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A CROSS-CULTURAL EXAMINATION OF ADULTS' PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING

By

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ABSTRACT

A CROSS-CULTURAL EXAMINATION OF ADULTS' PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING

By

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The purpose of this study was to explore the nature of principled moral reasoning of a group of adults from Western and non-Western societies and to determine if these adults differ significantly regarding moral reasoning. The study was intended to provide some useful information concerning the theoretical adequacy and implications of cognitive developmental theory in ascertaining the claims for validity of universal moral structures.

One hundred subjects from two culturally different groups of adults were selected purposively and asked to respond to two self-report questionnaires at the end of spring and the beginning of summer of 1989. The Defining Issues Test was used to measure the principled moral reasoning of the subjects and the Personal Inventory Form was used to obtain the demographic characteristics and other relevant variables. Both instruments were pilot tested before they were mailed to the respondents. Out of

the 70 returned questionnaires, 57 were usable. Descriptive statistics (percentages, means, standard deviations, and frequencies) were used to analyze demographic variables. To determine if there were significant relationsip between the subjects' place of origin and principled moral reasoning, a one-way analysis of variance was used, but Chi-square was used to control for categorical variables.

The findings of this study indicated that there were no cultural differences between adult Black African and White American subjects with respect to their principled moral reasoning. However, controlling for some variables, such as the type of place of upbringing and the number of years of schooling, the results are inconlusive. Overall, the conclusions of the study were tentative due to insufficient data.

Based on the precedent literature and the findings of this study, some implications for adult education and suggestions for further study were presented.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Joan, for her exuberant love, unwavering commitment, and moral support.

To my children, Kibeet, Kipkoech, and Kibichii, for their outstanding joy and patience during my degree program.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study was to explore the nature of principled moral reasoning of selected groups of adults who come from Western and non-Western societies and to determine if these two selected groups differ significantly regarding principled moral reasoning.

In cognitive-developmental theory, moral reasoning of adolescents and adults is presumed to be a function of universal cognitive structures. According to Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1971, 1984; Rest, 1979), there are universal cognitive stages and levels of moral judgment: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional levels. Each level consists of two distinctive stages, creating six stages. Kohlberg (1969) asserted that these stages are "transformations of simple early cognitive structures as they are applied to (or assimilate) the external world, and as they are accommodated to or restructured by the external world in the course of being applied to it" (p. 352). Kohlberg postulated further that all individual persons in all cultures develop these stages sequentially, structurally, and hierarchically as diverse but challenging situations in a person's life-span

stimulate moral development by providing role-taking opportunities and creating cognitive disequilibrium. He maintained, however, that certain cultural experiences can slow down, speed up, or halt a shift to higher moral stages.

Construct Validity

To what extent Kohlberg's claims of the universality of moral judgment are true may be a subject of construct validity. Cronbach and Meehl (1956) explained that construct validity is concerned with the process by which a researcher derives meaning out of the procedures used and the reseacher's orientation to what the test measures (pg. 282, 283). These procedures include determining the sensitivity to group differences, correlation matrices and factor analysis, studies of internal structure, of change over occasions, of process, and of finding a numerical estimate of construct validity.

Cronbach and Meehl (1956) stated that the "logic of validation is invoked when the construct is highly systematized or loose, used in ramified theory or a few simple propositions, used in absolute propositions or probability statements" (pg. 284). Cook and Campbell (1979) emphasize the fact that construct validation can be the result of effects from measurement methods.

The logic of the construct validation, therefore, is focused on testing the claim that an instrument measures a

particular construct or phenomenon. The construct itself must appear in an interlocking system of propositions which constitute a theory, and that the purpose of the validation exercise is to elaborate or modify the constructs within their nomological network. Failure to use constructs to predict to observable behavior may be an indication of a problem of interpretation of the test itself or in the network.

Stimulated by Kohlberg's stage model of moral reasoning, investigators have explored the empirical evidences for Kohlberg's universality claims of moral development. Using modest experimental designs investigators have reported positive gains in moral development (Lickona, 1972; Rest et al., 1969; Rest, 1973). Others have conducted correlational studies linking structural stages of moral development to cross-cultural experiences (Edwards, 1978; Schlaefli, 1977); socio-economic status (Freeman and Griebnik, 1979); real life actions (Blasi, 1980); modernity (Maqsud, 1977a; Edwards, 1975); and Islam (Maqsud, 1977a, 1979).

Correlates of Moral Judgment

Rest (1986) summarized several studies and concluded that education, age, religion, and type of residential upbringing correlate moderately with moral judgment. Among adults, education, especially the number of years of

schooling, is more correlative with moral development than is chronological age. This finding implies that adults whose highest level of education is junior high have comparable moral reasoning stages as current high school students. Likewise, adults with college educations have identical moral stages with current college students.

While formal education is directly proportional to the level of moral reasoning scores, religious conservativism is inversely related to the level of moral reasoning. Ernsberger and Manaster (1981) found that conservative seminarians differ significantly from liberal and social issues oriented activists. They attributed this apparent difference to the seminarians' greater concern with maintaining religious orthodoxy than with reflecting autonomous moral judgment. In other words, highly religious seminarians subordinated adequate epistemological concerns to religious ideology.

Despite the critics' charge that Kohlberg's assessment of the stages of moral development reveals a gender bias (Gilligan, 1982; Holstein, 1976), Rest claims that in 22 studies only two showed significant difference related to gender. Even if the charges of gender bias were true, Rest claims only 6% of the variance would be accounted for by the gender variable. He concluded that the current charge reflects public concerns about gender discrimination more than it is concerned about legitimate psychological

variable.

Other studies seem to suggest that a person's academic major is related to the stages of moral development. Using the Defining Issues Test (DIT), an objective instrument developed by James Rest to measure Kohlberg's moral stages (see Chapter III), McGeorge (1976) found that physical education and social science majors had lower scores than English or science majors. This observation may be accounted for by the fact that subjects whose majors include moral problems as their focus of study tend to score higher on the DIT scores than do subjects whose majors are in disciplines less related to moral issues. Rest concluded, however, that there was no hard evidence pointing either to a positive or negative relationship.

Several variables, such as academic major, level of education, religion, and others may have an influence on a person's principled moral reasoning scores. A subject's position of responsibility for the welfare of others may also have an effective influence on a person's principled moral reasoning. Subjects who participate in the workplace, parents of teenagers, and even urban dwellers, are more likely to be exposed to sources of social disequilibria. They are forced to reflect on their choices of actions more often than those who experience less cognitive dissonance in moral issues. They have more complex decisions to make or have role-taking

opportunities which are conducive for stimulating a shift toward higher moral stages.

Cross-cultural Studies

Limited studies conducted among subjects from Black Africa indicate that some of Kohlberg's claims to universality of cognitive moral development are inconclusive. Maqsud (1977, 1978, 1979) found that Islam, the religion practiced by the followers of Mohammed, is significantly related to the stages of moral development. Contrary to Kohlberg's theoretical claims to sequentional order, he found that some subjects skip one or more moral stages. For instance, the Nigerian Hausa Muslim boys used Stage 2 and Stage 4 more frequently than Stage 3. Maqsud also found such factors as ethnicity, participation in family activities, and attending heterogeneous secondary schools to be significantly correlated with the stages of moral development.

In a study of the relation between social roles and moral reasoning among traditional Kipsigis people, Harkness, Edwards, & Super (1981) found leaders scored significantly higher on Kohlberg's assessment of moral stages than non-leaders when age, education, religion, and wealth were controlled. They explained that, in contrast to complex societies, norms in a small community are more stable and more equilibrated over time. They reasoned further that conventional and post-conventional levels of

moral reasoning are more likely to be found in industrialized societies which have complex social arrangements. For example, moral reasoning at Stages 5 and 6 assumes a codified law and the supremacy of a constitution as is found in Western democracies. In a face-to-face community, they concluded, justice principles are subordinated to maintaining societal cohesion rather than to individual needs for fairness.

Other studies conducted in non-Western societies by Edwards (1975, 1978) and Grimley (1974) reported similar findings. Edwards (1975) compared heterogeneous samples of adults from secondary schools and adult residents in rural Kenya with samples of subjects from the University of Nairobi. She found that Stage 4 reasoning was more used by the university subjects; Stage 3 reasoning was used more by the community leaders, and Stage 2 reasoning was used more by secondary school students. She found that age was not a relevant factor in moral reasoning variability; however, she attributed significant variability to formal education, modern job experience, urbanization, and a national world view. She explained that these variables are theoretically presumed to influence differentiation and integrations of basic moral categories such as the locus of authority, rules and law, guilt and blame, and individual liberty.

These social variables provide role-taking

opportunities in several ways. For instance, urbanization removes a person from a social environment which is regulated by kinship and close interpersonal relationships, one in which every individual knows what constitutes a moral issue, acceptable responses to moral situations, and group values. In the rural community, morality is defined not as an individual dilemma, but in terms of social norms of the immediate extended family or the entire ethnic group.

Statement of the Problem

Notwithstanding these recent studies, there exists very limited studies on Kohlberg's universality claims of moral reasoning stages, especially among non-Western adult samples who appear to have theoretically postulated role-taking opportunities. It has been suggested, though not substantiated, that logico-mathematical cognitive operations and certain social experiences stimulate higher cognitive moral stages of all individuals in all cultures, while certain experiences slow, stop or increase the rate of moral growth. If these experiences hold universally, then evidence from the universe of all subjects representing non-Western societies should help to confirm the theoretical postulations.

Significance of the Research

Claims of the universality of cognitive moral development have other important implications. Since the classical and medieval periods to the present, scholars have recognized the function of morality as critical and central in human affairs. Consequently, exploring the nature of the universal claims of cognitive-developmental theory should be of particular importance to those who have a compelling interest in socio-moral phenomena, because if specific correlates of moral reasoning stages can be identified in all subjects in non-Western societies, some errors in theoretical framework and methodological issues may be avoided and, hopefully, new insights may be gained.

In addition, the theoretical assumption that the stages of moral development are independent of religiosity has received little empirical support from the universe of subjects drawn from non-Western societies, such as Africa south of Sahara. In some of these societies, the dichotomy between the cognitive and non-cognitive function of religion seems to be non-existent as contrasted with non-Western societies (Horton, 1967; Mbiti, 1969, 1970, 1971). Generally, the relationship between morality and religiosity may take one of the following four views (Bartley, 1971):

(1) Morality is reducible to religion.

(2) Religion is reducible to morality.

(3) Morality and religion are in conflict (partially if not wholly).

(4) Morality and religion are inseparable.

Moreover, whether religiosity is related or not related to the stages of moral development, moral issues are increasingly becoming a worldwide concern both in professional circles and in public sectors (The Hastings Center, 1980). In addition, it is apparent that a large proportion of the world's population are religious and that the relationship between cognitive development and religiosity is far from being clearly understood. Consequently, the study of how adults' moral development relate to several social variables is an important theme in adult education. As Freire (1970) and Knowles (1970, 1973) have argued, curriculum discourse must take into account the empirical findings of adults' needs. While considerable work has been done on the characteristics of adult learners (Cross, 1979), knowledge of how adults across cultures make moral judgments would be useful for understanding psychological links between a person's ethical perspectives, values, beliefs, attitudes, and cognitive styles (Horton, 1967).

Questions

In light of the foregoing discussion, this study will focus on a few of the identified theoretical and methodological issues of Kohlberg's stage theory. Thus, to

accomplish this objective, the following questions will be used as guides.

1. What are the demographic characteristics of the selected groups of adults?
2. How do these selected groups of adults differ demographically?
3. What are the principled moral reasoning scores of the selected groups of adults?
4. Do these two selected groups of adults differ regarding their principled moral reasoning scores in the following ways?
   a) Do men and women differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores?
   b) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to their educational majors?
   c) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to age?
   d) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to their level of formal education?
   e) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to their number of years of

schooling?

f) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to the type of place of their upbringing?

Hypotheses

This study focused specifically on four hypotheses which are stated as follows:

1. One's home country is directly related to one's principled moral reasoning score.
2. One's gender is related to one's principled moral reasoning score.
3. One's formal education is directly related to one's principled moral reasoning score.
4. One's number of years of schooling is directly related to one's principled moral reasoning score.
5. The more metropolitan a person's community in which he/she was raised , the higher the score of principled moral reasoning of that person.

To fulfill the purposes of the study, the following null hypotheses will be tested at .05 alpha level of significance:

Ho1: There will be no significant difference between White Americans and Black African subjects regarding principled moral reasoning scores.

Ho2: There will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores between the Black African subjects and White Amerian subjects by gender.

Ho3: There will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores between Black Africans and White Americans by formal education.

Ho4: There will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores between Black Africans and White Americans by the number of years of schooling.

Ho5: There will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores between Black Americans and White Americans by the type of community in which the subjects grew up.

Definitions

To facilitate reading the remainder of this study, terms are defined below that are either unique in psychological or philosophical literature, or as operationalized in this study.

Cognitive structure: refers to a set of assumptions which serve as a filter or set of lenses for defining how an individual tends to perceive, organize, and evaluate experiences and events. Cognitive structure, therefore, refers to rules for processing information. Cognition means integrating things together or relating events

through active reflection. Thus, the emergent modes of thinking consist of relations of causality, substantiality, space, time, quantity, and logic (Kohlberg, 1984).

Constructivism: used ethically, it "implies that moral judgments or principles are human constructions generated in social interaction" and that they are "neither innate propositions known as priori or empirical generalizations of facts in the world" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 216).

Culture: as used in this study, it refers to "the body of learned beliefs, traditions, and guides for behavior that are shared among members of any human society" (Barrett, p.54). Specifically, two seemingly distinct cultures are identified in this study as African and American cultures.

Deontic judgments: refer to moral judgments in which concern is determining what act is right or obligatory; they derive from a rule or a principle such as Kant's categorical imperative and Mill's utilitarian principle. As used in Kohlbergian sense, deontic judgments are deductions from a stage structure (Kohlberg, 1984).

Developmental change: refers to the upward movement resulting from heightened cognitive conflict, a process of equilibration in which a person assimilates and accommodates unfamiliar factors of moral situations (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Kohlberg, 1984). As used here, it

refers to a movement from a lower stage to a higher stage of moral judgment.

