it!» .2. . .. .4 r. ,m .49 f u. flank .. . .ulrrwuln .3 4 1 .1 Poll. 21 . 4 . 1.4.4.43 ficflufinur L. ., . 1..-: . . . .4 u . .t . L.>\ J1no.l.r.T|~ l 7.1. . . . o awmfiw..1§ue.a4 .F . ..¢fiy,x_ 4 4.. . Or 3...... .I..vu . . ... 122‘ .l.4. ....4:1 . . . .4 i a £3.34 . . . . . smwlfimm . . ‘ L \\\\\\\i\l\l\\l\lill Z < l. O. "a 7!. / l\\\ LIBRARY “293°" Mlchigan State University This is to certify that the dissertation entitled HEURISTIC APPLICATION AND THE JURIDIC DECISIOI fiAKING PROCESS: THE ROLE OF MEDIA EXPOSURE AN! RACIAL STEREOTYPES presented by Ren-He Huang has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for ‘ Ph.D. Communication degree in 94 JW' Major professor Date ’Q-‘//’?8 M5 U L! an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12' PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. To AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE i ‘ @301933 '31": - n “£53 a: 5?." 1/” WW“ HEURISTIC APPLICATION AND THE JURIDIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: THE ROLE OF MEDIA EXPOSURE AND RACIAL STEREOTYPES By Ren—He Huang A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1998 ABSTRACT HEURISTIC APPLICATION AND THE JURIDIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: THE ROLE OF MEDIA EXPOSURE AND RACIAL STEREOTYPES By Ren-He Huang The present investigation attempts to explore the origins of stereotyped beliefs that are found to impact juridic decision-making and the factors influencing application of heuristics related to such stereotyped beliefs. Two studies were conducted to serve these objectives. Study 1 used the methods of focus-group discussion and survey to identify and measure existing racial and justice- system stereotypes. Individuals’ media exposure, judicial experiences, and demographic characteristics were entered as predictor variables in multiple linear regression analysis of stereotyped beliefs. The association of beliefs with exposure differed by media genre. First, exposure to reality-based television police programming predicted racist tendencies, negative stereotypes of race and the justice system, and low confidence in the credibility of various courtroom characters. By contrast, fictional judicial television drama viewing was associated with higher confidence in courtroom characters’ credibility. Second, similar to fictional judicial dramas, exposure to non-traditional television news sources also predicted higher confidence in courtroom characters’ credibility and better impressions of the criminal trial process. Finally, exposure to traditional television news showed mixed associations. Though, traditional television news broadcasting was linked with more positive images of Caucasian Americans in terms of criminality and violence, and less skepticism in the justice system being racially prejudiced, at the same time, it predicted greater distrust in the criminal trial system. Study 2 was a mock jury experiment. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design was used to study the impact of information volume (high or low), evidence of guilt (ambiguous or guilty), defendant’s rag (Caucasian or African American), and sample group (general public or college students) on the juridic decisions of Caucasian Americans. Results demonstrated that general-public subjects recommended longer sentences to convicted African- American defendants than Caucasian-American defendants, while college-student subjects recommended similar sentences for convicted criminals of both races. The population difference in egalitarian belief was used to explain this phenomenon. In addition, evidence was found that increasing information load might reduce the egalitarian constraint by repressing Caucasian-American college-student subjects’ use of heuristics associated with racial stereotypes in determination of sentence length. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation could not have been completed without the advice and support of many individuals to whom I am greatly appreciative. First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Professor Ron Tamborini. In the past six years he has been a great academic mentor as well as a good friend to me. With his passion, diligence, and patience, he helps me discover my potential and elevate the standard and expectation I have of myself again and again. It has been a wonderful experience and a great honor to work with and learn from Professor 'j‘ Tamborini. I would also like to thank members of my dissertation committee. I am indebted to Professor Sandi Smith for her inspiration and encouragement for developing the ideas and theoretical foundation of my dissertation project. Many thanks to Professor Bradley Greenberg for his precise judgments and invaluable comments. I am also very grateful to Professor Linda Jackson for her precious inputs in the field of social psychology. During the years of my graduate study at Michigan State University, I have been very fortunate to receive endlessly spiritual and emotional support from many great friends: Shelly Campo, Esther Baker, Yi-Chang Chiu, Ting-Ting Wu, Steven Warland, Warren Officer, Terry Boedeker, Kuan-Chou Chu, and many others. Their warm friendship has helped me survive the tough time of being a foreign student and kept me sane and cheerful in those snowy winters. Finally, I must express my greatest thankfulness to my parents for their most devoted support and unconditional love. Without them, I would not have the opportunity to begin the search of my dreams. Without them, I also could not conquer all the difficulties and frustration through these years and accomplish the goals I achieved. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES x INTRODUCTION 1 STUDY 1: ORIGINS OF JUSTICE-SYSTEM STEREOTYPED BELIEFS .................... 3 Media Cultivation 4 Distorted images 5 Stereotypes 6 Race in the Media 9 Images of African Americans in entertainment television ..................................... 9 The color of crime I 1 Media exposure and perceptions of African Americane l4 Cultivation of African Americans as criminal 15 Depictions and Perceptions of the Justice System 16 Media impact 13 Method 20 Overview 20 Subjects 21 Focus group 21 Scale pilot test 21 Formal survey 21 Measures 23 Focus group 23 Pilot testing 24 Formal survey Results Racial Perceptions Media exposure and racial stereotypes Impressions of the Justice System Media exposure and justice-system impressions STUDY 2: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND HEURISTICS APPLICATION... Racial Discrimination in Juridic Decisions Heuristics Application Heuristics. Heuristic-Systematic Model and stereotype use The Impact of Stereotypes on Juridic Decision-Making Stereotype use in legal situations Racial stereotypes and legal judgments A Test of Two Alternative Explanations Population difference Egalitarian constraint repressing disu' Interaction between population difference and egalitarian constraint ................ The Impact of Information Load on Heuristic Processing ..................................... Load and the Heuristic-S, ‘ in Model Load, heuristic processing, and juridic decision-meking Information load and application of racial stereotypes Method vii 25 30 30 31 35 37 46 46 49 49 50 53 53 55 57 57 59 60 61 61 62 65 66 Overview 66 Subjects 68 Treatment Materials 69 Measures 70 Pre—treatment measurement 7O Post-treatment ‘ 71 Results 73 Population Difference 73 Interaction of Egalitarian Constraint with Population 77 Information Load and Application of Racial Stereotypes ....................................... 80 DISCUSSION g7 Racial Perceptions 87 Media exposure and racial stereotypes 88 Impressions of the Justice System 89 Race as a predictor of perceptions 89 Media exposure as a predictor of r r" 90 Heuristics Application and Juridic Decision-”"king 93 Racial stereotypes 93 Juridic decision-making by Caucasian Americans 94 The Impact of Information Load on Heuristic .‘ r," " 97 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 99 APPENDIX A: ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE PILOT-TEST ANALISYS OF JUSTICE—SYSTEM-PERCEPTION SCALES ........ 103 APPENDIX B: MEDIA-EXPOSURE SCALE viii 105 APPENDIX C: PERSONAL JURIDIC EXPERIENCE SCALE ................................... 109 APPENDIX D: JUSTICE-SYSTEM BELIEFS SCALE ................................................ 111 APPENDIX E: RACISM TENDENCY SCALE ............................................................ 118 APPENDIX F: THE AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE-LOW INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT .......................................................... 119 APPENDIX G: THE AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE-HIGH INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT .......................................................... 122 APPENDIX H: THE GUILTY EVIDENCE-LOW INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT .......................................................... 131 APPENDIX 1: THE GUILTY EVIDENCE-HIGH INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT .......................................................... 134 APPENDIX J: INFORMATION LOAD MANIPULATION CHECK SCALE ............ 143 APPENDIX K: TRAIT EVALUATION SCALE .......................................................... 144 APPENDIX L: COURTROOM CHARACTER CREDIBILITY SCALE ..................... 145 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 148 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Factors Predicting Racial Stereotypes and Racism 33 Table 2: Factors Predicting Impressions of Credibility of J ustice-System Components. 39 Table 3: Factors Predicting Impressions of the Justice System 41 Table 4: Confidence of Guilt 76 Table 5: Recommended Sentence Length for Convicted Defendants .............................. 79 Table 6: Confidence in African-American Defendants’ Guilt 82 Table 7: Recommended Sentence Length for Convicted African-American Defendants 84 INTRODUCTION In a study investigating the impact of heuristics and information load on juridic decision-making, Tamborini, Huang, and Nabashi (1997) hypothesized that, in a criminal trial situation, people tend to use heuristics associated with justice-system stereotypes to simplify a decision-making task that was quantitatively high on information load. Their results were consistent with predictions. Tamborini et al. found that: l) A “legal corruption” stereotype leads to lower perceived credibility of witnesses. 2) A belief in allowing for “reasonable doubt” leads to higher perceived credibility of witnesses. 3) A higher perceived credibility of witnesses leads to greater confidence in the guilt of the defendant. 4) heavy information load operationalized in terms of quantity increases the impact of applied heuristics on decisions of guilt. These findings support and extend work by Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) showing people are inclined to apply heuristics to help them make legal judgments under conditions of high information load. In addition to using heuristics related to justice-system stereotypes, Tamborini et al. (1997) suggested that heuristics associated with racial stereotypes would impact juridic decisions and increase judgements of guilt for racial out-group members. Counter to expectations, however, their results showed: 1) Caucasian-American subjects had equal confidence in guilt for an African-American defendant and a Caucasian-American defendant; 2) though influencing the application of heuristics associated with justice- system stereotypes, heavy information load does not increase heuristic biases related to racial stereotypes. The unexpected findings for confidence in guilt may suggest that Caucasian Americans are uninfluenced by racial stereotypes in those determinations. However, alternative explanations provided by Tamborini et al. (1997) suggest: 1) The college- student sample used in their study, which was highly educated, might be liberal and unprejudiced on racial issues, did not represent the general population. 2) The egalitarian- laden nature of trial verdicts constrained Caucasian-American subjects’ application of heuristics related to racial stereotypes. The present investigation offers two studies designed to replicate and extend the previous work of Tamborini et al. Study 1 attempts to investigate the origins of stereotyped beliefs found to impact the juridic decision-making process. Study 2 tests the alternative explanations offered for the unexpected findings on confidence in guilt in the study by Tamborini eta1., and goes further to investigate the impact of information load on heuristic application in the process of juridic decision-making. Study 1: Origins of J ustice-System Stereotyped Beliefs The popularity of mass communication, especially television and its enormous appeal, has motivated theoretical development on the cultivation of social experience and its associated consequences. In research on media effects, a recurring theme has been “the degree to which most of our experience is literally mediated through the words and images of the dominant medium of our time” (McQuail, 1994, p. 110). Gerbner (1967) has suggested that through institutionalized public acculturation, mass communication can impact the transformation of society beyond the limits of face- to-face or any other personally mediated interaction. As a result of selective exposure, audiences of mass media (especially television) tend to develop their beliefs and values in accordance with the images portrayed. Research on media content points to specific aspects of social perception that might be strongly influenced by the cultivation processes. One area is the formation of racial stereotypes. In general, the media have been criticized for distorting images of racial minorities and leading audiences to biased impressions of them (Poindexter & Stroman, 1981). Another area of social perception closely tied to racial stereotypes is beliefs about the justice system and criminal-trial process. In research showing that people possess negative images of the justice system, Huang and Tamborini (1998) identified media exposure as a potential factor affecting these impressions. If media can impact stereotyped beliefs of race and the justice system, these cultivated stereotypes can be expected to act as heuristics used to assist us in our daily decision-making tasks. Research on heuristics suggests that once beliefs and attitudes are constructed, they are installed in the cognitive system and available for retrieval and use (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In daily life, people frequently process incoming information to make decisions, develop opinions, and form attitudes on various issues. However, it is rare that a person can reach a completely objective conclusion solely based on provided information. When dealing with various tasks in a complex environment, people often unconsciously rely on previous experience and learned knowledge for assistance in making social judgments. Due either to lacking adequate information or having information load exceed a person’s processing capacity, cognitive heuristics, such as stereotypes, are often used to assist the process of opinion formation or decision making. Heuristics related to racial and justice—system stereotypes have been found to play significant roles in the process of juridic decision-making. Previous studies have shown that heuristics related to racial and justice-system stereotypes impact the evaluation and judgment of courtroom characters as well as the perceptions of impartiality and credibility of the justice system’s operation (Huang, Nabashi, & Tamborini, 1997; Huang & Tamborini, 1998). If this is true, it becomes crucial for us to understand the manner in which people form stereotyped beliefs concerning race, criminality, and the justice system, and the circumstances by which these stereotyped beliefs are used as heuristics in juridic decision-making tasks. Media Cultivation Among theories of media’s effects on beliefs and attitudes, the cultivation hypothesis initiated by Gerbner (1973) remains probably the best documented and most investigated (see Signorielli & Morgan, 1990). The formulation originated from the national concern with the effects of televised violence in the 19605 and 19703. In their , early Work, Gerbner and Gross (1976) found that heavy viewers are more likely to give the “television answer” than are the light viewers when being asked their perceptions and opinions of social reality. Gerbner and his associates proposed cultivation theory to describe the mass media’s effect on perceptions of social reality. The theory holds that television, among modern mass media, has acquired a central place in our daily life and become the primary source of socialization and everyday information. Television has been substituting its (distorted) message about reality for personal experience and other means of knowing about the social world (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1986). Afier continuous heavy television exposure, audiences gradually adopt the “symbolic reality” created by television, and then reflect its images onto their real living environment. Distorted images. The chief concern about television's cultivation effect is that its systematic, but very selective portrait, of the world leads its audience to stereotyped and distorted perceptions of reality. Television is said oflen to over-represent certain aspects of social life while under-representing others. For example, in their content analysis of prime-time and weekend daytime network television drama from 1969 to 1984, Gerbner et al. (1986) found that television’s presentation of societal demographics were greatly skewed: Men outnumbered women by 3:1, and young people (under 18) comprised only one-third and older people (over 65) one-fifth of their true proportion in the population. Similarly, African Americans on television represented three-fourths and Hispanics only one-third of their share of the US population. During that period of time, the television world was also much more crime-ridden than the real world. In prime-time television, crime was 10 times as rampant as in the real world. The typical viewer of an average Week’s programs would encounter the representation of 30 police oflicers, 7 lawyers, and 3 judges, but only 1 engineer or scientist and very few blue-collar workers. Life style and social-economic status portrayals showed that nearly 70% of television characters were middle-classed while only 25% were blue-collar and service work. In reality, blue-collar and service jobs occupied 67% of all Americans. The reasons that television and other media so oflen deliver these unidimentional, or so-called “stereotyped,” images and messages are understandable. Using institutional process analysis to investigate the formation of policies directing the massive flow of media messages, Sprafltin and Liebert (1978) explain the reason for media’s repetition of stereotypes in terms of narrative conventions: “stereotypic portrayals may provide the lowest common denominator on which to build storylines” (p. 238). They suggested that general audience members would find it easier to accept those portrayed characters or phenomena as credible because the portraits are consistent with their conventional expectations. Stereogpes. Stereotype formation is one of the major functions of media cultivation. Defined by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1992), stereotype is “a conventional, formulaic, and oversimplified conception, opinion, or image.” In the context of social and political ideas, this term was introduced by an American journalist, Walter Lippmann, in 1922 to refer to the “pictures in our heads” of various social group. It has become one of the most frequently mentioned terms in fields studying social issues related to human interaction, such as ethnic attitudes, prejudice, and intergroup perception and conflict. Stereotypes originate in learning. People gain insight, intuition, or knowledge by perceiving surrounding stimuli. The concept of stereotype is essentially a belief or opinion about the attributes associated with a target. The distinction between stereotype and prejudice parallels the distinction commonly made between beliefs and attitudes. Stereotypes are beliefs or opinions about the attributions of a social group or its members, whereas prejudice connotes negative attitudes about a certain group (e.g., Harding, Kutner, Proshansky, & Chein, 1969). An attitude is a tendency to evaluate an entity (attitude object) with some degree of favor or disfavor. Prejudice is an attitude toward members of some out-group in which the evaluative tendencies are predominantly negative (Harding et al., 1969). The stereotype per se carries no state of favor or disfavor, but associated attitudes do. Therefore, it is often inevitable to discuss stereotype and prejudice together. From the perspective of interpersonal and crosscultural human interaction, Brigham (1971) defined stereotype as a generalization concerning a trait attribution of an out-group member made from prior experience or learning. It is often unjustified by the observer, but not necessarily inaccurate. However, stereotype attributions are not limited to human characters. They are also used in various situations of daily life. For most social psychologists, “stereotypes are universal, used by every human being in processing information about the social environment....'l'hey are not only inevitable but also are quite functional for effective social interaction” (Babad, Birnbaum, & Benne, 1983, p. 75). For the purpose of this study, a broader definition of stereotype is applied. Based on Tedeschi and Linskold’s (1976) definition, in the present study, stereotype is defined as beliefs about a cluster of traits attributed indiscriminately to all members of a group or to a given Sltuation or event. The target of stereotype is not limited to ethnic or national out—group members, but also includes people with certain characteristics (e. g., occupation, sex, age, etc.), organizations of people, and systems. This definition does not imply, however, that stereotypes are necessarily based on people’s first-hand experiences with members of the stereotyped group; they may also be learned indirectly from the descriptions of others or through images found in the mass media (Babad et al., 1983). In particular, people are constantly exposed to stereotypic beliefs and attitudes by institutional forces, like the dominant mass media. They are also treated stereotypically in their daily life. Using and relying on stereotypes is an unavoidable cognitive action taken to deal with the complexity of modern life. Stereotypes are often applied to assist in perceiving and predicting human behaviors. As a result, they influence social interaction at the interpersonal, societal, and cultural levels. Lippmann (1922) once noted that creating and maintaining a repertory of stereotypes leads to the subtlest and most pervasive influence of cultural forces in society. Inevitably, people use stereotypes often in their daily life without any awareness. The present study focuses on two categories of stereotypes and the extent to which their formation is associated with media cultivation: racial stereotypes toward African Americans, especially concerning criminality and violence, and stereotyped beliefs about the US justice system. Mass media’s depictions and audiences’ perceptions of the justice system and racial issues within the system will be studied in order to form a basis for understanding the role of media in juridic decision-making processes. R304 in the Media It has long been a major concern that mass media, especially television, have repeatedly portrayed limited and unfavorable facets of certain social groups which result in the acquisition of negative attitudes and the solidification of racial stereotypes by members of the audience (Schuetz & Sprafldn, 1978). For some time, racial minorities have been quantitatively underrepresented as well as qualitatively misrepresented by the media. Images of African Americans in entertainment television. Many scholars have conducted content analyses on images of African Americans in the mass media. In their review of previous studies, Poindexter and Stroman (1981) proposed that: though there has been a trend toward increased visibility, African Americans have been underrepresented; stereotyping and negative connotations of African Americans continue; and African Americans typically appear in minor roles and in low-status occupations on television. Lichter, Lichter, Rothman and Amundson (1987) conducted a content analysis of the portrayal of African Americans in prime-time television from 1955 to 1986. They found that African Americans only occupied 6% of the characters, compared with Caucasians’ 89%. Among African-American television characters, 49% lacked a high school diploma and 47% were low in economic status. The trend toward an increased representation of the African-American population over the past few decades is apparent in content analysis. Of television male characters in comedies and dramas, African American males increased from 6% in 1971 to 9% in 1980, while African American females fluctuated from 5% to 6% across the decade (Seggar, Hafen, & Hannonen-Gladden, 1981). One decade later, for the 1991-1992 season, African Americans constituted 11% of prime-time program characters (Gerbner, 1993), which nearly matched the actual population proportion, 12.8% (Bureau of the Census, 1998, June). The portrayal of African Americans on television has also gone through several eras of change. During 19405 and 19505, African Americans were rarely presented on television. When Afiican Americans were included, it was either in minor roles or in a highly stereotypic fashion (Smythe, 1954). Berry (1980) stated that characters were usually portrayed in roles consistent with pre-Civil Rights Movement images of African Americans. He claimed that in entertainment television and movies, African Americans were depicted as overweight domestic servants (e.g., “Beulah”) or in humorous yet ridiculous roles with thick dialects and nuances of laziness and stupidity (e. g., “Amos ‘n Andy”). Following the Civil Rights Movement, from the mid 605 to the early 705, television decision makers seemed to take the representation of African Americans more seriously. Berry (1980) observed that African-American actors and actresses began to get professional and intellectual roles with positive traits in television programs like “Star Trek,” “Mod Squad,” “Hogan’s Heroes,” “Peyton Place,” “Mannix,” “Mission Impossible,” and the first all-Black drama, “Julia.” He explained that some of those program productions might have been an attempt to compensate for earlier stereotypes. The 19705 was the decade of the prime-time Black situation comedy. At the same time, the trend toward portraying African Americans on television gradually shifled toward being “somewhat more realistic and focusing on individual characters with PerSOnal concerns” (Berry, 1980, p. 241). The audience could find more and more “real people” with “regular jobs” on television. However, the findings of content analyses suggested that distorted and stereotyped representations still seemed to remain. For example, Kaufman (1980) noted that television overrepresented African Americans as overweight, and Sweeper (1984) found that 90% of all obese characters in the prime-time television were African Americans, most often Black mothers. In occupational roles, few African Americans were found in prestigious roles. Compared with Caucasian Americans, non-Caucasians were more oflen portrayed in blue collar and service jobs and less often in white-collar and professional roles (Gerbner, Gross, & Signorielli, 1985). Baptista-Femandez and Greenberg (1980) analyzed the characters included in a sample week of prime time and Saturday morning commercial television in 1977. They found that African Americans were less likely to have an identifiable job compared to Caucasian characters (50% vs. 33%), and Caucasians were more likely to be professionals, administrators and managers (25% vs. 10%). Among three socioeconomic- status levels, African Americans comprised 75% of the lowest level and only 22% of the upper. Entering the 19805, research showed that fictional entertainment television started to feature more successful African-American professionals and African-American agents of authority, along with an upscale version of Black sitcoms (Gandy & Matabane, 1989). Gandy and Matabane credited the application of African-American middle class themes for an increased number of African-American characters shown in intergrated settings. W Aggression or character violence in media has been a popular feature for studies focusing on social roles. In early content analyses, though African Americans were more often found in less significant roles than Caucasians, African Americans were portrayed somewhat favorably on dimensions of aggression. In their 1973 content analysis of television comedy and drama, Hinton, Seggar, Northcott, and F ontes (1974) found that Caucasian Americans were more likely to be seen as violent, hostile, illegal, or immoral than non-Caucasians. In Gerbner’s (1970) report, non- Caucasians were more likely to be victims of crime and violence, while the killer-to- killed ratio was 4:1 for Caucasian Americans and 1:1 for non-Caucasians. Other studies also found that African-American male characters were less aggressive than their Caucasian counterparts (Donagher, Poulos, Liebert, & Davidson, 1975; Harvey, Sprafkin, & Rubinstein, 1979). In a more recent content analysis of violence in television programming (Mediascope, 1996), 76% of perpetrators in violent interactions were found as Caucasian, 5% were African Americans. Similar numbers were demonstrated for targets of violence in television programming: 76% of them were Caucasian, and 6% were African Americans. Content analyses of fictional programs report that television represents criminal suspects as being Caucasian American more often than other racial groups (Dominick, 1973; Estep & Macdonald, 1983; Potter & Ware, 1987). Additionally, in comparison to actual statistics, African Americans are underrepresented as criminal suspects or as perpetrators of serious violence. In the real world, 48.9% of those arrested for serious crimes are African Americans, but in the television world less than 10% of all perpetrators of serious crimes are African Americans. (Potter et al., 1995). Hinton and colleagues justified this more favorable portrayal of Afiican Americans in television as tokenism: since the small roles of African Americans do not have much impact in 12 changing the “White-Black” status quo, “the favorable characteristics of Blacks when portrayed in bit parts and minor roles constitute no threat to the world of the White man on television” (1974, p. 431). In contrast to fictional programming, however, analyses of more realistic content including televised news and reality-based police shows suggest that portrayals of Afiican Americans in such genres are much more negative. Sheley and Ashkins (1981) studied the news media in New Orleans and found that African Americans accounted for 93% of the robbery suspects featured in a local newspaper and more than 80% of robbery suspects shown in local television newscast. In Chicago, almost half of all news stories broadcast on local television news featured African Americans being involved in violent crime (Entman, 1990, 1992). Furthermore, in networks news, Entman (1994b) reported that 77% of all crime stories were related to African-American suspects, compared to only 42% of the crime stories that featured Caucasian criminal suspects. Not only are African Americans more ofien shown as criminal suspects, television news is also more likely to represent those African-American suspects hand-cuffed, poorly dressed, and nameless compared to Caucasian-American suspects (Entman, 1992). In a sample of national news portraying alleged criminals in 1985-1989, African- American characters more frequently appeared as criminal suspects and were more likely to be depicted as physically threatening (Jamieson, 1992). Entman claimed that “the choices TV journals make appear to feed racial stereotypes, encouraging Caucasian- American hostility and fear of African Americans. TV news, especially local news, paints a picture of African Americans as violent and threatening towards Caucasians, self- interested and demanding toward the body politic” (1994a, p. 29). III I It'l- li.l..l . inlll . Reality-based police shows (e.g., Cops) have gained increasing popularity in the recent years. These programs dramatize real criminal cases by interspersing details of the crime with narration from or interviews with police officers, or even with actual video footage featuring police oflicers investigating crimes, questioning suspects, and making arrests. Like television news, reality-based police shows also demonstrate more negative portrayals for African Americans than Caucasian Americans. In her analysis of reality- based police shows, Oliver (1994) reported that African-American characters were more likely to be portrayed as criminal suspects, whereas Caucasian Americans were cast more frequently as the “good guys” or police officers. Seventy-seven percent of African- American characters appeared as criminal suspects, compared to only 38% for Caucasian-American characters. The probability of being cast as criminal suspects was even higher (86%) for Hispanic characters in these shows. Regardless of whether or not the numbers were consistent with actual criminal activity, these news and reality-based police shows presented a very negative image of African Americans. Media exposure and perceptions of African Americans. Several studies exploring the relationships between media