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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN THE U.S.

Date

0-7639

BIERAR

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ILLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL LIL LL.

321293 017792

 

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled
ARMY:
THE CASE OF THE ADOPTION, ADAPTATION, AND
UTILIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC CRISIS EXERCISE
INTRANET
presented by

LINDA CAROL JANTZEN

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

 

 

MASTER OF ARTS degree in TELECOMMUNICATION

Leak/Leda

Major professor

BELLA MODY, Ph.D.

 

April 164 1999

MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

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1/96 chlM.p65—p.t4

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN THE U.S. ARMY:
THE CASE OF THE ADOPTION, ADAPTATION, AND UTILIZATION OF
THE STRATEGIC CRISIS EXERCISE INTRANET
By

Linda C. J antzen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Telecommunications

1999

ABSTRACT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN THE U.S. ARMY:
THE CASE OF THE ADOPTION, ADAPTATION, AND UTILIZATION OF
THE STRATEGIC CRISIS EXERCISE INTRANET
By

Linda C. J antzen

The U.S. Army has undergone dramatic changes in its structure and operating
procedures in recent years as a result of the introduction of new information
technologies. This study examines the adoption and adaptation of an information
technology innovation in a U.S. Army organization. While previous studies have
focused on the technologies themselves, this study investigates the process of
innovation adoption, with Special attention paid to how the technology and the
organization influence each other.

Data was collected through direct Observation of the Strategic Crisis Exercise
(SCE) intranet, in use in the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), located at the
Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Semi-structured
interviews were also conducted with key leaders, system developers, system
maintainers, and users of the intranet. Despite the unique military context,
theories and frameworks developed for similar studies of information technology
innovation adoption in business organizations were found to be valid with minimal

modifications.

To Mum and Dad

iii

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army War College, the
Department the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States

Government.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to my friend and academic
mentor, Professor Bella Mody, Ph.D., whose patience, attention, and cheerful
assistance made my experience in graduate school successful and enjoyable.

Thanks are also due to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kilmer and Major Matt
Cullen of the Center for Strategic Leadership, who thoughtfully and graciously
responded to my inquiries and coordinated my visit to Carlisle Barracks. I greatly
appreciate the kind assistance of the officers and noncommissioned officers at the
Center for Strategic Leadership who took time out from their busy schedules to
share their experiences and expert insights with me.

Finally, I thank Rhonda Grimm for her inspiration and technical assistance in

producing this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................. vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...................................... ............ viii
INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1
Chapter 1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE .......................................... 6
Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................... 14
Chapter 3 RESEARCH METHOD ........................................... 45
Chapter 4 FINDINGS ........................................................... 53
Chapter 5 CONCLUSIONS ................................................... 80
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................... 87

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

ROGERS’ PARADIGM OF THE INNOVATION PROCESS IN
ORGANIZATIONS ................................................................... 19

SCE 97 INTRANET DESIGN ....................................................... 59

vii

AGIS

AI

C2

CINC

CSL

DISA

F EMA

GCCS

HTML

113

LEADCT

MSEL

NGB

OLE

SCE

SNN

STD

SWAMI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Analysis and Gaming Information System
Artificial Intelligence

Command and Control

Commander in Chief

Center for Strategic Leadership

Defense Information Systems Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Global Command and Control System
Hypertext Markup Language

Internet Information System

Knowledge Engineering Group

Learning Enhancement, Assessment, and Data Collection Tool
Master Scenario Event List

National Guard Bureau

Object Linking and Embedding

Strategic Crisis Exercise

Strategic News Network

Science and Technology Division

Strategic Wargame Automated MSEL Injector

viii

INTRODUCTION

The field of organization and innovation research has produced many case
studies of businesses that have reinvented themselves. That is, they have
undergone drastic changes in their culture, structure, and procedures as a result
Of exposure to, adoption, and implementation of information technologies.
Indeed, the transformations of a wide spectrum of activities made possible by
computer processing and information technology are so profound that they
define an age. The Information Revolution now has the status of earlier
technological revolutions in agriculture and industry.

Small, medium, and large business enterprises in areas like manufacturing,
product development, medicine, retail, banking and transportation have found
new sources of wealth, not only by mastering vast material resources, but by
harnessing ideas and technology. New technologies for collecting, processing,
and disseminating information are now developed and placed on the market SO
quickly that their adoption and use is considered merely a matter of survival and
can hardly be called innovative any more. What interests managers and
researchers to a greater extent is the process of adoption and the appropriate
meshing of technology with organizational design, processes, strategy, and
external relationships (Pennings, 1987). From this point of view, adoption is not

the end point but actually just a milestone in a multistage process of innovation

consisting of both adoption and implementation stages. Reinvention, in the
business sense, is ofien thought of in terms of making planned and profound
changes to various activities in an organization. For example, downsizing in
personnel can be brought about by replacing people with technology, or by
automating previously manually performed tasks. Where information technology
is involved, reinvention can apply not only to an organization but to a
technology. Pennings (1987), for example, showed that word processing is a
flexible innovation that can be reinvented under suitable managerial conditions
(see Chapter 3).

Innovation is always difficult, but becomes even more complex within a large,
bureaucratic organization like the Army. But bureaucracies do innovate, and the
question is not whether, but why and how they can change (Rosen, 1991). An
organization that has been reinventing itself and reinventing technologies
throughout its 224 year history, yet has largely escaped the attention of
information technology innovation researchers, is the U.S. Army. The few
existing studies of technological innovation in the military focus on the Cold War
era development of weapons systems, characterized by product cycles measured
in decades, separation of research and development (R&D) and production, and
costs in the millions and billions of dollars (Alic, et al., 1992). These vintage

models might explain how the Army that emerged from WWI evolved into the

modern technological force that faced up to the Soviet Union and defeated the
Iraqi Republican Guards in the early 19905. However, they contribute little to the
field of innovation in information technology, where product cycles are measured
in weeks, R&D and production are integrated, and old hierarchies are being
discarded in favor of knowledge-empowered employees. Changes in the global
environment and events of the recent past call for a reassessment of the
assumptions upon which the traditional models of military innovation are based.
In 1991, the Persian Gulf War established new benchmarks for the use of
technology in the conduct of war, not just in weapons systems but in
information systems that enhanced the Allies’ situational awareness and
communication capability. Just 5 years later, the Army reinvented itself to
implement the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords in the former Yugoslavia.
In Operation Joint Endeavor, information proved to be a powerful weapon used
by U.S. forces to monitor troop movements and detect and react to violations of
the Dayton agreement. Another spectacular example of reinvention is the Army
personnel drawdown of the 19903, which saw the active component shrink from
almost 780,000 to about 480,000, with Similar reductions in the reserve component
and the civilian work force. Simultaneously, the Army’s operational tempo, a
measure of the degree to which it is committed to perform various missions

around the world, increased an astonishing 300% (Reimer, 1998). Success in

doing so involved fundamental changes not just in the adoption and
procurement of new weapons and management technologies, but in the
structure, doctrine, training, and competitive strategy of the organization as well.
The achievement of competitive advantage through technology is pursued
with no less urgency whether it is a strategic business goal or a matter of
national security. In fact, the distinction between the two is getting more and
more difficult to discern. In the past, wars were fought for geographic
dominance. In the future, national power may be measured by the ability to
attain information dominance and the capacity to deprive one’s competitors of
information (Pfaltzgraff, 1997, p.9). The information revolution has brought
changes in technology as well as a change in the nature of competition, be it
global military competition or global business competition. Unlike past
innovations that tended to bestow an enduring competitive advantage to the
innovator, Information Age technologies tend to be equally accessible to all
competitors. The discriminator among competitors in such an environment
becomes not the possession of the technology, but the way it is used. The term
“Revolution” connotes what George Gilder calls a paradigm shift, or the
“collapse of formerly pivotal scarcities,” and “the rise of new forms of
abundance” (Gilder, 1997). Applying this concept to the competitive

environment of business and national security, technology is the abundant

resource, while resources such as time and attention are scarce. Time pressures
leaders to make decisions in progress, to react faster than the competition. With
the explosion Of data and limitations of human beings to make use of it all,
attention becomes a very scarce resource. Again, in Army as well as business
organizations, the goal for information technologies is to be designed and used
to free up time and attention for more critical and strategic tasks. Accomplishing
this requires finding entirely new ways of doing work, not just more efficient
ways of doing work the same way.

Social science researchers in the past have looked to the military as a
“laboratory of social innovation”. For example, when full scale integration of
blacks and of women into the military preceded the same level of integration in
society at large, Army organizations in particular were studied as a microcosm of
what might be seen in society at large. Today, it behooves researchers to see the
Army as a laboratory of technological innovation because of the rate at which

new technologies are being tested and adopted, and the swift and visible results.

Chapter 1

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

In the Army, traditional criteria for assessing the effectiveness of command
and control (C2) systems, such as the evaluation criteria identified by Colodney
(1995), are based on Army history and doctrine that have in many cases already
been superseded by the provisions of the Army’s modernization program. The
plan of change, called Force XXI, is so named because it defines a process, the
successful completion of which will result in Army XXI, a modern force capable
of meeting the challenges of the let Century, in large part through effective use
of information. Part of the implementation of that program is evaluation of new
commercial information technologies and their effectiveness in enhancing
decision makers’ knowledge of the situation. Studies of particular technologies
are helpful in evaluating the performance of machines, but are not adequate to
explain or assess the complex processes and impacts of the adoption and
implementation of modern information technologies. These processes are unique
in that their effects are bi-directional. While a tank or an airplane may be used
with differing degrees of Skill in different organizations, it remains essentially the
same technology and is used with the same tactics, techniques, and procedures
between one unit and another. Information technologies are flexible in that the

same tool can be modified to suit the mission, and the organization can, under

suitable managerial conditions, evolve in its structure and its procedures to
optimize the potential of the tool.
Overall and intermediate objectives

The overall objective of this study was to describe the process of the adoption
and adaptation of an information technology innovation within the context of an
Army organization. The purpose was not to critique or evaluate the process or
the technology, but rather to describe the issues involved in meshing
organizational design, processes, and external relationships to the introduction
of information technology.

This study was intended to link research to a contemporary Situation in an
attempt to extend current innovation theory to that Situation. The intermediate
objectives leading up to the objective were to first look at the adoption process:
the elements of the process, and the surrounding conditions that shape the
process including organizational design and culture and the strategic orientation
of the leadership. Second, to look at the adaptation of the innovation to the
organization: explore its uses and impacts, and how and why the innovation was

reinvented.
Organization and innovation under study

The organization chosen for this study was the Center for Strategic Leadership

(CSL) at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Though there

are many innovations in the process of being adopted or being implemented
within the Center for Strategic Leadership, the scope of this study was limited to
the intranet and associated internally developed applications used to support the
annual Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE). The exercise is a ten-day, computerized,
interactive war game in which War College students put to use the concepts they
study in the classroom. Center for Strategic Leadership and War College faculty
use communication and computer technologies to create a Simulation of the
distributed, collaborative environment of strategic decision makers at the
national security level.

The SCE intranet, the focal innovation of this study, went into operation for
the first time in 1997. Therefore the initial impact of the adoption of intranet
technology by the CSL can already be observed. It is also in a constant state of
change, or reinvention, in response to new requirements from both inside and
outside the organization, making it ideal for a study of this type. Many other
organizations within the Army use intranet technology as a way to more
effectively accomplish every kind of mission from administrative message
distribution to training support to operational and decision support of combat
units. The Tactical World Wide Web (TACWEB), an intranet developed and
used in the Second (US) Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea, was first

selected to be the subject of this study. Lack of adequate time, funds, and the

high operational tempo of the Second Infantry Division made it infeasible to do
an on-Site study of TACWEB, but documentation as well as conversations with
TACWEB developers and maintainers contributed to the formulation of research
questions and conclusions in this study. Currently TACWEB and other
intranets like it are being assessed mainly by the users, developers, and
maintainers associated with them. These intranets and their adoption and
utilization within a real operational environment as opposed to a simulation, make
interesting subjects for future research.

