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
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POST-
SHOOTING TRAUMA ON SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

presented by

John Henry Campbell

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Educational Administration



Major professor

Date 5.11.92

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POST-
SHOOTING TRAUMA ON SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

By

John Henry Campbell

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Educational Administration

1992

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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF POST-SHOOTING TRAUMA ON SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

By

John Henry Campbell

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the Post-Critical-Incident Program of the FBI. The mission of the FBI continues to require special agents to make split-second decisions to shoot or not to shoot. When an agent does shoot and kills, or is shot, the incident has an effect on the agent for the rest of his or her life. That effect, whether psychological, physical, or emotional, is defined as post-traumatic stress.

This study was essentially an evaluation of the FBI's intervention program designed to address post-shooting trauma. The analysis compared the responses of two samples to items in a two-part questionnaire. The first group of respondents, the pre-program sample, were agents who had been involved in shootings between 1973 and 1983. Their responses were obtained through the use of a questionnaire completed in 1984. Those individual agents did not have the benefit of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. The second set of respondents, the post-program sample, were agents involved in serious shooting incidents, who had attended the

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Post-Critical-Incident Seminars and completed the same questionnaire from 1986 through 1989. Those agents received the benefits, organizationally and individually, of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, which was established to formally recognize, define, and address post-traumatic stress.

The design of this comparative analysis was exploratory and descriptive. The chi-square statistical test was used to determine statistically significant differences between the two samples on the questionnaire items.

The results reflected statistically significant pre-/post-program changes. The findings supported the value of the Post-Critical-Incident Program. The study identified not only positive and healthy adjustment trends, but also the significant reduction of the negative behavioral patterns of adjustment after a serious shooting. The Post-Critical-Incident Program of the FBI reflects an organizational commitment to the special agents who have been put to the ultimate test. That program has evolved into a law enforcement model. The value and success of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, as measured by this statistical analysis, are exemplary.

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To the special agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and their families,
who have made the ultimate sacrifice.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A special note of recognition and thanks is given to the special agents of the FBI who shared of themselves by participating in this research. Their acts of bravery were the basis for this analysis.

I owe a heartfelt thanks to the members of my committee: Dr. Eldon R. Nonnamaker, Chairman; Dr. Katherine White; Dr. Lewis F. Hekhuis; Dr. Robert C. Trojanowicz; and the late Dr. Richard Featherstone. Their encouragement and guidance are sincerely appreciated.

It is appropriate to recognize several individuals who have contributed significantly to the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program: John E. Otto, Robert Schaefer, Dr. David Soskis, Carole Soskis, and James M. Horn, whose leadership, encouragement, support, and caring are reflected in the evolution of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program from mere feelings and thoughts to an exemplary tribute to the agents of this organization.

A special message of appreciation is extended to the staff of the Behavioral Science Unit, for without their willingness to review, edit, and support this study, it would not have been possible. Thanks to Bernadette F. Cloniger, Cynthia J. Lent, Patricia Thompson, Dr. James T. Reese, and Dr. Roland Reboussin. I

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would also like to recognize Dr. David Carter, at Montana Tech, for his direction and assistance in the initial statistical analysis.

Finally, and most important, I would like to express my gratitude and love to my wife, Marlys, for her support, assistance, encouragement, and patience during the many long years culminating in this dissertation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The use of deadly force by law enforcement personnel has been and continues to be a controversial issue. The controversy centers on when, if, and under what conditions deadly force is justified. A less-often-considered aspect of the issue of the exercise of deadly force is the effect on the officer who has been involved in a shooting incident. These effects, whether psychological, physical, and/or emotional, are often referred to as transient situational disturbances or post-traumatic-stress disorder.

Much of the literature regarding shooting incidents has focused specifically on the use of deadly force. Until recently, there has been a limited amount of literature regarding the trauma often associated with shooting incidents. The literature that is available correlates the shooting incident with the experiences in military conflicts and other critical incidents.

Of the police psychologists, reporters, and writers who have addressed the issue of post-shooting trauma, there has seemed to be a consensus regarding what post-shooting trauma is and why there is a variance in the individual reactions. These points of consensus are:

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1. A shooting is a major trauma for the officer involved.
2. An officer's reactions to shootings vary with (a) his/her personality and work experience, (b) the circumstances of the shooting, (c) peers' responses, (d) the agency's responses, and (e) media and community responses.
3. Officers' public responses to offers of post-shooting counseling may be negative and a reflection of the prevailing hypermasculine, "macho" police image.
4. Because of the macho police image, many law enforcement officers believe their ability to perform their duties is challenged by the need to seek professional assistance through a psychologist or psychiatrist. That stigma has been well documented in the literature addressing post-shooting trauma. Based on that stigma, departments should consider mandating that officers participate in a confidential, professional post-shooting counseling program.
5. A post-shooting policy should be delineated so that it is clearly understood by the officer involved and also by the administration of the law enforcement agency.

Statement of the Problem

From an initial review of the literature, there appeared to be a significant problem surrounding the effects of post-shooting trauma on the law enforcement officer. The available literature regarding police shootings has identified frequent reactions that police officers go through to include sensory distortion,

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flashbacks, fear of insanity, emotional isolation, and depression, all of which often result in the officer leaving law enforcement.

In July 1983, a pilot research project was commissioned by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to evaluate the reactions of special agents of the FBI who were involved in shooting incidents. Essentially, the goal of that research was to determine whether agents of the FBI suffered from the effects of post-shooting trauma, and if they did, what were the physical, emotional, and psychological effects? Could those effects be identified and neutralized? Finally, the ultimate goal was to develop recommendations to neutralize or minimize the negative aspects of that trauma. In 1983, the FBI had no recognition or understanding of what post-shooting trauma was. The FBI had no policy or procedure to address that trauma, nor was there a program to provide assistance to the agents involved.

As a result of that pilot study, the FBI recognized the need to establish policies and procedures to appropriately address post-shooting trauma and to initiate an organizational understanding of its effect on special agents of the FBI. A follow-up study conducted in 1983 and 1984 resulted in further modifications and development of the FBI's Post-Shooting Program. The follow-up study used a questionnaire/interview process that represented 92 special agents of the FBI who were directly involved in shooting incidents. Both the pilot study and the expanded analysis used a two-part questionnaire instrument that was specifically developed to focus on post-shooting trauma of special agents. The development of the

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instrument, the pilot, the analysis, the follow-up, and written policies were coordinated and completed by this writer. The policy essentially has been in effect since the 1983-84 analysis, with limited modifications.

It was appropriate and necessary for the Behavioral Science Unit of the FBI to conduct a comparative analysis of the initial study, which focused on the reactions and responses of special agents of the FBI, with a more current sampling of agents who have been involved in shooting incidents. That current sampling included those special agents involved in shooting incidents during 1986 through 1989.

With the implementation of a post-critical-incident program, an evaluation of the efforts of that program was a focal point of this research. Are agents still suffering from sensory distortion, flashbacks, and depression? Have the effects of post-shooting trauma been identified and neutralized? Has the implementation of a post-shooting program with further training and support reduced the trauma experienced by special agents of the FBI? Those were a few of the issues and questions that were addressed in this analysis.

Importance of the Study

The mission of the FBI continues to require special agents to make split-second decisions to shoot or not to shoot. When they do shoot and kill, or when they are shot, the incident has an effect on the individual participant for the rest of his or her life. Those who are affected by post-shooting trauma need appropriate

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understanding, timely assistance, and intervention. Through evaluations of intervention programs established by law enforcement nationally and documented in numerous articles pertaining to post-shooting trauma, it has been suggested that timely support assists in reducing long-term disabilities. A current analysis of recent shootings through the assistance and input from those agents directly involved was extremely important to the FBI's Critical Incident Program. This understanding and evaluation has suggested modification to the current policy. The comparison of the responses of the initial study with a current sampling has provided insight into the continued violence that results from being federal law enforcement agents and the shooting incidents into which they are thrust. The aftermath has a significant effect on the individuals involved, on their families and peers, and on the agency or department as a whole. Organizational readiness, response, and support require constant evaluation and upgrading. The analysis reflected in this dissertation has provided a further understanding of the post-shooting-trauma disorder suffered by agents and also has supported the continued development of an exemplary post-shooting policy for the FBI. The analysis has some applicability to other law enforcement agencies in their efforts to understand and deal with post-critical-incident trauma.

The Methodology

This study was a historical overview and a comparative analysis. The initial study covered shooting incidents that

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involved special agents for the period from July 1973 through July 1983. A random sample of 100 agents who had been involved in shooting incidents was polled through a formatted questionnaire. The results of the 92 responses provided the basis for evaluation of what happened physically, emotionally, and psychologically to the agents during and after the shootings.

In the preparation of this dissertation and analysis, the writer collected an aggregate, unidentifiable set of responses using the identical two-part questionnaire. The period of time in this set of responses was 1986 through 1989. That set of 75 responses represented the total population of special agents within the FBI who survived shooting incidents during the period 1986 through 1989. That aggregate pool of questionnaires provided anonymity to the respondents and also a valuable source of data. The pool of data provided the basis for a comparative analysis with the information developed by the writer in 1983-84.

Analysis of the Data

The design of this comparative-analysis study was exploratory and descriptive. A coded frequency format was used through a simple tabulation of the responses. The survey data collected through the open-ended instrument were designed for natural groupings in major categories. Those categories are physical and emotional responses, sources of support and aggravation, factors that foster coping, effects of investigation, and so forth. The chi-square statistical test was used to determine statistical significance between

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responses in each of these categories with those in the previous study. The .05 level of probability was used as the minimum level for accepting differences as significant. With the pilot survey and initial study completed, many of the ambiguities were removed not only from the instrument, but also from the interpretation.

Limitations of the Study

A limitation of this study was the applicability of the conclusions and recommendations to other law enforcement agencies from the analysis solely of shooting incidents of the FBI. The ability to generalize was, therefore, somewhat curtailed. A second limitation was anticipated because of the requirement of self-reporting. However, the extended focus reinforced the ability to develop and augment a model post-shooting policy for the FBI. This policy examination would be of value to post-critical-incident programs of other law enforcement agencies.

Definitions of Terms

Several terms are used throughout this dissertation and are defined within a limited connotation as follows:

Deadly force--force that, when exercised, will or is likely to kill.

Persons directly involved--those agents who shoot or are shot, those who participate in the incidents surrounding or in which the shooting occurred, those who render assistance to the wounded party, and those who make the decision to shoot or not to shoot.

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Post-traumatic-stress disorder--the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human experience.

Shooting incident (street use in a law enforcement context)--a situation in which an officer or agent is severely wounded or killed, or in which a subject is severely wounded or killed.

Transient situational disturbance--a maladaptive reaction to an identifiable psychosocial stressor.

Summary and Overview

The effects of post-shooting trauma have been identified by police psychologists as they pertain to the law enforcement officer in general. An analysis conducted by the writer focused on shooting incidents of the FBI. That analysis was an effort first to identify frequent reactions of those persons directly involved and then to make recommendations to minimize or alleviate the physical, emotional, and psychological problems surrounding post-shooting trauma. A random sample of FBI agents who had been involved in shooting incidents was designated as the research population. That sampling was completed in 1983-84.

A comparative analysis with a more current population, using the designed and tested questionnaire, was the basis for an up-to-date understanding of post-shooting trauma of special agents of the FBI. This analysis compared the two samples to determine the effectiveness of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. The first responses were those of agents who had no benefit of the

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understanding of post-shooting trauma or a program to address the trauma resulting from shootings. The second set of responses was those of agents who had been provided training, assistance, and support through the FBI's Post-Shooting Program. With a current insight, modifications and recommendations to further develop a model post-shooting program for the FBI was a goal of significance. Realistically, those recommendations and conclusions were limited to the Bureau, but it is hoped that this study may serve as the basis for a comparative analysis with similar research in the design of a model post-shooting-trauma policy that can be examined and studied and, if appropriate, applied to enhance other local, state, and federal law enforcement post-shooting or post-critical-incident programs.

Chapter I contained an introduction to the study and a statement of the problem, the importance of the study, the methodology employed in carrying out the study and analyzing the data, limitations, and definitions of terms. Chapter II contains a review of literature pertinent to the topic under investigation. The research methodology is explained in greater detail in Chapter III. Chapter IV contains an analysis and presentation of the data gathered for this study. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter V.

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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Since the turn of the century when Lewis Terman (1917) first tested police candidates for selection using a modified version of the Stanford-Binet, mental health professionals have been involved in various aspects of law enforcement. Over the years their interest and research have resulted in an increased knowledge of law enforcement personnel, organizations, and functions. Much as medical doctors began as general practitioners and grew into specialty areas, so too was the evolution of psychology and the mental health profession, in general. Many mental health professionals are specializing in police psychology and are researchers of virtually every aspect of this unique and stressful occupation.

Post-shooting trauma is an issue in law enforcement that has been recognized, understood, and treated only in the past decade. The commendable efforts of several professional police psychologists are reflected in this literature review. This effort to provide an organized overview of the literature is not necessarily a chronological demarcation, but is differentiated more by the focus, direction, and subject matter of the presentations, articles, and

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reports as they delve into post-shooting trauma. The literature in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in fact, focused on the emerging recognition of post-shooting trauma or post-traumatic-stress disorder. This focus paralleled the growth, recognition, and acceptance as well as the development of police psychologists and they provided.

The first recognized full-time police psychologist dates back only to 1968, when Martin Reiser was hired by the Los Angeles Police Department. Reiser and his cohorts developed an understanding of stress and applied that understanding to the law enforcement profession. These same police psychologists began recognizing the serious nature of the effects, problems, and aftermath of an extreme stressor such as a shooting incident. From their experiences, these professionals were able to provide insight into the causes, symptoms, and effects of the reactions to the exercise of deadly force. In the first section of this literature review, the writer explores the efforts of police psychologists and their pioneering attempts to understand post-traumatic stress.

Two significant events provided a natural framework for developing a systematic review of the important literature pertaining to post-traumatic stress. On September 17, 1984, a dedicated group of professionals came together for the first time at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Academy in Quantico, Virginia, for a conference entitled The National Symposium of Police Psychological Services. The 150 professionals worked intensely throughout the week, discussing provisions that address and maintain

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mental health services for the nation's law enforcement officers. This conference was co-sponsored by James T. Reese, Supervisory Special Agent, Behavioral Science Unit, Training Division, FBI Academy, and Harvey A. Goldstein, Director, Psychological Services, Prince George's County Police Department, Upper Marlboro, Maryland. A call for papers before this symposium laid the academic and professional foundation for progress. The product of that effort, Psychological Services for Law Enforcement, was published in December 1986. Section Five of that publication focused specifically and entirely on critical incident reaction. The contributions of the professional participants provided a significant basis for the understanding and treatment of post-critical-incident trauma, and an evolution in terminology emerged with the recognition of not just shootings but other serious incidents confronting the law enforcement officer that result in post-traumatic stress.

A second significant conference provided a natural bridge that can be identified as an expanding professional research effort focusing on post-critical-incident trauma. In August 1989, 50 mental health professionals, employee assistance providers, chaplains, and law enforcement officers met for the Critical Incident Conference at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Each gave a week of his or her time to share thoughts and ideas concerning critical incidents in law enforcement. The resulting publication was a product of their knowledge and their dedication to

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assist the law enforcement officer. This publication was entitled Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese, Horn, & Dunning, 1991).

It was only through such efforts by those interested in the well-being of police officers that a body of knowledge emerged to protect and serve those in law enforcement who are sworn to serve and protect. It is important to note that the selection of options with regard to handling critical incident trauma is left to each individual. Presented in the publication were numerous options and theories ranging from therapy to spiritual awareness. The ideas of the invited authors were presented without editing the substance of their messages. Their messages provided a range of approaches to meet the needs of those affected by trauma. Each incident is unique, as are the many options suggested. It was impossible, however, to present all the various options. The choice remains up to the control of the readers of that effort.

This literature review, which provides an understanding of what post-shooting trauma is and what effects such incidents have on the law enforcement officer, is organized as follows: The first section concerns the initial recognition of post-shooting trauma. In the second section, the understanding and treatment of that trauma in the individuals involved is detailed. The focus in the third section is on the research, refinement, and professional development of a body of knowledge emerging to address the well-being of the law enforcement officer.

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Recognition of Post-Shooting Trauma

The purpose of this review was to establish an information base as to what work, research, and publications have been accomplished pertaining to post-shooting trauma. Until the early 1980s, little or no work had specifically focused on the effects of post-shooting trauma on the police officer or the special agent involved. The focus of the literature up until approximately the late 1970s and early 1980s was on stress in law enforcement. That material suggested that stress is part of living and that an understanding of what stress is could assist in effectively addressing the consequences. A second issue that surfaced during that time frame suggested that police officers perceive their work as extremely dangerous and stressful. For police officers, perception was and is reality. From that initial introspection, a more specific focus evolved, addressing extreme stressors, shooting incidents, which result in post-shooting trauma.

Of the police psychologist reports that addressed the issue of post-shooting trauma in presentations, speeches, and publications in law enforcement journals, the initial focus was attempting to define what post-shooting trauma is. In a police stress workshop in 1980, Mike Roberts, police psychologist of the San Jose, California, Police Department, established an insight into post-shooting reactions. In his comments, he stated that post-shooting trauma is a transient situational disorder that can easily be alleviated if it is handled or dealt with correctly. He further stated that part of the experiences an officer goes through as a result of killing

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another individual comes from the portrayal of such situations on television and in the movies, which is, in fact, contradictory to what really occurs. There was an expectation of being a hero, but reality was much less than that.

In his presentation, Roberts (1980) specified some frequent reactions and concerns that police officers experience during and after a shooting incident. Some of the reactions and concerns that he identified were sensory distortion, flashbacks, fear of insanity, sorrow over depriving the person of life, crying, grasping for life, and retaliation by family or friends of the slain party. Roberts suggested changes in training and departmental policy. The first recommendation was a short, mandatory, paid administrative leave; the second was supervisor or peer counseling afforded directly to the officers involved; the third was voluntary, confidential, free counseling with a psychotherapist who has a background in law enforcement; and the fourth was recruiting and training of supervisory personnel to meet the needs of officers suffering from post-shooting trauma.

Another individual who addressed the issue of post-shooting trauma during the early 1980s was Massad Ayoob. In his article, entitled "The Killing Experience," Ayoob (1980) described the experience of a law enforcement officer involved in a shooting incident as a mystical situation. He stated that one of the things that most affected the police officer was the administrative handling of the shooting incident. The question that frequently

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arose in the mind of the officer involved was, "What are they going to do to me?"

Ayoob (1980) pointed out some of the things that compound or exacerbate the shooting incident; one of them was the removal of the officer's gun. The scope and direction of this particular focus were limited. Some recommendations were developed from his effort. The most valuable recommendation was that the unit or department offer some counseling for both the officer and his wife.

In a second article, Ayoob (1982) addressed some of the massive psychological effects he observed in law enforcement stress, particularly involving post-shooting trauma. He stated that almost 100% of those officers involved in shootings will have nightmares, and he went on to mention other frequent reactions, including sleepless nights, social withdrawal, and avoidance or aggressive behavior. Ayoob coined the term "Mark of Cain Complex," which he defined as the feeling that everybody was watching the particular officer and concern about the behavior and the reaction of that officer after a critical incident. Ayoob recognized Walter Gorski, a Beverly Hills psychologist who had written about post-shooting trauma. Gorski suggested that an inoculation session, at which officers are told of common reactions of those involved in shooting incidents, is appropriate and necessary for dealing with future trauma. This provides an expectation and understanding of the events that follow the exercise of deadly force.

Before these efforts, Martin Symonds, an associate professor of psychiatry at New York University and newly appointed psychological

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services expert for the New York City Police Department, made a presentation at John Jay College in 1978. At this conference he discussed a traumatic syndrome that followed physical injury to police officers. Symonds specified reaction stages and some of the feelings that a police officer goes through in a post-shooting incident.

In his essay entitled "Beyond Accounts: The Personal Impact of Police Shootings," Van Maanen (1980) suggested that the possibility that the impact of shooting without physical and psychological reactions is rare. However, he admitted that what happens to the individual after a shooting depends on what others in the immediate situation do. He further stated that officers personally define their work and portray it as heavily laden with violence, confrontation, and the possibility of sudden death. This characterizes the officers' beliefs or the sense of risk that the officers feel in their assignments. Van Maanen indicated that a shooting event is without boundaries in the sense that it is unpredictable and comes as a surprise. To the officers, violence is an occupational hazard and is well-recognized and often discussed. Therefore, although shooting incidents are viewed as routine organizationally, they do have unusual and unexpected shock effect on the individuals involved.

Cohen (1980) pointed out that stress or the stressful confrontation that officers perceive often evolves from the investigation and administration questions after the shooting. Her

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work was completed from a series of interviews, and she suggested that the memory of the incident may drive the officer to the extreme use of alcohol or into self-doubt and withdrawal from the job. According to Cohen, personal doubts that accompany police officer shootings are frequent because of the strong, highly rigid moral standards of police officers.

Cohen (1980) also discussed the elements of "peer worship." Police officers who are involved in a fatal shooting quickly learn that there is seldom anything heroic in their incidents and, in fact, are appalled as their anxieties and reactions are compounded by others, including law enforcement officers, in hero worship. Cohen suggested that it was not unusual for an officer to resign as a result of the shooting. Limited studies in Michigan, Texas, Utah, and Massachusetts supported that there was a high correlation between post-shooting trauma, the incident, and resignation or leaving the department within a short period of time.

Cohen (1980) quoted several psychologists regarding what support was necessary. One of the articles Cohen identified was completed by Lippert and Saper (1981). These professionals identified and discussed a pattern of reaction of the officer involved in shooting incidents. They also reiterated the constant theme found in previous literature, which was essentially that officers who are involved in the use of deadly force often experience strong emotional and psychological reactions that greatly influence their ability to cope with their job, family, and life in general. Because of the very real threats these officers face when

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they take a human life and the resultant emotional and psychological reactions, it should be mandatory, from the perspective of the police psychologist, that an officer have the availability of and contact with a psychologist to specifically handle stress reactions. Lippert and Saper recommended that these meetings be mandatory rather than voluntary because there remained a stigma in law enforcement associated with seeking psychological counseling.

One of the themes that ran throughout the Lippert (1981) article was that police officers' responses to killing another individual vary. This variance can be extreme in some cases where reactions actually immobilize the officer. The other extreme of the continuum of reaction would be no reaction at all. An acceptable explanation is that it is normal to have an abnormal reaction to an abnormal situation. There was agreement among the police psychologists that an officer must understand that the reactions and feelings that he or she is experiencing at the time are normal reactions and are not part of a physical or mental breakdown, nor are they indications of some type of personality weakness. This is in direct contrast to the macho image that police officers quite frequently use as a shield to hide their emotions. In conclusion, Lippert reiterated that the key point of dealing with the serious psychological events following a shooting incident was that stress management or counseling contact be initiated within the first two to four days after the shooting incident.

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Lippert and Ferrara (1981) identified four major phases of trauma involving a critical incident. Those phases included the immediate reaction during the shooting, the initial reaction to the event after the shooting incident took place, that critical first three to four days' follow-up period, and then the long-range effect. They provided insight into some of the events of the first three phases by identifying a pattern of reaction to include denial, gathering facts, reporting facts, physical anxiousness, peer-group support, moral self-questioning, an impulse to resign, and the dealing with peers and subordinates in law enforcement. Many times, fellow law enforcement officers do not know exactly how to react to the officer who has been involved in a shooting. At times there is inappropriate reaction, inappropriate identification with the event, and expression of desire to have been part of that shooting.

James Shaw (1981), a licensed psychologist with the King County Department of Public Safety, Olympia, Washington, used the term "post-traumatic stressor." He stated that this was a process of internalizing extreme stress that was a result of the trauma surrounding a shooting incident. Shaw related that part of this effect was based on the characteristics of the officer involved and described many officers as joining police departments with a "Boy Scout syndrome." In effect, this resulted from police officers placing a high value on life and seeing themselves as resources or helping persons.

Shaw (1991a, 1991b) stated that quite frequently there is a delayed reaction after a shooting and described its characteristics

as (a) sleep-pattern disturbance, including problems in sleeping and recurring nightmares about the incident; (b) flashbacks of the incident, generally in slow motion; (c) development of emotional isolation, which affects job performance, but more critically, family family relationships as the officer becomes emotionally cold and withdrawn, having difficulty establishing and/or maintaining intimate relationships; (d) episodes of depression and helplessness, in which thoughts of suicide are common, with self-destructive-behavior tendencies; (e) fears and anxieties where the officer questions himself as to his abilities to handle further situations, questions concerning whether he will react too quickly and take another life, or whether he will be unable to react appropriately in future situations and therefore jeopardize himself and become the victim; and (f) alienation from, criticism, and distrust of the agency in particular, and the system in general--the officer has difficulty with authority figures and may challenge and test rules and regulations.

Shaw (1991a, 1991b) emphasized the fact that an officer who experiences any or all of these symptoms is not psychotic but merely reacting through a unique syndrome of adjustment to a traumatic, stressful situation. He also stated that this can be a prolonged stressful situation. Shaw recommended that conventional counseling be afforded these officers, and he also discussed the formation of a crisis-assistance team to use in a traumatic situation. He described the team as being generally composed of a legal advisor,

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medical health professional, and a police officer who has been involved in a prior shooting incident. As a whole, all of these individuals must understand the law enforcement officer, who he is, what he is, and why he came into the law enforcement profession.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, several newspaper articles and short publications had some pertinence to post-shooting-trauma reactions. One of these articles, entitled "Survivor Guilt," was published in The New York Times (1977). It discussed the symptomatology as well as the post-prevention and aftercare. A second article, entitled "The Second Injury," was published in Sunday News Magazine (Daly, 1979). This article was a result of comprehensive work conducted by Robert Daly, the Director of Psychological Services in the New York City Police Department. Daly pointed out that several things that evolved in the "second injury" included a kind of personality change and the feelings of bitterness. Daly stated that an officer who had been a victim of a shooting could manifest traumatic neuroses.

Kraft (1983) quoted Edward Donovan of the Boston Police Department as saying that "post-shooting trauma is the worst place you can be as a cop." Donovan further stated that about 80% of the officers who are involved in shooting incidents leave law enforcement, quitting their department within two years. That same refrain was echoed by John Powell, a Michigan State University counseling professor and practicing psychologist. Powell (1983) stated that 70% of the officers involved in a killing leave the force within seven years. He further warned that, in many cases,

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there was no one to guide the officers through the periods of self-doubt, depression, anger, and guilt, and that if this trauma was unresolved it could, in fact, lead directly to the ruination of the officer and his life.

Carson (1982) defined the stages of this pattern of post-traumatic-stress reaction as denial, isolation, anger, resentment, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. He related these stages to the symptoms that the officers work through themselves. The commonalities are recognizing the symptoms and patterns that lead to an effective approach to intervention. Again, Carson suggested the formation of a crisis-assistance team to use in the traumatic situation. He further suggested the use of a voluntary, confidential, free counseling service with a psychotherapist who has a background in law enforcement. He defined the peer-counseling process as including an officer who has been there and involved in a critical incident himself or herself. This individual must possess the incident experience, the ability to listen, and the ability to share.

In A Balance of Force, a report published for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Matulia (1982) recommended that professional counseling be mandatory. This recommendation was based on the understanding that there remains a stigma in law enforcement concerning those who seek psychological counseling. Counseling directly confronts the macho image possessed by the law enforcement officer. According to Matulia, this service must also

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be timely. A brief contact by a mental health professional should be afforded within the first 48 hours. In his IACP report, Matulia suggested that the officer's family suffers through the post-shooting trauma as well. He recommended that counseling services should also be available to the officer's immediate family and loved ones.

Nielsen (1981) provided the first empirical insight into the effects of post-shooting trauma. His focus was developed by an analysis of traumatic stress and post-traumatic-stress disorder as it relates to combat psychiatry. One of the main points that came out of Nielsen's work was that there was an apparent lack of emphasis on the well-being of the officers involved in the shootings. He based this statement and his further analysis on the fact that very few services were provided for the police officer shooter who has experienced emotional and physical distress after the shooting. Nielsen cited several frequent reactions, including perceptual distortion, which is often described as experiencing the incident in slow motion. Another major point that came from Nielsen's study was that shootings were magnified by vague, ill-defined, and agonizingly long post-shooting investigations and review procedures. He recommended that officers involved in shootings should be provided with counseling services and that the department's post-shooting procedure should be clear, concise, and applied as quickly as possible.

Hill (1984) stated that when an officer is involved in a shooting incident there are four primary high-risk situations that

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have a significant effect on the trauma. Those circumstances focus specifically on when the officer shoots somebody, when the officer is wounded, when the officer's partner is wounded or killed, and when the officer is present when somebody else is killed. This was reinforced by Sewell's (1981) evaluation, in which he identified 25 of the most stressful events experienced in law enforcement. The most stressful event, as reflected in this study, was the violent death of a partner in the line of duty. Thereafter, in rank order, were several other stressful events: dismissal, taking a life in the line of duty, shooting somebody in the line of duty, suicide of an officer who is a close friend, violent death of another officer in the line of duty, murder committed by a police officer, duty-related violent injury, and violent job-related injury to another officer. Sewell noted that the significant events in these top nine stressors revolve around death, suicide, and bodily injury, and that personal involvement in these events reflects significant stressors and potential for post-traumatic-stress reaction.

