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' -.‘ - A: k:-.\I"\. u . 9"" lal‘HHIAf-h. q”; llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllIllllllllllllllll 31293 01789 9547 This is to certify that the dissertation entitled A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POST- SHOOTING TRAUMA ON SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION presented by John Henry Campbell has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Educational Administration Ma j‘r professor MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0~12771 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POST- SHOOTING TRAUMA ON SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION By John Henry Campbell A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Educational Administration 1992 The ; Incident F IEQ‘Jll‘e 5; “GI to St: incidem l‘ That efie defined a: This ihtervent anaiYSls Dart QUEs' same, it. and 1983. qUEgthnni have the Seton: 3% invoiVEd ABSTRACT A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POST- SHOOTING TRAUMA ON SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION By John Henry Campbell The purpose of this study was to evaluate the Post-Critical- Incident Program of the FBI. The mission of the FBI continues to require special agents to make split-second decisions to shoot or not to shoot. When an agent does shoot and kills, or is shot, the incident has an effect on the agent for the rest of his or her life. That effect, whether psychological, physical, or emotional, is defined as post-traumatic stress. This study was essentially an evaluation of the FBI’s intervention program designed to address post-shooting trauma. The analysis compared the-responses of two samples to items in a two- part questionnaire. The first group of respondents, the pre-program sample, were agents who had been involved in shootings between 1973 and 1983. Their responses were obtained through the use of a questionnaire completed in 1984. Those individual agents did not have—the benefit of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. The second set of respondents, the post-program sample, were agents involved in serious shooting incidents, who had attended the Post-Crit‘ from 1985 organizer Prcgram, WI aiiress ;: The i descriptiv statistica questionna The Wham c'r. tritium} and health. the ”Egati Shsoting, °l§an123tj Ihe “the W. Th John Henry Campbell Post-Critical-Incident Seminars and completed the same questionnaire from 1986 through 1989. Those agents received the benefits, organizationally and individually, of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, which was established to formally recognize, define, and address post-traumatic stress. The design of this comparative analysis was exploratory and descriptive. The chi-square statistical test was used to determine statistically significant differences between the two samples on the questionnaire items. The results reflected statistically significant pre-/post- program changes. The findings supported the value of the Post- Critical-Incident Program. The study identified not only positive and healthy adjustment trends, but also the significant reduction of the negative behavioral patterns of adjustment after a serious shooting. The Post-Critical—Incident Program of the FBI reflects an organizational commitment to the special agents who have been put to the ultimate test. That program has evolved into a law enforcement model. The value and success of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, as measured by this statistical analysis, are exemplary. Wright 1992 Copyright by JOHN HENRY CAMPBELL 1992 Fe- To the special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their families, who have made the ultimate sacrifice. As; umcial ag in this r analysis. I ewe Udon R. Hekhuis; Feathers: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A special note of recognition and thanks is given to the special agents of the FBI who shared of themselves by participating in this research. Their acts of bravery were the basis for this analysis. I owe a heartfelt thanks to the members of my committee: Dr. Eldon R. Nonnamaker, Chairman; Dr. Katherine White; Dr. Lewis F. Hekhuis; Dr. Robert C. Trojanowicz; and the late Dr. Richard Featherstone. Their encouragement and guidance are sincerely appreciated. It is appropriate to recognize several individuals who have contributed significantly to the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program: .hflui E. Otto, Robert Schaefer, Dr. David Soskis, Carole Soskis, and James M. Horn, whose leadership, encouragement, support, and caring are reflected in the evolution of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program from mere feelings and thoughts to an exemplary tribute to the agents of this organization. A special message of appreciation is extended to the staff of the Behavioral Science Unit, for without their willingness to review, edit, and support this study, it would not have been possible. Thanks to Bernadette F. Cloniger, Cynthia J. Lent, Patricia Thompson, Dr. James T. Reese, and Dr. Roland Reboussin. I vi would als: his direct Fina' gratitude encourage in this (1‘ would also like to recognize Dr. David Carter, at Montana Tech, for his direction and assistance in the initial statistical analysis. Finally, and most important, I would like to express my gratitude and love to my wife, Marlys, for her support, assistance, encouragement, and patience during the many long years culminating in this dissertation. vii LIST OF T: Chapter TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ....................... Chapter I. INTRODUCTION .................... Statement of the Problem ............. Importance of the Study .............. The Methodology .................. Analysis of the Data ............... Limitations of the Study ............. Definitions of Terms ............... Summary and Overview ............... . II. LITERATURE REVIEW .................. Introduction ................... Recognition of Post-Shooting Trauma ........ Understanding and Treatment of Post-Shooting Trauma ..................... Research, Refinement, and Professional Development ................... Conclusion .................... III. METHODOLOGY ..................... Introduction ................... Population .................... Design ...................... The Questionnaire ................. Pilot Study .................... Data Collection .................. Data Analysis ................... Summary ...................... IV. ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF THE DATA ........ Introduction ................... General Analysis ................. viii l—i mNVOSm-hN APPEHDICES IJT,‘ [‘13 m (/2 L. r— .——-—< / REFERENCES Post-Shooting Trauma and Post-Traumatic-Stress Disorder ................... 69 Other Psychological Effects ........... 70 Physical and Emotional Responses at the Time of the Incident ................ 72 Reactions of Others ............... 74 Physical and Emotional Responses After the Incident ................... 77 Family Effects ................. 79 Sources of Support and Aggravation ....... 81 Factors That Foster Coping ........... 85 Effects of the Investigation .......... 86 The Shooting Incident .............. 88 Specific Analysis of Change ............ 92 Program Evaluation ................ 97 Limitations .................... 101 V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ........... 103 Introduction ................... 103 Conclusions .................... 104 General Recommendations .............. 108 Specific Recommendations ............. 113 APPENDICES A. THE INSTRUMENT ................... 118 8 COVER LETTER .................... 134 C. THE PILOT STUDY ................... 136 D SHOOTING INCIDENTS: ISSUES AND EXPLANATIONS FOR FBI AGENTS AND MANAGERS ............... 183 E. SUPPORT SERVICES TO SURVIVING FAMILIES OF LINE-OF-DUTY DEATH ................. 207 REFERENCES ......................... 224 ix LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Emotional Responses That Occurred During Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ..... 73 2. Perceptual Distortions That Occurred During Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ..... 74 3. Reactions of Fellow Agents That Occurred After Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implemen- tation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program . 75 4. Reactions of Families That Occurred After Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ..... 75 5. Reactions of Supervisors That Occurred After Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implemen- tation of the FBI’s Post-Critical—Incident Program . 76 6. Reactions of Nonagent Friends That Occurred After Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implemen- tation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program . 76 7. Physical Symptoms Occurring in the First 24 Hours Following the Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post—Critical- Incident Program .................. 78 8. Physical Symptoms Occurring in the Week Following the Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ....................... 79 10. ll. 12. l3. 14. 15. 16. 17[ Emotional Symptoms Occurring in the Week Following the Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ....................... Person the Agent Talked With Most About the Shooting, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ..... Person Who Provided the Most Assistance After the Shooting, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Imple- mentation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ....................... Major Sources of Aggravation to Agents Involved in Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Imple- mentation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ....................... Nature of Press Coverage, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical- Incident Program .................. Extent of the Subject’s Injury, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical- Incident Program .................. At the Time of the Shooting, Who Was With the Agent, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post—Critical-Incident Program ..... Who Assumed Command of the Investigation at the Shooting Scene, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program ....................... Recommendations of Other Individuals Who Were Affected by the Shootings, as Reported by Special Agents Who Were Involved in Incidents Before and After the Implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical- Incident Program .................. xi Page 79 82 82 84 84 89 9O 91 92 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The use of deadly force by law enforcement personnel has been and continues to be a controversial issue. The controversy centers on when, if, and under what conditions deadly force is justified. A less-often-considered aspect of the issue of the exercise of deadly force is the effect on the officer who has been involved in a shooting incident. These effects, whether psychological, physical, and/or emotional, are often referred to as transient situational disturbances or post-traumatic-stress disorder. Much of the literature regarding shooting incidents has focused specifically on the use of deadly force. Until recently, there has been a limited amount of literature regarding the trauma often associated with shooting incidents. The literature that is available correlates the shooting incident with the experiences in military conflicts and other critical incidents. _ Of the police psychologists, reporters, and writers who have addressed the issue of post-shooting trauma, there has seemed to be a consensus regarding what post-shooting trauma is and why there is a variance in the individual reactions. These points of consensus are: l. 2. personali shooting. media an: 3. counselir‘ hthermasc 4. l officers 1 by The ne 0’ psycni literatUré departmEn. Confident. 5. , Cleariy a Sigquj trauma on regardjn police 0 l. A shooting is a major trauma for the officer involved. 2. An officer’s reactions to shootings vary with (a) his/her personality and work experience, (b) the circumstances of the shooting, (c) peers’ responses, (d) the agency’s responses, and (e) media and community responses. 3. Officers’ public responses to offers of post-shooting counseling may be negative and a reflection of the prevailing hypermasculine, "macho" police image. 4. Because of the macho police image, many law enforcement officers believe their ability to perform their duties is challenged by the need to seek professional assistance through an psychologist or psychiatrist. That stigma has been well documented in the literature addressing post-shooting trauma. Based on that stigma, departments should consider mandating that officers participate in a confidential, professional post-shooting counseling program. 5. A post-shooting policy should be delineated so that it is clearly understood by the officer involved and also by the administration of the law enforcement agency. Statement of the Problem From an initial review of the literature, there appeared to be a significant problem surrounding the effects of post-shooting trauma ("1 the law enforcement officer. The available literature regarding police shootings has identified frequent reactions that police officers go through to include sensory distortion, flashback all of Hf- In J Director the react shooting determine post-shoe erotional identifie develop aspects c understan policy or t0 provid As a Establish Shooting its effe COEdUCted flashbacks, fear of insanity, emotional isolation, and depression, all of which often result in the officer leaving law enforcement. In July 1983, a pilot research project was commissioned by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to evaluate the reactions of special agents of the FBI who were involved in shooting incidents. Essentially, the goal of that research was to determine whether agents of the FBI suffered from the effects of post-shooting trauma, and if they did, what were the physical, emotional, and psychological effects? Could those effects be identified and neutralized? Finally, the ultimate goal was to develop recommendations to neutralize or minimize the negative aspects of that trauma. In 1983, the FBI had no recognition or understanding of what post-shooting trauma was. The FBI had no policy or procedure to address that trauma, nor was there a program to provide assistance to the agents involved. As a result of that pilot study, the FBI recognized the need to establish policies and procedures to appropriately address post- shooting trauma and to initiate an organizational understanding of its effect on special agents of the FBI. A follow-up study conducted in 1983 and 1984 resulted in further modifications and development of the FBI’s Post-Shooting Program. The follow-up study used a questionnaire/interview process that represented 92 special agents of the FBI who were directly involved in shooting incidents. Bothkthe pilot study and the expanded analysis used a two-part questionnaire instrument that was specifically developed to focus on post-shooting'trauma of special agents. The development of the instruEE poiicies essential limited I evaluatio research. flashback trauna be; POSI~ShOOl ITEUTf'a ex; Of the IS< instrument, the pilot, the analysis, the follow-up, and written policies were coordinated and completed by this writer. The policy essentially has been in effect since the 1983-84 analysis, with limited modifications. It was appropriate and necessary for the Behavioral Science Unit of the FBI to conduct a comparative analysis of the initial study, which focused on the reactions and responses of special agents of the FBI, with a more current sampling of agents who have been involved in shooting incidents. That current sampling included those special agents involved in shooting incidents during 1986 through 1989. With the implementation of a post-critical-incident program, an evaluation of the efforts of that program was a focal point of this research. Are agents still suffering from sensory distortion, flashbacks, and depression? Have the effects of post-shooting trauma been identified and neutralized? Has the implementation of a post-shooting program with further training and support reduced the trauma experienced by special agents of the FBI? Those were a few of the issues and questions that were addressed in this analysis. Importance of the Study The mission of the FBI continues to require special agents to make split-second decisions to shoot or not to shoot. When they do shoot and kill, or when they are shot, the incident has an effect on the individual participant for the rest of his or her life. Those who are affected by post-shooting trauma need appropriate underst evaluat ratiora shootin in redu shootir directl Incideh Iodiiic 0f the into tl EEfGrCE IRTUSt. anOlv dECart: SUPDOri refTeC1 of the understanding, timely assistance, and intervention. Through evaluations of intervention programs established by law enforcement nationally and documented in numerous articles pertaining 11) post- shooting trauma, it has been suggested that timely support assists in reducing long-term disabilities. A current analysis of recent shootings through the assistance and input from those agents directly involved was extremely important to the FBI’s Critical Incident Program. This understanding and evaluation has suggested modification to the current policy. The comparison of the responses of the initial study with a current sampling has provided insight into the continued violence that results from being federal law enforcement agents and the shooting incidents into which they are thrust. The aftermath has a significant effect on the individuals involved, on their families and peers, and on the agency or department as 21 whole. Organizational readiness, response, and support require constant evaluation and upgrading. The analysis reflected in this dissertation has provided a further understanding of the post—shooting-trauma disorder suffered by agents and also has supported the continued development of an exemplary post-shooting policy for the F81. The analysis has some applicability to other law enforcement agencies in their efforts to understand and deal with post-critical-incident trauma. The Methodology This study was a historical overview and a comparative analysis. The initial study covered shooting incidents that involved 1983. A shooting The result “Titer co the ident involved special agents for the period from July 1973 through July 1983. A random sample of TOO agents who had been involved in shooting incidents was polled through a formatted questionnaire. The results of the 92 responses provided the basis for evaluation of what happened physically, emotionally, and psychologicalty to the agents during and after the shootings. In the preparation of this dissertation and analysis, the writer collected an aggregate, unidentifiable set of responses using the identical two-part questionnaire. The period of time in this set of responses was 1986 through 1989. That set of 75 responses represented the total population of special agents within the FBI who survived shooting incidents during the period 1986 through 1989. That aggregate pool of'«questionnaires provided anonymity to the respondents and also a valuable source of data. The pool of data provided the basis for a comparative analysis with the information developed by the writer in 1983-84. Analysis of the Data The design of this comparative-analysis study was exploratory and descriptive. A coded frequency format was used through a simple tabulation of the responses. The survey data collected through the open-ended instrument were designed for natural groupings in major categories. Those categories are physical and emotional responses, sources of' support and aggravation, factors that foster coping, effects of investigation, and so forth. The chi-square statistical test was used in) determine statistical significance between responsr study. for acce initial only frc responses in each of these categories with those in the previous study. The .05 level of probability was used as the minimum level for accepting differences as significant. With the pilot survey and initial study completed, many of the ambiguities were removed not only from the instrument, but also from the interpretation. Limitations of the Studx A limitation of this study was the applicability of the conclusions and recommendations to other law enforcement agencies from the analysis solely of shooting incidents of the F81. The ability to generalize was, therefore, somewhat curtailed. A second limitation was anticipated because of the requirement of self- reporting. However, the extended focus reinforced the ability to develop and augment a model post-shooting policy for the FBI. This policy examination would be of value to post-critical-incident programs of other law enforcement agencies. Definitions of Terms Several terms are used throughout this dissertation and are defined within a limited connotation as follows: Deadly force--force that, when exercised, will or is likely to kill. Persons directly involved--those agents who shoot or are shot, those who participate in the incidents surrounding or in which the shooting occurred, those who render assistance to the wounded party, and those who make the decision to shoot or not to shoot. n O m 4 l. _- tic syn.‘ 3 T?) generally (/1 l hor situatior Post—traumatic-stress disorder--the devel0pment of characteris- tic symptoms following a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human experience. Shootinq incident (street use in a law enforcement context)--a situation in which an officer or agent is severely wounded or killed, or in which a subject is severely wounded or killed. Transient situational disturbance--a maladaptive reaction to an identifiable psychosocial stressor. Summary and Overview The effects of post-shooting trauma have been identified by police psychologists as they pertain to the law enforcement officer in general. An analysis conducted by the writer focused on shooting incidents of the FBI. That analysis was an effort first to identify frequent reactions of those persons directly involved and then to make recommendations to minimize or alleviate the physical, emotional, and psychological problems surrounding post-shooting trauma. A random sample of FBI agents who had been involved in shooting incidents was designated as the research population. That sampling was completed in 1983-84. A comparative analysis with a: more current population, using the designed and tested questionnaire, was the basis for an up-to- date understanding of post-shooting trauma of special agents of the FBI. - This analysis compared the two samples to determine the effectiveness of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. The first responses were those of agents who had no benefit of the understan trauna re those of support t insight, model pos' Realistic; understanding of post-shooting trauma or a program to address the trauma resulting from shootings. The second set of responses was those of agents who had been provided training, assistance, and support through the FBI’s Post-Shooting Program. With a current insight, modifications and recommendations to further develop a model post-shooting program for the FBI was a goal of significance. Realistically, those recommendations and conclusions were limited to the Bureau, but it is hoped that this study may serve as the basis for a comparative analysis with similar research in the design of a model post-shooting-trauma policy that can be examined and studied and, if appropriate, applied to enhance other local, state, and federal law enforcement post-shooting or post-critical-incident programs. Chapter I contained an introduction to the study and a statement of the problem, the importance of the study, the methodology employed in carrying out the study and analyzing the data, limitations, and definitions of terms. Chapter 11 contains a review of literature pertinent to the topic under investigation. The research methodology is explained in greater detail in Chapter 111. Chapter IV contains an analysis and presentation of the data gathered for this study. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter V. Sinc tested p: the Stan? in varig; interest ‘ enforcene medical q Specialty meItal h Professj C researChEr OCCUPBITOr CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW Introduction Since the turn of the century when Lewis Terman (1917) first tested police candidates for selection using a modified version of the Stanford-Binet, mental health professionals have been involved in various aspects of law enforcement. Over the years their interest and research have resulted in an increased knowledge of law enforcement personnel, organizations, and functions. Much as medical doctors began as general practitioners and grew into specialty areas, so too was the evolution of psychology and the mental health profession, in general. Many mental health professionals are specializing in police psychology and are researchers of virtually every aspect of this unique and stressful occupation. Post-shooting trauma is an issue in law enforcement that has been recognized, understood, and treated only in the past decade. The commendable efforts of several professional police psychologists are reflected in this literature review. This effort to provide an organized overview of the literature is not necessarily a chronological demarcation, but is differentiated more by the focus, direction, and subject matter of the presentations, articles, and 10 reports a the late recognii disorder. acceptanc they pro: The only to l Departmen stress a professio serious n stressor professic Silttoms, force_ I explores attempts t Two 11 reports as they delve into post-shooting trauma. The literature in the late 19705 and early 19805, in fact, focused on the emerging recognition of post-shooting trauma or post-traumatic-stress disorder. This focus paralleled the growth, recognition, and acceptance as well as the development of police psychologists and they provided. The first recognized full-time police psychologist dates back only to 1968, when Martin Reiser was hired by the Los Angeles Police Department. Reiser and his cohorts developed an understanding of stress and applied that understanding to the law enforcement profession. These same police psychologists began recognizing the serious nature of the effects, problems, and aftermath of an extreme stressor such as a shooting incident. From their experiences, these professionals were able to provide insight into the causes, symptoms, and effects of the reactions to the exercise of deadly force. In the first section of this literature review, the writer explores the efforts of police psychologists and their pioneering attempts to understand post-traumatic stress. Two significant'events provided a natural framework for developing a systematic review of the important literature pertaining to post-traumatic stress. On September 17, 1984, a dedicated group of professionals came together for the first time at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Academy in Quantico, Virginia, for a conference entitled The National Symposium of Police Psychological Services. The 150 professionals worked intensely throughout the week, discussing provisions that address and maintain mental h This con Special Academy, Prince Ge A call professic December Specifics contrjbb significa critical- with the incidemS p0st~ttau A Se can be 12 mental health services for the nation’s law enforcement officers. This conference was co-sponsored by James T. Reese, Supervisory Special Agent, Behavioral Science Unit, Training Division, FBI Academy, and Harvey A. Goldstein, Director, Psychological Services, Prince George’s County Police Department, Upper Marlboro, Maryland. A. call for papers before this symposium laid the academic and professional foundation for progress. The product of that effort, Psychological Services for Law Enforcement, was published in December 1986. Section Five of that publication focused specifically and entirely on critical incident reaction. The contributions of the professional participants provided a significant basis for the understanding and treatment of post- critical-incident trauma, and an evolution in terminology emerged with the recognition of not just shootings but other serious incidents confronting the law enforcement officer that result in post-traumatic stress. A second significant conference provided a natural bridge that can be identified as. an expanding professional research effort focusing (n1 post-critical-incident trauma. In August 1989, 50 mental health professionals, employee assistance providers, chaplains, and law enforcement officers met for the Critical Incident Conference at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Each gave. a week, of' his or her time to share thoughts and ideas concerning critical incidents in law enforcement. The resulting publication was a product of their knowledge-and their dedication to assist t‘ Critical It u well-beir protect a and prote WlIh reg; individua theories the ”WM ”1917' me: 13 assist the law enforcement officer. This publication was entitled Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese, Horn, & Dunning, 1991). It was only through such efforts by those interested in the well-being of police officers that a body of knowledge emerged to protect and serve those in law enforcement who are sworn to serve and protect. It is important to note that the selection of options with regard to handling critical incident trauma is left to each individual. Presented in the publication were numerous options and theories ranging from therapy to spiritual awareness. The ideas of the invited authors were presented without editing the substance of their messages. Their messages provided a range of approaches to meet the needs of those affected by trauma. Each incident is unique, as are the Inany' options suggested. It. was impossible, however, to present all the various options. The choice remains up to the control of the readers of that effort. This literature review, which provides an understanding of what post-shooting trauma is and what effects such incidents have on the law enforcement officer, is organized as follows: The first section concerns the initial recognition of post-shooting trauma. In the second section, the understanding and treatment of that trauma in the individuals involved is detailed. The focus in the third section is on the research, refinement, and professional development of a body of knowledge emerging to address the well-being of the law enforcement officer. The' as to us pertainir | or no we trauma 0 focus of early 13 14 Recognition of Post-Shootinq_Trauma The purpose of this review was to establish an information base as to what work, research, and publications have been accomplished pertaining to post-shooting trauma. Until the early 19805, little or no work had specifically focused on the effects of post-shooting trauma on the police officer on: the special agent involved. The focus of the literature up until approximately the late 19705 and early 19805 was on stress in law enforcement. That material suggested that stress is part of living and that an understanding of what stress is. could assist iri effectively addressing the consequences. A second issue that surfaced during that time frame suggested that police officers perceive their work as extremely dangerous and stressful. For police officers, perception was and is reality. From that initial introspection, a more specific focus evolved, addressing extreme stressors, shooting incidents, which result in post-shooting trauma. Of the police psychologist reports that addressed the issue of post-shooting trauma in presentations, speeches, and publications in law enforcement journals, the initial focus was attempting to define what post-shooting trauma is. In a police stress workshop in 1980, Mike Roberts, police psychologist of the San Jose, California, Police Department, established an insight into post-shooting reactions. In his comments, he stated that post-shooting trauma is a transient situational disorder that can easily be alleviated if it is handled or dealt with correctly. He further stated that part of the experiences an officer goes through as a result of killing another i televisio what real reality or In reactions after a 5 he identi 15 another individual comes from the portrayal of such situations on television and in the nmyies, which is, in fact, contradictory to what really occurs. There was an expectation of being a hero, but reality was much less than that. In his presentation, Roberts (1980) specified some frequent reactions and concerns that police officers experience during and after a shooting incident. Some of the reactions and concerns that he identified were sensory distortion, flashbacks, fear of insanity, sorrow over depriving the person of life, crying, grasping for life, and retaliation by family or friends of the slain party. Roberts suggested changes in training and departmental policy. The first recommendation was £1 short, mandatory, paid administrative leave; the second was supervisor or peer counseling afforded directly to the officers involved; the third was voluntary, confidential, free counseling with a psychotherapist who has a background in law enforcement; and the fourth was recruiting and training of supervisory personnel to meet the needs of officers suffering from post-shooting trauma. Another individual who addressed the issue of post-shooting trauma during the early 19805 was Massad Ayoob. hi his article, entitled "The Killing Experience," Ayoob (1980) described the experience of a law enforcement officer involved in a shooting incident as a mystical situation. He stated that one of the things that most affected the police officer was the administrative handling of the shooting incident. The question that frequently .TF' 16 arose in the mind of the officer involved was, "What are they going to do to me?" Ayoob (1980) pointed out some of the things that compound or exacerbate the shooting incident; one of them was the removal of the officer’s gun. The scope and direction of this particular focus were limited. Some recommendations were developed from his effort. The most valuable recommendation was that the unit or department offer some counseling for both the officer and his wife. In a second article, Ayoob (1982) addressed some of the massive psychological effects he observed in law enforcement stress, particularly involving post-shooting trauma. He stated that almost 100% of those officers involved in shootings will have nightmares, and he went on to mention other frequent reactions, including sleepless nights, social withdrawal, and avoidance or aggressive behavior. Ayoob coined the term "Mark of Cain Complex," which he defined as the feeling that everybody was watching the particular officer and concern about the behavior and the reaction of that officer after a critical incident. Ayoob recognized Walter Gorski, a Beverly Hills psychologist who had written about post-shooting trauma. Gorski suggested that an inoculation session, at which officers are told of common reactions of those involved in shooting incidents, is appropriate and necessary for dealing with future trauma. This provides an expectation and understanding of the events that follow the exercise of deadly force. Before these efforts, Martin Symonds, an associate professor of psychiatry at New York University and newly appointed psychological pl it 17 services expert for the New York City Police Department, made a presentation at John Jay College in 1978. At this conference he discussed a 'traumatic syndrome that followed physical injury to police officers. Symonds specified reaction stages and some of the feelings that a police officer goes through in a post-shooting incident. In his essay entitled "Beyond Accounts: The Personal Impact of Police Shootings," Van Maanen (1980) suggested that the possibility that the impact of shooting without physical and psychological reactions is rare. However, he admitted that what happens to the individual after a shooting depends on what others in the immediate situation do. He further stated that officers personally define their work and portray it as heavily laden with violence, confrontation, and the possibility of sudden death. This characterizes the officers’ beliefs or the sense of risk that the officers feel in their assignments. Van Maanen indicated that a shooting event is without boundaries in the sense that it is unpredictable and comes as a surprise. To the officers, violence is an occupational hazard and is well-recognized and often discussed. Therefore, although shooting incidents are viewed as routine organizationally, they do have unusual and unexpected shock effect on the individuals involved. .Cohen (1980) pointed out that stress or the stressful confrontation that officers perceive often evolves from the investigation and administration questions after the shooting. Her f a bf Cc 18 work was completed from a series of interviews, and she suggested that the memory of the incident may drive the officer to the extreme use of alcohol or into self-doubt and withdrawal from the job. According to Cohen, personal doubts that accompany police officer shootings are frequent because of the strong, highly rigid moral standards of police officers. Cohen (1980) also discussed the elements of "peer worship." Police officers who are involved in a fatal shooting quickly learn that there is seldom anything heroic in their incidents and, in fact, are appalled as their anxieties and reactions are compounded by others, including law enforcement officers, in hero worship. Cohen suggested that it was not unusual for an officer to resign as a result of the shooting. Limited studies in Michigan, Texas, Utah, and Massachusetts supported that there was a high correlation between post-shooting trauma, the incident, and resignation or leaving the department within a short period of time. Cohen (1980) quoted several psychologists regarding what support was necessary. One of the articles Cohen identified was completed by Lippert and Saper (1981). These professionals identified and discussed a pattern of reaction of the officer involved in shooting incidents. They also reiterated the constant theme found in previous literature, which was essentially that officers who are involved in the use of deadly force often experience strong emotional and psychological reactions that greatly influence their ability to cope with their job, family, and life in general. Because of the very real threats these officers face when ra 6." ar liar lo 19 they take a human life and the resultant emotional and psychological reactions, it should be inandatory, from the perspective of the police psychologist, that an officer have the availability of and contact with a psychologist to specifically handle stress reactions. Lippert and Saper recommended that these meetings be mandatory rather than voluntary because there remained a stigma in law enforcement associated with seeking psychological counseling. One of the themes that ran throughout the Lippert (1981) article was that police officers’ responses to killing another individual vary. This variance can be extreme in some cases where reactions actually immobilize the officer. The other extreme of the continuum of reaction would be no reaction at all. Ihi acceptable explanation is that it is normal to have an abnormal reaction to an abnormal situation. There was agreement among the police psychologists that an officer must understand that the reactions and feelings that he or she is experiencing at the time are normal reactions and are not part of a physical or mental breakdown, nor are they indications of some type of personality weakness. This is in direct contrast to the macho image that police officers quite frequently use as a shield to hide their emotions. In conclusion, Lippert reiterated that the key point of dealing with the serious psychological events following a shooting incident was that stress management or counseling contact be initiated within the first two to four days after the shooting incident. Lip trauma innediat event af three t: effect. three pt Gatherir Sueport, dealing u fellow 11' the offi_| in3mm;- and EXPré Jam; DEpartmE, DDOSt-tra internali SUTrOUndi Effect w; 20 Lippert and Ferrara (1981) identified four major phases of trauma involving a critical incident. Those phases included the immediate reaction during the shooting, the initial reaction to the event after the shooting incident took place, that critical first three to four days’ follow-up period, and then the long-range effect. They provided insight into some of the events of the first three phases by identifying a pattern of reaction to include denial, gathering facts, reporting facts, physical anxiousness, peer-group support, moral self-questioning, an impulse to resign, and the dealing with peers and subordinates in law enforcement. Many times, fellow law enforcement officers do not know exactly how to react to the officer who has been involved in a shooting. At times there is inappropriate reaction, inappropriate identification with the event, and expression of desire to have been part of that shooting. James Shaw (1981), a licensed psychologist with the King County Department of Public Safety, Olympia, Washington, used the term "post-traumatic stressor." He stated that this was a process of internalizing extreme stress that was a result of the trauma surrounding a shooting incident. Shaw related that part of this effect was based on the characteristics of the officer involved and described many officers as joining police departments with a "Boy Scout syndrome." In effect, this resulted from police officers placing a high value on life and seeing themselves as resources or helping persons. Shaw (1991a, 1991b) stated that quite frequently there is a delayed reaction after a shooting and described its characteristics 21 as (a) sleep-pattern disturbance, including problems in sleeping and recurring nightmares about the incident; (b) flashbacks of the incident, generally in slow motion; (c) development of emotional isolation, which affects job performance, but more critically, family family relationships as the officer becomes emotionally cold and withdrawn, having difficulty establishing and/or maintaining intimate relationships; (d) episodes of depression and helplessness, in which thoughts of suicide are common, with self-destructive- behavior tendencies; (e) fears and anxieties where the officer questions himself as to his abilities to handle further situations, questions concerning whether he will react too quickly and take another life, or whether he will be unable to react appropriately in future situations and therefore jeopardize himself and become the victim; and (f) alienation from, criticism, and distrust of the agency in particular, and the system in general--the officer has difficulty with authority figures and may challenge and test rules and regulations. Shaw (1991a, 1991b) emphasized the fact that an officer who experiences any or all of these symptoms is not psychotic but merely reacting through a unique syndrome of adjustment to a traumatic, stressful situation. He also stated that this can be a prolonged stressful situation. Shaw recommended that conventional counseling be afforded these officers, and he also discussed the formation of a crisis-assistance team to use in aa traumatic situation. He described the team as being generally composed of a legal advisor, med‘ invc indi what Depar‘ you ca Offic entorc l‘p COURSE Stated 22 medical health professional, and a police officer‘ who has been involved in a prior shooting incident. As a whole, all of these individuals must understand the law enforcement officer, who he is, what he is, and why he came into the law enforcement profession. During the late 19705 and early 19805, several newspaper articles and short publications had some pertinence to post- shooting-trauma reactions. One (Hi these articles, entitled "Survivor Guilt," was published in The New York Timaa (1977). It discussed the symptomatology as well as the post-prevention and aftercare. A second article, entitled "The Second Injury," was published in Sunday News Magazine (Daly, 1979). This article was a result of comprehensive work conducted by Robert Daly, the Director of Psychological Services in the New York City Police Department. Daly pointed out that several things that evolved in the "second injury" included a kind of personality change and the feelings of bitterness. Daly stated that an officer who had been a victim of a shooting could manifest traumatic neuroses. Kraft (1983) quoted Edward Donovan of the Boston Police Department as saying that "post-shooting trauma is the worst place you can be as a cop." Donovan further stated that about 80% of the officers who are involved in shooting incidents leave law enforcement, quitting their department within two years. That same refrain ‘was echoed by John Powell, a, Michigan State University counseling professor and practicing psychologist. Powell (1983) stated that 70% of the officers involved in a killing leave the force within seven years. He fhrther warned that, in many cases, there doubt, unreso office C. trauna' bargair the S} confide a backg Process CTitjCa- the inc Share. In ASSOCtat that prg based 0r 23 there was no one to guide the officers through the periods of self- doubt, depression, anger, and guilt, and that if this trauma was unresolved it could, in fact, lead directly to the ruination of the officer and his life. Carson (1982) defined the stages of this pattern of post- traumatic-stress reaction as denial, isolation, anger, resentment, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. He related these stages to the symptoms that the officers work through themselves. The commonalities are recognizing the symptoms and patterns that lead to an effective approach to intervention. Again, Carson suggested the formation of a crisis-assistance team to use in the traumatic situation. He further suggested the use of a voluntary, confidential, free counseling service with a psychotherapist who has a background in law enforcement. He defined the peer-counseling process as including an officer who has been there and involved in a critical incident himself or herself. This individual must possess the incident experience, the ability to listen, and the ability to share. In A Balance of Force, a report published for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Matulia (1982) recommended that professional counseling be mandatory. This recommendation was based on the understanding that there remains a stigma in law enforcement concerning those who seek psychological counseling. Counseling directly confronts the macho image possessed by the law enforcement officer. According to Matulia,-this service must also be tin be aff sugges shooti should ones. N effect analys lt rel out 01 ETAlias ShOOIll fact t shoote, the sh: DETcept incidEr 24 be timely. A brief contact by a mental health professional should be afforded within the first 48 hours. In his IACP report, Matulia suggested that the officer’s family suffers through the post- shooting trauma as well. He recommended that counseling services should also be available to the officer’s immediate family and loved ones. Nielsen (1981) provided the first empirical insight into the effects of post-shooting trauma. His focus was developed by an analysis of traumatic stress and post-traumatic—stress disorder as it relates to combat psychiatry. One of the main points that came out of Nielsen’s work, was that there was an apparent lack of emphasis on the well-being of the officers involved in the shootings. He based this statement and his further analysis on the fact that very few services were provided for the police officer shooter who has experienced emotional and physical distress after the shooting. Nielsen cited several frequent reactions, including perceptual distortion, which is often described as experiencing the incident in slow motion. Another major point that came from Nielsen’s study was that shootings were magnified by vague, ill- defined, and agonizingly long post-shooting investigations and review procedures. He recommended that officers involved in shootings should be provided with counseling services and that the department’s post-shooting procedure should be clear, concise, and applied as quickly as possible. Hill (1984) stated that when an officer is involved in a shooting incident there are four primary high-risk situations that have a ; | specific I is woun I when the | reinforc of the most stv death of DSycholo’l 303 - 1 his, F the FBI). 