THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: EVALUATING THE DETERMINANTS OF AMERICAN THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS, 1918-1994

By

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ABSTRACT

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Research indicates that the settlement of democratic disputes frequently relies upon neutral third-party states. Indeed, some scholars suggest that the pacific effects of liberal regimes are not so much a function of their ability to avoid conflict, but rather their capacity to resolve conflicts short of armed hostilities (Raymond, 1994; Bremer, 1993). It is not clear, however, what conditions lead certain states to take on a role as a third-party diplomat. Given that in the post-Cold War world the United States and other great powers have been frequently called upon to provide regional stability by preventing the escalation of burgeoning interstate disputes, it seems prudent to systematically account for these attempts at conflict resolution. U.S. involvement in the Ecuador-Peru border conflict, for instance, helped facilitate the recent peace agreement. Similarly, U.S. intervention in the Bosnian crisis was instrumental in crafting the Dayton Peace Accord. If attempts at conflict resolution are coming to occupy a more prominent position in the foreign policies of the major powers, then there is a need to understand when and how such intervention has been used in the past. Likewise, if the intervention of neutral third-party states can substantially alter the dynamics of a bilateral struggle, then to fully understand the causes and consequences of interstate conflict we need to have some understanding of the role played by third parties.

In this study, I develop a modified realist model of neutral U.S. third-party interventions in ongoing interstate crises. I assert that systemic threat, domestic political opposition, and crisis saliency all enter into the decision calculus of a president when considering whether to help manage burgeoning conflicts abroad. Both salience and threat are purported here to encourage conflict resolution attempts by a U.S. president. That is, as national security looms larger in the minds of foreign policy decision makers, the U.S. should increasingly seek to protect its interests abroad through active international involvement. Domestic-political opposition, however, is asserted here to deter executives from contributing political, economic, or military aid to states in conflict. As domestic-political opposition increases, presidents should be increasingly unlikely to initiate potentially costly foreign policy endeavors. I test these theoretical propositions on a set of 356 interstate crises coded by the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) dataset. Logistic and Poisson regression, plus time series analyses are used to evaluate the influence systemic threat, domestic constraints, and crisis saliency all have on the foreign policy decisions of a president.

The empirical evidence I find strongly demonstrates that all three components of the theoretical model play a role in U.S. conflict resolution attempts. Not only is U.S. third-party intervention behavior associated with broad systemic-level changes. But, geographic salience and domestic-political conditions also are related to interstate conflict resolution efforts abroad. First, I find that increases in systemic threat tend to increase attempts at conflict resolution, particularly when the intervention decision involves the commitment of military troops or personnel. Second, the results show both Soviet involvement and geographic location to influence U.S. intervention decisions. Not

surprisingly, the propensity to intervene is positively related to Soviet involvement. What's more, the U.S. appears notably more willing to intervene in conflicts close to home, with crises in Central and South America receiving considerable American attention, while conflicts in the African region are only infrequently addressed. The empirical evidence also shows congressional opposition to moderate conflict resolution attempts while domestic economic conditions seem to incite U.S. peace-making endeavors. These results demonstrate the sometimes contradictory pull of domestic-political forces on presidential foreign policy decision-making. Finally, the evidence here provides further support for the importance of regime type in U.S. foreign policy decision-making. In both the interwar and post-World War II periods, democratic governments involved in crisis situations were much more likely to receive U.S. aid than states with authoritarian regimes.

To the memory of my Grandfathers
Their pursuit of knowledge served as an inspiration

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The core theme of this dissertation has its genesis in a research design proposal written for Gretchen Hower's international relations course at Michigan State University. The fundamental concern driving that proposal was conflict resolution. Simply put, I wanted to understand how states resolve their conflicts of interest, and as Jacob Bercovitch writes, third-party involvement is "both an obvious and ingenious way of managing, or dealing with, conflict." At the same time, however, I have been continually interested in the foreign policy decision-making of nation-states: why certain decisions are taken rather than others. This dissertation is an attempt to provide insight into both research areas.

Many people have contributed in a variety of ways to the writing of this dissertation. First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee members: Scott Gates, Dave Rohde, Tom Hammond, and Jim Granato. The advice, guidance, and support given by each of these scholars has been inimitable. I must admit, though, that I did not willfully intend my committee to span such a diverse range of research areas in political science. Fortunately, this meant each member of my committee brought a unique perspective to bear on my work which in the end certainly made this project a learning experience, despite the minor difficulties it created when it came to satisfying demands.

Scott Gates deserves much praise. Although Scott's departmental responsibilities were substantial, and his trips to Norway frequent, he consistently found the time to

review my work and offer insights into how it could be improved. Scott is a good friend who has never hesitated to voice his opinion or point out my bad ideas before I have invested too much time in them.

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Tom Hammond has also had an important influence on me. Not only did Tom diligently read through all the material I placed in his box, but from the very beginning of our collaborative work he always impressed upon me the importance of the larger theoretical picture. I am also convinced that he is the only faculty member to read draft dissertation chapters before breakfast or morning coffee. I must also thank Jim Granato who, despite having misplaced loyalties to Chicago sports teams, always had time for a methods question.

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Charles Finocchiaro, Mark Hurwitz, Matt Kleiman, Dave Lektzian, Bryan Marshall, Sara Mitchell, Roger Moiles, Mark Souva, and Chris Sprecher. At one time or another each had a helpful insight or word of encouragement for which I remain grateful. Special thanks go to Sara for her advice as both a scholar and a friend. My first academic publication was a collaborative effort with Sara for which I always will be thankful. Special thanks also go to Bryan for being a great friend. Although a student of the U.S. Congress, Bryan always was willing to read drafts of my work. With five collaborative efforts already under our belts, I only expect more in the future.

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Finally, I would like thank my family, especially my loving wife. Each has provided inspiration and support in their own unique way. However, my wife, a southern California native, left the sunshine behind to join me here in Michigan. I cannot thank her enough for the sacrifices she has made throughout the time we have been here. Her love, support, and patience truly kept me sane.

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INTRODUCTION

> *The existence of broad national agreement on matters of foreign policy, the fluidity of the parties, and the strong position of the president enable one to say that any crucial problem of foreign policy will be acted upon in terms that the president himself sets (Waltz, 1967: 118-119).*
>
> *Almost all the natural defects of democracies are to the fore in the conduct of foreign affairs, whereas its good qualities are hardly to be seen (Tocqueville, 1988 [1848]: 226)*

The United States in a New International Environment

Events in the late 1980s and early 1990s dramatically transformed the international environment. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, for example, was followed with breath-taking speed by a failed military coup in August of 1991 in Moscow that eventually led to the dismantling of the Soviet regime. In the midst of these two profound incidents, a multinational military force comprised of over 20 sovereign states was assembled that successfully checked Iraqi aggression in the Middle East. Such events led President George Bush to declare the emergence of a "new world order"; a world characterized by the deterrence of aggression and the *peaceful* settlement of interstate disputes (*The Economist*, February 23, 1991).[1]

[1] Interesting, the transformation of the international system has generated other dilemmas that Cold War security structures have been ineffective at resolving (Rotfeld, 1997: 14). Indeed, the Cold War's demise was partly responsible for liberating pent-up rivalries between ethnic groups, as well as contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both of which the international community has been slow to

The systemic changes, in addition, have reduced tensions between the major powers.[2] According to one recent survey, "one of the new order's basic defining characteristics is the relationship between the major powers and the fact that none of them is currently preparing for conflict with another" (Rotfeld, 1997: 4). As a result, the role of military power in interstate affairs has unequivocally waned in importance (Luttwak, 1990).[3] Post-Cold War cooperation between Russia and the United States has also reinforced the importance of regime type (i.e., the values that tend to direct government policy) in helping to facilitate understanding, and reduce uncertainty, among state leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Partell, 1997). As two of the most important world powers, their willingness to sustain a dialogue on international security has helped manage emerging conflicts of interest between these two nations, as well as those emerging between other states.[4]

However, at the same time as these systemic changes have made interstate conflict prevention and resolution increasingly possible, the important global players have tended to focus predominately on domestic concerns. Indeed, many of the major

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address. John Mearsheimer (1990) even suggested that the United States may look back fondly on the stability of the Cold War, as a multipolar environment characterized by turbulence and transition begins to emerge (see also Waltz, 1964, 1993; and Layne, 1993).

[2] Les Aspin, former secretary of defense, summarized the vagaries of the post-Cold War world as a member of Congress: "In the old world there was only one thing that posed a threat. It was the Soviet Union. In the new world, there will be diverse threats. In the old world, the very survival of our nation was at stake. In the new world, the interests of our nation will be at risk. In the old world, we knew what threatened us. In the new world, we will have to learn what threatens us..." (quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996: 88).

[3] For the major powers, national security and the Cold War threat no longer dominate the foreign policy agenda. Indeed, the deterrent use of force has become less relevant as an instrument of policy. As Keohane and Nye (1996: 243) suggested, "foreign affairs agendas--that is, sets of issues relevant to foreign policy with which governments are concerned--have become larger and more diverse. [Therefore], no longer can all issues be subordinated to military security."

powers seem loathe to commit their country's resources to, in the words of one scholar, "export democracy abroad."[5] The Clinton administration, for instance, despite the systemic changes, or perhaps because of them, was convinced that its mandate was confined to internal affairs and initially downgraded the importance of foreign policy issues. Admittedly, with polls revealing that Americans are unwilling to sustain a unilateral and activist approach to foreign affairs and external threats to security nearly nonexistent, any administration would find it difficult to galvanize core domestic groups for a vigorous foreign policy agenda.[6] Seemingly as a consequence, the Clinton administration initially avoided security issues, focusing instead on questions of economic interdependence, such as NAFTA, the APEC summit, and most-favored nation trade status with China.[7]

What's more, in the U.S. at least, the general public continues to hold disparate views as to what should prompt the commitment of resources abroad. According to Brooks and Kanter (1994: 22-23), the variation in viewpoints virtually spans the possible options executives have available. Many neo-isolationists maintain that there are few external threats to our interests serious enough to justify costly foreign policy initiatives

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[4] According to former National Security Council member Arnold Kanter (1994: 136), Russia remains a prominent threat to our national security. However, "it is a national security [threat] for which our traditional foreign policy instruments, particularly military capabilities, are virtually irrelevant."

[5] See Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992. Muravchik maintains that the promotion of democracy abroad should be an important component of American foreign policy.

[6] According to the *Strategic Survey 1996/97*, conflict in the post-Cold War era has tended to be regional or internal in character, and has thus failed to arouse the interests of the great powers.

[7] According to *The Economist* (November 23, 1996: 24), the Clinton administration's focus on economic interests led it to "advance the Commerce Department at the expense of the State Department--and to allow trade-dispute brinkmanship to endanger carefully balanced security relations." To be fair, though, the importance of geoeconomics was certainly evident in the Bush administration. His ill-fated trip to Japan was largely organized by the Commerce Department and had everything to do with American jobs (Kanter, 1994).

such as military interventions. Others, though, would use U.S. resources for narrowly confined issues, such as protecting American jobs. Still, on the other side of ideological spectrum, according to Brooks and Kanter (1994: 23) we can find those who insist "that we should intervene to promote American values of democracy and human rights, as well as to relieve suffering and prevent "ethnic cleansing," even if there is no direct security impact on the United States." Such ideological diversity regarding U.S. foreign policy often constrains a president's leeway to act decisively in international affairs. Yet at the same time, administrations are also provided the opportunity to shape public opinion and consequently generate the domestic and international coalitions necessary for foreign policy initiatives.[8]

Testing the Determinants of U.S. Conflict-Resolution Attempts

In this dissertation, I directly address the determinants of U.S. foreign policy activism, concentrating specifically on conflict-resolution endeavors. That is, I examine the factors which lead a president to intervene as a neutral third party into interstate crisis situations.[9] Presumably, discerning the conditions that lead a U.S. president to commit resources to help prevent an impending attack on another state is a worthwhile empirical exercise. As such, I offer a theoretical model and empirical test of the circumstances, both domestic and systemic, that lead U.S. presidents to intervene abroad. I argue that systemic threat, domestic-political opposition, and crisis saliency all enter into the

[8] Rosenau (1981: 42) averred that "changes in foreign policy are most likely to occur when developments at home give rise to new needs and wants with respect to their environment, or when developments abroad give rise to potential threats to their essential structures" (also see Rosati, et al., 1994).

[9] Neutrality refers to the intentions of the third-party intervening state. According to the coding rules established by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 849), third-party states are disinterested parties concerned

decision calculus of executives when calculating the costs and benefits of third-party intervention.

Analytically speaking, scholars should not dismiss the important role played by third-party actors. Indeed, the decision-making of third-party states has meaningful implications for many well-researched aspects of international politics. For one, there are distinct differences between conflict initiators and conflict joiners (Gochman, 1996). Pairing every state on one side with every other state on the other regardless of when or how they entered a conflict may tend to mask some important relationships. Second, research on alliance-behavior has generally failed to account for the decision-making of a state faced with a choice of whether or not to honor a deterrent pledge. However, research on such decision-making can seemingly shed some light on the reliability of democratic alliance commitments. Lastly, empirical research indicates that the settlement of democratic disputes frequently relies upon neutral third-party states. Yet, it is not clear what conditions lead certain states to take on the role of a third-party diplomat. And, equally important, little evidence exists for determining the success of these conflict-resolution efforts.

Fundamental questions in international politics cannot be fully understood without considering the role of third parties. Given that in the post-Cold War world the United States and other great powers have been frequently called upon to provide regional stability by preventing the escalation of burgeoning interstate disputes, it seems prudent to systematically account for these attempts at conflict resolution. U.S.

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only with facilitating the termination of the interstate dispute. Non-neutral third parties are states that join interstate conflicts on one side or the other.

involvement in the Ecuador-Peru border conflict, for instance, helped facilitate the recent peace agreement. Similarly, U.S. intervention in the Bosnian crisis was instrumental in crafting the Dayton Peace Accord. If attempts at conflict resolution are coming to occupy a more prominent position in the foreign policies of the major powers (Snow, 1998), then there is a need to understand when and how such intervention has been used in the past.[10] Likewise, if the intervention of neutral third-party states can substantially alter the dynamics of a bilateral struggle (Huth, 1998; Smith, 1996; Snow, 1998), then to fully understand the causes and consequences of interstate conflict we need to have some understanding of the role played by third parties.

To date, little theoretical or empirical attention has been devoted to understanding third-party conflict resolution. For instance, theories of foreign policy have largely been confined to decisions involving the use of military force. However, as Lindsay, et al. (1992: 6) noted "decisions to use force cover only a fraction of the foreign policy choices available to the president." Hence, to comprehensively explain presidential decision-making in foreign affairs, scholars need to account for cooperative strategies, as well as conflictual ones. Not only may the forces driving conflict-resolution attempts differ from those driving non-neutral or war-joining interventions. But similar to political uses of force, heads of state may find peace-making endeavors useful for rallying public support behind government policies (see Lindsay, et al., 1992).

The actions of third-party states, then, can provide an additional avenue for research on theories of foreign policy decision-making. That is, an understanding of the

[10] For example, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan helped resolve a crisis between Yugoslavia and Italy over Albania in the mid-1920s.

factors that influence the decision to intervene in a burgeoning conflict situation can be useful, if not necessary, for the development of a comprehensive theory of foreign policy decision-making. As such, I intend this research to speak to the ongoing debate between neo-realist scholars who maintain that politics stops (should stop?) at the water's edge and scholars who insist that domestic-political demands have a systematic and meaningful influence on the foreign policy decisions of state leaders. Only by examining the empirical record of foreign policy decision-making can scholars determine whether systemic indicators such as threat and power tend to overwhelm the domestic-political concerns of state leaders. The multi-level model developed in this dissertation tests suppositions drawn from both neo-realist and liberal theories of international politics.[11]

Outline of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, decision-making surrounding neutral U.S. third-party interventions is used as a lens to examine how systemic and domestic forces influence foreign policy decisions. The empirical evidence I find strongly demonstrates that all three components of the theoretical model play a role in U.S. conflict-resolution attempts. Not only is U.S. third-party intervention behavior associated with broad systemic-level changes. But, geographic salience and domestic-political conditions also are related to U.S. interstate conflict-resolution efforts abroad.

In Chapter One, I review previous research on foreign policy decision-making, paying particular attention to work on the diversionary use of force and on the

[11] According to Deborah Gerner (1991: 125), "foreign policy analysis is somewhat unusual in that it deals with both domestic and the international political arenas, jumping from individual to state to systemic

institutional constraints leg of the democratic peace research program. Crucial to this discussion are the theoretical and empirical discrepancies that appear in these two sets of research. I additionally compare and contrast a realist approach to foreign policy decision-making with an approach that incorporates domestic-political demands.

In Chapter Two, I develop a rudimentary decision-theoretic model of executive decision-making that is based on three crucial factors: (1) systemic threat, (2) domestic-political opposition, and (3) crisis saliency. I argue that the decision to intervene as a neutral third-party state is determined by the executive's subjective estimation of these three conditions. From this model, I derive testable hypotheses regarding the influence of both important domestic and international-level forces. I also examine the salience to U.S. security of each specific crisis at hand, a variable which often gets ignored by large-N empirically-oriented scholars.

In Chapter Three, I discuss the data used to empirically test the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter Two. First, I operationalize concepts discussed in this second chapter. Then, I present basic descriptive statistics that highlight important characteristics of both the endogenous and exogenous variables.

In Chapter Four, I present an event-count model of neutral U.S. third-party interventions into interstate crises that attempts to confirm and extend Gowa's 1998 findings on U.S. uses of force. Particular attention is paid to how crisis interventions are affected by both systemic and domestic forces. Plus, temporal dynamics are systematically addressed to prevent biased and inefficient estimation results.

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levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these into a coherent whole." As a result, the study of a state's foreign policy, any state's, presents a formidable challenge, both theoretically and empirically.

In Chapter Five, a multivariate logistic model is explicated that incorporates crisis saliency into the executive decision calculus. A weakness of the event-count approach is that important characteristics of each crisis cannot be controlled for in the empirical model. The logistic analysis is designed in part to incorporate crisis saliency into the estimation and evaluate its relative importance in the decision to intervene. Similar to research on the use of force, such as Ostrom and Job (1986), Morgan and Bickers (1992), and Meernik and Waterman (1996), close attention will be given to the interaction between domestic level variables, systemic structure, and presidential foreign policy choice.

In Chapter Six, a multinomial logit model is introduced that extends the initial logit model by systematically accounting for the level of U.S. involvement. Clearly, some interstate crises receive greater American attention than others. Indeed, diplomatic involvement is often sufficient depending on the nature of the conflict, and the domestic and systemic circumstances in which it evolves. However, to fully understand foreign policy decision-making, attention needs to be given to how commitment and resolve are influenced by both systemic and domestic-level factors. That is, what conditions lead U.S. presidents to spend scarce resources and political capital to help prevent the escalation of disputes abroad?

I conclude in Chapter Seven with a summary of what has been learned and offer suggestions on how this research can be extended in the future.

CHAPTER 1

DOMESTIC-POLITICAL INTERESTS, DIVERSIONARY TACTICS, AND PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

> *Statesmen may be driven to a policy of foreign conflict--if not open war--in order to defend themselves against the onslaught of domestic enemies (Haas and Whiting, 1956: 62).*
>
> *The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and are playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a people's war, not a statesman's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken (Wilson, 1917: 1).*
>
> *[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation (Simmel, 1898: 832).*

There is a need to account for the foreign policy decisions of nation-states. While the realist paradigm remains prominent in international relations, the democratic peace proposition has presented a serious challenge to its preeminent position. Empirical evidence continues to demonstrate that democracies avoid high levels of conflict with one another (Chan, 1984; Bremer, 1992; Russett, 1990; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Gleditsch, 1995; Ray, 1995; Gates and McLaughlin, 1996). Yet, there remains substantial disagreement over what it is about democratic decision processes that leads them to avoid

such hostility, and many scholars admit that large-N dyadic studies cannot provide the answer to such a question (see for example, Singer, 1994).[1]

Interestingly, some scholars suggest that the pacific effects of liberal regimes may not so much be a function of their ability to avoid conflict, but rather their capacity to resolve conflicts short of armed hostilities (Raymond, 1994; Bremer, 1993). For instance, research by Bercovitch (1996), Dixon (1993), and Raymond (1994) indicates that democratic regimes have a higher propensity to resolve their disputes through the use of third-party intermediaries. That is, democracies appear to be more likely than non-democracies to submit to the peace-making attempts of third-party states. Indeed, Raymond (1994: 27) concluded that "disputes between democracies rarely escalate to war because each side expects the other to rely on peaceful means of conflict resolution."

