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BASIC ELEMENTS OF A DEMOCRATIC AND JUST
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BASIC ELEMENTS OF A

DEMOCRATIC AND JUST THEORY

OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
By

Harold D. Morgan

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree Of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Teacher Education

1997

ABSTRACT
BASIC ELEMENTS OF A
DEMOCRATIC AND JUST THEORY
OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
By

Harold D. Morgan

Proponents of social-reconstructionist multicultural education declare their
commitment to just democratic polities in their introductory works in the field. They deem
multicultural education especially fitting for modern, liberal, pluralistic democracies, and
they set the furtherance of equal educational opportunity, the reduction of discrimination
and social inequalities, and the pursuit of social justice as prominent goals for the field.
However well-intentioned these claims may be, a close study reveals their status as largely
ritual incantations, for the multicultural-educational literature lacks a systematic, rigorous,
theoretical discussion of democracy and justice. Given the centrality of these concepts in
political philosophy and their obvious relevance to educational matters, such theoretical
neglect is particularly disappointing.

This study seeks to fill this gap by drawing on respected works in political theory to
enhance an understanding of multicultural education's dedication to democratic and just
political systems. A review of C. B. Macpherson's historical-conceptual analysis of liberal
democracies shows that what constitutes democracy is not self-evident. Protective,
developmental, equilibrium, and participatory models of democracy employ varied political
mechanisms and presuppose differing goals for democratic polities, some of which are
more compatible with the objectives of multicultural education than others. Moreover,
John Rawls's landmark analysis situates justice squarely within the broad tradition of
pluralistic, liberal democracies while implicitly questioning multiculturalists' fervent

attention to cultural identity and difference.

The study concludes by first examining briefly the controversies surrounding the
very notion of curricular theories and accordingly proposes to Offer some fundamental
elements from which a full-fledged theory might subsequently be developed. It then
considers the possibility that social-reconstructionist multicultural education is equivalent to
an enhanced civic education; it challenges the multiculturalist preoccupation with cultural
identity; it makes a case that the concern for social justice that characterizes modern liberal
societies inhereS in the definition of democracy itself; and it illustrates the advantages a
principled treatment Of justice can bring to currently typical lessons in multicultural

education.

Copyright by
HAROLD D. MORGAN
1997

To my parents,
Walter Clayton Morgan
and
Blanche Anna Green Morgan,

for their steadfast encouragement and support.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

"Not to name the school and the masters of illustrious men is a kind of historical
fraud," declares Michael Oakeshott, paraphrasing Dr. Johnson. For us lesser mortals who
write doctoral dissertations, to withhold such recognition would be similarly misleading.
Therefore, I would here like to honor those who have brought me to this point.

As those most intimately involved with this research, the members of my
dissertation committee deserve first mention. After cajoling a reluctant dissertationist into
undertaking this project, Susan Melnick graciously agreed to become the chair of the
committee. She Offered both regular encouragement and constructive criticism as the work
progressed. Perhaps more importantly, she believed in the significance of this work even
when it was still an incipient idea. Robert Floden, my program advisor, supplied helpful
advice throughout my career at MSU and insisted I be clear about my study‘s contribution
from the outset. Bruce Miller guided and enhanced my growing familiarity with political
philosophy, and Wanda May supported my efforts in curriculum and educational theory
while asking important questions that I would have preferred to avoid. As a group, they
provided the most important services one can expect of a dissertation cOmmittee: They kept
me focused on the essentials and insisted that my analysis be accurate, honest, fair, and
thorough. Their questions, criticisms, and recommendations have strengthened this
dissertation in numerous and immeasurable ways.

I never would have pursued this research had not my professors at Lebanon Valley
College introduced me to the rewards of cultivating a life of the mind. In this regard, Elbert
Wethington, Edwin Welch, Robert Clay, James Scott, and Elizabeth Geffen were

especially influential. They led me into a fascinating world of ideas far beyond the

vi

adolescent imagination of a boy from rural Pennsylvania. In subsequent years, Morris
Zelditch, Nathaniel Gage, and Nel Noddings at Stanford, and Margret Buchmann, Suzanne
Wilson, and Martin Benjamin at Michigan State Offered additional models of insight and
wisdom worthy of emulation.

Numerous friends and colleagues regularly encouraged me and took an active
interest in my academic pursuits. I can mention here only a few: Kathy Semak, Tammy
Lantz, Cathy Siebert, Neli Wolf, Shirley Miske, Corinna Hasbach, Michael Michell, and
Lynn Brice at MSU; Jack Wenrick, Charles White, Cathy Bauer, and Charise Neugebauer
from the Salzburg International Preparatory School; and David Davies and Betty Williams
from Wyoming Seminary. Representing the department of teacher education, David
Labaree supplied helpful financial assistance so that I could devote full attention to my
writing in the spring semester of 1997. By putting their houses at my disposal during
sabbaticals and vacations and at other times, Lauren Young, Jay and Helen Featherstone,
Susan Melnick, Jack and Sharon Schwille, and Corinna Hasbach and Michael Michell
allowed me to live much more comfortably than I had any reason to expect. And through
one of those rare interventions Of fate, I was privileged to enjoy Terry Woodward's
delightful companionship during the writing of this dissertation. I extend my sincere

appreciation to all of you.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: MAKING THE CASE FOR A DEMOCRATIC AND JUST

THEORY OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION .............................................. 1
Defining Multicultural Education ............................................................... 2
' Multicultural Education and Social Reconstruction .......................................... 5
Multicultural Education and Critical Theory .................................................. 7
Multicultural Education and Democratic Politics ............................................ 10
The Issues and Their Significance ............................................................ 13
Assumptions Of the Study ..................................................................... 15
The Conduct of the Research .................................................................. 16
The Selection of Texts ..................................................................... 16
The Analysis, Briefly Summarized ....................................................... 19
CHAPTER H: THE AMBIGUOUS MEANING OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
LITERATURE ON MU LTICULTURAL EDUCATION ...................................... 21
Ambiguous Conceptions Of Democracy ...................................................... 23
The Forms of Liberal Democracy ............................................................. 24
Protective Democracy ...................................................................... 26
Developmental Democracy ................................................................ 3O
Equilibrium Democracy .................................................................... 34
Participatory Democracy ................................................................... 35
Models of Democracy and Multicultural Education ......................................... 37
Limitations of Participatory Democracy and of a Concern with Democratic Form ...... 40
CHAPTER III: MULTICULTURALIST EDUCATORS' SINCERE COMMITMENT
TO-—BUT FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF--SOCIAL JUSTICE ........................ 42
Rawls's Theory of Justice ..................................................................... 44
Comerstones of Rawls's Theory ......................................................... 44
The Original Position and Primary Goods .............................................. 48
Rawls's Principles of Justice ............................................................. 52
Implications of Rawls's Theory ............................................................... 53
The Centrality of Rationality .............................................................. 53
Identity as a Primary Good ................................................................ 55
The Public Goals of Public Schooling ................................................... 60
CHAPTER IV: IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ........................................................................... 62
Theory to the Rescue? .......................................................................... 64
Multicultural Education as Democratic Education ........................................... 68
Multicultural Education as Education for Social Justice .................................... 73
The Connections Between Democracy and Justice ..................................... 74
The historical argument ............................................................... 74
The social argument ................................................................... 75
The philosophical argument .......................................................... 75
Elevating the Reasonable and Just Above the Right and True ........................ 76

viii

Additional Encumbrances to the Advancement of the Multicultural Program ............ 78

Cultural Identity as a Distraction .......................................................... 79
Cultural Identity as a Violation Of the Public-Private Distinction ..................... 79

A crucial role for identity in public schooling ...................................... 80

A challenge to a too-strict public-private distinction ............................... 81
Cultural Identity as a Potential Violation Of Justice ..................................... 81
Moving from the Abstract to the Concrete ................................................... 85
Multicultural Education as Civic Education? ............................................ 85
Principled Versus Intuitive Justice in the Curriculum .................................. 90
Looking Backward--and Ahead ............................................................... 93
Further Work on These Issues ............................................................ 94
Projecting the Reception of These Findings ............................................. 95
The Benefits of the Study ................................................................. 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................... 97

ix

CHAPTER I:
MAKING THE CASE FOR A DEMOCRATIC AND JUST
THEORY OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION

That schools reflect the societies in which they are situated may be a truism, but
being such neither minimizes its significance nor clarifies the occasionally problematic and
always complex relationships between the two. The history of American primary and
secondary education is replete with evidence that the purposes schools pursue are not
selected arbitrarily or without consideration of society's current understanding Of itself.
Puritan New England passed the "Old Deluder" laws in 1647, requiring that children
receive instruction adequate to reading the Bible for themselves. Benjamin Franan
proposed a practical education commensurate with the needs of a thriving, commercial,
colonial economy. Thomas Jefferson advocated a curriculum that would foster an
informed citizenry for the new republic, and Horace Mann's efforts to establish a system of
universal primary schooling in the 18405 coincided with the first major influx of non-
English-speaking, non-Protestant immigrants to the United States.

The contexts and the particulars would vary, but for the next century and a half the
pattern remained the same: American public schools were charged with purposes believed
to be appropriate for the prevailing social, economic, and political conditions.‘ Of
immediate interest are the social changes of the past generation. The drive for equality of
opportunity for all Americans, regardless of racial or ethnic background, religion, gender,
social class, or sexual orientation, has not proceeded without significant consequences for
the schools. Recognizing that schools have frequently perpetuated the unequal relations
among social groups (see, e.g., the essays in Karabel & Halsey, 1977), educators have

sought to reform schools so that they "provid[e] meaningful and equitable educational

 

1This is not to imply that there was unanimity of interpretation of these conditions. Rarely was that the
case, allowing Herbert M. Kliebard (1986) to refer to a "struggle" for the American curriculum. But none
of the interlocutors in the debates over schooling ignored the circumstances of the society on whose behalf
they claimed to speak.

1

2
Opportunities for all. . .children" (Larkin & Sleeter, 1995, p. vii). Conceptually subsumed

under the rubric of "multicultural education," these efforts have been a prominent and
controversial element of primary and secondary education in recent years.
Defining Multicultural Education
Multicultural education is sometimes regarded as a monolithic strategy of education
for social reform and social justice. Actually, this is far from being the case. From the
outset, multicultural education2 has allowed varied--and competing--conceptions of
purpose and method to take shelter under its umbrella. Several typologies have been
developed to clarify the confusions to which such an eclectic term as multicultural education
is prone. Of these, two are worthy Of nOte here--for their prominence, for their insights,
and for their historical settings. The first, proposed by the anthropologist Margaret Alison
Gibson (1976/1984) when multicultural education was in its infancy, faults multicultural
theory for its inconsistent attention to the overarching purposes its programs are intended to
promote. Following an extensive review of the literature, Gibson divides the myriad
works in multicultural education into four basic categories with their concomitant purposes:
roa 12mm
1. Education of the Culturally Different, 1. to equalize educational opportunity for
or Benevolent Multiculturalism culturally different students
2. Education About Cultural Differences, 2. to teach students to value cultural
or Cultural Understanding differences, to understand the meaning
of the culture concept, and to accept
others' right to be different
3. Education for Cultural Pluralism 3. to preserve and to extend cultural
pluralism in American society
4. Bicultural Education 4. to produce learners who have

competencies in and can Operate

 

2Some advocates have proposed an alternative designationo-"educating for diversity"--a term generally
regarded as synonymous with "multicultural education."

successfully in two different cultures

(Gibson, 1976/1984, p. 95)
She then proceeds to lay bare the assumptions regarding values, strategies, outcomes, and
target population that underlie each approach, and she concludes her treatment of each
category with a discussion that summarizes its shortcomings. In so doing, Gibson not
only makes the taken-for-granted problematic, she also forces adherents to confront
potentially serious weaknesses in their positions. She does the former by bringing often
unquestioned assumptions to light and thereby exposing them to public scrutiny. She
accomplishes the latter by pointing out, for example, that benevolent multiculturalism
"accepts without question that cultural differences are the cause of minority groups' failure
in mainstream schools" (p. 97), whereas education for cultural pluralism confuses ideology
with theory (p. 104).

Gibson reveals her training as an anthropologist by the prominence she assigns to
culture in each Of her four categories of multicultural education. This move is not
unreasonable, given the designation of the field as multicultural education. Indeed, that
cultural distinctions of one kind or another are at the core of the differences in educational
outcome and Opportunity which this movement seeks to address is an assumption held by
all writers in the field. Nevertheless, this aspect receives varying treatment according to the
goals that accompany the more general concern with cultural difference. For some, culture
is only a factor (and a not-very-precisely-defined one at that) to be considered in an attempt
to correct past imbalances in educational opportunity or to bring about reforms to make
society itself more just. For others, culture is the lens through which all aspects of
multicultural education must be viewed. Much Of this division can be credited to the
historical development of the field in the years since Gibson’s typology appeared. As a
result, use of the term occasions a fair amount of confusion, since multiculturalists rarely
specify the exact understanding of culture that they employ in a given context. This leads

observers and commentators outside the field (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1994, pp. 5-6, and

4
Coughlin, 1992) to fault multiculturalists for a lack of serious attention to culture in the

standard anthropological sense.3
Of more recent vintage, the second typology, proposed by Christine E. Sleeter and
Carl A. Grant (1994), incorporates developments in the two decades since Gibson first

surveyed the field. These authors identify five versions of multicultural education:

Approach mm
1. Teaching the Exceptional and 1. to help low-achieving students catch up
Culturally Different and succeed in school so they can "make

it" in the mainstream of society; not to
criticize or try to change the mainstream
itself, but to build bridges between
children and that mainstream

2. Human Relations 2. to improve affective dimensions of the
classroom: how students relate to each
other, how they feel about themselves,
and how they feel about diverse groups in
the community and society

3. Single-Group Studies 3. to teach about one specific group, or one
group at a time, such as African
Americans, Native Americans, women,

or people with disabilities

 

3The following definition may be deemed typical of an anthropological understanding of culture:

A culture is the total socially acquired life-way or life-style of a group

of people. It consists of the patterned, repetitive ways Of thinking,

feeling, and acting that are characteristic of the members of a particular

society or segment of a society. (Harris, 1975, p. 144)
A key component of anthropology involves the identification of and the discrimination among these ways
of life. Richard Bernstein accuses the multiculturalists of ignorance of important distinctions within what
multiculturalists indiscriminately refer to as "Asian culture" or "African culture." Coughlin reports on the
concern of some anthropologists that they have been unaccountably excluded from debates on
multiculturalism, a field they think could especially benefit from their expertise.

5
4. Multicultural Education 4. to reform the entire educational process to

reflect and support diversity; to develop a
culturally pluralistic mainstream that does
not require assimilation for success
5. Education That Is Multicultural and 5. to call attention to issues Of social justice
Social Reconstructionist and to empower young people to make
social changes; to reform the entire
educational process by focusing more
explicitly on social critique and
democratic citizen participation
(Sleeter & Grant, 1994, pp. vi—vii)
Not only do these authors treat each of these approaches thoroughly (stating goals,
surveying the theoretical and conceptual background, recommending practices, sketching
scenarios, summarizing critiques, and offering references), they also conclude their review
with a defense of the perspective they prefer-—the social reconstructionist. In doing so, they
align themselves with other prominent advocates of multicultural education.
Multicultural Education and Social Reconstruction
Sleeter and Grant's view that multicultural education should promote the

achievement of social justice by reforming society is widespread. James A. Banks, most
recently distinguished as the primary editor Of The Hgdbock cf Research cu Multicultural
Education, has asserted that "the deve10pment of W is

the key goal for the multicultural curriculum" (Banks, 1991, p. 24). Sonia Nieto, author of
W (1992), an introductory textbook on multicultural education, includes
"education for social justice" (pp. 216—218) and "critical pedagogy" (pp. 219—221) among
the seven basic characteristics of multicultural education. And Christine 1. Bennett, author
of another basic textbook, sets as the ultimate goal of multicultural education the

"development of social action skills" (Bennett, 1986, pp. 212—214). All begin with a

6
commitment to equality of educational Opportunity, but, recognizing that such a promise

could be fulfilled while leaving unequal and oppressive societal structures intact (Sleeter &
Grant, 1994, pp. 77-79), they proceed quickly to calling for a reform Of society itself, not
just the schools.

There is much to admire in this effort to provide a more equitable education via the
establishment of more equitable relations in society. Yet one cannot help but wonder at the
impression of novelty and innovation that seems to accompany this defense of social
justice, for such strivings have an established history in American education, a history
stretching back three quarters of a century (Kliebard, 1986, pp. 184 & 187). In the 19205
George Counts began drawing attention to the tendency of American education to serve the
interests of social elites-mot only in the content of that schooling, but also in the access to it
(Kliebard, 1986, p. 184). The crash of the stock market and the onset of the Great
Depression exacerbated the economic and social disparities long present in the United
States, leading Counts (1932) boldly to question, MW
QLdEL'Z This issue served as the crux of American educational debate throughout the 19305,
until concern with growing belligerence in Europe diverted Americans' attention from their
own society's shortcomings to the threat of armed conflict abroad (Kliebard, 1986, pp.
186—193, 207—208).

World War H may have diverted Americans' attention from the inequalities and
injustices in their own society, but it failed to remove such concerns from the public mind--
or at least the minds of educationists--permanently. In fact, in the midst of an educational
era pervaded by a life-adjustment curriculum seeking to mold pupils for success in society
as it was (Kliebard, 1986, pp. 240-254), B. O. Smith, William 0. Stanley, and J. Harlan
Shores (1950) issued a renewed call for "a continuous reéxamination and reconstruction of
our social ideals, beliefs and institutions" (Smith, Stanley, & Shores, 1950, p. 186). This
position preceded by at least half a decade the W Supreme

Court decision, the civil-rights movement that that decision triggered, and the subsequent

7

educational concerns with multiculturalism.4 It is therefore unfortunate that this long and
noble history of social reconstructionist education is either ignored by contemporary
multiculturalists—-neither Counts nor Smith, Stanley, and Shores appear in Bennett's
(1986) or Nieto's (1992) text--or receives only passing, almost perfunctory, mention (e.g.,
Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 235; Gay, 1995, pp. 26 & 31). At the least, locating themselves
within this tradition should make multiculturalists more acutely aware of the obstacles they
will face and could further legitimate their struggle as part of an ongoing strand of
American educational history.
Multicultural Education and Critical Theory
The failure of these advocates of multiculturalism to connect their interpretations to

earlier writing in social reconstruction does not mean that their arguments are ungrounded.
Contemporary multiculturalists concede that their positions support social reconstructionist
goals in education, but they prefer to trace their intellectual heritage to the developments in
critical social science. Born with the founding of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research
in the early 19205 (Bredo & Feinberg, 1982, p. 271), the "critical school" Of social
research matured and expanded its influence-~at least in education--in the 19705.5
Adherents to this approach hold that

knowledge must be seen in the context of its constitution in

and potential contribution to social evolution, where social

evolution is conceived of in terms of the possibility for

progressive material and symbolic emancipation. (Bredo &

Feinberg, 1982, p. 272)
In their desire to use educational institutions to effect social change (as embedded in the

notion of social reccnstcucticn), multiculturalists understandably find ready allies in those

who view knowledge as a source of "progressive material and symbolic emancipation."

 

4This sentence is obviously not intended to provide an authoritative historical summary Of the civil-rights
era, but rather a brief reference to the commonly understood relationship among the three listed events.
Those seeking a thorough historical treatment of the Brawn decision and its aftermath might consult Kluger
(1975).

5Indeed, none of the sources that Bredo and Feinberg cite in their review of the critical approach to
educational research was published before 1971 (see Bredo & Feinberg, 1982, pp. 290—291).

8
The alliance may indeed be ready and the cause common, but the partnership

between critical social science and multicultural education is not without its problems. The
first of these concerns the internal consistency and theoretical integrity of critical social
science itself. In a thorough review of the critical tradition, Brian Fay (1987), a formerly
ardent disciple of critical theory,‘5 finds himself chastened by a systematic and honest
evaluation of the limits Of this perspective. Acknowledging the centrality of a belief in the
power of human reason tO critical social science, Fay confesses that his analysis persuaded
him that "there are limits to the power of reason both to know what we as human beings are
and to engender political revolutions which will be genuinely liberating" (Fay, 1987, p.
143). Of four general types (viz., epistemological, therapeutic, ethical, and power), these
limits to rational change pose formidable challenges to an exaggerated belief in the ability of
rational thought to promote change. When confronted by a physical oppression--i.e., one
that "leaves its traces not just in people's minds, but in their muscles and skeletons as well"
(Fay, 1987, p. 146)«by people's inflexible self-understandings that give inordinate force
to certain forms of persecution (p. 157), or by the often underestimated weight of tradition
(pp. 159-164), critical social science may ultimately be much less liberating than its
proponents envision.

Even if it were possible to revise critical theory to reduce its dependence upon faith
in human reason and thereby minimize the pitfalls that accompany such faith, this
epistemological approach may still be less compatible with multicultural education than is
commonly supposed. On the one hand, there is some common ground between
multicultural education and critical theory. Given that one of the functions of critical social
science is "the organization of action" or "the conduct of the political struggle" (Carr &
Kemmis, 1986, p. 147), multiculturalism's emphasis on social action reflects this
perspective nicely. Multiculturalists want students and teachers to "recognize their right

and responsibility to take action" (Nieto, 1992, p. 220), to "take personal, social, and civic

 

6Fay (1987, pp. 4—6) presents a persuasive case for not using the terms "critical theory" and "critical social
science" interchangeably. However, his distinctions appear not to be crucial in the present context.

9
actions to help solve the racial and ethnic problems in our national and world societies"

(Banks, 1991, p. 25), to "help youth become more effective agents of change" (Bennett,
1986, p. 212), and to "[prepare] future citizens to reconstruct society so that it better serves
the interests of all groups of people" (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 210). Even earlier social
reconstructionists argue for "the building, and not merely. . .the contemplation, of our
civilization" (Counts, 1932, p. 37) and for "a continuous reexamination and reconstruction
of our social ideals, beliefs, and institutions" (Smith, Stanley, & Shores, 1950, p. 186).