25 have a significant effect on the trauma. Those circumstances focus specifically on when the officer shoots somebody, when the officer is wounded, when the officer’s partner is wounded or killed, and when the officer is present when somebody else is killed. This was reinforced by Sewell’s (1981) evaluation, in which he identified 25 of the most stressful events experienced in law enforcement. The most stressful event, as reflected in this study, was the violent death of a partner in the line of duty. Thereafter, in rank order, were several other stressful events: dismissal, taking a life in the line of duty, shooting somebody in the line of duty, suicide of an officer who is a close friend, violent death of another officer in the line of duty, murder committed by a txflice officer, duty- related violent injury, and violent job-related injury to another officer. Sewell noted that the significant events in these top nine stressors revolve around death, suicide, and bodily injury, and that personal involvement in these events reflects significant stressors and potential for post-traumatic-stress reaction. In June 1983, the Director of the FBI, William H. Webster, commissioned a pilot study to examine post-shooting trauma, its ramifications and effects on special agents of the FBI as they are involved in the exercise of deadly force. This pilot study was to determine whether Bureau agents have problems physically or psychologically resulting from the use of deadly force. David Soskis, Carol Soskis (contract psychological services employees of the FBI), and the writer established the goal of this project to neutr 14 st speci‘ involi 26 make appropriate recommendations to institute a Bureau policy to neutralize effects of post-shooting trauma. This pilot study drew 14 special agents of the FBI in a conference setting, focusing specifically on the 17 shooting incidents in which they had been involved. The initial exploration and analysis during the interaction and conference revealed areas of similarity and also areas of difference between the agents of the FBI and the police experience in the realm of' post-shooting ‘trauma. Extreme reactions described in police literature, such as the complete inability to function on the job (Donovan, 1983; Hill, 1984; Somodevilla, 1981), leaving the agency (Nielsen, 1981; Powell, 1983; Somodevilla, 1981), or incapacitating psychological or physical symptoms (Cohen, 1980; Hill, 1984; Matulia, 1982; Nielsen, 1981; Somodevilla, 1981) were not observed. In addition, agents uniformly reported that their firearms training had prepared them well for their incidents and, in fact, had provided the ability and was given credit for saving their lives. The incidents involving these special agents showed an almost complete absence of the classic bad shooting that often stems from an unplanned patrol or domestic-dispute setting with minimal or no backup and support. The tasteless joking and hypermasculine macho comments concerning shooting incidents were far rarer in the FBI than were reported in the police literature (Ayoob, 1980; Carson, 1982; Shaw, 1981; Somodevilla, 1981), although they'cihi sometimes occur. De: signific the age readjust profess stressfc shooting incident prevent: The exDerier “Ettore c a99nts . Iamilie, eXDErier plOionCE Staff on esDecial EXIEnded police Oi lnCTdEnt. legal re DOTiCe u lhl: d isorder 27 Despite these positive findings, it was painfully clear that significant symptoms and psychological readjustments did occur in the agents following the exercise of deadly furce. Whereas readjustment generally was manageable, most agents thought that some professional and peer support would have been helpful during those stressful periods. Specific recommendations for intervention at the shooting scene, during the first week, and following the shooting incidents, as well as discussion of long-term issues and training in prevention recommendations, were developed in detail. The character of post-shooting trauma and its stress experienced by agents. was, in part, conditioned by the special nature of the Bureau as a national organization. Although most agents and their families thought that field office staff and families rallied to their support, considerable stress was experienced by agents and their families in the course of the prolonged administrative investigations conducted by the inspection staff quartered at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. This was especially a problem when these investigations continued over an extended period of time. Agents and their families shared with police officers concern about legal liabilities surrounding shooting incidents, but because of the absence in the FBI of the kind of legal representation often provided on the scene and afterwards by police unions, agents often felt much more vulnerable in these areas. This pilot group used the diagnosis of post-traumatic-stress disorder as reflected in the American Psychiatric Association (1980) Diagn stres it anr invol' or ner nucoii Withdi group t0 tht avoids lucid; Ptovic disor: 28 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). This diagnosis required a stressor that would cause symptoms in almost everyone experiencing it and a positive occurrence of symptoms in three groups. The first involved reexperiencing of the trauma in terms of intrusive thoughts or memories, flashbacks, and so forth. The second group involved a numbing or reduced responsiveness to the environment as expressed by withdrawal of interest and the feeling of detachment. The final group involved the presence of two or more of six symptoms related to the incidents, such as startle response, sleep disturbance, and avoidance of situations or circumstances similar to the traumatic incident. This pilot study included a literature review and provided an insight into the responses 1x; a post-traumatic-stress disorder as reflected in this diagnostic manual. It is significant that the majority of agents reported that they could remember the shooting as if it had happened yesterday. In 11 out of the 17 incidents, agents responded positively to the statement, "After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger." There was a normal reaction on the part of many agents of regret and sympathy for the subject who had been shot. Not all of the effects of the shooting incident were perceived as negative. Several of the agents mentioned that they had "met the test" of a severe stressor and they felt more confident in themselves and less need to prove themselves in other situations. It was a further positive note that, in more than half of the incidents, agents reported that they had reevalua values. these a; her a optimist thought others. count or In evaluate ldEntif Underst; TESponse aPDTOprj 0f aOFEn Previous 1980; Lo as b9ing auditory Charactel ag€nts l' 29 reevaluated what was important in their lives as to their goals and values. A general overall conclusion was provided that each of these agents, as a whole, thought that this experience made him or her a better person. In general comments, agents remained optimistic about their ability to cope with the future stresses and thought that the experience had taught them that they could trust others, to include family members, peers, and fellow agents, and count on them during a crisis. In this pilot study, both physical and emotional responses were evaluated. Several of the frequent emotional responses that were identified were disbelief, where there was the inability to understand that this event really had happened; an automatic response, which was suggested by many of the agents based on appropriate training and conditioning in the use of firearms; rush of adrenalin; strength; and fear. Several perceptual distortions previously mentioned by many of the police psychologists (Ayoob, 1980; L00, 1986; Nielsen, 1980; Powell, 1983) also were identified as being significant by the agents involved, including slow motion, auditory blocking, and tunnel vision. Less frequent physical characteristics, responses, or symptoms that, were _identified by agents involved in critical incidents where they used deadly force included fatigue, sleep problems, anxiety or tension, and depression. A major category of response provided by these agents was measured through a series of questions and responses, and was also evaluated through interviews. Reactions of others were generally characterized as being overwhelmingly supportive. Those support by fell area of wives/9' of the their fr; release. the eff _ Coin» ‘th3a* not hav< the Ml . 30 supportive concerns were identified specifically as being provided by fellow agents, spouses, or girlfriends. Another significant area of reaction identified by the agents involved was that their wives/girlfriends were upset and fearful for the health and welfare of the agents. These agents stated that the ability to talk out their feelings, frustrations, and experiences provided an excellent release. This again has been supported by much of the literature in the effort to identify a peer group--that is, someone who has had similar experiences. It has been recognized that talking out feelings is a natural and quite frequently necessary mode of coping with traumatic-stress experiences. The reactions of the families of the agents seem to vary more than the specific reactions of the agents themselves. The nature of the incident, i.e., whether an agent was wounded or whether someone was killed, had a definite effect on the reactions of the spouses or girlfriends. The spouses shared the concern of the agents about potential lawsuits, and some spouses resented a prolonged FBI investigation into inns shooting incident. These prolonged investigations caused a sense of being "left out in the cold" or defenseless. There were some particular problematic issues for families of the agents who had been wounded during the shooting incident, particularly financial arrangements and sometimes worker’s compensation, handling phone calls, dealing with small children, and not having friends and relatives immediately available to assist them. An: the so; Undoubte physicaT peer gr: by fell them wit prising the spa news m5; tipifiej had beet ch genera] 1” that 31 Another significant issue in this pilot project revolved around the source of support as well as the source of aggravation. Undoubtedly, the support provided to special agents of the FBI, both physically and mentally, was based in two areas: the home and the peer group. Agents specifically stated that they were most assisted by fellow agents and second by their wives/girlfriends providing them with the ability to cope with life in general. Somewhat sur- prising was the identification of major sources of aggravation by the special agents who were involved in shooting incidents. The news media emerged as the most aggravating. Frequently, the media typified the shooting incident as being one in which excessive force had been used or concluded that this particular incident could have been resolved with appropriate negotiation. Not surprisingly, the next major aggravation to the agents involved in shooting incidents was Bureau officials themselves. A general tone of hostility and anger arose from a shooting incident in that anger was directly focused on the FBI because of the agents’ belief that the investigation was adversarial and prolonged. The investigations themselves are blocks to final completion and resolution of these traumatic incidents. The shooting incident and the life-threatening situation challenge the sense of security and basic trust of the strongest and best adjusted person. That heightened sensitivity or hypersensitivity concerning how their organization supports them or withholds that support is critical. Although it is necessary to have a thorough and fair investigation into an incident, the prolonged nature and fragmented communications surroun: signific An attribut shooting other a situatic had this reassure the rec overrid aTDYOpri it guide The r“Wise rounding 32 surrounding that investigation become a source of stress to a significant number of agents involved. An overwhelming finding of this pilot study was that agents attributed great value in their coping with the trauma of the shooting incidents to the opportunity to both talk and listen to other agents who had been involved in the same or a similar situation. The opportunity to share and compare with others who had had this particular experience was extremely beneficial in providing reassurance and support. This finding provided the rationale for the recommendation that a peer-support program be established. iAn overriding issue that was focused on was the development of appropriate recommendations necessary for the FBI to establish a set of guidelines to counteract the trauma of a shooting incident. There was a detailed analysis regarding assignments and responses after a critical incident, particularly questions sur- rounding assignments at the shooting scene, the necessity of the administrative inquiry, and questioning as to the adversarial aspect of that inquiry--seeking fault rather than providing the agent with the opportunity to "tell his or her story" appropriately. Further issues that were evaluated were the need for legal advice and representation, administrative leave, training for new agents, and various phases of' development in expeditious resolution of the shooting investigation itself. From this pilot study, a series of recommendations and guidelines were established. 'Those recommendations and guidelines I were sei shootirgl term is: In‘ of concr opportu' as $00,” 33 were separated into four distinct phases: (a) intervention at the shooting scene, (b) intervention during the first week, (c) long- term issues, and (d) prevention and training. Initially, at the shooting scene, there must be an expression of concern for the agent involved. A second issue would be the opportunity for the agent to contact his or her spouse and/or family as soon as possible after the incident. If the agent had been injured, there should be an immediate personal response to the family by an agent who has some personal familiarity with the family. A third aspect of the intervention at the shooting scene would include the immediate removal of the personnel involved from that scene. Another issue that frequently surfaced in the literature (Matulia, 1982; Nielsen, 1981; Somodevilla, 1981) was that if, in fact, the weapon has been seized for evidence or for ballistic testing, another weapon should be issued immediately because a weapon is part and parcel of the image of the law enforcement officer. Several of the key elements of the intervention during the first week should be'the availability of a peer-support team of persons to allow the agent involved in the critical incident to vent or tell his or her story. The second would be the availability of a mental health professional through the Psychological Services Program of the FBI. A third issue that surfaced would be the development of a brochure that would be available to the agents, which would cover the symptoms to be expected in the normal course as regards the phases of post-traumatic stress. That brochure would also in investi; counsel include investig rind,“ 34 also include the administrative handling of the post-shooting investigation, the legal aspects of the shooting incident, and what counseling services would be available for the agent involved in that critical incident. Another phase of the intervention during the first week would be the availability of administrative leave at the discretion of the persons involved in this critical incident. Long-term issues that were identified during this pilot study included the necessity of facilitating the administrative investigation 50 that the agents are not left "twisting in the wind." A second long-term issue that was recognized is that agents are not always ready immediately to move back into their work assignment, and there should be some type of flexibility or allowance for the agents to pace themselves into the return. A major consideration in this long-term issue was the development of training, be it sensitivity or understanding of the shooting incident for the inspection staff from FBI headquarters. This training did, in fact, ensure that at least there was an understanding of the personal experiences of those agents involved in the shooting incident. As part of the prevention and training, one of the significant recommendations that was established was a block of training that would prepare new agents through an introduction to post—shooting trauma. This inoculation session would be developed and presented by the FBI’s Behavioral Sciencee Unit. A final issue that was addressed was the need for communication through briefings and/or EDDT‘ODI“ with tt shooting for dea trauma. Appendi> In present establis 1. 2. COUnSeli hyPErmaS Dartjcjp 35 appropriate memoranda to the management of the FBI to provide them with the understanding and recognition that incorporates post- shooting trauma, its effects, and the appropriate recommendations for dealing with employees of the FBI who are involved in such a trauma. A full copy of the completed pilot study is included in Appendix C. In summary, from the early articles, publications, formal presentations, and research, several points of consensus were established. Those points were: 1. A shooting is a major trauma for the officers involved. 2. An officer’s reactions to the shooting vary with: a. His or her previous reputation and status, personality, and work experience. b. The circumstances of the shooting. c. Peer response. d. Administration response. e. Media and community responses. 3. An officer’s reactions to shooting are unpredictable in advance. 4. An officer’s public responses to offers of_post-shooting counseling may be negative and a reflection of the prevailing hypermasculine macho police image. 5. The department should consider mandating that officers participate in confidential, professional post-shooting counseling. clear admini 36 6. The post-shooting policy should be delineated so that it is clearly understood by the officers involved and also by the administrators of the law enforcement agency. The significance of this effort on the part of police psychologists was, in fact, the recognition of post-shooting trauma, its effects on the officers or agents involved in the shooting incident, and the ultimate development of appropriate policies and procedures to reduce the murky aspect of the aftermath of these incidents. Understanding and Treatment of Post-Shooting Trauma In the mid-19805, the police community and mental health and psychological services professionals continued to focus their attention and energy on post-trauma stress, or post-shooting trauma, as it affected the officers involved. Their efforts moved beyond merely the identification and recognition of post-shooting trauma and resulted in an expanded awareness. This awareness motivated them to establish programs and explore resources to address the consequences of the exercise of deadly force. Police psychological service professionals assumed a leadership role in providing that understanding of post-shooting trauma and the development of treatment and programs to address the aftermath. Police psychologists provided significant leadership through their activities, which included publishing articles and conducting workshops and conferences pertaining to post-shooting trauma. Emerging expertise expanded the cadre of professionals who chose to — assist inclu Schae' name . forth. invol‘ expam sacri‘ Pol ice on P0' 37 assist law enforcement. Significant contributions during that time include the work of Roger M. Solomon, James M. Horn, Robert Schaefer, Wayne Hill, Clarence Jones, and Michael J. McMains, to name a few. Two significant events directly expanded the understanding and further recognition of and commitment to the officers and agents involved in the exercise of deadly force. That commitment was expanded to include the families of those who made the ultimate sacrifice. Those two events were the feunding of the Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS) and the convening of the National Symposium on Police Psychological Services. COPS was founded in 1984 as a national network to provide peer support to police survivors. The key to their organizational goals was peer support. That recurring theme of assistance through peers has been observed as the best tool for helping. A second goal established by COPS was to provide assistance and guidelines and to prepare the law enforcement community to address line-of-duty deaths through victimization training. COPS was initially funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and has since received support from police organizations, private foundations, corporations, and private citizens. The initial research grant established by NIJ resulted in a report entitled "Line of Duty Deaths: Survivor and Department Responses" (Stillman, 1987). ‘That study, coupled with the commitment of survivors, has provided direction, guidance, and understanding in how to deal with the trag SUF? stag conc con; assi to t fami hate Hell con: 53C? 38 tragedy of line—of-duty deaths, as well as how to provide emotional support and counseling to the surviving families. An eye-opener provided by the NIJ research was that a staggering 67% of law enforcement agencies lacked formal policies concerning the deaths of officers. The lack of guidelines compounded the emotional tragedy of the surviving families. Based on that research, COPS (1988) published a law enforcement agency’s handbook entitled Support Services to Surviving Families of Line-of- Duty Death. This handbook covered significant issues such as death notification, assisting the family at the hospital, support for the family during the wake and funeral, providing information on assistance and benefits to the surviving family, continued follow-up to the family as a departmental responsibility, and support of the family during trials. Through this outstanding effort, a range of materials were developed that are necessary in providing a sense of well-being and organizational support from the law enforcement community to the family of that officer who has made the ultimate sacrifice. Appendix E contains a copy of the 1988 COPS handbook. The second event that influenced the law enforcement community’s effort to address post-shooting trauma was a conference held at the FBI Academy in September 1984, entitled "The National Symposium of Police Psychological Services." The theme of that symposium was helping services. More than 150 professionals participated in that week-long working conference to assist, improve, and maintain mental health services for the nation’s law enforcement officers. A call for papers produced a state-of-the-art 39 publication entitled Psychological Services for Law Enforcement. That compilation of papers was edited by Reese and Goldstein (1986). The publication included sections pertaining to police-officer selection and assignment, counseling, organizational issues, psychological services, and stress and stress management. Section Five specifically addressed critical incident reactions. At that time, the work reflected in that publication of the professionals was the gospel on critical incident reactions. The breadth of information provided by the practitioners and experts in their papers was remarkable. The range of information included Baruth’s (1986) discussion of the role of the police psychologist in pre-critical assistance. Essentially, Baruth reviewed the consequences of job-related stress on the performance of police officers and focused on previous works that suggested that the police officer’s reaction to a shooting incident cannot be predicted in advance. He developed several recommendations for law enforcement agencies to establish procedures and policies to deal with incidents that create high levels of stress for officers. Baruth’s work was further defined and augmented by two other writers, Blak (1986) and Frederick (1986). Each of their articles provided an analysis of post-traumatic-stress disorders and the reactions of law enforcement officers to a violent confrontation. Both-identified initial intervention-response treatment 11) provide the victim officer with honest and accurate information to deal not only with the tragic event, but also the potentially significant step react pTOYli appro; react “than Show J‘10 "Era 4O aftermath of violent trauma. Blak (1986, 1991), Fowler (1986), Garrison (1986, 1991), McMains (1986a, 1986b, 1991), and Somodevilla (1986) expanded treatment models, as well as initial intervention strategy. The timely and appropriate response, not only by the administration, but also be peers, was identified as a significant step in providing the foundation to alleviate long-term stress reaction. That timeliness of intervention was perceived as a key to providing an understanding of the vulnerability of the officers, and appropriate principles of management served to properly resolve reactions to shootings. The principles of management as identified through the works of McMains included brevity cn~ra short-term intervention; immediacy, which essentially was intervening as soon as possible; centrality, which provided more effective and efficient use of resources through a team approach; expectancy, which conveyed an understanding to the officer regarding his or her expectations and efforts; and proximity, which was, in fact, as close to the shooting as possible. Included in the writings of these professionals were the initial reactions, the reactions to the investigation, short-term follow-up, extended follow-up from up to six weeks, and then long-term follow- up of expectations. Solomon and Horn (1986) provided an overview of a pilot study that addressed the full range of reactions to include the perceptual distortion of all five senses, the standard responses, and the emotional responses. The types of intrusive thoughts or flashbacks were again reviewed, as well as the isolation or alienation and 41 other consequences. These professionals determined that approxi- mately one-third of those individuals involved in shooting incidents had limited reactions, one-third had moderate reactions, and the final one-third had severe reactions. It was important to assess the reactions of the officer or agent involved in the shooting to determine an appropriate level of support needed. There were prior significant correlations to support variables in the investigative process that directly affect how an officer reacts to his or her critical events. Their recommendations, 'hi fact, paralleled the recommendations provided by Somodevilla (1986) as standard operating procedures covering police shootings. Those recommendations included the need for a companion