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ABSTRACT

MEET THE PRESS AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS:
THE CANDIDATES AND THE ISSUES, 1952-1964

By Jules Rossman

The underlying premise of this study was that the elicitation and unbiased uncensored reporting of candidates' views on major issues are vital mass media functions. This study analyzed the advantages and methods of the panel interview format of MEET THE PRESS in fulfilling these functions during national elections from 1952 through 1964.

The program was evaluated in terms of its fairness and of the ability of the format to elicit candidates' clear views on selected issues. Program contribution to candidates' verbal ethos was also studied. Primary sources included scripts of all program appearances by Democratic and Republican national candidates, and personal correspondence with guests and program personnel.

An examination of program history, production and questioning procedures, and comments from various sources revealed the program's fair treatment of guests. Questions, with few exceptions, were unbiased, hit the heart of issues, and clarified the ambiguous or evasive reply. Candidates were generally frank, except for questions involving candidacy, national security, or comment on other personalities. Lyndon Johnson was the most evasive in terms of suggesting rather than

directly stating a conclusion or accusation.

On the issue of the cold war, candidates of both parties shared a distrust of Soviet leadership and recognized the need to maintain military superiority. Democrats in general favored a defensive strategy of containing Communism, while Republicans favored an offensive strategy, and a cautious, if not negative attitude, toward co-existence and cooperation in various areas.

Although all candidates opposed having Red China in the UN, Democrats were more anxious to seek cooperation and co-existence. Stevenson implied an eventual two-China UN solution, an idea rejected by Republicans. In program appearances since 1963, Republicans Lodge, Nixon, Goldwater, and Miller, and Democrats Stevenson and Humphrey completely supported the extent of our Vietnam involvement under Johnson. Democrats, however, stressed limited military action and negotiations, while Republicans advocated military victory and rejected negotiations involving concessions. Also, Lodge, Nixon, and Humphrey only months before the major setback of the Communist tet offensive of 1968 reported military and political progress. Only Democrats Sparkman and Kennedy questioned our involvements in Formosa and Indo-China and sending Americans to fight Asian wars.

On the issue of federal responsibility and states' rights, Republicans Nixon, Goldwater, and Miller, and Democrats Sparkman and Kefauver advocated state control and private initiative in areas of education, welfare, and fair employment. All other Democrats, and Republican Lodge,

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favored federal action, but took moderate stands on speedy implementation of FEPC, school desegregation, and fair housing. The most inflexible conservative attitude on all issues was taken by Goldwater.

Program prestige and format contributed to ethical proof. The nature of many questions elicited replies which had to appeal to democratic and Christian values, thus contributing toward candidate ethos. Candidates used little emotional proof. Logical proof consisted mainly of evidence, with some reasoning from sign and example. Only Goldwater appeared to rely heavily upon causal reasoning. The development of all reasoning was restricted by limitations of time and could be subjected to tests of validity.

Humphrey, Stevenson, Johnson, and Goldwater projected the sharpest images of good will. Their linguistic styles were humorous, colorful, and informal. The styles of Nixon and Kennedy were similar in their lack of warmth, humor, or colorful language. Intellectually, Stevenson displayed the most concern with definitions of terms, and Kennedy used statistics and other facts extensively.

The program in general fairly elicits candidates' frank views between and during election years. Improvements in areas of questioning regarding candidacy and comparison of candidates' views were suggested. To determine more adequately the program's contribution to political information, research is needed on the isolation and interaction of verbal and visual components of ethos; and comparative studies are needed on similar network programs.

MEET THE PRESS AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: THE CANDIDATES AND THE ISSUES, 1952-1964

By

Jules Rossman

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Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Speech, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.

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This study would not have been possible without the prompt and excellent cooperation of Mr. Lawrence Spivak, producer of MEET THE PRESS, and his secretaries Miss Lee Noseworthy and Miss Betty Cole.

I would also like to thank the following for their helpful correspondence and comments. Senator Barry Goldwater, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Former Vice-President Richard Nixon, Governor George Romney, and Senator John Sparkman.

The comments of the following reporters and journalists were also helpful in determining the role of the panelist. Jack Bell of the Associated Press, former program moderator Ned Brooks, Pauline Frederick and Edwin Newman of NBC News, Ernest Lindley, and Richard Wilson of Cowles Publications.

My appreciation also to my efficient advisors, Dr. Kenneth Hance and Dr. Walter Emery, for their always prompt and helpful criticism and cooperation from the very beginning.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a tragedy, or perhaps both.[1]
>
> James Madison

In analyzing a work of art, the critic must inevitably determine the artist's intent and how well he has succeeded. In analyzing a product of the mass media, it is necessary to determine its function and how well it has fulfilled it. Since the media have several functions, each one has its own particular criteria against which it can be evaluated.

This study is executed in the firm belief that the most important function of the mass media is that of informing the public on the vital social and political issues of the day. It is most important because it is the only function related to the First Amendment of the Constitution, guaranteeing a free press and free speech to satisfy the "public right to know." How well the media fulfill this function is a subject deserving of serious study and criticism.

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[1]William Rivers, The Mass Media (New York: Harper & Rowe, 1964), p. 3, quoting from The Writings of James Madison, ed. by Gaillard Hunt, v. 4, p. 398.

The "right to know" is especially important in the area of political communication. Never before have issues facing our national leaders been so complex in scope and meaning. There is a plethora of facts, opinions, and decisions to report and clarify to the public. In Freedom and Communication Dan Lacy writes:

> Wise policies are possible only to the extent that the public understands them and will support them. . .Never until today, in consequence, has the necessity of a continual education of the population at large with respect to major issues been of such critical importance.[2]

The Town Hall issues of territorial expansion during our country's early beginnings are modernized by the international issues of ideological expansion. Local disputes over state rights are now overshadowed by the more imposing issue of human rights for the world community. The people must get adequate information to reach sound judgments and decisions on South Asia, the Atlantic community, the balance of payments, China, outer space, and Civil Rights.

Through the electronic media the dialogue between national leaders and the people has assumed new global significance. The eyes and ears of a tense and concerned world are focused on every fact and statement about the fact emitted from Washington. The press can report the news, but the government makes it. Executive and congressional opinions,

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[2]Dan Lacy, Freedom and Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 17.

speeches, and decisions are a matter of deep concern in a world of instantaneous communication.

The instantaneous communication of facts was vividly demonstrated during the tragic week-end of the Kennedy assassination in 1963. The story was carried into more than ninety percent of American homes so quickly that over half of all Americans heard the news before the President was pronounced dead, only thirty minutes after the shooting.

Within forty-eight hours, the print and electronic media reported the Dallas story so thoroughly that the Warren Commission in ten months and with unlimited resources did not alter the basic outlines of what the media had reported.[3]

The communication of ideas is also instantaneous. Understanding of these ideas is essential to judge fully the implications of any official action. Especially during the years of political campaigns is this understanding so related to our democratic process.

No individuals assume greater importance than those with the potential of occupying our nation's highest offices. Unfortunately, however, there is little contact between our elected representatives and their constituents. There is little opportunity between, during, and after campaigns to become familiar with their views and opinions on vital issues. It is imperative, therefore, that their comments, suggestions and feelings on these issues receive truthful, accurate, and

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[3]William Rivers in "The Press and the Assassination," in The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public, ed. by Bradley Greenberg and Edwin Parker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965) p. 52.

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comprehensive reporting. There can be no errors in translation or in analysis.

Limitations, however, within and from without the media make it increasingly more difficult for the public to know the facts and what these individuals say or think about the facts. Concentrated ownership of the media, the methods of receiving and reporting news, the problems of political broadcasting and the Fairness Doctrine, the lack of objectivity in news selection and editing, and the problems of new management, all contribute to an infringement on the public's "right to know."

Television has played an increasingly important role in an attempt to lessen this communication gap. The Kennedy-Nixon Debates of 1960, the emergence of the "live" press conference under John Kennedy, and the interview format pioneered by MEET THE PRESS have done much to remove the nebulous area which exists between what is said and what is reported. "Live" face to face confrontation between the politician and the public removes the possibility of misquoting, selective omission, or faulty clarification by the media of important statements of fact and opinion. What is said and the manner in which it is said are seen and heard directly. The importance of communicating this type of verbal information was expressed by William Ernest Hocking, a member of The Commission on Freedom of the Press:

> It is the business of the press to communicate to the public, news and opinions, emotions and beliefs.[4]

The significance of MEET THE PRESS lies in its contribution to political information. MEET THE PRESS is the pioneer "press conference of the air." By its nature and format the program serves as a forum of opinion, criticism, and testing of information by national and international leaders. Their words in unchanged direct form are available to the public who seeks them as an aid in the electoral decision-making process.

Since the program's debut in 1945 many similar type programs have evolved. The two major survivors are FACE THE NATION on the Columbia Broadcasting System, and ISSUES AND ANSWERS on the American Broadcasting Company. It is common for all three of these programs to make headline news by nature of their format and guests. To the political candidate exposure on this type of program is a necessity.

To appreciate fully the importance of this spontaneous type of confrontation between candidate and public it is first necessary to explore certain questions with regard to the media in our society and their functions. We can then examine the state of the media today in fulfilling their functions, and the limitations imposed on them. It is in the capability to overcome some of these limitations that MEET THE PRESS can be analyzed. The program potentially meets the need for a

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[4]William Ernest Hocking, Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Principle, A report from The Commission on Freedom of the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947) p. 210.

method of accurate, unbiased solicitation of the views of our political figures. How the program meets this need is the subject of this study.

This accuracy of reporting political information is most crucial in the electronic media. Television has in increasing measure displaced older media as a primary source of information. Newspapers now rarely publish extras; on the contrary, front pages often refer to news emerging from television interview programs, such as MEET THE PRESS. Moreover, surveys have shown that the public believes television more than any other medium with regard to news credibility.

A recently published poll by Roper Associates, Inc. compared public attitudes toward television and other media between the years 1959 and the present. Three questions from this study have relevance to this paper because of their concern with the informational aspects of the media. The first question was worded as follows:

> First, I'd like to ask you where you usually get most of your news about what's going on in the world today--from the newspapers or radio or television or magazines or talking to people--or where?[5]

Television was selected as the major source of information by sixty-four percent of those interviewed. Newspapers claimed fifty-five percent and radio twenty-eight percent.[6]

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[5] Emerging Profiles of Television and Other Mass Media: Public Attitudes, A report by Roper Research Associates, published by The Television Information Office, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York. p. 7.

[6] Ibid.

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The next relevant question concerned the elections of 1966:

> Here are some questions about the election campaigns that took place this summer and fall. From what source did you become best acquainted with the candidates for city (town) and county offices? What about the candidates for state office?

Thirty-two percent of the respondents considered television as their best source of information for local office, but fifty percent selected television for state office.[8] A 1964 study pertaining to the Presidential elections also revealed that the farther a candidate was removed from "here in town" the stronger television was as a source of political information.[9]

A third question concerned the relative credibility of the various media.

> If you got conflicting stories or different reports of the same news story from radio, television, the magazines and the newspapers, which of the four versions would you be most inclined to believe--the one of radio or television or magazines or newspapers?[10]

Forty-one percent of those interviewed gave television first preference. Newspapers received only twenty-eight percent, and radio received seven percent. When asked which of the

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[7] Ibid., p. 8.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., p. 9.

[10] Ibid., p. 11.

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four media they would be least inclined to believe, only five percent rated television as the one they would be least inclined to believe.[11]

Because of this built-in credibility factor and the fact that television is becoming the most important source of national political information, programs such as MEET THE PRESS assume added significance. They overcome the barriers of secondhand reporting and the accompanying risks in accuracy.

MEET THE PRESS was titled "the fifty-first state" by the late President John F. Kennedy during a 1960 campaign speech. In some years it has made headlines in as many of thirty-nine out of fifty-two weeks. The program has elicited much praise and criticism.

Historical analysis of the program's contributions can best be told in terms of the kind of news it has made, the comment it has elicited, and the awards it has received over the years for successfully fulfilling its informative function. A brief selective commentary will, therefore, demonstrate the nature of the program as a channel of political information. It will include representative newsmaking programs and the praise and criticism, which the program has elicited over the years.

A second analysis will concern itself with the kind of information and the methods the program uses in eliciting this information. Its form and substance as revealed through program

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

scripts are evidence of the program's ability to get to the heart of important issues and direct answers to urgent questions. The analysis must deal with such areas as the kinds of questions asked, the issues pursued, and the strategy of questioning. Direct and important answers require important and correctly phrased questions with no inherent biases or false presumptions.

The kinds of questions a candidate must answer and the manner in which he answers serve another function in this type of format. Both of these factors contribute toward the television image the candidate projects. Although this study focuses on what is said, it is well to keep in mind the importance of how it is said. It must be an accepted premise that the "live" spontaneous format of this program is an important factor of its success. In a letter to this author, Lawrence Spivak, creator and producer of the program, stated:

> Experience has proven that it is more difficult to evade answering an informing and challenging question when it is known that millions of people are watching and listening. As a result, the television press conference frequently produces news difficult to get at in other ways. Important also is the fact that the camera close-up permits the viewer to judge for himself the added meaning of a hesitation, a smile, a frown, important nuances sometimes undetectable even to reporters in regular press conferences.[12]

This image-making power of television has been extensively treated in the numerous works dealing with political

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[12]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, June 17, 1967.

broadcasting. In 1955, Republican National Chairman Leonard Hall realistically stated:

> We must choose able and personable candidates who can "sell themselves" because television has changed the course of campaigning.[13]

And so it has. The 1951 Senate Crime Investigation Hearings gave the Democrats a Vice-Presidential candidate in Estes Kefauver. In 1952 Adlai Stevenson was relatively unknown on the national scene. Within weeks through television he was a familiar figure. Richard Nixon's famous "Checkers" speech in October of 1952 brought about an amazing reversal of political fortune. The television influence was dramatically demonstrated during the Kennedy-Nixon debates of 1960. On the Monday morning following the election President Kennedy himself declared, "It was television more than anything else that turned the tide."[14]

More important than mere exposure, however, it is the candidate's expression at any particular moment and his overall image which are determinant factors in the personality he projects. The following two reactions to the Debates illustrate the point.

> Nixon might be defeated not by Kennedy nor by Kruschev but by Klieg, who invented the lights they use on TV. Under the harsh relentless glare, Kennedy looked seraphic, and Nixon looked like home made sin...and among the sixty million viewers there must be plenty who are swayed by appearances.

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[13]"The Changing Face of Politics," Newsweek, March 14, 1955, p. 28.

[14]Theodore H. White, The Making of a President (New York: Pocket Books, 1961), p. 353.

> There is a danger of course that Kennedy may win on light and shadow as Eisenhower won on five stars.[15]

> In the fourth debate the director showed only two reaction shots, and both of these came when Nixon was engaged in an earnest and angry plea. Kennedy was shown both times with a broad and relaxed grin on his face. Does the TV camera give an advantage to the performer who is best able to project an image of himself and to manipulate his viewers most skilfully? Or, has the eye of the camera become the probing eye, capably showing us the man as he is beneath the image he is trying to adopt?[16]

Another example of television's probing eye was revealed during the famous McCarthy investigations according to NBC executive Frank Stanton.

> It was through television that the public came to know Senator Joseph McCarthy, his voice, his sarcasm, the caustic way he dealt with witnesses. Television, face to face with persons in an important critical situation can convey the quality of fact and feeling that leads far more deeply than print--to understanding. The fact and feeling are not always available together, far less frequently in the print media now than when journalism benefitted by a strong literary tradition.[17]

Before over emphasizing the visual aspect, however, it must be pointed out that it is the combination of words and pictures which formsthe image. This is specially important

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[15]Gerald Johnson, "In Search of Identity," The New Republic, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 20.

[16]William Hamilton, "The Victory Was Video's," Christian Century, Nov. 30, 1960, p. 1410.

[17]J. Edward Gerald, Social Responsibility of the Press (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 125.

if we consider the factors of selective exposure and selective perception, which greatly affect the impact of any media message on the viewer.

A viewer's partisanship plays a strong role in the formation of his conclusions as to the image the candidate projects. Therefore, it is almost impossible to separate entirely what a candidate says from how he says it. Jack Gould, television critic of The New York Times, commenting on television technique and politics stated:

> If a viewer thinks a politician's script is wanting, the performance may seem wanting as well. If the script is good the performance may seem better than it really is.[18]

Then, emphasizing the importance of the verbal aspect he continues, "In the art of government, one word can be more important than a thousand pictures."[19]

The program, for this reason, provides an interesting testing ground for those who aspire to high office and the press confrontations that accompany the office. The candidate's handling of spontaneous questions and his adeptness at controlling personal reaction are put to the test before a scrutinizing public.

How might the Eisenhower image have fared on the program considering his early difficulties with the press? Once in response to persistent queries about the McCarthy forays

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[18]Jack Gould, "TV Technique on the Political Stage," New York Times Magazine, April 25, 1954, p. 12.

[19]Ibid., p. 44.

against his administration, he stalked angrily from the conference room. On a number of occasions he flushed deep red when prodded about a sensitive subject and rejected the questioner abruptly.[20]

A Life magazine story in May of 1958 relates the following:

> President Eisenhower has a legendary temper well-known to his close associates but usually controlled in public. It flares particularly when his personal rectitude or his military judgment is impugned. Last week at a White House press conference a reporter asked a barbed question about the President's cherished plan for Defense Department reorganization, and the Eisenhower ire came out for all to see.[21]

His early press conferences produced comments such as this to describe his verbal fluency at clarification.

> Ike's press conferences produced a rich harvest of published distortions, ambiguities, and dead pan ridicule.[22]

Perhaps several appearances facing the sharp, incisive questioning of the MEET THE PRESS panel before taking office might have better prepared him for the give-and-take of press conference drama.

Harry Truman's press conference difficulties might also have been forecast by a MEET THE PRESS appearance. How might

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[20]Douglas Cater, "Thank You Mister President," The Reporter, March 19, 1959, p. 18.

[21]"Executive Ire at a Needling," Life, May 5, 1958, p. 40.

[22]Phillip M. Wagner, "The Easy Chair: A Better Way With Press Conferences," Harpers, May, 1961, p. 14.

his snappy manner have affected his image as projected on the program? Here is one description of his press conference image as seen by the Atlantic:

> What Mr. Truman has never been able to do is use the press conference to explain, elaborate, and interpret, to give broad outlines of administration policy in language the people can understand. His answers usually are simple yes and no replies with only a few words of explanation. He has never talked for the background or guidance of correspondents.[23]

The danger a candidate risks in the kind of image he might project by an appearance on this show is illustrated in this excerpt of an article by Arthur Krock of The New York Times. Krock is commenting on Senator Barry Goldwater's appearance on the program two days after his announced candidacy for the Presidency. Unfortunately, the Senator had not adequate time in which to prepare for the tough confrontation of the program. The result was the following analysis of his appearance by Krock.

> He was not at his best in sustaining the impression of qualifications to lead the nation that has produced the powerful presidential movement in his behalf. This impression was of a man forthright, resolute, clear, and candid in the expression of views which were thought through. His "image" must have been somewhat blurred in two areas by the responses the Senator made to several, though not certainly all, of the sharply probing questions addressed to him by the television panelists. He was neither forthright nor candid in discussing the implied modification of his often repeated stand against simultaneous candidacies for President

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[23]"The Atlantic Report on Washington," Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1950, p. 6.

> and for re-election to the Senate. And obviously he has not thought through his proposition touching the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R. and of United States membership in the United Nations.[24]

Krock then further analyzes Goldwater's statements, using such terms as "The Senator could have made a better case," "...the Senator also made a fuzzy explanation," etc.[25]

Thus, while the program can prepare a candidate for the give-and-take of press conferences, it also presents a stark challenge to the verbal and visual image he might project of his leadership capabilities.

Another important measure of the program's informational utility concerns the role of the candidates themselves. The candidate's methods of political persuasion can here be analyzed. His methods of reply, his premises, his points of view on issues over a period of time reveal something of the intellectual and philosophical caliber of the man.

To the layman, his statements are a primary source of information and a hint as to the kinds of decisions he will make on vital issues if elected.

To the rhetorician, the candidate's reasoning patterns reveal the manner in which he uses ethical, logical, and emotional proof as a political persuader in clarifying issues. To the trained psychologist, the candidate's logical thinking

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[24]Arthur Krock, New York Times, January 7, 1964, p. 32.

[25]Ibid.

patterns can reveal personality traits which might affect his political behavior as a leader.

Analysis of this aspect of the program must deal with such issues as the candidate's strategy in answering or evading questions, his views of important issues before, during, and after running for office, and whether any common type of thinking patterns on issues can be determined which are similar among candidates regardless of political bent. An inventory of statements and thinking patterns can offer a political and rhetorical profile of the candidates involved.

A final evaluation of the program's contribution, therefore, must measure its potential against its performance, as determined by a study of its form, its substance, and its reception by the critics, where possible.

This particular study focuses on the program during the national political campaign years from 1952 through 1964. The programs studied involve all those candidates who ran for the office of President and Vice-President during these four campaigns. All their appearances on the program, however, will be studied, regardless of the year in which they appeared; hence, programs before, during, and after running for office. The exception is former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who never appeared on the program. All other candidates for office, including President Lyndon Johnson, can be studied over a period of years.

The campaign of 1952 was selected as a point of departure for several reasons. It was the first big year for national

political television. Both political conventions were carried by the networks. It was the first year a price tag was put on political time, thereby adding significance to the problems of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. Legitimate interview programs like MEET THE PRESS, being exempt from the equal time provisions of Section 315, assume added importance during any national campaign.

Only by beginning with the 1952 campaign does the opportunity exist to study all candidates who ran for high office. It was the first campaign to be covered by television featuring candidates who were not major office holders and could appear on the program. Between the debut of MEET THE PRESS in 1945 and the 1952 campaign, the Presidency was held and successfully resought by Harry S. Truman, thereby prohibiting his appearance on the program.

Beginning with the 1952 campaign, the issues of Korea, McCarthyism, Red China, Civil Rights, and Vietnam come into sharp focus to provide interesting political fare for the MEET THE PRESS dialogue. Eliciting candidates' views on these issues and how they are clarified make important contributions to political journalism.

To appreciate the role of MEET THE PRESS, however, it is first necessary to examine the state of the media in general and determine what barriers exist to providing full political information. We can better assess the role of the MEET THE PRESS format. Since it is "the press conference of the air" we must also examine the press conference itself as a source of information.

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The question arises: what is the purpose of the media today in their relation to the public and politics? The answers to this question are requisite to examining the function of a program such as MEET THE PRESS. Let us briefly determine the role of a free media in a democratic society.

THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC

A good many theories of the social and cultural responsibilities of mass communication have been elaborated over the years. All of the theories are based chiefly on two grounds: the position accorded mass communications by the First Amendment, and the indispensability of criticism and guidance and fresh ideas to a democratic society.

The two interests embodied in the First Amendment, (1) the right of free speech and press, and (2) the recognition of a public right to know are inseparable under our democratic form of government. To deny one is to negate the other. This idea of a well-informed public as being essential to a free public was carefully woven into our governmental fabric. The crucial function of the press in keeping the public aware was recognized by Thomas Jefferson.

> The basis of our government being the opinion of the people; the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.[26]

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[26]Rivers, p. 3, quoting from Paul L. Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, p. 69.

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Our First Amendment, therefore, reflects two aspects of a free press and free speech. The first aspect concerns the need of many men to express their opinions on vital matters of the day. This implies the idea of a free informative press and broadcast media, allowing all views to find their way into the marketplace of ideas. The second aspect of the First Amendment is that of a social need to attain the truth, which embodies the idea of a public's right to know.

More than three hundred years after the First Amendment was written, it was given its ultimate flexibility of definition. The right of free speech to include even dissent in time of war in the interest of an informed public was upheld by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. In the case of Abrams vs. The United States during World War I, Holmes' written dissent to the opinion of the Court stated as follows:

> When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe, even more than they believe in the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.[27]

There is a danger in Holmes' philosophy, however. It overlooks the necessity for knowing not only the truth, but the facts pertaining to the truth. This is possible only with a responsible press. As Walter Lippmann points out:

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[27]Reports, Abrams vs. The United States, 63 Lawyers Edition, 1173, vol. 250, p. 1180.

> True opinions can prevail only if the facts to which they refer are known. If they are not known, false ideas are just as effective as true ones, if not a little more effective.[28]

The press cannot assume public knowledge of all facts, but must guarantee knowledge of all facts for the truth to become accepted in a democratic society.

Implied in this search for truth is a responsibility of criticism where it is necessary. The importance of this critical function was also recognized by Thomas Jefferson who wrote, "No government ought to be without censors; and where the press is free no one ever will."[29]

Pointing out abuses, the truth about governmental affairs, the shallow words of governmental leaders, are the signs of a healthy press. A sterile press is the symptom of a politically sick society. Any attempt by the government or the media to suppress unfavorable news, criticism, or dissent infringes on the public right to know. It is through critical reporting that the press leads in the formulation of public opinion.

Dean Fred Siebert of Michigan State University in a Don R. Mellet Memorial address defined the ingredient of press leadership in a democratic society:

> ...the obligation to expose, to pass judgment, to call for remedies for abuses in the community. This is a newspaper

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[28] Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt Brace & Howe, 1920), p. 71.

[29] Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering in Washington (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 1, quoted from The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. by Paul L. Ford, vol. 7, p. 146.

> function a newspaper cannot avoid if it is to serve a free society.[30]

In referring to broadcasting's responsibility in a free society, Charles Siepmann, noted critic of the medium, almost reiterates Siebert's words:

> Freedom to hear is nowhere more important than with references to public issues and events on which the electorate is required to pass informed, intelligent and sober judgment. Essential to such judgment is a responsible, a continuous, and a diverse flow of informed opinion and interpretation.[31]

Emerging from Siebert and Siepmann's words is another vital press responsibility, that of interpretation of issues. In Liberty and the News, Walter Lippmann stresses the need to go beyond the mere reporting of facts.

> The raw news cannot keep the body politic healthy; it cannot satisfy the public's need to understand what is going on. And so the journalist interprets.[32]

Interpretation or commentary has always been a press trademark. The editorial page of the newspaper, supposedly distinctive from the objective news columns can reflect any point of view and offer any commentary on issues deemed vital.

In broadcasting, commentary and discussion of public issues have also been recognized as essential functions of

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[30]Ralph D. Casey ed., The Press in Perspective (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. x.

[31]Charles Siepmann, Radio Television and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 249.

[32]Lippmann, p. 71.

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responsible media. The preamble to the National Association of Broadcasters' guide to editorializing, states the following:

> An informed public requires free expression of opinion and thorough discussion of public issues. The broadcast editorial serves this purpose, stimulates this free expression and discussion and advances the people's right to know.
> The broadcast editorial, because of its unique capacity to lead and influence, imposes upon the broadcaster great responsibilities. The exercise of this constitutional right of freedom--broadcast editorializing--protects the public interest by contributing to an informed public.[33]

The importance of giving meaning to the day's issues in broadcasting was also vividly expressed by veteran C.B.S. news commentator, Eric Sevareid:

> We are showing our people who, what, where, and how; we are not sufficiently showing them <u>why</u>. The journalism we throw on our daily screen is still two-D journalism, the flat fact accompanied by the flat opinion. That never was good enough, and it is perilously inadequate now. We have not really moved into the area of 3-D journalism, although some are trying; we are not providing the depth, not illuminating the background, making it a living part of the picture with the third dimension, which is meaning.[34]

The government has certainly recognized this important function in broadcasting. A license applicant must designate in his application the time he will devote to such types of programs as news and discussion of public affairs. This would include such material as editorializing, commentary,

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[33]<u>Editorializing on the Air</u>, publication by The National Association of Broadcasters, 1963, p. 5.

[34]Eric Sevareid, "The Big Truth," in <u>The Press in Perspective</u>, ed. by Ralph D. Casey, p. 79.

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and forum or panel shows. The second Mayflower Decision in 1944 not only recognized the right of a station to editorialize, but encouraged editorializing, provided, of course, that time to respond be offered to the opposing point of view. The "Blue Book", Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, also recognizes the importance of news and discussion of public affairs as essential to a balanced program schedule serving the public interest.

For various reasons, however, the broadcast media are less prone to offer editorializing or commentary than the press. The line among commentary, straight news, and editorializing is a nebulous one. The free-time provisions of the Fairness Doctrine and Section 315, the problems of sponsorship, and the definitive element itself involved in commentary, all serve to diminish this informative function. Nevertheless, it is recognized by the broadcasters and the government as being crucial to an informed public and a responsible medium.

These various criteria of an informative press were perhaps best summarized and stated in a report by The Commission on Freedom of the Press in 1947. The Commission listed five qualifications which our democratic society requires of its press. Three of these five criteria have special relevance to this study in the light of political communication.

1: Provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning.
2: Serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism.
3: Project a representative picture of the constituent groups in society.

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4: Be responsible for the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of a society.
5: Provide full access to the day's intelligence.[35]

The first criterion implies accurate and truthful reporting of what was said as well as what has happened. There is also a demand for objective analysis and commentary to give the report meaning. As the Commission stated: "It is no longer enough to report the fact truthfully, it is now necessary to report the truth about the fact."[36] Inaccurate or slanted reporting with no clarification does not serve this purpose. The misquoting, misinterpretation, selective omission, or taking of words out of context from any speech, statement, or decision voiced by any public official negates this criterion of an informative press.

The Federal Communications Commission has repeatedly emphasized the need for accurate and truthful presentation of news. The second Mayflower decision on editorializing also forbade broadcasters to compel newsmen to slant their broadcasts to conform to a particular point of view. The most famous case involving news slanting was the "Richards" case, which began in 1948, and ended in 1951. The case involved G. A. Richards, owner of KMPC in Hollywood, WGAR in Cleveland, and WJR in Detroit. News employees of Richards charged in 1948 that he had given them written instructions to slant news

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[35]Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of The Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), pp. 87-91.

[36]Ibid.

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materials in such a way as to create public opposition to the "New Deal", to the Roosevelt family, to Communists, and to Jews. On the basis of these charges, the FCC in May, 1943, placed Richards' three stations on temporary license, pending results of a hearing to determine whether Richards had the character qualifications required of a licensee of a broadcasting station.

Before a final decision had been reached, Richards died. His widow filed a formal statement with the FCC, however, stating that in the future there would be no news slanting on any of the three Richards' stations. On the basis of her statements, licenses were finally renewed in 1951.[37] The case serves as a reminder of FCC concern over this matter.

The concern with potential sponsor control of news through the pressure of hiring and firing led to the introduction in Congress of the Wheeler White Bill in 1943. The bill provided that no news, analysis, or news commentary could be sponsored. Although the bill failed for various practical reasons, it served as a warning to the broadcaster in the area of news control.

The second criterion of a responsible press according to the Commission implies a free marketplace for exchange of all kinds of views including the critical, the minority, and the extreme. Any attempt by broadcasting, especially to present only one point of view without offering access to the opposition, seriously impairs this informational function.

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[37]Elmer E. Smead, Freedom of Speech by Radio and Television (Washington, D. C. Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 80.

This balanced presentation of views is strongly emphasized by the FCC in the equal time provisions of Section 315 of the Act and in the Fairness Doctrine of 1949. The broadcast media cannot have the complete freedom of expression of views which characterizes our privately owned press. The nature of the broadcast spectrum limits the ownership of channels, thereby making it a publicly owned medium. The privilege of ownership must be decided upon by the government, using the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" as its main criterion. The licensee's proposals for a balanced presentation of news, and his performance in living up to these proposals must be taken into consideration at license application or renewal time.

A free press or free speech does not mean that every citizen has a moral or legal right to own a press or broadcast facility, or be an editor, or have right of access to any audience. It <u>does</u> mean that an idea shall have its chance, even if it is not shared by those who own or manage the media. Any use of a broadcast facility to propagandize, attack, or repress a point of view has been strongly acted upon by our government.

The Trinity Methodist Case in 1933 resulted in a license renewal refusal because of personal attacks made consistently on the air by its owner Reverend Robert Shuler. The first Mayflower decision in 1941 brought an FCC ruling that the policy of editorializing by station WAAB, Boston, was not in the public interest since a station could not be an advocate.

The principle of personal attack also applied to the Richards case. In all of these cases, the expression of all points of view in a truthful manner emerges as a recognized principle of responsible media. A public owned medium means that all segments of the public are entitled to a hearing.

The fifth Commission criterion implies complete and comprehensive coverage of the vital news of the day and access by the public to this coverage. Selective reporting or editing, or any limitation on public access to as many different sources of information as possible, are all hindrances to an informed public.

Concentrated ownership of the media brings with it the dangers of restricted points of view. The condition in a one-paper town is comparable to having a privately owned utility, constitutionally exempt from government regulation because of freedom of the press. The freedom of the individual editor and journalist is hampered since he cannot go over to the opposition. It does not exist. The access of the citizen to news is, therefore, completely aleatory, depending on the character of the monopoly publisher in the city in which he lives.

Monopoly control of the broadcast media is less of a probability because of the fact that it can be regulated by the government with no infringement on the right of free speech. In Section 311 of the Federal Communications Act, any applicant for a license who has previously been found guilty of unlawful monopoly cannot be issued a broadcast

license. The multiple ownership rules of the Commission forbid any group from owning more than seven stations of each type. Nobody may own two stations serving the same primary broadcast coverage area. Bernard Schwartz in his book, The Professor and the Commission, considers diversification of control as the most important criterion applied by the FCC in granting licenses. He says, "A monopoly of communications is a monopoly of the approaches to the mind of the public."[38] In the Associated Press Case, involving the right of a wire service to refuse its news to broadcast facilities, the Supreme Court held that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is the objective of the First Amendment."[39] Diversity, and the competition it causes, does not insure good news coverage or a fair champion for every point of view, but it increases the chances.

These then are the standards against which we can evaluate media performance as responsible channels of political information. In evaluating the media against these standards, we can determine the factors restricting them. How does a program like MEET THE PRESS overcome these factors? Is it meeting its potential in electronic journalism in the area of political information? These are some of the questions we can attempt to answer.

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[38]Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 157.

[39]Sidney Head, Broadcasting in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 372.

A statement on the press by Alan Barth, editorial writer of the Washington Post might serve as a prelude to the following chapter. His words apply with equal weight to the broadcast channels.

> I think that American newspapers are in little danger of having freedom of the press taken away from them. But many of them are in serious danger, I think, of losing their freedom through disuse and atrophy.[40]

The nature of some of this disuse and atrophy will now be discussed.

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[40]Nimmo, p. 228.

CHAPTER II

THE MEDIA, POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW

> When editors and publishers do not publish information or opinions which are extremely important for the interests of society as a whole, when editors distort events to serve special interests, and when they fabricate canards to blacken or eliminate unfavorable political candidates, then the press deserves the severest criticism and condemnation.[1]
>
> Harold Ickes

THE PRESS AND THE CAMPAIGNS

The magazine New Republic, commenting on the 1936 Presidential campaign, wrote:

> Sound public opinion obviously cannot be developed without access to the news; and the conduct of certain newspapers in the 1936 campaign gives rise to a considerable doubt as to whether such access is possible in much of the daily press.[2]

In this campaign an Editor and Publisher poll revealed that 57% of the newspapers supported the Republican candidate. Only 36% supported President Roosevelt.[3]

Twenty-five years later, referring to the Presidential campaign of 1952, CBS commentator Eric Sevareid had the following comments:

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[1] "Whose Press is Free?", Time, October 1, 1945, p. 57.

[2] "Forward", New Republic, March 13, 1937, p. 178.

[3] Editor and Publisher, October 31, 1964, pp. 9-13.

> ...the country experienced, one year ago in the election campaign, a sudden rash of news cheating such as we have not known for years....Dozens of excellent newspapers, with a record of honorable news handling, cheated in their allotment of news and picture space between the two candidates.[4]

In the 1952 campaign, again, the Republican candidate was heavily supported by 67% of the newspapers in this country. Only 15% backed Democrat Adlai Stevenson.[5]

Richard Nixon, speaking out at a press conference following his defeat in the 1962 California Gubernatorial race, stated:

> I think it is time that our great newspapers have at least the same objectivity, same fullness of coverage, that television has. And I can only say, "Thank God," for television and radio for keeping the newspapers a little more honest.[6]

These three statements, spanning a period of more than forty years, seem to say something very critical about the performance of our daily press in keeping the public informed during any election year.

The first criterion of responsible journalism defined by The Commission on Freedom of the Press is "a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning." This involves not only accuracy but the identification of fact as fact and opinion

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[4]Eric Sevareid, "The Big Truth", in The Press in Perspective, ed. by Ralph Casey (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 83.

[5]Editor and Publisher, pp. 9-13.

[6]Newton Minnow, Equal Time (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 21.

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as opinion. It implies equal and fair coverage of all candidates in any given election, regardless of the point of view of those who own and manage the media.

Equal space should be devoted to news about candidates, as well as reporting of their views, comments, and speeches. A slanted press abdicates the responsibility of a free press. The danger in a slanted press, however, does not lie in any correlation between press support and electoral victory. Press influence in any campaign is doubtful in light of the record.

Since the election of 1932, the press has supported Republican nominees in seven out of eight national elections. The Democrats emerged victorious in six of the eight. Figures might even indicate that press support is a minimal factor in any campaign. In 1940 Wendell Willkie had the support of 64% of the nation's newspapers compared to only 23% for Roosevelt. Dewey in 1944 received 60%. Only 22% backed Roosevelt. The 1948 election gave Dewey 65% of the newspaper as against only 15% supporting Harry Truman. Nixon in 1960 had the backing of 57% of our daily press compared with only 16% backing Kennedy.[7]

Interestingly, in 1964, one of the few campaigns in which the press supported the Democratic candidate, the same charges and accusations of a slanted press were voiced by the Goldwater camp.

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[7]Editor and Publisher, pp. 9-13.

Vice-Presidential nominee William Miller claimed, "The Democrats have all the newspapers, all the columnists, all the pollsters."[8] Staunch Goldwater supporter, Clare Booth Luce, called the press brutally unfair to Goldwater and charged that newspapers were giving the impression that all his supporters were "racists, kooks and neanderthals."[9] John Knight, owner of the Miami Herald and Detroit Free Press stated that while Barry Goldwater is not his candidate, he must say that Goldwater is getting shabby treatment from most of the news media.[10]

The danger in a slanted press, however, does not lie in the fact that it is evidently not respecting the public's right to know information which will aid it in making an intelligent rational voting decision. This danger seems inherent regardless of which party controls ownership or management of the press, and whatever candidate the press supports. The danger lies in that a monopoly of any kind is detrimental to the public in obtaining full access to all available information. It is also detrimental to the candidate in obtaining full exposure for his views to the public.

Therefore, it is a matter of deep concern when the available news sources across the country diminish in number and in independent control. Figures over the last forty years

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[8]Ben H. Bagdikian, "A Two Party Press", New Republic, October 10, 1964, p. 11.

[9]"Covering the Candidate", Newsweek, July 20, 1964, p. 71.

[10]Ibid.

show a decreasing number of competitive newspapers and a growth of centralization.

In 1909 there were 2600 newspapers in the United States. Today there are about 1700.[11] Some 95% of American newspapers today are monopoly owned.[12] In 1920 there were 552 cities with competitive newspapers. Today there are only 46.[13] Great cities like New York and Los Angeles are now served by only one or two daily papers.

Because of government restriction, the problem of monopoly of broadcast facilities is not as serious as that of the press. It is a fact, however, that more than half of television's 274 markets are served by only one channel, thus limiting public access to a variety of sources of information and points of view.

The concern that monopoly newspapers cannot provide quality journalism was reflected in several recent surveys listing the best American newspapers, according to publishers, editors, professors of journalism and Washington correspondents.

One survey asked for classification of the ten "great" newspapers living up to the ideal of Adolph Ochs, Joseph Pulitzer, and Thomas Gibson. Another survey required listing the best "all around" newspapers. The third survey asked for the "most superior newspapers in news coverage, integrity, and

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[11]William Rivers, The Mass Media (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1964), p. 18.

[12]Ibid., p. 23.

[13]Ibid., p. 21.

service." Finally, the newspapers were judged on the basis of being the "fairest and most reliable."

The results emphatically showed monopoly newspapers almost absent from all four lists of the top ten in each category. The few monopolies that did appear were near the bottom. Newspapers like the New York Times, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and Milwaukee Journal, all independents, consistently topped the list.[14]

Certainly it is the privilege of any newspaper, whether monopoly owned or independent, to be partisan in any political campaign. It is a basic principle of a truly free press, which cannot be refuted. What is at stake, however, is not the obvious partisanship of the editorial column, but the not so obvious partisanship of the news columns and methods of campaign coverage.

Responsible reporting requires not only the truth but emphasis on events in proportion to their significance. A newspaper which gives its biggest headlines to whatever suits its purpose, or slants a story to give a false impression, does not measure up to responsible journalism.

> But still more important than editorials are the news columns which are supposed to report what is going on in the country. Every publisher knows that his greatest power to influence the mind of his reader comes from the possibility of leaving

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[14] Ibid.

things out or subtly distorting what he does publish.[15]

A study of political bias by "omission" or reluctance to publish was made concerning press reaction to the Nixon Fund during the 1952 Presidential campaign. The fund involved $18,000 given to Senator Nixon by some California businessmen. Although this was not illegal, it became newsworthy political fare when Nixon became the Republican Vice-Presidential nominee. Arthur Rowse of the Washington Post studied the reporting of the Fund by the press.

Of thirteen afternoon papers studied, only four put the story on the front page at the first opportunity. Of the four, only one was a pro-Eisenhower paper. Three other papers used the story the first day, but buried it inside the paper. Five evening papers did not use the story until the following day. One paper, the New York Journal American, could not find room for the story until Sunday, four days after it broke. Of the eighteen morning papers studied, all pro- Eisenhower, only eight featured the story on their front pages. Three papers omitted the story entirely.[16]

Another study of the techniques a newspaper can use to slant its political coverage was made following the 1952 campaign by Jean Begeman. The study demonstrated how newspapers were determined to slant news prior even to the Republican

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[15]"The Press and the Campaign", New Republic, July 22, 1936, p. 311.

[16]Arthur E. Rowse, Slanted News (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 124.

convention. Most of the newspapers studied not only editorialized in headlines but gave the Republicans splashy news coverage while playing down the favorable news about Democratic candidates.

> When the General, fresh from Paris headquarters of NATO, told a group of Midwestern isolationists on July 8th, that the French had become "50% agnostic or atheistic," the press successfully protected him by keeping the story out of view. The New York Times did not use the statement till July 11th and then put it on page ten. Eisenhower's later contradictory positions on off-shore oil, social security, budget cuts, and other issues were seldom the subject of editorials. The newspapers gleefully turned out reams of editorials on President Truman's attacks of the General, calling them "gutter" politics, but at the same time, Richard Nixon and Joe McCarthy were able to sound off any subject and remain unchallenged by most papers. General Eisenhower's candidacy was supported editorially by 993 of the nation's daily newspapers with a total circulation of 40.1 million. Governor Stevenson was supported by 201 newspapers with a total circulation of 4.4 million. The poll revealed that General Eisenhower had editorial support in every state, but Governor Stevenson was without the backing of a single newspaper in eight states.[17]

Begeman then asks the one crucial question with regard to this fact:

> How, then, were the people--the millions of readers of pro-Eisenhower newspapers--able to get the facts necessary to vote sensibly on November 4th?[18]

A survey of twenty-six newspapers made by ninety-four American authors brought forth this conclusion:

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[17]Jean Begeman, "The One Party Press Pays Off," New Republic, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 17.

[18]Ibid.

> Partisanship has been allowed to soak through from its legitimate place on the editorial pages and in signed columns. It has been allowed to infect the very writing of the news, and even more, the way it is displayed. Even photographers have been used to mislead. We believe that in the present circumstances few voters can hope to get a true idea of either candidate's personality, stature, or views from our press.[19]

In this survey all but four of the newspapers were found guilty of one or more of the following faults:

1. Slanted news stories.
2. Prejudiced use of photographs.
3. Unfavorable placement of stories concerning Democrats.
4. Inadequate coverage of Democratic news and of the campaign as a whole.
5. Omission of stories favoring Democrats.
6. The use of headline reflecting meaning of stories inaccurately.[20]

Begeman's New Republic survey embraced twenty-one newspapers from September 1st to October 31st of 1952. Nine called themselves Independent; four, Independent-Democrat; three Independent-Republican; four, Republican; and, one had no political category. Particular attention was paid to headline and news play, pictorial presentation, and editorial policy.

A variety of legitimate and contrived methods were used to give readers an unbalanced picture of the campaign across the country. A list of some of the main distorting techniques utilized included the following:

1. Giving Eisenhower top headlines.
2. Burying the favorable Democratic news and playing up the unfavorable.

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[19] Ibid., p. 18.

[20] Ibid.

3. Editorializing in the headlines.
4. Discriminating in favor of the Republicans in comparable news events.
5. Biased use of campaign pictures.

It is necessary here to cite only one or two examples of the findings.

The AP wire consistently led off with Eisenhower news, the Stevenson news usually constituting the last few pages of the story. Newspapers who used the AP daily campaign roundup on the front page automatically would, therefore, give Eisenhower the headline almost every day. On September tenth the headline read DEMOS CALLED FEAR-MONGERS, QUACKS BY IKE. The story ended with a few paragraphs of Stevenson's first major foreign-policy address on Asia in San Francisco. On October 1st, the AP headline ran as follows:

VERBAL BLASTS CONTINUE
ACROSS POLITICAL FRONT

Ike says Truman regime Scandal-a-day Affair:
General attacks Adlai in Carolina Speech[21]

Somewhere in the text were Truman's statement that Eisenhower failed to awaken the country to the Soviet threat; and on page four, Stevenson's statement on Bedell Smith's testimony, as well as a report of the Governor's first fireside chat from Chicago to the people.[22]

The Peoria Journal could find no Stevenson news worthy of a headline from September 1st till September 15th, while giving Eisenhower a three column, three deck head every day.[23]

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[21] Ibid., pp. 18-21.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

The second technique involved the burying of good Democratic news and highlighting the bad. The joining of Republican ranks by Democrats Jimmy Burns of South Carolina and Harry Byrd of Virginia received front page headlines in most newspapers. Republican Wayne Morse's endorsement of Stevenson, however, received scant attention. Five newspapers did not even mention the story at all in their Sunday edition the next day. Eight other newspapers buried the story on inside pages. Six other newspapers did not use the story until Monday.[24]

The first time Stevenson received banner headlines was when the newspapers seized on the "Stevenson Fund," shortly after they were compelled to print the story of the Nixon Fund. The difference in treatment of the two can be seen from the following headlines:

> IKE DEFENDS NIXON
> NIXON GOES TO PEOPLE TONIGHT
> NIXON VINDICATED
> STEVENSON FUND UNDER FIRE
> STORY OF ILLINOIS FUND IS AWAITED[25]

Editorializing in the headlines was another technique utilized. Even under the most favorable conditions, headlines can only simplify issues, in a well-chosen six or eight words. Headlines are allegedly objective, but not so during political campaigns. Used in a slanted manner they can be most harmful in political communication.

> The debate between candidates strikes most newspaper readers as headlines swiftly

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

> scanned. Calculate as they will, candidates and their speech writers are at the mercy of newsmen whose judgment determines what is likely to go into that headline. Furthermore, even the ablest reporter is often hard put to do justice to a speech within the framework of the spot lead.[26]

When Stevenson made his Milwaukee speech on McCarthy on October 9, 1952, the Milwaukee Sentinel headlined:

> ADLAI HERE SLAPS IKE, TAFT, JOE[27]

The Minneapolis Tribune was specific in reporting Republican charges:

> TRUMAN LEADERS BUSY CONCEALING CROOKS,
> CAN'T BUILD PEACE, IKE ASSERTS[28]

But in dealing with a Stevenson speech it dealt in trivial generalities:

> REBEL YELLS FOR IKE HAUNT ADLAI ON TRIP[29]

Here is a typical headline of one newspaper:

> TRUMAN AGAIN BELITTLES IKE[30]

Discriminating in favor of Republicans in comparable news events was another technique found. Both candidates spoke before the American Federation of Labor. The Mobile Register headlined Eisenhower's speech on Page 1:

> IKE REAFFIRMS LABOR LAW STAND
> IN SPEECH BEFORE AFL LEADERS

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[26]"The Press in '56: Conclusion," New Republic, December 3, 1956, p. 13.

[27]Begeman, New Republic, November 17, 1952, pp. 13-21.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

Stevenson's speech was mentioned on an inside page, the end of a story which was concerned mostly with this headline:

NIXON TO BARE PRIVATE FUNDS ON AIR TONIGHT[31]

Although the AFL eventually endorsed Stevenson, the World Telegram's banner headline read:

IKE'S FIGHTING BID STIRS AFL[32]

When AFL did endorse Stevenson, the first time it had endorsed a Presidential candidate since 1924, the Telegram put the story on page two. Most other papers left the story out or buried it.

When Eisenhower entered San Francisco on October 9th, the Oakland Tribune gave him the following banner headline:

RECORD 100,000 THRONG HAILS EISENHOWER
ON EASTBAY VISIT

The page was also filled with huge photographs of the crowds, of the General and of Mamie. Stevenson's visit eight days later received the banner headline:

STEVENSON LIKENS COMMUNIST SWEEP IN ASIA
TO AMERICAN REVOLUTION[33]

The page carried one photograph of Stevenson. Other newspapers ran headlines and pictures of Eisenhower for three days prior to his visit, while Stevenson's schedule was relegated to a small page one box.

The biased use of campaign pictures can be illustrated in this one example. The Los Angeles Times, when Stevenson was

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

speaking, devoted the full half top of page three to a photograph of a wounded GI being carried down a Korean hill. Beneath this the Times placed six small pictures of Stevenson. When Eisenhower visited, the Times gave him a two page spread of photographs, nineteen pictures throughout the paper.[34]

The study demonstrated the failings of a partisan press truthfully and fully to report to the people. It also exposed the dangers involved in the selective process of news reporting and editing as was demonstrated in the AP wire coverage of the campaign.

As was previously mentioned, Goldwater coverage in 1964 was also subject to criticism by the Republican Party. On July 13th of that year the San Francisco News Call Bulletin ran a page one banner headline:

BARRY IS QUOTED: REPUBLICANS CAN'T WIN

The headline was based on his interview with the German news magazine, Der Spiegel. What Goldwater had said was that "as of now, no Republican candidate could defeat President Johnson." He had not said that the Republicans could not win in November of that year.

An AP story in May stated that Goldwater advocated defoliation of Vietnamese jungles with low yield atomic weapons.[35] The story shot around the world of Goldwater's trigger happy nuclear policy. What Goldwater actually had

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[34] Ibid.

[35] "Covering the Candidate," Newsweek, July 20, 1964, pp. 71-72.

said, however, was something less direct than headlines indicated.

On an ABC television interview, Howard K. Smith asked the Senator how he would interdict in the Vietcong supply lines. Goldwater replied, "There have been several suggestions made. I don't think that we would use any of them." He then advised defoliation as one of the possible methods suggested.[36] What the AP story eliminated was Goldwater's important second statement, implying that we would not use any of the suggestions, including that of defoliation. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, it is an example of misinterpretive political reporting.

Much of this kind of reporting possibly reflects a partisan press. Those who work in the press, however, are primarily obligated to serve their public and not their employer in the truthful accounting of political events. The ultimate test of what should be written and how, should be the reporter's obligation to his public, according to James Reston.

> He must know where his primary allegiance lies. He does not owe that primary allegiance to the owner of his newspaper, or to his managing editor, or to his government, or to the sources of his information; he owes it to the people, and if he gives it to any of the others, then he is not, in my judgment, a thoroughly honest reporter, no matter how much information he gathers,

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[36] *Ibid*.

> or how enterprising he is, or how well he may write.[37]

This allegiance to the public is especially vital in the press function of criticism of our government when necessary. Regardless of the reporter's personal feelings, or the partisanship of those who own and manage the media, when administrative policies or decisions can be questioned or criticized, they cannot be ignored. It is one thing for the Administration to attempt to repress criticism; it is another when the medium itself avoids the critical function.

The questioning and discussion of Eisenhower's health was a taboo subject during the 1956 campaign. Whenever Stevenson raised the question, he was denounced vituperatively. Mass control of the media on this subject was absolute. Yet, in 1957, Stewart Alsop stated that because of his health, "Eisenhower is an elderly man...a part time President." Alsop also stated that there should be no surprise about his physical state since the "voters" knew of it when they elected him, or should have known about it.[38] The question then arises as to how the voters could have known about it if the subject was so thoroughly suppressed from questioning, discussion, or criticism.

Speaking about press treatment of Kennedy, Peter Lisagor, Washington bureau chief of the Chicago Daily News stated:

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[37]James Reston, "The Job of the Reporter" in The Newspaper: Its Making and Its Meaning (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 93.

[38]New Republic, May 20, 1957, p. 2.

"The Kennedy administration has gotten the best press in my memory. I think that we have been unduly uncritical."[39] Lyle C. Wilson, Washington bureau manager of United Press International has said, "I think the press was kind to Ike and I think that the press is being very kind to Kennedy. It was inordinately kind during the campaign."[40] Here is another reporter's views on press treatment of the Eisenhower years.

> It is my impression that for eight years Eisenhower was guarded very carefully. I think he had an eight year honeymoon: I think he got better treatment from the press than any other American who was President. I think it is much safer when there is good criticism of a President. I think a President deserves criticism, it helps him. I think Ike would have been a better President if he had had criticism.[41]

It is a fact, however, that management slanting of news has decreased in the last few years. A recent survey of Washington correspondents revealed that pressure to slant stories exists in a much smaller degree than had prevailed some thirty years ago when a similar study was made. Only 10% of Washington correspondents still admit to some subtle pressure as to how stories should be played. Only 7% admit that their stories have been subjected to direct retaliation.[42]

This is interesting in view of the fact that there are more than three times as many Democrats as there are Republicans

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[39]Worth Bingham and Ward S. Just, "The President and the Press," The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 19.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Dan Nimmo, Newsgathering in Washington (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 197.

[42]Rivers, p. 64.

among Washington correspondents. More than 55% of the Washington correspondents consider themselves liberal, and 25.9% consider themselves conservative.[43] Considering that the pressure to slant stories is small, another important question presents itself, with regard to news coverage and criticism: Is complete objectivity possible in the news reporting process? It is a fact that even the most honest reporters and the most responsible media too often fall far short of objectivity and accuracy because of circumstances which will now be discussed.

THE MATTER OF OBJECTIVITY

Part of the problem in receiving truthful accurate information lies in the complexity and conventions of the news reporting and dissemination process itself. Walter Lippmann wrote of the problem in Liberty and the News:

> The subdivision of labor is now accompanied by the subdivision of the news organization. At one end of it is the eye witness, at the other, the reader. Between the two is a vast, expansive transmitting and editing apparatus. This machine works marvelously well at times, particularly in the rapidity with which it can report the score of a game, or a transatlantic flight, or the death of a monarch, or the result of an election. But where the issue is complex, as for example in the matter of the success of a policy, or the social conditions among a foreign people, that is to say when the real answer is neither yes or no, but subtle, and a matter of balanced evidence, the subdivision of labor involved in the report

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[43] Ibid.

> causes no end of derangement, misunderstanding and even misrepresentation.[44]

Of primary importance in this subdivision of news organization is the matter of editorial and news selectivity, both in the wire news services and the newspaper or television news offices. Lester Markel of the New York Times attacks the notion that any form of reporting and dissemination of news can really be defined as "objective".

> The reporter, the most objective reporter, collects fifty facts. Out of the fifty he collects twelve to include in his story (there is such a thing as space limitation). Thus he discards thirty-eight. This is Judgment Number One.
> Then the reporter or editor decides which of the facts shall be the first paragraph of the story, thus emphasizing one fact above the other eleven. This is Judgment Number Two.
> Then the editor decides whether the story shall be placed on page one or page twelve; on page one it will command many times the attention it would on page twelve. This is Judgment Number Three.
> This so-called factual presentation is thus subjected to three judgments, all of them most humanly and most ungodly made.[45]

Markel's statement is only reaffirmed by the many studies of Lewin, Trohldal, Carter, White, and others covering the "gatekeeping" process in news selectivity and editing. A study by Ithiel De Sola Pool and Irwin Shulman confirmed the hypothesis that persons writing about good news tend to produce **supportive** images, while persons writing about bad news

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[44]Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt Brace and Howe, 1920), p. 42.

[45]Rivers, p. 43.

tend to produce more crucial images.[46] The same study produced other interesting findings including the fact that good news was more accurately reported than bad.[47] This and other studies emphasize that the reporting of a story very often depends on the newsman's conception of the audience he is writing for. This conception of the audience originates in the personality of the writer and his immediate social environment.

Simply this means that different reporters see the same things differently and see different things. The reader at home or the television viewer has a right to this diversity of reports. This is extremely crucial in towns where reporting and interpretation of news is dependent on one newspaper or one or two broadcast facilities.

A study by David Manning White concerned the wire editor on the non-metropolitan newspaper. The wire editor is responsible for selection of national and international news which will appear on the front and jump pages. Among the reasons found which determined his selection or rejection of news items were the following:

1. Category of News
2. Personal Prejudices
3. Concept of the Audience

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[46]Ithiel de Sola Pool and Irwin Schulman, "Newsmens' Fantasies, Audiences, and Newswriting" in People, Society and Mass Communications, ed. by Lewis Anthony Dexter and David Manning White (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 155.

[47]Ibid.

4. Specific tests of subject matter or way in which the story is written.[48]

The reporting process itself, with regard to press association coverage of a Presidential press conference was typically described by veteran journalist, A. J. Liebling, in an article in Holiday:

> The hurried press association reporter carries the raw material of history into the Washington news bureau in the form of scrawlings on the scratch paper in his pocket. He writes it. It is processed by rewrite men and copy readers and it goes on the wire in fragmentary takes. Press association coverage is fast, perfunctory, and superficially factual.[49]

All these studies would seem to indicate that the reporting and dissemination of news represent a highly complex process, subject to many variations along the way. These variations can only result in political information which is subjected to misinterpretation, and inaccuracy.

These factors of selectivity and editing apply to the broadcast media in no less measure than they do to the press.

TELEVISION AND THE NEWS

CBS newsman Walter Cronkite has stated:

> Television, like other news media, can be, and has been guilty of distortion by omission or commission, and like them, faces a daily dilemma of making news judgments in

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[48]David Manning White, "The Gatekeeper; A Case Study in the Selection of News" in Dexter and White, pp. 170-171.

[49]J. A. Liebling, "The Press," Holiday, February, 1950, p. 100.

> the continuing effort to be fair and impartial.[50]

These judgments Cronkite speaks about are subject to the same human fallibilities which exist in the press. Moreover, in the nature of television itself lie restrictions on full and accurate reporting that do not exist in the press.

One of television's biggest problems in any newscast is the time limit imposed upon it. This is an inherent handicap to full or comprehensive development of any important story. Again, Cronkite says, "Daily newscasts can only supplement newspapers."[51] There are time limits on the programs and on how much the average viewer wants to hear about a given story.

> In the daily newscast, I rarely use a story of more than 175 words as a straight on-camera report. Even a film report seldom runs over 350 words. At the other end of a scale, a front page story in The New York Times runs to one thousand words or more.[52]

The mere selection of the 175 or 300 words themselves involves a subjective judgment which might unintentionally omit some more important fact. Which words out of a candidate's speech are the ones that will be shown? Can the public really grasp the full implication of any political message after being exposed to a minimum amount of words taken out of context? These are questions that must be realized in the

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[50]Walter Cronkite, "Television and the News" in The Eighth Art, (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 227.

[51]Robert Kintner, "Broadcasting and the News," Harpers, April, 1965, p. 50.

[52]Ibid.

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Television news programs compete for time more acutely than a managing editor competes for news space with a newspaper's advertising department. The newspaper's space can be expanded to accommodate any major news event.

Television news, however, must function within the imposed time limits of the thirty-minute newscast. Editing is, therefore, that much more important to utilize the time most efficiently. The balance between news and advertising cannot be arbitrarily fixed from program to program as a newspaper can do from one edition to the other.

The lead headline in a television newscast is even more important than the lead headline of the daily newspaper. Page one of a newspaper can highlight a variety of news items, some more prominently than others. The reader can select the item most appealing to his news curiosity. If necessary the item can "jump" to an inside page to develop fully the important story and all the facts. In television there is no "jump." Television must deliver one news item at a time consecutively. Prominence of the story can be illustrated only by its place in the newscast. The story of a bus accident, however, may receive only few words less than the story of a revolution.

Even more vital is the fact that a newspaper reader can go back and re-check. The television newscaster cannot offer these facts or details or figures. The viewer cannot return to

look at these things for clarification. The fast moving pace of the television news program dictates simplicity of detail.

The problem of dealing with a complex news story in the simple terms demanded in a hard news program is one of television's built-in barriers to full reporting and clarification of issues. The print media have developed the "all purpose" news story technique.

The most dramatic single lead is followed by the less dramatic but essential facts, so that theoretically the first paragraph tells all.

The editor can cut the story off at any point after that. However, as James Reston of The New York Times points out:

> This practice sharpens and inflates the news. It encourages not a balanced but a startling presentation of the news. Time after time, with a complicated story the result is distortion.[53]

The same is true in television news, which by its nature stresses the action news event. Eric Sevareid gives an example of the kind of news distortion the visual medium gives because of this emphasis on dramatic.

> Buddhists staged some riots in Saigon and DeNang. The TV cameras wheeled up. They focus, of course, on whatever is most dramatically in motion. They act like a flashlight beam in the darkness. Everything else around, however vital to the full story, is lost in the darkness and ceases to exist. The picture could not show you that a block away from the Saigon riots the populace was

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[53]Eric Sevareid, "Politics and the Press," an address before a Joint Session of the Massachusetts State Legislature, Boston, Mass., Jan. 24, 1967.

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> shopping, chatting, sitting in restaurants in total normalcy. The riots involved a tiny proportion of the people in either city; yet the effect of the pictures in this country, including in the Congress, was explosive. People here thought Vietnam was tearing itself apart, that civil war was raging. Nothing of the sort was happening.[54]

Sevareid then states the problem of finding the techniques that will balance the spot news and the spot picture and put them into proportion so that things can be seen as they really are.

One of the methods of achieving this balanced presentation of facts is through analysis or commentary. Unfortunately, however, television commentary does not enjoy the prominence which it did in radio. As stated previously, the line among straight news, commentary and editorializing is deemed a narrow one by broadcasters. The dangers of having to offer free time through misinterpretation of a commentator's or newscaster's remarks have proven a big enough concern to sponsors and to broadcast management to cause almost a complete avoidance of this news function.

Even in straight news reporting some editorializing takes place, however. Quincy Howe, a former President of Radio Television News Analysts, has stated:

> All news presented on radio and television editorializes. The newscaster editorializes in what he emphasizes and what he plays down, in what he omits and what he includes.[55]

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[54] Ibid.

[55] Edith Effron, "Why Speech on Television is Not Really Free," TV Guide, April 11, 1964, p. 7.

NBC newscaster David Brinkley has said:

> News is what I say it is. Its something worth knowing by my standards.[56]

Certainly even the most objective newscast can, by the way it is delivered, have editorial implications. Although the newscaster's words can have the cold objectivity of a computer, his delivery and emphasis do not. The implications of the delivery can be as evident or meaningful as the words themselves.

Aside from the straight newscast, however, which is not intended to be commentary, there is little straight analysis on the air today in television. The brilliant radio commentators who dominated the air in the thirties and forties have long since left the broadcast scene. H. V. Kaltenborn, Gabriel Heater, Raymond Swing, Fulton Lewis Jr., are names of a bygone era.

The famous CBS corps of commentators developed during World War II, including Cecil Brown, Edward P. Morgan, Joseph Harsch, and John Daly, are not known in television for their roles as commentators. Only the late Edward R. Murrow, Howard K. Smith, and Eric Sevareid have built reputations on their critical broadcasts in television.

This lack of commentary must have a detrimental influence on the public's full understanding of important issues. It is a cause of concern for many astute broadcasters and critics.

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[56] Ibid.

Professor Percy Tannenbaum of the University of Wisconsin Mass Communications Research Center complained during the 1960 Presidential campaign that television newsmen were failing to interpret the news. Jay Gould in an article asked "Might not the absence of regular commentary on television which so preoccupies the American attention be one factor in the national complacency?"[57] Perhaps an elucidation and discussion of the full implications of the Vietnam commitment since its inception over the years might have done much to clarify the present confusion evident in the American public.

What commentary does exist has been charged by some with being oriented toward a liberal or moderate point of view. John Gregory Dunne blames the three major networks for the proliferation of extreme right wing religious broadcasts on radio today. He is referring to such programs as Carl McIntire's "Twentieth Century Reformation Hour" and the programs of Billy James Hargis, Ed Cotton, and others who represent the extreme conservative point of view.

Dunne claims that the news departments of all three networks are "in the hands of an established consensus, boarded on one side by Eric Sevareid, on the other by Howard K. Smith."[58] Regarding their positions on important issues, he says:

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[57]Jay Gould, "Opinion on Television," New Republic, January 13, 1958, p. 4.

[58]John Gregory Dunne, "Whose Dissent do You Hear?," New Republic, November 6, 1965, p. 36.

> To ascertain where these gentlemen stand on any given public issue takes no great perspicacity on the part of the listener.[59]

Quincy Howe, writing of the state of news commentary in television, commented on the partisanship of the CBS news staff:

> While no two CBS news analysts agree on every subject, the CBS news staff includes only those commentators whose views follow liberal patterns in domestic affairs and internationalist views in foreign affairs. Not since H. V. Kaltenborn moved to NBC in 1940 has the CBS Network featured a news analyst with a frankly conservative outlook.[60]

NBC News chief Bill McAndrew has stated:

> The prevailing opinion of this network is moderate. We have the political spectrum interpreted by moderates. Rightists call us liberal, labor people say we are in the middle.[61]

Don Hewitt of CBS News likewise admitted, "the networks are in the hands of corporations which see the world in the same way--as moderate liberals."[62] Thus, it would seem to be accepted that the prevailing network voice today is one of moderate if not liberal interpretation.

According to Dunne, as a result of this policy, the right or conservative viewpoint is represented by the fringe element, and not by any intelligent spokesmen.

> If only by implication dissenters are made to appear as obstructionists, curios, or

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Quincy Howe, "Rise and Fall of the Radio Commentators," Saturday Review, October 26, 1957, p. 40.

[61] Effron, TV Guide, p. 7.

[62] Ibid.

> maniacs. As a result a communication gap has opened between the main stream and other tributaries of American thought, and one effect of this gap has been to drive those to the right of consensus into the arms of Reverend Bob Wells. (A right wing religious broadcaster.) sic[63]

Wells, Hargis, McIntire, and other extremists voice doom, hatred, and fear in more than 10,000 broadcasts a week across the country. Their brand of political-religious rhetoric is neither rational political dissent nor the constructive criticism of responsible conservatives. Other conservative programs include the Dan Smoot Report and the Clarence Manion Forum.

Under the guise of patriotism these extremists of the airwaves play havoc with the true meaning of loyal conservative opposition represented by such protagonists as William Buckley, Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and others.

The background of McIntire, Hargis, Smoot, and Manion would hardly qualify them as truly knowledgable and articulate spokesmen for the conservative voice in this country. Dan Smoot, a former FBI man was a reporter for the now defunct Facts Forum program, financed by Texas oil millionaire and arch right-winger H. L. Hunt, a notorious anti-Semite. The Reverend Carl McIntire was expelled from the Presbyterian Church in 1936 for "causing dissension and strife and generating suspicion and ill will." Clarence Manion is a member

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[63]Dunne, New Republic, p. 36. (The discussion here of Welles, McIntire, etc., is a distillation of opinions expressed on this group in articles by Dunne, Hickey, and others.)

of the National Council of the John Birch Society.[64]

The need for a true articulate representation of the conservative element of our country is then well-stated by Dunne.

> An influx of conservative broadcasts could be invigorating, could cut through to shape the thinking of Americans who now live in an embottled half world where they have never heard a literate statement of their own position, a world in which all dialogue has broken down, where the vocabulary of politics is the vocabulary of resentment, which is the specialty of the electronic Bible whackers.[65]

There is indeed a noticeable lack of intelligent conservative representation among major television newscasters. Be that as it may, the network must still be wary of too strongly advocating any particular point of view. Regardless of any position it might take, there is always a segment of the public which it is bound to offend, including the government which has long been concerned with the words uttered by news analysts and commentators. Professor Elmer Smead of Dartmouth College has written:

> Congressmen have often resented criticism from newscasters. Advocacy of ideas has often offended social and economic groups in the country. Protests have come from all sides. Republicans have charged Democrats with using political pressure on broadcasters to get favorable treatment for New Deal and Fair Deal policies. Liberals have complained that radio and television tend to favor conservatives. Labor has maintained that

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[64]Neil Hickey, "They Call Themselves Patriots," TV Guide, April 15, 1967, pp. 14-17.

[65]Dunne, New Republic, p. 37.

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> businessmen indoctrinate listeners with the business point of view.[66]

The problem remains, however, in that without this analysis and explanation, how is the public to be adequately and truthfully informed on vital political issues? It is another serious barrier to the public right to know.

No small part of network reluctance to take direct stands or offer more commentary is the fear of sponsor pressure. A sponsor cannot control news content. There is nothing, however, which prevents him from dropping sponsorship of a program in which he feels the newscaster is a little more than objective in his treatment of the news. The bigger the information media, the less courage and freedom of expression they allow, according to Eric Sevareid. The late Edward R. Murrow, one of the most respected of broadcast commentators, stated his dissatisfaction with the state of broadcasting in these words:

> I would like television to produce some itching pills rather than this endless outpouring of tranquilizers.[67]

The kinds of pressures a news analyst is subjected to can be evidenced in the case of Howard K. Smith. Smith left a lucrative position as Chief Washington Correspondent for CBS in a dispute over his freedom to comment on events. Going to ABC, he began originating a "News and Comment" program. On

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[66]Elmer E. Smead, Freedom of Speech by Radio and Television, (Washington, D. C. Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 74.

