I develop an argument for the justification of global responsibilities based on the capabilities approach and care ethics. I examine the work of Thomas Pogge and David Miller. While there is no precise algorithm to determine what each individual's responsibility is to others in the world, Thomas Pogge's institutional model based on libertarian justifications and Miller's needs based approach do not take into account the importance of care, relationships and the capabilities necessary to live a life of full human potential. Pogge separates his moral sympathies from his intellectual sympathies. This bifurcation is unnecessary. There does not need to be such a radical split between our moral sympathies and our intellectual sympathies and when that split is reconciled, a case can be made for a more robust account of human rights and our responsibilities to one another. The capabilities approach model is a more justifiable place to ground responsibilities because it recognizes the importance of care, relationships and the importance of the interrelatedness of various capabilities.The capabilities approach requires both more institutional responsibility than Pogge argues for, along with the collective responsibility that Young advocates. The capabilities approach is robust enough to support a conception of justice that not only relies on justice as obligation based on benefits received through institutional arrangements and structural processes, but also as an idea of fairness wherein peoplehave the opportunity to fulfil basic capabilities, whether we rely on Nussbaum's list or argue that these capabilities may vary from one society to another and can't be determined in advance of a participatory democratic consensus. I examine the role of blame in justice systems. If we shift our focus from blame to responsibility, then we will more likely provide motivation for people to work towards global justice. Further, it seems that people who are responsible for injustice are often not blameworthy for these unjust structural institutions and processes. Instead, a moral orientation towards a virtue care ethics will provide a lens to include other types of unjust structural processes, such as those that care for children, the elderly and so forth. It will also provide an orientation which will not rely solely on what David Miller called a benefit responsibility for justice. Care ethics and the capabilities approach will provide a robust methodology and moral lens through which to work through our responsibilities for justice.While Martha Nussbaum argues it is morally imperative that primary agents of justice should be relatively democratic nation states, Jane Addams vision of democracy is more closely linked to social ethics. She argues that a robust democracy develops through sympathetic knowledge and experience. Nussbaum agrees that compassion should play a role in how our institutions are structured, too. Yet her approach to this issue is different in some significant ways from Addams' vision. Addams' methodology is more appropriate for a capabilities approach to human development. The role of narrative is crucial to the development of a culture of care. Narratives are designed for a multitude of purposes. Addams, Nussbaum and Lindemann's work highlight different ways in which the capabilities approach can be helped or hindered through varied types of stories. Which ones are helpful to a capabilities approach which is adequately and properly informed by care? While their work is compatible with Pogge and Miller's theories of responsibility and global justice, Robinson and Tronto's contributions add an important dimension which is missing from Miller's and Pogge's more libertarian theories.I examine some of the narratives provided in Nussbaum's work. Primarily I focus on the narratives in Creating Capabilities and Women and Human Development. By embracing Alison Jaggar's critique of Nussbaum, we can better understand how western complicity and responsibility may change what narratives we use to demonstrate obstacles to human rights. A virtue epistemology, as advanced by Miranda Fricker, will provide a strategy for choosing appropriate counter narratives. Lisa Schwartzman has provided a critique of Nussbaum's liberal, individualistic methodology and points out that it has often been helpful to look at issues such as unequal pay for equal work, domestic violence, rape and so forth from a social and political perspective. When feminists begin to talk and uncover patterns, then they often realize that what they once thought were individual failings are really the result of oppressive social and political practices. I will use concrete examples to explore how this methodology can work with the capabilities approach to development.
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