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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

Teaching science for understanding and applications:
The role of technology

presented by

Mario Fernando Cajas

has been accepted towards fulfillment
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Doctor of philosaafixehl Curriculum, teaching
Educational Policy.

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1/98 WHO/“Dram.“

TEACHING SCIENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATIONS:
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

By

Mario Fernando Cajas

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Teacher Education

1998

ABSTRACT

TEACHING SCIENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING
AND APPLICATIONS: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

By

Mario Fernando Cajas

In the international arena as well as in the American context, current science educational
reform proposals are asking for the introduction of technology. However, technology has not
had a real impact on the science curriculum. Rather, the long history of the lack of connection
between technology and science in general education continues.

This dissertation studies the role of technology, as curricular content, in school science.
Given the current concerns of educational reforms regarding the connection between science
and students' everyday lives, two generic goals are analyzed: teaching science for
understanding and teaching science for applications. It is suggested that in order to connect
science to students' everyday lives, it is important to expand traditional science curriculum
across alternative territories, with technological territories being one option.

The dissertation provides a scenario to discuss applications of school science to
students' everyday life experiences and the potential role technology may play. Using data
available from the Salish I Research Project, the dissertation shows how science teachers are
connecting school science with students’ everyday lives. The starting point is a set of general
outcomes of the Salish I Research Project which guided this research toward the study of the
knowledge science teachers need in order to help their students perceive the relevance of their
science studies to their everyday lives. The dissertation shows that the introduction of
applications of science in students’ everyday lives requires a different kind of subject matter
knowledge than traditional scientific knowledge. In doing so, a framework on science teacher

knowledge which asks for the introduction of technological knowledge is constructed.

The dissertation also develops a framework in which technology is seen as artifact.
knowledge, and social practice. This framework is used to clarify the potential role of
technological knowledge in science teacher knowledge. The conception of technology and its
relation to science education, as presented in Project 2061 and the National Science Education
Standards, are studied. A theoretical explanation on the translation of technological knowledge
into the curriculum and its implications for science education is provided. Using the construct
translation of knowledge, it is explained how school science knowledge has been the product
of views of science which have overemphasized abstract over practical knowledge erasing most

traces of technology from the curriculum.

Copyright by
Mario Fernando Cajas
1998

To Nadia.
I see in her face the smiles of millions of Guatemalans
who one day may have access to a democratic education.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To say thanks to the people who have affected our lives is a basic human act which
reflects that we are not alone in this universe. For me, this is an opportunity to link my
emotions with their lives. It is an attempt to keep memories in a special place. Although
some of them may not read this dissertation, I still want to thank those who have
transformed my life.

This dissertation has been possible because of the support of several people and
institutions. They have allowed me to pursue my interest in science and technology
education. I would like to thank all of them, particularly my colleagues, professors and
friends.

I want to thank my advisor and dissertation director James Gallagher. He has given
me a lot of support during my years at MSU. He has made time to listen to my fears and
plans. He has guided my studies and encouraged my research. Jim has shown me a world
of respect, work and peace. I am grateful for having him as my advisor. At the same time,
I want to express my gratitude to the committee members, Deborah Ball, Edward Smith,
David Labaree and David Wong. In different forms they have been very important during
these years of doctoral studies. During my first year at MSU Deborah helped me to
understand the norms and practices of a new community. She provided me guidance in the
complex world of education. Ed has shown me a conception of science education in which
children are able to understand powerful scientific concepts. He gave me opportunities to
work in his projects and learn several useful and beautiful things from these experiences.
The sociologist David Labaree showed me a critical position toward education. He allowed
me to develop my dissertation ideas through two courses I took with him. David Wong
kindly and critically discussed my ideas from the perspective of learning. He always had a
powerful contra argument to my ideas. Thanks to all of them.

vi

There are two institutions that have helped me to study in America. I owe the
privilege of studying at MSU to a Fulbright scholarship provided by the Latin American
Scholarship Program of American Universities (LASPAU). Also, I have had the support
of my home university, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala.

Now that I am preparing the final report of this dissertation, the image of several
friends comes to mind. All of them have a special place in my heart. Angela Shojgreen-
Downer and her family gave me a new home...gracias familia. My friends have been
patient enough to hear my complaints and to show me a world that I could not see by
myself. Don Duggan-Haas, Helene Alpert Furani, Gaston Dembélé, Maria Eulina
Carvalho, Qasim AlShannag, Washington Carvalho, Francisca Garcia Kidder, Doug
Gordin and Matt Bliton are among these beautiful folks.

My family and friends in Central America are part of my life. Mama and Papa are a
source of inspiration . Having my daughter Nadia around me during my last year of studies
made a big difference. Thanks Nadia for having been here.

Tracy Wardle, my love, has shared with me good and difficult times. We have
grown together during these years at Michigan State. During our long conversations she
saw the evolution of my ideas on the relevance of school science and the role of technology
in society. She always asks me why I am suggesting the introduction of practical
knowledge into the science curriculum when I, myself, am so abstract. I still do not have a
concrete answer. We are able to move our conversations from science education to delicate
topics of school psychology, from teacher education to poetry, from neuropsychology to

everyday life. I am grateful for having her in my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW .....................................................................................
CHAPTER 1

CONNECTING SCHOOL SCIENCE WITH EVERYDAY LIFE: THE ROLE OF

TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................................
Relevance of school science: The Salish Research ..................................
Connecting school science with everyday life: A difficult task ....................
Connecting science with everyday life: Some alternatives .........................
The knowledge behind the use of science in everyday life .........................
Technology: Reducing the gap between school science and everyday life .......

CHAPTER 2

THE TENSION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATIONS ..........
The case of Dave and Feynman ......................................................
External and internal relevance: Dave and Feynman ...............................
Understanding and applications: The case of Dave ................................
Educational research on electricity ....................................................
The knowledge behind teaching for understanding and applications .............
Understanding and applications: An example from mechanics ....................
Concluding comment ...................................................................

CHAPTER3

SCIENCE TEACHER KNOWLEDGE: A FRAMEWORK ................................
Science teacher knowledge ..............................................................
Science teachers' knowledge: The context of Salish .................................
Teacher knowledge: A brief review ....................................................
Literature on science teacher knowledge ...............................................
Teacher knowledge: A theoretical model ...............................................
Science teacher knowledge: Implications and limitations ...........................

CHAPTER 4

TEACHER KNOWLEDGE: APPLICATIONS ..............................................
Understanding..applications: A clarification of basic terms .......................
The multiple meanings of understanding & applications ...........................
Problems .................................................................................
Personal relevance: A kind of application ............................................
Demands of science teacher knowledge in the context of applications ............
Extension of a theoretical model for science teacher knowledge ..................

viii

10
10
13
18
21
24

CHAPTER 5
A FRAMEWORK FOR TECHNOLOGY: INTRODUCING TECHNOLOGY

INTO THE SCIENCE CURRICULUM ...................................................... 127
The term technology ..................................................................... 128
A framework for technology ........................................................... 146
Teaching science, teaching technology: The case of energy ....................... 149

CHAPTER 6

TECHNOLOGY: PROJECT 2061 AND THE NATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION

STANDARDS ................................................................................... 162
The introduction of technology: The perspective of Project 2061 ................ 162
Technological content knowledge: The missing element ........................... 170
The position of technology IN The National Science Education Standards ...... 173
Personal relevance: The case of the National Standards
and Project 2061 ....................................................................... 178
Concluding comments ................................................................. 180

CHAPTER 7

THE TRANSLATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE INTO

SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE ..................................................................... 182
Translation of knowledge .............................................................. 182
Translation of scientific knowledge: A sociological perspective .................. 186
Translation of scientific knowledge: A general introduction ....................... 187
Translation of technological knowledge: An exploration .......................... 194
Translation of technological knowledge into the curriculum ....................... 203
A generic case of translation: The goals of science education ...................... 209
Translation of technological knowledge: Potential problems ...................... 213

EPILOGUE

HOW TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE WOULD CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN

UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATION: IMPLICATIONS ........................... 215

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................ 227

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 Contrasting external and internal relevance ........................... 34
Table 2.2 Summary of the pedagogical actions and goals

in Dave’s class on electricity ................................................ 37
Table 2.3 Objectives and concepts for a part of the topic

of electricity according to MEGOSE ....................................... 41
Table 2.4 Goals, knowledge and pedagogical actions in teaching forces

and electricity from the perspective of understanding and applications 49
Table 3.1 Reproduction of the "structure of the content" row of the Secondary

Teaching Analysis Matrix Science Version ................................. 59
Table 3.2 Reproduction of the second row of the Secondary

Teaching analysis Matrix Science Version ................................... 60
Table 3.3 Reproduction of the fourth row of the Secondary

Teaching analysis Matrix Science Version .................................... 62
Table 3.4 Primitive actions regarding the psychogenesis of motions and forces

according to Bliss and Ogborn ................................................. 79
Table 3.5 Relationship between substantive and procedural subject-matter

knowledge ......................................................................... 82
Table 3.6 An illustration of the philosophical assumptions of science from the

perspective of Project 2061 ..................................................... 84
Table 4.1 Real life situations and traditional textbook problems in the context of

mathematics education ........................................................... 97
Table 4.2 Features of children's engineering and science models .................. 102
Table 4.3 The multiple meanings of the term application .............................. 104
Table 5.1 Relationship between science (S) and technology (T) .................... 141
Table 5.2 Concepts and goals of teaching energy from the traditional

science education perspective .................................................... 153
Table 5.3 Teaching energy from the perspective of technology education ......... 156
Table 5.4 Three different approaches for teaching the topic of energy ............. 159
Table 7.1. Different types of reconstruction of scientific knowledge ................ 193
Table 7.2 Reconstruction of scientific knowledge to design artifacts ............... 202
Table 7.3 Epistemological assumptions of science and technology ................. 203

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Students personal relevance scores as a function
of teacher personal relevance scores ...........................................

Figure 2.1 The book-on-the-table problem stresses the use
of knowledge for explaining and predicting ..................................

Figure 2.2 The forces that act on a given bridge .....................................
Figure 3.1 A minimal model for the knowledge base of science teaching .........

Figure 3.2 Subject-matter knowledge to be translated in the case
of electrical circuits ...............................................................

Figure 3.3 Phenomenological model of a simple electrical circuit ..................

Figure 3.4 Three kinds of knowledge as part of a minimal model of
science teacher knowledge ......................................................

Figure 3.5 Concept map developed by E. Smith for unit on forces ................
Figure 4.1 The simple pendulum ........................................................
Figure 4.2 An extension of the science teacher model ................................
Figure 5.1 Three different meanings of the term technology ........................

Figure 5. 2 Relationships between science, technology and vocational practices
with status, artifacts, and knowledge ..........................................

12

46
48
53

59
63

64
76
94
l 24
146

148

OVERVIEW

In the international arena, as well as in the American context, current science
educational reform proposals are asking for the introduction of technology in general
education. The two leading science education reforms in the United States: Project 2061
and the National Science Education Standards are important examples (AAAS, 1990;
National Research Council, 1995). At the same time teachers and researchers are making
important contributions to the field of technology education (e. g., Olson, 1997; Lewis &
Gage], 1992, Raizen, Sellwood, Todd & Vickers, 1995, etc.). Despite the calls of national
reform proposals and the interest that researchers have shown for introducing technology
into the science curriculum, there has not been a real impact on teaching science. Rather,
the long history of the lack of connection between technology and science in general
education continues.

The role of technology in science education emerges in my thinking as an alternative
to an old epistemological tension between two kinds of knowledge, abstract and practical
(Becher, 1993). This tension has taken several forms throughout the history of ideas. One
of them is the tension between abstract and concrete knowledge (Turckle & Papert, 1992).
Another is the tension between causal (mechanists) and fmalistic (teleological) explanation
(Wright, 1971). One more is the tension between sacred and popular knowledge (Muller &
Taylor, 1995). Another is the tension understanding and application which I suggest has
important implications on teaching science. In order to tackle this problem, I framed my
dissertation research using a set of questions which were suggested in my original research

proposal. They are:

 

1) What is the relationship between teaching science for understanding and
teaching science for applications?

2) What are the possibilities of technological knowledge for being used in
teaching science for understanding and teaching science for applications?

3) What are the demands that the introduction of technology would place on
science teacher knowledge?

 

 

 

These preliminary questions have guided my research. As one expects they have
changed while I have been writing. The very meanings of the terms understanding and
applications have changed. However, the basic three research questions remain my general
guides. They have helped me to: a) present an epistemological scenario in which I show a
tension between understanding and application, b) clarify what I mean by technology, and
c) develop more language to understand what I mean by science teacher knowledge.

These three areas are represented in my work in the form of theoretical frameworks.
To develop such frameworks I open my dissertation with a discussion on the current

concern on connecting science to students' experiential world. In this first chapter, I

illustrate the notion of relevance of science using data from the Salish Research Project.l I
have studied some outcomes of this research project to show how difficult it is for science
teachers to connect science with students‘ everyday lives. My analysis of the relevance of
science, that is, meaningful applications of science to everyday life, uses of students'
experiential world in teaching science, attempts to show the reader the need for including
technology into the science curriculum. I explain why technology can provide an
epistemological basis to use science in meaningful ways in students' experiential world.

In the context of my argument, it is important to show the reader what the problems
that technology -as content knowledge- would solve are. My thesis is that in teaching
science, there is an intrinsic epistemological tension between understanding and
application. This tension is not a simple dichotomy between understanding and
applications; rather this is a complex interaction which has important pedagogical

implications. Only if the reader is willing to give a chance to this option, she or he can

 

' The Salish Research Project is a collaborative effort on the part of 10 Universities
throughout the US which aims to research the effectiveness of science and mathematics
teacher preparation programs. From 1993 to 1996, Salish I has been gathering data from
three groups of individuals: a) science, mathematics and education faculty involved with
the teacher preparation programs, b) new teachers who are recent graduates of the
programs, and finally, c) the students of these new teachers (see Salish, 1997 for an
extensive report).

make a space for other kind of knowledge in science education (e.g., technological
knowledge). Therefore, pointing out the tension understanding/applications is an important
step. This is the topic of the second chapter.

As I said, I think the tension understanding-application is a reflection of a wider and
old tension between abstract and practical knowledge. The pedagogical implications of such
tension are enormous and little understood. Although researchers have reported that the
tension between abstract and practical knowledge has some responsibility on the lack of
impact of technology on science education (e.g., Lewis, 1991), there has been little attempt
to explain why that is. Moreover, the same researchers who tend to prescribe technology as
part of general education are not explicit with the knowledge that students can learn with
such introduction. I argue that this dissertation fills this gap. In doing so, I examine the
demands that some general meanings of understanding and applications, such as the use of
science in everyday life and the knowledge needed to design artifacts, place on science
teacher knowledge.

Despite that there are several meanings of understanding, in the second chapter, I use a
generic meaning of understanding in the sense of describing, explaining and predicting
natural phenomena. This conception seems to be widely shared within school and scientific
communities (Reif, & Larkin 1991; Wolpert, 1993). I decided to contrast a conception of
understanding and applications within scientific communities and others from school
settings. In doing so, I constructed:

1) a brief case from some examples of the Richard Feynman's Lectures to illustrate one
meaning of understanding/applications, and

2) a case from a new science teacher with the pseudonym of Dave who was part of the
Salish Research Project.

The case of Feynman illustrates a generic conception of understanding while the case
of Dave is a study of the difficulties that Dave is having in connecting understanding with

applications in the context of a Mid West High School. From these cases emerged several

observations in the form of problems. Here I raise more questions than answers. However,
the reader should not be confused by the observation that I do not present any solution,
strategy or alternative in this chapter. For her/his tranquillity she/he should know that later
I face some alternatives.

The importance of the first two chapters is that they provide a preliminary scenario to
talk about everyday life applications of science in relation to students' experiential lives.
This goal of current science education reforms is usually seen in line with the goal of
understanding. In these first two chapters 1 seek to show that understanding and
applications are quite different epistemological positions toward the world.

The epistemological difference between understanding and application is the basic
argument of my work. I show that by pointing out differences between micro (e.g.,
atomic) and macro models of teaching and learning science such as the use of atomic
models to teach electricity or more phenomenological approaches. I show that by clarifying
what kind of discussion Dave's students were having about the topic of electricity. I show
that by studying some epistemological demands of the knowledge behind understanding and
behind applications. I also show that by pointing out that traditional topics such as
electricity (e.g., experiment with bulb light, batteries and wires) seem irrelevant for dealing
with everyday life situations (despite the fact that electricity is a theme that is accepted as
very relevant to students' everyday lives).

I move to the next chapter by developing a theoretical framework to talk about what
teachers need to know in order to teach for understanding and applications. The first thing
I learned was that in order to talk about what teachers need to know, I needed to develop a
language to clarify the kind of knowledge teachers use. Here I found that, in general,
scholars do not make a distinction between knowledge within disciplinary departments
(e.g., scientific communities) and knowledge within school settings. I mean, people seem
to acknowledge that there is a difference between science and school science, but when one

needs to know more about such differences and similarities (e.g., what, why, how, when),

the literature does not offer much help (Deng, 1997 is an exception with his contribution on

key ideas in teaching school physics and key ideas in the discipline of physics. Chevallard,

1991, with his "Transposition Didactique" in the context of mathematics education is also an
exception and a fundamental reference of my work).

The inclusion of a framework of science teacher knowledge could be seen. in the
best of the cases, as a simple aggregated chapter of my dissertation, or as an unconnected
chapter of my argument in the worst case. However, its existence has an explanation.
While I was writing, I was assuming that my readers knew what I meant by science teacher
knowledge. A review of the literature convinced me that I had to be more specific with my
own terms. I did that in Chapter 3 by developing a framework on science teacher
knowledge. At the same time, I was assuming that my readers could make a general
distinction between the knowledge science teachers need to know to teach for understanding
in relation to the knowledge teachers need to know to teach for applications (e.g., facing
every day life applications as opposed to solving academic problems). I could not support
this assumption at least for two reasons. First, as I show in the first chapter, there is an
incredible lack of research, that is, papers, books, web sites, etc., on how students use
science in everyday life (e.g., out of school). As a logical consequence we know few
things on what teachers need to know if they are going to face everyday life problems. A
second reason is that the meanings of understanding and applications that I use are quite
different from the common connotations of these terms. W

”.110 0-4 .1 n Wu, i... 1 QI‘r‘r "-1.“. 1..-; r' 'o ,r‘ ‘m ' .u‘ m-
W. Therefore, I needed to tell the reader what I meant by
understanding and applications and how it can be connected to technology. I did that by
creating a minimal model of science teacher knowledge. This model includes three types of
knowledge: Scientific knowledge (SK, the subject-matter knowledge of teachers),
pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) and knowledge of knowledge (KK), that is, <S K,
PCK, KK>.

I used this minimal model of science teacher knowledge to clarify what teachers need
to know in order to teach for understanding. I developed the argument that the knowledge
needed to teach for applications is not necessarily the same knowledge that teachers use to
teach for understanding. Using the case study of another Salish science teacher with the
pseudonym of Judy, who consistently was rated high in the personal relevance scale of the
Constructivist Learning Environment Survey (CLES), I developed an analysis of the
knowledge she used during her three years of teaching that we have access to. Judy taught
biology. However, the case study I developed shows that the relevance of biology was not
limited to biology itself. Biology was one part of her knowledge. There is evidence that
she consistently included important applications of biology regarding students' lives (health,
food production and consumption, etc.). In addition, biotechnology played an important
role of her teaching (e.g., genetic engineering). The case of Judy was my first attempt to
connect my minimal model of science teacher knowledge with other kinds of knowledge. In
her case, subject-matter knowledge was a mix of scientific knowledge (SK) with
technological knowledge (TK), in addition to other mundane knowledge MK (knowledge of
how to use biology in a florist shop). Therefore, I extended my original model of science
teacher knowledge. Particularly the "new" subject-matter knowledge, SK, was represented
by <SK, TK, MK>. I also developed an extension for pedagogical content knowledge and
the knowledge-of-knowledge component.

Pedagogical content knowledge for applications seems to include a new, or at least
different, set of demands. The case of Judy also helped me to illuminate potential
scenarios. One important scenario was the creation of contexts in which students could use
science in meaningful ways. In the second chapter I point out that research in science
education has developed knowledge on how students learn. This knowledge would be used
to develop PCK in both substantive and procedural aspects. The case of research on
students' naive conceptions of science was an important part of that. I called for a re-

evaluation of this research in light of other meanings of understanding and application, such

as the relevance of this knowledge to develop pedagogical content knowledge for
applications to: a) real world problems, b) everyday life, and c) design of artifacts.

From the case of Judy, and also from my general discussion on science teacher
knowledge, one can expect that PCK for applications differs from PCK for understanding.
Therefore, the demands of pedagogical knowledge that applications introduce in science
teacher knowledge should be reconsidered, I think, in light of the several meanings of the
terms understanding/ applications which I already have pointed out. In fact, at this moment
I think that the most important argument of this section is the argument that knowledge for
understanding is quite different from knowledge for applications. This set" the basis for my
discussion on the introduction of technology into the science curriculum.

My argument in the fourth chapter is that traditional science teacher knowledge has
had for referent scientific knowledge in contrast to other kinds of knowledge (e.g., practical
knowledge). In relation to the model presented in the third chapter, the big difference that I
presented in this fourth chapter is the introduction of other kinds of knowledge. For “other
kinds of knowledge” I refer to
a) knowledge needed to solve real-world problems (as opposed to "academic" problems),
b) knowledge of how to use science in everyday life, and
0) knowledge needed to deal with technological tasks (e.g., to design artifacts).

These three generic "applications" of science also carry different epistemologies,
methodologies, and ontologies. In other words, applications of science beyond scientific
knowledge require a re-examination of new epistemological territories, methodological
rules and ontological worlds. With such discussion, I also connected with the knowledge
needed for applications regarding technology. At this moment, I felt it was a good time to
provide my readers a more detailed clarification of what I meant by technology and mainly
by technological knowledge.

In the fifth chapter, I developed a framework on technology. The starting point of
this framework is based on works of contemporary philosophers of technology such as

Mario Bunge (McGill), Rodolfo Herrera (University of Costa Rica), Carl Mitchman (Penn

State), Paul Durbin (Delaware), and Steve Goldman (Lehigh University). Here the term
technology has three different, yet complementary, meanings:
1) technology as artifact (a concrete system)
2) technology as knowledge (a conceptual system), and
3) technology as social practice (an activity).
I argue that these three meanings are important elements for a framework for technology.
The framework on technology has helped me to clarify the potential role of technological
knowledge in science teacher knowledge. Using such a framework I clarified, in this
chapter, what I meant by the introduction of technology into the science curriculum. In
addition, the framework provided tools to study current national reforms that include
technology as part of their proposal. I studied the conception of technology and technology
education of Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards and their relation
with science education.

My discussion on understanding and applications; the cases of Feynman, Dave, and
Judy; the framework on science teacher knowledge, together with the framework on
technology and its use on the analysis of current reforms, provided the basis to study the
translation of technological knowledge into the science curriculum. In different chapters, I
developed the argument that technology can and should be part of general education. From
the very beginning I showed that technological knowledge would close the gap between
understanding and application in school science. Based on an eminent epistemological
tension between understanding and applications, I called for a re-evaluation of school
science knowledge. Using the example of engineering, that is, based on an epistemology of
engineering, I clarified the specificity of the epistemology of technology. I illustrated the
epistemological richness that technology has and its potential in science education. I
reinforced the idea that technology (e.g., engineering) generates its own knowledge
somewhat related to scientific knowledge in contextual and complex ways. The point that

remains to be explained is why it has been so difficult, throughout the history of science

education, to introduce technology in the science curriculum. The last chapter of my
dissertation deals with this problem and its implications on science teacher knowledge.

The last conceptual link of my argument faces the critical problem of introducing
technology into the science curriculum. The attempts of introducing technology as part of
the science curriculum are nothing new. What is the norm in these attempts is that they have
not had real impact on the science curriculum. One of the reasons is that usually these
propositions are not explicit with the kind of knowledge that students can learn with the
introduction of technology. Therefore, it is important to know what the connections
between scientific and technological knowledge are in order to be aware of the potential that
technology has for teaching science. This is a missing element of the intents made to
introduce technology as part of the science curriculum. I argue that my dissertation presents
a contribution to this point. However, even if one clarifies this knowledge, the introduction
of technology into school knowledge, that is its translation, still presents serious dilemmas.

I finish my argument developing a theoretical explanation on the translation of
technological knowledge into the curriculum and its implications on science education. I
recapitulate several parts of my arguments. Using the construct of "translation of
knowledge" I explain how school knowledge has been the product of the translation of a
clean history and philosophy of science which has denied (and perhaps erased) nearly all
traces of technology. An epilogue explains the implications of this argument for the

preparation of science teachers.

CHAPTER 1
CONNECTING SCHOOL SCIENCE WITH EVERYDAY LIFE:
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

In the past decade, there have been renewed calls for reforming education in the
United States. Such calls have markedly focused on science and mathematics with a
particular concern for teaching and learning for understanding. Within the context of
science education the reform proposals are also calling for meaningful applications of
science to students' experiential worlds. Science teachers are expected to have an in-depth
knowledge of subject-matter and a high level of capacity for connecting that to real-world
situations (e.g., use of students' out-of—school experiences). Consequently, understanding
and application are two key terms that partially define current science education reforms
(e.g., the National Science Education Standards and Project 2061).

Although there are several potential interpretations of what it means to understand
and use science in meaningful ways, the current concern for relating subject-matter to
students’ everyday lives experiences, that is, the personal relevance of school science, is
the focus for this chapter. Later in the dissertation I offer a detailed analysis of several
meanings of the uses of the terms understanding and applications. What is important at this
moment is to note that contemporary reforms are asking for a stronger connection between
school science and students’ everyday lives. In this chapter, I set an introductory scenario
from which the reader can see some of the problems that science teachers are having in
connecting science with students’ out.of-school experiences. I seek to show the potential

role technology has in connecting school science with students’ everyday lives.

The relevance of school science: The Salish Research
The Salish Research Project was an exploratory study conducted by a national
collaborative team with members from 10 universities. It was monitored by the National

Center for Improving Science Education (NCISE) and the Council of Scientific Society

10

Presidents (CSSP) and was supported with a three-year grant from the Office of
Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) of the US. Department of Education.
Many relationships were explored which included a consideration of the personal relevance
of school science and teachers' knowledge and beliefs. The Project also studied potential
connections among personal relevance with teachers' actions, students’ outcomes and
program features (teacher preparation), that is, characteristics of the program experienced
by these new science teachers that would affect the relevance of science perceived by
students and teachers. Preliminary findings from this project show that science teachers
are not perceived by their students as making science highly relevant to their lives outside
the school (Salish, 1997).l

The concept of personal relevance in the Salish Research is related to uses of
science out-of-school as perceived by students and teachers. Although one can access
records of in—depth interviews and videotapes of actual teaching to discern how teachers
were connecting science to students’ everyday lives, a preliminary study was developed
using the Constructivist Learning Environment Survey (CLES) (Taylor, Fraser, & White,
1995). On the CLES Personal Relevance Scale (PR), students and teachers rated the
relevance of their science lessons. For each item the minimum score is 7, which means
“almost” no relevance, and the highest is 35, which means that they “almost always”
perceived relevance. Between “almost no relevance” and “almost always” there are
different degrees such as “seldom” (14), “sometimes” (21) and “often” (28). The Personal
Relevance score is calculated as an average of all scores.

The first general outcome of the Salish I Research regarding the relevance of

science and mathematics studies showed that “Students in science classes perceived their

 

1 This dissertation uses data from the Salish I Research Project. Salish was sponsored by
the US. Department of Education, Office of Education, Research, and Improvement,
Grant No. R168U3004. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the US. Department of Education or of the Salish I Research Project as a whole.

11

study to be personally more relevant to their lives than did students in mathematics classes”
(Salish, 1997, p.18). This finding was based on data from 241 classes taught by 116 new
teachers (207 of these classes were science and 34 were mathematics classes). The survey
included more than 5,000 students. Therefore, one may suggest that science studies were
being perceived highly relevant. However, when one sees the average scores of science
and mathematics (23.3 and 21.2 respectively), the situation is less promising. The
following figure displays data of personal relevance as it was perceived by science teachers

and their students.

 

CLES Personal Relevance Scores - Student vs. Teacher

W

Student PR

 

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 2
Teacher PR

Figure 1.1 Students personal relevance scores as a function of teacher personal relevance
scores.

A first interpretation of the data displayed in Figure 1.1 is that few science teachers
were seen as making science highly relevant according to their students. Only about 10%
of the sample obtained personal relevance scores greater than 25. In fact, one can sort the
sample of Salish science teachers in two subsets: those teachers whose classes were seen as

highly relevant and those who were perceived with medium and low relevance. The vast

12

majority of science teachers were rated by their students with scores between 20 and 25
(medium scores). These teachers saw their teaching as being more relevant than students
did. This is especially valid if one notes in Figure 1.1 that the majority of students are
between the 20 and 25 interval while their teachers are between the 20 and 30, and mainly
between 25 and 30. At any rate, few science teachers were seen by their students as
making science study highly relevant.

There are, of course, several more interpretations or perhaps concerns about the
data displayed in Figure 1.1. One would argue, for example, about the validity and
reliability of the survey or the conditions in which the test was applied (see Taylor, et a1.
1995 for specific discussions on the instrument). Nonetheless, this data can be used as a
starting point, that is, as exploratory research on the perceptions that teachers and students
have regarding the relevance of their science classes. Given this clarification, one can see
that data firm the Salish Research show that science teachers have difficulties in connecting
science with students’ out-of-school experiences (relevance of science as measured by the
instrument CLES). The problems that teachers are having in connecting science to students

everyday life experiences may become clearer if we examine other studies.

Connecting school science with everyday life: A difficult task

The connection of school science with students’ everyday lives is another of these
educational goals which looks simple, plausible and desirable. However, it seems to be
complex, difficult, and rarely studied. Of course, there have been researchers and even
movements concerned with the topic (e.g., the science technology and society movement,
usually called STS). Take a look of the following titles: “Cognition in scientific and
everyday domains: Comparison and learning implications” (Reif, & Larkin
1991) or “ Bridging the gap between school and real life...” (Roth, 1992), etc.
Unfortunately they are just titles. None of these papers attempts to study what the title
suggests (Reif, & Larkin, 1991 studied everyday life thinking as opposed to scientific

13

thinking rather than the uses of science in students’ everyday lives). In fact, one easily
finds an incredible lack of research on how students use science in their lives. There is
even less research on how teachers can help students to connect students out-of-school
experiences with science.

There have been some works about the relevance of science education, for example
the reports of Lewis (1972), and also Newton (1988). The problem with these studies is
that they tend to be general recommendations (opinions), rather than research based on
actual observations of classroom situations or everyday life activities. Nagel (1996) is an
exception, but her work is still general. Linn has studied the use of thermodynamics in
everyday life and her work is studied later in this chapter. Lave (1988) is another exception
in mathematics education; unfortunately, her work does not have a parallel in science
education.

One of the few systematic works on school science and students’ out-of-school
experiences is the recently published paper of K. Mayoh and S. Knutton (1997). They
reported the way in which twelve science teachers were using students’ out-of-school
experiences in their science lessons. The authors set an experimental design which
included data collection from one hundred lessons during the period of fourteen months
(Mayoh, & Knutton, 1997, pp. 850-851). In their report, Mayoh and Knutton stress their
decision of preserving -as much as possible- the naturalistic setting of classrooms
investigated. Both the level of teachers investigated (secondary education) and the
exploratory nature of the research make Mayoh and Knutton’s study similar, in part, to the
Salish research. However, Mayoh and Knutto research was much more specific in the
sense that it was planned to study the way in which secondary science teachers use
students’ out-of-school experiences in their science lessons.

There are several important points of the Mayoh and Knutton report that are important
for my discussion (Cajas, 1998a). In principle they ordered the data using a “taxonomy of

episodes involving out-of-school experiences” which seems to be useful to think about the

14

uses of science in real life (e.g., episodes referring to: the mass media, use in everyday life,
industry, etc.). In addition, they reported different roles that out-of-school experiences
play in teaching science. Some of them are: linking everyday experiences with scientific
ideas, raising students’ awareness of science related to everyday life situations, increasing
students’ interest in science, etc. (pp. 862, 863). What is really striking from this study is
that almost no teacher from their sample seems to be able to connect science to students'
out-of-school experiences (i.e., everyday life of students). Although we all know that it is
difficult to connect science to students' out-of school experiences, one would expect that
some teachers can make this connection. However, for the set of teachers studied by
Mayoh and Knutton, it was an impossible task. If this is indeed the case, one should ask
why.

One immediate answer regarding the lack of teachers that connected science with
students’ out-of-school experiences would be that perhaps these teachers simply do not
know how to do so because they only have a few years of experience. From this
perspective, connecting students' out-of-school experiences with school science may be a
matter of teachers‘ experience.

Years of teaching experience may be an important factor enabling teachers to connect
school science and students' out-of-school experience. However, the Salish Research
Project revealed that some new science teachers were able to make this connection.
Although in general terms students tended to perceive that their classes were not very
relevant to their every-day life, the Salish research found a set of teachers -about 10% of
the sample- which included students who perceived their science lessons as being highly
relevant to their personal lives (Salish, 1997, p. 47). The problem with this sample of
Salish teachers was that classroom observations showed that they were "telling" students
what was relevant (ibid. p.47). Therefore, one cannot say that the problem of relevance of

school science was solved.

15

Another potential answer to the lack of connection between science and students’ out-
of-school experiences may be the teachers’ lack of pedagogical knowledge to do that. This
deserves a better understanding of the sample of teachers studied by Mayoh and Knutton.
For the case of the few episodes in which there were potential attempts to connect out-of-
school experiences with science lessons, Mayoh and Knutton report that:

...teachers appeared to possess some knowledge-in-action concerning the
importance of linking everyday experiences to scientific knowledge. However,
their awareness of the role of out-of-school experience within their teaching seemed
largely to be tacit. Rarely, were teachers explicit about the potential relationships of
out-of-school experiences to their science learning (p. 865).

The question is: What is this “tacit” knowledge teachers need to know to help
students connect everyday experiences with science lessons? Why is it so difficult for these
teachers, and teachers in general, to be explicit with the connection between out-of-school
experiences and science learning? One specific example would help to see this point.

Consider the case of the ‘Episodes developing skills of use in everyday life’ section
of Mayoh and Knutton's paper. This is related to the topic of electricity (p.859).
Electricity seems to present a meaningful context for using science in everyday life.
Moreover, there is abundant research on electricity, particularly on circuits (Arons, 1997;
McDermott & Shaffer 1992a, 1992b). In fact, the topic is considered as one with several
real-world applications. However, such applications tend to be difficult because normally
science teachers work with very simple circuits (e.g., closed circuits constructed with
flashlight bulbs, wires, and batteries) while real-world circuits tend to be different (Black &
Harlen, 1993). More important, working with bulbs, wires and batteries is to develop
models mm how electricity works rather than developing skills Win
Wilk- This becomes clearer when one reads the specific episode reported by
Mayoh and Knutton on the electricity unit:

This was rarely observed but one episode which could be interpreted as deliberate
skills training involved wiring an electrical plug. However, for safety reasons

pupils were not allowed to test their wired plug in a socket...Pupils also carried out
a range of classroom-based skills such as plotting graphs and recording numerical

16

data in tables as well as open-ended problem-solving investigations. However, the
extent to which these skills might be transferable to other problems and issues in
their lives is not clear (p.869).

There are at least two different episodes in this quotation. The first is an attempt to do
practical things (e.g., wiring an electrical plug). As the authors say, problems of safety did
not allow students to fully develop the task. My interpretation includes more alternatives.
First, I think that usually science teachers do not have the kind of practical knowledge
needed to help students with these tasks. And second, it is possible that science teachers
are not interested in this kind of knowledge.2 Certainly, one can see that in order to wire
an electrical plug, teachers need to draw from practical knowledge (technical knowledge on
circuits) that usually is not integrated in science education. This contrasts with the second
part of the quotation from Mayoh and Knutton’s paper which reflects the classical goal of
science education: to develop analytical investigations. In this case, what matters is the
collection of data, development of graphic interpretations, which are strategies to develop
understanding rather than practical applications of electricity in the real world. The
connection between these two approaches seems to be very difficult if not impossible for
these science teachers. Again, one should ask why is it so?

A second example taken from the same report clarifies this question. This time the
example comes from the topic of energy. The episode identified is on the use of ‘analogies
based on students’ everyday experiences. Here the teacher says:

Imagine if you had some hot water from the tap at the back and you had to tip it into

a bucket at the front. You’ve got a saucepan to carry it in...but as you walk along it
slops all over...So what do you do?

 

2 Science teachers do not have this “practical knowledge” nor they are interested in it. For
example, a recent project developed in Thailand that attempted to connect school with
community by including in the curriculum the topic of “social forestry” showed that:
“Resistance remained particularly great among the four science teachers who continued to
argue that such field-base program was inconsistent with the curriculum they were
mandated to teach and represented an inappropriate leaming style [practical] for students in
llogvggr segqrgglary school” (Wheeler, Gallagher, McDoDonough & Sookpokakit-Namfa,

p.

17

You put a lid on it to stop the water escaping while you’re carrying it. Well, that’s
like the water pipes, except in that case, you don’t want the heat to escape so you
put lagging on the pipes. The lagging is like the saucepan lid. It stops the heat
escaping (p.858).
According to Mayoh and Knutton, with this analogy there “...is a clear attempt by the
teacher to bridge pupil’s understanding from a familiar experience towards an unfamiliar
science concept” (p.858). I do not analyze the quality of the analogy. What is important is
the assumption that it is possible to use familiar experiences (everyday) to understand
unfamiliar explanations (scientific). Here the notion of insulation and transfer of heat have
been identified as simpler phenomena. One can argue that for this topic, there are better
analogies that allow teachers to connect science with students’ everyday experiences. Yes
there are, and one can help students to develop a scientific understanding of processes of
heat transfer, temperature changes and thermal equilibrium (see examples in Arnold &
Millar, 1996). The problem begins when one tries to develop scientific understanding and
practical applications at the same time.

As I have illustrated, the demands of teachers’ knowledge in the sense of practical
applications of science to students’ everyday experiences and scientific knowledge is
problematic. Mayoh and Knutton recognize that by pointing out that the few teachers who
attempted to connect science with students’ out-of-school experiences were using a kind
of “tacit” knowledge, that is, “knowledge-in—action”. However, Mayoh and Knutton did
not clarify the nature of this knowledge. In fact, they do not explain why it is difficult for

teachers to connect students’ everyday lives with science lessons.

Connecting science with everyday life: Some alternatives

The problems that Mayoh and Knutton are reporting is not the difficulty of developing
students’ scientific understanding. The problem is the lack of connection of this scientific
understanding with practical applications, particularly the lack of connection between science

and students’ out-of-school experiences. Think of the suggestion made in Project 2061

18

regarding the models of heat that should be taught in K-12 education. Science for All
Americans suggests an approach in which energy is understood using mainly atomic and
molecular models. For example, the process of transformation of heat from "warmer" places
to "cooler" is explained in the following terms:

Heat energy in a material consists of the disordered motions of its perpetually colliding

atoms or molecules. As very large numbers of atoms or molecules in one region of a

material repeatedly and randomly collide with those of a neighboring region, there are

far more ways in which their energy of random motion can end up shared about
equally throughout both regions than there are ways in which it can end up more

concentrated in one region (AAAS, 1990, p. 51).

Some, actually few, science education researchers have studied the relevance of the
kind of models of heat advanced by Project 2061, that is, atomic and molecular models,
regarding students’ everyday lives. For example, Linn and her colleagues at the University of
California, Berkeley, have developed a cuniculum that attempts to connect science with
everyday life applications on the topic of thermodynamics. Since their earlier works, Linn
and her team have criticized the uses of atomic and molecular-based models of
thermodynamics in K-12 education (Linn & Songer, 1991). In doing so, they have argued
the lack of relevance of these models in students’ everyday lives

These elegant models may not be very effective for many students...As a result of this

abstraction, many elegant theories do not appear directly linked to the world around

us“ (Linn, & Muilenburg, 1996, p. 19).

In contrast, they suggest alternative models that can be used in more relevant ways: “We find
alternative to the abstract, elegant models in the relatively concrete, pragmatic models used by
experts in heat transfer” (ibid., p.21).

From the perspective of Linn and her colleagues, the problem of connecting school
science with students’ everyday lives experiences is an epistemological problem. What she
suggests is to reduce the abstractness of school knowledge by introducing more concrete and

pragmatic models. The problem here is not necessarily years of experience of teachers or their

pedagogical knowledge, not even social limitation of schooling. These factors may or may

19

not affect the teaching of science (Linn, & Butler, 1991; Linn, & Burbules, 1993). What is
urgent, from their perspective, is to reduce the epistemological distance between students’
everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge. Note that the Linn team is asking for the
introduction of more concrete and pragmatic models as opposed to deeper and abstract
theories. The solution is epistemological.

The epistemological solution that Linn has suggested is nothing new. The problems is
so important that it has been the very topic of specific conferences, such as the European
Science Education Conference: “Relating Macroscopic Phenomena to Microscopic
Particles: A Central Problem in Secondary Science Education,” held in Holland a
few years ago (Lijse, & Licht 1990). In reading the proceedings of this conference, one
realizes the existence of research that has attempted to discuss the problems and advantages
that the inclusion of micro models (e.g., atomic or molecular models) has had in science
education. However, Linn’s suggestion is more specific in the sense that she has advanced
specific “pragmatic” models (macro models) which have important philosophical assumptions
and crucial pedagogical implications.

In principle, according to Linn’s research, it is possible to reduce the epistemological
distance between scientific knowledge and everyday life knowledge (Linn, & Songer, 1991;
Linn, 1992; 1993; Linn, & Muilbenburg, 1996; Linn, 1997). The price is to sacrifice abstract
models. Therefore, one would increase the relevance of science by reducing the level of
abstractness of school knowledge. This has some favorable empirical evidence beyond
Linn’s research. One is the historical case of the Movement of Common Things in England
which last century attempted to include more practical knowledge into the science curriculum
(Layton, 1973, see also Goodson, 1996 for a critical analysis of this historical case). Another
is closer to home: the Salish research itself which found a set of teachers (about 10% of the
sample) that included students who perceived their science lessons as being highly relevant to
their personal lives (Salish, 1997, p. 47). What is interesting is that "several teachers with

high personal relevance ratings from students had prior careers in applied fields such as the

20

military, geology, engineering, scientific research, and business" (Salish, 1997, p. 48). It is
clear that the knowledge from which these teachers based their practice tended to be more

applied.

The knowledge behind the use of science in everyday life
In attempting to connect school science, particularly topics like thermodynamics, to
students’ everyday lives Linn has suggested the use of more pragmatic models (Linn,

1993; Linn & Muilenburg, 1995). Pragmatic models means specific macroscopic models

of transfer of heat in which ”..heat energy flows from objects at higher temperature to

objects at lower temperature” (Linn & Muilenburg, 1996, p. 21). There are mathematical
interpretations of such models based on the works of the French scientist J. Fourier
(1890). The rate of heat transfer can be determined by the expression q=UA AT in which A
is the area of transference of heat, U the coefficient of transfer (determined by the
mechanics of transfer which can be either radiation, convection or conduction), and AT the
change of temperature. Linn and her team have developed computer simulations for this
expression (Linn, 1991).

The important point of Linn’s research is that she thinks that such kinds of models,
(pragmatic) are more useful for connecting science with students’ everyday lives (Linn,
1993; Linn & Songer, 1991). Particularly her team has reported that:

...students taught the heat-flow model learned more about heat and temperature and

solved more relevant problems than those taught the molecular-kinetic model...the

heat-flow model can help with many personally relevant phenomena, including

keeping Cokes cold and hands warm...” (Linn, & Muilenburg, 1996, p. 21).
Here, these particular “pragmatic” models seem to help students to have more “real”
experiences with science.

When one examines the knowledge in which the curriculum suggested by Linn and

her colleagues is based and the knowledge in which the relevant Salish teachers based their

practice, one finds that they have drawn from epistemological territories different from, yet

21

perhaps complementary to, science. In the case of Linn’s curriculum, these models come
from technology. In fact, Linn and her colleagues have often used engineering models of
transfer of heat (see examples in Kreith, 1973). Therefore, one would defend the idea that
technological knowledge can increase the connection between school science and students’
out—of-school experiences. In other words, it is possible that this kind of knowledge can
be more relevant to students’ everyday lives. However, the problem of relevance of
science, use of science in everyday life, connecting science to students’ everyday lives
experiences, etc. is much more complex. For example, how can one support, that
understanding how to keep Cokes cold and hands warm is something that students will
find interesting and useful? What are the intellectual challenges of such kinds of tasks?
What are the learning outcomes of these activities? Moreover, the same topic of heat and
temperature can be approached from another more pragmatic perspective such as the case of
knowledge about refrigeration, insulation, etc. This has been a topic of vocational
education which has not been translated into science education. Therefore, there are several
pedagogical alternatives from which one would draw in order to make the topic of heat and
temperature more relevant to students’ out-of-school experiences. This requires a
clarification of what are we looking for in science education and what the role of the uses of
science in students’ everyday lives is.

The problem of the relevance of science can be seen from several perspectives.
From a pedagogical point of view, it requires a better understanding of the kind of
knowledge teachers need to know to connect students’ everyday lives experiences with
school science. Given the concern of science education reforms -teaching science for
understanding and also for meaningful applications in students’ everyday lives- this is an
imperative task. However, pedagogical actions may be conditioned to epistemological
decisions. For example, it is possible that overvaluing abstract and universal knowledge
over practical knowledge does not allow teachers to connect school science with students’

out-of-school experiences. This should be investigated further. Therefore, a first step for

22

analyzing the relevance of school science in relation to students’ experiences is to study the
epistemological demands that applications of science -regarding students’ everyday lives-
place on science teacher knowledge.

A second step is the study of other epistemological alternatives to traditional science
curriculum. For example, we have seen that Linn and her team have advanced a curriculum
which is basically formed for “...more concrete and pragmatic models used by expert in
heat transfer” (Linn, & Muilenburg, 1996, p. 21). This argument also needs to be
investigated. What is the epistemological nature of such models? Where do they come
from? How can we connect them to science education?