Similarly, Raknerud and Hegre (1997) show that democracies have a tendency to aid other democracies engaged in conflict. Not only may this empirical result help explain the lack of evidence for a monadic-level democratic peace, but it also demonstrates that third-party states may play a crucial role in crisis bargaining.[2] In fact, Smith (1996) has even suggested that the decisions of state leaders to initiate hostilities cannot be fully understood without accounting for the potential third-party participant.

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[1] Critics continue to insist that the lack of war between democratic states is a statistical anomaly that is driven by both the rarity of war and the rarity of democracy, as well as by the arbitrary operationalizations of both concepts. Proponents, however, contend that democratic institutions serve as a signal to other states. They convey a message of trustworthiness. Indeed, Huntley (1996: 58) insisted that, "the most important quality that a republican government brings to [the] table is not a 'peaceful disposition,' but rather a *capability to be trusted*" (quoted in Chan, 1997: 81). Political ideology, then, serves as a simple and effective way of distinguishing ally from adversary (Elman, 1997).

[2] Monadic-level, that is state-centered, conflict behavior may require further empirical research. Most of the evidence collected to date shows democratic regimes to be equally as conflict-prone as non-democratic ones. However, if democracies demonstrate a propensity to aid like regimes in peril, the monadic-level results may be heavily affected by joining behavior.

Given these important findings regarding the effects third parties have on interstate interactions, there clearly is a need to understand the decision calculus of the potential intervening state, rather than merely the actions of the original states in conflict. For instance, why does the U.S. intervene as a third party in certain conflicts but not in others? Such decision-making has rarely been addressed by international relations scholars. Indeed, not only do we know very little about the war-joining behavior of states, but we know even less about the conditions surrounding third-party conflict resolution efforts.[3] Given that the democratic peace proposition is fundamentally a theory of foreign policy, perhaps what is needed is a closer examination of the foreign policy decisions of individual third-party states, and the domestic contexts in which these decisions are made.[4]

Of concern in this dissertation is the third-party decision-making of U.S. presidents. Similar to models of conflict initiation, I insist that peace-making endeavors are influenced by both power-based and domestic-political considerations. Accordingly, I discuss in this first chapter the domestic and systemic demands made on presidents when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. In particular, I focus on how the inclusion of domestic-political concerns can measurably improve our understanding of international politics. I then present two brief illustrations of executive decision-making in foreign affairs that highlight the important interactive role played by democratic political

[3] Considerable research exists on alliance behavior in general, and even more specifically on whether states honor their deterrent obligations (see for example, Walt, 1987; Huth, 1988; Morrow, 1993; Huth and Russett, 1988). However, as Huth (1998: 45) noted, there is little systematic work that accounts for the decision making of third-party states when confronted with an interstate crisis.

[4] Elman (1997: 490) has argued that the United States, more than other democratic states, tends to "identify friends and foes on the basis of regime type." Therefore, it may be wise to examine more closely whether foreign policy decision-making in the U.S. does sustain the democratic peace proposition.

institutions and systemic structure. One includes decision-making within the Clinton administration over the Bosnian crisis. The second involves Eisenhower's actions during the offshore islands crisis in 1954. I then elaborate further on the role played by domestic politics by comparing and contrasting two distinct theories of foreign policy decision-making that propound very different hypotheses. I conclude with a discussion of the modified realist model of presidential decision-making that is explicated in Chapter Two which incorporates domestic, systemic, and crisis-specific factors into the executive's decision calculus.

The Domestic-International Nexus

Foreign policy emanates from the interaction of domestic and system-level forces. In an increasingly interdependent world, U.S. interests are undeniably affected by the decisions of other governing bodies, such as international organizations and nation-state governments. Peterson (1994: 22) concluded that, "If a country is going to be led by statesmen who take into account the long-term interests of the nation, then policy must be rooted in accurate assessments of the international situation, not based on myths or ideological thinking." Certainly, U.S. trade and defense policy, issues of arms control and disarmament, and the politics of environmental regulation necessarily require attention to the preferences of other state actors and the potential spillover effects of uncoordinated decision-making. Yet, as Russett (1990) pointed out, foreigners do not vote, and consequently democratically-elected leaders demonstrate a propensity to conciliate domestic constituencies in spite of the adverse international effects.

Figure 1 illustrates important internal and external forces influencing presidential decision-making in foreign affairs. While most scholars of international politics would acknowledge the validity of a two-level approach to foreign policy, the dominant paradigm has largely tended to ignore important domestic-political structures and their effects on elite decision-making. Indeed, realist explanations of foreign policy behavior consistently affirm the primacy of structural features of the international system, such as the organization of states and the relative diffusion of economic and military capabilities. However, a purely structural approach to international politics fails to provide an adequate explanation for the individual actions of nation-states (Moon, 1991).

Figure 1: Forces Affecting Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Affairs



Realism and the External Environment

Realist thought, or perhaps more accurately neo-realist thought, correctly recognizes the role external forces play in foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, a state's foreign policy is largely designed to secure its political and economic interests in the midst of a potentially dangerous international order. Consequently, democratically elected leaders are charged with the responsibility of placing the national interest ahead of personal electoral fortune. As Huth (1996: 43) wrote, "the resource commitments and attention to the necessities of national security would be expected to override the needs of domestic policy programs or the pressures emanating from the competition with counterelites for maintaining positions of political power."

Realism further asserts a clear hierarchy in the foreign policy goals of a state (see Waltz, 1979). Generally, issues of 'high politics,' such as territorial integrity, take precedent over 'low politics' issues such as trade and immigration. This is because in a self-help environment states must take measures to ensure their own security.[5] Without a supra-national legal authority to guarantee order, disputes between nations are often settled through the strength of arms. Consequently, states must act as "short-term power

[5] Much of the debate surrounding a neo-realist vision of international affairs concerns the polarity of the state system. The classic balance of power, eurocentric view seems to attribute stability to a system with numerous great powers. Such a system is characterized by restrained national behavior as the threat of alliance formation curtails aggressive ambition. The ability of nations to shift alliance commitments under a multipolar system tends to reduce the accumulation of hostilities between states. This is because today's allies may be tomorrow's adversaries and vice versa. Therefore, protracted and intense hostility is simply not in the interest of any state. Waltz (1979), however, challenged this view. He asserted that in a bipolar system the predominant powers focus intensely on each other's actions and react before one's opponent accumulates a preponderance of power. He further assumed that uncertainty tends to increase the likelihood of conflict, and multipolarity, Waltz argued, increases the amount of uncertainty present in the system, while bipolarity reduces it.

maximizers" to defend their political influence within the international system (Mearsheimer, 1995: 82).

An increase in military strength provides one solution to the security dilemma states face. However, such growth in capabilities, even if designed for defensive purposes, creates problems for other members of the international system. For one, it is nearly impossible to, in the words of Art and Jervis (1996: 3), "distinguish between offensive and defensive postures," and so a mistake in perception could cost a state its sovereignty. Two, even if a state presents little threat today, its intentions may change tomorrow (Art and Jervis, 1996). Consequently, the security dilemma that states face makes the threat and use of military force an inevitable aspect of the state system.[6] Given the stakes involved, then, neo-realist scholars, such as Jervis, Grieco, and Mearsheimer, insist that states respond primarily to threats from the international environment, rather than to domestic demands or conditions.

Two problems arise, though, with a realpolitik approach to foreign policy. First, it fails to provide an adequate explanation for individual foreign policy decisions. Structural theories simply cannot account for state-specific actions. Indeed, according to Lake (1976: 539-40), systemic approaches provide an insufficient "conception of process, or an explanation of how the constraints or interests derived from international...structures are transformed into decisions or political strategies within particular countries." Second, and particularly relevant for today's international environment, structural realism does not provide as useful a conceptual framework for issues other than national security

[6] This is to some extent why relations among sovereign states are often described as power politics.

(Keohane, 1986; Ruggie, 1986; Milner, 1997; Rosecrance and Stein, 1993).[7] Holsti (1991: 117) has maintained that while, "realism appropriately points to survival and security as core goals..., it does not tell us about the other values and preferences that can affect the selection of goals, strategies, and tactics."[8] So, despite the fact that Waltz (1979) has forcefully argued that a theory of international interaction does not require a theory of foreign policy (also see Krasner, 1978), his model addresses questions of national security and state survival. But, as Milner (1997: 11) has stated, "most decisions do not directly concern the state's survival." As such, conventional balance of power theories, with their exclusive attention to military capabilities, may not provide a sufficient explanation for the actions states take.[9]

It is also true that a systemic theory of international politics has difficulty explaining structural change.[10] As Vasquez (1993) has noted, realism fails to provide an explanation for periods of peace. Given that scholars have observed that states' experience with war varies dramatically over time (see for example Bremer, 1980), "an

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[7] According to Moon (1991: 188), "realism's success in dealing with politcomilitary interactions among stable and homogeneous developed nations was sufficient in an era dominated by this 'high politics' vision of international relations."

[8] The constructivist critique of neo-realist theory focuses heavily on state preferences, insisting that they are not exogenous to systemic structures, but rather intricately tied to them (see for example Wendt, 1992). Actually, the constructivist critique also has implications for rationalist approaches to world politics. Scholars, such as Alexander Wendt maintain that political structures not only help shape the behavior of maximizing individuals, but they also help shape their preferences as well.

[9] In fact, there are many scholars who insist that realism cannot even adequately account for traditional systemic concepts, such as conflict and stability (see for example Vasquez, 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1971; Mansback and Vasquez, 1981; Krauthammer, 1986). According to Charles Kegley (1993: 134-5), scholars have "warned that realism [is] incomplete, misdirected, nonrigorous, inconsistent with scientific evidence, [and] conceptually confused." Ernst Haas (1956) considered the realist concept of deterrence to be illogical and fallacious. He argued that as a theory it was unable to realize policy aims and harmful because it went against moral law (443). Haas even suggested that realists, such as Morgenthau, advocated a policy of mutual deterrence primarily for ideological reasons, rather than a fundamental understanding of international politics.

[10] Indeed, this is because, as Kegley and Wittkopf (1996: 167) maintain, "changes in the structure of the international system begin with changes in states."

adequate theory," in the words of Vasquez (1993: 89), "should be able to delineate the conditions that promote power politics behavior and non-power politics behavior, and how a system or issue area characterized by one mode of behavior might be transformed to the other."

Foreign policy research, in contrast, tends to eschew the structural approaches of neo-realist scholars.[11] As J. David Singer (1994: 93) has observed, a national or sub-systemic level of analysis provides "richer detail, greater depth, and [a] more intensive portrayal." Echoing a similar sentiment, Hermann (1990) insisted that modifications in a state's foreign policy need to be viewed as a decision process, rather than a deterministic response to environmental conditions. Admittedly, this latter approach tends to provide a somewhat 'messier' description of foreign policy. Yet, this kind of approach also recognizes the importance of both the decision maker and the policy process.[12] This recognition, according to Zakaria (1992: 198), "can be more useful in explaining events, trends, and policies that are too specific to be addressed by a grand theory of international politics."[13]

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[11] It is clear that foreign policy analysis suffers from what Wallace (1976) called 'boundary problems.' Indeed, an understanding of foreign policy, according to White (1989: 7), "requires the analyst not only to know something about interactions *between* states but also something about political processes *within* the state."

[12] According to Snow and Brown (1997: 2), "the substance of policy and the way policy is made are clearly related to one another and [these] processes are undergoing change to adapt to new and dynamic policy requirements." And, Brian White (1989: 2) has insisted "that an understanding of the way in which policy is made is central to an understanding of the substance of foreign policy."

[13] Alexander George (1993: 9) has made a similar argument. He wrote, "Practitioners find it difficult to make use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with action specific models that grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal."

To be sure, structural theories help illuminate broad trends in the international system. Influential modern realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, have been largely responsible for pointing out the need to understand how the organization of the international system and the distribution of capabilities influence and constrain leaders' behavior (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979).[14] However, as Paul Peterson (1994: 17) wrote, realists still tend to insist that "external constraints are so great that it is not necessary to understand the way in which responses to these constraints are chosen." As a result, rather than viewing the structure of the system as one component of state decision- making, neo-realists tend to see systemic structure (e.g., polarity) completely determining state actions.[15]

The Role of Domestic Politics

Despite realist claims that international affairs should be above the popular embrace, politics in fact does not stop at the water's edge. Indeed, foreign policy has always been subject to the push and pull of domestic-political interests. According to Hagan (1993: 2), "foreign policy making is an inherently political process and such

[14] Morgenthau (1973) in fact concluded that arms and alliances are the two most consequential factors contributing to a state's national security.

[15] Admittedly, Morgenthau did acknowledge the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. However, he believed it was a detriment to American diplomacy. He and others, such as George Kennan and Walter Lippman, frequently assailed the poor quality of American foreign policy, which they attributed to the caprice of an ill-informed public (see Kennan, 1982; 1993; Lippman, 1923, 1925). Nincic (1992), though, disagreed. "Contrary to the views of many realists," he wrote, "it might be assumed that the quality of political leadership improves in rough proportion to the rigors of political competition for public support -- something in which democracies plainly have the upper hand" (Nincic, 1992: 12). Furthermore, Americans appear to demonstrate rather pragmatic views with regards to military intervention abroad. Nincic (1992) reported that despite Reagan's tireless attempts to paint Central America as the next Cold War battlefield, the electorate remained united against using troops. In fact, in 1984 74% opposed removing the Sandanista government by force, and in 1987 over two-thirds of Americans opposed foreign military assistance to the Contras. In contrast, the American public has generally supported the defense of our interests in the Middle East.

domestic influences on foreign policy are a cross-nationally pervasive phenomenon." Of course, for issues of trade, the environment, and foreign aid, scholars have long recognized the unambiguous imprint of domestic-political interests. For example, the agricultural and maritime business sectors in the U.S. have long championed the economic side of the foreign aid program. Yet, even issues of national security are plagued by domestic-political forces, and presidents are often compelled to meet public and congressional concerns in foreign policy decisions. For instance, during the height of the Cold War, partisan bickering over America's foreign policy was clearly evident. Eisenhower's missile program was criticized by congressional Democrats, as was Kennedy's failed invasion of Cuba by congressional Republicans. In the 1970s, Nixon's bombing of Cambodia met vehement opposition on Capitol Hill, as did Reagan's Latin America policy in the 1980s. Without an understanding of the domestic battles that rage over foreign policy priorities, models of executive decision-making will fail to explain the actions state leaders take.[16]

According to Morrow (1991: 245), "elections and legislatures are the two essential institutions that characterize a democracy...These institutions channel political pressures on the executive, influencing the choice of policies." In the U.S., for example, an independent legislature sharing powers with the executive creates conflict when

[16] For realists, though, the maximization of a state's overall welfare constitutes the primary objective of the state leader. Notwithstanding the ambiguity inherent in the 'national interest,' the goals of political leaders most certainly include maintaining their own personal positions of power. As former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill liked to remark, 'all politics is local politics,' and even presidents must acknowledge the domestic demands made on the scarce resources an administration has to work with. Furthermore, as Milner has argued (1997: 14), state survival no longer takes priority in U.S. foreign policy, rather "the struggle for internal power and compromise dominates foreign policy making. The executive does not always prevail, as theories based on the unitary actor assumption maintain. Since executives share

differences in the means of policy implementation, or in the ends of policy choice, emerge. Moreover, the different constituencies and electoral time frames of elected officials often lead to separate issues and agendas. Not only does the legislature retain prerogatives in foreign affairs, but members of Congress and the president often possess visibly divergent preferences.[17] Particularly when presidents are facing their second term, according to Thurber (1996: 6), "legislators, are often reluctant to allow their workload and policy agenda to be dictated by a president who has no electoral mandate to do so."[18]

Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994: 596) reached a similar conclusion regarding the measurable effects an independent legislature has on executive decision-making. They asserted that "fire alarm and police patrol oversight and the credible threat of [congressional] sanctions effectively constrain the president's leeway to set policy."[19] Light (1991) has also argued that the most important factor contributing to presidential

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decision-making power with other internal groups, policy choices will differ from a situation of executive dominance."

[17] How preferences are aggregated in Congress may also play an important role in how the two chambers respond to a president. Certainly, the new institutionalist literature insists that legislative rules and structure have an important influence on policy outcomes (see for example, Shepsle, 1979; Rohde and Shepsle, 1987; Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Aldrich, 1991; Hammond and Miller, 1987; Riker, 1980, 1982; Shepsle and Weingast, 1995).

[18] The rise in partisanship has also visibly affected presidential leadership. It not only infuses conflict into the political process making consensus much more difficult to sustain. But, as party leaders have become increasingly important in the legislative arena, presidents are not able to easily dismiss their preferences and hope to succeed on either the House or Senate floor. In fact, presidents can no longer assume that they will have the clear support of congressional leaders when it comes to issues of international affairs. For instance, the resolution authorizing the use of force by President Bush witnessed the leaders of both parties taking opposing positions (Smith, 1994: 129). The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, in contrast, was unanimously supported in the House of Representatives by the members of both parties and met only two dissenting votes in the Senate (Snow and Brown, 1997). In many instances during the 1950s and 1960s, it seems, the similarity of views held by the strong committee chairmen and the presidents they served with helped muster congressional support (Rohde, 1994: 102). However, with party playing an increasingly important role in congressional roll-call voting and the preferences of the median members of both parties growing further apart (Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Rohde, 1991), political competition over foreign policy priorities will seemingly continue to affect presidential decision making.

[19] In the U.S., one only has to look at the Republican led 104th Congress for a vivid example of congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs. When Kofi-Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,

success is congressional party support. It not only forms the foundation of a president's political capital, but it additionally conveys a message of effectiveness to foreign leaders. Consequently, such support is crucial for foreign policy success.

Executive accountability is further provided for by periodic elections. Given that votes in the words of Nincic (1992: 91), "are the major prize sought in democratic political contests," presidents are undeniably concerned with avoiding unpopular policies.[20] If an incumbent president is perceived as having neglected the preferences of his principals during the last four years, a retrospective electorate is capable of sanctioning an executive by voting him out of office (Fiorina, 1981).

In the words of Morrow (1991: 249), then, electoral and congressional constraints tend to motivate "incumbents to perform the wishes of the electorate." Moreover, these institutional structures also help to compel executives to act with caution in foreign affairs. As Nincic (1992: 122) wrote, "When foreign policy violates the limits of what interests, culture, and expectations have defined as acceptable, when its actual or potential costs are too great, or when it flies in the face of the most elementary common sense, it will eventually be pounced upon by the opposition and, sooner or later, denounced by the electorate." So, the need to secure support from domestic groups often circumscribes foreign policy initiatives, and potentially imprudent reactions to international events are frequently eschewed by a necessarily deliberative political process.[21]

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visited Washington in 1996, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recommended that he discuss his plans with chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (*Strategic Survey, 1996/97*: 6).

[20] Clearly, decision makers are sensitive to the preferences of the electorate (see for example, Hughes, 1979; Ginsberg, 1986; Stimson, 1991).

[21] V.O. Key (1961: 45) concluded that American political processes tend to invite delay, thereby arresting the implementation of many policy initiatives.

By ignoring the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics, neo-realist scholars may tend to misstate the determinants of executive choice in international affairs. For example, the 'national interest' is not exogenously determined as realists typically assume, but rather subject to both popular debate and partisan politics.[22] For this very reason, executives must secure domestic support for their foreign policy initiatives or risk undermining their own agenda and possibly U.S. influence abroad. Consequently, only a model that incorporates both international and domestic-level forces can successfully explain foreign policy behavior.

