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1m chlRC/DdaDuopGS-p.“

 

THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: EVALUATING THE
DETERMINANTS OF AMERICAN THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS, 1918-1994

By

Brandon C. Prins

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Political Science

1 999

ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: EVALUATING THE
DETERMINANTS OF AMERICAN THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS, 1918-1994

By

Brandon C. Prins

Research indicates that the settlement of democratic disputes frequently relies
upon neutral third-party states. Indeed, some scholars suggest that the paciﬁc effects of
liberal regimes are not so much a function of their ability to avoid conﬂict, but rather
their capacity to resolve conﬂicts short of armed hostilities (Raymond, 1994; Bremer,
1993). It is not clear, however, what conditions lead certain states to take on a role as a
third-party diplomat. Given that in the post-Cold War world the United States and other
great powers have been frequently called upon to provide regional stability by preventing
the escalation of burgeoning interstate disputes, it seems prudent to systematically
account for these attempts at conﬂict resolution. U.S. involvement in the Ecuador-Peru
border conﬂict, for instance, helped facilitate the recent peace agreement. Similarly, U.S.
intervention in the Bosnian crisis was instrumental in crafting the Dayton Peace Accord.
If attempts at conﬂict resolution are coming to occupy a more prominent position in the
foreign policies of the major powers, then there is a need to understand when and how
such intervention has been used in the past. Likewise, if the intervention of neutral third-
party states can substantially alter the dynamics of a bilateral struggle, then to fully
understand the causes and consequences of interstate conﬂict we need to have some

understanding of the role played by third parties.

In this study, I develop a modiﬁed realist model of neutral U.S. third-party
interventions in ongoing interstate crises. I assert that systemic threat, domestic political
opposition, and crisis saliency all enter into the decision calculus of a president when
considering whether to help manage burgeoning conﬂicts abroad. Both salience and
threat are purported here to encourage conﬂict resolution attempts by a US. president.
That is, as national security looms larger in the minds of foreign policy decision makers,
the US. should increasingly seek to protect its interests abroad through active
international involvement. Domestic-political opposition, however, is asserted here to
deter executives from contributing political, economic, or military aid to states in conﬂict.
As domestic-political opposition increases, presidents should be increasingly unlikely to
initiate potentially costly foreign policy endeavors. I test these theoretical propositions on
a set of 356 interstate crises coded by the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB)
dataset. Logistic and Poisson regression, plus time series analyses are used to evaluate the
inﬂuence systemic threat, domestic constraints, and crisis saliency all have on the foreign
policy decisions of a president.

The empirical evidence I ﬁnd strongly demonstrates that all three components of
the theoretical model play a role in US. conﬂict resolution attempts. Not only is US.
third-party intervention behavior associated with broad systemic—level changes. But,
geographic salience and domestic-political conditions also are related to interstate conﬂict
resolution efforts abroad. First, I ﬁnd that increases in systemic threat tend to increase
attempts at conﬂict resolution, particularly when the intervention decision involves the
commitment of military troops or personnel. Second, the results show both Soviet

involvement and geographic location to inﬂuence U.S. intervention decisions. Not

W?"

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surf-K

surprisingly, the propensity to intervene is positively related to Soviet involvement.
What’s more, the US. appears notably more willing to intervene in conﬂicts close to
home, with crises in Central and South America receiving considerable American
attention, while conﬂicts in the African region are only infrequently addressed. The
empirical evidence also shows congressional opposition to moderate conﬂict resolution
attempts while domestic economic conditions seem to incite U.S. peace-making
endeavors. These results demonstrate the sometimes contradictory pull of domestic-
political forces on presidential foreign policy decision-making. Finally, the evidence here
provides further support for the importance of regime type in US. foreign policy
decision-making. In both the interwar and post-World War II periods, democratic
governments involved in crisis situations were much more likely to receive US. aid than

states with authoritarian regimes.

 

 

To the memory of my Grandfathers
Their pursuit of knowledge served as an inspiration

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The core theme of this dissertation has its genesis in a research design proposal
written for Gretchen Hower’s international relations course at Michigan State University.
The fundamental concern driving that proposal was conﬂict resolution. Simply put, I
wanted to understand how states resolve their conﬂicts of interest, and as Jacob
Bercovitch writes, third-party involvement is “both an obvious and ingenious way of
managing, or dealing with, conﬂict.” At the same time, however, I have been continually
interested in the foreign policy decision—making of nation-states: why certain decisions
are taken rather than others. This dissertation is an attempt to provide insight into both
research areas.

Many people have contributed in a variety of ways to the writing of this
dissertation. First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee members: Scott
Gates, Dave Rohde, Tom Hammond, and Jim Granato. The advice, guidance, and support
given by each of these scholars has been inimitable. I must admit, though, that I did not
willfully intend my committee to span such a diverse range of research areas in political
science. Fortunately, this meant each member of my committee brought a unique
perspective to bear on my work which in the end certainly made this project a learning
experience, despite the minor difﬁculties it created when it came to satisfying demands.

Scott Gates deserves much praise. Although Scott’s departmental responsibilities

were substantial, and his trips to Norway frequent, he consistently found the time to

vi

review my work and offer insights into how it could be improved. Scott is a good friend
who has never hesitated to voice his opinion or point out my bad ideas before I have
invested too much time in them.

I am also extremely grateful for Dave Rohde’s support and guidance throughout
graduate school. He brought me on as a PIPC Fellow my ﬁrst year at Michigan State and
kept me on for the next 4 years. While I fought the good ﬁght, I was inevitably drawn
into a world of roll-call votes, congressional committees, and theories of legislative
organization. I cannot thank Dave enough for the opportunities and the intellectual
insights he has provided me.

Tom Hammond has also had an important inﬂuence on me. Not only did Tom
diligently read through all the material I placed in his box, but from the very beginning of
our collaborative work he always impressed upon me the importance of the larger
theoretical picture. I am also convinced that he is the only faculty member to read draft
dissertation chapters before breakfast or morning coffee. I must also thank Jim Granato
who, despite having misplaced loyalties to Chicago sports teams, always had time for a
methods question.

A special thanks must also be given to Gretchen Hower. This dissertation is in
part dedicated to her for all of her help. My introduction to the study of international
politics came from one of her graduate seminars. Gretchen is both a gifted scholar and an
outstanding person. I only hope that I can demonstrate a modicum of the concern she
showed for her students and for scientiﬁc rigor.

I would be remiss if I did not mention my many colleagues at Michigan State.

Thanks go to Renee Agress, Sara Benesh, Chris Butler, Jamie Carson, Erich Duchesne,

vii

Charles Finocchiaro, Mark Hurwitz, Matt Kleiman, Dave Lektzian, Bryan Marshall, Sara
Mitchell, Roger Moiles, Mark Souva, and Chris Sprecher. At one time or another each
had a helpful insight or word of encouragement for which I remain grateful. Special
thanks go to Sara for her advice as both a scholar and a friend. My ﬁrst academic
publication was a collaborative effort with Sara for which I always will be thankful.
Special thanks also go to Bryan for being a great friend. Although a student of the US.
Congress, Bryan always was willing to read drafts of my work. With ﬁve collaborative
efforts already under our belts, I only expect more in the future.

Several other colleagues deserve recognition as well for their support and
encouragement over the years: Darren Davis, Ada Finifter, Malinda Hall, Bill Hixon,
Mark Jones, Dennis Patterson, Reginald Sheehan, Brian Silver, Harold Spaeth, Barry
Stein, Jerry Weinberger, Carol Weissert, and Ken Williams. Of course, thanks also must
be given to Karen Battin, Rhonda Burns, Iris Dunn, and Elaine Eschtruth, for graciously
putting up with me.

Finally, I would like thank my family, especially my loving wife. Each has
provided inspiration and support in their own unique way. However, my wife, a southern
California native, left the sunshine behind to join me here in Michigan. I cannot thank her
enough for the sacriﬁces she has made throughout the time we have been here. Her love,

support, and patience truly kept me sane.

viii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................. xi
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................. xiii
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 1
DOMESTIC-POLITICAL INTERESTS, DIVERSIONARY TACTICS,
AND PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS ....... 10
The Domestic—Intemational Nexus ..................................................... 13
Realism and the External Environment ....................................... 15
The Role of Domestic Politics ................................................. 19
Decision Making During the Clinton and Eisenhower Administrations ........... 23
Clinton and the Bosnian Crisis of 1995 ...................................... 23
Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954 ............... 25
Diversionary Tactics and Institutional Constraints ................................... 27
Do Leaders Divert? ............................................................. 32
Institutional Constraints ........................................................ 38
Conclusion ................................................................................ 42
CHAPTER 2
SYSTEMIC THREAT, DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND CRISIS SALIENCY:
MODELING THE DECISION TO INTERVENE ............................................ 50
Intervening in Foreign Interstate Conﬂicts ............................................ 52
Intervention ............................................................................... 54
Theoretical Assumptions ....................................................... 57
The Decision Calculus .......................................................... 59
Interstate Crises and American Foreign Policy: Testable Propositions ............ 63
Conclusion ................................................................................ 75
CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL BEGINNINGS ................................................................... 79
Unit of Analysis .......................................................................... 79
Endogenous Variables ................................................................... 81
Event-Count Model ............................................................. 81
Logistic Model .................................................................. 84
Multinomial Logistic Model ................................................... 85
Exogenous Variables .................................................................... 85
Systemic Threat ................................................................. 86
Domestic-Political ............................................................... 88
Crisis Saliency .................................................................. 90
Conclusion ................................................................................ 93
ix

Li'-

 

CHAPTER 4
TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES:

POISSON REGRESSION ANALYSIS ...................................................... 113
The Poission Model .................................................................... 114
Poisson Regression: 1918-1994 ...................................................... 116

Partisan Effects ................................................................. 120
President Effects ............................................................... 121
Conclusion ............................................................................... 122

CHAPTER 5

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES:

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS ..................................................... 130
The Logistic Model ..................................................................... 132
Logistic Results: 1918-1994 ........................................................... 133
Logistic Results: Alternative Speciﬁcations .......................................... 139
Diverting Attention to Foreign Affairs ................................................ 141
Predicted Probabilities .................................................................. 145
Conclusion ............................................................................... 147

CHAPTER 6

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES:

MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC ANALYSIS ................................................... 160
Substitutability in Foreign Policy ..................................................... 161
The Multinomial Logistic Model ...................................................... 163
Results ................................................................................... 165
Conclusion ............................................................................... 1 68

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 175

APPENDIX A .................................................................................... 189

APPENDD( B .................................................................................... 190

APPENDIX C .................................................................................... 191

APPENDIX D .................................................................................... 192

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 193

x

“it. “MP

Table 1:

Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:

Table 6:

Table 7:

Table 8:
Table 9:

Table 10:

Table 1 1:

Table 12:

Table 13:

Table 14:

Table 15:

Table 16:

LIST OF TABLES

A Comparison of the Hypotheses of Two Theories of Foreign Policy

Decision Making ................................................................ 46
Empirical Results From Recent Diversionary Theory Research ........... 48
Basic Operationalization of Important Theoretical Components ........... 77
Hypotheses to be Tested Against ICB Data .................................. 78

Frequency of US. Involvement as a Third Party in Interstate Crises,
1918-1994 ....................................................................... 95

Frequency of US. Involvement as a Third Party in Interstate Crises,
1918-1994 ....................................................................... 96

Operationalization of Important Theoretical Components (Additional
Exogenous-Variable Speciﬁcations) .......................................... 97

Frequencies and Relative Frequencies of System Level .................... 98

Regional Variation in Interstate Crises and US. Involvement,
1918-1994 ....................................................................... 99

Regional Variation in the Level of US. Third-Party Crisis Involvement,
1918-1994 ...................................................................... 100

Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on US.
Third-Party Crisis Intervention, 1918-1994 ................................ 124

Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on US.
Third-Party Crisis Intervention With Additional Temporal Dummies
(Lag Variable Included), 1918-1994 ........................................ 125

Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on US.
Third-Party Crisis Intervention With Additional Temporal Dummies
(Lag Variable Excluded), 1918-1994 ........................................ 126

Poisson Regression Evaluating Different Election-year Speciﬁcations,
1918-1994 ...................................................................... 127

Poisson Regression with Alternative Speciﬁcation for Political
Opposition, 1918-1994 ....................................................... 128

Poisson Regression Examining the Role of the Party of the President,
1918-1994 ...................................................................... 129

xi

 

Table 17:
Table 18:
Table 19:
Table 20:

Table 21:

Table 22:

Table 23:

Table 24:

Table 25:

Table 26:

Table 27:

Table 28:
Table 29:
Table 30:
Table 31:

Logistic Results, Equation 1, 1918-1994 ................................... 150
Logistic Results, Equation 2, 1918-1994 ................................... 151
Logistic Results, Equation 3, 1918—1994 ................................... 152

Logistic Results, Equation 4, 1918-1994
(Excluding World War II Cases) ............................................. 153

Logistic Results, Equation 5, 1935-1994
(Excluding World War 11 Cases) ............................................. 154

Logistic Results, Equation 6, 1918-1994
(Excluding World War H Cases) ............................................. 155

Logistic Results, Equation 7, 1918-1994
(Excluding World War II Cases) ............................................. 156

Marginal Effects on Changes in the Probability of Third-Party Crisis
Intervention, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War 11 Cases) ............... 157

Multinomial Logistic Model of Domestic, Systemic, and Crisis-Speciﬁc
Variables on US. Third-Party Involvement in Interstate Crises,
1918-1994 ...................................................................... 170

Multinomial Logistic Model of Domestic, Systemic, and Crisis-Speciﬁc
Variables on US. Third-Party Involvement in Interstate Crises,

1918-1994 (Excluding World War 11 Cases) ............................... 172
Estimated Coefﬁcients of Multinomial Logit Models Moving from No

Involvement to a Higher Level of Involvement ............................ 174
Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Results ........................... 188
Chapter Four Correlation Table .............................................. 189
Chapter Five Correlation Table ............................................... 191
Mean Values for Exogenous Variables, 1918-1994 ....................... 192

xii

‘6 U” _‘.Iixﬁ“? 1’3]

mo:

Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:

Figure 4:

Figure 5:
Figure 6:
Figure 7:

Figure 8:

Figure 9:

Figure 10:
Figure 1 1:

Figure 12:
Figure 13:

Figure 14:

Figure 15:

Figure 16:

LIST OF FIGURES

Forces Affecting Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Affairs ....... 14
US. Neutral Third-Party Interventions by Year, 1918-1994 ............ 101
US. Neutral Third-Party Crisis Interventions Abroad, by President,
1918-1994 ...................................................................... 102
Interstate Crises Involving the US. as a Primary Actor,

1918-1994 ...................................................................... 103
ACF of US. Neutral Third-Party Involvement ............................ 104
PACF of US. Neutral Third—Party Involvement .......................... 105
US. Political and Military Involvement in Interstate Crises,

1918-1994 ...................................................................... 106
Ratio of US. Military Expenditures to Soviet Expenditures,

1918-1994 ...................................................................... 107
US. Share of International System’s Military Expenditures and
Personnel, 1918-1994 ......................................................... 108
US. Military Expenditures (First Difference), 1918-1994 ............... 109
House and Senate Seats Held by the President’s Party,

1918-1994 ...................................................................... 110
US. Unemployment Rate, 1934-1994 ..................................... 111
Percent Change in the US. Gross National Product (GNP),

1918-1994 ...................................................................... 112
Inﬂuence of Outliers on US. Third-Party Crisis Intervention,

1918-1994 ...................................................................... 158
US. Propensity to Intervene as a Neutral Third-Party in an Interstate
Crisis, 1918-1994 ............................................................. 159
Histogram of Event-Count Model Dependent Variable .................... 190

xiii

 

INTRODUCTION

The existence of broad national agreement on matters of foreign
policy, the fluidity of the parties, and the strong position of the
president enable one to say that any crucial problem of foreign policy
will be acted upon in terms that the president himself sets (Waltz,
1967: 118-119).

Almost all the natural defects of democracies are to the fore in the

conduct of foreign aﬂairs, whereas its good qualities are hardly to be
seen (Tocqueville, 1988 [1848]: 226)

The United States in a New International Environment

Events in the late 19805 and early 1990s dramatically transformed the
international environment. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, for example, was
followed with breath-taking speed by a failed military coup in August of 1991 in Moscow
that eventually led to the dismantling of the Soviet regime. In the midst of these two
profound incidents, a multinational military force comprised of over 20 sovereign states
was assembled that successfully checked Iraqi aggression in the Middle East. Such events
led President George Bush to declare the emergence of a “new world order”; a world
characterized by the deterrence of aggression and the peaceful settlement of interstate

disputes (The Economist, February 23, 1991).I

 

' Interesting, the transformation of the international system has generated other dilemmas that Cold War
security structures have been ineffective at resolving (Rotfeld, 1997: 14). Indeed, the Cold War’s demise
was partly responsible for liberating pent-up rivalries between ethnic groups, as well as contributing to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both of which the international community has been slow to

The systemic changes, in addition, have reduced tensions between the major
powers.2 According to one recent survey, “one of the new order’s basic deﬁning
characteristics is the relationship between the major powers and the fact that none of them
is currently preparing for conﬂict with another” (Rotfeld, 1997: 4). As a result, the role of
military power in interstate affairs has unequivocally waned in importance (Luttwak,
1990).3 Post-Cold War cooperation between Russia and the United States has also
reinforced the importance of regime type (i.e., the values that tend to direct government
policy) in helping to facilitate understanding, and reduce uncertainty, among state leaders
(Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Partell, 1997). As two of the most important
world powers, their willingness to sustain a dialogue on international security has helped
manage emerging conﬂicts of interest between these two nations, as well as those
emerging between other states.4

However, at the same time as these systemic changes have made interstate
conﬂict prevention and resolution increasingly possible, the important global players

have tended to focus predominately on domestic concerns. Indeed, many of the major

 

address. John Mearsheimer (1990) even suggested that the United States may look back fondly on the
stability of the Cold War, as a multipolar environment characterized by turbulence and transition begins to
emerge (see also Waltz, 1964, 1993; and Layne, 1993).

2 Les Aspin, former secretary of defense, summarized the vagaries of the post-Cold War world as a
member of Congress: “In the old world there was only one thing that posed a threat. It was the Soviet
Union. In the new world, there will be diverse threats. In the old world, the very survival of our nation was
at stake. In the new world, the interests of our nation will be at risk. In the old world, we knew what
threatened us. In the new world, we will have to learn what threatens us...” (quoted in Kegley and
Wittkopf, 1996: 88).

3 For the major powers, national security and the Cold War threat no longer dominate the foreign policy
agenda. Indeed, the deterrent use of force has become less relevant as an instrument of policy. As Keohane
and Nye (1996: 243) suggested, “foreign affairs agendas--that is, sets of issues relevant to foreign policy
with which governments are concemed--have become larger and more diverse. [Therefore], no longer can
all issues be subordinated to military security.”

powers seem loathe to commit their country’s resources to, in the words of one scholar,
“export democracy abroad.”5 The Clinton administration, for instance, despite the
systemic changes, or perhaps because of them, was convinced that its mandate was
conﬁned to internal affairs and initially downgraded the importance of foreign policy
issues. Admittedly, with polls revealing that Americans are unwilling to sustain a
unilateral and activist approach to foreign affairs and external threats to security nearly
nonexistent, any administration would ﬁnd it difficult to galvanize core domestic groups
for a vigorous foreign policy agenda.6 Seemingly as a consequence, the Clinton
administration initially avoided security issues, focusing instead on questions of
economic interdependence, such as NAFTA, the APEC summit, and most-favored nation
trade status with China.7

What’s more, in the US. at least, the general public continues to hold disparate
views as to what should prompt the commitment of resources abroad. According to
Brooks and Kanter (1994: 22-23), the variation in viewpoints virtually spans the possible
options executives have available. Many neo-isolationists maintain that there are few

external threats to our interests serious enough to justify costly foreign policy initiatives

 

‘ According to former National Security Council member Arnold Kanter (1994: 136), Russia remains a
prominent threat to our national security. However, “it is a national security [threat] for which our
traditional foreign policy instruments, particularly military capabilities, are virtually irrelevant.”

5 See Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America 's Destiny. Washington, DC: The AEI
Press, 1992. Muravchik maintains that the promotion of democracy abroad should be an important
component of American foreign policy.

6 According to the Strategic Survey 1996/9 7, conﬂict in the post-Cold War era has tended to be regional or
internal in character, and has thus failed to arouse the interests of the great powers.

7 According to The Economist (November 23, 1996: 24), the Clinton administration’s focus on economic
interests led it to “advance the Commerce Department at the expense of the State Department-and to
allow trade-dispute brinkmanship to endanger carefully balanced security relations.” To be fair, though,
the importance of geoeconomics was certainly evident in the Bush administration. His ill-fated trip to Japan

was largely organized by the Commerce Department and had everything to do with American jobs (Kanter,
1 994).

.__. g”...
“'27.

such as military interventions. Others, though, would use US. resources for narrowly
conﬁned issues, such as protecting American jobs. Still, on the other side of ideological
spectrum, according to Brooks and Kanter (1994: 23) we can ﬁnd those who insist “that
we should intervene to promote American values of democracy and human rights, as well
as to relieve suffering and prevent “ethnic cleansing,” even if there is no direct security
impact on the United States.” Such ideological diversity regarding US. foreign policy
often constrains a president’s leeway to act decisively in international affairs. Yet at the
same time, administrations are also provided the opportunity to shape public opinion and
consequently generate the domestic and international coalitions necessary for foreign

policy initiatives.8

Testing the Determinants of US. Conﬂict-Resolution Attempts

In this dissertation, I directly address the determinants of US. foreign policy
activism, concentrating speciﬁcally on conﬂict-resolution endeavors. That is, I examine
the factors which lead a president to intervene as a neutral third party into interstate crisis
situations.9 Presumably, discerning the conditions that lead a US. president to commit
resources to help prevent an impending attack on another state is a worthwhile empirical
exercise. As such, I offer a theoretical model and empirical test of the circumstances, both
domestic and systemic, that lead U.S. presidents to intervene abroad. I argue that

systemic threat, domestic-political opposition, and crisis saliency all enter into the

 

3 Rosenau (1981: 42) averred that “changes in foreign policy are most likely to occur when developments
at home give rise to new needs and wants with respect to their environment, or when developments abroad
give rise to potential threats to their essential structures” (also see Rosati, et al., 1994).

’ Neutrality refers to the intentions of the third-party intervening state. According to the coding rules
established by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 849), third-party states are disinterested parties concerned

decision calculus of executives when calculating the costs and beneﬁts of third-party
intervention.

Analytically speaking, scholars should not dismiss the important role played by
third-party actors. Indeed, the decision-making of third-party states has meaningful
implications for many well-researched aspects of international politics. For one, there are
distinct differences between conﬂict initiators and conﬂict joiners (Gochman, 1996).
Pairing every state on one side with every other state on the other regardless of when or
how they entered a conﬂict may tend to mask some important relationships. Second,
research on alliance-behavior has generally failed to account for the decision-making of a
state faced with a choice of whether or not to honor a deterrent pledge. However, research
on such decision-making can seemingly shed some light on the reliability of democratic
alliance commitments. Lastly, empirical research indicates that the settlement of
democratic disputes frequently relies upon neutral third-party states. Yet, it is not clear
what conditions lead certain states to take on the role of a third-party diplomat. And,
equally important, little evidence exists for determining the success of these conﬂict-
resolution efforts.

Fundamental questions in international politics cannot be fully understood
without considering the role of third parties. Given that in the post-Cold War world the
United States and other great powers have been frequently called upon to provide
regional stability by preventing the escalation of burgeoning interstate disputes, it seems

prudent to systematically account for these attempts at conﬂict resolution. U.S.

 

only with facilitating the termination of the interstate dispute. Non-neutral third parties are states that join
interstate conﬂicts on one side or the other.

involvement in the Ecuador-Peru border conﬂict, for instance, helped facilitate the recent
peace agreement. Similarly, U.S. intervention in the Bosnian crisis was instrumental in
crafting the Dayton Peace Accord. If attempts at conﬂict resolution are coming to occupy
a more prominent position in the foreign policies of the major powers (Snow, 1998), then
there is a need to understand when and how such intervention has been used in the past.10
Likewise, if the intervention of neutral third-party states can substantially alter the
dynamics of a bilateral struggle (Huth, 1998; Smith, 1996; Snow, 1998), then to fully
understand the causes and consequences of interstate conﬂict we need to have some
understanding of the role played by third parties.

To date, little theoretical or empirical attention has been devoted to understanding
third-party conﬂict resolution. For instance, theories of foreign policy have largely been
conﬁned to decisions involving the use of military force. However, as Lindsay, et a1.
(1992: 6) noted “decisions to use force cover only a fraction of the foreign policy choices
available to the president.” Hence, to comprehensively explain presidential decision-
making in foreign affairs, scholars need to account for cooperative strategies, as well as
conﬂictual ones. Not only may the forces driving conﬂict-resolution attempts differ from
those driving non-neutral or war-joining interventions. But similar to political uses of
force, heads of state may ﬁnd peace-making endeavors useful for rallying public support
behind government policies (see Lindsay, et al., 1992).

The actions of third-party states, then, can provide an additional avenue for

research on theories of foreign policy decision-making. That is, an understanding of the

 

‘0 For example, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan helped resolve a crisis between Yugoslavia and Italy
over Albania in the mid-19205.

factors that inﬂuence the decision to intervene in a burgeoning conﬂict situation can be
useful, if not necessary, for the development of a comprehensive theory of foreign policy
decision-making. As such, I intend this research to speak to the ongoing debate between
neo-realist scholars who maintain that politics stops (should stop?) at the water’s edge
and scholars who insist that domestic-political demands have a systematic and
meaningful inﬂuence on the foreign policy decisions of state leaders. Only by examining
the empirical record of foreign policy decision-making can scholars determine whether
systemic indicators such as threat and power tend to overwhelm the domestic-political
concerns of state leaders. The multi-level model developed in this dissertation tests

suppositions drawn from both neo-realist and liberal theories of international politics.‘l

Outline of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, decision-making surrounding neutral U.S. third-party
interventions is used as a lens to examine how systemic and domestic forces inﬂuence
foreign policy decisions. The empirical evidence I ﬁnd strongly demonstrates that all
three components of the theoretical model play a role in US. conﬂict—resolution attempts.
Not only is US. third-party intervention behavior associated with broad systemic-level
changes. But, geographic salience and domestic-political conditions also are related to
US. interstate conﬂict-resolution efforts abroad.

In Chapter One, I review previous research on foreign policy decision-making,

paying particular attention to work on the diversionary use of force and on the

 

” According to Deborah Gemer (1991: 125), “foreign policy analysis is somewhat unusual in that it deals
with both domestic and the international political arenas, jumping from individual to state to systemic

- - -:—-—-—-.—-—.-—-w

Vu

institutional constraints leg of the democratic peace research program. Crucial to this
discussion are the theoretical and empirical discrepancies that appear in these two sets of
research. I additionally compare and contrast a realist approach to foreign policy
decision-making with an approach that incorporates domestic-political demands.

In Chapter Two, I develop a rudimentary decision-theoretic model of executive
decision-making that is based on three crucial factors: (1) systemic threat, (2) domestic-
political opposition, and (3) crisis saliency. I argue that the decision to intervene as a
neutral third-party state is determined by the executive’s subjective estimation of these
three conditions. From this model, I derive testable hypotheses regarding the inﬂuence of
both important domestic and intemational-level forces. I also examine the salience to
US. security of each speciﬁc crisis at hand, a variable which often gets ignored by large-
N empirically-oriented scholars.

In Chapter Three, I discuss the data used to empirically test the theoretical
propositions presented in Chapter Two. First, I operationalize concepts discussed in this
second chapter. Then, I present basic descriptive statistics that highlight important
characteristics of both the endogenous and exogenous variables.

In Chapter Four, I present an event-count model of neutral U.S. third-party
interventions into interstate crises that attempts to conﬁrm and extend Gowa’s 1998
ﬁndings on US. uses of force. Particular attention is paid to how crisis interventions are
affected by both systemic and domestic forces. Plus, temporal dynamics are

systematically addressed to prevent biased and inefﬁcient estimation results.

_‘

levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these into a coherent whole.” As a result, the study of a
state’s foreign policy, any state’s, presents a formidable challenge, both theoretically and empirically.

In Chapter Five, a multivariate logistic model is explicated that incorporates crisis
saliency into the executive decision calculus. A weakness of the event-count approach is
that important characteristics of each crisis cannot be controlled for in the empirical
model. The logistic analysis is designed in part to incorporate crisis saliency into the
estimation and evaluate its relative importance in the decision to intervene. Similar to
research on the use of force, such as Ostrom and Job (1986), Morgan and Bickers (1992),
and Meernik and Waterman (1996), close attention will be given to the interaction
between domestic level variables, systemic structure, and presidential foreign policy
choice.

In Chapter Six, a multinomial logit model is introduced that extends the initial
logit model by systematically accounting for the level of US. involvement. Clearly, some
interstate crises receive greater American attention than others. Indeed, diplomatic
involvement is often sufﬁcient depending on the nature of the conﬂict, and the domestic
and systemic circumstances in which it evolves. However, to fully understand foreign
policy decision-making, attention needs to be given to how commitment and resolve are
inﬂuenced by both systemic and domestic-level factors. That is, what conditions lead
U.S. presidents to spend scarce resources and political capital to help prevent the
escalation of disputes abroad?

I conclude in Chapter Seven with a summary of what has been learned and offer

suggestions on how this research can be extended in the future.

CHAPTER 1

DOMESTIC-POLITICAL INTERESTS, DIV ERSIONARY TACTICS, AND
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Statesmen may be driven to a policy of foreign conﬂict--if not open
war--in order to defend themselves against the onslaught of domestic
enemies (Haas and Whiting, 1956: 62).

The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and
straightforward and more uniﬁed than the counsels of sophisticated
men of aﬂairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a
game of power and are playing for high stakes. That is why I have said
that this is a people 's war, not a statesman ’s. Statesmen must follow
the clarified common thought or be broken (Wilson, 191 7: 1).

[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might

on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation (Simmel, 1898:
832).

There is a need to account for the foreign policy decisions of nation-states. While
the realist paradigm remains prominent in international relations, the democratic peace
proposition has presented a serious challenge to its preeminent position. Empirical
evidence continues to demonstrate that democracies avoid high levels of conﬂict with one
another (Chan, 1984; Bremer, 1992; Russett, 1990; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Gleditsch,
1995; Ray, 1995; Gates and McLaughlin, 1996). Yet, there remains substantial

disagreement over what it is about democratic decision processes that leads them to avoid

10

such hostility, and many scholars admit that large-N dyadic studies cannot provide the
answer to such a question (see for example, Singer, 1994).1

Interestingly, some scholars suggest that the paciﬁc effects of liberal regimes may
not so much be a function of their ability to avoid conﬂict, but rather their capacity to
resolve conﬂicts short of armed hostilities (Raymond, 1994; Bremer, 1993). For instance,
research by Bercovitch (1996), Dixon (1993), and Raymond (1994) indicates that
democratic regimes have a higher propensity to resolve their disputes through the use of
third—party intermediaries. That is, democracies appear to be more likely than non-
democracies to submit to the peace-making attempts of third-party states. Indeed,
Raymond (1994: 27) concluded that “disputes between democracies rarely escalate to
war because each side expects the other to rely on peaceful means of conﬂict resolution.”

