n-p. .- .5-.. H". >4..’. “— - 5"... ...—n 9—_ an»... Q on.' . (.1. ~~'~.. ‘I \.“ ' ‘v.-. -..: ’.:‘h -J 4" . ‘ . \ .- ' D ..., ‘g ‘7'" U . ‘ l - II- A. _ s o 1.“!- oc ... - . ‘1... .-‘~- . "-. ‘ H: ._ I -,. \.“~.. '5.t.. b ‘ "~.~‘ n, o s.‘ ‘ o- . ‘ 5 . ‘~. ...‘. . " . .- V~ - .‘v, 0. ‘.,: n ' n.: -‘. y -’ n .- co ..- — . a "n“. a. \- ‘ I ‘.‘ ... o . . b-‘ o y. t. v. .- I'l— - -- —. (u “ . ‘ . O . ' .u_ I A . . - e e - .. ‘p . ‘, 4 '. . ‘ ‘q-z"- o s.- . . o I C b .‘~ ‘- ‘- ‘0 ‘~‘. . -.'. w ". ‘ .l .' . “‘ -n n, 'I . I \ . . 0 '4 ~, . e h‘ . . ...-_ ._ F- .._o— - 13 against his administration, he stalked angrily from the conference room. On a number Of occasions he flushed deep red when prodded about a sensitive subject and rejected the questioner abruptly.20 A Life magazine story in May of 1958 relates the following: President Eisenhower has a legendary temper well-known to his close associates but usually controlled in public. It flares particularly when his personal rectitude or his military judgment is im- pugned. Last week at a White House press conference a reporter asked a barbed question about the President's cherished plan for Defense Department reorganization, and Epe Eisenhower ire came out for all to see. His early press conferences produced comments such as this to describe his verbal fluency at clarification. Ike's press conferences produced a rich harvest of published distortion? ambi- guities, and dead pan ridicule. 2 Perhaps several appearances facing the sharp, incisive questioning ofthe MEET THE PRESS panel before taking Office might have better prepared him for the give-and-take of press conference drama. Harry Truman's press conference difficulties might also have been forecast by a MEET THE PRESS appearance. How might 20Douglas Cater, "Thank You Mister President," The Ekmgxter, March 19, 1959, p. 18. 21"Executive Ire at a Needling," Life, May 5, 1958, p. 40. 22Phillip M} Wagner, "The Easy Chair: A Better Way With Press Conferences,” Harpers, May, 1961, p. 14. ll: o _,_ -5 ..-. 00 'v .. yo-.t .. v! o I . D c ’ ' .- u C "~ ”...-c- ... Q. ‘-g h .'.. . _ . o .5 ..- D .. -5 “-- . -~.'-o C.—.... . .. . .. .---.. -2 ...- . p ..- ...uo- .- ...- .... f . .- ._ —~‘ -u- no ‘0- s ‘v ...t._. . .9 - I-—..e , ‘V' ‘ .‘ *-\_/ - o a. ."' :V‘ n " vb C. . '4; - 'w‘ .. d «e. r ‘ I!” . -' - ‘. G. -. . I ‘u --.. . ' -0 ‘. . ‘- . . . .‘ .‘ c. -t -..._- e.‘ ' m“ . ‘~. . .- ‘_.. .-. o ‘t. . ~I ~ . .- ' O .. “' I. he ... a "s it E ' K . . 4 .T- ‘- ‘ '.. l . ”e n_ , -. ..- N ‘~ . “A .‘s . 's_ . s. ‘. ' - ‘. - K , . .. . -... ‘ -‘. ‘9. I. .“ , u \,. w‘v‘ ' I “ n. .> b 0-- ‘" - 0 S 0- . \ L ‘ . .‘ —- 5.- .'~ . '\ 5- ‘x I ~ \O ‘ .. e‘ - 14 his snappy manner have affected his image as projected on the program? Here is one description of his press conference image as seen by the Atlantic: What Mr. Truman has never been able to do is use the press conference to explain, elaborate, and interpret, to give broad outlines of administration policy in lan- guage the people can understand. His answers usually are simple yes and no replies with only a few words of explana- tion., He has never talked for the background or guidance of correspondents.23 The danger a candidate risks in the kind Of image he might project by an appearance on this show is illustrated in this excerpt of an article by Arthur Krock of The New York Times. Krock is commenting on Senator Barry Goldwater's appearance on the program two days after his announced candi- dacy for the Presidency. Unfortunately, the Senator had not adequate time in which to prepare for the tough confrontation of the program. The result was the following analysis of his appearance by Krock. He was not at his best in sustaining the impression of qualifications to lead the nation that has produced the powerful presidential movement in his behalf. This impression was of a man forthright, resolute, clear, and candid in the expression Of views which were thought through. His “image" must have been somewhat blurred in two areas by the responses the Senator made to several, though not certainly all, of the sharpl probing questions addressed to him by tne television panelists. He was neither forth- right nor candid in discussing the implied modification of his Often repeated stand against simultaneous candidacies for President 23"The Atlantic Report on Washington,” Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1950, p. 6. 15 and for re-election to the Senate. And obviously he has not thought through his proposition touching the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R. and of United Spates membership in the United Nations. Krock then further analyzes Goldwater's statements, using such terms as ”The Senator could have made a better case," "...the Senator also made a fuzzy explanation,” etc.25 Thus, while the program can prepare a candidate fer the give-and-take of press conferences, it also presents a stark challenge to the verbal and visual image he might project of his leadership capabilities. Another important measure of the program's informational utility concerns the role of the candidates themselves. The candidate's methods of political persuasion can here be analyzed. His methods of reply, his premises, his points of view on issues over a period of time reveal something Of the intellectual and philosophical caliber of the man. To the layman, his statements are a primary source of information and a hint as tO the kinds of decisions he will make on vital issues if elected. To the rhetorician, the candidate's reasoning patterns reveal the manner in which he uses ethical, logical, and emo- tional proof as a political persuader in clarifying issues. To the trained psychologist, the candidate's logical thinking 24Arthur Krock, New York Times, January 7, 1964, p. 32. 251b1d. _. ~‘v- "_‘ . . nu" . A. .a. i O ‘. .uu ‘ n h’ ' - u. -' ... r.. n I “ . .1 I: ‘ -- ‘1-' .. 1 a O. . Vs \ ,. ...-.. '4- . I I I .v -' - I e x . . I Iv. pl-‘v -.. - , - n-u-a- —‘ ' — ..u. gt“... 0 - o -. . -...._,_.. . g. . ‘LC. .‘u-'.-.¢ -.u "" "u- ‘.s.. . a h u-»....l._-_.'- _ ""‘.—.-.- ...- D 4 ‘ "‘-- ..b. v. u h e L ...... .- ‘ .' q--- J '."‘ "-o-. I I o I" 0 ... h .T“. c' . "9' - . ‘i ..I ., _-\ ' .‘ ... ~. _"U~lu . . _ "~V.-' ’n ' .7" . . ‘ .- c ~ - ‘1 .V'n. - ~ .1. no. ‘ .... “ n l ‘ . . n ‘ t . :I... sh ,-..- e .V . .. . ". . e. f u I'. ‘- ._ 0“ - "~-'. . ..‘o. I . -. ‘0 . .. _ ~.- \ (e. o ‘0 't»..- ..- . . .‘ ‘. -_ n n‘ he ‘5 .‘i .Ih, '~ 0 . ..\ “ .‘ .‘ . a U .' \ ‘9 5‘ - I “ , ~e - '. ‘p Q, I‘ \ ‘-_ I . ‘.~E v ' 3 H ' I O I ~. ‘~.. . ‘- ‘b #- o ‘ A v ‘1‘ - .-, 'r .‘s: ..'s M. : ‘.‘ ’- - e ‘U I. . , ~ . . -, ‘. ~:b ‘ -~..:.~ . ~~ e v ,. a - . -L-. c . .“. - u“. .5 _ ’~_ ' 1 ~. "I. H ." '§ t—‘s ~. «- v .‘. . '9 ‘ I. e - - - t N ' ~ 0 I ~‘ g | . . -‘ . _. '- b... »_- n. 9,— ~|-' I ~ ‘ u l6 patterns can reveal personality traits which might affect his political behavior as a leader. Analysis of this aspect of the program must deal with such issues as the candidate's strategy in answering or evading questions, his views of important issues before, during, and after running for office, and whether any common type of thinking patterns on issues can be determined which are similar among candidates regardless of political bent. An inventory of statements and thinking patterns can offer a political and rhetorical profile of the candidates involved. A final evaluation of the program's contribution, there- fore, must measure its potential against its performance, as determined by a study of its form, its substance, and its reception by the critics, where possible. This particular study focuses on the program during the national political campaign years from 1952 through 1964. The programs studied involve all those candidates who ran for the office of President and Vice-President during these four campaigns. All their appearances on the program, however, will be studied, regardless of the year in which they appeared; hence, programs before, during, and after running for office. The exception is former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who never appeared on the program. All other candidates for office, including President Lyndon Johnson, can be studied over a period of years. The campaign of 1952 was selected as a point of departure for several reasons. It was the first big year for national . . . L. >~§ . .. .. .. . .. .._ . > . I- - - \ k b7- .0. 3.. -. ‘ .‘._ Q ‘-~ - -- .. . --‘ . U‘- . o .. .. ~ . a ' \ ‘,_ . ~- c - . -\-1 o ,_ u > " - . ‘.N .- ‘ ~.. \- ._~ . ‘C ‘- . -. .\_“ a 3 .. \- .‘ . . c, - «. O 'P '. s ‘ ‘- .. ‘ .- .- .- \ ‘ ‘~ ‘ . \- u, q ‘ .' .‘rs . ‘N...’\ . U \- Lt -\ . . )C a‘. Q ~ .— .. . . '4 9' ‘ H 0‘. . -- - . \‘ . .‘ 6 - ‘ _ - - .. ~ - ‘~ nu§ ‘ V- ..4 P. . ‘. \C s u ‘ ‘- u“‘s - ‘ ‘ .. n,“ -~ ~\._‘_ ~ ‘7' _ .~.~ . I F-‘ . x ... n ‘ “‘ A ... .‘ -.. \_.. . ‘ -.. s‘ - "~\\ ‘ \ \_ - h ‘\ \ ‘ ‘. a .— s ~ .\' U ‘ v‘ ' ‘ -. ‘\ up ‘2 § ‘.‘ ~ '7' -- u - \ . ...- ‘ - . . - ‘ x _, ‘ c ‘ u ‘5 \ ~— -‘~---—w -~ ’ . _ .. u " .. o _. -.- O o -. o - . 5. o~ 4 at -o- —\ ‘ ... r‘-.—v 5 c a . -... ‘- > u 4;.-- -- V v "'--—-.- §. 17 political television. Both political conventions were carried by the networks. It was the first year a price tag was put on political time, thereby adding significance to the problems of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. Legitimate interview programs like MEET THE PRESS, being exempt from the equal time provisions of Section 315, assume added importance during any national campaign. Only by beginning with the 1952 campaign does the oppor- tunity exist to study all candidates who ran for high office. It was the first campaign to be covered by television featuring candidates who were not major office holders and could appear on the program. Between the debut of MEET THE PRESS in 1945 and the 1952 campaign, the Presidency was held and successfully resought by Harry S. Truman, thereby prohi- biting his appearance on the program. Beginning with the 1952 campaign, the issues of Korea, IMcCarthyism, Red China, Civil Rights, and Vietnam come into sharp focus to provide interesting political fare for the MEET THE PRESS dialogue. Eliciting candidates' views on these issues and how they are clarified make important contributions to political journalism. To appreciate the role of MEET THE PRESS, however, it is first necessary to examine the state of the media in general and determine what barriers exist to providing full political information. We can better assess the role of the MEET THE PRESS format. Since it is "the press conference of the air" we must also examine the press conference itself as a source of information. ‘jH' .. .. fly» .. u e or» .\. ... O; .U .I 4. a— n. .- . . ..L .. .‘-' ... . '.--o-«§ # ..- ... a s .t .t 6 b nx‘v . a '. u .r» h. .. - or. .. s I. .. . . ... . L. .u- 0.5 h . Q n I. § 1... oc§ av ., .L ... ...,u Q. o.» t . F. L.. z .1. a.» or s o. x .. ~ .C .. . a P a .. a .a V p s . . u n u s “F. RIP; 5 s A u ‘k C5 0" Dh‘ bifi ... ...“. 18 The question arises: what is the purpose of the media today in their relation to the public and politics? The answers to this question are requisite to examining the func- tion of a program such as MEET THE PRESS. Let us briefly determine the role of a free media in a democratic society. THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC A good many theories of the social and cultural reSponsi- bilities of mass communication have been elaborated over the years. All of the theories are based chiefly on two grounds: the position accorded mass communications by the First Amend- ment, and the indispensability of criticism and guidance and fresh ideas to a democratic society. The two interests embodied in the First Amendment, (1) the right of free speech and press, and (2) the recognition of a public right to know are inseparable under our democratic form of government. To deny one is to negate the other, This idea of a well-informed public as being essential to a free public was carefully woven into our governmental fabric. The crucial function of the press in keeping the public aware was recognized by Thomas Jefferson. The basis of our government being the opinion of the people; the very.first o Ject should be to keep that right, and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without news- papers or newspapers without a government, I should no? hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. 6 26Rivers, p. 3, quoting from Paul L. Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, p. 69. . . ... . . _ . . .. .‘u . . t. v. 7‘ .~ ... . . . .Q . t. x . o . . .. a . . , . . . _ . .. .. r. 1. A. is ... . ... . .L .x ..L .. . a . o . . . n s . .: .n . _ &. .,_ a I , . _. .. . .~.. ..e c. . a a. a . .2. .w _ . _. .. .. ... —.. . . .. ... L . . . ... a: .t. ..a . _~ .2 1‘ .C .W .. .2 ... ... . . ... a. .... .. c.» a. . ......~ .‘ ... .. .... ... r: .. o. C. ._ .3 5» .5 3 —. .~ .\u ..‘ .N x. .u .. a»... ......‘. ..g a» . .. ... ... . .a ... ... ... . u. ... c. t. a. .. . . .. .. .. .5 .... z. .2 ... . . ‘. . . ... ... . ... u o _ .. . .. ... .u . ... .. ... .. . Z. .. . . u . .. .. 1,. ... . s . .H . ... .. .. .. ... .1 .. .. . . \_ ~ . . . .. ..., ...” . H u.” ... .. V. . . .. . ..C . _ .. ..... . . . . . a .a 1“,... ..h v. k . .. .... . .... . . 19 Our First Amendment, therefore, reflects two aspects of a free press and free Speech. The first aspect concerns the need of many men to express their opinions on vital matters of the day. This implies the idea of a free informative press and broadcast media, allowing all views to find their way into the marketplace of ideas. The second aspect of the First Amendment is that of a social need to attain the truth, which embodies the idea of a public's right to know. More than three hundred years after the First Amendment was written, it was given its ultimate flexibility of defini- tion. The right of free speech to include even dissent in time of war in the interest of an informed public was upheld by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. In the case of Abrams vs. The United States during World War I, Holmes' written dissent to the opinion of the Court stated as follows: When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe, even more than t1ey believe in the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. There is a danger in Holmes' philosophy, however. It overlooks the necessity for knowing not only the truth, but the facts pertaining to the truth. This is possible only with a reSponsible press. As walter Lippmann points out: ¥ 27Reports, Abrams vs. The United States, 63 Lawyers Edition, 1173, vol. 250, p. 1180. . \ . . . . ... . . .... .\ .. .<. . p». _. an» o _ ¢\. . . ... . n n v, I n O .. O o . . . cry . n c ‘ « . o q .. ,. _ _ . . ...s o . ... ... . ~ .. no. .. ._ n .v ... .J c Q o. . .u . a\. I .‘ v . ... ... .~ 0 o - a an! n . h I t. . . . . . . . ..nl.-.i - 20 True opinions can prevail only if the facts to which they refer are known. If they are not known, false ideas are just as effective as true ones, if not a little more effective.‘° The press cannot giggmg public knowledge of all facts, but must guarantee knowledge of all facts for the truth to become accepted in a democratic soc1ety. Implied in this search for truth is a responsibility of criticism where it is necessary. The importance of this critical function was also recognized by Thomas Jefferson who wrote, "No government ought to be without censors; and where the press is free no one ever will."29 Pointing out abuses, the truth about governmental affairs, the shallow words of governmental leaders, are the signs of a healthy press. A sterile press is the symptom of a politically sick society. Any attempt by the government or the media to suppress unfavorable news, criticism, or dissent infringes on the public right to know. It is through critical reporting that the press leads in the formulation of public opinion. Dean Fred Siebert of Michigan State University in a Don R. Mellet Memorial address defined the ingredient of press leadership in a democratic society: ...the obligation to expose, to pass judgment, to call for remedies for abuses in the community. This is a newspaper Z3Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt Brace & Howe, 1920), p. 71. 29Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering_in washington (New York: .Atherton Press, 1964), p. 1, quotedfrom‘The7Works of Thomas .Jefferson, ed. by Paul L. Ford, vol. 7, p. 146. r—r—r -v‘~v— — .- a . -b " ' . u ‘ ._,....... ,. . ., ...v..-- 9- ~ ... wr. - .---' . -. u¢-—v . c. v. - ‘ - ~ .~ . o- ....-.-§v' ‘-'- b. 'u. I. - u .-.o- . an ‘ I r . _.. ‘ " o. u a . . ... . .. ‘ “o~ .~ .. U- wt § . _ Q . 6'. ‘ Su~. “I. ‘ ‘ C- D “ u 5 . '\ v. u .. o—"u ‘ .‘_‘ , .. -‘- o "s ‘D . l- -_ ‘Q 0‘. -- ‘ L + . F u‘...4 t . 5 _ ‘0 . v , .. '. f\. O ~‘R - ‘ .. . A“ v. “ ..-— .I‘ O" .- .. _., . ...c. . ‘ C ' ‘yo .A U c . _ ~ - ‘. . \ u . ..l U ‘ U 5 . . . Q, '- u , - - . '~ - o A. I ~ . n n d '- \ ’, ’ .... ..- ’u V w' ‘ ._ - ., .‘. ‘ -. u ; .I v I 1.. - N K 21 function a newspaper cannot38void if it is to serve a free soc1ety. In referring to broadcasting's responsibility in a free society, Charles Siepmann, noted critic of the medium, almost reiterates Siebert's words: Freedom to hear is nowhere more important than with references to public issues and events on which the electorate is re- quired to pass informed, intelligent and sober judgment. Essential to such judg- ment is a responsible, a continuous, and a diverse flow 3E informed opinion and interpretation. Emerging from Siebert and Siepmann's words is another vital press responsibility, that of interpretation of issues. In Liberty and the News, Walter Lippmann stresses the need to go beyond the mere reporting of facts. The raw news cannot keep the body politic healthy; it cannot satisfy the public's need to understand what is going on. And so the journalist interprets. Interpretation or commentary has always been a press trademark. The editorial page of the newspaper, supposedly distinctive from the objective news columns can reflect any point of view and offer any commentary on issues deemed vital. In broadcasting, commentary and discussion of public issues have also been recognized as essential functions of 30Ra1ph D. Casey ed., The Press in Perspective (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. x. 31Charles Siepmann, Radio Television and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 249. 32Lippmann, p. 71. ‘ 7 ~_'." in ..il (“3.1 -‘ .1! n- ..‘ -. " --u__‘.. .. "« ..- .. 1 . fl». ‘ ~ . t '9. a “.' '. ‘sJ , .. I . N, "n ..‘: "h ... ...ev u. o .. . ,. (w ‘I '~ ... ..« . B. _} a . ‘ . -.‘I\ -v . S I .. I 'r K‘\ . 5C U ‘0 ‘. 1‘. o..- u.. 22 responsible media. The preamble to the National Association of Broadcasters' guide to editorializing, states the following: An informed public requires free expression of Opinion and thorough discussion of public issues. The broadcast editorial serves this purpose, stimulates this free expression and discussion and advances the peOple's right to know. The broadcast editorial, because of its unique capacity to lead and influence, im- poses upon the broadcaster great responsibilities. The exercise of this constitutional right of freedom--broadcast editorializing--protects the public igterest by contributing to an informed public. The importance of giving meaning to the day's issues in broadcasting was also vividly expressed by veteran C.B.S. news commentator, Eric Sevareid: We are showing our peOple who, what, where, and how; we are not sufficiently showing them Ehy, The journalism we throw on our daily screen is still two-D journalism, the flat fact accompanied by the flat opinion. That never was good enough, and it is peri- lously inadequate now. We have not really moved into the area of 3-D journalism, although some are trying; we are not pro- viding the depth, not illuminating the background, making it a living part of the picture gzth the third dimension, which is meaning. The government has certainly recognized this important function in broadcasting. A license applicant must designate in his application the time he will devote to such types of programs as news and discussion of public affairs. This would include such material as editorializing, commentary, 33Editorializingon the Air, publication by The National Association of Broadcasters, 1963, p. 5. 34Eric Sevareid, ”The Big Truth,” in The Press in EgrSpective, ed. by Ralph D. Casey, p. 79. '6 v ~ O I v. e .. .a e. —o C a ea “5 .n a. - ..wy _ . . . . ~.. ~. - o ... ~ . .\ h. »u- . _ ..u ..u «J . s .C v ..v -.. ... g . u .‘~ . ~ . A I V g y ‘, . 23 and forum or panel shows. The second Mayflower Decision in 1944 not only recognized the right of a station to editorialize, but encouraged editorializing, provided, of course, that time to respond be offered to the Opposing point of View. The "Blue Book”, Public Service Responsibility 2f Broadcast Licensees, also recognizes the importance of news and discus- sion of public affairs as essential to a balanced pr gram schedule serving the public interest. For various reasons, however, the broadcast media are less prone to offer editorializing or commentary than the press. The line among commentary, straight news, and editori- alizing is a nebulous one. The free-time provisions of the Fairness Doctrine and Section 315, the problems of Sponsorship, and the definitive element itself involved in commentary, all serve to diminish this informative function. Nevertheless, It is recognized by the broadcasters and the government as being crucial to an informed public and a responsible medium. These various criteria of an informative press were perhaps best summarized and stated in a report by The Commis- sion on Freedom of the Press in 194/. The Commission listed five qualifications which our democratic society requires of its press. Three of these five criteria have special relevance to this study in the light of political communication. 1: Provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning. 2: Serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism. 3: Project a representative picture of the constituent groups in society. .0 .. . . . . . . o . u . . I. a ... . 0.. o x u.» ‘ ‘ . . . . . n h. .I5 O s (u n; we Ms ‘14 “~ . _. E ... 1. a. 7. ... a- ..x e a. .t ... ... . .. r. . . . t a o. n E .r. . .. ... u a: . . u. s 5.5 .. ... .. .. ...- ~ c a. at f: .2 1 J. ‘ . . . e . .5. 3.“ .. . . ... C4 .3 . u e t ... an. . . ... I n\~ ..b a... a cunt-I . .. \ ... .. . .s- e - . . . . .. . v . a. .... .i. u . . ‘. . ~ D. 5. A»; s an. ... ... . . u h N p .4 . . . . .u. - .. ~ . .t . ..b a \‘ ... . A 24 4: Be responsible for the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of a society. 5: Provide full agcess to the day's intelligence.3 The first criterion implies accurate and truthful report- ing of what was said as well as what has happened. There is alSo a demand for objective analysis and commentary to give the report meaning. AS the Commission stated: "It is no longer enough to report the fag; truthfully, it is now necessary to report the truth about the fact."36 Inaccurate or slanted reporting with no clarification does not serve this purpose. The misquoting, misinterpretation, selective omission, or taking of words out of context from any Speech, statement, or decision voiced by any public official negates this cri- terion of an informative press. The Federal Communications Commission has repeatedly emphasized the need for accurate and truthful presentation of news. The second Mayflower decision on editorializing also forbade broadcasters to compel newsmen to slant their broad- casts to conform to a particular point of view. The most famous case involving news slanting was the ”Richards” case, which began in 1948, and ended in 1951. The case involved G. A. Richards, owner of KMPC in Hollywood, WGAR in Cleveland, and‘WJR in Detroit. News employees of Richards charged in 1948 that he had given them written instructions to slant news 35Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Frnm Theories of The Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), pp. 87-91. 361bid. . ... 1H . . w. . . . ~ 1 v . . .L a c .... .. a .C . s .M e .. s .. .. ..L C» ..0. ..v .‘ .v .u» 6. k . . . .3 .C . t ... C» E o s ... .C ... .4 .4. .n. c n L. ‘ . .... .5 .v . u 1 ‘ ~ g .. ~ .. .2 u . 2. un ..- .n u 4 . . ... .r. N... .- a . . »h\ s s . S 1 c o \ ... ..v ‘ 5 . . . .4. :5 ... n n a s s Q u u e s ... .. , . . .. n \ .—- ‘ a a; . u . - n u u t C... .\o . . . . . 25 materials in such a way as to create public opposition to the 'New Deal”, to the Roosevelt family, to Communists, and to Jews. On the basis of these charges, the FCC in May, 1943, placed Richards' three stations on temporary license, pending results of a hearing to determine whether Richards had the character qualifications required of a licensee of a broad- casting Station. Before a final decision had been reached, Richards died. His widow filed a formal statement with the FCC, however, Stating that in the future there would be no news slanting on any of the three Richards' stations. On the basis of her statements, licenses were finally renewed in 1951.37 The case serves as a reminder of FCC concern over this matter. The concern with potential sponsor control of news through the pressure of hiring and firing led to the introduction in Congress of the Wheeler White Bill in 1943. The bill provided that no news, analysis, or news commentary could be Sponsored. Although the bill failed for various practical reasons, it served as a warning to the broadcaster in the area of news control. The second criterion of a responsible press according to the Commission implies a free marketplace for exchange of all kinds of views including the critical, the minority, and the extreme. Any attempt by broadcasting, especially to pre- sent only one point of view without offering access to the opposition, seriously impairs this informational function. 37Elmer E. Smead, Freedom of Speech by Radio and Tele- vision (Washington, D. C. Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 80. , u "‘ _. .r' . ‘ _: ‘ . . .- «I!!! x- . ‘ - - ..,C o--' ... c ' _'.p ...-4 -. u -v"'. _. U .6 a . .. . -...-. . .... (... .--. .. ,, ~ .- ...... fl" ‘ .~-- ...—- ' Q . " " -o >.a ‘_- F n-.. . b -- . "" ‘ -~-~_. - s ,- . ‘7 v .. u- u- b ‘ a n . . A. ._" ' D ”"' 0 v. .C c r ‘ O. ‘ ~ . ‘n... o . eat .9 . . I 1 "-~_‘ ... .. I """§.. .. ._~ ‘. . ‘ 'c- "0-. 7' v». .’-- l _. . ' ~.. . .' . . r . . § ‘. ._. ‘n. .. ‘ v .... .."_.‘- '. . ‘ ..‘. I 0 Q ‘~. ‘ u use an ..- . d.\ t . ... “~u ..‘ . .._ g\ ~ ~ C I. n v. ., .. ..~ . _' ‘A, v . ~.‘ ' o 0 . ... I N '.O n -. * '0 . ... .. -‘. o .;. ... I - u . .. : Q Q I F §~ ‘ ‘y ‘0 ,\. I ‘. f- . .. ~~ . .‘- - ‘ o .‘ § c u ”s i 0.5 .- V‘; a a- ‘ _‘ or t W‘ . 1‘. ‘7 ‘u‘. . ‘0 I. ’. — . e n- . '\ ‘0 §‘ I ‘|. ‘ \ . . o .A— § . O C q i \- ~‘ « . O I .~ - ‘ .. ‘ ' I ‘ o \‘ t. ‘ O .‘ \ '~,._s o 't F». I ‘t ,0 ... ~- _. ' N I I. . ‘ ‘ ' v a . § y- ‘ ... , . " F. -§ .. ¢ .. n '.‘ p \5 ‘ “a ... y 26 This balanced presentation of views is strongly empha- sized by the FCC in the equal time provisions of Section 315 of the Act and in the Fairness Doctrine of 1949. The broad- cast media cannot have the complete freedom of expression of views which characterizes our privately owned press. The nature of the broadcast spectrum limits the ownership of channels, thereby making it a publicly owned medium. The privilege of ownership must be decided upon by the government, using the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" as its main criterion. The licensee's prOposals for a balanced pre- sentation of news, and his performance in living up to these proposals must be taken into consideration at license appli- cation or renewal time. A free press or free Speech does not mean that every citizen has a moral or legal right to own a press or broad- cast facility, or be an editor, or have right of access to any audience. It dggg mean that an idea shall have its chance, even if it is not Shared by those who own or manage the media. Any use of a broadcast facility to propagandize, attack, or repress a point of view has been strongly acted upon by our government. The Trinity Methodist Case in 1933 resulted in a license renewal refusal because of personal attacks made consistently on the air by its owner Reverend Robert Shuler. The first Mayflower decision in 1941 brought an FCC ruling that the policy of editorializing by station WAAB, Boston, was not in the public interest Since a station could not be an advocate. , -o .5 o u- p. a. a- u. ‘. o H“ -— -9 t a. o x \. .— .- A - -« x . v u ’- 'w x. ‘— s *‘ ‘» — 27 The principle of personal attack also applied to the Richards case. In all of these cases, the expression of all points Of View in a truthful manner emerges as a recognized principle of responSible media. A public owned medium means that_§ll segments of the public are entitled to a hearing. The fifth Commission criterion implies complete and comprehensive coverage of the vital news of the day and access by the public £2 this coverage. Selective reporting or editing, or any limitation on public access to as many differ- ent sources of information as possible, are all hindrances to an informed public. Concentrated ownership of the media brings with it the dangers of restricted points of view. The condition in a one-paper town is comparable to having a privately owned utility, constitutionally exempt from government regulation because of freedom of the press. The freedom of the individual editor and journalist is hampered since he cannot go over to the Opposition. It does not exist. The access of the citizen to news is, therefore, completely aleatory, depending on the character of the monopoly publisher in the city in which he lives. {onopoly control of the broadcast media is less of a probability because of the fact that it can be regulated by the government with no infringement on the right of free speech. In Section 311 of the Federal Communications Act, any applicant for a license who has previously been found guilty of unlawful monOpoly cannot be issued a broadcast c i .. .- O . w l. - _ - a ._ ou~— " _"~ .--... - .. . .... ‘uun .‘ M. -- - ' . , 4 ,. .. runa- 1 '- ~ 4‘ . — 0“. 9 I ...... -.. . _ .... _ .. ---.o‘~._o. . - -.. _ -—... ~.. .. .. _‘ .: :- . -. ‘_ -' - . 4.. . .... .; ~ "‘ "" -' I V. , .- . ..., . § - . o- k- . , . ’ ‘- ..p.« a - .... l -. '\. ' u i- ‘ ' ~‘-. - . -. ‘ ~ .. ‘5. V. -o ~ . ‘0 “’ - t ‘5 ‘ ‘ . - ,\ ._ ‘ . n. I I “'.. \ .. ~ .0 n , -. - - s - .75. _ .- . - _ p -\ _ - . ‘s - . L k- . ~\ . . a “- ‘ ... K~ ». - ~.. _ u u. "h w. . ‘s ' . I“ . . - ‘ k . N ~— -1. ‘e' h, ‘ . . . ., _ -. u. \ . ~ .~, ~ Q. 9 ‘ ~ ‘ ~. .‘ ’.,' ~‘- A ‘ N - ‘ ~ \. " ‘ s ‘ . . . - .. ‘ \~ _ Q - “ ‘ . - e o _. - . . ‘- ‘g - .. ‘.. _ ._ . \ ‘ § ~ \ \‘ , ~ 5 - . . | ‘ . Q ‘- \ . ‘ \ 23 license. The multiple ownership rules of the Commission forbid any group from owning more than seven stations of each type. Nobody may own two stations serving the same primary broadcast coverage area. Bernard Schwartz in his book, The Professor and the Commission, considers diversification of control as the most important criterhnnapplied by the FCC in granting licenses. He says, “A monopoly of communications is a monOpoly of the “1'1 Hog approaches to the mind of the public. In the Associated Press Case, involving the right of a wire service to refuse its news to broadcast facilities, the Supreme Court neld that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is the objective of the First 1°C Amendment.'3/ Diversity, and the competition it causes, does not insure good news coverage or a fair champion for every point of view, but it increases the chances. These then are the standards against which we can evalu- ate media performance as reSponsible channels of political information. In evaluating the media against these Standards, we can determine the factors restricting them. How does a program like MEET THE PRESS overcome these factors? Is it meeting its potential in electronic journalism in the area of political information? These are some of the questions we can attempt to answer. 8Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions (New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1959), p. 157. 39Sidney Head, Broadcasting in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 372. iH v \. rill, *7 Ill! 29 A statement on the press by Alan Barth, editorial writer of the Washington Post might serve as a prelude to the follow- ing chapter. His words apply with equal weight to the broadcast channels. I think that American newspapers are in little danger of having freedom of the press taken away from them. But many of them are in serious danger, I think, of losing tgsir freedom through disuse and atrOphy. The nature of some of this disuse and atrophy will now be discussed. 40Nimmo, p. 228. III .n" h _ 1‘ a. . . .:‘ ‘ 9A» - . P\~ . \ O b A - EU‘-—5 ’ a ‘w-.._ "~r—\ r h H ..., . . o ‘9 A4 I t. ‘ Q “-....- a -_,-'v‘ n n» --- . ~ A, .‘ u . n E Q 5 ~-- . W‘ . v ‘1- "-.' Q . «. .5 A. . .. - ._‘ .. -_ ‘ I ~ “ A \ ... ' u_ . ' g . \ r'.‘ 0 I -5I... - a ’. g 5 .. r ' \ Q. ‘ " I ., " a. v ‘ . x .- . I b_b ‘ , u- _ V § .. ~c. ' §~“‘ Q ‘ ‘3. .61 ‘p s \ r.., ‘6 . . ..~, u‘ ~ 9 ‘- n ‘1. "c ‘1 U. L“ '.. .- l . ‘\ . Id l C . \’~ 4" s... . '.'-~I s ‘Q ‘13.“, -‘ 5.-‘~ ' ‘.. ‘ 'I _.‘..o .. A .~ - ... “_ s I . ‘A. s . '4 to CHAPTER II THE MEDIA, POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW When editors and publishers do not pub- lish information or opinions which are extremely important for the interests of society as a whole, when editors distort events to serve special interests, and when they fabricate canards to blacken or eliminate unfavorable political candi- dates, then the press deserves the severest criticism and condemnation. Harold Ickes THE PRESS AND THE CAMPAIGNS The magazine New Republic, commenting on the 1936 Presi- dential campaign, wrote: Sound public opinion obviously cannot be developed without access to the news; and the conduct of certain newspapers in the 1936 campaign gives rise to a considerable doubt as to whether such acgess is possible in much of the daily press. In this campaign an Editor and Publisher poll revealed that 57% of the newspapers supported the Republican candidate. ()nly 36% supported President Roosevelt.3 Twenty-five years later, referring to the Presidential campaign of 1952, CBS commentator Eric Sevareid had the following comments: 1“Whose Press is Free?", Time, October 1, 1945, p. 57. 2"Forward", New Republic, March 13, 1937, p. 178. 3Editor and Publisher, October 31, 1964, pp. 9-13. 30 ... . O.\ u .. . . a .o . I . . _. .a .... .... . . ... . . “a. c \ c c y a . ... . . . .. .. . _ U . . .» . .— y u T. .... r: .. .3 ... ~ . h. .. Z a .. ny‘ : s . . ... .... ... nu. -- . * _1 Q“ L .... ... . I : fa .: .... .. . .. . . Z. . C... ... nae II. E c: t a .. \\ ‘u 1’ ~‘ ... .. v W \~ .5 r.4 a: .. . . ‘u .s .1 7 \ 31 ...the country experienced, one year aoo in the election campaign, a sudden rasn of news cheating such as we have not known for years....Dozens of excellent newspapers, with a record of honorable news handling, cheated in their allotment oftuwm and ic- ture space between the two candidates. In the 1952 campaign, again, the Republican candidate was heavily supported by 67% of the neWSpapers in this country. Only 15% backed Democrat Adlai Stevenson.5 Richard Nixon, Speaking out at a press conference following his defeat in the 1962 California Gubernatorial race, stated: I think it is time that our great news- papers have at least the same objectivity, same fullness of coverage, that television has. And I can only say, ”Thank God,” for television and radio for keeping the news- papers a little more honest. These three statements, spanning a period of more than forty years, seem to say something very critical about the performance of our daily press in keeping the public informed during any election year. The first criterion of responsible journalism defined by The Commission on Freedom of the Press is "a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning. This involves not only accuracy but the identification of fact as fact and opinion 4Eric Sevareid, "The Big Truth", in The Press in Per- spective, ed. by Ralph Casey (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 83. 5Editor and Publisher, pp. 9-13. 6Newton Minnow, Equal Time (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 21. ... . - ..---~¢. -- ,' 0.- " ...“- o I fly... ‘ .. ~- - ...-. an ‘ . IIQ -. .v.‘ ' .. -- h“ . ‘ ’7 . ' v .. . .- . a Q . Q 5 - o—o ' o O . ‘c o ..- .. 1c _.‘ ~ ‘ I ~ -~ I ..- - . ‘ “A -L l o .--;- - L - ‘ L . ‘ a ‘1‘ ~.... --u r. o o .. ..-~-- .‘ { ' ‘ - ‘ . ..b .V‘“-. ‘.' . . ' ..-»~ pt. .- _:>._ ...-.--.-_‘. u‘ - . n . .. ~.a ‘ . ‘ ‘ i V. - ‘ H c .~". ...‘-A- . . -0 . "“z.. ' . \‘q- ‘ “-..- 5‘~C ‘ ' o . ‘ “I . _ - . v ~\ d - ‘ - ... "“w - . ’ :~.- .. .\ .. V. C :‘ .-‘_‘u , ‘ - ~ ~ .- . F.” . “ u .....- 'v‘ ‘ - ‘ § — ‘0. ‘s ‘ ‘_. k. ‘ L -' " ‘ ‘ - . -“l‘. ‘ v n . r a. 's. .- . 0 ~ ...‘ ‘ k ' ' W- - _ ..- t »- ‘ -.. H . L ~ ... . I . s. ".'b ._ ‘ ‘ t 0 s. ‘-" ' o t_~.‘ ‘ \ I O h “ : “... i ‘ h n A ‘~ ‘ ‘ ..".- ._‘ a ..v. ‘ .__" . ...» \.>“> - ‘. . -‘ ‘ ‘ ‘s, a " ‘AA . 1‘ ~- ' ' Av. ‘ »‘ , _ -~ . - i \ ‘5 \ ' ‘ .-‘ . ~ l o a ‘ 32 as Opinion. It implies equal and fair coverage of all candi- dates in any given election, regardless of the point of view of those who own and manage the media. Equal space should be devoted to ggwg about candidates, as well as reporting of their views, comments, and speeches. A slanted press abdicates the responsibility of a free press. The danger in a slanted press, however, does not lie in any correlation between press support and electoral victory. Press influence in any campaign is doubtful in light of the record. Since the election of 1932, the press has supported Republican nominees in seven out of eight national elections. The Democrats emerged victorious in six of the eight. Figures might even indicate that press support is a minimal factor in any campaign. In 1940 Wendell Wiflkie had the support of 64% of the nation's newspapers compared to only 23% for Roosevelt. Dewey in 1944 received 60%. Only 22% backed Roosevelt. The 1948 election gave Dewey 65% of the newspaper as against only 15% SUpporting Harry Truman. Nixon in l960 had the backing of 57% of our daily press compared with only 16% backing Kennedy.7 Interestingly, in 1964, one of the few campaigns in wldch the press supported the Democratic candidate, the same charges and accusations of a slanted press were voiced by the Goldwater camp. 7Editor and Publisher, pp. 9-13. kl .... "‘- r—v. ~ .. ‘.-5 v..- I . .' . - .--— 5 . . . r . o. ...... o ~-s .- c- ' .. n- 0"" - u C n-0--0.0‘§-0 ‘ 'I o . " “ -- pa ' H . .... .-,.._‘ 5. _ . ..-.. .._.' n,”- .. . . " "' "u. ..- ,. n. ‘ v c ‘ --.--.- p. .u " ‘ u _ .-' _- s. ._ .“' -Q _' ..: ‘ u " ‘—-.. I. ’ v. ..-._' o.._‘ '_ “V O -.' ..“_ an .__‘ .I- . ‘u _' . > - -A‘A- - . . . ~ V . d ¥- c C *- .. ‘V . ‘ —. .. .. ... : —_ . -‘ i ‘ ...»— . -_ \ ~ ‘ o § ‘QI. v ‘- N.’ ,- -‘_~ a. ‘. 'b ' y - ‘p. . .. . m. ._ “ ~‘ ’-_ -‘ ‘ - .Q" \ u ‘s o ' ~ ‘ ‘u-.. a '- ."-" o- . \- '- - n f. " -" Cr 3 .‘-‘. 0- « ~.. ... '> u» .. .‘ _ . ‘ A I .‘up. _ \‘ N _ ‘.. a . .‘v ‘ - 0 ‘ n ‘ s . ‘- “w . 4 n . ‘ Q “. ‘0 ~ - \_ “.\ "n- ‘ l- ‘5 v ‘ ‘ s . - . L‘P‘ § 6-' s . “ - -.‘ ‘. - - s - ‘ .. ._’ A ‘ N V .. ‘c ‘ - \ " 33 Vice-Presidential nominee William Miller claimed, "The Democrats have all the newspapers, all the columnists, all the pollsters."8 Staunch Goldwater supporter, Clare Booth Luce, called the press brutally unfair to Goldwater and charged that neWSpapers were giving the impression that all his supporters were "racists, kooks and neanderthals."9 John Knight, owner of the Miami Herald and Detroit Free Press stated that while Barry Goldwater is not his candidate, he must say that Goldwater is getting shabby treatment from most of the news media.10 The danger in a slanted press, however, does not lie in the fact that it is evidently Egg respecting the public's right to know information which will aid it in making an intelligent rational voting decision. This danger seems inher- ent regardless of which party controls ownership or management of the press, and whatever candidate the press supports. The danger lies in that a monOpoly of any kind is detrimental to the public in obtaining full access to all available informa- tion. It is also detrimental to the candidate in obtaining full exposure for hflsviews £2 the public. Therefore, it is a matter of deep concern when the avail- able news sources across the country diminish in number and in independent control. Figures over the last forty years 8Ben H. Bagdikian, “A Two Party Press”, New Republic, October 10, 1964, p. 11. 7”Covering the Candidate”, Newsweek, July 20’ 1964’ p. 71' lolbid. 1H a . . ‘d .h ‘ A s .. \I . . I r...» us Cu ‘ .. 1)! 3 . .. u». n.,J\ . x . \ . . . 4 h; PC a; w u . . \ s x s ‘0 N C» . . a ‘1‘ a V ...; C» ..v a? \ 1s . ‘ ‘s ... ... ... ‘ .. ... 5 ._ s c 8 .~\ :5 .‘o .. q ... Mn. \ v. I nu» . 4 a E ... . n ' o A '1‘], «w show a decreasing number of competitive newspapers and a growth of centralization. In 1909 there were 2600 newspapers in the United States. Today there are about 1700.11 Some 95% of American news- papers today are monopoly owned.12 In 1920 there were 552 cities with competitive newspapers. Today there are only 46.13 Great cities like New York and Los Angeles are now served by only one or two daily papers. Because of government restriction, the problem of mono- poly of broadcast facilities is not as serious as that of the press. It is a fact, however, that more than half of tele- vision's 274 markets are served by only one channel, thus limiting public access to a variety of sources of information and points of View. The concern that monopoly newspapers cannot provide quality journalism was reflected in several recent surveys listing the best American newspapers, according to publishers, editors, professors of journalism and Washington correspondents. One survey asked for classification of the ten ' 'great” newspapers living up to the ideal of Adolph Ochs, Joseph Pulitzer, and Thomas Gibson. Another survey required listing the best "all around" newspapers. The third survey asked for the "most superior newspapers in news coverage, integrity, and 11William Rivers, The Mass Media (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1964), p. 18. 121bid., p. 23. 13Ibid., p. 21. .... .. .- . . . .~- . b ... u - a . ... - .. O 5 on.-.‘ I "‘ ’ -~- ... ... ’ - . ..-”. ¢--,,,. .. ... - . 'A . ., _ ,. .. . .1 .. C 0 -- . ..,‘_ 0.. . -~_- . I' - § - l» . . ....“ -- L .._ . .. ..., ‘11- .... _ , - nus. , _ . ~ ... .L. _ ‘- .. "--5 . N :' § .. s .~~.. a ‘u-_‘ - ~ _ .. . u - . “.--.u.. ‘ a. . ..._ -.. e -. . *vu- ° ."‘ L ' “vu * . --_.' _ - h \ ‘- . . ‘ ‘no ' - . .~ -\ ' n - .---... ’ 5 -.....~ («I . 5» ._‘ . .’ ‘ . '5 _ ‘~\‘ .\ ._U .. 14“ ._ . . ._ . b. ~- .._‘ .r as,“ n. ‘. ' a .a s. t ‘ -~ . ‘— ~ \-. ‘c ‘- v‘ . '. '— V~ . -.'\- - o. ‘ t -.“ a -. ... ‘ . . u . ~ _ . '- '- - ._‘ .._ ' 4-‘.‘.. ' ‘x’ ’ c (K " '\~i u. " ‘o \_ ' r A “\ ~. ". ~‘ - - ~ _ ‘ .. .- f - “b. s -, «' ‘ — N ~ ~ ' . C . 35 0 H 3 a? .. .2 1 V .3 serVice. Finally, Lne newspapers were judged on tne basis of being the "fairest and most reliable.” The results emphatically showed monopoly newspapers almost absent from all four lists of the top ten in each cate- gory. The few monOpolies that did appear were near the bottom. Newspapers like the New York Times, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and Milwaukee Journal, all independents, consistently l4 topped the list. Certainly it is the privilege of any newspaper, whether monopoly owned or independent, to be partisan in any political campaign. It is a basic principle of a truly free press, which cannot be refuted. What is at stake, however, is not the obvious partisanship of the editorial column, but the not so obvious partisanship of the news columns and methods of campaign coverage. ReSponsible reporting requires not only the truth but emphasis on events in proportion to their significance. A newspaper which gives its biggest headlines to whatever suits its purpose, or slants a story to give a false impression, does not measure up to responsible journalism. But still more important than editorials are the news columns which are supposed to report what is going on in the country. Every publisher knowstha:his greatest power to influence the mind of his reader comes from the possibility of leaving 14Ibid. .,-, I p .. b -. n‘ - . \ , a - . ,. vi“ 0. a -. u “ - —. "... . \ . m ..-...” “A: _. ' L. ' ~ >“ 4‘ —- p . “" ...-u b k r' - - ‘ -— . ‘.- .. H ' ‘-‘voc 5 ‘ . -.( I . . «- o._ . “_ .. . "' b.,_: | ’~\-. ,_ ‘v. .... " "...--.. ... H. .i. .-. . - - ....‘.. s t _ . -.. 4‘ ‘ \. . " n J. ’ 5.. . -.‘\- 1"“ _ . . I l.- ‘_ v.. C ... ' ...; "‘ .5. . ., ... . ‘-..l " 9. _ -u.- -.. I O -‘ a in w- .'i. ‘ . up a ‘v '.«: E' in '. “a v ~‘— . \ p... . ‘q . “p . ., t ~,._ . . _.._ A -. ' | I u. .__ o s ”n . 's a A. ‘ ‘ 5 a "Q cv‘ \ _ “s. L ., ' c . ~ ‘- 0.. ,~ : . ‘ k “r\ "s ’ g u \ ‘li ..- . C' 1'. _ . x‘ . . .. fi ‘. 1.. "s '¢ .‘v. -. .‘§ , ‘ s ~ ' I". Q v~ ~ -‘ o 55“ L . K , u ._ :5... p“ 0‘ ~. ._ s . ‘- _ 4'. ‘ , ‘s ' 36 things out or gubtly distorting what he does publish.l A study of political bias by "omission” or reluctance to publish was made concerning press reaction to the Nixon Fund during the 1952 Presidential campaign. The fund involved $18,000 given to Senator Nixon by some California businessmen. Although this was not illegal, it became newsworthy political fare when Nixon became the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee. Arthur Rowse of the Washington Post studied the reporting of the Fund by the press. Of thirteen afternoon papers studied, only four put the story on the front page at the first opportunity. Of the four, only one was a pro-Eisenhower paper. Three other papers used the story the first day, but buried it inside the paper. Five evening papers did not use the story until the following day. One paper, the New York Journal American, could not find room for the story until Sunday, four days after it broke. Of the eighteen morning papers studied, all pro- Eisenhower, only eight featured the story on their front pages. Three papers omitted the story entirely.16 Another study of the techniques a neWSpaper can use to slant its political coverage was made following the 1952 cam- paign by Jean Begeman. he study demonstrated how newspapers were determined to slant news prior even to the Republican 15”The Press and the Campaign", New Republic, July 22, 1936, p. 311. ‘ 16Arthur E. Rowse, Slanted New§_(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 124. ‘ § ‘ k‘: m": V ‘. .Q ‘1. . ... I ’I a--.‘ ..- . - ‘~‘ -. - .’~ A s. .. «1‘ "_ c,‘ N \ 37 convention. Most of the newspapers studied not only editorialized in headlines but gave the Republicans splashy news coverage while playing down the favorable news about Democratic candidates. When the General, fresh from Paris head- quarters of NATO, told a group of Midwestern isolationists on July 8th, that the French iad become “50% agnostic or atheistic,“ the press successfully protected him by keeping the story out of View. The New York Times did not use the statement till July 11th and then put it on page ten. Eisenhower's later contradictory positions on off-shore oil, social security, budget cuts, and other issues were seldom the subject of editorials. The neWSpapers gleefully turned out reams of editorials on President Truman's attacks of the General, calling them “gutter“ politics, but at the same time, Richard Nixon and Joe McCarthy were able to sound off any subject and remain unchallenged by most paters. General Eisenhower's candidacy was supported editorially by 993 of the nation's ail newspapers with a total circulation of 40.1 million. Governor Stevenson was supported by 201 newspapers with a total circulation of 4.4 million. The poll revealed that General Eisenhower had editoria support in every state, but Governor Stevenson was without th backing of a single newspaper in eight states. Begeman then asks the one crucial question with regard to this fact: How, then, were the people--the millions of readers of pro-Eisenhower newspapers--ab1e to get the factslnecessary to vote sensibly on November 4th? a A survey of twenty-six newspapers made by ninety-four American authors brought forth this conclusion: 17Jean Begeman, " he One Party Press Pays Off,” New Reading. Nov. 17, 1952, p. 17. ~-- 13Ibid. on o.... . ..s. ... n on p . u. so- < O s..\— x 1 “. - n v c. s- .. . o ta..— 4... o I - . .,. n \ x e. ', ‘v v . - I .. _ . u- -.__ v. .. . _ _. ‘ a A. _ A .. a. . a .. ‘ . d. ' 0 . H . A . '0 , A .... .I . v ‘ 1' . -‘. fl 1 , ~ . u . '9‘. \ ..- . ‘v. ‘ 4 - . o _‘; a..- q ‘O-.. "k " d \ ~ It .. . . ... . 'u‘ h ~_ -.. r-“ - , _ . ‘§ O- t _ ~.\.. .- U . u . ... n. _ a. . .- _ “ . ,‘I. o H‘- r .. ‘ \— - .‘. . - . x. “r - ‘Cl ". h _ P Ev». q v u.‘. I “y .Vt ‘~ I I 5 s n " .f I' s ‘~ .4 W, ‘x o . . l h. ‘: . _~I: \o,. , a- . c . “u-'~‘ V‘. ~ ‘ \~\ ~.‘- \ s. ' o ' :- m. « m. . \‘ NC: ‘ D h ~ ‘4 u‘ | ‘- ' 7V n ”a: n ‘0 {)0 J'.) Partisanship has been allowed to soak through from its legitimate place on the editorial pages and in signed columns. It has been allowed to infect the very writing of the news, and even more, the way it is displayed. Even photographers have been used to mislead. We believe that in the present circumstances few voters can hope to get a true idea of either candidate's perignality, stature, or views from our press. 7 In this survey all but four of the newspapers were found guilty of one or more of the following faults: l. Slanted news stories. 2. Prejudiced use of photographs. 3. Unfavorable placement of stories con- cerning Democrats. 4. Inadequate coverage of Democratic news and of the campaign as a whole. 5. Omission of stories favoring Democrats. 6. The use of headline reflgcting meaning of stories inaccurately. 0 Begeman's New Regflflic survey embraced twenty-one news- papers from September lst to October 3lst of 1952. Nine called themselves Independent; four, Independent-Democrat; three Independent-Republican; four, Republican; and, one had no political category. Particular attention was paid to head- line and news play, pictorial presentation, and editorial policy. A variety of legitimate and contrived methods were used to give readers an unbalanced picture of the campaign across the country. A list of some of the main distorting techniques utilized included the following: 1. Giving Eisenhower t0p headlines. 2. Burying the favorable Democratic news and playing up the unfavorable. 191bid., p. 18. ZOIbid. ' i a i ‘ l l‘ I. ‘ 1 , ..a ..v . i u . .2 . . .-. .t 3. .1. r; A c I... . . L s . . ... . — . a~ . .1 Axv as» .4 M Q .C .c .C . . a... . ~ . _ 3 ... . ‘ ..~ a .v \~ I. -c , ..w a. . . .. a . .. . .. . .... ~ . -. . .\ s . \ on Q 5‘ v .\ § Q i K d 39 3. Editorializing in the headlines. 4 Discriminating in favor of the Repub- licans in comparable news events. 5. Biased use of campaign pictures. It is necessary here to cite only one or two examples of the findings. The AP wire consistently led off with Eisenhower news, the Stevenson news usually constituting the last few pages of the story. Newspapers who used the AP daily campaign roundup on the front page automatically would, therefore, give Eisenhower the headline almost every day. On September tenth the headline read DEMOS CALLED FEAR-MONGERS, QUACKS BY IKE. The story ended with a few paragraphs of Stevenson's first major foreign-policy address on Asia in San Francisco. On October lst, the AP headline ran as follows: ERBAL BLASTS CONTINUE ACROSS POLITICAL FRONT Ike says Truman regime Scandal-a-day Affgir: General attacks Adlai in Carolina Speech Somewhere in the text were Truman's statement that Eisenhower failed to awaken the country to the Soviet threat; and on page four, Stevenson's statement on Bedell Smith's testimony, as well as a report of the Governor's first fireside chat from 22 Chicago to the peOple. The Peoria Journal could find no Stevenson news worthy O of a headline from September lst till September 15th, while giving Eisenhower a three column, three deck head every day.23 211bid., pp. 13-21. 22Ibid. 23Ibid. ,A ... . 1H kn , v .. , . ...... .~ .— . lk . ...-.- . u. .. ¢ 1- x. J . - a 0 - .'~‘~ ...-4 -. .. ~-. .. .g v. .- o """"-‘v- ~ 1' r L ‘ " ‘nul ,,‘ .--. , , > ... ‘I- . v- - g.. ‘ .- " 'b.\ l;’ ‘ h‘ - b- . ..' I. ; .~.‘. . 0‘ | ~ ' -1 o ‘— .. ‘v‘ . ‘- . 'u. w' " ..- 'u.,. r - ‘ ..-I.‘ v — "t ...E “ \~~~ n“-. | , . ‘. ; ...,‘ h... . ... ‘u. I C .~:u _' . -. ..,. . .... ", , m, ‘ h |. l ‘«~ . .\,‘ . «1‘ -~ ,:‘ -_ ‘4.’ ' l V Q--\‘ I I 'r . - O ': I ‘u .1 .‘ 0 L“ ‘1 ‘-~ . .- ‘-- \‘~., ck ;._ n_‘ q 'u. 8“- H,‘ \ . ”c 'v . In ‘ ‘o. 'o. ‘15 ’x..° . - 5 0‘ ' ... ' I ' . ' P ,- “h:’ u. "I -. ~I. '- 'l ‘ ‘ .‘ 3‘ ‘k .0 " '\‘- . - . v‘. ‘ "x ., ‘.l 5 . ,. ~ . -\.. 1 - “ \ ‘-'. ._ ‘_I ~\ , ‘ ‘\ .‘ - x -. \u. p I . 40 The second technique involved the burying of good Demo- cratic news and highlighting the bad. The joining of Repub- lican ranks by Democrats Jimmy Burns of South Carolina and Harry Byrd of Virginia received front page headlines in most newspapers. Republican Wayne Morse'sendxmxment of Stevenson, however, received scant attention. Five newspapers did not even mention the story at all in their Sunday edition the nex day. Eight other neWSpapers buried the story on inside pages. Six other newspapers did not use the story until Monday.24 The first time Stevenson received banner headlines was when the newspapers seized on the ”Stevenson Fund,” shortly after they were compelled to print the story of the Nixon Fund. The difference in treatment of the two can be seen from the following headlines: IKE DEFENDS NIXON N XON GOES TO PEOPLE TONIGHT NIXON VINDICATED STEVENSON FUND UNDER FIRE STORY OF ILLINOIS FUND IS AWAITED25 Editorializing in the headlines was another technique utilized. Even under the most favorable conditions, headlines can only simplify issues, in a well-chosen six or eight words. Headlines are allegedly objective, but not so during political campaigns. Used in a slanted manner they can be most harmful in political communication. The debate between candidates strikes most newspaper readers as headlines swiftly 24ibid. 251bid. 41 scanned. Calculate as they will, candidates and their speech writers are at the mercy of newsmen whose judgment determines what is likely to go into that headline. Furthermore, even the ablest reporter is often hard put to do justice to a spgech within the framework of the Spot lead. When Stevenson made his Milwaukee speech on McCarthy on October 9, 1952, the Milwaukee Sentinel headlined: ADLAI HERE SLAPS IKE, TAFT, JOE27 The Minneapolis Tribune was specific in reporting Repub- lican charges: RUNAN LEADERS BUSY CONCEALING CROOKS, CAN'T BUILD PEACE, IKE ASSERTSZO But in dealing with a Stevenson Speech it dealt in trivial generalities: REBEL YELLS FOR IKE HAUNT ADLAI ON TRIF29 Here is a typical headline of one newspaper: TRUMAN AGAIN BELITTLES 1KE30 Discriminating in favor of Republicans in comparable news events was another technique found. Both candidates Spoke before the American Federation of Labor. The Mobile Register headlined Eisenhower's Speech on Page 1: IKE REAFFIRMS LABOR. N STAND IN SPEECH BEFORE AFL LEADEP 26"The Press in '56: Conclusion,” New Republic, December 3, 1956, p. 13. - 27Begeman, New Republic, November 17, 1952, pp. 13-21. zslbid. 29191d. 3olbid. . . .. n n . w r. . . p C.— . ...» .. b Q -_~ —. . . . o u .. o. . .- .. , ._ Z I ”A. *- ~. .. “... 42 Stevenson's speech was mentioned on an inside page, the end of a story which was concerned mostly with this headline: ’J NIX N TO BARE PRIVATE FUNDS ON AIR TOIIIGIITJ1 Although the AFL eventualiy endorsed Stevenson, the flprld Teleeram' 3 banner headline read: IKE'S FIGHTING BID STIP s AFL32 When AFL did endorse Stevenson, the first time it had endo orsed a PreSIdential candidate since 1924, the Epleeram put the story on page two. Most other papers left the story out or buried it. When Eisenhower entered San Francisco on October 9th, the Oakland Tribune gave him the following banner headline: RECORD 100,000 THR ONG HAILS EISENI ‘IOW*R UN EASTBAY VISIT The page was also filled with huge photographs of the crowds, of the Genei a1 and of Mamie. Stevenson's visit eight days later received the banner headline: STEVEIISON LIKENS COIIITU’IIST SUE}; P III ASIA T0 AMERICAN In T"VOLUTICI‘U3 The page carried one photograph of Stevenson. Other newspapers ran headlines and pictures of Eisenhower for three days prior to his visit, while Stevenson's scIIedule was relerated to a small page one box. The biased use of campaign pictui res can be illustrated in this one example. The Los Angeles Times, when Stevenson was I\ D) (- speaking, devoted the full halt top of page ’ I hree to a photo- '1 77": AJ- y-v- vi 'u-J graph of a wounded GI bein” carried down a Korean ‘L‘LJ Beneath this the Times placed six small pictures of Stevenson. When Eisenhower visited, the Times gave him a two page Spread of photographs, nineteen pictures throughout the paper.3* The study demonstrated the failings of a partisan press truthfully and fully to report to the people. It also exposed the dangers involved in the selective process of news reporting and editing as was demonstrated in the AP wire coverage 0c the campaign. As was previously mentioned, Goldwater coverage in 1964 was also subject to criticism by the Republican Party. On July 13th of that year the San Francisco News Call Bulletin ran a page one banner headline: BARRY IS QUOTE : REPUBLICANS CAN'T WIN The headline was based on his interview with the German news magazine, Der Spicgel. What Goldwater had said was that "as of now, no Republican candidate could defeat President Johnson.” He had not said that the Republicans could not win in November of that year. An AP story in May stated that Goldwater advocated defoliation of Vietnamese jungles with low yield atomic wea- pons.35 The story shot around the world of Goldwater's trigger happy nuclear policy. What Goldwater actually had 34Ibid. 35"Covering the Candidate,” Newsweek, July 20, 1964, pp. 71-72. 44 said, however, was something less direct than headlines indicated. On an ABC television interview, Howard K. Smith asked the Senator how he would interdict in the Vietcong supply lines. Goldwater replied, ” here have been several suggestions made. I don't think that we would use any of them." He then advised defoliation as one of the possible methods suggested.36 What the AP story eliminated was Goldwater's important second statement, implying that we would not use any of the suggestions, including that of de- foliation. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, it is an example of misinterpretive political reporting. Much of this kind of reporting possibly reflects a partisan press. Those who work in the press, however, are primarily obligated to serve their public and not their employer in the truthful accounting of political events. The ultimate test of what should be written and how, should be the reporter's obligation to his public, according to James Reston. He must know where his primary allegiance lies. He does not owe that primary alle- giance to the owner of his neWSpaper, or to his managing editor, or to his government, or to the sources of his information; he owes it to the peeple, and if he gives it to any of the others, then he is not, in my judgment, a thoroughly honest reporter, no matter how much information he gathers, 36Ibid. :‘l' 1... - U 1 . '0’, cu. , »__ ~ . ‘ ¢ - -.. _ s. 45 or how enterprising he is, or how well he may write.3' This allegiance to the public is especially vital in the press function of criticism of our government when neces- sary. Regardless of the reporter's personal feelings, or the partisanship of those who own and manage the media, when administrative policies or decisions can be questioned or criticized, they cannot be ignored. It is one thing for the Administration to attempt to repress criticism; it is another when the medflmiitself avoids the critical function. The questioning and discussion of Eisenhower's health was a taboo subject during the 1956 campaign. Whenever Stevenson raised the question, he was denounced vitUperatively. Mass control of the media on this subject was absolute. Yet, in 1957, Stewart Alsop stated that because of his health, ”Eisenhower is an elderly man...a part time President.” Alsop also stated that there should be no surprise about his physi- cal state since the "voters" knew of it when they elected him, or should have known about it.33 The question then arises as to how the voters could have known about it if the subject was so thoroughly suppressed from questioning, discussion, or criticism. Speaking about press treatment of Kennedy, Peter Lisagor, IJashington bureau chief of the Chicago Daily News stated: 37James Reston, ”The Job of the Reporter" in The News- :paper: Its Iaking and Its Meaning (New York: Charles Scrib- Iner's Sons, 1945), p. 93. 33New Republic, May 20, 1957, o. 2. L .—- ‘52... 16,332.. ... I \ v «I. .. .1 ‘4. a. a .. ‘ « ~u. n/.\ 11.5 «4 Is L» I.