officer, removal from the immediate scene, providing ability to respond to the family’s welfare, support and reassurance by the organization, access to legal representation, handling of the media, administrative leave, psychological intervention, and proactive treatment. All of these issues are integral parts of a comprehensive policy 'hi addressing post-shooting trauma. In his paper presented at this symposium, Nielsen (1986) identified the need to assess the stress reaction and different diagnoses as a response to a normal stress, a severe stress, or a stress reaction with preexisting conditions (N‘ impairment. Those treatment implications differentiated from a normal reaction, which may be short term and include symptoms of anxiety, depression, and fatigue. In comparison to that short-term reaction, there could be 42 an extreme tax on an already overloaded c0ping system, which frequently results in social isolation. The extreme reaction typically shows a premorbid adjustment by the officer and is based on preexisting psychological problems and/or general ego weaknesses. The results of this reaction may be the onset of psychotic symptoms or a breakdown in internal regulation or self-control. Throughout that symposium, there was a recognition of the future and the need for further study of post-shooting trauma. Zeling (1986) recognized that the next major hurdle was the growing need for and emphasis on research. That research not only is necessary to have a proactive inoculatory effect, but it will enhance a full mental health and psychological service effort to address post-shooting trauma. Paralleling the efforts of these participants are the efforts educators, researchers, and professionals working in their own organizations’ projects and spheres of influence. Robert L00 (1984), chief psychologist with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, studied post-traumatic-stress reactions to develop psychological- services policies and- procedures in support of members of the Canadian law enforcement community. His two empirical studies determined that officers experience most stress reactions within three days of a shooting. His recommendations paralleled those of psychological service professionals in the United States and incldded psychological debriefing/counseling, a period of leave from duty, and psychological services offered to follow-up. He also recommended the participation of psychological services in all aspectt vortsho provid during for o offic shoo‘ incl decal ccpi 43 aspects of law enforcement, which would include training and workshops that address the police family. Jones (198) published a book entitled After the Smoke Clears: Surviving the Police Shooting. His research effort and analysis provided a basic understanding of what a police officer experiences during and after a shooting. That book, written by a police officer for other police officers, provided insights not only for the line officer, but also for the mid-level manager in dealing with post- shooting trauma. Jones’s explanation of post-shooting trauma included the shooting incident itself, the aftermath, the department’s response, the effect on the family, recommendations for coping, and examples of model policies. Two other pilot studies were completed during this time, one by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, as represented by Stratton, Snibbe, and Bayless (1984), and another broad study completed in Kentucky by Martin, McKean, and Veltkamp (1986). In each of these studies, the variety of psychological reactions was described, and the effects as reported by the respondents or involved officers determined that the emotional responses varied as to the individual involved. Post-shooting-stress disorders were described as a sequel to victimization. These limited pilot studies provided further insight into post-shooting trauma, which goes beyond the everyday traumatic events of the law enforcement officer. In his article entitled "Post-Killing Trauma: When Police Officers Are the Victims," Hill (1984) reviewed the sequence of initia' sharir depart psychc MUTE ( on an; the; 0i to logal. etentr 44 initial response and follow-up. He cHscussed a unique concept of sharing a psychologist, an appropriate solution for small departments that cannot afford the annual salary of a police psychologist. Hill provided an authentic alternative where five or more departments could share the cost (H’ a psychological services division. During this same period, Robert Schaefer, a special agent with the Behavioral Science Unit of the FBI, focused the FBI’s attention on appropriate recognition of the aftermath of a shooting incident through a series of articles. In a presentation before a conference of top-level managers, Schaefer (1986) provided insight into the legal, procedural, and moral issues of post-shooting trauma and the events following the exercise of deadly force. He also provided guidelines for~ intervention. Subsequently, Schaefer (1987) published an article entitled "Post-Shooting Trauma: The Role of the FBI Manager," in an in-house management quarterly. FHs insightfulness provided a projected goal of neutralizing the effects of post-shooting trauma. The key to a healthy response was defined as knowing about the normal reactions to a critical event and then making appropriate adjustments as they (xxnna Another significant step by Schaefer was the initial phase of developing a peer-support process. He defined an effective peer-support program as the basis of developing rapport, facilitating listening, and taking action with the ultimate goal of being able to support and help the agent or police officer involved in a shooting incident by addressing or reducing the trauma associated with that incident. At entitle pamphlr and Ca the pi involv as we‘ identi also 9 essent incide the ag comp’g ltaira l trauma stres: what, demon ”firth 0t Th “is it sit; EXTiOr 45 At that same time, a Bureau project was completed, which was entitled Shooting Incidents: Issues and Explanations for FBI Agentsand Managers (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.). This pamphlet reflected the research efforts of Soskis, Soskis, Schaefer, and Campbell. It provided managers within the FBI an insight into the physiological and psychological aspects of shooting incidents involving FBI agents. The range of reactions during the incident, as. well as other' physiological and psychological reactions, was identified. Family issues, work issues, and successful coping were also preeminent aspects of this summary publication. This pamphlet essentially was a summary of the ramifications of a shooting incident. It was prepared with an emphasis on providing support to the agents involved in shooting incidents. Appendix D contains the complete explanation for FBI agents and managers on post-shooting trauma. The recurring theme in addressing the effects of post-shooting trauma, more specifically defined by clinicians as post—trauma stress, was recognized as peer support. Questions regarding the what, who, and why of a peer-support program have been answered with demonstrated success through the efforts of the professionals working with and in the law enforcement community. Inherent in each of the landmark articles, reports, pilot studies, and initiatives was the realization of the need for more research. That recognition sets the stage for the following section, which concludes the eXploration of the literature. state- beyond forth: resea aware produc daily Exper crash trag (I) ITEQL Help ii ti on r The PTOCT DTOV 46 Research. Refinement, and Professional Development In August 1989, a remarkable week observed the birth of a state-of-the-art assessment of post-shooting trauma and a step beyond in assisting law enforcement. That step beyond was in the further developed recognition, conceptualized treatment, and research in the field of post-critical-incident trauma. The awareness was that life-threatening and traumatic events that produce physical, psychological, and emotional trauma are, in fact, daily' occurrences 11”“ the law enforcement officer. Those experiences include shootings, automobile accidents, airplane crashes, suicides, and training events that result in trauma, tragedy, and personal health problems. All of those events can and frequently do result in post-traumatic-stress reactions. In August 1989, 50 experts in the fields of mental health, employee assistance, Chaplaincy, and law enforcement came together at the FBI Academy to focus their energies, expertise, and attention on research into and treatment of post-critical-incident trauma. The backgrounds and expertise (H"this group of professionals produced a :synergetic- effect. Their‘ contributions and messages provided a range of options and theories to address critical- incident trauma. Their effort ultimately was assembled in Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese et al., 1991). This publication can, in fact, be systematically analyzed through a subset of themes or messages. A brief analysis of this state-of—the-art publication resulted in the ident‘. critic refins 47 identification of five significant themes pertaining to post- critical-incident trauma. Those five areas represent the research, refinement, and professional development of current literature in the field of critical incidents, as well as the tools for dealing with the aftermath of experiences involving the use of deadly force. The focused themes included debriefing models, critical-incident debriefing and peer-support initiatives, mandated aftercare, family and spouse issues, and the role of the chaplain. Two parallel articles also are worthy of mention. Those articles pertained to the second injury and inoculation training. Blak (1991), Havassy (1991), and Violanti (1991) provided insight into critical-incident debriefing models. Much of their work referenced the systematic approach established by Mitchell (1983). The process essentially is the initial defusing of the critical incident through a spontaneous sharing of feelings, support, and ventilation. The second phase is the use of a mental health professional to establish the ground rules. This process leads into a fact phase, which elicits factual information; a feeling phase; a symptom phase, which essentially describes emotional, physical, and mental reactions; a teaching phase; a reentry phase; and the general follow-up or after-contact. Debriefing essentially is the common intervention used in critical incidents. ’The structural phases introduced by Mitchell (1983) resulted in information for successful coping. That coping need, as suggested by Violanti (1991), is created by the effect of the traumatic event and t destrc indest shocki E effeci conch syipt vulnei in a after. Drovi: and t lncoi DVOEE be c: aSEnc lie-as“ 43 and the realization of the vulnerability. That vulnerability destroys the myth possessed by law enforcement officers as to their indestructibility. The unmasking of that vulnerability can be a shocking experience for the law enforcement officer. Bohl (1991) and Solomon (1991) reviewed the long-term effectiveness of a brief psychological intervention. The similar conclusion of their works was that intervention prevents delayed symptoms of stress. They again addressed the dynamics of vulnerability and fear, what the expectations are of being involved in a critical incident, and, more important, how to cope with the aftermath of such an incident. llue models that both proposed provided implications for further training, research, and treatment, and tended to support the mandatory aftercare program. Mandatory aftercare was addressed in more detail by both Reese (1991) and Havassy (1991). Reese suggested that law enforcement officers are an "at risk" population. He essentially suggested that exposure to life-threatening events challenges the equilibrium of those involved. The requirement to adjust to that disequilibrium supports the mandated critical-incident treatment and aftercare program. The recognized need for adjustment, in fact, should be incorporated into departmental or agency policy. It provides protection for the departments and officers involved and should not be construed as a sign of weakness. In fact, the support between agencies and/or the supervisory staff of the department provides a measure of sensitivity and support to the officers or agents invol but ‘ su;;< part 49 involved. These authors not only recommended mandatory aftercare, but they also suggested that same assessment be made available to support persons of the agency, as well as to the families of the participants involved. The most significant theme that evolved in Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese et al., 1991) was the issue of families and spouses. Several authors, including Fisher (1991), Hartsough (1991), Shar (1991), Nittrup (1991), Pastorella (1991), Sawyer (1991), and Sheehan (1991), recognized the effect of the critical incident on family members and support groups of the officers and agents involved, and their subsequent vulnerability. The ripple effect of the traumatic-stress incident creates emotional and physical trauma for those who support the officer and, in fact, it was recognized that that cadre of persons and officers is often overlooked. The need for support and assistance of those involved, both directly and indirectly, was also recognized by Fisher (1991), Hartsough (1991), Shaw (1991), and Sheehan (1991). Nittrup (1991) suggested that little attention has been given to family members and that lack of support,-through ignorance or negligence, compounded the tragedy or the critical-incident trauma effect on the officer involved. These authors supported and defined programs to provide the same debriefings, understanding, and assistance to the families of the officers involved in critical incidents. 'There is evidence that the process of recovery by officers’ and agents’ spouse and immediately family in the case of a death is directly related to the notification process and to the support provi offic proce issue Fami 50 provided. Death notification to the families and spouses of the officers and agents involved must be made through a predetermined process that is sensitively yet professionally handled. 'That same issue becomes a central role of the law enforcement Chaplaincy. Family members, in fact, also experience post-traumatic-stress reactions. The work of COPS, reflected in Sawyer’s (1991) article, suggested that the response of the officer’s department either compounded the trauma of shock or provided a source of strength to the family and spouse involved. An overview of the role of the chaplain in traumatic-incident response was developed in Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese et al., 1991). The Chaplaincy in law enforcement has been defined as an ecumenical perspective providing a worth to family and adding to the support program. Formerly, police chaplains often served in a ceremonial role. Through the recognition of chaplains’ participa- tion in responses to critical incidents, the professional handling of death notifications, and the follow-up support of issues of personal health, the role has been significantly expanded. The Chaplaincy addresses the needs of the spirit. Chaplains provide a resource to address the ethical and moral implications of a shooting. They also can deal with the guilt, anger, fear, and remorse that surface in the aftermath of the experience of deadly force. Chaplains fill a role in addressing the grief that results in the pain of loss. They are trained professionals in handling the aftercare issues. avai exte mam pas Eat cha 51 abc dev the 5P. 51 The role of chaplain meets a level of demands not specifically available in a peer-support program. The role allows for the extension beyond the traumatic event and helps in a practical manner. Chaplaincy provides a resource to the participants in a critical event above and beyond the law enforcement response. Benjestorf (1991), Brende (1991), Dunne (1991), Gold (1991), Palmese (1991), Puckett (1991), and Wentick (1991) all suggested that pastoral presence goes beyond the normal law enforcement support. Each individual involved iri a critical incident feels cn~ sees a chaplain on his or her own terms. The most overwhelming role that is so professionally addressed by the chaplains was discussed in detail by the authors mentioned above, particularly Wentick (1991). That overwhelming or devastating responsibility is death notification. He suggested that there is no easy way, that it must be done with feeling, with understanding of the responses, with expediency, and with first—hand information. Nentick provided guidelines for delivering that tragic message. Those guidelines included dealing with the present, recognizing the potential for emotional and physical responses by the loved ones, and ensuring that a support system is in place for the grieving family. Doing it right requires (sensitivity, understanding, and a format. The personal experiences of the aforementioned authors assisted in ‘the development of a proper notification procedure. The most significant treatment available for the law enforcement officer in addressing critical incidents and post-sh critica 1991) i has su: his pe proies betnee | inmden 52 post-shooting trauma is the available of a peer-support or critical- incident debriefing team. Britt (1991) provided a checklist for a critical-incident response teanL Mitchell (1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1991) has treated law enforcement personnel across the country and has successfully established critical-incident stress teams through his personal and professional dedication to 'the law enforcement profession. The critical-incident team results in a partnership between mental health professionals and emergency workers who are committed to preventing the negative effects of acute stress. They also incorporate many of the resources and tools suggested by the chaplains and family support programs, as well as follow-up response to those affected by post-shooting trauma. Neilson (1991) suggested that there is aui ongoing learning process for those involved 'hi the traumatic-incident corps. Emotional and social support. must be reinforced through lessons learned and incorporated in the legitimization of the team. It is necessary to have a clear policy and procedure documented to ensure proper acceptance. The integrated response must be recognized through an organizationally established statewide multi-agency program. The program should be focused on a strong debriefing component, which is the underlying premise for the success of the peer-support efforts. _Many departments and states have recognized the need fOr law enforcement to establish peer-support services. Kline (1991) suggested that peer counselors are a relatively new phenomenon in lave tool intei toms and t for i and 1 shoes tray. 53 law enforcement; however, they have provided the most significant tool for addressing post-traumatic stress. With the natural built- in trust of another officer, the peer-support program and the intervention provided have been unanimously recognized. The counselor’s knowledge of not only the job, but also the experience and the aftermath, is an effective tool in understanding and liaison for the officer involved, as well as for the family, the department, and the community. The counselors have, in fact, walked in their shoes and experienced the roller coaster of emotions. Two final articles suggested other experiences of post-shooting trauma. The first was "Modeling Inoculation Training for Traumatic Incident Exposure" (Garrison, 1991). In this article, Garrison explored proactive preparatory measures that offer effective strategies for coping during an incident. Essentially, understanding through designed training provides a basis for coping with a future tragedy or critical incident. The overall anxiety and stress resulting from a major critical incident often are compounded by the lack of understanding and lack of control. Garrison suggested that previous training provides necessary skills and coping abilities to deal with tragedies. Snidersich (1991) wrote an article entitled "The Second Injury," in which he suggested that an officer or agent involved in a critical incident or having experienced extreme stress is, in fact, precariously vulnerable, and the effects of being shot or taking ii person’s life are compounded when that individual is confronted with further emotional or psychological challenges. con ass tra the ES . deal aft 54 Dealing with the emotional and psychological reactions of taking a life or being seriously wounded creates an experience that results in the fear and threat of a similar future event. The natural conclusion of his recognition was that care must be taken in future assignments of those individuals who suffer from post-shooting trauma. Second injury is a further theme that will be developed in the recommendations and conclusions of this study. During the past few years, several other significant articles have been published that have contributed to the full understanding and ‘treatment 01: post-critical-incident ‘trauma. Issues of liability, legal analysis, policies, and training have been raised as areas that need refinement when the law enforcement officer uses deadly force. This evaluation is a process of refocusing on the aftermath of a shooting. Titus (1991), Mayer, Coble, and Praet (1989), and Everett (1991) explored the legal responsibilities, not only of the officer or agent, but also of the department or agency. Issues as extreme as failure to train versus an excuse not to work were prevailing questions. These authors also supported the necessity of a proper plan or policy that provided the basis for analysis. Everett reviewed the Supreme Court decision in Garritv v. New Jersey. That analysis established policy issues that required agencies or departments actually to evaluate the interview process of the individual involved in the use of deadly force. That evaluation 55 pointed out the need and concern for appropriate legal advice and representation for the officers involved in shootings. Solomon (1990) continued to focus his energies and attention through the Police Psychological Services Section of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). He reviewed and documented administrative guidelines for officers involved in on-duty shooting situations. Those guidelines were not unique. They covered the range of the emotional reactions of the officer, the administrative aspects of the investigation, mandatory confidential debriefings, administrative leave, and the expeditious completion of the administrative and criminal investigation. Solomon’s concluding remarks suggested that training of all officers in critical-incident reaction—-in what is to be expected personally, departmentally, and legally--is the key to the prevention of that second injury. A significant issue in a pilot study by Band and Vasquez (1991) was survivability. They concluded that proper training is necessary to ensure that law enforcement officers are prepared to meet occupational challenges. They identified five critical items perceived as important to survivability. Those items include self- confidence in performance, training, effectiveness in combat, decisiveness, and perseverance under stress. These authors recognized that their effort was a preliminary one and that further research is necessary to examine the war in the streets and the survivability of the warriors (the law enforcement officers). unde oiii lien lnCi full. was 56 If one looks back at yesterday and then accounts for today and looks ahead to tomorrow in a systematic and educated manner, that exploration might be defined as visionary. That was, in fact, what Carlson (1989) accomplished in his command-college research paper, "How Will Law Enforcement Agencies Manage the Issue of Post-Shooting Trauma by the Year 2000?" In this extended research effort, Carlson examined potential future scenarios that are likely to confront those professionals who are exploring post-shooting trauma and the ultimate effect on the law enforcement officer. The considerations examined through a future-oriented approach provided an understanding of the potential effect on the future of those officers involved in critical incidents. Carlson reviewed fUture trends, which range from more officer-involved shootings to the increased quality of psychological services. Through the use of futures techniques, including scanning, future wheel, nominal group techniques, and trend analysis, Carlson was able to identify five important events that may have an effect on the future services to the law enforcement professionals involved in shooting incidents. Those future events include economic depression that results in major cutbacks in resources for criminal justice, law enforcement officers being prosecuted and convicted for involvement in shootings, major shooting incidents resulting in significant loss of life, the development of effective nonlethal weapdns that would result in the reduction of officer-involved shootings, and the restructuring of the draft based on a major military conflict. Carlson’s cross-impact analysis provided a systs traur in ti post‘ estat explc from tontr Drofi ijCl 57 systematic insight into what may be the future of post-shooting trauma. He identified two keys for addressing post-shooting trauma in the future. Those keys are awareness and commitment to managing post-shooting trauma. Conclusion In the past decade, a true recognition and understanding of and established treatment models for post-shooting trauma have been explored and developed through the work of dedicated professionals from many diverse fields. This literature review recognized the contributions and recommendations of a significant number of those professionals from the fields of law enforcement, police psychological services, mental health, psychiatry, and social work. The professional concern and care expressed in each of the individual contributions are commendable. The challenge ahead for all is iX) continue further empirical research, to communicate the findings, and to ensure that the lessons. of' the past are not forgotten, while at the same time expanding on new efforts to further develop treatment that addresses the post—critical-incident trauma of the law enforcement officer who serves and protects. A second challenge is to continue to safeguard the families and support groups of those who serve. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY Introduction This chapter contains an overview of the design, instrument, and methodology used in this study. The research design was a combination of a longitudinal survey with a cross-section analysis. The survey facilitated and supported a comparative analysis between a pre-program sample and a current set of responses. The survey was initially developed to analyze post-shooting trauma involving special agents of the FBI who had been involved in shooting incidents. The instrument that was used, in part, was a modification of the questionnaire developed by Neilson (l98l) in his research. Neilson provided a formal authorization for the use of the> questionnaire. The research instrument was modified to be appropriate for special agents of the FBI. .A second section was added to this instrument to evaluate post—traumatic stress disorder. Population For the purpose of evaluation, this analysis focused on the implication and impact of shooting incidents on special agents of the FBI. The initial source of respondents was identified through a detailed analysis of agents who had been involved in shooting incidents for the period from T973 through l983. One hundred 58 59 questionnaires were forwarded to these agents who were identified as being involved in a serious shooting incident, asking for their participation in this research project. Ninety-two respondents provided their insights into the effect of shooting incidents. Their responses provided the basis for the development of a post- shooting policy. A pilot survey pretested the instrument and allowed for detailed interviews and individual responses. Subsequently, through the establishment of Post-Critical-Incident Training Seminars and the continued use of this questionnaire as an evaluative instrument, a basis for a comparative analysis was possible. A total of 333 employees of the FBI have related their personal experience while attending these seminars and are represented and documented in the research program. A recent sampling of special agents who had been involved in a shooting and also participated in the Post-Critical- Incident Seminar during the period from l986 through l989 provided the specific basis for the comparative analysis conducted in this research. DMD. The initial purposes of this study were primarily exploratory and descriptive. A further developed focus of the research was to present a comparative analysis of those special agents who were involved in shooting incidents before the FBI’s implementation of a Critical Incident Program with those agents who received support and assistance through the Pbst-Critical-Incident Seminar. The ___ _‘m-,.- data- endec asses incic of t atte Acad. psych forma agent: 60 data-collection instrument used in this research was generally open ended. The questionnaire, as modified, was specifically designed to assess the nature of the shooting incidents and the effect of those incidents on agents who were directly involved. A follow-up aspect of this study was to conduct individual interviews during the attendance at Post-Critical-Incident Seminars held at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. The Questionnaire The questionnaire (Appendix A) was an adaptation of a previously used instrument and was constructed with two separate sets of questions. The first set of questions was designed to elicit insight into the shooting incidents and the responses of the agents involved. It also focused on any support obtained, as well as the aggravations of being involved in shooting incidents. Another expectation of the questionnaire was to determine specifically from whom the agents received emotional and psychological support. The questions were established it: a simple format with an easy check-off list to capture the responses of the agents. The second section of the questionnaire was designed with an open-ended format allowing for "yes" or "no" responses. This particular section focused on general understanding and evaluation of post-traumatic stress disorder as reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (3rd ed.). David Soskis provided invaluable assistance in the review and construction of both sections of this questionnaire. F effort as we incide comle involi mm with FBI A 61 Follow—up interviews were incorporated in this process in an effort to elicit factual information concerning shooting incidents, as well as to explain further the agents’ responses to the incidents. ‘These follow-up interviews were used in) reinforce and complement the questionnaires. It was recognized that the agents involved in shooting incidents frequently had emotionally charged responses and reactions; therefore, the interviews were conducted with sensitivity. Pilot Study In July l983, l4 special agents of the FBI were brought to the FBI Academy to provide a basis for the analysis of the discussions of post-shooting trauma. Those l4 agents had been involved in a total of T7 shooting incidents. The continued goal of that conference was to determine whether FBI agents suffered from post- shooting trauma and, if so, to make appropriate recommendations to minimize the negative effects of that trauma. The conference format included an introduction to the goals and objectives of the conference, the completion and analysis of the formal questionnaire, personal interviews, and a series of group discussions. From the information that was developed at the conference, the interviews, and analysis of research, several positive recommendations were instituted, dealing with the need for the FBI to establish a program or policy to address post-shooting trauma. 'This pilot study provided an opportunity to evaluate the questionnaire to determine an appropriate understanding of the 62 questions themselves and allowed for individual responses through the focused interviews. The pilot project provided an invaluable basis for further recommendations and analysis. A full, detailed report of this conference was prepared (Appendix C) and forwarded to the Director of the FBI, reflecting the evaluation, accomplishments, and recommendations of the participants. Data Collection The initial data were collected and presented in a systematic manner. The questionnaire was sent out to special agents of the FBI W‘i th a cover letter (Appendix B). The recipients were a narrow Se1ection of special agents identified through Bureau records who w(are involved in shooting incidents from l973 through l983. The r‘ecipients of this questionnaire were, in fact, involved in shooting irI<:idents as narrowly defined in this research where an agent was k‘i 1led or wounded, or the subject was killed or seriously wounded. The cover letter provided an explanation of the rationale for this re search project and asked for each agent’s participation. A return r‘equest was made, using the FBI mailing system. No follow-up ma 1'ling was necessary because of the extraordinary response rate of 92 out of MO initial questionnaires (92%). An effort was made to de‘termine the reason for lack of response by the eight nonparticipants, and it was determined that four agents had retired from the FBI and four agents chose not to participate in this "e search project. years Durir veek' semi ques Sim; anal Soci prog assi at ‘ Mani was the of 63 A second set of responses was generated during the past eight _years through attendance at FBI Post-Critical-Incident Seminars. During that period, 333 employees of the FBI participated in these week-long training and debriefing seminars. Participation in these seminars included individual interviews and completion of the questionnaire. Data Analysis Responses to the questionnaire were coded and key punched for simple computer tabulation and processing. The collected data were analyzed with the assistance of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The first phases of the data-processing program, including tabulation and evaluation, were initiated during as signment at the FBI Academy. Subsequent processing was conducted at the Montana College of Mineral Science and Technology, Butte, MOritana, with the assistance of David Carter. That full analysis Was subsequently transferred and loaded on the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) mainframe computer. The data were analyzed in accordance with the purpose and goals of’ the research. Open-ended questions were coded, using natural groupings of answers as major categories. The responses and data We re displayed in a frequency format. In the pilot report, ‘1 lustrative quotations provided explanations and enhancements of the responses. 'The chi-square statistic was used to determine statistical Significance where appropriate data assumptions could be establ for ac descr obtai been 64 established. A 5% level of probability was used as a minimum level for acceptable differences of significance. Somme This study was primarily designed to be exploratory and descriptive. A structured multiple-part questionnaire was used to obtain evaluative responses of special agents of the FBI who had been involved in serious shooting incidents. The initial focus was to determine whether FBI agents who were involved in serious Shooting incidents do suffer from post-shooting trauma. Subsequently, with a pilot analysis and a pre-program sampling of 92 r‘esponses, a comparative program analysis was completed. The an alysis compared a pre—program group with a current sampling of agents who had been involved in serious shooting incidents and r‘eeeived the benefits of a post-critical-incident seminar. The Survey data were collected through a two-part open-ended instrument. S‘i ruple computer tabulations with overall analysis through SPSS were the basis of this research design. The findings are reported in C h apter IV. the ] Drov‘ invo‘ CHAPTER IV ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF THE DATA Introduction The data for this research and analysis were obtained through two separate procedures. The initial pre-program set of responses was obtained through a mailed questionnaire during the period from July 1983 through the end of 1984. .A cover letter explaining the goals and objectives of that survey accompanied the two-part questionnaire. This survey was forwarded to 100 special agents of the FBI who had been involved in a "serious" shooting incident. 0f the 100 questionnaires, 92 were returned. That set of 92 responses provided the population for this analysis of agents who were involved in shootings and did not receive assistance from the Post- Critical-Incident Program. The responses (H’ this population are referred to as "pre-program data." The specific shooting incidents that these special agents were involved in covered the period from 1973 through 1983. In the summer of 1983, the FBI embarked on an initial examination of the issue of post-shooting trauma and, after that examination, the implementation (H: a program that recognizes and alleviates the effect of such severe stressors on special agents of the FBI. 65 66 In devel0ping this program, the FBI and, more specifically, the Behavioral Science Unit, has sponsored 20 Post-Critical-Incident Seminars since the program’s implementation in 1983. Part of the week-long seminars includes tflua completion of ‘the two-part questionnaire that was initially developed by this writer and others in the summer of 1983. The second set of data were provided by those individuals who attended recent Post-Critical-Incident Seminars at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The number of individuals who were involved in serious shooting incidents, attended these Post-Critical-Incident Seminars, and completed this questionnaire during the period of 1986 through 1989 totaled 75. 'That set of 75 questionnaires represented special agents of the FBI who were afforded the benefits, organizationally and individually, of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Employees of the FBI who attended the week-long seminar were also individually interviewed and were provided an opportunity to elaborate and clarify their responses to the instrument or questionnaire. These 75 responses are referred to as "post-program data." The goal and objectives of this study were essentially the analysis of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program through a comparison of responses to the focused questionnaire of a group of agents who had received the benefits of a formalized Post-Critical- Incident Program that recognized, defined, and addressed post-trauma stress (post-program) and those who did not receive those benefits (pre-program). Progra posed It was result office shooti examin 67 In the initial examination of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program through this comparative analysis, numerous questions were posed regarding the need for modifications of the current policy. It was recognized that continued violence in the American society results in an increased involvement by federal law enforcement officers and, more specifically, special agents of the FBI, in shooting incidents. The overall analysis essentially was an examination of the FBI’s effort to understand and deal with post- critical-incident trauma. Several specific questions were initially presented; these included: Are agents still suffering from sensory distortions, flashbacks, and depression? Has the organization identified and neutralized the effects of post-shooting trauma? And, most important, has the implementation of a post-shooting program with training and support reduced the trauma experienced by special agents of the FBI? In keeping with the purpose of this study, the data are presented in a series of tables reflecting frequencies and percentages. This study was designed as exploratory and descriptive research; therefore, explanations of the total responses are included in the section entitled General Analysis. ~~ That section provides accurate insights into the experiences of a special agent of the FBI when he or she has been involved in an exercise of deadly force. The tables graphically reflect a range of emotional, perceptual, and interpretive responses experienced during and after a shooting event. Those tables represent the responses reported by speci provi post- grout incic Incic 68 special agents who were involved in shooting incidents. The tables provide frequencies and percentages defined by the pre-group and post-group, as well as a total of both groups’ responses. The pre- group (pre), again, included those who were involved in shooting incidents before the implementation of ‘the FBI’s Post-Critical- Incident Program. The post-group (post) comprised those individuals who were involved after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. The total population (reflected in this analysis) was 167: 92 pre and 75 post. The tables incorporating those totals iri the descriptive section entitled General Analysis provide an explanation of the responses. The second part of this chapter reflects an explanation of the statistical evaluations of significant changes as identified through the chi-square statistical test. Those changes that were identified as significant are appropriately noted in the tables, and a detailed analysis regarding the significance is provided in the second section of this chapter, entitled Specific Analysis. This chapter also includes a brief evaluation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. That evaluation incorporates the explanation, tables, and details reflected in both the general and specific analysis portions of this chapter. The concluding section of this -chapter is a discussion of the limitations of this analysis, as well as of the overall study. 69 General Analysis Post-Shooting Trauma and Post- Iraumatic-Stress Disorder hi the most recent edition (H: the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1987), there exists a diagnosis of post-traumatic-stress disorder. This diagnosis is explained as a result of a stressor that would cause some symptomatology in anyone experiencing that trauma. The experience, essentially, is an event that is outside the normal range of human experiences. Included in the general definition is an experience that is defined as a serious injury or death as a result of an accident or physical violence. This diagnosis is further defined as reflecting positive occurrences of symptomatology in three separate categories. The first category of symptomatology involves reexperiencing the trauma in terms of intrusive thoughts/memories, flashbacks, nightmares, and so on. The second group of symptoms involves a numbness or reduced responsiveness to the environment as experienced by a withdrawal of interest and feelings of detachment. The final category incorporates the presence of two or more of a total of six symptoms related to the incident, such as sleeping difficulties, irritability, hypervigilance, startled responses or avoidance of similar' situations, and reduced concentration. 1k: applying the diagnosis, the disturbances and symptoms must have persisted at least a month. diso' was i elic agen I It): ’1 L; In 1 warr post reex ness our: freq 70 A specific focus and attempt to identify post-traumatic-stress disorder in special agents of the FBI following a shooting incident was made through the questionnaire. The instrument was designed to elicit and evaluate responses that provide an insight into special agents’ reactions as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). In the pre-sample, more than one-third of the agents’ responses warranted the diagnosis of post-traumatic—stress disorder. In the post-sample, somewhat fewer responses would fit this criterion. In the total number of shootings reported (167), evidence of reexperiencing the trauma, psychic numbing, or reduced responsive- ness was reported in more than one-half of the instances. A similar number reported two or more of the associated symptoms. The most frequent statements identified by the respondents were "Thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my mind" (104); "After the incident, I slept more poorly than usual" (90); "I sometimes felt guilty about what happened" (43); "I became hyper-alert and/or startled after the incident" (46); "I dreamed frequently about the shooting" (49); and "After the incident, I became more cautious/ concerned" (90). Other Psychological Effects Not unexpectedly, most of the agents (142) reported that they could remember the shooting as if it had happened yesterday. Of the 167 total experiences reported, 90 agents responded positively to the statement concerning being more cautious in situations that 71 m ‘i ght involve firearms and danger. In a limited number (25) of the 1 ricidents, special agents expressed concern, regret, and sympathy For the subject who had been shot. However, very few responses r-e ‘Flected harmful involvement with the subject’s family. A response th at was frequently given reflected Monday-morning quarterbacking or 5 e1 f-criticism. Seventy-one agents indicated that they reviewed the 1 ncident over and over again and wondered whether they had done the r “i ght thing. A positive trend reflected in this analysis of the agents “i nvolved indicated that many effects of the shooting events were not negative. A number of agents mentioned that they had finally met the ultimate test of a severe stressor and that this reinforced thei r confidence. They also thought that they could handle future events most effectively. A large number (115 of the 167) indicated that they had learned they could trust people and count on them in a Crisis. Ninety—one agents reported that their future would be better than their past. Fifty-nine agents indicated that they became more interested in and involved with their families. One hurldred forty-nine agents reported that they would be able to handle Whatever happened in the future. One of the extremely positive trends and responses was that, in one-half of the incidents, agents reported that they had reevaluated those things that were important to them in their lives and established goals, objectives, and values. In 88 of the 167 incidents, agents reported that their experiences had helped them 72 mature, and in 83 incidents, the agents concurred with the st atement, "I think that the whole incident has made me a better person." These positive trends reflect a significant focus of agents’ energies and attentions. Their optimism reinforced their ab 'ility to cope with future stressors. The lessons learned regarding their ability to trust, and finally getting the job done, reflect an extremely healthy result from a significant stressor. One other observation worthy of note is that 104 agents reported that their sense of humor assisted them in coping with the whole event. _Phxsical and Emotional Responses at the Time of the Incident One of the areas that was examined through this analysis was the reactions, both physical and emotional, that the agents EXperienced during the shooting. Those responses provided a better understanding of what the agents had experienced. Recognizing that an abnormal reaction to an abnormal occurrence/situation is normal, and using this as an evaluative criterion, provided a framework for examining the responses of the agents. Several notable emotional responses took place within the individuals during the shooting incidents. These included the automatic response that is interpreted as a result of appropriate training (140), a rush of strength and adrenalin (76), disbelief that this was really happen- ing (62), fear for self (33), and fear for others (66). Table 1 reflects these responses . 73 T ab'le 1.--Emotional responses that occurred during shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incide before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. nts Frequency Percent Response _— Pre Post Total Pre Post D ‘i sbelief 30 32 62 32.6 42.7 Fear for self/shakes 18 15 33 19.6 20.0 Fear for others 32 34 66 34.8 45.3 Re sponded automatically 75 65 140 81.5 86.7 Feeling--"I must survive" 22 14 36 23.9 18.7 Rush of strength/adrenalin 43 33 76 46.7 44.0 Note: Some agents gave more than one response. In this and succeeding tables, percentages are based on an N of 92 for pre-data and an N of 75 for post-data. Not every agent responded to every question. Exploring what perceptual thoughts occurred to the agents duri ng their shooting incidents was another specific focus. most frequent perceptual distortion experienced by the agents tunnel vision (74). A significant number of agents (56) a experienced the event in slow motion. Auditory blocking or hearing all of the shots fired or noises surrounding the agent t The was 150 not hat actually occurred was reported by 70 agents. Several agents repor‘ted physical responses of immediately being cold at the time of the shooting. This experience subsided sometime afterwards. Table 2 reflects these specific perceptual distortions. 74 T able 2.--Perceptual distortions that occurred during shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Distortion _— Pre Post Total Pre Post $1 ow motion 27 29 56 29.3 38.7 Auditory blocking 33 37 70 35.9 49.3 *Tunnel vision 33 41 74 35.9 54.7 Note: Some agents reported more than one distortion. *Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test. Reactions of Others The agents’ perceptions of the reactions of others after the Shooting influenced how they personally experienced the aftermath and how they were able to deal with the trauma. Tables 3 through 6 ref"! ect the reactions of fellow agents, families, supervisors, and friends, respectively. Overwhelmingly, the reactions were support- ive- The support provided and concern expressed were identified in separate areas of all-167 shooting incidents as follows: fellow 8agents (146), supervisors (134), friends (99), and wives/girlfriends (124) . This strong display of support and confidence assisted the a“3971125 in their handling of a split-second decision in the use of deadly force. Other significant areas of reactions identified by agents were that the wives/girlfriends were upset and fearful for the health and welfare of the agents (71). A negative perception 75 was that some supervisors were concerned for themselves or their pos i tions (33). Table 3.