Social action is evidently a leading concem--perhaps the foremost concem--of
social reconstructionists and critical theorists in education. Admittedly, Grant and Sleeter
believe that one "encourages social action by having students actually work on social
issues" (1989, p. 214), and their example of putting multicultural and social
reconstructionist curricula into practice involves having pupils investigate the controversy
surrounding proposals to close or renovate a local hospital (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, pp.
232-234). Furthermore, not only were the pupils to investigate the matter, they were to
publish their findings in the local newspaper with the hope of influencing "city hall," if
perhaps not on this issue, then on future issues (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 233).

Yet on the other hand, there is reason to challenge multiculturalism's affiliation with
critical theory, for this drive toward social engagement may not be as uniform as it first
appears. Sleeter and Grant talk about the preparation of fugue citizens and emphasize the
need for various types of uudcrstauding (1994, p. 210). Bennett speaks more of
"understandings," "values," and "attitudes" (1986, p. 206) than of direct action; she is also
concerned that pupils "perceive, evaluate, and comprehend different beliefs and behaviors"
(p. 206). And even George Counts, who wants the school to build a new social order,
points out that

this does not mean that we should endeavor to promote
particular reforms through the educational system. We
should, however, give to our children a vision of the
possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to enlist their

loyalties and enthusiasms in the realization of the vision.
Also our social institutions and practices, all of them, should

10

be critically examined in the light of such a vision. (Counts,
1932,p.37)

Hence, the relationship between study, contemplation, and understanding on the one hand
and action on the other is less straightforward than critical theory asserts. Both aspects
seem to play important roles in the critical, social-reconstructionist visions, but their
balance and emphasis remain to be clarified.

Multicultural Education and Democratic Politics

Multicultural education's commitment to promoting the democratic ideal is less
ambiguous. Each theorist-mot only in multicultural education but in social
reconstructionism as well--makes explicit reference to the requirements of a democratic
polity when making his or her case: the goals of multicultural education "are part of this
nation's basic democratic ideals" (Bennett, 1986, p. 55); multicultural education is
unmistakably connected to "students' future rights and responsibilities in a democracy"
(Nieto, 1992, p. 218); it promotes "an active and informed citizenry capable of making
reflective personal and public decisions" (Banks, 1991, p. 25); it can help schools "actively
encourage democracy" (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 223); a wholehearted commitment to
social reconstruction can lead to "the conscious and deliberate achievement of democracy"
(Counts, 1932, p. 40); and social reconstruction is even termed "democratic
reconstruction" (Smith, Stanley, & Shores, 1950, pp. 190 & 191). For multicultural and
reconstructionist education there appears to be no confusion about a distinct and solid
commitment to democratic principles.

Unfortunately, this unity of background and intent is deceptive. Upon closer
inspection one detects that it incorporates more the form of a ritual incantation than of a
conscientious review of the demands of democratic participation on the education of the
young. This is not to say that the previously cited commitments are insincere or fraudulent,
for most rituals reflect deeply held beliefs and trace their origins to some perception of the
truth. But the assertions at issue here rarely go beyond this stage in substance, whatever

their sometimes eloquent elaborations in form. For example, at a minimum these advocates

1 I
fail to specify which conception of democracy they consider definitive for their arguments--

or even to acknowledge that democracy may assume multiple forms. While "democracy" is
not a completely open concept, historically there has been enough variation in its structures
and its demands upon its constituents to pose problems in the undifferentiated use of the
term.7

More damaging, perhaps, is the theoretically weak explanation of the relationship
between multiculturalism and democracy. The unsubstantiated assumption is that
pluralistic societies place new demands upon democratic polities. Some political theorists
have in fact begun to analyze in new ways the demands that multiculturalism exerts on
democratic societies. For instance, if liberal democratic governments are obligated to
recognize primary goods (e.g., religious freedom, freedom of speech, education, income)
as central and fundamental to their citizens' being treated as free and equal, and if people
need a secure cultural context in order to make their choices in life meaningful, then a
secure culturalcontext becomes a primary good deserving of protection--and perhaps
promotion--by liberal democratic states (Gutmann, 1994, pp. 4-5). The multicultural
attention to cultural identity is at least as strong, with many proponents granting it a
prominent place in their work (see, e.g., Banks, 1994, pp. 40—42, Gollnick & Chinn,
1990, pp. 14—17, and Nieto, 1992, pp. 127—131 & 230—231). Each author seems to
assume the self-evidence of the role of cultural identity in achieving true democratic
participation in pluralistic societies.

Self-evidence can be a tricky thing, though, for it often becomes a designation for
the lack of an alternative vision. But, interestingly enough, standard theories of the
foundations of justice in a democratic society offer a powerful and long-standing alternative
to the particularist approaches mentioned above--without relying on the ideological critique

of critical theory. Of these standard views, John Rawls's description of the "original

 

7For a succinct yet comprehensive review of possible alternatives, see C. B. Macpherson's (1977) mm;

W-

12
position" in determining just actions is the most prominent and the most widely accepted in

contemporary political theory:

It seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one
should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or
social circumstances in thc choicc of principles. It also
seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor
principles to the circumstances of one's own case. We
should insure further that particular inclinations and
aspirations, and persons' conceptions of their good do not
affect the principles adopted. The aim is to rule out those
principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance,
however little the chance of success, only if one knew
certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of
justice. For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he
might find it rational to advance the principle that various
taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that
he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary
principle. To represent the desired restrictions one imagines
a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of
information. One excludes the knowledge of those
contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be
guided by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of
ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. (Rawls, 1971, pp.
18-19, emphasis added)

A more drastic contrast to the particularist approach would be difficult to imagine, for here
justice demands that reasonable, free, and equal citizens regard all of their specific traits
(e.g., ethnicity, gender) and commitments (e.g., to religious ideals, to friends) as irrelevant
to the determination of a just basic structure for society. While these traits and
commitments may be central to individuals as they live their daily lives, this perspective
prevents their influencing the establishment of basic principles of justice.8 The
consequences of the perspectives presented here are twofold and significant. The first
raises the question of whether particular identities, commitments, and traits are relevant to
the formulation of basic p_r_iugip_lc§ of justice and the design of a just basic W of

society. The standard liberal position as represented by Rawls argues that they are not,

 

8Rawls dedicates his recent book, WM (1993), to a clarification of the metaphysical
confusions that arose from W. One of these misunderstandings is a failure to recognize
that the original position is a "device of representation. ..[with] no specific metaphysical implications
concerning the nature of the self' (Rawls, 1993, p. 27). Rawls also takes care to state that his conception
of justice is political, not metaphysical, with implications only for the restricted domain in which persons
are seeking to live together reasonably. as free and equal citizens (Rawls, 1993, pp. xv, 4—15). Neither of
these clarifications requires a revision in the original position as just summarized.

13
whereas other positions, especially those of communitarians (see, e.g., Taylor,

1992/1994), hold that they are. Resolution of this debate one way or the other has serious
repercussions for a just social framework. The second consequence arises in the instance
of a liberal approach to justice. While this model excludes particularistic considerations
from the establishment of principles of justice and a just basic structure of society, those
considerations may be found relevant to actual claims of justice within a functioning
society. This is especially so if people who possess given traits find themselves the victims
of systematic discrirrrination because of those traits. Careful attention to the issue at hand is
necessary if the relevant demands of identity are not to be confused with the irrelevant.
Despite their concern with both cultural identity and justice, multicultural theorists in
education seem oblivious to these nuances and hence fail to consider potentially
consequential factors in an understanding of social justice and the schools' possible
contributions to its realization.
The Issues and Their Significance

The preceding discussion identifies several problematic yet related areas within
multicultural education that are worthy of further investigation and which form the foci of
the present study. The first of these is the connection between multicultural education and
democratic theory. The aforementioned ritual incantations about democracy neither suggest
deep understanding on the part of the multicultural advocates nor offer helpful guidance to
practitioners. But volumes have been written--many of them substantive and insightful--on
the forms and demands of democratic political systems. The most disturbing gap in the
literature on multicultural education is the absence of any insights that political theorists of
integrity, intellect, and renown might provide. They are strangely missing from m

e h ' r E ' (Banks, 1995a) and from the

introductory textbooks in the field that serve as the basis for the present study. In fact,
John Dewey represents the only regularly cited philosopher of democracy and its

educational demands, and he often appears only in passing (e. g., in Sleeter & Grant, 1994,

14
pp. 218—219, and in Gay, 1995, p. 32--this latter instance constituting the only reference to

Dewey in the entire Handbuck). This study proposes to compensate for this oversight by
reviewing the contributions of political philosophers to democratic theory and democratic
education.

The contributions of political philosophy are not limited to theories of democratic
political systems. They offer valuable insights into justice, its justification, its
prerequisites, and its demands. Multiculturalists' concern for social justice appears to be of
the same order as that for democracy. It is assumed to be an unequivocal and self-evident
good, but no systematic treatment of the issue is offered in any of the prominent texts.
Recommendations for action are therefore presented without a solid grounding. This study
does not question a priori the appropriateness of including social justice among the
objectives of multicultural education; it does propose to investigate the theoretical
justification for such an inclusion and its connection to democratic theory. The work of
John Rawls, the foremost philosopher of justice in the United States, will serve as the basis
for that evaluation.

The current concern with the implementation and practice of multicultural education
may lead one to question the need for further solely conceptual work on the topic. With a
democratic polity in desperate need of redemption and a society crying out for justice, the
contemplation of theory seems a rash luxury indeed. Ironically, this attitude pervades
much intellectual work in education, a field presumably dedicated to intellectual pursuits.
And, as Robin Barrow suggests, the consequences of an avoidance of theory can be
serious:

One sympathises with the widespread desire on the part of
teachers to get on with teaching rather than theorising about
what to teach, but surely one must insist that there be some
good reasons to get on with whatever they want to get on
with, and probably that they should have some
understanding of those reasons. (Barrow, 1984, p. 17)

Not only might theoretical reflections aid in determining what is worth doing but also

whether there is good reason to believe that the stated goals are compatible with the

15
intended methods of their achievement. For example, despite the passionate commitment

of multiculturalists to democratic processes and to social justice, their efforts on behalf of
these ideals could well be for naught if they are based on a flawed understanding of the
claims of justice and democratic governance. Theoretical engagement offers the best
promise of clarifying these connections. Finally, if multicultural education is to become a
recognized field of study--or "discipline," as Banks & Banks (1995, p. xi) would have it--
it is rightly expected that it be built upon a solid theoretical framework, as a theory of
education and a theory of practice (of, e.g., de Castell & Freeman, 1978, and Kerr, 1981).

Much reference is made in the literature to theories of multicultural education (see,
e.g., Banks, 1994, p. 7; Ladson-Billings, 1996, p. 101). Yet it is unclear to what extent
typologies, such as those constructed by Gibson or Sleeter and Grant, or programs for
educational practice, such as those that comprise the bulk of most textbooks on
multicultural education, constitute genuine curricular theories.9 Several domains of the
field have certainly been the focus of theoretical work--particularly that dealing with the
interaction of ethnicity, class, and gender on educational experiences and opportunities (see
Banks, 1995b, p. 3). But virtually no attention has been devoted to the core themes of
multicultural education reviewed here--namely, democratic polity and social justice. This
study will conclude with a brief review of the demands of curricular theory and draw on the
investigation of political theory in democracy and justice to lay the groundwork for a more
complete theory of multicultural education. Given the breadth of the field, the full theory
may still be some time in coming, but consideration of these fundamental themes is long
overdue.

Assumptions of the Study
Because social and cultural contexts quickly lead one to take for granted certain

ways of thinking and of viewing the world, it is impossible to identify all assumptions and

 

9A more thorough summary of the controversies and ambiguities surrounding the topic of curricular theory
appears in Chapter 4. Suffice it here to note that curricular theories deal at a minimum with the question of
what should be taught, why it should be taught, and how it should be taught.

16
suppositions that underlie a study such as this. But it is possible to enumerate three

assumptions that have significantly influenced both the initial undertaking of the present
effort and the direction it ultimately followed. The first concurs with Barrow’s conviction
of the importance of theoretical work. Proper attention to theory results in several distinct
benefits: it forces clarification of basic terms and ideas; it bounds a field by defining what
is properly within the jurisdiction of that topic and what lies beyond its conceptual borders;
and it offers guidance for and a justification of practice. A second assumption of this
research is that multicultural education is not simply a political movement disguised as an
educational program (as Bernstein, 1994, among others, suspects) but potentially a
legitimate area of endeavor with worthy pedagogical goals. A third assumption of the
study is that the fundamental features of multicultural education are best sought in the basic,
introductory publications in the field, not in specialized monographs or fugitive works
(such as materials in the ERIC database, project reports, or unpublished conference
presentations). Because these books are widely available and currently in use in
classrooms around the country, introductory textbooks and general works such as Inc
1:132de cf Rcsearch on Multicultural Educaticu have served exclusively as the subjects
of review in this project.
The Conduct of the Research

T l ' ext

The choice of basic, introductory works in multicultural education was
accomplished in consultation with three sources. The fust of these was the database
version of the Citaticp Indcx.10 The three indices were the mm
11151221. the W, and the WW. Variants of the
terms "multicultural" and "diversity" were searched in each index for the following periods:
the arts and humanities index, January 1995 through August 1995; the science index,
January through December 1992, 1993, and 1994, and January through September 1995;

 

10Reference is made here to the compact-disc edition of this work, issued by the Institute for Scientific
Information, 3501 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-3389.

l7
and the social science index, January through December 1991 and 1993 and January

through September 1995.ll The results were assembled into one large file, and those
authors whose names appeared five or more times were identified. These authors were
Gwendolyn C. Baker, James A. Banks, Marilyn Cochran-Smith, W. E. B. Du Bois,
Geneva Gay, Henry Giroux, Carl A. Grant, Sonia Nieto, and Christine E. Sleeter. Several
authors were eliminated from consideration because of the period in which they wrote (Du
Bois) and because they are most closely associated with other, albeit related, fields of
activity--curriculum (Gay12 and Giroux) and language arts (Cochran-Srnith).l3
IntroductOry texts in multicultural education written by the five remaining authors were then
acquired for review.

The second source of recommendations came from Carl A. Grant, who was the

president of the National Association for Multicultural Education at the outset of the
research. In addition to the Handbook, he suggested Making Chcices fur Multicultural

Educaticn (Sleeter & Grant. 1994). Educatirmigtafluralistimsism (Gollnick & Chinn,
1990), and An ntr u ti n Mul ic lura Educ tion (Banks, 1994). The final source of

recommendations came from colleagues abreast of developments in the field of
multicultural education or familiar with basic texts on the topic from having reviewed them
for adoption for use in their classes. These added Nieto (1992), Bennett (1986), and Baker
(1983) to the preceding list. The final compilation of multicultural references included the

following works (full bibliographic information may be found in the reference list):

 

llThese periods were chosen by default. That is, they were the files available in the main library at
Michigan State University at the outset of the study. Because of the coincidence of the three sources of
recommendations for texts, there is no reason to believe that the missing years and months distorted the
outcome of the search.

l2Gay's work is included in the W, and consequently she is
represented in the present study.

13Confirmation of this decision was that none of the other two sources of recommendations included any of
the authors excluded in this manner.

18

Baker, Gwendolyn C.
0 Planning and Organizing for Multicultural Instruction
(1983)14

Banks, James A.

0 The Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education
(1995)

0 An Introductipn to Multicultural Educatipu (1994)

0 Teaching Strategies for Ethnic Studies (1991)

Bennett, Christine 1.

0 Ccmprehcpsivc Multicultural Educaticn (1986 & 1995)
Gollnick, Donna M. and Chinn, Philip C.

- Multicultural Educaticn in a Pluralistic Sgicty (1990 &
1994)

Nieto, Sonia

0 Affirmipg Divcgig (1992)

Sleeter, Christine E. and Grant, Carl A.

0 Making Choiccs for Multicultural Educaticn (1994)

0 fIfutping up Lcarning (1989)

The selection of texts for the treatment of democratic theory, the theory of justice,
and curriculum theory was more straightforward. C. B. Macpherson's ( 1977) historical
survey of the development of liberal democracy became a plausible candidate as a result of
the complimentary reference to his work in Jane Roland Martin's (1981) essay, "Needed:

A New Paradigm for Liberal Education." His recognition of the role of class in modern

 

”Because of an oversight, a newer, second edition of Baker's text (published 1994) was discovered only as
the final draft of this study was being prepared. It could therefore not be included in the research. A cursory
review of this book, though, suggests that Baker maintains her membership in the human-relations group
of multiculturalists. She does now claim that empowering pupils is a goal of multicultural education
(Baker, 1994, p. 26), but it is unclear whether this reflects a more explicit concern for social justice than
that found in her first textbook. The implicit desire for justice of the order found in the first edition seems

present.

l9

democratic societies and his prominence in other surveys of modern democratic theory
(see, e.g., Held, 1987) confirmed the appropriateness of this selection. Little reflection
was necessary in deciding upon an analysis of justice, since John Rawls's work has
dominated the field for the past generation. Valuable pieces on curriculum theory were
identified by recommendations from professors in the field and from my own background
in curriculum studies. I have long found the work of Robin Barrow particularly insightful,
the essay by de Castell and Freeman was referred to favorably in an essay by Donna Kerr
(1981), and the 1982 special edition of Theoty Intc Eracticc, devoted to curriculum theory,
supplied additional helpful perspectives.
I si riefl ummarize

In light of the foregoing arguments, the questions that will guide this research are
specified as follows:

0 How does multicultural education, especially its social-reconstructionist camp,
understand its commitment to democracy and social justice?

0 What insights to the benefit of multicultural education might political philosophy
be able to shed on the concepts of democracy and social justice?

0 What contribution might the answers to these questions make to the formulation
of a credible theory of multicultural education?
In its overall pattern, the analysis proceeded largely as it is presented here. That is to say,
following a determination that the references to democracy and social justice were indeed as
vague as they appeared at first reading, I directed my attention first to clarifying the
possible meaning of democracy. Macpherson's history delineated the topic, and reference
was made to specific historical variants (e.g., those of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill,
John Dewey) to provide a fuller understanding of the models. Attention was then
redirected to the multicultural literature to gauge the extent to which the historical and
philosophical perspectives could shed light onto the ambiguities noted therein. Essentially
the same method was employed in treating Rawls. A thorough study of his Buliticul

20
I‘m was followed by a comparison with the limited and imprecise references in the

works on multiculturalism. Central elements from these two analyses were identified as
crucial to any potential theory of social-reconstructionist multicultural education, and their

possible role in such a theory was explicated.

CHAPTER H:
THE AMBIGUOUS MEANING OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE LITERATURE ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION

Multicultural education often seems to have as many distinct goals as it has
proponents. Yet certain themes recur in most of the treatises on multicultural education.
Almost all begin with an acknowledgment of cultural pluralism in the United States (see,
e.g., Baker, 1983, pp. 7—9; Banks, 1991, pp. 3-11; Bennett, 1986, p. 9; Nieto, 1992, pp.
xxiv—xxv; and Sleeter & Grant, 1994, pp. 3 ff.). Many then proceed to make explicit
connections between this social reality and the need for multicultural education to prepare
pupils for participation in a democratic society. Sonia N ieto (1992), for example, believes
that "the connection of multicultural education with students' future rights and
responsibilities in a democracy is unmistakable" (p. 218). Christine Sleeter and Carl Grant
(1994) assert that the explicit purpose of schooling in the United States has been "to
promote democracy" (p. 129). But, recognizing that "for many groups democracy is an
ideal to pursue rather than a reality" (p. 129), they advocate multicultural education as a
means to begin remedying this discrepancy, and they enumerate specific ways in which
multicultural education encourages pupils to "practice democracy" (pp. 223—225).

Other advocates of multicultural education, while placing emphasis elsewhere,
recognize the important connections between their primary concern and a democratic
society. Gwendolyn Baker (1983) focuses on pupils' becoming aware of themselves and
their cultures and on their developing an appreciation of other cultures (p. 4), yet she points
out that multicultural education can best be understood "within the context of a changing,
pluralistic, democratic'society" (p. 4). James Banks (1991) centers his attention on ethnic
identity, but he nevertheless regards his proposed curriculum as appropriate for developing
"an active and informed citizenry capable of making reflective personal and public

decisions" (p. 25). Although Banks does not mention democracy by name, the abilities to

21

22
which he refers are clearly central to democratic citizenship. Lastly, Christine Bennett

(1995, pp. 16—20) understands multicultural education to be primarily a means of
advancing--and, ideally, guaranteeing--equal educational opportunity. Not only is this a
matter of promoting academic excellence among pupils regardless of their ethnic
backgrounds, but the nation's democratic ideals of "basic human rights, social justice,
respect for alternative life choices, and equal opportunity for all" (p. 20) demand such
efforts.

These apologists, therefore, believe that programs of multicultural education can
make important contributions to the preparation of informed, responsible, and active
citizens in a democracy. Their assertions possess a prima facie plausibility about the
connection between multicultural education and democracy. However, closer inspection of
both the particular competencies advocated above and their underlying-—albeit tacit--
justifications gives one cause for skepticism. As an illustration, Sleeter and Grant (1994)
offer one of the most explicit statements of the democratic "skills" that multicultural
education promotes: "Practicing democracy also means learning to articulate one's
interests, to openly debate issues with one's peers, to organize and work collectively with
others, to acquire power, to exercise power, and so forth" (p. 223). Certainly none of
these skills taken individually is sufficient to guarantee democratic participation. Moreover,
whether any (alone or in combination) is necessary to democratic participation depends
upon one's conception of democracy.