The case of the SCE intranet provides a good starting point for study of
technological innovation in a military context because many of the original
developers and decision makers are still present at the CSL. Like most other
military organizations, the historical evolution of the CSL’S roles and missions
are well documented (it is interesting to note that the Military History Institute
also resides at Carlisle Barracks). Finally, the CSL and the manner in which they
conduct the SCE have a real influence on Army policy. This influence is due to
two things: 1) the CSL is an education, research, and outreach organization for
the highest levels of the Army, specifically the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations (ADCSOPS), and 2) the conduct of the Strategic Crisis Exercise has a

direct and personal effect on the War College students and visiting dignitaries

who participate in it, among whom are current and future leaders in the National
Security Community.
Specific research questions

The topic of information technology innovation adoption and adaptation in
the Army is vast and largely unexplored. This study is a start, limited time and
resources notwithstanding. It addresses the following specific research
questions:

1. Why and how did the Center for Strategic Leadership adopt the SCE
intranet?

2. How did the Center for Strategic Leadership reinvent the SCE intranet?

3. How has the SCE intranet shaped the organizational structures and
processes of the Center for Strategic Leadership?

This study is intended to provide a logical basis for, as well as to stimulate
interest in doing fiirther research in the area of innovation in the military. It is
also intended to illuminate the parallels between the innovation processes of
business organizations and modern Army organizations in order to facilitate the
sharing of lessons learned on a practical level and theoretical perspectives on a
conceptual level. As such, it assumes little or no previous expertise on the part
of the reader on the structure and procedures of either business or military

organizations.

10

Organization of this study

Chapter 2 introduces the reader to relevant organization and innovation
literature. Chapter 3 describes the case study method and, protocol used to
investigate the process of innovation in the CSL, the use of the intranet in the
SCE, the reinvention process including some of the more recent applications
developed to supplement the intranet and the impact of the process on the CSL.
Chapter 4 presents the findings. Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the research
findings and addresses the larger issues that prompted the overall research
objective.
Audiences

The intended audiences for this study are organization and innovation
researchers of all disciplines, practitioners of information systems development,
management, and implementation, and decision makers in the Army and in
business. This research is extremely valuable to each for the following reasons:

1. Researchers seek to develop relevant theory to fill the vacuum of

experience created by new technologies. That development requires
observations be made in a variety Of different contexts to provide a foundation
for predictions of the organizational effects Of new technologies. The Army
provides a new technological context, increasingly related to and interconnected

with that of business organizations. This study is not an attempt to invent a new

11

theory of innovation, but rather to alter, or at least inform current theory based
on analysis of the new context. Further, the same technologies are being
adopted and implemented in Army organizations as in business organizations.

2. Information practitioners are faced with implementing into their
organizations a Steady stream of new technologies without experience or a
theoretical framework to help integrate them. Most computer innovations are not
simply turnkey systems where the purpose is well understood and the functions
easy to use. Managers as well as developers have to be both technologically
sophisticated and adept at facilitating organizational and attitudinal change.
Theory cannot provide foolproof steps for successful implementation, but it can
contribute to well informed and well managed implementations that will maximize
the potential for more effectively achieving organizational goals.

3. Decision makers must be aware of and Skilled at applying different
planning and control systems for various stages of the innovation process.
Development and adoption of innovations requires experimentation, risk taking,
and freedom from bureaucratic control. Yet a degree of strategic control is
necessary for successful implementation, guided by monitoring and feedback.
Finding an appropriate balance between the two is of particular interest to
leaders of innovating organizations. Organizational leaders also seek to

understand how they can get the maximum benefit from information without

12

being overwhelmed by it. Increasingly, business and military leaders are
expected to be managers of uncertainty. This study and others like it will help to
share the experiences and the lessons of organizations who have, successfully or

unsuccessfully, adopted and adapted information technologies.

13

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

An exhaustive review of previous research relevant to all possible aspects of
the information technology adoption and adaptation process is impractical and
beyond the scope of this study. However, an understanding of existing theory
and a review of significant findings from a cross section of the relevant research
areas is essential not only as a guide for further investigation, but as a basis for
understanding the results of this investigation. Each of the individual views is
helpfiJl, but all of them collectively are necessary to provide an adequate basis
for a theoretical framework that can be applied to the innovation process in both
business and Army organizations. This chapter is divided into the following
subsections:

1. Defining Innovation: This section provides a range of views on what
an innovation is and how the definition impacts the resulting research effort.

2. Modeling the Innovation Process: This subsection describes how
researchers have attempted to model or provide a framework for understanding
the innovation and reinvention process in organizations.

3. Applying the Model to Information Technology: This subsection

provides examples of how basic models of innovation have been applied to help

14

understand the adoption and adaptation of information technology in particular,
including a detailed example of the case of word processing.

4. Innovation in the Military: This section providesja detailed summary of
research on innovation in the military by Stephen P. Rosen (1991), a scholar of
national security affairs.

5. Barriers to Innovation: This section addresses the political and social
forces that may oppose the innovation adoption process, and describes research
into how innovative organizations overcome those barriers.

6. Forecasting the Future: This section describes the work of fiJturist
theorists and how they have influenced the initiation of innovations in business
and military organizations.

7. The Human Dimension: This section describes the perspective that an
organization’s members are, as individuals, also affected by and a part of the
reinvention process.

Defining innovation

A meaningful summary of innovation research must begin by delineating what
is meant by “innovation”. Rogers defines an innovation as an idea, practice, or
object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption (1982,
p. 11). He later introduced the concept of an innovation-development process,

consisting of all of the decisions, activities, and their impacts that occur

15

throughout the development of an innovation, from recognition of a need
through adoption of an innovation to address that need (p. 135). Rogers’
primary interest was the diffiision process by which an innovation is
communicated among certain populations. This study is confined to one
organization and encompasses the initiation and adoption process as well as the
reinvention process by which the innovation and the organization both change
as a result of their unique combination. Therefore elements of both Rogers’
definitions are applicable.

Stephen P. Rosen (1991, p. 7) defines a military innovation as a change in the
ideas governing the way a combat organization uses its forces to win. He places
emphasis on major changes in organizational structure and doctrine, historically
brought about by new developments in technology (nuclear weapons, for
example). He describes entirely different innovation processes based on the type
of innovation and the context in which they occur. For example, according to
Rosen (1991), the process of innovation during peacetime has slightly different
elements than during wartime. He also distinguishes between social innovation,
which changes the way people behave, and technological innovation, which is
concerned with the building of machines (p. 39). Rosen’s theory of military
innovation will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. His work is

valuable in understanding the innovation process as it pertains to military

16

organizations, but his distinctions by context or type of innovation make it
problematic in making sense of the innovation process within organizations that
function in dynamic and competitive environments.

Rogers’ definitions apply generically to all types of innovations, including
both technologies and techniques for doing things. The type Of innovation this
study is concerned with is information technology, a Specific type of
technological innovation involved in the creation, storage, or transmission of
information.

Modeling the innovation process

Research in the field of innovations differs in scope and focus. Rogers (1976)
and Rosen (1991), for example, looked at the entire process of innovation that
starts with identifying the need for a change to solve some problem, and
progresses through implementing the solution. One of the earliest and most
widely known models of innovation in organizations comes from Rogers’ (1976)
research on the innovation process as it pertains to communication in
organizations. Rogers’ focus was on communication patterns, and his model of
innovation was developed for innovations in products and practices but not
Specifically with information technologies in mind. Yet analysis of subsequent
models developed for technological innovations Shows that other researchers

drew heavily on Rogers’ research, or at least found strikingly similar elements in

17

the process of adopting and implementing information technologies. A summary
of Rogers’ process model of innovation is presented here to provide a solid
foundation on which to build an understanding of more contemporary models
(See Figure 1).

Rogers’ assumptions distinguish his model from previous models, which
investigated the time of adoption and the frequency of previously adopted
innovations as a measure of an organizations innovativeness. Rogers’ four
assumptions are (1) innovation iS one of a number of possible responses by the
organization to a confluence of external forces acting on it, (2) innovation
proceeds through a number of stages, representing increasing commitment by
the organization, (3) the process is not unidirectional but interactive, subject to
backtracking and change, and (4) one of the best measures of effects of
innovation is change in the overall effectiveness of the organization (1976, pp.
155-156). He describes two main stages in the innovation process, initiation and
implementation. He also stresses that structural characteristics of an
organization, such as complexity, formalization, and centralization may have
different effects at different times on the process. For example, Rogers cites
Sapolsky’s (1967) argument that high complexity, low formalization, and low
centralization facilitate initiation of an innovation, but these same structural

characteristics make it difficult for the organization to implement the innovation.

18

ENVIRONMENT

POSSIBLE RESOURCE DEMANDS &
INNOVATIONS CONSTRAINTS SUPPORTS

KNOWLEDGE OF SLACK EXTERNAL
INNOVATIONS RESOURCES ACCOUNTABILITY

\. L /

 

 

PROBLEM DEFINITION
THE AGENDA OF EXPECTATIONS
AND PROBLEMS
(PERFORMANCE GAPS)

 

 

 

feedback

 

NO CHANGE
INNOVATION NONINNOVATIVE
l CHANGE EXPANSION OR
CONTRACTION
—- MATCHING OF ACTIVITIES
__. TESTING
_ INSTALLATION

L

__ INSTITUTIONALIZATION

 

Figure 1. Rogers’ (1976) Paradigm of the Innovation Process
in Organizations (p. 164)

19

(Rogers, 197 6, p. 156). Therefore, Rogers found, a multistage approach to
examining the innovation process was necessary. Even before the first stage in
the process of innovation adoption, environmental, structural, and
communication factors combine to influence the organization. The problem
definition is the process by which the organization defines actual or perceived
discrepancies between its expectations and its actual performance. Rogers calls
these discrepancies performance gaps (1976, p. 157). Measurement of
performance gaps is difficult because they are based largely on perceptions, and
thus can be created or disappear as a result of changes in either perceptions or
realities. In addition, the effects of performance gaps are bi-directional, that is, a
performance gap may inspire a search for an innovation, or alternatively a
member’s awareness of a useful innovation may create a perceived performance
gap (Rogers, 1976, p. 159).