The two anecdotal accounts that follow illustrate U.S. foreign policy decision-making during salient interstate crises. In both instances, the U.S. was a third party, intervening on behalf of one or more sides in the conflict. The record of each crisis indicates that both system structure and domestic opposition interacted to influence U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

Decision-Making During the Clinton and Eisenhower Administrations

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia presented the Clinton administration with a very real and very difficult foreign policy problem. The United Nations strategy of providing protection within safe-areas effectively collapsed after the fall of Srebrenica in July of 1995 (Drew, 1996). After ignoring earlier abuses perpetuated by the Serb forces,

[22] Charles Beard concluded in 1935, "In studying thousands of actors justified by the appellation 'national interest,' I was tempted to conclude that the conception was simply a telling formula which politicians and private interests employed whenever they wished to accomplish any particular designs in the field of foreign affairs." (quoted in Milner, 1998: 772). President Bush in early 1993 was not able to provide a precise definition of the national interest either. He said, military force should be used "where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential cost and sacrifice" (quoted in Jentleson, 1997: 51).

the Clinton administration was increasingly being expected by the international community to help formulate a resolution to this European crisis. Indeed, Clinton had guaranteed in 1993 that the U.S. would at a minimum aid the pulling out of U.N. peacekeeping troops. However, many officials in the administration believed American casualties would be inevitable if this pledge was honored (Drew, 1996: 244).

When it came to the Bosnian crisis, however, the American public was clearly against U.S. involvement. Not only did Americans want to avoid placing U.S. soldiers in harm's way, but many legitimately saw the problem as distinctly European in nature. Similar opposition was evident inside the beltway, as well. The Republican-led Congress was intent on restructuring the State Department and American foreign policy, and was highly critical of the moves already made by the Clinton administration (see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, April 19, 1997: 921). Drew (1996: 245) reported that after NATO air strikes failed and U.N. peace-keepers were captured by Serb forces, the Clinton administration feared that this debacle would be pounced upon by Republicans on the Hill. Indeed, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole had already threatened to bring to the floor a resolution lifting the embargo against the Muslims in response to an earlier suggestion by Clinton that American troops would potentially be needed to help resolve the crisis. The House, in fact, did vote on this resolution, approving it 318-99, despite Clinton's vehement opposition (Drew, 1996: 248).[23]

[23] Lee Hamilton, the former ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee, accounted for the overwhelming vote on lifting the embargo by stating that it was a consequence of a lack of attention by the Clinton administration. "By far, the dominant factor was frustration about Bosnia and the administration's handling of it" (quoted in Drew, 1996: 248).

When the Clinton administration finally determined that American peace-keeping troops would be deployed, it was under a much more confined set of conditions than had previously been disclosed. Many officials credited the new set of guidelines to congressional and public opposition, and the lack of political clout Clinton was fielding at the time (Drew, 1996: 243-255). Admittedly, after further shelling by Serbian forces, the Clinton administration did authorize heavy bombing by NATO planes in late August of 1995. However, it is evident that Clinton's decision calculus during this international crisis included particular attention to domestic consensus and support.

The Bosnian crisis certainly demonstrates that in the post-Cold War era, with the collapse of the Soviet threat, congressional leaders have become increasingly willing to substitute their judgment in foreign affairs for the executive's. The crisis, in addition, indicates that conflict resolution attempts are subject to some of the same forces affecting conflict initiation. Still, opposition to presidential foreign policy initiatives is not limited to the post-Cold War era. Indeed, even during the height of the ideological struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, presidents and top officials expressed concern over public and congressional opposition to foreign policy actions. The crisis over Taiwan in 1954, for example, illustrates similar forces at work in Eisenhower's decision calculus.

Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954

Relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Nationalist China (ROC) deteriorated in August of 1954 as a result of the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), to which Taiwan was being admitted as a member

(Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997). In September of that same year, the PRC bombed the Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and the Nationalists responded a few days later with air strikes against the mainland. President Eisenhower quickly realized the potential threat to U.S. interests in the region if the Communists succeeded in securing the offshore islands and possibly Taiwan itself (Foyle, 1997).

The crisis presented Eisenhower and his Secretary of State with an occasion for decision. Both understood the strategic importance of Quemoy and Matsu for the effective defense of Taiwan. Dulles even believed initially that a forceful reaction from the United States was essential for maintaining America's reputation in the region (Foyle, 1997: 158). Yet, both men were also keenly aware of domestic public opinion. The Korean War was still etched in the minds of many Americans, and polls suggested that the American people were not in favor of a military action to now defend East Asia.

Given the importance attached to the crisis by Eisenhower and Dulles, U.S. involvement was virtually assured in some form or another. However, both men were concerned about congressional and public opposition to a confrontational (possibly military) approach (Foyle, 1997: 160). Particularly Dulles, who believed it unwise to use force without congressional authorization, saw risks involved in asserting presidential leadership during the congressional election season. According to Foyle (197: 156), "Dulles believed public opinion had the ability to undermine or support the government's foreign policies. If disunity reigned, then the U.S. would not have the ability to act decisively, undercutting American leadership."

It appears, then, that both the timing of the crisis and the lack of public or congressional support contributed to Eisenhower's avoidance of military force. A

cautious and less confrontational strategy was deemed necessary to prevent domestic disunity (Foyle, 1997: 164). In fact, according to Foyle (1997: 159), "[Dulles] suggested immediate consultations with the congressional leadership as a matter of 'urgency' to ensure congressional backing." The policy that was eventually reached upon involved submitting the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which effectively avoided a direct military confrontation with the PRC.

Deliberation and decision-making within both the Clinton and Eisenhower administrations involved attention to both U.S. national security interests and domestic public opinion. Particularly Clinton, whose poll numbers were down during the Bosnian crisis, seemed deeply concerned with Republican opposition on Capitol Hill. For Dulles and Eisenhower, domestic support was deemed essential for military engagement. Because such support was not forthcoming, a less belligerent foreign policy action was selected. It seems, then, that foreign policy initiatives that involve significant resource commitments necessitate domestic assent. Indeed, without generating a domestic coalition in support of such initiatives, a president risks foreign policy failure and perhaps electoral sanction.

Diversionary Tactics and Institutional Constraints

While the Bosnian and Taiwan Straits crises show foreign policy elites to be concerned about domestic politics, many liberal scholars continue to disagree on the effects these domestic forces have on foreign policy decision-making.[24] That is, even

[24] Liberal theory can be defined by its concern for the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999: 39) note that liberal theory refers simply to the concept that "state structures matter: the structure of their domestic governments and the values and views of their

among scholars who accept that foreign policy is affected by domestic politics there are disagreements over the extent and direction of that influence.[25] For instance, two prominent theories of foreign policy decision-making offer very different assessments of the role played by domestic-political and economic conditions; see Table 1 for a brief summary. Some scholars argue that leaders, particularly democratically elected ones, often face situations in which they have an incentive to use international affairs for personal or partisan political ends (see for example, Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Stoll, 1984; Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; DeRouen, 1995; Smith, 1996). Given a desire to retain office, leaders are able to influence public opinion by acting decisively on the international stage. Presumably, such actions will not only focus media and public attention away from domestic discontent, but attention to foreign affairs will additionally allow a president to demonstrate competence in governing. Some notable (though arguable) instances of diversionary behavior on the part of American presidents include Johnson's bombing of Hanoi in 1966, Carter's rescue attempt of embassy hostages in Iran in 1980 (Russett, 1990), and Clinton's cruise missile attack against Afghanistan and Sudan prior to the 1998 congressional elections.[26]

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citizens affect their behavior in international affairs." Or as Andrew Moravcsik (1997: 513) writes, "Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments."

[25] The direction of influence has profound normative implications. As Lindsay, et al. wrote (1992: 5), "the defense of imperial presidency rests on the claim that presidents are more rational and more immune to the tide of public opinion than is Congress. The claim of superior presidential decision making crumbles, however, if presidents use foreign policy to serve their own political ends."

[26] Interestingly, both the Johnson and Carter administrations were not rescued by their military moves, and the Clinton administration was severely criticized for timing the strikes so near the congressional election date.

Diversionary theories, however, stand in marked contrast to the democratic peace proposition. Evidence, it seems, continues to demonstrate that domestic-political institutions effectively constrain the belligerent foreign policy actions of democratically elected leaders (see for example, Schweller, 1992; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Peterson, 1994). Indeed, according to Maoz and Russett (1993: 626), "due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage war..." What's more, the openness of the democratic political process seemingly helps prevent leaders from acting against the preferences of their principals. Jentleson (1992) argued, in fact, that Americans are quite capable of discerning when their agent in the White House legitimately expends U.S. resources abroad. Presumably, such oversight compels executives to act with caution given that their positions of power depend on popular support.

Yet, Russett (1990) acknowledged that constraints on an executive may not serve to impede minor uses of force, such as those associated with the diversionary literature. Indeed, Russett (1990: 43) found that the United States, and democratic states more generally, were more likely to engage in international disputes during economic downturns. "Faced with [considerable domestic] discontent," Russett (1990: 24) wrote, "even a democratically elected government may feel some temptation to try to divert hostility toward foreign adversaries." In short, then, democratic decision processes may

constrain large scale belligerency, but disputes involving mere threats and brief military moves appear to be to some extent inspired by democratic politics.[27]

Furthermore, theoretical models of foreign policy decision-making have demonstrated that electoral incentives exist for using force abroad (see for example, Smith, 1996; Richards, et al., 1993; Blainey, 1973). Given the possibility of preference divergence between a president and the electorate when it comes to foreign affairs, plus the asymmetrical level of information that exists, differences over the appropriate means to address foreign policy problems may from time to time arise.[28] Many scholars insist that this information asymmetry leads executives to focus on issues of foreign policy. Indeed, according to Downs and Rocke (1995: 138), domestic uncertainty creates more uses of force by a president than would exist under full information environments.[29] Smith (1996) reached a similar conclusion. In his model, electoral incentives rarely cause

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[27] Interestingly, Fearon (1994) has argued that while domestic political institutions may constrain an executive from becoming involved in foreign conflicts, they may serve to incite belligerency once involved. Given the domestic costs for backing down in the face of a challenge, presidents have an incentive to escalate disputes in hopes of avoiding congressional and electoral sanctions for policy failure.

[28] Such uncertainty, according to Downs and Rocke (1995), has a tremendous influence not only on what candidate will eventually be selected by the electorate, but also on the decision-making of the incumbent chief executive. Voters generally make decisions with only limited information about the issues and candidates on the ballot. Indeed, not only are voters uncertain whether the president they elect actually shares their policy preferences (and therefore will act in their interest), but they additionally may be uncertain about the quality of the information they possess regarding a president's proposed policy prescriptions. In foreign affairs, then, as Downs and Rocke (1995) insisted, voters must both monitor presidential decisions and the information a president chooses to divulge regarding international events. With regards to the former, the electorate must determine whether involvement is in fact the desired response to systemic conditions. With regards to the latter, the asymmetrical level of information between the executive and the public forces the public to remain skeptical of presidential justifications. However, according to Ornstein (1994), Congress provides the electorate with an alternative source of information. "The old time executive pattern of settling foreign policy arguments by saying, 'we have more information than you do' is simply no longer possible when a legislative branch is loaded with experts in every regional, technical, and policy area who can match their own expertise with ready access to sources in the executive, and who can supplement their information with networks of contacts in academia and industry (113)."

[29] Television has arguably helped to politicize foreign affairs. However, it is not clear whether such a medium has contributed to the political use of force by presidents. At the same time as instantaneous news

a president to behave tentatively. Smith (1996: 147) insisted that, "if foreign policy evaluation is likely to be important at the next election then the range of international conditions under which intervention occurs increases." Smith (1996: 147) further argued that:

> When the voters' evaluation of the government's foreign policy performance affects the outcome of an election, the model shows that suboptimal foreign policy decisions are made. Since the government cares, not only about taking the best course of action for the nation, but also about getting reelected, it is biased towards violent behavior.

On the other hand, numerous institutionalists and proponents of the democratic peace insist that democratic decision processes dissuade adventuresome foreign policies by requiring input from multiple domestic actors before a policy is implemented (see for example, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990; Morrow, 1991; Morgan and Campbell, 1991; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992; Peterson, 1994). The authority of the presidency may appear inviolable when it comes to the handling of foreign affairs, yet clearly domestic institutions have been developed to help curtail the ability of an executive to act against the preferences of the electorate. Recently, in fact, Drew (1994: 230) reported that the Clinton administration initially rejected the commitment of peace-keeping troops into the Bosnian conflict because of probable opposition from Capitol Hill. Arguably, this was a demonstration of how democratic political institutions not only help shape foreign policy, but tend to pacify it as well.

What are we to make, then, of the theoretical contradictions between a diversionary specification of foreign policy decision-making and that specified by the

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coverage provides an opportunity to demonstrate statesmanship, it also provides the electorate with a source of information to accurately assess presidential conduct.

democratic peace proposition? Both do insist, contrary to a neo-realist explanation, that domestic politics affects the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet, generally speaking, diversionary theories insist that these domestic forces encourage greater belligerency on the part of an executive, while scholars of the democratic peace argue that such forces pacify foreign policy decision- making. Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence used to test diversionary theory tends to suffer from similar discrepancies. Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, observed that U.S. conflict behavior increased dramatically as a result of elections and economic downturns (also see Russett, 1990). Yet, Gaubatz (1991) reported that democratic states rarely engage in war around election time. Stoll (1984), interestingly, found the results of both studies to be supported, when he controlled for whether the U.S. was at peace or war.[30] Given these divergent findings, as well as others, it certainly appears as if the relationship between system and domestic-level forces continues to be only partially understood (Levy, 1989).

Do Leaders Divert?

To be sure, foreign affairs represents an electorally salient arena for demonstrating leadership skill. As the primary organ of America's international interests, the president is in a unique position to attend to America's foreign policy concerns without the same congressional scrutiny that often plagues a president in the domestic arena. And, given the importance that the American public ascribes to foreign policy (see Holsti, 1996; Aldrich et al., 1989), presidents may find the manipulation of foreign affairs to be in their

[30] Stoll (1984) in fact found uses of force to decline prior to an election during peacetime, while they slightly increased during wartime. According to James and Oneal (1991: 315), "Stoll attributed the decline

immediate electoral interests. Similar to the manipulation of macroeconomic policy (Lewis-Beck, 1990; Tufte, 1978), presidents may have an incentive to divert public attention away from electorally damaging problems at home by engaging in conflict or peace-making abroad (Stoll, 1984; Levy, 1989; Smith, 1996; Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger, 1992). Presumably, presidents trust that cleverly crafted military actions or visible mediation efforts will be perceived by the electorate as foreign policy acumen.[31]

Diversionary theories of conflict maintain that leaders who face domestic discontent engage in international conflict to generate events that obscure the problems being experienced at home (Ward and Widmaier, 1982). Such manipulation is also designed, particularly in democratic states, to demonstrate leadership skills and competency in governing. Indeed, risky foreign policy moves may be used by politically threatened governments to boost their flagging polls ratings by solidifying public support prior to an election (Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Levy, 1989). Furthermore, belligerent foreign policies may offer elites a way to rationalize their control over the levers of state (see Schumpeter, 1939; Levy, 1989). Evidence does suggest that voters are often loathe to change leadership structures when a country is faced with a crisis, particularly an external one. Studies, for example, show that public approval for a president tends to increase following uses of force (Mueller, 1970).

Empirical support for diversionary behavior on the part of elites has been provided by various studies (see for example, Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Stoll, 1984;

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in U.S. military actions during peacetime elections to the president's desire to address the domestic issues that usually are more salient to voters."

[31] Arguably, the definitive work on the political use of force was Blechman and Kaplan's *Force Without War* (1978). For these authors, though, the tacit signal being sent by the President was not intended for a

Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; DeRouen, 1995). Lebow (1981), for example, found that crisis initiation and escalation were related to domestic discontent. And, Stoll (1984) later concluded that in the United States at least presidential uses of force were targeted towards the electoral calendar. More recent studies have found some indication of a partisan effect. Morgan and Bickers (1992) and James and Hristoulas (1994) both discovered political opposition to be associated with diversionary behavior. Based on the evidence, then, diversionary activities by democratic leaders appear to be sustained by the empirical evidence collected to date.

Yet, many scholars have contested these diversionary findings. Meernik and Waterman (1996) in fact concluded that, in the United States at least, the link between domestic-political conditions and uses of military force is nearly non-existent. Ward and Widmaier (1982) gathered that not only is there little evidence supporting the externalization of conflict, but there appears to be a very limited range of circumstances that would persuade a president to use military force abroad to moderate conflict at home. Moreover, Lian and Oneal (1993: 278) pointed out that, "If it could be proven in a single instance that a president used America's armed forces for partisan purposes, there would be justifiable calls for impeachment."

Table 2 clearly shows that evidence in support of the political use of force is less than consistent across studies. In fact, not only does the unit of analysis, dependent variable, and time frame vary considerably across these studies, but the signs and significance of the exogenous variables vary greatly as well. So, despite the empirical

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domestic audience, but rather was directed at a foreign adversary and was designed to convey U.S. conviction.

support to date, there are both theoretical and methodological reasons to believe that some of these findings may be spurious.

Theoretically, it is not at all clear that initiating a conflict would in fact electorally benefit a democratic leader (see Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1996; Hazelwood, 1975). While a quick and successful strike prior to a presidential election may provide a boost in popular support, not only are opportunities rare, but as Russett (1990: 47) argued, "fears of the domestic-political consequences of becoming involved in a real war work to restrain the belligerent actions of leaders." Certainly such belligerency can result in a prolonged engagement that results in substantial casualties (see Ward and Widmaier, 1982; Russett, 1990). Given that rally-around-the-flag support is generally short lived, the use of force may not be a cost-effective way of generating electoral support.[32] President Clinton, for instance, brought American troops home from Somali after fewer than two dozen battlefield deaths. For a great power such as the United States, such a casualty toll is exceedingly small.

Moreover, according to Eckstein, "Military adventures are excellent diversions, and military successes can marvelously cement disjoint societies, but military failure, on the evidence, can hardly fail to hasten revolution in such cases" (quoted in James and Oneal, 1991: 314). Thus, the potentially high political costs involved in what can easily become a foreign policy blunder would seem to prohibit diversionary uses of force (see Brace and Hinckley, 1992).[33] Indeed, rather than encouraging the initiation of conflict,

[32] Brody and Shapiro (1989), in fact, found that a significant number of events deemed likely to produce a rally effect led to a decline in the president's approval rating (also see Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1989).
[33] Blainey (1973) argued that diversionary actions tend to be the most beneficial when leaders find them the least necessary (also see Mayer, 1969). Ostrom and Job's (1986) evidence seems to support Blainey's

domestic turmoil may, as Ward and Widmaier (1982: 77) suggested, incite attack by states attempting to take advantage of other states' domestic turbulence (also see Leeds and Davis, 1997). If true, incidents of conflict would appear much higher not because of diversionary moves made by politically vulnerable administrations, but rather because the foreign initiators of these disputes have not been controlled for in the empirical analysis.

Also, by examining only belligerent foreign policy actions scholars have ignored diplomatic or economic responses that may effectively demonstrate both resolve and competency, without resorting to military moves. Indeed, if the goal is to divert attention away from social and economic problems, a bold peace move, such as proposing an arms control agreement or mediating an interstate crisis, may provide a president with prime time media coverage absent the potential costs associated with a failed military action (see Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger, 1992).[34] Moore and Lanoue (1997: 8), for example, argued that "political leaders have many tools at their disposal to try to persuade their constituents that they are doing something meaningful in the realm of foreign policy. Often, such 'messages' can be sent simply by making well-publicized speeches or engaging in trading verbal barbs with one's adversaries." A case in point, Morrow (1991) found American arms control concessions to the Soviet Union to be linked to high unemployment conditions.

Finally, one of the most significant problems associated with the diversionary research program has been the issue of opportunity. Electoral sanctions and constitutional

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conjecture. They found the likelihood of force being used to increase with presidential approval. Yet, this would appear to be when a president has little need for a boost in his ratings.

[34] For example, take Carter's facilitation of the Camp David Accords and Clinton's Wye Plantation agreement.

checks seemingly prohibit American presidents from actually creating interstate crises through the initiation of armed conflict (see Hower, Ostrom, and Quiñones, 1992).[35] Generally speaking, presidents require a credible justification for such bold military actions (see Hunt, 1997). President Clinton, for instance, may have wished for an opportunity to demonstrate his commander-in-chief competency during the initial months of his presidency when he was vehemently criticized by members of Congress and even high-ranking Pentagon officials. Yet, it was not until June of that same year that Iraq may have provided such an opportunity with its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush (Fisher, 1996).