A telling example of the connection between conceptions of democracy and the
skills they demand regards the popular belief that voting constitutes the defining element of
democracy. Through the ballot, citizens "exercise power" by selecting those who would
govern them or, in rarer instances, by choosing one of several alternative courses of action.
These paeans to citizens' involvement (even in this periodic, limited way) resound most
forcefully around election days. Yet if voting is the only way most citizens are expected to

exercise political power, the competencies Sleeter and Grant enumerate have no necessary

23
connection to registering one's choice in the voting booth. Consequently, what advocates

of multicultural education mean by democracy, although generally only implicit in their
writings, has an important bearing on the defensibility of the curricular programs they
propose.
Ambiguous Conceptions of Democracy

At the outset, it should be noted that for multiculturalists there is no confusion
between democracy and other undemocratic or totalitarian systems of government. Instead,
difficulty emerges from the apparent failure of any of the supporters of multicultural
education to recognize that democracy-especially in its incarnation in industrialized
Western societies, known as liberal democracy--has over the past century and three
quarters assumed various forms to accommodate various conceptions of the function of the
political system. Multicultural educationists regularly speak of an undifferentiated
"democracy." Only rarely do they modify the term, and when they do, it lacks helpful
clarification. Nieto (1992) talks of "culturally democratic" education (p. 112), which
appears to mean an education in which pupils are helped to acquire the "learning styles" of
both their ethnic group and their social class. And Nieto (1992, p. 21) and Sleeter and
Grant (1994, p. 130) both emphasize the need to build a "true" democracy, presumably in
contrast to the various imperfect democracies established in Western societies.

Ironically, Sleeter and Grant tacitly acknowledge the need for a historical
perspective by quoting approvingly an earlier theorist of education:

If democracy is to be conserved and fully realized, the
American people must understand the meaning of

democracy, both in its histcrical ucvclopmcut and in its

social bearing and implications for the world of today.

(Newlon, 1939, p. 94, cited in Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p.

129, emphasis added)
Apart from passing mention of Thomas Jefferson, Noah Webster, and Benjamin Rush,
though, these authors fail to incorporate into their survey any reference to historians or

political theorists, let alone any adequate treatment of the historical development of

democracy. In this respect they are no different from any of the other defenders of

24
multicultural education, whose similarly oblique references to a substantive democracy are

scattered throughout the literature.

This neglect is troubling. It suggests the advisability of investigating the
distinctions that may reasonably be drawn among the democratic systems of government
prevalent in Western industrial societies, particularly in the United States. In so doing, an
attempt will be made to forestall two problems likely to arise in the absence of such a
review. First, because multicultural educationists do not discriminate historical variants of
democracy,15 confusions and seeming contradictions in the literature may be attributed to
this failure to distinguish meanings of "democracy" and hence may be resolved by this
analysis. Second, and more importantly, a clearer sense of the forms, requirements, and
promises of different versions of democracy may reasonably be expected to enhance our
understanding of the educational aspects that would allow citizens living under each type of
government to fulfill their proper roles. Being serious about preparing pupils for
democratic participation obliges one to learn what such participation entails.

The Forms of Liberal Democracy

There is no shortage of theoretical treatments of democratic political systems from
which one might enhance one's understanding of the demands of democratic education.
However, several features of C. B. Macpherson's (1977) analysis make it especially
relevant here. By elaborating historically successive models, he places each form not only
in its immediate social and political contexts but also in its temporal context, that is, in a
sequence including what had come before and what came after. This responds directly to
Newlon's (1939, p. 94) insistence (reaffirmed by Sleeter and Grant, 1994, p. 129) upon
understanding democracy in its historical development. Macpherson's analysis pertains to
the types of society currently most concerned with multicultural issues, because his

definition of liberal democracy presupposes an industrial, class-based economy. Indeed,

 

15As will become evident presently, these versions of democracy form something of a chronological
progression. That is not to say, however, that each has been either superseded or usurped by subsequent
models.

25
Macpherson carefully and explicitly distinguishes "liberal" democracy from its precursors

(i.e., those stretching from the ancient Greek polis to Jefferson's society of yeoman
farmers): these forerunners have all presupposed a classless or a one-class society.16
Liberal democracy, in contrast, is faced with a class-divided society, one characterized by a
capitalist market economy, and one in which the ultimately successful pressure for an
expanded franchise has entitled people from competing economic strata to enter the political
fray. This feature has significant consequences for each of the versions of democracy and
consequently for the prospects for success in achieving the multiculturalists' ideal of
democratic participation.

Macpherson also reveals assumptions about people and society embedded in the
various models of liberal democracy.17 For example, he demonstrates the incompatibility
between the Utilitarians' model of man and society and their simultaneously held ethical
principle of equality (Macpherson, 1977, pp. 23—43, especially pp. 29—30)--a
contradiction, incidentally, which Jeremy Bentham and J arnes Mill either never recognized
or chose to ignore in favor of the promised benefits of capitalism. ‘3 Finally, his treatment
of the subject is thorough enough to offer genuinely substantive insights into the various
conceptions of democracy while remaining succinct enough to be manageable, considering
the present emphasis is not upon democratic theory per se but upon the insights it can offer
to multicultural theory. As a result, while other political scientists' work might provide
worthwhile albeit different contributions to a study of multicultural theory, there seems no

reason to doubt that Macpherson's treatment is ideally suited to the present need.

 

l6For Macpherson (1977), a classless society allows "up individual ownership of productive land or capital"
(p. 12), whereas a one-class society presumes that "everyone owns, or is in a position to own, such
property" (p. 12).

17Jane Roland Martin (1981, pp. 51—53) lauds this aspect of Macpherson's work and uses his revelations as
a model for challenging assumptions implicit in Paul Hirst's theories of the forms of knowledge and liberal
education.

18Bentham unequivocally announces his commitment to property--seen as the foundation of "security," the
term he uses more frequently—-over equality: "When security and equality are in conflict, it will not do to
hesitate a moment. Equality must yield" (Bentham, 1830/1931, p. 120).

26
This review will consist of two parts. It will follow Macpherson's chronology in

tracing the history of liberal democracy--not for the purpose of duplicating his analysis but
to afford a cogent summary of the central features of each type. This will facilitate
comprehension of the type itself and comparisons with other versions of democracy. Each
summary will be followed by a brief consideration of the educational implications of that
model. The intent here is not to propose a complete curricular program but merely to
furnish evidence for the assertion that general, often superficial, talk about democracy
ignores important distinctions in the curricular strategies appropriate for each conception.
W

The first formulation of liberal democracy was proffered by the Utilitarians Jeremy
Bentham and James Mill, writing in England in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The
main elements of this Utilitarian theory can be summarized thusly:19 Human beings are
governed by "two sovereign masters" (Bentham, 1789/1948, p. 1), namely, pleasure and
pain. Not only do individuals act to maximize their pleasures and minimize their pains,
they are morally justified in doing so. (If nature has indeed made these two masters
Wu over human existence, people have little real choice in this matter, for rare is the
individual who would seek to maximize pain over pleasure”) And this moral imperative
applies to collectivities, not just individuals, so the best government is the one which can
maximize the happiness of its citizens. However, the question of who should control that
government is difficult to resolve, for each ready alternative poses the threat of abuse by the
govemor(s). Whether led by one individual (monarchy), a group of individuals

(oligarchy), or the citizenry as a whole (democracy), the government may fall prey to the

 

19This synopsis draws on the following works: Bentham's (1789/1948)1ntt§u1ucucn_tc_thgflnpc_rplcs_uf
MW and his (1830/1931) WM, Mill's (1820/1937) MW
Ornament. and MacPherson's (1977) W

20Bentham termed this inverse principle "asceticism" and rejected the possibility of its forming the logical
basis of an ethical system (see Bentham, 1789/ 1948, pp. 8-13).

27
attempt of those in power to advance their personal happiness at the expense of the public at

large.21
When persons of equal status-~whether political, economic, or social--hold power

over their fellow citizens, the dangers are serious enough. When persons of unequal
status-~specifically, persons of a higher social class-combine political power with the
power inherent in their vaster resources of wealth, even greater offenses against the
commonweal (understood as the greatest happiness) might ensue. The early Utilitarians
recognized the potential for abuse in a political system in which persons of differing class
backgrounds were presumed to have equal political power.22 The ethical principle of
equality, in conjunction with the economic model of human beings as maximizers of
utilities and of society as a collection of individuals with conflicting interests (because
different people find different things pleasurable or because numerous people find a limited
resource pleasurable), led the Utilitarians to devise a mechanism for controlling the
tendency of the powerful to abuse their power. This mechanism was an expanded
franchise:

The vote was political power, or at least the lack of the vote

was lack of political power. Therefore everyone needed the

vote, for self-protection. Nothing short of "one person, one

vote" could in principle protect all the citizens from the

government. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 37)
The franchise was deemed prctcctu/c because, despite assertions of a belief in equality, the
society remained one in which individual consumers sought to maximize private benefits in
free economic and political markets. Not surprisingly, under such circumstances the rich

would enjoy considerable advantage in influencing governmental policies; the poor were to

use their newly acquired vote to protect themselves against such machinations.

 

21Whereas the potential for abuse is rather obvious in monarchical and oligarchical regimes, it is far from
absent in democratic polities, for not all citizens can hold the reins of government simultaneously. The
issue then becomes one of how the larger, governed populace can protect its interests against its smaller,
governing contingent. Checks on power and rotation in office are two common methods for restraining the
natural tendencies of the governors in a democracy.

22As mentioned earlier, the presence of class distinctions in a political system assuming equal political
standing defines modern liberal democracies.

28
So asserts the theory. Ultimately the success of the model depended upon two

features. First, the franchise must be extended universally. This, as it turned out, was
done only grudgingly and in fits and starts well into the 20th century. Indeed, James Mill
gave many pseudo-democratic reasons for believing that something much less than a
universal franchise would guarantee the necessary protections of the people. His assertion
that "all those individuals whose interests are indisputably included in those of other
individuals" (Mill, 1820/1937, p. 45) could be denied the vote without any dire
consequence seems ludicrous to late-20th-century citizens, particularly when one regards
his examples: Children's interests were involved in those of their parents, women's in
those of their husbands or fathers, and younger men's in those of older men, because
"scarcely any laws could be made for the benefit of all the men of forty which would not be
laws for the benefit of all the rest of the community" (Mill, 1820/1937, p. 47). This belief
in common interest strikes the modern democrat as naive at best, but it coincides perfectly
with the market model of economy and polity that dominated the early industrial age--
namely, that political power should reside in those with clear economic interests. The
consequences were profound, for not only could the resultant politically powerful groups
justifiably protect their own interests, through the implicit paternalism (or, more favorably,
noblesse oblige) they could decide what benefits to grant to the lower classes.

The second feature upon which the success of protective democracy depended is the
ability of voters to act in concert to protect their interests. In this respect, an isolated,

individual vote counts for little. Election-year rhetoric notwithstanding,23 it is possible-—

 

23A letter to the W just prior to the presidential election of 1996 illustrates this
perfectly:
You may be hearing from the various press sources that the
"election is already decided" and the polls have shown that your choice
has "won" or "lost."
Do not stay home on election day! Your vote is important
because:
—In 1776, one vote gave America the English language
instead of German.
—In 1845, one vote brought Texas into the Union.
—In 1867, one vote ratified the Alaska Purchase, which
became our largest state.

29
especially in a winner-take-all system, such as that in the United StateS--for a citizen to

waste a vote on a candidate with little chance of winning or for one citizen to cancel the vote
of another in a two-candidate race. The protective model of democracy encourages persons
negatively affected by the actions of incumbents to use their votes to prevent such actions
by turning powerholders out of office if they have violated the public's trust. However,
the principle of "one person, one vote" is deceptive, for it is not individuals who protect
themselves at the voting booth, but rather collectivities:

In actuality the right [to vote] is not fundamental because it

secures benefits or other rights directly for the individual

voter acting alone; it does so only if he or she votes as a

member of a group. (Shklar, 1991, p. 55)
One person's vote cannot protect that person from a community which supports its
representative(s) in enacting a policy to that person's detriment, unless that person bands
together with enough others similarly affected to reverse the outcome of the election.
Because people have varied interests, though, the groups to which they belong will vary
depending upon the issue at stake. These shifting allegiances complicate the selection of a
single candidate in the voting booth, leading the voter to "play the odds" that, in general, a
certain candidate will act in that voter's interest more often than not. How much protection
the voter ultimately enjoys in return is something that cannot be known in advance.

Citizenship education in a protective democracy will emphasize above all the need

for citizens to vote. In this respect, it will look very much like what passes for democratic

 

—In 1868, one vote saved President Andrew Johnson from
impeachment.
—In 1876, one vote gave Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency
of the United States.
—In 1923, one vote gave Adolf Hitler leadership in the Nazi
Party.
—In 1941, one vote saved the Selective Service, just 12 weeks
before Pearl Harbor.
Exercise your right to vote. Vote on Nov. 5. (Hubert, 1996)
That every vote cited in this letter took place in a committee, party gremium, or other legislative body
(where, because of the relatively small number of votes cast, each vote carried more weight) rather than in a
general election is beside the point.

30

education in many schools today.24 11% one votes is almost universally regarded as less
important than 1M. one vote. (Ironically, the references to the sacred right to exercise one's
conscience in the voting booth ignore the self-interest at the core of protective democracy.)
An educational program for protective democracy cannot rest there, however. It must also
persuade pupils of the need to act conjointly if votes are not to be "wasted" and if any
semblance of protection is to be assured. Most difficult of all, this curriculum will need to
address the question of how one identifies or defines one's interest, including how to
resolve internal conflicts of interest. Given the controversial nature of this topic and given
its implicit challenge to more flattering and noble conceptions of democracy, however, it
appears unlikely that schools would be very successful in implementing such a curriculum
even if they could be persuaded to adopt it.
v 1 nt 1 m r c

Even its originators concede that expediency is the strongest recommendation for
protective democracy. In that model there is "no enthusiasm for democracy, no idea that it
could be a morally transforrnative force" (Macpherson, 1977, p. 43). By the middle of the
19th century, however, the increasing deprivations of the working classes--leading to
revolutions across Europe in l848--and the simultaneous increase in literacy among those

classes meant that the poor' could not be shut out or held down much longer"
(Macpherson, 1977, p.45). In the face of increasingly strident demands for political
participation on the part of persons historically regarded as politically irrelevant or
irresponsible (viz., the working classes), political theorists began reconsidering their
assumptions regarding the demands of democratic polities. By rejecting the expediency of
the protective model, John Stuart Mill redefined the function of government so that the
working classes could be included in the polity without fear of their undermining

democracy itself, for their very engagement in political processes was to effect their

improvement not only as citizens, but also as human beings:

 

24Schools are not the only agencies that encourage voter participation. MTV, among other organizations,
sponsors a quadrennial get-out-the-vote campaign.

31

The first element of good government, therefore, being the
virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the
community, he most im rtant int exc l ence whi

n rm f overnment can ossess i romote h vi

cud intelligence of the mople themselves. The first question

in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to

foster in the members of the community the various desirable

qualities, moral or intellectual. . ..A government is to be

judged by its action upon men,. . .by what it makes of the

citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve

or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or

badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of

them. (Mill, 1861/1962, pp. 32-36, emphasis added)
As the foremost way in which people establish the arrangements that enable them to live
together peaceably, political engagement is crucial to a development of people's
understanding of themselves. Developmental democracy transforms the purely mechanistic
model of protective democracy into a moral imperative by rejecting a fundamentally
calculating vision of humankind and replacing it with a vision of a continually developing
being. No longer need individual citizens worry that their interests will be ignored or
violated by privileged others ostensibly acting on their behalf. Nor need they employ some
utilitarian calculus to determine their interests or to arrive at the number of like-minded
individuals necessary to form a voting bloc powerful enough to protect their interests.
Developmental democracy envisions a growing political engagement among all citizens that
improves not only their economic well-being but their political, social, cultural, and moral
prospects as well.

This hope for personal development through democratic participation continued
through the 19th century and well into the 20th, with adherents on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean. Ernest Barker, former chair of political science at Cambridge University, saw no
tension between the functions of government and the rights of individuals, for a democratic
government is obligated to act on behalf of the right of "each individual person to enjoy the
conditions necessary to the development of his capacities" (Barker, 1951, p. 269). The

rights involved do exact a price--both financial, primarily in the taxes necessary to enable

the government to act in this capacity, and spiritual, in the increased control over human

32
lives that accompanies the government's role in protecting individual rights. By attending

more to the spiritual price than the financial (p. 270), Barker skirts the issue of how
economically disadvantaged individuals may come to enjoy the conditions for development
of personal capacities. Economic inequalities would be addressed "as social thought about
justice grows" (p. 272)--apparently as a result of a growing progressive Zeitgeist rather
than from the agency of a particular person or social group--and could be dealt with
through agreements "based on voluntary consultation and issuing in voluntary co-
operation" (p. 275). Barker's call for personal development via political engagement, then,
presupposes a good dose of voluntary self-help of individuals by groups of individuals (p.
276).

AS the foremost American proponent of developmental democracy, John Dewey
both supported and extended Mill's vision. For Dewey, personal enhancement was not
merely a possible, but a necessary outcome of democratic participation, for democracy was
more than a form of government: "Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to
other principles of associated life. WM' (Dewey, 1927, p.
148, emphasis added). Furthermore, this common engagement of individuals in civic
affairs promotes a salutary interdependence:

The extension in space of the number of individuals who

participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own

action to that of others, and to consider the action of others

to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the

breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national

tenitory which kept men from perceiving the full import of

their activity. (Dewey, 1916/1980, p. 93)
The result is both an expansion of the shared concerns of the members of the community
and a freeing of their capacities for personal development. Requisite to the achievement of
these goals is the individual's access to educational and intellectual opportunities-~in the
context of his life and work, an understandably central concern for Dewey.

Despite its claim to enhance the political knowledge, engagement, and satisfactions

of the working classes, the developmental model proved unable to resolve the

33
contradictions between its political ideals and the demands of a market-based economy.

The people deemed most needful of the moral and intellectual improvements that democracy
could provide--namely, the lower and working classes, for the upper classes' long
enjoyment of the franchise supposedly testified to their established political (and,
presumably, moral and intellectual) competence--were the very members of society whose
social and economic circumstances most frustrated the attempt and even the inclination to
pursue social improvement. Most theorists of developmental democracy failed to recognize
this contradiction or minimized its significance (cf., e.g., the discussion of Barker above).
Only Mill and Dewey acknowledged the relevance of a capitalist economy to their analysis
of democratic politics, but Mill failed to identify the connection correctly (Macpherson,
1977, p. 69) and Dewey was more concerned with the promise of a democratic liberalism
than with a study of capitalism (Macpherson, 1977, pp. 74-75). Consequently, the
potential of developmental democracy remained unfulfilled, in part because the insidious
presence of class, ethnic, and other distinctions prevented the type of interaction envisioned
here, but more generally because, as Dewey (1927, p. 148) himself conceded, the model
portrayed a completed and perfected ideal incapable of ever being fully realized because of
distractions and interferences in people's actual, everyday lives.

The expansiveness of developmental democracy's vision--as Dewey asserted, it is
"the idea of community life itself'--justifies a similarly broad educational program. Since
almost anything can be a focus of community life or contribute to personal development,
excluding any but the most clearly antisocial ideas, attitudes, and behaviors would be
difficult to justify (and these would ultimately be excluded from any educational program).
Perhaps some genuine advantage is to be gained from the broad perspective that this model
supports, for taking seriously the wide-ranging implications of democracy could indeed
extend civil discourse and behavior far beyond the traditional domain of politics. On the

other hand, the possibility of defending practically any course of action in an overcrowded

34
curriculum as furthering democratic or citizenship education could rapidly trivialize such

programs.
i i ' m ra

Mill's model of developmental democracy proved so attractive that it was not until
the middle of the 20th century that a new model was proposed to supersede it.
Interestingly, this model reverted to the market assumptions of the protective model. Its
major advance is that it places these considerations squarely in the context of a modern
pluralistic society, that is, "a society consisting of individuals each of whom is pulled in
many directions by his many interests, now in company with one group of his fellows,
now with another" (Macpherson, 1977, p. 77). Indeed, the market mechanism returned
with a vengeance, for the equilibrium touted in the title is one that exists between the
demand and supply of pcli_tical goods. The voters became the consumers of political goods
offered by the entrepreneurs--the politicians (Macpherson, 1977, p. 79). Citizens
purchased different political goods according to their shifting interests and alliances as
members of competing groupsuclass, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation (hence the
pluralistic aspect of the model)--and the political system was expected to respond to those
demands whose extent or intensity justified the creation, the "manufacture," of that political
good.

Joseph Schumpeter makes his reliance upon a market model as explicit as does any
theorist of equilibrium democracy, and he offers a good example of the parallels between
economic and political theory:25 In a democracy, the primary function of the elector's vote
is to produce government. Generally, producing a government amounts to deciding who
the leader shall be. But in the vast majority of instances, candidates for office present
themselves to the electorate, which then chooses among the available alternatives; these
candidates rarely emerge at the behest of the voting public. This applies even when-—or

perhaps especially when-~the candidates are representatives of and backed by political

 

25This summary is based on the theory Schumpeter presents in W
(1943/1987, pp. 273—283).

35
parties, which theoretically may have selected them from the entire pool of party members

but actually chose them from a much smaller group of party members eager to occupy
public office. These parties act much as businesses do in the economic arena. They
attempt to sell their candidate to the public, contrasting his features with those offered by
candidates affiliated with other parties. The parties' platforms respond to the demands of
the political marketplace (or, in some cases, create that demand) by including provisions
that will appeal to the consumers, the electorate. The candidate is then marketed in much
the same way as any other product--with slogans, advertising, etc. The candidate whom
most voters "buy" on election day wins the contest and enters office.

The educational implications of equilibrium democracy resemble those of protective
democracy because the fundamental assumptions of the models are similar. The centrality
of voters' interests parallels that of the earlier model, but the objective is no longer merely
to protect oneself against the incursions of powerful groups. Instead, there arises the
possibility of enhancing one's position through the adept forming of political alliances and
through the judicious use of one's vote. The aspects that mark this system as political
consumerism suggest that an appropriate educational program would incorporate elements
of consumer education, shifting their application from the economic to the political arena.
How to detect fraud and how to assess competing claims for the political products-~in
short, how to "spend" one's political vote wisely--would be important skills for young
citizens to master.

