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POLITICS OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN TAIWAN'S LEGISLATIVE YUAN:
DESCRIPTIVE, SYMBOLIC, OR SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION.

By

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ABSTRACT

POLITICS OF GENDER DIFFERENCE IN TAIWAN'S LEGISLATIVE YUAN: DESCRIPTIVE, SYMBOLIC, OR SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

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This study examines the impact of gender on representative politics in Taiwan. I start my theoretical inquiry by looking at the different assumptions surrounding the relationship between identity (gender) and representation. Liberal theorists claim that representatives should transcend any identity difference and move from the localized concern to the universal interest, whereas the "politics of difference" literature posits that identity characteristics matter and consistently shape deputies' policy interests. These two theories thus contradict each other, making opposing assumptions regarding the existence of a direct and positive link between the large-scale presence of one identity group (descriptive representation) and the embodiment of the interest of that identity group (substantive representation).

In the face of these competing theories, I test five theoretical hypotheses regarding the extent to and manner in which female legislators differ from their male counterparts. The impact of gender in the legislative process is measured on two dimensions: attitudinal (symbolic) and behavioral (substantive).

In order to test these five hypotheses, I conduct two separate analyses of policy representation in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. Two distinct datasets are employed. The first is based upon a primary content analysis of the bills presented between 1990 and 1997 in the Yuan. The second is based upon interviews with third-term legislators, a

matched sample of men and women, in which I attempted to elicit their views regarding their policy priorities and the constituencies with which they identify.

Both the quantitative and qualitative findings reveal that female legislators have developed their own distinctive set of concerns and priorities. Women legislators embrace such issues as education, health, welfare, children, and women's issues. However, male legislators do not share this priority list: rather, they are more likely to prioritize political and economic issues. The interviews make clear that female and male legislators also display different constituency concerns. Overall, I demonstrate that gender has both a substantial and distinctive impact on the political arena in Taiwan.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research Question

To date, the influence of women on representative politics has not been systematically studied, therefore, one has not yet been able to prove conclusively whether the presence of women influences political processes and policy agendas to a significant degree. However, Taiwan, due to its unique history, culture, and political institutions, offers us a great opportunity to study this question in detail.

In 1947, a formula that reserved for women approximately 10 percent of seats at all levels of the legislature was incorporated into the Taiwanese constitution. Since the adoption of this formula four decades ago, the proportion of women representatives at all levels of the Taiwanese Government has wavered between 10 percent and 20 percent of the whole. Despite this apparent failure by women to "build" on the seats guaranteed by the constitution, it can be argued that the system is, nevertheless, acting as an influential agent of counter-socialization and effectively promoting political representation for women. This is particularly evident when one considers the cultural and socioeconomic disadvantages that women face in Taiwan's traditional Confucian society (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990).

Pre-1990 studies (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990) found that women, and particularly those from elite backgrounds or political families, did manage to overcome cultural and political disadvantages when entering politics. In addition, it was observed that women legislators differed little from their male counterparts in terms of role orientations, types of legislative activities undertaken, and their legislative effectiveness. However, they did appear to be less active than men in sponsoring legislation. In the light of this, the studies argued that Taiwanese politics seemed to be closely following the liberal-feminist

tradition. In this comparison, the reserved-seat system is seen to be serving the same function as the women's movements in America and Western Europe – namely, overcoming socialization and discrimination barriers by expanding political opportunities for women.

It is my contention that these accounts are of questionable uses as regards understanding and evaluating the relationship between women and representative politics in Taiwan's current political context. Prior to 1987, Taiwan was governed by an authoritarian regime under which, for the most part, the legislature acted as a "rubber stamp". Consequently, exactly who was or was not present during legislative sessions was largely irrelevant, as the influence of the legislators themselves was limited. Chou, Clark, and Clark (1990) argued that a "gender-neutral" model best represented women's political activities before democratization in Taiwan. However, I would argue that these activities reflected a political reality of homogeneous oppression under authoritarian rule. Neither gender nor class can be used to differentiate the roles of legislators at that time, since all were effectively powerless.

Accordingly, studies focusing on the number of women in electoral politics before Taiwanese democratization can often only result in a somewhat shallow (rather than in-depth) understanding of women's representation in Taiwan, since no attempt has been made to see what gender representation actually means to women. Put another way, Nechemias's (Nechemias 1994) description of the status of women in the pre-perestroika Soviet Union, in which the "tokenism" of women's representation prevailed in a token institution, even though the proportion of female deputies was relatively high, can in all likelihood be applied to Taiwan, too. Consequently, without a critical examination of the nature of the representation, a study focusing on the *number* of female participants may well be misleading.

Therefore, bearing all of the above in mind, the aim of this study is to examine the impact of gender in representative politics after democratization. As political

democratization is consolidated, and social fissures come to the surface, political decisions in Taiwan are now subject to the influences of growing demands, conflicting claims, and limited resources. The questions of "who is present", "who represents what", and "who represents whom" are now of great interest to people studying representative democracy.

In 1996, Peng, Wan-Ru, a lifelong female activist and a delegate of the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP, Taiwan's first opposition party), put forward a proposal which provided for a minimum quota of 25 percent of women in the party nomination list for national elections. The proposal caused heated debates amongst different camps and was eventually passed after a taxi driver murdered Peng. The death of the female activist, and the various provisions of the plan itself, provoked nationwide interest in the rights and security of women in Taiwan. In a direct response to the homicide, a new cross-party Coalition for Promoting Women's Rights was formed within the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's national legislature), leading to many of the bills relating to women's security being passed immediately, and women's issues gaining increasing attention.

The institutional change from the national reserved-seat system to the new DPP party gender quota approach has led to new interest in the notion of women's representation. Extrapolating from the experiences of other countries, particularly Western European and Nordic ones, once a certain level of female representation has been achieved by one political party, one might expect that other parties would adopt similar standards (Skjeie 1992). Given the potential impact of gender quotas on women's representation, the global debate has long focused on such questions as: why do we need more women in politics? What differences will result from having more women in politics? Does gender make any difference in representative politics? And, in what ways does the policy representation of women occur in the legislative process? The answers to these questions must be grounded in theoretical and empirical inquiry.

Theories of women's representation

This study addresses the issue of gender representation in Taiwanese politics via two inquiries: (1) should gender constitute a significant basis for separate political representation at all, and (2) how will differences between the genders, if any can be identified, affect that representation? In addressing the first issue, of whether significant gender differences in politics exist, and what the nature of these differences might possibly be, it should be noted that some argue that gender does not make a meaningful difference at all. However, others argue that women comprise a distinct political group with distinct political interests that warrant representation, and I will begin by examining this theoretical disagreement in some detail.

The second issue involves the question of how gender differences, if they exist at all, are actually carried over into representative politics. Some argue that increasing the number of female representatives is a necessary step because only women can represent women. Still others argue that, even with mirror (proportional) representation, the representation of an electorate's interests and opinions cannot be guaranteed – i.e., that women do not necessarily need to be represented by other women, and that women, when elected, may not actually achieve anything for, or actively represent, their own sex. This fundamental disagreement leads me, in the second part, to attempt a clarification of the nature of representation.

The relationship between gender and representation

Different assumptions are present regarding the relationship between identity (in this case, gender) and representation. The disagreements are generally centered upon two questions, namely, what should constitute the basis of representation, and can (or should) identities (i.e., gender differences) serve as such a basis? Such questions are the result of

deeper ideological divides between certain conflicting democratic ideals (Squires 1995).[1]

The concept of liberal democracy has always claimed to transcend any identity differences, to move from localized concerns to the universal interest, and to deny identity (gender) as the basis of representation. Nevertheless, discourse as to what should constitute the content of democracy, and general political shifts in one direction or another, establish and alter those categories that are seen as relevant and important enough to be represented. As the notion of identity differences introduces new perspectives into the democratic discourse, our understanding of the nature of representation also changes fundamentally. Such "theories of difference" have moved the question of identity (gender) into mainstream representative discourse, resulting in the seeking of special forms of representation and political recognition. Relating each to women's representation, I will now briefly discuss the two competing forms of representative democracy - the liberal (individualistic) democracy and the group democracy.

Liberal democracy: the argument of equality despite difference

The liberal tradition of democracy originates from the ideals of individualism and freedom from state interference, moving away from group privilege and transcending the affects of individual difference to work toward an ideal of citizenship (Bryson 1992). At its centers is a universal norm of citizenship, in which each individual's level of political participation and influence is equal. It is held that all people, regardless of their social and cultural background, should be treated equally and, therefore, that representative

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[1] For example, the tradition of liberal democracy is concerned with representing people on the basis of individual ideas. The notion of pluralist democracy, as advocated by Dahl, seeks to represent different interests in society via the form of interest groups. The idea of consociational democracy, as articulated by Lijphart, seeks to represent the social divisions in the form of parties. Finally, the prevailing concern of democracy of difference is to attempt to represent different identity groups (race, ethnicity, class, and gender). Here I am especially interested in the notions of representative democracy related to women's representation—liberal and difference theories.

democracy does not, or should not, differentiate between citizens on the basis of identity differences. The central concepts of "the citizen" and "the individual" assume that it will make no difference whether these citizens or individuals are men or women as "representation" means representing the abstract individual without distinction. The liberal tradition has highlighted the virtue of representing people on the basis of individual ideas instead of social groupings, and interests and ideologies instead of identities.

The liberal school focuses on individual rights and individual access to political influence and seeks to "equalize" it by disregarding group concerns and social structure. To this extent, it is in line with liberal feminism, which advocates equality of opportunity for women regardless of "difference", and promotes the entry of women, on the same basis as men, into established institutions without any concern as to the concept or premise upon which the institutions in question is based. In seeking increasing numbers of female representatives, liberal feminists argue that democracy requires this for reasons of political equality and justice. It is regarded as an injustice that women are excluded from any form of activity, including politics, and, since women constitute approximately half of most populations, it is expected that they should be represented more equally than is currently the case. Furthermore, liberal feminists would introduce the idea of affirmative action into representative democracy not only to promote equality in terms of opportunity, but also in terms of outcome: i.e., in order to achieve the random and even distribution of political representation.

However, without recognition of the differences between the genders, and of the need to treat women as a "collective", a proportionally even distribution of representative seats by gender will not achieve much more than claims for gender equality in other occupations have produced. The concept does not address how women represent, whether they are represented as individuals or groups, or the possible impact of such representation on women. Neither does it guarantee that these women, once elected, will

make any difference or even represent the interests of women, since both male and female constituents will have a hand in electing them. It might well address the issue of equality and fairness re the individual women seeking election. But it does not address the issue of the representativeness of the candidate or the need of the electorate, as a group, to be represented fairly (Norris 1996; Phillips 1991; Phillips 1995). Looked at in this manner, the achievement of equal representation for women would appear to be an end in itself, regardless whether such women will make a difference, or substantially and effectively represent the interests of women.

By and large, liberalism assumes that if no obstacle is present to equal participation, political influence should be distributed randomly and evenly regardless of individual ethnicity, race, or gender. "The liberal individual is an abstract person without context – an individual with rights, but without sex, race, age, or disabilities and situated outside geographical and social boundaries. The ideal liberal society is color-blind and sex-blind." (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995, 51) Therefore, representatives should move beyond any localized or group concerns to embrace a variety of different interests, and anyone can represent any group's interests without the need to actually belong to that particular identity group. In other words, gender identity, or any group identity, is not seen to constitute a distinct set of interests and values to be represented, rather, identity characteristics are assumed irrelevant. Despite this, some feminists have pressed for the politics of difference and heterogeneity to be incorporated into democracy theory and practice.

The group democracy: the argument of identity difference

Two points of difference between the liberals and the school of identity are, firstly, that the latter recognizes that women have different interests and form a politically relevant group deserving of representation, and, secondly, that it considers group representation an essential prerequisite to the achievement of political equality.

Some feminists have challenged the gender neutrality of "malestream" political thought in liberal tradition, accusing it of dishonestly "abstracting" the individual from the social and economic structures that bring about inequality (Phillips 1993). Whereas the liberal claim to treat everyone as abstract individuals or citizens, regardless of their sex, race, or class, is often associated with the ideal of "impartiality" and with the concept of a "universal" point of view, Young describes impartiality as "an idealistic fiction" (Young 1990, 104). In her opinion, it is impossible for individuals to adopt a point of view that is not, to some extent, affected by their situation and, if a point of view is "situated", then it clearly cannot be universal. Furthermore, she argues that "because such a universalist ideal continues to threaten the exclusion of some, the meaning of 'public' should be transformed to exhibit the positivity of group differences, passion, and play" (Young 1990, 97). However, to accommodate group difference, it is necessary to first recognize the nature of it.

Many feminists assume that women speak "in a different voice", whether they base this on biological, psychological, or sociological theories of gender difference (Galligan 1982). Galligan's influential work, *In a Different Voice*, has given rise to new theories of gender that validate "women's differences", and have stimulated many scholars from many fields to explore its implications. Because of sex-socialization, it has been found that women possess different, but not inferior, moral outlooks to men. Female morality emphasizes interpersonal relationships, responsibility, and the need to care for others, whereas male morality emphasizes competitive success, rules, laws, and the protection of individual rights. Furthermore, adult sex-role differences, as well as the importance of gender in the structure of women's social and workplace interactions, reinforce and perpetuate gender differences.

Many researchers, such as Alison Jaggar, Nel Noddings, Susan Okin, Mary O'Brien, and Sra Ruddick (Rhode 1990), have also stressed the importance of care-giving relationships in explaining attributes historically linked with women. Most feminists

agree that the production/reproduction divide ascribes different social roles and functions to men and women, and that women's continued responsibilities as the primary care-givers of the family, lead to women assuming different positions, characteristics, and interests to men. As regards politics, all these differences are expected to lead to a distinctive female perspective on many issues, and to the nurturing of different political interests and behaviors to men (Kelly, M.A., and Horn 1991). According to these studies, women will initiate, pursue, and support issues concerning bio-social production and reproduction, i.e., those issues that concern the control of, responsibility for, and care of, both people and other natural resources.

Building upon this recognition of gender difference, some feminists propose new visions of democracy based around the concept of heterogeneity, seeking to recognize and accommodate identity difference by promoting group representation (Phillips 1991). They insist that one's gender identity also determines one's claim to be representative of one's constituents. The politics of difference, as advocated by Iris Young (Young 1990), posits that existing arrangements are unjust and unrepresentative, since they fail to reflect the diversity of the population. Young argues that groups that have suffered oppression need "group representation" to ensure their inclusion and to diminish the effects of "impartiality." The politics of difference is an approach that claims to involve all groups by prescribing different and specialized treatment for oppressed and disadvantaged groups, and its treatment of the issue of female political representation involves such recognition of group difference. As Young asserts, "social justice ... requires not the melting away of difference, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group difference without oppression." (Young 1990, 47.) Therefore, it is argued that only through such a form of group representation as this can the democracy achieve an effective level of representation of the distinct voices and interests of those oppressed constituent groups.

In a similar vein, Charles Taylor in his *The Politics of Recognition* (Taylor 1994)

criticizes the "difference-blind" liberal theories as a reflection of one hegemonic culture. He argues that the concern for equality should involve the recognition of the value of the diverse cultures and identities and, in order to attain the required recognition, an increased public presence of the "oppressed" is necessary. He argues that, given the diverse group perspectives and concerns that exist, the polity can only function democratically by recognizing and incorporating the voices of these different groups. For example, by bringing more women into politics, we bring a different (and differing) set of values, experiences, and expertise to our politics.

In short, the differences between these two claims are derived from their different premises, i.e., the concept of equality *despite* difference versus the concept of equality *but* difference; and opposing viewpoints as to just how such a difference will alter and affect representative bodies and public policies. Table 1-1 is an attempt to summarize the different meanings of "women's representation" within each democracy discourse, as well as related implications and goals.

Table 1-1: Comparison of different discourses on the representative democracy

Democracy discourse	Premise	Unit of representation	Representation Implication	Goal
Liberal democracy	Individual equality	Individuals	Equal representation as an end itself (politics of idea)	Discount the difference
Politics of difference	Group difference	Group	Group representation as a means to justice (politics of presence)	Accommodate the difference

Liberals attempt to equalize political power with equal representation without emphasizing the difference in the representative process and outcome, whereas the latter view, that of women as a distinct group with shared basic interests, implies that the "individual" of liberal theory does not, in fact, exist. According to the former, it is not necessary to have any group representation since identity is not necessarily linked with interest, whereas, according to the latter approach, group representation is necessary to bring gender difference into politics by linking the identity with interest. Staying with

this line of reasoning, I will investigate the following questions – Are there significant gender differences in politics? Will an increase in female representation change policy directions and existing political institutions? And, finally, how can such a transform proceed and on what basis?

The nature of representation

Having claimed the right to representation as a distinctive group, the next question to face women concerns the form such representation should take. A variety of possible approaches to female representation have already been mentioned. Other women who share similar characteristics with them may represent women, or people whom they believe to represent them, or even people who share similar concerns and opinions with them but whom are not necessarily women. In light of these different approaches to representation, Hanna Pitkin (Pitkin 1967) distinguished three types of representation: namely, descriptive, symbolic, and active. Descriptive representatives refer to those who share the same characteristics as those represented; symbolic representatives refer to those who symbolize the identity or quality of a particular constituency; and active representatives refer to those who are concerned and act for the interests of those represented. According to these different types and definitions of representation, women politicians who stand for women either descriptively or symbolically may not *act* for them, and those who act for them may not necessarily *be* women. Pitkin further criticizes descriptive representation by arguing that, because the notion of who is present in legislative assemblies diverts attention from what the legislators represent, fair representation is achieved only by looking at legislative behavior - by focusing on the activities of a person rather than their characteristics. Pitkin argues that even the maximization of descriptive representation, such as via a huge numerical increase in female representatives, may be of limited help to female interests because these representatives may not effectively represent women's interests and ideas.

Perkins and Fowlkers (Perkins and Fowlker 1980) make similar distinctions of representation but under different rubrics, with "social representation" being similar to descriptive representation, and "opinion representation" being similar to active representation. In a simulated choice situation, Perkins and Fowlkers found that both men and women would prefer to have their interests or ideas represented rather than achieve mere social representation. They also agreed with Pitkin's theory that representatives could appear to be a microcosm of society in every aspect but still fail to represent what the electorate wants. Conversely, legislators could do what the electorate wants without resembling their characteristics. Put another way, it remains unclear whether the election of more women candidates will bring about a more "women-orientated" political agenda.

Ann Phillips (Phillips 1995) also offers a similar framework of representation by distinguishing "politics of idea" from "politics of presence". The politics of idea emphasizes "what" is represented by looking at the activities and decisions regardless who is present in the legislature, whereas the politics of presence emphasizes "who" is represented by looking at the composition of a parliament. However, Phillips places greater emphasis than Pitkin on the importance of the latter approach, questioning Pitkin's assertion that the emphasis on what they represent must depend primarily on a tighter mechanism of accountability that binds politicians to the opinions they are meant to represent. Phillips, as concerned with accountability and the search for authenticity as other feminists, goes so far as to question who can best stand for another. Acknowledging that representatives have considerable autonomy, as well as the absence of procedures for establishing what the groups want and think, Phillips still believes that who those representatives are is more important than what they represent.

However, Phillips assumes that we can better approximate true representation by ensuring that representatives are a microcosmic reflection of the group they are meant to represent. Therefore, in the case of female representation, because they stand for women

(symbolic representation), it is expected and assumed that they will act for women (substantive representation). But this argument is based on the assumption of a direct correlation between gender (presence) and interests (idea). In reality, women politicians are divided by other social differences – class, race, age, and marital status – that might very well prevent them from simply "standing for women". In addition, they are also forced to confront, and perhaps grapple with, pre-existing institutional norms and priorities and will, like their male counterparts, have most likely come into politics through party systems that may separate them from each other as regards basic ideologies and priorities (Skjeie 1992). In short, there are many pre-existing fissures between women that may significantly affect the use of the female mandate.

Pitkin's theoretical discussions about different types of representation, and Perkins' and Fowlkers' evidence, all confirm that only women can represent women descriptively. But all of them question whether women officeholders would necessarily represent women substantively, acting for women and their interests. This assumption leads them to emphasize the importance of the "politics of idea". In the other corner, Phillips assumes that there is a link between descriptive and substantive modes of representation, and therefore argues for the "politics of presence", believing that the presence of more women in political office is necessary for the effective representation of women to be achieved. Clearly, then, the fundamental disagreement between the two "camps" rests on one unanswered question: namely, whether women in office act for, or simply stand for, women. Or to put it another way: Are female representatives more likely than their male counterparts to actively represent women?

Literature Review
Comparative studies on women in legislative politics

The theoretical dispute regarding whether, and in what way, representation is related to gender identity raise a number of questions. Do women make a difference in politics?

More specifically, under what conditions can women in politics make a difference? And, in what ways do women make a difference? Though much research has been undertaken in an attempt to answer these questions, the results have been mixed. I have classified these past comparative studies into four distinctive groups. (1) Those researchers who have stressed similarities between male and female politicians. (2) Those who have identified distinctive female policy interests and agendas. (3) Those who have suggested that gender differences in politics depend on the institutional context in which they exist (critical mass theory). And, (4), those who have suggested that gender differences are contingent to lots of different factors (contingent and contextualized theory). These four distinct "sets" of research findings are summarized in the following subsections.

1. Similarities between male and female politicians

Early studies (Gehlen 1977; Kirkpatrick 1974; Mezey 1978; Muller 1982) reported that women tended not to identify themselves as "women's candidates" and, therefore, did not place a higher priority on women's issues than did men. A possible explanation for this is that women politicians may wish to avoid being labeled "radical", or only responsive to the interests of women, fearing that voters and male colleagues would penalize them for this. Using attitudinal surveys and statistical analyses of voting behavior, Carroll, in *Women as Candidates in American Politics* (Carroll 1985), noted that most women candidates did not belong to feminist organizations and did not emphasize women's issues. Diamond (Diamond 1977) came to a similar conclusion, noting that the majority of female state representatives in the United States did not campaign on women's issues or trumpet feminist goals. In a study of women in a U.S State legislature, she found that only a small number of the female representatives were advocates of women's rights. Rather, most could be classified as the traditional civic worker, whose attitude toward the role of women in society was one that assumed that little or no change was needed. These studies starkly demonstrated that female legislators

did not distinguish themselves from male legislators as regards "women's concerns".

In addition to their role orientation, Randall (Randall 1987) argued that, due to the process of selective recruitment, party pressure, and political socialization within legislatures, female MPs maintained similar political attitudes to their male counterparts. Clearly, these earlier studies, carried out in the United States, suggested that the claims that women politicians would transform politics were overstated.

Studies in other countries also generated somewhat similar results. In the United Kingdom Parliament, with few women entering politics in the early 1970s, women MPs were loath to adopt exclusively women's issues, feeling that their loyalty was to their party rather than to women (Vallance 1979). Comparative studies of female leaders, such as Benazir Bhutto, Corazon Aquino and Margaret Thatcher, found it difficult to classify these female leaders as a single group as regards both their leadership styles and policy agendas (D'Amico 1995). Recent research has also uncovered an increasing similarity between Scandinavian female and male MPs in their methods of political communication (Karvonen and Selle 1995).

2. Differences between male and female legislative participation

Contrary to these studies, however, some researchers had found gender differences in legislative attitudes and behaviors. In terms of legislative activities, some researchers have shown that female legislators are far more supportive of women's rights and are more likely to sponsor bills that address matters of health and welfare, and women, children, and family (Carroll, Dodson, and Mandel 1991; Reingold 1992; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991). Scandinavian research also uncovered a gender-related division as regards parliamentary activities. In Dahlerup (Dahlerup 1988) and Haavio-Mannila's (Havvio-Manilla 1985) study of Nordic politics, women MPs were more likely to ask questions about family, health, housing, environmental, and consumer policies, while men were more likely to ask questions re fiscal, labor market, and energy

policies. In addition, women were most likely to raise the profile of women's issues on the legislative agenda.

There is also some evidence to indicate a gender gap in the basic political attitudes of representatives. In Reingold's (Reingold 1992) analysis of the survey responses of state legislators in California and Arizona, she found that female politicians were more likely to represent women's interests, to perceive themselves as receiving support from women constituents, and to consider such support important, than were men. In addition, women politicians felt themselves to be more qualified to deal with the concerns of their women constituents. Moreover, Lyn Kathlene's study of female legislators in Colorado's House of Representatives (Kathlene 1989) suggested that female representatives conceptualize problems differently from their male colleagues. Thus, she argued that women tend to practice a different type of politics to men, and have different conceptions of what constitutes political power.

In terms of political ideology, Stanwich and Kleeman (Stanwick and Kleeman 1983) noted that women officeholders tend to be more sympathetic to liberal policies such as nuclear disarmament and welfare programs. It has also been found that women are more liberal than their male counterparts as regards their general attitudes and legislative behaviors, although the differences are not great (Frankovic 1977; Gehlen 1977; Leader 1977; Norris 1986; Welch 1985). Similar attitudinal gender differences have been found amongst the US party delegates and state legislators (Baxer and Lansing 1983; Diamond 1977; Soule and McGrath 1977). Moreover, such results also gain support from other studies carried out in other countries. For example, studies in the United Kingdom suggest that women are more left wing and supportive of feminist values than men are (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

With respect to legislative duties and roles, some studies also point to gender differences in terms of a legislator's own self-perception. A legislator's perception of their individual role shapes what they do in the office and how they do it. Norris's study

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of British MPs (Norris 1996) distinguishes three types of legislators: the constituency workers, the parliamentarians, and the party loyalists. It was found that women, primarily because of their greater emphasis on interpersonal relationships, their self-perception as problem solvers and public servants, and their feelings of obligation to the communities they represent, tended to give a higher priority to constituency work (Antolini 1984; Freeman and Richardson 1995; Thomas 1992). Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick 1974) argued that women legislators tend to see themselves as problem-solvers, in power in order to help people, whereas male legislators tend to see themselves as leaders or politicians. It should also be noted that female legislators receive more calls from constituents and spend more time serving constituents than their male colleagues do. Thomas's study (1993) of city council members produced a similar result, and Freeman and Richardson's (1995) survey of four state legislatures confirmed that, after controlling for other variables, women received more casework requests than their male colleagues, and were twice as likely to believe that they performed more casework.

3. The critical mass theory

Given the fact that these various sets of findings seem to contradict each other, other studies have sought to explore the conditions under which the similarities and differences between female and male legislators might become more apparent. Some have argued that once women achieve a "critical mass" of political positions of power, they would start to change politics in substantive ways. The concept of critical mass is borrowed from physics, where it is used to refer to the quantity needed to begin a chain reaction (Dahlerup 1988). The theory as it applies to representative politics suggests that political behavior is shaped by its surroundings (loosely, a new "institutionalist" perspective), and that politicians will respond differently and strategically to the opportunities that form around them. According to this theory, few gender differences in legislatures will be apparent so long as women remain a distinct minority, because of the possible trade-offs

between challenging the dominating organization's agendas and being marginalized politically that could take place. However, the situation may be transformed once women reach a critical mass (Dahlerup 1988; Kanter 1977; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994). However, the proportion of the total number of seats which constitutes a critical mass vary, from 15% to 30% (Dahlerup 1988; Kanter 1977)

For example, Saint-Germain's (1989) longitudinal study on Arizona state legislatures from 1969-1986 found, firstly, that women legislators were more likely to introduce feminist legislation seeking for greater equality and improvement of women status, as well as legislation dealing with women traditional interests such as children, education, and the family. In addition, as the number of women representatives increased, the degree of attention paid to women issues also increased.

In addition to the longitudinal study, Thomas and Welch (Thomas and Welch 1991), in their twelve-state survey of state legislators, also found a correlation between the ratio of female delegates and the degree of support for legislation related to women, further confirming that the proportion of women present makes a difference. Although Thomas and Welch did not find a systematic sex difference, they did find that women tended to introduce more bills relating to children, women, and the family, and that they were more likely than men to cite such bills as accomplishments. This was particularly so in states with a high percentage of female deputies.

4. The transformational and contingent theory

Nevertheless, recent research indicates that the "number factor" alone is far from adequate in explaining whether or not women make a difference in politics. Yoder (Yoder 1991) argues that simply increasing the number of women in the workplace does not solve the negative effects of tokenism, since token men do not experience the same level of inequality and negative treatment as token women. The problem of tokenism is sexism, and it is the group norms rather than the group size that brings inequality.

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Hellevik and Skard (Bystydzienski 1995) applied Diamond's classification in their study of female Norwegian local councilors in seven municipalities in the county of Akershus. They found that, even though women occupied approximately 30 percent of the seats at the local level in Norway, only one-third of the women representatives were women's rights advocates who "identified" with women and their claims, and took initiatives on women's issues and interests. It is clear that, without a shared consciousness of a women's agenda, female politicians would not take any action on behalf of women even if a large number of women representatives ever come to sit in our legislative bodies. Furthermore, the attempt to shape politics and legislation to reflect women's interests does not necessarily guarantee that the outcome of such political processes will have the intended consequences. Clearly, whether women politicians will make differences depends on various factors.

It is possible for women to make a difference in politics when their numbers are relatively small, as in the case of Japan (Bystydzienski and Lin 1994; Ling and Matsuno 1992), and to seem to have little effect when their numbers are increasing, as in Canada (Brodie and Gotell 1991). In the former Soviet Union, women made up a fourth to a third of the political representatives, yet made no significant difference at all. Recent studies (Epstein 1983; Reskin 1988; Yoder 1991) indicate a curvilinear relationship between the size of a minority grouping and institutional responsiveness. That is, very small numbers of the minority receive a hostile response from the dominants, but, as the size of the minority increases, the response from the majority becomes more positive. However, as the number continues to grow, the majority turn full circle, reacting with hostility to what they now perceive as threatening. This finding suggests that the presence of a larger number of women in politics does not make it easier for women politicians to develop and promote women's agenda. It is also worth noting that, the larger the number of women, the more divergent women's opinions may become, especially when female politicians are scattered across different parties and have embraced conflicting ideologies.

Bystydzienski (Bystydzienski 1995) concludes that whether or not women have an effect on politics cannot be determined solely by the number of women in the legislature. Rather, the effects of their presence depend on other factors, such as the political climate, the prevailing ideology, the strength of the women's movements, and the structure of the political system. When the political climate is favorable to the entry of new groups, the social and women's movement flourishes, and the political structure is relatively open and flexible, women's interests and concerns may finally change the face of politics.

Research of gender dynamics in Taiwan's representative politics

As noted above, many researchers in many different countries have studied the representation of women. However, the majority focus upon the industrial West – such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and certain Scandinavian countries. Though some studies were undertaken in developing countries, they were not as reliable as the former in terms of quantity and quality. The reason for this concentration on the politics of the West is twofold. Firstly, these countries are well-institutionalized nations with a long history of parliamentary politics. Even with different constitutional systems (the parliamentary versus the presidential system), the legislatures within these countries do wield important influence in the policy-making process. Not only that, but the function and operation of the parliaments in these countries has been stable over a long term and, because of this relative institutional stability, systematic data is available for research. It is especially true of the United States that congressional studies have developed plenty of solid tools (e.g., interest group ratings, and indices) to analyze roll call data and legislative processes. Secondly, a social interest in gender politics has also been apparent. Most of these countries have either the highest levels of female representation (like the Scandinavian countries), or a history of well-organized women's movements (such as in the United States), leading to a social climate that is supportive of such studies. For example, in the United States, a critique of academic bias toward gender

studies (Sapiro 1981) provoked a response from certain academic institutions. In the APSA and MPSA, a women's section hosting various gender study panels was created.

On the other hand, in developing countries, if there is any interest at all in studying the role of female politicians, it is likely to be focused on the executive side of government, given the usual administrative domination over the legislature. The situation in Taiwan is similar to this. In general, Taiwan's legislative studies have reflected the political structure and the processes of change. Before democratization (1987), most of the research merely provided static descriptions, and few behavioral studies were available, since the legislative body was not an autonomous stage in the legislation-making process. Put simply, the behavior of individual legislators in an ineffective institution was not worth studying.

Chou, Clark, and Clark's work (1990) represents the first systematic analysis on female political representation in Taiwan. They were primarily interested in assessing the problem of women's political under-representation in Taiwan, and did so by conducting a survey of the representatives in 1985. They pointed out that several institutional and social factors combined to produce certain opportunities and barriers to women's political participation in Taiwan. Within the legislative bodies, they found that women entered via reserved-seats systems and differed little from their male counterparts in terms of role orientations, types of legislative activities, and legislative effectiveness, with the exception that they were less active than men in sponsoring legislation. However, despite the well-stated theory, methodology, and findings, the study was conducted in 1985, when Taiwan was still under the influence of an authoritarian regime. At that time, the representative bodies and members played an extremely limited role in the decision-making process. Taiwan has experienced democratization since 1987 and, therefore, most of the study's findings must be re-evaluated in the light of this.

The number and scope of Taiwanese legislative studies remained limited even after democratization. What research does exist in this area focuses either on the legislators'

interpellation actions or on several particular "women's bills." Basically, the legislative study of gender politics is something that has arisen only in the last ten years, and the quantity and quality of relevant research is still limited. Cheng's (Cheng 1983) analysis of legislator's interpellations on women's issues, from the 67th to 71st legislative sessions, found that gender and seniority were the most significant variables. In other words, women and senior legislators were more likely to raise questions in the policy area of women's interest than male and junior members were. Nevertheless, as a whole, those relating to women's issues made up only a tiny minority of all interpellation.

Own-Ying (Own-Ying 1992) conducted a content analysis on representatives' interpellations and legislation on women's issues from the 51st to the 84th legislative sessions (17 years). She found that the frequency of interpellation on women's issues was very low, and that more were put forward by female legislators than male ones. In addition, there were more such interpellations by supplementary legislators than senior legislators, and by the Taiwanese than mainlanders. Consequently, it can be seen that gender, seniority, and ethnicity were the main factors that dictated the frequency of interpellation on women's issues. Similar content analyses of legislators' interpellations (both oral and written) were conducted by the New Times Foundation, from the 79th to the 82nd legislative sessions. The findings were similar to previous ones, namely that gender and seniority are still the most important factors in explaining the difference in interpellations on women's issues, but that the result is not overly significant.

Most of the above studies on gender difference in Taiwan's legislative politics were concentrated upon such interpellation, which is but one function among various representative activities. The benefit of such an approach is that there is a considerable volume of relevant data. Prior to democratization, because of the possession of only limited legislative power, most legislators regarded their duties as monitoring what government was doing instead of making laws. Therefore, interpellation had been the primary channel by which representatives could express their opinions about how the

Government conducted its business. Besides, interpellation is a near individual action, and consequently unlike other legislative actions, such as bill sponsorship and debates, which involve cooperation and bargaining between legislators. It is easy for an individual legislator to proclaim his or her concerns regarding any specific topic by questioning the administrative officers on their policy-making or policy implementation.

However, the system of interpellation was not as institutionalized in Taiwan as it was in other parliamentary countries. In Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, if legislators are not satisfied with the replies they receive from administrative officers, they cannot find other ways to gain satisfaction, because they do not have access to other leverages, like a power of veto, investigation, or impeachment with which to do so. In addition, and as most legislators admitted, their assistants usually write the actual contents of an interpellation. Legislators under the SNTV electoral system (discussed later) are constantly striving to secure the attention of the media and thereby raise their personal profile. To achieve this, they will inevitably pick the most "popular" subjects upon which to interpellate, depending on the news, social events, or current topics of interest to the media itself. Hence the fact that essentially redundant interpellation is extremely common. Many scholars, as well as some legislators themselves, have criticized the pattern and function of interpellation. However, due to re-election concerns, legislators must compete to show off, even if the issues upon which they choose to focus are of little or no interest to them at all.

In addition, the establishment in 1995 of the Forum of National Affairs, an hour-long meeting that precedes the Yuan (floor) meeting, has created another stage for legislators to express their opinions on general policies and social developments. It has, in fact, replaced some of the functions of interpellation itself. The channels through which legislators can express their opinions have multiplied and overlap, but the substantive function and policy influence of these simple opinion expressions remains limited. The studies focusing on interpellation for understanding legislators' interests and

behaviors are thus problematic.