The problem is that the probability of a military action being taken in a given quarter has been assumed to be invariate. But, the likelihood of an opportunity presenting itself undoubtedly varies over time. Controlling for this invariance is clearly necessary as leaders must cultivate domestic support for presidential uses of force based on the type of opportunity that presents itself. Indeed, rather than using the quarter as the unit of analysis, the opportunity is perhaps a more appropriate choice for theoretical and methodological reasons (Meernik, 1994; Meernik and Waterman, 1996). Furthermore, some international crises are more likely to receive American attention than others. According to Meernik and Waterman (1996: 576), "If presidents are to respond to international crises, they must at a minimum be aware that a 'pretty prudent' public may not share their definition of the national interest" (also see Jentleson, 1992). Conceivably,

[35] According to Schweller (1992), great-power democracies have *never* instigated a preventive attack against other great powers.

then, both the unit of analysis and the salience of a crisis need to be controlled for in any model of presidential decision- making.

Institutional Constraints

In contrast to the diversionary argument, one pillar of the democratic peace research program insists that institutional structures serve to inhibit impetuous military actions by heads of state. According to Maoz and Russett (1993), the decision to use force becomes more difficult as the need to secure political support from multiple domestic groups increases. Indeed, the multiple layers of possible participation presented by the American federal system encourages executives to seek political support from bureaucratic agencies, legislators, and important interest groups.[36] Consequently, as Russett (1993: 80) observed, "Federalism restricts the ability [of executives] to mobilize economic and military resources rapidly in the event of a serious international dispute." This tends to allow alternative options to be forwarded increasing the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement.[37]

Strong executive leadership is further hampered by the governing structure established by the American Constitution. Not only does the separation of powers insure that various interests get incorporated into the policy-making process, but parochialism is further assured by the division of Congress into two equal branches (Peterson, 1994: 7; Silverstein, 1994). Moreover, despite presidential assertions to the contrary, the American

[36] According to Lee Hamilton, the former ranking minority member on the House International Relations Committee, one of the president's responsibilities is to help reconcile the differences that exist between the professional foreign policy decision-makers and a less activist American public (*The Economist*, October 30th, 1993: 24).

executive has few formal powers when it comes to international affairs. In fact, the Constitution defines Congress as the predominant player, in both domestic and foreign affairs. Such formal authority makes Congress one of the most powerful legislative bodies in the world when it comes to foreign policy (Crabb and Holt, 1989).[38]

The constraints proffered by domestic-political structure have been substantiated by various studies. Snyder (1991), for instance, found that democratic institutions help pacify foreign policy behavior, and Schweller (1992) concluded that democratic institutions confer caution in democratic decision-making. Mintz (1993) further argued that domestic support is a necessary condition for belligerent foreign policy actions. The dispersion, then, of executive authority among multiple agencies and individuals appears to help arrest belligerent foreign policy decisions by requiring a president to secure consensus from multiple domestic players (Russett, 1993; Morgan and Schwebach, 1992).

Certainly in the U.S., competition over turf jurisdiction is endemic among foreign policy players, such as the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Pentagon. These checks and balances between different individuals and institutions help to encourage conflict resolution strategies that avoid violent confrontations with the leaders of other states. Furthermore, democratic domestic institutions present visible manifestations of constraint that are likely to be seen by other democratic states (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). Given the high political costs involved in using force,

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[37] Given that "too quick a readiness to act in foreign policy," as Russett (1990: 12) noted "can lead to disaster, as it did for John Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs," democratic decision processes generally tend to impede executive dispatch.

leaders will recognize that democratic institutions present an impediment to violent engagement.

Gleditsch and Ward (1997) additionally found evidence tying institutional constraints to pacific foreign policy behavior. In their disaggregation of the Polity scales, Gleditsch and Ward discovered that the executive constraints component of the democracy score had the largest influence on a state's final democracy ranking. Given the lack of violent conflict between democratic nations, Gleditsch and Ward's findings tend to support the argument that constraints on the chief executive keep in check foreign policy adventurism, at least when it comes to relations with similar regimes (see Benoit, 1996 for monadic-level evidence).

In the United States, for example, the president must consider the preferences of leaders on Capitol Hill, particularly if those House and Senate members are from the opposition party.[39] In 1973 Congress dramatically asserted its constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs by passing the War Powers Resolution over a presidential veto, and this measure has since visibly restricted the use of force by American presidents. Auerswald and Cowhey (1997), for instance, found the duration of military interventions to be statistically shorter after the resolution was passed than prior to it. They concluded that presidents have tailored their interventions to the main requirements of this statute. Particularly today, with partisanship on Capitol Hill at a post-World War II high (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), presidents must be wary of providing political

[38] The former British ambassador to the United States during the Carter administration, in fact, remarked on the "extraordinary power of...Congress over foreign policy" (quoted in Crabb and Holt, 1989: 223).

ammunition to opposition leaders in the House and Senate. Indeed, as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990: 752) averred, "The very need to resort to force suggests a political failure by the national leadership, creating openings for oppositional factions."

Clinton, in particular, has been challenged by congressional Republicans regarding his competency in the area of foreign policy. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), for example, forced Clinton to meet many of his demands regarding the foreign policy bureaucracy, in return for scheduling debate on the Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, December 6, 1997: 3019).[40] According to Rohde (1994), congressional assertiveness can be tied to the unwillingness of opposition leaders to accept an executive's definition of the national interest. Given the fluidity of international politics today, Congress has become much more active in determining where America's interests lie.

Admittedly, statutory restrictions on presidential management of foreign affairs are rare. This is because congressional assertiveness remains hampered by both political and institutional obstacles (Smith, 1994: 131). Yet, Congress can easily make foreign policy decisions costly for a president. By publicly denouncing such initiatives, opposition leaders on the Hill can make foreign policy adventurism a political liability for a president. Indeed, domestic program priorities can at times be held hostage by congressional leaders unless a president addresses the foreign policy concerns of

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[39] According to Simon (1998: 6), "the relationship between president and congress will be more contentious under divided government and the incidence of institutional conflict, roll call defeats for the president, and vetoed bills will be greater when partisan control of the presidency and congress is split."

[40] The State Department will undergo considerable change as a result of pressure put on the Clinton administration by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), and by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who has voiced her desire to reshape America's foreign policy apparatus to

important members of Congress (see Crabb and Holt, 1989). Smith (1994), in fact, showed that congressional party leaders in both chambers have become much more active in foreign policy, and the relevant committees spend more time questioning executive officials regarding the administration's foreign policy decisions (also see Sinclair, 1993). Peterson (1994: 10), it seems, correctly concluded that, "partisan opposition is effective opposition" (also see Oldfield and Wildavsky, 1991), and congressional Republicans in the 1990s, as with the Democrats in the 1980s, have effectively demonstrated a willingness to oppose executive decisions in the realm of foreign affairs.

Even rally effects may not ultimately help an administration, depending on the extent of congressional opposition (Gowa, 1998). That is, if Congress is held by the opposition party, fellow partisans on Capitol Hill may suffer electorally from strategically-timed foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, if helping to elect one's partisans to Congress will tend to allow a president greater flexibility in foreign policy decision-making (Smith, 1996; Furlong, 1996; Bond and Fleisher, 1990), then initiatives designed to induce rally effects may tend to have the adverse consequence of reelecting opposition-party incumbents.[41]

Conclusion

Considerable research has been devoted to understanding the determinants of conflict initiation. The study of third parties in international politics, in contrast,

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manage the challenges of post-Cold War world (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, April 19, 1997: 921).

[41] Smith (1994) showed that opposition leaders in both the House and Senate have consistently provided much less support for the president's position on foreign policy issues than congressional leaders of the president's party during the post-World War II time period.

continues to receive little theoretical and empirical attention. However, understanding the determinants of foreign policy decision-making requires an analysis of the full range of events a president may confront and the strategies available to him. While Smith (1996) has formally incorporated the likelihood of third-party support in the expected utility equations of primary crisis actors, there also is a need to more fully understand the decision calculus of the potential intervening state. Why, and under what conditions will a president intervene in a conflict between two or more states? Given the importance of third parties in both the initiation and resolution of interstate conflict, there clearly is a need to better understand the role these states play.

In answering this question, I propose a modified realist model of presidential decision-making. While attention must be given to the structure of the international system, if scholars are to understand foreign policy decision-making, research efforts must also address how decisions are influenced by domestic conditions.

Fortunately, a concern for second-image influences on interstate interactions has blossomed in the international relations literature in the last decade. This coincides quite appropriately with changes in both American domestic politics and in the international system. However, as Putnam (1988: 427) observed in his seminal two-level game essay, the question of whether domestic politics determines international relations is nowhere near as interesting, nor as fruitful, as probing for when and how domestic politics influences international behavior. That is, many theories of international politics fail to rigorously examine the different and often times contradictory influences of domestic-level forces.

According to Elman (1997), for example, the impact of domestic-political structures on foreign policy decision-making is only marginally addressed by much of the democratic peace research. She wrote:

> The democratic peace theory presents a truncated view of domestic politics in general, and democratic politics in particular. Specifically, the theory ignores the role of leaders; underemphasizes norms that are not associated with domestic political ideology; obscures the role of political parties; and discounts how civil-military relations can concentrate or disperse war powers (483).[42]

On the other hand, diversionary theories tend to concentrate on domestic economic conditions and often neglect the influence of typical domestic-political institutions. Domestic structure, however, is certainly more complicated than either of these theoretical traditions acknowledge. Not only will the influence of domestic demands on executive decision-making vary with time, but individual institutions also differ dramatically and as a consequence they each may have a different influence on presidential decision-making.

The model developed in Chapter Two contends that both domestic and systemic factors contribute to the decision by a president to intervene in a foreign interstate crisis. However, contrary to diversionary theories of foreign policy decision-making, it is argued that domestic-political institutions should invoke caution in executives contemplating new and potentially costly foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, both national elections and the strength of domestic-political opposition should naturally focus presidential attention on important economic and social concerns on the home front.

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[42] Certainly in the post-Cold War era, with little agreement on foreign policy objectives and partisanship at a 50 year high, Congress has visibly restricted a president's leadership capacity (see Lindsay, 1994).

It furthermore is argued in Chapter Two that the decision to intervene is significantly affected by the specific characteristics of the crises themselves. Nascent conflicts abroad must be evaluated individually by presidents to ensure that the appropriate response meets security needs while maintaining support at home. Certainly, salient international events, such as interstate crises, have the potential to dramatically escalate in severity. If that were to occur, a policy of active diplomatic or military intervention could threaten U.S. troops or personnel. The political costs to an administration for the unwarranted or unpopular use of U.S. resources abroad could easily lead to electoral and policy defeat.

TABLE 1: A Comparison of the Hypotheses of Two Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making

	Hypothesized Direction of Relationship	
Variable	*Diversionary Theory*	*Structural Constraints Theory*
National Elections	Presidential elections encourage greater belligerency. • Ostrom and Job, 1986 • James and Oneal, 1991 • Stoll, 1984 • DeRouen, 1995	Not clear, though as one of the twin pillars of domestic structure, elections are hypothesized to invite caution in decision making. • Russett, 1990 • Morrow, 1991 • Snyder, 1991 • Schweller, 1992
Economic Conditions	Poor economic conditions tend to increase the likelihood of presidential uses of force. • Ostrom and Job, 1986 • James and Oneal, 1991 • James and Hristoulas, 1994 • Russet, 1989	Poor economic conditions tend to present an impediment to presidential belligerency or should be unrelated to it. • Meernik and Waterman, 1996 • Lian and Oneal, 1993
Presidential Approval	Aggregated presidential approval is positively related to the use of force. • Ostrom and Job, 1986 • James and Hristoulas, 1994 • Morgan and Bickers, 1992 DeRouen (1995) argued that the opposite relationship exists.	Public opinion serves to constrain presidential uses of force or should be unrelated to presidential uses of force. • Meernik and Waterman, 1996
International Threat	As threat increases, presidents are less likely to use force for political purposes. • James and Hristoulas, 1994 Ostrom and Job (1986) argued the opposite relationship exists.	Threat level tends to increase presidential uses of force. • Morgan and Palmer, 1997

Table 1 (cont'd):

Saliency of Crisis	As the importance of the crisis increases, presidents are less likely to use force. • James and Hristoulas, 1994	Saliency tends to increase presidential uses of force. • Morgan and Palmer, 1997
Political Opposition	Significant political opposition encourages diversionary uses of force. • Morgan and Bickers, 1992 • Meernik and Waterman, 1996 • James and Hristoulas, 1994	Political opposition discourages belligerent foreign policy actions. • Russett, 1990 • Morgan and Campbell, 1991 • Morrow, 1991 • Mintz, 1993 • Maoz and Russett, 1993 • Morgan and Schwebach, 1992 • Gowa, 1998

TABLE 2: Empirical Results From Recent Diversionary Theory Research

Authors (Year)	*Years of Study*	*Unit of Analysis*	*Dependent Variable*	*Independent Variables*	*Direction of Relationship*	*Level of Significance*
Stoll (1984)	1947-1982	Half-year	Number of visible uses of force	• National elections	-	<.05
				• Election during war	+	<.05
Ostrom and Job (1986)	1946-1976	Quarter-year	Force (yes/no)	• Tension	+	<.05
				• Balance	-	—
				• Cumulative war dead	-	<.05
				• Aversion to war	-	<.05
				• Misery index	+	<.05
				• Approval	+	<.05
				• National elections	+	—
James and Oneal (1991)	1949-1976	Quarter-year	Level of force	• Severity	+	<.05
				• Tension	+	<.05
				• Balance	-	—
				• Cumulative war dead	-	—
				• Aversion to war	-	—
				• Misery index	+	<.05
				• Approval	+	<.05
				• National elections	+	<.05
Morgan and Bickers (1992)	1953-1976	Quarter-year	MID involvement	• Approval	+	<.05
				• Partisan approval	-	<.05
				• Ongoing war	-	—
James and Hristoulas (1994)	1949-1976	Quarter-year	Crisis-actor	• Severity	+	—
				• Tension	+	<.05
				• Balance	-	<.05
				• Aversion to war	+	—
				• Misery index	-	—
				• Approval	+	<.10
				• National elections	-	—
				• Congress	+	—
				• Armed attacks	+	<.05
				• Crisis gravity	-	<.10
				• Crisis importance	-	<.05

Table 2 (cont'd):

DeRouen (1995)	1949-1984	Quarter-year	Level of force	• Severity	+	<.05
				• Tension	+	—
				• Balance	-	—
				• Cumulative war dead	-	<.05
				• Aversion to war	-	<.05
				• Misery index	-	—
				• Approval	-	<.05
				• National elections	+	—
				• Congress	-	—
Meernik and Waterman (1996)	1953-1988	Opportunity	Force (yes/no)	• Tension	+	=.084
				• Balance	+	=.020
				• Cumulative war dead	-	=.005
				• Misery index	-	=.003
				• Approval	-	=.960
				• Partisan approval	+	=.953
				• National elections	-	=.896
				• Congress	+	=.235
Gelpi (1997)	1948-1982	Opportunity	Level of force	• Nonviolent protest	-	<.05
				• Challenger democracy	-	—
				• Balance of military caps	-	<.05
				• Challenger issue	-	<.05
				• Status quo	-	<.001
Hess and Orphanides (1995)	1953-1988	Year	War	• GNP (mean)	+	=.039
				• Unemployment (MA-8)	+	=.039
				• Industrial prod. (MA-8)	+	=.039
				• Approval (MA-8)	+	=.141

CHAPTER 2

SYSTEMIC THREAT, DOMESTIC-POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND CRISIS SALIENCY: MODELING THE DECISION TO INTERVENE

> *[Eisenhower] did not believe that we could put the proposition of going to war over with the American people at this time. The West Coast might agree, but his letters from the farm areas and elsewhere constantly say don't send our boys to war. It will be a big job to explain to the American people the importance of these islands to US security. Moreover, it we shuck the UN, and say we are going to be the world's policeman, we had better get ready to go to war, because we'll get it. The President said that while he was in general agreement with everything that had been said, we must enlist world support and the approval of the American people (Foreign Relations of the United States, quoted in Foyle, 1997).*

> *[Some officials in the Clinton administration] had said that the Bosnian Serb attack on Muslim-held areas in Bosnia was an affront to the U.S.'s national interest, but, this thinking went, if it was an affront to our national interest, officials should have been willing to put a half million troops in Bosnia. But they hadn't been and weren't going to--the assumption, a valid one, being that the public would be strongly opposed (Drew, 1996: 244).*

Domestic-political institutions help shape the foreign policy decisions of presidents. Indeed, given that domestic support is generally required for the success of any administration policy, the decision by a president to embark on any given course of action must necessarily be driven by domestic-political concerns (Russett, 1990). Yet, the external environment additionally places constraints on executive decisions. In proposing foreign policy initiatives, a president must not only consider the likelihood of

congressional and public opposition, but he must also concern himself with the potential threat to U.S. national security if important interests are not defended.

In this chapter, I argue for a structural-constraints theory of American foreign policy. Domestic-political institutions, such as Congress and elections, coupled with the constitutional separation of powers, all tend to invoke caution in presidential decision making. And, the stronger these constraints the more likely a president will avoid precarious foreign policy choices. Contrary to diversionary theories, then, I argue that domestic-political institutions tend to prevent the abuse of power by executives. These governing structures provide a brake on executive impetuousness and consequently tend to discourage costly foreign policy initiatives.

However, any model of foreign policy decision-making must not neglect the demands placed on an executive by both systemic structure and the salience of external crises. Domestic politics are clearly part of the decision calculus. But, threats to U.S. interests also affect presidential attention to foreign affairs. Consequently, a fully specified model of presidential decision-making in foreign affairs controls for all three factors; domestic-political support, systemic threat, and conflict or event saliency. The theoretical model presented below, then, attempts to understand broadly how threat, salience, and domestic-political support influence presidential decision-making in foreign affairs. More specifically, this model tries to address the following questions:

- What role does systemic structure play in the conflict-resolution initiatives of a president?

- Do domestic-political conditions serve to encourage of discourage presidential peace-making endeavors?
- Are presidents more likely to intervene in certain interstate crisis situations than others, independent of domestic-political and systemic considerations?
- Have conflict-resolution efforts fluctuated significantly over time?

To evaluate these questions, I propose a modified realist model of presidential decision-making in foreign affairs. Testable propositions are subsequently derived and I then conclude with a brief discussion of the insights provided by my theoretical model.

Intervening in Foreign Interstate Conflicts

The relationship between international affairs and domestic-political systems continues to generate considerable interest among international relations scholars. As part of an effort to better understand the link between the two levels of analysis, this dissertation examines one aspect of American foreign policy: the decision to intervene as a third party in an ongoing interstate crisis. Aiding the resolution of conflicts abroad has become a staple of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II era. Indeed, to prevent the escalation of interstate disputes, the United States has frequently contributed political, economic, and military resources. Often, the political clout, financial backing, and military might of the United States serve as the necessary ingredients to overcome conflicts of interest and push state leaders back to the bargaining table.

Although prevalent, we know little about the decision calculus of a president during these interstate conflicts. I present a conceptualization of the conditions in which a president will intervene in an interstate crisis. Clearly, the question of whether the United

States intervenes has important implications for America's foreign policy. As Huth (1988) observed, major power interventions into regional crises have had dramatic consequences for the final outcomes of the conflicts.[1] Furthermore, many scholars believe that research on crisis conditions can lead to a more complete understanding of the outbreak of war (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Lebow, 1981; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997; Morgan, 1993). Indeed, according to Snyder (1994: 316), "An international crisis is international politics in a microcosm. That is to say, a crisis tends to highlight or force to the surface a wide range of factors and processes which are central to international politics in general." And, Hermann (1994: 292) insisted that an international crisis "becomes an occasion for decision."

Previous studies of U.S. crisis involvement have almost exclusively concentrated on those incidents where the United States was a primary crisis actor (see for example, James and Oneal, 1991 and James and Hristoulas, 1994). This set of cases clearly is a small subset of the opportunities a president has to demonstrate foreign policy acumen.[2] Indeed, by ignoring conflict-resolution initiatives, scholars may be drawing inappropriate conclusions regarding the determinants of executive decision-making in foreign affairs. For example, as a direct participant, presidents may often be guided solely or predominately by systemic factors or bureaucratic decision rules (see James and Oneal, 1991; Quiñones and Hower, 1996). Peace-making attempts, however, may respond to an

[1] Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the role of third parties in international conflicts. Yet, generally speaking, the primary focus of this attention has been on the arbitration and mediation of interstate disputes (Bercovitch, 1991, 1996; Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Efraim, 1992; Matthews, et al., 1989; Princen, 1992; Touval and Zartman, 1985).