Individual modernity: refers to a syndrome which characterizes a person with a factory experince. Inkeles (1975) summed a modern person as follows:

> "He is an informed participant citizen; he has a marked sense of personal efficacy; he is highly independent and autonomous in his relations to traditional sources of influence especially when he is making basic decisions about how to conduct his personal affairs; and he is ready for new experiences and ideas, that is, he is relatively open-minded and cognitively flexible." (p.328)

Metaethical assumptions: presuppositions about moral domain derived from one of three ways of theoretical discourse; namely, descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethical ethics (Frankena, 1973, p.4-5). Metaethical ethics is concerned with analytical, critical, and reflective thinking. It deals with the epistemological or semantical questions such as "How can ethical and value judgments be established or justified?" (Frankena, 1973, p.5). As an epistemological concern in Kohlberg's view, the stage theory of moral judgment assumes that there is moral truth of the type that can be either true or false. Cognitivism, says Kohlberg, implies prescriptive moral judgments, but not descriptive in the sense of the naturalist's ethical claims. Cognitivism is in sharp contrast to emotive theories which assert that moral judgments are merely a person's emotional status (Stevenson, 1963; Gilligan,

1976; Smith, 1948; Hume, 1930).

Moral judgments: refer to evaluations about rightness and goodness of an action. Moral judgments are universal, inclusive, consistent and grounded on objective, impersonal or ideal grounds (Kohlberg, 1984). There are no probabilities regarding duty or obligations.

Moral point of view: refers to the role-taking position marked by impersonality, ideality, universality and preemptiveness when making moral judgments. Also, it is identified with formalism.

Principled level: refers to the last two stages of Kohlberg's theory of stages of moral judgment. Also defined in terms of ethical perspective, the level is marked by an appeal to justice as a means of resolving competing claims, a reference to a method of distributing or defining claims. The basic rule for justice is distributive equality, an assertion calling for treating every person equally. Commutative justice or reciprocity deals with contracts, trust, undoing harm done to others, and gratitude. The general assumption underlying the principled level is that human rights take priority over the special claims of commutative justice. Hence, in distributive justice, equality at Stage 6 is superior to commutative justice of Stage 5. For the purposes of this study, principled moral reasoning is characterized by the main features of principled level.

Religiousity: refers to a total approach to religious phenomena on some reasonably limited set of experiences. Glock and Stark (1966) have proposed five dimensions upon which all organized religions may be characterized; namely, experiential (i.e., feeling of presence or nearness of the supernatural being); ideological (i.e., adherence to a core of beliefs); ritualistic (i.e.,observing prescribed activities such as prayer or fasting); intellectual(i.e., knowledge about the tenets of religious faith); and consequential (i.e., the manifestation of the actual behavior of an individual as result of the effect of religiosity).

Stages: refer to basic structures with which people reason; they are invariant sequences through which people must pass as they grow. The stages are also hierarchical since each stage is more differentiated and integrated such that they are qualitatively different and universal (Kohlberg, 1969, 1971). They are concerned with the form rather than with the content of moral reasoning.

Limitations

Specific results of this study may be generalizable only to the samples of adults involved, but significant theoretical observations may be obtained to generate further investigation concerning the moral reasoning of adults and related issues.

Consequently, the study will be limited:

1. To those adults who consent to participate voluntarily,
2. By the size and nature of the sample,
3. In the analysis due to the nature of the data,
4. By the subjects' self-report data.
5. By paper and pencil testing of values.

Summary

This study is designed to explore the nature of principled moral reasoning of selected groups of adults who differ culturally and to determine if these two selected groups differ significantly regarding this variable. American and African adults were asked to respond to a questionnaire dealing with principles of moral reasoning. The respondents were also requested to fill a personal inventory form from which pertinent data were obtained and used in answering some of the research questions.

The results of this study may provide information pertaining to cross-cultural comparison of moral reasoning perceptions and may be useful in clarifying some of the unanswered questions concerning the psychology of adult moral development.

Overview of the Study

Chapter I has been concerned with the delineation of the research problem. It located the main research

questions within Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory of moral judgment which claims the existence of universal moral structures.

The next chapter will examine in detail the theoretical framework of cognitive developmental theory, outlining the conception of the theory, methodological concerns, and related aspects of cognitive development. It will also contain some criticisms of the theory which some scholars have pointed in Kohglberg's stage model.

CHAPTER II

PRECEDENTS IN THE LITERATURE

The following literature review is divided into four broad sections. The first section focuses on the main features of Kohlberg's theory of moral cognitive development. The second section deals with summaries of subsequent studies which were conducted in Western and non-Western societies. The third section deals with a critique of Kohlberg's stage theory. The final section is a summary of the literature review.

Theoretical Framework

Within cognitive structural psychology, the stage model of moral development is best associated with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1971). Kohlberg proposed a stage model of moral development which is characterized by four main criteria: structural, sequential, hierarchical, and normative. These four criteria will be discussed briefly in this chapter.

The structural criterion holds that each stage of cognitive-moral judgment represents a holistic structure, a relatively consistent mode of reasoning across varying moral contexts and contents. Thus, a stage of moral

development involves change in the overall shape, pattern, and organization of moral judgment which is independent of cultural mores.

The sequential criterion suggests that the qualitative modes of reasoning form an invariant order which an individual acquires as stages or structures. However, cultural factors may also speed up stage progression or stagnate it, but they cannot reverse its sequence. The qualitative and sequential modes of thought represent an underlying pattern of responding to a task which is independent of familiar tasks learned in the past or resembling them.

The third criterion holds that there is an order of increasing differentiation of development of moral stages such that higher stages are better integrated to deal with a common function. In addition, the development of higher stages is directed toward a terminal disposition to apply the highest principles available to moral issues. Kohlberg asserted further that the stage transformation also involves uniqueness, a qualitative difference in response to moral situations. These structural responses, he claimed, are hierarchical and not subject to regression.

In Kohlberg's theory, the last criterion of the stages of moral development takes the form of moral philosophy. Kohlberg's theoretical model of moral judgment development has the objective of evolving a universal

ethical perspective from which all human beings can appeal for solving moral issues. Kohlberg stated that the "focus of Piaget and myself on morality as deontological justice springs, in part, from a concern with moral and ethical universality in moral judgment" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 248). He further asserted that the "search for moral universality implies the search for some minimal value conception(s) on which all persons could agree, regardless of personal differences in detailed aims or goals" (Ibid, pg. 248).

Kohlberg distinguished between assumptions made prior to research and the implications of research findings. The former requires a psychologist to endorse certain metaethical assumptions whereas the latter has to do with the relationship between "is" and "ought" claims. Consequently, moral stages are construed as a rational reconstruction of development. Moral judgments assume certain criteria such as phenomenalism, universalism, cognitivism, formalism, principledness, constructivism, primacy of justice, and prescriptivism. Thus, a moral judgment corresponds to a point of view which is characterized by impartiality. To act morally, therefore, is to be concerned with the welfare of other people by applying moral principles.

Viewed from the moral philosophical perspective, Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development consists of the increasing differentiation between prescriptive and

universalizable moral judgments and aesthetic and prudential judgments. For instance, a person at preconventional level of moral judgment fails to differentiate between 'rights and shoulds' as prudential hypothetical imperatives and moral 'rights and shoulds' as categorical imperatives. Hence, Kohlberg asserted, the core of moral judgments is a deontological morality (i.e., justice or principles of justice as the core of morality). The highest principle or the end point of morality is represented by Stage 6.

Compared with the lower stages, Stage 6 embodies the fundamental features of normative and metaethical assumptions. Kohlberg states that "both by Stage 6 normative ethical standards and by formalist metaethical criteria, Stage 6 is a more moral mode of judgment than Stages 5 or 4" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 217). In deciding a moral course of action, a Stage 6 person would define a moral obligation in terms of the principles of justice, role-taking, and respect for human personality. For instance each individual has an equal consideration for his/her claims in every situation that requires a solution. Each person is in a state of innocence regarding the role which he/she plays in a given moral dilemma. Consequently, the principles of Stage 6 represent principles which are eternal and identical with the natural law.

Kohlberg explained that the natural law theory encompasses principles of justice which are conceived as a social contract designed to solve conflicts in a civil society. It is reflected in an order inherent in both human nature and in the natural law or cosmic order.

Interpreted this way, Stage 6 embodies moral principles which are inherent in a natural law: they are the universal outgrowth of human nature. However, the relationship between mature moral judgments as embodied in Stage 6 and the natural law is different from the relationship between the divine command theory and moral judgments. Kohlberg claimed that the natural law theory accommodates religious teachings such as those of Martin Luther King, Jr., but Kohlberg also claimed that the theory is incompatible with the equation of a higher law with God's commandments. King's natural law, Kohlberg explained, was not specific to a particular theology or creed. The religious traditions which are compatible with this natural law may be found in pantheists' positions. For instance, the pantheists generally equate ultimate power, being, or reality with the whole of nature as discovered by rational science.

Empirical and Normative Implications

In stage theory, the relationship between the structure of moral development and moral action takes several forms. First, moral judgments influence moral

action through differences in deontic choices and judgments of responsibility. Secondly, they provide some perspectives from which alternative courses of action may be formulated along with arousing the appropriate emotions. Hence, the findings of empirical studies of how people make moral judgments cannot prove the validity of universal moral principles, but they can be found to be consistent with them. In other words, failure to confirm the empirical hypotheses of the cognitive moral development theory would cast doubt on the plausibility of the normative claims upon which the descriptive developmental theory rests. The role of empirical data in Kohlberg's cognitive moral developmental theory, therefore, is to support the non-relativistic metaethical assumptions. In this case, the validity of the metaethical assumptions are not subject to empirical verifications.

Kohlberg proposed three steps which individuals follow in making a moral decision. An individual must interpret pertinent aspects which are involved in the rightness or justice of a situation. Next, he/she must choose the appropriate deontic judgment in the moral situation, and finally, he/she must implement the chosen moral judgment. Thus, a morally principled person is likely to more often perform those actions which are right both in form and content than a person with lower principled moral reasoning ability. An individual's

structure of moral development, therefore, reflects a pattern of universal stepwise but invariant sequences which form a complex functioning within an individual. For instance, Kohlberg claimed that

> "there are universal structures of the social environment which are basic to moral development. All societies have many of the same basic institutions, institutions of family, economy, social stratification, law, and government. In spite of great diversity in the detailed definitions of these institutions, they have certain transcultural functional meanings" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 39).

Three levels of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development and their corresponding stages are listed below. Each level consists of two stages (See Appendix A).

I. Preconventional Level

Stage One: Heteronomous morality

Stage Two: Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange

II. Conventional Level

Stage Three: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships and Interpersonal Conformity

Stage Four: Social Systems and Conscience

III. Post Conventional Level

Stage Five: Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights

Stage Six: Universal Ethical Principles

Moral judgment develops until age 30 for half the middle-class population in Western societies. The

antecedents of moral development are role-taking opportunities which are mediated by participation in a group or institution (family, peer group, law, government, work). Variations in moral judgment development are accounted for by parallel cognitive stages (Piaget, 1965), education, social environmental factors, democratic leadership, participation in discussions of moral dilemmas, individual modernity in the case of non-Western persons (Inkeles & Smith, 1983) (i.e., living in an urban setting, attending Western-style schools, living in a heterogeneous community).

Piaget's Contribution to Kohlberg's Stage Model

Kohlberg's conception of stages was greatly influenced by Jean Piaget's logico-mathematical and physical deductive model of the development of judgments (Piaget, 1967/1971). Using clinical methods developed by Sigmund Freud and others, Piaget, a biologist by training, incorporated some principles of epigenetics into the formulation of a cognitive-structural developmental psychology. According to Piaget, the methods which people use to organize information consist of four stages: sensorimotor (approximately birth to two years); preoperational operations (approximately two to seven years); concrete operations (approximately seven to eleven years); and formal operations (approximatley eleven and

older). Through the processes of invariant functions (adaptation, organization) and qualitative differentiations (assimilation, accomodation), human beings evolve hierarchical stages prompted by disequilibrium and equilibrium factors towards the highest stage. The highest stage is characterized by such criteria as the ability of a person to define a problem, formulate a hypothesis, generate several possible solutions, and test the hypothesis experimentally.

Kohlberg's Methodology

After reviewing moral philosophy and sociology of moral literature, Kohlberg identified 12 categories of norms (life, property, truth, affiliation, love and sex, authority, law, contract, civil right, religion, conscience, and punishment) and 17 elements or descriptors which philosophers use to differentiate a range of moral questions involving blaming, obeying, obligations, duty, retribution, and principles of justice (See Appendix B). Further, Kohlberg openly made an ideological commitment prior to research, such as the assumption that morality is value relevant, universal, prescriptive, cognitive, formal, and constitutes justice orientations. He characterized his metaethical commitment as a response to ethical relativism, a position which views moral values as relative to culture. Kohlberg's stage theory, though not derived from Divine Command Theory, would implicitly

permit anyone to judge certain moral content as wrong in time and space.

Based on these ideas, Kohlberg (1958) designed and used a clinical-like interview in which 75 white boys (ages 10, 13, 16) in the suburbs of Chicago were asked to respond to questions based on hypothetical moral dilemmas. The subjects' responses were then used to generate the stage theory.

Kohlberg used several methods to assess an individual's moral judgment stage. In his aspect-scoring system, Kohlberg determined moral stages by relating 25 aspects of justice to formal philosophic assumptions. These aspects were subsumed under categories of rules, conscience, welfare of others, self's welfare, a sense of duty, role taking, punitive justice, positive justice, and motives.

To assign stages to the subjects, Kohlberg used two specific methods: sentence scoring and story scoring. In sentence scoring, a subject's responses are matched to a list of prototypical sentences on each aspect contained in each moral dilemma. In story rating scoring, a subject's stage total response to a dilemma story is matched to the stage's overall definition of each moral aspect. Hence, a person is assigned a stage structure based on (a) theoretical statements concerning the value issues and the elements (considering overrides __ for instance a refusal

to grant a patient a request for a mercy killing may be overriden by the risk of punishment to oneself); (b) critical indicators in which specific justifications are given for judgments; for instance, weighing the risk of punishment or other discomforts to the person making the judgment.

In addition to the aspsect-scoring system of moral judgment, Kohlberg employed intuitive issue scoring. In it he distinguished between form and content of moral reasoning. According to him, the content of moral reasoning is what an individual values or appeals to in making a moral judgment. For instance, Kohlberg identified approximately 11 issues which are involved in moral judging: laws and rules, conscience, personal roles of affection, authority, civil rights, contract, trust, and justice in exchanging of goods, punishment and justice, the value of life, property rights and values, truth, sex and sexual love (Kohlberg, 1976).

These two scoring systems, however, failed to make clear distinctions between matching a subject's verbal sentence to a criterion concept, and between matching a criterion concept to the content (issue) of response. To remedy this failure, Kohlberg developed a standardized issue scoring in which each moral dilemma is assigned only two issues. For example, on Heinz's story of stealing the drug (see Appendix C, the Defining Issues Test), life and

punishment are the issues.