The specific case of transfer of heat studied at Berkeley only illustrates the
replacement of one kind of knowledge (classic thermodynamics) for another (heat transfer).
In principle, one can deduce that this knowledge comes from engineering models of heat
transfer; however, therrnodynarrrics is only a small piece of the K- 12 science education
curriculum. Therefore, we need to know more about the general potential of this kind of
knowledge in other topics of science curriculum, that is, technological knowledge.
Moreover, the argument that the inclusion of more concrete and pragmatic models can
increase the relevance of school science is conditioned to other factors. There are at least
two dimensions that seem to be important: WM
'0 'iio 0' -. 'r or, '.9 5:1"!!! rnw 'O‘C or. o h '0... 0. ’1’
education.

The introduction of technology in forms of more concrete and pragmatic models
with the explicit goal of increasing the relevance of school science has not been
systematically studied. The work of Linn and her team suggests the introduction of this
knowledge without discussing its epistemological status. In other words, although Linn
has developed an argument to show the case of thermodynamics, she has not unpacked the
epistemological nature of the models she is advancing. In fact, she is assuming that more

concrete and pragmatic models can be more relevant to students. However, what does it

23

mean more concrete or more pragmatic? What does it mean to be relevant? The former
question is related to the nature of the knowledge suggested (e.g., epistemology of
engineering) and the latter to the goals of science education (e.g., teaching for

understanding).

Technology: Reducing the gap between school science and everyday life

Technology would reduce the gap between school science and students’ out-of-
school experiences. The examples taken from Linn’s research and the general discussion
on the potentiality of using more concrete and pragmatic models support that. This is
because I am assuming that technology, as epistemological field, tends to be based on
pragmatic models which have a closer relation to students’ everyday lives. However, there
are many questions that need to be analyzed. First, one may ask: What is the nature of the
technological knowledge that can help us to connect science to students’ everyday lives?
Second, how do the goals of science education transform such knowledge and vice versa?
Moreover, the very conception of technology is by itself a problem. In fact, the term
technology is mainly used for referring to educational technologies (computers). I argue
that this extensionalist connotation limits the richness that technology, as epistemological
territory, would provide to teaching science.

One should be aware that the introduction of technology into the science cuniculum
is not a new idea as one can conclude by reading the abundant reports on the Science
Technology and Society (STS) movement (see Solomon, & Aikenhead, 1994; Yager,
1996 for reviews). Many of them have justified the approach as a means for increasing the
relevance of the science cuniculum (Yager, 1996). Unfortunately, the conception of
technology that these movements have presented tends to be obscure and its connection to
science education unclear.

On the other hand, current science education reforms are asking for the introduction
of technology into the K—12 curriculum. The two leading science education reforms in the

United States, Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards, include

24

technology as a significant part of the content of science cuniculum. In other words,
reformers are asking for the introduction of technology, as content knowledge, in K- 12
education. In contrast to previous reforms, these documents include conceptions of
technology that go beyond the notion of artifacts. Project 2061, for example, includes a
solid and rich epistemological conception of technology that needs to be connected to
science education.

This dissertation analyzes the role of technology as curricular content in science
education and its implication on science teacher knowledge. In doing so, I propose to
examine carefully recent works of philosophy of technology, mainly epistemology of
engineering -a field of research that has just emerged in the last twenty years (Bunge,
1976; Goldman, 1984). Moreover, what is needed is to connect these emergent works -
philosophy of technology- with the conceptions of technology advanced for science
education reforms such as the case of Project 2061 and the National Science Education
Standards. This dissertation attempts to do that.

The basic point of this dissertation is the idea that technology provides an important
epistemological referent for teaching of science. Particularly, technology becomes almost
indispensable when one wants to connect science with students’ everyday lives.
Therefore, I do not study technology for its own sake. Rather, technology appears in scene
given the problems of connecting science to students’ everyday lives experiences. This is
why one needs to study in detail the nature of technology and its multiple faces. This of
course is a means. The end is to explore alternative epistemological territories that can help
us to reduce the gap between school science and students’ experiential world.

In order to frame my argument, it is important to show the reader that in fact there is
a tension between teaching science for understanding and teaching science for applications.
This tension is not a simple dichotomy between two opposite approaches. Throughout this
dissertation, the reader will see that this relationship, understanding and application in its

pedagogical context, is a complex relation which takes several forms that at the end have

25

important implications for science education. It is in this context where I develop the idea
that technology can play an important role in teaching science given its unique
epistemological characteristics. Particularly, I show that technology lies somewhere
between knowing and doing, that is, between creation and understanding. This condition
places technology in an optimal position to teach science if one is interested in connecting
science to students’ everyday lives. However, before studying in detail the conception of
technology, it is fundamental to clarify what the problem that technology will solve is. In
others words, what is this so—called tension between teaching science for understanding and
teaching science for applications, and how it is related to technology? These are questions I

study in the followings chapters.

26

CHAPTER 2

THE TENSION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATIONS
"Interviewer: What science concepts do you believe are the most important for your
students to understand by the end of the school year?
Dave: I think first of all, they should have a good understanding of the fact that every
thing is made up of small particles...atoms. I think that's very important. Other
than that, they should understand some hazards of chemicals, some benefits of
chemicals, and how we use chemicals in our everyday life" (3/23/ 1995) '

Dave is a new secondary science teacher who seems to reflect in the quoted
statement one of the most accepted current goals of scientific literacy: teaching science for
understanding and teaching science for everyday life. Dave does not present this goal as
the tension between understanding and application. From his perspective understanding
and applications do not seem to compete. By the same token, the two leading science
education reform proposals in the United States, Project 2061 and the National Science
Education Standards (AAAS, 1990, 1993; National Research Council, 1995) are also
asking for deep conceptual understanding and applications to everyday life.

In this chapter, I study the emergence of a potential epistemological tension between
understanding and application in the context of teaching science. I partially illustrate my
points using preliminary data from the Salish Research Project. I also examine the recently

published audio information of the lectures of Richard Feynman as representative of a kind

of understanding.

The Case of Dave and Feynman
In trying to make sense to Dave's response to a query about the most important
concepts that his students should learn, one has to deal with several possible explanations.

I would like to begin with a position adopted by Richard Feynman when he suggested

 

' Question # 34 of the Salish's protocol called Teachers' Pedagogical Philosophy Interview
(TPPcll). The quotations of the interviews that appear in this dissertation have not been
edite .

27

what was the most valuable knowledge for his students: "I believe it is the atomic
hypothesis...that all things are made of atoms, -little particles that move around in perpetual
motion..." (Feynman, 1995, p.4). Both, Feynman and Dave, are concerned with teaching
science for understanding. However, in contrast to Dave, Feynman was teaching with the
assumption that his students would be physicists: "This two-year course in physics is
presented from the point of view that you...are going to be...physicist[s]" (ibid., p.1).
This assumption introduces a special meaning of the term "understanding”, that is, the
meaning of the term is tied to the meaning of understanding within scientific communities,
particularly a community of physicists.

Understanding within scientific communities has traditionally been characterized by
explanations based on scientific theories. Although there are several philosophical schools
that have "defined" criteria for accepting what constitutes a scientific explanation, the
dominant school has been positivism.2 Explicit and implicit followers of this position
argue that, "The criteria for scientific understanding are well specified" (Reif, & Larkin,
1991, p.739). From this perspective, "...understanding in science is a working goal
pursued deliberately in the service of the central goal of explaining and predicting..."
(ibid.). Moreover, this position assumes that a given theory is formed by well specified
postulates and understanding will be derived from the use of these theories.

Although it is difficult to translate the above conception of understanding into
school settings, I suggest one possibility. Understanding in school settings using the
above criteria of explanation and prediction will require that teachers and students master
scientific theories. One common translation of this "understanding" to school settings is
exemplified by traditional textbooks in which scientific knowledge is presented with the

addition of exercises that have to be solved. Such exercises usually appear at the end of

 

2 I refer to the philosophical school that defends the idea that : a) science consists in the
subsumption of individual cases under general laws, b) scientific explanations are causal,
c) mathematics is the language of science. See Wright (1971) for a discussion on
positivism. See also Philips ( 1983) for a differentiation among different kinds of

28

each chapter. For example: “Calculate the work done when a 20—N force pushes a car 3.5
m” (Hewitt, 1997, p.120).

Rather than explaining and predicting natural phenomena traditional science classes
tend to be based on canonical school knowledge that is taught for solving exercises
invented by textbook writers. These problems force students to learn the "right" formula
which will produce the right answer (W=Fd=20Nx3.5m=7OJ in the above example).
Refined versions of this conception of understanding is the use of established algorithms
for solving text-book exercises. For instance: “If a car traveling at 60 km/h will skid 20m
when its brakes lock, how far will it skid if it is traveling l20km/h when its brakes lock?”
(Hewitt, 1977, p. 121). From this perspective, the original notion of understanding is
transformed into the manipulation of formulas for solving textbook problems or the
“understanding” of specific rules. I see this shift, from understanding as explanation and
prediction using theories to applications of formulas, as an outcome of a complex social
and epistemological process in which expert scientific knowledge (ESK) is translated into
school canonical knowledge. A specific analysis of this process (translation) is offered in
chapter 7 of this dissertation.

As I said, it is difficult to make the case that a given conception of science, for
example understanding as prediction and explanation, can be purely translated to school
settings given the multiple factors that affect schools. However, one can accept that the
conception of science might affect science teaching. Dave for example, believes that "...a
theory is just someone's idea [which has] not been proven at all. A law is proven and a
fact is proven and believed..." (Interview, 3/23/95). Dave's general conception of science
is based on truth facts which are the basis of scientific laws. Moreover, in a specific
question about the relationship between science and truth Dave expressed that: "Science is

based on truth. What we believe to be true we teach" (Interview, 3/23/1995).

 

positivism, such as Comtenian positivism, logical positivism.

29

From this conception of science, one can expect that Dave will develop pedagogical
structures which will help him to teach "what we believe to be true".3 In some respects this
is not difficult for Dave given the existence of an official curriculum which is represented in
textbooks. In fact, in answering the question of how he decides what to teach and what not
to teach, Dave expressed that " ...it goes pretty much right from the book, and I'm kind of
following that pattern, going chapter to chapter." (Interview, 3/23/95). One year later,
Dave also pointed out the existence of external factors that affected his decision on what to
teach: " I do not know if this is a bad thing or anything, but, we get [the] goals and
objectives book, and we look at the proficiency test, what's going to be tested, that puts a
lot of pressure on the school..." (Interview, 1/29/96). Consequently, the conception of
science (e.g. "science is based on truth") and the external pressure of an official curriculum
(e.g. proficiency test), just to mention two factors, play important roles in Dave's
teaching. In this case, both factors tend to reinforce science as a body of knowledge
already made, that is, canonical knowledge in which students have to master formulas and
algorithms already developed by others. This is only one kind of translation of canonical
knowledge into school science.

When Feynman agreed to teach basic physics for freshman at California Institute of
Technology in the early 60's, the notion of understanding that he stressed in the lectures
seems to be explanation and prediction based on theories. The recent reproduction of his
lectures (audio tapes) provides a basis for concluding that Feynman kept this notion of

understanding throughout his lectures (Feynman, 1995). Feynman developed pedagogical

 

3 The literature on the relationship between nature of science and science teaching is
enormous (e.g. ,Duschl, 1994 ; Matthews, 1994). With the exception of some important
contributions of philosophy of science to learning science (Carey, 1992; Chi, 1992; Duschl
& Hamilton, 1992), the contributions of the research on the nature of science to teaching
science is quite limited (see Lederrnan, 1992 for an extensive analysis). Although we think
that nature of science is important for teaching science, we have not shown useful
relationships between conception of science and teaching science (Cajas, 1995a). We
know that science teachers are not exposed to programs that include nature of science
(Gallagher, 1991). However, we have not produced knowledge relating teachers'
knowledge, teachers' actions and nature of science beyond general descriptions.

30

structures which presented science as a body of knowledge. Although his pedagogical
actions were centered in key ideas and frequent uses of interesting examples, his teaching
had the goal of introducing students to the discipline of physics for its own sake. This
approach would be problematic if one needs to teach in the context of general education and
from the perspective of everyday life. The scientific account would be valuable, but its

applications to everyday life should be examined further.

Feynman’s pedagogical actions: The glasses of STAM

During our research in Salish, particularly in the classroom observations through
analysis of video tapes, we used the Secondary Teaching Analysis Matrix (STAM)
developed by J. Gallagher and J. Parker. The instrument includes several categories of
teaching styles; however, one can summarize them in three general categories of teaching:
teacher-centered, conceptual and student-centered (personal communication, J. Gallagher,
February 1997). The teacher-centered category is related to didactic approaches in which
teachers tend toward factual knowledge, that is, isolated pieces of information.
Conceptual teachers in this category place the subject-matter of science as the central focus.
The pedagogical structure of a conceptual teacher is organized around “key ideas” of the
discipline and the pedagogical strategies includes real world applications of such content.
The meaning of real-world applications here is related to explaining or predicting using
everyday phenomena. These connections are usually made or leaded by the teacher.
Student-centered category is related to teaching styles which focus on students. In this
category, teachers and students negotiate the understanding of the content. The
connections with real-world applications are elaborated by students and teacher related to
investigations, data analysis and concept building.

When one sees Feynman’s pedagogical actions through the glasses of STAM, that
is, the above typology, one observes a mix between teacher-centered and conceptual

teaching styles. There is evidence (e.g., audio tapes) that several of Feynman's lectures

31

included interesting connections of science to every-day phenomena. However, these
connections were important for the sake of the discipline. As I said, from the perspective
of the typology used in Salish (Gallagher & Parker, 1995), Feynman tends to be a mix of
conceptual teacher (content) and didactic (actions)." What is important for my account is
that his conception of understanding, which is tied to explanations and predictions using
theories, is at the end the "real" application of science. In other words, understanding and
application are somewhat inseparable given that understanding means the application of

theories for explaining and predicting.

External and internal relevance: Dave and Feynman

Dave, in contrast to Feynman, has a different reality. In principle, Dave is being
asked by current educational reform for explicit connections between science and their
students’ everyday lives (scientific literacy). For example, the National Science Education
Standards as well as Project 2061 assume that understanding science and being able to use
it in everyday affairs are hallmarks of scientific literacy. From this perspective, the interests
and experiences of students play an essential role in current calls for reforming science
education.

As I mentioned in the first chapter, the Salish Research Project explored this
connection using the concept of personal relevance. In doing so, the Project used the
Constructivist Learning Environment Survey -CLES- (Taylor, et a1. 1995). In analyzing
the questions in CLES, one can deduce that personal relevance was not defined in relation
to the notion of understanding as explanation and prediction using scientific theories.

Here, the application of science is embedded in the notion of personal relevance which goes

beyond the use for explaining and predicting. Personal relevance in the context of CLES is

 

’ Feynman acknowledged the limitations of his pedagogical work: “I think, however, that
there isn’t a solution to this problem of education other than to realize that the best teaching
can be done only when there is a direct individual relationship between a student and a .

32

related to the direct connection between science and uses of science in everyday life, such
as how students perceive science in their out-of-school lives.

Relevance is a tricky term. Douglas Newton, for example, defines two kinds of
relevance: external and internal. The former, external, is related to the connections between
science and people's lives while the latter are those meaningful uses students make of
science within the subject-matter. In his own words, “In science teaching, some courses
are described as having internal relevance and by that is meant the connections between and
the interdependence of different parts of the subject” (1988, p.8). For example, a) the
importance of Euclidean Geometry as a formal support of Newton’s Laws, b) the
connection of key scientific ideas in different context of the discipline such as energy in
biology, mechanics, electricity, chemistry, etc. External relevance, in contrast, is more
related to meaningful uses of science in real life, here “...science might be used as a model
for thinking about and solving problems of a more mundane nature. Now the relevance of
science to such needs is real” (ibid.).

It seems to me that Feynman was more concerned with internal relevance (less
mundane nature) while Dave is being asked to satisfy both: external and internal relevance.
The following table illustrates a preliminary contrast between Feynman’s pedagogical

positions and Dave’s in light to the notions of internal and external relevance.

 

good teacher- a situation in which the student discusses the idea, thinks about the things,
and talks about the things” (Op. cit, p. xxix).

33

Table 2.1. Contrasting external and internal relevance.

 

 

Feynman Dave

Internal Relevance YES YES ,
High concern on the uses of Concern for students leamrng
scientific theories for scientific concepts.
describing, explaining and
predicting.

Commitment with the
subject-matter.

 

 

External Relevance NO YES
Disregard on how students Concern on how students use
use science in their everyday science in evegday life (out-
life (out-of—school). of-school)

Stress on the uses of theories
within the scientific
community.

 

 

 

The notions of internal and external relevance are preliminary terms in order to
tackle a possible distinction and connection between two goals of science education. These
terms are problematic, like all of our concepts, in principle, because what is considered
internal or external depends on the position of the observer (personal communication with
David Wong, June 1997). What is relevant for a scientist, for example, should include
internal and external relevance given that her/his everyday life turns around scientific
activities. Everyday life for students also includes several hours within schools.
Therefore, defining external relevance in the sense of the use of science out-of-school is
problematic. The very distinction between understanding and applications is problematic
because for some people understanding implies applications. However, despite these
potential limitations, I think that the terms, external and internal relevance, are useful tools

for a preliminary analysis.

Understanding and applications: The case of Dave
Throughout the course of our research in Salish we followed Dave for three years.
Dave consistently showed a concern for teaching science for understanding and application.

In 1995, when he answered what learning in his classroom he thinks his students will

34

 

value, he said: “Just the basics of scientific literacy like the first half of our physical science
class is all Chemistry...1 tried...[to teach] concepts they may use at home, and figuring out
the bounds between chemistry and home (Interview, 2/23/1995).

The second year of our research, Dave also showed interest for these two kind of
goals in his teaching. This time, 1996, the class that he reported as the best experience that
he had had was electricity.

Interviewer: Describe the best teaching/learning situation you have ever

experienced?

Dave: I would say my electricity unity. We have little kits where...two kids work

on a kit together. It does a great job of getting them to test different types of

circuits, see what happens...during the period they are going to do certain light
bulbs. These kids can really get into...they are always working with something

(Interview, 1/29/96)

During this interview Dave constantly refered in a positive sense to his electricity class.
Classroom observations of this unit showed interesting features. Let us transport ourselves
to the day of Dave’s electricity class (source: video 2-08-1).

For this morning Dave planned to teach concepts related to electricity. In dealing
with this topic, Dave divided his students in groups of three. There were approximately 6
groups. He asked them to discuss within their groups what people can or cannot do with
electricity and what life would be like without electricity. The groups discussed for almost
15 minutes while Dave walked around checking some discussions. He engaged in some
specific discussions with his students. He asked all the groups for a summary on their
discussion. As far I can see, Dave was setting a real world context for the uses of
electricity. He also attempted to take into consideration what his students already knew
about electricity and how this was connected to the real world. It seems to me that he had a
specific pedagogical plan: 1) forming groups, 2) asking for important aspects of electricity
in everyday life, 3) asking the groups for reports. Dave’s students talked about electricity

during 25 minutes without moving their discussion toward scientific explanations of

electricity.

35

The report of each group took place with the help of Dave. The class became
engaged in what appears to be an interesting discussion on the importance of electricity in
everyday life; that is, what life would be look like without electricity and how electricity
has changed our current life. All the examples that students presented tended to be
technological artifacts (TV, CD player, VCR, etc.). Dave directed the discussion toward
the uses of these artifacts and how they have changed our lifestyle. One group perceived
the message and reported examples more congruent with Dave’s suggestion, such as “ the
importance of electricity for the illumination of cities”. Other groups followed this
suggestion presenting examples such as air conditioning, keeping food in the refrigerator,
etc.

After 35 nrinutes of discussion, Dave gave each group batteries, flashlight bulbs
and wires for constructing circuits and moves the discussion to another level (source:
Video tape with the code MSU 2-08-1 Time 40:00). The transition from the general
discussion on the uses of electricity in everyday life to the potential laboratory on electricity
would reflect the concern that Dave has for both: applications and understanding. Each
group had to create a circuit in order to light the bulb and then each individual had to draw a
picture which described and explained the arrangement that made the circuit works.

From the video tapes, I cannot infer the quality of the discussions of each group;
however, the goal that Dave had for his students is quite clear: To light the bulb, study the
various arrangements of a battery and bulbs and study the potential effects that these
arrangements have on the bulb. In addition, he expected his students to construct diagrams
and develop mental representations of the circuits that they constructed. In the best of the
cases, students would development explanations on how the circuits work. One potential
outcome is the develop of causal models about electric energy which can be represented by

the following structure (e.g., Devi et al., 1996):

Battery freeway Bulb ‘ *‘Light

36

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

These preliminary models, circuits and energy models. would be the basis for more
developed models for explaining and predicting natural phenomena. In fact, Dave was
looking for deeper models. After 45 minutes of class he asked students to include in their
drawings a description of the circuit and mainly an explanation on how it works. At this
moment Dave moved the discussion to another level by suggesting that: “Electricity is just
the movement, of electrons which are negative...What do you think, is there a lot or very
few electrons in your circuits? “ (source video 2—08-1 Time: 51:00). Therefore,
explanations on how the circuits work, what flows in the circuits (electrons), and the
source of electricity (battery) were expected.

From my observations of this class, I can see a clear concern for introducing a real
life context for the uses of electricity, particularly in the first part of the class. I also see a
moderated ability for introducing explanations using scientific knowledge, mainly in the
second part of the class. What is interesting for my discussion is the contrast between

these two features of the class. The following table is a summary of that.

Table 2.2 Summary of the pedagogical actions and goals in Dave’s class on electricity.

 

 

 

 

Application Understanding
Pedagogical actions Exploring what students Doing experiments with
already know about batteries, bulbs, etc.
electricity in eve da life. Drawing circuits.
Discussing the role oi Making descriptions, and
electricity in daily life explanations
Goals of the class Being aware of the Understanding electricity in
importance of electricity terms of electrons.
Developing causal models on
the role of battery in the
“production” of electricity.

 

 

 

 

Despite Dave’s concern in both teaching science for understanding and applications,
our research team in Salish found that “ He [Dave] leads the students to make connections

to real world (about electricity), but he has problems in connecting the real world examples

37

to key ideas of the subject-matter" (Video analysis, STAM report, 5/27/96). In other
words, there are some important limitations in Dave’s pedagogical actions, mainly
regarding the connection of key idea and students’ examples. I argue that this lack of
connection between key ideas of the subject-matter (internal relevance) and real world
examples (external relevance) is in part because of an intrinsic epistemological tension
between understanding and application. That is, this may not be only a problem of Dave;
rather, it would be a limitation of some type of scientific knowledge to be used in real-
world problems. However, one would argue that this is not related to the tension between
understanding and applications; instead it is the lack of pedagogical knowledge of Dave for

helping students to do both. This is one potential answer that should be considered.

Educational research on electricity

From the perspective of his pedagogical actions, Dave is trying to take into
consideration what students already know about electricity and mainly how electricity is
connected to their Whig. In relation to Feynman, Dave is more concerned about the
uses of science regarding students’ everyday lives. Certainly, Dave set an interesting real
world context for introducing the topic of electricity (external relevance). However, the
connection between this context and the goal of teaching for understanding is difficult for
him. My argument is that this connection is by its own right complex. One of the options
that Dave had for dealing with students’ naive conceptions is using conceptual change
model or another version of science teaching which takes into consideration what students
already know. In fact, one would speculate that if Dave had drawn from research on naive
conceptions, conceptual change, or other framework, he would have gotten better
outcomes.

Among several science topics, research on naive conceptions has analyzed the ideas
that students have about electric circuits (see Driver et al., 1994 for an extensive summary

of research on naive conceptions on electric circuits. See also Osborne & Freemanm 1989

38

for specific guides on how to teach electricity as well as McDermott, 1997, MacDennott &
Shaffer, 1992a, 1992b). One can expect that Dave’s students will have similar
conceptions. For example, in the first part of the experiment Dave gave each group one
battery, one flashlight bulb and two wires. The task was to light the bulb and then draw a
circuit and explain how it works. A common conception is the idea that in order to light the
bulb, one only needs one wire rather than two. This naive conception which states that
“...electricity can leave a battery go to an electrical device throughout a single wire, and not
return to the battery” (Chambers & Andre, 1997, p.114, see also Fredette & Lochhead
1980; McDermott and Shaffer, 1992a, 1992b for similar reports). Some of Dave’s
students could have this idea.
One goal of teaching science from the perspective of conceptual change is to replace
these conceptions with accepted canonical ideas:
If a person has properly assimilated the circuit model for direct current electrical
circuits, there must be recognition of what we now call the ‘passing-through’
requirement. That is, whenever an element is either part of, or added to this kind of
circuit, the device must include an ‘in’ and ‘out.’ Furthermore, if a device is
connected so that it allows a conducting path for passing through, then it must be
considered a part of the circuit (Fredette & Lochhead, 1980, p.198)
Teaching for understanding also asks for explanations. The tendency of these explanations
is the use of deep models. One of the vignettes of the Fredette and Lochhead study is an
example of the kind of answer which one can expect from this perspective. Here, the
student (“Ellen”) was asked to light the bulb and draw a diagram of the circuit explaining
the process (which was exactly what Dave asked of his students). In the process of
constructing the circuit, this student says:
I’m making a circuit; making it because I know that electrons travel through a wire
and this is positive [points to end of battery so labeled] and that’s negative [points
to other end of battery]. One of them (inaudible) one or the otheruand then I have
to-it’s broken now so if I connect it there...the current is running (p.198).
According to Fredette and Lochead, Ellen was able to light the bulb and provide

some “reasonable” explanation of her action. As far I can see, her explanation is not clear;

however, what called my attention is the concern of the researchers in asking for deep

39

explanation based on flow of electrons. A question that comes to mind in reading this
research is my lack of clarity on what is the problem to be explained. This takes me back
to the context of Dave’s electricity class again. When Dave or any science teacher asks
students “to explain” the circuit, what do they mean? What are they actually asking for?

For a physicist there are different phenomena in a “simple” circuit. One can think
of three generic elements: the battery, the wires and the bulb. The battery is the source of
energy. Free energy is transformed in electric energy within the dry cell. The very
explanation of this transformation is incredibly complex given the fact that the system (dry
cell) is not in equilibrium. Within the battery, electricity is due to the movement of positive
and negatives ions rather than free electrons, an outcome of chemical reactions. What the
battery does is to provide a difference of potential, that is a form of electrical energy that
can be used to do work. Let us see what is going on within the wires. When the wires are
connected with the battery and the bulb (as Ellen did), a difference of potential is
established between the extremes of the wires (and the bulb). The role of such difference
of potential is to accelerate all the free charges (in metal they are free electrons). A
physicist will think in terms of electric and magnetic fields. These fields are the means for
accelerating the electrons. However, the movement of electrons in metals is incredibly
slow (0.01 cm/s). So in order to explain the instantaneous effect of conduction of
“electricity,” one should note that there is not material movement of electrons rather than a
perturbation, that is, an electromagnetic field which is propagated with the speed of light.
When we go to the flashlight bulb, the electron flow model can be used with the addition of
the Joule effect in the filament, an effect that also is taking place in the wires but is not
evident with low electrical power (Reference: any contemporary college physics book).

In the context of science education, there are specific models that have translated
these explanations to school settings. For example, Licht says: “We would like to make a
case for seeking a model of model-building which provides students [with] explanatory

tools...Therefore we have generated a subatomic model of electron flows and electron

4o

density...Our expectation that such a model can be useful and productive in educational
terms...” (1990, pp. 219-320). The model is based on the ideas of charge densities and is
coherent with the canonical explanation that I suggested earlier.

This model nicely matches with the concern of science education reforms on the
need of introducing explanations based on constructs such as electrons (or electron
densities in the specific model of Licht) and how they behave in the circuit. However, from
the perspective of real life applications, these explanations sound very abstract because they
are far away from students’ everyday lives (see Licht’s paper for a different argument). In
fact, the first part of Dave’s class, for example, was about real life applications of
electricity in relation to students’ everyday lives. The examples suggested by Dave’s
students were very mundane, such as technological artifacts or practical uses of electricity.

Teaching for this real world context is also one goal of current science education
reforms. For example, the Michigan Essential Goals and Objectives for Science
Education (MEGOSE) suggests the following objectives, concepts and real-world
applications regarding this topic represented in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Objectives and concepts for a part of the topic of electricity according to
MEGOSE (Taken from Michigan Department of Education, 1991, p.85).

 

 

 

 

 

Objectives Relater concepts, terms ITe’al-world contexts
and tools
15) Describe electron flow in Complete circuits, open Household wiring, electrical
simple electrical circuits circuit, closed circuit conductivity testing,
flashlight, electric appliances

 

Looking at Table 2.3 one can see that Dave is trying to satisfy these goals.
However, the connection between the objectives (electron flow) and the real-world context
(e.g., electric appliances) is complex and problematic. The illumination of cities, the
illumination of a given house, the testing of electrical conductivity or the way in which
electric appliances work would be explained using atomic models or models based on the

idea of flow of electrons. However, stressing the uses of atomic models does not

41

 

necessarily mean uses of theses models in the context of students’ everyday lives . The
connections of these models based on micro variables is problematic when teachers need to
connect them with macro variables and mainly with students’ everyday lives (see reports on
problems on teaching science via atomic models in Millar, 1990; Lijnse, 1990; Lichtfeldt,

1996; Mashadi, 1996).

The knowledge behind teaching science for understanding and applications

In school settings, the potential tension between understanding and applications can
be explored by analyzing what we can gain by introducing atomic models and how these
models can be related to the everyday life of students. I am using the example of electricity
given the fact that Dave pointed it out. In addition, this is a common topic in K— 12 science
education. Moreover, there is a lot of educational research on electricity and the topic is
considered, without discussion— as one with several real world applications.

For me, the real world examples that Dave’s students suggested and the goal of
developing mental models based on constructs such as electrons, are in tension. The
suggestions of Dave’s students on the uses of electricity and even Dave’s conception of
applications are more related to a different type of knowledge (more practical). This is
reinforced by another interview now in the context of Dave’s third year of teaching. Dave
reported again the importance of real world applications of his electricity class:

With electricity we use kits to set up certain types of circuits, series and parallel

circuits, for one type of circuit if you unplug one light all electricity goes out

because it cannot get from the battery to the back... on the other hand there is a

parallel circuit where if you unplug one the other will stay up... one good

application is to ask them how about in your houses?....how would in your home

things work if they weren’t in parallel? (Interview, 4/22/1997)

In this interview, Dave framed the applications of his electricity class in a middle position,
that is, he neither takes the students’ position (which presented more mundane examples)
nor the existence of atomic model’s position (e.g., flow of electrons model). The quotation

reflects a well-accepted role of the “applications” of electricity. However, even in this

middle position, there is no consensus on the relevance of these circuits in the everyday life

42

of students. For example, Paul Black and his colleague Wynne Harlen have pointed out
this situation: “Work on closed circuits [like the circuits used in Dave’s unit] seems
irrelevant for dealing with torches, bicycle dynamos, motor car electric and some devices at
home...” (1993, pp. 220-221). The introduction of atomic models is even more
problematic.

One way of reducing the tension between what I am calling understanding and
applications is by using macroscopic models, such as models that include: voltage, current,
electrical energy, resistance. These models, together with a phenomenology of simple
circuits, could provide bases for understanding difference between different kinds of
circuits (see a specific model in Arons, 1997). In this line of thinking, one can expand
these applications to other examples such as discussing the role of conductors and
insulators. It is possible to discuss the kind of electricity that we consume, the way of
calculating the consumption of electricity in our houses, etc. These examples can be
connected to explanations in the context of everyday life.

What I call here an epistemological tension between understanding and application
is a tension between internal and external relevance when teaching science keeps traditional
scientific knowledge by stressing abstract theories. I suggest that the tension does not
appear, or at least it is not so critical, when the constructs used are more macroscopic. As
I showed in the first chapter, in explaining everyday problems, such as how to keep a soda
cold, students successfully used models of heat transference based on macroscopic
variables (temperature, mass, volume) rather than microscopic (either atomic or molecular)
explanations (Linn & Muilenburg, 1996). The same holds, I argue, for topics like weather
when teachers use macroscopic variables (temperature, mass of air, pressure) for
explaining changes in weather. Therefore the argument is not that it is impossible to teach
for internal and external relevance at the same time. Instead, the argument is the potential
conflict between two different kinds of knowledge, abstract and applied. In the case of

Dave, the knowledge needed to engage students with everyday life applications of

43

electricity, for example, does not require, in principle, the uses of atomic models.
Therefore, the connection that Dave tries to make between his students’ conceptions of
electricity in everyday life and atorrric models, as the electron model of electricity. is an

incredible epistemological jump.

Understanding and applications: One example from Mechanics

My argument on the potential tension between understanding and applications goes
beyond the case of electricity. Think of examples related to teaching the Newtonian
concept of force (see Minstrel], 1984 or Smith, 1990). Although science teachers seem to
assume that this theory has several real-world applications, when one sees it from the
perspective of students’ everyday lives the knowledge itself would have intrinsic limitations
because it requires specific contextualizations which can be interesting for academic
purposes but unnecessary for everyday life . Dave is an example of how science teachers
do not see problems in the relevance of applications of Mechanics:

...the next unit is motion, forces and energy ...and that is an excellent one for real

world applications. How fast can you run? How much power can you generate?

(Interview, 4/22/97).

In everyday life the quantification of how much power can one generate is unnecessary.
The problems teachers face is the creations of contexts in which these scientific problems
can make sense to students.

In the same interview, Dave also reported another activity in the context of
mechanics which is important for my account. Given the importance of this activity for my
argument I transcribe here the specific sections of this interview (D: Dave, I: Interviewer,
4/22/97):

I: In some of the laboratories, have your students made some stuff [asking about the role
of students in laboratory work]?

D: This is not related to the class, but this is fine. Thursday we have a half day, I only
have two of my classes and I do not want to use my fourth hour by getting too far

ahead...so what we are doing is we are building bridges and then we are going to test them
“‘“fiext week, actually test them in a couple of weeks, to see how much mass they can hold

44

before they break and then if they do not break you look at the ratio of the mass they hold
to the mass of the bridge...

I: How do you do you that [designing the activity of building a bridge]?

D: I use science Olympiad...I have a lot of their materials and I just make few changes...
I: Do you give them some specifications about the kind of bridge?

D: I will give them a print-out of the specifications...l will bring toothpicks and glue...

1: At this moment, do you know what kind of knowledge they are going to need for dealing
with this project?

D: No, It does not matter to me...it does not have anything to do with where we are
going...we are doing that because we have time and also we are moving into a new book...

I: Do you know what kind of knowledge they need in order to do this project?

D: I think they are going to get out more by doing it, this is a new challenge... We might
talk when we get into certain parts of physics chapter....but this is something that we are
doing because we have a strange schedule...

I: Is part of the curriculum to design a bridge?

D: No, this is for a competition...

I: Can you guess the kind of knowledge that they are going to need?

D: I think what would happen is that they will have to think of how to put the toothpicks
together to get the strongest [inaudible] structure...if they are good they are going to start to
think in some geometry things and make triangle shapes to get the more strength...some
people might put square shapes and we can talk about that at the end...becausc we are not
giving it much time we are going to test them only once...If they break perhaps they can
make another one on their own...

From the perspective of teaching science for applications one can make the case that
the design of a bridge provides a meaningful and practical context for the uses of Newton’s
laws (Roth, 1995). From the perspective of teaching for understanding, the picture is
quite different because the design of the bridge has a different epistemological assumption
than the uses of Newtonian laws for predicting and explaining natural phenomena. In fact,
from the perspective of teaching science for understanding (internal relevance) what matters
is the use of scientific ideas for explaining.

Traditionally, teaching about mechanical forces takes place in the context of

Newton’s laws and their applications. Teaching activities include the study of horizontal

45

motions or the analysis of gravity such as the classic case of “free fall”. More progressive
teaching approaches are based on the wide research on naive conceptions.

For example, E. Smith (1990) reports his experiences in teaching forces. The
problem of the book-on-the—table is the case in point (see also Minstrell, 1982; Arons,
1997; McDermott, 1996). What matters here is to learn, understand, what are the forces
that act on the book (normal, N, and gravity, W ). The goal is to help students to “see”

these forces by explaining why the books is at rest.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2.1 The book-on—the-table problem stresses the use of knowledge for explaining
and predicting (Smith, 1990).

The point that I want to make is that teaching science from this perspective tends to
stress questions of “why” which are answered by the use of canonical scientific
knowledge. For example, why is the book at rest, why is gravity different on the moon
than on the Earth, or more specific problems such as the following example taken from a
text-book: “If you were on the moon and dropped a hammer and a feather from the same
elevation at the same time, would they strike the surface of the moon at the same time?”
(Hewitt, 1997, p.68). Even more mundane problems such as motions on the Earth (e.g.,
cars on ice) have the purposes of explaining and predicting using canonical knowledge. In
this context, understanding means describing, explaining and sometimes predicting. In
contrast, the design of a bridge has a different ontological and epistemological frame. The
purpose is to invent a structure which supports as much weight as possible; that is, the
practical problem of creating a useful object. This problem, the design of a bridge, requires

different epistemological demands than the analysis of forces.

46

The purpose of scientific knowledge, from the perspective of understanding, is
explaining natural or even artificial phenomena. Therefore, teaching science for
understanding tends to have a clear and clean epistemological position toward the world.
Given a structure, for example, students are usually asked to determine what the forces that
act on the structure are (whether it is an apple, a book, a car or a bridge) . All Newtonian
mechanics, for example, tends to isolate the components of the structure and consider the
forces that act on it. The assumption is that knowing the forces that act on the structure
means understanding what is going on; that is, it is assumed that these conceptual tools
(forces) help to describe, explain and predict the behavior of objects.

A bridge, from the perspective of understanding, is an interesting object because it
provides opportunities to apply the concept of force (torque, stress, etc. for more advanced
approaches). Teaching activities from this perspective tend to focus on what the forces that
act on the bridge are. From a static point of view, they are the weight W (considered in the
center of mass of the bridge) and the reactions of the supports which are represented by
R1 and R2 in Figure 2.3). The design of the bridge, however, is a different kind of
problem. The problem is not to analyze a given structure. The problem is to

invent a structure for a given problem.

47

 

 

 

R1 2 /
1..

Figure 2.2 The forces that act on a given bridge.

 

 

 

 

Note that the notion of applications here is not only the meaningful uses of scientific
knowledge. The notion of applications here is related to the possibility of designing and
constructing artifacts. This possibility is not only in the topic of forces. In fact, one can
develop practical applications of science via technological knowledge using several science
topics. For example a reconceptualization of the unit of electricity taught by Dave can also
be presented in light of this notion of in which electricity is more related to practical
applications. Table 2.6 summarizes a preliminary analysis of the knowledge behind both
topics, forces and electricity, in light of my interpretation of teaching science for

understanding and applications.

48

Table 2.4 Goals, knowledge and pedagogical actions in teaching forces and electricity
from the perspective of understanding and applications.

 

 

 

Teaching for ITeaching for
Understandigg Applications
Forces Questions: Questfins:
Why is the book at rest? How to design a bridge?

Why is gravity different on How to produce structural
the Earth than on the Moon? stability?

 

 

Goals Describing, explaining, DesTgning, solving, usifig
predicting
Proprieties of materials,
Knowledge Newton’s laws (forces) stability of different
(related to natural world) structures,

geometrical knowledge,
(related to artificial world)

 

Constructing different

 

 

 

Potential pedagogical Naive conceptions. on geometrical structures, testing
knowledge and actions mechanics, analogres, stabrlrty, desrgnrng and
laboratories constructing a bridge,
testing the bridge
Electricity How can we generate
Questions: Why does the bulb electricity?
light? How can we construct a
circuit?
G088 DeveIoping atomic models Designing circuits (e.g.
for explaining electricity similar to those that are used
(e.g. based on the free in a house).
electron model) Designing an electric
enerator.
Knowledge Electric charge, electron, Eurrent, voltage, resistance.
conservation of charge, power.
polarization. Knowledge about circuits.

Knowledge about specific
electric generators.

 

 

Potential pedagogical Naive conceptions, analogies, Constructing circuits.
knowledge and actions laboratories. Constructing models of
electric generators

 

 

 

 

49

Concluding Comments

Throughout this chapter I have presented examples and evidence that there is a
potential tension between teaching science for understanding and teaching science for
applications. This, of course, is related to how one defines understanding and
applications. In fact, one meaning of understanding is the very application of knowledge
(applications for describing, explaining, predicting). Another meaning of understanding
and applications was related to the uses of science in students’ everyday lives which was
explored by the construct “external relevance”. Another sense of application is the design
and creation of artifacts (technology). These multiple meanings of understanding and
applications will be clarified during this dissertation.

The case of Dave and the references on Feynman’s lectures have been an important
source of concrete reference for analyzing the relationship between teaching science for
understanding and applications. I also illustrated some of my arguments using preliminary
findings of the Salish Research Project. In general I based my discussion on the idea that
understanding and applications are quite different epistemological positions toward the
world. My assumption is that these positions, understanding and applications, have
implications in how we teach science. Think of the topic of forces. The question “Why is
the book at rest?” reflects one epistemological position, whereas the question “How to
design a bridge?” represents another. How are they connected? How are they in tension?
How does this relationship between understanding and applications affect teaching science
and mainly the knowledge that teachers need to know? These are questions that will be
analyzed in the following chapters.

Dave’s case raises the complex problem of what science teachers need to know in
order to teach for understanding and applications. Differently from Feynman, Dave is
asked to satisfy internal and external relevance in his teaching of science. If we accept an

identification of understanding as explanation and prediction (internal relevance), more

50

subject-matter knowledge will be needed. One would conclude that more deep scientific
knowledge is one condition as well as connecting pedagogy with content, that is, knowing
how students learn, developing powerful pedagogical strategies such as analogies,
experiments, etc. (e.g., Clements, 1993; Smith, Blakeslee and Anderson, 1993;
Freedman, 1997, Tamir, 1991; Wong, 1993). In fact, teaching science for understanding
is a complex task. Teaching science for understanding and applications, in the sense of
satisfying external and internal relevance at the same time, could be an impossible task if
we do not rethink what the knowledge that science teachers need is.

The problem of what science teachers need to know if they are going to teach
science for understanding and applications should take into consideration a potential
epistemological tension between understanding and application. For example: a) the idea
that explanations do not lead necessarily to practical applications, and b) the assumption
that there are different kinds of knowledge (e.g., abstract versus applied, scientific versus
technological).

Because school is an important place for learning science, teaching for conceptual
understanding is an important goal. However, if we also want to teach for applications,
we need to analyze the demands of knowledge that this goal places on science teachers.
My thesis is that the knowledge that teachers need to know in order to teach science for
understanding and applications requires a re-examination. For example, I think that to
stress the development of atomic models of electricity (e.g., flow of electrons) does not
necessarily help teachers to develop practical experiences with electricity (e.g., experience
with electric circuits). The question still is: What is the knowledge that teachers need to
know in order to help students to learn science in meaningful ways? In other words, what
is the knowledge that science teachers need to know in order to teach for understanding and
applications in relation to students’ everyday lives? These are questions that are examined

in the following chapters.

51

CHAPTER 3
SCIENCE TEACHER KNOWLEDGE: A FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I study the construct science teacher knowledge. My starting point is
a minimal theoretical model in which I have been working during the last years (Cajas,
1991; 1995a; 1995b). This model includes three general domains: knowledge of the subject
matter (SK), pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) and knowledge about knowledge
(KK). Given this minimaLmodel, <SK, PCK, KK>. I review part of the literature on
teacher knowledge in order to interpret my own constructs. I study how the demands of
understanding shapes our conception of science teacher knowledge. I illustrate what I mean
by "science teacher knowledge" using data and instrumentation from the Salish Research
Project and research on science education. The main point of the chapter is to clarify my
own framework of science teacher knowledge, its relation with the literature and its contact

with reality.

Science teacher knowledge

Science teaching (ST) assumes the existence of a knowledge that can be taught. I
call this knowledge: Expert scientific knowledge (ESK) which I consider a conceptual
system, that is, a set of scientific concepts that are interconnected (theories) and used within
scientific communities in a specific era. Only a part of expert scientific knowledge is taught
in schools. The part of scientific knowledge that is translated to schools will be called
scientific knowledge (SK). This knowledge, SK, is transformed in a specific kind of
knowledge: School science knowledge (SSK)- by a process which usually takes place
within classrooms.

The translation from expert scientific knowledge (ES K) to school science

knowledge (SSK) is a complex social and epistemological process (Chevallard, 1985).1 In

 

1Note that the translation from ESK to SK is a different process than the translation from
SK to SSK. The former tends to be a political process while the latter is the process that

52

this chapter, I focus on the knowledge that teachers need to know for doing such translation
which requires, in principle, the use of a specific kind of knowledge: Pedagogical Content
Knowledge (PCK). In the context of teaching science, the concept of pedagogical content
knowledge represents the emergence of a new kind of knowledge property of teachers
(either individual or communities of teachers) who intend to construct and reconstruct
scientific ideas with their students. Although, researchers have reported other kinds of
knowledge and teachers actually use several "knowledges" (e.g., knowledge of cultural
diversity, knowledge of classroom management, etc.), the starting point of my model only
includes: SK, PCK and SSK in which PCK is the conceptual bridge between SK and
SSK.

 

SK <— PCK—’SSK

 

 

 

Figure 3.1 A minimal model for the knowledge base of science teaching.

Given this minimal model one can see that there are at least two kinds of knowledge
that science teachers need to know: Knowledge of the subject matter of science (SK) and
knowledge of how to teach this specific subject matter (PCK). Note that my model does not
assume that teachers need to know expert scientific knowledge. I argue that teachers learn
transformations of expert scientific knowledge (ESK) that I call scientific knowledge (SK).
In this sense, I see science teachers -in general education- as cultural workers who help

students to reconstruct versions of science designed for general education (scientific literacy)

 

usually takes places within classrooms. French researchers have called the all process: The
trdanspositjon didactique (Verret, 1975. See Chevallard, 1985 for the case of mathematics
e ucatron .