W

The last of the four models of democracy is less of a formal model than a conviction
that more people should be involved to a greater degree in governmental decision-making.
Arising out of the student and labor movements of the 19608 (Macpherson, 1977, p. 93)
and seeking to make the state more morally, rather than bureaucratically, responsive to the
interests of the citizenry (Held, 1987, pp. 257—258), this model has been the topic of

fervent discussion in recent years. It can claim credit for some clear and some partial

36
successes. The model purports to remedy the shortcomings of blatantly market models and

restore a moral component to democratic processes. It urges all citizens to involve
themselves in political affairs, both for their own satisfactions and development and for the
achievement of genuinely democratic decision-making. It reduces the apathy that plagues
those without the resources to compete in a market-based system, for those without
adequate resources, whether economic or political, to achieve their goals are inclined to
withdraw their participation rather than to fritter away what limited resources they have or
to face the prospect of repeated failure. The hold that the pure, direct democracy of Athens
or the New England town meeting, to use Macpherson's (1977, p. 95) examples, exerts
upon the popular imagination attests to the attractiveness of this approach.

The degree to which participatory democracy emerges from a dissatisfaction with
the equilibrium model of democracy should not be underestimated. In fact, it addresses
itself to the most harmful consequence of a market-based political system, namely, apathy.
All political activity levies costs, be it in time, effort, money, commitment, or any
combination of these. As in economic markets, in which consumers must decide whether
the benefits of a purchase (e.g., in pleasure, in utility, in increased productivity) outweigh
the costs of that purchase (e.g., the price itself, the loss of interest on money taken from
savings to buy the product, the interest on a loan needed to purchase the item), political
consumers are faced with similar cost-benefit analyses. Indeed, the market model
encourages such calculations. Given the scarce financial resources of the lower classes,
their limited familiarity with political mechanisms, and the meager benefits that political
bodies generally assign to them, workers and the poor not surprisingly disengage
themselves from political activity. This withdrawal from political involvement not
uncommonly feeds upon itself, for reduced involvement brings in its wake reduced
effectiveness, which promotes even less involvement. Frequently ascribed to apathy, this

disengagement of the lower classes from democratic affairs could also plausibly be an

37

indication of their rejection of existing political relations. Macpherson indicts this cycle of

political alienation as a moral, not just a political, failure of market politics:
It is sufficient to say that in view of the unquestioned class
differential in political participation in the present system,
and assuming that that differential is both the effect and the
continuing cause of the inability of those in the lower Strata
either to articulate their wants or to make their demands
effective, then nothing as unparticipatory as the apathetic
equilibrium of Model 3 measures up to the ethical
requirements of democracy. This is not to say that a more
participatory system would of itself remove all the inequities
of our society. It is only to say that low participation and
social inequity are so bound up with each other that a more
equitable and humane society requires a more participatory
political system. (Macpherson, 1977, p. 94)

Participatory democracy's demands upon the curriculum focus on the abilities
necessary for citizens to engage in productive, thoughtful exchange with each other on
political matters. The ability to articulate a position and to discuss its merits and
shortcomings intelligently, the inclination to submit to refutation in the face of persuasive
evidence and argument, and the willingness to recognize the legitimate political claims of
others are essential traits of the mature citizen in this model.26 Process prevails over
substance, for there is no prescribing the issues of concern to deliberative communities. In
conjunction with the increasing attention that participatory democracy demands as a political
model, the concomitant abilities have become increasingly prominent in educational debates
(see, e.g., Gutmann, 1987, and Sleeter & Grant, 1994, esp. p. 223).

Models of Democracy and Multicultural Education
That proponents of multicultural education claim a commitment to democratic forms

of government and that they see curricula in multicultural education as contributing to the

 

26There is a surprising but encouraging coincidence between these dispositions and the "intellectual
virtues," as defined by Michael Oakeshott:

But learning to think...is learning to recognize and enjoy the

intellectual virtues. How does a pupil learn disinterested curiosity,

patience, intellectual honesty, exactness, industry, concentration and

doubt? How does he acquire a sensibility to small differences and the

ability to recognize intellectual elegance? How does he come to inherit

the disposition to submit to refutation? How does he not merely learn

the love of truth and justice, but learn it in such a way as to escape the

reproach of fanaticism? (Oakeshott, 1965/ 1989, pp. 60—61)

38
realization of more truly democratic societies is evident in their writings. Just what they

mean by these claims is more problematic. None of the works under scrutiny in this study
incorporates the insights of any theorist summarized above in its review of democratic
principles-mot even John Dewey, the most salient and likely example. Nor, for that
matter, have the multiculturalists substituted other political philosophers for those in the
preceding survey. In short, while one finds no solid basis for challenging the
multiculturalists' commitment to democracy, one can only surmise about the meaning of the
term as it is employed in their discourse. An attempt to match relevant assertions to the
purposes as described by the theorists of democracy included here leads to the following
conclusions.

In light of the protective model of democracy's heyday in the early-to-mid- 19th
century, its datedness would lead one to assume that it would have little relevance to the
multiculturalists' goals for democratic education. This is not necessarily the case.
Multiculturalists criticize quite explicitly the political and social arrangements that lead to
unequal educational opportunity (Bennett, 1986, pp. 52—56), institutional racism (Nieto,
1992, pp. 21—29), or the oppression of the poor and minority groups (Sleeter & Grant,
1994, pp. 126—133). The protective model of democracy encourages persons so affected
to use their votes to prevent such actions by the more powerful but presumably less
numerous elites. However, this strategy falls prey to the misconception that individuals
acting in isolation can protect themselves by voting. At a minimum, the use of the ballot in
this manner needs coordination among citizens to serve as a stopgap against the more
egregious abuses cited by the proponents of multicultural education. But the franchise
alone plays no discernible role in promoting the wider civic virtues frequently credited to
participation in political affairs.

Because educators in general (see, e.g., Purpel, 1989) and multicultural educators

in particular (see, e.g., Nieto, 199227) do regard themselves as being engaged in a moral

 

27This attitude is clearly implicit in Nieto's work (see, e.g., p. 222), although it doesn't appear to be stated
explicitly in this text.

39
enterprise, the developmental model of democracy would seem to resonate with the goals

of multicultural education. Yet the available evidence is surprisingly weak. Granted, some
leading multicultural educators are concerned with personal development, whether in the
general instance of cultural identity (e.g., Baker, 1983) or the more specific instance of
ethnic identity (e.g., Banks, 1991). Most multiculturalists, though, go beyond these
essentially personal, individual concerns to advocate collective social action, particularly in
their emphasis upon social justice (e.g., Banks, 1991, p. 28; Bennett, 1986, p. 55; Nieto,
1992, pp. 216—218; and Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 171). These larger social goals
obviously do not preclude individuals' engaging in political processes in order to come to a
deeper understanding of themselves, but it appears that most multiculturalists would be
sorely disappointed were their efforts to have such a limited puMic effect as this.

That the equilibrium model has purged democracy of the moral element introduced
into it by John Stuart Mill is impossible to disguise. To that extent, educators of all stripes
are likely to respond adversely to it. Yet multiculturalists in particular have been accused--
and not always without justification-«of promoting the very "special interest" politics found
at the core of this model. After all, multiculturalists eagerly point to the categories of pupil
that are generally disadvantaged by the current educational system: the poor, ethnic
minorities, women, gays and lesbians, etc. Interestingly, in encouraging such political
activism, multiculturalists employ to their advantage the market techniques characteristic of
the equilibrium model: Just as in a market economy, one dollar is equal to every other
dollar--meaning that one is "entitled" to whatever one has the dollars to purchase--in the
market polity, one vote is equal to every other vote, and any group with enough votes to
achieve its political objectives is "entitled" to that political victory. Nevertheless, as with
the connection between multiculturalism and protective democracy, one finds in the
multicultural literature only potential and implicit support for the equilibrium model.

Lastly, participatory democracy claims its adherents among educators as well.

Perhaps the most thorough and eloquent argument on behalf of educating pupils for this

40
type of democracy was presented by Amy Gutrnann in her book, Democratic Educaticn

(1987).28 Multicultural educators weigh in on the side of citizen participation, too. They
emphasize the "important role of citizens in ensuring and maintaining the privileges of
democracy" (Nieto, 1992, p. 218); they strive to develop "an informed and active citizenry"
(Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 219) that can "openly debate issues" (p. 223), "organize and
work collectively with others" (p. 223), and "exercise power" (p. 223), one that is "capable
of making reflective personal and public decisions" (Banks, 1991, p. 25). In fact,
participatory democracy can reasonably be understood to encompass what multiculturalists
mean by the phrase "true democracy" (Nieto, 1992, p. 21; Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 130),
although admittedly this term suffers from the same ambiguity that surrounds all of the
multiculturalists' references to democracy and that have been the focus of this review.
Limitations of Participatory Democracy
and of a Concern with Democratic Form

Given the growing attention devoted to both the political and the educational aspects
of participatory democracy (see, e.g., Macpherson, 1977; Barber, 1984; Held, 1987;
Gutmann, 1987), it deserves some further consideration here. Despite its popularity,
participatory democracy has yet to be implemented in any extensive manner in Western
societies. This has less to do with its attractiveness, which seems substantial, than with
several serious problems complicating its implementation. First, the problem of size means
that although widespread popular participation in governmental affairs may have been
feasible in the Greek city-state or in local governments (whether or not they are run as a
town meeting), it strikes one as impossible to expect a comparable degree of involvement
by the thousands or millions at county, state, and national levels of government.29 For this
reason, various surrogate mechanisms for direct participation have long been in place in

democratic societies. (The electoral college and representative legislative bodies are two

 

28Gutmann, however, prefers the term "deliberative democracy," although the essentials of the model appear
the same as in the participatory model.

29Macpherson (1977, pp. 95—98) details the formidable difficulties that would remain were even massive
technological resources marshaled to avail every citizen of access to direct~balloting machines.

41
handy examples from the United States.) Second, the problem of self-definition means that

people accustomed to viewing themselves, even tacitly, as consumers of political goods
who make their purchases in periodic elections must now begin to understand themselves
as exerters and developers of their own capacities and adjust themselves to the demands of
their new roles. And third, the inequalities of wealth and power that characterize any
market system would have to be redressed if people are to feel they have a fair chance of
influencing the outcome of political deliberations (Macpherson, 1977, pp. 98-101).
Several uncertainties derive from excessive attention to participatory democracy as
the form which democratic processes Should assume. M. B. E. Smith (1975) points out
that, in the absence of a persuasive case that participation in political affairs is an inherent
good, recommendations for democratic polities must consider not only the method by
which decisions are made, but also the quality of the decisions rendered. He claims that
there is no a priori reason to believe that greater participation leads to better and more
efficient results; indeed, he asserts the opposite conclusion is more reasonable. In a related
vein, the concern with form presupposes substantive interest among the citizenry in
political affairs. But Judith Shklar (1991) argues that, at least in the United States, the right
to vote is important for the standing it grants to citizens apart from any use they may make
of that right. Multiculturalists should take these challenges to heart. Their desire to involve
("empower" is the favored tennnsee Sleeter, 1991) previously disfranchised or
discouraged groups in political activity, both for the direct advancement of their interests
and for the more indirect personal edification that accompanies such engagement, is
commendable. A sense of democratic fairness requires nothing less. But their assumption
that greater participation by greater numbers of citizens will have very specific, desirable,
substantive results remains questionable. Multicultural educators' commitment to social
justice represents this expectation more than any other, but it is unclear that placing trust in
a merely formal procedure-even when it is democmtic--can guarantee particular outcomes

such as a just society.

CHAPTER III:
MULTICULTURALIST EDUCATORS' SINCERE COMMITMENT TO--
BUT FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF—-SOCIAL JUSTICE

Despite the varied and wide-ranging goals of multicultural education, the
movement's commitment to preparing pupils for participation in a democratic society finds
a central place in the literature. The specific form that democracy might assume--given the
historical altematives--remains to be clarified, as does the instructional program that would
be most appropriate for promoting citizens' involvement in that form. Yet this focal
commitment to democracy does not exhaust the multiculturalists' engagement with political
(as opposed to cultural or economic) affairs. Except for the increasingly limited numbers
of advocates for the human relations and single-group studies approaches to the field (e.g.,
Baker, 1983, 1994), multiculturalists expand their interest in democracy with an equal
concern for social justice.

Social justice as a goal commensurate with democratic participation is a theme
prevalent in the literature on multiculturalism. Banks (1994) wants pupils to learn "to
participate in civic action to make society more equitable and just" (p. 1), in the process
extending to all citizens "the democratic ideals. . .that the Founding Fathers intended for an
elite few" (p. 6). Gollnick and Chinn (1990) assert this purpose in a pair of goal-
statements: "to promote social justice and equality for all people" and "to promote equity in
the distribution of power and income among groups" (p. 31). Sleeter and Grant (1994)
hope their support of "education that is multicultural and social reconstructionist" will
promote "a vision of social justice for all groups" (p. 210). Bennett (1995) elaborates on
her belief in social justice as a means "to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of
prejudice and discrirrrination" (p. 301), while Nieto (1992) straightforwardly asserts that
"multicultural education is education for social justice" (p. 216). Few of the varied

objectives of multicultural education command as many champions as does social justice.

42

43
Anyone who reads the cases these authors make on behalf of the goal of social

justice would be hard pressed to question their passion or sincerity. Beyond that, one
would find it quite a challenge to argue against the goal of justice per se and, seemingly,
against appropriate measures to impress upon budding democrats in schools the overriding
claims of justice upon a truly democratic society.30 Just what those claims of justice might
be, though, is difficult to say with any certainty—-at least based upon the multicultural
literature itself, for not one of the leading multicultural treatises surveyed in this study
makes reference to any of the standard, accepted philosophical or political-theoretical
analyses of justice. Instead, multiculturalists rely on plausible but unexplicated notions of
justice, apparently assuming that commonsensical beliefs reflect an adequate understanding
of the issues involved. Its popularity and satisfactions for day-to—day living
notwithstanding, however, common sense often suffers from distortion and
incompleteness (see, e.g., "Fragile Common Sense" in Regal, 1990, pp. 87-110). Hence,
these dangers make common sense a questionable basis for educational policy on social
justice. A systematic review of the demands of justice is therefore warranted.

Such a review need not result in a challenge to the principles advocated by
multicultural educators. After all, those commitments have a prima facie validity: among
others, to equal opportunity for all people and to an equitable distribution of power among
all etlmic groups (Gollnick & Chinn, 1990, p. 31); to equal protection under the law and to
the protection of basic liberties (Bennett, 1995, pp. 301—302); to the (fair3‘) distribution of
power, status, and rewards (Nieto, 1992, p. 218); and to a society that better serves the
interests of all groups of people, particularly those who have most been the victims of
oppression and discrimination (e.g., people of color, the poor, women, gays and lesbians,

people with disabilities) (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 210).

 

30I'he preoccupation of upper-elementary and middle-school pupils for fairness, be it in actions that affect
them directly in school or in conditions in the wider society, suggests that people early on develop an
intuitive sense of justice. However well or poorly articulated the "legal" case, "That isn't fair!" is a serious
and impassioned accusation from these students.

31Implied by the context.

44
However, attention to the work of political theorists on justice can provide distinct

benefits. Since justice is central to the field of political philosophy, one may expect to find
thoughtful, systematic treatments of the topic and related issues. In the process,
commonsensical notions can be put to the test to see if they withstand proper scrutiny.
Assumptions may be made explicit, the structure of an argument may be made more
prominent, and implications may be identified and traced from their origins through their
consequences. Ultimately one may emerge from such a review with greater insight and
understanding that should promote more effective and defensible work in connecting
principles of justice to questions of pedagogy.
Rawls's Theory of Justice

Since the publication of A fI'hecty ct Justicc in 1971, John Rawls has been the
preeminent philosopher of justice in the United States. That is to say that, although other
theorists may disagree with the Kantian foundations of his argument or challenge the
conclusions he draws-—or fails to draw32--from those premises, no responsible political
philosopher of justice can fail to take Rawls's treatment of the issue into account. The
debate that has surrounded A 'lfhcog ct Justicc has been intense, leading Rawls to expand
and clarify his positions in a newer work, Eclitical LiMralism (1993). Here Rawls
attempts to correct serious internal problems, clear up obscurities, rectify misleading
assertions, and supply taken-for-granted, rrrissing pieces of his argument in A Thcoty cf
,Iustjcc. In the process, he simultaneously responds to the myriad specific criticisms levied
by his detractors. As a result, EolttjcaLLtmttlism stands as Rawls's more recent and more
mature work and consequently will serve as the basis of the present analysis of
multiculturalism.
MW

Rawls bases his theory of justice upon two notions that address, on the one hand,

fundamental characteristics of persons and, on the other hand, unavoidable traits of the

 

32An example here is Amartya Sen's criticism that Rawls has too narrow a notion of freedom; see Sen, -
1990.

45
societies in which those persons live. Regarding the people, citizens are held to be frcc and

cqual persons (Rawls, 1993, p. 19 & passim). By this is meant the following:

The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a

capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the

good) and the powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and

inference connected with these powers), persons are free.

Their having those powers to the requisite minimum degree

to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons

equal. (Rawls, 1993, p. 19)
The conception of equality here is a strictly political one, in that it concerns solely the
"requisite minimum degree" of competence to participate fully in society. The conception
of freedom emerges from equality's assumption that society rests upon a system of
voluntary social cooperation. Therefore citizens must have a capacity for a sense of justice,
in order to determine the fairness of that system, and a conception of the good, in order to
determine ends toward which that cooperation is presupposed.

Regarding the society, Rawls assumes a democratic society,33 and he
acknowledges that the political culture of a democratic society is characterized by a plurality
of "reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines" (p. 36).
Furthermore, this plurality is the necessary result of free citizens' exercising their two
moral powers--particularly the one enabling them to formulate a conception of the good.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the fact of this plurality of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines: (1) The diversity of ideas of the good is a permanent feature of modern
democracy, not just a temporary historical condition, and (2) from the opposite perspective,
"a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or

moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power" (p. 37).34

Rawls's theory, then, is a theory for modern, pluralistic democracies.

 

33This assumption is plausible enough, and Rawls rightly sees no need to defend it.

34The futility of trying to preserve a deteriorating, single, societal conception of the good--or to reinstate an
already abandoned one--is widely understood to be best evidenced by the wars of religion in Europe in the
16th and 17th centuries. For a full review, see, e.g., Rawls, 1993, pp. xxii—xxvii, and Winks, Brinton.
Christopher, & Wolff, 1988a, pp. 344—346, 351—354, & 360-365. These last passages treat the religious
conflicts in the Dutch revolt, the French wars of religion, and the Thirty Years' War, respectively. Despite
the toll that religious intolerance took in these events, however, the authors claim that "there emerged from

46
Given this assumption about society, the Rawlsian theory ofjustice--quite apart

from its predominance in the.field--has unmistakable commonalities with the literature on
multicultural education. The writings on multiculturalism are rife with references to
pluralistic, democratic societies in general or to the specific differences that constitute that
pluralism (see, e.g., Banks, 1994, p. 1; Bennett, 1995, pp. ix—x & 100—151; Gollnick &
Chinn, 1990, pp. 20—22; Nieto, 1992, p. 272, where she speaks of competing "cultures"
instead of "comprehensive doctrines"; and Sleeter & Grant, 1994, pp. 209—212, where
they elaborate the differences at the root of oppression and structural social inequality,
hence bases of injustice). In light of the patent compatibility between the concerns of
multiculturalists and of theorists of justice, one can only find the multiculturalists sorely
remiss in neglecting the political analyses of a topic they place at the center of their
educational program.

The similarities are not exact, however, for Rawls carefully and explicitly
differentiates between a pcl_i_t_i_c_al conception (in this case, of justice, although the distinction
could be applied to other areas as well) and a ccmprchcpsivc one. Indeed, Rawls (1993, p.
xv) admits that confusion between the two kinds of conception lay at the heart of many
misunderstandings of his original statement of the theory.35 Although people rarely talk
about comprehensive doctrines as such, they are quite familiar with them. By and large,
the world makes sense to most people. It does so because over the course of their lives,
they have--sometimes consciously, frequently unconsciously-~0rdered their perceptions,
their experiences, and their knowledge in ways that form a largely coherent whole.
Furthermore, they find themselves discomfited by new experiences or facts that do not fit .
neatly into the world view they have built. As a result, they may ignore the discrepant
elements, they may deny their existence altogether, or they may mold--some would say

distort--them into compatibility with their way of seeing things. Beyond whatever

 

the English Revolution (of Cromwell and the Interregnum, 1649-1660), even more clearly than from the
religious wars on the Continent, the concept of religious toleration" (Winks et al., 1988a, p. 416).
35This led to a 1985 clarification in the essay "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical."

47
intellectual satisfaction this cohesive perspective might provide, it allows people to make

sense of their existence, to regulate the world around them, and to make life more stable
and predictable.

Rawls designates these outlooks "comprehensive doctrines" and inclines to assign
them to one of three categories: religious, philosophical, and moral (Rawls, 1993, p. xvi),
although, depending on the strictness with which one wishes to employ the labels, the
taxonomy could be expanded to include political, economic, or social as well. In any
event, these perspectives supply meaning and understanding to a wide range of issues
central to human existence. That is precisely what makes them Will: doctrines.
To the extent that these outlooks are reasonable, they provide unobjectionable, even
satisfactory, guidance to an individual, allowing everyone to choose a notion of the good
life, either commensurate with or, more commonly, implicit within that doctrine. The
danger arises when a society--in practice, generally a politically powerful group therein--
establishes one of the comprehensive conceptions of the good life as authoritative for the
society at large, thereby prescribing one particular conception of the good life for everyone.
This is something a pluralistic democracy dare not do if it desires to avoid the repression
which would be needed in order to sustain the chosen vision over its competitors.

For this reason, Rawls insists upon grounding his theory of justice upon a
political36 conception, not a comprehensive one (Rawls, 1993, pp. 11—15). The two types
of conception are not without commonalities. Quite the contrary, a political view should be
compatible with any number of comprehensive views. However, Rawls (1993, pp. 11-
15) sees clear distinctions between the two: First, a political conception concerns only the

"basic structure" of society (Rawls, 1993, p. 11), that is, its main political, social, and

 

36The word "political" takes on one of three meanings in this discussion. Here, when contrasted with
"comprehensive" or "metaphysical," it designates those elements (of justice) that are common to--and
logically prior to--more elaborate and specific notions of the good life. When contrasted with "social" or
"economic," it refers to those activities by which a group of people establish the principles that allow them
to lead a public common life. In other instances, the term may be employed derogatorily to connote the
self-interested actions people employ within the political arena (e.g., "That's just politics!"). In the present
work, the intended meaning will be stated explicitly whenever it cannot be readily discerned from the
context.