Subsequent Studies

Subsequent studies which were conducted by Kohlberg and his colleagues used longitudinal designs with some of Kohlberg's original sample of subjects (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). While some were quasi-experiments (Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg, 1969), others have come from cross-sectional studies and longitudinal studies which were conducted among the subjects from developing nations, such as studies in Kenya (Edwards, 1975), longitudinal studies in Honduras (Gorsuch and Barnes, 1973), and Bahamas (White, 1975). Studies on both adolescents and adults indicate the existence of the hypothesized stages (Fishkin et al., 1973; Edwards, 1978) in persons of developed nations as well as of the developing nations.

More directly, Kohlberg made some specific metaethical assumptions prior to research, such as the commitment to universality of moral judments. He emphatically rejected the notion that he committed the Natural Fallacy (Kohlberg, 1971). For instance, he believed that respect for and the sanctity of human life was a categorical imperative (Kohlberg, 1984). He asserted that the validity of respect for human life is not a subject for empirical investigation. Precedent conditions which stimulate the growth of the desired end, therefore, form a necessary but insufficient

cause for cognitive moral behavior. However, there are no a priori tenets of faith; ethical principles are human constructions.

Evidence for the Universality of Stages

Evidence for Kohlberg's postulation that the structure of moral judgment is culturally universal has been investigated extensively. First, the postulation asserts that moral judgment is transformed sequentially from precoventional level to postconventional level. In a three-year longitudinal study of white subjects, Holstein (1976) empirically assessed the stepwise, invariant sequence and the irreversibility of the stages. However, evidence was inconclusive. Young males tended to move directly from Stage 1 or 2 to Stage 4. Girls tended to move one step, from Stage 2 to Stage 3. He noted that 21% of the adolescent subjects skipped some stages in contrast to 7% of the adults. Holstein rightly observed that methodological limitations may have been responsible for the discrepancy. The time interval for which the measurements were taken could have resulted in the subjects' acquisition of the structures.

Other studies have shown that the sequential transformation of moral structures is cross-cultural. In a longitudinal study of Turkish children, adolescents, and young adults, Turiel et al. (1978) found that the sequential growth of moral structures was not different

from that of samples from Western and other non-Western societies. Several studies found similar results; for example, White et al. (1978) in a study of Bahamian males and females; Harkness et al. (1981) in a case study of subjects in a rural African community; Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) in a longitudinal study of the Turkish subjects that were earlier studied by Turiel(1966).

Another central assumption of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral judgment is that the attainment of Jean Piaget's cognitive stages is a necessary but insufficient condition for the attainment of parallel moral stages. In a pretest-postest experiment, Walker and Richards (1979) found that moral Stage 3 subjects who exhibited basic formal substage of cognitive development differed significantly ($p < .05$) from Stage 3 subjects who had attained only the beginning substage. In a related study, Faust and Arbuthnot (1978) found a consistent relationship between Kohlberg's moral stages and Piagetian stages. Cable (1976) found a strong relationship between moral stages and formal operations only.

A more basic aspect of cognitive structural development which is often ignored in the literature was reported by Black et al. (1976) and Haan et al. (1982). Black et al. attempted to answer the question, "Does logical development play a gating function in moral structural development?" Using a longitudinal design and a

sample of subjects in California, they found inconclusive evidence linking formal logic and the development of moral stages. Examining the same topic, Colby (1973) reached exactly the opposite conclusion. In a study of 42 upper-middle class Jews, she predicted that intervention programs designed to stimulate moral development would be gated by a lack of the formal operations stage, especially in subjects progressing toward principled moral reasoning. Employing Piaget's logical tasks, Kohlberg's moral jugdment interview, prestest and posttest scores, Colby found that an intervention technique was more effective with subjects who had attained formal operations than with those who had not.

The stage of formal operations has other aspects which are central to hypo-thetico-deductive structure of Kohlberg's stage theory. For example, "What is the relationship between hypothesis-testing ability of a person and the stages of moral development?" Moshman (1979) traced the development of three areas of hypothesis-testing ability; namely, the comprehension of implication relationships, falsification strategy, and nonverification insight. For instance, "If James uses Close Up, then he will have healthy teeth." Using truth values, the subjects were asked to evaluate each description of conditional truth statements, and then they were tested for both consistency and inconsistency. The results of the study

showed that different cognitive thinkers used all the possibilities to effectively solve the problems. Moshman concluded that a formal thinker reasons more effectively using all combinations of hypothesis testing. The sample consisted of 24 male volunteers at Rutgers University.

In spite of these studies, however, the central place of logical reasoning in moral development of adults has not been resolved empirically. Some investigators have found that a lag exists between the acquisition of logical operations and the applications of them to morality. Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey (1974) were concerned that if the formal operations stage of cognitive development were a prerequisite for principled moral reasoning, then only 10% of the adult population would attain the principled level. Using Piaget's formal operations tasks and Kohlberg's interview protocols, they found a moderate relationship between formal operations and principled moral reasoning. Subjects who evidenced increased cognitive stages did not necessarily attain parallel moral stages. Some subjects' responses to Piaget's tasks became more concrete, but their responses to the moral dilemmas tended to be preconventional.

Other studies in support of the claim that logical development is a necessary but insufficient condition for moral development have investigated the correlations between moral stages and individual characteristics. In a

meta-analysis of thousands of subjects in cross-sectional data reported by Thoma (1984), over 50% of the variance of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979) was attributed to age and formal education. Cross-cultural studies reveal that moral maturity increases with age (Edwards, 1978; Gorsuch and Barnes, 1973; Kohlberg, 1969). Still, other investigators have attempted to relate moral reasoning to honesty (Haan and Block, 1968); and resistance to conformity (Milgram, 1974).

Ethical Justifications of the Stages

While the first three criteria discussed above could be justified empirically, Kohlberg's third main criteria requires a philosophical justification. Kohlberg asserted that a higher stage is more adequate, equilibriated, differentiated and integrated in contrast to the lower stages. Consequently, the highest stage, Stage 6, is better than the lower stages since it constitutes moral maturity (Kohlberg, 1970, 1984).

Conceived as a commitment to a metaethical position, the principled level of moral reasoning defines the end of moral growth. According to Kohlberg, Stages 5 and 6 define inalienable human rights or liberties. Thus, obligations are what individuals rationally deduce relative to the welfare of others. Obligations are viewed as differentiations from fixed moral virtues and

responsibilities. Furthermore, individuals recognize universal rights of just treatment which supersede liberties and claims beyond the cultural milieux. Hence, obligation is what is right or a just claim that can be willed to all people impartially and universally.

The underlying nexus of this claim to the hierarchy of moral stages is the formalist notion of consistency, reversibility, universalizability, and prescriptivity of the moral domain. Evidently, only Stages 5 and 6 persons may be governed by ideal role-taking claims, the Golden Rule; and that they appeal to absolute rights and utilitarian conceptions of Stage 5. They have respect for human beings; they view justice as equity, and practice equality for all.

Basically, the role of moral philosophy in moral decision making, Kohlberg claimed, is to define the empirical domain of morality. Agreeing somewhat to this suggestion, Hogan (1970) stated that answers to moral dilemmas draw on a variety of considerations such as moral philosophy, psychology and social practices. He identified three broad categories from which moral principles are derived: natural considerations principles; the social contract principle; and principles of organic state theory.

The first category asserts that there are self evident higher laws which are absolute and may be discovered by intuition or by reason. Thus, a human law is just only if

it corresponds to or is derived from the higher laws. The second category suggests that there is no such thing as a higher law. What is perceived in social settings is constructed social practices which are based on current legal and general welfare of the society. Thus, just laws are validated by their maximum contribution to the good. Attainment of these laws are accomplished by appealing only to rational decision making processes which will safeguard against anarchy and inconsistency.

Ethical Surveys Related to Kohlberg's Moral Stages

Studies aimed at determining the relationship between moral philosophy and Kohlberg's moral stages have found mixed results. Using Hogan's Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) to test the hypothesis that moral maturity is related to ethical attitude, Nardi and Tsujimoto (1978) concluded that Kohlberg's measure of moral maturity is linearly related to SEA. However, they observed that the two measures provide separate conceptions of moral maturity. The study did not make any distinction regarding Hogan's descriptions of the essential nature of moral conscience and the ethics of responsibility in relation to the structural content of the stages of moral development.

Trainer (1983) conducted a study identical to the one by Nardi and Tsujimoto. He observed that Kohlberg's conception of moral maturity is constituted by Stage 6. Based on a cross-sectional study, he explored indirectly

the relationship between Kohlberg's stages of moral development and two aspects of metaethics: objectivism and subjectivism. The subjects consisted of college students and adults including professors across Australia. They were administered several questionnaires one of which tapped the objectivism-subjectivism dimensions. The subjects were presented with a pair of statements each representing one of the dimensions. Each respondent was asked to indicate which statement he/she favored. A person's metaethical position was determined by computing the highest percentage of responses in favor of one of the positions relative to the total possible responses. Trainer concluded that objectivists tend to be older, conventional, female, less self-actualized, universalistic, absolutistic, religious, and value conscience derived from intuition. But, on Piagetian indices of immature moral thought, the objectivist tends to endorse immature responses to two items from Piaget's formal operations tasks.

The interpretations of the findings of Trainer's study, however, are inconclusive due to flaws in the design. In either case, the dimensions fail to distinguish between cognitive naturalism and cognitive nonnaturalism in metaethics. The metaethical positions which Trainer measured did not correlate directly with Kohlberg's stages of moral development.

The following statements representing two tenets of metaethical positions illustrate the ambiquity inherent in Trainer's measures of the metaethical dimensions. For example,

> A. Your basic moral principle can only be your best guess at the criteria for evaluating things; you can never know whether yours are the right criteria.
>
> B. It is impossible to know that your basic moral principles are the right criteria for evaluating things.

The task for the respondent was to indicate which statement he/she favored. In the example given, "B" represents an objective position, whereas "A" represents the subjectivism position.

Conceivably, therefore, two persons at a principled level of moral development may differ on what they favor from these examples. By the definition of the justice principles and what is moral in a given situation, these two examples could not discriminate validly, categorizing people on the objectivism-objectivism dimension.

Kohlberg explicitly stated that moral stages, especially the principled stages, are constructed: they are objective. They can be true or false in the logical sense. However, the truth of the stages does not assume any a priori truths as would be the case if Divine Command Theory positions were adopted. Justice principles are constructed from an individual's interaction with the social environment. In another sense, Kohlberg repudiated

the notion that the stages are absolutes transmitted for all time from some independent source (i.e. Bible, Koran).

Critique of Moral Stage Theory

Besides specific stage model modifications, a number of scholars have criticized the stage theory in terms of a cultural bias. They argue that the invariant sequence of stages and the showing of higher stages by subjects from developed nations in contrast to lower stages by subjects from developing nations indicates a cultural bias. For example, in an analysis of the evidence supporting the hierarchy of moral reasoning and the claims for cross-cultural universality of the stages, Simpson (1974) concluded that the definitions of stages and the assumptions underlying claims for the universality of the stages are ethnocentric and culturally biased. Simpson's main criticism of Kohlberg's stage model draws from analytical sociology, research design, and social learning theory. She argued that research designs which have been employed in the establishment of the theory are flawed. She explained that anthropological findings suggest that people worldwide shape their structural thinking and actions relative to historical, genetic, and environmental factors. She questioned further the usefuleness of cognitive-structuralism in establishing claims of universality and how to account for group differences in moral judgments.

According to Simpson, the domain of morality may be carried on philosophical and psychological levels. On one hand, an empirical concern with moral issues seeks to ascertain the patterns of behavior, principles, concepts, rules for dealing with moral issues and decision-making. On the other hand, normative investigation seeks to determine what should be the moral obligation, right, or good in human relationships. If the inquiry is carried on the philosophical level, then analytical problems concerned with answering logical, epistemological, and semantic questions about ethics becomes the central focus. As such, each of these differing investigations require different modes of inquiry to justify claims of authority as science in contrast to claims of authority of theology and philosophy.

Simpson observed, consequently, that Kohlberg's writings fail to clarify the empirical sources of claims to universality in the empirical realm (i.e., distinction between normative or analytical philosophy and empirical psychology). The normative mode governs the description of empirically derived categories of principled reasoning.

The distinctions concerning the modes of inquiry has special significance. According to Simpson, morality consists of culturally defined goals and rules governing achievement of goals which are external or internal to an individual person. These goals and rules are inculcated

as habits, internalization by irrational but conjoined by culturally-held beliefs given as reasons. Later, a movement emerges toward rationality in which an individual examines life, and strives for autonomy by becoming an independent moral agent.

Another significant implication of Simpson's analysis concerns Kohlberg's omission of non-Western philosophy (i.e., Indira Gandhi) in creating moral categories. Western and Eastern philosophies differ far more between themselves than within both in substance and methodology. Besides, says Simpson, Kohlberg is an accident of time and place, norms and special environment. Whereas Kohlberg explains cultural differences in moral judgment to be a function of fundamental differences in principles or modes of moral reasoning, Simpson explains the differences as factors of maturation and culturally learned morality. Whereas Kohlberg claims that differences in values between cultures are consequences of diversity in ethical principles, Simpson claims that they are due to differences in the comprehension and definition of a situation and in relation to the meaning which it has for specific groups.

Simpson characterized Kohlberg's stage theory as implying moral inferiority for subjects in developing nations. According to the theory, members of preliterate or semiliterate peasant communities are unable to reach the highest stages of ethical reasoning.

Such a suggestion seems to echo the ideas expressed by Levy-Bruhl(1926). For Levy-Bruhl, primitive culture implied primitive thought, prelogical mind-beliefs about the world infused with and governed by emotions in which mental processes follow naturally from a highly simplified and religious culture.

Lastly, Simpson noted that stage theory ignores concepetual differences regarding justice. Justice is subject to learning, not free from the restrictions and qualifications imposed upon it by membership in specific groups in time and place. In view of this, the meanings of abstract concepts, such as justice, cannot be generalized cross-culturally. In other words, the development of the concept of justice does not entail learning a uniform body of knowledge (i.e., equality in U.S. varies in meaning which is affected by social class membership). In some cultures in Africa responsibility is directed towards people, not principles, ideas, or a system.

While Kohlberg has responded to some of the charges which Simpson raised, an unclear relationship between moral stages and other aspects of human behavior remains. Trainer (1983) has observed that Kohlberg's stage model of moral judgment makes a distinction between the objective and subjective dimensions of moral thought. He claims rightly that Kohlberg identifies his theory with Immanuel Kant's maxim, the categorical imperative, which holds that

moral judgments are not relative; instead, they are characterized by preemptiveness, impartiality, universality, and justice for all people as ends rather than as objects of manipulation. Contextual relativism, on the other hand, emphasizes the particular or situational.