[67]William Rivers, The Opinion Makers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 104.

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one of these he presented a political obituary of Richard Nixon that included a two-minute interview with Alger Hiss. Several ABC sponsors of other ABC programs attempted to break their contracts. Two ABC stations refused to broadcast the program, and then blacked-out references to it in the next day's news reports. By the end of the season Smith's own sponsors had deserted him.[68]

The case of commentator John Henry Faulk still recalls unpleasant memories of the McCarthy era in broadcasting. In his book, Fear on Trial, Faulk gives stark evidence of how the members of a small anti-communist organization called Aware Inc. posed as "consultants" to the industry. They were paid to use innuendoes, half-truths, and meaningless "research" to defame and ruin the professional careers of many personalities, including news commentators. The networks in this era had completely abdicated their responsibility to serve the public interest in favor of the commercial interest and the threat of sponsor boycott.

A more striking example of possible sponsorship control of news, implied if not direct, concerns the UPI wire service. Since many broadcast stations utilize the UPI, its case is certainly most relevant. Several years ago a Senator Fullbright Committee Hearing uncovered the fact that UPI assigned news agency reporters from time to time to projects paid for by private industry and public relations firms.[69]

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[68]Ibid.

[69]Richard L. Tobin, "Straws of an Ill Wind," Saturday Review, July 13, 1963, p. 41.

This raises two important questions. When reporting any news concerning one of his "clients," how objective can the wire service reporter be? Secondly, when interviewing an important official, how certain can the official be as to the reason for the interview? Is the reporter asking a question for news value, or for the information of a client? This question might very well tend to influence the flavor of the questions and answers of the interview.

For whatever reason, the fact remains that the networks are not yet fully fulfilling the obligation to the public outlined in the first and second requirements of a free and responsible press, "to provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning," and "to serve as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism." The problems of "fairness" and "sponsorship" combine to defeat this criterion.

If straight editorializing on national and international issues is prohibited on the networks, it is not much more freely permitted on the local stations. The problems of equal time and sponsorship would again seem to be the two major reasons for neglecting this vital area of public interest.

In the latest NAB survey of editorial practices by our nation's broadcasters, 59% of the broadcast station managers stated that the FCC fairness doctrine inhibits the treatment

of controversial subjects.[70]

Among the interesting findings reported by the survey are the following:

1. 57% of radio stations and 56% of TV stations now broadcast editorials.
2. 33% of radio stations and 35% of TV stations have never editorialized.
3. There has been no appreciable increase in the extent of broadcast editorializing since 1963.
4. Gross revenues play a role in a station's decision to editorialize.
5. Only 10% of the stations has ever endorsed a political candidate.
6. Items of purely local interest are most likely to be covered editorially.[71]

These facts would seem to indicate that the function of editorializing is still not widely practiced by the industry. Moreover, when it is, it deals with local issues, but not necessarily political, as evidencedby the majority of stations failing to endorse any political candidate. This is principally due to the failure of broadcasters, or lack of concern to understand fully the Fairness Doctrine and Equal Time provisions of Section 315.

The Survey asked the respondents to answer true or false to the following statement:

> The fairness doctrine requires that a station give equal time for the presentation of views contrary to the stand taken by the station in an editorial.

The statement is false because it contains the equal time phrase. The Fairness Doctrine states only that time must be offered to

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[70]"The Shackles of Fairness," Broadcasting, August 7, 1967, p. 92.

[71]"Editorializing Tied to Station Revenues," Broadcasting, August 7, 1967, p. 58.

the opposing view. It says nothing about equal time being definitely given. However, 69% of radio management and 56% of television management said the statement was true.[72]

Questioned on Section 315 of the Communications Act, one out of three broadcast executives thinks the statute applies to editorials as well as to political candidates speaking out on their own behalf.[73]

This confusion over the statutes pertaining to political broadcasting and Fairness was demonstrated in the 1962 political elections. According to former FCC Chairman, Newton Minow, the Commission received a total of 856 complaints of unfair treatment involving station treatment of sixty-three specific issues, forty concerned with treatment of candidates, and twenty with issues on ballots.[74] Whether through misunderstanding or intention, broadcasters have used both the Fairness Doctrine and Section 315 to shirk part of their informative responsibility.

Considerably lacking even where there is editorializing is comment on foreign affairs. Aside from sponsor pressure, however, or equal time implications, perhaps one of the reasons for lack of commentary is the sheer courage it takes to make a stand.

When King Broadcasting Company stations in Seattle, Portland, and Spokane came out strongly for de-escalation of

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Minow, Equal Time, p. 23.

the war in Vietnam, their editorials made headlines. Among many vociferous reactions the station in Portland received was the accusation that the station manager is a Communist.[75]

In some parts of the country, the Fairness Doctrine while preventing editorializing on the one hand, seems to be advantageously overlooked on the other. Only two years ago the FCC held that ten AM stations had violated the Fairness doctrine when they refused to make time available, except on a paid basis, to the victim of an attack broadcast on a sponsored program. The program involved was one of these featuring the Reverend Billy James Hargis, a notorious right-winger. Hargis made his attack while discussing an article in The Nation on right-wing hate groups. The subject of his attack, Fred Cook, a reporter for the New York World Telegram, and Sun, requested time to reply. Most of the stations said they would not grant Mr. Cook time unless he paid for it or secured sponsorship. Others directed him to ask the Reverend Hargis for permission to appear on the program.[76]

One of the most flagrant violations of the Fairness doctrine, with regard to public issues, involved station WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi. It is an important case because only recently it resulted in a new precedent being set by the Supreme Court, which can have many implications for the future of any radical extremist broadcast.

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[75]"TV Raises its Editorial Voice," Newsweek, May 15, 1967, p. 93.

[76]Story in Broadcasting, October 11, 1965, p. 58.

WLBT has long been an advocate of States' rights and segregation. In 1955 the station deliberately cut off an NBC program featuring Thurgood Marshall, then Solicitor General of the United States and Legal Counsel for the NAACP. The program was replaced by a slide reading, "Sorry Cable Trouble." The reason given by the manager was that the program was "controversial" and the station would have to offer equal time to the other side.

In 1957 the station presented a program after elections which featured a panel of elected Mississippi officials discussing the Little Rock Crisis. The late Medgar Evers, claiming that only the Caucasian segregationist point of view was represented, asked for time to reply. In this case, however, the owners did not consider the matter as one of controversy, but only as a report to the people by their elected representatives. Hence, Evers was refused time.

In 1962 the station ran a series of editorials opposing the entry of James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. A series of commercial announcements paid for by The White Citizens Council showed "published proof" that the Communists were behind racial agitation in Mississippi. The management maintained that the Fairness doctrine did not apply to commercials, and that the editorials dealt with "states rights" and not with racial integration.

The National Church of Christ introduced affidavits that the station introduced the NBC News on the TODAY program with a local voice saying, "What you are about to see is an

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example of biased, managed, Northern news. Be sure to stay tuned at 7:25 to hear your local newscast."[77]

Where is the broadcaster's doubt as to interpretation in these cases? How can the public be truthfully and accurately informed of both points of view with regard to programs like this, when the definition of controversy is so arbitrary?

Finally, in 1965 WLBT was granted a license renewal on a probationary basis and a rather tepid warning by the FCC to straighten out its editorial and public service policies. At the insistence of the Church of Christ, however, and other civic groups, the decision was appealed. This year, in a dramatic decision, the United States Court of Appeals forced the FCC to schedule a full public hearing on the current application for license renewal. This important decision sets the precedent that any responsible group can challenge a station's right to the airwaves if it fails to serve all segments of its community.[78]

This is most important in those markets which do not have access to more than one or two stations. The fact is that our of 274 total TV markets, almost half, 111, are still one-station markets.[79] Fifty-seven are two-station markets.[80] Less than half of all television cities have access to three

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[77]Walter Pincus, "Discriminating TV in Jackson, Mississippi," New Republic, June 5, 1965, pp. 7-8.

[78]"Challenge in the South," Newsweek, May 29, 1967, p. 63.

[79]Dimensions of Television (report by the NAB, 1966), p. 13.

[80]Ibid.

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or more stations. For a small market station to advocate and flagrantly violate the Fairness doctrine is generally agreed to be a serious neglect of the public's right to know. Moreover, it does not fulfill the final requirement of a free and responsible press: that of providing "full access to the day's intelligence."

TELEVISION AND CAMPAIGNS

We have so far discussed the treatment of news in general by the media and its restricting limitations. The focus of this study, however, being political communication, it is necessary to examine the role television plays in bringing and clarifying issues to the public.

The power of television to build a campaign image is a generally conceded assumption. Not so evident, however, is television's ability or attempts to clarify issues and points of view or guarantee maximum exposure to all political points of view. Much of this difficulty lies within the nature of the medium itself, compounded by the rules and regulations of political broadcasting.

Certainly it cannot be denied that television to a large extent has given us a more informed citizenry and a wider choice of candidates. Senators, governors, congressmen, and other officials now have national access to voters' homes by appearing on the many political interview programs and news shows emanating from Washington. Any potential candidate no longer must be the stranger to the American voting public that

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he formerly was. Kefauver, Stevenson, and the late John F. Kennedy are evidence of television's power to familiarize the public with the relatively unknown politician.

Television has probably also served to make political campaigns more honest, according to CBS News director, Sig Mickelson. The candidate cannot deny statements made over the air in full view of a national audience in a "live" speech, debate, or interview program.

Television's potential during any campaign was stated by Robert Bendiner:

> Given a role in keeping with its power, its nature and its demands, TV can serve to distill the essentials of campaign debate from the mass of flummery and empty rhetoric. It can establish a greater rapport between the nation and its potential leaders.[81]

Perhaps television has done too much distilling. If the press can be accused of possible slanting in its political coverage, television might be accused of simplification. More and more, candidates are turning to television; and more and more, politics approach the selling techniques of advertising. TV would seem to be more inclined to sell the brand name or image, rather than the ingredients or substance of the man. Eric Sevareid has stated.

> This is the age of appearances, when the wrapping seems more important than the contents. Wrappings can be seen at a glance, while contents require digging, and that takes

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[81]Robert Bendiner, "How Much Has TV Changed Campaigning?," in Elections USA, ed. by Evron M. Kirkpatrick and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956) p. 71.

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> time. Our political campaigns are the longest in the world, much too long in many respects, but still too short for the full unfolding of a public man's private nature.[82]

It is difficult to state any exact time when jockeying for convention votes begins. Decisions to run can be contemplated many many months before a convention or primary even takes place. In October, 1950, a good year and a half before the convention, Governor Dewey announced he would not be a candidate in 1952. Eisenhower and MacArthur booms began in 1951. The clever maneuvering that put John Kennedy in the White House is known to have started years before the 1960 convention.

Appearances, therefore, by any potential candidate at any time amount to a public testing of his television image. The impression the candidate makes on any voter depends on the timing and of the appearance factors within the voter himself. The homecoming of General Eisenhower to Abilene on a dreary rainy day, added to the General's sluggish appearance, to convey the picture of a tired man. To some undecided voters, the recall of this one bad impression might form the rationale for an irrational negative vote. Nixon's sluggish appearance in his debate with Kennedy did much to contribute to the image he projected.

This element of timing is also important in the inclination to accept and pay attention to a candidate's message.

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[82]Eric Sevareid, ed. Candidates 1960 (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 10.

There is ample evidence to suggest that given a choice of television fare, even a committed voter will prefer viewing something other than conventions and speeches. A Sidlinger survey of 1956 found the following facts:

1. an average of 33 million watched conventions each day compared to 54 million reached by two competing commercial shows.
2. nearly 70% of the viewers complained about not being able to get programmed entertainment.
3. where available baseball and old movies frequently attracted more viewers than the conventions.[83]

On October 22, 1958, President Eisenhower on a speech from Chicago began with an Arbitron rating of 11.8 and ended up with a 7.1.[84] Even the Great Debates of 1960 showed an audience decline after the first debate. Approximately 75 million viewers watched the first debate. Between 51 and 62 million watched the second debate, and between 48 and 60 million viewed the third. The last debate again drew between 48 and 70 million.[85]

Too much political palaver, like too many commercials, placed in their wrong time spot, can have an irritating or negative effect on viewer desire to receive the message, let alone pay attention to its contents. There is evidence of positive irritation at the disruption of a scheduled program for political speeches. Station ABC-TV in New York received

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[83]"Are Political Conventions a TV Flop?," US News and World Report, September 7, 1956, p. 35.

[84]"Boredom and TV Politicking," The Nation, November 8, 1958, p. 330.

[85]Earl Mazo, "The Great Debates," in The Great Debates (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1962), p. 4.

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1,000 protests when the program "77 Sunset Strip" was cut into by a Democratic program.[86] WPIX in New York received irate calls from more than 300 viewers after giving equal time to splinter party candidates in the 1960 race for the United States Senate.[87]

The importance of the timing of a political speech was recognized by Sig Mickelson, CBS News Director, in a speech on "TV and the Voter."

> The paid speech usually interrupts an entertainment program which the viewer tunes in to see. This does not make for a particularly favorable climate. He is seen by many who might be watching a western and are irritated by the intrusion.[88]

He then suggests that the candidates pay more attention to getting on newscasts and news interview type programs such as MEET THE PRESS.

It is in this departure from the standard political speech that television politics approaches the advertising concept. Since voters are conditioned to escapist entertainment, political rhetoric must adapt itself to pleasing and persuading like entertainment type advertising.

Within the time limits of the ten, twenty, or sixty second spot, the political commercials must use slogans, appeals, and images to catch the voter's interest. It is similar to the simplified yet biased wording of a newspaper

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[87]Robert Lewis Shayon, "A Political Climic Program," Saturday Review, November 17, 1962, p. 38.

[88]Robert Lewis Shayon, "Pavlov and Politics," Saturday Review, January 23, 1960, p. 28.

headline. The commercial spot can only simplify the issues and the candidate's stand on these issues. By the act of omission it cannot accurately give the voting public the information it really needs to make a rational decision.

Many political formats used to replace the straight speech have more of a tinge of show business than political rhetoric. Image and personality become dominant over issues. And, most important, many of these formats practice outright deceit in their presentation. There is much evidence to show television's ability to project personalities rather than issues because of these commercial tactics. Malcolm Moos has made the statement:

> Television has become a supermarket for personality projection. The key to successful TV performance lies in the word image, the sculpturing of a candidate's public figure to satisfy the quixotic whims of the public eye and mind.[89]

This image building is accomplished through television's own symbolic language of advertising and entertainment. Shorthand stereotypes create a maximum image in a minimum amount of time. Visual and verbal symbols replace meaningful clarification of views and statements. The Kennedy-Nixon Debates are a prime example of the "good guy" "bad guy" images as reflected in different political personalities.

Speeches, when they are used, must be prepared carefully in advance to be worded for mass audience consumption. Basic

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[89]William Ewald, "Television and Politics-Who Projects the Image of a Winner?", Newsweek, September 5, 1960, p. 19.

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ideas turn into a repetition of the most facts in the shortest time. It has been shown that television is more effective in projecting central issues, those most closely related to the mass public, than peripheral issues.

One of the most successful attempts to free political rhetoric from the binding format of the straight political speech took place in 1960 during the debates between Kennedy and Nixon. No other political event of our time received such thorough coverage and analysis. The vast amount of research and commentary that the debates elicited is beyond the focus of this study. Suffice to say, the debates made a tremendous impact on political campaigning. By exposing both candidates to voters of all parties simultaneously, the debates overcame the effects of selective exposure. They did much to advance the level of public political information, and certainly contributed greatly to the image of the two candidates. However, even the debates, in their treatment of vital issues, were a source of some disappointment to many observers. Theodore White blames this factor on television's nature to demand constant action.

> All TV and radio discussion programs are compelled to snap question and answer back and forth as if the contestants were adversaries in an intellectual tennis match . . . The most thoughtful and responsive answers to any difficult questions come after long pause, and the longer the pause the more illuminating the thought that follows it, but the electronic media cannot bear to suffer a pause more than five seconds; a pause of thirty seconds of dead time or air seems interminable. Thus, snapping two and a half minute answers back and forth, both candidates

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> could only react for the cameras and the people, they could not think. And since the two and a half minutes permit only a snatch of naked thought and a spatter of raw facts, both candidates, whenever caught out on a limb with a thought too heavy . . . a thought seemingly too bold or fresh to be accepted by the conditioned American mind, hastily scurried back toward center as soon as they had enunciated the thought . . . The TV debates did little to advance the reasonable discussion of issues that is the dream of unblooded political scientists.[90]

The format of the debates as a handicap to eliciting clarification on important issues was also expressed as a concern of Douglas Cater, one of the selected panelists.

> The format of the Great Debates was neither fish nor fowl, not permitting the relentless interrogation of the MEET THE PRESS type of quiz show, or the clash of ideas that can occur in genuine debate.[91]

(It is interesting to note Mr. Cater's mention of the MEET THE PRESS.)

This implied concern for a format which elicits opinion and solution to problems more than just repetition of facts is also voiced by Norman Cousins, in an article titled, "Presidents Don't Have to be Quiz Champions."

> Far more impressive in fact, than an instant display by a candidate of his statistical knowledge of a problem would be a clear statement of how he would go about developing the responsible means of findings a responsible answer.[92]

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[90]Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmot, Cal. Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967), p. 52.

[91]Douglas Cater, "Notes From Backstage," in The Great Debates, ed. by Sidney Kraus (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1962), p. 128.

[92]Norman Cousins, "Presidents Don't Have to be Quiz Champions," Saturday Review, November 5, 1960, p. 34.

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Regardless of these limitations, however, the Debates were an attempt honestly to enlighten the public by direct, spontaneous confrontation with the candidates. They were one way of eliminating any misquoting or inaccurate biased reporting of what was said and how it was said. For this alone they were a great step forward in electronic political communication. They were far removed from the deceit and simplification characterizing the political commercial, which is now becoming the more dominant type of political broadcasting.

In the elections of 1962 candidates and their supporters spent three times as much for spot announcements as they did for program time.[93] It is well to ask, what is the effect of the political commercial on truly informing the public.

COMMERCIAL POLITICKING

The use of advertising techniques applied to politics has been a part of television since the early 1950's. Slogans and appeals and the manner in which a program is staged make it more difficult for the voter to differentiate the contrived from the truthful and the image from the issue.

The theory that the same kind of salesmanship that induces people to buy soap can induce them to buy a candidate was used by Representative Harrison Williams as early as 1954. With help from a professional ad man from Benton and Bowles,

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[93]Rubin, Political Television, p. 132.

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he produced three shows and cartoons of a baby-kissing, cigar-distributing ward politician contrasted with the thirty-four year old personable Williams.[94]

Nixon's famous "Checkers" speech, Eisenhower's, "I'll go to Korea" promise, Kennedy's "New Frontier" slogan have all had the symbolic simplicity of advertising appeal.

One of the most flagrant uses of advertising technique was exhibited in 1956 according to Gilbert Seldes:

> Television comes out of the (1956) campaign humiliated, corrupted, and disgraced . . . from the way it was used and not used, from the way it allowed itself to be abused and from its failure to function at the top of its potentialities.[95]

The advertising influence resulted in phony domesticity, folksiness, and informality hardly suitable to the dignity of a Presidential campaign. Candidates were known by first names. We visited "Ike and Mamie,""Adlai and the boys," "Dick and Pat," and "Estes and Nancy."

The commercial spots and contrived programs not only simplified issues, but deceived the public on personality as well.

The "Citizens for Eisenhower" press conference was well-rehearsed with Eisenhower supporters all carefully selected and representing every major voting block in a beautifully contrived commercial. The questioners were

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[94]Gilbert Seldes, "Bullies and Fraidy Cats," Saturday Review, December 8, 1956, p. 31.

[95]Walter Goodman, "Candidates and the Camera," New Republic, May 9, 1955, pp. 13-14.

identified as newspapermen, but there were no hostile newspapers represented. It was actually a caricature of an honorable institution.[96]

Similarly a visit between Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver on Stevenson's farm staged in a "regular fellow" atmosphere, showed both candidates in shirt sleeves talking about farm prices, and accented by "yes, Adlai," and "no, Estes."[97] It seemed contrived and untimely. A Kefauver television program on October 16th, 1956, featured Republican corruption. Here is one critic's comments on the program.

> The main purpose was to come as close as possible to a rogues gallery without using those very words for it . . . showing pictures of Republican officials in photos worthy of police files and with commentary by Kefauver.[98]

Eisenhower's famous TV spots on corruption, high prices, high taxes, and war were generally good even though they represented the essence of simplification of complex issues. The following words were included in the original plan for the spot campaign, produced by Ted Bates and Company, and managed by the Batten, Barton, Dustine, and Osborne Ad Agency.

> The spots themselves would be the height of simplicity. People from each of forty-nine areas would ask the General a question.

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[96]John Cogley, "A Word From the Sponsor," Commonweal, November 23, 1956, p. 208.

[97]Ibid.

[98]Charles H. Thomson and Frances Shattuck, The 1956 Presidential Campaign (New York: The Brookings Institute, 1960), p. 284.

> The General's answer would be his complete comprehension of the problem and his determination to do something about it when elected. Thus, he inspires loyalty without prematurely committing himself to any strait jacketed answer.[99]

Candid interest, involvement, and simplicity of answer were the essence of these spots. For example, one spot showed Eisenhower and a voice asking, "Mr. Eisenhower, what about the high cost of living?" Eisenhower answered, "My wife Mamie worries about the same thing. I tell her its our job to change that on November 4th."[100]

The 1964 Presidential election was witness to several highly controversial commercial spots proposed or actually utilized by the Democratic Party in its treatment of Republican, Barry Goldwater.

One celebrated spot interrupted NBC's MONDAY NIGHT AT THE MOVIES presentation of "David and Bathsheba" on September 7, 1964. The spot was one of the most controversial of the campaign.

> In the course of the one minute film, a little girl with windblown hair was seen picking daisies in a sun swept field. The child starts to pick the petals of one daisy, and as she plucks each petal, she counts, "One, two . . ." behind her, the sound track provides a male voice counting the numbers backwards, from ten to zero. The man counts with "doom-filled cadence." When he intones "zero" there is a screen filling scene of an atomic explosion. Then the voice of the President is heard saying, "These are the stakes. To make a world

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[99]Rubin, Political Television, p. 34.

[100]Ibid.

> in which all of God's children can live, or go into dark. We must either love each other, or we must die." The doom voiced announcer picks up the thread at this point and urges viewers to vote for President Johnson on November 3rd.--"The stakes are too high for **you** to stay home."[101]

Another similar spot had a child eating an ice cream cone while a narrator explains about atomic bombs, fallout, and the nuclear test ban treaty. "But now there's a man who wants to be President," the announcer states. "And he doesn't like treaties. His name is Barry Goldwater and he fought against it. He wanted to go on exploding more bombs."[102]

One proposed commercial would have shown a purported KKK member announcing, "I like Barry Goldwater. I think the way he does."[103]

Another spot prepared for the Democrats took advantage of a statement uttered by Goldwater during his New England trip earlier in the year. Goldwater had injudiciously said, "Sometimes I think this country would be better off if we could just saw off the Eastern seaboard and let it float out to sea." A television spot prepared for the Democrats showed a representation of the Eastern part of the United States being sawed apart at about the Mississippi River. As the

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[101] Ibid., p. 86.

[102] "Are Political Spots on TV Unfair?" US News and World Report, September 28, 1964, p. 10.

[103] "Spotting the Candidate," Newsweek, September 21, 1964, pp. 76-77.

Eastern seaboard was seen floating off, the announcer repeated Goldwater's views.[104]

Still another spot concentrated on a poster of Governor Rockefeller:

> It called to viewer's minds in no uncertain imagery the San Francisco convention. The poster toppled onto a littered floor and the announcer's voice said, "Remember him? Governor Rockefeller. He said Barry Goldwater's positions can spell disaster for the party and the country.[105]

Such appeals to fear and slogans, such quoting of words out of context, such simplified implications of a candidate's views on complex issues, prostitute television's true capability to provide important political information.

One of Goldwater's basic themes was morality. A film entitled, "Choice," was prepared to show how President Johnson was supposedly leading a morally decaying society. The film itself, however, while preaching morality, contained many scenes of immorality and the implication that the President could be blamed directly. NBC debated whether the film could be screened without extensive editing.

> One staged portion had a speeding Lincoln Continental racing across the screen, with beer cans being tossed out of the driver's window from time to time. It was an obvious allusion to news reports of the previous Easter that the President had been drinking beer while driving the car near his LBJ ranch. The President was not mentioned by name. Other scenes showed violence and looting in city streets; gyrations of young

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[104]Rubin, Political Television, p. 136.

[105]Ibid.

> people doing the twist with frenzy; shots of a young girl in a topless bathing suit being peered at by young men: "montages of pornographic magazines and book covers;" the marquees of nudie theatres; shots of Billy Sol Estes, the legally loose Texas financier; and pictures of Robert G. (Bobby) Baker.[106]

Goldwater himself rejected the film, calling it "racist," on the grounds that certain scenes dealing with Negro and White did not meet with his approval.

Thus, the advertising technique in political broadcasting, rather than creating a way of enlightening the public on basic issues, emphasizes the superficial, the implied, and the emotional. All semblance of rationality is lost in politics, "commercial" style. The performance of the television medium in this respect not only demeans the democratic way, but interferes with the responsibility of a free press to adequately inform the public.

The cost of political broadcasting is also another detriment to public exposure to all points of view. Total money spent by both the Democratic and Republican parties in the 1964 election amounted to more than twenty-four million dollars.[107] More than ten million dollars was spent on the primary elections alone.[108]

With Section 315 practically prohibiting the issuance of free time to any minority candidate, the opportunity for

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[106] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

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public access to minority views before and after any election is virtually non-existent. Where will the independent get the money to finance a primary campaign? Where is the political voice that dissents from both major party points of view? These are further handicaps to public information, and must be considered under the peculiar problems of the equal time provisions of Section 315. With campaign costs increasing steadily, and with more and more money being spent on television time, there is a diminishing opportunity to become acquainted with diverse points of view and criticism of the major parties in power.

Perhaps the best summation of how television has affected the political campaign can be stated in these words by John Cogley:

> A campaign is essentially a non-intellectual, if not anti-intellectual enterprise. The virtues of the academy are handicaps in this marketplace. The model here is the locker room pep talk. Partisan audiences are not interested in political enlightenment. The knowledgeable campaigner avoids a complexity as if it were the plague. The people who attend rallies want horsefeathers and hoopla, and this is what they usually get.[109]

Recalling Bendiner's words, we can then ask whether television has indeed "distilled the essentials of a campaign debate from the mass of flummery and empty rhetoric?" The answer is debatable, embraced as political television is in a commercial format.

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[109]John Cogley, "Who's Listening?" Commonweal, October 26, 1956, p. 96.

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PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE NEWS

Full information to the public in itself requires full access to information by the media. Formation of public opinion demands truthful, enlightened criticism of the government. Any policy of suppression of news of important decisions, opinions or facts, seriously impedes the press function.

The complexity and amount of news coming out of Washington are only matched by the complexity of methods used in obtaining this news and of disseminating it.

Joseph Kraft, writing of the politics of the Washington press corps, stated:

> In the typical Washington situation news is not nosed out by keen reporters and then purveyed to the public. It is manufactured inside the government by various interested parties for the purposes of their own, and then put out in ways and at times that suit the source.[110]

There are those who do, however, "nose out" the important news and work diligently and imaginatively to report to the public. Russell Baker describes their methods and the difficulties in obtaining all news that is worthy of coverage.

> One must interview endlessly, attend press conferences and briefings, set up occasional background dinners with important officials and develop an ability to create friction in high places. The leading correspondents are adept at exploiting the rich antagonisms

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[110]Joseph Kraft, "Politics of the Washington Press Corps," Harpers, June, 1965, p. 102.

> between Congress and the administration, between one agency and another, between a politician who has power and one who is hungry for it.[111]

Access to the important sources of news, therefore, would seem in itself to be an important factor in the full communication of news to the public. A secondary problem is the differentiation between news and government publicity, as Kraft states.

The important question arises: just what news is the public entitled to know? Certainly, there is a limit to the amount of information or verbal commitment any political figure can give the public without jeopardizing our security. The problem, therefore, becomes one of news management. This matter of "news management" was a concern even to Patrick Henry, our forefather.

> The liberties of the people never were, or never will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them . . . I am not an advocate for dilvulging indiscriminately all the operations of government, though the practice of our ancestors, in some degree, justifies it. Such transactions as relate to military operations or affairs of great consequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat the interests of the community, I would not wish to be published, till the end which required their secrecy should have been effected. But to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man.[112]

The amount of information that must be kept secret increases as the number of international issues become more

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[111]Rivers, The Opinion Makers, p. 40.

[112]Rivers, The Mass Media, pp. 3-4.

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complex and more delicate. However, the secrecy that enveloped the atomic bomb in World War II has been the pattern for projects far less worthy. Full understanding by the public of vital issues requires the knowledge of certain basic facts which in themselves do not necessarily involve national security, but can lead to national distrust of leadership when they are finally brought to light. This is especially so when vital issues need clarification and explanation.

> The White House above all places must translate into neutral, if not favorable terms events which are too complicated for unprofessional minds, and which, unless explained, appear to clash with traditional notions of morality and good government. The President's relation to public opinion is perhaps his key relation. His chief business is to manipulate symbols.[113]

The purpose, functions, and operations, therefore, of all departments, branches, and government agencies should be given free coverage. The recent disclosure of armament sales by the Pentagon to various countries is certainly a matter of grave concern. A diligent press and a less secretive government might have allowed more adequate coverage of Pentagon business.

Is the press being given adequate information on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency? "The regimes it supports, the results of its policies, and the potential danger it generates are not known even to many of the informed press," according to Justice William O. Douglas.[114]

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[113]Kraft, Harpers, June 15, 1965, p. 102.

[114]William O. Douglas, Freedom of the Mind (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 8.

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Regarding the issue of Vietnam, New York Times reporter Charles Mohr has written that "a steady stream of misinformation about the war in Vietnam is reaching the American public."[115] Some military publicists in the Defense Information School agree with cynical trainees that the military information slogan "maximum disclosure with minimum delay" should now read "minimum disclosure with maximum delay."[116]

Every President has known that control of information is central to power. Government by publicity and managed news, however, expanded greatly under Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. William Rivers, writing of this news management policy has stated:

> Lacking legal controls over the Washington correspondents, executive officials have tried to manage the flow of information with threats and favors, silence and oratory with lies and varying degrees of truth.[117]

Arthur Krock, veteran Washington correspondent of the New York Times, had the following to say concerning the news policy of Kennedy's first few years in office.

> A news management policy not only exists but in the form of direct and deliberate actions has been enforced more cynically and boldly than by any previous Administration in a period when the United States was not in a war, or without visible means of regression from the verge of war.[118]

Perhaps under Lyndon Johnson, the flow of news has been most controlled to emphasize policy and point of view.

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[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid., p. 129.

[118] Arthur Krock, "Mr. Kennedy's Management of the News," Fortune, March, 1963, p. 87.

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Johnson's attitude has elicited this comment from journalist I. F. Stone.

> Johnson sometimes seems to think the Constitution made him not only commander in chief of the nation's armed forces but editor in chief of its newspapers.[119]

The extent to which the President will go to maintain his image and prevent criticism of his policies is evidenced in the following incidents.

A small town item in a West Texas paper mentioned Billie Sol Estes in connection with the President in a three paragraph story on the inside. The editor claimed he got a telephone call from the White House in time to kill the story in late editions.[120] One television correspondent was awakened in the middle of the night by the White House, which had heard that he planned to make some critical remarks the next day.[121] A newspaper correspondent wrote a critical morning story and got three telephone calls from White House aides before breakfast.[122]

Regarding foreign policy, the Administration is equally as concerned about maintaining secrecy and suppressing criticism. The New York Review of Books, "a medium highbrow publication," ran a scathing review of Johnson's Vietnam policy.

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[119]Ben H. Bagdikian, "Press Agent but Still President," Columbia Journalism Review, Summer, 1965, pp. 11-13.

[120]Ibid.

[121]Ibid.

[122]Ibid.

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The editor received a phone call from the White House, suggesting that in the future they have Vietnam books reviewed by Joseph Alsop (who approves of Johnson policy).[123]

Broadcast journalism is no exception to this attempt at news control through pressure. When CBS correspondent Morley Safer filed a story on our soldiers burning the huts of a Vietnamese village, and the film footage showed a GI actually touching a cigarette lighter to a thatched roof, the action was at first angrily denied by the State Department. It was then justified on the grounds that the village concealed a network of Viet Cong tunnels. Both the story and footage reportedly brought pressure from the White House. Fred Friendly, then CBS News president, was asked to air a retraction. He refused. Also involved in the incident was Arthur Sylvester, censor of the Department of Defense. One network man reported, "He was on the phone every fifteen minutes raising hell."[124]

Johnson's attitude on controlled news has been defended by his former press secretary Bill Moyers as presidential prerogative.

> It is very important for a president to maintain up until the moment of decision, his options, and for someone to speculate days or weeks in advance that he's going

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[123] Ibid.

[124] "The Heat on TV," The Nation, January 10, 1966, pp. 1-2.

> to do thus and thus is to deny the president the latitude he needs.[125]

As a result of this policy, when the press has uncovered some action, decision, or statement to be made by the President, and published it beforehand, the President has changed his mind, thereby giving the public the impression of an inaccurate or untruthful press. James Reston, who saw the speech Johnson was to make at the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the UN, reported the President's plan for ending the then present UN financial crisis. The President, reading the story, ordered his speech rewritten and eliminated disclosure of his plan from the speech.[126]

The question arises, how much vital information about options are the people to be denied on such personally involving issues as war financing, foreign armament, foreign commitments, and taxes? As James Reston states:

> If all presidential options are to be protected from speculation "until the very last minute" what redress will there be the next day after the President has opted to dispatch the Marines or to bomb Hanoi, or to publish a request to wage war as he deems necessary all over Southeast Asia?[127]

It is in this context that the mass media have an obligation to uncover information, to report, and to comment. It is through this reporting to the public that the media will

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[125]James Reston, "The Press, the President, and Foreign Policy," The Reader's Digest, September, 1966, p. 73.

[126]Ibid.

[127]Ibid.

keep alive the debate on foreign affairs, excite the public, and even make persuasive points which might have influence on policy. The dangers of a centralized point of view and the need for diverse sources of information on all vital issues was stated by Dan Lacy.

> We need to have information in sensitive areas reach us through a variety of channels in which it has been appraised, tested, commented on from as many points of view as possible. It will be fatal to the ends of government itself if we are reduced to the blind following of government policy because the only view of issues we have is one uncritically shaped for us by the communications systems from the materials provided by government.[128]

It is up to the mass media to give exposure to congressional leaders, government officials, political candidates, and all other important individuals who can clarify, defend, or criticize Administrative opinions, decisions, and policy. In this sense the media fulfill the vital function of serving as a forum of discussion and criticism. In this context the "live" spontaneous confrontation type of format pioneered by MEET THE PRESS becomes most important. It is necessary, however, to examine at this point the advantages and disadvantages of the "live" press conference itself as pioneered by the late John F. Kennedy.

THE "LIVE" PRESS CONFERENCE

One of the oldest established methods of eliciting information direct from the Chief Executive has been the press

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[128]Dan Lacy, Freedom and Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 18.

conference. Since its inception it has also been used to gain information from any important official, political figure, or dignitary. It wasn't until President Kennedy established the "live" conference, however, that the format assumed its most accurate informative potential for the public.

The press conference is one method of eliminating such restrictive factors as the exclusive interview, and the imparting of news to those correspondents or publications closest to the Administration. A common complaint about the Kennedy administration was his partiality in dispensing news to those who most favored his policies. A year after taking office, Kennedy's actions prompted James Reston to comment:

> Far from doing away with the exclusive interview, Mr. Kennedy has made private sessions with reporters almost an extension of policy making procedure.[129]

Franklin Roosevelt granted one exclusive interview to Arthur Krock of the New York Times, and Harry Truman did likewise. Kennedy, however, made such a fetish of the exclusive interview that his press secretary Pierre Salinger once commented he often had to go to the President's office to see White House correspondents.[130]

Another complaint was that those closest to Kennedy did not even represent the largest papers. Charles Bartlett was

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[129]Worth Bingham and Ward S. Just, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 18.

[130]Rivers, The Opinion Makers, p. 157.

Washington correspondent for the Chattanooga Times. Joseph Alsop, according to Worth Bingham and Ward S. Just, "so often a lone wolf, reported inside information with a new zest."[131] Writing in 1962, Bingham and Just noted:

> The President himself is supplying more and more of the inside details, personally explaining and clarifying his policies, both in exclusive interviews and backgrounders. The background interview is typified by the year end stories eminating from Palm Beach under the clumsy disclaimers of "close friends of the President said today" . . . More frequent however and much more significant are his private talks with newsmen.[132]

The press conference when televised does away with the possibility of saying one thing in private and another in public. Reporters, if given the opportunity to ask the right pointed questions, can elicit the kind of information in full view of the public which heretofore was reserved for private scoops or preferential treatment.

Another obvious advantage to "live" coverage is its unbiased accurate reporting of every word spoken precisely at the moment it is spoken. There is no opportunity for inaccurate reporting or selective omission of anything said for home newspaper consumption. The newspaper report of the conference might attempt to elucidate, interpret or paraphrase, but it cannot selectively edit. The viewer who has seen the conference can spot the invalidity of the newspaper report. Any false implications by the reporter can be disproved.

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[131]Bingham and Just, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 19.

[132]Ibid., p. 20.

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Neither can the President retract any statement, thought, opinion, fact or accusation which he utters in full view of the public. All of these advantages naturally hold true for any "live" conference or interview, regardless of the official involved.

It took several years for "live" coverage of the press conference to evolve. Under Roosevelt, a standard rule was initiated and perpetuated for twenty years, that newsmen could paraphrase the President but never quote him directly. Four categories of press conference news were established and also followed by Truman.

1. Off the record announcements, to be neither published nor passed on to outsiders.
2. Background information for guidance and use but not attributable to the President.
3. Information attributed to the President but not to be quoted.
4. Statements which could be quoted with Presidential permission.[133]

The result of these categories in many cases was misinterpretation and inaccurate reporting of Presidential statements to the reading public. Perhaps this is inevitable under a system of intermediate reporting between the source and receiver of political communication, as Ernest Lindley describes.

> The individual reporter in summarizing what was said or in choosing an answer or fact with which to begin his account, often gives an emphasis somewhat different from that

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[133]"Truman's First Press Conference," Newsweek, April 30, 1945, p. 41.

> intended by the President. In rapid reporting in the bulletin style, some distortion often is unavoidable, especially if the subject matter is complex.[134]

An outstanding example of the dangers of inaccurate reporting took place in a 1950 Truman press conference. News stories all over the world had Truman considering use of the Atomic Bomb in Korea. The stories brought Prime Minister Atlee of Great Britain flying to America for consultation. John Hersey in an article entitled "The Wayward Press" gives an account of this conference which caused a world furor through its inaccurate reporting.

There was nothing in Truman's prepared opening statement about the bomb. In one of the questions, the President stated that the United States would take whatever steps were necessary to meet the military situation, including every weapon the United States has. Paul Leach of the Chicago Daily News asked Truman, "does every weapon mean active consideration of the use of the A-bomb?" Truman replied that there has always been active consideration of its use, but added at once that he didn't want to see it used. He stated that it was a terrible weapon and shouldn't be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing to do with military aggression.[135]

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[134]Ernest K. Lindley, "Eisenhower and the Press," Newsweek, February 2, 1953, p. 19.

[135]John Hersey, "The Wayward Press," The New Yorker, December 16, 1950, p. 73.

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136-Ibid.

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At 10:47 that morning the AP wire bulletin read:

> President Truman said today that the U.S. has under consideration use of the Atomic bomb in connection with the war in Korea.[136]

A later revised AP bulletin lead off with the following:

> President Truman said today use of the Atomic bomb in Korea has always been under consideration, and whether it is used is up to American military leaders in the field.[137]

Under Eisenhower, in 1953, permission was given to quote the President directly and to broadcast conferences from officially released tape recordings. The Eisenhower years, however, were not free from instances of selective reporting and misinterpretation.

In March, 1953, a question was raised at an Eisenhower conference pertaining to Senator Velde's suggestion of investigating Communism in the Church. A twenty-paper survey of coverage of this conference revealed the following.

> Eight papers made no mention at all of the question or reply.
> Two papers ignored the conference completely.
> Four papers carried wire service summaries.
> Five papers carried only part of Eisenhower's answer.
> Only three papers quoted Eisenhower at length.[133]

On March 26th of that year, the question of Charles Bohlen's confirmation as Ambassador to the Soviet Union was brought up. The President made a strong personal defense of

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[136] Ibid., p. 87.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Douglas Cater, "The President and the Press," The Reporter, April 23, 1953, p. 26.

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Bohlen and stated he wasn't even going to discuss Senator McCarthy's objections. A survey of press coverage of this conference revealed:

> Fourteen papers failed to include Eisenhower's testimony on Bohlen. Twelve papers completely omitted his statement on McCarthy, and his charges, or, had printed distorted versions.[139]

The effects of inaccurate reporting, and reliance on wire service copy, are reduced when the communicator's words are received by the public as well as those privileged to attend the conference.

Access by the public to the conference is vital in a society which is experiencing a decline in daily papers, and hence, a decline in news sources. During the first few weeks of Kennedy's "live" conferences only eight daily papers carried a full text.[140] Since all three television networks, however, carried the conference in full, even a one-station market had access to the President's words. Of the first three press conferences which were televised, 90% of the people who were polled had seen one or more, and 85% had turned on the conference intentionally.[141] It is because of this new pervasive quality of the conference that is more imperative that Executive statements need the comment, clarification and criticism which the media can give.

In essence, therefore, the "live" press conference would

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[139] Ibid.

[140] Pierre Salinger and James Haggerty, "The Press and Presidential Leadership," in Casey, The Press in Perspective, p. 183.

[141] Ibid.

seem to present the most accurate method of political communication between source and receiver, leader and public, candidate and voter. It is necessary to be cautious, however, in evaluating this type of format. Its weaknesses lie in the general nature of conferences today and in the difficulties assumed by television coverage.

The vast number of correspondents covering today's conferences in itself breeds a certain degree of confusion and doubt as to the value of the conference as a news getting device. Today's average press conference draws about 400 correspondents. The conference has lost its intimacy so characteristic during the Roosevelt administration, when a handful of reporters could gather around the Presidential desk. The result of increased coverage, even under Truman, already meant a decline in the amount of information which can be communicated. Ernest Lindley, writing of the Truman conferences commented:

> An unorganized rapid fire barrage of questions from 50-200 correspondents is not an efficient way to elicit information. Often, many of the inquiries are about matters of local, rather than general interest. Orderly exploration of an important subject is seldom possible.[142]

Under Eisenhower and Kennedy the conference was more organized by recognizing reporters from the floor before being questioned. The amount of information elicited, however, was

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[142]Ernest K. Lindley, "The Truman Press Conference," Newsweek, October 23, 1946, p. 30.

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still a matter of concern. Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News giving his impression of a "live" Kennedy conference stated, "when I got up to ask a question I felt like I was addressing the United Nations."[143] This description of a Kennedy conference seems to agree with Lisagor's observations on the remote character of the central figure with regard to the audience.

> As spotlights go on and cameras whir, the newsmen, separated from the President by a broad expanse of beige carpet and sitting as if in a classroom, are massed in such numbers that only a small and sometimes preselected handful ever get the floor, serving as little more than props. Some of them, Salinger has already tipped to raise questions that the President wants to answer.[144]

The matter of planted questions as being detrimental to the full effectiveness of the conference was a concern of Clark Mollenhoff, Washington correspondent for the Des Moines Register.

> Unless I have a specific question to ask I seldom go anymore. Too many of the questions are lobs, setups, and blooper balls, and there is too little effort to obtain any more than the most generalized information.[145]

Lyle C. Wilson of UPI agreed with Mollenhoff.

> The press conference defeats itself. I don't want to say it's not worth while.

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[143]"Historic Conference," Newsweek, February 6, 1961, p. 56.

[144]"The Show-Biz Conference," Time, November 17, 1961, p. 39.

[145]Bingham and Just, The Reporter, April 12, 1962, p. 20.

> But the President is in absolute control. He can select the people who ask the questions.[146]

Former Presidential press secretary Bill Moyers has stated that the news conference is "to serve the convenience of the President, not the convenience of the press."[147] Moyers admitted planting questions with reporters at a Johnson news conference; the reason being, "I wanted to be certain the questions the President did have on his mind did get asked."[148]

Certainly, the idea of planted questions did not originate with either Kennedy or Johnson. They have been used since the first conference in the Wilson administration. Since the conference is to an extent a forum in which the President has an opportunity to expound on his policies, or make known decisions on certain matters to be tested by the public, some method of assuring discussion must be found. Aside from an opening statement, some directed questions must be assured. There is the danger, however, that those correspondents who represent publications most critical of the Administration will not get the opportunity to question. Under these circumstances the President can use the Conference as an instrument of persuasion and power more than the press can use it as an informative tool.

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[146] Ibid.

[147] "Back of the Uproar About LBJ Managing the News," US News and World Report, January 31, 1966, pp. 42-43.

[148] "Plants and Digs," Newsweek, January 24, 1966, p. 56.

A press conference, moreover, to be informative must be more than a planted question session. It must encourage discussion and clarification which go beyond the mere reply. It has been the contention of many that this function of the conference has deteriorated under its "live" coverage by television.

Political "pundit," Walter Lippmann, considered the Kennedy conferences failures in this respect:

> The President makes announcements and the correspondents ask him questions in order to get stories, perhaps even scoops. That is, I believe, a basically false conception of why it is worthwhile to have the President submit himself to questions from the press. The real use of the Presidential press conference is to enable the President to explain his policies and if necessary to compel him to explain them. In this respect the Kennedy conference format has been a failure.[149]

An article in the Reporter almost reiterates Lippmann's view:

> Both the President and his interrogators are performing. We must appear to be quick, bright, and informed. He can initiate discussion only by the formal opening statement or by the planted question. For their part, the reporters who win out in the near hysterical competition to be recognized can rarely get an answer amplified, or press on if the President is evasive. In other words, the Presidential press conference has become less a discussion than a two way show. It gave the President a chance to seem to have answered questions he had not, and it gave reporters a chance to leave all manner of doubt in the public mind.[150]

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[149] "JFK and the Conference," Time, March 24, 1961, p. 44.

[150] "Back to the Oval Room," The Reporter, January 2, 1964, p. 12.

An important means of eliminating this doubt referred to is by the follow-up question, pursuing the subject until a more direct and clarified answer is given, and opening up relevant avenues of thought. The follow up was also seen to be lacking in the Kennedy conferences according to John Cogley of the New Republic:

> No reporter has a chance to follow through on any of the numerous subjects brought up. Time after time Mr. Kennedy suggests a line of thought that cries out for further development, but there the subject is dropped and a new one introduced by the next reporter who usually seems not to have heard anything that has already been said.[151]

Without the important follow-up question, answers often lack depth and significance, and only raise more questions later among the reading and viewing public.

The regularity and timing of the press conference also affect its utility in informing the public. Certainly in times of crisis it is more essential to fill gaps in public knowledge.

It has been maintained that when Congress was in session and Kennedy had a need to convey views or force pending issues, he would hold frequent conferences. When he had to deliberate carefully matters of diplomacy, it has been said that Kennedy was too busy to meet the press. During 1961, when the Vienna meeting with Kruschev and the Berlin crisis were making important headlines, there was no scheduled

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[151]John Cogley, "The Presidential Image," New Republic, April 10, 1961, pp. 29-30.

Presidential conference for seven weeks. During the 1962 Cuba crisis there was no scheduled press conference for a month.[152]

Irregularity in formal meetings with the press has also characterized President Lyndon Johnson's free-wheel style of seeing reporters. An example of what Johnson considers "conferring" with the press is evidenced by this breakdown of press meetings that the President gave in 1965:

9 rambles with reporters around the White House grounds
173 conferences aboard Air Force One
2 pooled interviews when hospitalized in January
374 meetings with reporters who requested appointments
64 talks with Washington news bureau chiefs
9 informal encounters at barbeques, speeches and public functions
8 other chance occasions
200 telephone calls
34 on the record press conferences
18 off the record press conferences.[153]

Interesting, however, is the fact that of the 34 on-the-record press conferences, only 18 were given with adequate advance notice.[154] It would seem, therefore, that the formal press conference is not the chief source of eliciting executive opinion or discussion under Johnson--especially since notably missing in the short notice conferences are the

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[152]Tom Wicker, "Questions and Answers About the Press Conference," New York Times Magazine, September 8, 1962, p. 25.

[153]Time, March 26, 1965, p. 33.

[154]Ibid.

experts who can follow up, dig, and elicit direct and clear answers to vital questions.

Even the press conference, therefore, seems to have its own inhibiting factors which prevent it in large part from fully informing the public on vital political issues. In view of this factor, and the inhibiting factors of the media in general discussed up to this point, the advantages of the live interview format pioneered by MEET THE PRESS can be studied and analyzed.

The "live," spontaneous format of MEET THE PRESS and programs like it, eliminates the inaccurate reporting or misinterpretation of words between source and receiver. Since the program is spontaneous and unrehearsed, there is no possibility of control of content, facts, or statements from any source. Since the give-and-take of the program supposedly represents a non-partisan point of view, the important voices of criticism and dissent can be heard, as well as the voices of those who must inform and elucidate. The selection of an impartial panel of knowledgable reporters and correspondents utilizes the full incisive potential of the press conference. Moreover, since the guest cannot select his panel, there is no possibility of the planted question which could present the guest in a favorable or non-critical light.

For these reasons, perhaps the program performs its most vital function during political campaign years by exposing candidates to the public in direct confrontation. There is no

time or opportunity for prepared rhetoric on predetermined issues of discussion. There is no commercially gimmicked format to cloud the issues. There is no deliberate attempt to make the candidate look good or bad. The test of the man here is clear, logical, and frank answers to important questions. The nature of this political testing, and an evaluation of its efficiency concern the rest of this study.

CHAPTER III

DIMENSIONS OF MEET THE PRESS

A program's significance and contributions to the broadcast medium can be measured along several dimensions, not the least of which is chronological continuity. MEET THE PRESS claims the distinction of being network television's oldest presentation. Since its radio debut in 1945 and its television debut in 1947 it has continued to be regarded by many as the outstanding public affairs program of its kind. For twenty years MEET THE PRESS has served the vital democratic function of free discussion of important social and political issues by those in position to voice meaningful information and opinion with regard to these issues. More important, the program offers representation to all points of view.

Since MEET THE PRESS is a straight informational program, lacking the embellishments of a mass entertainment format, its continuing public reception is one of its most impressive dimensions. It is stated by the network that the program generally draws between five to ten million viewers. Considering its usual time slot of early Sunday afternoon, this is a respectable rating figure. Some mass entertainment programs do not draw many more than ten million

viewers, even in more choice time. It is also a fact that local stations do not always carry network public affairs programs. MEET THE PRESS, however, is regularly carried by 174 out of about 200 NBC affiliated stations across the country.

One measure of a program's effect is the mail that it draws. Although the television audience as a whole is not noted for its letter writing, MEET THE PRESS in some weeks has received up to 20,000 requests for transcripts. Author William Manchester's appearance on the program in 1967, Juana Castro's appearance in 1964, Admiral Hyman Rickover's appearance in 1960, and the program featuring Soviet Premier Anastos Mikoyan in 1959, all drew from 15,000 to 20,000 requests for program scripts from all over the country.[1]

Another dimension of program success is imitation, and the MEET THE PRESS format has attracted its share of emulators over the years. MAN OF THE WEEK, CAPITOL CLOAKROOM, COLLEGE PRESS CONFERENCE, YOUTH WANTS TO KNOW, and the current network offerings ISSUES AND ANSWERS on ABC and FACE THE NATION on CBS are but a few of the similar programs which have evolved from the MEET THE PRESS format. Local versions of the program have been produced throughout the country. Cuba, Australia, Germany, and England have also imitated the program. On the national scene, however, the original "press

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[1]Letter from Betty Cole, Secretary to Lawrence Spivak, June 22, 1967.

conference of the air," is still regarded by many as the best of its kind.

The tributes the program has received over the years could in themselves fill the pages of a volume. The following excerpts from letters to Lawrence Spivak, however, illustrate the point that of all political interview programs on the air, MEET THE PRESS, is still considered by many the outstanding program in its class.

> I sincerely believe MEET THE PRESS to be the most effective public affairs program on the air today.
> _____Tom C. Clark[2]

> MEET THE PRESS is the liveliest, most provocative discussion on TV today.
> _____General Lawton J. Collins[3]

> I know of no radio or television program throughout the years which has made such a great contribution to the enlightenment of the American public.
> _____James A. Farley[4]

> In my judgment, MEET THE PRESS is the best public affairs program on the air--best to watch and best to appear on.
> _____Dr. John W. Gardner[5]

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[2]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Tom C. Clark, cited in Meet the Press, (Booklet prepared by NBC, 1964), p. 16.

[3]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from General Lawton Collins, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16.

[4]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from James Farley, Ibid., p. 18.

[5]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Dr. John Gardner, Ibid., p. 19.

MEET THE PRESS is an outstanding example of TV at its best.
. . . While I realize it is the oldest program of its type, I consider it also to be by far the best.
_____General James M. Gavin[6]

. . . What is most impressive to me is that, although many have tried to imitate your program, you have come through against all competition with flying colors.
_____Christian A. Herter[7]

I have always thought yours was the best program on television, and it is very heartening to know that so many other listeners agree with me.
_____George M. Humphrey[8]

From my long knowledge of the program, both as a viewer and a participant, I think MEET THE PRESS is the best program on radio or television in the United States today.
_____Claude Pepper[9]

As one who has appeared on MEET THE PRESS, I feel that no program in any of the media of public opinion has more of an impact on the thinking of American citizens than does MEET THE PRESS.
_____Adam Clayton Powell[10]

No program on the air has more impact.
_____Abraham Ribicoff[11]

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[6]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from General James Gavin, Ibid., p. 19.

[7]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Christian Herter, Ibid., p. 20.

[8]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from George Humphrey, Ibid., p. 21.

[9]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Claude Pepper, Ibid., p. 25.

[10]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Adam Clayton Powell, Ibid., p. 26.

[11]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Abraham Ribicoff, Ibid., p. 26.

> I suppose the greatest tribute to MEET THE PRESS is the fact that in recent years you have had so many imitators with only slight modifications of your format; and yet, you have always remained at the top of the list.
> _____Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr.[12]

> The impact of MEET THE PRESS on American opinion is probably greater than that of any other public affairs panel show.
> _____Senator Hugh D. Scott[13]

> In my estimation, MEET THE PRESS is, and will continue to be, the nation's foremost public affairs program.
> _____Senator Herman E. Talmadge[14]

> I cannot think of any show which through the years has done more to bring out facts and logic, or the lack of them.
> _____Norman Thomas[15]

> To me, MEET THE PRESS is easily the most stimulating and provocative television presentation.
> _____Roy Wilkins[16]

The statements represent national and international figures, liberals and conservatives, testimony to the program's wide scope of viewers and participants. These verbal plaudits are equally matched by the major broadcasting awards the program has received over the years, including the Peabody

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[12]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., Ibid., p. 27.

[13]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Senator Hugh Scott, Ibid., p. 28.

[14]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Herman E. Talmadge, Ibid., p. 28.

[15]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Norman Thomas, Ibid.

[16]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Roy Wilkins, Ibid., p. 30.

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Award, the Sylvania Award, the Freedom Foundations medal, and many others.[17] Only recently, the program won the American Bar Association's Golden Gavel Award for a one hour special on crime, presented in February, 1967. Every award the program has received has been for outstandingly fulfilling its function as an informational program. The words inscribed on one of the first awards the program received, an Ohio State Citation in 1948, perhaps best typify the reasons for its recognition.

> For its presentation of viewpoints of an interviewer who is in a position to give pertinent information on a given subject. It evokes unprepared and revealing statements from men in public life without the sugar coating of a public relations blue pencil and its appeal is mass rather than specialized.[18]

That same year, Jack Gould of the New York Times, citing MEET THE PRESS in the Radio Honor Roll, stated:

> MEET THE PRESS was again outstanding in its class. In employing trained newsmen to question public figures on issues of the day, it brings out a maximum of straight forward information and a minimum of confusion and emotion, something which cannot be said for many of the other discussion shows.[19]

Here in these two citations lies the essence of the MEET THE PRESS popularity: a simple press conference type format which by its spontaneity guarantees built in information and verbal drama. Evidently the program has never

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[17]The program received more than sixty major awards.

[18]American Mercury, July, 1949, p. 4.

[19]American Mercury, January, 1949, p. 3.

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wavered from its purpose or its incisive format in twenty years, judging by the tribute and recognition it has received by the public and by the broadcast profession.

To understand why the program has received such acclaim, it is necessary to examine the substance of the program, its purpose, and how it adheres to this purpose. The historic dimension of MEET THE PRESS must be measured in terms of the kind of news and opinion it has elicited. and how it goes about eliciting this news and opinion. Why has the program been able to capture headlines during its early years in as many as 40 out of 52 weeks? Just what is the appeal of this program which has been termed "the 51st state," by a former United States President, and "the conscience of America" by a former congressman?[20] These are some of the questions which will be examined in the following selective biography of the program and analysis of its format and structure.

A large part of the image of MEET THE PRESS and its success lies in the role played by its guiding spirit, Mr. Lawrence Spivak, permanent panel member, and producer. Mr. Leroy Collins, past President of the National Association of Broadcasters, wrote the following to Mr. Spivak on the occasion of the show's 15th anniversary.

> . . . Back of every success of such distinction there is always the vision, creative genius, hard work and sacrifices

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[20]The term "conscience of America" was utilized by former Republican Senator from Missouri, James P. Kem, in a letter to Lawrence Spivak, cited in Meet the Press, p. 22.

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> of one person above all others. You are the person who has made MEET THE PRESS, Larry, and while I salute all of your capable staff, I commend you above all.[21]

Spivak's probing, incisive questioning manner has given the program its stamp of personality, distinguishing it from any other program of its kind. It behooves us to examine the program and Mr. Spivak's influence on its development over the years.

BRIEF FACTUAL BIOGRAPHY

In 1945 Lawrence Spivak was the successful editor and publisher of American Mercury magazine. Martha Rountree was a successful radio producer. Spivak at the time had been experimenting with a radio program titled, "The American Mercury of the Air," which dramatized articles appearing in the magazine. A proposed article for the magazine by Miss Rountree brought her in contact with Spivak. Although the article was rejected, the germ of MEET THE PRESS evolved out of this meeting.

Spivak asked Miss Rountree's opinion of his radio program, which she bluntly gave, advising him to drop it. Spivak's idea for the MEET THE PRESS format, however, did catch Miss Rountree's fancy, as having the potential for an exciting new kind of interview show. Consequently the idea led to the program itself, which was worked out, owned, and

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[21]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from LeRoy Collins, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16.

produced by both Spivak and Rountree.

When Spivak approached the networks with the idea, he was met with cool indifference. The idea, he was told, sounded too dull and too intellectual. It took Miss Rountree's woman's touch to sell the idea to Mutual Broadcasting. Appealing to their sense of news and curiosity, Rountree asked them quite simply, "How would you like a program in which four top newsmen would interview Truman, Stalin, Wallace, and Churchill?" The program was promptly sold as a promotion for American Mercury Magazine.[22]

Actually, of Miss Rountree's proposed interviews, only Wallace materialized. Mr. Spivak once wrote an invitation to Stalin, who never did reply. Neither did President Truman or Churchill ever appear on the program.

A test program was held on June 24, 1945, in a Washington theatre before an audience. The guest was Edmund Stevens, Soviet correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, who had just returned from Moscow. The program made its official radio debut on October 5, 1945, interviewing Eric Johnston, then newly elected president of the Chamber of Commerce.[23] Miss Rountree served as the program's first moderator, and eventually Mr. Spivak joined as regular panel member.

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[22]Irwin Ross, "Meet the Press," Coronet, June, 1955, p. 44.

[23]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967.

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MEET THE PRESS was virtually launched on a shoestring by its co-producers. With Mutual paying only $300 per program, Mr. Spivak had to put in an additional $300 to meet expenses. The program quickly caught the public's fancy, however, and acquired a series of local sponsors. The program remained on a weekly basis with Mutual until August 4, 1950. MEET THE PRESS was also an early television pioneer. Although MEET THE PRESS became a regular NBC television feature in 1948, the first televised version of the program took place on November 6, 1947, with James A. Farley as guest. In May, 1952, NBC also began carrying the radio broadcast of the program.

When the program left Mutual, that network began a similar program called REPORTER'S ROUNDUP. Spivak and Rountree sued Mutual for $1,250,000 in damages. The pretrial examination produced enough evidence to show Mutual guilty of a number of breaches which made it legally vulnerable. Mutual's insurance company settled with Spivak and Miss Rountree for a substantial sum, in order to call the trial off.

From the beginning it was Spivak and Rountree who gave the program the kind of driving force that soon propelled it onto the front pages of America's major newspapers with the news it would make. The spontaneous excitement of the program was nurtured by Spivak and Rountree's extensive production preparation. As participants as well as co-producers, they were not hidden from their audience as most broadcast

producers are. They were deeply involved in the program's success and image.

By its purpose, its format and its selection of guests and reporters, and the skillful leadership of its co-producers, the program maintained its spontaneous, uninhibited quality in eliciting news and opinion. Its producers seemed to possess the ability to select the right combination of an inquiring panel and a newsworthy guest, who was even more newsworthy at the time of his appearance on the program.

Both Spivak and Rountree from the beginning seemed to exercise a sixth sense, according to some, in anticipating the most newsworthy developments in current affairs. Miss Rountree was one of Washington's most popular and influential hostesses. Together, Spivak and Rountree also kept in touch with a circle of friends and acquaintances in public life, whose number and importance one magazine described as having been rivaled "perhaps only in the heyday of Mrs. Perle Mesta in Washington."[24] The result was that week after week, any public figure before the public appeared as nearly as possible at the very moment when he himself or a question in which he was involved was ripe for headlines. The success of his appearance was further assured by the extensive preparation for the program by its two producers.

Both Rountree and Spivak maintained headquarters in New York and Washington, commuting between the spots. Miss

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[24]Hubert Pryor, "Bigwigs Under Fire," Look, February 10, 1953, p. 35.

Rountree, while still producing and moderating the program, read every New York and Washington paper every day and all the weekly magazines. Spivak still devotes several days a week just to reading up on subjects on which a guest could be questioned. His researchers check into the background of each guest. By program time he generally has 50 questions in mind, of which he may use five or six. His preparation for each program was described in a letter.

> I prepare for each program by reading whatever is available about our guest, examining speeches and statements that he has made, written criticism for and against him, and in general getting as much background about the issue or issues with which the guest is involved or should be.[25]

Spivak's extensive preparation for questioning gave the program the bombshell quality which has since marked it. The somewhat bear-baiting aspects of the program are reflected in Spivak's technique, which allows him to get a tenacious grip on some evasive guest and often shake some important admission or opinion from him. His questioning methods early stamped the program with his personality, and have evoked such descriptions of him as "God's angry little man,"[26] and "the show's chief prosecutor."[27] His manner of questioning was described some years ago by Newsweek magazine.

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[25]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, October 3, 1967.

[26]David R. Ebbit, "Television," The New Republic, January 23, 1956, p. 21.

[27]"Question Man," Newsweek, September 3, 1962, p. 68.

> Many of the large questions . . . come from Larry Spivak himself, who is five feet three inches tall. Sitting on two pillows, his feet dangling just above the floor, Spivak, looking up through his glasses like an exasperated baby owl and shooting questions in a voice that is precariously polite, radiates almost total suspicion of his famous guests. Beneath the camera's line of sight he methodically thumbs through a stack of cards with which, said one recent reporter-panelist, "he could ask questions for five days."[28]

Actually, Spivak is a soft-spoken man who speaks with precise deliberation. Perhaps this soft-spoken, deliberative quality gives him his reputation for sharpness. Although he tries to exercise restraint, he once admitted in an article that "unless I'm very careful, I do get in to a debating tone."[29] In keeping with his taste for a good scrap, however, Spivak has admitted to disliking having to face a weak adversary, who causes his sharp incisive manner to make him feel like a bully.[30]

Spivak's success seems to lie in the fact that when he is on the air, his debating manner tends to lead him into asking questions that the usually mild-mannered off-the-air Spivak would love to ask. Spivak has stated, "We've heard it a thousand times. People say: 'Gosh, I'd like to ask that fella that. I'm glad you did.'"[31] It is Spivak's kind of questioning which has elicited headlines and news-making answers. The following examples of typical frank

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

Spivak questions might illustrate the point.

> Spivak to Senator McCarthy: "Are you suggesting that J. Edgar Hoover knows a spy in the State Department and has done nothing?"
>
> Spivak to Mikoyan: "Are we to understand that the only thing that impressed you were our roads?"
>
> Spivak to Senator Kennedy: "What would you do about Cuba that hasn't been done or ought to be done?"
>
> Spivak to Nehru: "How do you apply the principle of independence to the situation, for example, in East Berlin?"[32]

Many times Spivak's deft manner of questioning and his refusal to be put off with half answers or double talk has succeeded in extracting information where a guest, just a few seconds before, has said that he couldn't or wouldn't give it. On March 2, 1952, Newbold Morris appeared on the program shortly after his appointment by Truman to investigate corruption in government departments. The following bit of dialogue illustrates Spivak's tenacious questioning to this point.

> Spivak: What indications have you that there will be dismissals if you reveal similar things (instances of unethical behavior in the administration)? Has the President definitely promised you that if there are any more Vaughns or O'Dwyers, they will be dismissed?
>
> Morris: I'm not going to quote a confidential conversation with the President.
>
> Spivak: It's very important for the American people to know that, sir.

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[32] Ibid.

Morris: Now, look, give this guy a chance. Who are we to say that the Angel Gabriel didn't appear to the President of the U. S. and say you've got to clean this up? And why would he have picked me unless he wanted to? Did he think I was just a nice guy that wouldn't raise a fuss?

Spivak: You think the Angel Gabriel has more influence than some of the top Congressional committees?

Morris: Who am I to say? I don't know.

Spivak: I'd like to pursue this for a minute because this seems pertinent to the whole investigation. Have you assurance that if the same kind of low ethics or corruption is revealed by you, those people will be dismissed or will be tried if necessary?

Morris: Yes, sir.

Spivak: The President has given you that assurance?

Morris: I have that assurance.[33]

The program elicited a front page New York Times headline the next day.

MORRIS THREATENS TO QUIT IF TRUMAN FAILS TO BACK HIM[34]

On other occasions, under Spivak's questioning, the guest has said one thing, and then the exact opposite. Foreign Minister Sean MacBride of Ireland appeared on MEET THE PRESS on March 18, 1951. He stated there was no difference between Russia and Britain as far as democracy was concerned. He argued that Britain was no democracy, since it did not permit the people of Ireland to determine freely by democratic means their own affairs, and method of government. The following dialogue illustrates his change of mind within minutes.

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[33]Pryor, Look, p. 34.

[34]New York Times, March 3, 1952, p. 1.

Spivak: Isn't it true, Mr. Minister, that a great deal of your trade today is with Britain, and that your relationship with Britain is really very friendly?
MacBride: A lot of our trade is with Britain yes, because we need things from Britain and Britain needs things from us.
Spivak: In other words, when you are trading, you don't care whether they are a democracy or not.
MacBride: Well, I gather that was the attitude of the United States . . .
Spivak: I am talking about Ireland now.
MacBride: Well, I am laying down what seems to be the general international practice.
Spivak: Would you trade with Russia?
MacBride: No, we don't trade with Russia.
Spivak: Would you trade with Russia if Russia had something you wanted?
MacBride: Well, as little as possible, I think.
Spivak: Well, then there is a difference in your mind between the democracy of Russia and the democracy of Great Britain.
MacBride: Yes.[35]

Spivak's questioning doesn't always produce these results. When a question is avoided, however, or the guest refuses to answer, the implications might be equally as strong as a direct answer. On February 4, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy had stated that State Department files were the basis of his charges of malfeasance in that department. In five questions Spivak asked McCarthy how he had gotten his information from the files, specifically whether he had seen them himself. In his reply to Spivak's fifth question, the Senator stated:

McCarthy: I've just got through telling you that I haven't been over the State Department to see the original files. The answer is no.
Spivak: That wasn't the question, Senator. I didn't ask you whether you've been

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[35]Pryor, Look, p. 34.

the State Department, I asked you if you'd seen the files.

McCarthy: What's the next question?[36]

The Spivak brand of questioning and the ability of Miss Rountree to entice guests on to the program paid off early in what the London Times called, "one of the most reliable breeding grounds of week-end news."[37] A description of the Spivak-Rountree combination in Life read as follows.

> Between Spivak's Brooklyn bite and vigor and Rountree's Southern florence, the program has become a source of potential popularity and ruin to every big time politician.
>
> Stung by Spivak's clever questioning, they frequently say more than they intend to on the show. Yielding to Martha's cajolery they often use the program for major announcements.[38]

Miss Rountree from the beginning had a simple argument for convincing her newsworthy guests, according to The New York Times. To someone suddenly injected into the spotlight, she might say, "Here's a chance for you to tell your story to the American people. If you are honest and believe what you say, there is nothing to fear."[39]

Producers Spivak and Rountree in seeking the drama plus quality that stamps the program never avoided the controversial or unconventional in guest selection. This has been possible because the sponsor of the program has absolutely

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[36]Ibid.

[37]"Headliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89.

[38]"Life Goes to a Meet the Press Garden Party," Life, June 23, 1952, p. 127.

[39]Val Adams, "Glamour Girl and Newspapermen," New York Times, September 3, 1950, Sec. 2, p. 7.

no control over selection of guests or panelists. Guests on the program have come from every shade of the political spectrum. As a result the program over the years has had its share of verbal firewords and heated comment. Guests have included former Communists such as Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, William Remington, Soviet agent Gerhard Eisler, and John Gates, editor of the Daily Worker. Other controversial guests seen on MEET THE PRESS include the late Senator Bilbo; Lycurgus Spinks, former Imperial Emperor of the Ku Klux Klan; and Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society.