48
economic institutions and how they fit together. Comprehensive views, in comparison,

range more widely over these and additional fields of human endeavor. Second, a political
conception is a "freestanding" view (Rawls, 1993, pp. 12-13). This means that it is
neither equal to nor derived from any single comprehensive view or collection of several
such views, although it will be compatible with many comprehensive doctrines and may
have elements in common with them.37 Third, a political conception expresses its content
"in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a
democratic society" (Rawls, 1993, p. 13), namely, the political institutions, the public
traditions of their interpretation, and foundational texts and documents.

The Rawlsian vision of justice that has been grounded here consists of several
parts: an assumption that society is democratic and pluralistic;38 an assumption that citizens
in such a society are free and equal--free in that they may exercise their capacities for a
sense of justice and for a conception of the good life, and equal in that they all can
cooperate in society to a minimum degree; and a warning that whatever conception of
justice is ultimately adopted, it may not arise from the wholesale appropriation of an
existing comprehensive view's notion of justice. The question remains of how one is to
determine a just structure and basic principles. To accomplish this, Rawls employs a
representational device called the "original position," a hypothetical assemblage in which
the participants determine the circumstances of fair cooperation among free and equal
citizens.

Any existing society that seeks to determine what is just is confronted with a
difficult problem: How is it possible for human beings to determine the truly just and

remain confident that the resulting conclusion has not been contaminated by the self-interest

 

f

37Rawls credits to an "overlapping consensus" (1993, pp. 15, 39—40) the possibility of formulating an
acceptable notion of justrce with elements common to multiple comprehensive views, but developed
independently, not extracted from them.

38Rawls emphasizes the fact of mm pluralism, a concern 'not crucial to the analysis at this point
For a contrast of the' 'reasonable" with the "unreasonable," see Rawls, 1993, pp. 63—66, with the "true"
see Rawls, 1993, pp. 126—129.

49
of the deliberators? In all but hypothetical or Utopian societies, people are interested

beings. That is simply to say that they have certain conceptions of the good life, certain
goals they wish to pursue in the face of limited resources of time, money, energy, and so
on, and certain notions of the means that will best enable them to accomplish their
objectives. Consequently, any effort by those same human beings to establish fair bases of
social cooperation will run the risk of subversion by self-interest disguised as impartial
judgment.39 Rawls's contrivance of the original position, along with the use of a veil of
ignorance, is intended to forestall such a corruption of justice.

The goal of the original position is to remove the influence of self-interest on the
setting up of basic principles of justice and ajust basic structure of society, both of which
must regard citizens as free and equal members of society. Treating those citizens equally
means not favoring one or some reasonable conceptions of the good life over others. Yet
deliberations about what is just can be undertaken only by interested human beings; there
simply is no one else to do the job. Since people cannot divest themselves at will of their
beliefs, commitments, and conceptions of the good life, a clean slate--a status devoid of
these int'erests--is neither a historical nor a possible condition. To compensate for this,

Rawls posits the original position (pp. 22—28), a device of representation,40 as the

 

39For an extensive treatment of the ways in which progressives and other social reformers have been blind
to the infiltration of self-interest into the most seemingly altruistic efforts, see Niebuhr (1944). This
difficulty arises not solely because of outright duplicity or even lack of diligence on the part of the
negotiators, but often because people come to take their ways of life, with all their accompanying
assumptions and expectations, for granted and hence genuinely are unable to recognize the self-interest in
their ostensibly objective assessments. The work of Peggy McIntosh provides a good example of the ways
in which "white privilege" in a racially fragmented society such as that in the US. is viewed as part of the
taken-for-granted, unexamined order of things. Her monograph W (1988)
draws parallels between the tacit privileges men enjoy and those that white people enjoy. That is, while
both groups may concede that the "other" (women and people of color, respectively) has been disadvantaged,
they are reluctant to acknowledge that this disadvantage implies certain privileges for their own group, let
alone to renounce those advantages in the service of justice. In "The lmpracticality of lmpartiality,"
Marilyn Friedman (1989) advocates the intentional inclusion of people of varied backgrounds in deliberative
processes (such as represented by the original position, for example) in the belief that the conflicts among
different notions of a "natural, unbiased order of things" will make the self-interest embedded in supposedly
impartial positions more evident.

40Confusion arose among readers of Alhccmpuustjcc that Rawls held the original position to be a
historical reality (in a social-contract theory of government) or a present possibility. He therefore takes
great pains in Rcmicauubctalism to establish the hypothetical nature of the original position (see Rawls,
1993, pp. 24 & 271-273).

50
arrangement through which the basic structure of a just society is designed. The

participants in this procedure are obligated to ensure the most just set of societal
circumstances for all members of that society. Accordingly, they are representatives of the
widest range of human contingency.

Ignoring one's particular commitments can be accomplished only with the greatest
difficulty even under the best of circumstances. For this reason, Rawls supplements the
original position with the veil of ignorance. This veil must be lowered, figuratively
speaking, for deliberations to proceed. The veil prevents the representatives in the original
position from knowing their particular circumstances in life, from knowing anything about
themselves that would influence their selection of a comprehensive doctrine (i.e., a
conception of the good life): their gender, race, ethnicity, religion, physical condition,
sexual orientation, residence, occupation, socioeconomic status, and so on.41 Because any
of the representatives could hypothetically have ended up in any of these circumstances and
because the representatives are charged with formulating a just basic structure of society for
all its members, they must disregard the identifying features enumerated above and
concentrate on the aspects that ensure justice free from self-interest. This consequence can
be stated straightforwardly: Just because someone occupies a certain socioeconomic
position or has adopted a particular comprehensive doctrine does not mean that that person
can reasonably expect other (free and equal) citizens to approve principles of justice that
would favor persons in that position or of that belief. A political conception of justice
precludes such favoritism; it dare not privilege some social positions or conceptions of the
good life over others. This is the objective the veil of ignorance in the original position
strives to promote (Rawls, 1993, pp. 24—25).

The conditions under which deliberations will proceed have been established, but

the point of these negotiations is left unclear. On the most fundamental level, the end

 

41These conditions of ignorance obtain only during the deliberations in the original position in order that
the basic principles of justice and the basic structure of society not be contaminated by self-interest. This
ignorance does not apply to actual lives led in the society.

51
toward which the participants in the original position are working is the fair terms of social

cooperation for free and equal citizens (Rawls, 1993, p. 23). Here the distinction between
everyday negotiations and those within the original position must be stressed. The
common variety of agreement between persons or groups takes place in a given social
context-~one in which, to a greater or lesser degree, participants can take inequalities of
status, wealth, role, etc., into account, although they may not always be able to overcome
them. (On the contrary, the better-placed negotiator prefers that the other parties to the deal
pct be able to overcome the imbalance.) The parties in the original agreement, however,
seek to determine the "background institutions of the basic structure" of society (Rawls,
1993, p. 23) and hence must avoid the inequalities that arise from interactions in any
society functioning over the long term:

The reason the original position must abstract from and not

be affected by the contingencies of the social world is that

the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of

political justice between free and equal persons must

eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise

within the background institutions of any society from

cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies. These

contingent advantages and accidental influences from the

past Should not affect an agreement on the principles that are

to regulate the institutions of the basic structure itself from

the present into the future. (Rawls, 1993, p. 23)
This summary reveals why Rawls has preferred to characterize his conception of justice
with the phrase "justice as fairness" (Rawls, 1993, p. 23).

Parties to the original position concern themselves with the basic structure of social
cooperation not only because that structure is fundamental to all other purposes but also
because they are forbidden to promote any particular conception of the good life. (The veil
of ignorance is designed to prevent this latter type of undertaking.) The concomitant
danger, however, is that deliberations on principles of justice will occur at such an abstract
level that they ultimately prove to have little relevance to people living in the midst of

particular, albeit varied, commitments. Rawls introduces the notion of primary goods (p.

75) in order to mitigate this concern. Primary goods are defined as those items necessary

52
for the realization of My conception of the good life. Among these primary goods are the

following: basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and occupation, fair equality of
opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect (Rawls, 1993, p. 76).
To the extent that the basic structure devised in the original position secures these primary
goods for the citizenry, it is compatible with the constraints and expectations of political
justice.
Rawls's Etinciples of Justicc
The outcome of the deliberations in the original position must meet two

requirements. First, it must establish both the basic principles of justice and a just basic
structure for society. Second, it must continue to regard citizens as free and equal persons
capable of participating in cooperative society on at least a minimal level. These conditions
may not appear overly restrictive, but they wrestle with the tension between liberty and
equality that has historically plagued liberal societies. Rawls proposes two fundamental
principles of justice commensurate with these expectations:

a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate

scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is

compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme

the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be

guaranteed their fair value.

b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two

conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and

offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of

opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit
of the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1993,

pp-5—6)
The first of these, sometimes known as the "maximum liberty" principle, seeks to
guarantee citizens' liberties. The second, known as the "difference" principle, addresses
the conditions under which inequalities among citizens are to be allowed. These are to be
permitted only when the inequality is to the benefit of the least advantaged (for example, by
ensuring better education for everyone by raising teachers' salaries). Controls such as
those implied by the difference principle are not instituted merely out of a desire to "level"

society, but out of the recognition that

53
below a certain level of material and social well-being, and

of training and education, people simply cannot take part in
society as citizens, much less equal citizens. (Rawls, 1993,
p.166)
No society can regard itself as just if it does not provide for at least a minimal basis of
participation in society by all of its members.
Implications of Rawls's Theory

The effort thus far has centered on establishing the basic elements of Rawls's
theory of justice. Little attention has been directed to the connections between the theory
and the multiculturalists' advocacy for social justice, especially its implications for
education. The two do have points in common, however, and the consequences for
multicultural education of taking Rawls's theory seriously could be grave indeed. Kenneth
Strike, a philosopher of education, has attempted to bridge this gap between political and
educational theory, using at times an explicitly Rawlsian approach, at other times an
implicit one (see Strike, 1982). Out of the breadth of Rawls's and Strike's discussions,
three issues appear most relevant and of the greatest significance: the centrality of
rationality, the question of whether cultural identity is a primary good, and the distinction
between public and private goals of schooling.

1' t' al'

Common sense suggests that rational and reasonable people would seek justice in
their private lives and in the society at large. Yet given the admitted potential shortcomings
of common sense, it is advisable to begin with a formal definition of rationality as it relates
to persons before delving too quickly into debates about justice itself:

Rational persons are those whose beliefs are well ordered
and are based on available evidence and who are able and
willing to alter their beliefs when available evidence
warrants. (Strike, 1982, p. 19)
Strike here is concerned with the bases of belief, especially that belief be based on solid

evidence and that it be modified as the evidence for or against that belief changes. Rawls

also views the rational as pertaining to individuals and their processes of thought:

54
The rational. . .applies to a single, unified agent (either an

individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment

and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its

own[,]. . .to how these ends and interests are adapted and

affirmed,. . .to how they are given priority[,]...[and] to the

choice of means. (Rawls, 1993, p. 50
If one views judgment as a specific type of belief and deliberation as a weighing of reasons
and evidence, the similarity of Rawls's understanding42 of rationality to Strike's is even
more evident. Strike, the educator, situates rationality at the center of the educational
enterprise: Schools should teach pupils that they need to have solid reasons for what they
believe; that, in essence, beliefs based on less than solid reasons--or on no reason at all-~are
held irresponsibly; and that as the evidence and understanding that undergird those beliefs
change, so must the beliefs themselves. Rawls, the philosopher, regards rationality--or
"rational autonomy" (Rawls, 1993, pp. 72—77)--as a prerequisite for individuals'
exercising their fundamental moral powers, particularly that of choosing or defining a

conception of the good. In both cases, human beings are held to be rational agents.
Rawls, though, insists upon the need to complement rationality with

reasonableness, since for Rawls rationality is a trait of the individual acting alone, whereas
the reasonable characterizes individuals' interactions with others.43 To this degree, "the
reasonable is public in a way the rational is not" (Rawls, 1993, p. 53).44 A conception of
justice whose fundamental principles are established through the deliberations of
individuals in the original position and that views justice largely as a means of establishing
fair bases of social cooperation can ill afford to rely upon the individuality and privacy of

rationality alone. What matters most in this context is that all parties to the negotiations be

able to accept the terms of cooperation, even if those terms are not true or rational in the

 

42Rawls's statement is less of a formal definition of rationality than a description of its employment.
43Rawls's emphasis upon public discourse resonates strongly with Dewey's assertion that democracy is "the
idea of community life itself" (Dewey, 1916/1980, p. 93) and simultaneously confirms Dewey's belief in
reasonableness.

44For an extensive treatment of the distinction between the reasonable and the rational, see Rawls, 1993,
pp. 48—54.

55
Strict sense. Rawls summarizes the complementarity of the reasonable and the rational as

follows:

Merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own

they wanted to advance by fair cooperation; merely rational

agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the

independent validity of the claims of others. (Rawls, 1993,

p. 52)
Since both elements are present in any genuine social setting, a conception of justice must
incorporate both and define their relation to each other, as Rawls has done.

Rawls and Strike present persuasive cases for locating rationality and
reasonableness squarely within the domain of education for social justice. Given the
strength of this case and the primacy of social justice among the goals of multicultural
education, one would expect rationality and reasonableness to be central to multicultural
education.45 Granted, the absence of something is more difficult to document than its
presence. The presumably missing idea could be found on pages other than those cited as
evidence of its absence, or the idea could be more subtle than that normally found in
traditional citations. Nevertheless, rationality46 is not explicitly treated in any of the
multicultural monographs under consideration in this study. It is mentioned in a passage
cited by Sleeter and Grant (see Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 210), and there is no evidence to
suspect that multiculturalists oppose rationality as a goal of (multicultural) education. Yet
Rawls's and Strike's arguments argue for something more decisive than a tacit assumption
of rationality as a goal of (multicultural) education.

W
Whether or not they use the term explicitly, multicultural educators are concerned

with the notion of identity, by which is meant the cultural attachments (of race, gender,

 

45This should be the case regardless of whether Rawls and Strike are the actual sources of the ideas as found
in the works on multicultural education.
46In this and subsequent contexts, and unless clearly indicated otherwise, "rationality" should be understood
to mean "rationality and reasonableness."

56

ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and so on)47 that situate a life in the social world and
give meaning and perspective to that life. The frequent references to diversity--understood
as a multiplicity of cultural identities--and to cultural pluralism are part and parcel of this
commitment. Sleeter and Grant (1994, p. 211) set the promotion of cultural pluralism as a
goal of multicultural education;48 Gollnick and Chinn (1990, p. 31) want to promote
cultural diversity and alternative life choices for people; Bennett (1995, p. 301) strives to
strengthen cultural consciousness; and Banks (1994, pp. 40—42) devotes several pages to a
discussion of racial identity. Nieto (1992) goes so far as to emphasize this concern in the
title of her book: Affirming Diyctsim. The variations in which this interest in identity is
expressed in discussions of multicultural education-mot just as an interesting issue but
ultimately as a formal commitment of these educational programs-demonstrate its assumed
significance in the field.

However well this celebration and promotion of diverse cultural identities may
resonate with educators' empathic attachments to their pupils, the connection of this
dedication to identity to a presumably equally fervent dedication to social justice is
ambiguous. After all, principles of justice, according to Rawls, are established by
negotiators operating behind a veil of ignorance--a device introduced for the explicit
purpose of masking the very cultural understandings and commitments that multiculturalists
now wish not Only to identify but to expand and to honor. An unsettling contradiction
lurks in this stance. The rationale for the veil of ignorance appears unexceptionable: Why
would it be reasonable for someone in a particular social position or some adherent of a
certain comprehensive doctrine to propose, and to expect others to accept, principles of
justice that favor that position or doctrine? (And if the proposed principles of justice don't

favor that position or doctrine, there is little cause for raising the issue, for people would

 

47Of primary importance here is not whether the stated characteristics constitute identity in any
conceptually rigorous way but that multiculturalists generally list these features when they speak of cultural
identity.

48This is the case even for their social-reconstructionist vision of multicultural education; it is more
evident in other forms of multicultural education that they identify--for example, Single-group studies (pp.
123-126) and non-social-reconstructionist multicultural education (pp. 167—169).

57
not consistently propose to disadvantage themselves, and neutral principles by definition

mean the position or doctrine plays no relevant role in the matter.)

The most persuasive resolution of this puzzle, at least initially, coincides with that
posited by Amy Gutmann. The participants in the original position are charged not only
with formulating a set of abstract principles of justice upon which the basic structure of
society will be founded but also with specifying a collection of primary goods whose
presence or accessibility will offer more concrete guidance in testing the validity of those
abstract principles. Gutmann (1992/1994, pp. 4—5) speculates whether a "secure cultural
context" is needed "to give meaning and guidance to [people's] choices in life" (p. 5). If

so, She suggests, then that context is a primary good and entitled to recognition and
promotion by a society that understands itself as adhering to basic principles of justice.
Her speculation implies a positive reaction to the proposal, but she fails to offer any
analysis of the issue or a persuasive rationale for this position.

For this and additional reasons, therefore, one dare not too hastily expand the
category of primary goods to include cultural identity among its members. A brief
summary of three objections will sufficiently attest to the problem. First, the emphasis on
cultural identity does not accord with the understanding of primary goods that Rawls
presents in W. Of the five primary goods listed there (viz., basic rights
and liberties, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives
of offices and positions of responsibility, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-
respect), only "the social bases of self-respect" possesses any prima facie connection to
cultural identity. Yet a close reading of Rawls's limited elaborations of this primary good
leads one to question its coincidence with identity as promoted by multiculturalists. At two
pointsRawls addresses the social bases of self-respect as something more than just an
element in a basic list of primary goods. In one, he defines it in the negative: Failure of
citizens to care about their basic liberties and opportunities (also primary goods) betrays

their lack of self-respect (Rawls, 1993, pp. 76—77). A reasonable conclusion, therefore, is

58
that self-respect leads citizens to regard themselves as free and equal political beings by

expressing concern about their basic rights, liberties, and opportunities. This is a pclitical
conception of self-respect, not cultural or social in the way that multiculturalists are wont to
view it (and even then their positions lack an explicit theoretical basis). Rawls maintains
this political view in the second commentary on this primary good:

Not only are [citizens] normal and fully cooperating

members of society, but they further want to be, and to be

recognized as, such members. This supports their self-

respect as citizens. So does counting certain primary goods,

such as the equalbasic rights and liberties, the fair value of

the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity, as

social bases of self-respect. (Rawls, 1993, pp. 81—82)
Equating the multiculturalists' broad view of identity with Rawls's political understanding
of the bases of self-respect appears unwarranted.49

Second, multiculturalists' fondness for, and even idolization of, cultural identity

ignores the noteworthy, troubling, and unfortunately none-too-rare instances in which
elements of a group's identity violate basic and cherished principles ofjustice.5O A
prominent illustration of this incompatibility is, on the one hand, the tension between
certain religious or cultural views of women and their place and role in society and, on the
other hand, the principle of justice that ensures women equal rights, liberties, and
opportunities. Conceding final authority to some idealized and, in the absence of specific
cases, often vague notion of culture is to concede too much. Furthermore, this problem
arises in a different guise when one must confront the non-essentialist nature of culture and
identity, as evidenced by individuals who choose to deviate from or abandon aspects of

their presumed cultural heritage. There seems to be no more justification for forcing people

within a culture to assume a certain identity than for forcing outsiders to that culture to

 

49This political conception of self-respect marks a modification of the position Rawls took in Alhccntcf
Justicc, in which he adopted a wider-ranging, more psychological view of self-respect (see Rawls, 1971, pp.
440—446). For reasons he elaborates in the introduction to Eclitical Lipetalism, Rawls now takes great
pains to distinguish the underlying political conception from comprehensive conceptions of the good (see
Rawls, 1993, pp. xiii-xxxiv).

50Despite her willingness to entertain the possibility that a secure cultural context belongs in the category

of primary goods, Gutmann does recognize this serious danger inherent in lauding identity indiscriminately
(see Gutmann, 1992/1994, p. 5).

59
accept unjust elements found therein. The multicultural literature is strangely and

disturbingly silent on this point, given its urgency in any program that elevates culture and
identity to such noble status.

Third, the types of identity at issue in this context are more limited than the touted
embrace of diversity by multiculturalists would lead one to expect. The literature is replete
with references to identity arising from aspects of life based on race, ethnicity, (lower)
class, or gender, regardless of the content, but elements of identity attributed to affinities of
(upper) class, religion, or political belief, for example, are rarely granted a comparable
legitimacy--at least not without more intense scrutiny than the former set of affiliations
receives. An extreme example will dramatize this difference: A poor, Haitian gay man is
regarded as possessing not merely a iiffeucpt cultural identity from that of a rich,
Episcopalian woman, but a more genuinc one. In fact, a survey of major multicultural
works reveals that, despite rhetorical insistence, culture and identity per se are not the
issue, but rather those cultural traits that have historically formed the basis for
discrimination and injustice.

Multiculturalists can hardly be faulted for their sense of duty to the economically
disadvantaged and socially disfranchised; however, they can be criticized for not discussing
this commitment more explicitly and more thoroughly in their basic works. If injustice is
the crux of the matter here, then it should be declared openly and not disguised or even
diluted by a canonization of culture, identity, or diversity in the abstract (when, as
described above, not all cultures, identities, or differences are equal in multicultural
doctrine). Such a clarification--or, in some instances, redirection--of emphasis would offer
several benefits: it would remove some of the confusion and resulting compromised effort
within the multicultural-educational community; it would avoid the dilemma of sanctifying
aspects of culture that Rawls’s original position might decree unjust (at the least, it would
imply the need for serious reflection on whether there are limits to the kinds of diversity

deemed worthy of acceptance and promulgation); it would remove a frequent basis of

6O
criticism from Opponents of multicultural education, namely, that multiculturalism is

curiously ignorant of and uninterested in "the real cultural richness of the world"
(Bernstein, 1994, p. 6; see also Coughlin, 1992); and it would force multiculturalists to
dedicate themselves to formulating or adopting a defensible theory of justice.

flfhc Public Gcals cf Public Schcoling

A third implication of Rawls's theory is in many respects the overarching category
for which the preceding two implications serve as examples, but all three are serious
enough issues to be treated as independent entities. This final question addresses the
legitimate curricular jurisdiction of public schools. Anyone familiar with public schools
knows that over the years there has been an accretion of the subjects and topics that schools
are charged with teaching to pupils. Every new social problem or popular concern finds its
way into the curriculum, from AIDS awareness to computer literacy to cultural pride. Nor
need one rely solely on impressionistic or anecdotal evidence, for various observers and
commentators have documented this phenomenon (see, e. g., Goodlad, 1984, esp. chap. 2;
Powell, Farrar, & Cohen, 1985, esp. chap. 1; and Sedlak, Wheeler, Pullin, & Cusick,
1986, esp. chap. 3). Unfortunately, the systematic thought that has been devoted to
elaborating the proper purposes of public schooling and compatible curricula gets lost in the
more crudely political considerations that often prevail in these debates.