--Reactions of fellow agents that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post—Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Reaction _— Pre Post Total Pre Post Support 79 67 146 85.9 89.3 Curiosity 42 36 78 45.7 48.0 Aggravation 3 5 8 3.3 6.7 *None reported 6 1 7 6.5 1.3 Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction. *Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test. Tab'l e 4.--Reactions of families that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Reaction ————— Pre Post Total Pre Post :‘fe/girlfriend fearful/upset 40 31 71 43.5 41.3 Naref‘lts fearful/upset 22 18 40 23.9 24.0 c:,"eported reaction 7 3 15 7.6 10.7 w.‘ldren asked about shooting 28 28 56 30.4 37.3 ‘fe/girlfriend supportive 70 54 124 76.1 72.0 \ Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction. 76 Tab'l e 5.--Reactions of supervisors that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Reaction _— Pre Post Total Pre Post Supportive 74 60 134 80.4 80.0 Criticism 4 2 6 4.3 2.7 Concerned for own self or position 17 16 33 18.5 21.3 No reaction reported 0 O 0 Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction, which was a com- bination of criticism and self-concern. Table 6.--Reactions of nonagent friends that occurred after shoot- ings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. R Frequency Percent eaction _— Pre Post Total Pre Post Curi osity 53 51 104 57.6 68.0 Support 58 41 99 63.0 54.7 Cri t icism ‘ 0 1 l 0 1.3 Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction. Being able to talk out feelings, frustrations, the shooting exF’elrtience, the aftermath, and the investigation was identified as a c“tharsis for release. This release through talking it out is a natural and frequent method for coping with a traumatic experience. 77 Thi s concept is a fundamental basis for a peer-support program and was reinforced through responses provided by 120 agents who expressed positive responses to "A person who has not been in a shooting can’t really understand what it is like." The peer-support program was further enhanced and supported by the 98 positive responses to the statement, "It helped me to talk with other agents who had been involved in shootings or to hear about it from others." Table 10 further identifies the person/people to whom the individual agent related his experiences. The peer group (fellow Special agents of the FBI) ranked number one. That overwhelming response of the need for discussing the shooting event and the aftermath with peers strongly supports the basis of and need for an Advanced Peer-Support Program. Not unexpectedly, the wives/ girlfriends were ranked highly by the agents (65) because of the s‘ignificant bond, interaction, and empathy that exists in that Y‘E'I ationship. Counseling and support services need to be provided to the spouse, as well. _Phxsical and Emotional Responses After the Incident As a follow-up, another series of questions was posed in an attempt to identify physical and emotional symptoms and responses that the agents could identify in themselves that continued after the shooting experience. The initial benchmark was persistence in the Week following the shooting. Tables 7, 8, and 9 specifically ref] ect those responses. It was of interest to note that, phJ'Soi'cally, the only significant response or symptom that persisted 78 was fatigue (49). When questioned regarding emotional feelings that persisted, the responses included sleep problems (54); anxiety/ tension (41); sadness, crying, and depression (26); and thought di sturbances (39). In general, the physical, emotional, and perceptual responses were resolved. The support the agents received From peers and families assisted in these areas. Those abnormal reactions to an abnormal situation were normal. The extended symptomatology of the post-group was significantly less than that of the pre-group. Those responses and evaluations are further examined 'i n the section of this chapter entitled Specific Analysis. Table 7.--Physical symptoms occurring in the first 24 hours follow- ing the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Symptom —— Pre Post Total Pre Post :auiea/vomiting 1 1 2 1.1 1.3 ea aches 2 4 6 2.2 5.3 Fatigue - 26 23 49 28.3 30.7 Other 19 11 30 20.7 14.7 NO reaction 2 6 8 2.2 8.0 \ 79 Tab"! e 8.--Physical symptoms occurring in the week following the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Symptom _— Pre Post Total Pre Post Nausea/vomiting l 1 2 1.1 1.3 Headaches 4 4 8 4.3 5.3 Fatigue 25 15 40 27.2 26.0 Table 9.--Emotional symptoms occurring in the week following the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Symptom —— Pre Post Total Pre Post Anxi ety/tension 24 17 41 26.1 22.7 Sadness/crying/depression 10 16 26 10.9 21.3 5! eep problems 31 23 54 33.7 30.7 D1 sturbing thoughts 22 17 39 23.9 22.7 Note: Some agents reported more than one symptom. \Fami l y Effects The effect of a shooting incident on a special agent and the family was evaluated and understood both through the responses comp] eted by the agents and through direct and indirect interviews of agents and their spouses. Reactions of the families were rep of of inc $0! 1'6 fa 0v 39 80 reported in Table 4. In 71 of the 167 incidents reported in Part 1 of the questionnaire and again in a similar question in Part 2, 73 of 167 agents reported that "My wife was very worried and upset." Even more than that number was the concern and problems related to children reported by the respondents. Ninety-six of the 167 questionnaires reflected concerns and problems related to children and to parents alike. In about one-third of the incidents, agents identified some increased irritability in the home, as well as some increased personal problems. Very few of the agents who had par- ticipated in the use of deadly force and provided their insights indicated marital problems as a result of the shooting incident. It should be further noted, and is reflected in Table 4, that 124 responses reflected that the wives and/or girlfriends were suPDOrtive. Contacts with special agents and their spouses through follow— up interviews uniformly confirmed that the positive support was, in fact, a reflection of the ability to listen to the agent over and We" again regarding his critical incident. This information, 3931. n, strongly supported the healing process but also clarified the need to provide similar assistance to spouses lest they become se(Kind victims as the care givers. The agents clearly were helped by the availability, confidentiality, and support of their marital re‘l ationships. Agents’ wives uniformly reported that they had received abundant support from other agents, from their friends in the Bureau, and from field offices during times 0f crisis. There was a 81 reflection of the need for appropriate and timely notification both of the spouse and the children to ensure that effects of this shooting event were not compounded by media coverage. Previous exposure to shooting incidents and other acts of violence through military and law enforcement experience closely influenced the specific incidents and the families involved. The concerns reflected by the agents also became the concerns of their spouses. Examples of those types of concerns include potential legal action, the prolonged investigation, and the sense of being the subject of the inquiry. W of Support and Aggravation One of the areas that was reviewed through the questionnaire was where the agents received the most assistance in dealing with the trauma of the shooting event. That assistance and support are ref] ected in Tables 10 and 11. The support, both physical and mental, was based in two areas, the home and the peer group. The agents specifically reinforced the statement that peer groups of f9] 1 ow agents provided .the necessary insight into the critical event to ensure that this was not a long-term stress reaction. Peer counseling, obviously, is a vital aspect of dealing with the crisis. The extension and elaboration of the FBI’s Advanced Peer-Support Pr‘C’Qram was supported and justified through this overall analysis. Deté‘ails are provided in the section of this chapter entitled Program Ana1.1/sis. The wives/girlfriends also provided valuable assistance in Coping with life and placing things in perspective. 82 T3131 e 10.--Person the agent talked with most about the shooting, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Person —————————— Pre Post Total Pre Post Hi Fe/girlfriend 37 28 65 40.2 37.3 Other family members 3 4 7 3.3 5.3 Fe1 1 ow agents 66 63 129 71.7 84.0 SUDervisor 5 8 13 5.4 10.7 C1 elegy 2 l 3 2.2 1.3 Note : Some agents reported more than one person. ‘TEIED'I e 11.--Person who provided the most assistance after the shooting, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Person —-———————- Pre Post Total Pre Post "1 ‘Fe/girlfriend 45 26 71 48.9 34.7 *other family members 1 3 4 1.1 4.0 Peel 1 ow agent - so so 110 54.3 80.0 *Supervisor 11 9 20 12.0 12.0 Cl ergy 2 o 2 2.2 o \ Note: Some agents reported more than one person. test *Reflects significant change identified through chi-square Not surprisingly, the major focus of aggravation for agents was considered tobe Bureau offices (39). The natural process that 83 agents go through as a reaction to a shooting incident often creates an atmosphere of hypersensitivity, and the healing process includes anger and hostility. The adversarial aspect of the investigation of a critical event focuses that anger directly toward the employees of the FBI who are charged with conducting an appropriate investiga- ti on . A prolonged investigation compounds that anger. There has been a considerabIe and conscientious effort on the part of program managers of the Post-Critical-Incident Program to reduce the adversarial aspects of the necessary investigation, resulting in Significantly reduced feelings of hostility. There has been an even more conscious effort to reduce the time frame of the investigation. Agai n, this serves as a significant reducer of aggravation. The Other areas of aggravation identified by the respondents included Other agents (18), supervisors (26), and subjects’ attorneys (11). Tab1 es 12 and 13 reflect details regarding the aggravation perceptions by the agents involved. Somewhat surprising in this evaluation of aggravation to the agents was the continued aggravation of the news media. The Bureau 901 ‘icy regarding news media prohibiting releasing the identity of agents involved in investigations is most appropriately applied in post~shooting incidents. That policy serves to protect the agents, as Well as their wives and families. It should be noted that continual aggravation by the media with all of law enforcement is a co'mnon stressor in a shooting incident. In summary, the ability to p"(Hit-Rt the names of the participants involved and the expeditious 84 1 nvestigation significantly reduce the "murky aftermath" of a shooting. Tab'l e 12.-—Major sources of aggravation to agents involved in shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementa- tion of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Source —————————— Pre Post Total Pre Post Other agents 8 10 18 8.7 13.3 News media 17 17 34 18.5 22.7 Supervisor 11 15 26 12.0 20.0 Other Bureau officials 24 15 39 26.1 20.0 SUSpect’s attorney 7 4 11 7.6 5.3 SUSpect’s family and friends 8 1 9 8.7 1.3 NOte: Some agents reported more than one source. Tab1 e 13.--Nature of press coverage, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Nature of Coverage _— Pre Post Total Pre Post \ Extensive 45 43 88 48.9 57.3 n9d?rate 32 22 54 34.8 29.3 N‘himai 12 7 19 13.0 9.3 FO'Je 1 3 4 1.1 4.0 anled to report 2 o 2 2.2 o \ 85 :a c torsdhat Foster Copinq An overwhelming finding of this study was that agents attached great value in their coping with shooting incidents to the opportunity both to share their experiences with other agents who had been involved in similar incidents and to receive the agency’s support through a recognized program. The support reflected in Tab1 es 3 through 6 overwhelmingly documented this position. A Special reason for the prominence of this coping can be found in the response of 110 of the total 167 agents agreeing with the statement, "A person who has not been in a shooting incident cannot understand What it is like." The reassurance and support of agents who had "wa1ked in those shoes" have built-in credibility and provide Confidence. One hundred agents positively responded to the Statement, "It helped me to help/listen to others who have been involved in shootings." It also surfaced as being helpful to have a period of administrative leave offered after a shooting incident. The need For peer support and interaction suggests that administrative leave Should be left to the discretion of the agent involved. Sixty agents responded affirmatively to the statement, "It helped me to get back to my normal work routine." Often, the investigation of the incident may require the presence of the agents. As suggested in the pilot study completed by David Soskis, Carole Soskis, and this writer, allowing the agents to schedule the administrative leave at any time during the 30 days following the incident would enslire that this leave could provide the maximum benefit for the 86 agent and for the family. The opportunity to interact with Advanced Peer-Support Agents and the offered support from other Bureau officials also suggests that flexibility is necessary in the admi nistrative-leave offer. Some other issues or factors reported by the agents that provide an insight into the helpful aspects of coping include a sense of humor (114), getting back to normal work routine (60), being physically active (88), keeping one’s mind off what has haDilbened (39), appropriately moving through the phases of shock and reaction by feeling anger (48), and also strong support through "e‘ligious beliefs and practices (86). The final evaluation of re] igious beliefs and practices suggests and supports the value of a Chaplaincy program, which is elaborated on in Chapter V. mews of the Investigation Shooting incidents and the life-threatening situations that can and do challenge the senses of security and trust require strong sUpport and adjustment on the part of the agents involved. There is a continued second guessing, not only by the agents involved, but also by the investigator who is required to do a follow-up. The agents involved are naturally hypersensitive in reacting to how their organization, meaning the FBI, supports them or fails to support them during and after a shooting incident. It is recognized that it is necessary to conduct a thorough and fair investigation of the incident, but at times the prolonged and fragmented nature of this investigation has compounded the source of stress for a 87 s ‘i gnificant number of agents. Thirty agents responded affirmatively to the statement that it was very hard for them to find anything good about the incident or what followed that incident. The element 0“: stress compounded by the organizational inquiries plants a ‘Further burden on those agents. Statements reflecting this include " I worried a lot about the investigation of the incident" (45), "I was treated like a suspect in the investigation of the incident" ( 25), and "The way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me than the shooting itself" (32). This concern with the aftermath and its adversary effects on the agents has been addressed continually over the past eight years by the Director of the FBI. Every effort has been made to expedite the investigation and to offer support, both by telephone and in WY‘itten communications. Organizational letters forwarded at the Conclusion of the investigation have been written and rewritten to provide an appropriate phraseology that is not offensive. Many agents discovered that the process of the investigation was assisted through the assignment of an investigator who had some personal experience of a shooting incident. The value of having such an i n\Iestigator often offsets the need for objectivity. Currently, the Inspection Staff is required to view a 20-minute Videotape prepared by the Behavioral Science Unit, which provides them with insight into post-shooting trauma and the necessity for handling these investigations with sensitivity and professionalism. Often, the agents themselves are self-questioning. This was pointed 88 out by 71 responses to the statement, "I would review the incident agai n and again and wonder if I did the right thing." Understand- ing , compassion, and a professional objectivity are necessary in these sensitive matters. _The Shooting Incident Annually, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Section publishes a handbook entitled Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted. That publication incorporates a statistical analysis of law enforcement officers’ involvement in shooting incidents and other assault crimes. In that publication, there is a profile of law errForcement officers who had been involved in such incidents. This profile provides factual statistical information regarding the Shootings. It is appropriate that the present analysis provide a s‘il'nilar profile that reflects the incidents in which FBI agents have IDeen involved. Tables 14 through 17 reflect a limited insight into the eXercise of deadly force by special agents of the FBI. Table 14 r‘Ef‘l ects the extent of the subjects’ injuries. If one analyzes the types of investigations to be conducted in which the FBI exercises deadly force both in pre- and post-group iclentified dangerous investigations, these would include unlawful- 1Plight fugitives, bank-robbery investigations, and drug-related in\Iestigations. The dangerous nature of these investigations comes as no surprise. If we explore by frequency of incidents that identify more dangerous field offices, the most dangerous would 89 include Miami, New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Cleveland, and Newark. These field offices are considered major offices by the FBI and are also considered by law enforcement personnel as relatively di fficult cities to work in because of the violent crime in the communities. The Bureau also recognizes the significant number of federal violations being committed in these jurisdictions as a proportionate number of agents are assigned in each of these field offices. Table 14.--Extent of the subject’s injury, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Extent of Injury _— Pre Post Total Pre Post Killed 45 35 80 48.9 47.9 Seriously wounded 23 10 33 25.0 13.7 Wounded, not seriously 14 10 24 15.2 13.7 Not wounded 10 18 28 10.9 24.7 \ In the questionnaire, the agents were asked what time of day the shooting occurred. It was interesting to learn that 50% of the Shootings occurred before noon. This is, in fact, a contradiction 0f normal law enforcement shootings, which reflect the most dangerous shift as being in the evening. An explanation of this difference is that many of the arrests and raids conducted by the FBI are conducted in the early morning hours. As to frequency, the 90 most frequent time of day involving the total population of shootings was at 12:00 noon, and the second most frequent was at E) :130 a.m. In further analysis of the shootings, one of the considerations was to identify who was with the agent at the time of the shooting. Wreabfle 15 reflects the details of that response. Another question VVEIS asked regarding the number of rounds fired by the agent, by the suspect, and by others. The number of shots fired by the agent involved ranged from 0 to 150; by the suspect, 0 to 130; and by others, 0 to 100. Another specific question concerned how many minutes elapsed between the agent’s arrival on the scene and the Sliooting. That time ranged from 0 to 905 minutes. That 905 minutes (15 hours) obviously reflects an extended stand-off. Tkable 15.--At the time of the shooting, who was with the agent, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post- Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Person(s) _— Pre Post Total Pre Post Alone 10 3 17 10.9 4.0 Other Bureau agents 54 48 102 58.7 64.0 Other law enforcement officers 6 4 10 6.5 5.3 Other (not specified) 1 5 6 1.1 6.7 Combination of other Bureau 21 15 36 22.8 20.0 agents and law enforcement officers \ 91 A limited focus on the agents themselves showed the mean age of the pre-group to be 35.1 years and the mean age of the post-group to be 38.7 years. This is not surprising because the population of special agents is aging. Another question about the agents involved concerned their time in the Bureau. In the pre-group, the range was from 8 months to 18 years; in the post-group, the range was from 1 month to 28 years and 7 months. The agents involved also provided insight into the investigation and who took charge of that investigation. Those responses are reflected in Table 16. 'Tiable 16.--Who assumed command of the investigation at the shooting scene, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Person _- Pre Post Total Pre Post Special agent in charge 29 17 46 31.5 22.7 Investigative team 11 20 31 12.0 26.7 Police department 24 17 41 26.1 22.7 Others 27 16 43 29.3 21.3 No response 1 5 6 1.1 6.7 e One final reflection of the incidents is that the shootings affected not only the participants, but others as well. The agents recognized this and provided recommendations as to other individuals Who would benefit from a post-critical-incident program or debriefing. Those recommendations are incorporated into Table 17. 92 'I’eatfle 17.--Recommendations of other individuals who were affected by the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Frequency Percent Person —————————— Pre Post Total Pre Post 53;)ouse 11 9 20 12.0 12.0 i"Other family member 1 2 3 1.1 2.7 ()1:her participating agent(s) 16 12 28 17.4 16.0 ESLJpervisor 2 4 6 2.2 5.3 53;)ecial agent in charge 1 3 4 1.1 4.0 *Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test. Specific Analysis of Change The chi-square test was used to evaluate significant differences between the data reported by the pre-group and those lceported by the post—group. Those differences were tested at the 5% ‘Ievel of confidence. The total number of items in the two-part (questionnaire was 157. In analyzing the pre- and post-group individual question responses using the chi-square statistical procedure, 38 of the 157 comparisons were determined to be Significant, far more than would be expected merely by chance at the .05 level. These overall results strongly support the effects of 'the FBI’s Post-Critical-Incident Program. Individual areas of Significance were described and explored to provide a basis for 13rogram evaluation. The overall trend analysis is incorporated into 93 the portion of this chapter that evaluates the Post-Critical- I ncident Program. In the general response in Part 1 of the questionnaire, where ]t£3 instances of significant differences were identified between the pre- and post-analyses, a number of items deserve further ee) Principal Legal Advisor Private Attorney SAC Supervisor U. S. Attorney Legal Counsel Division - FBI Headquarters Other, if so, who? 128 PART II SHOOTING INCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE Directions: Below is a series of statements that represent the experiences, attitudes and beliefs of law enforcement profes- sionals who have been involved in shooting incidents. Some will apply to you, others will not. For each statement, please mark a check (v’) in the space following the statement if it applies to you, or an ( X ) if it does not. Please give a response for each statement. After the incident, I slept more poorly than usual. I felt angry, and it helped me. I learned that I could trust people, and count on them in a crisis. It's very hard for me to find anything good about the incident and what followed. [::1 I was more irritable at home and had a "shorter fuse." I I I felt that I was made a scapegoat after the incident“ [::1 I can remember the shooting as if it happened yesterday. I I became more interested in/involved with my work. I , [I My family was bitter towards the Bureau. I felt regret over injuring someone/taking a life. I I My wife was very worried/upset. I I It was harder for me to feel things. I I 129 I became more interested in/involved with my hobbies, friends, or leisure activities. I sometimes felt guilty about what happened. I was more irritable with other people at work. I was helped by my religious beliefs and/or practices. I felt harassed and/or blamed by other people after the shooting. My future will be better than my past. I was disappointed by my wife's/girlfriend's reaction to the incident. I worried alot about the investigation of the incident. After the incident I became less cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or dangers. 7‘_"—l My child(ren) were very worried/upset. I became hyper-alert and/or startled easily after the incident. [:::] Thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my mind. I I It helped me to help/listen to others who had been involved in the shooting. 