Learning from the experiences and methods of American congressional studies, different approaches to legislative studies have emerged in the 1990s. Huang's study (Huang 1994) of legislators' constituency services found that women, on average, received 200 casework requests from their constituents, while men received only 112. The result of conducting a multiple regression on the second term legislators, and after controlling for their party, education, seniority, backgrounds, and constituency geography, proved that gender was a significant factor in explaining the variation in representatives' casework. This result is consistent with some past U.S studies referred to earlier (Antolini 1984; Freeman and Richardson 1995; Thomas 1992). However, Huang also noticed that at that time there were only 17 women legislators, constituting a mere 10.6 percent of the whole, and that, of those 17, only 15 agreed to be interviewed. Also, most of her female interviewees were either highly recognizable to the public, or had previous experience as elected officials with good local connections. This could be another reason for the high number of casework requests they received from their constituents.[2]

Cheng (Cheng 1997) also conducted a thesis on legislative participation in women's issues. Learning from Sheng's sophisticated study (1996) on legislative behavior in Taiwan, she concentrated upon bill sponsorships and speeches to examine the possible gender effect on representative politics. In the three women's bills Cheng selected, she recorded the frequency of sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and speeches of each legislator serving in the second and third terms, and applied OLS regression to the participation of

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[2] In the beginning, I also attempted to ask the relationship between legislators' role definition and constituency service in the interview. However, most legislators I have contacted did not have ideas about the approximate number of case services they received and the content of the requests, and most of them have their assistants take care of the constituency service. Most legislators' assistants know more about the constituency service than the legislators did. However, few assistants did sort out the types and the number of the legislators' constituency service in a week or month, on average. A general survey in the number of the case services should be careful about the mis-reporting or over-reporting.

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the legislators in each bill. For those three bills, she concluded that three independent factors – gender, connection with women's groups, and serving as committee chairs – are significant in determining the intensity of a representative's legislative participation in women's issues. Her study attempted to combine the strength of legislative study with gender study; however, her choice to focus on three particular feminist bills cannot serve to illustrate the role of gender representation in legislative structures and processes as a whole.

About this study

The results of these comparative empirical studies on gender representation have been contradictory. Also, the researches carried out in Taiwan, which either applied loose measures like interpellation or restricted itself to certain select and limited cases, are not as solid and systematic as the studies carried out in other countries. Drawing on the experiences and insights outlined in the existing research, and using both comparative legislative studies and Taiwanese studies, I attempt to retest the empirical basis of the gender difference argument in Taiwan, and address some of the questions encountered in previous research designs. My research shall address some of the problems and enrich the study of gender representation in the following aspects:

Firstly, gender difference in politics does not exist in a vacuum. Gender is one dimension among various sociopolitical divisions (class, party, and ethnicity), and it is dangerous to assume that an essential clear-cut difference will always be apparent between men and women. Policy environments, both political and social, determine the possible policy-making processes and potential outcomes of any political initiative. Even differences in the institutional environment can lead to different representative outcomes. A number of previous studies were conducted in the legislature across different cultures and political institutions, and the results were markedly different. An understanding of Taiwan's unique sociopolitical context is an important first step in any attempt to explain its gender dynamics. Therefore, in my study, I first turn to the contextual factors,

political as well as social, structural as well as concerning processes, and examine the ways in which they might affect the gender dynamics in politics.

Secondly, most of the studies emphasize only a single dimension, focusing on either the attitudinal or behavioral side of political representation. Unfortunately, when focusing upon the behavioral side, one looks at policy output or roll call data to determine the pattern of gender difference, which does not take into account legislators' subjective willingness to represent, or the institutional constraints imposed upon women who are willing to "push" women's issues. Therefore, this approach tends to underestimate the gender differences in a more subtle way – perceptual and symbolic. On the other hand, focusing on the perceptual dimension can, potentially, overestimate gender differences and lead to findings that ignore or obscure reality. Only a few studies (e.g., Thomas 1994) have examined legislators' perceptions and behaviors. Clearly, a study incorporating the perceptual input from legislators and the policy output might better explain the gender dynamic in representative politics.

To address the bias of studying a single dimension, my research is designed to investigate three dimensions. (1) The objective legislative behaviors of representatives: By examining everything from agenda setting to policy deliberation from 1990-1997, I will show the general trend and pattern of gender representation in Taiwan over time. (2) The subjective perceptions of female representatives: By interviewing third-term legislators, I will reveal the "inside story" of gender dynamics in the Legislature. (3) The links between subjective identification and objective representation: By linking both aspects together, I will be able to explain and put in context the gender politics of Taiwanese representation in a thorough manner. In short, I will specify the dimensions (both behavioral and attitudinal) that need to be addressed if one is to successfully analyze the policy representation of women, and I will apply different methods of investigation to each of these "dimensions".

Thirdly, the choice of appropriate measurements for legislative behaviors is crucial

to the study of policy representation. A mature gender study on representative politics requires not only that the researchers possess a sophisticated understanding of the theories of gender politics, but also that they are aware of, and can comprehend, the workings of the Legislature. Gender study assists researchers in formulating their questions within a theoretical framework, and legislative studies are essential in so far as they allow the researcher to approach these questions with a sufficiently in-depth understanding of the legislative process. Therefore, in order to offer a fair account of gender representation in Taiwan, my study incorporates the strengths of both gender study and legislative study.

In previous behavioral research in this area, some methods of measurement have proved problematic from the perspective of both gender and legislative study. As mentioned above, one such problem is the use of parliamentary interpellation statistics, as this measure cannot directly address the policy representation of legislators. Of course, the most common approach in use is that of examining roll call data, however, many researchers have also cautioned against the use of voting statistics as an indicator of gender differences.

Tamerius argues that roll call voting is "the indicator theoretically associated with the least dramatic aspect of gendered representation." (Tamerius 1993, 96) She claims that the reason why previous studies of gender differences in legislative politics have failed to find compelling evidence of a significant female impact is because they relied on roll call voting statistics. She contends that,

> Roll call voting, which assumed that enactment is the most important stage in the legislative process, privileges majority and, therefore, male interests. Since policies of concern to the majority of members are bound to make it to the floor eventually, early maneuvers are unlikely to have a major impact on whether a policy is ultimately adopted. From the perspective of women and other legislative minorities, however, critical stages of the legislative process are more properly identified as agenda setting and policy formulation, since the vast majority of policies of interest to underrepresented groups, including feminist bills, never receive consideration on the floor (1993: 105).

She further argues, both theoretically and empirically, that the greater the level of

"purposive" involvement required by an activity, the greater the difference between male and female legislators in terms of the performance of that activity in feminist issues. She ranks the extent of these sex differences in the following manner: roll call voting (smallest difference); co-sponsorship; speechmaking; and sponsorship (largest difference between the sexes).

From the perspective of legislative study, it is also noted that the representatives engage in various legislative activities other than voting on bills in order to pursue their concerns. For example, legislators might set the agenda and specify alternatives, exclude some alternatives from consideration, initiate or draft a bill or an amendment, debate for or against the policy, or attempt to persuade legislative colleagues to adopt the same position. As Hall has noted, if we neglect to take into account the various possible efforts that legislators might put into the legislative process before reaching the stage of formal roll call voting, we might well underestimate their overall representation. Voting records alone are not sufficient. In *Participation in Congress* (Hall 1996), Hall cautioned us that,

> Although most members vote when specific decisions come to a formal roll call on the chamber floor, floor voting is only one and probably not the most important form of participation in the legislative process. Building a coalition for a legislative package, drafting particular amendments, planning and executing parliamentary strategy, bargaining with or persuading colleagues to adopt one's point of view—all these activities weigh more heavily than voting in the decision-making calculus of most bills, especially in a legislature where committees, anterooms, and staff meetings are the principal forums for deliberation and decision. In such activities, participation is highly selective...(1996: 8)

In light of the selective nature of legislative participation and the different assessments of level of representation, therefore, a detailed and systematic investigation of legislative activities is clearly necessary. Among the various legislative activities that I will identify, my research will emphasize the importance of certain stages of the law-making process in Taiwan, from agenda setting to policy debates, to an understanding of political gender differences. I will also compare the varying degrees of gender difference that can appear at different stages of the legislative process.

Finally, in an attempt to bolster the strength and reliability of their legislative research, most recent studies of Taiwan's legislature borrowed their methods of measurement from the experienced and systematic research previously carried out in the United States. However, researchers should be aware of the inapplicability of some measures employed in traditional legislative studies to the case of Taiwan. In an American legislative study, Hall (1996) argued that the structure of levels of legislative participation in Congress is hierarchical, and that, from the top, the order was: engaging in agenda action, offering substantive amendments, offering minor amendments of procedural motions, speaking during markup, voting and merely attending, and, finally, engaging in none of the activities. Members carrying out activities at the top of this hierarchy were likely to engage in lower level activities, too. Another warning in this area comes from Kingdon (Kingdon 1989), who notes that voting is a legislative activity that actually requires little substantive knowledge, since representatives are able to rely on cues from a variety of sources when making their decisions.

However, Sheng's study of Taiwanese legislative politics (Sheng 1996) questioned Hall's notion of this hierarchical order of legislative activities. The problems of using such "American methods" to measure activity in Taiwan are twofold: firstly, there are difficulties re the availability of data (e.g. voting statistics); secondly, one must allow for the different nature of the legislative process in Taiwan. In Taiwan, because of institutional limitations (e.g., quorum requirement on initiation), and the ways in which the parties mobilize legislators and direct their activities, legislative participation is no longer hierarchical but, rather, can be described as random.

To devise a set of measures applicable to the study of Taiwanese legislature requires a contextual understanding of the operation of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. Drawing on previous and related studies, and incorporating the results of my interviews, I will devise a set of measures that will be of use in gaining a full understanding of the workings of the Taiwanese legislature. I also intend that this will assist in the study of gender

representation in this arena. This aspect will be addressed and further elaborated upon in the research method section.

In closing, I hope that such a study of gender representation in Taiwan will enable us to project, accurately but within the bounds of reason, the possible consequences of more female officeholders for both public policy and political processes.

Organization of this study

With the aim of examining the gender dynamics present in Taiwan's legislative politics, this study is divided into two parts. In the first part, I examine the impact of contextual factors - such as sociopolitical structure and change - on the political status of women in Taiwan. Following on from this, I turn to the impact of gender difference on representation in Taiwan's national legislature. I examine this by, firstly, analyzing the possible behavioral differences between male and female legislators in the Legislative Yuan between 1990 and 1997, and, secondly, exploring the subjective perceptual differences between the genders in the third term-legislature.

In pursuit of the above, I attempt in Chapter 2 to explore the former of these two parts. Three dimensions that are related to the issue of political opportunities for women to enter politics are especially addressed in this chapter: political structure and institution, social structure and change, and democratization. When referring to political structure and institution, I mean the constitutional arrangements, electoral cultures, the SNTV electoral rule, and the reserved-seats provisions in Taiwanese politics. I also provide a brief account of the evolution of the political institutions within the existing social culture, in so far as this is relevant to the issue of female political opportunity and participation. Moreover, levels of female political participation are sensitive to the dynamic characteristics of societies, making it imperative to consider the change in a social context. With respect to social structure and change, I pay particular attention to the role of social modernization and the women's movements in changing the political

status of women in Taiwan. Finally, I address the relationship between democratization and female representation and, in doing so, I attempt to specify both the positive and the negative impact of contextual factors on female representation. All of these structural descriptions will set the stage for the following chapters.

In Chapter 3, I place my main research questions into a set of theoretical hypotheses and research designs. The main theoretical purpose of this study is to explore the gender dynamic and to thereby specify the nature of women's representation in Taiwanese politics. As mentioned earlier, embedded in the theoretical debates are two questions – (1) Do women make a difference in Taiwanese politics? (2) If so, in what ways does gender make a difference? As regards the first question, an expectation that women participate differently in legislative process arises from the assumption that women deputies would better represent female concerns. Therefore, differences as regards policy representation between male and female deputies are also assumed to lie in this female area. Based on the existing research and theoretical projections, I define the gender-specific policy domains - "women's issues" - to which female legislators are expected to pay more attention than their male counterparts.

The second question touches on the nature of gender representation, asking whether the women in legislative politics are making a difference in a substantive way or merely on a symbolic level. It is my intention to explore how different modes of representation - descriptive, symbolic, and substantive - are linked together in Taiwanese politics and just how representation can be seen to embrace both the attitudinal (symbolic) and the behavioral (substantive) modes. An awareness of both "dimensions" is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of gender representation. Therefore, I generate five hypotheses concerning gender difference along the lines of these two modes of representative politics, and follow this with a research design employing these two distinct methods of assessment. I then test the five hypotheses - by means of a behavioral assessment in Chapter 4, and an attitudinal assessment in Chapter 5. Therefore, Chapter

4 focuses on the actual behavioral differences between the genders in legislative politics, and Chapter 5 examines the perceptual differences regarding legislative roles and priorities between female and male legislators.

Chapter 4, in focusing on the actual behavioral differences between the genders, seeks to investigate the latitude of substantive policy representation of deputies in the Legislative Yuan. To explore the trends in legislative participation, I conduct a longitudinal analysis of legislators' behavior in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan from 1990-1997. In studying legislative behavior in this manner, different aspects of legislative processes are also examined, from static institutional arrangements to dynamic legislative processes. As regards the former, I examine the division of labor in terms of legislators' committee memberships in the Legislative Yuan. Turning to the dynamic aspect, I observe the legislative process from agenda setting to policy formation. I start by looking at the agents of agenda setting, examining the initiating and scheduling of bills. Next, I examine the policy formation process, by examining the speeches that the legislators have made in the Legislative Yuan. Having divided legislative processes into these distinct and recognizable stages, I then go on to examine possible gender differences at each stage.

As already outlined above, in Chapter 5 I focus on the subjective aspects of representation. By examining the perceptual differences between the genders, we can better understand the mechanisms behind gender patterns – patterns that reveal themselves in legislative activities and behaviors. In this chapter, I am especially interested in individual legislator's perceptions of what, and whom, they regard it as important to represent. In other words, the extent of their identification with their constituency and their policy priorities. The interview is regarded as the most direct method with which to reveal legislators' conceptions of representation and, therefore, I design several questions to elicit their views on these two aspects of representation. Finally, the interviews are of a matched sample of third-term legislators.

CHAPTER 2

WOMEN IN TAIWANESE POLITICS

Taiwan's sociopolitical history since 1947

For centuries, Taiwan's social structures have preserved both Confucian and patriarchal traditions that have relegated women to a subordinate social status. These traditions have excluded women from active roles in the public domain, including politics. However, the area of female political representation in Taiwan reveals an interesting contrast. On the one hand, women have fared well in Taiwanese politics compared to women in other countries with similar cultural backgrounds (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990). On the other hand, however, many factors have hindered an increase in the number of female representatives over the past decades. Thus, viewing the situation from a dynamic perspective, the proportionate representation of women remains static even though the sociopolitical environment has changed. To better explain and understand the opportunities as well as the constraints on female political participation, this chapter will explore women's political status in Taiwan by examining it within the context of change in the sociopolitical structure.

Between 1947 and 1997, Taiwan has experienced a significant change in its sociopolitical structure. In 1947, the Kuomintang (the KMT, or the Nationalist party) lost the civil war in Mainland China and moved to Taiwan. The regime the KMT established, which survived intact for almost four decades (1947-1987) was essentially an authoritarian one-party government composed of mainlander political elites. The party ruled Taiwan by implementing martial law, which repressed competing political parties and any political activity.

Upon retreating to Taiwan in 1948, the KMT formally maintained a five-branch national government, including the Executive Yuan (the administration), the Legislative

Yuan (the parliament), the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Nevertheless, informal political practices and institutions greatly affected the operation of the formal institutions of government, especially so given the fact that the KMT has dominated normal political practice at all levels of government for forty years. The KMT held almost all the significant administrative positions and exercised a major role in policy making, with the major policy decisions being made by the top party organs (Central standing committee). The executive Yuan was viewed as an organ that implemented rather than initiated policy, and members of the Legislative Yuan (national parliament) were known simply for endorsing the decisions made at the party center.

The KMT also retained a four-tier administrative and representative system designed for all of Mainland China, from the national down to provincial, county/city, and town/village levels. At the national level, in order to maintain the claim to be legitimately representing all the people of China, the KMT kept those representatives of the Legislative Yuan elected from China in place for a long time without making them subject to re-election. Yet, the increasing age of the incumbents as well as the pressure to make the electoral organs more representative of Taiwan's constituency led the regime to hold "supplementary" elections in 1969 in order to "rejuvenate" national representative politics. The supplementary elections elected only a small minority among those tenured members from China before democratization took place in the late 1980s (Chu 1994). At the local level, because of the earlier ethnic conflict (the 228 event) between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese in 1947, local elections were instituted in the 1950s so as to reduce the level of Taiwanese hostility toward the mainland KMT regime, and to avoid the threat of local violence. The native Taiwanese were able to elect and enter representatives up to the provincial level, and executive officials up to the county/city levels. These elections allowed the native Taiwanese to enter local politics and thus prepared Taiwan's citizens for future democracy.

In addition to maintaining political stability, the KMT also embarked on a process of

modernization in seeking industrialization, urbanization, and economic prosperity. For a long period, the KMT sustained political stability with economic growth under the authoritarian regime. By the 1980s, Taiwan's political landscape had, however, changed dramatically. With the increasing political protests and social movements, Taiwan began the process of democratization with the lifting of martial law in 1987. The first opposition party, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), was legally established in 1988, and the 1989 legislative election became the first nationwide campaign after democratization. Since 1989, the DPP has consistently won approximately 30 percent of vote in the national representative campaigns, and the electoral share of the KMT has been steadily eroded during the transition from a one-party authoritarian regime to a competitive party political system. In the early 1990s, the entire Legislative Yuan and the top executives became subject to election, and party competition was further intensified in 1993 with the split of the New KMT Alliance from the KMT to organize the third party. This party was termed the New Party (NP), and their electorate is heavily concentrated in urban areas among mainlanders and young middle-class voters (Tien 1996). However, despite the KMT's decline, they still remain the majority party in Taiwan.

For the past five decades (1947-1997), the paralleled engineering of electoral politics, social development, and democratization has carried important implications for developing an understanding of women's representational politics in Taiwan. In the pre-1987 authoritarian phase, women who entered politics were the result of the dynamic interaction between political institution and social modernization. To ensure sociopolitical stability, the regime informally utilized electoral clientism in order to tighten social control, detrimentally affecting, in the long term, the opportunities open to women to develop an independent political status (Chen 1996). The regime also formally implemented the SNTV electoral rule and certain gender quotas, which have helped as well as hindered the potential growth of Taiwanese women politicians. The social

program of modernization, which ensured Taiwan's economic prosperity, also altered the existing gender social structure, though in a more positive direction. By 1987, the democratic transition, which has restructured the political scheme of Taiwan, has brought another wave of women into the domain of representative politics. However, over time, women in Taiwanese politics have experienced changing political opportunities and fluctuating constraints derived from the interaction of institutional design and structural reshuffling. Therefore, in the following sections, I examine the implications of the electoral culture and system, of the social structure and change, and of democratization, to women's representational politics in Taiwan.

Political structure and institution

Electoral clientism

Since the evacuation from Mainland China to Taiwan, the KMT has implemented local elections at the level of county magistrates, city mayors, city and county councilmen, and provincial assemblymen. As an extrinsic regime to most native Taiwanese, the KMT controlled the elections by co-opting the existing social structure and local elites by cultivating networks of patronage. By exchanging and allocating economic interests and local rents to local factions, the KMT was able to mobilize local electoral support with which to bolster its political dominance. To strengthen its political control, the KMT pursued bi-factionalism, i.e., they kept two local factions competing for political offices through divide-and-rule tactics. Candidates were mostly from local factions and were prohibited from engaging in activities outside their own voting districts, so much so that an opposition coalition could not be formed. The KMT therefore gained its legitimacy by fostering institutionalized connections between newly arrived mainlander elites and local elites through a patron-client network (Tien 1996).

The KMT's patron-client mechanism is operated through ties with local factions, which have the strongest webs of connection. Especially in traditional rural areas,

everyone is connected to every one else in a complicated web of social relations. These faction webs, or networks, are made up of many types of connections - kin connections (family, relatives, and patrilineal and filial ties), neighbors, classmates, co-workers, or other bonds. The kinship and patron-client nature of these electoral politics greatly influenced the operation of local politics and women's political power at the grass roots level in Taiwan.

Within these connections, women are relatively disadvantaged, since the women's network is less extensive and their status is more subordinate to the patrilineal or filial relationship. Women have ties with their family, their other relatives, and with groups of women with which they socialize, most often in their neighborhood or their natal villages. However, women leave their natal family upon marriage, and hence leave their original network of connection, transferring to become a subordinate of her husband's network. Men, on the contrary, following Chinese convention, live in the same village in which they were raised. Therefore, by comparison, men can maintain continuing and broader village networks (Bosco 1994, 124) in which their kinship relationships can be continuously built up or maintained.

Therefore, the political power women can accrue is limited due to women's discontinued connections and subordinated relationship in the traditional network. The electoral culture in general is a disincentive for independent women to enter politics, and men almost always occupy the leadership positions within the factions. Only under rare conditions (e.g., the reserved-seat system, discussed later), do they recruit relatives or other loyal women to run for political offices. Women politicians that have arisen from the political factions or families are generally seen as fulfilling the need for a political "heir". Their qualifications as political leaders are questioned, since their success depends on the political capital of their families. This type of woman politician does not necessarily succeed in politics, and their political careers are tied to their family elders' (male normally) agreements and party's support which might undermine their subsequent

ability to gain true independence and political stature.

Chiang's interview (Chiang 1996) found that even though female politicians from factions or political families might not start their political careers voluntarily, they could still manage them successfully given their advantages in terms of political socialization, sufficient training, and political resources. Also, because of their factional backgrounds and political experience, their views of power and politics are more realistic and skeptical. However, the patronage orientation of the local networks and factions do limit a woman's ability to act independently and to deal with the social problems of special interest to women (Clark and Clark 1997).

Electoral rule

Different electoral systems also affect the electoral prospects of women and various minority groups. Taiwan employs the single non-transferable voting system (SNTV), like Japan's Lower House before 1994. The majority of Taiwan's legislators, both local and national, are elected under this system, in which votes are cast for only one candidate in a multi-member district, and candidates who get relatively more votes than others win the seats.

Generally speaking, women did better in such multi-member districts with proportional representation than in single-member, plural systems. Willma Rule (Rule 1987) found that party-list proportional representation (PR) systems averaged a 12.5 percent female membership in their lower houses, while other systems averaged only a 4.1 percent female membership. Furthermore, her multivariate analysis showed that the existence of proportional representation with a party list was the major determinant of the level of women's representation in these 23 democracies, controlling for other socioeconomic and political characteristics.

Comparing four parliamentary-plural democracies with nine parliamentary-PR countries in terms of their performance records regarding female representation, Lijphart

(Lijphart 1994) also found significant differences between these two systems. He noted that women legislators were more numerous in PR countries than in plural countries. Engstrom (Engstrom 1987) examined the relationship between district magnitude and female representation in the Irish Dail. His findings suggest that districts with four or five seats are more likely to have female representatives than districts with only three seats.

The prominent explanation for differences in terms of women's representation levels among the different electoral systems is the district magnitude. Some recent research (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Matland 1992; Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Studlar and Welch 1989) also found that more women were elected under multi-member districts than under single-member districts. The reasons why women's representation is advanced in multimember district with proportional representation are various. From the parties' perspective, under a PR system, parties have more incentive to place different based candidates, like women, in the same list to broaden their appeal and to run as a team. At the same time, the potential cost to the party of nominating a woman also decreases. The political risk of nominating women decreases as the district magnitude increases, because unlike the situation that occurs in a single-member district system, a female candidate did not exclude *all* male candidates in a multimember district. From the voters' perspective, voters may be more comfortable voting for women as part of a slate of representatives than as their sole representative. From the female candidates' perspective, they might feel themselves to be more acceptable to parties and voters, and thus be more willing to run for election. In general, a multi-member district system can lower the barriers for women, so they would be willing to stand for election, be acceptable to the party selectorate, and be approved by the voters. Thus, the election turns from a zero-sum game under the plural system into a positive-sum game under the multi-member district system.

The institutional arrangements and legislative consequences for SNTV countries,

such as Taiwan and Japan, are a little more complicated than for a simple PR or plurality system. Unlike the plurality system, under which the winner takes all and minorities run a higher risk of losing in a district, the SNTV is not a zero-sum game in terms of party nominating. Unlike the PR system, under which the party puts the name list together and allocates the votes to its candidates, under the SNTV, the individuals who get the most votes win. Even with multi-member districts, since voters can only cast one vote in the ballot, many voters would still be unwilling to cast their sole vote for a woman as their representative (Amy 1993; Berg 1994; Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Matland 1992) (Studlar and Welch 1989). In terms of minority representation, the SNTV system does manage to avoid the disadvantages of winner-takes-all plurality systems, but it does not have multiple votes and a party list as in multi-member districts, PR systems. Therefore, though the SNTV could be seen as less attractive than straightforward PR, it does appear to be preferable to the plurality system, at least for its multi-member district aspects. Consequently, the SNTV system is regarded as an intermediate stage between plurality systems and PR systems, both because of its electoral allocation rules (which are close to the plural design), and its district magnitudes (which resemble the PR system).

Rule (Rule 1987) compared the consequences of elections held at the same time but under different electoral rules, in Japan. In Japan, elections for the Upper House were held under the PR system, and those for the Lower House were held under the SNTV system (prior to 1994). The electoral outcome in the SNTV multimember districts was very similar to that of single-member districts, since voters selected only one candidate and the district magnitude was, on average, small. Rule argued that the SNTV system for the Lower House discouraged the nomination of women by major and minor parties since the stakes are so high. Alternatively, the PR system employed in the Upper House turned out to be more far more favorable to women's representation. A similar conclusion is also reached in Taagepera's finding (Taagepera 1994) that, although women and

minorities benefit from the increased district magnitude of PR-electoral systems, the SNTV is as unfavorable to women and minorities as a single-member district, plural electoral system. Hickman's most recent findings (Hickman 1997) also showed that increasing district magnitude under Japan's SNTV had a negative effect on the election of women.

However, this conclusion is rarely tested, except in the case of the Japanese Diet Lower House. In Taiwan, the SNTV system has not discouraged women's political participation as in the case of Japan. Women legislators average 10-15 percent of the members elected since the 1980s and Taiwan has achieved the most equitable degree of female legislative representation of any country with an SNTV electoral system. The percentage of female representatives in Taiwan is significantly above the worldwide average for national legislatures and is close to that of Western European countries with multi-member PR electoral systems (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990).

In Taiwan, the districts are based on the existing executive unit and the magnitude varies across different districts, depending on the population of the executive unit. Before the 1989 election, with limited elections at the national level, there were only a few districts (9), and most districts (7 out of the 9) were large ones with at least five seats. Thus it is difficult to determine if increasing the size of the district affects the percentage of women getting elected. However, since the district was redrawn at the 1989 election, it has produced a variety of district magnitudes ranging from one to seventeen. Therefore, examining the effect of district magnitudes on the election of women in the Legislative Yuan finally becomes possible.

Table 2-1 displays the change in the district magnitude and number of women elected across time in the Legislative Yuan election. As it shows, the number of districts changed from 9 to 27 in 1989, and the district magnitude thus began to vary greatly after the 1990 election. Table 2-2 examines the correlation between the district magnitude and women's representation under the SNTV system, and this correlation is both positive and

Table 2-1. Elected seats (E.S.) and number of women elected (W.E.) in different district magnitudes in the legislative Yuan.

Magnitude	1983 E.S./ W.E.	1986 E. S./ W.E.	1989 E. S./ W. E	1992 E. S./ W. E	1995 E. S./ W. E
1	1(1)/ 0	1(1)/ 0	8(8) / 1	5(5)/ 0	5(5) / 0
2	2(1)/ 0	2(1)/ 0	10(5)/ 0	10(5)/ 1	10(5)/ 1
3			9(3) / 2	9(3)/ 0	9(3)/ 1
4			24(6)/ 3	12(3)/ 1	12(3)/ 2
5	10(2)/ 2	10(2)/ 1	5(1)/ 1	10(2)	5(1)/ 0
6	6(1)/ 1	6(1)/ 1	12(2)/ 3	18(3)/ 3	24(4)/ 4
7				21(3)/ 3	14(2)/ 1
8	16(2)/ 1	8(1)/ 2			8(1)/ 1
9	18(2)/ 4	18(2)/ 1		18(2)/ 2	18(2)/ 6
10		10(1)/ 2			
11-15			11(1)/ 2		
16-20				16(1)/ 2	17(1)/ 2
Total	53(9)/ 8	55(9) /7	79(26)/ 12	119(27)/ 12	122(27)/ 18

Note: figures in parentheses are the frequencies of each district magnitude.

Table 2-2 Correlation between district magnitude (DM) and the number of women candidate elected under the SNTV for the Legislative Yuan election.

Year	Number of women MPs elected by SNTV(all)	Number of MPs elected by SNTV(all)	% of female MPs elected by SNTV	Correlation between DM and number of district female candidates	Correlation between DM and number of district female delegations
1989	12(13)	79 (101)	15%	.710**	.750**
1992	12 (17)	119 (161)	10%	.891**	.746**
1995	18 (23)	122 (164)	16%	.672**	.658**

Note: the figures in parentheses indicate the total MPs including non-territorial members.
** correlation is significant at 0.01 level.

significant. Districts with several seats available are more likely to attract a large number of women candidates to run for election. Furthermore, the district magnitude is also positively associated with the chance of women getting elected in the SNTV electoral system. This assertion holds true in Taiwan's SNTV system and strengthens the argument for adopting larger district magnitudes in non-PR electoral systems.

The recent ongoing debate in Taiwan about whether to adopt a single-member plurality system to replace the existing SNTV system is therefore expected to alter the existing electoral course in many aspects, including that of female representation. In the interviews, some female legislators did express concern that the change from the SNTV to the single-member plurality system might be harmful to them. One senior female legislator strongly opposes the single member plurality system because she claims that it might totally deprive women of their political opportunities (interview: 98031). Another KMT female legislator feels uneasy about redrawing the magnitude of districts so as to create smaller ones, since she considers it a threat to her chances of re-election to be forced to fight a smaller district (interview: 98002). It appears that some legislators, especially female legislators, are aware of the effect of electoral rules and district magnitude on the future prospects of women both seeking re-election, and those looking to enter the Yuan for the first time.

Gender quotas

Another major reason for the relatively high level of women's representation in Taiwan compared to Japan lies in the system of reserved seats. Chou, Clark, and Clark, attributed the differences as regards female representation between the Japanese and Taiwanese legislatures under the SNTV system to the use of the reserved-seats system (gender quota) in Taiwan. By the 1947 constitution, women are guaranteed some seats in Taiwan's legislative assembly. In most of the elections, women run in the general constituencies, and female candidates are guaranteed a certain minimum number of the

seats in each district. The exact number of guaranteed seats and the mechanisms for electing women are left to the statutory law and are, therefore, slightly different at different levels of the representative bodies. In the Legislative Yuan election, one seat is reserved for women in a district with a total of five to ten seats and another reserved seat is added whenever the district magnitude is increased by ten. In practice, the number of seats reserved for women has never exceeded one per district, since Taiwan's district magnitude has never exceeded 19. An electoral district needs to elect 20 members before a second reserved seat is designated for female candidates.

There are two mechanisms that allow women to be selected from these reserved seats under the SNTV rule. Firstly, when a sufficient number of female candidates win, they are viewed as having fulfilled the quota reserved for women. However, when none or not enough female candidates are running in multimember districts, the votes of all the women candidates are tallied separately, and then the female candidate or candidates with the highest number of votes are elected to fulfill the seats reserved for women (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990). For example, in 1986 legislative election, in Kaohsiung district, there were five seats and 11 candidates were running in that district. Under the normal SNTV rule, the first five candidates with the most votes won the seats. However, when the reserved seat is taken into account, it is mandatory that one out of five seats must be assigned to a female candidate. The electoral result was changed due to the reserved seat. Table 2-3 shows the electoral result. In this example, the district magnitude equals five, therefore, one reserved seat was assigned for female candidate No. 11, and male candidate No. 8 was excluded even he got more vote than No. 11.

The formula for calculating the quota possesses a markedly "U-curve" distribution instead of being proportional to the population share of women. When the district magnitude (total number of seats) is small, for example 5, the proportion of women's guaranteed representation appears to be high around 20%; as the district magnitude increases from 5 to 19, the average proportion of women's reserved representation

Table 2-3. The electoral outcome in Kaohsiung district under the SNTV system in 1986.

Candidate	Sex	Votes	Vote ranking	Elected
1. Lee, Ming-chu	M	2,892	11	No
2. Chang, Chun-hsiung	M	77,429	3	Yes
3. Chou, Kao-chuan	M	4,805	10	No
4. Dai, Chung-ching	M	13,378	7	No
5. Su, Chiu-cheng	M	11,184	8	No
6. Wang, Yi-hsiung	M	91,984	1	Yes
7. Ma, Wei-pang	M	5,724	9	No
8. Chang, His-yao	M	54,896	5	No (excluded)
9. Huang, Cheng-hsiung	M	62,159	4	Yes
10. Hsiao, Chu-chiao	M	86,903	2	Yes
11. Wu, Der-Mei	F	35,747	6	Yes(reserved)

Source: The Electoral Bulletin of Central Election Commission.

decreases to 5% before it increases again. Only when the district magnitude reaches 20 will the level of representation reserved to women increase again to a maximum of 10% (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990). Given the fact that the district magnitude in Taiwan's legislative elections range from 2 to 17, the reserved-seats do not perform the same floor function at all levels of district magnitude. The low level of representation for women prescribed by law only aims to set the *minimum* threshold for women's political representation.

Generally speaking, the purpose of the quota system is to promote political equality between the sexes. It is widely recognized that the gender quotas create incentives for parties to nominate women as legislative candidates. For a period of time, the reserved seat system had clearly been beneficial in so far as it was promoting women's political representation in Taiwan. The proportion of women in Taiwan's assemblies is quite high in relative terms, especially in light of the island's patriarchal society and level of development. Indeed, the reserved-seat system motivates parties to recruit women candidates to run for the reserved seat, for fear of an opposing party filling it. Once in public office, female representatives, who were first elected as tokens by the reserved-seat, develop their own political skills and are eventually transformed into competitive

candidates. Over time women clearly *did* become competitive in their own right as evidenced by their winning significantly more than their minimum number of reserved seats. During the 1970s and 1980s, women consistently won more local council positions than they had been guaranteed. At the provincial and national levels, women's ability to win more than their minimum quota grew much slower (except for the Taipei City assembly and National Assembly). Yet by the mid-to-late 1980s, women were able to exceed their minimum quotas in the Provincial Assembly and Legislative Yuan as well.

However, attributing the success of female levels of election to the reserved-seat system is no longer such an unquestionably valid approach. Since the late 1980s, the female share of the seats in most assemblies has grown only marginally. Despite the advantages women representatives may have attained through this institutionalized guarantee over the past four decades, as the sociopolitical context has changed, this institutional arrangement has become more of a ceiling which stagnates the growth of women representatives rather than a floor which assures a certain level of female representation. Since 1987, Taiwan has entered a new stage of socioeconomic development and democratic transition and consolidation. More eligible women candidates have moved forward, yet, parties still appear reluctant to nominate more than one woman in each district beyond the level prescribed by the quota (Chou 1995).

It is also the case that, at the moment, almost all of the female candidates win in their districts without the need for their gender quotas. Clearly, the quota is too conservative to produce any progressive effects on the level of women's legislative representation. Nowadays, in Taiwanese politics, almost none of the establishment women are elected through the reserved-seat system, as evidenced by the claims made during my interviews with the third-term legislators, the majority of whom won first or second place in their districts. Women have gradually become independent actors in the sense that they win enough legislative races beyond their reserved minimums to demonstrate that they are viable candidates in their own right. Some of them even

mentioned the *negative* effects of reserved-seat system as regards its influence on a party's nominating and electoral campaign strategy. One senior female legislator reported that her campaign consultants told her to target another woman candidate instead of other male candidates as her primary male opponent. She disagreed with that strategy, but the situation certainly does arise. However, as a whole, she supports the system of gender quotas due to her recognition that not many women possess the sort of social and familial resources that she does (Interview: 98031).

In some interviews, women legislators suggested a more progressive measure of gender quota to kick start female representation out of its current state of slumber. Most of the female legislators do not espouse the Nordic European model of relatively high quotas (30-40 percent), instead, they suggest an increase in the size of the gender quota from the current level of approximately 10 percent to something approximating to a quarter of the seats available. They realize that elite women can hardly understand the needs of women of other classes, and the needs for a higher gender quota, which would both encourage women to run for election in the first place, and force the parties to be to nominate more women.