53

rather than formal representatives of scientific communities. In addition, the model
assumes that teachers need to know other kinds of knowledge such as knowledge about
their subject matter, that is, knowledge about knowledge (KK) (e.g., philosophical
knowledge about science, history of science, sociology of science), or knowledge about
science teaching (e.g., the goals of teaching science).

To say that there is a knowledge base of teaching does not mean that teaching is only
about knowledge. Teaching is also about feelings, values, histories, power, actions, love,
creation, production, reproduction, etc. In other words, teaching is about human
relationships. All these characteristics of teaching cannot be captured only by one
framework. I choose to work with the science teacher knowledge framework given my
interest in clarifying what is the role of technological knowledge in teaching science. The
route that I suggest includes a general clarification of the term "science teacher knowledge"
in the context of teaching science for understanding. Then, in the next chapter, I study the
demands that applications introduce in our conception of science teacher knowledge.
Therefore, from the beginning until the end of my work, I assume that teaching has
knowledge base. The existence of this knowledge is a different problem than the evolution
or even the acquisition or creation of such kind of knowledge (e.g., learning to teach). My
assumption is that we cannot find out how knowledge is learned or how it evolves unless
we know of what knowledge we are talking about.

The model of science teacher knowledge that I present tends to be a model of
competence rather than a model of performance. In other words, I explore theoretical
possibilities of a minimal model of science teacher knowledge rather than deducing this
model (knowledge) from teachers actions (performance). In this way, I respect the
following distinction:

It is important to distinguish studies directed to building up a theory of competence,

in ways recognizably appropriate to, and constitutive of, the collectives to which

they belong, from studies directed to a theory of performance, that is, a theory of
how on particular occasions an individual actor draws on corpus of knowledge

54

relevant to the occasions in question to control his or her conuibution to the social
fabric (Harré, 1981, p.152).

Although I illustrate my model with particular teachers' actions (e.g., the case of Dave), I do
not pretend to develop a theory of performance. 2

The model I endorse assumes a general conception of teaching. I have constructed
this conception throughout my life, in part, during my long period of apprenticeship of
observation (Lorrie, 1975) and also by reflecting on my own teaching (Cajas, 1992a). l
have spent time thinking, that is, writing about the teaching of my teachers, and the teaching
of other teachers that I have studied (e.g., Salish teachers). In addition, I draw my
conception of teaching from works of educational researchers, philosophers, psychologists,
sociologists, etc. For example, Gary Fenstermacher has advanced an important

philosophical framework for understanding teaching which has influenced my thinking.3

 

2Regarding the distinction competence/performance some scholars use the expression
normative/descriptive, i.e., what teachers should know (normative) in contrast to what
teachers actually do (descriptive) (Fensterrnacher, 1994; Shulman & Quinlan, 1996). My
model is not totally encapsulated by the dichotomy normative/descriptive. I present a very
preliminary model of competence with illustrations of performance.

3Thus far, the following features of the activity called "teaching" have been isolated:

1) "There is a person, P, who possesses some 2) content, C, and who 3) intends to convey
or impart C to 4) a person, R, who initially lacks C, such that, P and R engage in a
relationship for the purpose of R's acquiring C. " (Fensterrnacher 1986, p.38). This model
of teaching can be expanded to more complex relations (ibid. p..58). In addition, this is
not a definition of good teaching: "The question, What is teaching? is different from the
questions, Is this good teaching?, and, Is this teaching successful?..."(ibid. p. 38). It is
important to note that I have been working in some aspects of philosophy of education
during the last years. In 1992 I presented at the University of Morelia, Mexico, a paper
called "The Role of Philosophy of Science In Teaching Science." In 1994 I published at
the University of Costa Rica a paper in which I introduced, independently, a definition very
similar to Fenstermacher's definition. Two years ago (1995) I published at the University
of Havana, Cuba, a paper on the limitation of this framework. In this paper (Educational
Ontology), I pointed out that this relationship (teaching defined in Fenstermacher's way)
is somewhat poor from the logic and semantic point of view. It seems to me that the formal
logical (classic propositional logic) does not explain teaching (e.g. teaching is not a cause-
effect relationship). In order to understand this relation (teaching) we need, perhaps,
another kind of logic (differently than the classic true-false logic), a logic of the form "may
be", i.e., if I teach C to R maybe R will learn C in some given conditions (modal logic, see
Bechtel 1988, p.26). In addition, I have been thinking that Fenstermacher's definition has
another problem. In fact, it supposes that it is possible to communicate ("transfer") the
content “C” to the student R. To be sure there is not such content, nor such transfer
process. The separation of the content C is a methodological separation that could produce
an idealistic interpretation of teaching. The separation of the content is just a fiction. For

55

Teaching can be clarified from a historical, sociological, psychological, cultural,
philosophical, or ethical perspective. To be explicit about all these components is a task
which is beyond the limits of this dissertation. What I clarify now is that from an
ontological point of view my model assumes that teaching is an oriented activity in which
humans are looking for learning (Cajas, 1995b). Such process, teaching, assumes a
specific treatment of knowledge. As I said, Fensterrnacher (1986) pr0poses one. In this
chapter, and throughout the dissertation, I suggest others. At this moment it is enough to
clarify that I assume that knowledge can illuminate our understanding of teaching, yet
teaching is not only about knowledge.

Regarding the knowledge base that I suggest for science teaching, scientific
knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge and knowledge about knowledge, <SK,
PCK, KK>, they should be defined in specific conditions. SK, scientific knowledge, is a
specific version of expert scientific knowledge that a community (e.g., scientific
community, policy makers community, religious community) agrees on for being taught at
schools in a specific era. In the case of Project 2061, for instance, this knowledge is
explicit in the panel reports of the Project and mainly in the book Science for All Americans
(AAAS, 1990). It is important to note that what I call here "scientific knowledge" is a
transformation from expert scientific knowledge to the knowledge that should be taught at
schools. Usually it is assumed that scientific knowledge (SK) is a representation of expert
scientific knowledge (ESK). I do not endorse such an assumption.

The transformation from expert scientific knowledge to scientific knowledge (the

planned knowledge to be taught in schools) is affected by several social factors which do

 

example, we can read a paper but this paper is just a representation of somebody's
thinking, there is not a real separation between the paper's ideas and the person who wrote
the paper, so the content is a representation of somebody's thinking process. This idea is
hidden in Fenstermacher's definition ( in my earlier papers too) because the relation between
the teacher and the student should account that "Acquiring knowledge is leaming
something, i.e. going through a certain brain process, hence not the same as acquiring a
book or some other commodity." (Bunge 1983, p.61).

56

not allow, for better or worse, a representation of expert scientific knowledge in schools.
When the knowledge that should be taught in general education is endorsed by scientific
communities (e. g. the American Association for the Advancement of the Science (AAAS)
with its Project 2061, the Association for the Promotion and Advancement of Science
Education in Canada (APASE) or the historical examples of the Physical Science Studies
Committee (PSSC) in the 60's), there is more coherence between school science
knowledge and expert scientific knowledge, that is, SSK and ESK tend to share structures
and key ideas. However, even in these cases, the transformation of expert scientific
knowledge to school science knowledge is not isomorphic. In other words, it is possible
that such transformation changes the very meaning of scientific theories within school
settings (Cajas, 1995a).4 Think of any scientific concept or theory which is translated from
ESK to SK and then SSK, "heat" for example:
The uses of the 'heat' concept by a teacher solving a problem at high school level,
and an engineer calculating in a power station are not the same. The frameworks of
use may be calorimetry for the teacher, and the equivalence of work and heat for the
engineer. Each of these different persons might not be able to deal with the aspects
of the concepts involved in the other situation. In this case, the ways of
understanding the knowledge about heat are different..." (Tiberghien, 1996, p. 101)
My assumption is that SK is more than a simple version of the expert scientific
knowledge. The transformation from expert scientific knowledge (ESK) to scientific
knowledge (SK, i.e., teachers' knowledge of the subject matter ) and then to school science
knowledge (SSK) is a social and epistemological transformation that I study in depth in a

different chapter. For now I focus on a general clarification of the framework of science

teacher knowledge. I begin with an illustration of the meaning of "science teacher

 

4 It seems that some scholars tend to break down the distinction between expert scientific
knowledge and school knowledge. I think one should be very careful in separating or not
these types of knowledge because it has important implications. This separation can be
done from different perspectives. For example, I am offering an epistemological separation
(see Den, 1997 for an extensive analysis). However, I do not mean that expert and school
knowledge are unrelated. In fact the interconnection is complex. Adult scientists and
children may share ways of constructing theories as A. Karmiloff-Smith (1988) and D.
Kuhn, (1989) have shown. This would be a methodological connection.

57

knowledge" using information from the Salish Research Project, that is, instrumentation.

data, outcomes, experiences.

Science teachers' knowledge: The context of Salish5

During our research in Salish we studied the nature and evolution of science
teachers' knowledge of new teachers. Teachers' knowledge was explored by interviews
and classroom observations (video tapes). For example, teachers' knowledge in the context
of the instrument used for analyzing videos was divided in four categories: 1) structure of
content, 2) examples & connections, 3) limits, exceptions, & multiple interpretations, and 4)
processes & history of science (Gallagher & Parker, 1995). Science teachers' knowledge
was defined in relation to teachers' understanding of the content and the way in which it was
either presented or explored within classroom activities. In this framework, the structure of
the content, for example, can take several forms (from didactic to constructivist). The
following table is a reproduction of the first row of the matrix used for analyzing videos
which actually has 22 rows and 6 columns. The following row refers to the "structure of the

content"6

 

5When I refer to the Salish Research, I use the expression teachers' knowledge (with
apostrophe). By doing that I respect the form in which Salish researchers have reported
their findings (Salish, 1997). However, when I refer to my framework I use the expression
"teacher knowledge" without the possessive. The difference that I find between the term
"teachers' knowledge " and "teacher knowledge " is that the former assumes that this
knowledge in fact belongs to teachers. Therefore it has more descriptive connotations
(performance). The latter, teacher knowledge, has a more normative connotation and is a
knowledge which tends to be produced by researchers (competence). See footnote # 1.

6The study of teachers' knowledge is only a small piece of the Salish Research Project.
galish was an exploratory research with several components (see footnote #1 Chapter I and
a ish, 1997)

58

Table 3.1 Reproduction of the "structure of the content" row of the Secondary Teaching
Analysis Matrix Science Version (Gallagher, & Parker, 1995).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. Didactic B. Transitional C. Conceptual D. Early E. Experienced F. Constructivist
Constructivist Constructivist Inquiry
Factual content, Content tends Content tends Teacher and Teacher and firvestigation
factoids to be to be students students dominate
descriptive with explanatory negotiate negotiate content.
concepts and with conceptual understanding understanding Conceptual
factoids given content of key ideas of key ideas content and
equal emphasis organized with teacher's based on connections
around key content students' ideas embedded into
ideas emphasized & content design,
implement,
analysis, and
report of
investigation

 

 

 

SK is a transformation from expert scientific knowledge to school knowledge. In

general, there are social an epistemological constrains in the process. As I reported in

chapter 2, Dave mentioned some of them, particularly he follows a textbook and the

curricular guides of his State. From the textbook and video observations, one can see that

his electricity class includes knowledge of: simple circuits (in series, parallel), electric

current, voltage, resistance, electrical energy, electrostatic, etc. In the video analysis of

Dave's electricity class (see chapter I of this dissertation for an account on Dave's case), one

Salish researcher categorized Dave's content as explanatory (conceptual). A second

researcher reported that his content was not conceptually integrated, so it was more

"transitional" with some features of conceptual. The means that Dave's knowledge was

formed by isolated facts with some conceptual connections.

From a general perspective, science subject matter knowledge is formed by the

theories and models that are translated into school knowledge. Think of the case of a simple

circuit formed by a battery, a bulb-light and two wires (an activity developed by Dave). A

potential model that would represent science SK (the knowledge to be taught) is illustrated

by the following figure:

59

 

 

voltage

 

 

»

 

 

 

 

Battery

 

flow of electrons

 

resistance

 

 

Bulb

 

 

Figure 3.2 Subject-matter knowledge to be translated in the case of electrical circuits.

Note that SK does not only include propositional knowledge (e.g., Ohm's law, i.e.

=IR), SK also includes procedural knowledge such as how to connect the wires with the

bulb in electric circuits. We could not assess this knowledge in the case of Dave. What is

important for my discussion in this section is that subject matter knowledge (SK) includes

both substantive and procedural knowledge. The transformation of SK with educational

purposes is exemplified by the following row of the matrix.

Table 3.2 Reproduction of the second row of the Secondary Teaching analysis Matrix
Science Version (Gallagher, & Parker, 1995). This refers to "Examples and connections".

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. Didactic B. Transitionall C. Conceptuall D. Early E.Experiencedl F.Constructivisl

Constructivist Constructivist Inquiry
No examples Real world Examples and Teacher leads Connections Connections
or intercon- examples connections students in constructed by constructed by
nections to: and/ or related made by using examples students with students are
a) real world ideas separate teacher to: and teacher's related to
events, from other a) real world constructing guidance to: investigations,
b) related pieces of events, connections to: a) real world data analysis,
ideas, c) key content b) related a) real world events, b) and concept
ideas of the ideas, c) key events, b) related ideas, building.
subject ideas of the related ideas, c) key ideas of

subject c) key ideas of the subject
the subject

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

One can see that here ( Table 3.2) the content goes beyond the subject matter. This

row refers to the transformation that teachers make of such content using examples,

connections, and applications regarding key ideas of the subject-matter (SK). This

60

transformation has been conceptualized as pedagogical content knowledge (Shulman,
1986). Later I explore the nature of such construct.

In the case of Dave's electricity class video analysis observations reported that he did
not integrate content (e. g., scientific models of electricity for circuits) to real-world events
(e.g., everyday uses of electricity). However, it was reported that Dave gave students
opportunities to explore the uses of electricity in everyday situations. Therefore, Salish
researchers reported the content of Dave as transitional and early constructivist at the same
time without being conceptual. As I showed in chapter 2, the connection between the
content and its examples regarding students' everyday situations was difficult for Dave.
However, what is important for this section is that teacher knowledge includes the
transformation of the content.

In teaching electrical circuits, or any topic, teachers can use analogies in order to
help students to construct their own models. One well known analogy in the case of circuits
is to explain electrical current in terms of water analogy. Positive and negative outcomes of
such analogies have been widely explored by science educators. These transformations,
analogies, are part of the construct pedagogical content knowledge (Shulman, 1986).

A third element of science teacher knowledge is what I call knowledge about
knowledge, that is K. This type includes the conception of science that teachers hold and
the use of such conceptions (e.g., philosophy of science, history of science) in teaching
science. The Salish research also included an exploration of this important component of
science teachers' knowledge. I reproduce the section of the matrix used in Salish to study

this component:

61

Table 3.3 Reproduction of the fourth row of the Secondary Teaching analysis Matrix
Science Version (Gallagher, & Parker, 1995). This refers to "processes of science".

 

 

 

A. Didactic B. Transitional C. Conceptuii D. Early E. Experience F. Constructivisfi
Constructivist Constructivist Inquiry
No explicit No explicit "How we know" Teacherfleads Students, with Processes 8'
mention on mention of hovd included in students to teacher's science applied
how we know. we know. content. reconstruct how guidance, to design of
Scientific Processes of Teacher evidence has reconstruct how project
method is science integrates been used to evidence has investigation.
presented (observation, processes of formulate been used to data collection.
separately as inference, science with scientific ideas formulated data analysis,
rote procedure experiment, concepts. and to use scientific ideas and concept
etc.) are not scientific and to used building.
integrated with processes to scientific
content formulate and processes to

 

 

 

evaluate ideas.

 

formulated and

 

evaluate ideas.

 

 

This component of science teacher knowledge is more related to epistemological and

methodological aspects of science. This knowledge is about science (e. g., epistemological

issues on how we know that we know or methodological arguments of what is considered

as evidence). In the case of Dave's electricity class, we found an absence of this kind of

knowledge during his teaching. Although from our interviews we determined a set of

epistemological and methodological positions that Dave has toward science, the explicit use

of such positions in teaching was difficult to asses.

Knowledge about knowledge assumes

the existence of explanations (e.g., specific models of electricity). For example, one can

think of the experiment on simple circuits formed by one battery, one bulb and two wires,

the one in which Dave asked his students to light the bulb and then make an explanation of

such phenomena. In general teachers and students can construct different kinds of

explanations to this phenomena as we saw in chapter I (see Arons, 1997; Devi et al., 1996;

Tiberghien, Psillos, & Koumaras, 1995 for examples). Think of a preliminary

phenomenological model in which the battery is a container of electricity and the bulb is a

consumer of electricity:

62

 

 

 

 

Container of flow Of + Consumer 0f

 

 

electricity electricity electricity

 

 

 

Battery Bulb

 

 

 

Figure 3.3 Phenomenological model of a simple electrical circuit (This is not a canonical
model. Rather, this would be a typical student’s model).

Knowledge about knowledge refers to questions such as: How do we know that
there is a flow of electricity? How do we find/use evidence in order to support this model?
What can the model explain? What is the difference between a model and a theory? What
counts as scientific explanation? What counts as scientific evidence? Such potential
explanations also have a sort of philosophical assumption which can be important from the
perspective of teaching (Duschl, Hamilton, & Grandy, 1992; Cajas, 1995b). Think of the
following assumptions: 1) there is electricity (ontological), 2) we can explain how circuits
work (epistemological) and, 3) we can plan an experiment and get evidence
(methodological). What is important for my discussion here is the potential existence of
knowledge about knowledge as part of the package of science teacher knowledge.

So far I have illustrated one meaning of the term "science teacher knowledge" using
the instrumentation and data from Salish throughout an emergent theoretical model. This
model is represented in Figure 3.4. Using this minimal model allowed me to focus on three
kinds of knowledge that teachers need to know in order to teach science: Knowledge of the
subject matter (SK); knowledge of the transformation of the subject matter (analogies,
examples, representations, applications, etc.), that is, pedagogical content knowledge

(PCK); and knowledge about knowledge (KK).

63

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Subject-matter
Knowledge
SK
Pedagogical
Content
Knowledge
PCK
Knowledge
about
Knowledge
KK .

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 3.4 Three kinds of knowledge as part of a minimal model of science teacher
knowledge.

I have illustrated these three kinds of knowledge using examples taken from video
analysis (STAM) in Salish with sporadic comments on the case of Dave.7 These and other
components of the teacher knowledge framework have also been explored theoretically and
empirically by several scholars. In the following section, I selectively review the literature
on science teacher knowledge in order to make sense of my own model. I begin by setting a

historical context.

Teacher knowledge: A brief review

Before reviewing the literature on science teacher knowledge, I think that it is
instructive to present a brief historical context of the research on teacher knowledge. My
starting point will be the 80's given the unprecedented call for reforming education in the

US. in this decade. The accumulation of psychological research on students' naive

 

7In the context of Salish, the concept of science teacher's knowledge was also explored
throughout semi-structured interviews. I do not include this section here given that my
interest is only to illustrate the minimal model that I propose rather than presenting a detailed
report of Salish (see Salish, 1997 for an extensive report).

64

conceptions was a key element for understanding the lack of efficiency of traditional
instruction. The pioneers of this movement were works from science education, particularly
misconception on mechanics such as Newton's Laws, forces, etc. (e.g., Viennot, 1979). A
seminal seminar on student misconception was (and still is) held at Cornell University
(Novak, 1987; 1993; 1997). At the same time, researchers put attention on students'
learning of science from other perspectives such as artificial intelligence (Larkin, et al.
1980), cognitive sciences (Chi, et al. 1981), developmental psychology (Karmiloff-Smith
1988), and epistemology (Carey, 1986, 1992).

The work on students' naive conceptions had as logical consequence research on
how teachers could/should face these naive conceptions. The focus of this research was
"students" rather than teachers A very well known work in this direction, in the
community of science educators, was the conceptual change model developed by Posner
and colleagues (1982).

One of the uses of the research on students' misconceptions was the conclusion that
previous educational reforms had almost had no impact on students understanding of
science. This, among other political factors, moved the focus of attention from students to
teachers. A special interest on how teachers teach emerged in the 80's. Although for
several decades the research on teachers was focused on how teachers manage their
classrooms, organize actives. etc. (a research done mainly from a behaviorist perspective),
in the middle of the 80's there was a turning point which focused on teachers' thinking.

Early in the 1980’s, Leinhardt and Smith studied mathematics novices and expert
teachers in order to explore their subject-matter knowledge and teacher thinking by analysis,
video tapes and interviews, in addition to actual observation of classes. These authors
reported the existence of two kinds of knowledge: subject-matter knowledge and lesson
structure knowledge. The former was the traditional "content knowledge" which, in the
case of their paper, refers to mathematics teachers' knowledge. This knowledge was

defined as algorithms, rules, systems number, operations, etc., that is, the traditional

65

content knowledge (Linhardt & Smith, 1985). In contrast, they also defined the notion of
"lesson structure knowledge" as the skills needed in order to teach a specific subject
matter and to clearly explain the material.

At the same time Lee Shulman reported the lack of research on how teachers teach
and mainly on what teachers need to know in order to teach effectively (Shulman, 1986).
Shulman questioned the exclusive research on student misconceptions rather than research
on teacher understanding of their subject-matter. In two influential papers Shulman mainly
expressed that the missing paradigm in educational research, and also in teacher
education, was the study of the understanding of teaching particularly the knowledge base
of teaching in specific content areas (Shulman, 1986; 1987). Shulman argued for a stronger
relationship between pedagogy and content in the context of understanding teaching. In
these papers, Shulman introduced the now well known, yet still controversial, concept of
pedagogical content knowledge as a key element of his notion of teacher knowledge.
In addition to the concept of pedagogical content knowledge, Shulman suggested the
existence of other kinds of knowledge, such as general pedagogical knowledge, subject-
matter knowledge, and curricular knowledge. 8

Shulman and his colleagues also suggested the notion of pedagogical reasoning
which includes the following cycle: comprehension, transformation, instruction,
evaluation, reflection, and new comprehension (Shulman, 1987. See also Wilson, Shulman
& Ritcher, 1987). In this process, pedagogical reasoning, the category of "subject-matter
knowledge provides the focal point" (Wilson, et al. 1987 p. 120). Despite the report on the

 

8 As I mentioned, Leihardt & Smith (1985) made a similar distinction; however, they did
not introduce the term "lesson structure knowledge" as part of a broader system. In fact,
several researchers have "talked" about how to "psychologize" the subject matter (e.g.
Dewey, 1902), but the explicit introduction of the term PCK into a conceptual system of
teacher knowledge was suggested, I think, by Lee Shulman and his colleagues. According
to Shulman (1987), his work is based on the works of several scholars such as Dewey,
Brunner, Schawb, Fensterrnacher, etc. (see also Shulman, & Quinlan, 1996). What is
important here is the distinction between two kinds of knowledge: the knowledge of the
subject-matter per se and the knowledge for teaching this subject-matter. The term
pedagogical content knowledge is useful in clarifying this distinction.

66

pedagogical-reasoning framework, the authors themselves have stressed the role of

pedagogical content knowledge.

Literature on science teacher knowledge

Regarding the literature on teacher knowledge, one can easily conclude that this is
abundant (e.g., Ball, 1989; Ball, & McDiarmidl 990; Cochran, 1992, Cochran et al., 1993;
Darling-Hammond, Wise, & Klein, 1995; Karter, 1990; Linhardt,& Smith, 1985;
Shulman, 1986, 1987; Smith, & Neale, 1991; Smith, 1996; Tobin, Tippins, & Gallard,
1994; Carter, 1990; Fensterrnacher, 1994; Feiman-Nemser, & Remillard, 1996,
Grosmman, 1990; Magnusson, 1992; Magnusson, Krajcik, & Borko, 1994; William, 1992;
Wilson, et a1. 1987; etc. ). One observation is that this literature refers -in general- to social
studies, mathematics, English, and teacher knowledge. Only a few of them refer to
science. From these works, I have identified two basic references on science teacher
knowledge: Magnusson's and Smith's pieces (Tobin's piece is a review).

In general the literature on teacher knowledge tends to incorporate several kinds of
knowledge in the package of teacher knowledge (e.g., Cochran et a1 1993; Darling-
Hammond, Wise, & Klein, 1995, Grossman, 1990). 9 For example Magnusson, Krajcick,
and Borko (1994) conceptualize pedagogical content knowledge for science teaching using
five components: "(a) orientation toward science teaching, (b) knowledge and beliefs about
science curriculum, (c)knowledge and beliefs about students' understanding of specific
topics, (d) knowledge and beliefs about assessment in science, and (e) knowledge and
beliefs about instructional strategies for teaching science". (p.5) Each of these components
has its own division. The components of knowledge of science curriculum, for instance,
is subdivided into 1) knowledge of goals and objectives, and 2) knowledge of specific

curricular programs.

 

9An extreme case is the framework of R. Stemberg, & J. Horvath (1995) which includes
more than a dozen of types knowledge (p.15).

67

In contrast to the model of Magnusson et al. S. Wilson, L. Shulman and their
colleagues suggest the specificity of pedagogical content knowledge. That is, these authors
coined the concept of PCK as a different kind of knowledge in relation to knowledge about
curriculum, or knowledge about educational aims or other kinds of knowledge:

Our preliminary findings suggest that novice teachers, as they prepare to teach their
content as well as during instruction, develop a new type of subject-matter
knowledge that is enriched and enhanced by other types of knowledge -knowledge of
the learner, knowledge of the curriculum, knowledge of the context, knowledge of
pedagogy. We call this form of knowledge pedagogical content knowledge. (Wilson,
et al. 1987, p.114. Italics added).

The importance of Wilson's model is that it forces us to study the specificity of
pedagogical content knowledge. In contrast, the model suggested by Magnusson and her
colleagues tends to explain pedagogical content knowledge in terms of other kinds of
knowledge (e.g., curricular knowledge, knowledge about the goals of education).

The second important reference that I use is the work of Deborah Smith and her
colleagues (e.g., Smith and Neale, 1991; Smith, 1997). Based on a longitudinal study of
primary science teachers, Smith & Neale (1991) studied the nature and evolution of science
teacher's knowledge. In line with the work of Magnusson and colleagues, Smith & Neale
(1991) identify: substantive content knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge (three
varieties), teachers' orientation toward science and teaching and learning, pedagogical
knowledge of organization and management . What is important for my discussion is that
there is a clear concern in Smith and Neale's report in clarifying the specificity of
pedagogical content knowledge. In fact, the authors refers to three specific kinds of PCK:
l) Pedagogical content knowledge of student's concepts;

2) Pedagogical content knowledge of strategies for teaching content; and
3) Pedagogical content knowledge for shaping and elaborating the content.
The connection between the minimal model that I proposed in the beginning of this

chapter and the notion of science teacher knowledge of the literature, particularly

pedagogical content knowledge, will be explored in the following section. My sense is that

68

the minimal model that I suggest provides a starting point for analyzing more complex
demands of science teachers knowledge. And more important, this minimal model can be
used to study the nature of science teacher knowledge that is needed in the context of
teaching science for understanding in relation to the science teacher knowledge in the context
of applications.

A final comment regarding the literature on teacher knowledge is that it is full of
discussions about the problems and the limitations that the teacher knowledge framework
introduces (e.g., Cochran et al., 1993; McEwan & Bull, 1991; Tom, 1992). I identify at
least two main critiques. One is that this framework does not account for other important
characteristics of teaching such as moral values (Tom, 1992; Fenstermacher, 1990). A
second critique is that the teacher knowledge framework is too "static" or too "fixed" (see
Cochran et al., 1993).

I agree with the comment that the teacher knowledge framework does not account
for several factors, particularly the moral aspect of teaching. However, it does not mean
that the framework is contradictory to them. Some ethical studies of teaching need
clarification of teacher knowledge (e.g., Ball & Wilson, 1996). The second critique is more
problematic for me. Although there is a danger in representing teaching by specific
categories of knowledge, such as SK, PCK, KK in my model, these knowledges represent
only a part of a very dynamic practice (teaching). These knowledges look fixed, but in fact
they are not. The subject-matter knowledge SK, for example, changes across time, as do
PCK and KK. Fifty years ago, the subject-matter knowledge in K-12 education was
different than today's. The same holds for PCK (think of the influence of research on how
children learn) or K (think of research on epistemology of science during the last thirty
years). Therefore, there is nothing fixed in this package of teacher knowledge. It does not
mean that we have a perfect representation of reality. There is no perfect picture of reality

nor need for one. 10

 

10For some scholars such as (educational) constructivists, the very notion of "teachers'

69

Science Teacher knowledge: A theoretical model

In this section, I clarify what I mean by the components of the minimal model of the
science teacher knowledge model that I suggest. In the first part of this chapter, I illustrated
SK, PCK and KK, that is subject matter knowledge (SK), pedagogical content knowledge
(PKC) and knowledge about knowledge (KK). In this section, I present more specific

definitions and interpretations of what I mean by these constructs.

Subject—matter knowledge (SK)

In general, I define subject-matter knowledge -SK- as a transformation from expert
scientific knowledge to school knowledge. This transformation refers to the substantive and
procedural knowledge of natural phenomena that teachers need to known in order to teach
science. Substantive SK knowledge tends to be identified with propositional knowledge-
that is, factsl 1, laws, and theories -while procedural knowledge, from the perspective of my
model, is the know-how in the context of experimental science. Think of Dave's electricity
class on electric circuits. Substantive SK includes propositional knowledge (e.g., Ohm's
law, i.e. V=IR) and procedural SK includes how to connect the wires with the flashlight
bulb in electric circuits. A second example is teaching Boyle's law. Substantive SK refers

to the law itself (PV= constant) whereas procedural SK refers to experimental knowledge

 

knowledge" is problematic because they do not separate the knower from the known (e. g.
Tobin, Tippins, & Gallard, 1994). No wonder since contructivists confuse reality with its
representations (e.g., Von Glaserfield); that is, they confuse the tenitory with the map.
Therefore, they will see teaching and teachers' knowledge as the same thing. The roots of
the problem seem to be in a confusion between epistemological and ontological
constructivism. I, for example, consider myself as an epistemological constructivist. But I
am not an ontological constructivist in the sense that I am not assuming that I am
constructing the external world just by thinking about it.

11The term "facts" in my model refers to "knowledge of facts" which is expressed by
concepts. Facts are not epistemological entities. They are ontological entities (things or
processes, natural or social). Several scholars do not distinguish between facts and
knowledge of facts. Given the wide use of the term fact with epistemological purposes, I
keep it in my model with the above clarification.

70

related to this law. For example: the knowledge of how to produce vacuum (e.g.,
Tonicellian method). 12

From the perspective of my model substantive science teacher knowledge includes a
minimal understanding of the mathematical knowledge in which several scientific laws and
theories are expressed. Ideal gases theory (e.g., Boyle's law) requires knowledge of
elementary algebra. Schools' versions of Newtonian mechanics, another example, requires
elementary Euclidean and analytical geometry, elementary logic, elementary set theory,
basic algebra, elementary vector space theory. '3 However, my conception of substantive
SK goes beyond this formal knowledge. Science teachers, and scientists, develop
substantive knowledge of science in other forms such as narratives.

Substantive SK is related to Schwab's notion of substantive structures of the
discipline. It is well known that Joseph Schwab made the important distinction between
substantive and syntactic structures of the disciplines ( 1964/1978). The former, substantive
structures, refers to the facts and relationships among them (concept, laws, theories) while
the latter, syntactic structures, refers to methodological canons of the discipline (e.g., what
is evidence?) and how knowledge is evaluated (e.g.. what is valid evidence?) As I said,
what I call substantive subject-matter knowledge is partially related to Schwab's substantive
structures. However, what I call procedural subject-matter knowledge is not conceptualized
in Schwab's syntactic structures.

Procedural subject-matter knowledge refers to the knowledge developed in

experimental sciences, that is, the "knowing how". In the case of Dave's electricity class

 

12 Some scholars use the terms explicit/implicit as synonymous of propositional/
procedural. For example, some neuropsychologists and linguistics hold that: "Procedural
knowledge is knowledge that cannot be inspected consciously [implicit]..." (Harris, 1996,
p.245. See also Ellis, 1994 for an example in linguistic). The dichotomy tacit/explicit does
not capture my distinction procedural/ propositional. In my model, procedural knowledge
can become explicit, yet usually it tends to remain tacit or missed.

13The expression "minimal" understanding of mathematics is tricky because the clarification
of the kind of mathematical knowledge that science teachers need to know depends on the
knowledge selected and the conception of mathematics, science, and science teaching,
among other factors.

71

this knowledge is connected to the goal of describe, explain and predict how electrical
circuits work. This goal assumes that Dave's students, and Dave himself, are able to put
together the circuit; that is, they have to have a minimal procedural knowledge regarding
electrical circuits such as simple connections and troubleshooting strategies.
The case of Torricelli provides an interesting historical context for illustrating
substantive and procedural SK. It is well known that Torricelli, a disciple of Galileo and a
predecessor of Boyle, faced the problem of explaining why lift pumps (formed by handle,
piston, valve) could not lift water to more than 34 feet. According to the Harvard Case
Histories in Experimental Science, Torriceli explained that the ascension of water in a pump
is an effect of the air pressure rather than being sucked by the vacuum (this, of course, is an
oversimplification of the history. See Conant, 1947 or Shamos, 1958 for more details and
Shapin & Schaffer 1985 for a different political-historical perspective). This explanation
assumes that air has weight. The following narrative, which includes conjectures on how
the pressure of the air would produce "the suction" of water, reflects what I am calling
substantive SK:
If air had weight, why might it not exert pressure on the surface of the water in a well
and thus force the water up the lift pump as the piston rises and produces suction?
The height of the 34 feet of water would thus represent the weight of water which this
pressure of the air on the surface of the earth could maintain (Conant, 1947, p.37).

In addition, Conant describes part of the procedural knowledge used in this experiment:
[Toricceli and Viviani]..took a glass tube about a finger's width in diameter and about
3-feet long, sealed it off at one end, filled it completely with mercury, and keeping a
finger over the end inverted in an open vessel of mercury (p.37)

Moreover, Conant explains with more detail the general procedural knowledge of

Torricelli's experiment:
Three new techniques [were] introduced into science; they are still invaluable. The

first was the use of liquid mercury in open vessels and the tubes as a medium for
experimenting with what we now call gases; the second, closely related, was a

72

method of producing vacuum; the third was the invention of the barometer...
(Conant, 1947, p.39). 14

Torricelli did not invent only techniques. He developed a theory for explaining
natural phenomena. His theory includes substantive and procedural knowledge. Although
canonical reconstructions of science tend to make procedural knowledge disappear
(Gooding, 1992), procedural subject-matter knowledge is the basic component of
experimental science and should be an important component of teacher subject-matter
knowledge.

Both substantive and procedural knowledge are related to the frameworks
established within academic disciplines, and both are related to expert scientific
knowledge. 15 The translation from expert scientific knowledge into SK has stressed
substantive knowledge, particularly in its propositional form. This is related to a common
conception of science as a body of propositional knowledge. 16 This is somewhat clear
when one sees traditional science classes -or even more progressive teaching perspectives-
using the matrix developed by Gallagher and Parker in the Salish Research. See for
example the row related to teachers' content (Table 3.1) in which didactic, transitional and
even conceptual perspectives are centered around substantive subject-matter knowledge

(from facts to conceptual understanding, that is, from "factoids" to "key ideas"). Only

 

l4Conant calls "techniques" what I call procedural subject-matter knowledge. The notion
of procedural SK in my model goes beyond the common use of the term "technique"
which usually is identified with mechanical skills. Donald Schtin (1983) calls "knowing in
action" the category of know-how, i.e., procedural knowledge. I restrict my procedural
SK to scientific procedural knowledge rather than the wide spectrum of knowing-how
knowledge (e.g. how to ride a bicycle which -by the way -was the favorite example of
Polyani)

l5Some scholars include in the subject-matter of science "heuristic", that is, ways of
solving problems (e.g. H.M. Collins, 1987). Heuristics (e.g., analogies) are an important
part of scientific thinking (Polya 1957). They are tools in the production of knowledge. In
the context of science teacher knowledge, I conceptualize them as part of the pedagogical
content knowledge construct.

lfilt is easier to translate propositional knowledge in contrast to procedural as I explain in
chapter 7. However, the reasons of the stress in translating substantive SK are much more
complex.

73

from the perspective of constructivism procedural subject-matter knowledge has a place
(Gallagher & Parker, 1995).
In summary, science subject-matter knowledge in my model is formed by

substantive and procedural knowledge. Now, let us see its pedagogical perspective.

Pedagogical content knowledge

In this section, I offer a clarification of the construct pedagogical content knowledge.
I follow a general direction suggested by Dewey to whom : “Every study or subject thus has
two aspects: one for the scientist as a scientist; the other for the teacher as a teacher. These
two aspects are in no sense opposed or conflicting. But neither are they immediately
identical” (1902/1990, p. 200). In other words, Dewey suggests a separation -and a
connection- between the subject for the scientist and the subject for the teacher. A
separation on what I developed the meaning of pedagogical content knowledge.

The separation between subject-matter knowledge and pedagogical content
knowledge is by its own right, difficult, given the intrinsic pedagogical value of scientific
knowledge. In other words, expert scientific knowledge (ESK) has educational
characteristics. Needless to say that subject-matter knowledge, SK, the knowledge selected
and translated into schools, has mainly educational purposes. Therefore, the separation
between subject-matter knowledge and pedagogical content knowledge should not deny that
science has a pedagogical component. In fact, any separation between pedagogy and
content should take into account the connection between both, that is, the pedagogical
aspects of science. However, it is important to clarify that subject-matter knowledge comes
from a selection of knowledge which belongs to a specific community, the scientific
community, a community with its own goals. The main goal of scientific communities, as
far as I understand them, is to produce knowledge about the world. The pedagogical
characteristics of this knowledge is not the main concern of such communities (see chapter 7

for an extensive discussion on the topic).

74

When subject-matter knowledge is re-interpreted with specific educational purposes,
there is the emergence of a new kind of knowledge: pedagogical content knowledge, PCK
for short. This explains the existence of knowledge that teachers have used, for years and
years, to help their students to learn any subject-matter. This emergent educational
knowledge has, I argue, two components: substantive (PCKs) and procedural (PCKp).

Substantive pedagogical content knowledge (PCKs), in my framework, is related to
substantive subject-matter knowledge (SKs). However, PCKs goes beyond that given the
emergence of substantive knowledge which is not conceptualized in the SKs component.
Think of the topic of “forces” for example. Expert scientific knowledge can be seen as any
of the mechanics that have interpreted (invented) the concept of force (e.g., Aristotelian,
Newtonian, Lagragian, or Hamiltonian mechanics). In each framework (e. g., either
Newtonian or Lagragian), the concept of force is quite different. The concept of force that
has been translated to modern schools has been a version of Newton-Euler mechanics
(T rusdell, 1968) in which force is proportional to acceleration of a given body (F=ma with
m constant which is a particular case of F=dp/dt in which p is the linear momentum vector).
SKs is formed by these academic (i.e., disciplinary-bounded) concepts and theories.

When a given teacher has to teach Newtonian mechanics, she or he uses, re-uses or
invents a sort of emergent concepts that go beyond the Newtonian framework, yet they are
related to it. E. Smith, for example, has reported a possible pedagogical structure of the

Newtonian mechanics.

75

 

FORCES

 

 

gravitional ‘ frictional
forces forces

 

 

 

Figure 3.5 Concept map developed by E. Smith for unit on forces (adapted from Smith,
1990, p.48). ‘
This conceptual map illustrates the difference between subject-matter knowledge, SK, and
pedagogical content knowledge from the perspective of my model. Concepts such as
gravity, gravitational forces, and frictional forces are part of SK, specifically substantive
SK. Concepts such as pushes and pulls, are examples of what I call substantive
pedagogical content knowledge when they are intentionally connected to SK in useful
pedagogical ways. This point will become clearer later when I present more examples.
The common interpretation of pedagogical content knowledge has been with
representations of the subject-matter. Shulman, for example, stresses this aspect of PCK:
" [the knowledge] which goes beyond knowledge of subject matter per se to the

dimension of subject matter for teaching... [it includes] the most useful forms of
representations of those ideas, the most powerful analogies, illustrations, examples,

76

explanations, and demonstrations-in a word, the ways of representing and
formulating the subject that make it compressible." (Shulman 1986, p.9 ).

Some of these representations come from the framework of the disciplines (either expert
scientific knowledge or subject-matter knowledge) and some of them are teachers'
inventions. Several researchers have explored the role of representations in teaching science
such as heuristic, analogies, demonstrations, etc. (Ball, 1989; Clemens, 1993; Wong,
1993, etc.). Although I do not describe this research here, it is important to note that
representations can be a part of substantive pedagogical content knowledge (see Perkins,
and Unger, 1994 for a review and a reconceptualization of the role of representations in
science and mathematics education).

Representations, a component of pedagogical content knowledge called "shaping
and elaborating the content" by D. Smith and Neale, can be constructed using research in
science education. Moreover, teachers can use research in science education in order to
develop substantive pedagogical content knowledge (beyond representations). Think of the
wide research on Newtonian mechanics since the pioneer works of Viennot at France (1979)
to the extensive summary of Driver et al., (1994). Research on the relationship between
force and motions suggests, for example, that students tend to believe that:

If there is a motion, there is a force acting;

If there is no motion, there is no force acting;

There cannot be force without motion;

When an object is moving, there is a force in the direction of motion;
A moving object stops when its force is used up;

A moving object has a force within it which keeps it going;

Motion is proportional to the force acting;
A constant speed results from a constant force (Driver, etal., 1994, p. 149)

This knowledge is not part of expert scientific knowledge nor substantive subject-matter
knowledge (SKs). This is the outcome of analyzing Newtonian mechanics from a
pedagogical point of view. Teachers can construct substantive pedagogical content
knowledge using as a starting point such knowledge. Note that this knowledge becomes
substantive pedagogical content knowledge only when teachers actually use that in

instruction. Otherwise, this knowledge is general research in science education.

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In line with the research tradition on how children learn, I see the emergence of a
body of systematized knowledge which is the basis of what I call substantive pedagogical
content knowledge. A. diSessa, for example, has suggested the existence of specific
phenomenological primitives (p-prims) which can be connected to scientific theories in the
course of instruction:

physics-naive students begin with a rich but heterarchical (none being

significantly more important than others) collection of recognizable phenomena in
terms of which they see the world and sometimes explain it. These are p-prims.

Some of them are compatible with formal physics... (diSessa, 1983, p.16). 17
For example the p-prim called 'force as mover" -among several p-prims suggested by
diSessa- refers to the idea that forces cause motion in the direction of the force. The genesis
of this idea is explained by diSessa: "Pushing an object from rest causes it to move it in the
direction of the push. The p—prim abstracted from that behavior, at that level of detail, I call
force as mover." (1993, p. 129). Force as mover can be seen as part of substantive
pedagogical content knowledge if we use that as a bridge between naive conceptions of
force and Newtonian forces.

It is important to note that there are different and sometimes competing positions on
how people learn science, particularly forces. For example, Bliss and Ogborn (1994)
suggest a different set of primitives (they call prototypes of motions) regarding the
acquisition of the notion of force. In relation to diSessa's framework on force and motion,

Bliss and Ogborn assume fewer primitives actions. Table 3.4 is taken from their report.

 

17diSessa (1989) reported the phenomenology and the evolution of intuition in teaching
physics. In this report, he introduced the notion of phenomenological primitives as key
percepts or concepts for connecting scientific concepts with students pre-conceptions.
Later, in 1993, he presented a work of synthesis in his paper: "Toward an epistemology of
physics". Despite this title, what he presented, I argue, is an Epistemology of Physics
Education, that is, an epistemology of school physics rather than an epistemology of

p ysrcs.

78

Table 3.4 Primitive actions regarding the psychogenesis of motions and forces according to
Bliss and Ogborn (1994, p.12). The framework was developed for infants.

 

 

 

 

Fundamental

prototypes

Level I pull

Level 2 fall

Level 3 carry
move-self
push/pull
set-moving

Latter

prototypes

Level 4 lift
walk/run
non-living walk/run
hit/kick/roll/slide/throw
jump

Level 5 fly
float

 

The use of this framework can be illustrated by one example taken from Bliss and
Ogborn about a person who goes to the bus stop and catches the bus:
The trip to the bus stop belongs to the prototype walk. It follows at once that the
person makes the necessary effort, can control the motion, and won't fall because
supported by the ground. When on the bus, the person is carried by the bus. We
know without reflection that the person, being inside the bus, will behave like a part
of the whole and so will move with the bus (non-living walk-run)...." (ibid. p.20)
Note that here there is an attempt to provide a theoretical explanation which does not
follow a canonical direction, yet it would be connected later. The phenomenological
primitives of diSessa (e. g. p-prims such as "force as mover") or the primitive actions of
Bliss and Ogborn (e.g. walk, carried , non-living walk-run) are part of theories based on
research on how students learn. These theories tend to take into account research on
students naive conceptions, cognitive research, developmental psychology, etc. The core of
these theories is what I am calling substantive pedagogical content knowledge.
Procedural pedagogical content knowledge differs from substantive PCK. The

meaning of procedural PCK that I endorse is the knowing how-to-teach a specific content.

This is related to what D. Smith and Neale have called strategies for teaching content. In

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teaching the Newtonian concept of force E. Smith, for example, has drawn on the
conceptual change model proposed by Posner et al (1982). Conceptual change model
provides a "procedur " framework for dealing with specific content, that is, l) knowing
common naive conceptions that students tend to have; 2) presenting students with specific
questions on the book-on-the table situation, 3) introducing the concept of force using the
notion of push and pull, 4) developing the plausibility that the table was pushing on the
table, and 5) using the notions of pushes, pulls and interaction among stationary objects to
analyze problems (Smith, 1990, p. 50, 51). Although the conceptual change model
provides a reference for a general pedagogical knowledge, my interest is in its use for
teaching specific content (PCKp).

Procedural pedagogical content knowledge is not directly connected to procedural
substantive knowledge (SKp). The former is related to useful pedagogical strategies tied to
specific content. The latter, procedural subject-matter knowledge, was defined in terms of
the "knowing how to do" in experimental science (e. g. knowing how to produce a vacuum
in experiments of hydrostatic).