Rogers describes reinvention as distinct from simply importing an innovation
from some external source and putting it to use within an organization. Rather,
he explains, organizations Often adopt a “general concept whose operational
meaning gradually unfolds in the process of implementation” (Rogers, 1976, p.
160). Stated another way, reinvention is the way in which an organization
modifies both the innovation and its own organizational structure to fit with each

other after the decision to adopt has been made. A number of factors influence

20

the nature and direction of this process beginning prior to the decision to adopt.
Rogers divides those factors into four classes: (1) Knowledge of Innovations,
(2) External Accountability, (3) Slack Resources, and (4) Organizational Structure
(1976, p. 159). Knowledge refers to the awareness of an organization’s members
as to what innovations are available and perceptions about the salient
characteristics of innovations. Knowledge is influenced by the characteristics of
the members and the existence of defined search processes such that members
will be exposed to literature or demonstrations of new innovations, either on their
own time or while acting as a member of the organization. External accountability
refers to the degree to which an organization is dependent or responsible to its
environment. Rogers proposes that the higher the degree of external
accountability, the more innovative the organization will be (1976, p.160).
External accountability also includes a psychological dimension, such as
accountability to “reference groups”, or those who “ask the questions that the
organization must answer” (Rogers, 1976, p. 160). For example, members of
military organizations are accountable to higher ranking members, and military
organizations have a well-defined position in a structural hierarchy. Business
organizations are accountable to customers and investors. External
accountability can also be thought of as the formation of expectations, both

specified and perceived, stemming from among other things organizational and

21

professional norms. As with knowledge, the existence and effects of
accountability on an organization are influenced by the characteristics of the
members and the existence of formal reporting procedures. ‘ While external
accountability implies some sort of control of an organization’s activities by
outside individuals or agencies, an organization must also exert some degree of
control over its environment in order to be innovative (Rogers, 1976, p. 161).
Slack resources refer to those resources that an organization controls that are not
already committed to other purposes (Rogers, 1976, p. 161). They may already
exist or be deliberately created. Like external accountability, slack resources have
a psychological dimension as well as a financial dimension. For example,
financial slack may be an objective measure such as total amount of budget
increase, or it may be more a more subjective assessment as to total amount of
discretionary or anticipated fimds. Personnel slack may be an objective measure
of total number of employees, or it may be a subjective assessment of how their
workload compares with their actual capabilities. Rogers proposes that slack
resources are essential for innovation to occur in an organization, and also that a
high degree of slack resources may create a perceived performance gap which
leads to innovation (1976, p. 162). In the latter case the performance gap comes
from the expectation that a responsible organization will maximize their resources

and not simply stockpile them. The final factor, organizational structure, refers to

22

the arrangement of components and subsystems within a system (Rogers, 1976,
p. 162). Variables such as the degree of centralized control, the existence of
formal procedures, and the complexity and openness of an. organization influence
the way in which organizations perceive problems, search for solutions, and
make decisions.

Each of these factors contributes to the formulation of an organization’s
agenda, including the decision to develop and/or adopt innovations. However,
having become aware of problems or opportunities and having the resources,
demand and support structure to implement the innovation process, not all
organizations will proceed down the path of adopting and implementing
innovations. In Rogers’ model, initiating the innovation process is only one of
several alternative responses, along with others like noninnovative change,
expansion or contraction of present activities, or no change at all (1976, p. 164).
Even afier the decision is made to initiate the innovation process, full
implementation of that innovation is not inevitable. Rogers describes the
innovation process in four steps or subprocesses: (1) adoption, or matching, (2)
testing, or limited implementation, (3) installation, or full implementation and (4)
institutionalization, the process of making the innovation an integral part of the
organization’s activities (1976, p. 163). Rogers cautions that this process is not

unidirectional or uniform. To complete the model, feedback and redirection lines

23

are added to Show that adoption decisions at all stages have a direct bearing on
future problem definitions and further innovations.
Applying the model to information technology

Although it was developed in 1976 and not with computer technology or even
automated procedures specifically in mind, a comparison of Rogers’ descriptive
paradigm of the innovation process with a more prescriptive methodology for
information systems development found in a contemporary textbook shows how
theory can inform and influence practice. A generic methodology called FAST
developed by Whitten and Bentley (1998) prescribes phases for information
systems development. In the survey phase, the project context, scope, budget,
staffing, and schedule are established. In the study phase, both the business and
technical issues are identified and analyzed for causes and effects. In the
definition phase, business requirements are identified and analyzed for the
possible technical solution. Candidate technical solutions that might address the
business requirements are identified and analyzed in the configuration phase.
The target solution is either designed by the organization (design phase) or
specified to a vendor (procurement phase). The system is then built and tested
in the construction phase, and put into full implementation in the delivery phase.
The phases are grouped into three major stages. The first three phases, survey,

study, definition, are collectively known as the systems analysis stage. The next

24

three phases, configuration, procurement and design, are known as the systems
design stage. The last two phases, construction and delivery, are known as the
systems implementation stage. The activities prescribed in the FAST
methodology for the systems analysis and design stages of development
correspond closely with the matching stage in Rogers’ paradigm, in which the
organization matches a problem or performance gap to an innovation believed to
address that problem or close the performance gap. The activities prescribed in
the systems configuration stage of development correspond to the testing,
installation, and institutionalization stages in Rogers’ paradigm. In both cases,
the innovation is first partially implemented in order to assess the accuracy of the
match and the possible effects, then installed and connected to the activities of
the organization, and finally losing the distinction of being an innoVation as it
becomes an integral part of the organization’s ongoing activities.
Methodologies such as FAST place emphasis on identifying the proper
requirements at the beginning of the process (problem definition and matching)
and on proper implementation and maintenance of the system at the end of the
process (installation, institutionalization, and feedback) as a recipe for success in
developing or adopting information systems.

Another example of the influence of Rogers’ paradigm comes from Johnson

and Rice’s (1983) case study of the reinvention process. Their study

25

investigated the adoption and adaptation of automated word processing systems
when such systems were relatively new to offices. Johnson and Rice used a five-
stage model attributed to Rogers and others to summarize their data on the
process of adopting and adapting world processing systems in business
organizations. As with Rogers’ (1976) model, the Johnson and Rice model does
not begin nor end with the decision to adopt, but describes an entire process
including elements that contribute to the decision, elements of the adoption
process, and elements of the reinvention process. The five stages are (1) agenda
setting, similar to problem definition, (2) matching, as previously described, the
problem from the agenda and the possible solution are brought together, (3)
redefining, or defining the attributes of the innovation relative to the
organization’s needs, (4) structuring, whereby members establish the innovation
within the organization’s structure in the process of reacting or adjusting to it,
and (5) interconnecting, whereby political questions about turf, social benefits,
control and access are raised and their solutions negotiated or dictated.

Johnson and Rice focused on one innovation, word processors, and compared
data collected from nearly 200 organizations. They compared not only the
features put into use, but also the different patterns of implementation (for
example, distribution Of terminals, division of labor, design of work groups, etc.).

Their data reinforced the usefulness of the multi-stage model approach and

26

highlighted some additional factors in information system adoption. For example,
the initial stage in Johnson and Rice’s (1983) model, agenda setting, corresponds
with Rogers’ description of problem definition. As Rogers pointed out, there are
multiple factors affecting the problem definition process, including knowledge of
innovations, slack resources, external accountability, and organizational

structure (1976, p. 159).

Johnson and Rice (1983) found from the case of word processing that it was
not sufficient to think of agenda setting from a rational perspective. Instead,
they found that decision making was multi-faceted and influenced as much by
systematic establishment of goals and objective criteria as by human emotion
and ideology (Johnson & Rice, 1983, p. 164). In response to their survey and
those of others, the rationales given for initial use of word processing were not
uses that would change or improve the organization, increase productivity, or
save money. The most common rationale given for initial installation of word
processors was “repetitive typing” (Johnson & Rice, 1983, p. 165). This
suggests that the real extent of the benefits of replacing traditional typewriters
with word processors was not foreseen, but would come about later in the
process as users and managers became more experienced with the new tool’s

capabilities.

27

In the next phase, matching, Johnson and Rice’s data reinforced the
importance of top level management support for successful adoption and
implementation (1983, p. 164). In addition, they found that the attributes that
facilitate adoption during this phase may have the long term effect of either
suppressing its potential or generating organizational conflicts in later stages (p.
166). For example, the compatibility, or consistency with the adopter’s prior
experience, beliefs, and values, was initially high when word processing was
placed into the existing centralized typing pools. By simply automating old work
procedures rather than using the new tool to create new, more efficient work
procedures, the potential of word processing was suppressed.

Communicability, or the visibility of the innovation to potential adopters, was
high with respect to the visible results of rapid production, correct fOrmatting
and clean copy. Visibility of the higher quality product without a corresponding
appreciation for the work involved in producing it had a dual effect in that it led
to higher standards for demands on the word processing operators and
eventually became the source of tension between requesters of word processing
services and operator capabilities. Another attribute, divisibility, was not a
strength of the word processing systems in Johnson and Rice’s study.
Introduction of word processing equipment tended to be large scale rather than

incremental. However, as with compatibility, efforts to keep initial systems

28

simple also worked against developing managerial and employee expertise
needed in later stages (Johnson & Rice, 1983, p. 166).

The case of word processing went beyond the stages of innovation adoption,
and produced interesting findings related to the reinvention process as well.
Johnson and Rice define reinvention as “the degree to which an innovation is
changed by the adopter in the process of adoption and implementation after its
original development” (1983, p. 169). They stressed that reinvention can occur at
any of the five adoption stages. They categorize reinvention into planned or
vicarious (intentional versus learning from other’s mistakes), and reactive or
secondary (solving a problem generated by the innovation versus solving
unintended consequences brought on by reinvention) (Johnson & Rice, 1983, p.
170). Recall that reinvention is the process of adapting an organization to an
innovation and vice versa. No case study of adoption is complete without
following it through the reinvention process, as the consequences of this
process will certainly affect future adoption processes.

Johnson and Rice noted that management and innovation practices have a
direct impact on organizational effectiveness, successful accomplishment of
organizational mission, and perhaps even redefinitions of that mission (1983, p.
176). They observed word processing technology, procedures, and operators in

multiple organizations and found that the technology had taken on what they

29

considered to be different forms as a result of the different managerial conditions
and different decisions made throughout the adoption and reinvention process.
Each form exhibits increasing amounts of reinvention. In the first form, Low
Integration, word processors were used as typewriters, with minimal
understanding of, or appreciation for the capabilities Of the technology (Johnson
& Rice, 1983, p. 176). In the next form, called Standard Adapter: Clockwork
Systems, emphasis on short term efficiency creates a reluctance to get new
equipment or develop new procedures. Attention is placed on quantity rather
than quality of output (Johnson & Rice, 1983, p. 177). In the next form,
Expanding Systems: Supervisory Reinvention, applications evolve and functions
are added frequently. Supervisors motivate change and put a premium on fast
results. They invest in reinvention, and have a Significant influence on the
attitude of their subordinates (Johnson & Rice, 1983, p. 178). The final form,
High Integration: Systemwide Reinvention, differs from Expanding Systems in
that word processing was managed rather than supervised. Supervisors and
operators cooperated in system development and operation, with a willingness to
accept risk and uncertainty in order to experiment and learn (Johnson & Rice,
1983, p. 179). While the latter form, High Integration, appears to be the most
desirable for innovation to thrive, it is not always possible or desirable for every

type of organization.

30

The importance of Johnson and Rice’s (1983) findings was not to prescribe a
recipe for successful innovation, but to illustrate the fact that managerial
conditions as well as the participation of those close to the work process can
shape both the innovation process and the consequences of it on the
organization and the innovation.

Innovation in the military

Few theoretical works can be found that focus on the process of innovation in
the case of military organizations. Stephen P. Rosen’s analysis, Winning the
Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (1991), is one of the few. Its
weakness is that it used mainly historical examples to illustrate and evaluate the
innovation process. History does in fact provide many insights, but it is difficult
in hindsight to accurately assess the conditions that led to decisions and their
outcomes. Examples of past successes or failures are useful to understanding
the evolution of the process, but they are inadequate as predictors or measures
of current models. Nevertheless, many elements of his work are useful for
understanding the current process of innovation in Army organizations. These
elements are examined here in some detail.