Social structure and change

Modernization

The changing gender roles in Taiwan should be assessed against a backdrop of Confucian patriarchal culture and an ongoing modernization process. As well as attempting to maintain the traditional culture and level of social control, the KMT also sought social modernization, committing itself to promoting rapid economic development and industrialization and to taking care of all groups and classes through legal reforms and universal education (Chu 1994). Consequently, during the most recent decades, Taiwan has experienced a dramatic economic expansion known as "The Taiwan Miracle" (Rubinstein 1994). However, those social changes that have accompanied this process of

modernization, have brought tension to a social structure deeply rooted in a patriarchal culture.

On the one hand, the traditional patriarchal culture prescribes women's roles as being complementary to those of men, and women are expected to serve different functions that assist with the overall development of society. In the 1960s, educated women were encouraged by the government to participate in the work force to fuel economic expansion (Gallin 1984). Women were seen as an efficient and flexible reserve army of labor with which to bring about economic prosperity but, as economic prosperity contributed to the growth of a new urban middle class in the 1970s, the government then began to promote the wife and mother role as the proper sphere for women to adopt (Farris 1994).

On the other hand, this process of modernization contributed to the change in women's roles and still helps, indirectly, to enhance women's political status. In theory, socioeconomic progress as a result of modernization should break the traditional patriarchy and kinship culture and enhance the status of women in society. In addition, the rising educational levels provide women with the means to realize their potential, move into the workplace, and perhaps alter their social status. Industrialization creates opportunities for women to leave the home and enter the workplace. As a result, the increase in employment can endow women with material independence, increase their self-esteem, and give them a degree of control over their lives. Moreover, women's entrance into the labor market moves them from the private to the public spheres, changes the traditional socialization pattern, and fosters their interests in public affairs.

And in practice, the mandated primary and secondary education and the merit-based access to higher education in Taiwan did create an enlarged group of well-educated, well-adjusted, women. With respect to the average years of schooling, in 1951, men had more than women (3.9 to 1.4 years), but by 1983, this gap had shrunk considerably (8.9 to 7.4). As regards college education, women's share of this grew from 18.8 percent in 1958 to

43.6 percent in 1987 (Chou 1994). This improvement in women's educational standards also laid the foundations for their equal entrance into various occupations. The rapid industrialization in Taiwan shattered the traditional labor model of "men go out, women stay in" by bringing more women into new jobs in various industries, service-based sectors, and professional occupations. From the 1960s to the 1980s, women have increasingly participated in the expanding industrial production sector and have significantly succeeded in gaining entrance to the more desirable clerical and professional jobs on almost equal terms with men. In twenty years, modernization had altered the social gender structure in term of education growth and occupation distribution.

Consequently, the increase in education and employment has led to a change in women's political participation. In the past, in terms of voting behavior, women were considered as more conservative or dependent than men, and more likely to be influenced by their husbands or parents in voting decisions because of their family roles (Hu and Chen 1987). Women were more likely to vote because of relational connections, like friends, classmates, and neighborhoods. Also women voters were more likely to be mobilized by factions: female factional voters (59.6 percent) outnumbered male faction voters (40.4 percent) (Chen 1994). In terms of party preferences, it was found that the majority of women voters did not have any (52. 5 percent of women compared with 45.8 percent of men). Among those female voters with party preferences, only 8.8 percent of women voted for the DPP; whereas 16 percent of men voted for the KMT (Huang 1994). In fact, in general, it was found that the majority of women voters supported the KMT, and that the DPP's electoral support was drawn largely from male voters. This particular gender gap would seem to indicate that women tend to be more conservative and thus more supportive of the KMT.

The gender gap as regards political participation is in many ways decreasing (improving) as a result of women's increasing education and employment opportunities. In addition, the conservatism of women voters was found to be related to their lower

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education, profession, and family status. Some scholars stratified voters by education, profession, and marital status, and found that the differences between men and women decreased within the same stratum (Fan and Hsu 1994; You 1989). As women voters have obtained higher levels of education and forced their way into better professions, the gender gap has clearly narrowed, proving that women's political conservatism and dependence was caused by their education and marital status rather than their gender. A comparison of female voting patterns between the years 1983 and 1992 found that the turnout of women's votes had increased over time, and women had gradually been politically mobilized - i.e., they'd gained higher political interests, formed clearer party preferences, and had cultivated higher democratic values.

However, despite these obvious improvements, one must still describe the impact of modernization upon women's political status as mixed. Whereas all the above is certainly true, and women's passive forms of political participation (such as voting) now exhibit a far higher level of sophistication; in terms of active political participation (e.g., participation in campaign activities), the gender gap does not yet appear to have narrowed much (Chao 1995). Under the KMT's one-party rule, women's political role was substantively limited and the percentage of female party cadres in the KMT serves as an indicator of just how insubstantial women's political power under the KMT was. Though past research found that the educational level of KMT's party cadres increased over time, it was also the case that the percentage of women cadres *decreased* during the same period. For example, whereas at the provincial level, the KMT cadres with college education increased from 53.4 percent to 76.7 percent, at the county level, from 38 percent to 64.9 percent, and at the district level, from 40.2 percent to 85.3 percent, the percentage of female cadres within the KMT did not grow over the same period. In fact, female cadres decreased from 8.0 percent to only 5.4 percent at the district level, and from 17.4 percent to 15.9 percent at the county level. Only at the province level did the percentage increase slightly (Dickson 1996). To put it simply, in electoral politics as a

whole growth in the level of female representation did not keep pace with changes in the socioeconomic structure.

Women's organizations and movements

Another aspect of social change that is important to women's political power lies in the evolution and development of women's movements and organizations. Viewed by most Taiwanese as a foreign regime, the KMT reoriented the social organizations to accommodate existing social structures and tight social control. In addition to the electoral clientism exhibited at the grass roots level in order to co-opt the existing sociopolitical network into the party structure, in the social sphere, the KMT applied social corporatism to restructure civil society and voluntary organizations.

On a national level, the KMT divided society into functionally specialized groups, labor unions, farmer associations, fisherman associations, trade associations, intellectuals, students, and other professional groups. Before the democratic liberalization of the late 1980s, there was only one official recognized union or association within each section. Any other paralleled organizations were prohibited. The KMT controlled and demobilized all modern social sectors through the pre-emptive incorporation of all social groups, and, because these associations were closely controlled by the KMT, their members had little or no autonomy. It has been argued that this social corporatism had successfully controlled and atomized society, and that, as a result, Taiwanese civil society had been deprived of the option of autonomous collective action (Chen 1996; Chu 1994).

Since tight control was exerted over the non-governmental organizations under martial law, the vast majority of women's groups were either controlled by the KMT, such as the Chinese women's anti-communist aggression league, and the Fu-Nu Huei women's associations, or were local branches of conservative international organizations, such as the YWCA, the Zonta Club, and the Taipei Jaycettes (Farris 1994). Within these organizations, women served as wives of celebrities or maintained their own social status

within the traditional and conservative value system that dominated. Most of the women's organizations maintained a close association with the KMT and followed the policies decided by the Office of Women's Activities of the KMT central party, under the leadership of Chiang, Sung, May-Ling. Autonomous women's organizations promoting social reform did not exist until the 1970s.

The earliest attempt to form an influential women's movements in Taiwan dates back to the early 1970s. Lu, Hsiu-Lien, the pioneer of Taiwan's women's movement, launched the organization with a talk on International Women's Day, 1972. Under the authoritarian regime, she undertook a series of lectures, debates, and writings to raise the consciousness of women. However, her first attempt to organize a women's organization - the Association for the Promotion of Women - was thwarted by the Taipei City government in 1972. One year later, in 1973, the Taipei Chapter of the International Federation of Business and Professional Women, aiming at sponsoring activities and networks for career women, was formed. However, the founder, Lu, was later forced out by the wives of KMT officials. At the same year, the Protect You Hotlines, which were set up to counsel and help women who suffered domestic violence or sexual assault, were closed down within two years of opening - sabotaged by the KMT. The feminist publications distributed by the Pioneer Press (established by Lu) were censored and denied a copyright by the government. The first stage of the women's movement was regarded as a one-person crusade by Lu (Lu 1994), and, given the extent to which it was attacked, this was no doubt the case as women rushed to distance themselves from any possible association with the movement.

This first example of a women's movements was strategically moderate and appealed to the universality of human nature. In Lu's own words, it accepted the validity of marriage, the ethic foundation of the society, and the feminine nature of women by setting the issue of freedom of sexuality aside to reduce possible objections. However, the advancement of the women's movement inevitably provoked traditional patriarchal

attacks and harassment from the KMT, because the idea of feminism was clearly contrary to the KMT's women's policy. The permissive women's organizations under the KMT's corporatism advocated preserving the patriarchal traditions and roles, according to which women should serve as good mothers, virtuous wives, and voluntary workers. Given the conflicting directions of the women's movement with the KMT's policy, the movement could not continue. With all the frustration and harassment from the KMT that followed, Lu changed her life and went to study abroad, later becoming an opposition activist, arrested and sentenced to 12 years in prison following the Kaohsiung Incident (discussed later).

In 1982, to further the cause of feminism, a group of feminists formed the Women's New Awakening Association, which became the only association openly promoting feminist and women's rights under the KMT's tight control. The New Awakening worked to raise female consciousness and voice feminist opinions through the means of publishing a monthly magazine. However, the New Awakening magazine was considered radical and was not readily circulated in the beginning. In challenging the traditional gender roles and culture, this association also sponsored annually thematic activities regarding, and drawing attention to, women's issues, and initiated discussions on the injustice of women's legal status. They also carried their concerns into legislative politics by seeking to change this legal status. Despite some practical difficulties (management and finance), the organization succeeded in serving as the center of the feminists' movement, and coordinated the joint activities of other women's groups.

With the lifting of martial law in 1987, a variety of women's organizations were formed and women's movements gained a new dynamism. In 1987, the New Environmental Association was established to recruit housewives to advocate consumer and environmental protection rights. In the same year, the Taiwanese Women's Rescue Association was formed by some female lawyers and other concerned citizens to provide legal services for child prostitutes. Also the Warm Life Association was established for

supporting divorced women and widows. In early 1987, the Rainbow (a project for rehabilitating escaped child prostitutes) and the Awakenings projects joined with other human rights, religious, and women's groups to demonstrate against the abuse of child prostitutes on Hwa-hsi Street in Taipei. This was the first time that Taiwanese women had organized a mass protest on the street.

The multiplicity and diversity of women's organizations and activities demonstrated that they were not only concerned with the traditional women's issues of child and health care, but also with broader social issues which might be contrary to the government's agenda. For example, they not only voiced their concerns regarding such matters as prostitution, pornography, and discrimination in the workplace, but also participated in protests related to consumption, environment and pollution, minorities, and the aborigines' land struggles (Clark and Clark 1997; Farris 1994). The diversity of the activities and functions of women's groups may not have necessarily furthered the cause of women's rights, but it did elevate women's status through an increasing degree of participation in social issues and public affairs.

Generally speaking, although the women's movement existed before democratization, its influence was limited. However, as democratization took place, the women's movement embraced a period of transitional diversity. Facing the opposition of a still largely patriarchal society and authoritarian regime, some of the women activists persisted with the women's movement and sought social reform as outlined above. On the other hand, some of them joined the opposition movement, hoping to bring down the KMT's authoritarian regime.

Democratization
Democratic transition and women

The dynamics of democratization have changed the political landscapes and gender politics of the past decade. Under the authoritarian regime, most governments are

concerned with national security and stability and thereby prescribe their members certain roles to achieve these goals. Women were mostly deemed to be the guardians of traditional family values and social order. Given the history of rights granted from above, the autonomous women's organizations or movements found it hard to emerge into the light. In Taiwan, under the authoritarian regime, women performed traditional roles ratified by Confucian culture and the KMT's ideology. As already pointed out, the political roles played by women were extremely limited. Thus women who wanted to hold public offices had to make their way either through local faction's recruitment systems or gender quotas. Furthermore, the KMT's corporatism had atomized women away from participating in any autonomous collective action. Even though women's movements emerged in the 1970s, before the democratization proceeded, their influence was not great.

However, Waylen (Waylen 1994) argued that some authoritarian regimes did allow one section of the population, women, the space to mobilize, and that, in the absence of conventional politics, they tended to allow women to develop new ways of practicing politics. Comparing the differences between socialist and Latin American countries, Waylen found that the latter gave women more space for political mobilization. In the former societies, such as those in Central and Eastern Europe, the government, with a symbolic commitment to gender equality, did include a considerable number of women in politics. But a high proportion of women politicians were co-opted into the establishment's politics and the women were, essentially, little more than tokens. On the other hand, in Latin America, women were relegated to the protection of the traditional values of God, family, and nation. Because the military government often did not see women's activities as dangerous enough to warrant repression, this gave women the opportunity to mobilize their causes. For example, one of the first mass protests against the Pinochet government in Chile was mobilized by women, who used their traditional maternal roles to protest against the regime. That made it hard for the Pinochet regime to

launch any attack since the women claimed to be fulfilling their maternal roles.

Like the situation in Latin America, women also played a significant role during the transitional process in Taiwan (Clark and Clark 1997). In the 1970s, social movements, human rights groups, and political oppositions began to take root in Taiwan. In the 1980s, these social and political opposition movements had been able to expand, campaigning through a nationwide network of political alliances. A semi-opposition group (Tang-wei, or non-KMT) was formed advocating a greater measure of liberalization and democratization. The opposition movement was interrupted by the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979, a large demonstration against the ruling party which led to a violent confrontation with the regime. The regime responded by arresting and jailing the major opposition leaders. After the event, to fill the evacuated leadership positions following the arrests, the wives of the demonstration organizers became symbolic leaders of the opposition. The absence of men in the opposition brought a new wave of women into the opposition movement to continue the Tang-wei cause. Those women without previous political experiences and involvement were motivated by the KMT's suppression and imprisonment of their husbands, and chose elections as the channels through which to voice their dissent regarding political prosecution and the need for liberalization. Running for office as relatives of political prisoners, and with the voters' sympathy and resentment of KMT injustice behind them, these women won a stunning share of the vote in the 1980s' elections. These campaigns were run for moral and symbolic reasons rather than in the hope of actually gaining political power. However, by so successfully publicizing these moral concerns, these women were advocating the opposition cause (Clark and Clark 1997).

The role women played at the beginning of the democratic transition was to create a space for which conventional politics does not allow. In Taiwan, the elected wives of the arrested opposition dissidents continued the push toward democracy until 1986, when they helped establish the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Later, as democratization

moved on, male leaders of the opposition were released from jail and reassumed control of the DPP. As the politics returned to normal, most of these women, who had acted as surrogates for their husbands, have not gone on to gain top leadership positions in the DPP. Some of the surrogates withdrew or transformed their resources into family politics, while others remained active, accumulating their own political careers based on their past accomplishments.

Instead of being surrogates of absent male leaders or concomitants of political families, some women played an independent and autonomous role in the opposition, coming into politics in an incremental way, either working as assistants of opposition politicians or joining the democratic protest movement. They had had first-hand experience of being victims of authoritarian oppression. This type of woman, who had grown under the authoritarian regime and had run for political offices successfully, was relatively rare in the 80s. They had been well aware of the reality of politics while in office, but they still held rather objective attitudes toward their own goals and ideals (Chiang 1996). Most of these independent women remain active in politics since their political participation is as a result of their own long-held aspirations.[3]

The impact of democratization on women's representation

As noted, no necessary connection exists between playing an important part in any stage of the process of democratization and having a favored status during the period of consolidation. In some cases, normal party politics pushed surrogated women back into their subordinate political roles; in others, independent women politicians converted the high profile they had achieved into institutional representation. It is important to evaluate the impact of this reconstitution of democratic politics on women's political participation

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[3] For example, while serving as public officers, Chen, Chie is still enthusiastic for human rights; Lu, Hsiu-Lien is still pursuing women's independent status in the society and working for Taiwan's international status.

on a general level. I examine the impact of democratization on women's political representation from the following two aspects: electoral and party political.

With respect to electoral politics, democratization requires open and regular elections that provide women with the opportunity to vote and be elected. However, the percentage of female representatives does not increase consistently as democratization proceeds. If one compares statistics in the National Assembly before and after democratization in the late 1980s, the percentage of women representatives can be seen to have decreased from 19.0 percent in 1986 to 12.9 percent in 1991. In the Legislative Yuan election, the figure increased from 8.0 percent in 1985 to 13.9 percent in 1989, but decreased again to 10.6 percent in 1992. In the mayoral and magistrate elections, which control the most important executive resources, women won very few seats both before and after democratization.

In terms of running as candidates, except in the national assembly, women's degree of participation has marginally increased, but the change has not been substantial. However, the success rate of women candidates has actually decreased since democratization began in 1986. In the Legislative Yuan, the success rate of women candidates dropped from 66.7 percent in 1987 to 37 percent in 1991; in the National Assembly, the rate decreased from 64 percent in 1986 to 56.8 percent in 1991(Chou 1995). Clearly, the percentage of women in the representative bodies did not rise significantly as, even though more women ran for election, the success rate of women candidates did not increase in line with expectations.

With respect to party politics, the open competition among parties - the KMT, the DPP, and the NP - also creates new space for women to enter party politics. Theoretically, because parties struggle for the majority's support, they must mobilize every possible political resource and appeal to different constituencies. As a result of the perceived importance of women's mobilization, parties may well try to gain women's support by proposing more women candidates in the ballot.

In terms of the number of female candidates within each party after democratization, except in the 1989 Legislative Yuan election, the percentage of the KMT female candidates has *decreased*, whereas the relative number of DPP and NP female candidates has *increased*. At the local level, the KMT's faction domination has long prevented independent women from running as KMT candidates. In terms of party nomination, all three parties have increased their female nominees across time. Among the three parties, except in the 1989 legislative election, the percentage of KMT female nominees has always been lower than that of the DPP and the NP after 1986. Generally, therefore, women have received higher levels of electoral nominations from the new parties, which suggests that new parties tend to offer more opportunities for women. However, there has been no significant increase in women's electoral representation and appointment to top government posts after democratization (Chou 1995).

The change of the Legislative Yuan

Significant change has also occurred in the legislative politics after democratization. Before democratization, the majority of the members of the Legislative Yuan were the tenured members elected in Mainland China, even though the supplementary members have increasingly formed a much higher percentage of those who actively participate in the legislative process.[4] The elected supplementary seats as well as the tenured members in the Legislative Yuan were subject to the KMT's manipulation, and the Legislative Yuan was viewed as a rubber stamp for decisions made, essentially, from the KMT party center (the Central Standing Committee). Because the KMT's nomination made it extremely likely that the member would get elected (Ho 1986), most elected legislators followed the KMT party line in the Legislature Yuan.

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[4] Even the supplementary members constituted only a tiny minority in the Legislative Yuan, in 1983, they performed 52.7 percent of the articulation in the legislature, whereas the majority of the tenured members never presented any ideas or spoke less than once per session in the legislature (Ho 1986).

The party dynamics in the legislative politics changed in the mid-1980s. The DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), the first opposition party, was formed in 1986 and legalized in 1988. In 1986, 13 DPP members were elected and entered the Legislative Yuan. The number of opposition members was too small to wield significant influence on the legislative process, except to disrupt the normal operation of the legislature. The 1989 legislative election was the first nationwide election (the founding election) following this legalization of the DPP, the first opposition party, and democratization was thus institutionalized. In the 1989 supplementary election, the DPP won almost 30 percent of the vote, whereas the KMT earned 59 percent. With a critical number (21 seats), the DPP members were strong enough to effectively filibuster the KMT's bills and were able to attain a quorum in initiating bills and amendments. The vote share of the KMT has steadily eroded, whereas that of the DPP has increased over time.

The legislative sessions from 1948-1992 were termed the first term of the legislature. In 1992, the tenured cohorts involuntarily retired and the entire Yuan was subject to election on a three-year basis, which was called the second term legislature.[5] The party competition further intensified in 1993 as the New KMT Alliance registered as the New Party (NP). The NP, with a significant voter base for a third party, gained few seats but maintained strong vote solidarity and has often fulfilled a "balancing" role on the floor and in committees. The DPP, combined with the NP, could form a majority of the vote in the Legislative Yuan (Tien 1996). Faced with the DPP's and the NP's challenges, the KMT's dominance in the decision making process has been gradually eroded, and the whole ecology of the Legislative Yuan changed. I show the changing

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[5] Since 1992, there have been four types of legislators in the Legislative Yuan. The first one is the territorial representative elected by SNTV. The second one is the party representatives, proportional to the vote shares party gain in territorial election.[(total votes for party A/total votes)* total PR representatives] The threshold for the PR is 5% of the total vote share. The party representation replaces the system of occupational group representation and gives the party more power selecting its representatives. Still the last two types of legislators, which constitute a small number of the representatives, are 6 overseas Chinese delegates elected by party proportion lists; and 6 minority representatives elected by aboriginal voters.

party composition of the Legislative Yuan over time in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4. Proportions of votes and seats of major parties in the Legislative Yuan elections,1986-1998

Year	Total Seats	KMT % Seats	Votes	DPP% (tangwei) Seats	Votes	NP % Seats	Votes	Others Seats	Votes
1986	73	80.8(59)	66.7	16.4(13)	24.6	---		2.8(1)	8.7
1989	101	71.3(72)	59.2	20.8(21)	29.9	---		7.9(8)	10.9
1992	161	63.4(102)	52.7	32.9(53)	36.1	---		3.7(6)	11.2
1995	164	51.8(85)	46.1	32.9(54)	33.2	12.8(21)	13.0	2.5(4)	7.7
1998	225	54.7(123)	46.4	31.1(70)	29.6	4.9(11)	7.1	9.3(21)	16.9

Notes: cell entries are the percentages each party received in elections. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of seats of each party.
Sources: The data from the 1986 to 1995 elections are based on Sheng, 1996, p.13. The data on the 1998 election are based on the web-site report of the Central Election Commission, Taiwan.

In addition to party competition, the KMT and the DPP further split into several opinion groups. The fragmentation has made it difficult for the party leaders to govern the legislative process. In the past, the KMT leadership was able to impose party discipline on its factional party members given the electoral advantages of a KMT nomination in the Legislative Yuan election. However, with democratization and increasing electoral competition, the relationship between the KMT's central leadership and its legislative members has been weakened. Given the declining levels of KMT discipline, the ruling majority party has lost its ability to manage the legislative process. As a result of increasing party competition and loosened party discipline, cross-party voting has also become very common. Bills were frequently held up in committee and on the floor (Tien 1996). Put simply, the function and ecology of the Legislature Yuan has been altered.

Furthermore, the legislative function has evolved to reflect the changing party dynamics and new political reality following democratization. In the past, legislators were used to paying most of their attention to interpellation as a gesture of administrative

oversight. However, the real policy impact of interpellation was limited. In the watershed 1989 legislative term, most of the tenured legislators grew older and attended fewer Yuan meetings, and the 101 newly elected supplementary members had gradually taken over almost all the legislative power within the Yuan. Elected legislators not only oversaw the executive in interpellation sessions and performed constituency service, but also began to exercise policy initiatives and to participate actively in committees and floor meetings. The executive department will still lead policy initiatives in many instances, of course, but the policy steering power, including the informal process of party bargaining and the formal process of agenda setting and policy debate, has gradually transferred itself to the institutionalized Legislative Yuan.

Legislators have become more active and autonomous in the decision-making process. Before the 1980s, most bills were initiated by the Executive Yuan and legislators just voted for them. In the late 1980s, legislators started speaking more frequently. In terms of speaking for bills, on average, a legislator spoke less than 20 times per session during the period 1973-1980, 32 times per session during 1981-1983, and more than 70 times per session after the mid-1980s. In terms of initiating bills, before the 1990s, the average number of legislators' initiations was less than one per session. However, from the beginning of 1991, legislators began sponsoring bills aggressively. The average number of bills sponsored rose dramatically in 1993; there were about 6.5 initiations per person at the break in session in the second term of the Legislative Yuan (Sheng 1996). The Legislative Yuan, which used to serve as a rubber stamp during the authoritarian era, has turned into a true law-making body and an important policy forum.

The increasing levels of party competition and legislative autonomy have transferred matters of policy decision from the centralized top-down KMT dominance to the competing "bottom-up" representative politics. Women began to protest the right to demand government to meet their needs, to incorporate their concerns into policy

discourse, and to become political agents in bringing about changes. Parties have tried to mobilize women's support by placing women's issues on electoral and legislative agendas, and, there have been a number of policy initiatives aimed specifically at women's concerns.

A summary

Sociopolitical life in Taiwan is generally structured upon an informal kinship and faction network, which precipitates a "patronage-led" electoral culture and discriminates against the concept of female political representation because of their linkage to the traditional patriarchal culture. Thus women must mobilize resources from supportive natal and marital families to gain political power (Clark and Clark 1997). Nevertheless, the introduction of local elections based on the system of SNTV, and the special provision of the reserved-seats system for women, has countered many of the traditional cultural disadvantages facing politically ambitious women and has created a beneficial political opportunity structure for women to gain political power. These electoral provisions create incentives for parties to nominate women candidates, which triggers further election gains by women.

Rapid modernization has also removed the barriers against the entry of women into public life. Increasing opportunities in the fields of education and employment have improved women's social mobility and level of political participation. Moreover, the rising women's movements and political transition have further impinged on the patriarchal power structure of pre-democratic Taiwan. As a result of these favorable changes in the sociopolitical environment, female entrance to representative politics no longer relies on the approval of political families or factions or a reserved-seat system administered by the state.

In general, this chapter has focused on women's political status in Taiwan's changing sociopolitical context. This lays the foundation for understanding the gender dynamics visible in the legislative politics to which I will now turn.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Theoretical hypotheses

Liberal theorists assert that, regardless of their social and cultural backgrounds, and thus without making any distinction based on identity differences, all people should be treated equally. Therefore, representatives can represent anything or anyone *without* sharing particular identity features and, consequently, a random relationship is expected between identity and representation since identity characteristics will not influence a representative's legislative performance. On the other hand, the politics of difference posits that identity characteristics *do* matter and that they shape the policy interests of deputies. Therefore, this approach implies that gender distinguishes male from female legislators with respect to the substance of policy representation. However, it is clearly the case that these two theories contradict each other and, in order to resolve this issue, I propose to re-examine the empirical base of this theoretical debate, focusing primarily upon the representational politics of Taiwan.

A study of women in Taiwanese legislative politics in the 1980s found that those who entered politics through the reserved-seats system differed little from their male counterparts in terms of role orientations, types of legislative activities, and legislative effectiveness. The only exception to this, as already observed, was that they were less active than man as regards actually sponsoring legislation (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990). However, despite this apparent *lack* of a clear difference between the sexes, certain differences can now be seen to have been underestimated. One reason for this was the urgent concern at that time to demonstrate that a female could compete with men on the same terms, rather than to identify different policy interests between the genders. In other

words, attempts to demonstrate that there was a difference between the sexes were regarded as undesirable in the 1980s. Consequently, the concerns and aims of the researchers themselves have, to a certain extent, attempted to reflect political reality, by putting more emphasis upon comparing male and female equality as regards opportunities and capabilities, but neglecting to examine the meaning of female representation to women and the differences that gender might make.

Generally speaking, the democratization of Taiwan since 1987 has given rise to different voices in a more equal tone. In the 1990s, a heated debate upon identity politics, such as ethnicity (the mainlanders versus the native Taiwanese), ideology (independence versus unification), and gender, have combined to foster a new awareness of the "politics of difference" that such multiple identities can generate. However, to date, the majority of studies have identified ethnic identity and conflict as the most important factors in understanding party coalition, ideological confrontation, and social fissures in Taiwan. As a result of this focus, the possible relationships between gender identity and group representation have, as already suggested, been largely ignored. However, as more issues emerge that span the entire political spectrum, and competing political groupings succeed in inspiring very different sections of Taiwanese society to take an interest in them (Chu and Lin 1996), it is my belief that matters of gender will become increasingly important.

As already noted, the importance of the role of women in Taiwan has grown significantly in a number of ways. Socially and economically, due to increasing educational and employment opportunities, and the effects of social modernization, women have been able to compete on more equal terms with men in more occupations and activities than was previously the case. In electoral politics, since the late 1980s, women have been able to exceed their minimum quotas by a significant margin. The intense and growing competition between the main political parties - the KMT, the DPP, and the NP - has forced these organizations to take note of the new and growing electorate and to respond by putting forward more female candidates. There is also

evidence to suggest that women have ceased to be mere "tokens" in the political process – an idea generated by a minimum quota. Rather, they have become active and effective campaigners - a political force in their own right.

Moreover, the flourishing of various women's movements since the late 1980s has pushed women's issues to the foreground of various political agendas, with debates for gender quotas sometimes altering these agendas significantly. In addition, following the murder of Peng in December 1996, a women's caucus was formed within the Legislative Yuan. The Coalition for Promoting Women's Rights, initiated by six DPP women legislators and endorsed by female legislators from right across the political spectrum, is one of a handful of factions that have been formed across party lines in the Legislative Yuan. Considered together in this manner, it becomes clear that a number of factors have combined to create a favorable environment for women's interests to emerge and for differences of gender to become increasingly important in representative politics.

The argument of identity difference posits that women and men are different, whether for biological, sociological, or psychological reasons, and that these differences will inevitably affect representative politics. If it is assumed that female legislators are more likely to be concerned with "women's issues" than their male counterparts, then, to accurately gauge the impact of gender on legislative politics it becomes necessary to specify just what these "women's issues" consist of. Therefore, I will begin this section of the chapter with an attempt to identify the policy domains in which gender differences may have an effect. Moreover, as I discussed in the theoretical section, different kinds of representation exist; namely, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. To examine how these different modes of representation are actually employed in Taiwan, it is necessary to distinguish them. Consequently, in the second section I will elaborate upon these different forms of representation, and then put forward a series of sub-hypotheses along the lines of the dimensions identified. In summary then, the following two sections will address the notions of (1) the policy areas and, (2) the legislative

dimensions, within which female and male representation would appear to differ.

The policy domains of gender difference

I assume that gender differences in representative politics are likely to be most apparent in policy areas that concern themselves with "women's issues". In other words, female legislators are more likely to devote their time and effort to women's issues. However, to better assess the impact of gender in legislative politics, I must first specify what I mean by "women's issues". Little agreement exists on whether significant gender differences are present or not in politics and what such differences might involve. Some feminists have argued against the theories of gender difference, and the existence of an objective set of women's interests, for the reason that it might "freeze" what are multiple and shifting identities and instead label women as a single and indivisible grouping. Arguing against any such all-embracing sense of identity based upon gender distinction alone, these post-modern theorists instead suggest that *heterogeneous* difference coexist (Rhode 1990). Therefore, embroiled within these theoretical disputes, an objective definition of "women's interests" seems impossible.

Even though some feminists deny the essential, foundational, and biologically determined differences between the sexes, the majority of feminists consider it dangerous to completely deny the existence of gender difference. Notwithstanding the dispute over the definition and content of an objective women's interest, most feminist theorists still believe that gender is a fundamental organizing principle of social life and of human consciousness, and the majority share some basic beliefs as to what constitutes women's interests (Jonasdottir 1988). As Sapiro (Sapiro 1991) put it, gender schemes are important in structuring people's perception and behavior. "Women's shared gender gives them shared political interests. Women face certain problems that need to be addressed through politics and, for the solving of those problems, their shared gender takes primacy over other types of identities and characteristics that may divide

them."(p.189)

In light of the conflicting nature of theories of gender difference, it is necessary for me to define exactly what I mean by gender difference in politics and then clarify which values or priorities will form the basis for a possible transformation of policies. I attempt to apply a broader definition of gender difference in policy domains here, and the women's issues referred to herein encompass not only the concerns of different feminists, but also the interests that originate from female physiological experiences. The former is subjective in the sense that women's interests are here equivalent to what women want. These can be ascertained via an examination of the public policy preferences of women's groups, and I will refer to these desires as "feminist issues". On the other hand, according to Abby Patterson, women's issues could also be defined *objectively* through an examination of the value systems of female culture. Gender-differentiated interests, as they pertain to women and men, refer to the fact that the sexes participate in different activities, work with different things, have different responsibilities, and involve other people in different ways. The differences in interests originate from men and women having undergone different experiences due to being from different social spheres: namely, the public as opposed to the private (production versus reproduction). These distinct physiological experiences also assign men and women different social agendas. Therefore, by way of providing an operational definition of "women's issues", I specify two main types of women's issues as below:

1. Feminist issues - defined by some basic principles or policy goals and agreed upon by most feminists. These include removeing ascriptive criteria in the allocation of social resources by eliminating discriminatory sex roles, broadening the choices open to women by removing social and legal constraints, addressing women's needs from different psychological or socioeconomic perspectives, and generally improving women's status in society (Carroll 1984; Saint-Germain 1989; Tamerius 1993).

2. Caring and communication issues - matters traditionally associated with the

domestic concerns of women, such as children, education,[6] health care, and social welfare (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Saint-Germain 1989; Sapiro 1981; Thomas 1991). As suggested above, most feminists agree that the division of production/reproduction ascribes different social roles and functions to men and women. Traditionally men and women are separated into the public/private spheres. Furthermore, women's continued responsibilities as the primary givers of care within the family unit assign women different characteristics and interests from men. As a result, the processes of sex-based socialization, and division of labor, have situational influences on gender behavior.

By contrast, on the basis of the public/private dichotomy, such policy areas as economic development, and government organization, have traditionally been familiar to most men, and are thereby regarded as "men's issues". Therefore, it is equally expected that men will invest most of their attention in these policy areas - dealing with such matters as governmental roles and rules, political reform and competition, and economic resources and their allocation.

The legislative dimensions of gender difference

The politics of identity difference begin with the general assumption that group identity (gender) does indeed matter and that it shapes the form and content of representation. However, the ways in which females and males actually differ in terms of representational politics remain to be explored.[7] Given the complicated nature of the legislative process, it is imperative to first clarify the various dimensions of representation that exist and, therefore, I have positioned my inquiries upon this point within the theoretical framework of the three types of representation - namely,

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[6] In Taiwan, education, culture, and communication are conventionally linked together within the same category of education, which deals with interpersonal relationship and is the profession predominated by women.

[7] Many past studies have tested the gender difference in the legislative politics in scattered research without a systematic examination of the nature and dimensionality of representation as a whole, and the results as we have seen in the literature review are also inconclusive.

descriptive, symbolical, or substantive (Pitkin 1967).

I assume that for substantive representation to be successfully sustained, female representatives might be both attitudinally and behaviorally different from men with regard to the presentation of female concerns. For symbolic representation to prevail, women representatives might be attitudinally linked to women's concerns, but not necessarily perform accordingly. In other words, female representatives will stand for a particular constituency and their concerns, but not necessarily act upon their subjective beliefs. Finally, for female legislators to represent women in a merely descriptive way, they need only share the gender characteristics of women in general, and need not be identified with them, or act for them. Beneath these modes of representation lie two very different dimensions - the *behavioral* and the *attitudinal*. Even though the way certain female legislators represent might not easily fit into either category, this framework is extremely useful in helping to locate and investigate the different types of women in Taiwanese politics.

Behavioral hypotheses

The study of legislative behavior must take into account the multiple-layer nature and different stages of the legislative process (Hall 1996). Hall argued that the representatives engage in various legislative activities other than voting on bills in order to pursue their concerns. The possible types of legislative participation range from agenda setting, offering amendments, and speaking during mark-up, to voting and the mere act of attending. Many feminists have also questioned the measures used by traditional behavioral researches - for example, studying voting patterns alone might bias the result we would obtain when attempting to identify gender differences (Burrell 1996: Tamerius 1993).

Therefore, it is vital to understand Taiwan's legislative structures and processes before attempting to study legislators' behavior. Each legislative term in Taiwan lasts for

three years and the Legislative Yuan holds two sessions per year. With respect to structure, the Legislative Yuan uses a committee system, and there are a total of ten standing committees covering economic, finance, budget, transportation, interior and civil affairs, government organization and administrative affairs, education and culture, legal and judicial affairs, foreign affairs, and defensive matters. The committees are based upon the labor division of the executive departments and are each responsible for bill-examination within their own subject areas. Each legislator is required to register to join one committee at the beginning of each session and most legislators will sit on a number of different committees during the three-year term. Amongst the committees, some are inevitably more popular than others[8] and, whenever demand for a popular committee exceeds the maximum quota (18), legislators are required to cast lots. Usually, however, the parties will have attempted to coordinate committee membership long before this stage has been reached. In addition, members of each committee elect three chairpersons at the beginning of each session and these chairpersons take turns to preside over the workings of the committee and setting agendas (such as which bills will be discussed each week).

