...n-

“"7...

Flllllll I I I I I I I I III!

 

THESIS

Illllllllllllllllllll

 

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

The Minimum Role of External Agents in Administrative Reform:
The Case of USAID-Egypt

presented by

Sameh Mamdouh Kamel

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Political Science and
Urban Affairs Programs

 

 

@armSWWuUr

Major professor

Date (71/23qu

MSU i: an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0‘ 12771

 

 

 

 

 

PLACE IN REIURN Box to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINE return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE

DATE DUE

DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

M MNM

 

THE MINE/{UM ROLE OF EXTERNAL AGENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
THE CASE OF USAID-EGYPT.

By

Sameh Mamdouh Kamel

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science and Urban Affairs Programs

1999

THE \ll.\l_\‘.

 

 

 

ml

timiriszratix t
mirormems

M model for

 

leby'bmh
Mons ( 1,
aliens of en
@‘mmem 1h
MOW“ efforts
may infi.
dimllﬂﬂuw

The Ca
Vmch Contra.-
frcam Cairo
steam ar

M

Kits

ABSTRACT

THE NIINIMUM ROLE OF EXTERNAL AGENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
THE CASE OF USAID-EGYPT.

By

Sameh Mamdouh Kamel

The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the role of external agents in
administrative reform of developing countries’ bureaucracies given the complex political
environments characterizing intervention and implementation attempts. It conceptualizes a
new model for continuity and reform forces on administrative reform in developing countries
placed by both the external agents and the recipient governments. The research answers four
questions: (1) can a recipient government through its bureaucracy directly constrain the
efforts of external agents’ contractors for administrative reform; (2) can a recipient
government through political and economic strategies indirectly constrain the external agents’
reform eﬂbrts; (3) can external agents indirectly through political and economic forces
positively inﬂuence administrative reform; and (4) can external agents through contractors
directly inﬂuence the social and cultural aspects ofbureaucracy toward administrative reform.

The case used to empirically test the model involves the role of USAID and Black and
Veatch contractors in reforming the Egyptian bureaucracy and the General Organization for
Greater Cairo Water Supply. The long-tenn relationship between the political actors and the
signiﬁcance and dynamics of strategic and economic variables involved in the case study
provide a reliable foundation for generalizing the results to other international development

08888.

She?

 

whittled w:
at ll’tt'ilOl‘. ,
dimmer
mm :
mhsmft
mam

lit Sill-3M per

 

m mononuc C
W5 adm.
mi”? 10 cre

midﬂpiam

d“ioilm‘cnt u
immigrants
Me abiendz
Mk [53.31362

Mugged b} ills

Several data collection methods were employed. First, elite interviewing was
conducted with public and private ofﬁcials in Cairo and Washington to assess the signiﬁcance
and direction of continuity and reform forces. Second, a survey of Egyptian bureaucrats was
administrated and the results were compared with a 1983 survey to measure the impact of
administrative reform efforts. Third, a review of documents at government and newspapers
archives in Cairo and Washington was conducted to elicit information about the interplay of
administrative, political, and economic variables between both sides of the relationship over
the studied period of time.

Findings suggest that: (l) the signiﬁcant presence of an external agent with a social
and economic development strategy in a developing country does not necessarily enhance the
country’s administrative capacity; (2) domestic and international political pressures can
interplay to create a window of opportunity for reform and place sufﬁcient forces on a regime
to adopt a certain degree of administrative reform; (3) political and economic interests of
external agents outweigh the beneﬁts of administrative reform’s positive impact on
development when designing involvement strategies; and (4) consultant ﬁrms contracted by
external agents to implement reform policies have a limited authority for administrative reform
in the absence of sufﬁcient support from other political actors. Thus, this detailed analysis
of the Egyptian-USAID relationship indicates that even with a window of opportunity
provided by the regime’s political support for administrative reform, the external agent’s role
is still constrained by limited authority and countervailing political and economic continuity

forces.

Copyright by
Sameh Mamdouh Kamel
1999

To the memory of Professor Mamdouh Kamel who taught me the love of science and the
love of Egypt.

 

l lilSi’
[stasis i0?
lactation it
upon my l

tintiedged

 

lalso v
hits$0r C arc
M- 188mm
“liable and v
Mich or Wl
MKS to Them
was, and P;

9?:th

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to extend my appreciation to Urban Affairs Programs at Michigan State
University for ﬁilly supporting my graduate-level studies. My thanks also go to the Ford
Foundation and the American Research Center in Egypt for their ﬁnancial contributions to
support my ﬁeldwork. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and gratefully
acknowledged.

I also wish to express my thanks to the chairperson of my dissertation committee,
Professor Carol Weissert, whose resourceful insights, constructive research guidance, and
encouragement have helped me bring this research project to fruition. She was always
available and willing to spare time for discussions and advice regardless of the stage of my
research or whether I was in Michigan, Cairo, or Washington. I also wish to express my
thanks to members of my dissertation committee, Professor Richard Hula, Professor Robert
Lowry, and Professor Jeffrey Riedinger for advising me at different stages of the research
process.

I gratefully acknowledge the time and effort spent by Professor Joe Darden to enhance
my analytical skills and my views of the US. policies. I was not only privileged ﬁom my
work as his research assistant for seven years, but also from our continuous discussions that

allowed me to share his experience and information.

I“C‘u

ofﬁncSaiAI'

 

miracw
am and
tggeiicns a;
limp
ll' Hosam ll
“my for

. itimstrazion

 

iIL’lt 025cc 0 ;
Black and Vea
lath team le
net} ”Wage
Elam Ade?
(ﬂame; Sen
“a: Sitters

I); ”am at

l‘ “n...
WKLHQUL \1

I would like to express my deep thanks to Professor Mohamed El-Azzazi president
of the Sadat Academy for Management Sciences for his commitment to the promotion of my
academic career since my undergraduate years at the academy. His past and present advice,
support, and assistance have been very instrumental in producing a valuable study. His
suggestions and comments were also valuable in the ﬁnalization of this study.

I would like to express my deep thanks to the valuable suggestions and comments of
Mr. Hosam Mohsen, manager of E.A.P. consultants, Professor Samir Farid at the Sadat
Academy for Management Sciences, Dr. Farouk Helmy, Head of the Research Central
Administration at the Central Agency for Organization and Management, Mr. Robert Ford
at the Ofﬁce of Egypt and North Africa at the US. Department of State, Ms. Peggy Howe,
Black and Veatch program manager at GOGCWS, Mr. John Dalton, former Black and
Veatch team leader at GOGCWS, Engineer Afaf El-Marakby, former Black and Veatch
project manager at GOGCWS, Mr. Brooke Whitaker, Arthur Anderson Privatization Project,
Engineer Adel El-Toweiry, Chairman of GOGCWS, Mr. Adoy Labib, manager of the
Customer Service Department at GOGCWS, Mr. Abd El-Fatah El-Said, manager of the
Water Meters Department at GOGCWS, Mr. Abd El-Aziz, manager of the Collections
Department at GOGCWS, Mr. Abd El-Samad Mahmoud, manager of the Subscriptions
Department, Mr. Mark Easton, Director of the American Research Center in Egypt, and Ms.

Mary Sadek at American Research Center in Egypt.

vii

 

 

 

 

in ii) wi-
ﬁtlna'cr an:..
ill Citing lift:
E3173: mien:

’53 ﬁlm it

 

mimed n

teatime

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help, patience, and
indulgence of my mother, sister, neighbors and friends, and my former teachers in Cairo.
Over the years, they have provided support, assistance, encouragement, and other forms of
help.

Special thanks are due to my family, Laura, Hana and Khaled. I owe a great debt to
them. My work on this dissertation has made their lives immeasurably more difﬁcult in ways
that I never anticipated. I thank my wife Laura for sacriﬁcing the comfort of living in Okemos
and moving with me to Cairo to support the completion of the ﬁeldwork. I also thank my
kids for unintentionally optimizing my detemrination to ﬁnish this study by making me aware
of the ﬁxture. Without my family, I might have never done this work at all. Through it all,
they supported me with their love and understanding, and I hope that I continue to deserve

their faith in me.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1
Administrative Reform .................................................. 4
Importance of Administrative Reform ...................................... 5
Importance of the Role of External Agent ................................... 7
Theoretical Framework ................................................ 11
Research Questions ................................................... 18
Methodology ........................................................ 19
The Research Level of Generalization ..................................... 22
Organization of the Dissertation .......................................... 23
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................... 26
Administrative Problems and the Need for an External Agent .................... 27
The Role of External Agents ............................................ 29
Change Options Available to External Agents ............................... 32
Theoretical Guidelines ........................................... 32
Barriers to Change .............................................. 34
Pros and Cons of an External Reform Strategy ......................... 35
Political Resistance ................................................... 37
Bureaucratic Resistance ................................................ 40
Overcoming Bureaucratic Resistance ................................ 45
Approaches and Types of Administrative Reform ............................. 46
Planning of Administrative Reform .................................. 50
Structural and Procedural Change Approach .......................... 52
Decentralization ................................................ 56

ix

Behavioral Change .............................................. 61

Organizational Culture Reform ..................................... 65
Changing or Redeﬁning Organization’s Goals ......................... 69
Improving Relation with the Public ................................. 72
Technological Change Approach ................................... 75
Conclusion ......................................................... 76
CHAPTER 3
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ........ 79
Historical Background ................................................. 79
Administrative Problems of Contemporary Egyptian Bureaucracy ................ 84
Size and Quality ................................................ 85
Centralization .................................................. 90
Decentralization Attempts .................................. 98
Fragmentation of the Centralized Structure ..................... 100
Products of Patronage .......................................... 101
Bureaucratic Incompetencies ..................................... 103
Lack of Training .............................................. 107
Problems with Leadership ....................................... 109
Corruption ................................................... 110
Bureaucratic Resistance ............................................... 114
Conclusion ........................................................ 1 16
CHAPTER 4
THE GOE POSITION ON ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM .............. l 19
Previous Administrative Reform Efforts ................................... 119
Recent Administrative Reform Efforts .................................... 123
The New Ministry of Administrative Development ..................... 123
Refomring the Administrative System ............................... 124
Reforming Public Relations and the Process of Service Delivery ........... 127
Bridging the Gap Between Promises and Performance .................. 129
Implementation Problems ........................................ 134
Political and Economic Support for Administrative Reform .................... 136
Global Shift to Market Economy .................................. 139
The Rise of Islamic Groups ...................................... 139

 

DeCE
Recs

lit Comm. .

Conclusion

CHAPTER 5
THE

[sited States
The 5
Inside
An As

llleSi

 

Decline in Foreign Aid .......................................... 142
Recent Changes in the US. Priorities ............................... 145

The Continuity and Reform Model in Light of Answers to the Research Questions

........................................................... 146
Conclusion ........................................................ 150
CHAPTER 5

THE ROLE OF USAID IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM .............. 151
United States Agency for International Development (U SAID) ................. 151
The Signiﬁcance of the USAID Role in Egypt ........................ 151
Inside the USAID’s Mission ...................................... 154
An Assessment of USAID’s Role in Administrative Reform .............. 162
The Irony of Conditionality ................................. 164
The Signiﬁcance of Political and Economic Factors in the USAID’s Role

..................................................... 170
Political Interests ........................................ 171
Economic Interests ....................................... 173
Assessment of Success in Attaining Economic and Political Goals ......... 175

The Continuity and Reform Model in Light of Answers to the Research Questions

........................................................... 179
Conclusion ........................................................ 182
CHAPTER 6

THE CASE OF USAID/GENERAL ORGANIZATION FOR GREATER CAIRO
WATER SUPPLY ............................................. 184
GOGCWS Prior to Black and Veatch .................................... 185
The Organization’s Legal History .................................. 188

The Impact of Black and Veatch efforts on GOGCWS ....................... 189
Responsibility and Performance ................................... 189

The Organizational Structure ..................................... 193
Human Resources ............................................. 202
Training ............................................... 206

Salaries ................................................ 207

Incentives .............................................. 208

Leadership ................................................... 210
Revenues and Financial Situation .................................. 211

Assessment of GOGCWS Administrative Capacity .......................... 214

Conditionality ...................................................... 218
The Future of GOGCWS .............................................. 220
Conclusion ........................................................ 221
CHAPTER 7
THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ON BUREAUCRATS’
BEHAVIOR ................................................. 224
Methodology ....................................................... 224
Group-Dynamics Scale .......................................... 227
Bureaucratic Flexibility ......................................... 232
Vertical Communications ........................................ 236
Bureaucratic Innovation ......................................... 238
Bureaucratic Decision-making .................................... 242
Bureaucratic Relationship with the Public ............................ 24S
Sources of Information .......................................... 249
Summary of Results .................................................. 251
The Continuity and Reform Model in Light of Answers to the Research Questions
........................................................... 256
Conclusion ........................................................ 259
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 262
Generalizability ..................................................... 264
Research Findings ................................................... 265
Bureaucratic Resistance to Administrative Reform ..................... 265
Governmental Political and Economic Constraints ..................... 266
Political and Economic Forces of External Agents ..................... 268
Indirect Pressure for Reform by External Agents ...................... 270
Implications and Recommendations ...................................... 272
APPENDICES ........................................................ 275

xii

 

Armin A

spends C

list of Refera

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix A: List of Interviewees ........................................ 276

US. Institutions ............................................... 276
Egyptian Institutions ........................................... 276
Consultant Firms .............................................. 277
Appendix B: Interview Questions ....................................... 278
Appendix C: Egyptian Civil Servants Survey ............................... 279
List of References ................................................... 284

xiii

11bit 3,1
OTC"

latii
for

Table} 3
Dist:

    

Title 3 4
Numb
Table 3 S
Numb
Table 3 6
Dim?
Tahiti 1
Emnt'

~- P
SBJLI;
TaleS l

 

Amen;

akin
L'SEk

lam '

. Egiptr
Tablet 1
, llepo

451:6}

Xumbe

lﬁk63 '
N‘u‘ll‘rbe

littlest I i "

Comm:

lék6slli'

Month“.
r,” q - - . . _
“He [,1

Bill'eaUc

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1
Growth of Egyptian Bureaucracy from 1951-1998. ..................... 83
Table 3.2
Comparative Share of Egypt’s Bureaucrats in Non-Ag Economic Activity
............................................................ 86
Table 3.3
Distribution of Egyptian Bureaucrats by Level and Education, 1996. ........ 88
Table 3.4
Number of Egyptian Bureaucrats by Service, 1996. ..................... 89
Table 3.5
Number and Geographical Distribution of Egypt’s Local Units, 1997. ....... 94
Table 3.6
Distribution of Egyptian Bureaucrats to Govemorates and Citizens ......... 97
Table 4.1
Egypt’s Position Among the Top Ten Recipients of U. S. Foreign Aid, FY 1995 (US.
5 Billion) .................................................... 144
Table 5.1
American Aid to Egypt Prior to the Peace Accords, 1952 - 1967 (U .S. 5 Million)
........................................................... 1 53
Table 5.2
US. Economic Assistance by Type and Bureaucracy, 197 5 - 1996 (U .S. 3 Millions)
........................................................... 153
Table 5.3
Egypt’s Outstanding Debt as of End of September, 1997. ............... 167
Table 6.1
The Population of Egypt and Greater Cairo, 1897 - 1996. ............... 190
Table 6.2
Number of Personnel at GOGCWS Distributed by Job Categories, 1990-1996.
........................................................... 203
Table 6.3
Number & Percentage of the GOGCWS Labor Force by Education, 1996.
........................................................... 204
Table 6.4
Comparing Cairo’s water Utility to Other Water Utilities around the World
........................................................... 205
Table 6.5
Monthly Salary Structure of Egypt’s Civil Service According to Law No.47 of 1978.
........................................................... 207
Figure 7.1
Bureaucrats Group-Dynamics Scale ................................ 228

xiv

Figure 7.2

Bureaucratic Flexibility: Trade-off Between Rules and Efﬁciency .......... 233
Table 7.3

Bureaucratic Flexibility: Disagreement with Supervisors ................. 234
Table 7.4

Vertical Communications: Official Matters ........................... 237
Table 7.5

Vertical Communications: Informal Matters .......................... 237
Table 7.6 (A - E)

Bureaucrats Predisposition Toward Social Innovation. .................. 239
Table 7.7 (A - E)

Bureaucratic Decision Making Behavior ............................. 243
Table 7.8

Additive Decision-Making Scale .................................. 245
Table 7.9

The Public Respect of Egyptian Bureaucrats ......................... 246
Table 7.10

The Public Appreciation of Egyptian Bureaucrats’ Efforts ............... 247
Table 7.11

Public Honesty in Dealing with Egyptian Bureaucracy .................. 248
Table 7.12

Public Attempts to Pull Strings and Get Special Treatment .............. 248
Table 7.13

Sources of Information .......................................... 250
Table 7.14

Summary of Survey Results ...................................... 252

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1
Forces of Continuity and Change Model .............................. 12
Figure 1.2
Forces of Continuity and Reform Model .............................. 14
Figure 2.1
Forces of Continuity and Reform Model: Methods of Administrative Reform
............................................................ 78
Figure 3.1
The Administrative Hierarchy of Egyptian Bureaucracy, 1998: With an Emphasis on
External Agents and Bodies Involved in Administrative Development ....... 93
Figure 4.1
Net Aid Flows to Egypt, 1978-93.
........................................................... 143
Figure 4.2
Forces of Continuity and Reform Revised Model: The GOE Role in Administrative
Reform ..................................................... 149
Figure 5.1
Forces of Continuity and Reform Revised Model:
The Political and Economic Role of External Agent in Administrative Reform
........................................................... 18 1
Figure 6.1
GOGCWS Organization Structure ................................ 195
Figure 6.1.A
GOGCWS Organization Structure Part A ........................... 196
Figure 6.1.3
GOGCWS Organization Structure Part B ............................ 197
Figure 6.1.C
GOGCWS Organization Structure Part C ............................ 198
Figure 6.1.D
GOGCWS Organization Structure Part D ........................... 199
Figure 6.1.E
GOGCWS Organization Structure Part E ............................ 200
Figure 7 .1
Forces of Continuity and Reform Final Revised Model .................. 258

The
lathe adm:
menial age
or oflnterm
insomc case
Will a divers
91W). edu;
sector. Mou-

nd humanila

 

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The question addressed in this study is what role can be played by an external agent
in the administrative reform of bureaucracies given the complex political environment. An
external agent, in most cases, represents foreign aid units of individual states (bilateral donors)
or of international organizations and multilateral donors (e.g., the World Bank and IMF) or,
in some cases, of nongovernmental, private-voluntary agencies. External agents are involved
with a diversiﬁed staﬂ‘ in every fundamental ingredient of developing societies from expanding
primary education and universal literacy to creating a supportive environment for the private
sector. Motivations behind their missions are often a mix of political, strategic, commercial,
and humanitarian and are not easily disentangled.

Diﬁculties facing external agents’ administrative reform missions form a complex
political environment. In the case of Egypt/U SAID, difﬁculties face administrative reform
missions from both the US. government (Sullivan, 1987, 1996) and the recipient’s
government, and bureaucratic resistance (Gates, 1989). On one hand, the White House,
Capitol Hill, the State Department, and the United States Agency for International
Development (U SAID) had different goals for promoting aid. On the other hand, recipient
governments want to receive aid with minimum external agents’ interference in their public
institutions. Bureaucrats also resist external agents’ attempts to change organizational
patterns either in defense of the status quo or due to ideological, political, and/or cultural

disagreements with external agents.

 

Tilt
agent has I:
have to be :
and bureau;
ardirions a
dhmm

This =
Elam] Cl'l'il
The case of l
famous reg

3 dominam “

 

Oi lee] Oped
530:? (1947
mm PIObler
Setonc
9001 mom is
tirnuledged
alandful 0me
tamed fro”
him} in
Eiliim Comm

“Md, 3%,.

The theoretical argument for this study is that to play an effective role an external
agent has to skillﬁrlly operate in such a political environment. Reform strategies do not only
have to be concerned with administrative capacity of the bureaucracies but also with political
and bureaucratic resistance. The external agent has to continuously work on satisfying two
conditions: a suitable political environment that does not constrain the implementing capacity
of the external agent, and the willingness of bureaucrats to adopt and sustain reform.

This dissertation will analyze the role of the external agent in the face of a complex
political environment and inefﬁcient ~bureaucracies using the case of the USAID in Egypt.
The case of USAID/Egypt was selected for studying the prospects of administrative reform
for various reasons. First, on the Egyptian side of the relationship, bureaucracy has long been
a dominant aspect of society. Max Weber portrays the Egyptian bureaucracy as an example
of developed and quantitatively large centralized bureaucracies throughout a 7,000-year
history (1947: 315). Hence it provides a rich practical material for studying administrative
reform problems.

Second, on the USAID side of the relationship, the agency has been criticized for its
poor record as an external agent in developing countries (Bandow, 1997, 1995). The USAID
acknowledged this problem after a detailed review of its programs by concluding that “only
a handﬁrl of countries that started receiving U.S. assistance in the 1950s and 19605 has ever
graduated ﬁ'om dependent status” (1989: 112). Decades of foreign assistance did not
signiﬁcantly improve the economies of most Aﬁican, many Latin American, Asian and Middle
Eastern countries. It is not also clear that the few successﬁrl countries have improved because

of the aid. South Korea and Taiwan saw prosperity emerge after they cashed their last aid

check and their aid was primarily for military purposes (Bandow, 1997, 1995). These
conclusions about the USAID’s efforts, however, have been oﬁen made without sufﬁcient
analysis of administrative variables that lead to unsatisfactory outcomes.

Third, the case of USAID/Egypt was selected because it represents more than two
decades of direct interaction between an external agent and a bureaucracy to form the largest
aid program in the world. No other relationship between an external agent and a developing
bureaucracy could provide such long-term experience for a case study. More speciﬁcally, the
institutional memory of other external agents, such as the World Bank and the IMF, in
developing countries is very short and there is a little systematic attention to collecting the
political data of particular programs (Kahler, 1992).

Thus, the case of USAID/Egypt is an interesting one by which to measure the
prospects of administrative reform and the utility and appropriateness of the external agent’s
role. This dissertation builds on a broad base of political science and public administration
literature, some speciﬁc to Egypt and other developing countries, some more generally
concerned with bureaucratic behavior in any country. It involves collection and analysis of
original survey data and interviews with informed participants and observers. The ﬁndings
should be useful to international aid agencies which take on the role of external agents,
scholars of Egypt and other developing countries, and researchers seeking to better

understand administrative reform and its political, economic, and bureaucratic constraints.

Th:

 

arm in
onloreigna
and mom:
delivery. ll :
toaudil put;
and him;
all? them 0:.
Mimics

W “Shes

 

Administrative Reform

The principal goal of reform in developing countries should be utilizing administrative
capacity in order to attain ﬁnancially self-sufﬁcient bureaucracies that do not rely endlessly
on foreign aid. Utilizing administrative capacity involves the ability to manage the personnel
and resources of the government and to ensure accountability and efficiency in service
delivery. It is based on objective hiring and promotion practices, adequate accounting staﬁ‘
to audit public expenditures, working systems of information, stable and rule-based authority
and internal coherence between goals and the resources, personnel, and tools available to
cany them out (Brautigam, 1996). Reform should bring bureaucracy closer to the people by
making bureaucratic services more accessible and promoting bureaucratic responsiveness to
local wishes and needs. Indicators of administrative capacity are mirrored in the
bureaucracy’s ability to maintain a satisfactory level of its services, collect the operation and
maintenance costs, and keep up with the increasing demands for services. Bureaucracies
unable to perform these functions would cause the stagnation of the development process
(Brautigam, 1996).

Brautigam (1996) and Putnam (1993) argue that some indicators for the levels of
administrative capacity include measures of the level of service delivered by government such
as the percentage of population with access to safe water or electricity. These indicators have
some caveats. Access to safe water, for example, may reﬂect the capacity of ﬁrnding ﬁ'om
foreign aid agencies. The assumption that resources necessary to undertake new tasks would
be automatically generated by the performance of the tasks themselves is misleading. The

process is often unlike the private sector where expanding a firm’s sales generate resources

for more p '

nicious ci

 

 

.ldrinistra'
limo: whi;
ta imitate

clement

Adm.

 

 

 

 

P135375 are
“minimal.
d"'elllprnent,
minimally-r
it primal) tr
311d “alts-are l
bmiailcrides
“Lil Scheme
in” prolet‘ts

“it-a-
“(Twain's

at Me lhe
l

for more production. Evans (1992) argues that expansion of bureaucratic services leads to
a vicious cycle because the capacity grows more slowly than the need for services expands.
Administration and organizations based on economics of scale cause the decline in perfor-
mance which in turn “undercuts legitimacy and makes it hard to claim the resources necessary
to increase capacity” (177). The gap between capacity required and capacity available is
characterized by rapid increase and inversely related to the effective execution of tasks.
Importance of Administrative Reform

Administrative reform is a very important issue to address given that bureaucratic
problems are one of the main hindrances for economic and social development because
“administration in underdeveloped countries . . . is either administration for economic
development, or it is bad administration” (Hanson, 1965: 56; Hanson, 1969: 248). Further,
administrative reform is important to address because bureaucrats in Egypt as elsewhere play
the primary role in implementation of reform. Bureaucracies implement, monitor, manage,
and evaluate public policies and deliver public services. As in many Third World countries,
bureaucracies in Egypt are asked to transform Egypt into a developed entity. Bureaucracies
must generate, co-ordinate, and supervise the execution of development projects and maintain
those projects once they reach ﬁ'uition (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1975).

Successﬁrl development must include a constructive role for bureaucracies in fostering
and managing the development process (Ndulu and van de Walle, 1996). Further, unless the
administrative structure is strengthened through reform, it is not clear that the government

will have the capacity to respond to the new demands put on it. Administrative reform is

 

team
Silttrgs as PI
of foreign a;

“ti
hi1 also to

@10qu

mm u-

 

“like but a
mailing

53%me ll
“lining pen
lhs Suggests

important so that bureaucracies are capable of processing, channeling, and, when necessary,
rejecting demands (Gyimah—Boadi and van de Walle, 1996).

Unless administrative reform takes place, Egypt’ 8 chances at sustainable development
are slim. It is no longer the case that the government of Egypt (GOE) can ignore
inemciencies by patching its problems through nationalization by seizing private assets and
savings as President Nasser did in the 19503 and 19603, nor can it rely on the constant ﬂow
of foreign aid from various sources as was the case in 19705 and 19805.1

The centrality of bureaucracy to the development process is not only unique to Egypt
but also to many other developing countries. In the Middle East, most traditional
authoritarian regimes rely on bureaucracies for their modernization efforts despite their
announced Western alliances (Hess, 1995). Bureaucracies do not only put development plans
in place but are also responsible for variety of tasks from entertainment to industry and
agriculture. Even in cases of opening markets and breaking government monopolies,
bureaucrats remain responsible for issuing investment authorizations and importing and
exporting permits. Such authorities make bureaucracies’ efﬁciencies vital for development.
This suggests that the developmental potential of developing a society depends on the
developmental potential of its bureaucracy.

Finally, lack of administrative reform in Egypt not only threatens development but also
threatens political stability. Islamic groups have taken the opportunity to provide public

services. Schools and nurseries, health clinics, public water taps, uncrowded buses for female

 

' Foreign aid is signiﬁcantly in decline as it will be illustrated later in the discussion of the positive political
factors aﬂ'ecting chances of reform.

common ls
Mantra;
mica.
Barium;

deiclopmer.

 

 

university students, and affordable copy centers for students are only some examples of
common Islamic services now in urban areas. These tasks are still the bureaucratic tasks, but
bureaucracies are either not keeping up with the demand or are inefﬁcient in their delivery of
services. It thus appears that administrative reform is urgently needed in Egypt.
Bureaucracies unable to effectively perform their fimctions would cause the stagnation of the
development process and destabilize the pro-Westem regime.
Importance of the Role of External Agent

In the absence of an external agent, administrative reform faces the dilemma of
“orthodox paradox” due to expecting the incompetent, and the beneﬁciaries of the inefﬁcient
system, to reform themselves (Kahler, 1992). In other words, reform involves “orthodox
policy prescriptions” that contain “the paradoxical expectation” that the government which
is the root of the problem would somehow be able to initiate and implement the reform
process and become the solution (Evans, 1992: 140). The role of an external agent in reform
is thus of signiﬁcant importance because it is empirically unrealistic and not consistent with
the willingness and capacity of Third World governments to implement reform on their own.

Administrative reform would require creating an efﬁcient self-sustaining bureaucracy
through strategies such as rebuilding professionalism and a sense of mission in the civil
schiCt’t, establishing clear rules, merit-based procedures for hiring and promotion,
institutionalizing review procedures that evaluate and reward good performance, and the
elimination of “ghost” employees to raise government salaries and beneﬁts to approximately

market levels (Brautigam, 1996: 82).

But bureaucracies are not self-reforming. The role of an external agent then becomes
of a signiﬁcant importance in facing the “orthodox paradox.” Without an external agent there
will be little demand for good public administration. An external agent can push and
implement diﬂicult tasks required to attain administrative reform. In the absence of an
external agent, authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt’s, follow the politics of patronage, arbi-
trary policy decisions not based on careﬁrl analysis, and rule mainly through patrimonial ties
rather than rational-legal norms.

The role of an external agent in administrative reform is also of signiﬁcance due to the
negative impact of political pressure on bureaucrats. Political pressures that bureaucrats face
in developing countries are part of what made them uncommitted, lacking the will and
commitment to reform (Migdal, 1988). The country’s elites manipulate, subvert, or utilize
bureaucratic structures to enhance their power base, undermining public organizations’ goals
and aspirations at the implementation stage. The importance of an external agent in the
reform process stems ﬁ'om its capacity to lessen the elites’ manipulation of bureaucracies for
personal gains and allow bureaucracies to focus on policy formation and implementation for
sustainable development. As an outsider with ﬁnancial and knowledge leverages, external
agents can change the tradition of public administration from “self service” to public service
(P er lrnan, 1989: 671). Traditional policy tools, such as small incremental increases in
strategic aid, could be considered for breaking political coalitions and patronage over
bureaucracies (Horowitz and Just, 1995). The role of the external agent as a mediator for the

regime’s politics of administration is thus of a signiﬁcant importance for reform.

The role of the external agent is also of increased importance because there is no
separation of politics and administration in its role. That is goal setting, policy formulation,
and allocative decisions on one hand are not separated from the application or implementation
and enforcement of policy. The external agent involvement in both the politics and
administration is very important. For example, the involvement in the decision making
process would ensure that resources and ﬁrnding to implement reform are available.
Involvement in both politics and administration is an “interactive model of implementation”
that follows up on the conﬂicts and oppositions that arise after decisions are made (Thomas
and Grindle, 1990: 1 163). The presence of an external agent allows administrative reform to
be a process or a “linear model” rather than a separate “series of phases” (Thomas and
Grindle, 1990: 1178).

Another advantage of the presence of the external agent is that its role in reforming

administrative systems ruled by authoritarian regimes can be viewed as a rescuer. Jensen

(1982: 110) notes that:

Perhaps the most serious deficiency for the authoritarian regime lies in the fact
that it may be severely hampered when it comes to policy innovation. Since
its command and control structure is so centralized and there is a tendency
toward paranoia in such structures, authoritarian regimes often generate “yes
men” who tend to accept whatever the dictator desires (or whatever the
subordinates think the dictator desires). Initiative is lost in such a system, and
there is no opportunity to explore a range of options. Reliance on heavily
centralized structures with their emphasis on secrecy and isolation from
external criticism also destroys the opportunity to tap fresh view points and
obtain new information.

The role of an external agent is also important under authoritarian regimes because

public Programs and allocative policies intended to beneﬁt low-income or unpowerful groups

often do not do so.2 This is despite the fact that large proportions of population live at,
below, or only slightly above, subsistence level, and need the promised public services
(Grindle, 1980a, 1980b). Even when bureaucrats may have the best of intentions, the support
essential to the regime primarily dictates who gets what. The external agent intervention for
administrative reform, therefore, can be seen as helping incapable people in the face of
unresponsive authoritarian regimes.

The role of the external agent is also of signiﬁcance given that social movements have
a minimum chance of ﬁxing the ills in urban service delivery. Ruland (1984: 325) concludes
that after reviewing the case of raising social movements in face of rapid urbanization and
government incapacity to meet the public needs in Manila:

Without minimum constitutional liberties and pluralism, urban social

movements remain rather short-lived phenomena and that the improvement

of services through urban social movements is bound to fail under a political

climate of repression.
The external agent in developing countries can help social movements to improve their public
and social services delivery.

Finally, studying the role of an external agent in administrative reform is of signiﬁcant
imWrtance since we know very little about their success. Despite all the external efforts

directed at reforming and rebuilding administrative capacity in developing countries, many

scholars point to discouraging results (Bossuyt, et al., 1992; Lindauer, and Nunberg, 1994;

 

fFor example, Grindle (1980b) ﬁnds that resources allocated for the achievement of speciﬁc program goals
“1 l546,000 may be reallocated at the site of implementation in order to achieve more pressing and general
{081106 80818, such as maintaining the political peace. Temple and Temple (1980) ﬁnd that public housing
rn urban Nairobi was built to serve high-income groups rather than in response to the nwdy. And Perlman
(1930) ﬁnds that those evacuated from urban squatter settlements in Brazil also lacked the power and the
m to force the success of resettlement schemes.

10

Picard, and Ganity, 1994; Brautigam, 1996). There are still far more questions than answers
in the role of external agents in administrative reform.

Even after USAID’s involvement in most aspects of Egyptian society for more than
two decades, “Egypt continues to exhibit virtually all the characteristics the United States has
claimed it would change since it began its massive economic aid program in 1975 . . . The
country remains poor, overpopulated, polluted and undemocratic while the state remains the
dominant force in economic affairs” (Sullivan, 1996: 37). The gap between social classes had
reached unprecedented levels, high unemployment rates, poverty had signiﬁcantly expanded
to the middle class, and culture had been corrupted by a deteriorating education system
(Kamel, 1998: 5). It has been argued that the GOE is less likely to initiate, let alone to
succeed, on its own to deal with these issues. Such strategies would require a revolution to
come from within the GOE (Ayubi, 1980). A major disadvantage of a revolution, however,
is jeopardizing the pro-Westem regime that industrial countries have been investing in
maintaining since the mid-19705.

Theoretical Framework

The importance of administrative reform for developing countries and the importance
of the role of external agents in achieving reform warrant modeling the relationship between
all the actors and variables involved in this complex political environment. Axinn (1988) and
Axinn and Axinn (1997) were ﬁrst to outline the forces involved in the developmental process
in the form of a Continuity and Change Model and applied it to the ﬁeld of International Rural
Development. Their model, illustrated in Figure 1.1, assumes that technological, biological,

physical, cultural, social, economic, administrative, political, and diplomatic forces inﬂuence

ll

l. n, i
deiesvp...‘

g
‘ ~11.-
»‘5 I
Uri
' u \—
~

 

r:~
Q
ﬁ‘n
..‘ .
...\ -
1.
‘4
\
I
«f
b s
1. fut
‘.
‘\

development from both sides in a straightforward fashion. Their model, however, fell short

of including the role of, and the interplay between, political actors and implementors in the

ﬁeld who are primarily responsible for the forces in the model.

Figure 1.1
Forces of Continuity and Change Model
Time X
Technological
7 7 7 7 7 7 _-. _ ’ ‘ _ _. _
Biological
. 7 ,7 7_. 7 7 7 7 7 . > ‘ 7 7
Physical
7___.,7.,7..7> <*
Cultural
___7 77__ _.77 7 7’ ‘ 7 7
Social
___ _, 7 7 7 7’ ‘— — ‘
Economic
-7... _ __ 7- _ -_ 7. 7,. p ‘ 7
Administrative
______ _ ___ 7’ ‘ 7 .7
Political
-___7__,___ __ 77,7 7 7 7» ‘ 7
Diplomatic
._ .____~_________‘ _ 7 47 # > < 7
Forces of Change

 

 

 

 

Intended Direction of Planned Change

Source: Axinn (1988): Axinn and Axinn (1997).

12

Technological

Biological
Physical

Cultural

Social

Economic

Administrative

Political

Diplomatic

Forces of Continuity

To overcome the limitations of Axinn and Axinn’s framework, a new model was
developed to be adopted as the theoretical guidance for the study. The new Continuity and
Reform Model, presented in Figure 1.2, is more applicable to the ﬁeld of Comparative Public
Administration than Axinn and Axinn’s framework in Figure 1.1. More speciﬁc, Figure 1.2
reﬂects the following changes to Axinn and Axinn’s model. First, it is assumed that the level
of development hinges of the status of public administration. Second, political actors
involved in the aid relationship and implementors of administrative reform from both sides
were incorporated in the model. Third, the focus of the new model is limited only to the
variables perceived to be theoretically relevant to the relationship between external agents and
developing countries in terms of administrative reform. Omitting some variables from Axinn
and Axinn’s model, under theoretical guidance, has the empirical advantage of allowing for
a systematic approach in analyzing the interaction between the relevant dynamic variables
from the perspective ofboth political actors and implementors involved in the reform process.
Beneﬁts of omitting variables based on theory also include maintaining the simplicity of Axinn

and Axinn’s modeling approach for a rather complex political and administrative process.

13

 

 

Eternal .1

 

F0.

Figure 1.2

Forces of Continuity and Reform Model
Status Quo of Public Administration

Political

- +USAID

Economic

External Agent

Social

 

 

l
L -- -' >Contractors
Cultural

 

Forces of Change

........

, .

 

~'-‘ .'~' . i .70'1 A Ir-l"l'l'¥""
A :4. U" r‘r.‘ .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political
‘ 7 . - _
Cabinet‘ ‘ - 7

Economic l

Govemment of Egypt

Social

 

 

Forces of Continuity

Intended Direction of Administrative Reform

14

The Forces of Continuity and Reform Model in Figure 1.2 then aims at
conceptualizing the outcome of the external agent’s role in administrative reform in the face
of continuity forces of recipient governments. The model assumes that economic, political,
social, and cultural factors are involved in such relationship and represent forces of continuity
and reform. The interplay of forces in this model operates so that there is a theoretical
balance responsible for the status quo for public administration at any given time. The status
quo of public administration exists at any particular point in time not only due to forces which
are pressing the situation toward reform, but also due to forces pressing against reform.
Egyptian public administration is as it is because the forces in one direction balance the forces
in the other direction. Administrative reform would result from introduction of additional
force on the external agent’s side, or Item reduction of some force on the recipient
govemment’s side.

In case of Egypt, continuity forces are placed through three means. First, the GOE
in the form of the President and the country’s elites based on the traditional Middle East’s
politics of kinship and exclusion; second, directly through the Egyptian bureaucracy that
maintains the social and cultural aspects of continuity in the government machinery; and third,
indirectly through the political and economic policies issued by the cabinet and approved by
the President. In the case of the U. S. on the reform side, forces are also placed through three
means to inﬂuence the status quo in a manner opposite to the continuity fores. First, the
external agent is in the form of the White House, Capitol Hill, and the State Department;
53001111, directly through foreign contractors who are assigned the task of on-site

administrative reform to change the social and cultural aspects of Egyptian bureaucracy; and

15

 

thiri in:

reverse ti
political a.
mmaa
winner a
11 times be

hnwm

 

 

third, indirectly through macro political and economic strategies designed to absorb, or
reverse, the continuity forces placed by the cabinet’s policies. Overall, it is theorized that
political actors and implementors are keeping circumstances under constant review to adjust
the pace and location of intervention as needed. Continuity and reform forces are pushed
wherever and whenever the circumstances warrant. Forces are slowed down or accelerated
at times based on higher chances of continuity for the recipient government and reform for
the external agent.

To make the picture more clear, the status quo of public administration could be
viewed as sliding on a continuum, or an X axis, that ranges from an inefﬁcient and ineffective
status, i.e., negative, to an efﬁcient and effective status, i.e., positive. Thus, increasing forces
placed by the external agent are theoretically expected to result in administrative reform by
moving the status of public administration toward the positive end of the continuum. For
example, a cabinet’s decision to guarantee employment in the civil service for all college
graduates would have a less negative impact on the status quo of public administration if
faced by an external agent’s economic strategy that would expand the scope of the private
sector to absorb more college graduates. Another example is that when continuity forces in
a society take the shape of large public labor force, large public organizations, and typical
government monopolies, then inducing more contractors with on-site administrative reform
projects by the external agent is theoretically expected to lessen the impact of continuity
forces on public administration. The net result of the continuity and reform forces is expected
to be the enhancement of the status quo of public administration by moving it toward reform.

This outcome is based on the assumption that the external agent adopts the appropriate

16

 

strttegu'cs
|
governm:

matting

tnd imple'

 

strategies and administrative reform tools to outplay the continuity forces of the recipient
government. The goal of this study is to test the posited assumption through empirically
answering a research question about the theory behind the role of each of the political actors
and implementors involved in the relationship.

It should be noted that other actors that may play a role in continuity or reform, such
as Islamic groups, the private sector, or European donors, are not included as an integral part
of the model. Instead forces placed by such actors will be analyzed separately in this study
as outside forces that may affect the decision of the main actors in the model. This is a
legitimate strategy for two reasons. First, the system is not isolated from the outside
environment as forces are linked to variables outside the system (Axinn, 1988; Axinn and
Axinn, 1997). Second, such actors take the form of changing variables rather than constants
in placing forces due to their short-term life span in the system. Third, it is difﬁcult to
theorize a formal role or direction for some of these actors due to inconsistency in their
strategies. For example, until the mid-19705 Islamic groups were advocating joining the civil
service as a form of nationalization. Later, however, they denounced the civil service and
labeled it as sin for being paid for doing nothing or for helping a pro-Westem society (Kepel,
1993). Fluctuations in positions of such actors warrant analyzing them as outside variables
that may inﬂuence the main actors in the model.

In sum, the theoretical framework of this study is guided by the Forces of Continuity
and Reform Model suggested by Figure 1.2. The model informs this study by assuming that
the status quo of public administration does not exist by chance but rather is due to strategic

and systematic interaction between internal and external political actors. Any strategy

17

adopted
compone

isnot lirr

 

common 7

|
Mllgm‘erf

dcelopin.
catﬁsh tl

rtlatonsh;

hOWher. is

 

loam o

if adminis:
ilJCSIIOns be

Can

‘0‘.)

Can

clller

Mlle
Can rl

“Petr

adopted by one political actor in this force ﬁeld perspective has an impact on all other
components. It should also be noted that the role of external agents in administrative reform
is not limited to the relationship between the US. and Egypt. Bilateral aid relations are
common between developing countries and the West. International, multilateral donors,
nongovernmental, and private-voluntary organizations are also increasingly involved in
developing the Third World. The case of USAID/Egypt modeled here and utilized to
establish the theoretical framework is by no means unique but rather parallel to many other
relationships between external agents and developing countries. The case of USAID/Egypt,
however, is worth modeling and analyzing here due to its signiﬁcance in terms of both the
long-term of the relationship and the interplay of variables.
Research Questions

The main focus of this study concerning the role that an external agent can be play in
the administrative reform of bureaucracies will be addressed with the following research
questions based on the Continuity and Reform Model.
1. Can the GOE through its bureaucracy directly constrain the contractor’s efforts of

administrative reform?

2. Can the GOE through political and economic strategies indirectly constrain the
external agent’s reform efforts?
3. Can the external agent indirectly through political and economic forces positively

inﬂuence public administration?
4. Can the external agent through contractors directly inﬂuence the social and cultural

aspects of bureaucracy toward administrative reform?

18

Methodology

The research questions were answered using both qualitative and quantitative
approaches and a typical urban public service as a case study. The qualitative approach was
composed of face-to-face interviews and observations made with ofﬁcials and consultants in
both public and private organizations from both sides of the USAID/Egypt relation in both
Cairo and Washington. On the external agent side, State Department and USAID oﬂicials
and American management consultants associated with the USAID’s mission were asked to
assess the Egyptian bureaucracy and the role of the mission in administrative reform. The
interviewed consultants were ﬁ'om AMBRIC, Arthur Anderson, EAP, Black and Veatch, and
CH2M Hill. On the Egyptian side, interviews included Egyptian scholars from the Sadat
Academy in the ﬁeld of Public Administration, an Assistant Minister of the new Ministry of
Administrative Development, Head of the Research Division at the Central Agency for
Organization and Administration, an ofﬁcial at the Budget Division at Ministry of Finance,
an ofﬁcial at the Personnel Department at Ministry of Education, an ofﬁcial at the Minister’s
oﬂice at the Ministry of Culture (See Appendix A for a complete listing of those interviewed).

The main goal of the interviews was to examine the practitioners’ opinion and
knowledge about bureaucratic problems, prospects of internal and external administrative
reform, and the political environment in which the external agent operates. These interviews
were based on techniques of elite interviewing described by Manheim and Rich (1991). For
example, each interviewee was questioned differently based on the information he or she
possessed. Questions were “unscheduled” to the extent that their order, predeterrnination and

ﬂexibility were guided only by the objective of collecting the information that the interviewee

l9

uniquel}
converse
and and}
bureaucr.

saluting

and serve.

Minthe'

 

uniquely possesses (Manheim and Rich, 1991: 140). Also, the tone of the interviews was
conversational without rapid questions in order to allow interviewees to collect their thoughts
and analyze the question whether it related to the relation between GOE and USAID or the
bureaucracy. Interviewees’ answers helped in answering the research questions and
evaluating the relevance of explanations offered by the literature review and previous survey
results. Information from these interviews also captured the dynamics of the reform process
and served as a gauge to cultural, situational, and interpretive validity for the survey to be
used in the quantitative approach (See Appendix B for a copy of the interview protocol).
The quantitative method adopted a systematic survey approach of bureaucrats and
managers at a typical urban public utility in Cairo that has been subject to USAID’s
administrative reform over the last decade. The bureaucrats’ capacity was examined by using
a “bottom-up” approach in the form of a survey of workers in that utility and interviews with
a series of front line workers and consultants. Wilson (1989) argues that “there are two ways
to look at government agencies: from the top down and from the bottom up. Most books.
. . . tend to take the ﬁrst view. The academic perspective, much inﬂuenced by Max Weber
(and lately by economic theories of the ﬁrm), typically centers on the structure, purposes, and
resources of the organization. . . . These are important matters, but the emphasis . . . has
caused us to lose sight of what government agencies do and how the doing of it is related to
attaining goals or satisfying clients” (11). Utilizing the “bottom-up” approach in this study
also considers the sensitivity of the method (Haltiwanger, 1998). For example, when
approaching the managers to ask for surveying the bureaucrats, a request was made that the

managers should not only include the agency’s “best workers” in the survey. Also, interviews

20

 

 

Sampling '

Water Sup.
151mm, '
[it public (

Witter

 

with omcials were also conducted to complement the study with an “up-bottom”approach
that would ﬁll the missing pieces of the puzzle not solved by the survey. The General
Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply was chosen for surveying bureaucrats because
it constitutes a representative case study of external agents’ administrative reform attempts.
As an external agent, USAID has been attempting to work closely and cooperatively with this
public utility for over two decades to achieve goals, including administrative reform. The
survey was administrated in Cairo in June, 1998 and was designed in the Arabic language.
Sampling was limited to the headquarters of the General Organization for Greater Cairo
Water Supply which has been a part of USAID’s on-site administrative reform program for
ten years. The ﬁnal sample was 63 out of the 123 bureaucrats who are in direct contact with
the public on daily basis at the General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply or a
return rate of 51 percent.

The results of the survey were compared to Al-Ahram’s survey which was conducted
in the spring of 1983 and successfully surveyed 836 bureaucrats using funds from the Ford
Foundation.3 Al-Ahram’s survey was selected for several reasons. First, it is the largest
identiﬁed survey of Egyptian bureaucrats. Second, studies that used Al Ahram’s data such
as Palmer et al. (1987, 1988, 1989) and Sullivan et a1. (1990) did not resurvey bureaucrats
to measure changes in the bureaucrats’ behavior. Finally, using Al Ahram’s survey saved the
effort of pretesting the questionnaire and at the same time allowed measurement of the

changes in bureaucrats’ behavior. Comparing the survey results with Al-Ahram’s results will

 

’ Al-Ahram is Egypt’s official newspaper. Founded in 1875, it is the oldest Arabic daily and had the largest
circulation of all Arabic newspapers.

21

illustrate persistence of problems and will note any changes in attitudes, solved problems, new
strengths, or new problems. Overall, comparisons of the results provided theoretical
consistency and a moving picture of the empirical ﬁndings in the form of trends rather than
a simple snap shot of the status quo in 1998.

Finally, evaluation of the external agent’s efforts depended also on reviewing
government documents housed at the USAID library in Arlington, Virginia, that was later
moved to the new Ronald Regan building in Washington, DC, the USAID library in Cairo,
and newspapers archives. Funding for both the qualitative and quantitative approaches was
provided by the Ford Foundation and the American Research Center in Egypt. Overall,
personal interactions, qualitative data, and quantitative data analysis provide answers to the
research questions and form the basis of the conclusions and implications of the study.

The Research Level of Generalization

While every country has a different political and economic environment, each faces
similar forces modeled in the Continuity and Reform diagram in Figure 1.2. What differs is
the strength of forces. An external agent could be stronger in one case and weaker in another
or the government of the recipient country could be active in development in one case and
resisting in another. Further, factors analyzed in the Continuity and Reform model within the
context of USAID/Egypt case study are standard across other cases. Political, economic,
social and culture factors analyzed in the model are common components of relationships
between external agents seeking development and recipient countries seeking aid. In the case
of USAID, other major recipient countries such as Israel, Russia, Gaza, and Jordan are often

chosen and developed by the external agent based on the political, economic, social, and

22

cultural factors in the model. This pattern is true with other external agents such as the IMF
or the World Bank. Thus, the Egyptian experience based on the Continuity and Reform
model should help inform the understanding and applicability of continuity and reform in other
countries.

Finally, the importance of bureaucrats and administrative capacity in the Continuity
and Reform model are also not unique to the case of USAID/Egypt. These two factors are
the main determinants of the success or failure of the external agent and the recipient
government in their tasks because they are responsible for implementation. Therefore,
speciﬁcally focusing on bureaucrats and public administration increases the generalization
level of this study.

On the whole, the universality nature of the Continuity and Reform is based on
including the standard forces and factors involved in drafting and implementing the
relationship between external agents and recipient governments. Hence, the universality of
the model allows the knowledge produced by this study to be generalizable and transferable
to different cases. Generalization of this research is highly feasible because the model utilized
is both conceptually sound and generally applicable and the key factors analyzed in the model
are of direct operational relevance to other case studies.

Organization of the Dissertation

After presenting the problem and the theoretical framework in this chapter, Chapter
2 provides a review of pertinent literature to identify administrative problems in developing
countries and the means of administrative reform. Within the context of the Continuity and

Reform model, this chapter explains the “Direction of Administrative Reform” presented in

23

figure}

model

 

sherbet ‘
This will
problems
of what:
Eternal aj
@8111 ad:

til then

 

Wicabili:

Figure 1.2. The following chapters examine the propositions of the Continuity and Reform
model by answering the research questions. Chapter 3 answers the research question of
whether the GOE directly constrains efforts of administrative reform through its bureaucracy.
This will be done by an analytical study of Egyptian bureaucracy to identify its administrative
problems and the contribution to these problems. Chapter 4 answers the research question
of whether the GOE indirectly through political and economic strategies constrains the
external agent’s reform efforts. This question will be answered by an analysis of previous and
recent administrative reform attempts. Answers to the ﬁrst and second research questions
will then be analyzed in terms of the Continuity and Reform model to examine its
applicability.

Chapter 5 answers the research question of whether the external agent positively
inﬂuences the status quo of public administration as proposed by the Continuity and Reform
Model. This will be done by analyzing the case of USAID/Egypt and an assessment of
USAID’s role in administrative reform. Chapter 6 qualitatively answers the research question
of whether the external agent through consultants directly inﬂuences the organizational
aspects of bureaucracy toward administrative reform. The case chosen to answer this
question is the USAID administrative reform efforts for The General Organization for Greater
Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS) as part of Water and Wastewater Institutional Development
Program. Qualitative analysis examines the impact of consultants on administrative reform
in the areas of organizational responsibility and performance, relationship with other
bureaucracies, organizational structure, human resources, training, salaries, incentives, and

revenues and ﬁnancial performance. Chapter 7 quantitatively answers the research question

24

banal)

 

innovat; .

inﬂuence
Reform .\
Chapter 8

Th
Reform N

millOnmei

 

litter. n
exilltllatior
Problems 5,
11989) ”501
is M9110:
i“ POliticai

ho.

by analyzing the areas of bureaucratic productivity, bureaucratic ﬂexibility, communication,
innovation, relation with the public, and professional information. This will be done by
surveying bureaucrats who deal with the public on daily basis at GOGCWS. The
methodology employed, the sample, sources of comparison data, processes of data collection,
and the data analysis for the questionnaire administered at GOGCWS to examine consultants’
inﬂuence on administrative reform are presented in this chapter. Finally, the Continuity and
Reform Model is analyzed and modiﬁed in light of the answers to the research questions.
Chapter 8 presents the ﬁndings, conclusion, and implications of the study.

The main goal here is to examine the theoretical propositions of the Continuity and
Reform Model. The models of Gates (1989) and Sullivan (1987) about the political
environment in which the external agent operates suggest resistance from bureaucracies.
Further, Downs’ (1967) model of bureaucracy in which rigidity looms large provides an
explanation for the Egyptian bureaucracy’s inability to implement reform goals due to
problems such as inﬂexibility, inefﬁcient output levels, and lack of innovation. Wilson’s
(1989) “bottom-up” model is the most relevant to empirically assess the extent of rigidity and
its indicators. Administrative reform based on hunches rather than empirical assessment of
the political environment and implementors’ capacity is a recipe for maintaining the status

quo.

25

 

prope
tounme:
thrpler e
The orde
lbltlilﬂé
limirisvp
irauerap
halting
”Show

thorn

 

Man
I00115 it the
lips] {or
in”? and n

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The stage is now set for an exposition of the relevant literature and different
perspectives on how the role of external agents in administrative reform in developing
countries may be undertaken. Within the context of the Continuity and Reform model, this
chapter explains the “Intended Direction of Administrative Reform” presented in Figure 1.2.
The order in which the discussion will be presented in this chapter is as follows. After
reviewing the problem in terms of developing govemment’s incapacity for internal
administrative reform and the need for an external agent, I address the complex political and
bureaucratic environment in which the external agent must operate. I shall do this by (1)
identifying the role that an external agent can play in the process of administrative reform and
the importance for carrying out this role, (2) examining the political resistance facing external
agents and the dilemma of inadequate tools to face this resistance, and (3) reviewing of the
bureaucratic resistance that the external agent is most likely to face, its causes, forms, and
tools at the external agent’s disposal to deal with it. Finally, the tools at the external agent’s
disposal for administrative reform are examined. Each of these tools is identiﬁed in terms of
theory and methods for implementation as recommended by the literature review in order to
provide a blue print for the external agent’s task. Put together, this chapter should provide
a clear understanding of the intended direction of administrative reform in the Continuity and
Reform model, the role of the external agent in implementation, and the forces of continuity

that face reform.

26

 

public nr
to save. a
1998). T
terms of
fleeting t

Which fos:

 

efﬁcient b
lit increa
1983b)

“135m.

 

Administrative Problems and the Need for an External Agent

A pre-eminent example of an efﬁcient bureaucracy is one that effectively serves the
public needs, assists the expansion of economic production and trade, enhances willingness
to save, and holds the rule of law without being a big burden on the public’s lives (Thompson,
1998). The deﬁnition of an efﬁcient bureaucracy can be carried further to characterize it in
terms of curtailing government expenditures and contributing to an annual surplus while
meeting the public needs. Efficient bureaucracies are central to creating an environment
which fosters sustainable social and economic development. A development process requires
efﬁcient bureaucracies (W erlin, 1992). Efﬁcient bureaucracies are required for coping with
the increasingly complex and technical tasks and issues of development (Hope, 1983a,
1983b). This is because bureaucracy is a coherent power center where major development
rules are made and applied (La Palambora, 1963).

The problem is that in developing countries weak administrative systems are usually
a countervailing force for development (Haggard, 1985). Most bureaucracies do not play an
effective role in providing public and social services needed for development. The centralized
nature ofbureaucracies in developing countries tends to immobilize effective decision making
by leading to either procrastination and long delays, and/or inadequate and inept policies
(Hope, 1983a, 1983b). The World Bank (1992) describes administrative problems in
developing countries as “excessive rules, regulations, licensing requirements, and so forth,
which impede the functioning of markets and encourage rent-seeking” (9).

Other common administrative problems include: rigidity; recruitment of generalists

into the administrative service and a system of promotion based solely on seniority rather than

27

 

merit, p

 

barium
inrptitut
rdiriirustr

1983).

dri'elopir.

ex. 1

fat
rec
res

 

 

merit; poor staff development and training arrangements; corruption and nepotism and
backward personnel practices-patronage; weak administrative leadership and managerial
ineptitude; unclear, multiple or contradictory objectives; strong political interference in local
administration; and shortage of ﬁscal resources and low salaries (Walakira, 1982; Shirley,

1983).
Esman (1991: 32) summarizes administrative problems facing bureaucracies of

developing countries as follows:

Bureaucracy is charged, often not inaccurately, with contradictory offenses:
with mindless adherence to rigid mles and formal, impersonal routines at the
expense of performance and timely responsiveness to public needs, the
meansured tape-displacing the goals; with abuse of discretion, resulting in
favoritism, discrimination, self-serving enrichment, and corruption; with
technical and managerial incompetence that absorbs and squanders scarce
resources, while producing few beneﬁts for society and at high cost; with
bureaucratic politics, victimizing both state and society in self-regarding
struggles for irresponsible power and pelf. State bureaucracies are vulnerable
to the political abuses of overstafﬁng and of employment according to ethnic,
nepotistic, or patronage criteria that undermine discipline and performance
incentives. So rigid, complex, and often contradictory are the formal rules
and procedures in government bureaucracies that only informal behavior
outside the rules permits the essential business of government to proceed, but
these informal practices invite foot-dragging and corruption.