In June 1983, the Director of the FBI, William H. Webster, commissioned a pilot study to examine post-shooting trauma, its ramifications and effects on special agents of the FBI as they are involved in the exercise of deadly force. This pilot study was to determine whether Bureau agents have problems physically or psychologically resulting from the use of deadly force. David Soskis, Carol Soskis (contract psychological services employees of the FBI), and the writer established the goal of this project to

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make appropriate recommendations to institute a Bureau policy to neutralize effects of post-shooting trauma. This pilot study drew 14 special agents of the FBI in a conference setting, focusing specifically on the 17 shooting incidents in which they had been involved.

The initial exploration and analysis during the interaction and conference revealed areas of similarity and also areas of difference between the agents of the FBI and the police experience in the realm of post-shooting trauma. Extreme reactions described in police literature, such as the complete inability to function on the job (Donovan, 1983; Hill, 1984; Somodevilla, 1981), leaving the agency (Nielsen, 1981; Powell, 1983; Somodevilla, 1981), or incapacitating psychological or physical symptoms (Cohen, 1980; Hill, 1984; Matulia, 1982; Nielsen, 1981; Somodevilla, 1981) were not observed. In addition, agents uniformly reported that their firearms training had prepared them well for their incidents and, in fact, had provided the ability and was given credit for saving their lives. The incidents involving these special agents showed an almost complete absence of the classic bad shooting that often stems from an unplanned patrol or domestic-dispute setting with minimal or no backup and support. The tasteless joking and hypermasculine macho comments concerning shooting incidents were far rarer in the FBI than were reported in the police literature (Ayoob, 1980; Carson, 1982; Shaw, 1981; Somodevilla, 1981), although they did sometimes occur.

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Despite these positive findings, it was painfully clear that significant symptoms and psychological readjustments did occur in the agents following the exercise of deadly force. Whereas readjustment generally was manageable, most agents thought that some professional and peer support would have been helpful during those stressful periods. Specific recommendations for intervention at the shooting scene, during the first week, and following the shooting incidents, as well as discussion of long-term issues and training in prevention recommendations, were developed in detail.

The character of post-shooting trauma and its stress experienced by agents was, in part, conditioned by the special nature of the Bureau as a national organization. Although most agents and their families thought that field office staff and families rallied to their support, considerable stress was experienced by agents and their families in the course of the prolonged administrative investigations conducted by the inspection staff quartered at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. This was especially a problem when these investigations continued over an extended period of time. Agents and their families shared with police officers concern about legal liabilities surrounding shooting incidents, but because of the absence in the FBI of the kind of legal representation often provided on the scene and afterwards by police unions, agents often felt much more vulnerable in these areas.

This pilot group used the diagnosis of post-traumatic-stress disorder as reflected in the American Psychiatric Association (1980)

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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). This diagnosis required a stressor that would cause symptoms in almost everyone experiencing it and a positive occurrence of symptoms in three groups. The first involved reexperiencing of the trauma in terms of intrusive thoughts or memories, flashbacks, and so forth. The second group involved a numbing or reduced responsiveness to the environment as expressed by withdrawal of interest and the feeling of detachment. The final group involved the presence of two or more of six symptoms related to the incidents, such as startle response, sleep disturbance, and avoidance of situations or circumstances similar to the traumatic incident. This pilot study included a literature review and provided an insight into the responses to a post-traumatic-stress disorder as reflected in this diagnostic manual.

It is significant that the majority of agents reported that they could remember the shooting as if it had happened yesterday. In 11 out of the 17 incidents, agents responded positively to the statement, "After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger." There was a normal reaction on the part of many agents of regret and sympathy for the subject who had been shot. Not all of the effects of the shooting incident were perceived as negative. Several of the agents mentioned that they had "met the test" of a severe stressor and they felt more confident in themselves and less need to prove themselves in other situations. It was a further positive note that, in more than half of the incidents, agents reported that they had

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reevaluated what was important in their lives as to their goals and values. A general overall conclusion was provided that each of these agents, as a whole, thought that this experience made him or her a better person. In general comments, agents remained optimistic about their ability to cope with the future stresses and thought that the experience had taught them that they could trust others, to include family members, peers, and fellow agents, and count on them during a crisis.

In this pilot study, both physical and emotional responses were evaluated. Several of the frequent emotional responses that were identified were disbelief, where there was the inability to understand that this event really had happened; an automatic response, which was suggested by many of the agents based on appropriate training and conditioning in the use of firearms; rush of adrenalin; strength; and fear. Several perceptual distortions previously mentioned by many of the police psychologists (Ayoob, 1980; Loo, 1986; Nielsen, 1980; Powell, 1983) also were identified as being significant by the agents involved, including slow motion, auditory blocking, and tunnel vision. Less frequent physical characteristics, responses, or symptoms that were identified by agents involved in critical incidents where they used deadly force included fatigue, sleep problems, anxiety or tension, and depression. A major category of response provided by these agents was measured through a series of questions and responses, and was also evaluated through interviews. Reactions of others were generally characterized as being overwhelmingly supportive. Those

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supportive concerns were identified specifically as being provided by fellow agents, spouses, or girlfriends. Another significant area of reaction identified by the agents involved was that their wives/girlfriends were upset and fearful for the health and welfare of the agents. These agents stated that the ability to talk out their feelings, frustrations, and experiences provided an excellent release. This again has been supported by much of the literature in the effort to identify a peer group--that is, someone who has had similar experiences. It has been recognized that talking out feelings is a natural and quite frequently necessary mode of coping with traumatic-stress experiences.

The reactions of the families of the agents seem to vary more than the specific reactions of the agents themselves. The nature of the incident, i.e., whether an agent was wounded or whether someone was killed, had a definite effect on the reactions of the spouses or girlfriends. The spouses shared the concern of the agents about potential lawsuits, and some spouses resented a prolonged FBI investigation into the shooting incident. These prolonged investigations caused a sense of being "left out in the cold" or defenseless. There were some particular problematic issues for families of the agents who had been wounded during the shooting incident, particularly financial arrangements and sometimes worker's compensation, handling phone calls, dealing with small children, and not having friends and relatives immediately available to assist them.

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Another significant issue in this pilot project revolved around the source of support as well as the source of aggravation. Undoubtedly, the support provided to special agents of the FBI, both physically and mentally, was based in two areas: the home and the peer group. Agents specifically stated that they were most assisted by fellow agents and second by their wives/girlfriends providing them with the ability to cope with life in general. Somewhat surprising was the identification of major sources of aggravation by the special agents who were involved in shooting incidents. The news media emerged as the most aggravating. Frequently, the media typified the shooting incident as being one in which excessive force had been used or concluded that this particular incident could have been resolved with appropriate negotiation.

Not surprisingly, the next major aggravation to the agents involved in shooting incidents was Bureau officials themselves. A general tone of hostility and anger arose from a shooting incident in that anger was directly focused on the FBI because of the agents' belief that the investigation was adversarial and prolonged. The investigations themselves are blocks to final completion and resolution of these traumatic incidents. The shooting incident and the life-threatening situation challenge the sense of security and basic trust of the strongest and best adjusted person. That heightened sensitivity or hypersensitivity concerning how their organization supports them or withholds that support is critical. Although it is necessary to have a thorough and fair investigation into an incident, the prolonged nature and fragmented communications

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surrounding that investigation become a source of stress to a significant number of agents involved.

An overwhelming finding of this pilot study was that agents attributed great value in their coping with the trauma of the shooting incidents to the opportunity to both talk and listen to other agents who had been involved in the same or a similar situation. The opportunity to share and compare with others who had had this particular experience was extremely beneficial in providing reassurance and support. This finding provided the rationale for the recommendation that a peer-support program be established. An overriding issue that was focused on was the development of appropriate recommendations necessary for the FBI to establish a set of guidelines to counteract the trauma of a shooting incident.

There was a detailed analysis regarding assignments and responses after a critical incident, particularly questions surrounding assignments at the shooting scene, the necessity of the administrative inquiry, and questioning as to the adversarial aspect of that inquiry--seeking fault rather than providing the agent with the opportunity to "tell his or her story" appropriately. Further issues that were evaluated were the need for legal advice and representation, administrative leave, training for new agents, and various phases of development in expeditious resolution of the shooting investigation itself.

From this pilot study, a series of recommendations and guidelines were established. Those recommendations and guidelines

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were separated into four distinct phases: (a) intervention at the shooting scene, (b) intervention during the first week, (c) long-term issues, and (d) prevention and training.

Initially, at the shooting scene, there must be an expression of concern for the agent involved. A second issue would be the opportunity for the agent to contact his or her spouse and/or family as soon as possible after the incident. If the agent had been injured, there should be an immediate personal response to the family by an agent who has some personal familiarity with the family. A third aspect of the intervention at the shooting scene would include the immediate removal of the personnel involved from that scene. Another issue that frequently surfaced in the literature (Matulia, 1982; Nielsen, 1981; Somodevilla, 1981) was that if, in fact, the weapon has been seized for evidence or for ballistic testing, another weapon should be issued immediately because a weapon is part and parcel of the image of the law enforcement officer.

Several of the key elements of the intervention during the first week should be the availability of a peer-support team of persons to allow the agent involved in the critical incident to vent or tell his or her story. The second would be the availability of a mental health professional through the Psychological Services Program of the FBI. A third issue that surfaced would be the development of a brochure that would be available to the agents, which would cover the symptoms to be expected in the normal course as regards the phases of post-traumatic stress. That brochure would

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also include the administrative handling of the post-shooting investigation, the legal aspects of the shooting incident, and what counseling services would be available for the agent involved in that critical incident. Another phase of the intervention during the first week would be the availability of administrative leave at the discretion of the persons involved in this critical incident.

Long-term issues that were identified during this pilot study included the necessity of facilitating the administrative investigation so that the agents are not left "twisting in the wind." A second long-term issue that was recognized is that agents are not always ready immediately to move back into their work assignment, and there should be some type of flexibility or allowance for the agents to pace themselves into the return. A major consideration in this long-term issue was the development of training, be it sensitivity or understanding of the shooting incident for the inspection staff from FBI headquarters. This training did, in fact, ensure that at least there was an understanding of the personal experiences of those agents involved in the shooting incident.

As part of the prevention and training, one of the significant recommendations that was established was a block of training that would prepare new agents through an introduction to post-shooting trauma. This inoculation session would be developed and presented by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit. A final issue that was addressed was the need for communication through briefings and/or

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appropriate memoranda to the management of the FBI to provide them with the understanding and recognition that incorporates post-shooting trauma, its effects, and the appropriate recommendations for dealing with employees of the FBI who are involved in such a trauma. A full copy of the completed pilot study is included in Appendix C.

In summary, from the early articles, publications, formal presentations, and research, several points of consensus were established. Those points were:

1. A shooting is a major trauma for the officers involved.
2. An officer's reactions to the shooting vary with:
 - a. His or her previous reputation and status, personality, and work experience.
 - b. The circumstances of the shooting.
 - c. Peer response.
 - d. Administration response.
 - e. Media and community responses.
3. An officer's reactions to shooting are unpredictable in advance.
4. An officer's public responses to offers of post-shooting counseling may be negative and a reflection of the prevailing hypermasculine macho police image.
5. The department should consider mandating that officers participate in confidential, professional post-shooting counseling.

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6. The post-shooting policy should be delineated so that it is clearly understood by the officers involved and also by the administrators of the law enforcement agency.

The significance of this effort on the part of police psychologists was, in fact, the recognition of post-shooting trauma, its effects on the officers or agents involved in the shooting incident, and the ultimate development of appropriate policies and procedures to reduce the murky aspect of the aftermath of these incidents.

Understanding and Treatment of Post-Shooting Trauma

In the mid-1980s, the police community and mental health and psychological services professionals continued to focus their attention and energy on post-trauma stress, or post-shooting trauma, as it affected the officers involved. Their efforts moved beyond merely the identification and recognition of post-shooting trauma and resulted in an expanded awareness. This awareness motivated them to establish programs and explore resources to address the consequences of the exercise of deadly force. Police psychological service professionals assumed a leadership role in providing that understanding of post-shooting trauma and the development of treatment and programs to address the aftermath. Police psychologists provided significant leadership through their activities, which included publishing articles and conducting workshops and conferences pertaining to post-shooting trauma. Emerging expertise expanded the cadre of professionals who chose to

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assist law enforcement. Significant contributions during that time include the work of Roger M. Solomon, James M. Horn, Robert Schaefer, Wayne Hill, Clarence Jones, and Michael J. McMains, to name a few.

Two significant events directly expanded the understanding and further recognition of and commitment to the officers and agents involved in the exercise of deadly force. That commitment was expanded to include the families of those who made the ultimate sacrifice. Those two events were the founding of the Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS) and the convening of the National Symposium on Police Psychological Services.

COPS was founded in 1984 as a national network to provide peer support to police survivors. The key to their organizational goals was peer support. That recurring theme of assistance through peers has been observed as the best tool for helping. A second goal established by COPS was to provide assistance and guidelines and to prepare the law enforcement community to address line-of-duty deaths through victimization training. COPS was initially funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and has since received support from police organizations, private foundations, corporations, and private citizens. The initial research grant established by NIJ resulted in a report entitled "Line of Duty Deaths: Survivor and Department Responses" (Stillman, 1987). That study, coupled with the commitment of survivors, has provided direction, guidance, and understanding in how to deal with the

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tragedy of line-of-duty deaths, as well as how to provide emotional support and counseling to the surviving families.

An eye-opener provided by the NIJ research was that a staggering 67% of law enforcement agencies lacked formal policies concerning the deaths of officers. The lack of guidelines compounded the emotional tragedy of the surviving families. Based on that research, COPS (1988) published a law enforcement agency's handbook entitled Support Services to Surviving Families of Line-of-Duty Death. This handbook covered significant issues such as death notification, assisting the family at the hospital, support for the family during the wake and funeral, providing information on assistance and benefits to the surviving family, continued follow-up to the family as a departmental responsibility, and support of the family during trials. Through this outstanding effort, a range of materials were developed that are necessary in providing a sense of well-being and organizational support from the law enforcement community to the family of that officer who has made the ultimate sacrifice. Appendix E contains a copy of the 1988 COPS handbook.

The second event that influenced the law enforcement community's effort to address post-shooting trauma was a conference held at the FBI Academy in September 1984, entitled "The National Symposium of Police Psychological Services." The theme of that symposium was helping services. More than 150 professionals participated in that week-long working conference to assist, improve, and maintain mental health services for the nation's law enforcement officers. A call for papers produced a state-of-the-art

publication entitled Psychological Services for Law Enforcement. That compilation of papers was edited by Reese and Goldstein (1986). The publication included sections pertaining to police-officer selection and assignment, counseling, organizational issues, psychological services, and stress and stress management. Section Five specifically addressed critical incident reactions. At that time, the work reflected in that publication of the professionals was the gospel on critical incident reactions.

The breadth of information provided by the practitioners and experts in their papers was remarkable. The range of information included Baruth's (1986) discussion of the role of the police psychologist in pre-critical assistance. Essentially, Baruth reviewed the consequences of job-related stress on the performance of police officers and focused on previous works that suggested that the police officer's reaction to a shooting incident cannot be predicted in advance. He developed several recommendations for law enforcement agencies to establish procedures and policies to deal with incidents that create high levels of stress for officers.

Baruth's work was further defined and augmented by two other writers, Blak (1986) and Frederick (1986). Each of their articles provided an analysis of post-traumatic-stress disorders and the reactions of law enforcement officers to a violent confrontation. Both identified initial intervention-response treatment to provide the victim officer with honest and accurate information to deal not only with the tragic event, but also the potentially significant

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aftermath of violent trauma. Blak (1986, 1991), Fowler (1986), Garrison (1986, 1991), McMains (1986a, 1986b, 1991), and Somodevilla (1986) expanded treatment models, as well as initial intervention strategy. The timely and appropriate response, not only by the administration, but also by peers, was identified as a significant step in providing the foundation to alleviate long-term stress reaction. That timeliness of intervention was perceived as a key to providing an understanding of the vulnerability of the officers, and appropriate principles of management served to properly resolve reactions to shootings.

The principles of management as identified through the works of McMains included brevity or a short-term intervention; immediacy, which essentially was intervening as soon as possible; centrality, which provided more effective and efficient use of resources through a team approach; expectancy, which conveyed an understanding to the officer regarding his or her expectations and efforts; and proximity, which was, in fact, as close to the shooting as possible. Included in the writings of these professionals were the initial reactions, the reactions to the investigation, short-term follow-up, extended follow-up from up to six weeks, and then long-term follow-up of expectations.

Solomon and Horn (1986) provided an overview of a pilot study that addressed the full range of reactions to include the perceptual distortion of all five senses, the standard responses, and the emotional responses. The types of intrusive thoughts or flashbacks were again reviewed, as well as the isolation or alienation and

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other consequences. These professionals determined that approximately one-third of those individuals involved in shooting incidents had limited reactions, one-third had moderate reactions, and the final one-third had severe reactions. It was important to assess the reactions of the officer or agent involved in the shooting to determine an appropriate level of support needed. There were prior significant correlations to support variables in the investigative process that directly affect how an officer reacts to his or her critical events. Their recommendations, in fact, paralleled the recommendations provided by Somodevilla (1986) as standard operating procedures covering police shootings. Those recommendations included the need for a companion officer, removal from the immediate scene, providing ability to respond to the family's welfare, support and reassurance by the organization, access to legal representation, handling of the media, administrative leave, psychological intervention, and proactive treatment. All of these issues are integral parts of a comprehensive policy in addressing post-shooting trauma.

In his paper presented at this symposium, Nielsen (1986) identified the need to assess the stress reaction and different diagnoses as a response to a normal stress, a severe stress, or a stress reaction with preexisting conditions or impairment. Those treatment implications differentiated from a normal reaction, which may be short term and include symptoms of anxiety, depression, and fatigue. In comparison to that short-term reaction, there could be

an extreme tax on an already overloaded coping system, which frequently results in social isolation. The extreme reaction typically shows a premorbid adjustment by the officer and is based on preexisting psychological problems and/or general ego weaknesses. The results of this reaction may be the onset of psychotic symptoms or a breakdown in internal regulation or self-control.

Throughout that symposium, there was a recognition of the future and the need for further study of post-shooting trauma. Zeling (1986) recognized that the next major hurdle was the growing need for and emphasis on research. That research not only is necessary to have a proactive inoculatory effect, but it will enhance a full mental health and psychological service effort to address post-shooting trauma.

Paralleling the efforts of these participants are the efforts educators, researchers, and professionals working in their own organizations' projects and spheres of influence. Robert Loo (1984), chief psychologist with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, studied post-traumatic-stress reactions to develop psychological-services policies and procedures in support of members of the Canadian law enforcement community. His two empirical studies determined that officers experience most stress reactions within three days of a shooting. His recommendations paralleled those of psychological service professionals in the United States and included psychological debriefing/counseling, a period of leave from duty, and psychological services offered to follow-up. He also recommended the participation of psychological services in all

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aspects of law enforcement, which would include training and workshops that address the police family.

Jones (198) published a book entitled After the Smoke Clears: Surviving the Police Shooting. His research effort and analysis provided a basic understanding of what a police officer experiences during and after a shooting. That book, written by a police officer for other police officers, provided insights not only for the line officer, but also for the mid-level manager in dealing with post-shooting trauma. Jones's explanation of post-shooting trauma included the shooting incident itself, the aftermath, the department's response, the effect on the family, recommendations for coping, and examples of model policies.

Two other pilot studies were completed during this time, one by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, as represented by Stratton, Snibbe, and Bayless (1984), and another broad study completed in Kentucky by Martin, McKean, and Veltkamp (1986). In each of these studies, the variety of psychological reactions was described, and the effects as reported by the respondents or involved officers determined that the emotional responses varied as to the individual involved. Post-shooting-stress disorders were described as a sequel to victimization. These limited pilot studies provided further insight into post-shooting trauma, which goes beyond the everyday traumatic events of the law enforcement officer.

In his article entitled "Post-Killing Trauma: When Police Officers Are the Victims," Hill (1984) reviewed the sequence of

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initial response and follow-up. He discussed a unique concept of sharing a psychologist, an appropriate solution for small departments that cannot afford the annual salary of a police psychologist. Hill provided an authentic alternative where five or more departments could share the cost of a psychological services division.

During this same period, Robert Schaefer, a special agent with the Behavioral Science Unit of the FBI, focused the FBI's attention on appropriate recognition of the aftermath of a shooting incident through a series of articles. In a presentation before a conference of top-level managers, Schaefer (1986) provided insight into the legal, procedural, and moral issues of post-shooting trauma and the events following the exercise of deadly force. He also provided guidelines for intervention. Subsequently, Schaefer (1987) published an article entitled "Post-Shooting Trauma: The Role of the FBI Manager," in an in-house management quarterly. His insightfulness provided a projected goal of neutralizing the effects of post-shooting trauma. The key to a healthy response was defined as knowing about the normal reactions to a critical event and then making appropriate adjustments as they occur. Another significant step by Schaefer was the initial phase of developing a peer-support process. He defined an effective peer-support program as the basis of developing rapport, facilitating listening, and taking action with the ultimate goal of being able to support and help the agent or police officer involved in a shooting incident by addressing or reducing the trauma associated with that incident.

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At that same time, a Bureau project was completed, which was entitled Shooting Incidents: Issues and Explanations for FBI Agents and Managers (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.). This pamphlet reflected the research efforts of Soskis, Soskis, Schaefer, and Campbell. It provided managers within the FBI an insight into the physiological and psychological aspects of shooting incidents involving FBI agents. The range of reactions during the incident, as well as other physiological and psychological reactions, was identified. Family issues, work issues, and successful coping were also preeminent aspects of this summary publication. This pamphlet essentially was a summary of the ramifications of a shooting incident. It was prepared with an emphasis on providing support to the agents involved in shooting incidents. Appendix D contains the complete explanation for FBI agents and managers on post-shooting trauma.

The recurring theme in addressing the effects of post-shooting trauma, more specifically defined by clinicians as post-trauma stress, was recognized as peer support. Questions regarding the what, who, and why of a peer-support program have been answered with demonstrated success through the efforts of the professionals working with and in the law enforcement community. Inherent in each of the landmark articles, reports, pilot studies, and initiatives was the realization of the need for more research. That recognition sets the stage for the following section, which concludes the exploration of the literature.

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Research, Refinement, and Professional Development

In August 1989, a remarkable week observed the birth of a state-of-the-art assessment of post-shooting trauma and a step beyond in assisting law enforcement. That step beyond was in the further developed recognition, conceptualized treatment, and research in the field of post-critical-incident trauma. The awareness was that life-threatening and traumatic events that produce physical, psychological, and emotional trauma are, in fact, daily occurrences for the law enforcement officer. Those experiences include shootings, automobile accidents, airplane crashes, suicides, and training events that result in trauma, tragedy, and personal health problems. All of those events can and frequently do result in post-traumatic-stress reactions.

In August 1989, 50 experts in the fields of mental health, employee assistance, chaplaincy, and law enforcement came together at the FBI Academy to focus their energies, expertise, and attention on research into and treatment of post-critical-incident trauma. The backgrounds and expertise of this group of professionals produced a synergetic effect. Their contributions and messages provided a range of options and theories to address critical-incident trauma.

Their effort ultimately was assembled in Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese et al., 1991). This publication can, in fact, be systematically analyzed through a subset of themes or messages. A brief analysis of this state-of-the-art publication resulted in the

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identification of five significant themes pertaining to post-critical-incident trauma. Those five areas represent the research, refinement, and professional development of current literature in the field of critical incidents, as well as the tools for dealing with the aftermath of experiences involving the use of deadly force. The focused themes included debriefing models, critical-incident debriefing and peer-support initiatives, mandated aftercare, family and spouse issues, and the role of the chaplain. Two parallel articles also are worthy of mention. Those articles pertained to the second injury and inoculation training.

Blak (1991), Havassy (1991), and Violanti (1991) provided insight into critical-incident debriefing models. Much of their work referenced the systematic approach established by Mitchell (1983). The process essentially is the initial defusing of the critical incident through a spontaneous sharing of feelings, support, and ventilation. The second phase is the use of a mental health professional to establish the ground rules. This process leads into a fact phase, which elicits factual information; a feeling phase; a symptom phase, which essentially describes emotional, physical, and mental reactions; a teaching phase; a reentry phase; and the general follow-up or after-contact. Debriefing essentially is the common intervention used in critical incidents.

The structural phases introduced by Mitchell (1983) resulted in information for successful coping. That coping need, as suggested by Violanti (1991), is created by the effect of the traumatic event

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and the realization of the vulnerability. That vulnerability destroys the myth possessed by law enforcement officers as to their indestructibility. The unmasking of that vulnerability can be a shocking experience for the law enforcement officer.

Bohl (1991) and Solomon (1991) reviewed the long-term effectiveness of a brief psychological intervention. The similar conclusion of their works was that intervention prevents delayed symptoms of stress. They again addressed the dynamics of vulnerability and fear, what the expectations are of being involved in a critical incident, and, more important, how to cope with the aftermath of such an incident. The models that both proposed provided implications for further training, research, and treatment, and tended to support the mandatory aftercare program.

Mandatory aftercare was addressed in more detail by both Reese (1991) and Havassy (1991). Reese suggested that law enforcement officers are an "at risk" population. He essentially suggested that exposure to life-threatening events challenges the equilibrium of those involved. The requirement to adjust to that disequilibrium supports the mandated critical-incident treatment and aftercare program. The recognized need for adjustment, in fact, should be incorporated into departmental or agency policy. It provides protection for the departments and officers involved and should not be construed as a sign of weakness. In fact, the support between agencies and/or the supervisory staff of the department provides a measure of sensitivity and support to the officers or agents

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involved. These authors not only recommended mandatory aftercare, but they also suggested that same assessment be made available to support persons of the agency, as well as to the families of the participants involved.

The most significant theme that evolved in Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese et al., 1991) was the issue of families and spouses. Several authors, including Fisher (1991), Hartsough (1991), Shar (1991), Wittrup (1991), Pastorella (1991), Sawyer (1991), and Sheehan (1991), recognized the effect of the critical incident on family members and support groups of the officers and agents involved, and their subsequent vulnerability. The ripple effect of the traumatic-stress incident creates emotional and physical trauma for those who support the officer and, in fact, it was recognized that that cadre of persons and officers is often overlooked. The need for support and assistance of those involved, both directly and indirectly, was also recognized by Fisher (1991), Hartsough (1991), Shaw (1991), and Sheehan (1991). Wittrup (1991) suggested that little attention has been given to family members and that lack of support, through ignorance or negligence, compounded the tragedy or the critical-incident trauma effect on the officer involved. These authors supported and defined programs to provide the same debriefings, understanding, and assistance to the families of the officers involved in critical incidents.

There is evidence that the process of recovery by officers' and agents' spouse and immediately family in the case of a death is directly related to the notification process and to the support

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provided. Death notification to the families and spouses of the officers and agents involved must be made through a predetermined process that is sensitively yet professionally handled. That same issue becomes a central role of the law enforcement chaplaincy. Family members, in fact, also experience post-traumatic-stress reactions. The work of COPS, reflected in Sawyer's (1991) article, suggested that the response of the officer's department either compounded the trauma of shock or provided a source of strength to the family and spouse involved.

An overview of the role of the chaplain in traumatic-incident response was developed in Critical Incidents in Policing (Reese et al., 1991). The chaplaincy in law enforcement has been defined as an ecumenical perspective providing a worth to family and adding to the support program. Formerly, police chaplains often served in a ceremonial role. Through the recognition of chaplains' participation in responses to critical incidents, the professional handling of death notifications, and the follow-up support of issues of personal health, the role has been significantly expanded. The chaplaincy addresses the needs of the spirit. Chaplains provide a resource to address the ethical and moral implications of a shooting. They also can deal with the guilt, anger, fear, and remorse that surface in the aftermath of the experience of deadly force. Chaplains fill a role in addressing the grief that results in the pain of loss. They are trained professionals in handling the aftercare issues.

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The role of chaplain meets a level of demands not specifically available in a peer-support program. The role allows for the extension beyond the traumatic event and helps in a practical manner. Chaplaincy provides a resource to the participants in a critical event above and beyond the law enforcement response. Benjestorf (1991), Brende (1991), Dunne (1991), Gold (1991), Palmese (1991), Puckett (1991), and Wentick (1991) all suggested that pastoral presence goes beyond the normal law enforcement support. Each individual involved in a critical incident feels or sees a chaplain on his or her own terms.

The most overwhelming role that is so professionally addressed by the chaplains was discussed in detail by the authors mentioned above, particularly Wentick (1991). That overwhelming or devastating responsibility is death notification. He suggested that there is no easy way, that it must be done with feeling, with understanding of the responses, with expediency, and with first-hand information. Wentick provided guidelines for delivering that tragic message. Those guidelines included dealing with the present, recognizing the potential for emotional and physical responses by the loved ones, and ensuring that a support system is in place for the grieving family. Doing it right requires sensitivity, understanding, and a format. The personal experiences of the aforementioned authors assisted in the development of a proper notification procedure.

The most significant treatment available for the law enforcement officer in addressing critical incidents and

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post-shooting trauma is the availability of a peer-support or critical-incident debriefing team. Britt (1991) provided a checklist for a critical-incident response team. Mitchell (1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1991) has treated law enforcement personnel across the country and has successfully established critical-incident stress teams through his personal and professional dedication to the law enforcement profession. The critical-incident team results in a partnership between mental health professionals and emergency workers who are committed to preventing the negative effects of acute stress. They also incorporate many of the resources and tools suggested by the chaplains and family support programs, as well as follow-up response to those affected by post-shooting trauma.