Rawls's theory of justice implies certain limitations on the proper domain of the
school's curriculum. As puIaIi_c agencies, public schools would ostensibly be precluded
from promoting any Specific conception of the good life, for that would place the
imprimatur of the state on one comprehensive doctrine while withholding it from other,
presumably equally reasonable, doctrines. Therefore, public schools need to dedicate
themselves to establishing the foundations for a society based on principles of cooperation
among free and equal citizens. The schools would be to education much as the original
position and the overlapping consensus are to political justice, concentrating on the

educational equivalent of primary goods. Strike (1982, esp. pp. 91—101) concurs with this

61
distinction and makes these consequences for public schools much more explicit than does

Rawls. "In educational contexts the public/private distinction must be applied to the
propagation of values and beliefs," he asserts (Strike, 1982, p. 94), and he proceeds to
delineate just what the public role entails: promoting the conditions for fair competition,
promoting goods with significant neighborhood effects, preventing harm to others,
promoting universal instrumentalities, and promoting transcultural rational enterprises (pp.
97-98). Neither philosopher sanctions the schools' promotion of particular conceptions of
the good, seeing this a function of the private domain instead.

To this point the analysis has concentrated on two central elements of multicultural
education-fits appropriateness for a pluralistic democratic society and its furtherance of
social justice. More specifically, the analysis has mined the literature in political
philosophy for insights on democracy and social justice lacking in virtually every major
treatise on multicultural education. Not only does the claim seem to be substantiated that
multiculturalists' frequent and often fervent references to democracy and social justice
amount to little more than ritual incantation, but a proper respect for political theory also
reveals serious problematic assumptions within the multicultural position, for example, the
multiculturalists' failure to distinguish among forms of liberal democracy (some of which
seem rather incompatible with the multiculturalists' goals) and the prominent emphasis on
cultural identity (which certainly exceeds and may even compromise the commitment to
social justice). The task remains, then, to specify the fundamental components essential to

the construction of a democratic and just theory of multicultural education.

CHAPTER IV:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

The preceding review of political theories about democracy and social justice in
conjunction with a survey of the multicultural literature on these topics has accomplished its
twofold objective. On the one hand, it has demonstrated the sobering complexity of these
political concepts and the impressive richness of the philosophical work that has been
carried out in trying to make these notions both intelligible and practicable. On the other
hand, it has documented the unfortunate absence of these insights in the vast writings on
multicultural education, despite the field's express commitment to these ideals. This void
cannot be ascribed to insufficient dedication on the part of multiculturalism's proponents.
On the contrary, without exception their works affirm a sincere and passionate belief that
educators could advance these noble causes if only they were to become more aware of the
ways that schools unwittingly erect obstacles that frustrate, if not outright prevent, the
realization of democratic and just ends. However, the literature sorely lacks a
comprehensive treatment of the substance and implications of these goals. Instead, one
finds references to these ideals that amount to little more than shibboleths.

The conviction that multicultural education should command public support because
"it's the right thing to do"51 exudes an attractive simplicity. People like to believe not only
that they can recognize unfairness when confronted with it, but also that they will act to
rectify those unjust situations. As persons raised and living in what frequently is dubbed
the world's greatest democracy, Americans also believe that they understand the demands
of democratic politics and know how to fulfill their civic responsibilities accordingly, even

if they sometimes lack the motivation to act on that understanding. Were the functioning of

 

5 lNone of the multiculturalists words this quite so blatantly, although the attitude pervades their work.
Nieto comes closest with her assertion that "in the final analysis, multicultural education as defined here is
simply good pedagogy" (Nieto, 1992, p. 222).

62

63
democratic politics and the demands of justice so straightforward and agreeable, one would

be forced to question how the current unsatisfactory arrangements arose.52 As the
previous chapters have shown, the phenomena of democracy and justice admit of
complexities and stringencies that exact a heavy price: careful thought, thorough
understanding, consistent action, and--perhaps most severe of all--occasional self-sacrifice.
This hardly resembles the concerned but largely optimistic picture that multiculturalists tend
to paint.

One senses the need to account for this discrepancy. Two explanations are readily
available. The first is that the multiculturalists are fully aware of the requirements of
democracy and social justice and, concomitantly, of their potentially controversial aspects.
Deeming the chances of success rather Slight were they candidly to profess their intentions,
they dilute the message to make it more palatable to a complacent public.53 The second is
that the multiculturalists are indeed largely unfamiliar with the rigorous treatments of these
topics that occupy such a prominent place in political theory. As a result they do not so
much neglect these intricacies as proclaim the simple, even naive, understanding they do
possess. Both factors likely have played a role in bringing about the present situation. It
seems much safer to talk about diversity and cultural identity than to insist upon just
institutions and actions.54 Moreover, multiculturalists are perhaps as prone as the general
citizenry to take democracy and fairness at face value. But the preceding discussions about
democracy and justice attest to the fallacies in these assumptions, and educators in

particular (an occupation which most multiculturalists pursue) should find them troubling.

 

52Although this dissatisfaction may not be shared by the public at large, or at least not by certain segments
of it, multiculturalists uniformly believe that American society is neither as democratic nor as just as it
could and should be.

53Some critics of multicultural education and its alternative manifestations (e.g., Bloom, 1987; D'Souza,
1991) adopt this conspiratorial view.

54This is not always the case, as, for example, the supporters of New York State's "rainbow curriculum"
learned to their chagrin (see Combleth & Waugh, 1993).

64
Theory to the Rescue?

When confronted with ambiguities, contradictions, and fallacies, scholars routinely
look to theory for guidance. Nor is such a reaction necessarily unreasonable. Theory can
be understood as an explanation of a practice (Barrow, 1984, p. 16), and since politics--to
which field of action both democracy and justice belong--and education are both practices,
one can sensibly hope for assistance from its realm. After all, the sophistiCated and cogent
interpretations of democracy and justice traced earlier are themselves the product of
theoretical reflection. This is not to deny that theory also has a dubious reputation, best
evinced by the contrast between theory and practice, by the assumption that theory is
divorced from practice, and by the propensity of practitioners of various stripes to dismiss
involved, initially implausible, or even merely unwanted recommendations with the retort,
"Well, that's just theory." Nevertheless, as a means of arriving at an explanation of a
practice and possibly at guidelines for that practice, theory--or at least theorizing--should
hold some promise for multicultural educators.

This equivocation in the advantages of theory itself (as opposed to the process
through which it is formulated) is borne out by the history of curriculum theory55 in the
United States. It is generally agreed that curriculum deals at a minimum with the questions
of what should be taught, why it should be taught, and how it should be taught, and that all
other pedagogical considerations depend upon the answers to these questions. Nor would
many doubt that curriculum theorists, such as John Dewey, Franklin Bobbitt, Harold
Rugg, and Jerome Bruner,56 have exerted no small influence on academic programs during
the past century. All this effort, productivity, and influence notwithstanding, there has

emerged an essential division of opinion within the field, with neither side particularly

 

55There is no reason to believe that any valuable distinction is to be drawn between "curriculum" theory
and "educational" theory--in any event, not in the present context-~and therefore the two terms will be used
interchangeably.

5"’This list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive, because even a brief treatment of the history of
cuniculum development in the United States is beyond the scope of this study. Herbert Kliebard (1986)
offers a helpful and comprehensive introduction to the topic. It should also be noted that these educators
may not have regarded themselves as "curriculum theorists" (see Walker, 1982, p. 62).

65

sanguine about the status of curriculum theory. The more extreme perspective holds that,
as of the late 20th century, there does not yet exist a genuine curriculum theory:

The field has been active, and it has been extraordinarily

productive. Its adherents have worried a lot about the role of

theory. But I don’t believe we have really produced one.

(Vallance, 1982, p. 5)

Research, categorization, and conceptual work is important,

but we have not synthesized it into theories. (McCutcheon,

1982,p.22)

One of the surest ways to kill a conversation on the subject

of curriculum theory is to ask someone to name one.

(Kliebard, 1982, p. 11)
The more moderate view acknowledges that some things may pass for theory in the field,
but the lack of a consensus about what a curriculum theory should be means that any claim
to having produced a definitive curriculum theory will face certain and usually severe
challenges:57

The field, unlike philosophy of education for instance, did

not originate as an extension or application of an extant

discipline. AS a result, curriculum developed no universally-

accepted method of working, no consensus regarding the

boundaries of its interests. (Pinar & Grumet, 1982, p. 50)

As I reflected..., [i]t began to dawn on me how pervasive

was contention on the subject of curriculum theory.

(Walker, 1982, p. 62)

Not surprisingly, what all agree on is that the activity of theorizing is a worthwhile
undertaking. Whatever the quality or status of the final products, the process of doing
theory contributes to education in valuable ways: it edifies the good (van Manen, 1982); it
identifies and describes the set of educational phenomena, searching out relationships
among them and among the relationships themselves (Beauchamp, 1982, p. 24); it forces a
close look at practice, an analysis of real situations (Vallance, 1982, p. 9); it necessitates a

respect for language and the careful use of terms (Barrow, 1984, pp. 19—21); and it

challenges the taken-for-grantedness that so often plagues those deeply involved in a

 

57Despite the implications of the passage quoted above, Kliebard's discussion of "theories" in his article
suggests that he actually belongs to this second camp.

66
practice, leading to a more contemplative, reflective stance vis-a-vis action (Pinar &

Grumet, 1982, p. 54). These benefits are of no small moment. They support the decision
in this study to forgo efforts to proffer a full-fledged theory and instead direct attention to
the more promising individual outcomes of the enterprise of theorizing.

Even those inclined to pursue a theory as a final product should be properly
forewarned: The present study represents a scholarly endeavor to understand the
defensible connections between certain aspects of political theory and multicultural
education. Yet Joseph Schwab, himself a leading contemporary curriculist and disciplinary
scholar, insists that

scholars, as such, are incompetent to translate scholarly
material into curriculum. They possess one body of
disciplines indispensable to the task [namely, knowledge of
subject matter]. They lack four others, equally indispensable
[namely, knowledge of pupils, of teachers, of the learning
milieu, and of curriculum-making, i.e., of how profitably to
bring the other four areas together]. (Schwab, 1978, p.
365)

A final caveat is in order: One must be cognizant of the limits of theory, of what
theory can and cannot accomplish. A single theory-especially one that pertains to social
affairs and not to the physical world--is unlikely to account for all aspects of a given
phenomenon. Nor is a theory, despite its furtherance of understanding and its possible
implications for practice, capable of effecting reforms. In short, theory is no agent. Sen's
(1990) criticism of Rawls's theory ofjustice--most notably of Rawls's reliance upon the
index of primary goods as a means of securing access to participation in cooperative society
and a basic degree ofjustice-exemplifies this shortcoming. Sen raises the reasonable
objection that freedom is determined not merely by possession of a proper quantity of
primary goods but by the commensurate ability to use them on behalf of one's interests.
He sununarizes this criticism in this way:

Since the conversion of these primary goods and resources
into freedom to select a particular life and to achieve may

vary from person to person, equality in holdings of primary
goods or resources can go hand in hand with serious

67

inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons.
(Sen,l990,p.115)

In other words, persons can have adequate supplies of the primary goods (e.g., rights and
liberties, wealth, freedom of movement and occupation) , but if they do not have the ability
to further their interests (e.g., they are severely disabled), their freedom is as circumscribed
as if they lacked the primary goods themselves.

The intention here is not to minimize the real difficulties that Sen raises, for to be
unable fully to exercise one's ostensible freedom is to be at no small disadvantage. But
two factors suggest that Sen's criticism is misplaced. The first factor seems to be his
disregard fOr the original position, whose sole purpose is to guarantee the "free and equal"
condition of citizenship by attempting to endow citizens with an equal footing,
unencumbered by knowledge of the special, potentially compromising or disadvantageous,
circumstances in which they might find themselves. For example, Since none of the parties
to the original position can assume that they will put be one of the disabled in actual
society, they will be motivated to ensure that the disabled are not systematically
disadvantaged in the resulting principles of justice. The second factor pertains more
directly to the present point: Rawls's theory, including its assigning such prominence to
the primary goods, elaborates on what the principles of justice are and how they are
determined. It cannot guarantee that they will be put into practice. If Sen is correct that the
original position, combined with a fair distribution of the primary goods, does not
guarantee equal freedom to all citizens, then the conclusion is not necessarily that the theory
is flawed. The theory mild, imply in such instances either that justice has not been
served--and in this case, Rawls relies on legislative and judicial mechanisms as means of
redress (see Rawls, 1993, pp. 338—339)--or that people have chosen versions of the good

life that do not require equal outcomes, given equal potentials.58 But the theory gu_a theory

 

58Sen seems not to allow for this second possibility:
A person may have the same capability as another person, but
nevertheless choose a different bundle of functionings in line with his
or her particular goals. Furthermore, two persons with the same actual
capabilities and even the same goals may end up with different

68
can only define and explain the requirements of justice; it cannot guarantee that justice will

be served.

The task ahead may therefore be defined as one of theorizing, not constructing a
complete theory. It would accordingly hope to accomplish some of the aforementioned
objectives of theorizing: to clarify concepts and terms (Barrow, 1984, p. 19), to trace
relationships among ideas and phenomena (Beauchamp, 1982, p. 24), to identify some of
the central aspects of the phenomenon in question (Vallance, 1982, p. 5), to attenuate the
clamor for action and practical guidance so contemplation can claim its place (Pinar &
Grumet, 1982, p. 54); and perhaps even, as Max van Manen (1982, p. 48) urges, to edify'
pedagogic being and orient toward the good. Ensuring the quality of the elements out of
which a subsequent theory may be constructed is a task worthy of serious effort.

Multicultural Education as Democratic Education59

That education should be concerned with the preparation of the young for
citizenship is a belief that has a long and distinguished history, reaching at least as far back
as Aristotle's defense of such education in flfhc Politics. Thomas Jefferson‘s conviction
that a democracy can function properly only with an informed and educated citizenry means
that this notion is as old as the American republic itself. Through the years, others have
made a similar case: Horace Mann, John Dewey, George Counts, Jesse Newlon, Amy
Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and many, many more. There is no need to rehearse here
the arguments in defense of this position. Suffice it to summarize that in a democracy, final
political authority resides with the citizens. For the citizens to exercise this authority
wisely, they need to be knowledgeable about both the issues under consideration before the

polity and the procedures by which political decisions are made. Individual citizens need

 

outcomes because of differences in strategies that they follow in

exercising their freedoms. (Sen, 1990, p. 116)
It is unclear why liberty of action should preclude such different outcomes if the prerequisites for action are
just. Such restrictions on means would seemingly limit freedom to an even greater degree than would the
presumably unacceptable equality of primary goods without commensurate assurances of capability in
employing those goods. -
59This issue is treated in a different form in the penultimate section of this chapter.

69
do nothing to earn this authOrity; it is granted to them by virtue of their birth or

naturalization into a democratic system. As agents of the government, public schools (and
private schools, to the extent they wish to or are required to fulfill their civic obligations)
assume the duty of preparing young citizens to exercise their political authority responsibly.
Recognizing that democracy runs the risk of constituting nothing more than a way "to make
decisions. . .by counting heads, no matter what is inside them" (Winks et al., 1988b, pp.
573—574), schools understandably strive to improve the caliber of those political decisions.

In this regard, then, there is nothing inappropriate about multiculturalism's concern
for democratic education. Confusion arises, however, when one wishes to identify the
form of democracy for which pupils are being prepared. As has already been documented,
all works in multicultural education assert that their pedagogical objectives are set within the
context of American pluralistic democracy. They all also claim to offer instructional content
that promotes a fuller realization of the democratic principles of the nation--for example, by
"practicing critical thought and social decision making" (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 219), by
"foster[ing] a 'free marketplace of ideas' and encourag[ing] dissent" (Bennett, 1995, p.
302) and by welcoming discussions that focus on social justice (Nieto, 1992, p. 218).

But these general references to context and content could be understood as
promoting any of the previously defined models of democracy. "Practicing critical thought
and decision making," while not exclusively the province of any single model, is certainly
quite compatible with deVelopmental democracy's belief that democratic involvement
edifies the citizen in more respects than just the political. "Fostering a free marketplace of
ideas" sounds very much like equilibrium democracy, in which on election day voters elect
the candidate that most fully embodies the political ideas they would like to buy.
"Welcoming discussions that focus on social justice" stimulates the development of the
deliberative abilities that lie at the core of most popular conceptions of participatory

democracy. And all three strategies could constitute means by which citizens come to

70
recognize their interests and seek to secure them against incursions by those with contrary

political goals, as protective democracy prescribes.

Still, some may charge that this portrayal of multiculturalism's ambiguous
understanding of democratic education is somewhat disingenuous. For when one removes
oneself from the particular and individual expressions with which multiculturalists describe
democratic education and instead attempts to encompass their overall intention, the entirety
of their meaning, one can hardly reconcile these understandings of democracy with the
calculating and mechanistic versions that the protective and equilibrium models represent.
The developmental and participatory models are much more compatible with the gist of

their arguments. Which of these two they would prefer is more difficult to state

 

definitively. Yet given the currency of the participatory (or deliberative) model in
contemporary political debate (cf. Macpherson, 1977; Barber, 1984; Held, 1987; &
Gutmann, 1987), the multicultural emphasis on social action beyond personal
development, and the general—-but not determinant--historical progression that Macpherson
sketched, one doubts that any of these proponents would take exception to being relegated
to the group advocating deliberative democracy.

The attributes of participatory democracy are laudable indeed. The main virtues of
the model as set forth earlier may be summarized here: It encourages Ml citizens to exercise
the political authority they hold; it counteracts the political apathy that market models evoke;
and it aspires to restore a distinctively moral component to political activity. Lest one
become too enamored of this vision, though, it would be advisable to consider a serious
limitation:

The enduring appeal of the Aristotelian vision of
participatory aristocracy is in its account of the practice of
citizenship and the importance of public activity in the daily
lives of the citizens. It is not claimed that the distribution of
citizenship was democratic, since the vast majority of
persons so governed were excluded from all public activity
or enslaved, but that the privileged enjoyed a perfect form of
democratic activity. Disenfranchised Americans have not

demanded this sort of citizenship. They have asked for
something quite different, that citizenship be equally

71

distributed, so that their standing might also be recognized
and their interests be defended and promoted. flihe call fut a

classical pa_rt_icipatogt democracy may, thcrefore, cc far frcm
democratic, becausc It does not correspond to thc aspitaticus

cf most Ameticaus now aud has never dcnc sc In tllc past,
(Shklar, 1991, p. 30, emphasis added)

It is not appropriate to enter here into a debate on the merits of participatory democracy. It
is appropriate to raise the possibility that apologists for this model may be expecting more
than the American public either chooses or is able to give in their role as citizens. To
educate pupils “for a form of democracy that, if Shklar is correct, has such little chance of
realization is both to squander precious educational resources of time, energy, and
motivation and to be faced with the prospect of continuing frustration at the meager fruit
one's educational efforts repeatedly bear.

Perhaps what is needed is not a removal of presumed ambiguity from the
multicultural advocacy of democracy through the selection of a specific model (in all
probability, that of deliberative democracy) but rather the adoption of what Rawls might
term a "political"60 approach to democratic education. Recall that Rawls contrasts the
"political" with the "metaphysical" or the "comprehensive." The term refers to those
elements of justice that may be compatible with more fully elaborated versions but that are
not derived from those versions. The political view of justice, in this sense, is a
freestanding view, attending to fundamental components and principles that do not rely on
any particular, more extensive, view for their meaning or justification. Analogously, a
political conception of democratic education would not presuppose one of Macpherson's--
or anyone else's--models of democracy as the form toward which citizenship education
aims. It would instead require the specification of the essential components of democratic
political involvement, regardless of the exact form the political system might ultimately

assume.

 

60Some may wish to dub this the "generic" method of democratic education, but the term seems ill-suited
to the present purpose.

72
Identifying and justifying the elements that would constitute this method of

democratic education is no task for the fainthearted, and it is one that extends beyond the
scope of the present study. The conception undoubtedly would include many of the
features so cherished by the multiculturalists (e.g., the ability to examine the merits of a
proposal, to identify one's interests, to think critically)!51 But merely enumerating relevant
competencies would not suffice. Certainly some knowledge and understanding of rights,
liberties, and the structure and functioning of the political system would be necessary as
well.62 Especially importantly, pupils must become familiar with the idea that "democracy"
is not self-evident, that various forms of political organization can legitimately be deemed
democratic and that each has its assumptions, strengths, and shortcomings. To this end,
Newlon's recommendation is quite contemporary, in spite of its age:

It is evident that if democracy is to be conserved and fully realized,
the American people must understand the meaning of democracy,

both in its historical dcvclopmcpt and in its social bearings and
implications for the world of today. (Newlon, 1939, p. 94,

emphasis added)
Whether or not the pupils learn Macpherson's categories or those of some other political
theorist, they must gain some sense of the alternatives in political organization available to

democratic societies, not only alternatives in public policies.63 This is essential even for

 

6lThese examples--and they are meant to be only suggestive--illustrate the potential dangers associated with
a political approach to democratic education. One is that this may initially appear to be nothing more than
a "skills-based" approach to democratic education (and be, by some, summarily disparaged or rejected). The
term "skill" is quite misleading, however, because it is unclear that all, or even most, of these things are
skills in any meaningful sense of the word (cf. Barrow & Milbum, 1986, pp. 203—205). Attitudes,
dispositions, understandings, and commitments of various sorts are equally apt to number among the
components of a political method. A second danger inheres in the tendency for such talk about democracy
to be trite, simplistic, or superficial, as these examples show. For this very reason, a thorough,
thoughtful, and defensible case must be made on behalf of the complete approach once its details have been
elaborated.