exposure and beliefs about African Americans show support for some aspects of media cultivation theory. From the standpoint of social stereotyping and social-role learning (Greenberg, 1986), evidence indicates that relevant broadcast-media content significantly influences the formation and reinforcement of audience beliefs about racial characteristics and behaviors (Greenberg & Atkin, 1982). For example, Armstrong, Neuendorf, and Brentar (1992) conducted two sample surveys of Caucasian-American university students in 1980-81 and 1985-86, and concluded that media exposure can be a contributor to perceptions of African Americans. Furthermore, they found that different types of media content are related differently to beliefs about the socioeconomic standing of Afiican Americans. Their measurements indicated that greater exposure to fictional television entertainment content (e.g., drama) is associated with beliefs that Afiican Americans achieve a higher socioeconomic position with respect to average income, social class, and educational level, than actual census data. In contrast, higher exposure to television news is associated with the perception that in comparison with Caucasian Americans, Afiican Americans are relatively worse off socioeconomically. Armstrong and colleagues also found that with fewer opportunities for direct interracial contact, media effects on perceptions of African Americans are even stronger. Cultivation of Afiican Americans as criminal. Evidence suggests that media’s impact on social perceptions goes beyond its relationship with stereotypes of racial socioeconomic status, and extends to racial stereotypes of criminality as well. Oliver and Armstrong (in press) showed that not only do reality-based police programs represent African Americans as criminal suspects, but exposure to reality-based police television programs is associated with significantly higher estimates of criminality among African Americans. At the same time, however, their research failed to demonstrate a similar relationship for exposure to fictional legal/police drama. No meaningful association between fictional legal/police drama and estimates of criminality was found. This research was consistent with the proposition that the perceived reality of media portrayals moderates the strength of media influences. Potter (1988) suggests that media content that is perceived as real or realistic has stronger effects on viewers’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors than does media content that is understood to be fictional. The present study attempts to replicate and extend Oliver and Armstrong’s findings. Exposure to mass media is expected to correlate with racial stereotypes concerning criminality or violence. However, based on content analytic evidence concerning race portrayal, different media genres are expected to correlate with racial stereotypes in different directions. Exposure to television program content that often portrays Afiican Americans as criminal should predict impressions that African Americans are more likely to be criminal or violent. Evidence suggests that reality-based police shows present this type of portrayal. H1; Exposure to reality-based police shows positively correlates with the belief that African Americans are criminally/violently inclined. Oliver and Armstrong (in press) looked at only the effect of exposure to reality- based police programs on perceptions of race and criminality. Armstrong et al. (1992), however, have demonstrated news exposure can also contribute to perceptions of race in term of socioeconomic status. Extending the reasoning of Oliver and Armstrong to the content of news known to portray African Americans as criminal and physically threatening (e.g., Entman, 1990, 1992, 1994a; Jarnieson, 1992; Sheley & Ashkins, 1981), we can expect exposure to this content to impact viewers' perceptions. & Exposure to television news positively correlates with the belief that African Americans are criminally/violently inclined. BMW According to recent public opinion studies, confidence in democratic institutions, including the justice system, has begun to erode at a threatening pace (e.g., Craig, 1993; film-Hg & Tamborini, 1998; Lipset & Schneider, 1987). This erosion has become a serious issue in the operation of justice (“The Appearance of Justice,” 1996). In their public opinion survey, Huang, Tamborini, and colleague (Huang & Tamborini, 1998; Tamborini et al., 1997) found that a negative pattern of beliefs and attitudes toward the justice system and criminal trial process exist in the public's mind. People tend to believe that the justice system is authority-abused, monetarily corrupted, and racially biased. The criminal trial system is thought to be unjust, often wrongly accusing innocents or missing real criminals. Furthermore, the public perceives the conduct and testimony of bystander witnesses and police officers to lack credibility. Researchers in sociology and politics have offered a number of explanations for the low confidence levels in public institutions and authorities. Some suggest this results from dissatisfaction with shortcomings in the character and/or competence of the people working in those institutions and systems (Citrin & Green, 1986). Other explanations are based on dissatisfaction with government administration, that is, the overall performance of public policy and affairs (Miller & Borrelli, 1991). The present study attempts to replicate the work by Huang and Tamborini (1998) and extend its scope to cover not only the justice system in general, but also its specific components. The following research questions are established for the purpose of this study. RQL Is there an overall negative impression of the justice system and the criminal trial process? Q; Are the components of the justice system (e.g., police officer, expert witness, bystander witness, juror, judge, and lawyer) perceived as low in credibility? RQ3: Is the justice system believed to be racially biased? Media impact. When considering process influencing public opinion, information about institutions and authorities is believed to be central to the public’s low levels of confidence. An important factor often identified as driving down confidence levels in democratic institutions is the media. Critics claim that in reporting or depicting affairs related to democratic institutions, mass media’s “antipolitics bias” (Patterson, 1993, p. 19) undermines confidence in democratic institutions, including the justice system, by focusing on controversial issues, raising suspicion, and connoting conspiracy (Walsh, 1996). In a content analysis of network television news, talk radio, and television entertainment talk shows, Pfau, Moy, Radler, and Bridgeman (1996, May) documented evidence of persistent negativity toward democratic institutions, such as the Congress, the Presidency, the news media, and/or the public school system. Although it is suggested that the mass media usually display negativity towards democratic institutions, the extent of media effects on social perceptions demonstrated by previous researches has been mixed. The mass media do not appear to affect public opinion in a unified manner. Instead, different types of media (e.g., television, radio, and newspaper) or contents (e.g., entertainment and television news) have been found to lead their audiences in different directions concerning confidence and perception in our democratic institutions. For example, in a study on the impact of news resources and political talk radio on public confidence in democratic institutions, Pfau, Moy, Radler, and Bridgeman’s (1997) measured perceptions of the criminal court system and the police on three dimensions (trustworthiness, global attitude, and confidence). The results of multiple regression analyses showed that, after controlling of demographics (sex, age, education, income), partisanship, and expertise (knowledge and interest in political objects), newspaper reading was a positive predictor of confidence in the criminal court system. In addition, use of non-traditional news sources (e.g., entertainment talk shows, televised political talk, and television tabloids) predicted negative attitudes and lower levels of trustworthiness and confidence toward the police. However, respondents’ attitudes toward the court or the police were not predicted by their use of television news or political talk radio. The findings of Pfau et al. suggest that exposure to specific media is related to general impressions of the criminal court system, and exposure to specific television genre, non-traditional news, is related to one subcomponent, confidence in the police. The present study attempts to replicate and extend the work of Pfau et al. by considering additional subcomponents of the justice system. H3; Exposure to non-traditional television news sources is negatively correlated with impressions of the credibility of components of the justice system, including police officer, expert witness, bystander witness, juror, judge, and lawyer. Though Pfau et al. found television news unrelated to general perceptions of police or the criminal court system, the present study attempts to determine possible relationships between news as well as other media genere and perceptions of justice system subcomponents. 139$ What is the relationship between exposure to television news, reality-based police shows, and legal/police dramas and overall negativity toward the justice system, beliefs that the justice system is racially biased, and impressions of the credibility of 19 s35 ‘* fl oi m z, , . ,5: .u’ j. / , - .14. r i. " .7 .7 I! I Y .1 V a ma. justice-system components, including police officer, expert witness, bystander witness, juror, judge, and lawyer? MM Overview Study I attempted to discover the nature and structure of existing beliefs and attitudes concerning the justice system, especially the criminal-trial system, and its components, and the potential sources influencing the development of these justice- system stereotyped beliefs. First, focus-group discussion sessions were organized to collect people’s impressions and opinions about the justice system. The information obtained from the focus-group discussion and questionnaire responses was analyzed and used as a reference for constructing a set of scales to measure justice-system stereotypes. Second, the justice-system stereotype scales developed based on the findings of the focus—group study were pilot-tested on a separate sample of subjects. Last, a questionnaire was distributed to survey justice-system stereotypes and the potential sources of influence on these beliefs. Subjects responded to the justice-system stereotype scales and additional scales measuring their media exposure patterns, personal experience related to the judicial process and criminal trials, and subject characteristics. Subjects completed the questionnaire and returned it with a signed consent form indicating their agreement to participate in the research project. 20 Sim Focus ggoup. Six sessions (six to nine persons per session) of focus-group discussion were organized. A total of 43 subjects participated in the initial focus-group study. All the subjects were college students and their participation was voluntary. Scale pilot test. A total of 95 subjects (71 were female and 24 were male) participated in the pilot test of the created justice-system scales. They were recruited from an introductory communication course at a large Midwestern university. In exchange for their participation in the study, these students were granted extra course credit. The subjects completed the pilot-test questionnaire and return it to the researcher. Formal survey. The subject pool for the formal survey in Study 1 came form two sources: the general public and college students. The goal of recruiting subjects from the general public was to obtain a composition of demographics that included subjects from the target population (i.e., those who have the opportunity or qualification to participate in judicial-process activities) unlikely to be represented in the student sample in order to maximize the representativeness of the present study. After completion of Study 1, both the general-public and college-student subjects recruited in Study 1 were asked to participate in the follow-up experiment of Study 2. A total of 303 general-public subjects completed the formal survey of Study 1. Eighty students of a communication research methodology course at a large Midwestern university assisted in recruiting those general-public subjects. Each student was assigned to collect a sample of four general-public subjects (some students recruited only three participants) who fit the following characteristics criteria (if they could): (1) over 30 years old, (2) two females and two males, (3) two with college or higher degree and two 21 ‘flllhout college degree, and (4) no more than two family members of the recruiter. The Students who assisted subject recruiting received course credit for their participation. The ages of the recruited general-public subjects ranged from 19 to 78, and the average was 44 years old. Among the 303 participants, 160 (53%) were female, and 143 (47%) were male. The majority of the collected sample (294; 97%) were Caucasian Americans, and only 9 participants (3%) were African Americans. Besides Caucasian American and African American, no other ethnic groups were included in this sample. Each general-public subject received a booklet containing a questionnaire along with a cover letter and a consent form from the investigator. The cover letter introduced the present study as an investigation of media exposure and public opinion conducted by the Department of Communication at Michigan State University for academic purposes. They were asked to complete the survey, sign the consent form, and then return both to the investigator. At the same time, 379 college-student subjects were recruited from an introductory communication course at a large Midwestern university. The ages of the recruited college—student subjects ranged from 17 to 35, and the average was 20 years old. Among the 379 participants, 230 (61%) were female, and 149 (39%) were male. If categorized by racial identity, 320 (84%) were Caucasian Americans, and 59 (16%) were African Americans. In exchange for their participation in the study, these students were granted extra course credit. The college-student subjects completed the questionnaire in a classroom setting, and returned it to the researcher with a signed consent form. Of the combination of general-public and college-student subjects, 682 persons completed the survey for Study 1. Categorized by sex, 390 (57%) of them were female, 22 9nd 292 (43%) were male. Categorized by race, 614 (90%) of the subjects were Caucasian American, and the remaining 68 (10%) were African American. Measures Focus group. Before the group session began, participants were required to complete a written questionnaire. The pre-meeting questionnaire, which covered the topics that would be discussed during the group session, was supposed to lead the participants to “commit” to a particular opinion or attitude before entering the group. This commitment would eliminate one potential problem created by group dynamics — namely, people might wish not to offer their opinions, or even provide statements inconsistent with their position if they found that they were in a minority. The pre- meeting survey was designed to reveal those unspoken opinions as well as anchor participants’ original positions (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997). The focus-group discussion sessions were conducted in a conference-room setting. The moderator instructed participants to freely offer their thoughts regarding the discussed issues. Participants were also informed that the discussion content would be kept anonymous and confidential and used for only academic purposes. Each session ran through all the prepared topics and lasted approximately 90 minutes. In the focus-group discussions, participants described the impressions or ideas that came to their minds when being asked about the justice system and its components. Several primary open-ended questions were asked. They included “What do you think of the justice system and the criminal-trial process?” “What comes to your mind when you think about a judge (jury, lawyer, police, expert witness)?” “What do you think of the determination of guilt and the influence of a judge (jury, lawyer, police, expert witness)?” 23 314d “What do you think of the determination of guilt and the influence of a defendant’s characteristics? What type of defendant characteristics might be influential in determination of guilt in the criminal-trial process?” All discussion and elaboration were recorded. The obtained information was used as a reference for constructing scales that would be used to measure justice-system stereotypes in the formal survey for Study 1. For example, in the focus-group discussions, participants used terms or phrases like 3, “ “unfair,” “money can buy freedom,” “biased depending on race or sex, corrupted,” “too 9, ‘6' expensive, inconsistent, ” 6‘ a game of money and power,” “tricky,” etc. to describe the justice system and criminal trial process. Based on these provided descriptions, 15 statements representing perceptions suggested by focus group were extracted. These statements were then put into a Likert-scale format for later pilot testing. Pilot testing. A pilot test for the 15 items extracted from the focus-group discussions was conducted using a self-report survey instrument. Subjects completed the survey individually. A factor analysis was performed on responses to these newly created items. Based on the results, five multiple-item scales (unjust-trial, money-corrupted, authority-abused, opinion-based, and racially-biased) measuring impressions of the justice system were developed. The items and factor loadings are shown in Appendix A. In addition, 12 other established scales (77 items) originally developed by Huang and Tamborini (1998) and modified for this study to measure racial stereotypes, criminal- trial—system perceptions, justice-system subcomponents impressions, and beliefs about the presumption of guilt were included in the pilot-test survey for testing the reliability of each scale and the correctness and appropriateness of wording. The descriptions of all 17 scales are provided on pages 28 and 29. 24 .Iilmflllm 1.. .r ED. rmal survey. The questionnaire for the formal survey in Study 1 included four categories of items: media-exposure patterns, personal experience related to the judicial Process and criminal trials, justice-system stereotypes, and subjects’ characteristics. The media-exposure scale consisted of three subsections (see Appendix B). The items of the first subsection asked the amount of television-viewing time subjects normally spent during each of four time periods (6 am. to noon (morning), noon to 7 pm. (afiemoon), 7 pm. to 11 pm. (evening), and 11 pm. to 6 am. (night)) on a Sunday, a Saturday, and a regular weekday, respectively, in the past six months. According to the data, subjects of this study spent an average of 39.81 hours (fl = 22.23, H = 678) watching TV per week. The second subsection measured the amount of time subjects listened to radio in a day and their weekly frequency of newspaper reading in the past six months. In addition, subjects also indicate the amount of time they spent listening to each of five categories of radio programs: music, national and local news, political talk, sports, and other, in a day during the past six months. The data showed that subjects of this study had an average newspaper-reading frequency of 3.86 days per week (S_D = 2.26, 11 = 680) and spent 16.91 hours (fl = 12.01, I_\I_ = 680) listening to the radio per week. Furthermore, the measures also showed that, for a week, subjects spent an average of 13.91 hours (S1; = 11.39, E = 681) listening to music radio programs, 3.54 hours (fl = 6.24, E = 681) on national and local news radio programs, 1.25 hours (S_D = 3.87, L1 = 681) on political talk radio programs, 2.56 hours (S12 = 5.53, E = 681) on sport radio programs, and 1.64 hours (fl = 5.1 1, Ij = 681) for other types of radio programs not included in the previous categories. 25 i. llllll-ull- A list of specific television programs was provided in the third subsection. Subjects were asked to indicate the amount of time they watched each program per week in the past six months. Eight categories of television programs were included: reality- based police shows (H1, RQ4), TV news (H2, RQ4), legal/police drama (RQ4), court shows, entertainment talk show, TV news magazine, TV tabloid, and political talk shows (the latter four were considered as non-traditional television news sources for H3). All programs in the eight categories broadcast during 1997-98 television season were included in the survey list. Second, three additional categories (sports, music television, and situation comedy) were included as foils. One to three examples were entered for each of the three categories. As a result, a total of forty-two television programs were listed and classified into eleven categories: (a) TV news (Mew W newscast) (M = 3.28 hours/week, S_D = 2.73, E = 682), (b) TV news magazine (20/20, 69 Minutes Primetime Live Dateline 48 Hours Public Eyes) (M = 2.35, S_D = 2.87, E = 682), (c) legal/police drama (Law & Order, The Practice. NYPD Big, Homicide Brooklm South, Michael Hayes) (M = .86, SQ = 1.70, LI = 682), (d) TV tabloid (1% Edition Hard Copy, American Journal) (M = 1.24, S_D = 2.07, E = 682), (e) reality-based police show (gm; Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, Unsolved Mysteries, America’s Most Wanted) (M = 1.22, S2 = 2.53, 1;! = 682), (t) court show (People’s Court. Mg; Judy, Cochran & Company) (M = .47, _S_D = 1.18, E = 681), (g) political talk show (Cross Fire, F ace the Press) (M = .18, $2 = .63, E = 681), (h) entertainment television talk show (Tonight Show, Late Show with Dgid Letterm_a_n, Politicpllv Incorrect. Oprah W'nfi'ey, Jenny Jones, Montel Williams, Geraldo Jegy Springer, Sally Jessy Raphael, Ricki Lake Leia) (M = 6.14, SQ = 6.39, E = 681), (i) sports ESPN) M = 1.63, SQ = 2.02, 1:1 = 26 631), (1) music television (MTV) (M = 1.52, s1; = 1.81, p = 681 ), and (k) situation comedy (Seinfeld, Friends Home Improvement) M = 3.23, E = 2.99, E = 681). Responses (the amount of time subjects watched the program per week) for each item in the same category were summed to create a measure of the total amount of time spent on watching that category of included television programs per week (as indicted above). In addition, total scores from four categories of television programs: entertainment talk show, TV news magazine, TV tabloid, and political talk shows were summed to create a measure of the amount of time watching “non—traditional television news sources” per week (M = 9.90, fig = 9.09, E = 682). The Personal juridic experience scale was the second category of the questionnaire (see Appendix C). These items asked subjects their direct and indirect personal experience with the juridic or trial process, such as if they had ever served as a juror or a witness, been a defendant or a plaintiff in a criminal trial, or knew some others being in similar judicial situations. For each of the four types of situations (being a juror, witness, defendant, or plaintiff), subjects marked “Yes” or “No” on seven items measuring the juridic experiences of the subject oneself, girlfi'iend/boyfriend/spouse, parents, brother/sister, other family members, friends, and others. Every response of “Yes” on the item was counted as one point, all obtained points were summed up as the index of Juridic Experienc , which ranging from O to 28. The justice-system beliefs scale was the third section in the questionnaire. Items were created to measure those trait attributes associated with the justice system and its components that were identified from focus-group discussions or borrowed from Huang and Tamborini (1998). As a result, seventeen 7-point Likert scales (from 1 (strongly 27 (95—51213) to 7 (strongly agree)) measuring the beliefs and impressions of the justice SyStem, criminal trial, and related components were constructed (see Appendix D). An average score across items was computed for each scale. The first two scales measure variables about racially stereotyped beliefs related to criminality and violence. 1. Caucasian Americans are Criminally/Violently Inclined: Caucasian Americans are more likely to be violent or criminal than others (6 items, alpha = .85). 2. African Americans are Criminally/Violently Inclined: African Americans are more likely to be violent or criminal than others (6 items, alpha = .90). Five scales measured impressions about the justice system that were extracted from focus-group discussion. 3. Unjust-Trial System: the current criminal trial process is likely to accuse innocents and let real criminals get away (4 items, alpha = .75). 4. Money-Corrupted Judicial System: money can buy freedom for criminals (3 items, alpha = .89). 5. Authority-Abused Judicial System: certain authorities use power to influence the trial process (3 items, alpha = .68). 6. Qpinion-Based Verdicts: a verdict is decided more on opinion than fact (3 items, alpha = .75). 7. Racially Biased System: the justice system is racially prejudiced (2 items, alpha = .87). Two additional scales measure impressions of trial bias specifically for Caucasian Americans or against African Americans. 28 8- Trial-Bias in Favor of Caucasian American: the criminal trial system is biased '10 favor of Caucasian Americans (5 items, alpha = .90). 9. Trial-Bias against African American: the criminal trial system is biased against African Americans (5 items, alpha = .93). Six scales measure impressions about subcomponents of the justice system. 10. Police Credibility: police officers are reliable in their duties and operation (1 1 items, alpha = .88). 11. Exgrt Credibilig: experts’ court testimony is reliable (7 items, alpha = .84). 12. Bystander Witness Credibility: court testimony by bystander witnesses is credible (7 items, alpha = .80). 13. Ju_ry Credibility: a jury is competent to make precise judgments of a case (9 items, alpha = .86). 14. Judge Credibilig: a judge is competent and reliable in his or her duties (6 items, alpha = .83). 15. Lawyer Perceptions: perceptions towards lawyers, such as expertise and professional ethics (7 items, alpha = .82). The final two scales measure beliefs about the presumption of guilt in the criminal trial system. 16. Presumed Guilg: a defendant would not be charged and brought to criminal trial unless he/she was likely to be guilty (4 items, alpha = .85). 17. Reasonable Doubt: a defendant should be treated as innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (4 items, alpha = .71). 29 The subjects’ characteristics scale was the last section of the survey. These questions measured subjects’ basic personal characteristics. First, a Racism scale was used to measure subjects’ racial-discrimination tendency. This scale was originally designed by Kleinpenning and Hagendoom (1993) and modified for this study (see Appendix E). The scale consisted of seven 7-point Likert-type items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (alpha = .91). Subjects also responded to a set of questions asking about demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, race, educational level, and annual income. 3% Multiple regression analyses and t-tests were used to test the hypotheses for Study 1. The present study used the t-test procedure to test hypotheses concerning whether or not subjects’ impressions about the credibility and racial objectivity of the justice system and its subcomponents could be considered high or low. The purpose for applying multiple regression analysis here was to estimate the predictive power of certain subject characteristic and media exposure variables on stereotyped beliefs of race and the justice system. Racial Perceptions One objective of the study aimed to examine the effects of media exposure on racial stereotypes associated with violent and criminal behavior tendencies. In order to accomplish this task, statistical analyses were conducted first to provide a basic understanding of the racial stereotypes held by participants in the study. Since stereotypes are usually established on out-group members, and in-group favoritism still appears 30 common in this society, negative racial stereotypes associated with criminality and ViOlence might be expected for out-group members. The findings of the present study show that Caucasian-American and African- American subjects have different impressions of respective races when considering criminality and violence. On a scale from 1 to 7, Caucasian-American subjects believed African Americans to be more criminally or violently inclined (M = 3.87, _S_D = 1.12) than Caucasian Americans (M = 3.22, S_D = .98), t(612) = 11.98, p < .001. However, for African-American subjects, the impressions of Caucasian Americans (M = 3.76, sp = 1.21) and African Americans (M = 3.70, S_D = 1.08) concerning criminality and violence were not statistically different t(67) = .30, p = .76. Since results were not completely consistent with the expectation of out-group stereotype formation, racism scale scores were examined. Analysis of the racism scale showed that Caucasian-American subjects displayed a significantly stronger racism tendency (M = 3.42, SD = 1.21) than African-American subjects (M = 1.94, _S_D = 1.08), t(679) = 9.66, p < .001. Media exposure and racial stereogpes. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted correlations between exposure to certain television genres (reality-based police shows and television news) and racial stereotypes associated with criminality and violence. Hypothesis I predicted that exposure to reality-based police shows positively correlates with the belief that African Americans are criminally/violently inclined, while hypothesis 2 stated that exposure to television news positively correlates with those same beliefs. Multiple regression models were used to examine the impacts of reality—based police shows and television news on racial stereotypes concerning criminality and 31 4101ence (i.e., “African Americans are criminally/violently inclined,” “Caucasian Mnericans are criminally/violently inclined”). In addition to the above two types of television programs, five other media genres, including legal/police television dramas, non-traditional television news sources (combination of entertainment talk shows, TV news magazines, TV tabloids, and televised political talk shows), court shows, political radio talk show, and newspaper, were also entered as media exposure variables in the multiple regression models. Personal characteristics expected to affect justice-system and racial stereotypes were added to the model. Subject’s race, age, sex, education level, previous juridic experience, sample group (general-public or college-student), and total television viewing time were entered as personal characteristic variables in order to control extraneous influences on the relationships predicted in hypotheses 1 and 2. In addition to the racial stereotypes associated with criminality and violence (i.e., “African Americans are criminally/violently inclined,” and “Caucasian Americans are criminally/violently inclined”), racism tendency was also entered as dependent variable in order to inspect its relationship to media exposure and personal characteristics. The regression model summary is represented as Table 1. 32 1‘ able 1 F actors Predicting Racial Stereotypes and Racism Whites are Blacks are Racism criminally/ criminally/ (E =682) violently violently inclined inclined (E =682) (E =682) Personal characteristics Age 205 .07 .15‘ Sexa .03 .03 .09" Raceb .16” c07’ e39“ Educafion .07 fl02 a13" Juridic experiencec .02 .05 .01 Sample group .07 .00 -.11 Total TV exposure .07 .03 .03 hmn3_ 34%” 13% 153%” Media exposure Reality-based police show .03 .07 .08. Legal/Police drama .00 .00 -.03 TV news -.15” —.04 -.06 Non-traditional television -.05 .07 .07 news Court show -.00 .01 .02 Newspaper .03 -.02 -.05 Political talk radio .01 -.08‘ .02 hmngf zn%‘ 19% 20%‘ Final _R_2 5.5%” 3.2% 17.8%“ Note. Entries are standardized regression coefficients after all variables are entered. The significance of coefficients were tested by one-tailed t-test. a1 = female, 2 = male. b1 = White, 2 = Black. °Previous experience of being involved in juridic processes. d1 = college-student, 2 = general-public. ‘o< .05. "2 < .01. 33 Though some media exposure measures were significant predictors of racial stereotypes, no strong support was found for hypotheses 1 and 2. Although hypothesis I predicted that exposure to reality-based police shows positively correlates with the belief that African Americans are criminally or violently inclined, the result of multiple regression analysis did not show clear support for this. The regression model displayed a standardized regression coefficient (pet_a) of .07 from exposure to realiy-based police shows to the belief of African Americans being criminally/violently inclined, the coefficient was close to but still not statistically significant, 1 = 1.43, p = .08. Hypothesis 2, that exposure to television news positively correlated with the belief that Afiican Americans are criminally/violently inclined, was not supported by the finding of this study either. The standardized regression coefficient of exposure to television news on such racial perception was a trivial -.04, t = -.82, p = .21. Though not predicted in this study, television news was a significant predictor for stereotypes of Caucasian Americans as criminal and violent. The results of multiple regression analysis demonstrated that exposure to television news predicted lower beliefs of Caucasian Americans being criminally/violently inclined, B = -.15, t = -3.46, p < .001. Additionally, exposure of really-based police shows predicted higher racism tendencies, [3 = .08, t = 1.70, p < .05. At the same time, another media exposure measure was found as a significant predictor for the racial stereotypes. Political talk radio was found to predict a lower belief that African Americans are more criminally/violently inclined, B = -.08, t = -2.05, p < .05. 