130 I trusted people less. I I I think that the whole thing made me a better person. I I felt the need to apologize to the subject's family. It helped me to get back to my normal work routine. I I My parents were very worried/upset. My reaction to the incident was influenced by other shootings I had been involved in. I dreamed frequently about the shooting or had other bad dreams that were unusual for me. I I I became less interested in/involved with my family. It helped me to share experiences and feelings with others who had been involved in the shooting incident. I I My happiest days are in the past. I I I dreamed more after the incident, but the dreams were not frightening or unpleasant. I I The people who should have supported me were all busy "covering their asses." [::] The incident led to problems in my marriage. [::] I felt sorry for the subject who was shot. 131 Although I was an adult when the shooting incident occurred, the whole thing helped me to grow/mature. I I I became less interested in/involved with my work. I I I drink more after the incident. I I I had trouble remembering and/or concentrating after the incident. I I Whatever happens in the future, I think I will be able to handle it. [::j I was treated like a suspect during the investigation of the incident. [::] My sense of humor helped me to cope with the whole thing. I I I avoided situations similar to the shooting incident or that reminded me of it. I I It helped me to keep my mind off what had happened. IL__J Most people were insensitive to what I had gone through. I became less interested in/involved with my hobbies, friends, or leisure activities. I I I sometimes felt like it was happening again, especially if I was in a similar situation or thinking about it. [::] I felt angry, and it upset me. 132 I realized that I was the only one who really cared about me. [:I I would review the incident again and again, and wonder if I did the right thing. I I I had trouble explaining what happened to my children. After the incident, I felt isolated from other people. I , After the incident, I felt uncomfortable/insecure about being alive. I I I felt worse in situations that reminded me of the shooting. D A person who has not been in a shooting incident can't really understand what it is like. [::j The whole incident made me reevaluate what was important in my life/my goals and values. I I I sometimes wonder if I'll be able to face what the future will bring. The way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me than the shooting itself. I I After the incident, it helped me to be physically active. I mostly wanted to be left alone, even by people who were trying to help me. I I q.’ 133 After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger. I I I became more interested in/involved with my family. It helped me to talk with other Agents who had been involved in shooting incidents, or to hear about them from others. [::3 Thank you for your assistance in completing this questionnaire. APPENDIX 8 COVER LETTER 134 U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Academy InReply.PleaseRefcrto Quantico, Virginia 22135 HkNm January 11, 1984 Special Agent (Full Bureau Name) Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Office Address Dear (First Name): In May 1983, members of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) observed that in the two years prior, Special Agents of the FBI had been involved in over forty serious shooting incidents. Questions arose as to what problems, physical or psychological, those Agents may have been confronted with as a result of those shootings. Literature in police journals refer to post-shooting trauma as an acute stress reaction. If that stress is not minimized, the literature basically suggests that cops who shoot or are shot have problems coping with life afterward. In June 1983, Dr. David Soskis, Bureau Psychiatric Consultant, and the Behavioral Science Unit were requested by Director Webster to conduct a research and interview project to determine if Special Agents of the FBI have any problems resulting from the exercise of deadly force. Since I am working on a Ph.D. dissertation in the area of post-shooting trauma specifically focusing on Bureau Agents, I was requested to assist Dr. Soskis. In July, a conference was held at Quantico with 14 Special Agents attending. From the conference, interviews, suggestions from participating Agents, and research, an extensive report with recommendations was submitted to FBI Headquarters. On December 12, 1983, those recommendations were incorporated into guidelines and transmitted to the field. The enclosed questionnaire is a follow-up to that SAC letter. I have been requested to continue this project to support, update, and/or modify those guidelines. 135 Letter to Special Agent (Full Name) I would appreciate you taking a few minutes to complete the questionnaire. If you have any questions, comments, or concerns, give me a call. Upon completion, please forward the questionnaire to my attention in the Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, via Bureau mail. Your individual responses will be kept strictly confidential and the questionnaires will be destroyed after tabulation. I am anticipating scheduling another Post-Shooting Trauma Conference this summer. If you are interested in participating please note that on the last page. Sincerely yours, John Henry Campbell Supervisory Special Agent Behavioral Science Unit Enclosure APPENDIX C THE PILOT STUDY 136 An Analysis of the Effects of Post-Shooting Trauma on Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation BY David A. Soskis, M.D. Carole W. Soskis, M.S.W., J.D. and SSA John Henry Campbell Prepared For Executive Assistant Director John E. Otto 137 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ................................... 1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ........................... 3 SURVEY OF LITERATURE ........... . ........ ....y.. 4 SPECIFIC ANALYSIS .............. .. ........... ... 7 Post-Shooting Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. ................. . ...... 7 Other Psychological Effects ............... 7 Physical and Emotional Responses .......... 8 Reactions of Others ...................... . 9 Family Aspects ............................ 9 Sources of Support and of Aggravation ..... 10 Factors that Foster Coping ................ 11 Effects of the Investigation ....... . ...... 12 Telephone Call from Headquarters Admini— strative Personnel ...................... 13 Information Pertaining to Individual Recommendation ..................... ..... 13 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................ 15 APPENDICES. .................................... 20 A - Questionnaire ................ . ........ 21 B - Tables..... ........... . ............... 34 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................... 45 138 INTRODUCTION The focus of this study is on the effects of post-shooting trauma on Special Agents of the FBI. The concern for Special Agents of the Bureau expressed by John J. Schreiber, Section Chief, Personal and Property Crimes Program, in his memorandum to Mr. Revell dated May 4, 1983, was well-founded. From that initial concern Executive Assistant Director John Otto promptly directed that a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the effects of post-shooting trauma on FBI Special Agents be conducted. On June 20, 1983, a conference was held at the FBI Academy to discuss post-shooting trauma, its ramifications and effects on Agents involved in the exercise of deadly force. In attendance at this conference were John J. Schreiber; Dr. David A. Soskis, Bureau Psychiatric Consultant; Lawrence J. Monroe, Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit; Robert Schaefer and John Henry Campbell, Supervisory Special Agents, Behavioral Science Unit. Dr. Soskis stated that he was requested to conduct a research and interview project by Executive Assistant Director John E. Otto to determine if Bureau Agents have problems, physically or psychologically, resulting from the use of deadly force. Dr. Soskis indicated that the goal of this project is to make appropriate recommendations to establish a Bureau policy to neutralize effects of post—shooting trauma. Dr. Soskis further stated that the project could be com- pleted through a minimal number of interviews, approximately ten. He requested the c00peration and assistance of the Behavioral Science Unit in completing this project. On June 29, 1983, approval was granted by Assistant Director James D. McKenzie to conduct the interviews during a conference to be scheduled at the FBI Academy. The scope of this conference was to elicit from Special Agents of the FBI who have recently been involved in shooting incidents their reactions, both physical and psychological, attributable to the use of deadly force. On July 14-15, 1983, 14 Special Agents of the FBI conferred at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia, with Dr. Soskis and Supervisory Special Agent Campbell. Those 14 Agents had been involved in a total of 17 shooting incidents. The continued goal of that project was to determine if FBI Agents suffer from post- shooting trauma and, if so, make apprOpriate recommendations with the cooperation of the conference attendees to minimize the negative aspects of that trauma. The conference format included an address by Assistant Director McKenzie, an introduction to the goals and objectives of the conference, completion of a formal questionnaire, personal interviews, and a conference group discussion. Followup inter- views were conducted by Carole W. Soskis of the spouses of several of the Agents attending the conference. From the information that was developed in this conference, the interviews, and the analysis of research conducted by Dr. Soskis and Supervisory 139 Special Agent Campbell, a formulation of positive recommendations was instituted. The recommendations include intervention both at the shooting scene and during the first week, long term issues, and prevention and training. This report provides the details of the research, interviews and subsequent recommendation. 140 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS Our experience with Agents both in the Quantico seminar and during interactions around specific prior incidents reveals areas of similarity and difference between the Bureau and police experience of post-shooting trauma. We have not observed the extreme reactions described in the police literature such as complete inability to function on the job, leaving the agency, or incapacitating psychological or physical symptoms. In addition, Agents uniformly report that their firearms training has prepared them well for these incidents and, in fact, has been credited with saving their lives. The incidents themselves show an almost complete absence of the classic police "bad shooting" which often stems from an unplanned patrol or domestic dispute setting with minimal or absent backup and support. The tasteless joking and hypermasculine "macho" comments concerning shooting incidents are far rarer in the Bureau than as reported in the police literature, although they do sometimes occur. Despite these positive findings it is clear that signi- ficant symptoms and psychological readjustments do occur in Agents following involvement in a shooting incident. While these are generally manageable, most Agents feel that some pro- fessional and peer support would be helpful during this stress- ful period. Specific recommendations for interventions at the shooting scene and during the first week following the shooting, and discussion of long term issues, training and prevention are offered in the Conclusions and Recommendations. The nature of post—shooting trauma and stress experienced by Agents is, in part, conditioned by the special nature of the Bureau as a national organization. Although most Agents and their families felt that field office staff and families rallied to their support, considerable stress is experienced by Agents and their families in the course of prolonged administrative investigations initiated by Headquarters. This is especially a problem when these investigations drag out over a long period of time. Agents and their families share with police officers concerns about legal liability surrounding shooting incidents but because of the absence in the Bureau of the kind of legal representation often provided on the scene and afterwards by police unions, Agents often feel much more vulnerable in this area. 141 SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE A number of symptoms have been regularly experienced by police officers following shooting incidents. These include sensory distortion, flashbacks, fear of insanity, sleep pattern disturbances, develOpment of emotional isolation, depression, and the development of alienation and distrust of the agency. These symptoms are merely a few of the multitude of physical and psychological reactions that can and do surface after a shooting. The responses of officers following shooting incidents may be both positively and negatively affected by the reactions of their peers. Supportive officers, especially those who have had similar experiences themselves, make a big difference in facilitating readjustment. On the other hand, insensitive comments or jokes praising the officer for being a "good killer" can and have had lasting negative effects. A number of recommendations have emerged for the manage- ment of post-shooting trauma by police departments. These, in summary, stem from the fact that a shooting is a major trauma for the officers involved. The individual officer's reactions to his or her shooting vary due to many contributing factors. The officer's prior work experience and personality help to determine the individual's reactions. The circumstances of the shooting also have an influence on how the officer might react. The responses of the officer's peers, the administration of his or her agency, the media and community also directly influence the severity, type and extent of the officer's reactions after a shooting incident. Because of the prevailing hypermasculine "macho" police image, the law enforcement officer's public response to offers of post—shooting counseling can be expected to be negative. A departmental policy of mandating that officers participate in confidential, professional post- shooting counseling reduces the stigma of receiving mental health services. A final recommendation is to develop a post- shooting policy which is inclusive and clearly understood by the officer involved and also by the administration of the law enforcement agency. Until the late 1970's there existed little or no specific literature pertaining directly to the stresses of post-shooting trauma. Several police psychologists, including Mike Roberts of the San Jose Police Department; Stephen Carson of the Arizona Department of Public Safety; James Shaw of the King County Department of Public Safety, Seattle, Washington; and Walter Lippert, a clinical psychologist who works with the Cincinnati Police Department, began recognizing the serious nature of problems associated with post-shooting trauma. From their limited experiences they were able to identify symptoms of the post-shooting experience and the effects that experience might have on the officer, his work and family and then 142 ultimately to formulate preventive or interventive approaches to neutralize or reduce the effect of the shooting incident. In general, the symptoms of a post-shooting trauma are as varied as illustrated previously. There does appear to be a pattern of developing a coping approach to this or any other traumatic life event. Carson defines the stages of this pattern as denial and isolation, anger and resentment, bargaining, depression and acceptance. Carson relates these stages to the symptoms that the officer works through. The commonalities that are recognized in the symptoms and patterns lend to an effective approach for intervention. These psychologists, again, are in agreement as to aiding the officer. Shaw recom— mends that conventional counseling be afforded these officers and he also discussed a formation of a crisis assistance team to use in a traumatic situation. This team he describes as being generally composed of a legal advisor, medical health professional, and a police officer who has been involved in prior shooting incidents. As a whole, all of these individuals must understand the law enforcement officer, who he is, what he is and why he came into law enforcement. Those thoughts and recommendations are echoed by the other police psychologists who have examined the deadly force and post-shooting issues. Carson and Roberts further modify the crisis assistance team approach. They recommend the use of a voluntary, confidential, free counseling service with a psychotherapist who has a back- ground in law enforcement. They define the peer counseling process as the officer who "has been there". This individual must possess the incident experience, the ability to listen and the ability to share. Several more current articles including "A Balance of Force" by Kenneth Matulia, state that professional counseling must be mandatory. This recommendation is based on the fact that there remains a stigma in law enforcement to seeking psychological counseling. Again, counseling directly confronts the macho image. This service must also be timely. A brief contact by the mental health expert should be afforded within the first 48 hours. Matulia, in his IACP report suggests that the officer's family suffers through the post-shooting trauma as well. Counseling services should also be available to them. Dr. Eric Nielsen, in his dissertation entitled, "The Law Enforcement Officer's Use of Deadly Force and Post Shooting Trauma",completed in 1981, provides the first empirical insight into the effects of post-shootings. His focus was developed by analyzing traumatic stress and post-traumatic stress disorder as it relates to combat psychiatry. One of the main points that comes out of the work done by Nielsen is an apparent lack of departmental emphasis on the well—being of the officers involved in the shootings. He bases this statement on the fact that there are too few services provided for the police officer who has experienced emotional and physical distress after the 143 shooting. Nielsen concurs with the frequent reactions, patterns of dealing with the stress and counseling assistance previously reviewed. Another major point that comes from Nielsen's study is that the shooting is magnified by vague, ill-defined and agonizingly long post—shooting investigations and review pro- cedures. He recommends that the departmental post-shooting procedures be made as clear and applied as quickly as possible. Nielsen's effort provided the basis for the collection and analysis of the physical and psychological responses of Bureau Agents. A series of modifications of his questionnaire were made and thereafter utilized, in part, to obtain data in this study. Many parallels can be drawn between Dr. Nielsen's study and results, and the data and recommendations developed during the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference held at the FBI Academy. The main points suggested by Nielsen concerning the well-being of the officer involved and the agonizingly long post-shooting investigation are very similar to the results of the post-shooting conference. The analysis of the physical and emotional response, reactions of others, and sources of support and aggravation are also parallel. These responses have been validated and substantiated through the personal interviews and the second part of the questionnaire, developed for the Agent study, requiring the appropriate selection of responses to statements that represent the experiences, attitudes and beliefs of those Agents who had been involved in shooting incidents. The details of those responses are reflected in the Specific Analysis section. 144 SPECIFIC ANALYSI S Post-Shooting Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder The latest edition of The American Psychiatric Associa- tion's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III, 1980) in- corporates the diagnosis of post—traumatic stress disorder. This diagnosis requires a stressor which would cause symptoms in almost everyone experiencing it and a positive occurrence of symptoms in three groups. The first involves reexperiencing of the trauma in terms of intrusive thoughts or memories, flashbacks, etc. The second group involves a numbing or reduced responsiveness to the environment as expressed by withdrawal of interest and feelings f detachment. The final group involves the presence of two or more out of six symptoms related to the incident such as startle responses, sleep disturbance, or avoidance of situations similar to the traumatic incident. A Specific inquiry was made in the questionnaire distributed to participants in the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference concerning the diagnostic criteria for post- traumatic stress disorder. In five out of the seventeen incidents, the positive responses warranted the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. In fifteen of the seventeen incidents,there was evidence of reexperiencing of the trauma; psychic numbing or re- duced responsiveness was reported in seven of the incidents, and a similar number reported two or more of the associated symptoms. Within this group, the most frequent statements endorsed by the Agents were "thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my mind" (13), "after the incident I slept more poorly than usual" (10), "I sometimes felt guilty about what happened" (7), and "I became hyperalert and/or startled easily after the inci- dent" (7). Other Psychological Effects Most of the Agents reported that they could remember the shooting as if it had happened yesterday. In eleven out of the seventeen incidents, Agents responded positively to the state- ment, "After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger." In about half of the incidents, Agents expressed regret or sympathy for the sub— ject who had been shot but there were few instances of compulsive or harmful involvement with the subject's family. Not all of the effects of the shooting incident were per- ceived as negative. Several of the Agents mentioned that they had finally "met the test" of a severe stress and they felt more confident in themselves and less pressed to prove themselves in 145 other situations. In over half of the incidents,Agents re- ported that they had reevaluated what was important in their lives, goals or values. In seven of the seventeen incidents, Agents reported that the experience had helped them to grow or mature, and in five of the incidents,the Agents agreed with the statement, "I think that the whole thing made mewa better person." In general, Agents remained optimistic about their ability to c0pe with future stresses and felt that the experi- ence had taught them that they could trust other people and count on them in a crisis. Physical and Emotional Responses One of the specific areas that we sought to develop during this conference at Quantico was the reactions, both physical and emotional, that the Agent encounters during and after the shootings. These responses provide a better under- standing of what the Agent has gone through. It is noted that an abnormal reaction to an abnormal situation is normal. Sev- eral notable emotional responses took place within the individual during the shooting incidents. These included: disbelief that this was really happening (11), the automatic response (which we suggest is a result of appropriately trained and conditioned response in the use of firearms) (10), rush of strength and/or adrenalin (10), and fear (5). (Table l in the appendices reflects these responses.) We explored what perceptual distortions oc- curred to the Agents during their shootings. Significantly, seeing the event in slow motion was experienced by Agents in ten separate incidents. Auditory blocking such as not hearing all the shots, not hearing voices of others or not hearing the sounds that normally are observed was reported in eleven inci- dents. The final perceptual distortion is tunnel vision. In nine incidents,Agents reported they experienced tunnel vision. One comment of interest that was added to this area by an Agent was that he became immediately very cold at the shooting scene, and that feeling did not go away until sometime the following day. (Table 2 reflects these experiences.) As a followup, another series of questions attempted to identify physical and emotional symptoms that the Agent could identify in themselves and which persisted in the week following the shooting. It was interesting to note that physically the only significant response or symptom that was identified was fatigue (5). (See Table 7) However, when questioned regarding emotional feelings that persisted, the responses included: sleep problems (8), anxiety/tension (7), sadness/crying/ depression (6), and thought disturbances (4). In general, the physical, emotional and perceptual responses were appro- priately recognized and worked through by the responding Agents. 