On broader theoretical issues, Kohlberg's stage theory lacks adequate empirical analysis of the relationship between moral stages and specific metaethical commitments. The theory also fails to differentiate how individuals, especially adults in non-Western societies, perceive the moral domain at certain stages of moral judgment. Understanding apparent problem areas is essential in determining the critical features of the decision making process of adults. Further, the theory, as it stands presently, offers no conclusive empirical evidence for the assumption that a Stage 6 person will adopt an objective ethical perspective on moral judgments, nor does it provide justifiable exclusion of competing deontological theories. It does not indicate clearly if a person at a principled level of moral reasoning will also adopt or be predisposed to hypo-deductive epistemology parallel to attainment of formal operations stage (Piaget, 1959). More significantly, the postulated separation between morality and religiosity has not been explored adequately with subjects from non-Western societies.

Summary

This chapter described the main theoretical framework and precedent studies underlying cognitive moral development theory. Several distinctions were made concerning the impact of an individual's social and cultural milieux and how certain aspects of human moral judgment may be subject to empirical examination. To what extent certain moral content or form may be characterized as universal has been studied by several investigators. Still, there are certain questions about moral judgment that need to be understood.

Based on the foregoing reviews and analyses, this study explored the relationship between the stages of moral development and certain selected variables in order to determine if subjects from non-Western societies who appear to have ideal role-taking opportunities follow the theoretically hypothesized patterns.

The next chapter will describe the design of the study, giving the sample techniques, sample size, instrumentation, measures, and an overview of the data analysis.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The procedures used in the design of this study include an identification and description of the population and sampling techniques, discussion of the instruments and measures used, validity and reliability of the instruments, a description of the preparation for and collection of the data, and an explanation of the methods of data analysis.

Sampling Techniques

The central purpose of the study is to explore the nature of principled moral reasoning of selected groups of adults who come from Western and non-Western societies and to determine if these two selected groups differ significantly regarding principled moral reasoning.

Subjects

A potential pool of 100 subjects was drawn from two groups: 50 from an African group and 50 from United States of America group. The African sample consisted of Black students from Africa south of Sahara who were enrolled at Michigan State University during spring and summer terms, 1988. The designation of African was based on background data which were obtained from records at the Office of

International Students and Foreign Scholars, East Lansing. There were over 100 students from Black Africa attending Michigan State University during the spring and summer terms of 1989. The choice of the African subjects was also based on the fact that Black African students in overseas settings represent a cross-section of Africans on selected variables. They come overseas (to the United States) with unusual backgrounds and often experience the pangs of moral dilemmas which attend their sojourn (Armer, 1970).

In order to minimize the potential effects of cultural diversity among Black African students, only students from the following countries were requested to participate in the study: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. These countries share a relatively common cultural background. The geographical boundaries of these countries are so arbitrarily drawn that they alone do not permit accurate location of ethnic compositions. For instance, the Somali people are found in in three countries: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Moreover, these countries share in common certain social and economic heritage. They share the use of English language as a medium of instruction in higher institutions of learning. They also share the aftermath of European colonialism and the challenges of national rebuilding within a framework of rich pluralistic ethnic cultures and diverse social

institutions.

The second sample was selected from a membership list of White Americans who belong to a religious organization in Lansing, Michigan. Fifty such individuals were identified from two of the adult Sunday school classes of an evangelical church in Lansing. As one of the oldest established religious institutions in Lansing, the church is celebrating one hundred years of existence in 1989 and it has a membership of over 2,000 people.

The designation of American was based on a person's legal residence in the U.S.A. or citizenship by birth. The choice of the church members was based on the fact that the African sample is presumed to be religious (Daka, 1986; Okafo, 1986; Jahoda, 1970). Thus, a comparable sample having a strong religious affiliations was selected.

Instruments and Measures

Subjects were self-administered the Defining Issues Test, and they were requested to complete the Personal Inventory Form.

Defining Issues Test (DIT): The DIT (Appendix C) is an instrument which Rest (1975) developed to measure the moral judgment level for subjects above 9th grade and above 15 years of age. The test areas of the instrument are identified as moral cognitive stages which are identical to Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of cognitive moral development.

The type of items used include multiple choices of moral reasons in support of moral judgments which an individual appeals to in solving dilemma stories. The source of the items were drawn from a review of the literature and Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Test.

Administration

The administration and timing of the DIT require approximately 60 minutes, especially in a classroom setting. About 50 minutes are required for testing and about 10 minutes for administration. No specific administrator's qualifications are explicitly stated in the manual although the DIT's author requires investigators to secure approval from him before using the test. The DIT has been given to subjects to take home and complete without monitoring. The instrument is not designed to be used in a timed fashion.

Subjects are instructed to read six moral dilemmas and then asked to respond to 12 statements each tapping one of Kohlberg's stages. For each of the six dilemmas, a subject selects the four best statements and ranks them in order of preference. A person's score is the percentage of responses which have been keyed to stages which an individual ranks highly (Stages 5 and 6 -- principled moral reasoning) (Rest, 1979).

For instance, a delimma often used in the DIT is that of a husband, Heinz, who must choose whether to steal a

drug to save his dying spouse when other possible alternatives to secure the rare drug failed. If a person's consideration is whether "it is natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife," then that person's reasoning is coded Stage Three because a Stage Three person makes moral judgments on the basis of maintaining good relations. A person at Stages 5 and 6 makes moral judgments based on "what values are going to be the basis of governing how people act towards each other" (Rest, 1986, p. 187).

Scoring

The DIT can be scored by hand by following the directions given in the manual (Rest, 1986), by using the computer scoring service available at the University of Minnesota, or by using the computer prorams provided in the manual. To score by hand, a minimum of high school education is needed whereas computer programs require some statistical proficiency. About six to ten minutes per test are needed to complete hand scoring. There is no subjective scoring since all the items are objectively scored. The scores can be transformed into derived scores such as percentiles.

Each of the respondents' four rankings at the end of each dilemma story are matched with the stages which the items exemplify. For example, in the Heinz story, item 4

is an "M" item; item 6 is a Stage 4 item; and item 10 is a Stage 5 item. After finding the stage for each ranked item, the item ranked as first importance in each story is assigned 4 points, the item ranked second, 3 points; the item ranked third, 2 points; and the item ranked fourth, 1 point. For each 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ranked item in the 6 stories, an appropriate weight is entered in the stage column on each subject's data sheet. If the first choice was item 6, a Stage 4 item, in the example of Heinz story which is mentioned above, then a weight of 4 points is entered under Stage 4. If the second choice was item 10, a Stage 5 item, then a weight of 3 points would be entered under Stage 5, and so on.

Thus, each completed data sheet will have 4 entries for every story and 24 entries altogether. Each story can have more than one item at the same stage. All the points under each stage are then summed. Each dilemma story has four ranks with 10 points to distribute among the stages.

Next, the points are summed across the six stories for each stage. To obtain the raw principled morality score (P), all the points from Stage 5 and 6 are added and converted to percentages by dividing the raw scores by .6. The P percent ranges from 0 to 95 instead of 100 because on 3 stories there is no fourth principled item in the multiple choices.

The test uses two indices: P index and M index (Rest,

1979). The P score refers to the relative importance a subject gives to principled moral thinking represented by Stages 5 and 6. The M score refers to meaningless items in the test intended to tap a subject's tendency to respond to statements which are irrelevant. If a subject's raw M score is 8 or higher, the entire protocol of that subject is discarded. Overall, the P index has 2.0 standard error of measurement (Rest, 1986).

A consistency checking system is also built into the scoring. An indicator of the usability of a subject's questionnaire is the consistency between a subject's ratings and rankings of an item, or a careful discrimination of the ratings. For example, a subject's 1st ranked choice must be consistent with the highest rated item. In other words, it is not permissible to have an item rated higher than the top ranked choice. Thus, a subject's response to the DIT may not be usable if it has more than eight inconsistencies, more than two stories with any inconsistencies, or more than nine items rated the same.

Based on the analysis of data from 1,080 subjects, Rest recommends the following cut off points on the P%.

Low	0 - 27
Middle	28 - 41
High	42 +

DIT and Kohlberg's Interview Scale

Although based on Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral judgment and characterization of the stages, the DIT differs from Kohlberg's assessement of moral stages in several ways. Kohlberg's clinical interview requires the subjects to solve a problem, whereas the DIT asks the subjects to evaluate various considerations supplied to them. The task for the subjects responding to the DIT is one of recognition rather than one of production of solutions. In Kohlberg's interview a trained judge classifies the subject's responses according to the prototypical statements contained in the scoring manuals. In the DIT method, the subjects classify their own responses. The object of Kohlberg's interview analysis is to assign stages to the subjects. In Rest's DIT the objective of the analysis of data is to locate a subject's principled moral reasoning based on a continuous number which is indicative of the developmental continuum (Rest, 1979, 1986).

In addition, the assumptions underlying the DIT differ from those of Kohlberg's interview strategy in a significant way. As a psychological construct, stage typing of people is inappropriate according to DIT. The DIT taps the basic conceptual frameworks from which a subject analyzes a social moral problem and evaluates a moral course of action in a dilemma. It does not evaluate

the moral worth of a person. Moral problems are about making decisions concerning conflicting claims of peoples' welfare.

Norms

There are several types of norms which can be obtained for junior high, senior high, college, college graduates, and adults. These norms were derived from 5,714 people who were sampled using a combination of techniques such as convenience and random sampling. Rest (1986) claims that the DIT eliminates gender bias since it is objectively scored. However, he suggests that the DIT, as a standardized test, is not suitable for minorities or people whose English is their second language.

Validity and Reliability

The DIT has been used by researchers with over 5,000 subjects. The Test-retest reliability is .81, while its internal consistency reliability is .77. Construct validity of the instrument has been demonstrated by several longitudinal studies (Rest et al., 1974; Rest, 1975; Martin et al., 1977; Page and Bode, 1978) by its convergent validity and by its correlation with several theoretically predicted variables. For instance, Sheehan et al. (1980) found a strong correlation (r = .78) between the DIT and Kohlberg's moral judgment interview instrument. While concurrent validity has been determined by criterion

groups, such as comparing ninth graders' scores with the scores of doctoral students in moral philosophy and political science, content validity was based on an analysis of moral philosophy and psychological concepts. According to Rest (1975), the DIT is sensitive to cross-cultural experiences and has low correlation with socioeconomic class and gender (Rest, 1979). Thus, DIT seems to measure a person's actual moral structure.

PERSONAL INVENTORY FORM: a form containing questions designed to elicit demographic information and other data which have been identified to be essential for the study. Ascribed characteristics were measured by the respondents' age (in group range) by their native land (Africa, U.S.A.), and by gender (male, female). Socioeconomic status was measured by education (degree attained), and local upbringing (urban, rural). Marital status was measured by six categories: single; widowed; divorced; or married without any children; married with children under 18 residing with parents; and married with children not residing with parents. Labor force participation was measured by the respondent's current or previous employment: working full-time, working part-time, unemployed, home duties, retired. Educational experience was measured by the respondent's major at undergraduate, masters, or doctoral levels for those who were enrolled and for those who had already attained their highest

academic achievement. (See Appendix D for the variables which are contained in the questionnaire).

Preparation for and Collection of the Data

After receiving approval from the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects to conduct the study, the investigator set up appointments with members of a consultative group.

The consultative group consisted of three people who were judged to be specialists in the broad fields related to the research problem. One faculty member who teaches moral philosophy at Michigan State University, one African student who was majoring in moral philosophy, and an American theologian formed the consultative group.

The purpose of this group was to provide the investigator with useful feedback on the constructs which were intended to be measured, and how to evaluate appropriately the effectiveness of the research design which was chosen for the study.

Based on the suggestions from this group, the research design was modified slightly and resubmitted to the advisory committee for the final approval. The correspondences about seeking approval or permission from respective organizations and individuals to conduct research are included in Appendix E.

Pilot Testing

Six people with similar characteristics as the target population were asked to participate in a pilot study to determine if the respondents would clearly comprehend the task and had the appropriate test-taking set. Africans were identified from the list of members of the African Student's Union. The Americans were identified by an attendance record of one of the church organizations in the East Lansing area.

After responding to the questionnaires, these same six individuals were asked to explain if they understood the instructions and whether there were any particular content or format sections that they felt were confusing. The time it took the subjects to respond to the questionnaires was noted and used to evaluate any appropriate changes before administering the instruments.

Procedures

Approval requests were submitted to all relevant channels for clearance before commencing this study. At the end of the month of May, 1989, the subjects were mailed a transmittal letter, the Defining Issues Test, Personal Inventory Form, and a stamped pre-addressed return envelope. The letter explained the purpose of the study, and asked them to participate voluntarily by responding to the questions which took approximately one hour to complete. The letter assured the respondents concerning confidentiality and anonymity of reporting

results. Personal information data were obtained along with the information on the Defining Issues Test. Each subject was requested to give his or her own personal, candid answers to the questions and to return the questionnaires as soon as possible using the stamped and pre-addressed return envelopes.

Confidentiality

Specifically, the subjects were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they would indicate their consent to participate by completing and returning the questionnaires. Certain measures were taken to ensure that the respondents' names and addresses would in no way be identified in the results of the study nor the information they supplied be stored in any way which could reveal their identities. For instance, the subjects were instructed not to write their names or addresses anywhere on the questionnaires. However, each questionnaire was assigned an identifying number. The DIT and the Personal Inventory Form were each assigned an identical number before mailing to the respondents.

Analysis of the Data

The data were coded into a computer language program at a computer lab located at Berkey Hall, Michigan State University. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyze the responses

reported on the questionnaire. Also, descriptive statistics (frequencies, means, and standard deviation) and Chi-square tests were used to compare observed and expected or theoretical frequencies in a contigency table. Chi-square can be used only with frequency data (Isaac & Michael, 1982). The level of significance was set at .05 for both nominal, ordinal, and interval data. This technique is used to test whether significant relationships exist among the hypothesized variables (the DIT, and selected demographics).

To aggregate and describe categorical or continous data, means, standard deviations, variances, and percentages will be presented in a tabular (frequency distribution) form for all appropriate variables (gender, country, number of years of schooling, type of community, DIT scores).

To interpret the data more meaningfully, some variables will be re-classified according to the following rationale. The number of years of schooling of the subjects will be sub-divided into broad categories: 1) 0 to 17 years, and 2) over 17 years. The rationale for these divisions is based on the assumption that on the average approximately 17 years of uninterrupted schooling is needed to earn an undergraduate degree.

The level of formal education will be broken into two main categories: 1) Below College, 2) Above College.

The rationale for this division is based on the assumption that those who have earned a master's or a doctoral degree are more likely to perform cognitive tasks which are more sophisticated than the tasks required at the undergraduate level (Piaget, 1967; Perry, 1968; Edwards, 1978).