This distinction that I make between procedural subject-matter knowledge (SKp) and
procedural pedagogical content knowledge (PCKp) is important. Such distinction is based
on the idea that the knowledge of how to set an experiment is not necessarily the best
procedural knowledge of how to teach specific content. The connection between
substantive subject-matter and pedagogical content knowledge is stronger than the
connection between procedural SK and procedural PCK. Think of the example of Dave's
electricity class (basic electric circuits). SKs includes Ohm's law, i.e. V=IR, knowledge of
electrical energy, Joule effect, etc. This knowledge is related to expert scientific knowledge
(which also includes deeper and more complex models than Ohm's law) such as:
Kirchhoff's laws, the free-electron model, in addition to more complex circuits such as RC
(resistence-capacitor circuit) and RCI (resistance-capacitor-inductance circuit) etc.

Procedural SK includes knowledge of how to connect the wires with the bulb in electric

80

circuits, basic knowledge of troubleshooting strategies, etc. This knowledge is not directly
related to procedural pedagogical content knowledge. In fact, for a given substantive SK
and PCKs there is room for several kinds of procedural pedagogical content knowledge.
The meaning of procedural pedagogical content knowledge can be encapsulated by
what Shirley Magnusson and her colleagues call orientations toward science teaching. In
explaining the nature of the different kinds of pedagogical content knowledge in the t0pic of
electricity, the authors use the following example:
For the teacher with a "discovery" orientation, the purpose would be to have students
discover the relationship that light bulbs in a parallel circuit give off more light than
those in a comparable series circuit, and she would expect the students to conclude
from this discovery that the amount of current is greater in a parallel circuit. For a
"conceptual change" orientation, the purpose would be to have students generate

explanations for the result that light bulbs in a parallel circuit are brighter than those in
a comparable series circuits....(p.6).

Note that here the discovery orientation suggests a procedural pedagogical content
knowledge in which students are allowed to discover differences between proprieties of
circuits in series and parallel. In contrast, the teacher with a conceptual change orientation
would have a set of different (but perhaps related) procedures.

Magnusson et al. (1994) report other kind of strategies -procedures- from the
"guided-inquiry" teacher to whom the goal of teaching science mainly is to engage students
in their own research. Students are expected to frame research questions, design an
experiment and find a pattern; in this specific case of electricity they are expected to find
"...pattems of differences between parallel and series circuits" (ibid.). Here, students study
differences in light bulb brightness as part of the research. This category is very similar to
the constructivist inquiry category suggested by Gallager and Parker (1995).

The following table summarizes my discussion on the difference between procedural
and substantive pedagogical content knowledge and subject-matter knowledge. I have
included the didactic orientation (defined in terms of STAM, see Table 3. 1,3.2 and 3.3 in

this chapter). I have also collapsed the inquiry and the discovery orientations into one

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given their similarities. Note that substantive and procedural subject-matter knowledge are
un-variable. In order words, there are many ways of teaching the same content (i.e., given
a selection of knowledge -SK- there are many ways of teaching it PCK).

Table 3.5 Relationship between substantive and procedural subject-matter knowledge and
pedagogical content knowledge for different orientations in teaching electrical circuits.

 

Orientation: Substantive SK Procedural SK substantive PCKl Procedural PCK

 

 

Didactic. Current, voltage, 1) how to Current, voltage, 1) how to
Ohm's law, connect the wires Ohm's law, connect the wires
difference of with the bulb difference of with the bulb
potential 2) basic potential d 2) basic
series and parallel knowledge of series and parallel knowledge of
circuits. troubleshooting circuits. troubleshooting
strategies strategies
Conceptual Current, voltage, 1) how to -analogies of 1) Detenfining
Ohm's law, connect the wires flow of water with naive conception
difference of with the bulb electrical circuits of electricity
potential 2) basic -powerful 2) Presenting
series and parallel knowledge of representations of intelligible
circuits. troubleshooting electrical circuits alternatives
strategies -specific 3) Developing
pedagogical plausible

models to explain explanations
flow of electrons 4) Generating

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

in a circuit fruitful
explanations
Constructivist Current, voltage, 1) how to 1) Framing a
Inquiry Ohm's law, connect the wires ? research question
difference of with the bulb (Undetermined) 2) Discussing the
potential 2) basic methodology
series and parallel knowledge of 3) Designing the
circuits. troubleshooting research/experim
strategies ent
4) Reporting the
results

 

Note that I have added the "didactic" orientation in order to illustrate the differences
between SKs, SKp, PCKs, PCKp. I suggest that teachers with a didactic orientation do not
distinguish between SK and PCK. This is clearer in higher levels in which teachers (e.g.,
colleges professors) believe that the more you know SK, the better your teaching is.
However, what is important for this section is the explicit distinction that I make between
SK and PCK in their substantive and procedural forms according the kind of orientation in

teaching science.

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Knowledge about knowledge (KK)

For knowledge about knowledge, I refer to a philosophical component of science
teacher knowledge which takes into account questions of how we know, what counts as
evidence, what is a scientific theory, what counts as scientific knowledge, etc. This area has
been characterized as nature of science or philosophy of science and illuminated by history
and sociology of science (Gallagher, 1991). In the context of my model, this component of
science teacher knowledge is related to Schwab's syntactic structures of the disciplines
(1964), that is, methodological and mainly epistemological canons of the disciplines.

Knowledge about knowledge in my framework focuses on epistemological aspects
of scientific knowledge. However, it includes other philosophical components such as
ontological, methodological and ethical assumptions about science. Usually science
teachers only have implicit ideas of such philosophical assumptions (Gallagher, 1991). By
the same token, science education reforms have traditionally tended to be implicit with their
philosophical assumptions of science. In the context of science curriculum policy, R.
Douglas (forthcoming) has called these assumptions "companion meanings." One exception
is Project 2061 which has been explicit in its conception of science. For example, Chapter 1
of Science for All Americans (AAAS, 1990) presents a set of explicit philosophical
assumptions of science which would be part of science teacher knowledge.

In order to illustrate what I mean by the component knowledge about Imowledge in
the framework of science teacher knowledge, I briefly comment on the conception of
science that Project 2061 has suggested. I use its framework Science for All Americans in
order to do this illustration (AAAS, 1990).

In an earlier work, I reported a set of philosophical assumptions that Science for All
Americans portrays (Cajas, 1995a). I identified epistemological (E), methodological (M),
ontological (O) and ethical (Eth) assumptions of science that this reform carries. The

following table is a summary of these assumptions.

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Table 3.6 An illustration of the philosophical assumptions of science from the perspective
of Project 2061, particularly Science for All Americans. O, E M and Eth mean
ontological, epistemological, methodological and ethical assumptions (adapted from Cajas,
1995a,p.178)

 

 

 

The Scientific World View Scientific Inquiry The Science Enterprise
e World is Understandable ScienceDemands Evidence Science is a Complex Social
(E) (M-E) Activity (O-M)
Scientific Ideas Are Subject Science Is a Blend of logic Science Is Organized Into
to Changes (E) and Imagination (O-M-E) Content Disciplines and Is
Scientific Knowledge is Science Explains and Conducted in Various
Durable (E-M) Predicts (E) Institutions (O-M)
Science Cannot Provide Science is not Authoritarian There Are Generally
Complete Answers to All (M-Eth) Accepted Ethical Principles
Questions (E-M) in the Conduct of Science
(Eth)
Scientists Participate in
Public Affairs Both as
Specialists and Citizens (?)

 

 

 

 

In order to illustrate how this knowledge can become part of science teacher
knowledge let me interpret any of these assumptions. Let us see the epistemological
assumption that the world is understandable, for example.18 It seems to me that this
principle means that we can have partial knowledge of how the world works (e. g. models
of electrical circuits). It does not mean that we can know each part of the world (or each
part of the circuit). It does not mean either that the world will be completely understood
(any scientific model has limitations). In explaining this principle, Project 2061 stresses
the human capacity of knowing from a humble position. That is, it is possible to know the
world, but our knowledge is fallible, it is not perfect, it has limitations. From my
perspective this philosophical position, fallibalism, does not mean a radical skepticism, that

is, that we know nothing. It does not mean either that we know everything (dogmatism).

 

18Such assumption is based on the idea that we know what understanding means. The
interpretation that I suggest here of this assumption does not re-elaborate the discussion on
understanding that I presented in the first chapter. In addition I explore several meanings
of the term understanding in the following chapter. Here I only show a general
epistemological interpretation of such principle.

This kind of knowledge is what I call knowledge about knowledge. Project 2061 is only
one possible alternative and the above interpretation is my own interpretation. Science
teachers should construct their own interpretations in explicit ways.

The separation that I offer between knowledge of the subject matter (SK) and
knowledge about subject matter stresses the need for being explicit with our conceptions of
science (Cajas, 1992a). 19 Perhaps this will pay off if one is interested in the pedagogical
values of different conceptions of science in teaching science. It seems obvious that not all
conceptions of science have the same pedagogical value. However, we do not know much
about the role of different conceptions of science, particularly conceptions of specific subject
matter, in teaching science (Cajas, 1995a). Let us think again of the problem of Newton's
Laws. From a philosophical point of view, classic mechanics can be understood from
several philosophical perspectives. For some philosophers, Newton's laws are
mathematical definitions (formalism). For others they are empirical deductions, that is,
patterns deduced from empirical observations (empiricism). Others think that they are
mathematical universal laws that can be applied to specific cases (a version of positivism).

Ernest Mach, for example, defended the idea that we can reduce Newtonian
mechanics to perceptible proprieties (e. g. by experimenting with observable masses). Mach
intended to reduce dynamics to kinematics (Mach, 1893). Although I think that Newton's
laws are conjectures (hypotheses) of how material objects interact rather than empirical
deductions, 20 from a pedagogical point of view, the philosophy of Mach has several
things to offer to teacher knowledge given its connection to more concrete assumptions

(perceptible proprieties). Therefore, the separation between knowledge of subject matter

 

19The separation between knowledge of subject matter (SK) and knowledge of knowledge
(K) is problematic. For several scholars, the notion of science also includes ideas about
science (Matthews, 1995). I endorse the position that learning science also includes
learning about science. However, usually the ideas about science are implicit. This is a
critical issue in learning how to teach science because in order to improve our teaching, we
need to know our implicit ideas (Ball, 1989). Therefore I keep separated SK from K.

20High level of hypothesis, that is, theoretical conjectures. (M. Bunge, August 1995
personal communication).

85

(e.g., Newton's laws) and knowledge about Newton's laws (such as formalist, empiricist,
positivist interpretations of the theory) is an important strategy in order to point out potential
pedagogical implications of both kinds of knowledge in teaching science.

It is important to note that the component knowledge-about—knowledge in my model,
K, is formed by general assumptions about science (e. g. Table 3.5) and specific
assumptions of specific subject-matter. In the case of Newton's law they were mentioned in
the last paragraph (see Bunge, 1967; Cajas 1991; 1992b; 1995 for a detailed analysis of
Newton's laws philosophical assumptions). Another example is Torricelli's experiment.
According to J. Conant, E. Torricelli, a disciple of Galileo, faced the problem of why it was
impossible "...to draw up water from a cistern for a distance of more than approximately 34
feet" (p.33). Toricceli's experiment is explained in several sources (Conant, 1947;
Shamos, 1958). What is not presented in these histories are the philosophical assumptions
of such an experiment. For example: fluids (in this case air) obey the laws of the static of
liquids, or, the assumption that the earth is surrounded by air. There are also assumptions
related to procedural knowledge. For example, why did Torricelli select mercury for his
first experiment? These specific assumptions are examples of what I call knowledge about
knowledge.

The role of philosophy of science in science teacher knowledge may have important
implications. However, we still need to face basic problems regarding this potential
component of science teacher knowledge. In relation to the role of philosophy in teaching
science, my position used to be more optimistic (Cajas, 1991). However, after being in the
US. and learning the lack of impact of philosophy of science in teaching science it has
become more critical:

The quality of the transference of the philosophical principles of science to the school
discourse is an open problem because we (teachers, researchers and curriculum
developers) still need to answer at least two questions: 1) what is the epistemological
status of these principles inside the school discourse?; and 2) what are the

pedagogical advantages of introducing these assumptions into the curriculum?
(Cajas, 1995a, p.181)

86

For example, I see basic problems on the relationship between epistemologies within
scientific communities and epistemologies within schools settings. One fundamental
problem that guides this dissertation is "Should 'understanding' be based on how scholars
hold knowledge in a domain or be defined by how ordinary people use knowledge in
everyday life?" (Shulman & Quinlan, 1996, p.400). The answers -or proposal of answers-
that science teachers can provide to this question and actually their own actions are related to
philosophical conceptions of science and their social value in a given society. Such answers
-or conjectures- will be reflected in the knowledge-of-knowledge component of science
teachers. For example, a revision of current science teacher knowledge shows a concern for
cannons and conceptions that come from disciplinary positions. However, with this

discussion we are touching the topic of the following section.

Science teacher knowledge: Implications, limitations

When one sees science teacher knowledge from the perspective of my model there
are three components: SK, PCK and KK. These three components seem to be in line with
the idea that science is to describe, explain and predict natural phenomena. There is a
translation from expert scientific knowledge (ESK) to scientific knowledge SK (the
knowledge to be taught in schools) with the assumption that science teachers can learn
science (SK), reflect on K (e. g. epistemologies of science) and develop PCK in order to
help their students to construct powerful scientific explanations. Here the connection
between content, pedagogy, and philosophy is crucial. This raises the question of how
much SK, PCK and KK shape each other (Tobin, Tippins, & Gallard, 1994).

The picture that one can draw from my model and from the review of the literature
with which I interpreted my constructs is that the goals of teaching science are quite clear:
teaching science for understanding in light of disciplinary criteria. This seems to be a
translation of understanding of the discipline to schools. The depth of the translation

depends on how much understanding teachers want for their students. For example, in

87

teaching electric circuits one can choose between macro models based on general variables
such as current, voltage, resistance or micro models based on electron flow models. The
same holds for almost any part of the K-12 science education curriculum. So far, science
education has produced knowledge to illuminate teaching science from either macro or micro
points of view. At any rate the goal is understanding.

At the same time, we are witnesses of an era in which reforms are also asking for
connecting school science to students' everyday lives. Therefore applications of science
are, or should be, key components of science teacher knowledge. Applications of school
science to everyday life assumes that it is possible to do that. In teaching Newtonian forces,
science teachers and researchers assume that we (general public) can use such tools in
everyday life. For example, research on naive conceptions assumes that we (humans) are
doing explanations of natural phenomena in our daily life (yet we are, usually, wrongl).
Think of diSessa's research on the preconceptions of physics (1988, 1993). The p-prim
"force as mover" explains (from a naive point of view), according to diSessa, a relation
between force and effort. However, in everyday life "...people do not try to explain why
you get more results when you expend more effort pushing a big rock. There is no ready
explanation or really any need for one" (Ueno, 1993, p.329).

In a study on how people use scientific knowledge for solving real-world problems,
Brian Wynne and his colleagues found, among several interesting findings, that

...the closer one gets to everyday discussion of apparently technical issues such as
those examined in these projects [the research projects carried out by Wynne's team],
the more science seems to 'disappear'. This does not deny the importance of science

in such contexts but note the extent (and variety) to which it needs translation, or
'reframing'. (1990, p.1 16).

Teaching electricity, another example, supposes several concepts, theories (SK) and
assumptions about such concepts (K) with which students can describe, explain and
predict the phenomena in electric circuits using batteries. Teachers, can help students to

construct their own models by using analogies (water pump), models (the container---

88

>consumer-analogy) or theories (voltage-current, electron flow), that is, knowledge to help
students to learn science (PCK). However, some researchers have reported the irrelevance
of these circuits in everyday life (Black & Harlen, 1993). How does it affect the science
teacher knowledge model that I just described?

The first important element of the model of science teacher knowledge that I
developed is that it should help teachers and researchers to understand what teachers need
to know to provide students opportunities to use science in meaningful ways. This is
difficult because it forces us to think what students can do with science in their lives. For
me, such goals shape what we consider SK, PCK and KK. Although it is accepted that
applications are part of science teacher knowledge, when one sees the model on teacher
knowledge that I developed - and its connection with the literature- there is much more
attention to explanations than applications. Teachers and researchers assume that these
explanations are connected to students’ everyday lives. However, I think that these
assumptions and connections deserve to be studied.

In general, I think that there is a basic tension between what is considered science
teacher knowledge, at least in the sense described by my model, and the demands of
applications that current reforms are asking for. The tension in teacher knowledge is related
to the tension that I studied in Chapter 1 and 2 between understanding and applications. In
this way, applications of science to the real world in the sense of students' everyday lives
require a reconsideration of the knowledge that teachers need to know. This calls for better
theories and a richer language to talk about teacher knowledge and teaching.

My position is that we need to study the relevance of school science and develop
conceptual systems (theories) to study what science teachers need to know. My sense is
that traditional scientific knowledge (SK) has limitations for being used in real-world
applications regarding students' everyday lives. It does not mean that teaching science for
understanding is impossible. Rather, what I mean is that the epistemological and

pedagogical demands that applications -in the sense of real world applications connected to

89

students' everyday lives- introduce on science teacher knowledge are complex. In order to
show that, I think that a re-evaluation of the science teacher knowledge model proposed in
this chapter, it is needed. The reason for this re-evaluation is that I see possibilities in using
more mundane knowledges, such as technological knowledge, as part of science teacher

knowledge in connecting science with students' everyday lives.

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CHAPTER 4
SCIENCE TEACHER KNOWLEDGE: APPLICATIONS

Understanding...applications: A clarification of basic terms

The firsts two chapters have set a scenario for analyzing the potential that technology
has in teaching science for understanding and applications. Using the case of Dave and
examples taken from Feynman's physics classes I illustrated different relationships between
teaching science for understanding and applications. One approximation to the terms
understanding/application was epistemological. I identified understanding with one of its
meanings within scientific communities, that is, the use of scientific knowledge to describe,
explain, and predict.

A second meaning of the relationship understanding/applications was introduced in
the opening chapter with the current concern of science education reforms of connecting
school science with students' out—of-school experiences, that is, meaningful applications
regarding students’ everyday lives. Here, applications go beyond the use of scientific
knowledge per se. I used some outcomes of the Salish Research Project along with other
references to illustrate the notion of relevance of school science.

During the firsts three chapters I also used other meanings of understanding
/application. I mentioned the use of science to solve real-world problems as opposed to
academic problems and the role of technology in connecting science to students' out-of-
school experiences. Now my aim is to unpack the epistemological demands that teaching
for understanding and applications place on science teacher knowledge. Therefore, the

several meanings of understanding/applications that I am using need to be clarified.

The multiple meanings of understanding & applications
Looking back I can see that all my interpretations of the terms understanding &
application are related to the "solution" of different kinds of problems. So it sounds

reasonable to clarify what I mean by the term problem. My general assumption is that a

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problem is a difficulty which requires some degree of challenge in order to be faced.
Problems have many purposes, roots, colors, flavors, etc. according to their creators and
their affiliations. Therefore, I begin my clarification on the multiple meanings of the terms
understanding/applications by analyzing the meanings of academic problems in the context

of teaching science.

Understanding/applications: Academic problems

One meaning of the term "scientific problem" can be analyzed from the perspective
of disciplinary knowledge in which problems are a special kind of conceptual difficulties
developed within the tradition of academic disciplines. Such problems require the
"application" of scientific knowledge in order to be solved. Of course, I do not mean that
academic problems are solved by a simplistic application of knowledge already made. The
problem is much more complex than that (see Popper 1996 for a discussion). What I want
to point out is that from this perspective, understanding/applications means to solve
theoretical difficulties framed by scientists. The assumption is that these problems address
features of reality, that is, Nature poses the problems. The common assumption is that
scientific problems are discovered. Here the meaning of understanding/application is to
discover the secrets of the Universe. 1 do not share this philosophical position, but I think
this assumption is widely shared within scientific communities in which scientific problems
are supposed to be given by Nature.

Scientific problems can also be seen as special kinds of difficulties which are posed
within a scientific paradigm shared by a scientific community (Kuhn, 1970). The
epistemological conditions for accepting scientific problems change from author to author
and from time to time yet they share some features. For example, some people tend to agree
on the need of a specific body of knowledge to be applied (scientific theories). Others ask
for well-formulated problems (e. g., Reif & Larkin, 1991). Understanding and application

' here is the use of such a paradigm to solve problems. Note that although the notion of

92

scientific problems is tied to the paradigm, understanding/applications is the use of canonical
knowledge to solve specific difficulties.

One fundamental paradigm has been identified with Galileo's contributions. This
paradigm has supported the development of modern science. One line of interpretation of
Galileo's work, and perhaps the only one, has stressed the process of idealizations and
abstractions in the explanation of natural phenomena (Matthews, 1995). Think of the case
of a simple pendulum (which is the problem usually presented as an example). Galileo
developed, among several other contributions, a theory for explaining a) how the period of a
pendulum changes with its longitude, b) the relationship between period and amplitude
(actually no connection), and c) the relationship between period and mass (also
independent). In this theory, Galileo reduced real events into abstractions. The "simple"
pendulum is not a real pendulum; this is an ideal pendulum whose mass is an ideal point.

Based on this general paradigm (reductionism into abstract ideas) scientists have
invented several "scientific problems." Note that from this perspective, in order to be
"scientific," the problem should be posed within this specific paradigm. This is one
meaning of the term "scientific problem", that is, those problems which make sense within
these conceptual frameworks (Kuhn, 1970).

There is a parallel process in school settings. Contemporary science education
reformers are also asking for teaching science in line with the above conception of
understanding. This is not only the position of scientific communities or the position of
science education reformers, but it is also a general movement for reforming education
(e.g., O'Day & Smith, 1993; The Holmes Group, 1990). The following case taken from
one of the Holmes Group reports is an interesting example: "In a school where students are
taught for understanding: Fifth graders may experiment with pendulums and refine
contrasting hunches about timing and length into testable theories" (1990, p. 17). Here,
understanding and applications for these fifth graders is the reconstruction of this Galilean

experiment. Their hunches about timing and length of the pendulum will refer to ideal

93

types, that is, an ideal pendulum. The problem will be scientific because it belongs to the
organized tradition of scientific communities. Note that I am not criticizing such positions.
Rather, I am illustrating one meaning of students’ everyday lives which is related to the
solution of academic problems in school settings.

A second meaning of understanding as application is its concern on developing
mathematical models. The problem of the pendulum, for example, would be seen as the
justification of using mathematical tools, such as differential equations or algebraic
equations in the case of K-12 science education. Using again the potential interpretation of
understanding as explanation and prediction based on mathematical models, one can see
that, from this perspective, the deeper the theory the better the understanding. The more
formal the mathematical apparatus the better the understanding.

What is important for my analysis is that the focus of attention changes from the
natural phenomena to the mathematical apparatus. Think of the case of the pendulum which
consists of a small mass (m) suspended by a light inextensible cord of length 1. If cc is the
angle between the cord and the vertical, one can develop the following equations of motions

of the particle m:

 

J;
\K

Figure 4.1. The simple pendulum.

 

 

 

 

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( 1 ) SF=ma

(2) ma: mdxz/dt2=-mg sina
dx2/dt2=-g sina

or in terms of the angle (where x=10t)

(3) lda2/dt2=-g sina

with approximations of small angles one can assume that sina is more or less 0:, therefore
the differential equation becomes

(4) da2/dt2=-g/1a

What is important from this perspective of applications is not the natural phenomena.
What is important is the mathematics. Followers of this perspective would argue that the
natural phenomena is embedded in the differential equation (4). The solution of the equation
for specific conditions is one meaning of application. However, the tendency in theoretical
mechanics, for example, is to value the formal apparatus rather than the natural phenomena.
In this way, the natural phenomena (real-world event) is an excuse for developing formal
models (e.g., Lanczos, 1970). In other words, the concern is the mathematics.

For better or worse this meaning of understanding/applications has its existence in
school settings. Take the same example of the pendulum suggested by the Holmes Group
(1990). One plausible interpretation of this suggestion is that students will develop or
simply use mathematical models such as the formula of the period of the simple pendulum,
that is, T: 2p ‘ll/g (with l the longitude of the pendulum, p the irrational number 3.14...,
g the acceleration due gravity, and "\/ " the symbol of square root) -which by the way is
one solution of equation (4)- in order to make predictions. '

When the mathematics has the objective of describing, explaining, and predicting I
refer to the notion of internal relevance, that is, the first meaning of understanding/

application that I suggested. However, when the phenomena is only one excuse to develop

 

1For greater amplitudes, the expression of period of a pendulum becomes the following:

T: 21: ‘ll/g (l + 1/4 sin2 01/2 + 9/64 sin4 a/2+....) If one wants to take into consideration
the form of the pendulum, i..e., the real interaction between the mass of the pendulum and
the arr, the problem is much more complex (Reference: any college physics textbook).

95

mathematical models, I refer to a different meaning of understanding/ application. Although
the mathematical model can be used for understanding, the second meaning of applications

that I am pointing out is the very use or creation of mathematics for its own sake.

Solving real-world problems

A third meaning of the word application, according to my clarification, is the use of
science for solving real-world problems. The meaning of the term real-world problem is
tricky. On the one hand, "real world" would mean the phenomena itself; for example, the
pendulum with its movement. On the other, hand real word problems could mean problems
that refer to real objects and events rather than abstractions or idealizations. One special
kind of these problems are everyday phenomena. Both meanings of real-world problems
are quite different notions. The idea that science refers to real—world events is a general
ontological assumption. However, not all real-world events are approached in similar
forms. The example of the pendulum-problem can be seen as a real-world event
(ontological assumption), but it is also an idealization (methodological strategy).

The ontological assumption that science is about real-world events is problematic
only for some philosophers (idealists such as the case of Plato and several contemporary
constructivists who are also idealistic). However, the idea that one can apply scientific
knowledge to real-world problems is more problematic because it depends on the kind of
real-world problems that one is talking about. Real-world problems in everyday life tend to
be ill-structured, confusing, outside of specific disciplines, etc. (Lave, 1988; Schon,
1983). Therefore the assumption that canonical scientific knowledge can be applied to real-
world problems, in the sense of everyday problems, requires more than a clarification.

When scientists refer to real-world problems, they talk from their own experiences.
When science educators talk about real-world problems, they refer to common experiences
that can be approached by scientific knowledge. In teaching my own classes, particularly

in topics such as forces, energy, and momentum, like many science teachers I frame "real-

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world" problems with common examples such as climbing a rope, accelerating a car,
pushing a box along the floor, filling with air the tires of the car, etc. Nobody denies that
they are real-world problems (ontological assumption). However, these problems become
scientific (academic) problems after a huge process of transformation such as idealizations
(methodological strategies) or after changing the very nature of the problem. In other
words, they become scientific, and also much more manageable, after one eliminates all
their mundane characteristics.

The nature of real-world problems is problematic by its own right. Such problematic
nature and complexities transcends disciplinary boundaries. In a recent presentation at
Michigan State, Richard Lesh, for example, suggested a separation between traditional
textbook problems and real real-world situations in the context of mathematics education.
The following table represents his conception of real-world problems in relation to
traditional textbooks problems:

Table 4.1 Real life situations and traditional textbook problems in the context of
mathematics education according to Richard Lesh (1997).

 

 

 

 

 

Traditional 'I'extESoE 32 Test Real-life Situafions

Problem: What‘s problematic is to make Problem: What's problematic is to make

meaning of symbolically stated situations. symbolic description of meaningful
situations.

Procfircts students produce includes simple Products students produce include

answers to questions constructions, descriptions, explanations,
justifications, predictions.

Focus on numbers and operations Focus on quantities, relationships, and
transformations.

 

 

 

I see a small difference between Lesh's conception of textbook problems and his
idea of real-life situations. It seems to me that what is a real-life situation for Lesh is still an
unproblematic description of a very complicated issue. Perhaps in a community of
mathematicians, descriptions, explanations, justifications and predictions are part of their

real life. After all, real-life problems are relative to the life of the people. However, if one

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is thinking about common people (just plain folks, jpf, is the expression coined by Lave),
real life problems tend to be ill-structured, confusing, outside of specific disciplines, and
several times they are more practical rather than cognitive.

In an interesting paper, Reif and Larkin (1991) have analyzed cognition from the
perspective of everyday and scientific domains.2 The authors attempt to show continuities
and discontinuities between science and everyday life. Reif and Larkin's analysis is
important because it points out the difficulties of using school science in everyday life. The
meaning of understanding in both domains is of special importance in my discussion.
According to them, understanding in science "...is a working goal pursued deliberately in
the service of the central goal of explaining and predicting...the criteria of scientific
understanding are well specified" (p.741). In contrast, according to them, there are not
well defined criteria of what constitutes understanding in everyday life.

Although the separation between scientific and everyday life domains is important,
the business of science education is to connect both. The discontinuities between science
and everyday life according to Reif and Larkin would have important consequence in
teaching science (in fact it has had implications given the popularity of this vision). The
authors make the case that being aware of these differences is important for students given
the fact that they commonly import into science problem-solving strategies used in everyday
life with negative consequences. It seems to me that the authors make an important
contribution to the (lack of) research on the use of science in everyday life. However, the

assumption behind the argument is that science is going to be useful in everyday life if we

 

2 The authors refer to "knowledge domain" following the language of research in
cognition and computers. There are other meanings of domains even within this line of
research. R. Schank, for example, defines a domain as "...an area of interest that can be
used as background for the acquisition of skills and cases while one engages in tasks that
teach processes used with a subject area" (1993/1994, p. 433). Therefore, physics is a
domain in Schank's sense and also a knowledge domain in Reif and Larkin's sense. It is
problematic to talk about everyday domain because the area of interest is not limited. When
one says that everyday knowledge is knowledge that one use in everyday life, one does not
say anything. Delirniting and clarifying what everyday knowledge is seems to be a super
complex problem. Despite that, I keep talking about the two domains suggested by Reif
and Larkin with the clarification that we are in a fuzzy, uncertain and complex area.

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are aware of the differences/ similarities between science and everyday life knowledge. The
conception of science that is behind this argument is the idea that scientific problems can be
solved by general theories. The role of students is learning such theories and how to use
them in "real" life situations. The importance of these theories was already built by
scientists; that is, it is a general assumption that these theories are important and useful in
every day life.

The meaning of real-world problems, which ultimately is related to the meaning of
understanding and applications in everyday life, is important given the stress that
contemporary educational reforms are putting on this goal. However the implications of
such a goal and its relation with the scientific knowledge that is taught in school is still
unclear to me. To complicate matters, real-world applications in the context of current
educational reforms are not only in the sense of real stuff, but also in relation to students'

experiential worlds. This is a matter of the following section.

The relevance of science

Another meaning of the word application in the context of my work is its connection
with the concept of personal relevance introduced in the first chapter. The reader may recall
that in the exploratory study of Salish, personal relevance was used in order to know how
teachers make use of students' everyday experiences as a meaningful context for the
development of student's scientific knowledge and, mainly, how students perceive such
relevance (Taylor, et. a1, 1995). However, the concept of relevance of science goes beyond
personal relevance. The relevance of science in personal life is not only connected to
utilitarian reasons. There can be cognitive, aesthetics, social, and other reasons that are
included in this kind of application.

Educational reformers are asking for meaningful applications of science to students’
everyday lives (e.g., Project 2061, the National Science Education Standards). As I pointed

out in the last section, this assumes that scientific knowledge can be used in meaningful

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ways in real-world problems and everyday life. The advantages and limitations of this
assumption should be analyzed taking into account the kind of relevance that one is talking
about. Traditionally the notion of relevance has been approached from a cognitive point of
view. From this perspective, the idea is that scientific knowledge can be used in students'
personal lives with meaningful, i.e., cognitive, purposes. However, the relevance of
science from a cognitive point of view is not necessarily the same as the relevance of science
from a social point of view (see chapter 7 for a discussion).

Another meaning of the term understanding application I have used is the design of
artifacts. This is the perspective of technology. In the following section I clarify this

meaning.

The design of artifacts

In the first chapter, I used the meaning of application in the sense of the design and
creation of artifacts. This is the perspective of technology in which knowledge has practical
value (e.g., for designing and/or transforming artifacts). Here applications do not only have
the cognitive goal of understanding (as describing, explaining and predicting). Rather,
knowledge, from this perspective, makes sense if it can be used with practical goals
(designing, creating or transforming). This meaning of application of science is presented
in the two leading science education reform proposals: Project 2061 and the National
Science Education Standards.

We can start with the general statement that technology is a problem-solving activity
(Allshop, 1981) or the very first definition that the Panel Report of Project 2061 suggests:
"Technology is the application of knowledge, tools, and skills, to solve practical problems
and extend human capabilities" (Johnson, 1989, p. 1). Although both definitions of
technology, problem solving activity and application of knowledge are broad descriptors of

a complex activity, they illustrate (with the danger of a mis representation) the meaning of

100

applications that I want to point out here. That is, the idea that science can be related to the
solution of practical problems.

Of particular interest in this meaning of application is one branch of technology:
engineering. To some extent, engineering is a representative of technology and its relation
with science is important to science education. In general, one can assume that "Engineers
spend their time dealing mostly with practical problems, and engineering knowledge both
serves and grows out of this occupation" (Vicenti, 1990, pp. 200-201). Practical problems
in the context of engineering and the existence of engineering knowledge are key terms that
are related to the meaning of application as design of artifacts. In fact, the meaning of
application that I want to clarify in this section is related to the use of science to deal with
"practical problems" in the sense of designing, creating or transforming things. Later, in a
specific chapter, I clarify the meaning(s) of technological knowledge and its potential
connection with science education.

From a cognitive point of view, Leona Schauble and her colleagues have analyzed
how children's understanding of experimentation changes when they are exposed to
scientific (understanding) and engineering (applications) types of experiments. The features
of children's engineering and science models of experimentation used by Schauble and her
colleagues is important to clarify one meaning of applications in the sense of the design of

artifacts.

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Table 4.2 Features of children's engineering and science models of experimentation
according to Schauble et al. (1991, p.861).

 

 

 

 

Engineering model Science model
Goal: Make a desired or interesting Understand relations among causes
outcome occur or reoccur and effects
Strategies:
Procedures: Compare highly contrastive Establish the effect of each
instances potentially important variable
Emphasis on making exclusion or
Inferences: Emphasis on making inclusion, or non causal inferences of
causal, inferences indeterminacy
Seek to test all combinations, if
Search: Focuses on variables believed to feasible
cause the outcomes
Stop rule: When the desired outcome (or When systemic test of each
acceptable approximation) is manipulable variable is completed
achieved)

 

Applications in the context of the engineering model are better characterized by
practical, utilitarian and pragmatic reasons: "We refer to the practical approach to
experimentation as the engineering model of the process. The main objective of engineering
practice is to optimize a desired outcome, and much of engineers' experimentation is
organized around this objective" (ibid, p.860). In contrast, the scientific model stresses
understanding (describing, explaining, and predicting using causal models).

From this cognitive perspective, the domain of knowledge and experimentation
strategies (either scientific or practical) affect how children learn science. For my argument
the very existence of engineering problems, as part of applications of science, places new
demands of knowledge in science teachers. Perhaps these applications will pay off if they
can be connected to other goals of science education such as everyday applications. This
argument is implicit in Schauble's report: "'Engineering' of this kind arguably has wider
applicability to everyday purposes and may thus be developmentally prior to the more
analytic form of thinking involved in scientific inquiry" (p.860).

The argument of Schauble has important implications for science education and
reflects a specific meaning of understanding/application that I have used. I am particularly

interested in this notion of understanding/ application. Therefore, I will study the role of

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technology as content knowledge in science education. This implies a careful study of the
notion of design in some technological fields (e.g., engineering) and how this can have
implications in the science cuniculum. At this moment, the goal of my discussion is to
clarify the multiple meanings of students’ everyday lives have used in the first chapters of

this dissertation.

103

 

Problems

So far I have illustrated five generic meanings of the terms understanding and
applications that I have been using during the first chapters of this dissertation. At this
moment, the reader can see that the tension understanding versus applications of which I am
talking about is not a simple dichotomy between a single meaning of understanding and a
single meaning of application. Rather, it reflects a complex interaction among several
potential and actual meanings of these terms. The following table summarizes these different

meanings.

Table 4.3 The multiple meanings of the term application.

 

Application 1
The use of scientific knowledge to solve scientific problems

Application 2
The use of science to solve mathematical problems

Application 3
The use of science to solve real-world problems

Application 4
The relevance of science in everyday life

Application 5
The design of artifacts

 

I call "application" each of the meanings that I am using, yet sometimes I refer to
understanding. Application 1, for example, does not separate understanding from
application. Here, understanding and application mean the use of scientific knowledge to
describe, explain, or predict. The meaning that I stressed was the use of science to solve
academic problems. This meaning was also called internal relevance given its concern on the

use of knowledge for cognitive reasons usually in line with the key ideas of the discipline.

104

 

Application 2 refers to the concern of the use of mathematical tools to solve scientific
problems. Application 2 also has its representation when school science tends to stress the
use of mathematical models rather than the understanding of the natural phenomena.
Application 3 is a goal in contemporary science education. There is a great concern in
approaching real-world problems within school settings (Resnick, 1987; AAAS, 1990).
Application 4, relevance of science in everyday life, is another current goal of schooling
and usually is mixed with application 3 (e.g., N agel, 1996) . However, the relevance of
science in personal life is a somewhat different goal than the solution of real-world
problems, yet they could be related. Application 5 refers to the uses of science to design,
change, and control artifacts.

All these meanings represent general categories that are interconnected and
overlapped among them. For example, for some people, mathematical models are related to
real-world problems such as the case pointed out by Speiser and Walter: "The message of
this article is that if we take real-world modeling seriously, then we need to introduce the
basic concepts of calculus with much more subtlety and depth" (1994, p.135). Therefore,
for these authors, application 2 is related to application 3. The same holds for applications
of science to real-world problems or the notion of personal relevance. If one of the goals of
science teaching is to give students opportunity to use science in the real world in relevant
contexts, application 3 is mixed with application 4. In this way, the meanings that I have
pointed out are not pure goals of science and mainly science education. Rather, they are
terms that I use in order to explore what the kind of knowledge is that science teachers need
to know that they are going to teach for understanding and applications. My interest is on
I applications that go beyond the discipline; that is, applications 3, 4 and mainly 5 because
they are more important from a social point of view. It does not mean that I am not
interested in applications 1 and 2. Certainly, I think that in order to know what the role of
science in everyday life is, or what the relevance of science is, we need to know more about

the role of science as institution, that is, know more about how scientific communities

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actually work, what count as knowledge and evidence and mainly what is the meaning of
understanding and applications within these communities.

When one sees Table 3 with its different meanings of understanding and
applications, one also sees different conceptions of the nature of the problems. For example
the use of science to solve academic problems assumes that problems exist somewhere;
therefore, their ontology is already established. This is not the case for the creators of such
problems, but this is the case for the re-creators of these problems. For example, for
Galileo, the problem of the pendulum was his creation. However, the transformation of this
problem and its incorporation within the discipline of physics illustrates the existence of
academic problems with their own ontological status. On the other hand, when one sees
what a problem is from the perspective of students’ everyday lives, the relationship
between the problem and the "solver" (the person who intends to solve the problem)
becomes more complex. Here, the very ontological status of problems changes from
something already made (disciplinary problems) to something with less clear ontological
status (Roth, 1995b). The notion of “problem” moves from the discipline to students’
everyday lives. This movement introduces new demands of teacher knowledge.

At this moment my interest is on the clarification of the kind of knowledge that
science teachers need to know in order to teach for applications in general. In doing so I
suggest the following two steps. First, I want to explore those Salish teachers who were
perceived with high personal relevance by their students. I mainly use the example of one
teacher (Judy) who was consistently rated high on the personal relevance scale of (CLES).
I also mention the examples of other Salish teachers. Second, I present an extension of the
model of science teacher knowledge developed in the second chapter in light of my
discussion of those Salish teachers who made science relevant according to their students
and in light of the several meanings of understanding and applications that I pointed out in
this section. These two steps will prepare my specific discussion on technology to be

presented in the next chapter.

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Personal relevance: A kind of application

The Salish Research Project explored the relationship between personal relevance
and teaChers' knowledge and beliefs. The Project also studied potential connection with
teachers' actions, students’ outcomes and program (teacher preparation) features, that is,
characteristics of the program of these science teachers that would affect the relevance
perceived by students and by the teachers themselves. A general finding of the Salish
Research was that few science teachers were rated by their students with high personal
relevance. In other words, students did not perceive the relevance of science out-of-school.
In addition, science teachers agree with their students, yet they tended to rate higher the
relevance of their classes (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1).

In this section, I use the case of Judy in order to set a preliminary scenario on the
demands that applications place on science teacher knowledge. As I just said, one
interesting set of teachers are those Salish teachers who were rated by their students with
high scores on the scale of personal relevance according to the Constructivist Learning
Environment Survey (CLES), that is, those students who perceived their science classes
highly relevant to their personal lives. In the context of Salish, we found that only a small
proportion of teachers (10% approximately) were seen as highly relevant by their students
(personal relevance scores > 25). Relevance according CLES is defined as the meaningful
uses of science out-of-school (Taylor, et al. 1995). Dave was not viewed as a very highly
relevant teacher by his students. He was in the middle of the scale like most of the Salish

teachers of the national sample (68 science teachers in this case).3

 

3When we wrote the final report of Salish (chapter 5 on linkages of Salish Final Report,
1997) in December 1996, we used a sample of 68 science teachers. Later more data was
added. Chapter 2 of the final report of Salish includes data from 116 new teachers. Data
from CLES now is avai;able from 241 classes taught (we have some data of the same
teachers for different years, i.e. multiyears teacher), 207 of these were science and 34
wggrg)mathematics. The CLES data was used with more or less 5,000 students (Salish,

107

The case of Judy

Judy is a new science teacher who consistently was rated with high personal
relevance scores by her students. She seems to help students to see the relevance of
science. In the following paragraphs I explore some general aspects of Judy's knowledge,
beliefs, and actions that would illuminate a future analysis on what teachers need to know
for making science relevant to students. I use the case of Judy as an example of those
teachers who were rated as having high personal relevance by their students. I sporadically
introduce references from other Salish teachers such as the case of Dave. 4

From the very beginning of the Salish research, Judy showed several interesting
characteristics that would explain why she was seen by her students with high relevance. In
the first year of the research, 1994, Salish researchers asked Judy how she knows when
she has learned something. She answered in the followings terms: "If I can explain it again,
you know, to somebody else or use it either to apply it or explain it to somebody
else...apply it...like if learned how to measure something I would be able to go into a room
that I was going to wallpaper and determine how much wall paper I needed....IfI learn I
solve a problem with it" (Interview, 6/28/1994). This conception of learning tied to
applications is also present in her concern for external relevance: "We do a lot of human
biology and there are limits to what you can do in the class because you do not have the
equipment like a lot of diagnostic equipment. But a lot of times it is just giving examples of
something that is happening to people like diseases" (ibid.) This was confirmed by video
tape observations (Tapes 101 # l, 2, and 3)

The concern of Judy is not only on the applications of science but also in teaching
science itself. In this first year of teaching, she seems to use the following pedagogical

structure: basic science ---> complex systems --->applications:

 

4Salish researcher divided CLES scores in two groups: high (more or equal than 25) and
low (less than 25). Given the high numbers of scores in the interval between 20 and 25
scores, I decided to include a medium scale between 20 and 25. Therefore, I interpret low
scores as those which are less than 20. High scores are > 25.

108

Because we really do try to build upon basics we start off with the cell. We do some
genetics, and then so many of the human systems we go through. You have to
understand what cells are and then we go into describing how cell are different by
getting into viruses and bacteria. And then I try to get into more of that later with
applying it to what some of the human system of specific diseases and problems and
plants. (Interview, 6/28/1994)

She also showed a critical position toward the knowledge that her students need in order to
learn about complex biological systems from the basics.
When I looked at the textbooks, so much is explained in terms of biochemistry
and I do not see how they could ever give the books a reference or read anything in
detail without having some of that background. Sol did take some extra days to go

through just the basics- here is a carbohydrate, here is a protein, a lipid...(Interview,
6/28/1994)

Judy holds a position which goes beyond the uses of this pedagogical chain (from
basic to complex systems). In answering the question of what learning in her class she
values she said:
I think it does not have to do with the topic of science. A lot of it is study habits,
being organized, and just thinking of defining a problem or thinking. It does not
often necessarily relate to science. Questioning, not believing everything. Looking
further into something. I think a lot of those things are far more important than
knowing how many hydrogen will be on the terminal end of a carbon, you know,
carbohydrate or something. A lot of facts, yet facts where they apply to keeping them
healthy and safe too. With the human biology, you know, them knowing what
diseases are out there, how to protect themselves, the importance of immunization
(Interview, 6/28/1994).

Therefore, knowledge is important; however, it has to have some personal implications on

students’ lives. This partially explains why Judy was consistently scored high by her

students on the personal relevance scale of CLES.

When we asked Judy directly what some of the things that she values about science
are, her answer was coherent with what we have already seen: "It would have to do with
health and technology. I'm really in biology. Things that it is done for, how science is
applied to better people's health and the technology. And again, my bias is toward human
biology. So I really think a lot in terms of medicine and disease..." In this quotation, there

is the emergence of the 352111152128! component which was also pointed out early in the

109

interview when Judy answered the question on what she decides to teach or not to teach in a
school year: "A lot of it I go by what is current and important. Biotechnology...They
[students] are going to have to make far more decisions with genetic testing and things like
that than we ever did." Therefore, biotechnology (e. g. genetic engineering, medicine) are
clear concerns of Judy as well as their connection with students’ health.

In her second year of teaching, Judy also shows high concern for relevance and
applications. The first question on the TPPI interview of the second year of teaching was
how she describes herself as a teacher: "I feel that the subject I teach is relevant and
important to all the students" (3/28/1995), which is the belief of almost all teachers, I think.
However, in contrast to several teachers Judy is trying to connect her subject(s) with
students' interests.

In answering how she decides what to teach or not to teach, this year she responded:

I look at what units have been taught in the past in the subject in high school...for
example in physical science we are doing a unit on alternative energy...There is
hardly anything in the textbook...so a lot of it I go by what is current in society
or...in a current area of research. In biology...we hit DNA really, really because of
the OJ. Simpson trial. So, I think any time that there is something outside the
classroom that might help interest the students and show the relevance of it, I think it
is important to seize that opportunity (ibid.)