‘ it I. 46 'The Kennedy administration has gotten the best press in my memory. I think that we have been unduly uncritical."39 Lyle C. Wilson, Washington bureau manager of United Press International has said, “I think the press was kind to Ike and I think that the press is being very kind to Kennedy. It H40 was inordinately kind during the campaisn. Here is another U “ reporter's views on press treatment of the Eisenhower years. It is my impression that for eight years Eisenhower was guarded very carefully. I think he had an eight year honeymoon: I think he got better treatment from the press than any other American who was President. I think it is much safer when there is good criticism of a President. I think a PreSI- dent deserves criticism, it helps him. I think Ike would have beep a better President of- ’ ... ° ‘1’]. II he had had critICIsm. It is a fact, however, that management slanting of news has decreased in the last few years. A recent survey of Washington correspondents revealed that pressure to slant stories exists in a much smaller degree than had prevailed some thirty years ago when a similar study was made. Only 10% of Washington correspondents still admit to some subtle pres- sure as to how stories should be played. Only 7% admit that C . O O O O 42 their stories have been subjected to direct retaliation. This is interesting in view of the fact that there ar more than three times as many Democrats as there are Republicans 39Worth Bingham and'Ward S. Just, ”The President and the Press,” The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p.-l9. 40Ibid. 41Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering_in Washington (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 197. 42Rivers, p. 64. "z‘ w-Nv ~ .- -. .... - ‘ .- ... .o --- ~— - . o s. . .-- ~- . '. ' - --- ...-- ~ A \ fi - C ‘s 7., 47 among Washington correspondents. More than 55% of the Wash- ington correspondents consider themselves liberal, and 25.9% consider themselves conservativef'3 Considering that the pressure to slant stories is small, another important question preserts itself, with regard to news coverage and criticism: Is complete objectivity possible in the news reporting pro— cess? It is a fact that even the most honest reporters and the most reSponsible media too often fall far short of objec- tivity and accuracy because of circumstances which will now be discussed. THE MATTER OF OBJECTIVITY Part of the problem in receiving truthful accurate information lies in the complexity and conventions of the news reporting and dissemination process itself. Walter Lippmann wrote of the problem in Liberty and the News: he subdivision of labor is now accompanied by the subdivision of the news organization. At one end of it is the eye witness, at the other, the reader. Between the two is a vast, expansive transmitting and editing apparatus. This machine works marvelously well at times, particularly in the rapidity with which it can report the score of a game, or a transatlantic flight or the death of a monarch, or the result of an election. But where the issue is complex, as for example in the matter of the success of a policy, or the social conditions among a foreign people, that is to say when the real answer is neither yes or no, but subtle, and a matter of balanced evidence, the sub- division of labor involved in the report 43Ibid. I nab. .... ,. ..t _ .- - v , --..‘. .- ..r».,“ . 7" I... n 7“ -»_ H. ‘« . .‘ . ._ u '. . ~‘, - ‘. ‘| . f| '. , . ‘. . ~ ~~ ._ . .‘. ~ ‘ . 's . ‘ . u. ' -_ “ ‘ . - I § . .' _ -‘ . ‘. - ‘~. \ . n . . 77 ('1 5 .. a . n .I, -. . ~ .‘ . .L g 4 ‘ . \ w ‘ . v ’1 40 causes no end of derangement, misundEZ- standing and even misrepresentation. Of primary importance in this subdivision of news or- ganization is the matter of editorial and news selectivity, both in the wire news services and the newSpaper or television news offices. Lester Markel of the New York Times attacks the notion that any form of reporting and dissemination of news can really be defined as ”objective“. The reporter, the most objective reporter, collects fifty facts. Out of the fifty he collects twelve to include in his story (there is such a thing as space limitation). Thus he discards thirty-eight. This is Judgment Number One. Then the reporter or editor decides which of the facts shall be the first paragraph of the story, thus emphasizing one fact above the other eleven. This is Judgment Number Two. Then the editor decides whether the story shall be placed on page one or page twelve; on page one it will command many times the attention it would on page twelve. This is Judgment Number Three. This so-called factual presentation is thus subjected to three judgments, all 0 them most humanly and most ungodly made. Markel's statement is only reaffirmed by the many studies of Lewin, Trohldal, Carter, White, and others covering the ”gatekeeping" process in news selectivity and editing. A study by Ithiel De Sola Pool and Irwin Shulman confirmed the hypothesis that persons writing about good news tend to pro- duce supportive images, while persons writing about bad news 44Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt Brace and Howe, 1920), p. 42. 45Rivers, p. 43. {- “e \ S .‘ ., . a . . “ - \ ‘ I I-.. .. 7‘ 49 46 tend to produce more crucial images. The same study pro- duced other interesting findings includ in the fact that good news was more accurately reported than bad.47 This and other studies emphasize that the reporting of a story very often depends on the newsman's conception of the audience he is l—o :3 writing for. This conception of the audience originates the personality of the writer and his immediate social environment. Simply this means that different reporters see the same things differently and see different things. The reader at home or the television viewer has a right to this diversity of reports. This is extremely cruc cia l in towns where repor - ing and interpretation of news is dependent on one newsgaper or one or two broadcast facilities. A study by David Manning White concerned the wire ecMi on the non-meti Opolitan news aper. The wire editor is respon- sible for selection of national and international news which will appear on the front and jump pages. Among the reasons found which determined his selection or rejection of news items were the following: 1. Category of News 2. Personal Prejudices 3. Concept of the Audience —f —_' ‘- 46Itniel de Sola Pool and Irwin Schulman, "Newsmens' Fantasies, Audiences, and Newswi iting" in Peeple, Society an IIass Communications, ed. by Lewis Anthony Dexter and David— Iflanning White (New York: Tne Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 155. 47Ib-d. [“0 5'1 .— I. 53 4. Specific tests of subject matter oz: way in which the story is I-iJr tten. The reporting process itseli, with iegard to press association coverage of a Presidential press confereLce was typ oically described by eteran l in an article in Holiday: The hurried press association reoortcr carries the r aw material of history into the Jas ington news bu:eau in the form of scrawlin gs on the scratch paper in his pocket. He writes it. It is processed by rewrite men and copy readers and it goes on the wire in fr gmenL tary takes. Press associsL on coveiage is fast, 'er- functory,a nd superfi ciallv factual.*7 All these studies would seem to indicate that the re- porting and dissemination of news “epresent a highly complex process, subject to many variations along the way. These variations can only result in political information which is ubje cted to misinter reta tion, and inaccuracy. These factors of selectivity and editin apply to the broadcast media in no less measure than they do to the press. TELEVISION AI ID THE Na .18 CBS newsman Walter Cronkite has stated: Television, like other news media, can be, and has been guilty of distortion by omis- sion or commission, and like them, faces a daily dilemma of mah ing news judgments in 48David Manning White, 'The Gatelzeeper; A Case Study in tine Selection of News” in Dexter and White, pp. 170-171. 49J. A. Liebling, ” he Press,” Hol'day, February, 1950, p. 100. ' Sl the continga " effort to be fair and impar t .Lci 1. These judgments Cronkite speaks about ai e subject to the same human fallibilities which exist in the press. Moreover, in ctions on full and H- the natui e of television itself lie res tr accurate reporting that do not ex st in the press. One of televisi Lon '3 biggest problems in any newscast is the time limit imposed upon it. This is an inherent handi- cap to full or comprehensive development of any important story. Again, Cronkite says, ”Daily newscasts can only sup- plement newspapers."51 There are time limits on the programs and on how much the average viewer wants to hear about a given story. In the daily newscast, I rarely use a story of more than 175 words as a straight on- camera report. Even a film repor t seldom runs over 350 words. At the other end of a scale, a fi ont page story in The New York Times runs to one thousand wor ds or more. J2 he mere selection of the 175 or 300 words themselves involves a subjective judgment which might unintentionally omit some more important fact. Which words out of a candi- date's speech are the ones that will be shown? Can the public really grasp the full implication of any political message after being exposed to a minimum amount of words taken out of context? These are questions that must be realized in the 50Walter Cronkite, ”Television and the News” in The Eighth Art, (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 19625, p. 227. 51Robert Kintner, ”Broadcasting and the News,” War ers, April, 1965, p. 50. _ —-lL—- SZIbid. . _.. ‘7‘." 1'. . . ...-va._..( “ . ...—..-.o- and .. ._,‘ d:u€‘~ a 4 , c The 1 1:3 ." ‘58“‘ C“ t ‘59: can ". . 3 5“ I Sta», If. ' .Q‘J." 'r 52 hazardous game of news selectivity, regardless of any lack of bias. Television news programs compete for time more acutely than a managing editor competes for news Space with a news- paper's advertising department. The neWSpaper's Space can be expanded to accommodate any major news event. Television news, however, must function within the im- posed time limits of the thirty-minute newscast. Editing is, therefore, that much more important to utilize the time most efficiently. The balance between news and advertising cannot be arbitrarily fixed from program to program as a neWSpaper can do from one edition to the other. The lead headline in a television newscast is even more important than the lead headline of the daily neWSpaper. Page one of a newspaper can highlight a variety of news items, some more prominently than others. The reader can select the item most appealing to his news curiosity. If necessary the item can "jump" to an inside page to develop fully the impor- tant story and all the facts. In television there is no ' Television must deliver one news item at a time "jump.' consecutively? Prominence of the story can be illustrated only by its place in the newscast. The story of a bus acci- dent, however, may receive only few words less than the story of a revolution. Even more vital is the fact that a neWSpaper reader can go back and re-check. The television newscaster cannot offer these facts or details or figures. The viewer cannot return to 53 ' . look at these things for clarification. The fast moving pace of the television news program dictates simplicity of detail. The problem of dealing with a complex news story in the simple terms demanded in a hard news program is one of tele- vision's built-in barriers to full reporting and clarification of issues. The print media have developed the ”all purpose" news story technique. The most dramatic single lead is followed by the less dramatic but essential facts, so that theoretically the first paragraph tells all. The editor can cut the story off at any point after that. However, as James Reston of The New York Times points out: This practice sharpens and inflates the news. It encourages not a balanced but a startling presentation of the news. Time after time, with a complicated story the result is distortion.J3 The same is true in television news, which by its nature stresses the action news event. Eric Sevareid gives an example of the kind of news distortion the visual medium gives because of this emphasis on dramatic. Buddhists staged some riots in Saigon and DeNang. The TV cameras wheeled up. hey focus, of course, on whatever is most dramatically in motion. They act like a flashlight beam in the darkness. Everything else around, however vital to the full story, is lost in the darkness and ceases to exist. The picture could not show you that a block away from the Saigon riots the populace was 53Eric Sevareid ”Politics and the Press," an address . , before a Joint 8e831on of the Massachusetts State Legislature, Boston, Mass., Jan. 24, 1967. ... ... A ~‘ IV § 9% LL ... a. ~4h ... a. .... c L a. ... al\ C. ... ._ ...~ . . a. .. q.v tan an .. L x. \. ‘.~ .I ~\~ ..- .. ... 1 N.H H“ CH .: Inu.‘L c c . i 3 ... 54 shopping, chatting, sitting in restaurants in total normalcy. The riots involved a tiny proportion of the people in either city; yet the effect of the pictures in this country, including in the Congress, was explOSive. People here thought Vietnam was tearing itself apart, that civil war was t, raging. Nothing of the sort was happenings)“+ Sevareid then states the problem of finding the techniques that will balance the spot news and the Spot picture and put them into proportion so that things can be seen as they really are. One of the methods of achieving this balanced presenta- tion of facts is through analysis or commentary. Unfortunately, however, television commentary does not enjoy the prominence which it did in radio. As stated previously, the line among straight news, commentary and editorializin is deemed a narrow one by broadcasters. The dangersof having to offer free time througn misinterpretation of a commentator‘s or newscaster's remarks have proven a big enough concern to sponsors and to broadcast management to cause almost a complete avoidance of this news function. Even in straight news reporting some editorializing takes place, however. Quincy Howe, a former President of Radio Television News Analysts, has stated: All news presented on radio and television editorializes. The newscaster editorializes in what he emphasizes and what he plays down, in what he omits and what he includes. 54Ibid. 55Edith Effron, 'Vhy Speech on Television is Not Really Free," TV Guide, April ll, 1964, p. 7. ; . '.' 55 NBC newscaster David Brinkley has said: News is what I say it is. Its aomething worth knowing by my standards. Certainly even the most objective newscast can, by the way it is delivered, have editorial implications. Although the news- caster's words can have the cold objectivity of a computer, his delivery and emphasis do not. The implications of the delivery can be as evident or meaningful as the words themselves. Aside from the straight newscast, however, which is not intended to be commentary, there is little straight analysis on the air today in television. The brilliant radio commen- tators who dominated the air in the thirties and forties have long since left the broadcast scene. H. V. Kaltenborn, Gabriel Heater, Raymond Swing, Fulton Lewis Jr., are names of a by- gone era. The famous CBS corps of commentators developed during World War II, including Cecil Brown, Edward P. Morgan, Joseph Harsch, and John Daly, are not known in television for their roles as commentators. Only the late Edward R. {urrow, Howard K. Smith, and Eric Sevareid have built reputations on their critical broadcasts in television. This lack of commentary must have a detrimental influ- ence on the public's full understanding of important issues. It is a cause of concern for many astute broadcasters and critics. 56Ibid. 56 Professor Percy Tannenbaum of the University of Wisconsin Mass Communications Research Center complained during the 1960 Presidential campaign that television news- men were failing to interpret the news. Jay Gould in an article asked “Might not the absence of regular commentary on television which so preoccupies the American attention be one factor in the national complacency?“57 Perhaps an eluci- dation and discussion of the full implications of the Vietnam commitment since its inception over the years might have done much to clarify the present confusion evident in the American public. What commentary does exist has been charged by some with being oriented toward a liberal or moderate point of View. John Gregory Dunne blames the three major networks for the proliferation of extreme right wing religious broad- casts on radio today. He is referring to such programs as Carl McIntire's ”Twentieth Century Reformation Hour” and the programs of Billy James Hargis, Ed Cotton, and others who represent the extreme conservative point of view. Dunne claims that the news departments of all three networks are "in the hands of an established consensus, boarded on one side by Eric Sevareid, on the other by Howard K. Smith.“53 Regarding their positions on important issues, he says: 57Jay Gould, "Opinion on Television," New Republic, January 13, 1958, p. 4. - H 58John Gregory Dunne, ”Whose Dissent do You Hear?, _New Republic, November 6, 965, p. 36. V-Ql" ~.v . ...-..- h 'A..._. . L n 1 I r I I ... .- ' ~-. ‘ . v 's- ‘ L. ‘_ c . .‘ u ... u -. ‘. ., ' . ‘ . ’- L 3‘ v5 , ‘- ‘~-: s o 'L ‘ . .~ . \,' ‘ 'L . \ - ‘ u ,. ‘ h -k ‘~ ~ t _ .~ \ ’~ - x a . r n 57 To ascertain where these gentlemen stand on any given public issue takes no great perspicacity on the part of the listener.59 Quincy Howe, writing of the state of newscommentary in tele- vision, commented on the partisanship of the CBS news staff: While no two CBS news analysts agree on every subject, the CBS news staff includes only those commentators whose Views follow liberal patterns in domestic affairs and internationalist views in foreign affairs. Not since H. V. Kaltenborn moved to NBC in 1940 has the CBS Network featured a news 60 analyst with a frankly conservative outlook. NBC News chief Bill McAndrew has stated: The prevailing opinion of this network is moderate. We have the political spectrum interpreted by moderates. Rightists call us libegal, labor peOple say we are in the middle. 1 Don Hewitt of CBS News likewise admitted, ”the networks are in the hands of corporations which see the world in the same way--as moderate liberals."62 Thus, it would seem to be accepted that the prevailing network voice today is one of moderate if not liberal interpretation. According to Dunne, as a result of this policy, the right or conservative vieWpoint is represented by the fringe element, and not by any intelligent spokesmen. If only by implication dissenters are made to appear as obstructionists, curios, or bVIbid. 6oQuincy Howe, "Rise and Fall of the Radio Commentators,” Saturday Review, October 26, l95l, p. 40. blEffron, TV Guide, p. 7. 621bid. .....q. . -\-.. .l 53 maniacs. As a result a communication gap has opened between the main stream and other tributa dries of America n thought and one effect of this gap has been to drive those to the right of consensus into the arms of Reverend Bo b Jells3 (A right wing religious broadcaster.) Si CU Wells, Flare is, McIntire, and other extremists voice doom, hatred, and fear in more than 10,000 broadcasts a week across the country. Their brand of political-religious rhetoric is neither rational political dissent nor the con- structive criticism of responsible conservatives. Other conservative programs include the Dan Smoot Report and the Clarence Manion Forum. Under the guise of patriotism these extremists of the airwaves play havoc with the true meaning of loyal conserva- tive opposition represented by such protagonists as William Buckley, Barr Ly Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and others. lLe background of McIntire , Hargis, Smoot, and Nanion would hardly qualify them as truly knowledgable and articu- late Spokesmen for the conservative voice in this country. Dan Smoot, a former FBI man was a reporter for the now defunct Facts Forum program, financed by Texas oil millionaire and arch right-winger H. L. Hunt, a notoritnmsanti-Semite. Luz Reverend Carl McIntire was expelled from the Presbyterian Church in 1936 for "causing dissension and sti ife and geneL- ating suSpicion and ill will.” Clarence Nanion is a member 63Dunne, New Republic, p. 36. (The discussion here of Welles, McIntire, etc., is a distillation of Opinions expressed on this group in articles by Dunne, Hickey, and others.) C .) '3 of the National Council of the John Birch Society.64 The need for a true articulate representation of the conservative element of our country is then well-stated by Dunne. An influx of conservative broadcasts could be invigorating, could cut through to shape the thinking of Americans who now live in an embottled half world where they have never heard a literate statement of their own posi- tion, a world in which all dialogue has broken down, where the vocabulary of politics is the vocabulary of resentment, which is the sge- cialty of the electronic Bible whackers. 5 There is indeed a noticeable lack of intelligent conser- vative representation among major television newscasters. Be that as it may, the network must still be wary of too strongly advocating any particular point of view. Regard- less of any position it might take, there is always a segment of the public which it is bound to offend, including the government which has long been concerned with the words uttered by news analysts and commentators. Professor Elmer Smead of Dartmouth College has written: Congressmen have often resented criticism from newscasters. Advocacy of ideas has often offended social and economic groups in the country. ’Protests have come from all sides. Republicans have charged Democrats with using political pressure on broadcasters to get favorable treatment for New Deal and Fair Deal policies. Liberals have complained that radio and television tend to favor con- servatives. Labor has maintained that 64Neil Hickey, ”They Call Themselves Patriots,” TV game, April 15, 1967, pp. 14-17. 65Dunne, New Republic, p. 37. - .. . , .— --~ ...-.L . ..- _ ' . v; .- v - . u.¢..,“‘_’ ‘ . -. \n-- .- _ - ...-..‘3 . -L ‘ ‘ .. h A ‘- ’ '~__'\ ‘W '5 C -c . '.“' f. - L . v- -‘ a ._. _ ll.h ‘AA ‘ .. . .- - h o -. C v. k . ‘ o.._ - L . '__ . .. -~ £ - -h I O -\ ‘.‘ VS. : ‘-.\_. u - .‘r‘ ‘ .‘ ‘ ‘HL. “ ._ . C- . g“ . I \- . ll .“ ‘ .‘ . ’ :"‘L 0 U‘ ’1‘. u ‘ “~L " A 1" 5‘; t P ‘ . .‘ge a“ ‘ . - in ~,‘ '- ‘uL . I \Q" ‘ .L' d_~‘ L... R l \'\ {\ ‘ Q .1. V4 .0 - .‘\ ~E:c \ U . , K. a 6O businessmen indoctrinate ligteners with the business p01nt of View.00 The problem remains, however, in that without this analysis and explanation, how is the public to be adequately and truthfully informed on vital political issues? It is another serious barrier to the public right to know. No small part of network reluctance to take direct stands or offer more commentary is the fear of sponsor pres- sure. A sponsor cannot control news content. There is nothing, however, which prevents him from dropping sponsorship of a program in which he feels the newscaster is a little more than objective in his treatment of the news. The bigger the information media, the less courage and freedom of eXpression they allow, according to Eric Sevareid. The late Edward R. iurrow, one of the most respected of broadcast commentators, stated his dissatisfaction with the state of broadcasting in these words: I would like television to produce some itching pills rather than th%§ endless outpouring of tranquilizers. The kinds of pressures a news analyst is subjected to can be evidenced in the case of Howard K. Smith. Smith left a lucrative position as Chief Washington Correspondent for CBS in a dispute over his freedom to comment on events. Going to ABC, he began originating a "News and Comment” program. On 66Elmer E. Smead, Freedom of Speech by Radio and Tele- ifléigg, (Washington, D. C. Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 74. 67William Rivers, The Opinion Makers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 104. .. . ....“ - ‘I O -‘h 0' “.‘ ‘o ....I‘ .--..- ... n\d ...-u- I" -" 3 2.. .3 T. T. c. L . ‘ ~ — . s :- .— .l ... u “I. A w L .L— ... a. .c .3 I. «0‘ .... ... .. L ‘. a”. ... L a“ Q. as :L .. .... LL .I\ L... are Cu .L; at Cr» 3 s .FM s 5 o. § .v . a by ac 0“ A. s ‘ rt.» .3 : ... ..‘u my. ..L e E .~.. .... as L. A: O '\ 3 QC" " 61 one of these he presented a political obituary of Richard Nixon that included a two-minute interview with Alger Hiss. Several ABC sponsors of other ABC programs attempted to break their contracts. Two ABC stations refused to broadcast the program, and then blacked-out references to it in the next day's news reports. By the end of the season Smith's own sponsors had deserted him.68 The case of commentator John Henry Faulk still recalls unpleasant memories of the McCarthy era in broadcasting. In his book, Fear on Trial, Faulk gives stark evidence of how the members of a small anti-communist organization called Aware Inc. posed as "consultants" to the industry. They were paid to use innuendoes, half-truths, and meaningless "research" to defame and ruin the professional careers of many person- alities, including news commentators. The networks in this era had completely abdicated their responsibility to serve the public interest in favor of the commercial interest and the threat of sponsor boycott. A more striking example of possible Sponsorship control of news, implied if not direct, concerns the UPI wire service. Since many broadcast stations utilize the UPI, its case is certainly most relevant. Several years ago a Senator Fullbright Committee Hearing uncovered the fact that UPI assigned news agency reporters from time to time to projects paid for by private industry and public relations firms.69 681bid. 69Richard L. Tobin, ”Straws of an Ill Wind," Saturday Review, July 13, 1963, p. 41. a." -" '.J (... ...F. ..c ... .. ...v ... : ~-—--~., gay...“ IA-pq. ...~ .‘O'CI. ~_. ~‘. \- 1r. 4 I 62 This raises two important questions. When reporting any news concerning one of his "clients," how objective can the wire service reporter be? Secondly, when interviewing an important official, how certain can the official be as to the reason for the interview? Is the reporter asking a question for news value, or for the information of a client? This question might very well tend to influence the flavor of the questions and answers of the interview. For whatever reason, the fact remains that the networks are not yet fully fulfilling the obligation to the public out- lined in the first and second requirements of a free and responsible press, "to provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning, and "to serve as a forum for the exchange ' The problems of "fairness" and of comment and criticism.’ "sponsorship" combine to defeat this criterion. If straight editorializing on national and inter- national issues is prohibited on the networks, it is not much more freely permitted on the local stations. The problems of equal time and sponsorship would again seem to be the two major reasons for neglecting this vital area of public interest. In the latest NAB survey of editorial practices by our nation's broadcasters, 59% of the broadcast station managers stated that the FCC fairness doctrine inhibits the treatment 63 of controversial subjects.7O Among the interesting findings reported by the survey are the following: 1. 57% of radio stations and 56% of TV stations now broadcast editorials. 2. 33% of radio stations and 35% of TV stations have never editorialized. 3. There has been no appreciable increase in the ngent of broadcast editorializing since 1 . 4. Gross revenues play a role in a station's decision to editorialize. 5. Only 10% of the stations has ever endorsed a political candidate. 6. Items of purely local interest are most likely to be covEEEd—editorially.71 These facts would seem to indicate that the function of editorializing is still not widely practiced by the industry. Moreover, when it is, it deals with local issues, but not necessarily political, as evidencedby the majority of stations failing to endorse any political candidate. This is princi- pally due to the failure of broadcasters, or lack of concern to understand fully the Fairness Doctrine and Equal Time pro- visions of Section 315. The Survey asked the respondents to answer true or false to the following statement: The fairness doctrine requires that a station give equal time for the resentation of views contrary to the stand ta en by the station in an editorial. The statement is false because it contains the equal time phrase. The Fairness Doctrine states only that time must be offered to 70"The Shackles of Fairness,’l Broadcasting, August 7, 1967, p. 92. ‘ 71"Editorializing Tiedto Station Revenues," Broadcastigg, August 7, 1967, p. 58. I. 2.. ..— 64 the opposing view. It says nothing about equal time being definitely given. However, 69% of radio management and 56% of television management said the statement was £333.72 Questioned on Section 315 of the Communications Act, one out of three broadcast executives thinhsthe statute applies to editorials as well as to political candidates speaking out on their own behalf.73 This confusion over the statutes pertaining to politi- cal broadcasting and Fairness was demonstrated in the 1962 political elections. According to former FCC Chairman, Newton Minow, the Commission received a total of 856 com- plaints of unfair treatment involving station treatment of sixty-three specific issues, forty concerned with treatment of candidates, and twenty with issues on ballots.74 Whether through misunderstanding or intention, broadcasters have used both the Fairness Doctrine and Section 315 to Shirk part of their informative responsibility. Considerably lacking even where there is editorializing is comment on foreign affairs. Aside from sponsor pressure, however, or equal time implications, perhaps one of the rea- sons for lack of commentary is the sheer courage it takes to make a stand. When King Broadcasting Company stations in Seattle, Portland, and Spokane came out strongly for de-escalation of 721bid. 73Ibid. 74Minow, Egual Time, p. 23. 65 the war in Vietnam, their editorials made headlines. Among many vociferous reactions the station in Portland received was the accusation that the station manager is a Communist.75 In some parts of the country, the Fairness Doctrine while preventing editorializing on the one hand, seems to be advantageously overlooked on the other. Only two years ago the FCC held that ten AM stations had violated the Fairness doctrine when they refused to make time available, except on a paid basis, to the victim of an attack broadcast on a sponsored program. The program involved was one of these featuring the Reverend Billy James Hargis, a notorious right- winger. Hargis made his attack while discussing an article in The Nation on right-wing hate groups. The subject of his attack, Fred Cook, a reporter for the New York World Telegram, Egg §Efla requested time to reply. Most of the stations said they would not grant Mr. Cook time unless he paid for it or secured sponsorship. Others directed him to ask the Reverend Hargis for permission to appear on the program.76 One of the most flagrant violations of the Fairness doctrine, with regard to public issues, involved station WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi. It is an important case because only recently it resulted in a new precedent being set by the Supreme Court, which can have many implications for the future of any radical extremist broadcast. 75"TV Raises its Editorial Voice," Newsweek, May 15, 1967, p. 93. 76Story in Broadcasting, October 11, 1965, p. 58. ‘v. 66 WLBT has long been an advocate of States' rights and segregation. In 1955 the station deliberately cut off an NBC program featuring Thurgood Marshall, then Solicitor General of the United States and Legal Counsel for the NAACP. The program was replaced by a slide reading, "Sorry Cable Trouble.” The reason given by the manager was that the program was "controversial" and the station would have to offer equal time to the other side. In 1957 the station presented a program after elections which featured a panel of elected Mississippi officials dis- cussing the Little Rock Crisis. The late Medgar Evers, claiming that only the Caucasian segregationist point of view was represented, asked for time to reply. In this case, however, the owners did not consider the matter as one of controversy, but only as a report to the people by their elected representatives. Hence, Evers was refused time. In 1962 the station ran a series of editorials Opposing the entry of James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. C A series of commercial announcements paid ior by The White Citizens Council showed ' ’published proof” that the Communists were behind racial agitation in Mississippi. The management umintained that the Fairness doctrine did not apply to commer- cials, and that the editorials dealt with ”states rights” and not with racial integration. The National Church of Christ introduced affidavits that the station introduced the NBC News on the TODAY program with a local voice saying, ”What you are about to see is an On- ..—. ab. ... .t c» 67 example of biased, managed, Northern news. Be sure to stay tuned at 7:25 to hear your local newscast."77 Where is the broadcaster's doubt as to interpretation in these cases? How can the public be truthfully and accur- ately informed of pp 2 points of view with regard to programs like this, when the definition of controversy is so arbitrary? Finally, in 1965 WLBT was granted a license renewal on a probationary basis and a rather tepid warning by the FCC to straighten out its editorial and public service policies. At the insistence of the Church of Christ, however, and other civic groups, the decision was appealed. This year, in a dramatic decision, the United States Court of Appeals forced the FCC to schedule a full public hearing on the current application for license renewal. This important decision gggg the precedent that any responsible group can challenge a station's right to the airwaves if it fails to serve all segments of its community.78 This is most important in those markets which do not have access to more than one or two stations. The fact is that our of 274 total TV markets, almost half, lll,are still one-station markets.79 Fifty-seven are two-station markets.80 Less than half of all television cities have access to three 77Walter Pincus, "Discriminating TV in Jackson, Missis- sippi," New Republic, June 5, 1965, pp. 7-8. 78"Challenge in the South," Newsweek, May 29, 1967, p. 63. 79Dimensions of Television (report by the NAB, 1966), p. 13. , 8OIde. “ on ‘5’ t % .. L . ,, ‘ -. .-. . - ., And -... g 0 .‘ -‘ o ‘ .P ‘ v” s. . 'l . -a‘l. h— :“ 4 .~.. L ... -..». .L~ " ‘4 I. \ r-”' . F . b_v ‘ "'.- V ‘_ h- 9. Q {.7- ‘ V. .-‘\¢-‘ o .‘_. A, —. -p‘ - . .. ‘ ‘uu— - .,~° . ‘ ‘ v. . e‘ . ‘A ‘5 x w ~~ (- - ..~~L t . as h . ‘~- «“" ‘ v ...... f‘ .5 ':‘rJ do“ V “- Q ‘~ . t_‘ h D 5*.‘E\"'.-: §‘ h k‘ ‘ . s d‘ " I C)" y" a ‘ E o‘ N! ’p. ...E -. u‘ ‘- ‘. q: V‘ _‘. A ‘K et*a .ektIflt Q I ‘3 '1 . Lint, u) \,-e _ L 68 or more stations. For a small market station to advocate and flagrantly violate the Fairness doctrine is generally agreed to be a serious neglect of the public's right to know. Moreover, it does not fulfill the final requirement of a free and responsible press: that of providing "full access to the day's intelligence.” TELEVISION AND CAMPAIGNS We have so far discussed the treatment of news in general by the media and its restricting limitations. The focus of this study, however, being political communication, it is necessary to examine the role television plays in bring- ing and clarifying issues to the public. The power of television to build a campaign image is a generally conceded assumption. Not so evident, however, is television's ability or attempts to clarify issues and points of View or guarantee maximum exposure to all political points of view. Much of this difficulty lies within the nature of the medium itself, compounded by the rules and regulations of political broadcasting. Certainly it cannot be denied that television to a large extent has given us a more informed citizenry and a wider choice of candidates. Senators, governors, congressmen, and other officials now have national access to voters' homes by appearing on the many political interview programs and news shows emanating from Washington. Any potential candidate no longer must be the stranger to the American voting public that ~~‘ o-c—hv-r')§' h- E or i ‘Ov ,_‘ 9 .\5;.«. v - I»- A ‘4... .§ I. —uv.~~ . . ,3 I ... ... . ... .. ... . .. .\ . . x. . ‘— s ... _ u . 9“ .L .C u... p: ... .... u” t ,C 3 h . a. . . .... ..F» fiat o‘- “. voo .L ,L ‘. ... a? ...u e .1. .... t uwv A . -. Ox \ “st, 69 he formerly was. Kefauver, Stevenson, and the late John F. Kennedy are evidence of television's power to familiarize the public with the relatively unknown politician. Television has probably also served to make political campaigns more honest, according to CBS News director, Sig ‘Mickelson. The candidate cannot deny statements made over the air in full view of a national audience in a ”live“ speech, debate, or interview program. Television's potential during any campaign was stated by Robert Bendiner: Given a role in keeping with its power, its nature and its demands, TV can serve to dis- till the essentials of campaign debate from the mass of flummery and empty rhetoric. It can establish a greater rapport ngween the nation and its potential leaders. Perhaps television has done too much distilling. If the press can be accused of possible slanting in its politi- cal coverage, television might be accused of simplification. More and more, candidates are turning to television; and more and more, politics approach the selling techniques of adver- tising. TV would seem to be more inclined to sell the brand name or image, rather than the ingredients or substance of the man. Eric Sevareid has stated. This is the age of appearances, when the wrapping seems more important than the contents. Wrappings can be seen at a glance, while contents require digging, and that takes 81Robert Bendiner, ”How Much Has TV Changed Campaigning?,” in Elections USA, ed. by Evron M. Kirkpatrick and Jeane J. - KirkpatrickJTNew York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956) p. 71. --.. ‘0. “‘ao. 70 time. Our political campaigns are the longest in the world, much too long in many respects, but still too short for the full unfolding of a public man's private nature.82 It is difficult to state any exact time when jockeying for convention votes begins. Decisions to run can be contem- plated many many months before a convention or primary even takes place. In October, 1950, a good year and a half before the convention, Governor Dewey announced he would not be a candidate in 1952. Eisenhower and MacArthur booms began in 1951. The clever maneuvering that put John Kennedy in the White House is known to have started years before the 1960 convention. Appearances, therefore, by any potential candidate at any time amount to a public testing of his television image. The impression the candidate makes on any voter depends on the timing and of the appearance factors within the voter himself. The homecoming of General Eisenhower to Abilene on a dreary rainy day, added to the General's sluggish appear- ance, to convey the picture of a tired man. To some undecided voters, the recall of this one bad impression might form the rationale for an irrational negative vote. Nixon's sluggish appearance in his debate with Kennedy did much to contribute to the image he projected. This element of timing is also important in the incli- nation to accept and pay attention to a candidate's message. 82Eric Sevareid, ed. Candidates 1960 (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 10. .S- -. ..\ 71 There is ample evidence to suggest that given a choice of television fare, even a committed voter will prefer viewing something other than conventions and speeches. A Sidlinger survey of 1956 found the following facts: 1. an average of 33 million watched conven- tions each day compared to 54 million reached by two competing commercial shows. 2. nearly 70. of the viewers complained about not being able to get programmed entertainment. 3. where available baseball and old movies fre- quently attracted more viewers than the conventions. On October 22, 1958, President Eisenhower on a speech from Chicago began with annArbitron rating of 11.8 and ended up with a 7.1.84 Even the Great Debates of 1960 showed an audience decline after the first debate. Approximately 75 million viewers watched the first debate. Between 51 and 62 million watched the second debate, and between 48 and 60 million viewed the third. The last debate again drew between 48 and 70 million.85 Too much political palaver, like too many commercials, placed in their wrong time spot,can have an irritating or negative effect on viewer desire to receive the message, let alone pay attention to its contents. There is evidence of positive irritation at the disruption of a scheduled program for political speeches. Station ABC-TV in New York received 83”Are Political Conventions a TV Flop?," US News and World Report, September 7, 1956, p. 35. 84"Boredom and TV Politicking," The Nation, November 8, 1958, p. 330. ' 85Earl Mazo, "The Great Debates,’I in The Great Debates (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 19627, p. 4. us- as T; m n.‘ 72 1,000 protests when the program “77 Sunset Strip“ was cut into by a Democratic program.86 WPIX in New York received irate calls from more than 300 viewers after giving equal time to splinter party candidates in the 1960 race for the United States Senate.87 The importance of the timing of a political speech was recognized by Sig Mickelson, CBS News Director, in a Speech on ”TV and the Voter.” The paid Speech usually interrupts an entertainment program which the viewer tunes in to see. This does not make for a parti- cularly favorable climate. He is seen by many who might be watching g western and are irritated by the intrusion.00 2) He then suggests that the candidates pay more attention to getting on newscasts and news interview type programs such as MEET THE PRESS. It is in this departure from the Standard political speech that television politics approaches the advertising concept. Since voters are conditioned to escapist entertain- ment, political rhetoric must adapt itself to pleasing and persuading like entertainment type advertising. Within the time limits of the ten, twenty, or sixty second Spot, the political commercials must use slogans, appeals, and images to catch the voter's interest. It is similar to the simplified yet biased wording of a newspaper _‘ 87Robert Lewis Shayon, “A Political Climic Program,” Saturday Review, November 17, 1962, p. 38. 88Robert Lewis Shayon, "Pavlov and Politics,” Saturday Review, January 23, 1960, p. 28. ‘7- it. 73 headline. The commercial spot can only simplify the issues and the candidate's stand on these issues. By the act of omission it cannot accurately give the voting public the in- formation it really needs to make a rational decision. Many political formats used to replace the straight speech have more of a tinge of show business than political rhetoric. Image and personality become dominant over issues. And, most important, many of these formats practice outright deceit in their presentation. There is much evidence to show television's ability to project personalities rather than issues because of these commercial tactics. Malcolm Moos has made the statement: Television has become a SUpermarket for personality projection. The key to success- ful TV performance lies in the word image, the sculpturing of a candidate's public figure to satisfy theflquixotic whims of the public eye and mind.07 This image building is accomplished through television's own symbolic language of advertising and entertainment. Shorthand stereotypes create a maximum image in a minimum amount of time. Visual and verbal symbols replace meaningful clarification of views and statements. The Kennedy-Nixon Debates are a prime example of the ' 'good guy” ”bad guy” images as reflected in different political personalities. Speeches, when they are used, must be prepared carefully in advance to be worded for mass audience consumption. Basic 89William Ewald, “Television and Politics-Who Projects the Image of a Winner?”, Iewsweek, September 5, 1960, p. 19. 74 ideas turn into a repetition of the most facts in the shortest time. It has been shown that television is more effective in projecting central issues, those most closely related to the mass public, than peripheral issues. One of the most successful attempts to free political rhetoric from the binding format of the straight political speech took place in 1960 during the debates between Kennedy and Nixon. No other political event of our time received such thorough coverage and analysis. The vast amount of research and commentary that the debates elicited is beyond the focus of this study. Suffice to say, the debates made a tremendous impact on political campaigning. By exposing both candidates to voters of all parties simultaneously, the debates overcame the effects of selective exposure. hey did much to advance the level of public political information, and certainly con- tributed greatly to the image of the two candidates. How- ever, even the debates, in their treatment of vital issues, were a source of some disappointment to many observers. Theodore White blames this factor on television's nature to demand constant action. All TV and radio discussion programs are compelled to snap question and answer back and forth as if the contestants were adver- saries in an intellectual tennis match . The most thoughtful and reaponsive answers to any difficult questions come after long pause, and the longer the pause the more illumina- ting the thought that follows it, but the electronic media cannot bear to suffer a pause more than five seconds; a pause of thirty seconds of dead time or air seems interminable. Thus, snapping two and a half minute answers back and forth, both candidates a; . 4 LL 1 ..a .J " .f «a 1F. .. in!» o. .. .. 75 could only react for the cameras and the people, they could not think. And since the two and a half minutes permit only a snatch of naked thought and a spatter of raw facts, both candidates, whenever caught out on a limb with a thought too heavy . . . a thought seemingly too bold or fresh to be accepted by the conditioned American mind, hastily scurried back toward center as soon as they had enunciated the thought . . . The TV de- bates did little to advance the reasonable discussion of issues that is the dream of unblooded political scientists. The format of the debates as a handicap to eliciting clarification on important issues was also expressed as a con- cern of Douglas Cater, one of the selected panelists. The format of the Great Debates was neither fish nor fowl, not permitting the relentless interrogation of the MEET THE PRESS type of quiz show, or the clash pf ideas that can occur in genuine debate.’ (It is interesting to note Mr. Cater's mention of the MEET THE PRESS.) This implied concern for a format which elicits opinion and solution to problems more than just repetition of facts is also voiced by Norman Cousins, in an article titled, "Presidents Don't Have to be Quiz Champions.’l Far more impressive in fact, than an instant diSplay by a candidate of his statistical knowledge of a problem would be a clear state- ment of how he would go about developing the reSponsible means of findings a reSponsible answer.9 90Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmot, Cal. 'Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967), p. 52. 91Douglas Cater, "Notes From Backstage,” in The Great ngates, ed. by Sidney Kraus (Bloomington, Indiana: Univer- sity of Indiana Press, 1962), p. 128. 92Norman Cousins, "Presidents Don't Have to be Quiz Champions," Saturday Review, November 5, 1960, p. 34. . "--. o~t I. 'I'EI'E 32'. 51‘ S“‘.=-e-\ iii-.... "" -u‘ r7_ r? 76 Regardless of these limitations, however, the Debates were an attempt honestly to enlighten the public by direct, spontaneous confrontation with the candidates. They were one way of eliminating any misquoting or inaccurate biased report- ing of what was said and how it was said. For this alone they were a great step forward in electronic political communica- tion. They were far removed from the deceit and simplifica- tion characterizing the political commercial, which is now becoming the more dominant type of political broadcasting. In the elections of 1962 candidates and their supporters spent three times as much for spot announcements as they did for program time.93 It is well to ask, what is the effect of the political commercial on truly informing the public. COMMERCIAL POLITICKING The use of advertising techniques applied to politics has been a part of television since the early 1950's. Slo- gans and appeals and the manner in which a program is staged make it more difficult for the voter to differentiate the contrived from the truthful and the image from the issue. The theory that the same kind of salesmanship that in- duces peOple to buy soap can induce them to buy a candidate was used by Representative Harrison Williams as early as 1954. With help from a professional ad man from Benton and Bowles, 93Rubin, Political Television, p. 132. v. . .. h s H « . . t n a. a. a? . . Q,— .p~ . _ a In. «. _ —. c . o‘u . w .4 or; , .~ 5 ‘- 5. 0.. . fin.» bk . . :u .. . . ... Ag. ..L Lfi \. 77 he produced t ree shows and cartoons of a baby-kissing, cigar- distributing ward politician contrasted with the thirty-four year old personable Williams.9l+ Nixon's famous "Checkers'i Speech, Eisenhower's, "I'll go to Korea" promise, Kennedy's ”New Frontier“ slogan have all had the symbolic simplicity of advertising appeal. One of the most flagrant uses of advertising technique was exhibited in 1956 according to Gilbert Seldes: Television comes out of the (1956) campaign humiliated, corrupted, and disgraced . from the way it was used and not used, from the way it allowed itself to be abused and from its failure toogunction at the top of its potentialities.J The advertising influence resulted in phony domesticity, folksiness, and informality hardly suitable to the dignity of a Presidential campaign. Candidates were known by first names. We visited ”Ike and Mamie,"“Adlai and the boys,” ”Dick and Pat," and ”Estes and Nancy.” The commercial spots and contrived programs not only simplified issues, but deceived the public on personality as well. The "Citizens for Eisenhower” press conference was well-rehearsed with Eisenhower supporters all carefully se- lected and representing every major voting block in a beautifully contrived commercial. The questioners were 94Gilbert Seldes, “Bullies and Fraidy Cats," Saturday Egyiew, December 8, 1956, p. 31. 95Walter Goodman, "Candidates and the Camera,” Egg Re ublic, May 9, 1955, pp. 13-14. ,- 78 identified as newspapermen, but there were 22 hostile news- papers represented. It was actually a caricature of an honorable institution.96 Similarly a visit between Adlai Stevenson and Estes T Kefauver on Stevenson's farm staged in a “regular fellow” atmosphere, showed both candidates in shirt sleeves talking i'yes, Adlai,” and no, about farm prices, and accented by Estes."97 It seemed contrived and untimely. A Kefauver television program on October 16th, 1956, featured Republican corruption. Here is one critic's comments on the program. The main purpose was to come as close as possible to a rogues gallery without using those very words for it . . . showing pic- tures of Republican officials in photos worthy of police files and with commentary by Kefauver./U Eisenhower's famous TV spots on corruption, high prices, high taxes, and war were generally good even though they represented the essence of simplification of complex issues. The following words were included in the original plan for the Spot campaign, produced by Ted Bates and Company, and managed by the Batten, Barton, Dustine, and Osborne Ad Agency. The Spots themselves would be the height of simplicity. People from each of forty- nine areas would ask the General a question. 96John Cogley, "A Word From the Sponsor," Commonweal, November 23, 1956, p. 208. - 97Ibid. 98Charles H. Thomson and Frances Shattuck, The 1956 Ere ' 'a Ca aie (New York: The Brookings ESSEIEEEE, 1960), p. 284. 79 The General's answer would be his complete comprehension of the problem and his deter- mination to do something about it when elected. Thus, he inSpires loyalty without prematurely committing himself to any strait jacketed answer. 99 Candid interest, involvement, and simplicity of answer were the essence of these spots. For example, one spot showed Eisenhower and a voice asking, ”Mr. Eisenhower, what about the high cost of living?” Eisenhower answered, “My wife Mamie worries about the same thing. I tell her its our job to change that on November 4th."100 The 1964 Presidential election was witness to several highly controversial commercial spots p1 roposed or actually utilized by the Democratic Party in its treatment of Repub- lican, Barry Goldwater. One celebrated Spot interrupted NBC's MONDAY NIGHT AT THE MOVIES presentation of “David and Bathsheba" September 7, 1964. The Spot was one of the most controver- sial of the campaign. In the course of the one minute film, a little girl with windblown hair was seen picking daisies in a sun swept field. The child starts to pick the petals of one daisy, and as she plucks each petal she counts, ’One, two behind her, the sound track provides a male voice counting the numbers backwards, from ten to zero. The man counts with “doom-filled cadence." 'When he intones ”zero' 'there is a screen filling scene of an atomic explosion. Then the voice of the President is heard saying, "These are the stakes. To make a world I? 99Rubin, Political Television, p. 34. lOOIbid. 80 in which all of God's children can live, or go into dark. We must either love each other, or we must die. The doom v01ced announcer picks up the thread at this point and urges viewers to vote for President Johnson on November 3rd.--“Thp itakes are too high for you to stay home.“ 0 Another similar Spot had a child eating an ice cream cone while a narrator explains about atomic bombs, fallout, and the nuclear test ban treaty. ”But now there's a man who ” the announcer states. ”And he wants to be President, doesn't like treaties. His name is Barry Goldwater and he fought against it. He wanted to go on exploding more bombs."102 One proposed commercial would have shown a purported KKK member announcing, "I like Barry Goldwater. I think the way he does."103 Another Spot prepared for the Democrats took advantage of a statement uttered by Goldwater during his New England trip earlier in the year. Goldwater had injudiciously said, “Sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off the Eastern seaboard and let it float out to sea.” A television spot prepared for the Democrats showed a representation of the Eastern part of the United States being sawed apart at about the Mississippi River. As the lOlIbid., p. 86. 102"Are Political Spots on TV Unfair?” US News and WOrld Report, September 28, 1964, p. 10. 103"Spotting the Candidate,” Newsweek, September 21, 1964, pp.76-77. _. ”‘wv'vvj — _A- a ,. ....-.t A .. -_ .... v.-.- . .-.. . |< u-. _ EDI. ”\- . oh. 3. .. .3”, b. .~ ..- . 0-. N. .5 v .a ‘. an... a It) I - . g r _ ., ‘h v Q ‘r - r ”t. \..‘o s_ e ‘\ 81 Eastern seaboard was seen floating off, the announcer repeated Goldwater's views.104 Still another Spot concentrated on a poster of Governor Rockefeller: It called to viewer's minds in no uncertain imagery the San Francisco convention. The poster toppled onto a littered floor and the announcer's voice said, ”Remember him? Governor Rockefeller. He said Barry Gold- water's positions can 18511 disaster for the party and the country. Such appeals to fear and slogans, such quoting of words out of context, such simplified implications of a candidate's views on complex issues, prostitute television's true capa- bility to provide important political information. One of Goldwater's basic themes was morality. A film entitled, "Choice," was prepared to Show how President Johnson was supposedly leading a morally decaying society. The film itself, however, while preaching morality, contained many scenes of immorality and the implication that the President could be blamed directly. NBC debated whether the film could be screened without extensive editing. One staged portion had a Speeding Lincoln Continental racing across the screen, with beer cans being tossed out of the driver's window from time to time. It was an obvious allusion to news reports of the previous Easter that the President had been drinking beer while driving the car near his LBJ ranch. The President was not mentioned by name. Other scenes showed violence and looting in city streets; gyrations of young 104Rubin, Political Television, p. 186. 105Ibid. “- 82 people doing the twist with frenzy; shots of a young girl 1n a tepless bathing suit being peered at by young men: ”montages of pornographic magazines and book covers;” the marquees of nudie theatres; shots of Billy Sol Estes, the legally loose Texas financiag; and pictures of Robert G. (Bobby) Baker. Goldwater himself rejected the film, calling it "racist," on the grounds that certain scenes dealing with Negro and White did not meet with his approval. Thus, the advertising technique in political broad- casting, rather than creating a way of enlightening the public on basic issues, emphasizes the superficial, the implied, and the emotional. All semblance of rationality is lost in poli- tics, "commercial" style. The performance of the television medium in this reSpect not only demeans the democratic way, 'but interferes with the responsibility of a free press to adequately inform the public. The cost of political broadcasting is also another detriment to public exposure to all points of view. Total ‘money Spent by both the Democratic and Republican parties in the 1964 election amounted to more than twenty-four million dollars.107 More than ten million dollars was spent on the primary elections alone.108 With Section 315 practically prohibiting the issuance <3f free time to any minority candidate, the opportunity for 106Ibid., p. 137. 107Ibid., p. 134. 1031bid., p. 133. . n - .1..- --- . u . v 4- . \- hu ‘ -- - -4- ... .. ,— b- u . C .....- b.——. o " a. s .‘& . ~ -_ ‘ - —..‘_- L_..-A - ~-...: 5 t ‘V-V'. PA -._‘ . Hfi ‘.’ , sk‘;. s. F-_ . c.,‘ o ‘A Uh-- k-S. ‘7 c .. ‘ l n I o." k,,E —. - ..-. o p .‘.-‘ “v e:- v‘ C o. A L ‘ L ‘ o ~L‘" - «‘- .3.“- \J_ ’ "a. ‘ ‘ x ‘- . ‘ H A .-. r V ~7~ \ 83 public access to minority views before and after any election is virtually non-existent. Where will the independent set the money to finance a primary campaign? Where is the poli- tical voice that dissents from both major party points of View? These are further handicaps to public information, and must be considered under the peculiar problems of the equal time provisions of Section 315. With campaign costs increas- ing steadily, and with more and more money being spent on television time, there is a diminishing opportunity to become acquainted with diverse points of view and criticism of the major parties in power. Perhaps the best summation of how television has affected the political campaign can be stated in these words by John Cogley: A campaign is essentially a non-intellectual, if not anti-intellectual enterprise. The virtues of the academy are handicaps in this marketplace. The model here is the locker room pep talk. Partisan audiences are not interested in political enlightenment. The knowledgeable campaigner avoids a compl xity as if it were the plague. The people who attend rallies want horsefeathers igd hOOpla, and this is what they usually get. 9 Recalling Bendiner's words, we can then ask whether television has indeed ”distilled the essentials of a campaign debate from the mass of flummery and empty rhetoric?” The answer is debatable, embraced as political television is in a commercial format. 109John Cogley, "Who's Listening?” Commonweal, October 26, 1956, p. 96. 4 PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE NEWS Full information to the public in itself requires full access to information by the media. Formation of public opinion demands truthful, enlightened criticism of the government. Any policy of suppression of news of important decisions, opinions or facts, seriously impedes the press function. The complexity and amount of news coming out of Washington are only matched by the complexity of methods used in obtaining this news and of disseminating it. Joseph Kraft, writing of the politics of the Washington press corps, stated: In the typical Washington situation news is not nosed out by keen reporters and then purveyed to the public. It is manufactured inside the government by various interested parties for the purposes of their own, and then put ouElan ways and at times that suit the source. There are those who do, however, ”nose out” the impor- tant news and work diligently and imaginatively to report to the public. Russell Baker describes their methods and the difficulties in obtaining all news that is worthy of coverage. One must interview endlessly, attend press conferences and briefings, set u occasional background dinners with importan officials and develop an ability to create friction in high places. The leading correspondents are adept at exploiting the rich antagonisms 110Joseph Kraft, "Politics of the Washington Press Corps," Har ers, June, 1965, p. 102. u‘q VI. 0 on | a: .