The type of community in which the respondents spent their first 12-15 years were categorized into farm, town, suburb, and city. The literature on modernity and cognitive research suggest that the degree of social complexity is more likely to occur in the urban environment and in the cities than in the peasant communities (Harkness et al., 1981; Inkeles, 1983).

Age was sub-divided into three categories: 1) 20-29 years; 2) 30-39; and 3) 40 plus. These divisions were based on life structures and developmental tasks which have been found to correlate with chronological age (Gould, 1978; Levinson, 1978; Sheehy, 1974; Havighurst, 1972).

The P index score was categorized into the following cut off points as suggested by Rest (1986). Zero to 27 is Low; 28 to 41 is Middle; and over 41 is High.

For the interval scaled variables (number of years in schooling) an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the differences between group means on DIT scores and those variables that are categorical (level of formal education, gender, type of community). In

addition, Chi-square Goodness- of- fit was performed to determine whether there is a significant difference between some theoretical or expected frequencies and the observed frequencies in two or more categories.

Chi-square has certain restrictions which should be noted. It assumes that the individual events or measures are independent of each other and that the data are categorized according to some logical or empirical basis. To obtain strong statistical significance tests, each theoretical frequency must not be less than 5 and it assumes that the sum of observed frequencies and the sum of expected frequencies are identical (Isaac & Micheal, 1980). However, in some special cases, less than 5 frequencies in a cell is acceptable (Hays, 1963, p. 597).

Findings

The findings of this study will be presented in three sections: a description of the subjects' demographic characteristics, a description of the results of the DIT and an analysis of statistical tests to determine the rejection or confirmation of the hypotheses relative to the stated purpose of the study.

Summary

This chapter outlined the design of the study by describing the sampling techniques, the nature of the sample, instruments and measures used, information on

validity and reliability of the questionnaires, pilot testing, procedures for collection of the data, and suggested methods of data analysis.

The next chapter will present the results of the data analysis using the outlined statistical techniques as presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

This chapter explains the data analyses which follow the research design outlined in Chapter III. First, a broad description of the subjects' demographic characteristics will be presented and will be followed by a comparison of African and American subjects on these same characteristics. Third, the subjects' moral judgment scores as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT) will be presented along with contrasts between the groups of subjects on these scores. Lastly, the results of the statistical tests which were performed to determine if the null hypotheses could be rejected will be presented with relevant interpretation of each analysis.

Characteristics of the Sample

In order to facilitate reading and better understanding of the data, the demographic characteristics of the sample will be grouped according to these naturally occuring themes: ascribed and environmental variables (gender, marital status, age, employment, culture or place of origin, type of community of upbringing); educational

variables (highest level of formal education, field of study, parochial school attendance, years of schooling); and religiousity (church attendance, church membership).

Analysis of Question 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Selected Groups.

The items dealing with ascribed and environmental variables are presented in Table 1. Men constitute 64.9% (N=37) of the entire population while women constitute only 35.1% (N=20). In contrast to 26.3% (N=15) of those who have never married from both genders, those who are married make up 73.7% (N=42). A majority are between 30 and 39 years (75.4% or N=43) of age. However, on the current status of employment, there is almost an equal number of subjects on study leave as there are those who work full-time. For the two groups combined, a slightly larger group (38.6% or N=22) was raised on the farm. The others are divided almost evenly between town (24.4% or N=14) and city (29.8% or 17). The last group makes up only 7% (N=4) and consists of those who were brought up in a suburb.

TABLE 1. ASCRIBED AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

VARIABLE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
GENDER		
FEMALE	20	35.1
MALE	37	64.9
TOTAL	57	100.0
AGE		
GROUP 1 (20-29 YEARS)	10	17.5
GROUP 2 (30-39 YEARS)	43	75.4
GROUP 3 (40 + YEARS)	3	5.3
MISSING	1	1.8
TOTAL	57	100.0
TYPE OF COMMUNITY		
FARM	22	38.6
TOWN	14	24.6
CITY	17	29.8
SUBURB	4	7.0
TOTAL	57	100.0
MARITAL STATUS		
NEVER MARRIED	15	26.3
MARRIED	42	73.7
TOTAL	57	100.0
MARRIED		
WITH CHILDREN NOT AT HOME	3	5.3
WITH CHILDREN	8	14.0
WITH CHILDREN AT HOME	27	47.4
MISSING	19	33.3
TOTAL	57	100.0

(Table 1 continued)

VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCTENT.
EMPLOYMENT STATUS		
UNEMPLOYED	1	1.8
HOUSE KEEPING	6	10.5
WORKING PART-TIME	13	22.8
WORKING FULL-TIME	18	31.6
STUDY LEAVE	19	33.3
TOTAL	57	100.0

In educational background, most subjects have earned an undergraduate and/or a master's degree. Table 2 shows that 31.6% (N=18) have a master's degree, and 36.8% (N=21) have only an undergraduate degree. However, when the total number of years of schooling is broken into two broad categories, those subjects with under 17 years of schooling constitute 50.9% (N=29), while those subjects with above 17 years of schooling make up 49.1% (N=28). The most often reported major fields of study are agriculture (26.3% or N=15), social sciences (17.5% or N=10), business and management (15.8% or N=9), and education (10.5% or N=6). A majority of the subjects did not receive their formal education in parochial schools; however, a few of them indicated that they received part of their elementary, secondary, or college education in parochial school.

TABLE 2: EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE POPULATION

VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.
LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION		
HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA	7	12.3
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL	3	5.3
UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE	21	36.8
MASTER'S DEGREE	18	31.6
DOCTORAL DEGREE	5	8.8
OTHERS	3	5.3
TOTAL	57	100.0
YEARS OF SCHOOLING		
AVERAGE (0-17 YEARS)	29	50.9
ABOVE AVERAGE (OVER 17 YEARS)	28	49.1
TOTAL	57	100.0
LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION		
BELOW COLLEGE	10	17.5
ABOVE COLLEGE	47	82.5
TOTAL	57	100.0
FIELD OF STUDY		
HUMANITIES	1	1.8
OTHER	1	1.8
HEALTH PROFESSIONS	3	5.3
NATURAL AND LIFE SCIENCES	3	5.3
ENGINEERING	5	8.8
EDUCATION	6	10.5
BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT	9	15.8
SOCIAL SCIENCES	10	17.5
AGRICULTURE	15	26.3
MISSING	4	7.0
TOTAL	57	100.0

(Table 2 continued)

VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN A PAROCHIAL SCHHOL		
ALL IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	4	3.5
PART IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	8	10.5
NONE IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	45	86.0
TOTAL	57	100.0
HIGH SCHOOL IN A PAROCHIAL SCHOOL		
ALL IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	2	3.5
PART IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	6	10.5
NONE IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	49	86.0
TOTAL	57	100.0
COLLEGE EDUCATION IN A PAROCHIAL SCHOOL		
ALL IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	4	7.0
PART IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	8	14.0
NONE IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	45	78.9
TOTAL	57	100.0

Concerning religiousity, an overwhelming majority (73.7% or N=42) of subjects are members of a congregation in contrast to only 21.1% (N=12) who are not. However, the length of time in church membership of these subjects varies. Table 3 shows that if the subjects who claim church membership of three or more than three years are combined, then more than 59% (N=34) of the entire population belongs to a congregation. The table also shows that 43.9% (N=25) attend church every week, while

an additional 24.6% (N=14) attend nearly every week.

TABLE 3: RELIGIOSITY OF THE POPULATION

VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.
MEMBERSHIP OF A CONGREGATION		
NO	12	21.1
YES	42	73.7
MISSING	3	5.3
TOTAL	57	100.0
YEARS OF CHURCH MEMBERSHIP		
LESS THAN ONE YEAR	4	7.0
ONE TO TWO YEARS	3	5.3
THREE TO FIVE YEARS	7	12.3
SIX TO TEN YEARS	5	8.8
MORE THAN TEN YEARS	16	28.1
ALWAYS A MEMBER	6	10.5
MISSING	16	28.1
TOTAL	57	100.0
CHURCH ATTENDANCE		
ABOUT ONCE OR TWICE A WEEK	5	8.8
EVERY WEEK	25	43.9
NEARLY EVERY WEEK	14	24.6
ABOUT ONCE A MONTH	2	3.5
ABOUT TWICE A MONTH	4	7.0
ABOUT EVERY 3 MONTHS	1	1.8
NEVER	3	5.3
MISSING	3	5.3
TOTAL	57	100.0

Analysis of Question 2: Demographic Differences Between the Selected Groups.

Except in a few areas, African subjects do not differ very much demographically from the American subjects. Table 4 shows a comparison of demographic characteristics of African and American subjects by ascribed and environmental variables. While males constitute 83.87% (N=26) of the African subjects, only 42.31% (N=11) of the American subjects are males. The Americans are more nearly divided equally between females (N=15) and males (N=11). More American subjects (80.8% or N=21) are between 30 and 39 years of age in contrast to 71.0.3% (N=22) of Africans.

More Americans are married (92.3% or N=24) compared to 58.1% (N=18) of Africans. As might be expected, more Africans (58.1% or N=18) are on a study leave while more Americans are employed full-time (61.5% or N=16). The majority of Africans were raised on the farm (45.2% or N=14) while the remaining Africans were brought up in towns (25.8% or N=8) and cities (29.0% or N=9). Unlike the Africans, the Americans fall into three main types of communities. There is an equal number of those who were brought up in the city (30.8% or N=8) or on the farm (30.8% or N=8) while the third largest group grew up in towns (23.1% or N=6).

Table 4. ASCRIBED AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO SAMPLES OF SUBJECTS

	PLACE OF ORIGIN			
	AFRICA		USA	
VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.	FREQ.	PERCENT.
GENDER				
MALE	26	83.87	11	42.31
FEMALE	5	16.13	15	57.69
TOTAL =	31	100.00	26	100.00
AGE				
20-29 YEARS	7	26.6	3	11.5
30-39 YEARS	22	71.0	21	80.8
40 + YEARS	1	3.2	2	7.7
MISSING	1	3.2		
TOTAL =	30	100.0	26	100.0
TYPE OF COMMUNITY				
FARM	14	45.2	8	30.8
TOWN	8	25.8	6	23.1
SUBURB	--	----	4	15.4
CITY	9	29.0	8	30.8
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0
MARITAL STATUS				
NEVER MARRIED	13	41.90	2	7.7
MARRIED	18	58.10	24	92.3
TOTAL =	31	100.00	26	100.0

(Table 4 continued)

	PLACE OF ORIGIN			
	AFRICA		USA	
VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT	FREQ.	PERCENT
STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT				
UNEMPLOYED	1	3.2	--	----
WORKING PART-TIME	10	32.3	3	11.5
WORKING FULL-TIME	2	6.5	16	61.5
HOME MAKING	--	----	6	23.1
STUDY LEAVE	18	58.1	1	3.8
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0

Concerning educational background, more than half of the African subjects have academic achievement beyond the baccalaureate degree. Table 5 shows that 48.4% (N=15) Africans have a master's degree while 12.9% (N=4) have doctoral degrees. More Americans have undergraduate degrees (46.2% or N=12) and a few have master's degrees (11.5% or N=3). Among the Americans, the subjects with over 17 years of schooling make up 80.8% (N=21) in contrast to 74.2% (N=23) of the Africans.

In both groups of subjects, an overwhelming majority did not receive their formal education in parochial schools. However, 19.2% (N=5) Americans had part of their college education in parochial schools in contrast to only 9.7% (N=3) of Africans. Only 19.6% (N=6) of Africans had part of their elementary education in parochial schools

in conrast to 7.7% (N=2) of Americans. More Africans (45.0% or N=14) claim that agriculture is their major while Americans claim business and management (30.8% or N=8).

TABLE 5. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE TWO SAMPLES OF SUBJECTS

	PLACE OF ORIGIN			
	AFRICA		USA	
VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.	FREQ.	PERCENT.
LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION				
HIGH SCHOOL DIPL.	3	9.7	4	15.4
VOCATIONAL SCH.	-	---	3	11.5
UNDERGRAD. DEGREE	9	29.0	12	46.2
MASTER'S DEGREE	15	48.4	3	11.5
DOCTORAL DEGREE	4	12.9	1	3.8
OTHERS	--	----	3	11.5
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0

(Table 5 continued)

VARIABLE	PLACE OF ORIGIN: AFRICA FREQ.	AFRICA PERCENT.	USA FREQ.	USA PERCENT.
LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION AFTER CLASSIFICTION				
BELOW COLLEGE	3	9.7	7	26.9
ABOVE COLLEGE	28	90.3	19	73.1
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0
YEARS OF SCHOOLING				
AVERAGE (0-17 YRS.)	8	25.8	5	19.2
ABOVE AVERAGE (OVER 17 YRS.)	23	74.2	21	80.8
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0
FIELD OF STUDY				
AGRICULTURE	14	45.20	1	3.8
BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT	1	3.2	8	30.8
EDUCATION	4	12.9	2	7.7
ENGINEERING	2	6.5	3	11.5
HEALTH PROFESS.	--	--	3	11.5
HUMANITIES	1	3.2	--	----
NATURAL AND LIFE SCIENCES	2	6.5	1	3.8
SOCIAL SCIENCES	7	22.6	13	11.5
OTHER	--	----	1	3.8
MISSING	--	----	4	15.4
TOTAL =	31	100.0	16	100.0

(Table 5 continued)

	PLACE OF ORIGIN			
	AFRICA		USA	
VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.	FREQ.	PERCENT.
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION				
ALL IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	4	6.5	1	3.8
PART IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	5	16.1	--	----
NONE IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	24	77.4	25	96.2
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0
HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION				
ALL IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	2	6.5	1	3.8
PART IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	5	16.1	--	----
NONE IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	24	77.4	25	96.2
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0
COLLEGE EDUCATION				
ALL IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	3	9.7	1	3.8
PART IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	3	9.7	5	19.2
NONE IN PAROCHIAL SCHOOL	25	80.6	20	76.9
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0

As shown in Table 6, American subjects differ from African subjects slightly on religiosity. Although 73.7%

(N=42) (Table 3) of the entire population of subjects claim membership in a congregation, more Americans (84.6% or N=22) belong to a congregation in contrast to 64.5% (N=20) of Africans. Forty two and three tenths percent (N=11) of American subjects have more than ten years of congregation membership compared to 16.1% (N=5) with the same number of years of congregation membership for the Africans. More American subjects (61.5%, N=16) attend church every week compared to African (29.0%, N=9) subjects.