Similarly, Raknerud and Hegre (1997) show that democracies have a tendency to
aid other democracies engaged in conﬂict. Not only may this empirical result help explain
the lack of evidence for a monadic-level democratic peace, but it also demonstrates that
third-party states may play a crucial role in crisis bargaining.2 In fact, Smith (1996) has
even suggested that the decisions of state leaders to initiate hostilities cannot be fully

understood without accounting for the potential third-party participant.

 

‘ Critics continue to insist that the lack of war between democratic states is a statistical anomaly that is
driven by both the rarity of war and the rarity of democracy, as well as by the arbitrary operationalizations
of both concepts. Proponents, however, contend that democratic institutions serve as a signal to other
states. They convey a message of trustworthiness. Indeed, Huntley (1996: 58) insisted that, “the most
important qualityl that a republican government brings to [the] table is not a ‘peaceful disposition,’ but
rather a capability to be trusted” (quoted in Chan, I997: 81). Political ideology, then, serves as a simple
and effective way of distinguishing ally from adversary (Elman, 1997).

2 Monadic-level, that is state-centered, conﬂict behavior may require further empirical research. Most of
the evidence collected to date shows democratic regimes to be equally as conﬂict-prone as non-democratic
ones. However, if democracies demonstrate a propensity to aid like regimes in peril, the monadic-level
results may be heavily affected by joining behavior.

11

 

Given these important ﬁndings regarding the effects third parties have on
interstate interactions, there clearly is a need to understand the decision calculus of the
potential intervening state, rather than merely the actions of the original states in conﬂict.
For instance, why does the US. intervene as a third party in certain conﬂicts but not in
others? Such decision-making has rarely been addressed by international relations
scholars. Indeed, not only do we know very little about the war-joining behavior of states,
but we know even less about the conditions surrounding third-party conﬂict resolution
efforts.3 Given that the democratic peace proposition is fundamentally a theory of foreign
policy, perhaps what is needed is a closer examination of the foreign policy decisions of
individual third-party states, and the domestic contexts in which these decisions are
made.4

Of concern in this dissertation is the third-party decision-making of US.
presidents. Similar to models of conﬂict initiation, I insist that peace-making endeavors
are inﬂuenced by both power-based and domestic-political considerations. Accordingly, I
discuss in this ﬁrst chapter the domestic and systemic demands made on presidents when
it comes to foreign policy decision-making. In particular, I focus on how the inclusion of
domestic-political concerns can measurably improve our understanding of international
politics. I then present two brief illustrations of executive decision-making in foreign

affairs that highlight the important interactive role played by democratic political

 

3 Considerable research exists on alliance behavior in general, and even more speciﬁcally on whether states
honor their deterrent obligations (see for example, Walt, I987; Huth, 1988; Morrow, 1993; Huth and
Russett, 1988). However, as Huth (1998: 45) noted, there is little systematic work that accounts for the
decision making of third-party states when confronted with an interstate crisis.

‘ Elman (1997: 490) has argued that the United States, more than other democratic states, tends to “identify
friends and foes on the basis of regime type.” Therefore, it may be wise to examine more closely whether
foreign policy decision-making in the US. does sustain the democratic peace proposition.

12

institutions and systemic structure. One includes decision-making within the Clinton
administration over the Bosnian crisis. The second involves Eisenhower’s actions during
the offshore islands crisis in 1954. I then elaborate further on the role played by domestic
politics by comparing and contrasting two distinct theories of foreign policy decision-
making that propound very different hypotheses. I conclude with a discussion of the
modiﬁed realist model of presidential decision-making that is explicated in Chapter Two
which incorporates domestic, systemic, and crisis-speciﬁc factors into the executive’s

decision calculus.

The Domestic-International Nexus
Foreign policy emanates from the interaction of domestic and system-level forces.
In an increasingly interdependent world, US. interests are undeniably affected by the
decisions of other governing bodies, such as international organizations and nation-state
governments. Peterson (1994: 22) concluded that, “If a country is going to be led by
statesmen who take into account the long-term interests of the nation, then policy must be
rooted in accurate assessments of the international situation, not based on myths or
ideological thinking.” Certainly, US. trade and defense policy, issues of arms control
and disarmament, and the politics of environmental regulation necessarily require
attention to the preferences of other state actors and the potential spillover effects of
uncoordinated decision-making. Yet, as Russett (1990) pointed out, foreigners do not
Vote, and consequently democratically-elected leaders demonstrate a propensity to

Conciliate domestic constituencies in spite of the adverse international effects.

13

Figure 1 illustrates important internal and external forces inﬂuencing presidential
decision-making in foreign affairs. While most scholars of international politics would
acknowledge the validity of a two-level approach to foreign policy, the dominant
paradigm has largely tended to ignore important domestic-political structures and their
effects on elite decision-making. Indeed, realist explanations of foreign policy behavior
consistently affirm the primacy of structural features of the international system, such as
the organization of states and the relative diffusion of economic and military capabilities.
However, a purely structural approach to international politics fails to provide an

adequate explanation for the individual actions of nation-states (Moon, 1991).

Figure 1: Forces Affecting Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Affairs

 

 

Domestic Forces

‘l

External Forces

 

Political Opposition Public Opinion Threat
Elections Economy 41 Saliency
Capabilities

Alliance Ties

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PreT'dent

Foreign Policy Decision-Making

l4

Realism and the External Environment

Realist thought, or perhaps more accurately neo-realist thought, correctly
recognizes the role external forces play in foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, a
state’s foreign policy is largely designed to secure its political and economic interests in
the midst of a potentially dangerous international order. Consequently, democratically
elected leaders are charged with the responsibility of placing the national interest ahead of
personal electoral fortune. As Huth (1996: 43) wrote, “the resource commitments and
attention to the necessities of national security would be expected to override the needs of
domestic policy programs or the pressures emanating from the competition with
counterelites for maintaining positions of political power.”

Realism further asserts a clear hierarchy in the foreign policy goals of a state (see
Waltz, 1979). Generally, issues of ‘high politics,’ such as territorial integrity, take
precedent over ‘low politics’ issues such as trade and immigration. This is because in a
self-help environment states must take measures to ensure their own security.5 Without a
supra-national legal authority to guarantee order, disputes between nations are often

settled through the strength of arms. Consequently, states must act as “short-term power

 

5 Much of the debate surrounding a neo-realist vision of international affairs concerns the polarity of the
state system. The classic balance of power, eurocentric view seems to attribute stability to a system with
numerous great powers. Such a system is characterized by restrained national behavior as the threat of
alliance formation curtails aggressive ambition. The ability of nations to shift alliance commitments under
a multipolar system tends to reduce the accumulation of hostilities between states. This is because today’s
allies may be tomorrow’s adversaries and vice versa. Therefore, protracted and intense hostility is simply
not in the interest of any state. Waltz (1979), however, challenged this view. He asserted that in a bipolar
system the predominant powers focus intensely on each other’s actions and react before one’s opponent
accumulates a preponderance of power. He further assumed that uncertainty tends to increase the
likelihood of conﬂict, and multipolarity, Waltz argued, increases the amount of uncertainty present in the
system, while bipolarity reduces it.

15

maximizers” to defend their political inﬂuence within the international system
(Mearsheimer, 1995: 82).

An increase in military strength provides one solution to the security dilemma
states face. However, such growth in capabilities, even if designed for defensive
purposes, creates problems for other members of the international system. For one, it is
nearly impossible to, in the words of Art and Jervis (1996: 3), “distinguish between
offensive and defensive postures,” and so a mistake in perception could cost a state its
sovereignty. Two, even if a state presents little threat today, its intentions may change
tomorrow (Art and Jervis, 1996). Consequently, the security dilemma that states face
makes the threat and use of military force an inevitable aspect of the state system.6 Given
the stakes involved, then, neo-realist scholars, such as Jervis, Grieco, and Mearsheimer,
insist that states respond primarily to threats from the international environment, rather
than to domestic demands or conditions.

Two problems arise, though, with a realpolitik approach to foreign policy. First, it
fails to provide an adequate explanation for individual foreign policy decisions. Structural
theories simply cannot account for state-speciﬁc actions. Indeed, according to Lake
(1976: 539-40), systemic approaches provide an insufﬁcient “conception of process, or
an explanation of how the constraints or interests derived from intemational...structures
are transformed into decisions or political strategies within particular countries.” Second,
and particularly relevant for today’s international environment, structural realism does

not provide as useful a conceptual framework for issues other than national security

 

6 This is to some extent why relations among sovereign states are often described as power politics.

16

(Keohane, 1986; Ruggie, 1986; Milner, 1997; Rosecrance and Stein, 1993).7 Holsti
(1991: 117) has maintained that while, “realism appropriately points to survival and
security as core goals..., it does not tell us about the other values and preferences that can
affect the selection of goals, strategies, and tactics.”8 So, despite the fact that Waltz
(1979) has forcefully argued that a theory of international interaction does not require a
theory of foreign policy (also see Krasner, 1978), his model addresses questions of
national security and state survival. But, as Milner (1997: 11) has stated, “most decisions
do not directly concern the state’s survival.” As such, conventional balance of power
theories, with their exclusive attention to military capabilities, may not provide a
sufﬁcient explanation for the actions states take.9

It is also true that a systemic theory of international politics has difficulty
explaining structural change.10 As Vasquez (1993) has noted, realism fails to provide an
explanation for periods of peace. Given that scholars have observed that states’

experience with war varies dramatically over time (see for example Bremer, 1980), “an

 

7 According to Moon (1991: 188), “realism’s success in dealing with politcomilitary interactions among
stable and homogeneous developed nations was sufﬁcient in an era dominated by this ‘high politics’ vision
of international relations.”

8 The constructivist critique of neo-realist theory focuses heavily on state preferences, insisting that they
are not exogenous to systemic structures, but rather intricately tied to them (see for example Wendt, 1992).
Actually, the constructivist critique also has implications for rationalist approaches to world politics.
Scholars, such as Alexander Wendt maintain that political structures not only help shape the behavior of
maximizing individuals, but they also help shape their preferences as well.

9 In fact, there are many scholars who insist that realism cannot even adequately account for traditional
systemic concepts, such as conﬂict and stability (see for example Vasquez, I983; Keohane and Nye, 1971;
Mansback and Vasquez, 1981; Krauthammer, 1986). According to Charles Kegley (1993: 134-5), scholars
have “warned that realism [is] incomplete, misdirected, nonrigorous, inconsistent with scientiﬁc evidence,
[and] conceptually confused.” Ernst Haas (1956) considered the realist concept of deterrence to be illogical
and fallacious. He argued that as a theory it was unable to realize policy aims and harmful because it went
against moral law (443). Haas even suggested that realists, such as Morgenthau, advocated a policy of
mutual deterrence primarily for ideological reasons, rather than a fundamental understanding of
international politics.

'° Indeed, this is because, as Kegley and Wittkopf (I996: 167) maintain, “changes in the structure of the
international system begin with changes in states.”

17

 

adequate theory,” in the words of Vasquez (1993: 89), “should be able to delineate the
conditions that promote power politics behavior and non-power politics behavior, and
how a system or issue area characterized by one mode of behavior might be transformed
to the other.”

Foreign policy research, in contrast, tends to eschew the structural approaches of
neo-realist scholars.” As J. David Singer (1994: 93) has observed, a national or sub—
systemic level of analysis provides “richer detail, greater depth, and [a] more intensive
portrayal.” Echoing a similar sentiment, Hermann (1990) insisted that modiﬁcations in a
state’s foreign policy need to be viewed as a decision process, rather than a deterministic
response to environmental conditions. Admittedly, this latter approach tends to provide a
somewhat ‘messier’ description of foreign policy. Yet, this kind of approach also
recognizes the importance of both the decision maker and the policy process.'2 This
recognition, according to Zakaria (1992: 198), “can be more useful in explaining events,
trends, and policies that are too speciﬁc to be addressed by a grand theory of international

politics.” ‘3

 

” It is clear that foreign policy analysis suffers from what Wallace (1976) called ‘boundary problems.’
Indeed, an understanding of foreign policy, according to White (1989: 7), “requires the analyst not only to
know something about interactions between states but also something about political processes within the
state.”

‘2 According to Snow and Brown (1997: 2), “the substance of policy and the way policy is made are
clearly related to one another and [these] processes are undergoing change to adapt to new and dynamic
policy requirements.” And, Brian White (1989: 2) has insisted “that an understanding of the way in which
policy is made is central to an understanding of the substance of foreign policy.”

‘3 Alexander George (1993: 9) has made a similar argument. He wrote, “Practitioners ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
make use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all
state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations, and which rest on
the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the
contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with action speciﬁc models that grasp the different
internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal.”

18

To be sure, structural theories help illuminate broad trends in the international
system. Inﬂuential modern realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz,
have been largely responsible for pointing out the need to understand how the
organization of the international system and the distribution of capabilities inﬂuence and
constrain leaders’ behavior (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979)." However, as Paul
Peterson (1994: 17) wrote, realists still tend to insist that “external constraints are so
great that it is not necessary to understand the way in which responses to these constraints
are chosen.” As a result, rather than viewing the structure of the system as one
component of state decision- making, neo-realists tend to see systemic structure (e.g.,

polarity) completely determining state actions."

The Role of Domestic Politics

Despite realist claims that international affairs should be above the popular
embrace, politics in fact does not stop at the water’s edge. Indeed, foreign policy has
always been subject to the push and pull of domestic-political interests. According to

Hagan (1993: 2), “foreign policy making is an inherently political process and such

 

"’ Morgenthau (1973) in fact concluded that arms and alliances are the two most consequential factors
contributing to a state’s national security.

" Admittedly, Morgenthau did acknowledge the inﬂuence of domestic politics on foreign policy. However,
he believed it was a detriment to American diplomacy. He and others, such as George Kennan and Walter
Lippman, frequently assailed the poor quality of American foreign policy, which they attributed to the
caprice of an ill-infonned public (see Kennan, 1982; 1993; Lippman, 1923, 1925). Nincic (1992), though,
disagreed. “Contrary to the views of many realists,” he wrote, “it might be assumed that the quality of
political leadership improves in rough proportion to the rigors of political competition for public support --
something in which democracies plainly have the upper hand” (N incic, 1992: 12). Furthermore, Americans
appear to demonstrate rather pragmatic views with regards to military intervention abroad. Nincic (1992)
reported that despite Reagan’s tireless attempts to paint Central America as the next Cold War battleﬁeld,
the electorate remained united against using troops. In fact, in 1984 74% opposed removing the Sandanista
government by force, and in 1987 over two-thirds of Americans opposed foreign military assistance to the

Contras. In contrast, the American public has generally supported the defense of our interests in the Middle
East.

19

 

domestic inﬂuences on foreign policy are a cross-nationally pervasive phenomenon.” Of
course, for issues of trade, the environment, and foreign aid, scholars have long
recognized the unambiguous imprint of domestic-political interests. For example, the
agricultural and maritime business sectors in the US. have long championed the
economic side of the foreign aid program. Yet, even issues of national security are
plagued by domestic-political forces, and presidents are often compelled to meet public
and congressional concerns in foreign policy decisions. For instance, during the height of
the Cold War, partisan bickering over America’s foreign policy was clearly evident.
Eisenhower’s missile program was criticized by congressional Democrats, as was
Kennedy’s failed invasion of Cuba by congressional Republicans. In the 19705, Nixon’s
bombing of Cambodia met vehement opposition on Capitol Hill, as did Reagan’s Latin
America policy in the 19803. Without an understanding of the domestic battles that rage
over foreign policy priorities, models of executive decision-making will fail to explain
the actions state leaders take.l6

According to Morrow (1991: 245), “elections and legislatures are the two
essential institutions that characterize a democracy...These institutions channel political
pressures on the executive, inﬂuencing the choice of policies.” In the US, for example,

an independent legislature sharing powers with the executive creates conﬂict when

 

‘6 For realists, though, the maximization of a state’s overall welfare constitutes the primary objective of the
state leader. Notwithstanding the ambiguity inherent in the ‘national interest,’ the goals of political leaders
most certainly include maintaining their own personal positions of power. As former Speaker of the House
Tip O’Neill liked to remark, ‘all politics is local politics,’ and even presidents must acknowledge the
domestic demands made on the scarce resources an administration has to work with. Furthermore, as
Milner has argued (1997: 14), state survival no longer takes priority in US. foreign policy, rather “the
struggle for internal power and compromise dominates foreign policy making. The executive does not
always prevail, as theories based on the unitary actor assumption maintain. Since executives share

20

 

differences in the means of policy implementation, or in the ends of policy choice,
emerge. Moreover, the different constituencies and electoral time frames of elected
officials often lead to separate issues and agendas. Not only does the legislature retain
prerogatives in foreign affairs, but members of Congress and the president often possess
visibly divergent preferences.” Particularly when presidents are facing their second term,
according to Thurber (1996: 6), “legislators, are often reluctant to allow their workload
and policy agenda to be dictated by a president who has no electoral mandate to do so.” ‘8

Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994: 596) reached a similar conclusion regarding the
measurable effects an independent legislature has on executive decision-making. They
asserted that “ﬁre alarm and police patrol oversight and the credible threat of
”19

[congressional] sanctions effectively constrain the president’s leeway to set policy.

Light (1991) has also argued that the most important factor contributing to presidential

 

decision-making power with other internal groups, policy choices will differ from a situation of executive
dominance.”

'7 How preferences are aggregated in Congress may also play an important role in how the two chambers
respond to a president. Certainly, the new institutionalist literature insists that legislative rules and structure
have an important inﬂuence on policy outcomes (see for example, Shepsle, 1979; Rohde and Shepsle,
1987; Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Aldrich, I991; Hammond and Miller, 1987; Riker, 1980, 1982;
Shepsle and Weingast, I995).

'8 The rise in partisanship has also visibly affected presidential leadership. It not only infuses conﬂict into
the political process making consensus much more difficult to sustain. But, as party leaders have become
increasingly important in the legislative arena, presidents are not able to easily dismiss their preferences
and hope to succeed on either the House or Senate ﬂoor. In fact, presidents can no longer assume that they
will have the clear support of congressional leaders when it comes to issues of international affairs. For
instance, the resolution authorizing the use of force by President Bush witnessed the leaders of both parties
taking opposing positions (Smith, 1994: 129). The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, in contrast, was
Unanimously supported in the House of Representatives by the members of both parties and met only two
dissenting votes in the Senate (Snow and Brown, 1997). In many instances during the 19505 and 19605, it
seems, the similarity of views held by the strong committee chairmen and the presidents they served with
helped muster congressional support (Rohde, 1994: 102). However, with party playing an increasingly
important role in congressional roll-call voting and the preferences of the median members of both parties
growing further apart (Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Rohde, 1991), political
Competition over foreign policy priorities will seemingly continue to affect presidential decision making.
’9 In the US, one only has to look at the Republican led 104th Congress for a vivid example of
Congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs. When Kofi-Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,

21

‘AE F-1ﬂ

success is congressional party support. It not only forms the foundation of a president’s
political capital, but it additionally conveys a message of effectiveness to foreign leaders.
Consequently, such support is crucial for foreign policy success.

Executive accountability is further provided for by periodic elections. Given that
votes in the words of Nincic (1992: 91), “are the major prize sought in democratic
political contests,” presidents are undeniably concerned with avoiding unpopular
policies.20 If an incumbent president is perceived as having neglected the preferences of
his principals during the last four years, a retrospective electorate is capable of
sanctioning an executive by voting him out of office (Fiorina, 1981).

In the words of Morrow (1991: 249), then, electoral and congressional constraints
tend to motivate “incumbents to perform the wishes of the electorate.” Moreover, these
institutional structures also help to compel executives to act with caution in foreign
affairs. As Nincic (1992: 122) wrote, “When foreign policy violates the limits of what
interests, culture, and expectations have deﬁned as acceptable, when its actual or potential
costs are too great, or when it ﬂies in the face of the most elementary common sense, it
will eventually be pounced upon by the opposition and, sooner or later, denounced by the
electorate.” So, the need to secure support from domestic groups often circumscribes
foreign policy initiatives, and potentially imprudent reactions to international events are

frequently eschewed by a necessarily deliberative political process."

 

visited Washington in 1996, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recommended that he discuss his plans
with chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (Strategic Survey, [996/97: 6).

2° Clearly, decision makers are sensitive to the preferences of the electorate (see for example, Hughes,
1979; Ginsberg, 1986; Stimson, 1991).

2‘ V.O. Key (1961: 45) concluded that American political processes tend to invite delay, thereby arresting
the implementation of many policy initiatives.

22

i- 1- 1". u- -m

By ignoring the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics, neo-
realist scholars may tend to misstate the determinants of executive choice in international
affairs. For example, the ‘national interest’ is not exogenously determined as realists
typically assume, but rather subject to both popular debate and partisan politics.22 For this
very reason, executives must secure domestic support for their foreign policy initiatives
or risk undermining their own agenda and possibly US. inﬂuence abroad. Consequently,
only a model that incorporates both international and domestic-level forces can
successfully explain foreign policy behavior.

The two anecdotal accounts that follow illustrate US. foreign policy decision-
making during salient interstate crises. In both instances, the US. was a third party,
intervening on behalf of one or more sides in the conﬂict. The record of each crisis
indicates that both system structure and domestic opposition interacted to inﬂuence US.

foreign policy decision-making.

Decision-Making During the Clinton and Eisenhower Administrations

The conﬂict in the former Yugoslavia presented the Clinton administration with a
very real and very difﬁcult foreign policy problem. The United Nations strategy of
providing protection within safe-areas effectively collapsed after the fall of Srebrenica in

July of 1995 (Drew, 1996). After ignoring earlier abuses perpetuated by the Serb forces,

 

22 Charles Beard concluded in 1935, “In studying thousands of actors justiﬁed by the appellation ‘national
interest,’ I was tempted to conclude that the conception was simply a telling formula which politicians and
private interests employed whenever they wished to accomplish any particular designs in the ﬁeld of
foreign affairs.” (quoted in Milner, 1998: 772). President Bush in early 1993 was not able to provide a
precise definition of the national interest either. He said, military force should be used “where the stakes
warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective,
where its application be limited in scope and time, and where the potential beneﬁts justify the potential cost
and sacriﬁce” (quoted in Jentleson, 1997: 51).

23

the Clinton administration was increasingly being expected by the international
community to help formulate a resolution to this European crisis. Indeed, Clinton had
guaranteed in 1993 that the US. would at a minimum aid the pulling out of UN.
peacekeeping troops. However, many ofﬁcials in the administration believed American
casualties would be inevitable if this pledge was honored (Drew, 1996: 244).

When it came to the Bosnian crisis, however, the American public was clearly
against US. involvement. Not only did Americans want to avoid placing US. soldiers in
harm’s way, but many legitimately saw the problem as distinctly European in nature.
Similar opposition was evident inside the beltway, as well. The Republican-led Congress
was intent on restructuring the State Department and American foreign policy, and was
highly critical of the moves already made by the Clinton administration (see
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 19, 1997: 921). Drew (1996: 245)
reported that after NATO air strikes failed and UN. peace-keepers were captured by Serb
forces, the Clinton administration feared that this debacle would be pounced upon by
Republicans on the Hill. Indeed, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole had already
threatened to bring to the ﬂoor a resolution lifting the embargo against the Muslims in
response to an earlier suggestion by Clinton that American troops would potentially be
needed to help resolve the crisis. The House, in fact, did vote on this resolution,

approving it 318-99, despite Clinton’s vehement opposition (Drew, 1996: 248).23

 

2’ Lee Hamilton, the former ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee, accounted for the
overwhelming vote on lifting the embargo by stating that it was a consequence of a lack of attention by the
Clinton administration. “By far, the dominant factor was frustration about Bosnia and the administration’s
handling of it” (quoted in Drew, 1996: 248).

24

 

When the Clinton administration ﬁnally determined that American peace-keeping
troops would be deployed, it was under a much more conﬁned set of conditions than had
previously been disclosed. Many ofﬁcials credited the new set of guidelines to
congressional and public opposition, and the lack of political clout Clinton was ﬁelding at
the time (Drew, 1996: 243-255). Admittedly, after further shelling by Serbian forces, the
Clinton administration did authorize heavy bombing by NATO planes in late August of
1995. However, it is evident that Clinton’s decision calculus during this international
crisis included particular attention to domestic consensus and support.

The Bosnian crisis certainly demonstrates that in the post-Cold War era, with the
collapse of the Soviet threat, congressional leaders have become increasingly willing to
substitute their judgment in foreign affairs for the executive’s. The crisis, in addition,
indicates that conﬂict resolution attempts are subject to some of the same forces affecting
conﬂict initiation. Still, opposition to presidential foreign policy initiatives is not limited
to the post-Cold War era. Indeed, even during the height of the ideological struggle
between the US. and the Soviet Union, presidents and top ofﬁcials expressed concern
over public and congressional opposition to foreign policy actions. The crisis over
Taiwan in 1954, for example, illustrates similar forces at work in Eisenhower’s decision

calculus.

Eisenhower. Dulles. and the Taiwan Stgiits Crisis of 1954
Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Nationalist China
(ROC) deteriorated in August of 1954 as a result of the establishment of the Southeast

Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), to which Taiwan was being admitted as a member

25

 

(Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997). In September of that same year, the PRC bombed the
Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and the Nationalists responded a few days later
with air strikes against the mainland. President Eisenhower quickly realized the potential
threat to US. interests in the region if the Communists succeeded in securing the offshore
islands and possibly Taiwan itself (Foyle, 1997).

The crisis presented Eisenhower and his Secretary of State with an occasion for
decision. Both understood the strategic importance of Quemoy and Matsu for the
effective defense of Taiwan. Dulles even believed initially that a forceful reaction from
the United States was essential for maintaining America’s reputation in the region (Foyle,
1997: 158). Yet, both men were also keenly aware of domestic public opinion. The
Korean War was still etched in the minds of many Americans, and polls suggested that
the American people were not in favor of a military action to now defend East Asia.

Given the importance attached to the crisis by Eisenhower and Dulles, U.S.
involvement was virtually assured in some form or another. However, both men were
concerned about congressional and public opposition to a confrontational (possibly
military) approach (Foyle, 1997: 160). Particularly Dulles, who believed it unwise to use
force without congressional authorization, saw risks involved in asserting presidential
leadership during the congressional election season. According to Foyle (197: 156),
“Dulles believed public opinion had the ability to undermine or support the government’s
foreign policies. If disunity reigned, then the US. would not have the ability to act
decisively, undercutting American leadership.”

It appears, then, that both the timing of the crisis and the lack of public or

congressional support contributed to Eisenhower’s avoidance of military force. A

26

cautious and less confrontational strategy was deemed necessary to prevent domestic
disunity (Foyle, 1997: 164). In fact, according to F oyle (1997: 159), “[Dulles] suggested
immediate consultations with the congressional leadership as a matter of ‘urgency’ to
ensure congressional backing.” The policy that was eventually reached upon involved
submitting the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which effectively avoided a
direct military confrontation with the PRC.

Deliberation and decision-making within both the Clinton and Eisenhower
administrations involved attention to both US. national security interests and domestic
public opinion. Particularly Clinton, whose poll numbers were down during the Bosnian
crisis, seemed deeply concerned with Republican opposition on Capitol Hill. For Dulles
and Eisenhower, domestic support was deemed essential for military engagement.
Because such support was not forthcoming, a less belligerent foreign policy action was
selected. It seems, then, that foreign policy initiatives that involve signiﬁcant resource
commitments necessitate domestic assent. Indeed, without generating a domestic
coalition in support of such initiatives, a president risks foreign policy failure and perhaps

electoral sanction.

Diversionary Tactics and Institutional Constraints
While the Bosnian and Taiwan Straits crises show foreign policy elites to be
concerned about domestic politics, many liberal scholars continue to disagree on the

effects these domestic forces have on foreign policy decision-making.“ That is, even

 

2" Liberal theory can be deﬁned by its concern for the rule of law and the protection of individual rights.
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999: 39) note that liberal theory refers simply to the concept that
“state structures matter: the structure of their domestic governments and the values and views of their

27

 

among scholars who accept that foreign policy is affected by domestic politics there are
disagreements over the extent and direction of that inﬂuence.25 For instance, two
prominent theories of foreign policy decision-making offer very different assessments of
the role played by domestic-political and economic conditions; see Table 1 for a brief
summary. Some scholars argue that leaders, particularly democratically elected ones,
often face situations in which they have an incentive to use international affairs for
personal or partisan political ends (see for example, Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Stoll,
1984; Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992;
DeRouen, 1995; Smith, 1996). Given a desire to retain ofﬁce, leaders are able to
inﬂuence public opinion by acting decisively on the international stage. Presumably, such
actions will not only focus media and public attention away from domestic discontent,
but attention to foreign affairs will additionally allow a president to demonstrate
competence in governing. Some notable (though arguable) instances of diversionary
behavior on the part of American presidents include Johnson’s bombing of Hanoi in
1966, Carter’s rescue attempt of embassy hostages in Iran in 1980 (Russett, 1990), and
Clinton’s cruise missile attack against Afghanistan and Sudan prior to the 1998

congressional elections.26

 

citizens affect their behavior in international affairs.” Or as Andrew Moravcsik (I997: 513) writes,
“Societal ideas, interests, and institutions inﬂuence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the
fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments.”

2’ The direction of inﬂuence has profound normative implications. As Lindsay, et al. wrote (1992: 5), “the
defense of imperial presidency rests on the claim that presidents are more rational and more immune to the
tide of public opinion than is Congress. The claim of superior presidential decision making crumbles,
however, if presidents use foreign policy to serve their own political ends.”

2" Interestingly, both the Johnson and Carter administrations were not rescued by their military moves, and
the Clinton administration was severely criticized for timing the strikes so near the congressional election
date.

28

‘01“.

wﬁh Ox:

Diversionary theories, however, stand in marked contrast to the democratic peace
proposition. Evidence, it seems, continues to demonstrate that domestic-political
institutions effectively constrain the belligerent foreign policy actions of democratically
elected leaders (see for example, Schweller, 1992; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Maoz
and Russett, 1993; Peterson, 1994). Indeed, according to Maoz and Russett (1993: 626),
“due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad
base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage war...” What’s
more, the openness of the democratic political process seemingly helps prevent leaders
from acting against the preferences of their principals. Jentleson (1992) argued, in fact,
that Americans are quite capable of discerning when their agent in the White House
legitimately expends U.S. resources abroad. Presumably, such oversight compels
executives to act with caution given that their positions of power depend on popular
support.

Yet, Russett (1990) acknowledged that constraints on an executive may not serve
to impede minor uses of force, such as those associated with the diversionary literature.
Indeed, Russett (1990: 43) found that the United States, and democratic states more
generally, were more likely to engage in international disputes during economic
downturns. “Faced with [considerable domestic] discontent,” Russett (1990: 24) wrote,
“even a democratically elected government may feel some temptation to try to divert

hostility toward foreign adversaries.” In short, then, democratic decision processes may

29

constrain large scale belligerency, but disputes involving mere threats and brief military
moves appear to be to some extent inspired by democratic politics.27

Furthermore, theoretical models of foreign policy decision-making have
demonstrated that electoral incentives exist for using force abroad (see for example,
Smith, 1996; Richards, et al., 1993; Blainey, 1973). Given the possibility of preference
divergence between a president and the electorate when it comes to foreign affairs, plus
the asymmetrical level of information that exists, differences over the appropriate means
to address foreign policy problems may from time to time arise.” Many scholars insist
that this information asymmetry leads executives to focus on issues of foreign policy.
Indeed, according to Downs and Rocke (1995: 138), domestic uncertainty creates more
uses of force by a president than would exist under full information environments.”