\ . ‘ I fi‘u rad. ‘ll E " O 1 i I 9 ‘ c. all I" “a .. ‘-i~.. U l... .1 ' ~i..l '1 new u. 85 between Congress and the administration, between one agency and another, between a politician who has power and one who is hungry for it. Access to the important sources of news, therefore, would seem in itself to be an important factor in the full communication of news to the public. A secondary problem is the differentiation between news and government publicity, as Kraft states. The important question arises: just what news is the public entitled to know? Certainly, there is a limit to the amount of information or verbal commitment any political figure can give the public without jeopardizing our security. The problem, therefore, becomes one of news management. This matter of "news management" was a concern even to Patrick Henry, our forefather. The liberties of the people never were, or never will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them . . I am not an advocate for dilvulging in- discriminately all the operations of govern- ment, though the practice of our ancestors, in some degree, justifies it. Such trans- actions as relate to military operations or affairs of great consequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat the interests of the community, I would not wish to be published, till the end which re uired their secrecy should have been effecte . But to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man.112 The amount of information that must be kept secret in- creases as the number of international issues become more 111Rivers, The Opinion Makers, p. 40. 112Rivers,_T_he Mass Media, pp. 3-4. a F¢-— A.. o ......a -sa. v .1" ...F 5.. C..- ' o -.-p. .- c \ "" -.- c Q vu-F- : '-s£..- .‘ a . , I!.o.-.q "... “.-9‘. -“ I a ".Q. .-5“ v“ u ‘ - 0-" ‘fxe “v' c.; 9 u... . a- '5 , ~- ““~ ‘.‘ - N. ‘ A A:‘ t~bE“ f ‘u L ‘ h 3 D‘EaTCA A.\~.‘ 3') l ‘ C3“. _ “ - s . :Cr \ .. ‘Ecg I 86 complex and more delicate. However, the secrecy that enveloped the atomic bomb in World War II has been the pattern for pro- jects far less worthy. Full understanding by the public of vital issues requires the knowledge of certain basic facts which in themselves do not necessarily involve national secu- rity, but can lead to national distrust of leadership when they are finally brought to light. This is especially so when vital issues need clarification and eXplanation. The White House above all places must trans- late into neutral, if not favorable terms events which are too complicated for unpro- fessional minds, and which, unless explained, appear to clash with traditional notions of morality and good government. The President's relation to public opinion is perhaps his key relation1 His chief business is to manipulate symbols. The purpose, functions, and operations, therefore, of all departments, branches, and government agencies should be given free coverage. The recent disclosure of armament sales by the Pentagon to various countries is certainly a matter of grave concern. A diligent press and a less secretive govern- ment might have allowed more adequate coverage of Pentagon business. Is the press being given adequate information on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency? "The regimes it supports, the results of its policies, and the potential danger it generates are not known even to many of the informed press," according to Justice William 0. Douglas.114 113Kraft, Harpers, June 15, 1965, p. 102. 114Wi11ian 0. Douglas, Freedom of the Mind (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964 , p. 8: 87 Regarding the issue of Vietnam, New York Times reporter Charles Mohr has written that "asundy stream of misinformation about the war in Vietnam is reaching the American public."115 Some military publicists in the Defense Information School agree with cynical trainees that the military information slogan "maximum disclosure with minimum delay” should now read ' 'minimum disclosure with maximum delay."116 Every President has known that control of information is central to power. Government by publicity and managed news, however, expanded greatly under Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. William Rivers, writing of this news management policy has stated: Lacking legal controls over the Washington correspondents, executive officials have tried to manage the flow of information with threats and favors, silence and orapory with lies and varying degrees of truth.1 7 Arthur Krock, veteran Washington correspondent of the New York Times, had the following to say concerning the news policy of Kennedy's first few years in office. A news management policy not only exists but in the form of direct and deliberate actions has been enforced more cynically and boldly than by any previous Administration in a period when the United States was not in a war, or without visible means of regression from the verge of war.110 Perhaps under Lyndon Johnson, the flow of news has been most controlled to emphasize policy and point of view. 1161bid. 1171bid., p. 129. 118Arthur Krock, "Mr. Kennedy's Management of the News," Fortune, March, 1963, p. 87. U ..- A u . ' m." ‘_- ~ .._V ‘- . I ._ "7 “Q. ~ u. o “0.. . 1. ~‘. "“«c u-‘__‘ 54" _ ‘ I ‘ I- . ‘ Q C' 3%. \\“’u o u ‘ w «L— “. __ “v~ ' . f'nh Le..~‘. ‘ x. ‘ u R‘r‘ . ‘:‘& *.. ‘r‘.~ L.~.‘~ -. . av.“ k.a s..~ C 88 Johnson's attitude has elicited this comment from journalist I. F. Stone. Johnson sometimes seems to think the Consti- tution made him not only commander in chief of the nation's armed forc s but editor in chief of its newspapers.118 The extent to which the President will go to maintain his image and prevent criticism of his policies is evidenced in the following incidents. A small town item in a West Texas paper mentioned Billie Sol Estes in connection with the President in a three paragraph story on the inside. The editor claimed he got a telephone call from the White House in time to kill the story in late editions.120 One television correspondent was awakened in the middle of the night by the White House, which had heard that he planned to make some critical remarks the next day.121 A neWSpaper correspondent wrote a critical morning story and got three telephone calls from White House aides before breakfast.122 Regarding foreign policy, the Administration is equally as concerned about maintaining secrecy and suppressing criti- cism. The New York Review of Books,'a medium highbrow publi- cation,"ran a scathing review of Johnson's Vietnam policy. 119Ben H. Bagdikian, "Press Agent but Still President," Columbia Journalism Review, Summer, 1965, pp. 11-13. 1201bid. 1211bid. 1221bid. . ‘0 ... ‘ .‘o ' 9 ...~ .._w - V v- . .. .... “ “-1...- " ..’_ ; \' or" F ..~-_‘ ~ ’ 7'. a. . . “ ‘- --f C “‘h... 1‘ ,. ...‘__" O .A“ N“ ‘ c,__ .. . Q ‘ ....a ‘5 l. . . “c- -1 ‘ 0 ¥\_ “‘ ’ §_‘\“- ' ‘V-‘fi‘ . u. ”av-.r) o. g ‘. .‘- Q~~ ‘ n“... “« ""4 5 ‘u‘ “ I A'_L.‘~.s_ . ‘§n\ 0 \. . K ‘\ ~ ‘ . \.“s§- 1 V 7“ . ‘ ‘5 Ni. ,5 a, ‘ v '5‘, D ‘yv' fl £. K \— 89 The editor received a phone call from the White House, sug- gesting that in the future they have Vietnam books reviewed '- by Joseph AlsOp (who approves of Johnson policy).123 Broadcast journalism is no exception to this attempt at news control through pressure. When CBS correspondent Morley Safer filed a story on our soldiers burning the huts of a Vietnamese village, and the film footage showed a GI actually touching a cigarette lighter to a thatched roof, the action was at first angrily denied by the State Department. It was then justified on the grounds that the village con- cealed a network of Viet Cong tunnels. Both the story and footage reportedly brought pressure from the White House. Fred Friendly, then CBS News president, was asked to air a retraction. He refused. Also involved in the incident was Arthur Sylvester, censor of the Department of Defense. One network man reported, ”He was on the phone every fifteen minutes raising hell."124 Johnson's attitude on controlled news has been defended by his former press secretary Bill Moyers as presidential prerogative. It is very important for a president to maintain up until the moment of decision, his options, and for someone to speculate days or weeks in advance that he's going 123Ibid. 124”The Heat on TV,” The Nation, January 10, 1966, pp. 1-2. ,f'\ '30 to do thus and thus is to deny thg president the latitude he needs.1 5 As a result of this policy, when the press has uncovered some action, decision, or statement to be made by the Presi- dent, and published it beforehand, the President has changed his mind, thereby giving the public the impression of an inaccurate or untruthful press. James Reston, who saw the speech Johnson was to make at the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the UN, reported the President's plan for ending the then present UN financial crisis. The President, reading the story, ordered his Speech rewritten and eliminated dis- closure of his plan from the Speech.126 The question arises, how much vital information about options are the peOple to be denied on such personally in- volving issues as war financing, foreign armament, foreign commitments, and taxes? As James Reston states: If all presidential options are to be pro- tected from Speculation "until the very last minute" what redress will there be the next day after the President has opted to dis- patch the Marines or to bomb Hanoi, or to publish a request to wage war as hp deems necessary all over Southeast Asia? 27 It is in this context that the mass media have an obli- gation to uncover information, to report, and to comment. It is through this reporting to the public that the media will 125James Reston, "The Press, the President, and Foreign Policy," The Reader's Digest, September, 1966, p. 73. 1261bid. 1271bid. \n 91 keep alive the debate on foreign affairs, excite the public, and even make persuasive points which might have influence on policy. The dangers of a centralized point of view and the need for diverse sources of information on all vital issues was stated by Dan Lacy. We need to have information in sensitive areas reach us through a variety of channels in which it has been appraised, tested, com- mented on from as many points of view as possible. It will be fatal to the ends of government itself if we are reduced to the blind following of government policy because the only view of issues we have is one un-. critically sha ed for us by the communications systems from t e materials provided by government.128 It is up to the mass media to give exposure to con- gressional leaders, government officials, political candi- dates, and all other important individuals who can clarify, defend, or criticize Administrative Opinions, decisions, and policy. In this sense the media fulfill the vital function of serving as a forum of discussion and criticism. In this context the ”live” spontaneous confrontation type of format pioneered by MEET THE PRESS becomes most important. It is necessary, however, to examine at this point the advantages and disadvantages of the ”live” press conference itself as pioneered by the late John F. Kennedy. THE "LIVE" PRESS CONFERENCE One of the oldest established methods of eliciting in- formation direct from the Chief Executive has been the press 128Dan Lacy, Freedom and Communication (Urbana: Uni- versity of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 18. or. e a v u 1 n h u . ppm .. . V... ...s w. ..llnkuu..r I I. II r.\ .x. 2 KO conference. Since its inception it has also been used to gain information from any important official, political figure, or dignitary. It wasn't until President Kennedy established the "live" conference, however, that the format assumed its most accurate informative potential for the public. The press conference is one method of eliminating such restrictive factors as the exclusive interview, and the im- parting of news to those correspondents or publications closest to the Administration. A common complaint about the Kennedy administration was his partiality in diSpensing news to those who most favored his policies. A year after taking office, Kennedy's actions prompted James Reston to comment: Far from doing away with the exclusive interview, Mr. Kennedy has made pr1vate sessions with reporters almost an extension of policy making procedure. Franklin Roosevelt granted one exclusive interview to Arthur Krock of the New York Times, and Harry Truman did likewise. Kennedy, however, made such a fetish of the ex- clusive interview that his press secretary Pierre Salinger once commented he often had to go to the President's office to see White House correspondents.130 Another complaint was that those closest to Kennedy did not even represent the largest papers. Charles Bartlett was 129Worth Bingham and Ward S. Just, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 18. 130Rivers, The Opinion Makers, p. 157. m r. in- .. a. 93 Washington correspondent for the Chattanooga Times. Joseph Alsop, according to Worth Bingham and Ward S. Just, "so often a lone wolf, reported inside information with a new zest."131 Writing in 1962, Bingham and Just noted: The President himself is supplying more and more of the inside details, personally ex- plaining and clarifying his policies, both in exclusive interviews and back grounders. The background interview is typified by the year end0 stories eminating from Palm Beach under the clumsy disclaimers of "clo'se friends of the President said today" More frequent however and much more signifi- cant are his private talks with newsmen. 32 The press conference when televised does away with the possibility of saying one thing in private and another in public. Reporters, if given the opportunity to ask the right pointed questions, can elicit the kind of information in full View of the public which heretofore was reserved for private scoops or preferential treatment. Another obvious advantage to "live" coverage is its unbiased accurate reporting of every word Spoken precisely at the moment it is Spoken. There is no opportunity for in- accurate reporting or selective omission of anything said for home newspaper consumption. The newspaper report of the conference might attempt to elucidate, interpret or paraphrase, but it cannot selectively edit. The viewer who has seen the conference can Spot the invalidity of the newspaper report. Any false implications by the reporter can be disproved. 131Bingham and Just, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 19. 1321bid., p. 20. A ~ ‘1‘“ w ac 94 Neither can the President retract any statement, thought, opinion, fact or accusation which he utters in full view of the public. All of these advantages naturally hold true for any "live" conference or interview, regardless of the offi- cial involved. It took several years for "live" coverage of the press conference to evolve. Under Roosevelt, a standard rule was initiated and perpetuated for twenty years, that newsmen could paraphrase the President but never quote him directly. Four categories of press conference news were established and also followed by Truman. 1. Off the record announcements, to be neither published nor passed on to outsiders. 2. Background information for guidance and use but not attributable to the President. 3. Information attributed to the President but not to be quoted. 4. Statements which could bl quoted with Presidential permission. 33 The result of these categories in many cases was mis- interpretation and inaccurate reporting of Presidential statements to the reading public. Perhaps this is inevitable under a system of intermediate reporting between the source and receiver of political communication, as Ernest Lindley describes. The individual reporter in summarizinO what was said or in ch0031ng an answer or fact with which to begin his account often gives an emphasis somewhat d1fferent from that 133"Truman's First Press Conference," Newsweek, April 30, 1945, p. 41. _ 95 intended by the President. In rapid report- ing in the bulletin style, some distortion often is unavoidable, eSpecgally 1f the subject matter is complex. J An outstanding example of the dangers of inaccurate reporting took place in a 1950 Truman press conference. News stories all over the world had Truman considering use of the Atomic Bomb in Korea. The stories brought Prime Minister Atlee of Great Britain flying to America for consultation. John Hersey in an article entitled "The Wayward Press" gives an account of this conference which caused a world furor through its inaccurate reporting. There was nothing in Truman's prepared opening state- ment about the bomb. In one of the questions, the President stated that the United States would take whatever steps were necessary to meet the military situation, including every weapon the United States has. Paul Leach of the Chicago Daily News asked Truman, "does every weapon mean active con- sideration of the use of the A-bomb?" Truman replied that there has always been active consideration of its use, but added at once that he didn't want to see it used. He stated that it was a terrible weapon and shouldn't be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing to do with military aggression.135 134Ernest K. Lindley, "Eisenhower and the Press,” News- week, February 2, 1953, p. 19. 135John Hersey, ”The Wayward Press," The New Yorker, December 16, 1950, p. 78. I ..- "wwl 10". e—r—w H -- 5 : ... ...‘ .. A ~- y“"‘—- H ' .i U I "\E 3a€f_ ”‘V 1... .. "‘-.._ ..I _ .‘ ‘ “‘ A3, “— fi‘-‘¥-L--, ‘k‘ 4-.._.‘_‘ ..- . .— , ' — “.'~‘\'A\ “-QC . , C A... __-: ‘ r s. ‘ C: __ _ hut ”‘U‘Iy“~ - . 9 ‘_ I“ ”i‘ «u . *~--. A 1.‘ _' ,- ‘ _._ ~-,_ I" . V;..~ syc~c u¥‘ A u t. ..-: a - a. -_ v «u‘ “v.“ “ I"'.c'-q. - “"‘~C. _ ‘4 L ‘. ,- 96 At 10:47 that morning the AP wire bulletin read: President Truman said today “hat the U.S. has under considera ion use of the Atomic , bomb in connection with the war in Korea. 0 A later revised AP bulletin lead off with the following: President Truman said today use of the Atomic bomb in Korea has always been under considera- tion, and whether it is used i qup to American military leaders in tne field. 37 Under Eisenhower, in 1953, permission was given to quote the President directly and to broadcast conferences from officially released tape recordings. The Eisenhower years, however, were not free from instances of selective reporting and misinterpretation. In March, 1953, a question was raised at an Eisenhower conference pertaining to Senator Velde's suggestion of inves- tigating Communism in the Church. A twenty-paper survey of coverage of this conference revealed the following. 1" . ..7 a» .3 ‘ Eight papers made no mention at all of tne question or reply. . Two papers 1gnored tne conference completely. Four papers carried wire service summaries.' Five papers carried only part of Eisenhower 8 Only three papers quoted Eisenhower at length. On March 26th of that year, the question of Charles Bohlen's confirmation as Ambassador to the Soviet Union was brought up. The President made a strong personal defense of 1361bid., p. 87. 1371bid. 138Douglas Cater, ”The President and the Press,” he Reporter, April 28, 1953, p. 26. - .. . _ s ' . -‘---—~ .... - .. c. h C : . -“ w ...- ‘ B~C -3 , ‘~ a-.__ o C. '— ~-~. \- ~ I I.‘ “.‘A‘ ."..‘c v‘ 3 L -: 1. ‘§ ' “.5 ‘~\ ..A.t \ .- C-‘VV: v ‘8‘ {. ..\I . 9.. - “Jr" "p u r? L.‘ I; J A‘ _ V t“ k‘s s v- he. - ‘s\ L ‘2 . AVF’C‘..‘-“. LL‘L \ n ‘I ‘ “r.“-. ‘ijx‘ «4‘. 5 1.. 1.- ‘4 ‘F w~ ‘5 w. ‘sL".' ~ \\ ‘4 (r K‘s,“ p «- ~- 0 A i a u do ‘1, KO 7 Bohlen and stated he wasn't even going to discuss Senator McCar hy's objections. A survey of press coverage of this conference revealed: Fourteen papers failed to include Eisenhower's testimony on Bohlen. Twelve papers com letely omitted his statement on McCarthy, and 118 fin charges, or, had printed distorted versions.13> The effects of inaccurate reporting, and reliance on wire service copy, are reduced when the communicator's words are received by the public as well as those privileged to attend the conference. Access by the public to the conference is vital in a society which is experiencing a decline in daily papers, and hence, a decline in news sources. During the first few weeks of Kennedy's "live” conferences only eight daily papers carried a full text.140 Since all three television networks, however, carried the conference in full, even a one-station market had access to the President's words. Of the first three press conferences which were televised, 90% of the people who were polled had seen one or more, and 85% had turned on the conference intentionally.141 It is because of this new pervasive quality of the conference that is more imperative that Executive statements need the comment, clari- fication and criticism which the media can give. In essence, therefore, the "live” press conference would 139Ibid. 140Pierre Salinger and James Haggerty, "The Press and Presidential Leadership,” in Casey, he Press in Perspective, p. 183. 1411bid. 93 seem to present the most accurate method of political com- munication between source and receiver, leader and public, candidate and voter. It is necessary to be cautious, however, in evaluating this type of format. Its weaknesses lie in the general nature of conferences today and in the difficulties assumed by television coverage. The vast number of correSpondents covering today's conferences in itself breeds a certain degree of confusion and doubt as to the value of the conference as a news getting device. Today's average press conference draws about 400 correspondents. The conference has lost its inti- macy so characteristic during the Roosevelt administration, when a handful of reporters could gather around the Presi- dential desk. The result of increased coverage, even under Truman, already meant a decline in the amount of information which can be communicated. Ernest Lindley, writing of the Truman conferences commented: An unorganized rapid fire barrage of questions from 50-200 correspondents is not an efficient way to elicit information. Often, many of the inquiries are about matters of local, rather than general inter- est. Orderly exploration of fin important subject is seldom possible. Under Eisenhower and Kennedy the conference was more organ- ized by recognizing reporters from the floor before being questioned. The amount of information elicited, however, was 142Ernest K. Lindley, "The Truman Press Conference," Newsweek, October 28, 1946, p. 30. p.-— _ y..- I. x I u? 1 . 7. Q . rm... r . a t). 3..» Us ht 0 J \0 still a matter of concern. Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News giving his impression of a ”live" Kennedy confer- ence stated, "when I got up to as k a question I felt like I “11:. was addressing the United Nations. 3 This description of a Kennedy conference seems to agree with Lisagor's observa- tions on the remote character of the central figure with regard to the audience. As Spotlights go on and cameras whir, the newsmen, separated from the President by a broad expa cnse of beige carpet and sitting as if in a classroom, are massed in such numbers that only a small and sometimes preselected handful ever get the floor, serving as little more than props. Some of them, Salinger has already tipped to raise questizns that the President wants to answer. The matter of planted questions as being detrimental Ato the full effectiveness of the conference was a concern of Clark Mollenhoff, washington correspondent for the Des Moines _§egister. Unless I have a specific question to ask I seldom go anymore. Too many of the ques- tions are lobs, setups, and blooper balls, and there is too little effort to obtain any more than the most generalized information. Lyle C. Wilson of UPI agreed with {ollenhoff. The press conference defeats itself. I don't want to say it's not worth while. 143”Historic Conference," Newsweek, February 6, 1961, p. 56. - 30 144"The Show-Biz Conference," Time, November 17, 1961, D. J. ' léSBingham and Just, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 20. 100 But the President is in absolute control. He can selipt the pCOple wh ask the questions. *0 Former Presidential press secretary Bill Moyers has stated that the news conference is "to serve the convenience of the President, not the convenience of the press."147 Moyers admitted planting questions with reporters at a Johnson news conference; the reason being, "I wanted to be certain the questions the President did have on his mind did get asked."143 Certainly, the idea of planted questions did not origi- nate with either Kennedy or Johnson. They have been used since the first conference in the Wilson administration. Since the conference is to an extent a forum in which the President has an Opportunity to expound on his policies, or make known decisions on certain matters to be tested by the public, some method of assuring discussion must be found. Aside from an Opening statement, some directed questions must be assured. There is the danger, however, that those corres- pondents who represent publications most critical of the Administration will not get the opportunity to question. Under these circumstances the President can use the Conference as an instrument of persuasion and power more than the press can use it as an informative tool. 146Ibid. 147"Back of the Uproar About LBJ Managing the News," US News and World Report, January 31, 1966, pp. 42-43. 148"P1ants and Digs," Newsweek, January 24, 1966, p. 56. 131 A press conference, moreover, to be informative must be more than a planted question session. It must encourage discussion and clarification which go beyond the mere reply. It has been the contention of many that this function of the conference has deteriorated under its ”live” coverage by television. Political'punditILWalter Lippmann, considered the Kennedy conferences failures in this respect: The President makes announcements and the correspondents ask him questions in order to get stories, perhaps even scoops. hat is, I believe, a basically false conception of why it is worthwhile to have the President submit himself to questions from the press. The real use of the Presidential press confer- ence is to enable the President to x lain his policies and if necessary to comnel him to explain them. In this respect the KenEedy conference format has been a failure.1 9 An article in the Reporter almost reiterates Lippmann's Both the President and his interrogators are performing. We must appear to be quick, bright, and informed. He can initiate dis- cussion only by the formal opening statement or by the planted question. For their part, the reporters who win out in the near hysteri- cal competition to be recognized can rarely get an answer amplified, or press on if the President is evasive. In other words, the Presidential press conference has become less a discussion than a two way show. It gave the President a chance to seem to have answered questions he had not, and it gave reporters a chance to leave all manner of doubt in the public mind. 149"JFK and the Conference," Time, March 24, 1961, p. 44. 150”Back to the Oval Room,” The Reporter, January 2, 1964, p. 12. 102 An important means of eliminating this doubt referred to is by the follow-up question, pursuing the subject until a more direct and clarified answer is given, and opening up relevant avenues of thought. The follow up was also seen to be lacking in the Kennedy conferences according to John Cogley of the New Republic: No reporter has a chance to follow through on any of the numerous subjects brought up. Time after time Mr. Kennedy suggests a line of thought that cries out for further development, but there the subject is dropped and a new one intro- duced by the next reporter who usually seems not to have heard anything that has already been said.151 Without the important follow-up question, answers often lack depth and significance, and only raise more questions later among the reading and viewing public. The regularity and timing of the press conference also affect its utility in informing the public. Certainly in times of crisis it is more essential to fill gaps in public knowledge. It has been maintained that when Congress was in ses- sion and Kennedy had a need to convey views or force pending issues, he would hold frequent conferences. When he had to deliberate carefully matters of diplomacy, it has been said that Kennedy was too busy to meet the press. During 1961, when the Vienna meeting with Kruschev and the Berlin crisis were making important headlines, there was no scheduled 151John Cogley, "The Presidential Image,” New Republic: April 10, 1961, pp. 29-30. 103 Presidential conference for seven weeks. During the 1962 Cuba crisis there was no scheduled press conference for a month.152 Irregularity in formal meetings with the press has also characterized President Lyndon Johnson's free-wheel style of seeing reporters. An example Of what Johnson considers ”conferring“ with the press is evidenced by this breakdown of press meetings that the President gave in 1365: 9 rambles with reporters around the White House grounds 173 conrerences aboard Air Force One 2 pooled interviews when hospitalized in January 374 meetings with reporters wno requested appointments 64 talks With Washington news bureau chiefs 9 informal encounters at barbeques, Speeches and public functions 8 other chance occasions 200 telephone calls 34 on the record press conferences q 18 Off the record press conferences.153 Interesting, however, is the fact that of the 34 on-the- record press conferences, only 18 were given with adequate - 154 ‘ 1 v u - “ vi a: c.“ a advance notice. It would seem, therefore, that Lne 1Orma1 press conference is not the chief source of eliciting execu- tive Opinion or discussion under Johnson-~especia11y since notably missing in the short notice conferences are the 152TomWicker, ”Questions and Answers About the Press Conference,“ Iew York Times Magazine, September 8, 1962, p. 25. 153Time, March 26, 1965, p. 38. 154Ibid. 104 experts who can follow up, dig, and elicit direct and clear answers to vital questions. Even the press conference, therefore, seems to have its own inhibiting factors which prevent it in large part from fully informing the public on vital political issues. In View of this factor, and the inhibiting factors of the media in general discussed up to this point, the advantages Of the live interview format pioneered by MEET THE PRESS can be studied and analyzed. The "live," spontaneous format of MEET THE PRESS and programs like it, eliminates the inaccurate reporting or misinterpretation Of words between source and receiver. Since the program is Spontaneous and unrehearsed, there is no possibility of control of content, facts, or statements from any source. Since the give-and-take Of the program supposedly represents a non-partisan point of view, the impor- tant voices Of criticism and dissent can be heard, as well as the voices of those who must inform and elucidate. The selection Of an impartial panel Of knowledgable reporters and correspondents utilizes the full incisive potential of the press conference. Moreover, Since the guest cannot select his panel, there is no possibility of the planted question which could present the guest in a favorable or non-critical light. For these reasons, perhaps the program performs its most vital function during political campaign years by exposing candidates to the public in direct confrontation. There is no 105 time or Opportunity for prepared rhetoric on predetermined issues of discussion. There is no commercially gimmicked for- mat tO cloud the issues. There is no deliberate attempt to make the candidate look good or bad. The test of the man here is clear, logical, and frank answers to important questions. The nature of this political testing and an evaluation Of O, its efficiency concern the rest of this study. CHAPTER III DIMENSIONS OF MEET THE PRESS A program's Significance and contributions to the broadcast medium can be measured along several dimensions, not the least Of which is chronological continuity. MEET THE PRESS claims the distinction of being network television's Oldest presentation. Since its radio debut in 1945 and its television debut in 1947 it has continued to be regarded by many as the outstanding public affairs program of its kind. For twenty years MEET THE RESS has served the vital demo- cratic function of free discussion of imlortant social and political issues by those in position to voice meaningful information and opinion with regard to these issues. More important, the program offers representation to all points of View. Since MEET THE RESS is a straight informational pro- gram, lacking the embellishments of a mass entertainment format, its continuing public reception is one Of its most impressive dimensions. It is stated by the network that the program generally draws between five to ten million viewers. Considering its usual time Slot Of early Sunday afternoOn, this is a respectable rating figure. Some mass entertainment programs do not draw many more than ten million 106 107 viewers, even in more choice time. It is also a fact that local stations do not always carry netwO1 k public affai programs. MEET THE PRESS, however, is regularly carried by 174 out of about 200 ‘ {BC affiliated stations across the country. One measure of a program '5 effect is the mail that it draws. Although the television audience as a whole is not noted for its letter writing, MEET THE PRESS in some weeks has received up to 20, 000 requests for transcripts. Author William Manchester's appearance on the program in 1967, Juana Castro's appearance in 1964, Admiral Hyman Rickover's appear- ance in 1960, and the program featuring Soviet P1 emier Anastos Mikoyan in 1959, all drew from 15,000 to 20,000 requests for program scripts from all over the country.1 Another dimension of program success is imitation, and the MEET THE RESS format has att1 acted its share Of emulators over the years. NAN OF THE WEEK, CAPITOL CLOAKROOM, COLLEGE PRESS COI*ERENCE, YOUTH WANTS TO KNOJ, and the current net- work Offerings ISSUES AND ANSWERS on ABC and FE CE THE NATION on CBS are but a few of the Similar programs which have evolved from the MEET THE PRESS format. Local versions of the program have been produced throughout the country. Cuba, Australia, Germany, and England have also imitated the pro- gram. On the national scene, however, the original "press L 1Letter from Betty Cole, Secretary to Lawrence Spivak, June 22, 1967. 103 '0 n. I conference of the air, is still regarded by many as the best of its kind. y—vv‘ The tributes t1e program has received over the years could in themselves fill the pages of a volume. The following excerpts from letters to Lawrence Spivak, how- ever, illustrate the point that of all political interview programs on the air, MEET THE PRESS, is still considered by many the outstanding program in its class. I sincerely believe MEET THE PRESS to be the most effective public affairs program on the air today. Tom C. Clark2 MEET THE PRESS is the liveliest, most pro- vocative discussion on TV tooay. General Lawton J. CollinsJ I know Of no radio or television program throughout the years which has made such a great contribution to the enlightenment or the American public. James A. Farley4 1 In my judgment, MEET THE PRESS is the best public affairs program on the air--best to watch and best to appear on. Dr. John W. Gardner 2Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Tom C. Clark, cited in Meet the Press, (Booklet prepared by NBC, 1964), p. 16. 3Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from General Lawton Collins, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16. 4Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from James Farley, Ibid., p. 18. 5Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Dr. John Gardner, Ibid., p. 19. .C J. ..J MEET THE PRESS is 1ding example O TV at its best. . . . While I realize gram of its type, by far the best. General James the oldest pro- it also to be . . What is most impressive to me is that, although many have tried to imitate your program, you have come through against all competition with flying colors. Christian A. Nerter7 I have always thought yours was the best pro- gram on television, and it is very heartening to know that SO many other listeners agree with me. 0 George M. HumphreyO From my long knowledge of the program, as a viewer and a participant, I think THE PRESS is the best program on radio television in the United States today. Claude Peppery As one who has appeared on MEET THE PRESS, I feel that no program in any of the media Of public Opinion has more of an impact on the thinking of American citizens than does MEET THE PRESS . Adam Clayton Powell10 No program on the air lhas more impact. Abraham Ribicoff 6Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence James Gavin, Ibid., p. 19. 7Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Herter, Ibid., O. 20. I. n 0Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Humphrey, Ibid., p. 21. (x. fiExcerpt from a letter to Lawrence Pepper, Ibid., p. 25. 10Excerpt from a letter to Lawrenc Clayton Powell, Ibid., p. 26. 11Excerpt from a letter to Lawrenc Ribicoff, Ibid., p. 26. Spivak from General 0 '7' Spivak from Christ1an Spivak from George Spivak from Claude e Spivak from Adam G Spivak from Abraham 110 I suppose the greatest tribute to MEET THE PRES is the fact that in recent years you have had so many imitators with only slight modifications of your format; and yet, you have always remained at the topzof the list. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. The impact of MEET THE PRESS on American Opinion is probably greater than that of any other public affairs panel ghow. Senator Hugh D. Scott1 In my estimation, MEET THE PRESS is, and will continue to be, the nation's foremost public affairs program. Senator Herman E. Talmadgel4 I cannot think of any Show which through the years has done more to bring out facts and logic, or the lack of them. Norman Thomas To me, MEET THE PRESS is easily the most stimulating and provocative television presentation. Roy Wilkinsl6 The statements represent national and international figures, liberals and conservatives, testimony to the pro- gram's wide scope of viewers and participants. These verbal plaudits are equally matched by the major broadcasting awards the program has received over the years, including the Peabody lexcerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., Ibid., p. 27. 13Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak Hugh Scott, Ibid., p. 28. 14Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak E. Talmadge, Ibid., p. 28. 15Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak Thomas, Ibid. 16Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak ‘Wilkins, Ibid., p. 30. from from Senator from Herman from Norman from Roy -""'. 5‘ -8...l ‘ , o "i O _ 0-" “C‘ ~'-t “u- 1".“ 111 Award, the Sylvania Award, the Freedom Foundations medal, and many others.17 Only recently, the program won the American Bar Association's Golden Gavel Award for a one hour Special on crime, presented in February, 1967. Every award the pro- gram has received has been for outstandingly fulfilling its function as an informational program. The words inscribed on one Of the first awards the program received, an Ohio State Citation in 1948, perhaps best typify the reasons for its recognition. For its presentation Of vieWpointS of an interviewer who is in a position to give pertinent information on a given subject. It evokes unprepared and revealing state- ments from men in public life without the sugar coating of a public relations blue pencil and itg appeal is mass rather than specialized.1 That same year, Jack Gould of the New York Times, citing MEET THE PRESS in the Radio Honor Roll, stated: MEET THE PRESS was again outstanding in its class. In employing trained newsmen to question public figures on issues of the day, it brings out a maximum Of straight forward information and a minimum Of confu- sion and emotion, something which cannot be said for many of the other discussion shows.19 Here in these two citations lies the essence of the MEET THE PRESS pOpularity: a simple press conference type format which by its spontaneity guarantees built in informa- tion and verbal drama. Evidently the program has never 17The program received more than sixty major awards. 18American Mercugy, July, 1949, p. 4. 19American Mercury, January, 1949, p. 3. C I't-.a\-- : .....;u u ... ,. r Q ~. .. a. ..g r ... 3. n» u. 3 1i ...; . i ..L a ...» 112 wavered from its purpose or its incisive format in twenty years, judging by the tribute and recognition it has received by the public and by the broadcast profession. To understand why the program has received such acclaim, it is necessary to examine the substance of the program, its purpose, and how it adheres to this purpose. The historic dimension of MEET THE PRESS must be measured in terms of the kind of news and opinion it has elicited. and how it goes about eliciting this news and opinion. Why has the program been able to capture headlines during its early years in as many as 40 out of 52 weeks? Just what is the appeal of this program which has been termed ”the Slst state," by a former United States President, and "the conscience of America" by a former congressman?20 These are some of the questions which will be examined in the following selective biography of the program and analysis of its format and structure. A large part of the image of MEET THE PRESS and its success lies in the role played by its guiding spirit, Mr. Lawrence Spivak, permanent panel member, and producer. Mr. Leroy Collins, past President of the National Association of Broadcasters, wrote the following to Mr. Spivak on the occa- sion of the show's 15th anniversary. . . . Back of every success of.such dis- tinction there 18 always tne v181on, creative genius, hard work and sacrifices 20The term "conscience of America" was utilized by former Republican Senator from Missouri, James P. Kem, in a letter to Lawrence Spivak, cited in Meet the Press, p. 22. 5'3‘, H-. ._, _‘ b a—., f‘ . v. ,- ... ‘-f: H‘a .y ._ . A- a ' m ‘ ~- -~ - . n .- nl ‘A L‘V‘ ‘V - g C. ._ ‘fla V” C" “_‘ . ..J'. . . ‘1' O- ‘- (T I”? 113 of one person above all others. You are 13,-:00, the person who has made I“ QET THE Psta Larry, and while I salute all of your 21 capable staff, I commend you above all. Spivak's probing, incisive questioning manner has given the progra am its stamp of personality, distinguis any other program of its kind. It behooves us to examine the program and Mr. Spivak's influence on its development over the years. BP IEF FACTUAL BIOGPARP In 1945 Lawrence Spivak was the successful editor and publisher of American Mercury magazine. Martha Rountree was a successful radio producer. Spivak at the time had been xperimenting with a radio program titled, "The Ame mi an Mercury of the Air," which dramatized articles appear ring in the magazine. A proposed article for the magazine by Jiss .Rountree brought her in contact with Spivak. Although the article was rejected, the germ of MEET TIE PRESS evolved out of this meeting. Spivak asked Miss Rountree's Opinion of his radio pro- gram, which she bluntly gave, advising him to drop it. Spivak' s idea for the MEET THE PRESS format, however, did catch Miss Rountree's fancy, as having the potential for an exciting new kind of interview show. Consequently the idea led to the program itself, which was worked out, owned, and 21Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from LeRoy Collins, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16. 114 produced by both Spivak and Rountree. When Spivak approached the networks with the idea, he was met with cool indifference. The idea, he was told, sounded too dull and too intellectual. It took Miss Rountree's woman's touch to sell the idea to Mutual Broadcasting. Appealing to their sense of news and curiosity, Rountree asked them quite simply, “How would you like a program in which four top newsmen would interview Truman, Stalin, Wallace, and Churchill?” The program was promptly sold as a promotion for American MercuryMagazine.22 Actually, of Miss Rountree's proposed interviews, only Wallace materialized. Mr. Spivak once wrote an invitation to Stalin, who never did reply. Neither did President Truman or Churchill ever appear on the program. A test program was held on June 24, 1945, in a Washington theatre before an audience. The guest was Edmund Stevens, Soviet correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, who had just returned from Moscow. The program made its offi- cial radio debut on October 5, 1945, interviewing Eric Johnston, then newly elected president of the Chamber of Commerce.23 Miss Rountree served as the program's first moderator, and eventually Mr. Spivak joined as regular panel member. 22Irwin Ross, ”Meet the Press,” Coronet, June, 1955, p. 44. ‘ 23Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967. ‘- .~ U. ... ' \v ... . .3 _ pld L‘ -‘ 4 '- . .. -.. ng‘ .7 _ .— ... n1. ._ .. C. T. .3 T a a s . .. . i at. k g a . L . : . ... u‘ ‘5.“ .. a a a h: - u A~ ‘ Q UK >. ¢ V. \ V C ‘ a c 4.. #0 :~ he oh .\ I~N ‘ Q U ‘ a... .C \ . r.~ QWM £1. at : x 3 Q» L \ 0‘0. an E 3 . .. 115 MEET THE PRESS was virtually launched on a shoestring by its co-produeers. With Mutual paying only $300 per pro— gram, Mr. Spivak had to put in an additional $300 to meet expenses. he program quickly caught the public's fancy, however, and acquired a series of local sponsors. The pro- gram remained on a weekly basis with Mutual until August 4, 1950. MEET THE PRESS was also an early television pioneer. Although MEET THE RESS became a regular iBC television feature in 1948, the first televised version of the program took place on November 6, 1947, with James A. Farley as guest. H] In May, 1952, NBC also began carrying the radio broadcast o the program. When the program left Mutual, that network began a similar program called REPORTER'S ROUHDUP. Spivak and Rountree sued Mutual for $1,250,000 in damages. he pre- trial examination produced enough evidence to show Mutual guilty of a number of breaches which made it legally vulner- able. Mutual's insurance company settled with Sinak and ‘Miss Rountree for a substantial sum, in order to call the trial off. From the beginning it was Spivak and Rountree who gave the program the kind of driving force that soon propelled it onto the front pages of America's major newspapers with the news it would make. The spontaneous excitement of the pro- gram was nurtured by Spivak and Rountree's extensive produc- on preparation. As participants as well as co-producers, ('1' Ho they were not hidden from their audience as most broadcast ..n. ~ .\ ..\ Q. . Cu 7; rte . _ ... ..n L; .Q 2 fin 116 producers are. They were deep11y involved in the rogram 8 success and image. By its purpose, its format and its selection of guests and reporters, and the skillful leaoe‘sn p of its co- producers, the program maint a.in ed its Spontaneous, uninhibited quality in elicitiig news and opinion. Its producers seemed to p-os- sess the ability to select the right combination of inquiring panel and a newsworthy guest, who was even more newsworthy at the time of his aope.r ence on the program. '— Both Spivak and Rountree from the beginning seemed to xercise a sixth sense, according to some, in antic1patin most newsworthy develOpments in current a11airs. Miss Rountree was one of Washington's most popular and influential hos- tesses. To gather, Spivak and Rountree also kept in touch with a circle of friends and acq aintances’in public life, whose number and importance one magazine described as having been rivaled "perhaps only in the heyday of Mrs. Per ]e Mesta in n24 Washington. The result was that week after week, anv J 1 public figure before the public appe reo as nearly as possible at the very moment when he himself or a question in which he was involved was ripe for headlines. The success of his appearance was further assu1 ed by the extensive preparation for the program by its two p1 roducers. Both Rountree and Spivak maintained headquarters in New York and Washington, commuting between the spots. Miss 24Hubert Pryor, ”Bi gwigs Under Fire," Look, Febr ary 10, 1953, p. 35. 117 Rountree, while still producing and moderating the program, read every New York and Washington paper every day and all the weekly magazines. Spivak still devotes several days a week just to reading up on subjects on which a guest could be questioned. His researchers check into the background of each guest. By program time he generally has 50 questions H- in mind, of which he may use rive or s x. His preparation for each program was described in a letter. I prepare for each program by reading what- ever is available about our guest, examining Speeches and statements that he has made, written criticism for and against him, and in general getting as much background about the issue or issues wiEE which the guest is involved or should be. Spivak's extensive preparation for questioning gave the program the bombshell quality which has since marked it. The somewhat bear-baiting aspects of the program are reflected in Spivak's technique, which allows him to get a tenacious grip on some evasive guest and often shake some important admission or opinion from him. His questioning methods early stamped the program with his personality, and have evoked such des- .- -- 1- - n v 1,- --1 :26 (11:4 c11pL10ns 01 him as God 5 ang1y llLLle man, an Lne show's chief prosecutor.“27 His manner of questioning was described some years ago by Newsweek magazine. 25Letter from Lawrence Spivak, October 3, 196 26David R. Ebbit, "Television," The New Republic, January 23, 1956, p. 21. - 27"Question Man,‘l Newsweek, September 3, 962, p. 63. 113 Many of the large questions . . . come from Larry Spivak himself, who is five feet three inches tall. Sitting on two pillows, his feet dangling just above the floor, Spivak, looking up through his glasses like an e} :as- perated baby owl and shooting questions in a voice that is precariously polite, radiates almost total suSpiqion. of his famous guests. Beneath the camera 3 line of Sight heb methodi- cally thumbs through a stack of cards with which, said one recent reporter- panelist, ”he could ask questions for five days.‘ Actually, Spivak is a soft-spoken man who speaks with precise deliberation. Perhaps this soft-spoken, delibera- tive quality gives him his reputation for sharpness. Although he tries to exercise restraint, he once admitted in an article that ”unless I'm very careful, I do get in to a debating tone."29 In keeping with his taste for a good scrap, however, Spivak has admitted to disliking having to face a weak adversary, who causes his sharp incisive manner to make him feel like a bully.30 Spivak's success seems to lie in the fact that when he is on the air, his debating manner tends to lead him into asking questions that the usually mild-mannered off-the-air Spivak would love to ask. Spivak has stated, 'We've heard it a thousand times. People say: 'Gosh, I'd like to ask that fella that. I'm glad you d1d.‘“31 It is Spivak's kind of questioning which has elicited headlines and news- making answers. The following examples of typical frank 2s§§l§. 29Ibid. 3OIbid. 311b1d. ll9 Spivak questions might illustrate the point. Spivak to Senator McCarthy: "Are you sug- gesting that J. Edgar Hoover knows a Spy in the State Department and has done nothing?" Spivak to Mikoyan: ”Are we to understand that the only thing that impressed you were our roads?" Spivak to Senator Kennedy: 'What would you do about Cuba that hasnjt been done or ought to be done?" Sgiyak to Nehru: "How do you apply the principle of independence to She situation, for example, in East Berlin?” 2 Many times Spivak's deft manner of questioning and his refusal to be put off with half answers or double talk has succeeded in extracting information where a guest, just a few seconds before, has said that he couldn't or wouldn't give it. On March 2, 1952, Newbold Morris appeared on the program shortly after his appointment by Truman to investi- gate corruption in government departments. The following bit of dialogue illustrates Spivak's tenacious questioning to this point. Spivak: What indications have you that there will be dismissals if you reveal simi- lar things (instances of unethical behavior in the administration)? Has the President definitely promised you that if there are any more Vaughns or O'Dwyers, they will be dismissed? Morris: I'm not going to quote a confidential conversation with the President. Spivak: It's very important for the American people to know that, sir. 321bid. 120 Morris:,_Now, look, give this guy a chance. Who are we to say that the Angel Gabriel didn't appear to the President of the U. S. and say you've got to clean this up? And why would he have picked me unless he wanted to? Did he think I was just a nice guy that wouldn't raise a fuss? Spivak: You think the Angel Gabriel has more influence than some of the top Con- gressional committees? Morris: Who am I to say? I don't know. Spivak: I'd like to pursue this for a minute because this seems pertinent to the whole investigation. Have you as sur- ance that if the same kind of low ethics or corruption is revealed by you, those people will be dismissed or will be tried if necessary? Morris: Yes, sir. Spivak: The President has given you that assurance? Morris: I have that assurance. 33 The program elicited a front page New York Times headline the next day. MOR1IS THREATENS TO QUIT IF TRUMAN FAILS TO BACK HIM34 On other occasions, under Spivak's questioning, the guest has said one thing, and then the exact Opposite. Foreign Minister Sean MacBridc of Ireland appeared on MEET THE PRESS on March 18, 1951. He stated there was no differ- ence between Russia and Britain as far as democracy was con- cerned. He argued that Britain was no democracy, since it did not permit the peOple of Ireland to determine freely by democratic means their own affairs, and method of government. The following dialogue illustrates his change of mind within minutes. 33Pryor, L993) p. 34. 34New York Times, March 3, 1952, p. l. 121 ,Snixak: Isn't it true, Mr. Minister, that a great deal of your trade today is with Britain, and that your relationship with Britain is really very friendly? W: A lot of our trade is with Britain yes, because we need things from Britain and Britain needs things from us. Sniyak: In other words, when ou are tradin , you don't care whethei they are a dgmo- cracy or not. ‘MacBride: 'Well, I gather that was the attitude of '——__—_—' the United States . . figiggg: I am talking about Ireland now. Magfiride: ‘Well, I am laying down what seems to be the general international practice. S ivak: 'Would you trade with Russia? Mm: No, we don't trade with Russia. ,figigak; 'Would you trade with Russia if Russia had something you wanted? MacBride: ‘Well, as little as possible, I think. Spivak: well, then there is a difference in your mind between the democracy of Russia and the ggmocracy of Great Britain. MacBride: 'Yes. Spivak's questioning doesn't always produce these re- sults. ‘When a question is avoided, however, or the guest refuses to answer, the implications might be equally as strong as a direct answer. On February 4, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy had stated that State Department files were the basis of his charges of malfeasance in that department. In five questions Spivak asked McCarthy how he had gotten his information from the files, specifically whether he had seen them himself. In his reply to Spivak's fifth question, the Senator stated: W3 fax: Iuggvggtttgiggggvgflflflgszgge Department to see the original files. The answer is no. Spivak: That wasn't the question, Senator. I didn't ask you whether you've been 35Pryor, Look, p. 34. 122 the State Department, I asked you if you'd seen the files. MbCarthy: What's the next question?36 The Spivak brand of questioning and the ability of Miss Rountree to entice guests on to the program paid off early in what the London Times called, "one of the most reliable breeding grounds of week-end news."37 .A description of the Spivak-Rountree combination in Life read as follows. Between Spivak's Brooklyn bite and vigor and Rountree's Southern florence, the program has become a source of potential popularity and ruin to every big time politician. Stung by Spivak's clever questioning, the fre- quently say more than they intend to on t e show. Yielding to Martha's cajolery the; often use the program for major announcements.3 Miss Rountree from the beginning had a simple argument for convincing her newsworthy guests, according to 1h_e_ _b_1_e_w_ 3935 _'J_.‘_im___e_s_. To someone suddenly injected into the spotlight, she might say, "Here's a chance for you to tell your story to the American peOple. If you are honest and believe what you say, there is nothing to fear."39 Producers Spivak and Rountree in seeking the drama plus quality that stamps the program never avoided the controver- sial or unconventional in guest selection. This has been possible because the sponsor of the program has absolutely 351bid. 37"Readliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89. 38“Life Goes to a Meet the Press Garden Party," Life, June 23, 1952, p. 127. A . . 39Va1 Adams, "Glamour Girl and Newspapermen," New York Times, September 3,1950, Sec. 2, p. 7 . 123 no control over selection of guests or panelists. Guests on the program have come from every shade of the political spectrum. As a result the program over the years has had its share of verbal firewords and heated comment. Guests have included former Communists such as Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, William Remington, Soviet agent Gerhard Eisler, and John Gates, editor of the Pill-.11 29%. Other controversial guests seen on MEET THE PRESS include the late Senator Bilbo; Lycurgus Spinks, former Imperial Emperor of the Ku Klux Klan; and Robert'Welch, founder of the John Birch Society. One of the earliest examples of Rountree tact in get- ting controversial guests occurred shortly after the program began in 1946, and resulted in one of broadcasting's most historical journalistic moments. It involved the late Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi, considered a prize catch for any interview program. ‘Frequently a victim of attack because of his vitriolic, prejudicial personality, he was an object of great curiosity, but had constantly avoided any nation-wide broadcast. After Bilbo had won a bitterly contested primary, Spivak solicited his appearance on the program by phone from New York but was flatly refused. Several days later, Miss Rountree, who was Florida‘born, received a more cordial re- ception. Her southern drawl charmed the Senator into suggest- ing that she write him a letter. .After getting an appointment with Bilbo, she was curtly told she was wasting her time. 124 Trying a new kind of tack, she told Bilbo that "one of the hardest things about being a southerner up North was hearing the horrible charges made against Senator Bilbo." She then asked, “Are you really as dreadful as they say?" Bilbo then launched into a lengthy account of the roads and schools he built for the good people of Mississippi. Miss Rountree then asked, "Then Senator, why do you object to telling all this to the American peOple?" Bilbo had no answer.40 The announcement of his appearance on the program.was met with a deluge of protests. Station WOL in Washington was in a state of siege the night of the program. Pickets paraded outside, and scores of police were inside, Bilbo had secured a pistol permit, and arrived with four armed body- guards. The program lost no time on amenities. The first question asked of Bilbo was whether he agreed.with a poll of reporters that he was the worst man in the Senate. Bilbo politely demurred and was then deluged with a series of questions on the racial issue. Becoming increasingly irate, Bilbo began losing his poise. Consequently, Spivak, catching Bilbo off guard, frankly asked the Senator, "Have you ever been a member of the Ku Klux Klan?" Bilbo promptly replied, "I have. I am a member of Ku Klux Klan Number 40, called the Bilbo Klan."41 This admission made coast-to-coast headlines and started the movement to oust Bilbo from the Senate, a 4OIrwin Ross, "Meet the Press," The Reader's Digest, September, 1951, p. 19. 411b1d. H-111» 125 move which was thwarted by the Senator's death. After auspicious beginnings like the Bilbo expose, the program has continued over the years to provide an exciting pace to viewers and news to the Monday morning newspapers. In 1953, following Miss Rountree's marriage, the Spivak- Rountree partnership broke up. Spivak bought out Miss Rountree for a sum exceeding $100,000. The program in turn was sold to NBC in 1955, and Spivak has continued to produce it under a long-term contract. Certainly the complete story of Rountree and Spivak's contributions to MEET THE PRESS over the years cannot be told in one chapter. Their ability to coax guests on to the pro- gram in its early days is itself a study in the art of per- suasion. It is only the purpose here to project a represen- tative image of the program's long and colorful history. The program idea, however, is merely the skeleton. The exciting personality of the program comes from its body, which is nourished every week by the elements now to be discussed. FORMULA FOR SUCCESS The program's basic format allows for the spontaneity of a "live," unrehearsed press conference. The aim of the program from the very beginning was described in a letter from Lawrence Spivak. MEET THE PRESS was designed to give the public a chance to view an on-the-recorc press conference from.a front row seat. The basic assumption is that the audience may 126 i§°SiiaffgfltESS‘EBEne¥§i§iigw23§3§§13333‘;233123"a§§ interpretations of what is said. The program'basically consists of a prominent figure facing a panel of four top flight newsmen, including permanent panel member Lawrence Spivak, in a simulated, unrehearsed press conference. Unlike a real conference, however, continuity and order are provided by the presence of a moderator. The role of moderator is also filled by a leading newsman. The moderator, according to Spivak, in general "serves to keep the program at an interesting pace, exercising profes- sional news judgment. His manner should add quiet authority, and normally he should assert himself only when necessary to correct inadvertent misstatements, add important clarifica- tions, etc."43 The program's first moderator, Miss Rountree, perhaps set the pattern for the role. She likened it to a woman'e hat. "If it's in good taste," she remarked, "it's not the most noticeable thing in the outfit."44 .As moderator, Miss Rountree undbtrusively tried to keep reporters from going up blind alleys, and guests from getting out of hand. One of the program’s longest serving moderators was veteran news broadcaster Ned Brooks, who served for eighteen years in the role. One Boston columnist described Brooks's job on MEET THE PRESS as follows. 