Rosen (1991) proposes that bureaucracies, large organizations with well
defined procedures and centralized control, are not hard to change, even though

they are actually designed not to change. Bureaucracies, including the military

31

services, do innovate and change. The question, then, is why and how do they
change (Rosen, 1991, p. 3). Rogers agreed with that observation, stating that
bureaucracies, which rely on stability for their efficiency, lose that efficiency
when rapid change is introduced (Rogers, 1976, p. 149). Yet innovation and
change are a regular part of most organizations, including bureaucracies.
Another paradox brought up by Rogers (1976) is that the same structural
characteristics of an organization that work to facilitate the innovation adoption
process later work against the implementation process. He suggested that this
problem might be solved if organizations could adapt a dual structure: complex,
informal, and decentralized to initiate innovations, while on the other hand low in
complexity, formalized, and centralized in order to facilitate implementation
(Rogers, 1976, p. 156). If a bureaucracy can be designed for stability and yet
adapt itself to accommodate and even to initiate the process of change, perhaps
therein lies a clue to creating an organizational structure that could facilitate both
initiation and implementation of innovations. Rosen’s work takes a first step in
addressing this issue by focusing on one very large and stable bureaucracy, the
military. Rosen describes the innovation process differently based on whether it
occurs in peacetime or wartime, and whether it is a social behavior innovation or
a technological one (1991, p. 7). In peacetime, he says, the impetus for

innovation can come from a previous catastrophic defeat or from civilian

32

intervention. Peacetime innovation requires a redefining of values through an
ideological struggle over what the next war will look like and how it must be
fought to be won (Rosen, 1991, p. 20). This ideology is then transformed into
legislation or new tasks, missions, and performance measures for the military.
The actors in this scenario are primarily senior military officers. Unlike a Chief
Executive Officer of a civilian organization, the senior leaders of the military all
come from the ranks. This creates a unique power structure in which diffusion of
new ways of doing things comes about very effectively through the creation of
new promotion pathways that incorporate the new tasks and performance
measures. Civilian intervention can play a part in this process, primarily in the
role of reinforcing the senior officers or protecting military innovators against
opposition (Rosen, 1991, p. 21).

In his discussion of wartime innovation, Rosen (1991) introduces the concept
of feedback in the innovation process. Improving performance of existing tasks
is difficult, but learning entirely new tasks is even more difficult under wartime
conditions, when time and the availability and reliability of information may be
extremely limited. Even under these conditions, feedback can enable reform of
certain practices, something that is short of actual innovation. Real innovation
becomes necessary when the feedback, or intelligence, lies outside of

established categories, or when an inappropriate strategic goal is being pursued.

33

Stated another way, innovation is required when the old ways are being
performed well but not winning the war (Rosen, 1991, p. 35). Wartime innovation
can proceed from wartime learning, but learning must go beyond improvement in
existing routines. Rosen observed from the cases of the British tank, the
American submarine force, and the strategic bombing force of WWII that
wartime innovation proceeds from wartime learning. In each case, new strategic
goals were defined rather than pursuing Old ones. Thus, in wartime, real
improvement in effectiveness for a military organization stems not only from the
selection of appropriate strategic goals, nor even from the way it conducts
operations, but from the proper definition of what and how it Should be learning
from its wartime experiences.

The more traditional type of innovation usually associated with the military is
the building of machines, or weapons. But even this type of innovation has a
political component, the recognition of which can shed light on the development
and adoption of any technological innovation including both weapons and
information technology. Rosen first addresses the misconception that military
technological innovation comes about as a result of objective knowledge about
enemy capabilities. He found from historical accounts a pattern of both
peacetime and wartime research and development (R&D) surprisingly divorced

from intelligence about enemy technology (Rosen, 1991, p. 187). Current

34

innovation decisions have been and are likely to involve the more complex
question not of what capabilities the enemy has today, but what major
competitors are likely to have five to ten years in the future. Rosen discusses the
role of demand and the historical role of scientists in his discussion of
technological innovation in the military. The ideal way to decide what
technologies to develop is the business approach - estimate future costs and
their anticipated benefits. Actual costs Of research and development of military
technology are highly uncertain because contributions in the effort come not just
from within the military but from the collective resources of universities, research
labs, and industry. The value yielded from military technology is just as difficult
to calculate: how does one measure political and military power or the value of
deterrence? The relevant question is what strategies to develop for coping with
these uncertainties (Rosen, 1991, p. 53).

In Rosen’s analysis of the historical role of scientists in military innovation, he
found one view that new ideas for weapons systems come from scientists and
engineers and rarely from within the military. Further, this view charged, the
military was not even adept at selecting from commercially developed
technologies and adapting them for military use (Rosen, 1991, p. 222). Prominent
scientist and advisor to the President, Vannevar Bush, argued in 1945 for letting

scientists become familiar with the needs of the military, and then proceed with

35

research independent of military interference (Rosen, 1991, p. 228). This view
was valid on its face. Soldiers are trained to make snap decisions with
inadequate data, while researchers supposedly know better. Military
organizations tend to follow the bureaucratic imperative of self preservation,
resisting the introduction of new technologies that lie beyond their existing areas
of expertise (Rosen, 1991, p. 231). Once again, however, Rosen’s detailed
analysis of historical cases served to contradict the assumptions and reinforce
the paradox. Rosen found no evidence that bureaucratic pathologies had caused
the military to neglect available technologies, nor was there evidence that
technological innovations had come about due to the exclusive efforts of either
the military or the civilian scientific community.

Rosen concluded that successful innovations are initiated as often during
periods of constrained resources as during times of growing budgets. Rather
than money, he found, the key to innovation was talent, time, and information
(Rosen, 1991, p. 252). Intelligence about the behavior and capabilities of the
enemy was only loosely connected to peacetime, wartime, or technological
innovation. Innovation is more closely linked to predictions about changes in
the security environment that are based on economic, technological, and political
factors outside the control of the US or its potential competitors. Successful,

useful innovations, Rosen asserts, have an intellectual basis determined by

36

environmental factors that are independent of fluctuating policy decisions (1991,
p. 254). Finally, Rosen recommends the best technique for managing uncertainty
is the “low cost hedge”: emphasis on research and development (R&D) and on
simulated warfare on a range of new technologies and mobilization plans for
mass production rather than large scale procurement of any one system. It is
more effective, he says, to buy information and defer construction until a new
strategic requirement is defined (p. 259). Another interesting finding put forth by
Rosen is that he found no clear cut cases of “bad” innovation in the US Military.
Mistakes appear to have been the result of failure to innovate rather than
inappropriate innovations (Rosen, 1991, p. 53).
Barriers to innovation

Models Of innovation and other complex processes seek to demystify and to
provide a certain degree of structure and predictability to the dynamics of
organizational behavior. As Johnson and Rice (1984) pointed out, the rational
perspective on the adoption decision process fails to account for emotional,
psychological, and political factors acting on the decisionmaker. Johannes M.
Pennings (1987) examined some of the factors that tend to inhibit the process of
innovation, including observable but unexplained reluctance on the part of some
managers to exploit the opportunities new technology can bring. An

understanding of the factors inhibiting adoption or adaptation of innovations

37

may contribute as much to the decisionmaking process as understanding the
factors that facilitate them. Pennings (1987) described the phenomenon of
behavioral inertia as “a tendency to persist in a pattern of learned behavior that
has become established, even in the face of rather strong temptation to abandon
or change it” (p. 57). As a heritable trait, the effects of behavioral inertia will
manifest differently in different people and in different groups, adding a
subconscious, seemingly unpredictable element to the decision making process.
In terms of innovation connected with new technology, says Pennings, “either
the benefits of change or the cost of inertia must be extremely powerful before
adoption will occur” (1987, p. 19). Inertial forces may have a greater impact on
radical adoptions, where sweeping changes are swiftly introduced into an
organization and the people are unfamiliar with the technology. The impact on
acceptance of the new technology is likely to be fragmentation, delay, and
interruption (Pennings, 1987, p. 214). Pennings (1987) found that innovative
organizations did not overcome strong emotional barriers per se, but treated them
as part of the common, ordinary routine of individuals and of the organization. In
his Routine Change model, Pennings introduced several submodels of what he
called ordinary routines that can lead to adoption as part of simply the “normal
flow of things” (1987, p. 20). He emphasized that these submodels were not

determinants of innovation, but instead a way of understanding adoption in

38

terms of the unfolding of a host of standard operating procedures. For example,
an organization may follow defined search routines as part of its problem-
solving model and discover new technology as a solution to problems. New
technologies may be perceived as critical for market survival and adopted as a
result of a routine scan of the capabilities of the organization’s competitors. The
organization may adopt on the advice of consultants or in response to demands
by clients or customers. Accepting that organizational routines can mitigate
behavioral inertia and promote innovation leads to a host Of possible strategies
for formulating technological policies, such as maintaining openness to the
environment, tracking and forecasting technological trends, and making
structural adaptations like creating unique position, teams, and mechanisms for
implementing new technologies (Pennings, 1987, p. 214).
Forecasting the future

AS illustrated above, innovation adoption and development decisions come
about in many ways. Rational analysis of organizational requirements is but one
of them. Factors such as knowledge of innovations, slack resources, and
external accountability (see above) focus on the ability to see, understand, and
respond to the environment as it exists today. But success in the competitive
business and security environment requires the ability to anticipate the

requirements of the future. Business and military leaders alike seek not to merely

39

keep up with their competitors but to stay ahead of them. The perception of
necessity may come about more from a vision of the future rather than from some
measurable observation or economically calculated value. Contributing to that
vision are knowledge of emerging technologies and how they are intended to be
used, as well as an informed and enlightened conception of the environment or
context in which these technologies will likely be developed and implemented.
Several scholars have sought to describe the future environment and how it
will influence the direction and nature of future technologies and ways of using
them. Futurist views have had a great impact on military doctrine and strategic
business goals, and thus have contributed to decisions to initiate development
of new technologies. For example, an Army doctrinal publication, Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI OperatiOns. (1994)
lists in its references the works of futurist theorists Alvin and Heidi Toffler.
Force XXI Operations describes the conceptual foundations for the conduct of
future Army Operations in war and in operations other than war involving Force
XXI, the US Army of the early twenty-first century. The purpose of the
document is to provide a basis for development of supporting concepts,
programs, experiments, and initiatives, many of which have already begun.
According to Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993), historical epochs or waves of

socioeconomic change are brought about by revolutionary technological

4O

change. The first (agrarian) wave was characterized by animal domestication and
agricultural cultivation, the second (industrial) wave by mass production and
mechanization, and the third (information) wave by digitization, computers, and
information technologies. The effect of these socioeconomic developments has
been to alter the world economy and the goals of military strategy. If the analogy
holds, then information is the new basis of power. For example, companies can
achieve competitive advantage and thereby make more money through the
effective use of information. The Army can control the terms and progress of
battle by maximizing the ability to collect and process relevant intelligence and
transmit directives while denying this capability to competitors.

Another futurist theorist, George Gilder, describes socioeconomic change in
terms of “paradigm shifts” (1997). He explains that “the key to paradigm shifis is
the collapse Of formerly pivotal scarcities, the rise of new forms of abundance,
and the onset of new scarcities. Successful innovators use these new forms of
abundance to redress the emergent shortages” (Gilder, 1997). Returning for a
moment to Johnson and Rice (1983) information technology creates new
information pathways and makes information flow more efficient (p. 158). The
very scarce resource in organizations is attention. Information systems should
therefore be designed to free up this scarce resource for more crucial tasks than

prioritizing, filtering, and editing the flow of information. This requires new ways

41

of doing work, not just more efficient ways of doing the same work. This example
illustrates how a vision of the future environment can be an impetus for
innovation in technological and organizational design.
The human dimension of innovation

Reinvention of organizations involves a transformation in the design and
strategic goals of the organization, but must also include some corresponding
transformation on the part of the people who make up the organization. The
human dimension is often mentioned in innovation literature, but research on the
effect of new technology on social and cultural change is difficult to find
because the results tend to be incomplete or inconclusive until the technology
has been in use for a long period within a population. But theories and opinions
abound about the effect of the Information Age on human conceptual behavior.
Army Colonel Paul T. Harig (1996) postulated that “complexity of life may
produce corresponding changes in complexity of mind”. He explained that the
explosion of information had transformed the meaning of the concept of
expertise. In the past, an expert was a repository Of facts. Today, an expert is
defined by the ability to efficiently find and manipulate data, to recognize
patterns and integrate new facts from data without being overwhelmed by it. If
the power of computers is in the ability to imitate human intelligence, the power

of humans to use computers may require that they adopt a sort of “digital

42

 

thinking” pattern, while still retaining the very human traits of intuition, risk-
taking, and creative thinking.