[2] Opportunity is seemingly analogous to the Sprout's (1965) conception of 'environmental possibilism.'

entirely different set of exogenous factors. Given the importance of these actors, we need to have some idea about the systemic and domestic environments that are associated with the decision to intervene (see Goertz, 1994).

Intervention

The decision to intervene as a neutral third party in a foreign conflict is not always a straightforward one. "A president," as Russett (1990: 4) aptly phrased it, "is expected to deliver two items to the electorate: peace and prosperity." Attention abroad not only can lead to the neglect of important domestic issues. But, international engagement risks involving U.S. troops and personnel in potentially costly conflicts that the American electorate may subsequently conclude to be unimportant to its own notion of U.S. national interests. Consequently, providing these two goods is difficult to accomplish, and presidents are often forced to make choices that strengthen one at the expense of the other. Furthermore, given the cacophony of different beliefs and political motivations in the electorate as well as on Capitol Hill, decision-making of any kind will likely incur some level of domestic opposition. A president must balance his own domestic-political interests with the national security needs of the country he is charged to protect.

In attending to foreign policy, then, a president must manage the interplay of various forces at work. First and foremost is the international environment. Systemic structure and threat level inexorably enter into any foreign policy calculation. Does the structure of the international system warrant an activist foreign policy agenda? Second, what are the domestic demands being made on a president? Will the public support attention and engagement abroad, or do conditions at home require a concentrated domestic focus? Finally, an executive must take into account the specific characteristics

of the interstate crisis itself. Is it directly salient to U.S. interests? Are our allies in need of support?

The model of executive decision-making posited here specifies that systemic threat, crisis salience, and domestic-political support help determine foreign conflict intervention. While reelection may be a prime motivating factor in the calculations of all elected officials, neglecting policy for the sole sake of personal political interests will eventually be recognized by the electorate. Indeed, rarely can a president act in foreign affairs with only the exigencies of his domestic-political situation in mind (Russett, 1990: 11). To be sure, the pursuit of an appropriate national security policy does not often conflict with personal or partisan interests. Carter's facilitation of the Camp David accords, for instance, was a major victory for his administration, both politically and internationally. However, his attention to foreign affairs also provided Reagan with an excellent opening for his nascent political campaign. Bill Clinton's attack on President Bush for the lack of attention paid to domestic affairs also illustrates how success on the international stage can become a liability for an incumbent executive. For this reason, presidents must be concerned with maintaining a balance between domestic and foreign priorities.

Interestingly, while scholars have argued that international and domestic factors interact to determine presidential decision-making in foreign affairs, few have controlled for the precise characteristics of the external event. However, as Quiñones and Hower (1996: 5) have suggested, the decision an executive makes regarding which foreign conflicts necessitate attention depends considerably upon "the context of the particular type of opportunity that arises." Indeed, a model of decision-making would seem

fundamentally underspecified without the inclusion of salient factors that undoubtedly enter into the decision calculus of foreign policy elites.

I draw on both Regan's (1996, 1998) work on third-party interventions into intrastate conflicts and Fordham's (1998) model of diversionary behavior to help explicate the decision calculus of a president when confronted with a foreign interstate crisis.[3] Foreign conflicts clearly present opportunities to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the face of a threatening international environment. And, they offer the opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to alliance partners facing potentially dangerous crisis situations. However, attention to foreign affairs also has the ability to generate significant political opposition. Given the electoral relevance of the domestic economy and social conditions, neglect of these important issues can be costly for a president.

According to Fordham (1998: 570), "uses of force risk war and other international commitments that can drain resources, divert military assets from other uses, and place a political burden on the government." While Fordham was addressing primary actor activity, a similar argument can be made for conflict-resolution initiatives. Providing even political resources to aid the resolution of a foreign conflict depletes the availability of scarce capital from other issues, and risks provoking public and congressional

[3] Regan (1998) avoided low-level (i.e., diplomatic) interventions into civil conflicts. He argued that an entirely different decision calculus exists for economic and military interventions due to the heightened costs involved. While this may be so, it is interesting to note that in less than half the crises used in the empirical analysis presented in subsequent chapters, did the U.S. become involved politically. This seems odd given America's broad reach in the international system. Apparently, there are foreign conflicts that administrations deem insignificant to U.S. interests to even contribute political resources to aid in their resolution. On the other hand, though, crisis situations are by definition dangerous events that possess the potential to escalate. An administration has only finite resources to help resolve both crises abroad and problems at home. Certainly, presidents can be held accountable for spending too much time on foreign policy and not enough on the plight of the domestic economy and social conditions. It may be the case, then, that even political involvement is influenced by the same domestic and systemic forces that affect

opposition. Indeed, the potential political costs involved in committing scarce resources to help resolve conflicts abroad must naturally concern incumbent administrations. Domestic program priorities may languish while administration attention is focused abroad. Furthermore, given that foreign conflicts can at times be exceedingly difficult to resolve, the potential political and economic costs resulting from future obligations to the primary crisis actors could be substantial (e.g., the Arab-Israeli peace process).

The costs, then, to a president for intervening in a foreign conflict are unmistakable. Not only might a president generate significant political opposition which threatens his ability to effectively address future issues. But, a failure on the international stage has the potential to harm U.S. credibility and influence abroad. The gains, in contrast, are much less visible. Indeed, in the words of *The Economist*, "successful intervention does not win votes; failed intervention loses buckets of them" (July 25, 1998: 33). So, the successful resolution of a conflict may matter little if the domestic economy is doing poorly.[4] Furthermore, voters may not understand the intricacies of global politics and consequently may fail to reward a president for maintaining alliance cohesion.

Theoretical Assumptions

I begin with the common assumption that a president is a rational actor, weighing the costs and benefits of intervention in an expected utility framework. Without a doubt,

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economic and military interventions. Regan, in a 1998 conference paper, did include diplomatic involvement in his multinomial logistic analysis.

[4] While foreign policy has been and continues to be salient to the American public, this interest varies over time and presumably is influenced by domestic economic conditions. Russett (1990: 13) noted that "the state of the economy and its impact on [a president's] electoral prospects must be [a president's] first priority." Plus, attention to domestic policy generally garnishes more rewards than foreign affairs.

the decision to intervene as a neutral third party in a crisis rests largely in the hands of the president. As commander-in-chief, the Constitution not only provides the executive with legal authority over America's armed forces, but as Alexander Hamilton (1961: 424) insisted, the advantages of "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch" naturally provide for a president's leading role in international affairs. Furthermore, as the 'sole organ' of American diplomacy, the president has the additional responsibility of administering the U.S. response to international events. To be sure, Congress has formal authority in foreign affairs. Presidential scholar Louis Fisher, in fact, maintains that the initiation of major foreign policy moves by the executive without statutory authorization from Congress was never intended by the Founding Fathers, unless of course national security is threatened (see Fisher, 1995). However, presidents in the post-World War II period have claimed this executive power and the Supreme Court has consistently supported this Constitutional interpretation (Crabb and Holt, 1989).[5] The president, then, is assumed to be the ultimate decision maker, though his options are constrained by international and domestic environments.

I additionally assume that leaders desire to remain in office. While structural theories and models of foreign policy decision-making may both ground behavior in the rational cost-benefit calculations of a presidential administration, structural theories tend to view these costs and benefits relating to a poorly defined national interest. On the other hand, a theory of foreign policy generally views these costs and benefits relating to an

[5] The Supreme Court has consistently chosen to either avoid constitutional disagreements between the two other branches by labeling such questions political in nature, or the Court has supported charges of executive privilege. Both options ultimately favor executive dominance in foreign affairs (see Crabb and Holt, 1989; Silverstein, 1997; Koh, 1990).

individual's political motivations. This latter view does not suggest that external forces play no role in foreign policy behavior. Indeed, it is the interaction of systemic forces and domestic-political goals that generally shapes policy choice. Yet, presidents clearly possess a compelling interest in their own political future, and therefore should attempt to maximize their chances of retaining office. We should expect presidents, then, when presented with an opportunity to intervene to consider important domestic forces, such as congressional sentiment, the state of the economy, and the proximity of elections in their decision calculus, for these variables are directly consequential to their electoral designs. A president must also, though, as commander-in-chief, be acutely aware of systemic conditions and take into account the threat directed at U.S. national interests, the nations involved in a crisis, relative capabilities, and the value of the current status quo (Snyder, 1994; Ostrom and Job, 1986). Similar to Huth (1997), then, a modified realist model of foreign policy decision-making is proposed that incorporates both security interests and domestic-political considerations in the executive decision calculus.

The Decision Calculus

According to Morgenthau (1966), a rational statesman should naturally base his foreign policy decision on a cost-benefit calculation that preserves a state's national interests. While the underlying motivations of Morgenthau's statesman can be criticized, the rational expected utility framework of the decision maker(s) offers a tractable way of explaining foreign policy decision-making. The decision to intervene, for instance, includes a subjective estimation of threat, salience, and domestic support. Presumably, when the expected utility of intervening is greater than the expected utility for not

intervening, an executive will contribute political, economic, or military resources to help resolve a burgeoning conflict abroad. So, more formally, if

$$EU[\text{intervention}] - EU[\text{non-intervention}] > 0$$

then a president will choose to intervene in a foreign interstate crisis situation to help resolve the issue or issues in dispute.

When systemic threat and crisis salience are both high, and domestic opposition is low or zero, the decision for a president should be relatively clear.[6] That is, if the structure and current status quo of the international system indicate an increasing hostility to U.S. interests, and the salience of a given foreign conflict is high, plus domestic-political opposition is minimal, intervention should always be the chosen course of action of an administration. Similarly, when systemic structure coincides with current U.S. interests, a crisis abroad does not meet a salience threshold, and domestic opposition is high, non-intervention should naturally be the president's choice. However, when these critical factors pull an administration in different directions, the cost-benefit calculations become particularly important. Indeed, future domestic support and electoral viability may have to be weighed against maintaining alliance ties or containing the spread of Soviet influence.

A basic model of presidential third-party intervention, then, can be specified as follows:

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[6] This decision is only relatively clear because there are latent costs that have the potential to arise if the intervention does not go as planned, or if the subjective prior beliefs regarding the values of the three important variables prove to be incorrect. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990: 748), "Beliefs about the level of domestic opposition to given foreign policies may profoundly influence the range of policy choices that a state has or the responses of adversaries to those choices."

$$TPI_c = f\ (O_c, S_c, T_c)^7$$

where

TPI_c is the likelihood of third-party intervention in crisis c;

O_c is the strength of domestic-political opposition prior to a given crisis;

S_c is the salience of the crisis to U.S. national security interests;

T_c is the systemic threat level at the time of a crisis situation.

Both salience and systemic threat are purported here to encourage foreign conflict intervention by a president. Indeed, as national security looms larger in the minds of foreign policy decision makers, the U.S. should increasingly seek to protect its interests abroad through active international engagement. Domestic-political opposition, on the other hand, is asserted here to deter executives from contributing political, economic, or military aid to states in conflict.

If crisis saliency and systemic threat were the only two factors determining third-party intervention then the decision calculus of a president would be much simpler. As a foreign crisis emerges, an executive need make only a determination as to whether such a conflict meets a critical threshold for engagement. More specifically, there is some combination of systemic threat and crisis saliency that overcomes the costs (A_c) of involvement. These costs, assuming away domestic-political ones, are logistic and material, plus the potential cost to one's prestige. So, when $(S_c + T_c - A_c) < 0$, an administration should avoid involvement in the foreign conflict. In such an instance, the

[7] These three factors largely coincide with Mitchell's (1970) view of interventions. He concluded that four important concerns influence the decision to intervene: (1) characteristics of the countries in conflict; (2)

conflict has simply not reached the critical salience threshold, nor does the international status quo necessitate a demonstration of U.S. resolve.

When domestic-political costs are included in the decision calculus, the threshold for intervention can become much greater. Indeed, even if $(S_c + T_c)$ is large, domestic-political costs can prevent U.S. aid. Not only may A_c be large, but the likelihood of O_c increasing significantly as a consequence of intervention alters the executive calculation. Indeed, how dormant constituency interests will respond to a bold foreign policy initiative can often be unpredictable. Furthermore, assume that there also exists an opportunity cost for attention to a foreign crisis. Administration resources, particularly political capital, are finite. Resources spent on one important issue are resources that cannot be spent on another. President Clinton, for instance, spent over a week prior to the 1998 congressional elections mediating a further peace accord between Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Each prime time speech on the peace process was a missed opportunity to attend to domestic concerns, such as education, social security reform, and disaster relief.

The likelihood of U.S. third-party intervention, then, is directly related to the executive estimation of systemic threat, crisis saliency, and domestic-political opposition. When a crisis, C_i, reaches a critical threshold value on either the systemic threat or salience dimension, an administration should be prepared to devote political, economic, or military resources to aid in its resolution. Arbitrarily establishing zero as this critical threshold, when $(S_c + T_c) > 0$, a president will intervene. When $(S_c + T_c) < 0$, a president

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characteristics of the intervening country; (3) characteristics of the international system; and (4) linkage patterns between target and intervening country (see Regan, 1998).

will remain uninvolved. When domestic-political concerns are included in the decision calculus, overcoming the critical threshold becomes more difficult. Whenever O_c assumes a positive value, T_c or S_c must necessarily increase for an intervention to occur. So, even when $(S_c + T_c) > 0$, domestic-political costs can dissuade intervention. The threat of congressional sanctions, for instance, should naturally deter U.S. third-party involvement. Only if $0 < (S_c + T_c)$, and $O_c < (S_c + T_c)$, will a president intervene as a third party in a foreign conflict situation.

In the next section, I present testable propositions derived from the basic logic of the model presented above. Admittedly, I do not formally deduce these hypotheses. However, the intention of the decision model is to help clarify the interactions of different forces and how they connect to foreign policy decision-making. The discussion is intended to present factors that are deemed critical to the executive decision calculus. Similar to many other models, it serves mainly as a heuristic to help generate insights into the particular variables that affect the decision to intervene.

Interstate Crises and American Foreign Policy: Testable Propositions

American presidents are often presented with salient international events that necessitate U.S. involvement. Indeed, to help facilitate the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes, ensure stability in a region, and protect U.S. interest abroad, American leadership and military strength have often provided the necessary ingredients to accomplish these objectives. According to Crabb and Holt (1989: 6), "foreign policy refers to the external goals for which a nation is prepared to commit its resources." Foreign policy also provides the primary process through which states resolve their

conflicts of interest with one another. For the United States, given its geographic size, its economic wealth, and its military might, foreign policy must regulate important interests in many parts of the world. Particularly during the Cold War, the U.S. sought to defend its national security by extending protection to many states in the north and the south. Naturally, the U.S. deployed both political and military resources in numerous circumstances to convey our resolve and demonstrate a commitment to our allies and our interests.

Propositions

I have argued that three broad concerns enter into the decision calculus of a president when confronted with the decision to intervene: systemic threat, crisis saliency, and domestic-political opposition. I also have asserted that threat and salience tend to increase the likelihood of neutral third-party interventions while domestic opposition serves to decrease that probability. Three general propositions are constructed:

> *P_1: The likelihood of third-party intervention increases as the level of threat to the United States increases.*
>
> *P_2: The likelihood of third-party intervention increases as the salience of the crisis to U.S. national interests increases.*
>
> *P_3: The likelihood of third-party intervention decreases as the level of domestic-political opposition increases.*

In Table 3, I present operational proxies for the three broad theoretical concepts discussed above. These proxies represent the exogenous variables that will be tested in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. For systemic threat, measures of U.S. relative power and U.S. military expenditures are used. For domestic-political opposition, the strength of presidential support within Congress, plus domestic economic conditions provide the

proxies. For crisis saliency, the regime type and alliance portfolios of the primary crisis actors, the level of Soviet involvement, plus the regional location of the conflict are all used. While admittedly imperfect measures, these variables do capture the general relationships between the three theoretical components and U.S. third-party intervention. Below, I present precise hypotheses to be tested against the ICB data.

Systemic Threat

According to Walt (1987), states principally react to the threat they perceive emanating from the international system. As the threat level increases, major powers such as the U.S. will embrace a more assertive role in global affairs. I expect, then, that conflict-resolution initiatives will be more likely as threat increases.

> *H_1: As the level of threat increases, U.S. third-party involvement in interstate crises will increase.*

There are two reasons why increases in threat should lead to a greater propensity to initiate peace-making efforts. First, as mentioned above, domestic-political opposition will naturally be more willing to defer to executive actions when a security risk is clearly evident. According to Huth (1997: 8), "When political leaders can package their decisions to intervene as credibly linked to external security threats, then leaders are in a stronger position to confront domestic-political opposition..." Indeed, presidents can effectively use the bully pulpit to define the importance of the foreign conflict, leaving congressional opposition in the uncomfortable position of challenging the president's duties as commander-in-chief (Sinclair, 1993).

Congress should, then, tend to defer to the president in times of national insecurity (see Sundquist, 1981). Certainly, the traditional interpretation of post-war American

foreign policy insists that congressional behavior in the 1950's and 1960's was largely bipartisan in response to the Cold War threat (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996). It was not until the détente years that Congress began reasserting its constitutional prerogatives in the realm of foreign affairs. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequently the development of a less threatening systemic environment, congressional assertiveness has become even more apparent, and President Clinton seems quick to respond to the concerns of Congress, particularly House and Senate Republicans.

The second reason is that given the anarchic nature of the international system, leaders must often deter aggression through the threat, show or use of military force. According to Ostrom and Job (1986: 546), "A president will seek to maintain his international and domestic credibility by indicating his willingness to use force..." Particularly if the crisis involves an ally with whom we have formally negotiated security arrangements, intervention becomes tantamount to a referendum on the value a president places on that relationship. Not only would inaction bring into question U.S. credibility, but it would also demonstrate a lack of resolve.

During the Cold War era, U.S. commitments were largely determined by a coterie of foreign policy experts that discerned the threat looming from the international arena (Organski and Tammen, 1996). Given their concern with the spread of Communism, active engagement was believed to be necessary in order to check Soviet expansion (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996). Presumably, the failure to demonstrate resolve in the face of aggression brought into question the competency of American leadership. Furthermore, demonstrating resolve through active engagement was thought to avoid conflict by making negotiated settlements seem less costly (Schelling, 1960). NATO

flights over Serbian territory, for example, were designed to maintain regional stability by deterring further aggression by Serbian authorities.

Status Quo

The valuation of the status quo by an administration has important implications for foreign policy decision-making, as well. Admittedly, threat and the status quo are closely linked, both theoretically and empirically. In fact, it may be difficult to empirically distinguish their separate influences on decision-making. However, Morgan and Palmer (1997), insisted that an administration will increasingly select an activist foreign policy as the status quo moves further away from the administration's ideal point (also see Werner and Kugler, 1996). Similarly, when the norms and rules that govern international politics coincide with the personal and electorally induced preferences of the president, opportunities to redraw this systemic structure should rarely be seized upon. This is to some extent why powerful states are seldom revisionist. However, given that the U.S. has been instrumental in creating an international status quo in its own image with institutions designed to avoid conflict among states, it should not be surprising to find a willingness among foreign policy elites to maintain this favorable international order (Kacowicz, 1995).

As a satisfied or dissatisfied power, America's place in the global hierarchy necessarily means that the valuation of the status quo by foreign policy elites will likely influence the foreign policy agenda of a presidential administration. The appraisal of the status quo can also help explain why, despite congressional opposition, an administration may be willing to risk partisan criticism in its conduct of foreign affairs. Indeed, if an

administration places little value on the present status quo, a president may be willing to incur substantial costs to alter the current state of affairs so it better fits the administration's ideal (Lindsay, 1994). The leads to a second hypothesis.

> *H_2: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase as the distance between the ideal point of an administration and the status quo grows larger.*

Crisis Saliency

There is little doubt that certain crises elicit greater attention by the U.S. government than others. This is to be expected if certain issues are intrinsically more important to particular presidents. One need only compare the administrations of Carter and Reagan for a striking example of how issues are differentially weighed by those in positions of power. According Morgan (1993: 270), "third parties become involved [in crises] when they perceive it is in their interest to do so; that is, they become involved when they are concerned with the outcome of the issues in dispute or with the issues that are created by the conflict." Yet, U.S. interests abroad are considerable, and they are often contradictory, making the determination of salience difficult to pinpoint accurately.