42Letter from Lawrence Spivak, June 17, 1967. 43Ib1d. ' 44Hubert Pryor, Look, p. 34. 127 Ned Brooks has the softest job in television. At 6 o'clock on Sunda enings he puts out the cat; at 6:30 he calls her back.2g According to Brooks, the moderator must handle the time allotment in such a way as to create the impression with the panel and the audience that the time is being divided fairly.46 Aside from.this chore, however, Brooks agreed, that like Miss Rountree, he was encouraged to stay in the background, and not impose his presence on the program. ‘Watching the time allotment among participants is impor- tant, since domination by any one panelist or his questions interfere with the allowance of maximum expression and fair- ness. The arrangement of time on the program was described by Spivak. Generally, we try to divide the time equally among the questioners so that each man is able to ask approxi- mately the same number of questions. The moderator more or less controls that. It is difficult, however, to divide time on the basis of the number of questions, because much depends on the length of the answer . . . Usually we are able to run down the panel at least twice, sometimes if the questions and answers are brief, three times, and there have been occasions when we have gone down the panel four times. It is fair to say, there- fore, that each panelist gets at least two turns but the number of questions he gets depen s on a number of factors which cannot be predicted. This attempt at fairness to the panelists, and flexi- bility of time, allows important follow-up questions and overcomes one of the handicaps of a real press conference. 45Letter from Ned Brooks, August 11, 1967. 461bld. 47Letter from Lawrence Spivak, October 3, 1967. 128 The injection of a follow-up question naturally depends on the judgment of the panelists. All panelists queried, how- ever, agreed that if there is any gap or evasive quality in an answer, a follow-up question would be considered more important than the injection of the panelist's own new line of questioning. The mechanics of the format, however, do not in them- selves assure an exciting or provocative program. Program success depends in large part on the selection of guests and panelists, and the questioning process itself as personified by the Spivak method. One of the distinguishing elements of MEET THE PRESS is its timing in selection of its guests. Many of the program's newsmaking shows were due to the fact that the right guest was on at the right time, confronted by the kind of panel which could verbally elicit the kind of information and Opinion which makes news. Since the beginning, the timing of a guest's appearance on the program has been given the utmost consideration. Once the program achieved its reputa- tion, with newspapers anxious to lend their reporters, the problem of guests was one of selection, not of shortage. Guests, therefore, had to be not only newsworthy but news- making. The secret, Martha Rountree once explained, lies in timing. If you have Joe MbCarthy on your program in an ordi- nary run-of-thedmill week, people say, 'So what?‘ But 129 if you get him the night after 25 makes a sensational speech, everybody's Spellbound. The importance of timing in guest selection was empha- sized by producer Spivak in describing the procedure used. Although many detailed factors go into programming each week, there are some primary considerations: ‘We are guided by news events. Often, however, we set guests up long in advance because we believe they will be newsworthy at the time we plan the interview. 'When, for example, the Prime Minister of a foreign country schedules a trip, we feel fairly safe in planning an interview with him after his arrival even though the event is months away. Thus, we planned an interview with Nehru months before he came, and with Mendes-France, the premier of France. Sometimes we make last minute changes when the news shifts. ‘We usually find that if the reason is good enougg, we can postpone the scheduled guest for a later date. In this manner, MEET THE PRESS constantly keeps up with the news and keeps its guests as newsmakers. A listing of guests the program has featured over the years would include almost every important national and international diplomat and statesman. The program has also featured celebrities from every walk of life, the scientists, educators, civic leaders, and intellectuals, who are worthy of achievement or position. Only a partial listing would encompass a score of pages. A representative idea, however, can be gleaned from the testimonials cited and from the newsmaking programs dis- cussed throughout this chapter. Equally as important as the selection of guests is the 48"Headliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89. 49Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967. 130 selection of the right panel of interviewers. The panel represents the kind of broadcast and press journalists who can verbally frame the kinds of questions which elicit frank and important answers. A roster of newsmen who have appeared on the program over the years reads like a "who's who" of American journalism. Scotty Reston, Marquis Childs, Peter Lisagor, Raymond Brandt, Earl Mazo, May Craig, Ernest K. Lindley, Merriman Smith, Drew Pearson, Pauline Frederick, RichardNWilson, Jack Bell, David Brinkley, Norman Cousins, Max Lerner, William White, Roscoe Drummond, are only some of the names that have occupied panel seats. All are seasoned veterans of the give-and-take of the press conference format. Consequently, the program often results in a half hour free swinging battle of wits. The interviewee, under the glare of the television Spotlight, cannot retreat behind an obstinate "no comment," nor can he label anything "off the record." His image is constantly being challenged. - ‘ The selection of the right combination of guest and panel requires something of an anticipatory skill. Reporters selected have always been among those considered to be the most informed, responsible, and articulate in the‘washington press corps, and throughout the country. A problem, however, exists in that while there are many good reporters and writers, there are far fewer good on-the-air interviewers and ques- tioners. Some reporters, therefore, do appear more often than others because the producer has found them more articulate. 131 A few of these moreover appear quite frequently because they are knowledgeable in a variety of fields. Once a guest is selected, according to producer Lawrence Spivak, the panel is selected with several factors in mind. 'we seek informed, responsible journalists, with some special knowled e of the field of the guest's interest, but we do not a ways select a panel of Specialists in the field. ‘wa often combine 8 ecialists with one or two reporters of more general nowledge, because we think this combinatiga gives a more balanced interview for a mass audience. .A question which naturally arises in the selection of any panel is that of possible personal bias of a particular reporter or of the publication which he represents. ‘With regard to this issue, producer Spivak has stated the following: ‘wa do take into consideration to some extent any poli- tical ”tag"*which may be attached to any particular reporter or his publication. This presents difficul- ties however, because often a reporter's personal political inclination is not the same as is publica- tion's. Also, we have found that.with the best reporters, their questioning will be fair in spite of their personal views. However, from the audience's pointsqf view, we try not only to.bg_fair but to seem fair. This is a most important point, since the manner in which a question is posed, or the kind of question which is posed, can very well contribute toward the kind of image the guest will project. A guest who is put on the defensive rather than in a position of merely giving an Opinion can come off in a particularly bad manner. For this reason, the integrity 50Letter from Lawrence Spivak, April 14, 1967. SlIbid. 132 of the panel must be, and has been, preserved since the pro- gram's very beginning. Producer Rountree once stated: 'We never load the panel against the man being inter- viewed, because people are always for the underdog. ‘Why, with a loaded panel, I could takg the worst man in the country and make him a martyr. 2 To assure maximum spontaneity and fairness of question- ing, each panelist is responsible for his own questions and does not even confer with other panel members in advance even as to areas of questioning. Guests are not told either questions or areas. They know only that they will be inter- viewed in relation to their own field of knowledge or interest. This arrangement not only allows room for the important follow- up question, but also eliminates the dangers of the planted question and the prepared answer. Former guests queried by this author find the MEET THE PRESS format to be the closest approximation of a "live" press conference, and in many ways more effective and important. Michigan Governor George Romney, a frequent participant on the program, wrote as follows: Only the President's press conferences have the overall "live” coverage to compare with a program like this. As a result, I rarely will put the time and effort into pre- paring for a regular press conference such as I put into an appearance on MEET THE PRESS. My staff will spend several days preparing logical questions and answers, and I usually reserve at east one ay in advance for personal preparation.53 Barry Goldwater, also realizing the importance of ade- quate preparation for this program, has written: 52"Headliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89. 53Letter frothovernor George Romney, September 22, 1967. 133 The disadvantage of appearing on any program like this is in the fact that the person generally does not go ' well prepared or prepared enough. On the other hand, it s impossible for the person to know what questions will be asked unless he has been asked to cover a particular subject or statement. The person appearing must remember that the leader of this group, Mister Spivak, has dedi- cated a good ortion of his life to this program and its success or failure depends upon his ability to diagnose a question and to ascertgzn whether or not correct answers are being given. The fairness of treatment accorded guests on the pro- gram'was also stressed by all past candidates personally contacted in this study. The following excerpts from letters by Richard Nixon, George Romney, Hubert Humphrey, Barry Goldwater, and Henry Cabot Lodge illustrate the point. The normal program that MEET THE PRESS conducts features a panel of knowledgable individuals who have spent time in preparing their questions, who are tough in their questioning, but not hostile, and who help to make that show one gf the most reSpected news interview shows on the air.5 ‘MOst people are biased, including newsmen. Overall the panelists have been objective . . . Occasionally a panelist will put a ques§§on out of left field and dwell on it, but this is rare. I have always been treated fairly by the panelists. Obviously, questions raised by the panelists reflect their points of view and interests, and uestions are often posed in a.wa that will elicit in ormation they consider congrovers al or newsworthy. I don't consider that unfair. . 54Letter from Barry Goldwater, July 21, 1967. 55Letter from Richard Nixon, August 1, 1967. 56Letter from George Romney, September 22, 1967. 57Letter from Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, September 20, 1967. . - 134 In looking back over the many years I have appeared on the program I cannot remember one question that I didn't consider fair and objective. Naturally, some of the panelists could not, nor can they today keep themselves from displaying either violent disagreement or violent agreement, and to that end I suppose there has been bias and I suppose there always will be, but not bias in the manner you and I think of. I have absolutely no complaint about the way in which I was treated durggg the many times that I appeared on MEET THE PRESS. This fairness of treatment seems to extend even to the most controversial guests. Robert Welch of the John Birch Society, writing to Lawrence Spivak about his treatment on the program stated: The treatment of mgself by the four interviewers could probably be descri ed as pretty rough.‘ But that, I am sure, is what makes the show inferesting to your 'millions of viewers; and actually did not mind it at all. I feel that 3 man who can't take it probably has something to hide. 0 If fairness of treatment is evident to the guests, it is not, however, so evident to some of the program's critics. Since its inception, the hard hitting, incisive, unsubtle questioning manner of the panel, moulded by Spivak's strong personality, has tended to project a sometime hostile and suspicious image of the panel's treatment of guests. As a result the program has not been.without its share of adverse criticism, which will now be discussed. 58Letter from Barry Goldwater, July 21, 1967. 59Letter from Henry cabot Lodge, Jr., August 3, 1967. 60Excerpt from.a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Robert Welch, cited in.Meet the Press, p. 29. 135 A CRITICAL LOOK Communist Earl Browder's appearance on the program in 1946 elicited the following description in Time magazine. The ex-communist turned book peddler sat uneasily before a washington microphone. Reason for Earl Browder's dis- comfort: a battery of four newsmen, a little less than friendly, a little more than anxious to interview him on Mutual's MEET THE PRESS program.61 Here is another early description of the format and panel as seen by Albert N. Williams in the Saturday Review. By confronting an opinion holding uest with four irre- verent, suspicious, and often Open y hostile newsmen who cross examine him mercilessly, real reasons are gotten at, true facts unearthed, important but colorful overtones are shown up as superficial, and in the end the listener 62 in a position to make up his own posi- tive opinion. In 1952 philosopherBemardRussell appeared on the pro- gram. The manner in which he was treated by the panel was unquestionable, according to Leo Cherne. Again, it is the manner of questioning by Spivak which is here under fire. In one typical stimulating MEET THE PRESS session, Bertrand Russell confronted a panel of journalists. There was no presentation of what the noted philosopher believed on any one subject. Nor, as a matter of fact, did the program leave an understanding of any one of the hundreds of controversial views he had articulated in a long life. ‘What emerged from the TV screen and what undoubtedly remained in the minds of viewers was the personal contest between acidulous Lawrence Spivak anchor man on the MEET THE PRESS panel and Lord Russell. The manner in which he, a Nobel prize winner, was cross examined, would have suggested to those who tuned in late that he was appear g under subpoena in a Kefauver 61"Know How‘Woman," Time, July 26, 1946, p. 54. 52% Ghost 1 Laid," Albert N Willi s m, Jilly 6, 19 6’ p.,20. ams, aturdgy 136 investigation of mental crime. The contest of wits was sharp, quick, flashing. Capitalism got a quick defense from the panel, socialism, an equally quick defense from Lord Russell, and the audience, twenty-three minutes of this illusion of contact with the mind that produced "Principia'Mathematica."63 Perhaps one of the sharpest attacks on the program occurred in 1956, in an article by David R. Ebbit appearing in The New Republic. After discussing the format of interview programs in general, Ebbit wrote the following specifically with regard to MEET THE PRESS. The MEET THE PRESS panel, aparked by Lawrence Spivak, God's Angry Little Man, and by the alternate prosecu- “ting attorney, Mby Craig, functions with all the venom and brutality of that one-man investigating committee which once threatened the nation's sanity. As far as I've been able to make out it doesn't even pretend to take an interest in the significant ideas and interests of the people it examines, (though I seem to detect a somewhat more gentle handling of middle-of-the-roaders than of those who might very loosely be called liberals). Instead it begins to pick awa at t e sorest point it - can find and continues to pic until the victim explodes in wrath, or collapses in sick despair, upon which the panel grins happily.‘ It seems perfectly obvious that the urpose of the panel show is to bait and embarrass (thoug there is a marked difference in the treatment of accorded individuals representgag conservative and liberal schools of thought). Speaking about the heated nature of MEET THE PRESS, he further states: The reason for turnin the TV interview into a sort of kangaroo court is pro ably twofold: first, the show itself is made more dramatic--there is tension and sus- pense (Will he crack? Will he confess? Will he smack Spivak on the nose?) second, there is a better chance 63Leo Cherne "Biggest Question on TV Debate," 3193 mm, March 5,195 , Sec. 6, p. 14. . 641mm R. Ebbit, The New Republic, January 23, 1956, P. 210 ' 137 of getting a news story. The man who is badgered is the man who blurts out, and practically every Monday now, there is at least one idiotic news item gleaned from the outbursts which take place on the Sunday panel shows. Being more specific, Mi. Ebbit Speaks of the treatment accorded two MEET THE PRESS guests, poet Robert Frost and distinguished educator Robert Hutchins. During the Christmas season it was announced that MEET THE PRESS would keep yuletide spirits from being soured by foregoing its typical prey and welcoming in- stead the good grey poet, obert Frost. ‘Well, Mr. Frost appeared, and for a while everything was jolly and gentle. But pretty soon the panel began to interrupt the poet, and before long it was cross examining him about some statement that he was supposed to have made when he was sixteen, or sixty, or some such age. ‘Mr. Frost just smiled and nodded and kept on quoting poetry, but it was clear that-~Christmas or no Christmas-~the panel was determined to make a liar out of somebody.56 Some weeks ago the MEET THE PRESS panel gave the full treatment to Robert Maynard Hutchins, concentrating on a single theme for almost thirty minutes. You have been quoted as sayin "that you might hire a communist." Do you mean to say t at you.would hire a communist? Confusing itself as it customarily does, with a judi- cial body, the panel reached the Stage of pounding the table and demanding a flat and immediate "yes" or "no." In the last few minutes of the program he complained sadly that no one had asked him anything at all about the work done by the Fund for the Republic in combatting racial discrimination. The Fund spent considerably more time and effort on this matter he said, than on anything to do with communism. The panel still asked him nothing about the Fund and racial discrimination, and.when the show went off the air, Mr. Hutchins looked very tired.67 The article resulted in a series of letters to the magazine by prominent past guests on the program who refuted 551b1d. 65Ibid. 571h1d. 138 the charges of unfair treatment and methods of questioning. The following excerpts are from letters printed in the maga- zine several weeks later, answering Ebbit's article. I have always been impressed by the insight Of the inter- viewers as indicated in their leading questions, as well as by their generous attitude of developing the speaker's position without attemptégg to color or distort his meaning . Wayne Morse As one of your victims (to Spivak)--is that the right word?--I can testify to the excellent job you do, with questions direct, to the point, but algays within the bounds of fair play. Norman Thomas 9 Probing is done by experts who are tharough but not antagonistic. John Foster Dulles Spivak also received a letter from A1 Edwards, Executive Vice President of Henry Holt, and a friend of Robert Frost. This letter was also printed in the magazine. I hope you will understand that neither Robert Frost nor I share the Opinion of The New Republic concerning his treatment on your program at Christmas time. He would be most sensitive to any feeling of pressure or discom- fort, but his reaction was one of pleasure at the way he was handled by the panel, and he was most apprecia- tive Of the Opportunity to go before the largest Single audience in his experience. 1 Perhaps the best professional refutation of Ebbit's charges was in a letter to the magazine by noted newscaster John Daly, then Vice President Of the ABC netowrk, itself originator of the interview program.ISSUES AND ANSWERS. 68W. February 20, 1956, p. 22. 692,12. 70219.19.- 71111151. 139 Unquestionably the TV inquisition, as currently prac- ticed, leaves something to be desired as a means of extractin ideas from the presumably willing and knowledge 1e guest. But just what the new, painless method is to be, I don't know. But regarding Mr. Ebbit's intimation that it is always his ox which is most bloodied by the TV panels, I would only suggest 'tis better to be gored than bored. Further, it is difficult to understand his surprise. I am reasonably certain that Dr. Hutchins and the other guests are aware of the nature Of the program before they accept. If not, then I can appreciate Mr. Ebbit's solicitude for the blind. ‘Maybe the prOSpective vic- tims should watch some Eelevision, as a prerequisite to becoming participants.7 One of the most impressive MEET THE PRESS scoops, and a program‘which also drew some adverse criticism, took place in 1959 when the panel faced Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastos Mikoyan. Mikoyan closed his American tour with a sixty minute visit on the Show. The New York Times described the security measures taken. ‘While security agents and policemen stood guard, Mr. fit°§§i§2§é§§fi§§§2§b3333.322 53832213325: 9 walked on catwalks above the sound stage, and even on the roof.73 The importance of television's being able to convey an image of a man who himself is trying to convey a favorable image can be seen in this description of Mikoyan's appearance. At no point in his hour long appearance did the Soviet official look ill at ease or nervous. He ducked a few questions by answering some of his own, and he sometimes equated things that for most.Americans were entirely d fferent. ut most viewers doubtless got the impression ”Ibid., p. 23. 73New York Times, January 19, 1959, p. 1. 140 of an able and articulate spokesman for Communism and the Soviet cause.7 The article also describes his discomfort a few times during the program. At one point Mr. Mikoyan took out a white handkerchief and wiped his brow. It was not the questions that made him erspire he said, but the hot television lights. He wrin led his brow as he listened to some questions but he was never at a loss for words.75 Perhaps most important in the newspaper's accounts of the program, however, were its comments on Mr. Spivak's treat- ment of Mikoyan in the closing minutes of the show. Perhaps because in an earlier exchange Lawrence Spivak had been bested by Mr. Mikoyan's sense of humor, the former's conduct at the very close of the program was re- grettable. .Advising Mr. Mikoyan that there were only two minutes remaining, Mr. Spivak thereupon proceeded to use them up with a protracted uestion. Mr. Mikoyan was left with no time to reply, har 1y an attractive example of American hospitalityfi As a TV veteran int ately acquainted with the mechanics Of the medium, Mi. Spivak should have exercised more care to observe the amenities, especially in the case of one with whom he strongly disagrees.7 New York Times television critic Jack Gould expressed the same thoughts several days later. Now it should be noted that Lawrence Spivak the prime interviewer and producer of the program covered himself with the expected glory--he did not. His behavior made up in rudeness for what it lacked in forcefulness. The highly emotional Mr. Spivak dutifully warned Mr. Mikoyan that only two minutes were left to the Show, which re- flected a keen awareness of the Operation of the medium's mechanics. And thereupon Mr. Spivak indulged in a strictly pro-American harangue that left Mr. Mikoyan no chance to 741bid. 751b1d. 751hid., p. 51. 141 reply. Later Mr. Mikoyan upbraided Mr. Spivak who responded with a wishy washy and totally unconvincing repl . The childish petulance of Mr. Spivak can be frightfully tiresome. In interviewing prominent figures in the news he is obviously beyond his ken. He should learn to defer to Ned Brooks, his program's mod- erator, who knows phe value Of putting courtesy before a grandstand play. At least one New York Times reader, however, disagreed with Gould's criticism of Spivak's performance. Allow me to express my strong disagreement with your critic's rebuke on January 25th to Lawrence Spivak con- cerning his last words to Anastos Mikoyan on MEET THE PRESS. ‘mr. Spivak certainly has every ri ht to end the discussion as he did by a clarification O the differ- ence between the American position and Mr.‘Mikoyan's clever propaganda. A courageous clarification of the issues and defgnse of our position was certainly much needed on TV. Perhaps the best judges of the program's fair treatment Of guests in general, and political guests in particular, are those who have been subjected to the program's questioning. The following excerpts from letters to Mr. Spivak testify to the panel's sharp and provocative but always fair probing procedure. As one who has appeared on your program several times, I can testify to your absolute, arms-length integrity which is so necessary in assuring the public that it is getting exactly what is represented--an unrehearsed inter- view by the press. ‘Wilbur Brucker former ecretary Of the Army79 ”MMM: January 25, 1959, Sec. 2, p. 11. 78Letter to the New York Times by Miss Vera Gibson, Forest Hills, N. Y., February 8, I959, section 2, p. 17. 79Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Wilbur Brucker, cited in Meet the Press, p. 15. 142 I congratulate you on the high standards of timeliness and fair play which you have attained. Senator Clifford Case80 I have always been impressed with the effort you and other panelists have made to present a critical and fair examination Of your guests. Senator James Fullbright81 I have found that in spite of your penetrating questions and your determination to prevent peOple from dodging your questions you have always been fair. W. Averill Harriman82 Nothing I enjoy more than to meet the press in general and Mk. Spivak's press in particular: clear and Sharp but never harsh. Robert Frost83 I found the moderator and the panel forceful but always fair and kind. Congressman Lawrence Curt 584 Certainly, the line between sharp, incisive probing and intentional intimidation is sometimes difficult to distinguish when dealing with important controversial issues which demand carefully thought-out and frank answers. By the nature of its guests and the issues raised, the program expectedly at times leads to heated exchange and verbal fireworks, but not very often. This is a tribute to the nature of the panel and its adherence to standards Of good taste and fairness. 8oExcerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Clifford Case, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16. 81‘Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Senator James‘Fulbright, cited in Meet the Press, p. 19. 82Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from W. Averill Harriman, cited in Meet the Press, p. 20. 83Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Robert Frost, cited n Meet the Press, p. 19. . 84Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Lawrence Curtis, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16. 143 Testimonials cited in this chapter represent all political shades, liberal and conservative, somewhat refuting any charge of any political favoritism‘by the panel or Mr. Spivak. It would seem that those who have appeared on the program not only expected the treatment they received but enjoyed every challenging moment of it. The program's techniques are legitimate, as a way Of getting through subterfuge and double talk and getting at the heart Of matters. Only an incisive, probing panel can pro- vide the kind of rhetorical repartee that elicits newsmaking opinion and fact. It is this combination of the right guest at the right time. which has produced the kinds of news making programs which will now be examined, as representative of the show's success for more than twenty years. HEADLINERS Some Of the most significant Stories which the program made took place in the late forties and early fifties, when the increasing concern over Communist expansion and govern- ‘ment infiltration invited the McCarthy era, and the rebirth of the "red witch hunt" Of the twenties. In 1947, Soviet agent Gerhard Eisler made an appearance on the program, which eventually embroiled him in great diffi- culties. Accounts of the program made Eisler out to be a self-assured, quick witted individual who tried to side-step pointed questions with a Show Of injured innocence. He insisted that he was only a poor German anti-Fascist who only 144 wanted to go back where he came from. 'When asked why his sister stated that he was a Russian agent, he replied, "This lady is a well known informer." ‘When asked if he got his money from the Soviet Union he replied, "No, no, no." The shrewd questioning of the panel, however, gradually elicited the full story of how Eisler had come to this country, in- cluding his damaging admission that interested the F.B.I. Eisler admitted that he had perjured himself by denying he was a Communist when he got a United States visa in Marseilles in 1941. His admission on that program led to further F.B.I. investigation and resulted in a one to two- year jail sentence for falsifying his immigration record.85 Two of the program's biggest bombshells exploded in 1948, involving Elizabeth Bentley, William Remington, 'Whittaker Chambers, and Alger Hiss. These early programs perhaps set the prelude for the era which was to follow. On a September 12th program Elizabeth Bentley, former Soviet spy courier, repeated the charges in public which she had made earlier before an investigation committee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures. She asserted that she had definitely conveyed the meaning that/William.Remington (sus- pended official of the Department of Commerce) was a Communist while he was in government employ. Remington promptly filed a libel suit against Miss Bentley, the pro- gram, and its sponsor, General Foods, for $100,000. Over 8slrwin Ross, Reader's Digest, September, 1951, p. 19. "~ 145 the protests of Spivak and Rountree, the insurance company settled with Remington for $9,500, based on the fact that it would have cost them more than that amount in legal fees just to defend the suit.86 As a result of the suit, however, the Senate re-Opened the investigation, found new evidence, and indicted Remington within a matter of weeks after the suit was settled. If he had not sued, he might have gone completely free. The Chambers interview resulted in one of the prize coups of broadcast journalism. It was on a program of .August, 1948, that Whittaker Chambers, without benefit of Congressional immunity, used MEET THE PRESS to repeat his charge that Alger Hiss had been a Communist. Hiss promptly sued Chambers for libel. In self defense, Chambers un- veiled the famous "pumpkin papers," which not only proved Hiss a Communist, but linked him to a pre-war Soviet spy ring. There ultimately followed Hiss' indictment for per- jury, his two sensational trials, and his conviction.87 Had Chambers not gone on MEET THE PRESS, the Hiss case might still be unresolved. Also in 1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall electrified the MEET THE PRESS audience by announcing that General Lucius Clay ”had the authority as military commander 86Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967. 87Irwin Ross, Coronet, June, 1955, p. 40. 146 to shoot" if the Russians attacked any Americans.88 In April, 1949, former Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith gave a hint of things to come when he warned that the Russians had "solved the problems of Nuclear atomic fission."89 The issues of Communism and Russian expansion caused many headline-making programs during those early years. 'When issues are controversial, tempers can be short. On a program of August, 1949, liberal columnist I. F. Stone, then working for the ultra liberal New York DailyACompass was a member of the panel quizzing Major General Patrick Hurley, former Presidential trouble shooter in China. Stone accused Hurley of "making a wonderful stump speech on the subject of America's being duped by Russia in the past."90 The General retorted, "I'm right on your track now, just like I was on Stalin's from the beginning."91 Panelist Paul Ward of the Baltimore Sun suggested getting away to a little less personal field. Stone, however, then asked the General whether ”he had ever seen in the oil fieldsof Texas and ‘Oklahoma any crooks bigger than those in the Chinese Nation- alist Government."92 The General, a native Oklahoman, 88Irwin Ross, Reader's Digest, September, 1951, p. 18. 391bid. 90Newsweek, August 29, 1949, p. 44. 911bid. 921b1d. 147 exploded and exclaimed, ”You go back to Jerusalem, and I'll go back to the oil fields, young fellow."93 The NBC switchboard lit up "like a new saloon" according to Newsweek. In 1951, Governor Dewey split sharply with national Republican leaders on a MEET THE PRESS program, when he advocated trOOps and sea air units for EurOpe without the necessity of Congressional approval for such commitments by military leaders.94 In direct opposition Senator Taft and former President Hoover had both counselled against using more troops abroad without approval. In October, 1953, only hours before returning to EurOpe, Supreme Allied Commander General.Gruather revealed on MEET THE PRESS that he was doubtful of United States leadership of the western world in Europe.95 That same year, Robert Morris, of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, made headlines with his MEET THE PRESS accusation of new facts which would lead to more spy convictions.96 Senator MtCarthy himself was a MEET THE PRESS guest on several occasions. He made front page headlines, however, in October, 1954, when he stated on the program that he would not provide any accounting of his use of funds given to him to fight Communism.97 This was his first public statement 93Ibid. 94§gg York Times, February 12, 1951, p. 1. ”EL-31mm, October 13, 1953, p. 3. 9632113522222. November 23. 1953. p- 1. ”Emma, October 4, 1954, p. l. 148 since a special Senate Committee recommended that the Senate censure him. .An indication of McCarthy's waning popularity and power was given on a.MEET THE PRESS program in May, 1954. High ranking Republican Senator Homer Ferguson became the first Republican running for reelection to suggest he would not welcome McCarthy's help.98 Foreign diplomats also made news on MEET THE PRESS in 1954. Anthony Nutting, Chief British delegate to the United Nations, made American headlines and shocked his own House of Commons by stating that Britain.would be involved if Red China attacked Formosa.99 No British official had ever made such a statement before. The greatest Spivak coup of that year, however, came when he secured the French Premiere Pierre Mendes-France's appearance on the program November let. It was the first time any head of government had ever appeared on any American political interview program. The success of Mbndes' appearance also illustrates Spivak's ability to put those guests at ease, who are hesitant to appear on any other program of this type. On the morning of the program,‘when Spivak approached Mendes in his hotel room, the Premiere eyed Spivak and stated, "So, you're the executioner, and I'm to be the victim."100 Spivak told Mendes, "No man need worry who knows the answers, ”mum. May 17. 1954. p. 1. 99Irwin Ross, Coronet, June, 1955, p. 41. 100nm. , p. 42. 149 and I'm sure you do.”101 The Premiere disregarded Spivak's suggestions on how to dress for television, and to shave before the show. He actually seemed quite disgruntled on the way to the studio with Spivak. As he got out of the taxi at Radio City he was greeted by a cheering crowd. In a completely changed mood, he marched to the elevator all smiles and quips. Spivak could then swiftly propel him into General Sarnoff's dressing room and get him properly groomed for television. .A letter which Spivak later received from one of the Premiere's aides said that judging from the reac- tion, his appearance on television was the most effective thing Mendes did while he was in this country.102 Since then, many other foreign heads have graced the MEET THE PRESS guest seat, including Fidel Castro, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Ghandi, Hailie Selassie, Konrad Adenauer, ‘Willy Brandt, Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan, King Hussein of Jerdan, a score of Prime Ministers, and many other notable foreign diplomats and representatives. In 1955, Senator waiter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, used MEET THE PRESS to call for a meeting of the "Big Four" heads of states, and thereby started the chain of events that led to the Summit Conference at Geneva.103 The danger of war during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 was foreseen by Secretary of State John 1011b1d. 1°21b1d. 103New York Times, March 21, 1955, p. 1. 150' Foster Dulles. On MEET THE PRESS he publicly announced for the first time his intention to ask the Treasury to amend its regulations so as to require United States shipowners to pay their canal tolls into a blocked account instead of directly to Egypt.104 MEET THE PRESS on several occasions has broken news before it was officially released by the government. In 1952, Charles Sawyer, then Secretary of Commerce, confirmed on a program of April let, an increase in the price of steel to be granted that week.105 In September, 1956, Secretary of Labor James Mitchell released figures on national job totals that were not to be officially released until the Tuesday following the program.106 Although the program produced much heated verbal con- tact during the forties and fifties, it produced physical violence only once, and that was after the program had gone off the air. Elliott Roosevelt was interviewed by a panel which included Fulton Lewis Jr. After the broadcast, Roosevelt thought he had heard Lewis make an unflattering reference to Roosevelt's wife, actress Faye Emerson. Roosevelt called Lewis a liar, and Lewis objected. One of Roosevelt's friends then took a swing at the famous commentator. In the exchange, co-producer Rountree received a sprained thumb.107 IMMMM: September 24, 1956, p. 1. 105-1531293513335, April 21, 1952, p. 1. 106m 32.153.119.93: September 3, 1955, p. 1. 107"Headliner," 113e, March 5, 1951, p. 89. 151 _ During one early program, a stir was created not by any verbal fireworks, but by a violation of one of broad- casting's then strictest taboos. Tex McCrary asked New York ZMayor Fiorello LeGuardia if he had ever tried to get a New York newspaper publisher to fire his city hall reporter. LaGuardia promptly replied, "That's a damn lie!"108 Since the mid-fifties the program has had to share headlines with the two other major network interview programs, FACE THE NATION on CBS and ISSUES AND ANSWERS on ABC. Be- cause all three programs feature newsworthy guests every week, they receive about equal coverage by the major news- papers. This is especially true during political campaigns, when all three programs attempt to give maximum exposure to all major candidates. In recent years, however, MEET THE PRESS has still managed to capture the front page in many instances, because of the timing involved in selecting guests. In 1961,.Attorney General Robert Kennedy made headlines throughout the world with a MEET THE PRESS statement that his brother, President John Kennedy, would use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Berlin.109 In August, 1967, Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh gave his first national interview, immediately following the worst racial riot in our nation's history.110 Only hours after his election, VietnamLPresident INguyen Van Thieu gave his first interview for an American —-L 108Irwin Ross, Coronet, June, 1955, p. 41. 109Cited in Meet the Press, p. 10. 11OAugust 30, 1967. 152 audience via satellite on MEET THE PRESS. On November 20th, 1967, following a week of intensive conferences on Vietnam, General William Westmoreland and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker faced the MEET THE PRESS panel in a special one-hour pro- gram. Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban was a program guest during the height of the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967. In August, 1966, during the NAACP convention, a time of great dissent among civil rights leaders, MEET THE PRESS produced a special one-and-a-half-hour program, featuring six civil rights leaders. Featured guests were Martin Luther King, Floyd McKissick, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, Stokely Car- michael and James Meredith. The dissent splitting the move- ment and expressed openly on the program elicited this New 39315 Type; headline. 6 Hours LEADERS cusu ON TACTICS IN EQUALITY DRIVE-111 More important, however, than the amount of news the program makes is the nature of the news it makes. John Foster Dulles in praising the program,‘wrote as follows. On controversial subjects it is easy to generate heat. but hard to generate light. MEET THE PRESS does a job of intellectual illumination. . Very often "intellectual illumination" does not make front page headlines. Its importance lies in the kinds of opinion, conjecture, and clarification of thought which the MEET THE PRESS format allows. It is the kind of illumination most 111New York Times, August 22, 1966, p. l. 112The New Re ublic, February 20, 1956, p. 22. 153 present on those programs which feature political guests. During any election year, it is not so much hard news head- lines which give the program its significance as much as its ability to serve as a forum for the discussion of issues and candidates' views on these issues before a national audience. The kinds of truth which emerge on these programs are as important as the kinds of facts which usually make headlines. The importance of MEET THE PRESS during political years will now be briefly discussed. THE PROGRAM AND POLITICS During any election year, an appearance on MEET THE PRESS and other similar nationally televised political interview programs is an obligation of any candidate and potential candidate. It is in the area of political communi- cation, therefore, that MEET THE PRESS plays its most impor- tant role. The image-making contributions of the questioning technique assume their greatest importance. As Governor George Romney has.written, "There are few public officials who don't relish a good showing on this program or fear a bad one."113 As 4a new interview program, MEET THE PRESS is exempt from the "equal time" provisions of Section 315 of the ‘Federal Communications Act. The producer, therefore, must be as impartial as possible in the selection of political 1967 113Letter from Governor George Romney, September 22, 154 guests and in questioning. Because it is exempt from 315, the program also offers the best opportunity to expose the minority as well as the majority points of view on any issue. Producer Lawrence Spivak, discussing the problem of selecting political guests, wrote the following. ‘We are specifically exempted from Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act but we are very careful about the doctrine of fairness. Difficulties arise however, when a candidate is already in an important office and gets involved with an important issue that makes him newsworthy. ‘we try to be fair also to minority candidates, bearing in mind of course that MEET THE PRESS is a news program; thus, while we inter- viewed the Republican and Democratic candidates for President and Vice President in 1960, we did not inzer- view the candidates of the many minority parties.11 The program has, however, in any election year featured interviews with all of the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, (declared and undeclared), as well as with cam- paign managers, Congressional candidates, governmental appointees, and others directly or indirectly involved in, or affected by, the outcome of the November elections. In 1964, MEET THE PRESS presented two special full- hour programs from the conventions, besides regular inter- views with candidates. In 1960 the program presented one of its most thorough election year schedules. Candidates John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Henry Cabot Lodge all appeared within a five-week period. Other active and inactive candidates, including Senators Stuart Symington, Hubert Humphrey, andflWayne Morse, also were seen. A special 114Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967. 155 ninety-minute program featuring Kennedy, Johnson and Symington was telecast from Los Angeles a few hours before the Demo- cratic Convention was calledto order. An hour-long version with Senator Barry Goldwater and Governor Nelson Rockefeller (who stated on the air that he would not accept a Vice Presidential nomination) was a highlight of coverage of the Republican Convention. 'Other 1960 guests were Senators Thruston B. Merton and Henry M; Jackson, respective Republic- an and Democratic National Committee chairmen; Chester A. Bowles and Charles H. Percy, respective Democratic and Republican Platform Committee chairmen; and Governor LeRoy Collins,~permanent chairman of the Democratic Convention. A special full-hour pre-election program on November 6th featured campaign managers Leonard Hall (Republican) and Hebert F. Kennedy (Democratic). - Similarly, in 1956, MEET THE PRESS was host to Demo- cratic candidates Adlai E. Stevenson and Estes Kefauver; Governors Frank Lausche, Christian A. Herter, W. Averill Harriman, and A. B. "Happy" Chandler (all of whom then cherished Presidential or Vice Presidential ambitions); Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt; and James.A. Finnegan, campaign manager for.Ad1ai Stevenson. In 1952, the news forum program featured a roster of guests that included Democratic Presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson; both Vice-Presidential candidates, Richard Nixon and John Sparkman; Presidential aspirants Richard Russell, Robert A. Taft, Estes Kefauver, Robert S. Kerr, and 156 W. Averill Harriman; Democratic National Committeemen Frank E. McKinney and Jacob Arvey; and Republican National Com- mitteeman Arthur Summerfield. The program that year also featured two one-hour pre-convention programs, each of which presented a number of the respective contenders for Presi- dential and Vice-Presidential nomination in direct question and answer exchanges with the MEET THE PRESS panel. Almost every major political figure has appeared on the program over the years. Those who have not appeared on the program have not been ignored, but rather, have not ex- pressed the desire to appear at the particular time they were asked. President Truman never appeared, even after he was out of office. President Eisenhower once accepted an invitation when he was chief of staff, then cancelled out. His failure to accept an invitation during the 1952 campaign was thrown at him by reporters on a number of occasions and irritated him to a point where he said he never would appear. The press quoted him once as warning members of his cabinet not to appear. 'When one of his members said he had already accepted an invitation, the President supposedly said, "Watch our for that fellow Spivak."115 Senator Harry Byrd and' Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn are two other prominent figures who cancelled out of invitations and never appeared on the program. The program consistently offers most political figures the opportunity for national exposure of their views before, 115Ibid. 157 during, and after any political campaign year. Moreover, by the incisive questioning of the panel, the program on occa- sion has produced some newsmaking moments in national politics. MEET THE PRESS is directly credited with producing the beginnings of at least two Presidential nominations. The most famous of these occurred on October 15, 1950. The guest was Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, immediately after he had reconsidered his previous refusal to run again for the Cover- norship of the state. As he was a Republican party leader, a two-time Presidential nominee, his decision raised many questions as to his possibility of national candidacy. Soon after the reporters began their questioning, Dewey was obviously asked why he had reconsidered running for Governor. He replied that his health was better and the country was at war. Leo Egan of The New York Times then asked whether his decision could be because he wanted another try at the Republican Presidential nomination. Dewey replied that he had removed himself from that position about eighteen months previously and would not reconsider that decision. The news- making statement was elicited in the next few questions. EGAN: Governor, if you are not going to run, do you have any candidate in mind? DEWEY: Well, it's a little too early, but we have in New York a very great world figure . . . and if I should be re-elected governor and have in- fluence with the New York delegation, I would recommend to them that they support General Eisenhower for President if he would accept the draft.116 116Hubert Pryor, Look, February 10, 1953, p. 33. IF 158 The next morning saw new3paper headlines like the following all across the country. DEWEY BOOMS IKE FOR '52 RACE--HE'S OUT: BIDS GENERAL TO RUN DEWEY FOR IKE IN '52: FLATLY RULES SELF 01113117 It was the beginning of an Eisenhower boom, two years before the 1952 election, which carried through to victory and the ‘White House. 4 It was MEET THE PRESS which also gave the impetus to the eventual candidacy of Adlai E. Stevenson. One day after Harry Truman announced his decision not to seek reelection, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois was a MEET THE PRESS guest on March 30, 1952. Again, the important element of timing played a role in Stevenson's nomination. Although no newsworthy headlines resulted from his appearance on the program, Stevenson did project a picture of frankness, astute grasp, and a keen wit. It wasn't so much what he said but how he handled himself that day which made an impression on the audience. A member of that audience was David L. Lawrence, Pitts- burgh Democratic leader. Lawrence placed a call to Chicago's famous Jacob Arvey, Illinois Democratic National Committee- man, who played a leading role in persuading Stevenson to run for Governor in 1948. Lawrence told Arvey that in his opinion Stevenson was the man for the Democratic nomination. It was the beginning of a Stevenson boom,‘which‘with the help 117Ibid. 159 of television exposure, resulted in his becoming a two-time nominee for the Presidency, and one of the nation's out- standing political figures.118 Arvey himself, appearing on MEET THE PRESS in October, 1952, in answer to a question about Stevenson, stated: ‘Were it not for this program, he would never, in Spigiggécgayegbeen considered as a candidate for t e Evidently, the Governor himself thought the same thing. After his defeat by General Eisenhower, Stevenson encountered Lawrence Spivak at a dinner. Pointing an accusing finger at him, he stated, "You got me into all that trouble."120 Over the years, the program has caught its share of political headlines in the faceof competition from the other two major news interview programs. Most of these headline- making programs have not been of the "hard news" variety, but rather have elicited important indications of major party politics, strategy, and internal strife. Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico made the front page in October, 1950, with his MEET THE PRESS appearance the day before. Anderson, then acting chairman of the Democratic National Committee, stated "Truman would be the only man con- .sidered by the Democrats as the 1952 Presidential candidate."121 1131bid. 1191bid. IZQArnold H. Lubasch, "Personal Political Panaceas Hit TV," New York Times, April 12, 1964, sec. 2, p. 15. filmmm, October 23, 1950, p. 1. 160 It marked the first time a leading Democrat has come out so strongly for'Mr. Truman's reelection, having the effect of tossing Truman's hat in the ring for the first time in the 1952 election year. The Eisenhower-Taft battle for the nomination was re- flected in several MEET THE PRESS headline-making programs. Harold Stassen used the program early in January, 1952, to deny that his aim was to help the General in entering the Illinois Republican primary.122, Senator Taft publicly stated on MEET THE PRESS that Eisenhower's weakness lay in the many issues on which he hadn't taken a stand.123 Taft's feelings about Eisenhower were perhaps best revealed in the Senator's final appearance on MEET THE PRESS before leaving for the Republican National Convention. Asked about the report that a Taft-MacArthur combination was under consideration, Taft declared, “That would be quite a ticket."124 He then stated, "It would be entirely up to General MacArthur and I don't know whether he would accept."125 Actually, his statement had slipped out before he was able to stop himself and give his stock answer to questions about the Vice-Presidential nomination, "that for obvious reasons he could not comment about the possible candidacies for the Vice-Presidential uznggggimfig, January 7, 1952, p. 1. 123New York Times, March 10, 1952, p. 1. 124New York Times, June 30, 1952, p. 1. 125lhig. 161 ' This incident was significant because only a nomination.’ few minutes earlier he had given this stock answer when queried how he would feel about General Eisenhower as a running mate. Governor Adlai Stevenson's reluctance as a potential candidate was revealed on his MEET THE PRESS appearances in ‘March, 1952. The following week, Democratic National Chair- man Frank McKinney used the program to warn that "nobody could get to the White House without working for it."126 The first hint at a bid by Averill Harriman for the 1956 Democratic nomination was made on a MEET THE PRESS pro- gram of July, 1955, by New York political head Carmen DeSapio. It was the first time that DeSapio publicly indicated that Harriman would be in the political race the following year.127 Senator Stuart Symington also used the program in January, 1960, to come as close as he could to announcing his candidacy.128 During the 1960 campaign, Richard Nixon used MEET THE PRESS to make his first public television appearance after eleven days in the hospital. He made head- lines by publicly seeking a date to end all talk on the religious issue.129 Earlier that year, Senator John Kennedy was a program guest one day after his announced candidacy, mammals-mes. April 7. 1952. p. 9. ”7.15521933311222. July 4. 1955. p. 1- 128New York Times, January 11, 1960, p. 1. 129New York Times, September 22, 1960, p. l. 162 and challenged Johnson and Symington to enter the primaries.”0 Senator Hubert Humphrey appeared on the program only two days before the crucial Wisconsin primary of 1960. TWO days after his announced candidacy in 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater used the program for his first appearance as a candidate before a national audience. His frank remarks on the program elicited the following New York Times headline. GOLDWATER WOULD THREATEN A BREAK WITH SOVIET131 Following his defeat in 1964, Goldwater issued a state- ment proposing to realign the two major parties into a Liberal and Conservative two party system. Henry Cabot Lodge used MEET THE PRESS to publicly object to Goldwater's pro- posal in no weak terms, giving an indication of the divided state of the Party. The New York Times headline the following day, read: LODGE DENOUNCES PARTY REALIGNING132 Headlines, however, do not tell the full meaning of any one statement made on a program, nor do they indicate the flexibility or firmness with which a statement was made. A headline by its nature is concise and selective. It can re- flect an interpretation of a statement, rather than the true meaning of the statement itself. It can, by the addition of adjectives, in verbally describing the nature of a statement, or in selectively summarizing a statement, misconstrue the 130New York Times, January 7, 1960, p. 1. 131New York Times, January 6, 1964, p. 17. 132New York Times, November 16, 1964, p. 17. 163 true meaning. Headlines cannot indicate the context in which a statement is made; what preceded it or what followed. The significance of a program lies many times, not in the headline-making statement but in the opinions and thoughts that do not necessarily make the headlines. Over the long term, a candidate's image must be measured not by any one statement but in his many statements on many issues, as ex- pressed on many interview programs. Are his views a result of consistent and logical expression, as they remain stable or fluctuate over the years? Do his replies reflect an eva- sive nature, or do they indicate a desire for frankly meeting an issue head on? The significance of the panel itself also does not lie in the number of headlines it can elicit, but rather in how it goes about eliciting the kinds of facts and opinions which can make headlines. 'What is the questioning method employed which can force a straight reply where one is not readily given? Does the program draw out discussion on the really important issues of the campaign? Is the questioning pattern consistent, regardless of the pOlitical views of the guest and the panel? The answers to these questions form the qualitative di- mension of the program, which most contributes to our know- ledge of the value of the political interview, more than chronological continuity, more than the number of awards or headlines which the program has elicited. It is along this dimension that MEET THE PRESS will now be measured in the following analytical chapters. CHAPTER IV THE QUESTIONING PROCESS The essence of MEET THE PRESS, like any political interview program, lies in its questioning process. Through the kinds of questions posed by the panel and its insistence on clear, direct answers, the program strikes at the heart of important issues. Certainly, by its question-and-answer technique, its statements and comments of a speculative nature, and its treatment of political subject matter, the | program combines the elements of both rhetorical and dialec- tical discourse. Consequently, it emerges as not only an interview program, but an enlightening forum for political discussion. The main objective on those programs featuring political guests would seem to be an attempt to replace the vague ambiguities of political rhetoric with specific comment and opinion. Under the scrutinizing probe of the MEET THE PRESS panel, the general accusation must give way to the specific charge, the cliche criticism must be replaced by the specific alternative, the nebulous term or statement must give way to the specific clarification or definition of meaning. The evasive answer can serve only to contribute to an evasive political image. It is this direct quality which 164 165 gives MEET THE PRESS a decided advantage over the political Speech as a means of political communication and information. The campaign speech usually is devoid of any immediate chal- lenge or questioning of charges, criticisms, or inconsis- tencies which are couched in the language of political platitudes. The televised speech has no audience immediately to point out or question any implications or dangers inherent in any policy, or to express the alternate point of view. The questioning procedure, therefore, supported by the preparation of the panel, the impossibility of question con- trol by the guest, and the significance of the particular guest at the particular time he is on the show, are the most important dimensions of the program. Important answers can be elicited only by important and timely questions. This chapter will illustrate the kinds of questions asked in various areas of political opinion. The answers themselves will not be stressed as much as the questions posed in order to analyze the probing technique of the panel. As has been previously pointed out, in those programs fea- turing political guests, the panelists concentrate mostly on questions of opinion and commitment regarding important issues, rather than on questions of information. This fact was elicited by correspondence with several of the major panel- ists who have appeared over the years on the programs being analyzed. More specifically, the chapter will deal with those kinds of questions which attempt to cut at the heart of the issues by clarification, rather than with those 166 questions of general Opinion, comment, or information. The importance of the opinion elicited on the program is usually assured by the fact that in general questions focus on the reason why the guest is newsworthy at the mo- ment. In the case of political candidates most questions naturally deal with political issues of candidacy, party politics, and campaigns and issues. Many of the candidates, however, have been questioned on the program in various other roles. Henry Cabot Lodge and Adlai Stevenson both appeared several times as United Nations representatives. The ques- tions on these programs naturally centered in important pending actions or decisions within the United Nations re- garding a variety of international issues. Senator Estes Kefauver was a guest during the height of his crime investi- gating activity in 1951. In 1958 then United States Senator Hubert Humphrey was a program guest following his newsmaking interview with Soviet leader Krushchev. Question content in all cases was determined by the guest's role at the particu- lar moment, thus insuring timely Opinion and information. An analysis of questions in those programs being studied revealed that the majority of opinion questions asked for clarification purpose fall under several major types as follows: 1. ue tio Of c a a These questions involve the clarification by the guest of the meaning of any term, statement, or point of view expressed, either on the program or at some other time. An example of 167 this kind of questioning took place on a program featuring Estes Kefauver in May, 1952. The questions were asked by panelist Lawrence Spivak. SPIVAK: Senator, you yourself, in a speech you made on May 7th said, "We in the Federal Government must clean up our own house. Some steps have been taken to accomplish this but what has been done is not yet enough." What exactly did you mean by that? SPIVAK: As late as April 5th for examp le you said at Cleveland and again I quote, {A criminal ele- ment has been gaining ground and warming its way into all levels of gogernment. Can you be more specific on that? 2. (Questions involvinggthe explanation of inconsis- tencies. These questions elicit the explanation of inconsis- tencies between political statements and actions, inconsis- tencies of governmental or political policies and actions, and inconsistencies of language. An example of this kind of questioning involving inconsistency of governmental policy took place on a program in October, 1954. The guest was Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., then Chief U. S. Delegate to the United Nations. Lawrence Spivak questioned American actions outside of the United Nations as being inconsistent with the purpose of the united Nations. SPIVAK; ‘Wasn't the United Nations formed originally really to prevent aggression? Yet, we're running all over the world trying to set up treaties with various other countries in 1MEET THE PRESS program script, May 18, 1952, p. 16. 