One of the earliest examples of Rountree tact in getting controversial guests occurred shortly after the program began in 1946, and resulted in one of broadcasting's most historical journalistic moments. It involved the late Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi, considered a prize catch for any interview program. Frequently a victim of attack because of his vitriolic, prejudicial personality, he was an object of great curiosity, but had constantly avoided any nation-wide broadcast.

After Bilbo had won a bitterly contested primary, Spivak solicited his appearance on the program by phone from New York but was flatly refused. Several days later, Miss Rountree, who was Florida born, received a more cordial reception. Her southern drawl charmed the Senator into suggesting that she write him a letter. After getting an appointment with Bilbo, she was curtly told she was wasting her time.

Trying a new kind of tack, she told Bilbo that "one of the hardest things about being a southerner up North was hearing the horrible charges made against Senator Bilbo." She then asked, "Are you really as dreadful as they say?" Bilbo then launched into a lengthy account of the roads and schools he built for the good people of Mississippi. Miss Rountree then asked, "Then Senator, why do you object to telling all this to the American people?" Bilbo had no answer.[40]

The announcement of his appearance on the program was met with a deluge of protests. Station WOL in Washington was in a state of siege the night of the program. Pickets paraded outside, and scores of police were inside, Bilbo had secured a pistol permit, and arrived with four armed body-guards. The program lost no time on amenities. The first question asked of Bilbo was whether he agreed with a poll of reporters that he was the worst man in the Senate. Bilbo politely demurred and was then deluged with a series of questions on the racial issue. Becoming increasingly irate, Bilbo began losing his poise. Consequently, Spivak, catching Bilbo off guard, frankly asked the Senator, "Have you ever been a member of the Ku Klux Klan?" Bilbo promptly replied, "I have. I am a member of Ku Klux Klan Number 40, called the Bilbo Klan."[41] This admission made coast-to-coast headlines and started the movement to oust Bilbo from the Senate, a

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[40]Irwin Ross, "Meet the Press," The Reader's Digest, September, 1951, p. 19.

[41]Ibid.

move which was thwarted by the Senator's death.

After auspicious beginnings like the Bilbo expose, the program has continued over the years to provide an exciting pace to viewers and news to the Monday morning newspapers. In 1953, following Miss Rountree's marriage, the Spivak-Rountree partnership broke up. Spivak bought out Miss Rountree for a sum exceeding $100,000. The program in turn was sold to NBC in 1955, and Spivak has continued to produce it under a long-term contract.

Certainly the complete story of Rountree and Spivak's contributions to MEET THE PRESS over the years cannot be told in one chapter. Their ability to coax guests on to the program in its early days is itself a study in the art of persuasion. It is only the purpose here to project a representative image of the program's long and colorful history.

The program idea, however, is merely the skeleton. The exciting personality of the program comes from its body, which is nourished every week by the elements now to be discussed.

FORMULA FOR SUCCESS

The program's basic format allows for the spontaneity of a "live," unrehearsed press conference. The aim of the program from the very beginning was described in a letter from Lawrence Spivak.

> MEET THE PRESS was designed to give the public a chance to view an on-the-record press conference from a front row seat. The basic assumption is that the audience may

> profit from hearing exactly what is said--and how it is said--rather than relying entirely on reports and interpretations of what is said.[42]

The program basically consists of a prominent figure facing a panel of four top flight newsmen, including permanent panel member Lawrence Spivak, in a simulated, unrehearsed press conference. Unlike a real conference, however, continuity and order are provided by the presence of a moderator. The role of moderator is also filled by a leading newsman.

The moderator, according to Spivak, in general "serves to keep the program at an interesting pace, exercising professional news judgment. His manner should add quiet authority, and normally he should assert himself only when necessary to correct inadvertent misstatements, add important clarifications, etc."[43] The program's first moderator, Miss Rountree, perhaps set the pattern for the role. She likened it to a woman'e hat. "If it's in good taste," she remarked, "it's not the most noticeable thing in the outfit."[44] As moderator, Miss Rountree unobtrusively tried to keep reporters from going up blind alleys, and guests from getting out of hand.

One of the program's longest serving moderators was veteran news broadcaster Ned Brooks, who served for eighteen years in the role. One Boston columnist described Brooks's job on MEET THE PRESS as follows.

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[42]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, June 17, 1967.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Hubert Pryor, Look, p. 34.

> Ned Brooks has the softest job in television. At 6 o'clock on Sunday evenings he puts out the cat; at 6:30 he calls her back.[45]

According to Brooks, the moderator must handle the time allotment in such a way as to create the impression with the panel and the audience that the time is being divided fairly.[46] Aside from this chore, however, Brooks agreed, that like Miss Rountree, he was encouraged to stay in the background, and not impose his presence on the program.

Watching the time allotment among participants is important, since domination by any one panelist or his questions interfere with the allowance of maximum expression and fairness. The arrangement of time on the program was described by Spivak.

> Generally, we try to divide the time equally among the questioners so that each man is able to ask approximately the same number of questions. The moderator more or less controls that. It is difficult, however, to divide time on the basis of the number of questions, because much depends on the length of the answer . . . Usually we are able to run down the panel at least twice, sometimes if the questions and answers are brief, three times, and there have been occasions when we have gone down the panel four times. It is fair to say, therefore, that each panelist gets at least two turns but the number of questions he gets depends on a number of factors which cannot be predicted.[47]

This attempt at fairness to the panelists, and flexibility of time, allows important follow-up questions and overcomes one of the handicaps of a real press conference.

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[45]Letter from Ned Brooks, August 11, 1967.

[46]*Ibid*.

[47]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, October 3, 1967.

The injection of a follow-up question naturally depends on the judgment of the panelists. All panelists queried, however, agreed that if there is any gap or evasive quality in an answer, a follow-up question would be considered more important than the injection of the panelist's own new line of questioning.

The mechanics of the format, however, do not in themselves assure an exciting or provocative program. Program success depends in large part on the selection of guests and panelists, and the questioning process itself as personified by the Spivak method.

One of the distinguishing elements of MEET THE PRESS is its timing in selection of its guests. Many of the program's newsmaking shows were due to the fact that the right guest was on at the right time, confronted by the kind of panel which could verbally elicit the kind of information and opinion which makes news. Since the beginning, the timing of a guest's appearance on the program has been given the utmost consideration. Once the program achieved its reputation, with newspapers anxious to lend their reporters, the problem of guests was one of selection, not of shortage. Guests, therefore, had to be not only newsworthy but newsmaking. The secret, Martha Rountree once explained, lies in timing.

> If you have Joe McCarthy on your program in an ordinary run-of-the-mill week, people say, 'So what?' But

> if you get him the night after he makes a sensational speech, everybody's spellbound.[48]

The importance of timing in guest selection was emphasized by producer Spivak in describing the procedure used. Although many detailed factors go into programming each week, there are some primary considerations:

> We are guided by news events. Often, however, we set guests up long in advance because we believe they will be newsworthy at the time we plan the interview. When, for example, the Prime Minister of a foreign country schedules a trip, we feel fairly safe in planning an interview with him after his arrival even though the event is months away. Thus, we planned an interview with Nehru months before he came, and with Mendes-France, the premier of France. Sometimes we make last minute changes when the news shifts. We usually find that if the reason is good enough, we can postpone the scheduled guest for a later date.[49]

In this manner, MEET THE PRESS constantly keeps up with the news and keeps its guests as newsmakers. A listing of guests the program has featured over the years would include almost every important national and international diplomat and statesman. The program has also featured celebrities from every walk of life, the scientists, educators, civic leaders, and intellectuals, who are worthy of achievement or position. Only a partial listing would encompass a score of pages. A representative idea, however, can be gleaned from the testimonials cited and from the newsmaking programs discussed throughout this chapter.

Equally as important as the selection of guests is the

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[48]"Headliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89.

[49]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967.

selection of the right panel of interviewers. The panel represents the kind of broadcast and press journalists who can verbally frame the kinds of questions which elicit frank and important answers. A roster of newsmen who have appeared on the program over the years reads like a "who's who" of American journalism. Scotty Reston, Marquis Childs, Peter Lisagor, Raymond Brandt, Earl Mazo, May Craig, Ernest K. Lindley, Merriman Smith, Drew Pearson, Pauline Frederick, Richard Wilson, Jack Bell, David Brinkley, Norman Cousins, Max Lerner, William White, Roscoe Drummond, are only some of the names that have occupied panel seats.

All are seasoned veterans of the give-and-take of the press conference format. Consequently, the program often results in a half hour free swinging battle of wits. The interviewee, under the glare of the television spotlight, cannot retreat behind an obstinate "no comment," nor can he label anything "off the record." His image is constantly being challenged.

The selection of the right combination of guest and panel requires something of an anticipatory skill. Reporters selected have always been among those considered to be the most informed, responsible, and articulate in the Washington press corps, and throughout the country. A problem, however, exists in that while there are many good reporters and writers, there are far fewer good on-the-air interviewers and questioners. Some reporters, therefore, do appear more often than others because the producer has found them more articulate.

A few of these moreover appear quite frequently because they are knowledgeable in a variety of fields.

Once a guest is selected, according to producer Lawrence Spivak, the panel is selected with several factors in mind.

> We seek informed, responsible journalists, with some special knowledge of the field of the guest's interest, but we do not always select a panel of specialists in the field. We often combine specialists with one or two reporters of more general knowledge, because we think this combination gives a more balanced interview for a mass audience.[50]

A question which naturally arises in the selection of any panel is that of possible personal bias of a particular reporter or of the publication which he represents. With regard to this issue, producer Spivak has stated the following:

> We do take into consideration to some extent any political "tag" which may be attached to any particular reporter or his publication. This presents difficulties however, because often a reporter's personal political inclination is not the same as his publication's. Also, we have found that with the best reporters, their questioning will be fair in spite of their personal views. However, from the audience's point of view, we try not only to <u>be</u> fair but to <u>seem</u> fair.[51]

This is a most important point, since the manner in which a question is posed, or the kind of question which is posed, can very well contribute toward the kind of image the guest will project. A guest who is put on the defensive rather than in a position of merely giving an opinion can come off in a particularly bad manner. For this reason, the integrity

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[50]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, April 14, 1967.

[51]<u>Ibid</u>.

of the panel must be, and has been, preserved since the program's very beginning. Producer Rountree once stated:

> We never load the panel against the man being interviewed, because people are always for the underdog. Why, with a loaded panel, I could take the worst man in the country and make him a martyr.[52]

To assure maximum spontaneity and fairness of questioning, each panelist is responsible for his own questions and does not even confer with other panel members in advance even as to areas of questioning. Guests are not told either questions or areas. They know only that they will be interviewed in relation to their own field of knowledge or interest. This arrangement not only allows room for the important follow-up question, but also eliminates the dangers of the planted question and the prepared answer.

Former guests queried by this author find the MEET THE PRESS format to be the closest approximation of a "live" press conference, and in many ways more effective and important. Michigan Governor George Romney, a frequent participant on the program, wrote as follows:

> Only the President's press conferences have the overall "live" coverage to compare with a program like this. As a result, I rarely will put the time and effort into preparing for a regular press conference such as I put into an appearance on MEET THE PRESS. My staff will spend several days preparing logical questions and answers, and I usually reserve at least one day in advance for personal preparation.[53]

Barry Goldwater, also realizing the importance of adequate preparation for this program, has written:

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[52]"Headliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89.

[53]Letter from Governor George Romney, September 22, 1967.

> The disadvantage of appearing on any program like this is in the fact that the person generally does not go well prepared or prepared enough. On the other hand, it's impossible for the person to know what questions will be asked unless he has been asked to cover a particular subject or statement. The person appearing must remember that the leader of this group, Mister Spivak, has dedicated a good portion of his life to this program and its success or failure depends upon his ability to diagnose a question and to ascertain whether or not correct answers are being given.[54]

The fairness of treatment accorded guests on the program was also stressed by all past candidates personally contacted in this study. The following excerpts from letters by Richard Nixon, George Romney, Hubert Humphrey, Barry Goldwater, and Henry Cabot Lodge illustrate the point.

> The normal program that MEET THE PRESS conducts features a panel of knowledgable individuals who have spent time in preparing their questions, who are tough in their questioning, but not hostile, and who help to make that show one of the most respected news interview shows on the air.[55]

> Most people are biased, including newsmen. Overall the panelists have been objective . . . Occasionally a panelist will put a question out of left field and dwell on it, but this is rare.[56]

> I have always been treated fairly by the panelists. Obviously, questions raised by the panelists reflect their points of view and interests, and questions are often posed in a way that will elicit information they consider controversial or newsworthy. I don't consider that unfair.[57]

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[54]Letter from Barry Goldwater, July 21, 1967.

[55]Letter from Richard Nixon, August 1, 1967.

[56]Letter from George Romney, September 22, 1967.

[57]Letter from Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, September 20, 1967.

> In looking back over the many years I have appeared on the program I cannot remember one question that I didn't consider fair and objective. Naturally, some of the panelists could not, nor can they today keep themselves from displaying either violent disagreement or violent agreement, and to that end I suppose there has been bias and I suppose there always will be, but not bias in the manner you and I think of.[58]

> I have absolutely no complaint about the way in which I was treated during the many times that I appeared on MEET THE PRESS.[59]

This fairness of treatment seems to extend even to the most controversial guests. Robert Welch of the John Birch Society, writing to Lawrence Spivak about his treatment on the program stated:

> The treatment of myself by the four interviewers could probably be described as 'pretty rough.' But that, I am sure, is what makes the show interesting to your millions of viewers; and actually I did not mind it at all. I feel that a man who can't take it probably has something to hide.[60]

If fairness of treatment is evident to the guests, it is not, however, so evident to some of the program's critics. Since its inception, the hard hitting, incisive, unsubtle questioning manner of the panel, moulded by Spivak's strong personality, has tended to project a sometime hostile and suspicious image of the panel's treatment of guests. As a result the program has not been without its share of adverse criticism, which will now be discussed.

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[58]Letter from Barry Goldwater, July 21, 1967.

[59]Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., August 3, 1967.

[60]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Robert Welch, cited in Meet the Press, p. 29.

A CRITICAL LOOK

Communist Earl Browder's appearance on the program in 1946 elicited the following description in Time magazine.

> The ex-communist turned book peddler sat uneasily before a Washington microphone. Reason for Earl Browder's discomfort: a battery of four newsmen, a little less than friendly, a little more than anxious to interview him on Mutual's MEET THE PRESS program.[61]

Here is another early description of the format and panel as seen by Albert N. Williams in the Saturday Review.

> By confronting an opinion holding guest with four irreverent, suspicious, and often openly hostile newsmen who cross examine him mercilessly, real reasons are gotten at, true facts unearthed, important but colorful overtones are shown up as superficial, and in the end the listener is in a position to make up his own positive opinion.[62]

In 1952 philosopher Bertrand Russell appeared on the program. The manner in which he was treated by the panel was unquestionable, according to Leo Cherne. Again, it is the manner of questioning by Spivak which is here under fire.

> In one typical stimulating MEET THE PRESS session, Bertrand Russell confronted a panel of journalists. There was no presentation of what the noted philosopher believed on any one subject. Nor, as a matter of fact, did the program leave an understanding of any one of the hundreds of controversial views he had articulated in a long life. What emerged from the TV screen and what undoubtedly remained in the minds of viewers was the personal contest between acidulous Lawrence Spivak anchor man on the MEET THE PRESS panel and Lord Russell. The manner in which he, a Nobel prize winner, was cross examined, would have suggested to those who tuned in late that he was appearing under subpoena in a Kefauver

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[61] "Know How Woman," Time, July 26, 1946, p. 54.

[62] "A Ghost is Laid," Albert N. Williams, Saturday Review, July 6, 1946, p. 20.

> investigation of mental crime. The contest of wits was sharp, quick, flashing. Capitalism got a quick defense from the panel, socialism, an equally quick defense from Lord Russell, and the audience, twenty-three minutes of this illusion of contact with the mind that produced "Principia Mathematica."[63]

Perhaps one of the sharpest attacks on the program occurred in 1956, in an article by David R. Ebbit appearing in The New Republic. After discussing the format of interview programs in general, Ebbit wrote the following specifically with regard to MEET THE PRESS.

> The MEET THE PRESS panel, sparked by Lawrence Spivak, God's Angry Little Man, and by the alternate prosecuting attorney, May Craig, functions with all the venom and brutality of that one-man investigating committee which once threatened the nation's sanity. As far as I've been able to make out it doesn't even pretend to take an interest in the significant ideas and interests of the people it examines, (though I seem to detect a somewhat more gentle handling of middle-of-the-roaders than of those who might very loosely be called liberals). Instead it begins to pick away at the sorest point it can find and continues to pick until the victim explodes in wrath, or collapses in sick despair, upon which the panel grins happily.
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> . . . . . .
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> It seems perfectly obvious that the purpose of the panel show is to bait and embarrass (though there is a marked difference in the treatment of accorded individuals representing conservative and liberal schools of thought).[64]

Speaking about the heated nature of MEET THE PRESS, he further states:

> The reason for turning the TV interview into a sort of kangaroo court is probably twofold: first, the show itself is made more dramatic--there is tension and suspense (Will he crack? Will he confess? Will he smack Spivak on the nose?) second, there is a better chance

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[63]Leo Cherne, "Biggest Question on TV Debate," New York Times, March 2, 1952, Sec. 6, p. 14.

[64]David R. Ebbit, The New Republic, January 23, 1956, p. 21.

> of getting a news story. The man who is badgered is the man who blurts out, and practically every Monday now, there is at least one idiotic news item gleaned from the outbursts which take place on the Sunday panel shows.[65]

Being more specific, Mr. Ebbit speaks of the treatment accorded two MEET THE PRESS guests, poet Robert Frost and distinguished educator Robert Hutchins.

> During the Christmas season it was announced that MEET THE PRESS would keep yuletide spirits from being soured by foregoing its typical prey and welcoming instead the good grey poet, Robert Frost. Well, Mr. Frost appeared, and for a while everything was jolly and gentle. But pretty soon the panel began to interrupt the poet, and before long it was cross examining him about some statement that he was supposed to have made when he was sixteen, or sixty, or some such age. Mr. Frost just smiled and nodded and kept on quoting poetry, but it was clear that--Christmas or no Christmas--the panel was determined to make a liar out of somebody.[66]

> Some weeks ago the MEET THE PRESS panel gave the full treatment to Robert Maynard Hutchins, concentrating on a single theme for almost thirty minutes. You have been quoted as saying "that you might hire a communist." Do you mean to say that you would hire a communist? Confusing itself as it customarily does, with a judicial body, the panel reached the stage of pounding the table and demanding a flat and immediate "yes" or "no." In the last few minutes of the program he complained sadly that no one had asked him anything at all about the work done by the Fund for the Republic in combatting racial discrimination. The Fund spent considerably more time and effort on this matter he said, than on anything to do with communism. The panel still asked him nothing about the Fund and racial discrimination, and when the show went off the air, Mr. Hutchins looked very tired.[67]

The article resulted in a series of letters to the magazine by prominent past guests on the program who refuted

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

the charges of unfair treatment and methods of questioning. The following excerpts are from letters printed in the magazine several weeks later, answering Ebbit's article.

> I have always been impressed by the insight of the interviewers as indicated in their leading questions, as well as by their generous attitude of developing the speaker's position without attempting to color or distort his meaning._____Wayne Morse[68]

> As one of your victims (to Spivak)--is that the right word?--I can testify to the excellent job you do, with questions direct, to the point, but always within the bounds of fair play._____Norman Thomas[69]

> Probing is done by experts who are thorough but not antagonistic._____John Foster Dulles[70]

Spivak also received a letter from Al Edwards, Executive Vice President of Henry Holt, and a friend of Robert Frost. This letter was also printed in the magazine.

> I hope you will understand that neither Robert Frost nor I share the opinion of The New Republic concerning his treatment on your program at Christmas time. He would be most sensitive to any feeling of pressure or discomfort, but his reaction was one of pleasure at the way he was handled by the panel, and he was most appreciative of the opportunity to go before the largest single audience in his experience.[71]

Perhaps the best professional refutation of Ebbit's charges was in a letter to the magazine by noted newscaster John Daly, then Vice President of the ABC netowrk, itself originator of the interview program ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

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[68]The New Republic, February 20, 1956, p. 22.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Ibid.

> Unquestionably the TV inquisition, as currently practiced, leaves something to be desired as a means of extracting ideas from the presumably willing and knowledgable guest. But just what the new, painless method is to be, I don't know.
> But regarding Mr. Ebbit's intimation that it is always his ox which is most bloodied by the TV panels, I would only suggest 'tis better to be gored than bored. Further, it is difficult to understand his surprise. I am reasonably certain that Dr. Hutchins and the other guests are aware of the nature of the program before they accept. If not, then I can appreciate Mr. Ebbit's solicitude for the blind. Maybe the prospective victims should watch some television, as a prerequisite to becoming participants.[72]

One of the most impressive MEET THE PRESS scoops, and a program which also drew some adverse criticism, took place in 1959 when the panel faced Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastos Mikoyan. Mikoyan closed his American tour with a sixty minute visit on the show. The New York Times described the security measures taken.

> While security agents and policemen stood guard, Mr. Mikoyan sat imperturbably under the glaring lights. His protectors guarded the entrance to the studios, walked on catwalks above the sound stage, and even on the roof.[73]

The importance of television's being able to convey an image of a man who himself is trying to convey a favorable image can be seen in this description of Mikoyan's appearance.

> At no point in his hour long appearance did the Soviet official look ill at ease or nervous. He ducked a few questions by answering some of his own, and he sometimes equated things that for most Americans were entirely different. But most viewers doubtless got the impression

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[72] Ibid., p. 23.

[73] New York Times, January 19, 1959, p. 1.

> of an able and articulate spokesman for Communism and the Soviet cause.[74]

The article also describes his discomfort a few times during the program.

> At one point Mr. Mikoyan took out a white handkerchief and wiped his brow. It was not the questions that made him perspire he said, but the hot television lights. He wrinkled his brow as he listened to some questions but he was never at a loss for words.[75]

Perhaps most important in the newspaper's accounts of the program, however, were its comments on Mr. Spivak's treatment of Mikoyan in the closing minutes of the show.

> Perhaps because in an earlier exchange Lawrence Spivak had been bested by Mr. Mikoyan's sense of humor, the former's conduct at the very close of the program was regrettable. Advising Mr. Mikoyan that there were only two minutes remaining, Mr. Spivak thereupon proceeded to use them up with a protracted question. Mr. Mikoyan was left with no time to reply, hardly an attractive example of American hospitality.
> As a TV veteran intimately acquainted with the mechanics of the medium, Mr. Spivak should have exercised more care to observe the amenities, especially in the case of one with whom he strongly disagrees.[76]

New York Times television critic Jack Gould expressed the same thoughts several days later.

> Now it should be noted that Lawrence Spivak the prime interviewer and producer of the program covered himself with the expected glory--he did not. His behavior made up in rudeness for what it lacked in forcefulness. The highly emotional Mr. Spivak dutifully warned Mr. Mikoyan that only two minutes were left to the show, which reflected a keen awareness of the operation of the medium's mechanics. And thereupon Mr. Spivak indulged in a strictly pro-American harangue that left Mr. Mikoyan no chance to

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[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., p. 51.

reply. Later Mr. Mikoyan upbraided Mr. Spivak who responded with a wishy washy and totally unconvincing reply. The childish petulance of Mr. Spivak can be frightfully tiresome. In interviewing prominent figures in the news he is obviously beyond his ken. He should learn to defer to Ned Brooks, his program's moderator, who knows the value of putting courtesy before a grandstand play.[77]

At least one New York Times reader, however, disagreed with Gould's criticism of Spivak's performance.

Allow me to express my strong disagreement with your critic's rebuke on January 25th to Lawrence Spivak concerning his last words to Anastos Mikoyan on MEET THE PRESS. Mr. Spivak certainly has every right to end the discussion as he did by a clarification of the difference between the American position and Mr. Mikoyan's clever propaganda. A courageous clarification of the issues and defense of our position was certainly much needed on TV.[78]

Perhaps the best judges of the program's fair treatment of guests in general, and political guests in particular, are those who have been subjected to the program's questioning. The following excerpts from letters to Mr. Spivak testify to the panel's sharp and provocative but always fair probing procedure.

As one who has appeared on your program several times, I can testify to your absolute, arms-length integrity which is so necessary in assuring the public that it is getting exactly what is represented--an unrehearsed interview by the press. ____ Wilbur Brucker, former Secretary of the Army[79]

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[77]New York Times, January 25, 1959, Sec. 2, p. 11.

[78]Letter to the New York Times by Miss Vera Gibson, Forest Hills, N. Y., February 8, 1959, section 2, p. 17.

[79]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Wilbur Brucker, cited in Meet the Press, p. 15.

I congratulate you on the high standards of timeliness and fair play which you have attained.
_____Senator Clifford Case[80]

I have always been impressed with the effort you and other panelists have made to present a critical and fair examination of your guests._____Senator James Fullbright[81]

I have found that in spite of your penetrating questions and your determination to prevent people from dodging your questions you have always been fair.
_____W. Averill Harriman[82]

Nothing I enjoy more than to meet the press in general and Mr. Spivak's press in particular: clear and sharp but never harsh._____Robert Frost[83]

I found the moderator and the panel forceful, but always fair and kind._____Congressman Lawrence Curtis[84]

Certainly, the line between sharp, incisive probing and intentional intimidation is sometimes difficult to distinguish when dealing with important controversial issues which demand carefully thought-out and frank answers. By the nature of its guests and the issues raised, the program expectedly at times leads to heated exchange and verbal fireworks, but not very often. This is a tribute to the nature of the panel and its adherence to standards of good taste and fairness.

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[80]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Clifford Case, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16.

[81]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Senator James Fulbright, cited in Meet the Press, p. 19.

[82]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from W. Averill Harriman, cited in Meet the Press, p. 20.

[83]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Robert Frost, cited in Meet the Press, p. 19.

[84]Excerpt from a letter to Lawrence Spivak from Lawrence Curtis, cited in Meet the Press, p. 16.

Testimonials cited in this chapter represent all political shades, liberal and conservative, somewhat refuting any charge of any political favoritism by the panel or Mr. Spivak. It would seem that those who have appeared on the program not only expected the treatment they received but enjoyed every challenging moment of it.

The program's techniques are legitimate, as a way of getting through subterfuge and double talk and getting at the heart of matters. Only an incisive, probing panel can provide the kind of rhetorical repartee that elicits newsmaking opinion and fact. It is this combination of the right guest at the right time which has produced the kinds of news making programs which will now be examined, as representative of the show's success for more than twenty years.

HEADLINERS

Some of the most significant stories which the program made took place in the late forties and early fifties, when the increasing concern over Communist expansion and government infiltration invited the McCarthy era, and the rebirth of the "red witch hunt" of the twenties.

In 1947, Soviet agent Gerhard Eisler made an appearance on the program, which eventually embroiled him in great difficulties. Accounts of the program made Eisler out to be a self-assured, quick witted individual who tried to side-step pointed questions with a show of injured innocence. He insisted that he was only a poor German anti-Fascist who only

wanted to go back where he came from. When asked why his sister stated that he was a Russian agent, he replied, "This lady is a well known informer." When asked if he got his money from the Soviet Union he replied, "No, no, no." The shrewd questioning of the panel, however, gradually elicited the full story of how Eisler had come to this country, including his damaging admission that interested the F.B.I. Eisler admitted that he had perjured himself by denying he was a Communist when he got a United States visa in Marseilles in 1941. His admission on that program led to further F.B.I. investigation and resulted in a one to two-year jail sentence for falsifying his immigration record.[85]

Two of the program's biggest bombshells exploded in 1948, involving Elizabeth Bentley, William Remington, Whittaker Chambers, and Alger Hiss. These early programs perhaps set the prelude for the era which was to follow.

On a September 12th program Elizabeth Bentley, former Soviet spy courier, repeated the charges in public which she had made earlier before an investigation committee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures. She asserted that she had definitely conveyed the meaning that William Remington (suspended official of the Department of Commerce) was a Communist while he was in government employ. Remington promptly filed a libel suit against Miss Bentley, the program, and its sponsor, General Foods, for $100,000. Over

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[85]Irwin Ross, Reader's Digest, September, 1951, p. 19.

the protests of Spivak and Rountree, the insurance company settled with Remington for $9,500, based on the fact that it would have cost them more than that amount in legal fees just to defend the suit.[86] As a result of the suit, however, the Senate re-opened the investigation, found new evidence, and indicted Remington within a matter of weeks after the suit was settled. If he had not sued, he might have gone completely free.

The Chambers interview resulted in one of the prize coups of broadcast journalism. It was on a program of August, 1948, that Whittaker Chambers, without benefit of Congressional immunity, used MEET THE PRESS to repeat his charge that Alger Hiss had been a Communist. Hiss promptly sued Chambers for libel. In self defense, Chambers unveiled the famous "pumpkin papers," which not only proved Hiss a Communist, but linked him to a pre-war Soviet spy ring. There ultimately followed Hiss' indictment for perjury, his two sensational trials, and his conviction.[87] Had Chambers not gone on MEET THE PRESS, the Hiss case might still be unresolved.

Also in 1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall electrified the MEET THE PRESS audience by announcing that General Lucius Clay "had the authority as military commander

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[86]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967.

[87]Irwin Ross, Coronet, June, 1955, p. 40.

to shoot" if the Russians attacked any Americans.[88] In April, 1949, former Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith gave a hint of things to come when he warned that the Russians had "solved the problems of Nuclear atomic fission."[89]

The issues of Communism and Russian expansion caused many headline-making programs during those early years. When issues are controversial, tempers can be short. On a program of August, 1949, liberal columnist I. F. Stone, then working for the ultra liberal New York Daily Compass was a member of the panel quizzing Major General Patrick Hurley, former Presidential trouble shooter in China. Stone accused Hurley of "making a wonderful stump speech on the subject of America's being duped by Russia in the past."[90] The General retorted, "I'm right on your track now, just like I was on Stalin's from the beginning."[91] Panelist Paul Ward of the Baltimore Sun suggested getting away to a little less personal field. Stone, however, then asked the General whether "he had ever seen in the oil fieldsof Texas and Oklahoma any crooks bigger than those in the Chinese Nationalist Government."[92] The General, a native Oklahoman,

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[88]Irwin Ross, Reader's Digest, September, 1951, p. 18.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Newsweek, August 29, 1949, p. 44.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid.

exploded and exclaimed, "You go back to Jerusalem, and I'll go back to the oil fields, young fellow."[93] The NBC switchboard lit up "like a new saloon" according to Newsweek.

In 1951, Governor Dewey split sharply with national Republican leaders on a MEET THE PRESS program, when he advocated troops and sea air units for Europe without the necessity of Congressional approval for such commitments by military leaders.[94] In direct opposition Senator Taft and former President Hoover had both counselled against using more troops abroad without approval. In October, 1953, only hours before returning to Europe, Supreme Allied Commander General Gruenther revealed on MEET THE PRESS that he was doubtful of United States leadership of the Western world in Europe.[95] That same year, Robert Morris, of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, made headlines with his MEET THE PRESS accusation of new facts which would lead to more spy convictions.[96]

Senator McCarthy himself was a MEET THE PRESS guest on several occasions. He made front page headlines, however, in October, 1954, when he stated on the program that he would not provide any accounting of his use of funds given to him to fight Communism.[97] This was his first public statement

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[93]Ibid.

[94]New York Times, February 12, 1951, p. 1.

[95]New York Times, October 13, 1953, p. 3.

[96]New York Times, November 23, 1953, p. 1.

[97]New York Times, October 4, 1954, p. 1.

since a special Senate Committee recommended that the Senate censure him. An indication of McCarthy's waning popularity and power was given on a MEET THE PRESS program in May, 1954. High ranking Republican Senator Homer Ferguson became the first Republican running for reelection to suggest he would not welcome McCarthy's help.[98]

Foreign diplomats also made news on MEET THE PRESS in 1954. Anthony Nutting, Chief British delegate to the United Nations, made American headlines and shocked his own House of Commons by stating that Britain would be involved if Red China attacked Formosa.[99] No British official had ever made such a statement before. The greatest Spivak coup of that year, however, came when he secured the French Premiere Pierre Mendes-France's appearance on the program November 21st. It was the first time any head of government had ever appeared on any American political interview program. The success of Mendes' appearance also illustrates Spivak's ability to put those guests at ease, who are hesitant to appear on any other program of this type.

On the morning of the program, when Spivak approached Mendes in his hotel room, the Premiere eyed Spivak and stated, "So, you're the executioner, and I'm to be the victim."[100] Spivak told Mendes, "No man need worry who knows the answers,

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[98]New York Times, May 17, 1954, p. 1.

[99]Irwin Ross, Coronet, June, 1955, p. 41.

[100]Ibid., p. 42.

and I'm sure you do."[101] The Premiere disregarded Spivak's suggestions on how to dress for television, and to shave before the show. He actually seemed quite disgruntled on the way to the studio with Spivak. As he got out of the taxi at Radio City he was greeted by a cheering crowd. In a completely changed mood, he marched to the elevator all smiles and quips. Spivak could then swiftly propel him into General Sarnoff's dressing room and get him properly groomed for television. A letter which Spivak later received from one of the Premiere's aides said that judging from the reaction, his appearance on television was the most effective thing Mendes did while he was in this country.[102]

Since then, many other foreign heads have graced the MEET THE PRESS guest seat, including Fidel Castro, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Ghandi, Hailie Selassie, Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan, King Hussein of Jordan, a score of Prime Ministers, and many other notable foreign diplomats and representatives.

In 1955, Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, used MEET THE PRESS to call for a meeting of the "Big Four" heads of states, and thereby started the chain of events that led to the Summit Conference at Geneva.[103] The danger of war during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 was foreseen by Secretary of State John

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[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] New York Times, March 21, 1955, p. 1.

Foster Dulles. On MEET THE PRESS he publicly announced for the first time his intention to ask the Treasury to amend its regulations so as to require United States shipowners to pay their canal tolls into a blocked account instead of directly to Egypt.[104]

MEET THE PRESS on several occasions has broken news before it was officially released by the government. In 1952, Charles Sawyer, then Secretary of Commerce, confirmed on a program of April 21st, an increase in the price of steel to be granted that week.[105] In September, 1956, Secretary of Labor James Mitchell released figures on national job totals that were not to be officially released until the Tuesday following the program.[106]

Although the program produced much heated verbal contact during the forties and fifties, it produced physical violence only once, and that was after the program had gone off the air. Elliott Roosevelt was interviewed by a panel which included Fulton Lewis Jr. After the broadcast, Roosevelt thought he had heard Lewis make an unflattering reference to Roosevelt's wife, actress Faye Emerson. Roosevelt called Lewis a liar, and Lewis objected. One of Roosevelt's friends then took a swing at the famous commentator. In the exchange, co-producer Rountree received a sprained thumb.[107]

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[104]New York Times, September 24, 1956, p. 1.

[105]New York Times, April 21, 1952, p. 1.

[106]New York Times, September 3, 1956, p. 1.

[107]"Headliner," Time, March 5, 1951, p. 89.

During one early program, a stir was created not by any verbal fireworks, but by a violation of one of broadcasting's then strictest taboos. Tex McCrary asked New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia if he had ever tried to get a New York newspaper publisher to fire his city hall reporter. LaGuardia promptly replied, "That's a damn lie!"[108]

Since the mid-fifties the program has had to share headlines with the two other major network interview programs, FACE THE NATION on CBS and ISSUES AND ANSWERS on ABC. Because all three programs feature newsworthy guests every week, they receive about equal coverage by the major newspapers. This is especially true during political campaigns, when all three programs attempt to give maximum exposure to all major candidates. In recent years, however, MEET THE PRESS has still managed to capture the front page in many instances, because of the timing involved in selecting guests.

In 1961, Attorney General Robert Kennedy made headlines throughout the world with a MEET THE PRESS statement that his brother, President John Kennedy, would use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to defend Berlin.[109] In August, 1967, Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh gave his first national interview, immediately following the worst racial riot in our nation's history.[110] Only hours after his election, Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu gave his first interview for an American

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[108]Irwin Ross, Coronet, June, 1955, p. 41.

[109]Cited in Meet the Press, p. 10.

[110]August 30, 1967.

audience via satellite on MEET THE PRESS. On November 20th, 1967, following a week of intensive conferences on Vietnam, General William Westmoreland and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker faced the MEET THE PRESS panel in a special one-hour program. Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban was a program guest during the height of the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967. In August, 1966, during the NAACP convention, a time of great dissent among civil rights leaders, MEET THE PRESS produced a special one-and-a-half-hour program, featuring six civil rights leaders. Featured guests were Martin Luther King, Floyd McKissick, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, Stokely Carmichael and James Meredith. The dissent splitting the movement and expressed openly on the program elicited this New York Times headline.

6 RIGHTS LEADERS CLASH ON TACTICS IN EQUALITY DRIVE[111]

More important, however, than the amount of news the program makes is the nature of the news it makes. John Foster Dulles in praising the program, wrote as follows.

> On controversial subjects it is easy to generate heat but hard to generate light. MEET THE PRESS does a job of intellectual illumination.[112]

Very often "intellectual illumination" does not make front page headlines. Its importance lies in the kinds of opinion, conjecture, and clarification of thought which the MEET THE PRESS format allows. It is the kind of illumination most

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[111]New York Times, August 22, 1966, p. 1.

[112]The New Republic, February 20, 1956, p. 22.

present on those programs which feature political guests. During any election year, it is not so much hard news headlines which give the program its significance as much as its ability to serve as a forum for the discussion of issues and candidates' views on these issues before a national audience. The kinds of truth which emerge on these programs are as important as the kinds of facts which usually make headlines. The importance of MEET THE PRESS during political years will now be briefly discussed.

THE PROGRAM AND POLITICS

During any election year, an appearance on MEET THE PRESS and other similar nationally televised political interview programs is an obligation of any candidate and potential candidate. It is in the area of political communication, therefore, that MEET THE PRESS plays its most important role. The image-making contributions of the questioning technique assume their greatest importance. As Governor George Romney has written, "There are few public officials who don't relish a good showing on this program or fear a bad one."[113]

As a news interview program, MEET THE PRESS is exempt from the "equal time" provisions of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. The producer, therefore, must be as impartial as possible in the selection of political

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[113]Letter from Governor George Romney, September 22, 1967.

guests and in questioning. Because it is exempt from 315, the program also offers the best opportunity to expose the minority as well as the majority points of view on any issue. Producer Lawrence Spivak, discussing the problem of selecting political guests, wrote the following.

> We are specifically exempted from Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act but we are very careful about the doctrine of fairness. Difficulties arise however, when a candidate is already in an important office and gets involved with an important issue that makes him newsworthy. We try to be fair also to minority candidates, bearing in mind of course that MEET THE PRESS is a news program; thus, while we interviewed the Republican and Democratic candidates for President and Vice President in 1960, we did not interview the candidates of the many minority parties.[114]

The program has, however, in any election year featured interviews with all of the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, (declared and undeclared), as well as with campaign managers, Congressional candidates, governmental appointees, and others directly or indirectly involved in, or affected by, the outcome of the November elections.

In 1964, MEET THE PRESS presented two special full-hour programs from the conventions, besides regular interviews with candidates. In 1960 the program presented one of its most thorough election year schedules. Candidates John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Henry Cabot Lodge all appeared within a five-week period. Other active and inactive candidates, including Senators Stuart Symington, Hubert Humphrey, and Wayne Morse, also were seen. A special

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[114]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, September 1, 1967.

ninety-minute program featuring Kennedy, Johnson and Symington was telecast from Los Angeles a few hours before the Democratic Convention was called to order. An hour-long version with Senator Barry Goldwater and Governor Nelson Rockefeller (who stated on the air that he would not accept a Vice Presidential nomination) was a highlight of coverage of the Republican Convention. Other 1960 guests were Senators Thruston B. Morton and Henry M. Jackson, respective Republican and Democratic National Committee chairmen; Chester A. Bowles and Charles H. Percy, respective Democratic and Republican Platform Committee chairmen; and Governor LeRoy Collins, permanent chairman of the Democratic Convention. A special full-hour pre-election program on November 6th featured campaign managers Leonard Hall (Republican) and Robert F. Kennedy (Democratic).

Similarly, in 1956, MEET THE PRESS was host to Democratic candidates Adlai E. Stevenson and Estes Kefauver; Governors Frank Lausche, Christian A. Herter, W. Averill Harriman, and A. B. "Happy" Chandler (all of whom then cherished Presidential or Vice Presidential ambitions); Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt; and James A. Finnegan, campaign manager for Adlai Stevenson.

In 1952, the news forum program featured a roster of guests that included Democratic Presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson; both Vice-Presidential candidates, Richard Nixon and John Sparkman; Presidential aspirants Richard Russell, Robert A. Taft, Estes Kefauver, Robert S. Kerr, and

W. Averill Harriman; Democratic National Committeemen Frank E. McKinney and Jacob Arvey; and Republican National Committeeman Arthur Summerfield. The program that year also featured two one-hour pre-convention programs, each of which presented a number of the respective contenders for Presidential and Vice-Presidential nomination in direct question and answer exchanges with the MEET THE PRESS panel.

Almost every major political figure has appeared on the program over the years. Those who have not appeared on the program have not been ignored, but rather, have not expressed the desire to appear at the particular time they were asked. President Truman never appeared, even after he was out of office. President Eisenhower once accepted an invitation when he was chief of staff, then cancelled out. His failure to accept an invitation during the 1952 campaign was thrown at him by reporters on a number of occasions and irritated him to a point where he said he never would appear. The press quoted him once as warning members of his cabinet not to appear. When one of his members said he had already accepted an invitation, the President supposedly said, "Watch our for that fellow Spivak."[115] Senator Harry Byrd and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn are two other prominent figures who cancelled out of invitations and never appeared on the program.

The program consistently offers most political figures the opportunity for national exposure of their views before,

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[115] *Ibid*.

during, and after any political campaign year. Moreover, by the incisive questioning of the panel, the program on occasion has produced some newsmaking moments in national politics.

MEET THE PRESS is directly credited with producing the beginnings of at least two Presidential nominations. The most famous of these occurred on October 15, 1950. The guest was Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, immediately after he had reconsidered his previous refusal to run again for the Governorship of the state. As he was a Republican party leader, a two-time Presidential nominee, his decision raised many questions as to his possibility of national candidacy.

Soon after the reporters began their questioning, Dewey was obviously asked why he had reconsidered running for Governor. He replied that his health was better and the country was at war. Leo Egan of The New York Times then asked whether his decision could be because he wanted another try at the Republican Presidential nomination. Dewey replied that he had removed himself from that position about eighteen months previously and would not reconsider that decision. The newsmaking statement was elicited in the next few questions.

> EGAN: Governor, if you are not going to run, do you have any candidate in mind?
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> DEWEY: Well, it's a little too early, but we have in New York a very great world figure . . . and if I should be re-elected governor and have influence with the New York delegation, I would recommend to them that they support General Eisenhower for President if he would accept the draft.[116]

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[116]Hubert Pryor, Look, February 10, 1953, p. 33.

The next morning saw newspaper headlines like the following all across the country.

> DEWEY BOOMS IKE FOR '52 RACE--HE'S OUT:
> BIDS GENERAL TO RUN
>
> DEWEY FOR IKE IN '52: FLATLY RULES SELF OUT[117]

It was the beginning of an Eisenhower boom, two years before the 1952 election, which carried through to victory and the White House.

It was MEET THE PRESS which also gave the impetus to the eventual candidacy of Adlai E. Stevenson. One day after Harry Truman announced his decision not to seek reelection, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois was a MEET THE PRESS guest on March 30, 1952. Again, the important element of timing played a role in Stevenson's nomination. Although no newsworthy headlines resulted from his appearance on the program, Stevenson did project a picture of frankness, astute grasp, and a keen wit. It wasn't so much what he said but how he handled himself that day which made an impression on the audience.

A member of that audience was David L. Lawrence, Pittsburgh Democratic leader. Lawrence placed a call to Chicago's famous Jacob Arvey, Illinois Democratic National Committeeman, who played a leading role in persuading Stevenson to run for Governor in 1948. Lawrence told Arvey that in his opinion Stevenson was the man for the Democratic nomination. It was the beginning of a Stevenson boom, which with the help

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[117] *Ibid*.

of television exposure, resulted in his becoming a two-time nominee for the Presidency, and one of the nation's outstanding political figures.[118]

Arvey himself, appearing on MEET THE PRESS in October, 1952, in answer to a question about Stevenson, stated:

> Were it not for this program, he would never, in my opinion, have been considered as a candidate for the Presidency.[119]

Evidently, the Governor himself thought the same thing. After his defeat by General Eisenhower, Stevenson encountered Lawrence Spivak at a dinner. Pointing an accusing finger at him, he stated, "You got me into all that trouble."[120]

Over the years, the program has caught its share of political headlines in the face of competition from the other two major news interview programs. Most of these headline-making programs have not been of the "hard news" variety, but rather have elicited important indications of major party politics, strategy, and internal strife.

Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico made the front page in October, 1950, with his MEET THE PRESS appearance the day before. Anderson, then acting chairman of the Democratic National Committee, stated "Truman would be the only man considered by the Democrats as the 1952 Presidential candidate."[121]

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[118] Ibid.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Arnold H. Lubasch, "Personal Political Panaceas Hit TV," New York Times, April 12, 1964, sec. 2, p. 15.

[121] New York Times, October 23, 1950, p. 1.

It marked the first time a leading Democrat has come out so strongly for Mr. Truman's reelection, having the effect of tossing Truman's hat in the ring for the first time in the 1952 election year.

The Eisenhower-Taft battle for the nomination was reflected in several MEET THE PRESS headline-making programs. Harold Stassen used the program early in January, 1952, to deny that his aim was to help the General in entering the Illinois Republican primary.[122] Senator Taft publicly stated on MEET THE PRESS that Eisenhower's weakness lay in the many issues on which he hadn't taken a stand.[123] Taft's feelings about Eisenhower were perhaps best revealed in the Senator's final appearance on MEET THE PRESS before leaving for the Republican National Convention. Asked about the report that a Taft-MacArthur combination was under consideration, Taft declared, "That would be quite a ticket."[124] He then stated, "It would be entirely up to General MacArthur and I don't know whether he would accept."[125] Actually, his statement had slipped out before he was able to stop himself and give his stock answer to questions about the Vice-Presidential nomination, "that for obvious reasons he could not comment about the possible candidacies for the Vice-Presidential

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[122] New York Times, January 7, 1952, p. 1.

[123] New York Times, March 10, 1952, p. 1.

[124] New York Times, June 30, 1952, p. 1.

[125] Ibid.

nomination." This incident was significant because only a few minutes earlier he had given this stock answer when queried how he would feel about General Eisenhower as a running mate.

Governor Adlai Stevenson's reluctance as a potential candidate was revealed on his MEET THE PRESS appearances in March, 1952. The following week, Democratic National Chairman Frank McKinney used the program to warn that "nobody could get to the White House without working for it."[126]

The first hint at a bid by Averill Harriman for the 1956 Democratic nomination was made on a MEET THE PRESS program of July, 1955, by New York political head Carmen DeSapio. It was the first time that DeSapio publicly indicated that Harriman would be in the political race the following year.[127] Senator Stuart Symington also used the program in January, 1960, to come as close as he could to announcing his candidacy.[128] During the 1960 campaign, Richard Nixon used MEET THE PRESS to make his first public television appearance after eleven days in the hospital. He made headlines by publicly seeking a date to end all talk on the religious issue.[129] Earlier that year, Senator John Kennedy was a program guest one day after his announced candidacy,

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[126]New York Times, April 7, 1952, p. 9.

[127]New York Times, July 4, 1955, p. 1.

[128]New York Times, January 11, 1960, p. 1.

[129]New York Times, September 22, 1960, p. 1.

and challenged Johnson and Symington to enter the primaries.[130] Senator Hubert Humphrey appeared on the program only two days before the crucial Wisconsin primary of 1960. Two days after his announced candidacy in 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater used the program for his first appearance as a candidate before a national audience. His frank remarks on the program elicited the following New York Times headline.

GOLDWATER WOULD THREATEN A BREAK WITH SOVIET[131]

Following his defeat in 1964, Goldwater issued a statement proposing to realign the two major parties into a Liberal and Conservative two party system. Henry Cabot Lodge used MEET THE PRESS to publicly object to Goldwater's proposal in no weak terms, giving an indication of the divided state of the Party. The New York Times headline the following day, read:

LODGE DENOUNCES PARTY REALIGNING[132]

Headlines, however, do not tell the full meaning of any one statement made on a program, nor do they indicate the flexibility or firmness with which a statement was made. A headline by its nature is concise and selective. It can reflect an interpretation of a statement, rather than the true meaning of the statement itself. It can, by the addition of adjectives, in verbally describing the nature of a statement, or in selectively summarizing a statement, misconstrue the

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[130] New York Times, January 7, 1960, p. 1.

[131] New York Times, January 6, 1964, p. 17.

[132] New York Times, November 16, 1964, p. 17.

true meaning. Headlines cannot indicate the context in which a statement is made; what preceded it or what followed.

The significance of a program lies many times, not in the headline-making statement but in the opinions and thoughts that do not necessarily make the headlines. Over the long term, a candidate's image must be measured not by any one statement but in his many statements on many issues, as expressed on many interview programs. Are his views a result of consistent and logical expression, as they remain stable or fluctuate over the years? Do his replies reflect an evasive nature, or do they indicate a desire for frankly meeting an issue head on?

The significance of the panel itself also does not lie in the number of headlines it can elicit, but rather in how it goes about eliciting the kinds of facts and opinions which can make headlines. What is the questioning method employed which can force a straight reply where one is not readily given? Does the program draw out discussion on the really important issues of the campaign? Is the questioning pattern consistent, regardless of the political views of the guest and the panel?

The answers to these questions form the qualitative dimension of the program, which most contributes to our knowledge of the value of the political interview, more than chronological continuity, more than the number of awards or headlines which the program has elicited. It is along this dimension that MEET THE PRESS will now be measured in the following analytical chapters.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTIONING PROCESS

The essence of MEET THE PRESS, like any political interview program, lies in its questioning process. Through the kinds of questions posed by the panel and its insistence on clear, direct answers, the program strikes at the heart of important issues. Certainly, by its question-and-answer technique, its statements and comments of a speculative nature, and its treatment of political subject matter, the program combines the elements of both rhetorical and dialectical discourse. Consequently, it emerges as not only an interview program, but an enlightening forum for political discussion.

The main objective on those programs featuring political guests would seem to be an attempt to replace the vague ambiguities of political rhetoric with specific comment and opinion. Under the scrutinizing probe of the MEET THE PRESS panel, the general accusation must give way to the specific charge, the cliche criticism must be replaced by the specific alternative, the nebulous term or statement must give way to the specific clarification or definition of meaning. The evasive answer can serve only to contribute to an evasive political image. It is this direct quality which

gives MEET THE PRESS a decided advantage over the political speech as a means of political communication and information. The campaign speech usually is devoid of any immediate challenge or questioning of charges, criticisms, or inconsistencies which are couched in the language of political platitudes. The televised speech has no audience immediately to point out or question any implications or dangers inherent in any policy, or to express the alternate point of view.

The questioning procedure, therefore, supported by the preparation of the panel, the impossibility of question control by the guest, and the significance of the particular guest at the particular time he is on the show, are the most important dimensions of the program. Important answers can be elicited only by important and timely questions.

This chapter will illustrate the kinds of questions asked in various areas of political opinion. The answers themselves will not be stressed as much as the questions posed in order to analyze the probing technique of the panel. As has been previously pointed out, in those programs featuring political guests, the panelists concentrate mostly on questions of opinion and commitment regarding important issues, rather than on questions of information. This fact was elicited by correspondence with several of the major panelists who have appeared over the years on the programs being analyzed. More specifically, the chapter will deal with those kinds of questions which attempt to cut at the heart of the issues by clarification, rather than with those

questions of general opinion, comment, or information.

The importance of the opinion elicited on the program is usually assured by the fact that in general questions focus on the reason why the guest is newsworthy at the moment. In the case of political candidates most questions naturally deal with political issues of candidacy, party politics, and campaigns and issues. Many of the candidates, however, have been questioned on the program in various other roles. Henry Cabot Lodge and Adlai Stevenson both appeared several times as United Nations representatives. The questions on these programs naturally centered in important pending actions or decisions within the United Nations regarding a variety of international issues. Senator Estes Kefauver was a guest during the height of his crime investigating activity in 1951. In 1958 then United States Senator Hubert Humphrey was a program guest following his newsmaking interview with Soviet leader Krushchev. Question content in all cases was determined by the guest's role at the particular moment, thus insuring timely opinion and information.

An analysis of questions in those programs being studied revealed that the majority of opinion questions asked for clarification purpose fall under several major types as follows:

1. Questions of clarification or definition of terms. These questions involve the clarification by the guest of the meaning of any term, statement, or point of view expressed, either on the program or at some other time. An example of

this kind of questioning took place on a program featuring Estes Kefauver in May, 1952. The questions were asked by panelist Lawrence Spivak.

> SPIVAK: Senator, you yourself, in a speech you made on May 7th said, "We in the Federal Government must clean up our own house. Some steps have been taken to accomplish this but what has been done is not yet enough." What exactly did you mean by that?[1]

> SPIVAK: As late as April 5th for example you said at Cleveland and again I quote, "A criminal element has been gaining ground and worming its way into all levels of government." Can you be more specific on that?[2]

2. Questions involving the explanation of inconsistencies. These questions elicit the explanation of inconsistencies between political statements and actions, inconsistencies of governmental or political policies and actions, and inconsistencies of language. An example of this kind of questioning involving inconsistency of governmental policy took place on a program in October, 1954. The guest was Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., then Chief U. S. Delegate to the United Nations. Lawrence Spivak questioned American actions outside of the United Nations as being inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

> SPIVAK: Wasn't the United Nations formed originally really to prevent aggression? Yet, we're running all over the world trying to set up treaties with various other countries in

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[1]MEET THE PRESS program script, May 18, 1952, p. 16.

[2]*Ibid*., p. 17.

order to prevent aggression, all outside the UN.[3]

A question involving inconsistency between political talk and political action involved Vice Presidential candidate Richard Nixon on a program of September, 1952. The question was put to Nixon by Felix Belair of the New York Times.

BELAIR: Senator, you have had some things to say recently about the need to clean up the awful mess in Washington, and I assume that that includes tax evasion and tax fixing, and the mess in the Internal Revenue Bureau. That being so, how do you explain your negative vote on the President's plan to put revenue collectors under civil service and make it a blue ribbon entry which ultimately was done?[4]

3. Questions involving committal to a specific action or policy or proposed alternative to the resolution of a problem of issue. These questions usually involve the action a guest might take, given the role and opportunity to face and resolve important issues. Also involved are alternative solutions to important problems, when governmental solutions or solutions by other individuals to these problems are adversely criticized by the guest. In March, 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson was asked the following questions by May Craig of the Portland Press-Herald, which illustrate this type of direct committal question.

CRAIG: Governor, you said once that peace is the unfinished task of our generation. Korea of course is the hot spot. What would you do about Korea?

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[3]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 10, 1954, p. 2.

[4]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 5.

CRAIG: It's been since last July now since we've even tried to get a truce. Would you just go on talking at Panmunjon?[5]

A series of questions regarding the filibuster issue were put to Senator John Sparkman testing his stand on civil rights, during a program of August, 1952. As Vice Presidential nominee of the Democratic party, he was asked questions based on the hypothetical possibility of his being elected to office, and the role he could play regarding the filibuster. The following questions of commitment were put to Sparkman by William White of the New York Times.

WHITE: Senator . . . as vice-president and therefore as presiding officer of the Senate, what part would you be willing or prepared to take in carrying out that part of the Democratic platform that calls for amending the Senate rules against filibuster?

SPARKMAN: The vice-president as presiding officer of the Senate has no vote except in case of a tie.

WHITE: He could however, it is conceivable isn't it, he could find himself in the position where he had to make a very important ruling?

SPARKMAN: Certainly.

WHITE: Would you as presiding officer of the Senate feel bound by the statement made in the platform or would you feel bound by whatever precedent had existed in the Senate itself?[6]

The questions strike at the heart of the civil rights issue and the handicap which filibuster had always presented

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[5]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 7.

[6]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 10, 1952, p. 4.

in the passage of any civil rights legislation. Since Sparkman as a Southerner had always defended the filibuster, his answers to these questions would test his sincerity in carrying out the Democratic platform regardless of sectional tradition.

Alternative solutions to criticism of policy also fall under this category of questioning as exemplified in a program of May, 1957, featuring Adlai Stevenson. The following question was put to the former Governor and Democratic nominee for President by James Reston of the New York Times.

> RESTON: . . . There was a great deal of criticism this weekend about the Eisenhower foreign policy. But in specific terms, does your party or do you have an alternative say to our policy in Germany or the Middle East or with Communist China? What would you do other than what is now being done.[7]

A similar type of question was put to Stevenson by Lawrence Spivak on a program in April, 1960.

> SPIVAK: When you returned from South America, you accused our leaders of "talking of freedom and embracing dictators." Haven't we got quite a problem in South America? How do we deal with the dictatorships of the left and the right? Would you have us deal with Castro today the way you would have us deal with Trujillo?[8]

4. Questions or statements containing a built-in premise. These questions or statements by the panelists serve to point out valid points of view, facts, assumptions,

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[7]MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 7.

[8]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 10.

and problems connected with major issues and policies. They serve as a means of getting at the truth of the matter and exposing all sides to be considered. The guest might or might not accept the premises, depending upon the nature of the premise and the language in which it is stated. Several examples of this type of questioning occurred on a program of December, 1951, featuring Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. who was then acting campaign manager for General Dwight Eisenhower. The first question concerned Eisenhower's reluctance to declare himself a Republican, and included several premises regarding Eisenhower's political strategy.

> SPIVAK: But isn't he in essence saying to the American people, "I am going to do my duty as an army officer and I am not going to say that I am interested in the nomination and that I am a Republican," but all those other people who are very very responsible--Governor Dewey, and Senator Lodge and Senator Carlson, and all those people whose words you can trust say, "I am a Republican and that I am interested in the nomination," and isn't that political coyness?[9]

A second question contained built in premises regarding a Republican Party split. It was put to Lodge by James Wechsler of the New York Post.

> WECHSLER: Isn't the split between the Republican party and the so-called international wing and what I would call the McCormick wing as sharp as any split in the Democratic party?
>
> LODGE: No.
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> WECHSLER: And wouldn't that be as great a problem

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[9]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 3.

to General Eisenhower as any that the Democratic President faces?

LODGE: In the first place, I don't think the split is as sharp as the split in the Democratic party on the civil rights issue. In the second place, I think that the Republican president will naturally have a much stronger influence over the Republican Senate than a Democratic President has.[10]

Lodge rejected both premises of a strong party split and an Eisenhower problem if elected, because of this split.

There are times when the premises, although possibly valid, are presented in language which makes it difficult to determine whether the panelist is objectively expressing a valid point, or whether he is expressing a personal bias on the issue. This type of statement will be discussed later in the chapter under the matter of program objectivity.

When an evasive answer is given to any type of question, a panelist might repeat the question, rephrase it, or rephrase the answer to remove any doubt in interpretation. This technique in pursuit of a direct reply resulted in a headline-making admission by Senator Barry Goldwater on a MEET THE PRESS program of February, 1955. Panelist Lawrence Spivak was questioning Goldwater on the importance of President Eisenhower's running again as a factor in whether the Republicans could gain control of Congress in 1956.

SPIVAK: Do you think you could possibly win without him?

GOLDWATER: Well, I don't think it's right for any American to say any other American is

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

indispensable and I think President Eisenhower would be the first to agree with that. But I think in this case he's the obvious choice for President and I'm hopeful.

SPIVAK: I'm not saying indispensable to the country; is he indispensable to your victory? Do you think you could possibly win without him?

GOLDWATER: I think President Eisenhower is the obvious candidate of the Republican Party and I hope he accepts it.

SPIVAK: The question is do you think you could win without him?

GOLDWATER: I'll give you my personal opinion, I don't think we can.[11]

Goldwater's pessimistic admission drew a New York Times headline the next day.

The method of rephrasing an answer for further clarification was utilized in this exchange between Lawrence Spivak and U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson in September, 1961. The questioning concerned the issue of Berlin.

SPIVAK: The most serious threat to the peace of the world today is the threat to Berlin by the Soviet Union, and the UN's major objective is to make sure that there is peace in the world and to handle such threats. Why hasn't this matter been brought before the UN?

STEVENSON: Do you mean, why hasn't it previously, or why has an item not been inscribed so far before the UN?

SPIVAK: Why has it not been inscribed; why hasn't it been brought up previously?

STEVENSON: I suppose the reason why it has not been brought before the United Nations thus far

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[11]MEET THE PRESS program script, February 27, 1955, p. 11.

is that there is little that can be done except to call upon the parties in interest to negotiate, that is to say, the Soviet Union on the one hand and the allies on the other . . . The only solution for it is negotiation, the jurisdiction or the utility of the United Nations is somewhat limited.

SPIVAK: In short, what you are saying really is that the UN is helpless to do anything where the large nations, the big nations are involved.

STEVENSON: I don't think it is helpless in the exercise of its moral responsibility and moral judgment on the right and the wrong of issues. What is involved in Berlin as we all know, is the sanctity of international treaties; it is the self-determination of peoples, the integrity of the pledged word. All of these are considerations which, I think, concern the members of the United Nations.

SPIVAK: Are you saying then that the issue of Berlin will not be brought up before the UN and that it makes no point to bring it up?

STEVENSON: Oh, I can't answer that; I don't know whether it will be brought up or not.[12]

This, then, is the questioning procedure employed by the panel. The different kinds of questions employed seek clarification and truth regarding important issues. Direct replies are elicited by repeating the question, rephrasing it, or rephrasing the answer, so that every effort is made to overcome evasion. On occasion the panel has failed to elicit some kind of direct reply or clarification. Since the time limit prevents any one question from being pursued indefinitely, some answers do get by with no further probing. The number of completely evasive replies, however, is minimal,

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[12]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, ps. 1-2.

and will be discussed later in this study. This chapter will now focus on examples of the questioning process at work, as it has dealt with some typical political issues over the years.

THE CANDIDACY

One of the most evasive areas of political rhetoric is that of the denial or admission of a politician's candidacy for office. Over the years the MEET THE PRESS panel when given the opportunity has proven that a firm refusal to run for office can never be elicited, and is hardly reliable when it is. In March, 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois was a program guest. Stevenson had been highly touted by party leaders as a potential but reluctant nominee. By carefully probing, the panel eliminated any doubt as to Stevenson's willingness to accept the nomination, if not actively to seek it. The questioning began with Edwin Leahy of the Chicago Daily News.

> LEAHY: You have said you don't want a place on the ticket, haven't you, that you aren't seeking it?
>
> STEVENSON: Yes, I have said that I was a candidate for Governor of Illinois and that's all.
>
> SPIVAK: President Truman said yesterday that he will not be a candidate for the Democratic nomination nor will be accept a draft. Does that describe your position, sir?
>
> STEVENSON: . . . I have no other ambitions than to be Governor of Illinois. I do not seek, I will not seek, the Democratic nomination for the Presidency.

Since, "not seeking" does not, however, mean "not accepting,"

Spivak rephrased the reply.

> SPIVAK: Are we to understand from what you have just said that you are requesting that your name not be presented to the convention for the Democratic nomination and that if it is presented, that you will ask that it be withdrawn, sir?
>
> STEVENSON: Mr. Spivak that's a bridge that's more than four months hence, isn't it? It certainly is a bridge that I will not attempt to cross now, I can only tell you what my present state of mind is and that is that I'm a candidate for Governor and nothing else and I seek nothing but that.[13]

Stevenson's evasive direct reply to Spivak's question resulted in the following question sometime later in the program by May Craig.

> CRAIG: Governor, I've been here twenty years and I have heard a lot of ways of talking about things, like I'm not a candidate and so forth--General Eisenhower went through that. President Truman said a very simple thing last night. He said, I shall not accept a nomination. Will you say that or will you not say that?
>
> STEVENSON: I will not say that. I will say that that's a bridge and I can't cross it until I come to it and I see very little likelihood that I will have to come to it.[14]

As was pointed out in a previous chapter, his appearance on this program, and his reply, opened the door to his eventual draft and nomination. The New York Times ran the following headline the day after the program.

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[13]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, ps. 7-9.

[14]Ibid., p. 10.

GOVERNOR SAYS NO--BUT WONT SAY HE WOULD REFUSE NOMINATION IF OFFERED[15]

One of the most nebulous candidacies was that of General Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 Presidential election. Not only Eisenhower's candidacy, but his political party and his stands on various issues were all a matter of deep concern. MEET THE PRESS on several programs skillfully pointed out the uncertain areas of his candidacy, including his relationship with his campaign manager Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Eisenhower's extreme popularity among members of both political parties and the possibility of a party split was a matter of deep concern among party leaders of both sides. In July, 1951, Senator John Sparkman was a program guest after having just returned from Europe and conferring with Eisenhower and other European leaders. The questioning began with Ruth Montgomery of the New York Daily News.

MONTGOMERY: Do you think Ike is willing to be a candidate next year?

SPARKMAN: I haven't the slightest idea.

MONTGOMERY: Would you like to see him say on the Democratic ticket next year?

Sparkman's answer, which did not address itself to the question, resulted in the following question by Montgomery in an effort to determine party loyalty.

MONTGOMERY: Well, with him at the head of the Republican ticket, which I am sure you wouldn't like, and President Truman head of your ticket, do you think that the Dixiecrats

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[15]New York Times, March 31, 1952, p. 1.

would bolt and vote for Ike next year?

SPARKMAN: Well, I don't know what the Dixiecrats would do.[16]

Since the Dixiecrats in Alabama were bound not to vote for Truman in 1948, the question of Sparkman's own preferences came up, since he stated he was not a Dixiecrat.

MONTGOMERY: Do you want to see him run for President next June?

SPARKMAN: I haven't given a great deal of thought to next year's election.

Martha Rountree then asked the following.

ROUNTREE: Would you vote for him for President?

SPARKMAN: I will vote for the nominee of the Democratic Party . . . I will vote for the electors who will pledge themselves to support the Democratic Party.

To eliminate all doubt of Sparkman's loyalty to the party even if Eisenhower were the Republican nominee, Rountree asked the following.

ROUNTREE: If Eisenhower were a Republican, you wouldn't vote for him then?

SPARKMAN: I will not violate my oath when I cast my ballot to vote for the nominee of the Democratic Party.[17]

This reply, of course, committed Sparkman to vote for the Democratic nominee even if the Alabama electors voted for Eisenhower on the Republican ticket.

In August, 1951, Henry Cabot Lodge was a program guest after he had just returned from a call on the General. Lodge

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[16] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 29, 1951, p. 2.

[17] Ibid., ps. 3-4.

expressed a desire to see Eisenhower as President, even though admitting he didn't know whether Eisenhower was a Republican or a Democrat. Martha Rountree tested Lodge's loyalty to his party regardless of Eisenhower's political preference, as she had tested Sparkman's.

ROUNTREE: Would you like to see him President even if it were on a Democratic ticket?

LODGE: I would like to see him President. I think I'll stand on that. I'd rather see him on the Republican ticket.

The answer did not affirm Lodge's rejection of Eisenhower on the Democratic ticket: hence Rountree's important follow-up question to remove any doubt.

ROUNTREE: If he was on the Democratic ticket, would you vote for him?

LODGE: That depends whom the Republicans put up.[18]

It would seem that Lodge was less committed to the party than to the man, whereas Sparkman was more committed to the party. It is possible that both men, by their answers, were sure of Eisenhower's political preference, even though the General had been non-committal.

The vagueness of Eisenhower's political preference was again made apparent in December, 1951, when Lodge was again a guest, this time as Eisenhower's campaign manager. Lawrence Spivak addressed the following question to Lodge.

SPIVAK: . . . Most of the supporters say that it is not a good thing for him to talk out loud and say, "I am a Republican. I am interested in the

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[18]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1951, p. 2.

nomination." Isn't that essentially true?

LODGE: I don't think he ought to do that while he is a regular army officer on active duty.[19]

In March, 1952, following the Minnesota primary Eisenhower stated he was going to have to reconsider his position on running for office. Lodge was again a MEET THE PRESS guest. With an apparent draft Eisenhower movement building up, the question of his returning before convention time was important, in light of the following statement on the program by Lodge.

LODGE: I think the question of his coming home ought to be considered in the light of whether the things that only he can do have been done in Europe.

The important question of whether the General would refuse the nomination if he, or the government, considered his job incomplete, was raised by Martha Rountree.

ROUNTREE: Suppose the job wasn't done and he was nominated and elected. Would he have to refuse to accept it then?

LODGE: Oh no, he said definitely he will accept the nomination. There is no question about that.[20]

The matter of Eisenhower's reluctance to return before convention time raised a valid premise in this question put to Lodge by Marshall McNeil of the Scripps Howard chain.

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[19]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 2.

[20]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 23, 1952, ps. 1-2.

McNEIL: As a matter of fact, isn't it possible that your candidate might get himself into some trouble by an early return?

Lodge rejected this premise, leading to the following question by McNeil which stated the implications of his first question.

McNEIL: He's been a front runner thus far without saying anything particularly. Why change the technique?

LODGE: He hasn't said anything in this campaign, but of course his views are well known on all the great questions at bay.[21]

This reply by Lodge introduced a series of questions regarding Eisenhower's views. Lodge admittedly did not know where Eisenhower stood on the issues of Senator McCarthy's campaign, China policy, a compulsory FEPC, or the supporting of Senator Taft if he received the Republican nomination. The entire series of questions served to portray a picture of a nebulous relationship between Lodge and his candidate and a nebulous image of Eisenhower as a politician and what he stood for, only four months before convention time.