Smith (1996) reached a similar conclusion. In his model, electoral incentives rarely cause

 

27 Interestingly, Fearon (1994) has argued that while domestic political institutions may constrain an
executive from becoming involved in foreign conﬂicts, they may serve to incite belligerency once
involved. Given the domestic costs for backing down in the face of a challenge, presidents have an
incentive to escalate disputes in hopes of avoiding congressional and electoral sanctions for policy failure.
28 Such uncertainty, according to Downs and Rocke (1995), has a tremendous inﬂuence not only on what
candidate will eventually be selected by the electorate, but also on the decision-making of the incumbent
chief executive. Voters generally make decisions with only limited information about the issues and
candidates on the ballot. Indeed, not only are voters uncertain whether the president they elect actually
shares their policy preferences (and therefore will act in their interest), but they additionally may be
uncertain about the quality of the information they possess regarding a president’s proposed policy
prescriptions. In foreign affairs, then, as Downs and Rocke (1995) insisted, voters must both monitor
presidential decisions and the information a president chooses to divulge regarding international events.
With regards to the former, the electorate must determine whether involvement is in fact the desired
response to systemic conditions. With regards to the latter, the asymmetrical level of information between
the executive and the public forces the public to remain skeptical of presidential justiﬁcations. However,
according to Omstein (1994), Congress provides the electorate with an alternative source of information.
“The old time executive pattern of settling foreign policy arguments by saying, ‘we have more information
than you do’ is simply no longer possible when a legislative branch is loaded with experts in every
regional, technical, and policy area who can match their own expertise with ready access to sources in the
executive, and who can supplement their information with networks of contacts in academia and industry
(113).”

29 Television has arguably helped to politicize foreign affairs. However, it is not clear whether such a
medium has contributed to the political use of force by presidents. At the same time as instantaneous news

30

 

a president to behave tentatively. Smith (1996: 147) insisted that, “if foreign policy
evaluation is likely to be important at the next election then the range of international
conditions under which intervention occurs increases.” Smith (1996: 147) further argued
that:

When the voters’ evaluation of the government’s foreign policy

performance affects the outcome of an election, the model shows that

suboptimal foreign policy decisions are made. Since the government cares,

not only about taking the best course of action for the nation, but also

about getting reelected, it is biased towards violent behavior.

On the other hand, numerous institutionalists and proponents of the democratic
peace insist that democratic decision processes dissuade adventuresome foreign policies
by requiring input from multiple domestic actors before a policy is implemented (see for
example, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990; Morrow, 1991; Morgan and Campbell,
1991; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Peterson, 1994). The authority of the presidency
may appear inviolable when it comes to the handling of foreign affairs, yet clearly
domestic institutions have been developed to help curtail the ability of an executive to act
against the preferences of the electorate. Recently, in fact, Drew (1994: 230) reported that
the Clinton administration initially rejected the commitment of peace-keeping troops into
the Bosnian conﬂict because of probable opposition from Capitol Hill. Arguably, this was
a demonstration of how democratic political institutions not only help shape foreign
policy, but tend to pacify it as well.

What are we to make, then, of the theoretical contradictions between a

diversionary speciﬁcation of foreign policy decision-making and that speciﬁed by the

 

coverage provides an opportunity to demonstrate statesmanship, it also provides the electorate with a
source of information to accurately assess presidential conduct.

31

M

democratic peace proposition? Both do insist, contrary to a neo-realist explanation, that
domestic politics affects the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet, generally speaking,
diversionary theories insist that these domestic forces encourage greater belligerency on
the part of an executive, while scholars of the democratic peace argue that such forces
pacify foreign policy decision— making. Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence used to
test diversionary theory tends to suffer from similar discrepancies. Hess and Orphanides
(1995), for example, observed that US. conﬂict behavior increased dramatically as a
result of elections and economic downturns (also see Russett, 1990). Yet, Gaubatz (1991)
reported that democratic states rarely engage in war around election time. Stoll (1984),
interestingly, found the results of both studies to be supported, when he controlled for
whether the US. was at peace or war.30 Given these divergent ﬁndings, as well as others,
it certainly appears as if the relationship between system and domestic-level forces

continues to be only partially understood (Levy, 1989).

Do Leaders Divert?

To be sure, foreign affairs represents an electorally salient arena for demonstrating
leadership skill. As the primary organ of America’s international interests, the president is
in a unique position to attend to America’s foreign policy concerns without the same
congressional scrutiny that often plagues a president in the domestic arena. And, given
the importance that the American public ascribes to foreign policy (see Holsti, 1996;

Aldrich et al., 1989), presidents may ﬁnd the manipulation of foreign affairs to be in their

 

3° Stoll (1984) in fact found uses of force to decline prior to an election during peacetime, while they
slightly increased during wartime. According to James and Oneal (1991: 315), “Stoll attributed the decline

32

W“ ------—--:m

immediate electoral interests. Similar to the manipulation of macroeconomic policy
(Lewis-Beck, 1990; Tufte, 1978), presidents may have an incentive to divert public
attention away from electorally damaging problems at home by engaging in conﬂict or
peace—making abroad (Stoll, 1984; Levy, 1989; Smith, 1996; Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger,
1992). Presumably, presidents trust that cleverly crafted military actions or visible
mediation efforts will be perceived by the electorate as foreign policy acumen."

Diversionary theories of conﬂict maintain that leaders who face domestic
discontent engage in international conﬂict to generate events that obscure the problems
being experienced at home (Ward and Widmaier, 1982). Such manipulation is also
designed, particularly in democratic states, to demonstrate leadership skills and
competency in governing. Indeed, risky foreign policy moves may be used by politically
threatened governments to boost their ﬂagging polls ratings by solidifying public support
prior to an election (Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Levy, 1989). Furthermore, belligerent
foreign policies may offer elites a way to rationalize their control over the levers of state
(see Schumpeter, 1939; Levy, 1989). Evidence does suggest that voters are often loathe to
change leadership structures when a country is faced with a crisis, particularly an external
one. Studies, for example, show that public approval for a president tends to increase
following uses of force (Mueller, 1970).

Empirical support for diversionary behavior on the part of elites has been

provided by various studies (see for example, Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Stoll, 1984;

 

in US. military actions during peacetime elections to the president’s desire to address the domestic issues
that usually are more salient to voters.”

3' Arguably, the deﬁnitive work on the political use of force was Blechman and Kaplan’s Force Without
War (1978). For these authors, though, the tacit signal being sent by the President was not intended for a

33

VI”;-

Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; DeRouen,
1995). Lebow (1981), for example, found that crisis initiation and escalation were related
to domestic discontent. And, Stoll (1984) later concluded that in the United States at least
presidential uses of force were targeted towards the electoral calendar. More recent
studies have found some indication of a partisan effect. Morgan and Bickers (1992) and
James and Hristoulas (1994) both discovered political opposition to be associated with
diversionary behavior. Based on the evidence, then, diversionary activities by democratic
leaders appear to be sustained by the empirical evidence collected to date.

Yet, many scholars have contested these diversionary ﬁndings. Meernik and
Waterman (1996) in fact concluded that, in the United States at least, the link between
domestic-political conditions and uses of military force is nearly non-existent. Ward and
Widmaier (1982) gathered that not only is there little evidence supporting the
extemalization of conﬂict, but there appears to be a very limited range of circumstances
that would persuade a president to use military force abroad to moderate conﬂict at home.
Moreover, Lian and Oneal (1993: 278) pointed out that, “If it could be proven in a single
instance that a president used America’s armed forces for partisan purposes, there would
be justiﬁable calls for impeachment.”

Table 2 clearly shows that evidence in support of the political use of force is less
than consistent across studies. In fact, not only does the unit of analysis, dependent
variable, and time frame vary considerably across these studies, but the signs and

signiﬁcance of the exogenous variables vary greatly as well. So, despite the empirical

 

domestic audience, but rather was directed at a foreign adversary and was designed to convey U.S.
conviction.

34

:‘M

‘ﬂug- .u n-Q “.1 ~.-" A

support to date, there are both theoretical and methodological reasons to believe that
some of these ﬁndings may be spurious.

Theoretically, it is not at all clear that initiating a conﬂict would in fact electorally
beneﬁt a democratic leader (see Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1996; Hazelwood,
1975). While a quick and successful strike prior to a presidential election may provide a
boost in popular support, not only are opportunities rare, but as Russett (1990: 47)
argued, “fears of the domestic-political consequences of becoming involved in a real war
work to restrain the belligerent actions of leaders.” Certainly such belligerency can result
in a prolonged engagement that results in substantial casualties (see Ward and Widmaier,
1982; Russett, 1990). Given that rally-around-the-ﬂag support is generally short lived, the
use of force may not be a cost-effective way of generating electoral support.32 President
Clinton, for instance, brought American troops home from Somali after fewer than two
dozen battleﬁeld deaths. For a great power such as the United States, such a casualty toll
is exceedingly small.

Moreover, according to Eckstein, “Military adventures are excellent diversions,
and military successes can marvelously cement disjoint societies, but military failure, on
the evidence, can hardly fail to hasten revolution in such cases” (quoted in James and
Oneal, 1991: 314). Thus, the potentially high political costs involved in what can easily
become a foreign policy blunder would seem to prohibit diversionary uses of force (see

Brace and Hinckley, 1992).33 Indeed, rather than encouraging the initiation of conﬂict,

 

’2 Brody and Shapiro (1989), in fact, found that a signiﬁcant number of events deemed likely to produce a
rally effect led to a decline in the president’s approval rating (also see Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1989).

3’ Blainey (1973) argued that diversionary actions tend to be the most beneﬁcial when leaders ﬁnd them the
least necessary (also see Mayer, 1969). Ostrom and Job’s (1986) evidence seems to support Blainey’s

35

 

domestic turmoil may, as Ward and Widmaier (1982: 77) suggested, incite attack by
states attempting to take advantage of other states’ domestic turbulence (also see Leeds
and Davis, 1997). If true, incidents of conﬂict would appear much higher not because of
diversionary moves made by politically vulnerable administrations, but rather because the
foreign initiators of these disputes have not been controlled for in the empirical analysis.

Also, by examining only belligerent foreign policy actions scholars have ignored
diplomatic or economic responses that may effectively demonstrate both resolve and
competency, without resorting to military moves. Indeed, if the goal is to divert attention
away from social and economic problems, a bold peace move, such as proposing an arms
control agreement or mediating an interstate crisis, may provide a president with prime
time media coverage absent the potential costs associated with a failed military action
(see Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger, 1992).34 Moore and Lanoue (1997: 8), for example,
argued that “political leaders have many tools at their disposal to try to persuade their
constituents that they are doing something meaningful in the realm of foreign policy.
Oﬁen, such ‘messages’ can be sent simply by making well-publicized speeches or
engaging in trading verbal barbs with one’s adversaries.” A case in point, Morrow (1991)
found American arms control concessions to the Soviet Union to be linked to high
unemployment conditions.

Finally, one of the most significant problems associated with the diversionary

research program has been the issue of opportunity. Electoral sanctions and constitutional

 

conjecture. They found the likelihood of force being used to increase with presidential approval. Yet, this
would appear to be when a president has little need for a boost in his ratings.

3‘ For example, take Carter’s facilitation of the Camp David Accords and Clinton’s Wye Plantation
agreement.

36

w... -m in“
r

checks seemingly prohibit American presidents from actually creating interstate crises
through the initiation of armed conﬂict (see Hower, Ostrom, and Quiﬁones, 1992).35
Generally speaking, presidents require a credible justiﬁcation for such bold military
actions (see Hunt, 1997). President Clinton, for instance, may have wished for an
opportunity to demonstrate his commander-in-chief competency during the initial months
of his presidency when he was vehemently criticized by members of Congress and even
high-ranking Pentagon ofﬁcials. Yet, it was not until June of that same year that Iraq may
have provided such an opportunity with its failed plot to assassinate former President
Bush (Fisher, 1996).

The problem is that the probability of a military action being taken in a given
quarter has been assumed to be invariate. But, the likelihood of an opportunity presenting
itself undoubtedly varies over time. Controlling for this invariance is clearly necessary as
leaders must cultivate domestic support for presidential uses of force based on the type of
opportunity that presents itself. Indeed, rather than using the quarter as the unit of
analysis, the opportunity is perhaps a more appropriate choice for theoretical and
methodological reasons (Meernik, 1994; Meernik and Waterman, 1996). Furthermore,
some international crises are more likely to receive American attention than others.
According to Meernik and Waterman (1996: 576), “If presidents are to respond to
international crises, they must at a minimum be aware that a ‘pretty prudent’ public may

not share their deﬁnition of the national interest” (also see Jentleson, 1992). Conceivably,

 

’5 According to Schweller (1992), great-power democracies have never instigated a preventive attack
against other great powers.

37

gm

 

then, both the unit of analysis and the salience of a crisis need to be controlled for in any

model of presidential decision- making.

Institutional Constraints

In contrast to the diversionary argument, one pillar of the democratic peace
research program insists that institutional structures serve to inhibit impetuous military
actions by heads of state. According to Maoz and Russett (1993), the decision to use
force becomes more difﬁcult as the need to secure political support from multiple
domestic groups increases. Indeed, the multiple layers of possible participation presented
by the American federal system encourages executives to seek political support from
bureaucratic agencies, legislators, and important interest groups.36 Consequently, as
Russett (1993: 80) observed, “Federalism restricts the ability [of executives] to mobilize
economic and military resources rapidly in the event of a serious international dispute.”
This tends to allow alternative options to be forwarded increasing the likelihood of a
diplomatic settlement.37

Strong executive leadership is further hampered by the governing structure
established by the American Constitution. Not only does the separation of powers insure
that various interests get incorporated into the policy-making process, but parochialism is
further assured by the division of Congress into two equal branches (Peterson, 1994: 7;

Silverstein, 1994). Moreover, despite presidential assertions to the contrary, the American

 

3" According to Lee Hamilton, the former ranking minority member on the House International Relations
Committee, one of the president’s responsibilities is to help reconcile the differences that exist between the
professional foreign policy decision-makers and a less activist American public (The Economist, October
30th, 1993: 24).

38

executive has few formal powers when it comes to international affairs. In fact, the
Constitution deﬁnes Congress as the predominant player, in both domestic and foreign
affairs. Such formal authority makes Congress one of the most powerful legislative
bodies in the world when it comes to foreign policy (Crabb and Holt, 1989).38

The constraints proffered by domestic-political structure have been substantiated
by various studies. Snyder (1991), for instance, found that democratic institutions help
pacify foreign policy behavior, and Schweller (1992) concluded that democratic
institutions confer caution in democratic decision-making. Mintz (1993) further argued
that domestic support is a necessary condition for belligerent foreign policy actions. The
dispersion, then, of executive authority among multiple agencies and individuals appears
to help arrest belligerent foreign policy decisions by requiring a president to secure
consensus from multiple domestic players (Russett, 1993; Morgan and Schwebach,
1992)

Certainly in the US, competition over turf jurisdiction is endemic among foreign
policy players, such as the National Security Council, the State Department, and the
Pentagon. These checks and balances between different individuals and institutions help
to encourage conﬂict resolution strategies that avoid violent confrontations with the
leaders of other states. Furthermore, democratic domestic institutions present visible
manifestations of constraint that are likely to be seen by other democratic states (Bueno

de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). Given the high political costs involved in using force,

 

’7 Given that “too quick a readiness to act in foreign policy,” as Russett (1990: 12) noted “can lead to
disaster, as it did for John Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs,” democratic decision processes generally tend to
impede executive dispatch.

39

leaders will recognize that democratic institutions present an impediment to violent
engagement.

Gleditsch and Ward (1997) additionally found evidence tying institutional
constraints to paciﬁc foreign policy behavior. In their disaggregation of the Polity scales,
Gleditsch and Ward discovered that the executive constraints component of the
democracy score had the largest inﬂuence on a state’s ﬁnal democracy ranking. Given the
lack of violent conﬂict between democratic nations, Gleditsch and Ward’s ﬁndings tend
to support the argument that constraints on the chief executive keep in check foreign
policy adventurism, at least when it comes to relations with similar regimes (see Benoit,
1996 for monadic-level evidence).

In the United States, for example, the president must consider the preferences of
leaders on Capitol Hill, particularly if those House and Senate members are from the
opposition party.39 In 1973 Congress dramatically asserted its constitutional prerogatives
in foreign affairs by passing the War Powers Resolution over a presidential veto, and this
measure has since visibly restricted the use of force by American presidents. Auerswald
and Cowhey (1997), for instance, found the duration of military interventions to be
statistically shorter after the resolution was passed than prior to it. They concluded that
presidents have tailored their interventions to the main requirements of this statute.
Particularly today, with partisanship on Capitol Hill at a post-World War II high (Rohde,

1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), presidents must be wary of providing political

 

3’ The former British ambassador to the United States during the Carter administration, in fact, remarked on
the “extraordinary power of...Congress over foreign policy” (quoted in Crabb and Holt, 1989: 223).

40

 

 

ammunition to opposition leaders in the House and Senate. Indeed, as Bueno de Mesquita
and Lalman (1990: 752) averted, “The very need to resort to force suggests a political
failure by the national leadership, creating openings for oppositional factions.”

Clinton, in particular, has been challenged by congressional Republicans
regarding his competency in the area of foreign policy. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), for
example, forced Clinton to meet many of his demands regarding the foreign policy
bureaucracy, in return for scheduling debate on the Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty
(Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, December 6, 1997: 3019)."0 According to
Rohde (1994), congressional assertiveness can be tied to the unwillingness of opposition
leaders to accept an executive’s deﬁnition of the national interest. Given the ﬂuidity of
international politics today, Congress has become much more active in determining
where America’s interests lie.

Admittedly, statutory restrictions on presidential management of foreign affairs
are rare. This is because congressional assertiveness remains hampered by both political
and institutional obstacles (Smith, 1994: 131). Yet, Congress can easily make foreign
policy decisions costly for a president. By publicly denouncing such initiatives,
opposition leaders on the Hill can make foreign policy adventurism a political liability for
a president. Indeed, domestic program priorities can at times be held hostage by

congressional leaders unless a president addresses the foreign policy concerns of

 

3" According to Simon (1998: 6), “the relationship between president and congress will be more
contentious under divided government and the incidence of institutional conﬂict, roll call defeats for the
president, and vetoed bills will be greater when partisan control of the presidency and congress is split.”

’° The State Department will undergo considerable change as a result of pressure put on the Clinton
administration by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), and by Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright who has voiced her desire to reshape America’s foreign policy apparatus to

41

 

important members of Congress (see Crabb and Holt, 1989). Smith (1994), in fact,
showed that congressional party leaders in both chambers have become much more active
in foreign policy, and the relevant committees spend more time questioning executive
ofﬁcials regarding the administration’s foreign policy decisions (also see Sinclair, 1993).
Peterson (1994: 10), it seems, correctly concluded that, “partisan opposition is effective
opposition” (also see Oldﬁeld and Wildavsky, 1991), and congressional Republicans in
the 19905, as with the Democrats in the 19805, have effectively demonstrated a
willingness to oppose executive decisions in the realm of foreign affairs.

Even rally effects may not ultimately help an administration, depending on the
extent of congressional opposition (Gowa, 1998). That is, if Congress is held by the
opposition party, fellow partisans on Capitol Hill may suffer electorally from
strategically-timed foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, if helping to elect one’s partisans to
Congress will tend to allow a president greater ﬂexibility in foreign policy decision-
making (Smith, 1996; Furlong, 1996; Bond and F leisher, 1990), then initiatives designed
to induce rally effects may tend to have the adverse consequence of reelecting opposition-

party incumbents.“

Conclusion
Considerable research has been devoted to understanding the determinants of

conﬂict initiation. The study of third parties in international politics, in contrast,

 

manage the challenges of post-Cold War world (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 19, 1997:
921)

" Smith (1994) showed that opposition leaders in both the House and Senate have consistently provided
much less support for the president’s position on foreign policy issues than congressional leaders of the
president’s party during the post-World War 11 time period.

42

continues to receive little theoretical and empirical attention. However, understanding the
determinants of foreign policy decision-making requires an analysis of the full range of
events a president may confront and the strategies available to him. While Smith (1996)
has formally incorporated the likelihood of third-party support in the expected utility
equations of primary crisis actors, there also is a need to more fully understand the
decision calculus of the potential intervening state. Why, and under what conditions will
a president intervene in a conﬂict between two or more states? Given the importance of
third parties in both the initiation and resolution of interstate conﬂict, there clearly is a
need to better understand the role these states play.

In answering this question, I propose a modiﬁed realist model of presidential
decision-making. While attention must be given to the structure of the international
system, if scholars are to understand foreign policy decision-making, research efforts
must also address how decisions are inﬂuenced by domestic conditions.

Fortunately, a concern for second-image inﬂuences on interstate interactions has
blossomed in the international relations literature in the last decade. This coincides quite
appropriately with changes in both American domestic politics and in the international
system. However, as Putnam (1988: 427) observed in his seminal two-level game essay,
the question of whether domestic politics determines international relations is nowhere
near as interesting, nor as fruitful, as probing for when and how domestic politics
inﬂuences international behavior. That is, many theories of international politics fail to
rigorously examine the different and often times contradictory inﬂuences of domestic-

level forces.

43

According to Elman (1997), for example, the impact of domestic-political
structures on foreign policy decision-making is only marginally addressed by much of the
democratic peace research. She wrote:

The democratic peace theory presents a truncated view of domestic

politics in general, and democratic politics in particular. Speciﬁcally, the

theory ignores the role of leaders; underemphasizes norms that are not

associated with domestic political ideology; obscures the role of political

parties; and discounts how civil-military relations can concentrate or

disperse war powers (483).42
On the other hand, diversionary theories tend to concentrate on domestic economic
conditions and often neglect the inﬂuence of typical domestic-political institutions.
Domestic structure, however, is certainly more complicated than either of these
theoretical traditions acknowledge. Not only will the inﬂuence of domestic demands on
executive decision-making vary with time, but individual institutions also differ
dramatically and as a consequence they each may have a different inﬂuence on
presidential decision-making.

The model developed in Chapter Two contends that both domestic and systemic
factors contribute to the decision by a president to intervene in a foreign interstate crisis.
However, contrary to diversionary theories of foreign policy decision-making, it is argued
that domestic-political institutions should invoke caution in executives contemplating
new and potentially costly foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, both national elections and

the strength of domestic-political opposition should naturally focus presidential attention

on important economic and social concerns on the home front.

 

’2 Certainly in the post-Cold War era, with little agreement on foreign policy objectives and partisanship at
a 50 year high, Congress has visibly restricted a president’s leadership capacity (see Lindsay, 1994).

44

It furthermore is argued in Chapter Two that the decision to intervene is
signiﬁcantly affected by the speciﬁc characteristics of the crises themselves. Nascent
conﬂicts abroad must be evaluated individually by presidents to ensure that the
appropriate response meets security needs while maintaining support at home. Certainly,
salient international events, such as interstate crises, have the potential to dramatically
escalate in severity. If that were to occur, a policy of active diplomatic or military
intervention could threaten US. troops or personnel. The political costs to an
administration for the unwarranted or unpopular use of US. resources abroad could easily

lead to electoral and policy defeat.

45

TABLE 1: A Comparison of the Hypotheses of Two Theories of Foreign Policy Decision

 

 

 

 

 

 

Making
Hypothesized Direction of Relationship
Variable Diversionary Theory Structural Constraints Theory
National Presidential elections encourage Not clear, though as one of the twin
Elections greater belligerency. pillars of domestic structure, elections
. Ostrom and Job 1986 are hypothesized to invite caution in
’ decision making.
0 James and Oneal, 1991
o Russett, 1990
0 Stoll, 1984
o DeRouen 1995 . Morrow, 1991
’ - Snyder, 1991
0 Schweller, 1992
Economic Poor economic conditions tend to Poor economic conditions tend to
Conditions increase the likelihood of present an impediment to presidential
presidential uses of force. belligerency or should be unrelated to
o Ostrom and Job, 1986 ”-
, James and Oneal, 199] o Meernik and Waterman, 1996
0 James and Hristoulas, 1994 ' Lian and Oneal, 1993
0 Russet, 1989
Presidential Aggregated presidential approval is Public opinion serves to constrain
Approval positively related to the use of force. presidential uses of force or should be
. Ostrom and Job, 1986 unrelated to presidential uses of force.
0 James and Hristoulas, 1994 ° Meernik and Waterman, 1996
0 Morgan and Bickers, 1992
DeRouen (1995) argued that the
opposite relationship exists.
International As threat increases, presidents are Threat level tends to increase
Threat less likely to use force for political presidential uses of force.

 

purposes.
0 James and Hristoulas, 1994

Ostrom and Job (1986) argued the
opposite relationship exists.

 

0 Morgan and Palmer, 1997

 

46

 

Table 1 (cont’d):

 

Saliency of As the importance of the crisis Saliency tends to increase presidential
Crisis increases, presidents are less likely uses of force.

to use force. 0 Morgan and Palmer, 1997
0 James and Hristoulas, 1994

 

 

Political Signiﬁcant political opposition Political opposition discourages
Opposition encourages diversionary uses of belligerent foreign policy actions.

force. Russett, 1990

Maoz and Russett, 1993
Morgan and Schwebach, 1992
Gowa, 1998

O
0 Morgan and Bickers, 1992 . Morgan and Campbell, 1991
o Meernik and Waterman, 1996 . Morrow, 1991
0 James and Hristoulas, 1994 . Mintz, 1993

O

O

 

 

 

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49

CHAPTER 2

SYSTEMIC THREAT, DOMESTIC-POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND CRISIS
SALIENCY: MODELING THE DECISION TO INTERVENE

[Eisenhower] did not believe that we could put the proposition of going to
war over with the American people at this time. The West Coast might
agree, but his letters from the farm areas and elsewhere constantly say
don ’t send our boys to war. It will be a big job to explain to the American
people the importance of these islands to US security. Moreover, it we
shuck the UN, and say we are going to be the world ’s policeman, we had
better get ready to go to war, because we’ll get it. The President said that
while he was in general agreement with everything that had been said, we
must enlist world support and the approval of the American people
(Foreign Relations of the United States, quoted in F oyle, 1 99 7).

[Some oﬂicials in the Clinton administration] had said that the Bosnian
Serb attack on Muslim-held areas in Bosnia was an aﬁront to the US. ’s
national interest, but, this thinking went, if it was an ajjront to our
national interest, oﬂicials should have been willing to put a half million
troops in Bosnia. But they hadn’t been and weren’t going to--the

assumption, a valid one, being that the public would be strongly opposed
(Drew, 1996: 244).

Domestic-political institutions help shape the foreign policy decisions of
presidents. Indeed, given that domestic support is generally required for the success of
any administration policy, the decision by a president to embark on any given course of
action must necessarily be driven by domestic-political concerns (Russett, 1990). Yet, the
external environment additionally places constraints on executive decisions. In proposing

foreign policy initiatives, a president must not only consider the likelihood of

50

congressional and public opposition, but he must also concern himself with the potential
threat to US. national security if important interests are not defended.

In this chapter, I argue for a structural-constraints theory of American foreign
policy. Domestic-political institutions, such as Congress and elections, coupled with the
constitutional separation of powers, all tend to invoke caution in presidential decision
making. And, the stronger these constraints the more likely a president will avoid
precarious foreign policy choices. Contrary to diversionary theories, then, I argue that
domestic-political institutions tend to prevent the abuse of power by executives. These
governing structures provide a brake on executive impetuousness and consequently tend
to discourage costly foreign policy initiatives.

However, any model of foreign policy decision-making must not neglect the
demands placed on an executive by both systemic structure and the salience of external
crises. Domestic politics are clearly part of the decision calculus. But, threats to US.
interests also affect presidential attention to foreign affairs. Consequently, a fully
speciﬁed model of presidential decision-making in foreign affairs controls for all three
factors; domestic-political support, systemic threat, and conﬂict or event saliency. The
theoretical model presented below, then, attempts to understand broadly how threat,
salience, and domestic-political support inﬂuence presidential decision-making in foreign
affairs. More speciﬁcally, this model tries to address the following questions:

0 What role does systemic structure play in the conﬂict-resolution initiatives of a

president?

51

0 Do domestic-political conditions serve to encourage of discourage presidential
peace-making endeavors?
o Are presidents more likely to intervene in certain interstate crisis situations than
others, independent of domestic-political and systemic considerations?
0 Have conﬂict-resolution efforts ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly over time?
To evaluate these questions, I propose a modiﬁed realist model of presidential decision-
making in foreign affairs. Testable propositions are subsequently derived and I then

conclude with a brief discussion of the insights provided by my theoretical model.

Intervening in Foreign Interstate Conﬂicts

The relationship between international affairs and domestic-political systems
continues to generate considerable interest among international relations scholars. As part
of an effort to better understand the link between the two levels of analysis, this
dissertation examines one aspect of American foreign policy: the decision to intervene as
a third party in an ongoing interstate crisis. Aiding the resolution of conﬂicts abroad has
become a staple of US. foreign policy in the post-World War II era. Indeed, to prevent
the escalation of interstate disputes, the United States has frequently contributed political,
economic, and military resources. Often, the political clout, ﬁnancial backing, and
military might of the United States serve as the necessary ingredients to overcome
conﬂicts of interest and push state leaders back to the bargaining table.

Although prevalent, we know little about the decision calculus of a president
during these interstate conﬂicts. I present a conceptualization of the conditions in which a

president will intervene in an interstate crisis. Clearly, the question of whether the United

52

States intervenes has important implications for America’s foreign policy. As Huth
(1988) observed, major power interventions into regional crises have had dramatic
consequences for the ﬁnal outcomes of the conﬂicts.‘ Furthermore, many scholars believe
that research on crisis conditions can lead to a more complete understanding of the
outbreak of war (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Lebow, 1981; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997;
Morgan, 1993). Indeed, according to Snyder (1994: 316), “An international crisis is
international politics in a microcosm. That is to say, a crisis tends to highlight or force to
the surface a wide range of factors and processes which are central to international
politics in general.” And, Hermann (1994: 292) insisted that an international crisis
“becomes an occasion for decision.”

Previous studies of US. crisis involvement have almost exclusively concentrated
on those incidents where the United States was a primary crisis actor (see for example,
James and Oneal, 1991 and James and Hristoulas, 1994). This set of cases clearly is a
small subset of the opportunities a president has to demonstrate foreign policy acumen.2
Indeed, by ignoring conﬂict-resolution initiatives, scholars may be drawing inappropriate
conclusions regarding the determinants of executive decision-making in foreign affairs.
For example, as a direct participant, presidents may often be guided solely or
predominately by systemic factors or bureaucratic decision rules (see James and Oneal,

1991; Quiﬁones and Hower, 1996). Peace-making attempts, however, may respond to an

 

‘ Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the role of third parties in
international conﬂicts. Yet, generally speaking, the primary focus of this attention has been on the
arbitration and mediation of interstate disputes (Bercovitch, 1991, 1996; Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992;
Camevale and Pruitt, I992; Efraim, 1992; Matthews, et al., 1989; Princen, 1992; Touval and Zartman,
1985).

2 Opportunity is seemingly analogous to the Sprout’s (I965) conception of ‘environmental possibilism.’

53

entirely different set of exogenous factors. Given the importance of these actors, we need
to have some idea about the systemic and domestic environments that are associated with
the decision to intervene (see Goertz, 1994).

Intervention

The decision to intervene as a neutral third party in a foreign conﬂict is not always
a straightforward one. “A president,” as Russett (1990: 4) aptly phrased it, “is expected
to deliver two items to the electorate: peace and prosperity.” Attention abroad not only
can lead to the neglect of important domestic issues. But, international engagement risks
involving US. troops and personnel in potentially costly conﬂicts that the American
electorate may subsequently conclude to be unimportant to its own notion of US.
national interests. Consequently, providing these two goods is difﬁcult to accomplish,
and presidents are often forced to make choices that strengthen one at the expense of the
other. Furthermore, given the cacophony of different beliefs and political motivations in
the electorate as well as on Capitol Hill, decision-making of any kind will likely incur
some level of domestic opposition. A president must balance his own domestic-political
interests with the national security needs of the country he is charged to protect.