Despite these dysﬁinctions, public bureaucracies are shouldering important

responsibilities.‘ They are responsible for vital aspects of people’s life and are the universal

 

‘ Van de Wallc (1989) summarizes the reasons that led to bureaucracies taking over the responsibility of
providing all goods and services instead of the private sector. The reasons are: ﬁrst, governments believe that
intervention in all aspects of the socio-economic aspects of their citizens’ life will increase people’s welfare
and at the same time will bring much needed revenues. Second, socialist ideology of regimes never believed
in the capacity of the private sector to satisfy the public needs and to attain rapid and sustainable deve10pment
Third, the private sector was usually associated with unpopular foreign sources. In the case of Egypt,
nationalization decisions in the 19505 were very popular because the private sector, mostly owned by British
or French people or sources, was perceived as a form of colonization. Finally, expanding bureaucracies
provides regimes with political security by creating jobs, servicing constituencies, and patronage.

28

 

 

produce

 

governs
0f empI-c.
patronag
only a mi
The abti
problem
Mic 587

m Role

 

 

producer and provider of goods and services. This responsibility leads to rapid grth in
governmental departments and agencies and causes bureaucracies to be the preferred source
of employment in most developing countries. While a bureaucracy provides the regime with
patronage and the middle income groups with employment, the national community receives
only a minimum level of essential services as compared with its size and cost (Timsit, 1982).
The ability of a bureaucracy to carry out its tasks at acceptable levels of efﬁciency is
problematic in most developing countries despite their signiﬁcance for providing social and
public services (Kiggundu, 1989; Esman, 1991).
The Role of External Agents

It is unlikely for internal forces to initiate the process of administrative reform because
at low levels of development, the demand for efﬁciency of government agencies by the public
is not urgent and can be politically costly. The rhythm of administrative life is slow and things
move in set patterns with a little difference between the ways of administration and the ways
of life beyond the ofﬁce (Dabasi-Schweng, 1965). The failure of the government to
implement reform could be also due to limitation of public administration knowledge (Lin,
1989). Politically speaking, the cost of internal reform is often high, and thus avoided,
because regimes have to upset their supporting political base by disturbing the bureaucratic
norms. Therefore, without an external agent there is a very low chance of setting the reform
agenda and starting the reform process.

Arguing for an internally initiated effective administrative reform that would change
organizations including the attitude of bureaucrats might be dismissed as utopian (Levy,

Meltsner, and Wildavsky, 1974). Yet calling for the external agent to play that role is quite

29

 

"BORE.

Emma.

 

 

Implant?!
l

MN

dill scr.

 

01mm
Mute .
to-ordina
Mamie
Of ”1001}
We of I:
[he Collecz‘
M Qpac

The

 

 

 

reasonable. The remarkable ability of regimes to obtain foreign aid Opens the door for reform.
External agents can be of signiﬁcant importance for offsetting the reluctance of initiating and
implementing administrative reform.

External agents’ involvement in administrative reform has expanded in recent years.
Their work in bureaucracies has broadened from strengthening organizations to reforming the
civil service (World Bank, 1992). External agents’ role includes a wide range of activities
(Duncan, 1986). They assist in policy analysis, provide technical assistance, plan projects,
evaluate outcomes. External agents conduct research activities such as promoting, and
co-ordinating comparative studies on administrative problems connected with social and
economic development. They can act as host and as scientiﬁc contact body for the beneﬁt
of schools of public administration and any other agencies whose activities come within the
scope of reform (Huynh, 1982). Finally, external agents also assist governments to improve
the collection and dissemination of economic and social data and assist them to strengthen
their capacity in understanding, processing, and using information (World Bank, 1992).

The external agent can make an important contribution to administrative reform, but
cannot do it alone. Schiavo-Campo (1994b: 169) notes that:

On the donor side, activities of the different donors need to be coordinated,

at least enough to prevent contradictory efforts and at best to take advantage

of complementarities and comparative advantages of the various donors. On

the recipient side, external assistance must be managed well - not only in order

to guard against waste, diversions and theft, but also to ensure that external

resources are used in pursuit of national economic objectives in the context
of an integrated policy framework.

30

 

 

COMUT

to Schia-

 

 

 

 

ﬁreman}
lhe initial :

Fu

 

 

The external agent should be a dynamic “efﬁcient nuclei” that strengthens linkages and
communication channels to facilitate administrative reform. An efﬁcient nucleus, according
to Schiavo-Campo (1994a: 13), should meet the following practical standards:

Be small; . . . be ﬁercely meritocratic, in the initial selection and in the

evaluation of staff performance; . . . have ﬂexible and simple procedures; . .

. have adequate material and ﬁnancial resources; . . use local talent, with

external advisors only when demonstrably necessary;. . . advance speciﬁcation

of the procedures for reassignment of its staff throughout the relevant

government agencies;. . .operate not only to perform speciﬁc tasks but also

a teaching-by-doing ﬁmction, in cooperation with other agencies.

An efﬁcient nucleus role is “a catalyst” that should facilitate an internal process of a
potentially self-sustaining character and eliminate the need to remain directly involved beyond
the initial phase (Schiavo-Campo, 1994a: 16).

Further, playing the role of an external agent and getting involved in administrative
reform beneﬁts foreign aid units. They are accountable to their government or executive
board and have to ensure that their investments are put in place and their efforts are leading
to a sustainable development. Therefore, most assistance is awarded with conditions such as
administrative reform even when money is in the form of loans and must be repaid with
interest. External agents often provide for the continuous presence of an active team of
specialists, either employed or contracted, to ensure that resources are used for their intended
purposes and reach the beneﬁciaries. The presence of an external agent would allow

overseeing resources devoted to administrative reform and would ensure sustainable

development.

31

 

Theorr

Reform
in their a
include f
dexelopr.
developn

T
guidelines

Menu] a

 

high feasi
Wes
l6), gem:

 

 

Change Options Available to External Agents
Theoretical Guidelines

Identifying the theoretical steps for playing an active role in the Continuity and
Reform model is important for external agents because they have often so frequently failed
in their administrative reform efforts. Common problems that external agents have suffered
include failure to establish a predictable framework of administrative behavior conducive to
development, arbitrariness in reform of rules and laws, and priorities inconsistent with
development causing a misallocation of resources (World Bank, 1992).

To overcome common problems, the external agent should follow theoretical
guidelines. First, the power of a bureaucracy being reformed has to be considered by the
external agent.’ In order to make a difference, the external agent has to focus on areas with
high feasibility of signiﬁcant and identiﬁable change, a “positive impact on intra-system
linkages,” and a potential for generalizing the change to other areas (Schiavo-Campo, 1994a:
16). Second, administrative reform should introduce maintainable policies that enhance the
stability of the overall policy environment. Completely changing the rules and procedures just
to temporally facilitate the external agent’s task or to minimize bureaucratic resistance is not
an eﬂ‘ective strategy. The external agent should plan a maintainable administrative reform
within a societal acceptance reference (Rodrik, 1990). New forms of practices have to be

incorporated within the existing institutionalized set of norms, values and structures

(Kimberly, 1979).

 

’ A bureaucracy’s power rises or falls in proportion to the material basis it manages; it is powerful if it
manages a large sector of the economy or a large part of the social capital, social activities, and public services
(Tonkovic, 1982).

32

Third, incrementally changing rules is an effective mean of administrative reform for
many reasons.‘ Incremental strategies entail smaller risks of error and require less information
(Lindblom, 1965; Cleaves, 1980). This is especially important in the case of the external
agent operating within many constraints such as opposing political and bureaucratic forces
and incomplete information. Incremental change allows leaders to avoid unanticipated results
of a major change (Levi, 1990; Werlin, 1992).

Administrative reform can be incrementally tailored accordingly based on the urgency
of the reform and the bureaucrats’ readiness status (Annenakis, Harris, and Mossholder,
1993). Expected resistance can be minimized with smaller ongoing changes that are
maintained throughout the process of administrative reform (Annenakis, Harris, and
Mossholder, 1993). Based on the level of the organization’s readiness to change, a decision
could be made about whether to initiate changes in “profound components” such as
organizational structure, or in “shallower components” such as simple formal rules (Downs,
1967: 196)" Finally, the external agent can minimize resistance by proceeding incrementally
so that reform affects the fewest possible number of bureaucrats at a certain time. This is a
helpﬁal strategy in case of large organizations where the number of bureaucrats being affected

by reform increases the chances of bureaucratic resistance (Downs, 1967).

 

‘ There are paradoxical views regarding the effectiveness of an incremental approach. Bunker (1973: 289)
points out tlmt increasing the duration of “sequential steps involved in the implementation stage”, increases
“the possibilities for existing actors to alter their goals, for leadership to turn over, for new actors to enter the
scene, or for unintentional consequences to take their toll.” Also Sussman (1980) shows that political and
bureaucratic factors impeded development work in India because factors of timing led to the abandoning the
original pattern for development and adopting a new approach.

7 Identifying profound changes is based on the extent of political uncertainty, or elimination of old accustomed
functions, associated with reform (Merton, I957).

33

Further, individuals are often slow to adjust to new situations because they have
acquired work habits, such as working slowly or not taking initiative or responsibility, that
cannot be modiﬁed on short order. Finally, reform has to proceed incrementally because there
is no comprehensive approach for policy formation (Lindblom, 1959). No one approach can
deal with individual perceptions and motivations, social processes and interactions, and
political dynamics that must be effectively shifted, evolved or changed (Rose, 1985). In
reality, however, the external agents often push reform too rapidly due to congressional
pressures, lack of time, or to get over the exceedingly complex and diﬂicult tasks.
Administrative reform often takes longer than the external agent assumes (Rose, 1985). The
external agent must view its role as a long-term investment of time, imagination and resources
(Schiavo-Campo, l994a).

One ﬁnal theoretical consideration to increase the chances of administrative reform
success is that the external agent should focus on increasing the organization’s revenues. The
surplus that the organization earns out of its operation would help in pursuing change (Cyert
and March, 1963) and in maintaining it.

Barriers to Change

While theoretically the external agents are expected to be an effective force for
initiating refomr, in reality this is not actually the case. One reason for that is the methods of
planning, analysis, and management adopted by external agents and governments fail because
they are not seriously tried (Rondinelli, 1993). Another reason for failures in attempts of
reform is that external agents do not deal with problems over the long-term. Cooperation and

ﬁrnding of development programs with bureaucracies are not based on need but rather on

34

 

 

transrel
into th:
to deta

overlca

1986).

to inter:
requires
ma.C‘Pror '
10 will ch ‘

the narure

   
 
  
  

Wen:
to mmpier
m lit refo
”Mum

”Mum

 

 

transient, short-term political interest. Management techniques are often translated poorly
into the developmental area due to lack of commitment to long-term objectives and attention
to details (Dow, 1985). In these cases, the aggregate effect of external agent efforts is to
overload an already weak administrative system with programs and procedures (Duncan,
1986)

Also failure could stem from the fact that external agents heavily delegate ﬁinctions
to international technical experts and consultants. They can understand and meet the
requirements of the external agent, but this delegation often leads to unrealistic and
inappropriate policies for local conditions (Rondinelli, 1993). Success depends on the extent
to which work reﬂects the country’ s bureaucratic needs, its history, its political economy, and
the nature of its society. The need for highly trained international technicians to deal with the
complexity of the procedures for planning and analyzing proposals, should not be translated
to complete dependence on imported experts. External agents should rely on native expertise
in the reform efforts in order to understand local problems and needs and to avoid adverse
consequences (World Bank, 1992).

Pros and Cons of an External Reform Strategy

The deviation from theory and the negative record for some cases warrants weighing
the advantages and disadvantages of external initiation of reform. In the case of external
agent initiation of administrative reform, there is a price to be paid. Relying upon the external
source introduces a certain degree of bias because inevitably it introduces professionals who

may or may not have the best interests of the country in mind. While doing a professional job,

35

 

 

 

forcig:

COUan

may I
Wrile r
reie'an:
about in
lots: dc‘
Country ‘.
a?“ m.
PUNK) tf.
Mount 0

agains rm

 

 

 

a!

 

 

foreign international professionals may view the particular needs of the bureaucracy and the
country it serves as irrelevant (Jedlicka, 1987).

Another disadvantage for relying on an external agent is writing reform proposals in
a way that only satisﬁes the local bureaucrats who will review and assess their worthiness.
While recipient regimes accept administrative reform in principle, local bureaucrats with
relevant expertise at recipient governments review the proposals and made the ﬁnal decisions
about the details. Local bureaucrats are expected to have their interest in mind when making
these decisions. Third, there is the disadvantage of extra paperwork and labor that the host
country will have to make just to produce the help for the external agent. Fourth, the external
agent must convince those who provide resources (Congress, the White House, and the
public) that it knows what it is doing and that it can produce clear results in a reasonable
amount of time. These pressures promote ﬁxes and patching rather than reform and stand
against the longer-term sustainable development that theory prescribes (Rondinelli, 1987).
Finally, when relying solely on external agents, a certain degree of dependency will be
established that can inhibit the development of indigenous control (Jedlicka, 1987).

On the other hand, advantages of external initiation of administrative reform might
outweigh the disadvantages despite that the internal sources are in a better position to
understand the local problems and needs. This is because without the external agent the
chances of initiation of administrative reform in the ﬁrst place are slim. In addition to political
and bureaucratic resistance, the phenomenon of “brain drain” in developing countries deprive
bureaucracies of their most skillﬁil. There are few talented and qualiﬁed people who are able

to get involved and manage the process of reform (Jedlicka, I987).

36

 

 

refom

incapa.

|
pensive
soluticr
training
than be:

external

 

 

The best option to emphasize the advantage of external initiation of administrative
reform may be a mixed approach of internal and external strategies to address the local
incapacity. It is more productive because the international professionals after all are ex-
pensive and probably temporary at best. The mixed approach would also apply a long-term
solution through training of selected personnel to mange and sustain reform by providing
training sessions either locally or in the sponsoring country. Incapable bureaucrats would
then become indigenous reform agents and trainers who do not rely upon the support of the
external agent (Solomon and Heegard, 1977).8

The above discussion so far assumes that the willingness of both top ofﬁcials and
bureaucrats to accept and make commitment to administrative reform. Political and
bureaucratic resistance to the external agent role creates a complex political environment and
raises serious questions about the ability of the external agent, politicians, and bureaucrats to
rationalistically and systematically implement reform (Rondinelli, 1993). The signiﬁcance of
resistance problems warrants the analysis of the political and bureaucratic environments and
the examination of the external agent’s tools to deal with them.

Political Resistance

Political considerations in general are important in determining the success or failure

of development projects (Hawkins, 1991). More speciﬁcally, political leadership’s support

and commitment are of major signiﬁcance in affecting the success of the external agent’s role

 

' It must be said, however, this strategy runs the risk that they will become part of the “brain-drain” problem.
For example, many Egyptians as many other nationalities remain in the States after training programs.
Bureaucrats with the proper skills and training seldom remain within their own countries after receiving

training
37

in administrative reform (Nelson, 1989).9 Signiﬁcance stems from the need for the backing
of the regime’ 8 political leadership for administrative reform because bureaucracies’ functions,
unlike other activities in society, are determined by political authority. Bureaucracies’ work
conditions, appointments, and salaries are all based on decrees. They receive their funding
from the state budget on the basis of political decisions (Tonkovic, 1982). Political leaders
can inspire and direct the bureaucrats to higher levels of performance through words and
actions (Hope, 1983a, 1983b). Bureaucrats, typically, do not change voluntarily and must
receive a mandate from national authority.

The degree of political commitment is crucial to the success and sustainability of the
external agent’s efforts because “outsiders can assist and advise, but unless governments are
committed to refomt, changes that are brought about will not be sustainable” (World Bank,
1992: 50). Without this requisite, there will be either no administrative reform in the ﬁrst
place and consequently no development, or at best, a signiﬁcant lag and increase in the cost
of the external agent’s tasks. If political leadership is ambivalent about administrative reform,
then the external agent ﬁnds itself conducting technical exercises with little impact on
bureaucracies and on attaining its developmental task (Caiden, 1973; Hope, 1983a, 1983b).

Despite its importance, political commitment, however, is difficult to attain because
politicians’ political power, authority, and elite status are put on the line by the external agent

intervention. Regimes are likely to hang on to the privileges and security of their positions

 

’ Political leadership here refers to the top most decision-makers whose legal and/or actual responsibility is
to make ﬁnal authoritative decisions on each of the issues and problems the external agent is concerned with
(Hope, 1983a, 1983b). The Chief Executive of the nation and his Cabinet or whoever controls government
usually has the last word and ean enforce decisions on other organization (Dahl and Lindblom, I953).
Commitment and leading support of political leadership to administrative reform here refer to a desire to
increase productivity and efﬁciency of service delivery regardless of the cost to their authority.

38

 

Wilf'lOL

l983t

agent ;

reform
political
fun-nit r.
Emit-a:

B‘Jarame

Complexj

mkillor

 

dISCTEllQn

 

without making a serious attempt to contribute to the quality of public policy (Hope, 1983a,
1983b).”

The likelihood of resistance is decided by a beneﬁt-cost analysis. When the external
agent presents a reform proposal that emphasizes the impact of change on the nation’s total
wealth, the ruler, as a wealth maximizer, is likely to provide support. ” The ruler will support
reform when his estimated marginal beneﬁts exceed the estimated marginal costs in terms of
political support or other commodities such as net tax revenues that enter in the niler’s utility
function. On the other hand, the ruler is likely to resist reform if it threatens his political
survival or lowers his utility while bringing higher income to the nation. There is no
guarantee, however, that a utility-maximizing ruler has an incentive to support reform to the
socially optimal point that maximizes social wealth. Also, given bounded rationality and the
complexity of information needed to calculate the utility function it is very unlikely for the
ruler to reach an accurate decision (Lin, 1989).

The ruler’s beneﬁts from administrative reform are not always monetary. One factor
likely to be included in the ruler calculation of beneﬁts to support reform is bureaucratic
discretionary behavior. While bureaucracies are at the ruler’s disposal to implement the law,
collect taxes, and provide public and social services, each bureaucrat in the process is a

rational individual and his interests never completely coincide with the ruler’s. The ruler

 

'° For example, Haggard’s (1986) study remarks a dismal record of reform implementation for external agents:
of thirty cases, twenty-four were not implemented in their original form and sixteen of these were canceled
due to political resistance.

” It worth mentioning that wealth is only one of the many commodities that the ruler values because he is also

concerned about his prestige in the international political arena. Therefore, he may choose to strengthen
military power instead of administrative reform at the cost of his nation’s wealth.

39

 

 

 

mem;

cannc:

much I

calculL

 

 

 

attempts to monitor their behavior and to set a reward system that promotes loyalty but
cannot perfectly control or eliminate bureaucratic discretionary behavior. Therefore, how
much the bureaucrats take the ruler’s goals as their own is always in the ruler’s decision
calculus to support or resist administrative reform. If the ruler control over bureaucrats is
minimum, he faces high transaction costs for ruling bureaucracies and is more likely to
support administrative reform (Lin, 1989).

Appointed ministers may oppose change since administrative reform is likely to
jeopardize their control by attempting to transfer decision-making to the leaders of
bureaucracies (Mills, 1966). However, foreign aid, new technologies, study and travel
opportunities introduced by the external agent may make administrative reform more tolerable
for the ministers (Esman, 1991). These incentives often minimize resistance and to some
extent get politicians to assume their responsibilities in supporting the external agent.

Overall, political resistance is often due to the fact that recipients’ prefer direct aid
with no strings is the best approach to maintain power while the external agent seeks
conditional aid to take advantage of integrating reform policies with the lending arrangements
(USAID, 1985; World Bank, 1992).

Bureaucratic Resistance

As early as the mid-18005 John Stuart Mill, commenting on the ability of
bureaucracies to accept new ideas, suggested that where everything is done through the
bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all
(Abrahamson, 1977). Max Weber recognized the strength and power of the professionally

trained bureaucrat and his resistance to change (Weber, 1947). Crozier (1964) has found that

40

 

 

 

 

learnir.
midi cl
(Dom.

bureau.

poﬁtica.‘

75F!

 

bureaucracies resist change to such an extent that bureaucracies would be incapable of
learning from past mistakes. Bureaucratic resistance can even change the problems being
attacked by reform as they can make “defensive changes” in response to external pressures
(Downs, 1967: 200). Bureaucratic buy-in is necessary due to the significant role that

bureaucrats can play. Lindblom (1980: 68) notes that:

Policy making rests overwhelmingly in the hands of the bureaucracy, leaving
relatively few policies to be determined elsewhere. . . Policy emerges
speciﬁcally in the mutual interaction of bureaucratic politics.

Bureaucrats, according to Moe (1990: 143), are powerful actors and make the

political world a different place:

Agency bureaucrats are now political actors in their own right: they have
career and institutional interests that may not be entirely congruent with their
formal missions, and they have powerful resources—expertise and delegated
authority—that might be employed toward these “selﬁsh” ends. They are new
players whose interests and resources alter the political game.

It follows that cooperation of bureaucrats in the implementation phase is signiﬁcant

for the success of reform efforts.‘2 Gates (1989: 243) notes that:

Inducing ﬁeld ofﬁcers to implement policies to which they are opposed is
extremely difficult. Attempting to alter these bureaucrats’ behavior across
agency boundaries is even more difficult. No matter how committed a donor
and federal governmental agency may be to policy reform, they need to take
into account the goals and constraints that inﬂuence the decisions of the
bureaucrats that are responsible for the implementation of policy reform.

 

'2 A paradoxical view is that bureaucratic resistance can sometimes have positive effect on reform. For
example, Downs (1967) notes that resistance to change could also be viewed as a virtue because it is an
indicator of organizational stability that helps in performing important social functions. Another example
is Quick’s (1980) study in Zambia that refers to this view by noting that bureaucratic adversaries can have
a salubrious effect on policy implementation by obliging program advocates to specify their goals and
procedures in advance.

41

Bureaucratic resistance to administrative reform could be due to many reasons. First,
resistance takes place as a natural reaction to reduce political uncertainty (Moe, 1990).
Administrative reform brings political uncertainty for bureaucrats because it threats the
distribution of power within an organization. Bureaucratic resistance is expected by
self-interest motives in the face of real or perceived threats to things that bureaucrats hold
dear, such as restricting mandates, reducing or eliminating functions, cutting budgets,
curtailing discretion, or blemishing reputation.l3

Administrative reform may affect the way in which property rights are deﬁned within
an organization and any change in those rights will affect individual incomes. Those who gain
ﬁ'om a change will tend to favor it and those whose incomes will fall will tend to oppose it
(Coase, 1974; Goldberg, 1974). Overall, things that bureaucrats personally value differ from
one bureaucrat to another. Downs (1967: 196) notes that:

Most of the items personally valued by officials are positively correlated with

the amount of resources under their control. These items include personal

power, prestige, and income (valued by climbers); organizational power,

prestige, and income (valued by climbers, advocates, and zealots); and
security (valued by conservers). It is hard to conceive of many situations in

which these elements are enhanced by decreases in the resources controlled

by the ofﬁcials concerned.

Second, bureaucrats’ resistance to administrative reform could be due to their trained

incapacity to change and be innovative. The emphasis upon expertise and specialization

 

'3 The external agent has to plan reform in terms of the distribution of power and the consequences of change
on individuals within the bureaucracy. For example, Downs (1967) argues that a good indicator of chances
for bureaucratic resistance is the percentage conservers and the degree of their dominance in a bureaucracy.
Ifthe external agent attempts to reform an organization where conservers occupy the important posts, then
a strong resistance for change should be expected. However, if conservers are numerous but without
important posts, then resistance is expected to be for the implementation rather than adapting the principle
of change.

42

 

within
render
name
inertia
to avoi
(Danni
bureaus

resistar.

 

 

 

within a bureaucracy narrows the scope of intellectual experimentation. Trained incapacity
renders the professional bureaucrat relatively unable to respond to demands in an innovative
manner (Selznick, 1949). Third, resistance to reform could be caused by the “forces of
inertia.” That is a bureaucracy tends to continue with behavior patterns due to its willingness
to avoid any “sunk cost” in the form of time, effort, and money invested in its current form
(Downs, 1967: 196). Fourth, the size of a bureaucracy plays an important role in determining
bureaucratic resistance for reform. As a rule of thumb, the larger the organization, the more
resistant it will be to change (Downs, 1967).

Fifth, the lack of professional security engenders attitudes towards reform and inhibits
innovation. Bureaucrats who had fully mastered their tasks welcome new problems produced
by changes as it makes their work more interesting. Less competent bureaucrats, however,
create a resistance by adhering to existing procedures in which they are familiar (Blau, 1955).
The professional insecurity of a bureaucrat makes administrative reform a threat and creates
generic opposition to change. Sixth, resistance could be due to conﬂicting interests between
those who are involved in the reform process and those who are excluded from the process.
Groups not involved in the initial stages of change tend to resist it because they do not feel
committed to the success of the proposed reforms (Walakira, 1982).

Seventh, bureaucratic resistance could be explained by the formal hierarchies and
division of labor which stabilize the organization’s environment. Bureaucrats will try to keep
their relationships with the organization structure as stable as possible due to the fear of
failure (Thompson, 1965; Kaufman, 1971; Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky, 1974). Rather

than attempting to change or innovate, bureaucrats are often “shrinking violets” who prefer

43

 

 

 

burea

intern.

 

(Tend;

mess.-
decisio
decisic:
relation

t0 corn:

is SUICII‘:

 

 

adjustment to conﬂict with the existing environment (Downs, 1967: 216). Finally,
bureaucratic resistance in developing countries may be caused by the presence of an
international external agent who represents a different culture and promotes different values
(T endler, 1975).

One often observed form of bureaucratic resistance is monopolizing the information
necessary for effective oversight by the external agent. Bureaucrats can formalize their
decision procedures by relying on technical expertise and operational experience to make
decisions agency-centered (Moe, 1990). Asymmetrical information dominating the
relationship allows bureaucrats’ expertise to outweigh authority because it allows bureaucrats
to control the agenda (Niskanen, 1971).

Another form ofbureaucratic resistance to external demands for administrative reform
is strictly adhering to rules and regulations and emphasizing standardization in operating
procedures (Merton, 1957; Rondinelli, 1993). This rigid behavior impedes a bureaucracy’s
ability to accept change and transforms rules into an end in itself (Merton, 1957). The
bureaucracy can insulate itself from demands that it does not want to address. Red tape is an
often used method by bureaucracies to shield themselves from external forces (Kaufman,
1977). Such strategies are readily available for bureaucrats given the job-speciﬁc expertise

they accumulate through the normal performance of their duties.

44

 

Over

resists

on the

[10165 '.

 

 

 

Overcoming Bureaucratic Resistance

External agents have two major tools at their disposal to overcome bureaucratic
resistance.“ The ﬁrst tool to minimize resistance is the motivational approach which is based
on the utilization of incentives or intrinsic rewards (Thompson, 1965). Wilson (1989: 88)
notes that:

Government agencies are not billiard balls driven hither and yon by the impact

of forces and interests. When bureaucrats are free to choose a course of

action their choices will reﬂect the full array of incentives operating on them:

some will reﬂect the need to manage a workload; others will reﬂect the

expectations of workplace peers and professional colleagues elsewhere; still

others may reﬂect their own convictions. And some will reﬂect the needs of

clients.

The incentive approach, however, is not without opposition. Barnard (1968) denies
that material inducements are important to organizations. He argues that people should give
more than they receive in order for the organization to prosper and grow. Bamard's solution
instead is that the leader should inspire bureaucrats to transcend self-interest. Miller (1992)
also refutes the claim of the “principal-agency theory” of developing incentive systems to
shape subordinate behavior. Information asymmetry creates possibilities for undetected
shirking and make it generally impossible to create incentives that completely realign

individual self-interest. Miller’s solution is inducing norms of cooperation and trust among

bureaucrats that transcend their short-term self interest.

 

” There are means outside the inﬂuence of the extemal agent that could lead to bureaucratic commitment to
reform. For example, getting bureaucrats to perceive the “performance gap” is a mean of getting them to
accept reform. By realizing a discrepancy between what they are doing and what they believe they should be
doing, bureaucrats will develop anxiety that could ultimately lead to supporting reform (Downs, 1967).
Another example, is that any change in the societal function of a bureaucracy, or its importance, can lead to

changed behavior (Downs, 1967).
45

 

Second, managers with good leadership characteristics are tools at the external agent’s
disposal to overcome bureaucratic resistance. The literature on good leadership and its
characteristics is sufﬁcient to identify the leader that an external agent should look for.”
Commitment to change is an important characteristic that should be one of the extemal
agent’s criteria in choosing the organization’s managers (Esman, 1991). Recruitment of
leaders should also be from all available sources and not based on the developing countries’
practice of appointing unqualiﬁed political loyalists based on patronage grounds. Further, to
ﬁilly utilize leadership as a tool for minimizing bureaucratic resistance, the external agent’s
role should not be limited to recruiting managers. It is recommended that external agents
follow a strategy of enhancing the appointed leader’ 5 managerial skills through education and
training for administrative reform (Kerri gan and Luke, 1987). The approved leader must also
be made familiar with external agents’ governments or international institutions’ procedures,
diplomatic skills, capable to cope with cross-cultural sensitivities, and ﬂuent in the external
agent’s foreign language (Esman, 1991).

Approaches and Types of Administrative Reform

The following is a review of change approaches which are applicable to almost all
bureaucracies. A few points should be made clear. First, the endeavor here is not to
repackage the public administration literature, but rather to identify the means available to
assist the external agent in its task of administrative reform. This is an essential endeavor

because administrative reform is a priori theory about a set of activities, processes, or

 

" For a good summary of leadership’s characteristics, tools, skills, and strategies see Riccucci (1995: 228-29)
who provides a summary for the proﬁle of an ideal effective “unsung heroes.”

46

 

methi

organ

other.

6.1de

reSpot‘s?

 

of mm
Change bf,
“Mi.
area may .

 

 

methods designed to change some target or aspects of individual or group’s attitudes and
organization structure or processes in order to reach a determined bureaucratic goal.

Second, the study does not advocate one administrative reform approach over the
other, but rather intends to utilize the review of available approaches in evaluating the
seriousness of administrative reform efforts. Identifying all the available approaches of
administrative reform will be essential to measure how the external agent in practice conforms
to, or deviates from, the Continuity and Reform model.

Third, identifying the possible approaches to reform is important because
organizational theory does not provide explicit propositions for administrative reform or
organizational change. It only suggests hypotheses that bear on the subject with most often
theoretical and empirical inconsistencies, divergent recommendations, and contradictory
results. It then becomes the responsibility of the external agent to identify its speciﬁc
constructive entry points given the many possibilities for ineffective entry.

Finally, no method alone is likely to be effective in administrative reform. Empirical
evidence suggests that organizational factors such as organizational leadership, bureaucrats’
responsiveness, managerial goals, ofﬁce procedures, and work style affect the effectiveness
of bureaucracies and the provision pattern for public services (W eissert, 1994). Structural
change by charts showing line relationships would be ﬁne if not for the bureaucrats in the little
boxes who have emotions of power, security, and strategic behavior. Further, reform in one
area may create a necessity to intervene in another. For example, enhancing bureaucratic
capacity may only exacerbate the abusive behavior and degenerate into uncontrolled

bureaucracies (Riggs 1963). The external agent may also face many trade-offs between the

47

 

desirable approaches of reform. As Arrow (1963) implied in the impossibility theorem, no
social choice function can simultaneously guarantee all of the desirable characteristics for
social choice. In bureaucracies, as in other social choice mechanisms, there must be a
trade-oﬂ' between desirable characteristics.

The complexity of change mechanism in addition to its nature consequently affects the
chances of its success. Tools such as innovative organizational forms or untried technology
reduce the chances for successful implementation of reform given their complexity (Pressman
and Wildavsky, 1973; Cleaves, 1980). Ambiguity surrounding the process of choosing an
approach also makes the process extremely complex. During the choice process true goals
are deﬁned, history is interpreted, success and blame are distributed, and self-interest is
discovered. The ambiguities of intention, understanding, history and organization together
place severe limitations on attaining a complete rational cycle of choice. Each connection in
the cycle of choice is severed by the extreme ambiguity present in organizational settings.“
Finally, due to that intervention is likely to be in important organizational areas, failures are
also likely to affect these areas and raise the cost of intervention (March and Olsen, 1976).

The external agent can apply these approaches to the structures, procedures, and
operations of bureaucracies to enhance their performance and attain control, discipline, and
accountability essential to a speciﬁc policy outcome. Theoretically, this will satisfy the need

for ﬂexibility and timely response to different public demand in pursuit of developmental

 

" Choice could be decided wherein streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities
intermingle. This “garbage can” model may accidentally form a decision, but the outcome may still be anrbi-
guous and uncertain (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972).

48

 

 

goals

Kﬁﬁer

bursa;

eﬁcier
their.
mt’ma
Oligjna'

approa;

Ntloﬁj

“Hens

 

goals. No alternative design, however, is recommended as the ﬁnal solution. Knott and
Miller (1987: 267) note that:

Emphasizing redundancy rather than specialization, delegation rather than

hierarchy, ﬂexibility rather than rules, champions rather than trained experts

[are not] a ﬁnal solution to the problems of public administration.

The ﬁnal solution, however, is decided according to the policy outcomes of the
bureaucracy under reform. External agents should not focus on reform in terms of the
efﬁcient form of bureaucracy, but in terms of the bureaucracy’s policy outcomes. Achieving
the preset goals are important factors in determining a bureaucracy’s success and not only
efﬁcient coordination or control of productive activities (Knott and Miller, 1987).17

Before identifying the theoretical approaches and types of administrative reform at the
external agents’ disposal, it is important to keep in mind that these techniques were not
originally designed for Third World’s cultural setting. Borrowing Western societies’ reform
approaches decreases the costs of investment in social science and public administration
research. But cultural differences require accommodating the transferred arrangements if they
are to function as intended. Long term implementation is needed to transform approaches for
a different socio-political setting (Lin, 1989). This is not a call for acceptance or rejection of
Western knowledge and theories of public administration and organization theory, rather it

is a reminder against the danger of mindless imitation.

 

'7 In this context, eﬂ‘ectiveness has been seen by some as not enough criterion for success, because
organizations that are truly eﬂ’ective may threaten their existence due to problems such as communicating
with their external or internal constituents (Kimberly, 1979).

49

History is another issue that must be fully examined by the external agent.
Bureaucracies have been developed through historical processes that signiﬁcantly impact their
culture and may explain unexpected responses to the external agent. One important historical
factor is the colonial period of a country that may raise an attitude against the external agent
by the locals similar to that raised against the former masters. Throughout history all
outsiders intervening in a country’s business have claimed and viewed themselves as
reformers. It may be true that Nineteenth Century Britain behaved differently than an external
agent does today, yet both entities are viewed by the locals as external. The point here is that
external agents should not overlook the historical effects, such as the impact of a former
colonial system, upon bureaucracies’ degree of enthusiasm to cooperate in the reform
process.

Planning of Administrative Reform

Administrative reform theoretically involves two steps (Chapel, 1982). The ﬁrst step
is conceiving a new mental image or planning. The second step in converting this image into
action in the world outside the mind or implementation. In addition to the tools of
implementation at the external agent’s disposal, planning of administrative reform is an
important step. Chapel (1982: 3 1) notes that:

Planning ﬁrst of all supports administrative reform, and its implementation.

It introduces an element of prediction and additional rationality. It enables

administrative problems to be tackled in a coordinated way, following a

uniform line of thought . . . Planning, at least in theory, provides a framework

for consistent action directed to achieving precise objectives and makes it

possible to avoid the disadvantages of successive changes or ill-prepared

undertakings. It is not, however, a panacea and in itself contributes nothing
to the actual solutions to be adopted for achieving the objectives.

50

Planning change is also important and should take place before the inception of any
action within the organization. Lippett, Watson, and Westley (1958) were ﬁrst to provide a
general handbook for principles and techniques of organizational change including diagnosing
the nature of problem; assessing the capabilities to change; selecting appropriate change
methods; choosing the appropriate helping role; recognizing and guiding the phases of
change; and establishing a system of maintaining change.

Theory, in a form of a plan and practice, is necessary for efficient and useful
implementation of administrative reform. To be practical and effective, the external agent’s
plan must not only be a general scheme but also must contain instructions for speciﬁc
administrative requirements in terms of economic, social, and technical analyses and
components. Quick (1980) demonstrates that even political commitment or extensive
promotion of policies is not sufficient condition for successful implementation if reform is
poorly deﬁned.

The external agent has to also take certain precautions to design and implement
eﬂ'ective administrative reform. Experimentation or evaluation of different approaches under
diﬁ’erent conditions to determine the most effective policies is a theoretically sound practice.
Also utilization of social science and technical investigation using anthropological, economic,
and sociological research to consider motivations and behavior patterns in planning reform
is also encouraged (Cleaves, 1980).

Finally, it is also important that planning for administrative reform must take national
development objectives into consideration. For example, many of external agents’ training

programs are superﬂuous or misdirected to the national needs due to the lack of forecasting

Sl

 

 

 

the r
burs;
refor.
aoocr
adequ
(Hop:
Shook
IO atta

Struct

if: /

is
i

é’
g

 

 

the manpower and training needs. External agents often focus upon top-downward
bureaucratic management rather than training bureaucrats that can effectively handle the
reform efforts. This strategy neglects the input of the crucial element in bureaucracies and
accordingly fails to sustain the reform efforts (Jedlicka, 1987). It also fails to ensure the
adequate supply of leadership to meet professional requirements of national development
(Hope, 1983a, 1983b). Overall, planning of administrative reform for a certain bureaucracy
should take national requirements into consideration in order to assist other reform efforts and
to attain a comprehensive social and economic development outcome.

Structural and Procedural Change Approach

The second step is converting the imaged plan into action. One approach is reforming

the bureaucracy’s structure and hierarchy. "

This is an important approach because it
improves the way information is communicated and decisions are made by efﬁciently
controlling, managing, and reducing the cost of information (Hammond, 1986; Jacobs, 1981).
Adjusting organizational structures and methods could aim at enhancing leaders’ control,
saving resources, or speeding the delivery of public service (Rondinelli 1987). Structural
change could also facilitate loosening rigidity, improving the performance, reduce shirking,

enhancing the responsiveness, or coordinating efforts across the boundaries of specialized

hierarchies (Esman, 1991).

 

" Still, there are limitations of designing a perfectly satisfactory hierarchy due to two problems or managerial
dilemmas. First, the horizontal dilemma, or the Sen Paradox, created by delegating authority to more than
one subset of individuals and suffering from either incoherent or inefﬁcient behavior due to different
combinations of individual preferences. Second, the vertical dilemma as the self-interested behavior of
bureaucrats leads them to make potential efﬁciency gains impossible (Miller, 1992).

52

 

 

 

looks

goal a

relies

(Helge

 

adlliSl.’

 

 

There is no ideal structure, rather different types of structures are optimal for diﬁ’erent
kinds of problems (Lindblom, 1977). Nevertheless, one general theoretical theme can be
identiﬁed. Administrative reform adopting the structural reform approach should move the
organization on a continuum between two poles. On one end, is the mechanical
organizational approach, which is a bureaucracy with a strict hierarchical setting that controls
all administrative operations ﬁom above. At every echelon of the hierarchy, a bureaucrat
looks to his superior for orders and guidance. This approach claims to maximize efﬁcient
goal achievement at minimal cost through rule-bound service-delivery.

On the other end of the continuum, is the organic organizational approach, which
relies on ﬂexible patterns of communication that adopts public demands and preferences
(Hage and Finsterbusch, 1987). A bureaucracy following this approach is a process of
adjustments to cope with public needs. Top-down standardized rules, procedures, and job
descriptions are relaxed or suspended. Bureaucrats are encouraged to combine their
collective knowledge, experiences, and initiatives to structure their own work environment
with cost-effective standards of performance that are satisfactory to the public demands
(Esman, 1991). The external agent does not have to fully apply this approach and jeopardize
accountability. A strategy of moving on a continuum to loosen the organizational rigidity has
the advantages of taking the best of both approaches and does not require dismantling the

hierarchal framework. ‘9

 

'9 There is always a nwd for a hierarchy. Explaining the need for its existence, however, is not
straightforward. Researchers refer to psychology (Law, Wilson, and Wilson, 1969), to cognitive sciences
(e.g., Simon, 1957), to communicative efficiency (e.g., Arrow, 1974), to differences in human talent (e.g.,
Williamson, 1985), or to the free riding problem (Williamson, 1975) in attempting to explain the need for
hierarchy.

53

 

cont
cont
oner
ofpo
lurai

locks

aPPfoa

 

One way for the external agent to move away from the monocratic end of the
continuum is through incrementally loosening the organization and improving
communications through encouraging less stratiﬁcation, more group processes, and project
oriented structures. The devaluation of authority and positional status, and official sharing
of power and inﬂuence, would also facilitate loosening the organization (Thompson, 1965).
An alternative approach entails the destruction of any function or process that is perceived
to discredit, suppress, or render reform. Some view the destructive processes as a necessary
part of structural reform due to its effectiveness in eliminating former ideologies, power
alliances, and leadership in order to permit the development of new ones congruent with the
new organizational structure (Biggart, 1977).

After moving ﬁ'om the monocratic end of the continuum, there are different theoretical
approaches to organize a bureaucracy. Methods include organization based on location
according to where services are delivered, based on purpose according to what is served,
based on process according to how services are delivered, or based on clientele according to
who is served (Gulick, 1992). Multiple structure approaches could also be used. For
example, an organization can be divided by policy, then by geography, and then by the
division of labor (Hammond, 1986).

Organizing the line of command within each of these structures could be based on the
principle of specialization (Simon, 1992). A multiple command structure approach is
theoretically sound because decisions in a bureaucracy often involve expertise from numerous
different ﬁelds. Also, it allows superiors to minimize the risk of biased information due to the

many avenues for bringing information. This advantage allows decisions to be responsive to

54

 

 

the;

be“
lit.

 

(H2:

relia':
thror.
errors

in re

Redo:

 

 

the public needs due to minimizing the value of information from bureaucrats with strategic
behavior who may alter the information input as a means to obtain a preferred policy outcome
(Hammond, 1986).20

The external agent approach to structural reform can also increase organizational
reliability by introducing redundancy into the hierarchy. Bureaucracies possessing reserves
through duplication or overlap have the capacity to detect errors, correct errors, and reduce
errors’ effect. Adding redundancy or duplication of functions within an organization enhances
its reliability because it illuminates the threats of parts prone to failure (Landau, 1969).”
Redundancy not only provides security but also spreads the risks of change, allowing the
external agent to try various ways to accomplish its reform objectives while “decreasing the
need for accurate prediction and increasing the probability that at least one method will
succeed” (Naomi and Wildavsky, 1974: 59).

The level of redundancy should be decided by the type of bureaucracy. For essential
public services, for example, pursuing redundancy with less considerations to its cost, is
theoretically sound due to the social costs of the interruption of service. The politics of
structural choice is also a decisive factor (Moe, 1990). If the political will tends toward

stream-lining and refuses redundancy, the external agent should put in place high quality

 

2° A paradoxical view is that structuring based on a unity of command is a preferable method because
“workman subject to orders from several supervisors will be confused, inefficient, and inesponsible. A
workman subject to orders from but one superior may be methodical, efﬁcient and responsible” (Gulick, 1992:
91). However, weighing the advantages and the disadvantages of both methods, a desired policy outcome
seems to be served better using a multiple structure of command based on specialization.

2‘ External agents, however, have to be aware that certain redundancy within an organizational structure can
cause costly errors. Heimann (1993) shows how redundancy can have negative effects on the capacity of
problem solving and decision making. For example, serial redundancy could create a Type 11 error or cause
signiﬁcant delays in decision making, and parallel redundancy could increase the likelihood of a Type I error.

55

 

C0?

 

rehabi

 

 

 

aPProz
Organ;L
an of-
YCﬂDrnq

Decca

components to maximize reliability. Overall, the presence of an external agent is crucial if
structural redundancy is to be adopted. This is due to the fact that societal poverty is the
main cause of preventing developing governments ﬁ'om using redundancy (Naomi and
Wildavsky, 1974).

The point made here is that structural and procedural approach is theoretically based
on incrementally removing obstacles of status, rank, authority, and hierarchical rigidities to
facilitate ﬁ’ee and frequent interaction among bureaucrats at all levels in order to efﬁciently
respond to the public needs. The external agent should remove unnecessary curbs on
legitimate diﬁ’erences of opinion, make sure that decision-makers are not excessively hindered
by compliance to formal rules or unity of command, and introduce redundancy to ensure
reliability of public services. A major obstacle for implementing the structural and procedural
approach, however, is the over-emphasis on centralization that puts stringent curbs on
organizational changes. Many bureaucratic problems are also associated with centralization,
all of which warrant presenting decentralization as a major approach for administrative
reform.

Decentralization

Decentralization as a reform method refers to any transfer of authority from politicians
and higher level ofﬁcials to middle level and lower level bureaucrats to plan, make decisions,
or mange public firnctions (Rondinelli, 1981, 1983, 1989; Hope, 1983b). This method is
needed because deteriorating service-providing bureaucracies rely heavily on centralization
to the point that “the public is surprised when any services are properly provided”(Werlin,

1992: 225). Local governments and service delivery bureaucracies are often underdeveloped

56

 

 

or l
tech
ofa:

COllS

dose:
for g:
burea
ldmir
times

matter

PTOVer

 

 

 

dedSio
milking

Centraj

or left with no functions due to the absence of a taxing power and resources, discretion, or
technically competent staff (Esman, 1991). In Middle Eastern countries, for example, little
of any consequence occurs in the administrative setting without the knowledge and direct
consent of the supervisor (Palmer, 1987: 245).

International external agents’ objective for promoting decentralization is improving
the planning, implementation, and effectiveness of bureaucracies (Conyers, 1983). First,
decentralization enhances public services delivery (Rondinelli, 1981, 1983, 1989). It allows
for greater organizational ﬂexibility to meet changing public demands and socially integrating
bureaucracies with their served communities (Timsit, 1982). Second, decentralizing the
administrative machinery serves to improve the level of coordination by removing
time-consuming conferences and consultations, often at the wrong levels, about unimportant
matters (Hope, 1983a, 1983b).

Third, decentralization relieves the central government of tasks and functions it has
proven to carry out inefﬁciently (World Bank, 1992). Minsters’ tendency to concentrate
decision-making in the headquarters leads to an overload of small decisions, and long delayed
actions without input of local information or understanding of local circumstances.
Centralized, preprogrammed, and uniform decisions in the delivery of public services waste
resources without accommodating variations in public local needs, demand, or circumstances
(Esman, 1991). Fourth, decentralization is also important to enable the internal agent to
implement the reform policies. Under the centralization policy, an organization’s leader has
to abide with the decisions and enormous power of ministers who are often less trained or

educated (Mills, 1966). Appointed senior ofﬁcials are not required to have expertise in their

57

 

 

 

1'".—

 

ﬁel.

reg:

tens:
supre

desk:

 

ﬁeld but only to carry out a political agenda and to keep bureaucracies responsive to the
regime’s changing priorities (Jedlicka, 1987).

Before identifying the external agent’s means for decentralization, it is important to
identify the problems most likely to be encountered. The major problem is the hostility or
reluctance of senior ofﬁcials and ministers who start to lose authority and power (Timsit,
1982; Werlin, 1992). Insecurity is theorized to be the main cause for government nrinisters’
resistance to delegate authority and operate without political sovereignty and unquestionable
supremacy (Hope, 1983a, 1983b). Another political reason to maintain centralization is the
desire to maintain national policies’ differences based on boundaries according to ethnic
groupings or class (Mills, 1966). Decentralization would not allow ofﬁcials to continue
serving one group better than the other. Finally resistance could be simply because
bureaucrats at the center refuse their transfer to the ﬁeld (Esman, 1991).

Another problem facing the external agent is at the local level. While in some cases
“street-level” bureaucrats request autonomy and control from their leaders (Lipsky, 1980),
many others refuse this autonomy. Many bureaucrats think that centralization is the best
option for career security because decentralization eventually opens the door for popular
participation and eliminates the need for excess bureaucrats. Bureaucrats at the local level
may also not support the external agent’s demand for decentralization due to the additional
responsibility and burdens associated or due to insufﬁcient organizational self-conﬁdence
(Jedlicka, 1987).

Given the political resistance to centralization, implementation has to include a

continuous negotiation strategy with the ministers and senior ofﬁcials as an attempt to

58

increase their conﬁdence and sophistication about decentralization. The external agent has
to consistently make the argument that decentralization does not entail loss of control, “but
rather is a substitution of methods that relieve headquarters of routine details and enhance
their ability to concentrate on more consequential problems-policy development, ﬁnancial
allocations, performance evaluation, and program adjustment-~while using their administrative
resources more effectively” (Esman, 1991: 50-51).

Overcoming resistance would then allow the external agent to choose ﬁ'om various
methods depending on the problem at hand such as yielding enough ﬁnancial space to local
entities to raise more revenues and meet increasing demand or improve quality. Further, level
of decentralization should be a function of the type of government services. More
decentralization is preferred for public utilities because discretion allows responding to
speciﬁc local needs and providing services to the public in a timely manner (Rondinelli and
Cheema, 1988).22 On the other hand, less decentralization is preferred on routine services
such as taxes or pension payments due to the little or no need for great managerial discretion
(Esman, 1991).

The type of policy pursued is also a determinant of the success or failure of
decentralization. The success in decentralization is more likely for projects dealing with a
collective good such as electriﬁcation rather than a divisible good that may exacerbate conﬂict

in the implementation process such as housing (Grindle, 1980a). Political factors and the type

 

2’ Many factors may support the external agent’s quest in intensifying its demand for decentralization of urban
services. Governments’ need to maintain public services in urban areas in the face of rapid population
growth, intensiﬁed nrral-urban migration, and “urban bias” in the form of a concentrated demand for public
services from an articulate middle class urban residents (Lipton, 1977) all help the external agent in its
demand for decentralization.

59

d

 

 

of;

isa

imp.
dece

Ofd:

than.
long i
fear i

deter.

 

Wan.

Wan

of political response at the local level should also be examined to determine if decentralization
is a viable approach for administrative reform.23 Decentralization attempts should contain the

necessary control mechanisms for handling political conﬂicts sufﬁciently so that
implementation can proceed. These considerations are important because failing in
decentralization attempts has signiﬁcant consequences such as leading to future elimination
of decentralization as an option for other bureaucracies.

The external agents’ means of implementation also have to take into account the
chances of incompetence or corruption by bureaucrats at the local level. Such chances have
long reinforced the unwillingness of senior ofﬁcials to delegate authority (Werlin, 1992). This
fear is true as the World Bank (1992: 21) warns about unprofessional implementation of
decentralization:

If not carefully managed, however, decentralization can lead to a deterioration

in the use and control of resources, especially in the short term. National

goals can be seriously distorted by local governments, and scarce resources

can be diverted to poor uses. Moreover, radical decentralization can seriously

weaken the capacity of the central government to manage the economy

through ﬁscal and monetary means.

One remedy is to proceed incrementally with decentralization in order to prepare
bureaucrats for more responsibility and to allow senior ofﬁcials to gain more conﬁdence in

them. Incremental implementation would also allow a reliable management information

system to be in place to ensure a timely and accurate communication for better decisions.

 

2’ Rothenberg (1980) gives an example of how fragmented political power led to the failure of decentralization
attempts to provide low-income housing in urban Colombia due to problems over decisions such as site
selection.

60

 

M

Be

bure

grou
semi:
grog
job c1

effort

Amer
t0 the
”mill:

13¢le ‘5

 

More importantly, minimizing breakdowns of the decentralized system can be done by
building competence and confidence ofbureaucrats as a part of a behavioral change approach.
Behavioral Change

Another approach is creating an actual difference or improvement in some aspect of
bureaucrats’ behavior through a long term effort of applying theories of behavioral science
on diﬁ‘erent organizational elements. Fundamental elements include bureaucrats in groups,
groups combined into organizations, the actions of bureaucrats and groups in organizational
settings and, by inference, the values that are the basis for action by both bureaucrats and
groups (French and Bell, 1984; Jedlicka, 1987). This is not an easy task. Simply changing
job characteristics, for example, would not improve a bureaucrat’s behavior in terms of his
efforts, performance or satisfaction (Hall et al., 1978).

The presence of the external agent is of great importance for adopting this approach.
Autocracy is unfortunately still a very common behavior in Third World change strategies due
to the underlying cultural realities of class or social status. External agents would allow
utilizing ﬂexible and scientiﬁc approaches to changing human behavior that are usually
lacking in their absence (Jedlicka, 1987).

Irnpedirnents to the external agent’s role in the management ofbehavioral change are
more challenging and problematic due to factors such as the unclear preferences of individuals
(Cohen and March, 1974). To understand why it is difﬁcult to change bureaucrats’ behavior,
external agents must ﬁrst explore what holds bureaucrats to their sets of actions. Bureaucrats
may persist in a course of action simply because they believe consistency in that action is

appropriate behavior based on their culture and history (Ginzberg and Reilly, 1957).

61

 

 

Bu

cha

Va:

1nd:

CXpr

chat

 

 

 

 

Bureaucrats may also interpret changes with reference to their own self-interest and resist
change as an attempt to pursue their own goals and to maximize their beneﬁts (Astley and
Van de Ven, 1983). Personal interest governing bureaucrats’ behavior could also be due to
individual preferences that cause them to persist in attempting to maximize pleasant
experiences and minimize unpleasant ones (Daudi, 1986).

Theoretically, there are few tools at the external agent’s disposal for behavioral
change. One ﬁrndamental way to improve bureaucrats’ behavior is recruiting competent
persons based on efficient and fair process. The behavior approach should deal with
reforming the recruitment process. Selecting career posts should be based on merit and
competitive selection of the best qualiﬁed applicants according to objective tests, educational
achievement, and relevant experience. Subsequent advancement should also be based on the
same criteria, not only to rnininrize the need for behavioral change programs in the future, but
also to provide bureaucracies with qualiﬁed administrators. Promotions, like recruitment,
should not be guided by religion, wealth, social class, or the period in the service. Rather, the
principal objective for a promotion system should be to secure the best possible incumbents
for higher positions.

The appointment of persons without the necessary competence has contributed in no
small way to the current behavioral problems within Third World bureaucracies. The external
_ agent has to break the traditional cycle of kinship afﬁliation or political loyalty in exchange
for government employment. This is done by continuously attempting to convince the regime
that recruitment based on merit brings expertise with commitment and reliability to the public

service with no signiﬁcant threat to the regime (Esman, 1991).

62

Second, training to improve bureaucrats’ capability to perform certain tasks and to
change the way they think and behave is an indispensable element of the behavior approach.
It is important because it increases the quality of bureaucrats and administrators expected to
cope with the increasingly weighty and varied public demands. Training is a continuous
long-term process, even after reforming the recnritment procedures, whether in educational
institutions, formal training programs, or/and self-development. Many qualiﬁed recruited
bureaucrats still have certain inadequacies and therefore much to learn before becoming really
eﬂ‘ective. No single shot program of education or training in public administration is able to
cover all needed areas (Hope, 1983a, 1983b). Training of senior ofﬁcials to ensure a greater
degree of expertness is also a means to ensure that efﬁcient decisions are made (Simon,
1992).

Training changes bureaucrats’ behavior through increasing specialization and
professionalism as well. In the absence of the external agent, seldom do senior ofﬁcials give
positive encouragement to bureaucrats who seek to broaden their specialization (Jedlicka,
1987). Specialization would increase competence and foster technical knowledge and
experience to cope with problems (Gonnley, 1983).” The degree of professionalism is also
an important factor that affects the success of changing behavior. Professionally competent
bureaucrats process the work more smoothly and are more acceptant to change in

organizational environment (Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky, 1974; Daft, 1978).

 

1‘ Specialimtion, however, is not without disadvantages to other areas of bureaucracy. A paradoxical view
is that it would also increase the barriers for the public to entry and to even understand the bureaucrats’

language.
63

 

3?
of t
its
at}

rlit

‘5 fax
0133;“.

mits“ ,

 

Third, incentives can be an effective tool for behavioral change that theoretically could
aid the external agent’ 3 in minimizing bureaucratic resistance. The external agent could adopt
a positive incentive approach given that inadequate ﬁnancial compensation drains the morale
of bureaucrats and limits their commitment to the minimum requirements of their job. The
reward system should also not be heavily biased against the risks of innovation. Compared
with the private sector, the bureaucratic innovator who fails is condemned and innovation has
a little payoff (Barton, 1979). Or it could be a negative incentive approach with strong
enough pressure that leads bureaucrats to adopt the required changes in their behavior
(Downs, 1967).

Fourth, the behavioral approach could also address the problem of excessive delays
in decision-making, excessive formalisms, and rigidity. A bureaucrat’s extreme conformity
with rules and procedures could be means to protect himself from a superior and to reduce
the pressure of decision making (Thompson, 1961). Bureaucrats most often fall into this
dilemma are “conservers” concerned with preserving their present power, prestige, income,
and job security by rigidly applying rules to minimize risk (Downs, 1967; Foster, 1990).

The external agent can add more details to make laws more clear and precise in order
to change bureaucrats’ behavior in the implementation process.” Rules protect values such
as fairness and reducing fraud, but at the same time they “reduce the ability of the
organization to achieve its goals and its incentives to cooperate with those who enforce the

rules” (Wilson, 1989: 343). This is a tough task for the external agent because it should also

 

2’ Intervening in the law making process is not an unrealistic approach. External agents are already involved
in judiciary reform in many countries, including Egypt.

64

 

 

at

midi:
bore.
PT?» e

I0 the

 

work on minimizing “ritualism” and the power struggle among groups that increase rules in
a bureaucracy just to preserve and enlarge their discretion areas (Crozier, 1964: 156).