TABLE 6. RELIGIOSITY OF THE TWO SAMPLES OF SUBJECTS

	PLACE OF ORIGIN			
	AFRICA		USA	
VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.	FREQ.	PERCENT.
MEMBERSHIP OF A CONGREGATION				
YES	20	64.5	22	84.6
NO	9	29.0	3	11.5
MISSING	2	6.5	1	3.8
TOTAL =	31	100.0	16	100.0

(Table 6 continued)

	PLACE OF ORIGIN			
	AFRICA		USA	
VARIABLE	FREQ.	PERCENT.	FREQ.	PERCENT.
YEARS OF CHURCH MEMBERSHIP				
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	3	9.7	1	3.8
ONE TO 2 YEARS	1	3.2	2	7.7
THREE TO 5 YEARS	5	16.1	2	7.7
SIX TO 10 YEARS	-	-----	5	19.2
MORE THAN 10 YRS.	5	16.1	11	42.3
ALWAYS A MEMBER	6	19.4	--	----
MISSING	11	35.5	5	19.2
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0
CHURCH ATTENDANCE				
EVERY WEEK	9	29.0	16	61.5
NEARLY WEEKLY	6	19.4	8	30.8
TWICE A MONTH	4	12.9	--	----
ONCE A MONTH	2	6.5	--	-----
EVERY 3 MONTHS	1	3.2	--	----
ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR	4	12.9	1	3.8
NEVER	3	9.7	--	----
MISSING	2	6.5	1	3.8
TOTAL =	31	100.0	26	100.0

Analysis of Question 3: Principled Moral Reasoning Scores of the Selected Groups

The third main area of the data analysis concerns the results and comparisons of subjects' score on the DIT. Table 7 shows the mean and the standard deviation of moral judgment scores of the two sample groups. Although

African subjects have a higher mean P scores, Americans have more consensus than Africans as evidenced by the standard deviation results for both samples. The standard deviation for Black Africans is 14.17 while that of White Americans is 9.67.

TABLE 7. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

PLACE OF ORIGIN	FREQ.	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
1. AFRICA	31	36.613	14.172
2. USA	26	34.295	10.287
3. ENTIRE POP.	57	35.556	12.498

Analysis of Question 4: Differences in Principled Moral Reasoning Scores by Selected Independent Variables

Question 4 is divided into six sub questions. Data relative to these questions are presented separately in Tables 8 to 13.

Table 8 shows the percentage of P score by gender. African males and females had higher mean P score compared to that of Americans. However, the standard deviation for both African males and females was higher than that of the Americans.

TABLE 8. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND GENDER

VARIABLE	F	MEAN	STD. DEV.
AFRICA			
GENDER			
MALE	26	37.613	13.453
FEMALE	5	33.998	19.101
USA			
GENDER			
MALE	11	36.818	11.018
FEMALE	15	32.445	9.675

TOTAL CASES = 57.

Among Africans, the subjects majoring in engineering have the highest mean P score (51.67) on the Defining Issues Test. As seen in Table 9, the next highest African mean P score of 45.42 was obtained by those who are majoring in education. Among the American subjects those in health professions have the highest mean P score of 40, although one person obtained a score of 51.67. In two fields of study, business and management (35.83% or N=8) and social sciences (35.56 or N=3), the scores of American subjects are almost identical.

TABLE 9. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND EDUCATION MAJOR

VARIABLE	F	MEAN	STD. DEV.
AFRICA			
FIELD OF STUDY			
AGRICULTURE	14	30.357	12.441
BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT	1	33.330	.000
EDUCATION	4	45.418	14.618
ENGINEERING	2	51.670	21.213
HUMANITIES	1	28.330	.000
NATURAL AND LIFE SCIENCE	2	39.170	10.607
SOCIAL SCIENCES	7	40.714	14.652
USA			
FIELD OF STUDY			
AGRICULTURE	1	28.330	.000
BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT	8	35.834	11.683
EDUCATION	2	27.500	5.897
ENGINEERING	3	34.443	5.855
HEALTH PROFESSIONS	3	40.000	10.141
NATURAL AND LIFE SCIENCE	1	51.670	.000
SOCIAL SCIENCES	3	35.557	8.386
OTHER	1	28.330	.000
MISSING CASES	4		

TOTAL CASES = 57.

Subjects were grouped into three age categories: 1) 20-29 years; 2) 30-39 years; and 3) 40 + years (Table 10). The rationale for these categories is based on the developmental tasks and chronological age of the subjects. The two sample groups differ on the category in which the subjects had the highest mean P score. Among

the Africans the subjects in the first category (20-29 years) had the highest mean P score (P =41.91). For the American counterpart, the subjects in the second category (30-39 years) had the highest mean P score of 34.84. Africans, however, had less variation on their scores than the Americans.

TABLE 10. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND AGE

VARIABLE	F	MEAN	STD. DEV.
AFRICA			
AGE			
GROUP 1 (20-29 YRS.)	7	41.906	13.488
GROUP 2 (30-39 YRS.)	22	36.667	13.618
GROUP 3 (40 + YRS.)	1	10.000	.000
USA			
AGE			
GROUP 1 (20-29 YRS.)	3	32.220	21.106
GROUP 2 (30-39 YRS.)	21	34.842	8.896
GROUP 3 (40 + YRS.)	2	31.665	11.788
MISSING CASES	1		
TOTAL CASES = 57.			

Attainment of formal education was classified into two broad categories: 1) Below college (Undergraduate); and 2) Above college (Table 11). In the first category, Africans had a higher mean P score than that of the Americans. However, Africans with education above college received a

mean P score of 35.66 to Americans' 35.79.

TABLE 11. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION

VARIABLE	F	MEAN	STD. DEV.
AFRICA			
BELOW COLLEGE	3	45.557	18.361
ABOVE COLLEGE	28	35.655	13.724
AMERICA			
BELOW COLLEGE	7	30.239	10.473
ABOVE COLLEGE	19	35.790	10.083

TOTAL CASES = 57.

The number of years of schooling of the subjects was divided into two broad categories: 1) 0 to 17 years, and 2) over 17 years (Table 12). The rationale for these divisions was based on the assumption that average number of years of uninterrupted schooling required for a normal student to obtain a high school diploma and an undergraduate degree is 17. It was assumed that over 17 years of schooling would be characterized as above undergraduate or college education.

Table 12 shows that in both samples of African and American subjects, those who had 17 or less years of schooling had a higher mean P score. For instance, among the African sample, the highest mean score is 40.63 while

that of the American sample is 35.08. However, the standard deviation difference between below and above average categories for the African sample is smaller (1.22) compared to that of the American sample (4.45).

TABLE 12. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING

VARIABLE	F	MEAN	STD. DEV.
AFRICA			
AVERAGE (0-17 YRS.)	8	40.626	13.273
ABOVE AVERAGE (OVER 17 YRS.)	23	35.217	14.489
USA			
AVERAGE (0-17 YRS.)	21	35.080	10.974
ABOVE AVERAGE (OVER 17 YRS.)	5	30.998	6.521
TOTAL CASES = 57.			

In addition, the size of the community in which the subjects were brought up was classified into four categories: 1) farm; 2) town; 3) suburb; and 4) city (Table 13). Africans who grew up in the farm scored higher (39.17) than Americans (36.25) who grew up in a similar environment. But among those who grew up in town, the scores are almost identical for both samples of subjects. However, for the USA subjects, those who were raised in the suburb had higher mean P score (38.75) than those who were raised either in the farm or in the city. The concentration

of subjects is nearly evenly distributed among the farm (N=8), town (N=6), and city (8).

TABLE 13. PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND TYPE OF PLACE OF UPBRINGING

VARIABLE	F	MEAN	STD. DEV.
AFRICA			
FARM	14	39.166	14.555
TOWN	8	33.544	14.376
CITY	9	35.370	14.334
USA			
FARM	8	36.249	6.221
TOWN	6	33.612	9.155
CITY	8	30.626	11.196
SUBURB	4	38.750	16.910

TOTAL CASES = 57.

Hypothesized Findings

Analysis of Hypothesis 1

Null Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no significant difference between White Americans and Black African subjects regarding principled moral reasoning scores (DIT). This hypothesis was analyzed using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way Analysis of Variance. The significance level was set at .05. The results of ANOVA are shown in Table 14. Observed significance level resulting from ANOVA is .4904. Since the observed

significance level is greater than the theoretical alpha level .05, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

TABLE 14. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Source	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F Ratio	F Prob.
Between Groups	1	75.993	75.993	.4820	.4904
Within Groups	55	8670.678	157.649		
TOTAL	56	8746.671			

Analysis of Hypothesis 2

Null Hypothesis 2 states that there will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores (DIT) between Black African subjects and White American subjects by gender. This hypothesis was analyzed using Chi-square Goodness-of-Fit with significant alpha level set at .05. Table 15 shows the analysis of responses to DIT and Chi-square test results.

Observed significant level resulting from Chi-square after controlling for males is .3550 and .8371 after controlling for females. Since the observed significance levels are greater than the theoretical alpha level .05, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

TABLE 15. RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND GENDER

A. MALE

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	9(7.7) 34.6%	2 (3.2) 18.2%
MIDDLE	6(7.7) 23.1%	5 (3.3) 45.5%
HIGH	11(10.5) 42.3%	4 (4.5) 36.3%
COLUMN TOTAL =	26 100.0%	11 100.0%

Chi-square = 2.0715; Degrees of freedom = 2.
Significance = .3550.

B. FEMALE

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	2 (1.5) 40.0%	4 (4.5) 26.7%
MIDDLE	2 (2.5) 40.0%	8 (7.5) 53.3%
HIGH	1 (1.0) 20.0%	3 (3.0) 20.0%
COLUMN TOTAL =	5 100.0%	15 100.0%

Chi-square = .3356; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .8371.

Analysis of Hypothesis 3

Null Hypothesis 3 states that there will be no significant difference in DIT scores between Black Africans and White Americans by the level of formal education. Chi-square was used to test this hypothesis with alpha level set at .05. The results of this test are presented in Table 16. Observed significance level resulting from the test after controlling for 'below college' category is .3858 and .0633 for 'above college' category. Since the observed significance level is greater than the theoretical alpha level, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

TABLE 16. RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION

A. BELOW COLLEGE

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	0 (.9) .0%	3 (2.1) 42.9%
MIDDLE	2 (1.5) 66.7%	3 (3.5) 42.9%
HIGH	1 (.6) 32.3%	1 (1.4) 14.2%
COLUMN TOTAL =	3 100.0%	7 100.0%

Chi-square = 1.9048; Degrees of freedom = 2
Significance = .3858.

(Table 16 continued)

B. ABOVE COLLEGE

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	11(8.3) 39.2%	3 (5.7) 15.8%
MIDDLE	6 (9.5) 21.4%	10 (9.5) 52.6%
HIGH	11 (10.1) 39.4%	6 (6.9) 31.6%
COLUMN TOTAL =	28 100.0%	19 100.0%

Chi-square = 5.5211; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .0633.

Analysis of Hypothesis 4

Null Hypothesis 4 states that there will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores between Black Africans and White Americans by the number of years of schooling. Chi-square was also used to test this hypothesis. Alpha level of signifigance was set at .05. The results of this test are presented in Table 17.

Observed siginificance level resulting from Chi-square after controlling for 'below average' is .7972 and .0168 for 'above average'. Since the observed significance level is greater than the theoretical alpha level after controlling for 'below average', the null hypothesis could not be rejected. However, for the 'above average' category, the observed significance level is below the

theoretical alpha level of .05. Consequently, the null hypothesis could be rejected under this condition.

TABLE 17. RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING

A: AVERAGE

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	1 (1.7) 12.5%	5 (4.3) 23.8%
MIDDLE	4 (3.6) 50.0%	9 (9.4) 42.9%
HIGH	3 ((2.8) 37.5%	7 (7.2) 33.3%
COLUMN TOTAL =	8 100.0%	21 100.0%

Chi-square = .4532; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .7972.

(Table 17 continued)

B: ABOVE AVERAGE

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	10 (9.0) 43.5%	1 (2.0) 20.0%
MIDDLE	4 (6.6) 17.4%	4 (1.4) 80.0%
HIGH	9 (7.4) 39.1%	0 (1.6) .0%
COLUMN TOTAL =	23 100.0%	5 100.0%

Chi-square = 8.1676; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .0168.

Analysis of Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 states that there will be no significant difference in principled moral reasoning scores between Black Americans and White Americans by the type of community in which the subjects were raised. Communities were classified into four categories; namely, farm, town, suburb, and city. Chi-square was also used to test the hypothesis with a theoretical alpha level set at .05. The results of this test are found in Table 18.

The observed significance levels resulting from the test after controlling for the categories are as follows: .0135 for the farm; .0998 for the town; and .7249 for the

city. The results for the suburb community are unusable since there were unacceptable cell frequencies to perform Chi-square test.

Except for the farm community, the observed significance level exceeds the theoretical alpha level of .05. Hence, the null hypothesis could not be rejected except in the case of the farm community category.

TABLE 18. RESULTS OF CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO PRINCIPLED MORAL REASONING BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND THE TYPE OF PLACE OF UPBRINGING

A: FARM

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	4 (2.5) 28.6%	0 (1.5) .0%
MIDDLE	2 (5.1) 14.1%	6 (2.9) 75.0%
HIGH	8 (6.4) 57.1%	2 (3.6) 25.0%
COLUMN TOTAL =	14 100.0%	8 100.0%

Chi-square = 8.6036; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .0135.

(Table 18 continued)

B: TOWN

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	5 (3.4) 62.5%	1 (2.6) 16.7%
MIDDLE	1 (2.9) 12.5%	4 (2.1) 66.7
HIGH	2 (1.7) 25.0%	1 (1.3) 16.7%
COLUMN TOTAL =	8 100.0%	6 100.0%

Chi-square = 4.6083; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .0998.

C: CITY

STAGE	AFRICA	USA
LOW	2 (2.6) 22.2%	3 (2.4) 37.5%
MIDDLE	5 (4.2) 55.6%	3 (3.8) 37.5%
HIGH	2 (2.1) 22.2%	2 (1.9) 25.0%
COLUMN TOTAL =	9 100.0%	8 100.0%

Chi-square = .6434; Degrees of freedom = 2;
Significance = .7249.

Summary

This chapter presented a description of the demographic characteristics and the scores from the Defining Issues Test of Black Africans and White Americans. It covered the nature of statistical techniques which were used and the results of specific tests. Except in two variables, the null hypotheses could not be rejected.

The next chapter draws conclusions from the study and makes some suggestions for further inquiry.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS

Introduction

This chapter contains a brief summary of the statement of the research problem, purpose, procedures, and findings. The findings are discussed and conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the data. This chapter also includes suggestions for further study.