This second year, Judy was also teaching physical science. Here her approach of
teaching science seems to differ in relation to her teaching of biology. In physics, she
seems to be more conservative. I mean, it is not clear to me the kind of relevance that she is
presenting because in her physical science classes she uses a quite different approach. It
would be clearer if we listen to what she says is important to her students: "In physical
science, they need to understand what measurement is about, things like density, and
math..." (Interview 3/28/1995). This is reinforced by an interview in her third year of
teaching. In answering how she decides to move from one concept to another, Judy
reports:

Say we do Newton's first law lab with cars and collisions and all that. After they
work a few problems and answer some questions, you see degrees of what they have

110

obtained from it...After we have covered some content, usually through lecturing or
reading, hands-on, there is some follow up...We look at a textbook and we draw out
some critical chapter [because] we do not cover an entire textbook in the year of
physical science (Interview 4/20/1996).
This seems to be a different approach than her biology class. Although class observations
in a unit on fluids (Tape 101-2) showed that she tried to connect as much as possible the
topic of forces, pressure and fluids with students everyday life experiences, observations in
biology showed that in this subject, her classes are more relevant regarding to student's
questions and discussions. Therefore, the subject matter seems to make a difference in the
relevance that Judy can or cannot accomplish with her students. It seems to me that biology
is more relevant to students’ everyday lives than traditional physics classes. However I
cannot make any final claim regarding the role of the specific subject-matter and personal
relevance. In addition, the Salish questionnaire used to measure personal relevance, CLES,
does not discriminate the specific subject-matter that was taught. Salish data on CLES only
provides a general average score of personal relevance without having information on the
role of the specific subject-matter (see chapter 1).

The third year of classes shows an evolution of Judy's pedagogical thinking. In
answering a question about her philosophy of teaching she seems to be more concerned
about all students: "You need to look at a body of knowledge within a subject area and
figure out what is going to be useful for the majority of the students" (Interview 4/20/1996).
This is coherent with the following answer on the question about what she decides to teach
or not teach:

For example, I spent more time on genetic engineering than I did on some of the older
like Hardy Wineberg rules of gene pools and all that. Because I think they [students]
need to know what scientists are really doing and what‘s going on in the field because
they are going to need to narrow down their career choices...I look a combination of
what some of the college-bound students will encounter in physics and chemistry that
they really need to be prepared for and what is relevant. There is a lot of content that
is relevant...(ibid.).

The case of Judy can illuminate part of the problem of teaching relevant science to

students lives. According to Salish reports (e.g. video analysis observations, information

111

of teachers' academic background, etc.), Judy has a solid subject-matter knowledge. She
holds a degree in biology. In addition, the subject-matter knowledge that she reports
during our research goes beyond traditional biology subject-matter knowledge. She is
helping students to see the relevance of science by moving her knowledge beyond the
science territory and traveling to areas less explored, such as biotechnology (testing using
DNA, genetic engineering, health, etc.)

The introduction of this kind of knowledge is nothing new. In a study of biology
teachers, Zesaguli (1994) reported these kinds of approaches in the teaching of science of
some of the teachers of her research sample (see Lock, 1996 for a survey on the
implications of teaching genetic engineering in middle school). The topics covered in these
classes were -along traditional topics of biology, such as DNA, cellular biology; etc., -the
following: " 'Drug and Alcohol Abuse', 'Genetic Engineering,‘ and 'Applied
Genetics,'...[and]... 'Biological society' and 'Biological Seminars' (1994, p.343).
Although Zesaguli did not report what the specific knowledge that teachers needed to know
for dealing with these generic topics is, she points out that: "The students were not enacting
the role of knowledge consumers. Instead they were provided with an opportunity in which
they made use of knowledge that they learned and also to reflect critically on their espoused
view..." (ibid.).

The topics reported by Zesaguli are illustrations to support that Judy's approach is
not new as one can see by reviewing the literature (Lock, 1996, Kille, 1985, Johnsen,
1985). What is new is the explicit clarification of the role of technological knowledge in
these approaches, that is, biotechnology, applied genetics, genetic engineering, etc. This
clarification is important given the potential relation between relevance and technological
knowledge.

Note that I am not arguing that technological knowledge is producing high personal
relevance in students' perception of science nor the inclusion of "current" issues (social

problems as part of the subject-matter). The problem is much more complex than that. I am

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pointing out Judy's epistemological and pedagogical positions toward knowledge. For
example, Judy's relevance seems to be supported by her experience in several mundane
works and her preparation on science and science education. She worked as a medical
technologist and then with health care, computers, florist, etc. as she explains:
I think having done several different types of work has given me a good background.
I have worked in business, in hospitals, with computers. I have a real varied
background. In fact, towards the end of the year, one student told me he did not
really believe that I had every job that I described. When we talked about plants, I
talked about working in a florist shop and he goes, no, you did not work in a florist
shop. You told us you worked in a glass factory once and you told us you worked

with computers once. How many things have you done? But I think it helps, because
you are always fishing for any example or an illustration... (Interview, 6/28/1994)

In addition, she reports a clear concern on biotechnology (e.g. genetic engineering). This is
partially supported by external conditions such as the connection between science and
technology within professional communities: "Biotechnology is an interesting case in point
because the boundaries between science and technology appear particularly indistinct in this
field" (Faulkner 1994, p.439).

In the case of Judy, one could speculate that external situations provided conditions
for meaningful discussions such as the OJ. Simpson trial in 1994 and 1995 - the first two
years of Judy's teaching. This trial could introduce an authentic context for discussions on
DNA testing, evidence, instrumentation, technology, etc. The creation of such contexts is a
critical problem in education (Lave & Wenger, 1991). David Susuki, for example, sees the
relevance of science education from this perspective, that is, the creation of meaningful
contexts according to students' lives:

Science education in high school should be designed around sex and human
biology...By starting their instruction with human sexuality and reproduction,
Eea2c1h3eis will be able to go on to practically every other subject in science" (1989,

One can speculate that Judy is approaching problems that keep the interest of

students. Although she did not report human sexuality as part of the content, in her human

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biology classes, and in general in all her classes that we had access to, she found ways to
help students to see the relevance of science. What is interesting of the case of Judy, for my
argument, is that Judy's knowledge seems to differ from the model that I presented in the
last chapter because of the emergence of other kinds of knowledge such as mundane
experiences and technological knowledge. How does it differ? This is a matter of the

following section.

Demands of science teacher knowledge in the context of applications
I assume that science teacher knowledge can be represented by the minimal model I

suggested in the second chapter, that is, subject-matter knowledge, (SK), pedagogical
content knowledge (PCK), and knowledge about knowledge (KK). Remember that in this
model, subject-matter knowledge has two generic components: substantive (SKs) and
procedural (SKp). The same holds for pedagogical content knowledge, yet there is not a
one-to-one relation between SKs and PCKs nor between SKp and PCKp (See Table 4
Chapter 3 for a summary). The relationship between SK and PCK depends on the kind of
teaching (orientation). Now I study the demands of knowledge that applications (in general)
place on science teacher knowledge. In doing so, I present a first extension of my original
model. I begin with an illustration of the three generic components of my model in light of
Judy's case. For the purposes of this illustration, I do not get into details of the original

model (for details see chapter 3). Rather, I prefer to illustrate the extension of the model.

Subject-matter knowledge. Subject-matter knowledge includes what Judy calls the basic,
that is, scientific knowledge (SK) of natural phenomena (e.g., basic biology: cell, viruses,
bacteria; basic biochemistry: carbohydrate, protein, lipid; basic physics: density, Newton's
laws; basic mathematics: arithmetic, measurement, graphics, etc.). I conceptualized science
subject-matter knowledge as a part of the transformation from expert scientific knowledge to

science school knowledge. SK includes theories, laws of nature, theoretical tools,

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substantive and procedural knowledge. At this level the goal of SK is understanding

(describing, explaining, predicting). As I said, Judy calls this knowledge "basic".
Interviewer: In general, what science concepts do you believe are most important for
your students?
Judy: It depends on the subject...In biology they get an idea of some basic bio-
chemistry, metabolic process, genetics, DNA. In physical science the big things we
hit usually are basics...some main things like math. There might be two or three in
each unit that we hit heavy like the unit on forces, Newton's first and second law.
We have just done simple machines. We just want them to get an idea of efficiency

and work and what might be some of the goals of people designing machines...
(3/20/1996)

This comment has two important parts. The first part stresses the basic nature of SK
(particularly substantive SK). The second goes beyond the knowledge of natural
phenomena. Here, Judy introduces the goals of efiiciency, design, and transformation.
During the three years of Salish data available from Judy's teaching one sees that she
presented several examples of this kind of goal in the context of biology, particularly
biotechnology (including genetic engineering). I will call this knowledge technological
knowledge (TK).

In the case of Judy, TK mainly seems to refer to knowledge of biotechnology.
There are several definitions of biotechnology. For example, R. Kille suggests that
biotechnology is the

...application of biological organism, systems and processes to manufacturing and
service industries. In particular it is the expansion of use of microbial and other cell,
together with the demands these new manufacturing processes will place upon close
relation and understanding between biologists, chemists and engineers (1985, p.67)
Although this definition tends to connect biotechnology with industry more than what one
can (should) do in general education, there is also a clarification on the role of biology,
chemistry and engineering. These areas are unconnected and mainly missed in traditional

science teachers subject-matter knowledge.

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The potential use of technological knowledge also appeared in some of Dave's
classes, particularly during the task of designing a bridge. This task requires knowledge of
materials for the construction of a bridge, that is, proprieties of materials (natural or
artificial). It also requires knowledge about stability of structures (e.g., triangles for
forming bridges), fatigue of materials, and knowledge of how to construct a structure
(procedural technological knowledge). Therefore, technological knowledge also comes in
two forms: substantive and procedural. As we will see in a later chapter, procedural
knowledge in technology is much more complex than in science. This explains the
difficulties of using technology in teaching science. Moreover, the very existence of
technological knowledge is, by it own right, problematic and it is a matter of discussion of a
specific chapter of this dissertation. For now, it is enough to illustrate the general
characteristics of this knowledge rather than doing a detailed epistemological surgery of

technological knowledge.

Pedagogical Content Knowledge.

There is a qualitative difference between Dave's knowledge and Judy's. Judy has
integrated several mundane experiences and has also developed a level of awareness about
the role of technology in society (e.g. genetic engineering). Dave, in contrast, intends to
present the relevance of science anchored in traditional scientific knowledge: "...the next
unit is motion, forces and energy...and this is an excellent one for real-world applications.
How fast can you run? How much power can you generate? (Interview, 4/22/97). In
contrast, Judy was always aware of the potential uses of important problems from the
perspective of students and the uses of areas of applied biology (e.g. genetic engineering).
Therefore, one can conclude that Judy has developed pedagogical content knowledge which
is richer than Dave's in the context of applications, mainly application types 3, 4 and to

some extent 5 (see Table 4.3).

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In relation to Dave, Judy has integrated (rather than added) her knowledge using
applications in more efficient ways. This would be related to the construction of her
pedagogical content knowledge which went beyond canonical knowledge. Although both
Dave and Judy were concerned with including applications as part of their science teaching,
the very notion of applications differs in both cases. This implies that the notion of
relevance differs, too. In addition, and more important for my argument, Dave's students
did not perceive the relevance of science in the same way than Judy's. Although I can not
present any final claim regarding the reasons of that, I suggest some conjectures. One
potential reason would be that Dave's subject-matter knowledge is connected to traditional
science (describing, explaining, predicting in the context of applications type 1 of Table 3).
Judy, in contrast, has a more integrated subject-matter knowledge which allows her to
include several mundane experiences in her pedagogical content knowledge. What is
important to note is that the kind of pedagogical content knowledge that Judy holds is quite
different than Dave's mainly in the case of applications.

The kind of pedagogical content knowledge that applications of knowledge requires
depends on the conception of the application that one is talking about. Science teachers and
science education researchers have studied and developed applications of science in the
sense of describing, explaining, and predicting natural phenomena (applications type 1
according to Table 4.3). For this kind of application, there is a body of knowledge that
suggests analogies, representations, and examples that teachers use (or should use) in order
to teach science (e.g., all of the research on misconceptions, theories such as diSessa's
work). A movement from understanding (internal relevance) to external relevance, that is,
applications to a) real-world problems (type 3), b) personal relevance (type 4) and c) design
of artifacts (type 5) will change important aspects of teachers' knowledge in general and
pedagogical content knowledge as well. Needless to say, these applications produce or
affect what is traditionally considered subject-matter knowledge. The case of Judy

illustrates how her subject-matter knowledge also includes knowledge of applied science

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and biotechnology which at the end allowed her, I suspect, to develop a different
pedagogical content knowledge than Dave's.

From a theoretical perspective it is important to know whether or not the construct
pedagogical content knowledge changes with the introduction of applications. It is obvious
that it changes, but how does it change? What is the kind of knowledge that allows teachers
to construct pedagogical content knowledge for applications types 3, 4 and 5? We know,
for example, that applications are already part of pedagogical knowledge of science teachers.
Applications have been means and ends. That is, applications have been essential for
meaningful uses of science and also are means for presenting the importance of science.
What is new and needed is the explicit clarification of the knowledge for applications and
mainly applications which go beyond the discipline (types 3, 4, 5). In fact, I argue that
knowledge for applications (e.g., knowledge for solving real-world problems or
technological knowledge) produces changes in our conception of pedagogical content
knowledge.

Researchers have reported that there is a relation between pedagogical content
knowledge and the kinds of problems that science teachers are incorporating in their classes
(Magnusson, et al. 1994). Moreover, there is a relation between teachers' pedagogical
content knowledge and students' content knowledge (Magnusson, 1992). However, the
changes that real-world problems, personal relevance goals, and mainly the inclusion of
technology introduces in pedagogical content knowledge have not been explored.

If one buys Shulman's notion of pedagogical content knowledge (analogies,
representations, illustrations), substantive pedagogical content knowledge for this kind of
teaching is also related to canonical representations which include, I suggest, "... the
notations for algebra and calculus, the Cartesian coordinate system with its numerous
applications, various kinds of diagramrrring, such as free body diagram in physics, and so
on" (Perkins and Unfer, 1994, p.9). In chapter 3, I discussed the nature of pedagogical

content knowledge in the context of my framework and its relation with the literature. In this

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context, representations, analogies, examples, etc. are an important part of pedagogical
content knowledge. However, the connection of this kind of pedagogical content
knowledge in the context of applications beyond the discipline, such as to everyday life, is
problematic.

If one accepts Judy's case as an example, teachers would need to have more
mundane experiences and more opportunities to use science in meaningful ways. Although
Judy, for example, did not work from the perspective of students’ everyday lives
problems, she did set a meaningful context for discussions. In this context, students
perceived the relevance that Judy was presenting, One would say that she invited her
students to connect their everyday lives with canonical knowledge and applied experiences.
She did that by constructing a context for the discussion. This is clearer if one reads what

she answered regarding a question on how she assesses learning in her class:

You go by the questions...assessing their [students'] discussions, how well they can
discuss, what they do when you throw out a question, what kind of response you
get. You can show them a real current video or something that gets into an
application or the idea or something. I showed them a video of some genetic
engineering and only part of the video and then had them write their opinion
(6/28/1994).

Note that this quotation reflects procedural pedagogical knowledge. In this case, Judy's
procedural pedagogical content knowledge which together with her substantive knowledge
allowed her to construct meaningful scenarios for her students.

In the case of Judy, one sees that her pedagogical content knowledge seems to be
integrated in light of both: canonical knowledge and mundane experiences. From a
canonical point of view, she reflects a common pattern of the Salish Science teachers that
were perceived relevant, that is, these teachers framed what is relevant for students. The
way in which such a process takes place is usually by word problems or setting context for

discussions, as in the above example. Even in the case of laboratory work, word

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problems, that is, verbal presentations of difficulties, were the core of the instruction.
Within this mix of canonical versions of word problems and mundane experiences Judy
seems to have called the attention of her students to the use of science in everyday life.

Taking into account the above discussion one can see that pedagogical content
knowledge for teaching science tends to be connected to the capacity of teachers to present
word problems rather than world problems, particularly real-world problems. There are,
perhaps, differences in the kind of knowledge that both approaches require. Word
problems tend to have their roots in disciplinary traditions. Real-world problems are elusive
problems that depend on the interest of individuals. Moreover, the knowledge that teachers
need to know for helping students to face real-world problems will depend on the kind of
real-world interest that students have. Despite these limitations, one can explore a
distinction between word problems and real-world problems in the construction of
pedagogical content knowledge.

My general position is that in constructing pedagogical content knowledge for real-
world problems, teachers need to be aware of the advantages and limitations of using
canonical knowledge to solve ill-structured problems. Teachers need to learn how to
approach the complexities of real-world events. That is, the question is how to help
students to solve problems beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries. For example,
teachers will need to be ready to accept students' problems as an important part of their
teaching.

Using the Salish Research as a general referent, I can say that science teachers seem
to assume that problems already exist and they [the problems] are looking for "solvers,"
"[but] with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the process by
which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, the means which may be
chosen. In real-world practice, problems do not present themselves to practitioners. as
given". (Schon, 1983, p. 40). Therefore, problems, if they are so, should be invented and

delimited by their creators. Teachers need to know how to help students to invent, frame,

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and face their own problems. This is not the case of Dave and only appears sporadically in
Judy's classes. One of the reasons, I argue, is that school science is framed in terms of
word problems rather than real-world problems. A second problem, I argue, is that we still
do not know what kind of science people need to know in everyday life.

The case of Dave and Judy reflect what seems to be a common practice in teaching
science: solving word problems. Applications of science from this perspective tend to be
conversations about what is relevant from the perspective of disciplines. Yet, there are
cases of teaching science in which students moves from teachers' explanations to their own
explanations. Even here, the notion of application is still in the sense of word problems or
disciplinary problems. However, if one wants to move to more relevant science teaching,
such as meaningful uses of science in everyday life, I think we need to re-examine the
knowledge behind these real-world applications (types 3,4,5). My suggestion is that
technological knowledge can play a rrriddle ground role, that is, a conceptual bridge between
canonical knowledge and real-world applications.

When one thinks of technological knowledge as a means for doing real-world
applications, the very meaning of science teacher knowledge, in general, and pedagogical
content knowledge, in particular, should be analyzed further. One way of doing that is by
using research on students conceptions of technological tasks. For example, I showed in
the last section that Leona Schauble and her colleagues have studied how children approach
engineering tasks in relation to scientific tasks. Based on this kind of research and other
such research on engineering design (e. g., Bucciarelli, 1994) or epistemology of
engineering (e. g., Vicenti, 1990), one can show how the introduction of technological tasks
would require the construction of a different pedagogical content knowledge, that is,
different representations, different analogies and quite different subject-matter. The task is
to connect that with teaching science. This moves my discussion to the last component of
the extension of the model of science teacher knowledge, that is, knowledge about

knowledge.

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Knowledge about knowledge (KK).

Traditional science teacher knowledge has had for referent scientific knowledge in
contrast to other kinds of knowledge (e.g., practical knowledge). In relation to the model
presented in the second chapter, the big difference here is the introduction of more mundane
knowledges. For more mundane knowledges, I refer to a) the knowledge needed to solve
real-world problems as opposed to "academic" problems, b) the knowledge related to
relevance of science in everyday life, and c) the knowledge needed to deal with
technological tasks (e.g., the design of artifacts). These three generic "applications" of
science also carry different epistemologies, methodologies, and ontologies. In other words,
applications of science beyond scientific knowledge requires a re-examination of new
epistemological territories, methodological rules and ontological worlds.

My concern is with technological knowledge. Although the other applications are
important, I tend to think that technology can provide conditions to use science to solve real-
world problems, to increase the relevance of science in everyday life and to use science in
specific and concrete conditions (e.g., by designing artifacts). The introduction of
technological knowledge will require a reconceptualization of the nature of science which
takes into account the nature of technology. From an epistemological point of view, I
expect important differences given the positions that science and technology have toward the
world. However, from a methodological point of view, it is possible that both nature of
science and nature of technology will be similar. Being aware of the similarities and
differences between science and technology, and its potential use for teaching science, is
part of this extension of my model of science teacher knowledge, particularly its component
KK.

This component of science teacher knowledge, KK (knowledge about knowledge),
is intrinsically related to our beliefs of what counts for knowledge, that is, the criteria of

validation of knowledge that teachers translate to schools. For example, science education

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has stressed a conception of knowledge based on universality :"Science also assumes that
the universe, as its name implies- a vast single system in which the basic rules are
everywhere the same" (AAAS, 1990, p.2). The basic rules of the universe are a basic
referent of science education. More examples of this perspective can be found in the
previous chapter, chapter 3, in which I studied some assumption of Project 2061 regarding
the knowledge-of-knowledge component (see also Cajas, 1995a). However, other goals of
science education, for example, everyday life applications of science regarding students'
interest, move the attention to more local and mundane phenomena. Technological
knowledge, for example, tends to be more local rather than universal. Therefore,
knowledge about practical knowledge would differ from knowledge about universal
knowledge. Being aware of this distinction is partially what I mean by this component of

science teacher knowledge.

Extension of a theoretical model for science teacher knowledge

I have discussed some implications that the introduction of applications would
produce on science teacher knowledge. I began with a clarification of the multiple meanings
of the terms understanding and applications that I used in the first three chapters. After that,
I explored some characteristics of a Salish teacher whose students perceived science relevant
to their lives. This teacher, Judy, is representative of a group of Salish teachers who were
perceived highly relevant according to their students' rate on the Constructivists Learning
Environment Survey (CLES). Using the case study of Judy, I explored her knowledge,
beliefs and actions using the tools of my preliminary model of science teacher knowledge. I
reported some changes on the connotation of some elements of my original science teacher
knowledge model which allowed me to illustrate a potential extension of my first model.

The following figure illustrates such changes:

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ST

 

 

SKV\

TK‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

\
/

MK‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 4.2 An extension of the science teacher model in which SK is the traditional
subject-matter knowledge, TK is technological knowledge and MK represents other
mundane knowledge.

In principle, subject-matter knowledge in the context of applications goes beyond
traditional specific disciplines. Think of the case of Judy in her biology class. When she
teaches biology, there is an integration of canonical and mundane knowledge (SK and MK
according to Figure 4.2). Yes, Judy teaches biology; however, the relevance of biology is
not limited to biology itself (internal relevance). Biology is one part of her knowledge.
There is evidence that she consistently includes important applications of biology regarding
students' lives (health, food production and consumption, etc.). In addition, biotechnology
plays an important role of her teaching (e.g., genetic engineering). Therefore, the case of
Judy illustrates one option in which students saw science relevant to their lives.

Subject-matter knowledge in the case of Judy is a mix of SK (defined in the last
chapter) with TK (technological knowledge) with other mundane knowledge MK
(knowledge of how to use biology in a florist shop). Therefore, subject-matter knowledge,

SK, can be represented by <SK, TK, MK> as it is illustrated in Figure 2.

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Pedagogical content knowledge for applications seems to includes a new set of
demands. The case of Judy also helps to illuminate potential scenarios. One important
factor is the creation of contexts in which students can use science in meaningful ways. In
an earlier chapter I pointed out that research in science education has developed knowledge
on how students learn. This knowledge would be used to develop both substantive and
procedural pedagogical content knowledge. The case of misconceptions (naive conceptions)
of science was an important part of that. The importance of this research should be analyzed
further in light of the relevance of this knowledge to develop pedagogical content knowledge
for applications to: a) real world problems, b) everyday life or c) design of artifacts. From
the case of Judy, and also from my general discussion, one can expect that pedagogical
content knowledge for applications (types 3, 4 and 5) differs from PCK from understanding
(e.g., types 1 or 2). Therefore, the demands of knowledge that applications introduce in
science teacher knowledge should be reconsidered.

Knowledge about knowledge in the context of my framework should open
possibilities for other kinds of epistemologies, methodologies and ontologies that can help
us to teach science in meaningful ways. As I have pointed out, technological knowledge
has some potentialities for being used in teaching science because it Can provide
opportunities to a) work with real-world problems, b) increase the relevance of science, and
c) connect science with society as a whole. Of course, science teacher knowledge would
need to change. In order to describe and explain these changes I propose to study in depth
the role of technology in science education.

Technology has been introduced as part of the leading science education reform
proposals, Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards. However, its role in
teaching science is still unclear. One of the first reasons is that the very notion of
technology advanced in Project 2061 and the National Standards needs to be unpacked. In
fact, the relationship between scientific and technological knowledge in the context of

general education needs to be clarified. This is one goal of this dissertation. A second

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reason for unpacking this relationship is the complexity of the social scenario, particularly
the social status of technology as subject matter (Lewis, 1993). Both problems, the
meaning of the term technology in the context of science education reforms and the
potentiality of being used as a bridge between understanding and applications in teaching
science are the core of this dissertation.

In the following chapter, I approach the first of these problems, that is, I clarify the
meaning of the term technology and technology education. I re-study the notion of teaching
science for applications in light of the potential use of technological knowledge. I also
clarify the very notion of technological knowledge and how it is (or would be) related to
scientific knowledge in the context of teaching science in K-12 education. The goal of this
discussion is to explore the role that technology would play in connecting understanding
with applications in the sense of connecting internal with external relevance in teaching
science. I am particularly interested in what knowledge science teachers need to know in

order to connect both domains of teaching science, understanding and applications.

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CHAPTER 5

A FRAMEWORK FOR TECHNOLOGY:
INTRODUCING TECHNOLOGY INTO THE SCIENCE CURRICULUM

During the first four chapters, I have insinuated that technology should have a place
in general education. I have proposed that technological knowledge can and should be part
of science teacher knowledge. One of the reasons for that is the potential that technology
has to provide meaningful contexts for teaching and learning science. Particularly,
technology can be seen as a domain of practical applications of science. Therefore,
technology would reduce the tension between understanding and applications that I have
pointed out.

One of the first problems in suggesting technology as a bridge between
understanding and applications is the general conception of technology in society at large
and academic in circles. In fact, the term technology is mainly used for referring to artifacts,
computers for example. This connotation limits the epistemological richness that
technology, as a way of thinking, would provide to teaching science. Consequently, the
first step in suggesting technology as part of the science curriculum is to clarify the concept
of technology and its connection with science. In this chapter, I offer a clarification of the
term technology in light of current and relevant work in philosophy of technology.

A second problem in suggesting the use of technological knowledge for teaching
science for application and understanding is its connection, or potential connection, with
traditional science curriculum. Therefore, a second step is to identify some of the
technological knowledge, i.e., the specific technological theories, that have potential for
being used in school curriculum. In this chapter, I explore this possibility. In doing so, I
first develop a framework for technology based on a general discussion of the meanings of
the term technology. I offer a framework for analyzing technology as artifact, knowledge

and social practice. This framework provides analytical tools for studying different

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conceptions of technology and their implications in science education. I illustrate my

argument using examples from the topic of energy.

The term technology.

We all seem to agree that we live in an era dominated by technology. However, there
is least agreement on the meaning of the term technology. As the Benchmarks for Science
Literacy of Project 2061 acknowledges: "Technology is an overworked term. It once
meant knowing how to do things -the practical arts or the study of the practical arts. But it
has also come to mean innovations such as pencils, televisions...or manufacturing..."
(AAAS, 1993, p.43). In fact, the term technology is used with several meanings. One of
the most common meanings of the term is related to the idea of artifact, that is, the object
(usually seen as material) which can perform an activity. Within educational circles when
one talks about technology, people immediately think of computers and their applications in
classrooms. Moreover, given the revolution of the electronic communication era people do
not see problems in identifying technology with CD-ROM, Internet, etc. This extentionalist
conception of technology is also found in society at large. Common citizens tend to think
that the television, car, highway, factory, or the atomic bomb are technologies. To some
extent, this is one meaning of the term technology. However, it is necessary to clarify what
people mean when they say that the computer or the television, for example, are
technologies. And more important, it is necessary to clarify why one should care about this

meaning of the term technology.

Technology as artifact

From a general perspective there are, at least, two ways for identifying technology
with artifacts. In either way, what is interesting is the object, that is, the artifact that can
solve a problem or perform an activity. The first identification comes from the perspective

' of the general public, the common user of the artifact (technology). From this perspective,

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the internal way in which a given artifact (technology) works does not seem to be
important. Think of the computer. When one person is working on a computer, what
usually matters is the things that the computer can or cannot do. We can call this perspective
a kind of "black box" model perspective. Black-box models do not take into account
internal mechanisms. They stress inputs and to a greater degree outputs.

The lack of interest in the internal mechanism of the artifact is justified for practical
reasons. One does not need to know how a car works (internal mechanism of the car) in
order to drive it. One needs general ideas about some inputs (gasoline, starting, skills for
driving, etc.). The picture is quite different when one is thinking of the design (art) of the
artifact (e.g., the car) or about the preparation of technologists (education of designer and
constructors of cars). In this context, technology as artifact has an important place.
Traditional engineering education has stressed the study of artifacts as part of the
preparation of their students. For example, the mechanical dissection of a structure
(examples: a bridge, an engine of internal combustion, etc.) is a pedagogical strategy for
teaching the function of each part of the artifact (the bridge or the engine). This is a widely
used pedagogical technique for teaching engineering. In this case, it is assumed that the
study of the artifact will provide knowledge of the form in which the artifact works. This is
also a first attempt to open the black-box model of technology as artifact.

Focusing on the artifact is a methodological strategy for understanding technology.
The concept of artifact that I use has a general philosophical base on the works of Mario
Bunge to whom artifacts are "...anytlring optional made or done with the help of learned
knowledge utilizable by others" (1985, p.222). The ontological status of artifacts depends
of the kind of creation. They could be material or conceptual. The most common meaning
of the term artifact is its material connotation such as the computer (its monitor, mouse,
keyboard, i.e., the hardware). However, the computer is not a computer without some
conceptual features (e.g., the software that I'm using: Microsoft Word ). In addition, the

concept of artifact that I endorse (Bunge, 1985) includes social artifacts (artifacts states), for

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example, the intemet (that is, a network of computers users made by intentional human
actions or a plan for increasing the level of literacy of a given country).

The ontology of artifact raises important questions. What I present is a distinction
between artificial and natural objects. This is a distinction between the mouse that I am
using to control the computer and my hand. The former is the product of an intentional
action, a design which included a blueprint, specifications, negotiations (T urckle, & Paper,
1990; Buciarelli, 1994). The latter, my hand, is not the outcome of a specific intentional
human action nor a blueprint. The separation should not be seen in the sense that artifact are
part of an unnatural world (either Platonic, magic, or Popperian World 3). What I want to
point out is that both, the computer and my hand have different ontological histories. Such
history, the connection between nature and artifice, is the very history of technology which
dramatically changed with the creation of new products (e. g., organic products developed
by chemists), control of energy (invention of the steam engine, electrical motor), invention

of new materials ( e.g., steel) and control of time (popularization of mechanical clocks).l

 

'I-Iistorians identify the 17th century as the beginning of the scientific revolution and later
(18th and 19th) the industrial revolution. The connection between both revolutions is
complex. For example, according to D. Cardwell, "Indisputably, in popular opinion and in
economic fact, the single most important technological agent over the greater part of the
nineteenth century was the ever-triumphant steam engine" (1995, p.306). The creation and
improvement of the steam engine is related to the names of Joule, Carnot, Clausius, etc.
(17th century). However, a new historical report shows that Papin already had a proposal
of a steam engine 100 years earlier. Philip Valenti recently deve10ped a case study of
sabotage by the Britsh Royal Society which delayed the steam power 100 years (Valenti,
1997). At any rate, the steam engine is the symbol of the industrial revolution. However,
it is hard to deny the importance of other technological advances such as the mechanical
clock and mainly its popularization which has had an incredible impact on society, perhaps
deeper than the steam engine. Just think of the omnipresence of the clock in our life and
how society became structured in relation to time. However, the steam engine and the
clock are not alone. I am sure that a chemist would develop an argument to support that the
industrial production of sulfuric acid was the most important technological agent for the
scientific and industrial revolution. Therefore, there are no simple factors to explain the
industrial revolution.

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Technology as knowledge

Opening the black-box model of technology, that is, an artifact that perform
activities, leads us to see a second meaning: Technology as knowledge. The explanation of
how a given artifact actually works requires a specific knowledge. Moreover, the design of
the technological artifacts supposes the existence of a specific knowledge. Design, in the
framework that I use, is a previous representation of a thing or process. Particularly,
technological design is a representation of an artifact with the help of scientific knowledge
(Bunge, 1985). The nature of this knowledge has been a matter of long debate and is
related to the way in which people have seen the connection between science and
technology. The range of interpretations varies from one that indicates there is no such
thing called technological knowledge to another extreme position, which indicates that there
is a body of knowledge independent from science, technological knowledge.

Early conceptions on the relationship between science and technology tended to see
a hierarchical relationship between science and technology in which technology was
subordinated to science (see Barnes, 1982 for an account). Another saw a cause-effect
relationship between science and technology. From this perspective, technology is an
outcome of science. These linear models also made a clear distinction between science and
technology. Science provides the knowledge and technology the artifact. The model,
which seems to have positivistic roots, is still used. Think of traditional curriculum in
technological fields (e.g., engineering, medicine). The way in which future technologists
(e.g., engineers or medical doctors) are generally prepared is the following. Students first
take science classes with the assumption that such classes can be applied to specific
technological problems (e. g., engineering problems, medical problems). The justification
of taking science classes (physics, for example, in the case of engineers or physiology in the

case of medicine), is that these classes are the bases of their future professional work (this

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justification is used within engineering colleges, but it also appears in medical schools and
several professional careers).

The idea that scientific knowledge is the basic knowledge and its applications are
what make the technology has been challenged. Studies of how technologists actually work
have shown that technologists (e. g., engineers) do not go to the real world with their
general scientific theories and solve practical problems by applying them (Buciarelli, 1988,
1994; Simon, 1969; Schon, 1983, 1987). Donald Schon (1983), for example, has shown
that in fact technologists, "practitioners," develop contingent theories at the level of their
actions. Any experienced technologist knows that the relationship between science and
her/his own work is more complex than a simple application of basic science. And several
technologists complain about the lack of applications they see between their basic science
courses and their professional career as H. Simon recognizes: "Engineering schools have
become schools of physics and mathematics; medical schools have become schools of
biological science" (1977, p.56)

[One more example comes from teaching. There was/is the assumption that you can
teach how to teach by teaching general theories of learning . There are programs in which
future teachers learn general theories of learning (e.g., Ausubel's theory) with the purposes
of learning how to teach. The assumption is that one can learn basic science (psychology)
and then apply that to specific conditions (practice of teaching). However, nobody uses
such general theories of learning in specific classrooms situations, not even the same
teachers that are teaching such general laws (Edward L. Smith, personal communication,
July 1997). The contexts of real classrooms are too complex for being captured for such
theories (Schon, 1987). These general theories are -usually, if not always- unpractical.
The nature of the connection between these general theories of learning and the practical
needs of teaching is in the core of what I call technological knowledge (Cajas, 1993a,
1993b)].

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In challenging the linear model of technology as a simple application of science.
Edwin Layton advanced an influential discussion in which he suggested the existence of
specific technological knowledge. Such knowledge is quite independent of science, yet
somewhat related to it. Working from a historical perspective, Layton showed that the
relationship between science and technology is more complex than the linear model, that is,
the cause-effect model. What Layton suggested is a kind of two-way model in which there
is the emergence of a specific technological knowledge as part of the practice: "We might
restate the matter by noting that laws of science refer to nature and the rules of technology
refer to human artifice" (Layton, 1974, p.40). The human artifice seems to be the referents
of technological knowledge. Unfortunately, E. Layton did not present in his paper examples
of what he called "rules of technology", that is, technological knowledge. However, the
importance of Layton's paper is that it opened a fruitful discussion on the very existence of
technological knowledge. I do not discuss here the debate (see, for example, Technology
and Culture Vol. 29, No.1). What is important for this general introduction is the
possibility of having a meaning of technology that is related to knowledge.

The philosopher Mario Bunge provided a specific definition of technology in line
with Layton's conception. According to Bunge: "A body of knowledge is a technology if
and only if: (i) it is compatible with science and controllable by the scientific methods, and;
(ii) it can be employed to control, transform or create things or processes, natural or social,
to some practical and deemed to be valuable" (1976, p. 154). The first criterion assumes a
relationship between science and technology. Bunge asks for compatibility with science.
From this perspective the knowledge which was used in designing and producing the chair
in which I am sitting now would be technological only if it is coherent with science. This
definition is useful in the sense that it makes a distinction between technique and
technology. A carpenter, for example, could create this chair without taking into account
any scientific canonical knowledge. In this context, the knowledge that the carpenter has,

technique, only satisfies the second of Bunge's criteria, that is, it is being used to create a

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thing (chair). Artisans and technicians would produce technological artifacts only if they
use canonical scientific knowledge in the design or construction of the artifacts. This is a
problematic distinction because, in principle, it will depend on one's conception of science.
If one thinks that science is a body of knowledge which is expressed in the form of
canonical theories, e.g., Newton's laws, a carpenter hardly uses this canonical knowledge
and consequently she/he does not produce technological artifacts. However, do we know,
for example, what is the kind of geometrical knowledge that carpenters use in the design of
chairs? I think that we do not even know what the role of creativity is in the work of
carpenters in designing chairs. For some people, creativity is the core of science.
Consequently, Bunge's definition is an alternative, but one has to be aware of its
limitations.

The basic problem in identifying technology with knowledge is the clarification of
the knowledge needed for the design or the solution of practical problems (e.g., design of
an artifact). It is difficult to be specific with the knowledge because it is not so universal.
There is a huge amount of tacit knowledge in the process, too (Polyani, 1958, Sorensen, &
Levold, 1992). Although there are people who defend the idea that it is possible to have a
universal science of design, the challenges of such a proposal are enormous. In his
exquisite book, the Sciences of the Artificial, Herbert Simon defends the idea that this
universal method is not only possible, but it is also desirable. Despite that, the existence of
this kind of universal knowledge has been challenged empirically and theoretically.
Regarding this point Bunge says: "Given the large variety of design problems, it is doubtful
that a unified science of design, capable of tackling any design problem -as imagined by
Simon (1977) could ever be built..." (1985, p.228).

Bunge's critique is not alone. Layton, Barnes, and others have suggested the
limitations that a potential universal method of design would have. These limitations seem
to be related to the nature of the "technological knowledge." One of the problems of such

critiques is that they tend to leave the reader with the idea that although there is something

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called technological knowledge, its nature is unknown. It seems to me that the literature
available does not help to clarify what technological knowledge is. Yet, one can go to the
engineering building and check out the disciplinary autonomy of engineering by taking a
look at the specific engineering courses, labs, journals or hand-books. In general, one will
find that technological disciplines have their own departments. However, the nature of the
knowledge that these departments are teaching is another problem.

In order to clarify one meaning of the term technological knowledge, I invite the
reader to take a short epistemological trip. I suggest using the example of engineering, a
special kind of technology. The reason for that is double. First, I have more familiarity
with this epistemological tenitory. Having been trained as an engineer and having worked
with them for several years, this territory is more familiar to me than other technologies
(e.g., medicine). I have also spent time thinking about the role of technology in education
(Cajas, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1997a, 1997b). And second, the epistemology of
engineering is a pioneer area of research within the emergent philosophy of technology
(Bunge, 1985; Herrera, 1989, 1996; Vicenti, 1990).

The trip I propose requires some clarification. I will begin with a typology of
technological knowledge given a priori (a map). I draw the map from two kinds of works:
research on the knowledge needed for industrial innovations (Faulkner, 1994) and
epistemology of engineering (Vicenti, 1991). Although both sources have empirical
evidence, I use them as preliminary analytical tools in the sense of the Deweynian
connection between map and tenitory, that is, a tool to order experiences (1902, pp. 197-
200). Such typology is a preliminary picture (map) of what I call technological knowledge.
As in the case of my study on science teacher knowledge, the clarification of what counts as
knowledge is not only a problem of definition (just drawing a map). There should be a

relation between knowledge (model) and reality (practice).2

 

2Of course I am not building a descriptive model of technological knowledge. I am not
analyzing any engineer’s actions. At this level I present a map of the epistemological
territory of engineering informed by the literature. However, my analysis is enriched for
my expenence.

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Drawing on the demands of knowledge required by industrial innovations Wendy
Faulkner has proposed five types of knowledge regarding: 1) the natural world, 2) design
practice, 3) experimental R&D, 4) the final product, and 5) knowledge itself (1994, p.449).
This is related to the epistemological work developed by Walter Vicenti who, drawing on
cases of study of aeronautical engineering between 1900 and 1950 suggests the following
characterization: 1)fundamental design concepts; 2) criteria and specification, 3) theoretical
tools, 4) quantitative data, 5) practical considerations, 6) design of instruments (1991,
p.208). Both typologies overlap. However, one should be aware that they come from
different kind of research. Given my interest on the clarification of the meaning of
technological knowledge, rather than an extensive report on such typologies, I illustrate my
point using few elements of both taxonomies. I particularly use Faulkner's types of the
natural world and design practice knowledge which are related to the theoretical tools and
fundamental design concepts of Walter Vicenti.

What is considered knowledge of the natural world includes, according to Faulkner,
scientific and engineering theories, "laws" of nature, and proprieties of materials (natural
and artificial). [This is something that we already explored with the notion of expert
scientific knowledge ESK and substantive scientific knowledge SK, see chapter 2.] Now,
let us first explore the nature of scientific theories within engineering knowledge. It seems
to be obvious that engineering requires some kind of basic science: "Concepts of broadest
applicability include basic ideas from science, like force, mass, electric current, and so
forth..." (Vicenti, p.217). The question is how do these theories look like in the context of
engineering?

Think of the epistemological background of Newton's laws. As scientific laws they
are to describe, explain and predict movement of objects (material bodies). All the scientific
versions of Newton's second law ( F=ma, F=dP/dt) are descriptive. For example, the
following well known version of Newton's second laws asserts that: "The net (external

unbalanced) force [F] acting on a material body is directly proportional to, and in the same

136

direction as, its acceleration [a]" (Holton, 1985, p. 118). An engineer interested in using
such law -to design a bridge, for example- would read this descriptive statement with
normative lenses such as: "To cause a material body an acceleration a exert on it a force F"
or :"to prevent a body to get an acceleration a exert on it a force F"(adapted from Bunge,
1985, p. 244). In the hands of the engineer, the descriptive character of the scientific law
becomes normative. The scientific law is called either causal-mechanists or descriptive
explanation, whereas the other (the engineering version) is a teleological "explanation"
(finalistic, using a differentiation suggested by George H, von Wrigth, 1979). My
argument is that even scientific knowledge in the hands of engineers (technologists in
general) tends to be more teleological, finalistic, normative (utilitarian) rather than
descriptive, mechanist.

What engineers use in most of the cases are specific technological theories which
refer to specific devices. Vicenti, for example, suggests something like that:

Farther in the direction of engineering are theories based on scientific principles but
motivated by and limited to a technologically important class of phenomena or even
specific devices...examples of such essentially engineering theories centered on a
class of phenomena are those dealing with fluid mechanics, heat transfer, and solid-
body elasticity... (p.214). ,
Therefore, the notion of "scientific knowledge" within the epistemology of engineering
suggests the specific nature of technological knowledge (theories about "specific devices")
and the complex relation that this knowledge establishes with scientific knowledge
(teleological position rather than causal).

The teleological position that engineers, and in general technologists, have toward
the world is exemplified with the relation that they establish with artifacts. Machines, for
example, are understood as a special kind of artifact and are defined for what they do rather
than for what they are. Using Simon's words: "Artifact things can be characterized in terms
of functions, goals, adaptation" (1969, p.8). Moreover, the artifice -the term used by

Simon to situate the world of artifacts- brings with itself the emergence of new otolological

status which is not explained by natural science (e. g., physics, chemistry, etc.):

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All machines have technological proprieties, such as maneuverability, versatility,
and safety, as well as economic proprieties, such as high or low production or
operation cost. These proprieties are neither physical nor chemical: they are
emergent proprieties resulting from the particular interplay between machine and

user. (Bunge, 1985, p.244)

From the perspective of technology as knowledge the connection between scientific
knowledge and technological knowledge becomes clearer given the fact that the design and
also the explanation of artifact require an emergent knowledge. As Polyani has pointed out
several years ago:

Suppose you are faced with a problematic object and try to explore its nature by a
meticulous physical or chemical analysis of all its parts. You may thus obtain a

complete physico-chemical map of it. At what point you would you discover that it is
a machine (if it is one), and if so, how it operates? Never (1958/1962, p.330).

The reasons for that, according to Polyani, are that: "The complete knowledge of a
machine as an object tells us nothing about it as a machine" (ibid. p. 330). In other words,
what Polyani says is that scientific explanations of artifacts do not help to understand their
technological properties. Although my position is less extreme than Polyani's, I think that
his point is valuable. In fact, teleological explanations (finalistic, i.e. one which answers
the question: for what?, what are the purposes of this artifact?) does not follow from a
scientific explanation ("a complete description"). In order to design a machine, it is
important to know for what, that is, the purposes of the machine while in order to explain
how an artifact works (causal explanation), one does not need to know what the purposes of
the artifact are. The design and eventually the explanation (when it is needed) of artifact
require a specific kind of knowledge: technological knowledge. This is related to the second
kind of knowledge suggested by Faulkner: knowledge of design practice.

Both Faulkner and Vicenti point out the importance of a specific kind of knowledge
to design artifacts. Polyani has stressed the importance of tacit knowledge (procedural) in

the process of constructing -interpreting the behaviors of- machines (a special kind of

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artifact). However, Polyani did not develop an epistemology of engineering nor an
epistemological study of technologies. Recent studies on engineering reflect that procedural
knowledge is not always tacit (Shapiro, 1997, Vicenti 1990 partially develops this point).
Procedural technological knowledge for the construction of artifacts has its roots in
experience, research and failure (Petrostki, 1985) and it has been partially codified in the
form of standards.