Finally, a behavioral approach should also address the issue of jurisdiction in order to
get bureaucrats in the same organization to work together towards a common goal. A
bureaucrat usually has the tendency to believe that his responsibility regarding a particular
case extends only to the extent of his jurisdiction. What happens to a ﬁle when it moves away
from his desk is not of an interest to him. Thus, bureaucrats’ behavior makes a bureaucracy
looks like a loose fragmented bag of responsibilities (Shaukat, 1975). The external agent has
to minimize the causes of opposing factors that disrupt bureaucrats’ behavior such as
opposition between appointees and civil servants, struggles between agency zealots and
agency conservatives, and simply internal personality clashes.
Organizational Culture Reform

Approaches of structural and behavior reform are important in dealing with issues
related to efﬁciency, accountability, monitoring, and ﬂow of information within a
bureaucracy. Organizational culture is also important in addressing the details that may
prevent bureaucrats ﬁom doing their part in helping the organization to accomplish its goal
to the best of their ability. Schein gives examples of organizational culture (1992: 492-93):

Observed behavioral regularities when people interact, such as the language

used and the rituals around deference and demeanor. . . .The norms that evolve

in working groups....The dominant values espoused by an organization, such

as product quality... The philosophy that guides an organization’s policy

toward employees and/or customers. . . .The rules of the game for getting along

in the organization, such as the ropes that a newcomer must learn in order to
become an accepted member....The feeling or climate that is conveyed in an

65

 

 

 

organization by the physical layout and the way in which members of the
organization interact with customers or other outsiders.

The concept of organizational culture is broad and includes various aspects that allow
the external agent to ﬁnd reasons for unexplained policy outcomes. Consequently, the effort
to examine it is worthwhile because much of the mysterious and seemingly irrational issues
in the organization become clear.

Organizational culture makes a signiﬁcant difference between the success and failure
of the external agent’s efforts. Most of the better performing organizations have a
well-deﬁned set of guiding beliefs while poorer performing organizations have dysfunctional
cultures. Strong cultures are those considered to be more directed toward the marketplace
with less need for policy manuals or detailed procedures and rules. Dysﬁrnctional cultures,
on the other hand, focus on internal politics rather than the customer and on the quantity
rather than the quality. The philosophy and spirit that drive an organization “have far more
to do with its relative achievements than do technological or economical resources,
organizational structure, innovation, and timing” (Peters and Waterman, 1982: 280).

Organizational culture falls on a continuum with a rigid environment on one end and
a loose environment on the other. In the case of the rigid environment, formality is
symbolized by observations such as a slow pace of work, high value for rank or status, and
managers who are serious and concerned about protocol. On the other end of the continuum,
there is a loose environment with a high regard for individual’s creativity and insubordination

is positively valued and rarely punished (Schein, 1992).

66

The external agent’s approach to culture reform should avoid the extreme on either
side of the continuum. Reform should be balanced on the continuum by taking in account
accountability and efﬁciency, on the one hand, and human needs on the other. Under an
extreme rigid culture, for example, problems would arise from resistance to innovative ideas
and creativity is deemed to be a sign of revolt or a deviant action (Shaukat, 1975). Under a
complete informal culture, on the other hand, problems would arise from not implementing
decisions due to bureaucrats’ discretions in reversing if they think they are correct (Schein,
1992). A mix between the two approaches is most likely to be the best strategy for
administrative reform.

One common method for cultural reform is based on comparing the “descriptive
cultural elements” as they exist and “normative cultural elements” as they should exist with
reference to the desired organizational goals in order to provide a “gap analysis”
(V emon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989: 638). The external agent would then decide which of
the organizational change approaches discussed here should be adopted to overcome the
identiﬁed gap. Another method for changing the organizational culture is to aim at
minimizing the effect of government rules by moving a bureaucracy from being govemment-
oriented to customer-oriented. Total Quality Management as designed by Deming (1990) is
a mean towards that end. It is a process-oriented method to promote worker participation
in decision making, continuous improvement in work processes, and treating organizational
clients as customers (Walton, 1990). A balance, however, has to be achieved so that issues

are solved in favor of the public without sacriﬁcing the government agenda.

67

 

116‘.

.
511'”
L

QC:

Cult

 

 

Regardless of the method adopted, a major problem that faces the external agent is
changing informal arrangements such as values, ethical norms, mores, customs, and ideologies
that underlie the organizational culture. It is a problem because informal organizational
arrangements are transformed only when bureaucrats abandon their conventions or personal
standards and adopt new ones on individual basis and without collective action (Lin, 1989).
This is in contrast to formal nrles, which are easy to change by ﬁat, law, or the passage of a
new statute (Riggs, 1964). Changes in informal arrangements occur gradually, and often
subconsciously, as bureaucrats evolve new alternative patterns ofbehavior consistent with the
external agent’s adopted reform approach. It is an incremental process of changing informal
culture due to gradual withering away from an accepted norm or social convention and the
gradual adoption of a new one (North, 1993).

Changing informal arrangements is also a problem because the reform costs do not
only take the form of time, effort, or resources spent on the process, but also signiﬁcant
material incentives. Lin (1989: 29) notes that:

No individuals are bounded by cultural endowments in seeking to improve

their own lots. They are bounded only by the lack of opportunities that

promise large enough proﬁts for undertaking changes.

The external agent has to portray the expected beneﬁts for the bureaucrat as large
enough to exceed the bureaucrats’ nonmaterial beneﬁts from sticking to their norms and
values. Reform of informal arrangements signiﬁcantly depends on the bureaucrats’
calculation of the beneﬁts and costs that may arise from reform. Beneﬁts also have to be

distributed equally among bureaucrats of the organization to achieve common compliance

68

ll:

me
org-
pic-I:

Cha

eSser
910C:

Shara

 

with the new organizational culture. While very few are expected to be reluctant to adopt the
new arrangements even if the material costs for their violation are large, many bureaucrats
who do not share the material beneﬁts of reform will feel that their valued mores are offended.
Overall, altering values, customs, and social mores is possible given that they all have been
changed in the process of human history (Lin, 1989).

It is left to emphasize here that despite the informal arrangements’ expected negative
effects on the organizational culture, they should be tolerated to some extent. The external
agent should not attempt to completely eliminate informal arrangements in the organization
because they are necessary to oil the wheels of the organization and responsible for essential
means of operation such as cohesion (Barnard, 1968). Therefore, a mix of loose and rigid
organizational culture will help the external agent to effectively reduce organizational
problems such as systematic rule violation or a minimum output.

Changing or Redeﬁning Organization’s Goals

Explicitly identifying and deciding on the organizations’ goals and objectives is an
essential step in administrative reform (Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989). Rules and
procedures, such as mandated procedures and routines requiring competitive bidding or
guaranteeing equal access to public services, often become ends in themselves and displace,
conStrain, or retard the organizational goals (Esman, 1991). This is a signiﬁcant problem

given that the main and explicit purpose of an organization is to seek speciﬁc goals (Blau and
Scott, 1962; Etzioni, 1964).
Changing or redeﬁning the organization’s goals is an important approach due to the

absence of a realistic statement of goals and objectives to begin with in most cases (Andrews,

69

 

 

 

1980). It is also important because many of the conventional methods of introducing
organizational change discussed here are inadequate without clear goals. Based on the
reestablished goals, the external agent can then set about arranging the organizational
structure, or other reform approaches, to enable the organization to meet its goals (Brooker,
1965). Finally, clarity of goals is important for successful policy implementation (Cleaves,
1980). While ideally organizations should have a single set of compatible goals that are
conﬂict ﬁ'ee, this is not the case that faces an external agent. Legitimate goals have an
inevitable conﬂict, such as the tradeoff between equity and efﬁciency, in providing services.
The external agent must identify an explicit tradeoff among goals in order to minimize that
inherent conﬂict (Vemon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989).

Goals must not only be clear and unambiguous, but they must also be agreed upon by
oﬁcials at different levels in the government hierarchy otherwise the capacity of the
government to control implementation may rapidly disappear (McClintock, 1980). Further,
the external agent will often ﬁnd that the organization’s goals have conﬂict with the coalition
members of the organization such as suppliers, customers, and other related agencies.
Sequential attention to goals by the external agent is useful when bargaining within the
coalition is problematic. Picking and attending one goal at a time helps in attaining an
acceptable resolution level of goal conﬂict. The process of tending one goal, or sirrrilar set
of goals, at one time eases the bureaucracy’ pressure from its coalition that contain conﬂicting
interest (Cyert and March, 1963).

Comparing existing goals and objectives with desired ones provides a gap analysis for

the external agent to change the organization’s goals. Identifying the organization’s present

70

 

 

no

th:

 

 

 

goals can be through deducing the bureaucrats’ strategy from their observed behavior
(Andrews, 1980). Identifying what the goals and objectives should be can be identiﬁed
through surveying the public. Assessing the gap provides an indication of which approach
of organizational change should be imposed by the external agent in order to attain the desired
goals. Feedback from the implementation could also provide information that might result
in a redeﬁnition of goals (Quick, 1980).

The external agent’s task of changing organizational goals does not stop at deﬁning
the new organization’s goals. In addition to ensuring that a working system able to attain
these goals is in place, the external agent has to consider Barnard’s (1968) zone of
indifference for bureaucrats to predict the acceptance and inculcation of goals in the
organization. Bureaucrats tend to accept the organization’s objectives without question as
long as they remain within the terms of their employment contract (March and Simon, 195 8).

Finally, the organization’s leadership has an important role under this approach. He
has to always bring the organizational goal to the front by coordinating, inspiring, and
motivating bureaucrats to achieve the desired goals (Quick, 1980; Esman, 1991). Behn’s
(1991) “management by groping along” would allow leaders to be strategic in developing a
realistic vision, and then use their skills and interpretation of events to make progress towards
the strategic goal. Further, making sure that bureaucrats are focusing on the organization’s
goals would increase their rationality in decision making. Assigning a high priority to the
organization’s goal, while controlling other environment factors, 'such as organization
loyalties or group identiﬁcation, minimizes the problem of bounded rationality in decision

making (Simon, 1945).

71

-—»——-—4_.—r-1

 

 

 

196

 

 

Improving Relation with the Public

A meaningful interaction between bureaucrats and the public is an essential
administrative function and helps in achieving the goals of a developed society.
Administrative reform approaches discussed here would go unnoticed if bureaucrats dealing
directly with the public are arrogant, aloof, arbitrary, and corrupt in their behavior. Street-
level bureaucrats who work in the delivery of public and social services are the mirror of the
bureaucracy because citizens deal with bureaucracies only through encounters with them
(Lipsky, 1980). The external agent thereby has to work on establishing channels of
communication between the bureaucracy and its public (Hassan, 1983). The success of
organization largely hinges on the performance of bureaucrats in contact with the public
(Esman, 1991).

The relationship between bureaucrats and the public is weak, negative, and in some
cases hostile in deveIOping countries. The external agent often faces bureaucracies that suffer
from excessive sense of self importance, an indifference to the feelings or the convenience of
the citizens, and/or an obsession with the authority of departmental decisions (Eldersveld,
1968). Serving the public does not usually take a priority on the bureaucrats’ agenda of
maximizing beneﬁts. Bureaucrats’ welfare does not mainly depend upon the number of
people they serve and they do not see increasing the bureaucracy’s clientele as a means to that
end (Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky, 1974). The citizen on the other hand suffers ﬁ'om the
incompetence of bureaucracies and their drawbacks (Eldersveld, 1968). When a person is

ﬁnally able to make contact with the bureaucracy, he will often be faced with the indifference,

72

the incompetence, or arrogance of the bureaucrat whose job is after all to assist or inform him
(Schaffer, 1982).

The monopoly nature of bureaucracies does not give the public the consumer options
of exiting or complaining (Hirschman, 1970). In the absence of monopoly, the dissatisﬁed
public can cause organizations to change their behavior or improve their services ﬁom the
fear of market depletion. However, the monopoly nature of bureaucracies alleviates the exit
option available to the public. Further, the public has been practicing their voice option for
decades with minimum response due to the lack of accountability and responsiveness.
Bureaucrats ill trained for dealing with the public give public administration a bad name by
being indifferent, unhelpful, and inconsiderate to public problems. The least privileged
categories of people in developing societies do not have enough time, money, education, or
means of transportation to make the necessary contact with bureaucracies (Schaffer, 1982).

There is a little training for changing the bureaucrats’ views toward the public whose
lives are aﬂ‘ected by the bureaucracy (Jedlicka, 1987). Training cultivates in bureaucrats the
qualities required for improving relation with the public such as good listeners, capacity to
explain things thoroughly, and perfect self-control (Hassan, 1983). Bureaucrats with such
qualities who assume less authoritarian techniques can convince the public of their
instrumental role in the system and lead to a decline in public’s hostility and initiate
cooperation (Eldersveld and Jagannadham, 1968). Such qualities in bureaucrats are also
important because the public is not one mass but is distinguishable in terms of different status
and its frequency of contacts with a bureaucracy. Bureaucrats, therefore, should reﬂect in

their work the aspirations, interests, and demand of the diverse public they serve.

73

There are many tools at the external agent’s disposal to improve bureaucracies’
relation with the public. This is a difﬁcult task, however, given that once an image of
bureaucracy develops it persists in the public mind (Eldersveld, 1968). First, the external
agent can apply pressure on street-level bureaucrats through demanding greater accountability
to the public and increased productivity (Lipsky, 1980). Second, the agent can continually
monitor and evaluate services in relation to the deployment of staff and the public reaction
to procedures. Third, attention can be focused on the three problem areas of the
applicant/bureaucracy relationship: entrance, queue, and reception counter (Schaffer, 1982).
Fourth, provide stronger incentives for low-speciﬁcity activities with uncertain technologies.
This category contains a wide range of civil servants from jarritors to service delivery and are
large in numbers given developing countries’ high illiteracy rate. It is essential to get some
of the best people in charge of most important low-speciﬁcity activities (Israel, 1987).

Finally, improving working conditions is also theorized to improve bureaucrats’
relationship with the public. Bureaucrats in the ﬁeld of service delivery are often working in
deteriorating, poorly lighted, unsanitary conditions, and old, unreliable, and ﬁequently out of
order facilities and equipment. These conditions develop a sense of neglect and low
satisfaction which is translated into low productivity levels, unresponsive performance, and
alienating the public (Esman, 1991). Street-level bureaucrats are usually ﬁ'ustrated by the
lack of gratitude and appreciation they receive for preforrning their diﬂicult service jobs
(Yates, 1977). Overall, these methods would not only improve the public’s access to the

organization, but would also create an incentive to improve the bureaucrats’ performance.

74

"‘ﬁ-

Sustainability of the efforts for improving relation with the public is more in the hands
of bureaucrats than the external agent. The external agent’s efforts could provide only a
temporary boost, but the image of a bureaucracy in the public mind is endured through reality.
Sustainability can be only attained through bureaucrats’ good performance because public
opinion about a bureaucracy is formed on the basis of personal experience (Hassan, 1983).
Technological Change Approach

The external agent often ﬁnds it necessary to introduce new technology into a
bureaucracy to increase its efﬁciency and reduce the production and transaction costs (Lin,
1989). The presence of the external agent is crucial for this approach because developing
countries cannot be expected to develop high technologies themselves (Swerdlow, 1975).
Bureaucracies in direct contact with the external agent are expected to perform at levels far
superior to the average of the country due to the additional technical assistance (Israel, 1987).

The technological change approach allows a bureaucracy to use resources more
eﬁciently and make its performance more effective. Further, advanced technology is not
restricted to the ﬁelds of production. It improves ﬁnancial methods such as budgeting,
accounting, and expenditure control, and introduces more rational methods of scheduling,
monitoring, and evaluation (Kiggundu 1989; Esman, 1991). The technological approach also
improves the speed and accuracy ofinforrnation ﬂows, particularly through microcomputers.
The electronic processing of data is an especially important mean of reform in service-
providing organizations (Swerdlow, 1975).

The technological approach is also essential for facilitating other approaches to

administrative reform. It helps in decentralizing operations by loosening the requirements for

75

A

management of information. Routine ﬂows of reliable and timely data, both quantitative and
qualitative, can be speeded at moderate cost by microcomputer technologies that facilitate the
storage and retrieval of large volumes of potentially useful materials (Esman, 1991). The
technological approach allows the communication of information speedily and accurately,
greatly increases the productivity of bureaucrats and accountability, speeds their response
time, and adjusts responses to speciﬁc local needs (United Nations, 1988).

Common in the means of this approach is to include specialists in the external agent’s
staff who are able to design computer programs and applications according to individual
organizations and individual countries. The external agent has to make sure that the new
technology and the installation of such equipments lead to their actual usage at all levels of
the organization. Otherwise, the new technology will just become a new expensive toy.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a literature review of the external agent’s role in
administrative reform. The complex political environment in terms of the regime and
bureaucratic resistance was emphasized. The problematic nature of the relationship between
bureaucrats and politics and the external agents makes it difﬁcult to plan, analyze, and manage
administrative reform in a highly rationalistic and systematic ways. Therefore, the importance
of an organization’s leadership in aiding the external agent to overcome these problems and
to establish effective means of communications, was also emphasized.

Finally, a blue print of tools available for the external agent’s task of administrative
reform was presented. Approaches reviewed included planning, structural and procedural

change, decentralization, behavioral change, organizational culture reform, redeﬁning

76

*‘w’

organization’s goals, improving relation with the public, and improving the technological
capacity. It is also emphasized that the external agent should form a strategy for
organizational change based on a combination of these tools because organizational change
is a complex task. Changes often involve trade offs and solving the problem often creates
other problems that require adopting more change tactics. Adopting one without the other
is an over-sirnpliﬁcation of administrative reform. Overall, the external agent’s goal in
combining all the change approaches is to shape bureaucracies in a manner that is capable of
responding to the challenge of development requirements.

In light of the Continuity and Reform model, the literature review explains the means
available for establishing administrative reform. These means are stated next to the “Intended
Direction of Administrative Reform” in Figure 2. 1. Put together, this chapter should provide
a clear understanding of the forces of continuity that face reform in the form of political and
bureaucratic resistance, intended direction and tools of adnrinistrative reform, and the role of
the external agent in implementation all within the context of the Continuity and Reform

model.

77

Figure 2.1

Forces of Continuity and Reform Model: Methods of Administrative Reform
Status Quo of Public Administration

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political Political
7 ,,,,,, ‘-
*7 DUSAID Cabinet‘
Economic Economic 1
a , ‘ '
External Agent Government of Egypt
l
1 l
l l
l
Social Social .
4
>Contractors Bureaucracy<~v
Cultural Cultural
4
Forces of Change Forces of Continuity
Intended Direction of Administrative Reform
+

 

Structural reform, procedural reform , decentralization, behavioral change,
cultural change, redeﬁning organization's goals, improving relation with the public,
and /or enhancing technological capacity.

78

Mm!

CHAPTER 3
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

In this chapter I will attempt to answer the research question of whether the GOE, in
the form of the President and his ministers, directly constrains efforts of reforming the
Egyptian bureaucracy. This will be done by an analytical study of Egyptian bureaucracy and
the relative government policies with the goal of identifying Egypt’s administrative problems
and the role of government policies in solving, or complicating, these problems.

Historical Background

The Egyptian bureaucracy as we know it today ﬁrst took shape with the
nationalization of British and French interests and Egyptian private sector ﬁrms in the wake
of the 1956 Suez War. The unique feature of President Nasser’s nationalization is the
diversity of assets with the expectation that bureaucracies would be able to compete with one
another (Waterbury, 1992). With nationalization, a new unprepared Egyptian bureaucracy
was made responsible for social and economic development and for attaining the revolution’ 3
goal of social equality.

To change Egypt ﬁ'om a colonized society to a developed nation, administrative tasks
from planning to delivery of goods and services in all sectors ﬁ'om tourism and entertainment
to industry and agriculture, and even the religious institutions, became bureaucratic
responsibilities. To attain the goal of social equality, President Nasser undertook a series of
broad obligations to provide the people with subsidized basic human needs such as food,

healthcare, and housing; free education through the university level; rent control; and

79

WWI.

guaranteed employment. Later it was argued that these measures also ensured bureaucrats
a minimally adequate standard of living (Palmer et al., 1989; Said, 1992).

Egypt’s administrative problems started by President Nasser’s replacing of King
Farouk’s bureaucrats to insure a bureaucratic loyalty and to create an apparatus that could
carry out the new responsibilities. By the end of President Nasser’s regime in 1970, the
number of government employees jumped from 350,000 to 1.2 million and the number of
ministries from 15 to 28; forty-six new public corporations were created to replace private
institutions, and public expenditures per capita tripled from 9.6 to 31.8 Egyptian pounds at
ﬁxed prices (Ayubi, 1980, 1982). The new bureaucratic force had no practical skills in public
administration and was, thus, not suited for attaining developmental goals. New hires were
primarily trained in arts, law, or the humanities and given irrelevant positions in the civil
service just to lower unemployment (Harbison and Abd Al-Kader, 1958). Senior ofﬁcials
were trained in military affairs rather than public administration. The dilemma intensiﬁed
because President Nasser came to power with no blueprint on how to effectively promote
growth and development (Ajami, 1982; Waterbury, 1983).

Egypt’s bureaucratic expansion was effortless due to many reasons. First, the
adoption of a centrally planned economic system, followed by the nationalization in all sectors
of the society, led to replacing market forces by administrative decision-making that required
a large bureaucracy (Ikram, 1980). Second, under the “graduates policy,” which guarantees

every graduate a bureaucraticjob, bureaucracy became “bloated as the employer of last resort

80

for Egypt’s recent university graduates who wait several years for an actual appointment”
(Weinbaurrr, 1986: 115)".

Al Ahram’s survey in 1983 found that bureaucrats have to wait on average more than
two years before receiving a government position under the “graduates policy.” In 1990,
Sullivan et al. found that the norm had become ﬁve to six years and the waiting periods for
applicants entering the bureaucracy via nepotism is considerably less. By 1997, the number
of graduates demanding bureaucratic positions far exceeded the government’s needs as it is
still hiring those who graduated in 1984-85.

Third, hiring more bureaucrats was an assurance for the government against political
unrest (Waterbury, 1983). Bureaucratic efﬁciency took second place to social and political
pressures to provide employment for Egyptians in the absence of a ﬁee market. The
expansion of goods and services associated with the recruitment of bureaucrats became a
major political objective, limited only by budgetary constraints rather than by public demand
(Ikram, 1980). Finally, Egyptian bureaucracy was growing as a result of its own momentum
as managers wanted to increase their prestige and promotion possibilities by expanding their
employment (Rivlin, 1985).

President Sadat appointed his ﬁrst government after President Nasser’s death in 1970.
For over a decade the GOE of 1970s did not make any serious administrative reform attempts
to halt or reverse the expanding unskilled bureaucratic apparatus. The number ofbureaucrats

jumped to 2.6 million or about 6 percent of the population in 1980. In addition, 100,000

 

2‘ The graduates policy was initiated as a part of President Nasser’s “social contract.” It is supposedly a
government tool that uses the public service for reducing intellectual unemployment. Every graduate from
Egypt’s free education system is guaranteed a job in the public sector upon graduation.

81

university graduates were waiting to be hired under the “graduate policy" (Ayubi, 1982).
Things got worse for Egyptian public administration when President Sadat’s “open door
policy” led to a noticeable migration of the few skilled public managers to the private sector,
international agencies, or out of the country mainly to the oil rich Arab peninsula (Waterbury,
1983). Internal and external brain-drain continues today and is caused by the ﬁxed low value
of salaries in the face of inﬂation (Sullivan, 1996).

Table 3.1 illustrates the growth of Egyptian bureaucracy between 1951 and 1998.
The table also compares grth with a base year 1981/1982, the year when power was
transferred to President Mubarak.

Egypt entered into President Mubarak’s era with no sign of serious administrative
reform in sight. One early sign was President’s Mubarak selection of Kamal Al-Ganzouri as
his new prime minister for administrative reform. Al-Ganzouri was the minister responsible

for planning Egypt’s inﬂated bureaucracy and command economy since President Sadat’s

regime.

82

Table 3.1

Growth of Egyptian Bureaucracy from 1951-1998.

 

 

 

 

 

Comparing with
Number of 1981/82 Base
Fiscal Year Bureaucrats Year

1951/52 350,000 13
1956/57 454,000 17
1962/63 770,000 29
1965/66 932,897 35
1966/67 1,035,747 39
1967/68 1,102,925 42
1968/69 1,134,867 43
1969/70 1,187,726 45
1970/71 1,250,280 47
1971/72 1,290,528 49
1973/74 1,471,236 56
1974/75 1,660,609 63
1975/76 1,701,000 64
1976/77 1,779,000 67
1977/78 1,910,525 72
1978/79 2,065,286 78
1979/80 2,215,779 84
1980/81 2,474 450 94
1982/83 2,850,122 108
1983/84 3,015,329 114
1984/85 3,204,785 12]
1985/86 3,258,650 123
1986/87 3,480,191 132
1987/88 3,571,201 135
1988/89 3,867,583 146
1989/90 3,948,000 149
1990/91 4,122,274 156
1991/92 4,313,432 163
1992/93 4,452,583 168
1993/94 4,665,676 176
1994/95 4,929,417 186
1995/96 5,103,879 193
1996/97 5,541,121 209
1997/98 (estimate) 5,553,217 210

 

Sources: FYs 1951/52, 1956/57, and 1962/63 are from Ayubi (1980) pp. 213-232. FYs 1965/66 -

1997-98 are from the Central Agency for Organization and Administration.

83

 

Administrative Problems of Contemporary Egyptian Bureaucracy

In 1992, various bureaucracies were put to a test when thousands of citizens were left
homeless ﬁ’om a devastating earthquake. The Egyptian bureaucracy failed to provide rescue,
temporary housing, food, clothing, or even money to the victims. Bureaucratic inefﬁciency
gave legitimacy to Islamic groups who were able to provide tangible relief to the growing
number of victims and cause national embarrassment to the regime (Sullivan, 1994). The
Egyptian bureaucracy, according to a representative in the People Assembly, is still unable
to help the victims in his district six years after the earthquake. Many families still live in tents
waiting for the government’s promises to be fulﬁlled (Al-Add, 1998).

The Egyptian bureaucracy has retained almost complete control over social and
economic activities since the 19503 and both society and bureaucracy have been experiencing
mounting diﬂiculties as a result. Efﬁciency and development did not increase in proportion
to investment with money and manpower into the bureaucratization of Egypt. Giugale and
Mobarak (1996: 2) note that:

About six million Egyptians are ultrapoor, that is, have an income lower than

a third of the national average. These Egyptians live on a quarter of a dollar

a day or less. The poor are characterized by larger and younger households

with a high incidence of disability and malnutrition, higher mortality and

morbidity rates, little or no access to basic inﬁastructure like safe water and

sanitation, and a high degree of geographical concentration in Upper Egypt

(40 percent of Egypt’s poor live there, although the region comprises only 30

percent of the country’s population). A skewed pattern of income distribution

aggravates the situation; the income of the richest twenty percent of the

population is six times higher than that of the poorest twenty percent, a

pattern that is more unequal than that of Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Indonesia,
or the Philippines.

84

In the following I shall review the most signiﬁcant administrative problems that
prevented ﬁ'om addressing such disparities. This is an important exercise because
bureaucracies have a key role to play in lowering the level of inequality and meeting the public
demand for goods and services.

Size and Quality

Comparatively speaking, Egyptian bureaucracy is characterized by its large size. Its
share of total employment approached 40 percent by the late 19808, one of the highest in the
world (Ayubi, 1991). Further, while the weighted average of bureaucratic share in non-
agricultural economic activity for all developing and low income economies was 12.8 percent
and 17.6 percent respectively for the period between 1978-1991, the public sector’s share for
Egypt was 43 percent. Table 3.2 illustrates the signiﬁcant size of Egyptian bureaucracy
relative to developing and low income economies.27

Waterbury (1992) compares Egypt’s public sector in terms of size, expenditures as
a proportion of GDP, and public sector’s deﬁcits with other less developed countries under
the assumption that the challenge of reform is determined by these indicators. He concludes
that Egypt’s public sector on all counts is the biggest to the point of being an outlier relative
to all less developed countries. “In this respect Egypt is in a universe by itself” (196). Thus
the case for reform is the most compelling in Egypt, but to date all that has resulted have been

“ineﬁ’ectual attempts” (196).

 

’7 Table 3.2 also shows how the public sector’s size in Arab countries such as Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia
that literally followed President Nasser’s bureaucratic model of development are also signiﬁcantly above
average.

85

Table 3.2
’s Bureaucrats in Non- Economic
1978-91 1978-91
’ "" - y- . Mexico 12.6
Greece 120
Ecuador 1 1.5
69.0 11.3
.. .. . . :' ' 11.3
Tunisia 34.3 Ghana 10.7
Zambia 34.3 Costa Rica 9.1
Sierra Leone 32.7 9.1
Mali 28.1 T 9.1
Venezuela 24.4 Panama 8.6
Cameroon 23.5 Colombia 8.2
Jamaica 22.3 Peru 8.1

Share of

            

Morocco 21. 1 8. 1
Tanzania 20.3 T ' China 7 .8
Indonesia 19.9 Brazil 7.2

19.7 Central Aﬁican ' 6.7
Bolivia 1 8.7 Botswana 6.4
India 17.4 Honduras 6.3
N' ' 17.2 Thailand 6.2
T 16.6 ' The 5.3
Comoros 15.8 ' 5. 1
South Aﬁica 15.0 U 4.7
Pakistan 14.9 4.6

14.5 El Salvador 2.8
Chile 13.9 ' ' 2.3

13.8 2 0
Note: Bureaucrats’ share is based on the percent of the GDP. Their share for the l4-year period is
based on the weighted average for that period.
Source: World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business. 1995. (Disks)

86

 

 

 

 

s-r‘

(.7“
4-

 

 

In the more than 15 years of President Mubarak’s rule, the size of Egyptian
bureaucracy has doubled at an average annual increase of 9 percent, compared to an annual
population increase of 2.1 percent. According to the 1996 census, Egypt’s population has
reached 61,452,382 or one public servant for every 11 Egyptian citizens compared to one
bureaucrat for every 40 citizens in the 1960s. Bureaucrats share about one-third of the
aggregate employment from Egypt’s 17,795,647 labor force. Ifthe agricultural sector is
excluded, bureaucrats account for 61 percent of aggregate employment in the Egyptian
economy (CAPMAS, 1997a). Their salaries reach 26 billion Egyptian pounds ($7.6 billion)
or more than one-third of the national budget. The problem of size is enhanced when we
consider the qualiﬁcations of the labor force. As shown in Table 3.3 only 24 percent have
bachelors degree or higher.

The increase in employment in the public sector has been uneven across categories.
For example, the Ministries of Education Research, and Youth and Sports have 1.9 million
bureaucrats, as shown in Table 3.4, with the highest percentage of the labor force
bureaucrats. Furthermore, jobs have been added mostly in administrative positions in all
bureaucracies. This caused a serious problem of overstafﬁng in ofﬁces with twelve
bureaucrats sharing a desk fairly common. The burden of disguised unemployment and
redundant personnel is very high in central and local government administration and reaches
over 30 percent of the employed civil servants (Cabinet’s Information and Decision Support

Center, 1995).

87

.Eroo— Am<SE<UC 85:55. was 8:3:502 .8 xocow< .2250 :5: 85:5 2: 3 32:22.5 623cm

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

  
 

.mLOUmmmanEa

USN dew—.2; £53395 w: £031. 20>»: bCCEQm oEsm 95 E mama—Sean can: mats—am her—m3; Ema 0.5 053 mco_mmo.wo.a 32:2: momUsU EBOvaw
2: 3.: :5 93 2.8 «so? 3% mg ...._.sl9a._
9: 5.33. Ema». 2 18 24.3. 332... 33de 33m? $3: .25
x2 Manta £4. 3. £3: :3 03.3 3.32 $3.4 $3 $290 38%
mi Ema: $4. a? me. :83: Eng snow 82cm 22:28
was are; l l | | 80.2 $33. .23... 29:0 55.
:2 :33. l l l I can? mass 83: 820 is
at: 3 not: I | l l were: 2538 News 2:5 5.2a
9.2. 53%.. we can. an: 33.x? 99,5 8%: $3 255 .55.
8.2 83: NS. 22 Edd 5.ch 82% Sod: $0.4 295 2.8%
9% 22mm 5. as.“ age 232 42.4: 88: l 295 mi
and 9.3,. 2: RN $2 an: E l l 5325 Ease
8.: 43m m: m: was «an I l I 5528285..
5.0 36 mm 3 mx $4 | l l bsaussueca E5
.95 me E m o l l 5222 base
53 S Q 4 _ mm l | 5.252
ck» 739—. .Cﬁh whoama—Z NEO- F— LEE—own hO-Q—ﬁvam 3:3 CCN 3.23:: 2:29

:5: $04 wavy—

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.cee— £2333“ ES .954 E mannogonam :augwm be 5:2:me
mam ~33.

88

Table 3.4

 

 

 

Number of Egyptian Bureaucrats b r Service, 1996.
_Sector 1996 Percent
Education, Research, and Youth & Sports 1,991,514 35.9
Health, Social, and Religious Services 637,371 11.5
Industry 559,055 10.1
Presidential Services 430,139 7 .8
Transportation and Communication 364,343 6.6
Agriculture and Water Resources 411,212 7.4
Housing and Construction 277,565 5.0
Finance and Economics 222,876 4.0
Police and Justice 193,573 3.5
Internal Trade 173,405 3.1
Electricity 143,237 2.6
Tourism 38,802 0.7
Social Insurances 30,906 0.6
Culture and Media 67,123 1.2
Total 5.541 L121 100

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Calculated by the author from the Central Agency for Mailization and Statistics
(CAPMAS), 1997c.

The government’s objectives in guaranteeing employment may elicit sympathy at the
price of efﬁciency. First, the economy is faced with a mounting wage bill extended to one-
third of the national budget. Second, while the beneﬁciaries of this policy are from all
educational levels, university graduates hired under the job guarantee policy are not trained
in government service during college years. Third, the more educated is the person today in
Egypt, the more likely he or she is unemployed due to waiting for a job security with

bureaucracy or being unqualiﬁed for the private sector due to the poor quality college

89

education (Handoussa, 1991; Singerrnan, 1995).28 Finally, due to the “graduate policy” the
majority of bureaucrats are not in the right position according to Singennan (1995: 142):

Even though many people still desire a government position, those positions

are often completely unrelated to the education and training of the graduate.

For example, trained electricians work as ofﬁce clerks, and English teachers

are assigned to teach mathematics or history.

The Egyptian bureaucracy has become the decision-blocking tier of government due
to its size, growth, and lack of skilled manpower (Rivlin, 1985). President Mubarak
commented in one of his speeches that “Egypt’s suffocating bureaucracy seeks to make the
easy difﬁcult and the possible impossible” (AMBA, 1989: 1). His practical judgement is
theoretically consistent with Downs’s (1967) proposition that organizational growth causes
a decrease of bureaucracies’ capacity for effective action and an increase in their wasted
activity at a marginal rate proportional to their growth. Downs also points out that the older
an organization, as the case with Egyptian bureaucracy, the more likely it is to develop a self-
serving ideology that is extremely inefﬁcient to decision making and implementation.”
Centralization

Egyptian bureaucracy is characterized by centralization in planning and decision

making as shown in Figure 3.1. The ﬁgure is an outline of the administrative system

responsible for providing goods and services. It is composed of 30 ministries with 76 main

 

2‘ It seems that “reform by stealth” is adopted because no politician is willing to take the risk of eliminating
the “graduate policy” of the 1950s. One can notice a common understanding among Egyptians that a college
degree no longer guarantee a job due to the long delay in hiring graduates. Increasing the waiting period for
a job in bureaucracy seems to be the safe strategy for the regime to back away from its inherited promise.

’9 The Suez Canal Authority and the Aswan High Dam Authority are exceptions from these judgments
because they are operating successfully since President Nasser’s regime. This is partially due to their
operation outside the bureaucratic hierarchy in the absence of many of the restrictions and red tape imposed
by law (Baker, 1978; Sullivan, 1996).

90

dependent agencies, 86 dependent service agencies, 61 dependent economic agencies, and
350 dependent local units. This is a total of 603 dependent bureaucracies with 5,633
dependent branches (Ibrahim, 1998a).

The center of command is the president who makes decisions about the level of
ﬁrnding, quality, and quantity of services according to information provided from the cabinet
and its ministerial commissions. Centralization of the Egyptian bureaucracy gives the
president the power to interpret and to articulate the preferences of society based on
information that has been communicated up through all levels of hierarchy. The centralized
structure assumes that bureaucracies possess and provide information about resources,
opportunities, and demand in society and inform their respective ministerial commissions
without strategic behavior. The centralized structure also assumes that the President knows
what is needed at the desegregated level through information obtained through the centralized
hierarchy. After the president’s authorization, ﬁnal decisions for producing goods and
services are then made by the cabinet. Every Minister is responsible for a sector in the
economy such as industry and communication and exercises his/er duties all the way down
the hierarchy to the local level.

In addition to the Prime Minister and ministers’ direct control of bureaucracies, there
are controls exercised by two non-ministerial bodies: the Central Auditing Agency,
responsible for auditing the bureaucracies’ accounts, and the Central Agency for Public
Mobilization and Statistics, responsible for providing the standard formats with which

bureaucracies must comply in order to present their accounts. Bureaucracies are responsible

91

for regularly providing these agencies with extensive reports on their performance and output.
These agencies are a cumbersome form of control (W ahba, 1983).

To administer public programs of the GOE ministries, there are 5,633 local branches
shown in Figure 3.1 and are distributed geographically over 4,946 local units shown in Table
3.5. Local branches include all non-central public enterprises and bureaucracies responsible
for the provision of various public services, the maintenance of services, revenue collection,
and a host of other activities. These establishments are dispersed over 26 govemorates as the
largest geographical division of Egypt. They are ﬁrrther allocated to smaller units, i.e.,
quarters, districts, towns, and villages, within each govemorate. Theoretically, geographical
dispersing of local administrations is for the sake of efﬁciency rather than conducting the
public business for remote units from a minister’s desk. This is based on the assumption that
local administration systems have a signiﬁcant role to play in affecting the development by

eﬂiciently and effectively providing public services.

92

22.22223...

:no_t< as sweet ,
Esman”. "Mimics W

   

 

  

cecasm W
<m 3 .
mococaum ~ .

. i .5664 mmcm _ e z:
_ .coczungeo m _ :e:1.;_:_Eua ﬂ; _ h .co::.naoo H macaw: _
m :otuoam:_ m a co:a~_:am.O.ZC_ 4 mane; E :wﬁzem ﬂ

. o>:au;_:C:c< A _ xocuw<.a::omv. ._ w W m .

. . . mo_o:o < z m

n H 0:93; neon

 

w . w :x:.n.oacncu

 

 

 

 

 

_ fazaugauvc: 2...; Zap—€359.53:—
” H #:2222323:W .% w:_::a_m.ma_sc.< _
m_:opceo_o>oc _ m _ Bacc:oom % co :acfmuc.
v _
u>:_.:._E_:U< m2u3_:52 " A muoi_:_2.oEr:.».=aoQ
h a: A..m.:_—z _ . .. .l
n M _
ﬂ _
w _
xucow< m . i A motmta.m %
w::_::< W ,Auo;_=_2.oczuev mcoGw_Er:oU Acc:=~:_noezuca
. .o:_LsU H .3uo$_:_2 _ a w
2:.ccU _ , . A _ a use < 22.:90.
. . m
_ _ _
m__o::CU a _ 53.300mchm a mumtam
uoN:m_oogm a W h 6:52; F _ao::om
x_chmm< _a:c:az F _ . .£_Eoom " .ﬁm:o_=:
mo_a30e r .cutioae w . . been;

325.296: o>.:..:m_:_=:c<

:. .823:— 86cm .25 $=~w< 13.53am :e man—3:5 :5 5:5 .mae— .acauozeoazm swag—mum be 32.22: 3555255.; 2:.
m m 2:9,.—

93

Table 3.5

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number and Geogra ahical Distribution of E pt’s Local Units, 1997.
Village Satellite
Govemorate Quarters Districts Towns Units Village_s_4
Cairo 20 - - - -
Giza 5 6 9 45 121
Qalyubiya 2 7 9 45 149
Greater Cairo 27 13 18 90 270
Urban Govemorates
Alexandria 6 1 1 3 -
Port Said 5 - - - -
Suez 4 - - - -
Rural Govemorates
Lower Egypt
Ismailia 3 4 5 10 37
Sharqiya 2 13 15 75 397
Daqahliya 2 10 16 89 357
Dumyat - 4 9 26 44
Kafr Al-Shaykh - 10 10 44 153
Manuﬁya - 8 9 67 234
Gharbiya 2 8 8 53 263
Bahayra - 12 14 69 360
Upper Egypt
Fayum - 5 5 39 121
Beni Suwayf - 7 7 38 160
Mnya - 9 9 57 286
Asyut 2 10 10 49 191
Suhag 2 ll 11 51 210
Qina - 12 13 48 202
Frontier Govemorates
Aswan - 5 10 26 85
Red Sea - - 5 8 -
South Sinai - 5 8 8 -
North Sinai - 6 6 32 161
Marsa Matruh - 8 8 30 22
New Valley - 2 2 16 48
Total Egypt 55 163 199 928 3,601

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Ministry of Local Administration.

94

Practically, the dispersing of local units in Egypt only represents physical
decentralization without decentralization of control and ﬁnancial decisions. The decentralized
agencies and branches in the hierarchy are, in practice, under the direct control of their
respective ministries. The minister in charge serves as the director general with the cabinet
reserving for itself all the important decisions pertaining to the quantity and quality of services
according to guidance ﬁ'om President Mubarak (Harik, 1992). The centralized hierarchical
setting leaves local administrative units without the authority to make vital decisions. In the
case of water utilities, for example, local units do not have the power to decide on the number
of connections, the price of services, or means of maintenance. Rather, the central
headquarters at the Ministry of Housing and Construction submits its proposals for improving
services to the cabinet and receives limited permission based on ﬁmding and priority.

Centralization occurs also in the distribution of bureaucrats as shown in Table 3.6.
Greater Cairo houses 32 percent of the total labor with l bureaucrat for every 8 citizens.
Urban govemorates have a low ratio with l bureaucrat for every 7 citizens despite the fact
that they house only 7 percent of the population and 11 percent of the labor force. Put
together, extreme centralization does lead to delays and compromised scheduling because
reports have to be made and submitted to the home ofﬁces in Cairo for the ﬁnal ministerial
approval on small details. Decades of little or no power at the local level created an opinion
among the majority of Egyptians that local public administration does not have an important

role to play in achieving national development goals. Mayﬁeld (1996) describes local ofﬁces

95

as “extraneous and of no consequence to the broader issues and concerns at the central leve ”
(48).30

Finally, the external agents’ place in the hierarchy is in the Ministry of International
Cooperation, but other ministries are also involved. Donors’ proposals have to be approved
by the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Ministry of
Finance. This is in addition to the individual ministry concerned with the external agent’s
investment. The USAID’s investments in the water and wastewater sectors, for example,
have to be signed for approval from the Ministry of Housing and Construction. All the
approval signatures collected by the external agent then have to be approved in a cabinet
meeting to ensure that the investment ﬁts into the national plan. Finally, a follow-up for the
ﬁnancial input and results of the external agent’s investment has to be conducted annually by
the Central Auditing Agency. It is common for actors in this centralized bureaucratic process
to behave rationally. Interviews with ofﬁcials at the USAID reveal that it usually takes few
days to approve grants or loans, while it may take years to approve, or disapprove, plans for

reform or privatization.

 

3° Side eﬂ'ects of centralization in decision making on society are most signiﬁcant in security issues. lslamists’
attacks on tourists are alien due to less fwdback from police ofﬁcers in the ﬁeld and their inability to make
immediate decisions about the level of security.

96

 

Table 3.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Distribution of E stian Bureaucrats to Govemorates and Citizens
1996
, Bureaucrats :
Population Bureaucrats Citizens
Govemorate Number Percent Number ercent
Cairo 6,789,479 11.05 1,228,384 22.17 6
Gin 4,779,865 7.78 300,355 5.42 16
alyubiya 3,302,860 5.37 258,026 4.66 13
Greater Cairo 14,872,204 21.33 1,786,765 32‘25 8
Urban Govemorates
Alexandria 3,328,196 5.42 480,549 8.67 7
Port Said 469,533 0.76 81,124 1.46 6
Suez 417,610 0.68 5L127 1.03 7
Total 4,215,339 6.86 618,800 11.17 7
Rural Govemorates
Lower Egypt
Ismailia 715,009 1.16 82,665 1.49 9
Sharqiya 4,287,848 6.98 307,401 5.55 14
Daqahliya 4,223,655 6.87 338,142 6.10 12
Dumyat 914,614 1.49 88,731 1.60 10
Kaﬁ' AI-Shaykh 2,222,920 3.62 151,700 2.74 15
Manuﬁya 2,758,499 4.49 226,924 4.10 12
Gharbiya 3,404,827 5.54 327,278 5.91 10
Bahayra 3,981,209 6.48 258,740 4.67 15
Total 22,508,581 36.63 1,781,581 32.15 13
Upper Egypt
Fayum 1,989,881 3 .24 106,400 1.92 19
Beni Suwayf 1,860,180 3.03 120,472 2.17 15
Minya 3,308,875 5.38 178,450 3.22 19
Asyut 2,802,185 4.56 165,150 2.98 17
Suhag 3,123,000 5.08 193,355 3.49 16
Qina 2,801,923 4.56 193,312 3.49 14
Total 15,886,044 25.85 957,139 17.27 17
Frontier Govemorates
Aswan 973,671 1.58 104,189 1.88 9
Red Sea 155,695 0.25 24,582 0.44 6
Sinai (North and South) 307,245 0.50 45,706 0.82 7
Marsa Matruh 211,866 0.34 15,778 0.28 13
New Valley 141,737 0.23 28,930 0.52 5
Total 1,790,214 2:91 419,185 3.96 8
Abroad 2,180,000 3.55 177,651 3.21 12
Total Egypt 61,452,382 100 5,541,121 100 11

 

 

 

 

 

Sources: Calculated by the author ﬁ'om (1) 1996 Census (CAPMAS, 1997a) and (2) the Central
Agency for Organization and Administration.

97

Since the l 95 Os, administrative reform has been the responsibility of a subordinate unit

at the oﬂice of the Minister of Cabinet Affairs. In July 1997, President Mubarak assigned the
task of putting and implementing a plan for administrative reform to a new independent
ministry called The Ministry of Administrative Development. The Ministry also became
responsible for overseeing The Central Agency for Organization and Management which
controls the labor and wage policy of bureaucracies. A detailed review of the ministry and
its plans for administrative reform is presented later in this chapter.
Decentralization Attempts. A common pattern has persisted in Egypt’s decentralization
eﬂ’orts. Reform starts when a new president comes to power and seeks to decentralize the
administrative system; it ends by the same president reversing his actions. President Sadat
began a process of decentralization that was supposed to strengthen local government
through decentralization. He approved the Local Government Law 52 of 197 5, which
authorized the creation of councils of beneﬁciaries from customers of public services such as
health clinics and schools. The goal was to improve the quality of public services by
decentralizing decision making and enforcing accountability. This law was only a step
towards decentralization because the People’s Assembly voted on the same year not to give
local units independent budget allocation. Due to mounting opposition to President Sadat’s
peace initiative, the president approved Law 43 of 1979 that reversed Law 52 and abolished
the councils of beneﬁciaries. The goal of this authoritarian law was to prove that the
executive arm of central government is dominant over any local decisions.

The same cycle occurred under President Mubarak who started his rule by allowing

local elections to occur with greater freedom. His fear of radical Islamist opposition at the

98

local level, however, compelled him to pass the Law 145 of 1988, which substituted the term
“local administration” with “local government” to imply increased autonomy. In 1994
President Mubarak faced more Islamic activities on the local level. In return, he enacted into
law the practice of appointing people to local positions that were formally ﬁlled by elections
(Mayﬁeld, 1996).31

The other major decentralization attempt in Egypt’s recent history was President
Mubarak’s decree in 1980 to increase the power of provincial governors at the expense of
central government. This law only increased the power of governors in matters that do not
conﬂict with any central decisions and kept the ministers’ upper hand (Mayﬁeld, 1996). The
side eﬂ’ect of this decree was that governors did not gain any authority ﬁom the higher levels
of the hierarchy but rather were able to deprive local elected councils from their rights. Ayubi
(1984: 71) notes that:

Members are no longer able to question, investigate or to call to account . .

. the governor or the heads of public departments and corporations within the

govemorate, but can only ask, enquire or seek information . . . On the other

hand, the governor has the right to veto the resolutions of the popular

councils if he thinks they are not in agreement with the law.

The ﬁnal outcome that emerged from these decentralization attempts was an

enhancement of the centralized structure.

 

3' The USAID has shown no opposition to enhancing centralization because it seems to enhance stability
which has a high priority than development for Washington. The USAID did not interfere as an external
agent of reform in President Mubarak’s contradictory policy of decentralization out of fear of Islamism on the
local level (Mayﬁeld, 1996).

99

Fragmentation of the Centralized Structure. Despite the strong centralization in decision
making, the bureaucratic structure operates in a fragmented manner with the priorities of the
ministries oﬁen in conflict. Bureaucratic and political struggles between and within units
cause decisions to be highly personalistic (Sullivan, 1987, 1990, 1996). The outcome is a
fragmented administrative system that lacks coordination in planning, approving, ﬁnancing,
and slow execution of services.

The problem is exacerbated by agencies’ overlapping responsibilities. For example,
the employment policy ofbureaucracies is the domain of the Central Agency for Organization
and Management, the Central Agency for Accounts, and the Central Agency for Public
Mobilization and Statistics, as well as various departments in the Ministries of Planning and
Labor. This involves waste in time and money due to repetitive and complex control system.
The efﬁciency control itself is at stake due to the clash in demands for information and
supremacy. In addition, the efﬁciency of bureaucracies is sacriﬁced to devote time and efforts
for satisfying the demands of too many control agencies (Wahba, 1983).

Rivalries, struggles for power between ministries, and overlapping of responsibilities
keep bureaucracies from cooperating to improve their services. Sullivan (1990: 138) notes
that:

Organizational and personal rivalries, based on related interests, are evident

and endemic between bureaucracies, not just within them. And even if a

particular minister decides on certain initiatives to change, reform, or

otherwise improve the operation of his/her organization or the economic or

social concerns for which he/she is entrusted, rival ministers may have

something to say about any proposed changes. Even if the changes cover

areas which otherwise appear to be wholly within one ministry’s range of

responsibilities, other ministries can ﬁnd a reason to assert themselves and
disrupt any plans for change.

100

These problems between ministers are often translated into destructive policies for
development plans. In 1997, for example, a new Ministry for Higher Education was initiated
as a separate entity from the Ministry of Education. Due to a famous tense personal
relationship between the two ministers, the ﬁrst decision for the new minister was to close all
the universities that the former minister approved while overseeing higher education. The
students were the victims of this policy caused by rivalry rather than educational development
plans. The former minister of higher education commented after this radical decision “that
the new generation of Egyptians is the one who will end up paying the price in the quality of
their education due to our personnel conﬂict” (Goda, 1998: 5).

Products of Patronage

The political appointment system that brings ministers to power causes different
administrative problems. First, the frequent changes in ministers and in high level ministry
posts, due to political reasons, creates indifferent behavior about long-term objectives.
Ministers and high-level officials are likely not to have personal commitment to energize their
bureaucracies or familiarity with objectives for adequate long-range planning. With this last
government change in 1997, President Mubarak would have changed only 76 ministers during
16 years.32 The Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Security had the most frequent
changes. Exceptions to the high turn over are the ministers in the Ministry of Energy and the
Ministry of Transportation where their ministers have been in power since President Sadat’s

regime. It is also worth saying that there is no record of resignation for any minister during

 

’2 This is less than President Nasser’s regime who changed 115 ministers and President Sadat’s regime who
hold the record by changing 170 in less than one decade.

10]

President Mubarak’s regime despite some bureaucracies’ highly unsatisfactory record of
performance (Goda, 1998).

Second, the selection of ministers due to their political loyalties puts decision making
in the hands of unqualiﬁed persons. The Ministry of Tourism, for example, has never been
run by a minister with relevant qualiﬁcations despite its importance to the economy. Since
its initiation, the ministry has been run by an army officer, medical doctor, civilian engineer,
architect, lawyer, economist, and banker (Abd Al-Aty, 1998). Third, ministries are merged,
separated, or eliminated ﬁ'equently without gains in efficiency. Most often the same ministry
is merged or eliminated more than once. One ex-Prime Minister, Mustafa Khalil (1978-80),
notes on this practice (Abd Al-Aty, 1998: 5):

Each ministry works independent from the other, which costs the budget

signiﬁcant expenses. Coordinating between different ministries would save

unnecessary costs. Common decisions on merging or separating ministries,

such as the cases of Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation or Ministries of

Education and Higher Education, do not cut any money from the budget.

Changes only happen in the minister’s ofﬁce, his secretary, and in the

assignment of work among his staff not in the budget. More important,

everything else stays the same.

One can conclude that a hierarchy with a pyramid shape and little delegation may
explain the inefﬁciency of Egyptian bureaucracy. Other problems arise from ministers’
competition to inﬂuence policy. Decentralization has been a much attempted solution for

these administrative problems. It is often a discussed solution to allow managers to make

decisions away from the top.

102

Bureaucratic Incompetencies

Bureaucrats are key ﬁgures in meeting the public needs and in maintaining
development due to their role in planning and implementation policies. Effective policy
implementation depends ultimately on bureaucratic behavior. Their behavior is a decisive
factor as they can be inefﬁcient and ineffective or become entrepreneurs and activists
(Sullivan, 1990). Applying these criteria, the behavior of Egyptian bureaucrats would
legitimately be considered as an administrative problem and ,an obstacle to sustainable
development. Ayubi (1982: 293) observes their behavior and notes that:

On average, the Egyptian civil servant was estimated to work solidly only for

a period of between twenty minutes and two hours every working day. Other

amenities may also be provided: a shoe-shine man may pass by the office to

offer his services, and sometimes the odd vendor or two will also pass by,

selling date-stuffed rolls or soap, perfume or mothballs, shoelaces or

safety-pins! Then all of a sudden, a great rush will be seen and the ofﬁce will

be almost entirely deserted: in an hour or so, cheerful faces will reappear as

the ofﬁcials return carrying their loot-oil, meat, chickens, olives, detergent,

soap, and whatever else may happen to be available that day at the consumer

cooperative of that particular government department.

Palmer et al. (1987, 1988, 1989) have empirically tested the capacity of the Egyptian
bureaucracy and concluded that “the Egyptian bureaucracy lacks the developmental capacity
to provide basic economic and social services for a growing population” (1988: 157). Based
on empirical results, the Egyptian bureaucracy is judged as “sluggish, rigid, noninnovative,
riddled with favoritism, and lacks concern for public service” (Palmer et al., 1988: 34).
Palmer et al. (1988) identify four indicators of bureaucratic rigidity: a signiﬁcant low

productivity level; inﬂexibility in the form of tendencies to hide behind rules and regulations

ongypt’s rigid bureaucratic codes that severely restrict the capacity to respond promptly and

103

eﬂiciently to the needs of reform; time-worn strategies of postponement and muddling
through instead of innovation in bureaucratic strategies as part of reform; and antagonism
with the public that is characterized by distrust and disrespect making it difficult for the
bureaucracy to accomplish its goals.

Bureaucrats’ behavior in the late 19903 is not much different than Ayubi and Palmer’s
assessments in the 19705 and 19805. Sobhi (1998a) indicates that the average Egyptian
bureaucrat works only 27 minutes a day on average. The rest of the working day is used by
most bureaucrats to read the newspapers, solve crosswords, or chatting. For females they
are usually preparing food items and cutting vegetables for dinner due to the time it takes
them to go home in the heavy trafﬁc.

Centralization ofdecision-making seems to be creating a lack of responsibility among
bureaucrats. The indifference and passivity of Egyptian bureaucrats toward public affairs
were also argued to be a result of overcentralization (Hinnebusch, 1988; Hopwood, 1991).
Also, Palmer, Yassin, and Leila (1985, 1988) empirically ﬁnd that the reluctance of Egyptian
subordinates to accept responsibilities is a consequence of the centralized apparatus. This is
in addition to causing the majority of supervisory ofﬁcials to shun responsibility and at the
same time resist the delegation of authority. Finally, patterns of communication, especially
vertically between superiors and subordinates, were also found to be rigid as a consequence
of centralization (Palmer, Yassin, and Leila, 1985, 1988).

Personal interests and lack of professionalism are also problems in bureaucrats’
behavior. Weinbaum (1986, 1 14-15) refers to the culture of Egyptian bureaucracy to explain

bureaucrats’ behavior:

104

[They] tend to oversimplify problems and delay dealing with them. The
duplication and inﬂexibility of rules are maddening to outsiders who also
disparage the personal inﬂuence that it takes to cut through the endless
decision processes. . . Inadequately trained lower ranking ofﬁcials are usually

fearful of making mistakes and embarrassing supervisors and thus try to pass

on or ignore problems. These ofﬁcials are assigned tasks without either ample

material support or expectations of reward for their accomplishments; they

understand that beneﬁts are normally awarded for loyalty, regardless of one’s
competence or efﬁciency . . . Criteria of status and individual security in the

Egyptian bureaucracy often count as much as efﬁciency measured in temporal

and monetary terms.

Such behavior is an obstacle to Egypt’s development given that the actual running of
the machinery remains ﬁrmly in the hands of bureaucrats. Taking inﬂexibility for example,
any step in the USAID’s economic and social development efforts that does not ﬁt a clearly
stated regulation will be either ignored or set aside for ﬁirther adjustment of the rules. For
Egyptian bureaucracy, that would normally take anywhere from a few years to decades.
Inﬂexibility also signiﬁcantly affects how the public perceives bureaucracy. Any transaction
with the Egyptian bureaucracy is a laborious and time-consuming task. Egyptians “must
spend days in the corridors of government buildings trying to collect signatures, ﬁlling forms,
buying stamps, and paying bribes under different pretexts in order to obtain the proper papers
enabling them to take advantage of public goods” (Hoodfar, 1996: 17).

These problems do not only sacriﬁce administrative efficiency, but also have a
signiﬁcant effect on Egypt’s economy. The government pays about 6 million bureaucrats for
eight hours work, while the public receives only one-half hour of work in return. Then the
economy is incurring the cost of more than 42 million working hours annually without any

added value. Second, Oweiss (1990) points to bureaucrats’ actions that force many projects

to declare bankruptcy or stop projects short of completion. He ﬁnds that this behavior incurs

105

the economy sunk costs of more than ten billion Egyptian pounds ($3 billion) on average per
decade. Finally, a report auditing public enterprises also identiﬁed 25 billion Egyptian Pounds
($7.3 billion), or 32.1 percent of the public investment in production, in the form of damaged
or unsaleable goods due to “bad administration” and careless inventory practices (Khalil,
1998: 2). To subsidize these practices, bureaucracies have been borrowing from banks with
no guarantees and signiﬁcantly increased the internal debt to $60 billion with $8.82 billion
annual payment (Central Bank of Egypt, 1997). The dilemma is intensiﬁed bythe fact that
bureaucrats associated with these losses have been receiving regular salary increases
throughout the period.