21bid., p. 17. 168 order t3 prevent aggression, all outside the UN. A question involving inconsistency between political talk and political action involved Vice Presidential candidate Richard Nixon on a program of September, 1952. The question was put to Nixon by Felix Belair of the New York Times. BELAIR: Senator, you have had some things to say re- cently about the need to clean up the awful mess in washington, and I assume that that includes tax evasion and tax fixing, and the mess in the Internal Revenue Bureau. That being so, how do you explain your negative vote on the President's plan to put revenue collectors under civil service and make it a blue ribbon entry which ultimately was done?4 3. ,Qngagign§_1ngg;ging committal to a specific action or policy or proposed alternative to the resolution of approb- 1em of issue. These questions usually involve the action a guest might take, given the role and Opportunity to face and resolve important issues. Also involved are alternative solutions to important problems, when governmental solutions or solutions by other individuals to these problems are adversely criticized by the guest. In March, 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson was asked the following questions by May Craig of the‘gggtland Press-Hggglg, which illustrate this type of direct committal question. CRAIG: Governor, you said once that peace is the unfinished task of our generation. Korea of course is the hot spot. What would you do about Korea? 3MEET THE PRESS program script, October 10, 1954, p. 2. 4m THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 5. 169 CRAIG: It's been since last July now since we've even tried to get a truce. 5W go on talking at Panmunjon? ould you just A series of questions regarding the filibuster issue were put to Senator John Sparkman testing his stand on civil rights, during a program of August, 1952. As Vice Presidential nominee of the Democratic party, he was asked questions based on the hypothetical possibility of his being elected to office, and the role he could play regarding the filibuster. The following questions of commiUumuzwere put to Sparkman by William White of the New York Times. 'WHITE: SPARKMAN: ‘WHITE: SPARKMAN: WHITE: Senator . . . as vice-president and there- fore as presiding officer of the Senate, what art would you be willing or prepared to take in carrying out that part of the Democratic platform that calls for amending the Senate rules against filibuster? The vice-president as presiding officer of the Senate has no vote except in case of a tie. He could however, it is conceivable isn't it, he could find himself in the position where he had to make a very important ruling? Certainly. WOuld you as presiding officer of the Senate feel bound by the statement made in the platform or would you feel bound by whatever prgcedent had existed in the Senate itself? The questions strike at the heart of the civil rights issue and the handicap which filibuster had always presented 5MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 7. 6MEET THE PRESS program script, August 10, 1952, p. 4. " ‘ .‘A'- 1“. 170 in the passage of any civil rights legislation. Since Sparkman as a Southerner had always defended the filibuster, his answers to these questions would test his sincerity in carrying out the Democratic platform regardless of sectional tradition. Alternative solutions to criticism of policy also fall under this category of questioning as exemplified in a program of May, 1957, featuring Adlai Stevenson. The following question was put to the former Governor and Demo- cratic nominee for President by James Reston of the New York Times. RESTON: . . . There was a great deal of criticism _ this weekend about the Eisenhower foreign policy. But in specific terms, does your party or do you have an alternative say to our policy in German or the Middle East or with Communist China What would you do other than what is now being done. A similar type of question was put to Stevenson by Lawrence Spivak on a program in April, 1960. SPIVAKs 'When you returned from South America, you accused our leaders of "talking of freedom and embracin dictators." Haven't we got quite a prob em in South-America? How do we deal with the dictatorships of the left and the right? ‘Would you have us deal with Castro today tge way you would have us deal with Trujillo? 4. Questions or statements containing a built-in premise. These questions or statements by the panelists serve to point out valid points of view, facts, assumptions, ‘ 7MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 7. 8MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 10. 171 and problems connected with major issues and policies. They serve as a means of getting at the truth of the matter and exposing all sides to be considered. The guest might or might not accept the premises, depending upon the nature of the premise and the language in which it is stated. Several examples of this type of questioning occurred on a program of December, 1951, featuring Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. who was then acting campaign manager for General Dwight Eisenhower. The first question concerned Eisenhower's reluctance to de- clare himself a Republican, and included several premises regarding Eisenhower's political strategy. SPIVAK: But isn't he in essence saying to the American peOple, "I am going to do my duty as an army officer and I am not going to say that I am interested in the nomination and that I am a Republican," but all those other people who are very very responsible-- Governor Dewey, and Senator Lodge and Senator Carlson, and all those people whose words you can trust say, ”I am a Republican and that I am interested in the ngmination," and isn't that political coyness? . A second question contained built in premises regarding a Republican Party split. It was put to Lodge by James Wechsler of the New York Post. 'WECHSLER: Isn't the s lit between the Republican party and t e so-called international wing and what I would call the McCormick wing as sharp as any split in the Democratic party? LODGE: No. ' 'WECHSLER; And wouldn't that be as great a problem 9MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 3. 172 to General Eisenhower as any that the Democratic President faces? LODGE: In the first place, I don't think the split is as sharp as the split in the Democratic party on the civil rights issue. In the second place, I think that the Republican president will naturally have a much stronger influence over the Republican Senate than a Democratic President has.10 Lodge rejected both premises of a strong party split and an Eisenhower problem if elected, because of this split. There are times when the premises, although possibly valid, are presented in language which makes it difficult to determine whether the panelist is objectively expressing a valid point, or whether he is expressing a personal bias on the issue. This type of Statement will be discussed later in the chapter under the matter of program objectivity. When an evasive answer is given to any type of question, a panelist might repeat the question, rephrase it, or rephrase the answer to remove any doubt in interpretation. This technique in pursuit of a direct reply resulted in a headline-making admission by Senator Barry Goldwater on a MEET THE PRESS program of February, 1955. Panelist Lawrence Spivak was questioning Goldwater on the importance of President Eisenhower's running again as a factor in whether the Republicans could gain control of Congress in 1956. SPIVAK: a: you think you could possibly win without ‘m GOLDWATER: ‘Well, I don't think it's right for any American to say any other American is 101bid., p. 10. SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: 173 indispensable and I think President Eisen ower would be the first to agree with that. But I think in this case he's the obvious choice for President and I'm hopeful. I'm not saying indispensable to the country; is he indispensable to your victory? Do you think you could possibly win without him? I think President Eisenhower is the obvious candidate of the Republican Party and I hope he accepts it. The question is do you think you could win without him? I'll give you my personal opinion, I don't think we can.11 Goldwater's pessimistic admission drew a New York Times head- line the next day. The method of rephrasing an answer for further clari- fication was utilized in this exchange between Lawrence Spivak and U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson in September, 1961. The questioning concerned the issue of Berlin. SPIVAK: STEVENSON: SPIVAK: STEVENSON: The most serious threat to thepeace of the world today is the threat to Berlin by the Soviet Union, and the UN 8 major objective is to make sure that there is peace in the world and to handle such threats. Why hasn't this matter been brought before the UN? Do you mean why hasn't it previously, or why has an tem not been inscribed so far before the UN? Why has it not been inscribed: why hasn't it been brought up previously? I suppose the reason why it has not been broug t before the United Nations thus far 11MEET THE PRESS program script, February 27, 1955, r). 11. 174 is that there is little that can be done except to call upon the parties in interest to negotiate, that is to say, the Soviet Union on the one hand and the allies on the other . . . The only solution for it is negotiation, the jurisdiction or the utility of the United Nations is somewhat limited. SPIVAK: In short, what you are saying really is that the UN is elpless to do anything where the large nations, the big nations are involved. STEVENSON: I don't think it is helpless in the exercise of its moral responsibility and moral judg- ment on the right and the wrong of issues. What is involved in Berlin as we all know, is the sanctity of international treaties; it is the self-determination of peoples, the integrity of the pledged word. 11 of these are considerations which, I think, concern the members of the United Nations. SPIVAK: Are you saying then that the issue of Berlin will not be brought up before the UN and that it makes no point to bring it up? STEVENSON: Oh, I can't answer that; I don't know whether it will be brought up or not.12 This, then, is the questioning procedure employed by the panel. The different kinds of questions employed seek clarification and truth regarding important issues. Direct replies are elicited by repeating the question, rephrasing it, or rephrasing the answer, so that every effort is made to overcome evasion. On occasion the panel has failed to elicit some kind of direct reply or clarification. Since the time limit prevents any one question from being pursued indefinitely, some answers do get by with no further probing. The number of completely evasive replies, however, is minimal, L 12MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, pa. 1-2. 175 and will be discussed later in this study. This chapter will now focus on examples of the questioning process at work, as it has dealt with some typical political issues over the years. THE CANDIDACY One of the most evasive areas of political rhetoric is that of the denial or admission of a politician's candidacy for office. Over the years the MEET THE PRESS panel when given the Opportunity has proven that a firm refusal to run for office can never be elicited, and is hardly reliable when it is. In March, 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois was a program guest. Stevenson had been.high1y touted by party leaders as a potential but reluctant nominee. By carefully probing, the panel eliminated any doubt as to Stevenson's willingness to accept the nomination, if not actively to seek it. The questioning began with Edwin Leahy of the Chicago Daily News. LEAHY: You have said on don't want a place on the Eigket, haven' you, that you aren't seeking STEVENSON: Yes, I have said that I was a candidate for Governor of Illinois and that's all. SPIVAK: President Truman said yesterday that he will not be a candidate for the Democratic nomi- nation nor will be accept a draft. Does that describe your position, sir? STEVENSON: . . . I have no other ambitions than to be Governor of Illinois. I do not seek, I will not seek, the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. Since, "not seeking" does not, however, mean "not accepting,"., 176 Spivak rephrased the reply. SPIVAK: STEVENSON: Are we to understand from what you have just said that you are requesting that your name not be presented to the convention for the Democratic nomination and that if it is presented, that you will ask that it be withdrawn, sir? Mr. Spivak that's a bridge that's more than four months hence, isn't it? It certainly is a bridge that I will not attempt to cross now, I can only tell you what my present state of mind is and that is that I'm a candidate for Governor and nothing else and I seek nothing but that. Stevenson's evasive direct reply to Spivak's question resul- ted in the following question sometime later in the program by May Craig. CRAIG: STEVENSON: Governor, I've been here twenty years and I have heard a lot of ways of talking about things, like I'm not a candidate and so forth--General Eisenhower went through that. President Truman said a very simple thing last night. He said, I shall not accept a nomination. ‘Will you say that or will you not say that? I will not say that. I will say that that's a bridge and I can't cross it until I come to it and I see very littli likelihood that I will have to come to it. 4 As was pointed out in a previous chapter, his appearance on this program, and his reply, opened the door to his even- tual draft and nomination. The New York Times ran the following headline the day after the program. ps. 7-9. 13MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, 141bid., p. 10. 177 GOVERNOR SA S NO--BUT WONT SAY HE WOULD REFUSE NOMINATION IF OFFEREDl One of the most nebulous candidacies was that of General Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 Presidential election. Not only Eisenhower's candidacy, but his political party and his stands on various issues were all a matter of deep concern. MEET THE PRESS on several programs skillfully pointed out the uncertain areas of his candidacy, including his relationship with his campaign manager Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Eisenhower's extreme popularity among members of both political parties and the possibility of a party split was a matter of deep concern among party leaders of both sides. In July, 1951, Senator John Sparkman was a program guest after having just returned from Europe and conferring with Eisenhower and other European leaders. The questioning began with Ruth Montgomery of the New York Daily News. MONTGOMERY: Do you think Ike is willing to be a candidate next year? SPARKMAN: I haven't the slightest idea. MONTGOMERY: ‘Would you like to see him say on the Demo- cratic ticket next year? Sparkmsn's answer, which did not address itself to the question, resulted in the following question by MOntgomery in an effort to determine party loyalty. MONTGOMERY: 'Well with him at the head of the Republi- can ticket, which I am.sure you'wouldn't like, and President Truman head of your ticket, do you think that the Dixiecrats 15New York Times, March 31, 1952, p. 1. 178 would bolt and vote for Ike next year? SPARKMAN: ‘Well, I dig't know what the Dixiecrats would do. Since the Dixiecrats in Alabama were bound not to vote for Truman in 1948, the question of Sparkman's own preferences came up, since he Stated he was not a Dixiecrat. MONTGOMERY: Do you want to see him run for President next June? SPARKMAN: I haven't given a great deal of thought to next year's election. Martha Rountree then asked the following. ROUNTREE: 'WOuld you vote for him for President? SPARKMAN: I will vote for the nominee of the Demo- cratic Party . . . I will vote for the electors who will pledge themselves to sup- port the Democratic Party. To eliminate all doubt of Sparkman's loyalty to the party even if Eisenhower were the Republican nominee, Rountree asked the following. ROUNTREE: If Eisenhower were a Republican, you wouldn't vote for him t en? SPARKMAN: I will not violate my oath when I cast my ballot to vote for t e nominee of the Democratic Party. This reply, of course, committed Sparkman to vote for the Democratic nominee even if the Alabama electors voted for Eisenhower on the Republican ticket. In August, 1951, Henry Cabot Lodge was a program guest after he had just returned from a call on the General. Lodge 16MEET THE PRESS program script, July 29, 1951, p. 2. 17Ibid., ps. 3-4. 179 expressed a desire to see Eisenhower as President, even though admitting he didn't know whether Eisenhower was a Republican or a Democrat. Martha Rountree tested Lodge's loyalty to his party regardless of Eisenhower's political preference, as She had tested Sparkman's. ROUNTREE: ‘WOuld you like to see him President even if it were on a Democratic ticket? LODGE: I would like to see him President. 'I think I'll stand on that. I'd rather see him on the Republican ticket. The answer did not affirm Lodge's rejection of Eisenhower on the Democratic ticket: hence Rountree's important follow-up question to remove any doubt. ROUNTREE: If he was on the Democratic ticket, would you vote for him? LODGE: That depends whom the Republicans put up.18 It would seem that Lodge was less committed to the party than to the man, whereas Sparkman was more committed to the party. It is possible that both men, by their answers, were sure of Eisenhower's political preference, even though the General had been non-committal. The vagueness of Eisenhower's political preference was again made apparent in December, 1951, when Lodge was again a guest, this time as Eisenhower's campaign manager. Lawrence Spivak addressed the following question to Lodge. SPIVAK: . . . Mbst of the supporters say that it is not a good thing for him to talk out loud and say, "I am.a Republican. I am interested in the 18MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1951, p. 2. 180 nomination." Isn't that essentially true? LODGE: I don't think he ought to do that whili he is a regular army officer on active duty. 9 In March, 1952, following the Minnesota primary Eisenhower stated he was going to have to reconsider his posi- tion on running for office. Lodge was again a MEET THE PRESS guest. 'With an apparent draft Eisenhower movement building up, the question of his returning before convention time was important, in light of the following statement on the pro- gram by Lodge. LODGE: I think the question of his coming home ought to be considered in the light of whether the things that only he can do have been done in Europe. The important question of whether the General would refuse the nomination if he, or the government, considered his job incomplete, was raised by Martha Rountree. ROUNTREE: Suppose the job wasn't done and he was nominated and elected. ‘Would he have to refuse to accept it then? LODGE: Oh no, he said definitely he will accept the ngBination. There is no question about that. The matter of Eisenhower's reluctance to return before con- vention time raised a valid premise in this question put to Lodge by Marshall McNeil of the Scripps Howard chain. 2 19MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. O ioMEET THE PRESS program script, March 23, 1952, p80 1- o 181 McNEIL: .As a matter of fact, isn't it possible that your candidate might get himself into some trouble by an early return? Lodge rejected this premise, leading to the following ques- tion by McNeil which stated the implications of his first question. McNEIL: He's been a front runner thus far without saying anything particularly. Why change the technique? LODGE: He hasn't said anything in this campaign, but of course his views are e11 known on all the great questions at bay.21 This reply by Lodge introduced a series of questions regard- ing Eisenhower's views. Lodge admittedly did not know where Eisenhower stood on the issues of Senator MCCarthy's cam- paign, China policy, a compulsory FEPC, or the supporting of Senator Taft if he received the Republican nomination. The entire series of questions served to portray a picture of a nebulous relationship between Lodge and his candidate and a nebulous image of Eisenhower as a politician and what he stood for, only four months before convention time. Aside from pointing up nebulous candidacies, the pro- gram.has also proven the unreliability of firm non-candidacy statements on the part of some individuals. In November, 1958, John Kennedy was a program guest a.week after rolling up a landslide senatorial victory in Mbssachusetts. He was questioned by James Reston of the New York Times. RESTON: Senator Kennedy, are you now seeking delegates 21Ibid., p. 3. 182 to the 1960 presidential nominating convention? KENNEDY: I am not. RESTON: Have you established or will you establish headquarters looking to 1960? KENNEDY: No. RESTON: Do you have any plans to enter the preferential primaries of 1960? KENNEDY: I don't.22 A little over a year later the Senator announced his candidacy. In June, 1958, Senator Hubert Humphrey appeared on the program the week he received the Farm-Labor Party's endorse- ment for the 1960 presidential nomination. Jack Bell of the Associated Press asked Humphrey the direct question. BELL: Your state convention has endorsed you as a Presidential nominee. Are you running? Humphrey's evasive answer invited a repetition of the question by Bell. BELL:* Are you running? Are you a candidate for President? A HUMPHREY: My term for the Senate expires in 1960, and I shall attempt to get re-elected to the United States Senate. Bell then rephrased the answer to make it a more specific and affirmative statement of non-candidacy. BELL: You are not running, then, for President? HUMPHREY: I am not running for President, that is correct. The reply still did not rule out an acceptance, however; hence Bell's next question. 22MEET THE PRESS program script, November 9, 1958, p. 1. 183 BELL: You don't care to have the Democratic nomination? HUMPHREY: That is not what I saig I said I am not running for President. 3 Humphrey's reply was indicative of his announcement of candi- dacy a little over a year and a half later. Senator Barry Goldwater also delivered a direct reply to a question put to him on a program in November, 1961, by Robert Abernethy of NBC News. ABERNETHY: Will you be a candidate for your party's nomination? GOLDWATER: No, I will'not.24 In view of the record, any potential candidate's denial of Presidential ambitions would seem to be hollow rhetoric. If the rhetoric of candidacy is of a nebulous nature, the rhetoric of a political campaign is even more so. It is in this area that MEET THE PRESS also serves the public by clarifying issues and sharpening candidate images. THE RHETORIC OF CAMPAIGNS A political campaign by its nature is filled with the sound of ambiguous charges, countercharges, praises, and promises. On MEET THE PRESS, however, criticism must be strengthened by alternatives, accusations must give way to 23MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 3. 24MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 7. 184 specific facts, and praise should be supported by reason. The ambiguous word or term must be clearly defined for public understanding. The definition of terms plays a major role in under- standing any candidate's stand on an issue with minimum opportunity for misinterpretation. An important issue regarding Eisenhower's candidacy in 1952 was brought out in these two questions regarding defi- nition of terms on a program of December, 1951. The questions were put to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. by Ogden Reid of the New York Herald Tribune and by Lawrence Spivak. The issue involved was why Eisenhower more than any other individual could get a more cooperative Congress to work for peace, since the desire for peace is more important than any party loyalty. REID: ‘When you opened the Eisenhower cam sign . . . you said . . . that "the biggest 8 ng e blow that could be struck against communism and for eace would be done with the election of eneral Eisenhower to the Presidency." Could you tell me just what you meant by that?25 SPIVAK: Senator, you said a moment ago that General Eisenhower will make a great contribution toward ace . . . Exactly what did you mean by that ‘What can be done that isn't being done now that the Republicans will support 26 The difficulty Lodge had in explaining his terms with support- ing reasons is illustrated in the dialogue which followed between Lodge and Spivak. 25MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 4. 261bid., p. s. 185 LODGE: ‘Well, . . . under his leadership we would get a much better production effort than we are getting now. SPIVAK: ‘Why do you think we would get a much better production? Isn't Charles Wilson, who is in charge of our production, a Republican? LODGE: . . . we have an atmosphere of olitics as usual and business as usual in ashington, and it is the failure of the administration to galvanize and lead the country that is at the , ottom of all our troubles including the lack of production. That is way beyond Mr. Wilson's Sphere. Spivak's next question struck at the heart of the leadership question and at the lack of cooperation of Republicans them- selves in the effort to better conditions. SPIVAK: How much of that trouble is due to contribu- tions of members of your own party? For example, you take the simple matter of organ- izing the European army. There was much more objection, wasn't there, from Republicans than there was from Democrats?27 The series of questions seemed to point up the difficulty in explaining the term "contribution toward peace" in political realities, other than having faith in the General's magnetic popularity to overcome all political disunity. The program also brought up another important question involving the definition of a very basic term. Lodge had stated his firm belief that the General was a Republican and would be nominated on that basis. Since Eisenhower's domes- tic and foreign views were at the time rather nebulous, James‘Wechsler of the New York Post asked Lodge the following question. 271bid. 186 WECHSLER: How do you define Republicanism on domestic issues, on foreign policy? IS he an Eisen- hower Republican or a.Winkie Republicapg He is not a Taft Republican, I gather. A question regarding definition of terms also came up with regard to Richard Nixon's charges that Governor Steven- son was a captive candidate in the 1952 election. On a program of September, 1952, Nixon was questioned on this matter by Peter Edson of the Newspaper Enterprise Associa- tion and by Lawrence Spivak. EDSON: Senator, in answer to m earlier question you indicated you believed overnor Stevenson was a captive of President Truman. Over the last week end the events of Senator Taft's confer- ence with General Eisenhower have led many peo 1e to believe that General Eisenhower was may e becoming a captive of Senator Taft. What is your Opinion on that? SPIVAK: Senator, I'd like to stay a minute on that captive business. Exact y when are you sup- ported by an organization and when are you captured by it? What makes the difference? If the NAM is for you is that sggport? If the ADA is for you is that capture? The same kind of question involving interpretation of a term was put to Lyndon Johnson in the 1960 election re- garding one of his charges against the Republican party. Johnson was questioned on a program of October, 1960, by Jack Steele of Scripps-Howard NewSpapers. STEELE: Senator, you said the other day that the Repub- lican Party reminded you of a three-headed monster run by Nixon, Goldwater, and Rockefeller. You are running on three platforms this year; 28MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 17. 29MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 7. 187 the Democratic national platform, the Democratic State platform in Texas, which is quite a bit to the right of that, and the Liberal Party platform in New York, which is quite a bit to the left of it. Without sug- gesting in a political sense that maybe th 3 makes you a three headed monster don't you find this a little inconsistent230 In both cases the panel demonstrated the difficulty of apply- ing a common definition to the kinds of expressions hurled about during the heat of any political campaign. Over the years, the MEET THE PRESS panel has continu- ously attempted to cut through the ambiguities of vague criticisms and elicit specific alternatives or reasons. ‘When the general cannot be amplified by the specific in any charge or statement, the candidate's image is certainly affected. In a program of December, 1951, the panel attempted to get Henry Cabot Lodge to be more specific about General Eisenhower's '. ” a ‘ supposed criticism of Truman foreign policy. James Wechsler asked Lodge the follow- ing question. ‘WECHSLER: You.were uoted the other night as sayin that he (Eisenhower) would contend that fie had vigorously opposed concessions to Russia. Now I wish you could spell out in a little more detail what recommendation you think that occurred? LODGE: I don't know . . . I think he took that posi- tion and I think the position is very clearly expressed in the "Forrestal Diaries" . . . In the "Forrestal Diaries" it shows clearly that he thought you couldn't keep the Russians out of the war against Japan anyway; they were so anxious to get into it, and it 30MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, 188 was a great mistake to make all the con- cessions we did make in order to get them. Since this reply still did not directly answer the question of what recommendations Eisenhower might have made, Lawrence Spivak posed the following question, calling for a specific instance. SPIVAK: What about the decision to go into Berlin, Senator Lodge? Did he have any part in that? LODGE: I don't know. I don't think he had any part in the deciSion to make Berlin an island com- pletely surrounded by Soviet territory, which was a catastrOphic decision. Since Lodge had voiced an opinion but still hadn't directly answered the question, Spivak rephrased it to make it more specific. SPIVAK: Do you think when the question came up as to whether or not to allow the American soldiers to go into Berlin, as to whether or not to let the Russians go in first, did he take any part in that decision: Did he object to that? It is a military decision. LODGE: I don't know; I don't know.31 In March, 1952, Lodge was again questioned on the pro- gram with regard to Eisenhower's views, by William‘White of the New York Times. Lodge had made the statement, "I think it's known where he (Eisenhower) stands on all the important things." 4 'WHITE: Is it known on a great man issues? Is it clear in your mind as to where t e General stands? LODGE: Yes. ‘WHITE: For example, do you know how he stands on 31MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 14. LODGE: 'WHITE: LODGE: ‘WHITE: LODGE: 189 Senator MCCarthy's campaign, how he stands about that? No. Before I leave this matter of issues may I ask you this question. Do you know how General Eisenhower stands on China policy? we11, I have just a personal impression which I can't prove, that e favored making a much bigger effort in Korea than was made . . . I think that history will show that he was not in sympathy with this lack of will to win. Will that be clear though, Senator, before the convention? I don't know. Martha Rountree then asked Lodge the following. ROUNTREE: Speaking of the General's views, do you know w ether he is for a compulsory FEPC? LODGE: I do not.32 Sometime later in the program, Marshall McNeil of Scripps- Howard Newspapers returned to the question of Eisenhower's views on China policy. McNEIL : LODGE: Getting back to what you said about the China views of Eisenhower, is there an implication there that he has advised the administration eithgr early or late to do more than it has done I don't know about that, but I understand that his opinion was that it should have been fol- lowed up much more than it was. William White then asked a question which struck at the heart of the issue, a definition of the term "more,' ' and how much of a commitment it would involve. 32MEET THE PRESS program script, March 23, 1952, ps. 5-7. ' 190 ‘WHITE: Senator . . . isn't the question what the definition of "more" is? How much farther?33 Since Eisenhower never did appear on the program, his views could be determined only as expressed by Lodge. The answers elicited from Lodge certainly did not portray a picture of clear understanding of the General's views by Lodge himself, nor could he be more Specific on some of Eisenhower's sup- posed general criticism of the administration. Governor Adlai Stevenson was also queried with regard to his criticism of the Eisenhower policy in a program of April, 1956. He was questioned by Lawrence Spivak. SPIVAK: Governor, you in your speech yesterday said that the Administration has denied us facts on the world situation. And these were our words: "We have all too often been deli er- ately, intentionally misinformed." Can you give us some specific instances when impor- tant facts have been witheld from u§ that we have been deliberately misinformed? 4 Stevenson then listed several specific instances. In April, 1960, the same kind of question was again put to Stevenson by Mr. Spivak. SPIVAK: Governor, in your Virginia speech recently you charged, 'Our own leaders have deceived us by under-rating the magnitude of the crisis." Is your charge that they have wil- fully deceived us, or just that they were ignorant, their judgment was bad? Stevenson then defined his terms in a more meaningful way, expresSing a clear, direct opinion. STEVENSON: As to wilfulness, if you imply wilfulness 33Ibid., p. 19. 34MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 2. 191 in any malevolent sense, no. If you imply wilfulness as a means of covering up their failures or to obscure them, to put emphasis perhaps where I wouldn't put it, I'd say yes.35 Attempts to draw out Specific statements from some of Lyndon Johnson's platitudes have also been in evidence several times on the program. Before the 1960 convention on a program of July, 1960, he was asked about one of his implied charges with respect to the fight for the nomination. John Steele of Time and Life magazine was the questioner. STEELE: ‘Would you give us a frank appraisal of how things look here so far as your candidacy for the nomination is concerned? JOHNSON: I think they are encouraging. I think the people are going to size up all the candidates and, notwithstanding the great propaganda effort that's being made to stampede folks and to take their integrity away from them and to say that they can't independently exercise their judgment . . . STEELE: I don't understand what you mean by this great propaganda campaign. What do you mean y that?3 During the same program Edwin Newman of NBC News asked Johnson to qualify one of his opinions. NEWMAN: Senator, if you became President, what would you regard as the most urgent problem you ad to deal with? JOHNSON: I think the first problem the next President must deal with is to regain America's leader- ship, to regain the initiative in the world. NEWMAN: How would you propose to do that? JOHNSON: I would try to lay down a program that would 35MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 4. 36MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 34. 192 appeal to the minds of men and try to go directly to persons rather than to continue with this fifteen-year-old foreign policy of ours that concerned itself principally with government. NEWMAN: Specifically, how would you do it?37 On a program of October, 1960, Johnson was asked about one of his implied criticisms reflecting on the character of Richard Nixon. The panelist was Robert Abernethy of NBC News. ABERNETHY: Senator, in almost ever speech of your campaign so far, which have heard, you have tried to attack the experience and consistency of Vice-President Nixon. I would like to ask you about this, about one of your charges specifically-~may I ask you about one specific story you tell? You tell your audiences that the Re ublican platform Mr. Nixon wanted was c anged at the insistence of Governor Rockefeller of New York. Then you go on to say, as you charge, that if Mr. Rockefeller can turn the Vice- President around, as you said it, in one midnight conference, you then ask, 'What could Mr. Krushchev do if he got Mr. Nixon in a room all day?" ‘What I would like to know is exactly what you mean to imply by that question? Are you trying to imply that Mr. Nixon lacks convictions or that he can be persuaded easily by‘Mr. Krushchev? Johnson's evasive answer resulted in a repetition of the question by Abernethy. ABERNETHY: But what do you mean to say about Mr. Nigon's convictions when you ask t at question? The term "extremism" played a major role in the rhetoric of the 1964 campaign. It was brought up, however, as early as 1961 with regard to a charge by Barry Goldwater against 371bid., p. 26. 5 gsMEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, p8. - . 193 the Kennedy administration. On a program of November, 1961, Goldwater was put through the following interrogation by lewrence Spivak. SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: . . . In Atlanta Georgia, yesterday you too went after the extremists, and this is what you said, "The real extremists are the people to the left. The socialists in the Kennedy Administration." ‘Will you give us tge names of the leading socialists in te... I don't have the time to go clear through them. Just give us the names of some of the impor- tant people. I would sa Arthur Schlesinger . . . There are two other members of the Americans for Democratic Action--and this is the group to whom I refer as the extremists to the left-- one of these is Ted Sorensen. The other one Slips my mind for the moment, but in the ‘White House there are three. There are three in Cabinet posts and I think, some thirty other members of this organization in govern- ment. Now, they are in. The Minutemen, the members of the Birch Society,are not in government, they are on the outside. Are you suggesting they are running the government rather than President Kennedy? I am suggesting they have a mighty strong hand in it . . . You also su gested in your 8 eech that the President h self was a left st. I think you said, “The whole wagon train, including the wagon master, is riding on the left wheel all the time." Can you tell us what the Presi- dent has done that makes him more leftist than Governor Rockefeller, for example, or even President Eisenhower? I will just take the words of the ADA. Let's take the words of the President. ‘Well, . . . the President about six or seven SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: The series of 194 years ago disavowed this group as being too liberal. Today he seems to be in perfect harmony with them, so I must assume that he has accepted their liberal positions. Would you say there is anything he has done as President that Rockefeller or Eisenhower would sharply disapprove of or would consider leftist--that they themselves haven't done? It is kind of hard to find anything that he has done . . . 9 questions demonstrated the difficulty the panel faces at times in attempting to elicit the specific charge from the general allusion with some candidates, regardless of how the questions are phrased or repeated. One of the dilemmas in political campaigns is the question of how candidates within the same party can so violently disagree before a convention, yet manage to support completely the winning nominee after the convention. The reason for this was perhaps best brought out in a headline- making statement by Senator Estes Kefauver in the 1956 cam- paign. The Senator was being questioned by Lawrence Spivak about his criticism of Adlai Stevenson in the Florida and California primary campaigns. SPIVAK: KEEAUVER: SPIVAK: Senator, you made some pretty serious charges against Governor Stevenson as the Democratic nominee. Are you going to support him if he wins the nomination? I certainly will if he wins the nomination. Regardless of the fact that you yourself as he was a fair weather liberal, you didn't like the position he has taken on 39MEET ps. 3-4. THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, 195 race relations, big business, machine poli- tics, and on socia welfare, still and all you would support him against other Demo- cratic nominees? KEFAUVER: . . . frankly I think in California and in the latter part of the Florida campaign I did get somewhat out of character, but in the heat of campaigns you sometimes say things that you mightn t have said if you thought it over more. Spivak then rephrased Kefauver's answer to eliminate any doubt as to the purpose and sincerity of Kefauver's attacks on Stevenson during the primaries. SPIVAK: ‘Well, Senator, may I get this straight, are you saying now that in the campaign during the primaries and the criticism you made of Governor Stevenson was what‘Wendell Wiflkie called just campaign oratory? KEFAUVER: NO it wasn't. The subject matters that I discussed were legitimate matters to discuss if we wanted to talk about one another's record or about differences of viewpoint. I think I got out of character later in the campaign about talking of differences in his viewpoint and my viewpointfl0 Kefauver's statement resulted in a New York Times headline the next day. 1 LOST MY HEAD, REPAUVER.ADM1TS41 The dialogue between Mr. Spivak and the Senator illustrate the program's technique in pinning down political statements so that candidates and guests must make some clarifying admissions. Aside from its function of clarifying the ambiguities 40MEET THE PRESS program script, June 17, 1956, ps. 2-3. 41New York Times, June 18, 1956, p. 1. 'lr 196 of political rhetoric, the MEET THE PRESS panel serves the viewing public in another vital area. The program continu- ously deals with the many issues involved in foreign policy and the "cold war." The questioning technique will now be examined in this cOntext. FOREIGN AFFAIRS In the semantics of the "cold war" the definition of terms is most important. Exact understanding of governmental policy in clearly defined terms is imperative in today's world of international tension. ‘Words like "peace," "total victory, commitment," "containment, aggressor,' cannot be tossed about lightly without specific interpretation by those who use them for those who hear them. MEET THE PRESS in this context consistently seeks exact meanings when con- fronted with these terms regardless of who uses them. Both political candidates and governmental representatives are expected to be clear and specific. Another important area in foreign affairs is the questioning of government policy. The program points out inconsistencies, dangers, alternatives, and opposing points of view to policy and to individual opinion on that policy as expressed by the guest. This chapter will examine ques- tioning employed in these two areas. In 1951, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. then a principal apostle of a big 150 group air force, in explaining his position, stated: 197 LODGE: It's much cheaper to build this force and pay what it costs to submit to the inconvenience and get this thing over with in two or three years than it is to go muddling along as we are now. Ernest Lindley of Newsweek promptly asked the important ques- tion regarding meaning of terms. LINDLEY: Senator, what do you mean by "get things over with in two or three years?" Do you mean have a war? The question struck at the heart of the issue in back of all our foreign policies. To what extent will we commit our- selves to further democratic ideals around the world, short of an actual major confrontation with communist powers? Lindley's question resulted in a clarification of Lodge's statement and opinion. LODGE: Oh, no of course not, Mr. Lindley. You know me well enough for that . . . When we regain the initiative and the Soviet Union confronts real strength, then they will accede to some of the reasonable demands tzgt the civilized community of nations makes. In December, 1958, Senator Hubert Humphrey was a MEET THE PRESS guest, after a recent eight hour interview with Soviet Prime Minister Krushchev, which attracted world wide atten- tion. The subject of Berlin occupied a good part of the program's questioning. The crux of the questioning, however, and the heart of the issue were focused upon in the follow- ing dialogue among Humphrey, Lawrence Spivak, and‘William Randolph Hearst Jr. of Hearst Newspapers. :ZMEET THE PRESS program script» “3““ 5’ 1951’ ps. 7- . ... SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK : HUMPHREY: 198 Did you come away feeling that there was anyt ing we could offer on Berlin that would ease the crisis without hurting the West? . . . I feel that in Berlin, as I said, number one, we must make positively sure to the whole world that‘West Berlin will be preserved as a free area of the world and not as Krushchev talks, a free city. That access to it will be guaranteed. That‘West Berlin will not be bargained away by itself. Does that mean that you would be prepared if necessary to use force to stay there . . I don't think we can afford to compro- mise this away a bit. Is it your impression then, that if we stand firm and let Krushchev understand that if he is going to go to war for Berlin, we are going to be there when he comes-- we have already said this. we have not quite said that, I think. I think we have said though, through NATO, that we consider Berlin to be a part of the NATO area, since Berlin is in fact a part ' of the West Republic of Germany. I don't think anybody has said in so many words that we are going to stay there no matter what. I think we have in the past and if we haven't we'd better say so now. Hearst then asked Humphrey to define one of the basic terms being used in the discussion. HEARST: The words "stand firm" have been used rather frequently. ‘Would you give us a definition of what you mean by "stand firm?" Does that mean break a blockade on the ground if they set one up?4 43MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, ps. 4-5. 199 Thus, the panel in this discussion again demanded clarifica- tion of important terms and a clear statement of our position. Senator Barry Goldwater, appearing on the program in November, 1961, was also asked by Earl Mazo of the New York Herald Tribune to define his use of the term "tough" in the cold war context. 'MAzo: ‘we hear a lot of criticism of the President's not being "tough”--is the word with Krushchev.' ‘What exactly is meant by that? Does it mean we should go to war? How much tougher would you be than President Kennedy has been?44 Goldwater was again questioned along these lines on a program of January, 1964, Shortly following his announced candidacy for SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: SPIVAK: GOLDWATER: the Republican nomination; Senator, in his New Year's eating to President Johnson, Mr. Krus chev said he was convinced that the new year would bring east-west understanding on a broad range of issues and an easing of the cold.war. Are you convinced of that? No, I am not convinced in the least, and I was happy to see that our President by his answer indicated that he is not convinced. You would make the same answer that Presi- dent Johnson did on that to‘Mr. Krushchev? I would-oalong these lines. "If you mean what you say, Mr. Krushchev, put up or shut up," as we‘Western poker players say. And by "putting up” what would you mean, get out of cuba, get out of Berlin? Get out of Cuba, get out of the countries where he has gone without the peOple's permi88103 o o o - 44MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 4. 200 SPIVAK: Senator, I am not quite sure I understand your foreign policy theory. You say you would say to the Soviet to "put up or shut up. ‘Well, supposing, if you were President ifidrfiifigiafiiri‘r’e‘hifi 2%23“b?32§83§“3§853§a or get the trOOpS out of Cuba, and they izigérgzs if you were President would you go Again, Spivak's question had to result in a clarification of Goldwater's views and the limit of his commitment. Our involvement in Asia and attitude toward Red China have also been topics of repeated discussion on the program, beginning with the Korean conflict, and now involving the struggle in Vietnam. At issue are not only our commitments to that part of the world, but our recognition of Red China and the seating of Red China in the United Nations. It is in this area that the program seems to have most questioned the motives, consistencies, and divergent points of view with regard to American policy. Many of the questions in this area seem to contain built-in premises expressing valid questions. The recognition of Red China as a consequence of the Korean peace plan, inconsistent with our desire not to do business with them, was raised on a program of August, 1951. The question was raised by Yates McDaniel to Henry cabot Lodge Jr. McDANIEL: .Senator, if we call this business off in Korea more or less along the lines now pro- jected, won't it actually and automatically mean that we'll be doing business with and 45MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 3. 201 certainly recognizing these Chinese Reds, puppets of the Russians though they might e LODGE: Oh no, I don't want to recognize them. I think it might be possible to get an armis- tice without recognizing them. \ ‘McDANIEL: ‘We're going to have to make a deal with them-- you stay here and we stay there-~50 that is more or less de facto recognition, is it not?46 Inconsistency of our policy with regard to the treat- ment of Red China and of Russia in the United Nations was brought up by Lawrence Spivak to Lodge on a program in August, 1953. Lodge at the time‘was Chief United States Delegate to the United Nations. The question followed a statement by Lodge that Russia should be present at the peace conference, along with the Chinese Communists, on the Communist side, so they could bear their share of responsi- bility for the war and accountability for peace. SPIVAK: ‘Where is the logic of permitting the Russians to sit in the UN as though the were peace loving nations, but insist that they sit with the aggressors at the poli- tical conference? Later in the program, Spivak again pointed out an inconsis- tency in policy with regard to the United Nations and Red China. SPIVAK: Do you think it would be an worse to have the Chinese Communists in t an to have the Russians in? Where's the logic of having 46MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1951, p. 3. 47MEET THE PRESS program script, August 23, 1953, p. 5. 202 one group of aggressors and saying let'z not have the other group of aggressors? 8 Lodge's explanation was based on the fact that the Chinese Communists had actually done the killing, although Russia might have been responsible for it behind the scenes. This same question came up on a program five years later in December, 1958. This time, however, the question- ing resulted in focusing on the whole issue of United Nations policy of whonand whom not to recognize for admis- sion to the United Nations, including definition of an important term. Lawrence Spivak questioned Lodge's reasons for being happy with the Soviet's being in the UN. LODGE: . . . Having them there has a certain value because it enables you to take some of the things that they say and expose them for the fallacies that they are. SPIVAK: ‘Where is the consistency of your part then of wanting the Russian communists in and fighting so hard to keep the Chinese communists out? LODGE: I can't throw the Russians out. I can't do it because they have the veto. SPIVAK: Mr..Ambassador. Do you think the world would be better off if they were out? LODGE: You can't tell. You can't tell. SPIVAK: You've got to make a judgment. LODGE: There are certain advantages in having them in. SPIVAK: And I say to you again, where is the consis- tency of wanting t em in and not allowing the Chinese communists in, so that you can watch them? LODGE: ‘The consistency is had their behavior been what it now is in 1946, they would not have 481bid., p. 14. 203 been admitted in the first place. The Chinese communist behavior 28ing what it is, they're not being admitted. Krishina Balarman of The Hindu, then asked Lodge an important 9 follow-up question. BALARMAN: ‘What is this behavior of the Chinese commun- ists you're talking about? They're not behaving any worse than some of the other members of the United Nations. After Lodge elucidated what this behavior was, a few minutes later he was asked another important pertinent question by Pauline Frederick of NBC-News, again pertaining to UN policy. FREDERICK: . . . The United Nations as originally set up was not SUpposed to be an exclusive club, as I understand it . . . Do you believe that this should be an exclusive club like NATO, where we have only our friends in, or should it be an organization to try to solve the world's problems, and therefore, take every- body in? LODGE: . . The Charter says that members shall be Mpeace-loving That confers on it a cer- tain amount of exclusivity . . . We have never admitted a country that has been offi- cially proclaimed an aggressor by the United Nations. FREDERICK: Then how can you be consistent with the way we treat Hungary? ‘We have denounced Hungary, but when it comes to ousting the Hungarian representative from the United Nations, we say no, let's not take any action; so the Hungarians sit there, debate, and vote just the same as any other member. ‘Where is the consistency in our attitude? LODGE: The two things are entirely different because the Hungarians are ghere and the Chinese communists are not. 49MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 5. 50Ibid., p. 6. SIMEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 7. 204 The reply struck at the heart of a basic and important issue. It implies that once a member nation is in, regard- less of whether he is an aggressor or not, the UN can do little about his membership. The definition of the term "aggression" also has come up during MEET THE PRESS discus- Sions of foreign policy. On a program of September, 1967, Pauline Frederick was again questioning Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. who at the time was Ambassador at Large, having served as Ambassador to Vietnam. The questioning concerned United States policy in Vietnam. FREDERICK: The UN Charter pledges all members to set- tle their international disputes by peaceful means. When you were there, you know, the Suez war occurred, and you were very active in trying to prevent the use of force. This has been true in many other areas-- Kashmir, Cyprus and so on. How do you justify one of the most powerful, if not the most powerful member of the United Nations using force in Vietnam when it has this other attitude LODGE: Because the charter of the United Nations contains a provision with which I am sure you are familiar, and that is the suppres- sion of aggression . . Miss Frederick then focused on a basic definition of terms. FREDERICK: But the United Nations has never called this aggression and, besides, the term figgression" has never been legally The questioning of United States policy in Asia was also brought up on a program of March, 1966, featuring Vice President Hubert Humphrey as guest. The Vice President was 52MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1967, p. 10. 205 questioned by Robert Lasch of the St. Louis Post-DiSpatch. LASCH: You mentioned the Cuban missile crisis and how important it was that we stood up there, and I agree with you that it was very important that we should and I am glad-~I think we had to and we did. That brings up the whole double standard of international conduct. That was a case where the Russians, after being contained by us for many years, decided to try a little containment on us, and we wouldn't stand for it very rightly. Aren't we applying a different standard of con- duct to the Russians and the Chinese in their part of the world, to the one that we claim for ourselves in our part of the world?53 On the same program, the basic issue of containment of Red China without confrontation was brought up by John S. Knight. KNIGHT: Mk. Vice President, in discussing aims and objectives of Vietnam you did not discuss one point. The United Press reported the other day that you told Senator Clifford Case that our real objective was the containment of Red China. If this report is accurate, could you say whether this is really our objective and how could this be brought about? Humphrey's reply elicited a repetition of the question from Knight, including another question which underscored the important underlying issue. KNIGHT: Mr. Vice President, my question was, was it accurate for the United Press to say that you felt the containment of Red China was our real objective and secondly, since the Defense Secretary says they already have nuclear capa- city within a range of five to seven hundred miles and it will be much longer as years go on, how do you contain a power like that without getting into direct conflict? 53MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 17. 206 Humphrey's reply this time led to a rephrasing of the reply by Knight, to eliminate any doubt as to United States position. KNIGHT: Then you are saying, in effect, air, that the L’Eé'éigniififii éitfirfié’firéfiifiifiEhiiqfii‘éid?£4 Again, the questioning technique employed hit at the crux of the issue. These have been but a few representative examples of the questioning process employed by MEET THE PRESS panelists in getting at the truth about the issues involved in our foreign policies and views regarding these policies. The panel has continuously served the viewing and voting public by astutely demanding an elucidation and questioning of foreign policy in clear terms. As a final summing up of the questioning procedure, the chapter will briefly discuss the matter of program objectivity. PROGRAMIOBJECTIVITY Every MEET THE PRESS program opening includes the following statement. "Remember that the questions asked by the members of the panel do not necessarily reflect their point of view. It is their way of getting the story for you." This statement of program objectivity is verified by an examination of the program scripts used in this study. There are several ways of measuring program bias, using criteria some of which have been previously discussed. 54Ib1d., ps. 10-11. 