In attending to foreign policy, then, a president must manage the interplay of
various forces at work. First and foremost is the international environment. Systemic
structure and threat level inexorably enter into any foreign policy calculation. Does the
structure of the international system warrant an activist foreign policy agenda? Second,
what are the domestic demands being made on a president? Will the public support
attention and engagement abroad, or do conditions at home require a concentrated

domestic focus? Finally, an executive must take into account the speciﬁc characteristics

54

of the interstate crisis itself. Is it directly salient to US. interests? Are our allies in need
of support?

The model of executive decision-making posited here speciﬁes that systemic
threat, crisis salience, and domestic-political support help determine foreign conﬂict
intervention. While reelection may be a prime motivating factor in the calculations of all
elected officials, neglecting policy for the sole sake of personal political interests will
eventually be recognized by the electorate. Indeed, rarely can a president act in foreign
affairs with only the exigencies of his domestic-political situation in mind (Russett, 1990:
11). To be sure, the pursuit of an appropriate national security policy does not often
conﬂict with personal or partisan interests. Carter’s facilitation of the Camp David
accords, for instance, was a major victory for his administration, both politically and
internationally. However, his attention to foreign affairs also provided Reagan with an
excellent opening for his nascent political campaign. Bill Clinton’s attack on President
Bush for the lack of attention paid to domestic affairs also illustrates how success on the
international stage can become a liability for an incumbent executive. For this reason,
presidents must be concerned with maintaining a balance between domestic and foreign
priorities.

Interestingly, while scholars have argued that international and domestic factors
interact to determine presidential decision-making in foreign affairs, few have controlled
for the precise characteristics of the external event. However, as Quiﬁones and Hower
(1996: 5) have suggested, the decision an executive makes regarding which foreign
conﬂicts necessitate attention depends considerably upon “the context of the particular

type of opportunity that arises.” Indeed, a model of decision-making would seem

55

fundamentally underspeciﬁed without the inclusion of salient factors that undoubtedly
enter into the decision calculus of foreign policy elites.

I draw on both Regan’s (1996, 1998) work on third-party interventions into
intrastate conﬂicts and Fordham’s (1998) model of diversionary behavior to help
explicate the decision calculus of a president when confronted with a foreign interstate
crisis.3 Foreign conﬂicts clearly present opportunities to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the
face of a threatening international environment. And, they offer the opportunity to
demonstrate a commitment to alliance partners facing potentially dangerous crisis
situations. However, attention to foreign affairs also has the ability to generate signiﬁcant
political opposition. Given the electoral relevance of the domestic economy and social
conditions, neglect of these important issues can be costly for a president.

According to Fordham (1998: 570), “uses of force risk war and other international
commitments that can drain resources, divert military assets from other uses, and place a
political burden on the government.” While Fordham was addressing primary actor
activity, a similar argument can be made for conﬂict-resolution initiatives. Providing
even political resources to aid the resolution of a foreign conﬂict depletes the availability

of scarce capital from other issues, and risks provoking public and congressional

 

3 Regan (1998) avoided low-level (i.e., diplomatic) interventions into civil conﬂicts. He argued that an
entirely different decision calculus exists for economic and military interventions due to the heightened
costs involved. While this may be so, it is interesting to note that in less than half the crises used in the
empirical analysis presented in subsequent chapters, did the US. become involved politically. This seems
odd given America’s broad reach in the international system. Apparently, there are foreign conﬂicts that
administrations deem insigniﬁcant to US. interests to even contribute political resources to aid in their
resolution. On the other hand, though, crisis situations are by deﬁnition dangerous events that possess the
potential to escalate. An administration has only ﬁnite resources to help resolve both crises abroad and
problems at home. Certainly, presidents can be held accountable for spending too much time on foreign
policy and not enough on the plight of the domestic economy and social conditions. It may be the case,
then, that even political involvement is inﬂuenced by the same domestic and systemic forces that affect

56

opposition. Indeed, the potential political costs involved in committing scarce resources
to help resolve conﬂicts abroad must naturally concern incumbent administrations.
Domestic program priorities may languish while administration attention is focused
abroad. Furthermore, given that foreign conﬂicts can at times be exceedingly difﬁcult to
resolve, the potential political and economic costs resulting from future obligations to the
primary crisis actors could be substantial (e.g., the Arab-Israeli peace process).

The costs, then, to a president for intervening in a foreign conﬂict are
unmistakable. Not only might a president generate signiﬁcant political opposition which
threatens his ability to effectively address future issues. But, a failure on the international
stage has the potential to harm U.S. credibility and inﬂuence abroad. The gains, in
contrast, are much less visible. Indeed, in the words of The Economist, “successful
intervention does not win votes; failed intervention loses buckets of them” (July 25,
1998: 33). So, the successful resolution of a conﬂict may matter little if the domestic
economy is doing poorly.4 Furthermore, voters may not understand the intricacies of
global politics and consequently may fail to reward a president for maintaining alliance

cohesion.

Theoretical Assumptions
I begin with the common assumption that a president is a rational actor, weighing

the costs and beneﬁts of intervention in an expected utility framework. Without a doubt,

 

economic and military interventions. Regan, in a 1998 conference paper, did include diplomatic
involvement in his multinomial logistic analysis.

‘ While foreign policy has been and continues to be salient to the American public, this interest varies over
time and presumably is inﬂuenced by domestic economic conditions. Russett (I990: 13) noted that “the
state of the economy and its impact on [a president’s] electoral prospects must be [a president’s] ﬁrst
priority.” Plus, attention to domestic policy generally gamishes more rewards than foreign affairs.

57

the decision to intervene as a neutral third party in a crisis rests largely in the hands of the
president. As commander-in—chief, the Constitution not only provides the executive with
legal authority over America’s armed forces, but as Alexander Hamilton (1961: 424)
insisted, the advantages of “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” naturally provide
for a president’s leading role in international affairs. Furthermore, as the ‘sole organ’ of
American diplomacy, the president has the additional responsibility of administering the
US. response to international events. To be sure, Congress has formal authority in
foreign affairs. Presidential scholar Louis Fisher, in fact, maintains that the initiation of
major foreign policy moves by the executive without statutory authorization from
Congress was never intended by the Founding Fathers, unless of course national security
is threatened (see Fisher, 1995). However, presidents in the post-World War 11 period
have claimed this executive power and the Supreme Court has consistently supported this
Constitutional interpretation (Crabb and Holt, 1989).5 The president, then, is assumed to
be the ultimate decision maker, though his options are constrained by international and
domestic environments.

I additionally assume that leaders desire to remain in ofﬁce. While structural
theories and models of foreign policy decision-making may both ground behavior in the
rational cost—beneﬁt calculations of a presidential administration, structural theories tend
to view these costs and beneﬁts relating to a poorly deﬁned national interest. On the other

hand, a theory of foreign policy generally views these costs and beneﬁts relating to an

 

5 The Supreme Court has consistently chosen to either avoid constitutional disagreements between the two
other branches by labeling such questions political in nature, or the Court has supported charges of
executive privilege. Both options ultimately favor executive dominance in foreign affairs (see Crabb and
Holt, 1989; Silverstein, 1997; Koh, 1990).

58

individual’s political motivations. This latter view does not suggest that external forces
play no role in foreign policy behavior. Indeed, it is the interaction of systemic forces and
domestic-political goals that generally shapes policy choice. Yet, presidents clearly
possess a compelling interest in their own political future, and therefore should attempt to
maximize their chances of retaining ofﬁce. We should expect presidents, then, when
presented with an opportunity to intervene to consider important domestic forces, such as
congressional sentiment, the state of the economy, and the proximity of elections in their
decision calculus, for these variables are directly consequential to their electoral designs.
A president must also, though, as commander-in-chief, be acutely aware of systemic
conditions and take into account the threat directed at US. national interests, the nations
involved in a crisis, relative capabilities, and the value of the current status quo (Snyder,
1994; Ostrom and Job, 1986). Similar to Huth (1997), then, a modiﬁed realist model of
foreign policy decision-making is proposed that incorporates both security interests and

domestic-political considerations in the executive decision calculus.

The Decision Calculus

According to Morgenthau (1966), a rational statesman should naturally base his
foreign policy decision on a cost-beneﬁt calculation that preserves a state’s national
interests. While the underlying motivations of Morgenthau’s statesman can be criticized,
the rational expected utility framework of the decision maker(s) offers a tractable way of
explaining foreign policy decision-making. The decision to intervene, for instance,
includes a subjective estimation of threat, salience, and domestic support. Presumably,

when the expected utility of intervening is greater than the expected utility for not

59

intervening, an executive will contribute political, economic, or military resources to help
resolve a burgeoning conﬂict abroad. So, more formally, if

EU[intervention] - EU[non-intervention] > 0
then a president will choose to intervene in a foreign interstate crisis situation to help
resolve the issue or issues in dispute.

When systemic threat and crisis salience are both high, and domestic opposition is
low or zero, the decision for a president should be relatively clear.6 That is, if the
structure and current status quo of the international system indicate an increasing hostility
to US. interests, and the salience of a given foreign conﬂict is high, plus domestic-
political opposition is minimal, intervention should always be the chosen course of action
of an administration. Similarly, when systemic structure coincides with current US.
interests, a crisis abroad does not meet a salience threshold, and domestic opposition is
high, non-intervention should naturally be the president’s choice. However, when these
critical factors pull an administration in different directions, the cost-beneﬁt calculations
become particularly important. Indeed, future domestic support and electoral viability
may have to be weighed against maintaining alliance ties or containing the spread of
Soviet inﬂuence.

A basic model of presidential third-party intervention, then, can be speciﬁed as

follows:

 

" This decision is only relatively clear because there are latent costs that have the potential to arise if the
intervention does not go as planned, or if the subjective prior beliefs regarding the values of the three
irnportant variables prove to be incorrect. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990: 748),
“Beliefs about the level of domestic opposition to given foreign policies may profoundly inﬂuence the
range of policy choices that a state has or the responses of adversaries to those choices.”

60

TPIc = f (0,, 8,, Tc)7
where
TPIc is the likelihood of third-party intervention in crisis c;
0c is the strength of domestic-political opposition prior to a given crisis;
Sc is the salience of the crisis to US. national security interests;

Tc is the systemic threat level at the time of a crisis situation.

Both salience and systemic threat are purported here to encourage foreign conﬂict
intervention by a president. Indeed, as national security looms larger in the minds of
foreign policy decision makers, the US. should increasingly seek to protect its interests
abroad through active international engagement. Domestic—political opposition, on the
other hand, is asserted here to deter executives from contributing political, economic, or
military aid to states in conﬂict.

If crisis saliency and systemic threat were the only two factors determining third-
party intervention then the decision calculus of a president would be much simpler. As a
foreign crisis emerges, an executive need make only a determination as to whether such a
conﬂict meets a critical threshold for engagement. More speciﬁcally, there is some
combination of systemic threat and crisis saliency that overcomes the costs (Ac) of
involvement. These costs, assuming away domestic-political ones, are logistic and
material, plus the potential cost to one’s prestige. So, when (Sc + Tc - A,) < 0, an

administration should avoid involvement in the foreign conﬂict. In such an instance, the

 

7 These three factors largely coincide with Mitchell’s (1970) view of interventions. He concluded that four
important concerns inﬂuence the decision to intervene: (1) characteristics of the countries in conﬂict; (2)

61

conﬂict has simply not reached the critical salience threshold, nor does the international
status quo necessitate a demonstration of US. resolve.

When domestic-political costs are included in the decision calculus, the threshold
for intervention can become much greater. Indeed, even if (S, + T,) is large, domestic-
political costs can prevent US. aid. Not only may A, be large, but the likelihood of 0,
increasing signiﬁcantly as a consequence of intervention alters the executive calculation.
Indeed, how dormant constituency interests will respond to a bold foreign policy
initiative can often be unpredictable. Furthermore, assume that there also exists an
opportunity cost for attention to a foreign crisis. Administration resources, particularly
political capital, are ﬁnite. Resources spent on one important issue are resources that
cannot be spent on another. President Clinton, for instance, spent over a week prior to the
1998 congressional elections mediating a further peace accord between Israeli Prime
Minister Benyarnin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Each prime time
speech on the peace process was a missed opportunity to attend to domestic concerns,
such as education, social security reform, and disaster relief.

The likelihood of US. third-party intervention, then, is directly related to the
executive estimation of systemic threat, crisis saliency, and domestic-political opposition.
When a crisis, Ci, reaches a critical threshold value on either the systemic threat or
salience dimension, an administration should be prepared to devote political, economic,
or military resources to aid in its resolution. Arbitrarily establishing zero as this critical

threshold, when (S, + T,) > O, a president will intervene. When (S, + T,) < O, a president

 

characteristics of the intervening country; (3) characteristics of the international system; and (4) linkage
patterns between target and intervening country (see Regan, 1998).

62

will remain uninvolved. When domestic-political concerns are included in the decision
calculus, overcoming the critical threshold becomes more difﬁcult. Whenever 0, assumes
a positive value, T, or S, must necessarily increase for an intervention to occur. So, even
when (S, + T,) > O, domestic-political costs can dissuade intervention. The threat of
congressional sanctions, for instance, should naturally deter U.S. third-party involvement.
Only if 0 < (S, + T,), and O, < (S, + T,), will a president intervene as a third party in a
foreign conﬂict situation.

In the next section, I present testable propositions derived from the basic logic of
the model presented above. Admittedly, I do not formally deduce these hypotheses.
However, the intention of the decision model is to help clarify the interactions of different
forces and how they connect to foreign policy decision-making. The discussion is
intended to present factors that are deemed critical to the executive decision calculus.
Similar to many other models, it serves mainly as a heuristic to help generate insights into

the particular variables that affect the decision to intervene.

Interstate Crises and American Foreign Policy: Testable Propositions

American presidents are often presented with salient international events that
necessitate U.S. involvement. Indeed, to help facilitate the peaceful resolution of
interstate disputes, ensure stability in a region, and protect US. interest abroad, American
leadership and military strength have often provided the necessary ingredients to
accomplish these objectives. According to Crabb and Holt (1989: 6), “foreign policy
refers to the external goals for which a nation is prepared to commit its resources.”

Foreign policy also provides the primary process through which states resolve their

63

conﬂicts of interest with one another. For the United States, given its geographic size, its
economic wealth, and its military might, foreign policy must regulate important interests
in many parts of the world. Particularly during the Cold War, the US. sought to defend
its national security by extending protection to many states in the north and the south.
Naturally, the US. deployed both political and military resources in numerous
circumstances to convey our resolve and demonstrate a commitment to our allies and our

interests.

Propositions

I have argued that three broad concerns enter into the decision calculus of a
president when confronted with the decision to intervene: systemic threat, crisis saliency,
and domestic-political opposition. I also have asserted that threat and salience tend to
increase the likelihood of neutral third-party interventions while domestic opposition
serves to decrease that probability. Three general propositions are constructed:

P1: The likelihood of third-party intervention increases as the level of threat to
the United States increases.

P 2: The likelihood of third-party intervention increases as the salience of the
crisis to US. national interests increases.

P3: The likelihood of third-party intervention decreases as the level of domestic-
political opposition increases.

In Table 3, I present operational proxies for the three broad theoretical concepts
discussed above. These proxies represent the exogenous variables that will be tested in
Chapters Four, Five, and Six. For systemic threat, measures of US. relative power and
US. military expenditures are used. For domestic-political opposition, the strength of

presidential support within Congress, plus domestic economic conditions provide the

64

proxies. For crisis saliency, the regime type and alliance portfolios of the primary crisis
actors, the level of Soviet involvement, plus the regional location of the conﬂict are all
used. While admittedly imperfect measures, these variables do capture the general
relationships between the three theoretical components and US. third—party intervention.

Below, I present precise hypotheses to be tested against the ICB data.

Systemic Threat

According to Walt (1987), states principally react to the threat they perceive
emanating from the international system. As the threat level increases, major powers such
as the US. will embrace a more assertive role in global affairs. I expect, then, that
conﬂict-resolution initiatives will be more likely as threat increases.

H 1: As the level of threat increases, U.S. third-party involvement in
interstate crises will increase.

There are two reasons why increases in threat should lead to a greater propensity
to initiate peace-making efforts. First, as mentioned above, domestic-political opposition
will naturally be more willing to defer to executive actions when a security risk is clearly
evident. According to Huth (1997: 8), “When political leaders can package their
decisions to intervene as credibly linked to external security threats, then leaders are in a
stronger position to confront domestic-political opposition...” Indeed, presidents can
effectively use the bully pulpit to deﬁne the importance of the foreign conﬂict, leaving
congressional opposition in the uncomfortable position of challenging the president’s
duties as commander-in-chief (Sinclair, 1993).

Congress should, then, tend to defer to the president in times of national insecurity

(see Sundquist, 1981). Certainly, the traditional interpretation of post-war American

65

foreign policy insists that congressional behavior in the 1950’s and 1960’s was largely
bipartisan in response to the Cold War threat (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996). It was not
until the détente years that Congress began reasserting its constitutional prerogatives in
the realm of foreign affairs. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequently the
development of a less threatening systemic environment, congressional assertiveness has
become even more apparent, and President Clinton seems quick to respond to the
concerns of Congress, particularly House and Senate Republicans.

The second reason is that given the anarchic nature of the international system,
leaders must often deter aggression through the threat, show or use of military force.
According to Ostrom and Job (1986: 546), “A president will seek to maintain his
international and domestic credibility by indicating his willingness to use force...”
Particularly if the crisis involves an ally with whom we have formally negotiated security
arrangements, intervention becomes tantamount to a referendum on the value a president
places on that relationship. Not only would inaction bring into question U.S. credibility,
but it would also demonstrate a lack of resolve.

During the Cold War era, U.S. commitments were largely determined by a coterie
of foreign policy experts that discerned the threat looming from the international arena
(Organski and Tammen, 1996). Given their concern with the spread of Communism,
active engagement was believed to be necessary in order to check Soviet expansion
(Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996). Presumably, the failure to demonstrate resolve in the face
of aggression brought into question the competency of American leadership.
Furthermore, demonstrating resolve through active engagement was thought to avoid

conﬂict by making negotiated settlements seem less costly (Schelling, 1960). NATO

66

ﬂights over Serbian territory, for example, were designed to maintain regional stability by

deterring further aggression by Serbian authorities.

Status Quo

The valuation of the status quo by an administration has important implications
for foreign policy decision-making, as well. Admittedly, threat and the status quo are
closely linked, both theoretically and empirically. In fact, it may be difﬁcult to
empirically distinguish their separate inﬂuences on decision-making. However, Morgan
and Palmer (1997), insisted that an administration will increasingly select an activist
foreign policy as the status quo moves further away from the administration’s ideal point
(also see Werner and Kugler, 1996). Similarly, when the norms and rules that govern
international politics coincide with the personal and electorally induced preferences of the
president, opportunities to redraw this systemic structure should rarely be seized upon.
This is to some extent why powerful states are seldom revisionist. However, given that
the US. has been instrumental in creating an international status quo in its own image
with institutions designed to avoid conﬂict among states, it should not be surprising to
ﬁnd a willingness among foreign policy elites to maintain this favorable international
order (Kacowicz, 1995).

As a satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed power, America’s place in the global hierarchy
necessarily means that the valuation of the status quo by foreign policy elites will likely
inﬂuence the foreign policy agenda of a presidential administration. The appraisal of the
status quo can also help explain why, despite congressional opposition, an administration

may be willing to risk partisan criticism in its conduct of foreign affairs. Indeed, if an

67

administration places little value on the present status quo, a president may be willing to
incur substantial costs to alter the current state of affairs so it better ﬁts the
administration’s ideal (Lindsay, 1994). The leads to a second hypothesis.

H 2: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase

as the distance between the ideal point of an administration and the
status quo grows larger.

Crisis Saliency

There is little doubt that certain crises elicit greater attention by the US.
government than others. This is to be expected if certain issues are intrinsically more
important to particular presidents. One need only compare the administrations of Carter
and Reagan for a striking example of how issues are differentially weighed by those in
positions of power. According Morgan (1993: 270), “third parties become involved [in
crises] when they perceive it is in their interest to do so; that is, they become involved
when they are concerned with the outcome of the issues in dispute or with the issues that
are created by the conﬂict.” Yet, US. interests abroad are considerable, and they are
often contradictory, making the determination of salience difficult to pinpoint accurately.

During the Cold War, though, presidential determinations regarding conﬂict
intervention were inﬂuenced by Soviet decision-making. The inference, of course, was
that checking moves made by the USSR. was clearly crucial for American national
security. The Berlin Blockade, for example, was of greater concern to US. interests than
the Costa-Rican coup in 1918. We would hypothesize, then, that US. third-party
involvement in foreign interstate crises is positively related to their salience.

H3: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase
as the salience of the crisis increases.

68

 

Additional Crisis Saliency Variables

Three additional variables of import directly related to the character of the crisis
itself must be included due to their importance in international politics. The international
relations community over the last decade has concluded that these factors need to be
incorporated in most models of foreign policy decision-making as theoretical and
statistical controls. One involves the regime type of the opponent. Democratic peace
research has consistently shown interactions between democratic states to be less
belligerent than mixed regime type interactions (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993;
Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997;
Rousseau, et al., 1996). Furthermore, though, democratic states appear to provide succor
to like regimes in times of crisis (see for example Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Gleditsch
and Hegre, 1997). We should expect, then, that the propensity to assist in the resolution
of international disputes is positively related to the regime types of the primary crisis
actors.

H4: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase

when the regime type of a primary crisis actor(s) reﬂects the
democratic values of the United States.

Alliance ties and geographical proximity have also been shown to be important in
foreign policy decision-making (see for example, Sabrosky, 1980; Smith, 1996; Vasquez,
1993; Huth, 1996; Holsti, 1991; Gibler and Vasquez, 1998). Although the evidence is
mixed (see for example, Singer and Small 1966; Levy, 1981; Huth, 1996), Raknerud and
Hegre (1997) found that democracies were much more likely to come to each other’s aid

When facing a crisis situation. The United States, moreover, is in a unique spot, at least

Since World War II, in its commitment to its allies. As one pole in the bipolar struggle,

69

the US. perceived its own vital security interests to depend on ﬁrm alliance ties designed
to constrain Soviet aggression.

H5: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase
when a primary crisis actor(s) is a formal ally of the United States.

Contiguity additionally needs to be addressed inasmuch as the projection of
inﬂuence is affected by geographical distance. Indeed, the propensity for two states to
become involved in a dispute is substantially affected by territorial proximity
(Wallensteen, 1981; Diehl, 1991; Bremer, 1990). Vasquez (1993), though, questioned the
proximity evidence. He insisted that the source of conﬂict is not a result of contiguity, but
a result of contentious territorial claims. For the US, boundary disputes have historically
been quite rare. However, it is equally evident that the Americas, particularly Central
America, have always been strategically and politically important to the United States.

H6: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase

as the geographic regional salience of the crisis increases.
Political Opposition

Effective political opposition naturally constrains the implementation of a
government’s agenda (Gowa, 1998).8 In the 19805, for example, congressional Democrats
expressed concern over Reagan’s arms control policy. According to Sinclair (1993), the
Democrats effectively mobilized a grass-roots campaign that put considerable pressure on
the Reagan administration and congressional Republicans to pass a nuclear freeze

resolution. The INF and START treaties were the eventual consequence of this

‘

‘ Waltz (1967) surprisingly agreed. He concluded that, “When the distance between parties grows wider,
concern for the continuity of policy abounds.”

70

constituent pressure.9 Given that voters appear to perceive differences among presidential
candidates with regards to foreign and defense issues, and these issues play a role in a
voter’s choice of candidates, opposition members of Congress have an incentive to
challenge presidential foreign policy decision-making (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida,
1989). This leads to a seventh hypothesis.

H7: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease
as the strength of domestic-political opposition increases.

Waltz (1967: 293) insisted that “the persistence of effective criticism,” is “one of
the most valuable qualities of the American political system.” To be sure, presidents
often face censure from opposition leaders on Capitol Hill. And, recently such
disapproval of a president’s policy prescriptions has become more common as the
ideological homogeneity of the two main political parties has led to sharp differences in
member preferences. Particularly with regards to the use of military force, conspicuous
divisions continue to exist between the two parties. Republicans, for example, generally
tend to be either hard-liners or intemationalists, while Democrats have consistently
gravitated towards accommodation (Holsti, 1996). As a result of this partisan conﬂict,
rarely will a president’s avowed Constitutional charge in foreign and defense policy
dissuade opposition congressmen from disputing executive decision—making when they
perceive a potential electoral reward for activism. For example, Reagan’s heavy handed
policy towards Nicaragua in the 19803, according to Pastor (1993), was undermined by

Opposition from congressional Democrats who correctly perceived a public aversion for

¥

9 While the Freeze Resolution initially failed to pass the House in August of 1982, it was placed on the
ballot in 11 states, and it passed in 10 of them (Smoke, 1987; Sinclair, 1993).

71

U.S. activities. It seems, then, that an independent-minded Congress can stiﬂe vigorous
executive action (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996).

Waltz (1967: 305), like many others, also recognized that the American political
system, “is one of contention among strong institutions,”10 and Milner (1997) pointed out
that policy outcomes are strongly affected by the legislative power of the executive.
Indeed, according to Milner (1997), executives with considerable legislative authority are
able to enact policies that reﬂect their ideal position. However, as this authority
increasingly moves into the hands of legislators, their policy preferences come to play a
much larger role in determining legislative outcomes. Given Congress’s clear
Constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs, presidents must certainly consider the
preferences of those on Capitol Hill.”

However, Morgan and Palmer (1997) have insisted that domestic consensus is
related to systemic threat. Congressional activism should naturally increase as threat
diminishes. Political opposition, then, should not only have become more constraining
following the Nixon administration’s attempt to reduce tensions between the two super
powers through the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, but given today’s international
climate congressional opposition should be particularly apparent. And, evidence appears
to support this conjecture. Carter (1986; 1997), for instance, recorded 105 instances of

congressional activity in foreign affairs from 1992-1995. Only 668 similar events were

 

‘0 Interestingly, since the Vietnam War the Joint Chiefs have been one of the most constraining domestic
institutions with regards to the use force. Without a well-deﬁned military objective, the Joint Chiefs rarely
assent to presidential interventions (see Organski and Tammen, 1996; Gergen, 1994).

” According to Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), voters oﬁen balance one institution by electing a different
majority to the other.

72

 

coded for the 36 years between 1946 and 1982. Presumably, then, the empirical evidence

will demonstrate that the inﬂuence of domestic-political opposition varies over time.

Elections

Many scholars have posited theories tying presidential decision-making to the
proximity of elections. And, elections are certainly a frequently cited motive for
diversionary uses of force (Meernik and Waterman, 1996). “In order to boost their own
chances of success,” Meernik and Waterman (1996: 580) wrote, “presidents have been
portrayed as ready to exploit their foreign policy powers to given these campaigns an
added boost.” Yet, the evidence fails to demonstrate that presidents shrewdly seize
intervention opportunities for immediate electoral gain. Indeed, elections should
seemingly tend to invoke caution in presidential decision-making. Even incumbents that
face likely defeat at the polls, must realize that an increasingly media savvy electorate
will be able to descry the political manipulation of international events. Jentleson (1992)
in fact found the American public quite capable of discerning whether presidential
interventions were guided by US. foreign policy interests, and Andrade and Young
(1996) furthermore concluded that presidents through overt acts were only marginally
able to move public opinion in a favorable direction. This leads to an eighth hypothesis.

H8: During a national election year, the likelihood of a presidential third-

party intervention will decrease.

Domestic Conditions

The state of the economy is the best predictor of an incumbent’s electoral success

(Russett, 1990). No doubt, voters are likely to hold current ofﬁce holders accountable for

73

 

their pocketbook woes. This concern with economic prosperity is clearly reﬂected in an
administration’s attention to ﬁscal and macroeconomic policy. Naturally, scholars have
hypothesized for quite some time that governments manipulate economic policy prior to
national elections to produce a boost in electoral support (Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1987;
Lewis-Beck, 1990). Similarly, diversionary theories have tied the use of force to
downturns in a state’s economic cycle. Yet, given the short-term impact and highly
uncertain consequences of a foreign policy move designed to boost public approval,
domestic economic problems should generally tend to be met with domestic economic
solutions.

H9A: In general, economic conditions will be positively related to conﬂict-
resolution initiatives; as the domestic economy deteriorates, the
likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease.

Yet, economic stagnation often leads governing elites to provide quick domestic
solutions to difficult policy problems. Two courses of action are often taken: protectionist
measures aimed at foreign goods and services or a domestic stimulus package (Russett,
1990). Both options, though, may lead to serious disputes with other states. Tariffs and
import quotas have an adverse effect on foreigners’ livelihood and may consequently
generate anti-American sentiment abroad, leading to more violent engagement. Similarly,
domestic spending often revolves around an increase in the defense appropriation, and
such investment can create unease in the minds of other leaders often leading to
increasingly tepid relations.

What's more, foreign leaders may time their moves against neighboring
adversaries around U.S. domestic conditions. When domestic disorder exists in the

United States, these leaders may surmise that such conditions will prevent American

74

 

presidents from intervening abroad. Recently, in fact, NATO and US. ofﬁcials suggested
that Slobodan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia, deﬁed the negotiated truce trusting
that the US. was sufﬁciently preoccupied with the impeachment trial of President
Clinton (see Washington Post, January 18, 1999, A17). Domestic turmoil, then, such as
economic dissatisfaction may be associated with foreign policy activism not because
presidents are attempting to divert attention away from the domestic arena, but rather
because the solutions directly affect or threaten other states, or because foreign leaders
strategically time conﬂicts with an eye towards the US. economy. An alternative
hypothesis, then, is also posited.

H93: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will be
inversely related to domestic economic conditions; as the domestic
economy deteriorates, conﬂict-resolution initiatives will increase.

Conclusion: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Choice

Domestic politics plays a role in the foreign policy behavior of democratic
leaders. According to Steve Chan (1993: 208), though, “the analytic challenge is to
identify the possibly different inﬂuences of democratic institutions under different
circumstances.” He additionally insisted that the international relations community must
move beyond the war-or-no-war dichotomy and ask “whether democracies are also less
likely to engage in a variety of conﬂict behavior that falls short of the threshold of war”
(208).

The model of presidential decision-making presented above insists that neutral

third-party interventions into foreign conﬂicts should be determined chieﬂy by the threat

imposed by the international system, domestic-political opposition, and the salience of

75

 

the crisis opportunity that emerges. Drawing on structural-constraints theories of
democratic decision-making in foreign affairs, I argue that domestic-political institutions
tend to constrain a president from intervening as a third party in conﬂicts abroad. In
contrast, a diversionary model offers an opposing view of the inﬂuence of domestic-
political institutions. Yet, many diversionary models additionally specify the importance
of systemic forces. Consequently, I have derived testable propositions from a model that
recognizes both theoretical traditions.

The analysis presented in the subsequent chapters provides preliminary evidence
regarding the conditions, both systemic and domestic, that lead states to intervene as a
third party in ongoing interstate crises. An understanding of such decision-making is
clearly crucial if we want to comprehend the decisions made by the primary states in
conﬂict. Moreover, without specifying the role of third parties, we cannot hope to fully
understand the process of conﬂict resolution.