34 In addition to variance accounted for by exposure to media, several personal characteristics (e.g., race, sex, age, and education level) were also found to predict an individual’s racism tendency. Among those characteristic variables, a person’s m and _s_e§ appeared to be the most powerful predictors of racism tendencies. Caucasian- American subjects ([3 = .39, t = 10.34, p < .001) and males ([3 = .09, t = 2.53, p < .01) were found to have a stronger racism tendency. Age was another factor predicting racism tendencies. The evidence indicated that the older a person is, the stronger his/her racism tendency would be, [3 = .15, t = 2.00, p < .05. In contrast, education seemed to challenge racism. Those with a higher education level showed a lower racism tendency, B = -.13, t = —3.23, p < .001. Impressions of the Justice System Negative impressions of the justice system were predicted in terms of the system’s credibility in general and unbiased treatment of different racial groups. It was expected that these impressions would be prevailing among minorities who may feel victimized by the justice-system prejudice. Research questions 1, 2, and 3 explored subjects’ perceptions of the justice system and its components’ credibility. Research question I asked about the existence of an overall negative impression of the justice system and the criminal trial process. Research question 2 asked about the perceived credibility of the components of the justice system. Furthermore, research question 3 investigated the impression of the justice system in term of racial bias. The t-test procedure was conducted to test the above hypotheses. Compared with the value of “4”, the midpoint of 7-point Likert scales, the indices of the four justice- system impression scales (Enjust-Trial, Money-Corrupted, Anthony-Abused, and 35 0 MOD-Based) demonstrated a common hostility toward the justice system by subjects. it ShOWed that subjects have an impression of the justice system being defective and questionable in its impartiality. They tended to believe that (l) the criminal trial operation is more likely to accuse innocents but let real criminals get away (M = 5.73, E = 1.00), 1(680) = 45.31, p < .001 , (2) the justice system is monetarily corrupted (M = 4.94, E = 1.36), t(679) = 18.07, p < .001, (3) the judicial system and criminal trial process have a lot of power abuse (M = 4.59, _S_12 = 1.00), t(681) = 15.25, p < .001, and (4) the judgments of a legal case are often influenced by personal opinions rather than objective truths (M = 4.36, E = 1.10), t(681) = 8.65, p < .001. The consistent negativity shown on all these four measures provided answers for research question 1: there is an overall negative impression of the justice system and the criminal trial process. Research question 2 investigated the perceived credibility of the justice—system components (i.e., police officer, expert witness, bystander witness, jury, judge, and lawyer). With the exception of judges, who received neither high nor low credibility evaluation (M = 4.01, §D_ = 1.08), t(681) = .32, p = .75, this study provided evidence showing that most components of the justice system are perceived low in credibility. Subjects gave a police officer M = 3.63, E = .99, t(681) = -9.61, p < .001), expert witness M = 3.91, _S_D = 1,02,1(678) = -2.23, p < .05), bystander witness M = 3.01, E = .84, t(681) = -30.76, p < .001), jury m = 3.56, SD = .93, t(677) = -12.41, p < .001), and lawyer M = 3.72, E = 1.02, t(680) = -7.21, p < .001), a “low credibility” evaluation for their performance in law enforcement and courtroom duties. Answering research question 3, the results of this study demonstrated that the justice system is perceived to be racially biased. Subjects gave a score significantly 36 blgher than the midpoint point “4” on the Racially Biased System scale (M = 4.41, M) = 1.41), 1(681) = 7.70, p < .001. Beyond testing hypotheses concerning general impressions of racial bias, two measurements, Trial-Bias in Favor of Caucasian American and Trial-Bias Against African American provided a closer look at the specific characteristics of perceived justice-system racial bias. Subjects in this study possessed the impression that the criminal trial process is prejudiced in favor of Caucasian Americans M = 5.23, E = 1.07), t(680) = 30.14, p < .001. On the other hand, the criminal trial process was perceived neither in favor of nor prejudiced against African Americans (M = 3.99, S_D = 1.33), 1(680) = -.13, p = .90. Media exposure and justice-system impressions. Media exposure was expected to be an important factor affecting impressions of the justice system. Hypothesis 3 predicted that exposure to non-traditional television news sources (i.e., entertainment talk shows, television tabloids, television news magazines, and televised political talk shows) is negatively correlated with impressions of the credibility of components of the justice system. Multiple regression analysis was applied to test hypothesis 3. The model examined the impact of non-traditional television news sources on impressions of the credibility of justice-system components (i.e., police officer, expert witness, bystander witness, jury, judge, and lawyer) using the same set of predictor and control variables entered in tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. The multiple regression analyses provided evidence conflicting with hypothesis 3. Non-traditional television news sources functioned in a matter contrary to expectation. Exposure to non-traditional television news sources predicted an impression of higher 37 G’edibility of bystander witnesses (B = .21), t = 3.83, p < .001, while showing no significant predicting power for impressions of credibility of other justice-system components (see Table 2). Beyond the specific predictions of hypothesis 3, research question 4 explored the relationships of television news, reality-based police shows, and legal/police dramas with overall negativity toward the justice system, beliefs that the justice system is racially biased, and impressions of the credibility of justice-system components. Once again multiple regression analysis was conducted to explore the impact of the media predictors on these different perceptual outcome measures. Table 2 shows that regression model summary for impressions of the credibility of the justice-system components. Table 3 shows the summary for overall negativity and beliefs that the justice system is racially biased. 38 ...\:.m .88.». :88 :83 .888 ....\..m.: M as: .888 8: :88 :82. 82 .82 M .85 8. 8. 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Entries are standardized regression coefficients after all variables are entered, The significance of coefficients were tested by one-tailed t-test. “1 = female, 2 = male. l’1 = White, 2 = Black. °Previous experience of being involved in juridic processes. d1 = college—student, 2 = general-public. ‘p < .05. ”p < .01. 42 -~ . «. my The multiple regression analyses showed that exposure to television news predicted a stronger impression that the criminal trial operation is more likely to accuse innocents but let real criminals get away (B = .12), t = 2.71, p < .01. At the same time, television news exposure measure negatively correlated with the belief that the justice system is racially biased (B = -.09), t = -2.10, p < .05, but positively correlated with the belief that the criminal trial process is prejudiced in favor of Caucasian Americans (B = .09), t = 2.13, p < .05. Additionally, television news viewing predicted an impression of high credibility of lawyers (B = .08), 1= 1.80, p < .05. The evidence also showed that exposure to reality-based police shows predicted stronger beliefs that a trial verdict is ofien decided more on opinion than fact (B = .13) t = 2.69, p < .01, and the justice system is racially biased (B = .09), t = 1.87, p < .05. Watching this type of television programs also predicted an impression of low credibility ofjurors (B = -.12), t = -2.50, p < .01. On the other hand, exposure to legal/police television dramas predicted higher confidences in the credibility of police officers (B = .07, t = 1.78, p < .05), judges (B = .08, t = 1.90, p < .05), and lawyers (B = .08, t = 2.09, p < .05). Though not in the scope of research question 4, reading newspaper was found to be a significant predictor of impressions of the justice system and its components. Exposure to newspaper predicted stronger beliefs that a trial verdict is decided often more on opinion than fact (B = .07), t = 1.68, p < .05, the justice system is racially biased (B = .09), t = 2.27, p < .05, and more specifically, the criminal trial process is prejudiced against African Americans (B = .07), t = 1.85, p < .05. Additionally, newspaper reading 43 Q A.” ‘ predicted lower confidence in the credibility of bYStander witnesses (B = -. 10, t = -2.43, p < .01), jurors (B = -.09, t = -2.22, p < .05), and judges (B = -.08, t = -l .86, p < .05). Exposure to political talk radio programs also showed significant predictive power on impressions of the justice system and its components. Listening to political talk radio negatively correlated with beliefs that the criminal trial process is likely to accuse innocents and let real criminals get away (B = -.07), t = -1.72, p < .05, the justice system is racially biased (B = -.08), t = -2.10, p < .05, and the criminal trial process is prejudiced against African Americans (B = -.09), t = -2.30, p < .05. Exposure to political talk radio - also predicted higher confidence in the credibility of bystander witnesses (B = .07, t = 1.83, p < .05), police officers (B = .10, t = 2.63, p < .01), andjurors (B = .11, t= 2.70, p < .01). In addition to variance accounted for by exposure to media, several personal characteristics (e.g., race, education level, and previous juridic experience) were also found to predict an individual’s racism tendency. Among those characteristic variables, a person’s m appeared to be the most powerful predictor of impressions of the justice system. African Americans had stronger beliefs that certain authorities would use power to influence the trial process (B = .07), t = 1.66, p < .05, and the justice system is racially biased (B = .23), t = 5.68, p < .01, particularly, the criminal trial process is prejudiced in favor of Caucasian Americans (B = .19), t = 4.77, p < .01, but against African Americans (B = .34), t = 8.81, p < .01. African Americans also had lower confidences in the credibility of police officers (B = -.23, t = -5.87, p < .01), expert witnesses (B = -.09, t = - 2.19, p < .05),judges (B = -.13, t = -3.24, p < .01), and lawyers (B = -.11, t = -2.59, p < .01). At the same time, education appeared to er Ode confidence in the justice system ’5 impartiality and its components’ credibility. Higher education level predicted stronger beliefs that the criminal trial process is likely to accuse innocents and let real criminals get away (B = .11), t = 2.62, p < .01, the justice system is racially biased (B = .07), t = 1.69, p < .05, and the criminal trial process is prejudiced against African Americans (B = .09), t = 2.18, p < .05. Higher education level also predicted lower confidences in the credibility of police officers (B = —.07, t = - 1.71, p < .05), expert witnesses (B = —. 12, t = - 2.86, p < .01), and bystander witnesses (B = -.12, t = -2.94, p < .01). Experiences of being involved in juridic processes positively correlated with the belief that the criminal trial system has been abused by authorities. The more direct or indirect experiences with juridic processes an individual has, the stronger he/she would believe that certain authorities use power to influence the criminal trial process (B = .07), I=1.7l,p<.05. 45 ~ ’. my Study 2: Judicial Decision-Making and Heuristics Application It has been suggested that people ofien apply heuristics to assist in decision- making tasks requiring high levels of cognitive effort and capacity. For example, previous research has suggested that subjects tend to use heuristics to simplify judgment tasks when they are under conditions of high information load (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). This has been found true particularly in cases involving decisions of guilt for suspects in criminal trials where we might expect heavy information loads to occur (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Tamborini et al., 1997). Racial Discrimination in Juridic Decisions One of the heuristics applied in juridic decisions is associated with race. The discriminatory efiect of defendant’s race in the determination of guilt has been an important issue for social scientists. For example, in a mock-jury experiment from Japan, Huang, Nabashi, et al. (1997) found that an Afiican-American defendant suspected of robbery is more likely than a Caucasian-American defendant to be judged guilty of committing the crime. Racial disparity of this type is definitely one of the most disputed issues associated with criminal processing and treatment in the US. justice system as well where disparate bails, longer sentences, and more death penalties, have been found imposed on racial minorities (D’Alemberte, 1992)- In a classic study of police prejudice, Black and Reiss (1967) found that 79 percent of Caucasian-American police officers and 28 percent of African-American police officers working in predominantly Black neighborhoods of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, DC. expressed prejudice against African Americans. Reiman (1979) suggested that minorities are often arrested merely on the grounds of suspicion, and are 46 frequently treated more harshly during their inteTaCtions with law enforcement officers. The prevalence of police officers’ prejudice againSt minorities has even been noted in prosecution rates where several studies have shown that Blacks and Hispanics are more often arrested and released without being charged (Hagan & Zatz, 1985; Barnes & Kingsnorth, 1996). This has been interpreted as an indication that police officers more ofien arrest racial minorities based on only suspicion and without substantial evidence. Similar criticisms about racial discrimination have also been aimed at the treatment of minorities both in police stations and courtrooms. For example, in a study investigating the frequency with which suspects differing by race were incarcerated following an arrest, African Americans were incarcerated in 41 percent of all arrests, whereas Caucasian Americans were incarcerated in only 4 percent (Chiricos & Crawford, 1995). Once in court, research shows that African-American defendants were more frequently convicted and more harshly sentenced (by both Caucasian and African- American judges) than Caucasian defendants (Uhlman, 1978). The discrepancy is even more obvious in interracial cases. Records show that African Americans who killed Caucasian Americans were much more likely to be sentenced to death than African Americans who killed African Americans or Caucasian Americans who killed Caucasian Americans (Bowers & Pierce, 1980; Gross & Mauro, 1984). Are African Americans repeatedly discriminated against by the criminal justice system? Is race a robust factor consistently leading to judicial treatment discrepancy? There is along history of argument over this issue, and mixed evidence for the proposition. Some research has found strong evidence of racial inequities, while other studies have found none. 47 Separate from issues of arrest and incarceration is the issue of criminal conviction. One factor shown to impact the decision of a defendant’s guilt or innocence is a juror’s perception of the defendant as being a stereotypical criminal (Macrae & Shephard, 1989). Carrol (1978) suggested that harsher punishment is typically recommended for transgressions committed by individuals who fit criminal stereotypes. Unfortunately, one of many areas in which African Americans are likely to suffer from negative stereotypes is in juridic judgments. For example, Huang, Nabashi, et al. (1997) explained their findings that African-American defendants in a mock trial were more likely to be judged guilty by Japanese jurors as resulting from negative racial stereotypes possessed by Japanese toward African Americans. They note that stereotype of African Americans in Japan is said to include perceptions such as dirty, unintelligent, and violent (Russel, 1991; Takezawa, 1995). In addition, several US. studies have indicated that African Americans are more likely to be stereotyped as criminal, convicted based on less evidence, and receive harsher sentencing for similar crimes (Perry, 1977; Petersilia, 1985). On the other hand, other studies have shown no evidence of racial discrepancy in legal judgments. Foley and Chamblin (1982) found that when socioeconomic variables are controlled, the race of the defendant has no influence on mock jurors’ decisions of guilt. In a more recent mock-jury study by Tamborini et al. (1997), Caucasian-American jurors perceived African-American and Caucasian-American defendants equal in terms of their probability to commit a robbery. 48 flemStics A lication If race and racial stereotypes can affect juridic judgments, what role do they play in the juridic decision-making process? How do they trigger discrepant treatment by individuals working within the justice system? What other determinants are there influencing an individual’s verdict? As in other information-processing tasks, heuristics are believed to play a significant role in the procedure of juridic decision-making and the mechanisms leading to racially discrepant treatment in many criminal-trial cases. Heuristics. Social perceivers often need to make complex judgments under conditions that may not be best suited to accuracy or thoroughness. Either due to time constraints, complexity, volume of the relevant information, or uncertainty about the evidence itself, it is unrealistic for the social perceiver to use exhaustive strategies for making judgments (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Therefore, people often use heuristics or shortcuts to reduce complex problem solving to more simple judgmental operations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In such a context, heuristic refers to a simplifying rule of thumb used in non-optimal cognitive environments to arrive at a judgment (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). That is, heuristic per se is a strategy to assist cognitive processes. Individuals apply this strategy to simplify complex information-processing tasks via the use of handy cognitive tools, such as stereotypes, schemata, etc. Several types of heuristics have been identified by scholars investigating decision- making process (for a review, see Sherman & Corty, 1984). One of those most influential within the field of social psychology is the availability heuristic. The availability heuristic is used to evaluate the frequency or likelihood of an event on the basis of how quickly instances or associations come to mind (Tversky & Kalmeman, 1973). It features the idea 49 i. a t A.” .1 1 : I » 3! l that When salient examples or associations for some concept are readily accessible and eaSily brought to mind, these thoughts have an inflated influence on related estimates or perceptions. For example, Reyes, Thompson, and Bower (1980) have shown that the availability heuristic can influence the recall of evidence and impact mock jury decisions. They show that the vividness of a stimulus or information is one factor that could trigger use of availability heuristic in this decision process. Compared with pallid information, vividly described evidence is more easily retrieved and likely to impact decisions. In addition to ease of retrieval, strength of association is another way of estimating the likelihood of an event being brought into the decisional process via the availability heuristics. Associative bonds are strengthened by repeated examples. In addition, the strength of an association between any two things is likely to be a fairly good estimate of the frequency or likelihood of some class of events being judged to co- occur. For example, the formation of group stereotypes can be facilitated from the behavior of just a few individuals whose behaviors shows up a large numbers of time. The formed group stereotypes will then be applied to estimate the likelihood that a target individual holds certain characteristics related to the group membership. Fiske and Taylor (1991) suggest that mass media are one possible sources of repeated examples. However, because media more often focused on negative than positive events, these biases could favor the formation of negative group stereotypes. Heuristic-Systematic Model and stereotype use. How will a set of stereotypes be retrieved, either consciously or unconsciously, and applied to daily tasks? The Heuristic- Systematic Model has been proposed to explain cognitive information processing (Chaiken, 1980). In cognitive information processing, people seek to establish the 50 sys sys pro rele mal info vdi pro syst proc form key judg enac PTOC assoc allth i ; . 1. w. my “validity” of information, that is, people’s primary motivational concern is to attain accurate judgments that square with relevant facts. According to Chaiken (1987), there are two mediational pathways used in these situations to process incoming information: systematic processing and heuristic processing. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) conceptualized systematic processing as “a comprehensive, analytic orientation to information processing in which perceivers access and scrutinize a great deal of information for its relevance to their judgment task” (p.326). Systematic information processors need to make greater effort to scrutinize persuasive argumentation and think about other information related to the object or issue discussed in the message in order to judge the validity of a message’s advocated position (Chaiken, 1987). Heuristic processing is conceptualized as “a more limited mode of information processing that requires less cognitive effort and fewer cognitive resources than systematic processing” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.327). When activating heuristic processing, receivers focus on the subset of available information that enables them to formulate their judgments and decisions by using these simplifying rules. Therefore, the key aspect of heuristic processing is the idea that simplifying rules can mediate people’s judgments. Neither systematic nor heuristic processing is assumed to be ubiquitous. The enactment of systematic processing requires ability and motivation, while heuristic processing depends on the presence of heuristic cues and on the cognitive availability of associated heuristics (Chaiken, 1987). According to the Heuristic-Systematic Model, if all the necessary factors exist, the two processing modes are assumed to occur in the same task. The concurrent processing assumption proposes that heuristic and systematic 51 3)’51 com (or p. I. a . f A.” promssing can exert both independent (i.e. additive) and interdependent (i.e. interactive) effects on judgment (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Therefore, in situations where people can use heuristics to assist in systematic information processing, cognitive heuristics containing skewed prior knowledge about an attitude object may bias systematic processing of information. Two central features of the Heuristic-Systematic Model are the principles of least effort and sufficiency. These principles suggest that efficient information processors are searching for a balance between satisfying motivational concerns and minimizing their processing efforts. People will try to engage in greater amounts of heuristic processing if this less effortful heuristic mode can yield sufficient judgmental confidence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, these principles suggest that once individuals feel confident enough to make their judgment towards target objects by applying heuristic cues, they will lose the motivation to conduct firrther systematic speculation. The Heuristic-Systematic Model’s propositions imply that perceivers’ confidence in their judgments is an important mediator in the heuristic/ systematic processing mechanism. The sufficiency principle suggests that an insufficient level of judgmental confidence motivates systematic processing until a satisfactory level of confidence is reached. However, the execution of systematic processing is contingent upon the ability to process information systematically. What happens when perceivers’ ability for systematic processing is constrained from use and unable to provide sufficient confidence? Chaiken et al. (1989) proposed that in such instances perceivers might more carefully scrutinize the setting of judgment-relevant heuristic cues. That is, when actual (or perceived) ability for systematic processing is low, the feeling of low confidence will 52 |-—-l dev bell $1611 facil COHS Emir inIh lllep the e. pt°Pel perceivers to search for and apply other accessible cues until their confidence has reached a sufficient threshold. The Impact of Stereogpes on Juridic Decision-Making Applied as heuristic cues, stereotypes are cognitively useful because they simplify the world. Cognitive theories in social psychology emphasize that ideal cognitive states are simple, coherent, and relatively enduring structures that provide organization for interpreting new experience (Farrell & Holmes, 1991). A stereotype is one form of cognitive structure that helps us process and organize information. Reliance on them makes information-processing more efficient. Stereogpe use in legal situations. When engaged in law enforcement or reaching verdict in a court of law, using stereotypes to judge a person’s guilt or innocence is improper by almost all modern social or legal standards; even if the stereotypic beliefs serve as only a trivial cue leading to the final decision. Nevertheless, the use of these devices seems highly likely when such decisions are made. As discussed above, it is believed that in sub-optimal information environments, individuals often apply available stereotypes or other heuristics in order to simplify complex judgmental tasks and facilitate information processing. The need to process heavy information loads with time constraints makes situations like juridic decision-making tasks one such sub-optimal environment. It therefore implies that stereotypes and/or other heuristics might play a role in the juridic decision-making process. For example, heuristics associated with the justice system are expected to impact the process of juridic decision-making and even to bias judgments. Evidence supporting the existence of heuristics related to the justice system has been demonstrated by 53 x ' I r 1 . \‘ \ \‘\ \ 3' A.” 1‘ amborini et al. (1997). Their study found evidence of heuristic use related to legal concepts such as “reasonable doubt” and “legal corruption.” In addition, they found that some of these heuristics can impact judgments of a defendant’s guilt. People who perceive the justice system to be corrupt may hold a “legal corruption” stereotype and doubt whether or not a case will receive a fair trial. They may even question the impartiality of all elements in the justice system, including the judge, jury, police officers, and witnesses. For example, in addition to scrutinizing the evidence provided for a legal case, they may perceive that the judge or jurors are not unbiased and fair in their treatment on the defendant, the police are not objective in the law enforcement process, and witnesses will not provide reliable testimony uninfluenced by irrelevant prejudices. Each of these considerations can undermine an individual’s perception of the justice system’s credibility and play a significant role in how evidence is interpreted and the trial is resolved. That is, the existence of a legal-corruption stereotype might attenuate a person’s trust and reliance on witnesses’ testimony and then sway his/her legal judgment. During criminal trials, court characters might also apply crime related stereotypes as cognitive heuristics on accused defendants. In fact, we might expect alleged transgressions that fit stereotypes will be dealt with routinely in these settings. Sigall and Ostrove (1975) claimed that both judges and jurors are more likely to deal harshly with a criminal if the stereotypic beliefs they retrieved of the target are consistent with a high probability that the criminal will commit further violations. Evidence suggesting stereotype influence in juridic decision-making can be seen in research on gender and criminal prosecution. For example, studies of adult convictions 54 10cc judgx 1‘ 7'. z. . _‘\ \ \ b. commonly report that females are given more lenient treatment than are males (Bishop & Frazier, 1984). Bishop and Frazier explained that this difference is caused by people’s expectation that women are more moral, more “risk-aversive,” and less aggressive. This stereotype lowers perceptions of the probability that women can be criminals too. Racial stereotypes and legal judgments. While gender stereotypes have been shown to influence juridic decision-making, the prevalence of studies on race and the justice system imply that bias and differential treatment resulting from racial stereotypes in the criminal justice system is often more serious. It has been found that members of certain racial groups, such as African American, are ofien the target of heuristic application in juridic judgments (Huang, Nabashi, et al., 1997; Miethe & Moore, 1986). Miethe and Moore (1986) suggested that African-American defendants in particular have been shown victims of disparate treatment. For example, in comparison to other African- American defendants and their Caucasian counterparts, African-American defendants who are single and living in urban areas have been given the most severe sanctions. Miethe and Moore suggested that such sanctions indicate that African-American offenders with these characteristics are perceived as “dangerous” and possibly having a prior felony record. As a result, these “criminality-inclined” perceptions lead judges and jurors to give the African-American offenders harsher treatments. In addition, they claimed that the prevailing stereotypes held by criminal justice officials are consistent with this type of dubious image of African Americans. The concern here is that congruity between images and stereotypes leads people to conveniently apply existing stereotypes as heuristics to assist tasks of juridic judgments. Although Miethe and Moore’s study did not, in itself, demonstrate that 55 ..h ,, Stereotype-based heuristic bias is the cause of more severe sanctions received by Afi'ican- Merican defendants, their findings were consistent with such an interpretation. It has been suggested that discrepant treatments toward African Americans essentially result from out-group-member discrimination. An understanding of heuristics associated with racial stereotypes can help explain this by suggesting a process that might predict increase judgements of guilt for out-group members. In a criminal trial situation, Tamborini et al. ( 1997) hypothesized that: 1) heuristic-biased processes would lead a Caucasian-American subject to rate the probability of guilt higher for an African- American defendant than for a Caucasian-American defendant, 2) these processes would lead an African-American subject to rate the probability of guilt higher for a Caucasian- American defendant than for an African-American defendant, and 3) the impact of heuristic-influenced decisional biases would be greater under conditions of heavy information load than under light information load. Tamborini and his colleagues found some support for the out-group-member bias: African-American subjects rated the probability of guilt higher for a Caucasian-American defendant than for an African—American defendant. In contrast to expectations, however, Caucasian-American subjects rated the probabilities of guilt for an African-American defendant and for a Caucasian-American defendant equally. The unexpected findings associated with heuristic use might imply that Caucasian Americans are uninfluenced by racial stereotypes in determination of guilt. However, Tamborini et al. provided alternative explanations suggesting: 1) The college student sample used in the study were highly educated, more liberal, and less prejudiced than the non-college educated population. Thus, the behavior of Caucasian- 56 - _ ' .. a.” Alnerican college students may not represent the general population. 