Aside from pointing up nebulous candidacies, the program has also proven the unreliability of firm non-candidacy statements on the part of some individuals. In November, 1958, John Kennedy was a program guest a week after rolling up a landslide senatorial victory in Massachusetts. He was questioned by James Reston of the New York Times.

RESTON: Senator Kennedy, are you now seeking delegates

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[21] Ibid., p. 3.

to the 1960 presidential nominating convention?

KENNEDY: I am not.

RESTON: Have you established or will you establish headquarters looking to 1960?

KENNEDY: No.

RESTON: Do you have any plans to enter the preferential primaries of 1960?

KENNEDY: I don't.[22]

A little over a year later the Senator announced his candidacy.

In June, 1958, Senator Hubert Humphrey appeared on the program the week he received the Farm-Labor Party's endorsement for the 1960 presidential nomination. Jack Bell of the Associated Press asked Humphrey the direct question.

BELL: Your state convention has endorsed you as a Presidential nominee. Are you running?

Humphrey's evasive answer invited a repetition of the question by Bell.

BELL: Are you running? Are you a candidate for President?

HUMPHREY: My term for the Senate expires in 1960, and I shall attempt to get re-elected to the United States Senate.

Bell then rephrased the answer to make it a more specific and affirmative statement of non-candidacy.

BELL: You are not running, then, for President?

HUMPHREY: I am not running for President, that is correct.

The reply still did not rule out an acceptance, however; hence Bell's next question.

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[22]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 9, 1958, p. 1.

BELL: You don't care to have the Democratic nomination?

HUMPHREY: That is not what I said. I said I am not running for President.[23]

Humphrey's reply was indicative of his announcement of candidacy a little over a year and a half later.

Senator Barry Goldwater also delivered a direct reply to a question put to him on a program in November, 1961, by Robert Abernethy of NBC News.

ABERNETHY: Will you be a candidate for your party's nomination?

GOLDWATER: No, I will not.[24]

In view of the record, any potential candidate's denial of Presidential ambitions would seem to be hollow rhetoric. If the rhetoric of candidacy is of a nebulous nature, the rhetoric of a political campaign is even more so. It is in this area that MEET THE PRESS also serves the public by clarifying issues and sharpening candidate images.

THE RHETORIC OF CAMPAIGNS

A political campaign by its nature is filled with the sound of ambiguous charges, countercharges, praises, and promises. On MEET THE PRESS, however, criticism must be strengthened by alternatives, accusations must give way to

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[23]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 3.

[24]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 7.

specific facts, and praise should be supported by reason. The ambiguous word or term must be clearly defined for public understanding.

The definition of terms plays a major role in understanding any candidate's stand on an issue with minimum opportunity for misinterpretation.

An important issue regarding Eisenhower's candidacy in 1952 was brought out in these two questions regarding definition of terms on a program of December, 1951. The questions were put to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. by Ogden Reid of the New York Herald Tribune and by Lawrence Spivak. The issue involved was why Eisenhower more than any other individual could get a more cooperative Congress to work for peace, since the desire for peace is more important than any party loyalty.

> REID: When you opened the Eisenhower campaign . . . you said . . . that "the biggest single blow that could be struck against communism and for peace would be done with the election of General Eisenhower to the Presidency." Could you tell me just what you meant by that?[25]

> SPIVAK: Senator, you said a moment ago that General Eisenhower will make a great contribution toward peace . . . Exactly what did you mean by that? What can be done that isn't being done now that the Republicans will support?[26]

The difficulty Lodge had in explaining his terms with supporting reasons is illustrated in the dialogue which followed between Lodge and Spivak.

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[25]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 4.

[26]Ibid., p. 8.

LODGE: Well, . . . under his leadership we would get a much better production effort than we are getting now.

SPIVAK: Why do you think we would get a much better production? Isn't Charles Wilson, who is in charge of our production, a Republican?

LODGE: . . . We have an atmosphere of politics as usual and business as usual in Washington, and it is the failure of the administration to galvanize and lead the country that is at the bottom of all our troubles including the lack of production. That is way beyond Mr. Wilson's sphere.

Spivak's next question struck at the heart of the leadership question and at the lack of cooperation of Republicans themselves in the effort to better conditions.

SPIVAK: How much of that trouble is due to contributions of members of your own party? For example, you take the simple matter of organizing the European army. There was much more objection, wasn't there, from Republicans than there was from Democrats?[27]

The series of questions seemed to point up the difficulty in explaining the term "contribution toward peace" in political realities, other than having faith in the General's magnetic popularity to overcome all political disunity.

The program also brought up another important question involving the definition of a very basic term. Lodge had stated his firm belief that the General was a Republican and would be nominated on that basis. Since Eisenhower's domestic and foreign views were at the time rather nebulous, James Wechsler of the New York Post asked Lodge the following question.

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[27] Ibid.

WECHSLER: How do you define Republicanism on domestic issues, on foreign policy? Is he an Eisenhower Republican or a Willkie Republican? He is not a Taft Republican, I gather.[28]

A question regarding definition of terms also came up with regard to Richard Nixon's charges that Governor Stevenson was a captive candidate in the 1952 election. On a program of September, 1952, Nixon was questioned on this matter by Peter Edson of the Newspaper Enterprise Association and by Lawrence Spivak.

EDSON: Senator, in answer to my earlier question you indicated you believed Governor Stevenson was a captive of President Truman. Over the last week end the events of Senator Taft's conference with General Eisenhower have led many people to believe that General Eisenhower was maybe becoming a captive of Senator Taft. What is your opinion on that?

SPIVAK: Senator, I'd like to stay a minute on that captive business. Exactly when are you supported by an organization and when are you captured by it? What makes the difference? If the NAM is for you is that support? If the ADA is for you is that capture?[29]

The same kind of question involving interpretation of a term was put to Lyndon Johnson in the 1960 election regarding one of his charges against the Republican party. Johnson was questioned on a program of October, 1960, by Jack Steele of Scripps-Howard Newspapers.

STEELE: Senator, you said the other day that the Republican Party reminded you of a three-headed monster run by Nixon, Goldwater, and Rockefeller. You are running on three platforms this year;

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[28]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 17.

[29]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 7.

> the Democratic national platform, the Democratic state platform in Texas, which is quite a bit to the right of that, and the Liberal Party platform in New York, which is quite a bit to the left of it. Without suggesting in a political sense that maybe this makes you a three headed monster, don't you find this a little inconsistent?[30]

In both cases the panel demonstrated the difficulty of applying a common definition to the kinds of expressions hurled about during the heat of any political campaign.

Over the years, the MEET THE PRESS panel has continuously attempted to cut through the ambiguities of vague criticisms and elicit specific alternatives or reasons. When the general cannot be amplified by the specific in any charge or statement, the candidate's image is certainly affected.

In a program of December, 1951, the panel attempted to get Henry Cabot Lodge to be more specific about General Eisenhower's supposed criticism of Truman foreign policy. James Wechsler asked Lodge the following question.

> WECHSLER: You were quoted the other night as saying that he (Eisenhower) would contend that he had vigorously opposed concessions to Russia. Now I wish you could spell out in a little more detail what recommendation you think that occurred?
>
> LODGE: I don't know . . . I think he took that position and I think the position is very clearly expressed in the "Forrestal Diaries" . . . In the "Forrestal Diaries" it shows clearly that he thought you couldn't keep the Russians out of the war against Japan anyway; they were so anxious to get into it, and it

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[30]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 7.

was a great mistake to make all the concessions we did make in order to get them.

Since this reply still did not directly answer the question of what recommendations Eisenhower might have made, Lawrence Spivak posed the following question, calling for a specific instance.

SPIVAK: What about the decision to go into Berlin, Senator Lodge? Did he have any part in that?

LODGE: I don't know. I don't think he had any part in the decision to make Berlin an island completely surrounded by Soviet territory, which was a catastrophic decision.

Since Lodge had voiced an opinion but still hadn't directly answered the question, Spivak rephrased it to make it more specific.

SPIVAK: Do you think when the question came up as to whether or not to allow the American soldiers to go into Berlin, as to whether or not to let the Russians go in first, did he take any part in that decision: Did he object to that? It is a military decision.

LODGE: I don't know; I don't know.[31]

In March, 1952, Lodge was again questioned on the program with regard to Eisenhower's views, by William White of the New York Times. Lodge had made the statement, "I think it's known where he (Eisenhower) stands on all the important things."

WHITE: Is it known on a great many issues? Is it clear in your mind as to where the General stands?

LODGE: Yes.

WHITE: For example, do you know how he stands on

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[31]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 9, 1951, p. 14.

Senator McCarthy's campaign, how he stands about that?

LODGE: No.

WHITE: Before I leave this matter of issues may I ask you this question. Do you know how General Eisenhower stands on China policy?

LODGE: Well, I have just a personal impression which I can't prove, that he favored making a much bigger effort in Korea than was made . . . I think that history will show that he was not in sympathy with this lack of will to win.

WHITE: Will that be clear though, Senator, before the convention?

LODGE: I don't know.

Martha Rountree then asked Lodge the following.

ROUNTREE: Speaking of the General's views, do you know whether he is for a compulsory FEPC?

LODGE: I do not.[32]

Sometime later in the program, Marshall McNeil of Scripps-Howard Newspapers returned to the question of Eisenhower's views on China policy.

McNEIL: Getting back to what you said about the China views of Eisenhower, is there an implication there that he has advised the administration either early or late to do more than it has done?

LODGE: I don't know about that, but I understand that his opinion was that it should have been followed up much more than it was.

William White then asked a question which struck at the heart of the issue, a definition of the term "more," and how much of a commitment it would involve.

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[32]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 23, 1952, ps. 5-7.

WHITE: Senator . . . isn't the question what the definition of "more" is? How much farther?[33]

Since Eisenhower never did appear on the program, his views could be determined only as expressed by Lodge. The answers elicited from Lodge certainly did not portray a picture of clear understanding of the General's views by Lodge himself, nor could he be more specific on some of Eisenhower's supposed general criticism of the administration.

Governor Adlai Stevenson was also queried with regard to his criticism of the Eisenhower policy in a program of April, 1956. He was questioned by Lawrence Spivak.

SPIVAK: Governor, you in your speech yesterday said that the Administration has denied us facts on the world situation. And these were your words: "We have all too often been deliberately, intentionally misinformed." Can you give us some specific instances when important facts have been witheld from us that we have been deliberately misinformed?[34]

Stevenson then listed several specific instances. In April, 1960, the same kind of question was again put to Stevenson by Mr. Spivak.

SPIVAK: Governor, in your Virginia speech recently you charged, "Our own leaders have deceived us by under-rating the magnitude of the crisis." Is your charge that they have wilfully deceived us, or just that they were ignorant, their judgment was bad?

Stevenson then defined his terms in a more meaningful way, expressing a clear, direct opinion.

STEVENSON: As to wilfulness, if you imply wilfulness

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[33]*Ibid.*, p. 19.

[34]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 2.

in any malevolent sense, no. If you imply wilfulness as a means of covering up their failures or to obscure them, to put emphasis perhaps where I wouldn't put it, I'd say yes.[35]

Attempts to draw out specific statements from some of Lyndon Johnson's platitudes have also been in evidence several times on the program. Before the 1960 convention on a program of July, 1960, he was asked about one of his implied charges with respect to the fight for the nomination. John Steele of Time and Life magazine was the questioner.

STEELE: Would you give us a frank appraisal of how things look here so far as your candidacy for the nomination is concerned?

JOHNSON: I think they are encouraging. I think the people are going to size up all the candidates and, notwithstanding the great propaganda effort that's being made to stampede folks and to take their integrity away from them and to say that they can't independently exercise their judgment . . .

STEELE: I don't understand what you mean by this great propaganda campaign. What do you mean by that?[36]

During the same program Edwin Newman of NBC News asked Johnson to qualify one of his opinions.

NEWMAN: Senator, if you became President, what would you regard as the most urgent problem you had to deal with?

JOHNSON: I think the first problem the next President must deal with is to regain America's leadership, to regain the initiative in the world.

NEWMAN: How would you propose to do that?

JOHNSON: I would try to lay down a program that would

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[35]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 4.

[36]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 34.

> appeal to the minds of men and try to go directly to persons rather than to continue with this fifteen-year-old foreign policy of ours that concerned itself principally with government.

NEWMAN: Specifically, how would you do it?[37]

On a program of October, 1960, Johnson was asked about one of his implied criticisms reflecting on the character of Richard Nixon. The panelist was Robert Abernethy of NBC News.

> ABERNETHY: Senator, in almost every speech of your campaign so far, which I have heard, you have tried to attack the experience and consistency of Vice-President Nixon. I would like to ask you about this, about one of your charges specifically--may I ask you about one specific story you tell? You tell your audiences that the Republican platform Mr. Nixon wanted was changed at the insistence of Governor Rockefeller of New York. Then you go on to say, as you charge, that if Mr. Rockefeller can turn the Vice-President around, as you said it, in one midnight conference, you then ask, "What could Mr. Krushchev do if he got Mr. Nixon in a room all day?" What I would like to know is exactly what you mean to imply by that question? Are you trying to imply that Mr. Nixon lacks convictions or that he can be persuaded easily by Mr. Krushchev?

Johnson's evasive answer resulted in a repetition of the question by Abernethy.

> ABERNETHY: But what do you mean to say about Mr. Nixon's convictions when you ask that question?[38]

The term "extremism" played a major role in the rhetoric of the 1964 campaign. It was brought up, however, as early as 1961 with regard to a charge by Barry Goldwater against

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[37]Ibid., p. 26.

[38]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, ps. 5-6.

the Kennedy administration. On a program of November, 1961, Goldwater was put through the following interrogation by Lawrence Spivak.

SPIVAK: . . . In Atlanta, Georgia, yesterday you too went after the extremists, and this is what you said, "The real extremists are the people to the left. The socialists in the Kennedy Administration." Will you give us the names of the leading socialists in the . . .

GOLDWATER: I don't have the time to go clear through them.

SPIVAK: Just give us the names of some of the important people.

GOLDWATER: I would say Arthur Schlesinger . . . There are two other members of the Americans for Democratic Action--and this is the group to whom I refer as the extremists to the left--one of these is Ted Sorensen. The other one slips my mind for the moment, but in the White House there are three. There are three in Cabinet posts and I think, some thirty other members of this organization in government. Now, they are in. The Minutemen, the members of the Birch Society, are not in government, they are on the outside.

SPIVAK: Are you suggesting they are running the government rather than President Kennedy?

GOLDWATER: I am suggesting they have a mighty strong hand in it . . .

SPIVAK: You also suggested in your speech that the President himself was a leftist. I think you said, "The whole wagon train, including the wagon master, is riding on the left wheel all the time." Can you tell us what the President has done that makes him more leftist than Governor Rockefeller, for example, or even President Eisenhower?

GOLDWATER: I will just take the words of the ADA.

SPIVAK: Let's take the words of the President.

GOLDWATER: Well, . . . the President about six or seven

years ago disavowed this group as being too liberal. Today he seems to be in perfect harmony with them, so I must assume that he has accepted their liberal positions.

SPIVAK: Would you say there is anything he has done as President that Rockefeller or Eisenhower would sharply disapprove of or would consider leftist--that they themselves haven't done?

GOLDWATER: It is kind of hard to find anything that he has done . . . [39]

The series of questions demonstrated the difficulty the panel faces at times in attempting to elicit the specific charge from the general allusion with some candidates, regardless of how the questions are phrased or repeated.

One of the dilemmas in political campaigns is the question of how candidates within the same party can so violently disagree before a convention, yet manage to support completely the winning nominee after the convention. The reason for this was perhaps best brought out in a headline-making statement by Senator Estes Kefauver in the 1956 campaign. The Senator was being questioned by Lawrence Spivak about his criticism of Adlai Stevenson in the Florida and California primary campaigns.

SPIVAK: Senator, you made some pretty serious charges against Governor Stevenson as the Democratic nominee. Are you going to support him if he wins the nomination?

KEFAUVER: I certainly will if he wins the nomination.

SPIVAK: Regardless of the fact that you yourself said he was a fair weather liberal, you didn't like the position he has taken on

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[39] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, ps. 3-4.

race relations, big business, machine politics, and on social welfare, still and all you would support him against other Democratic nominees?

KEFAUVER: . . . frankly I think in California and in the latter part of the Florida campaign I did get somewhat out of character, but in the heat of campaigns you sometimes say things that you mightn't have said if you thought it over more.

Spivak then rephrased Kefauver's answer to eliminate any doubt as to the purpose and sincerity of Kefauver's attacks on Stevenson during the primaries.

SPIVAK: Well, Senator, may I get this straight, are you saying now that in the campaign during the primaries and the criticism you made of Governor Stevenson was what Wendell Willkie called just campaign oratory?

KEFAUVER: No it wasn't. The subject matters that I discussed were legitimate matters to discuss if we wanted to talk about one another's record or about differences of viewpoint. I think I got out of character later in the campaign about talking of differences in his viewpoint and my viewpoint.[40]

Kefauver's statement resulted in a New York Times headline the next day.

I LOST MY HEAD, KEFAUVER ADMITS[41]

The dialogue between Mr. Spivak and the Senator illustrate the program's technique in pinning down political statements so that candidates and guests must make some clarifying admissions.

Aside from its function of clarifying the ambiguities

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[40]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 17, 1956, ps. 2-3.

[41]New York Times, June 18, 1956, p. 1.

of political rhetoric, the MEET THE PRESS panel serves the viewing public in another vital area. The program continuously deals with the many issues involved in foreign policy and the "cold war." The questioning technique will now be examined in this context.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the semantics of the "cold war" the definition of terms is most important. Exact understanding of governmental policy in clearly defined terms is imperative in today's world of international tension. Words like "peace," "total victory," "commitment," "containment," "aggressor," cannot be tossed about lightly without specific interpretation by those who use them for those who hear them. MEET THE PRESS in this context consistently seeks exact meanings when confronted with these terms regardless of who uses them. Both political candidates and governmental representatives are expected to be clear and specific.

Another important area in foreign affairs is the questioning of government policy. The program points out inconsistencies, dangers, alternatives, and opposing points of view to policy and to individual opinion on that policy as expressed by the guest. This chapter will examine questioning employed in these two areas.

In 1951, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. then a principal apostle of a big 150 group air force, in explaining his position, stated:

LODGE: It's much cheaper to build this force and pay what it costs to submit to the inconvenience and get this thing over with in two or three years than it is to go muddling along as we are now.

Ernest Lindley of Newsweek promptly asked the important question regarding meaning of terms.

LINDLEY: Senator, what do you mean by "get things over with in two or three years?" Do you mean have a war?

The question struck at the heart of the issue in back of all our foreign policies. To what extent will we commit ourselves to further democratic ideals around the world, short of an actual major confrontation with communist powers? Lindley's question resulted in a clarification of Lodge's statement and opinion.

LODGE: Oh, no, of course not, Mr. Lindley. You know me well enough for that . . . When we regain the initiative and the Soviet Union confronts real strength, then they will accede to some of the reasonable demands that the civilized community of nations makes.[42]

In December, 1958, Senator Hubert Humphrey was a MEET THE PRESS guest, after a recent eight hour interview with Soviet Prime Minister Krushchev, which attracted world wide attention. The subject of Berlin occupied a good part of the program's questioning. The crux of the questioning, however, and the heart of the issue were focused upon in the following dialogue among Humphrey, Lawrence Spivak, and William Randolph Hearst Jr. of Hearst Newspapers.

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[42]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1951, ps. 7-8.

SPIVAK: Did you come away feeling that there was anything we could offer on Berlin that would ease the crisis without hurting the West?

HUMPHREY: . . . I feel that in Berlin, as I said, number one, we must make positively sure to the whole world that West Berlin will be preserved as a free area of the world and not as Krushchev talks, a free city. That access to it will be guaranteed. That West Berlin will not be bargained away by itself.

SPIVAK: Does that mean that you would be prepared if necessary to use force to stay there?

HUMPHREY: . . . I don't think we can afford to compromise this away a bit.

SPIVAK: Is it your impression then, that if we stand firm and let Krushchev understand that if he is going to go to war for Berlin, we are going to be there when he comes--

HUMPHREY: We have already said this.

SPIVAK: We have not quite said that, I think.

HUMPHREY: I think we have said though, through NATO, that we consider Berlin to be a part of the NATO area, since Berlin is in fact a part of the West Republic of Germany.

SPIVAK: I don't think anybody has said in so many words that we are going to stay there no matter what.

HUMPHREY: I think we have in the past and if we haven't we'd better say so now.

Hearst then asked Humphrey to define one of the basic terms being used in the discussion.

HEARST: The words "stand firm" have been used rather frequently. Would you give us a definition of what you mean by "stand firm?" Does that mean break a blockade on the ground if they set one up?[43]

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[43]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, ps. 4-5.

Thus, the panel in this discussion again demanded clarification of important terms and a clear statement of our position.

Senator Barry Goldwater, appearing on the program in November, 1961, was also asked by Earl Mazo of the New York Herald Tribune to define his use of the term "tough" in the cold war context.

> MAZO: We hear a lot of criticism of the President's not being "tough"--is the word with Krushchev. What exactly is meant by that? Does it mean we should go to war? How much tougher would you be than President Kennedy has been?[44]

Goldwater was again questioned along these lines on a program of January, 1964, shortly following his announced candidacy for the Republican nomination.

> SPIVAK: Senator, in his New Year's greeting to President Johnson, Mr. Krushchev said he was convinced that the new year would bring east-west understanding on a broad range of issues and an easing of the cold war. Are you convinced of that?
>
> GOLDWATER: No, I am not convinced in the least, and I was happy to see that our President by his answer indicated that he is not convinced.
>
> SPIVAK: You would make the same answer that President Johnson did on that to Mr. Krushchev?
>
> GOLDWATER: I would--along these lines. "If you mean what you say, Mr. Krushchev, put up or shut up," as we Western poker players say.
>
> SPIVAK: And by "putting up" what would you mean, get out of Cuba, get out of Berlin?
>
> GOLDWATER: Get out of Cuba, get out of the countries where he has gone without the people's permission . . .

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[44]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 4.

SPIVAK: Senator, I am not quite sure I understand your foreign policy theory. You say you would say to the Soviet to "put up or shut up." Well, supposing, if you were President and you said to them as you have advocated in things before, an armed blockade of Cuba or get the troops out of Cuba, and they said, No, if you were President would you go to war?[45]

Again, Spivak's question had to result in a clarification of Goldwater's views and the limit of his commitment.

Our involvement in Asia and attitude toward Red China have also been topics of repeated discussion on the program, beginning with the Korean conflict, and now involving the struggle in Vietnam. At issue are not only our commitments to that part of the world, but our recognition of Red China and the seating of Red China in the United Nations. It is in this area that the program seems to have most questioned the motives, consistencies, and divergent points of view with regard to American policy. Many of the questions in this area seem to contain built-in premises expressing valid questions.

The recognition of Red China as a consequence of the Korean peace plan, inconsistent with our desire not to do business with them, was raised on a program of August, 1951. The question was raised by Yates McDaniel to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.

McDANIEL: Senator, if we call this business off in Korea more or less along the lines now projected, won't it actually and automatically mean that we'll be doing business with and

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[45]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 3.

certainly recognizing these Chinese Reds, puppets of the Russians though they might be?

LODGE: Oh no, I don't want to recognize them. I think it might be possible to get an armistice without recognizing them.

McDANIEL: We're going to have to make a deal with them--you stay here and we stay there--so that is more or less de facto recognition, is it not?[46]

Inconsistency of our policy with regard to the treatment of Red China and of Russia in the United Nations was brought up by Lawrence Spivak to Lodge on a program in August, 1953. Lodge at the time was Chief United States Delegate to the United Nations. The question followed a statement by Lodge that Russia should be present at the peace conference, along with the Chinese Communists, on the Communist side, so they could bear their share of responsibility for the war and accountability for peace.

SPIVAK: Where is the logic of permitting the Russians to sit in the UN as though they were peace loving nations, but insist that they sit with the aggressors at the political conference?[47]

Later in the program, Spivak again pointed out an inconsistency in policy with regard to the United Nations and Red China.

SPIVAK: Do you think it would be any worse to have the Chinese Communists in than to have the Russians in? Where's the logic of having

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[46]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1951, p. 3.

[47]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 23, 1953, p. 5.

one group of aggressors and saying let's not have the other group of aggressors?[48]

Lodge's explanation was based on the fact that the Chinese Communists had actually done the killing, although Russia might have been responsible for it behind the scenes.

This same question came up on a program five years later in December, 1958. This time, however, the questioning resulted in focusing on the whole issue of United Nations policy of whom and whom not to recognize for admission to the United Nations, including definition of an important term. Lawrence Spivak questioned Lodge's reasons for being happy with the Soviet's being in the UN.

LODGE: . . . Having them there has a certain value because it enables you to take some of the things that they say and expose them for the fallacies that they are.

SPIVAK: Where is the consistency of your part then of wanting the Russian communists in and fighting so hard to keep the Chinese communists out?

LODGE: I can't throw the Russians out. I can't do it because they have the veto.

SPIVAK: . . . Mr. Ambassador. Do you think the world would be better off if they were out?

LODGE: You can't tell. You can't tell.

SPIVAK: You've got to make a judgment.

LODGE: There are certain advantages in having them in.

SPIVAK: And I say to you again, where is the consistency of wanting them in and not allowing the Chinese communists in, so that you can watch them?

LODGE: The consistency is had their behavior been what it now is in 1946, they would not have

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[48]Ibid., p. 14.

been admitted in the first place. The Chinese communist behavior being what it is, they're not being admitted.[49]

Krishina Balarman of The Hindu, then asked Lodge an important follow-up question.

BALARMAN: What is this behavior of the Chinese communists you're talking about? They're not behaving any worse than some of the other members of the United Nations.[50]

After Lodge elucidated what this behavior was, a few minutes later he was asked another important pertinent question by Pauline Frederick of NBC-News, again pertaining to UN policy.

FREDERICK: . . . The United Nations as originally set up was not supposed to be an exclusive club, as I understand it . . . Do you believe that this should be an exclusive club like NATO, where we have only our friends in, or should it be an organization to try to solve the world's problems, and therefore, take everybody in?

LODGE: . . . The Charter says that members shall be "peace-loving". That confers on it a certain amount of exclusivity . . . We have never admitted a country that has been officially proclaimed an aggressor by the United Nations.

FREDERICK: Then how can you be consistent with the way we treat Hungary? We have denounced Hungary, but when it comes to ousting the Hungarian representative from the United Nations, we say no, let's not take any action; so the Hungarians sit there, debate, and vote just the same as any other member. Where is the consistency in our attitude?

LODGE: The two things are entirely different because the Hungarians are there and the Chinese communists are not.[51]

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[49]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 5.

[50]Ibid., p. 6.

[51]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 7.

The reply struck at the heart of a basic and important issue. It implies that once a member nation is in, regardless of whether he is an aggressor or not, the UN can do little about his membership. The definition of the term "aggression" also has come up during MEET THE PRESS discussions of foreign policy. On a program of September, 1967, Pauline Frederick was again questioning Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. who at the time was Ambassador at Large, having served as Ambassador to Vietnam. The questioning concerned United States policy in Vietnam.

> FREDERICK: The UN Charter pledges all members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. When you were there, you know, the Suez war occurred, and you were very active in trying to prevent the use of force. This has been true in many other areas--Kashmir, Cyprus and so on. How do you justify one of the most powerful, if not the most powerful member of the United Nations using force in Vietnam when it has this other attitude_____
>
> LODGE: Because the charter of the United Nations contains a provision with which I am sure you are familiar, and that is the suppression of aggression . . .

Miss Frederick then focused on a basic definition of terms.

> FREDERICK: But the United Nations has never called this aggression and, besides, the term "aggression" has never been legally defined.[52]

The questioning of United States policy in Asia was also brought up on a program of March, 1966, featuring Vice President Hubert Humphrey as guest. The Vice President was

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[52]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1967, p. 10.

questioned by Robert Lasch of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

LASCH: You mentioned the Cuban missile crisis and how important it was that we stood up there, and I agree with you that it was very important that we should and I am glad--I think we had to and we did.
That brings up the whole double standard of international conduct. That was a case where the Russians, after being contained by us for many years, decided to try a little containment on us, and we wouldn't stand for it very rightly. Aren't we applying a different standard of conduct to the Russians and the Chinese in their part of the world, to the one that we claim for ourselves in our part of the world?[53]

On the same program, the basic issue of containment of Red China without confrontation was brought up by John S. Knight.

KNIGHT: Mr. Vice President, in discussing aims and objectives of Vietnam you did not discuss one point. The United Press reported the other day that you told Senator Clifford Case that our real objective was the containment of Red China. If this report is accurate, could you say whether this is really our objective and how could this be brought about?

Humphrey's reply elicited a repetition of the question from Knight, including another question which underscored the important underlying issue.

KNIGHT: Mr. Vice President, my question was, was it accurate for the United Press to say that you felt the containment of Red China was our real objective and secondly, since the Defense Secretary says they already have nuclear capacity within a range of five to seven hundred miles and it will be much longer as years go on, how do you contain a power like that without getting into direct conflict?

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[53]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 17.

Humphrey's reply this time led to a rephrasing of the reply by Knight, to eliminate any doubt as to United States position.

> KNIGHT: Then you are saying, in effect, sir, that the United States is prepared for this kind of confrontation with Red China if required?[54]

Again, the questioning technique employed hit at the crux of the issue.

These have been but a few representative examples of the questioning process employed by MEET THE PRESS panelists in getting at the truth about the issues involved in our foreign policies and views regarding these policies. The panel has continuously served the viewing and voting public by astutely demanding an elucidation and questioning of foreign policy in clear terms. As a final summing up of the questioning procedure, the chapter will briefly discuss the matter of program objectivity.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVITY

Every MEET THE PRESS program opening includes the following statement.

> "Remember that the questions asked by the members of the panel do not necessarily reflect their point of view. It is their way of getting the story for you."

This statement of program objectivity is verified by an examination of the program scripts used in this study. There are several ways of measuring program bias, using criteria some of which have been previously discussed.

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[54] Ibid., ps. 10-11.

Testimony elicited from former candidates who have appeared on the show, and voluntary letters to Lawrence Spivak from other former program guests have all praised the impartiality with which the program is conducted. Newspaper and magazine articles over the years have likewise described the questioning process as being skillful, crisp, sometimes interrogative, but on the whole, free from individual or panel bias. By the criteria of testimony, the program would seem to live up to its opening claim of objectivity.

Another criterion of objectivity is the makeup of the panel. The program recognizes the absolute necessity of a balanced panel, as Spivak has stated:

> We do take into consideration to some extent any political "tag" which may be attached to any particular reporter or his publication. This presents difficulties, however, since often a reporter's personal political inclinations are not the same as his publication's. Also we have found that with the best reporters, their questioning will be fair in spite of their personal views. However, from the audiences's point of view, we try not only to <u>be</u> fair but to <u>seem</u> fair.[55]

An examination of programs over the years reveals that political bias has not influenced the questioning of any candidate. The same kinds of questions, dealing with the same kinds of issues, have been put to Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives. Stevenson, Kennedy, and Johnson have had to specify their criticism of Republican policies as Lodge, Goldwater, and Nixon have had to offer alternatives to their criticism of Democratic policies.

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[55]Letter from Lawrence Spivak, April 14, 1967.

Controversial issues have likewise been thoroughly probed, regardless of the candidate's known views on the issue. There are times when commitment to an action, or expression of an opinion on some controversial issue, could cost the candidate votes, or even cause him to lose ground in the quest for the nomination. No candidate, however, is treated with an avoidance of issues which might harm his political image, or undue emphasis only upon those issues which could harm or enhance his image. A balanced panel ensures the probability of a balance in the issues discussed and the kinds of questions asked.

Another criterion of possible bias is the language in which a question or statement is posed, especially in those statements and questions containing built-in premises or conclusions. It must be stated in this regard that an examination of more than sixty program scripts utilized in this study produced a very minimal number of questions or statements which could indicate personal bias by their language. The majority of premises put forth were worded in valid, sharp but fair language, presenting well-accepted points of view or questions regarding an issue. In some isolated cases, the phrasing employed in the question has made it difficult to distinguish between a valid point of view and the questioner's biases on the subject. The following examples represent these cases.

Personal disenchantment with the Truman administration and its foreign policy might have been expressed on the

program in several instances by May Craig and Lawrence Spivak. Although raising valid questions, the language employed might have been a little less connotative and descriptive. The questionable words or phrases are underlined.

In March, 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson was subjected to the following two questions by May Craig, the premises of which he rejected.

> CRAIG: Don't you think it's dangerous for one party to stay in so long, dangerous for the country?
>
> Don't you think the revelations of corruption reveal you've been in too long?[56]

Stevenson rejected both premises, since corruption had been revealed under a Republican administration as well, after only a few years of being in office.

On a program of September, 1950, Lawrence Spivak was questioning Senator John Sparkman on Acheson's foreign policy. Spivak utilized the technique of attempting to get Sparkman to accept a second premise after accepting the first premise, although one did not follow from the other.

> SPIVAK: Senator . . . if you had a doctor who made one wrong diagnosis after another would you permit him to go on treating anybody you really cared anything about?
>
> SPARKMAN: I don't think I would.
>
> SPIVAK: Don't you think that we are in the situation today with Secretary Acheson the doctor and the country the people we really care something about? And hasn't he made one fundamental error after another, and do you think he ought to remain in office?

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[56]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 1.

SPARKMAN: Well of course you packaged a good many questions in that one. Let me say that I do not agree with the statement that he has made one error after the other, and I do not agree we ought to get rid of him.[57]

Later in the program Spivak posed the following questions of the same nature.

SPIVAK: Don't you think the Democratic Party, however, deserves a good part of the blame for the mess the foreign policy is in?

SPARKMAN: I'm not going to accept your premise that the foreign policy is in such a mess.

SPIVAK: Isn't it true that we came through the last war the most powerful nation in all the world and isn't it true that we have permitted everybody from Tito to Stalin to kick us all over the place?

Sparkman did not agree, and a minute later Spivak asked the following question regarding Russia's acquisition of the Baltic states after World War Two.

SPIVAK: . . . We never did anything about it, did we, in the UN or anywhere else, we just let it stand because we were afraid to face up to the issue . . .

In 1945 when we were the most powerful nation in the world we let the Russians kick us around on that issue.[58]

In December, 1951, Spivak addressed the following question to then Congressman John F. Kennedy.

SPIVAK: Don't you think that a great deal of the responsibility for the mess that we've been in belongs to the Democratic Party, and that

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[57]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 10, 1950, p. 1.

[58]Ibid., ps. 5-6.

> the voters will punish them for it, or *should* punish them for it?[59]

An issue which has evoked many premises in recent years is that of Vietnam, due to its highly controversial and divisive nature. In May, 1965, former U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was a program guest, being questioned by Richard Wilson of Cowles Publications.

> WILSON: Secretary McNamara said we were going to reduce the number of troops in Vietnam about a year and a half ago . . . But these hopes never materialize. *So we go on, on an endless escalator. We don't really know where we are going.* Isn't that about it?
>
> LODGE: No, I don't agree at all. I think we have made some very real progress.[60]

In March, 1966, Vice President Hubert Humphrey rejected a premise put to him by John S. Knight, publisher of Knight Newspapers.

> KNIGHT: Mr. Vice President, despite all of the millions of words about Vietnam, the editorial opinion, background, interpretation, and even the Fullbright hearings, the American public is still *divided and confused* as to our ultimate aims and objectives.
>
> HUMPHREY: Mr. Knight, I am not at all convinced that the American public is confused.[61]

The examples cited here are isolated, and only serve to point out the importance of paying attention to *how* a question is worded as well as to *what* the question is about. They are the only instances found of premises rejected by the guest, which were couched in somewhat dubious language.

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[59]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 7, 1951, p. 12.

[60]MEET THE PRESS program script, May 23, 1965, p. 6.

[61]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 1.

The author concludes that on the basis of these criteria and all others employed, the program can claim objectivity and fair treatment of its guests, with an absolute minimum of any kind of individual or panel bias present.

An analysis of questioning technique has revealed how the program arrives at the heart of important issues to be discussed. Another important dimension of the program lies in its informational value. What were the important issues discussed and what were the candidates' views on these issues? The following chapter will focus on some of the dominating political issues in recent campaign years and how candidates have expressed themselves on these issues in their MEET THE PRESS appearances, before, during, and after running for office.

CHAPTER V

SOME SELECTED ISSUES AND VIEWS

A listing of issues discussed on MEET THE PRESS from the campaign year 1952 through the campaign of 1964 would certainly provide an index to the most vital questions and crises which have arisen over these past years. To determine candidates' views on most of these issues, however, is a difficult task for several reasons.

Issues have changed from campaign to campaign. The issues of corruption and communism in government, so prevalent during the early fifties, were no longer being discussed in the nineteen sixties. The issue of our Asia policy specifically with regard to Vietnam was not an important issue of the early nineteen fifties. Civil rights, although discussed during the early fifties, became a much more urgent and live issue during the last two major campaigns. Candidates, as a result of this changing of issues, have not always had the opportunity to express themselves on issues which were important before or after their candidacy.

A further limitation is imposed by the fact that a candidate might not have appeared on the program until a year or two immediately preceding his candidacy, or even not until the year of his candidacy. Hence, his opinions would be

limited to those issues important only at the time of his appearance, or important in the year of his campaign.

Many candidates have appeared over the years in roles other than that of a major candidate. When they have, it was due to the fact that they were newsworthy at the moment. Questions on the program in those cases focused on the issues which concerned the guest at the moment in the role he was playing. Adlai Stevenson and Henry Cabot Lodge both appeared on the program several times as United Nations delegates. Hence, questions during those programs focused on United Nations crises, decisions and issues. Senator Estes Kefauver appeared on the program during his crime investigation and was questioned mostly on that issue. Other candidates have appeared for other reasons and were questioned accordingly.

For these reasons it is difficult to determine candidates' views on all important issues which have arisen over the years. There are certain major issues however, which, in one context or the other, have appeared during all major campaigns over the years studied. These broad issues contain within their scope many other questions and crises which have had to be dealt with. It is these issues which also have given some kind of common ground, upon which most of the candidates studied have been able to express their opinions.

This chapter will examine several of these major issues of today, with regard to candidates' views on these

issues as expressed over the years. Not all candidates will be represented on all the issues selected. It is believed, however, that a representative sample of both political parties will be analyzed, so that a difference between parties, if one does exist, can be determined. The issues selected for study are as follows.

1. Russia and the "cold war."
2. Communist China and our Asian commitments.
3. Federal responsibilities and states' rights.

Within these three major issues are encompassed many of the vital crises and questions of policy which have arisen to provide the dialogue for political campaigns and public discussions from 1952 until the present.

RUSSIA AND "THE COLD WAR"

Since the end of the Second World War, relations between Russia and the United States have been precarious, flowing from one crisis into another. The Russian seizure of the Balkan States, the Hungarian crisis, the U-2 incident, the Cuban missile crisis, have all provided exciting issues for discussion from the early fifties until the present. The Berlin situation is still a widely discussed issue. Russia's behavior in the United Nations has caused many to speculate whether the world organization is indeed effective against the big powers. The "cold war" is an important pervasive issue in every campaign.

The Democratic position on the "cold war" and the

many issues it entails will be examined first. After examining both party positions, as represented by the candidates, a comparison of party posture will follow.

THE DEMOCRATS

SPARKMAN

As early as 1951, both parties recognized that a crisis existed in Europe which could result in a major confrontation between the two powers. As a result, major party leaders stated the need to bolster European defense and contain Communist aggression. Speaking on MEET THE PRESS in September, 1950, Senator John Sparkman, 1952 Democratic nominee for the Vice-Presidency, stated:

> I don't think twenty divisions can defend Europe, but I certainly am not willing to simply give over all of Europe to Communist Russia. I think we must make every effort to contain Communism in its present boundaries in Europe, and I think we're doing a very good job of it.[1]

Defending the Administration policy, Sparkman also took issue with an article by General Fellows, which stated that the U. S. must stop the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and keep all forces at home because Europe couldn't and wouldn't fight. Sparkman was a definite advocate of foreign aid as a "cold war" tactic.

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[1]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 10, 1950, p. 3.

KENNEDY

John F. Kennedy, appearing on the program in December, 1951, agreed with Sparkman on the crisis in Europe and the need for a stronger military buildup.

> I think we're going to be in the most critical time in Western Europe that we're ever going to be about next March or Spring. General Eisenhower has been attempting to build sufficient divisions to protect that area from attack by land. But the best indication is that by that time he's only going to have around 26 or 27 divisions by next spring providing the Germans come in to some degree--certainly not enough to stand up against the 175 divisions that the Russians are supposed to have under arms--certainly not enough to protect Western Europe . . . But I certainly feel we're going to be in the most danger of war in the summer of 1952 . . . [2]

Kennedy's concern for military strength again voiced itself in 1960. As candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, he criticized the Eisenhower administration for the lack of missile buildup.

> We are going to be faced with a missile gap, which will make the difficulties of negotiating with the Soviet Union and the Chinese in the 60's extremely difficult.[3]

As Democratic candidate he continued his criticism.

> We have been living off the fat for the last three or four years militarily. The Soviet Union made the great breakthrough in space and in missiles, and, therefore, they are going to be ahead of us in these very decisive weapons of war in the early 1960's.[4]

When asked if he would be willing to ask for higher taxes in the face of his concern for a strong military buildup, Kennedy replied in the affirmative.

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[2]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p. 5.

[3]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 5.

[4]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 8.

Kennedy displayed not only a concern for Soviet military strength but a distrust of Soviet leadership. He expressed a reluctance to rush into talks with the Soviets, although he believed greatly in personal diplomacy.

> I would think the next President of the United States should certainly talk with General DeGaulle and with Dr. Adenauer. Certainly he should see Mr. MacMillan and the others . . . When we go to meet with the Communists, however, and Mr. Krushchev, who has shown himself to be so volatile, bellicose and belligerent, I would like to feel we are moving in a definite direction with some understanding in advance.[5]

Kennedy was also firm on our Berlin commitments. In 1960 he was critical of Eisenhower for not getting an agreement, in the face of increasing Soviet gains in military strength.

> He is not going to get a hard and fast agreement on Berlin before he ceases to be President. The second conference will be in October. I would think they would not come to any final conclusions. The next President is going to be faced with the problem of Berlin at a time when the military advantage of the Soviet Union is more obvious than it is today.[6]

Although making a firm statement on our commitment, he did not, however, directly commit this country to the use of force if necessary, although he implied it.

> I would say that come next January or February, Mr. Krushchev is going to face the next President of the United States with a very difficult decision, perhaps even an ultimatum on Berlin. I think we should make it very clear that we are not going to concede our position on Berlin, that we are going to meet out commitment to defend the liberty of the people of West Berlin, and that if Mr. Krushchev pushes it to the ultimate, we are

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[5]Ibid.

[6]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 12.

> prepared to meet our obligation. I think that is the only way West Berlin is going to be free and that we are going to prevent any great difficulty or possible military action with the Soviet Union. During the period when we will be in a position of some inadequacy militarily, I think we have to make up for it with our determination. That's the only thing we can do.[7]

He believed negotiation was possible only if we negotiated from strength.

> I think negotiation is always possible. I hope we can negotiate with the Soviet Union. Sooner or later we are going to have to reach some agreement on Berlin. I hope they will be reasonable. But I would make it very clear if they are not prepared to be reasonable, we are going to meet our commitments. I think we have to do that, or we will find all Western Europe neutralized.[8]

Kennedy was pressed to give a direct answer to what would happen in the hypothetical situation of an ultimatum on Berlin taking the form of physical action. Kennedy again avoided a direct committal of force by expressing the belief that a display of United States determination and strength would prevent any such ultimatum from being given.

> I think we would meet our commitments. I think if we made that clear that we'd meet our commitments, I think Mr. Krushchev would not take action.[9]

Kennedy's reluctance to pledge the use of force was again revealed when he was asked about the Cuban situation, and what we could do about it that hadn't already been done. He expressed a firm disapproval of unilateral action outside the Caracas Declaration.

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[7]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 13.

[8]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 5.

[9]*Ibid*.

> I think Mr. Krushchev is attempting to enforce his own Monroe Doctrine to the Western Hemisphere. I think part of my criticism goes to past years. I think when the United States did not use its influence during the period when the former dictator was in control, to persuade him to permit free elections, to use, what I consider to be almost a dominant influence at one period to provide for restoration of constitutional rights, to prevent Mr. Castro from seizing power by a coup d'etat, I think that was a great mistake. As you know, in the Caracas Declaration in 1957, all the American republics signed a very clear declaration against the establishment of a communist government here in the Western Hemisphere. I think whatever action we should take should be taken through the association of the Organization of American States to implement the Caracas Declaration and make it quite clear that we will. I don't suggest any unilateral action. For the present I don't think there is any economic action we can take other than what we are doing, but I do suggest we associate ourselves intimately with the other countries of Latin America, those that are prepared to do so.[10]

When asked if he agreed with President Eisenhower, who had stated that any attempt on the part of the Soviet Union beyond what they had already done would require the strongest possible action on our part, Kennedy replied,

> I would regard it as a breach of the Caracas Declaration.[11]

He firmly opposed any unilateral action. There would seem to be a consistency here in his hesitancy to act during the Cuban missile crisis later on.

Kennedy, while distrusting Soviet motives, had also consistently sought peaceful and cooperative solutions to our cold war problems. He recognized the changing nature of the times and the need for accommodations by both sides.

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[10]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 16.

[11]*Ibid*.

In 1956 he doubted the utility of using force in Hungary or Poland to stop Communist aggression. He recognized other ways of waging a war.

> I think the new dimension of course is the fact that it is now becoming so unwise to try and solve matters through war because of the presence of atomic weapons, that other means must be determined. I hope we can increase the jurisdiction of the International Court. I hope we can increase the power of the United Nations. I hope we can demonstrate our willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union to try to bring about a peaceful solution to outer space, the question of nuclear cessation, and all the rest.[12]

He also gave his views on how he would minimize the dangers of an irrational, or accidental war. He stressed the importance of communication.

> I think communication is, of course, the only means, and also to make quite precise our guarantees. You have a situation now with Cuba where Mr. Krushchev is threatening if we take any action. We don't know exactly what action would bring about the rain of rockets, but you cannot continue to move from area to area, where we threaten them with war to meet our commitments; they threaten us; they increase their commitments, which they are trying to do in Cuba. I would say this presents a constant hazard, because we could all be destroyed. I think we have to make very precise our commitments and then attempt to maintain communication with the Soviet Union, which I think of course, is going to present us with one of the great problems. I'd say communication, good ambassadors, frequent meetings of the foreign ministers and be quite precise and inform them of actions we're about to take.[13]

In his quest for peaceful co-existence Kennedy favored taking the initiative on the question of disarmament and cessation of testing of the Hydrogen Bomb. In this matter,

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[12]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 17.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 25.

he was strongly in accord with fellow Democrat Adlai Stevenson. On a program in 1956, Kennedy stated his opinion.

> On the hydrogen bomb I must say without being a technical expert and obviously I'm not a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress and have no technical information, but in talking with Senator Clinton Anderson the other day in Texas, he convinced me properly I thought that if all tests were frozen today, the position of the United States as to the Soviet Union would be satisfactory from the weapons point of view . . . If that's true, I think the United States should take the leadership in bringing these tests to an end, and I think we ought to do it first because we're the only country that engaged in atomic warfare in the last war; we suffered great loss of prestige in the Middle East and Far East and Japan. . . . Seven or eight or nine countries in the next few years are going to begin these tests and I think we will lose the fact that just the Soviet Union and the United States are the only countries to have it, and as we spread it around the world I think the dangers will increase. I think Governor Stevenson made a real contribution in writing this out and I hope whoever wins the election, this will be followed through because I think it's a public service.[14]

From his statements on the program, Kennedy seemed to be strongly committed to prevent Communist expansion and to be aware of the need to negotiate from a strong military position. He was hesitant, however, to pledge the use of force unilaterally, convinced that the threat alone of our determination to stand fast would prevent any major confrontation. Although he distrusted the Soviet leadership, he was flexible in seeking peaceful cooperation and a lessening of tensions through accommodations by both sides.

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[14]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 7.

STEVENSON

Adlai Stevenson's cold war policy was stated on a program in 1952.

> I personally believe in the so-called post-war policy. It's been directed by the Administration. Perhaps I could reduce it to the simple words of "assistance and resistance." Resistance to the extension of Communist domination in the world, and assistance to the free world to help in that resistance.[15]

Stevenson, like Kennedy, also believed in a strong military budget as the price to pay for maintaining our superiority, despite the high taxes.

> The tax burden in this country is due largely to national defense effort. I would say that perhaps it's wiser to spend money even in what appears to be excessive quantities to buy insurance than it would be to risk war and the cost of rebuilding the house.[16]

Like Kennedy, Stevenson also saw the need to negotiate from strength.

Stevenson's distrust of Soviet policy was expressed in 1963, when he was United Nations Ambassador. Lawrence Spivak asked Stevenson what he thought of the latest relaxation by the Soviets of cold war tension.

> If there is any reason for it, I can't identify what it is. . . . Soviet policy has always been zig-zag. It opens the door a little bit, lets some fresh air in, then closes it, and this has gone on and on and on continuously as we know since the war, and I expect it will continue.[17]

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[15]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 5.

[16]*Ibid*., p. 4.

[17]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 22, 1963, p. 1.

A strong believer in foreign aid, Stevenson, however, supported a much stronger role for the United Nations in its distribution to get it out of the game of propaganda and politics.

> We have the problem of a large segment of mankind, namely the underprivileged underdeveloped areas of the world who are determined to industrialize rapidly and their allegiance how they do it, whether by consent or by involuntary methods is of first importance to the peace of the world and to our security. It's important, therefore, that we get into this and that we do a better job than we have done so far. My feeling is that if you're going to make the Russians responsible and they're not going to do this just to serve their own purpose, it would be better to use some collective method of distributing aid and I think it would also . . . be much more acceptable to the recipients of the aid.[18]

He was vitally concerned about the portion of foreign aid that was going to military assistance. In May, 1957, he was asked to explain his position on Eisenhower's foreign aid program.

> I emphatically approve the proposals of the President with respect to foreign economic aid, I did not intend to say, indeed I expressly expressed my uncertainty, my doubts, as to the prudence of the proposals with respect to economic military assistance. I'm not sure whether that's all justified or not. I've said on repeated occasions over a period of years that I disapproved what has seemed to be the overemphasis on military assistance abroad.[19]
>
> I have felt that the emphasis on military aid in other parts of the world was disproportionate to the needs of economic development, so that I repeat what I said, that in expressing my approval of the proposals for economic

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[18]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 9.

[19]MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 5.

> foreign aid--and I hope that the Democrats at least will not cut it--I have some misgivings about foreign military aid.[20]

Stevenson was consistent in his de-emphasis of the military aspect of the cold war. He was a firm believer in disarmament and cessation of H-bomb testing. In 1956 as Democratic candidate for the presidency, he stated:

> I think it becomes almost senseless when you multiply weapons of a power that's almost incomprehensible now, and it's apparent that the rest of the world is anxious in the extreme, and that we owe the rest of the world some concern for their feelings about the threat of this appalling weapon.[21]

> I am very much in favor of eliminating the tests of the large hydrogen weapon. I am also very much in favor of steps that would be calculated to control this weapon. I think the attention that we have had in the past has been largely directed to the danger of the fallout, its genetic damage, its poisonous effect on human beings and animals and plant life, etc. I think we tend to overlook the weapon itself, and that this must not be overlooked as a great menace to mankind in the survival of the race, if you please.[22]

He did not, however, advocate unilateral action on discontinuance of the development of weapons, although he recognized the dangers inherent in testing. He also clarified his position as to which weapons he was talking about, since our NATO allies had recently stated that they must have nuclear weapons and would use them.

> I have not proposed that we discontinue the development of weapons if others do. I do think that we ought to bear in mind that while we can do anything we please in

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[20] Ibid.

[21] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 10.

[22] MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, ps. 4-5.

> the interests of our own national defense within our land, when we test a weapon which has the effect of contaminating the atmosphere throughout the earth which indeed can poison other people in other lands who are helpless, we are not sowing good will but ill-will around the world. This is contamination without representation.[23]

> Let's not confuse nuclear weapons, tactical weapons with the large hydrogen bomb I've been talking about.[24]

Although distrusting Soviet motives, Stevenson saw the advantages in having Russia in the United Nations. He expressed himself during a time of crisis in the United Nations when in 1963 Russia owed some $52 million for peace-keeping operations which she refused to pay. Her behavior raised doubts in many quarters as to the practicality of Russian membership in the United Nations and the weakness of the United Nations in general in dealing with the big powers. Stevenson expressed the wish to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets on this point.

> Certainly we want to do everything we can to avoid this confrontation with the Soviet Union, not because we are afraid of a confrontation, or because we are apprehensive about the interpretation of the Charter, as the International Court has already interpreted it, but we want to keep the Soviet Union in it. It is important too, because this is the way we make peace and keep harmony between us, to talk across the table.[25]

On the issue of Berlin, Stevenson, like Kennedy, was committed to a firm meeting of our commitment. He also believed that our negotiation from strength, and determination to stand fast, would prevent a major confrontation.

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 22, 1963, p. 9.

> I don't believe the Russians want to precipitate any final issue over Berlin. I think their position is not dissimilar from ours, that neither of us have anything to gain, from making an issue over Berlin which could result from their point of view in war, from our point of view in imperilling our already exposed position 110 miles inside the Communist lines in East Germany. So I suspect that what will come out of Berlin will be at best, as a result of the Summit meeting, might be some agreement on the limits of the Allied garrisons in Berlin, some limitations on the use of radio facilities of spreading propaganda in both East and West Berlin.[26]

When asked if he had any solution to Berlin, Stevenson replied:

> No, there isn't any, actual. It is clear there is only one solution for Berlin and that is to treat it as a whole and that means the unification of Germany. Permanent division of the city is unnatural just like permanent division of Germany is unnatural. The only solution to Berlin in the long run is the solution of Germany, but obviously the Russians aren't going to accept unification of Germany on our terms, that is, a Germany allied to NATO, and we cannot accept unification of Germany on their terms, a Germany susceptible to the influences of the East. So there can't be any influences on Germany at the present.[27]

He also saw little hope or desire for United Nations action on the matter, when he was questioned about it in 1961.

> I suppose the reason it hasn't been brought up before the United Nations thus far is that there is little that can be done except to call upon the parties of interest to negotiate, that is to say, the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Allies on the other. And as long as that is a matter which lies peculiarly within the range of their own decisions and the only solution for it is negotiation, the jurisdiction or the utility of the United Nations is somewhat limited.[28]

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[26]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, ps. 8-9.

[27]*Ibid*.

[28]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, p. 2.

> What is involved in Berlin, as we all know, is the sanctity of international treaties; it is the self determination of peoples, the integrity of the pledged word.[29]

He did see room for UN supervision if internationalization of the city could be negotiated.

> I think, if we could achieve the unification of East and West Berlin--that is, both parts of Berlin--that we could find some great advantages to both sides, not just the United States, but to the Soviet Union likewise, in the unification of Berlin under some sort of international supervision.[30]

On the question of using force if necessary, Stevenson, like Kennedy, assumed there would be no confrontation because of nuclear threat.

> Of course, I don't think we should ever yield to the Russians, and I pray to God we are not going to be confronted with that choice . . . I still don't see that war is going to be any solution, is going to serve the advantage of either party, and I therefore don't recognize the imminence of the danger.
> With regard to submission to the Soviet Union, I think we should bear in mind, and our more timid friends, that our country and they likewise have great power, great retaliatory power, and that this is known to the Soviet Union.[31]

Stevenson's position is similar to Kennedy's. He expressed a firmness of attitude toward our commitment against Communist expansion, but a flexibility in ways of seeking peaceful co-existence and benefitting other nations without necessarily gaining any political advantage. This is reflected in his desire to have us take the initiative in cessation of

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, p. 9.

H-bomb testing, and to have the United Nations play a larger role in distribution of foreign aid. He also expressed a confidence that since threat of nuclear war would in itself prevent any major confrontations negotiation is inevitable.

HUMPHREY

Hubert Humphrey has been likewise committed to a policy of co-existence together with a firm determination to meet our commitments. His belief in foreign aid as a cold war tactic extended itself to proposing a bill to grant foreign aid even to those satellites already under Communist domination. In 1958 he explained his position on the bill, citing where aid of this kind had been effective.

> I think only if it appears to be in our national interest to do so, provided that the President and the National Security Council find that by some economic aid you may promote a greater degree of independence on their part. We should have, I think, as our present policy, a very realistic one.
>
> I would say in the instance of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is able to stand up and talk back to the Soviet Union a little more forcefully today because of the aid which we have given her, than if she had no aid at all. I am confident that if Yugoslavia had had no aid at all, today she should have been literally under the boot heel of the Kremlin. Right now she is able to spit on the boots of the Kremlin, and believe me this is a mighty good sign to people around the world. It has shaken the Communist parties in Asia and Africa right down to their very toenails.[32]

Like Stevenson and Kennedy, Humphrey has always been for a policy of disarmament and a cessation of testing. He also realized, however, the importance of an adequate

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[32]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 7.

inspection system, and was opposed to any unilateral stopping of the tests on our part. He was willing to share our atomic know-how with our allies to effect a policy of disarmament and cessation of testing, but was cautious on this point.

> I think the most important thing is to get a ban on nuclear testing with inspection, and I want to underscore "with inspection." I think this is more important than talking about sharing the know-how of the creation of more atomic bombs . . . if we must share the technology of the atomic bomb, I would say we ought to share it very, very, carefully with the most trusted of allies.[33]

He also expressed a dislike for any bilateral agreement strictly between Russia and the United States, regardless of other powers, as had been suggested by Harold Stassen and Adlai Stevenson.

> It would be very helpful. It would not, however, be disarmament. It would be only the initial stage of working out certain matters with the Soviet Union. I think we ought not fool ourselves at all. This would still mean that other countries could test, and it would open up the door for some cheating.
> I think that the best you could say of such an arrangement would be that it might improve some relationships between the USSR and the United States.[34]

Like the others, on the matter of Berlin, Humphrey took a firm stand and expressed a conviction that there would be no major confrontation. He had occasion to express himself on the program in December, 1958, following a news-making eight hour interview he had had with Krushchev. He

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[33] Ibid., p. 5.

[34] Ibid., p. 6.

was asked about several statements he had made after his meeting.

> I said I doubted there would be war over Berlin, and I still do. I say indeed that the Berlin situation is fraught with danger, but the danger will become less so if the position of our government and our allies is calm, firm, and one of unity.[35]

During the course of their conversation, Krushchev had pointed out to Humphrey the power of Soviet weapons, including their newly developed five megaton bomb. If there was any implication by Krushchev of its use in the event of a Berlin confrontation, Humphrey had told Krushchev, we were not to be frightened.

> I reminded the Prime Minister of the Soviets that we were first of all not a warlike people but that we were not a frightened people and that we were not going to be intimidated.[36]

Later in the program, in elucidating his position on Berlin, Humphrey perhaps made a stronger commitment to use force than either Kennedy or Stevenson.

> I am one of those persons who has taken a very definite stand about Berlin, I feel that in Berlin, as I said, number one, we must make positively sure to the whole world that West Berlin will be preserved as a free area of the world and not as Krushchev talks, a free city. That access to it will be guaranteed. That West Berlin will not be bargained away by itself.[37]

When asked if he would be prepared to use force if necessary, Humphrey, like the others, at first avoided a direct commitment.

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[35]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 2.

[36]*Ibid*., p. 3.

[37]*Ibid*., p. 4.

> I think that the American people have to make up their minds that they are living in a tough world. I don't believe force will be necessary . . . I don't think we can afford to compromise this away a bit. You must think about it, I will say quickly, in the broad context of a European settlement.[38]

Lawrence Spivak pressed for a more direct answer.

> SPIVAK: Is it your impression that, if we stand firm and let Krushchev understand that if he is going to go to war for Berlin, we are going to be there when he comes.
>
> HUMPHREY: We have already said this.
>
> SPIVAK: We have not quite said that I think.
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> HUMPHREY: I think we have said, through NATO, that we consider Berlin to be a part of the NATO area, since Berlin is in fact a part of the West Republic of Germany.
>
> SPIVAK: I don't think anybody has said so in so many words, that we are going to stay there no matter what.
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> HUMPHREY: I think we have in the past, and if we haven't, we'd better say so now.
>
> SPIVAK: And you think if we do say so, that he will step away?
>
> HUMPHREY: I think that if we do say so, it may in the long run open up the possibilities of some sensible negotiations about a settlement in central Europe relating to a united or reunified Germany and other areas that we ought to be discussing.[39]

Again, the usual conviction that the threat will prevent the confrontation.

Humphrey was then asked to clarify what he meant by the expression "stand firm."

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[38] *Ibid*.

[39] *Ibid*.

> First of all, I think what it means is that we and our allies, particularly the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and France, must have a position upon which we can all agree. There can be no loose threads. Secondly, standing firm to me means that even if the Soviets withdraw, which they may very well do as an occupation party in Berlin, that we stay there. And thirdly, it means that we will use all of the diplomacy and all of the statesmanship that we have to see to it that the corridors of contact with Berlin are kept open and that we notify the Soviet full well in advance that we are not going to permit the East German Republic, the Communist areas of Germany, to stand in our way of maintaining the supplies or the forces that we have in Berlin. I think if we do that, that Mr. Krushchev is not about ready to have a war. He needs peace, and I don't believe that he is about ready to have a war on Berlin, because his satellites are too unsteady and unreliable. This is one time where we need very cold and cool nerves if we are going to last out this cold war. Here is a place where I believe you have to draw the line.[40]

Humphrey also believed that the solution to Berlin was a solution to all of Germany.

> I think we ought to be pushing for German reunification. I think we ought to be talking about the necessity of establishing permanent boundaries. I think we ought to be giving some possible consideration of--they call it disengagement--I don't want to go that far, but some reasonable withdrawal of military forces. I think these things are at least possibilities.[41]

Humphrey's Berlin position certainly corresponds to those of other Democrats.

Although a believer in the philosophy of negotiation from strength, Humphrey is very wary of the use of nuclear weapons even in a major confrontation. He seemed to imply that they would be used only as a last resort, and possibly

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[40] Ibid.

[41] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 6.

only in a retaliatory manner. Although willing to share atomic secrets with our allies in 1958, in 1964 he took issue with Goldwater's suggestion to give the NATO commander the right of decision for the use of small nuclear weapons.

> I think when we talk about small nuclear weapons we should indicate to the American people what we are talking about. We are talking about little nuclear weapons that laid low Nagasaki and Hiroshima, 10 kiloton, 15 kiloton, 18, 20 kiloton weapons, larger than any other weapon that was ever used in World War II with the exception of the atomic bomb on Japan. There aren't any small, little nuclear weapons. There are no little old conventional nuclear weapons. These are deadly, destructive, powerful weapons.[42]

When questioned further, as to whether we were not to use them until the enemy has used them first, and if it would not then be too late, Humphrey replied,

> We do not believe in preventative war.[43]

Humphrey's firm attitude toward the Soviet leadership again manifested itself during the Cuban missile crisis. He expressed complete accord with Kennedy's actions, and considered Russian presence in Cuba entirely different from our presence in Europe. He differentiated between "containment" and "expansion", denying that we needed any containment here, as Russia has needed in Europe.

> I don't think we needed containment. We are not an aggressor. This nation has given away hundreds of billions of dollars since World War II. We have 167,000 casualties in the defense of other people's freedom. We have aggressed against no one.

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[42]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 20, 1964, p. 2.

[43]*Ibid*., p. 3.

> There is a great deal of difference, I might add, what Mr. Krushchev sought to do was to penetrate with the powerful new nuclear weapons system the Western Hemisphere, and we said no.
> The only reason we are in Europe, is because Europe was a target for Soviet ideological and military expansion some years back. I am happy to say that our relationships with the Soviet Union are much more stable and steady now, but I don't think we ought to kid ourselves for a single moment that the Soviet Union is anything but a Communist power.[44]

While maintaining a firm policy toward our commitments, Humphrey is an optimist on the chances for peaceful co-existence with Russia and has sought a more flexible and lenient strategy. In 1958 he was asked whether he thought the Communist peoples were sincerely interested in living together with the free world nations. This followed his interview with Krushchev.

> Yes, I do . . . I really do. I think one of the great needs today is communication with these peoples, not only of the Soviet Union but in the so-called satellite countries. This is very important. The more contacts we have with these people, particularly in the Eastern states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and with the Soviet peoples themselves, the better. I brought them a message of peace from America, with justice, and also brought them a message of cooperation in these great non-political areas of health, for example, and education.[45]

> I think that we need at least a change of emphasis or tactics in the total picture of our relationship with the Iron Curtain countries. It is only a matter of emphasis here again. I think we must emphasize the works of peace. I think we need to emphasize non-political contacts. I think we need to encourage the broadcast of exchanges on the cultural and the educational scientific basis. I think we have to realize there will be no immediate political settlements and

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[44]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 18.

[45]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 8.

> that we sort of have to pave the way, or prepare the way, by touching the people themselves.[46]

Humphrey's cold war philosophy in general and on specific issues would seem not to be different from that of other Democratic candidates studied.

THE REPUBLICANS

LODGE

Henry Cabot Lodge has from the early fifties expressed the need to maintain the military superiority needed to negotiate from strength. His words express a strong distrust of Soviet policy, and in some ways a much less flexible attitude toward accommodation than the Democrats here studied. In the early 1950's as principal advocate of a 150 group air force, he criticized administrative policies with regard to rearmament.

> I think this is the time to make a major effort to regain the initiative which we lost and which we threw away in 1945. I was the most surprised man in the world that after Korea last June we didn't take advantage of the mood of unity and dedication that existed in the country in order to really gain the initiative and organize the peace. Instead of that we had a 50% rearmament program and we are only doing 20% of that.
>
> I think there's a great sense of false security in this country. We've got a second best air force and we're muddling along year after year with all the expenditures of a great armament program and none of the advantages that armament can give you in the way of ability to reach a clear cut solution.[47]

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[46]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 9.

[47]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 8, 1951, p.16.

When questioned about a statement by Senator Taft that the country couldn't afford a 95 billion dollar defense budget, Lodge replied:

> The country cannot afford to lose this contest with the Soviet Union. We cannot afford to do that. And it's much cheaper to build this force and pay what it costs to submit to inconvenience and get this thing over with in 2 or 3 years, than it is to go muddling along as we are now.[48]
>
> When we regain the initiative and the Soviet Union confronts real strength then they will accede to some of the reasonable demands that the civilized community of nations makes.[49]

Lodge on several occasions has expressed his deep distrust of the Soviet leadership and motives. Commenting on Soviet proposals for disarmament and atomic control in 1954, Lodge stated,

> Any proposal on disarmament that comes from the Soviet Union must be looked at with the greatest care and with the spirit of hope rising eternal, though there's going to be something good in it. But we've been led down the primrose path so often that I'm not getting my hopes up. It's my speculation that in the United Nations next week we will, by a series of very clever, very well-phrased questions, elucidate whether this is a really bona fide proposal or whether it's just in the realm of sound effect.[50]

In 1955, commenting on Molotov's visit to this country, Lodge again pointed out the dangers of becoming too complacent.

> The danger always is that we will get to be wishful thinkers and we will think all is settled and everything is sweetness and light and we don't need to put the

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[48] Ibid.

[49] MEET THE PRESS program script, August 8, 1951, p. 8.

[50] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 10, 1954, p. 8.

> young men into the service any more and we can cut down on our armed services, etc. This is the danger we always confront in this country. . . . We ought to realize that the present very favorable situation in the world is due in large part to the fact we have in this country achieved a position of strength and therefore we ought to maintain and expand our position of strength now that it's producing such good results.[51]

In 1960 Lodge was asked to comment on the reasons for Krushchev's visit to this country.

> With Communists you shouldn't take what they say or do at face value. I have established that to my own satisfaction many times over the past seven and a half years. There is always a hidden meaning. You have certainly got to be prepared for his coming here for the purpose of making propaganda.[52]

> What I can't understand is why Mr. Krushchev would want to be treated differently from the routine that is being applied to the heads of the Soviet delegations. Mr. Krushchev broke up the Summit meeting. Mr. Krushchev insulted President Eisenhower. Mr. Krushchev withdrew the invitation to President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union. Mr. Krushchev made it perfectly clear that he didn't like the United States government, that he didn't want to be friendly with the United States government, therefore why should we treat him like a bosom buddy. What I can't understand is that the people in this country and at the United Nations . . . solemnly wag their head because we are treating Mr. Krushchev like the head of the Soviet delegation. That is what he is. . . . Why treat him like a bosom friend when he has made it perfectly clear he doesn't want to be one. This is typical of Communist tactics. When they have done something wrong, they immediately accuse you of doing something wrong. It is the old Tammany motto--the old Tammany boss who said, "Claim everything; concede nothing; and when defeated, allege fraud." That is how the Communists run their affairs, and I am amazed that so many people get taken in by it.[53]

Lodge was then asked whether Mr. Krushchev wouldn't be

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[51]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 9, 1955, p. 13.

[52]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. 3.

[53]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

adversely affected by the restricted treatment he was receiving, if he did indeed have motives other than propaganda. Lodge replied:

> He'd think that this is the good, tough action of the kind he understands well and has meted out to many others and which he knows inspires respect in many people. He will not take it sentimentally, I can assure you.[54]

Lodge has taken a realistic attitude toward having Russia in the United Nations. In 1953, discussing Russia's part in Korea and her behavior in general in the United Nations, he stated the following.

> I'm not particularly enthused about their being in the UN. I remember a friend of mine said it was like having an arsonist in the Fire Department. I don't quite agree with that. I think if you've got an arsonist, it's better to have him in the Fire Department where you can watch him than having him out around in the countryside setting fire to the bushes. I also think if you can have him in the Fire Department, you can not only watch him, but you can play the hose on him once in a while.[55]

In 1958, after a UN session marked by increased tension between the two powers, Lodge repeated his belief that the UN was better with Russia in it than out of it.