In the next chapter, I further discuss operational measures of the important
Variables and present preliminary descriptive statistics. In Chapters Four, Five and Six,
then, I evaluate the inﬂuence of these variables using Poisson, logistic, and multinomial

logistic regression.

76

 

TABLE 3: Basic Operationalization of Important Theoretical Components

 

 

 

 

 

SYSTEMIC THREAT CRISIS SALIENC Y DOMESTIC-POLITICAL
US Relative Power Soviet Involvement Political Opposition
US Military Expenditures (SQ) Alliance Ties National Elections
Democracies Unemployment
Regional Interests Economic Growth

 

 

 

 

 

 

77

 

 

TABLE 4: Hypotheses to be Tested Against ICB Data

Variable Type Hypothesis

_
Systemic Hypothesis] As the level of threat increases, U.S. third-party
involvement in interstate crises will increase.

 

Hypothesis 2 The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention
will increase as the distance between the ideal point of an
administration and the SQ grows larger.

Crisis Saliency Hypothesis 3 The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention
will increase as the salience of the crisis increases.

Hypothesis 4 The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention
will increase when the regime type of a primary crisis
actor(s) reﬂects the democratic values of the United States.

Hypothesis 5 The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention
will increase when a primary crisis actor(s) is a formal ally
of the U.S.

Hypothesis 6 The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention
will increase as the geographic salience of the crisis
increases.

Domestic-Political Hypothesis 7 The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention
will decrease as the strength of domestic-political
opposition increases.

Hypothesis 8 During a national election year, the likelihood of a
presidential third-party intervention will decrease.

Hypothesis 9a As the domestic economy deteriorates, the likelihood of a
presidential third-party intervention will decrease.
Hypothesis 9b As the domestic economy deteriorates, the likelihood of a
presidential third-party intervention will increase.
— I _

 

78

CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL BEGINNINGS

In this chapter, I further discuss the variables used in the statistical analyses
presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. This includes providing measurable proxies for
the three concepts discussed in Chapter Two: (1) systemic threat, (2) domestic-political
opposition, (3) crisis saliency. I then present basic descriptive statistics for each of the
operationalized variables, including time series plots, relative frequencies, and
stationarity tests. Although each of my empirical chapters that follow utilizes a different
statistical methodology, and at times slightly different arrays of exogenous variables, I
present here a description of all the variables used in the estimation that follows. When
necessary, however, additional information regarding data will be provided in Chapters

Four, Five, and Six.

Unit of Analysis

Neutral third-party crisis involvement is the policy choice of interest in this
research. However, in order to fully explore presidential decision-making, three different
statistical analyses are used. In two of the chapters, the unit of analysis is the foreign
interstate crisis. In the third, the unit of analysis is the year, but the number of crises

entered into becomes the object of concern.

79

The International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) dataset offers an appropriate set
of cases to be examined. It records 412 interstate crises from 1918 to 1994. A crisis,
according to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 3), is a situation in which state leaders
perceive, “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of ﬁnite time for
response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military
hostilities.” Most studies of crisis involvement have been conﬁned to the primary crisis
actors. Indeed, few have systematically examined the domestic and systemic determinants
of neutral third-party participation (Huth, 1997 is an exception; also see Regan 1996,
1998). Such an occasion for decision presents an excellent case for evaluating presidential
foreign policy choice. Not only does a crisis present a valid opportunity for a president to
focus on foreign affairs, but as a third party these events avoid immediate threats to U.S.
security interests or military personnel.

In the ICB data, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 849) deﬁned third-party
intervention as, “Any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is
designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship
and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself.” The variable is divided
into four distinct categories: (1) no U.S. activity; (2) low level U.S. activity (political,
economic, propaganda); (3) covert or semi-military activity (covert activity or military
aid or advisors); (4) direct military activity (dispatch of troops, air and naval assistance)
(Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 869). In Table 5, the relative frequencies of U.S. third-
party involvement are presented. Given the small number of direct military interventions,

categories three and four have been collapsed together.

80

The time frame of the study is 1918-1994. As such, the ICB data allows for an
extensive survey of presidential decision-making. Not only does it provide for a
comparison of the interwar years with the post-World War II era in which the United
States emerged as a superpower. It furthermore permits a comparison of crisis
involvement after Vietnam in which domestic-political constraints on executive action
arguably became more potent. The lengthy time series, then, affords the opportunity to
investigate whether any noticeable temporal change can be found in U.S. foreign policy

decision-making.

Endogenous Variables

Different dependent variables are used for each of the three empirical chapters. In
Chapter Four, an event count model is presented in which the dependent variable is the
number of U.S. third-party interventions into interstate conﬂicts each year. In Chapter
Five, a dichotomous dependent variable is created that collapses the ICB code for U.S.
involvement into two categories: (0) no involvement, and ( 1) involvement. In Chapter
Six, the dependent variable is once again expanded to allow for an investigation of the

level of U.S. involvement.

Event-Count Model

Figure 2 shows the total number of interstate crises per year, and the number the
U.S. actively intervened with low or high levels of aid. Looking over time, there is
considerable variation in U.S. conﬂict-resolution attempts. Not surprisingly, many more
crises were reported after World War 11 than during the interwar years. In fact, over 76%

of the crisis events occurred during or after 1948. As expected, as well, U.S. involvement

81

in helping resolve disputes was particularly evident after the war. Of the 67 crises from
1918 to 1938, the U.S. intervened politically, economically, or militarily in less than half
(42%) of them. In contrast, the U.S. was involved in 60% of the interstate crises after
1947. So, not only was there on average more crises per year in the post-World War II era
(5.26 versus 3.62), but the United States was much more likely to intervene as well.1

Two large spikes are also evident in U.S. involvement shown in Figure 2. The
ﬁrst occurred during World War II.2 The second spike, interestingly, appears during the
Carter administration. In the four year period from 1976-1980, there were 41 interstate
crises and Carter involved the U.S. in 23 of them. No other administration was faced with
this number of international crisis situations. In fact, Carter averaged nearly six
interventions per year. Only Reagan comes close to this number with a mean of 5.25 per
year from 1981 to 1984 (See Figure 3).3 Part of the story may be tied to the number of
disputes the U.S. was participating in (or not participating in) as a primary crisis actor.
During the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, for instance, the U.S. was
actively engaged in a substantial number of crisis situations as a primary actor (see Figure
4). This presumably limited the resources (political, economic, and military) that could
potentially be used to help resolve other disputes abroad. After Vietnam, however, U.S.
primary involvement appears to drop considerably. One hypothesis is that after the South

East Asian experience, presidents (particularly Carter) were constrained by both

 

' The annual mean number of third-party interventions by the U.S. was over 3.0 from 1948-1994, but only
2.0 from 1918-1947. This latter number would be less than 1.5 if World War II was excluded.

2 In Figure 2, all 412 cases have been included. However, for many descriptive statistics and for the logistic
estimation presented later, World War 11 cases will be removed.

3 In Figure 3, one can clearly see that opportunity varies dramatically by administration. Without
controlling for this a researcher may draw incorrect inferences regarding the importance of domestic and
systemic inﬂuences on foreign policy actions.

82

Congress’s willingness to oppose executive uses of force, and the public’s greater
aversion for military solutions to international problems. This perhaps freed up scarce
resources that could now be utilized for peace-making initiatives. In addition, given
Carter’s concern with international human rights, active political involvement was
incorporated into his administration’s foreign policy.

There are additional temporal dynamics to consider in the count series. A non-
stationary series (i.e., a series with a mean and variance that grow or shrink over time)
will provide both biased and inconsistent estimation results. Consequently, it is
empirically necessary to examine the properties of important variables. As can be seen
from the autocorrelation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation (PACF) functions presented in
Figures 5 and 6, some persistence in the intervention series is evident. The signiﬁcant
spikes in the two ﬁgures indicate that past interventions may be inﬂuencing present
intervention decisions.

The ACF measures the covariance of yt and lag k divided by the variance of y,:

p = Zill-YX ”Ir-)7)
" vle.) '

pk is a unitless measure that varies between -1 and l. The correlogram presented in Figure

 

5 plots pk against a subsequent number of k lags. The PACF measures the correlation
between time series observations controlling for the effects of all other lags. It is
analogous, then, to the interpretation of a regression coefﬁcient (Gujarati, 1995).
Although one signiﬁcant spike in the ACF may be expected to occur at random in 20
lags, two spikes gives cause to consider a dynamic event count speciﬁcation. It may be,

then, that a lag of yt will be necessary as an exogenous variable in the event-count model

83

to account for potential serial correlation. A further discussion of the time series

properties of this series will be presented in Chapter Four.

Logistic Model

The endogenous variable analyzed in Chapter Five is third-party crisis
involvement. Speciﬁcally, given an interstate crisis, does a president determine that the
United States should intervene as a neutral third party? In the analysis, then, both low-
level involvement, such as political mediation, and high-level involvement, such as the
contribution of U.S. peacekeeping troops, are collapsed into one category.4 The concern
in Chapter Five is with the conditions under which an executive will deploy political,
economic, and military resources to help resolve a crisis overseas.

Table 6 shows the frequency of the dependent variable. As one can see, the total
number of crises is only 359. This is because 53 crises have been dropped from the
logistic estimation.’ These cases correspond to ones in which the United States is a direct
crisis actor. Given that the concern here is with third—party involvement, cases of primary
crisis activity are removed. The 42 World War II crises will also be evaluated separately
in Chapters Five and Six. Both Huth (1997) and Gelpi (1997) excluded interventions that
took place during signiﬁcant armed conﬂicts. They both insisted that intervening in

disputes between countries already at war is very different than intervening in disputes

 

’ There are advantages to collapsing these categories. First, by only examining the military use of force,
empirical analyses may suffer from the concerns raised by Most and Starr (1989) regarding foreign policy
substitutability. In grouping categories two, three, and four, I can broadly evaluate foreign policy activism.
In Chapter Six, then, 1 provide a multinomial logit analysis of these distinct foreign policy actions.

5 Actually, these 53 cases have been dropped from all three of the empirical chapters.

84

that potentially could escalate to war.6 To prevent confounding two different decisions,

speciﬁc attention will be devoted to addressing the concerns of Huth and Gelpi.

Multinomial Logistic Model

For Chapter Six, the dependent variable is expanded to three categories as
illustrated in Table 5. This should allow for an assessment of low versus high
involvement. Indeed, the use of these distinct foreign policy tools may not depend on the
same array of covariates. Or, as is more likely, the strength of each covariate’s inﬂuence
on low versus high U.S. third-party involvement may be different. In fact, it does appear,
as Figure 7 demonstrates, that the use of low level resources to help resolve conﬂicts

abroad does not perfectly coincide with the high level series.

Exogenous Variables

Presidential decision-making during interstate crises is a complex process. Careful
calculations must be made with regard to the salience and threat proffered by the
international event, as well as the domestic support that appears to be forthcoming for or
against active engagement. According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1996: 99), decisions to
intervene in interstate crises have historically been inﬂuenced by factors, such as the
presence of nuclear weapons, Soviet involvement, and potential sanctions from Congress.
I have argued that in general three primary factors inﬂuence the decision to intervene: the
salience of the crisis to U.S. interests, the threat directed at the U.S. from the international

system, and the domestic-political environment (see Table 7).

 

6 According to Huth (1997: 18), “The political and military risks of intervention are clearly much greater in
[crises where the states are already at war].” Consequently, the decision calculus could be different.

85

Systemic Threat
U.S. Relative Power

Relative military power is measured in two different, though similar ways. First, I
construct a ratio of military expenditures each year for the U.S. and U.S.S.R.:

U. S. MilitaryExpenditwes
U. S. MlitmyExpencﬁtwes + U. S. S. R Militwaxpemlitwes

 

. Second, I take America’s share of

th t ’ '1't d't f h U.S.Militwaxpendiao'es Th' d
e sys e mi 1 my CXPC lures ° ’36 year TotalSysteliitwaxpenditw‘es

 

the system measure is repeated for military personnel. All three variables are also lagged
1 year to ensure that the crises themselves are not contributing to the military allocations
(Goertz, 1994). Figure 8 illustrates the ratio of U.S. military expenditures to the Soviet
Union’s over time, while Figure 9 shows the system measures. Clearly, all three
indicators are highly correlated. Presumably, then, they are measuring the same forces at
work. There also appears to be a structural break during World War II, and the event
count model will attempt to control for this by including a temporal dummy variable for

the years 1939-1945.

System Level

The ICB dataset provides a measure for the salience of, or the potential threat
created by, these crisis events. This system level variable accounts broadly for the types
of states involved in the crises. The most important of the categories coded by this
variable is the dominant system which indicates when the crisis involves the interaction
of major powers. Subsystem crises, in contrast, only involve regional states. According to

Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997:26-27), “crisis actors will behave with greater caution in

86

dominant system and mainly dominant system crises...because the stakes are higher, the
constraints are more visible, and vulnerability to pressure from the major powers is
greater.” As Table 8 shows, over 70% of the crises occurred in a subsystem, while only

13.9% involved states that belong to the dominant or mainly dominant system.

Status Quo

Morgan and Palmer (1997) proposed a conceptualization of foreign policy that
focused on how states allocate scarce resources in promoting and preserving the national
interest. Their model is heavily based on the growth or decline in a state’s military
capabilities.7 In times of rapid growth, a state will adopt an active foreign policy agenda
that seeks to revise internationally and regionally recognized status quos. In times of
sharp decline, a state will tend to curtail its international commitments.8

As with Morgan and Palmer (1997), satisfaction with the status quo is measured
using military expenditures. However, given the non-stationary properties of this series,
the variable is ﬁrst differenced to control for spurious inferences (see Figure 10). It also is

lagged 1 year.

Temporal Variables
Three temporal dummy variables are also created to assess broad changes in the

international system and in U.S. relative power. These three variables are: (1) super

 

7 Other operational measures of the status quo include the similarity of alliance portfolios, money market
discount rates, and past involvement in militarized disputes.
8 Bremer (1980) found military capabilities to be positively associated with armed conﬂict.

87

power”, (2) post-Vietnam War, (3) post-Cold War. Each is designed to test broadly
whether U.S. third-party intervention tends to vary systematically over time depending on
systemic trends. Gowa (1998) similarly used a dichotomous categorization to broadly
capture system change, threat level, and U.S. military capabilities. The change from a
multipolar to a bipolar international environment is the most signiﬁcant and obvious
change to occur in the time series. However, additional dummies for the post-Vietnam era

and the post-Cold War era are included to capture further changes in system structure.

Domestic-Political
Divided Government

Political opposition is measured initially through the use of a proxy variable
coding for divided government. To capture slightly more information than a simple
dichotomous dummy, a three category variable is constructed that attempts to get at the
strength of political opposition. Speciﬁcally, the variable is coded: (1) uniﬁed Congress
and executive, (2) executive and one house are the same party, (3) both houses of
Congress and the executive are controlled by different parties. The distribution of the
variable is skewed away from the middle range. 58% of the years between 1918 and 1994
involved a uniﬁed federal government, while 31% involved complete divided

government. In only eight years was the president faced with one house of Congress

 

9 To be sure, the precise year following World War II when the U.S. should be deemed a super power is
debatable. Gowa (1998) established 1949, when NATO was created, as the demarcation year. I have
selected 1948 given the fact that in this year heavy sums of foreign aid were already being sent to Turkey
and Greece to prevent Soviet expansion. It’s clear that the U.S. had decided by 1948 to take an active role
in world affairs. Indeed, according to Ruttan (1996: 3), President Truman “identiﬁed the Greek Civil War
as part of an ongoing struggle between democracy and dictatorship. He asked Congress not only to
appropriate funds to aid Greece and Turkey, but also for support of a commitment to containing the

88

controlled by the opposition party. Six of these years occurred during the Reagan
administration, where Republicans held the Senate. The only other period where one
house differed was 1931-32. President Hoover lost the House to the Democrats in the

elections of 1930.10

Seats of President ’s Party in Congress

An alternative speciﬁcation is also used to get at political opposition. Two
variables are constructed measuring the number of seats held by the president’s party in
the Senate and in the House (see Figure 11). Given the high collinearity between these
two variables and the dummy variable for divided government, only one can be included

in any model of U.S. third-party intervention.

National Elections

National elections is constructed as a dichotomous variable that equals one for the
year of congressional (i.e., off-presidential year) elections. An alternative speciﬁcation
equals one only during the year of a presidential election. I additionally code for whether
any differences emerge when controlling for U.S. engagement in armed conﬂicts. Korea
and Vietnam are the two conﬂicts that are of interest here, so as to provide a comparison

with earlier diversionary research. Including this variable is an attempt to test further

 

expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union.” As Gowa (1998) ﬁnds, though, few differences emerge
when any year from 1945 to 1950 is used as the point of reference.

'0 The level of partisanship is an additional variable that gets at political opposition. It is measured as the
percentage of total congressional roll-call votes that involved the majorities of both parties voting in
opposite directions (i.e., party-unity votes). This variable is incorporated in the logistic analysis presented
in Chapter Five. While the variable is calculated from all recorded votes and not simply those occurring on
issues of foreign and defense policy, it most likely presents a fairly accurate picture of the overall level of
conﬂict between the two parties.

89

Stoll’s (1984) ﬁndings, and Fordham’s (1998) more recent evidence regarding

presidential uses of force, elections, and on-going wars.

Unemployment
Unemployment data are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
(various years). It is measured as the percentage of the workforce not employed, and the

data series runs from 1934 to 1994 (see Figure 12).

Economic Growth
Growth data are taken from Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). This series is measured
as the percent change in the gross national product, and the series runs from 1918 to 1994

(see Figure 13).

Presidential Approval

Presidential approval measures the percentage of the public approving of the
president’s handling of his job. This series runs from 1935-1994 and is taken from the
Gallup Survey. An average of polls taken in a year is used for the event-count analysis.
For the logit and multinomial logit models, the survey closest to, but not after, a given

crisis is used.

Crisis Saliency
Soviet Involvement
A variable based on the level of Soviet involvement in a crisis is included to get at

salience. This variable is coded analogously to the original ICB code for U.S. third-party

90

involvement deﬁned on page two of this chapter. Salience is assumed to increase as

Soviet involvement increases.

Alliance Ties

Using the COW Alliance dataset (see Bennett, 1997), any primary crisis actor
involved in a defense pact or entente with the United States is coded as an ally. 18% of
the ICB crises involved a formal U.S. ally. Once again, crises involving U.S. allies are

assumed to be of greater salience.

Democracies

To account for cooperative behavior on the part of democracies (see for example,
Raknerud and Hegre, 1997), a dummy variable is constructed that indicates whether at
least one of the primary crisis actors is a democracy. The Polity III data ﬁle is used to
determine a state’s democracy level. A six or above on the democracy score is used as the
selection criterion for a democratic regime. Over 38% of the crises involved at least one

democratic regime.

Nuclear Powers

Nuclear weapons are an additional factor inﬂuencing U.S. intervention policy.
According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1996), U.S. involvement has been strongly
discouraged when states possessing the atomic bomb are participants. A dummy variable
is created that equals 1 if any state involved in a crisis is a suspected nuclear power. ICB
codes the U.S., U.S.S.R., UK, France, China, South Africa, India, and Pakistan as

nuclear powers after certain speciﬁc dates. ICB has a four category variable for nuclear

91

 

capability: (1) non-nuclear capability, (2) foreseeable nuclear capability, (3) nuclear

capable, (4) developed nuclear capability. A three or four on this variable was used as the

determining criterion for whether a primary crisis actor was considered a nuclear power.

Regional Interests

An interesting dynamic is the regional dispersion of these interstate crises, and the
salience of regional subsystems to U.S. national interests. Pickering and Thompson
(1998) found similar variation in the geographic spread of military interventions, with the
Middle East representing an intense locus of subsystem activity (see Table 9). I ﬁnd that a
large number of interstate crises similarly occurred in the Middle East. However, the
dispersion becomes much more evenly distributed after those cases have been removed.
Southeast Asia, East and Southern Africa, and Central America were also particularly hot
in terms of crisis activity.

U.S. involvement also varies dramatically by region. While the number of crises
that received American involvement was highest in the Middle East, as a percent of the
total crises occurring in a region, Central and South America were clearly the two
subsystems that U.S. presidents were most willing to aid in the resolution of foreign
crises.’1 This is also not terribly surprising. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, America’s
interests have always been closely tied to the western hemisphere, and the evidence
presented in Table 9 appears to conﬁrm this. Yet, Table 9 additional shows that
America’s interests abroad grew after World War II. The United States was much more

active in Europe and the Middle East during the Cold War struggle than prior to it. The

92

Middle East, which was largely ignored by the U.S. prior to World War 11, received a
particularly high level of attention during and after the Cold War. In both eras, Africa
received little aid from the U.S. in the resolution of its conﬂicts. Of the 101 crises that
occurred in Aﬁica from 1918-1994, the United States intervened in less than 45% of
them.’2

To examine the regional effects on crisis involvement, various dummy variables
are created for three separate areas: ( 1) Europe, (2) Americas (Central and South), (3)

Aﬁica.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I operationalized the important concepts in my theoretical model.
The measurement of these variables was then discussed and basic descriptives, time
series graphs, and frequency plots were presented. The issue of temporal dependence was
also addressed and dealt with by differencing certain key variables.

There has been little attention given to the determinants of American involvement
in interstate disputes as a third-party participant. Indeed, we know little about presidential
decision-making during these types of international events. Under what domestic and
systemic circumstances will a president use U.S. resources and expend political capital to
help resolve a regional dispute? The research presented here, then, is intended to help

address a neglected area of foreign policy decision-making.

 

” Table 10 additionally shows that the level of U.S. third-party involvement varies systematically by
geographic region.

'2 As a direct crisis actor the regional distribution is quite similar. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the crises the
U.S. was involved in as a primary actor occurred in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or Central America.

93

Admittedly, a focus on U.S. foreign policy decision-making naturally limits the
scope of my inferences. Huth’s approach, examining great power involvement, offers
greater generalizability. Yet, Huth was unable to pay close attention to domestic-political
variables, which is a primary concern of my research. Furthermore, as a principal member
of the international system with particular characteristics of interest to this study, the
United States, as James and Hristoulas (1994: 340) similarly argued, “emerges as a
balanced case with which to begin testing” (also see Risse-Kappen, 1991). Indeed, given
its active involvement in the international system and its particular constitutional
structure, the United States presents a suitable nation to test the relationship between
systemic and domestic-level forces. In addition, as Most and Starr (1989:119) have
pointed out, “the factors that create or preclude different [foreign policy] options are
differentially distributed across states and even within states through time.”
Consequently, to avoid mixing apples and oranges, a focus on a single country seems to
be an appropriate ﬁrst step.

In the next three chapters, the variables deﬁned above will be examined to
uncover the direction and importance of their inﬂuence on U.S. third-party crisis

intervention.

94

TABLE 5: Frequency of United States Involvement as a Third Party in Interstate Crises,

 

 

1918-1994
U. S. Involvement Frequency Percent
N o Involvement 149 41.5%
Low-Level Involvement" 146 40.7%
Hi gh-Level Involvementb 64 17.8%

‘Low-level involvement includes both political and economic activities.
b High-level involvement includes both covert and direct military activity, plus direct foreign aid or
advisors.

95

TABLE 6: Frequency of United States Involvement as a Third Party in Interstate Crises,

 

 

1918-1994
U. S. Involvement' Frequency Percent
No 149 41.5%
Yes 210 58.5%

 

* Involvement includes military, economic, and political.

96

 

TABLE 7: Operationalization of Important Theoretical Components (Additional

Exogenous-Variable Speciﬁcations)

 

 

 

SYSTEMIC THREAT CRISIS SALIENCY DOMESTIC-POLITICAL
US/USSR Relative Power Soviet Involvement Divided Government
US Military Expenditures Alliance Ties

Seats of President’s Party
in Congress

 

System Level

 

 

Democracies National Elections
US Military Personnel/System Nuclear Powers Unemployment
Military Personnel
US Military Expenditures/System Regional Interests Presidential Approval
Military Expenditures

 

 

 

 

Economic Growth

 

97

 

TABLE 8: Frequencies and Relative Frequencies for System Level

 

 

 

 

System Level Frequency Percent
Subsystem 262 73.0%
Mainly Subsystem 47 13.1%
Mainly Dominant System 22 6.1%
Dominant System 28 7.8%

98

 

TABLE 9: Regional Variation in Interstate Crises and U.S. Involvement, 1918-1994

1918-1938 [939-1945 1946-1962 1963-1988 I989-1994 Total

Central Asia 25.0% — — 100.0% 50.0% 43.8%
(N=4) (N=0) (N=0) (N=1) (N=2) (N=7)

East Asia 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% — -- 100.0%
(N=8) (N=5) (N=1) (N=0) (N=0) (N=14)
South-East Asia - 100.0% 77.8% 53.8% 0.0% 63.0%
(N=0) (N=3) (N=9) (N=13) (N=2) (N=27)
South Asia 0.0% -— 45.5% 66.7% 100.0% 52.6%
(N=1) (N=0) (N=11) (N=6) (N=1) (N=19)
Middle East 18.2% 100.0% 80.0% 67.6% 100.0% 65.7%
(N=1 1) (N=4) (N=15) (N=34) (N=3) (N=67)
West Africa -- ~— 0.0% 22.2% 50.0% 25.0%
(N=0) (N=0) (N=3) (N=9) (N=4) (N=16)
North Africa 100.0% 100.0% 75.0% 50.0% -- 60.0%
(N=1) (N=1) (N=4) (N=14) (N=0) (N=20)
East Africa 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 38.1% 0.0% 34.6%
(N=1) (N=1) (N=2) (N=21) (N=1) (N=26)
Southern Africa -- -- - 59.3% -- 59.3%
(N=0) (N=0) (N=0) =27) (N=0) (N=27)
Central Africa -— - 100.0% 33.3% 100.0% 42.9%
(N=0) (N=0) (N=1) (N=12) (N=1) (N=14)
East Europe 28.6% 57.1% 100.0% 100.0% - 50.0%
(N=14) (N=7) (Nﬂ) (N=1) (N=0) (N=26)
Central Europe 27.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 57.9%
(N=1 1) (N=2) (N=3) (N=1) (N=2) (N=19)
West Europe 50.0% 100.0% —— 100.0% -— 71.4%
(N=4) (N=2) (N=0) (N=1) (N=0) (N=7)
North Europe 50.0% 50.0% 33.3% 66.7% —- 50.0%
(N=2) (N=2) (N=3) (N=3) (N=0) (N=10)
Southern Europe 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 71.4% -- 50.0%
(N=8) (N=4) (N=3) (N=7) (N=0) (N=22)
Central America 100.0% —- 66.7% 70.0% -- 75.0%
(N=5) (N=0) (N=9) (N=10) (N=0) (N=24)
South America 75.0% 100.0% —- 87.5% 100.0% 85.7%
(N=4) (N=1) (N=0) =8) (N=1) (N=14)
Total 40.5% 84.4% 67.6% 57.1% 64.7% 58.5%

(N=74) (N=32) (N268) (N=168) (N=17) SET-359i

 

 

—
NOTE: Cells give the percentage of crises in a given region during a speciﬁc time period that the U.S. was

involved in.

99

 

TABLE 10: Regional Variation in the Level of U.S. Third-Party Crisis Involvement

 

 

1918-1994
No Involvement Low Involvement High Involvement Total

Central Asia 4 2 1 7
East Asia 0 10 4 14
South-East Asia 10 10 7 27
South Asia 9 8 2 19
Middle East 23 32 12 67
West Africa 12 4 0 16
North Africa 8 5 7 20
East Africa 17 4 5 26
Southern Africa 1 l 15 1 27
Central Africa 8 2 4 14
East Europe 13 11 2 26
Central Europe 8 8 3 19

West Europe 2 3 2 7
North Europe 5 5 0 10
Southern Europe 1 1 8 3 24
Central America 6 8 10 24
South America 2 ll 1 14
Total 149 146 64 359

 

NOTE: Cells give the percentage of crises in a given region during a speciﬁc time period that the U.S. was
involved in.

100

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CHAPTER 4

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES:
POISSON REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that U.S. third-party interventions into ongoing crises
vary substantially over the 1918-1994 time period. And, at ﬁrst glance, it appears that
U.S. activity may be driven largely by changes in the structure of the international
system. The absolute number of U.S. interventions is considerably different after World
War 11 than during the interwar period. Also, U.S. foreign policy activism increased
during 1918 and after 1936. So, this aspect of U.S. foreign policy decision-making may
be chieﬂy determined by the threat the United States faces from the distribution of power
within the international system.

Gowa (1998) similarly found U.S. foreign policy decision-making to be unrelated
to domestic-political conditions. She observed no partisan differences in the use of force,
and neither elections nor the economic growth rate had an inﬂuence on the propensity of
the U.S. to become engaged in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs).I She did ﬁnd,

though, that America’s place within the international system had a large impact on the

n

' According to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996: 169), a MID is a “single military action involving an
explicit threat, display, or use of force by one system member state towards another system member state.”
Furthermore, they are “confrontations that [lead] politicians to invest energy, attention, resources, and

credibility in a effort to thwart, resist, intimidate, discredit or damage those representing the other side” (p.
l 66).

113

number of yearly MID engagements. As a superpower, U.S. MID involvement was
considerably higher than the previous 170 years of American history. In this chapter, I
examine whether broad yearly trends in U.S. foreign policy behavior can be explained by
systemic factors alone, or whether domestic-political concerns play a role in executive
decision-making. I should emphasize that the foreign policy decisions analyzed in this
dissertation do not involve the United States as a primary participant in quarrels with
other states. I investigate only crises in which the U.S. comes to the aid of a state or states
already involved in a conﬂict. The U.S., then, is a neutral third-party player in these
disputes.

Below, I use Poisson regression to examine the conditions surrounding U.S. third-
party intervention into ongoing interstate crises. I ﬁrst discuss the nature of the model and
additional temporal dynamics of the dependent variable. Then, I test both domestic and
systemic variables on yearly interventions. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of my

ﬁndings.

The Poisson Model

The dependent variable is the number of neutral third-party interventions by the
U.S. each year, from 1918-1994. Consequently, the nature of this series (e.g., the data are
discrete rather than continuous) and its distribution suggest that an event-count model is
appropriate for statistical estimation. Appendix B presents a histogram of U.S. third-party
interventions. As is clear, the data largely follow a Poisson distribution. In essence, the
data can be thought of as a series of Bernoulli trials which occur within a speciﬁed

amount of time, where it is assumed that each observation is independent of all others

114

(Lindsey, 1995). So, we have a unit of measurement that is explicitly deﬁned and non-
changing (At). Here, it is the year. The variable of interest is the number of events, or
third-party interventions, that occur within this speciﬁed period of time.

We are interested in l, which represents the average number of events per time
interval (i.e., the year). This number is the rate at which an event occurs on average
(Lindsey, 1995). Now, according to King (1989: 50), the Poisson model further depends
on three core assumptions. First, only one event occurs at any given instant. Second, the
events are independent of one another. And third, the length of each time period is the
same. With these ﬁrst principles deﬁned, and if A is deﬁned as the rate, a model of an

event occurring during a speciﬁed amount of time is as follows:

e-IJ (11)}?
y !

i

P[Y1= Y1] =

where A is the mean number of interventions per year, yi is the observed count and e is the
natural log. To evaluate the parameters of interest, namely the betas, A is respeciﬁed as a
function of the theorized exogenous variables of inﬂuence. In other words, E[yi] = 7» =
116,13)-

Theoretically, the mean number of interventions per year (i.e., the rate) is also
supposed to remain constant across temporal intervals. That is, as Gary King (1989: 50)
wrote, “the rate of event occurrence )1 remains constant, or at least unresponsive to y,,
over the observation period.” However, Figure 2 shows that such an assumption is
perhaps unwarranted. Whether this variability in A is problematic for estimation remains

unclear. A solution may be the use of an alternative distribution; the negative binomial. If

115

overdispersion is present (i.e., the observations are not independent) then the negative

binomial model will provide more accurate coefficient estimates.