Neilson (1991) suggested that there is an ongoing learning process for those involved in the traumatic-incident corps. Emotional and social support must be reinforced through lessons learned and incorporated in the legitimization of the team. It is necessary to have a clear policy and procedure documented to ensure proper acceptance. The integrated response must be recognized through an organizationally established statewide multi-agency program. The program should be focused on a strong debriefing component, which is the underlying premise for the success of the peer-support efforts.

Many departments and states have recognized the need for law enforcement to establish peer-support services. Kline (1991) suggested that peer counselors are a relatively new phenomenon in

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law enforcement; however, they have provided the most significant tool for addressing post-traumatic stress. With the natural built-in trust of another officer, the peer-support program and the intervention provided have been unanimously recognized. The counselor's knowledge of not only the job, but also the experience and the aftermath, is an effective tool in understanding and liaison for the officer involved, as well as for the family, the department, and the community. The counselors have, in fact, walked in their shoes and experienced the roller coaster of emotions.

Two final articles suggested other experiences of post-shooting trauma. The first was "Modeling Inoculation Training for Traumatic Incident Exposure" (Garrison, 1991). In this article, Garrison explored proactive preparatory measures that offer effective strategies for coping during an incident. Essentially, understanding through designed training provides a basis for coping with a future tragedy or critical incident. The overall anxiety and stress resulting from a major critical incident often are compounded by the lack of understanding and lack of control. Garrison suggested that previous training provides necessary skills and coping abilities to deal with tragedies.

Snidersich (1991) wrote an article entitled "The Second Injury," in which he suggested that an officer or agent involved in a critical incident or having experienced extreme stress is, in fact, precariously vulnerable, and the effects of being shot or taking a person's life are compounded when that individual is confronted with further emotional or psychological challenges.

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Dealing with the emotional and psychological reactions of taking a life or being seriously wounded creates an experience that results in the fear and threat of a similar future event. The natural conclusion of his recognition was that care must be taken in future assignments of those individuals who suffer from post-shooting trauma. Second injury is a further theme that will be developed in the recommendations and conclusions of this study.

During the past few years, several other significant articles have been published that have contributed to the full understanding and treatment of post-critical-incident trauma. Issues of liability, legal analysis, policies, and training have been raised as areas that need refinement when the law enforcement officer uses deadly force. This evaluation is a process of refocusing on the aftermath of a shooting.

Titus (1991), Mayer, Coble, and Praet (1989), and Everett (1991) explored the legal responsibilities, not only of the officer or agent, but also of the department or agency. Issues as extreme as failure to train versus an excuse not to work were prevailing questions. These authors also supported the necessity of a proper plan or policy that provided the basis for analysis. Everett reviewed the Supreme Court decision in Garritty v. New Jersey. That analysis established policy issues that required agencies or departments actually to evaluate the interview process of the individual involved in the use of deadly force. That evaluation

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pointed out the need and concern for appropriate legal advice and representation for the officers involved in shootings.

Solomon (1990) continued to focus his energies and attention through the Police Psychological Services Section of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). He reviewed and documented administrative guidelines for officers involved in on-duty shooting situations. Those guidelines were not unique. They covered the range of the emotional reactions of the officer, the administrative aspects of the investigation, mandatory confidential debriefings, administrative leave, and the expeditious completion of the administrative and criminal investigation. Solomon's concluding remarks suggested that training of all officers in critical-incident reaction--in what is to be expected personally, departmentally, and legally--is the key to the prevention of that second injury.

A significant issue in a pilot study by Band and Vasquez (1991) was survivability. They concluded that proper training is necessary to ensure that law enforcement officers are prepared to meet occupational challenges. They identified five critical items perceived as important to survivability. Those items include self-confidence in performance, training, effectiveness in combat, decisiveness, and perseverance under stress. These authors recognized that their effort was a preliminary one and that further research is necessary to examine the war in the streets and the survivability of the warriors (the law enforcement officers).

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If one looks back at yesterday and then accounts for today and looks ahead to tomorrow in a systematic and educated manner, that exploration might be defined as visionary. That was, in fact, what Carlson (1989) accomplished in his command-college research paper, "How Will Law Enforcement Agencies Manage the Issue of Post-Shooting Trauma by the Year 2000?" In this extended research effort, Carlson examined potential future scenarios that are likely to confront those professionals who are exploring post-shooting trauma and the ultimate effect on the law enforcement officer. The considerations examined through a future-oriented approach provided an understanding of the potential effect on the future of those officers involved in critical incidents. Carlson reviewed future trends, which range from more officer-involved shootings to the increased quality of psychological services.

Through the use of futures techniques, including scanning, future wheel, nominal group techniques, and trend analysis, Carlson was able to identify five important events that may have an effect on the future services to the law enforcement professionals involved in shooting incidents. Those future events include economic depression that results in major cutbacks in resources for criminal justice, law enforcement officers being prosecuted and convicted for involvement in shootings, major shooting incidents resulting in significant loss of life, the development of effective nonlethal weapons that would result in the reduction of officer-involved shootings, and the restructuring of the draft based on a major military conflict. Carlson's cross-impact analysis provided a

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systematic insight into what may be the future of post-shooting trauma. He identified two keys for addressing post-shooting trauma in the future. Those keys are awareness and commitment to managing post-shooting trauma.

Conclusion

In the past decade, a true recognition and understanding of and established treatment models for post-shooting trauma have been explored and developed through the work of dedicated professionals from many diverse fields. This literature review recognized the contributions and recommendations of a significant number of those professionals from the fields of law enforcement, police psychological services, mental health, psychiatry, and social work. The professional concern and care expressed in each of the individual contributions are commendable.

The challenge ahead for all is to continue further empirical research, to communicate the findings, and to ensure that the lessons of the past are not forgotten, while at the same time expanding on new efforts to further develop treatment that addresses the post-critical-incident trauma of the law enforcement officer who serves and protects. A second challenge is to continue to safeguard the families and support groups of those who serve.

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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter contains an overview of the design, instrument, and methodology used in this study. The research design was a combination of a longitudinal survey with a cross-section analysis. The survey facilitated and supported a comparative analysis between a pre-program sample and a current set of responses. The survey was initially developed to analyze post-shooting trauma involving special agents of the FBI who had been involved in shooting incidents. The instrument that was used, in part, was a modification of the questionnaire developed by Neilson (1981) in his research. Neilson provided a formal authorization for the use of the questionnaire. The research instrument was modified to be appropriate for special agents of the FBI. A second section was added to this instrument to evaluate post-traumatic stress disorder.

Population

For the purpose of evaluation, this analysis focused on the implication and impact of shooting incidents on special agents of the FBI. The initial source of respondents was identified through a detailed analysis of agents who had been involved in shooting incidents for the period from 1973 through 1983. One hundred

questionnaires were forwarded to these agents who were identified as being involved in a serious shooting incident, asking for their participation in this research project. Ninety-two respondents provided their insights into the effect of shooting incidents. Their responses provided the basis for the development of a post-shooting policy.

A pilot survey pretested the instrument and allowed for detailed interviews and individual responses. Subsequently, through the establishment of Post-Critical-Incident Training Seminars and the continued use of this questionnaire as an evaluative instrument, a basis for a comparative analysis was possible. A total of 333 employees of the FBI have related their personal experience while attending these seminars and are represented and documented in the research program. A recent sampling of special agents who had been involved in a shooting and also participated in the Post-Critical-Incident Seminar during the period from 1986 through 1989 provided the specific basis for the comparative analysis conducted in this research.

Design

The initial purposes of this study were primarily exploratory and descriptive. A further developed focus of the research was to present a comparative analysis of those special agents who were involved in shooting incidents before the FBI's implementation of a Critical Incident Program with those agents who received support and assistance through the Post-Critical-Incident Seminar. The

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data-collection instrument used in this research was generally open ended. The questionnaire, as modified, was specifically designed to assess the nature of the shooting incidents and the effect of those incidents on agents who were directly involved. A follow-up aspect of this study was to conduct individual interviews during the attendance at Post-Critical-Incident Seminars held at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire (Appendix A) was an adaptation of a previously used instrument and was constructed with two separate sets of questions. The first set of questions was designed to elicit insight into the shooting incidents and the responses of the agents involved. It also focused on any support obtained, as well as the aggravations of being involved in shooting incidents. Another expectation of the questionnaire was to determine specifically from whom the agents received emotional and psychological support. The questions were established in a simple format with an easy check-off list to capture the responses of the agents. The second section of the questionnaire was designed with an open-ended format allowing for "yes" or "no" responses. This particular section focused on general understanding and evaluation of post-traumatic stress disorder as reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (3rd ed.). David Soskis provided invaluable assistance in the review and construction of both sections of this questionnaire.

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Follow-up interviews were incorporated in this process in an effort to elicit factual information concerning shooting incidents, as well as to explain further the agents' responses to the incidents. These follow-up interviews were used to reinforce and complement the questionnaires. It was recognized that the agents involved in shooting incidents frequently had emotionally charged responses and reactions; therefore, the interviews were conducted with sensitivity.

Pilot Study

In July 1983, 14 special agents of the FBI were brought to the FBI Academy to provide a basis for the analysis of the discussions of post-shooting trauma. Those 14 agents had been involved in a total of 17 shooting incidents. The continued goal of that conference was to determine whether FBI agents suffered from post-shooting trauma and, if so, to make appropriate recommendations to minimize the negative effects of that trauma.

The conference format included an introduction to the goals and objectives of the conference, the completion and analysis of the formal questionnaire, personal interviews, and a series of group discussions. From the information that was developed at the conference, the interviews, and analysis of research, several positive recommendations were instituted, dealing with the need for the FBI to establish a program or policy to address post-shooting trauma. This pilot study provided an opportunity to evaluate the questionnaire to determine an appropriate understanding of the

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questions themselves and allowed for individual responses through the focused interviews. The pilot project provided an invaluable basis for further recommendations and analysis. A full, detailed report of this conference was prepared (Appendix C) and forwarded to the Director of the FBI, reflecting the evaluation, accomplishments, and recommendations of the participants.

Data Collection

The initial data were collected and presented in a systematic manner. The questionnaire was sent out to special agents of the FBI with a cover letter (Appendix B). The recipients were a narrow selection of special agents identified through Bureau records who were involved in shooting incidents from 1973 through 1983. The recipients of this questionnaire were, in fact, involved in shooting incidents as narrowly defined in this research where an agent was killed or wounded, or the subject was killed or seriously wounded. The cover letter provided an explanation of the rationale for this research project and asked for each agent's participation. A return request was made, using the FBI mailing system. No follow-up mailing was necessary because of the extraordinary response rate of 92 out of 100 initial questionnaires (92%). An effort was made to determine the reason for lack of response by the eight nonparticipants, and it was determined that four agents had retired from the FBI and four agents chose not to participate in this research project.

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A second set of responses was generated during the past eight years through attendance at FBI Post-Critical-Incident Seminars. During that period, 333 employees of the FBI participated in these week-long training and debriefing seminars. Participation in these seminars included individual interviews and completion of the questionnaire.

Data Analysis

Responses to the questionnaire were coded and key punched for simple computer tabulation and processing. The collected data were analyzed with the assistance of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The first phases of the data-processing program, including tabulation and evaluation, were initiated during assignment at the FBI Academy. Subsequent processing was conducted at the Montana College of Mineral Science and Technology, Butte, Montana, with the assistance of David Carter. That full analysis was subsequently transferred and loaded on the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) mainframe computer.

The data were analyzed in accordance with the purpose and goals of the research. Open-ended questions were coded, using natural groupings of answers as major categories. The responses and data were displayed in a frequency format. In the pilot report, illustrative quotations provided explanations and enhancements of the responses.

The chi-square statistic was used to determine statistical significance where appropriate data assumptions could be

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established. A 5% level of probability was used as a minimum level **f**or acceptable differences of significance.

Summary

This study was primarily designed to be exploratory and **d**escriptive. A structured multiple-part questionnaire was used to **o**btain evaluative responses of special agents of the FBI who had **b**een involved in serious shooting incidents. The initial focus was **t**o determine whether FBI agents who were involved in serious **s**hooting incidents do suffer from post-shooting trauma. **S**ubsequently, with a pilot analysis and a pre-program sampling of 92 **r**esponses, a comparative program analysis was completed. The **a**nalysis compared a pre-program group with a current sampling of **a**gents who had been involved in serious shooting incidents and **r**ecieved the benefits of a post-critical-incident seminar. The **s**urvey data were collected through a two-part open-ended instrument. **S**imple computer tabulations with overall analysis through SPSS were **t**he basis of this research design. The findings are reported in **C**hapter IV.

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CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

Introduction

The data for this research and analysis were obtained through two separate procedures. The initial pre-program set of responses was obtained through a mailed questionnaire during the period from July 1983 through the end of 1984. A cover letter explaining the goals and objectives of that survey accompanied the two-part questionnaire. This survey was forwarded to 100 special agents of the FBI who had been involved in a "serious" shooting incident. Of the 100 questionnaires, 92 were returned. That set of 92 responses provided the population for this analysis of agents who were involved in shootings and did not receive assistance from the Post-Critical-Incident Program. The responses of this population are referred to as "pre-program data." The specific shooting incidents that these special agents were involved in covered the period from 1973 through 1983. In the summer of 1983, the FBI embarked on an initial examination of the issue of post-shooting trauma and, after that examination, the implementation of a program that recognizes and alleviates the effect of such severe stressors on special agents of the FBI.

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In developing this program, the FBI and, more specifically, the Behavioral Science Unit, has sponsored 20 Post-Critical-Incident Seminars since the program's implementation in 1983. Part of the week-long seminars includes the completion of the two-part questionnaire that was initially developed by this writer and others in the summer of 1983. The second set of data were provided by those individuals who attended recent Post-Critical-Incident Seminars at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

The number of individuals who were involved in serious shooting incidents, attended these Post-Critical-Incident Seminars, and completed this questionnaire during the period of 1986 through 1989 totaled 75. That set of 75 questionnaires represented special agents of the FBI who were afforded the benefits, organizationally and individually, of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. Employees of the FBI who attended the week-long seminar were also individually interviewed and were provided an opportunity to elaborate and clarify their responses to the instrument or questionnaire. These 75 responses are referred to as "post-program data."

The goal and objectives of this study were essentially the analysis of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program through a comparison of responses to the focused questionnaire of a group of agents who had received the benefits of a formalized Post-Critical-Incident Program that recognized, defined, and addressed post-trauma stress (post-program) and those who did not receive those benefits (pre-program).

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In the initial examination of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program through this comparative analysis, numerous questions were posed regarding the need for modifications of the current policy. It was recognized that continued violence in the American society results in an increased involvement by federal law enforcement officers and, more specifically, special agents of the FBI, in shooting incidents. The overall analysis essentially was an examination of the FBI's effort to understand and deal with post-critical-incident trauma. Several specific questions were initially presented; these included: Are agents still suffering from sensory distortions, flashbacks, and depression? Has the organization identified and neutralized the effects of post-shooting trauma? And, most important, has the implementation of a post-shooting program with training and support reduced the trauma experienced by special agents of the FBI?

In keeping with the purpose of this study, the data are presented in a series of tables reflecting frequencies and percentages. This study was designed as exploratory and descriptive research; therefore, explanations of the total responses are included in the section entitled General Analysis. That section provides accurate insights into the experiences of a special agent of the FBI when he or she has been involved in an exercise of deadly force. The tables graphically reflect a range of emotional, perceptual, and interpretive responses experienced during and after a shooting event. Those tables represent the responses reported by

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special agents who were involved in shooting incidents. The tables provide frequencies and percentages defined by the pre-group and post-group, as well as a total of both groups' responses. The pre-group (pre), again, included those who were involved in shooting incidents before the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. The post-group (post) comprised those individuals who were involved after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. The total population (reflected in this analysis) was 167: 92 pre and 75 post. The tables incorporating those totals in the descriptive section entitled General Analysis provide an explanation of the responses.

The second part of this chapter reflects an explanation of the statistical evaluations of significant changes as identified through the chi-square statistical test. Those changes that were identified as significant are appropriately noted in the tables, and a detailed analysis regarding the significance is provided in the second section of this chapter, entitled Specific Analysis. This chapter also includes a brief evaluation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. That evaluation incorporates the explanation, tables, and details reflected in both the general and specific analysis portions of this chapter. The concluding section of this chapter is a discussion of the limitations of this analysis, as well as of the overall study.

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General AnalysisPost-Shooting Trauma and Post-Traumatic-Stress Disorder

In the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1987), there exists a diagnosis of post-traumatic-stress disorder. This diagnosis is explained as a result of a stressor that would cause some symptomatology in anyone experiencing that trauma. The experience, essentially, is an event that is outside the normal range of human experiences. Included in the general definition is an experience that is defined as a serious injury or death as a result of an accident or physical violence.

This diagnosis is further defined as reflecting positive occurrences of symptomatology in three separate categories. The first category of symptomatology involves reexperiencing the trauma in terms of intrusive thoughts/memories, flashbacks, nightmares, and so on. The second group of symptoms involves a numbness or reduced responsiveness to the environment as experienced by a withdrawal of interest and feelings of detachment. The final category incorporates the presence of two or more of a total of six symptoms related to the incident, such as sleeping difficulties, irritability, hypervigilance, startled responses or avoidance of similar situations, and reduced concentration. In applying the diagnosis, the disturbances and symptoms must have persisted at least a month.

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A specific focus and attempt to identify post-traumatic-stress disorder in special agents of the FBI following a shooting incident was made through the questionnaire. The instrument was designed to elicit and evaluate responses that provide an insight into special agents' reactions as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). In the pre-sample, more than one-third of the agents' responses warranted the diagnosis of post-traumatic-stress disorder. In the post-sample, somewhat fewer responses would fit this criterion.

In the total number of shootings reported (167), evidence of reexperiencing the trauma, psychic numbing, or reduced responsiveness was reported in more than one-half of the instances. A similar number reported two or more of the associated symptoms. The most frequent statements identified by the respondents were "Thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my mind" (104); "After the incident, I slept more poorly than usual" (90); "I sometimes felt guilty about what happened" (43); "I became hyper-alert and/or startled after the incident" (46); "I dreamed frequently about the shooting" (49); and "After the incident, I became more cautious/concerned" (90).

Other Psychological Effects

Not unexpectedly, most of the agents (142) reported that they could remember the shooting as if it had happened yesterday. Of the 167 total experiences reported, 90 agents responded positively to the statement concerning being more cautious in situations that

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m i g h t involve firearms and danger. In a limited number (25) of the **i n c**idents, special agents expressed concern, regret, and sympathy **f o r** the subject who had been shot. However, very few responses **r e f**lected harmful involvement with the subject's family. A response **t h a t** was frequently given reflected Monday-morning quarterbacking or **s e l f**-criticism. Seventy-one agents indicated that they reviewed the **i n c**ident over and over again and wondered whether they had done the **r i g h t** thing.

A positive trend reflected in this analysis of the agents **i n v**olved indicated that many effects of the shooting events were not **n e g a t i v e**. A number of agents mentioned that they had finally met **t h e** ultimate test of a severe stressor and that this reinforced **t h e i r** confidence. They also thought that they could handle future **e v e n t s** most effectively. A large number (115 of the 167) indicated **t h a t** they had learned they could trust people and count on them in a **c r i s i s**. Ninety-one agents reported that their future would be **b e t t e r** than their past. Fifty-nine agents indicated that they **b e c a m e** more interested in and involved with their families. One **h u n d r e d** forty-nine agents reported that they would be able to handle **w h a t e v e r** happened in the future.

One of the extremely positive trends and responses was that, in **o n e - h a l f** of the incidents, agents reported that they had reevaluated **t h o s e** things that were important to them in their lives and **e s t a b l i s h e d** goals, objectives, and values. In 88 of the 167 **i n c i d e n t s**, agents reported that their experiences had helped them

mature, and in 83 incidents, the agents concurred with the **statement**, "I think that the whole incident has made me a better **person**." These positive trends reflect a significant focus of **agents'** energies and attentions. Their optimism reinforced their **ability** to cope with future stressors. The lessons learned **regarding** their ability to trust, and finally getting the job done, **reflect** an extremely healthy result from a significant stressor. **One** other observation worthy of note is that 104 agents reported **that** their sense of humor assisted them in coping with the whole **event**.

Physical and Emotional Responses at the Time of the Incident

One of the areas that was examined through this analysis was **the** reactions, both physical and emotional, that the agents **experienced** during the shooting. Those responses provided a better **understanding** of what the agents had experienced. Recognizing that an **abnormal** reaction to an abnormal occurrence/situation is normal, **and** using this as an evaluative criterion, provided a framework for **examining** the responses of the agents. Several notable emotional **responses** took place within the individuals during the shooting **incidents**. These included the automatic response that is **interpreted** as a result of appropriate training (140), a rush of **strength** and **adrenalin** (76), **disbelief** that this was really happening (62), **fear** for self (33), and **fear** for others (66). Table 1 **reflects** these responses.

Table 1.--Emotional responses that occurred during shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Response	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
D isbelief	30	32	62	32.6	42.7
F ear for self/shakes	18	15	33	19.6	20.0
F ear for others	32	34	66	34.8	45.3
R esponded automatically	75	65	140	81.5	86.7
F eeling--"I must survive"	22	14	36	23.9	18.7
R ush of strength/adrenalin	43	33	76	46.7	44.0

Note: Some agents gave more than one response.

In this and succeeding tables, percentages are based on an N of 92 for pre-data and an N of 75 for post-data. Not every agent responded to every question.

Exploring what perceptual thoughts occurred to the agents during their shooting incidents was another specific focus. The most frequent perceptual distortion experienced by the agents was tunnel vision (74). A significant number of agents (56) also experienced the event in slow motion. Auditory blocking or not hearing all of the shots fired or noises surrounding the agent that actually occurred was reported by 70 agents. Several agents reported physical responses of immediately being cold at the time of the shooting. This experience subsided sometime afterwards. Table 2 reflects these specific perceptual distortions.

Table 2.--Perceptual distortions that occurred during shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Distortion	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
S low motion	27	29	56	29.3	38.7
A uditory blocking	33	37	70	35.9	49.3
*T unnel vision	33	41	74	35.9	54.7

Note: Some agents reported more than one distortion.

*Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test.

Reactions of Others

The agents' perceptions of the reactions of others after the shooting influenced how they personally experienced the aftermath and how they were able to deal with the trauma. Tables 3 through 6 reflect the reactions of fellow agents, families, supervisors, and friends, respectively. Overwhelmingly, the reactions were supportive. The support provided and concern expressed were identified in separate areas of all 167 shooting incidents as follows: fellow agents (146), supervisors (134), friends (99), and wives/girlfriends (124). This strong display of support and confidence assisted the agents in their handling of a split-second decision in the use of deadly force. Other significant areas of reactions identified by agents were that the wives/girlfriends were upset and fearful for the health and welfare of the agents (71). A negative perception

was that some supervisors were concerned for themselves or their **positions** (33).

Table 3.--Reactions of fellow agents that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Reaction	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Support	79	67	146	85.9	89.3
Curiosity	42	36	78	45.7	48.0
Aggravation	3	5	8	3.3	6.7
*None reported	6	1	7	6.5	1.3

Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction.

*Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test.

Table 4.--Reactions of families that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Reaction	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Wife/girlfriend fearful/upset	40	31	71	43.5	41.3
Parents fearful/upset	22	18	40	23.9	24.0
No reported reaction	7	8	15	7.6	10.7
Children asked about shooting	28	28	56	30.4	37.3
Wife/girlfriend supportive	70	54	124	76.1	72.0

Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction.

Table 5.--Reactions of supervisors that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Reaction	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Supportive	74	60	134	80.4	80.0
Criticism	4	2	6	4.3	2.7
Concerned for own self or position	17	16	33	18.5	21.3
No reaction reported			0	0	0

Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction, which was a combination of criticism and self-concern.

Table 6.--Reactions of nonagent friends that occurred after shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Reaction	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Curiosity	53	51	104	57.6	68.0
Support	58	41	99	63.0	54.7
Criticism	0	1	1	0	1.3

Note: Some agents reported more than one reaction.

Being able to talk out feelings, frustrations, the shooting experience, the aftermath, and the investigation was identified as a catharsis for release. This release through talking it out is a natural and frequent method for coping with a traumatic experience.

This concept is a fundamental basis for a peer-support program and **was** reinforced through responses provided by 120 agents who **expressed** positive responses to "A person who has not been in a **shooting** can't really understand what it is like." The peer-support **program** was further enhanced and supported by the 98 positive **responses** to the statement, "It helped me to talk with other agents **who** had been involved in shootings or to hear about it from others."

Table 10 further identifies the person/people to whom the **i**ndividual agent related his experiences. The peer group (fellow **s**pecial agents of the FBI) ranked number one. That overwhelming **r**esponse of the need for discussing the shooting event and the **a**ftermath with peers strongly supports the basis of and need for an **A**dvanced Peer-Support Program. Not unexpectedly, the wives/**g**irlfriends were ranked highly by the agents (65) because of the **s**ignificant bond, interaction, and empathy that exists in that **r**elationship. Counseling and support services need to be provided to **t**he spouse, as well.

Physical and Emotional Responses After the Incident

As a follow-up, another series of questions was posed in an **a**tttempt to identify physical and emotional symptoms and responses **t**hat the agents could identify in themselves that continued after the **s**hooting experience. The initial benchmark was persistence in the **w**eek following the shooting. Tables 7, 8, and 9 specifically **r**eflect those responses. It was of interest to note that, **p**hysically, the only significant response or symptom that persisted

was fatigue (49). When questioned regarding emotional feelings that persisted, the responses included sleep problems (54); anxiety/tension (41); sadness, crying, and depression (26); and thought disturbances (39). In general, the physical, emotional, and perceptual responses were resolved. The support the agents received from peers and families assisted in these areas. Those abnormal reactions to an abnormal situation were normal. The extended symptomatology of the post-group was significantly less than that of the pre-group. Those responses and evaluations are further examined in the section of this chapter entitled Specific Analysis.

Table 7.--Physical symptoms occurring in the first 24 hours following the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Symptom	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Nausea/vomiting	1	1	2	1.1	1.3
Headaches	2	4	6	2.2	5.3
Fatigue	26	23	49	28.3	30.7
Other	19	11	30	20.7	14.7
No reaction	2	6	8	2.2	8.0

Table 8.--Physical symptoms occurring in the week following the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Symptom	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Nausea/vomiting	1	1	2	1.1	1.3
Headaches	4	4	8	4.3	5.3
Fatigue	25	15	40	27.2	26.0

Table 9.--Emotional symptoms occurring in the week following the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Symptom	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Anxiety/tension	24	17	41	26.1	22.7
Sadness/crying/depression	10	16	26	10.9	21.3
Sleep problems	31	23	54	33.7	30.7
Disturbing thoughts	22	17	39	23.9	22.7

Note: Some agents reported more than one symptom.

Family Effects

The effect of a shooting incident on a special agent and the family was evaluated and understood both through the responses completed by the agents and through direct and indirect interviews of agents and their spouses. Reactions of the families were

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reported in Table 4. In 71 of the 167 incidents reported in Part 1 of the questionnaire and again in a similar question in Part 2, 73 of 167 agents reported that "My wife was very worried and upset." Even more than that number was the concern and problems related to children reported by the respondents. Ninety-six of the 167 questionnaires reflected concerns and problems related to children and to parents alike. In about one-third of the incidents, agents identified some increased irritability in the home, as well as some increased personal problems. Very few of the agents who had participated in the use of deadly force and provided their insights indicated marital problems as a result of the shooting incident. It should be further noted, and is reflected in Table 4, that 124 responses reflected that the wives and/or girlfriends were supportive.

Contacts with special agents and their spouses through follow-up interviews uniformly confirmed that the positive support was, in fact, a reflection of the ability to listen to the agent over and over again regarding his critical incident. This information, again, strongly supported the healing process but also clarified the need to provide similar assistance to spouses lest they become second victims as the care givers. The agents clearly were helped by the availability, confidentiality, and support of their marital relationships.

Agents' wives uniformly reported that they had received abundant support from other agents, from their friends in the Bureau, and from field offices during times of crisis. There was a

reflection of the need for appropriate and timely notification both of the spouse and the children to ensure that effects of this shooting event were not compounded by media coverage. Previous exposure to shooting incidents and other acts of violence through military and law enforcement experience closely influenced the specific incidents and the families involved. The concerns reflected by the agents also became the concerns of their spouses. Examples of those types of concerns include potential legal action, the prolonged investigation, and the sense of being the subject of the inquiry.

Sources of Support and Aggravation

One of the areas that was reviewed through the questionnaire was where the agents received the most assistance in dealing with the trauma of the shooting event. That assistance and support are reflected in Tables 10 and 11. The support, both physical and mental, was based in two areas, the home and the peer group. The agents specifically reinforced the statement that peer groups of fellow agents provided the necessary insight into the critical event to ensure that this was not a long-term stress reaction. Peer counseling, obviously, is a vital aspect of dealing with the crisis. The extension and elaboration of the FBI's Advanced Peer-Support Program was supported and justified through this overall analysis. Details are provided in the section of this chapter entitled Program Analysis. The wives/girlfriends also provided valuable assistance in coping with life and placing things in perspective.