During the Cold War, though, presidential determinations regarding conflict intervention were influenced by Soviet decision-making. The inference, of course, was that checking moves made by the U.S.S.R. was clearly crucial for American national security. The Berlin Blockade, for example, was of greater concern to U.S. interests than the Costa-Rican coup in 1918. We would hypothesize, then, that U.S. third-party involvement in foreign interstate crises is positively related to their salience.

> *H_3: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase as the salience of the crisis increases.*

Additional Crisis Saliency Variables

Three additional variables of import directly related to the character of the crisis itself must be included due to their importance in international politics. The international relations community over the last decade has concluded that these factors need to be incorporated in most models of foreign policy decision-making as theoretical and statistical controls. One involves the regime type of the opponent. Democratic peace research has consistently shown interactions between democratic states to be less belligerent than mixed regime type interactions (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Rousseau, et al., 1996). Furthermore, though, democratic states appear to provide succor to like regimes in times of crisis (see for example Raknerud and Hegre, 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997). We should expect, then, that the propensity to assist in the resolution of international disputes is positively related to the regime types of the primary crisis actors.

> *H_4: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase when the regime type of a primary crisis actor(s) reflects the democratic values of the United States.*

Alliance ties and geographical proximity have also been shown to be important in foreign policy decision-making (see for example, Sabrosky, 1980; Smith, 1996; Vasquez, 1993; Huth, 1996; Holsti, 1991; Gibler and Vasquez, 1998). Although the evidence is mixed (see for example, Singer and Small 1966; Levy, 1981; Huth, 1996), Raknerud and Hegre (1997) found that democracies were much more likely to come to each other's aid when facing a crisis situation. The United States, moreover, is in a unique spot, at least since World War II, in its commitment to its allies. As one pole in the bipolar struggle,

the U.S. perceived its own vital security interests to depend on firm alliance ties designed to constrain Soviet aggression.

> *H_5: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase when a primary crisis actor(s) is a formal ally of the United States.*

Contiguity additionally needs to be addressed inasmuch as the projection of influence is affected by geographical distance. Indeed, the propensity for two states to become involved in a dispute is substantially affected by territorial proximity (Wallensteen, 1981; Diehl, 1991; Bremer, 1990). Vasquez (1993), though, questioned the proximity evidence. He insisted that the source of conflict is not a result of contiguity, but a result of contentious territorial claims. For the U.S., boundary disputes have historically been quite rare. However, it is equally evident that the Americas, particularly Central America, have always been strategically and politically important to the United States.

> *H_6: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase as the geographic regional salience of the crisis increases.*

Political Opposition

Effective political opposition naturally constrains the implementation of a government's agenda (Gowa, 1998).[8] In the 1980s, for example, congressional Democrats expressed concern over Reagan's arms control policy. According to Sinclair (1993), the Democrats effectively mobilized a grass-roots campaign that put considerable pressure on the Reagan administration and congressional Republicans to pass a nuclear freeze resolution. The INF and START treaties were the eventual consequence of this

[8] Waltz (1967) surprisingly agreed. He concluded that, "When the distance between parties grows wider, concern for the continuity of policy abounds."

constituent pressure.[9] Given that voters appear to perceive differences among presidential candidates with regards to foreign and defense issues, and these issues play a role in a voter's choice of candidates, opposition members of Congress have an incentive to challenge presidential foreign policy decision-making (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida, 1989). This leads to a seventh hypothesis.

> *H7: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease as the strength of domestic-political opposition increases.*

Waltz (1967: 293) insisted that "the persistence of effective criticism," is "one of the most valuable qualities of the American political system." To be sure, presidents often face censure from opposition leaders on Capitol Hill. And, recently such disapproval of a president's policy prescriptions has become more common as the ideological homogeneity of the two main political parties has led to sharp differences in member preferences. Particularly with regards to the use of military force, conspicuous divisions continue to exist between the two parties. Republicans, for example, generally tend to be either hard-liners or internationalists, while Democrats have consistently gravitated towards accommodation (Holsti, 1996). As a result of this partisan conflict, rarely will a president's avowed Constitutional charge in foreign and defense policy dissuade opposition congressmen from disputing executive decision-making when they perceive a potential electoral reward for activism. For example, Reagan's heavy handed policy towards Nicaragua in the 1980s, according to Pastor (1993), was undermined by opposition from congressional Democrats who correctly perceived a public aversion for

[9] While the Freeze Resolution initially failed to pass the House in August of 1982, it was placed on the ballot in 11 states, and it passed in 10 of them (Smoke, 1987; Sinclair, 1993).

U.S. activities. It seems, then, that an independent-minded Congress can stifle vigorous executive action (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996).

Waltz (1967: 305), like many others, also recognized that the American political system, "is one of contention among strong institutions,"[10] and Milner (1997) pointed out that policy outcomes are strongly affected by the legislative power of the executive. Indeed, according to Milner (1997), executives with considerable legislative authority are able to enact policies that reflect their ideal position. However, as this authority increasingly moves into the hands of legislators, their policy preferences come to play a much larger role in determining legislative outcomes. Given Congress's clear Constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs, presidents must certainly consider the preferences of those on Capitol Hill.[11]

However, Morgan and Palmer (1997) have insisted that domestic consensus is related to systemic threat. Congressional activism should naturally increase as threat diminishes. Political opposition, then, should not only have become more constraining following the Nixon administration's attempt to reduce tensions between the two super powers through the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, but given today's international climate congressional opposition should be particularly apparent. And, evidence appears to support this conjecture. Carter (1986; 1997), for instance, recorded 105 instances of congressional activity in foreign affairs from 1992-1995. Only 668 similar events were

[10] Interestingly, since the Vietnam War the Joint Chiefs have been one of the most constraining domestic institutions with regards to the use force. Without a well-defined military objective, the Joint Chiefs rarely assent to presidential interventions (see Organski and Tammen, 1996; Gergen, 1994).

[11] According to Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), voters often balance one institution by electing a different majority to the other.

coded for the 36 years between 1946 and 1982. Presumably, then, the empirical evidence will demonstrate that the influence of domestic-political opposition varies over time.

Elections

Many scholars have posited theories tying presidential decision-making to the proximity of elections. And, elections are certainly a frequently cited motive for diversionary uses of force (Meernik and Waterman, 1996). "In order to boost their own chances of success," Meernik and Waterman (1996: 580) wrote, "presidents have been portrayed as ready to exploit their foreign policy powers to given these campaigns an added boost." Yet, the evidence fails to demonstrate that presidents shrewdly seize intervention opportunities for immediate electoral gain. Indeed, elections should seemingly tend to invoke caution in presidential decision-making. Even incumbents that face likely defeat at the polls, must realize that an increasingly media savvy electorate will be able to descry the political manipulation of international events. Jentleson (1992) in fact found the American public quite capable of discerning whether presidential interventions were guided by U.S. foreign policy interests, and Andrade and Young (1996) furthermore concluded that presidents through overt acts were only marginally able to move public opinion in a favorable direction. This leads to an eighth hypothesis.

> *H8: During a national election year, the likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease.*

Domestic Conditions

The state of the economy is the best predictor of an incumbent's electoral success (Russett, 1990). No doubt, voters are likely to hold current office holders accountable for

their pocketbook woes. This concern with economic prosperity is clearly reflected in an administration's attention to fiscal and macroeconomic policy. Naturally, scholars have hypothesized for quite some time that governments manipulate economic policy prior to national elections to produce a boost in electoral support (Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1987; Lewis-Beck, 1990). Similarly, diversionary theories have tied the use of force to downturns in a state's economic cycle. Yet, given the short-term impact and highly uncertain consequences of a foreign policy move designed to boost public approval, domestic economic problems should generally tend to be met with domestic economic solutions.

> *$H9_A$: In general, economic conditions will be positively related to conflict-resolution initiatives; as the domestic economy deteriorates, the likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease.*

Yet, economic stagnation often leads governing elites to provide quick domestic solutions to difficult policy problems. Two courses of action are often taken: protectionist measures aimed at foreign goods and services or a domestic stimulus package (Russett, 1990). Both options, though, may lead to serious disputes with other states. Tariffs and import quotas have an adverse effect on foreigners' livelihood and may consequently generate anti-American sentiment abroad, leading to more violent engagement. Similarly, domestic spending often revolves around an increase in the defense appropriation, and such investment can create unease in the minds of other leaders often leading to increasingly tepid relations.

What's more, foreign leaders may time their moves against neighboring adversaries around U.S. domestic conditions. When domestic disorder exists in the United States, these leaders may surmise that such conditions will prevent American

presidents from intervening abroad. Recently, in fact, NATO and U.S. officials suggested that Slobodan Milosevic, President of Yugoslavia, defied the negotiated truce trusting that the U.S. was sufficiently preoccupied with the impeachment trial of President Clinton (see *Washington Post*, January 18, 1999, A17). Domestic turmoil, then, such as economic dissatisfaction may be associated with foreign policy activism not because presidents are attempting to divert attention away from the domestic arena, but rather because the solutions directly affect or threaten other states, or because foreign leaders strategically time conflicts with an eye towards the U.S. economy. An alternative hypothesis, then, is also posited.

> *H_{9B}: The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will be inversely related to domestic economic conditions; as the domestic economy deteriorates, conflict-resolution initiatives will increase.*

Conclusion: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Choice

Domestic politics plays a role in the foreign policy behavior of democratic leaders. According to Steve Chan (1993: 208), though, "the analytic challenge is to identify the possibly different influences of democratic institutions under different circumstances." He additionally insisted that the international relations community must move beyond the war-or-no-war dichotomy and ask "whether democracies are also less likely to engage in a variety of conflict behavior that falls short of the threshold of war" (208).

The model of presidential decision-making presented above insists that neutral third-party interventions into foreign conflicts should be determined chiefly by the threat imposed by the international system, domestic-political opposition, and the salience of

the crisis opportunity that emerges. Drawing on structural-constraints theories of democratic decision-making in foreign affairs, I argue that domestic-political institutions tend to constrain a president from intervening as a third party in conflicts abroad. In contrast, a diversionary model offers an opposing view of the influence of domestic-political institutions. Yet, many diversionary models additionally specify the importance of systemic forces. Consequently, I have derived testable propositions from a model that recognizes both theoretical traditions.

The analysis presented in the subsequent chapters provides preliminary evidence regarding the conditions, both systemic and domestic, that lead states to intervene as a third party in ongoing interstate crises. An understanding of such decision-making is clearly crucial if we want to comprehend the decisions made by the primary states in conflict. Moreover, without specifying the role of third parties, we cannot hope to fully understand the process of conflict resolution.

In the next chapter, I further discuss operational measures of the important variables and present preliminary descriptive statistics. In Chapters Four, Five and Six, then, I evaluate the influence of these variables using Poisson, logistic, and multinomial logistic regression.

TABLE 3: Basic Operationalization of Important Theoretical Components

SYSTEMIC THREAT	*CRISIS SALIENCY*	*DOMESTIC-POLITICAL*
US Relative Power	Soviet Involvement	Political Opposition
US Military Expenditures (SQ)	Alliance Ties	National Elections
	Democracies	Unemployment
	Regional Interests	Economic Growth

TABLE 4: Hypotheses to be Tested Against ICB Data

Variable Type	*Hypothesis*	
Systemic	Hypothesis 1	*As the level of threat increases, U.S. third-party involvement in interstate crises will increase.*
	Hypothesis 2	*The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase as the distance between the ideal point of an administration and the SQ grows larger.*
Crisis Saliency	Hypothesis 3	*The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase as the salience of the crisis increases.*
	Hypothesis 4	*The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase when the regime type of a primary crisis actor(s) reflects the democratic values of the United States.*
	Hypothesis 5	*The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase when a primary crisis actor(s) is a formal ally of the U.S.*
	Hypothesis 6	*The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase as the geographic salience of the crisis increases.*
Domestic-Political	Hypothesis 7	*The likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease as the strength of domestic-political opposition increases.*
	Hypothesis 8	*During a national election year, the likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease.*
	Hypothesis 9a	*As the domestic economy deteriorates, the likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will decrease.*
	Hypothesis 9b	*As the domestic economy deteriorates, the likelihood of a presidential third-party intervention will increase.*

CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL BEGINNINGS

In this chapter, I further discuss the variables used in the statistical analyses presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. This includes providing measurable proxies for the three concepts discussed in Chapter Two: (1) systemic threat, (2) domestic-political opposition, (3) crisis saliency. I then present basic descriptive statistics for each of the operationalized variables, including time series plots, relative frequencies, and stationarity tests. Although each of my empirical chapters that follow utilizes a different statistical methodology, and at times slightly different arrays of exogenous variables, I present here a description of all the variables used in the estimation that follows. When necessary, however, additional information regarding data will be provided in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

Unit of Analysis

Neutral third-party crisis involvement is the policy choice of interest in this research. However, in order to fully explore presidential decision-making, three different statistical analyses are used. In two of the chapters, the unit of analysis is the foreign interstate crisis. In the third, the unit of analysis is the year, but the number of crises entered into becomes the object of concern.

The International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) dataset offers an appropriate set of cases to be examined. It records 412 interstate crises from 1918 to 1994. A crisis, according to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 3), is a situation in which state leaders perceive, "a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities." Most studies of crisis involvement have been confined to the primary crisis actors. Indeed, few have systematically examined the domestic and systemic determinants of neutral third-party participation (Huth, 1997 is an exception; also see Regan 1996, 1998). Such an occasion for decision presents an excellent case for evaluating presidential foreign policy choice. Not only does a crisis present a valid opportunity for a president to focus on foreign affairs, but as a third party these events avoid immediate threats to U.S. security interests or military personnel.

In the ICB data, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 849) defined third-party intervention as, "Any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself." The variable is divided into four distinct categories: (1) no U.S. activity; (2) low level U.S. activity (political, economic, propaganda); (3) covert or semi-military activity (covert activity or military aid or advisors); (4) direct military activity (dispatch of troops, air and naval assistance) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 869). In Table 5, the relative frequencies of U.S. third-party involvement are presented. Given the small number of direct military interventions, categories three and four have been collapsed together.

The time frame of the study is 1918-1994. As such, the ICB data allows for an extensive survey of presidential decision-making. Not only does it provide for a comparison of the interwar years with the post-World War II era in which the United States emerged as a superpower. It furthermore permits a comparison of crisis involvement after Vietnam in which domestic-political constraints on executive action arguably became more potent. The lengthy time series, then, affords the opportunity to investigate whether any noticeable temporal change can be found in U.S. foreign policy decision-making.

Endogenous Variables

Different dependent variables are used for each of the three empirical chapters. In Chapter Four, an event count model is presented in which the dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions into interstate conflicts each year. In Chapter Five, a dichotomous dependent variable is created that collapses the ICB code for U.S. involvement into two categories: (0) no involvement, and (1) involvement. In Chapter Six, the dependent variable is once again expanded to allow for an investigation of the level of U.S. involvement.

Event-Count Model

Figure 2 shows the total number of interstate crises per year, and the number the U.S. actively intervened with low or high levels of aid. Looking over time, there is considerable variation in U.S. conflict-resolution attempts. Not surprisingly, many more crises were reported after World War II than during the interwar years. In fact, over 76% of the crisis events occurred during or after 1948. As expected, as well, U.S. involvement

in helping resolve disputes was particularly evident after the war. Of the 67 crises from 1918 to 1938, the U.S. intervened politically, economically, or militarily in less than half (42%) of them. In contrast, the U.S. was involved in 60% of the interstate crises after 1947. So, not only was there on average more crises per year in the post-World War II era (5.26 versus 3.62), but the United States was much more likely to intervene as well.[1]

Two large spikes are also evident in U.S. involvement shown in Figure 2. The first occurred during World War II.[2] The second spike, interestingly, appears during the Carter administration. In the four year period from 1976-1980, there were 41 interstate crises and Carter involved the U.S. in 23 of them. No other administration was faced with this number of international crisis situations. In fact, Carter averaged nearly six interventions per year. Only Reagan comes close to this number with a mean of 5.25 per year from 1981 to 1984 (See Figure 3).[3] Part of the story may be tied to the number of disputes the U.S. was participating in (or not participating in) as a primary crisis actor. During the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, for instance, the U.S. was actively engaged in a substantial number of crisis situations as a primary actor (see Figure 4). This presumably limited the resources (political, economic, and military) that could potentially be used to help resolve other disputes abroad. After Vietnam, however, U.S. primary involvement appears to drop considerably. One hypothesis is that after the South East Asian experience, presidents (particularly Carter) were constrained by both

[1] The annual mean number of third-party interventions by the U.S. was over 3.0 from 1948-1994, but only 2.0 from 1918-1947. This latter number would be less than 1.5 if World War II was excluded.

[2] In Figure 2, all 412 cases have been included. However, for many descriptive statistics and for the logistic estimation presented later, World War II cases will be removed.

[3] In Figure 3, one can clearly see that opportunity varies dramatically by administration. Without controlling for this a researcher may draw incorrect inferences regarding the importance of domestic and systemic influences on foreign policy actions.

Congress's willingness to oppose executive uses of force, and the public's greater aversion for military solutions to international problems. This perhaps freed up scarce resources that could now be utilized for peace-making initiatives. In addition, given Carter's concern with international human rights, active political involvement was incorporated into his administration's foreign policy.

There are additional temporal dynamics to consider in the count series. A non-stationary series (i.e., a series with a mean and variance that grow or shrink over time) will provide both biased and inconsistent estimation results. Consequently, it is empirically necessary to examine the properties of important variables. As can be seen from the autocorrelation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation (PACF) functions presented in Figures 5 and 6, some persistence in the intervention series is evident. The significant spikes in the two figures indicate that past interventions may be influencing present intervention decisions.

The ACF measures the covariance of y_t and lag k divided by the variance of y_t:

$$\rho_k = \frac{\sum(Y_t - \bar{Y})(Y_{t+k} - \bar{Y})}{\text{var}(Y_t)}.$$

ρ_k is a unitless measure that varies between -1 and 1. The correlogram presented in Figure 5 plots ρ_k against a subsequent number of k lags. The PACF measures the correlation between time series observations controlling for the effects of all other lags. It is analogous, then, to the interpretation of a regression coefficient (Gujarati, 1995). Although one significant spike in the ACF may be expected to occur at random in 20 lags, two spikes gives cause to consider a dynamic event count specification. It may be, then, that a lag of y_t will be necessary as an exogenous variable in the event-count model

to account for potential serial correlation. A further discussion of the time series properties of this series will be presented in Chapter Four.

Logistic Model

The endogenous variable analyzed in Chapter Five is third-party crisis involvement. Specifically, given an interstate crisis, does a president determine that the United States should intervene as a neutral third party? In the analysis, then, both low-level involvement, such as political mediation, and high-level involvement, such as the contribution of U.S. peacekeeping troops, are collapsed into one category.[4] The concern in Chapter Five is with the conditions under which an executive will deploy political, economic, and military resources to help resolve a crisis overseas.

Table 6 shows the frequency of the dependent variable. As one can see, the total number of crises is only 359. This is because 53 crises have been dropped from the logistic estimation.[5] These cases correspond to ones in which the United States is a direct crisis actor. Given that the concern here is with third-party involvement, cases of primary crisis activity are removed. The 42 World War II crises will also be evaluated separately in Chapters Five and Six. Both Huth (1997) and Gelpi (1997) excluded interventions that took place during significant armed conflicts. They both insisted that intervening in disputes between countries already at war is very different than intervening in disputes

[4] There are advantages to collapsing these categories. First, by only examining the military use of force, empirical analyses may suffer from the concerns raised by Most and Starr (1989) regarding foreign policy substitutability. In grouping categories two, three, and four, I can broadly evaluate foreign policy activism. In Chapter Six, then, I provide a multinomial logit analysis of these distinct foreign policy actions.

[5] Actually, these 53 cases have been dropped from all three of the empirical chapters.

that potentially could escalate to war.[6] To prevent confounding two different decisions, specific attention will be devoted to addressing the concerns of Huth and Gelpi.

Multinomial Logistic Model

For Chapter Six, the dependent variable is expanded to three categories as illustrated in Table 5. This should allow for an assessment of low versus high involvement. Indeed, the use of these distinct foreign policy tools may not depend on the same array of covariates. Or, as is more likely, the strength of each covariate's influence on low versus high U.S. third-party involvement may be different. In fact, it does appear, as Figure 7 demonstrates, that the use of low level resources to help resolve conflicts abroad does not perfectly coincide with the high level series.