With respect to the legislative process, it involves both formal and informal dimensions. However, as recorded data upon such informal activities as bargaining and log rolling is not available, I am forced to focus upon the formal dimensions. The formal process of legislation from initiation to passing of bills involves three reading stages. The first reading is to report the bill-initiation (both government- and legislator-sponsored bills) to the entire Yuan and then to refer the bill to the relevant committee for discussion, examination, and mark-up. After the committee examination is complete, the committee

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[8] The most prestigious committees are the economic, transportation, and interior committees. The transportation committee deals with issues such as transportation construction, highway, airport, traffic, etc. Most of the issues within the transportation jurisdiction are key to local development, therefore most legislators favor this committee for their constituency interests. The interior committee deals with issues of political reform, elections, police, local development, labor, and civil affairs. Because of the comprehensiveness and influence of the interior committee, it is also one of legislators' favorite choices.

report is then sent to the Yuan for a second reading, during which the legislators can usually be expected to commence with a general discussion and then move on to an article by article review of the bill. Once further conclusions have been reached, another Yuan meeting is arranged (sometimes immediately following the second reading meeting) for the third reading, in which the wording of the bill is examined and, finally, voting takes place. Generally speaking, the three reading procedures are for the purposes of agenda setting and policy formation. Once bills have been initiated, in the first reading, and sent to the committees, the majority of committee and Yuan meetings become forums for intensive discussion of the bills.

To embrace the different aspects mentioned above, both structural and as regards legislative processes, this study observes legislative participation from two perspectives - namely, a horizontal division of labor (structure) and the vertical legislative dynamics (processes). Therefore, hypothesis one focuses on the horizontal division of labor in the legislature by examining the choices the deputies make regarding which committee to join, whereas hypothesis two focuses on the deputies' participation in the dynamic legislative process from agenda setting to policy formation. Consequently, the general behavioral hypothesis that female legislators are more likely to engage actively in women's issues than are their male counterparts is examined on both a structural and dynamic level.

Hypothesis 1: In terms of horizontal institutional participation, female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to work within committees dealing with "women's issues" defined earlier.

Committee assignments set the primary structural division of labor within the representative body, and provide institutional power for legislators over the policy-making process. Studies have found that women representatives tend to choose the care-oriented committees rather than the technological, economic, or other types of

committees. Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) regarding certain countries - namely, Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden - demonstrates that women are most numerous in the areas of family, social affairs, health, and education (IPU) 1992). Comparing the participation of women in legislative committees in thirteen Western countries, only in Sweden did the extent of female participation in the defense committee approach the extent of their representation in the parliament as a whole. In all other countries, female representatives continue to register or be channeled into committees dealing with health and welfare.

Two possible explanations account for gender differences as regards committee assignments. Firstly, some claim that the difference is due to a type of institutional bias or discrimination, beneath which women tend to cling to the less prestigious committees and find themselves closely associated with these committees. Alternatively, some claim that the differences can be explained by gender socialization, e.g., women possess different training specializations, make different professional selections, or maintain different policy priorities (Kelly, M.A., and Horn 1991).

In Taiwan, studies in the 1980s showed that women were more likely to serve on both the education and interior committees (social issues and civil rights) in the Legislative Yuan. The OLS regression showed that, when other explanatory factors were taken into account, women were 32 percent more likely than men to have served on the education committee and 18 percent more likely to have sat on the interior committee, dealing with most domestic policies. However, gender made no statistically significant difference in any other areas - women did not appear to be under-represented, except in so far as more men than women had been members of committees related to economic affairs. Generally speaking, women did not suffer bias in committee selections. It was found that party affiliations and ideology had no effect in committee assignments, while the importance of experience accounted for the fact that seniors were more likely to serve on prestigious committees (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990). In this study, I hypothesize

that gender division in terms of committee assignments does exist, however, I will suggest that it is due to the specific needs that arise from the different socialization and psychological conditions and interests of women, rather than any form of gender discrimination. Therefore, I will examine whether women are more likely to join committees such as the interior and educational committees than men and the possible explanations for the pattern.

Hypothesis 2: In terms of actual legislative participation, female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to engage in legislative activities in the area of women's issues, from agenda setting to policy deliberation.

In light of the complicated legislative processes and multiple dimensions of legislative participation in Taiwan, I generate four measurements for evaluating gender difference in the legislative process. The level of behavioral legislative participation is generally divided into two parts: agenda setting and legislation formation. Agenda setting in the three-reading process involves two stages, as does policy formation. For the former, the stages are that of bill initiation in the Yuan and chairing the committee meetings, for the latter, speaking in the committees and speaking in the Yuan meetings. Overall, then, bill initiation is clearly the first step in getting an issue heard and, consequently, addressed. However, it is to be noted that many bills are proposed in each session, and that decisions as to which bills are discussed and at what pace are the preserve of the committee chairperson. Consequently, the speeches made in committee and Yuan meetings represent potentially critical stages in the legislative process as well as in the process of policy formation, directly affecting the formation and content of the bills.

Therefore, dealing with these four[9] forms of legislative activity together, I

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[9] Some legislative studies also include co-sponsorship and voting as indicators of legislative participation in policy-making. However, two problems occur in using co-sponsorship for this analysis: first, co-

hypothesize that:

a. Female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to initiate bills related to women's issues.

b. Female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to chair committee meetings examining bills related to women's issues.

c. Female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to speak in committee meetings examining bills related to women's issues.

d. Female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to take part in floor deliberation upon issues related to women's interests.

Attitudinal hypotheses

The attitudinal hypotheses are formulated to explore the possible differences of perception toward the idea of representation between the genders. Perception differences build up the foundation for behavioral difference and, therefore, gender differences in attitude are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for gender differences in behavior. This is especially the case in an arena such as politics, in which women have traditionally

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sponsorship does not have a substantial meaning in terms of telling us the individual legislator's interests in law making. Generally, representatives simply sign their names on others' bill in seeking the exchange of the support from others for their own bills. Some deputies have no idea what they have signed, in fact, on some occasions, they even endorse contradictory versions of the same bill. Since the act of co-sponsorship does not require deputies to take the time in making decisions or collecting information, most legislators co-sponsor their colleagues' bills for various concerns (parties, districts, factions, committees, friends). The co-sponsorship does not necessarily warrant the deputies' real interests in the bills they sign. Second, no systematic data is available on the co-sponsorship. Since 1995, all sponsorships are reported as only the title and the main authors to the Yuan meetings, and are then referred to the committees. The originally formal function of reporting all the co-sponsors of the bills to the Yuan meeting in the first reading has been replaced by the informal functioning of the scheduling committee since then. Thus, we can no longer find any systematic official records about the co-sponsorship. Likewise, the problem of applying voting as a measurement is also related to the problem of substantial meaning and data availability of voting. The problem of the significance of voting has been discussed earlier about how voting data might bias the measurement. The problem of data availability is because many bills did not involve the voting process. Voting tends to happen only for those important and controversial bills and articles. For example, the voting rate in the political and social welfare bills are higher than those of other categories are (Sheng 1996). Considering my attempt to examine the overall differences, these two conventional measurements are not included.

been prevented from active participation. Consequently, though female deputies could be attitudinally associated with women's concerns, they may be unable to carry their identity characteristics into actual representative acts. Therefore, the symbolic representation of female concerns is probably more common than substantive representation. Whether this actually turns out to be the case or not, examining the perceptual differences between the genders will clearly help us to better understand the calculations, constraints, and motivations behind legislators' decision making.

To evaluate whether gender makes a difference in terms of legislator's attitudes toward representation, two questions are essential - whom do deputies perceive to be their primary concern; and what do they consider it important to represent? The former question relates to individual deputies' level of constituency identification and the latter to their policy priorities, and they are addressed in hypotheses three and four, respectively.

Hypothesis 3: Gender differences are present regarding the perception of the "representation of women".

I assume that female legislators, because of their group affiliation and identity, and whether it arises from sociological or psychological conditions, are more likely to identify with female constituencies, and are more likely to have a personal commitment to representing women as a group. Empirical studies have also shown that female legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to see women as an identifiable *component* of their constituency (Freeman and Richardson 1995; Reingold 1992; Thomas 1992) (Dodson et al 1995). Therefore, I hypothesize that:

a. Female legislators are more likely than their male counterparts to think of themselves as representatives of women, and to consider women as an important constituency group with particular political concerns.

b. Female legislators are more likely than their male counterparts to believe that,

because of their gender, they are uniquely qualified for, or responsible for, representing women's concerns.

Hypothesis 4: Gender differences are present in the policy preferences and priorities.

In hypothesis two, I assumed that gender differences existed in actual legislative participation in two stages, agenda setting and legislation deliberation, and I further divided them into four measurements: initiation, chairship, speech in committee, and Yuan meetings. A full investigation into every aspect of legislative activity is required by this hypothesis. In addition, I agree with Tamerius (1993) that the most significant difference between female and male legislators lies less in their willingness to support feminist politics than in their willingness to initiate and guide policy processes pertaining to those issues. To better assess willingness to lead policy process in such areas, I therefore assume that female and male legislators have different policy priorities.

Because of gender difference in terms of socialization and life experience, women and men tend to encounter different problems, associate with different groups, acquire different policy expertise, and nurture different policy interests. As already noted, empirical studies have shown that female representatives tend to give a higher priority than their male colleagues to matters of women, children, family, and welfare (Boles 1991; Dodson 1991; Flammang 1985; Havens and Healy. 1991; Kathlene 1989; Leader 1977; Saint-Germain 1989; Tamerius 1993; Thomas 1994). Consequently, my hypotheses are:

a. That women tend to place a higher priority on issues related to female issues than do men.

b. That the legislative agenda might be changed if more women entered legislative politics.

It is also expected that such perceptual differences regarding policy preferences and priorities would markedly affect legislators' agenda setting, policy choices, and

legislative.

Hypothesis 5: A strong and positive link exists between a female legislator's perception of representing women and the policy preferences she will exhibit regarding women's issues.

I assume a positive link exists between subjectively identifying with women as a constituency and granting women's issues a higher policy priority. If hypothesis three holds true, then it should have strong implications on legislative priority in hypothesis four, since legislators who view their constituency differently may act upon their subjective perceptions rather than an objective definition of that constituency.

Research methodology

Two research methods

In the light of these two main forms of gender difference (behavioral and attitudinal), I attempt to test these five hypotheses, and thereby evaluate the gender dynamics present, in a Taiwanese context. To better discern the affect of the institution in question upon female representation, it would in general be preferable to be able to conduct either a cross-institutional or a longitudinal study, and thereby observe the possible patterns of gender difference in a variety of situations. Some cross-institutional studies of gender difference have been carried out in the United States - comparing two or more states to "factor out" the institutional effect (Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994). However, such an investigation across different legislative institutions is less desirable in Taiwan. This is because, despite the fact that there are several different levels of legislative body from the national to the local, only in the Legislative Yuan does one observe the sort of complete legislative process that allows legislators to actually make laws and be fully involved in policy-making. In other bodies, representatives are most likely to exercise an "oversight of the executive" role rather than actually make policy,

making it difficult to perform a comparative study of them. Hence I decide to concentrate on the Legislative Yuan. As regards a longitudinal study of both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, this would be almost impossible, if undoubtedly desirable. Representatives are, after all, replaced every three years, and it thus becomes hard to trace their attitudes toward public policies and perceptions of representation because they have vacated their positions. The most I can learn about legislators' attitudes is to elicit the views and perceptions of those who are *currently* serving on the representative bodies.

My research is, therefore, divided into two parts - a longitudinal study of legislative behavior and a series of interviews with legislators that attempt to gauge their perceptions of their representational roles. Therefore, while Chapter 4 focuses on the longitudinal study of legislative behavior from 1990 to 1997, and is set up to test hypotheses one and two; Chapter 5 focuses on the interviews and tests hypotheses three to five.

Data collection

Data collection is accordingly divided into two main parts: a primary content analysis of legislative activities to test the affect of gender on policy processes (hypotheses 1 and 2), and face-to-face interviews with sample legislators to gain an understanding of their perceptions of representation (hypotheses 3 to5).

Before actually collecting data, I first tried to gain some background information from official documents, newspaper reports, and relevant records upon my sample legislators in order to set up a primary data bank of demographic information. This included such information as age, education, ethnicity, party, seniority, committee assignment, institutional position, and the nature of their constituency (either urban or rural). I set up this demographic data bank to facilitate further multivariate analysis, as, with this supplemental information, one is better able to test whether gender is a significant factor *after* controlling for other variables, just as hypothesized. After obtaining this demographic data, interviews were conducted to test my attitudinal

hypotheses and to enable me to gain a more contextualized understanding of the operation of the legislature.[10] The necessary data collection for the longitudinal study of legislative behavior was then undertaken, after the second half of the interviews. And a primary content analysis of the legislators' activities was then sorted and coded. The data sources for this study can thus be summarized as:

(1) The Electoral Bulletin of Central Election Commission and legislators' rosters. From this data set, I obtained basic background information upon the legislators, such as their age, education, party affiliation, seniority, occupational background, and district information, especially the degree of urbanization evident therein.

(2) The monthly legislation reports. These reports cover bills proposed every month by first author, bills under committee discussion, and bills proceeding through the Yuan meetings. The Secretariat Chief of the Legislative Yuan provided me with the information and assured me that the names on the list were indeed the first authors of the bills. I recorded bill initiation using this data.

(3) The index system of legislative participation. This system provided information concerning the chairpersons in each legislative committee meeting, as well as the frequency of the speeches the legislators made in the committee and Yuan floor meetings. In the index record, each bill examined in committee is assigned one or two subject areas that serve as the basis of bill classification.

(4) The Legislative Gazette. The Gazette reports all the legislative activities proceeding in the committee and Yuan meetings, including sponsorship, interpellation, election, and voting. This serves as a reference for checking the content of the proposal and draft versions of bills.

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[10] During the interview process, some of my original behavioral measures (co-sponsorship and voting) have been found to be less relevant and unavailable, yet the information obtained from the interview adds another measurement (chairship) to my original measurements of the legislative participation. Therefore the procedure of my data collection has been revised to accommodate the new measures of legislative participation found during the interview process.

(5) The interview data. I interviewed a sample of legislators to explore and compare

male and female representatives' conceptualizations and attitudes to representation.

The interviews took place between September 1997 and January 1998, during the

fourth session of the third term Legislature.

Method 1: Longitudinal study of legislators' behaviors (i.e., hypotheses one and two)

Time span and unit of analysis

This longitudinal behavioral study is designed to test the first two sets of hypotheses.

The first hypothesis suggests that a horizontal labor division exists, along gender lines, as

regards committee choices and chairships. The second hypothesis states that different

degrees of participation are present, by policy subject, across different legislative stages.

The examination of these two hypotheses provide a relatively complete picture of the

legislative structure and processes by organizing into different aspects of legislative

activities, both static institutional arrangements and the dynamic legislative process.

I studied the legislators' behavioral participation from 1990 to 1997, including the

eighty-fifth to ninetieth sessions of the first, second, and third term Legislative Yuan.[11] I

had two basic reasons to focus upon this particular time span. Firstly, the 1990 legislative

session was the first legislative session held following the democratic elections of 1989.

Since 1987, the sociopolitical climate has changed, martial law has been lifted, the first

opposition party, the DPP, was formed, and the functions of the Legislative Yuan have

been revived. This is all in sharp contrast to the situation prior to 1988, in which the

Legislative Yuan could not be seen as an independent legislative body, but rather as a

rubber stamp for the KMT party-cum-administration. Under the KMT one-party regime,

most of the policies and bills were made within the party itself or the Executive Yuan

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[11] I cover the 85th to 90th session of the 1st term, from February 1990 to January 1993; the 2nd term, from February 1993 to January 1996; and the 3rd runs from February 1996 till the last session of my interview, Jan 1998.

(Lee 1989). Therefore, since representatives did not play any significant role in law-making, no meaningful data was available for study before 1988.

Secondly, prior to 1990, the majority of the representatives were senior members who had been elected before 1947 from Mainland China, and had thus been able to remain in their seats without the need for re-election. Though Taiwan had gradually, from 1969, introduced new members into the Legislative Yuan through the implementation of a system of supplementary seats, it was only following the 1990 supplementary legislative that these supplementary members started to play a significant part in law-making. As Sheng noted, there is a large difference between the figures concerning bill-initiation and speeches *before* 1990, and those that followed (Sheng 1996). Finally, my concentration upon this period provides us with a better point of departure with which to compare this study to Chou, Clark, and Clark's pre-1990 study, carried out under the authoritarian regime.

The unit of analysis is each legislator's level of participation in each policy area. I cover individual legislator's participation in initiating, chairing committees, and speeches in committee and the Yuan across three terms. In the first term, there were five different types of legislators: the first (and making up the majority), being the senior representatives who had held their positions since 1947, and the second being overseas Chinese representatives. Voters did not elect these types of representative and, therefore, they were immune from the need to represent the public and thus seldom participated in the legislative process. The third type were the district representatives, with a total of 78 members, and the fourth type were the occupational group representatives, with a total of 19 members elected by the voters of five occupational groups. The last type was the aboriginal representative, of which there were a total of 4 members elected by aboriginal voters. Excepting those senior representatives and overseas representatives who were either not subject to re-election or were not elected at all, all the legislators were included in my analysis. Come the second and third terms, all the senior mainlander members had

retired and had been replaced with newly elected members, and the group representatives

and overseas representatives were replaced by the party-list proportional representatives.

My sample includes all the elected members and party-list members, excepting those

members who had died or served for less than one year, and the President and Vice-

President of the Legislative Yuan. The President and Vice-President seldom participate

in the legislative process as regular members - instead they focus on generally facilitating

the proceedings of the meetings.

Among all the members included in my analysis, the gender and party distribution

is shown in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1 The sample legislators for the behavioral study

	1st term (85-90 sessions)	2nd term	3rd term
Gender Female Male	12 86	17 138	22 137
Types of members District Group (PR rep.) Ethnic minority	75 19 (group) 4	114 35 (PR party-list) 6	120 34 (PR party-list) 6
Party KMT DPP NP IND	72 19 0 7	94 49 8 4	81 55 21 2
Total	98	155	159

Data coding and analysis of legislative participation (i.e., the methods used to test
hypothesis two)

Hypothesis two involves a rather complicated series of measurements and

comparisons regarding legislators' overall behavior. Because of this level of complexity,

I make especial efforts to clarify the methods of coding and analysis used to test it. I

have divided the legislative participation into four stages: initiation, chairship, speech in

the committees, and speech on the floor. I then examine the gender differences at each stage and at two levels: aggregate and individual. Firstly, at the aggregate level, I want to observe the group (and gender) differences in the levels of participation by treating women and men as two different groups. I expect to reveal from this information concerning how the two gender groups expend their time and energy upon different policy areas at each legislative stage. Secondly, once we see such a pattern emerge. I then pinpoint the specific policy subjects related to women's interests and apply OLS regression analyses to examine the gender affect after controlling for other factors.

In each measurement of legislative participation, I first classify bills into several policy categories and then compare the overall differences between women and men, by policy subject, as regards their levels of legislative participation.

1. Bill classification

At each legislative stage, I am particularly interested in the different policy domains in which various deputies may take an interest. In order to pursue this, it is necessary to classify bills by policy subjects of interest to the representatives. As the first stage of specifying these policy subjects. I attempt to establish a general policy scheme to cover all the bills proposed and discussed. Given my interest in testing gender differences as regards policy interest, I first refer to the gender-based policy schemes of Thomas (1994) and Saint-Germain (1989). and I adopt five categories from their policy schemes - education, children, welfare, health, and feminist issues. Besides these five categories of theoretical interest to me, each bill examined in the committees is assigned one or two subject types in the Yuan index record. After browsing through all the bills' subjects and incorporating my theoretical interest, I established 19 policy-coding categories (see Appendix 1).

In coding the bills, those 19 categories might be expected to be completely exhaustive and mutually exclusive. However, many bills do touch on two or more

subject areas at the same time and are thus referred to more than one committee for examination. For example, the problem of child prostitution is an issue that embraces both children and women (pornography), the provision of education for the retarded is an issue of both educational and handicapped welfare, and subsidy for senior farmers is an issue that concerns both agricultural policy and welfare policy. Even in a committee meeting for the same bill, legislators may raise issues, or amend the bill, based on different thematic concerns. Such multiple themes contained in one bill caused many difficulties as regards their coding. In an effort to reflect the legislators' own classifications, I chose to base my decisions on the most prominent dimension of each bill as presented to the public. Though I feel this to have been an effective approach to the problem, I must, however, admit to my subjective bias in perceiving public perceptions.

In the second stage, a further collapsing of the bill categories was required in order to show the pattern of legislators' policy concerns as a whole, and to accommodate a wide range of policy subjects. Therefore, in an attempt to further collapse the bills into a more "macro-structured" scheme, I considered several schemes as references here, such as Sheng's scheme (1996), for studying the factors influencing legislative participation in Taiwan, Chou, Clark, and Clark's scheme (1990), for studying female representatives in Taiwan, and Thomas (1994) and Saint-Germain's (1989) gender-specific and theory-oriented policy scheme in order to discern possible gender differences (see Appendix1 for a brief discussion of each scheme). In light of the two general policy schemes applied in Taiwan's case, and the other gender-based schemes, I reduced the 19 categories into seven further categories.

Among the 19 categories, based on my theoretical hypotheses and some past studies, I establish the traditional "women's interest" area by collapsing the categories of education, children, health, welfare, and communication, together. I combine these categories into a new category entitled "care and communication". Another issue area that I theoretically hypothesize to be gender specific is women's rights (feminist) issues.

As to the remaining categories, I collapsed those categories with the most similar characteristics into a single category. For example, I combined finance, budget, economics, and local development into a category named "economics and development", political and government organization into one, judiciary and social order into one, and defense and foreign affairs into one. The remaining categories included labor, farmer, fishermen, ethnic minority, and the environment. Because these categories share common characteristics that work for different groups' interests, I put them together as a domain labeled "groups' interest". Therefore, the final seven categories that I used in this study were: economic and development issues, defense and foreign affairs, politics and government organization, judiciary and order, care and communication (domestic), women's issues, and groups' issues.

2. Coding and analysis

At the aggregate level of analysis, I make a general comparison of the level of participation of the two gender groups within the various policy areas mentioned above. In order to do this effectively, I coded the following items for each legislator: how many initiations s/he proposed in each policy domain, how many times s/he chaired bills in each policy domain, how many times s/he spoke in the committee meetings in each policy domain, and how many times the s/he spoke in the Yuan meetings in each policy domain. Because my primary interest is to differentiate the policy interests of each legislator, all the bills proposed and discussed were coded to cover the entire range of policy.

Furthermore, I adopted a relative measure at this stage so as to control the differences between the groups and better apprehend how legislators distribute their time and make the decision to give priority to a particular policy domain. Therefore, I code the values of the variables (bill initiation, committee chairing, committee speech, and Yuan speech) of each policy domain (A) as equal to the percentage of the total members

of either sex. In other words, I compare female and male legislators, as two distinct groups, via the following sets of measurements:

(1) Initiation of issue A / Initiation of all issues (hypothesis 2a.)

(2) Chairship of issue A/ chairship of all issues (hypothesis 2b)

(3) Committee speech regarding issue A/ committee speech regarding all issues (hypothesis 2c)

(4) Yuan speech regarding issue A/ Yuan speech regarding all issues (hypothesis 2d)

In comparing the policy priorities of the male and female groups by use of these measurements, I expect to find that gender differences are most likely to be apparent in two particular policy areas: namely, areas of traditional women's interest (education, children, health, welfare, and communication) and feminist policy areas. Consequently, I will pay particular attention to these policy domains.

In the individual level analysis, OLS regression is applied to each legislative stage. The eight measures of my dependent variables are bill initiations, committee chairships, committee speeches, and floor speeches, on the caring and communication issues and feminist issues. In addition to the coding of individual legislators' participation in these policy areas as dependent variables, I also code independent variables. These include the factors that influence the legislative participation of representatives, such as the individual's age, education, party identification, and level of constituency urbanization. Since constituency is a major explanatory variable in legislative participation, it is expected to have an affect on women's issues, as urban representatives are more likely to have experienced a diversity of lifestyles and pressure groups than are their rural counterparts. Age is included due to Norris's findings that younger legislators are more likely to support women's issues than older ones (Thomas and Welch 1991). Each legislator's top level of education is also regarded as an important factor due to the expectation that better-educated representatives are inclined to be more open to women's rights issues than less-educated ones. Party affiliation can also influence the level of

participation in issues. For example, DPP members are known for their enthusiasm for political reform issues. Some might argue that opposition parties are more aware of, and more open to, social welfare and social reform issues (such as women's right issues.)

Finally, and taking the legislative process as a whole, I am also interested in comparing gender difference in different legislative activities. In order to determine whether gender differences vary in magnitude at different stages of the legislative process, I compare the gender distributions evident within different legislative activities, including the setting of agendas and policy deliberation.

Method 2: Interview study on legislators' attitudes (i.e., hypotheses 3-5)

In order to test the attitudinal hypotheses 3 to 5, interviews were conducted. The sample representatives consisted of all the female legislators (with the exception of one who declined), and a near-equal number of male legislators (so as to be able to produce an accurate comparison), serving in the Taiwanese National Legislative Yuan from 1995-1998. In sampling the male legislators, I attempted to choose men who exhibited similar party affiliations, ethnicity, levels of education, and district backgrounds to their female counterparts, so as to isolate the affects of gender to as large a degree as possible.

Even with a matching sample, a legislator's perception of representation still depends on various factors. Advance preparation regarding each legislator's background was very useful as regards helping me interpret the significance of their responses and to check for inconsistencies and, therefore, as mentioned above, I sought to become well acquainted with each legislator's background. Following the setting-up of this data bank, I sent letters to 52 legislators (a little more than the matching sample required, so as to accommodate possible rejections), each requesting an interview. The letters (see Appendix 2-a) described my research interests and the aims and intentions of this study in

a general manner.[12] Of the 52 legislators from whom I requested an interview, 40 accepted, essentially meeting my requirement for a matching sample. Most of the interviews were conducted in legislators' own offices or small conference rooms, and the interviews took place between September 1997 and January 1998, during the fourth session of the third term legislature.

At the beginning of each interview, I asked some general questions regarding how deputies conducted their business, how they perceived their legislative role and function, and which institutional position was, for them, important as regards gaining influence in the policy-making arena. These questions elicited some rather general responses from the representatives that, though they might move beyond my hypotheses, are important in as far as they help to gain an understanding of how deputies legislate and represent, and thus help dig the foundations of a more solid legislative study. Following this opening, and to test hypotheses three to five (on gender difference), I elicited answers on two main aspects of my study - the legislator's identification of their constituency, and their individual policy priorities. I asked legislators to discuss which constituency groups and policy issues were important for them to represent and the reasons why. Appendix 2-b reproduces the interview questions, which are subdivided into several sections corresponding to hypotheses 3 and 4, as outlined earlier.

Because half of the questions were designed to gain an understanding of legislators' identifications and perceptions regarding legislative processes, and the issues involved are thus complex, open-ended questions are often regarded as more useful than their yes/no or highly structured counterparts. In addition, elite interviews such as these are regarded as substantially different from the highly structured and standardized format of survey research (Johnson and Joslyn 1991). For example, I am interested in an elite

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[12] To avoid directing legislator's responses, before and during the earlier part of the interview, I tried not to signify the gender distinction. Without any anticipation, legislators are able to reply to the questions with their genuine reactions.

interviewee's own interpretation of issues and events and, therefore, I do not want to close off access to this potentially valuable source of information by constraining responses. It is noted that "a less structured format is relatively exploratory and stresses subject rather than researcher definitions of a problem"(Johnson and Joslyn 1991). In practice, elite interviewees are sometimes reluctant to respond to a clearly standardized set of questions.

Since most of the questions are open-ended, the categories within which I classify the answers flow from the responses of the interviewee and refer to the theories only when relevant. In short, I apply the interview data to test hypotheses three to five - legislators' perceptions of their constituency, their policy priorities, and the association between these two. Finally, I also attempt to use the results of the interviews to generate a possible explanation for the pattern of gender difference that I found in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan.

CHAPTER 4

LEGISLATORS IN TAIWAN:
A BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT

This aim of this chapter is to discover whether the *descriptive* representation of female legislators guarantees the *substantive* representation of women's interests. As previously suggested, the descriptive representation of women refers to the presence of women in political office, whereas the substantive representation of women demands some form of actual activity by female deputies as regards the furthering of women's interests or concerns. In other words, I examine if the mere presence of female deputies is related to the realization of female concerns, as the politics of group difference assumes. I intend to test this hypothesis by discovering whether female legislators behave differently from male legislators with respect to female group concerns, and I will do this by examining two behavioral and three attitudinal hypotheses - the first two behavioral ones in this chapter, and the attitudinal ones in the next chapter.

In the first hypothesis, I focus on the institutional placement of legislators in terms of their selections regarding which committee to sit on, and the election of committee chairpersons across sessions. The second hypothesis will be organized into four stages: bill initiation, chairing of committee meetings, speeches in committee meetings, and speeches in Yuan meetings. In each of these sections, I will compare the actions of female and male legislators in different committees and areas of policy. As described in chapter 3, the time frame of both analyses is 1990 to 1997.

Hypothesis 1: Institutional placement of legislators: the committee system

Sheng (1996) argued that, in contrast to the situation in the United States, the committee system did not play an important role in the policy-making process in Taiwan.

This was for a number of reasons. Firstly, bills can bypass committee deliberation and move directly to the Yuan meeting if 20 legislators initiate this and a majority approve the action. Even bills actually processed by the committees can go to the Yuan meeting before they have been fully deliberated and, therefore, it can be seen that the authority of committees can be easily superceded. Secondly, the final results of the committee discussions are not treated as being more important than the original proposals or amendments. Following the committee's discussion of a bill, their decisions are sent to the Yuan meeting along with the original proposals, and all amendments are considered equally. Moreover, no closure rules are applied in the committee, so committee reports are not the final decisions, and legislators outside the committee can take part in the committee's discussion and sometimes even make amendments. In fact, the only differences between members and non-members of the committee are the committee voting rights accorded to the former.

However, based on my interviews with legislators, most would appear to consider committee discussion as very important if they want to influence and lead certain bills. It is certainly the case that bills bypassing the committees are not very common - only when the bills face time pressure or the level of revision is negligible will a full deliberation of a bill by the committee be considered unnecessary. The legislators told me that, to a great extent, committee assignments frame a legislator's policy orientation and the groups he or she will remain in contact with. And if the legislators consider some bills as important, they will attend to the bills persistently through the whole committee process so as to avoid unfavorable or unwanted revisions. While making appointments with legislators, their assistants often told me that it was easier to schedule them on the day of a committee meeting because legislators would come to the committees, whereas they would often not appear for the floor meeting. Also, while waiting in the legislators' offices prior to the interviews, their guests were usually those who dealt with issues within the legislators' committee jurisdiction. Admittedly, one reason for this is that the

administrative department liaisons are often in regular contact with, or even socialize with, legislators' assistants, particularly those assistants whose superiors serve on committees related to their own subject area. Therefore, even though the committee arrangement has not yet established a tradition of specialization and seniority in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, it still provides a medium through which legislators' can focus on the concerns of their constituencies. In addition, the committee system helps to establish their power bases and shape their policy focus. Therefore, given the significance of the committee system, I sought to evaluate the impact of gender on the legislative structure by examining both the legislators' choices as regards committee membership and chairpersons.

Committee membership by selection

The issues that relate to a given legislator's choice of committee can be rather complicated - affected as they are by various considerations, both individual and party-related. The same legislator might join very different committees in different sessions for different reasons. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that a legislator's presence in one particular committee will reveal their true policy interests to us. With the legislative activity of each term spread across six sessions, only few of them choose to focus on a single committee throughout (Sheng 1996). In other words, committee membership choices are fluid rather than static.

In general, most of the legislators do not feel that they suffer any discrimination as regards being able to join their choice of committee. A marginal hypothesis states that, because of gender discrimination, women tend to become members of less prestigious committees or those concerned with women's issues, and men of more prestigious ones, such as economic or local development. Yet this hypothesis does not seem to hold in Taiwan's legislatures, based upon the evidence contained in Chou's previous study

(1990) and my own interviews. According to the legislators themselves, they can either join the committee of their own choice or cast lots to decide who gets to choose.

Notwithstanding the lack of actual gender discrimination, I assume that gender does shape the deputies' personal committee choices. In my first hypothesis, I assumed that female legislators were more interested in joining the committees dealing with women's interests - i.e., education, welfare, children, health, and feminist issues. Most of the bills dealing with such traditional women's interests as the first four of these issues, are referred to the interior and education committees; whereas the last of these - the feminist issues - are dispersed across different committees, though they are usually referred to the interior and judicial committee at some stage. It is thus assumed that women are more likely to be members of the education, interior, or judicial committees, whereas men are more likely to be members of economic and government organization committees.

I examine the gender division of labor as regards committee membership for three terms in Table 4-1. Each representative can choose one committee in each session - therefore, each member can make six committee choices across the six sessions. In Table 4-1, two forms of percentages are present in each cell, indicating: (1) the percentage of women's/men's membership of each committee, and (2) the percentage of women's/men's membership in all committees. These measurements show the relative frequency of participating in any particular committee among two groups - women and men.

In the first term, on average, female legislators as a group registered more often than their male counterparts in four committees: education, interior, government, and transportation. In the second term, female legislators registered more often than their male colleagues in three committees: education, defense, and foreign. In the third term, among all the committee choices, women registered more often than their male colleagues in six committees: budget, defense, education, judicial, and transportation.

Therefore, across three terms, it is only in the education committee that female

Table 4-1. Committee memberships from 1990-1997 (3 legislative terms)

	1990-1992 Female /Male/ Total			1993-1995 Female/ Male /Total			1996-1997 Female/ Male /Total		
Members	12	88	100	17	141	158	22	139	161
Budget (count)	8	61	69	7	67	74	17	70	87
%within budget	11	89	100	9	91	100	20	80	100
% within gender	11	12		7	8		16	11	
Defense	10	74	84	13	87	100	15	65	80
% within Def.	12	88	100	10	90	100	18	82	100
% within gender	14	15		13	11		14	10	
Economics	6	56	62	7	101	108	11	71	82
% within Econ.	9	91	100	6	94	100	13	87	100
% within gender	8	12		7	12		10	11	
Education	11	32	43	33	67	100	21	60	81
%	26	74	100	33	67	100	26	74	100
	16	6		32	8		19	9	
Finance	7	84	91	3	104	107	4	81	85
%	8	92	100	3	97	100	5	95	100
	10	17		3	13		4	12	
Foreign	0	25	25	10	54	64	9	51	60
%	0	100	100	16	84	100	15	85	100
	0	5		10	7		8	8	
Government	7	40	47	5	70	75	3	67	70
%	15	85	100	7	93	100	4	96	100
	10	8		5	9		3	10	
Interior	15	53	68	9	99	108	5	76	81
%	22	78	100	8	92	100	6	94	100
	21	11		9	12		4	11	
Judicial	0	32	32	6	65	71	11	47	58
%	0	100	100	8	92	100	19	81	100
	0	6		6	8		10	7	
Transportation	7	42	47	8	96	104	13	75	88
%	14	86	100	8	92	100	15	85	100
	10	8		8	12		12	11	
Total	100	499		101	810		109	663	
	100	100		100	100		100	100	

Note: Not included are the president, the vice-president, and those who served less than one year in the Yuan. Two forms of percentages in each cell: the first row indicates the percentage of women's/men's membership of each committee, and the second row indicates the percentage of women's/men's membership in all committee

legislators consistently outnumbered male legislators. In contrast, in committees such as those covering matters of economic and finance, male legislators *always* registered more often than female legislators did. In other committees, no systematic pattern appeared across the three terms. It should also be noted that, in those committees where women outnumbered men, a positive relationship between the variable of gender and the particular committee was also apparent. The opposite also held true. However, it is important to stress that the resulting correlation was not hugely significant - only in the second term were women and education significantly linked (0.302**).