Many theories were established to explain the cultural factors that impede bureaucrats
in the Middle East from bringing an innovative behavior to work should have been considered
by the USAID. Most notably is the sense of fatalism where Egyptian bureaucrats believe that
events are ﬁxed in advance and bureaucrats as human beings are powerless to change them
(Hamady, 1960). The common belief that man affairs are regulated by God and, therefore,
the nwd for human innovative is minimal tends to pervade Egyptian bureaucrats’ innovative
behavior. A second set of theories suggests that social patterns in Middle Eastern societies
reward conformity and do little to reward creativity (Gellner, 1981).

A third set of social theories that should have been considered by USAID explains
these results by pointing to the poor sense of work ethic and lack of achievement motivation
in Middle Eastern societies (McClelland, 1976). Unlike their Western counterparts, Egyptian
bureaucrats’ self-esteem is not usually tied to levels of material achievement but rather to

conforming to traditional values. Since innovation and creativity are often means of greater

106

achievements, Egyptian bureaucrats are increasingly less innovative. Finally, depressed
innovation and productivity scores by Egyptian bureaucrats conﬁrm to arguments about the
security consciousness of Middle Eastern bureaucracies (Berger, 1957). The beneﬁts of a
government’s job, such as a guaranteed salary and tolerable work load, made bureaucrats less
willing to jeopardize their job by taking the initiative in decision-making. This attitude is
supported by the Egyptian proverbs such as “the more you work, the more errors you make”
made bureaucrats less willing to take the risk of innovation.
Lack of Training

Another administrative problem is the lack of training to cure administrative problems.
The Central Auditing Agency’s 1998 report identiﬁed a waste of 8 billion Egyptian Pounds
($2.4 billion) in the form of unused assets due to the lack of trained man power to utilize it
(Abd Al-Menam, 1998).33 Part of this administrative problem is due to the fact that the
government spends an average of only 3.5 Egyptian pounds (81) per bureaucrat for
training-despite the presence of a central training unit within each govemorate. An interview
with one official at one of those training centers revealed the problems from their point of
view:

We have two types. Those that the laws require them to pass a training

program before being promoted to high government levels. These laws bring

us only about 1,500 trainees per year and most of them close to retirement

age. The other type is sent to us for training because they are the worst

employees at their organizations. We usually have no luck with this type. We

found that their organizations take advantage of training programs to get rid

from them for a period of time and not to improve their performance. The
rest of the bureaucratic pyramid from the bottom up is left without training.

—‘

33 The report also refers this phenomenon to acquiring assets through borrowing or foreign aid without an
identiﬁed need

107

bu

ha-

the
is n
ﬂee

qua

This part of the pyramid represents the majority that decides what kind of
performance does we get from public organizations. I think the priority of
training should be given for the promising elements in each organization.

There is an additional problem of internal and external brain-drain for bureaucrats who
may gain signiﬁcant beneﬁts through training especially in technological tasks such as
computers. The Egyptian bureaucracy is rapidly deteriorating due to this phenomenon. Some
leave their government jobs to work in the private sector or with foreign companies and
others leave the country to ﬁnd work in the Arab peninsula where there are substantially
better salaries.34 Given that it is easier for the skilled and experienced to ﬁnd jobs than their
less qualiﬁed cohorts, defection to the private sector and the oil states is robbing the Egyptian
bureaucracy of its productive segment. Bureaucracies of oil-producing countries in the region
have been depending on Egyptian administrative expertise for decades.

Sullivan et al., (1990) found that the growing defection of bureaucrats to the private
sector and to the oil states has its roots in the low salary structure of the bureaucracy and in
the sense of relative deprivation felt by Egyptian bureaucrats. Unfortunately, the government
is not doing enough to combat either phenomenon because there are immediate gains in the
ﬂeeing of the bureaucrats. In the case of intemal brain-drain, the government sees a
quantitative relief in labor surplus without considering the quality of such relief. In the case
of external brain-drain, the government considers the relief in the labor market in addition to

bureaucrats’ remittances from abroad. Further when bureaucrats come back from the Arab

peninsula, their savings provide an alternative for asking the government to take care of them.

 

3‘ The ﬁnancial position of the Egyptian bureaucrat is not only low in absolute terms, but it is also dismal in
comparison to the private sector. A newly hired college graduate receives at best 120 LE ($40) per month in
the public sector, compared to about a minimum of 1000 LE (3300) in the private sector.

108

Problems wi
The 51

Egypt becaus
manage publiw
in the central
managerial ta}
Structure that i
regulations anc
‘0 deCide Upop,
result, leaders .~
based on emon
The dill
orgalrliZalions is
pmduction. A %

 

 

Problems with Leadership

The shortage of leadership skills in managers is a major constraint to development in
Egypt because success depends in large part on their capacity to implement policies and
manage public organizations (Weinbaum, 1986; Oweiss, 1990). A signiﬁcant problem lies
in the centralized pattern of control exercised through a centralized structure. Good
managerial talents that escape the internal or external brain-drain are left in a centralized
structure that forces them to operate under a mass control. Bureaucracies are burdened with
regulations and web of bureaucratic procedures. There is a little latitude that allows managers
to decide upon essential problems such as the size of his/er team or its qualiﬁcations.” As a
result, leaders spend their time dealing with small problems. Too often their decisions are
based on emotions and informal relations rather than objective criteria (Sobhi, 1998).

The dilemma of managers is compounded by the fact that the output of their
organizations is often rationed, cheap, or sold to the public at a price well below the cost of
production. A simple request, such as increasing price, must often go through various steps
to the top of the pyramid. If the request did reach the top and received an approval by the
minister, a manger’s request would then need a clearance from a ministerial committee, the
whole cabinet, the control agencies, and, of course the president. Further, managers’
attempts to ﬁnd a way around the constraints of centralization or to resort to different means

to achieve some degree of independence in the face of serious control often face political

 

3’ Constraints on leaders’ decisions are also seen as one of the main reasons for preventing Egypt from
utilizing its comparative advantage and joining the world’s substantial technical progress. Oweiss (1990)
makes the argument that constraints on bureaucracies’ leaders made the industry not able thus far to produce
a fully manufactured Egyptian car after more than forty years of assembling cars in Egypt. In comparison,
South Korea, which had almost the same economic and demographic characteristics as Egypt in 1952, has
successfully been able to penetrate world markets, even those of the United States with its cars.

109

opposition
of resistance

Anot

 

 

 

 

 

opposition (Handoussa, 1979; Wahba, 1983; Oweiss, 1990). Opposition often in the form
of resistance to delegate authority due to either fear of responsibility or of losing power.

Another problem lies in the ofﬁcial method adopted for choosing managers based on
tenure, seniority, or age rather than competence (Sobhi, 1998). This is in addition to the
common informal practice of patrimonialism that infects the official method of assigning
managers to their positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy (Hinnebusch, 1988, 1990). Finally,
the common manager in an Egyptian bureaucracy is also not effective in leadership due to the
often competing, overlapping, and conﬂicting jurisdictions among bureaucracies (Oweiss,
1990). Each department has its own agenda, administrative style, and marching orders.
Therefore, it is common in any given bureaucracy to ﬁnd managers operating independent of
other bureaucracies but still within the centralized hierarchy.
Corruption

Corruption and the lack of social and professional responsibility is a major
administrative problem in Egypt. Most studies that have looked at corruption assert that
Egyptian bureaucracy suffers from an array of private interests that have become the rule
rather than the exception (Waterbury, 1976, 1983; Baker, 1978; Hinnebusch, 1988; Mayﬁeld,
1996). Bureaucrats manipulate the public ofﬁce to personal advantage and put the
bureaucracy to the service of those who can buy its favors and beneﬁts. Bribing a bureaucrat
or taking advantage of personal connections are necessary if a person want to get things done
today in Egypt. While there are, of course, many public servants of integrity in all posts, the

cases of those engaged in corrupt practices are signiﬁcant.

110

Ther
into the issue.
the rise for
administrativ
wages in the

Third. Egypt‘

 

c0"!th practi
grants for Egy
1993) Finally
the foreign do
have the anthr

Clu'on
at the Nation;

WPUlation gr

ﬁve~stars hot.

efforts to rec;

There is a lack of methodologically sound public administration studies that looked
into the issue of corruption in the 19905. However, we can hypothesize that corruption is on
the rise for few reasons. First, increased demand for public services in the absence of
administrative reform facilitates the opportunity for rent-seeking behavior. Second, ﬁxed
wages in the face of inﬂation lead us to expect an increase in the rent seeking behavior.
Third, Egypt’s dependency on foreign aid greatly expands the rewards and temptations of
corrupt practices. For example, it was recently found that the majority of USAID training
grants for Egyptian bureaucracies were used as bonuses for high ofﬁcials (Abd Al-Menam,
1998). Finally, corruption should be expected to be on the rise due to the interaction between
the foreign donors who aim at approving their investment proposals and bureaucracies who
have the authority to do that.

Chronicling recent corruption cases for private gains illustrates the problem. Officials
at the National Population Council were using the aid money designated for controlling the
population grth rate to increase their salaries, remodel their ofﬁces, and hold parties at
ﬁve-stars hotels (Abd Al-Aziz, 1998; Sobhi, 1998b)"6 The recent case of the USAID’s

efforts to recall $17.5 million from its Family Planning Project aﬁer ﬁnding that The Central

 

3‘ Examples of how aid money is spent by bureaucrats signify the simplest role that should be played by the
external agents in overseeing how tax payers money is spent. The USAlD’s Family Planning Project included
the following items in its budget over a period of 18 months: $228,000 for fumishing managers offices,
$471,000 for publishing social greetings in newspapers, $29,000 incentives for secretaries at the managers
oﬂice, this is in addition to tens of thousands of dollars in cellular phone services for managers. Further,
salaries for managers’ relatives hired with temporary contracts were 3 l, 100 per employee with later increases
in some cases that reach 400 percent (Sobhi, 1998b). These ﬁgures are outrageous in comparison with
salaries and expenses of any Egyptian bureaucracy. Such cases are not new to USAID-funded projects. In
the case of water services that has been receiving the majority of USAlD’s investments for more than two
decades, the head of the board was charged with wasting more than one million Egyptian pounds

(Hinnebusch, 1988).
1 l l

 

Auditing Ag
Assembly is rl
spent due to tl
incidents of 6
example, “a bi
while his salat
bureaucrat wl

becameacom

 

Auditing Agency has no records about this amount is a signiﬁcant example. The People’s
Assembly is not supportive of the USAID’s efforts to more closely monitor how its ﬁll'ldS are
spent due to the fact that parliamentary elites are often caught in conuption practices.” Other
incidents of ﬁnancial corruption in Egyptian bureaucracies are frequently in the news. For
example, “a bureaucrat made billions of pounds during less than twenty years of public service
while his salary is only 90 Egyptian pounds a month” (Nussair, 1998). This is a case of a
bureaucrat who has been responsible for issuing authorization for investments in Egypt and
became a common household name after this case.

Corruption does not always take a monetary form as revealed from an interview with
a branch manager of Cairo water:

Corruption is everywhere in the public sector. If you search for the reasons,

you will probably ﬁnd that salaries are not enough or red tape is facilitating

corruption to get things done. I am here suffering ﬁom nepotism and will

give you an example. I have ordered to move about 50 workers to different

branches in order to lower the overstaﬁing rate. Within one year, 90 percent

of those workers came back to my branch through nepotism and favoritism.

Politically speaking, in an environment where corruption of top officials is part of the
administrative system, it is logical to expect that corruption is also common at the middle and
lower ranks of bureaucracy. Given the centralized structure of control, it is easy to infer that

Egyptian presidents have been tolerating, if not positively encouraging, corruption and

bureaucratic pathologies as a mechanism of ofﬁcial control (Waterbury, 1976; Baker, 197 8;

 

’7 In its boldest move in the 25 years the USAID attempted to strike a deal with the People’s Assembly by
providing it with computers and the technology needed for decision making in return for additional
information about projects that the USAID is investing in. This attempt was met by refusals from both the
mling party and opposition’s members alike as an “American attempt to inﬂuence the Assembly decisions”
(Abd Al—Menam and Galeb, 1997a: 3).

112

Hinnebusch.
that:

Hi gha
that
leade—
of duI
COlTU

WOUlt’
their
aCtior

 

Conn

and eCOnomic

When
bulldir
100k t
Properl
a Place
the pm
took t
Values,
Were d
from at

Hirlneb
Emples in al’

those Who paid

1 --
ties were}

 

Hinnebusch, 1988). Explaining corruption as a political tool, Waterbury (1983: 349) notes

that:

High-level corruption can be viewed as an instrument of political control. In
that sense conuption may be actively encouraged by a given regime. For
leaders like Nasser and Sadat, whose popular mandates to rule were always
of dubious validity and whose trust in their peers was always minimum,
corruption could be used to wed potential rivals to the regime. The elite
would be allowed to play its crass material games, records would be kept of
their activities, and were they ever to become politically threatening, legal
action could be taken against them.

Corruption as an administrative problem has a signiﬁcant negative impact on social
and economic development. Hinnebusch (1988: 262) illustrates this link by noting that:

When building inspectors took bribes to neglect the building code and

buildings collapsed, the public was deprived of a basic security; when they

took them to declare a sound building unsafe so the owner could sell the

property on the booming real estate market, they deprived ordinary people of

a place to live. When teachers insisted their students pay for private lessons,

the poor were deprived of equal educational opportunity. When tax assessors

took bribes to underestimate professional or business income or property

values, the cost was born by the treasury and the wage earners whose taxes

were deducted from their pay. The exaction of a bribe for every petty service

from acquisition of a ration card to a passport, discriminated against the poor.

Hinnebusch’s examples from the 19805 are still common in Egypt one decade later.
Examples in areas from air and Nile pollution, traffic, and education, to millions of people
who live in cemeteries because the apartments built for them by the government are given to
those who paid more. In the ﬁrst six months of 1997, 502 corruption cases ﬁ'om different
localities were being viewed by courts for charges of bribes, forfeiting, or embezzlement of

$33.5 million (Abd Al-Menam and Galeb, 1997b). Roy (1992: 696) portrays the size of

corruption as an administrative problem in Egypt:

113

Conl
actix
mos -
bribti
she \
top i
Cll'Clt
graft _
do n
invol

 

Ther
their designa

0f deveIOpm.

 

Corruption and graft are two of the most pervasive forms of black-market

activity currently in evidence in the Egyptian economy. They percolate to the

most minute and seemingly insigniﬁcant levels, such as the housewife who

bribes the operator of the village water-pump to operate it after hours so that

she would not miss televised soap operas. And there is corruption at the very

top involving present and former ministers, members of presidential ‘inner

circles’ and leaders and members of parliament . . . Those involved in major

graft are able to secrete their income abroad; the more brazen and conﬁdent

do not bother, keeping it in domestic banks that have offshore status. It

involves millions of dollars and thousands of government ofﬁcials.

Therefore, corruption it is an administrative problem that diverts public resources from
their designated task and channels them away from the targeted population and ﬁ'om the goal
of development.

Bureaucratic Resistance

Bureaucratic resistance to the external agent’s role in solving these administrative
problems is often expected and causes a negative record of accomplishments for two reasons.
First, external agents, as sources of change, often require bureaucrats to sacriﬁce their
interests and livelihood (Sullivan, 1990; Kahler, 1992). Resistance in this case is triggered
by the content of the reform program that may require shifts in power, authority, and labor
force. Major groups that may resist reform for this reason are the managers who perceive
themselves as losing power as a result of the change, and bureaucrats with less seniority that
would lose their jobs in the process reorganization. Given that chances of bureaucratic
resistance are increased in proportion to the organization’s size (Downs, 1967), then

signiﬁcant resistance and reluctant to change propositions should be expected in the case of

USAID/Egypt due to the large size of bureaucracies involved.

114

The

national res

1992). In tl
wide gap in
reformers art
and are paid
The degree 0
foreign polic
shape how a t
administratiw
to Convince ]
brothers. Tht
attemp ts by at
BUreat
ContractOrs re:
areas has cOnti
and Construct
international Ct
age inCum
intervened and

 

The second reason for bureaucratic resistance is caused by a political conﬂict and a
national resentment at the external agent itself rather than its on reform attempts (Kahler,
1992). In the case of USAID/Egypt, the degree of bureaucratic resistance is related to the
wide gap in social and economic characteristics of both sides. For example, American
reformers are often targets of criticism because they are not familiar with Third World’s needs
and are paid much more than Egyptian bureaucrats they try to work with (Quandt, 1990).
The degree of bureaucratic resistance in Egypt is also expected to be correlated with the US.
foreign policies in the Middle East. Sanctions on Libya or bombings of Iraq, for example,
shape how a bureaucrat views and deals with the American contractor responsible for on-site
administrative reform given Egypt’s historical ties and unions with Arab nations. It is diﬂicult
to convince Egyptian bureaucrats that the US. views them differently than their Arab
brothers. Therefore, bureaucratic resistance should be expected in the presence of reform
attempts by an American team.

Bureaucratic resistance can take unusual shapes. For example, one of the American
contractors responsible for implementing the USAID water and wastewater projects in some
areas has continuously complained about not receiving his fees from the Ministry of Housing
and Construction after ﬁnishing the project. His company actually ﬁled a law suit in
international court for the amount required ﬁ'om the Egyptian government in addition to the
damage incurred for stopping his payment for the amount of $34 million. The USAID
intervened and replaced the contractor and offered the Egyptian government to pay the

contractor $16.9 million in return for withdrawing the law suit in addition to $10 million to

115

be paid frc

governmen'

Nati
the new syst
posts in the c
car 081', to av
four decades
bureaucrat ha
get bureaucra
(Hopwood, 1t

Signiﬁ
0r low Clllilliﬁc
of duty, a lad

competent lea(

 

mennmiOn sh
ministries are U
walke

 

be paid ﬁ'om the following year aid. The USAID intervention at the highest levels of
government allowed the contractor to receive his fees from the bureaucracy.
Conclusion

Nationalization policies by President Nasser required many bureaucrats to administer
the new system. Later, the government introduced a policy of guaranteeing all graduates
posts in the civil service. Many Egyptians accepted this offer due to the lack of an alternative
career, to avoid manual labor, or to escape the backwardness of their villages. More than
four decades later, one bureaucrat’s job has to be shared by many, and more than one
bureaucrat has to be seated at one desk with no necessary means of occupation. In order to
get bureaucrats busy, Egypt has become “notorious for form ﬁlling and rubber stamping”
(Hopwood, 1991: 180).

Signiﬁcant administrative problems discussed here included a mix of size, irrelevant
or low qualiﬁcations, overcentralization, a behavior that lacks professional ethics or a sense
of duty, a lack of systematic or effective training, and internal or external brain-drain of
competent leaders. Decision-making is highly centralized, policy analysts few, the ﬂow of
information sluggish, and habits of open debate and policy dialogue primitive. Some
ministries are uninterested, even hostile, to policy discussion with donors (Berg, Sines, and
Walker, 1994). These pathologies would not allow bureaucrats to carry on the task of
development that has been the responsibility of foreign donors over the last decades.

These problems are most likely to have a negative impact on the development process
in the case of Egypt. Bureaucratic intervention in the economy, known as the model of

“embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1992) adopted in South Korea or Taiwan should not be

116

considered 2
of magic in g:
managers, ar
interventioni
in the ﬁsture.
Cons:
problems of 5
water, traffic
and are react”
implemented
p mowphy cl
poucy'mgete.
The g0
identiﬁed the
Administrative

numstfy’s refOr

-q ' s
_ T — — —
_

 

considered as a remedy for success in Egypt. In these countries, the model “contains a kind
of magic ingredient for which there is no theoretic explanation: the willingness of bureaucrats,
managers, and politicians to forego large-scale rent seeking” (Waterbury, 1992: 216). Highly
interventionist policy along the lines pursued by East Asia may well be desirable at some point
in the ﬁiture, but it is unrealistic with Egypt’s current bureaucracies.

Consequences of administrative problems can be seen daily in Greater Cairo’s
problems of slum congestion, pollution, unemployment, poor waste disposal, shortage of
water, trafﬁc crisis, and housing shortage. These problems multiply with rapid urbanization
and are reaching many other cities. The majority of government policies are often not
implemented as expected or do not ﬁrlﬁll their intended purposes. The developmental
philosophy of the regime written into laws and regulations is not ﬁltered down to
policy-targeted groups due to administrative problems (Ghorbal, 1990).

The government is aware of the social and economic problems facing it, and recently
identiﬁed the administrative problems causing it. An ofﬁcial at the new Ministry of
Administrative Development pointed to the following problems during an interview about the
ministry’s reform plan:

The problem with Egyptian bureaucracy lies in the inﬂation of the system in

both the number of bureaucrats and monetary costs along with low revenues

. . . Instability of the organization structure as we always experience

elimination, separation, or merging of departments . . . The division of the

system into numerous ministries, agencies, organizations, centers, and units

. . . A worn out physical structure that is uncomfortable for both bureaucrats

and the public . . . Poor and slow performance due to procedures and rules

that became goals in themselves rather than tools for achieving goals . . .

Extravagancy in consuming material and resources without suﬂicient
information . . . Isolation from the public and the surrounding environment

117

and

mat

mo*

dec

(1151

Ider

the unsolver
through its 1
Reviewing t1
the bureaucr
Next
pol-111%] and '
done by discu.
that Started in
and a“ asSessr

ﬁlling these p

 

continuity ant

framework

 

 

and slowness in responding to global and social changes . . . Low salaries

made incentives perceived as part of the salary and lost their effectiveness in

motivation . . . Power hungry managers who like to approve every single

decision made by their subordinates . . . Not considering the public as
customers, source of revenues, or as a criteria for judgment and evaluation.

Identifying the major obstacles for reforming the Egyptian bureaucracy and delineating
the unsolved administrative problems in this chapter answer the question of whether the GOE
through its bureaucracy directly constrain efforts of administrative reform. It clearly does.
Reviewing the reasons and forms of bureaucratic resistance to USAID efforts also highlights
the bureaucrats’ share of the USAID’s poor record of reform.

Next I shall answer the research question of whether the GOE indirectly through
political and economic strategies constrain the external agent’s reform efforts. This will be
done by discussing previous reform efforts, examining the recent administrative reform eﬁ’orts
that started in July 1997 by the inception of the new Ministry of Administrative Development,
and an assessment of whether internally initiated administrative reform efforts are capable of
ﬁxing these problems. Finally, answers to these questions will then be applied to the

Continuity and Reform model to examine if they warrant modiﬁcations to the theoretical

framework.

118

In I
through p0
efforts. Thi
attempts 3111
With the inc
political resi
answers to 1
Continuity a,

This 3
interviews wi,
Adrnitlistrativ:
USAID missi
Manheim and
i”formation he

Objective ochI

 

 

Since 11
reform Strategy
5’5! can re, an

Safeguard the PL

 

CHAPTER 4
THE GOE POSITION ON ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

In this chapter I will attempt to answer the research question of whether the GOE
through political and economic strategies indirectly constrains the external agent’s reform
efforts. This question will be answered ﬁrst with an analysis of previous administrative reform
attempts and then by examining recent administrative reform efforts that started in July 1997
with the inception of the new Ministry of Administrative Development. An analysis of
political resistance and political support for the recent efforts is then presented. Finally,
answers to the research questions will be analyzed in terms of the applicability of the
Continuity and Reform Model.

This analysis is based in part on reviewing plans and related documents and in part on
interviews with top Egyptian ofﬁcials, including an assistant minister of the new Ministry of
Administrative Development, and American management consultants associated with the
USAID mission. Interviews were based on elite interviewing techniques described by
Manheim and Rich (1991). Each interviewee was questioned differently based on the
information he or she possesses. Questions were ordered and determined only by the
objective of collecting the information. Finally, the tone of the interviews was conversational.

Previous Administrative Reform Efforts

Since the 19705 slogans and bureaucratic bashing were the primary administrative
reform strategy in Egypt. During a First of May Labor Day speech President Sadat made the
ﬁrst call for an “administrative revolution” that would “destroy routine and red tape and

safeguard the public interest” (Al-Abram, 1977 : 1). His call for an administrative revolution

119

launched a
adrninistrat
and efforts

of the extre
1985 addrer

We 1
situa

 

 

launched a national debate about the best ways for reform. However, one year later the
administrative revolution ended up only as a media event praising the President’s initiatives
and eﬂ’orts for administrative reform. President Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by members
of the extremist group Al Jihad and was succeeded by vice-president Hosni Mubarak. In a
1985 address to the People’s Assembly, President Mubarak noted:

We had before us the prospect of crumbling public services and utilities. The
situation was the result of years of accumulated paralysis and neglect. Citizens
complained of the situation from the moment they opened their eyes in the
morning until they returned from work. The flow of water was inadequate and
irregular. Electric current ﬂuctuated, and extended blackouts were common.
Communications moved at a snail’s pace. Roads were impassable. Television
was limited. The decay of the sewer system turned some streets and quarters
into swamps. . . .

Medical equipment in public hospitals is old and in short supply. Bureaucracy
oppresses the citizens with routine and delay. Free education has lost much
of its effectiveness and the expense of college education is oppressive to
Egyptian families. Then there are the problems of housing shortages, rising
prices, vanishing goods, and of houses collapsing on their inhabitants. The list
of problems our people complain of is endless, yet they are forced to put up
with them. . . .

The public sector bears many burdens of the past, including ﬁxed prices
unrelated to rising costs of production, absorbing surplus labor from among
the graduates, submitting to ministerial laws and decisions which restrict
administrative discretion and limit the administrator’s ability to use available
talents and capacities by precluding them ﬁ'om discriminating between lazy
and productive workers (Al-Ahram, 1985: 3).

President Mubarak recognizes the problems with Egyptian bureaucracy. He has called
time after time for simpliﬁcation of the bureaucratic rules and regulations and for changing
the incentive programs that failed to distinguish between productive and nonproductive
bureaucrats (Palmer et al., 1989). The Presidential calls for reform, however, do not go
beyond the news and end up being an intellectual exercise for scholars and another media

event for the GOE.

120

 

The
national de
commission
First, it is p
unemploym
the ever-inc
from the Ar
it is necessar—
Unemployme
SYStem (Pal r

Secc

and overStat
but rather f
(Waterbuw
reform mea
having to n

Thi'

refonnﬁ Pr:

These calls for reform can be considered non-serious and their only results were
national debates in the newspapers and the media for two decades. No task forces or
commissions were initiated. The lack of seriousness in reform efforts is due to three reasons.
First, it is politically advantageous to increase-not reduce-- the bureaucracy. Egypt has high
unemployment levels especially “intellectual unemployment.” This problem is intensifying by
the ever-increasing ﬂow of university graduates as well as by the return of expatriate workers
from the Arab oil states. While publicizing bureaucratic problems, President Mubarak knew
it is necessary to keep the bureaucracy overstaffed in order to ease the pressures of excessive
unemployment. Therefore, bureaucracy has been intentionally used as a welfare and security
system (Palmer et al., 1989).

Second, substantial foreign aid ﬂows have helped to offset the high cost of subsidized
and overstaffed public services. Most of the foreign loans were not tied to economic reforms
but rather ﬂowed from political considerations arising from instability in the Middle East
(Waterbury, 1993). Politically motivated foreign aid has lessened the probability of serious
reform measures by reducing the urgency for change and relieving President Mubarak from
having to make politically difficult decisions (Weinbaum, 1986).

Third, Egyptian presidents strongly support the role of bureaucracy. While calling for
reform, President Mubarak said in an interview to Al-Watan Al-Arabi:

I wonder about those who advocate selling the public sector, because this

would be a dangerous step taken at the cost of the simple citizen, because the

private sector operates according to the needs of the market, and its prices are

high. So what is the simple citizen to do? Frankly, he will starve. From here

starts social envy and crime ﬂourishes. This envy has serious effects on the

social structure. The public sector regulates the private one, thus offering
goods to the public at reasonable prices, because state control is a must.

121

 

Pre;
from his Sm
may still be
possible alte

the presiden

 

 

 

ldCOIOgy, Pr

administrativ-

FFOm

to take SeriOI

Selling the public sector would create a socio-economic problem. I am careful

to maintain social peace and balance. These are the fundamentals for me. So

I reiterate that the public sector is an essential foundation of the Egyptian

social and economic structure (Al-Watan Al-Arabi, 1987: 30).

President Mubarak’s strong belief in the role of the public sector ﬂows in large part
from his Soviet education.” Transferring the provision of public services to the private sector
may still be not an alternative for Egypt’s economy, but reforming the public sector is a
possible alternative. Due to many political factors in the 19905 that will be discussed later,
the president no longer has the luxury of shaping the national policy solely based on his
ideology. President Mubarak is far more constrained today by many pressures that imply that
administrative reform is central to a resolution of the country’s economic and social problems.

From the discussion above one can conclude that past Egyptian regimes have failed
to take seriously administrative reform efforts. Administrative reform efforts were ad hoc
procedures imposed on an already existing structure or value to serve as adjustments or
accommodations. Administrative reform measures were often to create new administrative
structures to deal with problems mishandled by the old (Waterbury, 1983). Intentions of
granting more independence and ﬂexibility to bureaucracies have further buried bureaucracies
under a plethora of decrees, articles, and executive documents (Wahba, 1983). Further, the

heterogeneity and rapid turnover in ministers undermined the unity and continuity in reform

efforts due to the lack of authority to provide the needed reform. Administrative reform

 

3‘ For an analysis of President Mubarak’s ideological, social, and personal type and their inﬂuence on his style
in politics see Chapter One in Robert Springborg (1989) Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political
Order. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

122

decrees we

retarded by

The New h

In J L
independent
became resp
became l'eSp
Which contrc
recent history
in the goven

administrative

 

decrees were often ﬁ'agmented, determined by bureaucratic rivalry, and implementation is
retarded by a lack of coordination (Hinnebusch, 1988).
Recent Administrative Reform Efforts

The New Ministry of Administrative Development

In July 1997, President Mubarak assigned the task of administrative reform to a new
independent ministry called the Ministry of Administrative Development. The new ministry
became responsible for designing and implementing a plan for administrative reform and
became responsible for overseeing the Central Agency for Organization and Management
which controls the labor and wage policy of bureaucracies. This is the ﬁrst time in Egypt’s
recent history that the task of administrative reform has been assigned to a separate institution
in the government hierarchy. It is also the ﬁrst time that a comprehensive plan for
administrative reform has been put forward in Egypt. The ministry’s efforts, therefore,
warrant analysis here as a candidate for a serious attempt of administrative reform. It also
seems that recent domestic and international political events have put pressure on President
Mubarak to improve the functioning of bureaucracies. The following analysis is a detailed
review of the ministry’s plan, respondents’ evaluations of the plan and recommendations for
bridging the gap between previous promises and effective performance, the political resistance
facing the plan, and domestic and international factors supporting the recent reform efforts.

Interviews at the new Ministry of Administrative Development revealed that its
organization operates without a written mission statement and no clear goals. The response
of a high ofﬁcial at the minister’s ofﬁce to my question about the ministry’s plan was that it

is to be found in the “minister’s speeches in public meetings, newspapers, and

123

recommer

collected 1‘

to address

and second

Reforming

The plan ca
1.

2.

 

 

recommendations to the cabinet.””

Therefore, the ministry’s plan presented here was
collected ﬁ'om the minister’s speeches since he came to power in 1997. The plan attempts
to address administrative problems on two fronts: ﬁrst, reforming the administrative system,
and second, reforming the relationship between bureaucrats and the public in service delivery.
Reforming the Administrative System
The plan calls for fourteen changes to reform the administrative system:
1. Facilitate the early retirement system to decrease the number of workers.
2. Support the social development fund to help retirees start small businesses and
provide them with ﬁnance, technical support, and training.
3. Reevaluate the public employees’ salary stnicture with the goal of increasing
wages to decrease the economic burden on bureaucrats.

4. Assign a special fee to be added for every public service. The money

collected would then contribute to improving the incentive system for

bureaucrats.
5. Make bureaucrats’ salaries and incentives tax exempt.
6. Establish a new incentive category under the name of “Citizen’s Satisfaction”

to be given based on a bureaucrat’s advancement in serving the public. This

incentive will be paid monthly so that bureaucrats can feel the signiﬁcance of

 

’9 One positive sign revealed by the new minister’s many speeches about his plan for administrative reform
is his marketing talent in eliciting public support without radical descriptions such as President Sadat’s
“administrative revolution.” This is a talent that most ministers in the Egyptian government lack. Many
government reform plans have yielded unsatisfactory results due to the lack of marketing on behalf of public
officials, such as in the case of family planning, rationing water usage, and moving people to the new
communities built in the desert around Cairo.

124

10.

ll.

12.

 

10.

ll.

12.

better customer service. Funding this new incentive system should be partially
through increasing the fees for public services

Provide economic and health services to bureaucrats in a manner that reduce
their ﬁnancial burden.

Establish more training centers for bureaucrats at all levels. Emphasis is to be
given to two groups; the new hires are targeted to improve their performance
and manners in serving the public; middle management will learn skills
necessary for translating ideas and plans into results.

Link hiring with the actual needs. No more hiring will be made without
written permission from the Central Agency for Organization and
Administration.

Solve the problem of overstaffing by transferring bureaucrats to empty
positions in different geographical locations and giving those transferred 30
percent bonuses for ﬁve years.

Change recruitment laws to allow agencies to advertise management openings
to the public. A committee whose members are from outside the hiring
bureaucracy including university professors will review the applications.
Limit management positions to four years after which the bureaucracy has to
re-advertise for the opened position. Incumbents can reapply and will be
evaluated with new applicants by a committee from outside the hiring

bureaucracy.

125

13.

 

 

 

The
OfESWIian
and (10) att
opportunist
attempt to it
improving ,
e"‘PhasizinE
Eliminating
though allo
incTme the
to both Wer]

This
admini-Sham

Further, as Fe

13. Establish an improved system for evaluation to measure bureaucrats’
performance and use it as the basis for promotions and incentives.

14. Improve the technological capacity of bureaucracies starting with priority to
administrative units. Also proposed is the establishment and continuously
updating of a digital database about individual bureaucrats and their
performance. In addition to monitoring the behavioral history of each
bureaucrat, this database is to be also used in assessing labor needs for
bureaucracies.

The reform plan as outlined by the minister addresses to a great extent the problems

of Egyptian bureaucracy discussed in Chapter Three. More speciﬁcally, items (1), (2), (9),
and (10) attempt to solve the problem of overstaf’ﬁng through early retirement, business
opportunities, hiring freeze, and transfer policies. Items (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (13)
attempt to improve the quality of work by increasing salaries, incentives, and beneﬁts, and by
improving the evaluation process. Item (8) targets administrative incapacity through
emphasizing training of bureaucrats and managers. Item (1 l) aims at corruption through
eliminating procedures facilitating nepotism. Item (12) points at the quality of leaders
through allowing outside recruitment of the most qualiﬁed. Finally, item (14) attempts to
increase the administrative capacity by improving the technological capacity of bureaucracies
to both work eﬂiciently and monitor bureaucrats.

This reform plan put forward by the GOE surprisingly utilizes the approaches to

administrative reform outlined in Chapter Two as tools at the external agent’s disposal.

Further, as recommended by the literature review, the plan is a mix of reform approaches put

126

together tc
started by
approach,
organizatio
incentives 5}
approaches
Reformin g
The Part of 1'

1.

2.

 

together to ensure that no problem is solved at the price of another problem. The ministry
started by planning administrative reform then by mixing between the behavioral change
approach, through improving the quality of recruitments, incentives and training, the
organizational cultural reform approach, by improving the evaluation process and making new
incentives speciﬁc to customer service, and ﬁnally, the technological change approach. Other
approaches not utilized at this phase of the plan were outlined in the next phase.
Reforming Public Relations and the Process of Service Delivery

The part of the plan calls for four changes:

1. Simplify procedures and rules to minimize the red tape.

2. Establish a process to minimize the direct contact between the person
requesting the service and the bureaucrat(s) providing the service. This will
be done by using the following strategy:

3. A. Identify the information, forms, and time needed to obtain the service
beforehand and write the information for the public on the form and
on the entrance of the agency providing the service.

3. B. Sell the forms needed to obtain the service at post offices.

3. C. Set a ﬁxed price for the forms 50 that the person requesting the
service does not have any ﬁnancial transaction inside the bureaucracy
providing the service.

3. D. Establish a separate unit inside agencies providing the service to
receive the forms from the public and give them in return a written

date in which he/she should expect to obtain the service.

127

4.

3. E.

3. F.

3.6.

3. H.

Establish a separate unit inside bureaucracies for delivering the
ﬁnished service.

Introduce a new system of service delivery that utilizes mail in
inquiring from applicants about more information if needed, notifying
the applicant if his/er service available for pickup, or delivering the
service if possible.

It is the responsibility of the delivering bureaucracy, not the applicant,
to ﬁnish the work needed from other bureaucracies if the service
requires the involvement of more than one bureaucracy.

For services that require direct contact with the public at least A, B,

and C guidelines have to be applied.

Locate agencies that provide related services in one building to make it easier

for the public to ﬁnish their work in one trip.

Train bureaucrats on how to facilitate the public’s visits to bureaucracies.

As it is the case with the ﬁrst phase of the plan, the GOE utilized theoretically sound

approaches of administrative refomi, based on the literature review in Chapter Two, to

address problems with the Egyptian bureaucracy, identiﬁed in Chapter Three. This phase of

the plan combines the structural and procedural change approach, by reorganizing and

simplifying the rules, providing better relationship with the public, and improving service

delivery. Indirectly this phase of the reform plan also attempts to minimize corruption by

keeping ﬁnancial transactions with the public inside the organizations to a minimum. Put

128

together, t
did so witt-

Thtl
with the pL
(Aria 1998'
budget for

Egyptian po

 

the wage in
minister’s p]
Bridging th

Inter
Plan, Inten

Developmen

together, the GOE surprisingly not only took the initiative for administrative reform, but also
did so with a theoretically sound plan.

The ﬁrst phase of implementation took six months and has been primarily concerned
with the public relations and service delivery areas of reform with the cost of $5.6 million
(Atia, 1998). However, it is important to keep this amount in respective. The Ministry’s
budget for FY 1998-99 is 2 billion Egyptian pounds ($588 million) of the 91.2 billion
Egyptian pounds ($26. 8 billion) national budget or only 0.02 percent.‘0 This amount includes
the wage increases and bonuses for the millions of bureaucrats that are promised in the
minister’s plan (Al-Shazly, 1998).

Bridging the Gap Between Promises and Performance

Interviews were carried on to assess the progress and the validity of the ministry’s
plan. Interviews included an Assistant Minister for the new Ministry of Administrative
Development, the Head of the Research Division at the Central Agency for Organization and
Administration, an ofﬁcial at the Budget Division at Ministry of Finance, an ofﬁcial at the
Personnel Department at Ministry of Education, and an official at the Minister’s ofﬁce at the
Ministry of Culture. On the external agent side, American management consultants
associated with the USAID mission were asked to assess the progress of the ministry’s plan.
Interviews included representatives from AMBRIC, Arthur Anderson, EAP, Black and

Veatch, and CH2M Hill.

 

‘° Including different sources of foreign aid, the 1998-99 national budget has a deﬁcit of about 1 percent
because the available resources are only 83.2 billion Egyptian pounds. Therefore, it is a positive sign that
President Mubarak is devoting money for administrative reform despite his budget’s deﬁcit. Within the
context of the Continuity and Reform Model, these changes in public administration are caused by forces of
reform that was hypothesized in Chapter One to be placed by an external agent.

129

 

Tb
ministryf
plan. Firs
analyzed 0
increasing
deve10pme1
involved if
knowledge

Se
Problems
announce
Persons 0
laws and

l.eir'lslted

—. ‘ A...-
‘ ‘_‘

There is a consensus among external and internal respondents that the initiation of a
ministry for administrative reform is a good step, but the majority had criticisms about the
plan. First, the weaknesses of the existing organizations have not so far been thoroughly
analyzed or given the deserved priority. The reform plan has yet to develop solutions for
increasing the capacity of organizations to perform their assigned role and to realize
developmental goals. At this stage, many of the respondents feel that bureaucrats should be
involved in the policy making process at the minister’s office because they are more
knowledgeable of their agencies’ capacity.

Second, a clear direct statement of how the ministry plans to deal with the signiﬁcant
problems of corruption, nepotism, and favoritism is missing from the minister’s
announcements. This would be a signiﬁcant step towards recruiting and promoting qualiﬁed
persons on the basis of competence rather than on the common practice of nepotism. Further,
laws and rules classifying all information and procedures as “national security” have to be
revisited because an official detailed map for Cairo, for example, should not be conﬁdential.
Also, interviewees noted that administrative reform should introduce a system that
encourages and protects whistle blowers and encourage criticism in the press to strength
public opinion as an effective deterrent for corruption.

Third, decentralization is virtually absent form the ministry plans. An official at the
Central Agency for Organization and Administration notes that:

Everybody works with his eyes on Cairo. Cairo is the source of inspiration

for decisions and approvals. No bureaucrat, even those at the top, makes a

decision without an approval of someone higher than him. This is a journey

that usually takes from days to years, and the decision may pass tens of
departments and committees. You may even ﬁnd a simple decision on the

130

de
.0!

Fu
more povt
Administra
the reform

Fou

 

 

More than
aﬂe’ Winnin

ministers O.

desk of the prime minister or the president. Administrative reform should plan
to decentralize the structure.

Further, procedures for reform in the plan are still centrally controlled and do not put
more power in the hand of the local leadership. Interviewees feel the Ministry of
Administrative Development should organize at the local levels to decentralize the inputs of
the reform plan.‘l

Fourth, the administrative reform plan does not address the separation of powers.
More than half of the People’ 5 Assembly’s members (278) are bureaucrats who kept their jobs
after winning the elections. As elected officials, those bureaucrats are expected to question
ministers on the legislative ﬂoor. Ironically, ministers being questioned are often the
members’ superiors at their respective bureaucracies. The dilemma is that the elected
bureaucrat is required to obey orders of his superiors and maintain conﬁdentiality of
information ﬁ'om his/er job at the executive branch. At the same time, he/she is required to
question bureaucracies and oversee their procedures.

Signs of this administrative dilemma are many. An elected bureaucrat at Cairo
wastewater revealed problems with the accounting system of his organization at the People’s
Assembly and was punished by his superior. Another incident involved the Minister of
Housing and Construction yelling on the ﬂoor of the People’s Assembly after receiving a
question about the ministry’s often changing policy in building highways: “Don’t you forget

that you are my subordinate at the ministry!” Interviewees believe the new ministry of

 

" Mayﬁeld (1996) argues that decentralization is unlikely given the regime and the USAID worry from threats
of instability that may occur from making room for Islarnists to form a political base at the local level.

131

Admini
giving re
bureaucra
F i
to be recei|
would alsoi
success, an|
strategic p1
1’ ecruiting c
Sixtl
Two encour;
Change. The
in (”def to 5;
through eTlhar

remained in p}

 

a 10n8.term tr

Wilden”), Cm

 

Administrative Development needs to address this point because it will be very helpful in
giving representatives the power to support the ministry’s plan and to reveal corruption in
bureaucracies.‘2

Fifth, more attention needs to be given to putting the “right” leader in the organization
to be receiving aid and shifting the power ﬁgures into different positions. Such methods
would also minimize the resistance to reform, give the ministry’s plan higher chances of
success, and increase aid’s effectiveness. Getting the “right” leader, however, requires
strategic planning and enhancing the wage system to compete with the private sector in
recruiting competent managers.

Sixth, although theoretically sound approaches from the literature review in Chapter
Two encourage incrementalism, many of the respondents preferred to see a comprehensive
change. The new Ministry of Administrative Reform intends to implement its plan gradually
in order to spread its cost over time. The goal seems to be to restructure the public sector
through enhancing the large system rather than mass layoffs because restrictions on dismissals
remained in place. This assumes, of course, that the national budget could afford to pay for
a long-term transition period. The ministry’s goal also assumes that the grth of the labor
force would not overwhelm the economy during that lag and that existing wages would
sumciently cover labor.

Some argue that under these assumptions, the impact of administrative reform on

employment is difficult to project. The plan has to directly and immediately attack the hidden

 

° The 1971 Constitution allows the bureaucrat to be a member of the People’s Assembly, but it also requires
him to leave the civil service. This is seldom the case and the Assembly in return is composed of a majority
that praise bureaucracy.

132

ernploym
continues

heavier.

 

Th
ministry cal
govemmer
"nemployn
at each burel

‘0 a1Pplicabl

small-scale

 

aidmg Categ.

SUCh as elem;

The E

The g,
ﬁVe Yt
gOVen
billion
time]
With 0;
public
“ill hat
imPIErr

employment and the unproductive manpower of Egyptian bureaucracy. Bureaucracy
continues to grow, bureaucrats’ unproductivity increases, and the government’s burden gets
heavier.

There are a number of additional measures that the respondents noted where the new
ministry can address administrative reform in a serious and thoughtﬁrl manner. First, the
government has to end the “graduates policy” that proved unrealistic in absorbing
unemployment that is hovering around 20 percent. Second, the ministry has to sort out labor
at each bureaucracy and keep the productive groups with relevant skills, move irrelevant skills
to applicable areas, and encourage the remaining segment to leave the service by providing
small-scale projects through soft loans and facilities. This last segment should contain the
aiding categories in public service, such as janitors, which reached the ratio of l for every 5
bureaucrats. Training programs should be given to this category to enhance its skills in areas
such as electricity or plumbing and encourage them to move into the private sector.

The government may not necessarily have to generate new revenues to ﬁnance this
comprehensive plan because it has different means at its disposal as the head of the research
division at the Central Agency for Organization and Administration suggested:

The government has been building new cities in the desert for the last twenty-

ﬁve years and expecting people to move out there, while their jobs are in

government buildings in Cairo. These buildings are on properties worth

billions of pounds. The new ministry should move bureaucracies to one of

those new cities and sell those buildings. This reform plan will hit two birds

with one stone. First, it will inhabit the new cities with bureaucrats and the

public in direct or indirect contact with bureaucracies. Second, government

will have signiﬁcant revenues from selling its expensive properties in Cairo to
implement the reform plan.

133

F i
bureaucra
continuati
necessary
adrninistra
MiniStry o:
ofadminist
The ministe
before bein
ImlJIement

Ther
Pohtica] fesj
he had Signe

Contracﬁng (

 

Finally, respondents from USAID’s consultant ﬁrms that deal with Egyptian
bureaucracies expressed the view that successﬁil administrative reform efforts cannot be a
continuation of the competition game of power and privilege. Many point out that it is
necessary to put the task of administrative reform in the hands of a new breed of
administrators who are drawn from the private sector or non-bureaucratic sphere. The
Ministry of Administrative Development responsible for reform implementation is made up
of administrators who have long resisted reform and believe in exceptions and compromises.
The minister himself was the head of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration
before being appointed to his new position."3
Implementation Problems

Theoretically, the administrative reform plan should expect to face political resistance.
Political resistance began after the Minister of Administrative Development announced that
he had signed an executive law to cancel the method of recruiting civil servants through
contracting (Atia, 1997b). This policy would affect the renewal of contracts for more than
over 750,000 in the labor force, many of them consultants over the retirement age.“ This can
be seen as a step towards reducing the size of bureaucracy by ﬁrst attacking the margins. It
is also estimated by the ministry that this policy would eliminate additional 400,000 “ghost

positions” that have been receiving 1.5 billion Egyptian pounds ($440 million) as salaries and

 

‘3 Egypt continues to be ruled by administrators who are trained during the socialist era and inﬂuenced by the
Eastern bloc from the President all the way down the hierarchy (Weinbaum, 1986; Mayﬁeld, 1996). Also,
most Egyptians continue to be dominated by a prevailing ideology of socialism as a method of attaining social
justice and equality planted by President Nasser.

“ A manager at one the branches at Cairo water pointed out that the importance of those consultants. When

a water pipe breaks in a neighborhood, the manager has to call one of those retirees at home because he is the
only one who knows the location of the main taps in this area of the water network.

134

bonuses

 

workers t
Lt
questionir‘
their const
Pam/“Nat

decision” (

 

0f P011tica]
revealed in

the Questioi

bonuses (Atia, 1997a). It was also viewed as a step to close the back door of recruiting
workers temporarily through contracts and then move them permanently into the civil service.

Less than one week after announcing this policy, the minister was called for
questioning on the People’ 5 Assembly ﬂoor after pressure was put on the representatives from
their constituents. In an attempt to stop the questioning of the minister, the chair of the niling
party—National Democratic Party--announced that “he convinced the minister to reverse his
decision” (Shoukry, 1997: 13). Nevertheless, the legislature held its session and the extent
of political pressure facing administrative reform through cutting down the labor force was
revealed in the minister’s speech. The minister reversed himself 180 degrees in response to
the question about his policy of eliminating the contracting method (Al-Batrik, 1998: 13):

There are no plans to stop hiring but rather to reorganize and provide

extensive training. Matter of fact, we were planning to give priority for the

non permanent positions through contracts.

The administrative reform plan completely stopped at its ﬁrst stages due to political
pressure." Political and social concerns have been evident in the minister’s speech:

What is meant by administrative reform is not getting rid of workers, but

rather the redistribution of them according to their qualiﬁcations and the need

of bureaucratic units. Administrative reform does not require a revolution

because we do not have problems that require a revolution. What we need is

to develop the concepts and tools used to run the system within a social

ﬁ'amework to ensure that no worker is worse off. We are limited by the social

dimension in the process of administrative reform (Al-Batrik, 1998: 13).

This runs counter to his previous announcements before facing political pressure in

the People’s Assembly (Al-Basel, 1998: 3):

 

‘5 At the time of writing, no comprehensive law to reverse this policy has been submitted to the People’s
Assembly or the ministerial Cabinet.

135

 

A
backing t1
with its n
priority to
Prejects, o
leaders to g
involved ir
their PrOte
and Planni
behither i.

trade adm

There is no reform without victims, and bureaucrats are victims of themselves
because they are not keeping up with development requirements and became
obstacles rather than facilitators.

Another sign of problems in implementation is that no other ministry seems to be
backing the minister in marketing administrative reform even after announcing the initial plan
with its new incentives for bureaucrats. The political leaders are still giving low, if any,
priority to administrative reform and are still more concerned in speeches with their own
projects, often externally ﬁrnded, to maintain their political power. The reluctance of political
leaders to engage with the minister of administrative reform in his efforts stems from the risks
involved in antagonizing bureaucracies. Also, other ministers’ hesitation leads to assessing
their protectionist behavior to maintain their decision making authority, in terms of stafﬁng
and planning manpower, that would otherwise be limited by administrative reform. This
behavior is consistent with Rivlin’s (1985) judgment of Egyptian Ministers’ willingness to
trade administrative efﬁciency for political loyalty and control of bureaucracy.

Political and Economic Support for Administrative Reform

It has been long believed that administrative reform would jeopardize the secular
regime because the millions of people on bureaucracy’s payrolls are the regime’s prime
instrument of political control. The interesting point is that the President did not interfere in
this political struggle or support either side of the debate after he initiated the ministry. In his
speeches during that period, President Mubarak only continued to point out the bureaucratic
pathologies and their impact on development. In his address to the People’s Assembly 1997-

8 opening session, President Mubarak named some of Egypt’s problems facing the

136

 

approaches
theoretical];
bureaucraq

0in
the long fe;
lately imple
tubsidies an.
reacﬁOn fro:

stealth” th

due in part t(

government such as unemployment, retardation of the education system, exports,
development of rural and urban areas, and pollution. He then offered the solution:

Fixing these problems requires a major administrative reform program that

would cure bureaucratic ills. Egyptian bureaucracy cannot in its current

condition carry the responsibility of major development programs.

In addition, the President is adopting a new tone saying that administrative reform is
“a requirement for taking Egypt to the new millennium” and “to cross the bridge to the 21"
century.” Along with the President’s speeches, the new Ministry of Administrative
Development has put together a plan that proves that administrative reform can adopt various
approaches without jeopardizing the regime by cutting down the labor force. And
theoretically, Perrow (1993) explicitly notes that there is nothing preventing a large
bureaucracy from being reformed.

Given the scenario of political resistance discussed earlier, there is reason to question
the long fear that administrative reform would cause a repetition of riots. The regime has
lately implemented many unpopular policy changes, such as raising prices by decreasing
subsidies and adding sales taxes, for the ﬁrst time since President Nasser revolution, with no
reaction from people. Another practice that the government is adopting is the “reform by
stealth” where subsidies are maintained but the subsidized items themselves gradually
disappear and are replaced by slightly modiﬁed and costlier items. The weak opposition is
due in part to the weakness of Egypt’s opposition groups. They seem to lack the ability to
mobilize a population that is, in any case, unorganized and apathetic. The President also has

the backing of wealthy Egyptian businessmen who are continuously asking for public

137

administ
1993).
administ
'1
political
This poll
Further, E
decrees, a
Controls t1
examine tl
Pontica] e,

interests.

administration with at least minimum honesty and efficiency (Springborg, 1989; Lofgren,
1993). The President does not seem to be sacriﬁcing political capital for his backing of
administrative reform.

Threats from the opposition pushed Egyptian presidents to permanently sacriﬁce
political participation as a popular form of decision making for the regime’s maintenance.“
This policy kept collective action, interest groups, and political participation to a minimum."
Further, Egypt’s powerless unions, the People’s Assembly that rubber stamps presidential
decrees, and no Vice President since 1981 make President Mubarak, a former officer who
controls the army, the primary national decision maker. Therefore, in order for this study to
examine the major factors that favor administrative reform in Egypt, it will analyze the
political economy of decision making relative to President Mubarak’s and his ministers best
interests.

This assumption is consistent with Sullivan’s (1990: 144, 146) prerequisites for
administrative reform in Egypt:

Given the primacy of politics in the bureaucracy and in the various aid

programs in Egypt, one hope for economic development may be found in

administrative reform. This would entail either a complete overhaul of a

bureaucracy, which may require a political revolution, or improvement in the

managerial capabilities of existing bureaucratic structures, i.e., training
bureaucrats or recruiting good managers . . . The reform of the bureaucratic

structure would, however, require a major initiative on the part of numerous
key ﬁgures in the Egyptian government, including President Mubarak and

 

“ For the record of politics and decision making without participation in Egypt see Springborg ( 1982, 1989);
Waterbury (1983); Hinnebusch (1985)were this issue has been extensively documented. The GOE remains
restrictive, arbitrary, and in violation of the fundamental rights of citizens (Al Sayyid, 1995).

‘7 Political participation and collective action refers to “those activities by private citizens that are more or less
directly aimed at inﬂuencing the selection of government personnel and/or actions they take” (Verba and Nie,
1972: 2).

138

several current Cabinet members. Given the rivalries between ministers, this
kind of innovation and initiative is unlikely.

While Sullivan concludes, however, that such prerequisites are unlikely, the
President’s behavior today seems to be inﬂuenced by the following positive international and
domestic political factors.

Global Shift to Market Economy

President Mubarak is currently facing a new global system since the demise of the
communist system. Changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and other parts of the
world are having an effect on GOE under President Mubarak due to the loss of Egypt’s
socialist partners (U SAID, 1992). President Nasser’s socialist model is being challenged by
the movement toward free market concepts throughout the world in the early 19905. The
contemporary international environment has already helped to free Egypt of the socialist
model by unleashing the private sector. In addition, images and news of former communist
leaders being prosecuted and watched by Egyptians represented a “wake-up call” for
President Mubarak and boosted the chances of compliance with requirements for
administrative reform.

The Rise of Islamic Groups

The second source of pressure for compliance with requirements of administrative
reform comes from the rise of Islamic groups among the public for the ﬁrst time since
President Sadat’s assassination. While President Mubarak still has the upper hand in

combating these groups, their actions have signiﬁcant negative effects." On the one hand,

 

" For a discussion about how the regime resists these groups through all possible means, including those that
abridge human rights see Sagiv (1995). _

139

the militant wings of these groups literally declared war on tourism as a source of income for
Egypt. On November 17, 1997, Islamic militants staged the bloodiest terrorist attack ever
in Egypt by attacking foreign tourists at the famous Queen Hatshepsut Temple in Luxor,
killing 62 people. Following several years of relative calm, this attack once again raised the
issue of reduced capital inﬂows from tourism and also reduced private foreign investments."
The image of an unstable country puts signiﬁcant pressure on President Mubarak given that
Egypt’s economy is a “rentier economy” that depends on sources of income outside its own
productive capacity such as tourism (Zaalouk, 1989).

On the other hand, the moderate members of Islamic groups took advantage of the
fact that bureaucracies entrusted with the responsibilities of providing public services have,
to a large extent, failed and have recently taken an entrepreneurial role. These groups have
developed an eﬂicient system for providing public and social services, such as schools and
hospitals, out of frustration over the bureaucracies’ inability to fully meet the public’s need
(Sullivan, 1994).’0

Kepel’s (1993) study of the demographics of Islamic groups revealed that poor
neighborhoods are known to be breeding spots for Islamic militants. Poor economic and

living conditions, such as the absence of water/wastewater services, create a revolutionary

 

‘9 Any decline in the capital inﬂow for Egypt should be viewed as signiﬁcant given the country’s bad
economic conditions. Egypt maintains a high trade deﬁcit, remains heavily dependent on food imports (more
than 50 percent of the country’s annual wheat requirement is imported), and unemployment rate is above 20
percent (USAID, 19963). More important, Egypt has the worst external debt problem in the world—worse
in relative terms than that of Brazil and Argentina (Lavy and Sheffer, 1991).

’° Also due to the failure of bureaucracies, the army took over the role of building roads, developing cities
(including providing basic infrastructure to support them), growing crops to feed its own troops and then
marketing and distributing the surplus to the public for proﬁt (Sullivan, 1994). This is while the bureaucrats
are still entitled to provide these services.