Standards of engineering practice refer to the physical (in the case of physical
engineering) properties (minimum or maximum) that the components of the artifact should
have:

Procedural standards of technological practice which indicate how one should go
about designing and implementing technological artifacts...they often specify
minimum and maximum values of physical quantities- strength of steel rods in

tension, for instance, or the means by which they should be calculated (Shapiro,
l997,p.291)

Such standards are formulated by communities of practitioners (e.g., the National
Association of Engineers in the X field which for consensus deve10ps their practice based
on a set of standards). Standards play a critical role in the design of artifacts not just from
the knowledge they embody, but also because they play the role of connecting local

contingencies with more universal knowledge. In the words of Shapiro:

There are many degrees of freedom available to the designer and builder of machines
and processes. In this context, standards of practice provide a means of mapping the
universal onto the local...Loca1 contingencies must govern the design and
construction of any particular bridge [for example] within the frame of relative
universals embodied in the standards. The point is not to maintain universalism as is
the case with physical laws and constants. Rather, the point is to localize the artifact.
A volt must mean the same thing regardless of where it is used. A bridge that
functions successfully (with respect to multiple criteria including aesthetics) in one
place need not have the capacity to function successfully in another place (pp. 293,
294. See also Petrosky, 1997 for a beautiful example on how contemporary design
competition takes place).

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Standards are key elements for understanding contemporary engineering. Design
philosophers are just in the beginning of the analysis of these components of what may be
an emergent epistemology of engineering. Note the role of standards in connecting science
with design. This peculiarity of engineering has important implications for science
education. However, standards are only a small part of what is called procedural
technological knowledge (Vicenti, 1990, Herrera 1996). For the purposes of this
clarification of technology as knowledge, I think we already have a general picture of the
epistemological territory of engineering. At this moment, I do not engage in any deeper
discussion on epistemology of engineering . What is important for now is to note that the
framework of technological knowledge I endorse is formed by substantive and procedural
knowledge. The role of procedural knowledge in technology is much more important than
science (Sorensen, & Levold, 1992). As I show later, technology is mainly based on
procedural knowledge, yet there is an important amount of substantive knowledge. In
contrast, science is based mostly on substantive knowledge.3 Clarifying the interaction
between substantive and procedural scientific knowledge in relation to technological
knowledge is a fundamental task to appreciate the potential uses of technological knowledge

in science education.

 

3I do not mean that procedural knowledge (e. g., tacit) is not important in science. History
and philosophy of science have shown that procedural knowledge is important in science
(Conant, 1947, Gooding, 1992, chapter 3 of this dissertation ). However, I argue that the
role of substantive knowledge is much more important than procedural in scientific
communities (this accounts for a smooth "translation" as I discuss in chapter 7). Although
some researchers have argued that modern science is an outcome of technology, such as the
case of Traweek (1988) in her studies of particle accelerators or the works of Latour (1987)
in biological laboratories, they seem to confuse the instrumental (technological artifacts)
with the research. Moreover, they defend the idea that scientific research constructs facts by
its instruments (e. g., particle accelerator) therefore they do not distinguish science from
technology. These conclusions may be right in the sense of the high technological
dependence of modern science. However, such technological artifacts are means rather than
ends. An account of research on particles suggested by Wilson (1958, 1980) is more
realistic and preserves the intrinsic scientific nature of this research rather than its
technological mis-connotations suggested by Traweek and others.

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In short, the relationship between science and technology that I endorse reflects a
complex interaction between them. Such interaction was illustrated using the case of
engineering. The typologies suggested by Faulkner and Vicenti have been useful to draw a
general picture of what technological knowledge means. The problem is much more
complex than this preliminary description; however, it is enough, at this moment, to
provide a general meaning of the term technology as knowledge. As the reader can see,
there is no simple relation between scientific and technological knowledge. In addition, the
very meaning of the term technology as knowledge has its own history. The following table

summarizes my discussion.

Table 5.1 Relationship between science (S) and technology (T).

 

 

 

 

Model: Relationship: Description:

Subordination T S is the base of T
l (S creates knowledge while T
S _ applies it)

Cause-effect S ---> T S provides knowledge

_ T the artifact

Two-way S <---> T 8 refers to natural world

T refers to artificial world. S
affects T, but T also affects S.
There is specific technological
Specificity-of—T knowledge (T) which would

@ be related to S. T creates
specific knowledge. S is
reinterpreted.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Technology as social practice

Both generic meanings of technology, artifact and knowledge, are concerned with
changes, that is, control, transformations, creations of things and processes. The creation
or transformation of processes assumes the existence of knowledge (whatever its nature).
The possible outcome of the process is an artifact (material as a bridge or social as a plan for
improving literacy). However, artifacts and knowledge do not exist by themselves in a

Platonic world (or a Popperian world 3). Both artifacts and knowledge are human

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constructions. The nature of the construction can be understood by looking for the kind of
social practice which produces a given artifact or the knowledge which supports this
construction. Again, E. Layton enriched the discussion on the social and epistemological
nature of technology: "What is needed is an understanding of technology from inside, both
as body of knowledge and social system" (1977, p. 198). This was the context of the
emergence of the Science Technology and Society movement, usually called STS (Spiegel-
Rosing, & Solla, 1977).

The STS movement has its roots in an interest in the social aspects of science and
technology, and it was an important movement in the 1970's. Ina Spiegel-Rosing (1977)
traces back the roots of this movement to the Second Word War as a reaction to the use of
science (technology) for military purposes. In the 1970's, there was a similar movement.
This time in the context of the unpopular war with Vietnam and the effect that technology
was producing on the environment (DeBoer, 1991; Spiegel-Rosing, & Solla, 1977). The
STS movement has had, according to Spiegel-Rosing, several tendencies (such as the
humanistic, cognitive normative, relativistic which, by the way, became the constructivist).
And one should be aware that the educational branch of the STS is only one tendency (see
examples of education versions in Yager, 1996 and Aikeheand, & Salomon, 1994). It is
also important to note that the roots of the STS movement are connected to external factors
(e.g., political, economic factors, i.e., macro factors) rather than the epistemological
demands of the design process.

A parallel movement regarding studies of science and technology from a social
perspective emerged in the 80's with the social studies of science (e.g., Barners and Edge,
1982; Knorr-Cetina, and Mulkay, 1983; Shapin, 1985; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1987;
Gooding, 1990; 1992; Knor-Cetinna, 1990, 1992; Latour, 1987; Traweek, 1988, and
others). This approach has taken over the studies on how scientists and technologists
actually work in laboratories (e.g., Latour, 1987; Traweek, 1988). In contrast to the roots

of the STS movement, the social studies of science have stressed micro analysis, that is,

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they have studied scientific and technological researches in terms of individual actions
within specific laboratories.

The social studies of science and technology are important references for analyzing
the meaning of technology as social practice.4 They have shown that: a) the connection
between design and knowledge is not linear, and b) negotiations play important role in the
design process (particularly Buciarelli, 1988; 1994). However, one should be careful in
interpreting their frequently radical conclusions. For example, researchers in science and
technology studies working within the "constructivist" or "relativistic" positions tend to
argue that scientific and technological knowledge are socially constructed and are
undistinguisble from other forms of knowledge: "The treatment of scientific [and
technological] knowledge as a social construction implies that there is nothing
epistemologically special about the nature of scientific knowledge. It is merely one in a
whole series of knowledge cultures..." (Pinch, & Bijker, 1987, p.19). I do not share this
radical conclusion. In principle, the slogan "socially constructed" has been used to justify

almost everything, so much that the term has become almost empty. And secondly, I think

 

‘The notion of social practice is taken for granted in the social studies of science and
technology. This is in part because of their philosophical positions regarding the role of
theories in scientific and technological research. The typical researcher in this line (e.g.,
Latour) goes to scientific laboratories, i.e. researchers make a field trip (like
anthropologists) in order to describe what they "see", usually without conceptual tools
(theories). In contrast, social practice is a key concept in sociology (a domain formed by
theories), particularly in the works of Marx, Althusser, and Bourdieu, (alternative versions
can be found in Coleman, 1990 in which the key concepts are "action", "actors",
"transaction", etc.). The notion of social practice that I assume is related to the idea of
intentional action. From a general perspective there are three basic social practices:
economic, political and cultural. According to Althusser, any social practice is composed
by four elements: human work force (w), means of production (m), the object of
transformation (0) and the final product (p). The structure of any social practice is
represented by < w, m, o, p > (Herrera, 1989). For example, think of the production
of a wood chair done by a specific social practice (carpentry). Carpentry can be seen as a
social practice which has the purpose of the production of material goods (furniture for
instance). The four elements of this social practice are: work force (labor of the
carpenter), means of production (tools, materials, knowledge, etc.), the object of
transformation (the wood) and the final product (the chair). When I refer to technology, as
social practice, I am thinking of a specific practice which has the purposes of transforming
a thing or process with the help of scientific and technological knowledge (Herrera, 1989;
1996; Cajas, 1993, 1994a, b). The practice can be conceptual (design of a bridge) or
material (the actual construction of the bridge).

143

that science and technology are quite different enterprises but they are connected in complex
and contextual ways. Moreover, they are both special kinds of knowledge that we can
distinguish from other kinds of knowledge.

My comments on the STS movement are related to the third meaning I propose for
the term technology. Technology can be seen as a social practice, that is, an oriented
activity which has the purposes of changing, controlling, or transforming material or social
things or processes with the help of scientific knowledge. The kind of transformation the
social practice makes is partially based on a special kind of knowledge. The nature of the
knowledge that a technological practice uses is determined by how one sees the relationship
between science and technology. So far we have explored some of them. Bucciarelli, for
example, has explored others.

Drawing from traditional models of engineering design, such as those found in
engineering textbooks, Bucciarelli reports that design is usually thought of as a practice that
are based on models like the following: Definition of the Problem---->Development of a
Plan---->Model Formation--->Applications of Physical Laws--->Computation---
>Checking-->Evaluation--->Solution. However, what Bucciarelli found in his
anthropological studies on how technologists actually work is that design takes place in
complex social settings in which the very "Definition of the Problem" is by its own right a
problem. Problems are not always well-understood, so the social practice of design
becomes complex (see also Schon, 1983; 1987). At this moment, I do not engage in any
discussion regarding the simplistic models criticized by Bucciarelli. What is important for
my discussion at this level is the intrinsic social character of the design process reported by
Bucciarelli.

The meaning of technology as a social practice also has a wider connotation. This
is its connection to economic, political, and cultural factors of a given society. Perhaps

this meaning is even more complex than the meaning of technology as social practice

144

regarding the nature of the design (knowledge base, negotiation, etc.) The problem is
complex as Bijerker and Law acknowledge:
What do we mean when we write of the "social"? Do we mean social in
"sociological"? The answer is we do, but only in part. For the sociological is not

exclusively sociological. In the context of technology and its social shaping it is also
political, economic, psychological - and indeed historical (1992, p.4).

1 agree with these authors in the sense of the multiple meanings of technology as social
practice. However, different from them, I assume a conception of social practice which
allows me to construct conceptual tools (theories) to explain such phenomena (technology).
Therefore, technology can be seen as a social practice with two aspects. First, the general
ontological assumptions that social practices are the basic realm of social interactions, that
is, individual interactions (micro-level). Such practice, technological practice, has its own
specificity. Particularly, it has the purposes of changing or transforming, natural or
artificial processes or states with the help of relevant scientific and technological
knowledge. I already showed that such practice is based on the concept of design which
ultimately requires a specific kind of knowledge. Second, I also refer to the intrinsic social
nature of the technological practice in the sense of its economic, political and cultural
connotations (macro level). I use both senses of the term "social practice" when I refer to
technology as a social practice (see footnote #4 for a definition of social practice used in
this chapter).

When I say that technology can be seen as artifact, knowledge and social practice, I
am trying to capture a huge complex phenomena with a sort of ontological assumptions
(what is an artifact?), epistemological positions (is there technological knowledge?) and
social peculiarities (what is the social nature of the design process? what are the political
assumptions of the practice?) The notion of artifact is connected to the meaning of social
practice. Artifacts were defined as objects that are made with the help of shared knowledge
(Bunge, 1985) . In this way, there is no artifact without "shared" knowledge and there is

no shared knowledge without communities.

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A framework for technology

Given this short discussion on the multiple meanings of the term technology, I re-
frame the three general uses of the concept: 1) technology as artifact (a concrete system) 2)
technology as knowledge (a conceptual system), and 3) technology as social practice (an
activity). I argue that these three generic meanings are important elements for a general
framework for technology. I do not mean that they are the only meanings of the term. The
term carries other meanings, such as technology as a way for solving practical problems
(methodological definition of technology), technology as a tool for educational purposes
(educational technology) or even technology as an ideology. The French philosopher J aque
Ellu, for example, argues that the term technology ( "La Technique") has mainly political and
ideological connotations; particularly, it is related to a new kind of society (technological
society). In the same line of thinking, technology is usually identified with destruction of
the environment and so on and so forth. I argue that these are social implications of
technology rather than specific meanings of the term. The framework I suggest can be used
for further analyses of such social implications. And more important, this framework on
technology can be used for studying some characteristics of technology education and its
potential connections with science education. The following figure summarizes this

framework.

Figure 5.1 Three different meanings of the term technology.

 

TEC LOGY

ARTIFACT KNOWLEDGE

SOCIAL PRACTICE

 

 

 

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The framework on technology that I propose has immediate applications. Vocational
studies, for example, stress a conception of technology as artifact (hands-on occupational
oriented experiences). In the United States, vocational studies do not focus on technology
as a special kind of academic knowledge. Although American vocational studies include
general knowledge, they stress the acquisition of actual job skills, such as repairing
televisions, or washing machines (see Evans, Hoyt, & Mangum, 1973 for an example). In
contrast, when one thinks of the preparation of engineers, technology stresses a specific
kind of professional knowledge. Engineers do not lead with the humble work of fixing
televisions, repairing cars, etc. They design "better" televisions, "better" cars and "new"
technological artifacts. Their preparation stresses the acquisition of high academic
knowledge which is connected, at least formally in the curriculum, with science?

The interaction between technology as artifact and technology as knowledge is also
an interaction between status. The emphasis of vocational studies on artifacts and job skills
contrasts with the preparation of technologists (e.g., engineers) whose preparation stresses
more academic knowledge, a knowledge that goes beyond job skills. Contemporary
departments of technological fields (e.g., engineering. biotechnology, medicine, etc.) have
an intense connection with science. For real or artificial reasons, science is the referent of
the knowledge taught in academic disciplines which is actually a higher status. I argue that
the relationships that science, technology and vocational practices (both: the preparation and
the practice itself) establish with artifact is a representation of the different status that each
has in a given social structure. If one draws a graphic representing the hierarchy of status
of these three social practices (science, technology and vocational practices), one would

draw in the top of the status-arrow (see Figure 2) the name science, and then technology in

 

5This is something relatively new. In the American context after World War 11 there was an
attempt to redefine engineering as an applied science rather than art. The tension between

alrrgtsagrd science has important implications for the preparation of professionals (Schtin,
).

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the middle, and finally vocational practices at the bottom. In the case of vocational studies,
there is a strong relation with the artifact. However, the relation is from the perspective of
the keeper, that is, the maintenance of the artifact. The emphasis is on the "fact" rather than
the "art". The case of technology changes this relationship with the artifacts. Here the
emphasis is on the "creation" of the artifact. The stress is in the "art". The artifact is seen
from the perspective of the "creator". The knowledge can or cannot be academic, but
usually there is emphasis on academic knowledge (technological knowledge). Science, in
contrast, has a different relation with artifacts. Although contemporary science is very
dependent on instruments (artifacts), the goal of science is not the construction of these
artifacts (think of a particle accelerator or an optical microscope). The artifacts in these
contexts are seen as tools which mediate research activities. The position that scientists have
in relation to artifacts is similar to the position the general public has in relation to
technology -both do not care much about how these given artifacts work. There is a weak
relation with the artifact and a strong relation with knowledge (high abstract and general
knowledge). The following figure illustrates this discussion.

Figure 5. 2. Relationships between science, technology and vocational practices with
status, artifacts, and knowledge.

 

 

 

 

Science I abstract
Technology practical
Vocational — _ skills
Status Artifact Knowlege

 

 

 

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It is important to note that the framework I propose only illustrates a general
tendency. The status that technicians, technologists and scientists have in a given social
structure and how it is related to the kind of practice they develop is a complex issue.6 What
I want to emphasize is the derogation that technical skills and technological knowledge
suffer in relation to science. As I show later, this has implications in science education.
Even in contemporary scientific laboratories, the status of technologists is lower than
theoretical scientists which is explained by Chandra Mukerji in the following terms: "This
has a long history and stems in part from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century tradition
of gentlemen scientists hiring technicians as a kind of servant" (Mukerji, 1989, p.15. See
also Shapin, 1985 for specific examples). The assumption is that technology does not have
epistemological value, so why should one care of its translation into science education? My
position is that we have to explore what the potentialities of technology in teaching science
are. So, far I have shown that technology has epistemological value (specific technological
theories). In the following section, I am more specific in relation to the potential that
technology has in the science cuniculum. In order to explore that, I propose to study a

specific topic which is part of contemporary science cuniculum: energy.

Teaching science...teaching technology: The case of energy

In this section, I study how the approach of teaching energy changes or would
change when one sees it from either the perspective of science or from the perspective of
technology. In other words, I attempt to show how the meaning of teaching energy would
change when one sees it from the perspective of traditional science education and technology

education respectively.

 

'5 For example, there are theories about instruments such as simple theories about how an
Ampere-meters works. These theories are used by scientists in order to contrast their data
with what they expect, i.e. for making corrections. However, the goal is not the
understanding of the instrument. The position that they have with the artifacts
(instruments) is still utilitarian.

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Energy is a fundamental concept within scientific and technological communities. It
has a place in the K-12 science curriculum. Although I focus my analysis on secondary
science curriculum, it is important to note that in elementary education, students are usually
expected to develop qualitative approximations to the several kinds of energy concepts, such
as knowing about: sources of energy (e.g., the Sun, batteries, wind, etc.) and
transformation of energy (e. g., from chemical to electrical). The National Science Education
Standards (National Research Council, 1995), suggest specific themes about energy,
particularly the study of energy in relation to movement of objects, light, heat and electricity.
Although I present my examples from the perspective of the movement of objects, my

argument can be developed using any of the other topics (i.e. light, heat, electricity).

Teaching science: Energy

Given the high order of generality of the concept of energy, teachers and students
can use these concepts for making connections with almost all kinds of science school
knowledge. From the physical science perspective, one can develop basic concepts of
energy from the perspective of the movement of objects (dynamics) or from the perspective
of heat and temperature (thermodynamic), as well as from electricity (electrokinetic) and
other alternative themes. From the perspective of dynamics, for example, there are two
general approaches. The first focuses on the notion of force and how forces act on objects.
This approach is based on contemporary interpretations of Newtonian mechanics in which
forces are treated with their vectorial proprieties. The general idea is to isolate the object and
to consider it as an individual. The changes of velocity of the object are explained for the
existence of unequilibrated forces. The connection between force and energy is made by the
concept of work (W), which in the school science context is defined as the force acting on
an object multiplied by the distance in which the force has been acted. For the particular
case in which both vectors, force (F) and distance (d), have the same direction, the

expression of work is W: Fd. From this perspective energy is work.

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It seems that the objective of introducing the concept of work is for preparing the
scenario for the concept of energy (see for example the high school text book" Conceptual
Physics", Hewitt, 1997). This introduction is done by explaining certain transformations
related to two different kinds of forces: "conservatives" (e.g., gravitation) and "non
conservatives" (e.g., friction). When there is work done by a given conservative force there
could be changes in the velocity of the object. This is explained introducing the concept of
kinetic energy. In the case of gravitational forces, some work is not transformed in changes
of velocity but in possibilities of producing these changes. This is explained with the
concept of potential energy. For conservative forces, one can deduce that there is a relation
between kinetic and potential energy, i.e. that the sum of both is constant. The point of the
approach is to explain movements of objects starting with the concept of force and finishing
with ideas about work and energy.

The second approach has a different starting point. Here, one defines two
quantities: kinetic and potential energy and postulates that the sum of both is constant. The
quantity most important here is not force; the important quantity is energy. Changes in
kinetic energy (1/2 mvz) are related to changes in other kinds of energy. Although the
approach does not start with a specific description of movements, it can be used for solving
problems of movement. The approach requires the introduction of several kinds of energy.
In the school science curriculum, the concept of kinetic and potential energy (mainly
gravitational and elastic) tend to be the most commonly used concepts, yet there are
references to other kinds of energy (chemistry, electric, etc.). Students are invited to
understand the principle of conservation of energy. Traditional high school physics, for
example, includes experiments for helping students understand the transformation of one
type of energy into another.

From the perspective of a physicist, both approaches are different alternatives for
solving problems, such as problems of movement of particles or analysis of more complex

systems. However, from a pedagogical point of view, they are very similar. In fact, they

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both are concerned with the traditional goal of science education of solving textbook-based
problems. In both cases, students are expected to use some general principles for solving
specific problems (e.g., predicting the final velocity of an object given its initial velocity and
other conditions). In other words, both approaches provide students analytical tools for
dealing with physics problems. As I just said, traditional science education has stressed
solving specific textbook-based problems using both approaches (e. g., the problems used in
the classical study on experts and novices presented by Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). A
more interesting way for acquiring these tools is by doing experiments. Paul Robinson,
who is the author of the Laboratory Manual of Hewitt's book "Conceptual PhysiCs,"
suggests the following experiment for investigating the relationship between work and
force: "In this experiment, you will investigate the relationship between the initial height of a
rolling ball and the distance it takes to roll to a stop" (Robinson, 1987, p.87-90.
Experiment #1 in Table 1). It is intended that students develop the notion of work by
analyzing the forces that act on the rolling ball (Newtonian approach) and the work that the
friction does. The point is to be able to predict movements. The second approach is
exemplified by another experiment taken from the same manual (Robinson, 1987, pp. 77-
79. Experiment # 2 in Table 5.1). The objective here is to measure the potential and kinetic
energies of a pendulum in order to see if there is conservation. My last example is an
experiment on solar energy (p.195. Experiment #3 in Table 5.1). Here the goal is to
calculate the rate of energy that the sun emits. These three experiments are examples, to
some extent, of the use of energy in school science. What is important for my account is
the idea that these conceptual tools (different kinds of energy and their transformation,
definition of work, etc. ) are important for students to make descriptions, calculations,
explanations and predictions.

The models that students are expected to develop are usually causal models (Devi,
Tibergheirn, Baker, & Brna, 1996). In the case of the experiment of the rolling ball, it is

expected that students conclude that the rolling ball stops because of dissipation of energy

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(friction), for example, "loosing energy" ---> "lack of movement". The
fundamental principle of conservation of energy, together with specific proprieties of
different kinds of energies such as kinetic, potential, etc., should be the essential
components of the expected student models. Students should deve10p models of
transformation of energy (causal model such as the potential energy of the rolling ball is
transformed in kinetic energy and then it is partially transformed in "heat" because of the
friction). The goals of such models are descriptions and mainly predictions of movements

using both analysis of forces and energy studies.

Table 5.2 Concepts and goals of teaching energy from the traditional science education
perspective.

 

 

 

Concepts Goals
Force Predicting movements of Experiment # 1
Work isolated objects
Developing an expression
between energy and force
Energy Explaining transformations Experiment # 2

Kinetic Energy

Potential Energy
Fundamental Principle of
Conservation

of energy

Predicting movements

 

Solar Energy

Calculating the amount of

Eiperiment # 3

 

Flux
Area, Volume, Temperature,
Units of energy

energy the sun emits

 

 

 

 

What students usually gain from these experiences is a mixture of outcomes (Tarrrir,
1991). Research in naive conceptions has clearly shown that students have problems in
distinguishing between energy and force. The pioneer works of Laurence Viennot (1979)
in France demonstrated that the notion of energy is problematic for students. Joan Solomon

(1994) in England also studied how students understand the concept of energy. Her

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extensive report indicates the problematic connection between everyday notions of force,

work and energy with scientific canonical definitions.

Teaching technology: Energy

From the perspective of technology, the picture of teaching energy is quite different.
One can analyze the introduction of the concept of energy using the framework for
technology I proposed earlier. As I said, technology can be seen from three different
perspectives: as artifact, as knowledge and as social practice. In looking at Table 5.1, the
first comment that comes to mind is that traditional science education stresses knowledge
rather than artifact or social practice. Focusing on knowledge within school settings is
nothing new. However, one would ask if there is any relationship between scientific and
technological knowledge in the case of teaching energy in school settings. In other words,
do the general concepts of energy change when one moves from the context of science to the
context of technology? In any case, does it matter?

From a historical point of view, several of the concepts of energy have their roots in
technological processes, such as the case of the development of stream engines. This is the
origin of thermodynamics. In this context, the goal of the knowledge developed was to
control, transform or create things or processes. This is one of the meanings of
technological knowledge that I explored earlier. From the perspective of science education
this goal is not presented, or at least it is not stressed. Consequently, if there is a difference
between scientific and technological knowledge, it would be in the goals of the use of
knowledge. These differences in goals have, I argue, important implications for teaching
science. The experiments already cited about energy (work-energy, conservation, and solar
energy) are experiments for understanding, that is, for describing, explaining or predicting.
As one can see in Table 5.1, no goal for transforming, controlling or developing artifacts

was presented.

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One way for understanding the role of technology in teaching science is by re-
frarrring the two science education experiments in the context of technology education. The
first experiment had the purposes of investigating the relationship between the initial height
of a rolling ball and the distance it takes to roll to a stop. In the context of technology
education, one can transform it, among other alternatives, into a research project for
investigating different materials that could produce less friction. Using the same structure,
students would test different materials in order to determinate the "best" material for
reducing the friction. Students would investigate the positive and negative implications of
friction. The goal of this experiment goes beyond explanations and predictions. The
introduction of this utilitarian goal has the potential positive effect that students can see some
uses of scientific and technological research. The potential negative implication is that people
do research not only for utilitarian reasons. In any case, from this general exarnple it is
difficult to distinguish between scientific and technological knowledge. What is making a
difference is the general goal of the experiment (Experiment # 1 according to Table 5.1 and
Table 5.2).

From the perspective of science education, the experiment on solar energy presented
earlier (Experiment #3) has the goal of calculating the amount of energy that the Sun emits.
From the perspective of technology education the focus of attention shifts somewhat. What
matters here, for example, is how to use this energy. Energy becomes a resource rather
than only an object of study. A possible technological problem is to design a solar collector
for capturing this energy and using it in some way. Think for example of the approach
reported by Wolff-Michael Roth and his colleagues when they were working with grade 10
students and asked them: "What is the rate of energy delivery from the sun per square meter
at the Earth's surface: your task is to design and build a solar heat collector which will
enable you to answer the question" (1992, p.22). The construction of the collector here is
very related to the notion of technological task. However, the artifact is being used for

answering questions related to understanding. I argue that generally technological

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approaches go beyond this epistemological position. Although knowing the amount of
energy that the Sun emits is an important goal from the traditional position of science
education, from a technological point of view, one should ask: for what? One
possibility is for heating water or for determining better material for building the collector.
From this perspective, the artifact has an intrinsic value. These utilitarian goals are behind
any technological design. Although conceptual understanding would be important, the goal
behind technological problems is related to the solution of specific problems or more
efficient uses of resources. This is perhaps the first difference between teaching technology
in relation to teaching traditional science. It does not mean that some science teachers have
not approached practical problems. What I mean is that traditional science education tends
to focus on conceptual understanding by using canonical knowledge in predetermined
problems. Technology education, in contrast, suggests more real scenarios in which
students and teachers can engage in approaching specific technological problems as the
following table shows.

Table 5.3 Teaching energy from the perspective of technology education. The concepts in
italics tend to have more technological connotations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Concepts Goals
Work Finding materials with less Experiment # 1
Force friction.
Efliciengy
Energy Designing and building a Experiment # 3
Solar energy solar collector.
Heat Transfer Selecting materials for
Thermal Conductivity building the "best" collector.
Using the solar energy for
heating water.

 

In thinking about the possibility of using technology as an alternative way for
teaching science the fnst meaning of technology that comes to my mind is technology as
artifact. Unlike traditional science classes, teaching science through technology will require
a more intense contact with instruments and with the production of artifacts. Given the role

that technology can play in teaching science, the second meaning that follows is technology

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as knowledge. The distinction between scientific and technological knowledge should be
approached with prudence. In the case of teaching science, it is important to stress the
epistemological richness of technology. The design of a solar collector requires a sort of
scientific concepts (energy, work, area, flux, etc.) in addition to specific technological
knowledge (about transfer of heat of the specific collector). As I pointed out, the
relationship between technological and scientific knowledge is complex. The same
complexity, and perhaps more, will be translated to the classroom. If students will be
engaged in solving technological problems, such as the case of the design of a solar
collector, according to some initial conditions, it is expected that they will generate specific
knowledge (situated knowledge). Think of graphics of velocity of heating different material
as a function of time or temperature. It is possible that students will construct knowledge
for designing specific kinds of collectors. Therefore the construction will be material and
conceptual. This is what I am calling teaching science via technology. In the case of
teaching science, this specific and perhaps local knowledge should be connected to some

extent with school science knowledge.

Technology: Social practice

So far, I have discussed two meanings of the term technology: technology as artifact
and technology as knowledge. The educational implications of the meaning of technology
as social practice have not been discussed. There are at least two ways for analyzing this
meaning. The first focuses on internal social interactions in classrooms situations,
particularly on the social interaction of students when they are engaged in technological
tasks. The second, is the social reasons that we have for teaching technology which has
been a concern of the STS movement (Yager, 1996). In this section, I analyze the meaning
of technology as social practice in relation to the social implication of technology. I do that

from the perspective of the topic of energy.

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There are several potential reasons why we teach energy from the perspective of its
social implications. One of the most accepted goals is that students should be aware of the
consumption of energy in their homes, in their country and even on the planet. Scholars
have suggested that "...conservation [of energy] must be our highest priority throughout the
rest of the twentieth century" (Olsen, & Joerges, 1981). This concern is an outcome of the
energy crisis of the 70's. In fact, the educational branch of the STS movement has been
suggesting this direction for almost twenty years (Layton, 1994. R. Yager, personal
communication, September 1996).

Teaching science and particularly energy from the perspective of its social
implications is a complex task. It requires some understanding of basic scientific concepts.

Gerald Davis, an expert in energy consumption, suggests that: ...it helps to understand
where energy comes from and the purposes that it serves in our lives" (Davis, 1990, p.55).
This emphasis in understanding basic concepts is important. However, if one wants to
understand what the status of the demands of energy of the planet is or how people use or
misuse energy, one has to go beyond these basic concepts. This will require technological
concepts such as efficiency, optimization, invention of better ways of consuming energy,
etc. Given its utilitarian connotations, these are technological rather than scientific concepts.
Looking for better uses of energy, developing alternative sources of energy, designing new
systems of recycling, creating more efficient artifacts, etc. are activities which have more
technological connotations. However, these concepts are only technical approximations to
the social core of the problem. From a social point of view, the problem of the uses of
energy in the world is a problem of power and stratification.

Teaching the social implications of the uses of energy is a very complex task. It
requires the integration of social with technological concepts in addition to scientific
concepts. Concepts such as energy policies and relationships of lifestyles to energy

consumption, that is, conservation versus consumerism, are social concepts that usually are

not connected to traditional approaches of teaching science. The introduction of these

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concepts into the traditional science curriculum is not only complex but also ideologically
problematic. Think, for example, of the complexities that the following information would
introduce into the classroom: "The average person in a developing country eventually uses
the equivalent of one or two barrels of oil...In contrast, the numbers jump to between 10
and 30 barrels in Europe and more than 40 in the US." (Davis, 1990, p.58) From the
perspective of science education, these are important goals for teaching science. However,
their connections with traditional science curriculum is still unknown.

I suggest Table 5.3 as a way of summarizing the three approaches for teaching
energy that I have discussed. The first kind of concept is related to the traditional way of
teaching science. The second is the technological approach that I defend. The third
approach stresses social implications of science and technology, a movement that has its
roots in the educational branch of STS (Yager, 1996).

Table 5.4 Three different approaches for teaching the topic of energy in high school.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Science Technology Society

Force, work ,kfiretic and Efficiency, Differences of consumpTron

potential energy, principle of quality of energy of energy between poor and

conservation of energy developed countries

Specific kinds of energy Specific knowledge about Social implications of

(solar, chemical, etc.) transfer of energy e.g., alternative sources of energy
knowledge about transfer of (nuclear plant, solar,

Transformation of energy, heat in specific artifacts firewood)

e.g., from kinetic to heat. Knowledge about the design Relationship between

Thermal conductivity of artifacts petroleum dependence and

environmental impact

 

I think that these three approaches reflect different conceptions of teaching science. I
also think that there is a progress in the complexity of each approach from the scientific to
the social approach. Usually, the scientific approach for teaching science is the simplest
approach (simplistic) given its relation with didactic approaches, which tend to be identified
with telling and remembering facts. However, it is important to note that there is an
enormous effort for teaching science for understanding in authentic way which is a complex

task. At any rate, the most complex approach is the social, but only if one wants to go

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beyond simple and general descriptions of the implications of science and technology in
society. I think that this perspective of teaching science is very important. However, we
still do not know how to connect social concepts with scientific concepts in the context of
teaching science.

In a middle position, I see the introduction of technology as a way for teaching
science. This approach can be analyzed using three meanings of the term technology: a) as
artifact, b) as knowledge and c) as social practice. The role of technological artifact in
teaching science is fundamental. The status of the artifact depends on the perspective that
one uses for teaching science. From a technological perspective, artifacts are very
important. They are means and mainly ends; that is, they can be used for solving some
practical problems, but they are also expected outcomes of a given learning process. The
relationship that scientific approaches have with artifact is interesting too. Traditional
science classes use artifacts developed by other people (instrumentation such as laboratory
equipment). From the technology education perspective, the design of artifacts is an
important goal in which students should be involved (Raizen, et a1. 1995). However, the
emphasis on teaching science through technology should be, I argue, in the technological
knowledge that is used for designing a given artifact or for solving practical problems.
This knowledge, technological knowledge, represents an opportunity for learning basic
scientific concepts, but it is also the arena for designing and developing artifacts based on
research projects. My concern is on the lack of research that we have for understanding the
role of technological knowledge in the teaching and learning of science.

Technology has been introduced as part of the leading science education reforms
proposals, Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards. However, its role
in teaching science is still unclear. One of the first reasons is that the very notion of
technology advanced in current reform proposal such as Project 2061 and the National
Standards, needs to be unpacked. In fact, the relationship between scientific and

technological knowledge in the context of general education needs to be clarified. This is

160

one goal of this dissertation. A second reason is the complexity of the social scenario,
particularly the social status of technology as subject matter. Both problems, the meaning
of the term technology in the context of science education reforms and the potentiality of
being used as a bridge between understanding and applications in teaching science, are the
core of this dissertation. The following chapter studies the position of technology in

Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards.

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CHAPTER 6

TEACHING SCIENCE, TEACHING TECHNOLOGY : PROJECT 2061
AND THE NATIONAL STANDARDS

In this chapter, I analyze the introduction of technology into the school curriculum
according to the two leading reform proposals in America: Project 2061 and the National
Science Education Standards. I attempt to describe the nature of technology portrayed in both
proposals. I use the conceptual tools that I developed in the previous chapters. Although my
analysis accounts for the general assumptions regarding teaching and learning, I stress the
position technology has in the school curriculum. In others words, I study how the nature
of technology, as it is presented in Project 2061 and the National Standards, would shape our
conception of science education. This chapter is descriptive in the sense that it attempts to
provide the reader with a general idea of the role of technology in these proposals. In
addition, this chapter is critical in the sense that it is looking for the specific technological

knowledge that would connect science and technology.

The perspective of Project 2061

In this section, I explore the meaning of the term technology in light of Project 2061.
The Project has reported its conception of technology across three documents. The first is the
Panel Report on Technology (Johnson, 1989). This document was produced by experts who
were asked to select the knowledge that schools should teach for technological literacy. This
suggestion was enriched and translated into the framework of the Project: the book entitled
Science for All Americans (SFAA). The preparation of documents for developing curriculum
was a different phase. This phase is mainly represented in the Benchmarks for Science
Literacy (AAAS 1993), and the Blueprints for Reform (e. g. National Center for Research on
Teaching and Learning, 1994). All these documents have information about technology and

technology education. However, for the purposes of unpacking the conception of

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technology, in this section, I will focus my analysis on SFAA and the Panel Report on
Technology (AAAS, 1990; Johnson, 1989).

SFAA presents a set of recommendations on what knowledge about technology is
required for scientific literacy. In fact, the text dedicates two chapters to exploring the concept
of technology: Chapters 3 and 8. In this context, the term technology is used beyond its
traditional meaning of artifact or even beyond the notion of educational technology. In a
broad sense, SFAA claims that:"...technology extends our abilities to change the world, to
cut, shape, or put together materials, to move things from one place to another, to reach
farther with our hands, voice, and sense" (p. 25). This wide conception of technology is
refined introducing three general ideas: he connection between science and technology, the
principles of technology itself, and the connection between technology and society.

The relationship between science and technology is seen in SFAA as a two-way route.
In other words, the authors describe how science produces some basic knowledge for
technology and how technology produces tools for science. The existence of technology is
justified as more than a producer of tools. SFAA claims that technologists work with
epistemological motivations, i.e. research for knowledge. In this way, the connection
between science and technology includes the production of knowledge because of
technological problems: "The theory of conservation of energy was developed in large part
because of the technological problem of increasing the efficiency of commercial steam engines
" (p. 26, 27).

The relationship between science and technology is enriched in SFAA by illustrating
how some classical technologies such as engineering have scientific characteristics: "...the
use of mathematics, the interplay of creativity and logic, the eagerness to be original..."
(p.27). However, these similarities do not mean identity. In fact, according to SFAA:
"Scientists see patterns in phenomena as making the world understandable; engineers also see
them as making the world manipulable" (p.27). These different epistemological positions

have tremendous implications on the nature of technology suggested by Project 2061.

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Scientists, according to SFAA, assume that the world is understandable while
technologists assume that the world is manipulable. The motivations behind science and
technology are partially different. In this sense, whereas for scientists knowledge is an end,
for technologists it is a mean in dealing with practical goals. As I will show later, this
conception of technology has important implications for developing curriculum.

The second general topic that SFAA suggests as part of the nature of technology is
Design and Systems. This topic is identified with the principles of technology itself and
includes four areas (pp 28-32):

The Essence of Engineering is Design under Constraint
All Technologies Involve Control

Technologies Always Have Side Effects
All Technological Systems Can Fail

In light of SFAA, the concept of design is the essence of technology. Although
engineering is used as an example, the text goes beyond classical engineering. The authors
describe general characteristics of technological design such as: flexibility, constraints (social
and natural), testability, multiple options, etc. However, this description is poor in
approaching the epistemological demands that technological designs would require. For
example, there is not any discussion on the possibilities of using technological methods of
design. The substantive knowledge that supports the technological design is not clear either.
This is understandable given the fact that SFAA is not a treatise on engineering or philosophy
of technology. In addition, only recently philosophers and ethnographers of technology have
studied the concept and use of design and the demands of technological knowledge within

technological communities (Bucciarelli, 1994).

Although SFAA does not present in an explicit way its conception of design, the
general idea seems to be in line with planning the creation of artifacts. Within the context of
science and technology education, Wolff-Michael Roth has recently suggested that : "[Design]

includes creating artifacts, specifying how a system should be organized, or specifying how a

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process should be executed. Design constitutes one form of situated learning in which
students appropriate practice co-incidentally in the pursuit of a purposeful goal..." (1996, p.
108). Although Roth's definition of design is much more specific, it seems to be in general
accordance with the implicit conception of technological design of SFAA.

The other section on the area of Design and System presents a description on the
nature of technological systems. SFAA introduces concepts such as "control", "unexpected

outcomes , technological failure", etc., in order to show general characteristics of
technological systems. Drawing on examples taken from classical technologies, SFAA
describes the importance of understanding intended and unexpected outcomes of
technological design. The text not only points out examples of intended outcomes, but it
stresses the complexities of unintended outcomes: "Some side effects are unexpected because
of a lack of interest on resources to predict them. But many are not predictable even in
principle because of the sheer complexity of technological systerrrs..." (p. 30). This position
recognizes that technology is not the simple positivistic application of scientific knowledge to
practical problems. In contrast, there is an intrinsic level of uncertainty in the design and
control of technological systems. This idea is coherent with current works on philosophy and
ethnography of technology. For example, drawing from an anthropological study on the
production of solar energy cells, Louis Bucciarelli reports that: "...ambiguity and uncertainty
are essential to design [engineering design]" ( 1988, p. 120).

The final section of SFAA on the nature of technology refers to issues of technology
and society. In this section the authors present a general description of the social matrix in
which technology is embedded. For example, SFAA shows how the human presence has
changed our earth and the living organism in part because of technological innovations. The
text draws on examples taken from environmental problems. Although SFAA tackles delicate
problems on environmental and related issues, its position is not alarmist. In addition, the
authors of SFAA display an optimistic position on the uses of technology in society, such as

their industrial and commercial advantages. In this way, they explain how technological

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systems interact with social systems and recognize that these interactions are usually complex.
Although SFAA is the most well-known report that Project 2061 has published, it is
important to review other reports of the Project in order to unpack its notion of technology. In
fact, there are two more documents that I analyze below: the Panel Report on Technology and
the Benchmarks for Science Literacy (Johnson, 1989; AAAS, 1993).

The panel report is an important source for summarizing the conception of the nature
of technology in Project 2061. This report suggests a framework for technology which is
coherent with the image presented in SFAA. This framework can be explained using some of
its questions: "What knowledge and know-how are needed? What materials will be used to
construct the artifacts of technology?..." (Johnson 1989, p.3). These questions are a sample
of some "technological" questions that are in accordance with the principles of technology
suggested by SFAA. In addition, the panel report introduces other kinds of questions which
should also be familiar to the technologically literate citizen:

-What are the mechanisms by which the technology enters [to the] social system?...
-Does the technology put at risk the users, or other people who are not beneficiaries?...
~Will the technology have long-range effects on the course of human history?"
(Johnson 1989, p. 3, 4).
These question are meta-technological questions in the sense that they do not address just
technical problems. They address social problems, that is, problems related with
technology conceptualized as a social practice. The conception of technology of the panel
report is coherent with SFAA and both suggest a conception of technology which goes
beyond the traditional notion of artifact, as I pointed out above. They both stress
technology as knowledge and technology as social practice. In fact, I argue that Project
2061's conception of technology includes the three general meanings of the term suggested
earlier: a) technology as artifacts (tools, special artifacts such as the computer, x rays, etc.),
technology as knowledge (e.g., technological knowledge for solving problems), and c)

technology as social practice (relationship between technology and social issues).1

 

1From a general perspective, these three meanings of the term technology are also useful
for understanding how researchers have studied the process of engineering design.

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In the context of teaching and learning science, one basic meaning of the terrrr
technology is its epistemological connotations, that is, technology as knowledge. I argue
that in order to clarify the role that technology would play in teaching science it is important
to study the relationship between scientific and technological knowledge in the context of
teaching science. This seems to be (obviously) an essential step in clarifying the potential
introduction of technology as part of the science curriculum. This task was done in the last
chapter from a general perspective. Now, I specifically examine the technological content

knowledge suggested by Project 2061 and its relation to teaching science.

Teaching technology, teaching science: The perspective of Project 2061

In order to unpack the relationship between teaching science and teaching technology
in light of Project 2061 I propose to follow the study on the topic of energy that I initiated
earlier (chapter 4). That is, I study how energy is treated from the perspective of both science
and technology education.

In the context of science education, SFAA suggests an academic approach in which
energy is understood using mainly atomic and molecular models. For example, the process
of transformation of heat from "warmer" places to "cooler" is explained in the following
terms:

Heat energy in a material consists of the disordered motions of its perpetually colliding
atoms or molecules. As very large numbers of atoms or molecules in one region of a
material repeatedly and randomly collide with those of a neighboring region, there are
far more ways in which their energy of random motion can end up shared about equally

throughout both regions than there are ways in which it can end up more concentrated
in one region ( p. 51).

 

Traditional research has focused on the product of the design, i.e. artifacts, machines (e.g.
Aglan, & Ali, 1996; Koen, 1994). A second line of research has focused on the
knowledge behind the design process (e.g. Eder, 1994; Fricke, 1996). A third approach
has studied the social context of design in which talking, negotiating and communicating
are important activities of engineering design (e.g. Bucciarelli, 1988; 1994).

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In line with this conception of energy, the “Benchmarks” suggests to develop curriculum
toward atomic models. In grades K-2 it, is only expected that students become aware of
some sources of energy (e.g. the sun). For grade 6-8 , the reformers upgrade their
expectations. For example, by the end of the 8th grade, "students should know that:

0 Heat can be transferred through materials by the collisions of atoms...
0 Energy appears in different forms. Heat energy is in the disorderly motion of molecules
..." (p.85).

For grades 9 to 12 the situation is even more demanding. In the case of heat energy,
student should know that: "...it consists of the disordered motions of its atoms or molecules.
In any interaction of atoms or molecules, the statistical odds are that they will end up with less
order than they began- that is, with the heat energy spread out more evenly..." (p.86).
Moreover, the final section on energy is dedicated to the introduction of quantum ideas, i.e.
more abstract ideas.2

The topic of energy introduced within the context of technology (chapter 8 of SFAA
and the Benchmarks) receives a different treatment. The emphasis here is that students can
obtain a sense of the process of transfer of energy from a macroscopic perspective. For K-2,

students the Benchmarks suggest that: "the emphasis should be on familiarizing them with a

 

2The use of atomic and molecular models in school science has its advantages and
limitations. One problem, for example, is the common idea that temperature (T) is a
measure of kinetic energy of the molecules or atoms in a substance. This idea seems to
have its roots when people began to identify the works of J. Bernoulli (1738) and L. Euler
(1729) [both developed an expression for the pressure (P) of a dilute gas in function of the
volume (V), mass (m), velocity (v) and number of moles (N )] with empirical results of
gases. Euler suggested the following expression of the pressure of dilute gases

=(l/3)(NN) mv2 (T rusdell, 1968, p. 274). People, perhaps physics textbooks writers,
have put together this expression with the empirical results that connects pressure, volume

and temperature, i.e. Boyle's Law: P= (NN)kT), in other words: ( l/3)(NN)mv2 =

(NN)kT. From this expression, one can deduce that (l/2)mv2=(3/2)kT. This
mathematical expression, although logical, does not provide meaning for temperature.
Several textbooks use this mathematical expression to make the case that "temperature is a
measure of kinetic energy of the molecules or atoms in a substance". However, this
expression confuses two different models: the kinetic theory of ideal gases and the kinetic
theory of matter (J.L. Sanchez-Saenz, personal communication, November 1995). In this
specific example, school science seems to present a trivialization of a microscopic model.