I appear to have produced a slightly different set of results to Chou, Clark, and Clark (1990). Their pre-1989 study found that women were more likely to serve on the education and interior committees. Also, their OLS regression of gender on these two committees (education and interior) proved significant after controlling for other factors, though there were no statistically significant differences in any other areas. My 1990-1997 study still shows that female membership of the education committee has consistently exceeded that of men across the three terms - in fact, the education committee has been the most popular committee for female legislators throughout this time. Yet, the general pattern has lessened in its significance. In addition to women's consistent predominance in the education committee, my results also show several changing patterns. Firstly, as regards the interior committees, gender and committee membership were positively correlated only in the first term. By the second and third terms, women had become less likely than men to join these committees. A possible reason might be the growing importance of the interior committee in dealing with the myriad political issues that followed democratization, however, in some traditionally male-oriented committees, female visibility actually increased. An example of this would be the fact that, in the second and third terms, female legislators were more likely than their male counterparts to be members of the defense committee. Equally, in the transportation committee, which is a popular one, there were on average more women

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registered than there were men in the first and second terms. This clearly demonstrates that women have diversified.

Committee chairpersons by election

Taiwanese committee chairpersons carry similar institutional power to U.S committee chairpersons in such areas as the calling of meetings, the arranging of hearings, and the establishment of agendas. However, in contrast to the U.S Congress, no seniority tradition exists in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. Indeed, studies of the Legislative Yuan show that newcomers are elected as chairpersons more often than their senior counterparts (Sheng 1996).

The number of female committee chairpersons represents a significant pool of elected women officeholders with institutional leadership responsibilities. In the first term (85-90 sessions), 16 out of 109 elected committee chairpersons were women. Of these 16 incidences, women served as the chairpersons of the education committee most often (6/16), and the interior committee next (4/16). In the second term, 21 out of 153 elected committee chairpersons were women, the largest numbers being elected to the chairs of the education committee (4/21), and the foreign affairs committee (4/21). However, the distribution of female chairships across the various committees has, in the second term, become increasingly uniform. For example, three served as the defense, three as the transportation, and still another three as the legal committee chairpersons. In the third term, 18 out of 127 committee chairpersons were women, with the chair of the education committee remaining the most common (5/18), and the judicial committee lying a close second (3/18).

Across three terms, the gender patterns associated with committee chairship are similar to those of committee membership. Women were *most* likely to join the education committee and to be elected its chairperson, and *less* likely to join the economic committee or be elected *its* chairperson. It is as well to note that, across the

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three terms, the number of women elected to the chair of the economic and finance committee has not exceeded two. However, the gender difference has not been truly significant across time, and the degree of difference in some other committees is not as obvious as in this case. Overall, then, with very few exceptions gender appears not to constitute a major dimension in the horizontal labor division, in terms of both committee memberships *and* chairships. These are findings at odds with previous studies, and this change has most likely occurred because of the new and expanded range of experiences now open to political women.

The choice of a committee is a result of several factors, so much so that is difficult to find, within it, a clear pattern of labor division by gender. Fenno (Fenno 1978) suggested that there were three basic goals of all lawmakers that could affect the committee preferences of legislators: namely, reelection, the gaining of influence within the house, and effective public policy. He argued that these three driving motives would lead legislators to seek certain different types of committee: the reelection-oriented (such as Interior committee), the influence-oriented (Appropriation or Ways and Means), and the policy-oriented (such as the Education and Labor committees). Since then, many other scholars have expanded upon his views but all agree that some mix of these three goals do indeed motivate matters such as committee choice.

The evidence above would tend to suggest that women would be divided by different institutional and individual motivations, as well. Therefore, based upon my observations and interviews with legislators, I suggest that there are two "levels" of factors that dictate committee choice in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan. Essentially, these are: (1) the individual level, at which legislators' committee choices are affected by different interests, constituency bases, and personal benefits; and (2) the aggregate (institutional) level, at which committee choices will also be subject to the affects of party political maneuvering.

To expand on the first level, it is clear that committee choices are affected by

individuals' interests derived from such diverse sources as formal professional training, ingrained ideological concerns, personal profits, or campaign promises. Individual deputies will rarely base their choice of committees to join entirely upon policy; rather, their committee choices tend to accommodate multiple concerns, including both material and symbolic interests they may have.

Clearly, some legislators will choose to join a particular committee because expertise gained within a previous profession provides them the leverage to participate effectively. As a number of the legislators indicated to me, committee discussion generally requires a more in-depth understanding of policy than does floor discussion. For example, some representatives with teaching experience, being familiar with the school system, might join the education committee; some of those with business/professional backgrounds might join economic or financial committees; and those with a civil-servant background might join the government organization committee. Therefore, with most of the female deputies possessing educational backgrounds it is to be expected that women would feel more comfortable about choosing the education committee than any other. Consequently, the social division of labor can in a way be seen to have transferred, institutionally, into the Legislative Yuan.

In addition, long-term ideological or personal concerns might affect an individual's committee choices. For example, in the second term, a number of female legislators joined the judicial committee because many feminist and children's bills were discussed there. However, a feminist-oriented deputy will not *necessarily* manifest her ideological commitment by joining a committee concerned with women's interests. For example, certain female legislators will purposely join committees that have no connection with what are traditionally seen as women's issues. The aim here would be to demonstrate the capacity to work in a variety of fields. In fact, as one self-identified feminist legislator put it,

Women are stereotypically oriented at the education and interior committees, and it has been taken as the way it should be. Not only good men should serve the military service, I think good women should too. In order to challenge the stereotype imposed upon women, we should join the defense committee to let people see women's role in that committee, instead of being stereotypically restricted. And it seems obvious that many female legislators have confined themselves to the education committee. The educational committee has enough people already, so they don't need me. I would go to those committees where women's visibility, opinions, and perspectives need to be further explored (interview: 98022).

In addition, representatives might also base their choice of committees on individual material benefits. After all, deputies come from different backgrounds and do themselves have different needs. By joining certain "relevant" committees, legislators can push laws along or pressurize the executive departments to make policy favorable to their interests or their constituency's interests. It is certainly the case that legislators will join committees to "escort" their favorite bills through the Yuan - bills from the passing of which they will personally benefit. In addition, some interest groups have close associations with certain legislators, which can also directly or indirectly affect a legislator's choice of committee. For example, legislators with business interests may well seek to join the economic or budget committees so as to monitor their own interests. Such materialistic motives are assumed to be equally rife within both gender groups and, according to my interviews and some of the opinions expressed therein, this would certainly appear to be the case. However, many female legislators also pointed out that, unlike men, most female deputies are professional full-time legislators, i.e., they seldom have outside business networks or connections to protect. This could be another reason why there are fewer women in the economic and budget committees.

Moreover, representatives tend to work for the interests of their constituency and to fulfil their campaign promises. Therefore, when seeking re-election, members tend to participate in the committees dealing with the bills upon which they campaigned as joining such committees will enable representatives to claim to have lived up to their promises. Legislators might also choose to join a committee in order to be seen to be

responding to the concerns of what they envisage to be their supporting constituency (re-elected constituency.) For example, as one female legislator put it: "some KMT female legislators, such as A, B, C, and D, have been supported by the Huang, Fu-shin party caucus (the KMT's military electoral machine) to get elected. In earlier times, they joined the defense committee to oversee the bills for their own constituency. However, as time passes, they no longer want to stay at the same committee, instead they might try to shop around [and experience] different committees."(Interview #98002.) This might explain why the defense committee, which used to be a male-oriented committee in other parliamentary countries, has been a popular committee for women in Taiwan.

Secondly, and at the aggregate level, the interests of the party can also guide legislators' committee choices. This often happens in two ways: by the party urging its member to move to a committee dealing with the party's concerns, or by persuading its members to attend less popular and prestigious committees. On the one hand, parties are always looking to promote certain issues or bills, and they will therefore try to ensure that these bills are carried through by coordinating the actions of their members as far as possible. For example, if in one legislative session a particular party has several important welfare bills on its agenda, the party will attempt to guide its members onto a related committee (e.g., the interior committee), so as to better influence the outcome of the legislative process. It is common for parties to direct most of their members to one particular committee if they have important agendas to promote in that committee's subject area during any given session. This "clustering" of one party's members in one or two committees is most common amongst the small parties, because they will often need to gather together in order to obtain sufficient critical mass to attempt to further their agenda. This, indeed, can obtain for the minority parties a certain degree of leverage in deciding committee agendas and bill-proceedings,[13] and yet, sometimes, it may well

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[13] For example, in the second term of the legislators, the NP mobilized all of their members to join the National Defense committee in the fourth session, and the Judicial committee in the fifth section, hence it

obstruct an individual member's personal interests. One New Party legislator (interview: 98024) describes the constraints that surround the choosing of committees to join as "the pity of the New Party." He says that, given the choice, he would attempt to join A or B, but that, for the past three sessions, he has disregarded his own choice of committee in favor of joining that which best serves the interests of his party. "Because for a small party, if the party wants to lead some agendas today, it must mobilize its members to the one committee. And once it chooses to do so, its members lack the autonomy in choosing the committee". Similar comments were heard from another NP female member (interview: 98017), who had been assigned to some totally unfamiliar committees, instead of her preferred and familiar committees.

On the other hand, the party whips might channel members to some less sought after committees, such as the foreign affairs or judicial committees, if competition for some popular committees, left unchecked, would entail them exceeding their quorum (the maximum size is 18 members per committee). For example, the party may redirect some members to their second or third choice committees in certain sessions, and in return promise them their first choice in the next session. Contrary to examples of the clustering effect, this need to urge party members into less popular committees is most likely to occur in the majority party, and members will invariably cooperate in return for some form of future gain. In the course of my interviews it became clear that female deputies are as subject to these pressures as male ones: forced to attempt to balance the interests of their party with their own interests, but often left with little choice but to bow to the influence of the party. For example, one KMT female legislator (interview: 98038) told me that she once intended to participate in the interior committee, however, her party

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has two chairs and one schedule member in the National Defense committee; and one chairperson and one schedule member in the Judicial committee in the fifth session (Sheng 1996). DPP are more concerned about the political bills since the party was formed, they have more of their members in the political affair committees (interior and government organization).

asked her to join the less-popular foreign affairs committee. In summary then, it is clear that the committee choices of female deputies are, to a certain degree, influenced by the wishes of their party.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, most of the legislators consider themselves to have an essentially free hand in choosing the committees they would like to join, at least in some sessions. However, in addition to the influences of party, their choices are also shaped by their expertise, experiences, bargaining power, interests, self-interest, and re-election considerations. Clearly then, there are a large number of different elements involved in choosing a committee to join and, consequently, a clear gender division as regards committee arrangements is extremely difficult to discern. Although female legislators would appear, generally, to prefer committees like education, the effects of such preferences cannot be viewed in isolation.

Hypothesis 2: Participation in legislative activities

Stipulated committee memberships cannot tell us much about the policy subjects in which individual legislators are really interested or the degree to which they engage in policy representation. Because committees do not have clear jurisdictional compartments, most policy subjects overlap committee jurisdictions, enabling members to master several policy fields and enhance the interaction and coordination of each committee in turn (Davidson and Oleszek 1996) but often obscuring a member's *principal* policy interests. For example, the interior committee deals with various matters, including political issues, civil affairs, elections, labor, welfare, health, and the police. Members of the same committee might therefore focus on very different policy subjects, and committee titles certainly do not give a clear indication of their substantive purview.

In addition, the question of which committee a legislator joins is not sufficient, in itself, to discern the actual and effective level of participation by the representative in the policy-making process. As Hall (1996) put it:

By focusing on the formal institutional units, we too-conveniently label as institutional or structural something that is better understood as a behavioral phenomena [albeit subject to institutional constraints]. Taken literally, at least, the view that committees constitute a system by which the organization divides labor - thereby achieving specialization, expertise, and greater organizational efficiency - founders on an important behavioral puzzle. Legislative labor in Congress is required of no one. Few specific tasks are assigned; no production quotas are set. No sanctions await senators and representatives who show up late, disappear when a constituent call or the golfing weather is good, or otherwise labor little in legislative decision making (Hall 1996, 11).

As Hall noted, the institutional arrangements serve as a point of departure but not as a satisfactory indicator of the level of policy responsiveness and participation of the legislators. As he points out, serious actors tend to be members of committees with jurisdiction, yet, members of such committees need not to be serious actors. Therefore, it is necessary to delineate the institutional and behavioral divisions of labor in the policy-making process; in short, we must move *beyond* the merely institutional arrangements. Therefore, I now turn to the dynamic processes of legislative participation, as stated in hypothesis two.

To evaluate (as suggested in the previous chapter) policy representation as a whole, I break down the legislative process into two phases: the agenda setting phase and the policy deliberation phase. Furthermore, agenda setting in the Legislative Yuan generally involves two stages: first, deciding which issues get to be addressed at all, and this is determined by the bill-initiation; second, deciding which issues get to be examined first in the committees, and this is determined by the chairperson's arrangements. In the beginning, legislators usually define their legislative agendas and the issues to which they will give effort and time. Next, policy deliberation is a long-term process proceeding both in the committee and Yuan meetings. Once the bills are on the agenda, it is then the speeches made during the policy debate and the deliberations that follow that determine the final result of the bills. Therefore, at each legislative stage (i.e., for each of these measures) - initiation, chairship, committee speech, and Yuan speech, I will examine the

policy interests and representation by gender.

Stage I: bill initiation (hypothesis 2.a)

Various policy issues occupy an individual legislator's time and attention, and the issues that are addressed at the first stage of the process set the scene for what will follow. Hypothesis 2a assumes that female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to initiate bills related to areas of women's issues and, to test whether such a gender pattern does indeed exist, I examine all the bill-initiations in the Legislature Yuan through the three terms of my observation.

By designation, bill-initiation in the Yuan meetings requires the co-sponsorship of 15 legislators besides the original initiators. Generally speaking, most of the bill proposals or amendments are drafted by one legislator's office even though the bills might have multiple authors. As I explained in the previous chapter (footnote no. 4), the act of co-sponsorship is not considered a particularly meaningful measurement of legislative participation and, therefore, all the bill initiations analyzed here are based solely on the first authors. For bills with multiple sponsors, the initiator is determined by reference to the documentary records, namely, a monthly report on bill-initiation, provided by the secretary of the Legislative Yuan. I examine the gender patterns by dividing the whole issue of bill initiation into seven policy subjects as referred to in the methodology section. Table 4-2 shows this aggregate data of bill initiation arranged by gender.

As shown, the discrepancy between the first and second terms as regards the total number of bill initiations is caused by the large number of tenured members that sat throughout the first term, performing no law-making function and all retired by the beginning of the second term. Consequently, the dramatic increase in the total number of bill initiations indicates that legislators have been increasingly engaged in *active* legislation since this occurred. On average, in the first term, female legislators initiated

Table 4-2

Numbers and proportions of bill sponsorship of each policy area

	1st term Female	Male	2nd term Female	Male	3rd term Female	Male
Economic Development	2(7%)	32(22%)	27(25%)	151(28%)	12(17%)	173(36%)
Defense and Foreign	1(3%)	4(3%)	3(3%)	10(2%)	1(1%)	22(5%)
Politics and Govern	3(10%)	53(37%)	16(15%)	168(32%)	1(1%)	93(19%)
Judicial and Order	4(13%)	17(12%)	16(15%)	48(9%)	14(20%)	61(13%)
Caring and Communication	14(47%)	18(13%)	21(20%)	80(15%)	29(42%)	81(17%)
Feminist	5(17%)	2(1%)	16(15%)	10(2%)	9(13%)	3(0.7%)
Group	1(3%)	17(12%)	8(7%)	63(12%)	3(4%)	51(10%)
Total	30	143	107	531	69	486

Cell entries are the numbers of bills initiated in each policy area. Figures in parentheses indicate the ratio of that type of bills among all policy area within each gender group

Source: The monthly legislation reports (primary source) and the Legislative Gazette.

2.5 bills (30/12) and male legislators initiated 1.7 bills (143/86). In the second term, female legislators initiated an average of 6.3 bills (107/17) and male legislators, 3.8 bills (531/138). In the third term, the figures were 3.1 (69/22) and 3.5 (486/137)[14] for females and males respectively. Given the very limited number of women in the Yuan, the differences here cannot be overstated without first examining the variation on a more individual level. However, at first glance, it does seem that the conclusion of Chou, Clark, and Clark (1990) that women deputies were less active in initiating bills in Taiwan's legislature is no longer valid. Even at this rather early stage it already looks as if women are now playing an active role in the making of laws.

The aggregate data allows me to demonstrate the different policy preferences between women and men. For men, in the first and second terms, the first priority of bill initiation lay in the public field - dealing with political issues and government organization; and the second priority lay in the field of economic development - dealing with issues related to economics, finance, transportation, and local development. However, by the third term, this order of importance appears to have been reversed. For women, in the first and third term, the top priority of their bill-initiations concerned matters of caring and communication. Whereas, in the second term, women initiated bills more evenly across different policy areas, with the number of bill-initiations in the area of economic and development policy slightly exceeding that in the caring and communication area. With an absolute majority in the Legislature Yuan, the men have consistently tended to emphasize political and economic issues, whereas women have *tended* to focus upon the issues of traditional interest to themselves.

In the policy domains of economic development and politics and government, male legislators consistently outnumbered their female counterparts in terms of bill initiation across the three terms. In the first and second term, male legislators initiated

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[14] Bill-initiation here includes the sponsorship on the draft of a new bill, the major amendments, and small amendments.

approximately one-third of bills concerned with these areas, in which matters of political power and economic resources lie. Perhaps because of the public/private dichotomy, and thus their traditional exclusion from these issues, women had less experience and interest in investing their time in these areas.

When examining these differences in policy areas of female interest, the gender gap becomes even more apparent. In the first term, of the 30 bills initiated by women, 47 percent were related to the caring and communications area and 17 percent to feminist issues. However, of the 143 bills initiated by men, the figures for these areas of policy were only 13 percent and 1 percent respectively. In the second term, and as the level of female bill-initiation increased dramatically, of the 107 bills proposed by women, 20 percent were proposed in the area of the caring and communication, and, this time, 15 percent concerned feminist issues. On the other hand, of the 531 bills proposed by men in that term, the figures were 15 percent and 2 percent. Finally, in the third term, of the 69 bills proposed by women, 42 percent were proposed in the domain of caring and communication, and 13 percent in the feminist domain. The figures for men were very different, with 486 bills proposed, but only 17 percent concerned with caring and communication, and only 0.7 percent concerning feminist issues. Except in the second term, it can thus be seen that the gap between the level of female and male bill initiations in the caring and communication policy domain is substantial.

In the second term, though the subject of caring and communication is no longer women's first priority when it comes to the initiating of bills, they still placed more emphasis upon this area than did men. In the first and third terms, than one-third of all female bill-initiations concerned this policy area. Consequently, it can be seen that, across three entire terms, women deputies consistently gave more weight to the subject areas of caring and communication and feminist issues than did their male colleagues, at least in terms of the relative level of bill-initiations.

Moving to the individual level by examining correlation and regression the

distinction becomes even clearer. The unit of analysis in the following six models is the individual legislator, and I use their bill-initiations in the areas of caring and communication and feminist issues respectively as my dependent variables across the three terms. To examine exactly what it is that affects legislators' policy preferences, I design each model to include several independent measures so as to capture the extent to which legislators' policy priority is affected by gender after controlling for other relevant factors. The independent variables include gender, age, education, the level of urbanization of their constituency, and their party affiliation, as described in the method section. The variables for gender and party are defined as dummy variables, with female, party-DPP, party-NP, and Independents all set at 1. The level of district urbanization is measured by the percentage of the total employed population in the legislator's district that works in the field of agriculture. For those party-list and other non-district members, I substitute this statistic with the corresponding national figures. All these independent variables were labeled in the methodology section as the general factors influencing the level and type of legislative participation of the individual member. Table 4-3 shows the results from OLS regressions.

It can thus be seen that gender is positively correlated with the level of bill initiations by legislators in the caring and communication and feminist areas. In the caring and communication policy area, and in the first and third terms, females are significantly more likely to initiate bills. Though it should be noted that this is not the case in the second term - in which age, education, and party were more significant in explaining differences in the level of bill-initiation - it is consistent with the results of the aggregate level analysis. Clearly, the policy interests of female deputies have become more diversified, and the gender patterns are thus less clear in the area of caring and communication. However, in feminist issue, gender is indeed shown to be a significant factor in explaining the differences between male and female bill-initiation across the

Table 4-3.

OLS models of policy initiation

	1st term		2nd term		3rd term	
	Care/Comm	Feminist	Care/Comm	Feminist	Care/Comm	Feminist
Independent variables						
Constant	-.083	.022	.534	.475*	-.420	-.059
	(.407)	(.168)	(.488)	(.235)	(.701)	(.135)
Age	-.068	.0013	-.273**	-.093	.131	-.016
	(.084)	(.035)	(.105)	(.051)	(.158)	(.030)
Education	.165*	.0026	.282**	-.032	.128	.03
	(.075)	(.031)	(.089)	(.043)	(.123)	(.024)
Gender	.980***	.386***	.410	.805***	.708*	.366***
	(.211)	(.087)	(.276)	(.133)	(.352)	(.068)
Rural	-.726	.026	-2.461**	-.204	-1.135	-.210
	(.666)	(.275)	(.892)	(.430)	(1.437)	(.277)
Party-DPP	.044	-.058	.547**	.101	.339	.042
	(.177)	(.073)	(.186)	(.090)	(.263)	(.051)
Party-NP			1.171**	.133	.845*	.247**
			(.390)	(.188)	(.396)	(.076)
Indep.	.213	-.039	-.106	-.057	-.592	-.014
	(.265)	(.275)	(.535)	(.258)	(1.086)	(.210)
Model diagnostics						
Adjusted R-square	.207	.145	.227	.224	.048	.229
F	5.213***	3.751**	7.375***	7.283***	2.138*	7.690***
N	98	98	155	155	159	159

The President and Vice-President of the Yuan are not included in the sample N

*p<=.05   **p<=.01   ***p<=.001

Source: 1. The monthly legislation reports. 2. The Legislative Gazette.

3. The Electoral Bulletin of Central Election Commission. 1989, 1992, 1995.

entire three terms. In essence, it would indeed appear that women tend to be more engaged in the initiation of women's issues than do men.

Stage II: committee chairship (hypothesis 2.b)

Once the bills are proposed and the first reading (report) takes place in the Yuan meeting, the next question to arise is whether the bill will be discussed in the committees or not. With hundreds of bills initiated by legislators and the administration, not all bills can possibly gain an equal degree of attention, with some bills remaining "frozen" for a considerable period of time because insufficient effort has been put into getting them onto a committee's schedule. Most legislators agree that the chairperson of each committee possesses greater power than others in the decision-making process due to their jurisdiction over the setting of their committee's agenda. One legislator stated that the power of the chairpersons as regards agenda setting is absolute, and that this was especially so for DPP and NP chairpersons, who can always place their own bills at the top of the list (interview: 98008). Yet, for some KMT chairpersons, who also need to consider the demands and preferences of the executive branches, the agenda setting power may not be as absolute as it is for minority party chairpersons. Also, as noted, the committee chairperson decides which bills get on the agenda for examination in the committee meetings and, therefore, because of the critical position of the chairperson in the legislative process, parties mobilize in order to get their own members elected as chairpersons and leading the discussions.

Hypothesis 2b assumes that female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to chair committee meetings examining bills related to women's issues. I discussed committee membership and chairship in a more static sense, earlier, as regards stipulated categories and without distinguishing between the respective policy subjects on which legislators within each committee focus. Here, I turn to a dynamic approach to investigate the gender pattern in terms of the policy interests of committee chairpersons

Table 4-4:

Numbers and proportions of bill chairship of each policy area.

	1st term Female	Male	2nd term Female	Male	3rd term Female	Male
Economic Development	11(13%)	95(25%)	22(23%)	184(34%)	12(19%)	110(36%)
Defense and Foreign	0(%)	8(2%)	5(5%)	13(2%)	2(3%)	14(4%)
Politics and Govern	14(16%)	73(20%)	8(8%)	121(22%)	5(8%)	65(21%)
Judicial and Order	11(13%)	64(17%)	11(12%)	61(11%)	11(17%)	54(18%)
Caring and Communication	22(25%)	67(18%)	41(43%)	117(21%)	24(38%)	36(12%)
Feminist	2(2%)	0(%)	6(6%)	8(2%)	6(10%)	3(1%)
Group	28(32%)	45(12%)	2(2%)	44(8%)	3(5%)	25(8%)
Total	88	374	95	548	63	307

Cell entries are the numbers of committees chaired in each policy area. Figures in parentheses indicate the ratio of that type of bills among all policy area within each gender group.

Source: The index system of the legislative participation (primary source) and the Legislative Gazette

in actually setting the agendas. Every time the committee meets, the chairperson will usually schedule one bill for examination.[15] Which bill is put forward, and by whom, is my primary interest here, and, by dividing the bills discussed in the committees into seven main categories (the same scheme used earlier and explained in the methodology section), the gender patterns regarding the policy agendas of the chairpersons are shown in table 4-4.

In the first term, 462 committee meetings on bill-examination, hosted by 8 chairwomen and 47 chairmen, took place. On average, chairwomen held 11 (88/8) committee meetings and chairmen held 7.6 (374/49). In the second term, there were 639 such committee meetings hosted by 13 chairwomen and 82 chairmen. On average, women chaired 7.3 (95/13) meetings and men chaired 6.7 (548/82). In the third term, 370 committee meetings were hosted by 10 chairwomen and 64 chairmen and, on average, women chaired 6.3 (63/10) and men chaired 4.8 (307/64) meetings.

In the first term, 25 percent of the 88 committee meetings hosted by female chairpersons were related to caring and communication bills, whereas male legislators hosted a total of 374 committee meetings, with 18 percent of those they hosted examining such bills. In the second term, 43 percent of the committee meetings women hosted examined bills that concerned the above arena, compared to 21 percent of the committee meetings that men hosted. Finally, in the third term, 38 percent of the committee meetings hosted by women discussed bills that concerned caring and communication, whereas only 12 percent of male-hosted committee meetings did the same. Thus, across three terms, and as a group, female chairpersons were more likely than male chairpersons to put bills concerning traditional female interests and feminist issues, on committee agendas, and thereby increase the chances of the bill being noticed and passed. Also,

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[15] Committee meetings have different functions, including : public hearing, interpellation, or bill examination. Bill examining before the second reading is the most important function of the committee. In each committee meeting, usually, the chairperson would schedule one bill for examination. In very rare cases chairperson might choose two bills in one meeting.

women chairpersons appeared most likely to arrange for bills concerning caring and communication issues to appear on committee agendas.

Contrary to this, male chairpersons were most likely to choose bills of economic, finance, budget, and transportation issues (the domain of economic and development issues) to place on committee agendas. In the first term, 25 percent of the committee meetings hosted by men examined policies of that type, whereas only 13 percent of the meetings hosted by women did the same. In the second term, 34 percent of the committee agendas set by chairmen were in that policy area as opposed to 23 percent of the committee agendas set by chairwomen. And in the third term, 36 percent of the committee meetings chaired by men discussed such bills. The figure for chairwomen was 19 percent. Therefore, across three terms, it was generally the case that almost one-third of the committee meetings chaired by male legislators discussed economic and development issues. The second most popular policy area for male-chaired meetings to discuss was that of political issues and government organization. Therefore, once again, men consistently emphasized "male issues" with respect to the scheduling of bills in the committee meetings.

However, even with these clear differences of preference, in terms of arranging bills, between chairmen and chairwomen, the factors that can affect a chairperson's choice of agenda can still be varied. Even though a chairperson's preferred bills tend to be at the top of their committee agenda list, some legislators (especially members of the majority party) commented that they would also take pressure from the party and the administration into account when arranging such agendas. Therefore, to examine exactly which factors affect an individual's agenda setting in the committees, a further correlation and regression analysis must be conducted. In this case, the unit of analysis is the individual chairperson. I regress such individual characteristics as the gender, age, education, the level of urbanization of their constituency, and their party (three dummy variables of DPP, NP, and INP, as before) of the chairpersons on the committees they

chair for caring and communication bills and feminist issues respectively. With two sets of dependent variables - the frequency of arranging bills concerning caring and communication, and concerning feminist issues - for each term, six models across three legislative terms are produced in Table 4-5.

First, the linear association between women and chairship in caring and communication areas is positive, and, except in the first term, significant. The difference in this first term might have been caused by the small number of chairpersons - 8/12 - and the vast number of caring and communication-related bills that were presented. Alternatively, it might be due to the fact that there was still a system of group representatives for educational matters at that time, and that male deputies were thus still taking the lead in educational issues.[16]) The correlation between gender and chairship as regards feminist issues is also extremely positive - the regression analysis showing that gender is a significant factor in explaining the feminist bill-setting agenda, after controlling for other factors for the first and third term.

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[16] Before 1992, beside the representatives from the district election, there was still the system of group representatives, under which certain candidates ran for the occupational list, instead of district list. They serve different constituencies, depending on their occupational constituency---business, industry, labor, agriculture, fishermen, and education. Voters must choose whether to register to vote for which list— district or occupational. Occupational group representatives tend to lead in the issue area of their group concern. If I remove the two members of the educational group representatives from the sample, gender becomes a significant factor in explaining the difference in chairing the committees related to domestic issues.

Table 4-5.

OLS models of committee chairship

	1st term Care/Comm	Feminist	2nd term Care/Comm	Feminist	3rd term Care/Comm	Feminist
Independent variables						
Constant	-1.650	-.0.053	1.598	.738	.893	.649
	(2.465)	(.206)	(1.563)	(.393)	(1.392)	(.512)
Age	.212	-.0092	-.350	-.153	-.289	-.185
	(.578)	(.048)	(.363)	(.091)	(.297)	(.109)
Education	.841	.023	.381	-.045	.158	.044
	(.442)	(.037)	(.291)	(.073)	(.231)	(.085)
Gender	1.150	.254**	1.611*	.178	1.677*	.475*
	(1.259)	(.105)	(.828)	(.208)	(.582)	(.214)
Rural	-3.081	-.015	-3.986	-.635	-.571	-1.229
	(4.329)	(.362)	(2.865)	(.721)	(2.609)	(.960)
Party-DPP	-1.131	-.0005	-.156	.161	-.042	-.089
	(1.279)	(.107)	(.575)	(.145)	(.430)	(.158)
Party-NP			-.560	.622	.737	-.140
			(1.395)	(.351)	(.662)	(.244)
Indep.	-1.421	.0016	5.155	-.107	-.515	-.105
	(1.696)	(.142)	(2.714)	(.683)	(1.757)	(.647)
Model diagnostics						
Adjusted R-square	.129	.118	.063	.036	.099	.064
F	1.235	1.110	1.896	1.508	2.146(*.051)	1.713
N	57	57	95	95	74	74

*p<=.05   **p<=.01   ***p<=.001

Source: 1. The index system of the legislative participation.   2. The Legislative Gazette.
3. The Electoral Bulletin of Central Election Commission, 1989, 1992, 1995

Committee chairships can be seen as the link between legislators' sponsorships and speeches. Next, I examine whether the gender patterns of the speeches legislators made are consistent with the above.

Stage III: speech in the committees (hypothesis 2.c)

Once the agenda in the committee meeting is set, the stage is set for the speeches. Making a speech requires an individual's time, effort, interest, and expertise, especially at the committee stage. As discussed earlier, even though the committee examination is not the most definitive or important stage of the law making process, it is still regarded as vital. In committee meetings, it is usually the case that only a few members will attend and, therefore, only a few people could end up deciding upon the main contents of the bill that will be sent on for floor discussion. Non-committee members can also participate in this process, however, they do not possess a vote if any changes are made to the bills. Considering the fact that many bills, after examination at the committee stage, do not experience a significant degree of alteration in the Yuan floor meetings, it can be seen that the committee discussion can decide the entire direction and content of many bills[17] and is thus of huge importance.

Given the scheduling conflicts that often arise, legislators need to determine in which committee meetings to invest their time. Hypothesis 2.c assumes that female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to speak in committee meetings in which bills relating to women's issues are discussed. Therefore, in order to unearth any distinctive gender patterns in this process, I here classify the committee speeches by policy area (using the same scheme as above) and whether male or female representatives delivered them in Table 4-6.

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[17] Especially in the third term, given the establishment of the mechanism of the party coordination, most of the bills were not discussed on the floor, but rather in the committee and the informal meetings (party coordination)

Table 4-6

Numbers and proportions of committee speeches made in each policy area

	1ˢᵗ term Female	Male	2ⁿᵈ term Female	Male	3ʳᵈ term Female	Male
Economic Development	605(19%)	9882(30%	199(9%)	3253(29%	225(22%)	2168(32%)
Defense and Foreign	110(3%)	1889(6%)	75(3%)	213(2%)	45(4%)	313(5%)
Politics and Govern	659(20%)	9564(29%	242(11%)	2740(24%	110(11%)	1533(23%)
Judicial and Order	361(11%)	4299(13%	305(13%)	1149(10%	225(22%)	1216(18%)
Caring and Communication	1196(37%)	4678(14%	1284(56%)	2865(26)	244(24%)	902(13%)
Feminist	12(0.3%)	7(.0002%)	96(4%)	159(.5%)	87(8%)	58(.9%)
Group	313(10%)	3098(9%)	75(3%)	843(8%)	89(9%)	612(9%)
Total	3256	33417	2276	11222	1025	6802

Cell entries are the numbers of speeches made in committee in each policy area. Figures in the parentheses indicate the ratio of that type of bills among all policy area within each gender group

Source: The index system of the legislative participation (primary source) and the Legislative Gazette

In the first term, on average, women spoke 271.3 (3,256/12) times and men spoke 388.6 (3,3417/86) times when examining bills in committee meetings. In the second term, women spoke 133.9 (2,276/17) times and men spoke 81.3 (11,222/138) times in the same circumstances. And in the third term, women made an average of 45.6 (1025/22) speeches and men made 49.6 (6,802/137) speeches in the committee meetings. Compared to the number of speeches made in the Yuan floor meetings (to which I will return later), on average, legislators tend to be more active at the committee stage.

I first compare the different subject emphases of these committee speeches between women and men and across the three terms. According to this analysis, it was consistently the case that women most frequently chose the policy area of caring and communication upon which to speak; and that men most frequently spoke of matters related to economic development. (Followed, except in the second term, by speeches about political and government policy.) It would appear, therefore, that women tended to address women's issues, whereas men chose to address men's issues.

Across the three terms, women consistently placed more weight than men upon caring and communication matters and feminist issues. In the first term, of the 3,256 speeches women made in bill-examining committee meetings, 37 percent addressed bills related to the caring and communications area. For men, of the 33,417 speeches they made, 30 percent addressed matters of economic development area and 29 percent dealt with political and government affairs. In the second term, the differences grew even more apparent, with 56 percent of female committee speeches addressing bills concerning caring and communication, but only 26 percent of male speeches dealing with the same area. In the third term, though the gender differences remained, the size of the gap decreased somewhat. Women still spoke most frequently in the area of caring and communication, using 24 percent of their total speeches in order to do so, but the number of speeches concerning other policy areas also increased. Turning to the area of feminist interests, the committee speeches made by both men and women are few and far between,

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especially in the first term. For example, in the first term, only one feminist bill was scheduled for examination by a chairwoman.

Once again, I regress the individual's party, age, level of education, degree of constituency urbanization, and gender on committee speeches that address caring and communications issues and feminist issues. The unit of analysis is, as ever, the individual legislator. The regression results of six models are shown in Table 4-7.

Clearly, the correlation between gender and the number of committee speeches made concerning bills related to caring and communication matters is positive across three terms, but not always significant. Nevertheless, gender appears to be an important variable in explaining such differences. Across three terms (i.e., with the exception of the first term), women were significantly more likely to speak upon bills that concerned caring and communication issues than men were. Turning to the area of feminist issues, the relationship between gender and that subject area is even stronger.

Table 4-7.