> I think at the moment there's a good deal of advantage in having them there though it is inconsistent to have a country there that disregards the Charter the way they do. But having them there has a certain value because it enables you to take some of the things that they say and expose them for the fallacies that they are.[56]

Although taking a firm attitude about our present relations with Russia, Lodge did express optimism for a more

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[54] Ibid., p. 5.

[55] MEET THE PRESS program script, August 23, 1953, p. 5.

[56] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 5.

peaceful future and eventual thawing of the cold war. He believed in tactics other than force to gain our ends. He was a strong believer in the foreign aid program started after World War II. In 1952, he commented on a statement by General MacArthur which maintained that "Thus despite the billions we have poured abroad I doubt that we have gained a single Communist convert to the cause of human freedom, or inspired newer deeper friendships."[57] Lodge said,

> I do think the Marshall Plan has stopped the spread of Communism in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another powerful factor tending to stop Communism. . . . I think the Greek-Turkish aid has been a wonderful investment in human courage because the Greeks and the Turks are mentally defeated and in case of war they'd be there to carry part of the load of combat so that our boys wouldn't have to do all the dying.[58]

In 1956 he sought to vindicate the United States for not using force in the Hungarian uprising crisis, although as UN Ambassador he pushed for a resolution which would indict the Soviets for crushing the rebellion. In explaining our position he stated:

> We have done everything that we think would be helpful in the case of Hungary short of using force. The United Nations has done everything the United States has asked her to do. The United States has favored every practical step except the use of force which we don't think would be practical . . . We can help Hungary, we can help it by moral pressure. We can't help it by armed force.[59]

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[57]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 23, 1952, p. 14.

[58]Ibid.

[59]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 8, 1957, p. 4.

In 1958, while still Ambassador to the United Nations, he stated:

> I think that the next twenty-five years you're going to see an evolution in the Soviet Union. I'm quite optimistic over the long pull. As they educate more and more of their young people, the world is going to shrink; they can't keep up these iron curtains forever. I would think over the next twenty-five years things might get better, but in the short view I don't see any sign at all of a change from this attitude that they've got.[60]

He recognized areas of cooperation between the two countries.

> I think there are some cultural activities which can be successful. I still think we ought to try and get political and diplomatic agreements on things that are self-enforcing, like the withdrawal of troops from Austria for instance. That was quite successful. I believe they have made a little headway at Geneva on the conference for cessation of nuclear tests. I think you ought to keep trying all the time because you can never tell where there may be a break, and you must not easily be discouraged.[61]

Lodge also voiced the need to engage in other cold war tactics beside the military.

> I think we should move ahead on this whole business of the non-military aspects of the world struggle. I think we have done well, but I think with the world getting tighter all the time, smaller all the time, we've got to step up our whole approach on the non-military aspects.[62]

In talking about this new kind of strategy, he stated,

> It is an attempt to make the people of the world understand that we believe the American Revolution holds promise for them, and to talk about the promise of the American Revolution and not about the menace of the Communist revolution.[63]

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[60] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 4.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[62] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. 9.

[63] *Ibid.*

Lodge in many ways seems to reflect the attitude and philosophy of Democrats Kennedy, Humphrey, and Stevenson.

On Berlin, likewise, he took the same firm position regarding the situation as one which must be dealt with now, with a language that the present Soviet leadership understands. Unlike Stevenson, however, he did not completely reject any United Nations action on the issue, but saw little hope for real negotiation. In 1960 he discussed our posture in Berlin.

> I think in Berlin we are just where we stood. We are going to keep our word. I personally think we ought to be prepared to see the Berlin thing brought up at the General Assembly, and I personally would like to see the United Nations brought into Berlin, supplementary to what is there already, let's say, by some such device as having United Nations guards at the check posts, something like that. I am not saying there isn't a chance to do a little negotiating on Berlin, but basically our honor has been pledged. If we go back on our word on Berlin, we destroy every commitment we have made all over the world. That is not a criticism of us. We ought to be praised for keeping our word. We are not on the defensive in Berlin any more than the Communists are.[64]

Lodge's overall position would seem to be based on a somewhat deeper distrust of Soviet leadership and somewhat firmer position on specific issues than that of the Democratic candidates. Basically, however, he seems to be in agreement with much of what they espouse.

NIXON

Republican Richard Nixon has continuously expressed the necessity of remaining alert and maintaining military

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[64]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. 7.

superiority regardless of cost.

> As far as defense spending is concerned I think we would all agree that we have to spend what is necessary . . . In this field of defense I don't think that we can have any compromise with the security of the United States, and I would say that here, we can never be in a position where we are second best. We have to spend what is necessary to maintain the position of being first.[65]

Nixon, furthermore, took issue with those who would be satisfied with a policy of containment of Communism as our main goal. Nixon would have us attempt to reverse it where it already exists.

> I believe that the statements made by Mr. Stevenson to the effect that what we have to do is to be satisfied for years with the policy of containment is going to discourage these people even more. I favor a policy in which we get off the defensive on the offensive to win this struggle without a war.[66]

In 1960 as Presidential candidate he reiterated his conviction that we must take the offensive rather than be satisfied with a defensive strategy.

> I believe as far as the United States is concerned, that as the leaders of the free world we have a responsibility to do everything that we can do to mobilize the forces in the free world for peace and freedom so that we can be on the offensive and not on the defensive in this struggle.[67]

Nixon at the same time, however, has advocated means other than force to gain the offensive. In 1952, as Republican Vice Presidential nominee, he said:

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[65]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 6.

[66]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 12.

[67]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 2.

> In the first place General Eisenhower has never advocated nor have I the liberation of the so called Iron Curtain countries by force. We have advocated a policy of liberation through means other than force . . . I mean in other words we're not engaged in a struggle with a power--the Soviet Union--who has developed to the nth degree means other than force to accomplish its end.[68]

Asked what means he would use other than force, Nixon replied:

> Psychological warfare, economic pressures, the other phases of internal warfare other than force which have proved so effective. Let me make this one point clear, the Communists have made a lot of gains in the last seven years. They have gained 600 million people. They have done it without losing a single Russian soldier in combat.[69]

He seemed consistently to follow this philosophy with regard to the Cuban situation. Like Kennedy, he did not think we could do much more than we were doing by 1960, and did not mention the use of force. He did, however, think that we might have prevented the crisis--and the Castro takeover--by means he discussed previously.

> When you examine the situation it is difficult to see what the United States should have done that might have averted it, or what we could have done. In retrospect I might suggest that the policies that the President is now advocating and that Congress has approved in this session for putting more emphasis on a program of economic assistance for Latin America, a program which will not go just to governments to strenghthen governments, but to serve the interests of the people, that such a program had we had it in effect, perhaps five years ago, might have produced economic progress in Cuba which might have prevented the Castro takeover.[70]

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[68]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 11.

[69]*Ibid*.

[70]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 3.

On the question of disarmament and nuclear testing, Nixon had also been willing to go as far as possible in taking the initiative in cessation, short of unilateral action. In 1960, as Presidential candidate he was asked whether he favored renewing underground nuclear testing. Test negotiations at the time were not very successful.

> I favor renewing the tests, once it is clearly established that the test negotiations which are presently going on have no chance of success or no reasonable chance to succeed, I would say. The reason that I feel that we, however, must go down to the end of the road with regard to exploring the chance of these talks succeeding is that the whole world is watching to see whether or not we can make this one breakthrough of control of armaments with inspection. So I would say that we must press the Soviet Union to get a decision, and if the decision is that there will be no suspension of tests with inspection, then the United States must resume them immediately.[71]

Nixon would seem to be no more firm than others in his cold war outlook.

GOLDWATER AND MILLER

Perhaps the biggest departure from the philosophy expressed so far by candidates of both parties is that espoused by both William Miller and Barry Goldwater, Republican 1964 candidates for major office. Where others have spoken about possible co-existence, Miller and Goldwater have rejected this approach. Consequently on several specific issues they have disagreed not only with Democrats but with members of their own party as well. Perhaps the best statement of their attitude was summed up by Miller in 1964, when he was asked

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[71]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 8.

to explain Goldwater's position on the possibility of war.

> Senator Goldwater, of course, abhors war as much as any living man. His point is simply that you come closer to war--and indeed defeat--by a policy of accommodation or appeasement or a policy which indicates that you can do business with the Communists; that he is concerned about the unilateral disarmament; he is concerned about concessions to the Communists, when you indicate that Communism in Cuba is only a nuisance, or that it is all right to have the Berlin wall, or that we are willing to commit American soldiers in Vietnam under a policy of doing enough to die and not enough to win, that you have to recognize Communism for what it is. It is a religion designed to communize the world, and the only thing you can do to deter war is to have a military posture so strong they won't start a war because they can't win it. You've got to get away from relying on their word or believing that they themselves want a policy of coexistence because they don't. Their aim is to communize the world.[72]

As a consequence of this philosophy, both Goldwater and Miller have taken much firmer stands on Berlin, treaties, foreign aid, nuclear weapons, and limits of our relationship with Russia.

Miller's stand on Berlin expressed full backing of Kennedy's policy if the President had decided that war was necessary.

> I think the Republican party takes the position that President Kennedy today is the Commander-in-Chief. That to the extent he stands firm on Berlin--he knows the facts, and is aware of the entire situation--to the extent that he stands firm in Berlin, we will stand behind him. At any time that he thinks such firmness necessitates war, then, of course, the Republicans would stand with him.[73]

Miller went beyond firmness, however, in his opinions. He had some critical remarks on the Democratic attitude, which

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[72]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 9.

[73]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 27, 1961, p. 6.

implied a lack of firmness on their part and a will to negotiate. To Miller, negotiation of any kind seemed to be unacceptable.

> As a matter of fact we are doing more for him than many of his cohorts. No responsible Republican has suggested as has Senator Mansfield, that it become a free city under international control. No responsible Republican as far as I know, has indicated, as has Senator Fulbright, that we might negotiate away the rights of people in East Berlin to come to freedom in West Berlin.[74]

Miller adversely criticized President Kennedy for having taken forty days to answer an ultimatum from Krushchev on a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Asked if the Allies should offer to negotiate with Russia on Berlin, Miller replied:

> What is there to negotiate, as far as Berlin is concerned? We are in West Berlin as a matter of right, as a matter of war victory, as a matter of fact. We have a right to air and land corridors as a matter of fact to West Berlin, an ingress and egress to West Berlin. What is there for us to negotiate as far as Berlin is concerned?[75]
>
> I can see no reason why the United States should be anxious to negotiate. There is nothing to negotiate.[76]

As Vice Presidential candidate in 1964, he extended this criticism of our Berlin posture to the Berlin wall as well, claiming we should have taken positive action.

> It should have been torn down brick by brick as it was being built because it was contrary to every agreement made by and among the allies at the conclusion of World War II. As a matter of fact our military commanders were anxiously awaiting word from the White House authorizing them to tear it down brick by brick as it was being

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[74] Ibid., p. 7.

[75] Ibid., p. 8.

[76] Ibid.

> built. Now it is an accomplished fact and stands as a tertimonial to the strength of the Communists and the weakness and vacillation of this Administration in the area of Communism.[77]

Questioned on President Johnson's proposed consular treaty, Miller again displayed his extreme hard-line attitude, which implied doubt of even recognizing Russia.

> Mr. Evans, you know and I know that from the very moment we recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 and permitted them to establish an ambassy and consulates in the United States, these consulates were never anything but seats of espionage, so why expand it.[78]

He expressed his intent to oppose the negotiations on consular offices, and he expected Republican Senators to do likewise.

Defense of Europe and the role of NATO in handling nuclear weapons were issues brought up by Barry Goldwater in the 1964 campaign. Miller was asked about a statement by Goldwater that NATO field commanders should have the power of decision as to whether to use nuclear weapons of the kind that a soldier might carry on his back. Miller, although changing the wording, agreed with the principle.

> No, I think that probably it would be more accurate to say the type of weapon that a soldier could man on a jeep. It is a very, very small weapon and that is the point I was making, and it is all that we are talking about.[79]

It might be recalled that Hubert Humphrey had maintained there was no nuclear weapon small enough to be even considered for NATO use. He adamantly opposed the Goldwater position on this.

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[77]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 11.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid.

Miller thought the issue of Communist appeasement could be highly important in the 1964 campaign. In the following statement he illustrated some of the issues he considered as examples of Administration appeasement of the Communists.

> When you make a statement that the Communists are going to gain no further territory in Laos and then you stand by for four or five weeks and let them capture the capital city of Prabang and other areas of strategic importance in Laos, when you commit American prestige to the invasion of Cuba and don't commit enough American power for it to succeed, when you have Chester Bowles indicating that he thinks perhaps we should have a two-China position, when you have Mr. Stevenson indicating that perhaps we should admit Red China to the United Nations, then I think it is time that we became firm in our position around the world in regard to the Communist situation.
>
> The events in Laos, the events in Cuba, the events in Geneva, the events in Vienna, the statements of Mr. Bowles, the statements of Mr. Stevenson, to me indicate a general attitude of appeasement in this area of dealing with Communism around the world.[80]

Senator Barry Goldwater's distrust of Russia and hard-line cold war strategy have also been expressed on the program, even prior to his candidacy. In 1961, criticizing American foreign policy in general, and Democratic policy in particular, he stated:

> I would say that the general attitude of weakness has prevailed in and out through our foreign policy ever since Versailles. We haven't been consistently hard. When we have been tough we have gotten what we want. We have won over Stalin and Krushchev when we have made it perfectly plain to them that we mean what we say, and I am very glad to see the stand that the President is taking on Berlin. I hope he keeps it up.[81]

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[80]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 27, 1961, p. 8.

[81]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 5.

In 1964, commenting on Krushchev's New Year greeting to President Johnson, in which the Soviet leader expressed conviction that the New Year would bring East-West understanding on a broad range of issues, and a ceasing of the cold war, Goldwater voiced his pessimism.

> No, I am not convinced in the least, and I was happy to see our President by his answer indicate that he is not convinced. He said that it was time for action and not time for talk, and in that I am in complete agreement with the President.[82]
>
> I can't get excited about Mr. Krushchev's offers of more understanding. He has yet to say that he didn't mean that he is going to bury us. He is yet to say that Communism is not going ultimately to dominate the peoples of this world, and once he backs off from that, then we will have started to win.[83]

Where Lodge recognized some utility in having Russia in the United Nations, Goldwater advocated non-recognition. Asked on the program whether he would use his power as President, if elected, to withdraw recognition from the Soviet Union, as he had once stated, Goldwater replied affirmatively.

> Yes, I would. There would be some qualifications on that. I would use the effort as a bargaining effort with the Soviet Union to try to get some things accomplished. It is to their advantage to have us recognize them. I can see no advantage to us at all.[84]

Lawrence Spivak then asked Goldwater to clarify his position.

> SPIVAK: Is it your belief that a threat would work miracles, but that you really don't want to break relations with them? It isn't quite clear to me.

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[82]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 3.

[83]*Ibid*.

[84]*Ibid*., p. 2.

GOLDWATER: No, it isn't that at all. I think that we would use any gesture toward the leaders of Communism as an indication that we would withdraw our recognitional support unless certain things were accomplished--supposing for example that we could change the governments of the Iron Curtain countries to the choice of the peoples. This I would say would be worth keeping recognition of the Soviet for. It would become a bargaining tool.

SPIVAK: And if they refused to do that, you would break off relations?

GOLDWATER: I would suggest it, but I would still have to have the Senate agree.[85]

This tough overall policy of Goldwater determined his stand on several specific issues. In explaining his vote against the Test Ban Treaty, he said,

> I still think it is of no advantage to the United States . . . There has been no major shift in emphasis on the position of Communism in the world since the Test Ban Treaty and no indications that there will be, so I think that my vote on the Test Ban Treaty was a sound one.[86]

Asked if he would renounce the treaty if given the opportunity as President, his reply was,

> If it appeared to be to our advantage to test in the atmosphere, yes, I would do it.[87]

He expressed doubts about our foreign aid program, and disagreed with Humphrey on the value of giving aid to satellite countries in an effort to make them independent of Russia. He agreed with Stevenson, however, on the dubious value of military aid.

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid., p. 3.

[87] Ibid.

> I would take another look at foreign aid. I am very much in favor of technical assistance, for example. Military assistance is a foreign giveaway. Even a man like Mr. Fisher, the editor of Harpers, a liberal, has finally recognized that the way the foreign aid program has been conducted has not produced results. He says you can't buy friends. I have been saying that for years. I think we can use technical assistance in a strategic way. We might even use some foreign aid in a strategic way, but we are giving away foreign aid to 97 out of 110 countries in the world.
>
> We give $1 billion to Tito, who is not our friend, and a billion dollars to Tito costs everybody in this country $25. It isn't the money end of it. It is the fact that we are helping our enemies in this program, and I think we ought to take another real hard look at it.[88]

He was opposed to taking the initiative in any disarmament agreement or negotiation. In his book, Why Not Victory, quoted by Lawrence Spivak, Goldwater had stated, "We should announce in no uncertain terms that we are against disarmament." Spivak asked Goldwater if he were elected President, would he under no circumstances negotiate with the Communists on disarmament.

> No. Anybody, I think, would be a fool to close the door on negotiations for anything. But until the Soviets show some indications that they want to disarm and are willing to disarm at the same tempo that we would be asked to disarm, then I don't think negotiations are possible. I have seen no indication on her part that she intends to disarm or is even interested in it.[89]

On the Cuban crisis, Goldwater was convinced that invoking a blockade would have prevented any Russian action leading to a crisis.

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[88]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 8.

[89]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 4.

> If we invoked a blockade down there, if we told the Cubans that they had to get rid of Soviet arms and equipment, I am convinced, and I am backed up by every military man I have ever spoken to, that Russia not only couldn't but wouldn't come to the support of Cuba.[90]

It would seem that both Goldwater and Miller advocate much stronger offensive cold war strategy and a much stronger resistance to cooperation with the Russians than any other candidate here cited.

SUMMARY

There would seem to be little difference in basic attitude toward Russia between the two parties, as expressed by the candidates studied. All party spokesmen show a marked distrust of Soviet leadership, and a recognition of the need to remain alert and militarily superior so that we can prevent confrontation by negotiation from strength.

The result of this policy has been an almost unquestioned rising military budget, an expensive foreign aid program, and a backing of all actions taken by the Administrations in the cold war. If there has been a reluctance to use force, it is more evident among the Democrats. The Republicans seem to take, with varying degrees of firmness, a stronger attitude toward the Russians, and a stronger desire to wage an offensive rather than a defensive strategy. This is most obvious, of course, with Goldwater and Miller and to some degree with Nixon. Lodge in many ways takes the Democrat point of view.

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[90] *Ibid*.

Except for Goldwater and Miller, the desire to seek ways of cooperation and coexistence is also characteristic of both parties. If there is any root difference between parties, and it is difficult to determine here, it might be that the Republicans display a much deeper distrust, perhaps realistically, of Soviet motives, words, and actions. There is still room, however, for accommodation, and a rather optimistic outlook for the future, expressed by both parties.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA

Our relations with China and our commitments in Asia have been a part of every major campaign, beginning with Formosa and Korea in the early fifties and presently involving the Vietnam conflict. This vital major issue involves such questions as recognition of Red China, the China position in the United Nations, our relationship with France in Indo-China, our Formosa commitment to Chiang Kai Chek, and, of course, our commitment to Vietnam. Candidates' stands on these issues will be examined, and again a party comparison will be made.

THE DEMOCRATS

SPARKMAN

One of the first Democrats to express a concern over our involvement with Chiang Kai-Shek and Formosa was John Sparkman. The Senator stated in 1950,

> Personally, I have not been very happy with the Chinese situation generally. Again, I think that if the mistake

> was made it was made four or five years ago near the end of the war when perhaps we should have sent men and military advisors in along with the money we were giving to the Chinese Nationalists.[91]

He stressed the point, however, that he did not mean the committal of troops.

> I didn't say American troops, I said advisors.[92]

Sparkman not only opposed the committing of troops, but would submit the matter to the United Nations if Formosa got into trouble. He absolutely opposed any unilateral action on our part outside of a UN solution.

> I think it's a matter that we have tied in with the United Nations and it ought to be submitted to the United Nations and we ought to abide by the decision that's reached in the United Nations.
>
> I wouldn't want to act unilaterally.[93]

Although expressing a concern over the possibility of Communist China's attainment of Formosa, he was not willing to risk any American action to prevent it, outside of the United Nations.

> I would hate very badly to see Red China get Formosa, but I rest on the statement that I made a few moments ago, that I think the eventual settlement of the Formosa question must be made by the United Nations.[94]

Sparkman expressed doubt that Formosa was that important a link in our Philippines-to-Japan line of defense; at least not important enough to risk a major confrontation and American lives.

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[91] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 10, 1950, p. 8.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid., p. 10.

> I recall a statement made by Mr. Walter Lippmann a few days ago to the effect that planes could use the mainland of China just about as well as they could use the island of Formosa. In other words he was making the point that Formosa itself was not an all important link in the defense of that area.
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> I would not be willing to run the risk of all-out war, which I think our acting of Formosa unilaterally might lead to.[95]

Sparkman's attitude on seating Red China in the United Nations was also expressed on several occasions. Although not willing to see Red China seated, he would not commit himself when asked whether we should use the veto to prevent it. He also didn't seem firmly committed to the Nationalist Shek government as being representative. He favored a solution brought out by John Foster Dulles and others, to take China off the Security Council and to supplant her with India. In explaining his views on this, he stated:

> I don't regard China as being at the present time a stabilized government and it seems to be just a little inconsistent for either side to be sitting as one of the Big Five on the Security Council.[96]

Sparkman also agreed with all our actions in Korea.

KENNEDY

John Kennedy, although agreeing with our entrance into Korea, was somewhat critical of some of our strategy, mostly our lack of build-up of air strength. He did not, however, agree with General MacArthur's recommendation to bomb Manchuria.

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[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., p. 16.

> I think that as a matter of fact I thought that we should have done some of the things that General MacArthur recommended, but I don't think we should have bombed into Manchuria. I thought that would take the chance of bringing us into a war with the Soviet Union. What I think has really been our difficulty in Korea has been our weakness in air strength, and most of the Chinese have been moving their supplies since the truce talks began as you know during the night, and we only have I think, two groups and some Marine planes that are doing interdiction along these supply routes and only stopping a fraction of those of the supplies that have moved forward. So I think we're paying the price for our lack of buildup in air strength . . . I would have supported . . . perhaps the use of Chiang's troops in Korea, but I wouldn't have supported the bombing of Manchuria at the time he recommended it.
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> When we had some hopes of truce talks working and ending the war in Korea, I don't think that would have been the time to have begun bombing in Manchuria.[97]

Kennedy's attitude on Asia was a cautious one. He recognized a need to align ourselves with the people rather than with the colonialist powers in control. He seemed to hesitate to commit the United States to any pledge beyond advice and assistance. Beginning with the Indo-China situation, Kennedy had some very firm views.

As early as 1951, he expressed the belief that "we've allied ourselves in the case of Indo-China with the French very closely, which has cost us heavily in theeyes of many natives."[98] His feelings on Indo-China might have implications for any action he might or might not have taken in Vietnam beyond the initial commitment.

> We tied ourselves completely with the French. You can never defeat the Communist government in Indo-China until

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[97]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 12, 1951, p. 13.

[98]Ibid., p. 16.

you get the support of the natives, and you won't get the support of the natives as long as they feel that the French are fighting the Communists in order to build their power there. And I think we shouldn't give the military assistance until the French clearly make an agreement with the natives that at the end of a certain time when the Communists are defeated that the French will pull out and give this country the right of self determination and the right to govern themselves. Otherwise this guerilla warfare is going to spread and grow and we're going to finally get driven out of Southeast Asia.[99]

In 1954, he was again asked about the possibility of the United States taking over the French role in Indo-China if the French should withdraw.

I don't think, if the French should suddenly withdraw today that there would be a possibility even if the United States intervened in its most conceivable active fashion as it did in Korea I don't think the prospects of success would be there because the native population has shown no desire, because of many reasons, to take an active part in the struggle as did the South Koreans. And without the support of the native population, there is no hope for success in any of the countries in Southeast Asia.

For the United States to intervene as westerners against natives, particularly when the population has not supported the struggle in the past, I think would not guarantee the prospects of victory and therefore it would be a mistake for us to go in.[100]

Although not agreeing with Senator John Stennis, who claimed that Eisenhower was inching us into a war in Indo-China by sending in technicians, Kennedy questioned the necessity of sending them in.

I think sending the technicians was not necessary. The French have no conscription. Obviously they could have provided the technicians. We sent them, however, because

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[99] Ibid.

[100] MEET THE PRESS program script, February 14, 1954, p. 4.

> we wanted to demonstrate we were supporting the French. I don't think they were necessary as technicians, however. Therefore it is a step forward in involvement in French Indo-China. I don't think we should continue that involvement until the political conditions are present to secure us victory.[101]

Perhaps his caution was due to his belief that the United States, as a powerful white western power, could never rely on the trust of the Asian people, so necessary when fighting those Asians who are Communists. He saw it as somewhat of a racial problem. In 1951 he gave his reasons for what he saw to be the neutrality or perhaps latent hostility by Far- and Mid-Eastern countries toward United States policies.

> In the first place nearly all those countries . . . have been under the domination of western European powers or the United States in the last thirty-five years, and some still are, and we are closely allied with those that they consider to be imperialist powers. It's a drive against the white race and we are perhaps the strongest of the countries that might be considered that way to the Asiatics. We have fallen heir to much of the hatred that they incurred by their policies.[102]

In 1960, Kennedy again expressed a philosophy of cautious involvement in Asia, this time with respect to the defense of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and our Formosa treaties. The issue was the subject of the first televised debate between Kennedy and Vice President Richard Nixon.

> The administration position since 1955 has been that we would defend Formosa and the Pescadores, that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu if there were an attack which was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. If the

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[101] Ibid., p. 11.

[102] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p. 10.

> attack was not part of an attack on Formosa, and the Pescadores, then our treaty commitment would not bind . . . In my judgment the position of the Administration has been that we should defend these islands if it is part of an attack. Meanwhile, they have attempted to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek to reduce his commitment. Chiang Kai-Shek has been unwilling to do so and because we didn't want to break morale on Formosa and because we have been unable to persuade him to withdraw, the situation has remained in flux and rather uncertain.[103]

Later that year, Kennedy again re-evaluated our moral commitment to Chiang and the dubious risk it involved.

> He has been unwilling to lessen his commitment and that is why we are still involved in this subject of Quemoy and Matsu, not because these islands are strategically defensible, not because they are easy to hold, but because Chiang Kai-Shek has been unwilling to withdraw, and we have been unable to persuade him to do so. But I want to make it clear . . . that the Administration has never suggested that we should extend our treaty commitment to these islands. Admiral Yarnell has said that these islands aren't worth the bones of a single American soldier.[104]

With regard to the seating of Red China, Kennedy was firmly against it at present. In 1960 he stated:

> I would be opposed to the admission of Red China as long as Red China's official foreign policy is based on the belief in the inevitability and desirability of war . . . It is rather difficult to vote to admit Red China when her foreign policy officially is based on that complete hostility to the United Nations. That is the issue. If they withdraw on that, other communist countries are in, and therefore, of course our position might change, but it is rather difficult to consider changing that position.[105]

Kennedy's attitude on Asia would seem to be one of cautious involvement, although he recognized the dangers of Red

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[103]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 2.

[104]*Ibid*, p. 3.

[105]*Ibid*., p. 4.

Chinese expansion. He considered it more of the Asians' struggle, and expected them to carry most of the burden.

STEVENSON

Adlai Stevenson, like Sparkman and Kennedy, was also firmly committed to our actions in Korea. Asked what might have been the consequences if we hadn't entered Korea, Stevenson answered,

> I think it's likely that it would have disillusioned a great many people in the Orient and in perhaps Western Europe . . . Had we not met this first armed challenge of the principle of collective security . . . it could only have resulted in a sense of alarm, a sense of apprehension and insecurity in the rest of the world with the probability that appeasement of these countries would have followed very rapidly.[106]

Stevenson opposed the seating of Red China in the United Nations, although he realized that discussion of the issue could not be postponed forever, and the time might come when Red China would be seated. He was convinced, however, that Nationalist China must keep its seat as the true representative of the Chinese people, thereby implying a possible two-China solution.

> The position of the United States is that we want to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations and to keep Red China out of the United Nations . . . We will make our most earnest efforts to ensure the continuity of the seat of Nationalist China.[107]

In 1961 he also admitted that the United States would no longer object to debate on the China question. This seemed

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[106]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 5.

[107]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, p. 5.

to mark a departure from our policy of attempting to postpone discussion of the issue indefinitely.

> We will no longer attempt to defer debate, to prolong the moratorium as it is called.[108]

He had strong reservations, however, about actually having them in the UN.

> I suspect that there will be a great protest in the United States in the event that should come to pass . . . I don't know what they can do about it in the event they elect them.
>
> It is a little difficult for me to foretell with any certainty what the results would be. We have noticed in recent years that the Communist regime in China has become more and more chauvinistic, more and more bellicose, more and more aggressive . . . These are very disturbing aspects about Red China, and I am a little afraid therefore that they would introduce a note in the deliberations of the United Nations which might be very bellicose and not in the least harmonious.[109]
>
> I have never been for admission of Red China. I have always said we will have to face the time sooner or later when we couldn't keep it out by refusing to discuss it, and I'm afraid we have reached that time.[110]

By 1963, Stevenson still saw no evidence of Red China's wanting to conform to the requirements for United Nations membership.

> They are still threatening Taiwan, they are still interfering in Vietnam and Laos, and they are still expansionist and aggressive. And this is going to be the way we will live with them. Now, if they really wanted to get into the United Nations they know very well that they can't get in on that basis that they have presented themselves heretofore, which is to expell Nationalist China--Taiwan--Formosa--because the United Nations isn't going to expel it. If they want to get in on some other basis, they have given no evidence of that, so it is hard

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[108] *Ibid*.

[109] *Ibid*., p. 6.

[110] *Ibid*., p. 7.

for me to say that I have detected any change in their attitude toward the United Nations as a result of their expansionist behavior elsewhere.[111]

Stevenson then described what he considered American policy toward Red China, a rather realistic combination of firmness and flexibility, similar to our policy toward Russia, with the door open for cooperation and accommodation.

I think you can characterize it as one of firmness, one of flexibility and one of dispassion. Maybe I could say that--firmness in our insistence on the fulfillment of all our obligations to Taiwan, to Nationalist China, flexibility in our readiness to consider accommodations with Communist China, when it is willing to fulfill its international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and dispassion, that is to say, a readiness to reach a--when we see any or detect any improvement in the behavior of Peking we will respond.

We are firm in the case of missiles in Cuba; we are flexible when it comes to a test ban treaty.[112]

As Ambassador to the United Nations, Stevenson had ample opportunity to express his thoughts on the conflict in Vietnam and American involvement. His position on a United Nations solution in Vietnam was similar to that on a United Nations solution in Berlin. He was pessimistic. He stated on a program in 1963,

I certainly don't exclude the usefulness or the possible usefulness of the United Nations in Vietnam, but meanwhile the problem isn't really one that the UN can resolve. It is a problem which they attempted to resolve at the Geneva conference, and if North Vietnam would leave its neighbor alone we wouldn't have any problem.[113]

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[111] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1963, p. 4.

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[113] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 13, 1964, p. 3.

By 1965, he still did not see much hope for a United Nations solution.

> One must bear in mind that neither Communist China nor South Vietnam or North Vietnam are members of the UN, thatlast year at the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident when I did bring it to the UN Security Council it invited North Vietnam to come to the table to present its case, and it declined to come. Ever since, it has sarcastically rejected any--even the propriety of any concern by the UN in the conflict in Vietnam. The Chinese have done likewise. In addition to that, it is problematical as to what--if it were possible to bring them all before the UN even though they are non-members--the UN could do in the present circumstances. . . . I have no doubt that if a peaceful settlement is arrived at in due course to stop the fighting in Vietnam--the UN will have an important role to play in the future in policing compliance with any agreement that is reached with respect to Vietnam.[114]

Stevenson was asked why the United States hadn't been willing to have UN Secretary General U Thant issue a cease fire appeal to all parties in the conflict. He again voiced doubt of UN ability to be effective.

> Whether or not such an appeal by the United Nations would elicit any more affirmative response than the other tracks have failed to elicit, I very much doubt.[115]

President Johnson, in his Johns Hopkins speech offered unconditional discussions. Stevenson, unlike some Republicans could see no difference between the terms "discussions" and "negotiations."

> This quarrel about--this semantic argument about discussions and negotiations, frankly has never--perplexes me.[116]

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[114] MEET THE PRESS program scrips, June 27, 1965, p. 4.

[115] *Ibid*., p. 5.

[116] *Ibid*.

As will be seen later, the term "negotiations" was unacceptable to some Republican spokesmen.

Stevenson recognized the possibility of having to negotiate with the Viet Cong if Hanoi wanted them as part of their delegation at any peace table.

> I think we have indicated that it is for Hanoi to determine whom it wants to sit at its table. If it wants to include a representative of the Viet Cong among its delegation to any conference, that would be for them to determine. We would have no objection.[117]

When asked if he agreed with American policy in Vietnam, Stevenson stated in 1965,

> I don't hesitate to say that as to every detail of the conduct of our policy, I am not always in agreement, nor I suspect are any of our responsible officials, and that is what you have a President for.[118]

By one of his statements, however, Stevenson might have indicated he disagreed with our bombing policy. He was asked: if a vote were taken in the UN on American action in Vietnam, would the United States be condemned.

> I don't think they would be condemned for trying to defend South Vietnam from aggression from its northern neighbor. I think there would be a good deal of feeling in the United Nations that the bombing was a mistake.[119]

As American representative at the United Nations, voicing American policy, he did not have to volunteer the second part of the statement, since it cast doubts on our image. It is possible that Stevenson might have been voicing his own opinion, using the United Nations opinion as a reinforcement.

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[117] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 27, 1965, p. 6.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[119] *Ibid.*

HUMPHREY

Much of the comment by Vice President Hubert Humphrey on our Asian commitments has been restricted to Vietnam since he did not appear on the program until 1958. Humphrey has used the term "negotiation" quite often in speaking about Vietnam and has indicated a flexible position on terms of bringing peace. In March, 1966, he described our purpose.

> The highest purpose of our national effort in Vietnam is to obtain peace, at least the conditions of peace that make possible the achievement of self-determination, social progress and a better society for these people.
>
> What we are seeking is a conference, negotiations that can lead to the conditions that can produce peace. This necessitates--one of the conditions I would hope would be a cease fire. I am sure that if we can get any response at all from Hanoi that indicates a desire for peace that this government is prepared as of this hour to sit down and to negotiate conditions that make peace possible.[120]

Humphrey also did not rule out the possibility of having to recognize the Viet Cong as part of a South Vietnamese government, if voted in. He also, like Stevenson, recognized their right to sit at the conference table, if Hanoi deemed it **necessary**. He ruled out any form of interim government, however, without the presence and consent of the South Vietnamese, or the forcing upon South Vietnam of any coalition government by this country.

> It has never been ruled out that the views of, or the words of, or the representation of the Viet Cong would not be at the conference table. It has been said by

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[120]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 2.

> the President of the United States that this was not an insurmountable obstacle. It is not a difficulty that cannot be handled if we ever get the opportunity for negotiations.[121]
>
> I think the one great disservice the Vice President of the United States could do would be to try to describe what might come as an interim government or an interim solution. I will say this, that we are prepared to sit down and discuss that formulation of such an interim government, but we are going to do it with the South Vietnamese being represented there. It is their country. The war is being fought in their country, and I would admonish my fellow Americans not to make this an American war. We are an ally. We are not in charge of South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese have a government. They have been there a long long time. This is a very fine people, and I do believe that we ought to constantly keep in mind their wishes as well as our own . . . We do not want peace at the price of appeasement at the price of loss of principle.[122]
>
> The discussion was whether or not the VietCong, the Communists, should be a part of a coalition government, at our insistence. I just--in all due respect, I can't imagine that we would insist that we fasten upon the people of South Vietnam the enemy which has been the terror of the countryside.[123]

Humphrey, however, was confident that in any free election held in South Vietnam, the Communists could never win. In 1964 he stated:

> The Communists have never won a free election and I have no reason to believe nor do I think you have any reason to believe that the Communists would win a genuinely free election in South Vietnam.[124]

He was perhaps more optimistic about involving the UN than was Stevenson. In 1967 he was asked what he thought of the approach to involve the United Nations in a settlement.

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[121] *Ibid*.

[122] *Ibid*., p. 7.

[123] *Ibid*., p. 16.

[124] *Ibid*., p. 2.

> We will continue our efforts to involve the Security Council and the United Nations in the area of Southeast Asia and the struggle in Vietnam.[125]

Humphrey's reports on Vietnam and his outlook were continuously optimistic, even up until the end of 1967. In March, 1966, he stated:

> When I returned from my trip to the Far East I said I had reason to feel encouraged about the situation--the military situation--in Vietnam, and one of the reasons was because we had a plan of action.[126]

In November, 1967, Humphrey stated:

> I do think it is fair to say there has been steady progress on every front in Vietnam. . . . Diplomatically, in terms of a peace negotiation, that is the place where there is a stalemate. There is no military stalemate. There is no political stalemate. There is no pacification stalemate.[127]

It is interesting to note that only three months later, in February, 1968, the Communist Tet offensive handed the United States its greatest military, political and pacification setback of the conflict. In view of Humphrey's optimistic report, either conditions changed drastically since his statement, or, the public must always carefully weigh all pronouncements on our gains in Vietnam.

Humphrey's position on Red China was also firm, in opposing her being seated in the United Nations. He reiterated the policy described by Adlai Stevenson, indicating

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[125]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 7.

[126]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 8.

[127]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 7.

a stance of eventual recognition and cooperation. He felt a major confrontation with Red China would be avoided by our expressed determination and showing to stand fast, even in the face of a nuclear threat.

> Every decision that this nation has had to make in recent years has been one that carried with it terrible risks. When we faced up to the Russians in Berlin there was always the risk that it might explode into a terrible war . . . And surely in the Cuban missile crisis we were right mighty close to terribly terribly destructive war. Unless the Communist leaders believe that we mean what we say--I think the worst thing this nation could do for humanity would be to leave any uncertainty as to our will, our purpose and our capacity to carry out our purpose.
> This is why I believe you must risk little aggressions before they break out into massive confrontations. We seek no confrontation with China or Russia.[128]
>
> I think it is a fact that when we stood firm in other times that these nightmares, possibilities, and prophesies just didn't come into being.[129]

In 1966 he explained his policy toward China as being one of containment without isolation, a position similar to that of Stevenson.

> I do believe that the containment of the big aggressive militancy of Red China is worthy objective, but containment without necessary isolation. Containment of its militancy, of its military power, just as we had to do in the post-war years of Europe relating to the Soviet Union. But at the same time not trying to isolate her from the family of mankind.[130]
>
> I think that the American people know far too little about Asia and the countries of Asia. They are all very different and we need to know something much more about them. We are a Europe oriented society and so is our education system. We need much more going on in our universities and institutes on China and Asia.[131]

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[128]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 11.

[129]*Ibid*.

[130]*Ibid*., p. 10.

[131]*Ibid*., p. 15.

> We have, of course, exercised a policy of containment and restraint on the Soviet Union in the past and she had nuclear capacity far beyond anything that China has today . . . and I am happy to say that the program of responsible containment, the buildup of collective security in the West, but at the same time trying to probe and trying to find ways of communication has been relatively successful, and I think it is in our interest and in the interest of humanity that the same kind of approach be exercised in Asia where Communist China today shows not only militancy against the West and against her neighbors, but also against the Soviet Union.[132]

As far as admitting Red China to the UN, however, as of 1966, Humphrey was adamantly opposed.

China today still stands branded as the aggressor by the UN in Korea.

> China has never asked to be admitted to the UN. She has suggested several revisions of the Charter. So maybe we ought to get a picture of China in proper perspective. We are always worried about that she is not in; she doesn't worry about it at all. I have a feeling that she has some things she'd like to do before she comes in to the family of responsible nations, and she is busily engaged in doing some of these things. She has not yet made formal application; and even when some others have applied for her, she has rebuked them.[133]

Humphrey has repeatedly voiced the Administration position of no preconditions for negotiation, although he expressed an implied approval of the continuation of the bombing when speaking about Vietnam.

> We are prepared to come to the conference table with no preconditions: unconditional negotiations. We are prepared at this moment to accept a cease-fire. We are prepared at this moment, if the North Vietnamese will quit bombing the South, we are prepared to quit bombing the North. But you cannot . . . place upon the South Vietnamese and the Americans the onus of something that is not of their making. We didn't start this struggle. We

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[132] Ibid., p. 10.

[133] Ibid., p. 15.

> did not aggress against North Vietnam. We did not send our bombers against North Vietnam until full regiments of North Vietnam forces were in the South, until it was recognized in every chancellery and every embassy around the world that the North Vietnamese had committed an act of aggression.[134]

Humphrey was asked how the Administration felt about a statement by U Thant in 1966, that any movement toward negotiations must be preceded by, among other things, a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

> We had 37 days of no bombing, total pause, de-escalation of the war during that 37 days. During those 37 days the North Vietnamese proceeded to move more troops into South Vietnam, proceeded to repair the roads and rails so that they could continue to move additional supplies into South Vietnam. We already have accommodated point one (cessation of bombing) and we didn't even get a feeler from Hanoi . . . I think it is about time that leaders in the world tried to bring a little pressure to bear upon Hanoi as to what Hanoi is willing to do.[135]

In November, 1967, Humphrey again reaffirmed his belief in our committal and the strategy we were pursuing, as the way to avoid a larger confrontation.

> We took our stand in Cuba; we took our stand in Korea; we have taken our stand in Berlin; we have stood many many times, and because of that we have averted the great holocaust that constantly threatens humanity. I believe that we are pursuing the right course; we are pursuing it with restraint--the use of power with restraint. We are seeking in the best way that we know to bring this struggle to a political solution as soon as possible.[136]

> We are taking stands now for limited objectives in the war, in battlefields far away, so that we may not have to take a stand later on in a greater conflagration. In other words, I don't think the people want Armageddon on the installment plan.[137]

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[134] Ibid., p. 6.

[135] Ibid, p. 7.

[136] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 5.

[137] Ibid., p. 6.

Humphrey at all times has completely backed our Asian involvement and the strategy we are following, including our bombing policy.

THE REPUBLICANS

LODGE

Henry Cabot Lodge has been an Ambassador to the United Nations and an Ambassador to Vietnam. He has expressed himself on the program regarding our Asian policy, from the days of the Korean peace conference up until the present conflict. Although in firm agreement with our Korean committal, he had reservations about the way we were waging the war. In August, 1951, he stated:

> I think we were right to go in. I think the sacrifices that have been made have been worth while. My one regret is that we did not build strength fast enough to apply pressure to the Soviet Union, who instigated that aggression and bring it to an end quicker. That I think has been the mistake.[138]

His language in explaining Eisenhower's position on Korea also indicated a dissatisfaction with the way the war was being waged.

> Well, I have just a personal impression which I can't prove, that he favored making a much bigger effort in Korea than was made, and that if his opinions had been followed, we probably would have reached a decision in Korea much quicker. I think history will show that he was not in sympathy with this lack of will to win.[139]

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[138]MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1951, p. 18.

[139]MEET THE PRESS program script, February 23, 1952, p. 6.

When asked to define what he meant by "doing more," Lodge replied,

> I think you'll find a speech that he made at Valley Forge which clearly implies that he favored taking the steps that were necessary to bring the Korean affair to a speedy conclusion instead of temporizing along and fiddling and faddling around with it the way we've been doing.[140]

Lodge's distrust of the Soviet leadership is perhaps surpassed by his consistently strong attitude against Communist China. He has through the years opposed recognition of the Red Chinese government and its seating in the United Nations. In 1953, as Chief Delegate to the United Nations, he adamantly rejected any proposal for a new United Nations which would include both Red China and Nationalist China in the General Assembly.

In 1954, Lodge was active in passing a motion that the issue of seating Communist China in the UN be postponed for discussion until the end of the year. He was asked how long we can succeed in blocking a showdown vote.

> As a matter of fact, the vote was a little better than postponed. The vote was not to consider. These are the words. So there's no implication that it has to come up in the future, although of course it will come up in the future . . . As long as the Chinese Communists persist in these warlike tactics, in following everything that goes against what the United Nations is founded on, the Communist Chinese will be kept out of the United Nations and they ought to be kept out.
>
> The Charter envisions an organization of peace-loving members. The Charter does not envision a mere sordid cockpit of power politicians in which the law abiding and the criminal are going to be indiscriminately scrambled up. I think the UN will keep out Communist

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[140] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

> China just as long as Communist China persists in these warlike tactics.[141]

Lodge later in the program admitted he would use the veto power, if necessary, to avoid the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

> I don't think the veto would be necessary. I wouldn't hesitate to use it if it became necessary. I've never been pessimistic about keeping the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations.[142]

In 1960 he again expressed confidence in keeping Communist China out of the United Nations.

> I think if the behavior of the Chinese Communists, should it change, would be something of interest. I think if the behavior of the Chinese Communists continues the way it is, I think we can keep them out.[143]

> They're in flagrant defiance of the UN by their presence in Korea, they have been in flagrant defiance of the UN Charter in North Vietnam, in Tibet, in the shelling of Quemoy, and a whole lot of other things. They have been officially declared by the UN General Assembly to be an aggressor. I don't know of any other country that has that questionable distinction.[144]

> When and if the time comes that Red China's behavior changes that will be the time to look at the question of discussing it.[145]

Whereas Lodge in 1960 would still prevent discussion of the issue from coming up, Stevenson, in 1961, as has been mentioned, stated that this country would no longer attempt to postpone debate on the issue.

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[141] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 10, 1954, p. 5.

[142] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[143] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 18, 1960, p. 9.

[144] *Ibid.*

[145] *Ibid.*

As former Ambassador to South Vietnam, Lodge was in full accord with involvement in that conflict. He stated in 1964:

> I am absolutely convinced that the place is very important and that it is worth a major effort to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Communists.[146]

In 1965, although no longer Ambassador, he still completely approved Johnson's Vietnam policies, and again in 1967.

> I think the President has been sagacious and courageous. I think the measures he has taken are very wise and will eventually bring success.[147]

> I completely support his policy of warding off aggression and doing it in such a way as to avoid World War III.[148]

Like Humphrey, he seemed to favor the strategy of restrained power. He admitted, however, as did Stevenson, that he could not agree with every detail.

> I agree on the basic policy. It is not human to expect complete agreement on every detail of tactics and strategy. You could only get that in a police state.[149]

Lodge recognized the different kind of conflict we are waging and the difficulty of winning a purely military solution.

> The heart of the problem to me is that you have in Vietnam a new kind of fighting man who is as distinct as the infantry man or aviator, and that is the terrorist . . . You don't get at the terrorist by putting in infantry battalions, airborne batallions, tank

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[146] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 15, 1964, p. 10.

[147] MEET THE PRESS program script, May 23, 1965, p. 2.

[148] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1967, p. 1.

[149] *Ibid*.

> battalions, because the terrorist just goes into the house of the average Vietnamese and hides there, and the infantry battalion stays three or four days or three or four weeks and then it goes on and he comes back out again. In order to get at the terrorist you have to combine, organize the totality of the civilian population . . . it is a combination civil and military problem . . . We have never had anything like it. It is complicated, and it is going to take some time.[150]

In September, 1967, Lodge again cautioned against any hope of getting out with speed in the American sense.

He never expressed much hope for negotiation. Asked in 1965 if he excluded the diplomatic approach, he answered:

> No, but I think we are nowhere near that stage and I think we might very well never come to negotiations.[151]

He then gave his concept of what victory in Vietnam might mean.

> I was asked sometime ago by a very eminent American how I define victory . . . and I said, the morning that the young VietCong wakes up and decides that he is not going back that day . . . and a great silence follows. That is what happened in Malaya; that is what happened in the Philippines. There was no negotiation.[152]

He expressed his opposition to having negotiations at that time.

> I think it would be the equivalent of turning South Vietnam over to the wolves. I don't know any country in the world that would want to get into a conference when it has got a huge fifth column in occupation on its soil like this.[153]

Unlike Stevenson, he also sharply differentiated between

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[150]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 16, 1964, p. 8.

[151]MEET THE PRESS program script, May 23, 1965, p. 3.

[152]*Ibid*.

[153]*Ibid*., p. 4.

discussions and negotiations, implying a concession in the term negotiation.

> If they accepted our invitation to discuss, Mr. Spivak--I don't need to tell you the difference between discussing and negotiating--if they accepted our invitation to discuss and it meant that they had a change of heart, then of course it would be worth doing.[154]

By 1967, Lodge still did not see much hope for negotiation.

> The thing that you would negotiate about would be how to end the war, but in order to do that, both sides must want to end it. At present we want to end the war, we want peace, and they want conquest . . . This state of mind has got to change before you can have negotiation.[155]

Lodge seemed to agree with Stevenson, that the role of the UN was extremely limited in any solution, although he seemed more willing to let the UN attempt it if it could.

> I would like to see them undertake the responsibility for the whole thing, but there hasn't been the will there to do it, and when there isn't the will, then they haven't got the tools. If they had the will, they might get the tools, but there isn't the will. If the UN had the muscle and the will to cope with it, I think it would be a fine thing to leave the whole issue to the UN.[156]

Although Lodge seemed to take a cautious view of our bombing activity, he was wary of any unilateral cessation of bombing on our part, without some reciprocal gesture of de-escalation on the part of the North Vietnamese. In 1965 he was asked if he favored another suspension of bombing raids.

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[154] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[155] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1967, p. 3.

[156] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

> I would think we have had it, and it has shown the hollowness of these pretentions about the peaceful nature of North Vietnam's policy. It is a thing--I don't think you ought to say what you are going to do. This is one of the many things that you can't talk about.[157]

In September, 1967, Lodge was asked to comment on an opinion expressed by U Thant that if the United States stops the bombing of North Vietnam, "There will be meaningful talks between Hanoi and Washington in three or four weeks." Lodge replied:

> The bombing in the North is of great importance to our soldiers with whom of course, all of us feel very closely identified. The bombing of the North means that 175,000 North Vietnamese are devoted to air defense--anti-aircraft artillery and rockets, that another 325,000 North Vietnamese are devoted to repairing bridges and roads . . . If these 500,000 men, because of the stopping of the bombing were to be put into South Vietnam, it would have a very tragic effect on our soldiers . . . Therefore the question is if, in return for stopping this program, which is of such great value to our troops, we can get some significant, some meaningful, some solid indication that peace will result, then of course that would be very much worth looking at. Frankly, I don't think such an indication has yet occurred.[158]

He was reminded of testimony by General Norstad and others, that the bombing could neither reduce the infiltration to the South nor bring Hanoi to the conference table. Consequently, they had pointed out, the bombing would seem to be a psychological question, rather than something which really affected casualty levels. Lodge still held his position.

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[157] *Ibid*.

[158] *Ibid*., p. 2.

> If the bombing is keeping 500,000 North Vietnamese out of South Vietnam where our troops don't have to cope with them, that is a definite gain for our troops and that shouldn't be given up without some kind of a solid assurance of peace.[159]

Since he seemed to advocate the bombing mainly to aid our troops, he expressed caution about the targets to be bombed, and a restrained judgment as to the overall strategic value of the bombing in bringing peace. He was asked whether he favored hitting other targets, such as the dikes, which could make a shambles of North Vietnam economy.

> I have never thought this would be a good thing to do. I have favored military targets, lines of communication, that sort of thing as support for our troops. I don't believe escalating the bombing is going to produce very sensational results, nor, do I think diminishing the bombing is going to produce very sensational results as far as peace is concerned. I think they do have a great effect on our infantry and our soldiers in South Vietnam.[160]

Lodge maintained a cautious optimism about our progress in Vietnam. In 1965 he considered a stalemate, if not victory, at least better than defeat.

> I think we have made some very real progress. I think the fact that we are there means that instead of having a defeat we have a stalemate. I prefer a victory, but I certainly prefer a stalemate to a defeat . . . I don't think we ought to talk about when we are going to get out. You never hear the other side talk about that.[161]

Consistent with a policy of preventative war by determination and strength, Lodge also did not believe Red China

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[159] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[160] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[161] MEET THE PRESS program script, May 23, 1965, p. 7.

would risk a confrontation by more actively participating in Vietnam than it is now.

> I don't look to see a big participation by China bigger than the participation is now. The participation is very big now. I wouldn't expect to see much difference in the near future.[162]

Lodge's attitude toward Red China seems to be more rigid than that of Stevenson or Humphrey. On Vietnam, likewise, he is more cautious in his approach to any form of de-escalation on our part or any kind of negotiation, without some reciprocal gesture on the part of the North Vietnamese. He would discuss, but certainly would not seem to favor "unconditional negotiations" as Humphrey advocated.

NIXON

Richard Nixon has taken a harder line on Vietnam than has Lodge. His emphasis seems to lie more on the military than the political aspect of the struggle. In 1965 he expressed an implication that we might win a military victory.

> When I left this time I was convinced that the VietCong could not win provided we continued to keep the military pressure on them. My guess is that we are looking down the road toward two or three years more of intensive activity to reduce the guerilla activities to the point that the Vietnamese will be able to handle them without our help.[163]

Like Lodge, he foresaw a long struggle, however, before we could think of talking about withdrawing.

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[162] Ibid., p. 11.

[163] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 12, 1965, p. 1.

> Victory in a situation like Vietnam would mean setting up conditions whereby the South Vietnamese would be able to defend their country against internal and external forces without any outside assistance. This means that the North Vietnamese, who are responsible for this war by their support of the guerilla forces, will have to be conditioned to the fact that they are not going to win. They must withdraw their support of the guerillas, and in addition to that it means that the guerillas must be reduced in their power to the point they recognize they can't win and that they will lay down their arms. We must accomplish these objectives before the U. S. can safely withdraw from Vietnam.[164]

> The war is not yet won because their resistance is not yet broken. In order to break it we must increase the level of attack until they stop the aggression. The decision of what targets should be hit, must of course, be a military decision.[165]

Nixon also predicted a rise in the number of American troops necessary.

> It is my view, however, that it will be necessary for the United States to make an additional commitment of troops if this job is to be done.[166]

Nixon's stress on military strategy included the consideration of bombing even Hanoi, if necessary, and a blockade of Haiphong.

> As far as bombing is concerned I would say that no targets, military targets should be off limits. The fact for example that a military target is in Hanoi should not make it off limits.

> We certainly should consider the necessity of a blockade, in the event the various nations, both Communist and free world nations continue to support North Vietnam with military supplies. We should, in other words, choke off and quarantine North Vietnam so that it will not be able to continue the support of the guerilla actions in South Vietnam.[167]

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[164] Ibid., p. 2.

[165] Ibid.

[166] Ibid., p. 3.

[167] Ibid., p. 4.

Since Communist China is a source of assistance to North Vietnam and the guerillas, the question arose as to how we could quarantine China without striking at her and risking a major confrontation. Nixon did not think it necessary to strike at China to stop her assistance. He also reiterated the accepted contention that threat of major confrontation would in itself prevent it.

> When you speak of striking at the source of that assistance, that means of course hitting the industrial and military targets on Communist China itself. In my view, if North Vietnam stops the supply of arms and men to South Vietnam, then our objective has been realized, and that is what I am trying to accomplish. I would say that the way we accomplish that is to cut the supply lines from Communist China into North Vietnam--that does not require going across into Communist China--and cutting off the flow of supplies by sea, which does not require going into Communist China.
>
> I do not favor the theory of preventive war against China or any other nation. I do, however, say that the United States should make it clear that whether it is intervention in Pakistan, India's problems, or whether it is intervention with men into South Vietnam, that the United States . . . will use all the power that we find necessary to destroy the capabilities of Communist China to wage aggressive war.[168]

Although he believed traditional weapons were all that were needed in the conflict, he did not rule out small atomic weapons against Red China, if necessary.

> Against North Vietnam I don't believe that the use of small atomic weapons of any kind or atomic power is either necessary or wise. In the event that Communist China should intervene with force in South Vietnam as they did in Korea, that would present a very difficult problem. I would think at this point that the use of traditional weapons would be enough in that case to strike back at Communist China . . . But we should not rule out as far as the Chinese Communists are concerned

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[168] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

> in the event that they do intervene in South Vietnam the use of all power that is necessary to destroy their ability to engage in aggression.[169]

Like Lodge, Nixon saw a sharp difference between the terms discussion and negotiation. To Nixon the word "negotiation" carried inherent dangers of concessions to the other side.

> When you use the term "concessions" that means making concessions to an aggressor . . . I am against concessions in Vietnam because we find that North Vietnam is in the position of being an aggressor. If they gain anything from their aggression, a coalition government for example, a neutralization of South Vietnam, some of the territory of South Vietnam, they will be encouraged to try aggression again, and consequently our goal must be the defeat of aggression in South Vietnam, punishment for the aggressors, and certainly no concessions to the aggressors, otherwise we will buy peace for the moment and a bigger war later.
>
> When we talk about peace, when we talk about negotiations, that actually encourages our enemies, it discourages and dismays our friends and prolongs the war . . . We have to recognize that the Communists think differently from us on that score. They never talk about negotiations unless they are losing. Therefore when we talk about negotiations they think we are losing.[170]

Nixon, like everybody else, however, was prepared to accept the Communists in a new government if they were voted in, although he doubted they could be.

> If the South Vietnamese were on their own volition to invite the Communists into their government there is very little we could do about it. On the other hand, I think it is a hypothetical question, and fortunately the hypothesis I think is false. I think the one thing we can be sure of, on the ideological front we have won.[171]

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[169] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[170] *Ibid.*, ps. 2-3.

[171] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

The possibility of any UN solution was also discounted by Nixon.

> In my view it would not be in the interests of the United States or the cause of freedom to have the UN intervene in the settlement as far as this particular matter is concerned. Where you have a straight confrontation between aggressive communism and when aggressive communism in effect threatens the free world, the policy must be made by the U. S. and not the United Nations . . . I do not believe in other words that a UN settlement would be in the interests of either freedom or peace.[172]

Nixon represents a somewhat stronger stand against a UN settlement than does Lodge, who would have the UN settle the dispute if they could.

Perhaps Nixon's philosophy with regard to Vietnam and our Asian commitment was best summed up in this statement. He was asked how he specifically differs with Johnson on Vietnam, since Nixon is also committed to the struggle and believes firmly in our role.

> One of those mistakes was the agreement with regard to Laos. After promising that we were going to defend Laos we made an agreement for a coalition government and neutralist government, in effect, with the result that the communists are quickly and inevitably taking over the country. We must not let that happen in Vietnam. A second mistake with regard to Vietnam was with regard to Diem. I think the complicity of the United States in the murder of Diem tended to destroy confidence in the United States on this score. That is, that it is dangerous to be a friend of the United States. We must not make that mistake again.
> It is going to be necessary for the United States to do more than it is presently doing against North Vietnam so that the amount of the ground commitment can be reduced. It is to the Communist's interest to fight this war on the ground. It is to our interest to fight it as much as possible on the sea and in the air. That is why I think we need to bring additional air power against North Vietnam and additional sea power against North

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[172] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

> Vietnam. I think that this continued talk on the part of Secretary Rusk and others suggesting that we want only peace, that we want to negotiate has the effect of prolonging the war rather than bringing it to a close. I think that President Johnson has to make it clear to the world and to the people of South Vietnam that our objective is a free and independent South Vietnam with no reward and no appeasement of aggressors.[173]

GOLDWATER AND MILLER

Perhaps the sharpest criticism of our Vietnam policy and the strongest line taken for a military victory has been voiced by the Republican 1964 candidates Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Miller. In 1964 Miller had voted with the House Republican policy statement which had advocated carrying the war to the supply lines and calling for Americans to take over the fighting rather than act as so-called advisors. Miller also advocated a much stronger role by the military in decision making.

> I don't believe we should have American boys exposed to battle and exposed to death under the direction of any other person than a United States military commander.
>
> I say . . . we should confer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we should confer with the people in the State Department who know something about the situation in Vietnam, we should confer with the commanders in the field, we should adopt a policy to win and not to have a constant attrition and a constant casualty list day after day and no victory.[174]

Asked about the danger of a nuclear war, if we enlarge our effort, Miller replied,

> You don't have to get into nuclear weapons at all in this connection. You can adapt conventional warfare methods

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[173] Ibid., p. 7.

[174] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 10.

> in South Vietnam that will do the job. But to continue to give these people sanctuary for their supply lines and allow them to continue to kill American boys day after day under the protection of a sanctuary because of the fact that we are unwilling to do the job that is necessary abroad--we should either win or get out, one or the other.[175]

Goldwater was equally outspoken in his criticism, his desire to give the military more authority, and like Nixon, he placed no limits on bombing.

> The President should be the President and stop trying to be General and run that show over there, and let the military people decide the strategy and the tactics and the bomb loads, their targets and so forth. Having done this I would hope that they would escalate where necessary, keeping Hanoi constantly on notice that Hanoi itself could be bombed unless they gave in. I fully think that if we did this, sometime in the early winter or fall, Hanoi will say that they have had enough, and they won't take that next step.[176]

He definitely supported President Johnson's 1965 decision to bomb North Vietnam, in line with his all out policy, although he criticized the limits placed on the bombing of Hanoi.

> We were on the brink of being pushed out of South Vietnam when the President finally took the action he has taken. I certainly wouldn't engage our ground forces in any large scale operation. They are completely unsuited for it. They are not trained for it. I would take advantage of our air power which we seem to be doing, but I would not limit the targets nor limit the attacks on specific targets, and again I would certainly have Hanoi or have ourselves on record that Hanoi would not be spared. I think we made a terrible blunder when we said we would not bomb Hanoi. I don't mean the citizen population but I am talking about the power plants, the ability to produce, the railroad marshalling years, the highways and so forth; they certainly should be there. The main thing I would do, I would let the military people have more of a say in running this war.[177]

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[175] Ibid.

[176] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 13, 1965, p. 1.

[177] Ibid., p. 3.

Goldwater, in line with his general tough cold war policy, took a much stronger stand against the seating of Red China in the United Nations than any other candidate. He advocated withdrawal from the UN if China was voted in. In 1964, as Presidential candidate he stated:

> I don't believe we could live in the United Nations with the Charter having been ignored if Red China is allowed.[178]

Asked what we would accomplish by withdrawing he answered:

> We would accomplish the protection of ourselves, and with us out of the United Nations you don't have much of a United Nations.[179]

SUMMARY

There is a sharper difference between parties on the issue of Red China and Asia, than there is on our cold war relationships with Russia. Although most candidates are adamantly opposed to having Red China in the United Nations, the Democrats on the whole seem to be more willing to recognize that we eventually shall have to live with the fact, and it is better to begin trying to seek ways of communication and accommodation for co-existence. The most extreme position, of course, is taken by Goldwater, the only one who would not want to accept the fact of Red China's recognition, or a two-China solution in the UN.

With regard to Vietnam, here again there is a marked difference. While most Democrats speak of negotiations and

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[178] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 10.

[179] *Ibid*.

a limited military strategy, the Republicans are mostly concerned with a military victory and a show of strength. They are wary of the term "negotiation," and firmly against any kind of concession to the North Vietnamese. As in the Korean war, most Republican criticism would seem to be that Administration policy is a no-win policy. On a continuum of firmness, beginning with Lodge and ending with Miller and Goldwater, there is a marked support for a bigger military effort and a much stronger role in the decision-making process for the military. Their position, in its most extreme form as defined by Goldwater, would seem to be an all-out offensive effort, short of actual nuclear warfare, to gain a military victory. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons, however, against Communist China, should she enlarge her participation, was not completely ruled out. It is believed that this threat will actually prevent Chinese expansion of activity in the war, and also an actual major confrontation.

FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STATES RIGHTS

The issue of Federal responsibility to the individual citizen versus states rights, in one form or another, has been present in every one of the campaigns included in this study. The questions of government responsibility in health, education, and welfare: the controversial FEPC: school integration: the current civil rights unrest, all have come up under this vital and far reaching issue. It has overshadowed every other domestic crisis of our time. Candidates'

views on this issue as expressed on the program through the years will now be examined.

THE DEMOCRATS

SPARKMAN AND KEFAUVER

Senators John Sparkman and Estes Kefauver, Vice Presidential hopefuls in 1952 and 1956, represented the Southern point of view on any civil rights issue. They believed that discussion of the issue and reliance on state action is the preferred course to any Federal legislation in the field. They did differ, however, on certain specific issues, with Kefauver taking a much more moderate than conservative approach than did Sparkman.

Sparkman fully defended the right to full debate, declining to accept the term filibuster and its connotations. In 1952 he defined his position on a compulsory FEPC and civil rights in general.

> I have always defended the right of full debate in the Senate.
>
> I've said many times . . . that if you'd divorce this subject from politics, quit making it a political football and sit around a table like good Christians ought to do and try to solve it to give these people regardless of who they are, their rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States we wouldn't have any trouble.
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> I have not believed in the type of FEPC legislation that has been presented in the past which was strictly a compulsory FEPC that they insisted on without changing the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t."[180]

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[180] MEET THE PRESS program script, August 10, 1952, p. 5.

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Kefauver, on the other hand, admitted on the program in 1952 that he made a mistake in voting for the Wherry Amendment on cloture, which would permit filibustering.

> I think I made a mistake frankly, voting for the Wherry resolution and afterwards I notified Senator Lehman and wrote him a letter. I wanted to support his resolution to amend the present Rule 22 which provides that you can get cloture by two-thirds majority up to twenty-five days and after that time I think by majority.[181]

He defended the right of full debate on any issue, but not the right of prolonged filibustering.

> I think we ought to have full debate in the Senate on all points of view but I think there must be a time when you can reach a decision on its merits without having the measure filibustered to death.[182]

On the matter of FEPC, however, Kefauver himself had filibustered, and then voted against cloture. He stated he would accept an FEPC plank in the Democratic platform, but would not advocate putting one in.

> In this field of FEPC you will make a whole lot better headway . . . by an educational, voluntary, persuasive method of publicizing discriminations with a voluntary commission.[183]

Lawrence Spivak then asked Kefauver, if, as a candidate for the nomination, he didn't think that he ought to take a position of leadership in the matter. Kefauver restated his opposition to a compulsory FEPC. His recommendation to the platform plank would be not to have a national compulsory FEPC plank but if they did have one, he would support it.

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[181] MEET THE PRESS program script, May 18, 1952, p. 3.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid., ps. 5-6.

> My position of leadership is that I don't want anyone's race, color or creed to stand in the way of their opportunity or to limit their chance in America . . . I think that if we have a voluntary effort of persuasion, education, publication, we'd make real progress. I don't think you can do it by a criminal code and I think probably most Americans agree with me.[184]

Kefauver's position on desegregation was again consistent with the Southern view of opposition to any kind of federal legislation in the field. In 1948 he had taken a strong position for continued segregation. In the middle of his Senatorial campaign, however, in 1954, the Supreme Court ruling on school integration came out. Kefauver, against the advice of his managers, conceded that the ruling was the law of the land, and that from that time on people ought to sit down and try to work out, with patience and with time, methods of putting it into effect.

When asked on the program in 1956 what made him change his attitude, his answer indicated a strong recognition of the changing times, and a need to enforce the law even though he might not necessarily agree with it.

> If you'll examine my record as a whole ever since I've been in Congress I've fought for many civil rights principles, such as removing the poll tax and fuller employment opportunities. I've always thought that we ought to have a full, equal opportunity for employment and for enjoyment of the economic opportunities of this nation. Of course, the main thing that came along was that there has been a change in the times, the times have grown, the world has grown, I have grown. I hope we can all grow as we go along.[185]

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[184] Ibid.

[185] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 17, 1956, p. 9.

In the face of Southern defiance to the Supreme Court ruling, however, Kefauver as President would still have rejected the use of federal force and would rely on personal persuasion and local legislation.

> Certainly coercion of a military nature of that sort is not going--would only harden the positions and make matters worse. I think the President himself through a personal commission and talking to the people of both races, leaders, school boards in the formulation of public opinion, that that's about the most effective thing that can be done. I think that public opinion plays a very important part. I don't think you can do it by military force certainly.[186]

On the question of federal aid to schools that desegregate, Kefauver clarified his position.

> If the amendment said exactly the same thing as the Supreme Court decision, in that exact language, I don't see how there could be any serious objection to it, and that would be all right with me and I would be in favor of it, provided this, however, that if any amendment is going to result in their being no school aid program at all, why then I think, the first thing we ought to do is have a school aid program. I don't think we ought to penalize the children while we adults argue about settling this problem.[187]

Since so many schools in the South do depend on federal aid which would not be received without desegregating, Kefauver's answer was non-committal, amounting in a real sense to opposing any amendment making federal aid dependent on desegregation.

Kefauver's attitude on the politics of civil rights was that the Democratic Party, by helping all lower classes, has helped the Negro as well, and regardless of the Southern

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[186] *Ibid*.

[187] *Ibid*.

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Democrat's attitude, was still a better party for the Negro than the Republican Party.

> Our party has traditionally stood for the rights of all people. It's been out party that has fought for the increased opportunities for people of all races, for liberal platforms all the way through, and I'm sure that our platform this time will be a progressive, a liberal one, and that it will meet forthrightly the issue of equal civil rights for all people.[188]

He firmly rejected a statement by Walter Reuther that it was time to throw the Dixiecrats out of the Party, specifically, Talmadge, Shriver, and Eastland.

> I think that everybody ought to be given an opportunity supporting a progressive Democratic platform, or working in the party. After all, in the state of Georgia and all other states different people have different attitudes, and because we don't like one person or what one person may say is no reason for taking an attitude of throwing out an entire state.[189]

KENNEDY

John Kennedy, like Kefauver, believed that the Democratic Party, by benefiting all members of the lower classes, had also benefited the Negro. In 1956 Kennedy was asked why any Negro should vote Democratic if it meant putting a James Eastland into a position on a committee which could bottle up civil rights legislation. Eastland was a strong segregationist.