Table 10.--Person the agent talked with most about the shooting, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Person	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Wife/girlfriend	37	28	65	40.2	37.3
Other family members	3	4	7	3.3	5.3
Fellow agents	66	63	129	71.7	84.0
Supervisor	5	8	13	5.4	10.7
Clergy	2	1	3	2.2	1.3

Note: Some agents reported more than one person.

Table 11.--Person who provided the most assistance after the shooting, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Person	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Wife/girlfriend	45	26	71	48.9	34.7
Other family members	1	3	4	1.1	4.0
*Fellow agent	50	60	110	54.3	80.0
Supervisor	11	9	20	12.0	12.0
*Clergy	2	0	2	2.2	0

Note: Some agents reported more than one person.

*Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test.

Not surprisingly, the major focus of aggravation for agents was considered to be Bureau offices (39). The natural process that

agents go through as a reaction to a shooting incident often creates an atmosphere of hypersensitivity, and the healing process includes anger and hostility. The adversarial aspect of the investigation of a critical event focuses that anger directly toward the employees of the FBI who are charged with conducting an appropriate investigation. A prolonged investigation compounds that anger. There has been a considerable and conscientious effort on the part of program managers of the Post-Critical-Incident Program to reduce the adversarial aspects of the necessary investigation, resulting in significantly reduced feelings of hostility. There has been an even more conscious effort to reduce the time frame of the investigation. Again, this serves as a significant reducer of aggravation. The other areas of aggravation identified by the respondents included other agents (18), supervisors (26), and subjects' attorneys (11). Tables 12 and 13 reflect details regarding the aggravation perceptions by the agents involved.

Somewhat surprising in this evaluation of aggravation to the agents was the continued aggravation of the news media. The Bureau policy regarding news media prohibiting releasing the identity of agents involved in investigations is most appropriately applied in post-shooting incidents. That policy serves to protect the agents, as well as their wives and families. It should be noted that continual aggravation by the media with all of law enforcement is a common stressor in a shooting incident. In summary, the ability to protect the names of the participants involved and the expeditious

investigation significantly reduce the "murky aftermath" of a **s**hooting.

Table 12.--Major sources of aggravation to agents involved in shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Source	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
O ther agents	8	10	18	8.7	13.3
N ews media	17	17	34	18.5	22.7
S upervisor	11	15	26	12.0	20.0
O ther Bureau officials	24	15	39	26.1	20.0
S uspect's attorney	7	4	11	7.6	5.3
S uspect's family and friends	8	1	9	8.7	1.3

Note: Some agents reported more than one source.

Table 13.--Nature of press coverage, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Nature of Coverage	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
E xtensive	45	43	88	48.9	57.3
M oderate	32	22	54	34.8	29.3
M inimal	12	7	19	13.0	9.3
N one	1	3	4	1.1	4.0
F ailed to report	2	0	2	2.2	0

Factors That Foster Coping

An overwhelming finding of this study was that agents attached great value in their coping with shooting incidents to the opportunity both to share their experiences with other agents who had been involved in similar incidents and to receive the agency's support through a recognized program. The support reflected in Tables 3 through 6 overwhelmingly documented this position. A special reason for the prominence of this coping can be found in the response of 110 of the total 167 agents agreeing with the statement, "A person who has not been in a shooting incident cannot understand what it is like." The reassurance and support of agents who had "walked in those shoes" have built-in credibility and provide confidence. One hundred agents positively responded to the statement, "It helped me to help/listen to others who have been involved in shootings."

It also surfaced as being helpful to have a period of administrative leave offered after a shooting incident. The need for peer support and interaction suggests that administrative leave should be left to the discretion of the agent involved. Sixty agents responded affirmatively to the statement, "It helped me to get back to my normal work routine." Often, the investigation of the incident may require the presence of the agents. As suggested in the pilot study completed by David Soskis, Carole Soskis, and this writer, allowing the agents to schedule the administrative leave at any time during the 30 days following the incident would ensure that this leave could provide the maximum benefit for the

agent and for the family. The opportunity to interact with Advanced Peer-Support Agents and the offered support from other Bureau officials also suggests that flexibility is necessary in the administrative-leave offer.

Some other issues or factors reported by the agents that provide an insight into the helpful aspects of coping include a sense of humor (114), getting back to normal work routine (60), being physically active (88), keeping one's mind off what has happened (39), appropriately moving through the phases of shock and reaction by feeling anger (48), and also strong support through religious beliefs and practices (86). The final evaluation of religious beliefs and practices suggests and supports the value of a chaplaincy program, which is elaborated on in Chapter V.

Effects of the Investigation

Shooting incidents and the life-threatening situations that can and do challenge the senses of security and trust require strong support and adjustment on the part of the agents involved. There is a continued second guessing, not only by the agents involved, but also by the investigator who is required to do a follow-up. The agents involved are naturally hypersensitive in reacting to how their organization, meaning the FBI, supports them or fails to support them during and after a shooting incident. It is recognized that it is necessary to conduct a thorough and fair investigation of the incident, but at times the prolonged and fragmented nature of this investigation has compounded the source of stress for a

significant number of agents. Thirty agents responded affirmatively **t**o the statement that it was very hard for them to find anything **g**ood about the incident or what followed that incident. The element **o**f stress compounded by the organizational inquiries plants a **f**urther burden on those agents. Statements reflecting this include **" I** worried a lot about the investigation of the incident" (45), **"I** was treated like a suspect in the investigation of the incident" (25), and **"The** way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me **t**han the shooting itself" (32).

This concern with the aftermath and its adversary effects on **t**he agents has been addressed continually over the past eight years **b**y the Director of the FBI. Every effort has been made to expedite **t**he investigation and to offer support, both by telephone and in **w**ritten communications. Organizational letters forwarded at the **c**onclusion of the investigation have been written and rewritten to **p**rovide an appropriate phraseology that is not offensive. Many **a**gents discovered that the process of the investigation was assisted **t**hrough the assignment of an investigator who had some personal **e**xperience of a shooting incident. The value of having such an **i**nvestigator often offsets the need for objectivity.

Currently, the Inspection Staff is required to view a 20-minute **v**ideotape prepared by the Behavioral Science Unit, which provides **t**hem with insight into post-shooting trauma and the necessity for **h**andling these investigations with sensitivity and professionalism. **O**ften, the agents themselves are self-questioning. This was pointed

out by 71 responses to the statement, "I would review the incident again and again and wonder if I did the right thing." Understanding, compassion, and a professional objectivity are necessary in these sensitive matters.

The Shooting Incident

Annually, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Section publishes a handbook entitled Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted. That publication incorporates a statistical analysis of law enforcement officers' involvement in shooting incidents and other assault crimes. In that publication, there is a profile of law enforcement officers who had been involved in such incidents. This profile provides factual statistical information regarding the shootings. It is appropriate that the present analysis provide a similar profile that reflects the incidents in which FBI agents have been involved.

Tables 14 through 17 reflect a limited insight into the exercise of deadly force by special agents of the FBI. Table 14 reflects the extent of the subjects' injuries.

If one analyzes the types of investigations to be conducted in which the FBI exercises deadly force both in pre- and post-group identified dangerous investigations, these would include unlawful-flight fugitives, bank-robbery investigations, and drug-related investigations. The dangerous nature of these investigations comes as no surprise. If we explore by frequency of incidents that identify more dangerous field offices, the most dangerous would

include Miami, New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Cleveland, and Newark. These field offices are considered major offices by the FBI and are also considered by law enforcement personnel as relatively difficult cities to work in because of the violent crime in the communities. The Bureau also recognizes the significant number of federal violations being committed in these jurisdictions as a proportionate number of agents are assigned in each of these field offices.

Table 14.--Extent of the subject's injury, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Extent of Injury	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Killed	45	35	80	48.9	47.9
Seriously wounded	23	10	33	25.0	13.7
Wounded, not seriously	14	10	24	15.2	13.7
Not wounded	10	18	28	10.9	24.7

In the questionnaire, the agents were asked what time of day the shooting occurred. It was interesting to learn that 50% of the shootings occurred before noon. This is, in fact, a contradiction of normal law enforcement shootings, which reflect the most dangerous shift as being in the evening. An explanation of this difference is that many of the arrests and raids conducted by the FBI are conducted in the early morning hours. As to frequency, the

most frequent time of day involving the total population of shootings was at 12:00 noon, and the second most frequent was at 9:30 a.m.

In further analysis of the shootings, one of the considerations was to identify who was with the agent at the time of the shooting. Table 15 reflects the details of that response. Another question was asked regarding the number of rounds fired by the agent, by the suspect, and by others. The number of shots fired by the agent involved ranged from 0 to 150; by the suspect, 0 to 130; and by others, 0 to 100. Another specific question concerned how many minutes elapsed between the agent's arrival on the scene and the shooting. That time ranged from 0 to 905 minutes. That 905 minutes (15 hours) obviously reflects an extended stand-off.

Table 15.--At the time of the shooting, who was with the agent, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Person(s)	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Alone	10	3	17	10.9	4.0
Other Bureau agents	54	48	102	58.7	64.0
Other law enforcement officers	6	4	10	6.5	5.3
Other (not specified)	1	5	6	1.1	6.7
Combination of other Bureau agents and law enforcement officers	21	15	36	22.8	20.0

A limited focus on the agents themselves showed the mean age of **the** pre-group to be 35.1 years and the mean age of the post-group to **be** 38.7 years. This is not surprising because the population of **special** agents is aging. Another question about the agents involved **concerned** their time in the Bureau. In the pre-group, the range was **from** 8 months to 18 years; in the post-group, the range was from 1 **month** to 28 years and 7 months. The agents involved also provided **insight** into the investigation and who took charge of that **investigation**. Those responses are reflected in Table 16.

Table 16.--Who assumed command of the investigation at the shooting scene, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Person	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Special agent in charge	29	17	46	31.5	22.7
Investigative team	11	20	31	12.0	26.7
Police department	24	17	41	26.1	22.7
Others	27	16	43	29.3	21.3
No response	1	5	6	1.1	6.7

One final reflection of the incidents is that the shootings affected not only the participants, but others as well. The agents recognized this and provided recommendations as to other individuals who would benefit from a post-critical-incident program or debriefing. Those recommendations are incorporated into Table 17.

Table 17.--Recommendations of other individuals who were affected by the shootings, as reported by special agents who were involved in incidents before and after the implementation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Person	Frequency			Percent	
	Pre	Post	Total	Pre	Post
Spouse	11	9	20	12.0	12.0
*Other family member	1	2	3	1.1	2.7
Other participating agent(s)	16	12	28	17.4	16.0
Supervisor	2	4	6	2.2	5.3
Special agent in charge	1	3	4	1.1	4.0

*Reflects significant change identified through chi-square test.

Specific Analysis of Change

The chi-square test was used to evaluate significant differences between the data reported by the pre-group and those reported by the post-group. Those differences were tested at the 5% level of confidence. The total number of items in the two-part questionnaire was 157. In analyzing the pre- and post-group individual question responses using the chi-square statistical procedure, 38 of the 157 comparisons were determined to be significant, far more than would be expected merely by chance at the .05 level. These overall results strongly support the effects of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. Individual areas of significance were described and explored to provide a basis for Program evaluation. The overall trend analysis is incorporated into

the portion of this chapter that evaluates the Post-Critical-
Incident Program.

In the general response in Part 1 of the questionnaire, where **18** instances of significant differences were identified between the **pre-** and post-analyses, a number of items deserve further **ex**amination. Several of those items are incorporated in this **an**alysis. Two of those noteworthy items are as follows. In this **an**alysis, significantly more agents and police officers in the post-**g**roup than in the pre-group were killed. Incidents like the FBI's **M**iami shoot-out led to this type of increase. When asked to **d**escribe any perceptual changes that occurred during the incident, a **s**ignificant number of respondents identified slow-motion/tunnel **v**ision (35 of 92 in the pre-group versus 41 of 75 in the post-group). These details were reflected in Table 2.

Law enforcement personnel are continually making efforts to become more professional. Part of the professionalization of law enforcement in the area of the exercise of deadly force is the investigation and handling of events. The investigation involving deadly force incorporates the seizing of weapons for ballistic tests. FBI policy recommends not only obtaining the weapon for testing, but also replacing that weapon or issuing another to the agent. A weapon is part of the identification of a law enforcement officer, and this procedure of replacement prevents stripping the agent of his or her identity. The results of this professionalism have led to a significant increase in the number of weapons of FBI

agents being held as evidence (28 of 92 in the pre-group versus 40 of 75 in the post-group).

Shooting events affected the individuals involved. Agents of the FBI responded that they noticed changes in their attitudes and emotional states during the first six months following the shooting incident. Twenty-six of the 92 pre-group versus 33 of the 75 post-group reported such changes. Another area of significance identified in Part 1 of the questionnaire was the effect of administrative time off after the shooting. Nineteen of the 92 agents in the pre-group were offered time off, versus 48 of the 75 agents in the post-group. When asked whether that time off had helped, 38 of the 92 from the pre-group indicated that the time off would have helped, and 54 of the 75 from the post-group indicated that time off did help. This reflects that providing time off has become a standard positive practice that has been incorporated through the FBI's post-critical-incident policy directives. The significance identified in this format is not surprising. Before FBI implementation of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, time off and the value of that administrative time were not recognized. With the implementation of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, administrative time off has been incorporated as a natural and healthy event to recover from the traumatic experience of a critical incident.

Another area of significance statistically that was identified in Part 1 was the combat experience of special agents of the FBI. Questions in the two-part questionnaire identified both status as a

military veteran and combat experience. Combat experience reflected in the pre-group was 23 of 92, and in the post-group, 10 of 75. Explanation of this seems simple in that there has not been a major military conflict since the Vietnam era, and many of the individuals in the pre-group were, in fact, Vietnam veterans.

Two final areas of significance identified in Part 1 reflected questions regarding legal advice. Those questions attempted to determine whether, in fact, legal advice had been sought or whether such advice had been offered. In the responses to both items, there was a significant increase reflecting recognition of the offering of legal advice after the shooting.

In Part 2 of the shooting-incident questionnaire, the individual responses of statistical significance suggested a positive effect of the Post-Critical-Incident Program. The questionnaire asked the agents to respond to a series of statements that reflected the experiences, attitudes, and beliefs of law enforcement professionals who have been involved in shooting incidents. Some of the questions may or may not have applied to the individual respondent. The agents were asked to identify the statements that applied to them.

In this section, 20 of the 67 positive responses were identified as being significant. Six items of significance specifically reflected the reduction of negative or not-positive aspects of the effects of critical incidents. Some examples of reduction of the negative include responses to "I felt that I was

made a scapegoat after the incident" (8 of the pre-group, 1 of the post-group); "I drank more after the incident" (16 of the pre-group, 4 of the post-group) "More people were sensitive to what I had gone through" (26 of the pre-group, 10 of the post-group); and "I sometimes wonder if I will be able to face what the future will bring" (46 of the pre-group, 2 of the post-group).

Conversely, seven significantly different responses indicated healthy and positive adjustment by the individuals who were put to the ultimate test. Statements and responses that reflected positive significant differences included the following: "I felt angry and it helped me" (19 of the pre-group, 29 of the post-group); "My future will be better than my past" (38 of the pre-group, 53 of the post-group); "I think the whole thing made me a better person" (31 of the pre-group, 52 of the post-group); "The whole thing helped me to grow/mature" (39 of the pre-group, 49 of the post-group); "My sense of humor helped me to deal with the whole thing" (54 of the pre-group, 60 of the post-group); "The whole incident made me reflect what was important in my life" (41 of the pre-group, 46 of the post-group); and "I became more involved with the family" (28 of the pre-group, 34 of the post-group).

Two other issues that were recognized in the significant responses included the need for the foundation of a chaplaincy program within the FBI. Eighty-six of the 167 total respondents indicated that "I was helped by my religious beliefs and/or practices." This item also reflected a statistically significant difference; 40 of the pre-group and 46 of the post-group responded

affirmatively. Religious beliefs and practices helped more than 50% **o**f the agents involved in shootings move beyond their self-doubt and **q**uestions that warranted the taking of a life.

Another statistically significant response was reflected in the **q**uestion pertaining to the concern of the agents' children. The **a**gents responded significantly to the statement, "My children were **u**pset." In the pre-group, 11 of the 92 agents responded **a**ffirmatively, and in the post-group, 26 of the 75 agents responded **a**ffirmatively. Both of these issues regarding chaplaincy and the **n**eed for assistance to be provided to the families of agents are **d**iscussed in Chapter V.

Program Evaluation

The FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program has been institutionalized since the initial pilot study in 1983 examined the effects of shooting incidents on special agents of the FBI. Not only has a set of policies and procedures been established that would be expected in a bureaucracy like the FBI, but also an organizational awareness and a refinement of those policies and procedures have taken place. Based on the recommendations of the participants in the 20 post-critical-incident seminars held over the last eight years, and with the direct support, concern, leadership and dedication of John E. Otto, former Acting Director and Associate Deputy Director-Investigations of the FBI, this program has taken on a life of its own. The enthusiasm and commitment of the program managers who followed this writer, Robert Schaefer and James M.

Horn, have enhanced the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program through the following initiatives:

1. The publication of a pamphlet entitled Shooting Incidents: Issues and Explanations for FBI Agents and Managers, which provides a unique insight into the responses and feelings of agents during and after the exercise of deadly force.

2. The establishment of an Advanced Peer-Support Program that defines, legally and organizationally, the role of the peer-support employee, as well as the training of such employees.

3. The addressing of workers' compensation issues when it became apparent that wounded agents were not receiving the necessary attention.

4. The defining of a Medals Program to ensure appropriate recognition for exemplary service.

5. The development of organizational awareness as to the need for a timely and compassionate shooting investigation that incorporates a mandatory videotape sensitizing the investigative staff before conducting the actual shooting investigation.

6. The introduction of an inoculatory training program for new agents of the FBI, providing them with insights into the realities of being a gun-carrying law enforcement officer.

7. The initial basis of the establishment of the FBI Chaplains Program.

8. The response to on-site incidents by staff of the Behavioral Science Unit, providing assistance and debriefing.

9. Participation in four national teleconferences pertaining to post-shooting trauma.

10. Sponsorship of three major conferences for mental health police psychological services and law enforcement professionals, specifically focusing on post-critical-incident issues.

11. Training developed for managers within the FBI, ranging from supervisor to special agent in charge, providing an understanding of the trauma resulting from a critical incident.

12. The expansion of services beyond post-shooting incidents to include professional and personal tragedies on and off the job affecting the employees of the FBI and their families.

These are huge contributions that require vast resources of the FBI. In Chapter I, it was suggested that it is appropriate to examine and evaluate the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. One of the major focuses of that evaluation was to ascertain whether the implementation of this program and further training and support provided through the program reduced the trauma experienced by special agents of the FBI. The pre-post changes identified in the statistical analyses reflected a positive change that supports the commitment and resources expended through the Post-Critical-Incident Program.

The individuals who have been required to use deadly force and who have received the benefits of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident program recognize and highly commend the organizational and individual support that they were provided in their time of need. However, questions arise as to how to evaluate those anecdotal

comments, how to place those observations in a proper perspective, and how to justify continued expenditure of resources based on individual statements.

This analysis systematically, scientifically, and statistically documented the changes in the FBI support system. A range of specific program responses showed significant pre-post change, supporting the Post-Critical-Incident Program. This included statements such as "I learned that I could trust people and count on them in a crisis" (57 of 92 in the pre-group, 58 of 74 in the post-group); "My future will be better than my past" (38 of 92 in the pre-group, 53 of 75 in the post-group); "It helped me to help/listen to others who have been involved in a shooting" (35 of 92 in the pre-group, 65 of 75 in the post-group); "It helped me to share experiences and feelings with others who have been involved in a shooting experience" (50 of 92 in the pre-group, 62 of 75 in the post-group); and "It helped me to talk with other Agents who have been involved with shooting incidents or to hear about them from others" (35 of 92 in the pre-group, 63 of 75 in the post-group).

These responses not only reflected statistically significant pre-post change, and hence support for evaluation of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program, but they resoundingly supported the value of the Post-Critical-Incident Program and the post-shooting aspect of that program. Not only has this program provided these positive results, but there have been five specific areas that demonstrate the reduction of negative response. Each of these five areas was

also statistically significant. These areas include: no longer using agents as scapegoats, the reduction of use of alcohol after shooting incidents, the positive adjustment to work, the reduction of insensitive responses by other members of the FBI, and no longer being isolated and alone.

Seven specific responses presented reaffirmed and supported the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program pertaining to individual adjustment. These areas include: the ability to release feelings through anger, positive focus on the future, the maturation through this experience, the ability to keep things in perspective through a sense of humor, and the need and ability to involve family and to place things in perspective. All of these responses supported the Post-Critical-Incident Program and the efforts of the FBI to foster and enhance successful individual adjustment to trauma.

Statistically significant change in 38 of 157 items was not the result of chance. It was the result of tremendous organizational effort, spearheaded by those few individuals who have dedicated themselves to the creation of the exemplary Post-Critical-Incident Program for those members of the FBI who have placed their lives on the line.

Limitations

When this study was initiated, there was a recognition of the potential limitations, as well as the strength of this study's conclusions and recommendations. An analysis based solely on FBI shooting incidents may be of limited benefit to other law

enforcement agencies. A second limitation is the use of self-reporting in the collection of data. The extended focus of this analysis over an eight-year period is a strength, reinforcing the ability to evaluate the augmentation and development of model post-shooting policies by the FBI. Specific individual expectations of this study are analyzed in Chapter V.

In conclusion, this is not a perfect world, nor is this a perfect analysis. But it is hoped that this analysis will serve as a tool to support, refine, and enhance the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This study examined the aftermath of the exercise of deadly force by special agents of the FBI. The acute-stress-reaction definition of post-shooting trauma was the focal point of this research effort. The range of reactions, organizational responses, and treatment were examined. That range of reactions is unpredictable, posing the greatest challenge to an ever-evolving policy. That range, which has been documented, essentially spans the continuum from no reaction to such reactions as leaving the job, divorce, and thoughts of self-destruction. Fortunately, those extreme reactions are rare within the FBI, and the current helping resources and organizational guidelines, in fact, have reduced the escalation of that extreme.

This research effort has developed conclusions and both general and specific recommendations. The conclusions were developed through this long-term analysis and through a continued series of interviews of those individuals who have met the ultimate test. Those individuals are survivors of physical and emotional wounds. The interviews, coupled with the observations and evaluations of the FBI's coordinators of the Post-Critical-Incident Program, provided

unique insights, over a period of ten years, into the effects of post-shooting trauma on special agents of the FBI.

This study and its focus, through a comparative analysis, generated a significant amount of data. A review and analysis of those data provided the basis for recommendations and conclusions. Implications for future research and analysis are a natural product of any study; so, too, were research recommendations generated from this project. Recommendations pertaining to and observations of the effect of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program on the victims of post-shooting trauma are included in this section. The chapter concludes with a brief glimpse through general and specific recommendations into the future of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

Conclusions

This study was an analysis of the effects of post-shooting trauma on special agents of the FBI who were involved in shooting incidents. The researcher identified frequent reactions of those individuals directly involved in shooting incidents and reviewed guidelines that were established to minimize or alleviate the physical, emotional, and psychological trauma surrounding shootings.

The analysis included two samples of special agents who had been involved in shooting incidents and focused on the evaluation of the effectiveness of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program. A random sample of FBI agents who were involved in shootings between 1973 and 1983 constituted the pre-program group. These agents

received no benefits of the understanding of post-shooting trauma, nor was there a program to address the murky aspects of the aftermath of the shootings. The responses of these individuals were collected during 1983 and 1984. Those responses were compared with the responses of a more recent sample of agents who had been involved in shootings during the period from 1986 through 1989. The agents supplying the second set of responses had been provided training, assistance, and support through the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program.

The writer's goal in this study was to evaluate the Post-Critical-Incident Program of the FBI and to examine the policies and responses provided by the FBI. Based on the literature review and the understanding provided through that review, coupled with this comparative analysis, a series of recommendations, both general and specific, were established. Those recommendations are presented in the concluding section of this chapter.

As reflected in Chapter IV, the Post-Critical-Incident Program of the FBI provides agents of the FBI with the ability to address the ultimate challenge confronting the law enforcement officer. The Post-Critical-Incident Program not only incorporates and is responsible for the development of the FBI's policies and procedures during and after a shooting incident, but it also is responsible for Post-Critical-Incident Seminars, the Chaplaincy Program, the Advanced Peer-Support Program, and the debriefing and response teams. Clearly reflected in the results of this study is

statistical documentation supporting the value of the Post-Critical-Incident Program. The specific responses reported and analyzed not only reflect positive trends that indicate a healthy adjustment to an extremely dangerous and traumatic incident, but also the reduction of negative factors that were detrimental to the physical, mental, and emotional adjustment of the agents involved in shooting incidents. The analysis supported the value and emphasis placed by this program on peer support. The premise underlying this program was that the results of a critical incident, if appropriately and immediately addressed, can be minimized, resulting in a transient situational disturbance that is a short-term stress reaction versus a long-term acute stress reaction. That premise was supported by the significant pre-post change reported in this study.

In summary, this analysis identified appropriate and healthy adjustment factors fostered and enhanced by the Post-Critical-Incident Program through the FBI's support system, as well as the reduction of negative trends by establishing patterns of healthy individual adjustment. That overall individual adjustment is characterized by keeping things in perspective, focusing on the future, managing and releasing feelings, maintaining a healthy perspective through a sense of humor, and placing life events in appropriate priority. These patterns of living were the most gratifying results of this analysis. The documented change between the two samples was a result of significant organizational and individual commitment to the welfare of the employees of the FBI.

The support experiences, both negative and positive, and the counsel of those who "have been there" have provided the impetus for and direction of this evolving Post-Critical-Incident Program. Top-level commitment, from the Director of the FBI, his immediate staff, and, more particularly, John E. Otto, has provided the climate and leadership to develop a model program. The energies, care, direction, and perseverance of the program managers have resulted in outstanding guidelines and necessary enhancements. The program managers have recognized the necessary tools to provide the employees of the FBI with the ability to deal with and overcome critical incidents and tragedies. Their insight has been the beacon in developing an Advanced Peer-Support System and a Chaplaincy Program, which are two successful tools for the FBI to use to address the effects of critical incidents. Through this continued organizational support, the Post-Critical-Incident Program has expanded beyond shooting incidents and has organizationally provided employees of the FBI with the ability to address other professional and personal tragedies.

In conclusion, the Firearms Training Unit of the FBI has prepared the special agent to act decisively and automatically when confronted with a deadly encounter. The Post-Critical-Incident Program has provided the understanding and ability to deal effectively with the aftermath of that event.

General Recommendations

Based on the review of literature and the analyses conducted in this study, there are several general recommendations identifying areas for further exploration and attention. These areas include: (a) a holistic approach to dealing with critical-incident trauma, (b) vicarious traumatization, (c) a defined debriefing program, and (d) expanded research analysis and comparison.

Currently, the FBI, through federal legislation, is prohibited from providing opportunities for family members to participate in critical-incident seminars. The legislation prevents the federal government from funding travel of individuals other than employees with the federal government. Because the critical-incident seminars are held in Quantico, Virginia, only government employees or employees of the FBI are authorized to travel and participate, learn, share, and address the traumatic issues of their critical incidents.

From a holistic point of view, only part of the traumatized family is provided this healing process. Documented throughout this study was the awareness of and need for assistance for spouses and other family members. If this is to be a systematic approach, a very important ingredient of that employee is not being provided assistance. Those individuals identified as the support group or the families also need attention, care, nurturing, and the opportunity to participate in the healing process of the post-critical-incident seminars. To address this inability is a monumental task that would require proposed legislation through

Congress or other alternatives to provide assistance to the whole family. The whole family suffers from the results of a critical incident, and by not addressing the needs of the family, the Bureau is committing an injustice. The proposed legislation for external funding to allow for travel is a necessary corrective action.

In support of this proposed legislation, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder chaired a Congressional Select Committee during this past year, focusing on problems and issues confronting the police family. Members of the Behavioral Science Unit prepared briefings and testified before this Congressional Select Committee. It seems that an advocacy of that nature could, in fact, provide the impetus for congressional interest and awareness of the needs of the families involved. Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS) has recognized this extraordinary need and has organizationally and nationally taken steps to provide meaningful cathartic support. It also is appropriate for the FBI to recognize and initiate action to support its Bureau families.

A second general recommendation is based on the awareness that there exists a second injury beyond the participation in a critical incident. That second injury was defined by McCann and Pearlmann (1990) as vicarious traumatization. Essentially, that vicarious traumatization is a transference of the trauma experienced by victims to the care giver. A question arises as to how much a peer-support person, program manager, or mental health professional can

share of himself or herself in dealing with the traumatic incident before it has a personal effect on the care giver.

There is a recognition of the immediate participants in the critical incidents, the trauma they experience, the aftermath, and the healing process. At this point, little is known about the compounding and continued effect of providing care to those who are traumatized. There is a general awareness of "burning out" or "emptying out" as it applies to those who are long-term care givers. Undoubtedly, there is a need for appropriate monitoring of care givers to ensure that a release and feedback mechanism is available as they personally explore coping with tragedies. It is recognized that there is a need for a healthy evaluation through discussion, debriefing, and resolution of traumatic issues. The heightened sensitivity and enhanced empathy of care givers open the individual up to the traumatic experiences. Further exploration of this phenomenon is important.