62This does not imply that the practice of taking a semester--or in some cases an entire year--to plod
through the legislative, executive. and judicial branches of government, the state and local governments, and
so on, as transpires in so many civics and government classes today, meets the objectives of a political
conception of democratic education.

63Any thoughtful observer of recent elections in the United States will know that the unfavorable
reputation protective and equilibrium democracies have received at the hands of the developmentalist and
participatory advocates has not eliminated the former's influence in American politics. How else could a
"get out the (black, labor, women's, fill-in-the-blank) vote" campaign be better interpreted than as a
reflection of the belief that these groups have interests in common that would not be protected if the
members did not exercise their franchise? (Interestingly, this confirms Judith Shklar's insistence that
protection of this sort occurs not through individual votes, but through voting as a bloc. See Shklar, 1991,

73

those dedicated to the deliberative model. As a leading advocate of this model of
democracy, Amy Gutmann (1987) unequivocally sets "conscious social reproduction"64 as
a central goal of education:

Although we are not collectively committed to any particular

set of educational aims, we are committed to arriving at an

agreement on our educational aims. . ..The substance of this

core commitment is conscious social reproduction. As

citizens, we aspire to a set of educational practices and

authorities of which the following can be said: these are the

practices and authorities to which we, acting collectively as a

society, have consciously agreed. (p. 39)
Enabling pupils eventually to build the type of society they desire--that is, to reproduce
society consciously, not simply to bow to the weight of tradition--means introducing them
to reasonable alternatives available in the construction of that society. (The deliberative
aspect of the model pertains to the procedures used for selecting intelligently among the
alternatives and for persuading others of the superiority of that choice.) This, then,
constitutes the crux of citizenship education in a democratic republic, for even were a non-

deliberative model instituted, to be truly democratic, the possibility of changing the form of

government must be maintained. To that end, pupils must be taught "to reason, collectively

 

and critically, about politics" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 106).
Multicultural Education as Education for Social Justice
Multicultural education's concern for political affairs is not exhausted by its
treatment of democracy. Its commitment to social justice appears equally strong. Every
one of the representatives of multicultural education included in this study sets the
achievement of justice as a goal, and all but one do so explicitly (see Banks, 1994, p. 1;

Bennett, 1995, p. 301; Gollnick & Chinn, 1990, p. 31; Nieto, 1992, pp. 216—218; &

 

p. 55.) And campaign staffs nowadays make no pretense of the fact that they poll the public to determine
what is politically marketable, thereby gaining a better sense of how to "sell" their candidates. All of this
is to say that none of these historical forms can be rejected out-of-hand as a model for contemporary
democracy, and a responsible program of civic education would inform pupils of this fact.

64Gutmann stresses the ccnsciuus part of the term. This distinguishes her view from those that accuse the
schools of reproducing social inequalities (see, e.g., Karabel & Halsey, 1977). In view of Gutmann's
complete theory (not just the features cited here, but including the principles of nonrepression and
nondiscrimination, among others), it is impossible to conclude that Gutmann sanctions the preservation of
social and class inequalities.

74
Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 210).65 But the defensibility of this stance rapidly comes into

question. As noted above, multiculturalists dc tacitly endorse the deliberative model of
democracy. Consequently, the possibility that deliberations would result in outcomes that
are less than just must be acknowledged. After all, according to this model, of primary
importance are the means by which decisions are made, not the content of those decisions.
At this point, the tension between procedural mechanisms and substantive outcomes
emerges. Multicultural educators have no qualms about assuming that the deliberations
central to their vision of democracy will necessarily result in a devotion to social justice. Is
such faith warranted?

n c ions Between m rac Jus ic

Actually, a strong case can be made that advancing the cause of democracy will also
promote social justice. Or perhaps better stated, there is good reason to suppose that a
commitment to justice inheres within modern conceptions of democracy. Three arguments
support this conclusion, which for convenience's sake may be labeled the historical, the
social, and the philosophical.“

Ihc histctical atgumcpt. Maurizio Viroli (1992) looks to the rise of the modern
nation-state67 from the crumbling ecclesiastical domination of the medieval era for an
appreciation of the implications of "politics." To those inured by the more cynical view of
contemporary politics, his findings are nothing short of astonishing:

When the word mlitics reappeared in 13th-century Europe,
its meaning was universally taken to be, as in Brunetto
Latini's famous definition, "the art of ruling a republic or a

kingdom in times of peace and war according to reason and
justice." Ruling also meant the art of shaping and

 

65The lone exception here is Baker (1983), who advocates a human-relations model of multicultural
education. However, a concern for justice is implicit within her interpretation of the model (see Baker,
1983,pp.7-9)

66These designations are indeed offered only for easy reference, since all are clearly political and social, the
second and third, at least, have blatant philosophical elements, the first is in important respects linguistic,
and so on.

67Granted, in Italy this nation-state was longer in forming than in much of the rest of Europe, but the
political principles upon which those entities are based were evident in the Italian republics of the
Renaissance.

75

preserving just political constitutions, as Dante said in the
Monarchia. (Viroli, 1992, p. 29)

This identification of politics with justice prevailed in all references to republican
governments, even in the face of the emergence of the raiscn d'ctat (the reason of state),
which became a conventional notion by the 16th century. Contrary to modern associations
between politics and reasons of state, the two originally had no connection:

Whereas the language of politics flourished in the age of the

free republics, that of reason of state was the ideology of

principalities and tyrannies. (Viroli, 1992, p. 30)
Therefore, the notion of politics in general--and a fortiori, the notion of demccgtic
politics--historically presupposes the existence of a just state (or of one striving to become
just).

Ihcsggialjtgmcpt. Even someone only superficially familiar with modern
political theory has an acquaintance with the social-contract theory of John Locke. In
short, it regards the relationship between the political structure and the citizenry as an
agreement in which the citizens establish a government for the explicit purpose of
guaranteeing their rights and liberties. This arrangement was contracted on behalf of all the
citizens, although in Locke's day the number of people who could claim the honor of this
status was much more restricted than now. Any government that failed to adhere to its part
of the agreement-~that is, any government that failed to protect the life, liberty, and property
of its citizens, equally and justly--became thereby illegitimate and the proper target of
reform or revolt. For Locke it was inconceivable that/citizens would agree to a political
system that treated them unjustly.68 Hence, the very existence of a government is
predicated upon the assumption that it will conduct its affairs in a just manner.

Ihcphildscphmtupeut. John Rawls subscribes to a Kantian view of the
fundamental trait of human beings: that they are moral entities. Upon this conviction rest

human claims to being regarded as free and equal persons. People are free to define the

 

68As indicated, the concept of "citizen“ has broadened in the years since Locke formulated his theory, but
the essential point remains: All citizens are to be treated equally, or at least not to be treated differently for
arbitrary reasons or for reasons that violate fundamental rights and liberties.

76
good (i.e., moral conduct) and to act in accord with its dictates. People are equal in that

they all possess this capacity for moral discrimination. For Rawls, people are also equal to
the extent that

they do have, at least to the essential minimum degree, the

moral, intellectual, and physical capacities that enable them

to be fully cooperating members of society over a complete

life. (Rawls, 1993, p. 183)
By assigning final political authority to their citizens, democratic governments capitalize on
this view of persons as moral beings. They therefore are obligated to act in just ways, that
is, in ways that respect and sustain this basic freedom and equality. To do otherwise
disqualifies a government from the company of democratic political systems.

v ' n l v Ri T
At this point, one rrright advisedly return to Gutmann's exposition of the

educational requirements of deliberative democracy. Of particular importance are the
conditions on debate that she introduces in order to facilitate the fair or just discussion of
political issues. For Gutmann, deliberation per se is insufficient to promote justice, let
alone to guarantee it. But discussions governed by the principles of W (i.e.,
the principle that no potentially reasonable conception of the good life may be excluded
from consideration a priori) and pcudiscliiplpaticp (i.e., the principle that no potentially
reasonable participant to the discussion may be excluded a priori69) are much better
positioned to see that justice is supported by instructional methods. Accustoming pupils to
just procedures of deliberation in school marks a conrrnendable, major step in preparing
them to attend to matters of justice in their actions as adult citizens.70

This is no guarantee, however, and Gutmann recognizes as much. It is not

logically necessary that just deliberations--free and open deliberations characterized by

 

69The "a priori" qualifications are significant, for Gutmann allows that ideas that are proven reprehensible
as the result of thoughtful consideration and persons who prove themselves unable or unwilling to engage
in reasoned debate may on those grounds eventually be rejected. But they must initially be allowed a
hearing, until their merits are shown wanting.

70Obviously, it is assumed that the techniques for teaching these procedures will be both appropriate and
effective. No one recommends any pedagogical strategy under the assumption that it will be incorrectly or
ineffectively employed.

77
nonrepression and nondiscrimination--eventuate in just social policies. Gutmann concedes

that errors are possible under such a system:

If democracies are to govern themselves, they must remain
free to make mistakes in educating their children, as long as
those mistakes do not discriminate against some children or
prevent others from governing themselves freely in the
future. The promise of the principles of nonrepression and
nondiscrimination is just this: to support a strong democracy
without sanctioning majority tyranny or sacrificing self-
govemment in the future. (Gutmann, 1987, pp. 96—97)

By extrapolating the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination from the
classroom to the arena of public policy in this manner, Gutmann seeks to guarantee a

minimal level of justice in society. Rawls employs the original position, the veil of

“i Elli". numb

 

ignorance, and the primary goods toward the same end--to ensure at least a modicum of
justice, incorporated in the ability of all citizens to participate in a cooperative society on a
minimal level. Like Gutmann, Rawls understands that this will not herald the perfectly just
society; he institutes the legislative and judicial levels of governance to address the
remaining inadequacies (Rawls, 1993, pp. 338-339). Also like Gutmann, he ranks the
reasonable above the true (Rawls, 1993, pp. 94, 127—129). In "accepting
nondiscriminatory and nonrepressive policies as legitimate even when they are wrong"
(Gutmann, 1987, p. 288), society may be establishing the best assurance of fundamental
justice possible in a flawed world.

These arguments demonstrate that the multiculturalists' joint concern with
democracy and justice is not necessarily the result of whim, idiosyncratic preference, or
superficial compatibility between the two notions. It has a solid theoretical grounding,
albeit one which no proponent of multicultural education explicates. Furthermore, this
grounding is one that applies both to the educational domain and to the society at large.
Multiculturalists repeatedly assert the need for this association of justice with democracy,
but mere assertion, no matter how vehement, is consistently less persuasive than cogent

argumentation.

78
The absence of this type of defense of their position weakens their efforts in two

ways. It leaves them open to criticism as serious intellectuals (cf. Bernstein, 1994), for
one reasonably expects not only that scholars have solid, intellectual grounds for their
positions, but also that they are able to articulate them to a wider audience. And it frustrates
their work politically, for the following reason: Education for democratic participation is a
relatively uncontroversial feature of American public schooling, both in its abstraction as a
goal of schooling and in the concreteness of the instructional materials and strategies
implemented in the schools.71 Multicultural education, in contrast, has been the focus of
controversy almost since its inception as a distinct educational movement. One can only
speculate at the reduction of tension and the improved success that might ensue from a
placement of the multicultural program squarely, candidly, and incontrovertibly within the
jurisdiction of citizenship education.

Additional Encumbrances to the Advancement of the Multicultural Program

Several other hindrances continue to burden the efforts of the multiculturalists in
converting opponents and recruiting potential allies to their cause. All deal with the
multiculturalists' preoccupation with cultural identity. This is not to say, again, that there is
anything logically inconsistent with a program of so-called multiculturalism attending to
aspects of culture and cultural identity. Nevertheless, the preceding argument makes a
strong case that "multiculturalism" is something of a misnomer in this regard, given that its
primary objectives, as asserted by its proponents themselves, pertain to the expansion of
democracy and social justice. Granted, many of the impetuses for this concern result from
society's discrimination against certain societal groups because of their cultural differences
or presumed cultural inferiority. Yet the multiculturalist emphasis on identity has had

serious repercussions for their desire to achieve justice. Three will be treated briefly here.

 

7'Whether it remains that way in light of the recommendations later in this chapter is a separate issue.
However, it is conceivable that a stronger civic education grounded in principles of democracy and social
justice could be made politically palatable as well.

79

The first of these problems follows upon the argument elaborated above which
connects justice intimately with democratic political systems. In many ways, it is a
generalization implied by that discussion. Simply put, overconcem with cultural identity
distracts from the core issues of democracy and social justice. Baker's work (1983), for
example, goes on at length about culture, cultural identity, cultural understanding, etc., but
by including the issue of justice only implicitly, Baker allows readers to miss the point too
easily--namely, that were discrinrination and disadvantage not based upon these cultural i
distinctions, culture would fail to be the pressing matter she makes it out to be. (This also
explains why certain cultural differences--to wit, those found amcpg persons of northern
European descent--are not relevant to the multicultural program.) No one can reasonably
deny that culture and cultural identity are important in a general sense, but they all too often

divert attention from the more politically and socially consequent dimension of justice.

 

The second of these problems recalls the earlier analysis of the distinction between
public and private goals of schooling. Rawls stipulates only basic, general goals for public
schooling, in conjunction with his insistence that a political conception of justice not
intentionally preference any of the myriad, alternative, reasonable comprehensive doctrines
people might choose to guide their lives (see Rawls, 1993, p. 199). In applying Rawls's
perspective on justice to educational policy, Strike (1982) asserts in this regard that "in
educational contexts the public/private distinction must be applied to the propagation of
values and beliefs" (p. 94). Because many values and beliefs are intertwined with people's
comprehensive doctrines--including values and beliefs associated with particular ethnic and
religious traditions--"schools cannot become intimately involved with particular ethnic or
religious traditions" (Strike, 1982, p. 115). Combining the two philosophers' views on
implications for education, one is left with an essentially political (in the peculiarly

Rawlsian sense) definition of the proper domain of public schools:

80
The central public function of schools is the fair distribution

of political and economic competency by developing the

individual's rational capacities through an emphasis on basic

skills and basic disciplines. (Strike, 1982, p. 101)
Anything more than this is to favor one conception of the good society over another.
Respect for moral autonomy, though, requires that this choice be unbiased by public
agencies and left to the private sphere.

A crucial rolc for idcntity in public schooling. Strike does admit of one point of
entry for cultural concerns into public schooling, but not in the manner preferred by
multiculturalists. This is as a test of whether principles of justice, in the form of equal
educational Opportunity, have been served by the educational system. The test works in the
following manner, for the following reasons: No persuasive evidence has yet been
advanced for the proposition that any social group72 is inherently inferior to any other--
regarding intelligence, ability, talent, or any of the other characteristics which education
addresses. Variation is to be expected within groups, because individuals do differ in these
traits, but individuals do not differ systematically enough that consistent differences among
social groups would be discernible. In light of this, pupils graduating from a just
educational system would differ from one another in their learning, achievement,
proficiency, etc., but they would not differ in ways that correlate with their social groups.
Therefore, to the extent that clear distinctions in educational achievement can be
distinguished among members of distinct social groups, the educational system has not
functioned justly.73 In this respect, schools may take cognizance of pupils' cultural
identities and backgrounds, but only to the degree necessary to supply guidance in

achieving genuine equality of educational opportunity. Since different conceptions of the

good life place different values on the full complement of cultural characteristics, to base an

 

72In this context, the term "social group" refers to the standard sociological designations involving race,
ethnicity, class, gender, and so on.

73In an unjust society, the schools may not be the cause of the unjust outcomes, for pupils may be
educationally disadvantaged along social lines before they arrive in school. In such cases, schools have not
fully compensated for the preexisting disadvantages, although they may have remedied them to some degree.

 

8 1
educational program on the preservation or extension of cultural identities would be to

violate the public functions of public schooling.

A challcngc to a tcc-stn’ct public-pdvatc distinction. One penetrating challenge to
Rawls's and Strike's rather strict delineation between the public and the private spheres
deserves mention, although it cannot be resolved here. Joel Feinberg (1980) has postulated
that children have a right to an open future. That is, in respect of their personal, moral, and
political autonomy, they have a right to an upbringing that does not exclude reasonable
conceptions of the good life from their life-choices as adults.74 The strictly "political"
version of educational responsibility, to which Rawls and Strike subscribe, would be
inadequate to this task. Promoting a child's open future would entail including various
cultural perspectives and visions of the good life in the curriculum (or at least not excluding
ones already there”). It must be noted that this line of argument does not necessarily
constitute an expansion of rights beyond those acknowledged by Rawls. A belief in the
moral and personal autonomy of individuals is fully compatible with a belief in their right to
an open future. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how one could deny the latter
without compromising the former. But a full investigation of the apparent dilemma must
wait for another place and time.

:1 111° E 'lll'l' [It

A third problem with the multicultural preoccupation with cultural identity must be
addressed in two parts, for the second derives from the first. The sad reality is that for all
their talk about culture, cultural identity, cultural respect, and cultural difference,
multiculturalists themselves appear unfamiliar with other cultures. They certainly do not

possess the anthropologist's familiarity with any of the cultures that they so fervently

 

”This may be called the weak version of the argument. The strong version of the argument would assert
that not only must reasonable conceptions of the good life not be excluded from children's future options,
but also that social institutions--especially the school and the family--must strive to introduce children to as
broad a range of these alternatives as possible, thereby "opening" their futures more widely than would
occur by default.

75Since curricula do not generate spontaneously but are created by educators and Others, it is unclear that
this is a viable distinction. However, to the extent that some curricula do already exist and can be regarded
as given, this qualification is compatible with the weak version of the argument.

82
advocate respecting--a point that anthropologists are quick to point out in their criticisms of

the multicultural movement (see, e.g., Coughlin, 1992). Too rarely do multiculturalists
move beyond heartfelt but vague acclamations of "African" or "Asian" or "Native
American" culture, seemingly unaware that the tremendous varieties of cultural expression
within each of the groups makes these terms woefully devoid of any real meaning. This
vacuity is evident even to persons outside academia:

Multiculturalists reiterate a few obsessively sincere phrases
about the holistic spirit of Native American cultures or about
how things are done in what they call the Asian culture or in
the African-American culture. The Asian culture, it happens,
is something I know a bit about, having spent five years at
Harvard striving for a Ph.D. in a joint program called
History and East Asian Languages and, after that, living
either as a student (for one year) or a journalist (for six
years) in China and Southeast Asia. At least I know enough
to know that there is no such thing as the "Asian culture."
There are dozens of cultures that exist in that vast
geographical domain called Asia. When the multiculturalists
speak, tremulous with respect, of the "Asian culture," it is
out of goodness of heart, but not much actual knowledge.
(Bernstein, 1994, p. 6)

Multiculturalists could avoid embarrassing criticisms of this type (and Bernstein relates
numerous similar instances) by shifting focus to the issue that seems to be their real
concem--redressing the injustices that certain social groups have suffered, and continue to
suffer, at the hands of the educational system.

The second part of this problem arises from multiculturalists' unfamiliarity with the
cultures they defend. As mentioned earlier, blanket praises for culture writ large removes
any basis for discriminating between just and unjust aspects of cultures--for every known
culture has elements of each. Gutmann recognizes that attention to the content of cultures
can pose serious difficulties:

How can respect for a culture of ethnic or racial superiority
be reconciled with the commitment to treating all people as
equals? If a liberal democracy need not or should not respect
such "supremacist" cultures, even if those cultures are highly
valued by many among the disadvantaged, what precisely
are the moral limits on the legitimate demand for political

recognition of particular cultures? (Gutmann, 1992/1994, p.
5)

83
Multiculturalists do not address this issue, perhaps because they overlook its existence.

But these and similar shortcomings of multicultural education do little to enhance the
credibility of proponents of those programs. That multiculturalists could end up condoning
injustice in the name of respecting cultures--which respect was originally intended as a
means of combating injustice--is an irony that multiculturalists Should not want to tolerate.

Enumeration of these problems paints a pessimistic but not unfair picture of the
current state of multicultural education. Whereas multiculturalists can hardly be faulted for
their sincere conviction that schools can correct some of the injustices of the past, and while
they have offered good documentation of the disadvantages that pupils in certain social
groups experience in schools and in society at large, a critical outside observer cannot help
concluding that the field is terribly muddled. Multiculturalists provide no convincing
reason to believe that they understand democracy and justice as anything more than
slogans--slogans that ostensibly have complex meaning and profound theoretical
implications.76 They seem unaware that consequential contradictions pervade a
simultaneous indiscriminate lauding of culture and an intense promoting of social justice.
Instead, they give the observer adequate reason to believe that multicultural education is a
political program garbed in academic clothing. To aggravate matters, it is a political
platform whose success is in potential jeopardy because of its advocates' ignorance of what
is fundamentally at issue in their program, as has been contended throughout this study.

The educational upshot of this entire discussion on justice differs from that of the
earlier discussion of democracy. A Rawlsian political solution seemed advisable in that
case, for the choice of specific political form is something that must be left up to democratic
polities to decide. The emphasis on the public-private distinction in education would lead
one to surmise that a similarly political solution would be warranted here, since, according
to the theory, schools dare not promote a particular conception of the good life. Such a

principle is satisfactory as far as it goes, but Feinberg's suggestion that the child's right to

 

76They do, however, note the political and social implications of those slogans.

84
an open future might properly belong to the category of basic rights and liberties means that

a Rawlsian political solution--at least in Strike's version of it--might not be adequate to the
task. A fairly definitive resolution must wait for the clarification of and response to the
issues Feinberg raises. In the meantime, a "negative" approach to educating for justice
might be advisable.