Poisson Regression: 1918-1994

The purpose of the following event-count estimation is to broadly examine the
inﬂuence of both systemic and domestic conditions on U.S. third—party crisis
intervention. With such an econometric framework, speciﬁc characteristics of each
conﬂict cannot be taken into account. Consequently, this model is unable to capture the
salience of each crisis, a variable stressed in Chapter Two. However, Chapter Five
addresses the issue of salience and therefore provides an opportunity to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the Poisson approach.

In Table 11, I present the results of a basic model of U.S. third-party intervention.
The ﬁve variables included in this model are meant to coincide closely with those
speciﬁed by Gowa (1998). Similar to Gowa (1998), I ﬁnd that the year of a presidential
election does not incite a greater number of interventions, nor does the existence of
divided government. I also ﬁnd, consistent with Gowa (1998), that there was a temporal
shift following World War II, with a signiﬁcantly larger number of interventions
occurring during the Cold War than during the interwar period. Interestingly, the percent
change in the gross national product appears to be signiﬁcantly related to third-party
conﬂict intervention, a relationship that Gowa (1998) did not observe with regards to
U.S. MID involvement. That is, the overall strength of the economy does inﬂuence

presidential decision-making. As domestic economic conditions improve (i.e., the growth

116

rate increases), presidents are less likely to intervene abroad. This supports Hypothesis 9b
from Chapter Two.

Conceivably, this latter result indicates that executives are timing interventions
during economic downturns. However, it may be that fewer opportunities arise when
domestic conditions are strong. Foreign state leaders may attempt to satisfy their
aggressive ambitions by initiating a conﬂict when these leaders believe U.S. attention
will be focused on domestic concerns. Certainly, the logic of Smith’s (1996) argument,
that states should time their strategic military moves when their opponent’s allies are least
likely to come to their aid, supports such an interpretation.2

Caution must be used in interpreting the results of this initial event-count model.
The goodness-of-ﬁt test indicates that the data do not efﬁciently ﬁt a Poisson process.
One potential problem is that the model suffers from underspeciﬁcation. Systemic change
following Vietnam and the end of the Cold War are not controlled for in the model. In
addition, while the event-count series does not appear to be non-stationary, there still may
be an autoregressive component to the data that needs to be addressed with a lag variable.

Table 12 presents the results of a more fully speciﬁed model. From the goodness-
of-ﬁt statistic, it appears that the model has improved, although it continues to show some
ﬁt problems. The signiﬁcance of the AR(1) component, however, does cast doubt on the
claim that the series suffers from serial correlation.3 To test whether the autoregressive

component affects the post-World War II era only, the lag was interacted with the dummy

‘

2 In fact, NATO and U.S. ofﬁcials have suggested that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic based
recent military moves on the domestic turmoil being experienced in the U.S. (see Washington Post,
January 8, 1999: A17).

117

variable for this temporal break. Once again, though, no serial correlation was detected.
Based on these results, the dependent variable lag was removed from the further analyses
presented below.

Table 13 presents a model without the lag variable. The results of this model
provide further support for the importance of systemic factors.4 Not only is the propensity
to intervene greater during the Cold War, but the two additional temporal variables are
signiﬁcant as well. It seems that in the post-Cold War era third-party interventions have
declined. This naturally follows from the overall decline in interstate (but perhaps not
intrastate) conﬂict. But, it may also be that U.S. activism has waned in the wake of the
Cold War. Certainly with signiﬁcant budget cuts in defense and international affairs
spending, the U.S. has considerably fewer resources to be able to effectively address
emerging crisis situations abroad.

The post-Vietnam War dummy is also interesting. Not only is there a signiﬁcant
increase in the number of interventions between 1974 and 1988, but this comes during a
time when presidential foreign policy making arguably became more constrained by
congressional assertiveness and political opposition. It is true, though, that both Carter
and Reagan were actively engaged in foreign affairs. Carter made conﬂict resolution a
core goal of his administration and Reagan used political, economic and military

assistance to increase pressure on Soviet Union. Consequently, the direct use of force

3 A negative binomial model was also run to explore whether the independence of observations assumption
was violated. No overdispersion in the data was evident.

" Alternative measures of threat were constructed to help capture some of the annual variability in third-
party interventions. Not only was the U.S. percentage of military expenditures and personnel used, but a
lag of the number of MID involvements was additionally created to help capture perceptions of threat. No
one proxy was superior across all models.

118

may have declined during this post-Vietnam period, but third-party interventions appear
to have increased sharply.

From the models presented thus far, domestic factors appear relatively
unimportant in determining U.S. third-party interventions. Both political opposition and
election years are statistically unrelated to presidential decision-making. However, in
Table 14 separate analyses are run for different speciﬁcations of the election-year dummy
and some interesting differences do emerge. It appears that off-presidential election years
are particularly inﬂuential in presidential decision-making. This supports Hypothesis 8.
Presidents seem unwilling to attend to foreign policy issues during these national
elections when congressmen may have an electoral incentive to challenge executive
initiatives. So, it is precisely during an election year in which a president is not running
for ofﬁce that we observe the strongest electoral effects. Not only are presidents
concerned about congressional opposition, as Eisenhower and Dulles expressed during
the Off-shore Islands crisis in 1954, but presidents are also busy campaigning for fellow
partisans on the Hill, leaving little time for attention to crises occurring overseas (Russett,
1990)

In Table 15, a different measure of political opposition is included. While
systemic factors continue to remain inﬂuential in this model, off-presidential year
elections, the number of Senate seats held by the president’s party, and GNP are also
related to third-party interventions. In fact, both elections and the growth rate are strongly
associated with the decision to intervene. The number of Senate seats, while admittedly

not signiﬁcant at a .05 level, may play some role in presidential decision-making of this

119

kind.5 Certainly, anecdotal accounts indicate that more seats for a president’s party in the
upper chamber provide him with greater political support, which allows him increased
ﬂexibility to act in foreign affairs. As political support drops in the upper chamber,
though, a president is less likely to support potentially costly attempts at conﬂict
resolution. This supports arguments made by Nincic (1992) and Mintz (1993), both of
whom insisted that presidents require domestic support for foreign policy success. The
directions of inﬂuence of these domestic-political variables also support a structural-
constraints view of democratic decision-making rather than a diversionary one. Indeed,
rather than inciting foreign policy activism, domestic opposition appears to draw

executive attention away from issues of foreign affairs.

Partisan Effects

Gowa (1998) found few differences across presidential administrations with
regards to MID involvement. Indeed, only when the U.S. was the revisionist state (i.e.,
the state which challenges the status quo) was a party effect found. She observed that
uniﬁed Democratic governments were less likely to challenge the status quo than their
Republican counterparts. However, when Gowa (1998) further controlled for the level of
the U.S. challenge, it was observed that the party difference was only present for threats
and shows of force, but not the actual use of military force. So, her evidence suggests that
Republican administrations may be more willing to rattle the sword, but no more willing

to commit troops to actual combat situations.

 

5 Presidential party support in the House of Representatives was also examined. The direction of the
relationship was the same as the Senate variable; however, the statistical signiﬁcance of the House was
never as strong.

120

Evidence in Table 16 also shows a partisan effect with regards to third-party
intervention. However, the direction of the relationship is contrary to Gowa’s (1998)
results. Democratic administrations appear to possess a greater propensity to engage in
peacemaking efforts than their Republican counterparts. Given that Democrats tend to be
more dovish than Republicans (Holsti, 1996), these administrations may be actively
directing their foreign policy agendas toward conﬂict resolution. If true, then these results
may in fact square with Gowa’s (1998) ﬁndings. Republicans may focus more heavily on
a realist-centered military strategy, while Democrat administrations show a greater

concern for an intemationalist peacemaking role.

President Effects

If one examines individual administration effects, some interesting results appear.
The 19205, for example, were a time of international isolationism, even when it came to
conﬂict intervention. All three Republican administrations showed a propensity to ignore
interstate crisis situations abroad. Roosevelt continued this policy during his ﬁrst four
years in ofﬁce, but was increasingly forced to attend to foreign affairs as the conﬂicts in
Europe grew in importance. The only other administrations to show noticeable
differences were the Kennedy-Johnson administrations and the Nixon-Ford
administrations that followed. Kennedy and Johnson appeared more likely to intervene as
a third party than other administrations, while both Nixon and Ford demonstrated a
propensity to ignore conﬂict resolution. I should also note that Carter and Reagan
demonstrated a greater likelihood of intervening in crisis situations abroad. But, the

temporal dummy for the post-Vietnam War tends to obscure any individual effects.

12]

Conclusion

There is a need to comprehensively understand the role that third parties play in
helping to resolve crisis situations. An initial step in this research is to address the
conditions that lead U.S. administrations to contribute aid to emerging interstate conﬂicts
abroad. In this chapter, an event-count analysis was used to assess the broad yearly
inﬂuence of system and domestic-level factors on U.S. third-party crisis intervention. It
was argued in Chapter Two that systemic threat should tend to increase attempts at
conﬂict resolution, while domestic-political conditions should constrain executives from
addressing crises abroad. Multiple models were presented in this chapter and comparisons
were made to Gowa’s (1998) work. Domestic-political and systemic forces were both
found to inﬂuence foreign policy decision-making of this kind. Not only was the systemic
environment of the Cold War found to increase the likelihood of third-party intervention,
but the atmosphere of the post-Cold War world has had the opposite effect, both of which
support Pr0position 1. On the domestic side, elections, economic conditions, and political
opposition all were found to be inﬂuential in the foreign policy decision-making of a
president. The evidence further indicated that both elections and political opposition tend
to dissuade American executives from becoming involved in these developing crisis
situations. This supports Proposition 3 and a structural-constraints theory of democratic
decision-making in foreign affairs.

The economic growth rate was also found to be signiﬁcantly related to third-party
interventions. The direction of this relationship indicates that economic conditions may
be used by foreign leaders as an indicator for a president’s near-term commitment to

domestic issues versus issues of foreign policy. Consequently, U.S. domestic conditions

122

may enter into the decision calculus of foreign leaders preparing to initiate aggressive
military moves.

In conclusion, then, this Chapter has provided some initial evidence relating to the
determinants of U.S. third-party decision-making. Two extensions, however, should be
made to the event-count analysis. First, the salience of these individual crises to the U.S.
undoubtedly plays an important role in the decision to intervene (see Carment and
Rowlands, 1998). Not only should the importance of a crisis affect third-party decision-
making, but salience will also likely play a role in the level of commitment made by the
third party, as well. The second extension, then, must attend to the multifarious strategies
available to third parties (i.e., knowing not only when third parties intervene, but how
they intervene, as well). This will help provide a more comprehensive account of both
conﬂict escalation and conﬂict resolution. Chapters Five and Six will in part address both

of these concerns.

123

TABLE 11: Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on U.S. Third-
Party Crisis Intervention, 1918-1994

 

 

Variable Variable Type Beta Standard En'or T-score P
Constant .36 .21 1.75 ‘ .081
Presidential Election Year Domestic -.03 .16 -.18 .858
GNP Growth Domestic -.03 .01 -2.25 .024
Divided Government Domestic .01 .09 .10 .924
Super-power Systemic .86 .21 4.03 .000
World War 11 Systemic 1.40 .29 4.77 .000
N = 77 Pseudo R2 = .088
Log-likelihood: -148.21 Goodness—ofﬁt( 71 ) = 104.6 (.006)

x’ (5) = 28.57 (.0000)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated
in Stata 5.0.

124

 

TABLE 12: Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on U.S. Third—
Party Crisis Intervention With Additional Temporal Dummies (Lag Variable Included),
1918—1994

 

 

Variable Variable Tree Beta Standard Enor T—score . _ P
Constant — .18 .25 .75 ;4'5"5 ' '
Presidential Election Year Domestic -.04 .16 -.25 .800
GNP Growth Domestic -.03 .02 -l .92 .054
Divided Government Domestic .05 .09 .50 .621
Super—power Systemic .71 .25 2.80 .005
World War H Systemic 1.46 .33 4.45 .000
Post-Vietnam War Systemic .56 .I9 2.94 .003
Post-Cold War Systemic -.85 .33 -2.55 .01 l
Dependent Variable Lag ~- .02 .04 .49 .622
N: 76 PseudoR2=J5
Log—likelihood: -136.52 Goodness-ofﬁt (67) = 84.47 (.07)

12(8) 2 48.15 (.0000)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated
in Stata 5.0.

125

TABLE 13: Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on U.S. Third-
Party Crisis Intervention With Additional Temporal Dummies (Lag Variable Excluded),
1918-1994

 

 

Variable Variable Type Beta Standard Error T-score P
Constant -~ .34 .21 1.63 .103
Presidential Election Year Domestic -.06 .16 -.39 .694
GNP Growth Domestic -.03 .01 -2.11 .035
Divided Government Domestic .03 .09 .34 .732
Super—power Systemic .64 .23 2.77 .006
World War H Systemic 1.39 .29 4.74 .000
Post-Vietnam Systemic .61 .17 3.50 .000
Post—Cold War Systemic -.89 .32 —2.83 .005
N: 77 PseudoR2=J4
Log-likelihood: -140.35 Goodness-ofﬁt (69) = 88.87 (.05)

x’ (7) = 44.28 (.0000)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third—party interventions per year. Models estimated
in Stata 5.0.

126

TABLE 14: Poisson Regression Evaluating Different Election-year Specifications, 1918-

1 994

 

Variable Model A Model B Model C
Constant .34 .51 * .52*
(.21) (.22) (.22)
Presidential Election Year -.06 -- --
(.16)
National Election Year -- -.34* --
(.14)
Off-Presidential Election Year -— -—- -.47*
(.19)
GNP Growth -.03* -.03* -.04*
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Divided Government .03 .02 -.01
(.09) (.09) (~09)
Super-power .64** .65** .66**
(.23) (.23) (.23)
World WarII 1.39** l.36** l.33**
(.29) (.29) (.29)
Post-Vietnam .61** .59** .58**
(.17) (.17) (.17)
Post-Cold War -.89** -.89** -.83**
(.32) (.32) (.32)
N = 77 N = 77 N = 77
LL = -140.35 LL = -137.41 LL = -136.99
x77) 2 44.28 (.000) x20) = 50.16 (.000) f(7) = 51.00 (.000)
Pseudo R2 = .14 Pseudo R2 = .15 Pseudo R2 = .16

 

NOTE: Standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party
interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

**p S .01, two-tailed test.
*p S .05, two-tailed test.

127

TABLE 15: Poisson Regression with Alternative Specification for Political Opposition,

 

 

191 8-1994
Variable Variable Type Beta Standard Enor T-score P
Constant -~ -. 13 .50 -.26 E .791
Off-Presidential Election Year Domestic -.51 .02 -2.70 .007
GNP Growth Domestic —.04 .02 ~2.65 .008
Senate Seats Domestic .01 .01 1.35 .178
Super—power Systemic .72 .23 3.15 .002
World War H Systemic 1.30 .29 4.45 .000
Post-Vietnam Systemic .58 .17 3.33 .001
Post-Cold War Systemic -.79 .32 -2.50 .012
N: 77 PseudoR2=.16
Log-likelihood: -136.10 Goodness-ofﬁt (69) = 80.37 (. l 7)

)5 (7) = 52.78 (.0000)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated
in Stata 5.0.

128

TABLE 16: Poisson Regression Examining the Role of the Party of the President,
1918-1994

 

 

Variable Variable Type Beta Standard Error T—score P
Constant — .86 .29 2.99 .003
Off-Presidential Election Year Domestic -.48 .19 -2.55 .011
GNP Growth Domestic -.04 .01 -2.56 .010
Party of the Executive Domestic -.24 .15 -1.59 .l 12
Super—power Systemic .66 .22 2.96 .003
World War 11 Systemic 1.23 .30 4.15 .000
Post-Vietnam Systemic .63 .18 3.56 .000
Post-Cold War Systemic -.84 .31 -2.37 .008
N = 77 Pseudo R2 = .17
Log-likelihood: -35. 75 Goodness-of—ﬁt ( 69) = 79.67 (.18)

11(7) = 53.48 (.0000)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated
in Stata 5.0.

129

CHAPTER 5

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES:
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

In Chapter Two I presented a structural-constraints model of U.S. third-party
intervention policy. Drawing on the democratic peace proposition and research by Huth
(1997), Morgan and Palmer (1997), and Regan (1998), I developed a theory of third-party
crisis intervention that incorporates both systemic and domestic factors into the decision
calculus of a president. Not only did I suggest that the relationship between a president’s
foreign policy choice and the domestic and international contexts should be dynamic
(evolving over time)‘, but contrary to diversionary theories I argued that domestic-
political institutions, such as Congress and national elections, should dissuade presidents
from initiating peace-making endeavors.

In Chapter Four, I presented results from an event-count model of U.S. third-party
intervention into foreign interstate crises. I found, contrary to Gowa (1998), that domestic
factors are not entirely irrelevant in inﬂuencing a president’s decision to intervene. In

fact, domestic-political factors, such as the year of national elections and economic

 

' Two types of dynamics are important. First, there are changes over time in the relationship between the
exogenous and endogenous variables. That dynamism is of particular interest in this study. Second, though,
is the recursive relationship between the dependent variable and an independent variable. DeRouen (1995)
hypothesized that such a relationship exists between the use of force and presidential approval. While the
conﬂict itself may indeed inﬂuence such factors as duration and troop commitment, it could clearly not

130

indicators, do play a role in U.S. third-party interventions. However, it certainly is true
that broad systemic changes appeared to have the largest impact on U.S. foreign policy
activism.

Nonetheless, the inability to control for the salience of individual crises is a clear
weakness of the events analysis. In Chapter Two it was argued that crisis saliency should
play an important role in the decision to intervene. By not controlling for this
theoretically important component of an executive’s decision calculus, inaccurate
inferences may be drawn regarding the size, signiﬁcance, and direction of the remaining
coefﬁcients.

In this chapter, I use logistic regression to examine the systemic and domestic
determinants of crisis involvement, while controlling for the salience of the crisis.2 In the
remainder of this chapter, I ﬁrst discuss the nature of the model and the dependent
variable. Second, I present a general econometric speciﬁcation and discuss the
implications of these initial results. Next, I compare my empirical results on third-party
foreign policy decision- making to recent diversionary research. Lastly, I conclude with a

discussion of my ﬁndings.

 

have an inﬂuence on the initial decision to become involved. Furthermore, it conceivably would not affect
the initial escalation of such a conﬂict, as well.

2 Nincic (1997), examined the domestic consequences of military intervention. More speciﬁcally, he
looked at how presidential approval responds to different kinds of military interventions. The question I am
interested in here involves the reverse relationship; how the decision surrounding intervention is inﬂuenced
by domestic-political forces (also see Ostrom and Simon, 1985, and Nincic and Hinckley, 1991).

131

The Logistic Model
With a dichotomous dependent variable, a logistic speciﬁcation is an appropriate
model for estimating the posited relationships. Drawing on King’s (1989) formalization,

the expected value of Yi is based on one parameter; 7ti

 

N
N
77"'(1— 7r)N'-”" .
11:1I y1!(N _yi)!

E[Y,] = P[Yi=1| in]
In the analysis that follows, then, Yi will take on a value of 1 (political, economic, or
military intervention) with a particular probability 11,, while no intervention will occur
with probability l-‘Iti. The task is to model ni as a function of theoretically important
exogenous variables. That is, we need to specify the probability of U.S. third-party
intervention, and while there is a stochastic element to the observed data, there is also a
systematic component that can be deﬁned. It is this systematic component that is of
interest here. in, then, is a function of explanatory variables,

711 = 80%: B)
with xi representing a vector of independent variables and B the relationship between “Ni
and xi.

A functional form for g is selected based on the characteristics of the observed
data and the research question (King, 1989: 100). The most common form of the model is
the logit, where
in: 1
1 + exr)(-X.-B)

Such a model is chosen because a linear probability speciﬁcation can produce nonsensical

results. Theoretically, we want tri to be constrained between 0 to 1. However, X113 is not so

132

constrained and thus with a linear speciﬁcation we can obtain results for tri that fall
outside of the O to 1 range. By transforming in using the logit formula above, we avoid
such out of bound results.

The interpretation of 0, while similar to standard regression coefﬁcients, must
take into account the nonlinearity of the model. While the sign of the coeﬂicient retains
an analogous meaning, the effect of [3 depends upon where on the curve one is looking. B
will naturally have a different effect on the E[Y] depending on the value of xi (King,
1989: 108). The predicted probabilities presented later offer one tractable method for

evaluating the substantive effects of the explanatory variables.

Logistic Results: 1918-1994
In Table 17, a general empirical model that includes all variables hypothesized to
affect U.S. involvement in foreign interstate crises is presented. These exogenous
variables are presented in the equation speciﬁed below.
USINVOLV = 131 + [32senateseats + B3elections + B4growth +
B,superpower + BGusmilexp + B7systemlevel + Bswar +
Bgsoviets + Bloallydem + Bllamericas + Bnafrica +
Bueurope + Bunuclear.
As with the Poisson analysis, both domestic and systemic variables are included in the
logit runs. Although this model is a 25% improvement over a null model in terms of
correctly predicting the occurrence of U.S. third-party interventions, it does appear as if
the crisis-speciﬁc characteristics are accounting for the variation explained by domestic-

political factors in the event-count models. Given the importance of geostrategic

concerns, such as Soviet involvement and regional location, this should not be too

133

surprising. However, alternative speciﬁcations presented below do show that domestic-
political factors remain inﬂuential in U.S. intervention decision-making.

The initial model presented in Table 17 indicates that system-level and crisis-
speciﬁc variables are signiﬁcantly affecting U.S. foreign policy decision-making. For
example, both U.S. military expenditures and the U.S. as a super power increase the
likelihood of U.S. third-party intervention. This supports Proposition 1 in Chapter Two as
well as Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the inﬂuence of threat on U.S. decision-making.
The variable, level of military expenditures, serves as a proxy for the level of U.S.
satisfaction with the international status quo. An increase in expenditures, then, indicates
increasing unease with system characteristics. To counter this dissatisfaction, a more
activist foreign affairs agenda is selected by an administration. This accords with the
relationship proposed by Morgan and Palmer (1997). These scholars view the defense
budget as a proxy for satisfaction. An increase or decrease in the appropriation serves as a
useful indicator for an executive’s perception of the threat level emanating from the
international system. Given this perception, conﬂict-resolution efforts on the part of a
president are likely attempts to alter sub-system status quos by committing political,
economic, and military resources abroad. The results from Table 17 support the argument
that decreases in satisfaction lead to increases in the likelihood of U.S. third-party crisis
intervention.

The temporal dummy variable indicating the change to a bipolar system
environment also serves as a proxy for threat. An intemationalist U.S. foreign policy was

instituted after World War 11 due to the perceived failure of U.S. policy during the

134

interwar years and the rise of the Soviet threat to U.S. security and interests.3 As with
Gowa (1998) and conventional wisdom, the results in Table 17 indicate that the U.S.
became more active on the international scene and, in particular, it appears that conﬂict
resolution became much more likely after World War 11 than during the interwar years.

An additional proxy variable for threat was also included. The variable--system
level--appears to be strongly related to presidential decision-making during ongoing
interstate crises. Dominant and mainly dominant system crises are much more likely to
receive U.S. attention than more regionally focused subsystem conﬂicts. This result
provides further support for Hypothesis 1. Dominant system crises presumably threaten
U.S. security and interests to a far greater extent than regionally-based disputes.
Consequently, U.S. attention and resources are more likely to be devoted to these major-
power crises. This result supports a supposition offered by Brecher and Wilkenfeld
(1997). These authors argue and ﬁnd that interstate crises which involve major powers
are more likely to draw in global organizations and third-party states that both possess a
concern with resolving these serious disputes. Rather than deterring U.S. engagement,
then, conﬂicts that involve major powers are associated with conﬂict-resolution attempts
by U.S. administrations.

Table 17 provides little support for the constraining inﬂuence of domestic-

political institutions. Political opposition appears unrelated to crisis intervention, as do

 

3 Three further speciﬁcations were used to measure systemic threat. One used the U.S. share of the
system’s military troop levels while another used expenditures. The third measure compared U.S.
expenditures to the Soviets, rather than the overall system’s. High collinearity with other important
variables prevented their inclusion in the ﬁnal analyses presented in this chapter.

135

off-presidential election years.4 Unlike the Poisson model, support for Hypotheses 7 and
8 is not provided by this logistic analysis. Even the annual percent increase in the gross
national product does not appear to have much inﬂuence on presidential decision-making.

From this initial model, it seems that crisis saliency tends to be the most
inﬂuential component of a president’s decision calculus. Soviet involvement in an
ongoing crisis, in particular, strongly affects a president’s decision to intervene. Indeed,
as the level of Soviet involvement increases, the likelihood of the U.S. contributing
resources to aid a primary state or states involved increases dramatically. This supports
Hypothesis 3. It furthermore appears to be the case that U.S. allies and the regime type of
the primary crisis actors are inﬂuential in presidential decision-making. When a primary
crisis actor is both a U.S. ally and a democracy the likelihood of conﬂict aid increases
sharply. This to some extent supports Raknerud and Hegre’s (1997) ﬁndings of war-
joining behavior on the part of democratic regimes and suggests that democratic alliances
may be more reliable than mixed regime type ones. Thus, the results in Table 17 provide
support for Hypotheses 4 and 5.

Geographical salience additionally plays a role in U.S. intervention policy.
Central and South American crises have overwhelming received U.S. assistance, while
conﬂicts in Africauand surprisingly Europe--have been neglected by U.S. presidents.
This latter relationship may be due in part to the strength of these western European

states. Many of these countries simply do not require U.S. aid to help resolve their

 

‘ An additional speciﬁcation--the level of partisanship between the two parties in Congress--does tend to
decrease third-party crisis involvement. In bivariate analyses, the variable is highly signiﬁcant. In the
multivariate models, however, the variable tends to be fragile, though the direction of the relationship
remains the same.

136

conﬂicts of interest. It also indicates, as Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) similarly noticed,
that the locus of interstate conﬂict has moved increasingly away from the European
theater, to other less developed subsystems.

The impacts of two additional variables are also worth noting: the dummy for
whether the U.S. was engaged in a major military conﬂict and the dummy for the
presence of nuclear capable states. Both variables have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
presidential decision-making. Rather than deterring additional resource commitments, it
seems, the U.S. tends to increase conﬂict-resolution attempts during major military
engagements. Most likely, both direct military activity and third-party involvement are
part of a broader U.S. foreign policy agenda designed to protect U.S. interests and allies.
However, the evidence also indicates that Kegley and Wittkopf’s (1996) supposition
regarding the presence of nuclear powers is supported. Interstate crises involving at least
one nuclear state are signiﬁcantly less likely to receive American attention.’ It may be
that the U.S. tries to avoid quarrels where an underlying issue in contention involves
nuclear capabilities for fear of aggravating or escalating an already tense situation.

The econometric model in Table 17 does not include two temporal dummies that
were found to be important in the Poisson analysis. There has been considerable

speculation, and some evidence in support, regarding the congressional constraints placed

 

’ This ﬁnding appears to be at odds with the evidence presented earlier regarding system level. Given that
major powers also possess nuclear weapons, wouldn’t both variables inﬂuence presidential decision
making in a similar direction? Interestingly, though, of the 356 crises involving the U.S. as a third-party,
only 36 involved nuclear-capable states. Equally as interesting is that only 50 crises occurred in the mainly
dominant and dominant systems, and nearly three-ﬁfths of these crises occurred during the interwar years
and World War II. The dominant system after World War II was deﬁned by the U.S. bloc--Soviet bloc
rivalry. Only 18 disputes were recorded. It seems, then, that U.S. involvement was virtually assured in the
few crises that occurred in the dominant and mainly dominant systems. Crises in the subsystems, in

137

on presidential actions in foreign affairs after the Vietnam War. Many scholars have
argued that the executive has been subject to increased oversight (e.g., the War Powers
Resolution) by congressional committees and party leaders. Although not included in the
ﬁrst logistic model presented in Table 17, a post-Vietnam War dummy variable is
moderately signiﬁcant, but the sign indicates that increased involvement in interstate
crises has occurred in the two decades following the Vietnam War. So, this result
conﬁrms what was found in Chapter Four with the Poisson analysis. However, one
problem with the present survey is the nature of the dependent variable. It may be that
military involvement is much less likely during the War Powers era, but the attention
given to foreign affairs by both Reagan and Bush has increased the level of political and
economic involvement. Involvement, though, is also a function of the total number of
interstate crises occuning at any given time. Perhaps we should not be surprised at the
attention given to foreign affairs by presidents elected after Vietnam due to the
prevalence of salient interstate crises.

Additional results show little temporal change in presidential decision-making
after the Cold War. Again, although not included in the model presented in Table 17, a
dummy variable turns out positive, but insigniﬁcant. In the Operationalization of ‘post-
Cold War,’ I selected 1989, although as Wittkopf and McCormick (1998) pointed out,
there are a number of events from 1987 to the collapse of the Communist regime in the
Soviet Union that could be selected to demarcate a post-Cold War dummy. Similar to

their coding, the beginning of the Bush presidency and the 101 st Congress is chosen here.

 

contrast, were less likely to receive U.S. attention, and even less likely if nuclear-capable regional states
were the primary crisis actors.

138

Wittkopf and McCormick (1998: 446) showed that the COPDAB measure of net conﬂict
and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States changed during
Reagan’s last year in ofﬁce. The ﬁrst year of the Bush administration, then, inaugurated a
much more cooperative east-west relationship. Unlike the results from Chapter Four,
however, there is little evidence from the logistic analyses to indicate a fundamental
change in the incidence of third-party crisis intervention after the Cold War.

In Table 18, a model is presented without many of the additional proxy variables
that were included in the full speciﬁcation. A log-likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that this
model has been pared down too far. In other words, the variation explained by the more
parsimonious model in Table 18 is signiﬁcantly less than the full model presented in
Table 17. It seems that while the domestic variables can be legitimately removed without
a signiﬁcant loss of information, the regional dummies cannot. We do see, however, that
these geographic dummies are not accounting for the predictive power and statistical
signiﬁcance of the model. The main systemic and salience variables continue to be

strongly related to U.S. third-party intervention decisions.

Logistic Results: Alternative Speciﬁcations

Table 19 presents a slightly different model speciﬁcation. Rather than a
continuous measure of political opposition, a trichotomous variable for divided
government has been included. This broad measure of divided government indicates that
intervention decisions are moderately inﬂuenced by the level of political opposition.
While not signiﬁcant at a standard level, opposition control on Capitol Hill does tend to

constrain executive attention to foreign affairs. One can also see from Table 19 that the

139

systemic and crisis-speciﬁc variables are not unduly affected by the inclusion of this new
variable.

An additional problem with the previous logit analyses may be the presence of
outliers. Figure 14 demonstrates that a number of observations are not predicted
accurately by the logistic model presented in Table 19. The sizes of the circles indicate
the inﬂuence these observations are having on the estimates. So, not only are there
covariate patterns that the model cannot account for, but a number of these observations
are having a disproportionate inﬂuence on the coefﬁcients.