> The whole Democratic philosophy and program . . . I believe has been of benefit to the Negroes for twenty-five years. We have a great deal of Democrats who are extremely active, Douglas, Humphrey, Lehman, the list is long; and I think the Democrats, the program of the Democratic

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[188] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[189] *Ibid.*

> Party, housing, minimum wage, unemployment, social security, and aid to education, etc. have been a benefit to the lower income groups, so I think the program of the Democratic Party in social legislation has been of great help to the Negroes. . . . In a two-party system there are bound to be areas where some voters are unhappy with some of us, north or south, east or west, but the point that really counts is the general current of a party, and I think they can have confidence in the Democratic Party.[190]

In 1958 Kennedy voiced his opinion that the Supreme Court decision must be obeyed and enforced. He favored a strong civil rights program, regardless of any dissent and disruption it might cause in the party.

> I do think there is no doubt but that any President elected in 1960 will make this clear in advance, and the Convention will make it clear that he is going to execute the laws and defend the Constitution. There isn't any doubt that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution so as to hold that segregation is unconstitutional, and the Chief Executive has the obligation to implement that action. Whether somebody walked out or stayed in isn't going to change the facts of life. Anybody who is elected must bear that responsibility, so I can't really believe that reasonable men can break up over that because a decision has been made. The responsibility of a Chief Executive who might be elected to office in 1960 is quite clear.[191]

He also expressed strong opposition to the filibuster.

> I don't think filibusters are justifiable or the threat of a filibuster hanging over legislation. In the words of an old time Senator, "The truth is the daughter of time," and we want to be sure there is sufficient time to develop the truth, but when it merely becomes a vocal contest, I think that is too much.[192]

Kennedy realized that civil rights action could not

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[190] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 9.

[191] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 9, 1958, p. 3.

[192] *Ibid*., p. 9.

be accomplished overnight, and that it was a Northern as well as a Southern problem.

> I think we are in for a very difficult period, but I believe in the long run the decision of the Supreme Court will be implemented. We are changing a way of life--a whole way of life is involved, and it is a national problem and not just a southern problem. I think that measurable progress is being made and will be made, but it will be time.[193]

In 1960, however, when asked if he, like Senator Lodge, would pledge himself to putting a Negro in the cabinet if elected, Kennedy would not directly commit himself.

> I think we ought to pick the best people we can and the best for each of the tasks, if the best person's a Negro, if he is white, if he is Mexican descent or whatever he may be. I believe he should get the job. But I do believe we should make a greater effort to bring Negroes into participation in the higher branches of government.[194]

Kennedy's position, although similar to Kefauver's with regard to the Party and civil rights, was certainly more liberal and more promising as to what he might do to enforce the law as well as accept it.

STEVENSON

Adlai Stevenson's approach to civil rights, as expressed on the program, was surprisingly moderate. He seemed to stress the states rights aspect more than did Kennedy. In 1952 he was asked his stand on a compulsory FEPC and on civil rights in general.

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[193] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[194] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 11.

> I personally feel that the states should regulate as many of the public affairs of this country as they possibly could. . . . I would hope very much that the problem of civil rights could be administered by the states and administered adequately by the states. To that end I have tried to in the past two sessions of the Illinois legislature to get an FEPC bill passed in Illinois. . . . If it's impossible to do this job and do it properly, then I would say the federal government must because I think ultimately it's imperative that we move on progressively to realize in practice our professions of faith, and one of our professions of faith is the equality of opportunity of every man, woman, and child in this country irrespective of race, color and creed. I think democracy knows no color line.[195]

In 1956 Stevenson was asked, if he were President, what he would do in the face of continued Southern defiance of the Supreme Court ruling to desegregate public schools. He took a moderate approach, avoiding any drastic committals to action.

> There isn't any defiance in the sense of any decree of a lower court which is not being complied with as of now, any legal defiance. There's a declaration of defiance--I suppose that's what you would call it, if you're referring to the manifesto that was signed, but I wouldn't even call it defiance--the manifesto signed by the Congressmen. They said they were only going to use legal means, they were not going to resort to violence. I have proposed as a means of trying to establish once more communication between reasonable people in this most critical area, that the President could very well convene a series of discussions, start a consultation going between leaders of thought of both races with a view to seeing if we can't find methods of solving this, of reducing the tensions, of altering the present polarization that's developing where people are being driven to extremes for and against segregation and desegregation in the South.[196]

Stevenson was then asked if he would give the South plenty of time to desegregate if they showed good faith, or

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[195] MEET THE PRESS program script, March 3, 1952, p. 13.

[196] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 11.

would he force the issue. Like Kennedy he took a moderate approach, seeing it as a matter of time.

> The language of the Supreme Court was all deliberate speed. Now I don't know what that means exactly . . . I don't believe it can be done instantly by any means, nor do I know anyone who does believe it can be done promptly, but I think the point is that we must do it and must make good faith progress toward doing it step by step.[197]

To get a more specific commitment from Stevenson on the issue, he was asked whether he would press for a platform plank calling for implementation of the Supreme Court decision with deliberate speed.

> I don't think that's necessary . . . We had a platform on civil rights in 1952 which was a good one, and which was a fair one, and I promise we'll have no trouble having one again.[198]

Stevenson's few comments on the program evidently displayed a strong concern for civil rights action, but a restrained approach to implementation.

HUMPHREY

Hubert Humphrey, in 1948 and in 1952, stood for a strong civil rights platform plank. In 1958, however, when he was asked if the Democratic platform in 1960 would have a plank calling for enforcement of the Supreme Court decision on school desegregation, Humphrey was non-committal.

> I am sure that it will have a strong civil rights platform plank, because our party stands for that.[199]

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[197] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[198] *Ibid.*

[199] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 3.

Asked if he would ask for such a plank, Humphrey implied he would not.

> I shall not go out of my way to be a troublemaker, but I surely would insist that our party stand up to the responsibilities of public service and of public policy, and one of the public policies in this country is that of integration and desegregation. I believe it should be carried through.[200]

If Humphrey seemed more moderate in 1958, he explained it by expressing a belief that even the moderates in his party had changed since 1948.

> I feel exactly about civil rights in 1958 as I felt in 1948 and in 1952. I believe in human equality. I believe in equal rights under the law; I am opposed to segregation. I believe that people ought to be treated on the basis of their own qualifications without regard to race, color, or creed or religion. If I seem to have changes any since 1948, I can only say most humbly and respectfully that I think maybe the country has gone ahead a little bit on civil rights, and what we stood for in 1948, which may have caused some commotion in the Democratic Convention is pretty well accepted now by even moderate people in 1958.[201]

In 1962, he did not believe Congress should take up the matter of an FEPC. When asked whether he thought Congress should take action on one, he replied

> I think we have done rather well with it already at the Executive level through the Committee on Equal Opportunity, chaired by Vice President Johnson.[202]

He also expressed a moderate attitude on the question of bussing pupils to achieve racial balance in our public schools. In 1964 he expressed his opposition to the bussing concept.

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[200] Ibid.

[201] Ibid.

[202] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 5, 1962, p. 2.

> The Civil Rights Act made a specific provision that none of the pertinent portions or the sections of that Act were to be used for the purpose of bussing children, as we put it. My position now is identical to what it was when we were on this program some months ago . . . I do not believe that this is the way that you achieve the objectives of equal protection of the laws and full citizenship under the Constitution. I think the best thing to do is to build good neighborhoods. I don't want the Federal government to be messing into this thing. I think this is a matter of local authority, and I think the matter ought to be handled locally.[203]

By 1964, the issue of violence combined itself with the civil rights issue, arising out of the civil rights demonstrations. May Craig asked Humphrey if the Democrats hadn't condoned this violence by allowing the civil rights demonstrations to take place. Humphrey denied the assumption, and condemned all lawlessness regardless of origin or cause.

> No, I do not believe that we have condoned it at all, and may I say that no one should condone lawlessness, violence, looting, vandalism, or hoodlumism.[204]

He then reminded Miss Craig that he was one of the first to speak out when the demonstrators had blocked the Triborough Bridge in New York.

> May I say that the first person, I think, to speak up on that is the man you are interviewing today, and I was joined in it by Senator Thomas Kuchel of California. We both issued a statement, a joint statement in which we said that civil wrongs do not make for civil rights, and civil disobedience does not add to respect for law and order or equal protection of the laws.[205]

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[203] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 10.

[204] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[205] *Ibid.*

He also conceded that civil rights movements and demonstrations are at times exploited by various undesirable elements.

> These demonstrations always lend themselves at times to people who are unsavory, people that have little or no regard for rights of other people, and there isn't any doubt at all but that in some of these demonstrations, gangsters, hoodlums, dope addicts, communists, Ku Kluxers, and their ilk have been involved, and our task is to see to it that they don't take over.
>
> I have constantly--or let me put it this way; I have on many occasions said that demonstrators are not serving the cause of civil rights, they are not serving the cause of a better America, by demonstrating with violence. The right to petition peacefully of course--that is free speech. But violence, looting, gangsterism, disorder in the streets, disregard for local ordinances, or law, this is something we cannot condone, and this I deplore. And I have asked people wherever I have had a chance, "Please, don't engage in it."[206]

In November, 1967, he again expressed his opposition to militant civil rights activity and to lawlessness of any kind.

> I think they do a disservice to the cause of social progress. There is no room in this country for violence, lawlessness, disorder, riot, arson, hooliganism. That has no place in a mature, developed, democratic society. We have ways and means of redressing grievances as I said.[207]

It would seem that both Humphrey and Stevenson take a liberal approach generally on the question of civil rights, but a rather moderate and restrained point of view on specific issues, rejecting extreme actions or solutions.

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[206]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 10.

[207]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 3.

JOHNSON

The same moderate approach was expressed on the program by Lyndon Johnson, although his appearances on the program were limited to only two, and consequently his comments were limited. He stated his general feelings about civil rights in 1960, in commenting on a statement by Richard Nixon that he had opposed most of the civil rights proposals of the Democratic platform.

> I stand in the North just like I stand in the South. . . . I have made the same speech in all the places I have been. I think that we have a real duty as public servants to protect the constitutional rights of every American citizen regardless of race or religion or region. I have tried to do that by implementing the constitutional rights guaranteed every citizen with two civil rights bills during the three Congresses that I have been leader.[208]

The question was brought up, that whereas Johnson had always acted as a moderate on economic and social issues, he seemed to be going all the way with the liberals on such issues as Federal aid to education and housing, social security, minimum wage, etc. Did this represent a shift in his position now that he was a candidate? Johnson replied as follows.

> Not in the slightest, A glance at my record will show that I have been for educating our young ever since I have been in Congress. I came here twenty-four years ago and I have always voted to improve the education of our young people and last February passed an education bill in the Senate that would now be law if we could have gotten one Republican vote from the Rules

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[208] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, p. 2.

> Committee of the House--assuming the President would sign the bill. I have voted for housing since the days of Senator Wagner, when Mr. Straus was the administrator of the housing program. The first slum clearance project in the United States, President Roosevelt allocated to my district, Austin, Texas. It was not only the first one, but it had the lowest cost and the lowest rental, so this is not any new venture for me.[209]

A statement made by Barry Goldwater during a later program would seem to back up Johnson's self-evaluation of moderate liberalism.

> Senator Johnson is not a conservative. That is one of the great hoaxes in American life today. Senator Johnson's voting record--and that's the only way you can judge a politician--is as far to the left, within a few points as Hubert Humphrey's or Senator Morse's. I think John Kennedy is one point better on the ACA index than Senator Johnson's. I think he is as much a radical as anyone in that party. I never considered him a conservative. He may be deep down in his Texas heart, but not out on the floor where they count.[210]

On specific issues Johnson compromised on some, expressed a more moderate position on others. He believed that the vote was the most important thing which could benefit the Negro as a means of self-improvement.

> I think that the Negro is going to be able to do much more for himself than anyone else can do for him, and he can do that under the 1957 and 1960 bills by participating in the election . . . I don't mean that voting will be the only step, but I mean that through the franchise they can obtain for themselves things that no one else can guarantee them.[211]

On the question of a national FEPC, Johnson, like Humphrey, did not seem to advocate an FEPC that would

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[209] Ibid., p. 5.

[210] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 24, 1960, p. 6.

[211] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 9, 1960, p. 3.

replace what all ready existed under Executive Order. He stated his committal to the FEPC, however, only because it was part of the 1960 Democratic Platform.

> We have a contracts agency of that kind. The only difference is it is set up by Executive Order now. Mr. Nixon is the head of it. I don't think it has done much good or much conciliation under Mr. Nixon because he has been active in other fields. But we have an agent of that type now, created by Executive Order, and our platform contemplates that the Congress will take some control of it both in the way of standards and providing the necessary funds.[212]

Johnson was strongly committed to federal aid to education. He was asked what kind of aid-to-education bill he would like to see passed.

> I would like to see a bill passed such as we passed in February in the Senate by an overwhelming vote that would make some of this money available to supplement our teachers' salaries, because our teachers are among the most overworked and underpaid professions in the country. I think the number one problem is education, and I think we're doing too little about it too late . . . So I think we should get ahead and get ahead fast, one, in closing the gap on shortage of classrooms; two, in raising the pay of our teachers.[213]

Perhaps one of the most frank statements of Johnson's position of moderation and compromise was contained in an answer to Bob Steele. In April, 1959, when the Civil Rights Bill was up in the Senate, there was an amendment proposed to have Congress endorse the Supreme Court decision and also to provide aid to schools which did desegregate. Johnson at the time voted against that amendment. Steele wanted to know if that still represented Johnson's position as a

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[212] Ibid.

[213] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 3.

candidate for nomination who believed that Congress had a responsibility to support the Supreme Court decision.

> No, that represented my position when I cast the vote, and here is the way I see it. You have to seek the best and do the possible. There are a number of proposals that are coming up. We voted on every conceivable proposal that could be voted on in the Senate, and I think we obtained the maximum that could be obtained from the Senate at that time. Some people like to keep issues going, and they would much rather create them than to solve them. It happens to be my job to try to resolve some of these issues, so I have obtained the best obtainable, so to speak . . . I think you have got to get what you can get, and that is what we did.[214]

Johnson's position on civil rights would certainly seem to be no less liberal than Humphrey's, Stevenson's, or Kennedy's, as expressed on this program. His views on some issues are in marked contrast with those of some of the Republicans who will now be discussed.

THE REPUBLICANS

LODGE

Henry Cabot Lodge has consistently maintained a liberal position on civil rights. In 1958, speaking of our image abroad, he stated:

> I think taking the broad view of all our foreign relations, the biggest single challenge we have is to live up to our own ideals. I think if we make a reality of the Declaration of Independence that says that all men are created equal, if we show that every man's civil rights are absolutely secure in this country, it would be the greatest thing that we could do to influence the minds of men all over the world.[215]

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[214] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, p. 4.

[215] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 21, 1958, p. 3.

The civil rights issue played a big part in the Republican Party split in 1964 between liberal and conservative wings. In November, 1964, Lodge adversely criticized the 1964 Republican Platform plank on this issue.

> I believe the '64 platform did not meet with the approval of the voters, and at the very least we need a new platform position on civil rights. This is one thing I think should be done.[216]

Richard Nixon had classified Lodge along with Case, Javits, and Kuchel, among the ultra-liberals who should not lead the Republican Party. Lodge, in disagreeing with Nixon, described the job of the Republican Party with regard to goals, as being competitive with the Democrats, not different, as Nixon implied.

> The thing that helps the consumer is competition between businesses. The thing that helps the voter is competition between the parties. There isn't anything to disagree about on racial equality. There is a question of how best to achieve it. There isn't any question about medical care for the aged. There is a question of how you are going to do it. There isn't any question about the fact that there are four million children in this country between the ages of 13 and 17 that are in no kind of school at all, but there is a question as to what you are going to do about it. That is where the argument ought to come, on how you are going to do it, not on the goals. Of all the senseless things, this attack on "me tooism" is the most senseless.[217]

Barry Goldwater, several days after his defeat in 1964, went farther than Nixon did in denouncing the liberal element of the party. He had suggested that the time may have come to realign the Republican and Democratic Parties into

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[216] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 16, 1964, p. 4.

[217] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

a Liberal and Conservative Party. Lodge was asked to comment.

> I think that would be totally foreign to the two party system. That would be going back to the ideological parties of Europe.[218]

A few minutes later, Lodge reiterated his belief that a new civil rights philosophy is necessary for the Republican Party.

> I would say that the Republican Party has got to get back to Abraham Lincoln, and got to get back very quick to Abraham Lincoln. And I don't think there is a good future for the Republican Party in the South in a lily-white type of organization. I don't think it is sound for either party to have a system in any one of the fifty states in which the Negro American doesn't take a full part.
>
> It must be the party of equal treatment for all Americans regardless of race or color.[219]

He also expressed a belief that the federal government has a definite responsibility to act not only in the field of civil rights, but in the areas of health, education, and welfare as well.

> I think the rank and file of registered Republicans overwhelmingly favor an active part by the federal government in civil rights--not only civil rights but equal treatment of people generally as regards education, economic opportunity and all that.[220]

More than paying mere lip service to civil rights and equality, Lodge, in 1960, actually proposed the appointment of a Negro to the Cabinet if the Republicans were elected. In 1964, he again stated his belief that this should be done.

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[218] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[219] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[220] *Ibid.*

> I thought that in 1960 and I still think it, and I have never run away from it, and I never will. I think steps should be taken, measures, which symbolize respect for the Negro ought to be encouraged. We want to make our democratic system work as well as we can. This civil rights problem is an urgent problem. It is also a problem of justice. The teachings of religion, of the Scriptures, of the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution leave you in no doubt at all that we ought to act affirmatively and with enthusiasm in connection with it.[221]

Certainly, Lodge is his liberal outlook shows no less fervent a dedication to equality of opportunity and federal action to promote individual welfare than do most of the Democrats studied.

NIXON

Richard Nixon, on the few occasions he was questioned on civil rights and federal responsibility, exhibited a somewhat more conservative philosophy than did Lodge. Although favoring equality and social gains, he was wary of federal activity in this area, and would rather rely on state and individual enterprise.

Nixon, like Johnson, was deeply concerned about education. In 1955 he had said that "salaries paid to teachers are nothing short of a national disgrace, and if the situation is not corrected it could lead to national disaster."[222] Lawrence Spivak in 1960 asked Nixon whether, since the situation hadn't been improved, he didn't think that federal action was essential. Nixon, although admitting federal

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[221]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 16, 1963, p. 16.

[222]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 7.

action was essential, unlike Johnson, rejected any form of direct aid to teachers.

> I think federal action is essential, but I do not think that federal action of the type which would directly subsidize elementary and high school teachers' salaries in our public schools would be wise . . . the moment you in effect have the federal government paying our teachers in whole or in part, in our public schools, you inevitably give to the federal government the power to set standards for teachers and to control what is taught--to tell them what is taught . . . One of the great guarantees of freedom is local control of our educational system, and that is why I believe that our federal aid program should be limited to school construction, which will allow funds then to be freed for paying teachers, if you have federal aid for construction only.
>
> The history of aid of any type, where aid is given in fields of this sort, has inevitably been that once you aid, the next step is control, and I feel that the risk is so great that a position must be taken against it.[223]

Nixon resented the objection to the 1964 Republican stand on civil rights by more liberal Republicans. In 1966 he accused the Democratic Party of being the true racist party in the South.

> What is happening in the South is this, that the great Democratic Party, the party of Jefferson and Jackson and Wilson has now become the party of Maddox, Mahoney, and Wallace. The Democratic Party nationally has condoned this. They have refused to disassociate, to disavow, except with a little smack on the wrist, this group. As a result they are playing with, and catering to, the racist elements in those states.[224]

He then implied that if the Republicans do not gain in the 1966 Congressional elections, it would be because they have become the more liberal Southern party.

> If the Republicans do lose seats in the House in Alabama, or if we don't make the gains in the South that we should

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[223] Ibid., ps. 7-8.

[224] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 23, 1966, p. 4.

make this year, it will not be a loss to the Republican Party in the long run. The Democrats will have won a pyrrhic victory, because they will then, for a long time, for the next generation, be the party of racism in the South, and that believe me, is for the past and not for the future.[225]

When asked if the Republicans hadn't used the "white backlash" line to make its gains in the South in 1964, Nixon sought to refute the assumption, and again disclaimed any notion that Goldwater or the Republican Party was racist.

Senator Goldwater appeared in Mississippi the other day. He was slapped on the wrist in several columns for what some people said, pulling a booboo, because he denied that he was a segregationist and he denied that the Republican Party was the part of segregation. That was the Goldwater position in '64. He had voted against the Civil Rights Bill and as a result it was true that many individuals in the South who were against it--who were for segregation, probably supported Goldwater, but neither Goldwater nor the National Republican Party took the segregationist position in 1964, and at the present time I want to make it clear that across this country I don't know one Republican candidate who is riding the backlash. I do know several Democratic candidates who are riding it, and so the Democratic Party now nationally has become the party of the backlash, not the Republican Party, and the Democratic Party is going to gain by backlash if any gain is to be had, not the Republican Party.[226]

Lawrence Spivak pressed for a more specific clarification of how the Republicans are disclaiming any backlash appeal.

SPIVAK: Mr. Nixon, did I understand you to say that the Republican Party in the South has made it clear to the people of the South that they are not for segregation, that the leaders who are running, the important people like Callaway and Kirk, for example, who are running, have made it clear that they are not for segregation?

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[225] *Ibid*.

[226] *Ibid*., p. 5.

NIXON: That would not be an accurate statement, and I want to put it exactly as it is. Neither the Republican candidates in the South nore the Democratic candidates in the South are integrationists. The responsible people in the South take a different view on this problem of integration than we do in the North. As far as Callaway is concerned and Martin is concerned and other candidates, they for example, opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. What I am saying is this: Callaway, Martin, Winthrop Rockefeller, are not racial demagogues. They are not trying to capitalize on the race issue. Their opponents, Wallace, Maddox with his pickaxe handle, Johnson, in an atrocious campaign which is making Faubus look like an integrationist by comparison in Arkansas, these men are exploiting the issue.[227]

It would seem there is little difference between parties where the Southern candidate is concerned. If the Republicans are different, according to Nixon, it is because they are not pressing for integration while at the same time, they don't actively deny they are for segregation. The Democrats, on the other hand, according to Nixon, actively admit they are for segregation and deny they are for integration.

When asked if he would truly like to see the Republican Party in the South become the Civil Rights party and come out against segregation, Nixon was non-committal.

What I would like to see is this. I want to see both parties . . . have a single standard. The Democratic Party has gotten away with having a double standard on integration and segregation for a century. They have run with the hares in the North and the hounds in the South. They are still trying to do it.

The Republican Party has not. The Republican Party--I point to the platform of 1960. I point to the platform of 1964. I point to the speeches I made in 1960

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[227] Ibid., p. 6.

> and in 1966 . . . and in every speech I have made it clear that we stand for equality of opportunity and that this is the way of the future for this country. I want the Republican Party to stand firmly in what I think is the sound position equality of opportunity and to reject racist appeal. We have to recognize, however, that Southern Republicans just like Southern Democrats cannot be expected to take the position of Northern Republicans, because the problem is different, and so I am not for kicking them out of the party because they don't happen to agree with the stronger position on civil rights that I take.[228]

Thus, Nixon, while criticising the Democrats for containing both extreme points of view within their party, advocates the same stance for the Republicans. There is a recognition that within both parties, candidates think as Southerners first, party members second, regardless of the position of the National Party. He also would seem to disagree with Lodge, who did not find the 1964 Republican Platform satisfactory on the issue.

With regard to segregation, Nixon took a conservative or moderate approach, relying on personal persuasion, rather than federal action. He was asked what he would do as President to try and develop public acceptance of desegregation:

> Through the appearances that I made in all parts of the country in which I could discuss this issue and through use of the Executive branch of government . . . in bringing these people together where these conflicts exist and attempting to get them on a voluntary basis to do what the law would otherwise require.[229]

In 1962 Nixon was asked whether he favored having

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[228] Ibid., p. 7.

[229] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 9.

President Kennedy issue an Executive Order putting an end to discrimination in housing. Nixon answered without committing his own feelings on the issue, but rather basing it on the issue of Kennedy's promise.

> I think President Kennedy should keep his campaign promises. He promised to do that, and I think that he should either keep his promise or indicate why he isn't going to keep it.[230]

It would seem Nixon has consistently maintained a conservative point of view with regard to areas of civil rights and federal responsibility, and showed a marked difference from the attitude of Lodge.

MILLER

William Miller, although running with Barry Goldwater, expressed a somewhat moderate if not liberal approach to the civil rights question, when queried on the program. In 1964, he stated he would not welcome the support of Governor Wallace.

> No, I don't think so . . . We welcome the support of anyone of course who will accept our platform and who believes in the principles in which we believe. I understand that Governor Wallace said he was not satisfied with the Republican Platform on civil rights.[231]

Unlike his running mate, Miller had voted for the Civil Rights Act although he had reservations about its constitutionality in some sections. He explained why he would still vote for the bill even though he was on the same ticket as the man who didn't.

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[230]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 7, 1962, p. 11.

[231]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 19, 1964, p. 1.

> Unlike Senator Goldwater I decided that while I had some serious concern, as did many other people who voted for the bill, as to the constitutionality of the public accommodations section and the FEPC section, I was in favor of the rest of the bill, as was Senator Goldwater. So, having the choice of voting for all of it or none of it, I voted for it, and I suppose faced with the same predicament, I would do the same thing again. On the other hand, Senator Goldwater, who voted for the '57 Civil Rights Bill and who voted for the 1960 Civil Rights Bill, felt in his judgment that these two sections were unconstitutional and were areas properly left to the state and local communities and therefore, following the dictates of his conscience he voted against them.[232]

Miller considered Goldwater more of a liberal than Lyndon Johnson.

> I am sure Senator Goldwater's whole record as one who led the integration for the National Guard in Arizona and one who as a member of the Common Council in Phoenix, Arizona, led the integration of facilities in Phoenix, and who voted for the Civil Rights Bill in '57 and the 1960 bill--that there would be an honest execution of the law, as compared to Lyndon Johnson's record where he voted 12 times against the poll-tax, against legislation to abolish the poll tax. He voted every time to prevent legislation from being enacted eliminating lynching within the states, and as a matter of fact Lyndon Johnson made a speech on the Floor of the Senate in 1949 in which he vigorously condemned the FEPC section then being offered in the Civil Rights Bill in the Senate--vigorously, much more vigorously opposed it than has ever Senator Goldwater, on the record.[233]

Miller would seem to disagree with Goldwater, who referred to Johnson as being a liberal.

Miller was asked, if Goldwater intends to enforce fully the Civil Rights Act if elected, why he constantly criticises it and charges that it has incited hatred and violence. Miller's reply indicated, that like Humphrey, although favoring the Act, he was opposed to the specific issue of bussing students.

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[232] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 13, 1964, p. 9.

[233] Ibid.

> I don't think that the Senator was doing more than pointing out that you cannot eliminate tensions in America by legislation alone, that it has to come from the hearts of men, and that sometimes you can legislate to a point where you create tensions instead of eliminating them, just as in the situation we have in New York today with this proposal of bussing students from one end of the city to another, only to create a so-called racial balance in the schools and to destroy the neighborhood school house. This wasn't the intent of the 1954 Supreme Court decision. It said nothing about racial balance.[234]

GOLDWATER

The most outspoken conservative view on federal action in civil rights, and in the areas of health, education, and welfare, has been voiced by Republican candidate Barry Goldwater. He was an early dissenter from the concept of liberal modern Republicanism. In 1957 he stated:

> When other members of the party or outside the party try to say that to be a moder Republican you have to embrace all the tenets of the New Deal, I disagree.[235]

In speaking of his disagreements with Governor Rockefeller in 1960, he stated:

> I think we would be in substantial agreement on foreign policy. We would fall apart when we get into the areas of health, education, and welfare, which I call the welfare state, and which I can't make compatible with the philosophies of the Republican Party.[236]

Whereas Lodge and Nixon, however, saw room in the Party for all points of view, Goldwater implied an eventual split between liberal and conservative wings. He was questioned

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[234] Ibid.

[235] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 1, 1957, p. 9.

[236] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 24, 1960, p. 7.

by Lawrence Spivak about a statement he had made regarding Rockefeller's moving to the Democratic Party.

> GOLDWATER: I think what I said was if Nelson Rockefeller really wanted to run for the Presidency, he should take his platform to Los Angeles. I felt he would have a better chance with it out there.
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> SPIVAK: As I remember it, the party holding its convention in Los Angeles was the Democratic Party . . . so you really did say you thought he belonged in another party.
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> GOLDWATER: If you want to interpret it that way, you can. I was being facetious in suggesting that might be a place where he could find companionship.[237]

He then stated that if the Republican Party continued to move in the direction which Governor Rockefeller espoused, he would find it uncomfortable to stay in, and he implied a party split.

> If it continues and we have become in effect a copy of the New Deal party, then I think the realignment of parties that I have long expected to take place will come. Certainly we have to have a home.[238]

At Montego Bay after his 1964 defeat, Goldwater suggested that it might be a good time to begin thinking about party realignment, with liberals in one and conservatives in the other. He was still of that opinion in 1965,

> I think people in both parties are constantly thinking about this problem of realignment. I discuss it very often with conservative Democrats, and they discuss it with me and suggest that I move on their side. This isn't anything new . . . I said I thought it was a good time to have it happen.[239]

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[237] Ibid., p. 9.

[238] Ibid., p. 12.

[239] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 13, 1965, p. 3.

Being practical, however, he realized that while still a Republican, he could not concentrate on pushing conservative candidates only.

> I have campaigned and raised money for liberal candidates . . . Frankly, I would like to see more conservatism, but after all, the man's job is to get elected. If he can't get elected in a certain state by being a liberal, then he can be moderate. If that doesn't work, then he can be conservative and so forth and so on. You can never gain control of your government until you gain control of the chairmanships of the House and the Senate and you do this by Republican bodies, whether they are liberal, middle of the road, or conservative.[240]

Goldwater's opposition to the welfare state, as he termed federal activity in health, education, and welfare, was expressed on several programs. When asked in 1960 whether he thought Richard Nixon was a good conservative, Goldwater replied,

> I honestly feel that when history is written my brand of conservatism is going to be called liberalism . . . I think that Mr. Nixon's differences with mine are in the areas where he is not trying to be a liberal, but what I call the welfare state approach to radicalism, because it is an approach to the bureaucracies of old from which your forefathers fled to establish this republic. You cannot take care of people from the cradle to the grave and expect them to be strong, solid people and expect the republic to survive, and you cannot expect to give federal money away without federal control. That is where we get into trouble, in the Republican Party. Outside of that area of the welfare state, you will find Republicans in great general agreement.[241]

His opposition to centralized government and concern for individual freedom to solve all problems was voiced in his criticism of the Kennedy administration in 1961.

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[240] Ibid., p. 8.

[241] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 24, 1960, p. 10.

> We are not in a shooting war so I see no need to extend the powers into the hands of the President that he would need in the case of a mobilized war. We have so far this year a depressed area bill that passed. It set up another division of government to take away from local area responsibility. They tried to get through a federal aid to education bill, which would have removed still more of the prerogative of local government. Agriculture continues to get more and more of a mess, which takes away from the individual the choice of planting, in time and price and so forth . . . We can create a strong military which is in a sense the power we are talking about, we can have a strong economy without having a centralized government.[242]

In 1962, asked what he would do to relieve the situation of poverty and unemployment in the country, Goldwater replied:

> I would allow the free enterprise system to work. I would get the government off the backs of the free enterprise system. I would cut down government expenditures, cut taxes, encourage initiative--in other words, let this system of ours work and it will produce all the jobs that are needed. The government can never produce them, and they should have found in the last thirty years that they were barking up the wrong tree.[243]

On the issue of civil rights, Goldwater took a strong stand for state and local action. He was highly concerned about the constitutionality of any federal legislation which might impinge on state or individual freedom. He differentiated between civil rights and what he termed civil liberties.

> When we talk about civil rights--and we must keep in mind the Constitution on this--there is only one civil right mentioned in the Constitution, and that is the right to vote. If we want to spell out civil rights all the way, then I suggest amending the Constitution

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[242] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 8.

[243] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 10.

> to include those things that are today called civil rights and I call civil liberties. For example, the right to get a job. This isn't a right. It's a liberty to seek a job and get it if you can, and hold it if you can. The so-called right to an education. There is no so-called right to an education. You have a liberty to seek an education. I would like to see everybody educated, but I don't want to destroy my fundamental concepts of our constitution to achieve something by law that can't be achieved by law. I can't make you like me by law, and you can't make me like you by law. We might gloss over the surface and make it sound like it, but fundamentally underneath, man has to love man, and law can't make man love man.[244]

In this author's opinion the difference between a "liberty" and a "right," of course, is that the "right" involves a guarantee, whereas a "liberty" merely involves the freedom of choice. He also overlooked the fact that the purpose of civil rights laws are not to make "man love man" but rather to guarantee man's equality of opportunity, regardless of whether he is liked by the majority or not. Goldwater's statement, in effect, completely relieves the federal government from any responsibility at all in education or employment, since in effect, everybody has the liberty to "seek" a job and to "seek" education.

In 1961 he had made the statement, "I would not like to see my party assume it is the role of the federal government to enforce integration in the schools."[245] He was asked in 1964 if that were still his position as a candidate.

> I think when the federal court hands down an edict that a school district has violated the decision of the Supreme Court then I think it is incumbent upon the

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[244] Ibid., p. 6.

[245] Ibid.

> federal government to enforce that edict . . . Frankly my feeling on this whole matter is that we are not going to solve the problems by federal legislation. I have changed my position slightly here in that a few years ago I didn't think that the federal government had the right to run the affairs of a school district or a local school, but I believe now, with the edict, that I have mentioned that they do have the right and power to step in if the edict is given. That has been a slight change.[246]

Goldwater's answer supported the right of the government to enforce a decision when violated, but in no way reflected a change of opinion as to the role of the party in advocating the enforcement of integration.

He was then asked if he would have used federal troops to enforce school desegregation practices, as did President Kennedy.

> No, I wouldn't because the Constitution is rather explicit on this. The troops can be called in at the request of the state legislature or the governor. They can be sent in by the President when revolution or secession appears to be iminent, but unless they are asked for, unless the occasion is covered by the Constitution, then I think the President would be wrong. If an edict had been issued by a federal court, then I believe that he has a right to use federal marshalls . . . I think, however, if you recall, he didn't use federal troops . . . he sent federal marshalls in.[247]

Goldwater, like Kefauver and Nixon, would rely on individual action and personal persuasion to bring about any change, rather than federal action.

> I am not optimistic enough or even a fool enough to think that what I would suggest would be accomplished overnight, but in my own state of Arizona it has been accomplished to a very large degree. I am not very happy that we still have some segregation problems

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[246] *Ibid*.

[247] *Ibid*.

> out there, but without any law, without any ordinances we have done away with segregation in schools and in public eating places and hotels. We do have some left but I think that the moral persuasion of the President could be used in this area.[248]

He admitted that this approach would be more difficult in the South, but expressed faith in the southern people to solve their own problems. He further claimed that states rights was no longer an issue involving racism, but fiscal policy.

> I couldn't do it as easily in Mississippi or Alabama as I could do it in Kansas or Nebraska, but I have a lot of faith in Southern people, more than a lot of Northerners have, and I think these people are first, good Americans. They are living with a situation they have lived with for over 300 years and they are not going to change it without an argument, but I find that in travelling through the South that integration and segregation is much less of a political issue today. The issue is a states rights issue based on the question of conservatism but mostly upon a conservative fiscal policy, and this is why the South has been turning toward the Republican Party, not because the Republican Party is a racist party, because you couldn't outrace the Democratic Party in the South.[249]

Goldwater is evidently much in agreement with Nixon with regard to the Republican Party in the South and its role.

Unlike his running mate William Miller, Goldwater did not vote for the 1964 Civil Rights Act, because he objected to the public accommodations section. As a candidate for the Republican nomination he again stated he would not vote for the Act given the opportunity because of this section.

> I think it is unconstitutional, and I think, if it is passed, it will work to the detriment of all Americans

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[248] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[249] *Ibid.*

> whether they be white or black, Catholic or Protestant or Jew, or whatever they are.[250]

It would seem that Goldwater has found it difficult to compromise, unlike Johnson or Miller, either on extreme points of view within his party, or on major civil rights legislation. His policy consistently, in the areas of foreign affairs, civil rights, and party politics, seems to have followed an all-or-nothing approach. He certainly represents the most extremely conservative point of view in the Republican Party as studied here.

SUMMARY AND REMARKS

Although there is a blurring of party lines on this issue, there is a marked difference as well. It would seem that there is little difference in philosophy between the Southern Democrats and the Republicans, except for Henry Cabot Lodge, who most closely resembles the Democratic point of view. The Republicans' most conservative spokesmen are Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater.

The Democratic spokesmen studied here would seem to agree on the need and desirability of federal action in civil rights, health, education, and welfare. They take a more moderate stand, however, on the implementation of specific issues such as FEPC, school desegregation, fair housing, and bussing of students. There is a recognition that this problem will not be solved by any fast and radical action, although federal action is advocated.

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[250] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

The Republicans, on the other hand, thoroughly oppose federal action, and would rather rely on state and local persuasion. This automatically commits them to even less drastic action in the areas of desegregation, aid to education, etc. then does the Democratic philosophy. As a result, any of the Republican candidates studied, possibly with the exception of Lodge, would presumably be a much more acceptable candidate in the South. This was proven in the 1964 election.

It is recognized that any party profile drawn here is a limited one, based solely on remarks issued by those candidates on this particular program. Certainly, the expressed views of General Eisenhower, had they been available, would have helped considerably in determining a more fully representative Republican viewpoint.

It is also recognized that to determine fully any candidate's views, it would be necessary to read everything that he has said or written about the issue. To determine his consistency of word and action, his voting record should be measured against his expressed views. This type of full analysis, however, was not the purpose of this study.

The sole purpose here was to examine some of the issues raised on the program which have been issues in most of the campaigns and which have concerned the candidates over the years. The effectiveness of the program in presenting political information can be measured in its ability to give the viewer a capsule profile of a candidate's

general philosophy on important issues and answers to some specific questions falling under these issues. The analyzed data support the conclusion that the program accomplishes this aim.

Aside from the limitations cited at the beginning of this chapter, there is one other limitation which needs mention. Many times during a campaign, two candidates for the same office were not asked the same specific questions on the same specific issues. This occurred even when the same panelist appeared on programs with both candidates. As a result an exact comparison of views on some issues is at times impossible. A correction of this factor by the panelists, perhaps by reading former program transcripts in preparation for each program, would make the show even more effective in politically enlightening the viewing public during an election year.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROGRAM AND ETHOS

A final important dimension of MEET THE PRESS can be measured in terms of its contribution to a candidate's image in terms of ethos, or source credibility. Since Aristotle first defined the term in the fourth century B.C., ethos has been regarded and proven to be one of the most effective means of persuasive proof. It is generally recognized that ethos consists of three major elements: competence, good character, and good will. As Hance, Ralph and Wiksell have stated, "The speaker with good ethos conveys the impression of knowing what he's talking about, of being honest and sincere, and of being friendly, congenial and likeable."[1]

It is recognized that the candidate's personality in terms of his visual image, can, in many cases play a larger role in total ethos projection than the content of his verbal message. At times the visual can reinforce the verbal. There are times, however, when the personality factor can obscure not only the verbal content but also its validity. It is this factor which makes it difficult to separate

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[1]Kenneth G. Hance, David C. Ralph and Milton J. Wiksell, Principles of Speaking (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1962), p. 39.

what is said from how it is said, in determining a candidate's source credibility. Television is known to project personality far better than issues.

Writing of the Nixon-Kennedy debates of 1960, political analyst Samuel Lubell pointed out this personality effect of television.

> The debates tend to lessen somewhat the importance of issues and party and to elevate the significance of personality, particularly on its theatrical side.[2]

In interviewing voters during the campaign Lubell found that the overwhelming majority responded in terms of how the candidates looked and handled themselves rather than in terms of the issues that they argued. Data by Roper also seemed to suggest that style of presentation was more important than either the content of the presentation (issues) or the personality of the debater (image).[3]

In its broadest context, however, this author believes that the total personality image projected involves not only the visual image, but also the verbal style of expression, and everything that the candidate says. The verbal image, therefore, is still a large part of both personality and total ethos projection. The directness with which a candidate answers questions, his verbal style, the nature of his opinion, and the degree to which he supports

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[2]Samuel Lubell, "Personalities vs. Issues," The Great Debates, ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 152.

[3]Elihu Katz and Jacob J. Feldman, "The Debates in Light of Research: A Survey of Surveys," The Great Debates, ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 200.

his statements with proof, all contribute toward the total amount of credibility he projects to the viewer.

Since this study is limited to the verbal aspect of the program, this chapter will likewise concern itself only with those verbal factors which contribute to the candidate's ethos. Moreover, there will be a discussion of the factors within the structure of the program itself which also contribute toward source credibility.

A preliminary analysis of the program format and of the data, has resulted in several general conclusions which can be stated. These conclusions provide a framework within which this discussion of program ethos can be adequately developed.

1. The interview format restricts any candidate from fully developing an organized persuasive message on any topic in the manner in which he would be able to do in a prepared political speech. Since the candidate does not control the line of questioning and is restricted by the time limit, an issue cannot be fully developed in a true rhetorical sense, utilizing <u>all</u> means of persuasion.

2. Because of these limitations, most proof takes the form of evidence, (facts, statistics, testimony) with little use of reasoning employed. Many statements also take the form of assertions. Except for John Kennedy, who will be discussed, there is little difference among candidates with regard to this factor. Hence, illustrative material and discussion are limited.

3. All candidates do use some reasoning, mostly of a sign and example form. Because of the minimal number of facts, examples, instances, etc., upon which premises are based, however, one might question the validity of the warrants or conclusions. This will be discussed later, where appropriate.

4. Candidates, on the whole, attempt to answer questions frankly. There is little evidence of intentional evasion. Moreover, when a reply is too evasive, ambiguous, or irrelevant, the question is usually repeated, or the answer rephrased by the panelist. Hence, few questions do not get some kind of direct answer, or an answer which is implied or suggested.

5. All candidates utilize the customary methods of establishing competence or authority. These include: the listing of governmental positions, roles in political parties, accomplishments, diplomatic journeys, relevant experience, discussions with important figures, etc. The methods are obvious ones and apply to all candidates with equal utilization, negating any need for discussion or illustration, except where they arise under other points.

6. The amount of emotional proof (that type of proof which is not directly related to, or dependent upon evidence and reasoning) used by all candidates is negligible, and needs no particular discussion or illustration.

7. Biggest differences among candidates exist with regard to their linguistic style. Since this could have a

bearing on the images they project, this factor will be discussed under each candidate, as being most relevant to his ethos. Significant differences will be illustrated.

Within these limitations, the program's contribution to candidate ethos will be examined. This study will limit itself to those candidates who either ran for the Presidency, or served as Vice President, so as to include both major party candidates of the current campaign. It is the image of the Presidential candidate which impresses the voter in any election. Since polls have shown that choice of the Vice Presidential candidate contributes little toward voter decision, the ethos of the Vice Presidential candidates will not be considered here.

PROGRAM ETHOS

PROGRAM FORMAT

A good part of candidate ethos stems from the built in credibility factor of television itself as compared to other informational media. Also, television newsmen have assumed a certain degree of credibility and authority. MEET THE PRESS, utilizing both of these built in factors in its format, promotes the ethos of any candidate appearing on the program. The number of awards the program has received also adds to its prestige and the prestige of any guest it features.

In addition, the program introduction contributes toward the credibility and importance of both the program

and the guest. The following introduction establishes program credibility and objectivity, and the importance and competence of the guest.

> Now MEET THE PRESS, winner of every major award in television and radio, produced by Lawrence Spivak. Ready for this spontaneous, unrehearsed conference are four of America's top reporters. Please remember, their questions do not necessarily reflect their point of view. It is their way of getting behind the headlines. And here is the moderator of MEET THE PRESS, Mr. Ned Brooks. Welcome once again to MEET THE PRESS. Our guest today is Senator Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, whose recent eight hour interview with Russian Prime Minister Krushchev has attracted world wide attention. The confidential messages he brought back for President Eisenhower have become the subject of much rumor and speculation. Senator Humphrey is a high ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he is a Chairman of the Sub-Committee on disarmament. He has served as a delegate to the United Nations and more recently as an advisor to the Geneva Conference on the control of atomic weapons. He is a former college professor and a former mayor of Minneapolis.[4]

The importance of the guest at the moment was also highlighted in this introduction given Senator Barry Goldwater in 1957.

> With the adjournment of Congress two important questions are being asked here in Washington. First, can organized labor clean its own house of corruption, or must the job be done by Federal legislation? Second, what is the future of President Eisenhower's program of modern Republicanism? With both of these questions Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, who is our guest today, has had much first hand experience. He is a member of the Senate Committee investigating racketeering in the labor-management field. Also, he's the former chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee.[5]

The language used in describing a candidate also

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[4]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 1.

[5]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 1, 1957, p. 1.

contributes to his image of competence, as is illustrated by introductions given to Humphrey, Lyndon Johnson, and John Kennedy.

> Senator Humphrey is a college professor who has mastered the art of politics. He was twice elected Mayor of Minneapolis and twice elected to the United States Senate.[6]

> Senator Johnson has spent nearly thirty years in public life. For twenty-four years he has been a member of Congress, first elected at the age of twenty-nine. Since 1953 he has been the Democratic leader of the Senate. He has been called one of the most effective leaders of our time.[7]

> Our guest is Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts; he is one of the most prominent figures of the political campaign. . . . He lost by only a very few votes, but his strong showing convinced many party leaders of his future possibilities on the national scene. . . . He had a distinguished war record . . . [8]

These examples illustrate how the program's introductory remarks build up program prestige and the ethos of the guest. Thus, the first element of ethos, competence, is built in to the format.

THE QUESTIONING PROCESS

Another program factor, which contributes more than the introduction to candidate ethos, is the questioning process itself. The questions posed on MEET THE PRESS contribute toward candidate ethos in two major ways. First, they deal in large part with those issues which involve

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[6]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 1.

[7]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, p. 1.

[8]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 1.

points of view related to values in our society. Questions dealing with Vietnam, the Berlin crisis, the cold war would naturally elicit expressions of patriotism, democratic ideals, freedom of choice, and other values cherished by a majority of our society. Questions dealing with civil rights would likewise call forth candidates' views on equality of opportunity, constitutional rights, local control, etc. Certainly a large part of any candidate's ethos is contained in the values he holds which are consonant with society at the time.

The second way in which questions contribute to ethos is the manner in which they allow the candidate to utilize those appeals which prove he is of good character and of good will. The nature of the question might determine the content of the answer with regard to what appeals the candidate will use. The following illustrative questions and answers help to demonstrate how the questioning process contributes to ethos by dealing with certain components of competence, good character and good will.

A: COMPETENCE. Certain questions posed by the panel elicit a direct statement of proof of the candidate's competence as a necessary reply.

On a program of January 3, 1960, Senator John Kennedy expressed confidence that he could beat Richard Nixon. The next question and reply follow.

JOHN STEELE: For what reasons?

KENNEDY: I have run for election on five occasions

> and I have been successful. I just have confidence that I can beat Mr. Nixon.[9]

Kennedy was forced into displaying an image of confidence and of competence in winning elections, thus adding to his image of credibility.

Later that year Kennedy was asked directly to state his qualifications for the Presidency. Consequently, his reply had to contribute toward his image of competency.

> JOHN STEELE: Senator, I ask this respectfully: How are you qualified to be President?
>
> KENNEDY: I have served the Congress for fourteen years and I think they were very difficult and changing years. I think that I am a figure of the post war where entirely new problems are coming on the scene which present entirely new challenges to American political leaders. Having come into politics during this period, having I think, some strong convictions as to what the United States must do to maintain its position as the leader of the free world, and its own survival, I think I can meet the responsibilities of the presidency.[10]

Again, Kennedy exhibited an air of confidence, which is part of being competent.

On the same program Lyndon Johnson was asked a question which also necessitated making a reply, which, in terms of experience and competence, had to contribute toward his ethos.

> MR. SPIVAK: As you know there have been charges from some quarters that despite the large Democratic majority in the Senate under your direction it has not made an impressive record this session. I know you think it

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[9]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 7.

[10]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 13.

has. Will you tell us specifically what you have done that you consider of great importance in this session?

JOHNSON: We've taken the minority of '52 and built it into the majority of '54. . . . We have had a program, I think of building a stronger defense, of providing the funds and the policies for the President to execute that could give us an effective foreign policy. We have had an outstanding space program. We've had a crash program for medical research. We have had outstanding conservation bills that would dam our rivers, harness our streams and provide reclamation projects for the west. . . . We have passed area redevelopment bills, housing bills, social security measures, all for the benefit of our working people and our farmers . . . [11]

By listing the achievements of his Congress, Johnson projected an image of a competent majority leader.

In 1962 Richard Nixon was asked a question by Earl Mazo with regard to his candidacy for Governor of California.

MAZO: It is stated here that the very fact of your running for Governor has solidified the Democrats, that they are now unified because you are their opponent, and that you can't get along with Democrats. What about that?

The question forced Nixon into proving his own competence at being able to get along with Democrats which also implies a degree of good will on his part.

NIXON: I would only respectfully submit that I think I have gotten along reasonably well with my friends in the Congress and in the Senate who have been Democrats, and I expect to get along with the Democratic leadership in the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California.
I should point out that two men, the Majority Leader of the Assembly, Speaker Unruh, has indicated that he could work, and I quote him, 'with

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[11] Ibid., p. 33.

> a Nixon administration," and the Majority Leader of the Senate, Hugh Burns, has indicated that he feels that he could work with a Nixon administration. Both of them obviously are supporting my opponent. I don't want to put words in their mouths. But they recognize what I just said, that they put California first, above party, and that is what I intend to do.[12]

By putting California above his party, Nixon also added to his image of integrity.

These selected examples have demonstrated how the questioning process can contribute toward a candidate's image of competence by forcing him to state his own qualifications to prove his case. Questions can also force the guest to reply by appealing to certain values inherent in our society, thus adding to an image of character and good will.

B: CHARACTER AND GOOD WILL. There are many components of character and good will. Honesty, integrity, fairness, pride, and warmth are only a few. One of the ways of demonstrating many of these qualities is to exhibit a belief in ideals and values considered to be good, just and moral by a majority of our society. These are the values founded on democratic and religious traditions. They espouse ideas of equality, freedom, truth, fair play, etc. The nature of many questions on MEET THE PRESS, because of their subject matter, forces replies which appeal to these values, thus affording the candidate the opportunity to increase his

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[12]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 7, 1962, p. 4.

ethical image of character and good will. The following examples help to illustrate the point.

There are certain topics which naturally call for opinions involving concepts of equality and democratic ideals. One of these is the question of religion in politics. The subject was widely discussed during the 1960 campaign and proved a good ethos building platform for candidates appearing on MEET THE PRESS. In 1958, however, the issue was brought up to John Kennedy after his landslide win. Ernest Lindley was the panelist.

> LINDLEY: Do you think that the recent election threw any new or additional light on the familiar question of whether the country would elect a Catholic to the Presidency?

The question gave Kennedy the opening he needed to appeal to the American sense of fair play in establishing an image of integrity, faith in the American people, and a belief in democratic toleration of all religions.

> KENNEDY: Not with precision, but I do think that there were general indications that the American people judge candidates on their qualities, their talent, character and general ability, and they do not regard a man's religion as either favorable or unfavorable. It doesn't seem to come into it, looking across the nation. Catholics won; Catholics lost. The same applies to Protestants and Jews.[13]

In 1960 Hubert Humphrey was asked about the religion issue by Sander Vanocur. The question gave Humphrey the opportunity to declare what he stood for and add to his image of being tolerant and democratic in his beliefs.

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[13]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 9, 1958, p. 2.

VANOCUR: Practicalities of politics are one thing and the moralities of politics are another. Do you resent the fact that a lot of people who are Catholic will vote for Senator Kennedy because he is a Catholic?

HUMPHREY: I have no proof of that. As a matter of fact, I resent the fact that people will intimate that until they have some evidence, and they have no such evidence. . . . And I deplore above all things in my life this injection of this element of what I call religious intolerance into this campaign. My whole life has been dedicated to the elimination of bigotry and discrimination, and nothing would sicken me more than to see this campaign degenerate into what I think some people would like to have it degenerate to, and when I say some people I mean some very little minded ones. Thank goodness that both Senator Kennedy and Senator Humphrey have no truck with this kind of thing, and we will have none, I can assure you of that.[14]

By complimenting Senator Kennedy, Humphrey also added to his image of being a man of good will and sincerity.

Adlai Stevenson was also given the opportunity to express his democratic and religious values when confronted with the same kind of question in April, 1960, by John Steele.

STEELE: Governor, there is one other issue; this is a rather dark and ominous one, which seems to hang over the whole business of selecting a President this year. It is the issue of religion. Has this really got any place in the business of politics?

In his reply Stevenson accomplished much toward building his image. He used religious appeal, the appeal to fair play, patriotic appeal, and historical reference. The question, by its nature, however, forced this kind of value laden reply.

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[14]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 3, 1960, p. 13.

STEVENSON: No, I supposed someone would ask me that question. I can only say about that, if I may take a moment, that I personally am deeply distressed, Mr. Steele and gentlemen, that there has been so much talk about religion in this campaign in this primary period. If one stops to think it was 300 years ago that the issue of religious toleration was settled in Protestant Rhode Island and in Catholic Maryland. . . . I think it is a pity that two such fine men as Senator Kennedy and Senator Humphrey--Senator Kennedy on the one hand that he must defend himself for being Catholic and Senator Humphrey on the other hand that he must defend himself from being charged with being the beneficiary of bigotry. . . . Of the greatest issue of all, which is the greatness and the security of the United States, Catholics and Protestants are as one on this issue. There is no division on this score.

I could say one other word and I thought about this on Easter Day. Instead of talking about religion in this campaign, it would be a mighty good thing if candidates and people alike were to recall a prayer which is common to both Catholics and Protestants, so far as I know. You know the one I mean, that "May the words of our mouths, the meditations of our hearts, be acceptable in Thy sight, O Lord."[15]

Richard Nixon was also asked for his views on the religion issue by panelist Herb Kaplow, during the 1960 campaign. In his reply Nixon was also forced to use patriotic and religious appeals. He also exhibited traits of integrity and good will by testifying to John Kennedy's loyalty and by declining to discuss religion as an issue. He also used religion as a common ground to unite all Americans, regardless of party, in our fight against communism. His reply was strong in ethical appeal.

KAPLOW: . . . There have been recent developments which indicate that religion is an issue in certain

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[15]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 7.

parts of our country, and I wonder if you have anything more to say about the subject?

NIXON: . . . I do think it might be appropriate for me to make another statement on it at this point, to be sure that the record is absolutely clear and that my convictions as a candidate for the Presidency are known. I have no doubt whatever about Senator Kennedy's loyalty to his country and about the fact that if he were elected President that he would put the Constitution of the United States above any other consideration. . . . I don't believe, in other words, there is a religious issue as far as Senator Kennedy is concerned.

In the second place, I believe that it would be tragic, and I repeat, tragic, for not only the United States at home, but it would be tragic as far as the picture the United States presents abroad, for this election to be determined primarily, or even substantially on religious grounds.

We do have a great problem in the world today, the one that has already been touched upon in two previous questions and that problem is fighting that ideology which opposes all religion--communism. In fighting that ideology--all religions are their enemy, and all religions must work together, and the United States must be united by this campaign insofar as that issue is concerned, and not divided. . . . As far as I am concerned, I have issued orders to all of the people in my campaign not to discuss religion, not to raise it, not to allow anybody to participate in the campaign who does so on that ground, and as far as I am concerned, I will decline to discuss religion and will discuss other issues in order to keep the minds of the people on the issues that should decide this election and to keep them off of an issue that should not enter into it.[16]

Concern for all mankind, another ethical trait, is almost always prompted in any discussion involving the testing of hydrogen bombs. In May, 1957, May Craig asked Adlai Stevenson to clarify his stand on nuclear testing. His reply illustrated his deep concern for his fellow man.

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[16]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 11, 1960, p. 3.

CRAIG: I meant to ask you, are you against only the tests or are you against the use of nuclear weapons in war?

STEVENSON: . . . I think it is apparent that the weapon, the large nuclear weapon is now a weapon of extermination, that it will probably therefore not be used. . . . I do think that we ought to bear in mind that while we can do anything we please in the interests of our own national defense within our land when we test a weapon which has the effect of contaminating the atmosphere throughout the earth which indeed can poison other people in other lands who are helpless, we are not sowing good will but ill-will around the world. This is contamination if you please without representation.[17]

The question of civil rights must by its nature involve value judgments in any statement. The questions themselves could contain built in premises, the acceptance of which contributes to the candidate's ethical image. The following two questions put to Senator John Kennedy by Ernest Lindley in 1958 illustrate the point.

LINDLEY: Senator, you believe that the Supreme Court decisions on integration of the schools should be obeyed and enforced, do you not?

KENNEDY: I do.

LINDLEY: And you favor a strong civil rights program?

KENNEDY: Yes.[18]

In 1960 Kennedy was again given the opportunity to express his stand on equality with a question from Ed Folliard of the Washington Post.

FOLLIARD: Henry Cabot Lodge made a speech in Harlem and promised that a Negro would be appointed to

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[17]MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 5.

[18]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 9, 1958, p. 2.

> the Cabinet if he and Mr. Nixon won. Then he got down to North Carolina, and as I understand it, sort of ate his words. You remarked on that yesterday. How would you feel about a Negro in the Cabinet if you were successful on November 8th?[19]

The answer called for a definite commitment which could either benefit or hurt Kennedy's ethos, depending on whether the viewer was a Northern liberal or Southern conservative. Kennedy's answer appealed to the sense of equality for all people, including Negroes, thereby doing his image good in the eyes of all segments of the viewing audience.

> KENNEDY: I think we ought to pick the best people we can and the best for each of the tasks. If the best person is a Negro, if he is white, if he is Mexican descent or Irish descent, or whatever he may be, I believe he should get the job. But I do believe we should make a greater effort to bring Negroes into participation in the higher branches of government. There are no Federal District Judges--there are 200 odd of them; not a one is a Negro. We have about 26 Negroes in the entire foreign service of 6,000 so that particularly now with the importance of Africa, Asia and all the rest, I do believe we should make a greater effort to encourage fuller participation on all levels, of all the talent we can get--Negro, white, of any race.[20]

It is interesting to note the use of statistics by Kennedy, a characteristic ofmany of his opinion replies. This practice added to his image of competence and intellectualism.

Senator Barry Goldwater's strong sense of patriotism and adherence to the Constitution have always been part of his ethical image. He was forced into adding to this image when he was asked a question concerning his vote on the Civil

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[19]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 11.

[20]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 12.

Rights Bill in 1964. Again, it was the kind of question which had to result in reply based on values and a contribution to ethos.

> SPIVAK: Senator Goldwater, the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Bill is certain to be a big issue in this coming Congress. Will you continue to oppose that?
>
> GOLDWATER: Yes, I will Mr. Spivak, because I think it is unconstitutional, and I think if it is passed it will work to the detriment of all Americans whether they be white or black, or Catholic or Protestant or Jew or whatever they are.[21]

A question put to Senator Hubert Humphrey in 1964 regarding looting and rioting practically dictated the answer, which was a clear defense of law and order and contributory toward an image of decency.

> CRAIG: Senator Goldwater was the first to speak out at the Republican Convention about violence in the streets, the streets not being safe for people to walk upon. Now after the looting and the rioting, the President also called for law and order, but did not the Democrats condone this sort of thing by allowing the demonstrations by the civil rights organizations?

Humphrey had to reject the built in premise and prove otherwise, thus using ethical appeal.

> HUMPHREY: No, I do not believe that we have condoned it at all, and may I say that no one should condone lawlessness, violence, looting, vandalism, hoodlumism. We cannot do that. I have been the Mayor of a rather large city, I have had to enforce the law. I operated and was in command of a police department, and I maintained law and order. That is the first duty of a public official that is entrusted with the responsibility of local government and of state government. The President of the United States

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[21]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 7.

Rights Bill in 1964. Again, [illegible]

which had to result in [illegible]

tion to echoes.

SPIVAK: Senator [illegible]
section of [illegible]
to be a [illegible]
Will you [illegible]

GOLDWATER: Yes, I w[illegible]
unconstitution[illegible]
it will [illegible]
whether [illegible]
or professor[illegible]

A question put to [illegible]

garding looting and rioting practices [illegible]

which was a clear defense of law and order [illegible]

toward an image of decency.

CRAIG: Senator Goldwater was the first to reach out to the Republican convention about violence in the streets, the streets not safe, safe for people to walk upon. Now after the looting and the riots, the President also called for law and order, but did not the Democrats condone this sort of thing by allowing the demonstrations by the civil rights organizations?

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[21] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 7.

> and the Senator from Minnesota both believe in law and order. We believe in strict law enforcement. We believe in strict law observance.[22]

It is interesting to note Humphrey's use of his own experience to add to his image of authority. His use of the third person in referring to himself is also a frequent Humphrey device, which perhaps adds to an image of humility and sincerity.

In 1967, Humphrey was again asked his opinion regarding the same subject. The manner in which the question was phrased dictated a positive statement on Humphrey's part calling for law, order, fair play, and other attributes of an image of decency, character and justice.

> STEELE: . . . in the field of civil rights where you have been a leader for years, some of the leaders have taken a most militant line urging other people to burn and shoot and take what normally is regarded in society as criminal action. I want to know what your advice is to these people--to the extreme militants of that movement--is.
>
> HUMPHREY: I think they do a disservice to the cause of social progress. There is no room in this country for violence, lawlessness, disorder, riot, arson, hooliganism. That has no place in a mature, developed, democratic society. We have ways and means of redressing grievances as I've said. Actually those who preach violence and hate do the cause of social progress a great disservice. They ought to be rebuked, and surely those of us who believe in social progress ought to take our stand and make it quite clear that we cannot in any way condone or tolerate that kind of action.[23]

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[22]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 5.

[23]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 3.

The patriotic American is part of a good ethical image. Questions dealing with Vietnam draw out responses which partly rely on democratic and patriotic values to justify our involvement.

In 1964, Adlai Stevenson was asked by A. M. Rosenthal what our objectives and strategy in Vietnam were. Stevenson's reply had to be couched in patriotic and democratic appeals, enhancing his image.

> STEVENSON: . . . We have no national interests in Southeast Asia other than the peace and the independence and the security of the countries in that region of the world and nothing would delight us more than an opportunity to leave Vietnam, to come back to the United States, to use those men, material and money that is now being expended in that ugly jungle war.[24]

In March, 1966, Vice President Hubert Humphrey was asked his opinion on the willingness of the American people to continue tolerating a continuing high casualty rate in Vietnam for an indefinite period. Humphrey's reply had to exhibit an image of faith in the American people's belief in the justice of the cause.

> HUMPHREY: Mr. Cowles, when anybody hears about fatalities or casualties it makes you very sad. But the American people recognize that this nation has a great responsibility in the world and that with responsibilities come sacrifices. I have never believed that a position of leadership gave you any privilege or luxuries. Actually, it imposes heavy demands and duties.[25]

When asked whether administration policies in Vietnam would influence the Congressional elections, Humphrey again answered

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[24]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 13, 1964, p. 6.

[25]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1956, p. 4.

in patriotic terms and a display of confidence in the American people, and pride in our army.

> HUMPHREY: . . . I happen to believe, that the American people understand what this struggle is about. They understand that we are not fighting just for a piece of geography. They understand that we are fighting for a principle: namely, that aggression cannot go unchecked. . . . I have a lot of faith in the American people. They are a mature people, and they are an understanding people, and the forces that we have in Vietnam today manifest that. They reveal that. These are the finest fighting men that we have ever put into the field. They do their job. They are brave, they are courageous, they are able, they are efficient, and they understand what they are there for. I think that is a reflection of the American body politic.[26]

Humphrey's image of patriotism and good will, exhibiting faith in the American people was again elicited in response to a question in November, 1967.

> STEELE: Mr. Vice President, after your recent trip to Southeast Asia, you came home and reported in these words--the question you said, that you were most frequently asked in the field was: "Why are we winning the war in Vietnam and seem to be losing it at home?" What is your answer to that question?
>
> HUMPHREY: I don't think we are losing the war at home. . . . My view is that the American people have the courage to stick it out, will stick it out, will persevere. And that was the message that I brought to Southeast Asia. This was the basic concern that the leaders of Southeast Asia had: Will the Americans persevere? Will we stay with them? Will we help them in national security and national development? Will we have the patience? And my answer was, yes.[27]

During the same program, Humphrey was asked to comment on the dissent being expressed on college campuses at that

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[26] Ibid., p. 5.

[27] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 7.

time. The question was phrased in a manner which would allow the Vice President to reflect an image of belief in democratic ideals on one hand, but also a strong belief in law and order on the other hand, when the two might conflict.

STEELE: Mr. Vice President, there seems to be in the country today a sort of intolerant dissent. One example is the number of college students who block other college students, block them physically, from attending interviews of government agencies, such as the military and the CIA, and indeed prevent them from going to job interviews with representatives of private companies.
You are an old dissenter yourself, and I would just like to know what you think about this business.

HUMPHREY: . . . dissent, freedom of speech, freedom of press, the right to seek redress of grievances is a very precious right and one that we must jealously guard, even to a point, may I say, of where it may appear at times that the guardianship is even of abusive dissent. My own feeling is that those who are deeply devoted to dissent and the right of dissent, the right to be heard, should keep in mind that the quality of tolerance of the other man's point of view or the willingness to listen to the other man's point of view is absolutely essential. . . . What disturbs me about some of the dissent of the present time is that it has gone in to the streets, so to speak. It is a dissent that is characterized in some quarters, and I want to be very careful about this, in some quarters with obscenity, obscene statements on walls, violence, people unwilling to listen to the other man talk, threatening abuse of public officials. I don't really consider that dissent. I think the President described it very well when he spoke of it as, sort of, storm trooper tactics.[28]

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

SUMMARY

We have seen in this section how the program format and questioning process directly contribute to the kind of ethical image the candidate can project. The program introduction, by listing his positions and experience, and stating why he is newsworthy at the moment, adds to a candidate's image of competence, authority and credibility. The recognition achieved by the program, the journalism and broadcast awards it has received, the top ranking reporters and journalists it features, all add to the prestige of the candidate who is a program guest.

The questioning process is also contributory to the candidate's ethical image by the nature of the replies it must elicit. The candidate is given the opportunity to state his qualifications, or express value judgments which are consonant with accepted ideals. Some questions, as was illustrated, almost dictate the kinds of ethical appeals that must be used in a response, to adequately support it.

The second, and more important major source of ethos on the program lies within the candidate himself, and the manner in which he expresses his thoughts.

CANDIDATE ETHOS

Everything a candidate says on the program, the language he uses, and the manner in which he approaches the question, all contribute to the image he projects. In this

broad context, ethical proof is the most predominant method of proof used to provide a basis for the candidate's opinions. This concept of ethos, and the limitations previously discussed, provide a framework within which each candidate can be studied and the necessary points illustrated.

The two main sources of ethos within the candidate lie in the statements he makes and the linguistic style he uses to express and support these statements. This would include the manner in which he responds, the personal quality of his language, the nature and extent of his proof, and other factors contributing to an image of competence, character, and good will. Within the framework of these two sources, the following section will analyze the ethical image projected by each candidate.

ADLAI STEVENSON

The image Adlai Stevenson projected on the program was one of deep integrity, honesty and humility, nurturing a deep concern for all of mankind, and a strong belief in American and democratic principles. This image was reinforced by a keen sense of humor and a certain amount of appeal to the religious or Christian ideals espoused by most citizens. Intellectually, Stevenson, more than any other candidate, displayed an acute concern for the meaning of any question thrown at him, before committing himself to a reply. More than any other candidate, he called for definition of terms by the panelist before he would directly offer an opinion or make a statement.

Stevenson's patriotic views, like those of the other candidates studied, have already been referred to under previous subject matter, and need not be discussed here. He also expressed a deep concern for all mankind in his views on the testing of the hydrogen bomb and on civil rights. His views on the religious question also probably reinforced his image of a man strongly committed to democratic ideas of freedom and tolerance.

On one appearance, however, which is worth noting, Stevenson also expressed his views on justice for all and the sanctity of our Bill of Rights and our Constitution, complementing his democratic and patriotic image. In 1952, he was asked about his role in the Alger Hiss trial, where he gave a deposition as a character witness. Although the question did not call for it, Stevenson added the following statement to his answer.

> I'm a lawyer. I think that one of the most fundamental responsibilities, not only for every citizen, but particularly of lawyers, is to give testimony in a court of law, to give it honestly and willingly, and it will be a very unhappy day for Ango-Saxon justice when a man, even a man in public life, is too timid to state what he knows and what he has heard about a defendant in a criminal trial for fear that defendant might later be convicted. That would be the ultimate timidity.[29]

Stevenson's integrity was also enhanced by this statement of principle.

A few minutes later, Stevenson was asked to comment on the McCarran investigation of Communism. The question gave

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[29]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 14.

Stevenson's particip[illegible] candidates studied, have [illegible] views subject matter, and [illegible] also expressed a deep [illegible] on the testing of the [illegible] His views on the relig[illegible] his image of a man [illegible] of freedom and tolerance.

On one appearance [illegible] Stevenson also express[illegible] the sanctity of our bill [illegible] complementing his democratic [illegible] he was asked about his role [illegible] he gave a deposition as a character [illegible] question did not call for it, Stevenson [illegible] statement to his answer.

> I'm a lawyer. I think that one of the most fundamental responsibilities, not only for every citizen, but particularly of lawyers, is to give testimony in a court of law, to give it honestly and willingly, and it will be a very unhappy day for Anglo-Saxon justice when a man, even a man in public life, is too timid to state what he knows and what he has heard about a defendant in a criminal trial for fear that defendant might later be convicted. That would be the ultimate timidity.[29]

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[29]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 14.

him an opportunity to voice his concern with individual rights.