Pennings (1987) observed what he called the gap between the technically
possible and the organizationally realizable (p. 77). He also applied the concept
of a “cultural lag” to information technologies, where changes in technology
move much faster than the culture (collective values, beliefs, ways of doing
things). DO the demands of the Information Age now require leaders to be
technology experts? Do technology experts need to master social and political
Skills? As an organization is reinvented, what transformations occur in its
members or future members? Pennings (1987) described the “role of boundary
spanning individuals’, stating that professionals would need social change skills,
complimenting their exclusive expertise, to modify beliefs, ideas, and values so
that these will fit the imminent technology of their organizations (p. 213).

Walter B. Wriston, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
Citicorp/Citibank, and former Chairman of the Economic Policy Advisory Board
in the Reagan administration, wrote, “an expert is a person with great knowledge
about a legacy system” (1997, p. 181). Henry Kissinger (1994) observed “It is,
afler all, the responsibility of the expert to operate the familiar and that of the
leader to transcend it”. It would seem that the need for both “experts” as well as

managers and leaders is as important as ever, but the roles and expectations of

43

both may be significantly different in the Information Age. Recognition of this
fact is already written into Army doctrine and into the curriculum at the Army
War College, an academic and research institution for educating the nation’s
senior strategic leaders. For example, among the attributes identified as crucial
for the senior commanders and staff in the Army are direct references to
managing and responding to change, leading in “learning organizations”,
fostering a determination to innovate, facility in managing an avalanche of data,
exercising “enlightened control”, and hands-on skill on computers (Chilcoat,
1995). The reinvention process for members of military and business
organizations may well begin with the integration of Information Age concepts
into educational curricula.

The common thread throughout the many approaches to innovation and
reinvention research examined here is the certainty of change and the need to
prepare for and adapt to it. Organizational structures, work, and people must be

changed, and information technology is both a cause of and a tool for change.

44

Chapter 3

RESEARCH METHOD

This study describes how an Army organization innovates. The focus iS on
contemporary, real life events that are dynamic and ongoing. The preferred
strategy in this case is the case study method, relying on direct observation
and systematic interviewing.

Case study methodology

This research follows a case study protocol appropriate for the single case
(embedded) design as described by Yin (1989, p. 46). The rationale for the
Single case design is twofold. First, the case of the Center for Strategic
Leadership’s Strategic Crisis Exercise intranet is revelatory in the sense that
the investigator had a unique opportunity to observe a process that is not
inaccessible, but very difficult for Similarly situated investigators to explore
in detail. The investigator’s status as an active duty Army Officer with a
security clearance gave her access, and her experience in planning, operating,
and maintaining information technologies within Army organizations gave her
a basis from which to construct appropriate interview questions and apply
appropriate theory. Second, a Single case study is necessary due to resource
constraints. The intranet technology adopted by the Center for Strategic
Leadership is widely available and is used by many other Army and business

organizations. A study of multiple cases would be very valuable and the

45

investigator invites other researchers to do so. This study should be treated as
foundational. It establishes the relevance of studying adoption and
reinvention of information technologies within the context of the U.S. Army,
and the applicability of existing theory to this unique Context.
Unit of analysis

The overall unit of analysis in this study is the Strategic Crisis Exercise
(SCE) intranet, adopted by the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) in 1997.
Within this larger unit of analysis lie several subunits. For example, in order
to construct a coherent description of the overall process of adoption and the
subsequent reinvention of the SCE intranet, it was necessary to examine the
effects of related and intermediate processes and the perspective of different
individuals. Each of these stages could be considered as a process in itself
and each. contributes to the overall process of innovation.
Interview development

With no prior knowledge of the CSL or the SCE intranet, the investigator
drafted interview questions based on Rogers’ stages of the innovation process
in organizations (Rogers, 1982, p. 363). The two main stages identified by
Rogers (1982) were 1) Initiation, and 2) Implementation (see Chapter 3).

Within the initiation stage, the intermediate processes and relevant

questions related to those processes were as follows:

46

 

a. Agenda setting: What was the original intent for the SCE intranet?
What was the problem it was intended to solve, or the directive or opportunity
it was intended to address?

b. Matching: What benefits were expected to be gained from the use
of the SCE intranet? What problems were expected? What were the barriers
and facilitators to the final decision to adopt the SCE intranet? What were the
risks?

Within the implementation stage, the intermediate processes and relevant
questions related to those processes were as follows:

a. Redefining/restructuring: What modifications were made in the SCE
intranet to make it fit the organization? What modifications were made in the
organization to fit the SCE intranet?

b. Clarifying: How was the SCE intranet introduced for Wide use?
What were the results, both intended and unintended?

c. Routinizing: How is the SCE intranet currently used? Has the use of
the SCE intranet been initiated for any new activities since its adoption? Has
it been discontinued for any activities?

This use of Rogers (1982) framework proved very useful in identifying the
appropriate individuals to interview and guiding the conduct of the semi-
structured interviews.

Interview respondents

Individuals interviewed for this study were categorized into four groups:

47

System Developers (SD) — those who originally conceived of and designed
the system. This category includes systems analysts, programmers,
contractors, etc.

System Maintainers (SM) — those who currently maintain the network and
make modifications to it in response to mission requirements. This category
includes signal (information management) staff, system administrators, etc.

Kej Leaders (KL) — the system “owners” who either directed that the
system be developed or approved the system as a solution. This category
includes the Director of the CSL, the Commandant of the Army War College,
etc.

System Users (SU) — those who use the system to accomplish their
mission, including students and controllers participating in the Strategic Crisis
Exercise.

Although each respondent consented to be interviewed and quoted,
confidentiality is maintained in this report by referring to respondents only by
their respective category (SD, SM, KL, or SU), and a number (e.g., SDI, SD2
refer to System Developer 1, System Developer 2, and so on).

Prior to the interviews, questions were formulated based upon the processes
described above, and tailored to the specific categories of individuals
identified here. With the help of a CSL staff officer, respondents from each
Of the categories were identified and permission to interview Obtained. The

actual questions asked in the interviews differed from the draft questions

48

where necessary to pursue unexpected issues raised by the respondents, but
the draft questions provided an excellent interview guide for the investigator.
The respondents were chosen based on their qualifications as system
developers, maintainers, users, and key leaders as described here. Another
important selection factor was respondent availability. The investigator was
limited to a four day, on-site visit for observing the SCE intranet and
conducting face-to-face interviews. A total of five SDS were interviewed,
consisting of four active duty Army officers and one Department of the Army
Civilian. Three SMs were interviewed, consisting of one active duty Army
Officer responsible for the procurement and proper functioning Of the
hardware and software associated with the intranet, and two responsible for
programming patches and modifications. Five KLS were interviewed,
consisting of four active duty officers responsible for running the SCE, as
well as one Reserve officer responsible for data collection during the SCE.
Two SUS were interviewed, consisting of active duty officers who
participated in the SCE as Army War College students. Ideally, additional
users would have been interviewed to include the controllers who use the
intranet to initiate the events that drive the exercise, and observers who
Critique the response of the students and conduct after action reviews to help
students learn from the experience. Since it was not possible to observe an
actual SCE in progress, the perspective of the controllers was represented by

the KLS who run the SCE and supervise the controllers.

49

 

Observation

In addition to on-site interviews, the investigator used additional sources of
information including direct observation of the SCE intranet features, its look
and feel, and its functionality. In general, an intranet is characterized by the
use of Internet technology to provide many of the same functions to a specific
organization as the Internet does to the general public. The technology
consists of, but is not limited to, Web servers, Web browsers, and hypertext-
based applications. The functions include electronic access to information,
single user interface to various computer applications, and hardware
independent delivery. The attraction of Army and business organizations to
intranets is the cost effective and timely approach to the distribution of
information.

Other sources of information used by the investigator were information
papers and briefings generated by the CSL, archival records and journal
articles written by CSL and Army War College personnel, and various
government Web Sites giving background information on Army doctrine,
training policy, and information management policy. The investigator’s
personal experience as officer-in-charge of communications and automation
on the staff of a large Army training center also contributed to the way in
which data was collected and interpreted for this case study. This may be
seen as a source of bias were this study an evaluation of the SCE intranet or

the innovation process of the CSL. However, as stated previously, this study

50

is not evaluative but descriptive. Therefore, the investigator’s background
does not add a bias but instead improves her ability to act as an “expert
observer” and provide an accurate description and a meaningful analysis of
the process. L
Data analysis
Rogers’ (1982) model aided both data collection and data analysis. Data

analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise
recombining the evidence, to address the initial propositions of the study
(Yin, 1989, p. 105). The mode of analysis used for this study to address the
initial research questions was a variation of the pattern-matching technique
(Yin, 1989, p. 109). A predicted pattern was based upon Rogers’ model of
innovation adoption and Rice’s framework for reinvention (see Chapter 3).
The findings of the case study helped to validate certain elements of these
models when applied in the context of an Army organization, and provided
the basis for an alternative model to be fully developed and validated by
further study.
External validity

External validity establishes the domain to which a study’s findings can be
generalized to other cases (Yin, 1989, p. 43). It should be stressed that the
findings of this study are not generalizable in a statistical sense. That is, a
sample of one case of innovation in one Army organization does not readily

generalize to apply to all cases of innovation in all Army organizations. The

51

innovation of intranet technology is common in many Army organizations but
the Center for Strategic Leadership is unique in its mission, structure, and
available resources. External validity in this case relies on analytical
generalization. in which a particular set of results generalize to some theory
(Yin, 1989, p. 43). The evidence in this case was carefully analyzed to show
consistency or inconsistency with existing theory described in Chapter 3,
thereby providing a theoretical basis for further research in other Army

organizations.

52

 

Chapter 4

FINDINGS

This chapter describes the subject organization, the organizational mission
that the innovation is intended to address, the innovation itself, and how the
innovation is used in support of the mission. Following a description of the
organization and the innovation of interest, answers to each research question
(see Chapter 1) are presented based on interviews, briefings, Observations,
published reports and other archival data.