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wide variety of phenomena that result from moving water, wind, burning fuel, or connecting
to batteries and wall sockets"(p. 193). The idea seems to move students from these early
experiences to design energy-conversion systems using available material. In line with the
general conception of technology education, design, testing, measuring, and problem solving,
seem to be the base of this kind of literacy.

The topic of energy seems to receive two different treatments in Project 2061. One is
in the context of teaching science and the other is in the context of technology. One could
argue that this only reflects how project 2061 faces this specific topic of energy. Although a
comprehensive study will be needed, I argue that in the context of Project 2061, there is a
clear distinction between teaching science and teaching technology. The difference can be
partially explained given the epistemological position of science and technology endorsed by
Project 2061. However, this difference does not mean that teaching technology should deny
teaching science. What is clear in this context is that both are different; however, science and
technology education share many characteristics such as: logical thinking, testing,
measuring, problem solving, and using mathematical models. The most important difference
that I observe between both kinds of "standards", within the context of Project 2061, is
related to two aspects. First, the goals behind teaching science are different from the goals
behind teaching technology. Teaching technology is more related to applications,
transformation, problem solving, and mainly designing. Teaching science is more
connected to understanding, explaining, and knowing. Second, the knowledge behind
teaching science is partially different from the knowledge behind teaching technology. In the
case of my example of energy, in the context of Project 2061, teaching science is more related
to atomic models. Teaching technology, in contrast, is related to general ideas of transfer of

energy, particularly it is related to the design of artifacts.

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Technological content knowledge: The missing element

If one asks about the demands of knowledge that Project 2061 introduces in teaching
energy according to its vision of science education, there will be few problems. SFAA and
the Benchmarks present a set of recommendations on what specific knowledge students
should learn. As we saw, both documents stress scientific models of energy, particularly
atomic and molecular models. On the other hand, if one asks what the demands of knowledge
that a movement toward technology education creates, there will be several problems. SFAA
and the Benchmarks present general explanations on the kind of teaching and learning that
reformers expect. However, the knowledge that students should learn, from the perspective
of introducing technology, is not explicit. Developing projects, solving problems,
measuring, testing, etc. are activities rather than specific kinds of knowledge.

In this section, I re-analyze the topic of energy using the basic principles suggested by
Project 2061. I study the kinds of knowledge that students and teachers need to know in
teaching energy from the perspective of technology.

In line with the framework on technology constructed in the first part of this chapter, it
is necessary to have a specific practical problem in order to teach technology. This is the first
difference with the traditional way of teaching science. Teaching technology will require
teachers to engage their students in solving practical problems and designing artifacts. The
Benchmarks of Project 2061 for example suggests that for grades 6-8 : "...students [should
be] making and testing simple energy-conversions devices as tabletop wind generator and
model solar collector...the data that they gather can inspire hypotheses..." (p. 194). Let
us think about making a solar collector. The first problem that a given teacher will have to
face is the WHY of building such an artifact. As we discussed earlier, the design of artifact
(e.g., machines) requires functional questions (e.g., for what?). In addition, and in contrast
to traditional science and school science problems, technological problems have their roots in

practical situations which are usually ill-defined. Let us assume that the teacher and students

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agree on designing a solar collector for heating water. Let us also assume that we are talking
about students who can be engaged in developing alternative ways of using energy (in
contrast to traditional ways such as combustion which produces pollution). What is
important for my account is that in teaching technology, the selection of the problem goes
beyond traditional disciplinary knowledge.

Within the context of the classroom, the problem of heating water will not be
determined until the teacher and students discuss the social reasons for thinking in alternatives
ways of using energy. In addition, they have to talk about conceptual and material resources
available. Materials for building the collector (metal, wood, etc.) will be needed, in addition
to tools (e. g., hammer) and instruments (e. g. thermometers). Moreover, specific information
will be needed. For example, the amount of water to be heated and the initial and final
conditions of the water. Consequently, traditional scientific knowledge is not enough.
However, what is the kind of knowledge required for carrying out these activities?

Rather than presenting a general discussion of the potential technological knowledge
suggested by Project 2061, I choose to focus my analysis on the specific technological
knowledge which is behind the potential design of a solar collector.

In designing a typical solar collector (e.g., a simple box -with a window- which can
contain a fluid), engineers do not use atomic models. 3 They do not even use classic
thermodynamics because"...it simply prescribes how much heat to supply to, or reject from, a
system during a process between specified end states without taking care of whether or how
this could be accomplished" (Kreith, 1973, p.2) which is in line with my discussion on the
descriptive character of scientific knowledge. Moreover, this general theory does not include
time as an important variable (time is a very important practical variable). What engineers

use, or construct, is a specific kind of knowledge developed by the demands of the specific

 

3The distinction between micro and macroscopic models is also presented in technological
knowledge. There are specific technological theories which are by nature microscopic, for
example, a theory of construction of solar cells based on the quantum theory of solids.
However, technologists will not use microscopic (deeper) theories from the very
beginning. The typical attitude of technologists is pragmatic, so if macroscopic theories
work, why should an engineer, for example, use more complicated theories?

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design and the constraints of reality (e.g. kind of materials, costs, engineering standards as
Vicenti, 1990 and Shapiro 1997 eloquently have shown). In the specific case of our collector.
"...the determination of the rate of heat transfer at a specified temperature difference is the key
problem" (Kreith, 1973, p.2). This information and the desirable outcomes provide the
bases for calculating costs, size, feasibility, etc. I do not discuss all these complexities here.

I am interested in the specific technological knowledge which has potential connection with
teaching science in K-12 education.

In designing a collector, the models that engineers tend to use are macroscopic which
can be based on either conduction, radiation or convection. Although each of these
mechanisms has its own theoretical support, in order to simplify my example let us think of
conduction as the mechanism that a teacher wants students to use in designing their collector
(yet radiation is the "source" or energy). J. Fourier developed, in the early 1800's, a model
for conduction which assumes that heat flows from higher to lower temperatures. He
suggested that the rate of heat flow is equal to the product of three quantities: 1) the thermal
conductivity of the material (k), 2) the area of the section through which heat flows (A), 3) the
rate of the change of temperature (T) with respect to distance in the direction of heat flow(x). 4
Within the classroom, this theoretical explanation of the process of transfer of heat can be the
basis of the design of the collector or goals for teaching science. In teaching technology
students would change areas of contact (A) or materials (k) in order to design different kinds
of collectors. In teaching science, the goal can be to understand processes of transference of
heat using macroscopic models (e.g., Linn, & Muilenbegur 1996). What is fundamental for
my point is that this kind of knowledge, technological knowledge, is not explicit in Project
206 1 .

 

4The analytical modern view of heat transfer assumes differential equations; for example, a
modern interpretation of Fourier's law for one-dimensional conduction is q=-kAdT/dx.
However, if one approaches more complex problems (e. g. three-dimensional conduction,
radiation and convection), "the solutions" go beyond the analytical methods and other
rlngequs are needed, for example, graphical, analogical, and numerical methods (Kreith,

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So far I have shown a general conception of the nature of technology suggested by
Project 2061. I also illuminated the problems of the lack of clarity with the technological
knowledge that teachers and students should learn. At this moment, the image of Project
2061 seems to reflect a high concern for the introduction of technology as part of K—12
education; however, its connection with science is still problematic. Now I analyze the
National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1995) given that this is a
very important document which is shaping current science education reforms. I study the

position that technology has in this proposal.

The position of technology in the National Science Education Standards5

Project 2061 has had an important impact on the National Science Education
Standards, NSES (Bybee, 1997). For instance, the emphasis of the Standards on deeper
content knowledge and unifying concepts and processes seems to have its roots in the work
of Project 2061. However, Project 2061 and the National Standards are quite different
enterprises, yet they both share the goal of reforming science education. In fact, the
Standards document has several components which provide guidance in many specific
areas of teaching science such as professional development, assessment, teaching, content,
etc. In contrast, Project 2061 is better known for its work on curriculum and mainly
content (Science for All Americans and the Benchmarks for Science Literacy).

Although Project 2061 is publishing materials in areas different than curriculum,
for example, the Teacher Education Blueprint (National Center for Research on Teacher
Learning, 1994, see also AAAS, 1997), the documents that seem to identify Project 2061
are related to content, that is, what students should learn. Given these differences between
Project 2061 and the National Standards, I approach the study of the position of technology
in the Standards analyzing mainly the content area.

 

5 Througgout the text, I refer to the National Science Education Standards in different
forrrrs. I use the expressions: "the Standards" or the National Standards and mainly the
NSES.

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In general, technology has a more important position in Project 2061 than in the
N SES. As I analyzed earlier, Project 2061 dedicates an entire section of its framework,
Science for All Americans, to clarify the nature of technology and several other sections to
introduce technology as part of K-12 education (e. g., activities on engineering design
according to the Benchmarks for Science Literacy, in addition to a chapter on the Designed
World). Although the National Standards recognizes the importance of technology:
"Everyone needs to be able to engage intelligently in public discourse and debate about
issues that involve science and technology", the "weight" of technology in the Standards is
minimal. Even in the case in which some technological tasks are introduced, there is a
tendency to be very careful with its presentation: "Because this study of technology occurs
within science courses, the number of these activities [technological tasks] must be limite "
(National Research Council, 1995, p. 192).

Regarding the general nature of technology endorsed by the Standards, this seems
to be in line with Project 2061's : "As used in the Standards, the central distinguishing
characteristic between science and technology is a difference in goals: The goal of science is
to understand the natural world, and the goal of technology is to make modifications in the
world to meet human needs" (p.24). In addition, the Standards recognizes the
epistemological richness of technology: "Technology as design is included in the Standards
as parallel to science as inquiry" (ibid., p.24). Therefore, the general conception of
technology in the Standards goes beyond the notion of artifact that we explored earlier as
l the document clarifies: "The use of 'Technology' in the Standards is not to be confused
with 'instructional technology' which provides students and teachers with exciting tools -
such as computers...to conduct inquiry and understand science" (p.24).

The first substantive appearance of technology in the context of the Standards is in

the Standard E. According to that, K-4 students should develop:

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Abilities of technological design,

Understanding about science and technology,

Abilities to distinguish natural objects and objects made by humans (p.135).

The concern of this standard is on developing students' abilities and understanding
about design, technological solutions, constructions of artifact, etc. It seems that the
standards are calling for familiarity with some technological strategies, that is, to identify a
problem, propose a solution, implement a solution, or evaluate a design. At this level,
some of the technological tasks suggested are:

...making yogurt and discussing how it is made, comparing two types of string to
see which is the best for lifting different objects, exploring how small potted plants
can be made to grow as quickly as possible, designing a simple system to hold two
objects together, testing the strength of different materials, using simple tools,
testing different designs, and constructing a simple structure (p.137).

From the point of view of teaching science, these experiences should be related to
the goal of understanding. To some extent, in the context of the standards understanding
science is in line with the notion of internal relevance that I developed earlier (chapter 2),
that is, describing, explaining and predicting using canonical knowledge:

Understanding science requires that an individual integrate a complex structure of
many types of knowledge, including the ideas of science, relationships between
ideas, reasons for these relationships, ways to use the ideas to explain and predict
other natural phenomena, and ways to apply them to many events (p.23).
However the NSES does not provide guidance on how to put together this conception of
understanding with technological tasks such as making yogurt or designing a simple bridge
(structure).

As one can see in the context of the N SES, teaching science tends to stress
questions like: How can microorganisms produce yogurt? What kind of biochemical
reactions take place? What kind of forces act on a structure (e.g. a bridge)? Why does the
bridge support a given charge? From the perspective of technology, what matters is the
very construction of useful artifacts (a plan for making yogurt, an efficient bridge). The

question is: What is the knowledge that students should learn after designing and

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constructing such kind of artifacts? Moreover, what is the knowledge that teachers should
know in order to help students with technological tasks. The potential answer to this
question is related to the clarification of the technological content knowledge behind the
design process. So far, the standard E on technology does not clarify the nature of this
knowledge. It does not even mention its potential existence. Despite the critique that I
presented on the lack of clarity on the specific technological content knowledge needed to
introduce technology in the context of teaching science, Project 2061 has a more developed
conception of technology than the National Standards.

Although the National Standards do not clarify the potential existence of
technological knowledge, they do suggest the need of introducing technology into the
teaching of science. The next level of the standard refers to students in grades 5 to 8.
Here. the NSES stresses the relationship between science and technology: "The
[technological] tasks chosen should involve the use of science concepts already familiar to
students or should motivate them to learn new concepts needed to use or understand
technology" (p.161). At this level (middle-school years), technological tasks are more
demanding; "...experiences could include making electrical circuits for a warrrring device,
designing a meal to meet nutritional criteria, choosing a material to combine strength with
insulation..." (p.165).

The stress in connecting science with technology in the middle-school according to
this standard does not mean a clarification of what scientific concepts should be used or
how to make the connection between scientific concepts and design. Any of the activities
suggested (e.g., making an electrical circuit for warming a device, designing the
components of a meal, selecting materials on the bases of heat transference and strength
proprieties) require a specific kind of knowledge, technological content lmowledge, a
knowledge which is absent in the NSES. My argument is that without having an idea of
the kind of knowledge required for dealing with these activities, the National Standards are

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asking teachers for something unknown. Think, for example, of the task of making an
electrical circuit for warming a device.

Although the problem of designing an electrical circuit for warrrring a device is
similar to the design of a solar collector (examined in chapter 1 and re-examined in chapter
5), it is instructive to point out the need of clarifying what the knowledge required to carry
out this activity is. The problem of design should start with the specification of: what
device needs to be heated, what changes of temperature are needed and what the general
conditions of the material to be heated are (static, dynamics). In short, for what is the
artifact needed. The standards call this starting point the clarification of the technological
problem. It is important to note that technological problems differ from scientific
problems. The former tend to be practical while the latter cognitive. Being practical does
not mean that these problems do not have cognitive demands. The very epistemology of
technological problems is tied to actions (rather than only analysis). So, one can assume
that the solution of practical problems will present cognitive demands for teachers and
students.

The most advanced topics of the standard on technology in K—12 education appear
for grades 9 to 12. Here, the situation is similar to the sections already examined with the
addition of more stress in the design process and the connection science/technology: "This
standard has two equally important parts [1] developing students’ abilities of technological
design and [2] developing students' understanding about science and technology" (p. 190).
The standard also suggests some general guides on the choices of technological tasks
which should take into account issues like "...whether to involve students in a full or partial
design problem; or whether to engage them in meeting a need through technology or in
studying the technological work of others" (p. 190). Although the general advice is
important, the criteria that teachers need to know in order to make a decision on whether or
not to involve students in a full design process should be illuminated by the kind of

knowledge that they (teachers and students) are persuading and the material conditions for

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deve10ping technological work (e.g. materials, instrumentation, laboratories). It is
impossible to make a reasoned decision on these aspects of teaching without having ideas
of the knowledge that teachers and students will need, the interconnection between
knowledge and artifacts, and the conditions that teachers and students will need for
developing these projects. The National Science Education Standards do not approach this

important problem.

Personal Relevance: The case of the National Science Education Standards
and Project 2061

Although the explicit technological knowledge that students should learn is a
missing element of the standards, one should note that Personal and Social Perspectives of
science are important components of this reform initiative. It is true that the N SES show
few aspects of technological knowledge in the section on technology. However, the section
of the relevance of science, Personal and Social Perspectives , is full of technological
assumptions. In fact, this section is characterized for K-4 grades in terms of:

Personal health
Characteristics and changes in populations
Types of resources

Changes in environments
Science and technology in local challenges

For grades 5-8 the topics are similar with the addition that students should take a
more global perspective (changes in society as opposed to local challenges).

In these two levels, from K-4 to 5-8 grades, there is a clear concern on the
personal uses of science. I do not report in detail all the standards here, in part, because
only some of them are directly related to technology. However, it is important to note that
the construct Personal Relevance -as a meaning of application- explored earlier (chapter 1
and 2), accounts for this tendency of the Standards. Although the connection between
personal relevance and technology is a difficult one, the standards provide help in clarifying

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important relevant aspects of science and technology that students should know. Think of
the case of health care.

The demands of the standards can be illustrated by the case of Judy already studied
in chapter 4. As we saw, Judy is a science teacher who values the personal uses that
students can make of science. Health was a constant concern of Judy's classes and it is
also a concern of the National Standards as the following example shows: “Food provides
energy and nutrients for growth and development. Nutrition requirements vary with body
weight, age, sex, and body functioning (Personal Health Standards for 4-8 level, p. 168).
This standard is only a sample of a set of recommendations related to health issues. For
Judy, for example, this is a basic criteria in selecting knowledge. In this case, the relevant
knowledge seems to come from biology and related fields such as biotechnology.

The case of Project 2061 is somewhat similar. The Project dedicates some sections
to health (chapter 6 of SFAA) and also a specific section to health technology (Chapter 8).
It is clear that Project 2061 has less to say regarding Science in Personal and Social
Perspectives. In other words, the Standards seem to do a better job in this direction.
However, Project 2061 did take into account this important aspect of teaching science.

Personal Relevance, as it is presented in the National Standards and Project 2061,
is connected to social aspects of science. Some of these aspects were conceptualized in my
framework of technology with the notion of technology as social practice. They also have
been the core of the so-called STS movement (Yager, 1996). Although advocates of the
STS movement complain for the lack of attention that the NSES show on the STS topics
(R. Yager, personal communication September 1996), my reading of this document
indicates that one would connect several standards with STS themes.

The connection between personal relevance and social aspects of science is only
insinuated by the Standards and Project 2061. For example, the case of HIV is explicitly
suggested in SFAA. This topic can be connected to discussion on DNA (as the case of

Judy shows) and a discussion on sex. In this context, technology would play a role.

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However, the notion of technology that the NSES and Project 2061 portray regarding this
connection is technology as artifact (e.g., instruments). The explicit technological
knowledge that allows researchers to connect biology with applications is not presented in

both reforms.

Concluding Comments.

Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards provide elements for a
discussion about the introduction of technology in general education. I think that both
reforms share several features regarding the position that technology should have in the K-
12 curriculum. There are basic points that one can stress: 1) technology is seen as
important, 2) there is a conception of technology that goes beyond artifact (particularly
Project 2061 shows the epistemological value of technology, yet the Project was not explicit
with the technological content knowledge that students should learn); and 3) the National
Science Education Standards (N SES) seem to stress more the social aspects of science in
which technology would find a place.

One could think that, in fact, the two leading reforms make room for technology
into the science curriculum. Therefore, the only thing that one should do is...do it!
However, one should remember that the introduction of technology as part of the science
curriculum is nothing new. There have been several efforts which have not had real impact.
One of the reasons is that usually these propositions are not explicit with the kind of
knowledge that students can learn with this approach. This seems to be part of the problem
in Project 2061 and the NSES, yet there is clear progress in the conception of technology
presented at least in Project 2061 (a progress that can be evaluated by looking at Table 4.1
on the evolution of the relationship science/technology). However, it is still important to
know what the connections between scientific and technological knowledge are in order to
be aware of the potential that technology has for teaching science. This is a missing point of

the intents made to introduce technology as part of the science curriculum.

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A second problem the introduction of technology faces is its academic status.
Technology is identified with vocational studies. In contrast, science is identified with high
academic status. This is implicit in the National Science Education Standards. This
assumption does not have support given the intrinsic epistemological richness of
technological knowledge. However, the perception that teachers and reformers can have of
technology is shaped by these problems of academic status. The introduction of technology
into the curriculum forces us to rethink these potential problems. In the following chapter, I
study why it is difficult to be explicit with the specific technological knowledge translated
into the curriculum and how the problems of status of knowledge can or would be basic
obstacles for introducing technology into the curriculum. In developing my argument
I re-study some sections of the National Science Education Standards and mainly Project
2061. However, the chapter attempts to explain the process of translating scientific, and

mainly technological, knowledge from expert knowledge into school knowledge.

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CHAPTER 7

TRANSLATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
INTO SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE

My aim in this chapter is to study the translation of scientific and mainly
technological knowledge into the curriculum. I am particularly interested on contrasting the
translation of scientific knowledge in relation to the translation of technological knowledge
into school knowledge. My thesis is that the difficulties that technology has had in finding
a place into the science curriculum are hidden by a complex process of translation of

knowledge which I explain in social and epistemological terms.

Translation of knowledge

There are several meanings of the term translation. In Physics for example,
translation is related to the motion of a body, particularly its changes of position in relation
to a given reference system.1 The assumption in Classic Mechanics is that some basic
proprieties of this given body (e. g. mass) do not change because of the translation. This
assumption is only valid for low velocities in relation to the speed of light. In this context,
translation and movement are synonymous, i.e., both refer to changes. The same holds
for mechanics of fluids in which physicists and engineers use the term "flow" for referring
to the translation of a special kind of physical object. In contrast to translation of bodies,
flux has the connotation of continuity which at the end is nothing more than another
methodological strategy in the treatment of movement of fluids (e. g., gases). This is the

case in processes of transfer of mass, such as diffusion ( i.e. the transfer of a fluid within

 

1Given a body, its position P1 at the time t1 can be represented by a point in a Cartesian
system as P1= (X1, Y1, 21) and its position P2 at the time t2 (t2> t1) is represented as
P2: (X2, Y2, Z2). The translation of the body is represented by the change of position
AP ( AP: P2-P1), The translation AP can also be interpreted from a vectorial point of

view. Note that the representation of the body and its translation is based on a process of
idealization, i.e. the possibility of representing real bodies by ideal points. This process of
idealization of real objects and its correspondence representation by abstract constructs has
been a powerful methodological strategy in physics and other sciences.

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another fluid because of change of concentration.

As one can see, the term translation seems to refer to material objects. In contrast.
when physicists or engineers talk about energy (which is a propriety rather than an object)
they do not use the word translation. They use the word "transfer". It is illustrated by
areas of disciplinary knowledge such as "transfer of energy" or "transfer of heat”. The term
"transfer of energy" is a misleading name because it produces the sense that "something"
called energy is transferred. In fact, one could think that energy is an object that moves
from one place to another rather than a propriety. As it is accepted now, energy is a
propriety rather than an object. However, it is useful to talk about "transfer of energy", yet
we know that energy is not a material object.2

A second meaning of the term translation is its linguistic connotation —the act of
translating from one language (e.g., Spanish) to another language (e.g., English). From a
formal linguistic point of view, a translation is a function that preserves some
characteristics of a given language when this language is translated to another. P.
Churchland (1979), for instance, suggests that "An optimal translation is a mapping
[function] that preserves semantical importance" (p.67). From this point of view, the best
translation will produce maximum agreement. I do not adopt this conception of translation.
Given the multiple factors that affect the translation of scientific knowledge into school

knowledge, it is not possible to guarantee that the goal of translating scientific knowledge

 

2There are two potential analogies between transfer of energy and translation of
knowledge. The first is an analogy that comes from the idea that energy is an object. In
fact, from a historical point of view, the theory of caloric has the assumption that heat
(now accepted as energy) is an object rather than a propriety. This theory assumes that heat
is formed by little particles . In this context, transfer of energy means the translation of
these particles. By the same token, one would argue that translation of knowledge mean
translation of material knowledge. I do not endorse this mechanist conception of
translation of knowledge. A second potential analogy comes from the idea that knowledge
is an explanatory concept like energy. Although this analogy seems to be potentially
fruitful, it should be analyzed further. I think that knowledge is more than an explanatory
concept. It is a propiety of conceptual systems and outcomes of mental processes. I
support a neuropsychological base of knowledge (Neisser, 1976; Bindra, 1976) in which
social factors play critical roles - as the experiments of Alexander Luria, developed in the
305- showed (Luria, 1976).

183

into the curriculum is to produce maximum agreement.

The term translation is used beyond physical sciences or linguistics. Mathematics
and even philosophy make a wide use of the term. Translation from a geometrical point of
view is related to specific kinds of changes of geometrical figures. Isometric translations
are those which keep the structure, for example, the isomorphism, of translating a triangle
onto a triangle with the same dimensions, yet in a different position. 3 From a
philosophical point of view, Quine challenged the possibility of "translating" logical into
empirical meaning. According to him, the distinction between analytic (logical) and
synthetic (factual) truths is ill-founded; therefore, logical meaning does not have translation
into real life (Quine, 1953).

One could go on looking for different meanings of the term translation. However,
in general, it refers to changes. Sometimes it is about changes of material objects and
another is changes of properties of these objects, but in general it is about changes. In the

context of my work, I define translation of knowledge in the following terms:

The translation of knowledge from one community to another is a general
soda-epistemological process which is referred to as the interpretation
and/or reinterpretation of knowledge in a community other than the

community where it was originally produced.

The word translation does not mean that the knowledge translated remains fixed.
Usually the translation includes a reconstruction and production of new knowledge. In this

sense, the term translation does not only mean the use of the same knowledge in different

 

3The mathematician Felix Klein developed a program of unification of Geometry (the
Erlanger Program) based on proprieties of figures which remain invariant under
transformations. In his taxonomy, the Euclidean plane geometry is only a particular case of
geometries which studies the proprieties of figures that remain invariant under translations

and rotations. Here "translation" has the meaning of a change of position in the plane (see
Boyer, 1986).

184

contexts (e. g. scientific knowledge in school settings); it also means reinterpretation and
creation of new knowledge (e. g., school knowledge for purposes of everyday life).

Using the word translation in talking about knowledge has potential problems. The
first potential problem is its common connotation with the translation of material objects.
Such connotation would produce the false impression that knowledge itself is moving from
one place to another, i.e. from one community to another or even from one brain to
another. Based on this, one could conclude that there is knowledge independent of the
human being who is producing or reproducing this knowledge, a position already
suggested by Plato. I do not endorse this assumption. First of all, the meaning of
translation of knowledge in the context of my research goes beyond its mechanical analogy
with translation of bodies. Second, the expression "translation of knowledge" reflects a
methodological strategy in my treatment of knowledge. In other words, I argue that from a
methodological point of view it is convenient to think or pretend that there is translation of
knowledge, i.e., that knowledge goes from one point to another or from one community to
another. However, from an ontological point of view, knowledge is the product of the
brain of a given human being who is embedded in a community.

The methodological treatment of "translation" of knowledge that I offer has some
advantages. It particularly permits the study of the content rather than other proprieties
related with knowledge (e. g., the cognitive processes which produces knowledge -
thinking, learning, knowing, etc.). We use this methodological separation daily in our
lives when we read one's idea on paper. For example, now you are not analyzing
Femando's cognitive processes. What you are doing is analyzing the final product,
oversimplified, of several cognitive processes of Femando's brain. These mental
processes have been influenced for several factors. Some of them are social (the
community in which Fernando is embedded now or was embedded 10 years ago). Others
are personal factors (intrinsic psychological characteristics of Femando's way of

thinking...he likes "abstract" concepts). Several of these factors are unknown and many of

185

them are not relevant for the purposes of the argument that Fernando wants to make in this
paragraph. You can escape from these complexities of Femando's thinking by focusing
on the final product of this process, i.e., the content that this paper represents (knowledge).
You can separate, methodologically, my thinking from the paper that you are reading and
also from the cognitive process which produced that. This methodological strategy would
produce the false impression that Femando's knowledge exists independently of Fernando
(the person with his brain and his social history which produced this paper). However,
this is not the case.

The general assumption that I endorse about knowledge is that there is not
knowledge independent of the human being who produces that (by thinking). I also
assume that there is not knowledge independent of the interactions of this human with other
humans (by acting). In other words, the ontological position that I have about knowledge
is that knowledge is the product of a cognitive process which occurs in the brain of a

human being who is acting in a particular social context.

Translation of scientific knowledge into schools: A sociological perspective
The translation of scientific knowledge into school knowledge became socially
important only when scientific communities appeared as institutions4 (e. g., 300 hundred
years ago in England) and when schools became public. (e. g., 150 hundred year ago in the
USA). What is important is that the process of translation became a process of public
interest. Although for centuries there have been processes of translations such as the case
of the translation of geometrical knowledge into school knowledge following the Elements
of Euclid, these cases were not socially important for the general public. The percentage of

pe0p1e who had access to this kind of education was minimal. The translation of scientific

 

4In 1600 and early 1700 "...no professional mathematical organization yet existed, but in
Italy, France, and England there were loosely organized scientific groups: the Academia dei
Lincei (to which Galileo belonged) and the Academia del Cimentoi in Italy, the Cabinet Du
Puy in France, and the Invisible College in England" (Boyer, 1968, p.367).

186

knowledge into school knowledge did not represent a social problem. The picture is
different when one sees that now, in industrialized societies (and even in other countries) a
wide spectrum of the population is expected to become scientifically literate (e. g., Science
for all Americans of Project 2061). This is the intrinsic social character of the translation of
knowledge which only appeared with the emergence of scientific communities and mainly
with the emergence of public education as an institution. Therefore, without scientific
communities, there would be no translation of scientific knowledge. Without universal
education, there would not be public interest in studying translation of knowledge as a
social phenomena. This is an oversimplified picture of the relationship between science
and school science as institutions, but it is a preliminary image of how both communities,
scientific and school communities, are connected by a flow and production of knowledge
that I call "translation."

From my point of view, the process of translation of scientific knowledge into
school knowledge is a socio-epistemological process. For methodological reasons, I will
study fnst some epistemological characteristics of the translation of scientific and
technological knowledge. This epistemological analysis will provide a basis to discuss
some of the social factors which are behind the translation of specific scientific and

technological knowledge.

Translation of scientific knowledge: A general introduction

The translation of knowledge on which I focus is a process of transfer of scientific
knowledge from scientific communities to school communities resulting in science school
knowledge. I argue that this process produces changes in the knowledge which is
translated. In other words, because of this process, some aspects of the expert scientific
knowledge (ESK) changes when it is used in school communities. Early in my work, I

suggested that the change of scientific knowledge when it is translated to school subjects

187

would be explained for the following reasons among others:
a) the users [of scientific knowledge] are different, in this case teachers have
different goals than scientists; b) the reinterpretation of the theory introduces
changes; c) the level of schooling of students and teachers introduces limitations: (1)
the rules and conventions in both communities, scientific and school communities,
are different; e) the educational system is also a site of knowledge production.
(Cajas, 1995a, p. 179)

It is possible that the reader would find problematic my interpretation that scientists
and teachers have different goals. My point here is that both institutions, scientific and
school communities, have different goals. I do not mean that schools do not have some
overlapping goals with scientific communities. However, schools are being asked to do
many more things than teaching science.

The second point is the changes to a given scientific theory when it is re-interpreted.
Let us think of the notion of force and the different scientific theories about forces.
Traditionally, the concept of force that has been translated from scientific communities to
school communities is the Newtonian Mechanics. Usually, school science has the goal of
teaching versions of the Newtonian Mechanics. The school goal seems to be the
reproduction of Newton's laws. The reinterpretation of these laws introduces intrinsic
problems. For example, what students and several teachers have is a phenomenological
conception of force, i.e., force as perceptual or even visible actions (push or pull). For
some people, these interpretations are only the perceptual roots of more abstract concepts of
forces (diSessa, 1993). Although the goal of scientists and science teachers with their
students is to use these conceptual tools for understanding natural phenomena, the level of
schooling introduces limitations. It seems that only some elementary and secondary
science teachers develop Newtonian conceptions of forces. Research in naive conceptions
has shown the status of such notions in students, i.e., they are no developed conceptions
of forces (Viennot, 1973). Therefore, the translation of the Newtonian Mechanics has

been problematic, yet not impossible.

It is important to note that the translation of knowledge of which I am talking about

188

is the translation from expert scientific knowledge (ESK) to school science knowledge
(SSK). My assumption is that SSK is the outcome of a complex process of selection,
debate and reinterpretation of a small part of ESK. As I discussed in chapter 3, from a
methodological point of view I separate the translation of expert knowledge (ESK) to
school knowledge (SSK) in several different stages. For example, in my framework, the
first generic translation from ESK to SSK includes a transformation of expert knowledge
into subject-matter knowledge (SK). Remember that SK is the knowledge of science
teachers (see chapter 3 and 4). Expert knowledge is related to subject-matter knowledge in
different forms, some of which are epistemological relations (e.g., key ideas in the
discipline versus key ideas in teaching, Deng, 1997; Cajas, 1995a) while other are social
(Cajas, 1995a, Chevallard, 1990; Verrert, 1975).

The traditional picture of the translation of scientific knowledge into school
knowledge is usually seen as a monolithic, passive and atemporal process. Even
contemporary and progressive science education reform proposals such as Project 2061
present or assume such a static picture. However, a critical view of the history of science
education and also a revision of the research on the evolution of scientific ideas show that
the case is much more complex than that. Here, one should note that the way in which one
sees the translation of ESK to SSK is shaped by one's conception on how scientific
knowledge is produced, developed and communicated.

First of all, in developing scientific explanations within scientific communities,
there is usually a set of competing ideas (Kuhn, 1962/ 1972). Only some of these ideas
survive in a given era and few of them are translated into the school cuniculum. For
example, the concepts of force suggested by Aristotle, Leibinz and Descartes, among
others, were not translated to the school knowledge. All of them have interesting
approaches to the notion of force and its potential application for explaining and predicting
the movement of objects (see an example in Silva, & Bastos, 1995, an historical analysis of

the Leibiniz and Descarte' conception of forces). However, none of them is even

189

mentioned in traditional science classes. The Newtonian paradigm was the only one which
was translated. What is interesting is that it was not the work of Newton the one that was
actually translated to the school knowledge. Although the work of Newton is important,
traditional histories of science have overvalued it. The school knowledge about forces
comes from the re-creation of the Newtonian Mechanics suggested by Euler who "...put
most of mechanics into its modern form..." (Trusdell, 1968, p.106). In fact, Leonard
Euler (1707-1783) was the person who suggested several contributions to mechanics,
including: 1) the use the concept of the mass-point for referring to bodies; 2) the definition
of acceleration in an explicit way and its graphical identification; and 3) the introduction of
the notion of vector (geometrical quantity). What we have in school is a kind of Euler-
Newtonian Mechanics.

What is important for my account is that there were several competing ideas about
forces and the way in which they could represent natural laws. Usually, school science
does not show this history. One of the reasons, I argue, is that what is translated is not the
original work, which is only understood by a few people. Given an original, potentially
powerful framework, it is necessary to reconstruct the theory for other people to
understand it. This process includes the cleaning up of the original context together with a
codification process: "Reconstruction is needed to produce an account ordered enough to
enable action to communicate what is going on" (Gooding, 1992, p.76). In approaching
the same problem, Holton explains this process in terms of his "private" and "public"
science constructs.

According to Holton, there are two different kinds of processes in the "natural"
selection of scientific ideas. Private science (8,) accounts for the complexities and
uncertainties of the construction of scientific concepts. This process describes part of the
implicit knowledge of "doing" science which is usually not reported (see the notion of
procedural subject-matter knowledge defined in chapter 3 which is related to this

knowledge). From the perspective of 8,, private science, creativity and ambiguity play

190

important roles in the development of scientific theories. However, the knowledge
developed in S. (science—in-the-making), is not all translated to the public science (8;),
which is the science published in research journals, for example. This latter process, 8,,
stresses translation as a body of knowledge (substantive expert knowledge) which does not
account for the struggles of knowledge production.
S, and S, are components of the process of translation of knowledge within
communities of experts. I do not theorize this process (there are already important
contributions since the pioneer contributions of Fleck, the works of Merton, the
contemporary contributions of Kuhn, Holton, Gooding, and all the contemporary work on
philosophy of science of the last thirty years. There is also much work to be done). My
study is not on the evolution of scientific concepts and theories nor a history and
philosophy of science. I use some of these studies in order to make sense of another kind
of phenomena: translation of knowledge from expert scientific knowledge to school
knowledge, that is, its pedagogical transformation. Philosophy and history of science
become here tools for analyzing what aspects of the expert scientific knowledge are
translated into school knowledge, how and why.
T. Kuhn, for example, has made important contributions to the history and
evolution of science. According to him, what is translated is what he calls normal science:
In this essay 'normal science' means research firmly based upon one or more past
scientific achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledge a time
as supplying the foundation for its further practice. Today such achievements are
recounted, though seldom in their original fornr, by science textbooks, elementary
and advanced. These textbooks expound the body of accepted theory, illustrate
many or all of its successful applications, and compare these applications with
exemplary observations and experiments (1970, p.10).

It seems to me that Kuhn's framework accounts for what Holton has called public science

(S; ) and private science (S, ) in quite different ways. However, in either model, Holton's

or Kuhn's, the process of re-interpreting and decontextualizing scientific knowledge seems

to be necessary for the advancement of science. Using both Holton's and Kuhn's

references, one can distinguish, in principle, two kinds of reinterpretations: cognitive and

191

pedagogical. From a Kuhnian perspective, such a translation process takes place within
scientific communities in order to consolidate "normal science". The account is
epistemological and it is based on a kind of variation-selection model borrowed from the
Darwinian theory of selection.

In either model, Holton's or Kuhn's, the process of re-interpreting and
decontextualizing scientific knowledge seems to be necessary for the advancement
(variation-selection) of science,

The lesson to be drawn from history is that science as a structure grows by a
struggle for survival among ideas; there is a marvelous mechanism at work in

science which in time purifies the meaning even of initially confused concepts, and
eventually absorbs into what we may label S2 (public science, science-as an-

institution) anything important that may be developed, no matter by what means or
methods, in S, (private science, science- -in-the- making) (1985 p.189).

The case of the Newtonian Mechanics and the role of Euler in its reinterpretation is
an example of a cognitive translation. There are so many more examples. Robert Millikan,
a second example, designed an experiment for determining the charge of the electron. The
experiment, its ontological assumptions, its methodological difficulties, its competing
paradigms (in this case his rival Ehrenhaft) and even the skills developed in the experiment
itself were not translated in school knowledge (pedagogical translation). What is translated
is the final fact: "The charge of the electron is -l.6 x 10'19 Coulomb).5 The implications of
these reinterpretations on school settings are enormous. The reason is simple, the
reconstruction of such an experiment is complex, if not impossible, in addition to the fact
that we have few historical accounts, i.e., case-studies, which can help us to reconstruct
realistic pedagogical versions. What we usually have in school science is a clean history in
which science is a body of knowledge developed for heroes or gods.

So far I have presented a general description on how the process of translation of
knowledge may be related to the evolution of science. I have mentioned that these

descriptions tend to be cognitive, that is, epistemological. I have briefly mentioned other

 

5Actually Millikan reported his results 1n other unites, e=4. 9 17 x 10'10 esu (Shamos,
1959, p. 246).

192

kinds of factors that affect the translation, such as methodological assumptions, ontological
commitments, etc. In fact, researchers have identified different kinds of "reconstruction"
of science. From my point of view, these "reconstructions" are "translations" only when
the community in which the knowledge was originated changes. Here, the framework of
David Gooding is a useful one. In fact, Gooding talks about other kinds of reconstruction
of science, such as demonstrative (reconstruction that generates evidence of particular
experiments), methodological (reconstruction which stresses agreement according to
canons), rhetorical (reconstruction that attempt to convince), and normative (reconstruction
that attempt to formalize). Table 7.1 is a re-interpretation of Gooding's reconstruction of
science.

Table 7.1. Different types of reconstruction of scientific knowledge (reinterpreted from
Gooding 1992, p. 78).

 

 

 

'Kind of Activity Narrative Enables

reconstruction

Cognitive Constructive Notebook, Representations,
sketches, communication,
letters argument

Demonstrative Reasoning Draft of papers letters Ordering,

descriptions
demonstratrons

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Methodological Demonstratfin Research Communication,
papers, criticism
monographs persuasion,

reconstruction

Rhetorical Demonstration Paper, Persuafion,
treatise dissemination

Pedagogical Exposition Textbooks Dissemination of

(called didactic by treatise exemplars

Gooding)

Normative Reconstruction Treatises of Logical

hilosophy idealization

 

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The reader should note that there are several different types of reconstruction of
scientific knowledge. Each of them has quite different goals. From these sorts of
transformations, the one that is more important for my account is the pedagogical
transformation. In the case of Gooding's framework, the pedagogical transformation takes
place within scientific communities. That is, this is an internal process of communication of
science which is partially responsible for the evolution of science. When this transformation
takes place outside of scientific communities, that is, when scientific knowledge is
transformed (re-interpreted or re-created) in other communities (e. g. school communities),
there is a translation of knowledge according to my framework. This translation accounts
for the uses of scientific knowledge by non-professional scientists (e.g., high school

students).

The translation of technological knowledge: An exploration

The first question that comes to mind is if the above explanation of the evolution of
scientific knowledge also holds for technological knowledge. In order to clarify this point,
it is important to note that my epistemological account on the translation of scientific
knowledge has been illuminated by works of Kuhn, Holton and Gooding. In general, these
authors share the idea that the history of science can be explained in terms of variation and
selection of knowledge. From this perspective, the evolution of science is analogous to the
evolution of biological species. There is a set of competing ideas (e.g., Aritotelian notion of
force, Leibinz's notion of Force Viva, Newtonian idea of momentum, Euler's conception
of acceleration), but only few of them survive (Euler's notion of force and acceleration for a
point mass). From this generic perspective, one could make the case that the evolution of
technological knowledge can also be explained in terms of variation and selection.

It is important to realize that there have been several attempts to explain the evolution

of technology (reference: any book on history of technology). However, most of these

194

attempts have focused on the evolution of artifacts. As I showed in chapter 5, only in the
last twenty years or so has there been an interest in studying the epistemological nature of
technology (Layton, 1974; Bunge, 1976). During these two decades, philosophers of
technology have also suggested the application of Kuhn's framework to technology
(Laudan, 1984). The basic idea of these attempts is that the evolution of technology follows
a variation-selection model.

When one sees the evolution of technology in terms of variation-selection models,
one needs to be careful in clarifying the criteria of selection. Although a generic model of
evolution may work for science and technology, the evolution of technology has different
criteria given its extreme dependence upon procedural and practical knowledge.6 In fact, in
WWaker Vicenti presents five specific
historical cases on the evolution of modern aeronautics which he incorporated in a variation-
selection model of engineering knowledge. A full account of this model and cases can be
found in Vicenti's book (see also chapter 5 of this dissertation for a revision on Vicenti's
taxonomy of engineering knowledge). Here, I will clarify the criteria of variation-selection
rather than explaining the details of the model.

Given a specific body of technological knowledge, for example engineering
knowledge, the criteria of selection seems to be based on utilitarian reasons. For example,
according to Vicenti:

...the criterion for selection of a variation for retention is, Does it work? or more
precisely, Does it help in design of something that works? This question, perhaps
unexpressed, exists in the mind of anyone laboring to add to engineering knowledge,
even in the most abstract reaches of engineering research (1990, p.248).
The evolution of science seems to have a different criterion of selection. In principle,
knowledge is selected according to the kind of explanation. For example, Newtonian

mechanics helps to understand "better" the universe than Aritotelian mechanics. Here,

 

6Remember that this section focuses on epistemological factors of technology. When one
sees technology in the context of social factors (i.e., economic, political, cultural) its
complexity rs even greater than science, yet both enterprises are related.

195

understanding means to describe, explain and predict. Although research on history and
philosophy of science have shown a more complex picture of the evolution of science (e. g.,
Kuhn, 1962; Gooding, 1990), we know that scientific communities have been successful
institutions in accumulating knowledge that explains and predicts natural phenomena in
accurate ways. Technological communities, in contrast, have been successful in
accumulating knowledge to create useful things.

When one sees scientific and technological communities as an outsider, one could
conclude that the propagation of knowledge follows similar patterns. One first option
would be to adopt a variation-selection model. In doing so, one may take a look at
journals, conferences, textbooks, teaching traditions, etc., and then conclude that the basic
elements of the propagation of scientific knowledge are similar to technological knowledge.
This holds only from a very generic perspective. In order to see what is really going on
with the evolution of technological knowledge, it is important to focus on a specific theory
or a specific topic. Given the frequent uses I have made of the concepts of energy, heat
and temperature, I will explore their scientific and technological roots. I heavily based my
exploration on the examples presented in chapter 1 (pragmatic models of transfer of heat,
pp. 27-31), chapter 5 (epistemology of engineering, how energy is seen from a scientific
and technological perspective) and chapter 6 (specific knowledge to design a solar
collector). The reader may need to re-read some of these sections while she/he is reading
the following account.

The historical development of heat theory has its roots on the works of Newton and
Fourier (Bergles, 1985).7 There are abundant historical accounts regarding the
contributions of Newton who developed an expression to explain the transfer of heat from
a surface of area A to the surroundings. The expression is q=Ah (Tsur-Tsm), in which q is

the rate of heat flow, A the area of transfer, h the heat transfer coefficient, Tsur is the

 

7Of course, I am making a huge simplification of this history. The origins of these
concepts can be traced back to Galileo's gas thermometer or even to the Aristotelian notion
of hot (Sanchez, 1997).

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temperature of the surface of area A, and Tsun is the temperature of the surroundings, is
attributed to Newton.

Based on the works of Newton, the French scientist, Joseph Fourier, developed La
Theorie Analytique de la Chaleur (1822). For example, historians have reported that
Fourier used the so called Newton's Law of Cooling, that is, dq/dA=dT/dt=T-Tair , to
clarify the meaning of conduction in solids (Bergles, 1988). In fact, Fourier extended the
works of Newton to the process of conduction of heat inspired mainly on problems related
to temperature of the earth. Fourier was able to suggest the instantaneous flux of heat in
solids (Trusdell, 1980).3 By the time in which Fourier developed the theory of heat, the
Newtonian paradigm was already solid. Therefore, his explanation on how conduction and
convection take place was incorporated to the Newtonian world-view. What is important is
that the theory of heat had its roots in an intrinsic conception of understanding the world,
that is, describing, explaining, predicting.