> I don't condemn that. I do very much condemn the danger of very broad accusation, unsubstantiated charges, which not only endanger the reputation of the individual, but they actually do an injustice to the Republic, because we can't let hysteria in our anxiety to prevent any injury to the Bill of Rights, destroy the Bill of Rights.[30]

Stevenson's sense of integrity, particularly with regard to the office of the Presidency, and in fact and public office, was revealed on several occasions, as was his concern for the morality of our times.

On a program in 1952, discussing the charges of corruption in his own party, he remarked:

> Corruption is treason to a political party in my opinion because corruption is disloyalty, because it can only breed ill will for the party.[31]

A few moments later he commented on morals in public life.

> The level of morals in public life can never be very much different from the level of morals in civilian life. I think therefore that our problem about improving the moral tone of public life is pretty much reflection on the spiritual difficulties which we seem to be encountering in this anxious age of two devastating wars. I think government, however, must take the lead and that we must establish precedents and practices in government which perhaps we wouldn't find among our citizenry. It must be like Caesar's wife, unimpeachable.[32]

During the program, when asked about his possible candidacy, he displayed a sense of loyalty to his constituents in Illinois and a sense of responsibility to his position as Governor.

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[30] Ibid., p. 16.

[31] Ibid., p. 2.

[32] Ibid., p. 3.

> I have invested something over three years now of hard work, blood, and sweat, in my job in Illinois. It's been a very satisfying and a very rewarding experience for me. I have induced a great many people to come into the state of Illinois government. . . . I feel a great sense of obligation both to them and also a great sense of personal obligation to a state in which my people have lived for over 120 years.[33]

In 1957, he spoke of the probable harm that his stand on nuclear testing had on his campaign of 1956 and the importance of being honest.

> I think it's imperative in national campaigns, and that's the purpose for which they exist, for candidates for public office and especially for the Presidency, to indicate with unwavering sincerity and candor what their views are on great and important public issues.[34]

A few moments later he criticized the Eisenhower administration for its lack of candor.

> I think there have been many occasions in the past four years under this administration when we have sacrificed truth, when we have sacrificed indeed even the respect and confidence of our friends abroad in the interests of party harmony or some fancied political advantage in this country, and I think this is a great mistake.[35]

He then backed up his accusation with evidence.

> We shouldn't tell the people that all is well in our alliance and then have it fall apart in the course of two weeks. We shouldn't tell the people that everything is good in Suez and going to be all right and then have it blow up in the course of a few weeks.[36]

In 1960, he again emphasized his concern with the quality of integrity in a public servant.

> I think that the most important quality in a President is character. There can be little effective persuasion or little conviction among our friends unless they are

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[33] Ibid., p. 8.

[34] MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 10.

[35] Ibid., p. 12.

[36] Ibid.

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> confident that the President's character, that his words, his meaning, that his purpose is clear and distinct.[37]

The quality of honesty played an important role in Stevenson's projected image of humility. He admitted the possibility of no person, no executive or no country being infallible. In 1952, he admitted that we might have made errors in Korea, with regard to Formosa and the withdrawal of troops from Korea.

> I think we complied in good faith; whether the Soviet Union did or not I have never been sure. It's possible that we have made errors in Korea. I'd be the last to dispute it.[38]

In 1964, speaking of the opportunity for agreements with the Soviets in view of the increasing Chinese and Soviet dispute, Stevenson honestly replied,

> I have been very hopeful that we could make some progress. . . . There is hope--I can't--I would be deceitful if I said that I saw any immediate prospect of progress.[39]

Speaking about our Vietnam commitment and the confusion of both the Chinese government and of our own people concerning the limits of this commitment, Stevenson admitted that even as United Nations Representative, he was less qualified to speak on this matter than one of the panelists. He addressed A. M. Rosenthal of the New York Times who raised the question.

> ROSENTHAL: Sir, I think a great many Americans, certainly including myself, are a bit confused as to how far the United States plans to go or is willing to go in defense of Vietnam. . . . If there is confusion in the minds of

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[37]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 4.

[38]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 6.

[39]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 13, 1964, p. 8.

some Americans--I think you will agree there is--isn't it likely there is also confusion in the minds of the Communist Chinese, and isn't this a dangerous thing?

STEVENSON: I can assure you that there is some confusion in the minds of some American diplomats, too, Mr. Rosenthal. And you, who probably know more about this than most any of our fellow countrymen, probably should be lecturing me on this subject and not me you.[40]

Several moments later in responding to a question by Pauline Frederick, he admitted his limitations, even in a most important diplomatic role: "There are some questions that I am not competent to answer, Pauline."[41]

Stevenson's style was somewhat intellectual but personal. On several occasions he addressed panelists Merriman Smith and Pauline Frederick by their first name, and almost always addressed the panelist directly when answering a question. Although his responses were in large part free from any colloquialisms, and little use was made of imagery, he did exhibit a keen wit and some religious references.

In 1961, he was asked whether Berlin was worth fighting a war over against the Russians. He replied: "Of course, I don't think we should ever yield to the Russians, and I pray to God we are not going to be confronted with that choice."[42]

In 1964, he was asked about the possibility of the United Nations Security Council not being able to resume

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[40] Ibid., p. 6.

[41] Ibid., p. 7.

[42] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, p. 9.

after Christmas and to solve the problem of the Soviet peace-keeping debt by the first of the year. Stevenson again expressed himself in religious terms: "There is a possibility that we won't. I pray that we will."[43]

On a program of June, 1965, he was asked about the United States wanting the UN to intervene in Vietnam.

> I have no doubt that if a peaceful settlement is arrived at in due course to stop the fighting in Vietnam--and pray to God that it is . . . [44]

Certainly this religious aspect of Stevenson's style contributed to his image of the good Christian man.

One of Adlai Stevenson's most pronounced qualities was his keen sense of humor, a quality almost completely missing in some other candidates.

In 1952, he was asked a question by Edwin Leahy pertaining to his desire not to seek the Presidential nomination.

> LEAHY: Wouldn't your grandfather, Vice President Stevenson, twirl in his grave if he saw you running away from a chance to be the Democratic nominee in 1952?
>
> STEVENSON: I think we will have to leave grandfather lie.[45]

He was asked a few minutes later if the studio audience didn't give him some indication of how the people felt about his running the country for the next four years. The audience evidently was giving him a most warm and encouraging

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[43]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 13, 1964, p. 2.

[44]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 27, 1965, p. 4.

[45]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 8.

reception. Stevenson replied:

> It's very flattering indeed, and I suppose flattery hurts no one then, that is if he doesn't inhale.[46]

It was this program, the Governor's first appearance on MEET THE PRESS, which eventually resulted in his consideration as nominee. His keen wit and frank answers contributed no small part to the favorable image he projected.

In 1957, speaking about the deficit the Democratic party was facing, he volunteered the following statement as part of an answer.

> All contributions will be gratefully received, Mr. Spivak, the larger the better. That's all the advertising I can get in today I guess.[47]

During the same program Marquis Childs asked Stevenson how far his authority extended as titular head of his party and whether it would grow or diminish approaching 1960.

> STEVENSON: I'm not sure it extends from me to you, but it certainly doesn't extend beyond you.[48]

In 1956, he was asked by Merriman Smith whether he had any organic disorders since the subject of Eisenhower's health was a campaign issue.

> STEVENSON: No, I have no organic disorders. I won't guarantee the mental situation, but I'll speak for the physical.[49]

In 1963, the following dialogue took place between Stevenson and Lawrence Spivak.

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[47] MEET THE PRESS program script, May 5, 1957, p. 2.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[49] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 6.

SPIVAK: Governor, now to other things . . .

STEVENSON: Are there any other things than foreign affairs?

SPIVAK: In answer--yes, there are. You will see in a minute.

STEVENSON: I am very glad to get in the outside world again after three years.[50]

Stevenson's informal relations with the panel were often expressed in humorous terms. The following two pieces of dialogue took place during a program of June, 1965.

SPIVAK: Governor, I don't like to labor the financial problem, but I would like to ask one more question on it.

STEVENSON: It has been labored pretty thoroughly.[51]

PETER LISAGOR: Can I ask you a rather blunt question about the United Nations and the Vietnamese situation? If a vote were taken in the UN today--

STEVENSON: I know you would ask a blunt question whether I gave you permission or not, so go ahead.[52]

Like all other candidates, Stevenson answered most questions in a frank and direct manner. In eight appearances on the program, Stevenson, to only six of the many questions thrown at him completely avoided a direct answer. Half of these indirect answers regarded his candidacy, which is typical of all candidates. This paucity of evasive tactics to at least some degree testifies to the man's intellectual honesty.

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[50]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 22, 1963, p. 6.

[51]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 27, 1965, p. 6.

[52]*Ibid.*, p. 7.

A definite mark of Stevenson's intellectual approach is his concern with meanings of terms or words, so that he can more honestly answer the question. In 1952, he was asked by Lawrence Spivak, how much of the responsibility for the events that led up to Korea was on the shoulders of the Democratic Party. Before accepting Spivak's premise, Stevenson replied,

> I don't know what you mean by the events that led up to Korea.[53]

On a program of April, 1956, several questions arose which involved definition of terms. Merriman Smith asked Stevenson the following, with regard to the testing of nuclear weapons.

> SMITH: Wouldn't you think we might be in a worse position if we stopped testing and then resumed it later on than we would be if we continued on a scheduled basis?
>
> STEVENSON: It depends what you mean by a worse position.[54]

Lawrence Spivak, later in the program asked Stevenson a question concerning southern desegregation of public schools.

> SPIVAK: Would you give them plenty of time if they showed good faith or would you force the issue?
>
> STEVENSON: I don't know what you mean by plenty of time.[55]

Merriman Smith then asked Stevenson a question with regard to his criticism of administration secrecy.

> SMITH: Governor, getting back briefly to the subject of administration secrecy, as you put it, your

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[53]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 5.

[54]MEET THE PRESS program script, April 22, 1956, p. 9.

[55]*Ibid*., p. 12.

feeling is that they have not respected the public's right to know. If you were elected . . . are there any specific government files or areas of information now secret that you would open to the public?

STEVENSON: Oh no. Well, I'm not sure that I know what you mean by files.[56]

In April, 1960, the following dialogue took place between Stevenson and Lawrence Spivak, again illustrating the importance of definition.

SPIVAK: Governor, in your Virginia speech yesterday you charged, "Our own leaders have deceived us by under-rating the magnitude of the crisis." Is your charge that they have wilfully deceived us, or just that they were ignorant, their judgment was bad?

STEVENSON: As to wilfulness, if you imply wilfulness in any malevolent sense, no. If you imply wilfulness as a means of covering up their failures or to obscure them, to put emphasis perhaps where I wouldn't put it, I'd say yes.[57]

During the same program, in reply to a question by Spivak concerning how we should deal with Castro, Trujillo and Krushchev, Stevenson answered:

What do you mean by deal?[58]

In September, 1961, William Frye asked Stevenson whether he thought we were going to lose on Red China in the United Nations. Stevenson wanted to know what Frye meant by "lose on Red China."[59] The tendency to give import to the exact meaning of words is illustrated in this defense by Stevenson of United Nations actions.

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[56] Ibid., p. 13.

[57] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 24, 1960, p. 4.

[58] Ibid., p. 10.

[59] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 17, 1961, p. 3.

FREDERICK: Both the Soviet Union and the United States have now invoked regional alliances in entering, respectively, Hungary and the Dominican Republic. Do these precedents set by the two big powers give the green light to any original group to take enforcement action although the Security Council is supposed, under the Charter, to approve such enforcement action?

STEVENSON: I don't consider this was enforcement at all.

FREDERICK: Do you mean the OAS force is not down there keeping the peace?

STEVENSON: It is not enforcing anything. . . . Enforcement--we have always interpreted the Charter and I think virtually all of the membership, Miss Frederick interprets that language, that word, as enforcing a decision. We are down there to keep the peace, to keep one party from enforcing its will on the other.

FREDERICK: The United States is keeping--

STEVENSON: The OAS, the Inter-American Peace Force.

FREDERICK: But if shooting breaks out, the OAS Force led by the United States is supposed to try and stop it, isn't it? Doesn't that make it enforcement?

STEVENSON: No, that is not our interpretation of what was intended by that language of the Charter at all.[60]

Stevenson's use of logical proof was limited to mostly facts, opinion, and some reasoning from example. He used very few statistics.

In 1952, May Craig asked him if he didn't think the revelations of corruption revealed that the Democratic Party had been in power too long. Stevenson used an example from past history to support his point. He used historical reference quite a bit.

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[60]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 27, 1965, p. 9.

STEVENSON: You saw revelations of corruption in the first years of the Harding Administration after it had been in office three years. Do you think that indicated that the Republicans had been in too long?[61]

In December, 1964, Stevenson was asked a question by Pauline Frederick concerning the firing of a bazooka shell on the UN, and its implications for moving the United Nations out of New York for safety reasons.

FREDERICK: Governor, what do you say to the assertion in the usual quarters now that, of course, proves the United Nations isn't safe in the United States and should be moved elsewhere?

In this one case Stevenson might have been using sign reasoning in stating his opinion.

STEVENSON: I don't think that follows necessarily. After all we have seen virtually--we have seen embassies burned all over the world. We have seen all sorts of public buildings attacked and frequently mutilated. We have seen none of this in this country. We even had--if I am not mistaken--an American consul arrested by the Prime Minister of a country at the point of a gun not long ago, but we don't retaliate in that way in this country, and we have been able to preserve I think a rather high degree of security than most other places in the world.[62]

Stevenson's major premise in this case might be that dangerous countries have the following attributes. The minor premise might be that the United States has exhibited none of these attributes, therefore, it is not a dangerous country.

In 1963, Stevenson was asked whether it was his impression that Red China was more interested than before in

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[61]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 30, 1952, p. 1.

[62]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 13, 1964, p. 1.

becoming part of the UN. In giving his opinion, Stevenson again used examples to support his suggestion that they might not be.

> They are still threatening Taiwan, they are still interfering in Vietnam and in Laos, and they are still expansionist and aggressive.[63]

In syllogistic form, Stevenson's major premise might be that aggressive nations do not want to join the UN. Red China is an aggressive nation and therefore does not want to join the UN. He is using sign reasoning, with aggressive nation being the substance, and all those actions he mentioned being the attributes.

On the whole, however, Stevenson employed little reasoning. As did most other candidates, he relied on evidence. This is probably due in large part to the format of the program. Evidence is more easily cited and understood in a short period of time than is the reasoning process. It is also necessary for the candidate to prepare adequately for several areas of possible questioning, rather than being able to prepare in depth on one specific line of thought, as he would be able to do in a prepared speech. This also limits full development of the reasoning approach. Stevenson's keen use, however, of examples, facts, and historical references, probably did as much to enhance the intellectual image he projected than would have a more frequent use of reasoning.

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[63]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 22, 1963, p. 4.

Having examined the ethical image projected on the program by Adlai Stevenson, we will now turn to an analysis of the ethos developed on the program by candidate John F. Kennedy, who actually did serve as President of the United States. Kennedy was the first candidate to appear on MEET THE PRESS who actually did seek and win the Presidency, and is properly called the first true television President.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

John Kennedy was one of the most popular guests ever to appear on MEET THE PRESS according to producer Lawrence Spivak. John Kennedy was also mentioned by panelists as being one of the most frank respondents to questions. The data support this contention. Of the many questions put to Kennedy during his eight program appearances, only five questions did not receive some kind of direct answer.

If frankness is one factor of the Kennedy image which is well defined, it is one of the few. Kennedy's image as projected verbally on this program lacks the detail so fully expressed by the styles of Stevenson, Humphrey, or Goldwater. To this author, based on the data, Kennedy exhibited an image of cold and impersonal intellectualism.

Marshall McLuhan believes that the reason Kennedy defeated Nixon in their television debates was that Kennedy represented a "cool" image on a "cool" medium. To McLuhan, the concept of "cool" is something which offers little detail or definition, in which the audience must fill in

information. He defines Kennedy as "a less well defined image."[64] The late President's MEET THE PRESS appearances seem to confirm McLuhan's contention. In view of the popular image Kennedy later projected, his verbal image on this program offers several paradoxes.

The Kennedy wit is a subject that has received much attention and discussion in the press and in broadcasting. His sense of humor was supposedly a part of his legendary personality. Yet, on MEET THE PRESS, in eight appearances, Kennedy did not couch one single reply in witty or humorous terms. He did not utter a single humorous reference or humorously chide any member of the panel, as did Adlai Stevenson.

Kennedy appeared on the program several times with the same panelists. As a glamorous and popular member of both the House and the Senate, he was no doubt familiar with a good number of the press representatives, including some of those who appeared with him on the program over the years from time to time. Yet, not once did Kennedy address any panelist by his first name. Moreover, on only three occasions did Kennedy directly address the panelist by name at all when answering questions. This detached, impersonal manner, although making a reply more concise, is in sharp contrast to the manner characterizing the responses of Adlai Stevenson.

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[64]Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p.330.

Kennedy's linguistic style--concise and direct and free from religious references, wit, colloquialisms, or imagery--makes it difficult to determine the extent to which "character" and "good will" would "come through." It is mainly through his stated ideas that we can determine how he projected the image of a man of competence, character and good will.

Kennedy, like Stevenson, had a deep sense of loyalty, especially to the Democratic Party. In 1956, he was one of Stevenson's most ardent supporters, and on MEET THE PRESS described his efforts to swing Massachusetts to the Democratic camp.

> I've been working as hard as I can since March when I came out for Governor Stevenson and when I went to the convention for him, and I have been up there, and I am introducing him tomorrow night on TV and my mother is in the morning, and my brother is on the train with him, and I am doing about everything I can do and taking the train tonight to go up there.[65]

Although Kennedy sought the Vice-Presidential spot in 1956, he in 1960 expressed his intention not to accept the offer if he lost his bid for the Presidency. When asked why he would not, he again brought out his concept of party loyalty. He felt he could do the party and the country much more good in the Senate, and could not help the party ticket by running as Vice-President, regardless of how popular he was. He used excellent examples to support his point.

> I am not going to accept the Vice Presidential nomination. I shall support the Democratic ticket; I will work hard for it. Looking at the history of the last

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[65]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 16.

> sixty years, I don't recall a single case where a Vice Presidential candidate contributed an electoral vote. I think Dewey lost California in 1948 with Mr. Warren at the height of his popularity, as Vice President. I know Wendell Willkie lost Oregon in 1940 with Charles McNary, the most popular political figure in the history of Oregon. The Vice Presidential candidate does not contribute. . . . I think I can best serve the country and the party in the Senate, and I would serve in what I prefer doing. . . . I will work extremely hard for the party. In 1956, when I was defeated for the Vice Presidential nomination, I think I probably spoke in more states for the party than any other Democrat, and I will do it again.[66]

Kennedy's sense of loyalty to the party nominee regardless of who he may be also demanded this kind of loyalty in return. In July, 1960, he stated;

> I think Senator Johnson is a very patriotic American, and after we've settled the matter, if he is successful, I'll strongly support him, and if I am successful, I'm sure he will strongly support me if I'm elected.[67]

Kennedy also thought party loyalty would help him carry the Southern vote, regardless of the controversy over civil rights and Kennedy's liberal votes on the issue.

> I think I can carry the South. I think the southerners are members of the Democratic Party. There are a great many problems on which members of the Democratic Party agree, north and south. I think many of the problems we have been talking about today the members of the Democratic Party feel in common, regardless of what section of the United States they live in. They may disagree on the question of Civil Rights, but there are many things that unite them.[68]

Closely allied to loyalty in politics is the trait of honesty, not only with regard to politics, but honesty in general. An honest and sincere candidate certainly is a

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[66]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 5.

[67]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 19.

[68]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 21.

reflection of a man of integrity, character and good will. Kennedy's sense of political honesty, like Stevenson's, concerned itself with corruption within a political party. In 1951, he took his own party to task. Asked whether Truman shouldn't have taken the lead in cleaning up the government, Kennedy replied:

> Whether he waited too long or not is a matter of opinion. I think he did. I think perhaps he should have taken the leadership.[69]

He repeated his concern with moral leadership a few minutes later.

> I don't think the Democratic Party should win an election unless it does clean up. And if it doesn't do it, then I don't think we deserve to win the election. I think efforts are being made to clean it up, but unless we are successful, then I think we should lose the election.[70]

His concern with honest leadership was reflected in his answer to a question by John Steele. Steele wanted to know what Kennedy would try to change as the first order of business if he were elected; what he considered most important.

> I would hope that the next President would try to determine what the unfinished business was, what our agenda was, and set it before the American people in the early months of 1961. . . . I think the President of the United States should inform the people as to what those efforts should be, and what the burdens should be.[71]

Kennedy was as much concerned about his religion's being an advantage to the Democratic ticket as he was about its

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[69]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p.2.

[70]Ibid.

[71]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 32.

being a handicap. He firmly deplored any vote based on religion, or any selection of a candidate by a party for religious advantage.

> I have said in my acceptance speech, as I have said on many occasions before, that I hope no one would vote for me, or against me because of my religion.[72]
>
> I would be extremely sorry if they said, "We won't take Kennedy because he is a Catholic, but we want him because he is a Catholic for Vice President." If we make both of these determinations on the grounds of my religion, regardless of any other factors, I would think that the Democratic Party would not deserve to be successful, because you would be giving an office to a candidate who potentially could be the President, in either case, and whose only claim under those conditions would be that he happened to go to Church on Sunday to the Catholic Church. I must say I would consider that, at a most crucial time in the life of this country, to be a disastrous way of picking a ticket. . . . I would not engage in the kind of operation which might be suggested in the question of attempting to attract Catholics to a ticket because I happened to be on it as Vice President. I must say any Catholic who voted for me on those grounds would be extremely unwise, and I would not run.[73]

Kennedy's sense of integrity affected his discussion of certain issues with regard to other personalities and topics which he considered too vital for public expression of personal opinion. Consequently, he condemned attacks by anybody on the personal integrity of a candidate or a political party with regard to their devotion to this country.

In 1954, he discussed the Democratic charges against Hoover and the depression and the Republican charges of the Democrats being the party of treason. Kennedy did not respect either tactic.

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[72]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 6.

[73]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 8.

> I think that was unfair to Mr. Hoover. . . . But that's far different I think from calling the Democratic Party the party of treason, referring to the twenty years of the Democratic Party's control as twenty years of treason, saying we deliberately were trying to lose the Korean war--I think that goes beyond the legitimate area of the party's dispute. I think it's unnecessary and untrue.[74]

A few minutes later he repeated his views.

> I don't think political charges which impinge on the loyalty of a great national party should be made by either side. . . . The American people really don't believe them. They don't help solve the problem, and I think it results in cynicism and distrust on the part of the people because they know that both sides are not devoting themselves to the basic problems. Therefore, I suggest that that should be true of the Democrats as well as the Republicans.[75]

Kennedy did not like to get into personality disputes although he was not averse to criticism of somebody when he thought it was justified on political grounds. In 1954 Kennedy would not endorse Massachusetts Governor Foster Furcolo in his race for the Senate. In 1956, however, Kennedy supported his candidacy for Governor. When asked why he was endorsing him in 1956, when he refused to endorse him in 1954, Kennedy answered that he thought he was superior to his present opponent. The following dialogue then took place between Kennedy and Thomas Gerber.

> GERBER: Well, do you mean that he's a better man now than he was?
>
> KENNEDY: I think he's superior to the man he's running against. . . . I don't want to say anything about his opponent or go into any personality discussion.[76]

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[74]MEET THE PRESS program script, February 14, 1954, p. 3.

[75]*Ibid*., p. 5.

[76]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 13.

In discussing the issue of Eisenhower's health in 1956, Kennedy again voiced his distaste for personality politics.

> I think the facts are out on the table, and I really don't see any necessity for the Democrats to belabor it. I think everybody knows what the illness is, and they make a judgment themselves and what to do for the future, and I really don't see that we should discuss it any more personally than it's been referred to.[77]

Kennedy also declined to discuss anything which he felt was too vital to the country's political security for the public arena of opinion. In 1956, he was asked what he thought a Democratic administration might do in coping with the problems of Poland and Hungary.

> I think all political candidates of both sides have refrained from commenting on it or attempting to reap some advantage out of it, and I would be rather reluctant to say anything about it.[78]

He gave the same answer in commenting on the Suez issue.

> I heard Mr. Stevenson at his press conference a month ago refrain from commenting on the Suez issue because he felt it mightn't be helpful to the United States in its negotiations. That's the only reason I refrain.[79]

In discussing the Quemoy and Matsu issue in 1960, Kennedy stated;

> As I would not want any issue to endanger the security of the United States, I would certainly feel that in the tradition of bipartisanship no area in the field of foreign policy should be used for political advantage.[80]

When asked whether he thought he will have any more success with Chiang Kai-shek than the Administration had, Kennedy replied:

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[77] Ibid., p. 16.

[78] Ibid., p. 15.

[79] Ibid.

[80] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 2.

> I would think it would be difficult matter for the next President, and I don't want to say anything in this campaign which will make either Mr. Nixon's responsibility or mine more difficult in January.[81]

Certainly in all these instances, Kennedy was appealing to the sense of patriotism as well as building an image of the man of integrity.

Missing from Kennedy's style were the small admissions of doubt or of human fallibility, which characterized much of Stevenson's sense of humility. On several occasions, however, Kennedy did project a sense of humility, although somewhat tempered with a strong confidence. In discussing his chances against Richard Nixon in 1960, Kennedy stated;

> I have no doubt that I can beat Mr. Nixon. I have run for election on five occasions, and I have been successful. I just have confidence that I can beat Mr. Nixon. I feel that I could do a better job than Mr. Nixon could do. I think Mr. Nixon is a formidable candidate. I think whoever is nominated will have a difficult fight with him. I personally happen to believe that I can defeat Mr. Nixon, but I don't think it is going to be who is the toughest gut fighter.[82]

Later that year he was asked whether Governor Stevenson, as a Vice-Presidential running mate, would add strength to the Democratic ticket. Kennedy used his reply as an opportunity to display his humble respect for the Governor's position.

> Yes, of course it would, but I wouldn't even suggest that. Governor Stevenson's name is going to be presented as a candidate. I don't think he is the slightest bit interested in running as the Vice President, and therefore, I

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[81] Ibid., p. 4.

[82] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 7.

think it would probably be presumptuous to endorse him.[83]

He was asked by Marquis Childs whether he had any qualms and doubts about his capacity and ability to be President during these critical times. Kennedy admitted the burden of the job but expressed confidence in being able to carry it.

> I would agree that the responsibilities and the tests that the next President will face are certainly as great as any since Lincoln. . . . I would say that probably in some ways the responsibilities will be greater than they have been, even in the time of Lincoln, and so that any man who runs for the presidency, realizes that if he is successful he will become the key figure in the fight for the United States and for the maintenance of our freedom. Therefore, anyone must feel that the burden is heavy. However, this job is going to be done. I am going to be one of the four or five candidates who will be considered to do it. I approach it with a feeling that I can meet the responsibilities of the office.[84]

Intellectually, Kennedy displayed a sharp ability to recall facts, testimony, authority, and examples to support his statements. Perhaps the one distinguishing quality of Kennedy's evidence, however, which differed from that used by other candidates, was his more frequent use of statistics.

In 1951, he was asked whether he thought General Eisenhower would have Europe in a condition which would permit him to leave to run for the Presidency by 1952. Kennedy replied as follows.

> General Eisenhower has been attempting to build sufficient divisions to protect that area from attack by land, but the best indication is that by that time he's only going to have around twenty-six or twenty-seven or perhaps twenty-eight divisions by next spring providing

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[83] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 13.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

> the Germans come up to some degree--certainly not enough to stand up against the 175 divisions that the Russians are supposed to have under arms.[85]

In a 1956 speech Kennedy had stated that the "Republicans do not work to meet the needs of all Americans, only select segments of our economy."[86] He was asked by Lawrence Spivak, whether that argument added up to much, when looking at the state of the world and at our own prosperity. Again, Kennedy used statistics to support his statement.

> Under the Republicans in the last four years just taking the business world at large, the profits of the largest corporations have gone up 61% in the last four years and business failures are up 59%. I've been in a lot of states in the country; in everyone of these states the business failures have been up substantially. They go up as high as 141%.[86]

In 1958, Kennedy stated why he would not put all the social legislation he proposed on the national debt.

> We still haven't got full employment. There are still 3,800,000 unemployed. . . . I think you are going to run a deficit next year, but it would be substantially less, I would hope, than it is this year because two thirds of last year's deficit is caused by a decrease in the tax revenues.[87]

In 1960, Lawrence Spivak asked Kennedy what he saw as the truth that he wanted above all for the American people to know. Kennedy answered in large part in terms of statistics.

> I think the real crisis is how a free society can successfully compete with a totalitarian society, how we are able to mobilize all of our resources. We have today, as

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[85]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p. 5.

[86]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 3.

[87]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 9, 1958, p. 4.

> you know, steel being 50% of capacity in production, farm income down to what it was almost twenty years ago in some basic crops. . . . At a time when even not only the Soviet Union but Western Germany is moving ahead five or six percent, we are moving ahead 1.5% to 2% in economic growth.[88]

Kennedy spoke about an appropriation of $2.5 billion to $3 billion in the military, in meeting an economic slowdown. He thought a restricted budget, resulting in a billion dollar surplus was partly responsible for the slowdown, again proving his point with statistics.

> With a billion dollar surplus, if we are going to have 50% of capacity--I think there will be 4.5 million unemployed in July, which is the highest since World War II--I would say we may be moving into a situation comparable to the '58 recession.[89]

Kennedy also stated his contention that a recession was probable, in statistical terms.

> I think it's possible and extremely dangerous. If you have a capacity of 100% and steel production in the month of July is 50%, I'd say that's extremely disheartening at a time when other free countries--not the Soviet Union, free countries--are going ahead with a boom. West Germany is going to have a 6% growth this year.[90]

In discussing the situation with regard to Quemoy and Matsu, Kennedy made the danger more vivid by the use of statistics.

> One of these islands is only two miles from the nearest coast of China. Therefore, they can be bombarded as they are, by artillery daily. To hold them might require nuclear weapons. There is to the Pescadores a whole reach of open sea, 75 miles, to Formosa, more than 100 miles, so it's a difficult problem.[91]

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[88] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 17.

[89] Ibid., p. 19.

[90] Ibid., p. 20.

[91] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 16, 1960, p. 4.

It would seem that in areas of economics and military matters, Kennedy presented an extensive array of statistics to illustrate and support his points. This recall of figures could logically contribute to a sharp intellectual image.

Although Kennedy used mostly evidence as logical proof, like Stevenson, he did use sign reasoning.

In 1951, asked why he thought the Democrats could carry Massachusetts in 1952, Kennedy stated as follows.

> The Democratic Party has carried Massachusetts in every Presidential election since 1932, and I think Massachusetts is basically a Democratic state and I think if we do our job and do it right I think we have a good chance to carry Massachusetts in 1952.[92]

One syllogism Kennedy might be using here could contain a major premise which states that all states won by the Democrats previously in an election are won on the next election. Massachusetts is a state won previously in an election, therefore the Democrats will win Massachusetts. The examples of course would be the elections the Democrats won in 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944 and 1948.

During the same program Kennedy was asked by Lawrence Spivak why the United States has made so few friends in the Far East, when we have tried so hard to help these countries. In giving his opinion, Kennedy used sign reasoning. His reply was as follows.

> Nearly all those countries stretching from Morocco in the Atlantic ocean to the Philippines on the other side have been under the domination of Western European powers or the US in the last thirty-five years, and some are still, and we are closely tied with those that they consider to be imperialist powers. It's a drive against the

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[92]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 2, 1951, p. 7.

> white race and we are perhaps the strongest of the countries that might be considered that way to the Asiatics. We have fallen heir to much of the hatred that they incurred by their policies. . . . We are a strong power and a rich country and therefore I think there's a natural animosity that goes with that sort of power, especially when we try to impose our will on those countries.[93]

Kennedy's syllogism here might go as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: Far Eastern countries hate all imperialist powers.
MINOR PREMISE: The US is an imperialist power.
CONCLUSION: The Far East hates the US.

The substance here would be imperialist power. The attributes of an imperialist power might be such things as countries closely allied with imperialist powers, the white race, and a strong rich country.

In 1956, Kennedy was explaining to Lawrence Spivak why the Negro could put more faith in the Democratic Party than in the Republican Party, even though the Democrats had a James Eastland in their ranks. Kennedy's reply was based on reasoning from example.

> The program of the Democratic Party, housing, minimum wage, unemployment, social security and aid to education, etc. have been a benefit to the lower income groups and unfortunately the Negroes, the predominant number of them, are in the lower income groups, so I think the program of the Democratic Party in social legislation has been of great help to the Negroes.[94]

Kennedy's assumption that the Negro benefits from this legislation in the same proportion as other low income groups might be questioned. His syllogism, however, might be phrased as follows.

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[93] Ibid., p. 10.

[94] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 28, 1956, p. 9.

MAJOR PREMISE: All lower income groups are helped by Democratic social legislation.
MINOR PREMISE: Negroes are a lower income group.
CONCLUSION: Negroes are helped by Democratic social legislation.

The examples used here could be housing has helped lower income groups, minimum wage has helped lower income groups, social security, etc.

Later during the program, Kennedy used sign reasoning to explain why he thought the Democrats were the party of the future.

> The Democrats had a dozen young Senators and Congressmen who I thought represented a very strong hope for the future. The Republicans did not have any young men in a position of leadership except Richard Nixon; that they didn't have many able young governors, as we do in the case of Ribicoff and Meyner and Leader, and so on, and they don't have as many able Senators I think, and, therefore, the party of the future is really the Democratic Party.[95]

In syllogistic form, Kennedy's reasoning might be phrased as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: The party of the future is the one with young governors and senators.
MINOR PREMISE: The Democratic Party has young governors and senators.
CONCLUSION: The Democratic Party is the party of the future.

The substance of course would be party of the future. The attributes are young senators and young governors like Ribicoff and Meyner.

In 1960, giving his reasons for not wanting the Vice Presidential nomination, Kennedy used examples to prove his point.

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[95] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

> Looking at the history of the last sixty years, I don't recall a single case where a Vice Presidential candidate contributed an electoral vote. I think Dewey lost California in 1948 with Mr. Warren, at the height of his popularity, as Vice President. I know Wendell Willkie lost Oregon in 1940 with Charles McNary, the most popular political figure in the history of Oregon. The Vice Presidential candidate does not contribute. People vote for the Presidential candidates on each side.[96]

What Kennedy was saying was that Vice Presidential candidates do not help win an election. I will be a Vice Presidential candidate if I accept, and, therefore, I will not be helping win the election.

If John Kennedy's ethos in terms of character and good will was nebulous, his ethos in terms of competence was more distinctly drawn. His ability to recall evidence and use it in the reasoning process helped to project a sharp intellectual image of the man.

Following the continuity of Democratic leadership, the ethos profile of President Lyndon Johnson will now be examined.

LYNDON JOHNSON

Lyndon Johnson appeared on MEET THE PRESS only two times. Yet, several of his ethical characteristics were sharply brought into focus. One of these concerns the quality of evasiveness.

Johnson in his few appearances avoided giving a direct answer to as many questions as did other candidates who

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[96]MEET THE PRESS program script, January 3, 1960, p. 5.

appeared on the program seven or eight times more than he. Closely allied to this is his tendency to suggest, rather than directly to accuse or conclude.

The following dialogue between Johnson and Edwin Newman illustrates both of these tendencies. Mr. Newman had just told Johnson that former President Truman had stated that he didn't want to be a party to what would take place at the 1960 Democratic convention.

JOHNSON: Mr. Truman has information perhaps that I don't have. I am going to be a party to what takes place here. I don't know that I will always be willing or give my consent to all the practices that are taking place. For instance, we have some 11,000 seats in the place where we are meeting. My delegation is allocated 120, and sixty of those were given to a national committeewoman who was not even elected as a delegate to our state or national convention. She has sixty of them for her people who are not even delegates, and we have sixty for the members of our families of all of our state who happen to be delegates. One thing sure, we're not going to have that gallery stacked with Johnson people. There are just going to be sixty of them scattered around there. I don't know who is going to get them but they won't belong to Texas.

NEWMAN: Whom is it going to be stacked for, if anybody?

JOHNSON: You will have to talk to the officials in charge as to whether it's going to be stacked or not. All I know is we have just sixty seats in Texas, and you and the people familiar with the large spaces available will have to find out what happened to the tickets. . . . Speaker Rayburn and Governor Daniel and the other members of the delegation and members of their family will have only sixty tickets, and we won't have a very big cheering section. So if you hear a lot of noises, you might get your noise meter and figure out how they got that cheering section in there.

NEWMAN: I've got my prejudice or discrimination meter here. I'm wondering at whose door you lay the

blame for what you plainly think is discrimination against you?

JOHNSON: I don't lay any blame. I just state a fact and let you draw your own conclusions. It might be the other candidates just have sixty, too. I don't know.[97]

Perhaps for strategy reasons, a few minutes later in the program, Johnson again avoided a direct answer concerning his delegate strength.

STEELE: Has anything encouraging occurred about the delegates?

JOHNSON: Yes, I'm quite encouraged.

STEELE: Could you give us an idea?

JOHNSON: No, I don't think I'd want to go into it state by state.

STEELE: Could you name a couple of them?

JOHNSON: No, I think in most of the states we have very fine sentiment, and we expect to have twenty-five or more supporters on the first roll call.[98]

In October, 1960, Lawrence Spivak asked Johnson what he thought the issues were in Texas, which might decide the election as far as the state was concerned. Johnson did not state the issues, but used his reply as an opportunity to attack Republican strategy.

JOHNSON: First, I don't think the Democrats are going to lose Texas. I think we have a fight in Texas. We usually do, but the most recent polls show that the Kennedy-Johnson ticket is running ahead in Texas. The opposition is resorting to the same type of argument that the Republicans have used since I have been in public life, a kind of a fear campaign. First, they take the Democratic

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[97]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 32.

[98]*Ibid*., p. 35.

platform and evaluate it and point out that we are going down the road to socialism. The same argument they used against Woodrow Wilson; the same argument they used against Franklin Roosevelt; the same argument they used against Harry Truman. They have also brought out the religious question, but I think it has somewhat boomeranged on them, and I anticipate you will hear very little from them in that regard from here out.[99]

Johnson's answer resulted in a repetition of the question by Spivak.

SPIVAK: Senator, what do you consider the major issues as far as the state of Texas is concerned?[100]

Several moments later, Johnson was asked how he stood on the civil rights issues of desegregating lunchroom counters. His reply espoused a general patriotic belief in equality for all, but did not answer this specific question of commitment.

JOHNSON: I think we have a real duty as public servants to protect the constitutional rights of every American citizen regardless of race or religion or region. I have tried to do that by implementing the constitutional rights guaranteed every citizen with two civil rights bills during the three Congresses that I have been Leader.[101]

Johnson was also questioned about some of his charges against Richard Nixon. The following exchange of dialogue also illustrates his tactic of suggestion.

ABERNETHY: May I ask you about one specific story that you tell? You tell your audiences that the Republican platform Mr. Nixon wanted was changed at the insistence of Governor Rockefeller of New York.

JOHNSON: That is true isn't it?

ABERNETHY: Then you go on to say, as you charge, that if

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[99] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, p. 1.

[100] Ibid., p. 2.

[101] Ibid.

Mr. Rockefeller can turn the Vice-President around, as you said, in one midnight conference, you then ask, "What could Mr. Krushchev do if he got Mr. Nixon in a room all day?" What I would like to know is exactly what you mean to imply by that question? Are you trying to imply that Mr. Nixon lacks convictions or that he can be persuaded easily by Mr. Krushchev?

JOHNSON: I am not trying to imply anything. I am just stating what I believe to be a fact, and what I understand the Vice-President states as a fact. Namely, that after a conference with Governor Rockefeller, he made some adjustments in his convictions. If an inexperienced governor of New York can turn a mature and experienced Vice-President around 180 degrees in one midnight conference in the Waldorf-Astoria, I just want the people to contemplate what might happen if a fellow like Krushchev got him all day.

ABERNETHY: But what do you mean to say about Mr. Nixon's convictions when you ask that question?

JOHNSON: I have said it; I have just repeated it to you. I have said if an inexperienced governor would cause him to rewrite his platform and change his convictions and come out to the public and say, "As a result of this conference we have changed our complete approach, and we want a different platform from the one we anticipated," if he could do that in a midnight conference, what would happen in a conference where he spent all day with Mr. Krushchev? I would be glad to have your opinion on that, Mr. Abernethy.[102]

Another factor of Johnson's ethos which was well brought out on the program was his competence, in terms of his experience and what he did in his Senatorial role. Although other candidates also used the program to state their qualifications, Johnson at times stated his when the question did not necessarily call for it.

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[102] Ibid., ps. 5-6.

Lawrence Spivak asked Johnson in 1960 whether he could get Northern support, or whether he had any indication that he was going to get sizeable Northern support. In his reply, Johnson stated his competence, the good will felt toward him by his colleagues measured in terms of popularity, and also used the kind of colloquialism with which he occasionally would sprinkle his speech.

JOHNSON: You know the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and I have been elected by my colleagues, who represent all of the people of the United States, five times to a position of leadership in the Senate, first as deputy leader unanimously, then as minority leader unanimously, then to the post of majority leader three times by the unanimous votes of all my colleagues, including some who are candidates for President themselves. They have always been willing to vote me as their leader, and I see no reason why the people they represent should demonstrate prejudice that they themselves don't express.[103]

Johnson was asked a question by John Steele which related to his attitude toward the opposition. Again, Johnson used the opportunity to add to his image of competence and good will, although the question did not necessarily call for it in terms of his accomplishments.

STEELE: Senator Johnson, a portion of your party in the Senate has criticized you for being what they regard as something less than combative and harsh in your approach to the political opposition. Would this be a penalty as far as a campaign against a Republican candidate is concerned?

JOHNSON: I would not think so. I guess any good leader gets criticized some. We have our extremes on both sides, the right and the left. Some want to go slower and some want to go faster, and the leader sometimes winds up as being the man in the middle, and he has to get something done, so he

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[103]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 28.

> is criticized. But I'm very proud of the fact that each Congress I have resigned as leader, although that was not customary before my election, and I've asked my colleagues to nominate a successor or re-elect me, and in each instance I have been nominated and elected unanimously. I just wish the convention would act as favorably upon my qualifications, as my colleagues have, even those who on occasions have criticized me.[104]

Johnson again brought out his devotion to his position, an important component of competence, when he was later asked whether he would return to the current congressional session as Majority Leader, if he received the Presidential nomination.

> JOHNSON: Most certainly. I have answered 99% of the roll calls this year since January. We had more than fifty quorum calls on one bill alone, the civil rights bill, and I answered every quorum call . . .[105]

Johnson's image of a man who was dedicated to his job was presumably enhanced when he explained why he would not accept the role of the Vice President.

> I think that every person ought to seriously consider where he can be the most effective and what job he can do best. Bearing in mind the Vice President has been there seven years now, and I have watched him, I recognize the fact he's only had an opportunity to express himself on seven votes, seven occasions where we've had a tie. I think I voted more than that last week, so I wouldn't want to trade a vote for a gavel, and I certainly wouldn't want to trade the active position of leadership of the greatest deliberative body in the world for the part-time job of presiding. Most Vice Presidents don't do very much, even at that.[106]

Certainly, by the illustrations here quoted, a large part of Johnson's ethos, in terms of competence, rested on

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[104] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

his own accomplishments, his dedication and drive as Majority Leader, and the good will and confidence shown toward him by his colleagues, who seemingly respected his ability.

If Johnson was not as direct as John Kennedy in answering questions, his verbal style was certainly more warm than that of Kennedy. Johnson on occasion used colorful phrases, and exhibited an appealing sense of humor.

When asked by Lawrence Spivak what he considered to be his major obstacle toward the nomination, Johnson promptly replied: "Convincing 761 people that I ought to be the nominee."[107] Spivak also reminded Johnson of the great deal of discussion about the fact that Johnson was a Southerner, which might be a handicap. Johnson replied as follows.

> JOHNSON: Yes, I have heard that. But I'm reminded that the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, was born in the same state where I was born. Both of our mothers happened to be there when we "discovered America," and it apparently didn't handicap him a great deal in '52 or '56.[108]

In speaking about Democratic cuts in the Eisenhower budget, Johnson expressed confidence in Kennedy's fiscal policies in the following manner.

> That is a prudent Democratic policy, and I predict if I know anything about Senator Kennedy, that he will continue that policy. All you have to do is go to the drug store with him and buy a sandwich and see how long he shuffles trying to get the money to pick up the check, to find out that if he handles the government's money like he handles his own, we are going to have a pretty good fiscal policy.[109]

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[107] Ibid., p. 28.

[108] Ibid.

[109] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 9, 1960, p. 7.

As with all candidates, Johnson exhibited a good grasp of facts, testimony, and other types of evidence in support of his statements, but did not exhibit many examples of reasoning. In this one example, however, Johnson might have been reasoning from analogy to prove his point. The question arose as to whether his being a Texan might not handicap the Democratic ticket. After bringing up the victories of Eisenhower, who Johnson realized was a Republican, the Senator stated the following.

> And I remind you, the winningest ticket the Democrats ever had, was when Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Garner from Texas were on the ticket in '36. They carried every state in the Union except Maine and Vermont, and apparently Texas didn't handicap them either.[110]

Johnson's reasoning might be stated as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: Democratic tickets consisting of a Northeast Presidential candidate and a Texan Vice Presidential candidate carry almost every state in the union in a national election.

MINOR PREMISE: Kennedy is a Northeastern candidate, and I am a Texas, both on the Democratic ticket.

CONCLUSION: The Democratic ticket will win the election.

The analogy here consists of the similarities of geographical location of the two candidates, and both running for the same offices as did Roosevelt and Garner.

On the whole, Johnson projected an image of high competence and a desire to be where the political action is so he could best serve his country. His character and good will were manifested in the extreme confidence and good will

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[110]MEET THE PRESS program script, July 10, 1960, p. 29.

exhibited towards him by his fellow congressmen. His one negative characteristic was his evasive quality in answering questions and making accusations. Perhaps this is a reflection of what later came to be known as the Johnson "credibility gap" when he assumed the Presidency. Personally, he expressed a degree of warmth and humor, which seems to bear out what people think of him today in this regard.

The next Democratic candidate to be considered is the current Democratic nominee for the Presidency as of this writing, Hubert Humphrey, one of the best known and most respected members of the Democratic Party and a frequent MEET THE PRESS guest.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Hubert H. Humphrey, like Adlai Stevenson, appeared on MEET THE PRESS in many different roles over the years. Humphrey's ethos comes through on the program in a sharp, clear manner, unlike that of John Kennedy.

Humphrey projects the image of an individual deeply committed to the democratic ideals of freedom, equality, and love of country. These beliefs seem nurtured by a strong, grass roots faith in the American people, and a deep religious conviction. His ideas are expressed in a warm, witty, and humble verbal style, sprinkled with imagery, colloquialisms, and religious references.

Like most candidates, Humphrey has answered questions directly, with few exceptions. On only five occasions out of

his nine program appearances did Humphrey give an indirect answer, or refusal to answer. Most of these evasions concerned questions dealing with other personalities, or questions based on a hypothetical situation. On some of these answers, Humphrey, like Johnson, suggested the conclusion, rather than stated it. This was especially true in two questions dealing with certain aspects of civil rights and the Party.

In 1966, Lawrence Spivak asked Humphrey whether he repudiated the segregationist candidates in Alabama, Georgia and Maryland. Humphrey implied that he did although avoiding a direct committal.

> The Democratic Party, Mr. Spivak, has a platform that we ask our fellow Democrats to adhere to. The segregationists have not asked the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, or the Vice President of the United States, Mr. Humphrey, to campaign for them, and we have no intention of doing so, and I think that speaks for itself.[111]

It is interesting to note Humphrey's use of the third person in referring to himself. This is a frequent Humphrey peculiarity which very possibly contributes to an image of humility, and will be discussed later.

During the same program, Humphrey was asked, if he voted in Maryland, would he vote for the Democratic candidate for Governor of Maryland, Mahoney. Mahoney was campaigning on the slogan, "a house is a man's castle," an attack on open housing ordinances, and an appeal to the backlash vote.

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[111]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 30, 1966, p. 6.

Humphrey's reply was again suggestive, because the question was hypothetical.

> I don't have to answer that question because I don't vote in Maryland, but I have a feeling that the people in Maryland will take care of their matters quite well. The Vice President of the United States supports the Democratic platform and candidates that adhere to the Democratic platform.[112]

Humphrey, by this reply, was also invoking the good will of the Maryland Democratic liberals, by placing his faith in their ability to vote against a backlash candidate.

The desire not to answer questions involving personalities was illustrated when Humphrey was questioned with regard to his fellow Senator Eugene McCarthy. The questioning was by Ray Scherer.

> SCHERER: If he came to you for friendly advice, would you tell him not to do it?
>
> HUMPHREY: I don't generally answer "iffy" questions, Mr. Scherer. I can only say my support for the President is well known. My support for the President's policies is equally well known. I would hope that the people in my state and throughout the nation would see matters as I do, and I shall campaign vigorously for President Johnson and his policies, domestic and foreign.[113]

The suggestion here of course is that McCarthy should not enter the primaries against the Johnson war policy, which was the subject of the discussion.

> SCHERER: Do you think Mr. McCarthy is interested only in moderating Administration Vietnam policy or is it more than that, taking the nomination away from the President?

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[112] *Ibid*.

[113] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 1.

HUMPHREY: I think you ought to ask McCarthy that question.[114]

Humphrey refused to make any statement which could be regarded as a possible impugning of McCarthy's motives, certainly a display of respect and integrity on Humphrey's part, although he evidently disagreed with the Senator's actions.

On another occasion Humphrey displayed a deep concern for the security of our country in refusing to answer a question by Lawrence Spivak regarding our retaliatory use of nuclear power and weapons.

SPIVAK: And we would not use them until they had used them on us, and mightn't that be too late, Senator?

HUMPHREY: I think these matters are a little too sensitive for candidates for public office to be talking about. This is a matter of the highest security of our land, and the Senator from Minnesota, not as a Vice Presidential candidate but as a responsible public official, is not going to be drawn into any iffy discussions or any theoretical discussions. These are matters which ought to be kept in the closest classification in terms of the security of our nation. I don't think we ought to telescope or telephone our messages to the potential enemy.[115]

Certainly, this sense of concern would seem to override the fact that he refused to answer a question, in terms of what image he might project. In general, Humphrey's evasive answers would seem to have some ethical motivation, rather than being of merely evasive nature.

Humphrey's ethos was projected by an image of integrity, honesty, and fair play. He believed in the loyalty of any

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[114] Ibid., p. 2.

[115] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 3.

American to his country, regardless of party, and would not impugn the motives or attack the personality of any other public official. Humphrey espoused loyalty and responsibility and expressed a faith that everybody else felt the same.

In 1960, speaking of his opponent John Kennedy, Humphrey stated;

> I have a high regard for Jack Kennedy. Jack is a fine man. He has a fine family. He has a splendid record. I am not going to let any personality stuff enter into this campaign.[116]

He was asked whether the voters wouldn't be running a risk by voting for a man who has identified himself so closely with the Midwest. Humphrey, in his reply, illustrated his hierarchy of roles as a politician.

> I have never put sectionalism above this country. I have never put even my partisanship above my dedication to the great causes for which this country ought to stand. I am an American first, I am a Democrat second, and then I come from the Midwest, as a matter of geography.[117]

Later in that same program he was asked about the possibility that some of his people might really prefer Stevenson if he would declare as a candidate. In his reply, Humphrey illustrated his sense of integrity, deep devotion to his cause, his honesty, and the kind of colorful, humble language which characterizes much of his verbal ethical image.

> I think there was something to that in the beginning, but I am convinced now that they have found a fellowship with Hubert Humphrey that they will stay with. It is a fact

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[116] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 3, 1960, p. 6.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

> that I have I think carried on the kind of campaign that--I trust this is a fact--that would gain the respect of those who had previously supported Mr. Stevenson. . . . I am a stalking horse for no one. I am a working horse for the country, the United States of America, and I am trying my level best to carry out a program that I think is worthy of the people of this state and of the nation. So if anybody has any suspicion that Humphrey is trying to save the day for them, the ones I am trying to save the day for are the people of the United States, and not some potential political opponent.[118]

Honesty in politics was important to Humphrey as suggested in this statement in answer to a question regarding campaign costs.

> I will tell you what I would like to do. I would like to assure you personally, privately and publicly, and all of you, before April 19th, a complete summary of all expenditures and contributions in the state of Wisconsin will be made to the people of Wisconsin. This will be a matter of what I call my integrity in politics, not a requirement of law.[119]

A large part of Humphrey's ethos comes from the implicit faith he places in the basic goodness of the American people. He has used the phrase "good people" many times. In 1964 he made several statements with regard to the civil rights demonstrations. He illustrated not only his sense of fair play, but trust in the basic sense of American decency.

> I would hope that Mr. Goldwater would help appeal to the basic sense of decency and fair play of the American people and urge law observance and quit making these comments to the effect that the Civil Rights Act breeds hatred and bitterness and violence.[120]
>
> May I add also that we ought to give a little word of praise to the hundreds of thousands of people who,

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[118] Ibid., p. 10.

[119] Ibid., p. 11.

[120] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 6.

> though they may not have all of the privileges that some of us have, go quietly about their business, trying to be good American citizens. As far as Hubert Humphrey is concerned, he is going to insist upon adequate protection for our people, that is, law enforcement. But I am also going to insist upon social justice.[121]

Humphrey's use of the third person, his concern for both justice and law enforcement, and his concern for the little person, again contribute to the image of liberalism and humility.

In March, 1966, Humphrey was questioned about Vietnam. He was asked to what extent he thought the prospect of the 1966 congressional elections might influence the Administration's policies on Vietnam. His reply again brought forth his concern with political integrity.

> Let me say first that this administration and any administration that is entrusted with the security of this nation cannot let the political eye govern the decisions that must be made in reference to our national interest and our national security.[122]

Later in the program, in his warm, personal manner, Humphrey assured some of his critics, in answer to a question, that he had not, as they thought, "left the family circle" of liberals, and gone off after some sort of political security by his Vietnam policies. The answer was directed to Turner Catledge.

> My good friend--I am not at all sure, Mr. Catledge, who has left any family circle. I feel very "family" and very much of a family man, but let me make it quite clear that on matters of national security there is no room for basic partisanship. That is No. 1. We need

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[121] Ibid.

[122] MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 5.

> to think as Americans. We may have different points of view, but we ought not to think as partisans, and I don't believe we do.[123]

Speaking of the erosion of the President's popularity due to the Vietnam conflict, Humphrey repeated his concern for honesty and integrity in politics. To Humphrey, principle is all important.

> What is important is not that the President is popular; what is really important is that he makes the right decisions on the basis of the best advice that he can obtain and that he makes the decisions in the belief that he is right.[124]

On this program, Hubert Humphrey on many occasions expressed a deep sense of humility, an important aspect of character. In 1958 he was asked if he would be willing to serve as a Democratic representative in the policy making decisions of Eisenhower's foreign policies.

> I haven't been asked, but let me say this: If the President of the United States should ask me to serve in any capacity relating to the fulfillment of our foreign policy, I will do so and try to do it honorably well.[125]

In 1958, he was asked by Jack Bell whether he was available for the 1960 Democratic Presidential nomination. Part of his answer had its appeal in the humility of the language used.

> HUMPHREY: My objective between now and 1960 is to do as good a job as I possibly can do as a United States Senator. I said this to the people of Minnesota last night, and I repeat it to you. We will see what 1960 does.

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[123] Ibid., p. 13.

[124] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 4.

[125] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 7.

BELL: Isn't that the best possible way to run?

HUMPHREY: It is the best possible way to be a public servant, worthy of the trust of the people.[126]

Very often Humphrey's humility was expressed in terms of his integrity and his responsibility to the people of this country. In 1966, when asked about the possibility of his strong advocation of Johnson's Vietnam policy being a handicap to his political future, Humphrey replied:

> As far as my political future is concerned, I have never really been able to plan it very well, Mr. Catledge, and I am not going to spend much time doing it. Not at the expense, may I say, of national security; not at the expense of the life of our people or the honor or integrity of our country and its commitments. I haven't the slightest idea whether what I am doing is helpful to me or not, but I think that what I am doing is the right thing to do, and I have been brought up to believe that when you are in a position of responsibility, you had better do what is right.[127]

In October, 1966, Humphrey was again asked about his political aspirations. He again displayed a humble approach to the honor and the responsibility of his office.

> I see, Mr. Kilpatrick, the opportunity to serve my country as Vice President of the United States, at least until January 30th, high noon, 1969, God willing, and I see the opportunity to try and make that office one of significance, add to its stature, to serve the public interest.
> I have not attempted to try to chart a course of personal or political action beyond that date. Life is rather uncertain. These are changing times, and it seems to me that if a man was trying to figure out every move ahead so far he might somehow stumble on the things that he is doing currently, and I should like to just do my job. You know I am a very happy man in my position as Vice President. I truly like the position, and I only hope that I may do it in a manner which is satisfying to you,

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[126] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[127] MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 13.

> sir, and to others who believe that the office ought to be one of some dignity and stature and respect.[128]

Humphrey's religious reference here is one of his more frequent personal appeals.

In November, 1967, the Vice President was asked whether he, like Johnson and others who had served in that capacity, considered the Vice Presidency a miserable job. His reply restated his belief that the job is one of importance and dignity, and that he, as an individual, found it a great opportunity for public service. Part of his reply, however, was characteristic of the common folks brand of humility which Humphrey seems to generate.

> If you don't mind my saying so--you know, I was just born a poor boy above a drug store out in South Dakota, and to come from that humble beginning at Wallace, South Dakota, the son of a small town, independent entrepeneur druggist, to become Vice President of the United States and to have the friendship and the confidence of the President of the United States, I think is a wonderful thing. I am quite happy about it.[129]

It would seem that Humphrey's dedication to placing political integrity and responsibility of office above personal political gain, is indeed sincere, in view of his problematic role during this 1968 campaign. He certainly has not changed his political stance, although he has alienated a portion of his own party by refusing to disengage himself from the albatross of Johnson Vietnam policy, which he must carry around his neck.

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[128]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 30, 1966, p. 4.

[129]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 4.

Hubert Humphrey's verbal style enhances the ethos which his ideas project. His approach is warm, to some degree sprinkled with religious references, and certainly exhibiting a folksy sense of humor. Occasionally one finds a beautiful use of imagery and colloquialism to add more personal concrete meaning to what Humphrey is trying to convey.

In 1958, referring to Krushchev's attitude towards Berlin, Humphrey stated as follows.

> I do feel that Mr. Krushchev would like nothing better than to seal off this city and literally to blot it out of existence because it is an oasis in a desert of totalitarianism. It is literally a beacon light in a sea of darkness.[130]

In 1962, he thought that by the end of 1962, the problem of unemployment in the United States would be a "page in the history books rather than a living fact."[131] In 1958, defending the giving away of foreign aid to satellite nations, Humphrey described--through the use of concrete imagery--what our foreign aid has accomplished in Yugoslavia.

> I am confident that if Yugoslavia had had no aid at all, that today she would have been literally under the boot-heel of the Kremlin. Right now she is able to spit on the boots of the Kremlin, and believe me this is a mighty good sign to people around the world. It has shaken the Communist parties in Asia and Africa right down to their very toenails.[132]

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[130] MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 4.

[131] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1962, p. 4.

[132] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 7.

When then asked who is to blame, if we have lost the leadership of the free world, Humphrey replied:

> If you are going to take credit for the rain, you've got to take credit for the drought. In this instance, it appears to me that the President and his Secretary of State have not given us the leadership that this nation needs in the field of international relations.[133]

In voicing his confidence in the ability of the American people to see through the struggle in Vietnam, Humphrey stated, "I don't think the people want Armageddon on the installment plan."[134]

Humphrey's somewhat colorful language was enhanced by a warm sense of humor, although perhaps lacking in the witticism of Stevenson. He exhibited even in his humor a sense of optimism and humility.

In 1960, he was asked about the rumors of a "stop Kennedy" movement, supposedly joined by many of the Humphrey forces, and whether he himself was a part of it. Humphrey humorously replied:

> I have been a party to the movement to "Start Humphrey."[135]

In discussing his financial situation later in the program, he remarked as follows.

> We have received a lot of help from people in Minnesota and a great deal of it from people in Wisconsin. And may I say, I welcome it. In fact, I know it might be a violation of the FCC rulings, but I need it.[136]

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[133] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[134] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 6.

[135] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 3, 1960, p. 9.

[136] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

During the 1964 campaign, Humphrey discussed the fact that Barry Goldwater seemed to be running against two main targets during his Southern trip: one, the Supreme Court, and the other, a man he kept calling Hubert Horatio.

> I think I ought to tell my good friend Senator Goldwater that I am not running for President. It is President Johnson that is his adversary in this campaign. But if he wishes to give me this friendly treatment out on the hustings, I am somewhat honored, and I am glad that he repeats my middle name, too, because it has seldom been used, and frankly, it was my father's addition to the name, and I sort of like the fact that someone has thought of dad in these moments.[137]

In October, 1966, Humphrey was discussing Richard Nixon's prediction that the Republicans would gain forty House seats and a net of three in the Senate, and elect some 700 additional state legislature offices. Again, Humphrey displayed his warm, personal brand of humor.

> Mr. Nixon has many qualities, I am sure, that are commendable, but as a prophet, I would suggest that he stay to law and politicking. He is a very poor prophet, and I am not going to get into the numbers game. I will just simply say this to Mr. Nixon, that I think we Democrats will do quite well in this election, and I hope that he is listening in, because after it is all over, I would like to have him come to Washington and buy me a big dinner to celebrate the Democratic victory.[138]

Speaking to panelists on a program of November, 1967, about the possibility of troop reductions in Vietnam, Humphrey stated:

> I hope that all that you have said is going to come true. I cannot be at all sure. I do not possess those mystical powers of prophecy. If I did, I might even be a journalist, you can't tell.[139]

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[137]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 5.

[138]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 30, 1966, p. 4.

[139]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 8.

Humphrey's use of the third person, or his proper name in referring to himself, and his use of religious references, are additional attributes of his style.

In 1960, he was asked about the factor of religion playing a part in the Wisconsin primary. He answered with a religious reference.

> . . . I have a feeling that the people of Wisconsin are no different from the people of Minnesota. I think they are going to take a good look at those of us who are the candidates--at least this is my hope and my prayer, and I think they will.[140]

In 1964, speaking about riots, Humphrey again referred to himself in a third person manner.

> The President of the United States and the Senator from Minnesota both believe in law and order.[141]

Speaking about a possible confrontation with China or with Russia over Vietnam, Humphrey exhibited his strong religious convictions.

> These are not choices that we make. They are sometimes forced upon us. Pray God that the choice never has to be made.[142]

On a program of October, 1966, Humphrey was speaking of a statement he had previously made with regard to negotiations with the Viet Cong. He again referred to himself in the third person.

> What the Vice President said. . . [143]

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[140] MEET THE PRESS program script, April 3, 1960, p. 12.

[141] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 20, 1964, p. 5.

[142] MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 12.

[143] MEET THE PRESS programs script, October 30, 1966, p. 8.

Referring to the Cyprus crisis in 1967, Humphrey again used religious language, to express the undesirability of a war.

> We are working as you know, along with the United Nations, to prevent that possibility, and let us hope and pray that it will be successful.[144]

These illustrations and those interspersed throughout other points of discussion reveal Humphrey's use of religion and humility in his verbal style to enhance his ethos.

One other characteristic of Humphrey's verbal style must be discussed, because it distinguishes him from other candidates. This characteristic consists of repetition of the same phrase in massing several ideas.

In 1958, Humphrey was describing what he thought the Vice President should do if he does take a trip to Europe as a good-will representative of the President.

> Let's go with a message. Let's go with a program. Let's go with a challenge, and let's go as brave men and not just brave in the sense of personal courage, but the kind of bravery and courage that comes from a bold, national policy.[145]

In December, 1958, he spoke of his ideas for talks between Krushchev and the United States, and the role of Congress in establishing foreign policy.

> I think we ought to be pushing for German reunification. I think we ought to be talking about the necessity of establishing permanent boundaries. I think we ought to be giving some possible consideration of--they call it disengagement.[146]

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[144]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 9.

[145]MEET THE PRESS program script, June 1, 1958, p. 9.

[146]MEET THE PRESS program script, December 14, 1958, p. 6.

> We cannot write a foreign policy in Congress. Let's face up to it. We can condition one, we can encourage, we can counsel, we can advise, we can sit down and discuss things, and I think this we ought to do.[147]

In speaking of the way he thought we should deal with Krushchev, Humphrey again used the repetition and massing technique.

> I think we must emphasize the works of peace. I think we need to emphasize non-political contacts. I think we need to encourage the broadest of exchanges on the cultural and the educational scientific basis.[148]

On a program of 1966, Humphrey described the moves we had made towards seeking peace in Vietnam.

> We have said that we would go through the United Nations and that has been rejected. We have said that we would accept the offer of the seventeen non-aligned nations, Hanoi rejected that. We have said that we would accept the good offices of the President of India, President Radhakrishnan. Hanoi has rejected that. We have said that we will go to a Geneva type conference. The Soviets have rejected that, and so has China.[149]

Several moments later, in describing our troops in the field, Humphrey again emphasized his feelings through massing of words.

> These are the finest fighting men that we have ever put into the field. They do their job. They are brave, they are courageous, they are able, they are efficient, and they understand what they are there for.[150]

Again, speaking of our desire for peace, Humphrey repeated the same important phrase.

> We are prepared at this moment to accept a cease fire. We are prepared at this moment, if the North Vietnamese will quit bombing the South, we are prepared to quit

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[147] Ibid., p. 6.

[148] Ibid., p. 9.

[149] MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 4.

[150] Ibid., p. 5.

> bombing the North. . . . We did not start this struggle, We did not aggress against North Vietnam. We did not send our bombers against North Vietnam until full regiments of the North Vietnam forces were in the South, until it was recognized in every chancellery and every embassy around the world that the North Vietnamese had committed an act of aggression.[151]

In speaking about the necessity to stand up against Communism, Humphrey stated in 1967;

> We took our stand in Cuba; we took our stand in Korea; we have taken our stand in Berlin; we have stood many many times, and because of that we have averted the great holocaust that constantly threatens humanity.[152]

A variation of this characteristic was illustrated by the Vice President when he discussed his trip to Southeast Asia in 1967. In a series of questions he was speaking of the message he brought to Southeast Asia.

> My view is that the American people will have the courage to stick it out, will stick it out, will persevere. And that was the message that I brought to Southeast Asia. This was the basic concern that the leaders of Southeast Asia had: Will the Americans persevere? Will we stay with them? Will we help them in national security and national development? Will we have patience? And my answer was, yes.[153]

This then, is the verbal style of the man, whom many refer to as another "happy warrior" kind of politician. Certainly, the optimism and warmth of his ideas and mode of expression would seem to bear out this image.

Intellectually, Humphrey also exhibited the ability to use evidence, as did all candidates. He did use some

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[151] Ibid., p. 6.

[152] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 26, 1967, p. 5.

[153] Ibid., p. 7.

reasoning, mainly from example, which seems to characterize the reasoning used by most candidates.

In 1966, Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, said that to have any movement towards negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam, three things had to happen: the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, a substantial reduction by all parties of all military activities in South Vietnam, and the participation of the National Liberation Front in any peaceful settlement. In explaining how our government felt about it, Humphrey stated the facts in what might have been phrased into syllogistic reasoning.

> Mr. Lasch, we had thirty-seven days of no bombing, total pause, de-escalation of the war during that thirty-seven days. During those thirty-seven days the North Vietnamese proceeded to move more troops into Laos--which is a fact--proceeded to move more troops into South Vietnam, proceeded to repair the roads and the rails so that they could continue to move additional supplies into South Vietnam. We already accommodated point No. 1, and we didn't even get a feeler from Hanoi.[154]

The syllogism might be stated as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: If Hanoi were sincere, then we could accommodate them by adhering to points two and three.
MINOR PREMISE: Hanoi is not sincere.
CONCLUSION: We cannot accommodate them with points two and three.

The examples Humphrey cited "prove" that Hanoi is not sincere.

In discussing the political aspect, Humphrey expressed a belief that the impact of terror and fear from the Viet Cong is less meaningful today. He used examples, which could be put into reasoning form, to prove his point.

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[154]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 6.

> I think the most encouraging sign in South Vietnam right now is the fact that we are getting information from the villagers, that the villagers are cooperating with the allied forces, and that the representatives of the government of Saigon are also receiving cooperation.[155]

Syllogistically, Humphrey's statement might be expressed as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: If fear of the Viet Cong is decreasing, we are making gains politically.
MINOR PREMISE: Fear of the Viet Cong is decreasing.
CONCLUSION: We are making gains politically.

The examples he gave supposedly "proved" that fear of the Viet Cong is decreasing.

During the same program, Humphrey expressed the belief that when we stand up to Communism we avoid nuclear confrontation. Again, he reasoned from example.

> When we faced up to the Russians in Berlin there was always the risk that it might explode into a terrible war. When we faced up to the Russians in Iran, immediately after World War II and asked them to get their forces out of there, there was a risk. When we aided the Greeks in the Greek civil war, there was a risk of confrontation, once again, with the Soviet Union. And surely in the Cuban missile crisis we were right, mighty close to a terribly terribly destructive war.[156]

Syllogistically, the reasoning goes as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: All major confrontations with Communists risk and avoid nuclear war.
MINOR PREMISE: Vietnam is a major confrontation with Communism.
CONCLUSION: Vietnam is a risk which will avoid nuclear war.

On another occasion Humphrey was asked whether Red China might be admitted to the UN within the next three, four, or five years. This was in 1966. Humphrey did not think Red

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[155] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[156] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

China was ready for admission into the UN, using what might be classified as either examples or signs, depending on what type of reasoning form we use.