The Center for Strategic Leadership

The Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), located on the grounds of the
Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, is the U.S. Army’s
strategic education center where senior military officers and goVemment
civilians are schooled in the art of strategic thinking and decision making.
The resources of the CSL go toward education and research focused on the
decision making process at the inter-agency, national, and strategic level. Its
mission of education, research, and outreach support the senior leadership at
the Department of the Army, combatant commanders around the world, and
the Army War College. The activities of the CSL include support for
strategic level political-military simulations for Army War College students,

support of Army Staff and Joint Staff exercises, and conduct of interagency

53

education and training. The Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE) is one of the
activities the CSL conducts in support of the Army War College curriculum.
The Strategic Crisis Exercise

The Strategic Crisis Exercise is an annual, ten-day, computer-supported,
practical exercise in which students of the Army War College are able to
integrate and apply the knowledge gained during the academic year through
experiential learning. The SCE has been conducted at the Army War College
since 1995 with the opening of the Center for Strategic Leadership in Collins
Hall. Students form cells representing government and military agencies at
the national level, such as the National Security Council, Department of
Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Joint
Staff, and geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCS). Faculty and subject
matter expert participants take on roles such as military and goVernment staff
elements, National Guard Bureau (N GB), Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the Surgeon General, members of Congress, and media
representatives. By visiting or using remote access, guest participants like
members of Congress or CINCS will participate as themselves and provide
realism for the exercise and mentorship for the students. The cells are
physically separated from one another to simulate the real life distances
between the agencies involved. Communication between cells is also
realistically accomplished through video teleconferencing, telephone and

conference calls, and e-mail, for example. The SCE scenario is set nine to

54

eleven years in the future, when the current students might be Generals
serving in key political and military positions. It is conducted with 320 War
College Students as players, 150 faculty as observers and controllers, and
invited guests who act as observers, players, and mentors. The mission of the
CSL is to provide exercise participants with information technology tools that
approximate those they might encounter in the future, many of which are
enhancements to existing technologies that are already in progress. It is up to
the leaders and developers in the Science and Technology Division (STD) of
the CSL to keep up with technology trends and to come up with their version
of current and upcoming technologies for use in the SCE. They cited the
Internet as the most important source of information to keep current on both
military and commercial developments. As recently as the early 19905 they
would have been limited to the information they could take in through
volumes of printed publications that may be out of date by the time they were
delivered.

With the aid of the SCE intranet and other automated tools, the exercise
controllers create an environment intended to stress students’ analytical and
decision making skills. Participants are presented with a series of crises
occurring in the U.S. and all over the world including armed conflicts, natural
and manmade disasters, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. They
then decide on the appropriate employment of national military, economic,

and political power in response. This must be done within the limits of

55

available resources (also managed by computer), such as the availability of
active duty and reserve military forces and of strategic airlift, etc. The
exercise scenario is written to depict realistic situations and present a logical
progression of events to which the participants, role-playing as military
generals, national security decisionmakers and advisors, must react. The
scenarios are sufficiently complex to require the participants to use the
information gathering, decision making, and collaborative skills spelled out in
the learning objectives for the exercise.
The SCE Intranet

For purposes of this study, SCE intranet refers to that portion of the CSL
local area network that is used for internal access of students and faculty
participating in the SCE. It includes the physical network, Web server,
database server, and browser interface. Certain separate applications that
support running, playing, and controlling the SCE and are delivered via the
network are covered also, although technically they are currently not a fully
integrated part of the intranet. This study was only concerned with the
development and use of the intranet as a solution to the requirements of the
SCE mission, although the use of the intranet is not limited to the features and
functions discussed here.

Just as the National Information Infrastructure (N 11) is the nervous system
of real-world crisis action, the information infrastructure supporting the

facilities of the CSL are the nervous system of the SCE. At Collins Hall, the

56

building where the CSL is housed, a portion of the N11 has been replicated as
closely as possible using state-of-the-art information and communication
technologies. The new facility provides rooms equipped with visual
information support, access to two local area networks (one classified and one
unclassified), over 400 PCs and Sun SparcStations, video-teleconferencing
capability, printers, large monitors, telephones with internal and external
lines, Whiteboards and world maps.

Internet/intranet technology is considered one of the most important means
of information sharing in the future environment of the SCE. An intranet
provides a networking environment with the browser providing a standard
software interface to numerous files, applications and databases. Intranet
management software allows users to post information as simply as copying a
file to a disk drive. Hence the attraction of intranet technology to all types of
organizations: accessible technology with a familiar interface and user
friendly interactivity. Because a majority of participants are experienced in
using the Internet, the SCE intranet meets the requirements of the CSL’S
automation architecture design philosophy. As stated in a CSL monograph
entitled “Simulating the Future: Automated Tools for Strategic Wargames”,
the goal is to Show the students something new, but not to make them spend
their time learning how to push new buttons at the expense of strategic

thinking, crisis action planning, and the interagency process.

57

The SCE intranet was designed to support the student/players,
faculty/controllers, and guest participants with tools for driving the scenario,
gathering information, making decisions, and issuing responses. Previous to
the adoption and implementation of the intranet, all of these functions were
done manually, with text-based e-mail support, paper copy messages, and
with volumes of reference books. The intranet was, as of 1997, comprised of
four main sections (see Figure 2): 1) Administrative, containing information
about visitors, announcements, schedules, and other notices that fall outside
the gameplay. 2) Controller Guide, containing exercise control information
that is visible only to the controllers. 3) Student Guide, containing reference
information and tutorials for the students. External agency homepages are
downloaded and modified to correspond to the scenario for students to Obtain
data from realistic looking sources. 4) SCE Scenario, containing actual
exercise data, including world summary information, maps, news, plans, and
intelligence updates. The system used intranet “cookies” to control which
information each student desktop can access. For SCE ’98, the security
control features provided by the Netscape server software ensured that the
appropriate information was delivered electronically to the correct
participants. For SCE ’99, the CSL changed the standard browser from
Netscape Navigator to Microsoft Internet Explorer, utilizing the security

features of Microsoft NT and Internet Information Server (11$).

58

 

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Running the SCE

The SCE is driven by event selection and notification. A list of messages
and other information called the Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) is kept
in a database until they are required for the scenario. Messages trigger an
event (called an implementer) when broadcast over the network via e-mail or
other means to the appropriate student cells. Realism is further enhanced by
the ability to apply notional addresses, i.e., address lines that reflect the
roleplaying identity rather than the actual name of both senders and recipients.
This process of injecting implementers into the game was previously managed
and executed manually, a complicated and time-consuming task that slowed
down the pace of the game.

For SCE ‘97, the staff of the Knowledge Engineering Group (KEG) in the
Science and Technology Division (STD) of the CSL designed and constructed
an automated system that integrated e-mail and a Microsoft Access database
via an Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) mail server. This system, called
the Strategic Wargame Automated MSEL Injector (SWAMI), selects the
appropriate message and releases it to the correct student cells at a scheduled
time. SWAMI has a simple user-interface, an embedded connection to a mail
server that distributes implementers automatically, and a Simple reporting
capability with which controllers can pass information to the observers in the
student cells. The result was more realistic looking messages, elimination of

redundancy and increased flexibility of the game scenario to follow different

60

threads in response to participants’ reactions. Programmers internal to the
organization designed, implemented, and fixed initial bugs in the system
using widely available Microsoft Visual and Access Basic programming
language. For SCE ’98, SWAMI was upgraded to autOmatically update
scenario information on the intranet Web pages to keep them consistent with
information in the e-mail messages released to the players.

Once the implementer is launched, the participants must develop a
response. In real life, the commanders and agency chiefs being role-played
by the students have large staffs to develop courses of action and assess the
feasibility of each. Operations research analysts in the STD developed a suite
of automated decision support tools to replicate much of this process and
allow the students to focus on critical evaluation and decision making rather
than staff work. Each of these decision support tools is a PC based
application linked through a common database, and tailored to the needs of a
specific player. Users need only minimal Spreadsheet and database expertise
to be proficient in the use of any of these tools. The analysts intend for the
applications to run through the intranet browser interface. Currently, the
applications are not browser based because of problems with slowing down
database access.

The SCE employs a data collection team to obtain feedback from the
exercise. The main concern of the team is whether students become proficient

with the Army War College’s learning objectives. The data collection team

61

observes key events, conducts interviews with students and faculty, interacts
with exercise controller, and provides responses to pre-defined questions
focusing on issues of interest to the exercise designers and War College
instructors. The information is used to conduct reviews of exercise events, to
make changes for future SCES, and to modify the War College curriculum if
necessary.

Research Question #1 : How did the CSL adopt the SCE intranet?

In 1995, the Strategic Crisis Exercise replaced a year-end practical exercise
conducted at Root Hall, the War College classroom facility. The earlier
exercise was conducted without automation support in a traditional seminar
format. With seminar format, participants sat around a conference table and
discuss the situation, their options, and their responses. Players tracked
events on a map board and controllers drove the discussion by'injecting
scenario information into the discussion and depicting counter-responses to
student actions on the situation map. The process of how the SCE intranet
was initiated in support of the new computerized exercise can be described
using Rogers’ stages of innovation adoption (1982, p. 363) to organize the
sequence of events.

Initiation stage, agenda setting process

Students were not satisfied with seminar format for the practical exercise

because of the artificiality of the events and the lack of realistic feedback on

the consequences of their decisions. The War College faculty was not

62

satisfied because it added little value to the classroom instruction and was
time and manpower intensive. The exercise developers were not satisfied
because the use of manual procedures created redundancy and inconsistency
in the scenario. Controllers could not possible keep up with the flow of
events and enforce the limitations on feasible responses.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Army began a major drawdown of
personnel and budget resources. World events signaled a major change in the
national security environment as well, and forced a reevaluation of
assumptions upon which the Cold War Army was based. The collapse of the
Soviet Union, the accelerated pace of new computer technology, and the
emergence of armed conflicts in previously stable regions of the world made
predicting and preparing for the future extraordinarily difficult. The Army
has always used wargames as part of an attempt to manage the uncertainty of
identifying, describing, and evaluating possible changes in the way it
accomplishes its mission. In the mid 19905, computer simulations had
become a major component of these wargames, first because of the cost
savings Of simulations over large scale deployment of troops and equipment,
and second because of the complexity and interactivity afforded by
computers. Computer wargames could be repeated again and again using
different scenarios to test different hypotheses and assumptions. The results
of the games helped Army leaders to assess new weapons technologies, force

structure, and doctrine. Wargames were also used to educate Army leaders in

63

 

the art of strategic thinking. At the Army War College, the Center for
Strategic Wargaming, precursor to the Center for Strategic Leadership,
developed wargames to support the War College curriculum. At the same
time, computer and communications technology became more and more
critical to the Federal Government and the military in coordinating
interagency activities. Collins Hall, a state-of-the-art facility providing
conferencing facilities, two classified and two unclassified local area
networks, GCCS, video-teleconferencing facilities, and access to the Defense
Simulation Internet and the Defense Data Network, and worldwide
commercial databases was opened on the grounds of the Army War College in
1995. Although the computer and communications technologies in Collins
Hall were installed prior to the creation of the SCE, they provided an
Opportunity for the new CSL to take advantage of the networks and
processing technology to emulate the environment in which War College
students were learning to operate.

In spite of the availability of sophisticated voice, visual, and data networks
at Collins Hall, automation support for the first SCE in 1995 consisted only of
e-mail and word processing. The lack of automation skills on the part of the
students contributed to the minimal use of technology. As former battalion
commanders, they were unused to sitting at the keyboard and unwilling to
take the job of downloading and sending e-mail away from their clerks and

secretaries. For the second SCE in 1996, the CSL introduced a system called

64

Analysis and Gaming Information System (AGIS). AGIS was a computerized
wargame system originally developed for use at the Joint Warfare Center by
using contracted, outsider developers. In the traditional method of
development, the organization’s operations research analysts translate
requirements into pseudo-code and pass it on to contractors to program,
usually using a complex programming language like FORTRAN. Army
Operations research analysts in the CSL typically confined their activities to
conducting studies, preparing requirements documents, and interfacing with
contracted programmers. In 1996, the new leadership of the CSL took a
different View that Army Operations research analysts should also do their
own programming. The analysts had to quickly pick up or refine their
programming skills, especially to work with AGIS, which used a Mosaic—like
interface and multiple CD-ROMs and disks to store informatiOn. Adding
information sources was a major programming effort. Again, the students and
exercise developers were not satisfied because the technology that was
supposed to make running the exercise more efficient by automating reference
materials was so complex to use and to program that the game seemed to be
driven by the automation tools instead of by the War College learning
objectives. Students spent inordinate amounts of time typing, reading,
calculating and trying to make the computer do what they wanted, and less
time doing the strategic decision making they were supposed to be learning.