140

mode among the youth in these neighborhoods." A natural consequence of their frustration
is believing in the cause of Islamic groups and joining the organization that is helping them
in most, if not all, aspects of life. Thus, the entrepreneurial role of Islamic groups is an
effective political weapon based on the rapid deterioration in government bureaucracies and
the services they provide (Roy, 1992). Their appeal to the public justiﬁes their militant Wing’s
cause and lowers President’s Mubarak popularity among Egypt’s majority: the lower class.
Most important, the entrepreneurial role of Islamic groups places a pressure on the president
to comply with requirements of administrative reform.

Seizure of power by Islamic groups is not only a threat to the regime but to other
groups both inside Egypt, such as secularists and Coptic Orthodox Christians, and outside
Egypt, such as Israel and the Arab peninsula secular regimes. Assuming that the majority
would vote for Islamic groups in Egypt is not an unrealistic assumption. Islamic groups
increased their power from 15 to 45 representatives in Egypt’s 1987 parliamentary election
despite the regime’s efforts. This was their last election, however, since they were forbidden
from running for election again by a presidential decree.’2 It is true that religion is
increasingly a salient factor in the politics of countries with different social and historical
backgrounds from Morocco to Indonesia. But Egypt is the core and its fall would trigger a

chain reaction in other Arab countries as was the case with the movements of

 

5' According to some USAID officials in Cairo. US. is spending signiﬁcant resources and efforts in providing
these neighborhoods with public utilities as a preventive measure of ﬁghting terrorism.

’2 Islamic groups also won 40 percent of the vote in Jordan’s 1991 parliamentary elections in 1991. In Algeria
the unexpected winning of Islamic groups to the majority of seats in the parliament led to a civil war since
1992.

141

decolonization.53 Also, Islamic groups would have no problems in applying their
interpretation of religion given that the Egyptian constitution already states that Islam is the
principal source of all legislation. Therefore, an anti-democratic framework is an “unfortunate
necessity” for the external agent (Sagiv, 1995).
Decline in Foreign Aid

In addition to the global shift to market economy and actions of both militant and
moderate members of Islamic groups, a recent decline in foreign aid puts another pressure on
President Mubarak to pursue administrative reform. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, there is a
steady and signiﬁcant decline in foreign assistance. Political considerations that motivated
foreign loans for too long are no longer signiﬁcant and aid inﬂows are declining sharply. It
became clear for international donors by the end of the 19805 that aid is not necessary to keep
Egypt on the peace track and the President is not about to wage war on Israel. Thus, the
picture began to change and net foreign aid inﬂows fell from more than 5 percent of GDP in
1980 to zero in 1988 and turned negative in 1989 after servicing the debt. Jeffrey Sachs
(1989) argues most forcefully that the burden of debt servicing siphons off to the beneﬁt of
out side creditors. That is true in Egypt as lending institutions, such as the World Bank and
IMF, are increasingly seen not as the agents of development but as bill collectors causing
levels of trust and cooperation to inevitably declined.

Figure 4. 1 is based on all sources of economic foreign assistance. The U. S. assistance,

however, is kept at high levels because Egypt is still a strategic asset to US. interests in the

 

’3 For a discussion of the increasing inﬂuence of Islam in politics see Ayubi (1991); Haynes (1993); and Kepel
(1994).

142

Middle East for areas such as oil, regional security, and counter-terrorism. In 21 years, Egypt
has received some $21 billion in economic aid ﬁom the United States plus over $25 billion
in military aid (Sullivan, 1996). As American economic aid to all nations has been reduced,
eliminated or under review in the past several years, U. S. aid to Egypt has been immune ﬁ'om

cutbacks and retained its second-place position to Israel in economic and military aid.

Figure 4.1
Net Aid Flows to Egypt, 1978-93.

 

Percent of GDP
10

\/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-5
t—I r—t v—t t—o H v—I I—l t—
\O \O \O \O \O \O \O \O
\l 00 00 00 0° 00 \O \O
00 O N 43 O\ OO O N
Year

Soume: World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business, 1995. (Disks)

143

Table 4.1 illustrates Egypt’s position in the US. foreign affairs budget. The decline
in other sources of foreign aid should give the US. more political leverage to push for

administrative reform given the increasing signiﬁcance of its funds.“

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Egypt’s Position Among the Top TTeiibRCe‘c‘ipients of US. Foreign Aid, FY 1995
(U .S. 5 Billion)
Country Economic Military Total
1.800

Russia .347 .0007 .348
Haiti .167 .003 . 170
Ukraine . 162 .0006 . 163
India .139 .00025 .139
South Africa .135 .00025 .135
Ethiopia . 126 .00025 . 126
Poland .079 .001 .080
West Bank/Gaza Strip .076 0.0 .076

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5‘ US. funds became of a great signiﬁcance to Egypt when they replaced the Arab aid which was cutoff in
1979 after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel. After Egypt resumed relations with its Arab neighbors,
USAID’s funds remained signiﬁcant due to the fall of oil prices which affected Egypt’s revenues from exports.
In the 19905, USAID’s funds also remained signiﬁcant to Egypt’s economy due to the sharp decline in the
country’s revenues from tourism and foreign private investments as a consequence of the militant members
of Islamic groups attempts to destabilize Mubarak’s regime and also due to the decline in other sources of
foreign aid.

144

The increasing signiﬁcance ofU. S. political leverage to push for administrative reform
is also based on Egypt’s crises ﬁ'om falling petroleum revenues, and worker remittances,
continued huge public deﬁcits, high inﬂation, and accumulating arrears in external debt
(Waterbury, 1992: 201).

Recent Changes in the U.S. Priorities

Despite Egypt’s second place in the U.S. aid list, President Clinton has recently
changed the U.S. priorities of distributing the funds thereby putting another pressure on
President Mubarak. Vice President Al Gore announced while in Cairo for the UN.
Population Conference in 1994 that U.S.-Egyptian aid relations might be better served
through a “partnership for growth” rather than an indeﬁnite continuation of foreign assistance
(U .S. Department of State, 1996). The goal of this initiative was to stimulate Egypt’s private
sector, attract private investments from the U. S., and reduce unemployment. Thus, President
Mubarak faced another pressure for reform as the U.S. policies will be moving away from
govemment-to-govemment assistance programs towards private-sector development. This
shift is apparent in the USAID’s activity sheet of FY 1997 as aid to the private sector
constitutes about 59 percent of the total economic aid to Egypt (U SAID, 1997a).

President Mubarak’s public response to Al Gore’s “partnership for growth” came in
1995 after the initiative had materialized in the USAID’s budget. He acknowledged: “We
don’t expect that aid will last forever. We know very well that there will come a time when
it will be reduced, and we have no problem with that” (Idriss, 1995: 4). There is a reason to

question whether the President has “no problem” with shifting the U. S. aid toward the private

145

sector rather than toward his government. After all, a signiﬁcant part of Egypt’s GNP
devoted to the public sector was coming ﬁ'om U.S. aid (Weinbaum, 1986).

The recent U.S. political position is an important part of the domestic and
international changes that would lead the President to sincerely support the administrative
reform. The President recognizes that accepting the status quo and not supporting
administrative reform may threaten the survival of his regime and, with it, the pro-Western
policies that have been in place by President Sadat since 1974.

Many of the political factors discussed as a support for administrative reform take the
form of crisis for the GOE. However, crises is not only theorized to be a factor in alleviating
the effect of resistance but also a cause for reform. Crozier (1964) argues that “crisis is a
distinctive and necessary element of the bureaucratic system. It provides the only means of
making the necessary adjustments, and it therefore plays a role in enabling the organization
to develop” (196). In the case of Egypt, crises have been on both the domestic and
international level.

The Continuity and Reform Model in Light of Answers to the Research Questions

Theoretically, President Mubarak and the GOE yielding to the domestic and
international pressures warrant modiﬁcations to the Continuity and Reform model. The
political commitment at the highest national level to administrative reform was translated to
the initiating of the new Ministry of Administrative Development. Further, President
Mubarak has recently shown signs of sincere commitment to reform after years of promises

to international donors. He appointed a new government in January 1996 after keeping the

146

same cabinet since the mid-19805 despite its lack of progress in reform (Sullivan, 1996).”

The GOE also accepted the political cost of administrative reform by not coloring the
eﬂ’orts with excuses about external agents’ pressures that are pushing for reform. The
national leadership appears in this reform process responsible for reform and not subservient
to the USAID despite the political cost for this strategy. President Mubarak is supporting
effective unpleasant implementation measures and taking the responsibility in the eyes of their
people to the possible extent. Given that the president is known to prefer the status-quo in
most of his political decisions (Springborg, 1989), it is not logical to expect from him more
than initiating the new Ministry of Administrative Development and give it a share of the
national budget. The political struggle for getting the reform plans into the implementation
phase and dealing with political resistance was left to his new minister. Such signs of
commitment led this study to posit that the GOE is riding on the forces of change in the
Continuity and Reform model.

Therefore, the Continuity and Reform model can be adjusted based on the answer to
the research questions of whether the GOE directly constrains efforts of administrative reform
through its bureaucracy and whether the GOE indirectly through political and economic
strategies constrain the external agent’s reform efforts. While administrative problems exist,

the GOE is riding on the forces of reform and attempting to solve these problems. As shown

 

’5 The new Prime Minister, Dr. Kama] Al-Ganzouri, a graduate of Michigan State University, is touted as a
born-again reformer. He had been long known to donor officials as a socialist, a throwback to the President
Nasser era, and an obstacle to economic reform. He acquired this reputation by heading the Ministry of
Planning for decades, which is in charge with overseeing various bureaucratic interests. The Ministry of
Planning is one bureaucratic holdover from the Nasserist era, a time of the state dominance of all aspects of
the society. Its nature is to plan, oversee, and ensure performance of public institutions-4n short, to control.
It is not interested in allowing the market to determine supply or prices (Sullivan, 1996).

147

in Figure 4.2 the GOE is directing its cabinet, through establishing the Ministry of
Administrative Development, and its bureaucracy, through a reform plan, in the direction of
administrative reform due to domestic and international political forces. These forces are
presented in the Figure 4.2 by the dotted arrow line that connects between the GOE and the
external agent. This is a legitimate change to the Continuity and Reform model given that the
GOE adopted theoretically sound approaches for reform in its plan, recommended by the
literature review in Chapter Two, to address the problems ongyptian bureaucracy, identiﬁed

in Chapter Three.

148

Figure 4.2

Forces of Continuity and Reform Revised Model: The GOE Role in

Administrative Reform

Status Quo of Public Administration

Political

PUSAID

Economic

:e' -~Extemal Agent

Social

 

‘— - - ~>Contractors

Cultural

 

 

Forces of Change

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political
‘. . _, _ __

Cabinet< - —
Economic '
‘. . _ . _ - -. l
Government of Egypt
1

Social
‘ l
Bureaucracy4 -_ 5
Cultural

4

Forces of Continuity

Intended Direction of Administrative Reform

 

Conclusion

In this Chapter I have answered the research question of whether the GOE indirectly
through political and economic strategies constrains the external agent’s reform efforts.
While there was lack of seriousness on part of the regime in previous reform efforts, the
recent inception of the new Ministry of Administrative Development points to a serious
strategy. The case of the new ministry seems to refute the assumption that the regime is
either not supportive or not sufficient to initialize administrative reform. Further, domestic
and international political factors analyzed seem to motivate the regime to initiate reform and
support the answer to the research question. Finally, the answer to the research question was
applied to the Continuity and Reform model to modify its propositions based on the ﬁndings.

In the next chapter I will attempt to answer the research questions of whether the
external agent through political and economic forces positively inﬂuences the status quo of
public administration. Domestic and international political and economic factors identiﬁed
in this chapter, in addition to the relatively skilled public-relations strategy adopted by the
Minister of Administrative Development in marketing his plan, made the USAID support for
administrative reform crucial. One can expect that the role of an external agent would be of
a signiﬁcant value in carrying the ministry’s plan further if it backs up the minister at this
stage. The new Ministry of Administrative Development would gain more political leverage

to expand on its initial reform plan if associated with the USAID.

150

CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF USAID IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Expecting Egypt to reform its bureaucracy is a questionable and large task in the
absence of an external agent. Therefore, focusing on the Egyptian bureaucracy without
examining the role of the USAID as the major external agent would affect much of the
explanatory power about the prospects for administrative reform. In this chapter I will
answer the research question of whether the external agent indirectly through political and
economic forces positively inﬂuences public administration as proposed by the Continuity and
Reform Model. I will do that by analyzing the case ofUSAID/Egypt and assessing USAID’s
role in administrative reform.

The Signiﬁcance of the USAID Role in Egypt

In the period between 1952 and 1967, American economic aid to Egypt varied
signiﬁcantly from one year to another depending on how tense was the political relationship
between the two countries. The signiﬁcant variance of aid amounts in Table 5.1 illustrates
the role that aid plays in reﬂecting the relationship between the two countries. President
Nasser’s socialist and anti-U.S. policies kept the relationship between the two countries

“

minimal, if not absent, for many years. President Sadat’s open door policy” and Camp David
Peace Accords led Egypt to become one of the United States’ largest economic assistance
programs ( Sullivan, 1987). The large amount of aid has taken the USAID’s role “beyond

issues of equity and basic human needs” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1980: 108). For

the period between 1979 and 1996 the Congress provided an average of $8 1 5 million annually

151

for the mission in Cairo (USAID, 1996b)."S By the 19905, the mission in Cairo became the
largest aid mission in the world despite the United States slipping ﬁ'om the ﬁrst position as
an aid provider to the fourth place after Japan, France and Germany. In addition to the direct
aid in Table 5.1, economic aid to Egypt was important, reaching $21 billion between 1975
and 1996 (see Table 5.2).’7 These amounts, however, substantially understate the magnitude
of the assistance. Aid amounts reported by both governments are in current dollars not
constant ﬁgures that take inﬂation into account, and they do not reﬂect the numerous special
privileges. For example, Egypt receives priority in the State Department’s budget over
contributions to the United Nations, the Peace Corps, and other international organizations

(Clarke, 1997).

 

5‘ Egypt also receives annually an average of $1.3 billion since 1979 in military aid representing more than
50 percent of Egypt’s defense budget (Clarke, 1997).

’7 Egypt has never been so dependent in development on one external agent. The closest external agent was
the Soviet with $842 million between 1958 and 1965 invested in only few speciﬁc projects: the construction
of the High Dam ($325 million), a steel mill, chemical and pharmaceutical plants, oil reﬁneries and cotton
spinning mills (Handoussa, 1984). American aid, on the other hand, is in every sector of the society.

152

Table 5.1

(U.S. s Million)

 

 

 

 

 

Year Amount
1952 1.2
1953 12.9
1954 4.0
1955 66.3
1956 33.3
1957 1.0
1958 0.6
1959 44.8
1960 65.9
1961 73.5
1962 200
1963 146.0
1964 95.0
1965 97.0
1966 27.0
1967 12.6
Total 881.1

 

 

American Aid to Egypt Prior to the Peace Accords, 1952 - 1967

Source: Al-Ahram Archives

Table 5.2
U.S. Economic Assistance by Type and Bureaucracy, 1975 - 1996
(U.S. 5 Millions)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Type Amount
Bureaucratic Projects 9,008
Commodity Import Programs 5,776
Food Aid 3,854
Cash Transfer 2,475
Totgl 21,1 13
Projects by Bureaucracy
Water & Wastewater 2,346
Energy 1,629
Agriculture 1,176
Human Resources 1,121
Local Government 884
Telecommunications & Other Infrastnrcture 791
Industry 671
Other 390
Totgl 9,008
153

USAID’s projects have produced beneﬁcial results for various bureaucracies as
illustrated in Table 5.2. However, there were problems facing both sides of the relationship.
For the USAID, the mission has to deal with ministries’ battles with one another and with
their attitude of portraying every project’s implementation as difficult or “a miracle” in order
to earn credit in the public eyes. The mission has always been “a scapegoat by inefficient
Egyptian bureaucrats. And, of course, Egyptians rarely express any gratitude for the
substantial funds provided by hard-pressed American taxpayers” (Quandt, 1990: 43). For
bureaucracies, a common administrative problem is goal displacement caused by decades of
aid dependency. An interview with a USAID official revealed that a bureaucracy’s goal is
often spending 100 percent of its aid by the end of each ﬁscal year rather than evaluating its
accomplishments and consistency with the organization and the development plan. Long-term
and continuous aid dependency led to the goal of spending aid to replace the development
goal of beneﬁcial use of these dollars.

Given this relationship, Egypt could be classiﬁed as a country with a high “absorbative
capacity” of resources and the USAID mission in Cairo as an organization with a superior
“money moving” behavior (Tendler, 1975: 86, 88). However, this behavior is not sufficient
for sustainable development in the absence of administrative reform.

Inside the USAID’s Mission

The signiﬁcant increase in the USAID’s mission funding has led to new mission goals

incorporating increasing responsibilities (U. S. House, 1980). Sullivan (1996: 46) summarizes

this shift in the mission’s priorities and goals:

154

 

From 1975 to 1996 and beyond, USAID has been expected to fulﬁll the
monumental task of assi sting the GOE in rebuilding a war-damaged economy;
developing a modernized urban infrastructure (sewers, telephones,
transportation, utilities, port facilities) supporting economic growth;
promoting the private sector in a state-controlled economy, satisfying basic
human needs in a society where the government has already done much to
establish a far-reaching minimum; promoting a complete overhaul of the
economy through drastically reforming foreign-exchange and interest rates,
government procurement policies and monopolies, and massive subsidization
of food and energy consumption; stabilizing population growth; protecting the
environment and building democracy. A massive agenda, no matter how much
money has been available . . . AID has undertaken the monumental task of
reworking an entire economy (and political system?) And it has had the
money to attempt it, more money than it has ever had to work within anyone
country in so short time.

As a result, the literature points to the USAID mission as a strong political power in
Egypt’s national decision making process and often referred to it as “Egypt’s shadow cabinet”
(Handoussa, 1990: 1 10). USAID approves and disburses funds to a large array of economic
and social projects that help legitimize the regime in the eye of the Egyptians. President
Mubarak always takes credit for the Washington-ﬁnanced projects and the media rarely
mention the source of ﬁmding. It is presumed then that USAID’s investments lend the
mission signiﬁcant power, and this power is the ultimate source of American inﬂuence over

the Egyptian regime.”

 

’8 Strategic funding in public services and government activities is valued by the regime because it legitimizes
the government. USAID funding portrays the ministers and the president as continuously taking care of
people’s business and shields the president from people’s aggravations stemming from the lack of public
services. Unlike other European and Multinational external agents, USAID provides long-term investments
in vital public services such as water, wastewater, telecommunications, transportation, education, census,
health services, birth control programs, research, police training and anti-terrorism investments, pollution
control, agriculture, privatizing the industrial sector, to name a few. This is in addition to reforming the court
and legal systems and the People’s Assembly. Importance of these investments to the regime also stems from
the fact that their absence is correlated with higher number of fundamentalists due to frustration from the
government and isolation from modernization (Kepel, 1993).

155

 

 

In practice, however, the aid program in Egypt has failed to one degree or another to
achieve sustainable development for over two decades and Egypt is far from being a model
for effective use of foreign assistance. The country remains poor, overpopulated, polluted,
and controlled by inefﬁcient bureaucracy. Egypt “continues to exhibit virtually all the
characteristics the United States has claimed to change since it began itsmassive economic
aid program in 1975" (Sullivan, 1996: 37). The gap between social classes had reached
unprecedented levels, high unemployment rates, poverty had signiﬁcantly expanded to the
middle class, and culture had been corrupted by a deteriorating education system (Kamel,
1998: 5). Therefore, while the USAID’s mission is a powerﬁrl institution, it is certainly
ineffective.

The USAID’s mission in Cairo has been repeatedly criticized for mismanagement and
inefﬁciency (GAO, 1993). American ofﬁcials are increasingly frustrated from “watching
billions of dollars being spent in numerous and diverse economic and social ﬁelds but with no
signiﬁcant overall impact on development” (Sullivan, 1990: 150). Bangura (1995) ﬁnds “that
there is no signiﬁcant relationship between the amount of United States aid and Egypt’s
overall economic development” in terms of increased productivity and living standards
(186).” Springborg (1989: 6-7) points to the frustration that some American ofﬁcials feel
about the unsatisfactory outcome of their mission in Cairo:

What continues to amaze and irritate those charged with the task of forcing
Egypt to see the irrefutable logic of choosing the new orthodoxy of

 

’9 One problem with regression models that attempt to test this relation, however, is the variety of lag
stmctures that need to be tested because the exact amount of time that it takes an independent variable to
affect a dependent variable cannot be speciﬁed.

156

development as the way out of the current impasse is that Egyptian decision

makers remain surprisingly unwilling or unable to take the requisite steps to

put the program in place. One such individual, an ofﬁcial in the economic

section of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, had become so ﬁustrated by the end of

his posting that he resorted to racialist interpretations. He bemoaned to the

author that the inability of Egyptians to grasp the seriousness of their plight

and to comprehend that reform offered the only real hope for salvation was

due to a deterioration of their racial stock as a result of generations of

endogamous marriages and immigration of the more talented.

Egypt is increasingly suffering from pronounced social and economic ills. Its per-
capita GDP has been around $600 since 1986 and unemployment is at more than 20 percent.
There is a violent conﬂict between the secular and Islamist segments of society. This conﬂict
is caused mainly from the alliance with the West and has led to widespread human rights
abuse by the government at the cost of thousands of lives, including those of politicians,
media ﬁgures, intellectuals, and tourists (Clarke, 1997).

One explanation of the undesired outcomes is the inﬂated size of the USAID
bureaucracy (Handoussa, 1990). The mission is shaped by decades of bureaucratic rules and
regulations ﬁ'om both the American and Egyptian sides. Second, the mission is buffeted by
political demands from the Congress, the White House, and two successive Egyptian military
regimes. An interview with a former USAID ofﬁcial revealed the signiﬁcance of the mission’s
political dependancy:

We were formerly not considered as a political agency. However, since the

riots in the 19703, the mission did not primarily operate as a body of

economists and administrators. Following daily orders from the State

Department was a higher priority than following policy plans.

Third, the mission also has to compete with the U.S. Embassy in Cairo that often

claims a share in the aid ﬁrnds. The competition between American institutions with differing

157

goals made the U. S. unable to speak with one voice regarding adrrrini strative reform in Egypt.
Egyptian ministers know how to take advantage of this disunity to prevent the idea of
administrative reform by the USAID.

Fourth, lack of coordination in development activities by Egyptian ofﬁcials is another
cause of the criticized outcomes of the USAID mission. Every Egyptian minister does not
welcome projects that would require him/er to share responsibilities with bureaucracies
outside his/er authority. Further, the USAID often does not see eye to eye on development
priorities or methods of funding with the Egyptian bureaucracy (Handoussa, 1990). Sullivan
(1990) notes that it is a fundamental problem to ﬁnd an agreement within Egyptian
bureaucracy on what the government position on development is. This is not only due to
political disagreements, but also due to frequent disagreement on technical issues and social
and cultural values in the Egyptian society. Therefore, continuously trying to avoid
entanglement in these bureaucratic in-ﬁghts in Cairo, while being led by political strategies
from Washington, the mission often yields inefficient outcomes.

Fifth, another reason for the unsatisfactory outcome is that the mission relies heavily
on consultant services. Signiﬁcant expenses are devoted to seemingly excessive consultancy
services rather than administrative reform. Each evaluation report costs on average more that
$100,000 to bring over American consultant teams and arrange their visits to project sites
around Egypt. An example of the magnitude of consultant expenses in the mission’s budgets
can be found in Alexandria’s wastewater project submitted in August 1994. The budget

contained $15 million in fees for technical consultative ofﬁces. The follow-up budget of the

same project in August 1995 contained an increase of additional $20 million for the same

158

purpose. When the Egyptian government refused to pay $3 5 million for consultancy services,
the mission devoted the $15 million for feasibility studies to start the second phase of the
project and the additional $20 million to expand and enhance the capacity of the ﬁrst phase
(Yonis, 1998).

Consultants’ recommendations are often not followed because political decisions made
in the Congress, the White House, and the State Department override any recommendations.
Rondinelli (1987) argues that the congressional pressure to control the use of funds is a
critical problem that separates the agency’s practice from its funded studies and knowledge
base. Sometimes consultants’ recommendations are not followed because the Egyptian
managers, who are the target audience of many reports, are not interested in “parachute
studies.”"o Recommendations are also not followed because they are not often realistic.
Sullivan (1990: 152) notes that most of these reports are “a waste of money” and are only
part of the mission’s culture:

Usually, the recommendations are given in a vacuum about which American

consultants know nothing. Also, the recommendations can be contradictory.

For example, in the urban health delivery project, the evaluation says the

project is not good because of certain problems in the region which can’t be

overcome. Yet, it is suggested later in the report that this project be

replicated elsewhere! In other words, this report-as others-goes through a

process, a necessary “back-patting” of AID telling AID what a good job it is

doing . . . This back-patting is also probably a good way of endearing these

consultants to AID, in the hope of gaining ﬁrrther invitations to evaluate
AID’s efforts on other projects.

 

‘° A manager at GOGCWS has a stack of USAID’s evaluation reports at the corner of his ofﬁce buried with
dust as sign of disinterest. When asked about the reports, his words were, “we don’t nwd any more reports,
take what you want.”

159

Seventh, in addition to the signiﬁcant reliance on consultant services, another reason
for the undesired outcome is that many of the ofﬁcials at the mission do not specialize in
Egypt. Ofﬁcials’ presence in Cairo is only part of their circulation from one country to
another every two or four years. Also, due to the long-term nature of projects, many ofﬁcials
seem disinterested knowing that they will not see their work through and at best will not
receive credit for their efforts (Weinbaum, 1986). Add to this that interaction between
ofﬁcials and bureaucrats, or the targeted public, for a feedback is not a common practice due
to security reasons, language barriers, or simply disinterest. Much of the mission’s efforts and
skills are spent on ﬁnishing consultants paperwork or ﬁnding more innovative ways to protect
the mission and its ofﬁcials politically from Washington and physically from Cairo.

Finally, the inefﬁcient Egyptian bureaucracy at the lower level of the hierarchy is
responsible to a large extent for the undesired outcome of the mission’s task. This factor has
not received enough attention in the literature. The USAID mission operates in a gap
between the goals of development and Egypt’s administrative problems. If the mission has
the political leverage to get the regime to adopt its policies, inefﬁcient bureaucracies and
bureaucratic resistance would still yield unintended outcomes. There is a lack of cooperation
and inefﬁciencies experienced from the Egyptian bureaucracy (Wichterrnan, 1994). The
“beleaguered Egyptian bureaucracy” is considered a signiﬁcant obstacle for the USAID
mission of pursuing coherent development policies (Bangura, 1995: 190).

The role that bureaucrats can play in obstructing the reform process is a signiﬁcant
factor in explaining the mission’s outcome. This role has been identiﬁed in other developing

countries as well. For example, Bajpai (1988) studied the case of the World Bank attempts

160

to reform the urban water supply in India. He emphasized the important role played by the
bureaucrats who were responsible for collecting user charges. Indian bureaucrats were able
to get the reform of the revenue collection process removed from the policy agenda because
they “knew” the decision could not be implemented. Despite pressure applied by the World
Bank to remove the subsidies, the policy of charging users was not put into effect because
Indian bureaucrats were convinced it could not be implemented.

Inside the mission in Cairo, ofﬁcials either complain or have a sarcastic attitude about
Egyptian bureaucrats’ behavior. An AID ofﬁcial, for example, hangs in his ofﬁce a sign
referring to the “Egyptian IBM” which stands for In-sha-A [Iah (If God Will), Bokra
(Tomorrow), and Maalesh (Never Mind) which are known to be a three of the most used
phrases by an average Egyptian bureaucrat. That is the IBM of Egyptian bureaucracy in the
USAID mission is procrastination, non commitment, and avoiding responsibility.“ Matter
of fact, one can notice that some AID ofﬁcials in Cairo are copying Egyptians’ attitudes as
some of them often use phrases such as In-sha-A [lab and Maalesh to imply that something
is to be done in the distant future, if at all, or the public should never mind if it is not done.

Common in the USAID oﬁicials’ complaints about Egyptian bureaucracy is the time

it takes, years in many cases, to approve proposals or give permission to certain tasks due to

 

" Joking about bureaucrats is part of the Egyptian culture and classic literature and the public patiently accept
it. This is clear from the following exchange quoted from a classic Egyptian play The Sultan 's Dilemma by
Tawﬁq Al-Hakim.-Translation by Hopwood (1991: 180).
A judge is attempting to discover a man’s profession and says:

“Tell me something about this person . . . What does he do?”

“Nothing,” is the reply.

“Has he no profession?”

“Allegedly, yes but that is not the case.” “He is alleged to have a profession, but does not

work.” “That is so.”

The judge concludes: “Then he must be a civil servant!”

l61

rules and regulations. Also, they note bureaucrats’ tendency to avoid responsibility as
project-related equipment sits in warehouses because no bureaucrat is willing to take the
responsibility for clearing them. Getting a bureaucrat to do his job in these cases often
requires pulling political strings to get the minister or a high ofﬁcial in the hierarchy to
intervene and make that decision.62 Egyptian bureaucrats’ indifference to the public need is
another source of complain. For example, despite the millions of dollars spent to provide
water pump stations to urgently needed neighborhoods the actual usage does not take place
for many months from completion, and years in some cases. Public ofﬁcials at the Ministry
of Housing and Construction did not complete their part of the paperwork to start using the
new connections and keep completed projects stalled while the public is in urgent need.

At Egypt’s desk in the State Department in Washington, which is responsible for
managing the country case, the story is different because Egyptian bureaucrats are not an
issue. The main goal at Washington headquarters seems to be limited to keep the money
moving. What happens about bureaucrats hindering of development efforts, or administrative
reform for that matter, is not a concern. As one ofﬁcial in Washington puts it during an
interview “Washington is just for problems . . . details are left to those in Cairo!”

An Assessment of USAID’s Role in Administrative Reform

The role of the USAID, as an external agent, in administrative reform formally started

in the mid-19703 with the appearance of the mission as a force on the Egyptian political scene.

Housing its own large bureaucracy in Cairo, the agency placed the Egyptian bureaucracy into

a defensive position for the ﬁrst time aﬁer its long-enjoyed hegemony. The agency began to

 

‘2 It is noteworthy that USAID oﬁicials’s responses about Egyptian bureaucrats are very similar.

162

publicly criticize the Egyptian bureaucracy and call for its reform. Directors of the USAID’s
mission in Egypt often labeled the Egyptian bureaucracy as “overblown” and as “a drain on
the public budget” (Kopec, 1985; Palmer et al., 1989). Beyond such early incidents, the
USAID never gave administrative reform a high priority or carried direct large-scale attempts
since the 19705. None of the 152 USAID projects attempted to directly address Egypt’s
bureaucratic problems. The two projects that appear to be closer to addressing administrative
reform are The Decentralization Support Fund and The Water Institutional Development.
A detailed review of the role and effect of external agents’ efforts in The Water Institutional
Development Project will be presented in Chapter Five.

The Decentralization Support Fund in itsdifferent phases was evaluated by Weinbaum
(1986). He concludes that it is operating based on transferring aid grants to councils and
lower-level bureaucratic bodies as revenue to run local public projects. The strategic role
as an external agent for administrative reform discussed in Chapter Two was not a factor in
the Decentralization Support Fund, rather it was simply a plain govemment-to-govemment
aid.63 No decentralization policies were put in place to pass greater authority and
responsibility to localities and bureaucracies. Public and social services, at least those funded
by the Decentralization Support Fund, were not left to localities involved to play an active
role in selecting, designing, and maintaining projects. This is despite the fact that localities

are supposed to be responsible for service delivery and decentralization as an important

 

‘3 It is noticeable that USAID’s strategy in running the Decentralization Support Fund has made a mistake
by signiﬁcantly enhancing the welfare of local council members above their poor district residents. This
created a gap and distrust between people and ofﬁcials and the feeling that members are in the council for
personal advancement and to get material political advantage.

163

method of reform. After the completion of the three phases of the Decentralization Support
Fund, one can conclude that investing in the infrastructure is the mission’s primary strategy
for decentralization. Such an indirect strategy is based on the assumption that stimulating
welfare at the local level, by providing water and wastewater for example, will eventually lead
to reform.

In sum, none of the strategies for administrative reform proposed by the literature
review in Chapter Two has been adopted by the external agent. The agency was only able
to encourage orthodox administrative practices through very few project-speciﬁc short-term
consulting activities such as The Decentralization Support Fund and The Water Institutional
Development. The mission continues year after year to accept the Egyptian bureaucracy as
it has found it.“

The Irony of Conditionality. Conditionality is a straightforward form of an exchange, or
a promise, of reform for external ﬁnancing in the form of debt rescheduling or relief, mul-
tilateral credits, bilateral loans, or grants. Theoretically, conditionality is a bargaining model
or a dynamic contract theory with repeated bargaining games between external agents and
regimes. The key in the relationship is rewarding compliance with continued ﬁnance in the
next round or punishing slippage with suspension (Haggard and Kauﬁnan, I989; Kahler,

1989, 1992).

 

“ This conclusion is consistent with Weinbaum (I986) ﬁndings in the 19805. USAID in Cairo was found
then to be preoccupied with problems involving the disbursement of funds and the mission’s relation with the
Egyptian government. In Washington, ofﬁcials focus on trying to rationalize programs to satisfy the current
administration and legitimize its efforts was also the strategy in the 19805 . Professionalism continues to be
lost in administrative reform.

164

As a bargaining process in which the external agent seeks to inﬂuence a policy,
conditionality takes into account the desire to maximize policy change while also spending
its budget. The recipient, however, resists inﬂuence attempts which do not harmonize with
its own political priorities (Mosley et al., 1991). The recipient government is pressured to
“undertake programs before the political conditions necessary to support them are in place”
(Finch, 1989: 20). The utility function of GOE on the other hand seeks to maximize the
external agent’s investments while minimizes its role and the politically burdensome
conditions. Demanded conditionality is, therefore, a persistent source of conﬂict between
external agents and GOE due to the political costs associated with policy changes especially
in areas such as administrative reform. Given this political environment, administrative reform
has been criticized by its lack of efﬁcacy for over two decades in Egypt and a negative record
in developing countries in general.65

In some cases, conditionality can contribute positively to bringing about political
support for reform and improvements in the recipient governments’ will to attain reform
(Duncan, 1986). In most cases, however, conditionality is an imperfect instrument and its
impact should not be overestimated. In the absence of strong commitment for reform, state
leaders are unlikely to give in to pressures (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). At best,
conditionality only leads reluctant regimes to promote reform through verbal attacks on

bureaucracies without actual commitment to reforming the sources of their various political

 

‘5 A sample of these studies includes: Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye, 1991; Nelson 1990; World
Bank, 1990; World Bank, 1988; Repetto, 1986; Zulu and Nsouli, 1985; Gerrard and Roe, 1983; Peterson,
1979.

165

privileges. As a tool, it gives governments incentives to argue that they are committed to
reform even when they are not (Kahler, 1992).

Tools at the external agent’s disposal, however, hinge on relative costs and beneﬁts
to both sides of the equation and are often unsuccessful in eliciting political support (Gates,
1989; Lin, 1989). The negative record of conditionally is often due to external agents’ failure
to follow up on threats of sanctions. Conditionality does not usually work because sanctions
increase the cost for the donor in the form of reducing private goods exchanged for aid or
jeopardizing economic and security interests. Such costs are usually higher than the beneﬁts
of administrative reform. Gates (1989) concludes that “compliance should not be expecte ”
because “it is unlikely that donors will change to a more committed strategy; the costs of
imposing sanctions are just too high” (244).

Gates (1989) argues that the recipient government noncompliance with conditionality
is partially due to the fact that the costs of imposing sanctions for the U.S. exceeds the costs
of noncompliance. The critical aspect of succeeding in externally inducing reform through
conditionality is that the “donor must convince a recipient that it is willing and able to levy
a signiﬁcant sanction” (241). The dilemma is that while increasing sanctions is required for
noncompliant, the U.S. would be worse off by implementing sanctions. Cutting off aid as a
noncompliant sanction or reducing the aid ﬂow, would reduce the payoffs that come from
allocating aid to a recipient in the ﬁrst place. Also at stake are goods that are exchanged for

aid including security and economic (Gates, 1989).

166

Table 5.3

 

 

 

 

p_t’s Outstandin Debt as of End of Se stember, 1997.
Original Currency US$
Currency (millions) millions
US Dollar 13,057 13,057
French Franc 29,379 5,701
Japanese Yen 434,832 3,964
German Mark 5,427 3,561
Austrian Schilling 8,110 756
Swiss Franc 925 738
Kuwaiti Dinar 198 661
UK Pounds 337 523
SDR 342 504
ECU 277 344
Canadian Dollar 323 237
Australian Dollar 249 196
Danish Kroner 1,013 172
Dutch Guilder 231 135
Belgian Franc 3,859 123
Swedish Kroner 607 91
Italian Lira 119,808 78
Saudi Ryal 246 66
U.A.E. Dirham 189 51
Spanish Peseta 5,815 45
Norwegian Kroner 244 38
Total 3 1,041

 

 

 

 

Source: Central Bank of Egypt.

Taking the political and economic variables out of the equation, conditionality would
be expected to have signiﬁcant effect in the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. U.S.
can put signiﬁcant pressure on Egypt given the amount of debt in Table 5.3. U.S. owns the

largest share in Egypt’s debt in addition to the political leverage on other creditors in the

167

Table.“ For example, the U.S. often pressures the IMF into softening its conditions on the
GOE (Sullivan, 1990). Thus, economic and political interests aside, conditionality would

work because Egypt is “an eternal beggar for debt forgiveness and emergency loans”
(Lofgren, 1993: 411).

However, conditionality is an irrelevant political tool in Egypt due to the economic
and political nature of American aid (U SAID, 1985). In 1997, money in the pipeline reached
$2 billion and the American ambassador’s reaction to move the money was only to publicly
criticize the government for “not doing enough to meet the conditions attached” (Zekry,
1997: 12). Having the regime responding to such soft calls is unlikely according to Clarke
(1997: 204):

Egyptian ofﬁcials have always recognized that this aid was forthcoming
because of supposed US strategic interests and, especially, because of
entrenched support for Israel in Congress and in successive US
administrations. Almost from the program’s inception, Egypt viewed the aid
as an assured entitlement for having made peace with Israel. As long as Cairo
honored the peace treaty and did not upset a Middle East peace process, it
knew that aid would continue to ﬂow. That is, its aid allotment would not be
cut substantially unless Israel’s was also reduced. With such an assurance, it
was predictable that attempts by Washington to place additional conditions on
this aid would be successfully resisted by Egypt, even when it promised to
improve program effectiveness. Partly as a consequence, US aid has
promoted neither sustainable economic development nor much-needed
economic reform. This situation can only impact negatively on US interests
and political objectives.

 

“ The common repayment procedure is semi-annual payments over a period of 30 years with 10 years grace
period for each loan and 2 percent interest rate during the grace period and 3 percent during the repayment
period. There are also few common conditions attached to each loan such as providing the necessary
documents to prove that the money will and is spent as previously agreed and that goods and services are
provided through American companies.

168

When I asked an ofﬁcial at Egypt’s desk in the State Department about the
effectiveness of conditionality in getting an administrative reform program in place, his
response took Clarke’s analysis further:

We are not willing to pick up a ﬁght with Mubarak over administrative

reform. Administrative reform is not an important enough issue to jeopardize

the relation with Egypt.67

It seems from his response that Washington is not aware of the new window of
opportunity for administrative reform developed by the domestic political factors, discussed
in Chapter Four, and led the President to support the new Ministry of Administrative
Development. The external agent’s isolation from the case of the new ministry is likely to
continue as revealed by the new ambassador to Egypt in a 1998 interview (Sami, 1998: 9):

I come to this assignment with the absolute conviction that bilateral relations

between our two countries are the most important thing the US has going for

it in the Middle East. What we do and how we relate to problems in this

region are directly facilitated by our relationship with Egypt. Whether in the

peace process, in our strategic role, or in our support for humanitarian and

peace operations even outside the Middle East, we require the assistance of

Egypt. The basic bilateral role is of such critical importance that it has to be

my primary focus. How to build new institutional arrangements between the

two countries and strengthen our muscle in every area.

Therefore, conditionality in the case of Egypt is not a signiﬁcant political tool for the
external agent. The relation is increasingly perceived by bureaucracies as a gift giving

relationship. The irony of the conditionality game in countries such as Egypt is that strong

political and economic interests work against its ability to externally induce reform.

 

‘7 Yet Mubarak disagrees with the State Department’s position on the sanctions on Libya and Iraq. In
addition Egypt cast its ballot against the U.S. in the UN 61 percent of the time on most issues (Johnson, 1997).
These are political issues that are not also important enough for the external agent to utilize conditionality

in the case of Egypt.

169

The Significance of Political and Economic Factors in the USAID’s Role

The USAID did not initiate any serious administrative reform projects for 25 years
due to threats of j eopardizing Washington’s political and economic interest in Egypt. Political
and economic interests have always hampered the external agent’s role in administrative
reform. This is a legitimate hypothesis because the case of the USAID/Egypt conﬁrms to
Watson and McCluskie’s (1994: 206) “aid typology” under “donor-interests aid.” American
aid “is distributed according to U. 8. military and strategic interests . . . and . . . ties assistance
to the promotion of U.S. economic interests and the service of enhancing and expanding
markets and capitalism” (208-9). These variables cannot be excluded from this analysis
because $25 billion in military aid and $21 billion in economic aid are sufﬁcient tools for
administrative reform.

Viewing the relationship between the U. S. and Egypt from a political or economic lens
is not a new ﬁnding. Theoretical and empirical studies from different world regions note that
political and economic interests have a “very strong positive inﬂuence” on bilateral aid
(Weck-Hannemann and Schneider, 1991: 251). What is new, however, is that the
organizational goal of sustainable development has been a low priority on the agenda of
USAID for more than two decades. Political and economic objectives of keeping a ﬁiendly
moderate regime in power and open new markets for American goods are a major distraction
for the USAID’s role as an external agent in administrative reform. The argument in this
section is not that political and economic interests should be minimized or disregarded, but

rather that such interests hampered the external agent’s role in administrative reform. In the

170

following, I shall examine the signiﬁcance of these goals and evaluate the U. S.’ s achievements
in that regard.

Political Interests. There is mutual political beneﬁt from American aid for both sides of the
relationship. The Egyptian regime sees aid as a mean of maintaining its legitimacy through
an uninterrupted ﬂow of ﬁnancial support. Since the 19703, military regimes have been
alleviated ﬁ'om the burden of importing food and the construction and rehabilitation of basic
utilities and social services. The U.S., on the other hand, sees aid as an investment for
strategic gains and increased regional inﬂuence in the Middle East. This political nature of
the relationship sidetracks the USAID’s organizational goal of promoting sustainable
development.

Since the 19705, the political rationale for aid to Egypt has been adopted by
successive American administrations from both parties. Because of the U. S. “historic, moral
and strategic” obligations towards Israel, Egypt is being rewarded a high level of aid (Clarke,
1997: 202). It is a reward for making and maintaining peace with Israel by using development
assistance. Aid for development is also a prevention measure against the continuous threat
of an Islamic regime in Egypt. Even the most vocal critics of foreign aid such as Senator
Jessee Helms (R-NC), who advocates abolishing USAID and creating an international
development fund that would ﬁnance development projects through private voluntary
organizations, takes a different stand when it comes to Egypt. He suggests treating economic

assistance to Egypt as part of the Defense Department’s expenditures (Bandow, 1995).“

 

‘3 Helms’ recommendations were previously adopted by the Bush administration by forgiving nearly $7 billion
from the Egyptian debt as a reward for President Mubarak’s decision to participate in the Gulf War (Bandow,
1995).

171

Interviews with ofﬁcials at Egypt’s desk in the State Department revealed two camps
when asked to be quite speciﬁc about the political dimensions of the USAID mission’s goal.
First, ofﬁcials admit the supremacy of political interests over development goals. Their logic
is that a “stable Egypt is better able to provide effective leadership in the peace process” and
“the cost of war between Egypt and Israel saved by aid outweighs the unsatisfactory
development results.” In the second camp, there are ofﬁcials who deny any political interest
for the USAID’s mission. They label the “allegation” that political interest drives the U.S.
development task in Egypt as a “conspiracy theory.” The favorable position of political goals
over development goals and administrative reform is not more than just “an interesting
academic notion.” One ofﬁcial explains the undesired outcomes:

The reason that aid succeeded in Europe under The Marshall Plan and in

South Korea is that these countries have public ofﬁcials and engineers capable

of keeping the system going after aid; but Egypt does not have this advantage.

Their denials seemed to ﬂy in the face of the declared State Department policy that
asserts that the aid is designed primarily to secure “a just and lasting comprehensive peace”
between Israel and its neighbors, especially Egypt, and to promote regional stability by
helping Egypt modernize its armed forces (U.S. Department of State, 1997: 416-17). It is
clear that the geopolitical agenda of the U. S. has a priority over the developmental task of the
USAID’s task in Egypt. The concept of administrative reform in attaining sustainable
development seems to have been excluded from the external agent’s role in the case of

USAID/Egypt. In return, the incapable Egyptian bureaucracy will not be able to maintain the

USAID mission’s development efforts and the aid relation has to continue indeﬁnitely.

172

Economic Interests. Statements made by USAID ofﬁcials often give the impression that
they are satisﬁed with their accomplishments over 25 years in Egypt. An example of a high
ofﬁcial at USAID praising the agency’s efforts on Capitol Hill is as follows:

It is easy to criticize the American foreign-aid program and the partnership

that we have had with Egypt. But look back at the last 20 years and see what

has been accomplished. Urban water and sanitation systems built or

rehabilitated through AID projects serve some 22 million people in Egypt

today. Thousands of primary schools have been constructed. Health care is

available. Infant mortality rates have been cut in half. There has been an

increase in agricultural production of 46 percent, and now Egypt is able to

feed itself. It is just a tremendous success story. I hesitate to think what

Egypt would be today if that investment had not been made over those years.

It was a true investment in the peace process, and an investment in the

development of Egypt (Hamilton, et al, 1996: 16-17).

One major failure ignored by ofﬁcials’ speeches is the strategy of aid policy in
discouraging production for internal consumption and creating signiﬁcant dependance on
American imports. The U.S. ’5 development strategy devotes 58 percent ($12 billion) of the
economic assistance directly to American corporations rather than on local projects in Egypt
(Mitchell, 1991). Therefore, Washington gives a priority to subsidizing American businesses
through Egypt rather than to take on the task of adnrinistrative reform that would eliminate
or minimize this subsidy.‘S9

The U.S. is more concerned with opening the Egyptian market for American goods

than with getting the USAID to play a role in administrative reform (Hwash, 1998). This was

facilitated by the “partnership for growth” strategy announced by Vice President Al Gore in

 

‘9 One direct consequence of this policy is that Egyptians have been hauntingly reminded through
commercials and advertisement of America’s relatively afﬂuent style of living and consumption. This led the
society to increasingly drop many of its culture values and to grow restive in an attempt to achieve a higher

standard of living (Bangura, 1995).

173

September 1994 (U.S. Department of State, 1996). The formal stated goal is “to enhance
linkages between the U.S. and Egyptian private sectors” (USAID, 1996b: 1). The often
announced goal by the nrission’s Director is to “revive the Egyptian economy in order to
increase the trade between the two countries” (Al-Gendi, 1998). As of 1997, Egypt had a
trade deﬁcit of more than $2.4 billion from the $3.8 billion total trade between the two
countries. The U.S. dominates 25 percent of Egypt’s total foreign trade and $1.2 billion of
the $1.7 billion American private investments is in the oil industry alone.

Washington tends to overlook the sustainability side of private investments and trade.
In the absence of administrative reform, the USAID thus far is adopting a short-term strategy
to produce immediate and highly visible results. Emphasizing administrative reform is the
recipe for longer-term strategy because bureaucracy and bureaucrats will be responsible to
sustain any attained economic or social development. It is true that aid has brought some
tangible beneﬁts, especially to the country’s physical infrastructure and closed market. Aid
has failed, however, to put in place an administrative system to maintain these achievements.
Without an efﬁcient bureaucracy, aid will always be needed to sustain previous investments.

It would be naive to suggest that Egyptian bureaucracy responsible for taking on the
task of development from the USAID could be changed because the society is being
Americanized through imported goods and services. Unrefonned bureaucracy is known to
hinder most private initiatives by putting obstacles in investors’ way or at least not securing
property rights. The U.S. focus on economic interests while ignoring the equally important
task of administrative reform is a naive strategy. Sustainable development is not in “a mere

return to the market, more foreign resources and technology, or peace, would almost

174

automatically bring prosperity”(Hinnebusch, 1988: 259). Washington’s argument that
Egypt’s development can be guided by political and economic interests is true only if pursued
with administrative reform of bureaucracies that maintain these interests.
Assessment of Success in Attaining Economic and Political Goals

An assessment of the U.S. success in attaining its political and economic goals is
important because Washington measures the success of the USAID’s nrission in terms of
these objectives “in the absence of development success” (Cantori, 1997: 177). This
assessment cannot be made statistically because “the statistics are categorically unreliable,
where available” (Sullivan, 1987: 221). It is a problem that faces researchers in Egypt
because it “is often the case that only highly aggregate ﬁgures are available and they do not
always accord with one another” (Waterbury, 1983). Observations made during the
ﬁeldwork were, therefore, included in the following assessment.

There are increasingly signiﬁcant voices of doubts in attaining the political goal. A
1994 poll indicated that a majority of Egyptians opposed maintaining formal ties with Israel
(Gerges, 1995). One main reason is that Egyptians are known to have a strong sense of
nationalism that is continuously enhanced by the govemment-controlled media. Regardless
of the size of economic assistance, it is not easy to change their views. Egyptians still have
memories of conﬂict in the region (Moore, 1997). The U.S. did not attempt to directly
change this side of the Egyptian society.

The Egyptian government is not attempting to take on this task either. There is a
remarkable absence of advocates of the U.S. in the press, which is the main developer of

public opinion. On the contrary there are a number of anti-American secular activities that

175

attack U.S. foreign policy’s attempts to inﬂuence Egypt’s decision-making sovereignty.
These activities affect the mission by causing USAID’s ofﬁcials to keep a very low proﬁle in
the country and build a wall between themselves and the people targeted for development.
Lately, the secular anti-American stream has been receiving support from President
Mubarak’s loud opposition to Netanyahu’s Likud government since it took power in 1996.”
Zimmerman (1993: 93), a former USAID ofﬁcial, argues that:

No one in the State Department or elsewhere in the US government wants to

risk an embarrassing assessment of how aid resources have failed to stimulate

the type of economic, social, and political development necessary for

self-sustainable peace in the Middle East.

In terms of economic goals, great apprehensions have been growing among Egyptians
about the American signiﬁcant inﬂuence in the economy. Voices are raised, especially on the
left and in academic circles, claiming that American aid is taking over the economy and helps
only the well-to-do sectors of society (Quandt, 1990). They also fear that opening the door
to more private sector inﬂuence, both ﬁom at home and from abroad, amount to an invitation
to neighboring Israel to increase its inﬂuence within Egypt. These elements in the Egyptian
society also suspect that greater inﬂows of western ideas or capital into the economy will
bring about an erosion of the moral and cultural ﬁbre of Egypt (Moore, 1997). As it is the

case of political interests, these views have been a major issue in the press without response

ﬁ'om the USAID or the Egyptian government.

 

7° This political environment, supported by the regime, made some argue that a gradual decrease in American
aid to Egypt will have no appreciable impact on the peace process. That process is in jeopardy already since
1996 without any cuts in economic aid (Clarke, 1997).

176

The strongest charges are against the privatization strategy of the USAID’s mission
towards the public sector. Charges have been political and economic in nature. It is very
common to hear that because privatization has been sponsored by a foreign actor, it reﬂects
the interests of the U.S. to dominate the world economy under the “new phenomenon of
globalization.” On the local level, privatization in the public eye is a response to the political
interests of Egyptian businessmen who put pressure on the regime to let go of its obligations
to the public. The business class backed by the U.S. seeks to dominate the economy and
affects the distribution of national income in their own favor at the expense of the mass
population.

These are common views in Egypt to the point of making the regime reluctant to
follow the USAID in its economic policies. Government ofﬁcials resist and delay economic
reforms that entail privatization to the extent they can. They use one of two arguments in
their negotiations with the USAID to delay implementation. First, they insist that the U.S.
should not be using the IMF criteria of economic reform or conditionality in determining
foreign aid that was originally based on need. Or second, they point to riots caused by
economic reform as a step to privatization in Venezuela, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan
due to falling real incomes and rising unemployment (Bangura, 1995). Using these strategies,
the GOE has privatized only 61 state-owned enterprises by 1997. Even compliance was
cosmetic in many cases as the GOE invented a way to privatize by shifting state-owned
enterprises’ shares to the Employee Shareholder Associations while leaving the control and
management without changes (Berg, Sines, and Walker, 1994). Egypt’s trick works because

“it becomes easy to excuse complete non-adherence to certain reform covenants when there

177

is evidence of compliance with other aspects of a conditionality agreement” (Gates, 1989:
245)

One can assess that there is slow progress in attaining economic goals associated with
a growing wide resentment of Washington’s policy implemented through the USAID. Policy
makers in Washington should expect the controversy to grow for several reasons. First, it is
running the largest foreign assistance program in history in a country which helped to found
the non-aligned movement in the World. Second, “Egyptians are extremely proud of their
country, very nationalistic, and suspicious that foreigners offering help are doing so for
non-Egyptian reasons” (Quandt, 1990: 6). Third, politicians in a highly nationalized country
such as Egypt are judged and evaluated by the public and in history as to whether or not they
have secured Egypt’s sovereignty and political independence while pursuing development.
This is evident in politicians’ common answer to the public resentment about aid “a ﬁnancial
dependency does not mean political dependency” (Ghali, 1998). Quandt’s (1990: 74)
conclusion about the relation between the U.S. and Egypt is increasingly proven to be true.
He notes that:

In the ﬁnal analysis, however, the United States cannot buy good relations

with Egypt. These will always depend in large part on developments

elsewhere in the Middle East region. Egypt cannot stand entirely apart from

a Middle East caught up in wars and political extremism. Most of the currents

that are aﬁecting the Middle East are beyond Washington’s control. That is

certainly true of Islamic extremism.

While Egypt has economic difﬁculties that require the assistance of the USAID,

Egyptians’ resentment is signiﬁcant when freedom to maneuver is constrained by strings tied

to aid. An undisputed leader of the Arab world, with a population above 61 million, Egypt

178

cannot be classiﬁed as just one more poor dependent third world country (Quandt, 1990).
A major side effect of ignoring the growing wide resentment against signiﬁcant economic and
political interest is jeopardizing the role that USAID may play in administrative reform in the
future.

The high priority to the U.S. geopolitical agenda in the aid approach is costly and
likely to harm the USAID’s goal of development. The U.S. investments lose their beneﬁts
quickly due to the inefﬁcient bureaucracies that later take charge of American-initiated
projects. Washington has to then keep aid ﬂowing due to bureaucracy’s incapacity to sustain
USAID’s development efforts. The case of USAID/Egypt is characterized by what Lewis
(1986: 18-19) calls a set of negative perceptions “endless aid” and “ineffective aid.” It is
unlikely for Egypt to graduate from the USAID program in the absence of administrative
reform. The argument is not that political and economic interests should be minimized or
disregarded, but rather that such interests are a serious obstacle for the external agent’s role
in administrative reform. Washington’s argument that Egypt’s development can be guided
by political and economic interests is true only if pursued with administrative reform of
bureaucracies that will maintain these interests.

The Continuity and Reform Model in Light of Answers to the Research Questions

The high priority given by the external agent to economic and political interests over
administrative reform and developmental goals warrants modifying the Continuity and Reform
Model. Political and economic forces of the USAID in the model are pressuring public
administration towards continuity rather than reform. This was reﬂected in Figure 5.1

through modifying the political and economic forces by the USAID from the direction of

179

reform, recommended by theory, towards the direction of continuity, recommended by
answers to the research questions. This is a legitimate change to the Continuity and Reform
model given that answers to the research questions were based on examining these interests

over a period of more than two decades and were based on interviews with U.S. oﬁcials in

the ﬁeld.

180

Figure 5.1

Forces of Continuity and Reform Revised Model:
The Political and Economic Role of External Agent in Administrative Reform

Status Quo of Public Administration

Political
‘ I , L ,

* ~>USAID

Economic

2:7,»..Extemal Agent

Social

 

- ~>Contractors

Cultural

 

Forces of Change

 

 

 

Political
‘4. _ I.-. _ -V, . “

Cabinetd - 7

Economic

Government of Egypt

Social

|
l
l
‘ 1
l

 

Bureaucracyd—W

Cultural

 

4

Forces of Continuity

Intended Direction of Administrative Reform

 

Conclusion

In this Chapter I have answered the research question of whether the external agent
positively inﬂuences the status quo of public administration. The answer to this question was
expected to be a positive one based on the propositions of the Continuity and Reform Model.
However, after analyzing the case ofUSAID/Egypt one can conclude that short-term political
and economic goals override the external agent’s main task of administrative reform. The
dominance of these goals represents strong factors on the continuity side of the model and
undermines the long-term development plan by overlooking models of administrative reform
proposed by the literature review. USAID failed to reform the administrative apparatus and
accepted it as fragmented, sluggish, and undisciplined due to strong economic and political
interests. This is despite the signiﬁcant importance of adnrinistrative reform for development.

Examining the practicality of the theoretical model about the role of an external agent
in administrative reform leads to the conclusion that political and economic variables should
be given more weight in the literature about the role of external agents in administrative
reform. These variables present signiﬁcant forces for continuity of the status quo in the
Continuity and Reform model. The external agent in the case of the USAID is an agent of
continuity rather than of reform due to the signiﬁcant weight given to political and economic
interests by its principals. Administrative reform then becomes a secondary issue and
approached on small-scale with discrete projects rather than a long-term effort as suggested
by the literature review in Chapter Two.

In the next two chapters I will attempt to answer the question of whether the external

agent through consultants directly inﬂuences the organizational, social, and cultural aspects

182

of bureaucracy toward administrative reform. Qualitative and quantitative analysis to answer
this question is applied to the case of USAID’s consultants’ administrative reform efforts for
The General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS) as part of Water
Institutional Development Program. Based on the answers to this question, I will then
proceed to analyze the answers to the research questions in terms of the Continuity and

Reform model to examine its applicability.