The third general observation is that there is a need for a formalized response and debriefing process following critical incidents experienced by the FBI. Currently, when an employee of the FBI is involved in a shooting incident or an accident, the determination to send out a peer-support team is left to the discretion of the senior manager of that field office or organizational entity. Many times that senior manager is also affected by the trauma involving the individuals for whom he or she is directly responsible. The managerial decision may be affected or clouded by those events that personally affect him or her at the

time of the tragedy. A formally defined response team, as well as the debriefing process, is appropriate and necessary.

In the response to a critical incident, there should be an established agenda or schedule of purpose. That schedule should include the following:

1. Advice and support for the administrators of that office, including the supervisory staff.
2. A presentation to and debriefing of all of the participants involved in the critical incident, including employees of the FBI and other participants. This extended debriefing should include individuals indirectly involved with the shooting or critical incident, as well.
3. A debriefing or support session for the entire office, providing them with an understanding of their feelings; the effect of the loss of life, if that is the case; and the availability for future follow-up through one-on-one counseling.
4. A debriefing session for family members and participants in the critical event. The normal "abnormal" reactions to a critical incident should be identified and shared with this group.
5. Off-site, one-on-one counseling for participants, other employees, and family members. These sessions should be coordinated with the Employee Assistance Staffer, and if referrals to mental health professionals are necessary, that process should be incorporated in this formal policy. Also included in this debriefing process should be handout materials, including the FBI's

critical-incident publication and other publications that reflect appropriate explanations of grieving and coping.

In this study, a significant amount of information was collected and analyzed. Essentially, this study has merely touched the surface of the capacity to look further in depth at the individuals involved in FBI critical incidents. These data present the capacity to go beyond the mere statistical and profile analyses reflected in this study. With the ability to conduct further correlative analyses with the multiple sets of data that have been gathered, it is now possible to further develop an in-depth look at the individuals involved in FBI shootings, their experience before and after the shooting, and specifically the traumatic interaction.

Further studies could explore the relationship of shootings with prior military experience, prior police experience, the reactions during and after the shooting, and the further similarities and differences identified through the two-part questionnaire. These could be further expanded in comparative analyses with the studies of Nielson (1981) and Solomon (1986), which would be valuable. Finally, it is possible to analyze the differences as well as the similarities between employees of the FBI who have been involved in shooting incidents and those who have been confronted with other personal and professional tragedies. With the longitudinal data collected, future researchers could produce further valuable insights into post-traumatic stress, the need and value of a peer-support program, coping models, and the ongoing development of a model post-critical-incident program.

Specific Recommendations

Throughout this study and analysis, several specific areas that pertain to the Post-Critical-Incident Program were identified as needing refinement, recognition, or adjustment. Those areas include focusing on sources of aggravation, the rewriting of the Bureau pamphlet, the FBI's Chaplaincy Program, the need for a clinical psychologist, and the future selection of program managers.

One of the areas that was addressed through the two-part questionnaire was major sources of aggravation for the involved agent following the shooting. Many of the areas identified by the pre-group, such as the handling of the investigation and the news media, have been addressed. Unfortunately, the agents involved in the shootings in the years 1986 through 1989 stated their their supervisors continued to be major sources of aggravation. The supervisor's concern for self is unacceptable. In the helping climate of the Bureau today, this is a contradiction of the FBI's Post-Critical-Incident Program and policies. This continued lack of concern or support can and will be addressed through appropriate communications forwarded to the attention of FBI field managers.

Currently, whenever a special agent of the FBI is involved in a shooting or other tragedy, he or she is provided with a copy of the FBI's publication entitled Shooting Incidents: Issues and Explanations for FBI Managers. That publication has been used for other personal and professional tragedies and has some applicability. However, since the expansion of the Post-Critical-Incident Program

to provide assistance to all employees who are suffering through not only shooting incidents, but suicides, accidents, and other personal and professional trauma, it is appropriate that this publication be rewritten to incorporate those other life tragedies. The publication has been a valuable tool to immediately place in the hands of participants in critical events and also has assisted managers in understanding and supporting their employees. Through the modification and rewriting process, this publication will become more universal and meet the needs of all the employees of the FBI during times of tragedies. It is appropriate to incorporate the results of this study into that publication. It is also appropriate to identify and expand on the similarities and differences in the post-traumatic reaction of FBI employees involved in shootings versus other critical incidents.

In April 1989, during the Twelfth Post-Critical-Incident Seminar held at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, a recommendation was prepared and submitted to the Director of the FBI to establish an FBI Chaplaincy Program. The value, support, and assistance provided by chaplains during several shooting incidents documented the need for a formalized Chaplaincy Program for the FBI. In 1991, this recommendation was approved, and an FBI Chaplaincy Program was established. This program is in its infancy; there is a need to further define the role of the FBI chaplain, the extension of the availability of this resource, and the responsibility of the FBI in supporting that program.

There also exists a need to promulgate the value, organizationally and personally, for supporting the Chaplaincy Program. In this study, more than one-half of the agents involved in shootings responded affirmatively to the statement, "I was helped by my religious beliefs and/or practices." That resounding call for spiritual and practical support cannot be ignored.

In May 1992, the writer moderated a panel providing FBI senior managers with insight into the value of the FBI's Chaplaincy Program. This presentation incorporated several real-life examples of tragedies and appropriate intervention where chaplains have assisted employees of the Bureau. That was an initial step in expanding the recognition, use, and support of the FBI chaplains. The need for refining and identifying the specific role and charter of this program is being addressed through an advisory board of representative chaplains. The FBI chaplains have been provided with a one-week seminar held at the FBI Academy, introducing them to the FBI and the needs of this organization. However, a more formal and documented program is necessary.

With the expanded focus of the Post-Critical-Incident Program from shooting incidents to further requests and demands for assistance in accidents, suicides, and traumatic deaths that affect employees of the FBI both personally and professionally, there is a need to augment the staff of the Behavioral Science Unit with a mental health professional--a clinical psychologist. This study, the requests for assistance, and the experiences shared at the Post-Critical-Incident Seminars reinforce the need for that professional

support. The current staff of the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy includes several doctorate-degree holders; however, there is a need for a practicing clinical psychologist to address the extreme mental health issues that surface in daily life.

Organizational steps through budgetary justification have been initiated to develop an appropriate description with the qualifications for such a position. Incorporated in this recommendation is the need to strengthen the working rapport among the Behavioral Science Unit, the Post-Critical-Incident Program, and the FBI's Employee Assistance Program. The Post-Critical-Incident Program complements and supports the Employee Assistance Program. The extended survey of more than ten years of the Post-Critical-Incident Program has provided exemplary models that have been replicated by other federal law enforcement agencies.

Ultimately, one person is responsible for the Post-Critical-Incident Program. That person is the program manager. The life of this program, its success, and the significant contributions that have been made to the employees of the FBI are directly related to the dedicated professional who has administered the Post-Critical-Incident Program. The future selection of program managers is the most critical assignment in the Behavioral Science Unit. The perseverance, dedication, and caring demonstrated by previous managers have been the foundation for its success. That success has *been* overwhelmingly documented throughout this study. The employees

of the FBI have benefited greatly from the evolution of the Post-Critical-Incident Program. The future selection of Post-Critical-Incident Program managers must be diligently and thoughtfully accomplished.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE INSTRUMENT

PART I

FOCUSED QUESTIONNAIRE
SHOOTING STUDY - SPECIAL AGENT

1. Date of shooting:

--	--	--	--	--	--

Mo. Day Year

2. Your age at shooting:

--	--

3. Years (convert to nearest month, e.g., four years and one month = 49 months) of service in the Bureau when the shooting occurred:

--	--	--

4. Field office assigned at the time of the shooting:

--	--

5. Field office now assigned:

--	--

6. Investigative assignment at the time of the shooting (type of case investigated (use #)):

--	--	--

7. Married at the time?: Yes ☐ No ☐ Separated ☐ Divorced ☐

Now married to the same person?: Yes ☐ No ☐

8. What time of day did the shooting occur (military time, e.g., 10:15 a.m. = 1015, 12:00 noon = 1200, and 10:15 p.m. = 2215)?:

--	--	--	--

9. Who was with you at the time of the shooting?:

Alone ☐ Other BuAgents ☐ Other Law Enforcement Officers ☐

Other ☐

10. How many rounds fired?:

A. By you:

--	--	--

B. By the suspect:

--	--	--	--

C. By any others:

--	--	--	--

 Who?

11. How many minutes elapsed between your arrival at the scene and the shooting?:

--	--	--

12. A. Describe what happened during the incident:

B. Were you wounded?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If yes, ☐ seriously
☐ not seriously

C. Was anyone, other than subject or subjects, wounded?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, who ☐ Other Agent
☐ Police Officer
☐ Relative of subject
☐ Bystander

D. Was anyone, other than subject or subjects, killed?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, who? ☐ Other Agent
☐ Police Officer
☐ Relatives of subject
☐ Bystander

E. Describe what happened to you emotionally during the incident; do any of the following apply to you?

☐ Disbelief that it is really happening
☐ Fear for self/shakes
☐ Fear for others
☐ Responded automatically
☐ Feeling - "I must survive"
☐ Rush of strength/adrenalin

F. Describe any unusual perceptual changes that occurred in you during the incident:

☐ Slow motion
☐ Not hearing all the shots, voice or noises
☐ Narrowing - tunnel vision
☐ Other, please specify

13. Had you had previous personal contact with the subject?:

Yes ☐ No ☐

If so, what was the nature and extent of contact?

14. Who assumed command at the scene; SAC ☐, investigative team ☐, police department ☐, others ☐, if so who?

15. Was there a post-shooting investigation?: Yes ☐ No ☐
If so, who handled the investigation?:

16. Was your weapon held as evidence?: Yes ☐ No ☐
If so, were you issued another weapon?: Yes ☐ No ☐

17. During the 24 hours following the incident:

A. What is your perception of the reactions of fellow Agents?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Support
<input type="checkbox"/>	Curiosity
<input type="checkbox"/>	Aggravation
<input type="checkbox"/>	None reported

B. What is your perception of the reactions of your wife/girlfriend and other family members?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Wife/girlfriend was upset/fearful
<input type="checkbox"/>	Parents were upset/fearful
<input type="checkbox"/>	No reactions
<input type="checkbox"/>	Children asked about shooting
<input type="checkbox"/>	Wife/girlfriend supportive

C. What is your perception of the reactions of your supervisors?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Support
<input type="checkbox"/>	Criticism
<input type="checkbox"/>	Concern about self or own position
<input type="checkbox"/>	No reaction

D. What is your perception of the reactions of your non-Agent friends?:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Support
<input type="checkbox"/>	Criticism
<input type="checkbox"/>	Curiosity
<input type="checkbox"/>	No response

18. A. After the first 24 hours did your initial reactions change?:

Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>	If so, how?	<input type="checkbox"/>	Nausea
			<input type="checkbox"/>	Headaches
			<input type="checkbox"/>	Fatigue
			<input type="checkbox"/>	Other, if so, please specify
			<input type="checkbox"/>	None

B. During the week following, did you experience any physical problems?

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, what were they?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Nausea/Vomiting
<input type="checkbox"/>	Headaches
<input type="checkbox"/>	Fatigue
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other

C. During the week following, did you experience any emotional problems?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, what were they?

18. C. (Continued)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Anxiety/Tension
<input type="checkbox"/>	Sadness/Crying/Depression
<input type="checkbox"/>	Sleep Problems
<input type="checkbox"/>	Disturbing thoughts

19. Did you notice any changes in your attitude or emotional state in the first six months following the incident?:

Yes ☐ No ☐

20. With whom did you talk with the most about the shooting?:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Wife/girlfriend
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other family members
<input type="checkbox"/>	Fellow Agents
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supervisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	Clergy
<input type="checkbox"/>	Others, if others, who?:

21. Of those around you, who provided the most assistance to you?: Why?:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Wife/girlfriend
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other family members
<input type="checkbox"/>	Fellow Agent
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supervisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	Clergy
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other If so who?:

22. Who was the most aggravating to you and why?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Other Agents	<input type="checkbox"/>	Suspect's Attorney
<input type="checkbox"/>	News media	<input type="checkbox"/>	Suspect's family and friends
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supervisors		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other Bureau officials		

23. Would it have been/was it of help for you to seek professional help after this shooting?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please explain: Psychological

Religious

Other

24. Would it have helped/did it help to have administrative time off after the shooting?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ Was it offered?: Yes ☐ No ☐

25. What was the nature of the press coverage of the incident?:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Extensive
<input type="checkbox"/>	Moderate
<input type="checkbox"/>	Minimal
<input type="checkbox"/>	None

26. How badly was the subject injured?:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Killed
<input type="checkbox"/>	Seriously wounded
<input type="checkbox"/>	Wounded, not serious

27. Did you or any other Agents offer first aid to the victim(s)?:

Yes ☐ No ☐

28. Have you had any subsequent contact with suspect,

Yes ☐ No ☐ , his/her family, Yes ☐ No ☐

or his/her friends, Yes ☐ No ☐ ?"

29. Had you participated in any Bureau or other survival training prior to shooting?:

Yes ☐ No ☐

30. Do you have any recommendations regarding shooting incidents in:

A. Bureau procedures:

B. Training:

C. Services provided Agent as a result of a shooting incident:

31. Did the FBI's firearms training prepare you for a shooting incident?"

Yes ☐ No ☐

32. Are you a military veteran?: Yes ☐ No ☐

33. Did you have combat experience?: Yes ☐ No ☐

If so, please provide details:

34. Do you have prior police experience?: Yes ☐ No ☐

35. Have you previously been involved in a shooting incident? Explain.

Yes ☐ No ☐

36. Is there anyone else that was affected by this shooting incident that you recommend be contacted?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, who? Please specify:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Wife/girlfriend
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other family member
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other Agents
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supervisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	SAC

37. Did you seek legal advice after this shooting?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, who? Please specify:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Principal Legal Advisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	Private Attorney
<input type="checkbox"/>	SAC
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supervisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	U. S. Attorney
<input type="checkbox"/>	Legal Counsel Division - FBI Headquarters
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other, if so, who?

38. Were you offered legal advice after this shooting?:

Yes ☐ No ☐ If so, who? Please specify:

38. (Continued)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Principal Legal Advisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	Private Attorney
<input type="checkbox"/>	SAC
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supervisor
<input type="checkbox"/>	U. S. Attorney
<input type="checkbox"/>	Legal Counsel Division - FBI Headquarters
<input type="checkbox"/>	Other, if so, who?

PART II

SHOOTING INCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Directions: Below is a series of statements that represent the experiences, attitudes and beliefs of law enforcement professionals who have been involved in shooting incidents. Some will apply to you, others will not. For each statement, please mark a check (✓) in the space following the statement if it applies to you, or an (X) if it does not. Please give a response for each statement.

After the incident, I slept more poorly than usual. ☐

I felt angry, and it helped me. ☐

I learned that I could trust people, and count on them in a crisis. ☐

It's very hard for me to find anything good about the incident and what followed. ☐

I was more irritable at home and had a "shorter fuse." ☐

I felt that I was made a scapegoat after the incident. ☐

I can remember the shooting as if it happened yesterday. ☐

I became more interested in/involved with my work. ☐

My family was bitter towards the Bureau. ☐

I felt regret over injuring someone/taking a life. ☐

My wife was very worried/upset. ☐

It was harder for me to feel things. ☐

I became more interested in/involved with my hobbies, friends,
or leisure activities. ☐

I sometimes felt guilty about what happened. ☐

I was more irritable with other people at work. ☐

I was helped by my religious beliefs and/or practices. ☐

I felt harassed and/or blamed by other people after the shooting.

☐

My future will be better than my past. ☐

I was disappointed by my wife's/girlfriend's reaction to the
incident. ☐

I worried alot about the investigation of the incident. ☐

After the incident I became less cautious/concerned about
situations that might involve firearms or dangers. ☐

My child(ren) were very worried/upset. ☐

I became hyper-alert and/or startled easily after the
incident. ☐

Thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my
mind. ☐

It helped me to help/listen to others who had been involved in
the shooting. ☐

I trusted people less. ☐

I think that the whole thing made me a better person. ☐

I felt the need to apologize to the subject's family. ☐

It helped me to get back to my normal work routine. ☐

My parents were very worried/upset. ☐

My reaction to the incident was influenced by other shootings
I had been involved in. ☐

I dreamed frequently about the shooting or had other bad dreams
that were unusual for me. ☐

I became less interested in/involved with my family. ☐

It helped me to share experiences and feelings with others who
had been involved in the shooting incident. ☐

My happiest days are in the past. ☐

I dreamed more after the incident, but the dreams were not
frightening or unpleasant. ☐

The people who should have supported me were all busy "covering
their asses." ☐

The incident led to problems in my marriage. ☐

I felt sorry for the subject who was shot. ☐

Although I was an adult when the shooting incident occurred,
the whole thing helped me to grow/mature. ☐

I became less interested in/involved with my work. ☐

I drink more after the incident. ☐

I had trouble remembering and/or concentrating after the
incident. ☐

Whatever happens in the future, I think I will be able to
handle it. ☐

I was treated like a suspect during the investigation of the
incident. ☐

My sense of humor helped me to cope with the whole thing. ☐

I avoided situations similar to the shooting incident or that
reminded me of it. ☐

It helped me to keep my mind off what had happened. ☐

Most people were insensitive to what I had gone through. ☐

I became less interested in/involved with my hobbies, friends,
or leisure activities. ☐

I sometimes felt like it was happening again, especially if I
was in a similar situation or thinking about it. ☐

I felt angry, and it upset me. ☐

I realized that I was the only one who really cared about me. ☐

I would review the incident again and again, and wonder if I did the right thing. ☐

I had trouble explaining what happened to my children. ☐

After the incident, I felt isolated from other people. ☐

After the incident, I felt uncomfortable/insecure about being alive. ☐

I felt worse in situations that reminded me of the shooting.

☐

A person who has not been in a shooting incident can't really understand what it is like. ☐

The whole incident made me reevaluate what was important in my life/my goals and values. ☐

I sometimes wonder if I'll be able to face what the future will bring. ☐

The way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me than the shooting itself. ☐

After the incident, it helped me to be physically active. ☐

I mostly wanted to be left alone, even by people who were trying to help me. ☐

After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger. ☐

I became more interested in/involved with my family. ☐

It helped me to talk with other Agents who had been involved in shooting incidents, or to hear about them from others. ☐

Thank you for your assistance in completing this questionnaire.

APPENDIX B

COVER LETTER

U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

FBI Academy
Quantico, Virginia 22135

January 11, 1984

Special Agent (Full Bureau Name)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Field Office
Address

Dear (First Name):

In May 1983, members of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) observed that in the two years prior, Special Agents of the FBI had been involved in over forty serious shooting incidents. Questions arose as to what problems, physical or psychological, those Agents may have been confronted with as a result of those shootings. Literature in police journals refer to post-shooting trauma as an acute stress reaction. If that stress is not minimized, the literature basically suggests that cops who shoot or are shot have problems coping with life afterward.

In June 1983, Dr. David Soskis, Bureau Psychiatric Consultant, and the Behavioral Science Unit were requested by Director Webster to conduct a research and interview project to determine if Special Agents of the FBI have any problems resulting from the exercise of deadly force. Since I am working on a Ph.D. dissertation in the area of post-shooting trauma specifically focusing on Bureau Agents, I was requested to assist Dr. Soskis. In July, a conference was held at Quantico with 14 Special Agents attending. From the conference, interviews, suggestions from participating Agents, and research, an extensive report with recommendations was submitted to FBI Headquarters. On December 12, 1983, those recommendations were incorporated into guidelines and transmitted to the field. The enclosed questionnaire is a follow-up to that SAC letter. I have been requested to continue this project to support, update, and/or modify those guidelines.

Letter to Special Agent (Full Name)

I would appreciate you taking a few minutes to complete the questionnaire. If you have any questions, comments, or concerns, give me a call. Upon completion, please forward the questionnaire to my attention in the Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, via Bureau mail. Your individual responses will be kept strictly confidential and the questionnaires will be destroyed after tabulation. I am anticipating scheduling another Post-Shooting Trauma Conference this summer. If you are interested in participating please note that on the last page.

Sincerely yours,

John Henry Campbell
Supervisory Special Agent
Behavioral Science Unit

Enclosure

APPENDIX C

THE PILOT STUDY

An Analysis of the Effects
of Post-Shooting Trauma on
Special Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation

By

David A. Soskis, M.D.
Carole W. Soskis, M.S.W., J.D.
and
SSA John Henry Campbell

Prepared For
Executive Assistant Director John E. Otto

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INTRODUCTION

The focus of this study is on the effects of post-shooting trauma on Special Agents of the FBI. The concern for Special Agents of the Bureau expressed by John J. Schreiber, Section Chief, Personal and Property Crimes Program, in his memorandum to Mr. Revell dated May 4, 1983, was well-founded. From that initial concern Executive Assistant Director John Otto promptly directed that a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the effects of post-shooting trauma on FBI Special Agents be conducted.

On June 20, 1983, a conference was held at the FBI Academy to discuss post-shooting trauma, its ramifications and effects on Agents involved in the exercise of deadly force. In attendance at this conference were John J. Schreiber; Dr. David A. Soskis, Bureau Psychiatric Consultant; Lawrence J. Monroe, Unit Chief, Firearms Training Unit; Robert Schaefer and John Henry Campbell, Supervisory Special Agents, Behavioral Science Unit. Dr. Soskis stated that he was requested to conduct a research and interview project by Executive Assistant Director John E. Otto to determine if Bureau Agents have problems, physically or psychologically, resulting from the use of deadly force. Dr. Soskis indicated that the goal of this project is to make appropriate recommendations to establish a Bureau policy to neutralize effects of post-shooting trauma. Dr. Soskis further stated that the project could be completed through a minimal number of interviews, approximately ten. He requested the cooperation and assistance of the Behavioral Science Unit in completing this project.

On June 29, 1983, approval was granted by Assistant Director James D. McKenzie to conduct the interviews during a conference to be scheduled at the FBI Academy. The scope of this conference was to elicit from Special Agents of the FBI who have recently been involved in shooting incidents their reactions, both physical and psychological, attributable to the use of deadly force.

On July 14-15, 1983, 14 Special Agents of the FBI conferred at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia, with Dr. Soskis and Supervisory Special Agent Campbell. Those 14 Agents had been involved in a total of 17 shooting incidents. The continued goal of that project was to determine if FBI Agents suffer from post-shooting trauma and, if so, make appropriate recommendations with the cooperation of the conference attendees to minimize the negative aspects of that trauma.

The conference format included an address by Assistant Director McKenzie, an introduction to the goals and objectives of the conference, completion of a formal questionnaire, personal interviews, and a conference group discussion. Followup interviews were conducted by Carole W. Soskis of the spouses of several of the Agents attending the conference. From the information that was developed in this conference, the interviews, and the analysis of research conducted by Dr. Soskis and Supervisory

Special Agent Campbell, a formulation of positive recommendations was instituted. The recommendations include intervention both at the shooting scene and during the first week, long term issues, and prevention and training. This report provides the details of the research, interviews and subsequent recommendation.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Our experience with Agents both in the Quantico seminar and during interactions around specific prior incidents reveals areas of similarity and difference between the Bureau and police experience of post-shooting trauma. We have not observed the extreme reactions described in the police literature such as complete inability to function on the job, leaving the agency, or incapacitating psychological or physical symptoms. In addition, Agents uniformly report that their firearms training has prepared them well for these incidents and, in fact, has been credited with saving their lives. The incidents themselves show an almost complete absence of the classic police "bad shooting" which often stems from an unplanned patrol or domestic dispute setting with minimal or absent backup and support. The tasteless joking and hypermasculine "macho" comments concerning shooting incidents are far rarer in the Bureau than as reported in the police literature, although they do sometimes occur.

Despite these positive findings it is clear that significant symptoms and psychological readjustments do occur in Agents following involvement in a shooting incident. While these are generally manageable, most Agents feel that some professional and peer support would be helpful during this stressful period. Specific recommendations for interventions at the shooting scene and during the first week following the shooting, and discussion of long term issues, training and prevention are offered in the Conclusions and Recommendations.

The nature of post-shooting trauma and stress experienced by Agents is, in part, conditioned by the special nature of the Bureau as a national organization. Although most Agents and their families felt that field office staff and families rallied to their support, considerable stress is experienced by Agents and their families in the course of prolonged administrative investigations initiated by Headquarters. This is especially a problem when these investigations drag out over a long period of time. Agents and their families share with police officers concerns about legal liability surrounding shooting incidents but because of the absence in the Bureau of the kind of legal representation often provided on the scene and afterwards by police unions, Agents often feel much more vulnerable in this area.

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

A number of symptoms have been regularly experienced by police officers following shooting incidents. These include sensory distortion, flashbacks, fear of insanity, sleep pattern disturbances, development of emotional isolation, depression, and the development of alienation and distrust of the agency. These symptoms are merely a few of the multitude of physical and psychological reactions that can and do surface after a shooting.

The responses of officers following shooting incidents may be both positively and negatively affected by the reactions of their peers. Supportive officers, especially those who have had similar experiences themselves, make a big difference in facilitating readjustment. On the other hand, insensitive comments or jokes praising the officer for being a "good killer" can and have had lasting negative effects.

A number of recommendations have emerged for the management of post-shooting trauma by police departments. These, in summary, stem from the fact that a shooting is a major trauma for the officers involved. The individual officer's reactions to his or her shooting vary due to many contributing factors. The officer's prior work experience and personality help to determine the individual's reactions. The circumstances of the shooting also have an influence on how the officer might react. The responses of the officer's peers, the administration of his or her agency, the media and community also directly influence the severity, type and extent of the officer's reactions after a shooting incident. Because of the prevailing hypermasculine "macho" police image, the law enforcement officer's public response to offers of post-shooting counseling can be expected to be negative. A departmental policy of mandating that officers participate in confidential, professional post-shooting counseling reduces the stigma of receiving mental health services. A final recommendation is to develop a post-shooting policy which is inclusive and clearly understood by the officer involved and also by the administration of the law enforcement agency.

Until the late 1970's there existed little or no specific literature pertaining directly to the stresses of post-shooting trauma. Several police psychologists, including Mike Roberts of the San Jose Police Department; Stephen Carson of the Arizona Department of Public Safety; James Shaw of the King County Department of Public Safety, Seattle, Washington; and Walter Lippert, a clinical psychologist who works with the Cincinnati Police Department, began recognizing the serious nature of problems associated with post-shooting trauma. From their limited experiences they were able to identify symptoms of the post-shooting experience and the effects that experience might have on the officer, his work and family and then

ultimately to formulate preventive or interventive approaches to neutralize or reduce the effect of the shooting incident.

In general, the symptoms of a post-shooting trauma are as varied as illustrated previously. There does appear to be a pattern of developing a coping approach to this or any other traumatic life event. Carson defines the stages of this pattern as denial and isolation, anger and resentment, bargaining, depression and acceptance. Carson relates these stages to the symptoms that the officer works through. The commonalities that are recognized in the symptoms and patterns lend to an effective approach for intervention. These psychologists, again, are in agreement as to aiding the officer. Shaw recommends that conventional counseling be afforded these officers and he also discussed a formation of a crisis assistance team to use in a traumatic situation. This team he describes as being generally composed of a legal advisor, medical health professional, and a police officer who has been involved in prior shooting incidents. As a whole, all of these individuals must understand the law enforcement officer, who he is, what he is and why he came into law enforcement. Those thoughts and recommendations are echoed by the other police psychologists who have examined the deadly force and post-shooting issues. Carson and Roberts further modify the crisis assistance team approach. They recommend the use of a voluntary, confidential, free counseling service with a psychotherapist who has a background in law enforcement. They define the peer counseling process as the officer who "has been there". This individual must possess the incident experience, the ability to listen and the ability to share.

Several more current articles including "A Balance of Force" by Kenneth Matulia, state that professional counseling must be mandatory. This recommendation is based on the fact that there remains a stigma in law enforcement to seeking psychological counseling. Again, counseling directly confronts the macho image. This service must also be timely. A brief contact by the mental health expert should be afforded within the first 48 hours. Matulia, in his IACP report suggests that the officer's family suffers through the post-shooting trauma as well. Counseling services should also be available to them.

Dr. Eric Nielsen, in his dissertation entitled, "The Law Enforcement Officer's Use of Deadly Force and Post Shooting Trauma", completed in 1981, provides the first empirical insight into the effects of post-shootings. His focus was developed by analyzing traumatic stress and post-traumatic stress disorder as it relates to combat psychiatry. One of the main points that comes out of the work done by Nielsen is an apparent lack of departmental emphasis on the well-being of the officers involved in the shootings. He bases this statement on the fact that there are too few services provided for the police officer who has experienced emotional and physical distress after the

shooting. Nielsen concurs with the frequent reactions, patterns of dealing with the stress and counseling assistance previously reviewed.