The works of Newton and Fourier were the basis of posterior development of
concepts of heat and temperature. Fourier particularly invented the mathematics of "heat
flux" (Fourier's series, partial differential equations). At this point in history, the accounts
on heat and temperature were scientific in the sense that they attempted to describe, explain
and predict natural phenomena (e.g., the problem of cooling the earth; see Holton, 1985,
pp. 285-287; see Fourier 1890, i.e., his Oeuvres, for a beautiful original account, see
Grattan-Guinness, 1972 for a translation into English). However, at the same time, there
were practical problems such as those related to increasing the efficiency of commercial
stream engines (Carnot). This latter practical problem set the basis of the principle of

conservation of energy (first law of thermodynamics) and the degradation of energy

 

8According to Trusdell: "Fourier's great contribution is the concept of flux of heat" (1980,
p.76). In order to define flux it is neccesary to use vectorial analysis, that is, the flux of
heat q is defined in the following terms: q=-KgradT in which is the flux of heat, K the
specific conductivity, T temperature and grad the operator (Bl x, a/ay, 3/82). "Flow" of
heat does not requires vectorial analysis and it is an expression less formal to represent the
"movement" of heat.

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(second law). Here, I see a separation in the history of science in relation to history of
technology. This separation has important implications for my account.

In principle, physicists followed a "scientific" route, particularly they used the
Newtonian paradigm to approach problems of heat and temperature by moving their
explanations toward atomic models. The case of the kinetic theory of gases to explain
processes of heat transfer is a classic example. In contrast, engineers approached problems
of heat and temperature from more utilitarian perspectives. This separation is reflected in
the way in which physicists have pursued problems of heat, temperature and energy in
relation to engineers.

The history of thermodynamics is tied to the evolution of the concepts of heat,
temperature and energy. This paradigm has been enriched by using the atomic theory. For
example, notions of heat and temperature have been reinterpreted as atomic and molecular
phenomena. Thermodynamics followed the ideal of the Newtonian paradigm of
describing, explaining and predicting using causal and deep models. In fact, at the end of
the 19th century, physicists had a common vision on the tOpic of heat transfer. The
specific case of gases may be used as an example. According to Brush, this consensus
includes the following synthesis:

(1) Commotion is the process described in the kinetic theory, whereby fast molecules
drift randomly from hotter to cooler regions of the gas where they collide with
slower molecules and transfer to them some kinetic energy...

(2) Kashmir is the process of heat transfer by emission and absorption of
electromagnetic waves, at a rate that depends on the temperature of the emitter. The
total emission rate, integrated over all frequencies, is proportional to the 4th power
of the absolute temperature...

(3) Congestion is described as transfer of heat by bulk motion of the fluid....(Brush,
1985.p.44)

Although from a contemporary perspective one may introduce several corrections to
this "synthesis," what is important is that heat transfer was framed as a way of seeing the
world. This is reinforced by the very history of thermodynamics in which processes of

conservation of energy were developed from universalistic and formal orientations (e.g.,

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the basic laws of thermodynamics). However, there is another history of heat transfer.
This history has to do with how engineers have used some basic conceptual tools of heat
transfer to design things. In principle, rather than being interested in universal phenomena
and explanations, engineers were looking for more effective ways of transferring heat in
specific artifacts. Joule, for example, reported in 1861 how to increase the heat transfer in
a condenser tube in which there is flow of water (Bergles, 1988, p. 56). The performance
of a condenser tube with specific geometrical configurations is a local problem. The same
holds for the design of a specific solar collector or any technological artifact. The
knowledge gained from this research tends to be local rather than universal. The
connection between the universal laws of thermodynamics or even the notion of heat
transfer and the specific artifact is an open problem that philosophers of technology are just
starting to approach.

The design of specific artifacts has forced engineers to create knowledge for very
situated conditions. For example, the performance of a condenser, or the efficiency of a
water heater (such as the solar collector I studied in earlier chapters), requires particular
specifications. From an epistemological point of view, the process is not linear, that is,
this is not the simple application of general and universal law to specific cases. Rather,
there is an intrinsic generation of specific knowledge that is completely related to the
specific artifact. The connection between the universal and the local can be mediated by
standards (Shapiro, 1997) or by specific conditions (see chapters 1 and 2 of this
dissertation, as well chapter 5 for examples). Even the general knowledge which is behind
the analysis of heat processes from the perspective of engineering tends to be macroscopic
rather than microscopic (see chapter 5 for a more detailed taxonomy of engineering
knowledge and chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of the knowledge needed for designing a
solar collector). In fact, engineers use atomic theories only when this is a necessary and
unavoidable step in the creation of their artifacts (e. g., designing micro-electronic

components of a computer); otherwise they hold macroscopic theories.

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The separation that I report between thermodynamics and the heat transfer of
specific artifacts reflects a delimitation of epistemological territories. This separation could
be seen as the traditional vision that technology is the application of science. However, my
point is different. The history of the development of the concepts of energy, heat and
temperature depends on the community in which these concepts have been created, re-
created, used, and re-used. Within scientific communities, the tendency has been the
creation of universal knowledge, formal structures and deeper explanations (e. g., atomic
and molecular explanation of heat transfer). These explanations attempt to be valid; that is,
they explain, to some degree of confidence, what is going on in nature. In contrast, when
one sees engineering models of heat transfer, they are not even valid from the scientific
point of view. This reflects a basic epistemological difference between technology and
science.

When Carnot developed his work on the efficiency that an engine could perform, he
based his work on the caloric theory. This theory had been rejected by scientific
communities because scientists have accepted that heat is not a material object, but rather a
property (energy). What is interesting is that despite the use of an "invalid" theory, his
practical outcomes are still important (useful from an utilitarian perspective). Physicists
know that, but they do not explain why:

Carnot used the caloric theory of heat in his analysis of steam engines; he assumed
that heat is not actually converted into work, but that the flow of heat from a hot
body to a cold body can be used to do work, just as the fall of water from a high
level to a low level can be used to do work. Although the caloric theory upon which
his results were based was later rejected by other scientists (and even by Carnot

himself in notes that remained unpublished until 1878), his conclusions are still valid
(Holton, 1985, p.288).

The reason is that in order to be efficient, you do not need a "true" description of the
system (Bunge, 1983 and chapter 5 of this dissertation). Efficiency is not validity. Truth
is not a concern of technological communities. However, one should not rush to the

conclusion that all technological models are lies. What they are, I argue, is that they are

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valid enough to the specific conditions of the design. This point requires a second
explanation.

Currently, heat transfer within technological communities is still based on
macroscopic models of heat. Moreover, several of these models still remain connected to
theories of heat in which heat "flows" from one point to another. Heat flow is seen as the
movement of an object from high temperature to low temperature. These models are
invalid judged from a scientific perspective. However, they are still useful to do
calculations, determine "areas of transfer", rates of transfer, coefficients of conduction,
etc. In fact, one characteristic of heat transfer as a disciplinary tenitory in relation to
thermodynamics is that it is based on "old" conceptions of heat rather than "scientific",
"accurate", and "deeper" explanations (e.g. atomic).

The separation between thermodynamics for physicists and heat transfer for
engineers reflects the approach of a generic topic from two different perspectives.
Although both epistemological territories share several roots and borders, their
epistemological commitments are quite different. It is reflected by the existence of journal
of thermodynamics and journal of heat transfer. The latter refers mainly to the analysis of
specific artifacts and particular process of heat transfer (for example the Journal of Heat
Transfer of the American Association of Mechanical Engineering, textbooks dealing with
heat transfer from the engineering point of view, and the specific "handbook" of heat
exchanger, which are full of empirical tables, local laws, graphical trends, tables of
efficiency of different artifacts). However, this is not only in the arena of heat transfer.
Even the generic thermodynamics when it is seen from the perspective of a physicist looks
different in the hands of an engineer (see chapter 5 regarding the same discussion in the
case of Newton's laws). Engineers have invented conceptual tools that are not used by
scientists, such as the case reported by Vicenti (1990) of the control-volume analysis.

Control volume analysis is a general framework in engineering thermodynamics

that allows you to analyze a given volume. Focusing on a specific volume helps to do the

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bookkeeping of physical proprieties such as energy balance, momentum balance, etc. The
use of control volume analysis avoids the study of the underlying physics of complex
systems. Although a physicist would prefer a detailed analysis (e. g., to study the
movement of a fluid point by point), the complexity of the systems with which
technologists usually work and the demands of practical outcomes have forced engineers to
create tools that scientists do not use (they do not need them anyway!).

The idea that engineers think about their problems differently than scientists has
been recognized long ago. However, this statement is usually made in abstract. The
specific espitemological implications of these different ways of thinking are still unknown
(Vicenti's clarification on the control volume analysis is an exception). My dissertation is
another exception, but it is a study on the implication of technological knowledge in science
education rather than a specific treatise on epistemology of engineering). Such implications
are in the core of what I call translation of scientific and technological knowledge into the
curriculum.

What is important from this epistemological exploration is the idea that the evolution
of scientific knowledge is related in complex ways to the evolution of technological
knowledge. Given the specific goals of technological communities, scientific knowledge is
re-interpreted in contextual ways. Therefore, we can add to Table 7.1 another kind of

translation of scientific knowledge: technological translation.

Table 7.2 Reconstruction of scientific knowledge to design artifacts.

 

 

'Kind of Activity Narrative Enables
reconstruction
Technologicar Design of artifacts Plans Create new useffii
sketches things

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note that Table 7.2 only reflects part of the discussion I have presented. The translation of

scientific knowledge into technological communities also needs to be informed by the very

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creation of new knowledge, technological knowledge, completely situated to the
community, such as specific knowledge about specific artifacts (substantive and
procedural) or specific frameworks that are invented by technologists and not necessarily
used by scientists (e.g., control-volume analysis) .

The lesson I learn from this discussion is that the evolution of technological
knowledge is related to the evolution of science. However, the specificity of the goals of
technological communities shape the scientific knowledge used by technological
communities. Moreover, such goals also detemrine epistemological characteristics of
technological territories. The following table summarizes this contrast. The reader should
be aware that this table reflects a crude separation between science and technology.
However, the interface between both, that is, the common ground, is the interesting part of
science education.

Table 7.3 Epistemological assumptions of science and technology drawn from the example
on thermodynamics and heat transfer.

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  

Science ... . .. Technology
The world is understandable 1 The world is manipulable
Knowledge is universal , 1 Knowledge is local
Howledge is to describe, explain and " Knowledge is to transform, design,

predict l 7 i improve

 

 

 

The translation of technological knowledge into the science curriculum.

The translation of scientific knowledge into the cuniculum of general education
already has a long history (e.g. DeBoer, 1991). In contrast, the translation of technological
knowledge into K-12 curriculum has been more problematic. In fact, I argue that there has
practically been no translation of technological knowledge into school knowledge in the
sense in which I use the term technology. There have been practical applications of science
such as the case of the science curriculum in the United States before the 50's. However, I

do not see such applications as part of the introduction of technological knowledge. In

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principle, because this curriculum did not recognize the very existence of technological
knowledge that could connect science with students' everyday lives.

From an historical point of view we know of some cases that have attempted to
introduce technology as part of the K-12 education. For example, the case of Central High
School, last century, is interesting: "Perhaps the most vivid symbol of the utilitarian
character of the practical curriculum was the inclusion within it of few courses that were
strictly vocational ...stenography, bookkeeping, mechanical drawing and civil
engineering..." (1988, p.22 italics added). The temporal context and the magnitude of these
kinds of courses is explained later by Labaree: "Vocational courses did not appear in the
cuniculum until the mid-18403, and they never constituted more than 15 percent of the
students' time in class" (ibid., p.22). In this context, technology is identified with
vocational studies. In fact, technology has been mostly identified with vocational studies
(Lewis, 1994). This option, vocational studies, does not recognize the epistemological
value of technology either.

Calvin Woodward, late last century, designed a version of high school engineering
education "...to replace the traditional vocationally irrelevant education" (Collins, 1979,
p.113). Woodward's attempt is interesting given its specific goal of introducing engineering
into general education. However, his high school did not survive (Collins, 1977). Other
attempts to introduce technology in general education are: A Study of Technical Institutes
(the society for the promotion of Engineering Education (1931), A curriculum to Reflect
Technology (William Warner, 1947), Engineering Concepts cuniculum Project: The Man-
made World (the Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1964), and the Jackson's Mill Industrial Art
curriculum in 1990 (see Gradwell, 1996 for an extensive analysis of several cases). What
is important to note is that the common pattern of all these attempts is that they have had
almost no impact in science education.

Currently, there is a big concern for including technology into the science

cuniculum. This is the first time in the history of science education in which technology is

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being included as part of curricular content. For example, Project 2061 and the National
Science Education Standards are two current reforms that have suggested how to introduce
technology into the science cuniculum. Although both have quite different conceptions of
technology, both reflect explicit attempts of translating technology into the science
curriculum. To some degree, the assumption of both proposals is that science education
will improve with the introduction of technological tasks. However, as I showed in chapter
6, despite these attempts and the rich generic conception of technology endorsed by Project
2061, the translation of technology into the science curriculum is going to be difficult if not
impossible. The reason I have to support this is related to the lack of clarity that both
proposals have regarding the specific technological knowledge that students should learn
and its specific connection with science education. I explain this lack of clarity in terms of
the complexity of technological knowledge and also in terms of the social position that this
knowledge has in a given social structure.

There have also been alternative attempts to introduce technological knowledge.
Researchers have been studying the potential technology has in science education. Some
examples are the case of Raizen and her colleagues at the National Center for Improving
Science Education (N CISE) in Washington (1995). Raizen’s book (1995) is an extensive
report of the status of technology education in the context of science education. A second
example is the curriculum materials developed at Northwestern University (Hsu, Walhof &
Turner, 1998; Bumgartner, 1998). Another example is the work of Martia Linn at Berkeley
regarding the introduction of pragmatic models to learn notions of heat and temperature
(thermodynamics). In fact, I opened my dissertation with an analysis of the work of Linn at
Berkeley (Linn 1997).

In light of my discussion on the nature of technology, one can conclude that Linn is
suggesting the introduction of technological knowledge. The goodness of her proposal is
that these models seem to be more relevant to students' everyday lives than abstract school

science. The same holds for the other reports (Raizen, et al., 1995; Bumgartner, 1998).

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They all assume that with these activities, students will connect science to their everyday
lives. However, the problem with these reports is basically the same as Project 2061 and the
National Standards problem; that is, there is a lack of clarity on the specific knowledge
students will learn. This lack of clarity, together with other characteristics of the translation
of technological knowledge into the science cuniculum, needs to be studied.

After this short review of the attempts of introducing technology in general
education, one should ask why technology has not found a place in general education and
mainly in the science curriculum. What factors have affected the translation of technological
knowledge into the K- 12 cuniculum? The explanation I offer takes into consideration two
dimensions: 1) the kind of knowledge which is translated, and 2) the social position of the
knowledge in a given social structure. The former is related to the intrinsic nature of the
translation of technological knowledge as opposed to the translation of scientific knowledge.
This dimension also addresses philosophical status and pedagogical implications of
technology. The latter dimension has more social connotations such as, the role of
professional battles in the construction of K-12 curriculum. Both are basic arguments to
understand the potential translation of technology in science education.

The translation of scientific or technological knowledge into school knowledge
includes the translation of the view of the nature of knowledge, i.e., the assumption on what
is valid knowledge. Traditionally, science education reforms tend to translate, explicitly,
only the content, i.e., the knowledge. The philosophies behind such content, the criteria
of validity for example, are only implicitly translated. The case of current science
education reforms is a mix because to some extent they are explicit with the nature of science
that they propose, e.g. Project 2061 and the National Science Education Standards. In fact,
both educational reforms partially present explicit views of the nature of science. Project
2061, for example, suggests a set of ontological, methodological, epistemological and
ethical principles of science that should be translated into school knowledge (Cajas, 1995a).

With the exception of its section on technology, the conception of “valid” knowledge in

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Project 2061 tends to be general, universal, and abstract knowledge. From this perspective,
science is a body of objective knowledge which is close to the truth.

The case of technology is quite different. As I discussed in an earlier section of this
chapter, technological knowledge is not tested for its validity. What is important is whether
or not it works. The criterion is more utilitarian. The test is for usefulness rather than for
truth. This locates technological knowledge in a more mundane position than scientific
knowledge (Lewis, 1991, 1994). From an epistemological point of view, this utilitarian
perspective is different. Scientists assume that the world is understandable while
technologists assumes that the world is manipulable. The motivation behind science and
technology is rather different. In this sense, whereas for scientists knowledge is an end, for
technologists it is a means for dealing with practical goals. This situation re-introduces an
old tension between abstract and practical knowledge. Abstract knowledge tends to have
higher status than practical knowledge. Moreover, what is translated into school knowledge
is a kind of abstract and decontextualized knowledge. What is valid is a platonic view of
knowledge (Lewis, 1994). Practical knowledge is not valid from this platonic perspective.

The conception of what is considered valid knowledge and who is deciding such
validity are important elements in the determination of what knowledge at the end is
translated into public education. A classical position tends to value platonic conceptions of
knowledge. Furthermore, canonical scientific knowledge can be easily re-interpreted from
this idealistic position. The tendency of educational systems is to focus on esoteric
knowledge rather than mundane knowledge,. This is the essence of the academia. This
phenomena is implicit in the account that the sociologist Durkheim presents about the history
of the educational systems in Europe, mainly France, together with the formation of the
Universities (Durkeheirn, 1938). Because of their historical and philosophical roots
universities tend to value abstract orientations rather than empirical ones, and then
universities impose the knowledge that should be taught.

The implications of having a conception of knowledge which overvalues abstract

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and authoritative discourses are important for education. From a pedagogical point of view,
it is easier to develop didactic (teacher-centered) approaches to communicate knowledge
already developed. From this perspective, codified knowledge has more advantages over
contextual, local, tacit, and procedural knowledge, that is, practical knowledge on which
technology is based.

The tension between abstract and practical knowledge which is a reflection of the
tension between esoteric and mundane knowledge and also universal and local knowledge is
only a part of a potential explanation on the difficulties of translating technological
knowledge. A second important point is the social position of the knowledge. Some
societies tend to value different kinds of knowledge than others. Therefore, it is not only
the nature of knowledge the important factor, but it is also important the social position of
this knowledge in a given social structure.

The social position of the knowledge depends on the kind of community that shares
such knowledge and the social position that this community has in a given time and society.
Engineering knowledge, for example, presents interesting characteristics for being included
as a part of general education. Engineering knowledge, in the sense in which I have
presented here, can play a connecting role between science and students' everyday lives.
Moreover,

Given the clear-cut importance of engineers above all of the professions in industrial

society, we might expect that engineering training would dominate the educational

system. Indeed, it is plausible that an industrial society could operate with an
educational system devoted almost entirely to engineering (1979, p.159).

However, the process of translating knowledge into schools is not only shaped by

epistemological factors. There are intrinsic and basic social problems that affect such

process. The case of American engineering studied by Randall Collins illustrates this point:
Throughout the nineteenth century, then, American engineering failed to achieve

either a united profession or a widely accepted system of education...the more
popularly oriented forms of engineering education-the mechanical institute and the

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training schools-failed from their fatal trait of low status connotations (ibid. pp. 168-
169).

The roots of this low status of American engineering is related to the problems of
the formation of professions. Engineering as profession comes from humble positions such
as skilled laborers and entrepreneur administrators "The skilled laborer side of engineering
proved an even more serious embarrassment" (ibid., p. 174). In addition, the referent of
the engineers are not embedded with esoteric connotations: "Engineers, however, deal with
relatively uncontroversial and unemotional tasks...Even more ironically, engineers and
technicians suffer from the very success of their techniques. The outcomes of their work
are quite reliable..." (ibid. 174). These characteristics of engineering knowledge make it
very useful to be included in connecting school science with students' everyday lives.
However, the same characteristics make engineering knowledge very low on our traditional
scales of valuable knowledge.

In attempting to introduce technology as part of the curriculum of science education,
one should be aware of the complexities already reported. As I showed in earlier chapters,
technology has the potential of connecting science to students' everyday lives. In this way,
technology can be used to satisfy basic goals of current science education particularly by
connecting science with students' everyday lives. However, this connection cannot take
place without affecting the basic goals of science education. This is the last part of my

argument.

A generic case of translation: The goals of science education

In general, it has been suggested that there are three goals for science education.
These goals are economic, political, and cultural. In clarifying these goals, I use the idea
that any human society can be analyzed at least in these three basic systems (economic,
political and cultural). These three systems are interconnected and the kind of connection
depends on the type of society. What follows is a general characterization, rather than

precise definitions, of each system. The economic system has the purpose of material

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production, for example manufacturing. The political system is referred to the state or
government, i.e. the control and administration of the social power and also the political
interconnection among citizens. The cultural system is formed by intellectual workers who
are engaged in artistic, humanistic, religious or scientific knowledge production.

This simple way, rather than simplistic way, for analyzing a human society has
methodological advantages. In principle, it provides a general framework for making sense
of the way in which people have justified the introduction of science into the cuniculum. I
argue that there have been three general arguments for introducing science into the
curriculum: economic, political, and cultural reasons.

The economic justification has stressed the educational needs that the economic
system requires in order to produce goods and services. Contemporary industry, for
example, needs (according to the followers of this view) some understanding of
mathematics, science and technology in order to produce with high levels of efficiency.
David Labaree has called this educational goal social efficiency: "The social efficiency
approach to schooling argues that our economic well-being depends on our ability to
prepare the young to carry out useful economic roles with competence"( 1997a, p.42).
Although during the last two decades there has been a renewed call for improving education
in order to improve productivity, the argument has been used consistently across the
history of public education as Labaree and other authors have shown.

The second generic goal of schooling that I analyze is its political goal. Although
this argument has been used for understanding problems of democracy, equity,
participation, assimilation, etc., this goal is also important for understanding the role of
science in school cuniculum. The political purpose of American education has its roots in '
the necessity of forming republic citizens. It was one of the more used justifications of
Horace Mann. Labaree defines this goal as the democratic equality goal of schooling
"From the democratic equality approach to schooling, one argues that a democratic society

cannot persist unless it prepares all of its young with equal care to take on the full

210

responsibilities of citizenship in a competent manner" (1997a, p.42). Within the
contemporary context of science education, the argument has been that citizens need
scientific and technological knowledge in order to make democratic decisions (e.g.
demanding environmental laws).

The third general reason that people have used for justifying teaching science is the
cultural reason. From this perspective, we teach science because it is part of our culture,
like music. From this view science enriches our lives and science also provides important
ways of thinking (habits of mind) which include curiosity, creativity, etc. As humans, we
are interested in antique civilizations, in the movement of galaxies, etc. This is the favorite
justification of teaching science from the "pure" disciplines.

From my perspective, these three general goals of science education, and schooling
in general, also set the basis for further explanations of why we teach science in general
education. In principle, these three goals are related to the production of three different
kinds of capital: economic capital (extensively studied for classic economic theories)
political capital (or social capital in the sense of Coleman 1990, or Bourdieu, 1988, i.e.,
resources provided by human relations, an area of research which has not received much
attention from sociologists), and cultural capital (the less developed area of research. P.
Bourdieu,l988, presents an important argument, but it is still a general argument. J .S.
Coleman goes beyond and suggest ways for the concrete uses of the social and cultural
capital constructs). In addition, these three goals of education are interconnected and they
only represent a first approximation to the question of why we teach science. The
interconnection that these goals have depends on specific contextual and temporal situation.
Despite this contextual and temporal limitation, I argue that these three general goals are
basic for understanding more complex goals.

When one sees the three goals of science education described here, one sees
different conceptions of why we should teach science. The general reasons seem to be

explained by economic, political and mainly cultural arguments. Project 2061 is an

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example of this kind of argument. One can explain the translation of scientific knowledge
into school knowledge using this generic case and within the notion of translation earlier
defined.

This simplistic picture of the translation of knowledge that I present looks clean and
rational. However, this is not the case. In fact, I argue that the process is neither rational
nor clean. It is not rational because the translation of knowledge is affected by assumptions
that are ill-founded. Some of these assumptions are contradictory goals. Think of the
economic goal of learning science in relation to the cultural goal. Learning science for
economic reasons is not necessarily in line with learning it for intrinsic reasons; Curiosity is
not utility. In addition, the process of translation hides incredible complex ideological
positions. In fact, it is difficult to determine whether or not there are/were genuine reasons
for improving science education. Usually, the proposals are embedded within political
rhetoric such as economic productivity or democratic participation which cannot be
realistically satisfied for the kind of knowledge suggested. At the same time, the battle for
professional status is shaping the translation together with personal agendas.

An important aspect of the process of translation is the assumption that people make
about it. It is usually accepted that teaching science will improve productivity, increase
democratic participation and solve the problem of scientific literacy. In other words, it is
assumed that the three generic goals of science education, economic E, political, P and
cultural C, will be satisfied. If one thinks of these three goals in terms of three social forces
<E, P, C>, the assumption is that these three goals will push the progress of a given
society. However, these three factors are the intended goals of any science education
reform. Their efficacy should be analyzed looking at the history of science education in a
given society. From this history, one can determine a set of different goals that appears
again and again. In particular, I think of two kinds of goals that have embodied the goals of
education in general and the purposes of science education: learning science understanding

and learning science for applications.

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Translation of technological knowledge: Potential problems

The selection of knowledge that should be taught in public education has been a
constant social concern particularly during the last years in which national calls for
reforming education have focused on science and mathematics. I have used the construct
translation of knowledge as a theoretical tool for understanding this selection of knowledge.
Bernstein, for example, has advanced the idea that "how a society selects, classifies,
distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public.
reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control (1975, p.85).
This general assumption is important, but it does not illuminate the internal mechanics by

H H

which society "selects, classifies," or "transmits" knowledge. In fact, one could assume
that there is a logical selection, i.e., a rational process of selecting educational knowledge.
My argument is that there is not a such rational process. The translation of scientific
knowledge, and the potential translation of technological knowledge, is not a rational
process. It is a socio-epistemological process shaped by competing and sometimes
contradictory goals of science education. In addition, factors of status and internal battles of
the formation of professions tend to affect the translation of a given body of knowledge.

If the process of translation were a rational one, could expect a clearer relation
between what is the knowledge that a society needs and what is the knowledge that is taught
in public education. From an economic point of view, one could argue again that in a
technological society, the educational knowledge should be technological. This is not the
case. Although the process of translation is partially shaped by these changes in society,
there is not a clear relation between real needs and potential real solutions. The same holds
for the political and even the cultural goals of education. These goals are reconstructed and
transformed for other educational goals that emerge from the interpretations that people have
about schools. One fundamental goal for understanding contemporary American education

is the emergence of social mobility as dominant goal (Labaree, 1997a). From this

perspective, education is a means for jumping in the social scale. This utilitarian position of

213

education affects what actually is taught in schools and how this knowledge is perceived by
students and parents.

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that technological knowledge has
important epistemological richness that allows it to be used in science education.
Technology provides opportunities for learning science in more authentic ways. An
emphasis on the cultural nature of technology as knowledge and a way of thinking, with its
potential connection to science, seems to be an optimal solution to the problems of teaching
science for understanding and applications. However, this introduction will face important
problems.

The first problem that the introduction of technology will suffer is a problem of
status. The tension between high academic status of science and low academic status of
technology will play an important role. Another potential problem is the commitment that
science teachers have unconsciously made with disciplinary knowledge. To complicate
matters, we need to take into consideration what the opinions of the parents are. How do
they see the introduction of technology into the science classes of their children? The
connotations of vocational studies will play an important role in their acceptance. Actually,
what parents are looking for is not a meaningful curriculum rather than a curriculum that can
differentiate their children from others (Labaree, 1997b). Given the fact that technology
tends to be more mundane than science, science is more adaptable to produce differentiation
and stratification. Particularly one would argue that science will be more connected to
college-bounded students and technology more to low status vocational careers. These are

some of the problems that the introduction of technology in general education will face.

214

EPILOGUE

HOW TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE WOULD CLOSE THE GAP
BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND APPLICATION

The tension between understanding and applications I have studied in this
dissertation can be seen as a distance between different communities. When a given person
does not belong to the community in which the knowledge was originated, I propose that
there is the emergence of an epistemological distance (between his/her knowledge and the

community's). Some examples of such distance are: a) the distinction I made between

external and internal relevance of science; and b) the difference between scientific and
everyday problems.

The basic point of my dissertation is that it is possible to reduce the distance
between understanding and applications for some types of outsiders, particularly for
science teachers and their students in general education in relation to scientific communities.
The general epistemological mechanism that I suggest for reducing such distance is to
introduce technological knowledge into the science curriculum. The argument is that
technology can play a connecting role between academic knowledge and students' everyday
problems. Technological knowledge can be located in the interface between several kinds
of knowledge that I have re-identified, such as: abstract versus practical; universal/local;
academic/everyday-life knowledge, etc. If the epistemological distance between
understanding and application is reduced, there would be more chances to learn science and
mainly there will be more options for students to reconstruct a kind of science more
relevant to their lives.

A basic connection between science and technology is the notion of design. As I
reported in chapter 6, design is related to the creation of artifacts, particularly the
specifications of how a system should be organized or how a process should be executed

(Bunge, 1985). The design of artifacts is one of the meanings of applications of science

215

and it is perhaps the most important connection among science, technology and science
education.
Traditional engineering design has been described as the process of
1) facing a problem, 2) proposing solutions, 3) building artifacts to solve the problem, 4)
testing the design, etc. From this methodological position, science and technology are very
similar. In fact, they both solve problems in an organized way. Moreover, design can be
seen as the process of making hypotheses of how the world should work:
Engineering design shares certain characteristics with the pointing of scientific
theories, but instead of hypothesizing about the behavior of a given universe,
whether atoms, honeybees, or planets, engineers hypothesize about assemblages of
concrete and shell that they arrange into a world of their own making (Petroski,
1992,p.43)
This methodological connection between science and technology is part of the concern of
the National Science Education Standards (see chapter 6 of this dissertation for an extensive
analysis of this and other reforrrrs which include technology), as well as the reports of
contemporary researchers (Raizen, et al. 1995; Schauble, et. a1 1991; Roth, 1996). In
general, the thesis is that science education will improve through design projects. This
argument needs to take into consideration the socio-epistemological explanation I have
developed on the process of translating technological knowledge into scientific tasks. A
typical example is the design of a bridge that supports as much weight as possible while the '
bridge remains as light as possible. This task was carefully studied in chapter 2. Here I
only review some of its implications to science education in light of my overall argument.
From a methodological point of view, the design of a given bridge shares several
characteristics of scientific tasks. In this line of thinking, one may assume that engineering
design and scientific investigation complement each other. However, what one is doing
here is translating technological knowledge (e.g., specific knowledge for designing a
bridge) into scientific tasks (i.e., why a given design works). According to my
description on the epistemological nature of technological knowledge, this translation is

asking for the connection of two quite different world-views.

216

Specific research on the role of design in science education has assumed some
connections between scientific understanding and technological tasks. Roth for example,
believes that "...children who designed towers, strong arms, bridges, or domes would
learn (a) about properties of materials and forces operating in structures and (b) how to
modify material properties, structural strength, and stability" (1996, p. 131). My
dissertation suggests that this translation is possible, but it is problematic.

In principle, I have illustrated that science teachers need to be exposed to a different
kind of knowledge. The framework on teacher knowledge developed in chapter 3 and
enriched in chapter 4 shows that the introduction of applications also requires a different
kind of pedagogical content knowledge as well as different philosophical assumptions
about knowledge (knowledge of knowledge).

In the case of the introduction of technology the framework on teacher knowledge
suggests the integration of technological knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge for
technological tasks and knowledge about technology. Think of the case of designing a
bridge. In addition to traditional school classic mechanics, teachers will have to explore
notions of strength, stiffness, stability, tension, compression, etc. (see Table 6, chapter 2
for a detailed analysis of the knowledge needed for this task). There are curricula for
science education which refer to the introduction of this design (e.g., the Canadian
Association for the Promotion and Advancement of Science, 1991; Hsu, Walhof, &
Turner, 1998). These curriculum materials attempt to reduce the epistemological distance
between understanding and applications in science education. My dissertation suggests that
this is possible, but it should be more than an addition of scientific plus technological
knowledge. Rather, science teachers will need to integrate scientific with technological
knowledge in contextual, that is, situated ways. Such integration requires a better
description of the technological knowledge to be included in the science curriculum and its
process of translation.

The introduction of technological designs into science education should be

217

"7 ml

illuminated by the recent works on epistemology of engineering. Based on this kind of
research, I have shown how this community, the engineering community, has a particular
world-view that transforms scientific knowledge into situated applications. Particularly, I
illustrated how there is the emergence of specific knowledge to deal with specific artifacts.
In fact, notions of understanding and applications depend on the community in which one
is embedded. These communities not only provide knowledge, they basically impose ways
of thinking about the world.

Of course, introducing technology into the science curriculum is not a new idea.
Technology and engineering are old activities. Therefore, the history of science education
is full of attempts to introduce practical applications and even technology into the
curriculum. However, research on epistemology of technology, particularly on
engineering knowledge, is new. In many ways, research on engineering design is almost
a new branch of the human knowledge as the references of my earlier exploration show
(chapter 5 and 7): The International Conference on Engineering Design in Copenhagen,
1983; the Journals Research in Engineering Design (USA, since 1989) and Journal of
Engineering Design (UK, since 1990), the pioneers works of D. Schon (1983; 1987), and
the anthropological studies of engineering (Buciarelli, 1988; 1994); specific research on
engineering knowledge (Vicenti, 1990; Faulker, 1994), not to mention an incredible
amount on work on sociology of technology (e.g., Latour, 1987; the journal Science,
Technology and Human Values). I could go on presenting more references; however, the
point is that the introduction of technology into the science curriculum needs to take into
consideration this new research. This dissertation suggests one way to do that.

I frequently used the topic of energy to frame several of my examples. I chose to
do that given the fundamental role that energy should play in science education. I showed
that the goal of teaching energy from the perspective of traditional curriculum is to describe,
explain and predict natural phenomena (chapter 5). Think of the case of solar energy.

School experiments on solar energy (if they are done) are used to "understand" sources of

218

energy, rates of energy flow and transformation of energy. The goal behind that is the
construction of knowledge to describe, explain, and predict. The same holds with the uses
of these tools in other areas such as movement of objects. Energy-related concepts are
used to analyze phenomena. Concepts such as force, work and power, are developed
around the analyses of the movement of objects of thermodynamics processes to be
understood from analytical perspectives

When you see energy from the perspective of technology the goals change
somewhat as well as the concepts themselves (chapter 6 and 7). In principle from the
perspective of technology, the goal is the use of energy for utilitarian reasons. A
technological task can be the design and construction of a solar collector to transform
energy. This task changes the way in which we usually "see" energy and even the way in
which we "see" the Sun. In a society in which traditional sources of energy have became
dangerous (pollution) and where energy is no longer inexpensive (e.g., oil) , solar energy
will be, perhaps, our only source of life. Therefore, we have to deal with the Sun from
several perspectives. A technological school task relating to this problem can be the
construction of a solar collector to heat water. Of course few people heat water for its own
sake. Heating water should be an activity around the solution of a specific kind of
problem. It is difficult to predict the specific activity in which students can find that heating
water is an authentic activity. I am assuming that it is possible to construct these settings
with a certain level of authenticity within classroom situations. This will depend on the
teachers' knowledge and material resources and mainly on the goals we have to teach
science to the general public.

What is important for my example on the solar collector is that what I call a
technological task is constructed around: a) the solution of a specific relevant problem
(negotiated by students and the teacher and restricted by real-world conditions), and b) the
design and construction of artifacts to face such problem(s). This changes the traditional

relationship between the learner and the knowledge established in science education. In

219

 

principle, learners will need to interact strongly with artifacts (by designing and
transforming materials for the construction of the solar collector). In doing so, teachers
and students will need to develop specific knowledge situated to the design of the artifact.
The knowledge created in the design and actual construction of the artifact (solar

collector) is not universal. I mean it is not valid for all solar collectors. This is specific
knowledge useful for the design of the specific artifact and it is restricted for the specific
conditions of this problem (heating water for some reasons that are constructed and
negotiated between teachers and students). In contrast to the traditional goal of science
education which tends to teach universal knowledge (thermodynamics in this case), the
design and construction of a solar collector establishes a different relation between learner,
knowledge and artifacts.

The relationship between the learner and knowledge is changed by technological tasks.
This is because technology forces one to design and actually construct artifacts. It is in the
construction of the artifact that students can construct their own practical knowledge (from
the design until the final product). This is not an anarchical process. As far as I see,
teachers should have an important role in developing contexts to do these kinds of activities.
Teachers, of course, need to learn a different kind of knowledge which includes
technological knowledge, as an important part of their preparation. What kind of
technological knowledge teachers need to know is a question that can be illuminated by this
dissertation.

The introduction of technology into the science curriculum in many ways is the
introduction of a specific world-view different than traditional science education's view.
By integrating technology into the science curriculum, we are asking science teachers and
their students to see the world in different ways, to be in the world in different forms, and
mainly, to act and interact differently. This challenges basic assumptions of science
education.

The first assumption to be challenged is the notion of rationality. The world-view that

220

has dominated science education seems to identify rationality with deductive, universal,
deterministic arguments. The assumption is that one can reason using some general rules of
logic or general scientific laws to approach the world. This platonic (pythagorean)
conception has made us believe that rationality is the essence of understanding; in other
words, rationality <--> understanding. This is the Principle of Sufficient Reason
defended for centuries by Western philosophies (Goldman, 1984). Technology assumes a
different notion of rationality. Design can be understood as a complex interaction between
understanding and creation, that is understanding and action. Therefore, the kind of
understanding in the context of technology is different than the analytical understanding
defended by science. Although technological design may be related to analytical thinking,
rationality is not the touchstone of design (Schon, 1987; 1983). Design needs an
epistemology of actions rather than an epistemology of reason, yet they are interconnected.

The same problem can be seen from a psychological perspective. Robert Stemberg
(1996) has suggested three fundamental aspects of intelligence-analytic, creative and
practical. Following works of Neisser (1976), Stemberg has clarified these three
components of intelligence. We know that traditional science education has privileged
analytic intelligence. Practical intelligence has been under-valued and it does not have a
place in the science curriculum. However, when we ask science teachers to connect science
to everyday problems, we are moving to more realistic problems. In these contexts, analytic
intelligence is not enough. In fact, cognitive researchers have shown that people reason
about realistic situations using neither analytic thinking nor specific rules (Kirsh, & Maglio,
1984). Rather, they need pragmatic reasoning schema (Cheng, & Holyoak, 1985) which,
in the context of teaching science for understanding and applications, I interpret as a mix
between analytic and practical intelligence.

Stemberg's theory also includes the notion of creative intelligence. Design can be

seen as the creation of novel realities (artifacts) which in engineering design must be useful

artifacts (practical intelligence). Using Stemberg's theory, one can suggest that one

221

 

direction to improve science education is to promote more than analytic intelligence
(Stemberg, 1996). My research moves in this general direction too. However, in contrast
to psychological research, which tends to see the problem of education in terms of
individual characteristics, 1 see the problem from a socio-epistemological perspective.
From this perspective, any movement of the science curriculum from being analytic to
being more practical will challenge basic goals of science education. Certainly, the tension
between understanding and applications can be seen as a reaction to different and
sometimes competing goals of science education. These goals need to be studied from a
wider perspective. My framework on the translation of scientific and technological
knowledge into school knowledge is one option.

As I showed, from the perspective of the economic and political goal of education
(Labaree, 1997a), science has extrinsic values, that is, science is to do something useful
(e.g., political participation, job training). In contrast, from a cultural perspective, science
tends to have more intrinsic values. From this view, one learns science for curiosity or
enjoyment or even for more basic reasons such as the basic meaning of life. These three
goals, economic, political, and cultural only represent part of a complex set of goals that
seem to compete among them.l This is not only a problem of science education. Rather, this
is a basic problem of contemporary education in which education can be seen from the
perspective of several competing goals (Labaree, 1997a). My dissertation suggests that
these basic problems of science education ought to be seen from a wider perspective such as
socio—epistemological frameworks.

From a rich picture of different goals of science education, I selected two generic

ideas: teaching science for understanding and teaching science for applications. It was

 

1There are several goals of science education that I do not analyze. Most of them are
related to general goals of education. Within industrialized and post-capitalist societies,
education has become a way to change social status (the social-mobility goal). Credentials
are an intrinsic part of such process (Collins, 1979; Labaree, 1997b). I do not analyze here
such basic goals. However, I think that the goals of science education should be seen from
the perspective of these sociological frameworks.

222

partially because of the current concerns of educational reforms on connecting science to
students' everyday lives. This dissertation suggests that in order to connect science with
students' everyday lives, it is important to open traditional science curriculum to alternative
territories and construct a situated science to everyday life. This requires flexibility to move
ourselves from one world-view to another in order to reduce their epistemological distances.
Technological territories are one option. However, in doing so, there are several problems
one needs to face.

A first problem with the introduction of technological knowledge in the sense in
which I have suggested is a common problem with teaching science. I am assuming, for
example, that students are interested in building a solar collector. It is difficult to support
this assumption. In fact, educational researchers frequently report the lack of motivation in
science education classes. However, one of the reasons, I argue, is that traditional school
scientific knowledge does not provide flexibility for its use in students' everyday lives. I
explain this with the concern of traditional science education in solving academic problems.
With this knowledge, it is difficult for teachers and students to face more real problems. A
different alternative is to think of a scenario in which students and teachers negotiate real-
world problems to be solved. This opens a new set of pedagogical possibilities in which
we do not have much experience. I think that in these settings, the distinction and
connection between scientific and technological knowledge are important.

Another problem the introduction of technology faces is its academic status.
Technology is identified with vocational studies which have had low academic status ( a
tension between analytic and practical). In contrast, science is identified with high academic
status. The difference in status does not have support given the intrinsic epistemological
richness of technological knowledge. This is more related to problems of evolution of
professions reflected on school curriculum in which notions of knowledge and rationality
are competing. However, the perception that teachers and reformers can have of technology

is shaped by these problems of academic status. The introduction of technology into the

223

 

curriculum forces us to rethink these potential problems. This is one important outcome of
introducing technology into the science cuniculum. In other words, introducing technology
into the science cuniculum will enable us to think about why we teach science in general
education. Approaches to this basic question require us to open our minds to alternative
ways of thinking as well as alternative epistemological territories.

The contemporary call of science education reforms of connecting science to
students' everyday lives hides incredible complexities. In fact, from a socio-epistemological
perspective, I illustrated how these goals compete. However, one may still ask for the
social conditions which are moving traditional science curriculum toward everyday life
applications. In others words, why the current concern on connecting school science to
students' everyday lives? One potential answer is the ideal of constructing a democratic
society via education. Other answer may be the evolution of society itself toward a
technological social structure. At any rate, I see the problem of connecting school science to
everyday life as a basic opportunity to discuss our current concern of translating science for
the general public, particularly K-12 education. In this situation, I see that the most
important question we should ask is: What is the kind of science that society needs?

This dissertation suggests that connecting science with students' everyday lives
requires the reconstruction of a specific kind of science, that is, a science re-interpreted in
specific and local conditions. Engineering is a good example of this process. Engineers
usually use science for their specific needs. Their "use" of science is not the simple
application of general and universal knowledge to particular problems. Rather, they invent
knowledge for specific situations illunrinated by practical and mundane information.
Science plays an important role in their designs. However, they integrate in a very
utilitarian way several kinds of knowledge. A similar situation is needed in facing everyday
life problems. In fact, I suggest that science teachers need to be exposed to this
technological way of thinking if they are going to help their students to connect science with

students' everyday lives problems.

224

When we ask science teachers to connect science with students' everyday lives, we
are asking them to bridge two generic communities which are represented by scientific and
everyday knowledge. Here, I have suggested the use of technological communities to find
epistemological conditions to use science in relevant ways to students' everyday lives. I
presented evidence on the potential connection between science and technology in the
context of general education. I have shown that there is a complex, but potentially fruitful,
epistemological connection between science and technology. Although we will deal with
different world-views (science and technology), I assume that the epistemological distance
between scientific and technological communities is smaller than the distance between
science and everyday life.

Note that I am not advocating for the introduction of the generic ideology of
engineering into science education. This is a different problem. Engineering communities
share ways of seeing the world. Some of them seem to be useful in connecting science to
everyday life. It does not mean that the science that society needs should be "engineering
science". No! Although I think that we still do not know what kind of science society
needs, we know enough about the generic ideology of engineering connected to problems of
power and control and mainly tied to a business conception of life (Layton, 1971). I am not
asking for introducing this ideology into the science curriculum. I am asking for opening
traditional scientific knowledge to alternative epistemological territories. Technological
knowledge is an important element that can help us to connect school science with students'
everyday life problems. Technology can reduce the distance between scientific communities
and the general public. However, technology is not the magic solution to the lack of
scientific understanding in society. Scientific understanding as a goal of science education
needs to be re-evaluated. Scientific understanding as a social phenomena needs to be re-
studied. The introduction of technology in the sense I have suggested in this dissertation can
help us to do this re-evaluation, particularly because of the connection that technology

provides between understanding and applications.

225

Finally, it is important to say that from my perspective, science for the general public
is going to be useful in everyday life only when people are able to construct such
importance. That is, we cannot assume that the importance of science is the same for a
scientist as for the general public. When science transcends its disciplinary boundaries, its
importance should be evaluated beyond disciplinary perspectives. The evaluation and
construction of the kind of science society needs requires conceptual frameworks to
understand the process of translation of scientific and technological knowledge into school

knowledge. These frameworks should help us to understand how knowledge is dependent

- m]

on communities and how it "moves" from one community (e.g., scientific and technological

iii-7i '
F

communities) to another (e. g., schools). Each community has different world-view that
shapes the kind of knowledge that is generated and translated. The nature of technological
knowledge is a good example of how its local and situated characteristics make its process
of translation difficult. However, this process is necessary on behalf of students' uses of
science in more realistic scenarios. This dissertation suggests that technology, as curricular
content, is an important medium to teach, learn, use and reconstruct science. A re-
evaluation of technology and its epistemological richness can help us to reduce the distance
between the general public and scientific communities. In others words, technology can

close the gap between understanding and applications of school science.

226

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