207 Testimony elicited from former candidates who have appeared on the show, and voluntary letters to Lawrence Spivak from other former program guests have all praised the impartiality with which the program is conducted. Newspaper and magazine articles over the years have likewise described the questioning process as being skillful, crisp, sometimes interrogative, but on the whole, free from individual or panel bias. By the criteria of testimony, the program would seem to live up to its Opening claim of objectivity. Another criterion of objectivity is the makeup of the panel. The program recognizes the absolute necessity of a balanced panel, as Spivak has stated: we do take into consideration to some extent any poli- tical "tag" which may be attached to any particular reporter or his publication. This presents difficulties, however, since often a reporter's personal political inclinations are not the same as his publication's. Also we have found that with the best reporters, their questioning will be fair in spite of their personal views. However, from the audiences's point of view, we try not only to 23 fair but to seem fair.55 An examination of programs over the years reveals that political bias has not influenced the questioning of any candidate. The same kinds of questions, dealing with the same kinds of issues, have been put to Democrats and Repub- licans, liberals and conservatives. Stevenson, Kennedy, and Johnson have had to specify their criticism of Republican policies as Lodge, Goldwater, and Nixon have had to offer alternatives to their criticism of Democratic policies. 55Letter from Lawrence Spivak, April 14, 1967. 208 Controversial issues have likewise been thoroughly probed, regardless of the candidate's known views on the issue. There are times when commimmnt to an action, or expression of an opinion on some controversial issue, could cost the candidate votes, or even cause him to lose ground in the quest for the nomination. No candidate, however, is treated with an avoidance of issues which might harm his political image, or undue emphasis only upon those issues which could harm or enhance his image. A balanced panel ensures the probability of a balance in the issues discussed and the kinds of questions asked. Another criterion of possible bias is the language in which a question or statement is posed, eSpecially in those statements and questions containing built-in premises or conclusions. It must be stated in this regard that an examination of more than sixty program scripts utilized in this study produced a very minimal number of questions or statements which could indicate personal bias by their lan- guage. The majority of premises put forth were worded in valid, sharp but fair language, presenting well-accepted points of view or questions regarding an issue. In some isolated cases, the phrasing employed in the question has made it difficult to distinguish between a valid point of view and the questioner's biases on the subject. The following examples represent these cases. Personal disenchantment with the Truman administration and its foreign policy might have been expressed on the 209 program in several instances by May Craig and Lawrence Spivak. Although raising valid questions, the language employed might have been a little less connotative and descriptive. The questionable words or phrases are underlined. In March, 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson was subjected to the following two questions by May Craig, the premises of which he rejected. CRAIG: Don't you think it's dangerous for one party to stay in so long, dangerous for the country? Don't you think the revelations 8f corruption revealgyou've been in too long?5 Stevenson rejected both premises, since corruption had been revealed under a Republican administration as well, after only a few years of being in office. On a program of September, 1950, Lawrence Spivak was questioning Senator John Sparkman on Acheson's foreign policy. Spivak utilized the technique of attempting to get Sparkman to accept a second premise after accepting the first premise, although one did not follow from the other. SPIVAK: Senator . . . if you had a doctor who made one wrong diagnosis after another would you permit him to go on treating anybody you really cared anything about? SPARKMAN: I don't think i would. SPIVAK: Don't you think that we are in the situation today with Secretary Acheson the doctor and the country the peOple we really care some- thingabout?::Andhasn't he made one funda- mental error after another, andfldo you think ‘he ought to remain in Office? 56MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 1. 210 SPARKMAN: ‘Well of course you packaged a good many questions in that one. Let me say that I do not agree with the statement that he has made one error after the other, agd I do not agree we ought to get rid of him. 7 Later in the program Spivak posed the following questions of the same nature. SPIVAK: Don't you think the Democratic Part , how- ever, deserves a good part of the b ame for the mess the foreign policy is in? SPARKMAN: I'm not going to accept your premise that the foreign policy is in such a mess. SPIVAK: Isn't it true that we came through the last war the most powerful nation in all the world and isn't it truethat we havegpermitted everybody from Tito to Stalin to—kick us all over the flag? Sparkman did not agree, and a minute later Spivak asked the following question regarding Russia's acquisition of the Baltic states after'World War Two. SPIVAK: . . . we never did anything about it, did we, in the UN or anywhere else, we just let it stand because we were afraid to face up to the issue . . . In 1945 when we were the most powerful na- tion in the world we let the Russians kick us around on that issue.bB In December, 1951, Spivak addressed the following question to then Congressman John F. Kennedy. SPIVAK: Don't you think that a great deal of the responsibility for the mess that we've been in belongs to the Democratic Party, and that 57MEET THE PRESS program script, September 10, 1950, p. l. 531b1d., ps. 5-6. 211 the voters will punish them for it, or should punish them for it?59 An issue which has evoked many premises in recent years is that of Vietnam, due to its highly controversial and divisive nature. In May, 1965, former U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was a program guest, being questioned by Richard'Wilson of Cowles Publications. WILSON : LODGE: Secretary McNamara said we were going to reduce t e number of troops in Vietnam about a year and a half ago . . . But these hopes never materialize. So we go on, on an end- less escalator. ‘we don‘t really know Where we are going. Isn't that about it? No, I don't agree at all. I gBink we have made some very real progress. In March, 1966, Vice President Hubert Humphrey rejected a premise put to him by John S. Knight, publisher of Knight Newspapers. KNIGHT: HUMPHREY: Mr.'Vice President, despite all of the millions of words about Vietnam, the edi- torial opinion, background, interpretation, and even the Fullbright hearings, the American public is still divided and con- fused as to our ultimate aims and"objecEIVes. Mr. Knight, I am not at all convgqced that the American public is confused. The examples cited here are isolated, and only serve to point out the importance of paying attention to how a question is worded as well as to what the question is about. They are the only instances found of premises rejected by the guest, which were couched in somewhat dubious language. 59MEET THE PRESS program script, December 7, 1951, p. 12. GOMEET 61MEET THE PRESS program script, May 23, 1965, p. 6. THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. l. 212 The author concludes thaton the basis of these criteria and all others employed, the program can claim objectivity and fair treatment of its guests, with an absolute minimum of any kind of individual or panel bias present. An analysis of questioning technique has revealed how the program arrives at the heart of important issues to be discussed. Another important dimension of the program lies in its informational value. ‘What were the important issues discussed and what were the candidates' views on these issues? The following chapter will focus on some of the dominating political issues in recent campaign years and how candidates have expressed themselves on these issues in their MEET THE PRESS appearances, before, during, and after running for office. CHAPTER V SOME SELECTED ISSUES AND VIEWS A listing of issues discussed on MEET THE PRESS from the campaign year 1952 through the campaign of 1964 would certainly provide an index to the most vital questions and crises which have arisen over these past years. To deter- mine candidates' views on most of these issues, however, is a difficult task for several reasons. Issues have changed from campaign to campaign. The issues of corruption and communism in government, so preva- lent during the early fifties, were no longer being dis- cussed in the nineteen sixties. The issue of our Asia policy specifically with regard to Vietnam was not an important issue of the early nineteen fifties. Civil rights, although discussed during the early fifties, became a much more urgent and live issue during the last two major cam- paigns. Candidates, as a result of this changing of issues, have not always had the opportunity to express themselves on issues which were important before or after their candidacy. A further limitation is imposed by the fact that a candidate might not have appeared on the program until a year or two immediately preceding his candidacy, or even not until the year of his candidacy. Hence, his Opinions would be 213 214 limited to those issues important only at the time of his appearance, or important in the year of his campaign. Many candidates have appeared over the years in roles other than that of a major candidate. When they have, it was due to the fact that they were newsworthy at the moment. Questions on the program in those cases focused on the issues which concerned the guest at the moment in the role he was playing. Adlai Stevenson and Henry Cabot Lodge both appeared on the program several times as United Nations dele- gates. Hence, questions during those programs focused on United Nations crises, decisions and issues. Senator Estes Kefauver appeared on the program during his crime investi- gation and was questioned mostly on that issue. Other can- didates have appeared for other reasons and were questioned accordingly. For these reasons it is difficult to determine candi- dates' views on all important issues which have arisen over the years. There are certain major issues however, which, in one context or the other, have appeared during all major campaigns over the years studied. These broad issues con- tainwmflfin their sc0pe many other questions and crises which have had to be dealt with. It is these issues which also have given some kind of common ground, upon which most of the candidates studied have been able to express their Opinions. This chapter will examine several of these major issues of today, with regard to candidates' views on these 215 issues as expressed over the years. Not all candidates will be represented on all the issues selected. It is believed, however, that a representative sample of both political parties will be analyzed, so that a difference between parties, if one does exist, can be determined. The issues selected for study are as follows. 1. Russia and the "cold war." 2. Communist China and our Asian commitments. 3. Federal responsibilities and states' rights. Within these three major issues are encompassed many of the vital crises and questions of policy which have arisen to provide the dialogue for political campaigns and public discussions from 1952 until the present. RUSSIA AND “THE COLD WAR" Since the end of the Second WOrld war, relations between Russia and the United States have been precarious, flowing from one crisis into another. The Russian seizure of the Balkan States, the Hungarian crisis, the U-2 inci- dent, the Cuban missile crisis, have all provided exciting issues for discussion from the early fifties until the present. The Berlin situation is still a widely discussed issue. Russia's behavior in the United Nations has caused many to speculate whether the world organization is indeed effective against the big powers. The "cold war" is an important pervasive issue in every campaign. ' The Democratic position on the "cold war" and the 216 many issues it entails will be examined first. After examining both party positions, as represented by the can- didates, a comparison of party posture will follow. THE DEMOCRATS SPARKMAN As early as 1951, both parties recognized that a crisis existed in EurOpe which could result in a major con- frontation between the two powers. As a result, major party leaders stated the need to bolster European defense and contain Communist aggression. Speaking on MEET THE PRESS in September, 1950, Senator John Sparkman, 1952 Democratic nominee for the Vice-Presidency, stated: I don't think twenty divisions can defend Europe, but I certainly am not willing to simply give over all of Europe to Communist Russia. I think we must make every effort to contain Communism in its present boundaries figurope, and I think we're doing a very good job of Defending the Administration policy, Sparkman also took issue with an article by General Fellows, which stated that the U. S. must stop the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and keep all forces at home because Europe couldn't and wouldn't fight. Sparkman was a definite advocate of foreign aid as a "cold war" tactic. 1MEET THE PRESS program script, September 10, 1950, p. 3. 217 KENNEDY John F. Kennedy, appearing on the program in December, 1951, agreed with Sparkman on the crisis in Europe and the need for a stronger military buildup. I think we're going to be in the most critical time in Western Europe that we're ever going to be about next March or Spring. General Eisenhower has been attempt- ing to build sufficient divisions to protect that area from attack by land. But the best indication is that by that time he's only going to have around 26 or 27 divisions by next spring providing the Germans come in to some degree--certainly not enough to stand up against the 175 divisions that the Russians are supposed to have under arms--certain1y not enough to protect Western Europe . . . But I certainly feel we re going to be in the most danger of war in the summer of 1952 . . . 2 Kennedy's concern for military strength again voiced itself in 1960. As candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, he criticized the Eisenhower administration for the lack of missile buildup. We are going to be faced with a missile gap, which will make the di ficulties of negotiating wit the Soviet Union and the Chinese in the 60's extremely difficult.3 As Democratic candidate he continued his criticism. we have been living off the fat for the last three or four years militarily. The Soviet Union made the great breakthrough in space and in missiles, and, therefore, they are going to be ahead of us in these very decisive weapons of war in the early 1960's.4 When asked if he would be willing to ask for higher taxes in the face of his concern for a strong military buildup, Kennedy replied in the affirmative. 2MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p. 5. 3MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 5. “MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 8. 218 Kennedy displayed not only a concern for Soviet mili- tary strength but a distrust of Soviet leadership. He ex- pressed a reluctance to rush into talks with the Soviets, although he believed greatly in personal diplomacy. I would think the next President of the United States should certainly talk with General DeGaulle and with Dr. Adenauer. Certainly he should see Mr. MacMillan and the others . . . When we go to meet with the Commun- ists, however, and Mr. Krushchev, who has shown himself to be so volatile, bellicose and belligerent, I would like to feel we are moving in a definite direction with some understanding in advance. Kennedy was also firm on our Berlin commitments. In 1960 he was critical of Eisenhower for not getting an agree- ment, in the face of increasing Soviet gains in military strength. He is not going to get a hard and fast agreement on Berlin before he ceases to be President. The second conference will be in October. I would think they would not come to any final conclusions. The next President is going to be faced with the problem of Berlin at a time when the military advantage of the Soviet Union is more Obvious than it is today. Although making a firm statement on our commitment, he did not, however, directly commit this country to the use of force if necessary, although he implied it. I would say that come next January or February, Mr. Krushchev is going to face the next President of the United States with a very difficult decision, perhaps even an ultimatum on Berlin. I think we should make it very clear that we are not going to concede our position on Berlin, that we are going to meet out commitment to defend the liberty of the people Of West Berlin, and that if Mr. Krushchev pushes it to the ultimate, we are 51bid. 6MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 12. 219 prepared to meet our obligation. I think that is the only way West Berlin is going to be free and that we are going to prevent any great difficulty or possible mili- tary action with the Soviet Union. During the period when we will be in a position of some inadequacy mili- tarily, I think we have to make up for it with our determination. That's the only thing we can do. He believed negotiation was possible only if we nego- tiatedfrom strength. I think negotiation is always possible. I hope we can negotiate with the Soviet Union. Sooner or later we are going to have to reach some agreement on Berlin. I hope they will be reasonable. But I would make it very clear if they are not prepared to be reasonable, we are going to meet our commitments. I think we have to do that, or we will find all Western Europe neutralized.8 Kennedy was pressed to give a direct answer to what would happen in the hypothetical situation of an ultimatum on Berlin taking the form of physical action. Kennedy again avoided a direct committal of force by expressing the belief that a display of United States determination and strength would prevent any such ultimatum from being given. I think we would meet our commitments. I think if we made that clear that we'd meet our commitmgnts, I think Mr. Krushchev would not take action. Kennedy's reluctance to pledge the use of force was again revealed when he was asked about the Cuban situation, and what we could do about it that hadn't already been done. He expressed a firm disapproval of unilateral action outside the Caracas Declaration. 7MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 13. 8MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 5. 9Ibid. 220 I think Mr. Krushchev is attempting to enforce his own Monroe Doctrine to the Western HemiSphere. I think part of my criticism goes to past years. I think when the United States did not use its influence during the period when the former dictator was in control, to persuade him to permit free elections, to use, what I consider to be almost a dominant influence at one period to provide for restoration of constitutional rights, to prevent Mr. Castro from seizing power by a coup d etat, I think that was a great mistake. As you know, in the Caracas Declaration in 1957, all the American republics signed a very clear declaration against the establishment of a communist government here in the Western HemiSphere. I think whatever action we should take should be taken through the association of the Organization of American States to implement the Caracas Declaration and make it quite clear that we will. I don't suggest any unilateral action. For the present I don't think there is any economic action we can take other than what we are doing, but I do suggest we associate ourselves intimately with the other coun- triia of Latin America, those that are prepared to do so When asked if he agreed with President Eisenhower, who had stated that any attempt on the part of the Soviet Union beyond what they had already done would require the stron- gest possible action on our part, Kennedy replied, I would regard it as a breach of the Caracas Declaration.11 He firmly opposed any unilateral action. There would seem to be a consistency here in his hesitancy to act during the Cuban missile crisis later on. Kennedy, while distrusting Soviet motives, had also consistently sought peaceful and cooperative solutions to our cold.war problems. He recognized the changing nature of the times and the need for accommodations by both sides. 10MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 16. 11Ibid. ‘ 221 In 1956 he doubted the utility of using force in Hungary or Poland to stOp Communist aggression. He recognized other ways of waging a war. I think the new dimension of course is the fact that it is now becoming so unwise to try and solve matters through war because of the presence of atomic weapons, that other means must be determined. I hope we can in- crease the jurisdiction of the International Court. I hOpe we can increase the power of the United Nations. I hope we can demonstrate our willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union to try to bring about a peaceful solu- tion to outer spaif, the question of nuclear cessation, and all the rest. He also gave his views on how he would minimize the dangers of an irrational, or accidental war. He stressed the impor- tance of communication. I think communication is, of course, the only means, and also to make quite precise our guarantees. You have a situation now with Cuba.where Mr. Krushchev is threaten- ing if we take any action. ‘We don't know exactly what action would bring about the rain of rockets, but you cannot continue to move from area to area, where we threaten them with war to meet our commitments; they threaten us; they increase their commitments, which they are trying to do in Cuba. I would say this presents a constant hazard, because we could all be destroyed. I think we have to make very precise our commitments and then attempt to maintain communication.with the Soviet Union, which I think of course, is going to present us with one of the great problems. I'd say communication, good ambassadors, frequent meetings of the foreign mini- sters and be quite pfgcise and inform them of actions we're about to take. In his quest for peaceful co-existence Kennedy favored taking the initiative on the question of disarmament and cessation of testing of the Hydrogen Bomb. In this matter, 12MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 17. 13Ibid., p. 25. 222 he was strongly in accord with fellow Democrat Adlai Steven- son. On a program in 1956, Kennedy stated his opinion. On the hydrogen bomb I must say without being a tech- nical expert and obviously I'm not a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress and have no technical information, but in talking with Senator Clinton Anderson the other day in Texas, he convinced me properly I thought that if all tests were frozen today, the position of the United States as to the Soviet Union would be satisfactory from the weapons point of view . . . If that's true, I think the United States should take the leadership in bringing these tests to an end and I think we ought to do it first because we're the only country that engaged in atomic warfare in the last war; we suffered great loss of prestige in the Middle East and Far East and Japan. . . . even or eight or nine countries in the next few years are going to begin these tests and I think we will lose the fact that just the Soviet Union and the United States are the only countries to have it, and as we spread it around the world I think the dangers will increase. I think Governor Stevenson made a real contribution in writing this out and I hope whoever wins the election, this will be follized through be- cause I think it's a public service. From his statements on the program, Kennedy seemed to be strongly committed to prevent Communist expansion and to be aware of the need to negotiate from a strong military position. He was hesitant, however, to pledge the use of force unilaterally, convinced that the threat alone of our determination to stand fast would prevent any major confron- tation. Although he distrusted the Soviet leadership, he was flexible in seeking peaceful cooperation and a lessening of tensions through accommodations by both sides. 1"MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 7. 223 STEVENSON Adlai Stevenson's cold war policy was stated on a pro- gram in 1952. I personally believe in the so-called post-war policy. It's been directed by the Administration. Perhaps I could reduce it to the simple words of "assistance and resistance." Resistance to the extension of Communist domination in the world, and assistance to the free world to help in that resistance.15 Stevenson, like Kennedy, also believed in a strong military budget as the price to pay for maintaining our superiority, despite the high taxes. The tax burden in this country is due largely to national defense effort. I would say that perhaps it's wiser to spend mone even in what appears to be excessive quantities to uy insurance than it would be to risk war and the cost of rebuilding the house.16 Like Kennedy, Stevenson also saw the need to negotiate from strength. Stevenson's distrust of Soviet policy was expressed in 1963, when he was United Nations Ambassador. Lawrence Spivak asked Stevenson what he thought of the latest relaxation by the Soviets of cold war tension. If there is any reason for it, I can't identify what it is. . . . Soviet policy has always been zig-zag. It opens the door a little bit, lets some fresh air in, then closes it, and this has gone on and on and on con- tinuously as we know since the war, and I expect it will continue. 7 15MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 5. 16Ibid., p. 4. 1 17MEET THE PRESS program script, December 22, 1963, p. . 224 A strong believer in foreign aid, Stevenson, however, supported a much stronger role for the United Nations in its distribution to get it out of the game of propaganda and politics. we have the problem of a large segment of mankind,’ namely the underprivileged underdeveloped areas of the world who are determined to industrialize rapidly and their allegiance how they do it, whether by consent or by involuntary methods is of first importance to the peace of the world and to our security. It's impor- tant, therefore, that we get into this and that we do a better job than we have done so far. My feeling is that if you're going to make the Russians responsible and they're not going to do this just to serve their own purpose, it would be better to use some collective method of distributing aid and I think it would also . . . be much more acceptable to the recipients of the aid.18 He was vitally concerned about the portion of foreign aid that was going to military assistance. In May, 1957, he was asked to explain his position on Eisenhower's foreign aid program. I emphatically approve the proposals of the President with reSpect to foreign economic aid, I did not intend to say, indeed I expressly expressed my uncertaint , my doubts, as to the prudence of the proposals with respect to economic military assistance. I'm not sure whether that's all justified or not. I've said on re- peated occasions over a period of years that I disapproved what has seemed 50 be the overemphasis on military assistance abroad.1 I have felt that the emghasis on military aid in other parts of the world was isproportionate o the needs of economic development, so that I repeat what I said, that in expressing my approval of the proposals for economic 18MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 9. 19MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 5. 225 foreign aid--and I hope that the Democrats at least will not cut $5--I have some misgivings about foreign military aid. Stevenson was consistent in his de-emphasis of the military aspect of the cold war. He was a firm believer in disarmament and cessation of H-bomb testing. In 1956 as Democratic candidate for the presidency, he stated: I think it becomes almost senseless when you multiply weapons of a power that's almost incomprehensible now, and it's apparent that the rest of the world is anxious in the extreme, and that we owe the rest of the world some concern for theirzfeelings about the threat of this appalling weapon. I am very much in favor of eliminating the tests of the large hydrogen weapon. I am also very much in favor of steps that would be calculated to control this weapon. I think the attention that we have had in the past has been largely directed to the danger of the fallout, its genetic damage, its poisonous effect on human beings and animals and plant life, etc. I think we tend to overlook the weapon itself, and that this must not be overlooked as a great menace to an- kind in the survival of the race, if you please. He did not, however, advocate unilateral action on discon- tinuance of the development of weapons, although he recog- nized the dangers inherent in testing. He also clarified his position as to which weapons he was talking about, since our NATO allies had recently stated that they must have nuclear weapons and would use them. I have not prOposed that we discontinue the develOpment of weapons if others do. I do think that we ou ht to bear in mind that while we can do anything we p ease in ZOIbid. 21MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 10. 22MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, ps. 4-5. 226 the interests of our own national defense within our land, when we test a wee on which has the effect of contaminating the atmosp ere throughout the earth which indeed can poison other people in other lands who are helpless, we are not sowing good will but ill-will around the worlg. This is contamination without representation. Let's not confuse nuclear weapons, tactical weapons with the large hydrogen bomb I've been talking about.24 Although distrusting Soviet motives, Stevenson saw the advantages in having Russia in the United Nations. He ex- pressed himself during a time of crisis in the United Nations when in 1963 Russia owed some $52 million for peace-keeping operations which she refused to pay. Her behavior raised doubts in many quarters as to the practicality of Russian membership in the United Nations and the weakness of the United Nations in general in dealing with the big powers. Stevenson expressed the wish to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets on this point. Certainly we want to do everything we can to avoid this confrontation with the Soviet Union, not because we are afraid of a confrontation, or because we are apprehen- sive about the interpretation of the Charter, as the International Court has already interpreted it, but we want to keep the Soviet Union in it. It is important too, because this is the way we make peagg and keep harmony be- tween us, to talk across the table. On the issue of Berlin, Stevenson, like Kennedy, was committed to a firm meeting of our commiumaun He also be- lieved that our negotiation from strength, and determination to stand fast, would prevent a major confrontation. 23Ihid. 24Ibid. 25MEET THE PRESS program script, December 22, 1963, p. 9. 227 I don't believe the Russians want to precipitate any final issue over Berlin. I think their position is not dissimilar from ours, that neither of us have anything to gain, from making an issue over Berlin which could result from their point of view in war, from our point of view in imperilling our already exposed position 110 miles inside the Communist lines in East Germany. So I suSpect that what will come out of Berlin will be at best, as a result of the Summit meeting, might be some agreement on the limits of the Allied garrisons in Berlin, some limitations on the use of radio facili- ties of gpreading propaganda in both East and West Berlin.2 When asked if he had any solution to Berlin, Stevenson replied: No, there isn't any, actual. It is clear there is only one solution for Berlin and that is to treat it as a whole and that means the unification of Germany. Per- manent division of the city is unnatural just like permanent division of Germany is unnatural. The only solution to Berlin in the long run is the solution of Germany, but obviously the Russians aren't going to accept unification of Germany on our terms, that is, a Germany allied to NATO, and we cannot accept unifica- tion of Germany on their terms, a Germany susceptible to the influences of the East. So thgre can't be any influences on Germany at the present. He also saw little hope or desire for United Nations action on the matter, when he was questioned about it in 1961. I suppose the reason it hasn't been brought up before the United Nations thus far is that there is little that can be done except to call upon the parties of interest to negotiate, that is to say, the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Allies on the other. And as long as that is a matter which lies peculiarly within the range of their own decisions and the only solution for it is negotiation, the jurisdiction or the utility of the United Nations is somewhat 1imited.28 ps. [3. 26MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, 8-9. 27Ibid. 2 28MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, '5 :- He of On 228 'What is involved in Berlin, as we all know, is the sanctity of international treaties; it is the self determination of peoples, the integrity of the pledged word. did see room for UN supervision if internationalization the city could be negotiated. I think,'if we could achieve the unification of East and West Berlin--that is, both parts of Berlin--that we could find some great advantages to both sides, not just the United States, but to the Soviet Union like- wise, in the unification of Berlin under some sort of international supervision. the question of using force if necessary, Stevenson, like Kennedy, assumed there would be no confrontation because of nuclear threat. Of course, I don't think we should ever yield to the Russians, and I pray to God we are not going to be con- fronted with that choice . . . I still don't see that war is goin0 to be any solution, is going to serve the advantage of either party, and I therefore don't recog- nize the imminence of the danger. With regard to submission to the Soviet Union, I think we should bear in mind, and our more timid friends, that our country and they likewise have great power, great retaliagqry power, and that this is known to the Soviet Union. Stevenson's position is Similar to Kennedy's. He ex- pressed a firmness of attitude toward our commitment against Communist expansion, but a flexibility in ways of seeking peaceful co-existence and benefitting other nations without necessarily gaining any political advantage. This is reflected in his desire to have us take the initiative in cessation of 29Ihid. 3°Ibid. 31MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, 229 H-bomb testing, and to have the United Nations play a larger role in distribution of foreign aid. He also expressed a confidence that since threat of nuclear war would in itself prevent any major confrontations negotiation is inevitable. HUMPHREY Hubert Humphrey has been likewise committed to a policy of co-existence together with a firm determination to meet our commitments. His belief in foreign aid as a cold war tactic extended itself to proposing a bill to grant foreign aid even to those satellites already under Communist domina- tion. In 1958 he explained his position on the bill, citing where aid of this kind had been effective. I think only if it appears to be in our national inter- est to do so, provided that the President and the National Security Council find that by some economic aid you may promote a greater degree of independence on their part. We should have, I think, as our present policy, a very realistic one. I would say in the instance of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is able to stand up and talk back to the Soviet Union a little more forcefully today because of the aid which we have given her than if she had no aid at all. I am confident that if Yugoslavia had had no aid at all, today she should have been literally under the boot heel of the Kremlin. Right now she is able to spit on the boots of the Kremlin, and believe me this is a mighty ood sign to people around the world. It has shaken tfie Communist parties i3 Asia and Africa right down to their very toenails. 2 Like Stevenson and Kennedy, Humphrey has always been for a policy of disarmament and a cessation of testing. He also realized, however, the importance of an adequate 32MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 7. 230 inspection system, and was opposed to any unilateral stOp- ping Of the tests on our part. He was willing to share our atomic know-how with our allies to effect a policy of dis- armament and cessation of testing, but was cautious on this point. I think the most important thing is to get a ban on nuclear testing with inspection, and I want to under- score ”with inspection." I think this is more impor- tant than talking about sharing the know-how of the creation of more atomic bombs . . . if we must share the technology of the atomic bomb, I would say we ought to share it gfiry, very, carefully with the most trusted of allies. He also expressed a dislike for any bilateral agreement strictly between Russia and the United States, regardless of other powers, as had been suggested by Harold Stassen and Adlai Stevenson. It would be very helpful. It would not, however, be disarmament. It would be only the initial stage of working out certain matters with the Soviet Union. I think we ought not fool ourselves at all. This would still mean that other countries could test, and it would open up the door for some cheating. I think that the best you could say of such an arrange- ment would be that it might improve som§4relationships between the USSR and the United States. 'Like the others, on the matter of Berlin, Humphrey took a firm stand and expressed a conviction that there would be no major confrontation. He had occasion to express himself on the program in December, 1958, following a news- making eight hour interview he had had with Krushchev. He 331bid., p. 5. 34Ihid., p. 6. r— j 231 was asked about several statements he had made after his meeting. I said I doubted there would be war over Berlin, and I still do. I say indeed that the Berlin situation is fraught with danger, but the danger will become less so if the position of our government and our allies is calm, firm, and one of unity. During the course of their conversation, Krushchev had pointed out to Humphrey the power of Soviet weapons, in- cluding their newly developed five megaton bomb. If there was any implication by Krushchev of its use in the event of a Berlin confrontation, Humphrey had told Krushchev, we were not to be frightened. I reminded the Prime Minister of the Soviets that we were first of all not a warlike people but that we were not a frightened peogle and that we were not going to be intimidated.3 Later in the program, in elucidating his position on Berlin, Humphrey perhaps made a stronger commitment. to use force than either Kennedy or Stevenson. I am one of those persons who has taken a very defi- nite Stand about Berlin, I feel that in Berlin, as I said, number one, we must make positively sure to the whole world that West Berlin will be preserved as a free area of the world and not as Krushchev talks, a free city. That access to it will be guaranteed. That West Berlin will not be bargained away by itself.37 When asked if he would be prepared to use force if necessary, Humphrey, like the others, at first avoided a direct commitment. 2 35MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. . 36Ibid., p. 3. 37Ihid., p. 4. . ...! 5.3a: .7 " I I- 232 I think that the American people have to make up their minds that they are living in a tough world. I don't believe force will be necessary . . . I don't think we can afford to compromise this away a bit. You must think about it, I will say quickly, in the broad con- text of a EurOpean settlement. Lawrence Spivak pressed for a more direct answer. SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: SPIVAK: HUMPHREY: Is it your impression that, if we stand firm and 1e Krushchev understand that if he is going to go to war for Berlin, we are going to be there when he comes. we have already said this. We have not quite said that I think. I think we have said, through NATO, that we consider Berlin to be a part of the NATO area, since Berlin is in fact a part of the West Republic Of Germany. I don't think anybody has said so in so many words, that we are going to stay there no matter what. I think we have in the past, and if we haven t, we'd better say so now. And you think if we do say so, that he will step away? I think that if we do say so, it may in the long run open up the possibilities of some sensible negotiations about a settlement in central Europe relating to a united or re- unified Germany and othgg areas that we ought to be discussing. Again, the usual conviction that the threat will prevent the confrontation. Humphrey was then asked to clarify what he meant by the expression "stand firm." 33Ibid. 39Ihid. 233 First of all, I think what it means is that we and our allies, particularly the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and France, must have a position upon which we can all agree. There can be no loose threads. Secondly, standing firm to me means that even if the Soviets withdraw, which they may very well do as an occupation party in Berlin, that we stay there. And thirdly, it means that we will use all of the dip- lomacy and all of the statesmanship that we have to see to it that the corridors of contact with Berlin are kept open and that we notify the Soviet full well in advance that we are not going to permit the East German Republic, the Communist areas of Germany, to stand in our way of maintaining the supplies or the forces that we have in Berlin.~ I think if we do that, that Mr. Krushchev is not about ready to have a war. He needs peace, and I don't believe that he is about ready to have a war on Berlin, because his satellites are too unsteady and unreliable. This is one time where we need very cold and cool nerves if we are going to last out this cold war. Here is a place where I believe you have to draw the line.4 Humphrey also believed that the solution to Berlin was a solution to all of Germany. I think we ought to be pushing for German reunification. I think we ought to be talking about the necessity of . establishing permanent boundaries. I think we ought to be giving some possible consideration of--they call it disengagement-- don't want to go that far, but some reasonable withdrawal of military gorces. I think these things are at least possibilities. 1 Humphrey's Berlin position certainly corresponds to those of other Democrats. Although a believer in the philOSOphy of negotiation from strength, Humphrey is very wary of the use of nuclear weapons even in a major confrontation. He seemed to imply that they would be used only as a last resort, and possibly 401bid. 6 41MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. . fli—;— 234 only in a retaliatory manner. Although willing to share atomic secrets with our allies in 1958, in 1964 he took issue with Goldwater's suggestion to give the NATO comman- der the right of decision for the use of small nuclear weapons. I think when we talk about small nuclear weapons we should indicate to the American people what we are talking about. we are talking about little nuclear weapons that laid low Nagasaki and Hiroshima, 10 kiloton, 15 kiloton, 18, 20 kiloton weapons, larger than any other weapon that was ever used in World War II with the exception of the atomic bomb on Japan. There aren't any small, little nuclear weapons. There are no little old conventional nuclear weapons. These are deadly, destructive, powerful weapons. 2 When questioned further, as to whether we were not to use them until the enemy has used them first, and if it would not then be too late, Humphrey replied, We do not believe in preventative war.43 Humphrey's firm attitude toward the Soviet leadership again manifested itself during the Cuban missile crisis. He expressed complete accord with Kennedy's actions, and considered Russian presence in Cuba entirely different from our presence in Europe. He differentiated between "contain- ment" and "expansion", denying that we needed any containment here, as Russia has needed in Europe. I don't think we needed gontainment. ‘Wfi a e ot 2n aggressor. This nation as given away un re s o billions of dollars since World War II. We have 167,000 casualties in the defense of other people's freedom. ‘We have aggressed against no one. 42MEET THE PRESS program script, October 20, 1964, p. 2. 43Ibid., p. 3. 235 There is a great deal of difference, I might add, what Mr. Krushchev sought to do was to penetrate with the powerful new nuclear weapons system the Western Hemis- phere, and we said no. The only reason we are in Europe, is because Europe was a target for Soviet ideological and military ex- pansion some years back. I am happy to say that our relationships with the Soviet Union are much more stable and steady now, but I don't think we ought to -kid ourselves for a single moment that tEE Soviet Union is anything but a Communist power. While maintaining a firm policy toward our commit- ments, Humphrey is an optimist on the chances for peaceful co-existence with Russia and has sought a more flexible and lenient strategy. In 1958 he was asked whether he thought the Communist peoples were sincerely interested in living together with the free world nations. This followed his interview with Krushchev. Yes, I do . . . I really do. I think one of the great needs today is communication with these peoples, not only of the Soviet Union but in the so-called satellite countries. This is very important. The more contacts we have with these people, particularly in the Eastern states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and with the Soviet peoples themselves, the better. I brought them a message of peace from America, with justice, and also brought them a message of cooperation in these great non-polizgcal areas of health, for example, and education. I think that we need at least a change of emphasis or tactics in the total picture of our relationship with the Iron Curtain countries. It is only a matter of emphasis here again. I think we must emphasize the works of peace. I think we need to emphasize non- golitical contacts. I think we need to encourage the roadcast of exchanges on the cultural and the educa- tional scientific basis. I think we have to realize there will be no immediate political settlements and 44MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 18. 8 45MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. . 236 that we sort of have to pave the way, or prepare the way, by touching the people themselves. Humphrey's cold war philosophy in general and on specific issues would seem not to be different from that of other Democratic candidates studied. THE REPUBLICANS LODGE Henry Cabot Lodge has from the early fifties expressed the need to maintain the military superiority needed to negotiate from strength. His words express a strong distrust of Soviet policy, and in some ways a much less flexible atti- tude toward accommodation than the Democrats here studied. In the early 1950's as principal advocate of a 150 group air force, be criticized administrative policies with re- gard to rearmament. I think this is the time to make a major effort to re- gain the initiative which we lost and which we threw away in 1945. I was the most surprised man in the world that after Korea last June we didn't take advan- tage of the mood of unity and dedication that existed in the country in order to really gain the initiative and organize the peace. Instead of that we had a 50% rearmament program and we are only doing 20% of that. I think there's a great sense of false security in this country. We've got a second best air force and we're muddling along year after year with all the expenditures of a great armament program and none Of the advantages that armament can give you in the way of ability to reach a clear cut solution. 7 9 46MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. O 47MEET THE PRESS program script, August 8, 1951, p.16. 237 When questioned about a statement by Senator Taft that the country couldn't afford a 95 billion dollar defense budget, Lodge replied: The country cannot afford to lose this contest with the Soviet Union. we cannot afford to do that. And it's much cheaper to build this force and pay what it costs to submit to inconvenience and get this thing over with in 2 or gayears, than it is to go muddling along as we are now. When we re ain the initiative and the Soviet Union con- fronts rea strength then they will accede to some of the reasonable gemands that the civilized community of nations makes.4 Lodge on several occasions has expressed his deep dis- trust of the Soviet leadership and motives. Commenting on Soviet proposals for disarmament and atomic control in 1954, Lodge stated, Any proposal on disarmament that comes from the Soviet Union must be looked at with the greatest care and with the spirit of hope rising eternal, though thenés going to be something good in it. But we've been led down the primrose path so often that I'm not getting my hopes up. It's my speculation that in the United Nations next week we will, by a series of very clever, very well- phrased questions, elucidate whether this is a really bona fide proposal or whether it's just in the realm of sound effect. 0 In 1955, commenting on Molotov's visit to this country, Lodge again pointed out the dangers of becoming too complacent. The danger always is that we will get to be wishful thinkers and we will think all is settled and everything is sweetness and light and we don't need to put the 48Ibid. 49MEET THE PRESS program script, August 8, 1951, p. 8. 50MEET THE PRESS program script, October 10, 1954, p. 8. 238 young men into the service any more and we can cut down on our armed services, etc. This is the danger we always confront in this country. . . . we ought to realize that the present very favorable situation in the world is due in large part to the fact we have in this country achieved a position of strength and therefore we ought to maintain and expand our position of strength now that it's producing such good results.51 In 1960 Lodge was asked to comment on the reasons for Krushchev's visit to this country. With Communists you Shouldn't take what they say or do at face value. I have established that to my own satisfaction many times over the past seven and a half years. There is always a hidden meaning. You have certainly got to be prepared for his coming here for the purpose of making prOpaganda.52 What I can't understand is why Mr. Krushchev would want to be treated differently from the routine that is being applied to the heads of the Soviet delegations. Mr. Krushc ev broke up the Summit meeting. Mr. Krushchev insulted President Eisenhower. Mr. Krushchev withdrew the invitation to President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union. Mr. Krushchev made it perfectly clear that he didn't like the United States government, that he didn't want to be friendly with the United States govern- ment, therefore why should we treat him like a bosom buddy. What I can t understand is that the people in this country and at the United Nations . . . solemnly wag their head because we are treating Mr. Krushchev like the head of the Soviet delegation. That is what he is. . . . Why treat him like a bosom friend when he has made it perfectly clear he doesn't want to be one. This is typical of Communist tactics. ‘When they have done something wrong, they immediately accuse you of doing something wrong. It is the Old Tamman motto-- the old Tammany boss who said, ”Claim everyt ing; con- cede nothing; and when defeated, allege fraud." That is how the Communists run their affairs, agg I am amazed that so many people get taken in by it. Lodge was then asked whether Mr. Krushchev wouldn't be 51MEET THE PRESS program script, June 9, 1955, p. 13. 52MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. 3. 53Ibid., p. 4. 239 adversely affected by the restricted treatment he was re- ceiving, if he did indeed have motives other than propaganda. Lodge replied: He'd think that this is the good, tough action of the kind he understands well and has meted out to many others and which he knows inspires respect in many people. He will not take it sentimentally, I can assure you. Lodge has taken a realistic attitude toward having Russia in the United Nations. In 1953, discussing Russia's part in Korea and her behavior in general in the United Nations, he stated the following. I'm not particularly enthused about their being in the UN. I remember a friend of mine said it was like having an arsonist in the Fire Department. I don't quite agree with that. I think if you've got an arson- ist, it s better to have him in the Fire Department where you can watch him than having him out around in the countryside setting fire to the bushes. I also think if you can have him in the Fire Department, you can not only watch hgg, but you can play the hose on him once in a while. In 1958, after a UN session marked by increased tension be- tween the two powers, Lodge repeated his belief that the UN was better with Russia in it than out of it. I think at the moment there's a good deal of advantage in having them there though it is inconsistent to have a country there that disregards the Charter the way they do. But having them there has a certain value be- cause it enables you to take some of the things that theysgay and expose them for the fallacies that they are. Although taking a firm attitude about our present relations with Russia, Lodge did eXpress optimism for a more 54Ibid., p. 5. 55MEET THE PRESS program script, August 23, 1953, p. 5. 5 56MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. . 240 peaceful future and eventual thawing of the cold war. He believed in tactics other than force to gain our ends. He was a strong believer in the foreign aid program started after World War II. In 1952, he commented on a statement by General MacArthur which maintained that "Thus despite the billions we have poured abroad I doubt that we have gained a single Communist convert to the cause of human freedom, or inspired newer deeper friendships."57 Lodge said, I do think the Marshall Plan has stOpped the spread of Communism in EurOpe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another powerful factor tending to stop Communism. . . . I think the Greek-Turkish aid has been a wonderful investment in human courage because the Greeks and the Turks are mentally defeated and in case of war they'd be there to carry part of the load of comggt so that our boys wouldn't have to do all the dying. In 1956 he sought to vindicate the United States for not using force in the Hungarian uprising crisis, although as UN Ambassador he pushed for a resolution which would indict the Soviets for crushing the rebellion. In explain- ing our position he stated: We have done everything that we think would be helpful in the case of Hungary short of using force. The United Nations has done everything the United States has asked her to do. The United States has favored every practi- cal step except the use of force which we don't think would be practical . . . We can help Hungary, we can help it by moral pressure. We can't help it by armed force. 9 57MEET THE PRESS program script, March 23, 1952, p. 14. 581bid. 59MEET THE PRESS program script, September 8, 1957, he He 241 In 1958, while still Ambassador to the United Nations, stated: I think that the next twenty-five years you're going to see an evolution in the Soviet Union. I'm quite Opti- mistic over the long pull. As they educate more and more of their young peOple, the world is going to shrink; they can't keep up these iron curtains forever. I would think over the next twenty-five years things might get better, but in the short view I don't see any Si§8 at all of a change from this attitude that they've got. recognized areas of cooperation between the two countries. I think there are some cultural activities which can be successful. I still think we ought to try and get political and diplomatic agreements on things that are self-enforcing, like the withdrawal of troops from Austria for instance. That was quite successful. I believe they have made a little headway at Geneva on the conference for cessation of nuclear tests. I think you ought to keep trying all the time because you can never tell where there may be a break, and you must not easily be discouraged.6 Lodge also voiced the need to engage in other cold war tac- tics beside the military. In I think we should move ahead on this whole business of the non-military aspects of the world struggle. I think we have done well, but I think with the world getting tighter all the time, smaller all the time, we've got to step Sp our whole approach on the non- military aspects.6 talking about this new kind of strategy, he stated, It is an attempt to make the people of the world under- stand that we believe the American Revolution holds romise for them, and to talk about the promise of the merican Revolution and not about the menace of the Communist revolution. 60MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 4. 61Ibid., p. 9. 9 62MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. . 63Ibid. 242 Lodge in many ways seems to reflect the attitude and philo- SOphy of Democrats Kennedy, Humphrey, and Stevenson. On Berlin, likewise, he took the same firm position regarding'the Situation asone which must be dealt with now, with a language that the present Soviet leadership under- stands. Unlike Stevenson, however, he did not completely reject any United Nations action on the issue, but saw little hOpe for real negotiation. In 1960 he discussed our posture in Berlin. I think in Berlin we are just where we stood. we are going to keep our word. I personally think we ought to be prepared to see the Berlin thing brought up at the General Assembly, and I personally would like to see the United Nations brought into Berlin, supple- mentary to what is there already, let's say, by some such device as having United Nations guards at the check posts, something like that. I am not saying there isn't a chance to do a little negotiating on Berlin, but basically our honor has been pledged. If we go back on our word on Berlin, we destroy every commitment we have made all over the world. That is not a criticism of us. ‘We ought to be praised for keeping our word. we are not on the gifensive in Berlin any more than the Communists are. Lodge's overall position would seem to be based on a somewhat deeper distrust of Soviet leadership and somewhat firmer position on specific issues than that of the Demo- cratic candidates. Basically, however, he seems to be in agreement with much of what they espouse. NIXON Republican Richard Nixon has continuously expressed the necessity of remaining alert and maintaining military 64MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. 7. 243 superiority regardless of cost. As far as defenSe spending is concerned I think we would all agree that we have to Spend what is necessary . . . In this field of defense I don't think that we can have any compromise with the security of the United States, and I would say that here, we can never be in a position where we are second best. 'We have to Spend what ig necessary to maintain the position of being first. 5 Nixon, furthermore, took issue with those who would be satis- fied with a policy of containment of Communism as our main goal. Nixon would have us attempt to reverse it where it already exists. I believe that the statements made by Mr. Stevenson to the effect that what we have to do is to be satisfied for years with the policy of containment is going to discourage these people even more. I favor a policy in which we get off the defensigg on the offensive to win this struggle without a war. In 1960 as Presidential candidate he reiterated his convic- tion that we must take the offensive rather than be satis- fied with a defensive strategy. I believe as far as the United States is concerned, that as the leaders of the free world we have a reSponsibility to do everything that we can do to mobilize the forces in the free world for peace and freedom so that we can be on the Sffensive and not on the defensive in this struggle.6 Nixon at the same time, however, has advocated means other than force to gain the offensive. In 1952, as Repub- lican Vice Presidential nominee, he said: 65MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 6. - 66MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 12. 