146 The support that the Agents received from peers and family assisted in these areas. The abnormal reactions were normal. Reactions of Others Our professional opinion pertaining to the post-shooting incident is that how the Agent perceives the reaction of others, particularly significant others, influences how the individual experiences the incident. Tables 3 through 6 reflect the reactions of fellow Agents, family, supervisors, and friends. Overwhelmingly, the reaction was supportive. The support con- cern was identified in separate areas in all seventeen shooting incidents as follows: fellow Agent (13), wife/girlfriend (ll), supervisors (11), and friends (8). This strong display of support and confidence assisted the Agents in handling their exercise of the use of deadly force. Other significant areas of reaction identified by the Agents were that the wife/girlfriend were upset and/or fearful for the health and welfare of the Agent (6L and the supervisors were concerned for themselves or their positions (C.Y.A.-6). Being able to talk out feelings, frustrations and ex- periences provides an excellent release. "Talking it out" is a natural and quite frequently necessary mode of coping with traumatic experiences. Agents expressed this in Table 9 where they identified those individuals with whom they were able to discuss their experiences. The peer group (fellow Agents) ranks number one. In all seventeen incidents, the ability to discuss the shooting with peers was noted. This response strongly suggests the use of trained peer counselors. Not unexpectedly, the wife/girlfriend were ranked very high by the Agents (9). Because of the significant bond and empathy that exists in this relationship, we feel that counsel- ing may be appropriate and should be available to the spouse as well. FamilyiAspects The impact of shooting incidents on Agents' families was assessed both through interviews and questionnaires com- pleted by the Agents and through direct interviews with a sample of spouses. In ten out of the seventeen incidents, Agents reported that "my wife was very worried/upset". About half that number reported problems relating to children or parents. In about one—third of the incidents,Agents identified some increase in irritability at home or subsequent problems in their marriage. Only one of the Agents participating in the seminar had been divorced since the shooting incident. 147 Contact with both spouses and Agents makes it clear that the most uniformly helpful intervention that spouses have pro- vided is their ability to listen to the Agent as he unburdens himself concerning the incident. These sessions have sometimes been described as "marathons" and Agents are clearly helped by the confidentiality, availability, and relative lack of a need to "put up a front" that the marital relationship provides. Agents' wives uniformly reported that there had been "floods of support" from Agents and from friends in the Bureau as well as field office administrative personnel. They were particularly concerned that the family be notified immediately by the Bureau after a shooting incident had occurred since several Agent spouses and children had learned of incidents from immediate media coverage. The reaction of families seemed to vary more than that of Agents in.terms of the nature of the incident (e.g., Was the agent wounded? Was someone killed?). In addition, prior exposure to shootings in previous law enforcement jobs and in other Bureau work clearly interacted with any given incident. Spouses shared the concern of Agents about potential lawsuits and some resentment concerning prolonged Headquarters investigations and a sense of being left "defenseless". Particular problems were encountered by the fami- lies of Agents who had been wounded during the shooting incidents in terms of financial arrangements and sometimes simply in terms of help in handling phones, small children, etc., if friends or relatives were not immediately available. Agents, in general, did not tend to discuss shooting inci- dents with young children. This approach may have some drawbacks when children sense that something is wrong and perhaps attribute their own personal responsibility to tensions within the family. In addition, in several incidents children had found out about the event at school and there had been some awkward moments as Agents and their spouses tried to explain what had happened. In general, we would recommend that Agents make some cautious, non- directive inquiries following a shooting incident to make sure that children do not have potentially damaging misinformation. In several cases Agents found out years after an incident that their children had, in fact, known about it but had felt uncom- fortable about discussing it with their parents. Sources of Support and of Aggravation One aspect that we attempted to identify through the questionnaire was where do the Agents receive the most assis- tance to deal with the trauma of the shooting incident. That assistance is reflected in the section regarding "Reactions of Others" and also in Table 10. The support, both physically and mentally, is based on two areas: the home and the peer group. 148 The Agents Specifically stated that they had been most assisted by fellow Agents (12). Peer counseling is a vital aspect of dealing with crisis. The wife/girlfriend provides valuable assistance (9) in coping with life in general and more so with trauma. Somewhat surprising was the response to major sources of aggravation to the Agents who were involved in shootings (see Table 11). The news media emerged as most aggravating (7). Two comments typified this response: "The news media stated that this could have been resolved with a negotiator" and "the articles accused me of using excessive force." The Bureau policy regarding not releasing the identity of Agents involved in any of our cases is appropriate in post-shooting incidents also. It also serves to protect the wives and family of the Agents involved. ' Not surprisingly, the next focus of aggravation is other Bureau officials (5). The natural process that was mentioned by Carson is part of this reaction. The hostility and anger that arises in the post-shooting incident is directed toward the Bureau because of the Agent's belief that the investigation is prolonged and adversarial. Other comments mentioned by the Agents at the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference were: "I didn't like being referred to as 'killer' by Agents and others," "I had a problem with the D.A. and local grand jury," and "The inspectors made me feel like a criminal." The recommendation to continue not releasing names of Agents in Bureau cases and, if possible, to expedite the investigation in a shooting incident are supported by this summary. Factors that Foster quing An overwhelming finding of our study was that Agents attributed great value in their coping with shooting incidents to the opportunity to both talk to apd_listen to other Agents who had been involved in the same or similar incidents. A reason for the special prominence of this coping device can be found in the response in fourteen of the incidents of "A person who has not been in a shooting incident can't really understand what it is like." Thus, the Opportunity to share and to compare with others who have had this particular experience may be much more helpful than general, if well- meaning, reassurance and support. This finding provides a rationale for our recommendation that peer support from Agents who have been involved in previous shooting incidents be provided. It also explains our hesitation to recommend a mandatory period of administrative leave immediately following the incident. This may be a time when peer support is especially important and this may be most easily obtained in 149 the office setting. In addition, investigation of the incident may require the Agent's presence so that, even if at home, he is reminded of and bothered by details relating to the incident during his "free" time. Allowing the Agents to schedule his five days of administrative leave at any time during the 30 days following the incident would ensure that this leave is able to exert its maximum benefit for the Agent. The opportunity to provide peer support also provides benefits to those offering the support. Other factors appeared helpful to individual Agents in their effort to cope: a sense of humor (11), getting back to the normal work routine (8), being physically active (8), keeping one's mind off what had happened, religious beliefs and/or practices, and feeling angry (6 each). Effects of the Investigation Shooting incidents and the life-threatening situations that lead to them can and do challenge the sense of security and basic trust of the strongest and best adjusted person. In addition to concerns about how they have performed as individuals, Agents naturally are sensitive to how their organization supports them or withholds support following the incident. While the necessity for a thorough and fair investi- gation of the incident is apparent, the prolonged nature and fragmentary communication surrounding these investigations have been a source of stress to a significant number of Agents. In approximately half the incidents reviewed during our Post- Shooting Trauma Conference this element of stress was felt to be paramount or extremely significant by the Agents involved. Statements reflecting this included, "I worried a lot about the investigation of the incident" (8), "I was treated like a suspect during the investigation of the incident" (7), and "the way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me than the shooting itself" (6). This fact is reflected in our recommendation that every effort be made to expedite these investigations and to offer communications about them in as supportive a manner as possible. Letters received by Agents at the conclusion of investigations have frequently been described as cryptic, impersonal, and as "opening old wounds." Some consideration should be given to these factors in the phrasing of such letters. Agents found that the difficult process of the investigation was made easier for them when at least one of the investigators from Headquarters had had some personal experience with a shooting incident himself. The value of having such a person as part of the investigating team to the Agents involved may very well offset any problems the investigator may have in terms of maintaining objectivity. 150 Telephone Call from Headquarters Administrative Personnel Several Agents have reported that their initial adjustment was helped greatly by a supportive call from senior Headquarters administrative personnel. All Agents agreed that such a personal call was much more helpful than a letter. All Agents were anxious to have accurate information concerning the nature and time course of official investigations, but felt that this information should be provided in the form of a brochure so that it did not have any implications of personal attack or prejudgment of that particular incident. Agents described several specific comments that they had found helpful when offered by senior administrative personnel. Statements such as "I am glad you are okay" or "I am sorry you were injured" followed by a question like "How are you doing now?," and "How is your family?" were always seen positively. If the calling Agent has had direct experience in this area, sharing and encouragement were valued. In one helpful conversa- tion, the senior Agent mentioned, "I can't know exactly how you feel" and then went on to mention some of the things that anyone might expect such as anger, anxiety, and "replays" of the incident. A helpful analogy was offered by one senior Agent to a "Bearcat Scanner" which constantly kept returning to and "locking" on the same station. This corresponded to the Agent's experience of repetitive thoughts concerning the incident and made him feel less unusual and isolated by his experience. A statement such as "If you need help, ask for it" was felt to be more helpful than one such as "Call me if I can help you in any way." Most Agents felt that calls by senior Bureau personnel to their families should be limited to instances where the Agent has been injured. Information Pertaining to Individual Recommendations Throughout the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference the over— riding issue was what recommendations are necessarily applicable to the FBI to counteract the trauma of a shooting incident. Part one of the questionnaire specifically solicited that information. Individual responses included: no assignment at the shooting scene, is it necessary that the administrative inquiry be adversarial,seeking fault, need for legal advice and representation, administrative leave should be available, training for new Agents is a must, mandatory counseling, use of a respected "shrink" for counseling, and variously phrased statements regarding stream- lining and expediting the shooting investigation. 151 These recommendations were reviewed in the personal in— terviews with the Agents. The comments were expanded upon and clarified. During the conference group discussion, a detailed and systematic review of all recommendations was made. This approach was the basis from which we worked to identify, develop and formulate appropriate recommendations that coincide with the needs of the Bureau. The information developed through the re- view of professional police literature was also incorporated in this developmental process. 152 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The goal of this project was to determine what, if any, post-shooting trauma reactions Special Agents of the FBI might encounter and suffer from, and then make recommendations to alleviate or minimize the effects. The data collected in this study included the responses of the fourteen Special Agents who attended this conference and interviews by the authors with a similar number of Agents involved in shooting incidents over several years. From this diversity of experiences we have concentrated our conclusions and recommendations on those aspects that reappeared with significant regularity and concerning which the conference participants were able to achieve consensus. l. Interventions at the Shooting Scene A. After the shooting scene has been secured, the first concern expressed and acted on should be that all Bureau personnel are both physically and mentally well cared for. B. The Agent(s) involved in the shooting should be permitted and encouraged to immediately contact his/her spouse and/or family. If the Agent has been injured, or if he/she feels it would be useful, the Agent's family should be contacted immediately in person by a designated Agent who knows the family personally. The field office should also be notified of the Agent's condition so that there will be a response to family who call the office. It is particularly important that family notification occur before press and/or media accounts appear. C. Agents who have been personally involved in the shooting incident should be removed from the scene as soon as possible and not assigned fur- ther duties in the investigation of that incident. D. If the Agent's weapon is seized for evidence or ballistics tests, another should be issued immediately. E. FBI Headquarters should explore the issue of the availability of legal advice and/or help for Agents who have been involved in shooting in- cidents. Agents need to know what their legal rights and liabilities are. The Agent often has to face difficult and pressured decisions in this area at the immediate scene of the shooting. 153 Within 24 hours following the incident, the SAC should initiate a personal contact with the Agent and his/her family in a supportive role and offer assistance, if needed. The current Bureau procedure of not releasing the identity of Agents involved in investigations or - incidents is especially important in post-shooting matters. Interventions During the First Week A. C. Dr. Soskis will contact the Agent as soon as possible after the shooting incident. This contact is designed to be supportive and to share with the Agent the possible physical and psychological re- actions to this trauma. If the Agent wishes, Carole Soskis will contact the Agent's family. Interactions of Dr. and Mrs. Soskis with Agents and their families around shooting incidents will be treated as confidential in the same way as self or informally referred cases in the routine Psychologi- cal Services Program. Peer support from other Agents who have experienced shooting incidents should be made available. If there is no readily available resource for this in the Agent's field office, the Behavioral Science Unit will identify the nearest available Special Agent who has participated in the Bureau's Post- Shooting Trauma Conference, which instructs Agents in providing support and counseling for others. Those Special Agents who have attended the most recent seminar are currently available to assist other Agents. A brochure should be available to Agents who have been involved in shooting incidents covering: (1) The symptoms to be expected and their normal course. (2) Administrative handling of the post-shooting investigation. (3) Legal aspects of the shooting incident. (4) Counseling services available. The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG), the Behavioral Science Unit, and Dr. and Mrs. Soskis will cooperate in the preparation of this brochure. 154 Agents who have been injured in a shooting incident should also have access to a brochure which covers the administrative aspects of on-the—job injuries. Specific concerns are issues of leave without pay versus sick leave, medical bills, workmen's compensation, and realistic planning for time without pay. The Administrative Services Division is currently working on such a brochure. An official from FBI Headquarters should contact the Agent personally by phone. The scope and direction of this call is to express concern for the welfare of the Agent and his/her family. A total of five mandatory days of administrative leave should be taken by all persons directly involved in the shooting incident. This leave may be taken any time during the first 30 days follow- ing the incident at the discretion of the Agent. Longer Term Issues A. Every effort should be made to facilitate the administrative investigation of shooting incidents so that Agents are not left "twisting in the wind." If a group of inspectors from Headquarters are required to conduct an investigation of the shooting incident, an effort should be made to ensure that at least one of the inspectors has had personal experience with a previous shooting incident. Agents should be allowed to pace their own return to work following shooting incidents. No automatic transfers of Agents to another squad following a shooting incident should be initiated unless the Agent requests that consideration. The letter announcing the conclusion of a Bureau investigation of a shooting incident should be phrased in a way that takes into account the emotional impact on an Agent who has been involved in a life threatening situation and may have suffered post-shooting trauma. Incentive awards following a shooting incident in which subjects have been seriously injured or killed can have a negative psychological impact and/or be perceived as a "bounty." Analysis of the advisability of continuing these awards is recom— mended. 155 Agents who have been involved in a shooting incident should not immediately be assigned to duties highly likely to involve armed confrontations. This is even more important when a given Agent has already been involved in two previous shooting incidents. On an annual or semi-annual basis, Agents who have been involved in shooting incidents should be afforded an opportunity to attend a Post-Shooting Trauma Conference at the FBI Academy. These group sessions will be the basis for future modifications in policy and training and will also provide a pool of Agents able to provide meaningful peer support. Prevention and Training A. Training related to post-shooting trauma and its management should be made available to Bureau administrative personnel. A training block of this type will be prepared by the Behavioral Science, Firearms Training, and Management Science Units. A presentation in this area should also be incor- porated into upcoming SAC conferences, Senior Executive Programs, and Executive Development Institute sessions. Dr. and Mrs. Soskis will incorporate the post-shooting trauma study and recommendations into their upcoming sessions with these groups. An inoculation session which provides the New Agent with an introduction to post-shooting trauma will be developed and provided during New Agents training. This block of instruction will be developed by the Behavioral Science Unit and the Firearms Training Unit. The brochure developed on post-shooting trauma issues should be distributed to all Agents. In the planning of operations which have a high risk of armed confrontations and/or the use of deadly force, Agents with current high levels of personal and/or family stress or health problems should be temporarily excused in order to minimize the risks of cumulative stress or trauma. 156 APPENDICES 157 QUESTIONNAIRE UTILIZED IN THE POST-SHOOTING TRAUMA CONFERENCE JULY 14—15, 1983 Profile of Conference Participants: Age: Ranged from 24-45 Years in Bureau: Ranged from 9 months to 15 years Types of Violation: Two - 87's Three - 88's (others not Four — 91's classified) Results: Eight subjects killed; four subjects wounded Shots Fired: 17 by Agents; 14 by subjects Time of Day: Ranged from 1:30 a.m. to 11:05 p.m. A tabulation of positive responses is indicated by individual questions and/or statements that apply. 158 FOCUSED INTERVIEW SHOOTING STUDY - SPECIAL AGENT 1. Date of shooting: I I I Mo. Day Year Varied with incident 2. Your age at shooting: Ranged from 24_45 3. Years (convert to nearest month, e.g., four years and one month = 49 months) in the Bureau when the shooting occurred: I_ I I Ranged from 9 months to 15 years 4. Field office assigned at the time of the shooting: 5. Field office now assigned: I 'I J 6. Investigative assignment at the time of the shooting (type of case investigated [use #1): 2 - 87's I I? . 3-88's 4 - 91's 7. Married at the time?: Yes No SeparatedI::1 DivorcedI 1 I Now married to the same person?: Yes No 8. What time of day did the shooting occur (military time, e.g., 10:15 a.m. = 1015, 12:00 noon = 1200, and 10:15 p.m. = 2215)?: I I Ranged from 1:30am to 11:05pm p 9. Who was with you at the time of the shooting?: Alone I Other BuAgents Other Law EnforcementI I Other [::I 10. ll. 12. 159 How many rounds fired?: A. BY you: 1 7I Totals from seventeen incidents B. By the suspect: I 1 4I C. By any others: I__J__ 5 1 Who?: How many minutes elapsed between your arrival at the scene and the shooting?: Varied A. Describe what happened during the incident: Individual responses 160 # of responses B. Describe what happened to you emotionally during the incident; do any of the following apply to you? 10 Disbelief that it is really happening Fear for self/shakes Fear for others Responded automatically Feeling - "I must survive" Rush of strength/adrenalin Describe any perceptual changes that occurred in you during the incident: Slow motion Not hearing all the shots, voice or noises Narrowing - tunnel~vision Other, please specify l3. 14. 15. 16. 17. 161 Had you had previous personal contact with the subject?: YesI II No I I If so, what was the nature and extent of contact? Who assumed command at the scene; SAC 53 , investigative team 3 , police department 9 , others - , if so, who? Was there a post-shooting investigation?: Yes‘_I7 Nc{___J If so, who handled the investigation?: Was your weapon held as evidence?: Yes 9 No If so, were you issued another weapon?: Yes 4 No [:::I During the 24 hours following the incident: A. What is your perception of the reactions of fellow Agents? classification purposes these categories were designated: Support Curiosity Aggravation None reported What is your perception of the reactions of your wife/girlfriend and other family members? Wife/girl friend was upset/fearful Parents were upset/fearful No reactions Children asked about shooting Wife/girl friend supportive 18. lUH—IIH 162 vnuat is your perception of the reactions of your supervisors?: Support Criticism Concern about self or own position No reaction reported What is your perception of the reactions of your non-Agent friends?: No response Curiosity Support Criticism .After the first 24 hours did your initial reactions change?: Yes 8 I NoI:::] If so, how? Nausea Headaches Fatigue Other None During the week following, did you experience any physical problems? Yes 7 No I I If so, what were they? - Nausea/Vomiting 1 Headaches 5 Fatigue 3 Other During the week following, did you experience any emotional problems?: Yes 10 No I I If so, what were they? 7 Anxiety/Tension 6 Sadness/Crying/Depression 8 Sleep Problems Disturbing thoughts 19. 20. 21. 22. 163 IDid 3mm; notice any changes in your attitude or emotional statxa in the first six months following the incident?: 'Yes 9 No IE] th>