2) The behavior of Caucasian-American subjects was restrained in the study by the highly egalitarian-laden conditions associated with verdicts of guilt in the criminal-trial context. These conditions repressed the use of racial stereotypes and curbed racial discriminatory behaviors in determination of guilt. A Test of Two Alternative Explanations One objective of Study 2 is to test the legitimacy of these two explanations for the behavior of Caucasian populations. Tamborini and his colleagues (1997) identified several variables as possible factors mediating the application of heuristics in juridic decision-making tasks: racial prejudice associated with characteristic differences among different Caucasian populations, and egalitarian constraints associated with judgment- task characteristics. Since these issues deal only with the behavior of Caucasian Americans, further discussion here is limited to Caucasian Americans and sub— populations within this group. Population difference. One limitation of the study by Tamborini et al. (1997) was that recruited subjects were all college students. The fact that college students may be more educated and liberal than the general public limits the applicability of these findings to other sub-populations. One way to test this rationale would be to replicate the study by Tamborini et al. on a sample selected to represent a broader cross-section of the general public. Evidence suggests that prevailing negative stereotypes of African Americans as lazy, low in intelligence, poor, criminal, and hostile, still exist (Devine & Elloit, 1995). Nevertheless, it is possible that the legal-decision making process of college-student 57 SUbjects might be uninfluenced by heuristics associated with a defendant’s race. This explanation is consistent with discussion of characteristic differences expected in college- student populations; they are likely to more liberal and highly educated than the general public. If it is true that college students are not racially discriminative in legal judgments, they should give equal treatments to defendants of different racial groups regardless of characteristic differences in judgment tasks and evidence. The witness testimony and evidence presented in the trial description used by Tamborini et al. (1997) were manipulated to be neutral in their indication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. This procedure was intended to increase the likelihood that subjects would apply legal and racial stereotypes in their legal-judgment task since they could not rely solely on the provided information to justify a verdict for the defendant. However, the failure to find that Caucasian-American subjects apply out- group stereotypes and rate an African-American defendant higher in probability of guilt than a Caucasian-American defendant was unexpected. If the finding of non- discriminative treatment by Caucasian-American college students resulted from the fact that education and a liberal environment (i.e., college campus) reduced racial discrimination, it follows that racially discrepant treatments originally expected by Tamborini et al. (1997) are more likely to be observed in general-public populations. Here, the counterbalancing factors to racial discrimination should be lesser or even nonexistent. A predicted interaction resulting from this logic would suggest that the difference in the confidence of guilt for African-American versus Caucasian-American defendants will be found only for general-public subjects and only under conditions where evidence for defendants’ guilt is ambiguous. When evidence is clear, we would 58 Wh- a.” SUbjects might be uninfluenced by heuristics associated with a defendant’s race. This explanation is consistent with discussion of characteristic differences expected in college- student populations; they are likely to more liberal and highly educated than the general public. If it is true that college students are not racially discriminative in legal judgments, they should give equal treatments to defendants of different racial groups regardless of characteristic differences in judgment tasks and evidence. The witness testimony and evidence presented in the trial description used by Tamborini et al. (1997) were manipulated to be neutral in their indication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. This procedure was intended to increase the likelihood that subjects would apply legal and racial stereotypes in their legal-j udgment task since they could not rely solely on the provided information to justify a verdict for the defendant. However, the failure to find that Caucasian-American subjects apply out- group stereotypes and rate an African-American defendant higher in probability of guilt than a Caucasian-American defendant was unexpected. If the finding of non- discriminative treatment by Caucasian-American college students resulted from the fact that education and a liberal environment (i.e., college campus) reduced racial discrimination, it follows that racially discrepant treatments originally expected by Tamborini et al. (1997) are more likely to be observed in general-public populations. Here, the counterbalancing factors to racial discrimination should be lesser or even nonexistent. A predicted interaction resulting from this logic would suggest that the difference in the confidence of guilt for African-American versus Caucasian-American defendants will be found only for general-public subjects and only under conditions where evidence for defendants’ guilt is ambiguous. When evidence is clear, we would 58 ' .1 D. eXpect this alone to determine judgments and eliminate differences between populations. This interaction can be stated as followed: & When evidence toward a defendant’s guilt is ambiguous, general-public subjects will have a greater confidence in the guilt for an African—American defendant than for a Caucasian defendant. No difference in the confidence of guilt for African- American and Caucasian-American defendants will be found for college-student subjects. When evidence for guilt is clear, no difference will be found across conditions of defendant’s race and subject population. Egalitarian constraint repressing discrimination. A second explanation for this no- difference phenomenon was that the college-student subjects still possessed discriminative racial perceptions, however, conditions in the study of Tamborini et al. repressed the influence of those stereotypes. The act of using racial heuristics became self-conscious for subjects when they encountered a race—discrimination-sensitive situation, i.e., a mock “court of law” in which the defendant was a racial minority. The concept of aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) has suggested that people sensitized to racial issues and situations calling for egalitarian treatment, such as a court of law, might repress the application of racial heuristics in order to present an egalitarian image of themselves. If the second explanation is correct, it might be assumed that a bias repressed by the egalitarian-laden setting for judgments would no longer be repressed if the situational pressure is lightened or no longer existent; without the concern of being perceived as unjustified in legal judgments, individuals will be more likely to express their uninhibited responses. For example, people might feel less constrained in their judgments and give 59 harsher treatment to a defendant of certain out-group characteristics (e. g., race) when making the decision of sentence length for a defendant already convicted instead of when asked to judge the probability of guilt for a defendant prosecuted on the basis of ambiguous evidence. Since sentence decisions are made after a defendant’s guilt has been decided, that is, the situation of ambiguity no longer exists and the pressure of being perceived as biased is lessened, individuals may be more likely to apply heuristics in their decision of sentence length. m; Subjects are likely to recommend a longer sentence length to a convicted African-American defendant than a convicted Caucasian defendant. Interaction between pppulation differenceland egalitarian constraint. If both these two alternative explanations (population difference and egalitarian constraint) for the non-discriminative treatment by Caucasian-American college students are legitimate, it is expected that there exists an interaction effect between population type and defendant’s race on recommended sentence length. When egalitarian constraint is lightened or removed, subjects should be likely to apply heuristics related to racial stereotypes and recommend a longer sentence length to an African-American defendant than a Caucasian defendant. However, reduced constraint might not be felt by all subjects. Since it is hypothesized that college students are liberal and racially unprejudiced and do not represent the general population, it is expected that the impact of reduced egalitarian constraint should be found only on general-public subjects. Thus, if the decision of sentence length for already convicted defendants acts to reduce egalitarian constraint, general-public subjects should recommend a longer sentence length to an African- American defendant. 60 . a.” H_6: Longer sentence recommendation will be given by general-public subjects to an African-American defendant than by general-public subjects to a Caucasian-American defendant or college-student subjects to defendants of either race. The Impact of Information Load on Heuristic Processing Load and the Heuristic-Systematic Model. In addition to the availability and accessibility of stereotypes, other factors are capable of determining which of the two processing modes of the Heuristics-Systematic Model is likely to be applied. As discussed above, individuals may apply heuristics to assist given cognitive process in sub-optimal information environments, such as making juridic decisions in a court of law. Because systematic processing both demands and consumes cognitive capacity, systematic processing should be more constrained or disrupted than heuristic processing by situational and individual difference factors that reduce people’s abilities for detailed information processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). One situational factor that can impede detailed information processing is the existence of a processing task containing an excess of information. Under conditions of information or processing overload (i.e., high volume or complexity of an information task), the receiver’s information processing capacity limit might force the individual to resort to a more simplistic heuristic processing mode in place of desirable systematic processing. In this situation, receivers are more likely to use existing stereotypes or other heuristic cues instead of attempting to thoroughly comprehend the provided information. Support for the position that heavy information load can increase heuristic processing can be found in research by Bargh and Thein (1985) demonstrating that the level of information load can impact information recall. In this study, subjects who were 61 - , ' .. a.” given control over the presentation rate of displayed text (self-paced) had better recall of described behaviors of the characters than subjects given only enough time to read the displayed text once before successive presentations (rapid-paced). Though other explanations of these findings are possible, this can be interpreted as evidence that subjects experiencing information overload could not apply systematic information processing perfectly, and thus recalled fewer behaviors. While the work of Bargh and Thein suggested that information load can impact recall, the belief that information overload not only limits systematic processing but also can lead to heuristic processing relies on the supposition that heuristic cues are accessible. Macrae, Hewstone, and Griffiths (1993) provided evidence that processing demands can increase heuristic access. By giving subjects an additional task (high processing load) or no additional task (low processing load) after the presentation of stereotypic cues associated with a target, they found that perceivers displayed preferential recall for stereotype-consistent information under high processing load, but switched to a preference for stereotype-inconsistent information as task demand decreased. Likewise, target-based trait judgments were more stereotypic under high processing load. Load, heuristic processing, and juridic decision-making. In related research, Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) successfully manipulated information load qualitatively by controlling task complexity: judging a defendant’s guilt (high complexity) or judging a defendant’s trait (low complexity). They found that when facing a complex judgmental situation (a condition of high information load), subjects used racial stereotypes (when available and applicable) as a way to simplify the task. Specifically, complex-judgment subjects used negative racial stereotypes as a central 62 theme to organize presented evidence that was stereotype consistent, and neglected inconsistent information. Information processing bias was apparent in their recall of more stereotype-consistent evidence. If the defendant was Hispanic, subjects with a (complex) guilt-judgment task not only judged the defendant more likely to be guilty and aggressive, but also recalled more negative features about him than if he was ethnically nondescript. In contrast, subjects with a (simple) trait-judgment task displayed no significant difference in their perceptions of aggressiveness between the two defendants (Hispanic and ethnically nondescript), and showed no bias in their recall of the evidence. Though this study provided great insight on the role of heuristics and information load, certain issues concerning characteristics of information load remained unaddressed. Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) successfully manipulated information load qualitatively in terms of task complexity (trait versus judgment tasks), but failed in their attempt to manipulate information load quantitatively (high versus low information volume). Their attempt at quantitative load manipulation dealt only with expectations of heavy versus light load, and did not vary the actual amount of information presented. For this manipulation, they constructed an expected-low-volume condition by showing subjects 20 pages of case material containing one item of evidence on each page, and an expected-high-volume condition by showing extra blank pages with the actual case material and telling subjects they would be required to read 100 pages of evidence instead of 20. The two groups of subjects eventually received the same amount of information. Unfortunately, the manipulation check showed that the expected-volume manipulation failed to significantly influence perceptions of information load. Not surprisingly, the 63 interaction between expected information volume and racial stereotype then failed to affect judgments of guilt. Since quantity (information volume) is more akin to some conceptions of information load than quality (task complexity), in a study investigating the impact of heuristics and information load on juridic decision-making, Tamborini et al. (1997) quantitatively manipulated the information volume subjects were required to process in a legal judgment task. They hypothesized that in a criminal trial situation, people tend to apply heuristics related to juridic decision-making in order to simplify quantitatively high-information-load tasks. The results were consistent with the predictions. Tamborini V and his colleagues found that: l) a legal-corruption stereotype leads to lower evaluations of witness credibility, 2) a reasonable-doubt stereotype leads to higher evaluations of witness credibility, 3) perceptions of the witnesses being credible increase perceived guilt of a defendant, and 4) heavy information load operationalized in terms of quantity increases the impact of legal-corruption and reasonable-doubt stereotypes on evaluations of witness credibility, and, thus on perceptions of guilt. These findings supported and extended Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein’s proposition that people are inclined to use heuristic cues to help themselves make legal judgments when under conditions of high information load. Taken together, these studies lead us to believe that information load and heuristic cues interact to influence judgments made by individuals in the juridic decision-making process. The results of past investigations have demonstrated: (1) There is an effect of information load on information recall. Less evidence is recalled under conditions of information overload (Bargh and Thein, 1985). 64 . . my (2) Information load and stereotype cues interact to impact information recall. More cue consistent evidence is recalled under conditions of information overload (Macrae et al., 1993). (3) Task complexity (a qualitative condition of information load) and racial stereotype cues interact to impact judgments of guilt. More stereotype-consistent evidence is taken into account, and there is a tendency to make more stereotype- consistent judgments when encountering a more complex task (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). (4) Information volume (a quantitative condition of information load) and justice- system stereotypes interact to impact evaluations of courtroom characters. As information volume increases, the probability of applying heuristic processing to judgments of guilt increases (Tamborini et al., 1997). Information load and application of racial stereotypes. Earlier it was hypothesized that when evidence toward a defendant’s guilt is ambiguous, general-public subjects have greater confidence in the guilt for an African-American defendant than for a Caucasian defendant. This hypothesis pre-supposes that general-public subjects possess negative racial stereotypes against African Americans and are likely to apply them as heuristics to assist juridic judgments for African-American defendants when systematic information processing of ambiguous evidence is not able to provide sufficient confidence in conclusions reached. In addition, according to the above reasoning that heavy information load increases the impact of applied heuristics on juridic judgments, it is expected that general-public subjects are more likely to apply available racial stereotypes 65 -.l 1. ill!!- to help them judge the guilt of defendants with out-group memberships when information load quantitatively increases. Based on the logic here, it is hypothesized that: Q When evidence toward a defendant’s guilt is ambiguous, general-public subjects will have a greater confidence in the guilt for an African-American defendant in a high information-load condition than in a low information-load condition. Finally, there is another judgment area in which information load is expected to impact the application of racial stereotypes: the length of sentence imposed on a convicted defendant. Earlier it was predicted that without the repression of egalitarian value, general-public subjects will be more likely than college-student subjects to use existing racial stereotypes as heuristics in their decisions related to the length of punishment for convicted criminals. At the same time, information load is expected to play a role boosting the application of heuristics and their impact on decisions. Therefore, it is expected that as information load increases, the impact of negative racial stereotypes increases, and the recommended sentence lengthens. 118; For convicted African-American defendants, longer sentence recommendation will be given by general-public subjects under high-information-load conditions than by general-public subjects under low-information-load conditions or college-student subjects under either high or low information load conditions. rm Overview Study 2 was an experiment which aimed to examine the impact of information load and criminal evidence on heuristic application in juridic decision-making situations. Two to four weeks after returning the survey used in Study 1, subjects took part in the 66 I I! I; CXperiment for Study 2. The experiment used 2 x 2 X 2 x 2 design combining information volume (high, low), evidence of g1_1_ilt (ambiguous, guilty), and defendant’s race (Caucasian American, African American) and sample group (general public or college students). Participants were asked to role-play a juror receiving testimony about a robbery case and deciding the verdict for a defendant. The case description and witnesses’ testimony for a criminal trial were presented to subjects in a printed booklet. The three independent variables were manipulated in the trial record. The first variable, information volume, was varied quantitatively: the high information-volume group read a 6000-word version of trial testimony; and the lo_w information-volume group read a 1500-word version of case materials. The second variable, evidence of guilt, was manipulated by presenting different sets of trial testimony. In the guiJlg condition, subjects were presented with evidence that clearly indicated the defendant on trial was guilty. In the ambigpous condition, evidence supporting guilt and innocence was equally presented. The third variable, defendant’s race, was manipulated by verbally describing the defendant as either Caucasian American or African American. This manipulation was expected to activate subjects’ racial stereotypes and act as heuristics which might influence their legal judgments- All experimental materials, including the introduction, the trial testimony, and the follow-up questionnaire, were presented in a printed booklet. The legal-judgment experiment was introduced to subjects as a study of information processing. Subjects read and signed an enclosed consent form indicating their willingness to participate in this research project. Then, subjects read the trial testimony. After reading the case materials, 67 SUbje-cts immediately responded to an enclosed questionnaire in which they judged the defendant’s guilt (verdict and length of sentence), personal traits (credibility, criminal tendency, and violent tendency), and the credibility of the police officer, the victim, and the expert witness in the case. In addition to these judgments, an information load manipulation check was conducted to measure the perceived magnitude of information processing required in the given judgmental task. m As discussed above, the primary objective of Study 2 was to investigate the unexpected findings of Tamborini et al. (1997) showing that racial heuristics/stereotypes had no impact on the legal judgments of Caucasian-American college-student subjects. As such, the subjects included in analyses were limited to Caucasian-American participants. A total of 430 subjects took part in Study 2. Of the 294 Caucasian-American general-public subjects who took part in Study 1, 226 returned to participate in Study 2. In addition, 9 other subjects completed only Study 2. These participating subjects were checked with their knowledge of the defendant’s race after making legal judgments and decisions for the criminal trial. If the defendant’s race they recalled did not correctly match the one provided in the case description, the subjects would be excluded from the analyses. Twenty-nine subjects failed to identify the race of the defendant correctly and were excluded from analyses, resulting in a total of 206 general-public subjects. The ages of the general-public subjects ranged from 21 to 78, and the average was 46 years old. Among the 206 participants, 114 (55%) were female, and 92 (45%) were male. 68 The second sample included 224 college-student subjects. Of the 320 Caucasian- American college—student subjects who took part in Study 1, 210 participated in Study 2. In addition, 25 other subjects completed only Study 2. After excluding 11 subjects failing to identify the race of the defendant correctly, A total of 224 college-student subjects were included in analyses. The ages of the college-student subjects ranged from 18 to 35, and the average was 20 years old. Among the 224 participants, 154 (69%) were female, and 70 (31%) were male. All subjects were randomly assigned to each of the 2 x 2 x 2 combinations of information volume (high, low), evidence of guilt (ambiguous, guilty), and defendant’s race (Caucasian American, African American). On average, 26 general- public subjects and 28 college-student subjects were obtained for each experimental condition. Treatment Materials The hypothetical trial report consisted of two sections. The first section contained a description of a robbery case including location, time, and related facts. It also provided background information about the defendant (suspect). The defendant’s name (Robert Williams), age (25), sex (male), and height (5’9”) were provided and maintained constant in all conditions. The defendant’s race was manipulated in this section by indicating the ethnic group to which he belonged. He was identified as either Caucasian American or African American. In the second part of the trial reports, four persons, including the victim of the robbery, a police officer, the defendant, and an expert witness, provided their testimony. Evidence of gpilt was manipulated in the content of witness testimony. Except the defendant who maintained his claim of innocence constantly, the testimony of the other 69 three witnesses was varied across the two different experimental condition. In the ambigpous condition, all these three witnesses gave testimony with no strong evidence to prove the defendant either guilty or innocent. For example, the victim could only provide a vague description of the person who robbed him and was not confident enough to identify the defendant as the robber. In the gfly condition, witness statements from the police officer, the victim, and a criminologist explicitly indicated a high probability that the defendant did commit the robbery. For example, the victim clearly saw the robber and could confidently identify the defendant as the robber from a line-up. Information volume was manipulated by varying the length of case description and trial testimony. The 191/ information-volume version of trial report contained 1500 words, which provided a short trial description and witness statements that included only essential information. Subjects in the MEL information-volume condition (6000 words) received a longer version of trial description and witness statements consisting of additional facts irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. No new criminal evidence was added in the high information-load version. The supplementary details were supposed to increase the volume of information subjects needed to process, without giving additional facts that might directly influence judgments for the case (see Appendix F for the ambiguous-low version of the trial report, Appendix G for the ambiguous-high version, Appendix H for the guilty-low version, Appendix I for the guilty-high version). Mm Pre-treatment measurement. The pre-treatment questionnaire (conducted in Study 1) measured justice-system related stereotypes, including Caucasian Americans are Criminally/Violently Inclined (6 items, alpha = .85), African Americans are 70 CriminallyNiolently Inclined (6 items, alpha = .90), Unjust-Trial System (4 items, alpha = .75), Money-Corrupted Judicial System (3 items, alpha = .89), Authority-Abused Judicial System (3 items, alpha = .68), Opinion-Based Verdict (3 items, alpha = .75), Racially Biased System (2 items, alpha = .87), Trial-Bias in Favor of Caucasian American (5 items, alpha = .90), Trial-Bias Against African American (5 items, alpha = .93), Police Credibility (1 1 items, alpha = .88), Expert Credibility (7 items, alpha = .84), Bystander Witness Credibility (7 items, alpha = .80), Jury Credibility (9 items, alpha = .86), Judge Credibility (6 items, alpha = .83), Lawyer Perceptions (7 items, alpha = .82), Presumed Guilty (4 items, alpha = .85), Reasonable Doubt (4 items, alpha = .71), using 7- point Likert scales. Post-treatment measurement. After reading the case description and witness testimony, subjects completed a three-section post-treatment questionnaire. The first section of the post-treatment questionnaire was a brief manipulation check measuring information load perception. Subjects’ perception of the level of information volume contained in the given trial report was assessed by a lO-point scale ranging from 1 (not much) to 10 (extremely) (3 items, alpha = .90) (see Appendix J). The manipulation check demonstrated that subjects did perceive greater load of given information in the high information-load condition (M = 5.87, E = 1.71) than in the low information-load condition (M = 5.18, E = 1.71), E(l, 429) = 17.50, p < .001. The second section measured subjects’ judgments and perceptions of the defendant. Subjects reported judgments of the defendant’s guilt in two items. Specifically, subjects were asked their confidence of gg'lt for the defendant with the question “What do you think the probability is that the defendant committed the 71 IObbery?” measured from 0 to 100%. A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial analysis combining evidence 919111, sample ggoup, and defendant’s race was conducted on subjects’ confidence of gig for the defendant as a check of the evidence of gpilt manipulation. ANOVA results demonstrated that subjects had an obviously higher confidence of guilt for a defendant in the “guilty” evidence condition (M = 72%, S_D = 18.82) than in the “ambiguous” evidence condition M = 55%, fl = 20.26), E(1, 427) = 84.46, p < .001. Second, they were asked to reach a verdict with the question “Would your verdict for the defendant be guilty or not guilty of the crime?” Subjects also decided the length of sentence (measured in months) they thought the defendant should be imprisoned if he was convicted. In addition, subjects evaluated the defendant’s criminal tendency (4 items, such as “I think that the defendant has committed or would commit the same type of crime at some other time,” alpha = .94), credibilig (3 items, such as “I think the defendant told the entire truth,” alpha = .91), and violent tendency (4 items, such as “I think that the defendant behaves violently in his daily life,” alpha = .92) on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (see Appendix K). In the final section, subjects evaluated the credibility of the police officer (4 items, alpha = .80), the victim (4 items, alpha = .74), and the expert witness (4 items, alpha = .75) who provided testimony in the criminal trial on 7-point Likert scales. Subjects also indicated their perception of the extent to which the testimony of the police officer, the victim, and the expert witness supported the defendant’s guilt or innocence (see Appendix L). This was done in order to decide the relationship between the perceived credibility of these three witnesses and the perceived credibility of the defendant. If a witness’ testimony was perceived to support a defendant’s guilt, it should 72 .5 U .D a.” be negatively correlated with their perceived credibility. On the other hand, if a witness’ testimony was perceived to support a defendant’s innocence, it should be positively correlated with their perceived credibility. RLults Population Difference It was suggested that college students do not represent the general population; they have advanced education, are more liberal and racially biased. On the other hand, general-public subj ects are more likely to have negative out-group racial stereotypes. As a preliminary investigation of assumptions underlying the “population differences” explanation, paired t-tests were conducted on comparisons between subjects’ racial perceptions of Caucasian Americans and of African Americans. Tests were conducted on data obtained from the Caucasian American are Criminally/Violently Inclined, African Americans are Criminally/Violently Inclined scales in survey from Study 1. However, according to these results, both college-student subjects (M = 3.84, S_D = 1.08 (for African American targets), vs. M = 3.15, S_D = .95 (for Caucasian American targets), 1(199) = 8.61 , p < .001) and general-public subjects (M = 3.84, S_D = 1.12, vs. M = 3.23, SI) = .96, t(196) = 5.79, p < .001) perceived African Americans more “criminally/violently inclined” than Caucasian Americans. Based on the assumption that general-public subjects would have more negative stereotypes than college-student subjects, hypothesis 4 predicted that when evidence toward defendant’s guilt is ambiguous, general-public subjects will have greater confidence in the guilt for an Afiican-American defendant than for a Caucasian- American defendant. No similar difference in the confidence of guilt for African- 73 HQ int: sul ger American and Caucasian-American defendants will be found for college-student subjects. When evidence for guilt is clear, no difference should be found across conditions of defendant’s race and subj ect population. The obtained data of subjects’ confidence of guilt in defendants are illustrated in Table 4. To test this hypothesis, a planned comparison AN OVA was conducted. Since our manipulation check already established a main effect for the evidence of guilt treatment, contrast coefficients of 0, 0, 0, 0 were assigned to confidence in guilt across all four “guilty evidence” conditions. Contrast coefficients of -1, -1, -1 were assigned to the college-student x Caucasian-American defendant, college-student x African-American defendant, and general-public x Caucasian-American defendant conditions, while a coefficient of 3 was assigned to the general-public x African-American defendant condition. The test of hypothesis 4 failed to show an increase in confidence of guilt for an African-American defendant by general-public subjects in the ambiguous evidence condition. Although the contrast analysis reached levels of significance (t(420) = -2.49, p < .05), the trend was not in the predicted direction. Failure to find support for the interaction expected is not surprising. Since preliminary tests showed college-student subjects to hold negative stereotyped perceptions of African Americans similar to the general public, the differences predicted by hypothesis 4 should no longer be expected. The results of this study also showed that defendant’s race had no significant impact on verdict decisions for any of the four sample group x evidence of guilt conditions: college-student x ambiguous-evidence (780, N = 112) = 1.10, p = .29), college-student x guilty-evidence (x20 , N = 111) = .49, p = .49), general—public x ambiguous-evidence (780, N = 106) = 0.01 , p = .91), and general-public x guilty- 74 6«lrclence (380, N = 98) = .06, p = .81). 