Exogenous Variables

Presidential decision-making during interstate crises is a complex process. Careful calculations must be made with regard to the salience and threat proffered by the international event, as well as the domestic support that appears to be forthcoming for or against active engagement. According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1996: 99), decisions to intervene in interstate crises have historically been influenced by factors, such as the presence of nuclear weapons, Soviet involvement, and potential sanctions from Congress. I have argued that in general three primary factors influence the decision to intervene: the salience of the crisis to U.S. interests, the threat directed at the U.S. from the international system, and the domestic-political environment (see Table 7).

[6] According to Huth (1997: 18), "The political and military risks of intervention are clearly much greater in [crises where the states are already at war]." Consequently, the decision calculus could be different.

Systemic Threat

U.S. Relative Power

Relative military power is measured in two different, though similar ways. First, I construct a ratio of military expenditures each year for the U.S. and U.S.S.R.: $\frac{U.S.\ MilitaryExpenditures}{U.S.\ MilitaryExpenditures + U.S.S.R.\ MilitaryExpenditures}$. Second, I take America's share of the system's military expenditures for each year: $\frac{U.S.\ MilitaryExpenditures}{TotalSystemMilitaryExpenditures}$. Third, the system measure is repeated for military personnel. All three variables are also lagged 1 year to ensure that the crises themselves are not contributing to the military allocations (Goertz, 1994). Figure 8 illustrates the ratio of U.S. military expenditures to the Soviet Union's over time, while Figure 9 shows the system measures. Clearly, all three indicators are highly correlated. Presumably, then, they are measuring the same forces at work. There also appears to be a structural break during World War II, and the event count model will attempt to control for this by including a temporal dummy variable for the years 1939-1945.

System Level

The ICB dataset provides a measure for the salience of, or the potential threat created by, these crisis events. This system level variable accounts broadly for the types of states involved in the crises. The most important of the categories coded by this variable is the dominant system which indicates when the crisis involves the interaction of major powers. Subsystem crises, in contrast, only involve regional states. According to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997:26-27), "crisis actors will behave with greater caution in

dominant system and mainly dominant system crises...because the stakes are higher, the constraints are more visible, and vulnerability to pressure from the major powers is greater." As Table 8 shows, over 70% of the crises occurred in a subsystem, while only 13.9% involved states that belong to the dominant or mainly dominant system.

Status Quo

Morgan and Palmer (1997) proposed a conceptualization of foreign policy that focused on how states allocate scarce resources in promoting and preserving the national interest. Their model is heavily based on the growth or decline in a state's military capabilities.[7] In times of rapid growth, a state will adopt an active foreign policy agenda that seeks to revise internationally and regionally recognized status quos. In times of sharp decline, a state will tend to curtail its international commitments.[8]

As with Morgan and Palmer (1997), satisfaction with the status quo is measured using military expenditures. However, given the non-stationary properties of this series, the variable is first differenced to control for spurious inferences (see Figure 10). It also is lagged 1 year.

Temporal Variables

Three temporal dummy variables are also created to assess broad changes in the international system and in U.S. relative power. These three variables are: (1) super

[7] Other operational measures of the status quo include the similarity of alliance portfolios, money market discount rates, and past involvement in militarized disputes.
[8] Bremer (1980) found military capabilities to be positively associated with armed conflict.

power[9], (2) post-Vietnam War, (3) post-Cold War. Each is designed to test broadly whether U.S. third-party intervention tends to vary systematically over time depending on systemic trends. Gowa (1998) similarly used a dichotomous categorization to broadly capture system change, threat level, and U.S. military capabilities. The change from a multipolar to a bipolar international environment is the most significant and obvious change to occur in the time series. However, additional dummies for the post-Vietnam era and the post-Cold War era are included to capture further changes in system structure.

Domestic-Political

Divided Government

Political opposition is measured initially through the use of a proxy variable coding for divided government. To capture slightly more information than a simple dichotomous dummy, a three category variable is constructed that attempts to get at the strength of political opposition. Specifically, the variable is coded: (1) unified Congress and executive, (2) executive and one house are the same party, (3) both houses of Congress and the executive are controlled by different parties. The distribution of the variable is skewed away from the middle range. 58% of the years between 1918 and 1994 involved a unified federal government, while 31% involved complete divided government. In only eight years was the president faced with one house of Congress

[9] To be sure, the precise year following World War II when the U.S. should be deemed a super power is debatable. Gowa (1998) established 1949, when NATO was created, as the demarcation year. I have selected 1948 given the fact that in this year heavy sums of foreign aid were already being sent to Turkey and Greece to prevent Soviet expansion. It's clear that the U.S. had decided by 1948 to take an active role in world affairs. Indeed, according to Ruttan (1996: 3), President Truman "identified the Greek Civil War as part of an ongoing struggle between democracy and dictatorship. He asked Congress not only to appropriate funds to aid Greece and Turkey, but also for support of a commitment to containing the

controlled by the opposition party. Six of these years occurred during the Reagan administration, where Republicans held the Senate. The only other period where one house differed was 1931-32. President Hoover lost the House to the Democrats in the elections of 1930.[10]

Seats of President's Party in Congress

An alternative specification is also used to get at political opposition. Two variables are constructed measuring the number of seats held by the president's party in the Senate and in the House (see Figure 11). Given the high collinearity between these two variables and the dummy variable for divided government, only one can be included in any model of U.S. third-party intervention.

National Elections

National elections is constructed as a dichotomous variable that equals one for the year of congressional (i.e., off-presidential year) elections. An alternative specification equals one only during the year of a presidential election. I additionally code for whether any differences emerge when controlling for U.S. engagement in armed conflicts. Korea and Vietnam are the two conflicts that are of interest here, so as to provide a comparison with earlier diversionary research. Including this variable is an attempt to test further

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expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union." As Gowa (1998) finds, though, few differences emerge when any year from 1945 to 1950 is used as the point of reference.

[10] The level of partisanship is an additional variable that gets at political opposition. It is measured as the percentage of total congressional roll-call votes that involved the majorities of both parties voting in opposite directions (i.e., party-unity votes). This variable is incorporated in the logistic analysis presented in Chapter Five. While the variable is calculated from all recorded votes and not simply those occurring on issues of foreign and defense policy, it most likely presents a fairly accurate picture of the overall level of conflict between the two parties.

Stoll's (1984) findings, and Fordham's (1998) more recent evidence regarding presidential uses of force, elections, and on-going wars.

Unemployment

Unemployment data are taken from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years). It is measured as the percentage of the workforce not employed, and the data series runs from 1934 to 1994 (see Figure 12).

Economic Growth

Growth data are taken from Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). This series is measured as the percent change in the gross national product, and the series runs from 1918 to 1994 (see Figure 13).

Presidential Approval

Presidential approval measures the percentage of the public approving of the president's handling of his job. This series runs from 1935-1994 and is taken from the Gallup Survey. An average of polls taken in a year is used for the event-count analysis. For the logit and multinomial logit models, the survey closest to, but not after, a given crisis is used.

Crisis Saliency

Soviet Involvement

A variable based on the level of Soviet involvement in a crisis is included to get at salience. This variable is coded analogously to the original ICB code for U.S. third-party

involvement defined on page two of this chapter. Salience is assumed to increase as Soviet involvement increases.

Alliance Ties

Using the COW Alliance dataset (see Bennett, 1997), any primary crisis actor involved in a defense pact or entente with the United States is coded as an ally. 18% of the ICB crises involved a formal U.S. ally. Once again, crises involving U.S. allies are assumed to be of greater salience.

Democracies

To account for cooperative behavior on the part of democracies (see for example, Raknerud and Hegre, 1997), a dummy variable is constructed that indicates whether at least one of the primary crisis actors is a democracy. The Polity III data file is used to determine a state's democracy level. A six or above on the democracy score is used as the selection criterion for a democratic regime. Over 38% of the crises involved at least one democratic regime.

Nuclear Powers

Nuclear weapons are an additional factor influencing U.S. intervention policy. According to Kegley and Wittkopf (1996), U.S. involvement has been strongly discouraged when states possessing the atomic bomb are participants. A dummy variable is created that equals 1 if any state involved in a crisis is a suspected nuclear power. ICB codes the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France, China, South Africa, India, and Pakistan as nuclear powers after certain specific dates. ICB has a four category variable for nuclear

capability: (1) non-nuclear capability, (2) foreseeable nuclear capability, (3) nuclear capable, (4) developed nuclear capability. A three or four on this variable was used as the determining criterion for whether a primary crisis actor was considered a nuclear power.

Regional Interests

An interesting dynamic is the regional dispersion of these interstate crises, and the salience of regional subsystems to U.S. national interests. Pickering and Thompson (1998) found similar variation in the geographic spread of military interventions, with the Middle East representing an intense locus of subsystem activity (see Table 9). I find that a large number of interstate crises similarly occurred in the Middle East. However, the dispersion becomes much more evenly distributed after those cases have been removed. Southeast Asia, East and Southern Africa, and Central America were also particularly hot in terms of crisis activity.

U.S. involvement also varies dramatically by region. While the number of crises that received American involvement was highest in the Middle East, as a percent of the total crises occurring in a region, Central and South America were clearly the two subsystems that U.S. presidents were most willing to aid in the resolution of foreign crises.[11] This is also not terribly surprising. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, America's interests have always been closely tied to the western hemisphere, and the evidence presented in Table 9 appears to confirm this. Yet, Table 9 additional shows that America's interests abroad grew after World War II. The United States was much more active in Europe and the Middle East during the Cold War struggle than prior to it. The

Middle East, which was largely ignored by the U.S. prior to World War II, received a particularly high level of attention during and after the Cold War. In both eras, Africa received little aid from the U.S. in the resolution of its conflicts. Of the 101 crises that occurred in Africa from 1918-1994, the United States intervened in less than 45% of them.[12]

To examine the regional effects on crisis involvement, various dummy variables are created for three separate areas: (1) Europe, (2) Americas (Central and South), (3) Africa.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I operationalized the important concepts in my theoretical model. The measurement of these variables was then discussed and basic descriptives, time series graphs, and frequency plots were presented. The issue of temporal dependence was also addressed and dealt with by differencing certain key variables.

There has been little attention given to the determinants of American involvement in interstate disputes as a third-party participant. Indeed, we know little about presidential decision-making during these types of international events. Under what domestic and systemic circumstances will a president use U.S. resources and expend political capital to help resolve a regional dispute? The research presented here, then, is intended to help address a neglected area of foreign policy decision-making.

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[11] Table 10 additionally shows that the level of U.S. third-party involvement varies systematically by geographic region.

[12] As a direct crisis actor the regional distribution is quite similar. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the crises the U.S. was involved in as a primary actor occurred in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or Central America.

Admittedly, a focus on U.S. foreign policy decision-making naturally limits the scope of my inferences. Huth's approach, examining great power involvement, offers greater generalizability. Yet, Huth was unable to pay close attention to domestic-political variables, which is a primary concern of my research. Furthermore, as a principal member of the international system with particular characteristics of interest to this study, the United States, as James and Hristoulas (1994: 340) similarly argued, "emerges as a balanced case with which to begin testing" (also see Risse-Kappen, 1991). Indeed, given its active involvement in the international system and its particular constitutional structure, the United States presents a suitable nation to test the relationship between systemic and domestic-level forces. In addition, as Most and Starr (1989:119) have pointed out, "the factors that create or preclude different [foreign policy] options are differentially distributed across states and even within states through time." Consequently, to avoid mixing apples and oranges, a focus on a single country seems to be an appropriate first step.

In the next three chapters, the variables defined above will be examined to uncover the direction and importance of their influence on U.S. third-party crisis intervention.

TABLE 5: Frequency of United States Involvement as a Third Party in Interstate Crises, 1918-1994

U.S. Involvement	*Frequency*	*Percent*
No Involvement	149	41.5%
Low-Level Involvement[a]	146	40.7%
High-Level Involvement[b]	64	17.8%

[a] Low-level involvement includes both political and economic activities.
[b] High-level involvement includes both covert and direct military activity, plus direct foreign aid or advisors.

TABLE 6: Frequency of United States Involvement as a Third Party in Interstate Crises, 1918-1994

*U.S. Involvement**	*Frequency*	*Percent*
No	149	41.5%
Yes	210	58.5%

* Involvement includes military, economic, and political.

TABLE 7: Operationalization of Important Theoretical Components (Additional Exogenous-Variable Specifications)

SYSTEMIC THREAT	*CRISIS SALIENCY*	*DOMESTIC-POLITICAL*
US/USSR Relative Power	Soviet Involvement	Divided Government
US Military Expenditures	Alliance Ties	Seats of President's Party in Congress
System Level	Democracies	National Elections
US Military Personnel/System Military Personnel	Nuclear Powers	Unemployment
US Military Expenditures/System Military Expenditures	Regional Interests	Presidential Approval
		Economic Growth

TABLE 8: Frequencies and Relative Frequencies for System Level

System Level	*Frequency*	*Percent*
Subsystem	262	73.0%
Mainly Subsystem	47	13.1%
Mainly Dominant System	22	6.1%
Dominant System	28	7.8%

TABLE 9: Regional Variation in Interstate Crises and U.S. Involvement, 1918-1994

	1918-1938	*1939-1945*	*1946-1962*	*1963-1988*	*1989-1994*	*Total*
Central Asia	25.0%	—	—	100.0%	50.0%	43.8%
	(N=4)	(N=0)	(N=0)	(N=1)	(N=2)	(N=7)
East Asia	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	—	—	100.0%
	(N=8)	(N=5)	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=0)	(N=14)
South-East Asia	—	100.0%	77.8%	53.8%	0.0%	63.0%
	(N=0)	(N=3)	(N=9)	(N=13)	(N=2)	(N=27)
South Asia	0.0%	—	45.5%	66.7%	100.0%	52.6%
	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=11)	(N=6)	(N=1)	(N=19)
Middle East	18.2%	100.0%	80.0%	67.6%	100.0%	65.7%
	(N=11)	(N=4)	(N=15)	(N=34)	(N=3)	(N=67)
West Africa	—	—	0.0%	22.2%	50.0%	25.0%
	(N=0)	(N=0)	(N=3)	(N=9)	(N=4)	(N=16)
North Africa	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	50.0%	—	60.0%
	(N=1)	(N=1)	(N=4)	(N=14)	(N=0)	(N=20)
East Africa	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	38.1%	0.0%	34.6%
	(N=1)	(N=1)	(N=2)	(N=21)	(N=1)	(N=26)
Southern Africa	—	—	—	59.3%	—	59.3%
	(N=0)	(N=0)	(N=0)	(N=27)	(N=0)	(N=27)
Central Africa	—	—	100.0%	33.3%	100.0%	42.9%
	(N=0)	(N=0)	(N=1)	(N=12)	(N=1)	(N=14)
East Europe	28.6%	57.1%	100.0%	100.0%	—	50.0%
	(N=14)	(N=7)	(N=4)	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=26)
Central Europe	27.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	57.9%
	(N=11)	(N=2)	(N=3)	(N=1)	(N=2)	(N=19)
West Europe	50.0%	100.0%	—	100.0%	—	71.4%
	(N=4)	(N=2)	(N=0)	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=7)
North Europe	50.0%	50.0%	33.3%	66.7%	—	50.0%
	(N=2)	(N=2)	(N=3)	(N=3)	(N=0)	(N=10)
Southern Europe	0.0%	25.0%	100.0%	71.4%	—	50.0%
	(N=8)	(N=4)	(N=3)	(N=7)	(N=0)	(N=22)
Central America	100.0%	—	66.7%	70.0%	—	75.0%
	(N=5)	(N=0)	(N=9)	(N=10)	(N=0)	(N=24)
South America	75.0%	100.0%	—	87.5%	100.0%	85.7%
	(N=4)	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=8)	(N=1)	(N=14)
Total	40.5%	84.4%	67.6%	57.1%	64.7%	58.5%
	(N=74)	(N=32)	(N=68)	(N=168)	(N=17)	(N=359)

NOTE: Cells give the percentage of crises in a given region during a specific time period that the U.S. was involved in.

TABLE 10: Regional Variation in the Level of U.S. Third-Party Crisis Involvement 1918-1994

	No Involvement	*Low Involvement*	*High Involvement*	*Total*
Central Asia	4	2	1	7
East Asia	0	10	4	14
South-East Asia	10	10	7	27
South Asia	9	8	2	19
Middle East	23	32	12	67
West Africa	12	4	0	16
North Africa	8	5	7	20
East Africa	17	4	5	26
Southern Africa	11	15	1	27
Central Africa	8	2	4	14
East Europe	13	11	2	26
Central Europe	8	8	3	19
West Europe	2	3	2	7
North Europe	5	5	0	10
Southern Europe	11	8	3	24
Central America	6	8	10	24
South America	2	11	1	14
Total	149	146	64	359

NOTE: Cells give the percentage of crises in a given region during a specific time period that the U.S. was involved in.



FIGURE 2: U.S. Neutral Third-Party Interventions by Year, 1918-1994



FIGURE 3: U.S. Neutral Third-Party Interventions by President, 1918-1994



FIGURE 4: Interstate Crises Involving the U.S. as a Primary Actor, 1918-1994



FIGURE 5: ACF of U.S. Neutral Third-Party Involvement



FIGURE 6: PACF of U.S. Neutral Third-Party Involvement



FIGURE 7: U.S. Political and Military Involvement in Interstate Crises, 1918-1994

FIGURE 8: Ratio of U.S. Military Expenditures to Soviet Expenditures, 1918-1994



FIGURE 9: U.S. Share of International System's Military Expenditures, 1918-1994

FIGURE 10: U.S. Military Expenditures (First Difference), 1918-1994



FIGURE 11: House and Senate Seats Held by the President's Party, 1918-1994



FIGURE 12: U.S. Unemployment Rate, 1934-1994



FIGURE 13: Percent Change in the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP), 1918-1994

CHAPTER 4

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES: POISSON REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that U.S. third-party interventions into ongoing crises vary substantially over the 1918-1994 time period. And, at first glance, it appears that U.S. activity may be driven largely by changes in the structure of the international system. The absolute number of U.S. interventions is considerably different after World War II than during the interwar period. Also, U.S. foreign policy activism increased during 1918 and after 1936. So, this aspect of U.S. foreign policy decision-making may be chiefly determined by the threat the United States faces from the distribution of power within the international system.

Gowa (1998) similarly found U.S. foreign policy decision-making to be unrelated to domestic-political conditions. She observed no partisan differences in the use of force, and neither elections nor the economic growth rate had an influence on the propensity of the U.S. to become engaged in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs).[1] She did find, though, that America's place within the international system had a large impact on the

[1] According to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996: 169), a MID is a "single military action involving an explicit threat, display, or use of force by one system member state towards another system member state." Furthermore, they are "confrontations that [lead] politicians to invest energy, attention, resources, and credibility in a effort to thwart, resist, intimidate, discredit or damage those representing the other side" (p. 166).

number of yearly MID engagements. As a superpower, U.S. MID involvement was considerably higher than the previous 170 years of American history. In this chapter, I examine whether broad yearly trends in U.S. foreign policy behavior can be explained by systemic factors alone, or whether domestic-political concerns play a role in executive decision-making. I should emphasize that the foreign policy decisions analyzed in this dissertation do not involve the United States as a primary participant in quarrels with other states. I investigate only crises in which the U.S. comes to the aid of a state or states already involved in a conflict. The U.S., then, is a neutral third-party player in these disputes.

Below, I use Poisson regression to examine the conditions surrounding U.S. third-party intervention into ongoing interstate crises. I first discuss the nature of the model and additional temporal dynamics of the dependent variable. Then, I test both domestic and systemic variables on yearly interventions. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of my findings.

The Poisson Model

The dependent variable is the number of neutral third-party interventions by the U.S. each year, from 1918-1994. Consequently, the nature of this series (e.g., the data are discrete rather than continuous) and its distribution suggest that an event-count model is appropriate for statistical estimation. Appendix B presents a histogram of U.S. third-party interventions. As is clear, the data largely follow a Poisson distribution. In essence, the data can be thought of as a series of Bernoulli trials which occur within a specified amount of time, where it is assumed that each observation is independent of all others

(Lindsey, 1995). So, we have a unit of measurement that is explicitly defined and non-changing (Δt). Here, it is the year. The variable of interest is the number of events, or third-party interventions, that occur within this specified period of time.