OLS models of committee speeches

	1st term Care/Com	Feminist	2nd term Care/Com	Feminist	3rd term Care/Com	Feminist
Independent variables						
Constant	-11.271	.485	8,853	2.209	-3.691	-.906
	(60.358)	(.418)	(20.586)	(2.331)	(4.640)	(1.183)
Age	-12.655	-.097	-6.590	-.230	.130	.019
	(12.511)	(.087)	(4.424)	(.501)	(1.046)	(.267)
Education	33.528**	.0097	8.780*	-.041	2.134**	.215
	(11.076)	(.077)	(3.758)	(.425)	(.816)	(.208)
Gender	49.143	.853***	49.072***	3.593**	4.472(.057)	3.485***
	(31.362)	(.217)	(11.632)	(1.317)	(2.332)	(.595)
Rural	-142.554	-1.124	-28.948	-6.423	-9.635	-1.914
	(98.845)	(.685)	(37.643)	(4.262)	(9.507)	(2.424)
Party-DPP	55.351*	.066	11.094	1.628	5.846***	1.236**
	(26.291)	(.182)	(7.862)	(.890)	(1.743)	(.445)
Party-NP			47.279**	6.492***	6.606*	1.782**
			(16.450)	(1.862)	(2.620)	(.668)
Indep.	-37.039	-.06	-.258	-.297	-2.173	-.091
	(39.292)	(.685)	(22.557)	(2.554)	(7.189)	(1.833)
Model diagnostics						
Adjusted R-square	.148	.157	.191	.131	.138	.230
F	3.807**	4.005***	6.123***	4.263***	4.621***	7.738***
N	98	98	155	155	159	159

Note that the president and vice president of the Yuan are not included in the sample N
*p<=.05   **p<=.01   ***p<=.001

Source: 1. The index system of the legislative participation.   2. The Legislative Gazette.
3. The Electoral Bulletin of Central Election Commission, 1989, 1992, 1995

Stage IV: speech in the Yuan meeting (hypothesis 2.d)

Following examination of a bill by committee, the second and third readings of the bills are conducted at a Yuan floor meeting. Most bills, before being sent to the Yuan floor meetings, have, of course, been intensively discussed in the committee meetings. Therefore, if no severe controversy or political sensibility is involved, some bills in the second and third readings may not evoke intensive discussion.

Each committee elects two procedural committee members, who report and arrange the order of the bills to be put on the Yuan agenda on behalf of their committees and their parties. Sometimes personal preferences play a part, too. Twenty procedural members work collectively to decide which bills will top the agenda. In the third term, and in order to save time and increase the efficiency of bill proceedings in the Yuan meetings, a mechanism of party coordination was established. This was necessary because both because the workload of the lawmakers has increased dramatically in recent years, and because competition among multiple parties (three parties and some small factions) has made the Yuan meetings inefficient. Legislators are, therefore, encouraged to participate in informal party coordination[18] to solve disagreements and attempt to strike a common ground before bills are actually sent to Yuan meetings. Such informal meetings determine both which bills will get addressed and which version of the bill will get precedence in the Yuan meeting. Consequently, discussions in the Yuan meetings have become less fierce and energetic, since most of the disagreements have already been settled.

However, the chances of a bill being passed are still, to a large extent, determined by the second and third readings. Legislators with different viewpoints need to make their presence known and express their concerns. Also, for non-committee members, Yuan (floor) meetings provide the chance to make meaningful revisions to a bill.

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[18] The original informal party bargain and coordination is now under consideration to formalize it.

Legislators speak upon various issues with differing levels of intensity. Generally speaking, the more a legislator addresses one particular policy area, the more he or she is obviously concerned about that issue, even though we cannot discern their position or approach from such a simplistic measurement. Hypothesis 2d assumes that female representatives are more likely than their male counterparts to speak during floor deliberation upon issues related to women's interests. I must therefore examine differences in the frequency of speeches made by women and men among the seven policy subjects in the second and third readings across the last three legislative terms as shown in Table 4-8.

As a whole, in the first term, women spoke an average of 40.7 times (488/12) and men spoke an average of 49.7 times (4,277/86) at the floor meetings of the Legislative Yuan. In the second term, women spoke an average of 32.5 times (553/17) and men an average of 23.4 times (3234/138). And in the third term, women spoke 23.4 times (233/22) and men spoke 9.4 times (1,320/137).

The different policy preferences as regards speeches made in floor debates between men and women appear significant. Female legislators spoke most frequently concerning bills related to caring and communication across three terms (32 percent, 27 percent, and 49 percent of the total floor meetings speeches in each term, respectively). Male legislators spoke most frequently on economic and development issues (29 percent) in the first term; on political and government organization issues (35 percent) in the second term, and on matters of the judiciary and social order (29 percent of the total male speeches made) in the third term. From the perspective of particular policy areas, it can be seen that, in the first term, 31 percent of female speeches on the floor concerned bills related to the caring and communication area, compared to 20 percent of male speeches. In the second term, 27 percent of women's speeches compared to 20 percent of men's speeches were made in that policy domain. Finally, in the third term, the gap is even larger, with 49 percent of women's speeches concerned with this policy domain as

Table 4-8:

Numbers and proportions of Yuan speeches in each policy area

	1st term Female	Male	2nd term Female	Male	3rd term Female	Male
Economic Development	102(21%)	1239(29%)	113(20%)	815(25%)	12(5%)	138(11%)
Defense and Foreign	4(.8%)	104(2%)	53(10%)	116(4%)	13(6%)	95(7%)
Politics and Govern	66(14%)	577(14%)	144(26%)	1121(35%	26(11%)	309(23%)
Judicial and Order	61(12%)	757(18%)	56(10%)	258(8%)	47(20%)	388(29%)
Caring and Communication	154(32%)	857(20%)	149(27%)	633(20%)	115(49%)	329(25%)
Feminist	0(%)	0(%)	0(%)	0(%)	12(5%)	9(.7%)
Group	101(21%)	743(17%)	38(7%)	291(9%)	8(3%)	52(4%)
Total	488	4277	553	3234	233	1320

Cell entries are the numbers of speeches made in Yuan meetings in each policy area. Parentheses in parentheses indicate the ratio of that type of bills among all policy area within each gender group

Source: the index system of the legislative participation (primary source) and the Legislative Gazette

opposed to only 25 percent of men's speeches.

It is also to be noted that no feminist bill was put forward in the Yuan meetings prior to the beginning of the third term. In the area of feminist bills, and as observed earlier, only one piece of feminist legislation was put forward in the committee meetings in the first term. That particular bill did not reach any agreement at the committee stage and,consequently, no bill was sent to the Yuan meeting. In the second term, most of the feminist bills were fiercely debated in the committee stages. Only in the third term, were feminist bills sent to the Yuan meetings for second and third readings.

To examine the effect of gender on the number of speeches made concerning the areas of caring and communications and feminist issues at this final stage, OLS regressions are again applied. The unit of analysis is once again the individual legislator. The factors affecting the frequency of the individual speech on the Yuan are generally the same - party, age, education, constituency urbanization, and gender - as before. The dependent variables here are the frequency of Yuan speeches concerning caring and communication issues and feminist issues. The results are shown in Table 4-9.

The correlation between gender and floor speeches upon caring and communication issues was positive and significant in the second and third terms. In the first term, the model has shown that the frequency of speaking in the Yuan meeting was affected by the level of education and party affiliation - better-educated legislators and DPP members paid more attention and spoke more often in the caring and communication policy area. In the second term, though the education level and party ID of each legislator was still sufficient to explain the differences in the number of the speeches made, gender was also significant. By the third term, though, education and the DPP were no longer significant factors; instead, gender and the NP now appeared to be most important in explaining the differences. In addition, gender and the frequency of speech upon feminist policy area have been positively correlated and the relationship is significant by the third term.

Table 4-9.

OLS models of Yuan speeches

	1st term Care/Comm	Feminist	2nd term Care/Comm	Feminist	3rd term Care/Comm	Feminist
Independent variables						
Constant	-5.039		-3.323		1.060	.042
	(7.072)		(3.166)		(2.159)	(.184)
Age	-1.856		.161		-.299	-.013
	(1.466)		(.680)		(.486)	(.041)
Education	5.166***		1.718**		.512	.021
	(1.298)		(.578)		(.380)	(.032)
Gender	5.628		4.347*		2.410*	.467***
	(3.675)		(1.798)		(1.085)	(.093)
Rural	3.166		.845		-5.385	-.389
	(11.582)		(5.790)		(4.424)	(.377)
Party-DPP	12.476***		3.717**		1.352	.078
	(3.081)		(1.209)		(.811)	(.069)
Party-NP			1.166		4.281***	.023
			(2.53)		(1.219)	(.104)
Indep.	1.264		.709		-2.210	-.083
	(4.604)		(3.470)		(3.345)	(.285)
Model diagnostics						
Adjusted R-square	.223		.097		.141	.135
F	5.641***		3.327**		4.708***	4.526***
N	98	98	155	155	159	159

Note that the President and the Vice-President of the Yuan are not included in the sample N

*p<=.05   **p<=.01   ***p<=.001

Source: 1. The index system of the legislative participation. 2. The Legislative Gazette. 3. The Electoral Bulletin of Central Election Commission, 1989, 1992, 1995

Summary: gender difference in the legislative participation

At an aggregate level, I have compared female and male primary policy interests at each legislative stage: namely, bill initiation, committee chairship, committee speech, and floor speech. I have shown that women and men have different policy preferences with respect to allocating their time and effort both within the groups and *between* groups. I summarize the different forms of legislative participation below.

Gender difference in the policy preferences

Throughout the legislative processes I observed, women and men have different preferences with respect to various policy domains. I summarize the top policy priorities within the female and male groups for each legislative measurement across three terms in table 4-10.

Table:4-10. First policy preferences in different stages of the legislative process.

	1st term	2nd term	3rd term
Initiation Female Male	 Care and Com. (47%) Pol. and Gov. (37%)	 Economics (25%) Pol. And Gov.(32%)	 Care and Com.(42%) Economic(36%)
Chairships Female Male	 Care and Com. (25%) Economics (25%)	 Care and Com.(43%) Economics (34%)	 Care and Com.(38%) Economics (36%)
Committee speech Female Male	 Care and Com.(37%) Economics (30%)	 Care and Com.(56%) Economics (29%)	 Care and Com.(24%) Economics (32%)
Yuan speech Female Male	 Care and Com. (32%) Economics (29%)	 Care and Com. (27%) Pol. and Gov. (35%)	 Care and Com.(49%) Order (29%)

Numbers in parentheses indicate the ratio of the participation of that policy area among all the policy areas within the gender groups.

Table 4-10 shows that within the two gender groups, with a few exceptions (concerning initiation in the second term), women deputies tended to consider caring and

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communication issues their primary policy concern, whereas men placed matters of economic and development policy in this position. Therefore, my findings thus far confirm that female legislators do indeed tend to emphasize "women's issues", whereas male legislators address "men's issues".

Gender differences in caring and communication issues

At each of the above legislative stages, I have also tried to compare the gender difference as regards certain policy areas: namely, matters of caring and communications, and feminist issues. I summarize gender differences for different legislative stages and terms by deducting the percentage of male legislators' participation in the policy area of caring and communication from that of female legislators. Table 4-11 shows the gender gap in this policy area that results from this calculation.

Table 4-11: Gender difference on the percentage of legislators' participation in the caring and communication issues.

	1st term	2nd term	3rd term
Initiation	34%	5%	25%
Chairship	7%	22%	26%
Committee speech	23%	30%	11%
Yuan speech	12%	7%	24%

The differences between the two groups are obvious and the direction is always positive, which confirms that women appear to put more emphasis on these particular policy areas than men do.[19] The individual-level analyses of OLS regression also show that women are positively correlated with the level of participation in the caring and communication area and that, except in the first term, the coefficients are significant. In general, comparing the efforts made by women and men, women as a group tended to place more weight on the areas of caring and communication (children, welfare,

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[19] Likewise, the sign of the same measurements between women and men in economic development and political issues is always negative, which means constantly men appeared to place more weight on these policy areas than women did.

education, and health).

Gender difference in feminist issues

I also discerned the gender difference in feminist issues across different legislative stages and terms by deducting the percentage of male legislators' participation in this policy area from that of female legislators. Table 4-12 shows the gender gap in this particular area.

Table 4-12: Gender difference on the percentage of legislators' participation in feminist issues.

	1st term	2nd term	3rd term
Initiation	16% (4.2%)	13%(4.1%)	12%(2.2%)
Chairship	2%(0.4%)	4%(2.2%)	9%(2.4%)
Committee speech	0.2998%(0.1%)	3.5%(1.9%)	7.1% (1.9%)
Yuan speech	---	---	4.3%(1.4%)

Numbers in parentheses indicated the percentage of feminist issues of all policy issues

Once again, the differences between groups are obvious and the direction is always positive, meaning that women appear to put more emphasis on feminist policy areas than men do. The individual-level analyses of OLS regression also show that gender is a significant factor in explaining the gender differences in the participation in feminist issues after controlling for other factors across the three terms (except in terms of chairship in the second term, and as explained earlier).

In the area of feminist policy, the degree of gender difference in each term decreased as we moved from the earliest stages of agenda setting to the latter stages. In the first term, there was a 16 percent gender gap as regards the level of bill initiation, a 2 percent gap in committee chairship, and a less than 1 percent gap in terms of committee speeches. In the second term, there was a 13 percent gender difference in terms of bill initiation, a 4 percent gap in terms of committee chairship, and a 3.5 percent gap at the committee speech stage. In both the first and second terms, there were in essence no speeches made at the final Yuan stage concerning feminist bills and, therefore, no difference can be

detected. However, in the third term, there was a 12 percent gender gap as regards bill initiation, a 9 percent gap as regards committee chairship, a 7 percent gap as regards committee speeches, and a 4 percent (approximately) gap in the number of final speeches made on the floor. Clearly, across three terms, the gender gap decreases as we move toward the later stages of the legislative process.

In general, therefore, a funnel-shaped gender difference as regards policy participation in the area of feminist issues can be discerned in each term. Such a pattern of decreasing gender difference in later legislative stages has not been found in other policy areas. This pattern suggests that gender difference is likely to be most apparent at the bill-initiation stage, followed by the chairship stage, the committee speeches stage, and the floor speeches stage, in that order. This appears to confirm Tamerius' assertion that female leadership in feminist issues is likely to be more apparent at the agenda setting stage of the legislative process than in later legislative deliberation or other processes. She attributed this situation to the different level of efforts, commitments, and expertise demanded and required by different stages of the legislative process. Tamerius (1993) found that the largest sex difference occurred in the area of sponsoring bills, the legislative activity that required the most awareness, support, commitment, and expertise. The more purposive involvement that an activity required, the larger was the size of the gender gap as regards the performance of that activity (Burrell 1996).

Tamerius's assertion of a decreasing gender difference in passive legislative measures remains true in my findings. In addition, though, my study across three legislative terms also reveals that feminist issues have provoked a higher level of legislative participation as time has passed. The percentage of legislative activity devoted to feminist issues (figures in parentheses), in terms of chairship, committee speeches, and Yuan speeches, increased in the third term. Comparing the percentage of the feminist issues addressed at each legislative stage across three terms and we find that, except as

regards bill-initiation,[20] the percentage increases from the first to the third term. Examining each term individually, we find that, in the first term, the differences between stages as regards the percentage of feminist issues addressed is the most obvious (from 4.2% → 0.4%→ 0.1%), since most feminist bills were proposed but halted at the bill-initiation and the committee-examination stages. In the second term, the difference between the stages is still evident but has decreased (from 4.1%→2.2%→1.9%), since most of the feminist bills have reached the stage of policy deliberation, yet few of them are actually passed. Only in the third term is the percentage of the feminist issues discussed at all the legislative stages more evenly distributed (2.4%→2.4%→1.9%→1.4%).

By examining the legislative process across three terms, I have been able to explore further the changes and constraints that the policy environment has created as regards feminist issues. Policy constraints are the strongest in the first term and weakest in the third term of the Legislative Yuan. Put another way, the policy opportunity window for feminist issues is far more open in the third term than it has been in previous legislative terms. Therefore, with relatively few policy constraints present, the degree to which feminist issues are addressed increases as the legislative process moves on. Therefore, I argue that policy environment affects the sizes and results, to a considerable degree, displayed in any examination of legislative participation upon feminist issues. As I have observed, feminist legislation fared relatively well in the third term compared to the first and second terms. So what changes have occurred in the third term Legislative Yuan that facilitate this finding? My interview data will tell that story next.

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[20] Sponsorship in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is continuing, that is, the bill proposed in previous terms can be put in the agenda of the next term. Therefore, if the bills in the previous legislative term have not reached any conclusion or did not pass, deputies can continuously bring out the old bills of previous terms bypassing the sponsorship process. Many feminist bills were proposed in earlier terms and the discussion and passage was postponed till the third term.

CHAPTER 5

INTERVIEWS WITH LEGISLATORS:

AN ATTITUDINAL ASSESSMENT

In the previous chapter, objective measurements were used to examine whether a gender pattern of legislative participation existed across the three legislative terms. In general, the results confirm the behavioral hypotheses, namely, that gender affects the deputies' policy interests and choices. In this chapter, the psychological basis and mechanism behind those behavioral gender differences will be explored. Since a particular legislator's predisposition will form the basis of their legislative behaviors, I will attempt to discover who and what is "important" to them. The question of who deputies regard as their primary concern is related to their conceptualization of constituency, and the question of what deputies regard as important is related to their evaluation of policy priorities.

I conducted these interviews in order to examine whether female deputies perceive their constituencies differently from their male colleagues (hypothesis 3), and whether female deputies emphasize different policy priorities to their male colleagues (hypothesis 4). In addition, I will also examine whether there is a positive association between a legislator's perception of their constituency and the possession of policy priorities favorable to that group (hypothesis 5).

Theoretically, gender differences could be attributed to female group affiliation and identity, whether originating from unique sociological or psychological conditions. Carroll (Carroll 1992) argued that female politicians, who are involved with women's organizations outside or inside government, will be more likely than men to develop affiliations with women's groups and to attempt to represent female concerns and culture. Therefore, in an attempt to explain the gender differences discovered, I will conclude this

chapter with an examination of the connection between women's networks and female legislators.

In short, this chapter commences with a brief introduction to the background of my interview data. This is then followed by investigations of hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Finally, based on the theory and interview data, I will provide the women's culture explanation for the gender patterns found.

The interview data

The 3rd term legislature was composed of 164 members, of which 22 were female legislators and 141 were male, and of which 84 were KMT members, 54 DPP members, 21 NP members, and 4 were independents. Of these 164 legislators, I interviewed 40 - 21 women and 19 men. The reason why the number of male legislators is lower than the number of female legislators is due to matched sample concerns. In my sample, I tried to interview all the female legislators, but was refused by one. I also interviewed a matched sample of male legislators, from the same party and sharing the same constituent districts as their female counterparts. However, a perfect matched sample was almost unattainable, predominantly because some districts are too small to contain sufficient male legislators who shared with their female counterparts the same constituency, the same party affiliation, and similar experiences. Even if a matched sample could be found, some male legislators were unwilling to accept the interview. Hence, a slight adjustment or substitution in the matched characteristics is inevitable, and table 5-1 shows the distribution of my sample with respect to party and gender.

To make sure that the sample approximates to a matched sample by gender, I also checked and compared the other relevant variables, such as the age, education, and the previous political experiences of the two sample groups. The results of this are found in table 5-2.

Table 5-1. The sample distribution by party and gender

	KMT	DPP	NP	INDEPEND	TOTAL
Female	11(12)	6(6)	4 (4)	0	21(22)
Male	9(72)	7(48)	3(17)	0(4)	19(141)
	20(84)	13 (54)	7(21)	0(4)	40(163)

Figures in parentheses are the population distribution of the third–term legislators. Some of the legislators changed their party identity while serving in the legislature, but here I adopt their party identities at the time of election.

Table 5-2 . The sample distribution by age, seniority, and education.

	Mean age	Mean education level	% who are incumbents (n)
Women	45	2.7	.51(12)
Men	49	3.1	.84(16)
Total	47	2.8	.70(28)

In education, 1 indicates high school or less; 2 indicates bachelor's degree; 3 indicates master's degree; and 4 indicates Ph.D. degree

Within the sample, the average age of female legislators is 45, and that of male legislators is 49. This pattern of age difference is not consistent with the general expectation. Based on past studies, it was my expectation that the female legislators would be older than their male counterparts, because familial obligations prevent them entering politics as early as males can. The majority of my interviewees were highly educated, with most of the women possessing either a master's or bachelor's degree, and the men having earned a Ph.D., a master's, or a bachelor's degree. Besides being highly educated, they are also politically experienced. Of the 21 congresswomen interviewed, 12 are senior representatives. Among the remaining nine, three served in other elected offices (National assembly members or Provincial assembly members) before entering the Legislative Yuan. The other three were either previous party cadres or public servants in the executive branch. Only three out of the nine female newcomers did not have previous political experience in public office. Among the 19 congressmen interviewed, 16 were senior members and three were newcomers to the Legislative Yuan, two of who

had never held any political office before entering the Yuan. As a whole, most of my interviewees, both male and female, are experienced politicians and, therefore, as regards the backgrounds of the two sample groups, they are generally compatible in terms of age, political seniority, and education.

In the interview itself, each legislator was asked two main sets of questions in order to test two hypotheses. The interviews lasted anywhere from 20 minutes to two hours, depending on legislators' schedules, interests, and degree of cooperation. When time permitted, I asked some additional questions, but these were not intended to assist with the systematic analysis. However, those additional questions and answers are helpful to us in so far as they provide us with a more in-depth understanding of how the representatives legislate. Most of the interviews were conducted in legislators' offices, or in small conference rooms in the Legislative Yuan, and the interviews took place between September 1997 and January 1998, during the fourth section of the third term Legislative meeting.

Hypothesis 3: Legislators' Constituency Perception:
Standing for all or groups? Which groups?

In the theoretical portion of this study, I have elaborated on the dispute between liberal individualism theorists and the identity group theorists regarding their perceptions of representation. The liberal theorists maintain that our representative bodies should transcend interests based on group identity, even though they may agree that different identity groups (e.g., women, or ethnic minority groups) have different interests. In contrast, the supporters of the politics of identity claim that representatives should represent different identity groups, and particularly those that are oppressed (Young 1990). These opposing viewpoints have aroused heated debates, both theoretical and empirical in nature.

In order to understand legislator's relationships with their constituencies, Fenno

(Fenno 1978) was the first to distinguish the four types of constituencies that the legislators can perceive of - namely, the geographical constituency, the re-election constituency, the primary constituency, and the personal constituency. Huang (1994) regarded Fenno's framework as applicable to Taiwan's case, applying it to the study of constituency service in Taiwan's legislative districts.

Even though this is an appropriate and comprehensive frame of reference with which to understand the legislators' perceptions of their constituencies, it does not address legislators' relationship to the group constituency of my theoretical and hypothetical interest. In hypothesis 3, I assume that women legislators are more likely to identify with the female constituency and possess a personal commitment to represent women as a group. Given that I am primarily interested in the constituency groups related to women's experience and identity, a different conceptualization scheme is, therefore, required to capture the dynamic of representation of this identity group.

Thus, to test hypothesis 3, rather than ask a totally open-ended question about their constituency, I asked: "As a representative, you represent many different constituency groups. Do you consider any group's concerns as very important to you and should be addressed by you? For example, the business constituency, military group, civil servants, education groups, labor groups, women, the elderly, children, or a single issue group (e.g., environment group)?"

In my question, I categorize the constituencies into different groups, consistent with my theoretical hypothesis of identity difference. However, it is expected that different conceptions beyond my own classifications would appear in their answers. Legislators have their own definition of constituency, which can be determined by region, by occupation, by social status (classes), or by certain other characteristics. Their own characterization is also helpful for a complete understanding of the meaning of "constituency". Therefore, before exploring the gender differences related to the legislators' constituency perceptions, I first attempt to clarify the general factors that

affect their views on the concept of group constituency.

Factors influencing legislators' perception of constituency

Most legislators referred to different factors that affect how they view their respective constituencies. Even when answering the same question, respondents came up with different ideas of constituency. Thus, it is clear that representation means different things to different people. Various factors have been identified to affect legislators' constituency perception, including electoral rules, district demography, seniority, ideology, professional backgrounds, and gender.

First, electoral rules affect the relationship between representatives and their constituency. Before 1991, in Taiwan's legislature election, voters had to choose to register between one of two rosters, territorial or occupational, before they could cast their votes. Voters had to decide whether to register under the geographical district roster, and thus be able to vote for representatives within their own resident districts; or to register under the occupational roster, and vote for their occupational group representatives, including the business, industrial, labor, farming, fishing, and educational groups. Besides the occupational groups, another type of group representation was that represented by the female reserved-seats system. However, unlike occupation-based group representation, there is no independent voter roster for this system, and instead the reserved seats are elected within the geographical district. Though the gender quotas remain in place, since the second-term national legislative election none of the female representatives have been elected through this system.

Under the old occupational group system, the representatives had a clear corresponding constituency group from which and by which they were elected. This system was most applicable to a cooperative society, within which sectional representatives were expected to represent economic-based or class-based interests. However, under the authoritarian one-party regime, the system of occupation-based

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representation was regarded as the KMT's control mechanism, used to co-opt occupational or class interests. Only members of lawful associations, who met the criteria stipulated by law, were eligible to elect their representatives. The KMT controlled and demobilized all modern social sectors through the preemptive incorporation of various occupational groups (Chu 1994). Therefore, under the KMT's control, the group representatives reflected the KMT's social agenda instead of their actual members' interests. After 1991, with newly-formed parties, the system of occupational group representatives was replaced by party-list proportional representation, within which each party wins seats proportional to its share of the vote in districts.

In terms of the relationship with the constituency, it is expected that representatives elected from the party-list will have to endure little pressure from the local constituencies. Rather, they will be concerned more with the party and group interest. Among the 40 third-term legislators I interviewed, five were party-list members from the KMT and the DPP. As one DPP party-list representative (interview: 98039) pointed out, because she was elected from the party list, she does not have a great deal of regional or local constituency services to undertake. She claims that a certain division of labor exists, under which city councilors take over most of the local individual requests and legislators deal with issues at the general policy level. If she receives requests related to a local or city matter, she will pass them on to the city councilors. Generally, she reports that, as a party-list representative, she is more often in contact with groups than individual constituents. Because she is elected from the minority group of the party-list,[21] she regards herself as representing the interests of culture-based groups, educational groups, social welfare groups (senior and children related to minority), and women. Another DPP party-list member (interview: 98040) shares a similar view regarding his relative freedom from constituency service. Because the local electorate does not elect

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[21] DPP divided its party-list representatives into three teams: politics, scholar, and minority groups.

him, he claims he is in a better position to represent minority and environmental groups.

However, there is some variety amongst party-list representatives. In my sample, three interviewees are KMT party-list members and, among them, two were once labor-group representatives and one is from the nursing association. The representative from the nursing association (interview: 98036) makes clear that she identifies with the nursing groups and that her friends in nationwide nursing associations offer her substantial suggestions and warm support in the legislative process. The other representative (interview: 98038) identifies various groups as being those that she is most concerned about, including labor, military, civil servants, and women. Still another senior KMT party-list member (interview: 98037), once the occupational labor-group representative and now from the party-list, denies the idea of any group constituency and emphasizes the generalization of representation. He argues that,

> In the past, we used to have professional group representation, because the minority lacked the ability of political participation and to reflect their own opinion. It has been revoked today. Now, the national educational level is more balanced and widespread. Group quota is still emphasized by some people, but in fact, all politicians want to be more popular and take care of everything. Besides, our government already divides the work into various administrative units - such as the nuclear, technology ... to take good care of every profession and citizen from different perspectives (interview: 98037)

During the interview, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of cooperating with the KMT government. He considers group representation as unnecessary since "society now is civilized, open, and democratic, and citizens should learn to cooperate with government". His stand could be attributed to his senior status within the KMT as a party cadre and party-list representative for several terms. Generally speaking, among the party-list members interviewed, the variety present in their answers was largely dependent on the different backgrounds from which they come. For example, the senior party cadre disapproves of any group constituency except when it conforms to the will of the party; while others, perhaps indirectly elected thanks to the support of a particular

group or groups, will emphasize their connections with those groups. Most of the party-list representatives, both KMT and DPP members, pay little attention to the individual constituent services since no local electorate is responsible for electing them. Instead, most of them make contact with groups and thus do identify themselves with a given group constituency.

In addition to the party-list representatives, a majority of representatives are elected from the geographic districts under the SNTV rule as described in Chapter 2. Under the SNTV system, it is usually the case that more than one seat in each district is open, which induces parties to nominate more than one candidate in each district. Therefore, candidates must compete with competitors from different parties as well as those from their own party. Given this, it is very important for them to build a personal source of support rather than rely on the party to do so for them. Consequently, the role of the faction has long been seen as an important informal mechanism through which legislators can mobilize votes.

Since the majority of the legislators are elected from the districts, the district demography is also a determinant factor of constituency perception amongst legislators. Some legislators claim that they represent all the people in their districts, some legislators from rural counties place the rural group's interest as most important, and still other legislators elected from the city districts highlight the middle-class interest among their concerns. For example, the so-called old-farmer legislators, who are elected from agricultural districts, have long been known for fighting for the interests of farmer's. Some legislators from city areas claim that the homogeneity of their districts has blurred the boundary of classes, and that they therefore do not favor any particular group or class. When they were pushed to make a distinction between groups, some identified with the interests of the middle-class, i.e., the majority of the city residents.

Moreover, several legislators link their self-identified group constituency with their previous professions and social status. For example, some legislators identify with

teachers, the military, or the minorities, because they themselves were once members of such groups. Their former experiences or professional training has granted them the familiarity and expertise necessary to deal with the issues related to those groups.

Some mention the difficulties that they face in attempting to distinguish between the group constituencies because of their seniority. One female legislator (interview: 98011) told me that such a question should only be asked of newcomers, because they have a clearer idea of exactly who they represent. She described herself as having been much surer about whom she represented when she was first elected as a legislator. However, over the years, since she has been re-elected many times, and she makes contact with more and more people, such clarity has faded. Another female legislator (interview: 98003) also mentions that she relates to a number of different constituencies because of her seniority.

By and large, given the range of factors that affect legislators' perceptions of constituency, a clear underlying dimension (profession, class, or gender) which can define every legislator's constituency clearly doesn't exist. A mixed concept of constituency is most likely to be the case since most legislators possess different and overlapping characteristics or identities. This also sheds light on that which I discussed earlier regarding the concept of representation. As I discussed in the theoretical portion of this study, a general, cohesive, and fixed gender interest transcending classes or other identities does not exist. From the legislators' responses to the various group constituents, the diversified and multi-dimensional character of the concept of representation is re-affirmed - i.e., even legislators who share similar characteristics or identities might identify with some very different groups. For legislators with multiple identities, exactly which characteristic or identity will prevail will also vary.

Gender pattern in constituency perception

Consistent with the fact that various dimensions influence legislators' constituency perceptions, the majority of the respondents identified with more than one constituency group. The number of groups mentioned by individual legislators varied from none to six. The combination of constituency perceived by the legislators as important also varied according to the individual legislator's background, experiences, seniority, and interests. Since I am primarily interested in legislators' perception of some relatively disadvantaged groups and the groups of my theoretical interest, I did not attempt to encompass all the possible constituency groups in the phrasing of my questions. As expected, though, the respondents provided more categories than I did. I dealt with this by sorting the constituencies identified by respondents into several larger categories: (1) public groups, including civil servants (such as the police, and firemen), and soldiers (veterans); (2) occupational-class groups, including the middle-classes, labor, farmers, and business groups; (3) welfare minority groups; (4) educational groups; (5) children; (6) the elderly; (7) women; (8) environmental groups; and (9) the aboriginal. Some respondents did not identify *any* group: a response that I labeled "non-group". The general pattern of the constituency identified by male and female respondents is shown in table 5-3.

From the table, a gender pattern regarding the identification of group constituencies emerges between male and female legislators. On average, women legislators identify 2.7 groups as their constituency, whereas men identify 1.3. Women are more likely to identify with the group constituency than men are in most categories of each constituency, including the civil servant, soldier, labor, farmer, minority, education, children, the elderly, women's groups, and the aboriginal. Of these constituency groups, the differences after deducting the percentage of men from that of women is positive, which indicates that relatively more women than men actually identified these groups as their constituency.

Table 5-3.

Constituency groups perceived by legislators

	FEMALE (N=21)	MALE (N=19)	DIFFERENCE (F-M)	SIG.
Public Servants % yes (n)	43 (9)	21 (4)	12	
Civil servant	19 (4)	11 (2)	8	.464
Soldier	24 (5)	11 (2)	13	.281
Occup. Class % yes (n)	29 (6)	47(9)	-18	
Middle class	0 (0)	16 (3)	-16	.061
Labor	14 (3)	5 (1)	9	.355
Farmer	14 (3)	11 (2)	3	.728
Businessmen	0 (0)	16 (3)	-16	.061
Welfare minority % yes (n)	43 (9)	26 (5)	17	.285
Education % yes (n)	43 (9)	21 (4)	22	.149
Children % yes (n)	19 (4)	0 (0)	19	.046
The Elderly % yes (n)	24 (5)	0 (0)	24	.023
Women % yes (n)	57 (12)	0 (0)	57	.000
Environment % yes (n)	0 (0)	11 (2)	-11	.134
Aboriginal % yes (n)	10 (2)	5 (1)	5	.620
*Non-group % yes (n)	14 (3)	26 (5)	-12	.355
Total groups : Mean (n)	2.7 (56)	1.3 (25)		

Cell entries are the percentages of respondents who mention the group as a perceived constituency. Figures (n) in parentheses indicate the number of respondents who identify with a group of that category. The number of total groups (n) equals the sum of the number of respondents of all the categories except the non-group respondents (* distinguishes it from other constituency groups). The final mean denotes the number of the total groups divided by the numbers of male and female respondents respectively, that is, the average of the groups identified by men and women as two groups.

Among these groups, it is obvious that the gender differences are most significant in three particular groups: those of children, the elderly, and women. Female legislators are more likely to identify these groups among their high-priority constituencies than men are. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation originating from the sexual division of labor in society - i.e., that caring for children and the elderly has become the primary responsibility of women. Women bear more societal responsibility for caring for these groups than men do and such responsibilities have evidently been transferred into the political arena, as well. The most marked male/female division in my sample regards the extent to which the legislators identify with the "female" constituency. Twelve out of 21 female legislators describe women as being amongst their highest-priority constituency groups. The figure amongst men was zero.

Only in the constituency categories of the middle-class, the business community, and the environment, is the percentage of men identifying themselves with these categories higher than that of women. Of these three, the difference in the middle-class and business groups are close to being significant and, as some of the legislators pointed out to me, men do tend to have more business connections than women. However, these two groups are relatively advantaged groups and thus bear little relevance to the study of the identity groups of my interest.

This general pattern across all the group categories might well imply, according to the group scheme that I frame in the question, that men are less group-oriented than women are. However, another, more direct, indicator of group-orientation is the last category in the above table: the non-group. According to the results for this category, more men than women reject the idea of actually representing any group interest.

These non-group respondents substitute the group-specific feature of my question with a rather generalized characterization of their constituency. For example, the three female "non-group respondents" either substitute the idea of group constituency with that of an ideology, such as Taiwanese independence (interview: 98025), or with a vague

identification with the constituency that "appreciates what she is doing for the nation" (interview: 98022), or with an attempt to embrace the interests of all (interview: 98003).

Some male respondents make even stronger claims to transcend the group interest. In answering my question, one male legislator (interview: 98026) described the majority as "the silent majority", whose interest *need* to be represented, and the minority as the "focal minority", whose interests should not be over-emphasized. He states that,

> I strongly disagree with speaking for any minority group, so I never propose amendments for any interest groups. If they come to me, I always say no. So the frequency that I say no every day is very high. I probably irritate five hundred people everyday. I think a good representative should learn how to say no, instead of learning how to say yes. Because the silent majority would not come to see you, those who come to see you are the focal minority. If under pressure you comply with their requests, eventually you are going to hurt the silent majority. So we should protect the interest of the majority, instead of that of the minority, not be tempted by the applause from the minority (interview: 98026).

Not only does he despise the concept of group interests, but he also claims to move beyond even the interests of his own district. He provided an example of how he made a decision regarding a policy that might hurt the majority of people in his district, Taipei, but which he regarded as good for the nation as a whole. He proudly tells me that it turns out "none of them complain. If you are right, no one will blame you" (interview: 98026).