The term "negative" in this case simply means that what should put be done is more
straightforward than what mild be done. Gutmann's insistence upon the principles of
nonrepression and nondiscrimination could be understood in this vein: fair discussion can
proceed only if reasonable conceptions of the good life are not disqualified ahead of time
and only if reasonable participants are not prevented from joining the enterprise. (The
principles do not prescribe specific visions of the good life for consideration, nor do they
propose a list of particular persons that must be included.) From Rawls's and Strike's
theories come two additional restrictions: Schools may not encourage pupils to adopt
wholesale any comprehensive doctrine, and they may not promote the acceptance of
identifiably77 unjust aspects of cultures examined in the curriculum.78 A political approach
to democratic education and a negative approach to education for social justice may appear
to be meager results from an extensive survey of these issues. However, such is the
present state of a field whose analytical and theoretical reflections have not matched the
intensity of its passionate rhetoric. At a minimum, both of these general conclusions are
fully compatible with the moral autonomy of persons with vastly differing backgrounds in
a pluralistic, democratic society-mo mediocre accomplishment for an incipient educational

theory.

 

77There is legitimate disagreement about some of the aspects of cultures that should be deemed unjust. but
there are also those aspects that unquestionably violate fundamental human dignity and basic rights and
liberties. No theory of justice worthy of the name dare sanction this second group.

78h is unlikely that justice would permit even the toleration of these unjust aspects of culture, at least to
the extent that they are practiced within the United States. The theory does not extend its scope to
nonpluralistic, undemocratic societies.

 

85
Moving from the Abstract to the Concrete

The discussion to this point in the study has concentrated almost exclusively on the
main purpose of the project: to investigate the contributions that political theory and
philosophy could contribute to an understanding of multicultural education. However, a
further, brief treatment of some of the practical consequences of these insights might be
helpful as well--even though this must be understood as an illustrative venture, for the
theoretical conclusions drawn here underdeterrnine practice. That is to say that the kind of
theoretical analysis this study was designed to provide cannot offer a final, conclusive
answer to the question of exactly what multicultural educators must and must not do.
Instead, these examples can serve most usefully to illustrate the elements that come into
play for educators seeking to bring multicultural education into greater consonance with
ideas from political philosophy. Two questions will serve to demonstrate. The first deals
with the connection between multicultural education and civic education; the second looks
at the ways in which attention to principles of justice can strengthen typical multicultural
lessons.

Mul i l r E uc ion as ivic Edu tio ?

The extensive attention that has been devoted in these pages to democratic theory
and a theory of justice-central notions in political philosophy--may persuade one that good
multicultural education is synonymous with civic education. In fact, not only might this
study be understood as implying this conclusion, but Sleeter and Grant's definition of the
goals of "education that is multicultural and social reconstructionist" (Sleeter & Grant,
1994, p. 209) also suggests as much. These authorssummarize the two main goals of this
approach at the outset of their book: to call attention to issues of social justice and to
empower young people to make social changes; and to reform the entire educational
process by focusing more explicitly on social critique and democratic citizen participation
(Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. vii). Later, their extensive explanation of the model focuses on

these issues as well, as the following central assertions attest:

86

To advocates of this approach to multicultural education, the
social issue of concern is the elimination of oppression of
one group of people by another. (p. 209)

Education That Is Multicultural and Social Reconstructionist
deals more directly than the other approaches with
oppression and social structural inequality based on race,
social class, gender, and disability.. . .The approach prepares
future citizens to reconstruct society so that it better serves
the interests of all groups of people and especially those who
are of color, poor, female, gay and/or disabled. (pp. 209—
210)

This approach works toward a vision of social justice by
teaching political literacy. (p. 210)

The assumption is that if we change peoples'[sic] world
significantly, then their attitudes, beliefs, and behavior will
change accordingly... .Advocates of this approach argue that
individuals need to learn to organize and work collectively in
order to bring about social changes that are larger than
individuals. (p. 213)

Recommended practices include practicing democracy (pp. 223—225); analyzing the
circumstances of one's own life (pp. 225—227), which "help[s] students analyze their own
lives in order to develop their practical consciousness about real injustices in society and to
develop constructive responses" (p. 225); developing social action skills (pp. 227—229);
and coalescing across race, social class, and gender lines (pp. 229—230). Sleeter and Grant
omit any explicit concern for "cultural understanding" or "cultural identity" (Sleeter &
Grant, 1994, pp. 209—241). "Promot[ing]...cultural pluralism" is listed as a societal goal
and "promoting cultural pluralism and alternative lifestyles" asc listed as school goals in the
one-page synopsis of the model that Sleeter and Grant offer (p. 211). The treatment of
those topics, though, is concentrated in a paragraph explaining commonalities between
"Education That Is Multicultural and Social Reconstructionist" and "Multicultural
Education," the fourth model they present (see Sleeter & Grant, 1994, pp. 231 & 167—
207). The leading proponents of this approach to multicultural education, it seems, place
civic concerns at the crux of their definition of the model.

To equate social-reconstructionist multicultural education with civic education,

however, is to fall prey to a confusion in terms. Regardless of the rubric under which it

87
government,

has been conducted (e.g., "civics, problems of democracy"), civic
education in the United States has historically not only n_qt wrestled with the questions of
justice, democracy, and equal opportunity that concern Sleeter and Grant, it has regularly
striven to avoid those issues (Newlon, 1939, pp. 88-93; Pratte, 1988, pp. 3-6).
Multicultural educators are understandably reluctant to place their trust in existing curricula
that seek "to prevent the study of controversial social issues in the school" (Newlon, 1939,
p. 88) or that teach pupils "the rights and duties of citizenship as a mere academic matter
and keep politics and morality at arm's length" (Pratte, 1988, p. 3).79 There can be little
doubt that civic education as it is commonly conducted is incompatible with the goals of
multicultural education.

7 In contrast, a strong case could be made that a reconceptualized civic education
would meet the central goals of a social-reconstructionist multicultural education. Crucial
to this position, though, are the components of such a revision. They would include some
topics already mentioned. One is thc {opp democracy shculd tflc. This need not be
limited to the four historical models that Macpherson describes, although they may be a
good place to start.80 Including this topic ensures that the form of democracy already in
place in society not be taken for granted, that it be investigated to detemrine its assumptions
about participation, citizenship, goals (e.g., democracy as a means of personal
development versus democracy as a means of "purchasing" a government Offered for sale
by political parties), and so on. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, p. 32) affirm
this approach by explaining, for example, why a purely procedural conception of
democracy (e.g., rule by majority vote) is incapable of addressing the fundamental issue of

the adequacy of that procedure. The composite features of any extant democracy are

 

79That essentially the same conditions in civic education are noted by observers half a century apart
supports the argument that these are central features of the curriculum and not simply isolated aberrations.
8OWare (1992) claims that no persuasive case can be made that liberal democracy has more than one form,
but his purpose--questioning American claims to exceptionalism--leads him to use a structural basis (e.g.,
parliamentary versus presidential) and origins (e.g., native-grown versus imposed) for his typology, making
it an inadequate response to Macpherson's distinctions, which center on democratic goals and mechanisms.
(Ware concludes that despite the seeming differences his typologies address, all liberal democracies are
fundamentally alike.)

 

88
neither predetermined nor limited to a single form. Informed and competent citizens need

to be aware of the basic alternatives of democracy available to their society.

A second element of a properly multicultural civic education is a study cf thc
mcapipgapddcuiaudscfiusdcc. Multiculturalists' insistence upon equal educational
opportunity (Bennett, 1986, pp. 52—53; Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 211), social structural
equality (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 211), and social justice writ large (Nieto, 1992, pp.
216—218) cannot be understood without a grounding in the basic meaning, principles, and
procedures of justice. The work of John Rawls is an appropriate place from which to
begin this effort. Understanding justice as the condition which prevails when citizens'
basic rights are acknowledged and protected provides a logical connection to civic
education in a constitutional democracy, in addition to those already presented.

These proposals are undoubtedly compatible with the goals of multicultural
education as set forth by Sleeter and Grant, for example, but the question remains of what
exactly is multicultutal about this program. "Promoting cultural pluralism and alternative
lifestyles" (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 211) may be desirable in itself, but to the extent that it
means instilling in pupils a decent respect for the myriad cultures represented in a pluralistic
society, it is already required by the principles of democratic government. Democratic
theory posits the political equality of each citizen to every other citizen.81 It guarantees
equal political rights, including the right to participate in public affairs. In so doing, it
presupposes the very kind of respect multiculturalists desire to advance. (This may explain
the objective's absence from Sleeter and Grant's core treatment of social-reconstructionist
multicultural education.) One is forced to review the possibility that a civic education that
emphasizes analysis of democracy itself, that encourages civic participation, and that insists

upon attending to the demands of justice may indeed fully represent the goals of this

perspective.

 

81This is why, in the heady, early days of the French Revolution, the standard term of address in France
was "Citizen."

89
Even Amy Gutmann, who is not commonly regarded as a multicultural educator on

the order of Sleeter and Grant, Nieto, Banks, and others cited in this study, implies that
"multiculturalism" adds an essential component missing from Simple "civic education":

Just as a civic education, unmodified by multiculturalism,

represses cultural differences, multiculturalism, uninformed

by civic values, discriminates among citizens on the basis of

their group identities. Schools can meet this challenge of

multiculturalism by allying common civic values with

uncommon cultural appreciations. (Gutmann, 1996, p. 91)
But the "multicultural" element at issue here remains uncertain, despite Gutmann's specific
mention of repression and cultural appreciation. Nonrepression is not a new topic for
Gutmann; on the contrary, along with nondiscrimination, it constitutes a cornerstone of her
conception of genuinely democratic education (see Gutmann, 1987, pp. 44—47 & passim).
Yet there is nothing peculiarly multicultural about nonrepression.82 It is and historically
has been competently addressed by basic notions of freedom of conscience and
fundamental civil liberties such as the rights to free speech and a free press-~in short, rights
a just society is committed to protecting. In fact, Gutmann herself was able to treat this
topic extensively in Mmdcfiducaticp without any explicit reference to
multiculturalism. And the difficulties associated with indiscriminate "cultural appreciation"
have already been mentioned (see also Strike, 1997).

In this light, the rhetoric of multiculturalism merely clothes a solid program of civic

education.” To be sure, multiculturalists' recognition that American society has frequently

 

82Multiculturalism could be redefined in such a way that would place nonrepression (i.e., consideration of
alternative viewpoints) at its core. However, this would mark a significant shift from the currently
predominant understanding of the term.
3Gutmann herself seems to return to this conclusion when considering proper respect for citizens of other

countries (as opposed to compatriots, respect for whom as fellow citizens is presupposed by democratic
theory):

Multicultural societies whose citizens care about people who live

beyond their borders support the kind of patriotism that eschews

parochialism and injustice. The aim of developing a sense of shared

humanity as individuals in all citizens regardless of our particular

citizenship,[sic] does not take us beyond democratic education. Quitc

WW
Wigwam (Gutmann.
1996, p. 101, emphasis added)

90
failed to put its democratic creed into practice for all citizens impels their emphasis on

cultural pluralism. But the attention to pluralism is not simply for pluralism's sake; it is
rooted in fundamental principles of democracy. Giving prominence to this fact can
strengthen the theoretical basis of multicultural education as it simultaneously diffuses some
of the more serious criticisms of the model-~namely, that social-reconstructionist
multicultural education is unrealistic, given the limited ability of the school to effect social
change; that it forces pupils to adopt their teachers' political viewpoints; or that it is too
radical (Sleeter & Grant, 1994, pp. 234—238). Multicultural education as civic education
locates the movement squarely within the long history of public schools' efforts to teach
responsible citizenship. This is no small recommendation for these programs. However,
if multiculturalists in the social-reconstructionist camp believe that multicultural education
properly defined goes beyond civic education as outlined here (and as implied by their own
writings, e.g., in Sleeter & Grant, 1994), they need to articulate more precisely the nature
of that additional contribution.
V ' 'v ti ' 'c

A second illustration of the consequences the theoretical conclusions of this study
might have for educational practice derives from the explicit inclusion of justice as a topic
of study. Attention to issues of justice need not be limited to courses formally designated
as civic education; they may arise in various forms in almost any school subject. Indeed,
because civics or one of its alternative manifestations is generally found only in high-school
curricula, if the topic of justice is to be addressed at the elementary or middle-school level,
it must occur in the context of other subjects-~most commonly social studies, but also
language arts. This approach to multicultural education commands the support of
increasing numbers of teachers, many of whom are eager to publicize their teaching
strategies, successes, and reflections (see, e.g., the articles in Bigelow, Christensen, Karp,

Miner, & Peterson, 1994). Yet while virtually all of these programs are well intentioned

 

There is no obvious reason why this "democratic commitment to treating all people as equals" is any less
relevant to political affairs yyithin pluralistic democratic societies.

 

91
and introduce questions of social justice more effectively than does traditional instruction,

they are more inclined to employ intuitive rather than principled notions of justice.

Bob Peterson (1994) provides some representative examples of this type of lesson.
He tells of an occasion on which his fifth-grade pupils were to present skits that would
illustrate instances of discrimination and how the pupils might respond. Three boys
decided to act out an encounter between a gay couple and a landlord who refused to rent to
them. Peterson mentions only the subject of the skit; he offers no description of the content
of the drama. However, he does enumerate the aspects of this event that gratified him as a
teacher hoping to promote in his pupils a concern for social justice. One, these boys
selected this aspect of discrimination without any prodding from the teacher or from other
pupils--or, for that matter, from current events, since it was established that these three
boys had not heard of a march on Washington for gay rights that had occurred a week
earlier. He mentions as well that discrimination against gays and lesbians had never been
raised as an example in earlier class discussions of discrimination. Two, although the skit
was greeted with "an initial chorus of laughs and jeers" (Peterson, 1994, p. 38), the pupils
quickly settled into an attentive posture to follow the story the skit was intended to tell.
Three, the ensuing discussion went beyond the common (for fifth-graders, anyway)
admonition not to use personal insults to a broader discussion of the injustices gays and
lesbians face.

Other lessons in Peterson's classroom dealt with topics such as homelessness, the
life-circumstances of slaves, and stereotypical representations of Native Americans. In
each instance, the pupils appear genuinely to have been moved, even outraged, by the
injustices that the respective group suffered. The lessons succeeded at "build[ing] on
students' seemingly innate sympathy for the down-trodden" (Peterson, 1994, p. 30). He
approvingly tells of the pupil who, if president, would invite into the White House the
homeless camped out in Lafayette Park during winter, and he reprints a pupil's poem in

which the pupil would aid the homeless "and let them pay me back with their love"

 

92
(Peterson, 1994, p. 33). Pupils' innate sympathies do indeed seem to serve the cause of

justice in Peterson's examples. But one could readily imagine these same pupils as, say,
high-school sophomores, who in the intervening years have come to adopt the more
conservative, social-Darwinistic attitudes of perhaps their parents, acquaintances, or
popular politicians. At this age, their sympathies might lie with the taxpayers whose hard-
eamed money is wasted on people who don't want to work and against those who are
homeless only because they want to be.84 The plausibility of this alternative scenario raises
two caveats: (l) Sympathetic attachments are quite variable; and (2) isolated, poorly
coordinated, or sporadic lessons of this type are likely to have limited effectiveness in
changing pupils' attitudes over the longer term and outside the school setting. Allowing
justice to rely on personal sympathies (or personal antagonisms) clearly has serious pitfalls.
Grounding civics lessons in Rawls's formal understanding of justice and its bases
could offer an important counterbalance to these intuitive responses, providing a more
principled understanding of justice. Certainly pupils at the fifth-grade level could
appreciate the importance of fundamental political rights, the recognition of persons as
moral and political equals in a democracy, and the need to base conclusions about social
policy on something more solid than emotional reaction. In fact, Jerome Bruner's position
that "any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at
any stage of development" (Bruner, 1960, p. 33) implies that pupils in the early elementary
grades could appreciate these ideas also. The question, then, is not only of "developmental
appropriateness" but of grounding deliberations on social justice on the political rights and
liberties guaranteed to citizens of a democracy. In the main example offered above, pupils
could discuss what legitimate legal basis could be cited for denying the gay couple access to
decent housing. The landlord's personal aversion to the couple is clearly insufficient. And

pupils could gain much from a discussion about whether the landlord's action could be

 

84'I'hese kinds of accusations were particularly common during the administration of Ronald Reagan,
although they have not disappeared since 1988. On a related note, it seems odd that no such countervailing
voices were raised even in the fifth-grade class; at least none are mentioned in Peterson‘s article.

93
defended as an instance of his freedom of religion (an argument often advanced by

opponents of equal rights for gays and lesbians). Pupils could readily consider how often
such claims might merely be a ruse. Or, given that not all religions--nor even all variants of
Christianity, for example--condemn homosexuality, they could debate whether allowing
such discrimination constitutes favoring one sectarian position over another. In this
manner, pupils get a sense of the complexity of issues of social justice at the same time that
they learn more about principled policy-making in a democracy.

This discussion is not intended to minimize the difficulty of changing people's
consciousness in favor of social justice, especially when such positions challenge their own
dearly held beliefs or exact a monetary price (of, e. g., Ryan, 1976). Catherine Combleth
and Dexter Waugh write of the need for a "transformative" approach to multicultural
education (1995, pp. 38—41)--an approach that doesn't merely add a few examples to the
curriculum or offer an occasional alternative perspective, but one that strives to force the
traditional dominant perspective into interaction with the perspectives of subordinated
groups. Accomplishing this requires a degree of empathy and understanding that much of
multicultural education rightly and laudably wishes to encourage. But a justice based upon
emotion is an unstable and at heart a false justice.85 Multicultural educators need to
advance their cause by complementing empathy and understanding with a principled
conception of justice.

Looking Backward--and Ahead

This study set for itself the task of investigating some fundamental issues in the
theory of multicultural education:

0 How does multicultural education, especially its social-reconstructionist camp,

understand its commitment to democracy and social justice?

 

85Consider W. H. Auden's prediction in "For the Time Being": "Justice will be replaced by Pity as the
cardinal human virtue, and all fear of retribution will cease" (Auden, 1944/1968, p. 189). Robert Hughes
(1993) begins his book QultumLCQmplaim, a critique of contemporary American culture, with the

lament that in this case Auden achieved what most poets only dream of: a prediction that has come true.

94
0 What insights to the benefit of multicultural education might political philosophy

be able to shed on the concepts of democracy and social justice?

0 What contribution might the answers to these questions make to the formulation
of a credible theory of multicultural education?
The preceding chapters and sections of this chapter have laid out a respectably thorough
response to these questions, so there is no point in recapitulating them here. Instead, some
pertinent issues that extend beyond the core of these matters deserve attention--namely,
work that remains to be done, the anticipated reception of the study, and the benefits of this
analysis. Each will be addressed briefly.
WW

Three topics in particular warrant further investigation to resolve some uncertainties
in the present study. (1) This report has adamantly opposed the inclusion of most of the
traditional multicultural concerns with cultural identity in programs of multicultural
education. This stance is neither arbitrary nor idiosyncratic but rather follows from the
conviction that these kinds of comnritrnents force upon pupils definite conceptions of the
good life. Doing this marks an infringement of the principles of political liberalism upon
which this research has been based. Yet there are alternative political philosophies, such as
communitarianism (see, e.g., Maclntyre, 1981; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1992/1994; &
Walzer, 1983), that take a much different view of the proper role of cultural identity in
political life, and they are worthy of investigation, as both a test of and possible
complement to the positions asserted here. (2) The long and tragic history of slavery in the
United States has led some (e.g., Surowiecki, 1996; Appiah & Gutmann, 1996) to
question whether race constitutes a special category in the American search for justice.
Given the entrenched prejudice and racism against African-Americans, it is plausible that
standard principles of justice will not’exert enough force to overcome this wretched legacy.
Whether race does indeed deserve this special attention is an issue worthy of further study.

(3) The possibility has already been raised that a contradiction exists between the liberal

 

95
posture of neutrality on comprehensive doctrines and the potential designation of the child's

right to an open future as a basic right deserving protection and furtherance. Additional
study into this dilemma would be helpful as well.
Pr ' c ' h ' f s i

Estimating the response that a work of this type will receive is an awfully
speculative venture. This study comes to some pointedly critical conclusions about the
current state of multicultural education, but the criticisms have been directed exclusively
toward positions and programs, not toward persons. In light of the vitriol frequently cast

back and forth over these issues, it is understandable that the defenders of multicultural

 

education might take personal exception to the concerns listed here and question the
motives behind the research. One might hope, however, that these issues are genuinely
regarded as the academic, theoretical matters they are intended to be, in which case
multicultural educators should welcome an argument that situates their dedication to
democracy and social justice squarely within the established tradition of American
education. To the extent, though, that these matters are viewed as a guise for ideological
posturing, attempts to ground theory in a firmer foundation are irrelevant.86 In this case,
the study will likely be disregarded or rejected.
t f tu

Although an attempt was made clearly to identify the benefits of the various
components of the study as they were presented, it may be apprOpriate to summarize them
here. The benefits derive solely from the new analysis offered by the research, not from
the criticism leveled against current forms of multicultural education. They are recounted in

an order to demonstrate the logical progression of the conclusions:

 

86Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991, esp. pp. 132-151) explains why ideological critique--the practice of regarding all
claims to knowledge as a cover for acquiring political power-deconstructs. If ideological critique is correct,
no one can claim any epistemic authority, for to do so would, by the theory, be simply another ploy for
power. Only when ideas are held to have intrinsic merit can a basis be set for judging the validity of
competing claims to knowledge.

96
° The multicultural comrrritrnent to democratic education continues a long and

respectable tradition of preparing pupils to assume their roles as responsible citizens in a
democratic republic.

0 The multicultural commitment to social justice derives My from the
commitment to democracy, for what have earlier been labeled historical, social, and
philosophical reasons.~

- Multicultural educators must be cautious about overemphasizing the role of
culture and cultural identity, both to maintain the academic integrity of their programs
(given the unfortunate state of cultural knowledge among many educators) and to respect
the moral autonomy of their pupils in public schools. As a response, multicultural
educators should redirect and redouble their efforts on behalf of educating for democratic
involvement and social justice.

- Multiculturalists now have some crucial pieces from political theory which they

may use to construct a stronger theory of multicultural education.

 

Should these conclusions prove durable in the face of the further study called for above and

of the critical examination to which they are likely to be put, one might ideally hope that
they will, as the title of this project suggests, form the basis of an educational program that

is truly democratic and just.

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