Summary

According to some cognitive-developmentalists, moral judgement is presumed to be a function of differentiated but universal structures which an individual person acquires through assimilation and accommodation. These structures are also heirarchical, and qualitatively different from each other. Throughout their life-span and regardless of cultural background, adolescents and adults use these moral structures or stages in solving moral issues which confront them. Thus, a moral judgment is concerned with how people decide about a course of action to take which meets certain criteria. For an act to be moral, the welfare rights of individuals other than self must be involved. Choosing an alternative course of action

requires appealing to moral principles.

Essentially, principles of morality entail reasoning ability which is acquired vicariously through democratic processes and through personal interaction with the social environment. For instance, numerous studies have indicated that social role-taking opportunities and posing of moral dilemmas in discussion groups increase a person's moral maturity. Higher levels of formal education, the number of years of schooling, a cosmopolitan environment, and other variables have been reported to facilitate higher level of principled moral reasoning. These variables, however, are more characteristic of men and women in the Western societies. Moreover, several cross-sectional studies indicate that non-Westerners without adequate exposure to Western forms of education do not use principled moral reasoning as compared to people from Western societies.

Questions and Hypotheses

The purpose of the present inquiry was to explore the nature of moral reasoning of groups of adults who come from Western and non-Western societies and to determine if these groups of adults differ significantly regarding their moral reasoning levels. The study was intended to provide useful information concerning the theoretical adequacy and implications of cognitive developmental theory for understanding claims to universal validity of moral

structures. To accomplish these objectives, the following questions were used as guidelines.

1. What are the demographic characteristics of the selected groups of adults?

2. How do these selected groups of adults differ demographically?

3. What are the principled moral reasoning scores of the selected groups of adults?

4. How do these two selected groups of adults differ regarding their principled moral reasoning scores?

a) Do men and women differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores?

b) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to their educational majors?

c) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to age?

d) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to their level of formal education?

e) Do the selected groups of adults differ significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to their number of years of schooling?

f) Do the selected groups of adults differ

significantly in their principled moral reasoning scores with respect to the type of place of their upbringing?

In addition to the suggested question guidelines, the following null hypotheses were tested.

1. There is no significant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning.

2. There is no significant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by gender.

3. There is no significant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by the number of years of schooling.

4. There is no significant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by formal education.

5. There is no significant difference between White and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by the type of community in which the subjects grew up.

One hundred subjects from two groups of adults were selected purposively to participate in the present study. Fifty students from seven Eastern African countries were identified from records of students at the Office of International Students and Foreign Scholars on the campus of Michigan State University. The White American group consisted of members of various educational classes of a

church organization in Lansing. These two samples comprised the Black African group and the White American group respectively.

Two self-reported instruments were used to obtain data. The Defining Issues Test was used to measure the subjects' principled moral reasoning. A Personal Inventory Form was used to obtain the subjects' demographic characteristics. These two instruments were pilot tested before they were administered. At the end of spring term and at the beginning of summer of 1989, each subject was mailed a letter detailing the purpose of the study, giving assurances of confidentiality of the subjects' personal identifiers, and requesting the subjects to voluntarily participate in the study. The subjects also received the two questionnaires and stamped self-returned envelope. Seventy questionnaires were returned but only 57 were usable.

Descriptive statistics (percentage, mean, standard deviation) were used to analyze the demographic variables. To determine if there was a significant relationship between culture (Africa or America) and principled moral reasoning, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. To control for some of the categorical variables, Chi-square test was used. In both Chi-square and ANOVA, the alpha level of significance was set at .05. The results from

ANOVA and Chi-square indicate that the null hypotheses could not be rejected except in two cases.

Summary of Findings Relative to Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4

There were 31 subjects from Africa and 26 from United States of America. Men outnumbered women almost two to one. However, among the American subjects, there were slightly more women than men. More Africans have advanced degrees and are on a study-leave while most Americans have undergraduate degrees and are employed full time. The Americans, however, are older than the Africans and most of them are married with children at home. Agriculture is a predominant college major for the Africans as is business and management is for the Americans. On the overall score on the Defining Issues Test, Africans had a higher mean P% score than that of Americans, and the standard deviation was higher for the Africans than it was for the Americans.

Discussion

The low percentage of return of usable questionnaires is understandable. To respond successfully to the Defining Issues Test requires valuable time which some students and business people might not have been willing to give up. Only willing research participants responded to the questionnaires. The test requires a fairly high level amount of comprehension to analyze the issues involved in

the dilemma stories, and it is possible that some subjects had never grappled with the kind of tasks needed to respond to all the 72 items contained in the questionnaire. One respondent from Africa commented personally to this author about his experience. He stated that choosing the alternative courses of action to solve moral dilemmas was like taking a comprehensive exam.

The demographic characteristics of these two selected groups were not surprising for several reasons. The unequal number of subjects in each group was perhaps due in part to the sampling bias, size of the sample, and partly in part due to the voluntary nature of the study. It is possible that the timing of the study contributed to the response rate, especially because many students were busy preparing for the summer term or seeking summer term employment.

These explanations, however, may be relevant to the American subjects more than they are to Africans, because the latter group of subjects are residents of the University housing apartments. Furthermore, in earlier studies involving Africans subjects drawn from students who were attending Michigan State Unviersity, there have been more males than females (Okafor, 1986; Daka, 1986). Furthermore, in the studies conducted by Okafor (1986) and Daka (1986) a greater number of the respondents were

brought up in a rural community of less than 20,000 people. These studies also reveal that the respondents' age ranged from 26-37 years and most of them majored in natural and social sciences.

Summary and Discussion of Findings Relative to Hypotheses

1) Null Hypothesis 1 could not be rejected. There was no significant difference between sampled White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning. This finding supports studies conducted by Turiel, Edwards, & Kohlberg (1978), and Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) in non-Western cultures. The studies revealed that a higher level of formal education, a democratic family structure, opportunities for challenging social roles, and living in conditions of ethnic diversity contributed significantly to moral reasoning levels of their research subjects.

2) Null Hypothesis 2 could not be rejected. There was no singificant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by gender. This finding was also not surprising in light of studies conducted by Edwards (1975) and Holstein (1976) which indicate that no relationship exists between the gender of a person and the level of moral reasoning.

3) Null Hypothesis 3. There was no significant difference between Black Africans and White Americans

regarding principled moral reasoning by the level of formal education, so the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The level of formal education was broken into two main categories: below and above baccalaureate degree. Studies which partially support this finding reveal that university students and those who had more exposure to Western forms of education were staged higher than the community leaders who had very minimal formal education (Edwards, 1975, 1978. What is suprising, however, is the fact that although there were more subjects with formal education beyond the baccalaureate among the African subjects in contrast to American subjects, there were no significant differences in level of moral reasoning. But, if the fact of acquisition of formal education beyond the baccalaureate level by the African subjects is to be considered as contributing to higher levels of principled moral reasoning, then the finding could be interpreted as important.

4) Null Hypothesis 4. There was no significant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by the number of years of schooling. This hypothesis could not be rejected without qualification. When the number of years of schooling was below average (less than or equal to 17 years), the null hypothesis could not be rejected, but it could be rejected in the 'above avarage' (greater than 17 years) category. This finding is consistent with

results of studies conducted by Harkness et al.(1981) and Edwards (1978). Basically, it supports the theoretical assumption that the number of years of schooling of a person is directly proportional to the level of moral reasoning. In relation to this hypothesis, subjects with more years of schooling were indeed different from those with less than 17 years of schooling.

5) Null Hypothesis 5 states: There was no significant difference between White Americans and Black Africans regarding principled moral reasoning by the type of the community in which the subjects were raised. The null hypothesis could not be rejected without qualification. Controlling for a farm upbringing, the finding was significant; but, controlling for city and town, it was not.

As indicated in Chapter II, several studies conducted in East Africa by Edwards (1975, 1978), and Harkness et al. (1981) indicate that subjects who grew up in a cosmopolitan community had a higher level of moral reasoning than those who had rural beginnings. The researchers explained this finding by noting that community elders, though wielding political power, did not have complex life issues to deal with in contrast to what one might expect to find in a city. Life in the city poses new perplexing problems not usually found in the peasant

community. In the city, law and order is very much structured and marked by impersonality. Furthermore, the diversity of cultures and access to mass media in the city opens more opportunities for people to learn to be tolerant and to accept diversity of opinion (Inkeles, 1983). Hence, there is a great deal of demand to respect the law and to respect the dignity and human rights of other races, nationalities, and even religious faiths. Unlike in the city, the peasant community is one in which every one knows his or her neighbor personally and decision making is by consensus. In addition, studies conducted among Kenyan and Nigerian subjects by Edwards (1975, 1978), Maqsud (1977, 1978, 1979, 1980), Harkness et al. (1981) indicate that urban and Western educated subjects have higher stages of moral development than comparable samples with a rural community upbringing.

Perhaps some of Simpson's criticisms of Kohlberg's theoretical assumptions have relevance here. For instance, it is possible that there are other domains of morality excluded in cognitive developmental theory. Black Africans who were brought up in the farm may have a different conception of justice which is unaffected by Western forms of formal education. Horton (1967) seems to suggest that Black Africans' traditional religious thought serves as a cognitive function which is identical to the role which a theory occupies in the Western world. Horton's postulation

that African traditional thinking approaches human experience from a wholistic stance is supported by Mbiti's (1971) study of the African traditional religions and philosophy. According to Mbiti, the African psyche and philosophy is rooted in a hierarchy of beings not limited to humans but extends to the spiritual world. Thus, moral domain is concerned not only with the welfare of the living, but also with the company of the departed ancestors. These few African traditional religious tenets are commonly found in African rural setting where the presence of the extended family is near.

Other explanations for the unexpected finding may be traceable to the small sample or to the small cell frequencies which affects the interpretation of the statistical analysis.

Conclusions

The following conclusions are tentative due to the research limitations which are contained in Chapter 1 and the limitations of assumptions underlying statistical techniques which were used to analyze the data.

1) Higher Western forms of formal education are directly related to adults' principled moral reasoning. Available research reports indicate that non-Westerners with little exposure to the Western form of formal education have lower stages of moral development. But

through the process of assimilation and accommodation and as a consequence of educational effects, non-Westerners develop moral reasoning abilities which entail judging by appealing to principles of universality, justice, fairness and respect for human dignity.

2) The gender of a person is unrelated to principled moral reasoning. In spite of claims made by Gilligan (1982) which suggest that women use a different mode of reasoning to solve moral dilemmas, several studies using DIT including the present one, suggest that there is no difference between men and women regarding principled moral reasoning. The same educational effects and other relevant social environmental factors which foster advanced level of moral judgment apply to women both in Western and non-Western societies.

3) Although the review of literature on moral development suggest that a non-Western adult who was raised in a cosmopolitan environment is more likely to have higher principled moral reasoning than a non-Western adult who was raised on the farm, the data in this study indicate the contrary. Those subjects who were raised on the farm did better than those who were raised in a cosmopolitan environment.

Modernity factors, such as appreciation for impartial rules, management of time, access to mass media, numerous

educational opportunities, and multicultural settings expose adults to issues more complex than issues which may be found in peasant communities. Urban intricate life situations, therefore, vicariously shape certain personality traits and cognitive skills which are necessary for people to function effectively.

Implications for Adult Education

The following implications derive from a somewhat liberal generalization of the findings of this study.

1. Social and political environmental factors affect the way adults make principled moral judgements. Because of this knowledge, understanding the nature of moral dilemmas is essential in determining the critical features of the adult education curriculum processes and products. For instance, cross-cultural variables which influence the way adults interpret moral cues, choose moral principles, and act on preferred choice of a principle should be considered in developing and evaluating adult education learning programs.

2. Cross-culturally, adults encounter daily situations which are analogous to moral dilemmas in that they are required to make tough decisions related to family, work, and the community. They are required to respond to life threatening issues in the context of many complex constraints such as political orientations,

ideological commitments, religious creeds, inadequate knowledge, uncertain outcomes, and rival hypotheses in problem solving. Information on comparative moral decision making techniques would, therefore, be useful to adult educators in establishing the psycholigical links between a person's principled moral reasoning and specific moral content. In other words, moral problems are a potential source for learning barriers for adults. Adult educators need to recognize the cognitive and affective aspects of adult education.

3. Moral judgement stages are complex psychological constructs which require better understanding if they are to inform adult program planning and instruction. Before making cross-cultural generalizations of the stages of moral development, therefore, adult educators and interested investigators should make every effort to develop effective instruments for measuring and validating moral judgement constructs. This is particularly significant in light of the problematic and possibly revisionary nature of moral discourse. For instance, correlates of moral reasoning stages should be identified in all subjects in non-Western societies in order to avoid some errors in theoretical framework and methodological issues.

Suggestions for Further Study

To further clarify the issues raised in this study, the following suggestions are made for further study.

1) A replication study of principled moral reasoning of non-Western adults should be conducted using a larger sample and comparable control group from a Western society.

2) A study should be done that specifically identifies the characteristics of a moral dilemma as perceived by subjects from non-Western societies. Rather than using moral dilemma stories which may have alien settings and possibly different forms of logic, real moral dilemmas would indicate the nature of the universal moral domain.

3) To determine if there is a relationship between the community in which a person was raised and moral reasoning, a comparison of two cosmopolitan non-Western samples on principles of moral reasoning should be done.

In each of these suggestions a larger sample would be desirable in order to control for certain independent variables and to allow greater degrees of freedom in statistical analysis. Generally, a study which overcomes the limitations of the present study would be desirable.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES

DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES

I. PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies on's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereoptypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for it's own sake.

III. POSTCONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individul's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of

human beings as individual persons.

SOURCE: **Adapted from Lawrence Kohlberg in Cognitive Development and Epistemolgy, pp. 164-165.**

APPENDIX B

ASPECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

ASPECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT

I. The modes of judgment of obligation and value

- A. Judgment of right
- B. Judgment of having a right
- C. Judgment of duty and obligation
- D. Judgments of responsibility__conceptions of consequences of action or of the demands or opinions of others one should consider over and above strict duties or strict regard for the rights of others.
- E. Judgment of praise or blame
- F. Judgments of punishability and reward
- G. Justification and explanation
- H. Judgments of nonmoral value or goodness

II. The elements of obligation and value

- A. Prudence __ consequences desirable or undesirable to the self
- B. Social welfare __ consequences desirable to others
- C. Love
- D. Respect
- E. Justice as liberty
- F. Justice as equality
- G. Justice as reciprocity and contract

III. The issues or institutions

- A. Social norms
- B. Personal conscience
- C. Roles and issues of affection
- D. Roles and issues of authority and democracy, of division of labor between roles relative to social control
- E. Civil liberties__rights to liberty and equality to persons as human beings, as citizens, or as members of groups
- F. Justice of actions apart from fixed rights-reciprocity, contract, trust, and equity in the actions or reactions of one person
- G. Punitive justice
- H. Life
- I. Property

J. Truth
K. Sex

SOURCE: Adapted from Lawrence Kohlberg in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, pp. 166.