183

CHAPTER 6
THE CASE OF USAID/GENERAL ORGANIZATION FOR GREATER CAIRO
WATER SUPPLY

The goal of chapters six and seven is to qualitatively and quantitatively answer the
research question of whether the external agent through consultants directly inﬂuences the
structural, cultural and social aspects of bureaucratic reform. The case chosen to answer this
question is the USAID administrative reform efforts for The General Organization for Greater
Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS) as part of Water and Wastewater Institutional Development
Program. In this chapter, I will qualitatively examine the impact of consultants on
administrative reform in the areas of organizational responsibility and performance,
relationship with other bureaucracies, organizational structure, human resources, training,
salaries, incentives, and revenues and ﬁnancial performance. This was done by reviewing
USAID and GOE documents, the contractor master plan and ﬁnal report, and interviews with
the GOGCWS’s chairman, managers of the Subscriptions, Water Meters, Collections, and
Customer Service Departments, two branch managers, and all of the contractor’s American
personnel responsible for the task of on-site administrative reform. In the next chapter, I will
examine other organizational areas, namely, bureaucratic productivity, bureaucratic ﬂexibility,
communication, innovation, decision-making, relationship with the public, and sources of
professional information. This will be done quantitatively through surveying bureaucrats to
measure the impact of administrative reform. Funding for both phases was provided by the

Ford Foundation and the American Research Center in Egypt.

184

The case ofUSAID/GOGCWS is important given that the public’s share of safe and
reliable water services is a signiﬁcant criterion for judging a society’s level of human
development. An efficient bureaucracy capable of providing safe and reliable water service
in one’s home directly affects the quality of life at any level of development, ﬁom the least to
the most developed. This case was also chosen because administrative incapacity would pose
a considerable threat to the welfare of the public. Water problems constitute the main reason
behind the most acute incidences of water-bome diseases, such as infectious diseases,
parasites and related illnesses, and cause an increase in morbidity and mortality rates.
USAID’s success in its administrative reform efforts, therefore, would be associated with
higher survival probabilities for Egyptians. Finally, in an urban setting such as Greater Cairo,
where there is extremely high population density, the need for an efﬁcient bureaucracy
becomes even more pressing. Lack or poor quality of potable water in urban households has
substantial consequences in terms of inconvenience and productivity of people. Water is
directly related to productivity because any break of the network, for example, will collapse
the transportation system and lead to absenteeism and shorter work days.

GOGCW S Prior to Black and Veatch

The USAID’s investment in reform of the drinking water sector began in 1977. By
the end of 1983, projects totaling about $600 million had been authorized. Because of the
expanding needs in the water sector and the GOGCWS incapacity to meet these needs, a
memorandum of understanding was signed by the U. S. and GOE in mid-1983, providing $1.2
billion in funding through 1987. By 1988, extensive improvements in the distribution system,

including new main pipes and expanded storage, were needed to fully utilize GOGCWS’s

185

production. The U.S. agreed to provide $104 million for this work which included a major
institutional development component to implement an administrative reform program. The
authorization for the administrative reform program was signed in September 1988. Black
and Veatch, an American consultant ﬁrm, was assigned the on-site task of administrative
reform. In its initiation of the administrative reform program, USAID was following Section
611(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act that requests policies and procedures to ensure that a
host government can operate and maintain infrastructure projects (U SAID, 1994b).

It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd accurate information about GOGCWS’s administrative capacity
prior to Black and Veatch’s mission. However, common problems prior to Black and Veatch
were known to be in the areas of management and staﬁing, organization and administrative
systems, and operation and maintenance. Aspects of deﬁciencies in these areas were
identiﬁed as follows (U SAID, 1993: 19-23):

The performance is far from acceptable performance standards found
in middle-income developing countries, it is extremely weak and deﬁcient.
Management is generally weak and not experienced in modern utility
management practices and severely overstaffed. Despite overstafﬁng, there
is an acute shortage of employees with adequate management, administrative
and technical skills. Low and middle management appears to be reluctant to
assume responsibility and initiative. Management tends to be preoccupied
with short-term concerns and daily problems. Little time is spent on
longer-term strategic aspects of agency development, as decisions on such
aspects (stafﬁng, ﬁnancial management, investment selection and execution)
are largely out of the jurisdiction of management.

Management’s capability for effective decision-making and
administration is restricted by dysfunctional organizational structures and the
absence of adequate and up-to-date information. Administrative and
operational systems (accounting, budgeting, commercial, information, control,
etc.) do not generate the ﬂow and type of information that is needed for
proper management control and decision-making. A particularly severe
shortcoming is the inability of the govemment-required accounting system to

186

produce timely and adequate information on expenditures. With few
exceptions, all administrative and operational systems are kept manually.

Evidence of inadequate operation and maintenance of water services
abounds throughout Cairo. Examples include pipe systems that do not work
properly because of inoperable valves or pumping stations, water treatment
plants don’t reach production capacity and adequate water quality standards
because of run-down and non-ﬁrnctioning equipment and poor process
management. Distribution systems are operated inefﬁciently causing water
shortages and low pressure. Poor operation and maintenance practices are
always highlighted as one of the most troublesome aspects of management.
In all cases, however, maintenance and operation of water are limited by the
constraints imposed by the ﬁve year planning process and shortage of
sufﬁciently experienced personnel.

Performance shortfalls of water supply are largely explained by the
inadequate policy framework and the overly centralized organizational
structure in which GOGCWS operates. The centralized approach to
management has not allowed the development of accountability, ownership,
responsibility and initiative which are all prime elements for fostering efﬁcient
performance.

The main stated objective of Black and Veatch’s on-site administrative reform
program is to strengthen the GOGCWS’s institutional capacity in order to operate and
maintain the heavily funded Greater Cairo water system. By operating on-site, Black and
Veatch has identiﬁed four objectives: an organizational objective to ensure autonomy and
decentralization of authority and decision making for water supply policies, plans, and
activities; a social objective to provide better service for the public and to increase public
awareness regarding water in order to have a positive impact on public health and Cairo’s
environment; an economic objective to recover operation and maintenance costs through
adequate tariffs and to utilize surplus in ﬁnancing new projects and rehabilitation of facilities;
and an administrative objective to give GOGCWS a greater administrative capacity in
rendering better quality services to the public. These four objectives are a basic reﬂection of

the contractor’s master plan for administrative reform. Empirically, however, a detailed

187

analysis is needed to identify the success, failures, and reasons for either result given the
external agent’ s narrow focus on a single organization in Egypt’ s cumbersome administrative
hierarchy.

The Organization’s Legal History

The establishment of GOGCWS dates back to 1865 and has undergone many stages
since then. The Cairo Water Supply Company was initiated on the May 17, 1865, as a
joint-stock company to provide the city of Cairo with potable water. On the July 1, 195 7, the
Cairo Water Supply Company was nationalized and changed to a public utility as part of
President Nasser’s movement to develop society through bureaucratization. On November
30, 1968, President Nasser issued Decree No.1638 to establish “The General Organization
for Greater Cairo Water Supply” and afﬁliated it with the Ministry of Housing and Utility.
The decree also gave the Board of Directors “the supreme authority dominating all
GOGCWS’s affairs” and stated that the organization’s budget will be in accordance with the
regulations of the national budget. President Sadat later expanded the Board of Directors
ﬁom 12 to 19.

In 1979, the organization was subjected to Local Administration Law and became
afﬁliated with the three Governors of Greater Cairo area. This policy was justiﬁed by the fact
that the organization is geographically responsible for three govemorates that adrrrinistratively
form the capital, Cairo, Giza, and Qalyubiya. Also, that year the prime minister issued a
decree to consider GOGCWS as an economic organization. The decree meant that the
organization would have the right to decide how to utilize resources to achieve the maximum

beneﬁts at a fair cost and the ability to raise the revenues needed to cover operations and

188

maintenance costs and provide ﬁrnds for paying a fair share of capital costs. In this stage,
however, no reforms were made towards such economic self sufﬁciency. From this
chronological narrative it is obvious that the GOGCWS has been a subject of unsuccessful
reform policies in the absence of Black and Veatch or other on-site contracted consultants.
The task of assigning administrative reform to an on-site foreign consultant ﬁrm came as an
unusual step in the organization’s legal history.
The Impact of Black and Veatch efforts on GOGCW S

Responsibility and Performance

Cairo is the largest city in Egypt, the African Continent, and the Arab world.
Population growth in Greater Cairo necessitates continuous expanding of public services.
This imposes several burdens on public organizations and utilities due to an unusually large
geographical distribution of services. The management of public services in Greater Cairo
is made more difﬁcult due to the need to prepare for times of danger and possible spread of
epidemics from wars or earthquakes.

The scope of responsibility of GOGCWS has expanded since 1958 as many potable
water works from various neighborhoods around the city were continuously incorporated
until they reached the three govemorates of Greater Cairo.71 The GOGCWS today is

responsible for providing water according to international health standards and speciﬁcations

 

7' In President Mubarak’s ﬁrst Five-Year Plan (1982 -l987), GOGCWS production capacity reached about
2.2 million m’lday. In the current Five-Year Plan (1997-2002) GOGCWS is supposed to increase its water
production capacity to reach 6.5 million m3/day or an increase of about 200 percent. There are other
signiﬁcant parameters which illustrate the organization’s increasing burden as of 1997. For example, total
water production reached 4,690,000 m’lday with 300 liter/day per capita consumption, the network length
reached 8000 km with 22 branches, 13 treatment plants, 1 compact unit, and 5 ground wells.

189

to the entire population of Greater Cairo. Table 6.1 illustrates the growing scope of

responsibility for GOGCWS since its initiation in the late 18003.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6.1
The Population of Egypt and Greater Cairo, 1897 - 1996.
Metropolitan Cairo
Population Size Percent
Censuses of Egypt (1000) (1000) of Egypt
1897 9,717 905 9.31
1907 11,183 1,071 9.58
1917 12,670 1,254 9.90
1927 14,083 1,572 11.16
1937 15,811 1,893 11.97
1947 18,806 2,779 14.78
1960 25,771 4,530 17.58
1966 29,724 — —
1976 36,656 7,471 20.38
1986 48,205 9,754 20.23
1996 61,452 14,872 24.20

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note: Data prior to 1986 are from Waterbury’s (1982) calculations based on official census results.
Other data are calculated by the author from census sources (CAPMAS 1987, 1997). Urban data
are from Shorter (1989) estimates for Cairo for years prior to 1986 who made the census ﬁgures
as nearly comparable as possible to the 1986 CAPMAS concept of urban Cairo.

Table 6.1 indicates that Greater Cairo now accounts for about 25 percent of Egypt’s
population. This growth is explained largely by an inward migratory movement towards
Cairo from other govemorates as people seek better public services, including potable water.
Thus, GOGCWS’s responsibility has increased over the years nearly doubling the number

desiring to be served between 1976 and 1996.

190

There are indicators, however, that the organization is not meeting its responsibilities
to provide water to Greater Cairo residents. Census ﬁgures from 1996 show that 11 percent
of Greater Cairo families and 26 percent of the city’s buildings are still not receiving the
service. The inability of the organization to meet its responsibility is largely attributed to
administrative problems despite Black and Veatch consultants on-site ten years administrative
reform efforts. A representative in the People Assembly emphasizes that many households
in his district are still without water despite the availability of service in their neighborhood.
The main complaint on the Assembly’s ﬂoor was that bureaucratic obstacles in the form of
“meaningless rules” had become the goal in GOGCWS rather than the means (Al-Abd, 1998:
13).

A simple comparison between the 1996 census and the organization’s customer
database also provides another indicator that GOGCWS is not adnrinistratively keeping up
with its responsibility for providing the service and collecting the charges despite a decade of
Black and Veatch on-site administrative reform efforts. While census ﬁgures show that more
than 3 million households reside in Greater Cairo, records show only 600,000 of the
households as subscribers as of 1997. This means that more than two million households are
either not accounted for, not receiving the service, or are illegally connected. In terms of
customer service, there also appears to be a signiﬁcant lack in administrative performance as
indicated by the organization’s 1997 records. Data from the customer service department
show that only 7 percent of arrears are collected, 18 months of receivables delay, and the ratio

of collection to billing is only 50 percent.

191

There are other indicators that the GOGCWS is not able to keep up with the work
pressure. Engineers estimate that only 39 percent of production is available for public use due
to water lost in the network (USAID, 1996c). Substantial water loss has been attributed in
part to the inability of the organization to keep up with operations and maintenance practices
resulting in broken pipe lines and provision of contaminated water. Ironically, the Nile has
been the primary source of water as well as its primary receptor of wastewater and drainage
despite the USAID’s signiﬁcant involvement in maintaining and expanding the water and
sewer networks in Cairo since the 1970s and in environmental projects since the early 1990s
(Al-Gohary, 1994). In 1998, water loss in the network is still signiﬁcant, representing 50
percent of GOGCWS’s production (Nasr, 1998; Soliman, 1998).

It is apparent that Black and Veatch consultant ﬁrm contracted by the external agent
for on-site administrative reform since 1988 was unable to address this problem despite the
investments and technical expertise. One can argue that the insufﬁcient reform was due to
lack of cooperation of other bureaucracies that lie outside the external agent’s domain of
authority. For example, the number of illegal connections in informal communities around
Cairo is a main cause of water loss due to their growing population that reached 3 million
(CAPMAS, 1997c).72 While addressing this problem would help GOGCWS to meet its

responsibility towards customers, it requires the cooperation of more than one Egyptian

 

7’ Informal communities in Cairo are unplanned neighborhoods growing randomly around the city. Their
structure range from multistory buildings to sun-dried brick shacks on agricultural land on the west coast of
the Nile, or cemeteries and desert land on the Nile’s east coast. They are usually constnrcted on government
property and inhibited by poor rural migrants and rural workers returning from oil-producing Arab countries.
Informal communities grow so rapidly to the point that a block of buildings or a whole street would be build
in less than a week. Because they are not planned or approved by the government, households connected to
public utilities are considered illegal until settlements are reached with the providing bureaucracy on a
building by building basis by paying fines.

192

bureaucracy including housing, roads, power, and the detection task force responsible for
identifying problem areas. Therefore, approaching administrative reform on a small scale
through Black and Veatch on-site consultants did not allow the external agent to confront
ﬁrndamental problems. In the absence of a large scale administrative reform to the Egyptian
bureaucratic hierarchy by the external agent, Black and Veatch cannot grant GOGCWS the
right to decide how, where, when and on what terms to offer services, after consultation with,
rather than under the control of outside agencies or the right to decide how to utilize
resources to achieve the maximum beneﬁt at a fair cost.
The Organizational Structure

In 1997, Black and Veatch on-site administrative reform efforts helped to issue
Decree No.337 by the Director of Central Agency for Organization and Administration to

reorganize GOGCWS. The decree afﬁliated the following departments and their staff with

the Chairman of GOGCWS:
- Central Department ofLegal Affairs. - General Department of
- General Department of Training. Information, Documentation and
General Department of Customer Decision Support.

Service.

General Department of Public
Relations.

General Department of Monitoring.
Financial and Administrative
Inspection Department.

General Department of Security.
Organization and Administration
Department.

Central Statistics Department.
Planing and Monitoring
Department.

It established two new positions to report to the Chairman: a Deputy Chairman for
Technical Affairs and one for Financial and Administrative Affairs. The Deputy Chairman of

Technical Affairs had now four central departments and three general departments afﬁliated

193

with his ofﬁce: Central Department of Projects, Central Department of Water Plants, Central
Department of Networks, Central Department of Heliopolis Networks, General Department
of Laboratories and Research, General Department of Workshops and Mechanical Campaign
(Fleet), and General Department of Safety and Occupational Health.

The Deputy Chairman for Financial and Administrative Affairs had four departments
afﬁliated with his ofﬁce: Central Department of Financial Affairs, Central Department of
Administrative Affairs, General Department for Procurement and Supply, and Commodity
Storage Department.

Figure 6. 1 depicts the current organization structure of GOGCWS that resulted ﬁ'om
Black and Veatch on-site administrative reform efforts. The detailed structures are shown in

Figures 6.1-A to 6.1-E.

194

 

 

      

      

:Eaumum
a. 8:223:
.3 d .0

       

mac—.353
5.. d .0

23.8.5 . . . .

  
 

  

.8 d0 . U :5 .52.:an
. . . beam .
. . 3:23;:qu . .

  

 

 

 

EoEznaud 35.35 3:50

_ 2.2.23. 22.... 8.. deJl

_ £952.23: .5527:— u>:_..:n_:_:__.< we __:u:=:_.._
_ 835m EEBQU .8 ddjT
_ EuEtaend :e:a.:m_EEu< a. SEES?

MES—uh. 5.. .25

   

 

 

   

 

 

  

E2625

m.__=.:< 23...? o
3652:". >_.=.:m_=_Eu<
. .5. d0 5.. d0

 

beard a. mctgm .
EoEoSoei bEcEEoU
5.. dd .5. dd .

 

 

55.86%

_m:=.c< o>:E_m_:._Eu< am 36:55... no. caEtazu based _

 

 

 

 

 

bEGow 5.. dd

 

 

   

252 in. .e do

     

 

.wzhﬂﬁﬂuﬂvm

   

do anm

  

259—Em :e_.au_:aw._O mBOQOG
S Baue—

llguagm :Eﬂood a. .:o:a_:oE=u_d .:o__...::c..:_ .8 dd _

195

 

 

I $53: an 3.63m end
mutatim

1 3.5:...6 maria... FEEL

     

.Eod m:.:2_:32 £3.35

.5»: 3.5.2:: €33.92
3.5291
.Eud 22:2913525 23:.—

ll:e:ooem£ u>._3:.n._:.:=u<

  

Mctezcaz
c8 dd

 

  
 

5:59am... u
...__n.:z.:::u<
eccuuemﬁ Finacﬁ a. .2235;

g
E

13:53.; 83:93: a. 5:505:20 23..

 

{3:32:30 a. ﬂee—:02 .433 2.3.:15
Ive? MES—EH . .

    

  

.Eue mFEEEO—z
as :::2._3m nEEmEL

  

:czzuunm «:2:sz— 15:5qu
MEEEF
3.. dd

5:593: 2:2? 5. _=_._uma:=—z

Iz.:at< o.»..:..:m_:.::t< as 32:: ..

 

< tam 9.52:5 catnip—«M5

 

   

 

5.5.6.5
5. dd

:eeazm
.5363. a.
c0:2=2::25
.:e.:nE._:._:_
Edd

 

Ea 2:3...

 

52:52.90 MFESECZ 3.3.5:qu an MESS—n.

Eu—czaed mania—.5 as 5:39:2—

   

   

253...“..—

Aznauum 3.22:; «a .353ch 3.5.5 EC

tune...

   

Eu: 3:57:— Z_.=.__O

l .3: a. 2.6 a:
45:3»:33; .111111 111:
s .3 g

.EuC 3:53.: 25

5:593: g
«x 55::
Emu; 3.52;:59 E
a... 2 C
as 2.25::

.Eod 3.52:5;

 

  
  

@50000

1%

28.8.; 3.3.6:.
32:23.2 Egan—.83.
..c .0

«.9...qu 2335
. . cwaod 4:38.95 caved ecu—5.9:.
32:35 Butte—m . .5529...
..c ...c Sakai 860.8...— mBumoi 83.3...

3.53 oer.
weimﬁod actsuoxm

we.=w.8d cotaooxm :20 =30 .___.8< ..EB<

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.Eod _ ﬂ .Eod _ ﬂ, .Eod 883:. j . no i j .aud ﬂ ﬂ . go
£00.35 .ao.=aco02 28.3... 33:85 .235 2520 . dz =c..3:oEc_eE. :0. a . ed...
.0 ceaauuxm .o coczooxm wEEoEoEE— 5.3.552 E. a. a. =m.8d 28.3... .. .58.. E. a
.% (chmGed _ a. meamaod aw weawacd ‘ cmﬁod .38qu ._>._U .E:.ou.=.2< cmiod .453 weer.
_ . .1 _ .
£00.65 .3535 .300 ﬂop—moi
a. 33:28:. awed w 5583. 39.5.8... .E:.8....B< ehSG .aud 9.39:5
.5 cozzuoxm wEBEQ 5.52: um. um 26.8355: .0 :o..2:oEo. E.
as 9.23.32 5.. d. O . . as. 3:32.52 .5. ..d J

 

 

 

__ r 7

 

_ 3.538% “1
_~j 3.388% w

m:&..< .8550... 5.. 5255.0 5:951.

d twa— 25935 :EENEaunO 950000
N. _ .e 959%

   

88.85
E. d .U

   
 

 

 

197

 

39.8.53
3:38:35.
Eon—3.5m.

39.8.5 3 39.8.53

5:53 :.
9.5.0 .3280

33 32526

95.3 c.
9.3 .3525

 

 

8:95.553.
3.33.
5.53.02

39.8.53
9.805. 533

 

5:50 8:532
95.5.3 59.381

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.390 —p_ .300 5989.3 .300 .300 .930 30‘. 3.58. 3.33.0

8.5.89.3 _n....u 3.5.39.5 3:58.53. a. .8... . . 39:33.
.8950 . 39.353 5.53
3... 552 d .80 3... .33 % 55m 50.... 32:23.). 30.52.32 35.53330
F . L F 3
5583. 50.... n”5.59.53. butam
um. 3.5.29.3 a. w 9.5.53 .95.:3500
5. 0.0 5.. 0.0

 

 

. .

 

 

H
3.555%
. L

H 53:. 28.9.8... 5. 9.5.9.0 5300 H

U .53 «5.9:...m 5.39.3.0 m3UOOD
0.3 2:”...—

 

 

 

 

198

 

 

 

  
  

933 a
28533 a. 2...: 22533 «5.62 ”5.62
i 2:23 25.32% w:ts:=:2 £3a< 3:335 m.::..uu< um mom-<5 wig-:3 9.31.? 3:23:—
Eagma _a=._u_xm .2390 333:". .2235”— 355 2:25?»— ﬁ maﬁa—am £25.50 €3.43»— % x532...

 

 

   

.auo
E55
a.
£53

    
     

 

 

 

          

.aoo £80
a.
8.23%
.2255".

4qu .390

.Eua 3:63.
8235

.EoQ m:_:=:<
33:33.

3::8u<
.5050

m.::ooo<
8958305

 

 

 

 

       
      

 

3292 23.4.2
553 .353
Bum .33
a. 552 um 5.5m

 

 

   

     

 
   

   

.33 .mam
cotuuzcu =239=ob um Ezom a £52
3am .33 3:83.:— manuu< 3:26.494. 2.533% ﬁascuu< 2:333< a:
um 5.52 Q 5:29; a Esman; wuztcﬁa" 325:ch Eustuﬁam ﬂuntuﬁam coca—98.2

 

 

 

 

:2.
£332 53>»

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
     

     
   

.Euo
£2338<

.Eoc
mascuu< $36
a 3255.?

.an >533...
d :anzcu

euntumcam

 

 

 

momcuaxw
.2 dd

 

 

      

.aoo .aoo 3.63
534.5 BSQEOU . 5. dd

moaco>uz
5.. dd

 

E 8.: <

.2285”.
.8 .Q.U

 

 

E_a.c< o>_§.m_:_En< 9% Eocacﬁ .8 58:20 5:30

 

G 2.5 239—Em 533E530 $50,060
93 8:5

 

 

199

    

  

EuﬁiiGEM 2.2.2:)—

:EEEEE...

      

     

.m0>_
in

3.35:...
q 153:

  

axiom

  

5:355:—

    

“Eu—Eng}.

d
:52...
2:3

um
EEG—=65

 

 

   

  

2935‘”.
E57;—

  

 

m. cucom um: cm
3139:.”—

  

  

5:95:25

333m

 

 

 

.,_< 3551.8;
:8 dd

 

 

     

 

3::
$3.532
xtvac‘i

      

    

54:40:
a. 9:520

       

EEC<
5:35

63:

   
 

  

33.3.3

 

.aud 9352
d 3.52:5

3:5":qu

  
  

   

    

   

2.0
.332

.50: 333%
£3502

mug—i=3”
.532

  
  

  

 

   

    

3333“
03:52: _EU<
:3 dd

  

 

 

3.52m
#4 E25535

53.“ :Q0

 

.Eud 358m
bﬁoﬁEcb

 

 

m Et< 9):...:m_:::u< Q ESSEE :8 55:20 baud

 

m tan— o.::o=.:m 5:55:30 $50600
ME: «ENE

  

geium .353:—

200

By reviewing the ﬁgures, one can notice the complex organization structure and infer
there are a few positive points that resulted from administrative reform restructure. First,
there are 11 departments acting in advisory and supporting capacity to the chairman in the
decision-making process. Second, the span of control for the chairman is limited to two
deputy chairmen, one for technical affairs and the other for ﬁnancial and administrative affairs.
This narrow span of control gives the opportunity for the chair to focus on policy-making
process. Third, the General Department of Laboratories and Research is not afﬁliated with
either Central Departments of Plants and Networks but its manager reports directly to the
Deputy Chairman for Technical Affairs. Thus, there is distinction made between the
quantitative side of potable water production and the quality of it; hence the control and
assurance of water quality are currently structured to be more objective and effective. Finally,
the organization structure allows a certain degree of managerial decentralization since the
Central Department of Plants is divided into general departments according to different plants
of Greater Cairo Region. The Central Department of Networks is also divided into general
departments according to different regions of Cairo.

On the other hand, there are negative aspects of the structure imposed by
administrative reform. First, the clear challenge of control for the leadership associated with
the complex organizational structure as reﬂected by the charts represents. Complex
organizational structures, in terms of form, procedures, and work environment, make the
management attempts for efﬁcient control very difﬁcult. Second, the current structure does
not reﬂect an effective and efficient tool for ﬂowing of information. One reason is the large

physical spacing between different administrative units in an organizational culture where

201

mastering administrative capacity in terms of communication and control is typically not the
norm. As pointed out by the literature review in Chapter Two about the efﬁcient means of
structural reform, loosening the organization could be achieved by moving away ﬁ'om this
monocratic end of the organizational continuum. The ﬂow of information in GOGCWS
remains mostly vertical causing the increase of stratiﬁcation, fewer group processes, and
fewer projects oriented structures. This is essential for providing customers with a quality
and user ﬁiendly service and for responding to customer requests in a courteous, accurate,
and timely manner without obstacles from the organization structure.

Third, the orientation towards customer service is made only at the central level of the
administrative organization since there is a General Department of Customers Service as a
supporting department afﬁliated to the Chairman of GOGCWS. The local level departments
concerned with Customer Relations and Services have to go back to the center for decisions
making the process inefﬁcient and cumbersome.

Human Resources

The size and quality of GOGCWS’s human resources, the training programs, and

salaries and incentives should be good indicators of the administrative reform’s impact. Table

6.2 shows the number of bureaucrats distributed according to their job categories.

202

$30000 .2588; S. EoEtnooD .2250 ”noesom

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3...... 3.06 mow... o mvmﬁ m a mo omx N .. mm mm mm. Em .m .c. mom Cm coo.
c.K.m. mmcé :34 :. ccvd m c on m; N x mm mm om. 3%. mm o .nm em woo.
o.c,m_ mxm.m omné c. oomzm m c 3. mm... N w mm 9.. mm. gm on on wcm vm woo.
HEN. xE.m «.mcé m. mmm.m m 0 mm ooh m m cm or. mm. ovm Cm Nb own m. moo.
v3.2 .33». gm... 3 ohmd m c t. no» N x mm mm D... omm on E. mmm m. moo.
mm..m. Err». $4.... c. End m c xo ocn N o mm mm .m. omm hm mp mmm o. .oo.
mmc.m_ 3%.». x94. 0. maxim i m co .:. I h on .m 3. .mm mm 3 3mm x. coo.
.59? En: $.20 02on ooawec 4.0:... SEES. was. mESEmm< mt< .w< cocsom ﬁtzoom Son. we. Ewe. oocoﬁm dam EoEo 23>

-_u._< v.4 -:cZ % a. .95 9.7.3.. E2: -Ezcoo< -mzcs—z

.5. 3.2. .w< a. 6.:— éwacas. % 855E ooh

33.5.0 78.5.85. 33.5.0on

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ad 935—.

.coo—éoo— .motaoEU new .3 cotﬁtaa $50000 an 7.5.8.5: .3 hos—5.7.

203

By reviewing Table 6.2, one can make the following observations. First, the size of
GOGCWS’s labor force is somewhat under control as the rate of increase in personnel over
the period of 1990-1996 is only about 10 percent. Second, the number of ancillary staﬂ‘
which are mostly janitors represents about 28 percent of GOGCWS personnel, placing a
burden on the organization’s budget, management, and culture. It is a major operating cost
as well as an administrative burden. A further assessment of the impact of administrative
reform on human resources can be made based on bureaucrats’ education credentials. Table

6.3 shows the distribution of GOGCWS’s bureaucrats by education level.

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6.3
Number & Percentage of the GOGCW S Labor Forceby Education, 1996.
Percentage of Total
Type of positions Number Labor Force
With university degrees 1,187 9.02
With secondary school degrees 3,520 26.74
Without degrees 8,458 64.25
Total 13,165 100

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6.3 illustrates the poor educational levels of GOGCWS employees. More than
60 percent of the GOGCWS labor force are without degrees of any kind. Only 9 percent
have university degrees far below the 24 percent of all Egyptian bureaucrats who have a
bachelor or higher degree (see Table 3.3). Finally, in order to assess the productivity level
of the labor force, however, one has to compare it with other organizations both in Egypt and

around the world.

204

.ooo. $7.96 5.55 9.50 5.5.0 5.. 5:35:30 .5250 59:.om
.55.... 5... .3 5.2.5.30 .o A.
59.5.59. 335m :55....=. 2.. .5 35 53.5.2 555.55%. 5... .5552 c. 35 .5255 9:. 2:. 5.55.5 5:. 52:22.3. .s

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

oo U . comm” H . mwﬁm .ww.m .wm me own w 5.23.5.
cc. H . NocU . comm coo... COW. cc..m o5: o 3.0 8.5—).
mm. H . op. . mNNm Coqm. mmo. ooc; can o 555.5!
mm. H . coo. u . .hém meow. wmo. oowﬁ o; m. V3.4—”25m
mo H . mmo H . bwﬁw vmmd occ covd wxv. w 2.5:).
no. u . :9: H . chmm soc;V och coed <\Z v a..€:axo.<
on n . one. u . 004% coax... 9% C. 1v 8%. +m. chm—«0
45.x: him :39: mac..— AE... .55....2. 0.0
u25.55550 ado.— .hoo: 52.5 .5 9......— annE no.5. 50.5.5.5—
” tim . him 55.550 52:52 55:55:50 50.525...— 3.?5m

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

E53 5... @555 55...: 5.55 .550 c. 3....0 .553 99.50 9:59.50

ed 5350.

205

From Table 6.4 one can assess the productivity of GOGCWS’s bureaucratic force in

terms of the number of people it serves and the number of connections established.
Compared with other water utilities, GOGCWS has the lowest productivity rate measured by
the number of connections per staff member. The main reason is that GOGCWS, like other
Egyptian bureaucracies, is not allowed to plan its human resources. For example, while
USAID’s consultants have stated that the average number of employees needed to run a
water plant is 179, the actual number remains 239 (U SAID, 1994a). Surplus and unqualiﬁed
manpower in GOGCWS is part of a larger problem that faces Egyptian bureaucracies as
illustrated in Chapter Three. Therefore, human resources parameters measured here are not
easily subjected to small-scale approaches such as the Black and Veatch effort.
Training. Training bureaucrats at GOGCWS is within the limits of policy regulations and
operations manuals developed by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration.
Administrative reform technical support and ﬁinding was not enough to remedy the side
effects of national training policies. The master training plan for 1997 has been developed and
budgeted for $103,000 of which the USAID pays $74,000 or more than 70 percent. With a
simple calculation these ﬁgures mean that only $8 per employee are budgeted for training.
However, it is worth noting that this ﬁgure represents more than eight times of what used to
be budgeted for training before Black and Veatch administrative reform.

Training programs carried out by Black and Veatch had only a limited effect on
improving the organization’ 5 performance and efﬁciency due to the absence of managers who

are committed to Black and Veatch’s cause of reform to assist in the training task. Those

206

who received training remain ineffective due to the lack of support and resources, or they are
ﬁustrated with their inability to make a difference and leave for other job.

Salaries. Administrative reform by Black and Veatch has been attempted under a general
public law that puts a strict ceiling on public salary levels. GOGCWS is subject, like other
bureaucracies, to the Civil Service Law. No.47 of 1978 which sets limits on public salaries
and which is too restrictive to allow administrative reform on small scale to effectively
manage human resources. Such assessment is based on reviewing Table 6.5 that shows the
salary level and the annual salary increase of bureaucrats in Egyptian pounds and their

American dollar equivalence according to Law No.47 of 1978.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6.5
Monthly Salary Structure of Egypt’s Civil Service According to Law No.47 of
1978.

Financial Grade Basic Salary Maximum Ceiling Annual Increase
Excellent 216 ($64) — —

Higher 140 ($41) 207 ($61) 75 ($22)
General Manager 125 ($37) 197 ($58) 72 ($21)
First 95 ($29 179 ($53) 60 ($18)
Second 70 ($21) 164 ($48) 40 ($12)
Third 48 ($14) 139 ($41) 36 ($11
Fourth 38 ($11) 106 ($31) 24 ($7)
Fifth 36 ($11) 82 ($24) 18 ($5)
Sixth 35 ($10) 67 ($18) 18 ($5)

 

 

 

 

 

 

The salary structure shown in Table 6.5 makes bureaucrats at GOGCWS conform to
the ﬁndings in Chapter Three that the ﬁnancial position of the Egyptian bureaucrat is not only
low in absolute terms, but also dismal in comparison to the private sector given that the
average starting monthly salary of a newly hired college graduate in the private sector is 1000

LE ($300). Further, it appears from Table 6.5 that the annual salary increase allowed under

207

the law has been limited since the 1970s without consideration to inﬂation and the expansion
of the private sector. This makes salary levels structured by the public law not adequate to
maintain a reasonable standard of living for employees in an increasingly Westernized society.
Such inﬂexible policies do not provide adequate motivation to most personnel and handicap
Black and Veatch’s efforts of administrative reform.
Incentives. The incentive system applied to the labor force at the GOGCWS is according to
the Board of Directors Decree No. 48 of 1984. It determines the percentage of incentives to
be granted monthly to employees based on their performance and in accordance with quotas
that range from 50 to 100 percent of the basic salary. As of 1996, the organization’s budget
for salaries and incentives reached $21 million (CAPMAS, 1997c). While an incentive system
is considered a step in the right direction towards providing more motivation to GOGCWS’s
personnel, there are ﬂaws in its application that were not corrected by administrative reform.
First, material incentives are calculated as a percentage of the basic salary. Hence the
basic salary and incentive quotas, combined together, are still insufﬁcient and below those
levels of the private sector (Soliman, 1998). Bureaucrats perceive material incentives as part
of the basic salary due to their low pay. Material incentives do not have any effect because
all workers receive them monthly based on artiﬁcial evaluation forms. It is in the
organization’s culture to pay material incentives to bureaucrats regardless of their

performance given that the majority of workers from managers to janitors are in ﬁnancial need

208

and paid according to a salary structure from the 19705.73 Second, managers’ discretion over
their budgets is limited by rules and regulations put forth by the central government. This
makes adopting an effective incentive system independent of the norm in other Egyptian
bureaucracies almost impossible. The inadequacy of salaries and incentives should be viewed
as a major restriction on attempts to make GOGCWS more business oriented. Again, the
small-scale nature of administrative reform was limited by rules applied from the central
administration that lacks reform.

Third, a system of non-material incentives is not taken seriously by managers. Non-
material incentives such as promotion based on performance, employee of the month
certiﬁcates, social events to improve human relations, assigning duties based on capacities,
provide a suitable working environment, or improving communication system are often
ignored tools at GOGCWS. This is despite the effectiveness of non-material incentives in
motivating workers to improve their productivity. Finally, negative incentives are also not
applied to reduce the slack of workers. They are only applied in the form of salary deductions
when workers are absent or late for signing in to work but not for their declining productivity

or performance.

 

7’ While some may argue that applying incentives to every worker without discrimination encourages a sense
of team work, it does not provide motivation for increasing productivity as it values both the productive and
non productive. Ifthe goal is to encourage team work, managers could divide their subordinates into groups
and evaluate them based on performance. This is based on the assumption that there is no problem in
measuring productivity of every member of the group.

209

Leadership

Black and Veatch was unable to assign managers committed to administrative reform
as recommended by the literature review in Chapter Two. According to public laws,
managers at GOGCWS are assigned to their positions based on seniority rather than
qualiﬁcations. This was another constraint placed on Black and Veatch’s small-scale
approach to administrative reform as it was unable to be either an exception to public laws
or to reform them. The only exception is the chairman who is a political appointee regardless
of his loyalty to the reformers. Therefore, Black and Veatch personnel was unable to take
advantage of leadership in the organization to monitor, minimize resistance, and motivation
of bureaucrats inside GOGCWS and to lobby for the reformers efforts outside GOGCWS.

The administrative reform to laws and regulations of the hiring and promotion of
managers by the new ministry of Administrative Development was announced after Black and
Veatch’s mission was coming to an end. Changes in recruitment laws, such as allowing
agencies to advertise management openings to the public and using an improved system for
evaluation as the basis for promotions, were not available to Black and Veatch. This is
despite the fact that unless there is a good leadership that runs an organization of the size of
GOGCWS, administrative capacity will remain insufﬁcient. As established in Chapter Two,
the presence of qualiﬁed leadership committed to administrative reform is crucial to the
success of external agents’ attempts. As things stand, GOGCWS is still a typical Egyptian
bureaucracy with fragmented responsibility that makes no one accountable for the inefﬁcient

results.

210

Revenues and Financial Situation

The GOGCWS produced 4. 7 million m3 of potable water per day, whereas water sales
amounted to only 2.7 million m3 representing only 59 percent of produced water due to
quantities lost in the network. As a result, the organization’s revenues amounted to $78
million out of which only $50 million was in direct revenue from water sales." On the other
hand, the organization’s total expenditures amounted to $261 million. The difference in
ﬁgures reﬂects the organization’s dependence on foreign loans as the main source of ﬁnance.
With an annual deﬁcit of 47 percent and debt service constituting 24 percent of total
expenditures, GOGCWS’s total debt stood at $486 million in addition to the accumulated
interests by the end of 1997 ﬁscal year (Abd Al-Menam and Galeb, 1997; Al-Moktar, Nafadi,
and Abd Al-Gafar, 1997; Ali and Batrik, 1997; Riad, Al-Kiat, and Rashad, 1997). These
ﬁgures mean that GOGCWS’s debt is more than twice its valued capital, and growing, despite
administrative reform.

One reason is that administrative reform was not sufﬁcient to increase water tariﬂir
in order to raise revenues, in addition to its inability to reduce the amount of water loss in the
network, to reduce the large unqualiﬁed and productive labor force, or to improve customer
service and collection procedures. Water consumption is heavily subsidized and tariff
revenues cover only a fraction of the operating costs. As illustrated by Table 6.4, GOGCWS

charges the lowest price for service compared to other major urban water agencies in

 

7‘ It is worth noting that more than 90 percent of customers do not have operating water meters which makes
the organization collect charges based on estimates. Estimates are based on the number of rooms at the
subscribed unit, i.e., apartment or house, regardless of the usage or the number of people using water at the
unit.

211

developing low income cities. This is despite the relative improvement in the quality of life
and increasing value of property and housing in Cairo. Water fees do not reﬂect all these
factors.”

Raising water tariffs would have been a legitimate administrative reform proposal
given that the average water tariff is only LE. 0.16 per m3 ($1.41 / 30m’) while the cost of
production is L.E. 0.46 per m3 ($4.06 / 30m3). These prices are set at the center of Egyptian
bureaucracy by the High Committee for Policy and Economic Affairs. Requests by the
organization to decrease the LE. 0.30 per m3 difference have oﬁen been denied due to
political and social considerations. This problem could have been addressed without
disagreeing with the government’s political and social objectives behind the subsidies.
Rondinelli (1986) recommends lowering the cost of service provision through minimizing
regulations and central control over the public organizations.’6

Another reason for the administrative reform’ s inability to improve the organization’s
ﬁnancial status is collecting charges based on a ﬂat tariff. GOGCWS charges the public
regardless of actual consumption because gauge meters are in short supply or broken. While
the organization is forced by law to subsidize its service, the ﬂat rate is due to administrative
incapacity. As a result of both the ﬂat rate and subsidy of service, Egyptians perceive water

as a public good to which they are entitled to rather than as a valuable resource that they

 

7’ Hoehn and Kreiger (1996) used contingent valuation and Kamel (1997) used hedonic method to empirically
prove that Cairo residents from all income groups are willing to pay more than the government standard
charge. Unlike what is commonly believed, charging the public the cost of production, operation, and
maintenance is popular among various income groups in return for a better service.

7‘ Rondinelli (1986) also offers the alternative of implementing policies that attempt to redistribute migration
to small and intermediate-sized cities in developing countries to face the problems in extending basic services

for a rapidly growing urban poor population.

212

should pay to obtain. The behavior associated with such perception made Black and Veatch’s
efforts in administrative reform to enhance maintenance capacity difficult because the public
lack incentives to share the responsibility or to ration consumption." Over-consumption
encouraged by underpricing also put a heavy burden on the wastewater sector, making it
another bureaucracy unable to keep up with the public demand and another case for USAID
to struggle with.

Finally, Black and Veatch was not able to improve the organization’s ﬁnancial status
due to the inability to collect more than 5 percent of other bureaucracies’ water bill. This is
despite the fact that other government units’ share of water usage reaches 29. 1 percent or $64
million (Abd Al-Menam and Galeb, 1997; Al-Moktar, Nafadi, and Abd Al-Gafar, 1997; Ali
and Batrik, 1997; Riad, Al-Kiat, and Rashad, 1997). With a simple calculation it appears that
the subsidy for public use is almost canceled out by the bureaucracies’ debt to GOGCWS.
Therefore, the issue of other bureaucracies’ consumption of subsidized water is critical to
GOGCWS’s ﬁnancial viability that lies outside the scope of administrative reform. Despite
the diminishing social and political claims that prevent increasing water tariffs for the public,

the government still refuses to lift the subsidies on govemment-to-govemment accounts.

 

’7 Water underpricing does not only affect administrative capacity but encourages over consumption of
resources in a region that suffers from water scarcity like the Middle East. Egypt is one of the countries that
predicted to have scarce water resources in the next decade (FAO, 1994). While water resources are
decreasing, the per eupita consumption in Cairo increased from 69 l/day in 1952 to 300 [May in 1996.
Therefore, increasing water tariffs is a strategic necessity for administrative reform and can be done without
hurting the low income groups by setting the price using willingness to pay methods.

213

Assessment of GOGCW S Administrative Capacity

A ﬁnal assessment of the extent to which administrative reform has reached its
objectives stated in the consultants’ plan can be made here after analyzing the relevant data,
information and documents as well as discussions with officials. It seems that administrative
capacity is still lacking in the areas of planning, operational control, ﬁnancial control, human
resources’ management, and organizational structure. First, in terms of planning, managers
did not capture the organization’s orientation through a future vision and long-term
objectives. Evidence shows that at present, GOGCWS does not have a strategic plan nor
does it have a vision as to how to be a modern utility providing a quality services to
customers. The organization still does not operate along economic lines and principles stated
in its 1957 establishing decree or in the external agent’s reform plan. A good start would be
by having a clear vision of the ﬁiture demand for GOGCWS’s service in a rapid urbanized
environment. This can be done by developing a new organization paradigm and culture in
the Planning Department to change its focus from only technical issues. Further, departments’
plans should not be articulated based on securing more foreign resources but based on how
to develop and manage resources. There is an urgent need for every manager to draw a plan
for his own department that includes objectives to be fulﬁlled, means of implementation, and
measurement of results.

Second, poor operational control tends to minimize the administrative capacity of
GOGCWS. Reasons for difficulties range from the lack of a well-deﬁned strategic plan to
lack of leadership skills. For example, managers are still being widely criticized by “the lack

of leadership capacity” and operate in a “backward administration environment” (Soliman,

214

1998: 9). There are also external reasons such as government rules that inhibit control by
requiring approval for most managers’ decisions. Addressing these issues is key to enhance
the operational control problem and increase the administrative capacity. One important step
would be to give managers more discretion based on performance indicators and key results.
Third, the current GOGCWS’s ﬁnancial control system negatively affects the
organization’s administrative capacity." Black and Veatch had falsely assumed that the
government would support ﬁscal decentralization. This could be due to failing to understand
the history of ﬁscal centralization that is so deeply entrenched in Egypt. The small-scale
nature of administrative reform overlooked the legal environment which ensures that the
central government retains control of all revenues collected locally. Financial control was also
not enhanced because the organization’s budget is not utilized as a tool for control and
monitoring but rather as a tool to substantiate to the government the need for additional
resources. Other common inadequacies observed regarding the budgeting process were that
departments do not play an active role in developing the budget other than submitting their
lists of needs. Undertaking the task of addressing these problems is still needed to facilitate
better management of costs and important for the budgeting process of GOGCWS.
Fourth, management and development of human resources seem to hinder
GOGCWS’s administrative capacity. Noteworthy among the reasons are external constraints

imposed on the human resources management by national labor laws and regulations.

 

7’ This assessment is consistent with Hoffer (1995) who studied and compared organizations in Egypt, Russia,
Vietnam, and the Netherlands to identify variables that inﬂuence the effectiveness of urban water supply to
millions of urban dwellers in a rapid urbanization environment. She ﬁnds that autonomy, in terms of
authority and ﬁnancial sustainability, has a direct effect on the outcomes. She also concludes that subsidies
and loans ﬁom donors often obstruct effectiveness and result in a passive attitude. To reduce the dependency
on subsidies, a more realistic, higher water tariff was also found to be necessary.

215

 

Managers could not facilitate or promote active motivation due to low salaries and incentives
that are perceived as a right regardless of performance. Further, personnel and leadership
within the organization do not have adequate discretion in planning their needs of human
resources because the centralized bureaucratic hierarchy puts this tool is in the hands of the
central government. These departments do not effectively contribute or assist in the analysis
and planning for organization’s needs regarding human resources. Unfortunately, this is not
the case only at GOGCWS. Inefficiency in utilizing USAID’s investments in all sectors was
to a large extent attributed to govemment’ 3 poor employment policies (Hanrahan and Walker,
1994). To overcome this constraint, GOGCWS’s different departments should have the
discretion to draw their plans for human resources guided by a strategic plan, vision, and
objectives.

There are some internal constraints on the management and development of human
resources as well. The most crucial internal constraint is that organizational culture does not
provide better management of human resources. Through observations and interviews it is
easy to characterize organizational culture as being “command and control,” engineering
focused, following the rules without input or innovation, let the top decide, with a strong
orientation towards centralization. Management climate and organizational culture have to
be altered so as to create an organizational environment that supports collaboration, team
work, and eﬂ‘ective leadership. Further, funding for training reﬂects an inadequacy in
developing human resources. An effective training function will require larger budgets,

qualiﬁed trainers, and consistent efforts. Addressing these issues would be effective in

216

enhancing the management and development of human resources at GOGCWS as well as
enhancing the organization’s administrative capacity

Finally, the current hierarchical organizational structure of GOGCWS imposed by
Black and Veatch is not the best option to maximize administrative capacity given the
environmental constrains in which managers have to operate. For example, the Board of
Directors is required to obtain approval from the Central Agency for Organization and
Administration for any change which creates new management positions. This makes it
difﬁcult to make needed periodic organization changes. Moreover, the required government
budget approval process is often an obstacle to reorganization plans that require adding
personnel or altering job grades. Therefore, GOGCWS does not have the discretion needed
to run a large scale organization such as revising the structure if necessary to keep up with
increasing responsibilities and a rapid urban environment.

Also the current organizational structure of GOGCWS hinders the promotion of
decentralization, delegation of authority, or enhancing customer service. This is true
especially regarding customer service, as there is no one manager below the Chairman who
is responsible for all aspects of service to customers. One place to start is to break the
organization into three independent units according to the three govemorates of Greater
Cairo that the organization is responsible for serving. The delivery of services for Cairo
residents requires decentralization as a vehicle to get services tailored to the people needs.
The operation of urban sites providing potable water should be at the organic end of the
continuum of organization structure as recommended by the literature review from Chapter

Two . GOGCWS should move these sites from their current highly centralized form to a

217

 

more ﬂexible decentralized form that is adaptable to local conditions of the communities they
serve.

A clear lesson is that in a bad policy environment, even well ﬁrnded administrative
reform projects, cannot deliver the external agent’s expectations. The absence of reform for
the Egyptian bureaucracy as a whole and of promoting reform initiatives at the national level
did not allow the external agent to confront fundamental problems at GOGCWS. It did not
appear that the small-scale approach for administrative reform yields the desired outcome.
After all the government is the entity accountable for policy reforms needed to overcome
administrative obstacles to sustainable development. Failing to link small-scale administrative
reform projects to GOE policy and organizational change did not enhance the administrative
capacity of GOGCWS to plan, implement, and maintain basic service delivery. Administrative
reform was not sufficient because reform efforts were limited by existing laws, small-scale,
and a noncontinuous approach.

Conditionality

Faced with the GOE’s unwillingness to change its rules and regulations for the sake
of reforming GOGCWS’s administrative problems, the USAID took shelter under the policy
of conditionality (USAID, 1995, 1997a). Relying on conditionality was also due to the fact
that GOGCWS’s long-term dependance on the foreign aid budget increases the opportunity
cost of using investments in other deteriorating public sectors. The agency hinged its further
support to GOGCWS on GOE’s fulﬁlling of two conditions: that the GOE agree to raise
tariﬂ‘s to cover the cost of operations and maintenance, debt service, and routine

improvements and that the legal status of GOGCWS be changed to an autonomous local

218

 

water organization with the authority to retain its service revenues for its own operating
needs. The President agreed to the USAID’s conditions by issuing a presidential decree that
granted the GOGCWS the right to operate as an economic entity on a cost-recovery basis.
Accordingly, GOGCWS draﬁed a mission statement to reﬂect its agreement to the USAID’s
conditions. The new mission statement included economically sound policies such as:

It is the policy of (GOGCWS) that total revenues from the sale of water

and/or other services will equal the total operational costs for providing water

and other services . . . The operating budget will balance operational expenses

with current sources of revenue. The capital budget will be based on the

availability of capital funds from all sources, and reﬂect the GOGCWS ability

to repay both debt interest and principal on borrowed ﬁrnds (GOGCWS,

1997)

One observation is that these announcements came about only when the USAID
announced that tariff reform was required as a prerequisite to new infrastructure
developments in other Egyptian cities. Later, however, President Mubarak explicitly and
publicly denied these conditions (Nafaa, 1997: 5):

I have continuously refused to spend portions from the U. S. aid that is tied to

the condition of increasing water tariffs. I assure citizens that there will be no

increase in water prices despite the high cost of water plants and connections.

. . This is my policy for the good of the citizens.

During the period between agreeing to the USAID’s conditionality and denouncing
it, the President secured other external sources for funding the GOGCWS. GOGCWS has
signed loans and grants agreements with the German, Japanese, Italian, French, Danish, and
Finish governments (Abdo, 1998; Ibrahim, 1998b; Lotﬁ, 1998). The funding that the

GOGCWS guaranteed from other external agents, with no conditions attached, far exceeds

the $19 million that USAID kept in the pipeline and tied to policy reform. While the GOE

219

 

has proven to be skillful in soliciting other external sources to evade conditionality, it has
highlighted the problem of lack of coordination between external agents to impose reform.

Getting other external agents to cooperate in the reform plan, however, is not on the
USAID’s agenda. One USAID official at Egypt’s desk in Washington argued during our
interview that coordination between external agents’ efforts is not possible for three reasons.
First, external agents have chances for subsidizing their private sectors through contracts with
GOGCWS that the USAID left until its conditions are met. Second, it is also difﬁcult to
coordinate external agents’ efforts due the variance in their political interests. In the case of
GOGCWS, while the USAID is concerned mainly with a market-oriented policy as a tool for
reform as part of its program in Egypt, many other agents are concerned with the
humanitarian dimension of water without a macro or long-term country plan. Finally, the
USAID ofﬁcial believes that any attempts to ask other external agents to cooperate in the
USAID sanctions on GOGCWS would have a political cost in terms of negative reaction from
the President on other USAID’s programs. Therefore, it appears that President Mubarak
would resort to any tactics other than yielding to the USAID’s conditionality.

The Future of GOGCW S

The future of GOGCWS became a topic for public debate in late 1997 when the
People’s Assembly discussed a report issued by the Central Agency for Accounts about the
organization’s budget and performance. The report proposed privatization as a means to
reform GOGCWS. The proposal faced signiﬁcant opposition despite the members’ attack
on the organization’s performance and management. A member from the ruling party

responded to the privatization proposal saying (Abd Al-Menam and Galeb, 1997: 2):

220

 

The government can privatize sectors such as the oil industry and keep the

money, but it should not step over the poor citizens’ right in drinking water.

Ifwe sell GOGCWS, the government will have nothing else to do but to sit

down and write its memoirs . . . Our discussion here should not be about

privatization but about methods for ﬁxing the incapable and corrupt

management at GOGCWS. The organization’s managers are today centers

of power in the Egyptian bureaucracy . . . Despite the organization’s poor

record, managers have been cashing their incentives and driving luxury cars

ﬁ'om a budget that is falling apart.

Managers and bureaucrats at GOGCWS were not phased by the debate. The chairman
denied the management responsibility and blamed the government’s policies and the public
for his organization’s performance in an unprecedented response in front of the Assembly’s
Housing committee (Al-Gazali, 1998: 3):

Putting social considerations above economic dimensions in pricing water is

to blame for the poor performance. The citizen does not perceive water as a

commodity. I blame the poor majority for putting billions of government’s

investments in jeopardy by their over consumption and irresponsible use of

water . . . Economic criteria should guide water pricing and not the poor or

social considerations.

The chair’s statement aiming at blaming the public came as a surprise to the
committee’s members some of whom objected in anger (Al-Gazali, 1998). One can infer ﬁ'om
his statement that bureaucrats at GOGCWS have political power to ensure a stable future.
After surviving the USAID’s administrative reform program and ensured future funding from
various external sources, they appear to be correct.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have qualitatively answered the research question of whether the

external agent through consultants directly inﬂuences the organizational aspects of

bureaucracy toward administrative reform. After analyzing the relevant data, information and

221

 

documents as well as discussions with officials at the USAID, consultants, and GOGCWS,
it appears that the Black and Veatch on-site administrative reform efforts were not successful
in completely solving the administrative problems. Administrative reform efforts and millions
of dollars being spent on water projects and administrative reform did not yield the expected
organizational capacity for ensuring sustainability of investments. Signiﬁcant problems still
exist in the areas of planning, operational control, ﬁnancial control, human resources’
management, and organizational structure.

One reason for the persistence of these problems is the small-scale nature of
administrative reform that does not put authority in the Black and Veatch’s hands to change
bureaucratic rules. The role of the contractor in administrative reform appears not to be
working in the absence of reforming the Egyptian bureaucracy as a whole. Administrative
reform should be a continuous process rather than a small-scale “one shot” effort. The recent
internally initiated reform efforts by the GOE analyzed in Chapter Four came after the USAID
placed its conditions on GOGCWS and after Black and Veatch’s on-site contracted mission
was coming to an end. The USAID’s conditions of raising tariffs and changing the legal
status of GOGCWS to an autonomous entity do not seem to be acceptable general policies
for the GOE to adopt and apply on a large scale in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Another reason for the inability of USAID to enhance GOGCWS’s administrative
capacity is the lack of cooperation among external agents operating in Egypt. The USAID’s
efforts toward administrative reform have been independently sought and the GOE had a
chance to take refuge from conditionality. Hence the main lesson learned ﬁom the case of

USAID/GOGCWS is that the role of an external agent in administrative reform would not

222

reach its goals in the absence of supportive government policies and the intervention of other
external agents in the opposite direction of reform.

In the next chapter I will quantitatively answer the research question in terms of other
organizational areas, namely, bureaucratic productivity, bureaucratic ﬂexibility,
communication, innovation, relation with the public, and professional information. This will
be done through surveying bureaucrats to measure the impact of administrative reform. I will
then proceed to analyze the answers to the research questions in terms of the Continuity and

Reform model to examine its applicability.

223

 

CHAPTER 7
THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ON BUREAUCRATS’
BEHAVIOR
Qualitative analysis in Chapter Six was able to partially answer the research question
of whether USAID strategy of small scale administrative reform was successﬁrl. The impact
of Black and Veatch on-site administrative reform efforts in GOGCWS was examined in the
areas of organizational responsibility and performance, relation with other bureaucracies,
organizational structure, human resources, training, salaries, incentives, and revenues and
ﬁnancial performance. However, other organizational areas that Black and Veatch was
involved in reforming over the last decade, namely, bureaucratic productivity, bureaucratic
ﬂexibility, communication, innovation, decision-making, relation with the public, and
professional information require surveying bureaucrats to measure the impact of
administrative reform. Therefore, the research question will be answered here in reference
to six sets of attitudes and behavior. This will be done by surveying bureaucrats who deal
with the public on daily basis at GOGCWS.
Methodology
The survey to examine these sets of attitudes and behavior was administrated in June
1998 (See Appendix C for a copy of the questionnaire). The questionnaire was designed in
the Arabic language based on a questionnaire that was designed and tested by Al-Ahram
Center for Strategic and Political Studies in the Spring of l 983 and sponsored by a grant ﬁ'om
the Ford Foundation (Sullivan, et al., 1990; Palmer, et al., 1989; Palmer, Leila, and Yassin,

1988; Palmer, et al., 1987; Leila, Yassin, and Palmer, 1985; Palmer, Yassin, and Leila, 1985).

224

The 1983 survey was administered in person by a team of sociology graduate students from
Ein Shams University in Cairo. The sample was composed of 836 Egyptian civil servants
selected from relatively equal proportions from three government sector agencies: the
Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Industry, and the Aluminum Corporation.