75 1‘ able 4 confidence of Guilt General public College student Caucasian- African- Caucasian- African- American American American American defendant defendant defendant defendant Ambiguous 54% 49% 59% 57% evidence (r_1 = 50) (g = 56) (n = 53) (n = 60) Guilty 70% 75% 73% 71% evidence (I_1 = 55) (g = 44) (r_1 = 46) (g = 64) Note. Confidence of guilt was measured by a scale ranging from 0 to 100%. 76 wtafian Constraint Repressing Discrimination The second alternative explanation for the unexpected non-racial-discrimination findings of Tamborini et al. (1997) was that the egalitarian nature of deciding guilt in a mock “court of law” repressed the use of heuristics related to racial stereotypes. Hypothesis 5 predicted that when the egalitarian constraint repressing the application of heuristics related to racial stereotypes has been lightened, subjects are likely to I recommend a longer sentence length to a convicted African-American defendant than a convicted Caucasian-American defendant. In order to test this hypothesis, only the subjects who gave a “guilty” verdict were included (l_\l_ = 248). After deciding guilt, subjects then decided the length of sentence that the defendant should be imprisoned. The results of t test showed that An African- American convict was sentenced with a longer jail time (45.23 months) than a Caucasian- American convict (34.07 months), t(246) = -2.10, p < .05. This finding confirmed hypothesis 5, Caucasian-American subjects are likely to recommend a longer sentence length to an African-American defendant than a Caucasian-American defendant. Interaction of Egalitarian Constraint with Population Based on the assumption that a reduction in egalitarian constraint would impact decision-making only in general-public subjects making sentence recommendation, hypothesis 6 predicted that for convicted defendants, longer sentence recommendation will be given by general-public subjects to an African-American defendant than by general-public subjects to a Caucasian-American defendant or college-student subjects to defendants of either race. 77 To test this hypothesis, only subjects who gave a guilty verdict were included (regardless of the “evidenCe of guilt” condition subjects were assigned) (E =248). The obtained data of recommended sentence length for convicted defendants are illustrated in Table 5. A planned comparison ANOVA was conducted. Contrast coefficients of -1, -l , - l were assigned to the college-student x Caucasian-American defendant, college-student x African-American defendant, and general-public x Caucasian-American defendant conditions, while a coefficient of 3 was assigned to the general-public x African- American defendant condition. Results of this analysis show support for hypothesis 6. A significantly longer sentence length was given in the general-public subjects’ recommendations for a convicted African-American defendant than was given in any other condition (1(244) = 3.50, p < .01). 78 {able 5 Recommended Sentence Len for Convicted Defendants College-student subjects General-public subjects Caucasian-American 31.96 35.87 defendant (_I‘_l = 53) (a = 62) African-American 36.79 56.82 defendant (3 = 77) (r_1 = 56) Note. Recommended sentence length was measured in months. 79 IflfOI'mation Load and A lication of Racial Stereo es It was expected that individuals may apply available heuristics in sub-optimal cognitive conditions, such as when processing excessive amounts of information. As information load raises, the likelihood of heuristic application increases, and therefore, the impact of applied heuristics strengthens. Based on the assumption that general-public subjects hold more negative stereotypes toward African Americans than college—student subjects, hypothesis 7 predicted that when evidence toward a defendant’s guilt is ambiguous, general-public subjects will have greater confidence in the guilt for an African-American defendant in a high information-load condition than in a low information-load condition. To test this hypothesis, a planned comparison AN OVA was conducted on the obtained data of confidence of guilt in African-American defendants’ guilt (see Table 6). Since our manipulation check already established a main effect of the evidence of guilt treatment, contrast coefficients of 0, 0, 0, 0 were assigned to confidence in guilt across all four “guilty evidence” conditions. Contrast coefficients of -1 , -1, -1 were assigned to the college-student x low-information—load, college—student x high-information-load, and general-public x low-information-load conditions, while a coefficient of 3 was assigned to the general-public x high-information load condition. The test of hypothesis 7 failed to show that high-information load increased the confidence of guilt for an African-American defendant by general-public subjects in the ambiguous evidence condition (1(216) = -.90, p = .37). Failure to find support for the interaction expected is not surprising. Since preliminary tests showed college-student 80 subjects to hold negative stereotyped perceptions of African Americans similar to the general public, the differences predicted by hypothesis 7 should no longer be expected. 81 fable 6 confidence in African-American Defendants’ Guilt General public College student Low High Low High information information information information load load load load Ambiguous 48% 50% 54% 60% evidence (r_1 = 26) m = 30) (a = 28) (a = 32) Guilty 79% 72% 74% 67% evidence (a = 19) (a = 25) (a = 35) (g = 29) Note. Confidence of guilt was measured by a scale ranging from 0 to 100%. 82 ..a Based on the assumptions both that (l) general-public subjects have negative ste'fCOtypes of African American not found in college-student subjects and (2) a reduction in egalitarian constraint would therefore impact decision-making only in general-public subjects making sentence recommendation, hypothesis 8 predicted that for convicted African-American defendants, longer sentence recommendation will be given by general- public subjects under high-information—load conditions than by general—public subjects under low-information—load conditions or college-student subjects under either high or low information load conditions. To test this hypothesis, only the subjects who gave a “guilty” verdict for an African-American defendant were included (no matter what evidence condition, ambiguous or guilty, they were originally assigned) (l_\I_ = 133). The obtained data of recommended sentence length for convicted African-American defendants are illustrated in Table 7. A planned comparison ANOVA was conducted. Contrast coefficients of -1, -1, -1 were assigned to the college-student x low-information— load, college-student x high-information-load, and general-public x low-information- load, while a coefficient of 3 was assigned to the general-public x high-information-load condition. 83 Tabl 13:61 Table 7 Recommended Sentence Len for Convicted African-American Defendants College-student subjects General-public subjects Low information load 27.22 57.21 (a = 37) (n = 24) High information load 45.65 56.53 m = 40) (n = 32) Note. Recommended sentence length was measured in months. 84 Results of this analysis failed to show suppOl't for hypothesis 8 (t( 129) = 1.43, p = .16). The failure to find support for hypothesis 8 is no surprise here. The earlier tests of these data have demonstrated some evidence violating the assumptions relied by hypothesis 8. In contrast to expectations, college-student subjects were found to have negative stereotypes of African Americans similar to those that were held by their general—public counterparts. In addition, the support for hypothesis 6 suggests that the sentence length determination condition removed egalitarian constraint for general—public subjects and resulted in their use of negative stereotypes in determination of sentence length. They gave high sentence-length recommendations for convicted African- American defendants while college student gave low recommendations. Given these two conditions, we might expect that the impact of high-information load on heuristic application would only effect these decisions by reducing constraints on college students’ use of negative stereotypes on decisions of sentence length. Since general-public subjects are already giving high recommendations, the only condition in which egalitarian constraint should remain in force would be found in college-student subjects under low information-load conditions. As such, under conditions of high-information load, college students should be predicted to give lengthy sentence recommendations similar to those expected in general-public subjects’ recommendations in the high or low information- load conditions. This would appear in the data as an interaction between population and information load in which recommended sentence length of college students in the low information load condition are expected to be shorter than subjects in other conditions. This prediction was tested in post-hoc analyses using planned comparison tests. A contrast coefficient of -3 was assigned to the college-student x low-information-load 85 condition, while coefficients of l, l, 1 were assigned to conditions of college-student x high-information-load, general-public x low-information-load, and general-public x high- information-load. The results of this analysis show support for the post-hoc elaboration. For African-American defendants, a significantly lower sentence was given by the college- student subjects under low-information-load conditions than was given in any other condition elaboration (t(129) = 2.94, p < .01). 86 CO] cxi sys lim Discussion Study I attempted to look at the relationship of exposure to specific television content with perceptions of race and components of the legal system. In general, it was expected that exposure to content believed to provide limited images of race and legal system components would be associated with perceptions that are consistent with those limited images. As such, for example, heavier viewers of reality-based television shows were expected to have perceptions of African-American as criminal and violent, and heavier viewers of non-traditional news were expected to have negative perceptions of the justice system. Some support for these expectations were found, and differences in these perceptions associated with viewers’ race were noted. Racial Perceptions Initial analyses on racial perceptions were conducted to establish base-line racial- perception differences among different sub-groups within our sample. These analyses demonstrated that while African-American subjects in our study had similar perceptions of the criminal/violent tendencies found both in other African Americans and Caucasians, the perceptions of Caucasian subjects differed as a function of target race. Caucasian subjects believe that African Americans are more likely to commit crimes and behave violently than are Caucasian Americans. To some extent, the tendency for Caucasian subjects in this study to score higher on racism may help explain the discrepancy between perceptions held by Caucasians and African Americans. This becomes important for issues associated with Study 2, for it indicates that Caucasian Americans may be more likely to differently judge people from non-Caucasian races. 87 Media exposure and racial stereot_v_pes. There are many possible origins for negative racial stereotypes. The most obvious, of course, is that the dissimilarity between perceivers’ and targets’ races may cause uncertainties and prejudices toward each other. Out-group members are ofien seen as competitors for scarce resources and threatening to the in-group members’ territory, cultural identity, safety, well-being, and material interests (Van Dijk, 1987). Therefore, they become an easy target for the application of blame and negative stereotypes. This study demonstrates that race is a strong predictor for stereotypes of African Americans as criminally or violently inclined. More central to the issues for Study 1, however, are sources of racial stereotypes related to mass media exposure. As suggested above, different media genres were expected to vary in their associations with such stereotypes. Consistent with these expectations, reality-based television police shows were found to be a potential, though not significant, predictor for the stereotype of African Americans being criminal or violent. Furthermore, it is also found that reality-based police shows predict racism, another source of heuristic considered to impact possible racial bias in decisions against minorities. Also interesting in this regard is the failure to find exposure to television news associated with the negative African American stereotypes. Television news broadcasts have been criticized for often portraying African Americans as criminal and physically threatening (e.g., Entman, 1990, 1992, 1994a; Jamieson, 1992; Sheley & Ashkins, 1981). At the same time, however, we must consider the unpredicted finding that exposure to television news does predict lower beliefs that Caucasian Americans are criminally or violently inclined. These results indicate that the impact of television news’ portrayal of 88 ‘iF. I . _.. .h- - i‘f' ' I I ’7' ‘J Afi'ican Americans as criminal or violent may not become apparent in the negative African American stereotypes. Its influence might result from the establishment of a comparative base for perceptions of Caucasian Americans. That is, compared with the negative African-American images provided by television news, Caucasian Americans appear to be much less criminally or violently inclined. Impressions of the Justice System Consistent with expectations, the findings in Study 1 demonstrate overall negative impressions of the justice system and the criminal trial process. Subjects display skepticism and distrust in the justice system’s impartiality and objectivity. More specifically, people believe that (1) the criminal trial operation is likely to accuse innocents but let real criminals get away, (2) the justice system is monetarily corrupted, (3) there is a lot of authority and power abuse involved in the justice system and criminal trial process, (4) juridic judgments are often influenced by personal opinions rather than objective truths, and (5) the whole system is racially prejudiced, particularly in favor of Caucasian Americans. These negative attitudes also spread to specific components of the justice system. Most important characters in criminal trial processes, including police officers, expert witnesses, bystander witnesses, jurors, and lawyers, are evaluated at the low end of credibility scales for their performance in law enforcement and courtroom duties. Race as a predictor of mrceptions. Not surprisingly, race is a strong predictor of impressions and attitudes toward the justice system and its subcomponents. The perceptions of the criminal-justice system as prejudiced and unjust found in the general population is amplified in African Americans. Minority members hold such belief even 89 more strongly, perhaps because they belong to the gTOUp most often victimized by the system. Compared with Caucasian Americans, African Americans are more likely to associate the criminal trial process with images of authorities abusing power and a system that is biased both against African Americans and in favor of Caucasians. At the same time, African Americans have less confidence in the credibility of justice-system characters, such as police officers, expert witnesses, judges, and lawyers. In particular, distrust of police officers is most strongly associated with race. Perhaps this is because police officers are the frontline figures in contact with legal or criminal issues and therefore the ones most directly associated with unfavorable experiences. Media exposure as a predictor of perceptions. Once again, the more central issue for Study 1 is the extent to which media exposure is a predictor for justice-system impressions. Initial tests failed to support the predicted associations between non- traditional news and perceptions. However, exploratory analyses associated with research question 4 showed that exposure to reality-based police shows, legal/police dramas, and other forms of news were associated with different ideas and attitudes about the justice system and its subcomponents. Realig—based police shows and legal/mlice drama provide some interesting comparisons. Analyses on reality-based television police shows, like “Cops,” “Unsolved Mysteries,” and “America’s Most Wanted,” suggest that viewing is associated with deteriorating trust in the justice system. Heavier reality-based police show viewers are more likely to think that juridic judgments are often affected by personal opinions rather than objective evidence, and that the justice system is racially prejudiced. They also have 90 less cOl’lfidence in courtroom characters’ credibility, such as jurors’ ability to thoroughly consider evidence objectively reach a verdict. On the other hand, exposure to fictional legal/police television dramas is associated more with positive images of justice-system personages. Heavier viewers have more confidence in several representatives of the court including police officers, lawyers, and judges. These observed associations seem consistent with expectations that might be made based on image in the content of television programs included in this study’s media exposure measures. Among the six shows listed in the legal/police drama category, “NYPD Blue,” “Homicide,” and “Brooklyn South” take perspective of police officers and detectives’ involvement in crime fighting. “The Practice” and “Michael Hayes” portray legal processes from the point of view of lawyers. “Law and Order” merges both the formats of police investigation and courtroom prosecution. The conventional format of these television productions usually present their protagonists (i.e., police officers and lawyers) with charming, trustworthy, and professional attributes. Therefore, exposure to such representations would be expected to result in positive attitudes towards the portrayed characters. Comparison among various forms of news exposure also provides valuable insight. It was suggested that reliance on television news tends to erode confidence levels in democratic institutions and govermnental activities (Becker & Whitney, 1980; Miller & Reese, 1982). The present investigation found that exposure to television news does predict a stronger belief that the criminal trial process is problematic. Heavier viewers perceive the system as more likely to accuse innocents and let real criminals get away and to be prejudiced in favor of Caucasian Americans. However, other measures showed 91 rpm heaVier television news viewers are less likely to think that the justice system is rac'lally biased, and, though not statistically significant, are less likely to think that the syStem is racially prejudiced against African Americans. This phenomenon seemed to imply that the image of the justice system being racially biased is more associated with its racial discrimination against African Americans, but not the treatments related to Caucasian Americans. Contrary to the expectations, exposure to non-traditional news sources including television news magazines, television tabloids, entertainment talk shows, and political talk shows, does not predict negative perceptions of the justice system and its components. In the present study, non-traditional news media viewing generates a greater confidence in bystander witnesses’ credibility and reduces viewers’ doubt that trial verdicts are decided more on personal opinions than objective facts. The manifest damaging effects of such non-traditional news media on perceptions of the police found in the study of Pfau, et al. (1997) do not appear in the present investigation. The inconsistent findings among studies lead to questioning the suitability of combing those various types of television programs (i.e., television news magazines, television tabloids, entertainment talk shows, and political talk shows) into one single category as non- traditional news sources. These television genres do contain certain common features, such as including material about current news and public affairs into their production formats. However, each television genre ofien represents one issues with its unique approach: some with sarcasm (e.g., entertainment talk shows), some with multi-angle discussions (e.g., political talk shows), and some with case interviewing or investigation (e. g., news magazines or television tabloids). Combining these different genres together 92 '19 analYSaes may nullify or skew their effects on Viewers’ perceptions. Although empirical research on the effects of these modalities is still quite limited (Pfau & Eveland, 1996; PrieSt & Dominick, 1994), with their increasing popularity, these non—traditional television news sources are likely to receive greater attention and study. In addition to traditional and non-traditional television news sources, exposure to newspamr and radio also appears to predict impressions of the justice system. Inconsistent with the findings of Pfau et al. (1997), in the present study, newspaper reading predicts lower confidence in the credibility of courtroom characters, especially bystander witnesses, jurors, and judges. Furthermore, newspaper reading predicts stronger beliefs that judicial judgments are based mostly on opinion and are racially prejudiced. On the other hand, opposite to the effects of newspaper reading, exposure to political talk radio predicts greater confidence in the credibility of police officers, bystander witnesses, and juries, and reduces listeners’ suspicion about the justice system and criminal trial processes’ precision and impartiality. Heuristics Application and Juridic Decision-Making Study 2 attempted to test the alternative explanations associated with population differences and egalitarian constraint for the unexpected findings on juridic decision- making in the study by Tamborini et a1 (1997), and investigate the impact of information load on heuristics application in the process of terminating verdict and sentence length. Racial stereotypes. Although it has been suggested that Caucasian-American college students may be more liberal on racial issues than their general-public counterparts, the present study found that both Caucasian-American college-student subjects and general-public subjects possess stronger negative stereotypes against African 93 Mencans in terms of criminality and violence than toward Caucasian Americans. By contrast, African-American subjects were undifferentiated in their evaluations of cr'lm'mality and violence across races. The observed similarity between Caucasian college-student and general-public samples is somewhat in conflict with the explanation of population difference in racial stereotypes for Tamborini and his colleagues’ (1997) failure to observe racially-biased guilt judgments toward an African-American defendant by Caucasian student subjects. The evidence of this study supports egalitarian constraint as a better explanation for discrepant judgments by Caucasian Americans. Juridic decision-making by Caucasian Americans. Though existing racial stereotypes may play a role in decision-making, they are not necessarily applied to all tasks of legal judgments of Caucasian Americans. In the present study, regardless of whether the evidence was ambiguous or clear, college-student subjects expressed equal confidence in the guilt of defendants across races (Caucasian American vs. African American). This replicates the finding of Tamborini en al. (1997), in which Caucasian college-student subjects also judged the likelihood of being found guilty to be the same for both Caucasian and African American defendants. When considering the explanatory logic offered, the results of this study were inconsistent with some expectations. The proposition based simply on population differences between college students and the general public suggested that general-public subjects are less liberal and more likely to apply racial stereotypes against African- American defendants. In contrast to this, a non-racially discrepant pattern for measures of confidence in the guilt of defendants was found for general-public subjects as well as college-student subjects. At the same time, explanations based simply on the egalitarian 94 flame of the decision tasks were challenged by findings in this study. The egalitarian 001191811“ rationale led to expectations that biased decision-making would be observed in me sentence lengths recommended to a African-American defendant. However, overall, the sentence lengths recommended by Caucasian college students was equal for Black and White defendants. The explanation most consistent with these data is one based on the interaction of population difference and egalitarian constraint. As predicted by this logic, differences in judgment were observed only for general-public subjects, and only in the task of recommending sentence length. After a defendant was convicted and in this manner, the egalitarian constraint was lightened, general-public subjects recommended significantly longer sentences for a convicted African-American defendant than did general-public subjects for a convicted Caucasian-American defendant, or college-student subjects for either convicted Caucasian and African—American defendants. These findings lead to the conclusion that there indeed exist certain differences between the general public and college students, but not in their negative racial stereotypes of Afiican Americans. Both populations believe that Afiican Americans are more criminally or violently inclined than Caucasian Americans. The population difference is more likely to be discovered in each of the conditions under which this stereotype impacts judgments. Findings are consistent with an interpretation that eagerness of presenting an egalitarian image constrains application of racial stereotypes, especially in juridic decision of guilt. This situation emphasizes equity and blind justice. Therefore, when asked to estimate the probability of guilt of a defendant or reach a verdict for a trial, the egalitarian-laden nature of the situation led both general-public and 95 18C CO] college-Student subjects to make judgments while repressing application of existing racial stereOtypes. Recommendation of sentence length, however, appears to be influenced by a different process. The present investigation shows that general-public subjects recommended longer sentences for convicted African-American defendants than convicted Caucasian-American defendants. Since decisions of sentences were made after a defendant’s guilt has been decided, that is, situational ambiguity and pressure for racially-blind justice have been lightened, the application of racial stereotypes is more likely be activated. This observation suggests that the forces of egalitarian constraint that repress application of racial stereotypes are somewhat limited for the general public. The functions of egalitarian pressure for this population vary along with given tasks even within situational setting. It appears that awareness of egalitarianism is a stronger internal factor for college students. While general-public subjects were demonstrating their racially discrepant tendencies in recommended sentence lengths for convicted defendants, college-student subjects still treated convicted defendants of both races equally--evidence that college- student subjects were again repressed by egalitariarrism to apply racial heuristics even though tasks changed. Apparently for this population, sentencing also creates an awareness of the need for egalitarian. These findings demonstrate the existence of population difference between the general public and college students, but the differences exist in egalitarian character instead of racial stereotypes concerning criminality or violence. Both college students and the general public perceive African Americans as more criminal and violent image. 96 flOWeVer, a strong faith in egalitarianism represses college students’ application of negative racial stereotypes in situations where the general public would use them in decisions harming African Americans. The Impact of Information Load on Heuristic Application The present study found evidence for the effects of information load on application of racial stereotypes in some areas of juridic decision-making. It is no surprise that general-public and college-student subjects’ estimations for the probability of an African-American defendant’s guilt did not vary across conditions of information load. The findings of this study have suggested that egalitarian constraint fimctions to restrain these populations from applying racial-stereotype heuristics in such decision-making situations. However, although no impact was found on general-public subjects’ use of negative stereotypes on convicted African-American defendants when deciding strength of punishment, quantitative information load did alter the impact of applied heuristics for college students--the recommended sentence length increased when information processing load was high. The findings indicated that general-public subjects used negative stereotypes in determination of sentence length regardless of egalitarian constraints, therefore, it left no space for the impact of information load to function as a boosting application of heuristics associated with those stereotypes. On the other hand, evidence in this study shows that negative stereotypes toward African Americans exist for college students, though their availability for use seems more likely to be repressed by egalitarian constraint in the juridic decision-making task than they are for the general public. However, increasing information load can function to reduce the egalitarian constraint, 97 afld lead college-student subjects to use the existing Stereotypes in determination of Sentence length in much the same manner as their general-public counterparts always did. 98 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Though reaching beyond the hard evidence found in the data here, the results of this Study suggest a picture of media exposure, racial heuristics and juridic decision- making with critical implications for society. Consistent with expectations, the media exposure appears to be associated with stereotypes of both race and the criminal-justice system. Heavy viewing of reality-based police shows and their negative portrayal not only predicts perceptions of African- Americans as criminal and violent, but also predicts dubious perceptions of the justice system as biased and untrustworthy. At the same time, however, exposure to fictional legal/police drama and its more admirable portrayal of the criminal-justice system is associated with greater confidence in the court and its representatives. All this suggests that these media images can play an important part in the structure of perceptions that relate to race and the criminal-justice system. When this is combined with evidence that these images are connected to juridic decision-making, the importance of these issues becomes more apparent. The study shows that both general-public and college-student Caucasian populations hold negative stereotypes of African-Americans as criminal and violent-- similar to those stereotypes associated with heavy exposure to certain television programming. Further, it is apparent that these perceptions are related to biased decision- making processes, particularly when decision-makers are faced with tasks requiring them to process heavy information loads. Since this is precisely the type of task with which jurors are likely to be confronted in a criminal trial decision-making process, we can expect African-American defendants in court to suffer great harm as a result of these 99 (regative stereotypes being used as heuristics in these judgement processes. To the extent mat this is unacceptable in a society, the results of this unintentional process are problematic. In terms of future research, a closer examination of media contents may give a more precise understanding of each media genre’s effects on audiences’ impressions of social reality. For example, among those so-called non-traditional television news sources, entertainment talk shows may differ with political talk programs in their tones and depths in the deliberation of political affairs. Even daytime and nighttime entertainment talk shows target different aspects of social issues, and this may impact perception. Additionally, further investigations on interaction between media exposure and individual characteristics may provide a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying how people construct stereotypes. Based on differential backgrounds and concerns, individuals often react to incoming information with various interpretations. Race, sex, partisanship, residence environment, or other personal experiences, will resonate with or contradict media experiences. More evidence is needed to clarify the effects of information load on heuristic application. Though we know that information load can impact heuristic application under some conditions, such as when egalitarian constraint is inactive, certainly, there are other factors influencing when the effect of information load will or will not be enacted. Identifying these factors is important for our understanding of the conditions leading to these influences. lOO Other factors should also be considered for studies of juridic decision-making. For example, group communication plays an important role in a jury’s consideration of criminal trial evidence. For example, perhaps peer pressure that comes with small group discussion will interact with egalitarianism to affect juridic decisions. Better understandings of the involved variables and mechanisms should benefit attempts to improve objectivity and justice in the criminal trial system. 