Two of the most inﬂuential covariate patterns involve World War II crises. Given
the important distinction between conﬂicts during this global war period and those
occurring before and after it, it may be that the decision calculus for intervening in
ongoing wars is different than intervening in crisis situations that could potentially
escalate to war. Regardless of the causes, it does appear that the model is not accurately
accounting for the World War 11 cases. Interestingly, both Gelpi (1997) and Huth (1998)
removed observations that occurred during major wars for fear of confusing the
determinants of two very different foreign policy decisions. According to Gelpi (1997:
264), “decisions that escalate the geographic scope or intensity of a major military
conﬂict [are] fundamentally different from decisions to initiate an armed conﬂict, or that
escalate an existing dispute up to the use of major force.”

Looking at the results in Table 20, it does appear as if the World War II crises are
heavily affecting the domestic-political variables. While elections continue to have little

effect on third-party interventions, both the presence of divided government and the

140

growth rate do appear to play a role in presidential decision-making.6 The divided
government variable is particularly interesting, because once again the relationship
indicates that political opposition tends to constrain executive decision-making in foreign
affairs. Presidents are less likely to intervene when they face a Congress controlled by the
opposition party.

It is also evident from Table 20 that the systemic and crisis-speciﬁc variables are
even more strongly related to third-party interventions when these World War 11 cases are
removed. In fact, the model in Table 20 represents a 28% improvement over a null model

in terms of correctly predicting the occurrence of U.S. interventions.

Diverting Attention to Foreign Affairs

The argument posited in Chapter Two was that domestic-political forces should
tend to constrain executive actions in foreign affairs. Given the electoral importance of
domestic issues and the potential costs involved in foreign policy activism, presidents
should avoid costly conﬂict-resolution attempts during times of domestic turmoil. This
line of argument, however, contradicts the logic of diversionary theory. The analysis that
follows is intended to further test whether any evidence exists for diversionary behavior
on the part of a president with regard to third-party intervention decisions.

From Table 21, we can see that the results do not appear to support the political

manipulation of international events. Indeed, the direction of many of the relationships is

 

6 The unemployment rate, while not as signiﬁcant as congressional opposition, has a similar effect on
presidential decision making. As unemployment increases, presidents appear less likely to help resolve
foreign crises abroad. Indeed, more than likely executive attention is devoted to addressing the domestic
concerns of the U.S. public, such as stimulating demand through monetary and ﬁscal policy. Interestingly,
the relationship of this economic indicator is opposite of GNP growth. It is not clear why such conﬂicting
effects exist.

141

contrary to what many diversionary models propound. For instance, the presence of
divided government appears to decrease the likelihood of crisis involvement. This is
opposite what James and Hristoulas (1994) argued. Divided government, they suggested,
should lead to increased diversionary uses of force (admittedly their variable was
statistically insigniﬁcant). To be sure, there is a difference between crises when the U.S.
is a primary actor and those where the U.S. has the option to intercede as a third party to
help resolve an interstate dispute. James and Hristoulas only investigated crises where the
United States was a primary actor, and it perhaps should not be surprising that an
opposition-controlled Congress was found to be unrelated to presidential decision-
making.7 It seems, though, that presidents are neither initiating crises nor instigating
peace efforts primarily for domestic-political ends.

Furthermore, presidential approval appears to have little to do with foreign policy
decision-making of this kind. While the sign of approval is in the same direction as that
reported by Ostrom and Job (1986) in their work on the political use of force, this
variable is far from reaching statistical signiﬁcance in the present analysis. Now, it may
be that these crisis situations are neither salient nor visible enough for presidents to
garnish a signiﬁcant short term increase in public support. However, it seems that the
Bosnian crisis did present the Clinton administration with a perfect opportunity to display
leadership skill and statesmanship to the American people. Therefore, it is not a priori
certain that these international events do not represent possible opportunities for political

advantage.

 

7 Meernik and Waterman (1996) proffered a similar argument to James and Hristoulas (1994). While
Meernik and Waterman measured congressional opposition differently (support for a president’s position

142

Interesting, as well, is the irrelevance of both presidential and war-time elections
in determining third-party crisis intervention. While the Operationalization used here for
presidential elections is slightly broader than in other studies (i.e., a full year-long period,
rather than one quarter prior to an election), the variable clearly appears unrelated to U.S.
third-party crisis intervention. The same goes for war-time elections. Contrary to
Fordham (1998) and Stoll (1984), the analysis presented here ﬁnds no relationship
between peace-making initiatives and elections held during war-time. In Table 22, we see
that the four election variables are not only insigniﬁcant, but their signs are consistently
negative. Given the opportunities these events present, it is unclear why no relationship
exists between elections and U.S. conﬂict-resolution efforts.

In addition, I ﬁnd that a president’s behavior during his ﬁrst term in ofﬁce does
not signiﬁcantly differ from the remaining years he serves (see Table 23). That is, there
appears to be no honeymoon effect with regard to third-party intervention. Most likely, as
Russett (1990) surmised, incoming executives are unfamiliar with foreign affairs and feel
a need to act on domestic promises made to constituency groups during the presidential
campaign. My evidence simply suggests that a president’s attention is not systematically
drawn to or away from issues of foreign policy during his ﬁrst year in ofﬁce. This result
presumably does not support a political manipulation argument. The ﬁrst year in ofﬁce is
a time of increased ﬂexibility for a president. Consequently, bold initiatives should be
undertaken to provide early policy successes for the campaign three years down the road.
The lack of evidence, however, suggests that presidents may be focusing domestically

rather than internationally during their ﬁrst year in ofﬁce.

 

on selected roll-call votes), their variable was also insigniﬁcant.

143

In diversionary research, the misery index has been a commonly used variable for
domestic conditions. Following the approach of Hess and Orphanides (1995), I selected
the gross national product (GNP) as a substitute proxy. As mentioned above, I ﬁnd that
the percent change in the annual gross national product to be inversely related to crisis
intervention. As growth goes down, then, presidents appear more willing to commit
political, economic, and military resources to help resolve conﬂicts abroad. Once, again,
this can potentially be interpreted as supporting a diversionary theory. However, this
result on the other hand, may indicate that disputes are being initiated by foreign leaders
with an eye towards U.S. domestic conditions. Aware of America’s long reach and
extensive interests, states may be trying to time strategic moves around domestic
conditions that they believe may decrease the likelihood of a president becoming
involved. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990: 748), for instance, suggested that the
Soviet decision to enter Afghanistan may have been partly due to U.S. domestic
conditions following the Vietnam War and the perception by Soviet leaders that the
American public would not tolerate engagement abroad (see also the argument posited by
Ward and Widmaier, 1982, and the empirical evidence presented by Leeds and Davis,
1997).8

Another interesting ﬁnding that does not support a diversionary interpretation of
U.S. third-party intervention is the relationship between current war involvement and

foreign policy activism. The results here indicate that the likelihood of conﬂict-resolution

 

’ Although the relationship between GNP growth and third-party intervention is subject to some
interpretation, there appears to be little uncertainty with regards to the unemployment rate. In a model from
1935-1994 (although not shown), the direction of the relationship indicates that economic downturns focus

144

initiatives increases when the United States is at war. Contrary to dissuading executives
from engagement, conﬂicts tend to encourage American succor in resolving quarrels
abroad. Now, this result may simply indicate that the U.S. is directing an active foreign
policy agenda. Policymakers and foreign policy elites may believe that U.S. interests
necessitate both direct military activity and the contribution of resources to aid in the
settlement of other important regional disputes. So, rather than an either-or strategy,
administrations may ﬁnd both direct conﬂict involvement and conﬂict resolution to be
important components of a foreign policy agenda designed to alter the current

international status quo.

Predicted Probabilities

One way of evaluating the inﬂuence of an individual exogenous variable on third-
party crisis involvement is through predicted probabilities. Given the non-linearity of the
logistic model, the coefﬁcients do not simply refer to the change in Y due to a one-unit
change in xi. Consequently, shifting the level of one variable, while holding the values of
the other independent variables at their means, provides information with regard to the
size of the each variable’s impact on foreign conﬂict intervention (see Appendix D for
descriptive statistics on variables used in Chapter Five).

In the ﬁnal model presented in Table 20, for instance, the mean probability of Y is
61%. That is, when the values of the exogenous variables are all held at their means, the
probability of a president intervening in an interstate crisis is about 61%. When there is a

uniﬁed government (i.e., divided government equals 1), the probability of involvement

 

attention away from issues of foreign policy. Presumably, such domestic troubles are directing White

145

jumps to nearly 67% (see Table 24). However, when the government is fully divided with
one party in control of the presidency and another in control of both houses of Congress,
the likelihood of involvement drops to 53%. Economic growth also has a substantial
inﬂuence on the probability of Y. At its empirical low, the likelihood of involvement is
over 85%. At its high, the probability of crisis involvement drops to less than 45%.

Clearly, the most inﬂuential variable is Soviet involvement. As the level of USSR
participation in these same crisis events increases, the likelihood of presidential
engagement increases considerably. In addition, the temporal change from interwar to
Cold War has an important inﬂuence on crisis involvement. Before World War II, the
likelihood of intervention is about 40%, however aﬁer 1947 this leaps to over 65%.

When all three domestic-political variables are held at their empirical high values,
their constraining inﬂuence is apparent. Indeed, the likelihood of involvement is only
33% when a president faces political opposition on the Hill and a deteriorating economic
situation necessitates attention to the domestic scene. However, when such domestic-
political constraints are lifted, the propensity to intervene as a third-party increases to
nearly 60%. The most inﬂuential variables, though, appear to be those associated with the
precise characteristics of the crises themselves. Excluding Soviet involvement, when a
crisis involves both a democracy and an ally, plus the conﬂict occurs in either Central or
South America, the probability of intervening to help resolve the conﬂict is about 95%.

This falls to less than 50% when none of these characteristics is present.

 

House resources to the resolution of economic and social issues on the home front.

146

Conclusion

In this chapter, a model of third-party crisis intervention was empirically tested
against a set of cases from 1918-1994. Moderate support was found for the argument that
divided government tends to discourage attention to foreign policy by presidential
administrations. Even more interesting, perhaps, was that little, if any, support was found
for a diversionary model of foreign policy decision-making. Greater attention to foreign
affairs does not appear to have occurred during midterm or presidential election years.
Furthermore, this does not change when controlling for whether the United States is at
war or not.

Little evidence was found indicating that presidential approval inﬂuences
intervention decisions. Not only was the substantive strength of this variable negligible,
but the variable was also highly insigniﬁcant. Domestic economic conditions do appear
important, however. In both models, the gross national product and the unemployment
rate were signiﬁcantly related to third-party interventions. These variables further appear
to sustain a structural-constraints theory of crisis intervention. The unemployment rate
was inversely related to intervention and statistically signiﬁcant (p <.05). Economic
growth was also inversely related to intervention, which may represent strategic behavior
on the part of the primary crisis actors who are wary of U.S. interference.

Most crucial, however, in the decision to intervene were the individual
characteristics of the interstate crises. Salience, measured by Soviet involvement and
geographic location were both highly inﬂuential in determining U.S. involvement.
Furthermore, both alliance ties and the nature of the governing regimes of the primary

crisis participants played a role, both encouraging presidential attention. Lastly, crises

147

involving nuclear-capable states were much less likely to receive American aid, as
Kegley and Wittkopf (1996) surmised.

Temporal change was not nearly as clear as had been expected. While the
evidence presented above supports Gowa’s (1998) ﬁndings regarding U.S. foreign policy
behavior before and after World War II, the evidence for a structural change aﬁer
Vietnam or following the end of the Cold War is much less clear. It may be that an
increase in the number of foreign crises provided greater opportunities for presidential
involvement during the two decades following the Vietnam War. It may also be true that
while political and economic involvement in these crises continued to be fairly high, the
actual use of military force to aid the resolution of crises decreased signiﬁcantly. Or, it
may be that primary crisis participation by the United States decreased while third-party
involvement remained fairly prominent. The analysis presented in Chapter Six is intended
to answer some of these puzzles.

The evidence presented in this chapter additionally exposes a weakness of the
event-count analysis. While the Poisson model is able to capture broad system and
domestic trends and their effects on uses of force or third-party conﬂict interventions, the
most powerful exogenous variables tend to be associated with the speciﬁcs of the
individual crises themselves. Figure 15 illustrates the substantial variation that exists in
the propensity to intervene as a third-party in foreign crises. That is, even during the same
year the propensity to intervene ﬂuctuates widely based on certain crisis-speciﬁc
characteristics. Particularly after 1974, such variation within a given year is clearly
apparent. Third-party crisis involvement, then, varies signiﬁcantly depending on the types

of conﬂicts that erupt. By not specifying these important factors that clearly enter into an

148

executive’s decision calculus, models may misstate the relationship between domestic-

political institutions, the systemic environment, and foreign policy decision-making.

149

TABLE 17: Logistic Results, Equation 1, 1918-1994

 

 

Robust
Variable Variable Type Beta Standard Error T-score . _ P ..
Constant — -3.31 1.05 -3.15 .002
Senate Seats Domestic .005 .01 .36 .716
Off-Presidential Year Elections Domestic -. 19 .33 -.56 .574
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.02 .03 —.80 .421
Super-power Systemic .78 .40 1.98 .048
US Military Expenditures Systemic 2.24*10'8 1.20"‘10‘8 1.86 .063
System Level Systemic .63 .19 3.29 .001
War Involvement -- .97 .35 2.80 .005
Soviet Involvement Crisis .87 .18 4.92 .000
Ally*Democracy Crisis .46 . 16 2.95 .003
Americas Crisis 1.34 .53 2.54 .011
Africa Crisis -.61 .30 -2.03 .043
Europe Crisis -1 . 17 .43 -2.74 .006
Nuclear Power Crisis -.87 .49 -I.77 .076
N = 356 Pseudo R2 = .201
Log-likelihood: -I 92. 95 Correct Prediction: 73.31%
x2 (13) = 68. 7] (.0000) Null Model: 58.5%

Goodness-of-ﬁt = 231.27 (.14)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models
estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

150

TABLE 18: Logistic Results, Equation 2, 1918-1994

 

 

Robust
Variable Variable Type Beta Standard Error T-score P
Constant — -3.38 1.01 -3.35 ' " “.001"
Senate Seats Domestic .006 .01 .41 .681
Off—Presidential Year Elections Domestic -.15 .32 -.46 .643
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.02 .03 -.77 .444
Super-power Systemic .79 .37 2.12 .034
US Military Expenditures Systemic l.74"‘10'8 1.14"‘10’8 1.53 .125
System Level Systemic .44 .18 2.41 .016
War Involvement -— 1.16 .35 3.36 .001
Soviet Involvement Crisis .85 .17 5.16 .000
Ally*Democracy Crisis .30 .15 2.03 .042
Americas Crisis 1.82 .50 3.63 .000
N = 356 Pseudo R2 = .174
Log-likelihood: -199.36 Correct Prediction: 71.91%
x’ (10) = 31.02 (.0000) Null Model: 58.5%

Goodness-ofﬁt = 294.66 (.07)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models
estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

151

TABLE 19: Logistic Results, Equation 3, 1918-1994

 

 

Robust
Variable Variable Tape Beta Standard Error T-score P
Constant -— -2.61 .62 -4.19 1000 I
Divided Government Domestic -.23 .16 - l .47 .143
Off-Presidential Year Elections Domestic -.22 .33 -.66 .507
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.03 .03 -l.1 l .266
Super-Power Systemic .92 .40 2.90 .022
US Military Expenditures Systemic 2.09”"10’8 1.21 “10'8 1.73 .084
System Level Systemic .62 .19 3.17 .002
War Involvement — 1.02 .34 2.97 .003
Soviet Involvement Crisis .88 .18 4.94 .000
Ally*Democracy Crisis .45 .16 2.84 .004
Americas Crisis 1.32 .52 2.53 .011
Africa Crisis -.65 .30 -2. 14 .033
Europe Crisis -1 .16 .43 -2.70 .007
Nuclear Power Crisis -.87 .50 - l .73 .085
N = 356 E Pseudo R2 = .205
Log-likelihood: -191.96 Correct Prediction: 72.19%
12(13) = 67.7 (.0000) Null Model: 58.5%

Goodness-of-ﬁt = 311.03 (.13)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models
estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

152

TABLE 20: Logistic Results, Equation 4, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War 11 Cases)

 

 

 

Robust
Variable Variable Tyee Beta Standard Error T-score P
Constant — -2.66 .64 -4.13 .000
Divided Government Domestic -.31 .17 - l .82 .068
Off-Presidential Year Election Domestic -. 16 .35 -.46 .644
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.06 .03 -l .90 .059
Super-Power Systemic 1.04 .47 2. 19 .028
US Military Expenditures Systemic 2.65*10'8 1.35*10'K 1.97 .048
System Level Systemic .48 .24 1.97 .049
War Involvement -- 1.07 .37 2.90 .004
Soviet Involvement Crisis 1.09 .20 5.30 .000
Ally*Democracy Crisis .40 .16 2.45 .015
Americas Crisis 1.44 .55 2.62 .009
Africa Crisis -.69 .32 -2.14 .032
Europe Crisis -.78 .52 -l .49 .137
Nuclear Power Crisis -.90 .52 - I .74 .081
N=3l5 Pseudo R2=.218
Log-likelihood: -168.39 Correct Prediction: 74.6%
f (13) = 67.12 (.0000) Null Model: 58.5%

Goodness-of-ﬁt = 269.02 (. 16)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models
estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

153

TABLE 21: Logistic Results, Equation 5, 1935-1994 (Excluding World War H Cases)

 

 

Robust
Variable Variable Type Beta Standard Error T-score ,P.
Constant —— -4.08 1.15 -3.54 .000
Presidential Approval Domestic .01 .01 .80 .423
Divided Government Domestic -.32 .18 -1.73 .083
Off-Presidential Year Election Domestic -.08 .41 —.20 .842
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.07 .05 —l .56 .1 19
Super-Power Systemic 1.43 .82 1.76 .079
US Military Expenditures Systemic 2.77"‘10'8 I.57*10" 1.77 .077
System Level Systemic .54 .33 1.62 .105
War Involvement —— 1.14 .38 2.96 .003
Soviet Involvement Crisis 1.41 .28 5.07 .000
Ally*Democracy Crisis .36 . 18 1.94 .052
Americas Crisis 1.24 .58 2.13 .033
Africa Crisis -.53 .35 -l .54 .124
Europe Crisis -.66 .76 -.86 .387
Nuclear Power Crisis -.99 .57 -l.73 .084
N = 264 Pseudo R3 = .237
Log—likelihood: 436.53 Correct Prediction: 75.8%
12(14) = 57.41 (.0000) Null Model: 58.6%

Goodness—of-ﬁt = 259.21 (.17)

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models
estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

154

TABLE 22: Logistic Equation 6, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

 

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant -2.62 -2.67 -2.66 -2.69
(17:-000) 0:000) 07:000) 0:000)
Divided Government -.29 -.28 -.31 -.30
(p=.081) W096) (p=.068) (p=.077)
GNP Growth Rate -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06
(p=.07 l ) (p=.069) (p=.059) (p=.060)
Super-Power l .08 l .07 1.04 1.05
(p=.025) (p=.025) (p=.028) (p=.028)
US Military Expenditures 2.52"‘10’8 2.49*10'8 2.65"‘10‘8 2.61"‘10’8
(p=.064) (p=.067) (p=.048) (p=.052)
War Involvement 1.01 1.03 1.07 1.09
(p=.008) (p=.006) (p=.004) (p=.008)
Soviet Involvement 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09
0:000) 0:000) (p=.000> (17:-000)
System Level .48 .45 .48 .46
(p=.045) (p=.061) (p=.049) (p=.057)
Ally*Democracy .39 .39 .40 .40
(p=.017) (p=.017) (p=.015) (p=.015)
Americas 1.43 1.42 1.43 1.43
(pr-.010) (p=.010) (p=.009) (p=.009)
Africa -.70 -.70 -.69 -.69
(p=.030) (p=.030) (p=.032) (p=.032)
Europe -.75 -.73 7278 -.76
(p=.152) (p=. 160) (p=.137) (p=. 146)
Nuclear Power -.90 -.89 -.90 -.90
(p=.084) (p=.088) (p=.08l) (p=.084)
National Elections -.25 —- -- —
(p=.374)
Presidential Elections -- -.20 —- --
(p=.534)
Off-Presidential Year Elections —- -- -.l6 --
(P=.644)
War Elections —- — -- -.04

($9602
N=315 N=3I N=3l N=3l

LL: 468.50
12(13) = 67.22 (.000) 12(13) = 65.73 (.000) x713) = 67.12 (.000) 12(13) = 65.6 (.000)
Pseudo R2 = .22

LL = -l68.ll
Pseudo R2 = .22

LL = -l68.32
Pseudo R2 = .22

LL = .16839
Pseudo R2 = .22

Model Pred..' 73.4% Model Pred.: 74.6% Model Fred: 74.6% Model Pred: 74.9%

Null Model: 58.5 % Null Model: 58.5 % Null Model: 58.5 % Null Model: 58.5 %
— ——

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Signiﬁcance
level in is parantheses. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

155

TABLE 23: Logistic Results, Equation 7, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War 11 Cases)

 

Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant -2.69 -2.71
(P=-000) (tr-.000)
Divided Government -.30 —.29
(p=.075) (p=.089)
GNP Growth -.06 -.06
(p=.060) (p=.062)
Super-power l .04 1 .03
(p=.028) (p=.031)
US Military Expenditures 2.61"‘10‘8 2.63"‘10'8
(p=.052) (p=.053)
War Involvement 1.08 1.08
(p=.003) (p=.003)
Soviet Involvement 1.08 1.08
(IF-000) (IF-000)
System Level .46 .46
(p=.057) (p=.057)
Ally*Democracy .40 .40
(p=.014) (p=.014)
Americas 1 .43 l .42
(F009) (17:-009)
Africa -.69 -.69
(p=.032) (p=.032)
Europe -.76 -.76
(p=.146) (p=.145)
Nuclear -.89 -.90
(p=.084) (p=.085)
Honeymoon -- .06
(E—870:
N = 315 N = 315
Log-Likelihood = -l68.50 Log-Likelihood = -I68.50
12(12) = 65.5 (.000) 12(13) = 65.6 (.000)
Pseudo R2 = .22 Pseudo R2 = .22
Model Prediction: 74.92% Model Prediction: 74.60%
Null Model: 58.5% Null Model: 58.5%

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Signiﬁcance
level in is parantheses. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

156

TABLE 24: Marginal Effects on Changes in the Probability of Third-Party Crisis
Intervention, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War H Cases)

 

 

Variable Variable Type Change in Predicted Probability
Divided Government Domestic .14
Off-Presidential Year Election Domestic .03
GNP Growth Rate Domestic .42
Super-Power Systemic .25
U.S. Military Expenditures Systemic .44
System Level Systemic .28
War Involvement -« .23
Soviet Involvement Crisis .52
Ally*Democracy Crisis .26
Americas Crisis .28
Africa Crisis .17
Europe Crisis . 19
Nuclear Power Crisis .22
Domestic Variables —- . 5 7
Systemic Variables -- . 7 9
Crisis Variables (w/o USSR) —- . 83

Crisis Variables (w/ USSR) - . 93
NOTE: The values in this column represent the change in the probability of Y (intervention) when the
exogenous variable is ﬂuctuated from its empirical low to its empirical high. The other independent
variables are held at their mean values. The average probability of U.S. third-party intervention is .61.

157

Change in Pea neon Chi-Square

Symbol Size proportional to aaeta

20"

15"

10-

 

 

 

.5
Predicted PM Damn t!

FIGURE 14: Inﬂuence of Outliers on U.S. Third-Party Crisis
Intervention, 1918-1994

158

Predicted Pr'oba bilitv

1“ O o
O O O
o 0 0° 0 0°° 0° 0 o
o 0 o o
O o o O O 0 00°00
oo 0 ° 8 0° 0°: 0 0 .°: o o
O 0
o o o o O o o O O o o o 0 o
O o o o o 0
0 0° 0 o 0 o
0 o 0 0° 0 O O O
o °° 0° 00 ° o o
0 ° 0 0° ° 0
O O o 00
o 0 o 0 °
0 o o 0
.5‘0 0 0 0° 0 .8 o o o
0
0° 0 o 0 0° . O 0 o O
O 00 O
o o o o °° 0 °
0 0 O. o
O o O 0
° ° 00 o o
0 0° 0 o o O
O
O
04

 

 

1 I I l l T I l l l l 1 1
45 50 54 58 62 65 711 74 7B 82 BE SO 94
year at trigger

FIGURE 15: U.S. Propensity to Intervene as a Neutral Third-
Party in an Interstate Crisis, 1918-1994

159

CHAPTER 6

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES:
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC ANALYSIS

In Chapter Four, we observed the temporal variability that exists with regards to
U.S. third-party interventions in interstate crises. In addition, we found that the number of
crises an administration was engaged in was strongly dependent on broad changes in
system structure. Unlike Gowa’s (1998) results on militarized interstate dispute (MID)
involvement, though, domestic-political variables, such as congressional opposition and
economic growth, also appeared to play a role in presidential decision-making. In Chapter
Five, the logistic estimation demonstrated that the event-count analysis may have
suffered from underspeciﬁcation. Particular characteristics of the interstate crises could
not be controlled for, and these characteristics, such as Soviet involvement, the regime
types of the primary actors, and whether these actors were nuclear capable, had a
tremendous impact on third-party interventions. It also seemed that when these individual
crisis characteristics were controlled for, the inﬂuence of domestic-political factors
decreased considerably, although political opposition in Congress continued to decrease
conﬂict-resolution initiatives. It was also found in Chapter Five that the directions of the
relationships of these domestic-level variables tended to support a structural-constraints

theory of democratic decision-making in foreign affairs, rather than a diversionary one.

160

Domestic opposition and economic weakness did not appear to divert executive attention
to interstate crises abroad.

In this chapter, the analysis is expanded once more to account for the variability in
the foreign policy choices coded in the dependent variable. In Chapter Five, political,
economic, and military involvement in interstate crises were all collapsed into one
category. The question remains, though, whether differences exist in the international and
domestic-political climates that foster low-level versus high-level involvement. As the
work of Wittkopf (1990, 1995) demonstrates, how the U.S. engages the rest of the world
is as important a question as whether to engage it. Below, a multinomial logistic model is
presented that evaluates the determinants of separate foreign policy choices.

In the remainder of this chapter, I ﬁrst discuss the need to evaluate the different
options available to an executive, drawing on the work of Most and Starr (1989) and
others. Next, I present the multinomial model and discuss its basic properties. I then
present the results of two regression runs that once again examine the roles played by
domestic, systemic, and crisis-speciﬁc variables. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of

the ﬁndings.

Substitutability in Foreign Policy

In a speech given in 1975, Henry Kissinger insisted that “the traditional agenda of
international affairs--the balance among major powers, the security of nations--no longer
deﬁnes our perils or our possibilities... we are entering a new era. Old international
patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive, old solutions are unavailing”

(quoted in Keohane and Nye 1996: 236). Kissinger’s words were prophetic, yet they are

161

even more appropriate for today’s international climate, than that of 1975. Not only are
the foreign policy problems of today very different that those of yesteryear, but American
society has grown increasingly skeptical of both the usefulness and morality of military
solutions (see Brooks and Kanter, 1994; Lewis, 1994; Garwin, 1994; Holsti, 1996). The
national security rhetoric that deﬁned the Cold War, and was used to justify America’s
extensive role in the world, has given way as international threats to U.S. sovereignty
have diminished. Indeed, at the same time as the anti-Communist consensus collapsed in
the mid to late 19705, American politics became increasingly pluralistic. As a result,
foreign policy decision-making became much less dictated by the national security
establishment, and the American public has continued to remain suspicious of national
security pretensions (Lewis, 1994).

The projection of inﬂuence abroad, though, has always been a controversial issue,
Cold War or not. Americans have consistently afﬁrmed their reservations about the use of
military force (Holsti, 1996). Given the importance of sovereignty and individual
freedom to the Republic’s origins, plus the strong desire to avoid the examples set by the
European powers, this should perhaps not be surprising (Fisher, 1995; Rosati, 1999). In
more modern times, certainly, there has been considerable disagreement over the
appropriate use of American’s armed forces. Reagan’s foreign aid to Latin America,
Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs invasion, and Clinton’s deployment of troops into the Bosnian
conﬂict each generated signiﬁcant political opposition, often a result of conﬂict between
foreign policy elites and the American public. Particularly when U.S. troops are called
upon to intervene in the affairs of other states, discord arises over the proper direction and

implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

162

Scholars of international relations have rarely addressed why or when certain
foreign policy tools, rather than others, are used to protect American interests abroad
(exceptions include Most and Starr, 1989; Morgan and Palmer, 1998). Certainly, we
would expect U.S. presidents to be discriminate as to when military force is required.
Given that, as Brooks and Kanter (1994: 15) noted, intervention can be deﬁned broadly to
“encompasses the entire spectrum of coercive techniques-—diplomatic, economic,
military, or new techniques based on new technology--with which we seek to change the
character or alter the behavior of another government,” scholars need to pay close
attention to presidential actions other than the use of military force. While America’s
place in the global order naturally invites active engagement in many interstate crises,
depending on public and congressional support, the salience of the crisis, and the level of
systemic threat, a president may opt for diplomacy over military engagement. There is a
need, then, as Morgan and Palmer (1998: 3) have pointed out, to compare the

international and domestic circumstances surrounding different foreign policy choices.

The Multinomial Logistic Model

Although the ICB dataset codes a four category variable for U.S. third-party
involvement in interstate crises, the frequency of covert military and direct military
activity is quite small. Consequently, these two distinct categories are combined to
produce a trichotomous endogenous variable. It is deﬁned as follows: (1) no involvement,
(2) low-level involvement (political and economic), (3) high-level involvement (semi-
and direct military). The outcome variable, then, codes for the speciﬁc U.S. policy choice

on an unordered scale of zero to two. The objective is to assess whether the determinants

163

of low-level involvement mimic those of higher levels of involvement, or whether
signiﬁcant differences emerge with regards to the determinants of distinct foreign policy
choices.

The multinomial model is calculated similar to the binary logistic regression
presented in Chapter Five. A set of coefﬁcients, 0,, [3], Bk, is estimated that correspond to
the three categories of the dependent variable. So, the probability of any outcome

occurring is calculated by the following formulas:

 

 

 

em

P(Y=1)= , . _
e‘V” +e‘m’ +em

P(Y 2) em.
em +e’w’ +em

P(Y—3)— em

_ _ 7
em +e ﬂ’ +em

To identify the model, one category is set as a baseline from which the remaining
coefﬁcients are measured relative to this base group. So here, an individual coefﬁcient
will conﬁrm or disconﬁrm whether a variable has any inﬂuence on the type of U.S.
peace-making response (low or high-level) to an interstate crisis event.

An ordered logit model is a conceivable alternative for estimating the posited
relationships. However, one has to assume that the level of involvement is ordered
correctly, with the military Option only used after diplomatic or economic attempts have
been exhausted. With the multinomial framework, such an assumption is not required.

The military option is merely assumed to be a different foreign policy choice.

164

Consequently, the likelihood of low-level versus high-level involvement is compared to
the option of not intervening at all, and the interpretation of the individual coefﬁcients is

then relative to this base category.

Results

Table 25 displays the results from an analysis of the full time frame, 1918-1994.
The multinomial estimation is designed to provide information on whether the foreign
policy option selected by the executive to address an interstate crisis is inﬂuenced by
domestic, systemic and crisis-speciﬁc factors. These results, however, must be considered
tentative given the dispersion of the dependent variable. As Table 5 illustrates, the
variable is skewed away from high-level involvement, and in fact less than 20% of the
cases involve the direct use of U.S. peace‘keeping forces or personnel.