Sampling for this study, on the other hand, was limited to the headquarters of
GOGCWS and excluded the branch ofﬁces in Greater Cairo neighborhoods. Bureaucrats
were chosen randomly from the 123 employees in the four departments who have direct
contact with the public: Subscriptions, Water Meters, Collections, and Customer Service
Departments.” The four departments were found to be the only units at GOGCWS that are
in contact with the public after consulting the organization’s chart and meeting with the
Chairman. Questionnaires were distributed to bureaucrats individually followed by a short
personal brieﬁng to ensure that each question was fully understandable (see Appendix B).
In the case of no response, a follow-up conversation was conducted to understand the reason
for reﬁrsing to ﬁll out the survey followed by a second request for participation.

The strategy was to distribute the questionnaire on available bureaucrats in the four
departments. In the Collections Department, 21 questionnaires were successfully completed
from the total of 36 bureaucrats who are in direct contact with the public. In the

Subscriptions Department, 17 out of the 35 bureaucrats who are in direct contact with the

 

7’ The Subscriptions Department is where the public petition for new accounts and legally mediate problems
they may have with previous illegal connections. The Water Meters Department is responsible for on-site
inspections of the new connections and deciding on the size and quality of meters to be installed. The
Collections Department is where payments are made. This is an often busy department due to the absence of
a mail in option of payments for all services. Finally, the Customer Service Department is a newly added unit
to GOGCWS by Black and Veatch to settle problems that the public has with the other three departments.
Problems are often heard in the Water Meters and Subscriptions departments due to subjective estimates and
judgements about ﬁnes and fees to settle illegal connections and initiate new accounts.

225

 

public were successﬁilly surveyed. In the Water Meters Department, 12 out of the 35
bureaucrats who are in direct contact with the public were successfully surveyed. Fewer
bureaucrats were surveyed in the Subscriptions and the Water Meters Departments because
their managers were less enthusiastic about letting their subordinates participate in the survey.
Finally, 13 out of 17 total bureaucrats who are in direct contact with the public were surveyed
in the Customer Service Department. In each department the manager ﬁlled the questionnaire
with bureaucrats. The ﬁnal return was 63 out of the 123 bureaucrats who are in direct
contact with the public on daily basis at GOGCWS or a return rate of 51 percent.

Final results of the survey are then compared with Al-Ahram’s survey results as
reported by Palmer et al. (1989), Palmer, Leila, and Yassin (1988), Palmer et al. (1987),
Leila, Yassin, and Palmer (1985), and Palmer, Yassin, and Leila (1985) studies. Comparing
the results to the 1983 data itself, rather than the aggregate results, was not possible. Many
visits to Al Ahram Computing Center and contacts with Professor Palmer revealed that the
data were stored on 9-track tapes that did not survive storage for 15 years. The unavailability
of the 1983 data also placed limitation on the statistical approaches that can be adopted by
the study. Nevertheless, comparing my survey with the 1983 aggregate survey results will
still provide a comparative and theoretical perspective that is not possible in the initial analysis
by allowing for an assessment of the impact of reform on administrative problems. A
comparative approach can also illustrate any change in bureaucratic attitudes, new strengths,
solved problems, persistence of the problems, or new problems. Comparison is a useﬁrl
indicator for the degree of inﬂuence that the external agent had over common administrative

problems. Overall comparisons to the 19805 can provide theoretical consistency and a

226

 

moving picture of the empirical results in the form of trends rather than a simple snap shot of
the status quo in 1998.80
Group-Dynamics Scale

The group-dynamics scale is a set of 16 items that were used by Al-Ahram’s (1983)
survey and reported by Palmer et al. (1989) study through asking bureaucrats about their
work environment to assess their group performance norms. The same questions were also
adopted by this study’s survey for comparison purposes and due to the fact that group
environment directly inﬂuences a bureaucrat’s productivity and the administrative capacity.
To overcome the bias problem in evaluating one’s own performance, bureaucrats were asked
to evaluate their peers rather than themselves. It is a threat to internal validity to ask
bureaucrats to incriminate themselves and acknowledge low levels of performance. Peer
evaluations are presented in the context of the group dynamics scale to indicate problems that
characterize public administration at GOGCWS. The weighted scores for each item listed in

Table 7.1 range from 0 to 100, with scores over 50 indicate at least adequate work.

 

'° For the sake of consistency in comparisons, the same categories of 1983's “group-dynamics scale” were used
in the survey. This was the case with other measures used in the survey including bureaucratic ﬂexibility,
vertical communications, bureaucratic innovation, bureaucratic relationship with the public, sources of
information. My decision was to categorize the results in way consistent with the categories reported by
Palmer et a1. (1989), Palmer, Leila, and Yassin (1988), Palmer et al. (1987), Leila, Yassin, and Palmer

(1985), and Palmer, Yassin, and Leila (1985) studies.

227

.026 $2 05 00 lax—£28205 05 o. 030 07:32. 8: 03>» $3000 05 .3 9500. 303.55 0050:..—
.ccﬁcsaEcnc act. 30:: 2 3020. m2. .3 EEC—cs can x33. 32 05 .3 e00: 033 9050:. if. $0380.05 :00.w<.. ._o 3303 0;. 00.3. :0>_w :00...
02E 8050300 ..00._w< bwcotm: 95 CE USN o 503.02 009:: 0.000 05. 002800. 0.: 0o :eEe—cn 03E? .0 .3 “005890 0003 3500 0.30m 05. *

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0% we 3 .m 2258 232. 5:8 .2
xdm mm md me 2.25% 0:53 9 :05: .m—
n. _ m ac we mm 258620 wczso0x0 E 03:85 .3
c.wm No as mm 37: 00—3 8 w:::>> .m—
eév we v.2 mm 030600 .2
m._v on ow mm 820200 use 09.05 2032 3:09:— ._ _
3% we a. z. E as a: 2< .E
w.mm mm _.m 2 8:028 E0000 2 wEEB .0
0.3. E. we cm 5:303 2&0; 003000 0:25 .w
Q3. mm Wm cm $56200 02.0.5300 o. 0>_mcomm0m H
Wmm we mew pm .00300 :23 0:02; 50:. .0
WC we 5m em 34:030.: bros...“ 0:03.00 .m
3810 we v.3 me 57:0 85:53:??? 30: E000< .v
2% ow cw. we 0050 :03 5:3 08:0; 0:0 :0QO .m
we. 3 no om £2: 22. 382 .m
fem. mo 0.xm cc Ba: 0:03 .—
Aeev 00aw< *00e0m Gav 000w< *0.50m
Emir—i @0233?» 39.3% 103303
wee— mae—

 

 

 

 

 

_ 3:050:03 9.23:8
05 :33 303005 rap—ohm .5 605005 .000w< .000“; bw—Sbmv :9» 0050:? 9:000:05 .3 .53 4.53 :9» 03:32.05 0.:
0.0230 0000:. .9.an £5 E .0:0E:e.._>:0 :09: m:— 3 30:03.5 ﬂ 003000.30 mm: 0.0200 8 5:30 0.3.8.5002. a m0ECOEem

0.00m m0_50:.mﬂ-n:e._w muaa0=a00=m
E. 02%?—

228

Two indicators from the sixteen-item group-dynamics questions that ask bureaucrats
to describe the work environment in which they operate were used to evaluate bureaucratic
productivity.“1 The two indicators measure productivity by asking the respondents if (1) that
most of their peers worked hard and (10) that most of their peers were not lazy. Those two
items should provide a reliable response because bureaucrats are not asked to judge or
criticize themselves. Also, to further assure the reliability of the answers, both items appear
at alternate ends of the group-dynamics scale to avoid strategic bias and to test for reliability
of responses. Comparison between 1983 and 1998 did not yield conclusive results. While
more bureaucrats at GOGCWS, in terms ofboth scale and percentage, believe that their peers
work hard, a lower percentage of them believe that their peers are not lazy.

To evaluate bureaucratic ﬂexibility, ﬁve items from the group-dynamics were used.
These items are (4) willingness to accept new responsibility, (5) delegate authority frequently,
(9) willingness to accept conﬂict, (l3) willingness to take risk, and (14) ﬂexibility in executing
decisions."2 The assumption is that reluctance of bureaucrats to assume responsibility
reinforces excessive centralization of authority at the senior level. Overloading officials with
small details robs them of time and energy to be devoted to important matters such as reform.
Bureaucrats who avoid responsibility tend to send all matters, even small ones, to their

supervisor for clearance. Further, avoidance of responsibility forces the public to search for

 

8' A second measure of productivity is based upon sources of professional information as presented in Table
7.12.

’2 A second measure of ﬂexibility based on the tendencies of bureaucrats to hide behind rules and regulations
of Egypt’s rigid bureaucratic codes is presented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. A third measure of bureaucratic
ﬂexibility is based on the ability of bureaucracies to operate ﬂexibly in an effective manner based on good
vertical communication as presented in Tables 7 .4 and 7.5.

229

answers and solutions for their problems at the senior level. Results ﬁ'om Table 7.1 show a
signiﬁcant improvement in the ﬁve items when compared with 1983. More bureaucrats at the
GOGCWS, in terms of both percent and scale, believe that their peers are ﬂexible by
accepting responsibility, delegating authority, accepting conﬂict, taking risk, and executing
decisions.

Innovation was reﬂected in one item from the peer evaluations of groupodynamics
items, namely, (2) openness to new ideas.” Results show that more bureaucrats at
GOGCWS, in terms of both percent and scale, are conﬁdent in their peers innovative
capacity. The degree of improvement over 1983 is remarkable as 49.2 percent in 1998
strongly agree that their peers work hard versus 9.3 percent only in 1983.

To evaluate the gap between bureaucrats and the public, the analysis used four items
from the peer evaluations of group-dynamics items. These items are: (6) treat the public with
respect, (8) are more concerned with public service than job security, (15) listen to public
opinions, and (16) solicit public opinions. The assumption is that the more the public trusts,
respects, and cooperates with the bureaucracy, the easier it is for the bureaucracy to
accomplish the reform goals.“ The comparison of results with 1983's scale and percent of
bureaucrats’ responses revealed also signiﬁcant improvement in all four items. For example,

more than half the respondents in 1998 strongly agree that their peers treat the public with

 

‘3 A second measure of innovation is based on bureaucrats’ disposition to challenge social practices and
traditions that pose an obstacle to reform as presented in Table 7 .6. A third measure is based on bureaucrats’
innovativeness and creativity in their everyday decision-making strategies as presented in Table 7.7.

u A second measure to evaluate the gap is bureaucrats’ self-perceptions of their social status and of the
Egyptian public is presented in Tables 7.8 and 7.9.

230

 

respect versus 26.5 only in 1983. Also more than half the respondents at GOGCWS strongly
agree that their peers listen to public opinions as opposed to 9.3 percent only in 1983.

Finally, improvements were also revealed in the remaining areas covered in Table 7.1.
More than half of the respondents at GOGCWS strongly believe that their peers are (3) open
and honest with each other versus 18 percent only in 1983. When asked about their peers’
(7) responsiveness to constructive criticism, 34.9 percent in 1998 strongly agreed versus 8.5
percent only in 1983. Bureaucrats at GOGCWS were also increasingly (l l) impartial toward
friends and relatives and (12) decisive in 1998 than 1983 as 41 .3 and 44.4 percent strongly
agreed that their peers have these positive characteristics versus 8.9 and 10.4 percent
respectively in 1983.

When results are compared to the earlier survey, improvements are in 15 of the 16
items of the group-dynamics scale. Improvements, however, should not be viewed as an end
to administrative problems. Results must be tempered with the ﬁnding that only four of the
items reached the 50 percent threshold. This is more of a problem when considering the
argument made by Palmer, Leila, and Yassin (1988) when they analyzed the 1983 data that
bureaucrats are often reluctant to criticize their peers.

In addition, some bureaucrats did not answer in reference to their performance but
rather to other administrative problems such as low wages or overstaﬂing. One of the
respondents notes on the questionnaire that “the organization is getting its money worth from
the workers.” It is not that bureaucrats are lazy or dodge responsibility, but their
performance meets the poor salaries and ineffective incentive structure. Also, bureaucrats

could be evaluating themselves in reference to the physical environment in their work. For

231

example, the performance of two or more bureaucrats who share one desk is perceived
satisfactory at low levels. On the other hand, one cannot completely dismiss the
improvements of results revealed by the group-dynamics scale. Given the recent organization
history of GOGCWS reviewed in Chapter Six, one can only attribute these improvements to
Black and Veatch’s efforts. However, the short comings and criticisms leveled at the method
of group-dynamics scale warrants further detailed and independent testing of each item in the
scale.
Bureaucratic Flexibility

Rules and regulations are often a sword against reform, supervisors, and the public
as they allow bureaucrats to hide behind the rigidity and complexity of bureaucratic codes.
The assumption is that any steps in the reform process that do not ﬁt a clearly stated
regulation will be either ignored or set aside for further adjustment of the rules that would
normally take years. Four items were employed in the survey to test the hypothesis that
bureaucrats were prone to this administrative problem and to provide a clear assessment of
to what extent administrative reform was successﬁil in eliminating the problem of hiding
behind rules in order to avoid meeting the refonn’s demands. The questions and responses

are presented in Table 7.2.

232

Figure 7.2
Bureaucratic Flexibility: Trade-off Between Rules and Efﬁciency

If the efﬁciency of your unit is slowed by red tape and your supervisor asks you to
bend the regulations for the sake of greater efficiency, what would you do?

 

Percent

Behavior 1983 1998

 

 

Seek the support of others in trying to follow the rules as they are written 17.5 12.7

 

Quietly follow the rules in spite of your supervisor’s request 20.6 50.8

 

Only under the condition that he accepts the responsibility for the changes 48.6 28.6

 

 

 

 

 

Accept your supervisor’s request without comment 12.0 7.9

 

The four items in Table 7.2 can be viewed as a continuum with the option of seeking
the support of others in order not to bend the rules on the rigid end of the continuum and the
option of accepting the supervisor’s request without comment at the ﬂexible end of the
continuum. With that picture in mind, results from Table 7.2 show that bureaucrats at
GOGCWS are moving towards the rigid end of the continuum when compared to 1983.
More than 50 percent would just ignore the leader’s demands to bend existing rules for the
sake of greater ﬂexibility and only 8 percent are willing to make adjustments without
comment. This is versus 20.6 percent and 12 percent for 1983 respectively.

These results reﬂect the bureaucrats’ tendency toward rigidity and avoiding
responsibility required by reform. Black and Veatch was unable to introduce bureaucratic
ﬂexibility or improve bureaucrats’ resistance to bend the rules for the sake of efﬁciency. One
can argue that rigidity is common behavior at GOGCWS due to bureaucrats’ fear of losing

their government job in a society with a high unemployment rate. Table 7.3 ﬁirther examines

233

the way that bureaucrats handle a difference in opinion in order to conﬁrm this conclusion
about bureaucratic inﬂexibility at GOGCWS.

Table 7.3
Bureaucratic Flexibility: Disagreement with Supervisors

Ifyou disagree with supervisor on the best way to handle a problem, what would
you do?

 

 

 

 

Percent
Behavior 1983 1998
Seek support for your position from other ofﬁcials 11.6 25.4
Quietly but ﬁrmly stick to your solution 3.5 22.2

 

Try to convince him of your point of view, but follow his solution 80.9 50.8

 

Accept his solution without comment 3.2 1.6

Other ’ 0.8 0.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

The four items in Table 7.3 can be viewed also as a continuum with the option of
seeking the support of ofﬁcials against supervisor on the rigid end of the continuum and the
option of accepting solutions without comment at the ﬂexible end of the continuum. With
that picture in mind, results from Table 7.3 conﬁrm the administrative problem ofbureaucratic
inﬂexibility at GOGCWS because bureaucrats are moving towards the rigid end of the
continuum when compared to 1983. On the rigid end of the continuum, about 25 percent of
the respondents at GOGCWS would seek support of other ofﬁcials against their supervisor
for the sake of opinion versus 12 percent in 1983. Also 22 percent would ﬁrmly stick their
solution against their supervisor in 1998 as opposed to 4 percent only in 1983. On the
ﬂexible end of the continuum, results also point to the problem of inﬂexibility. About 51

percent of the respondents at GOGCWS would follow their supervisors’ solutions with some

234

argument versus 81 percent in 1983. Finally, fewer of the respondents would just accept their
supervisors’ solutions as 1 .6 percent would choose this route at GOGCWS versus 3 .2 percent
in 1983.

Put together, results from Tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate that inﬂexibility and rigidity
inside GOGCWS. This type of rigidity would have required from Black and Veatch more
than structural reform of the organization’s chart. The argument can be made that rigidity
and inﬂexibility are on the rise due to the increased sense of marginalization among
bureaucrats. This feeling is associated with an increased public labor force in the Egyptian
society. While Table 7.1 reveals that bureaucrats view their peers as ﬂexible, the fact is that
when a worker feels that he is central to an issue he/she will prefer to move towards the
inﬂexible end of the continuum.

Other reasons also contribute to the increasing rigidity. In addition to the increasing
labor force and an associated sense of marginalization, assigning graduates to positions not
consistent with their educational background, or insufﬁcient education in other cases, and fear
of responsibility that may cause losing a public job all make bureaucrats more rigid. This
problem requires intensive training with an emphasis on the ability to ﬂexibly execute a wide
range of responsibilities and to objectively and professionally handle conﬂict in both rules and

opinion."

 

3’ Workers of Black and Veatch at GOGCWS were still using the terms “us” and “them” during our
conversations in referring to both sides of the reform equation. The existence of such a gap after ten years
of on-site cooperation between both sides suggests the ineffectiveness of the external agent’s training efforts
at GOGCWS. This is due to the lack of assimilation between the trainer and the trainee caused by the absent
of leaders associated with Black and Veatch to support the reform task.

235

Success of reformers in changing the bureaucrats’ behavior also hinges on studying
the history and culture of recipient country as recommended by the literature review in
Chapter Two. In the case of GOGCWS it seems to be lack of consideration on behalf of
Black and Veatch in studying the history and culture of Egyptian bureaucrats. Conversations
with Black and Veatch’s team did not indicate that they had taken into consideration the
cultural or social realities that shape the behavior of bureaucrats. For example, managers at
are still out-spoken about their Nasseriet ideology and consider water next to a public good
when asked about pricing strategies.

Vertical Communications

With the absence of technology at GOGCWS, and in most public organizations in
Egypt, communication between the leader as the main decision maker and bureaucrats as
policy implementors is of crucial importance for an enhanced administrative capacity.
Administrative capacity is enhanced by the ability of bureaucrats to provide, receive, and
process information in an effective manner. The assumption behind examining the efficiency
of vertical communication at GOGCWS is that without adequate vertical ﬂow of information,
reform will be difﬁcult to implement and coordination will be absent between workers and
units. The organizational structure aspect of communication examined in Chapter Six could
not assess this behavioral aspect. Results of the questionnaire on the other hand would

provide an indication about the level of rigidity and ﬂexibility in the leader-bureaucrat vertical

236

relationship. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present the results of measuring the vertical ﬂow of

information between supervisors and bureaucrats.“

Table 7.4
Vertical Communications: Official Matters

How often do you discuss ofﬁcial matters with your immediate supervisor?

Frequency 1983 1998

 

 

Rarely 6.8 28.6

 

Occasionally 46.0 39.7

 

Frequently 27.0 14.3

 

Daily 20.3 17.5

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7.5
Vertical Communications: Informal Matters

How often do you discuss informal or personal matters with your immediate
supervisor?

 

Frequency 1983 1998

 

Never 74.] 46.0

 

Occasionally 23.8 46.0

 

Frequently l .4 3 .2

 

 

 

 

 

Daily 0.8 4.8

 

 

3‘ “Rarely” in Table 7.4 and “Never” in Table 7.5 were used by the 1983 survey. Such inconsistency between
the labels was adopted by this study in order to allow for comparison with responses of the GOGCWS’s
bureaucrats. The decision was to use the same labels used in the 1983 Al-Ahram’s survey.

237

Results from Tables 7.4 indicate a lack in formal communication at GOGCWS that
reinforces centralization of deci sion making. More bureaucrats do not discuss ofﬁcial matters
with their immediate supervisor than in the 19803. For example, 29 percent rarely hold such
conversations with their supervisor as opposed to 7 percent in 1983. Also fewer bureaucrats
at GOGCWS, 18 percent, discuss oﬁicial matters with their supervisor on daily basis than in
1983, 20 percent. The results from the 1980s in Table 7.5 portray the manager as somewhat
of a tyrant where about 75 percent never discussed informal matters with him. At GOGCWS
in the 19903, in comparison, results show improvement but still point to a picture of a wide
gap between the manager and subordinates as 46 percent never or occasionally consult him
on informal matters.

As suggested by the literature review in Chapter Two, administrative reform efforts
at GOGCWS should attempt to move bureaucrats’ behavior towards the informal end of the
continuum. Personalizing the vertical relation would allow leaders to manage by informal
techniques such as persuasion and informal motivational and supervisory mechanisms rather
than by rigid authority. Such an improvement would diminish the image of dictator portrayed
for supervisors and enhance the informal aspect of vertical communications. Thus, it is
suggested to open the door for leadership to reform the rigidity known to hinder the
administrative capacity.

Bureaucratic Innovation

Bureaucratic innovation is the willingness of bureaucrats to develop and implement

new and different approaches and provide viable policies to the administrative and social

problems that face the society (Thompson, 1969). Non-innovation, however, is one of the

238

problems that has traditionally characterized the Egyptian bureaucracy (Palmer et al., 1989).
It was essential, therefore, to measure bureaucrats’ innovation capacity and provide empirical
assessment of their role in economic and social development. To evaluate the innovative
capacity, questions were asked to evaluate bureaucrats’ attitudes toward challenging social
and economic practices that can pose an obstacle to sustainable development. The
assumption behind this measure, presented in Table 7.6, is that a challenge of traditions and
practices is a dimension of innovation and the more bureaucrats at GOGCWS are receptive

for challenge, the more likely they are to administrative support reform and support

development.
Table 7.6 (A - E)
Bureaucrats Predisposition Toward Social Innovation.
A. It is best to cancel or change programs, such as increasing water tariff, that

could cause social conflict.
| I 1983 1998 I
I Agree I 89.8% 55.6%]
I Disagree I 10.2% 44.4%J

 

 

 

 

 

B. Social change should not be instituted at the expense of traditional values.
I 1983 I 1998 I

Agree I 70.5% | 69.8% I

Disgree I 29.5% I 30.2% I

 

 

 

 

 

C. Economic development should be pursued even if it means hardship for the
majority of the people.

I I 1983 I 1998 |

I Agree I 50.4% [66.7% |

[Disagree I 49.6% | 33.3% I

 

 

 

 

239

D. We have tried too hard to copy the developmental programs of the West
without worrying about our own heritage.

 

I 1983 I 1998 I
Aggee I62.5% I 39.7% I
DisagreeI 37.5% I 60.3% I

 

 

 

 

E. Pursuing development too rapidly rLight be worse than developing too slowly.
I 1983 I 1998 I

Agree I74.1% I 74.6% I

Disagree I 25.9% I 25.4% I

 

 

 

 

 

Results reported in Table 7 .6 reﬂect bureaucrats’ predisposition to challenge existing
social values. They reﬂect a variety of considerations that might deter bureaucrats ﬁ'om taking
an assertive and innovative posture in their decision making. An overall improvement in
behavior can be observed in items 7.6.A, 7.6.C, and 7.6.D. Fewer bureaucrats, 56 percent,
in 1998 believe that development programs should be canceled if causing social conﬂict
versus 90 percent in 1983. Also more bureaucrats, 67 percent, in 1998 prefer pursuing
economic development regardless of hardship of the people versus 50 percent in 1983.
Finally, fewer bureaucrats, 40 percent, in 1998 agree with the notion that society is copying
development programs of the West without factoring in its own heritage as opposed to 62
percent in 1983.

Improvement in these items reﬂects a more objective concern in bureaucrats’ behavior
for sensitive policies that may threaten social harmony or impose hardship on the people. One
can argue that the long-term involvement of foreign donors in general, and the USAID in
particular, made bureaucrats more willing to accept social conﬂict in favor of progressive

policies for the sake of economic development. Bureaucrats at GOGCWS are becoming to

240

realize that development is possible with some short-term sacriﬁces instead of the reluctance
to change that characterized Egypt’s civil service for decades. The credit for this positive
parameter does not only belong to Black and Veatch but to the USAID and other external
agents in Egypt as well because it changed bureaucrats’ view of development in society as a
whole.

Twenty-ﬁve years of American input in all sectors of society seems to have had an
effect on bureaucrats’ agreement with the statement that Egypt has tried too hard to copy the
developmental programs of the West without worrying about our own heritage. As
mentioned in Chapter Five, the Western style of living for Egyptians is one direct
consequence oflong-term ﬁnancial dependence on the West. Commercials and advertisement
about aﬁluent style of living and consumption dominate the government controlled media.
This led bureaucrats to increasingly view development efforts surrounding them as something
normal opposed to results of the 19808 when the Westemizing of society was just starting
after three decades of a Soviet-led society.

These results do not necessarily reﬂect bureaucrats’ opinion about the water services.
One manager notes that:

I was raised in the Nasseriet era where the government was responsible for the

welfare of its people. The price of water should not be touched. How can

poor people afford any price increase? More important, making water

affordable means preserving the public’s good health. The alternative for the

organization’s water is dirty water through vendors and polluted streams.

What we collect from the wealthy for a price increase, we will spend on the

poor for medical care. Laws attempt to do this mistake have been on the
shelves here for years but they would do more harm than good.

241

On the other hand, item 763 that directly asked about traditional values revealed the
persistence of bureaucrats’ preferences to conserve cultural norms in the face of change and
modernization. About 70 percent for both 1998 and 1983 hold social traditions into higher
standing. Such a parameter suggests that bureaucrats are less likely to accept new ideas and
programs if the external agent emphasizes the possibility of sacriﬁcing social mores. Finally,
item 7.6.E also suggests that bureaucrats still prefer incremental behavior in adopting
development polices rather than accelerating implementation: about 75 percent for both 1998
and 1983 prefer incremental development strategies. This die-hard characteristic of
bureaucrats’ behavior is difﬁcult to change in developed as well as underdeveloped societies.

Overall, the degree of cultural and social changes brought by external agents over the
years inﬂuenced society to a large extent to include bureaucrats’ personal attitude toward
challenging practices that pose an obstacle to sustainable development. The extent to which
administrative reform efforts have been successﬁrl in inﬂuencing bureaucrats’ level of
innovation and professionalism in everyday decision-making at GOGCWS, however, was
assessed through a different set of questions presented in Table 7.7.

Bureaucratic Decision-making

Table 7 .7 reports the results of measuring the level of professionalism in bureaucrats’

decision-making behavior through questions about their capacity to have new, ﬂexible, and

efﬁcient solutions to daily problems.

242

Table 7.7 (A - E)
Bureaucratic Decision Making Behavior

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. Decision should stress harmony in the work group
Year Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
1983 65.4% 33.3% 1.3% 0.0%
1998 79.4% 17.5% 1.6% 1.6%
It is probably best to consult with one’s supervisor before making even small
decisions.
Year Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
1983 31.3% 58.3% 9.5% 0.9%
1998 33.3% 33.3% 27.0% 6.3%
One should follow the rules in order to get thiggs done effectively.
Year Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
1983 36.7% 56.4% 6.1% 0.8%
1998 71.4% 23.8% 4.8% 0.0%
In Mg new decisions, it is probably best to see what was done in the past.
Year Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
1983 42.8% 53.4% 2.8% 1.0%
1998 46.0% 34.9% 14.3% 4.8%
It is better to delay decisions than to risk making a mistake.
Year Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
1983 27.2% 47.3% 20.0% 5.5%
1998 47.6% 31.7% 19.0% 1.6%

 

 

 

 

 

 

243

 

 

 

 

 

In Table 7.7, bureaucrats at GOGCWS were asked ﬁve questions about their daily
decision-making practices. Results suggest low levels of skills in the decision-making
behavior. Item 773 was easy to observe by visiting any of the managers ofﬁces. The
managers’ ofﬁces at Collections, Subscriptions, Water Meters Departments are crowded with
customers who did not try the help of bureaucrats at the windows or were sent to the
managers directly by bureaucrats.

In all ﬁve items, bureaucrats increasingly choose the rigid option by strongly agreeing
with all the questions. It appears that administrative reform efforts at GOGCWS by Black
and Veatch were unable to address this problem. Given that all questions were
unidimensional, a decision-making scale was then used to ﬁirther test this conclusion. The
Decision-Making Scale presented in Table 7.8 is a simple additive measure based on
aggregating the 1998 data used in Tables 7.7. Bureaucrats who answered most items with
either “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” were classiﬁed in the scale as less-ﬂexible in their
decision-making behavior, moderate if answered most questions with “Disagree,” and ﬁnally
highly ﬂexible if they answered most questions by “Strongly Disagree.” Using these criteria,
it still appears that administrative reform was not able to boost the professional decision

making behavior at GOGCWS as illustrated in Table 7.8.

244

Table 7.8
Additive Decision-Making Scale

 

 

 

 

 

Level of Flexibility 1983 1998
Low 86.3 92. 1
Moderate 13.5 7.9
High 0.3 0.0

 

 

 

 

Bureaucrats’ inclination toward more rigidity and inﬂexibility in decision-making in
Tables 7 .7 and 7. 8 can be explained by the inability of USAID’s administrative reform eﬁ’orts
at GOGCWS to increase the level of professionalism in bureaucrats decision-making
behavior. This is a negative parameter in the assessment of administrative refonn’s success
in creating elements within GOGCWS that are capable of producing new and innovative
solutions to different problems. Therefore, while bureaucrats’ attitudes towards social and
economic development have improved in Table 7.6 by the inﬂuence of long-time Western
external agents in society, professionalism in decision making inﬂuenced by the on-site
external agent’s contractor did not yield the same positive results in Table 7.7.
Bureaucratic Relationship with the Public

Improving the bureaucrats’ relationship with the public at GOGCWS is an important
component of administrative reform aiming at enhancing bureaucratic capacity. The level of
cooperation and trust between the bureaucracy and the public is directly linked to the
enhancement of bureaucratic capacity through positively inﬂuencing bureaucratic morale and

increasing their productivity. Further, administrative reform can do little to increase

245

bureaucrats’ perception of themselves as members of a high-status profession without public
support. This component of administrative reform is also important because bureaucrats’
status had a direct inﬂuence on their morale and consequently on the level of service they
would provide to the public. Feeling of status deprivation will not only undermine morale but
will create bureaucratic negativism toward the goals and the public.

Two items in the questionnaire were presented to assess the self-perceived social
status of Egyptian bureaucrats. The ﬁrst item in Table 7 .9 asked respondents to express their
level of agreement with the statement that “the public respects civil servants.” The second
item in Table 7.10 asked respondents to assess the statement that “the public appreciates the
efforts of civil servants.” The results of both items are presented in their respective tables

below.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7.9
The Public Respect of Egyptian Bureaucrats

1983 1998
Weighted Score“ 44 76
Strongly Agree 17.4% 42.9%
Agree“ — 34.9%
Disagree — l 5.9%
Strongly Disagree — 6.3%

 

 

 

 

 

‘Weighted scores represent a combination of “agree” and “strongly agree” responses in which the
“strongly agree” responses have received twice the weight of “agree” responses.
“Results ﬁom 1983 are not available for comparison.

246

Table 7.10
The Public Appreciation of Egyptian Bureaucrats’ Efforts

 

 

 

 

 

 

1983 1998
Weighted Score" 22 67
Strongly Agree 7.2% 33.3%
Agree“ — 39.7%
Disagree — 19.0%
Strongly Disagree — 7.9%

 

 

 

 

 

*Weighted scores represent a combination of “agree” and “strongly agree” responses in which the
“strongly agree” responses have received twice the weight of “agree” responses.

Collectively, results indicate signiﬁcant improvement ﬁ'om the relatively low
assessment of bureaucratic status in the 19808. While 17 percent of the respondents did
strongly agree with the statement that the public respects civil servants in the 1983, 42.9
percent did strongly agree in 1998. Also the 7 .2 percent that felt that the efforts of the
bureaucracy were appreciated by the public increased to 33.3 percent in 1998. While this is
a signiﬁcant improvement from the 19808, these ﬁgures are still low in a society that heavily
relies on bureaucracy in all of its aspects.

Two more items were presented in the questionnaire to examine the negativism
toward the public and to assess public/bureaucratic interaction. First, honesty in dealing with
the bureaucracy, and second, pressures for special treatment. The results of these two items
appear in Tables 7.11 and 7.12. Assessments of public honesty in dealing with bureaucracy
moved to the positive side by increasing from 10 percent to almost 40 percent. On the other

hand, no improvement is in the pervasive problem of the public desire to acquire special

247

treatment. This is expected because nepotism and favoritism, which are know to disrupt the

working environment, are so common till they became part of the Egyptian culture.

Table 7.11
Public Honesty in Dealing with Egyptian Bureaucracy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1983 1998
Weighted Score“ 29 70
Strongly Agree 10.4% 39.7%
Agree" -— 31.7%
Disagree — 22.2%
Strongly Disagree -— 6.3%

 

 

 

 

*Weighted scores represent a combination of “agree” and “strongly agree” responses in which the
“strongly agree” responses have received twice the weight of “agree” responses.
“Results from 1983 are not available for comparison.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7.12
Public Attempts to Pull Strings and Get Special Treatment

1983 1998
Weighted Score“ 54 53
Strongly Agree 35.5% 27.0%
Agree" — 30.2%
Disagree — 22.2%
Strongly Disagree — 20.6%

 

 

 

 

 

*Weighted scores represent a combination of “agree” and “strongly agree” responses in which the
“strongly agree” responses have received twice the weight of “agree” responses.
"Results from 1983 are not available for comparison.

Overall, the four questions aiming at evaluating the relationship between bureaucrats

and the public at GOGCWS point to an improvement from the 1980s and, accordingly, from

248

acute feelings of status deprivation. This improvement seems to support the notion that the
long-term presence of external agents in every sector of the society led to enhancing many
services and therefore, enhancing the relation between bureaucrats and the public. The public
is becoming less critical of bureaucrats and gives them credit for improving public services.

The task of Black and Veatch on that front, however, cannot be seen as completely
successﬁrl for many reasons. First, three respondents, including one manager, noted on the
questionnaire their Opinion that people treat them with respect only because they want their
papers done. Second, two ﬁst ﬁghts were witnessed in one week during data collection at
GOGCWS between bureaucrats and the public due to disagreement on fees based on
estimates for new connections. Third, the Customer Service Department at GOGCWS,
established by Black and Veatch, is a hidden, hard to ﬁnd, room with no signs to identify.
This room did not have any customers during the ﬁeld work despite the crowds of public in
the organization. Conversations with respondents at that department give the impression that
the public is not welcomed. As one worker puts it “customers are the enemy, they only come
to us with problems and cursing.” Finally, the reform strategy of Black and Veatch only
included establishing the department for customer service and occasional training over the
period of ten years (U SAID, 1998).
Sources of Information

The ﬁnal measure used in the questionnaire to assess the bureaucratic capacity and the
impact of administrative reform was based upon sources of professional information. It is
assumed that bureaucrats who took the time and effort to consult professional materials in the

execution of their job responsibilities are more productive than individuals who rely upon

249

other sources of information. Professional sources of information are also assumed to assist

in developing the bureaucrats’ administrative capacity. The results of this measure are

reported in Table 7.13.

Table 7.13
Sources of Information

What sources of information do jou ﬁnd most useful for your 'ob?
Source of Information 1983 1998

Media 5.9 53.9

 

 

 

Professional Materials/Rules and Manuals 34.3 14.3

 

 

 

 

Associations 2.6 1 1. 1
Friends/Relatives/Notables 14. 5 l .6
Colleagues 34.1 4.8
Boss 8.6 14.3

 

 

 

 

 

Results in Table 7.13 about sources of information that bureaucrats ﬁnd most useful
in shaping their professional decisions are unprecedented. Signiﬁcantly more bureaucrats are
relying on the media for their primary source of administrative information and fewer
bureaucrats are relying on professional materials as a primary source of information. More
than 50 percent of bureaucrats in 1998 rely on the media as their primary source of
information versus only 6 percent in 1983. This parameter supports the conclusion that the
external agent’s effect on society as a whole explains improvements in scores about
bureaucrats’ behavior in some areas and not others. In 1983, the GOE had only two

govemment-controlled TV channels and about four radio channels. In 1998, Egyptians are

250

overwhelmed by western style media and sources of information ran by the GOE. The
government now runs more than 10 TV channels, numerous radio stations, and its own
satellite with hundreds of channels. Such changes in the media and its impact on bureaucrats
would have not come about without external agents political and economic interest in Egypt.
Bureaucrats today have a positive attitude about development in society but are more rigid
about the organizational development. They are increasingly becoming consumers of the
media and, therefore, their culture is more linked to the society. This cultural link also
explains the adherence to traditional social values if they interfere with development.

Finally, results ﬁom Table 7.13 show that professional materials and manuals were
also used by fewer bureaucrats in 1998 as only 14 percent utilized them as a source of
information versus 34 percent in 1983. Also, fewer bureaucrats are relying on their
colleagues as sources of information as 4.8 percent do in 1998 versus 34.1 in 1983. This
could be an indicator of a diminishing in horizontal communication inside the organization.

Summary of Results

A summary table is helpﬁil due to the unavailability of the 1983 data for statistical
testing. Table 7.14 is presented below with the purpose of making ﬁnal assessments about
both the overall differences in results from 1983 and the overall level of administrative

capacity.

251

Table 7.14
Summary of Survey Results

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

More More
Than 1983 Than 50%

Bureaucratic Flexibility

Bend the Rules for the Sake of Efﬁcierg - -

Flexibility in Handling Difference in (pinion - +
Vertical Communications

Ofﬁcial - -

Informal + -
Bureaucratic Innovation

Positivism Toward Social and Economic Development + -
Bureaucratic Decision-makinL

Professionalism in Decision-making + -
Bureaucratic Relationship with the Public

Positive Relationship with the Public + -

 

 

Sources of Information

 

 

Official and Professional Sources

 

 

 

Bureaucratic ﬂexibility in Table 7.14 is assessed based on bureaucrats’ willingness to

bend the rules and their ﬂexibility in handling conﬂicts in opinion. Bureaucrats’ preference

to resist bending the rules for the sake of efﬁciency even with orders from their supervisors

is calculated from Table 7 .2 by adding up the ﬂexible end of the continuum. About 60.6

percent in 1983 accepted to bend the rules either with conditions or quietly versus only 36.5

in 1998. This is reﬂected in Table 7.14 by a decrease from 1983 results and by an inadequate

administrative capacity. The ﬂexibility of bureaucrats in handling conﬂicts in opinion against

their supervisors is calculated ﬁom Table 7.3 by adding up the ﬂexible end of the continuum.

252

 

About 84.1 percent in 1983 professionally handled the conﬂict in opinion with their
supervisor, either through convincing or without arguing, versus 52.4 percent in 1998. These
results are reﬂected in Table 7. 14 by a decrease ﬁ'om 1983 results and by an increase over the
50 percent level of administrative capacity.

Both ofﬁcial and informal ﬂexibility in vertical communication inside the organization
were assessed in Table 7.14. The degree of ﬂexibility in ofﬁcial communication was
calculated through bureaucrats’ frequency of discussing ofﬁcial matters with their immediate
supervisor by adding up the ﬂexible end of the continuum ﬁom Table 7.4. About 47.3
percent in 1983 discussed ofﬁcial matters with their supervisor either frequently or daily
versus 31.8 percent in 1998. These results are reﬂected in Table 7.14 by a decrease from
1983 results and an inadequate administrative capacity level. The degree of ﬂexibility in
informal communication was calculated through bureaucrats’ frequency of discussing informal
or personal matters with their immediate supervisor by adding up the ﬂexible end of the
continuum from Table 7.5. About 2.2 percent in 1983 discussed informal matters with their
supervisor either frequently or daily versus 8 percent in 1998. These results are reﬂected in
Table 7.14 by an increase from 1983 results and an inadequate administrative capacity level.

Bureaucratic innovation was assessed in Table 7.14 through measuring bureaucrats’
positivism toward social and economic development. Results ﬁom Tables 7.6 were averaged
to reﬂect the willingness of bureaucrats to implement new and different approaches to the
administrative and social problems facing society. On average 30.5 percent in 1983 disagreed
with canceling programs for the sake of social harmony, not instituting development at the

cost of traditional values, pursuing economic development if associated with hardship, the

253

notion that development programs hurt the country’s heritage, and that incremental approach
to development is the better route to take. This is versus an average of 38.7 percent in 1998
who disagreed with such statements. These results are reﬂected in Table 7.14 by an increase
from 1983 results and an inadequate administrative capacity level.

Bureaucratic decision-making capacity was assessed in Table 7. 14 through measuring
bureaucrats’ level of mastering professional decision-making behavior. Results from Table
7.7 were averaged to reﬂect the inﬂuence of harmony in the work group over decisions,
capacity to individually make small decisions, bureaucrats’ innovation and ﬂexibility in
decision making, and bureaucrats’ reluctance to take risks for the sake of efﬁciency. These
indicators are a reﬂection of bureaucratic capacity to have new and ﬂexible solutions to the
daily problems associated with reform and development. On average 1.6 percent strongly
disagreed, and 7.9 percent disagreed, in 1983 with statements that reﬂect unskilled decision
making behavior. This is versus an average of 2.9 percent who strongly disagreed, and 13.3
percent disagreed, in 1998. The increase in the average percentage for both categories,
strongly disagree and disagree, is reﬂected in Table 7. 14 by an increase from 1983 results and
an inadequate administrative capacity level below the 50 percent mark.

Bureaucratic relationship with the public was assessed in Table 7.14 through
evaluating how positive is the relationship. Results from Tables 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11 were
averaged to reﬂect the extent of bureaucrats agreeing with the notions that people respect and
appreciate civil servants and that people are honest in dealing with the bureaucracy. On
average 11.7 percent strongly agreed in 1983 with statements that reﬂect a positive

relationship with the public versus an average of 38.6 percent who strongly agreed in 1998

254

with such statements. The increase in the average percentage is reﬂected in Table 7.14 by an
increase from 1983 results and an inadequate administrative capacity.

Finally, bureaucrats’ capacity of utilizing professional information for their job was
assessed in Table 7.14 through identifying the share of ofﬁcial information sources. Results
ﬁom Table 7.13 were aggregated based on sources type to reflect how many of the
bureaucrats have chosen an ofﬁcial or professional source of information as their primary
preference. About 45.5 percent in 1983 relied on ofﬁcial and professional sources of
information in the form of professional materials, rules and manuals, associations, or bosses.
This is versus 39.7 percent in 1998 who chose the same ofﬁcial and professional sources.
These results are reﬂected in Table 7.14 by a decrease from 1983 results and an inadequate
administrative capacity level.

At this point a ﬁnal judgement can be made about the impact of Black and Veatch on
GOGCWS’ administrative capacity. Some, but not sufﬁcient, improvements have been made
in GOGCWS. This conclusion is illustrated in Table 7.14 by the many increases over 1983
results without enough increases over the 50 percent administrative capacity mark. '7 This
conclusion is consistent with the conclusion reached in Chapter Six after examining the impact
of Black and Veatch’s efforts on the GOGCWS’s organizational aspects. Not sufﬁcient

improvements have been made in the areas of organizational responsibility and performance,

 

‘7 The study faced the limitation of ﬁnding a comparable benchmark to assess the 1998 results. A lack of
similar bureaucracies, on both the local and the international levels, that have answered the same performance
questions made it difﬁcult for the study to use a comparable benchmark. The lack of homogeneity in the
compared bureaucracies and data is often a serious problem in benchmarking (Coe, 1999; Harty, 1999;
Kopcynski and Lombardo, 1999). Given this limitation, the study adopted the 50 percent level as an unbiased
objective benchmark for the 1998 performance data to provide only a roughly assessment of performance.
This is not an unusual approach in assessing performance because “most successful benchmarkers adapt
rather than adopt” (Ammons, 1999: 108).

255

relationship with other bureaucracies, organizational structure, human resources, training,
salaries, incentives, and revenues and ﬁnancial performance was revealed by the qualitative
analysis in Chapter Six.

The same explanation given for the insufﬁcient improvements in the organizational
aspects in Chapter Six applies for the quantitative analysis results reached in this chapter.
Problems persist due to the small-scale nature of administrative reform that does not put
enough authority in Black and Veatch’s hands to change bureaucratic rules and regulations.
Further, the role of contractors in administrative reform appears to be insufﬁcient in the
absence of reforming the Egyptian bureaucracy as a whole.

The Continuity and Reform Model in Light of Answers to the Research Questions

Despite the unsatisfactory results, improvements over the 1983 results have been
identiﬁed and some improvements in the organizational aspects were revealed by the
qualitative analysis in Chapter Six. Black and Veatch have been making on-site efforts within
the limits of authority given by the GOE and the USAID. Taking this limitation into
consideration, one can argue that improvements have been made within the contractor’s
capacity. Based on this conclusion, the Continuity and Reform model can be adjusted based
on the answers to the research questions. As shown in Figure 7. 1 the external agent indirectly
through the ﬁrm contracted for administrative reform, Black and Veatch, to establish some
improvements in the social and cultural aspects of bureaucracy. Forces of social and cultural
change, therefore, were placed on public administration in the model despite the absence of

political and economic forces by the USAID mission. The fact remains, however, that these

256

 

forces are not sufﬁcient without the GOE and the external agent delegating more authority

to the contractor to change rules and regulations.

257

Figure 7.1

Forces of Continuity and Reform Final Revised Model
Status Quo of Public Administration

Political
‘,

DUSAID

Economic
‘ _ _

:-‘=--External Agent

Social

 

 

~ ~>Contractors

Cultural

 

Forces of Change

 

 

Political

Cabinet<

Economic
‘ . L. __ .

Government of Egypt-

 

 

Social
4 I

 

Bureaucracy<—* -l
Cultural

 

e

Forces of Continuity

Intended Direction of Administrative Reform

 

258

As shown in Figure 7.1, the recipient country is supporting administrative reform by
devoting its cabinet, establishing a new Ministry of Administrative Development, and drafting
a large-scale reform plan for bureaucracy, due to domestic and international political forces.
The external agent, on the other hand, is riding on the forces of continuity due to the
domination of political and economic goals for the donating country and the small-scale
strategy of the consultant agent. This did not prevent changes in the social and cultural
aspects of bureaucrats’ behavior within the capacity of the contractor. In order to establish
signiﬁcant changes and to be completely successful in their task of administrative reform,
however, contractors should be delegated more authority by the GOE and the USAID.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to complement the qualitative analysis of the
organizational aspects in Chapter Six by a quantitative analysis to answer the research
question of whether the external agent’ s strategy of small-scale administrative reform through
consultants directly inﬂuences the social and cultural aspects of bureaucracy. Bureaucratic
areas examined were productivity, bureaucratic ﬂexibility, communication, innovation,
decision-making, relation with the public, and professional information. The method used
was surveying bureaucrats who deal with the public on daily basis at GOGCWS. As it is the
case with Chapter Six, the overall results are unsatisfactory, but some improvements were
made within the contractor’ s capacity. Black and Veatch capacity is limited by the small-scale
nature of its mission and the lack of authority to change bureaucratic rules and regulations.

Some of the most damaging constraints placed by the GOE and the USAID on Black

and Veatch’s efforts in administrative reform include: ﬁrst, micro-management of GOGCWS

259

by govemorates and ministries on matters of daily operations limits management’s ﬁeedom
to decide on matters that should be management privileges. Second, civil service manpower
regulations make it virtually impossible for GOGCWS to attract and retain qualiﬁed and
experienced management and staff and to motivate employees. Third, civil service
administrative regulations and practices (accounting procedures and’procurement rules) make
GOGCWS’s management cumbersome. Fourth, the tOp-down investment planning, project
selection, preparation, ﬁnancing and execution process is conducted without sufﬁcient
involvement of GOGCWS’s management. Fifth, restrictive government pricing and tariff
policies bound the GOGCWS’s sense of ﬁnancial responsibility and make the organization
dependent on sources of ﬁnancing largely outside of their control and often leave them
without the ﬁrnds needed for the proper operation and maintenance and expansion of systems
and facilities.

Black and Veatch had no authority to introduce a ﬁrnctional organizational structure
and adequate managerial, administrative and operating systems and procedure, attract and
retain sufﬁciently experienced and qualiﬁed personnel for all areas of utility management,
administration and operation, and implement higher rate levels and structures and collect
revenues sufﬁcient to attain an acceptable ﬁnancial performance. Consequently, the costly
administrative reform program carried out by Black and Veatch, has been successﬁrl only
within the contractor’s capacity. The lack of management autonomy and adequate resources
and severe restrictions on salaries imposed by civil service relations are to blame on the GOE

and the USAID rather than on the contractor.

260

Unique to the ﬁndings in this chapter, however, is the impact of Western external
agents’ inﬂuence on society as a whole including how bureaucrats perceive social and
economic development issues outside their organization. Bureaucrats increasingly have a
favorable opinion about the West’s developmental programs but not about administrative
reform. Finally, the answer to the research question was applied to the Continuity and
Reform model to modify its theoretical propositions based on the ﬁndings from Chapters Six
and Seven. Although insufﬁcient, the external agent is indirectly applying forces of change
on administrative reform. This is unlike the case of political and economic forces revealed
by Chapter Five where the external agent was found to be placing its forces in the direction

of continuity.

261

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This dissertation analyzes the likelihood of administrative reform in Third World
countries given political and economic constraints on both the country and the external agent
urging the changes. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis and using the Continuation
and Reform Model as the theoretical guide, I examined the successes and failures of the
USAID to encourage administrative reform in Egypt." I examined efforts and problems of
Black and Veatch, as a typical consultant ﬁrm contracted for on-site administrative reform,
at the General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. Both the USAID and Black and
Veatch were representative case studies of the external agents responsible for administrative
reform in developing countries. The chosen case study possessed the major elements needed
to both answer the research questions posed in the study and to test and modify the
Continuity and Reform model. First, the case of USAID/Egypt was initiated over 25 years
ago and is still developing with no signs of a conclusion. The longitudial nature of the
relationship allows me to examine the forces of continuity and reform over many political and
administrative variables in both Egypt and the U.S. Second, issues conceptualized in the
Continuity and Reform model, such as administrative factors and economic and political

forces, are signiﬁcant and dynamically related in the case of USAID/Egypt.

 

3" 1 made substantial revisions to Axinn’s (1988) and Axinn and Axinn’s (1997) Continuity and Change
Model by including the external agents’ role in the model, by including only variables that believed to be
signiﬁcant in the relationship between external agents and developing countries, and by systematieally
analyzing the interaction between these variables as forces of continuity and reform from the perspective of
both the external agents and the recipient governments.

262

In this ﬁnal chapter I will brieﬂy summarize the major ﬁndings of the dissertation in
relation to the research questions and the Continuity and Reform model, and the implications
and importance of the study to the ﬁeld of political science. I shall also suggest areas where
further research might be ﬁ‘uitful.

The dissertation addresses four research questions:

1. Can the GOE through its bureaucracy directly constrain the contractor’s efforts of
administrative reform?

2. Can the GOE through political and economic strategies indirectly constrain the
external agent’s reform efforts?

3. Can the external agent indirectly through political and economic forces positively
inﬂuence public administration?

4. Can the external agent through contractors directly inﬂuence the social and cultural
aspects of bureaucracy toward administrative reform?

My answers to these research questions were a product of both qualitative and
quantitative methodological approaches. The qualitative approach was composed of
face-to-face interviews and observations made with 36 persons in both public and private
organizations from both sides of the USAID/Egypt relation in both Cairo and Washington
(see Appendix A). On the external agent side, State Department and USAID ofﬁcials and
American management consultants associated with the USAID mission were asked to assess
the Egyptian bureaucracy and the role of the mission in administrative reform. Evaluation of

the external agent’s efforts depended also on reviewing government documents housed at the

263

USAID library in Arlington, Virginia, that was later moved to the new Ronald Regan building
in Washington, DC, and the USAID library in Cairo, Egypt.

The quantitative method included a survey of bureaucrats and managers at a typical
urban public utility in Cairo that has been subjected to USAID’s administrative reform over
the last decade. Results of the survey were then compared to data from the 1980s to assess
the impact of the external agent on administrative reform. Comparisons of the results
provided theoretical consistency and a moving picture of the empirical ﬁndings in the form
of trends rather than a simple snap shot of the status quo in 1998. Finally, I used census data,
government reports, and prior analysis where appropriate to examine such issues as the
quality of Egyptian bureaucracy and the General Organization for Greater Cairo Water
Supply. Funding for the dissertation research was provided by the Ford Foundation and the
American Research Center in Egypt.

Generalizability

The level of generalization of the study stems from the adopted model’s relation to
the problem and the method of inquiry used in gathering the data. The level of generalization
of this study is also emphasized in terms of how the factors and forces in the adopted model
are theoretically sound and universally applicable. Thus, the Continuity and Reform model
shaped the theoretical framework of the study and was the guide in choosing the case of
USAID/Egypt. In other words, the case of USAID/Egypt was chosen due to its
representation for the factors and forces conceptualized in the Continuity and Reform model.

The case possessed signiﬁcant administrative problems, long-term involvement of the external

264

agent, and political, economic, social, and cultural forces that signiﬁcantly valued by both
sides of the relation.

Guidance by the theoretical framework in choosing the case study makes the results
not only applicable to the American aid relationship with Mubarak’s Egypt, but also to all aid
policies toward developing countries that need administrative reform. The guidance of the
Continuity and Reform model in addressing the problem under investigation, therefore, makes
the results not particular to Egypt as evidenced from the various factors and forces interplay
in the model. The role of U.S. in Egypt’s administrative reform should be seen as a general
problem to the extent that it occurs in several developing countries where the very issue of
bureaucracy and external agents are being signiﬁcant.

Research Findings
Bureaucratic Resistance to Administrative Reform

The Egyptian bureaucracy has a myriad of problems including the large size of the
labor force, quality of public service, a centralized and fragmented structure, patronage,
bureaucratic incompetencies, lack of training, inadequate leadership qualities, and corruption.
Consecutive governments in Egypt have been intentionally negligent to address these
problems despite incurring signiﬁcant ﬁnancial costs from a guaranteed public employment,
central laws and decrees, and ﬁxed prices of public goods and services. The GOE has made
the political decision that expanding bureaucracy continues to provide the regime with
political security by creating jobs, servicing constituencies, and patronage. Finally, the society
is still structured to help bureaucrats in keeping their underpaid government jobs through rent

control policies and subsidized food, cloth, and transportation. Overall, the social and cultural

265

structure of Egypt continues to be driven by, and signiﬁcantly relies on, bureaucracy only to
a lesser degree than during Nasser’s era.

Recent internally initiated administrative reform efforts approved by the GOE are
limited to approaches of organizational change such as changing procedures to improve the
quality of customer service. The government backs off reform plans that may include cutting
down the labor force or ﬁghting patronage and corruption at the top. This is evident by the
political resistance facing the minister of Administrative Development including continually
limiting his authority to present reform plans to cut down the labor force.

To generalize from the case ofU S AID/Egypt, it is expected that developing countries’
governments would oppose radical administrative reform plans by consulting ﬁrms contracted
by external agents. A country’s elites, who usually have a political stake in the government,
are expected to maintain their ability to manipulate, subvert, or utilize bureaucratic structures
as a means to enhance their power base. It is unlikely that a regime would be willing to
sacriﬁce its political capital by backing extreme reform measures put forward by the external
agent. Bureaucratic societies are expected to continue on such path regardless of the
presence of Western external agents. This pattern is reﬂected in the Continuity and Reform
model by social and cultural forces against the intended direction of adnrinistrative reform that
might be carried by external agent’s contractors. The direction of these forces did not
warrant a modiﬁcation in the model.

Governmental Political and Economic Constraints
In spite of GOE’s unwillingness to directly support administrative reform, there was

evidence that the government was more willing to put indirect political and economic pressure

266

for such reform. Domestic and international factors, including a global shift to market
economy, the rise of Islamic groups, and a decline in foreign aid, and changes in the U.S.
priorities towards the private sector, combined to urge the government to take small political
and economic measures to improve the quality of public service. Politically, the GOE recently
established a new Ministry of Administrative Development to take on the task of
administrative reform. In the absent of a reform plan or a mission statement of the new
ministry, I was able to put together the ministry’s plan through an extensive review of the
minister’s speeches. It became clear that the GOE would not allow the new ministry to cross
the line of changing a bureaucratic society. This was evident by the political opposition faced
the minister from his own government in the People’s Assembly on the issue of cutting down
the labor force. The ministry’s power is limited to approaches of theoretically sound
organization change as recommended by the literature review in Chapter Two such as better
relationship with the public and better trained bureaucrats.

The GOE also took small economic steps to help the new ministry in its task of
organizational change. Despite Egypt’s budget deﬁcit, the ministry’s appropriation for FY
1998-99 is 2 billion Egyptian pounds ($588 million) with a promise of ﬁrture increases. A
fiirther evaluation of the ministry’s plan was carried on through interviews with Egyptian
government ofﬁcials and American consultants. The majority of interviewees are not
optimistic about solving Egypt’s bureaucratic problems, but most viewed the step taken by
the government as a move in the right direction. Overall, the fact remains that the GOE made
the political and economic decisions to establish a new governmental body and give it the

resources to reform bureaucracies using approaches expected from the external agent. The

267

case of the new Ministry of Administrative Development then reﬁites the assumption known
as the “Orthodox Paradox” or that internal variables are either not supportive or not sufﬁcient
to initialize administrative reform.

Generalizing from the case of USAID/Egypt, administrative reform should be
expected from regimes which are facing domestic or international pressures and are suffering
from bureaucratic problems at the same time. Such pressures should be viewed as historic
moments or windows of opportunity for attempts of administrative reform. These are
important moments according to Cleaves (1980: 290) who refers to such occasions as:

[T]he coincidence of events, many of them seemingly insigniﬁcant by other

standards, that appear to play an important role at a particular point in time

with respect to a policy outcome. The fact that these variables often cannot

be systematically classiﬁed analytically does not diminish their importance.