101 APPENDIX A ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS FOR THE PILOT-TEST ANALISYS OF JUSTICE-SYSTEM-PERCEPTION SCALES (1) If a defendant has committed a crime, s/he is always convicted. (2) People who are guilty of a crime always get punished in our court system. (3) Innocent defendants never get convicted. (4) Our crirrrinal trial system would never put an innocent person in jail. (5) In our judicial system, money can buy freedom for criminals. (6) If a criminal is rich, s/he can easily get away with the crime s/he committed. (7) Rich people can buy themselves out of the punishment they deserve. (8) The justice of the court is controlled by some certain authorities. (9) A defendant’s destiny actually relies on the authorities of the system. (10) The current judicial system and criminal trial process have involved a lot of power abuse. (11) In the current judicial system, a verdict is decided more on opinions than facts. (12) The judgments on defendants are often influenced by personal perceptions rather than objective truth. (13) It is very likely that personal opinions get involved in the decision of a criminal trial. (14) A defendant's race is ofien a factor influencing the jury's judgment in the US. judicial system. x (15) It is likely that our justice system might be racially prejudiced. 103 - ------------------- F A C T O R Rotated Factor Matrix: F1 F2 Item2 .80 .20 Item4 .79 .03 Item] .73 .08 Item6 .71 .07 Item8 .04 .94 Item9 .13 .87 Item7 .30 .70 Itemll -.09 .05 ItemlO .10 .13 Item12 .21 .25 Iteml4 .11 .14 Item13 -.13 .06 Item15 .19 .13 Item17 .04 .1 1 Iteml6 .08 .13 Factor Transformation Matrix: F1 F2 F1 .50 .58 F2 -.85 .19 F3 .04 .03 F4 .08 -.44 F5 .14 -.66 Note. Items 1 to 4 are reverse-coded for data analysis. Fl: unjust-trial; F2: money- corrupted; F3: authority-abused; F4: opinion-based; F5: racially-biased. ANALYSIS ................... F3 .13 .10 —.11 .06 .02 .16 .33 .84 .76 .61 -.O4 .09 .07 .13 F3 .40 .29 -.51 —.32 .63 104 F4 .04 .07 .02 .06 .14 .15 .09 .08 -.02 .20 .81 .80 .67 .02 .12 F4 .35 .31 .80 .13 .35 F5 -.05 .07 -.01 .16 .04 .19 .ll .06 .06 .30 .21 -.10 .08 .90 .87 F5 .36 .24 -.31 .83 -.18 APPENDIX B MEDIA-EXPOSURE SCALE 1. In the past six months, how many hours of TV did you usually watch during each of the following four time periods on a Saturday ? (I) in the morning (6 am. to noon) (2) in the afiernoon (noon to 7 p.m.) (3) in the evening (7p.m. to II p.m.) (4) at night 0 never 0 up to 1 hr. 0 1 hr. to 2 hrs. a 2 hrs. to 3 hrs. 0 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 0 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. 0 5 hrs. to 6 hrs. 0 more than 6 hrs ‘ l L 17 WC ‘7 DUB D [1 fl BEDS DEUZI [3CD (11 p.m. to 6 am.) ;1 'v 1,) 2. In the past six months, how many hours of TV did you usually watch during each of the following four time periods on a Sunday ? (I) in the morning (2) in the afternoon (3) in the evening (4) at night (6 run. to noon) (noon to 7p.m.) (7p.m. to 11 p.m.) (11p.m. to 6 am.) 0 never E C 1’" i 0 up to 1 hr. 11 D D L1 0 1 hr. to 2 hrs. E :1 [J H o 2 hrs. to 3 hrs. D S U 1'1 0 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 1 ' U - 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. U 7 C ‘: 0 5 hrs. to 6 hrs. J _ u _ C1 C1 U o more than 6 hrs 3. In the past six months, how many hours of TV did you usually watch during each of the following four time periods on one single weekday on the average? (I) in the morning (6 am. to noon) (2) in the aflernoon (noon to 7 p.m.) (3) in the evening (4) at night 0 never 0 up to 1 hr. 0 1 hr. to 2 hrs. 0 2 hrs. to 3 hrs. 0 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 0 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. 0 5 hrs. to 6 hrs. 0 more than 6 hrs 17 D D D U D 1:" D 105 (7p.m. to 11pm.) U lL‘L'JClDDCJ (IIp.m. to 6 am.) Cl L1 L1 4' In the past six months, how many hours did you usually spend on listening to radio m (pry? f .7 : L1 T [,1 L1 . . About never up to 1 to 2to 3 to 4 to 5 to more than 1 hr. 2 hrs. 3 hrs. 4 hrs. 5 hrs. 6 hrs. 6 hr. 5. In the past six months, how often did you usually read newspaper (in a week)? 3 1' 1 1 l ; L‘ F1 ‘F 7 About never 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days a week 6. In the past six months, how many hours did you usually spend on listening to each of the following types of radio PER DAY? (I) music (2) national (3) political (4) sports (5) others radio and local talk radio radio news radio 0 never :1 I 13 0 up to 1 hr. a day 1] : D [1 a 0 1 hr. to 2 hrs. 1: 7 7 fl 1 o 2 hrs. to 3 hrs. E 3 _ 11 [1 o 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 1.. L1 7 F1 11 0 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. D D 13 C1 U o 5 hrs. to 6 hrs. :1 L1 1 1 g: I 6 hrs. to 7 hrs. L1 U 1.] F 1 1 o more than 7 hrs. _1 E 1 , 1 (please indicate how many) 106 ’l- In the past six months, how many hours of each of the following specific television programs did you usually watch PER WEEK (including weekdays and weekend)? (I) local (2) national (3) 20/20 (4) 60 (5) Prime (6) Dateline newscast nightly Minutes Time Live NBC newscast 0 never 3. ’i L 1 I up to 1 hr. a week 1] 11 1T1 7 _1 1,1 I 1 hr. to 2 hr. 1‘1 L1 1;? , 1, 1 1 I 2 hr. to 3 hrs. U [1 U 11 11 13 I 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 1] 11 L 1’1 1 1 i I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. 13 [1 L1 U C‘ U I more than 5 hrs. [1 D C1 L: r 17‘ ( 7) 48 (8) Public (9) Law & (10) The (I I) N YPD (12) Hours Eye Order Practice Blue Homicide I never D 1] 1] f1 U y I up to 1 hr. a week E [1 1,1 11 1‘] T; I | hr. to 2 hr. E U L1 C 1:: L1 I2hr.to3hrs. 17 l] [l 11 U L] I 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 1" [1 D 1: H 11 I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. C1 11 1'1 3 F1 11 I more than 5 hrs. ' ‘7 7 11 ’ (13) (14) (15) Inside (16) Hard (1 7)America (I8) Cops Brooklyn Michael Edition Copy n Journ South Hayes I never 1.1 ‘ C 1:1 L; T’ I up to 1 hr. a week U 1:] :1 I] 11 :1 I 1 hr. to 2 hr. 3 11 ,1 L1 L1 L1 0 2 hr. to 3 hrs. [1 E1 11 r {.1 .1 I 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. 121 L1 U L, ,1 L1 I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. C] C1 [1 Ci 1] 1.] I more than 5 hrs. D E 11 C 11 " (19) Real (20) (21)America (22) People’ (23) Judge (24) Stories of Unsolved 's Most Court Judy Cochran J: the Mysteries Wanted Company Highway Pm! I never U C E 1] [1 D I up to 1 hr. 3 week C1 C1 1] 1] D [1 I 1 hr. to 2 hr. [1 C. 1 D C [1 I 2 hr. to 3 hrs. [1 D l] [3 C1 I 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. U U U I T 17 I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. D [1 C1 3 [1 D I more than 5 hrs. (1 [1 L1 C1 L1 ; 107 (25) Cross ire (26) Meet the Press (2 7)Political (28) Tonight Iy Incorrect Show (29) Late ow with (30) Oprah Winfrey David I phat-nun- 0 never 11 L1 L1 ., oupto l hr.aweek 1:] L1 3 T1 1.1 ; o1hr.t02hr. 1‘1 11 I 3 T1 11 I 2 hr. to 3 hrs. E1 U 11 E1 11 11 I 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. F1 U H 11 C ‘7 I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. 13 1. L1 1 L1 T I more than 5 hrs. 7 U F1 L1 g ’ (31) Jenny (32) Monte! (33) (34) Jerry (35) Sally (36) Ricki Jones Williams Geraldo Springer Jessy Lake Raphael I never L1 '1 1 T1 ‘7’ 1 I up to 1 hr. a week L1 D 11 11 C 11 I 1 hr. to 2 hr. L’ 11 7 11 7 11 I 2 hr. to 3 hrs. 11 11 L1 11 11 r1 I 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. U 11 71 L1 L1 ' I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. [1 L1 11 L1 11 L I more than 5 hrs. E 13 fl ‘3 P L (3 7) Leeza (38) ESPN (39) MTV (40) (41) Friends (42) Home Seinfeld Improveme n! I never 3 F1 L L1 I up to 1 hr. a week D C1 D D L1 _ I 1 hr. to 2 hr. 11 L1 L1 11 C1 L I 2 hr. to 3 hrs. [1 [1 D 1:1 L1 U 0 3 hrs. to 4 hrs. L‘1 U 1:1 F 71 1 1 I 4 hrs. to 5 hrs. [1 1] C. 11 13 I more than 5 hrs. 1 1 1 108 APPENDIX C PERSONAL JURIDIC EXPERIENCE SCALE 1. Have you ever served as a juror for a trial? No_ Yes 2. Have the persons on the following list ever served as a juror for a trial? __ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes __ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes your girlfi‘iend/boyfriend/spouse your parents your brother/sister other family members friends other 3. Have you ever been a plaintiff in a criminal trial? No_ Yes 4. Have the persons on the following list ever been a plaintiff in a criminal trial? __ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes your girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse your parents your brother/sister other family members friends other 5. Have you ever been a defendant in a criminal trial ? No Yes 6. Have the persons on the following list ever been a defendant in a criminal trial? _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes _ No_ Yes __ No_ Yes your girlfriend/boyfi'iend/spouse your parents your brother/sister other family members friends other 109 II' '7'!” 1333376 you ever served as a witness (except being a plaintiff or a defendant) in a cnmmal trial? No_ Yes ‘ 8. Have the persons on the following list ever served as a witness (except being a plaintiff or a defendant) in a criminal trial? _ No_ Yes your girlfi'iend/boyfriend/spouse __ No_ Yes your parents __ No_ Yes your brother/sister _ No_ Yes other family members 1 ~ _ No_ Yes friends ' i _ No_ Yes other 1 ‘ ' '71”! 110 f. a APPENDIX D JUSTICE-SYSTEM BELIEFS SCALE 1. CAUCASIAN AMERICANS ARE CRIMINALLYNIOLENTLY INCLINED (1) I would agree that White people are inclined to use violence to solve conflicts. (2) White people have a strong tendency toward violence. (3) Caucasian Americans are very likely to behave aggressively. (4) According to statistics, a criminal is more likely to be Caucasian American than other races. (5) According to statistics, in armed robbery cases, the perpetrator is very likely to be Caucasian American. (6) According to statistics, in burglary cases, the perpetrator is very likely to be Caucasian American. 2. AFRICAN AMERICANS ARE CRIMINALLYNIOLENTLY INCLINED (1) I would agree that Black people are inclined to use violence to solve conflicts. (2) Black people have a strong tendency toward violence. (3) African Americans are very likely to behave aggressively. (4) According to statistics, a criminal is more likely to be African American than other races. (5) According to statistics, in armed robbery cases, the perpetrator is very likely to be African American. (6) According to statistics, in burglary cases, the perpetrator is very likely to be African American. 111 3.UNJUST-TR1AL SYSTEM 0) 1f a defendant has committed a crime, s/he is always convicted. (2) People who are guilty of a crime always get punished in our court system. (3) Innocent defendants never get convicted. (4) Our criminal trial system would never put an innocent person in jail. Note. All the four items are reverse-coded for data analysis. 4. MONEY-CORRUPTED JUDICIAL SYSTEM ( 1) In our judicial system, money can buy freedom for criminals. (2) If a criminal is rich, s/he can easily get away with the crime s/he committed. (3) Rich people can buy themselves out of the punishment they deserve. 5. AUTHORITY-ABUSED JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1) The justice of the court is controlled by some certain authorities. (2) A defendant’s destiny actually relies on the authorities of the system. (3) The current judicial system and criminal trial process have involved a lot of power abuse. 6. OPINION-BASED VERDICTS (1) In the current judicial system, a verdict is decided more on opinions than facts. (2) The judgments on defendants are often influenced by personal perceptions rather than objective truth. (3) It is very likely that personal opinions get involved in the decision of a criminal trial. 112 I Ifliildlllllllu It .... .. 7.RAC1ALLY BIASED SYSTEM 0) A defendant's race is ofien a factor influencing the jury's judgment in the US. judicial system. (2) It is likely that our justice system might be racially prejudiced. 8. TRIAL-BIAS IN FAVOR IN CAUCASIAN AMERICAN (1) Caucasian Americans are very likely to be treated unfairly in the current judicial system. (2) Many jury members have a prejudice against Caucasian-American defendants. (3) Convicted Caucasian—American defendants are sentenced more severely than they deserve. (4) Judges often discriminate against Caucasian-American defendants. (5) It is very likely that innocent people are convicted in our judicial system because they are Caucasian Americans. Note. All the five items are reverse-coded for data analysis. 9. TRIAL-BIAS AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN (1) African Americans are very likely to be treated unfairly in the current judicial system. (2) Many jury members have a prejudice against Afi'ican-American defendants. (3) Convicted African-American defendants are sentenced more severely than they deserve. (4) Judges often discriminate against African-American defendants. (5) It is very likely that innocent people are convicted in our judicial system because they are African American. 113 10. POLICE CREDIBILITY (1) It is likely that police officers may provide misleading testimony in a trial. (2) The credibility of the police is undoubted. (3) Police officer’s judgments are always reliable. (4) I believe that police officers always conduct their duties in an objective way. (5) Many police officers abuse power for personal interests. (6) Police officers will do anything for the right price. (7) Many police officers are inclined to use violence to solve problems. (8) Police officers ofien commit serious violations of law. (9) Police officers may be biased against or in favor of a defendant because of the defendant's race. (10) It is likely that a police officer’s judgments may be influenced by pre-existing racial stereotypes. (11) A suspect’s race is an important factor affecting a police officer’s duty operation . ll. EXPERT CREDIBILITY (1) It is likely that expert witnesses’ (e.g., criminologist, lab technician, etc.) statements may be biased. (2) It is likely that an expert witness may give misleading testimony in a trial. (3) I believe that expert witnesses always provide accurate information in a courtroom. (4) I believe that expert witnesses always give objective statements in a trial. (5) The credibility of expert witnesses’ testimony is undoubted. (6) Expert witnesses may be biased against or in favor of a defendant because of the defendant’s race. (7) It is likely that an expert witness’s statements may be influenced by pre-existing racial stereotypes. 114 12. BYSTANDER WITNESS CREDIBILITY (1) It is likely that witnesses' statements may be biased. (2) It is likely that a witness may give a misleading testimony in a trial. (3) I believe that witnesses always provide accurate information in a courtroom. (4) I believe that witnesses always give objective statements in a trial. (5) The credibility of witnesses’ testimony is undoubted. (6) Witnesses may be biased against or in favor of a defendant because of the defendant's race. (7) It is likely that a witness’s statements may be influenced by pre-existing racial stereotypes. Note. Items 1, 2, 6, and 7 are reverse-coded for data analysis. 13. JURY CREDIBILITY (1) It is likely that a juror may be biased when making legal decisions for a trial. (2) It is likely that jurors make judgments based on personal opinions rather than objective facts. (3) Most jurors fail to consider all the facts of the case. (4) Jurors often fail to pay close attention to the evidences presented in the trial. (5) Most jurors don’t have the expertise required to make an informed judgment in criminal trials. (6) Most jurors can be easily persuaded in a courtroom. (7) Jurors’ judgments about a case can be easily influenced by a good lawyer. (8) Jurors may be biased against or in favor of a defendant because of the defendant’s race. ' 115 (9) 1‘ is likely that a juror’s judgment may be influenced by pre-existing racial stereotypes. 14. JUDGE CREDIBILITY (1) A judge always stays neutral when conducting court. (2) The credibility of a judge is undoubted. (3) A judge may abuse his/her authority for personal interests. (4) A judge can be bought for right price. (5) A judge may be biased against or in favor of a defendant because of the defendant’s race. (6) It’s likely that a judge’s decisions may be influenced by pre-existing racial stereotypes. 15. LAWYER PERCEPTIONS (1) Lawyers are always looking for money rather than justice. (2) Most lawyers are greedy. (3) Money can buy lawyers to do anything for you. (4) Lawyers successfully help their clients to get fair trials. (5) Lawyers are reliable experts. (6) Lawyers try to manipulate the facts rather than to provide the truth in the courtroom. (7) Lawyers trick people into saying or doing things in order to win a case. 16. PRESUMED GUILTY (1) Before a trial begins, I would assume a defendant is very likely to be guilty. 116 (7") A dflfendant must have done something to violate the law in order to put himself(herself) in a trial situation. (3) A defendant must be guilty otherwise he(she) would not be brought to trial. (4) A case would never get to trial unless there was a high likelihood that the defendant was really guilty. 17. REASONABLE DOUBT (1) I believe that “people are innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” f should be the primary guideline for our jury system. (2) Defendants should be treated as innocent unless we find a great deal of evidence to the contrary. (3) It is righteous to require the prosecution to prove that a suspect is guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt". (4) In a court of law, a judge should always give a defendant the benefit of any doubt. Note. Responses to the above seventeen scales are measured in a 7-point Likert-type format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (stroneg agree). 117 APPENDIX E RACISM TENDENCY SCALE (1) Ethnic minorities are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. (2) Certain different ethnic cultures in the United States are a threat to our society. (3) Over the past few years ethnic minorities have received more economic advantages than they deserve. (4) Over the past few years the government has allocated more resources to ethnic minorities than they deserve. (5) Over the past few years the news media have shown more respect to ethnic minorities than they deserve. (6) It is ridiculous that ethnic minority members complain about the discrimination they claim they have been encountering. (7) The people who raise all the talk about putting minorities on the same level as Caucasian Americans are mostly radical agitators trying to stir up conflicts. Note. Responses to the scale are measured in a 7-point Likert-type format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly aggee). 118 APPENDIX F THE AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE-LOW INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT On Saturday, March 1, at 12:09 am, a robbery was reported to the Dalton County Sheriffs Department by Martin Johnson at 2341 Maple Rd, Dalton. The victim claimed he was not injured, but lost about 400 dollars in cash. About twenty minutes later, at 12:32 am, police officer Hendricks reported that he caught a suspect who possessed a gun and $ 400 in cash. The victim, Martin Johnson, 37 year-old, has lived at Dalton for 15 years. He is currently an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. The defendant, Robert Williams, a 25 year-old Caucasian (or African) American, is also an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. He moved fiom Miami, Florida, to Dalton five years ago after he graduated from high school. He had been periodically on welfare until he got a permanent job at Dalton Carpet Company eleven months ago. He currently lives with his girlfiiend and their children. This robbery case has been brought to trial. Four witnesses were called to provide their statements. They were officer Hendricks, the victim, Martin Johnson, the defendant, Robert Williams, and the criminology detective who conducted the following investigation and examined the obtained evidence, Kathleen Reid. Witness #1 (Police Officer Hendricks) Question: Please tell us your name and what happened that night. Response: My name is George Hendricks. On March lst, about 12:20 am, I detected a speeding car traveling about 80mph while I was patrolling on Route 75. I stopped it immediately. It was an '86 blue four door Chevy Cavalier with plate "CVL 641 ." It was confirmed that the car owner was Robert Williams, the driver. He is a(n) Caucasian (or African) American, 5’9” tall, and wearing a blue jacket and blue jeans. He was not drunk, but seemed to be in a big hurry for something. On inspection, I found that he was carrying a 45-caliber pistol and $ 400 in cash. Since a robbery had just happened, I took Mr. Williams to the station for further investigation. The defendant claimed that the gun belonged to his friend, Sam Morse. He was thinking about buying the gun from Mr. Morse, who had paged him that night and asked for the gun or the money immediately. Williams said that he was speeding because he promised to see his friend before midnight. We found Sam Morse and Morse said he might have paged the defendant that night, but was not sure. Mr. Morse also confessed that he lost a big bet and had to pay the bookie by midnight. So he asked Robert Williams at the beginning of the week to do him a favor by buying the gun so he could pay off the bet. Witness #2 (Officer Kathleen Reid, the criminology detective) Question: Please tell us your name, and what you did with this case. Response: My name is Kathleen Reid. I took charge of the investigation of this robbery. We quickly arranged a line-up identification at eight o’clock in the morning, March I". 119 However, although Mr. Johnson thought the robber’s voice sounded familiar to him, he didn’t feel certain enough to identify anyone, including the defendant, Robert Williams, as the robber. We found several fingerprints belonging to different persons and a Dalton Carpet Company mark on the flashlight found at the victim’s house. Unfortunately, most of the fingerprints had been damaged severely and were very difficult to identify. We checked the records of Robert Williams’ pager. There were five calls on Williams’ pager record that night and we found one call from Sam Morse. The call was made at 11:21 p.m., which was consistent with what the defendant claimed. However, after more questioning, we found that Williams was also involved in Morse’s gambling debt. We also found Mr. Johnson’s wallet two days later. On March 3rd, a woman found a wallet beside the dumpster located on Cooper St., which is 250 feet away from the victim’s house. Martin Johnson’s driver’s license was in that wallet. We examined the wallet and found some clear fingerprints. Two of them match with the wallet owner, Martin Johnson. However, the women sending the wallet to the station touched the wallet and unfortunately ruined most of the traces of fingerprints that might have been very helpful to us. Witness #3 (Martin Johnson, the victim) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened on the day you got robbed. Response: My name is Martin Johnson. I remember that Friday, several of us co-workers went to a bar together after work. Robert sat beside Larry, our supervisor, and the rest of us sat at another table. I was telling them about my Vegas trip, and how I was going to spend all my money. I was so excited that I even showed them all the cash I had on me. I don’t know if it means anything, but after we left the bar, Larry told me there was something wrong with Robert. He said that Robert told him he needed some money real bad and complained about how I had all this money I could waste. Robert told him that he might ask me to borrow some money since I had more money than I needed. Larry said that Robert seemed real desperate. When the robbery happened, I was already in my bed. A muffled noise woke me up. Before I could turn on the light, a voice in a strange low tone said, "I have a gun pointing right at you. Don't move or make any sound and I won't hurt you. I just want your money." His voice seemed familiar to me. He took my wallet and asked me to give him more money. Then, a car drove past my house and blew its horn. I think that scared him. He ran out the front door. I looked through the window and saw a man walk into an alley and disappear. The guy seemed about 6’ tall, and was wearing a dark jacket and black pants, though I’m not really sure about that because it was dark outside. I wasn’t even positive if he was the robber or not. I went downstairs and found a flashlight left in the front yard of my home. I think that the robber dropped it. There was $ 425 in my wallet. The next morning, I went down to the station to do a line-up identification. I was very surprised that Robert Williams was in the line-up. I could not identify anybody from the line-up as the robber. Witness #4 (Robert Williams, the defendant) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened that night. Response: My name is Robert Williams. On that night, I was playing with my kid until 10:00 p.m. After that, I watched TV with my girlfriend until 11 o’clock and then we went right to bed. We chatted for a while, about the kid and our bills. We have some problems 120 with the I! thinking a I live. 1 th a week ag night and fight awaj some casl only thing but 1 have Wlih the mortgage on our house. At about 11:30, My fiiend, Sam Morse, paged me. I was thmkmg about buying a handgun from him. It is n01 Very safe in the neighborhood where 1 live. I thought that I might need a weapon to protect my family. He showed me the gun a week ago and let me hold onto it while I made up my mind. He called me that Friday night and told me he really needed the money now, otherwise, I had to give the gun back right away so he could sell it to another buyer. It was Friday, and I just got paid, so I had some cash. I took the $ 400 and the gun with me. I know I was speeding, but that's the only thing I did wrong that night. I am not a crook. Ya, I have some financial problems, but I have never done anything bad to anybody. 121 THEAME The Robert Will 0n 1 Sheriffs D Johnson, c1 four hundr report was patrolling Hendricln suspect s: breathaly The polit 4S-calib1 police st currentl year-oh Compe from h Daltor their ( The r Daltt at 10c APPENDIX G THE AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE-HIGH INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT The case number 9793854 was brought to trial on April 19, 1997. The State vs. Robert Williams. On Saturday, March 1, at 12:09 am, a robbery was reported to the Dalton County Sheriff‘s Department by Martin Johnson at 2341 Maple Rd, Dalton. The victim, Martin Johnson, claimed neither he nor his family members were injured, but he did lose about four hundred dollars in cash. About twenty minutes after the call, at 12:32 am, another report was sent back to the station. The police officer on duty, Officer Hendricks, was patrolling Route 75 and reported having clocked a speeding vehicle at 80 mph. Officer Hendricks pulled over the driver, Robert Williams. Officer Hendricks recognized that the suspect seemed very nervous and suspicious. Acting on instinct, Officer Hendricks gave a breathalyzer test and performed a body search. There was no indication of drunk driving. The police officer, however, did find that the suspect possessed $400 in cash along with a 45-caliber gun. The suspect was therefore taken into custody down at the Dalton county police station for identification and firrther questioning. The victim, Martin Johnson, 37 year-old, has lived at Dalton for 15 years. He is currently an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. The defendant, Robert Williams, a 25 year-old Caucasian (or African) American, is also an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. He moved from Miami, Florida, to Dalton five years ago after he graduated fi'om high school. He had been periodically on welfare until he got a permanent job at Dalton Carpet Company eleven months ago. He currently live with his girlfriend and their children. Dalton, a middle-size city with a population of 115,000, is located on Route 75. The victim and the suspect are both employees of Dalton Carpet Company at Dalton. Dalton Carpet Co. supplies more than half of the world’s tufted carpet. In the early 1900's a local farm girl sold a hand-tufted bedspread for $2.50 and unknowingly revived a century-old craft that was to become a big business there. Although the bedspreads are no longer available, the craft is perpetuated in the production of floor coverings. Many people in Dalton and the towns around are involved in the carpet business. According to the annual report by Justice Department, the criminal rate of Dalton has been on the increase for the past five years. Officials reported 12 murders for the year of 1997, an increase of 11 percent from 1996 figures, 56 robberies in 1997, versus 48 for 1996, building up 17 percent, and 173 cases of theft, which is 21 percent higher than the figures of 1996. The analysts explain that several factors, including higher unemployment and drug use, might contribute to the increase of criminal rate. The main industry supporting Dalton and surrounding areas, carpet production, has been showing decline in the recent years. An the same time, changes in drug market participation, particularly in crack use and powdered cocaine use, is also very influential pattern. National Institute of Justice tracked criminal cases in the greater Dalton area from 1993 through 1997, and found there is a positive relationship between crack cocaine use and criminal rate. 122 Il- This robbery case has been brought to trial- Four witnesses were called to provide their statements. They were the police officer who arrested the defendant, George Hendricks, the victim of the robbery, Martin Johnson, the defendant, Robert Williams, and the criminology detective who conducted the following investigation and examined the obtained evidence, Kathleen Reid. Witness #1 (Police Officer Hendricks) Question: Please tell us your name and what happened that night. Response: My name is George Hendricks. I am the patrol officer on duty on March lst. I arrested the defendant, Robert Williams. Yes, on the night in question, I was on duty and parked beside Route 75 South. It's a great spot. I usually park in that same spot when I am patrolling Route 75. The spot is not easy to see when you're driving fast. It is covered by a lot of trees, with the ground level lower than the road. This allows me to have a much lower profile to speeding cars. So when speeders notice that I am there, it is too late. Anyway, remembering back to that night. I believe it was the night of March first and about 12:15 am, I had received a call from the station saying that an armed intruder had just robbed somebody. Dispatch also informed me of the robbery suspect's description: male, and about 5'10" in height. He was said to be wearing blue pants and a light weight jacket. The station had already dispatched other cars near the location of the neighborhood. Therefore, I reported my location and got permission to stay on route 75, to watch for anything that might seem a little bit out of the ordinary. Question: So, you were not on or near the spot where the robbery took place? Response: Yes. The place I stopped the defendant’s car is about 14 miles away from the victim, Mr. Martin Johnson’s house, where the robbery took place. Question: Please continue. Response: Just about 5 minutes after the station call, at 2:20 am, I detected a speeding car passing by the spot I parked and traveling about 80mph. J eez! The speed limit is only 55mph on that particular road because there is construction. The joker was over the speed limit by 25. Question: The driver, that is, the defendant of this case, didn’t see you when he past by you? Response: No, I don’t think so. As I told you, the spot I parked kept me in a low profile. Right after I detected the speeding car, I pursued the car with my signals flashing and it immediately pulled over. It was an '86 blue four door Chevy Cavalier. I had seen that make before, so I knew that it was made around '86 or '87. The license plate of the suspect’s car is "CVL 641." It has been confirmed that the car owner is Robert Williams, the driver. Finally I approached the car and asked the driver to hand over his license, registration, and proof of insurance. I instructed him to wait inside his car while I verified his information. I checked all the documents, and sure enough they were all legit. Then I asked him to step out of his car. Question: Can you describe the man you examined at the time? Response: Yes. The driver is a young Caucasian (or Afiican) American male, who is the defendant of the case. According to his driver’s license, he is 25 years old. When the man stepped out of the car, I noticed right away that he was wearing a blue rugged jacket and baggy blue jeans, exactly what the robber described was wearing. He was a couple inches shorter than me and I am 6’ even, and I checked his license and his height was 123 confirmed to be 5'9", also very close to the robber description. These made me feel a little uneasy. Question: Did the driver behave strangely or aggressively at that time? Was he drunk? Response: The reason he was stopped is he was speeding 25mph over the speed limit. And to my knowledge, I could not tell if he had been drinking. The car wasn't swerving at all and when I had approached the car he seemed very coherent and cooperative. Normally, I can tell if the driver has been drinking considering I have had plenty of experiences with them. However, in training, we are taught that if we are not 100 percent sure of a suSpect's alcohol intake then we should give a breathalyzer test. I have become aware that there are many drinking and driving arrests Friday through Saturday late at