Similarly, another legislator stated, "I do not make the distinction between groups or represent any particular groups"(interview: 98004). However, by making a distinction between representing any group and representing the majority, he argues further that he represents the majority interest. He insists that his style is "professional, neutral, rational, objective, and beyond party." Not only is group interest not his concern, neither is the party's interest. As a KMT member, he claims that he does not work for any party because he thinks "justice is more important than parties, the institution lasts longer than individuals." He emphasizes that he has never spoken or worked for any individual or group, and that the majority opinion should always come first.

Generally speaking, the negative views regarding the concept of group

representation among some respondents reflect a liberal point of view that representation means to represent everyone in the same way without making any distinction based on group identity. Taking any group particularly seriously is not deemed to be fair or desirable. According to the results of my interviews, the idea of group or minority interest is not popular with a number of legislators, especially certain male ones. Either they do not see the necessity of speaking for any particular group by claiming that no such minority issue exists; or they argue that group issues might conflict with the majority interest, and that it is the latter that matters most. They contend that representatives should transcend any group's demands and interests, and must be able to represent the majority. Referring to the majority interest as unbiased and objective, and the minority group's interests as favorable and subjective, is a liberal interpretation of representation that may well account for why some legislators (mostly male) are less group-oriented in answering the question.

On the other hand, the fact that women are more likely to identify with groups related to women's unique group experiences exhibits the sort of thinking that one finds embedded in the politics of identity difference. The theorists of identity difference contend that group identity forms the basis for special representation and political recognition (Young 1990) (Taylor 1994). They argue against the attempts of liberals to reduce the plurality of subjects to one universal point of view. Rather, they consider women's shared gender to grant them shared interests, which have been transferred into representative politics. Nevertheless, the question of whether such group differences have indeed been transferred into representational politics or not cannot be answered simply by noting that female deputies tend to identify with women's groups. Rather, there needs to be recognition that women have different interests and form a politically relevant group that needs and deserves to be represented. Is this the case?

The recognition of and willingness to represent women's concerns

Even though the majority of female representatives identify women as amongst their various constituency components, such identification might not necessarily lead to a subjective commitment to represent women's interests. In other words, women representatives may be concerned about the female constituency, but an overall gender difference in representational politics may not necessarily be warranted. Representatives could mention many constituency groups and interact with various groups at the same time without consciously engaging in representing any specific group. For representatives to commit themselves to representing women's interests and issues, they must first recognize that women are a politically relevant group that shares some common interests.

Therefore, I asked representatives about their ideas concerning "women's interests or women's concerns." The majority of the representatives in my sample do recognize the existence of women's issues. Almost everyone, both men and women, agree that women's issues do exist and have to be addressed by government, despite the fact that they refer to different things. Most of the issues they actually refer to under this heading were directly related to women and had been discussed in the third-term Legislative Yuan. Only three male KMT members flatly denied the existence of women's issues.

Granted the recognition of women's concerns, to examine whether women legislators are more likely than men legislators to commit themselves to representing women's interests, I asked legislators, "Do you think that you and your female/male colleagues are more willing than your male/female colleagues to represent women's concerns?" In general, both men and women legislators felt that women were more willing to act upon women's issues than men were. In addition to this similarity between the male and female responses, certain differences of approach are also worth noting. Whereas most female legislators describe how they are committed to representing

women's concerns, and most of them hold a rather disdainful view of men's relatively passive participation in the argument; most men admit that women are more active in representing women's issues, and then attempt to explain exactly why they do not pay as much attention to them as women do.

The typical answer among women respondents is that women are more willing to act upon women's issues than men are. One KMT female legislator's (interview: 98002) view was that, despite the fact that most women legislators have a wide variety of interests and choose different committees on which to serve, etc., in general, they share a common ground in so far as they are all concerned with women's issues. She says that, " as women, we must stand out and be more concerned with those issues" (interview: 98002). A DPP female legislator (interview: 98022) also reports that, generally, women take the lead in women's issues; e.g., women will draft women's bills, get the bills a committee examination, and have the procedural members arrange for those bills to gain Yuan second readings. Another DPP female legislator described the situation in the following terms:

> All the passages of laws about women's rights - the social security problem, the law of sexual assault, the revisions of the law of road security, to the law of family violence - are pushed by women. Now the progressive revisions in the property right and custody of the children in the family chapter in the civil law, which concerned about women's disadvantaged positions, all are delivered by female legislators (interview: 98039).

The majority of female legislators also remark that men do offer passive support for, or as some women put it, do not dare to oppose, women's issues. Generally speaking, most women representatives regard the male commitment to women's issues as unreliable. In some instances, female legislators question the genuineness of male involvement in women's issues, noting that: "Most men do not care [about women's concerns] at all. A few male legislators support them, but they do not donate time to carrying them out" (interview: 98039). In other instances, some women legislators imply

that men are reluctant to support women's concerns by saying that: "Men are very chauvinistic, but in public, they dare not oppose women's bills now" (interview: 98022); or "Of course men also pay attention to these bills, because they also have women voters. However, relatively, women are more involved in these issues than men are" (interview: 98005).

From the point of view of most female legislators, male involvement in women's issues is sporadic, inconsistent, and unreliable, and a distrust of male cooperation regarding women's issues is common. One KMT female legislator mentions that male legislators appear to be supportive, however, whenever it comes down to the vote, some would excuse themselves to the restroom (interview: 98038). Another women legislator also observed that:

> For example, while discussing some sensitive issues, like displaying the photos of those who illegally consume child prostitutes, most men at first agree to co-sponsor the bills. We collected about 60 co-sponsorships in one case. However, when a decision had to be made, there were only six women legislators left sitting for the bill (interview: 98005).

With respect to male support of women's issues, some attribute it to the increasing demands of society, rather than any sudden desire by men to represent women. However, when comparing men's attitudes to women's issues across time, some female respondents indicate that, as times change, men's attitudes toward these issues change, too. As one senior female member (interview: 98031) observed, when women's bills were promoted by female legislators in the past, many male legislators openly opposed them. For example, as she recalled, in the second-term, when examining such issues as the property rights of married women in the family, sexual violence, or prostitution, most men opposed the female point of view. However, she reckons that the situation has changed and most of the male legislators support women's issues. Even when they do not, they stop short of actively opposing them. She attributes this change to social trends that have imposed certain pressures upon men. And she regards the current situation to be

favorable as regards the promoting of women's bills, since men have responded to the social pressures upon them to accommodate women's needs (interview: 98031)

Overall then, most female interviewees consistently assured me of their strong commitment to representing women's concerns, and indicated that they regarded male support as doubtful. Even though almost everyone, women as well as men, agree that women are more active than men as regards women's issues, very few women believe that this division of labor when it comes to promoting women's issues is simply and completely a matter of gender. Instead, they argue that these differences are just as likely to be related to an individual's characteristics and ideologies. As one woman legislator says,

> On average, female legislators, because of their own roles, feel closer to those concerns. So in terms of attending the meeting and participating, they are more active. However, many male legislators are also concerned about that. As long as you respect individuals, and have some concern for gender equality, you will be concern with these issues. However, if you do not respect human beings then, even if you are women, you will not pay any attention (interview: 98025)

On the other hand, however, this concept of a labor division along the lines of gender regarding women's issues is further reinforced by the interview responses of the male legislators. The responses of most men tended to be along the lines of arguing that, of course women are more active than men regarding women's concerns, because that is the nature, the role, the duty, and the responsibility of women. Several male representatives claim that representing women's concerns is a woman's natural duty. One male legislator (interview: 98029) argues explicitly that it is human nature that everyone knows better about him/herself, and that, therefore, female legislators would be more concerned about women's issues because women know more about women's concerns. Most male legislators refer to the need to work on women's concerns as a responsibility of female legislators from which they cannot excuse themselves. Since most male respondents regard the division of labor in agenda setting as natural, it does

not matter to them that women propose women's issues, and that men propose men's, as

long as men support female legislators' initiatives. The predominant attitude of the male

legislators' is illustrated particularly well by one KMT legislator's response:

> Of course, women legislators are more actively involved in these issues [women's
> issues], and they should be. And men legislators also do not think they should
> compete with female legislators on this agenda. Legislators do compete in agendas,
> however, not in this area. If you do, people will feel strange [he laughs], and it is
> not necessary. It is natural that the leading role [in women's issues] is played by
> women legislators, and we support them. We cooperate with each other to advance
> their passage (interview: 98004).

Most male interviewees define their own role in the passage of women's issues and

bills through the Legislative Yuan as being passively supportive. In the previous chapter,

I described legislative activity as including everything from active agenda setting to

relatively passive levels of participation and, among this variety of legislative activities,

most male legislators clearly take their passive role in matters of women's interests for

granted.

> Not speaking on these issues is a type of support. On the contrary, the more you
> speak might adversely become a procedure filibuster, which increases the difficulty
> and delays the passage. Most of time, signing it, raising hands and supporting it,
> that is enough (interview: 98004).

In general, most male respondents explain and justify their limited support as

regards women's concerns by revealing that they perceive a gendered division of labor in

such areas as natural. This common perception of "spontaneously active women,

indispensably passive men" regarding matters of female concern can be further reinforced

by a certain male perception that their support of women's issues should be taken as

flattering by female representatives. For example, one DPP male legislator (interview:

98026) comments that female representatives do not need to worry about support from

men, because male legislators, "for the sake of good manners, have no reason to oppose".

Though he does not always totally agree with some female legislators, believing that their

biases and emotions can go too far, he adds that, "as long as everything is reasonable,

they do not need to worry about male support, men are still quite flattering"(interview: 98026).

To sum up, in testing the third hypothesis of gender differences as regards the concept of constituency, I have found that female legislators are more likely than their male counterparts to include women, the elderly, and children as constituency groups about which they care, and that this is consistent with their traditional care-giving roles. The most significant gender difference has been that more than half of the female representatives identify women as being amongst their constituency whereas no men do so. I have also shown that despite a common recognition of the existence of women's interests, female legislators feel more obligated and are more willing to represent women's concerns. The attitudinal differences with respect to the commitment to represent women's concerns is further manifested in both male and female responses to the division of labor by gender that can be observed in the Legislative Yuan.

Hypothesis 4: legislators' policy priority
Is women's orientation merely symbolic or more?

> Male legislators at most *support* your stand, but if you ask a male legislator to actively *lead* [my own Italics] and carry out women's issues, it is hard to imagine it happening. As women, we are relatively more flexible, we can bring out a neutral issue; for example, judicial reform, education, culture, economic, or defense. Women can lead in these policy areas, but no men lead and bring out any women's issue. Therefore, the women's issues must rely on women legislators (interview: 98028).

While asking female legislators what they perceive to be the differences between male and female legislators' involvement with women's issues, one female legislator replied with the above. She was not the only woman to point out that the main difference between the genders lies less in whether legislators "support" the issues or not, but in whether they will consistently "lead" the issue from the very beginnings of the legislative process. Even when I point out to certain female legislators that, according to the public

records, some men do actually participate actively as regards women's issues, the responses are less than enthusiastic. One female legislator (interview: 98039) felt that it depended upon the issue. If the issue was very obviously one of injustice, domination, or indicated a clear lagging behind the social trend that had be corrected, men will sometimes speak so as to show their progressiveness. But she goes on to emphasize that, if men were asked about their "priority bills", they would never mention women's rights. She claims that it is the priority bills that make the difference.

This suggests that in passive legislative participation, men show no significant difference from women in supporting women's concern, but that, as regards more energetic legislative activity, the gender gap is somewhat larger. It is consistent with my previous findings that the more purposive involvement that an activity requires, the larger was the size of the gender difference pertaining to the performance of that activity.

Is it true that women and men have different policy agendas? So far, from the interviews, we have seen that, compared to men, women are more committed to representing women's concerns. This commitment indicates a symbolic association between women legislators and their female constituency, but it does not necessarily imply that there is a gender difference at more critical levels, such as agenda setting, which require enormous individual awareness and expertise in addition to considerable commitment and support. Given legislators' limited resources and institutional constraints, they must obviously weigh up different policy interests when deciding which agendas to pursue. Thus, legislators could well make supportive gestures toward various causes without devoting the time and effort necessary to "lead" them all. This transition from "supporting" to "leading" in women's issues is a vital one that indicates whether legislators are willing to move beyond the merely symbolic and begin to substantively represent women. Therefore, it is worth discovering whether gender differences can be discerned in this area, too.

Hypothesis four assumes that women and men tend to have different emphases as

regards their policy priorities. Because of the gender differences derived from socialization and life experiences, women and men tend to encounter different problems, associate with different groups, acquire different policy expertise, and have different policy interests. Empirical studies from other countries show that female representatives tend to give a higher priority to matters that concern women, children, and the family than do their male colleagues (Boles 1991; Dodson 1991; Flammang 1985; Havens and Healy. 1991; Kathlene 1989; Leader 1977; Saint-Germain 1989; Tamerius 1993; Thomas 1994).

An empirical study of Taiwan's voters also found that female voters tended to emphasize political stability, social domestic issues, education, and culture issues, whereas male voters tended to emphasize the national defense, foreign relationships, and national identity issues (Fan and Hsu 1994). However, will such gender differences amongst voters translate into legislative politics? Are women more inclined to emphasize different policy priorities from men in the legislative process? Or are women in representative politics actually doing (or not doing) much the same as their male colleagues?

To examine policy priorities amongst the legislators, I asked legislators an open-ended question, requesting that they each indicate "the three most important bills s/he thinks about and spends most time on."[22] The 40 respondents mentioned 120 bills between them and, whenever a respondent mentioned more than three bills as being a personal priority of theirs, I coded only the first three mentioned. Those bills are first classified into 19 sub-categories, and are then collapsed into the seven major categories that I regard as important and relevant to this study. The seven categories are: (1) economic and development issues, including economic issues, budget, finance and local

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[22] To avoid leading their answers, I asked interviewees this general question about legislative priority before asking their identification of constituency and their subjective attitude on participating on women's issues.

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development: (2) politics and government organizations; (3) defense and foreign affairs; (4) judicial and public order issues; (5) caring and communication-related issues, including welfare, health, children, education, and communication; (6) feminist issues; and (7) other group issues (labor, agriculture, environment, and ethnic minorities).[23] The results are shown in table 5-4.

Table 5-4. Policy priority listed by legislators

		FEMALE (N=21*3=63)	MALE (N=19*3=57)	DIFFERNCE (F-M)	SIG
Econ. & Develop.	% yes (n)	14 (9)	9 (5)	5	.485
Defense & Foreign	% yes (n)	10 (5)	7 (4)	3	.872
Politics & Govern.	% yes (n)	2 (1)	37 (21)	-35	.000
Judicial & Order	% yes (n)	5 (3)	2 (1)	3	.355
Caring & Commun.	% yes (n)	43 (27)	35 (20)	8	.538
Women issues	% yes (n)	24 (15)	0 (0)	24	.002
Other group issues	% yes (n)	5 (3)	11 (6)	-6	.385
Total : (N)		(63)	(57)		

Respondents were asked to list three policy priorities. Entries are percent of that policy area as policy priority. Numbers (n) in parentheses indicate the frequency of the issues being identified as policy priority.

In my sample, ten female legislators have women's issues listed among their three policy priorities, and three out of the ten include them more than once. An accumulated frequency shows that the women's issues area is one of the most popular policy priorities, being mentioned 15 times among female legislators. However, as none of the male legislators include this policy area among their policy priorities at all, the difference between the sexes on this point is obviously significant. In other traditional women's interest areas, such as care and communication, including education, welfare, health, and children, which women mention the most (27 times), the difference is not so significant.

Interestingly, women exceed men in terms of the frequency with which they placed development policy on their priority list. This reverses our earlier findings that women

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[23] The category varies in their coverage and specification in general policy terms; some policy areas are broader and less specific. The category was set up based on the category I used in the chapter 4.

are less active in economic policy areas. However, this difference is insignificant, and

could have been caused by sample variation. On the other hand, the other significant

difference between sexes lies in the area of politics and government organization, which

is listed 21 times by men as their first priority. Many issues in this policy area[24] are

related to constitutional, institutional, and political reform and many male legislators

consistently emphasize the importance of these structural issues and are apparently more

enthusiastic than women. This category has traditionally been viewed as men's interests

in the public domain. This is also, of course, an area that contains a great deal of

controversy and political infighting and some of the female legislators mention in their

interviews that they prefer the domestic and social economic issues better for this very

reason. Overall though, the differences between male and female legislators as regards

policy priorities correspond, to a large extent, to the different priorities found among

women and men voters.

Difficulties in changing the agenda

Given that women and men have different policy priorities, especially in certain

policy areas, will women and men act similarly when attempting to change the political

agenda? In other words, "If more women enter the Legislative Yuan, do you think there

will be any changes in the agenda?" This question was designed to elicit the

interviewee's opinions regarding the agenda dynamics of the Legislative Yuan, and the

majority of my respondents pointed out that agenda change will only occur in the

women's rights area, as most gender issues have been led by women in the past.

However, as a whole, it is expected that the legislative agenda will not be substantially

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[24] The issues in this category include government organization (organization of national assembly and police department), constitutional restructure (reorientation of provincial government and self-ruling clause of decentralized local governments), electoral rules (methods of electing the president and vice president), china policy (relationship between two sides of Taiwan Strait and territory claim), political reform (public property claim of the officials and compensation for political prisons under the authoritarian era),and merit system (the recruitment and examination of public servants).

changed.

It is understandable that, even though most female legislators engage more actively in women's issues than do men, some calculations still deter them from pushing the issue too far. One NP female legislator (interview: 98023) summarized several constraints on women that can deter them from participating and leading in the area of women's issues. Firstly, the diversification of the backgrounds and characteristics of female representatives has prevented women from forming a collective entity with which to bring about any significant agenda changes. Secondly, women do not like to be stereotyped as concerned only with themselves. Rather, they would like to be seen as broad-based representatives. Thirdly, women voters are not independent, and, therefore, it is difficult to encourage the female electorate to combine in their support for women legislators. Because of these concerns, even though most legislators agree that women would make some changes in the agenda as regards women's issues, most of the respondents step back from predicting a substantial degree of agenda change, even with an increase in the number of female representatives. It is important to examine the possible factors which prevent women from achieving significant agenda change in the legislature, since these factors might constitute the gap between the subjective perception and objective behaviors of legislators' policy priorities. Therefore, I will now examine, one by one, the difficulties associated with the placing of women's issues at the top of the list of possible agenda changes.

First, a variety of objective characteristics and subjective identities divide representatives along various dimensions. Legislators' multiple objective characteristics, such as class, profession, and vulnerability to party influences, will affect their legislative activities. Many legislators report that, outside of women's rights issues, they do not think women would make any significant difference to the general political agenda, because most of them come into the legislature with their own professional bases, parties, and different backgrounds still fresh in their minds. The diversification of women

representatives has prevented them from building any substantive entities through which to bring about any agenda change. For example, one KMT female legislator (interview: 98002) tells me that her long-term interest in education and culture has long outweighed her interest in women's issues, even though education is still traditionally regarded as being within women's purview. She also emphasizes that many other women participate in a wide variety of policy areas, such as the budget, defense, and interior fields, particularly in the third term. She adds that, if the number of women legislators increases, and everyone has different interests as they do now, the agenda would be unlikely to change. One male legislator (interview: 98032) makes a similar point that increasing women representatives might lead to the opposite result to that intended - i.e., that the women would become unable to reach agreement on issues given the ever-growing number of diverse experiences and backgrounds that would suddenly be present.

Many legislators are unconvinced that being a woman would necessarily change the political agenda; rather, they think that it is background, resources, and training that will make the difference. As one KMT male legislator (interview: 98004) points out, "professions exert more influence than gender does. Even though they are all women legislators, they are divided by parties." Another KMT male legislator (interview: 98016) also argues that whether women will succeed in changing the political agenda depends on the backgrounds and class from which they come. He makes a general example that fishermen are more likely to represent fishermen, and laborers represent labor; however, if women are from an upper class, they are not going to represent women from different classes.

In addition to the varied objective characteristics that divide them, legislators' subjective identifications also shape their legislative orientations. The subjective identification is sometimes more critical to the real representation than the descriptive resemblance. The simply descriptive presence of women in the Legislative Yuan would not lead to any agenda change. As one DPP female legislator (interview: 98022) claims,

the key to making any difference depends on legislators' conscious identification with other women, not on simply *being* a woman,

> If a woman does not self-examine herself about women's role in human history; that is, does not understand that women's rights are oppressed by a patriarchal mechanism, she probably only has the body of a woman, without the mind of a woman. If so, when she gets into the system of political power, she will continue to use the same ways she learned from male power struggles, in acquiring and maintaining her power. This is because she does not have the independent and critical thinking ability, which is the key to making any difference. However, women's consciousness has gradually arisen in society, and women's votes are getting more and more attention, therefore, those women legislators with women's bodies show their concerns about women's bills. This is because she wants to share those votes, which is in fact viewing women as voting machines. It is women representatives without a woman's consciousness (interview: 98022).

Similarly, one DPP male legislator (interview: 98026) argues that the increasing presence of female representatives will not make any difference if the majority of women deputies are not independent political agents. He comments that,

> I do not think there is going to be any difference with more women coming into the Legislative Yuan. If we were to examine carefully where most women legislators came from in the DPP, as well as in the KMT, of course, some of them participated in earlier opposition movements for democratization, however, most of them were from family politics, being someone's daughter or wife. If we do not take these women into account, then the proportion of women politicians could be even less.

On the contrary, he argues that men could substantially represent women without descriptively resembling them. Men could be good representatives of women, as a non-labor member could be a good representative of labor, as long as men identify with women's concerns and possess adequate expertise. Even though men are not descriptively women, they could subjectively identify with women. And once men identify so, they could be better representatives for women's concerns than are unqualified women. He adds that,

> As to the question of whether we need women representatives to get bills that advantage women, the answer is yes and no. For example, in the sexual assault bill, women pushed much harder than men did. However, I think for bills related to labor, we do not need labor representatives to make them. For example, in the U.S,

those representatives who represent labor are not laborers; they are probably lawyers, who place protecting labor's interest as their main concerns. Today, a male lawyer who orients himself as the guardian of women interests might not be worse than a female legislator. Because he is more professional and efficient, unlike an unsophisticated woman legislator [Ms. A], even though she is a woman, she doesn't know how to promote them [the bills] (interview: 98026).

As a result, increasing the number of female legislators might not necessarily change the agenda, because it depends on various objective identities and the subjective consciousness of the representatives.

Secondly, other subjective obstacles also obstruct women's willingness to bring about significant agenda change. A prominent consideration is the fear of being labeled as "narrow." For example, one NP female legislator (interview: 98003) comments that women in the legislature should not only choose a "woman's" agenda, or "it will make people think we have little noses, little eyes, and are too narrow" (interview: 98003). Although well known for her concerns for women's rights issues, she does not like herself to be confined to these issues. She suggests that some women legislators only focus on women issues because of the votes involved, which for her is too narrow an outlook. She argues that female legislators should broaden their vision, looking at certain problems from a higher and broader angle.

Another DPP female legislator (interview: 98022) also dislikes the fact that many women are stereotyped as belonging to the education and interior committees. She states that "not only good boys should go to the military, good girls should be able to do so, too" (interview: 98022). Therefore, in order to challenge these female stereotypes, she entered the defense committee to let the public see women at work in such an area. She also points out that many female legislators confine themselves to the education committee, which she regards as unnecessary. By consciously avoiding the stereotype imposed on women legislators, some women legislators can make their way to some nontraditional women's fields and thereby avoid assuming a role in the processes of female agenda setting.

Such a fear of being labeled as narrow is not only found among female legislators, but also gains reinforcement from male legislators. One New Party male member (interview: 98008) also mentions that women should not concentrate on social security, violence, and family issues, yet neglect China and foreign policy. He claims that legislators should be more comprehensive, not only concerned with taking care of students or children, but also willing to do whatever their district electorate ask them to do.

In addition to the issue of narrowness, a perception of insignificance and non-salience is also often associated with women's issues. Some male legislators do express their feelings that women's issues deserve little attention. It is regarded as fact that women tend to focus on soft issues, however, as one male legislator (interview: 98004) states, it is only productive on very limited subjects. He argues that it does not matter that in this type of agenda only a few people are concerned and participate, since it involves little opposition and controversy, and once the bills get proposed, they are passed easily. He makes the example that in gender equality issues, men do not oppose them, and that's enough. Another male legislator (interview: 98040) shares the same view that his limited participation in those issues is because he considers that other issues are more important for society as a whole.

> On women's issues, most of the time, women propose, and men support. The national policy is wide-ranging, and complicated, some legislators [women legislators] would find the issues that she finds familiar, easy to handle and gain attention. Every time, some accidents happen, like the Peng, Wan-Ru's [a woman activist] event, they [women] can use it as an agenda to raise attention, unlike me, because I do not use those media issues. I do what they are not familiar with and it is more important for society. So in women's issues, it is not the case that women are more concerned, I am less (interview: 98040).

He contends that it is not the case that he is not concerned with women's issues, rather that other more important issues demand his attention and efforts. Both of the male respondents argue that it is unnecessary to engage actively on women's issues and

give them a degree of priority, based on the judgement that women's issues are less controversial, less oppressive, less substantial, and less important.

Thirdly, the perception of the inactiveness of the female electorate also constrains the prospect of women's issues getting onto the primary agenda of the Legislative Yuan. Some respondents point out that, to bring about significant agenda change, women constituencies will first have to become more active, before women in the Legislative Yuan can make any difference. One common example is raised by more than one legislator, both male and female, to demonstrate the lack of subjectivity of women voters. They take the example that if a handsome male candidate competes with a female candidate, the female electorate may still vote for the former instead of the latter (e.g., Mr. Ma, the newly elected Taipei mayor is very popular with women voters because of his handsome appearance). Using this example, a male legislator (interview: 98004) laughs and says that the faces and images of male candidates sometimes easily cheat women voters. He ridicules the irrationality of women voters by stating that "Women are honest to their feelings. What they like, they choose"(interview: 98004). A female legislator (interview: 98023) mentions the same example and regards this kind of electoral culture as a discouragement to independent and autonomous women who may wish to participate in politics. This perception of the passiveness of women voters has been seen as related to the relatively low profile of women's issues in the Legislative Yuan. As one DPP senior male legislator (interview: 98040) states:

> If women's political participation was more active, women's issues would get more attention. If women vote more actively, even men representatives will consider their issues important for votes' sake. The general idea that the voting behavior of women in Taiwan's election is more passive and obedient to parents and husbands affects the fact that women's issues are getting less attention. But this situation is gradually changing, since the number of independent women voters is increasing. Women's political participation in terms of voting will affect women's issues' policy direction. I think it is even more important than increasing the number of female legislators. There would be no difference because all are for votes (interview: 98040).

As I described in Chapter 2, the political participation of women on a large scale has been increasing along with the development of democratization and socioeconomic modernization in Taiwan in recent years (Chou, Clark, and Clark 1990). With an increase in the quality and availability of education, of labor participation, and profession choice, as well as democratization itself, the gender gap has decreased in the past ten years. However, many legislators still doubt the subjectiveness of women voters in pursuing their own agendas and their degree of support for female candidates.

To sum up, if we are to compare the answers as to whether future agenda change is guaranteed by introducing more women into the politics with those to the earlier question of whether women are more willing to represent women's concerns than men, the answers would appear contradictory. While the answers to the second question would appear, generally, to be in the affirmative, responses to the first one are far more problematic and ambiguous. While most believe that the only possible agenda change would occur in women's issues, some of them do express the opinion that agenda change depends on many different factors, and they also question the willingness of women in to actually bring about substantial change. In short, this section of the paper raises the possibility that women will not *necessarily* represent women just because they share the same sex. This is because the variety of considerations that divide women legislators may well prevent them from bringing forth any significant changes in the Legislative Yuan.

Hypothesis 5: The association among different dimensions of gender difference

Even with the constraints against projecting a significant agenda change, all in all, significant gender differences with respect to legislative participation (hypothesis two), constituency perception (hypothesis three), and policy priority (hypothesis four) are found to be present in Taiwan's third term legislature. The question that remains to be answered is whether a consistent and positive link exists between these dimensions of

gender difference, or is the gender pattern actually random.

I first checked for consistency between the behavioral and attitudinal measures of policy representation,[25] in other words, for an association between hypotheses three and four. In the previous chapter, I examined the actual behavioral difference in the different legislative stages, from agenda setting to policy deliberation (hypothesis two). Earlier in this chapter, by interviewing legislators, I asked respondents to report the three policies to which they attach the most importance (hypothesis three). The former provides me with an *objective* measure of policy representation, whereas the latter generates a *subjective* measure. Examined together, in most of the issue areas (caring and communication, women, economics and development, and politics and organization) a significant and positive correlation is present between the subjective identification of policy priorities and actual behaviors in agenda setting (especially as regards bill-initiation). Only in two policy areas - those of judicial matters and defense and foreign affairs - was there no significant relationship identified between the subjective identification of policy priorities and the objective measures. However, the frequency of these two issue areas being listed as policy priorities is too small to extrapolate any pattern from. Overall then, the pattern of reported policy priorities is consistent with that of the actual policy behavior.

Next, I turned to examine the relationship between constituency perception (hypothesis three) and policy priority (hypothesis four). As discussed earlier, I asked female legislators "do you think you and your female colleagues are more willing than your male colleagues to represent women's concerns? Why? Or, alternatively, why not?" From that question, I expected to elicit their subjective willingness and commitment to representing women as a group. However, many female respondents often spent more time addressing the observed *actual* gender differences as regards participation in

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[25] My data set of the legislative participation covers from the 85th session of the first term to the third term (1990-1997). Here, I only apply the third-term legislators' actual legislative participation from the data set, since the corresponding interview data on legislators' self-reported of policy priority is only available for the third term.

women's issues, since the answer to the above appears to them to be both in the affirmative and self-evident.[26] Their answers often ended up simply demonstrating to me how they actually perform the role of furthering female concerns. In answering the question regarding the subjective commitment to representing women's concerns, some female legislators spontaneously suggested that the gender difference will be more prominent in the area of policy priorities, because women would be more likely to list women's issues as a policy priority, whereas men will not. Many respondents have directly linked two different questions together: the question of a subjective commitment to representing women, and the question of listing women's issues as their policy priority. And many respondents imply a consequential link between these two; that is, the subjective willingness to represent one particular constituency (women) should lead to the actual policy representation of that constituency.

From the interview data I have analyzed so far, there appears to be a corresponding pattern of gender difference between the act of identifying women as a constituency and the listing of women's issues as policy priority. In general, women tend to be more likely to identify with the women's constituency and to identify women's issues among their policy priorities. Of 21 women legislators interviewed, 12 mention women as their constituency and 10 report women's issues among their policy priorities. Conversely, no men either identify women as a constituency or report women's issues among their top three policy priorities. In addition, the men's own policy priority is the area of politics and government organization, whereas for women it is the caring and communication issue. In constituency identification, women are more likely to identify with children and the elderly than men are.

Hypothesis five postulates that a positive association between legislators'

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[26] Their answers to the question why women are more willing to represent women's concern are as straightforward as those of male respondents, they regard it as the way it should be, since women know more about these issues, and women must do so. Most respondents attribute the gender difference of the subjective willingness to represent women to the different nature and the experiences between the genders.

constituency perceptions and policy priorities exists with respect to representing women's interests. That is, those who are more likely to identify with a female constituency and commit to represent women's concerns, are more likely to list women's issues as their top policy priority. So far, most of the patterns regarding constituency perception and policy priority seem to fit the gender line nicely. However, legislators are also re-election driven and have different considerations and constraints to face in actually carrying through the implications of these subjective gender differences. The various factors influencing representatives' choices of policy priority include some personal characteristics (age, education, and seniority), their party affiliations, and their district demography, all as discussed earlier. To examine the causal relationship between the constituency perception and policy priority, I must, therefore, include these factors, as well as the identification with a female constituency, as independent variables. The dependent variable here is whether the legislator considers women's issues to be among his or her policy priorities, which could be either 1, yes; or 0, no. Given the fact that the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable with a distribution of 0 and 1, I model it in a logistic regression as shown in table 5-5.[27]

The results show that whether legislators perceive women as a constituency is a significant variable in determining whether or not they would list women's issues among their policy priorities. Other variables cannot explain this significant variation of the dependent variable. In short, I have first affirmed the consistency between the actual legislative behaviors in the agenda setting (hypothesis two) and the perceptual policy priorities (hypothesis four) of the third-term legislators. A positive correlation between legislators' perceptions and behavior in agenda setting is apparent in most of the policy areas. Furthermore, the identification with a women constituency (hypothesis three) is causally linked to the perception of women's issues as a policy priority (hypothesis four).

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[27] whether women issues as policy priority=a+b1partyd+b2partyn+b3age+b4constituency urbanization+b5seniority+B6women constituency

Therefore, which *constituency* legislators perceive to be important, to a large extent

decides what *issues* are important to them. Overall, this demonstrates a consistent gender

difference with respect to various legislative dimensions.

Table 5-5.Logistic model of legislator's policy priority on women's issues (yes=1; no=0)

Independent Variables	B (S. E)	Exp(B)
Constant	-.9706 (3.124)	
Party-DPP	-.1075 (1.4113)	.8980
Party-NPP	1.8164 (1.7552)	6.1496
Age	.4352 (.9001)	1.5453
Education	-.7475 (.8079)	.4736
Seniority	.8420 (1.5037)	2.3209
Constituency urbanization	-.33.6734 (179.256)	.0000
Women constituency	4.0755**(1.5436)	58.8801
Model diagnostic		
-2 log Likelihood Chi-Square	27.757	
Model chi-square	21.608 (.0030)	
Correctly predicted	87.5%	

The seniority of the legislators is a dummy variable, with 1 as senior, 0 as newcomers.
The constituency urbanization is measured by the agricultural population divided by the
total employed population within the districts. For those party-list and non-district
members, I substitute the measure with the national agriculture population divided by the
national employment population. The variable of women constituency is a dummy
variable, taking women as the constituency group set as 1, and not as 0. The party-DPP
and party-NP is also dummy variable, with DPP and NP members set as 1.

A "women's culture" explanation of the gender difference

All in all, I have observed a significant gender difference as regards women's issues,

with respect to constituency perception and policy priority. On an individual level, I also

try to forge a causal link between these two seemingly correspondent gender patterns, by

examining the positive correlation and causation between seeing women as a "most-

concerned" constituency, and listing women's issues among top-three policy priorities.

All that is left to do is to provide a theoretical account of just why these gender gaps in

legislative perception exist.

Carroll (1992) provided a plausible explanation for the gender difference in terms of

identification with women's groups and policy priorities. She states,

> women's networks and organizations, both inside and outside government, play a
> vital role in linking women's officeholders to women's culture. Women's
> organizations and networks help to maintain and support the responsibility of
> women officeholders to represent women's shared interests and to act as an advocate
> on behalf of women within the institution in which they serve (Carroll 1992, 25).

She posits that women's networks, which links legislators with female culture,[28]

should affect legislators' identification with women, too. I attempt to explore if such a

women's network with women's culture exists in Taiwan's Legislature Yuan and, if so,

how it relates to women's constituency relationships and policy priorities, by examining

the connection between women legislators and women's networks both outside and inside

government.

Outside the government, two types of women's organizations should be noted -

feminist organizations and traditional women's organizations. The traditional women's

organizations are public-service-oriented membership organizations, which aim for

promoting traditional women's interests, as opposed to feminist groups aiming for

promoting gender equality and women's rights. The latter are more active in the process

of law making. The information from the roster of third-term congressional officeholders

shows that none of the women legislators are members or leaders from feminist groups,

but some of them participate informally in those groups' activities. On the other hand,

most of the KMT women legislators either hold positions or have interaction with

traditional women's organizations.

Different party members do have different ties with different women's groups.

Among 11 KMT female legislators, five held positions in local traditional women's

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[28] Carroll defines women's culture as "women as socially constructed, gendered beings have certain shared interests resulting from their position in the sexual division of labor and the oppression they face even though the strength and nature of the sexual division of labor as well as the manifestations and circumstances of their oppression may vary considerably depending on race, class, sexual orientation, and other cultural differences. Women's shared interests which can lead to common values, perspectives, and patterns of interaction, define 'women's culture" (Carroll 1992, 26)

groups, historically associated with the KMT party machine; and three held positions in the KMT's central women's section. Among KMT women legislators, an almost perfect overlap appears between those who belong to the traditional women's membership group and those who identify women as one of their constituency groups. Seven out of eight women legislators who have established networks with traditional women's groups identify women as their constituency, and, among those female legislators that identify women as their constituency, only one does not have a close tie with traditional women's groups. On the contrary, in the roster, only one DDP woman legislator was once the party's women's sector's executive; and only one NP women legislator holds the leadership position in a professional women's group. Since the KMT has long controlled local politics, and most of the traditional women organizations have developed in parallel with such local politics, KMT female members have clearly outpaced other parties' members in establishing close ties with traditional women's groups. However, this type of women's organization wields its electoral influence through the party machine, the historical association between traditional women's groups and the KMT having given the party the edge. And this, in turn, reinforces the relationship between the KMT women legislators with those organizations.