APPENDIX C

DEFINING ISSUES TEST

A. OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS

This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about social problems.* Different people often have different opinions about questions of right and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way that there are right answers to math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem stories. The papers will be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group, and no one will see your individual answers.

Please give us the following information:



In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinons about several stories. Here is a story as an example:

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children, and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but also sometimes for vacation trips. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. Below there is a list of some of these questions.

If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in deciding what car to buy?

Instructions for Part A: (Sample Question)

On the left-hand side, check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration. (For instance, if you think that Statement no. 1 is not important in making a decision about buying a car, check the space on the right.)

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No

1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives. (Note that in this sample, the person taking the questionnaire did not think this was important in making a decision.)

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					2. Would a *used* car be more economical in the long run than a *new* car? (Note that a check was put in the far left space to indicate the opinion that this is an important issue in making a decision about buying a car.)
					3. Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.
					4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200. (Note that if you are unsure about what "cubic inch displacement" means, then mark it "no importance.")
					5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car?
					6. Whether the front connibilies were differential. (Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish or nonsense to you, mark it "no importance.")

Instructions for Part B: (Sample Question)

From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. Put the number of the most important question on the top line below. Do likewise for your second, third, and fourth most important choices. (Note that the top choices in this case will come from the statements that were checked on the far left-hand side—statements no. 2 and no. 5 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the *most* important, a person would re-read no. 2 and no. 5, pick one of them as the *most* important, and then put the other as "second most important," and so on.)

Most	Second Most Important	Third Most Important	Fourth Most Important
5	2	3	1

Heinz and the Drug

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that the druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, and the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together only about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz became desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)

____ Should steal it ____ Can't decide ____ Should not steal it

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.
					2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal?
					3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?
					4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers.
					5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else.
					6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected.
					7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.
					8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act toward each other.
					9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law that only protects the rich anyway.

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society.
					11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel.
					12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____
Second most important _____
Third most important _____
Fourth most important _____

Escaped Prisoner

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took the name of Thompson. For eight years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison eight years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? (Check one)

_____ Should report him _____ Can't decide _____ Should not report him

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person?
					2. Every time someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime?
					3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal systems?
					4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society?
					5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect?
					6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for a charitable man?
					7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison?
					8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off?
					9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson?
					10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances?
					11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be served?
					12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____
Second most important _____
Third most important _____
Fourth most important _____

The Doctor's Dilemma

A woman was dying of cancer, which could not be cured, and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					4. Would taking over the building in the long run benefit more people to a greater extent?
					5. Whether the president stayed within the limits of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote.
					6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all students a bad name?
					7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
					8. Would allowing one student takeover encourage many other student takeovers?
					9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on himself by being so unreasonable and uncooperative?
					10. Whether running the university ought to be in the hands of a few administrators or in the hands of all the people.
					11. Are the students following principles they believe are above the law?
					12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be respected by students.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____
Second most important _____
Third most important _____
Fourth most important _____

Webster

Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station.

When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody else who was a good mechanic.

What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one)

_____ Should have hired Mr. Lee
_____ Should not have hired him
_____ Can't decide

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make his own business decisions or not?
					2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial discrimination in hiring for jobs.
					3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against Orientals himself or whether he means nothing personal in refusing the job.
					4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention to his customers' wishes would be best for his business.
					5. What individual differences ought to be relevant in deciding how society's roles are filled?
					6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic system ought to be completely abandoned.
					7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society feel like his customers or are a majority against prejudice?
					8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use talents that would otherwise be lost to society.
					9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs?

What should the doctor do? (Check one)

_____ He should give the woman an overdose that will make her die
_____ Can't decide _____ Should not give an overdose

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of giving her the overdose or not.
					2. Is the doctor obligated by the same law as everybody else if giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her?
					3. Whether people would be much better off without society regimenting their lives and even their deaths.
					4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an accident.
					5. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live?
					6. What is the value of death prior to society's perspective on personal values?
					7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's suffering or cares more about what society might think.
					8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
					9. Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end.
					10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior.
					11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to?

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____
Second most important _____
Third most important _____
Fourth most important _____

Student Takeover

At Harvard University a group of students, called the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), believe that the university should not have an army ROTC program. SDS students are against the war in Vietnam, and the army training program helps send men to fight there. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it toward their degrees.

Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC program as a university course. But the president of the university stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that the president was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands.

So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the university's administration building and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course.

Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check one)

_____ Yes, they should have taken it over _____ Can't decide
_____ No, they shouldn't have taken it over

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Are the students doing this to really help other people or are they doing it just for kicks?
					2. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn't belong to them?
					3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee?
					11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow man applies to this case.
					12. If someone's in need, shouldn't he be helped regardless of what you get back from him?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____
Second most important _____
Third most important _____
Fourth most important _____

Newspaper

Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the war in Vietnam and against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn over all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal, telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.

Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one)

_____ Should stop it _____ Can't decide _____ Should not stop it

IMPORTANCE:

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to the parents?
					2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper could be published for a long time, or did he just promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time?
					3. Would the students start protesting even more if the principal stopped the newspaper?
					4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal have the right to give orders to students?
					5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say "no" in this case?
					6. If the principal stopped the newspaper, would he be preventing full discussion of important problems?
					7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose faith in the principal.
					8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and patriotic to his country.
					9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the student's education in critical thinking and judgments?
					10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing his own opinions.
					11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some angry parents when it is the principal that knows best what is going on in the school.
					12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____ Third most important _____
Second most important _____ Fourth most important _____

APPENDIX D

PERSONAL INVENTORY FORM

_____ _____ _____

P E R S O N A L I N V E N T O R Y

THE PURPOSE OF THIS INVENTORY IS TO ELICIT INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED TO BE ESSENTIAL IN THIS STUDY. THE INFORMATION YOU SUPPLY WILL BE USED STRICTLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS PROJECT AND YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT ANONYMOUS.

PLEASE *DO NOT* WRITE YOUR NAME ANYWHERE ON THIS INVENTORY.

EVERY QUESTION IN THIS INVENTORY IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE PROJECT. WHAT COUNTS IS YOUR HONEST RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS.

CHOOSE ONE OF THE BEST ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION BY PLACING A CHECK MARK ( ) ON THE APPROPRIATE PLACE.

1. **What is your sex? Male _____ Female _____**

2. **What is your age? _____**

3. **What is your marital status?**

   a) **Single: _____**

   b) **Married**

      _____ With children

      _____ With children in home

      _ ___ With children not in home

   c) **Widowed _____**

   d) **Divorced _____**

4. **What country are you from? (Please check only the country of your citizenship).**

      _____ Kenya

      _____ Uganda

      _____ Tanzania

      _____ Ethiopia

      _____ Zambia

      _____ Somalia

      _____ Malawi

_____ United States of America

5. How much formal education have you had?

_____ Less than high school diploma

_____ High school diploma/certificate of completion

_____ Vocational school (trade school such as carpentry, electrical, and so forth).

_____ Bachelor's degree

_____ Master's degree

_____ Doctoral degree

_____ Others (Please specify)

6. Roughly how many years of schooling have you had? (Write down in the provided space) _____ _____.

7. What is your broad characterization of your field of study?

_____ Agriculture

_____ Business and management

_____ Education

_____ Engineering

_____ Health professions

_____ Humanities

_____ Natural and life sciences

_____ Social sciences

_____ Other (Please specify):

_____ _____

8. Was any of your education in parochial or church affiliated schools?

Yes _____ No _____

IF YES: Please indicate what portion of your education was in parochial schools.

	Grade School	High School	College
All in parochial schools	_____	_____	_____
Part in parochial schools	_____	_____	_____
None in parochial schools	_____	_____	_____

9. What is your current status of employment? (Please check the appropriate spaces.)

_____ Working full-time

_____ Working part-time

_____ Unemployed

_____ Home duties

_____ Retired

_____ Study leave

10. What was the size of the community in which you were raised?

_____ Raised on a farm

_____ A town of less than 2,500 persons (not a suburb of a large city)

_____ A town of less than 15,000 persons (not a suburb of a large city)

_____ A town of less than 50,000 persons (not a buburb of a large city)

_____ A city of less than 100,000

_____ 100,000 to 250,000

_____ 300,000 to 750,000

_____ A million or more persons

_____ A suburb of a city of 100,000 or more persons

_____ A suburb of a city of 500,000 or more persons

11. Have you ever been a member of any congregation or church?

_____ Yes _____ No

12. Are you currently a member of a congregation or church?

_____ Yes _____ No

13. How long have you been a member of your present congregation or church?

_____ I have always been a member

_____ Less than 1 year

_____ 1 to 2 years

_____ 3 to 5 years

_____ 6 to 10 years

_____ More than 10 years

14. How often do you attend worship services on Sunday or any other designated day of worship services? (Check the answer which comes closest to describing what you do).

_____ Every week

_____ Nearly every week

_____ About three times a month

_____ About twice a month

_____ About once a month

_____ About every six weeks

_____ About every three months

_____ About once or twice a year

_____ Less than once a year

_____ Never

PLEASE COMPLETE THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST NEXT !

THANK YOU VERY MUCH

APPENDIX E

RELEVANT CORRESPONDENCE

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS (UCRIHS)
206 BERKEY HALL
(517) 353-9738

EAST LANSING • MICHIGAN • 48824-1111

June 15, 1988

Philip K. arap Chelilim
1647 D Spartan Village
East Lansing, MI 48823

Dear Mr. Chelilim:

Subject: "A CROSS-CULTURAL EXAMINATION OF THE STATES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN RELATION TO ADULTS' METAETHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND COMPREHENSION OF MORAL DOMAIN IRB# 88-204"

The above project is exempt from full UCRIHS review. I have reviewed the proposed research protocol and find that the rights and welfare of human subjects appear to be protected. You have approval to conduct the research.

You are reminded that UCRIHS approval is valid for one calendar year. If you plan to continue this project beyond one year, please make provisions for obtaining appropriate UCRIHS approval one month prior to June 15, 1989.

Any changes in procedures involving human subjects must be reviewed by the UCRIHS prior to initiation of the change. UCRIHS must also be notified promptly of any problems (unexpected side effects, complaints, etc.) involving human subjects during the course of the work.

Thank you for bringing this project to our attention. If we can be of any future help, please do not hesitate to let us know.

Sincerely,

John K. Hudzik, Ph.D.
Chair, UCRIHS

JKH/sar

cc: J. Snoddy
Office of International Students

1647 D Spartan Village
E. Lansing, MI 48823
353-7949

September 30, 1988

Dr. David Horner,
Office for International
Students & Scholars,
103 Center for Intl Programs,
Michigan State University,
E. Lansing, MI 48824

Dear Dr. Horner:

RE.: Letter of Request for a List of Names
Dated August 8, 1988

I am writing to request a list of names of currently enrolled students from the following East African and Central African countries: ETHIOPIA, KENYA, MALAWI, TANZANIA, UGANDA, SOMALIA, AND ZAMBIA.

I need these names so I can use to random sample the subjects I intend to include in my study. The details of the research have been submitted to your office by my academic advisor and I believe you have a copy of the approval of the project by the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects.

I shall greatly appreciate your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,

Philip Chelilim

Philip K. Chelilim

1647 D Spartan Village,
E. Lansing, MI 48823
(517) 353-7949

September 16, 1988

Dr. James Rest,
Center for the Study of
Ethical Development,
University of Minnesota,
141 Burton Hall,
178 Pillsbury Drive SE,
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Dear Dr. Rest:

I am writing to seek clearance to use the Defining Issues Test to measure the development of moral judgment of two culturally diverse samples: one sample consists of a randomly selected group of adults from Africa (Sub-Sahara) and another sample from a randomly selected group of adult Americans living in Lansing. Both men and women (twenty from each group) will be requested to participate in the study.

Currently, I am a graduate student at Michigan State University. The project I intend to undertake has been approved by my academic advisory committee and cleared through the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects. I expect to complete data gathering on the project by the end of October. Thus, I hope you will respond to this request immediately. I have the Defining Issues Test (third edition, 1986) which I ordered from your office.

Thank you in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Chelilim

Philip K. Chelilim

CENTER for the study of
ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

University of Minnesota

James Rest, Research Director / 141 Burton Hall / 178 Pillsbury Drive / Minneapolis, MN 55455 / (612) 624 7479 or 624 0876
Muriel Bebeau, Education Director / 15136 Moos Tower / 515 Delaware Street SE / Minneapolis, MN 55455 / (612) 625 4633

10-06-1988

Philip Chelilim
1647 D Sparton Vill
East Lansing, MI 48823

Dear Mr Chelilim:

I grant you permission to use the Defining Issues Test in your study. If you are making copies of the test items, please include the copyright information on each copy (e.g., Copyright, James Rest, 1979, All rights reserved.

Best wishes for your study. Please send me a copy of your results.

Sincerely,

James Rest
Professor
Educational Psychology

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
ERICKSON HALL

EAST LANSING • MICHIGAN • 48824-1034

May 27, 1989

Dear African Student/American Citizen:

Over the last several decades a number of ethical concerns have emerged worldwide leading to a need to understand how individuals process moral judgments. As part of my educational program at Michigan State University, I have taken up the challenge to explore the nature of this phenomenon, focusing specifically on how stages of moral development relate to certain aspects of our strategies for solving social and ethical issues.

Strategies for solving ethical issues have significant ramifications for personal and societal applications, such as abortion, euthenasia, terrorism, and even distribution of scarce resources. Thus, I believe you will want to contribute your opinions towards an understanding of the characteristics of ethical decision making.

The study is an academic exercise and not an ideological or political propaganda. Measures have been taken to ensure that your name and address will in no way be identified in the results of the study; nor will the information be stored in any way which could reveal your identity. Your responses to the questionnaires will be combined with the responses provided by other individuals who have been selected to participate in the study. You will not be required to place your name anywhere on the questionnaires.

You are requested to participate voluntarily. You indicate your consent by completing and returning the enclosed questionnaires. A pre-addressed stamped envelope is enclosed for you to mail back the completed questionnaires. Please take the few moments necessary to complete the questionnaires and mail them back as soon as possible. I would like to have the completed questionnaires returned in two weeks. The results of the study will be reported as part of my doctoral dissertation in adult and continuing education.

If you have any questions about any part of this study, please call me at (517) 353-7949).

Thank you very much for your participation.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Chelilim

Philip Chelilim
Doctoral student
Educational Administration

cc. Dr. James Snoddy, Academic Advisor

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