Another major point that comes from Nielsen's study is that the shooting is magnified by vague, ill-defined and agonizingly long post-shooting investigations and review procedures. He recommends that the departmental post-shooting procedures be made as clear and applied as quickly as possible. Nielsen's effort provided the basis for the collection and analysis of the physical and psychological responses of Bureau Agents. A series of modifications of his questionnaire were made and thereafter utilized, in part, to obtain data in this study. Many parallels can be drawn between Dr. Nielsen's study and results, and the data and recommendations developed during the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference held at the FBI Academy. The main points suggested by Nielsen concerning the well-being of the officer involved and the agonizingly long post-shooting investigation are very similar to the results of the post-shooting conference. The analysis of the physical and emotional response, reactions of others, and sources of support and aggravation are also parallel. These responses have been validated and substantiated through the personal interviews and the second part of the questionnaire, developed for the Agent study, requiring the appropriate selection of responses to statements that represent the experiences, attitudes and beliefs of those Agents who had been involved in shooting incidents. The details of those responses are reflected in the Specific Analysis section.

SPECIFIC ANALYSIS

Post-Shooting Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

The latest edition of The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III, 1980) incorporates the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. This diagnosis requires a stressor which would cause symptoms in almost everyone experiencing it and a positive occurrence of symptoms in three groups. The first involves reexperiencing of the trauma in terms of intrusive thoughts or memories, flashbacks, etc. The second group involves a numbing or reduced responsiveness to the environment as expressed by withdrawal of interest and feelings of detachment. The final group involves the presence of two or more out of six symptoms related to the incident such as startle responses, sleep disturbance, or avoidance of situations similar to the traumatic incident. A specific inquiry was made in the questionnaire distributed to participants in the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference concerning the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. In five out of the seventeen incidents, the positive responses warranted the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. In fifteen of the seventeen incidents, there was evidence of reexperiencing of the trauma; psychic numbing or reduced responsiveness was reported in seven of the incidents, and a similar number reported two or more of the associated symptoms. Within this group, the most frequent statements endorsed by the Agents were "thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my mind" (13), "after the incident I slept more poorly than usual" (10), "I sometimes felt guilty about what happened" (7), and "I became hyperalert and/or startled easily after the incident" (7).

Other Psychological Effects

Most of the Agents reported that they could remember the shooting as if it had happened yesterday. In eleven out of the seventeen incidents, Agents responded positively to the statement, "After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger." In about half of the incidents, Agents expressed regret or sympathy for the subject who had been shot but there were few instances of compulsive or harmful involvement with the subject's family.

Not all of the effects of the shooting incident were perceived as negative. Several of the Agents mentioned that they had finally "met the test" of a severe stress and they felt more confident in themselves and less pressed to prove themselves in

other situations. In over half of the incidents, Agents reported that they had reevaluated what was important in their lives, goals or values. In seven of the seventeen incidents, Agents reported that the experience had helped them to grow or mature, and in five of the incidents, the Agents agreed with the statement, "I think that the whole thing made me a better person." In general, Agents remained optimistic about their ability to cope with future stresses and felt that the experience had taught them that they could trust other people and count on them in a crisis.

Physical and Emotional Responses

One of the specific areas that we sought to develop during this conference at Quantico was the reactions, both physical and emotional, that the Agent encounters during and after the shootings. These responses provide a better understanding of what the Agent has gone through. It is noted that an abnormal reaction to an abnormal situation is normal. Several notable emotional responses took place within the individual during the shooting incidents. These included: disbelief that this was really happening (11), the automatic response (which we suggest is a result of appropriately trained and conditioned response in the use of firearms) (10), rush of strength and/or adrenalin (10), and fear (5). (Table 1 in the appendices reflects these responses.) We explored what perceptual distortions occurred to the Agents during their shootings. Significantly, seeing the event in slow motion was experienced by Agents in ten separate incidents. Auditory blocking such as not hearing all the shots, not hearing voices of others or not hearing the sounds that normally are observed was reported in eleven incidents. The final perceptual distortion is tunnel vision. In nine incidents, Agents reported they experienced tunnel vision. One comment of interest that was added to this area by an Agent was that he became immediately very cold at the shooting scene, and that feeling did not go away until sometime the following day. (Table 2 reflects these experiences.)

As a followup, another series of questions attempted to identify physical and emotional symptoms that the Agent could identify in themselves and which persisted in the week following the shooting. It was interesting to note that physically the only significant response or symptom that was identified was fatigue (5). (See Table 7) However, when questioned regarding emotional feelings that persisted, the responses included: sleep problems (8), anxiety/tension (7), sadness/crying/depression (6), and thought disturbances (4). In general, the physical, emotional and perceptual responses were appropriately recognized and worked through by the responding Agents.

The support that the Agents received from peers and family assisted in these areas. The abnormal reactions were normal.

Reactions of Others

Our professional opinion pertaining to the post-shooting incident is that how the Agent perceives the reaction of others, particularly significant others, influences how the individual experiences the incident. Tables 3 through 6 reflect the reactions of fellow Agents, family, supervisors, and friends. Overwhelmingly, the reaction was supportive. The support concern was identified in separate areas in all seventeen shooting incidents as follows: fellow Agent (13), wife/girlfriend (11), supervisors (11), and friends (8). This strong display of support and confidence assisted the Agents in handling their exercise of the use of deadly force.

Other significant areas of reaction identified by the Agents were that the wife/girlfriend were upset and/or fearful for the health and welfare of the Agent (6), and the supervisors were concerned for themselves or their positions (C.Y.A.-6).

Being able to talk out feelings, frustrations and experiences provides an excellent release. "Talking it out" is a natural and quite frequently necessary mode of coping with traumatic experiences. Agents expressed this in Table 9 where they identified those individuals with whom they were able to discuss their experiences. The peer group (fellow Agents) ranks number one. In all seventeen incidents, the ability to discuss the shooting with peers was noted. This response strongly suggests the use of trained peer counselors. Not unexpectedly, the wife/girlfriend were ranked very high by the Agents (9). Because of the significant bond and empathy that exists in this relationship, we feel that counseling may be appropriate and should be available to the spouse as well.

Family Aspects

The impact of shooting incidents on Agents' families was assessed both through interviews and questionnaires completed by the Agents and through direct interviews with a sample of spouses. In ten out of the seventeen incidents, Agents reported that "my wife was very worried/upset". About half that number reported problems relating to children or parents. In about one-third of the incidents, Agents identified some increase in irritability at home or subsequent problems in their marriage. Only one of the Agents participating in the seminar had been divorced since the shooting incident.

Contact with both spouses and Agents makes it clear that the most uniformly helpful intervention that spouses have provided is their ability to listen to the Agent as he unburdens himself concerning the incident. These sessions have sometimes been described as "marathons" and Agents are clearly helped by the confidentiality, availability, and relative lack of a need to "put up a front" that the marital relationship provides.

Agents' wives uniformly reported that there had been "floods of support" from Agents and from friends in the Bureau as well as field office administrative personnel. They were particularly concerned that the family be notified immediately by the Bureau after a shooting incident had occurred since several Agent spouses and children had learned of incidents from immediate media coverage. The reaction of families seemed to vary more than that of Agents in terms of the nature of the incident (e.g., Was the agent wounded? Was someone killed?). In addition, prior exposure to shootings in previous law enforcement jobs and in other Bureau work clearly interacted with any given incident. Spouses shared the concern of Agents about potential lawsuits and some resentment concerning prolonged Headquarters investigations and a sense of being left "defenseless". Particular problems were encountered by the families of Agents who had been wounded during the shooting incidents in terms of financial arrangements and sometimes simply in terms of help in handling phones, small children, etc., if friends or relatives were not immediately available.

Agents, in general, did not tend to discuss shooting incidents with young children. This approach may have some drawbacks when children sense that something is wrong and perhaps attribute their own personal responsibility to tensions within the family. In addition, in several incidents children had found out about the event at school and there had been some awkward moments as Agents and their spouses tried to explain what had happened. In general, we would recommend that Agents make some cautious, non-directive inquiries following a shooting incident to make sure that children do not have potentially damaging misinformation. In several cases Agents found out years after an incident that their children had, in fact, known about it but had felt uncomfortable about discussing it with their parents.

Sources of Support and of Aggravation

One aspect that we attempted to identify through the questionnaire was where do the Agents receive the most assistance to deal with the trauma of the shooting incident. That assistance is reflected in the section regarding "Reactions of Others" and also in Table 10. The support, both physically and mentally, is based on two areas: the home and the peer group.

The Agents specifically stated that they had been most assisted by fellow Agents (12). Peer counseling is a vital aspect of dealing with crisis. The wife/girlfriend provides valuable assistance (9) in coping with life in general and more so with trauma.

Somewhat surprising was the response to major sources of aggravation to the Agents who were involved in shootings (see Table 11). The news media emerged as most aggravating (7). Two comments typified this response: "The news media stated that this could have been resolved with a negotiator" and "the articles accused me of using excessive force." The Bureau policy regarding not releasing the identity of Agents involved in any of our cases is appropriate in post-shooting incidents also. It also serves to protect the wives and family of the Agents involved.

Not surprisingly, the next focus of aggravation is other Bureau officials (5). The natural process that was mentioned by Carson is part of this reaction. The hostility and anger that arises in the post-shooting incident is directed toward the Bureau because of the Agent's belief that the investigation is prolonged and adversarial. Other comments mentioned by the Agents at the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference were: "I didn't like being referred to as 'killer' by Agents and others," "I had a problem with the D.A. and local grand jury," and "The inspectors made me feel like a criminal."

The recommendation to continue not releasing names of Agents in Bureau cases and, if possible, to expedite the investigation in a shooting incident are supported by this summary.

Factors that Foster Coping

An overwhelming finding of our study was that Agents attributed great value in their coping with shooting incidents to the opportunity to both talk to and listen to other Agents who had been involved in the same or similar incidents. A reason for the special prominence of this coping device can be found in the response in fourteen of the incidents of "A person who has not been in a shooting incident can't really understand what it is like." Thus, the opportunity to share and to compare with others who have had this particular experience may be much more helpful than general, if well-meaning, reassurance and support. This finding provides a rationale for our recommendation that peer support from Agents who have been involved in previous shooting incidents be provided. It also explains our hesitation to recommend a mandatory period of administrative leave immediately following the incident. This may be a time when peer support is especially important and this may be most easily obtained in

the office setting. In addition, investigation of the incident may require the Agent's presence so that, even if at home, he is reminded of and bothered by details relating to the incident during his "free" time. Allowing the Agents to schedule his five days of administrative leave at any time during the 30 days following the incident would ensure that this leave is able to exert its maximum benefit for the Agent. The opportunity to provide peer support also provides benefits to those offering the support.

Other factors appeared helpful to individual Agents in their effort to cope: a sense of humor (11), getting back to the normal work routine (8), being physically active (8), keeping one's mind off what had happened, religious beliefs and/or practices, and feeling angry (6 each).

Effects of the Investigation

Shooting incidents and the life-threatening situations that lead to them can and do challenge the sense of security and basic trust of the strongest and best adjusted person. In addition to concerns about how they have performed as individuals, Agents naturally are sensitive to how their organization supports them or withholds support following the incident. While the necessity for a thorough and fair investigation of the incident is apparent, the prolonged nature and fragmentary communication surrounding these investigations have been a source of stress to a significant number of Agents. In approximately half the incidents reviewed during our Post-Shooting Trauma Conference, this element of stress was felt to be paramount or extremely significant by the Agents involved. Statements reflecting this included, "I worried a lot about the investigation of the incident" (8), "I was treated like a suspect during the investigation of the incident" (7), and "the way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me than the shooting itself" (6). This fact is reflected in our recommendation that every effort be made to expedite these investigations and to offer communications about them in as supportive a manner as possible. Letters received by Agents at the conclusion of investigations have frequently been described as cryptic, impersonal, and as "opening old wounds." Some consideration should be given to these factors in the phrasing of such letters. Agents found that the difficult process of the investigation was made easier for them when at least one of the investigators from Headquarters had had some personal experience with a shooting incident himself. The value of having such a person as part of the investigating team to the Agents involved may very well offset any problems the investigator may have in terms of maintaining objectivity.

Telephone Call from Headquarters Administrative Personnel

Several Agents have reported that their initial adjustment was helped greatly by a supportive call from senior Headquarters administrative personnel. All Agents agreed that such a personal call was much more helpful than a letter. All Agents were anxious to have accurate information concerning the nature and time course of official investigations, but felt that this information should be provided in the form of a brochure so that it did not have any implications of personal attack or prejudgment of that particular incident.

Agents described several specific comments that they had found helpful when offered by senior administrative personnel. Statements such as "I am glad you are okay" or "I am sorry you were injured" followed by a question like "How are you doing now?" and "How is your family?" were always seen positively. If the calling Agent has had direct experience in this area, sharing and encouragement were valued. In one helpful conversation, the senior Agent mentioned, "I can't know exactly how you feel" and then went on to mention some of the things that anyone might expect such as anger, anxiety, and "replays" of the incident. A helpful analogy was offered by one senior Agent to a "Bearcat Scanner" which constantly kept returning to and "locking" on the same station. This corresponded to the Agent's experience of repetitive thoughts concerning the incident and made him feel less unusual and isolated by his experience. A statement such as "If you need help, ask for it" was felt to be more helpful than one such as "Call me if I can help you in any way." Most Agents felt that calls by senior Bureau personnel to their families should be limited to instances where the Agent has been injured.

Information Pertaining to Individual Recommendations

Throughout the Post-Shooting Trauma Conference the overriding issue was what recommendations are necessarily applicable to the FBI to counteract the trauma of a shooting incident. Part one of the questionnaire specifically solicited that information. Individual responses included: no assignment at the shooting scene, is it necessary that the administrative inquiry be adversarial, seeking fault, need for legal advice and representation, administrative leave should be available, training for new Agents is a must, mandatory counseling, use of a respected "shrink" for counseling, and variously phrased statements regarding streamlining and expediting the shooting investigation.

These recommendations were reviewed in the personal interviews with the Agents. The comments were expanded upon and clarified. During the conference group discussion, a detailed and systematic review of all recommendations was made. This approach was the basis from which we worked to identify, develop and formulate appropriate recommendations that coincide with the needs of the Bureau. The information developed through the review of professional police literature was also incorporated in this developmental process.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of this project was to determine what, if any, post-shooting trauma reactions Special Agents of the FBI might encounter and suffer from, and then make recommendations to alleviate or minimize the effects. The data collected in this study included the responses of the fourteen Special Agents who attended this conference and interviews by the authors with a similar number of Agents involved in shooting incidents over several years. From this diversity of experiences we have concentrated our conclusions and recommendations on those aspects that reappeared with significant regularity and concerning which the conference participants were able to achieve consensus.

1. Interventions at the Shooting Scene

- A. After the shooting scene has been secured, the first concern expressed and acted on should be that all Bureau personnel are both physically and mentally well cared for.
- B. The Agent(s) involved in the shooting should be permitted and encouraged to immediately contact his/her spouse and/or family. If the Agent has been injured, or if he/she feels it would be useful, the Agent's family should be contacted immediately in person by a designated Agent who knows the family personally. The field office should also be notified of the Agent's condition so that there will be a response to family who call the office. It is particularly important that family notification occur before press and/or media accounts appear.
- C. Agents who have been personally involved in the shooting incident should be removed from the scene as soon as possible and not assigned further duties in the investigation of that incident.
- D. If the Agent's weapon is seized for evidence or ballistics tests, another should be issued immediately.
- E. FBI Headquarters should explore the issue of the availability of legal advice and/or help for Agents who have been involved in shooting incidents. Agents need to know what their legal rights and liabilities are. The Agent often has to face difficult and pressured decisions in this area at the immediate scene of the shooting.

- F. Within 24 hours following the incident, the SAC should initiate a personal contact with the Agent and his/her family in a supportive role and offer assistance, if needed.
- G. The current Bureau procedure of not releasing the identity of Agents involved in investigations or incidents is especially important in post-shooting matters.

2. Interventions During the First Week

- A. Dr. Soskis will contact the Agent as soon as possible after the shooting incident. This contact is designed to be supportive and to share with the Agent the possible physical and psychological reactions to this trauma. If the Agent wishes, Carole Soskis will contact the Agent's family. Interactions of Dr. and Mrs. Soskis with Agents and their families around shooting incidents will be treated as confidential in the same way as self or informally referred cases in the routine Psychological Services Program.
- B. Peer support from other Agents who have experienced shooting incidents should be made available. If there is no readily available resource for this in the Agent's field office, the Behavioral Science Unit will identify the nearest available Special Agent who has participated in the Bureau's Post-Shooting Trauma Conference, which instructs Agents in providing support and counseling for others. Those Special Agents who have attended the most recent seminar are currently available to assist other Agents.
- C. A brochure should be available to Agents who have been involved in shooting incidents covering:
 - (1) The symptoms to be expected and their normal course.
 - (2) Administrative handling of the post-shooting investigation.
 - (3) Legal aspects of the shooting incident.
 - (4) Counseling services available.

The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG), the Behavioral Science Unit, and Dr. and Mrs. Soskis will cooperate in the preparation of this brochure.

Agents who have been injured in a shooting incident should also have access to a brochure which covers the administrative aspects of on-the-job injuries. Specific concerns are issues of leave without pay versus sick leave, medical bills, workmen's compensation, and realistic planning for time without pay. The Administrative Services Division is currently working on such a brochure.

- D. An official from FBI Headquarters should contact the Agent personally by phone. The scope and direction of this call is to express concern for the welfare of the Agent and his/her family.
- E. A total of five mandatory days of administrative leave should be taken by all persons directly involved in the shooting incident. This leave may be taken any time during the first 30 days following the incident at the discretion of the Agent.

3. Longer Term Issues

- A. Every effort should be made to facilitate the administrative investigation of shooting incidents so that Agents are not left "twisting in the wind."
- B. If a group of inspectors from Headquarters are required to conduct an investigation of the shooting incident, an effort should be made to ensure that at least one of the inspectors has had personal experience with a previous shooting incident.
- C. Agents should be allowed to pace their own return to work following shooting incidents.
- D. No automatic transfers of Agents to another squad following a shooting incident should be initiated unless the Agent requests that consideration.
- E. The letter announcing the conclusion of a Bureau investigation of a shooting incident should be phrased in a way that takes into account the emotional impact on an Agent who has been involved in a life threatening situation and may have suffered post-shooting trauma.
- F. Incentive awards following a shooting incident in which subjects have been seriously injured or killed can have a negative psychological impact and/or be perceived as a "bounty." Analysis of the advisability of continuing these awards is recommended.

- G. Agents who have been involved in a shooting incident should not immediately be assigned to duties highly likely to involve armed confrontations. This is even more important when a given Agent has already been involved in two previous shooting incidents.
- H. On an annual or semi-annual basis, Agents who have been involved in shooting incidents should be afforded an opportunity to attend a Post-Shooting Trauma Conference at the FBI Academy. These group sessions will be the basis for future modifications in policy and training and will also provide a pool of Agents able to provide meaningful peer support.

4. Prevention and Training

- A. Training related to post-shooting trauma and its management should be made available to Bureau administrative personnel. A training block of this type will be prepared by the Behavioral Science, Firearms Training, and Management Science Units. A presentation in this area should also be incorporated into upcoming SAC conferences, Senior Executive Programs, and Executive Development Institute sessions. Dr. and Mrs. Soskis will incorporate the post-shooting trauma study and recommendations into their upcoming sessions with these groups.
- B. An inoculation session which provides the New Agent with an introduction to post-shooting trauma will be developed and provided during New Agents training. This block of instruction will be developed by the Behavioral Science Unit and the Firearms Training Unit.
- C. The brochure developed on post-shooting trauma issues should be distributed to all Agents.
- D. In the planning of operations which have a high risk of armed confrontations and/or the use of deadly force, Agents with current high levels of personal and/or family stress or health problems should be temporarily excused in order to minimize the risks of cumulative stress or trauma.

APPENDICES

QUESTIONNAIRE UTILIZED
IN THE
POST-SHOOTING TRAUMA CONFERENCE
JULY 14-15, 1983

Profile of Conference Participants:

Age:	Ranged from 24-45
Years in Bureau:	Ranged from 9 months to 15 years
Types of Violation:	Two - 87's Three - 88's (others not Four - 91's classified)
Results:	Eight subjects killed; four subjects wounded
Shots Fired:	17 by Agents; 14 by subjects
Time of Day:	Ranged from 1:30 a.m. to 11:05 p.m.

A tabulation of positive responses is indicated by individual questions and/or statements that apply.

FOCUSED INTERVIEW
SHOOTING STUDY - SPECIAL AGENT

1. Date of shooting:
Mo. Day Year Varied with incident
2. Your age at shooting:
Ranged from 24-45
3. Years (convert to nearest month, e.g., four years and one month = 49 months) in the Bureau when the shooting occurred:

Ranged from 9 months to 15 years
4. Field office assigned at the time of the shooting:
5. Field office now assigned:
6. Investigative assignment at the time of the shooting (type of case investigated [use #]):

2 - 87's
3 - 88's
4 - 91's
7. Married at the time?: Yes ☐ No ☐ Separated ☐ Divorced ☐ 1
Now married to the same person?: Yes ☐ No ☐
8. What time of day did the shooting occur (military time, e.g., 10:15 a.m. = 1015, 12:00 noon = 1200, and 10:15 p.m. = 2215)?:

Ranged from 1:30am to 11:05pm
9. Who was with you at the time of the shooting?:
Alone ☐ Other BuAgents ☐ Other Law Enforcement ☐
Other ☐

10. How many rounds fired?:

A. By you:

	1	7
--	---	---

 Totals from seventeen incidents

B. By the suspect:

		1	4
--	--	---	---

C. By any others:

		5	1
--	--	---	---

 Who?:

11. How many minutes elapsed between your arrival at the scene and the shooting?:

--	--	--

 Varied

12. A. Describe what happened during the incident:

Individual responses

of responses

B. Describe what happened to you emotionally during the incident; do any of the following apply to you?

11	Disbelief that it is really happening
1	Fear for self/shakes
5	Fear for others
10	Responded automatically
4	Feeling - "I must survive"
10	Rush of strength/adrenalin

C. Describe any perceptual changes that occurred in you during the incident:

10	Slow motion
11	Not hearing all the shots, voice or noises
9	Narrowing - tunnel vision
-	Other, please specify

13. Had you had previous personal contact with the subject?:

Yes ☐ 1 No ☐

If so, what was the nature and extent of contact?

14. Who assumed command at the scene; SAC ☐ 8, investigative team ☐ 3, police department ☐ 9, others ☐ -, if so, who?

15. Was there a post-shooting investigation?: Yes ☐ 17 No ☐
If so, who handled the investigation?:

16. Was your weapon held as evidence?: Yes ☐ 9 No ☐
If so, were you issued another weapon?: Yes ☐ 4 No ☐

17. During the 24 hours following the incident:

A. What is your perception of the reactions of fellow Agents?

For classification purposes these categories were designated:

13 Support
3 Curiosity
- Aggravation
1 None reported

B. What is your perception of the reactions of your wife/girlfriend and other family members?

6 Wife/girl friend was upset/fearful
1 Parents were upset/fearful
- No reactions
1 Children asked about shooting
11 Wife/girl friend supportive

C. What is your perception of the reactions of your supervisors?:

- 11 Support
- Criticism
- 6 Concern about self or own position
- No reaction reported

D. What is your perception of the reactions of your non-Agent friends?:

- 2 No response
- 3 Curiosity
- 8 Support
- 1 Criticism

18. A. After the first 24 hours did your initial reactions change?:

Yes No If so, how?

- 1 Nausea
- Headaches
- 1 Fatigue
- 5 Other
- None

B. During the week following, did you experience any physical problems?

Yes No If so, what were they?

- | | |
|---|-----------------|
| - | Nausea/Vomiting |
| 1 | Headaches |
| 5 | Fatigue |
| 3 | Other |

C. During the week following, did you experience any emotional problems?:

Yes No If so, what were they?

- | | |
|---|---------------------------|
| 7 | Anxiety/Tension |
| 6 | Sadness/Crying/Depression |
| 8 | Sleep Problems |
| 4 | Disturbing thoughts |

19. Did you notice any changes in your attitude or emotional state in the first six months following the incident?:

Yes No

20. Who did you talk with the most about the shooting?:

9	Wife/girlfriend
2	Other family members
12	Fellow Agents
1	Supervisor
2	Clergy
-	Others If others, who?:

21. Of those around you, who provided the most assistance to you?: Why?:

9	Wife/girlfriend
2	Other family members
12	Fellow Agent
-	Supervisor
1	Clergy
2	Other If so who?:

22. Who was the most aggravating to you and why?

1	Other Agents
7	News media
1	Supervisors
5	Other Bureau officials
1	Suspect's Attorney
2	Suspect's family and friends

23. Would it have been/was it of help for you to seek professional help after this shooting?

Yes No

If yes, please explain: Psychological

Religious

Others

24. Would it have helped/did it help to have administrative time off after the shooting?:

Yes No Was it offered?: Yes No

25. What was the nature of the press coverage?:

<input type="text" value="13"/>	Extensive
<input type="text" value="4"/>	Moderate
<input type="text" value="-"/>	Minimal
<input type="text" value="-"/>	None

26. How badly was the subject injured?:

<input type="text" value="9"/>	Killed
<input type="text" value="7"/>	Seriously wounded
<input type="text" value="3"/>	Wounded, not serious

27. Did you or any other Agents offer first aid?:

Yes No

28. Have you had any subsequent contact with suspect,

Yes No , his family, Yes No ,

or his friends, Yes No ?:

29. Had you participated in any Bureau or other survival training prior to shooting?:

Yes No

30. Do you have any recommendations regarding shooting incidents in:

A. Bureau procedures:

Varied - reported in details
of this report entitled
recommendations.

B. Training:

C. Services provided Agent as a result of a shooting incident:

31. Did the FBI's firearms training prepare you for a shooting incident?:

Yes No

32. Are you a military veteran?: Yes No

33. Did you have combat experience?: Yes No

If so, please provide details:

34. Do you have prior police experience?: Yes No

35. Have you previously been involved in a shooting incident? Explain.

Yes No

36. Is there anyone else that was affected by this shooting incident that you recommend be contacted?:

Yes No If so, who? Please specify:

3	Wife/girlfriend
2	Other family member
3	Other Agents
1	Supervisor
-	SAC

SHOOTING INCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Directions: Below is a series of statements that represent the experiences, attitudes and beliefs of law enforcement professionals who have been involved in shooting incidents. Some will apply to you, others will not. For each statement, please mark a check (✓) in the space following the statement if it applies to you, or an X if it does not. Please give a response for each statement. Thank you. Positive responses that applied are recorded.

After the incident, I slept more poorly than usual. 10

I felt angry, and it helped me. 6

I learned that I could trust people, and count on them in a crisis. 12

It's very hard for me to find anything good about the incident and what followed. 1

I was more irritable at home and had a "shorter fuse." 6

I felt that I was made a scapegoat after the incident. -

I can remember the shooting as if it happened yesterday. 13

I became more interested in/involved with my work. 2

My family was bitter towards the Bureau. 5

I felt regret over injuring someone/taking a life. 7

My wife was very worried/upset. 10

It was harder for me to feel things. 2

I became more interested in/involved with my hobbies, friends or leisure activities. 3

I sometimes felt guilty about what happened. 7

I was more irritable with other people at work. -

I was helped by my religious beliefs and/or practices. 6

I felt harassed and/or blamed by other people after the shooting. 1

My future will be better than my past. 7

I was disappointed by my wife's/girlfriend's reaction to the incident. 2

I worried alot about the investigation of the incident. 8

After the incident I became less cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger. 2

My child(ren) were very worried/upset. 2

I became hyper-alert and/or startled easily after the incident. 7

Shooting Incident Questionnaire

✓=APPLIES TO YOU

✗=DOES NOT APPLY

Thoughts or memories about the shooting kept coming into my mind. 13It helped me to help/listen to others who had been involved in the shooting. 16I trusted people less. 1I think that the whole thing made me a better person. 5I felt the need to apologize to the subject's family. 1It helped me to get back to my normal work routine. 8My parents were very worried/upset. 4My reaction to the incident was influenced by other shootings I had been involved in. 5I dreamed frequently about the shooting or had other bad dreams that were unusual for me. 4I became less interested in/involved with my family. 2It helped me to share experiences and feelings with others who had been involved in the shooting incident. 15My happiest days are in the past. 3I dreamed more after the incident, but the dreams were not frightening or unpleasant. 3The people who should have supported me were all busy "covering their asses." 3The incident led to problems in my marriage. 5I felt sorry for the subject who was shot. 8Although I was an adult when the shooting incident occurred, the whole thing helped me to grow/mature. 7I became less interested in/involved with my work. 2I drank more after the incident. 6I had trouble remembering and/or concentrating after the incident. 6Whatever happens in the future, I think I will be able to handle it. 16I was treated like a suspect during the investigation of the incident. 7My sense of humor helped me to cope with the whole thing. 11

Shooting Incident Questionnaire

✓=APPLIES TO YOU

X=DOES NOT APPLY

I avoided situations similar to the shooting incident or that reminded me of it. 3

It helped me to keep my mind off what had happened. 6

Most people were insensitive to what I had gone through. 3

I became less interested in/involved with my hobbies, friends, or leisure activities. 2

I sometimes felt like it was happening again, especially if I was in a similar situation or thinking about it. 3

I felt angry, and it upset me. 5

I realized that I was the only one who really cared about me. 1

I would review the incident again and again, and wonder if I did the right thing. 7

I had trouble explaining what happened to my children. 4

After the incident, I felt isolated from other people. 6

After the incident, I felt uncomfortable/insecure about being alive. 4

I felt worse in situations that reminded me of the shooting. 2

A person who has not been in a shooting incident can't really understand what it is like. 14

The whole incident made me re-evaluate what was important in my life/my goals and values. 9

I sometimes wonder if I'll be able to face what the future will bring. 1

The way it was handled afterwards was more harmful to me than the shooting itself. 6

After the incident, it helped me to be physically active. 8

I mostly wanted to be left alone, even by people who were trying to help me. 5

After the incident I became more cautious/concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger. 11

I became more interested in/involved with my family. 4

It helped me to talk with other Agents who had been involved in shooting incidents, or to hear about them from others. 13

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.