2 67MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. O 244 In the first place General Eisenhower has never advo- cated nor have I the liberation of the so called Iron Curtain countries by force. We have advocated a policy of liberation through means other than force . . . I mean in other words we're not engaged in a strug le with a power--the Soviet Union--who has develOpe to the 25h degree means other than force to accomplish its end. Asked what means he would use other than force, Nixon replied: Psycholo ical warfare, economic pressures, the other phases 0 internal warfare other than force which have proved so effective. Let me make this one point clear, the Communists have made a lot of gains in the last seven years. They have gained 600 million people. They have done g5 without losing a single Russian sol- dier in combat. He seemed consistently to follow this philOSOphy with regard to the Cuban situation. Like Kennedy, he did not think we could do much more than we were doing by 1960, and did not mention the use of force. He did, however, think that we might have prevented the crisis--and the Castro takeover--by means he discussed previously. When you examine the situation it is difficult to see what the United States should have done that might have averted it, or what we could have done. In retrospect I might suggest that the policies that the President is now advocating and that Congress has approved in this session for putting more emKhasis on a program of eco- nomic assistance for Latin merica, a program which will not go just to governments to strenghthen governments, but to serve the interests of the people, that such a program had we had it in effect, perhaps five years ago, might have produced economic progress in Cuba which might have prevented the Castro takeover.7 P. p. 11 68MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, 691bid. 3 70MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, 245 On the question of disarmament and nuclear testing, Nixon had also been willing to go as far as possible in taking the initiative in cessation, short of unilateral action. In 1960, as Presidential candidate he was asked whether he favored renewing underground nuclear testing. Test negotiations at the time were not very successful. I favor renewing the tests, once it is clearly established that the test negotiations which are presently going on have no chance of success or no reasonable chance to suc- ceed, I would say. The reason that I feel that we, how- ever, must go down to the end of the road with regard to exploring the chance of these talks succeeding is that the whole world is watching to see whether or not we can make this one breakthrough of control of armaments with inspection. So I would say that we must press the Soviet Union to get a decision, and if the decision is that there will be no suSpension of tests with inspection, then the United States must resume them immediately. Nixon would seem to be no more firm than others in his cold war outlook. GOLDWATER.AND MILLER Perhaps the biggest departure from the philOSOphy ex- pressed so far by candidates of both parties is that eSpoused by both William Miller and Barry Goldwater, Republican 1964 candidates for major office. Where others have Spoken about possible co-existence, Miller and Goldwater have rejected this approach., Consequently on several specific issues they. have disagreed not only with Democrats but with members of their own party as well. Perhaps the best statement of their attitude was summed up by Miller in 1964, when he was asked 71MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 8. 246 to explain Goldwater's position on the possibility of war. Senator Goldwater, of course, abhors war as much as any living man. His point is simply that you come closer to war--and indeed defeat-~by a policy of accommodation or appeasement or a policy which indicates that you can do business with the Communists; that he is concerned about the unilateral disarmament; he is concerned about concessions to the Communists, when you indicate that Communism in Cuba is only a nuisance, or that it is all right to have the Berlin wall, or that we are willing to commit American soldiers in Vietnam under a policy of doing enough to die and not enough to win, that you have to recognize Communism for what it is. It is a religion designed to communize the world, and the only thing you can do to deter war is to have a militar posture so strong they won't start a war because they can't win it. You've got to get away from relying on their word or believing that they themselves want a policy of coexistence becauge they don't. Their aim is to communize the world.7 As a consequence of this philosophy, both Goldwater and Miller have taken much firmer stands on Berlin, trea- ties, foreign aid, nuclear weapons, and limits of our relationship with Russia. Miller's stand on Berlin expressed full backing of Kennedy's policy if the President had decided that war was necessary. I think the Republican party takes the position that President Kennedy today is the Commander-in-Chief. That to the extent he stands firm on Berlin--he knows the facts, and is aware of the entire situation--to the extent that he stands firm in Berlin, we will stand behind him. At any time that he thinks such firmness necessitates war, then, of course, the Repub- licans would stand with him.73 Miller went beyond firmness, however, in his Opinions. He had some critical remarks on the Democratic attitude, which 72MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 9. 73MEET THE PRESS program script, August 27, 1961, p. 6. 247 implied a lack of firmness on their part and a will to negotiate. To Miller, negotiation of any kind seemed to be unacceptable. As a matter of fact we are doing more for him than many of his cohorts. No responsible Republican has suggested as has Senator Mansfield, that it become a free city under international control. No reSponsible Republican as far as I know, has indicated, as has Senator Fulbright, that we might negotiate away the rights of people in East Berlin to come to freedom in West Berlin. 4 ' Miller adversely criticized President Kennedy for having taken forty days to answer an ultimatum from Krushchev on a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Asked if the Allies should offer to negotiate with Russia on Berlin, Miller replied: What is there to negotiate, as far as Berlin is con- cerned? We are in West Berlin as a matter of right, as a matter of war victory, as a matter of fact. we have a right to air and land corridors as a matter of fact to West Berlin, an ingress and egress to West Berlin. What is thgge for us to negotiate as far as Berlin is concerned? I can see no reason why the United States should be anxious to negotiate. There is nothing to negotiate.76 As Vice Presidential candidate in 1964, he extended this criticism of our Berlin posture to the Berlin wall as well, claiming we should have taken positive action. It should have been torn down brick by brick as it was being built because it was contrary to every agreement made by and among the allies at the conclusion of World War II. As a matter of fact our military commanders were anxiously awaiting word from the White House author- izing them to tear it down brick by brick as it was being 74Ibid., p. 7. 75lbid., p. 8. 76Ibid. 248 built. Now it is an accomplished fact and stands as a tertimonial to the strength of the Communists and the weakness and vacillation of this Administration in the area of Communism. Questioned on President Johnson's proposed consular treaty, Miller again displayed his extreme hard-line atti- tude, which implied doubt of even recognizing Russia. Mr. Evans, you know and I know that from the very moment we recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 and permitted them to establish an ambassy and consulates in the United States, these consulates were neger anything but seats of espionage, so why expand it.7 He expressed his intent to Oppose the negotiations on consu- lar offices, and he expected Republican Senators to do likewise. Defense of Europe and the role of NATO in handling nuclear weapons were issues, brought up by Barry Goldwater in the 1964 campaign. Miller was asked about a statement by Goldwater that NATO field commanders should have the power of decision as to whether to use nuclear weapons of the kind that a soldier might carry on his back. Miller, although changing the wording, agreed with the principle. No, I think that probably it would be more accurate to say the type of weapon that a soldier could man on a jeep. It is a very, very small wea on and that is the point I was making, and it is all t at we are talking about. 9 It might be recalled that Hubert Humphrey had maintained there was no nuclear weapon small enough to be even considered for NATO use. He adamantlyognsed the Goldwater position on this. 77MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 11. 781bid. 79Ibid. 249 Miller thought the issue of Communist appeasement could be highly important in the 1964 campaign. In the following statement he illustrated some of the issues he considered as examples of Administration appeasement of the Communists. When you make a statement that the Communists are going to gain no further territory in Laos and then you stand by for four or five weeks and let them capture the capi- tal city of Prabang and other areas of strategic impor- tance in Laos, when you commit American prestige to the invasion of Cuba and don't commit enough American power for it to succeed, when you have Chester Bowles indica- ting that he thinks perhaps we should have a two-China position, when you have Mr. Stevenson indicating that perhaps we should admit Red China to the United Nations, then I think it is time that we became firm in our position around the world in regard to the Communist situation. The events in Laos, the events in Cuba, the events in Geneva, the events in Vienna, the statements of Mr. Bowles, the statements of Mr. Stevenson, to me indicate a general attitude of appeasement in Bhis area of deal- ing with Communism around the world.8 Senator Barry Goldwater's distrust of Russia and hard-line cold war strategy have also been expressed on the program, even prior to his candidacy. In 1961, criticizing American foreign policy in general, and Democratic policy in particular, he stated: I would say that the general attitude of weakness has prevailed in and out through our foreign policy ever since Versailles. we haven't been consistently hard. When we have been tou h we have otten what we want. We have won over Stalin and Krus chev when we have made it perfectly plain to them that we mean what we say, and I am very glad to see the stand that the President is taking on Berlin. I hope he keeps it up, 80MEET THE PRESS program script, August 27, 1961, p. 8. 81MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 5. 250 In 1964, commenting on Krushchev's New Year greeting to President Johnson, in which the Soviet leader expressed conviction that the New Year would bring East-West under- standing on a broad range of issues, and a ceasing of the cold war, Goldwater voiced his pessimism. No, I am not convinced in the least, and I was happy to see our President by his answer indicate that he is not convinced. He said that it was time for action and not time for talk, and in that I am in complete agreement with the President.82 I can't get excited about Mr. Krushchev's offers of more understanding. He has yet to say that he didn't mean that he is going to bury us. He is yet to say that Communism is not going ultimately to dominate the peoples of this world, and once hg backs off from that, then we will have started to win. 3 Where Lodge recognized some utility in having Russia in the United Nations, Goldwater advocated non-recognition. Asked on the program whether he would use his power as President, if elected, to withdraw recognition from the Soviet Union, as he had once stated, Goldwater replied affirmatively. Yes, I would. There would be some qualifications on that. I would use the effort as a bargaining effort with the Soviet Union to try to get some things accom- plished. It is to their advantage to have g2 recognize them. I can see no advantage to us at all. Lawrence Spivak then asked Goldwater to clarify his position. SPIVAK: Is it your belief that a threat would work miracles, but that ou really don t want to break relations with them? It isn't quite clear to me. 82MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 3. 83Ibid. 84Ibid., p. 2. 251 GOLDWATER: No, it isn't that at all. I think that we would use any gesture toward the leaders of Communism as an indication that we would withdraw our recognitional support unless certain things were accomplished-~supposing for example that we could change the govern- ments of the Iron Curtain countries to the choice of the peoples. This I would say would be worth keeping recognition of the Soviet for. It would become a bargaining tool. SPIVAK: And if they refused to do that, you would break off relations? GOLDWATER: I would suggest it, but I would still have to have the Senate agree. This tough overall policy of Goldwater determined his stand on several specific issues. In explaining his vote against the Test Ban Treaty, he said, I still think it is of no advantage to the United States . . . There has been no major shift in emphasis on the position of Communism in the world since the Test Ban Treaty and no indications that there will be, so I think that my vote on the Test Ban Treaty was a sound one. Asked if he would renounce the treaty if given the Oppor- tunity as President, his reply was, If it appeared to be to our advantage to test in the atmosphere, yes, I would do it.87 He expressed doubts about our foreign aid program, and dis- agreed with Humphrey on the value of giving aid to satellite countries in an effort to make them independent of Russia. He agreed with Stevenson, however, on the dubious value of military aid. 85lbid. 86Ibid., p. 3. 871bid. 252 I would take another look at foreign aid. I am very much in favor of technical assistance, for example. Military assistance is a foreign giveaway. Even a man like Mr. (Fisher, the editor of Har ers, a liberal, has finally recognized that the way the foreign aid program has been conducted has not produced results. He says you can't buy friends. I have been saying that for years. I think we can use technical assistance in a strategic way. 'We might even use some foreign aid in a strategic way, but we are giving away foreign aid to 97 out of 110 countries in the world. We give $1 billion to Tito, who is not our friend, and a billion dollars to Tito costs everybody in this country $25. It isn't the money end of it. It is the fact that we are helping our enemies in this program, and8§ think we ought to take another real hard look at it. He was Opposed to taking the initiative in any disar- mament agreement or negotiation. In his book, Why Not Victory, quoted by Lawrence Spivak, Goldwater had stated, "We should announce in no uncertain terms that we are against disarmament.“ Spivak asked Goldwater if he were elected President, would he under no circumstances negotiate with the Communists on disarmament. NO. Anybody, I think, would be a fool to close the door on negotiations for anything. But until the Soviets show some indications that they want to disarm and are willing to disarm at the same tempo that we would be asked to disarm, then I don't think negotia- tions are possible. I have seen no indication on her part tgat she intends to disarm or is even interested in it. On the Cuban crisis, Goldwater was convinced that in- voking a blockade would have prevented any Russian action leading to a crisis. 8 88MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. . 89MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 4. mirtirrm. - 253 If we invoked a blockade down there, if we told the Cubans that they had to get rid of Soviet arms and equipment, I am convinced, and I am backed up by every military man I have ever spoken to, that Russia not only couldn't but wouldn't come to the support of Cuba.90 It would seem that both Goldwater and Miller advocate much stronger offensive cold war strategy and a much stronger resistance to cooperation with the Russians than any other candidate here cited. SUMMARY There would seem to be little difference in basic atti- tude toward Russia between the two parties, as expressed by the candidates studied. All party spokesmen show a marked, distrust of Soviet leadership, and a recognition of the need to remain alert and militarily superior so that we can pre-' vent confrontation by negotiation from strength. The result of this policy has been an almost unques- tioned rising military budget, an expensive foreign aid program, and a backing of all actions taken by the Admini- strations in the cold war. If there has been a reluctance to use force, it is more evident among the Democrats. The Republicans seem to take, with varying degrees of firmness, a stronger attitude toward the Russians, and a stronger desire to wage an offensive rather than a defensive Strategy. This is most obvious, of course, with Goldwater and Miller and to some degree with Nixon. Lodge in many ways takes the Democrat point of View. 90Ibid. 254 Except for Goldwater and Miller, the desire to seek ways of COOperation and coexistence is also characteristic of both parties. If there is any root difference between parties, and it is difficult to determine here, it might be that the Republicans display a much deeper distrust, perhaps realistically, of Soviet motives, words, and actions. There is still room, however, for accommodation, and a rather optimistic outloOk for the future, expressed by both parties. ( COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA Our relations with China and our commitments in Asia have been a part of every major campaign, beginning with Formosa and Korea in the early fifties and presently involv- ing the Vietnam conflict. This vital major issue involves such questions as recognition of Red China, the China posi- tion in the United Nations, our relationship with France in Indo-China, our Formosa commitment to Chiang Kai Chek, and, of course, our commitment to Vietnam. Candidates' stands on these issues will be examined, and again a party comparison will be made. THE DEMOCRATS SPARKMAN One of the first Democrats to express a concern over our involvement with Chiang Kai-Shek and Formosa was John Sparkman. The Senator stated in 1950, Personally, I have not been very happy with the Chinese situation generally. Again,I thin that if the mistake 255 was made it was made four or five years ago near the end of the war when perhaps we should have sent men and mili- tary advisors in along with the money we were giving to the Chinese Nationalists.9 He stressed the point, however, that he did not mean the committal of troops. I didn't say American troops, I said advisors.92 Sparkman not only Opposed the committing of trOOps, but would submit the matter to the United Nations if Formosa got into trouble. He absolutely opposed any unilateral action on our part outside of a UN solution. I think it's a matter that we have tied in with the United Nations and it ought to be submitted to the United Nations and we ought to abide by the decision that's reached in the United Nations. I wouldn't want to act unilaterally.93 Although expressing a concern over the possibility of Com- munist China's attainment of Formosa, he was not willing to risk any American action to prevent it, outside of the United Nations. I would hate very badly to see Red China get Formosa, but I rest on the statement that I made a few moments ago, that I think the eventual settlement of Ehe Formosa question must be made by the United Nations.9 Sparkman expressed doubt that Formosa was that important a link in our Philippines-to-Japan line of defense; at least not important enough to risk a major confrontation and American lives. 91MEET THE PRESS program script, September 10, 1950, p. 8. 92Ibid. 93Ibid. 94Ibid., p. 10. 256 I recall a statement made by Mr. Walter Lippmann a few days ago to the effect that planes could use the main- land of China just about as well as they could use the island of Formosa. In other words he was making the Oint that Formosa itself was not an all important link in the defense of that area. I would not be willing to run the risk of all-out war, which I hink our acting of Formosa unilaterally might lead to. Sparkman's attitude on seating Red China in the United Nations was also expressed on several occasions. Although not willing to see Red China seated, he would not commit himself when asked whether we should use the veto to prevent it. He also didn't seem firmly committed to the Nationalist Shek government as being representative. He favored a solu- tion brought out by John Foster Dulles and others, to take China off the Security Council and to supplant her with India. In explaining his views on this, he stated: I don't regard China as being at the present time a stabilized government and it seems to be just a little inconsistent for either side to be sigging as one of the Big Five on the Security Council. Sparkman also agreed with all our actions in Korea. KENNEDY John Kennedy, although agreeing with our entrance into Korea, was somewhat critical of some of our strategy, mostly our lack of build-up of air strength. He did not, however, agree with General MacArthur's recommendation to bomb Manchuria. 951bid. 96Ibid., p. 16. 257 I think that as a matter of fact I thought that we should have done some of the things that General MacArthur recom- mended, but I don't think we should have bombed into Manchuria. I thought that would take the chance of bring- ing us into a war with the Soviet Union. ‘What I think has really been our difficulty in Korea has been our weakness in air strength, and most of the Chinese have been moving their supplies since the truce talks began as you know during the night, and we only have I think, two groups and some Marine planes that are doing inter- diction along these supply routes and only stopping a fraction of those of the supplies that have moved forward. So I think we're paying the price for our lack of buildup in air strength . . . I would have supported . . . perhaps the use of Chiang's trOOpS in Korea, but I wouldn't have supported the bombing of Manchuria at the time he recom- mended it. When we had some hOpes of truce talks working and ending the war in Korea, I don't think that wou d have been the time to have begun bombing in Manchuria. Kennedy's attitude on Asia was a cautious one. He recognized a need to align ourselves with the people rather than with the colonialist powers in control. He seemed to hesitate to commit the United States to any pledge beyond advice and assistance. Beginning with the Indo-China situa- tion, Kennedy had some very firm views. As early as 1951, he expressed the belief that ”we've allied ourselves in the case of Indo-China with the French very closely, which has cost us heavily in theeyes of many natives."98 His feelings on Indo-China might have implica- tions for any action he might or might not have taken in Vietnam beyond the initial commitment. We tied ourselves completely with the French. You can never defeat the Communist government in Indo-China until 97MEET THE PRESS program script, December 12, 1951, p. 13. 98Ibid., p. 16. 258 you get the support of the natives, and you won't get the support of the natives as long as they feel that the French are fighting the Communists in order to build their power there. And I think we shouldn't give the military assistance until the French clearly make an agreement with the natives that at the end of a certain time when the Communists are defeated that the French will pull out and give this country the right of self determination and the right to govern themselves. Other- wise this guerilla warfare is going to spread and grow and wsére going to finally get driven out of Southeast Asia. In 1954, he was again asked about the possibility of the United States taking over the French role in Indo-China if the French should withdraw. I don't think, if the French should suddenly withdraw today that there would be a possibility even if the United States intervened in its most conceivable active fashion as it did in Korea I don't think the prosPects of success would be there because the native population has shown no desire, because of many reasons, to take an active part in the struggle as did the South Koreans. And with- out the support of the native population, there is no hope for success in any of the countries in Southeast Asia. For the United States to intervene as westerners against natives, particularly when the population has not suppor- ted the struggle in the past, I think would not guarantee the prospects of victifia and therefore it would be a mis- take for us to go in. Although not agreeing with Senator John Stennis, who claimed that Eisenhower was inching us into a war in Indo- China by sending in technicians, Kennedy questioned the necessity of sending them in. I think sending the technicians was not necessary. The French have no conscription. Obviously they could have provided the technicians. We sent them, however, because 99lbid. 100MEET THE PRESS program script, February 14, 1954, p. 4. 259 we wanted to demonstrate we were supporting the French. I don't think they were necessary as technicians, how- ever. Therefore it is a step forward in involvement in French Indo-China. I don t think we should continue that involvement until the political conditions are present to secure us victory. Perhaps his caution was due to his belief that the United States, as a powerful white western power, could never rely on the trust of the Asian people, so necessary when fighting those Asians who are Communists. He saw it as somewhat of a racial problem. In 1951 he gave his reasons for what he saw to be the neutrality or perhaps latent hos- tility by Far- and Mid-Eastern countries toward United States policies. In the first place nearly all those countries . . . have been under the domination of western European powers or the United States in the last thirty-five years, and some still are, and we are closely allied with those that they consider to be imperialist powers. It's a drive against the white race and we are perhaps the strongest of the countries that might be considered that way to the Asiatics. We have fallen heir to much 2f the hatred that they incurred by their policies.10 In 1960, Kennedy again expressed a philOSOphy of cau- tious involvement in Asia, this time with respect to the defense of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and our Formosa treaties. The issue was the subject of the first televised debate between Kennedy and Vice President Richard Nixon. The administration position since 1955 has been that we would defend Formosa and the Pescadores, that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu if there were an attack which was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. If the 101Ibid., p. 11. 10 102MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p. . 260 attack was not part of an attack on Formosa, and the Pescadores, then our treaty commitment would not bind . . . In m judgment the position of the Administration has been t at we should defend these islands if it is part of an attack. Meanwhile, they have attempted to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek to reduce his commitment. Chiang Kai-Shek has been unwilling to do so and because we didn't want to break morale on Formosa and because we have been unable to persuade him to withdraw, the situation has remained in flux and rather uncertain.103 Later that year, Kennedy again re-evaluated our moral commit- ment toChkag and the dubious risk it involved. He has been unwilling to lessen his commitment and that is why we are still involved in this subject of Quemoy and Matsu, not because these islands are strategically defensible, not because they are easy to hold, but be- cause Chiang Kai-Shek has been unwilling to withdraw, and we have been unable to persuade him to do so. But I want to make it clear . . . that the Administration has never suggested that we should extend our treaty commitment to these islands. Admiral Yarnell has said that these islandi aren't worth the bones of a single American soldier. 0 With regard to the seating of Red China, Kennedy was firmly against it at present. In 1960 he stated: I would be opposed to the admission of Red China as long as Red China 5 official foreign policy is based on the belief in the inevitability and desirability of war . . . It is rather difficult to vote to admit Red China when her foreign policy officially is based on that com- plete hostility to the United Nations. That is the issue. If they withdraw on that, other communist countries are in, and therefore, of course our position might change, but it is gather difficult to consider changing that position.1 5 ~ Kennedy's attitude on Asia would seem to be one of cautious involvement, although he recognized the dangers of Red 103MEET THE PRESS program script: October 16: 1960: p. 2. 104Ibid., p. 3. 1051bid., p. 4. HIE... EEK‘O a. v... t é . x r h i .. . ... ...“ ,, 261 Chinese expansion. He considered it more of the Asians' struggle, and expected them to carry most of the burden. STEVENSON Adlai Stevenson, like Sparkman and Kennedy, was also firmly committed to our actions in Korea. Asked what might have been the consequences if we hadn't entered Korea, Stevenson answered, I think it's likely that it would have disillusioned a great many peOple in the Orient and in perhaps western Europe . . . Had we not met this first armed challenge of the principle of collective security . . . it could only have resulted in a sense of alarm, a sense of apprehension and insecurity in the rest of the world with the probability that appeasement of these countries would have followed very rapidly.10 Stevenson Opposed the seating of Red China in the United Nations, although he realized that discussion of the issue could not be postponed forever, and the time might come when Red China would be seated. He was convinced, how- ever, that Nationalist China must keep its seat as the true representative of the Chinese people, thereby implying a possible two-China solution. The position of the United States is that we want to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations and to keep Red China out of the United Nations . . .‘We will make our most earnest efforts ti gnsure the continuity of the seat of Nationalist China. 0 In 1961 he also admitted that the United States would no longer object to debate on the China question. This seemed 106MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 5. 107MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, p. 5. 262 to mark a departure from our policy of attempting to post- pone discussion of the issue indefinitely. we will no longer attempt to defSr debate, to prolong the moratorium as it is called.1 8 He had strong reservations, however, about actually having them in the UN. I suspect that there will be a great protest in the United States in the event that should come to pass . . I don't know what they can do about it in the event they elect them. It is a little difficult for me to foretell with any cer- tainty what the results would be. We have noticed in recent years that the Communist regime in China has be- come more and more chauvinistic, more and more bellicose, more and more ag ressive . . . These are very disturbing aspects about Re China, and I am a little afraid there- fore that they would introduce a note in the delibera- tions of the United Nations which Sight be very bellicose and not in the least harmonious.10 I have never been for admission of Red China. I have always said we will have to face the time sooner or later when we couldn't keep it out b refusing to dis- cuss it, and I'm afraid we have reached that time. By 1963, Stevenson still saw no evidence of Red China's wanting to conform to the requirements for United Nations membership. They are still threatening Taiwan, they are still inter- fering in Vietnam and Laos, and they are still expan- sionist and aggressive. And this is going to be the way we will live with them. Now, if they really wanted to get into the United Nations they know very well that they can't get in on that basis that they have presented themselves heretofore, which is to expell Nationalist China-~Taiwan--Formosa--because the United Nations isn't going to expel. it. If they want to get in on some other basis, they have given no evidence of that, so it is hard 108Ibid. 109Ibid., p. 6. 110Ibid., p. 7. 263 for me to say that I have detected any change in their attitude toward the United Nations as a result of their expansionist behavior elsewhere.111 Stevenson then described what he considered American policy toward Red China, a rather realistic combination of firmness and flexibility, similar to our policy toward Russia, with the door Open for cooperation and accommodation. I think you can characterize it as one of firmness, one of flexibility and one of dispassion. Maybe I could say that--firmness in our insistence on the fulfillment of all our obligations to Taiwan, to Nationalist China, flexi- bility in our readiness to consider accommodations with Communist China, when it is willing to fulfill its inter- national obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and diSpassion, that is to say, a readiness to reach a--when we see any or detect any improvement in the behavior of Peking we will respond. We are firm in the case of missiles in Cups; we are flexi- ble when it comes to a test ban treaty. As Ambassador to the United Nations, Stevenson had ample opportunity to express his thoughts on the conflict in Vietnam and American involvement. His position on a United Nations solution in Vietnam was similar to that on a United Nations solution in Berlin. He was pessimistic. He stated on a program in 1963, I certainly don't exclude the usefulness or the possible usefulness of the United Nations in Vietnam, but mean- while the problem isn't really one that the UN can resolve. It is a problem which they attempted to resolve at the Geneva conference, and if North Vietnam would leave its neighbor alone we wouldn't have any problem.113 p. p. 111MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1963, 4. 112Ibid., p. 5. 113MEET THE PRESS program script, December 13, 1964, 3. 264 By 1965, he still did not see much hope for a United Nations solution. One must bear in mind that neither Communist China nor South Vietnam or North Vietnam are members of the UN, thatlast year at the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident when I did bring it to the UN Security Council it invited North Vietnam to come to the table to present its case, and it declined to come. Ever since, it has sarcasti- cally rejected any-~even the propriety of any concern by the UN in the conflict in Vietnam. The Chinese have done likewise. In addition to that, it is problematical as to what-~if it were possible to bring them all before the UN even though they are non-members--the UN could do in the present circumstances. . . . I have no doubt that if a peaceful settlement is arrived at in due course to stop the fighting in Vietnam--the UN will have an impor- tant role to play in the future in policing compliance with any igreement that is reached with respect to Vietnam.1 Stevenson was asked why the United States hadn't been willing to have UN Secretary General U. Thant issue a cease fire appeal to all parties in the conflict. He again voiced doubt of UN ability to be effective. Whether or not such an appeal by the United Nations would elicit any more affirmative response than the othig tracks have failed to elicit, I very much doubt.1 President Johnson, in his Johnsprkins speech Offered unconditional discussions. Stevenson, unlike some Republi- cans could see no difference between the terms "discussions" and "negotiations." This quarrel about-~this semantic argument about dis- cussions and negotiations, frankly has never-~perplexes me. 114MEET THE PRESS program scrips, June 27, 1965, p. 4. 115Ibid., p. 5. 116Ibid. 265 AS will be seen later, the term "negotiations" was unaccept- able to some Republican spokesmen. Stevenson recognized the possibility of having to nego- tiate with the Viet Cong if Hanoi wanted them as part of their delegation at any peace table. I think we have indicated that it is for Hanoi to deter- mine whom it wants to sit at its table. If it wants to include a representative of the Viet Cong among its delegation to any conference, that would be for them to determine. We would have no objection. 1 When asked if he agreed with American policy in Vietnam, Stevenson stated in 1965, I don't hesitate to say that as to every detail of the conduct of our policy, I am not always in agreement, nor I suspect are any of our responsiblg officials, and that is what you have a President for. 1 By one of his statements, however, Stevenson might have indi- cated he disagreed with our bombing policy. He was asked: if a vote were taken in the UN on American action in Vietnam, would the United States be condemned. I don't think they would be condemned for trying to de- fend South Vietnam from aggression from its northern neighbor. I think there would be a good deal of feel- ing in the United Nations that the bombing was a mistake.119 As American representative at the United Nations, voicing American policy, he did not have to volunteer the second part of the statement, since it cast doubts on our image. It is possible that Stevenson might have been voicing his own opin- ion, using the United Nations opinion as a reinforcement. 117 118 MEET THE PRESS program script, June 27, 1965, p. 6. Ibid., p. 8. 119Ibid. 266 HUMPHREY Much of the comment by Vice President Hubert Humphrey on our Asian commitments has been restricted to Vietnam since he did not appear on the program until 1958. Humphrey has used the term "negotiation" quite often in speaking about Vietnam and has indicated a flexible position on terms of bringing peace. In March, 1966, he described our purpose. The highest purpose of our national effort in Vietnam is to obtain peace, at least the conditions of peace that make possible the achievement of self-determination, social progress and a better society for these people. What we are seeking is a conference, negotiations that can lead to the conditions that can produce peace. This necessitates--one of the conditions I would hOpe would be a cease fire. I am sure that if we can get any response at all from Hanoi that indicates a desire for peace that this government is prepared as of this hour to sit dowg and to negotiate conditions that make peace possible.1 0 Humphrey also did not rule out the possibility of having to recognize the Viet Cong as part of a South Viet- namese government, if voted in. He also, like Stevenson, recognized their right to sit at the conference table, if Hanoi deemed it necessary. He ruled out any form of interim government, however, without the presence and con- sent of the South Vietnamese, or the forcing upon South Vietnam of any coalition government by this country. It as gever been ruled out that the views of, or the wor s o , or the representation of the Viet Con would not be at the conference table. It has been sa d by 120MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 2. 267 the President of the United States that this was not an insurmountable obstacle. It is not a difficulty that cannot be handled if we ever get the opportunity for negotiations.1 1 . I think the one great disservice the Vice President of the United States could do would be to try to describe what might come as an interim government or an interim solution. I will say this, that we are prepared to sit down and discuss that formulation of such an interim government, but we are going to do it with the South Vietnamese being represented there. It is their country. The war is being fought in their country, and I would admonish my fellow Americans not to make this an American war. We are an ally. We are not in charge of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese have a government. They have been there a long long time. This is a very fine people, and I do believe that we ought to constantly keep in mind their wishes as well as our own . . . We do not want peace at the Biice of appeasement at the price of loss of principle.1 The discussion was whether or not the VietCong, the Communists, should be a part of a coalition government, at our insistence. I just-~in all due respect, I can't imagine that we would insist that we fasten upon the people of South Vietnam thI gnemy which has been the terror of the countryside. 2 Humphrey, however, was confident that in any free election held in South Vietnam, the Communists could never win. In 1964 he stated: The Communists have never won a free election and I have no reason to believe nor do I think you have any reason to believe that the Communists wgzld win a genuinely free election in South Vietnam.1 He was perhaps more Optimistic about involving the UN than was Stevenson. In 1967 he was asked what he thought of the approach to involve the United Nations in a settlement. 121Ibid. 122Ibid., p. 7. 123Ibid., p. 16. 124Ibid., p. 2. 268 We will continue our efforts to involve the Security Council and the United Nations in Ege area of Southeast Asia and the struggle in Vietnam.1 Humphrey's reports on Vietnam and his outlook were continuously optimistic, even up until the end of 1967. In March, 1966, he stated: When I returned from my trip to the Far East I said I had reason to feel encouraged about the situation-~the military situation-~in Vietnam, and 03% of the reasons was because we had a plan of action.1 In November, 1967, Humphrey stated: I do think it is fair to say there has been steady pro- gress on every front in Vietnam. . . . Diplomatically, in terms of a peace negotiation, that is the place where there is a stalemate. There is no military stale- mate. There is no poliEécal stalemate. There is no pacification stalemate. 7 It is interesting to note that only three months later, in February, 1968, the Communist Tet offensive handed the United States its greatest military, political and pacifica- tion setback of the conflict. In view of Humphrey's Opti- mistic report, either conditions changed drastically since his statement, or, the public must always carefully weigh all pronouncements on our gains in Vietnam. Humphrey's position on Red China was also firm, in opposing her being seated in the United Nations. He re- iterated the policy described by Adlai Stevenson, indicating 12SMEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, 126MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 8. 127MEET THE PRESS program Script, November 26, 1967, 269 a stance of eventual recognition and cooperation. He felt a major confrontation with Red China would be avoided by our expressed determination and Showing to Stand fast, even in the face of a nuclear threat. Every decision that this nation has had to make in re- cent years has been one that carried with it terrible risks. When we faced up to the Russians in Berlin there was always the risk that it might explode into a terrible war . . . And surely in the Cuban missile crisis we were right mighty close to terribly terribly destructive war. Unless the Communist leaders believe that we mean what we say-~I think the worst thing this nation could do for humanity would be to leave any uncertainty as to our will, our purpose and our capa- city to carry out our purpose. This is why I believe you must risk little aggressions before they break out into massive confrontations. We seek no confrontation with China or Russia.128 I think it is a fact that when we stood firm in other times that these nightmares, possibil%ties, and pro- phesies just didn't come into being.1 9 In 1966 he explained his policy toward China as being one of containment without isolation, a position similar to that of Stevenson. I do believe that the containment of the big aggressive militancy of Red China is worthy objective, but contain- ment without necessary isolation. Containment of its militancy, of its military power, just as we had to do in the post-war years of Europe relating to the Soviet Union. But at the same timi Bot trying to isolate her from the family of mankind. 3 I think that the American people know far too little about Asia and the countries of Asia. They are all very different and we need to know something much more about them. 'We are a EurOpe oriented society and so is our education system. 'We need much more going on in our universities and institutes on China and Asia.131 128MEET THE PRESS program Script, March 13, 1966, p. 11. 129£Eig. 130_l_b_i_d_., p. 10. 131Ibid., p. 15. 270 We have, of course, exercised a policy of containment and restraint on the Soviet Union in the past and she had nuclear capacity far beyond anything that China has today . . . and I am happy to say that the program of responsible containment, the buildup of collective secu- rity in the West, but at the same time trying to probe and trying to find ways of communication has been rela- tively successful, and I think it is in our interest and in the interest of humanity that the same kind of approach be exercised in Asia where Communist China today shows not only militancy against the west and Egainst her neighbors, but also against the Soviet Union.13 As far as admitting Red China to the UN, however, as of 1966, Humphrey was adamantly opposed. China today still stands branded as the aggressor by the UN in Korea. China has never asked to be admitted to the UN. She has suggested several revisions of the Charter. SO maybe we ought to get a picture of China in proper perspective. We are always worried about that she is not in; she doesn't worry about it at all. I have a feeling that she has some things she'd like to do before she comes in to the family of responsible nations, and she is busily en- gaged in doing some of these things. She has not yet made formal application; and even when some others have applied for her, she has rebuked them.133 Humphrey has repeatedly voiced the Administration posi- tion of no preconditions for negotiation, although he ex- pressed an implied approval of the continuation of the bombing.when speaking about Vietnam. We are prepared to come to the conference table with no preconditions: unconditional negotiations. We are pre- pared at this moment to accept a cease-fire. ‘We are pre- pared at this moment, if the North Vietnamese will quit bombing the South, we are prepared to quit bombing the North. But you cannot . . . place upon the South Viet- namese and the Americans the onus of something that is not of their making. We didn t Start this struggle. We 1321bid., p. 10. 133Ibid., p. 15. 271 did not aggress against North Vietnam. 'We did not send our bombers against North Vietnam until full regiments of North Vietnam forces were in the South, until it was recognized in every Chancellery and every embassy around *the world that the garth Vietnamese had committed an act of aggression.1 Humphrey was asked how the Administration felt about a statement by U Thant in 1966, that any movement toward negotiations must be preceded by, among other things, a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. we had 37 days of no bombing, total pause, de-escalation of the war during that 37 days. During those 37 days the North Vietnamese proceeded to move more troops into South Vietnam, proceeded to repair the roads and rails so that they could continue to move additional supplies into South Vietnam. ‘We already have accommodated point one (cessation of bombing) and.we didn't even get a feeler from Hanoi . . . I think it is about time that leaders in the world tried to bring a little presspgg to bear upon Hanoi as to what Hanoi is willing to do. In November, 1967, Humphrey again reaffirmed his be- lief in our committal and the strategy we were pursuing, as the way to avoid a larger confrontation. ‘We took our stand in Cuba; we took our stand in Korea; we have taken our stand in Berlin; we have stood many many times, and because of that we have averted the great holocaust that constantl threatens humanity. I believe that we are pursuing t e right course; we are pursuing it with restraint--the use of power with restraint. we are seeking in the best way that we know to bring this gtruggle to a political solution as soon as possible. 3 'we are taking stands now for limited objectives in the war, in battlefields far away, so that we may not have to take a stand later on in a greater conflagration. In other words, I don't think he people want Armageddon on the installment plan.137 p. 5 1341bid., p. 6. 135Ibid, p. 7. 136MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, 137Ibid., p. 6. 272 Humphrey at all times has completely backed our Asian involvement and the strategy we are following, including our bombing policy. THE REPUBLICANS LODGE Henry Cabot Lodge has been an Ambassador to the United Nations and an Ambassador to Vietnam. He has expressed him- self On the program regarding our Asian policy, from the days of the Korean peace conference up until the present conflict. Although in firm agreement with our Korean com- mittal, he had reservations about the way we were waging the war. In August, 1951, he stated: I think we were right to go in. I think the sacrifices that have been made have been worth while. My one re- gret is that we did not build strength fast enough to apply pressure to the Soviet Union, who instigated that aggression and bring it to an end quicker. That I t nk has been the mistake.1 His language in explaining Eisenhower's position on Korea also indicated a dissatisfaction with the way the war was being waged. ‘Well, I have just a personal impression which I can't prove, that he favored making a much bigger effort in Korea than was made, and that if his opinions had been followed, we probably would have reached a decision in Korea much quicker. I think history will show tha he was not in sympathy with this lack of will to win. 39 133MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5. 1951. p. 18. 139MEET THE PRESS program script, February 23, 1952, p. 6. 273 ‘When asked to define what he meant by "doing more," Lodge replied, I think you'll find a speech that he made at Valley Forge which clearly implies that he favored taking the steps that were necessary to bring the Korean affair to a speedy conclusion instead of temporizing along and fid- dling and faddling around with it the way we've been doing.“0 Lodge's distrust of the Soviet leadership is perhaps surpassed by his consistently strong attitude against Communist China. He has through the years opposed recog- nition of the Red Chinese government and its seating in the United Nations. In 1953, as Chief Delegate to the United Nations, he adamantly rejected any prOposal for a new United Nations which would include both Red China and Nationalist China in the General Assembly. In 1954, Lodge was activein passing a motion that the issue of seating Communist China in the UN be postponed for discussion until the end of the year. He was asked how long we can succeed in blocking a shodewn vote. As a matter of fact, the vote was a little better than postponed. The vote was not to consider. These are the words. So there's no implication that it has to come up in the future, although of course it will come up in the future . . . As long as the Chinese Communists persist in these warlike tactics, in following everything that goes a ainst what the United Nations is founded on, the ommun at Chinese will be kept out of the United Nations and they ought to be kept out. The Charter envisions an organization of peace-lovin members. The Charter does not envision a mere sordi cockpit of power politicians in which the law abiding and the criminal are going to be indiscriminately scrambled up. I thin the UN will keep out Communist 1401bid. , p. 20. 274 China just as logg as Communist China persists in these warlike tactics. 1 Lodge later in the program admitted he would use the veto power, if necessary, to avoid the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. I don't think the veto would be necessary. I wouldn't hesitate to use it if it became necessary. I've never been pessimistic about keengg the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations. In 1960 he again expressed confidence in keeping Communist China out of the United Nations. I think if the behavior of the Chinese Communists, should it change, would be something of interest. I think if the behavior of the Chinese Communists con- tinues the way it is, I think we can keep them out.143 They're in flagrant defiance of the UN by their presence in Korea, they have been in flagrant defiance of the UN Charter in North Vietnam, in Tibet, in the shelling of Quemoy, and a whole lot of other things. They have been Officially declared by the UN General Assembly to be an aggressor. I don't know of any other country that has that questionable distinction. 44 When and if the time comes that Red China's behavior changes that will RE the time to look at the question of discussing it.1 ‘Whereas Lodge in 1960 would still prevent discussion of the issue from coming up, Stevenson, in 1961, as has been men- tioned, stated that this country would no longer attempt to postpone debate on the issue. 141MEET THE PRESS program.script, October 10, 1954, p. 5. 1421bid., p. 10. 9 143MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. . . 1441bid. 1“Ibid. 275 As former Ambassador to South Vietnam, Lodge was in full accord with involvement in that conflict. He stated in 1964: I am absolutely convinced that the place is very impor- tant and that it is worth a major effort to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Communists.146 In 1965, although no longer Ambassador, he still completely approved Johnson's Vietnam policies, and again in 1967. I think the President has been sagacious and courageous. I think the measures be haz taken are very wise and will eventually bring success.1 7 I completely support his policy of warding Off aggres- sion 2§d doing it in such a way as to avoid World‘War 111.1 Like Humphrey, he seemed to favor the strategy of restrained power. He admitted, however, as did Stevenson, that he could not agree with every detail. I agree on the basic policy. It is not human to expect complete agreement on every detail of tactics and stra- tegy. You could only get that in a police state.149 Lodge recognized the different kind of conflict we are waging and the difficulty of winning a purely military solution. The heart of the problem to me is that you have in Vietnam a new kind of fighting man who is as distinct as the infantry man or aviator, and that is the terrorist . . . You don't get at the terrorist by put- ting in infantry battalions, airborne batallions, tank 10 146MEET THE PRESS program script. November 15: 1954’ p. . A 1“MEET THE PRESS program script, Hwy 23, 1965. P- 2- 148MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1967, p. 1. 149Ibid. In of in He 276 battalions, because the terrorist just goes into the house of the average Vietnamese and hides there, and the infantry battalion stays three or four days or three or four weeks and then it goes on and he comes back out again. In order to get at the terrorist you have to combine, organize the totality of the civilian population . . . it is a combination civil and military problem . . .‘we have never had anything like it. g5 is complicated, and it is going to take some time.1 September, 1967, Lodge again cautioned against any hOpe getting out with speed in the American sense. He never expressed much hope for negotiation. Asked 1965 if he excluded the diplomatic approach, he answered: No but I think we are nowhere near that stage and I1 th nk we might very well never come to negotiations. 51 then gave his concept of what victory in Vietnam might mean 0 He I was asked sometime ago by a very eminent American how I define victory . . . and I said, the morning that the oung VietCong wakes up and decides that he is not going ack that day . . . and a great silence follows. That is what hap ened in Malaya; that is what happened in the Philippines. There was no negotiation. 2 expressed his Opposition to having negotiations at that time. I think it would be the equivalent of turning South Vietnam.over to the wolves. I don't know any country in the world that would want to get into a conference when it has got a hugs fifth column in occupation on its soil like this.1 Unlike Stevenson, he also sharply differentiated between p. 1SOMEET THE PRESS program script, November 16, 1964, 8. 151HEET THE PRESS program script. May 23. 1965, p. 3- 1521bid. 153Ibid., p. 4. ahahhnu run-hr a, . ...... , , is whi 277 discussions and negotiations, implying a concession in the term negotiation. BY If they accepted our invitation to discuss, Mr. Spivak-- I don't need to tell you the difference between discus- sing and negotiating-~if they accepted our invitation to discuss and it meant that they had a chigge of heart, then of course it would be worth doing. 1967, Lodge still did not see much hope for negotiation. The thing that you would negotiate about would be how to end the war, but in order to do that, both sides must want to end it. At present we want to end the war, we want peace, and they want conquest . . . This state of mind has got to change before you can have negotiation.155 Lodge seemed to agree with Stevenson, that the role of the UN was extremely limited in any solution, although he seemed more willing to let the UN attempt it if it could. I would like to see them undertake the responsibility for the whole thing, but there hasn't been the will there to do it, and when there isn't the will, then the haven't got the tools. If they had the will, they mig t get the tools, but there isn't the will. If the UN had the muscle and the will to cope with it, I think it would be a fine thing to leave the whole issue to the UN. 5 Although Lodge seemed to take a cautious view of our bombing activity, he was wary of any unilateral cessation of bombing on our part, without some reciprocal gesture of de-escalation on the part of the North Vietnamese. In 1965 he was asked if he favored another suspension of bombing raids. p. 154Ibid., p. 7. 155MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1967, 3. 156Ibid., p. 11. 278 I would think we have had it, and it has shown the hollowness of these pretentious about the peaceful nature of North Vietnam's policy. It is a thing-~I don't think you ought to say what you are going to do. This is one of the many things that you can't talk about.1 ' In September, 1967, Lodge was asked to comment on an opinion expressed by U, Thant that if the United States stops the bombing of North Vietnam, "There will be meaningful talks between Hanoi and‘washington in three or four weeks." Lodge replied: The bombing in the North is of great importance to our soldiers with whom of course, all of us feel very closely identified. The bombing of the North means that 175,000 North Vietnamese are devoted to air defenser-anti- aircraft artillery and rockets, that another 325,000 North Vietnamese are devoted to repairing bridges and roads . . . If these 500,000 men, because of the stopping of the bombing were to be put into South Vietnam, it would have a very tragic effect on our soldiers . . . Therefore the question is if, in return for stopping this program, which is of such great value to our trOOps, we can get some significant, some meaningful, some solid indication that peace will result, then of course that would be very much worth looking at. Frankgy, I don't think such an indication has yet occurred. He was reminded of testimony by General Norstad and others, that the bombing could neither reduce the infiltra- tion to the South nor bring Hanoi to the conference table. Consequently, they had pointed out, the bombing would seem to be a psychological question, rather than something which really affected casualty levels. Lodge still held his position. 157Ibid. 1581bid., p. 2. 279 If the bombing is keeping 500,000 North Vietnamese out of South Vietnam where our troops don't have to cope with them, that is a definite gain for our trOOps and that shouldn't be gigsn up without some kind of a solid assurance of peace. Since he seemed to advocate the bombing mainly to aid our troops, he expressed caution about the targets to be bombed, and a restrained judgment as to the overall strategic value of the bombing in bringing peace. He was asked whether he favored hitting other targets, such as the dikes, which could make a shambles of North Vietnam economy. I have never thought this would be a good thing to do. I have favored military targets, lines of communication, that sort of thing as support for our trOOps. I don't believe escalating the bombing is going to produce very sensational results, nor, do I think diminishing the bombing is going to produce ve sensational results as far as peace is concerned. I t ink they do have a great effect onégur infantry and our soldiers in South ‘ Vietnama Lodge maintained a cautious optimism about our pro- gress in Vietnam. Ln 1965 he considered a stalemate, if not victory, at least better than defeat. I think we have made some very real progress. I think the fact that we are there means that instead of having a defeat we have a stalemate. I prefer a victory, but I certainly prefer a stalemate to a defeat . . . I don't think we ought to talk about‘when we are going to get out. You never hear the other side talk about that. 61 Consistent with a policy of preventative war by deter— mination and strength, Lodge also did not believe Red China 159Ibid., p. 4. 15°Ibid., p. 9. 151MEET THE PRESS program script, may 23. 1965. P. 7. 