One SD referred to this phenomenon as the “tail wagging the dog”, meaning

65

that the tail, or the technology that was supposed to enhance the learning
process, was instead driving the conduct of the exercise. At the top of the
CSL’s agenda for the next SCE was to develop more efficient and user-
friendly automation tools. I

Initiation stage, matching process

By 1996, the Internet was used widely and had a huge impact on the CSL’s
ability to develop automated tools to support the exercise. The leaders and
developers in the STD set out to use the existing network in Collins Hall to
create an “internal Internet” that would deliver the same benefits to the SCE
participants as the Internet did to the public and to many businesses: a vehicle
for distributed storage of data and applications, a means of enabling network
users to also be content providers without extensive technical assistance,
flexibility and responsiveness to user demands.

The original intent for the SCE intranet was to provide an automated
system to feed intelligence and situational information to the students and
enhance the realism of the game. Developers sought to emulate an
information system the students would use in real life, the intel-link function
of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Their objective was to
replicate the look and feel of intel-link using exercise data and without
making a live connection to the real thing. The staff of the KEG and the
operations research analysts found that they could emulate many traditional

mainframe based systems using Visual Basic programming language and the

66

 

Microsoft Office suite of applications. The programmers themselves were
active duty Army Officers who were familiar with many of the processes and
tools they were tasked to emulate, so application development became a one-
person project instead of a major, multi-stage, partially or fully outsourced
project. With the power of the intranet, they could deliver not only
emulations of existing systems but create applications Of their own to
accomplish staff functions and force players to stay within the predefined
time, space, and resource box imposed by the scenario.

Not everyone was optimistic about the use of the intranet. High
expectations among the technology-savvy led to concerns among developers
as to whether the system would be ready for its debut in SCE 1997. On the
other hand, many of the War College instructors were skeptical that the
intranet would be any more useful than previous technologies that didn’t live
up to the promise of being user-friendly. Although HTML was certainly
much easier to use than programming languages like FORTRAN or C, there
was still very little expertise in HTML among the instructors and controllers
who were needed to create the content for the intranet. The lead intranet SD
created the shell for the site, but the participation of the instructors was
critical to meet the objective of providing access to content supporting the
War College curriculum. The staff who ran the exercise also had to be
persuaded to adjust their routines and sacrifice some short-term efficiency

learning to use the new system on top of the multitude of other critical tasks

67

they had to perform. The lead intranet SD used the regular staff meetings as a
forum for informing and promoting the benefits of the intranet to the decision
makers and firture users, who were not experienced in the capabilities of the
intranet. He made a concerted effort to convince KLS like the Deputy
Commandant at the War College whose attitude toward the new system had a
great influence on other members of the organization. He also adopted an
onion skin approach to development, in which the intranet in its basic form
was implemented first and later expanded to add more functionality as the
users got used to it.
Research Question #1 Summary

In summary, the key factors and events leading to adoption of intranet
technology in the CSL were 1) performance gaps perceived by students,
faculty, and exercise developers in the ability to meet leaming' objectives and
the ability to optimize the use of state-of—the-art technology available at
Collins Hall, 2) broad guidance and external pressure from Army leadership
whose vision was of the CSL as a “high technology laboratory” and a
“preeminant strategic wargaming facility”, 3) knowledge among leaders and
exercise developers about technologies in use in the military and national
security organizations they were attempting to emulate, 4) knowledge among
exercise developers about current technologies, programming languages and
sofiware and the ability to use them to create customized applications, 5) a

change in the leadership philosophy that moved from the expectation of long

68

 

term contracted software development or the employment of existing
wargaming models to internal creation and implementation of customized
applications, 6) the impact of the Internet as a model for intranets and a
source of information on new technologies and applications, 7) the influence
of opinion leaders in convincing users to adopt the new technology, and 8)
incremental implementation to allow users to become accustomed to using the
basic system before expanding the functionality.

Research Question #2: How did the CSL reinvent the intranet?

The CSL made numerous changes to the SCE intranet in the process of
adoption and throughout each stage through to its implementation. Changes
were made so quickly in some cases and with so much regularity that it was
difficult to distinguish one stage from another. In 1997, the first year the
intranet was used in the SCE, Netscape Navigator was the standard browser,
largely because Netscape was the standard browser designated by the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA). For SCE ’98, Netscape Navigator was
still used, but a Windows NT server was installed on the classified network.
Netscape Navigator initially had problems interfacing with the Windows NT
server. According to a SM, the decision to convert to Internet Explorer (IE)
for both the classified and the unclassified portion of the network, starting
with SCE ’99, was based on the speed at which IE operates, the fact that it
was integrated tightly into the other Microsoft applications, and the use of

active server pages with Microsoft Access. Active server pages make it very

69

 

easy for users to update content on the intranet, such as daily announcements.
The system maintainer said that leaders are very receptive to authoring
content themselves, as long as it is easy to learn and do, as an alternative to
passing draft documents to a clerk or staff member to post on the intranet.
This was a big shift from the days when senior leaders preferred not to
operate their own e-mail accounts.

Many of the automated decision support applications used in the SCE came
about as a result of the developers themselves recognizing and defining the
requirement. One SD credited the recent capability to purchase commercial-
off-the-shelf application development tools quickly by credit card with the
ease of creating PC based strategic decision aids for the SCE. With these
development tools, like Visual Basic and Microsoft Office, he was able to
make changes on the fly as opposed to going through a long procurement
cycle or contract change.

For data collection and feedback during the exercise, the original system
used a simple groupware system. The groupware system would collate the
data but not organize it, making it very difficult to extract key points and
assemble a useful report. Since 1997 the CSL employed a database system
known as the Learning Enhancement, Assessment, and Data Collection Tool
(LEADCT), which allowed users to collate data based on learning objective,
scenario, student cell, or time of observation by using simple database

queries. LEADCT was written in Microsoft Access version 2.1, adopted from

70

the Joint Warfare Center. According to a KL, the system was cumbersome
because it required data collectors to gather information relevant to 57
learning objectives, appropriate for other exercises but far too broad a scope
for purposes of the SCE. He became aware of the shOrtfall through informal
feedback from the observer-controllers and data collectors after the exercise.
At the time of this writing, SDS were developing a user-friendly alternative to
LEADCT called Phoenix. Phoenix will focus on a few learning objectives
and questions of interest to instructors and exercise developers to make future
improvements. It is also intended to reduce the workload on the data
collectors and analysts by automating much of the pre-processing of the report
data.

In addition to the initiatives of the leaders and developers to improve the
system, another source of change they reported is feedback frOm students and
faculty during and after the SCE. A KL described the measure of success as
the “volume of complaining from observer-controllers and students”. Many
modifications were made immediately and others required additional research
or experimentation to resolve consistency and compatibility problems.
Updating the scenario was a continuous process in which exercise designers
review concept plans, the world summary of civil-military-political conditions
and events, area studies furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense budgets, treaties and agreements, and many Internet

references to make the scenario as realistic and futuristic as possible.

71

Exercise designers updated the scenario portion of the intranet without an
intermediary. It was as simple as updating a Microsoft Word document on the
hard drive. For SCE ‘99, an entirely new scenario was being added at the
suggestion of a visiting U.S. Embassy representative from Canada. Scenarios
are not intended to be a prediction or reproduction of real events, but they are
based in reality in order to stimulate the strategic thought and decision making
process that students can apply to the issues they will face when they
graduate.

Another recent change to the intranet was the improvement of the directory
system in 1998. The SD first created the intranet home page but converting
the concept slide to an image map, i.e., an image that would appear in the
browser window that was divided into “clickable” zones with hyperlinks to
different sections of the intranet. Testing the interface and using well
designed multi-page Internet sites as a model, the SD made several
improvements in the appearance, organization, and content of the SCE
intranet interface. Reference material for current year administrative
information (e. g., 1998 information for SCE ’98) used by controllers and
students was placed in a directory called Exercise Guides. All information
relevant to the scenario year (e. g., 2008 for SCE ’98) was contained in the
Scenario Guide directory. A subdirectory was added to the SCE Scenario
directory called Strategic News Network (SNN), a fictional news entity, to

provide a central source for game related headline briefs, wire service

72

updates, and overseas news. The Intel Link, which emulates the Global
Command and Control System feature of the same name, was renamed Info
Link and provided links to replicas of the Web sites of the U.S. military
services, major commands, and governmental agencies such as the
Department of the Treasury and National Security Agency.

Further changes to the SCE intranet are planned for the future that will both
improve the way the exercise is run and help create the technological

conditions likely in the next ten years in which the exercise scenario is set. A

 

project has been undertaken in conjunction with George Washington
University and the U.S. Army Artificial Intelligence Center to build an agent-
based system to teach students about information warfare. A type of software
program called an “intelligent advisor” would be available through the
intranet to help students respond to a simulated cyber-attack On the intranet
during the exercise. Another planned change is in response to the current
system of having both classified and unclassified links. An intranet add-in
would dynamically modify Web pages on-the-fly to tailor the appearance of
links to the user’s level of classification. Currently all links are visible and
the system either activates them or deactivates them based on Internet
“cookies”, which are software agents that provide the network with
information about the user. Modifications are planned and made with the
common goal of increasing information availability, organization, ease of use,

and consistency with existing and future inter-service information systems.

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Research Question #2 Summary

In summary, the ways in which the CSL reinvented the SCE intranet were
1) conversion from Netscape browser to Internet Explorer browser to enhance
speed and interoperability with other Microsoft applications, 2) development
of customized decision support tools to simulate the information processing
functions of a staff so students could focus on decision making, 3)
replacement of a generic groupware system with a more specialized data
collection and feedback tool, and subsequently with a customized product to
reduce the information processing requirements of data collectors, 4) posting
exercise scenario information on the intranet and allowing scenario writers to
continuously update it without using an intermediary, 5) improving the
directory system to make it more attractive, easier to manage, and easier to
expand in the future. Modifications were continuously planned and
implemented as a result of routine channels of input from leaders, developers,
maintainers and users as they prepare for and conduct the exercise. The
primary reasons for the modifications were to add firnctionality (as with the
data collection and decision support tools) or maximize the system’s
capability (as with the active server pages, interoperable browser, and
directory improvements).
Research Question #3: How has the SCE intranet shaped the organization?

The CSL was set up as a strategic wargaming facility. As such, it was

authorized no software support in the way of staff programmers or resources.

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The Director of CSL’s Science and Technology Division (STD) knew that it
was possible to create algorithms for the applications needed for the SCE, but
his operations research personnel lacked the skill set for application
development. Instead, they were used to running mOdels designed for other
computerized wargames in which the focus was staff drills, not high level

r
decision making. The Knowledge Engineering Group (KEG) was formed in

the CSL at the direction of a former War College Commandant, but not with

the explicit intent of giving the CSL a software development capability.