> China today still stands branded as the aggressor by the United Nations in Korea. China has never asked to be admitted to the United Nations. She has suggested several revisions of the United Nations Charter. . . . She as yet has not made formal application, and even when some others have applied for her, she has rebuked them.[157]

Humphrey's reasoning could be formulated as follows.

> MAJOR PREMISE: All nations ready to abide by UN principles are accepted by the UN.
> MINOR PREMISE: Red China is not a nation ready to abide by UN principles.
> CONCLUSION: Red China will not be accepted by the UN.

Sign reasoning could involve the substance, "nation not ready to abide by UN principles." Or, Humphrey could be using examples, showing what Red China has done, indicating she is not yet a netion ready to abide by UN principles.

In 1966, discussing the possibilities of Democrats being successful in the congressional elections, Humphrey used Richard Nixon's predictions as a reason as to why Humphrey thought the Democrats would win seats.

> In 1964 he predicted that the Republicans would win about 40 seats, as I recall. They had a net loss of thirty-eight. In 1962 he predicted that the nation would repudiate John F. Kennedy and there was a total loss in that off-year election of two seats. He then thought the Republicans would gain about 45.[158]

Humphrey's reasoning, based on example, could go like this.

> MAJOR PREMISE: Nixon predictions of Republican victories turn into Democratic victories.

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[157]MEET THE PRESS program script, March 13, 1966, p. 15.

[158]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 30, 1966, p. 4.

MINOR PREMISE: Nixon is predicting a Republican victory.
CONCLUSION: The Democrats will win.

On the whole, Humphrey used more of the reasoning process than did other candidates. His intellectual capacity on one hand, and his optimistic outlook, expressed in a warm and humorous humble style on the other hand, could possibly make him the most acceptable Democrat to all types of persons in the party. If he did not have the intellectual reputation of Stevenson or Kennedy, he certainly was their equal, if not their superior in appeal to the average voter seeking humility and warmth.

The three components of ethos, competence, character, and good will, were well exhibited by Hubert Humphrey on this program. His opponent in this year's Presidential election, Richard M. Nixon, will be the first Republican studied.

RICHARD M. NIXON

Richard Nixon is not only the first Republican but the most recent Republican leader to be studied in the continuity of this study, based on the continuity of party leadership. Like his opponent, Hubert H. Humphrey, Nixon has actually served as Vice President prior to seeking the office of the Presidency.

Nixon's style on MEET THE PRESS, ironically, closely resembles that of his first opponent for the Presidency, John F. Kennedy. It could be described as direct, plain, lacking

in humor or the color of imagery and colloquialisms, and rather formal in its approach to the panel. Nixon, however, on the program on several occasions, seemed to display slightly more humility than did Kennedy.

On only four occasions did Nixon refuse to answer, or indirectly answer a question put to him by the panel. Even his frankness contributed to his image of integrity on two of these occasions, when he refused to become involved in personality discussions.

In 1966, Nixon was asked whether he had a second choice for the Republican nomination in 1968. For two reasons he refused to answer the question: (1) He was concerned for party unity; (2) He had a strong respect for the feelings of other candidates.

> Now Mr. Drummond, we are old friends, and you have asked me many questions through the years, and I have tried to be responsive. The Republican Party at the present time is on the brink of a dramatic breakthrough, the greatest comeback of any political party in this century, in my opinion. . . . One of the reasons we are going to have that breakthrough is that we have going for us what the Democrats had going for them in '64. We are united. They are divided. . . . I think all of the Republicans, George Romney and others who have been mentioned for '68 have been very responsible in refusing to discuss it. I am not going to discuss it either.[159]

Nixon's loyalty to the Republican Party is one of his more frequently exhibited characteristics on the program, as will be discussed.

During that same program, Nixon was asked how much of

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[159]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 23, 1966, p. 3.

a Democratic swing to the Republican Party by regular Democratic Party voters might be due to the absence of Goldwater on the Republican ticket that year. Again, Nixon displayed a party loyalty and a refusal to get caught up in any personality discussion.

> It is very hard--it seems to me--inappropriate for me to comment on a question of that type. The question is perfectly appropriate, but to indicate that Senator Goldwater's not being the candidate this year is going to be a plus for the Republicans, is something I am just not going to do. . . . I would say the issue is Johnson and not Goldwater, and I am not going to use this program for knocking Goldwater.[160]

Richard Nixon's sense of loyalty seems to play a large part in the image he projects of a man of integrity and good will. This loyalty extends not only to his party but to the role he is playing at any specific time during his political life. This includes a deep sense of responsibility to the people, both on a state and national basis.

In 1962, he was asked why he gave up a lucrative law practice to seek the governorship of California.

> Because I believe that the State of California, my native state, needs new leadership. There is no greater challenge for one whose profession is politics--and I am very proud of that profession--than to be able to lead this state. And because this responsibility is one that my party has given to me as its nominee, I intend to carry it out to the best of my ability as a candidate and as Governor of this state.[161]

For a long time Nixon said he would not accept the nomination. When asked what specifically made him change his mind, he

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[160] Ibid., p. 6.

[161] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 7, 1962, p. 1.

again gave as part of his reason his sense of party loyalty and responsibility.

> My conviction that unless I did accept the nomination we would not have a good chance to win the governorship. . . . it was my contention, after surveying the situation, that if I were to run, I might be able to win this race, which is a hard race, and I think it is vitally important that we get new leadership in Sacramento.[162]

Nixon was also asked how he could stop a draft from developing in 1964, even though he himself had repeatedly stated that he would not be a 1964 candidate for the presidential nomination. In his reply, he exhibited a loyalty and responsibility to the people of California and to the role of Governor, should he be elected.

> The nominee of the Republican Party in 1964, I believe, should be selected by the voters of California--selected in our primary. I will not be a candidate in that primary. There will be no native son delegation. . . . Now, I think after that statement nobody can question the honesty of something I have been trying to get across for months--that in running for Governor I think this state need a four-year Governor; I want to be a four-year Governor; and I cannot therefore run for President in 1964.[163]

In 1965, Nixon was questioned about a statement made by Barry Goldwater that if the Republican Convention were held that day, Nixon would be the Republican nominee. In his reply, Nixon again expressed a concern for party unity above all, and deep sense of responsibility to the party.

> I have a deep feeling about this Party, which I happened to lead in 1960--that our fortunes are so low at this point, where we aren't really an effective minority party, that we must concentrate on 1966 to the exclusion of any speculation about 1968. I am not trying to be coy in

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[162] Ibid.

[163] Ibid., p. 2.

> answering your question, but I feel that any discussion about '68 will again divide the Party, and it was division that cost us forty seats in the House, Senate seats and gubernatorial seats in 1964.[164]

Nixon's loyalty is reinforced by a sense of political honesty and personal humility. Like other candidates of both parties, he also refused to impugn the patriotism or loyalty to this country of any candidate, party, or personality.

He emphasized in the campaign of 1952 that any criticism of General Marshall was in no way a reflection upon the General's devotion to his position or his country.

> In no instance, in no respect does either General Eisenhower or do I offer any criticism of General Marshall insofar as his loyalty is concerned and his devotion to the United States. Any mistakes he made were mistakes of judgment and not mistakes which could be criticized from a loyalty standpoint.[165]

Later, during the same program, Nixon was asked why he was chosen as Vice Presidential nominee. Part of his reply implied his dislike for back room party politics. He also displayed his sense of humility and responsibility.

> I do know this, that this is one of those instances in which a Vice-Presidential candidate was not chosen in a smoke-filled room in which he sat in a room with the smoke, if there was any. I believe that as far as that decision was made, it was made by those who supported General Eisenhower, who considered the merits of all candidates and finally selected me. Why they did I do not know. Whether that was a good decision or not I do not know, but one thing I do know, from now until November 4th, I'm going to try not to let down the people that put this trust in me.[166]

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[164]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 12, 1965, p. 9.

[165]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 14, 1952, p. 4.

[166]*Ibid*., p. 10.

When asked whether if anything happened to General Eisenhower, Nixon felt he had the qualifications to carry on the Presidency, the Senator again revealed his humble feelings about his own qualifications.

> I think that the Presidency of the United States is the biggest job in the world today. I doubt that any man could honestly say that he felt that he was the best man qualified to be either the President or the Vice-President of the United States. All I can say is this: That I have been selected as the nominee for the Vice-Presidency of the United States. I'm going to work as hard as I can to elect the man that I think will make the best President that this country has had in many years. I think the country needs this man and I hope that he will be President a long time, four years, possibly eight years.[167]

In 1962, he revealed his sense of political integrity and dislike of personal attack politics, replying to a question by Tom Pettit of NBC News.

> PETTIT: Mr. Nixon, yesterday at a meeting of the California Republican State Central Commitee, copies of a pamphlet called "California Dynasty of Communism" were distributed. Among other things, this pamphlet calls Governor Brown a Communist sympathizer and collaborator and a Red appeaser. What do you think of it?
>
> NIXON: I think that kind of pamphlet is disgraceful. I repudiate it. If I had known that anybody was distributing it, I would have stopped it instantly. I am sure Governor Brown would say the same thing about pamphlets indicating that I was a member of the John Birch Society. . . . I have certainly indicated at all times that Governor Brown--my disagreement with him is not with regard to his loyalty but with regard to what he is willing to do and what he will do to deal with Communism at the state level.
>
> PETTIT: Do you think the Republican State Central Committee should repudiate any use of this pamphlet?
>
> NIXON: I certainly do, and I am sure that Casper Weinberger,

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[167] *Ibid*.

> who is chairman of that State Committee, completely agrees with me, and will repudiate it, and I will certainly take steps, the leadership, to see that it is repudiated.[168]

On a program of 1965, Nixon had an opportunity to again reveal his quality of humility, with regard to his own qualifications and feelings about the role of the Presidency. He was asked by Lawrence Spivak whether he still wanted to be President of the United States. In his reply, Nixon was not only honest but also again displayed his deep sense of loyalty to the Republican Party, regardless of who is selected.

> I would say that any man who has had the opportunity to participate in political life for twenty years as I have--it was just twenty years ago this fall that I entered political life for the first time--would set his goal at the very highest, and that of course is the Presidency. But I am a very practical man as our four questioners and you know. I believe that the Presidency seeks the man and that if a man is not destined at a particular time and place to lead the country, he will not be elected.
> I intend to do everything that I can to strengthen our party, my party, so that when we get to 1968, whoever is selected will be able to win, because I feel a certain responsibility, one, for losing the election of 1960, and now, a great responsibility for the weakness of this party, and I am devoting my efforts to building it up, without regard to what happens to me.[169]

In the process of rebuilding, Nixon evidently also captured the nomination in 1968. In deference to his words, however, it is very possible that Nixon honestly feels that the turbulence of the times have destined him to be the Party leader this year, and very possibly the leader of our country;

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[168]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 7, 1962, p. 6.

[169]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 12, 1965, p. 9.

this in no way demeans his quality of humility.

Nixon's tendency to avoid personality politics at the expense of party or national unity was illustrated again in 1966. He was asked to comment on the utility of President Johnson's Manila conference.

> Mr. Drummond, it would be very easy for me at this point to go back and point out what could have been done to make this a more effective conference. . . however, with the President abroad, with the Manila part of the conference trip now coming up, I am not going to indulge in criticism as to how he could have planned it better.[170]

Nixon's approach towards the panel, in answering questions, was somewhat more informal than that of John Kennedy, although not as personal as Adlai Stevenson's. On many occasions Nixon directly addressed the panelist when answering questions. Moreover, on a few occasions Nixon used some personal references.

On a program of 1962, while replying to a question posed by Lawrence Spivak, Nixon began the question as follows:

> Mr. Spivak--and incidentally, I am sorry to have mispronounced your name earlier; I know better. . .[171]

During the same program, Nixon was answering a question by Ben Bradlee of Newsweek. He good naturedly referred to moderator Ned Brooks.

> I answered that question. I answer it again. My friend, Ned Brooks, says, "Keep it short."[172]

In addressing panelist Tom Pettit a few minutes later, Nixon called him by his first name. He also, however,

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[170]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 23, 1966, p.2.

[171]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 7, 1962, p. 7.

[172]Ibid., p. 10.

explained the reason for this informality, which added a polite and humble touch to his reply.

> Tom, just to keep that one--and pardon me for the familiarity, but we have been travelling on the campaign trail so that I think I can refer to him as "Tom"--[173]

As mentioned previously, in one particular instance when Nixon was answering a question put to him by Roscoe Drummond, he referred to their long-standing friendship.

> Now, Mr. Drummond, we are old friends, and you have asked me many questions through the years, and I have tried to be responsive.[174]

On the whole, Nixon would seem to have a somewhat more informal and warmer attitude in his approach to the panel than did Kennedy, adding to his ethos in terms of good will.

Nixon's verbal style is plain and matter-of-fact. He uses no imagery, and his speech at least on this program is completely free from any colloquial expressions. Like Kennedy, he also displayed a businesslike, direct and humorless quality in his answers. There is also no characteristic unique to his style, such as Humphrey's fervid massing of words or repetition of a phrase. Nixon's rhetoric has the plain, simple, intellectual appeal of a Kennedy or Stevenson, displaying ample use of facts, examples, and other evidence with no particular embellishments.

On the few occasions when Nixon used reasoning, he seemed to use example most frequently as did most of the other candidates studied.

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[173] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[174] MEET THE PRESS program script, October 23, 1966, p. 3.

In 1962, discussing the crime rate in California, he expressed concern that California, although not first in the nation in population, was leading the nation in crime. Nixon also expressed the belief that a bigger population did not necessarily mean a bigger crime rate and used cause-effect logic. He used examples to prove his point.

> Of course, some of the increase in crime is due to the increase in population. But when you look at the population factor, New York is bigger than we are even now. There are more crimes committed in California than in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey combined, and they have twice the population, so you can't blame it on the population.[175]

Nixon's reasoning might be put into this form.

MAJOR PREMISE: If bigger population caused more crime, New York would have more crime than California.
MINOR PREMISE: New York does not have more crime than California.
CONCLUSION: Bigger population does not cause more crime.

His examples, naturally, consisted of crime rates in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

Speaking about Vietnam in 1965, Nixon used reasoning from analogy in a prediction that the Vietnam struggle would require two or three more years of intense activity on our part.

> Looking at the experience in Malaysia and other countries where we have had guerilla wars, we are looking down the road toward two to three years more of intensive activity to reduce the guerilla activities to the point that the Vietnamese will be able to handle them without our help.[176]

Nixon's analogy reasoning might take the following form.

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[175]MEET THE PRESS program script, October 7, 1962, p. 8.

[176]MEET THE PRESS program script, September 12, 1965, p. 1.

MAJOR PREMISE: All Guerilla wars take so many years to win.
MINOR PREMISE: Vietnam is a guerilla war.
CONCLUSION: Vietnam will take so many years to win.

The analogy between Vietnam and Malaysia considers such points of similarity as guerilla warfare, Asian location, type of struggle, native involvement, etc. Nixon also might have been using reasoning from example in this instance.

On the same program, Nixon reasoned from example to prove that we have won the ideological war in Vietnam. He was asked what we could do about it if the South Vietnamese invited the Communists into their government.

> If the South Vietnamese were on their own volition to invite Communists into their government, there is very little that we could do about it. On the other hand, I think it is a hypothetical question, and therefore, fortunately, the hypothesis, I think, is false.
> The South Vietnamese have learned what communism is. In the Viet Cong areas they know now that people join the Communists, not because they like it, but because they fear it. And also, the South Vietnamese know, looking at North Vietnam, that it is an economic slum. They do not want to have communism have anything to do with their future, when their per capita income is twice as high as it is in North Vietnam. I think one thing we can be sure of. On the ideological front we have won.[177]

Nixon's reasoning might be constructed as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: If Communist North Vietnam offers something better, South Vietnam will invite Communists into their government.
MINOR PREMISE: Communist North Vietnam doesn't offer something better.
CONCLUSION: The South Vietnamese will not invite Communists into their government.

Nixon's reasoning might also be stated as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: If the South Vietnamese invite Communists into their government we have lost the ideological war.

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[177] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

MINOR PREMISE: The South Vietnamese will not invite Communists into their government.
CONCLUSION: We haven't lost the ideological war.

Nixon's statements about North Vietnam are examples to prove why the Communists offer nothing better and why they would not be invited.

Nixon, on the whole, offers the same competent intellectual image that is offered by the other candidates. It is interesting to note, however, that his verbal style most resembles that of Kennedy, who defeated him on television. This would seem to add that much more importance and credence to the theory that the visual image, in terms of personality projection, is becoming one of the most important political assets.

In sharp contrast to the straight, serious, unembellished verbal style of Richard Nixon is that of the 1964 Republican nominee for President, Barry Goldwater, the final candidate to be analyzed in this study.

BARRY GOLDWATER

Barry Goldwater has been one of the most frequent and popular MEET THE PRESS guests. He was also frequently mentioned by the panelists with whom this author corresponded, as one of the most frank and direct. It would seem his general reputation for being frank bears this out.

Goldwater, like the other candidates studied, refused to answer or evaded directly answering only a minimal number of questions put to him by the panel. As in the case of the other

candidates, a good part of the questions he avoided answering concerned personalities.

When asked in 1955 whether he thought that Republicans lost so badly in Illinois in 1954 because McCarthy followers did not come out to vote, Goldwater would not commit himself, based on the grounds of political honesty.

> Well, Mr. Childs, one thing I don't want to ever do is inject my opinions or thoughts into other states than my own. Not living in Illinois, I can't give you any more than an opinion.[178]

During that same program, Goldwater was asked his opinion of Senator McCarthy. Although Goldwater evaded a direct answer, he brought out his sincere friendship for the Senator, which made it difficult to answer a question like that on national television.

> That's a difficult question because Joe McCarthy has been a personal friend of mine since 1940, long before either one of us got into politics. I like him as a friend. I don't think that the censure movement has hurt the Republican Party as deeply as some people on the outside world would like to make it appear.[179]

Since Goldwater in 1953 had stated that he would stick up for Mc Carthy and always would, this reply reaffirmed their friendship but did not give unqualified approval to McCarthy's tactics.

Several minutes later Goldwater was asked whether McCarthy would be used in the 1956 campaign. Again Goldwater reaffirmed his position of not wanting or not necessarily being able to interfere in the politics of another state,

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[178]MEET THE PRESS program script, February 27, 1955, p. 5.

[179]*Ibid*.

regardless of his personal feelings about the matter.

> There again, I want to make something clear. In my capacity as chairman of the Senatorial Campaign Committee, I will not inject the committee, myself or my wishes into the states. It's up to the candidate. If he wants Senator Smith or Senator Jones to come into the state, we will do all we can do to get him in, but the Senatorial Campaign Committee never picks a man out and sends him into the state. That's the way we're going to operate.[180]

In 1961, Goldwater refused to give an opinion on whether Governor Nelson Rockefeller's divorce might hurt his political future.

> I never beg off answering questions, but I have to on that. This is a personal matter of the Rockefellers, and I don't want to inject it into politics, so I have to turn you down, as much as I dislike doing it.[181]

Goldwater's integrity was illustrated on numerous other occasions on the program, when he did answer questions in his frank and direct manner. He expressed ideas of both political and personal honesty.

Goldwater's strong concern for individual freedom, certainly a strong factor of his patriotic image, has manifested itself in the discussion of many issues. In 1957, he expressed himself on the issue of union dues being used for political campaigns.

> I don't think that compulsory dues money, or dues money, should be entered into a campaign. I think the individual member of the union should be allowed to go to the Democratic Party or Republican Party and say, "here's a dollar, five dollars, or ten dollars; I want you to use it;" but certainly no union leader any more than the leader of the American Legion, or the leader of any church groups, or the leader of any Chamber of Commerce has a right to

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[180] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[181] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 6.

> take its members' money and invest it at his own wishes in a political campaign.[182]

A few minutes later he had to defend his own political honesty with regard to this issue. It was suggested that Goldwater's stand on the tidelands issue might have been somewhat influenced by the fact that some of his own campaign money had come from oil interests.

> I have been for the so-called tidelands issue ever since I can remember. I've been talking for it in the west just after the war, and certainly the fact that some people in Texas gave me some money didn't hurry up my decision on it. I would have made that vote whether they had given me a nickel or not, and those men by the way happen to be old friends of mine. I knew some of them before they ever had an oil well.[183]

He then defended the right of any individual to donate campaign money of his own, whether he be a union or a business representative.

> I think this, if Walter Reuther himself wants to give a candidate a thousand dollars that's his perfect right to do so and I think we would be wrong to say that man was beholden to Walter Reuther because of that.[184]

Goldwater's sense of responsibility to public office was brought out on a program of July, 1960. The question concerned Richard Nixon's delayed campaign.

> I think he was right in not having campaigned early. He does have the responsibility of being Vice-President, and I think we should be proud of a man who is seeking the Presidency who feels an obligation to his elected duties. That would be a rare thing if it were applied in the opposite party where the candidate for President I think missed something like 90% of the roll calls.

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[182] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 1, 1957, p. 7.

[183] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[184] *Ibid.*

> In fact he was in there so seldom the page boys didn't know him, and the Majority Leader, who was there just a fraction of the time, is now running for the Vice Presidency. I think the Vice President should be commended on his attention to duty.[185]

It is interesting here to note, Goldwater's humorous reference to John Kennedy. The Goldwater sense of humor plays a large role in the image he projects of character and good will, and will be discussed later.

Later in the program, expressing surprise at Richard Nixon's meeting with Rockefeller, Goldwater reaffirmed his own political honesty.

> I don't believe in trading off principles for votes. I just can't bring myself around to it. Maybe I won't get re-elected because of that, but by golly, I will sleep at night.[186]

Goldwater's use of the term "by golly", illustrates another characteristic trait of his verbal style, the frequent use of colloquialisms and down to earth expressions, which form a large part of his warm appeal.

During the same program, Goldwater restated his political principles, by placing his country above his party in the hierarchy of devotion. He was not a depressed Republican at the time, due to the actions of Mr. Nixon, in accommodating himself to the more liberal wing of the Party. Goldwater replied;

> No, I am an American, and I am very happy and proud of it, and being a Republican comes way down the list. We only have to go through this every four years.[187]

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[185] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 24, 1960, p. 11.

[186] Ibid., p. 13.

[187] Ibid., p. 15.

Another facet of Goldwater's political honesty was revealed on a program of November, 1961. Goldwater was already being considered by some as a possible Republican Presidential candidate in 1964. The following dialogue took place between Goldwater and panelist Earl Mazo.

> MAZO: If the Arizona legislature in a burst of local pride, had a bill before it that would permit you to run for both Senator and President or Vice President, would you do anything to encourage or prevent its passage?
>
> GOLDWATER: I would urge that they not pass it. However--and I don't speak with deep knowledge on this--I think the way the constitution of my state is written that this could be done. I was too highly critical of Vice President Johnson in the last campaign for doing the same thing--in fact, I accused him of developing "the Johnson ballot, which is the Townsend Plan for Aging Politicians"--and I don't think I could in good conscience ask my state to do something that I criticized somebody else for doing.[188]

Goldwater's goo d humor also is illustrated in this reply in reference to the President, who was then Vice President and in 1960 was faced with the dilemma of giving up the Senatorial position he held to run for the Vice Presidency.

After Goldwater's defeat in 1964, there was speculation that he might run for the Senate seat occupied by Carl Hayden of Arizona. On a program of 1965, Goldwater expressed his respect for Senator Hayden and the desire to wage a clean, respectable campaign if he did attempt to run against Hayden.

> Senator Hayden is one of my oldest and closest friends. His family and my family, I think, are among the oldest families in Arizona, and running against him would be difficult for me, although I think we could keep it at

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[188]MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 9.

> a plane that would not hurt either one of us, win, lose or draw.[189]

If Goldwater's character can be determined from what he says, his good will can be even more easily identified from the manner in which he expresses himself. Goldwater's colorful verbal style, with its humor and earthy colloquial expressions, reinforces an image of the western pioneer man, ruggedly individualistic, outgoing, and friendly. Goldwater's rhetoric, more than that of any candidate studied, is rich in humor and the colorful colloquialisms of his kind of America.

His ingratiating verbal style is enhanced by his friendly approach toward the panel. Like Adlai Stevenson, on several occasions he addressed panelists by their first name and was the only candidate who called producer Lawrence Spivak, "Larry." Examples of Goldwater's warm and personal verbal style follow.

In 1957, Goldwater was discussing the fact that part of his campaign money came from out of state.

> I don't care where it comes from just so it's printed here in Washington; it's not Confederate money.[190]

During the same program, referring to modern Republicanism, Goldwater gave his prediction for its continuance as follows:

> I said six months ago that modern Republicanism would live six months. I think Mr. Proxmire threw the last clod of dirt over the coffin last Tuesday.[191]

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[189] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 13, 1965, p. 7.

[190] MEET THE PRESS program script, September 1, 1957, p. 8.

[191] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

When asked whether he would consider President Eisenhower's endorsement important to his election, Goldwater used a quote from the remarks of Senator William Jenner to give his opinion.

> I remember Bill Jenner sitting here a few weeks ago, and he said he wanted everybody for him and even the dogs barking for him.[192]

Goldwater had previously remarked that perhaps Walter Reuther might have been happier had he stayed in Russia. Lawrence Spivak reminded Goldwater that Reuther hadn't been born in Russia but only visited it. Goldwater replied as follows.

> No, I said that facetiously because naturally any man born in the city of Wheeling, West Virginia would want to travel.[193]

Goldwater was also asked whether he would like President Eisenhower to come out to Arizona to campaign for him. Goldwater's reply had a personal quality to it.

> We have asked him to come out anytime he wants to; we have a delightful place for him to stay and I think it would help his golf.[194]

In 1960, asked about the purpose of the campaign being waged in his interest by the "Americans for Goldwater" group, Goldwater referred to them using a typical western colloquialism.

> I think the organization to which you refer . . . has been established to offer a hitching post you might say, for the conservatives of this country.[195]

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[192] Ibid., p. 10.

[193] Ibid., p. 12.

[194] Ibid., p. 14.

[195] MEET THE PRESS program script, July 24, 1960, p. 5.

When describing his attitude toward Richard Nixon, Goldwater stated;

> When he can cut the apron strings from the White House and speak out on his own, I still have great hopes of his proving himself to be a conservative in the eyes of the people.[196]

When asked for his opinion as to why Nixon "surrendered" to Rockefeller, as Goldwater put it, Goldwater replied;

> Something happened that probably set off his political antenna and said: I had better get together with Nelson because we need some votes in New York and that probably is what forced him to go up there.[197]

Goldwater had compared Nixon's act to Chamberlain's Munich actions. He was asked by panelist Richard Wilson whether he meant to suggest that Nixon, like Chamberlain, was being deluded on peace in our time. Goldwater explained his statement.

> I think if we talk long enough we could get it around to it. We might even get the umbrella in the act some place, but Munich was the first word that came to my mind that typified what I thought his actions to be.[198]

In 1961, Goldwater was asked whether he had any formula for soliciting votes which would work well for his party.

> I have a general formula, put in a way that I think most people would understand. If you are going hunting for ducks you go where the ducks are.[199]

On a program of August, 1962, Goldwater was asked whether he had any favorite Democratic Senators whom he would like to see defeated in the congressional elections. Goldwater humorously cited Wayne Morse of Oregon.

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[196] Ibid., p. 11.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Ibid., p. 13.

[199] MEET THE PRESS program script, November 19, 1961, p. 9.

> Oh, you always have your hopes. I would like to see Wayne Morse spend more time in Oregon raising his bulls than raising the devil with the Senate.[200]

Goldwater also spoke of people around the President as being a campaign issue.

> Well, people and animals. The Attorney General's dog that is being walked around by good looking young ladies. I know a lot of people who have dogs who would like to have them walked around by good looking young ladies.[201]

Near the end of the program Goldwater was asked whether he favored a national TV debate in connection with congressional campaigns. With only a minute or so left, the following dialogue took place with Goldwater getting in a last-minute remark.

> GOLDWATER: Frankly, I don't think you gain much or lose much by these so-called debates.
>
> BROOKS: Senator, I am afraid that is all the time--
>
> GOLDWATER: This is an example.[202]

In 1964, Krushchev sent New Year's greetings to President Johnson. Goldwater was asked whether he would respond to Krushchev in the same manner that the President had. Goldwater answered, again using typically Western language.

> I would--along these lines. "If you mean what you say, Mr. Krushchev, put up or shut up," as we Western poker players say.[203]

Goldwater in 1960 had accused Johnson of trickery because he was running for the Vice Presidency and the Senate at the same time. Goldwater then announced, in 1964, his

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[200] MEET THE PRESS program script, August 5, 1962, p. 9.

[201] Ibid., p. 11.

[202] Ibid.

[203] MEET THE PRESS program script, January 5, 1964, p. 3.

own candidacy for both the Senate and the Presidency. He explained his position on the program and his attack on Johnson in somewhat humorous and personal terms.

> I called it the "Johnson ballot," and I suggested that it might be a good idea because you could run for every office. You might lose all but one, but you'd wind up with a job, or you might wind up with one you didn't want and you could swap around. If the situation were different today, and I would not be faced with the possibility of running against Mr. Johnson, they my answer would be different, but as I said at my house the other day, I might be running against the teacher, and I want to be a good student. . . . By the peculiarity of Arizona election law our primaries are not until the second Tuesday in September, so if I am not successful in getting the nomination in July, I still have a crack at the Senate nomination in September, and I see no incompatibility in this position at all.[204]

Goldwater in the same program refused to accept the fact that President Johnson is an economizer and said so in some colorful language.

> He is not an economizer. He is putting up a good front. The neon lights are blinking, and the tilt balls are rolling, but he is not an economizer.[205]

Discussing the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, Goldwater again used colloquial language to describe his position.

> I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary in a war that we are fighting over there. In other words, don't use a 12-gauge shotgun to kill a target that one BB will work on.[206]

Later in the program, Goldwater admitted he had just a little touch of Potomac fever. This was in 1965. He again exhibited his warm sense of good humor.

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[204] Ibid., p. 4.

[205] Ibid., p. 9.

[206] MEET THE PRESS program script, June 13, 1965, p. 2.

> I don't think I could deny that, if you want to call it Potomac fever. I say I am too old to go back to work, and I am too young to get out of politics.[207]

At the end of the program, Goldwater again exhibited his good humor in the final seconds of the program. The question concerned itself with those Republicans who had not supported Goldwater in the 1964 election.

> NOVAK: Senator . . . after the election you referred to the Republicans who did not endorse you as "so-called" Republicans: Romney of Michigan, Kuchel of California. Do you think these people have disqualified themselves from a presidential nomination or from national party leadership?
>
> SPIVAK: I am sorry, I can't let you answer that; our time is up.
>
> GOLDWATER: Saved by the bell.[208]

It would seem that Goldwater's verbal style gives him a frank, warm, and simple approach, one which enhances his ethos in terms of character and good will.

When we examine Goldwater's reasoning processes, one factor stands out. Goldwater, more than any other candidate, used cause-effect reasoning. The judgment as to whether causal reasoning indicates a tendency to oversimplify complex matters more than do any of the other forms of reasoning, will not be made here. The fact is only brought out to illustrate another one of Goldwater's characteristic verbal traits. It is possible that people who tend to oversimplify also tend to use a specific kind of reasoning more frequently.

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[207] Ibid., p. 7.

[208] Ibid., p. 9.

This, however, would have to be proven in further research and is beyond the purpose of this study.

One of the first examples of causal reasoning occurred on a program of February, 1955. Lawrence Spivak asked Goldwater what he thought the cause was for the Republicans losing strength. Goldwater listed two causes.

> Mr. Spivak, I think we have two causes that are probably dominant to the others. The first one is that the Democratic Party have been better salesmen than the Republican Party. . . . The other one is one that goes back much further than just four years. I think we have failed up until the last you might say six years to encourage the young people of America to come into the Republican Party, to keep them there with encouragement and selling them on the idea that this interest in politics has to be a religious fervor.[209]

Goldwater's syllogism might read as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: The political party that has better salesmen and attracts more young people will gain more congressional seats.
MINOR PREMISE: The Democratic Party has better salesmen and attracts more young people.
CONCLUSION: The Democratic Party will gain more congressional seats.

Lawrence Spivak pointed out one cause that Goldwater overlooked.

> SPIVAK: Senator, aren't you overlooking the most important thing of all, and that is, there is a fundamental split in the Republican Party between the right wing of your party and let us say the progressive moderates, or progressive conservatives, or whatever President Eisenhower called them?[210]

A few minutes later, Goldwater again used causal reasoning to explain why the Republicans lost so badly in Illinois in the 1954 elections.

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[209] MEET THE PRESS program script, February 27, 1955, p. 2.

[210] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

> In Illinois there were 24% fewer Republicans voted in 1954 than voted in 1950, the last off year, and that only three percent more Democrats voted, so it's obvious that in Illinois the Republicans who didn't vote lost the election for the Republican candidate.[211]

Goldwater's reasoning could be expressed as follows.

MAJOR PREMISE: When all Republicans vote, they vote for the Republican Ticket and it wins.
MINOR PREMISE: All Republicans didn't vote.
CONCLUSION: The Republican Ticket lost.

or

MAJOR PREMISE: When a larger percentage of Republicans than Democrats do not vote, the Republican candidate loses.
MINOR PREMISE: A larger percentage of Republicans than Democrats did not vote.
CONCLUSION: The Republican candidate lost.

During the same program, Goldwater blamed the Democrats for the infiltration of Communists into government.

> They can't escape the obvious fact that Soviet Russia was recognized by the Democratic regime, and that Communists started to infiltrate the government during the period of time that they were in power.[212]

Stated as a syllogism, Goldwater is saying;

MAJOR PREMISE: The party that recognized Soviet Russia is the party that caused Communists to infiltrate the government.
MINOR PREMISE: The Democratic Party recognized Soviet Russia.
CONCLUSION: The Democratic Party caused Communists to infiltrate the government.

In both of these examples, some of Goldwater's warrants might be questioned. Do more registered Republican voters cast votes for the Republican candidate when they do vote? Does a larger percentage of voting Republicans necessarily mean

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[211] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[212] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

more Republican votes? Is there a direct relation between recognition of Soviet Russia and the number of Communists entering government? These are only a few questions to test the validity of Goldwater's reasoning here.

Again, during that same program Goldwater explained why he thought Republicans were showing their greatest weakness where there are mostly Republicans.

> Larry, there's a great migration going on all over the country. We're finding we're picking up Congressional seats down in the South. We had no place to go there but up. Out in the middle west where we have been strong all our lives, as a party we could go down and that's what we have done.[213]

What Goldwater is saying could take the following form.

MAJOR PREMISE: A majority party can only begin to lose strength in those areas where it has been the majority party.
MINOR PREMISE: The Republican Party has been the majority party in some areas.
CONCLUSION: The Republicans can only lose strength in those areas.

Again, one can question whether being a strong party necessarily causes people to turn to the other party.

It is interesting to note that Goldwater not only used one particular type of reasoning more than did the other candidates, he also used less reasoning to support his opinions, than did some other candidates. The most vivid attribute the Senator displayed on the program was his common appeal, based on the components of character and good will.

Having now examined the images projected by the major candidates in each party, several summary remarks need to be made.

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[213] Ibid., p. 15.

SUMMARY REMARKS

The image profiles drawn in this chapter are based solely on the candidates' verbal style. It is recognized, however, that the candidate's visual or physical image could resemble the television stereotypes of the "good guy," or the "bad guy." This resemblance could either reinforce or weaken the verbal image. Further research is needed to determine how the two types of images interact and which emerges as the stronger.

It is also recognized, as was illustrated with Goldwater, that the validity of some of the reasoning used by candidates could be questioned. Where sign reasoning is employed, the number of attributes and the validity of the attributes, with regard to the substance being referred to, could be examined. Where reasoning from example was used, the number of examples might not have been adequate. The kinds of questions that could be raised with causal reasoning, were demonstrated in discussing Goldwater. The use of analogy might also be questioned, with regard to the true similarity of the situations being cited as analagous.

Certainly, the time limitation of the program format can account for much of the somewhat superficial reasoning used. On the whole, however, the fact that evidence can be cited, and some reasoning employed in such a restrictive situation timewise, is a mark of the intellectual capacities of all candidates. To what extent an audience recognizes

reasoning and its validity as being more vital to an image of competence than the use of evidence, is also the subject of further study.

Having thus examined the contribution MEET THE PRESS makes toward candidate ethos, the analytical portion of this study is now complete. It remains only to summarize the knowledge gained by the complete study and to state the necessary concluding remarks.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study was executed to analyze the methods and content of the panel interview program, MEET THE PRESS, in communicating political information to the voting public during national election years.

MEET THE PRESS was selected for study because of its significance in the history of broadcast journalism. It introduced a format which probes a candidate and his opinions directly before the public, with no opportunity for misquoting or biased reporting of what he says, or the manner in which he says it. Moreover, the program, if it functions efficiently, denies the candidate the opportunity to go unchallenged when he voices the ambiguous and unsupported statements and accusations so often characteristic of the prepared political speech or political commercial.

The program was analyzed from five different points of view, as follows:

1. The significance of the information and opinion elicited.

2. The fairness of the program in its treatment of guests. This is especially important, since MEET THE PRESS is exempt from the equal time provisions of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act. The program must attempt, therefore, to provide not only equal exposure but equal fair treatment to all candidates.

3. The questioning process utilized to elicit opinion and information.

4. Candidates' opinion profiles on selected campaign issues.

5. Candidates' ethos profile, as projected by their verbal image.

The study focused on Republican and Democratic candidates for national office during the campaigns of 1952 through 1964. All program appearances were included, however, up through the end of 1967. The results of the analysis in the context of the five points described follow:

PROGRAM SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVITY

An examination of the program's history revealed both the significant information MEET THE PRESS has elicited over the years and its reputation for fairness. The number of newsmaking headlines it has made and the outstanding awards it has received testify to the program's contribution to broadcast journalism. Personal letters to producer Spivak and to this author from candidates who appeared on the program have verified the program's reputation for fairness and objectivity.

The panelists over the years have also proven themselves to be impartial in the questioning process. The same kinds of questions have been put to all candidates concerning the same issues regardless of the good or bad effect a frank reply could have on the image the candidate projects. On occasion, questions have been worded in a manner which could have reflected personal bias on the part of the questioner.

The number of these instances, however, is negligible.

The repeated willingness of candidates to appear on the program is in itself proof of the program's fairness. No candidate, regardless of the benefit he receives from national exposure, would be willing continuously to subject himself to impugnation or verbal antagonism by a biased and unfriendly panel.

THE QUESTIONING PROCESS

The questioning process employed by MEET THE PRESS is a major factor in its repeated success and reputation. The program maintains the ability to cut through the ambiguities of political rhetoric and get to the heart of important issues. The main focus of MEET THE PRESS questions, where opinion is elicited, is that of clarification. It might be noted that opinion questions are the type most frequently asked when the guest is a political candidate.

An analysis and classification of questions in the areas of politics, foreign and domestic affiars, revealed four major types of questions employed by the panel with political guests. These do not include straight information questions, or questions calling for comment of a general nature.

1. Questions of clarification or definition of terms.
2. Questions calling for the explanation of inconsistencies of action, inconsistencies of words, or inconsistencies between words and actions, on the part of the candidate, his party, or the government.
3. Questions involving committal to a specific action,

policy, or proposed alternative to the solution of a specific problem.

4. Questions containing built in premises, the acceptance of which admits valid facts and problems connected with major issues and policies.

Through this questioning process, the repeated use of ambiguous terms like "commitment," "stand firm," "aggressor," "victory," "peace," "rights," and others, have been converted into frank discussion of the principles and policies underlying their meaning.

The questioning process also minimizes the number of evasive replies. An answer that is too ambiguous or unrelated draws a repetition of the question or a rephrasing of the answer to remove doubt of its meaning. Only a direct refusal to answer frees the question from further probing. There is also little evidence of the panel riding a question to death when further probing would prove futile.

Candidates as a whole refuse to answer questions which they feel involve matters of national security, or which they feel constitute personal attack or comment on some other political figure. The most evasive area of questioning has proven itself to be that of political candidacy. Regardless of how questions and answers are rephrased and repeated, no candidate has ever denied or admitted his candidacy for national office in any binding fashion. The panel might spend less time pursuing this line of questioning in the future, knowing how inconclusive it is.

The questioning methods as a whole have also proven

efficient at eliciting information which reveals how candidates stand on vital campaign issues.

THE ISSUES

Three major issues were selected for study. The three issues, in one form or another, contributed to the dialogue of every campaign studied here and also are contributing to the rhetoric of the current 1968 campaign.

The first issue studied concerned candidates' attitudes on Russia and the "cold war."

Democrats Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy, and Hubert Humphrey exhibited little difference in their distrust of Soviet leadership and recognition of a need to negotiate from a position of military superiority. They shared the belief that military strength and the dangers of a nuclear war would, in themselves, prevent a major confrontation between the two powers.

All Democrats, however, are quite liberal in their attitude toward peaceful cooperation with the Soviets in the matters of disarmament, test ban treaties, and the like. Whereas Stevenson and Kennedy favored taking the initiative in disarmament and cessation of H-bomb testing, Humphrey has opposed any unilateral action. Humphrey, unlike Stevenson, opposed any bilateral agreement on testing which would only involve Russia and the United States.

Humphrey also most strongly committed us to the use of force in Berlin, although all three candidates strongly

affirmed our Berlin commitments. John Kennedy was the most reluctant candidate to commit this country to unilateral use of force. In the issues of Poland and Hungary in the 1950's, and again in Cuba during Castro's takeover, Kennedy considered any use of force unwarranted. With regard to Cuba, Kennedy considered that any action had to be taken only within the framework and with the cooperation of those nations who had signed the Caracas Declaration.

All three candidates supported a strong foreign aid program. Stevenson, however, was most vociferous in his criticism of foreign military aid. He also proposed that all foreign aid from both Russia and the United States be administered through the United Nations, thus removing any obligations which this aid might imply. A strong humanist, he attempted to disengage aid of any kind from the arena of politics. Humphrey, on the other hand, would have us distribute foreign aid even to Communist satellites in an effort to win them over, or at least help them become more independent of Russia. All three candidates recognized the advantage of having Russia in the U.N.

The Republicans as a group exhibited a deeper distrust of Soviet leadership and more of a reluctance to seek cooperative bridges of understanding. Like the Democrats, they believe in a strong military budget and the need to negotiate from strength, as a means of preventing actual war.

Henry Cabot Lodge most resembles the Democratic point of view in his belief in a strong foreign aid program, and seeking

peaceful means of cooperation. His distrust of the Soviets, however, extends itself even to matters concerning disarmament proposals.

Richard Nixon exhibited a harder line than did Lodge. He is not only for containment of communism, as are the Democrats, but, unlike some Democrats, favors an active attempt to reverse it where it already exists. Like Humphrey, Nixon opposed any unilateral action on cessation of H-bomb testing and is cautious with all treaty actions. Even most recently, due to the Russian actions in Czechoslovakia, Nixon has advocated not rushing into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is currently awaiting United States signature. Like Kennedy, however, Nixon also rejected the use of force in Cuba.

The hardest line on Russia was taken by Barry Goldwater, who has rejected the idea of co-existence or any possible negotiation on Berlin. Both Goldwater and his running mate William Miller would have had us tear down the Berlin wall as it was being built, as part of our Berlin commitment. Goldwater's rejection of co-existence resulted in an admission on the program that if elected President, he would seek to withdraw recognition of the Soviets by the United States.

Goldwater has taken a firm stand against any cooperative agreements, having voiced opposition to, and voting against, the consular treaty and the test ban treaty. Unlike Humphrey, Goldwater opposed any foreign aid to any communist satellite and has doubted the utility of foreign aid in general. He agreed with Stevenson on the waste of foreign

military aid. Like Nixon, Goldwater strongly opposed our taking the initiative in any disarmament agreement and placed strong faith in the military. His desire to give the NATO field commander the power to use small nuclear weapons by his own decision was a major 1964 campaign issue. Hubert Humphrey stated there were no nuclear weapons small enough to be used in the field by any commander. Humphrey also replied that this country would not and should not use nuclear weapons except in a retaliatory fashion since we do not believe in preventative war.

Goldwater went further than any other candidate on the issue of Cuba with regard to the use of force, advocating a blockade if necessary.

On the issue of the "cold war," the Democrats seem to have taken a more flexible position. The two extremes seem to be represented by Stevenson on one end and Goldwater on the other.

The second major issue studied concerned Communist China and our Southeast Asia commitments.

Although all Democrats agreed on our Korean actions, only John Kennedy questioned our stratgey. Kennedy's philosophy in this regard closely resembled that of John Sparkman. Sparkman questioned the value of Formosa as a vital link in our Pacific chain of defense. He would rather have risked a Communist takeover of Formosa than risk a single American life defending it. Sparkman frowned on any unilateral action in our part to defend Formosa outside the United Nations. He also

expressed doubts at the time of the Formosa government being representative of all the Chinese.

Kennedy, likewise, had doubts about our Formosa commitments and was extremely critical of Chiang Kai-Shek for not giving up Quemoy and Matsu. He recognized our commitment to defend these islands, but only if they were being attacked as part of an overall attack on Formosa. Kennedy stated an agreement with Admiral Yarnell that the islands themselves weren't worth the bones of a single American soldier. It was the issue of Quemoy and Matsu which sharply focused the difference in attitude on defense of Southeast Asia between Nixon and Kennedy in the debates of 1960.

Kennedy's attitude on the use of force in Asia was a cautious one. He recognized a need to align ourselves with the people rather than with the colonialist powers in control. He hesitated to commit the United States to any pledge beyond advice and assistance. Beginning with the Indo-China situation, Kennedy although recognizing the dangers of Red Chinese expansion, considered it more of the Asians' struggle and expected them to carry most of the burden. What effect Kennedy's philosophy might have had on our current Vietnam involvement had he lived, can only be speculated. Kennedy, like all other Democrats, opposed the seating of Red China in the United Nations.

In addition, Adlai Stevenson while opposing seating Red China in the United Nations, was willing to have Russia in the organization. Since both nations have aggressed,

Stevenson's attitude probably reflected an acceptance of UN policy rather than any preference toward Russia. While it would seem that Russia as a member nation could aggress with no danger of being expelled--especially since the Soviets have the veto power--Red China, on the other hand, can be kept out as an aggressor. This attitude was shared by Stevenson, with Henry Cabot Lodge, the other UN Delegate, who was also a national candidate. Stevenson, however, in 1961, admitted that the United States would no longer object to debate on the issue of seating Red China. He nevertheless reaffirmed the belief that the Formosa government will never lose her seat, thus implying an acceptance of a two-China solution.

As long as he served in the UN, Stevenson expressed a definite commitment to our Vietnam policy although he might have indicated a doubt about our bombing strategy. He also indicated a flexibility where negotiations were concerned but doubted the possibility or utility of any UN settlement.

Hubert Humphrey has strongly supported Administration policy on Vietnam in every respect. Unlike Stevenson, Humphrey also approved our bombing strategy. Humphrey has also placed more confidence than Stevenson did in the possibility of UN involvement in a peace settlement. Although opposed to forcing any coalition government on South Vietnam, Humphrey has recognized the possibility of including the Communists in any peaceful settlement. His attitude toward Red China was described as "containment without isolation." Like Stevenson, he opposes her seating in the UN but is hopeful of building

bridges of understanding as we have done with Soviet Russia.

On this issue the Republicans again are firmer than the Democrats. This applies both to the issue of Red China in the UN and to the issue of our Vietnam policies.

Henry Cabot Lodge not only opposed the seating of Red China in the UN, while still UN Delegate he stated on the program that if necessary he would use the veto power to prevent Red China's admission. As former Ambassador to South Vietnam, he also took a harder line than did the Democrats. Like Humphrey, Lodge opposed any unilateral stopping of the bombing on our part but did express reservations about the targets to be hit. Lodge also rejected the term "negotiations" in favor of the term "discussions," in any talks we might have with North Vietnam. To all Republicans, the term "negotiations" implies concessions on our part to an aggressor.

Richard Nixon has taken an even more firm position than Lodge with regard to Vietnam. He has stressed a military victory, including the use of bombing, and even a blockade of Haiphong Harbor if necessary. Nixon also did not rule out the use of small nuclear weapons against China in case China should intervene to help North Vietnam. Like Lodge, he is also opposed to "negotiations" and any concessions at all to North Vietnam. He is opposed to any UN settlement of the issue at all. Nixon opposes the seating of Red China in the UN but is prepared to accept it. He also is prepared to accept the communists as part of a South Vietnamese government if they are freely elected, but he has expressed strong doubts that they would be.

The strongest position on this issue has been taken once again by Barry Goldwater. Goldwater not only opposes the seating of Red China but would have us withdraw from the UN if they are seated. On Vietnam he takes a strong military line. He was among the first to advocate carrying the war to the supply lines and to have Americans do the fighting, rather than just advising. Goldwater would place no limits on bombing targets and would give the military a much more powerful voice in decision making where tactics are concerned.

It would seem that both parties regard Vietnam as an attempted Communist takeover and not as a civil war. The Democrats again, however, are more flexible as a whole on Red China and the Vietnam issue. The two extremes would seem to be represented by Kennedy and Goldwater.

The third issue studied concerned Federal responsibility and states' rights. The Republicans on this issue seemed to be closely aligned with the Southern Democrat point of view.

John Sparkman and Estes Kefauver both represented the Southern attitude on this issue. They favored local and state legislation and personal persuasion by discussion, rather than any Federal action in the civil rights field. Kefauver, however, displayed a more liberal attitude than did Sparkman.

Whereas Sparkman defended the right of "full debate" (refusing to call it filibuster), Kefauver opposed filibuster when it interfered with the legislative process, even in civil rights. Kefauver, in the middle of a campaign, endangered his own election by accepting integration as the law of the

land when it was passed by the Supreme Court. Although opposed to a national FEPC, he supported one as part of the Democratic platform.

He did, however, oppose the use of Federal troops or educational aid to schools that integrated as means of enforcing compliance. Kefauver had to justify the Southern Democrat's position within the otherwise liberal tenets of the national Democratic Party, to attract the Negro vote. Like Kennedy, therefore, he expressed the belief that the Democratic Party by helping all lower classes, also helped the Negro, and was a far better hope than the Republican Party for Negro advancement.

John Kennedy expressed a strong liberal attitude on civil rights, health, education, and welfare. He was not committed to drastic action. Like Kefauver, he believed that the Democratic Party helped all lower classes, including the Negro, and warranted the Negro confidence. When asked about appointing a Negro to the Cabinet, Kennedy couched his reply in terms of equal opportunity for all, rather than in terms of any obligation or promise to Negroes in particular.

Hubert Humphrey, although an advocate of a strong civil rights plank in 1948 and 1952, by 1960 had become more moderate in his civil rights approach and more concerned with party unity. In 1960 he claimed he would not be a troublemaker and push for a strong party plank on integration. He also did not believe Congress needed to set up a compulsory FEPC. Nor did he believe in the bussing of students as a

means of achieving integration. Humphrey has also expressed a strong stand against militant protest of any kind, regardless of the cause. He has carefully qualified the call for law and order, however, with the reminder that the root causes of protest must be destroyed. As a whole, he has probably become more moderate in his civil rights approach and more acceptable to the Southern Democrats.

Adlai Stevenson's limited opportunities to express himself on the subject did reveal, however, a strong concern for civil rights action, but a restrained approach on implementation, somewhat resembling that of Kennedy.

Lyndon Johnson's approach to this issue on the program was no less liberal than that of any of the other candidates. His record as President, achieving a record number of civil rights, health, education, and welfare bills, lend credence to the liberal beliefs he expressed on the program. On his few appearances he exhibited a strong political sense of compromise in the area of civil rights. He also expressed strong beliefs in direct Federal aid to teachers and the voting right for the Negro. Like all Democrats, Johnson believes in Federal responsibility in the areas of health, education, and welfare.

The Republicans, again, differ from the Democrats on this issue. The most liberal attitude is taken by Lodge, the most conservative, by Goldwater. Republicans as a whole espouse the same conservative view as the Southern Democrats.

Henry Cabot Lodge was classified as an ultra-liberal by

Barry Goldwater. His statements on the program certainly make him a liberal Republican and as liberal as any Democrat. He has favored Federal responsibility in health, education, and welfare. In 1960 he advocated the appointment of a Negro to the Cabinet if Nixon was elected.

Richard Nixon, like the Southern Democrats, has favored state, rather than Federal action in matters of health, education, and welfare. Like the Southern Democrats, he also advocates local discussion to promote understanding in civil rights rather than enforced action by the Federal government. Although committed to improving education, he has expressed opposition to Federal aid to teachers, fearing the controls it might bring with it. He would also rely on the free enterprise system to cure many of our city problems, rather than increasing Federal aid programs.

Barry Goldwater again represents the most extreme Republican view. He expressed the strongest concern for decentralization of government and the constitutionality of any law in the fields of health, education, and welfare. Goldwater considers the right to vote the only civil right. Other rights he considers civil liberties, such as the liberty to live where one wants, etc. Although his running mate William Miller voted <u>for</u> the Civil Rights Act, Goldwater voted against it because of the section on housing which he considered unconstitutional.

His extreme uncompromising stand against the welfare state resulted in a suggestion that the two major parties

realign themselves into a Liberal and Conservative Party. The suggestion was completely rejected on the program by Lodge. Like Nixon, Goldwater favors local solving of civil rights and a reliance on individual integrity and the free enterprise system to cure the conditions of unemployment, poverty, and inequality.

CANDIDATE ETHOS

The final area to be analyzed concerned the program's contribution to candidate ethos, or source credibility, in terms of competence, character, and good will.

The nature of the program itself was seen to contribute to ethos by its format, introduction, and questioning process. The built-in credibility of television, combined with that of an award winning program, added to the image of importance and competence of any candidate appearing on the program. The introductory remarks, likewise, by their listing of the guest's official roles, his accomplishments, and by the descriptive language employed, also add to his image of importance.

The questioning process, by the subject matter dealt with, often dictates an answer which must deal with the kind of values considered good, just, or moral in our society. Many questions contain built in premises, the acceptance of which reveals the candidate as a man who believes in the ideals of patriotism, democracy, equality, independence, etc. These questions concern such issues as Vietnam, the "cold war," education, poverty, civil rights, and the like. Thus, the

questioning process, by the ideas it elicits, helps the candidate project an image of character and good will.

The major contribution to ethos, however, lies in the candidate's mode of expression. This would include such factors as his linguistic style, his approach to the panel, his methods of proof, and his use of verbal imagery. Based on these factors, the following images were drawn of each candidate studied in this regard.

Adlai Stevenson projected an image of deep integrity, honesty, and humility. He displayed a deep concern for all of mankind and a strong belief in American, democratic, and religious principles. His language was sprinkled with wit and a modicum of religious reference. His style could be called "intellectual," almost devoid of any imagery or colloquialisms.

Like all candidates, Stevenson used mostly evidence to support his ideas. What reasoning he employed was mostly from example. More than any other candidate, he displayed an acute concern for the meaning of any question thrown at him, before committing himself to a reply. He repeatedly called for definition of terms by the panelist. His approach to the panel was somewhat informal and friendly. On occasion he would address a panelist by first name, a technique not common to all other candidates.

John Kennedy on MEET THE PRESS, exhibited an image of cold, impersonal, competent intellectualism. Unlike Stevenson's, Kennedy's style was completely lacking in wit or humor. He

did not utter a single humorous remark in any of his numerous appearances on the program. Unlike Stevenson's, Kennedy's approach to the panel was cold and formal. He seldom addressed a panelist by name and never by first name. Like Stevenson's, however, his style was also intellectual in that Kennedy also avoided the use of imagery or colloquial expression. He also avoided the use of any religious references.

Kennedy did display a sense of party loyalty, honesty, and integrity. He did not reflect the air of humility which characterized Stevenson. When he did express humility, it was balanced by a strong sense of confidence. Like Stevenson, Kennedy was also concerned with the good of mankind.

His one distinguishing intellectual trait was the extensive use of statistics to support his points. Kennedy used statistics almost as frequently as others used facts. What little reasoning he exhibited on the program was from example, and some sign. His intellectual image was much more sharply drawn than his personality in terms of character and good will, due to his cold and impersonal approach.

Lyndon Johnson's few appearances on the program projected an image of a somewhat evasive personality. He was less direct than other candidates in giving answers and more frequently than other candidates used suggestion rather than direct reply. His use of ethical proof, although not necessarily called for in the question, gave him ample opportunity to reveal his competence as Senate Majority Leader, his devotion to party and position, and the good will shown him by

his colleagues. He was no doubt a man dedicated to his job and to the carrying out of whatever policies the party stood for.

As with all candidates, Johnson exhibited a good grasp of evidence. Unlike Stevenson and Kennedy, he displayed a warm and colorful verbal style. He also exhibited an appealing sense of humor and, in general, projected a competent and friendly image, if not one of frankness.

Hubert Humphrey projected the image of an individual deeply committed to the democratic ideals of freedom, equality, and love of country. He expressed a strong grass roots faith in the American people, and a deep religious conviction. Humphrey's style is warm, humble, and humorous, sprinkled with imagery, colloquialisms, and religious references. His constant use of the third person and the use of his own name or position in referring to himself adds to an image of humility.

A distinguishing trait of Humphrey's style which adds fervor to his dedication is his repetition of the same phrase in massing ideas. More than any other candidate, Humphrey, through this characteristic, projects an image of fervid enthusiasm where vital issues demand vital commitments. As with all candidates, Humphrey used mostly evidence, and some reasoning from example. Humphrey's style probably represented the best combination of both personal and intellectual attributes.

Republican Richard Nixon, in several ways, exhibited a

style not unlike that of his first opponent for the presidency, John Kennedy. Nixon, like Kennedy, was plain and direct in his approach and almost completely lacking in humor, imagery, or colloquialisms. His approach to the panel was somewhat more informal than Kennedy's, but it was not as personal as Adlai Stevenson's. On several occasions Nixon addressed the panel with personal references. He also displayed more humility than did Kennedy.

Nixon exhibited a sense of integrity, honesty, and above all, a sense of party loyalty, equal to that of Kennedy. Both men, in their somewhat cold, intellectual style lacked the warmth which characterized all other candidates. Intellectually, Nixon also displayed a good use of evidence and when he did reason, used example and analogy.

Barry Goldwater, like all other candidates was frank and direct in his approach to questions. Like all other candidates, Goldwater also refused to answer those questions which involved personal attack on other political figures, thus adding to his image of character and good will. Perhaps more than any other candidate, he stressed placing his country at all times above his party, although he demonstrated a strong party loyalty.

His verbal style is probably the most colorful and down to earth of all candidates. His language is redolent with the humor and colloquial expressions of the western pioneer, ruggedly individualistic, outgoing and friendly. His approach to the panel has been likewise informal, friendly and ingratiating. Like Adlai Stevenson, he addressed

panelists several times by their first names, and was the only candidate to ever call Lawrence Spivak "Larry." His ethos in terms of character and good will was well defined in terms of his verbal warmth.

One of Goldwater's unique characteristics was the use of causal reasoning with more frequency than any other candidate. It might also be noted that although the warrants and conclusions of all candidates could be questioned, the relationships established by Goldwater's causal sequences were most open to conjecture.

Based on the findings of this study, some concluding remarks can now be stated.

CONCLUSIONS

The data in this study affirm the recognition that MEET THE PRESS has received over the years for fulfilling its function of providing political information. An analysis of content during and between election years has uncovered an abundance of information concerning the candidates' opinions on vital issues. The format of the program would seem to meet the need for a frank and direct confrontation between the candidate and the public, as represented by an impartial and probing panel.

One of the tests of the program's utility is how much information it can elicit in a limited amount of time and in a minimal number of exposures by each candidate over the years. As was illustrated, the program's keen questioning process

elicited enough information to give the viewer a good idea of each candidate's overall philosophy and specific approach to most issues. It was also possible to draw a party profile based on the views expressed by each candidate on the program. The actions of the two parties in Congress, with regard to various areas of foreign and domestic policy, would seem to support the profiles drawn from the program. MEET THE PRESS would, therefore, seem to be a somewhat reliable barometer of prediction of how parties and candidates can be expected to act on important measures and a definite aid to the voter in making a rational election decision.

The program, however, does have some limitations. The most obvious, as verified by correspondence between this author and several panelists, is the thirty minute time limit. There are times when a question begs more probing by a panelist. The number of panelists, however, and the time allotted combined to limit the amount of probing and development of many questions.

With regard to this matter, further research could certainly be done, in comparing the MEET THE PRESS format with the format of the other two major panel programs, FACE THE NATION and ISSUES AND ANSWERS, which do use a smaller panel. Does a smaller panel necessarily insure a deeper probing of questions or a concentration on more issues in depth? The programs might also be compared with regard to the kinds of questions asked, and the duplication of information elicited. Since candidates, as a rule, appear on all three programs during an election campaign, do they give similar or

contradictory replies to the same kinds of questions? Is there a replication of information, or does each program bring out some new facet of the candidate's views? These are questions worth exploring in fully evaluating the contribution of all panel interview programs to political information.

As was pointed out, perhaps another weakness in the program is its tendency to pursue the question of political candidacy, regardless of the fact that no candidate has declared his candidacy on the program, and in all probability never would. The program can elicit hints, suggestions, or denials, but never a binding statement. The time spent on this matter could perhaps be better utilized by dealing more deeply with questions on vital issues.

To explore fully candidates' views on issues in a meaningful way to the viewer, the program should allow comparison of candidates' views on specific issues. On many occasions, the program has failed to ask candidates the exact same questions dealing with the same specific issues, thus making comparison a difficult task. Since differences between candidates are perhaps more important than similarities, the program could improve its utility by providing this vital function of highlighting differences. This could be done by having panelists read the program transcripts of programs which featured candidates opposing the one being interviewed that day. A check of questions asked of one candidate could insure that the same questions are asked of the other candidate by at least some of the panel.

The study also recognizes its limitations in drawing an image based solely on verbal content. The visual image of the candidate, the facial expression underlying his statement, his physical appearance, cannot be overlooked in their impact on total ethos projection. Further research is needed as to which is the more impressive, and the results of their interaction.

If, indeed, personality projects better than issues, how can personality itself be better defined and analyzed? How much of personality is visual and how much is measured in terms of linguistic characteristics? What are the components of "competence," "character," and "good will," in terms of physical attributes and in terms of verbal attributes of ideas and style? Does the use of reasoning project a better image of competence than the use of evidence? Do statistics project a better image of competence that the use of testimony or facts? Does individual bias have a stronger cancellation effect on the visual or verbal image? In general, character traits must be more closely defined in terms of verbal and visual attributes.

Much of the research suggested here can be done under experimental conditions, utilizing actual audience reaction. Since the program is produced for both radio and television, the media could be compared with regard to ethos projection. When the visual and verbal can be separated, what is the result? Does the blind man <u>hear</u> the same image that the deaf illiterate <u>sees</u>? Since the main focus of this study was

political information, the image aspect should be dealt with more comprehensively in some other study.

Even with its limitations, the program offers the voter an excellent opportunity to obtain political information in a direct, uncensored, and unslanted manner, free from the ambiguous embellishments of the prepared campaign commercial or speech. The format combines the best features of the press conference and eliminates the opportunity for the candidate to control the line of questioning by choosing to recognize only those reporters who are agreeable to his point of view. In view of the high cost of political campaigns, perhaps the networks and stations should place more emphasis on this kind of format and limit the amount of commercial time that can be sold for commercials and speeches.

The program might also be presented during the prime evening hours, at least during an election campaign, so that a larger share of the voting audience can benefit from the information that it offers.

It must be concluded that, in terms of content, fairness, and methodology, MEET THE PRESS continuously makes a significant contribution to broadcast journalism in the area of political communication, the most vital mass media function in a free market place of ideas.

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APPENDIX

LETTERS FROM CANDIDATES

TRUE COPY

BARRY GOLDWATER
P. O. Box 1601
Scottsdale, Arizona 85252

Dictated in California July 21, 1967
Transcribed in Arizona July 25, 1967

Mr. Jules Rossman
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001

Dear Mr. Rossman:

I will attempt to answer your letters in the order in which you asked them but if I wander off it's only because I have a tendency to do that.

In looking back over the many times I have appeared on the program you refer to I cannot remember one question that I didn't consider fair and objective. Naturally, some of the panelists could not, nor can they today keep themselves from displaying either violent disagreement or violent agreement and to that end I suppose there has been bias and I suppose there always will be, but not bias in the manner you and I think of.

Never have I been asked to keep my answers short because I feel anyone who appears on these programs knows that thirty minutes is not much time to elicit news or answers and, let's face it, these programs depend upon the news they develop, so I think most guests, not all of them, do keep their answers short.

In looking at advantages to a candidate, I think the first thing that must be considered is, what is he a candidate for? If he is seeking national office I can think of no better platform than these programs to become better acquainted with the American people and, in turn, allow them to become better acquainted with the candidate. There might be a questionable value to a man seeking local office but, after all, if a candidate is important enough to be invited on this program, this should have a bearing upon the feelings of his local people toward him.

The disadvantages of appearing on any program like this is in the fact that the person generally does not go well prepared or prepared enough. On the other hand, it's impossible for the person to know what questions will be asked unless he

has been asked, to cover a particular subject or statement. The person appearing must remember that the leader of the group, Mr. Spivak, has dedicated a good portion of his life to this program and its success or failure depends upon his ability to diagnose a question and to ascertain whether or not correct answers are being given.

To this end I personally know that he devotes more time probably than any other person in this field to the study of the person appearing and to the questions and subject that will be asked and covered.

Frankly, I have always enjoyed them and I don't think that they have ever done me any harm.

Sincerely,

Barry Goldwater

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1967

Dear Mr. Rossman:

As a relatively frequent guest on MEET THE PRESS, I am quite willing to respond to your questions.

I have always been treated fairly by the panelists. Obviously, questions raised by the panelists reflect their points of view and interests, and questions are often posed in a way that will elicit information they consider controversial or newsworthy. I don't consider that unfair.

Any question and answer show on television has certain limitations on pursuing a single question so deeply that nothing else can be considered. Nevertheless, any guest has the opportunity to state his position as clearly as he wishes or can.

The program is a useful vehicle during a campaign period for a candidate to make his positions known. It has the same dangers as any press conference - hostile questions, possibilities for misstatements - but it does provide an interested audience nationwide.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

Mr. Jules Rossman
Assistant Professor of Speech
Department of Speech
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1967

Dear Mr. Rossman:

In reply to your letter of July 16, I have absolutely no complaint about the way in which I was treated during the many times that I appeared on "Meet The Press."

Your other questions will take a great deal of time which--alas!--I have not got.

I hope that what I have said may be of service to you.

Sincerely yours,

H. C. Lodge

Henry Cabot Lodge

Mr. Jules Rossman
Assistant Professor of Speech
Department of Speech
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001

RICHARD M. NIXON
20 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

August 1, 1967

Dear Mr. Rossman:

My overall impression of "Meet the Press" is that it is a first-class television interview program, which makes a conscious and consistent effort to remain so. I have appeared many times on the program. In a few of these occasions I have found some panel members inadequately informed on the issues to ask intelligent and penetrating questions. On others, I have found one or two questioners whose objectivity and neutrality was subject to some doubt.

But I feel these were the rare exceptions, and certainly not the rule. The normal program that "Meet the Press" conducts features a panel of knowledgeable individuals who have spent time in preparing their questions, who are tough in their questioning, but not hostile, and who help to make that show one of the most respected news interview shows on the air.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Mr. Jules Rossman
Assistant Professor of Speech
Department of Speech
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001

STATE OF MICHIGAN
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48903

GEORGE ROMNEY
GOVERNOR

September 22, 1967

Jules Rossman, Asst. Prof.
Department of Speech
WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
Kalamazoo, Michigan

Dear Professor Rossman:

Thank you for your letter of August 13 and please forgive my tardiness in replying to it.

As I understand your letter, my remarks are for use only in a doctoral dissertation and not for general public dissemination. I respond with that understanding and if this is not the case, I would appreciate the opportunity to review my comments.

Yes, I have appeared several times on Meet the Press, as well as on its two competitors, Face the Nation, and Issues and Answers. My last appearance on the former was the weekend immediately following the 1966 election; my next will be on October 15.

Let me begin first by dealing with the questions you specifically raised in your letter.

1. Do you feel that the format or time limit of the program is any handicap to getting at the heart of important issues or eliciting direct and comprehensive answers to important questions?

Generally speaking, no, I do not. The central figure on this type of program, as well as in a general press conference, is best advised to answer any question quickly and to the point. Mr. Spivak, for example, keeps count on the number of questions in any given program. If it runs below average, it usually means the guest was too long-winded in his answers, and this is usually the case. I have never felt myself unable to get to the heart of a question on Meet the Press unless an important question came at the very conclusion of the program.

2. What are the advantages or disadvantages to a candidate in appearing on a program such as this, and how is it different than a regular press conference?

Prof. Jules Rossman
September 22, 1967
Page two

The advantages and disadvantages overall are little different than those of any public statement by a candidate. He can do a good job or a poor job as he can in any public appearance. The major difference, of course, is the instantaneous impact on a wide audience. Only the President's press conferences have the overall "live" coverage to compare with a program such as this. As a result, I rarely will put the time and effort into preparing for a regular press conference such as I put into an appearance on Meet the Press. My staff will spend several days preparing logical questions and answers, and I usually reserve at least one day in advance for personal preparation.

3. Did you feel that you were treated objectively in the kinds of questions asked and the manner in which they were asked, or did you at any time feel that any of the panelists were biased?

Most people are biased, including newsmen. Overall the panelists have been objective. In the last program, for example, not a single question was asked that we had not anticipated. Occasionally a panelist will put a question out of left field and dwell on it, but that is rare.

Let me add the following.

Each of the three network panel press conferences has its own format. I find Meet the Press as close to a real press conference as any of the three, although the others have their own advantages and strong points. I also find Lawrence Spivak a great help in this field. He takes great pride in his program and goes out of his way to give advice to guests. There are few public officials who don't relish a good showing on his program or fear a bad one.

Sincerely,

George Romney