TABLE 1

EMOTIONAL RESPONSE DURING SHOOTING INCIDENT		
<u>Responses</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Disbelief	11	64.7
Fear for self/shakes	1	5.9
Fear for others	5	29.4
Responded automatically	10	58.8
Feeling - "I must survive"	4	23.5
Rush of strength/adrenalin	10	58.8
Other	-	-

*Some Agents reported more than one response

TABLE 2

PERCEPTUAL DISTORTIONS DURING
SHOOTING INCIDENT

<u>Distortion</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Slow motion	10	58.8
Auditory blocking	11	64.7
Tunnel Vision	9	52.9
Other	-	-

*Some Agents reported more than one distortion

TABLE 3

REACTIONS OF FELLOW AGENTS

<u>Reaction</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Support	13	76.5
Curiosity	3	17.6
Aggravation	-	-
None Reported	1	5.9

TABLE 4

REACTION OF FAMILY

<u>Reaction</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Wife/girlfriend fearful/upset	6	35.3
Parents fearful/upset	1	5.9
No reported reaction	-	
Children asked about shooting	1	5.9
Wife/girlfriend supportive	11	64.7

*Some Agents reported more than one reaction

TABLE 5

REACTIONS OF SUPERVISOR

<u>Reaction</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Supportive	11	64.7
Criticism	-	
Concerned for own self or position	6	35.3
No reaction reported	-	

TABLE 6

REACTIONS OF NON-AGENT FRIENDS

<u>Reaction</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
No response	2	11.7
Curiosity	3	17.6
Support	8	47.1
Criticism	1	5.9

*Some Agents reported more than one reaction

TABLE 7

PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS OCCURRING IN THE
WEEK FOLLOWING THE SHOOTING

<u>Symptoms</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Nausea/vomiting	-	
Headaches	1	5.9
Fatigue	5	29.4
Other	3	17.6

TABLE 8

EMOTIONAL SYMPTOMS OCCURRING IN THE
WEEK FOLLOWING THE SHOOTING

<u>Symptoms</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Anxiety/tension	7	41.2
Sadness/crying/depression	6	35.3
Sleep problems	8	47.1
Disturbing thoughts	4	23.5

*Some Agents reported more than one symptom

TABLE 9

PERSON THE AGENT TALKED WITH
MOST ABOUT THE SHOOTING

<u>Person</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Wife/girlfriend	9	52.9
Other family members	1	5.9
Fellow Agents	17	100
Supervisor	1	5.9
Clergy	2	11.7
Other	-	

*Some Agents reported more than one person

TABLE 10

PERSON WHO WAS REPORTED TO HAVE
BEEN THE MOST ASSISTANCE

<u>Person</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Wife/girlfriend	9	52.9
Other family members	2	11.7
Fellow Agent	12	70.6
Supervisor	-	
Clergy	1	5.9
Other	2	11.7

*Some Agents reported more than one person

TABLE 11

MAJOR SOURCES OF AGGRAVATION TO
AGENTS INVOLVED IN SHOOTING

<u>Source</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Relative Frequency</u>
Other Agents	1	5.9
News Media	7	41.2
Supervisor	1	5.9
Other Bureau officials	5	29.4
Suspect's attorney	1	5.9
Suspect's family and friends	2	11.7

*Some Agents reported more than one source

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
APPENDIX D

SHOOTING INCIDENTS: ISSUES AND EXPLANATIONS FOR
FBI AGENTS AND MANAGERS

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation



Shooting Incidents: Issues and Explanations For FBI Agents And Managers



For Official Use Only

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**U.S. Department of Justice****Federal Bureau of Investigation**

Office of the Director

Washington, D. C. 20535

Special Agents of the FBI are charged with the duty of investigating violations of the laws of the United States, collecting evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, and performing other duties imposed by law. Sometimes in carrying out these responsibilities they are confronted by violent members of our society and must use deadly force. Whether the Agent is victimized or forced to harm another, severe physical or emotional trauma may result not only for the Agent but also for the Agent's family.


Therefore, I have initiated, and will continue to update and refine a Psychological Services Program for our employees. Considerable effort has been devoted to evaluating and revising this program to ensure it meets the needs of our employees, their families, and the FBI as an organizational family.

With this as our motivation, we have examined the need to assess and reduce the trauma experienced by Agents involved in shooting incidents. We recognize that the FBI organization is essentially a second family for all of us and constitutes an excellent support system. Therefore, Special Agents, who have been involved in shooting incidents, have been trained to assist fellow Agents who, in the course of their duties, also become involved in similar situations.

We want all Special Agents, supervisors, and management to be aware of the program and to alert them to the availability of this support system.

The pamphlet which you are about to read summarizes the results of the research that the Bureau has conducted into shooting incidents in which Agents have been involved. It takes into consideration not only the psychological but also the physiological and legal ramifications of such incidents. The pamphlet was written with emphasis on providing support to Agents involved in shooting incidents from their own families and from "The FBI Family."

It is in the true spirit of the FBI Family that Agents involved in shooting incidents have contributed so significantly to the procedures outlined in this pamphlet for the benefit of their fellow Agents. I warmly commend each of you.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William H. Webster". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

William H. Webster
Director

PART I

Psychological and physiological aspects
of shooting incidents involving
FBI Agents

Introduction:

Agents of the FBI are trained to use the weapons authorized by the Bureau in response to life-threatening situations, yet every Agent hopes that he/she will not have to use that training. Although, to date, only a small number of Agents have been involved in shooting incidents, such incidents have had an impact on their lives as well as their families' lives. The purpose of this brochure is to prepare Agents for what may follow a shooting incident: the physical and psychological reactions, the administrative and legal aspects, and the help that is available in dealing with these issues.

Shooting incidents can be dramatic and unusual, and Agents often feel isolated and unprepared as they try to cope with such incidents. The information in this brochure is based upon the experiences of many Agents involved in shootings and of those whose job it is to try to help them. If you know what to expect and what the normal reactions are to this abnormal event, then the negative impact will be lessened.

Reactions during the incident:

Although Agents may be physically and mentally prepared for a shooting incident, when it actually occurs there is often a feeling of disbelief that it is really happening to them. Many Agents respond automatically, a reflection of good training which can often be life-saving when seconds count. There is often a rush of adrenalin, along with a feeling of fear. Perceptions may be altered during the actual incident. Agents frequently report that they see the event in slow motion or with a narrowed or tunnel vision, and that they do not hear all the shots, voices, or noises during the incident.

Physical and psychological reactions:

Agents are generally healthier and in better physical condition than the average citizen. Remember: IF YOU ARE SHOT YOU DON'T HAVE TO DIE. A number of surgeons have commented on the remarkable recoveries made by Agents from wounds that would ordinarily have been fatal. Agents who have been shot recover and return to their jobs.

Nevertheless, a shooting incident is one of the most severe occupational stressors that an Agent is likely to experience during his or her career. No one, no matter how healthy, well-trained, and well-adjusted is immune to the normal stress reaction to such an event. The key to a healthy response is to be aware of the normal reactions and to make appropriate adjustments as they occur. It is not unusual for an Agent to take several weeks or even months to adjust to a shooting incident, and some effects may last longer or appear after an initial delay.

If an Agent has been wounded in a shooting, he/she should expect a period of recovery and gradual readjustment; behavior at work and at home may not be the same. A definite amount of time and energy is consumed during the recovery process. Agents should be aware of this and pace themselves accordingly. It is important to have the same attitude toward the stress reaction as a shooting incident. You should pace yourself and budget your time and energy for recovery. The generally high level of physical and mental health in Agents helps this recovery, but it does take time.

The following are reactions commonly experienced by Agents involved in shooting incidents:

Sleeping problems - restless sleep, difficulty falling asleep, vivid dreams or nightmares (often about the incident).

Fatigue.

Anxiety and tension.

Sadness, crying, depression.

Repetitive and intrusive thoughts about the incident.

Hyper-alertness and/or startle responses.

Guilty feelings about what happened and wondering if you did the right thing.

Trouble remembering and/or concentrating.

Anger.

Drinking alcoholic beverages more than usual or to excess.

These reactions are unpleasant, but any or all of them may be normal. They usually begin immediately after the incident, peak during the first few weeks, then gradually subside. Occasionally, they will persist or recur. If this happens, or if the reactions (depression, for example) are severe enough to interfere with functioning, appropriate treatment techniques such as counseling and/or medication are helpful and should be made available.

Family issues:

Spouses of Agents may become upset or worried when a shooting incident occurs. If the Agent has been involved in a similar incident, in the past, painful memories may be revived.

Some Agents react to the stress of a shooting with increased irritability at home. Sometimes, the stress on an Agent and his/her spouse may temporarily strain the marital relationship. Spouses, too, can expect a milder form of stress reaction. Parents, children, brothers or sisters, and other relatives may be affected.

Agents and their spouses may try to protect their young children by not telling them about the incident. If there has been any publicity, as is often the case, this usually does not work. Children frequently receive distorted or inaccurate accounts from friends or acquaintances and are upset both by the accounts and by the fact that their parents have told them nothing. Young children usually sense when something important has happened to one of their parents, and if no explanation is offered they will construct one themselves, often one that involves unrealistic self-blame or responsibility. These can be corrected by giving children a simple age-appropriate explanation. Several Agents have discovered long after a shooting incident that their children knew of it but were afraid to talk to their parents because their parents had clearly not wanted to share it with them.

A good approach is to ask first if the child has heard anything about what happened. Then, let the child respond without interruption so that any unrealistic ideas can emerge, and be corrected gently. Reassure young children that they are safe with their parent(s) and that a "bad guy" is not going to hurt them. Reassurance may be more difficult when an Agent has actually been injured, but it is still appropriate. Children's fears are often different from, and worse than, the reality of the situation. If you decide not to tell your children, a cautious inquiry about whether they have heard anything is still recommended.

Work issues:

A shooting incident may affect your work environment and your feelings about it. You can expect a surge of support and encouragement from other Agents and the Supervisory Staff following a shooting incident. Some of your colleagues may be curious about what happened and how you felt; others may deal with feelings aroused by the incident with attempts at humor. Try to realize that they are wondering and worrying about what they would have done in a similar situation.

There is always an administrative investigation following a shooting incident, and some Agents have found this to be as stressful as the incident itself. Legal issues, including your own potential liability, are often involved. These aspects are described later in this brochure. Agents sometimes experience feelings of being treated like a criminal in the course of such investigations, especially if they perceive Supervisors to be concerned with protecting their own interests. The investigation usually takes longer than an Agent would like and leaves him/her in an uncomfortable state of suspense.

Other sources of frustration during this period are distorted or inaccurate media/press accounts, which often try to "second guess" what might have been done on the basis of inadequate information.

It is recommended that you plan on taking five days of administrative leave during the period following your involvement in a shooting incident. This leave gives you time to allow the normal stress reaction to take its course without you having to do your usual work at the same time. Attempt to pace your return to work.

You should not immediately be assigned to duties that would be highly likely to involve another armed confrontation. This will avoid accumulating additional stress of this nature. This is of paramount importance if you have been previously involved in another shooting incident. If you are in a period of high personal or family stress or health problems, you should ask to be excused from particular assignments that are likely to lead to a shooting incident.

Successful coping:

Up to this point the problems and stresses associated with a shooting incident have been emphasized, but Agents are not powerless in the face of traumatic events. Agents can and do cope with these happenings, and often are stronger and wiser for their experience. Many Agents have experienced shooting incidents and have had the chance to evaluate what was most helpful in coping. The suggestions that follow are based on the experiences of these Agents.

Sharing your experience with others is the most important technique of successful coping. The two resources for sharing identified as the most helpful were: (1) fellow Agents and (2) a spouse or close friend. We can be even more specific about fellow Agents: almost every Agent involved in a shooting was substantially helped by talking and listening to other Agents who have had a similar experience. A major reason for this is the perception of the involved Agent that someone who has not been personally involved in a shooting incident cannot really

understand what it is like. The high value of this kind of mutual sharing and help may be a reason for postponing your administrative leave during the crucial first days after the incident, so that you can be with Agents who have been involved in similar incidents. If you were alone in the incident, or if you and/or the other Agent(s) involved need some outside perspective, the Bureau, your SAC, ASAC or Supervisor can make available to you Agents from your area who have been involved in a shooting incident and have had special training in the area of possible effects and how they might assist fellow Agents. The more Agents that you can contact who have successfully coped with this type of experience, the better.

The value of sharing with a spouse or close friend ranks nearly as high for Agents as sharing with their colleagues. You don't have to put up a front for a spouse or a close friend or pretend to be tough. You can, and should, unburden yourself in this confidential relationship. Agents and their spouses have described intense "marathons" in the period after a shooting where the Agent "lets it all out" and feels better afterward. The important thing is to keep the lines of communication open.

If you are a spouse, try to be available and ready to devote the time and energy that this sharing requires. The most important thing is to be there and to listen as long as the Agent needs to talk; this is more important than reassurance or sympathy, although these are also helpful. A marriage does not have to be perfect in order to offer this helping and healing effect. Clearly, a spouse can also use this same technique to cope successfully with the stresses of a shooting incident; that is - talking to, sharing with, and helping other spouses.

Several other factors have been identified by Agents as helpful in their coping. These are more individual - what works for one person may not be helpful to another:

- * A sense of humor.
- * Return to the normal work routine.
- * Physical activity.
- * Religious beliefs and/or practices.
- * Feelings of anger.
- * Keeping one's mind off the incident.

Positive aspects:

There is no question that a shooting incident can be traumatic. Yet Agents have also been able to identify some positive effects associated with such incidents. Most important, and in spite of the problems associated with post-shooting incident investigations, Agents felt that they had learned that they could trust people and count on them in a crisis. For some, the experience helped them grow and mature. Having met the test

of the most severe stress, they were more confident in themselves and less pressed to prove themselves in other situations. They felt that whatever happened in the future, they would be able to handle it.

Some Agents became more cautious and concerned about situations that might involve firearms or danger; they now knew these things didn't only happen to the other guy. They could experience feelings of regret or sympathy for the subjects and at the same time know that they had done the only possible thing under the circumstances. As with any personal crisis, Agents often re-evaluated what was important in their lives - their goals and values - and found their new perspectives helpful.

Additional resources:

Most Agents interviewed about their adjustment after a shooting incident felt that some professional help would have benefited them and/or their families, if it had been provided by someone familiar with post-shooting incidents; and yet, like most other Agents, they acknowledged reluctance and embarrassment at asking for help. The solution they suggested, and the procedure the Bureau has chosen, is for the Bureau psychiatric consultant-David A. Soskis, M.D. (Office 215-471-2368: Residence 215-664-3401) to contact every Agent directly involved in a shooting incident, thus eliminating the burden from an individual Agent. Carole W. Soskis, M.S.W., J.D., (Office 215-563-4947: Residence 215-664-3401) also part of the Bureau's psychological services program, will be available to make contact with the Agent's spouse or other family members if the Agent feels that this would be helpful. These contacts will be treated as confidential under the same provisions as self or informally referred Agents in the psychological services program. Dr. and Mrs. Soskis have both had extensive experience in this area, as have several Agents in the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy, who are also available to Agents in the field. The purpose of these contacts is to provide help to the Agent, including a more individualized approach to the issues raised in this brochure. In the small number of cases where extended treatment is necessary, Dr. and Mrs. Soskis can arrange a referral to a well-qualified professional in the Agent's area.

As mentioned earlier, peer support will be made available to Agents through the Behavioral Science Unit Chief at the FBI Academy. In addition, on an annual or semi-annual basis, Agents who have been involved in recent shooting incidents will have a chance to participate in a Post-Critical Incident Seminar at the FBI Academy. At this conference, Agents will have the opportunity to review their own individual adjustment, share and compare their feelings with other Agents who have been through a similar experience, contribute to the ongoing development of the Bureau's Post-Shooting Policy Program, and equip themselves to help other Agents who are involved in future incidents.

PART II

Legal Issues for FBI Agents involved in shooting incidents

Legal issues:

Concern over potential legal problems may add to the psychological pressures ordinarily associated with a shooting incident. For example, an Agent involved in a shooting incident may be surprised to discover officers from a local law enforcement agency attempting to interrogate him or otherwise obtain a statement concerning the event. If death resulted from the shooting, there will routinely be a coroner's inquest or a review by a local grand jury to ascertain if the shooting was justified. At some point, an Agent involved in a shooting incident may be named as a defendant in a civil suit. None of these actions should be viewed as extraordinary or unusual. Interviews with police, coroner's inquests, grand jury investigations, and even civil suits are common and should be expected. The following is a brief summary of the legal issues most likely to arise. Appropriate sections of the Legal Handbook for Special Agents (LHBSA) are cited for future reference.

Investigation by local authorities:

An Agent should be aware that local law enforcement agencies have investigative responsibility for shooting incidents occurring within their territorial jurisdictions. That responsibility does not diminish simply because one of the participants is a law enforcement officer. Accordingly, an Agent involved in a shooting incident should routinely anticipate an investigation by local authorities. An Agent enjoys the same protections as any other person under the Constitution. For example, even though an Agent may be interviewed by local police or subpoenaed to a local grand jury or court proceeding, he/she could not be constitutionally compelled to make self-incriminating statements to local authorities concerning the incident. Likewise, due process, the right to counsel and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures are applicable to the same extent as with any other individual.

In the unlikely event that criminal prosecution against an Agent is sought by local authorities, the proceedings will be removed to Federal Court by the Department of Justice, and legal representation will generally be afforded by the Department. [See LHBSA, Section 9-5, p. 101.] Agents should understand that investigations of shooting incidents ordinarily are required by state law but prosecutions do not necessarily follow.

Civil liability:

An FBI Agent may be subjected to lawsuits in state court for allegedly negligent or wrongful acts committed in the course of official duties. In that instance, the case will be removed to federal court by the Department of Justice and legal representation will ordinarily be provided by the government. [See LHBSA, Section 9-2, p. 100.]

An Agent may also be sued in federal court for allegedly violating a person's constitutional rights or a specific federal statute authorizing recovery of money damages. Such a suit will ordinarily be defended by the Department of Justice, although the government has no authority to pay money damages which might be assessed against the Agent. Among the defenses available to the Agent is qualified immunity, which can result in a dismissal before trial or a legal and factual defense at trial. This defense is established by showing that the Agent's conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known at the time the action occurred. [See LHBSA, Sections 9-2 and 9-4.]

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act [FTCA] a suit may be filed against the government for allegedly negligent or other wrongful acts committed by an Agent during the course of employment. Because the government is named the defendant, the government will defend the case and be responsible for any compensatory judgment or settlement.

In the event that both an Agent and the government are named as defendants, the government will provide for the defense and pay any compensatory judgment or settlement entered jointly against the United States and the Agent. In the unlikely event that punitive damages are assessed against the Agent for gross negligence, they must be paid by the Agent. [See LHBSA, Section 9-2. 1.2, p. 100.]

It is important to note that, to date, there has been no successful lawsuit against an FBI Agent based on a shooting incident. Nor has there been a case where the government was successfully sued and an Agent assessed for punitive damages. The likelihood of either, although possible, may be considered remote.

Legal advice:

An Agent involved in a shooting incident from which a civil suit has arisen, may communicate directly with the FBIHQ Legal Counsel Division [LCD] Agent-Attorney assigned the case. Such communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and cannot be divulged to prosecutorial or administrative authorities for use in investigations. However, an Agent should understand that such information may impact on the scope of employment and affect the decision to grant personal legal representation [MIOG, para. 197-4.4.] Your Principal Legal Advisor is available for consultation.

Conclusion:

The purpose of the foregoing summary is to note the legal issues most likely to arise from a shooting incident involving Bureau personnel. Identifying the risks, and considering them realistically, should help to put them into a proper perspective.

PART III

Section A

Supervisor's and Manager's guidelines
for conducting Administrative Inquiries
into Agent-involved shootings

SHOOTING INCIDENT CHECKLIST

This checklist is intended to provide basic REMINDERS for an SAC, ASAC or Supervisor at the scene of an Agent-involved shooting incident.

Request medical assistance, if necessary, and contact local authorities.

Personally coordinate investigation if Inspector is not dispatched to the scene.

Secure the scene - establish crime/shooting scene perimeter, protect evidence. Collect weapon(s) and ammunition from involved Agent(s).

Request additional personnel as warranted. Arrange for replacement weapon(s) for involved Agent(s).

Broadcast critical information to backup/responding units.

Notify SAC/ASAC and FBIHQ.

Avoid having involved Agent(s) conduct any investigation and/or interviews relevant to the shooting. [Do not, however, delay substantive investigation to accomplish this.] Separate and remove involved Agent(s) from the scene.

Assign informed Supervisor, Primary Relief Supervisor or close friend to involved Agent(s). This Agent should act as liaison between the involved Agent and family and the Administrative Services Division, to resolve difficulties arising concerning salary, insurance benefits, leave, unemployment compensation, etc. Caution assigned personnel not to become involved in routine family affairs.

Ensure that involved Agent's family is personally briefed as soon as practical, by Agent himself or herself, if circumstances permit. If Agent is injured, the Agent's family should be personally contacted and provided transportation with an informed Agent to the treatment facility.

Identify, locate and interview all personnel and witnesses at the scene.

Secure evidence - meet with local authorities to clarify jurisdiction and investigative responsibilities.

Discuss the legal ramifications for involved Agent(s) with the Principal Legal Advisor prior to any interviews.

Consider interview of involved Agent(s) by someone sensitized in the area of Post-Critical Incident Trauma. The handling of such shooting investigations/inquiries by local police will vary greatly. SAC's reactions should adapt accordingly. Support for the Agent(s) and cooperation with the local inquiry must both be considered. In order to minimize the effects of post-shooting trauma, the SAC should personally assure that, if possible, involved Agent(s) are expeditiously removed from the shooting scene. Every effort should be made to insure that any statements required to be made by an Agent involved in a shooting are given after the Agent has been afforded reasonable time to regain composure and is capable of understanding his or her rights. Coordinate any problems with FBIHQ [Criminal Investigative Division, Legal Counsel, etc.].

In those situations where an Agent is injured, locate a secluded area of the hospital where a liaison telephone can be set up and coordinated with hospital authorities. Insure office personnel receive this number. Assign an Agent to this location to coordinate the following:

- * Security and privacy of injured Agent.
- * Media contacts through hospital Public Information Office.
- * Interviews with Bureau Agents and local authorities, if necessary.
- * Visiting hours with office personnel to avoid overcrowding and uncomfortable conditions.
- * Inquiries from Field Office or FBIHQ.

Insure additional items of evidence are properly secured at the hospital [eg., clothing].

Arrange for a daily briefing of injured Agent, if necessary.

Brief media personnel, being careful not to release Agent's name. [Consideration should be given as to which agency should make press releases, whether or not the subject's identity should be released and whether the identity of the subject's next of kin should be released.]

Keep office personnel apprised of the investigation and the condition of any injured Agent(s).

Screen all phone calls at the office to involved Agent(s). The same precaution may be necessary at the Agent's residence. Provide appropriate security for Agent and family. A telephone answering machine at the Agent's home may provide needed periods of respite for the Agent and his/her family.

Insure that contact has been initiated between involved Agent(s) and Dr. David Soskis.
Receive briefing concerning Post-Critical Incident Trauma.

SAC, ASAC, and Supervisor coordinate availability of Peer support through Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy.

Review booklet entitled "Your Workers Compensation Benefits" prepared by Employee Benefits Unit, Administrative Services Division for questions relating to work related illnesses and injuries.

In those situations where an Agent(s) have sustained damage to personal property, consult Section 19, pp. 221 - 221.07 of the Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures. Complete Form DOJ 110A - "Employee Claim for Loss or Damage to Personal Property".

PART III

Section B

GUIDELINES FOR SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS

Reporting administrative inquiries following Agent-involved
shootings.

ORGANIZING AN ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY REPORT FOLLOWING A
SHOOTING INCIDENT

FD-263

REPORTING OFFICE - Office submitting report

OFFICE OF ORIGIN - FBIHQ

DATE - Date of report

INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD - Date of shooting incident
including all investigation reflected by
the report

CASE TITLE - Shooting Incident
Name(s) of Deceased/Wounded
11/5/82
Reporting Division

CHARACTER OF CASE - Administrative Inquiry

CLASSIFICATION - 62A

REFERENCE - Notification teletype/telephone call.
Include a reference to the title of the
substantive violation, e.g.:

JOHN DOE
Bank of America
201 Pearlblossom Road
Los Angeles, California;
2/1/82
BR
00:LA
Bufile #: (if known)
Field file #:

ENCLOSURES - Include medical reports, coroner or
autopsy reports, and/or police reports as
enclosures. Also include any items of benefit
in explaining the Agent's actions and/or
reconstructing the shooting scene which are not
contained in the body of the report; e.g. videos
or film from local news agencies.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED - No accomplishments should
be claimed in the Administrative Inquiry report.
Any accomplishments achieved at the time of the
shooting incident (e.g. fugitive arrest, bank
robbery loot recovered) should be claimed via
communication under substantive title.

COPY COUNT - Original and 8 copies to the Bureau
(Attn: Shooting Incident Review Group)

ADMINISTRATIVE - Include the observations and recommendations of the SAC and/or Inspector. (e.g. the decision not to interview a subject due to death/injury or the possibility of Civil Rights/misconduct allegations.) Also include any pertinent administratively controlled material; i.e., informant information.

FD-204

SYNOPSIS - Should consist of an abbreviated, chronological recounting of the substantive investigation or event precipitating the shooting, a thorough explanation of circumstances necessitating the Agent's action, background information on the subject, the status of any wounded parties at the time of the report, any conflict in evidence collected, and unresolved or unresolvable issues, plus any other significant occurrences or information; i.e., process outstanding.

DETAILS - The details of an Administrative Inquiry report should be preceded by a Table of Contents setting forth the major categories of information contained in the report.

THE TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Table of Contents should be utilized to organize and identify report contents. Following is an example of items which might normally be included:

A) Interview of personnel involved - include statements of all Bureau employees immediately involved in investigation impacting upon the shooting incident. Any arrest plans should be carefully spelled out in the statement obtained from the person in charge of the raid/arrest.

Interviews in shooting inquiries should be handled administratively unless there are specific factual situations or complainants which might raise various questions about the shooting. Should these arise, the matter should be resolved with FBIHQ prior to conducting any interview of Bureau personnel.

B) Interviews of witnesses - persons interviewed should be apprised of the access provisions of the Privacy Act and afforded the opportunity to request confidentiality in accordance with MIOG Section 190-7 and SAC Memo 51-77 (C) dated 11/15/77. Include all interviews immediately bearing upon the shooting incident, such as hostages.

C) Investigation regarding subject - include such information as criminal record, if available, and interviews of associates which are germane to the shooting (i.e., crime partner, co-arrestee, etc.) If possible, include interview with subject regarding the shooting. Such an interview is often quite productive in obtaining admissions from the subject directly pertinent to the shooting incident. Statements made by subjects contemporaneous to the shooting oftentimes may be extremely critical to the overall evaluation of the incident by the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG). (Allegations by the subject of misconduct are often more easily refuted while recollections and evidence are fresh.)

Apprehension FD-302 should be included. Prepare FD-302 reporting that subject did not, was not known to have, or refused to comment on the shooting.

D) Medical reports - include medical reports and interviews with medical personnel clarifying the nature and gravity of all wounds to Agent, subject and others. Indicate weapon, entry and exit of individual shots, if determinable. If fatalities are involved, include coroner or autopsy report.

E) Vehicles involved - describe all pertinent vehicles and indicate damage incurred. Describe any other property damage.

F) Weapons involved - include FD-302's reflecting weapons and ammunition used by involved Agent(s) and subject(s), and disposition or custody of same following the shooting.

G) Maps/diagrams/photos of shooting incident.


H) Police reports - include copies of reports, if available, plus any statements made regarding possible prosecutive action against Bureau personnel. Include copy of any communications with local prosecuting attorney.

I) Prosecutive status of subject(s).

J) Laboratory reports - laboratory reports should NOT be routinely included in Administrative Inquiry reports. If results of specific laboratory examinations are necessary (e.g. to determine who fired a bullet taken from the victim), these results can be included in FD-302 from a laboratory report if necessary.

APPENDIX E

SUPPORT SERVICES TO SURVIVING FAMILIES OF
LINE-OF-DUTY DEATH



Support Services to Surviving Families of Line-of-Duty Death

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY HANDBOOK

Prepared by Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc.

OCTOBER 1988

Foreword

During this decade, the United States, each year, has lost between one-hundred fifty (150) to one-hundred sixty (160) law enforcement officers either accidentally or feloniously in the line-of-duty.