280 would risk a confrontation by more actively participating in Vietnam than it is now. I don't look to see a big participation by China bigger than the participation is now. The participation is very big now. I wouggn't expect to see much difference in the near future. Lodge's attitude toward Red China seems to be more rigid than that of Stevenson or Humphrey. On Vietnam, likewise, he is more cautious in his apprOach to any form of de-escalation on our part or any kind of negotiation, without some recip- rocal gesture on the part of the North Vietnamese. He would discuss, but certainly would not seem to favor "unconditional negotiations" as Humphrey advocated. NIXON Richard Nixon has taken a harder line on Vietnam than has Lodge. His emphasis seems to lie more on the military than the political aSpect of the struggle. In 1965 he ex- pressed an implication that we might win a military victory. ‘When I left this time I was convinced that the VietCong could not win provided we continued to keep the military pressure on theme My guess is that we are looking down the road toward two or three years more of intensive activity to reduce the guerilla activities to the point that the Végtnamese wil be able to handle them‘without our help.1 Like Lodge, he foresaw a long struggle, however, be- fore we could think of talking about withdrawing. 1621bid., p. 11. 163MEET THE PRESS program script, September 12, 1965, p. l. 281 Victory in a situation like Vietnam would mean setting up conditions whereby the South Vietnamese would be able to defend their country against internal and external for- ces without any outside assistance. This means that the North Vietnamese, who are responsible for this war by their support of the guerilla forces, will have to be conditioned to the fact that they are not goin to win. They must withdraw their support of the gueril as, and in addition to that it means that the guerillas must be reduced in their power to the point they recognize they can't win and that they will lay down their arms. ‘We must accomplish these objectivgz before the U. S. can safely withdraw from‘Vietnam.1 The war is not yet won because their resistance is not yet broken. In order to break it we must increase the level of attack until they stop the aggression. The decision of what targeti ghould be hit, must of course, be a military decision. 6 Nixon also predicted a rise in the number of American trOOps necessary. It is my view, however, that it will be necessary for the United States to make an additional commitment of trOOps if this job is to be done.166 Nixon's stress on military strategy included the consideration of bombing even Hanoi, if necessary, and a blockade Of Haiphong. As far as bombing is concerned I would say that no targets, military targets should be off limits. The fact for exam 1e that a military target is in Hanoi should not ma e it Off limits. - ‘we certainly should consider the necessity of a block- ade, in the event the various nations, both Communist and free world nations continue to support North Vietnam with military supplies. ‘we should, in other words, choke off and quarantine North Vietnam so that it will not be able to continue the support of the guerilla actions in South‘Vietnam.167 154Ibid., p. 2. 165Ibid. 1661bid., p. 3. 167Ibid., p. 4. 282 Since Communist China is a source of assistance to North Vietnam and the guerillas, the question arose as to how we could quarantine China‘without striking at her and risking a major confrontation. Nixon did not think it neces- sary to strike at China to stop her assistance. He also reiterated the accepted contention that threat of major con- frontation would in itself prevent it. When you speak of striking at the source of that assis- tance, that means of course hitting the industrial and milita targets on Communist China itself. In my view, if Nort Vietnam stops the supply of arms and men to South Vietnam, then our objective has been realized, and that is what I am trying to accomplish. I would say that the way we accomplish that is to cut the supply lines from Communist China into North Vietnam--that does not require going across into Communist China-~and cut- ting off the flow of supplies by sea, which does not require going into Communist China. I do not favor the theory of preventive war against China or any other nation. I do, however, say that the United States should make it clear that whether it is intervention in Pakistan, India's problems, or whether it is intervention with men into South Vietnam, that the United States . . . will use all the power that we find necessary to destroy the ggpabilities of Communist China to wage aggressive.war.1 .Although he believed traditional weapons were all that were needed in the conflict, he did not rule out small atomic weapons against Red China, if necessary. Against North‘Vietnam I don't believe that the use of small atomic weapons Of any kind or atomic power is either necessary or wise. In the event that Communist China should intervene with force in South Vietnam as they did in Korea, that would present a very difficult problem. I would think at this point that the use of traditional wea ns would be enough in that case to strike back at 83mmunist China . . . But we should not rule out as far as the Chinese Communists are concerned 168Ibid., p. 8. l 283 in the event that they do intervene in South Vietnam the use of all power that is necezgary to destroy their ability to engage in aggression.1 Like Lodge, Nixon saw a sharp difference between the terms discussion and negotiation. To Nixon the word "nego- tiation" carried inherent dangers of concessions to the other side. When you use the term "concessions" that means making concessions to an aggressor . . . I am against conces- sions in Vietnam because we find that North Vietnam is in the position of being an aggressor. If they gain anything from their aggression, a coalition government for example, a neutralization of South Vietnam, some of the territory of South Vietnam, they will be encouraged to try aggression again, and consequently our goal must be the defeat of aggression in South Vietnam, punishment for the aggressors, and certainly no concessions to the aggressors, otherwise we will buy peace for the moment and a bigger war later. ‘When we talk about peace, when we talk about negotiations, that actually encourages our enemies, it discourages and dismays our friends and prolongs the war . . . we have to reco ize that the Communists think differently from us on t at score. Thgg never talk about negotiations unless they are losing. erefore when we talk about negotia- tions they think we are losing.”0 Nixon, like everybody else, however, was prepared to accept the Communists in a new government if they were voted in, although he doubted they could be. If the South Vietnamese were on their own volition to invite the Communists into their government there is very little we could do about it. On the other hand, I think it is a hypothetical question, and fortunately the hypothesis I think is false. I think the one thing we can be sure of, on the ideological front‘we have won. 169Ibid., p. 3. 17oIbid., ps. 2-3. 17lIbid., p. 6. 284 . The possibility of any UN solution was also discounted by Nixon. In my view it would not be in the interests of the United States or the cause of freedom to have the UN intervene in the settlement as far as this particular matter is concerned. ‘Where you have a straight confrontation be- tween aggressive communism and when aggressive communism in effect threatens the free world, the policy must be made by the U. S. and not the United Nations . . . I do not believe in other words that a UN settlemegfi would be in the interests of either freedom or peace. Nixon represents a somewhat stronger stand against a UN settlement than does Lodge, who would have the UN settle the dispute if they could. ' Perhaps Nixon's philOSOphy with regard to Vietnam and our Asian commitment was best summed up in this statement. He was asked how be specifically differs with Johnson on Vietnam, since Nixon is also committed to the struggle and believes firmly in our role. One of those mistakes was the agreement with regard to Laos. After promising that we were going to defend Laos we made an agreement for a coalition government and neutralist government, in effect, with the result that the communists are quickly and inevitably taking over the country. ‘we must not let that happen in Vietnam. A second mistake with regard to Vietnam was with regard to Diem. I think the complicity of the United States in the murder of Diem tended to destroy confidence in the United States on this score. That is, that it is dangerous to be a friend of the United States. ‘We must not make that mistake again. It is going to be necessary for the United States to do more than it is presently doing against North‘Vietnam so that the amount of the ground commitment can be reduced. It is to the Communist's interest to fight this war on the ground. It is to our interest to fight it as much as possible on the sea and in the air. That is why I think we need to bring additional air power against ‘ North Vietnam and add tional sea power against North 172Ibid., p. 5. 285 Vietnam. I think that this continued talk on the part of Secretary Rusk and others suggesting that we want onl peace, that we want to negotiate has the effect of pro onging the war rather than bringing it to a close. I think that President Johnson has to make it clear to the world and to the people of South Vietnam that our objective is a free and independent South Viegnam'with no reward and no appeasement of aggressors. GOLQWAIER.AND MILLER Perhaps the sharpest criticism of our Vietnam policy and the strongest line taken for a military victory has been voiced by the Republican 1964 candidates Senator Barry Gold- water and Representative‘William Miller. In 1964Miller had voted with the House Republican policy statement which had advocated carrying the war to the supply lines and calling for Americans to take over the fighting rather than act as so-called advisors. Miller also advocated a much stronger role by the military in decision making. I don't believe we should have American boys exposed to battle and exposed to death under the direction of any other*person than a United States military commander. I say . . . we should confer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we should confer with the people in the State Department who know something about the situation in Vietnam, we should confer with the commanders in the field, we should adopt a policy to win and not to have a constant attrition and a gonstant casualty list day after day and no victory. 7 Asked about the danger of a nuclear war, if we enlarge our effort, Miller replied, You don't have to get into nuclear wea one at all in this connection. You can adapt conventions. warfare methods 173lbid., p. 7. 174MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 10. 286 in South Vietnam that will do the job. But to continue to give these people sanctuary for their supply lines and allow them to continue to kill American bo 3 day after day under the protection of a sanctuary ecause of the fact that we are unwilling to do the job that is necessary abrggd--we should either win or get out, one or the other. 5 Goldwater”was equally outspoken in his criticism, his desire to give the military more authority, and like Nixon, he placed no limits on bombing. The President should be the President and stOp trying to be General and run that show over there, and let the milita eo le decide the strategy and the tactics and the bogz Ioa 8, their targets and so forth. Having done this I would hope that they would escalate where neces- sary, keeping Hanoi constantly on notice that Hanoi itself could be bombed unless they gave in. I fully think that if we did this, sometime in the early winter or fall, Hanoi will say that they have had enough, and they won't take that next step.1 6 He definitely supported President Johnson's 1965 decision to bomb North Vietnam, in line with his all out policy, although he criticized the limits placed on the bombing of Hanoi. ‘We were on the brink of being pushed out of South Vietnam when the President finally too the action he has taken. I certainly wouldn't engage our ground forces in any large scale operation. They are completely unsuited for it. They are not trained for it. I would take advan- tage of our air power which we seem to be doing, but I would not limit the targets nor limit the attacks on Specific targets,“ again I would certainly have Hanoi or have ourselves on record that Hanoi would not be spared. I think we made a terrible blunder when we said we would not bomb Hanoi. I don't mean the citizen popu- lation but I am talking about the power plants, the ability to produce, the railroad marshallin ears, the highways and so forth; they certainly shoul e there. The main thing I would do, I would let the milisgry people have more of a say in running this war. 1751bid. 176MEET THE PRESS program script, June 13, 1965, p. 1. 177Ibid., p. 3. 287 Goldwater, in line with his general tough cold war policy, took a much stronger stand against the seating of Red China in the United Nations than any other candidate. He advocated withdrawal from the UN if China was voted in. In 1964, as Presidential candidate he stated: I don't believe we could live in the United Nations with the Charter having been ignored if Red China is allowed.178 Asked what we would accomplish by withdrawing he answered: we would accomplish the protection of ourselves, and with us out of the Upised Nations you don't have much of a United Nations. SUMMARY There is a sharper difference between parties on the issue of Red China and.Asia, than there is on our cold war relationships with Russia. Although most candidates are adamantly opposed to having Red China in the United Nations, the Democrats on the whole seem to be more willing to recog- nize that we eventually shall have to live with the fact, and it is better to begin trying to seek ways of communica- tion and accommodation for co-existence. The most extreme position, of course, is taken by Goldwater, the only one who would not want to accept the fact of Red China's recog- nition, or a two-China solution in the UN. ‘With regard to Vietnam, here again there is a marked difference. 'While most Democrats speak of negotiations and 178MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 10. A - 179Ibid. 288 a limited military strategy, the Republicans are mostly concerned with a military victory and a show of strength. They are wary of the term "negOtiation," and firmly against any kind of concession to the North Vietnamese. As in the Korean war, most Republican criticism'would seem to be that Administration policy is a no-win policy. On a continuum of firmness, beginning with Lodge and ending with‘Miller and Goldwater, there is a marked support for a bigger mili- tary effort and a much stronger role in the decision-making process for the military. Their position, in its most ex- treme form as defined by Goldwater, would seem to be an all-out offensive effort, short of actual nuclear warfare, to gain a military victory. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons, however, against Communist China, should she en- large her participation, was not completely ruled out. It is believed that this threat will actually prevent Chinese expansion of activity in the war, and also an actual major confrontation. FEDERAL.RESPONSIBILITY AND STATES RIGHTS The issue of Federal responsibility to the individual citizen versus states rights, in one form or another, has been present in every one of the campaigns included in this study. The questions of government responsibility in health, education, and welfare: the controversial FEPC: school integration: the current civil rights unrest, all have come up under this vital and far reaching issue. It has over- shadowed every other domestic crisis of our time. Candidates' 289 views on this issue as expressed on the program through the years will now be examined. THE DEMOCRATS SPARKMAN AND KEFAUVER Senators John Sparkman and Estes Kefauver, Vice Presi- dential hopefuls in 1952 and 1956, represented the Southern point of view on any civil rights issue. They believed that discussion of the issue and reliance on state action is the preferred course to any Federal legislation in the field. They did differ, however, on certain specific issues, with Kefauver taking a much more moderate than conservative approach than did Sparkman. Sparkman fully defended the right to full debate, de- clining to accept the term filibuster and its connotations. In 1952 he defined his position on a compulsory FEPC and civil rights in general. I have always defended the right of full debate in the Senate. I've said many times . . . that if you'd divorce this subject from politics, quit making it a political foot- ball and sit around a table like good Christians ought to do and try to solve it to give these people regardless of who they are, their rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the Unite States we wouldn't have any trouble. I have not believed in the type of FEPC legislation that has been presented in the pas which was strictly a com- ulso FEPC the the insisted on without ch ging the gottihg of an "is or {he crossing of a "t."188n 18OMEET THE PRESS program script, August 10, 1952, p. 5. filibl would would In hea met C011] LaWre the no Positi the pl FEPC 290 Kefauver, on the other hand, admitted on the program in 1952 that he made a mistake in voting for the‘Wherry Amendment on cloture, which would permit filibustering. I think I made a mistake frankly, voting for the Wherry resolution and afterwards I notified Senator Lehman and wrote him a letter. I wanted to support his resolution to amend the present Rule 22 which provides that you can get cloture by two-thirds majority up to Ewenty-five days and after that time I think by majority.1 1 He defended the right of full debate on any issue, but not the right of prolonged filibustering. I think we ought to have full debate in the Senate on all points of view but I think there must be a time when you can reach a decision on its meriEs without having the measure filibustered to death.18 On the matter of FEPC, however, Kefauver himself had filibustered, and then voted against cloture. He stated he would accept an FEPC plank in the Democratic platform,‘but would not advocate putting one in. In this field of FEPC you.will make a.whole lot better headway . . . by an educational, volunta , persuasive method Of pgggicizing discriminations wit a voluntary commission. Lawrence Spivak then asked Kefauver, if, as a candidate for the nomination, he didn't think that he ought to take a position of leadership in the matter. Kefauver restated his Opposition to a compulsory FEPC. His recommendation to the platform plank would be not to have a national compulsory FEPC plank but if they did have one, he would support it. 181MEET THE PRESS program script, May 18, 1952, p. 3. 182Ibid. 183Ibid., ps. 5-6. 291 My position Of leadership is that I don't want anyone's race, color or creed to stand in the way of their Oppor- tunity or to limit their chance in America . . . I think that if we have a voluntary effort of persuasion, educa- tion, publication, we'd make real progress. I don't think you can do it by a criminal codz and I think probably most Americans agree with me.18 Kefauver's position on desegregation was again consis- tent with the Southern view of Opposition to any kind of federal legislation in the field. In 1948 he had taken a strong position for continued segregation. In the middle of his Senatorial campaign, however, in 1954, the Supreme Court ruling on school integration came out. Kefauver, against the advice of his managers, conceded that the ruling was the law of the land, and that from that time on people ought to sit down and try to work out, with patience and with time, methods of putting it into effect. When asked on the program in 1956 what made him change his attitude, his answer indicated a strong recognition of the changing times, and a need to enforce the law even though he might not necessarily agree with it. If you'll examine my record as a whole ever since I've been in Congress I've fought for many civil rights principles, such as removing the poll tax and fuller employment Opportunities. I've always thought that.we ought to have a full, equal opportunity for employment and for en’oyment of the economic op ortunities of this nation. Of course, the main thing t at came along was that there has been a change in the times, the times have grown, the world has grown1 I have grown. I hope we can all grow as we go a ong. 3. 18"Ibid. 1BSMEET THE PRESS program script, June 17, 1956, p. 9. 292 In the face of Southern defiance to the Supreme Court ruling, however, Kefauver as President would still have rejected the use of federal force and would rely on personal persuasion and local legislation. Certainly coercion of a military nature of that sort is not going--would only harden the positions and make matters worse. I think the President himself through a personal commission and talking to the peOple of both races, leaders, school boards in the formulation of pub- lic opinion, that that's about the most effective thing that can be done. I think that public opinion plays a very important part. I don't think you can do it by military force certainly.186 On the question of federal aid to schools that deseg- regate, Kefauver clarified his position. If the amendment said exactly the same thing as the Supreme Court decision, in that exact language, I don't see how there could be any serious objection to it, and that would be all right with me and I would be in favor of it, provided this, however, that if any amendment is going to result in their being no school aid program at all, why then I think, the first thing we ought to do is have a school aid program. I don't think we ought to penalize the children while we adults argue about settling this problem.187 Since so many schools in the South do depend on federal aid which would not be received without desegregating, Kefauver's answer was non-committal, amounting in a real sense to opposing any amendment making federal aid dependent on desegregation. Kefauver's attitude on the politics of civil rights was that the Democratic Party, by helping all lower classes, has helped the Negro as well, and regardless of the Southern 186Ibid. 187Ibid. Dem< the: A “...-a (fit—.1 mn it w fica 0v- 3193511” 3. v ’ NJ .;; ,, . "7121:" c; " Jrvms 51"” 183W .. ,. 41’)‘ .335; basin” 9d: hit] up“ . ... 92:; an"; ".3 en 5.3“3inx r.) wivrzorae Sam 00". 4.... VIER’JJE asaabibnas and: [In (alumni. . .1 ’3': 437 affirmed our Berlin commitments. John Kennedy was the most reluctant candidate to commit this country to unilateral use of force. In the issues of Poland and Hungary in the 1950's, and again in Cuba during Castro's takeover, Kennedy considered any use of force unwarranted. ‘With regard to Cuba, Kennedy considered that any action had to be taken only within the framework and with the cooperation of those nations who had signed the Caracas Declaration. All three candidates supported a strong foreign aid pro- gram. Stevenson, however, was most vociferous in his criti- cism of foreign military aid. He also prOposed that all foreign aid from both Russia and the United States be admini- stered through the United Nations, thus removing any obliga- tions which this aid might imply. A strong humanist, he attempted to disengage aid of any kind from the arena of politics. Humphrey, on the other hand, would have us distri- bute foreign aid even to Communist satellites in an effort to win them over, or at least help them become more independent of Russia. All three candidates recognized the advantage of having Russia in the U.N. The Republicans as a group exhibited a deeper distrust of Soviet leadership and more of a reluctance to seek COOpera- tive bridges of understanding. Like the Democrats, they be- lieve in a strong military budget and the need to negotiate from strength, as a means of preventing actual war. Henry Cabot Lodge most resembles the Democratic point of view in his belief in a strong foreign aid program, and seeking 438 peaceful means of cooperation. His distrust of the Soviets, however, extends itself even to matters concerning disarma- ment proposals. Richard Nixon exhibited a harder line than did Lodge. He is not only for containment of communism, as are the Demo- crats, but, unlike some Democrats, favors an active attempt to reverse it where it already exists. Like Humphrey, Nixon opposed any unilateral action on cessation of H-bomb testing and is cautious with all treaty actions. Even most recently, due to the Russian actions in Czechoslovakia, Nixon has advo- cated not rushing into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is currently awaiting United States Signature. Like Kennedy, however, Nixon also rejected the use of force in Cuba. The hardest line on Russia was taken by Barry Goldwater, who has rejected the idea of co-existence or any poSsible negotiation on Berlin. Both Goldwater and his running mate William Miller would have had us tear down the Berlin wall as it was being built, as part of our Berlin commitment. Gold- water's rejection of co-existence resulted in an admission on the program that if elected President, he would seek to withdraw recognition of the Soviets by the United States. Goldwater has taken a firm stand against any COOpera- tive agreements, having voiced Opposition to, and voting against, the consular treaty and the test ban treaty. Unlike Humphrey, Goldwater Opposed any foreign aid to any communist satellite and has doubted the utility of foreign aid in general. He agreed with Stevenson on the waste of foreign 439 military aid. Like Nixon, Goldwater strongly opposed Our taking the initiative in any disarmament agreement and placed strong faith in the military. His desire to give the NATO field commander the power to use Small nuclear weapons by his own decision was a major 1964 campaign issue. Hubert Humphrey stated there were no nuclear weapons small enough to be used in the field by any commander. Humphrey also replied that this country would not and should not use nuclear weapons ex- cept in a retaliatory fashion since we do not believe in preventative war. Goldwater went further than any other candidate on the issue of Cuba with regard to the use of force, advocating a blockade if necessary. On the issue of the "cold war, the Democrats seem to have taken a more flexible position. The two extremes seem to be represented by Stevenson on one end and Goldwater on the other. The second major issue studied concerned Communist China and our Southeast Asia commitments. Although all Democrats agreed on our Korean actions, only John Kennedy questioned our stratgey. Kennedy's philo- SOphy in this regard closely resembled that of John Sparkman. Sparkman questioned the value of Formosa as a vital link in our Pacific chain of defense. He would rather have risked a Communist takeover of Formosa than risk a single American life defending it. Sparkman frowned on any unilateral action in our part to defend Formosa outside the United Nations. He also 440 expressed doubts at the time of the Formosa government being representative of all the Chinese. Kennedy, likewise, had doubts about our Formosa commit- ments and was extremely critical of Chiang Kai-Shek for not giving up Quemoy and Matsu. He recognized our commitment to defend these islands, but 2211 if they were being attacked as part of an overall attack on Formosa. Kennedy stated an agreement with Admiral Yarnell that the islands themselves weren't worth the bones of a single American soldier. It was the issue of Quemoy and Matsu which sharply focused the dif- ference in attitude on defense of Southeast Asia between Nixon and Kennedy in the debates of 1960. Kennedy's attitude on the use of force in Asia was a cautious one. He recognized a need to align ourselves with the peOple rather than with the colonialist powers in control. He hesitated to commit the United States to any pledge beyond advice and assistance. Beginning with the Indo-China situa- tion, Kennedy although recognizing the dangers of Red Chinese expansion, considered it more of the Asians' struggle and expected them to carry most of the burden. ‘What effect Kennedy's philOSOphy might have had on our current Vietnam involvement had he lived, can only be Speculated.. Kennedy, like all other Democrats, Opposed the seating of Red China in the United Nations. In addition, Adlai Stevenson while Opposing seating Red China in the United Nations, was willing to have Russia in the organization. Since both nations have aggressed, 441 Stevenson's attitude probably reflected an acceptance of UN policy rather than any preference toward Russia. While it would seem that Russia as a member nation could aggress with no danger of being expelled--especially Since the Soviets have the veto power-~Red China, on the other hand, can be kept out as an aggressor. This attitude was shared by Stevenson, with Henry Cabot Lodge, the other UN Delegate, who was also a national candidate. Stevenson, however, in 1961, admitted that the United States would no longer object to debate on the issue of seating Red China. He nevertheless reaffirmed the belief that the Formosa government will never lose her seat, thus implying an acceptance of a two-China solution. As long as he served in the UN, Stevenson expressed a definite commitment to our Vietnam policy although he might have indicated a doubt about our bombing strategy. He also indicated a flexibility where negotiations were concerned but doubted the possibility or utility of any UN settlement. Hubert Humphrey has strongly supported Administration policy on Vietnam in every respect. Unlike Stevenson, Humphrey also approved our bombing strategy. Humphrey has also placed more confidence than Stevenson did in the possibility of UN involvement in a peace settlement. Although opposed to for- cing any coalition government on South Vietnam, Humphrey has recognized the possibility of including the Communists in any peaceful settlement. His attitude toward Red China was des- cribed as "containment without isolation.’ Like Stevenson, he Opposes her seating in the UN but is hopeful of building 442 bridges Of understanding as we have done with Soviet Russia. On this issue the Republicans again are firmer than the Democrats. This applies both to the issue of Red China in the UN and to the issue of our Vietnam policies. Henry Cabot Lodge not only Opposed the seating of Red China in the UN, while still UN Delegate he stated on the pro- gram that if necessary he would use the veto power to prevent Red China's admission. As former Ambassador to South Vietnam, he also took a harder line than did the Democrats. Like Humphrey, Lodge opposed any unilateral stOpping of the bombing on our part but did express reservations about the targets to be hit. Lodge also rejected the term "negotiations" in favor of the term "discussions," in any talks we might have with North Vietnam. To all Republicans, the term "negotiations" implies concessions on our part to an aggressor. Richard Nixon has taken an even more firm position than Lodge with regard to Vietnam. He has stressed a military victory, including the use of bombing, and even a blockade of Haiphong Harbor if necessary. Nixon also did not rule out the use of small nuclear weapons against China in case China should intervene to help North Vietnam. Like Lodge, he is also Opposed to "negotiations" and any concessions at all to North Vietnam. He is Opposed to any UN settlement of the issue at all. Nixon opposes the seating of Red China in the UN but is prepared to accept it. He also is prepared to accept the communists as part of a South Vietnamese govern- ment if they are freely elected, but he has expressed strong doubts that they would be. 443 The strongest position on this issue has been taken once again by Barry Goldwater. Goldwater not only Opposes the seating of Red China but would have us withdraw from the UN if they arg seated. On Vietnam he takes a Strong military line. He was among the first to advocate carrying the war to the supply lines and to have Americans do the fighting, rather than just advising. Goldwater would place no limits on bombing targets and would give the military a much more powerful voice in decision making where tactics are concerned. It would seem that both parties regard Vietnam as an attempted Communist takeover and not as a civil war. The Democrats again, however, are more flexible as a whole on Red China and the Vietnam issue. The two extremes would seem to be represented by Kennedy and Goldwater. The third issue studied concerned Federal reSponsibility and states' rights. The Republicans on this issue seemed to be closely aligned with the Southern Democrat point of view. John Sparkman and Estes Kefauver both represented the Southern attitude on this issue. They favored local and state legislation and personal persuasion by discussion, rather than any Federal action in the civil rights field. Kefauver, how- ever, displayed a more liberal attitude than did Sparkman. Whereas Sparkman defended the right of ”full debate" (refusing to call it filibuster), Kefauver opposed filibuster when it interfered with the legislative process, even in civil rights. Kefauver, in the middle of a campaign, endangered his own election by accepting integration as the law of the 444 land when it was passed by the Supreme Court. Although Op- posed to a national FEPC, he supported one as part of the Democratic platform. He did, however, oppose the use of Federal troops or educational aid to schools that integrated as means of en- forcing compliance. Kefauver had to justify the Southern Democrat's position within the otherwise liberal tenets of the national Democratic Party, to attract the Negro vote. Like Kennedy, therefore, he expressed the belief that the Democratic Party bylekfing all lower classes, also helped the Negro, and was a far better hope than the Republican Party for Negro advancement. John Kennedy expressed a strong liberal attitude on civil rights, health, education, and welfare. He was not committed to drastic action. Like Kefauver, he believed that the Democratic Party helped all lower classes, including the Negro, and warranted the Negro confidence. ‘When asked about appointing a Negro to the Cabinet, Kennedy couched his reply in terms of equal opportunity for all, rather than in terms of any obligation or promise to Negroes in particular. Hubert Humphrey, although an advocate of a strong civil rights plank in 1948 and 1952, by 1960 had become more moder- ate in his civil rights approach and more concerned with party unity. In 1960 he claimed he would not be a trouble- maker and push for a strong party plank on integration. He also did not believe Congress needed to set up a compulsory FEPC. Nor did he believe in the bussing of students as a 445 means of achieving integration. Humphrey has also expressed a strong stand against militant protest of any kind, regardless of the cause. He has carefully qualified the call for law and order, however, with the reminder that the root causes of protest must be destroyed. As a whole, he has probably become more moderate in his civil rights approach and more acceptable to the Southern Democrats. Adlai Stevenson's limited opportunities to express him- self On the subject did reveal, however, a strong concern for civil rights action, but a restrained approach on imple- mentation, somewhat resembling that of Kennedy. Lyndon Johnson's approach to this issue on the program was no less liberal than that of any of the other candidates. His record as President, achieving a record number of civil rights, health, education, and welfare bills, lend credence to the liberal beliefs he expressed on the program. On his few appearances he exhibited a strong political sense of compromise in the area of civil rights. He also expressed strong beliefs in direct Federal aid to teachers and the voting right for the Negro. Like all Democrats, Johnson be- lieves in Federal responsibility in the areas of health, education, and welfare. The Republicans, again, differ from the Democrats on this issue. The most liberal attitude is taken by Lodge, the most conservative, by Goldwater. Republicans as a whole es- pouse the same conservative view as the Southern DemOcrats. Henry Cabot Lodge was classified as an ultra-liberal by 446 Barry Goldwater. His statements on the program certainly make him a liberal Republican and as liberal as any Democrat. He has favored Federal responsibility in health, education, and welfare. In 1960 he advocated the appointment of a Negro to the Cabinet if Nixon was elected. Richard Nixon, like the Southern Democrats, has favored state, rather than Federal action in matters of health, edu- cation, and welfare. Like the Southern Democrats, he also advocates local discussion to promote understanding in civil rights rather than enforced action by the Federal government. Although committed to improving education, he has expressed opposition to Federal aid to teachers, fearing the controls it might bring with it. He would also rely on the free enter- prise system to cure many of our city problems, rather than increasing Federal aid programs. Barry Goldwater again represents the most extreme Republican view. He expressed the strongest concern for de- centralization Of government and the constitutionality of any law in the fields of health, education, and welfare. Goldwater considers the right to vote the only civil right. Other rights he considers civil liberties, such as the liber- ty to live where one wants, etc. Although his running mate William.Miller voted £93 the Civil Rights Act, Goldwater voted against it because of the section on housing which he considered unconstitutional. His extreme uncompromising stand against the welfare state resulted in a suggestion that the two major parties 447 realign themselves into a Liberal and Conservative Party. The suggestion was completely rejected on the program by Lodge. Like Nixon, Goldwater favors local solving of civil rights and a reliance on individual integrity and the free enterprise system to cure the conditions of unemployment, poverty, and inequality. CANDIDATE ETHOS The final area to be analyzed concerned the program's contribution to candidate ethos, or source credibility, in terms of competence, character, and good will. The nature of the program itself was seen to contribute to ethos by its format, introduction, and questioning process. The built-in credibility of television, combined with that of an award winning program, added to the image of importance and competence of any candidate appearing on the program. The introductory remarks, likewise, by their listing of the guest's official roles, his accomplishments, and by the de- mniptive language employed, also add to his image of importance. The questioning process, by the subject matter dealt with, often dictates an answer which must deal with the kind of values considered good, just, or moral in our society. Many questions contain built in premises, the acceptance of which reveals the candidate as a man who believes in the ideals of patriotism, democracy, equality, independence, etc. These questions concern such issues as Vietnam, the "cold war," education, poverty, civil rights, and the like. Thus, the 448 questioning process, by the ideas it elicits, helps the can- didate project an image of character and good will. The major contribution to ethos, however, lies in the candidate's mode of expression. This would include such fac- tors as his linguistic style, his approach to the panel, his methods of proof, and his use of verbal imagery. Based on these factors, the following images were drawn of each can- didate studied in this regard. Adlai Stevenson projected an image of deep integrity, honesty, and humility. He displayed a deep concern for all of mankind and a strong belief in American, democratic, and religious principles. His language was sprinkled with wit and a modicum of religious reference. His style could be called "intellectual," almost devoid of any imagery or colloquialisms. Like all candidates, Stevenson used mostly evidence to support his ideas. 'What reasoning he employed was mostly from example. More than any other candidate, he displayed an acute concern for the meaning of any question thrown at him, before committing himself to a reply. He repeatedly called for definition of terms by the panelist. His approach to the panel was somewhat informal and friendly. On occasion he would address a panelist by first name, a technique not common to all other candidates. John Kennedy on MEET THE PRESS, exhibited an image of cold, impersonal, competent intellectualism. Unlike Stevensonrg Kennedy's style was completely lacking in wit or humor. He 449 did not utter a single humorous remark in any of his numerous appearances on the program. Unlike Stevenson's, Kennedy's approach to the panel was cold and formal. He seldom ad- dressed a panelist by name and never by first name. Like Stevenson's, however, his style was also intellectual in that Kennedy also avoided the use of imagery or colloquial expres- sion. He also avoided the use of any religious references. Kennedy did display a sense of party loyalty, honesty, and integrity. He did not reflect the air of humility which characterized Stevenson. ‘When he did express humility, it ‘was balanced by a Strong sense of confidence. Like Stevenson, Kennedy was also concerned with the good of mankind. His one distinguishing intellectual trait was the exten- sive use of statistics to support his points. Kennedy used statistics almost as frequently as others used facts. What little reasoning he exhibited on the program was from exam- ple, and some Sign. His intellectual image was much more sharply drawn than his personality in terms of character and good will, due to his cold and impersonal approach. Lyndon Johnson's few appearances on the program projected an image of a somewhat evasive personality. He was less direct than other candidates in giving answers and more fre- quently than other candidates used suggestion rather than direct reply. His use of ethical proof, although not neces- sarily called for in the question, gave him ample Opportunity to reveal his competence as Senate Majority Leader, his devo- tion to party and position, and the good will Shown him by 450 his colleagues. He was no doubt a man dedicated to his job and to the carrying out of whatever policies the party stood for. As with all candidates, Johnson exhibited a good graSp of evidence. Unlike Stevenson and Kennedy, he diSplayed a warm and colorful verbal style. He also exhibited an appeal- ing sense of humor and, in general, projected a competent and friendly image, if not one of frankness. Hubert Humphrey projected the image of an individual deeply committed to the democratic ideals of freedom, equality, and love of country. He expressed a strong grass roots faith in the American people, and a deep religious conviction. Humphrey's style is warm, humble, and humorous, sprinkled with imagery, colloquialisms, and religious references. His constant use of the third person and the use of his own name or position in referring to himself adds to an image of humility. A distinguishing trait of Humphrey's style which adds fervor to his dedication is his repetition of the same phrase in massing ideas. More than any other candidate, Humphrey, through this characteristic, projects an image of fervid en- thusiasm where vital issues demand vital commitments. AS with all candidates, Humphrey used mostly evidence, and some reasoning from example. Humphrey's style probably represented the best combination of both personal and intellectual attributes. Republican Richard Nixon, in several ways, exhibited a 451 style not unlike that of his first Opponent for the presi- dency, John Kennedy. Nixon, like Kennedy, was plain and direct in his approach and almost completely lacking in humor, imagery, or colloquialisms. His approach to the panel was somewhat more informal than Kennedy's, but it was not as personal as Adlai Stevenson's. On several occasions Nixon addressed the panel with personal references. He also displayed more humility than did Kennedy. Nixon exhibited a sense of integrity, honesty, and above all, a sense of party loyalty, equal to that of Kennedy. Both men, in their somewhat cold, intellectual style lacked the warmth which characterized all other candi- dates. Intellectually, Nixon also displayed a good use of evidence and when he did reason, used example and analogy. Barry Goldwater, like all other candidates was frank and direct in his approach to questions. Like all other candidates, Goldwater also refused to answer those questions which involved personal attack on other political figures, thus adding to his image of character and good will. Per- haps more than any other candidate, he stressed placing his country at all times above his party, although he demonstrated a strong party loyalty. His verbal style is probably the most colorful and down to earth of all candidates. His language is redolent- with the humor and colloquial expressions of the western pioneer, ruggedly individualistic, outgoing and friendly. His approach to the panel has been likewise informal, friendly and ingratiating. Like Adlai Stevenson, he addressed 452 panelists several times by their first names, and was the only candidate to ever call Lawrence Spivak ”Larry." His ethos in terms of character and good will was well defined in terms of his verbal warmth. One of Goldwater's unique characteristics was the use of causal reasoning with more frequency than any other can- didate. It might also be noted that although the warrants and cOnclusions of all candidates could be questioned, the relationships established by Goldwater's causal sequences were most open to conjecture. Based on the findings of this study, some concluding remarks can now be stated. CONCLUSIONS The data in this study affirm the recognition that MEET THE PRESS has received over the years for fulfilling its function of providing political information. An analysis of content during and between election years has uncovered an abundance of information concerning the candidates' opinions on vital issues. The format of the program would seem to meet the need for a frank and direct confrontation between the candidate and the public, as represented by an impartial and probing panel. One of the tests of the program's utility is how much information it can elicit in a limited amount of time and in a minimal number of exposures by each candidate over the years. As was illustrated, the program's keen questioning process 453 elicited enough information to give the viewer a good idea of each candidate's overall philosophy and specific approach to most issues. It was also possible to draw a party profile based on the views expressed by each candidate on the program. The actions of the two parties in Congress, with regard to various areas of foreign and domestic policy, would Seem to support the profiles drawn from the program. MEET THE PRESS would, therefore, seem to be a somewhat reliable barometer of prediction of how parties and candidates can be expected to act on important measures and a definite aid to the voter in making a rational election decision. The program, however, does have some limitations. The most obvious, as verified by correspondence between this author and several panelists, is the thirty minute time limit. There are times when a question begs more probing by a panel- ist. The number of panelists, however, and the time allotted combined to limit the amount of probing and development of many questions. With regard to this matter, further research could certainly be done, in comparing the MEET THE PRESS format with the format of the other two major panel programs, FACE THE NATION and ISSUES AND ANSWERS, which do use a smaller panel. Does a smaller panel necessarily insure a deeper probing of questions or a concentration on more issues in depth? The programs might also be compared with regard to the kinds of questions asked, and the duplication of information elicited. Since candidates, as a rule, appear on all three programs during an election campaign, do they give Similar or 454 contradictory replies to the same kinds of questions? Is there a replication of information, or does each program bring out some new facet of the candidate's views? These are questions worth exploring in fully evaluating the contribu- tion of all panel interview programs to political information. As was pointed out, perhaps another weakness in the program is its tendency to pursue the question of political candidacy, regardless of the factthmzno candidate has de- clared his candidacy on the program, and in all probability never would. The program can elicit hints, suggestions, or denials, but never a binding statement. The time spent on this matter could perhaps be better utilized by dealing more deeply with questions on vital issues. To explore fully candidates' views on issues in a mean- ingful way to the viewer, the program should allow comparison of candidates' views on specific issues. On many occasions, the program has failed to ask candidates the exact same questions dealing with the same specific issues, thus making comparison a difficult task. Since differenCes between candidates are perhaps more important than similarities, the program could improve its utility by providing this vital function of highlighting differences. This could be done by having panelists read the program transcripts of programs which featured candidates opposing the one being interviewed that day. A check of questions asked of one candidate could insure that the same questions are asked of the other candi- date by at least some of the panel. 455 The study also recognizes its limitations in drawing an image based solely on verbal content. The visual image of the candidate, the facial expression underlying his statement, his physical appearance, cannot be overlooked in their impact on total ethos projection. Further research is needed as to which is the more impressive, and the results of their interaction. If, indeed, personality projects better than issues, how can personality itself be better defined and analyzed? How much of personality is visual and how much is measured in terms of linguistic characteristics? What are the compo- " II I nents of "competence, character,' and "good will," in terms of physical attributes and in terms of verbal attributes of ideas and style? Does the use of reasoning project a better image of competence than the use of evidence? Do statistics project a better image of competence that the use of testi- mony or facts? Does individual bias have a stronger cancel- lation effect on the visual or verbal image? In general, character traits must be more closely defined in terms of verbal and visual attributes. Much of the research suggested here can be done under experimental conditions, utilizing actual audience reaction. Since the program is produced for both radio and television, the media could be compared with regard to ethos projection. When the visual and verbal can be separated, what is the result? Does the blind man hear the same image that the deaf illiterate sees? Since the main focus of this study was 456 political information, the image aspect should be dealt with more comprehensively in some other study. Even with its limitations, the program offers the voter an excellent Opportunity to obtain political information in a direct, uncensored, and unslanted manner, free from the ambi- guous embellishments of the prepared campaign commercial or Speech. The format combines the best features of the press conference and eliminates the opportunity for the candidate to control the line of questioning by choosing to recognize only those reporters who are agreeable to his point of view. In view of the high cost of political campaigns, perhaps the networks and stations should place more emphasis on this kind of format and limit the amount of commercial time that can be sold for commercials and speeches. The program might also be presented during the prime evening hours, at least during an election campaign, so that a larger Share of the voting audience can benefit from the information that it offers. It must be concluded. that, in terms of content, fair- ness, and methodology, MEET THE PRESS continuously makes a significant contribution to broadcast journalism in the area of political communication, the most vital mass media func- tion in a free market place of ideas. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Articles and Periodicals Adams, Val. "Glamour Girl and NeWSpapermen," New York Times, September 3, 1950, Sec. 2, p. 7. American Mercury. Vol. 68, January, 1949, p. 3. Amgrican Mercury. 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Box 1601 Scottsdale, Arizona 85252 Dictated in California July 21, 1967 Transcribed in Arizona July 25, 1967 Mr. Jules Rossman Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001 Dear Mr. Rossman: I will attempt to answer your letters in the order in which you asked them but if I wander Off it's only because I have a tendency to do that. In looking back over the many times I have appeared on the program you refer to I cannot remember one question that I didn't consider fair and objective. Naturally, some of the panelists could not, nor can they today keep themselves from displaying either violent disagreement or violent agreement and to that end I suppose there has been bias and I suppose there always will be, but not bias in the manner you and I think of. Never have I been asked to keep my answers short because I feel anyone who appears on these programs knows that thirty minutes is not much time to elicit news or answers and, let's face it, these programs depend upon the news they develop, so I think most guests, not all of them, do keep their answers short. In looking at advantages to a candidate, I think the first thing that must be considered is, what is he a candidate for? If he is seeking national office I can think of no better platform than these programs to become better acquainted with the American people and in turn allow them to become better acquainted with the candidate. There might be a questionable value to a man seeking local office but, after all, if a can- didate is im ortant enough to be invited on this program, this should have a bearing upon the feelings of his local people toward him. The disadvantages of appearing on any program like this is in the fact that the person generally does not go well pre- pared or prepared enough. On the ot er hand, it's impossible for the person to know what questions will be asked unless he 466 Mr. Jules Rossman Page Two July 25, 1967 has been asked, to cover a particular subject or statement. The person appearing must remember that the leader of the group, Mr. Spivak, has dedicated a good portion of his life to this program and its success or failure depends upon his ability to diagnose a question and to ascertain whether or not correct answers are being given. To this end I personally know that he devotes more time probably than any other person in this field to the study of the person appearing and to the questions and subject that will be asked and covered. Frankly, I have always enjoyed them and I don't think that they have ever done me any harm. Sincerely, Barry Goldwater £54.-- 467 THE VICE PICSIDKNT WASHINGTON September 20, 1967 Dear Mr. Rossman: As a relatively frequent guest on MEET THE PRESS, I am quite willing to reSpond to your questions. I have always been treated fairly by the panelists. Obviously, questions raised by the panelists reflect their points of view and interests, and questions are Often posed in a way that will elicit information they consider controversial or newsworthy. I don't consider that unfair. Any question and answer show on television has certain limitations on pursuing a single question so deeply that nothing else can be considered. Nevertheless, any guest has the opportunity to state his position as clearly as he wishes or can. The program is a useful vehicle during a campaign period for a candidate to make his positions known. It has the same dangers as.any press confer- ence - hostile questions, possibilities for misstatements - but it does provide an interested audience nationwide. With best wishes. Sincerely, 4 Hubert H. Humphrey Mr. Jules Rossman Assistant Professor of Speech Department-of Speech ' Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001 Dom-nnr—g .. ... ..- n. ”D'- ' .‘JOi. v .. '1 sell-ps.»..ux'é-a. '-_ "4. ..f'.‘. . .'. .... :v . ... . .- "‘., ...,.-.- o—. ‘ ‘1‘ (5423' "'~.-.‘ 1‘, «’11; ' , mil. ,‘. _ "T “:33: “3:: . ‘ . 5' -*j“. 2'? in“. L .‘ t- .1" ID .1 ‘9 463 ' DEPARTMENT OF STATE AMBASSADOR AT LARGE WASHINGTON AuguSt 3, 1967 Dear Mr. Rossman: In reply to your letter of July 16, I have absolutely no complaint shout the way in which I was treated during the many times that I appeared on "Meet The Press." Your other questions will take a greet deal of time which--slas!--I have not not. . I hope that what I have said may be of service to you. Sincerely yours, A t Henry Cabot Lodge 141'. Jules Rossman Assistant Professor of Speech Department of Speech Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001 : newt-m. ..u‘P‘!‘"rs'l.‘='.‘“'"T “ ' . ‘ I, . — - . A '. . . _. .~;3,;:7,.fiymsrm ‘ qmv 'ngr‘ ~, . b ...;‘v .wmytr‘ ' .‘A \ l. e ' Iv.- .V' . a.“ 'm’ .." ;.‘v ‘ .. '3 . (' ‘~ ,' ‘5... ' . .‘. ' y r .. . .'," . . _ a -. . ‘ ' - , . ' .4 469 RICHARD M. NIXON so saoao areas? new YORK. new YORK August 1, 1967 Dear Mr. Rossman: My overall impression of "Meet the Press" is that it is a first-class television interview program, which makes a conscious and consistent effort to remain so. I have appeared may times on the prowl“. h e few of these occasions I have found some panel members inadequately informed on the issues to ask intelligent and penetrating questions. 0n others, I have found one or two questioners whose objectivity and neutrality was subject to some doubt. But I feel these were the rare excep- tions, and certainly not the rule. The normal program that "Meet the Press" conducts features a panel of knowledgeable individuals who have- spent time in preparing their questions, who! are tough in their questioning, but not hostile, and who help to make that show one of the most respected news interview shows on the air. 'With every good wish, Sincerely, ,K7/j7n 'fZé%< x7“ Mr. Jules Rossman Assistant Professor of Speech ‘ Department of Speech western Michigan university Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001 '.!~€H.'-._.o x rue-o- - . ~ wire-A Hm, ’F “" ’_."‘:"2:?_ :“‘M'-' ”in-wfl. I- @470 STATE OF MICHIGAN urns: OF THE GOVERNOR LANSING. MICHIGAN asses “SURGE RDMNEY GOVERNOR September 22, 1967 Jules Rossman, Asst. Prof. Department of Speech WESTERN MICHIGAN UIIVERSITY " Kalemasoo, Michigan ' . near Professor loss-em: Thank you for your letter of August 13 and please forgive m tardiness in replying to it. As I understand your letter, w remarks are for use only in a y‘ doctoral dissertation and not for general public dissemination. I respond with that understanding and if this is not the case, I would appreciate the opportunity to review aw comments. Yes, I have appeared several times on that the Press, as well as on its two competitors, Face the latial, and Issues and Answers. W last appearance on the former was the weekend i-edietely following the 1966 election; aw next will be on October 15. Let me begin first by dealing with the questions you specifically raised in your letter. 1. Do you feel that the format or time limit of the progrus is any handicap to getting at the heart of important issues or eliciting direct and comprehensive answers to important questions? Generally speaking, no, I do not. The central figure on this type of program, .as well as in a general press conference, is best advised to answer any question quickly and to the point. Mr. Spivak, for example, keeps count on the amber of questions in any given program. If it runs below average, it usually means the guest was too long-winded in his answers, and this is usually the case. I have never felt melf unable to get to the heart of a question on Meet the Press unless an important question came at the very conclusion of the program. 2. that are the advantages or disadvantages to a candidate is appearing on a program such as this, and how is it different than a regular press conference! 0'“ Prof. Jules Rossman September 22, 1967 Page two The advantages and disadvantages overall are little different than those of any public statement by a candidate. He can do a good job or a poor job as he can in any public appearance. The major difference, of course, is the instantaneous impact on a wide audience. Only the President's press conferences have the overall ”live" coverage to compare with a program.auch as this. As a result, I rarely will put the time and effort into preparing for a regular press conference such as I put into an appearance on Meet the Press. My staff will spend several days preparing logical questions and answers, and I usually reserve at least one day in advance for personal preparation. 3. Did you feel that you were treated objectively in the kinds of questions asked and the manner in which they were asked, or did you at any time feel that any of the panelists were biased? . Most people are biased, including newsmen. Overall the panelists have been objective. In the last program, for example, not a single question was asked that we had not anticipated. Occasionally a panelist will put a question out of left field and dwell on it, but that is rare. let me add the following. Each of the three network panel press conferences has its own format. I find Meet the Press as close to a real press conference as any of the three, although the others have their own advantages and strong points. I also find Lawrence Spivak a great help in this field. He takes great pride in his program and goes out of his way to give advice to guests. There are few public officials who don't relish a good showing on his program or fear a bad one. Sincer HICHI 9N STA ARIES max/Mum1mMI)ziit’iIfi/im/Iflfiufliu/m 31293017541404