The political and economic decisions taken by the recipient government warrant
modiﬁcations to the Continuity and Reform model. In light of answers to the research
question, the continuity and reform model is modiﬁed so that the recipient government is
riding on the forces of reform and attempting to solve administrative problems only to the
extent beneﬁcial to the regime. This is a legitimate change to the Continuity and Reform
model given that government adopted theoretically sound approaches for reform in its plan,
based on recommendations by the literature review in Chapter Two, to address the problems
of Egyptian bureaucracy identiﬁed in Chapter Three.

Political and Economic Forces of External Agents

Theoretically, limited reform measures taken by the government under pressure do not

eliminate the signiﬁcant role expected ﬁom external agents in administrative reform. The

268

external agent should not only be expected to take the reform measures beyond the
government interests, such as cutting down the labor force, but also to assist in implementing
the organizational change approaches adopted by the government as well. Despite the large
bureaucracies and the oversupply of rule-making, the capacity of developing bureaucratic
societies to pursue collective goals, such as reform, in a predictable, coherent way is still
questionable (Evan, 1992). It was theoretically expected for the external agent to join the
government in its reform attempts due to the expected positive impact of reform on
development. A more efficient bureaucracy would signify the beneﬁts of external agents’
investments when taking charge of the Western projects.

Interviews with the State Department ofﬁcials in Washington and AD ofﬁcials in
Cairo, however, provided a different answer to the research question. As stated in Chapter
Five, administrative reform is not of a high enough priority to the external agent to use its
political and economic leverages as means to achieve it. Rather, political and economic
interests out weigh the beneﬁts of administrative reform. The USAID is caught in the web
of the U. S. Embassy in Cairo, the White House, the State Department, and the U. S. Congress
and Senate’s political and economic interests. In the words of a State Department oﬂicial in
Washington, “the cost of war between Egypt and Israel saved by aid outweighs the
unsatisfactory development results.” Political interests in the case of Egypt also stem its
leadership role in the Arab world. Economic interests for the external agent are also
signiﬁcant by taking the form of subsidizing American corporations relying on the AID budget
and opening the markets for American goods. The external agent, then, is constrained by

political and economic interests.

269

The USAID is left with an ambiguity regarding the goal of investments in Egypt. Only
two small-scale approaches with discrete projects for administrative reform were found to be
adopted by the USAID, rather than a long-term effort as suggested by the literature review
in Chapter Two. The mission is spending its efforts and skills on ﬁnishing consultants’ paper-
work or ﬁnding more innovative ways to protect its ofﬁcials politically from Washington and
physically in Cairo. Administrative reform as a priority is, therefore, lost despite its
importance for sustainable development.

Generalization from the case of USAID/Egypt leads to expecting economic and
political means to become goals for the external agents. This generalization is evident from
witnessing other external agents’ practices who compete for chances of investments in Egypt
with few considerations about bureaucratic problems as in the case of GOGCWS. Political
and economic goals override the main task of administrative reform despite its importance for
sustainable development. The dominance of these goals warrants another modiﬁcation to the
Continuity and Reform model. Political and economic forces of the USAID are g9; pushing
in the intended direction of administrative reform. Rather, these forces by the external agent
are joining the continuity forces placed by the Egyptian government to maintain the regime’s
power.

Indirect Pressure for Reform by External Agents

To empirically answer the posited research question, I have chosen one of the two

small-scale projects for administrative reform adopted by the USAID as a case study. The

other case was not available for analysis due to its conclusion in the early 1990s. The case

270

left for analysis was the General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply assigned to
Black and Veatch consultant ﬁrm for administrative reform in 1988.

Results from Chapter Six show that consultants who are isolated from the political and
economic interests in their task of on-site administrative reform have a limited capacity for
implementation due to the small-scale nature of their mission and the lack of authority to
change bureaucratic rules and regulations. Despite its efforts, Black and Veatch was unable
to affect the critical tasks of planning, operational control, ﬁnancial control, human resources’
management, and organizational structure because such decisions are made outside the
GOGCWS in a centralized bureaucratic structure. The role of the external agent in
administrative reform appears to be insufﬁcient in the absence of reforming the Egyptian
bureaucracy as a whole through a large-scale long-term approach with enough authority in
the hands of the contractors. Further, adopting conditionality as a means of imposing Black
and Veatch’s recommendations, such as raising tariffs or changing the organizational legal
status in the centralized structure, failed in the absence of coordination and cooperation
between various external agents especially from European countries.

In Chapter Seven, results about changes in the social and cultural values of
bureaucrats revealed improvements over the 1983 data. These improvements, however, were
not sufﬁcient to reach over the 50 percent level of administrative reform. Bureaucrats were
also found to be more developmentally oriented with respect to issues outside their
organization. Cultural and social aspects of bureaucrats’ behavior changed toward preferring
development in society as a whole rather than in their organization or its administrative

capacity. From these ﬁndings I concluded that the increasing role of Western external agents

271

in Egypt led to changing bureaucrats’ perception about society and is reﬂected in the
bureaucrats’ favorable opinion about the West’s developmental programs but not about
administrative reform.

Generalization from the case of USAID/Egypt suggests that the role of an external
agent would not reach its goal of administrative reform through small-scale approaches and
discrete projects assigned to on-site consultants. This is due to the absence of supportive
government policies for large-scale reform and the willingness of other external agents to
intervene and take on abandoned tasks of investment without consideration of bureaucratic
problems. Further, a long-term and diverse involvement of numerous Western external agents
in a society is more likely to change bureaucrats’ social and cultural attitude towards
development than the contracted consultants responsible for administrative reform.
Consultant ﬁrms contracted for on-site administrative reform are unable to reach such results
due to their limited scope and period of responsibility. Applying the answer of the research
question to the Continuity and Reform model would not modify its theoretical propositions.
This is unlike the case of political and economic forces which required modifying the model
because the external agent is indirectly applying forces of change on administrative reform.

Implications and Recommendations

The literature in political science often approaches aid cases without sufﬁcient analysis
of administrative variables. The argument that the absence of administrative reform led to
discouraging results and unsatisfactory outcomes for external agents has not received the
attention it deserves. In the case of Egypt, for decades political studies have been conﬁrming

dependency on the United States and some would go ﬁirther only to conclude that it is a case

272

of too much aid or failing aid. No study, however, sufﬁciently considered public
administration as a signiﬁcant cause for the poor development record. This paradigm led to
inconclusive conclusions such as dependency prevents development.

I adopted here a theoretical ﬁamework, in the form of the Continuity and Reform
model, to ﬁll the gap in approaching the role of external agents. While the universality of the
factors and forces of the model allows generalization, still a few points have to considered in
this approach. First, in societies with most of the power concentrated in the hands of a
president, it is essential to examine his ideas and perceptions to draw a conclusion about the
chances of administrative reform and not only the position of bureaucrats and politicians.
Second, conditionality should not be given too much weight in the analysis when political and
economic interests of the external agent are signiﬁcant. Third, the external agent should not
be viewed as one entity, but rather as many competing bodies with different political interests.
In the case of U. S., the interests of the State Department, the White House, and Capitol Hill
should not be assumed to be the same regarding the case being studied. Fourth, other
external agents from different countries should be included in the analysis and be given
enough weight in disturbing administrative reform plans to their economic and political
beneﬁts. Finally, major characteristics of actors from both the country receiving the aid and
the agency providing it have to be studied sufﬁciently, directly, and extensively. To examine
such characteristics, it is necessary to rely on elite-interviewing methods.

With these points in mind, I would conclude the dissertation by recommending ﬁrrther
testing of the results. The results constitute a warning to researchers and practitioners to

reconsider their conceptualization of the role of administrative reform in external agents’

273

developmental efforts. Thus, I would recommend further testing of the answers to the
research questions generated by the Continuity and Reform model about the role of external
agents is administrative reform. Answers to research questions should be used as hypotheses
because I relied on an exploratory and interpretive method of inquiry with the goal of
interpreting and illustrating. Therefore, it is recommended that follow up studies utilize a
hypothesis-testing approach with the goal of proving or dismissing the ﬁndings. I would
further recommend that future research include an extensive case study using a different
external agent and a different recipient government. I see no reason to expect that the model
developed here would not apply, but I recommend further testing to see how well it works

in other contexts.

274

APPENDICES

275

Appendix A: List of Interviewees
U.S. Institutions
United States Department of State- Washington, DC.
Ofﬁce of Egypt and North Aﬁica
United States Agency for International Development (U SAID) - Cairo, Egypt.
Ofﬁce of Urban Administration and Development
Economic Analysis and Policy
Former Oﬁicials from the State Department
American Research Center in Egypt
Michigan State University
Egyptian Institutions
Central Agency for Organization and Administration
Research Division
General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS)
Chairman Oﬁice
Central Department
Collections Department
Customer Service Department
Subscriptions Department
Water Meters Department
Ministry of Administrative Development

Minister’s Ofﬁce

276

Ministry of Finance
Budget Division
Ministry of Education
Personnel Department
Ministry of Culture
Minister’s Ofﬁce
Sadat Academy for Management Sciences
Faculty of Management
Consultant Firms
American British Consultants (AMBRIC)
Cairo Wastewater Project
Arthur Anderson
Privatization Project
Black and Veatch International
Management, Training, & Systems Strengthening (MT SS) Project
CH2M Hill International Services, Inc.
Project Manager Ofﬁce
EAP

Management Consultant Ofﬁce.

277

Appendix B: Interview Questions

The following is a sample of the open-ended questions that will be asked in interview.

For the Egyptian ofﬁcials:

5.

6.

10.

In your view, how important is continuity in preforming your job?

In your view, does the size of Egyptian bureaucracy a major obstacle for reform?
Please tell me how important is the USAID in setting your priorities?

In your view, are the current attempts of reform on behalf of the government and the
USAID signiﬁcantly different from previous attempts.

What do you think are the reasons for failing of previous attempts?

If you were to design an approach to reform Egyptian bureaucracy, what will it

include?

For American ofﬁcials:

1.

Would you please explain to me what are the steps taken by USAID to reform
Egyptian bureaucracy?
In your opnion what are the major obstacles that face USAID in its efforts to reform
Egyptian bureaucracy?
If you were to design an alternative approach to inﬂuence the reform of Egyptian

bureaucracy, what will it include?

278

Appendix C: Egyptian Civil Servants Survey

Good morning, may I take 15 minutes from your time?

YES (CONTINUE)

NO (END INTERVIEW)
My name is Sameh Kamel. I am working on my dissertation at Michigan State University.
I am conducting research about bureaucratic problems that may inhibit reform. I would
appreciate if you would agree to participate in this research. I have some questions that I
would like you to answer. The questionnaire will take about 15 minutes. You do not have
to participate. If you choose to participate, you do not have to answer all the questions and
you may stop the answering at any time. You indicate your voluntary agreement to
participate by completing and returning this questionnaire. Your answers will be completely
conﬁdential and you will remain anonymous in the research ﬁndings. If you have any

questions you can contact me at or my advisor at

 

Assessing Bureaucratic Relation with the Public

Question 1: If you are interacting with the public during the course of your job, please
indicate whether you (strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree) with each of the
following statements:
1. The public respects civil servants.

strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
2. The public appreciated the efforts of civil servants.

strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )

3. People are honest in dealing with the bureaucracy.

279

 

strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ()
4. Most people are always trying to pull strings and get special treatment.
strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
Assessing Bureaucratic Flexibility
Question 2: If the efﬁciency of your unit is slowed by red tape and your supervisor asks you
to bend the regulations for the sake of greater efﬁciency, what would you do?
1. Seek the support of others in trying to follow the rules as they are written
2. Quietly follow the rules in spite of your supervisor’s request
3. Bend the rules, but only under the condition that he accepts the responsibility for the
changes
4. Accept your supervisor’s request without comment
5. Other
Question 3: If you disagree with your supervisor on the best way to handle a problem, what
would you do?
1. Accept his solution without comment
2. Try to convince him of your point of view, but follow his solution
3. Quietly but ﬁrmly stick to your solution
4. Seek support for your position ﬁom other officials
5. Other
Question 4: How often do you discuss ofﬁcial matters with your immediate supervisor?
1. Rarely

2. Occasionally

280

 

3. Frequently
4. Daily
Question 5: How often do you discuss informal or personal matters with your immediate
supervisor?
1. Never
2. Occasionally
3. Frequently
4. Daily

Assessing Bureaucratic Predispositions Toward Innovation and Reform
Question 6: Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements:
1. It is best to cancel or change programs (such as changing water tariff) that could cause
social conﬂict. agree ( ) disagree( )
2. Social change should not be instituted at the expense of traditional values.

agree ( ) disagree( )
3. Economic development should be pursued even if it means hardship for the majority of the
people.

agree () disagree( )
4. We have tried too hard to copy the developmental programs of the West without worrying
about our own heritage.

agree () disagree()

5. Pursuing development too rapidly might be worse than developing too slowly.

281

agree ( ) disagree( )
Question 7: Please indicate whether you (strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree)
with each of the following statements:
1. Decision should stress harmony in the work group.
strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
2. It is probably best to consult with one’s supervisor before making even small decisions.
strongly agree ( ) agree () disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
3. One should follow the rules in order to get things done effectively.
strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
4. In making new decisions, it is probably best to see what was done in the past.
strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
5. It is better to delay decisions than to risk making a mistake.
strongly agree ( ) agree ( ) disagree ( ) strongly disagree ( )
Assessing Productivity Levels
Question 8: Sometimes an employee’s ability to achieve his objectives is inﬂuenced by his
work environment. In this regard, please evaluate the individuals you work with by indicating
whether you (strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree) with the following
statements.
1. Work hard
2. Accept new ideas
3. Open and honest with each other.

4. Accept new responsibilities easily

282

 

5. D
6. T1
7. RI

8. Pl

12. I
13V
14. P
15.1

16. 5

Que:

 

5. Delegate authority frequently

6. Treat public with respect

7. Responsive to constructive criticism
8. Public service over job security

9. Willing to accept conﬂict

10. Are not lazy

11. Impartial toward ﬁiends and relatives
12. Decisive

13. Willing to take risks

14. Flexible in executing decisions

15. Listen to public opinions

l6. Solicit public opinions

Question 9: What sources of information do you ﬁnd most USCﬁJl for your job?

1. Media
2. Professional Materials/Rules and Manuals
3. Associations

4. Friends/Relatives/Notables
5. Colleagues

6. Boss

283

LIST OF REFERENCES

284

 

 

 

Ab

Ab

Ab

Abl

Abr

 

LIST OF REFERENCES

Abd Al-Aty, Said. March 26, 1998. “The Burden of Ministries over the Budget,” Al- Wafed:
5.

Abd Al-Aziz, Harndi. March 3, 1998. “The National Population Council is Unaware of How
the American Grant is Spent,” Ruz Al-Yusuf, No. 3639: 12.

Abd Al-Menam, Jehad. March 18, 1998. “The Economic Committee of People’s Assembly
Seeks to Free the Public Sector from Its Corrupted Leadership,” Al—Wafed: 1.

and Galeb, Mahmoud. November 25, 1997a. “The Government Reﬁrses $8 Million
USAID Loan due to Attached Conditions,” Al-Wafed: 1 - 3.

. December 1, 1997b. “People’s Assembly Report Reveals Corruption of Local
Administration,” AI- Wafed: 1.

. December 21, 1997. “People’s Assembly Review of GOGCWS’s Financial
Reports,” Al- Wafed: 2.

Abdo, Yousif. January 18, 1998. “Solving Water Pressure Problems by the Year 2000,” AI-
Ahram: 12.

Abrahamson, Bengt. 1977. Bureaucracy or Participation: The Logic of Organization.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Ajami, Fouad. 1981. The Arab Predicament. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Al Sayyid, Mustapha. 1995. “A Civil Society in Egypt?” In Norton Augustus Civil Society
in the Middle East, Volume I. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.

Al-Abd, Sherif. March 3, 1998. “People’s Problems in Front of the People’s Assembly,” Al
Ahram: 13.

Al-Ahram (Cairo Arabic Daily), May 3, 1977.

Al-Basel, Abd Al-Azim. December 4, 1997. “The Minister of Administrative Development
Reveals his Cards,” Al-Ahram: 3.

Al-Batrik, Ahmed. March 29, 1998. “Ministers Answers to the People’s Assembly,” Al-
Ahram: 13.

Al-Gazali, Mohamed. February 11, 1998. “GOGCWS’s Chairman Testiﬁes in ﬁont of the
Housing Committee,” Al- Wafed: 3.

285

Al-Gendi, Ibrahim. April 1 l, 1998. “USAID’s Director Anticipates Decreasing the U.S. Aid
to Egypt,” Al Wafed: 6.

Al-Gohary, Fatma. 1994. “Comparative Environmental Risks in Cairo: Water Pollution
Problems,” Comparing En vironmental Health Risks in Cairo, Egypt, USAID & GOE,
Vol. 2: 21.

Ali, Abd Al-Goad, and Batrik, Ahmed. December 21, 1997. “A Heated Discussion in the
People’s Assembly on GOGCWS,” Al-Ahram: 13.

Al-Moktar, Mohamed, Nafadi, Mahmoud, and Abd Al-Gafar, Mostafa. December 21, 1997.
“The People’s Assembly Cannot Identify Who is Responsible for the Deteriorating
Water Network,” Al-Gomhoria: 3.

Al-Shazly, Fatouh. March 15, 1998. “Two Billion Egyptian Pounds Increase in the New

Budget for Salaries, Bounces, and the Requirements of Administrative Reform,” Al-
Wafed: 1

American Mideast Business Association (AMBA). December 1, 1989. Bulletin ofAmerican
Mideast Business, Vol. XX, no. 10: 1.

Ammons, David. 1999. “A Proper Mentality for Benchmarking,” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 59, no. 2: 105 - 109.

Andrews, Kenneth. 1980. The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Homewood, IL: Richard Irwin
Inc.

Armenakis, Achilles, Harris, Stanley, and Mossholder, Kevin. 1993. “Creating Readiness for
Organizational Change,” Human Relations, Vol. 46, no. 6: 681 - 703.

Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. Social Choice and Independent Values. New York, NY: Wiley.
. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Astley, G., and Van de Ven, Andrew. 1983. “Central Perspectives and Debates in
Organization Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 245 - 273.

Atia, Magda. December 3, 1997a. “The Minister of Administrative Development Reveal his
Cards,” Al-Ahram: 3.

. December 4, 1997b. “Improving the Administrative System Performance,” Al-
Ahram: 12.

. February 8, 1998. “Completion of the First Phase of Administrative Reform,” Al-
Ahram: 12.

286

Axinn, George. 1988. “International Technical Interventions in Agriculture and Rural
Development: Some Basic Trends, Issues, and Questions,” Agriculture and Human
Values, Winter-Spring: 6 - 15.

and Axinn, Nancy. 1997. Collaboration in lntemational Rural Development: A
Practitioner’s Handbook Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

 

Ayubi, Nazih. 1980. Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt. London, UK:
Ithaca Press.

. 1982. “Bureaucratic Inﬂation and Administrative Inefﬁciency: The Deadlock in
Egyptian Administration,” Middle East Studies. Vol. 18, no. 3: 286 - 299.

. 1984. “Local Government and rural Development in Egypt in the 1970s,” African
Administrative Sciences, Vol. 23: 61 - 74.

1986. “Bureaucratization as Development: Administrative Development and
Development Administration in the Arab World,” lntemational Review of
Administrative Sciences. Vol. 52: 201 - 222.

. 1989. “Bureaucracy and Development in Egypt Today,” Journal of Asian and
African Studies. Vol. 24, no.1: 62 - 79.

. 1991. The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat. Reading, UK: Ithaca
Press.

Bajpai, Shyam. 1988. “Sectoral Policy Reform: Water Supply in Indian Cities,” Mimeo
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for lntemational Development.

Baker, Raymond. 1978. Egypt ’s Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.

Bandow, Doug. 1995. A New Aid Policy For a New World. Cato Policy Analysis No. 226.

. 1997. Help or Hindrance: Can Foreign Aid Prevent International Crises? . Cato
Policy Analysis, no. 273.

Bangura, Abdul Karim. 1995. The Effects of A merican Foreign Aid to Egypt, 1 95 7-198 7.
Lewiston, NY: Mellen University Press.

Barnard, Chester. 1968. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.

Barton, Allen. 1979. “A Diagnosis of Bureaucratic Maladies,” American Behavioral
Scientist, Vol. 22: 477 - 608.

Bauer, Peter. 1976. Dissent on Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

287

Behrr, Robert. 1991. Leadership Counts: Lessons for Public Managers ﬁom the
Massachusetts Welfare, Training and Employment Programs. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

Berg, Elliot, Sines, Richard, and Walker, James. 1994. Interim Evaluation: Sector Policy
Reform Program and Technical Support for Sector Policy Reform Project—Egypt.
Bethesda, MD: Development Alternatives, Inc.

Berger, Morroe. 1957. Bureaucracy and Society in Egypt. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.

Biggart, Nicole. 1977. “The Creative—Destnrctive Process of Organizational Change: The
Case of the Post Office.” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 22: 410-426.

Blau, Peter. 1955. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

and Scott, Richard. 1962. Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. San
Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co.

Bossuyt, Jean, Geert Laporte, and Francois van Hoek, 1992. New Avenues for Technical
Cooperation in Africa: Improving the Record in Terms of Capacity Building.
Maastricht, Netherlands: European Center for Development Policy Management.

Bowden, Peter 1986. “Problems of Implementation,” Public Administration and
Development Vol. 6 no 1.

Bratton, Michael, and van de Walle, Nicolas. 1992. “Popular Protest and Political Reform
in Aﬁica,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, no. 4: 419- 43.

Brautigam, Deborah. 1996. “State Capacity and Effective Governance.” In Benno Ndulu
and Nicolas van de Walle. Agenda for Africa ’s Economic Renewal. New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Publishers.

Brooker, Michael. 1965. “The Content and Processes of Adaptive Change,” Advanced
Management Journal, Vol. 30: 24-30.

Bunker, Douglas. 1973. “Policy Science Perspectives on Implementation Processes,” Policy
Sciences, Vol. 3, no. 7: 75-77.

Burns, William. 1985. Economic Aid and A merican Policy Toward Egypt 1 955-81. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.

Cabinet’s Information and Decision Support Center. 1995. Egypt Human Development
Report. Cairo: Prime Minister Information and Decision Support Center.

Caiden, Gerald. 1973. “Development, Administrative Capacity and Administrative Reform,”
International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 39: 327 - 344.

288

 

 

C1

C1!

C0

C04

Col

 

Co

Cr

and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1975. Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries. New
York, NY: Wiley.

Cantori, Louis. 1997. The American Way: U.S. Development Policy in the Middle East,”
Middle East Policy. Vol. V, no. 1: 170-77.

Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 1997a. Census of
Population Characteristics 1996, Final Results, Volume 2, Cairo, Egypt: Central
Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.

. 1997b. Civil Workers in Government and the Public Sector in January I, 1996.
Reference no: 71-12523/1996. Cairo, Egypt: Central Agency for Mobilization and
Statistics.

. 1997c. General Agencies and their Dependent Units According to Status in June
30, 1996. Reference no: 73-14441-96. Cairo, Egypt: Central Agency for
Mobilization and Statistics.

Chapel, Yves. 1982. “Recent Developments in the Administrative Sciences, in Theories of
Public Administration and its Reform.” In Cao Huynh, editor. Public Administration
and Management: Problems of Adaptation in Diﬂerent Socio-cultural Contexts.
Paris: UNESCO.

Clarke, Duncan. 1997. “U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically
Untouchable?” Middle East Journal. Vol. 51, no.2: 199-214.

Cleaves, Peter. 1980. “Implementation Amidst Scarcity and Apathy: Political Power and
Policy Design.” In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the
Third World. Princeton University Press.

Coase, Ronald. 1974. “The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment,” The
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XVII, no. 2: 493-495.

Coe, Charles. 1999. “Local Government Benchmarking: Lessons from Two Major
Multigovernment Efforts,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 59, no. 2: 110 - 115.

Cohen, Michael, and March, James. 1974. Leadership andAmbiguity: The American College
President. New York: McGraw-Hill.

. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 17, no.1: 1-25.

Conyers, Diana. 1983. “Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development
Administration,” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 3: 97-109.

Crozier, Michael. 1964. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.

289

 

Er

Et.‘

Ev

Fin

F0

F0

Fr

Cyert, Richard, and March, James. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Dabasi-Schweng. 1965. “The Inﬂuence of Economic Factors.” In Martin Kriesberg, editor,
Public Administration in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institute.

Daft, Richard. 1978. “A Dual-Core Model of Organizational Innovation.” Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 21: 193-210.

Dahl, Robert, and Lindblom, Charles. 1953. Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning
and Politico-economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes. New York,
NY: Harper & Bros.

Dow, Michael. 1985. “Science, Technology, and Aﬁican Famine,” BOSTTD Developments.
Vol.5: 16-19.

Downs, Anthony. 1967 Inside Bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co.

Duncan, Alex. 1986. “Aid Effectiveness in Raising Adaptive Capacity in the Low Income
Countries.” In John Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, editors. Development Strategies
Reconsidered. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Eldersveld, Samuel, and Jagannadham, Vedula. 1968. The Citizen and the Administrator in
0 Developing Democracy: An Empirical Study in Delhi State. New Delhi: Indian
Institute of Public Administration.

Esman, Milton. 1991. Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and
Strategies. Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Etzioni, Amitai. 1964. Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Evan, Peter. 1992. “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy,
and Structural Change.” In Stephen Haggard and Robert Kauﬁnan, eds. The Politics
of Economic Adjustment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Finch, David. 1989. The IMF: The Record and the Prospect. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University.

Food and Agriculture Organization (F A0). 1994. The State of Food and Agriculture, 1993.
Rome, Italy: FAO of the United Nations.

Foster, John. 1990. “Bureaucratic Rigidity Revisited,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 71,
no.2: 223-238.

French, Wendell, and Bell, Cecil. 1984. Organization Development: Behavioral Science
Interventions for Organization Improvement, 3rd ed.. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ .:
Prentice-Hall.

290

 

 

 

 

 

GAO .

Gates

Gelln

Gerri

Ghal

Ghor

Ginz

Gen

Gol

 

Gor

 

GAO. June 1993. Foreign Assistance: AID Strategic Direction and C ontinuedManagement
Improvements Needed. NSIAD-93-106, Washington, DC.

Gates, Scott. 1989. The Limits of Conditionality: An Examination of Individual Incentives
and Structural Constraints. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science,
University of Michigan.

Gellner, Ernest. 1981. Muslim Society. London: Cambridge University Press.

Gerges, Fawaz. 1995. “Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour: Fundamentalism in Power,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, no. 3: 69-79.

Gerrard, Christopher and Terry Roe. 1983. “Government Intervention in Food Grain
Markets: An Economic Study of Tanzania,” Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 12:109-131.

Ghali, Boutres. 1998. “Aid to Egypt: Perspective of the Economic Minister.” January
Episode of the TV News Series Behind the Scenes. Arab Republic of Egypt
Television.

Ghorbal, Ashraf. 1990. “A Look Ahead: Problems and Prospects.” In Ibrahim Oweiss,
editor. The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt. Washington, DC: Center
for Contemporary Arab Studies.

Ginzberg, Eli, and Reilly, Ewing. 1957. Effecting Change in Large Organizations. New
York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Giugale, Marcelo, and Mobarak, Hamed. 1996. Introduction: The Rationale for Private
Sector Development in Egypt.” In Marcelo Giugale and Harned Mobarak, editors.
Private Sector Development in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo
Press.

Goda, Soliman. March 5, 1998. “The Conditions of Egyptian Ministries,” Al-Wafed: 5.

General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. How We Compare to Other Water
Utilities Around the World. [Online] Available
http://www.ritsec.com.eg/ritsec/env/gogcws/goghp.html, April 21, 1999.

Goldberg, Victor. 1974. “Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand,” The Journal
of law and Economics, Vol. XVII, no. 2: 461-492.

Gormley, William. 1983. The Politics of Public Utility Regulation. Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press.

Grindle, Merilee. 1980a. “Policy Content and Context in Implementation.” In Merilee
Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World. Princeton
University Press.

291

. 1980b. “The Irnplementor: Political Constraints on Rural Development in Mexico.”
In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.
Princeton University Press.

Gulick, Luther. 1992. “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” Reprinted in Shafritz and Ott,
eds., Classics of Organization Theory, 3rd ed. Paciﬁc Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole
Publishing.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., and Nicolas van de Walle. 1996. “ Ndulu, Benno, and, Nicolas van de
Walle. I 996. Agenda for A frica ’3 Economic Renewal. New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers.

Hage, Jerald, and Finsterbusch, Kurt. 1987. Organizational Change as a Development
Strategy: Models and Tactics for Improving Third World Organizations. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Haggard, Stephan. Summer 1985. “The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF’s
Extended Fund Facility,” International Organization, Vol. 39:

1986. “The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF’s Extended Fund
Facility.” in Miles Kahler, ed., The Politics of International Debt. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.

and Kauﬁnan, Robert. 1989. “The Politics of Stabilization and Structural
Adjustment.” In Jeffrey Sachs, editor. Developing Country Debt and Economic
Performance: The lntemational Financial System. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.

 

Hall, D. et al. 1978. “Effects of Top—Down Departmental and Job Change Upon Perceived
Employee Behavior and Attitudes: A Natural Field Experiment,” Journal of Applied
Psychology, 63:62-72.

Haltiwanger, John. 1998. “Creating Employer-Employee Data Sets,” Monthly LaborReview,
Vol. 121, no. 7: 49-50

Hamady, Sania. 1960. Temperament and Character of the Arabs. New York, NY: Twayne
Publishers.

Hamilton, Lee, Atwood, Brian, Gubser, Peter, and Roy, Sara. 1996. “Development
Assistance to the Middle East: Critical Perspectives,” Middle East Policy, Vol. IV,
no. 4: 13-35.

Hammond, Thomas.l986. “Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic
Politics,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30: 379-420.

Handoussa, Heba. 1979. “Time for Reform: Egypt’s Public Sector Industry.” Cairo Papers
in Social Science. Cairo: The American University in Cairo.

292

. 1984. “Conﬂicting Objectives in the Egyptian-American Aid Relationship.” In Earl
Sullivan, editor. Impact of Development Assistance on Egypt. Cairo Papers in
Social Science, Volume 7, Monograph Three. Cairo: The American University in
Cairo.

. 1990. “Fifteen Years of U.S. AID to Egypt: A Critical Review.” In Ibrahim Oweiss,
editor. The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt. Washington, DC: Center
for Contemporary Arab Studies.

. 1991. “Crises and Challenge: Prospects for the 1990s.” In Heba Handoussa and
Gillian Potter, editors Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the I990s.
Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.

Hanrahan, Michael, and Walker, James. March, 1994. Economic and Financial Analyses of
Nine Capital Projects in Egypt. Aid Evaluation Technical Report, No. 19.
Washington, DC: AID Center for Development Information and Evaluation.

Harbison, Frederick, and Ibrahim Abd Al-Kader. 1958. Human Resources for Egyptian
Enterprise. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Harik, Iliya. 1992. “Privatization: The Issue, The Prospects, and The Fears.” In Iliya Harik
and Denis Sullivan. Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Harty, Harry. 1999. “Mini-Symposium on Intergovernmental Comparative Performance
Data,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 59, no. 2: 101 - 104.

Hassan, Sajjad. 1983. “Government Servants and Public Relations,” Public Administration
Review (Lahore Pak), Vol. XXI, no. 1: 32 - 37.

Hawkins, Jeffrey. 1991. “Understanding the Failure of IMF Reform: The Zambian Case,”
World Development, Vol. 19, no. 7: 839 - 849.

Haynes, Jeffrey. 1993. Religion in Third World Politics. Philadelphia, PA: Open University
Press.

Heimann, Larry. 1993. “Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure
and the Design of Reliable Systems,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87:
421 - 435.

Hess, Andrew. 1995. “Peace and Political Reform in the Gulf: The Private Sector,” Journal
of International Affairs, Vol. 49, no. 1: 103 - 122.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. 1988. Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist
Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.

293

. 1990. “The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat
to Mubarak.” In Ibrahim Oweiss, editor. The Political Economy of Contemporary
Egypt. Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

Hirschman, Albert. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.

Hoehn, John, and, Krieger, Douglas. 1996. Cairo Water and Wastewater Economic Beneﬁt
Assessment. Institute for lntemational Agricultural, Michigan State University.

Hoffer, Jan. 1995. The Challenge of Effective Urban Water Supply. Ph.D. Dissertation,
Department of Political Science, Universiteit Twente, The Netherlands.

Hoodfar, Homa. 1996. “Political Economy of Low-income Households.”In Diane
Singemran, and Homa Hoodfar, editors. Development, Change, and Gender in
Cairo: A View ﬁom Household. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hope, Kempe. 1983a. “The Administration of Development in Developing Countries,”
Public Administration Review (Lahore Pak), Vol. XXI, no. 1: 38-62.

. 1983b. “The Administration of Development in Emergent Nations,” Public
Administration and Development, Vol. 3: 49-59.

Horowitz, John, and, Just, Richard. 1995. “Political Coalition Breaking and Sustainability of
Policy Refomi,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 47, no. 2: 271 - 287.

Hopwood, Derek. 1991. Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1990. London: Harper Collins
Publishers.

Huynh, Cao. 1982. “Problems Arising from the Existence of Dual Administrative Systems
in African Countries.” In Cao Huynh, editor. Public Administration and
Management: Problems of Adaptation in Different Socio-cultural Contexts. Paris:
UNESCO.

Hwash, Gamal. February 28, 1998. “American Aid to Egypt? Or to America?,”Al-Wafed:
7.

Ibrahim, Zenab. April 27, 1998b. “Grants to Train Managers of GOGCWS in Germany,”
Al-Ahram Al—Ektesady, No. 1529: 6.

. January 5, 1998a. “Ills of Public Administration,” Al—Ahram Al—Ektesady, No.
1513: 43-47.

Idriss, Shahira. 1995. “U.S. Aid to Egypt May be Reduced,” Financial Times. March, 21 :4.

Ikram, Khaled. 1980. Egypt Economic Management in 0 Period of Transition. A Report

by a Mission Sent to Egypt by the World Bank. Baltimore, ME: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.

294

 

Israel, Arturo. 1987. Institutional Development: Incentive to Performance. Baltimore, MD:
John Hopkins University Press.

Jacobs, Bruce. 1981 . The Political Economy of Organizational Change: Urban Institutional
Response to the War on Poverty. New York, NY: Academic Press.

J edlicka, Allen. 1987. Organizational Change and the Third World: Designs for the
T wenty-First Century. New York, NY: Praeger.

Jensen, Lloyd. 1982. Explaining Foreign Policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Johnson, Bryan. April 15, 1997. Does Foreign Aid Serve U.S. Interests? Not at the United
Nations. The Heritage Foundation, FYI No. 136.

Kamel, Mustafa. 1998. Annual Report for Development in Egypt. Cairo: Center for
Research and Studies of Developing Countries.

Kamel, Sameh. 1997. Using Hedonic Method to Quantrﬁ/ Policy Failure: The Case of
USAID ’s Policy in Cairo. MPA Thesis, Michigan State University.

Kaufman, Herbert. 1971. The Limits of Organizational Change. University, AL: University
of Alabama Press.

. 1977. Red Tape, Its Origins, Uses and Abuses. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution.

Kepel, Gilles. 1993. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh. Third Edition.
Berkeley, CA: University of Califomia Press.

_. 1994. The Revenge of God: the Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in
the Modern World. University Park, PA. : Pennsylvania State University Press.

Kerrigan, John, and Luke, Jeffrey. 1987. Management Training Strategies for Developing
Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Khalil, Atef. April 18, 1998. “Bad Public Administration and Careless Inventory Practices
Cause Sales Depression,” Al- Wafed: 2.

Ki ggundu, Moses. 1989. Managing Organizations in Developing Countries: An Operational
and Strategic Approach. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Kimberly, J. 1979. “Issues in the Creation of Organizations: Initiation, Innovation and
Institutionalization,”Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 22: 437 - 457.

Knott, Jack, and Miller, Gary. 1987. Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional
Choice. Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall.

295

Kopcynski, Mary, and Lombardo Michael. 1999. “Comparative Performance Measurement:
Insights and Lessons Learned ﬁ'om a Consortium Effort” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 59, no. 2: 124 - 134.

Kopec, Allen. November, 1985. “USAID in Egypt: An Interview with Frank Kimball,
Director of USAID in Egypt,” Cairo Today.

La Palambora, Joseph. 1963. “An overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development.” In
Joseph la Palambora, Editor. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.

Landau, Martin. 1969. “Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and
Overlap,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 29: 346-358.

Lavy, Victor, and Eliezer Sheffer. 1991. Foreign Aid and Economic Development in the
Middle East: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.

Law, Whyte, Wilson, Albert, and Donna Wilson. 1969. Hierarchical Structures. New York,
NY: American Elsevier Pub. Co.

Leila, Ali; Yassin, El Sayed; and Palmer, Monte. Summer, 1985. “Apathy, Values, Incentives,
and Development: The Case of the Egyptian Bureaucracy,” The Middle East Journal,
Vol., 39, no., 3: 341-61.

Levi, Margaret. 1990. “A Logic of Institutional Change.” In Karen Cook and Margaret
Levi, editors. The Limits of Rationality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Levy, Frank, Meltsner, Arnold, and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1974. Urban Outcomes. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.

Lewis, John. 1986. “Development Promotion: A Time for Regrouping.” In John Lewis and
Valeriana Kallab, editors. Development Strategies Reconsidered. New Brunswick:
Transaction Books.

Lin, Justin. 1989. “An Economic Theory of Institutional Change: Induced and Imposed
Change,” Cato Journal, Vol. 9, no. 1: 1-33.

Lindauer, David, and Barbara, Nunberg. 1994. “Conclusion: The Political Economy of Civil
Service Pay and Employment Reform.” In David Lindauer and Barbara Nunberg ,ed.
Rehabilitating Government: Pay and Employment Reform in Africa. Washington,
DC: World Bank.

Lindblom, Charles. 1959. “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 19: 79-88.

. 1965. The Intelligence of Democracy. New York, NY: Free Press.

296

 

. 197 7. Politics and Markets: The World 's Political Economic Systems. New York,
NY: Basic Books.

. 1980. The Policy Making Process. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Princeton Hall.

Lippett, Ronald, Jaenne Watson, and Bruce Westley. 1958. Planned Change: A
Comparative Study of Principles and Techniques. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace
and Co.

Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lipton, Michael. 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lofgren, Hans. 1993. “Economic Policy in Egypt: A Breakdown in Reform Resistance?,”
lntemational Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25: 407-421.

Lotﬁ, Mohamed. January 19, 1998. “Providing Potable Water in The Right Direction,” Al-
AhramAl-Ektesady, No. 1515: 13.

Manheim, Jarol, and Richard, Rich. 1991. Empirical PoliticalAnalysis: Research Methods
in Political Science. N.Y.: Longman. .

March, James, and Olsen, Johan. 1976. Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen,
Norway: Universitet forlaget.

and Simon, Herbert. 1958. Organizations. New York, NY: Wiley.

Mayﬁeld, James. 1996. Local Government in Egypt: Structure, Process, and the Challenges
of Reform. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

McClelland, Clarence. 1976. The Achieving Society. New York, NY: Irvington Publishers.

McClintock, Cynthia. 1980. “Reform Governments and Policy Implementation: Lessons
from Peru.” In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the
Third World. Princeton University Press.

Merton, Robert. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Migdal, Joel. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations in the Third
World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Miller, Gary. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of the Hierarchy. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Mills, G. 1966. “Education and Training for Public Services in the West Indies,” Journal of
Administration Overseas, Vol. 5: 155-166.

297

Mitchell, Tim. 1991. “America’s Egypt: Discourse of the Development Industry,” Middle
East Report March-April: 18-34.

Moe, Terry. 1990. “The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a Theory of Public
Bureaucracy.” In Oliver Williamson, ed., Organization Theory. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.

Moore, Philip. 1997. Egypt: Privatization and Beyond. London, UK: Euromoney
Publications.

Mosley, Paul, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye. 1991. Aid and Power: The World Bank and
Policy-based Lending. London: Rourledge.

Nafaa, Ibrahim. December 31, 1997. “The President Gives a Speech to ‘Good Moming
Egypt’ TV Program,” Al-Ahram: 1; 5.

Naomi, Ciden, and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1974. Planning and Budgetary in Poor Countries.
London: Wiley.

Nasr, Ahmed. April 26, 1998. “A Wanting Before Hitting a ‘Water Poverty Line’,” Al-
Ahram: 13.

Ndulu, Benno, and, Nicolas van de Walle. 1996. Agenda for Africa ’s Economic Renewal.
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Nelson, Joan. 1989. “Comparative Perspectives.” In Joan Nelson, editor. The Politics of
Economic Adjustment in Developing Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.

1990. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in
Developing Countries. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Ni skanen, William. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago, Aldine:
Atherton.

North, Douglass. 1993. “Institutional Change: A framework of Analysis.” In Sven-Erik
Sjostrand, editor. Institutional Change: Theory and Empirical Findings. Arrnonk,
NY: ME. Sharpe.

Nussair, Abd Al-Fatah. March 16, 1998. “Corruption and Government,” Al-Wafed: 7.

Oweiss, Ibrahim. 1990. “Egypt’s Economy: The Pressing Issues.” In Ibrahim Oweiss, editor.
The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt. Washington, DC: Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies.

Palmer, Monte. 1987. “Bureaucratic Rigidity and Economic Development in the Middle
East: a Study of Egypt, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia,” International Review of
Administrative Sciences. Vol. 53: 241-57.

298

 

. 1989. Bureaucratic Innovation and Economic Development in the Middle East: A
Study of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies.
Vol. 24, no. 1: 12-28.

Al Hegelan, Abdul Rahman, Mohammed Abdulrahrnan, Leila Ali, and El Sayed
Yassin. 1987. “Bureaucratic Rigidity and Economic Development in the Middle
East: a Study of Egypt, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia,” International Review of
Administrative Sciences. Vol. 53:241-57.

 

, A1 Hegelan, Abdul Rahman, Bushara, Mohammed; Leila, Ali, and Yassin, El Sayed.
1987. “Bureaucratic Rigidity and Economic Development in Middle East: a Study
of Egypt, the Sudan, and Saudi Arabia,” lntemational Review of Administrative
Sciences, Vol., 53: 241-57.

, Al Hegelan, Abdul Rahman, Bushara, Mohammed; Leila, Ali; and Yassin, El Sayed.
1989. “Bureaucratic Innovation and Economic Development in the Middle East: A
Study of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan,” Journal of Asian andAﬁ'ican Studies,
Vol., XXIV, no. 1-2: 12 - 27.

, Leila Ali, and Yassin El Sayed. 1988. The Egyptian Bureaucracy. Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press.

Yassin, El Sayed, and Leila, Ali. 1985. “Bureaucratic Flexibility and Development
in Egypt,” Public Administration and Development, Vol.5, no.4: 323 -3 7.

 

Perlman, Bruce. 1989. “Modernizing the Public Service in Latin America: Paradoxes of Latin
American Public Administration,” lntemational Journal of Public Administration,
Vol. 12, no. 4: 671 - 705.

Perlman, Janice. 1980. “The Failure of Inﬂuence: Squatter Eradication in Brazil.” In Merilee
Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World. Princeton
University Press.

Perrow, Charles. 1993. “Small Firms Network.” In Sven-Erik Sjostrand, editor. Institutional
Change: Theory andEmpirical Findings. Armonk, NY: ME. Sharpe.

Peters, Thomas, and Waterman, Robert. 1982. In Search of Excellence. New York, NY:
Warner Books.

Peterson, Willis. 1979. “International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap Food
Policies,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61: 12-21.

Picard, Louis, and, Michele, Garrity. 1994. “ Improving Management Performance in
Aﬁica: Collaborative Intervention Models.” In Louis Picard and Michele Garrity, eds.
Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa: The Institutional Imperative.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press.

299

 

President Hosni Mubarak, “Speech Opening the New Session of the Egyptian Parliament:
November 13, 1985,” AI-Ahram (Cairo Arabic Daily), November 14, 1985.

__, “This Is My Word to the Arab Summit in Amman,” Al- Wotan Al Arabi, no. 34-560,
November 6, 1987: 28-33.

Pressman, Jeffrey, and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1973. Implementation. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Quandt, William. 1990. The United States and Egypt: An Essay on Policy for the I990s.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Quick, Stephen. 1980. “The Paradox of Popularity: ‘Ideological’ Program Implementation
in Zambia.”In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the
Third World. Princeton University Press.

Repetto, Robert. 1986. Skimming the Water: Rent-Seeking and the Performance of Public
Irrigation Systems. Research Report #4. Washington, DC: World Resources
Institute.

Riad, Sherif, Al-Kiat, Amer, and Rashad, Refat. December 21, 1997. “The People’s
Assembly Discusses the Problems of GOGCWS,” Al-Akbar: 7.

Riccucci, Norma. 1995. “Execucrats, Politics and Public Policy: What are the Ingredients
for Successﬁil Performance in the Federal Govemment?,” Public Administration
Review, Vol. 55, no. 3: 219-230.

Riggs, Fred. 1963. “Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View.” In Joseph
la Palambora, Editor. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.

. 1964. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Societies.
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifﬂin

Rivlin, Paul. 1985. The Dynamics of Economic Policy Making in Egypt. Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers Division.

Rodrik, Dani. 1990. “How Should Structural Adjustment Programs be Designed?,” World
Development, Vol. 18, no. 7: 933-47.

Rondinelli, Dennis. 1981 . “Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory
and Practice in Developing Countries,” lntemational Review of Administrative
Sciences, Vol. 67: 133-45.

300

 

. 1983. Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing
Countries. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

. 1986. “Extending Urban Services in Developing Countries: Policy Options and
Organizational Choices,” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 6, No. 1: 1-
21.

. 1987. Development Administration and U.S. Foreign Aid Policy. Boulder, CO:
Lynn Rienner Publishers.

. 1989. Decentralizing Urban Development Programs: Concepts and Guidelines for
Analysis. Washington, DC: Ofﬁce of Housing and Urban Programs, United States
Agency for lntemational Development.

. 1993. Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to
Development Administration. New York, NY: Routledge.

and Cheema, Shabbir. 1988. Urban Services in Developing Countries. London:
Macmillans.

Rose, Tore, editor. 1985. Aid Modalities: Sector Aid as an Instrument in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Paris: OECD Development Center.

Rothenberg, Irene. 1980. “Administrative Decentralization and the Implementers of Housing
Policy in Colombia.” In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation
in the Third World. Princeton University Press.

Roy, Delwin. 1992. “The Hidden Economy in Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No.
4: 689-71 1.

Ruland, Jurgen. 1984. “Political Change, Urban Services, and Social Movements: Political
Participation and Grass-roots Politics in Metro Manila,” Public Administration and
Development, Vol. 4: 325-333.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 1989. New Approaches to the Latin American Debt Crisis. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University.

Sagiv, David. 1995. Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, I973-1993. London:
Frank Cass.

Said, Abdul Monem. 1992. “Privatization in Egypt: The Regional Dimensions.” In Iliya
Harik and Denis Sullivan. Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Sami, Aziza. 1998. “Advocating U.S. Business Interests,” AI-Ahram Weekly English, 26
February-4 March 1998: 9.

301

 

 

Sarris, Alexander. 1987. Agricultural Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Policies in
Developing Countries. FAO Series: Economic and Social Development Paper No.
65. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Schaffer, Bernard. 1982. “Improvement of Access to Public Services.” In Cao Huynh,
editor. Public Administration and Management: Problems of Adaptation in
Different Socio-cultural Contexts. Paris: UNESCO.

Schein, Edgar. 1992. “Deﬁning Organizational Culture,” Reprinted in Shaﬁitz and Ott, eds,
Classics of Organization Theory, 3 ed. Paciﬁc Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Schiavo-campo, Salvatore. l994a. “Institutional Change and the Public Sector: Towards a
Strategic Framework.” In Salvatore Schiavo-campo, editor. Institutional Change and
Public Sector in Transitional Economies. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

. 1994b. “International Cooperation for Institutional Development in The Public
Sector.” In Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, editor. Institutional Change andPublic Sector
in Transitional Economies. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Selznick, Philip. 1949. TVA and the Grassroots. Berkeley. CA: University of California Press.

Shaukat, Ali. 1975. “Creativity in Administration,” Public Administration Review (Lahore
Pak), Vol. XIII, no. 3: 1 - 24.

Sherif, Khaled, and Soos, Regina. 1992. “Egypt’s Liberalization Experience and Its Impact
on State-Owned Enterprises.” In Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan. Privatization and
Liberalization in the Middle East. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Shirley, Mary. 1983. Managing State Owned Enterprises. World Bank Staff Working Paper
577. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Shoukry, Nehal. December 8, 1997. “Continuing the Contracting Method in Government
Recruiting,” AI-Ahram: 13.

Silverman, Jerry. November, 1990. Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy
Reform and Sector Investment Programs. Public Sector Management Division Study
Paper No. 1. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Simon, Herbert. 1945. Administrative Behavior: a Study of Decision-making Processes in
Administrative Organization. New York, NY: Macmillan Co.

. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational; Mathematical Essays on Rational
Human Behavior in Society Setting. New York, NY: Wiley.

. 1992. “The Proverbs of Administration.” Reprinted in Shafritz and Ott, eds.,
Classics of Organization Theory, 3 'ed. Paciﬁc Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

302

 

Singerrnan, Diane. 1995. Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban
Quarters of Cairo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sobhi, Nadia. April 3, 1998b. “The Central Auditing Agency Accuses the Ministry of Health
and The Population Council of Wasting $117 million,” Al- Wafed: 3.

. January 9, 1998a. “Government Businesses in Deep Sleep,” Al-Wafed: 9.

Sobhi, Tarek. March 16, 1998. Effective Administration in the Face of Egyptian Social
Values. Public Lecture at the American University in Cairo.

Soliman, Ibrahim. April 10, 1998. “The Ministers Council Discusses the Status of Potable
Water,” Al-Ahram: 9.

Solomon, Morris, and Heegard, Flemming. 1977 . An Action-T raining Strategy for Project
Management. Development Project Management Center, lntemational Training. U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, mimeographed.

Springborg, Robert. 1982. Family, Power and Politics in Egypt. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press.

. 1989. Mubarak ’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.

Sullivan, Denis. 1987. American Economic Aid to Egypt, 1975-86: Political and
Bureaucratic Struggles over Aid Disbursement and Development Choices. Ph.D.
Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.

. 1990. “Bureaucracy and Foreign Aid in Egypt: The Primacy of Politics.” In
Ibrahim Oweiss, editor. The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt.
Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

. 1994. Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private
Initiative, and State Control. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

. 1996. “American Aid to Egypt 1975-96: Peace Without Development,” Middle
East Policy. Vol. IV, no. 4: 36 - 49.

Sullivan, Earl; Yassin, El-Sayed; Leila, Ali; and Palmer, Monte. Fall, 1990. “Social
Background and Bureaucratic Behavior in Egypt.” Cairo Papers in Social Science,
Volume, 13, Monograph, Three. Cairo: The American University in Cairo.

Sussman, Gerald. 1980. “The Pilot Project and the Choice of an Implementing Strategy:
Community Development in India. “ In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy
Implementation in the Third World. Princeton University Press.

Sven-Erik, deostrand editor. 1993. Institutional Change : Theory andEmpirical Findings.
Armonk, NY: ME. Sharpe.

303

 

Swerdlow, Irving. 1975. The Public Administration of Economic Development. New York,
NY: Praeger.

Temple, Frederick, and Temple, Nelle. 1980. “The Politics of Public Housing in Nairobi.”
In Merilee Grindle, editor. Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World.
Princeton University Press.

Tendler, Judith. 1975. Inside Foreign Aid. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Thompson, Herb. 1998. “The Japanese Economy / Bargaining with Japan: What American
Pressure Can and Cannot Do?” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 28, no. 3: 395
- 399.

Thompson, Victor. 1961. Modern Organizations. New York, NY: Knopf.

. 1965. “Bureaucracy and Innovation,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10:
1 - 20.

. 1969. Bureaucracy and Innovation. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama
Press.

Tirnsit, Gerard. 1982. “Public Administration and Socio-cultural Environment in the
Developing Countries.” In Cao Huynh, editor. Public Administration and
Management: Problems of Adaptation in Different Socio-cultural Contexts. Paris:
UNESCO.

Tonkovic, Stipe. 1982. “Adapting Public Administration for the Management of the Public
Sector of Economy and the Participation of the Workers in Decision-Making and
Self-Management.” In Cao Huynh, editor. Public Administration andManagement:
Problems of Adaptation in Diﬂerent Socio—cultural Contexts. Paris: UNESCO.

U.S. House of Representatives. February 11, 1980. “US Mission and Oﬁice Operations:
Egypt, ” Hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
96th Congress. 2nd session. Washington, DC: U.S. GPO.

United Nations. 1988. Information Systems for Government and Business: Trends, Issues,
Challenges. Nagoya, Japan: Author. Center for Regional Development.

United States Agency for lntemational Development (U SAID). 1985. Conditionality in the
Agency for lntemational Development ’3 Economic Assistance Programs in Six
Countries. Washington, DC: Office of Economic Affairs.

. November, 1990. Local Revenues: Current State and Recommended Course of
Action. Project No.263-0182-3-60054. Cairo: Chemonics lntemational Consulting
Report.

. May, 1992. Country Program Strategy: Eglpt, FY 1992 - I996.

304

 

. January, 1993. Water and Wastewater Sector Study. Report No.10350-EGT.

Cairo: Infrastructure Division, Country Department II, Middle East and North Aﬁica
Region.

. June, 1994a. Management, Training, & Systems Strengthening for the General

Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. Black & Veatch lntemational.
USAID Project No. 263-0193. Cairo: GOGCWS.

. August, 1994b. Audit of the Operation and Maintenance of USAID/Eth Water

and Wastewater Projects. Audit Report No. 6-263-94-008. Cairo: Aid Regional
Inspector General for Audit.

. August, 1995. Audit of Sustainability of USAID/Eth ’s Inﬁastructure Projects.

Audit Report No. 6-263-95-009. Cairo: AID Regional Inspector General for Audit.

. February 1996a. Report on Economic Conditions in Egypt, 1994 - I 995.

. December, 1996b. United States Economic Assistance to Egypt: Status Report.

Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for lntemational Development.

. June, 1996c Evaluation of the Institutional Development Component of the Cairo

Water 11 Project. Environmental Health Project Activity Report no. 23. Cairo:
GOGCWS.

. December 31, 1997 . Management, Training & Systems Strengthening for the

General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply. USAID Project
No.263-0193. Cairo: Black & Veatch lntemational.

. 1997a. The USAID Fiscal Year 1997 Congressional Presentation: Egypt.

United States Department of State. February 20, 1996. U.S. Egyptian Partnership for

Economic Growth and Development: Fact Sheet. (mimeo)

. 1997. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 199 7.
Washington, DC.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 1989. “Privatization in Developing Countries: A Review of the

Issues,” World Development, Vol. 17, no. 5: 601 - 615.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and

Social Equality. New York: Harper.

Vemon-Wortzel, Heidi, and, Wortzel, Lawrence. 1989. “Privatization: Not the Only

Answer,” World Development, Vol.17, no.5: 633 - 641.

Wagdy, Lewis. June 12, 1998. “Outcomes of Education,” AI-Ahram: 10.

305

 

 

Wahba, Mourad. 1983. “The Egyptian Public Sector: The Control Structure and Eﬁciency
Considerations,” Public Administration and Development. Vol. 3: 27 - 37.

Walakira, P. 1982. “The Relevance of Socio-cultural Factors to Public Administration and
Management: The East Aﬁican Experience and Beyond.” In Cao Huynh, editor.
Public Administration and Management: Problems of Adaptation in Drﬂerent
Socio-cultural Contexts. Paris: UNESCO.

Walton, Mary. 1990. Deming Management at Work. New York, NY: Putnam and Sons.

Waterbury, John. 1976. “Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative

Evidence from Egypt and Morocco,” Government and Opposition, Vol. II: 426 -
445.

. 1983. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

_. 1992. “The Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process.”
In Stephen Haggard and Robert Kauﬁnan, editors. The Politics of Economic
Adjustment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

_. 1993. Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in
Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, Robert, and McCluskie Sean. 1994. “U.S. Aid to the Third World: Testing AID
Theories and Programs of the 19808,” Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. XI, no.
2: 202 - 23 9.

Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, and Schneider, Friedrich. 1991. “Determinants ofForeign Aid
Under Alternative Institutional Arrangements.” In The Political Economy of
International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach. Roland Vaubel and
Thomas De Willett, editors. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Weinbaum, Marvin. 1986. Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Economic Aid. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.

Weissert, Carol. 1994. “Beyond the Organization: The Inﬂuence of Community and
Personal Values on Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Responsiveness,” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 4, no. 2: 225 - 254.

Werlin, Herbert. 1992. “Linking Decentralization and Centralization: A Critique of the New
Development Administration,” Public Administration and Development, Vol. 12:
223 - 235.

306

 

 

Wichterrnan, Dana. June, 1994. Export and Investment Promotion in Egypt and Morocco:
A Review of USAID Experience. Washington, DC: USAID Technical Report No.
22

Williamson, Oliver. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications:
a Study in the Economics of Intemal Organization. New York, NY: Free Press.

. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: F irms, Markets, Relational
Contracting. New York: Free Press.

Wilson, James. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.
New York, NY: Basic Books.

World Bank. 1988. Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.

. 1990. Report on Adjustment Lending II: Policies for the Recovery of Growth.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.

. 1992. Governance and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
. 1994. World Debt Tables. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
. 1995. Bureaucrats in Business (Disks). New York, NY.: Oxford University Press.

Yassin, Ali. September 29, 1994. “Cairo a City of One Thousand Staples and Thousands of
Strays,” Al-Wafed: 3.

Yates, Douglas. 1977. The Ungovernable City: the Politics of Urban Problems and Policy
Making. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Yonis, Gamal. April 2, 1998. “The Aid Disaster,” Al-Wafed: 3.

Zaalouk, Malak. 1989. Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New
Bourgeoisie. London, UK: Zed Books Ltd.

Zekry, Nagla. October 1, 1997. “The American Embassador Points to $2 Billion That Are
Not Used of Aid,” Al-Ahram: 12.

Zimmerman, Robert. 1993. Dollars, Diplomacy, and Dependency. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner.

Zulu, Justin, and Saleh Nsouli. 1985. Adjustment Programs in Aﬁ'ica: The Recent
Experience. Washington, DC: lntemational Monetary Fund.

307