night. That's when everyone relaxes with what they call a social drink or two. So I took precautions and gave him an intoxication test, both oral and physical. He seemed very nervous about this. He declared that I was harassing him, and that I should just give him his ticket so he could be on his way. Question: Did you harass him? Response: Absolutely not. All I did followed the normal and legal procedure by the law. . I decided to give him a breathalyzer test. The breathalyzer test showed that he was not I drunk with a .04 level, which is under the legal limit, .07. However, when I performed a search for any illegal activity such as narcotics, he cringed. He seemed as though he was anxious to get rid of something real fast. From the way he was driving, I would say he was in a big hurry to get to his destination. I asked where he was heading to so late at night. He responded that he was going to see his friend. Yet because of the robbery report, I thought I should take extra precautions. Question: What additional action did you take? Response: I decided to search his car. Well it so happened that on inspection, I found that he was carrying 400 dollars in cash with him, and a 45-caliber pistol in the glove box. I was very glad to find the gun before any further action takes place. Question: You mean, you thought the defendant might use the gun for further action? Response: I didn’t mean something ugly definitely would happen, but who knows, you couldn’t be careful enough. Question: Could you describe the gun you saw that night? Response: The gun was a Model 274 with a rubber grip. There was not bullet inside the gun. That's the gun he was carrying at the time. Besides the gun, the driver kept lots of pop bottles in the trunk. Question: What did you do then? Response: 1 strongly suspected that Mr. Williams might be involved in the robbery reported earlier, therefore, I decided to take Mr. Williams back to the station for further investigation. Later, down at the station, I asked him about what I found. Mr. Williams claimed that the gun belonged to his friend, Sam Morse. He was drinking about buying the gun from Mr. Morse, who had paged him that night and asked for the gun or the money immediately. I asked him what he was doing when Mr. Sam Morse paged him. The defendant said he was at home watching TV with his girlfriend and their kid. The defendant said that he promised his friend that he would bring him the money by g midnight and that was the reason he was speeding. Finally, after all that, I explained why I he was being thoroughly interrogated and needed to be held at the Dalton County Sheriff _-L ' 124 ~ 5 A...” Department for a line-up identification since he Was taken as a suspect for an armed robbery. Question: Did you do anything to confirm the defendant’s statement? Response: Yes. After the interrogation, I made two phone calls before I let Mr. Williams make his. First, I called Williams’ girlfriend to check her boyfriend’s story, but only got the answering machine. Then, I tried to called Mr. Sam Morse, and yes, we found Sam Morse and checked with him about the defendant's story and also asked him to bring papers claiming ownership of the gun. Mr. Morse cooperated and told us that he might have paged the defendant that night though he couldn’t be absolutely sure if he really had made the call and the exact time he made it because he was very busy and called lots of his friends that night. However, Mr. Morse also confessed that he had just lost a very big and important bet and had to pay the bookie by midnight. He was frightened because he believed that the loan sharks were very dangerous and would do absolutely anything to get their money. He was panicking and almost hysterical over the thought of those guys hurting him or maybe even killing him. So he asde Robert Williams for a favor at the beginning of the week of either buying the gun he gave Mr. Williams one week before or at least getting some money to him before that Friday night so he could pay off the bet. Mr. Morse said that he was waiting for Robert Williams at home at the time, but Williams never made it because of the arrest. Question: Did you check out Mr. Sam Morse’s background? Was there any file for him? Response: Yes. I also did some background check on Mr. Sam Morse. Sam Morse was an employee of Dalton Carpet Company, but was fired two years ago due to his conduct of sexual harassment upon his female coworkers. He is currently unemployed. Mr. Morse was also arrested once for battery and illegal weapon possession, but the charge was dismissed. Witness #2 (Officer Kathleen Reid, the criminology detective) Question: Please tell us your name, and what you do with this case. Response: My name is Kathleen Reid. I am the criminology detective of Dalton County Sheriff Department. I took charge of the investigation on the robbery case that took place on March lst. Question: Could you tell us what did you find in your investigation? Response: The defendant, Robert Williams, was brought to the Dalton County Sheriff Department at one o’clock in the morning, March lst by Officer George Hendricks. Officer Hendricks made the document explaining that the defendant was brought to the station because of speeding and especially on the suspicion of committing an armed invasion and robbery. I examined the document and the robbery case report and then decide to proceed a further investigation. Question: What did you do next? Response: We quickly arranged a line-up identification at eight o’clock in the morning, March lst, and invited the victim, Mr. Martin Johnson down to the station to help us for the identification job. Besides the defendant, Mr. Williams, there were three other suspects in the line, including one from our disguised police officer. Though Mr. Johnson claimed that the robber’s disguised voice sounded familiar to him, unfortunately, Mr. Johnson didn’t feel certain enough to point out anyone, including the defendant, 125 Willia out in Quest Rap victir Resp print belo evit Ru by 1 ext Williams, from the crowd as the robber who threatened him or the man he saw running out from his house after the robbery happened. Question: So there is no direct eye witness? Response: Yes. We also asked people living in the neighborhood, but no one except the victim saw or heard what happened or the robber. However, we did other examinations. Question: What else did you do? Response: We found a flashlight left in the front yard of the victim’s house, which, according to Mr. Johnson, the victim, doesn’t belong to him. We examined the finger prints left on the flashlight and found that there were several sets of finger prints belonging to different persons. Question: Could you give us a brief explanation about how fingerprint would be used as evidence? Response: Sure. Fingerprinting is a method of identification using the impression made by the minute ridge formation or patterns found on fingertips. No two persons have exactly the same arrangement of ridge patterns, and the patterns of any one individual remain unchanged through life. Fingerprints may be classified and filed on the basis of the ridge patterns, setting up an identification system that is almost infallible. Question: Did you find any evidence from the fingerprints? Response: No, they didn’t help too much. Although the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a library of over 213 millions civil and criminal fingerprint cards, we was unable to match anyone of them. Most of the fingerprints found on the flashlight had been damaged severely and were very difficult to identify. We are also not sure that it was left by the robber that night. There was no direct evidence indicating that. However, the defendant claimed that he had never seen that flashlight before. It didn’t belong to him. There is a mark of Dalton Carpet Company on that flashlight. Since many people in this town working for the carpet factory, it could be anybody’s. Question: How about the phone call that the defendant claimed his friend made and asked him for the gun and the money that night? Response: We contacted the telephone company and checked the records of Robert Williams’ pager from 12:00 am, February 28th to 2:00 am, March lst. During the period of 26 hours, there were five calls on Williams’ pager record and we found one call from Sam Morse, who Robert Williams claimed as the owner of the gun and calling him that night to ask him to bring the money or the gun back. The call was made at 11:21 p.m., which was quite close to the time the defendant had claimed. Question: Have you checked with Mr. Sam Morse? Response: Yes. We talked with Sam Morse. Mr. Morse confessed that he was involved in a gambling debts and tried to get some money from Mr. Robert Williams to help himself out of the jam. However, after more drilling and questioning, we were able to find that Robert Williams was also involved in Morse's gambling game. According to Mr. Morse, Robert Williams got him connected with the broker he bet with. He doubted that Robert Williams himself might also gamble. Question: Was any lost item of Mr. Johnson’s found? Response: Yes. Two days later, a woman reported to the station that she found a wallet besides the dumpster located on Cooper St, which is 250 feet away from the victim’s house. There was a driver’s license and a health insurance card of Martin Johnson and 126 several pictures inside, but no cash or credit cards were found in that wallet. We carefirlly examined the wallet and found some vague fingerprints. However, the two clean enough to be recognized matched with only the wallet owner, Martin Johnson. The woman sending the wallet back to the police station accidentally touched the wallet and unfortunately ruined most of the traces of fingerprints that might have been very useful to us. Witness #3 (Martin Johnson, the victim) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened on the day you got robbed. Response: My name is Martin Johnson. Robert Williams and me are coworkers. We all work at the local carpet factory, Dalton Carpet Company, in the same low level job on the production line. We are what they call the "grunts" of the business. We handle all the dirty work. After work, sometimes a bunch of us go to a bar named "J's" downtown in Dalton. I remember that Friday at “J’s”, as usual, we just wanted to relax a little before we went home. There were seven or eight of us drinking together. All of us work together. Robert sat beside Larry, our supervisor, and the rest of us sat at another table. Well later that Friday night, I began telling them what I had planned in a trip to Las Vegas! I mean it's Las Vegas! What to expect but a little gambling! So I told them more on how I saved up some money on the side and how I planned to spend that money trying to win back what I had lost from the other trip! I was so excited that I even showed them all the cash I had on me! I know, that was pretty stupid to show around my money! Question: So you showed the cash you carried to the defendant at the bar? Response: Not just to him, to everybody!!! I didn’t specifically show it to someone. I mean, I took out the money from my wallet and started to count how much of cash I had in front of them. Robert was sitting at another table. Question: How much money did you have at that time? Response: I remembered that I had three one hundred dollar bills, six twenties, and five pieces of one. That’s total four hundred and twenty—five dollars. Question: What did you do next? After you showed them your money. Response: I put the money back in my wallet. We chatted for a while, and we left for home. Question: So next thing happened on you was the robbery? Response: Yes, oh, no. I don't know if this adds anything to what you want to know. But later after we left the bar, Larry dragged me aside and told me that there was something wrong with Robert. He said that Robert told him he needed some money real bad and complained about how I had all this money I could waste. Robert told him that he might ask me to borrow some money since I had more money than I needed. Larry said that Robert seemed real desperate and jealous of me. Larry didn't know what was going on with Robert or why he needed the money. I can understand that he’s trying to support a family but there is no way I would lend him money, I mean we are not that close. However, I didn't pay too much attention to it then, I thought Robert was just whining. Everybody whines sometimes. I told Larry to offer Robert some overtime, maybe that would shut him up for a while. However, maybe I just shouldn't rub all my extra money in their faces. Question: Did Mr. Williams come to ask you for a loan? Response: No, he did not. 127 quite dark on 51ml lamp (it live in, huh? Question: 1 Response: ‘ Question: Ruponse: while and but beion pointing want 3101 Y 011 km What in hatter Quest Quesfion: O.K.. What happened next? Response: After I got home, I fixed something to eat and watched TV for a while. However, I was tired and that night's show was just a rerun, so I decided to call it a day. Before I went to bed, I looked through the window behind my TV set and saw a man walking around the comer of the street I live on. I thought he was just drunk, so I didn't pay too much attention to him. People, mostly kids, sometimes walk through between our houses as a means of a short cut to Orchard St. It bothers me though. I was thinking about calling the town council and asking if there is any way to stop people passing through that small alley. Anyway, I didn't think it was my business when I saw that man. It was quite dark outside at the time and I don't think that I saw his face clearly. You know, the street lamp don’t work sometimes. I should have called about that too. What a place to live in, huh? Question: Was the man you saw around the comer Mr. Williams? Response: 1 did not know. It was too dark. Question: Could you describe how the robbery took place? Response: When the robbery happened, I was already in bed. I fell into sleep for a little while and then, suddenly, a muffled noise woke me up. I was going to turn on the light, but before I could reach the switch, a voice in a strange low tone said, "I have a gun pointing right at you. Be quiet, don't move or make any sound and I won't hurt you. I just want your money. Where is it? Give me your wallet." I was real anxious at that point. You know, he was pointing a gun at me! It was scary. My gut told me, "you better do what he says". My life was on the line. I didn't want to be hurt. I don’t believe it could happen on me. Question: Did you see the gun? Response: I don’t know. I don’t think so. It was too dark, and I was just waked by him. Question: Did the robber hurt you? Response: No. Question: Did you see the robber? Could you recognize him? Response: It was so dark that I couldn't even see his face, but I could hear his voice. I knew he was trying to disguise his voice. It was kind of weird, but it seemed familiar to me. I thought I had heard it before. However, I was too shocked and nervous to be able to recognize who the person might be. I told him my wallet was in my pants on the floor. I was so tired that I just took off my pants and threw them on the floor. I usually put my wallet on the side table right next to the bed, but I even forgot to do that. He grabbed my wallet fiom the pants and asked me to give him more money. I told him that I didn't have any more money in the house and that he could take anything else he wanted. Then a car drove past my house and blew its born. I think that scared him, cause the next thing I knew he just ran downstairs and got out the house with my wallet. He took all of my money. There must have been about 425 dollars in my wallet that night. I also had my driver license and several family pictures in that wallet. Question: What did you do after the robber lefi? Response: Well after I heard the door slam, I got up right away to look through the window. I saw a man walk into an alley and disappear. The guy seemed about 6’ tall and was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. I am not really sure about this because it was dark outside at that time. Question: What race was the person you saw, do you remember? 128 Response: male. 1w: Question: Ruponst hatched It is not 1 house. 1 the poll! time. I! any cri questit Response: I think he was a White (or Black) guy, an Caucasian (or African) American male. I was not really sure. I am even not positive if the guy I saw was the robber or not. Question: Then what did you do? Response: I went downstairs to see if anything was missing and to call the police. When I reached for the phone, I noticed in the front yard of my house he had left his flashlight. It is not mine, so I supposed that the robber carelessly dropped it when he rushed out my house. I didn't touch it in order not to leave my finger prints on it. Then I quickly called the police. After I hung up, I looked at my clock and saw it was about 12:10 am. at the time. The police arrived shortly after I called and went through my house searching for any criminal evidence and finger prints. One of the police officers asked me a few questions and told me I would need to come down the police station to answer some more questions. They also took the flashlight. Later in the morning, the police called and told me that they had gathered a few suspects and would like it if I could come down the station as soon as possible to identify one. They let me wait in a room with a big glass window, you know, that kind of glass only allowing one side to see through but not from the other side. There were four suspects in the room. I was very surprised that Robert Williams was in the crowd. I couldn’t believe my eyes. The police officer told me that Robert was arrested by speeding and on the suspicion of committing the robbery. But I was really not sure about that. Question: Was you able to identify the robber? Response: However, after all, I must admitted that I was unable to identify anybody in that room as the robber. You know, I even didn’t see very clearly the man running out the alley. I didn’t want to mistakenly accuse any innocent person. Witness #4 (Robert Williams, the defendant) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened that night. Response: My name is Robert Williams. On that night, 1 was playing with my kid until 10:00 p.m. My girlfriend, Shelly, and me have been together for three years and have one child, a boy. My boy Trevor is three years old. Then it was time for the kid to go to sleep, so I sent him to bed. After that, I watched a little TV with my girlfriend till around 11 o'clock. I remember that we were watching "Homicide." Question: What did you do after that? Response: After watching Homicide, I think it was about 11 o'clock. We went to bed together and chatted with each other for a little while, about the kid, my work, and the bills. Raising a kid costs a lot, food, diaper, toys, doctor, medicine, you name it. Who knows what next when he grows older. I can't believe how expensive it has gotten to take care a child. Then we discussed some problems with the mortgage on our house. That has become the bulk of our problems. I told Shelly that I was going to start putting in some overtime at work, to bring home extra money. Our factory recently got a big order in, so me and the guys on the production line are going to be busy. These conversations about money between me and my girlfriend seem to go on forever nowadays. Question: So you were in bed already. How come you got out again that night? Response: I heard my pager go off when my girlfriend and me were in the middle of our money talk. However, I didn't immediately check it until later that night. I got a pager, because my family and friends can call me at any time on my pager and not wake up my 129 girlfriend and the kid. You never know when yOU're needed so I just wanted to be prepared. Question: Who called you? ReSponse: After washing up, at about 11:30 p.m. I checked the message and it was from my friend, Sam Morse. I was thinking about buying a handgun from him. Question: A gun? Response: Yes, you know, because it is not very safe in the neighborhood where I live. It is close to work, but still not very safe. You always can see gangsters, those street kids, walking around. My neighbor’s house just got invaded by a theft when they were out for work. So I thought I might need to carry a weapon to protect myself. You never know what may happen. Sam Showed me the gun a week ago and let me hold on to it while I made up my mind. I told him I still needed time to think about it, you know, and also to get some money for it. Since I got the gun, it had been hidden in my closet. I wasn't prepared to confront my girlfriend with the issue of buying a gun just yet. She's very fearful of guns. Question: Was it the 45-caliber gun you carried when you was stopped by Officer Hendricks on Route 75 on March lst? Response: Yes. Question: Why did Mr. Morse call you that night? Response: 1 called him back that Friday night, he told me he needed the money for the gun immediately, otherwise, I had to give the gun back right away so he could sell it to another buyer. He told me that he really needed the money and asked me to do him a favor. He sounded so desperate that I kind of felt something was wrong with him. It was Friday and I just got paid, I had some money at home. So I decided to send the money to him right after our conversation. Question: Did your girlfriend know you was going to see Mr. Morse? Response: I don’t know. I don’t think so. My girlfriend by that time was sleeping and I didn't want to wake her up. So I just whispered to her that I had to go out to see my friend for some kind of an emergency. I didn't know if she heard me or not, but I just left anyway. I took with me about 400 dollars in cash and the gun and drove to his house. On the way, I deiced that I was going to purchase the gun. Therefore, the money was actually for the gun. I was in a hurry because my friend seemed real upset and needed the money real fast. I realize now that I shouldn’t have brought the gun with me in the car, but I thought that I should take it with me in case my friend changed his mind and wanted the gun back. Question: Did you know why Mr. Morse was so hurried for money? Response: No. Question: Mr. Morse was involved in some gambling debts, and he said you might also bet with the same broker. Response: No. That is not true. I know I was speeding. That's the only thing I did wrong that night. Robbery! I am not a crook. I just wanted to help my friend out of a jam. Yeah, I don't make much money and I have some financial problems, but I don't know about the rest of this. Neither gambling nor robberyll It must be some kind of mistake. Martin and I work at the same factory in Dalton. I would never do anything bad, especially to a friend. 130 Sherri he wa police in ca‘ cum APPENDIX H THE GUILTY EVIDENCE-LOW INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT On Saturday, March 1, at 12:09 am, a robbery was reported to the Dalton County Sheriffs Department by Martin Johnson at 2341 Maple Rd, Dalton. The victim claimed he was not injured, but lost about $400 in cash. About twenty minutes later, at 12:32 am, police officer Hendricks reported that he caught a suspect who possessed a gun and $ 425 in cash. The victim, Martin Johnson, 37 year-old, has lived at Dalton for 15 years. He is currently an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. The defendant, Robert Williams, a 25 year-old Caucasian (or African) American, is also an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. He moved from Miami, Florida, to Dalton five years ago after he graduated from high school. He had been periodically on welfare until he got a permanent job at Dalton Carpet Company eleven months ago. He currently live with his girlfriend and their children. This robbery case has been brought to trial. Four witnesses were called to provide their statements. They were officer Hendricks, the victim, Martin Johnson, the defendant, Robert Williams, and the criminology detective who conducted the following investigation and examined the obtained evidence, Kathleen Reid. Witness #1 (Police Officer Hendricks) Question: Please tell us your name and what happened that night Response: My name is George Hendricks. On March lst, about 12:20 am, I detected a speeding car traveling about 80mph while I was patrolling on Route 75. I stopped it immediately. It was an '86 blue four door Chevy Cavalier with plate "CVL 641." It was confirmed that the car owner was Robert Williams, the driver. He is a(n) Caucasian (or African) American, 5’9” tall, wearing a blue jacket and blue jeans. He was not drunk, but seemed to be in a big hurry for something. On inspection, I found that he was carrying a 45-caliber pistol and $ 425 in cash. Since a robbery had just happened, I took Mr. Williams back to the station for firrther investigation. The defendant claimed that the gun belonged to his friend, Sam Morse. He was thinking about buying the gun from Mr. Morse, who had paged him that night and asked for the gun or the money immediately. Williams said was speeding because he had promised to see his fiiend before midnight. We found Sam Morse and he confirmed the defendant’s claim. Mr. Morse also confessed that he lost a big bet and had to pay the bookie by midnight. So he asked Robert Williams to do him a favor by buying the gun so he could pay off the bet. After more questioning, we found that Robert Williams was also involved in Morse’s gambling debt. Witness #2 (Officer Kathleen Reid, the criminology detective) Question: Please tell us your name, and what you do with this case. Response: My name is Kathleen Reid. I took charge of the investigation of this robbery. We quickly arranged a line-up identification at eight o’clock in the morning, March lst. 131 Mr. loh robbfl! wearln belong found Willie Willi: the c: defer John (him MI. Johnson identified the defendant as the man he saw running out of his house afler the robbery happened. Mr. Johnson claimed that he saw his face and the defendant was wearing the same clothing as the person he saw that night. We found several fingerprints belonging to different persons and a Dalton Carpet Company mark on the flashlight found at the victim’s house. One set of fingerprints match with the defendant, Robert Williams. We checked the records of Robert Williams’ pager. There were five calls on Williams’ pager record that day and we found one call was from Sam Morse. However, the call was made at 3:00 in the afiemoon, which was inconsistent with what the defendant claimed. The defendant said Morse called him at night. We also found Mr. Johnson’s wallet two days later. On March 3rd, a woman found a wallet beside the dumpster located on Cooper St., which is 250 feet away from the victim’s house. Martin Johnson’s driver’s license was in that wallet. We carefully examined the wallet and found the defendant, Robert Williams’ fingerprints on it. Witness #3 (Martin Johnson, the victim) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened on the day you got robbed. Response: My name is Martin Johnson. I remember that Friday, several of us co-workers went to a bar together after work. Robert sat beside Larry, our supervisor, and the rest of us sat at another table. I was telling them about my Vegas trip, and how I was going to spend all my money. I was so excited that I even showed them all the cash I had on me. I don’t know if it means anything, but after we left the bar, Larry told me there was something wrong with Robert. He said that Robert told him he needed some money real bad and complained about how I had all this money I could waste. Robert told him that he might ask me to borrow some money since I had more money than I needed. Larry said that Robert seemed real desperate. Before I went home, I stopped by the gas station to get some cigarettes. On the way home from the gas station, I noticed a car following me. It seemed to be Robert’s car. I was not sure if the driver was Robert or not, but I do know Robert owns a blue Cavaleir, and that was the car I saw. However, it disappeared when I turned onto the street I live on. When the robbery happened, I was already in my bed. A muffled noise woke me up. Before I could turn on the light, a voice in a strange low tone said, "I have a gun pointing right at you. Don't move or make any sound and I won't hurt you. I just want your money." His voice seemed really familiar to me, he sounded like Robert Williams. He took my wallet and asked me to give him more money. Then, a car drove past my house and blew its horn. I think that scared him. He ran out the front door. I looked through the window and saw a man walk into an alley and disappear. The guy seemed about 5’9”, and was wearing a blue jacket and blue jeans. I went downstairs and found a flashlight left in the front yard of my house. I think that the robber dropped it. There was $ 425 in my wallet. The next morning, I went down to the station to do a line-up identification. Robert was in the crowd. After I pointed out Robert to the police, they told me his fingerprints were on the flashlight found in my yard. Witness #4 (Robert Williams, the defendant) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened that night. Response: My name is Robert Williams. On that night, I was playing with my kid until 10:00 p.m. After that, I watched TV with my girlfriend until 11 o’clock and then we went right to bed. We chatted for a while, about the kid and our bills. We have some problems 132 with the mortgi thinking abOut llive.ltho\1%h week ago an night and told right away so some cash. I 1 only thing I c' problem, bu with the mortgage on our house. At about 1 1:30, My fiiend, Sam Morse, paged me. I was thinking about buying a handgun from him. It is not very safe in the neighborhood where I live. I thought that I might need a weapon to protect my family. He showed me the gun a week ago and let me hold onto it while I made up my mind. He called me that Friday night and told me he really needed the money now, otherwise, I had to give the gun back right away so he could sell it to another buyer. It was Friday, and I just got paid, so I had some cash. I took the $425 and the gun with me. I know I was speeding, but that's the only thing I did wrong that night. I am not a crook. Yeah, I have some financial problems, but I have never done anything bad to anybody. 