While it is assumed that the law enforcement community prides itself in "taking care of its own" and responds immediately to assist the officers' survivors in any way possible, a United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice "Research In Brief" document, cites that a staggering sixty-seven percent (67%) of law enforcement agencies surveyed lacked formal policies concerning the death of an officer. This same document showed that departments are also lacking guidelines for continued emotional support for the survivors beyond the days of the wake and the funeral.¹

Failure to provide continued support for the surviving family gives them the impression that they have been "totally abandoned" by the department. When, in fact, there are two simple reasons for this feeling of abandonment: 1) Fear and confusion on the part of the law enforcement officers themselves as they go through the trauma of losing a co-worker. This fear and confusion can be overcome by preparing to handle line-of-duty death and victimization training; and 2) insensitivity on the part of the administration and officers involved with the incident. Accidental death and/or off-duty deaths are no less heroic a death than felonious, on-duty deaths; and the trauma any type of death inflicts on the family is devastating, regardless of the circumstances.

Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc., was organized in 1984 as a national networking organization to provide peer-support to police survivors and assist law enforcement agencies with developing workable plans for handling survivors during the trauma affiliated with the sudden, often violent, loss of a loved one in the line-of-duty. Initially funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice, C.O.P.S. is now supported by police organizations, private foundations, corporations, and private citizens.

On May 13 and 14, 1988, C.O.P.S. sponsored the fourth National Police Survivors' Seminar in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area with approximately 425 police survivors attending from all across the Nation. The document which follows, "Support Services to Surviving Families of Line-of-Duty Death", is based on their own tragedies — being the survivors of line-of-duty death.

C.O.P.S. has found that survivors' level of distress is affected by the department's response to the tragedy of line-of-duty death.² C.O.P.S. has developed specific guidelines that address not only tangible procedural issues but intangibles as well, such as emotional support and counseling. A surviving family never "gets over" the tragedy, they simply continue on with their lives with the tragedy now a part of their personal history. Each and every time the death anniversary occurs, or a re-trial or appeal, or parole hearing is afforded the cop-killer, the family is forced to relive the injustice dealt to the fallen officer and their loved ones.

C.O.P.S., with the assistance of several law enforcement officials who are sensitive to the surviving family's needs, and affected survivors themselves have formulated the following guidelines so that they can be implemented regardless of the size of the department. Some larger departments may choose to incorporate the guidelines in general orders addressing line-of-duty death. Small departments may choose to use it as a reference guide for handling survivors.

Suzie Sawyer
Executive Director
Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc.

¹"Line-of-Duty Deaths: Survivor and Department Responses", Frances A. Stillman, Researcher, Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc., Grant #85-IJ-CN-0012, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

²Ibid.

POLICY STATEMENT

I. POLICY: Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc., believes that it is the responsibility of every department to provide liaison assistance to the immediate survivors of an officer who dies in the line-of-duty, whether feloniously or accidentally, while an active member of the department, to include the clarification and comprehensive study of survivor benefits, and to provide tangible and intangible emotional support during this traumatic period of re-adjustment for the surviving family.

II. PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to direct the police agency to provide proper emotional care for the deceased officer's family. It should be remembered that the funeral arrangements are to be decided by the *FAMILY*, with their wishes taking precedence over the police agency's.

III. DEFINITIONS:

Line-of-Duty Death: Any action, felonious or accidental (automobile accidents, hit by passing vehicle during a traffic stop, training accidents, etc.), which claims the life of a law enforcement officer who was performing police functions either while on or off duty.

Survivors: Immediate family members of the deceased officer; spouse, children, parents, siblings, fiancée, and/or significant others.

Beneficiary: Those designated by the officer as recipients of specific death benefits.

Benefits: Financial payments made to the family to insure financial stability following the loss of a loved one.

Funeral Payments: Financial payments made to surviving families of an officer killed in the line-of-duty which are specifically earmarked for funeral expenses.

DEATH NOTIFICATION

"I had just finished grocery shopping when I heard the chilling report of a police shoot-out on the car radio. The reporter was the one who informed me that it was my husband that had been killed. My neighbors found me, crying hysterically, parked in the middle of the road several blocks from home."

—A police widow from Texas

1. The name of the deceased officer *MUST NEVER* be released by the media before immediate survivors living in the area are notified.
2. If there is knowledge of a medical problem with an immediate survivor, medical personnel should be dispatched to the residence to coincide with the death notification.
3. Notification *MUST ALWAYS* be made in person and never alone. The police chaplain, psychologist, the chief of police (or his representative), or another police survivor could appropriately accompany the informing officer.

"When I got to the hospital, he had already died. He had been at the hospital for two hours. The department waited for the chaplain to arrive before coming to tell me. I could have seen him before he died."

—A police widow from Pennsylvania

Keep in mind, however, that if the above-suggested persons are not readily accessible, notification should not be held up until these people can gather. If the opportunity to get the family to the hospital prior to the demise of the officer presents itself, *DON'T* wait for the appropriate delegation to gather.

As soon as most police families see you, they will know something is wrong. Ask to be admitted to the house. *NEVER* make a death notification on the doorstep. Gather everyone in the home and ask them to sit down. Inform them slowly and clearly of the information you have on the incident. Make sure you use the officer's name during the notification.

If the officer has already died, relay that information. *NEVER* give the family a false sense of hope. Use words like "died" and "dead" rather than "gone away" or "passed away".

"We drove for what seemed like hours with the escorting officer saying repeatedly, 'He's going to be all right.' When we got to the hospital, I was told he was dead on the scene."

—An east coast police widow of 1981.

If the person responsible for the death notification has been seriously affected by the death, he (she) should understand that showing emotions is perfectly acceptable.

If specifics of the incident are known, the officer should relay as much information as possible to the family.

NOTE: Reactions of the family may include hysteria, anger, fainting, physical violence, shock, etc.

4. If the family wants to go to the hospital, they should be transported via police vehicle. **It is highly recommended that the family NOT drive themselves to the hospital. Should there be serious resistance and the family insists on driving, please have officer accompany them in the car.**

The department should know if there are young children in the home. The survivor may wish to leave the children at home. The department should be prepared to handle

immediate babysitting needs. This is where co-workers' spouses or a spouse support group can be used.

Because of the nature of possible radio transmissions, the officer making the transport should notify the OIC at the hospital that the family is enroute.

Keep in mind that the surviving parents should also be afforded this courtesy of personal notification if they live in the same geographic area.

5. If immediate survivors are from out of town, request personal death notification from the law enforcement agency in that area. Logistical arrangements should enable simultaneous telephone contact with the fallen officer's department.

6. It is most reassuring to the family when the Chief or another high-ranking designee responds to the home or hospital. (In some cases, the absence was viewed by both the family and fellow officers as not only insensitive but poor leadership as well.)

ASSISTING THE FAMILY AT THE HOSPITAL

1. The ranking police official at the hospital should meet with designated hospital personnel to arrange appropriate waiting facilities for the family and a separate area for fellow police officers. This police official should also insure that medical personnel relay pertinent information to the family on the officer's condition on a timely basis. These same medical personnel should make the family aware of hospital policy about visitation with the injured officer and/or visitation with the body following the demise, and explain why autopsy is needed.

*If it is possible for the family to visit their officer prior to the death, they most certainly should be afforded that opportunity. *DO NOT BE OVERLY PROTECTIVE OF THE FAMILY.* "There is a definite need to touch and hold the body while there is still life, and being present when death occurs can be comforting to the family."

2. The same ranking police official or designee will see that the family is updated on the incident as soon as the family arrives at the hospital.

3. A ranking police official or designee should be present the entire time the family is at the hospital and should arrange whatever assistance the family may need at that time.

4. The people who made the initial notification should be among those at the hospital.

5. A survivor should not be sedated unless medication is requested by the survivor.

6. Idle promises should not be made to the family at this time. (i.e., "We'll promote him/her posthumously." "We'll retire his/her badge.")

7. Arrangements should be made for transportation of the family back to their residence.

8. Arrangements should be made for all medical bills relating to the services rendered to the deceased officer to be sent to the appropriate governmental agency for payment. The family should *NOT* receive any of these bills at their residence address.

*Tula M. Redmond, MS, Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist, clinical thanatologist, nationally Certified Death Educator, Bereavement Therapist; Executive Director, Founder, Homicide Survivors Group, Inc., of Pinellas County, Clearwater, FL.

SUPPORT FOR THE FAMILY DURING THE WAKE AND FUNERAL

1. Appointment of a liaison officer is a *critical* assignment. Although the liaison officer should know the deceased officer and be aware of the family relationships, the officer should not be so emotionally involved with the loss that he/she would become ineffective. The liaison officer must know that *THIS IS NOT A DECISION-MAKING POSITION. THIS IS A ROLE OF "FACILITATOR" BETWEEN THE FAMILY AND DEPARTMENT.* The liaison officer will:

- Insure that the NEEDS OF THE FAMILY come before the wishes of the department.
- Meet with the family and tell them what his responsibilities will be during this time.
- Meet with the family regarding funeral arrangements. Since most officers have not prearranged their wishes for the handling of their own funeral, the family will most likely need to decide all aspects of the funeral. The department should only make the family aware of what they can offer in the way of assistance if the family decides to have a "law enforcement funeral".
- Be issued a pager immediately so there is an immediate line of communication.
- Know all information concerning the death and the continuing investigation to answer family questions.
- Provide as much assistance as possible, oversee arrangements for travel and lodging for out-of-town family members.
- Be *constantly* available to the family throughout this traumatic time.
- Ascertain what the police fraternal/labor organization involvement will be and what financial assistance they are willing to provide for out-of-town family travel, feeding the funeral attendees following the burial, etc.
- See that the surviving parents are afforded recognition and will have proper placement arranged for them during the funeral and funeral procession.
- See that the family is briefed on the funeral procedure; (i.e., 21-gun salute, presenting of flag, playing of taps, etc.)

2. A commanding officer/public information officer should be designated to handle the media throughout this traumatic ordeal. In the unlikely event that the family should decide to accept an interview, this officer should attend and "screen" all questions presented to the family so as to not jeopardize upcoming legal proceedings.

3. If there is a "family support group" organized in your department, assign this group the responsibility of seeing that the home is prepared for the influx of visitors and that ample food is available. Babysitting needs for all family members should be met. Have someone screen phone calls. Make sure someone is always at the home.

4. The department can make the family aware of alternate churches with seating capacities large enough to accommodate attendance at the funeral. However, any alternate churches will need to be aware of the fact that the family minister will officiate at the service. **REMEMBER: THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD ONLY MAKE THE FAMILY AWARE OF THE ALTERNATIVES. IT'S THE FAMILY'S CHOICE.**

5. Departmental cruisers should be made available to the family if they desire transportation to and from the funeral home.

6. The family should have access to other police survivors or other support groups (Concerns of Police Survivors, Survivors of Homicide Victims, Compassionate Friends, Parents of Murdered Children, etc.). Members of Concerns of Police Survivors make themselves

available to meet with new surviving families. They are the only ones who can say to the grieving family, "We know what you are feeling," and truly mean it!

7. Although some departments may provide the surviving family access to the police psychologist immediately following the death of the officer, the psychologist should provide only "supportive services". Survivors have a definite need to talk to someone about the incident over and over again. It has been recommended, however, that in-depth grief therapy not be entered into until 4-6 months following the death. By this time, the family member has reached the "disorientation" phase of the grief process, which is when entering into therapy is recommended.⁴

8. The department should send routine residence checks by the survivor's home for 6-8 weeks following the tragedy. We feel this service is necessary since large amounts of money are passing through the residence and the survivors will be spending much time away from the home with legal matters. The department should also check with the survivor to see if any harrasing telephone calls are being received.

PROVIDING INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE ON BENEFITS TO THE SURVIVING FAMILY

"The department told me to hire an attorney to research and file for my benefits and to let them know what I got so they'd know 'the next time'. The attorney's fee was \$10,000!"

—A Florida widow in 1985

1. A "benefits coordinator" should gather information on ALL benefits/funeral payments available to the family. Insure that this benefits coordinator has the department's full support to fulfill the responsibility to the survivor to coordinate ALL death benefits/payments; (i.e., insurance policies, outstanding debts, etc.). This officer should be completely responsible for filing appropriate paperwork and following through with the family to insure that these benefits are being received. *CAUTION: Do not rely on private consultants/attorneys to work on the benefits. As stated in the quote printed above, the bill for services will follow.*

"How do you tell a young widow that the benefits paperwork had been found on the town clerk's desk? Nine months after the death NONE of the paperwork had been done!"

—Officer of small Texas police department, 1987

2. The benefits coordinator should visit with the surviving family to discuss the benefits they receive within a few days following the funeral. A prepared printout of the benefits/funeral payments due the family, listing named beneficiaries, contacts at various benefits offices, and when they can expect to receive the benefit should be given to the family (See Appendix. Benefits will differ with each department and each state. However, the Appendix provides a good example to follow. Make clear distinctions between BENEFITS and FUNERAL PAYMENTS.) This same explanation procedure should be repeated within a month following the death since the initial contact is clouded by the

⁴Documented by use of pre- and post-testing on 48 survivors of homicide using the Grief Experience Inventory; Lula M. Redmond, MS, Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist, clinical thanatologist, nationally Certified Death Educator, Bereavement Therapist; Executive Director, Founder, Homicide Survivors Group, Inc., of Pinellas County, Clearwater, FL

emotional numbness of the family during that first benefits meeting. Check once again in about six months to make sure the family is receiving/has received every payment possible.

3. If there are surviving children from a former marriage, the guardian of those children should also receive a printout of what benefits the child(ren) will be receiving.
4. The benefits coordinator should pay special attention to the problems with possible revocation of health benefits to the surviving family. The vast majority of survivors are given a 30-day grace period before being cancelled from the coverage or of being responsible for monthly payments for the coverage.
5. If criminal violations surround the death, the family should be informed of all new developments prior to any press release.
6. If there will not be any court proceedings surrounding the circumstances of the officer's death, at the earliest opportunity, the department should relay all details of the incident to the family.

"I had to threaten suit against the department before they would sit down and tell me how it all happened. I was able to see, and feel comforted, by the fact there was nothing he could have done to save himself. Through all this, the department had me thinking there was something to hide."

—Police widow in Indiana, 1987

7. The chief and other high-ranking officials should be highly visible during these days.
8. The police organization (FOP, PBA, IUPA, etc.) or community support group (HEROES, Bluecoats, Backstoppers, 100 Clubs) should make their attorney/financial counselor available to the surviving family for whatever legal/financial counseling is necessary; (i.e., establish trust funds, educational funding, etc.) The attorney should not be affiliated with the jurisdictional government and should work as an avid advocate for the family's interests.

CONTINUED FOLLOWED-UP WITH THE FAMILY IS ALSO A DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

The department should be sensitive to the needs of survivors other than the spouse. Adult-aged or younger children, parents, siblings, etc. are all experiencing grief. Realize that grief is a process and that everyone handles grief differently. It might be beneficial to have the psychologist see the entire family for one "supportive service" session shortly after the funeral. Do not set time limitations on when the family should "recover" from the death. The grief process has no timetable and many survivors may experience a complicated grief process; in fact, research conducted by C.O.P.S. has shown that over 50% of surviving spouses develop symptoms of post-traumatic stress reaction to the tragedy.¹

Too often police surviving families state they feel totally isolated by the department within a short time following the funeral. Death of the officer does not take away that love for law enforcement that the entire family feels. Below are listed some ideas to help your survivors continue to feel a part of "the police family" for which their officer gave his life.

¹"Line-of-Duty Deaths: Survivor and Department Responses", Frances A. Stillman, Researcher, Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc., Grant #85-IJ-CX-0012, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

- When plaques/memorabilia are given to the surviving spouse, consider making the same available to the surviving parents. They have lost a child that can never be replaced. Remember to invite the surviving family to police department activities. They need that continued contact.
- Remember those children from a former marriage. Even though they did not live with the police officer-parent, they are nonetheless still that officer's child. They, too, need personal memorabilia of their parent.
- Departments can easily keep in touch with the family through monthly phone calls the first year, dwindling off to quarterly contact. Close co-workers of the deceased officer should also be encouraged to "drop" by the home on a regular basis. But the department should always try to observe the officer's death date with a short note to the family and/or flowers on the grave. Keep in mind that *ALL* holidays are traumatic events for the family the first year. Show your support during these times, too.
- When officers visit the family, don't be afraid to use the deceased officer's name or ask, "How are you doing since (name's) death? Even though tears may flow from your question, they are not flowing because "you brought back bad memories". They are tears of appreciation, knowing that you remembered and loved the fallen officer, too.

"My dad died when I was 10. I don't remember much about him. But can you tell me what he was like. . . . I mean as a cop?"

*—24-year-old daughter of an officer killed in 1974
at 1988 Police Survivors' Seminar after being introduced to one of her father's former squad members.*

- Remembrance books may be presented to the family. (A unique idea of remembrance came from the Aurora, CO, Police Department. Co-workers of the fallen officer worked together to provide a scrapbook. It included anecdotes, pictures, and newspaper articles of cases the fallen officer had worked on. The scrapbook was given to the children; but officers took time to go page-by-page through the book with the children.) Remember, if survivors of the officer include small children, these children will NEVER know their parent's "police stories" unless co-workers relate the humorous stories to the children.

"I'd prefer the guys not promise to take him fishing. Last Saturday he stood by the door all day long. Nobody ever showed up to keep their promise."

—Ohio police widow, 1987

- Never allow department personnel to make idle promises to the surviving family. It hurts children more to be promised a day with fellow police officers and be stood up rather than never to have been invited at all. "Oh, we'll have to get together for lunch," is a void statement to make to the surviving spouse. Set a definite time, place, and date — **AND KEEP IT!**
- The department should maintain support as long as the family feels the need for the support. In time, the family will let you know when they are ready to move on with their lives without assistance from the police department.

DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT FOR THE SURVIVING FAMILY AWAITING TRIAL OF THE SUSPECT IN THE KILLING

1. The family should NEVER hear of court or parole proceedings through the newspaper or television news. We feel strongly that it is the department's responsibility to keep the family informed of the legal proceedings. Perhaps a contact person from within the department should be assigned to notify the family of upcoming court proceedings.

2. Police surviving families are no different than any other victim. They **MUST** know how the incident occurred, down to the smallest detail. Many departments keep the family in the dark about the incident stating that it could influence the outcome of the trial if the family is informed of the investigation. If this is the case, the department should sit down with the family and explain their reasons for not sharing information.

At the earliest opportunity following the trial, the investigators should sit down with the family and answer **ALL** their questions about the ordeal. The facts will be far less shocking than what they have already imagined happened during the incident. Should the department show a reluctance to share information on the incident, the survivors may view it as an attempt to "hide something" from the family. ***DON'T BE OVERLY PROTECTIVE OF THE SURVIVORS.***

3. The department all too often tells the victim assistance specialists, "We take care of our own." And then the police survivors walk into the courtroom totally unaware of their rights as a victim/survivor. Use the victim assistance people — that's their job. If there is no victim assistance program operating in your jurisdiction, then the department should assume this responsibility.

4. Encourage the family to attend the trial. We have found that the vast majority of survivors attend so they can find out all the details of the incident that have thus far been denied them. Many survivors feel they are the only ones who can represent the deceased officer's interests. The department should assign a "support person" to accompany the survivors to the trial. If physical material evidence is going to be presented that will be upsetting to the family, this support person can suggest that the family leave the courtroom for that portion of the trial.*

5. The department should show support for the fallen officer during court proceedings by having as many officers as possible attend. This support should come from all segments of the department; management, the labor organization, co-workers, and even police friends from other departments.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

1. The need for the departmental to de-brief/provide psychological assistance to departmental personnel following the tragic loss of an officer.
2. Continued health insurance coverage at group rates, with the employing agency paying the premium, for the surviving family.
3. Continuance of educational benefits for surviving children **and spouses** even if the family should move from the state where the line-of-duty death occurred. Survivors would understand that they must return to the state where the death occurred to attend a state-owned institution for their tuition-free education.
4. Changing the surviving spouse pension benefits so spouses may remarry and continue to receive the pension benefits.
5. Preparation of critical incident booklets which will afford each officer the opportunity to gather vitally important information that may be needed in the event of a life-threatening incident.
6. Develop a system whereby timely reviews of beneficiary papers are afforded the officer.
7. Develop an in-depth general orders that logistically deals with the department's handling of a police funeral.

*Lula M. Redmond, MS, Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist, clinical thanatologist, nationally Certified Death Educator, Bereavement Therapist; Executive Director, Founder, Homicide Survivors Group, Inc., of Pinellas County, Clearwater FL

Summary

The key to properly handling survivors of law enforcement officers killed in the line-of-duty (and those dying from natural, non-service related incidents, too) is to ask yourself, "What would my family want done at a time like this?" Simply stated, handle the surviving family of a co-worker as you would want someone to treat your family if the incident had occurred to you.

Police survivors not only worry about their readjustment to life after the incident, **THEY ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED FOR THOSE WHO WORKED WITH THE FALLEN OFFICER.** *Departments MUST provide emotional support and debriefing sessions for the co-workers of fallen officers. . . .from the partner and shift co-workers to the station clerks and the dispatchers! Employees of any department that loses an officer in the line-of-duty are severely affected by the incident.* Administrators **MUST** recognize this fact.

Until everyone sees the need to "prepare" for death, we must prepare ourselves to handle the surviving families as compassionately as possible. We feel our booklet will help law enforcement agencies do that!

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Mobile, AL, Police Department for sharing their survivors' benefits booklet.

Sandra Sabino Chinn, who edited the booklet again and again, until she felt it was perfect.

Appendix

Hypothetical situation: Officer James Jones, Mobile Police Department, was struck by a tractor-trailer while issuing a traffic citation on September 2, 1988.

Sample for death benefits booklet for the surviving family provided by the Mobile, AL, Police Department.

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I.	Worker's Compensation	Page 1
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XIV.	Veterans Administration	Page 5
SUMMARY SHEET (listing all benefits and monthly payment amounts)		

*This benefit listing was added to the Mobile guidelines. The benefit is made available to surviving family only if certain criteria are met in the incident which claimed the officer's life in the commission of a federal crime. See Page 2 of this appendix.

These are the possible benefits/funeral payments available to the surviving family of Officer James Jones (fictitious name), Mobile Police Department.

I. WORKER'S COMPENSATION

Worker's Compensation benefits are payable to the beneficiaries of Officer Jones for a period of five hundred (500) weeks following the death of Officer Jones. Mrs. Jean Smith, City of Mobile Employee Benefit Office, is the coordinator/contact person for the Worker's Compensation filing. _____ (contact) can be reached at _____ (phone number).

In the case of Officer Jones, the benefits paid through Worker's Compensation of Alabama are as follows:

- A. \$1,000.00 Funeral Expense Benefit.
- B. \$_____ per week until minor child/children attain eighteen (18) years of age.
- C. \$_____ per week after minor child/children attain age 18; payment of weekly benefits continue for a period of five-hundred (500) weeks.

In order to file for Worker's Compensation benefits, the below listed forms/certificates are needed:

- A. Marriage License.
- B. Certified copy of Death Certificate.
- C. Certified copy of minor child/children Birth Certificate.
- D. Physician's Statement.

II. CITY LIFE INSURANCE

Life insurance benefits paid to the beneficiaries in this matter are based on double annual salary figures calculated at double indemnity rate. Again, _____ (contact) is the contact person.

Insurance benefits are as follows:

- A. Annual Salary \$_____
- B. Double Annual Salary \$_____
- C. Double Indemnity \$_____
- D. Total City of Mobile Insurance Benefit \$_____

III. POLICE PENSION

Officer Jones was a veteran officer with _____ years _____ months service to the Mobile Police Department. This length of service entitles the following pension benefit to this widow for the remainder of her lifetime.

Pension standards set forth in:

- A. Employee with _____ years service and age _____ or above entitled to _____% of salary in pension benefits; based on last three (3) years average income.
- B. In the event of employee's death prior to retirement, pension benefits are reduced by 10%.

C. Beneficiary is then entitled to one-half (1/2) of remaining percentage of pension benefit. See listing below.

1. Last three (3) years average income \$ _____
2. Pension benefit (_____%) \$ _____
3. Pension benefit reduced by 10% (_____%)\$ _____
4. _____% pension benefit to beneficiary \$ _____
5. Bi-weekly pension benefit to beneficiary \$ _____

IV. SOCIAL SECURITY

Because Officer Jones paid into Social Security for five years prior to joining the police department, the widow and family are eligible for Social Security benefits.

_____ (contact) _____, _____ (phone) _____, is the contact person for Social Security benefit coordination. Benefits available to the widow and family of Officer Jones are as follows:

- A. One-time death benefit: \$ _____.
- B. Minor child benefit payments until age 18: \$ _____.

Forms needed for filing Social Security survivors' benefits are:

- A. Certified copy of minor child/children Birth Certificate.
- B. Notorized copy of Marriage License.
- C. All _____ (year) _____ W-2 earnings forms.
- D. Certified copy of Death Certificate.

V. PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS' DEATH BENEFIT

Federal statute provides a one-time \$50,000 (may be increased to \$100,000 if pending legislation passes the Congress in 1988) death benefit to the survivors of a public safety officer who is killed in the line-of-duty. *Forms are completed by the local agency and forwarded to the U.S. Department of Justice for processing and payment.* Contact person: Mrs. Kathleen Greene, Claims Examiner, Public Safety Officers' Benefit Program, U.S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20531. Phone: 202-724-7620. If all paperwork submitted to the Department of Justice is in order, payment of this benefit can be expected within 90 days.

(Exclusions to this benefit would come if there was misconduct on the part of the officer, intoxication, performing duty in a grossly negligent manner, or if claimant was a substantial contributing factor to the death of the officer. Military law enforcement officers are excluded from this benefit.)

VI. BENEFITS FOR NON-FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP)

(Law enforcement agency should check with the Department of Labor to see if death circumstances meet criteria for filing for this benefit. If circumstances do not meet the criteria, either leave off benefit information or state that "This

benefit is not due to the family of Officer Jones.)

Benefits are provided for any non-federal law enforcement officer who is killed under one of the following conditions:

1. While engaged in the apprehension or attempted apprehension of any person—
 - a. who has committed a crime against the United States, or
 - b. who at that time was sought by a law enforcement authority of the U.S. for the commission of a crime against the U.S., or
 - c. who at that time was sought as a material witness in a criminal proceeding instituted by the U.S.
2. While engaged in protecting or guarding a person held for the commission of a crime against the U.S. or as a material witness in connection with such a crime.
3. While engaged in the lawful prevention of, or lawful attempt to prevent, the commission of a crime against the U.S.

Questions concerning this benefit should be directed in writing to the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, P.O. Box 37117, Washington, D.C. 20013-7117.

VII. ALABAMA STATE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

Alabama law provides for a one-time death benefit payment of monies ranging between \$1,000 and \$20,000 for the survivors of public safety officers killed in the line-of-duty. Forms must be filed by the local agency and forwarded to the Board of Adjustment. Contact person is (name) , Alabama Public Safety Department, in Montgomery, AL (phone:). Although the normal benefit for the loss of life to an officer is \$20,000, presentation must be made before the Alabama Board of Adjustment prior to actual receipt. Representation is necessary at the time of the hearing held in Montgomery in the House of Representatives Chamber. An attorney is not required at the hearing and in most cases a representative from the filing agency can capably assume the role of representative for the beneficiary.

VIII. ALABAMA PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION

Membership to the Alabama Peace Officers' Association entitles death benefits to officers' survivors in the form of a one-time \$2,500 death benefit payment plus the return of all contributions during membership. Forms can be obtained from the Alabama Peace Officers' Association office in Montgomery and should be filed by the local agency.

Officer Jones was not a member of the Alabama Peace Officers' Association; therefore, his survivors are not entitled to this benefit.

IX. CITY OF MOBILE PAYROLL

The City of Mobile provides payment of the following monies to the

survivors of deceased officers through payroll insurance:

- A. All regular salaried earnings up to the time of death.
- B. 75% of all accrued sick time.
- C. All accrued vacation time up to 480 hours.
- D. All compensatory time earned prior to January 1, 1976.
No payment for compensatory time after January 1, 1976.

These earnings will be issued in a final check to the surviving beneficiaries as soon as processing can be finalized.

X. PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS

Claims for insurance benefits available through this source are filed by the family with any assistance needed from the department. In the case of Officer Jones, _____ policies, with (names of companies) were in effect at the time of his death.

XI. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE (OR OTHER LABOR/FRATERNAL GROUPS)

The Fraternal Order of Police provides a one-time \$_____ death benefit to family members of a deceased member officer. Contact person is _____, phone _____.

XII. 100 CLUB OF MOBILE (HEROES, BLUECOATS, BACKSTOPPERS, ETC.)

The 100 Club is an organization of 100 area businessmen who contribute a one-time \$1,000 payment to the surviving family members of law enforcement officers killed in the line-of-duty. (Members of these organizations usually wish to remain anonymous; therefore, someone in the department should act as a contact person for the family. It is important that the police department encourage payments to be made to both survivors of felonious AND accidental loss.)

XIII. EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS

Under Alabama Law Act 82-277, payment of tuition and textbook costs in a state junior college, technical college or university is made for the dependent children of a law enforcement officer killed in the line-of-duty. A letter from the agency head, together with a certified copy of the marriage license, death certificate, and birth certificate(s) of child/children should be sent to Tuition Eligibility Board in Montgomery for review.

Since Officer Jones was a veteran of the United States Army, the widow is entitled to a one-time death benefit of \$150 for the opening and closing of the grave, a U.S. flag, and grave marker or \$70. Additional benefits may be available if covered under the National Service Insurance.

SUMMARY: (Include all benefits and dollar amounts of benefit and funeral payments on this sheet.)

This image shows a single page of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There is no handwriting or other markings on the paper.

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