The relationship between the KMT establishment women and traditional women's organizations is maintained through a formal relationship, by being a member of, or holding a position within, one of those organizations. However, the relationship between establishment women and feminist groups is generally a temporary, issue-oriented, coalition. The roster shows that none of the women legislators are members of feminist groups, or come from feminist groups. The relationships between establishment women and feminists groups can thus be seen as dynamic and fluid. From the interview, only a few of the women legislators mention their relationships with feminist groups, yet, the relationship is not always seen as positive and cooperative.

The KMT women legislators' attitudes toward feminist groups are ones of

considerable doubt. However, because of the political power wielded by feminist groups, some female legislators, even if they hold different views, will choose to remain silent. As one KMT female legislator (interview: 98002) explains, one of her reasons for not "leading" women's issues is because she holds a different perspective of what the female agenda should be from feminist groups. She argues "there are different types of women's organizations, some are radical, and some are conservative. If they are too radical, I cannot agree with them." From that, she mentions some cases that regard the promotion of gender equality, ones which she fears might over-protect and obstruct women's development and growth. She regards some of the feminist law-making as problematic, too. However, during our two-hour conversation, she asked for an assurance of confidentiality several times, because she knows that some people like to use such issues to attract votes and, if she opposes them, she will be attacked. She complains that "I do not want to irritate others [feminist groups], nor endorse, so I am just involved less ... in the Legislative Yuan. Democracy has its defects coming along with its votes, and what is of most concern to legislators is applause and votes, nothing else ... I am very rational. However, if I do not have votes, I lose" (interview: 98002).

In the DPP, the responses of female representatives toward feminist groups are more accepting. One female legislator (interview: 98039) has assigned one of her assistants to hold meetings with feminist groups on a monthly basis, meetings from which the legislator can learn more about the organization's plans and the bills in which they are interested. Besides these regular meetings with feminist groups, the representative told me that, sometimes, they act with feminist groups in holding public hearings, journalist meetings, or meetings with administrative officers. Another DPP women legislator (interview: 98025) also participates frequently in the activities held by feminist groups, such as various seminars and meetings. However, a new DPP woman legislator (interview: 98022) complains that the feminist groups are not so welcoming to other women legislators as they often come to those with whom they are already familiar, and

she regards this as a constraint on feminist development.

One NP female member (interview: 98028) also regards the relationship between female legislators and feminist groups as positive and mutually supportive. She notes that, "Women legislators and women's organizations help and support each other. They need us to help them understand or change laws, given the legislative Yuan's constraints. We need them to help us understand about social trends, and their expertise and research help our work."

Still, another NP woman legislator (interview: 98017), who is active in the furtherance of feminist bills, maintains a rather discontented attitude toward the relationship between herself and the feminist groups, even though they have worked together many times. She complains that:

> In the process of working with women's organizations, I always think they are very demanding on legislators, and it is unnecessary. They do not take legislators as cooperating partners, rather, they take you as the demanding and monitoring subjects. They think if they do not push and force you, you will not do it. They even took my version of amendments [in a civil law] as theirs, but in return they blamed me. So I do not care much about them now, what I want to do is not because of their push, but because I feel it is an important job, so I do it. Like last time, we brought back some old laws to the middle ... I thought if you just said "thank you for the help and we need more efforts", then I would continue. But if after all the effort I had put forward, you still said "why do you just bring it to the middle? Why can't you finish it?" I am sorry, please do it on your own, I am not interested in working with you. I dislike some of this kind of organizations. If you push something, you should be benign ...(interview: 98017).

Even though this legislator is very active on some women's issues, she does not mention women as her constituency. The reason for her not identifying with women might be attributed to her discontent with women's groups from her past experiences; it could also be the case that she was primarily concerned about another constituency group (children).

In addition to the women's organizations outside of the Legislative Yuan, establishment women have also organized caucuses *within* the Yuan. Two women's

caucuses are important in binding congressional women as a collectivity - the KMT women's caucus and the cross party "Coalition for Promoting Women's Rights." The KMT women caucus has been established since the first-term legislature. In the first term of legislature, there was a coalition called the "League of Eight Ladies" which included all the female legislators at that time (there were only 8 KMT women legislators). It is a group that is looked upon as more of a social network, rather than as a working team with any agenda. In the third-term, several KMT women legislators tell me that they gather, on a semi-formal basis, almost once a month or every other month, in one of the woman legislator's district to sponsor her district's activities. I asked most of the KMT female deputies if any agenda were involved; they all told me that it was activity-oriented, and thus did not possess any specific or serious agenda. The themes of the activities could be various, and were decided by the local situations and the hostess legislators. The main purpose of the meeting is to take turns rendering support to a district activity hosted by one of the KMT women legislators. As one KMT female legislator puts it,

> For example, we went to the district A to participate in their musical or art activities for the program of raising the standard of living in that district, or we went to district B to participate in a talk with family women about parenthood. Its aim is to let their voters see that, once you choose me, at the same time, you get some other people, and we help each other out (interview: 98002).

Such a caucus is important for establishment women to socialize and receive support from one another. Still other caucuses are important in as far as they enable women to work together on legislative issues of mutual concern to them. Another women's caucus within the Legislative Yuan was established in 1996. As previously mentioned, after the murder of Peng, Wan-Ru, six DPP female legislators initiated the "Coalition for promoting women's rights", which was endorsed by KMT and NP women legislators as well. Seventeen out of the 21 women legislators all joined the coalition (all DPP female members and all NP female members, excepting one, signed at the initiation). They

demanded the establishment of women's rights committees in local and central governments, an increase in the budget and level of personnel dedicated to women's welfare, and establishing of a committee for gender equality in education and a committee for preventing sexual assault. The urgent issues as regards this coalition, then, concerned women's safety.

Given that the coalition was a cross-party endeavor, in order to avoid any political dispute, one of DPP initiators of the coalition pointed out that there is no chairperson, nor any other formal position. Rather, the women simply gather together to campaign for women's issues. And in the beginning, they accomplished many things, as one DPP initiator of the coalition recalls:

> When it was just formed, we visited the Department of Health [to discuss women's issues]. They had never seen as many ten women legislators come together to talk about these issues, and so then they began to consider them serious. If ten legislators come together to a department, they will definitely feel enormous pressure. It is so powerful that they do not dare to block it, but must work with us seriously (interview: 98039).

Since the establishment of the Coalition (1996), many women's bills withheld in previous legislative terms have been passed in the third term. However, this initiator (interview: 98039) also admits some problems are present within the coalition. Now that the coalition has been operational for a good while, not everyone is as enthusiastic about it, and there have been differences expressed upon various issues and problems. Only a few legislators understand the problems completely and are acquainted with the goals and direction of the coalition, the majority simply attends in order to endorse the cause. The underlying reason for these differing degrees of involvement with the coalition is party, and she adds:

> There was certain period of time, during which some people were simply not interested [in the coalition]. For example, if the KMT's female legislators felt that the coalition was led by the DPP, they would become less likely to join it. If that's the case, it does not matter. We do not have to use the Coalition to do our business. Especially, right before the election, the strong party divisions would appear.

Anyway, the coalition is a form of operation and, whenever important issues arise, we need to use the [leverage] power of the form. For example, to get the Law of sex-invasion and the Law of road security passed, that's what matters. Whether the coalition exists or not, it does not matter. The next time we feel we need the clout of the Coalition, we will operate again. For example, last year, representative Pang advocated sex-invasion, but, in the beginning, she did not have the confidence that it might pass. She did not gain support from her own party, and the administrative departments were very reserved about that. It turned out that none of legislators from three parties opposed it, because we forcefully negotiated to schedule it into conference agenda and we passed it (interview: 98039).

On the men's side, most do not have such a connection with women's groups. Most of them lack any sense of familiarity while mentioning women's groups, at most they will receive letters or petitions from them. A direct and close association has been rare. As one male respondent (interview: 98026) points out, the women's organizations have their own set of myths, through which they confine their outside contacts to a few female legislators, and he regards this as unwise.

In short, the majority of female legislators have established ties with women's groups, whether outside or inside of the Legislative Yuan, whereas most men have not. This situation could possibly explain the gender differences that exist as regards identifying with the female constituency and advocating women's concerns. However, the extent to which even women legislators are actually and actively engaged with these women's groups is highly varied. The predominant women's network inside the Legislative Yuan is the "Coalition for promoting women's rights", which does succeed in connecting the majority of female legislators with issues of women's rights, and does work endlessly for women's interests. Nevertheless, inter-party divisions have prevented it from becoming a strong and sustainable group, despite the fact that the coalition has been the closest mechanism to an orchestrated establishment of women behind a common cause so far. The other groups, which are active in lawmaking on women's rights issues, are the outside feminist groups, yet the relationship between them and congressional women is remittent. Only a few female legislators have established cooperative and steady relationships with outside feminist groups. The most stable and long-lasting

women's network could well be found amongst the KMT's female legislators, both outside and inside the legislature. Outside the legislative Yuan, the long history of the connection between KMT women legislators and traditional women's groups can be ascribed to the KMT's manipulation of local politics, through which they have successfully co-opted most local traditional women's groups into the party. Inside the Legislative Yuan, because most KMT women legislators are dispersed across different electoral districts, competition among them is rare. With the women's league established since the first term, the KMT women's legislators have been semi-formally operating a women's network. But the KMT's women's networks both inside and outside of the Legislative Yuan can be deemed both conservative and traditional, and exist without a common agenda. This also affects the type of female constituency KMT women representatives identify with, and the issues with which they are concerned.

Finally, I try to summarize the stability of the association between women legislators and women's organizations, and whether the network involves the law-making function in table 5-6.

Table 5-6. Women's groups inside and outside of government

	Stability	Law-making
Cross-party women caucus	No	Yes
Within-party women caucus	Yes (KMT)	No
Feminist group	No	Yes
Traditional women's group	Yes	No

Given the different types and degrees of association between women's organizations and congresswomen, it is difficult for me to prove directly or even to make a causal relational generalization as to whether there is involvement with women's culture and an accompanying identification with a female constituency and with certain women-oriented

policy priorities. However, I have shown that women are, on average, more likely to be involved with or develop women's networks, and that such networking is conducive to developing a stronger female group identity and identifying with women's culture in a variety of ways. As Carroll (1992) noted, women in male-dominated institutions need access to a separate and alternative women's community in order to sustain their participation and to enable them to push for policies for women. From my interviews with the third-term legislators, it seems fair to conclude that women in public office, who are involved with women's organizations outside or inside government, will be more likely than men to represent female culture and to advocate the rights of women.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This aim of this project is to examine gender representation in Taiwanese politics. I began with a theoretical examination of the nature of female representation in Chapter 1, and then proceeded, in Chapter 2, to depict the changing sociopolitical context of Taiwan, setting the stage for the investigation of gender differences in Taiwanese representational politics that followed. In the theoretical part, the dispute between liberalism and the politics of difference concerns whether identity characteristics (such as gender) are correlated with relevant political variables to be represented and whether a link exists between descriptive representation and active representation. Liberalism emphasizes individual equality and procedural fairness regardless of any notion of identity difference, whereas proponents of the politics of difference argue that any real representation must start with some recognition of the differences between identity groups. To resolve this disagreement over the impact of identity on representational politics, I chose to test the impact of gender identity on the legislative process. In addition, by organizing possible gender differences into five hypotheses, further based on a behavioral and attitudinal distinction, I have managed to carry out two separate examinations into gender representation in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan - namely, longitudinal behavioral research covering 1990-1997, and attitudinal interviews with third term legislators. Based on the hypotheses I put forward earlier, my conclusions are as follows.

Research findings

Hypothesis 1: institutional committee assignment

In terms of institutional arrangements, studies in the 1980s found that women were more likely to serve on both the education and interior committees. However, in my comparison, such a clear gender pattern of committee assignment has not been found in the 1990s. Though women are still more likely to join the education committee, the degree of difference between the two genders as regards other committees is not significant. For example, the interior committee has turned out to be one of the most popular committees since, following democratization, it has concerned itself with a wide range politically important bills. Therefore, both men and women are now equally interested in joining it. Moreover, women also actively participating in the defense committee - a committee traditionally considered something of a "men's club."

The reasons for the blurring of gender division as regards committee choice are many. Firstly, a variety of factors affect legislators' committee choices, such as the interests and urgings of their party, and the individual's own self-interest and constituency considerations. Clearly, a final choice of committee is the product of each legislator's considered weighing of a number of factors, and gender is, for many, simply one of such consideration, and often not the primary one. Moreover, given that the social and professional opportunities for women have expanded over time to include non-traditional occupations, it should perhaps not be surprising that recently elected women would select a wider range of committee assignments. Secondly, the committee system is not well institutionalized in Taiwan and certain "rules" that exist in other countries, such as those regarding seniority and specialization, have not yet established themselves in the Legislative Yuan. Consequently, legislators tend to move amongst different committees in order to gain influence in various fields, and only a few legislators would claim any

form of authority over certain committee areas. Thirdly, because of jurisdictional overlap, an examination of the committee system is not in itself sufficient to reveal legislators' real policy interests. Committee participation can only, at most, serve as a general indicator of the policy interests of the legislators. Given this institutional flexibility and the constraints of the party system, the choice of committee appears to show a fluid and random pattern in Taiwan, largely unrelated to gender.

Hypothesis 2: legislative participation

Policy responsiveness involves a prolonged process of legislative activities, many of which cannot be determined by reference to the committee system. A legislator can be a committee member without really paying much attention or giving a great deal of time to the bills examined in the committee. To counter this, I reclassified legislative activities according to the subjects of the bills and then examined the gender patterns of legislative participation in different policy subjects at the different stages of legislative participation: i.e., initiation, chairship, speech at the committee stage, and speech at the final Yuan stage.

By treating women and men as two different groups, I compared the policy priorities of each at different stages of the legislative process, on both an aggregate and individual level. On the aggregate level, female legislators appeared to participate most often in the caring and communication policy area, whereas men legislators appeared to participate most often in the economic or development policy area. This pattern of difference was found across different stages - from agenda setting to policy deliberation - and across a number of legislative terms. The only exception was in the second term, when female legislators were most likely to initiate bills in the area of economic development.

I also compared the gender gap in terms of the percentage of legislator participation by each group in caring and communication and feminist issues, by deducting the percentage of male legislator participation in these policy areas from that of female

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legislators. In this regard, too, the findings are consistent with my hypothesis: namely, that women tend to be more involved in these particular policy areas than men do.

Furthermore, at the individual level, I have shown that gender is significantly and positively associated with the degree of legislative participation in these two policy areas. The OLS regressions, after controlling other factors that might affect the degree of legislative participation (e.g., age, education, party, constituency), also suggested that gender is both a positive and, in general, significant factor in accounting for the variances between the sexes in these policy domains. This positive association between gender and participation in these policy areas is especially clear in the third term.

Hypothesis 3: constituency perception

In approaching legislators' own subjective perception of whom and what they represent, the testing of hypotheses three and four required the conducting of a series of interviews with a matched sample of 40 third term legislators. By separating their constituencies into several groups, I asked legislators who they considered their primary constituency to be. Examining the results of the interviews, I discerned several patterns.

Firstly, legislators' identifications of their own constituency are influenced by a variety of factors. These include such issues as electoral rules, constituency demography, seniority in office, previous profession, class, or gender, and combine together to shape an individual legislator's evaluation of the relative importance to them of different constituencies. Given the overlapping characteristics or identity that each legislator might possess, a somewhat mixed, as opposed to entirely cohesive, concept of constituency came across in the interviews. Evidently, gender cannot easily transcend matters of class or other identity in defining whom a legislator will see as their primary constituency.

Secondly, when the respondents were divided into two gender groups, a significant gender difference became apparent as regards the degree of identification present with

three particular groups: namely, children, the elderly, and women. Female respondents were more likely to identify with these groups than men were, and the difference was especially striking as regards the level of identification with "women" as a group. Over half of the female legislators identified with their female constituency, whereas no men did so. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that the female's primary role in the family as a caregiver has in some ways been transferred into the representational arena.

Thirdly, men tended to be less group-oriented than women. Among all the categories of group constituency, only as regards the categories of the middle-class, business people, and environmental groups, did men outnumber women in reporting these categories as their constituency groups. Also, more men than women respondents denied the general idea of group constituency, considering the idea of group interest as partial and subjective. Instead they insisted that the majority interest, being unbiased and neutral, should always be the primary concern of the legislator. As I have already pointed out, such a viewpoint reflects a liberal approach to representation.

Finally, from the different self-reported constituency identifications, I further explored legislators' constructive willingness to represent the "women's interest" so as to examine whether group identification is linked to an active and actual commitment to that group. Based on respondents' observations and experiences, there was a near across-the-board consensus that women were more actively involved in the representation of women's issues than were men.

Hypothesis 4: policy priority

At least two ways to examine legislators' degree of commitment in the representation of certain groups are available to us: firstly, we can observe their actual legislative participation in different policy areas over the whole legislative process or, alternatively, we can cross-examine the legislators themselves. The former approach was

employed in the testing of hypothesis two and a general pattern of gender difference was discovered. The latter approach was used in hypothesis four to provide a more specific reference to the actual setting of agendas, which is the first step of the legislative process and requires the most commitment and expertise.

Generally, the answers I received delivered the following messages with respect to the agenda setting. First of all, there is indeed a gender gap as regards the identification of legislative priorities. Women's issues topped the female list of policy priorities, whereas no man described this area as being amongst their policy priorities. However, the differences in other policy areas were not significant. For example, more women than men listed caring and communication issues as policy priorities, but the discrepancy was not significant. And regarding development issues, the frequency of this being reported by female legislators as at the top of their agenda was even greater than that of male legislators. In the policy areas of defense and foreign affairs and politics and government, this arrangement was reversed. Overall, women appeared to report social and domestic issues as their top policy agenda, whereas men were more likely to attend to national and controversial political issues.

Secondly, I also asked whether the change in the gender composition of the Legislative Yuan would bring agenda change. Consistent with the above findings, most respondents who actually agreed that there would be a change of agenda following the introduction of more women, expected that change to lead to an increased emphasis upon women's interests. However, most were not convinced that there would be any such substantial alteration in the existing legislative agenda at all. Female legislators perceived at least three practical and psychological constraints to this: namely, the ways in which female legislators differ amongst themselves, the fear of being labeled as narrow-minded or blinkered, and the passivity of female voters as regards supporting the actions and proposals of female legislators. These obstacles account for the difficulty one faces in linking the mere descriptive presence of women to the substantive representation

of women's interests.

Hypothesis 5: the consistency of gender difference across different legislative dimensions

In hypotheses one to four, I have examined gender differences apparent in various legislative dimensions: institutional committee arrangements, actual legislative participation, constituency perception, and subjective policy priorities. With the exception of the first of these dimensions, the existence of a definite gender pattern has been discerned throughout. To discover whether these gender patterns are random, or whether they represent something more significant, I tested the association between objective legislative participation (hypothesis two) and the subjective identification of policy priorities (hypothesis four). Then I looked for a correlation between constituency perception (hypothesis three) and these declared policy priorities (hypothesis four).

First of all, I examined the possible link between the objective measure of legislative participation and the subjective perception of legislative priorities by examining the correlation of the third term legislators' performances on these two dimensions. Among the seven policy areas that I classified, and with only a few exceptions, the pattern of actual legislative agenda setting (i.e., bill-initiation and chairship) is positively and significantly associated with that of declared policy priorities. This demonstrates a consistent relationship between legislators' declared policy priorities and their actual legislative behaviors.

Secondly, I examined the association between legislators' perceptions of their own constituency and, once again, their declared policy priorities. In each dimension, a gender pattern was detected in which women were more likely to identify with a female constituency and also listed women's issues among their "top-three" policy priorities. Assuming that the constituency grouping with which legislators are most concerned might have an impact on the policy issues upon which they will spend time, I examined

this causal postulation via the use of a logistical model. After controlling other factors that might influence a legislator's choice of policy priority, the results demonstrated that whether legislators identified themselves with a female constituency or not, significantly affected the chances of "women's issues" being a primary policy agenda for that legislator.

Ultimately, in order to explain the consistent gender pattern that I have demonstrated, I utilized Carroll's (1992) "cultural" explanation. The growing influence of women's associations, and the increasingly close relationships between female deputies and these various women's organizations, have played a major role in bringing about the female legislators' general affiliation with women as a group and their deeper commitment to representing female culture. By examining the diversity and dynamics of the female legislators' association with women's organizations, the differences that exist among female legislators themselves could be further recognized

The implication and discussion

Compared with past studies of female compatibility with men in the arena of representational politics, this study goes further, and looks to explore exactly what it is that distinguishes women from men, and the rationale of considering gender divisions as an integral part of normal party politics. If women represent essentially the same constituency or the same policies in representative politics as men, it seems redundant or simply symbolic to describe women as a "category" in that arena. Representative politics differs from merit-based and expertise-oriented administrative systems in so far as it means to represent the people. Therefore, it is reasonable to inquire exactly who represents whom and what.

I began by sketching the institutional and sociopolitical background of Taiwan, which has provided a favorable environment for an ever-increasing level of attention being devoted to women's issues. Building upon this background, my research has

demonstrated that identity characteristics are indeed correlated with representative politics, and that legislators' gender identity affects their legislative behaviors and their subjective perceptions. The behavioral research regarding legislative participation from agenda setting (bill-initiation and chairship) to policy deliberation (speeches in committee and on the floor) has shown the different policy interests of male and female legislators across multiple terms. Women have consistently placed more emphasis on the policy areas of caring and communications and women's issues than have men, and men have tended to place more emphasis on political and economic issues. The behavioral research based on the objective measurements was then attested from the input side - i.e., legislators' subjective attitudes. The attitudinal research that followed - the interviewing of legislators so as to elicit their constituency identification and policy priorities - has further confirmed this gender pattern. It has especially pointed out the significant gender differences in the agenda setting process from legislators' own observations. Finally, these findings have, as a whole, paved the way to establishing a link between subjective perception and objective legislative participation, along the lines of gender. At the same time, from the interviews, the psychological obstacles that can prevent legislators acting upon their own differing agendas were also documented. These obstacles determine the extent to which subjective identity perceptions will lead to different and gendered levels of legislative participation.

The group identity and common agendas of female legislators seem to embrace and accommodate both their traditional roles in the private domain and a feminist concern for women's rights. The identity characteristics generated from female psychological and sociological experiences have been transferred into representational politics. The linkage between descriptive representation and substantive representation discerned in this study buttresses the assertion that who is present in legislative assemblies is closely related to what legislators actually do. Accordingly, it would appear that the "politics of idea" cannot be separated from the "politics of presence" along gender lines. In other words,

this research has demonstrated that gender characteristics are correlated with representative politics. This correlation carries both practical and theoretical implications.

In practice, the analysis of the legislative behavior of female members and their responsiveness to women could support the justification for increasing the number of female representatives. As the number of women elected to the Legislative Yuan continues to increase, we might expect this increase in the substantive representation of women's interests to continue and the representative gap between women and men to continue to escalate. While discussing gender quotas in Taiwan, one male legislator claimed that the reason he supported increasing gender quotas was because, generally, men are less concerned than women about women's issues, and so the system requires more women to enter the process to redress this (interview: 98024). Female representation, rather than simply visibly representing ideas of gender equality, implies substantive change in legislative processes and agendas, even if the degree of change is, as discussed above, still subject to many other considerations.

Furthermore, the findings also shed light on the theoretical dispute between the theory of liberalism and the politics of difference, with the former emphasizing the unimportance of identity difference, and the latter claiming that difference counts. My research cannot sustain either of these contentions in their entirety, which was also not my intent. Nevertheless, it does support the empirical basis of the politics of difference as regards representative politics. Gender division is a significant variable in explaining the specific policy choices and the general nature of representative politics. In advocating the equality of individual representation with no regard for the significance of group difference and representation, liberalism overlooks the implications of group identity to representative politics. Identity characteristics could be a necessary, though not sufficient, factor in bringing about a structural change in the social agenda of representative politics, as would appear to be the case in certain Nordic countries, where

increasing female representation has introduced more social welfare concerns into the political agenda. In short, this would suggest that the linkage between identity and interest should be properly addressed in future studies of legislative and electoral politics.

Suggestions for future works

Above all, several points remain which must be handled with caution in future research. Firstly, any research should try to avoid the danger of "essentializing" gender differences without first examining the sociopolitical and institutional contexts in which they exist. In discussing gender differences in politics, or in any social sphere, a tendency to overlook the differences that are derived from other social separations is always present. Indeed, one must first admit that there are no generic women versus generic men situations, rather, it is a matter of specific women versus specific men in different institutional and sociopolitical contexts. Failure to take into account the interaction between gender and other sociopolitical divisions will inevitably threaten the possibility of understanding gender dynamics in their sociopolitical contexts. My study has attempted to take the party factor into account by controlling its influence, however, a more dynamic and in-depth exploration of the interaction between gender and other sociopolitical factors could be even more inspiring.

In addition, many of the legislative procedures have been experiencing change. Since the start of the fourth term in 1999, the legislative process has become increasingly complex, because of the increasing number of legislative members, the increasing number of factional members in the legislative Yuan, the changing party politics, and actual alterations to legislative procedures. In terms of this last, a change to the party proportions regarding committee assignment, and the formal institutionalization of party negotiations concerning bills will enhance party discipline over individual members and thus the party's dominant role in the legislative process. More attention must be paid to the new legislative dynamics caused by different compositions, procedures, and party

politics.

Secondly, because my primary interest was sorting out the different policy interests of representatives, I compared gender differences by computing the intensity of behavioral participation in different policy areas. The behavioral measurements I used cannot reveal the possible policy position of legislators' interest within each policy domain. The whole legislative process from agenda setting to policy formation cannot be fully understood without knowing each legislator's viewpoint regarding each issue. For example, two legislators can participate actively to the same degree on the same issues but in a totally opposite direction. My study can only reach conclusions regarding the varied degrees of legislative participation and attention devoted to different policies, not the concrete policy positions of the legislators. Further exploration of policy direction and content would certainly improve this study.

Thirdly, this study did not spend much time discussing another important dimension of representation - constituency service. In the literature review, I have covered several U. S. studies and one recent Taiwan study upon legislators' constituency service (Huang 1994). Though their findings - that sex is a significant factor in accounting for the discrepancy of levels of constituency service undertaken between women and men - is consistent with my theoretical projections, I have criticized the methods and the representativeness of the samples used. Because most constituency service is passed down to legislators' local agents, the numbers obtained from a survey of these legislators' assistants (Huang 1994) cannot determine the direct connection between legislators and their constituency. In my interviews, I attempted to ask legislators directly about their efforts in constituency service, however, many of them failed to answer. This certainly does not suggest that we should give up the attempt to understand legislators' constituency service patterns, but, rather, that we should discover alternative methods (e.g., participant observation as Fenno did or field investigation) with which to do it. Another complete and well-designed study will be required for this.

Furthermore, this study focuses primarily upon the supply side of the legislators' methods and degrees of policy representation without paying sufficient attention to the demand side of the equation - i.e., to the voters themselves. Though I have mentioned some of the voters' policy interests studied in the past (Fan and Hsu 1994), they did not fit with the policy classifications I have used in this legislative study. Most studies of the level and form of policy representation by female legislators regarding their female constituencies have been based on theoretical assumptions of women's sociopolitical experiences and past studies. Also most of the legislative study on gender difference has failed to examine and incorporate the policy demands that emanate from the constituency and the electoral base of the representatives. Overall then, more accurate data from the input side of policy formation, such as concerning the constituency's own preferences and degree of electoral support, would be constructive in tracing the correspondence between a female constituency and female representatives.

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1

Bill classification

<u>First stage</u>:

I commenced by dividing the bills into 19 coding schemes. For each bill examined in the committee meeting, one or two subjects and types are assigned for each meeting in the Yuan index record. This was my most important source in setting up the first-stage scheme. I present all the categories and some examples of the subjects of bills that fall within those respective categories as:

1. Economic Affairs and Finance: taxes, finance; stock market, energy, licensing,

2. Budget and Local development: budget, transportation (highway, airport, port, post), public construction, local development, tourism development, land development.

3. Political issues: elections, political reforms, institution reform, ethnicity issues, mainland china policy.

4. Government Organization: government personnel, recruitment, merit system of public servants, infrastructure.

5. Education and Culture: school administration, teacher credentials and training, museums, management of cultural heritage.

6. Mass-communication: TV, PBS, radio, newspaper, magazines.

7. Judicial system: prosecution, lawyer, civil law, criminal law, law enforcement.

8. Social order: gun control, public building management, policemen, personnel, smuggling, game store management, stall-keeper management, drugs.

9. Environmental: air pollution, water pollution.

10. Medical : health system, public sanitary, hospital management.

11. Labor: wages, unions, hiring and hiring, labor health care, labor training programs, labor pension.

12. Agriculture: farm, food and livestock, senior farmers' pensions.

13. Fishery: ship management.

14. Women's right issues: gender equality at work, sexual harassment, sexual invasion, women's rights in civil laws, marriage, property rights.

15. Children: child prostitution, child care, youth issues.

16. Ethnic minority: aboriginal land issues, language education, names.

17. Welfare: health care, enforced comprehensive car insurance.

18. Foreign Affairs: embassy appointments, international relations, international economic cooperation.

19. Defense: military school, military court and prosecution, veterans.

Second stage

Next, I further collapse the bills into a more macro-structured scheme. Three policy schemes are considered as references here. Firstly, because of my interest in exploring the gender divisions that affect legislative participation as a whole, I refer to Thomas and Saint-Germain's gender schemes for collapsing policy. According to their classification, the categories of education, children, health, and welfare are traditionally regarded as being "women's interest" categories. I collapse these categories with the domain of communication and then label it the care and communication domain. Another issue area that I theoretically hypothesized to be gender-specific is the women's rights issue. As to the rest of the categories, I tried to put those categories with most similar characteristics together by referring to two general policy schemes.

The next scheme I referred to was Sheng's scheme (1996) for studying the factors influencing legislative participation in Taiwan. Sheng divided the bills into political affairs, economy and finance, government organization, social welfare, education and communication, judicial matters and social order, and environment protection. She classified bills by the content of the bills under examination, not by the name of the bills. Since she only sampled some bills from those that were proposed and passed on the

second and third term, her scheme was sufficient to cover and analyze those bills. If one were to attempt a full coverage of all the bills discussed, however, then it would soon become clear that some bills did not fit into any of Sheng's categories. For example, foreign affairs, defense, minority, and medical bills were not included in her scheme.

The last reference I have extensively used in this regard is Chou, Clark and Clark's classification of resolutions in studying women's representatives in Taiwan. They classified bills into economic affairs, public works, local development, education and culture, elections and civil and human rights, foreign affairs, and defense. The problem, as above, arises from the exhaustibility of their scheme. And the way Chou, Clark and Clark determined the type of bills was by asking legislators to list all the bills they sponsored in each category researchers had pre-set. In this study, I want to know legislators' subjective policy interests among all of the legislation. It would be easy to induce the classifications from them, yet, it is impossible to have all legislators attempt to classify all the bills they attend to.

According to these references, I collapsed the original 19 policy categories into the seven categories as shown in table appendix 1

Table appendix 1. Two stages of bill classification.

First-stage 19 categories	Second-stage 7 categories
Education, Children, Health, Welfare, Communication	Caring and Communication
Women's rights issue	Feminist issues
Finance, Budget, Economics	Economics and Development
Judicial, Social Order	Judicial and social order
Defense, Foreign Affair	Defense and Foreign affairs
Politics, Government Organization	Political and Government
Labor, farmer, fishermen, ethnicity minority, environment group;	Group interests

APPENDIX 2

Interview cover letter

Dear Representative _____.

This project attempts to gain insights into the workings of legislature through interviews with its members. It is a part of a dissertation project on Taiwanese representative politics by Wan-Ying Yang. a Ph.D. candidate at Michigan State University. Through her training at MSU for the past four years, she has developed a research interest in democratic processes and institutions, as well as representative politics across countries, including Taiwan. As members of her dissertation committee, we humbly request that you consider joining this project by participating in an interview.

As we know, Taiwanese democracy has made much progress since 1986. For a consolidated democratic country, a well functioning legislature plays an unsubstituted role. It is, therefore, in our highest interests as political scholars, to learn from people who practice and participate the representative system on a daily basis. Your experiences in the legislature will surely provide us with valuable information about how Taiwan's representative system functions.

We do hope that, through this project and your kindly assistance, people who are concerned about democratic politics in Taiwan, may be able to have a more in-depth and contextualized understanding about the operation of representative politics in Taiwan.

We thank you in advance for your consideration.

<div style="text-align:center">

Sincerely,

Dr. Jones, Mark

Patterson, Dennis

Rohde, David

Department of Political Science,

Michigan State University.

</div>

APPENDIX 2b

Interview questions guide

The purpose of this interview is to gain insight into the workings of legislators. We assure complete confidentiality of answers.

General perception on legislative activities.
The first set of questions deals with your views about performing some aspects of your jobs.

In your view, what is your main duty as a legislator?
(a suggesting list of legislative works, for example: making good policy, holding public hearing, serving constituency, working with interest groups)

Approximately how many hours a week, on average, do you devote to your job as a legislator working in the process of making policy (including policy debate, initiation, co-sponsoring, voting for policy, etc.) and serving your constituency (including casework, attending local community activities, etc.)?

Of this amount, how much, as a percentage, of your time do you spend on making policy (including policy debate, initiate, cosponsor, vote for policy, etc.)?

Of this amount, how much, as a percentage, of your time do you spend on serving your constituency (including looking after constituency, casework; attending local community activities, etc.), approximately?

What are the important factors that affect the success of getting bills passed?

Is there any position in the Yuan that is important to gain influence?

Perception of representation of constituency (Hypothesis 3).

As a representative, you represent many different constituency groups. Do you consider yourself representative of certain constituency groups (certain kinds of people, organized

or unorganized, within or outside your own district)?

----- (If no, probe) Do you consider certain group's concern as very important and worthy of being addressed by you? For example, people in your district, a certain ethnic constituency, a single-issue group(e.g., environmental), a business constituency, labor groups, women, elderly, children, poor, or others.

----- (if yes) who are they?

Did you gain support from these groups in your last campaign? Is there any groups that constitute your strongest source of support? Second strongest source of support?

Do you find it easier to represent these groups'(people's) concerns? Why/why not?

Do you feel you are better able than most other legislators to represent these groups' (people's) concerns?

----- (if no) Are there any groups you find easier to represent than others?

Perception of policy priorities (Hypothesis 4)

This set of question deals with your legislative priorities:

Please list your top three priority bills in the last complete legislative session?

How do you choose your legislative priorities?

Why are these issues important to you?

Do you make contact with outside groups while advocating these issues?

Whom do you ask support from for these issues?

What are the difficulties for you to promote these issues in the Yuan?

Do you spend most of your time on them? Or do you distribute your time evenly among

most policies?

What are the accomplishments you are proudest of during your term as a legislator?

Women in politics (related to hypothesis 3, but put in the last part to avoid leading respondent.

Recently, the discussion on women quotas in electoral rule is still under debate.
Do you think that having more women in representative politics would make a difference to the legislative process?

Do you think that having more women in the representative politics has made a difference in the legislative process?

---- If yes, what is the most important way women have affected the politics?

---- In what other ways, have women made a difference?

---- Are you particularly interested in seeing more women in politics? why or why not?

Do you feel that women as a group have particular concerns which the government should address or is addressing ?

---- If no, why not? (finish this part)

---- If yes, what are some of those concerns?

(For Female) Do you think you and your female colleagues are better able than your male colleagues to represent such concerns? If yes, why?

(For Male) Do you think your female colleagues are better able than your and your male colleagues to represent such concerns? If yes, why?

(For Female) Do you think you and your female colleagues are more willing than your male colleagues to represent such concerns?

(For Male) Do you think your female colleagues are more willing than you and your male colleagues to represent such concerns?

Do you think there are any barriers specific to women in elective politics? (Probe: are there "rules of the game" that particularly apply to women?)

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