133 APPENDIX I THE GUILTY EVIDENCE-HIGH INFORMATION VOLUME VERSION OF TRIAL REPORT The case number 9793854 was brought to trial on April 19, 1997. The State vs. Robert Williams. On Saturday. March 1, at 12:09 am. a robbery was reported to the Dalton County Sheriff‘s Department by Martin Johnson at 2341 Maple Rd, Dalton. The victim, Martin Johnson, claimed neither he nor his family members were injured, but he did lose about four hundred dollars in cash. About twenty minutes after the call, at 12:32 am, another report was sent back to the station. The police officer on duty, Officer Hendricks, was patrolling Route 75 and reported having clocked a speeding vehicle at 80 mph. Officer Hendricks pulled over the driver, Robert Williams. Officer Hendricks recognized that the suspect seemed very nervous and suspicious. Acting on instinct, Officer Hendricks gave a breathalyzer test and performed a body search. There was no indication of drunk driving. The police officer, however, did find that the suspect possessed $425 in cash along with a 45-caliber gun. The suspect was therefore taken into custody down at the Dalton county police station for identification and further questioning. The victim, Martin Johnson, 37 year-old, has lived at Dalton for 15 years. He is currently an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. The defendant, Robert Williams. a 25 year-old Caucasian (or African) American, is also an employee of Dalton Carpet Company. He moved from Miami, Florida, to Dalton five years ago after he graduated from high school. He had been periodically on welfare until he got a permanent job at Dalton Carpet Company eleven months ago. He currently live with his girlfriend and their children. Dalton, a middle-size city with a population of 1 15.000, is located on Route 75. The victim and the suspect are both employees of Dalton Carpet Company at Dalton. Dalton Carpet Co. supplies more than half of the world’s tufied carpet. In the early 1900's a local farm girl sold a hand-tufted bedspread for $2.50 and unknowingly revived a century—old craft that was to become a big business there. Although the bedspreads are no longer available, the craft is perpetuated in the production of floor coverings. Many people in Dalton and the towns around are involved in the carpet business. According to the annual report by Justice Department, the criminal rate of Dalton has been on the increase for the past five years. Officials reported 12 murders for the year of 1997. an increase of l 1 percent from 1996 figures, 56 robberies in 1997, versus 48 for 1996, building up 17 percent, and 173 cases of thefi, which is 21 percent higher than the figures of 1996. The analysts explain that several factors, including higher unemployment and drug use, might contribute to the increase of criminal rate. The main industry supporting Dalton and surrounding areas, carpet production, has been showing decline in the recent years. An the same time, changes in drug market participation. particularly in crack use and powdered cocaine use, is also very influential pattern. National Institute of Justice tracked criminal cases in the greater Dalton area from 1993 through 1997, and found there is a positive relationship between crack cocaine use and criminal rate. 134 11 their stalt Hendricl and the r the obta Wither Qnetil Rupol This robbery case has been brought to trial. Four witnesses were called to provide their Statements. They were the police officer who arrested the defendant, George Hendricks, the victim of the robbery, Martin Johnson, the defendant, Robert Williams, and the criminology detective who conducted the following investigation and examined the obtained evidence, Kathleen Reid. Witness #1 (Police Officer Hendricks) Question: Please tell us your name and what happened on that night. Response: My name is George Hendricks. I am the patrol officer on duty on March lst. I arrested the defendant, Robert Williams. Yes, on the night in question, I was on duty and parked beside Route 75 South. It’s a great spot. I usually park in that same spot when I am patrolling Route 75. The spot is not easy to see when you're driving fast. It is covered by a lot of trees, with the ground level lower than the road. This allows me to have a much lower profile to speeding cars. So when speeders notice that I am there, it is too late. Anyway, remembering back to that night. I believe it was the night of March first and about 12:15 am, I had received a call from the station saying that an armed intruder had just robbed somebody. Dispatch also informed me of the robbery suspect's description: male, and about 5'10" in height. He was said to be wearing blue pants and a light weight jacket. The station had already dispatched other cars near the location of the neighborhood. Therefore, I reported my location and got permission to stay on route 75, to watch for anything that might seem a little bit out of the ordinary. Question: So, you were not on or near the spot where the robbery took place? Response: Yes. The place I stopped the defendant’s car is about 14 miles away from the victim, Mr. Martin Johnson’s house, where the robbery took place. Question: Please continue. Response: Just about 5 minutes after the station call, at 2:20 am, I detected a speeding car passing by the spot I parked and traveling about 80mph. Jeez! The speed limit is only 55mph on that particular road because there is construction. The joker was over the speed limit by 25. Question: The driver, that is, the defendant of this case, didn’t see you when he past by you? Response: No, I don’t think so. As I told you, the spot I parked kept me in a low profile. Right after I detected the speeding car, I pursued the car with my signals flashing and it immediately pulled over. It was an '86 blue four door Chevy Cavalier. I had seen that make before, so I knew that it was made around '86 or '87. The license plate of the suspect’s car is "CVL 641." It has been confirmed that the car owner is Robert Williams, the driver. Finally I approached the car and asked the driver to hand over his license, registration, and proof of insurance. I instructed him to wait inside his car while I verified his information. I checked all the documents, and sure enough they were all legit. Then I asked him to step out of his car. Question: Can you describe the man you examined at the time? Response: Yes. The driver is a young Caucasian (or African) American male, who is the defendant of the case. According to his driver’s license, he is 25 years old. When the man stepped out of the car, I noticed right away that he was wearing a blue rugged jacket and baggy blue jeans, exactly what the robber described was wearing. He was a couple inches 135 shorter than me and I am 6’ even, and I checked his license and his height was confirmed to be 5'9", also very close to the robber description. These made me feel a little uneasy. Question: Did the driver behave strangely or aggressively at that time? Was he drunken? Response: The reason he was stopped is he was speeding 25mph over the speed limit. And to my knowledge, I could not tell if he had been drinking. The car wasn't swerving at all and when I had approached the car he seemed very coherent and cooperative. Normally, I can tell if the driver has been drinking considering I have had plenty of experiences with them. However, in training, we are taught that if we are not 100 percent sure of a suspect's alcohol intake then we should give a breathalyzer test. I have become aware that there are many drinking and driving arrests Friday through Saturday late at night. That's when everyone relaxes with what they call a social drink or two. So I took precautions and gave him an intoxication test, both oral and physical. He seemed very nervous about this. He declared that I was harassing him, and that I should just give him his ticket so he could be on his way. Question: Did you harass him? Response: Absolutely not. All I did followed the normal and legal procedure by the law. I decided to give him a breathalyzer test. The breathalyzer test showed that he was not drunk with a .04 level, which is under the legal limit, .07. However, when I performed a search for any illegal activity such as narcotics, he cringed. He seemed as though he was anxious to get rid of something real fast. From the way he was driving, I would say he was in a big hurry to get to his destination. I asked where he was heading to so late at night. He responded that he was going to see his friend. Yet because of the robbery report, I thought I should take extra precautions. Question: What additional action did you take? Response: I decided to search his car. Well it so happened that on inspection, I found that he was carrying 425 dollars in cash with him, and a 45-caliber pistol in the glove box. I was very glad to find the gun before any further action takes place. Question: You mean, you thought the defendant might use the gun for further action? Response: I didn’t mean something ugly definitely would happen, but who knows, you couldn’t be careful enough. Question: Could you describe the gun you saw that night? Response: The gun was a Model 274 with a rubber grip. There was not bullet inside the gun. That's the gun he was carrying at the time. Besides the gun, the driver kept lots of pop bottles in the trunk. Question: What did you do then? Response: I strongly suspected that Mr. Williams might be involved in the robbery reported earlier, therefore, I decided to take Mr. Williams back to the station for further investigation. Later, down at the station, I asked him about what I found. Mr. Williams claimed that the gun belonged to his friend, Sam Morse. He was thinking about buying the gun from Mr. Morse, who had paged him that night and asked for the gun or the money immediately. I asked him what he was doing when Mr. Sam Morse paged him. The defendant said he was at home watching TV with his girlfriend and their kid. The defendant said that he promised his friend that he would bring him the money by midnight and that was the reason he was speeding. Finally, after all that, I explained why he was being thoroughly interrogated and needed to be held at the Dalton County Sheriff 136 shorter than to be 5'9", al Question: I Response ' And to my 1 all and whe Normally, ‘ experience sure of a St aware that night. This precautior nervous a his ticket Question Respons ldecide< drunk w search i anxious was in : night. I ”P011, Quest Rape he wa Was V le Resp shorter than me and I am 6’ even, and I checked his license and his height was confirmed to be 5'9", also very close to the robber description. These made me feel a little uneasy. Question: Did the driver behave strangely or aggressively at that time? Was he drunken? Response: The reason he was stopped is he was speeding 25mph over the speed limit. And to my knowledge, I could not tell if he had been drinking. The car wasn't swerving at all and when I had approached the car he seemed very coherent and cooperative. Normally, I can tell if the driver has been drinking considering I have had plenty of experiences with them. However, in training, we are taught that if we are not 100 percent sure of a suspect's alcohol intake then we should give a breathalyzer test. I have become aware that there are many drinking and driving arrests Friday through Saturday late at night. That's when everyone relaxes with what they call a social drink or two. So I took precautions and gave him an intoxication test, both oral and physical. He seemed very nervous about this. He declared that I was harassing him, and that I should just give him his ticket so he could be on his way. Question: Did you harass him? Response: Absolutely not. All I did followed the normal and legal procedure by the law. I decided to give him a breathalyzer test. The breathalyzer test showed that he was not drunk with a .04 level, which is under the legal limit, .07. However, when I performed a search for any illegal activity such as narcotics, he cringed. He seemed as though he was anxious to get rid of something real fast. From the way he was driving, I would say he was in a big hurry to get to his destination. I asked where he was heading to so late at night. He responded that he was going to see his friend. Yet because of the robbery report, I thought I should take extra precautions. Question: What additional action did you take? Response: I decided to search his car. Well it so happened that on inspection, I found that he was carrying 425 dollars in cash with him, and a 45-caliber pistol in the glove box. I was very glad to find the gun before any further action takes place. Question: You mean, you thought the defendant might use the gun for further action? Response: I didn’t mean something ugly definitely would happen, but who knows, you couldn’t be careful enough. Question: Could you describe the gun you saw that night? Response: The gun was a Model 274 with a rubber grip. There was not bullet inside the gun. That's the gun he was carrying at the time. Besides the gun, the driver kept lots of pop bottles in the trunk. Question: What did you do then? Response: I strongly suspected that Mr. Williams might be involved in the robbery reported earlier, therefore, I decided to take Mr. Williams back to the station for further investigation. Later, down at the station, I asked him about what I found. Mr. Williams claimed that the gun belonged to his friend, Sam Morse. He was thinking about buying the gun from Mr. Morse, who had paged him that night and asked for the gun or the money immediately. I asked him what he was doing when Mr. Sam Morse paged him. The defendant said he was at home watching TV with his girlfriend and their kid. The defendant said that he promised his friend that he would bring him the money by midnight and that was the reason he was speeding. Finally, after all that, I explained why he was being thoroughly interrogated and needed to be held at the Dalton County Sheriff 136 l Dena! robbe Qua Resp make the a Mon Pal)e have mad his ‘ and bel get but be at M iii Q ll a c l 1 Depgertment for a line-up identification since he was taken as a suspect for an armed rob ry. Question: Did you do anything to confirm the defendant’s statement? Response: Yes. After the interrogation, I made two phone calls before I let Mr. Williams make his. First, I called Williams’ girlfi'iend to check her boyfriend’s story, but only got the answering machine. Then, I tried to called Mr. Sam Morse, and yes, we found Sam Morse and checked with him about the defendant's story and also asked him to bring papers claiming ownership of the gun. Mr. Morse cooperated and told us that he might have paged the defendant that night though he couldn’t be absolutely sure if he really had made the call and the exact time he made it because he was very busy and called lots of his friends that night. However, Mr. Morse also confessed that he had just lost a very big and important bet and had to pay the bookie by midnight. He was frightened because he believed that the loan sharks were very dangerous and would do absolutely anything to get their money. He was panicking and almost hysterical over the thought of those guys hurting him or maybe even killing him. So he asked Robert Williams for a favor at the beginning of the week of either buying the gun he gave Mr. Williams one week before or at least getting some money to him before that Friday night so he could pay off the bet. Mr. Morse said that he was waiting for Robert Williams at home at the time, but Williams never made it because of the arrest. Question: Did you check out Mr. Sam Morse’s background? Was there any file for him? Response: Yes. I also did some background check on Mr. Sam Morse. Sam Morse was an employee of Dalton Carpet Company, but was fired two years ago due to his conduct of sexual harassment upon his female coworkers. He is currently unemployed. Mr. Morse was also arrested once for battery and illegal weapon possession, but the charge was dismissed. Witness #2 (Officer Kathleen Reid, the criminology detective) Question: Please tell us your name, and what you do with this case. Response: My name is Kathleen Reid. I am the criminology detective of Dalton County Sheriff Department. I took charge of the investigation on the robbery case that took place on March lst. Question: Could you tell us what did you find in your investigation? Response: The defendant, Robert Williams, was brought to the Dalton County Sheriff Department at one o’clock in the morning, March lst by Officer George Hendricks. Officer Hendricks wrote the document explaining that the defendant was brought to the station because of speeding and was being hold on the suspicion of committing an armed invasion and robbery. I examined the document and the robbery case report and then decide to proceed a further investigation. Question: What did you do next? Response: We quickly arranged a line-up identification at eight o’clock in the moming, March lst, and invited the victim, Mr. Martin Johnson down to the station to help us for the identification job. Besides the defendant, Robert Williams, there were three other suspects in the line, including one from our disguised police officers. Mr. Johnson was able to point out the defendant, Robert Williams, from the crowd as the man he saw running out of his house after the robbery happened. Mr. Johnson claimed that he saw his face, and the defendant was wearing the same clothing as the person he saw that night. 137 ‘fl Id Question: Was there any other witness? Response: No. We also asked people living in the neighborhood, but no one expect the victim saw or heard what happened or the robber. However, we also did other examinations. Question: What else did you do? Response: We found a flashlight left in the frond yard of the victim’s house, which, according to Mr. Johnson, the victim, doesn’t belong to him. We examined the finger prints left on the flashlight and found that there were several sets of finger prints belonging to different persons. Question: Could you give us a brief explanation about how fingerprint would be used as evidence? Response: Sure. Fingerprinting is a method of identification using the impression made by the minute ridge formation or patterns found on fingertips. No two persons have exactly the same arrangement of ridge patterns, and the patterns of any one individual remain unchanged through life. Fingerprints may be classified and filed on the basis of the ridge patterns, setting up an identification system that is almost infallible. The Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has established a library of over 213 millions civil and criminal fingerprint cards. Question: Did you find any evidence from the fingerprints? Response: Yes. one set of the fingerprints found on the flashlight matches with the defendant, Robert Williams’. However, the defendant claimed that he had not seen that flashlight since one week ago. He said that one of his co-worker borrowed it from him and hadn’t return it back to him yet. He claimed that somebody else dropped it in the victim’s house or maybe someone wanted to set him up. We contacted the person who the defendant accused of borrowing the flashlight from him. However, this person claimed that he indeed borrowed the flashlight but he had returned it back to the defendant the next day. Question: So the defendant lied about the flashlight? Response: We could not make sure about it. Both sides, the defendant and his co-worker borrowing the flashlight, have no alibi to support their statement. Question: How about the phone call that the defendant claimed his friend made and asked him for the gun and the money that night? Response: We contacted the telephone company and checked the records of Robert Williams’ pager from 12:00 a.m., February 28th to 2:00 a.m., March lst. During the period of 26 hours, there were five calls on Williams’ pager record and we found one call from Sam Morse, who Robert Williams claimed is the owner of the gun and had called him that night to ask him to bring the money or the gun. However, the call was made at 3:00 in the afternoon, which was inconsistent with what the defendant claimed. Question: Have you checked with Mr. Sam Morse? Response: Yes. We talked with Sam Morse. Mr. Morse confessed that he was involved in a gambling debts and tried to get some money from Mr. Robert Williams to help himself out of the jam. However, after more drilling and questioning, we were able to find that Robert Williams was also involved in Morse's gambling game. According to Mr. Morse, Robert Williams got him connected with the broker he bet with. He doubted that Robert Williams himself might also gamble. Question: Was any lost item of Mr. Johnson’s found? 138 -r ‘Jlll Reaponse: Yes. Two days later, a woman reported to the station that she found a wallet beside the dumpster located on Cooper St, which is 250 feet away from the victim’s house. There was a driver’s license and a health insurance card of Martin Johnson and several pictures inside, but no cash or credit cards were found in that wallet. We carefully examined the wallet and fortunately found some vague finger prints. Some of them match with the wallet owner, Martin Johnson. However, most important, we also discovered that two finger prints match with the defendant, Robert Williams. Witness #3 (Martin Johnson, the victim) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened on the day you got robbed. Response: My name is Martin Johnson. Robert Williams and me are coworkers. We all work at the local carpet factory, Dalton Carpet Company, in the same low level job on the production line. We are what they call the "grunts" of the business. We handle all the dirty work. Anyway, after work, sometimes a bunch of us go to a bar named "J's" downtown in Dalton. I remember that Friday at “J’s”, as usual, we just wanted to relax a little before we went home. There were seven or eight of us drinking together. All of us work together. Robert sat beside Larry, our supervisor, and the rest of us sat at another table. Well later that Friday night, I began telling them what I had planned in a trip to Las Vegas. I mean it's Las Vegas! What to expect but a little gambling! So I told them more about how I saved up some money on the side and how I planned to spend that money trying to win back what I had lost from the other trip. I was so excited that I even showed them all the cash I had on me! I know, that was pretty stupid to show around your money. Question: So you showed the cash you carried to the defendant at the bar? Response: Not just to him, to everybody!!! I didn’t specifically show it to someone. I mean, I took out the money from my wallet and started to count how much of cash I had in front of them. Robert was sitting at another table. Question: How much money did you have at that time? Response: I remembered that I had three one hundred dollar bills, six twenties, and five pieces of one. That’s total four hundred and twenty-five dollars. Question: What did you do next? After you showed them your money. Response: I put the money back in my wallet. We chatted for a while, and we left for home. Question: So next thing happened on you was the robbery? Response: Yes, oh, no. I don't know if this adds anything to what you want to know. But later after we left the bar, Larry dragged me aside and told me that there was something wrong with Robert. He said that Robert told him he needed some money real bad and complained about how I had all this money I could waste. Robert told him that he might ask me to borrow some money since I had more money than I needed. Larry said that Robert seemed real desperate and jealous of me. Larry didn't know what was going on with Robert or why he needed the money. I can understand that he’s trying to support a family but there is no way I would lend him money, I mean we are not that close. However, I didn't pay too much attention to it then, I thought Robert was just whining. Everybody whines sometimes. I told Larry to offer Robert some overtime, maybe that would shut him up for a while. However, maybe I just shouldn't rub all my extra money in their faces. Question: Did Mr. Williams come to ask you for a loan? 139 50 Q R C F n 1 1 Response: No, he did not. Question: O.K. What happened next? Response: Before I went home, I stopped by the gas station to get some cigarettes. I know they can kill me, but I just can't resist the urge. On the way home from the gas station, I noticed a car following me. It seemed to be Robert’s car. I was not sure if the driver was Robert or not, but I do know Robert owns a blue Caviler, and that was the car I saw. However, it disappeared when I turned onto the street I live on. After I got home, I fixed something to eat and watched TV for a while. However, I was tired and that night's show was just a rerun, so I decided to call it a day. Before I went to bed, I looked through the window behind my TV set and saw a man walking around the comer of the street I live on. I thought he was just drunk, so I didn't pay too much attention to him. People, mostly kids, sometimes walk through between our houses as a means of a short cut to Orchard St. It bothers me though. I was thinking about calling the town council and asking if there is any way to stop people passing through that small alley. Anyway, I didn't think it was my business when I saw that man. It was quite dark outside at the time and I don't think that I saw his face clearly. You know, the street lamp doesn’t work sometimes. I should have called about that too. What a place to live in, huh? Question: Was the man you saw around the comer Mr. Williams? Response: I did not know. It was too dark. Question: Could you describe how the robbery took place? Response: When the robbery happened, I was already in my bed at the time. I usually go to bed pretty late like around 1 or 2 a.m., but like I said, I was kind of tired that night. I fell asleep for a little while and then, suddenly, a muffled noise woke me up. I was going to turn on the light, but before I could reach the switch, a voice in a strange low tone said, "I have a gun pointing right at you. Be quiet, don't move or make any sound and I won't hurt you. I just want your money. Where is it? Give me your wallet." I was real anxious at that point. You know, he was pointing a gun at me! It was scary. My gut told me, "you better do what he says." I know my life was on the line. I didn't want to be hurt. I couldn’t believe that it happened on me. Question: Did you see the gun? Response: I don’t know. I don’t think so. It was too dark, and I was just waked by him. Question: Did the robber hurt you? Response: No. Question: Did you see the robber? Could you recognize him? Response: It was so dark that I couldn't even see his face, but I could hear his voice. I knew he was trying to disguise his voice. It was kind of weird, but it seemed really familiar to me. In the back of my mind, I remember feeling that he sounded just like Robert Williams. I still can not believe he would ever rob me! I told him my wallet was in my pants on the floor. I was so tired that I just took off my pants and threw them on the floor. I usually put my wallet on the side table right next to the bed, but I even forgot to do that. He grabbed my wallet from the pants and asked me to give him more money. I told him that I didn't have any more money in the house and that he could take anything else he wanted. Then a car drove past my house and blew its horn. I think that scared him, cause the next thing I knew he just ran downstairs and got out the house with my wallet. He took all of my money. There must have been about 425 dollars in my wallet that night. I also had my driver’s license and several family pictures in that wallet. 140 W 0 ll 1 c s r l 4" Question: What did you do after the robber left? Response: Well after I heard the door slam, I got up right away to look through the window. I saw a man walk into an alley and disappear. The guy seemed a(n) Caucasian (or African) American male, about 5'10" tall and was wearing a blue jacket and blue jeans. Although I only saw his face from a distance, I am sure he was Robert. I thought we were friends, who would have known things would turn out like this! Question: Then what did you do? Response: I went downstairs to see if anything was missing and to call the police. When I reached for the phone, I noticed in the front yard of my house he had left his flashlight. It is not mine, so I supposed that he carelessly dropped it when he rushed out my house. I didn't touch it in order not to leave my finger prints on it. Then I quickly called the police. After I hung up, I looked at my clock and saw it was about 12:10 am. at the time. However, later in the morning, the police told me that they had gathered a few suspects and would like it if I could come down the station as soon as possible to ID one. When I got down to the station, they told me that they had matched the finger prints on the flashlight to one of the suspects. All I needed to do was identify him. As my eyes wandered down the line up, I saw him. It was Robert Williams, my co-worker. He was wearing blue jeans and a beat up jacket, just like the man I saw running out of my house that night. I was so shocked, but it was him. After I had identified him, the police told me that it was his finger prints on the flashlight. How could Robert have hurt me like that?! Witness #4 (Robert Williams, the defendant) Question: Please tell us your name, and what happened that night. Response: My name is Robert Williams. On that night, I was playing with my kid until 10:00 p.m. My girlfiiend, Shelly, and me have been together for three years and have one child, a boy. My boy Trevor is three years old. Then it was time for the kid to go to sleep, so I sent him to bed. After that, I watched a little TV with my girlfriend till around 11 o'clock. I remember that we were watching "Homicide". Question: What did you do after that? Response: After watching Homicide, I think it was about 11 o'clock. We went to bed together and chatted with each other for a little while, about the kid, my work, and the bills. Raising a kid costs a lot, food, diaper, toys, doctor, medicine, you name it. Who knows what next when he grows older. I can't believe how expensive it has gotten to take care a child. Then we discussed some problems with the mortgage on our house. That has become the bulk of our problems. I told Shelly that I was going to start putting in some overtime at work, to bring home extra money. Our factory recently got a big order in, so me and the guys on the production line are going to be busy. These conversations about money between me and my girlfriend seem to go on forever nowadays. Question: So you were in bed already. How come you got out again that night? Response: I heard my pager go off when my girlfriend and me were in the middle of our money talk. However, I didn't immediately check it until later that night. I got a pager, because my family and friends can call me at any time on my pager and not wake up my girlfriend and the kid. You never know when you're needed so I just wanted to be prepared. Question: Who called you? 141 Resp my f Que Reel is cl wal' wor wlr ma get in __._.. mnflmo Response; After washing up, at about 11:30 p.m. I checked the message and it was from my friend, Sam Morse. I was thinking about buying a handgun from him. Question: A gun? Response: Yes, you know, because it is not very safe in the neighborhood where I live. It is close to work, but still not very safe. You always can see gangsters, those street kids, walking around. My neighbor’s house just got invaded by a theft when they were out for work. So I thought I might need to carry a weapon to protect myself. You never know what may happen. Sam showed me the gun a week ago and let me hold on to it while I made up my mind. I told him I still needed time to think about it, you know, and also to get some money for it. Since I got the gun, it had been hidden in my closet. I wasn't prepared to confront my girlfriend with the issue of buying a gun just yet. She's very fearful of guns. Question: Was it the 45-caliber gun you carried when you was stopped by Officer Hendricks on Route 75 on March 1st? Response: Yes. Question: Why did Mr. Morse call you that night? Response: I called him back that Friday night, he told me he needed the money for the gun immediately, otherwise, I had to give the gun back right away so he could sell it to another buyer. He told me that he really needed the money and asked me to do him a favor. He sounded so desperate that I kind of felt something was wrong with him. It was Friday and I just got paid, I had some money at home. So I decided to send the money to him right after our conversation. Question: Did your girlfriend know you was going to see Mr. Morse? Response: I don’t know. I don’t think so. My girlfriend by that time was sleeping and I didn't want to wake her up. So I just whispered to her that I had to go out to see my friend for some kind of an emergency. I didn't know if she heard me or not, but I just left anyway. I took with me about 425 dollars in cash and the gun and drove to his house. On the way, I deiced that I was going to purchase the gun. Therefore, the money was actually for the gun. I was in a hurry because my friend seemed real upset and needed the money ‘ real fast. I realize now that I shouldn’t have brought the gun with me in the car, but I * thought that I should take it with me in case my friend changed his mind and wanted the gun back. Question: Did you know why Mr. Morse was so hurried for money? Response: No. Question: Mr. Morse was involved in some gambling debts, and he said you might also bet with the same broker. Response: No. That is not true. I know I was speeding. That's the only thing I did wrong that night. Robbery! I am not a crook. I just wanted to help my friend out of a jam. Yeah, I don't make much money and I have some financial problems, but I don't know about the rest of this. Neither gambling nor robbery!! It must be some kind of mistake. Martin and I work at the same factory in Dalton. I would never do anything bad, especially to a fi'iend. 142 W APPENDIX J INFORMATION LOAD MANIPULATION CHECK SCALE (1) Is there a lot of information to process in the trial description? (not (a great much) (moderate) deal) (extremely) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (2) Are there many details to remember in the testimony? (not (a great much) (moderate) deal) (extremely) l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (3) Are there many facts to analyze in the trial description? (not (a great much) (moderate) deal) (extremely) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l 0 143 t APPENDIX K TRAIT EVALUATION SCALE 1. CRIMINAL TENDENCY (1) I think that the defendant has committed or would commit the same type of crime at some other time. (2) I think that the defendant has committed or would commit bmglm at some other time. (3) I think that the defendant has committed or would commit theft at some other time. (4) I think that the defendant has committed or would commit other unlawful conduct. 2. CREDIBILITY (1) I think the defendant told the entire truth. (2) I think the defendant is credible when declaring his innocence. (3) I believe the defendant to be honest. 3. VIOLENT TENDENCY (1) I think that the defendant behaves violently in his daily life. (2) I believe that the defendant is an aggressive person. (3) I think that the defendant has a tendency to solve problems or conflicts with violence. (4) I think that the defendant would commit domestic violence at some other time. Note. Responses to the above three scales are measured in a 7-point Likert-type format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 144 1. P01 (1) Dr (stron for “i (2) I (stro (3) 1 (Sin (4) (st APPENDIX L COURTROOM CHARACTER CREDIBILITY SCALE 1. POLICE OFFICER (1) Does the testimony of the police officer indicate the defendant’s innocence or guilt? (strong evidence (strongly evidence for “innocent”) (neutral) for “guilty”) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (2) The police officer in this trial seems to be biased. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (3) I doubt the accuracy of the statement of the police officer. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (4) I believe the police officer in this trial is being very truthful. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (5) I believe the police officer in this trial is being very objective. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Note. Items 2 and 3 are reverse-coded for data analysis. 2. VICTIM (1) Does the testimony of the victim indicate the defendant’s innocence or guilt? (strong evidence (strongly evidence for “innocent”) (neutral) for “guilty”) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (2) The victim in this trial seems to be biased. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 145 (3) I don (strongl: (4) 1 be (strong' (5) 1 b1 (stront Nil; (3) I doubt the accuracy of the victim’s statement. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (4) I believe the victim in this trial is being very truthful. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (5) I believe the victim in this trial is being very objective. (strongly disagree) (strongly agree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Note. Items 2 and 3 are reverse-coded for data analysis. 3. 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