In this ﬁrst model, the results parallel those from Chapter Five. Crisis-speciﬁc and
system-level variables tend to be the most strongly related to U.S. decision-making of this
kind. Domestic-political factors, such as elections and the economy appear to have little
inﬂuence, although congressional opposition is marginally related to low-level
interventions.

The differences observed between low and high-level intervention are interesting,
however. Systemic variables, such as system level, U.S. military expenditures, and the
bipolar international environment are all much more strongly related to high-level third-
party interventions than low-level ones. Plus, all are positively related to the decision to
intervene. U.S. military expenditures, for example, which serves as a proxy for the

evaluation of the international status quo, tends to increase the likelihood of high-level

165

interventions. Its lack of signiﬁcance with low-level interventions suggests that measures
of systemic threat may be less important in determining when diplomatic or economic
means are used to help resolve interstate conﬂicts abroad, but tend to be extremely
important when the military option is selected.

The results also suggest that the speciﬁcs of the crisis situation are extremely
important in the type of action a president takes. While the regime type and alliance
portfolios of the primary actors play an important role in whether the United States
becomes politically involved in helping to resolve the crisis, they have only a minimal
effect on the military option. Given that America’s democratic allies tend to be powerful
states in their own right, contributing peace-keeping troops and personnel is most likely
deemed unnecessary.

Similarly, nuclear-capable actors tend to discourage both political and military
involvement by the U.S., although military involvement is more strongly affected.
Presidents clearly attempt to avoid conﬂicts where one or more of the primary crisis
actors possesses nuclear weapons. However, third-party conﬂict-resolution attempts in
which U.S. armed forces are used are particularly unlikely to occur when the presence of
nuclear weapons constitutes an underlying issue in contention.

In Table 26, the World War 11 cases have been once again removed to evaluate
whether any effects can be attributed to this particular time period. It does appear that the
domestic-political effects are being obscured by these inﬂuential World War II crises.
Both congressional opposition and the growth rate are moderately inﬂuential in

determining low-level third-party interventions. However, opposition appears to be less

166

ﬁt

If“

 

important when it comes to high-level involvement. The growth rate, though, shows an
even stronger relation to high-level interventions than low-level ones.

The system and crisis-speciﬁc variables all show similar relationships to the
results presented in Table 25, although the variables--system level and U.S. military
expenditures--are clearly affected by the great power crises that occurred during World
War 11.

One variable that has not been mentioned is war involvement. It appears that low-
level conﬂict-resolution attempts are positively related to when the United States is at
war. However, the strength of this relationship is not the same for high-level
interventions. Active diplomatic and economic means appear to be used along with direct
engagement to defend U.S. interests abroad. In other words, low-level conﬂict-resolution
attempts tend to go hand in hand with primary crisis activity. If war is politics by other
means, than both conﬂict resolution and the direct use of military force presumably are
used together to accomplish foreign policy objectives. The lack of signiﬁcance for high-
level third-party interventions during wartime can most likely be attributed to the
insufﬁcient variation on the dependent variable. With the World War II observations
included, this variable is signiﬁcantly related to both high and low-level third-party
interventions. In general, then, it appears that conﬂict resolution and direct engagement
are used together to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Although not shown, public approval for a president once again seems to have
little impact on foreign policy decision-making. In neither model is a president’s approval
rating prior to a given crisis signiﬁcantly important in the determination to intervene. The

evidence demonstrates that these interstate crises abroad rarely are seized upon by

167

administrations for immediate electoral gain. In fact, if anything, the evidence appears to
support the argument that presidents are increasingly constrained in their handling of

foreign affairs as domestic opposition rises.

Conclusion

According to Most and Starr (1989: 102),

If foreign policies can indeed be alternative routes that foreign policy

decision makers adopt in order to attain their goals, then it would seem

plausible that decision makers who are confronted with some problem or

subjected to some stimulus could, under at least certain conditions,

substitute one such means for another.
Indeed, by not accounting for the policy options executives have at their disposal,
scholars risk drawing inferences that may be based on spurious relationships. At a
minimum it would seem necessary to investigate the determinants of distinct foreign
policy actions. Third-party intervention is one such option that has not been sufﬁciently
addressed. The level of commitment by the U.S. to interstate crises is a further distinction
to make.

The results presented in this chapter suggest that the determinants of political and
economic intervention may be different than interventions involving U.S. peace-keeping
troops and personnel. For instance, conﬂicts that involve U.S. democratic allies may
invite U.S. low-level intervention. However, the further commitment of military
resources may still depend on important systemic concerns and geographic salience. It
also appears to be that domestic-political opposition serves as a constraint on U.S.

involvement. Under divided government presidents are less likely to intervene as a third-

party than under a uniﬁed national government. The same relationship once again does

168

not hold for high-level interventions, which may indicate that there is something unique
about crises requiring signiﬁcant U.S. aid that enables a president to ignore congressional
opposition.

Admittedly, the results presented in this chapter are only tentative given the lack
of variation found in the dependent variable. Surely, though, there is a need to ﬁrrther
examine the notion of foreign policy substitutability. Indeed, only by accounting for the
many tools an executive has at his disposal to address international issues, can we

systematically explain foreign policy decision-making.

169

TABLE 25: Multinomial Logistic Model of Domestic, Systemic and Crisis-Speciﬁc
Variables on U.S. Third—Party Involvement in Interstate Crises, 1918—1994

 

Category 1: Political or Economic Involvement

Variables Variable Type Beta Standard Error T—score P
Constant — -2.51 .66 —3.79 ’ ' .000
Divided Government Domestic -.25 . 17 -l .46 .145
Off-Presidential Year Elections Domestic -.27 .35 -.77 .439
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.03 .03 -.99 .323
Super—Power Systemic .79 .40 l .95 .051
U.S. Military Expenditures Systemic l.08*10" 1.21 "‘10‘8 .90 .370
System Level Systemic .41 .22 1.84 .066
War Involvement —- .94 .40 2.39 .017
Soviet Involvement Crisis .85 .17 5.16 .000
Ally * Democracy Crisis .50 .17 2.95 .003
Americas Crisis 1.06 .52 2.05 .040
Africa Crisis -.78 .34 -2.28 .023
Europe Crisis —.88 .43 -2.03 .043
Nuclear Power Crisis -.68 .49 -1.39 .164

 

Category 2: Military Involvement

Variables Variable sze Beta Standard Error T-score P
Constant -5.94 l .05 -5.64 .000
Divided Government Domestic -.22 .24 -.95 .344
Off-Presidential Year Elections Domestic -.06 .45 -.14 .887
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.04 .05 —.82 .413
Super—Power Systemic 1.70 .61 2.77 .006

170

Table 25 (cont‘d):

 

U.S. Military Expenditures Systemic 5.41*10'8 l.63"‘10'a 3.32 .001
System Level Systemic 1.45 .32 4.49 .000
War Involvement —- 1.12 .52 2.15 .032
Soviet Involvement Crisis .99 .21 4.69 .000
Ally * Democracy Crisis .26 .24 1.11 .268
Americas Crisis 2.32 .64 3.60 .000
Africa Crisis -.27 .46 -.60 .548
Europe Crisis -2.63 .71 —3.68 .000
Nuclear Power Crisis -1 .53 .75 -2.03 .042
N=356 12(26) = 140.94 (.0000).
LL = -298. 79 Pseudo R2 = .19

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the level of U.S. third-party involvement in an interstate crisis. Models

estimated in Stata 5.0.

171

TABLE 26: Multinomial Logistic Model of Domestic, Systemic and Crisis-Speciﬁc
Variables on U.S. Third-Party Involvement in Interstate Crises, 1918-1994 (Excluding
World War II Cases)

 

Category 1: Political or Economic Involvement

Variables Variable Type Beta Standard Error T-score P
Constant —- -2.63 .70 -3.76 .000
Divided Government Domestic —.31 .18 - l .76 .079
Off-Presidential Year Elections Domestic -.25 .37 —.68 .495
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -.05 .03 - l .60 .11 l
Super-Power Systemic .84 .44 1.93 .054
U.S. Military Expenditures Systemic l.87"‘10‘R l.32"‘10'8 1.42 .156
System Level Systemic .46 .27 1.71 .088
War Involvement --- l .14 .46 2.47 .013
Soviet Involvement Crisis .99 .19 5.20 .000
Ally * Democracy Crisis .44 .17 2.56 .01 l
Americas Crisis 1.14 .53 2.13 .034
Africa Crisis -.79 .35 -2.23 .026
Europe Crisis -.65 .48 -1.35 . 178
Nuclear Power Crisis -.73 .50 - l .46 .143

 

Category 2: Military Involvement

Variables Variable sze Beta Standard Error T—score P
Constant --- -5.84 1.17 -4.99 .000
Divided Government Domestic —.33 .25 -1.31 . 192
Off-Presidential Year Elections Domestic .18 .49 .368 .713
GNP Growth Rate Domestic -. 12 .06 -2.09 .037
Super-Power Systemic 2.18 .80 2.73 .006

172

Table 26 (cont’d):

 

U.S. Military Expenditures Systemic 5.27*10'8 1.93* 10.11 2.74 .006
System Level Systemic .65 .44 1.48 .140
War Involvement —-- .88 .64 1.37 .171
Soviet Involvement Crisis 1.50 .26 5.69 .000
Ally * Democracy Crisis .19 .25 .76 .446
Americas Crisis 2.56 .68 3.74 .000
Africa Crisis -.38 .49 -.78 .436
Europe Crisis ~2.15 .99 -2.19 .029
Nuclear Power Crisis -l.46 .76 -l .92 .055
N = 315 [’(26) = 123.53 (.0000)
LL = -256.69 Pseudo R2 = .19

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the level of U.S. third-party involvement in an interstate crisis. Models

estimated in Stata 5.0.

173

 

TABLE 27 : Estimated Coefficients of Multinomial Logit Models Moving from No
Involvement to a Higher Level of Involvement

 

Variable

Constant

Divided Government
Off-Presidential Year
Elections

GNP Growth Rate
Super-power

U.S. Military
Expenditures
System Level

War Involvement
Soviet Involvement
Ally*Democracy
Americas

Africa

Europe

Nuclear Power

Equation 1

Equation 2 (Excluding WWII)

 

No involvement

to low-level

-2.51***
(-3.79)

-.25
(-l.46)

~.27
(-.77)

-.03
(-.99)

.79*
(1.95)

1.08"“ 10'3
(.90)

.41*
(1.84)

.94**
(2.39)

.85***
(5.16)

.50***
(2.95)

1.06“
(2.05)

-.78**
(-2.28)

-.88**
(-2.03)

-.68
(-1.39)

No involvement
to high-level

-5.94***
(-5.64)

-.22
(-.95)

406
(e14)

-.04
(-.82)

l.70***
(2.77)

5x41*10£***
c132)

l.45***
(4.49)

l.l2**
(2.15)

_99***
(4.69)

.26
(1.11)

2.32***
(3.60)

-.27
(-.60)

-2.63***
(-3.68)

-l.53**
(-2.03)

No involvement

to low-level

-2.63***
(-3.76)

-.31*
(-l.76)

-.25
(-.68)

-.05
(~l.60)

.84*
(1.93)

1.87*10‘8
(1.42)

.46*
(1.71)

1.14”
(2.47)

.99***
(5.20)

.44**
(256)

l.l4**
(2.13)

-.79**
(-2.23)

-.65
(-l.35)

-.73
(-l.46)

No involvement
to high-level

—5.84***
(-4.99)

-.33
(-l.31)

.18
(.368)

-.12**
(-2.09)

2.18***
(2.73)

5.27*10'3***
(2.74)

.65
(1.48)

.88
(1.37)

150*“
(5.69)

.19
(.76)

2.56***
(3.74)

-.38
(-.78)

-2.15**
(-2.l9)

- l .46*
(-l.92)

N=356 f(26)=140.94(.0000)
LL = -298. 79 Pseudo R2=.19

 

N=3I5 f(26)=123.53(.0000)
LL = -256.69 Pseudo R2=.19

 

NOTE: The dependent variable is the level of U.S. third-party involvement in an interstate crisis.
Models estimated in Stata 5.0. T-ratios in parentheses.

***p<.01
**p<.05
*p<.10

174

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The ‘end of history’ as Francis F ukuyama (1992) imaginatively put it has not yet
emerged. Despite the tremendous growth in democratic regimes, conﬂicts continue to
percolate in many parts of the world; at least 90 by one count since the collapse of the
Soviet empire (see Jentleson, 1997). While the end of the Cold War has meant many
things, it has not as Bruce Jentleson (1997: 39) writes “meant the end of war...U.S.
military forces have been actively deployed more times to more places thus far in the
19903 than in any comparable length of time during the Cold War.” In 1996 alone, the
United States had approximately 30,000 peace-keeping troops in at least six different
countries around the world (The Economist, November 23, 1996).

Political and economic involvement has further helped resolve emerging conﬂicts
in regions such as Central and South America, the Middle East, East Asia, and the
Mediterranean. Indeed, given the increasing importance of conﬂict resolution, former
Secretary of State Warren Christopher even urged that a new diplomacy is needed “that
can anticipate and prevent crises...rather than simply manage them” (quoted in Jentleson,
1997: 57). This would presumably bode well for the emergence of an international system
free of interstate conﬂict. Certainly, research by Greg Raymond (1994) and Jacob

Bercovitch (1991, 1996) has already demonstrated that democracies show a propensity to

175

resolve their quarrels without the use of force. Strategies such as mediation and juridical
arbitration are prevalent policy choices, and ones that effectively avoid other more
belligerent possibilities. Conceivably then, if the growth of democracy continues
unabated, such conﬂict resolution strategies may well come to constitute the primary
responsibility of great power foreign policies in the foreseeable future.

Yet, at the same time that the U.S. has appeared ready and willing to intervene in
crises abroad, those in positions of power have been selective about the conﬂicts to
engage. The Balkans, for example, have received considerable attention while the crisis in
East Africa between Ethiopia and Eritrea has generated only a token response from the
Clinton administration. The why question that logically follows this example is a primary
concern of this dissertation.

Despite the pervasive role third parties play in the resolution of interstate crises,
little attention has been devoted to comprehensively accounting for when such states
intervene and the consequences they have on the conﬂicts themselves. While the major
power states, the United States in particular, appear ready at times to assist in conﬂict
resolution, we know little about the decision-making of these intervening states. Surely,
there is a need to understand the conditions that lead great powers to play an active role in
preventing dispute escalation.

Furthermore, if leaders base their foreign policy decisions in part on the likelihood
of great power intervention, then conﬂict initiation and escalation cannot accurately be
modeled without incorporating the potential third-party participant. Certainly the leaders
of Ecuador and Peru, Presidents Alberto Fujimori and Jamil Majuad, agreed to resume

peace negotiations as a result of pressure put on the two countries by the United States, as

176

well as by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. So, not only can third parties have a potential
impact on the policy choices of leaders in crisis, but such interventions may also serve to
alter the preference proﬁles of these governments as well.

Research on third parties should additionally help reﬁne our understanding of
U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Crisis bargaining, for example, presents only one
type of foreign policy problem that decision-makers must confront. To understand more
broadly the choices made by foreign policy elites, attention needs to be devoted to the

important factors entering into different decision rules.

The Politics of Conﬂict Resolution

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of U.S. third-party intervention into
ongoing interstate conﬂicts. I assert that systemic threat, domestic-political opposition,
and crisis saliency all enter into the decision calculus of a president when considering the
deployment of political, economic, or military resources to help prevent the escalation of
a crisis situation. It is the international climate that essentially provides the opportunity
for active intervention. However, domestic conditions together with the saliency of the
crisis both help determine an administration’s willingness to become involved.

The empirical evidence I ﬁnd strongly demonstrates that all three components of
my theoretical model play a role in U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Not only is U.S.
third-party intervention behavior associated with broad systemic-level changes. But,
geographic salience and domestic-political conditions also are related to these types of
resource commitments abroad. Furthermore, the evidence here provides further support

for the importance of regime type in U.S. decision-making. In both the interwar and post-

177

World War II periods, democratic governments involved in crisis situations were much
more likely to receive U.S. aid than non-democratic regimes.

In Chapter One, I discuss the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decision-
making. I argue, contrary to neo-realist structural theories, that domestic politics plays an
important role in international affairs. Indeed, I suggest that not only must societal-level
concerns be incorporated to effectively model the complexity of interstate affairs, but it is
also clear that foreign policy decisions necessarily have an impact on the domestic
setting, such as by upsetting trade ties, discouraging investment, or raising the prices of
certain goods and services. Consequently, a president will be compelled to monitor these
sorts of domestic-level extemalities.

Yet, as a number of other scholars have insisted (for example, Putnam, 1989;
Martin and Simmons, 1998), we need to not only understand whether domestic interests
play a role in state decision-making, but we also need to know how such domestic
interests affect policy choices. For example, diversionary theories maintain that
democratic political processes incite belligerent foreign policy initiatives. To avoid
electoral or policy defeat, many scholars insist that leaders are willing to instigate
interstate disputes to induce a rally-around-the-ﬂag effect. Others, however, suggest that
democratic decision processes dissuade executives from engaging in foreign policy
adventures. The institutional constraints placed on presidential decision-making--for
instance the need to put together a coalition to ensure policy success, public
accountability, and media oversight--all confer caution in foreign policy decision-making.

In this dissertation, then, both theoretical arguments are tested against the ICB data.

178

To be sure, though, the systemic environment and strategic interests must also
concern incumbent administrations. Consequently, only a multi-level model of
international behavior that incorporates both structural and liberal variables will
successfully explain foreign policy decision-making. In Chapter Two, then, I also
emphasize that U.S. third-party intervention policy cannot adequately be understood
without attention given to systemic structure and the unique characteristics of the crises
themselves. Drawing on the work of Regan (1998) and Fordham (1998) I surmise that as
threat increases, a president should increasingly turn to foreign policy to protect
American interests abroad. Given that U.S. interests are closely linked to a stable
international order, executives should actively attempt to prevent crises from becoming
full-scale conﬂagrations.

Yet, even under high threat conditions, not all crises will receive U.S. attention.
Surely, some conﬂict situations are more salient to U.S. interests than others. For
instance, many disagreed on the importance of the Bosnian situation and the necessity of
a U.S. troop deployment to the region. Few, however, would disagree that preventing the
escalation of the Egyptian-Israeli skirmish in 1948 was in America’s interests.

The remaining three chapters empirically test the hypotheses delineated in
Chapter Two. For example, in Chapter Four an event-count model is used to test the
relationship between systemic threat, domestic opposition, and third-party intervention.
Chapter Five then extends the analysis by incorporating crisis saliency on the right-hand-
side of a logistic equation. The dependent variable in this chapter collapses all
interventions into a dichotomous measure of conﬂict intervention or no intervention. In

the ﬁnal empirical chapter, the level of U.S. involvement is examined by expanding the

179

 

dependent variable. This trichotomous variable separates interventions into low-level
anlitical and economic) and high-level (military). A multinomial logistic model is then
used to assess the inﬂuences of the right-hand-side variables on low-level versus military

interventions.

Conﬂict Resolution in a Dynamic International Environment

In Chapter Two, I argue that systemic conditions should play an important role in
presidential foreign policy decision-making. Speciﬁcally, as threat increases the U.S. will
tend to become more active in international affairs. Conﬂict resolution is an integral
aspect of this foreign policy activism. While the results from the Poisson regression must
be interpreted with some caution, third-party intervention does appear to have increased
signiﬁcantly from the more isolationist interwar period to the tense Cold War
environment. An analogous change occurred after 1989 and the collapse of Eastern
Europe. From 1989 through 1994 the incidence of U.S. conﬂict-resolution attempts
decreased considerably. Presumably, the end of the Cold War, the focus on domestic
priorities, and the beginnings of Russian democracy have all played a role in convincing
many that scarce resources should be spent domestically, rather than abroad. Many
Americans also began to question the continued need for the U.S. to act as an
international policeman; preventing conﬂicts from escalating as well as punishing states
when they did.

Admittedly, this conclusion ﬂies in the face of Jentleson’s (1997) evidence related
to U.S. foreign policy activism after the Cold War. Given the prevalence of intrastate

conﬂict in the 19905, however, it is entirely possible that my conclusions here regarding

180

interstate conﬂict remain valid. Albeit, with the event-count model it is difﬁcult to know
whether U.S. willingness declined or whether interstate conﬂict opportunities have
become less prevalent in the post-Cold War world. There certainly is some evidence to
suggest that the latter may be the case. Conﬂicts have tended to be internal, rather than
external, conﬂagrations.

Chapters Five and Six continue to demonstrate the importance of systemic factors
in the decision to intervene. The logistic analysis in Chapter Five provides evidence that
the U.S. reacts to the level of systemic threat. Increases in military expenditures tend to
increase the likelihood of third-party interventions. Given that the variable is lagged, such
increases in the defense budget seemingly indicate a dissatisfaction with U.S. security,
and a more activist foreign policy is the consequence. Administrations further show a
marked propensity to involve the U.S. in crises that include major world powers, while
minor-power crises are less likely to receive U.S. attention.

Chapter Six interestingly demonstrates that systemic conditions are particularly
inﬂuential when it comes to the commitment of military resources abroad. While playing
a role in low-level interventions, high-level interventions, such as those that involve U.S.

troop deployments are strongly related to systemic threat.

Domestic Demands and Conﬂict Interventions

The evidence presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six also demonstrates that
domestic—political demands play a role in presidential decision-making related to conﬂict
resolution. In Chapter Four, for instance, I ﬁnd the economic growth rate to be

statistically signiﬁcant and negatively related to U.S. third-party interventions. Off-

181

presidential year elections similarly show a signiﬁcant and negative relationship with
intervention. Further evidence also, though only marginally, indicates that a partisan
effect may exist. Democrat administrations demonstrate a greater propensity to intervene
than their Republican counterparts, and political opposition within Congress tends to
prevent conﬂict-resolution attempts. The latter variable, admittedly, is statistically
signiﬁcant at only a p-level of .17.

Interestingly, three of the four domestic-political variables have a constraining
effect on third-party interventions. Rather than inciting presidential attention to
international events, domestic conditions appear to discourage foreign policy initiatives.
Only economic growth shows a relationship that potentially supports a diversionary view
of foreign policy. As economic conditions deteriorate, presidents may be intervening in
these salient interstate events to divert Americans’ attention from their pocket book woes.
However, the relationship may also indicate strategic behavior on the part of the primary
crisis actors. Believing that the U.S. may intervene, foreign state leaders may time their
dispute initiations when domestic-political conditions inside the U.S. will focus executive
attention on internal affairs.

Chapter Five further shows third-party interventions to be unrelated to electoral or
public approval forces. Not only is approval for a president insigniﬁcant, but neither
election years nor the honeymoon period appear to increase the propensity to intervene
abroad. Furthermore, political opposition on Capitol Hill is signiﬁcant (p <.10) and
negatively associated with third-party crisis involvement. This result indicates that
presidents are less likely to intervene as a third-party in ongoing crises when the

opposition party controls one or both houses of Congress. Presumably, presidents are

182

concerned about risky foreign policy ventures being used against the administration or
fellow partisans on the Hill in future elections.

In Chapter Six, 1 ﬁnd that such domestic opposition plays a stronger role in low-
level interventions than high-level ones. Such a difference may indicate that high-level
crises are salient enough to overcome partisan opposition to foreign policy initiatives.
However, it may also be the case that the lack of variation in the dependent variable is
hiding what could eventually be found to be a signiﬁcant relationship. Indeed, while
divided government is insigniﬁcant at a .05 level, the point estimate is similar to its low-
level intervention value and the relationship is in the same direction.

I also ﬁnd in Chapters Five and Six that war involvement tends to play a role in
third-party interventions. However, the relationship is opposite what might be expected;
war involvement tends to increase the propensity to intervene as a third-party in ongoing
crisis situations. Most likely, both primary actor engagement and third-party conﬂict-
resolution attempts are part of a larger foreign policy agenda that involves protecting U.S.
interests abroad. Executive attention in one arena of foreign policy may spur increased

attention to other festering problems abroad as well.

The Importance of Crisis Saliency

Given the importance of crisis saliency to U.S. intervention policy, the event-
count model may be inadequate for evaluating foreign policy decision—making. That is, if
meaningful explanatory variables cannot be included in the estimation, then perhaps the
Poisson model is underspeciﬁed resulting in inconsistent coefﬁcients. Figure 15

demonstrates that the propensity to intervene varies signiﬁcantly within any given year.

183

For instance, in 1971 a border crisis emerged between Sudan and Egypt. The U.S.
contributed semi-military aid to help prevent its escalation. That same year, however, a
crisis between Cambodia and Thailand erupted, as well. This time the U.S. refused to
intervene with even low-level aid. So, not only is the assumption of invariance across
time potentially invalid. But, this invariance is directly tied to salience and consequently
can be addressed via right-hand-side variables in the logistic model.

Indeed, we see that the precise characteristics of the crises signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the decision to intervene. Easily the most important of these characteristics is a Soviet
presence. As the level of involvement by the USSR. expands, the likelihood of the U.S.
intervening tends to increase substantially. Not surprisingly, this result is conﬁned to the
post-World War 11 period, although a positive (though not signiﬁcant) association is
present during the interwar years as well. However, during the Cold War the odds of U.S.
third-party involvement in crises are 5 times greater if the Soviets have also intervened.

The probability of intervention is interestingly reduced by the presence of nuclear-
capable states. U.S. administrations appear to avoid regional crises that involve a nuclear
issue. Further support for this conjecture is found in Chapter Six. The presence of
nuclear-capable states tends to have a larger effect on high-level interventions than low-
level ones. That is, the size of the coefﬁcient is two times greater for high-level
interventions, similarly suggesting that the U.S. is unwilling to contribute military
resources to conﬂicts that are unlikely to be resolved in the near-term.

The U.S. also appears prepared to support its democratic allies. While crises
involving at least one state with an entente or defense pact with the U.S. are marginally

more likely to receive U.S. aid, when the ally possesses a democratic regime U.S.

184

l mu- ins—Ii

 

fl

 

attention is nearly certain. In fact, regime type alone is statistically signiﬁcant in both the
interwar and Cold War periods, indicating that for the U.S. at least, the governmental
structure of states in crisis appears to have an invariant inﬂuence on foreign policy
decision-making. That is, peace-making initiatives are much more likely to be undertaken
by the United States when democratic regimes, rather than non-democratic ones, are
engaged in crisis situations.

Interestingly, though, the commitment of resources to our allies for conﬂict
resolution appears to have a limit. While willing to contribute political and economic
support, there appears to be no signiﬁcant relationship between high-level interventions
and democratic allies. It may be, however, that America’s democratic friends possess the
political and military capabilities to settle their own quarrels without the presence of U.S.
troops and personnel.

Geographic location is an additional component in an administration’s decision to
intervene abroad. The U.S. shows a systematic proclivity to help solve crises in its own
backyard. Crises within Central and South America are much more likely to receive U.S.
aid then crises that emerge in Africa. The evidence in Chapter Six shows this relationship
to be even more strongly supported for high-level interventions. The likelihood of a
military intervention is signiﬁcantly higher for Western Hemisphere quarrels than other
regions. In fact, burgeoning interstate quarrels in Africa on average receive U.S.
assistance less than half the time. Ultimately, the independent effect of the African region
is to decrease the likelihood of U.S. third-party involvement. Admittedly, when one

examines the multinomial results, the regional dummy for Africa is insigniﬁcant for high-

185

level interventions. However, this is most likely a consequence of insufﬁcient variance in

the right-hand-side dummy variable.

Future Research Possibilities: The Effects of Third Parties

Third parties continue to be under studied by international relations scholars. Yet,
their effects on conﬂict escalation and conﬂict alleviation may be profound. This
dissertation has provided some initial evidence for the systemic, domestic, and crisis-
speciﬁc factors that enter into the decision by a U.S. administration to intervene as a
peace-maker. Of course, many research avenues remain unexplored. For example, there is
little empirical evidence linking third parties to successful conﬂict resolution, although
some preliminary research by Duyvesteyn (1996) suggests that interstate conﬂicts that
involve military interventions may be both longer and more costly in terms of battleﬁeld
deaths than conﬂicts that do not involve third parties. These results are anomalous and
directly contradict the stated goal of many third-party interventions.

Duyvesteyn’s results, though, only beg for further analysis. Are third parties
intervening in disputes that are unlikely to be resolved in the ﬁrst place? That is, do the
great powers come riding in only aﬁer conﬂicts threaten to affect their interests, through
resource destruction, trade interruption, or spatial contagion? Such questions need to be
answered to get a handle on the effectiveness of, and continued reliance on, third-party
interventions.

Duyvesteyn’s research furthermore only addressed high-level third-party

interventions. However, we know that states have other tools to affect policy change. It

186

would certainly be interesting to know whether Duyvesteyn’s results regarding high-level
interventions are also supported for political mediation efforts, as well.

Attention must also be given to the role of issues in interstate conﬂict and third-
party interventions. If the underlying issues in conﬂict between two or more states affects
the likelihood of military force being used, such issues may additionally contribute to the
intervention of third parties. Might troublesome territorial questions be avoided by third
parties, concerned that the quarrel will require a considerable resource commitment?
Might issue type be confounding Duyvesteyn’s results regarding third parties and the
severity of interstate conﬂict?

In conclusion, then, neutral third-party interventions into interstate disputes are
relatively common actions taken by the great powers in the 20th century. The U.S., in
particular, has seemingly played an instrumental role in helping to resolve many incipient
crisis situations. Yet, clearly much more work needs to be done before any deﬁnitive
conclusions can be reached regarding the determinants of third-party decision-making
and the effects these interventions have on the conﬂicts themselves. Such additional
research is necessary, though, if scholars hope to meaningfully model the complexity of

interstate conﬂict.

187

 

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188

APPENDIX A

TABLE 29: Chapter Four Correlation Table

Elec. GNP Seats SuEr WWII Viet. Cold

Election 1.00
GNP -. 13 1.00
Senate Seats .13 .25 1.00
Super-Power -.01 .03 -.35 1.00
World War II -.08 .40 .31 -.40 1.00
Post-Vietnam War -.01 -.04 -.20 .47 -. 19 1.00
Post-Cold War .05 -.05 -. l 8 .23 -.09 .49 1.00

189

lyre-$332:

APPENDIX B

 

4U

 

Std. Dev = 2.09
Mean = 2.7
N = 77.00

 

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0

Third-Party Interventions

FIGURE 16: Histogram of Event-Count Model Dependent Variable

190

 

 

 

 

 

  
   

   

 
  
  
  

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191

TABLE 31: Mean Values for Exogenous Variables, 1918-1994

APPENDIX D

 

Variable

Divided Government

Off-Presidential Year Election

GNP Growth Rate
Senate Seats
Unemployment Ratea
Super-Power
U.S. Military Expenditures
System Level
War Involvement
Soviet Involvementb
Ally*Democracy
Americas
Africa
Europe

Nuclear Power

NOTE: N=359.
aN = 315.
bN = 356.

Mean
1.84

.18

2.70

54.15

7.25

.67

4798812

1.49

.19

1.72

1.65

.11

Standard Deviation

192

.91
.38
5.61
10.16
4.26
.47

1.39"‘107

Minimum

-4.49"‘107

Maximum

21.7
1
4.61*107
4

1

in

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

193

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aldrich, John. “Power and Order in Congress.” 1991. In Morris P. Fiorina and David. W.
Rohde, eds., Homestyle and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics.
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