 

Knowledge Engineering Groups exist in other organizations in the Army,
typically composed of two to four personnel with expertise in artificial
intelligence (Al), the science of using computers to perform symbolic
reasoning and problem solving in a manner similar to the human brain. The
development of the intranet and associated decision support tools was not
strictly an AI function, but the technical and programming Skills of the
knowledge engineers made the Chief of the KEG an excellent choice for lead
developer of the intranet. In fact, the knowledge engineers and operations
research analysts in the STD have provided not only technical solutions, but
their operational background as Army officers lets them initiate many of the
ideas to make the SCE more realistic or add functionality to the intranet. A
KL stated he prefers his own internal programmers to outside consultants or
contractors. Outside contractors may spend only a short time with the

organization and be very inflexible in doing anything outside of the contract,

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whereas SDs assigned to the organization understand and anticipate
requirements even when KLS may not be aware that there is a feasible
technical solution. They build, maintain, and take pride in their creations over
the long term, and can continue to adapt them to fit changing requirements.
Their expertise as Army Officers eliminates the need for a separate layer of
consultants who in many corporations translate the business requirements of
the management into the technical language that programmers need. The
main problems with internal development are difficulty in acquiring personnel
with programming skills and the limited budget available for training them.
Though larger projects may still require contractor support, a KL felt that for
the majority of requirements, the availability of software development tools
makes training his own personnel a better investment than hiring outside
consultants and contractors.

Combining the consultant (or business analyst) function with the
development (or programmer) function results in programmers who turn out
to be one-person project teams. The programmer/deveIOper must investigate
the requirements and current capabilities, advise the user of what is possible
or feasible from a technical standpoint, and then create the product and make
necessary modifications. Sometimes the SD ends up promoting the product
and training the users as well. SDS complained that users often cannot
articulate their requirements because they are unfamiliar with the technology.

SUS learned a great deal about the technology in the process of developing a

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solution for Operational requirements, but the combination of discovery
learning and application development led to a phenomenon where the user
continuously changed the requirements and the project never seemed to be
finished. On the other hand, less technically savvy ’KLs felt they needed

proactive support from the developers. In their View, the experts in the

 

operational part of the mission don’t have time to be code crunchers as well. F
“I owe them an objective and intent. The developers tie that to the realm of

the technologically possible”, said one KL. He expected a kind of “pull

system” in which developers work on broad guidance, not rigid specifications. .

“Don’t ask what I want”, he said, “tell me what you have planned to support
the exercise”. Such a pull system would be very difficult if development were
done by outside contractors, or if the developers did not have some
Operational background to go along with their technical expertise. Another
KL admitted the difficulty in “converting operational vision into bits and
bytes”. Both SDS and KLS agreed, however, that leaders have a responsibility
to have some degree of knowledge and experience about the information
technology they use so that they recognize potential technical solutions and
can translate their requirements to those who can create the solution.

Organizational culture contributed to reinvention as well. “An informal
atmosphere is essential for this type of development”, said one KL, “not just
rank, but also expertise begets respect. We all rely on a team effort”.

Another KL stated, “control squelches innovation” and “everyone operates on

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the obligation to make it better. We are structured around the Army
hierarchical system, of course, but people innovate better when the hierarchy
isn’t looking over their shoulder. You can’t force someone to be innovative,
nor punish them for not being innovative”.

The use of the Internet and the intranet and the increasing sophistication of
the students who participate in the SCE contributed indirectly to change by
creating not only a desire for something better, but a strong expectation of it.
This expectation is not taken lightly by the leaders and developers in the CSL
who know that the War College students of today are among the Army’s most
successful and influential current and future leaders.

Research Question #3 Summary

In summary, the ways in which the SCE intranet shaped the organization
were: 1) Use of members of the organization as the primary software
developers instead of using contracted programmers, made possible by the
increasing skill level of assigned personnel, investment in training, and the
and the relative ease of acquiring and using development tools like Microsoft
Visual Basic. 2) Use of “one-person project teams" to identify operational
requirements, develop automated solutions, and train users on a common
platform that is familiar to both the developers and the users alike. Prior to
the adoption of intranet technology, a large number of people might be
involved in implementing a single application, including operational

personnel to identify requirements, acquisition personnel to write contracts,

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“1.1

outside programmers to develop applications, and contractors to install new
programs and specialized hardware. 3) Greater awareness among leaders and
users about information technology and greater awareness among computer
personnel about Operational requirements and the sOcial aspects of
implementing a new technology. 4) A more open and informal organizational
atmosphere that fosters innovation and allows experimentation. A somewhat
informal atmosphere helped the CSL succeed in the initiation stage while the
hierarchical structure of the CSL as an Army organization helped it succeed in

the implementation stage.

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Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

This study successfully applied existing innovatiOn and organization
research to the case of the adoption and adaptation of the SCE intranet. It
demonstrated that theories and frameworks of innovation adoption,
adaptation, and implementation that are valid for business organizations are
also applicable to military organizations. Using a case study methodology to
examine the elements of the adoption process and the conditions that shape
that process, and to investigate the mutual adaptation of the innovation and
the organization, this study illuminated the parallels between the innovation
processes of business and military organizations.

External validity

The results of this study are not generalizable to other Army or business
organizations. This study uses analytical generalization to show that the
results generalize to existing theories. Further, it provides evidence that the
theories should be used as a vehicle for examining other cases, particularly in
a military context. Since this was a single case study of a revelatory case,
replication is needed to add reliability to the findings. In fact, both the
military context and the intranet technology were new in the realm of

innovation research, so the possibilities for further research are vast.

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This study does not claim to have identified any determinants of adoption or Of
reinvention. On the contrary, this study helps confirm the finding that technology
provides an occasion for, and not a determinant of, organizational change. It was
not merely the adoption of an intranet, but the way in Which both the technology
and the organizations were adapted to one another that made the CSL successful at
improving the conduct of the SCE.

Unique aspects of Internet/intranet technology

The abundance and availability of Internet/intranet technology, from the
client and server processing hardware to the browser software to the software
development tools like Visual Basic, distinguish it from previous information
technologies in several important ways.

First, when the same technology is available to the organization as well as
to its competitors, adoption becomes not a vehicle for competitive advantage
but for survival. The possibility of non-innovative change or no change at all
is decreased because both the potential benefits of innovation and the negative
consequences of non-innovation are so great.

Second, innovative change is more likely the easier it is to acquire,
implement, and modify the technology. In the past, organizations might
implement workaround solutions and put off the difficult and expensive
process of defining requirements, exploring options, procuring and
maintaining complex new computer systems, a process which took an entirely

new layer of personnel to accomplish. Today, CSL personnel can find out

81

 

about current technologies and quickly purchase the tools to create
applications tailored to their needs, rather than search for a prefabricated
system and third party support. Although still not structured to authorize
programmers specifically, expertise in using tools like Visual Basic and
applications like the Microsoft Office suite is becoming so common and easy
to acquire that the CSL can successfully adapt other personnel to the task.

Third, digital technology like that used in the SCE intranet is so flexible
that modifications can be made immediately and it is sometimes no longer
possible to distinguish separate stages of adoption. For example, the testing,
installation and institutionalization stages could be combined in a description
of the adoption of the SCE intranet. Each time the SCE is conducted, the
intranet is being tested. Installation may be considered to be perpetually
partial or incomplete because short and long term additions to the intranet are
constantly being planned and implemented. And, in the case of the SCE
intranet, what has been institutionalized is not just the technology but the
ongoing development and improvement of it. Leaders, developers, exercise
designers and controllers, data collectors, students, instructors, and even
visitors all contribute to the content, features, and functionality of the intranet.
Applicability of Rogers ’ model

The process of innovation within the context of Army organizations did not
contradict theories based on the business model. Though modifications will

certainly be appropriate as with any new context, valid theoretical principles will

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remain true in Army organizations as well as business organizations. The
findings in this study supported much of Rogers’ (1982) model of innovation.
Two main stages of innovation, initiation and implementation, were
distinguishable in the case of the SCE intranet. However, his four steps or
subprocesses in the innovation process, matching, testing, installation, and
institutionalization, were not distinguishable as discrete processes.

Rogers’ factors affecting the nature and direction of innovation (see
Chapter 2 and Rogers, 1976, p. 159) were also applicable. Knowledge had the
greatest impact, and it is no longer confined to knowledge of innovations
among the technically savvy personnel. This was especially true since system
developers and users alike had access to knowledge using the Internet. Both
developers and users had some degree of experience using Internet
technologies. Technical personnel also had expertise in the Operational
activities of the organization. Leaders and users obtained ideas for initiating
innovations by reading about them or by drawing on their own experiences in
using browsers, databases, reference media, and military systems such as
GCCS. Knowledgeable users were better able to conceive of and articulate
their requirements to the programmers, and programmers with knowledge of
the operational requirements of the organization were better able to create and
articulate technical solutions to the users.

External accountability was high in the CSL, in the form of the structural

hierarchy of the military, published military doctrine and vision statements of

83

 

the leadership, and the professional norms common to any Army organization,
which include dedication to the mission and pride in performance. For
example, from creating an effective intranet the developers perceived a
promotion incentive that comes from good performance reports. They also
had a continuing commitment to maintaining and improving the system due to
their status as members of the organization rather than temporary or
contracted employees. The organization was not only accountable to its
environment, but also exerted some control over it by maintaining a somewhat
informal managerial climate. The overall objectives for the SCE were clearly
defined and known to all personnel but only broad guidance was given on
how the organization would support those objectives. The effective use by
CSL leaders of the talents and resources of the organization, the physical
proximity of users and developers to facilitate communication and idea
sharing, and the willingness to take risks and tolerate setbacks all contributed
to the success of the intranet.

Slack resources were created in personnel whose job descriptions were
changed to maximize their talents and their role in supporting the new
technology, and in the financial budget by redirecting funds from hiring
outside contractors to training members of the organization to program and

use advanced features of Microsoft Office applications.

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Applicability of Rosen ’s framework

Rosen’s frameworks for peacetime, wartime, and technological innovation
in the military (see Chapter 3) were all applicable to the SCE intranet. Army
and Joint doctrinal publications provided the decision making procedures that
were taught in the War College curriculum and put into practice in the SCE.
Leaders, informed by operational experience and the writings of scholars,
provided the vision of the future environment and the strategic goals for the
organization. Members of the organization all applied their individual
expertise to the accomplishment of the common goal either by direction or by
their own initiative. Feedback on performance came from repeatedly running
Simulations and testing and modifying new systems. Costs and benefits Of the
intranet were measured not just in terms of money, but in terms of how much
time and talent is consumed to deliver more information.
Applicability of Pennings ’ framework

Pennings’ behavioral inertia acted to inhibit the adoption of the intranet.
Students initially resisted using e-mail and other computer applications in the
belief that it was the role of technicians and not warriors. War College
instructors resisted the intranet, owing to the complexity of previous
technologies that required a new skill set to operate rather than enhancing
proficiency in the curriculum. Reluctance was gradually overcome in the
course of the routine activities of the organization, such as weekly meetings

between CSL and Army War College representatives, annual participation in

85

planning and conducting the SCE, and ever increasing routine use of the
Internet in the classroom, for staff work, and at home. The proliferation of
computers in all aspects of society makes their use increasingly routine and
even expected in military settings.

The case of the SCE intranet suggests that the term reinvention is not
applicable to this type of technology. It is difficult if not impossible to
determine where adoption ends and reinvention begins because of the
flexibility of the technology. Rather than adopt a specific technology, the
CSL adopted the tools to create their own version of an “internal Internet”. In
the process of creating emulations of the GCCS features, they discovered they
could do more with the power of the network and the browser to provide a
common interface to the database, reference material, and separate
applications. The whole process could more accurately be called continuous
adaptation or iterative development.

Where the findings diverged from the theoretical models of the innovation
process, the differences were due to the nature of the technology and not to
the nature of the organization (i.e., an Army organization instead of a business
organization). One hypothesis for further research, then, is technology-
centered as opposed to context-centered: the nature of the innovation process

is a function of the nature of the technology.

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