We are interested in λ, which represents the average number of events per time interval (i.e., the year). This number is the rate at which an event occurs on average (Lindsey, 1995). Now, according to King (1989: 50), the Poisson model further depends on three core assumptions. First, only one event occurs at any given instant. Second, the events are independent of one another. And third, the length of each time period is the same. With these first principles defined, and if λ is defined as the rate, a model of an event occurring during a specified amount of time is as follows:

$$P[Y_i = y_i] = \frac{e^{-\lambda t}(\lambda t)^{y_i}}{y_i!}$$

where λ is the mean number of interventions per year, y_i is the observed count and e is the natural log. To evaluate the parameters of interest, namely the betas, λ is respecified as a function of the theorized exogenous variables of influence. In other words, $E[y_i] = \lambda = f(x_i, \beta)$.

Theoretically, the mean number of interventions per year (i.e., the rate) is also supposed to remain constant across temporal intervals. That is, as Gary King (1989: 50) wrote, "the rate of event occurrence λ remains constant, or at least unresponsive to y_i, over the observation period." However, Figure 2 shows that such an assumption is perhaps unwarranted. Whether this variability in λ is problematic for estimation remains unclear. A solution may be the use of an alternative distribution; the negative binomial. If

overdispersion is present (i.e., the observations are not independent) then the negative binomial model will provide more accurate coefficient estimates.

Poisson Regression: 1918-1994

The purpose of the following event-count estimation is to broadly examine the influence of both systemic and domestic conditions on U.S. third-party crisis intervention. With such an econometric framework, specific characteristics of each conflict cannot be taken into account. Consequently, this model is unable to capture the salience of each crisis, a variable stressed in Chapter Two. However, Chapter Five addresses the issue of salience and therefore provides an opportunity to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Poisson approach.

In Table 11, I present the results of a basic model of U.S. third-party intervention. The five variables included in this model are meant to coincide closely with those specified by Gowa (1998). Similar to Gowa (1998), I find that the year of a presidential election does not incite a greater number of interventions, nor does the existence of divided government. I also find, consistent with Gowa (1998), that there was a temporal shift following World War II, with a significantly larger number of interventions occurring during the Cold War than during the interwar period. Interestingly, the percent change in the gross national product appears to be significantly related to third-party conflict intervention, a relationship that Gowa (1998) did not observe with regards to U.S. MID involvement. That is, the overall strength of the economy does influence presidential decision-making. As domestic economic conditions improve (i.e., the growth

rate increases), presidents are less likely to intervene abroad. This supports Hypothesis 9_b from Chapter Two.

Conceivably, this latter result indicates that executives are timing interventions during economic downturns. However, it may be that fewer opportunities arise when domestic conditions are strong. Foreign state leaders may attempt to satisfy their aggressive ambitions by initiating a conflict when these leaders believe U.S. attention will be focused on domestic concerns. Certainly, the logic of Smith's (1996) argument, that states should time their strategic military moves when their opponent's allies are least likely to come to their aid, supports such an interpretation.[2]

Caution must be used in interpreting the results of this initial event-count model. The goodness-of-fit test indicates that the data do not efficiently fit a Poisson process. One potential problem is that the model suffers from underspecification. Systemic change following Vietnam and the end of the Cold War are not controlled for in the model. In addition, while the event-count series does not appear to be non-stationary, there still may be an autoregressive component to the data that needs to be addressed with a lag variable.

Table 12 presents the results of a more fully specified model. From the goodness-of-fit statistic, it appears that the model has improved, although it continues to show some fit problems. The significance of the AR(1) component, however, does cast doubt on the claim that the series suffers from serial correlation.[3] To test whether the autoregressive component affects the post-World War II era only, the lag was interacted with the dummy

[2] In fact, NATO and U.S. officials have suggested that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic based recent military moves on the domestic turmoil being experienced in the U.S. (see *Washington Post*, January 8, 1999: A17).

variable for this temporal break. Once again, though, no serial correlation was detected. Based on these results, the dependent variable lag was removed from the further analyses presented below.

Table 13 presents a model without the lag variable. The results of this model provide further support for the importance of systemic factors.[4] Not only is the propensity to intervene greater during the Cold War, but the two additional temporal variables are significant as well. It seems that in the post-Cold War era third-party interventions have declined. This naturally follows from the overall decline in interstate (but perhaps not intrastate) conflict. But, it may also be that U.S. activism has waned in the wake of the Cold War. Certainly with significant budget cuts in defense and international affairs spending, the U.S. has considerably fewer resources to be able to effectively address emerging crisis situations abroad.

The post-Vietnam War dummy is also interesting. Not only is there a significant increase in the number of interventions between 1974 and 1988, but this comes during a time when presidential foreign policy making arguably became more constrained by congressional assertiveness and political opposition. It is true, though, that both Carter and Reagan were actively engaged in foreign affairs. Carter made conflict resolution a core goal of his administration and Reagan used political, economic and military assistance to increase pressure on Soviet Union. Consequently, the direct use of force

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[3] A negative binomial model was also run to explore whether the independence of observations assumption was violated. No overdispersion in the data was evident.

[4] Alternative measures of threat were constructed to help capture some of the annual variability in third-party interventions. Not only was the U.S. percentage of military expenditures and personnel used, but a lag of the number of MID involvements was additionally created to help capture perceptions of threat. No one proxy was superior across all models.

may have declined during this post-Vietnam period, but third-party interventions appear to have increased sharply.

From the models presented thus far, domestic factors appear relatively unimportant in determining U.S. third-party interventions. Both political opposition and election years are statistically unrelated to presidential decision-making. However, in Table 14 separate analyses are run for different specifications of the election-year dummy and some interesting differences do emerge. It appears that off-presidential election years are particularly influential in presidential decision-making. This supports Hypothesis 8. Presidents seem unwilling to attend to foreign policy issues during these national elections when congressmen may have an electoral incentive to challenge executive initiatives. So, it is precisely during an election year in which a president is not running for office that we observe the strongest electoral effects. Not only are presidents concerned about congressional opposition, as Eisenhower and Dulles expressed during the Off-shore Islands crisis in 1954, but presidents are also busy campaigning for fellow partisans on the Hill, leaving little time for attention to crises occurring overseas (Russett, 1990).

In Table 15, a different measure of political opposition is included. While systemic factors continue to remain influential in this model, off-presidential year elections, the number of Senate seats held by the president's party, and GNP are also related to third-party interventions. In fact, both elections and the growth rate are strongly associated with the decision to intervene. The number of Senate seats, while admittedly not significant at a .05 level, may play some role in presidential decision-making of this

kind.[5] Certainly, anecdotal accounts indicate that more seats for a president's party in the upper chamber provide him with greater political support, which allows him increased flexibility to act in foreign affairs. As political support drops in the upper chamber, though, a president is less likely to support potentially costly attempts at conflict resolution. This supports arguments made by Nincic (1992) and Mintz (1993), both of whom insisted that presidents require domestic support for foreign policy success. The directions of influence of these domestic-political variables also support a structural-constraints view of democratic decision-making rather than a diversionary one. Indeed, rather than inciting foreign policy activism, domestic opposition appears to draw executive attention away from issues of foreign affairs.

Partisan Effects

Gowa (1998) found few differences across presidential administrations with regards to MID involvement. Indeed, only when the U.S. was the revisionist state (i.e., the state which challenges the status quo) was a party effect found. She observed that unified Democratic governments were less likely to challenge the status quo than their Republican counterparts. However, when Gowa (1998) further controlled for the level of the U.S. challenge, it was observed that the party difference was only present for threats and shows of force, but not the actual use of military force. So, her evidence suggests that Republican administrations may be more willing to rattle the sword, but no more willing to commit troops to actual combat situations.

[5] Presidential party support in the House of Representatives was also examined. The direction of the relationship was the same as the Senate variable; however, the statistical significance of the House was never as strong.

Evidence in Table 16 also shows a partisan effect with regards to third-party intervention. However, the direction of the relationship is contrary to Gowa's (1998) results. Democratic administrations appear to possess a greater propensity to engage in peacemaking efforts than their Republican counterparts. Given that Democrats tend to be more dovish than Republicans (Holsti, 1996), these administrations may be actively directing their foreign policy agendas toward conflict resolution. If true, then these results may in fact square with Gowa's (1998) findings. Republicans may focus more heavily on a realist-centered military strategy, while Democrat administrations show a greater concern for an internationalist peacemaking role.

President Effects

If one examines individual administration effects, some interesting results appear. The 1920s, for example, were a time of international isolationism, even when it came to conflict intervention. All three Republican administrations showed a propensity to ignore interstate crisis situations abroad. Roosevelt continued this policy during his first four years in office, but was increasingly forced to attend to foreign affairs as the conflicts in Europe grew in importance. The only other administrations to show noticeable differences were the Kennedy-Johnson administrations and the Nixon-Ford administrations that followed. Kennedy and Johnson appeared more likely to intervene as a third party than other administrations, while both Nixon and Ford demonstrated a propensity to ignore conflict resolution. I should also note that Carter and Reagan demonstrated a greater likelihood of intervening in crisis situations abroad. But, the temporal dummy for the post-Vietnam War tends to obscure any individual effects.

Conclusion

There is a need to comprehensively understand the role that third parties play in helping to resolve crisis situations. An initial step in this research is to address the conditions that lead U.S. administrations to contribute aid to emerging interstate conflicts abroad. In this chapter, an event-count analysis was used to assess the broad yearly influence of system and domestic-level factors on U.S. third-party crisis intervention. It was argued in Chapter Two that systemic threat should tend to increase attempts at conflict resolution, while domestic-political conditions should constrain executives from addressing crises abroad. Multiple models were presented in this chapter and comparisons were made to Gowa's (1998) work. Domestic-political and systemic forces were both found to influence foreign policy decision-making of this kind. Not only was the systemic environment of the Cold War found to increase the likelihood of third-party intervention, but the atmosphere of the post-Cold War world has had the opposite effect, both of which support Proposition 1. On the domestic side, elections, economic conditions, and political opposition all were found to be influential in the foreign policy decision-making of a president. The evidence further indicated that both elections and political opposition tend to dissuade American executives from becoming involved in these developing crisis situations. This supports Proposition 3 and a structural-constraints theory of democratic decision-making in foreign affairs.

The economic growth rate was also found to be significantly related to third-party interventions. The direction of this relationship indicates that economic conditions may be used by foreign leaders as an indicator for a president's near-term commitment to domestic issues versus issues of foreign policy. Consequently, U.S. domestic conditions

may enter into the decision calculus of foreign leaders preparing to initiate aggressive military moves.

In conclusion, then, this Chapter has provided some initial evidence relating to the determinants of U.S. third-party decision-making. Two extensions, however, should be made to the event-count analysis. First, the salience of these individual crises to the U.S. undoubtedly plays an important role in the decision to intervene (see Carment and Rowlands, 1998). Not only should the importance of a crisis affect third-party decision-making, but salience will also likely play a role in the level of commitment made by the third party, as well. The second extension, then, must attend to the multifarious strategies available to third parties (i.e., knowing not only when third parties intervene, but how they intervene, as well). This will help provide a more comprehensive account of both conflict escalation and conflict resolution. Chapters Five and Six will in part address both of these concerns.

TABLE 11: Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on U.S. Third-Party Crisis Intervention, 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	.36	.21	1.75	.081
Presidential Election Year	Domestic	-.03	.16	-.18	.858
GNP Growth	Domestic	-.03	.01	-2.25	.024
Divided Government	Domestic	.01	.09	.10	.924
Super-power	Systemic	.86	.21	4.03	.000
World War II	Systemic	1.40	.29	4.77	.000

N = 77
Log-likelihood: -148.21
χ^2 (5) = 28.57 (.0000)

Pseudo R^2 = .088
Goodness-of-fit (71) = 104.6 (.006)

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

TABLE 12: Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on U.S. Third-Party Crisis Intervention With Additional Temporal Dummies (Lag Variable Included), 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	.18	.25	.75	.455
Presidential Election Year	Domestic	-.04	.16	-.25	.800
GNP Growth	Domestic	-.03	.02	-1.92	.054
Divided Government	Domestic	.05	.09	.50	.621
Super-power	Systemic	.71	.25	2.80	.005
World War II	Systemic	1.46	.33	4.45	.000
Post-Vietnam War	Systemic	.56	.19	2.94	.003
Post-Cold War	Systemic	-.85	.33	-2.55	.011
Dependent Variable Lag	---	.02	.04	.49	.622

N = 76
Log-likelihood: -136.52
χ^2 (8) = 48.15 (.0000)
Pseudo R^2 = .15
Goodness-of-fit (67) = 84.47 (.07)

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

TABLE 13: Poisson Regression of Domestic and Systemic Variables on U.S. Third-Party Crisis Intervention With Additional Temporal Dummies (Lag Variable Excluded), 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	.34	.21	1.63	.103
Presidential Election Year	Domestic	-.06	.16	-.39	.694
GNP Growth	Domestic	-.03	.01	-2.11	.035
Divided Government	Domestic	.03	.09	.34	.732
Super-power	Systemic	.64	.23	2.77	.006
World War II	Systemic	1.39	.29	4.74	.000
Post-Vietnam	Systemic	.61	.17	3.50	.000
Post-Cold War	Systemic	-.89	.32	-2.83	.005

N = 77
Log-likelihood: -140.35
χ^2 (7) = 44.28 (.0000)
Pseudo R^2 = .14
Goodness-of-fit (69) = 88.87 (.05)

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

TABLE 14: Poisson Regression Evaluating Different Election-year Specifications, 1918-1994

Variable	*Model A*	*Model B*	*Model C*
Constant	.34	.51*	.52*
	(.21)	(.22)	(.22)
Presidential Election Year	-.06	—	—
	(.16)		
National Election Year	—	-.34*	—
		(.14)	
Off-Presidential Election Year	—	—	-.47*
			(.19)
GNP Growth	-.03*	-.03*	-.04*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Divided Government	.03	.02	-.01
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Super-power	.64**	.65**	.66**
	(.23)	(.23)	(.23)
World War II	1.39**	1.36**	1.33**
	(.29)	(.29)	(.29)
Post-Vietnam	.61**	.59**	.58**
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)
Post-Cold War	-.89**	-.89**	-.83**
	(.32)	(.32)	(.32)
	N = 77	*N = 77*	*N = 77*
	LL = -140.35	*LL = -137.41*	*LL = -136.99*
	χ^2 (7) = 44.28 (.000)	*χ^2 (7) = 50.16 (.000)*	*χ^2 (7) = 51.00 (.000)*
	Pseudo R^2 = .14	*Pseudo R^2 = .15*	*Pseudo R^2 = .16*

NOTE: Standard errors are in parantheses. The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

**p ≤ .01, two-tailed test.

*p ≤ .05, two-tailed test.

TABLE 15: Poisson Regression with Alternative Specification for Political Opposition, 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-.13	.50	-.26	.791
Off-Presidential Election Year	Domestic	-.51	.02	-2.70	.007
GNP Growth	Domestic	-.04	.02	-2.65	.008
Senate Seats	Domestic	.01	.01	1.35	.178
Super-power	Systemic	.72	.23	3.15	.002
World War II	Systemic	1.30	.29	4.45	.000
Post-Vietnam	Systemic	.58	.17	3.33	.001
Post-Cold War	Systemic	-.79	.32	-2.50	.012

N = 77
Log-likelihood: -136.10
χ^2 (7) = 52.78 (.0000)
Pseudo R^2 = .16
Goodness-of-fit (69) = 80.37 (.17)

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

TABLE 16: Poisson Regression Examining the Role of the Party of the President, 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	.86	.29	2.99	.003
Off-Presidential Election Year	Domestic	-.48	.19	-2.55	.011
GNP Growth	Domestic	-.04	.01	-2.56	.010
Party of the Executive	Domestic	-.24	.15	-1.59	.112
Super-power	Systemic	.66	.22	2.96	.003
World War II	Systemic	1.23	.30	4.15	.000
Post-Vietnam	Systemic	.63	.18	3.56	.000
Post-Cold War	Systemic	-.84	.31	-2.37	.008

N = 77 *Pseudo R^2 = .17*
Log-likelihood: -35.75 *Goodness-of-fit (69) = 79.67 (.18)*
χ^2 (7) = 53.48 (.0000)

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of U.S. third-party interventions per year. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

CHAPTER 5

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

In Chapter Two I presented a structural-constraints model of U.S. third-party intervention policy. Drawing on the democratic peace proposition and research by Huth (1997), Morgan and Palmer (1997), and Regan (1998), I developed a theory of third-party crisis intervention that incorporates both systemic and domestic factors into the decision calculus of a president. Not only did I suggest that the relationship between a president's foreign policy choice and the domestic and international contexts should be dynamic (evolving over time)[1], but contrary to diversionary theories I argued that domestic-political institutions, such as Congress and national elections, should dissuade presidents from initiating peace-making endeavors.

In Chapter Four, I presented results from an event-count model of U.S. third-party intervention into foreign interstate crises. I found, contrary to Gowa (1998), that domestic factors are not entirely irrelevant in influencing a president's decision to intervene. In fact, domestic-political factors, such as the year of national elections and economic

[1] Two types of dynamics are important. First, there are changes over time in the relationship between the exogenous and endogenous variables. That dynamism is of particular interest in this study. Second, though, is the recursive relationship between the dependent variable and an independent variable. DeRouen (1995) hypothesized that such a relationship exists between the use of force and presidential approval. While the conflict itself may indeed influence such factors as duration and troop commitment, it could clearly not

indicators, do play a role in U.S. third-party interventions. However, it certainly is true that broad systemic changes appeared to have the largest impact on U.S. foreign policy activism.

Nonetheless, the inability to control for the salience of individual crises is a clear weakness of the events analysis. In Chapter Two it was argued that crisis saliency should play an important role in the decision to intervene. By not controlling for this theoretically important component of an executive's decision calculus, inaccurate inferences may be drawn regarding the size, significance, and direction of the remaining coefficients.

In this chapter, I use logistic regression to examine the systemic and domestic determinants of crisis involvement, while controlling for the salience of the crisis.[2] In the remainder of this chapter, I first discuss the nature of the model and the dependent variable. Second, I present a general econometric specification and discuss the implications of these initial results. Next, I compare my empirical results on third-party foreign policy decision- making to recent diversionary research. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of my findings.

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have an influence on the initial decision to become involved. Furthermore, it conceivably would not affect the initial escalation of such a conflict, as well.

[2] Nincic (1997), examined the domestic consequences of military intervention. More specifically, he looked at how presidential approval responds to different kinds of military interventions. The question I am interested in here involves the reverse relationship; how the decision surrounding intervention is influenced by domestic-political forces (also see Ostrom and Simon, 1985, and Nincic and Hinckley, 1991).

The Logistic Model

With a dichotomous dependent variable, a logistic specification is an appropriate model for estimating the posited relationships. Drawing on King's (1989) formalization, the expected value of Y_i is based on one parameter; π_i

$$E[Y_i] = P[Y_i=1|\ \pi_i] = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \frac{N}{y_i!(N-y_i)!}\pi^{y_i}(1-\pi)^{N-y_i}.$$

In the analysis that follows, then, Y_i will take on a value of 1 (political, economic, or military intervention) with a particular probability π_i, while no intervention will occur with probability $1-\pi_i$. The task is to model π_i as a function of theoretically important exogenous variables. That is, we need to specify the probability of U.S. third-party intervention, and while there is a stochastic element to the observed data, there is also a systematic component that can be defined. It is this systematic component that is of interest here. π_i, then, is a function of explanatory variables,

$$\pi_i = g(x_i, \beta)$$

with x_i representing a vector of independent variables and β the relationship between π_i and x_i.

A functional form for g is selected based on the characteristics of the observed data and the research question (King, 1989: 100). The most common form of the model is the logit, where

$$\pi_i = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-x_i\beta)}.$$

Such a model is chosen because a linear probability specification can produce nonsensical results. Theoretically, we want π_i to be constrained between 0 to 1. However, $x_i\beta$ is not so

constrained and thus with a linear specification we can obtain results for π_i that fall outside of the 0 to 1 range. By transforming π_i using the logit formula above, we avoid such out of bound results.

The interpretation of β, while similar to standard regression coefficients, must take into account the nonlinearity of the model. While the sign of the coefficient retains an analogous meaning, the effect of β depends upon where on the curve one is looking. β will naturally have a different effect on the E[Y] depending on the value of x_i (King, 1989: 108). The predicted probabilities presented later offer one tractable method for evaluating the substantive effects of the explanatory variables.

Logistic Results: 1918-1994

In Table 17, a general empirical model that includes all variables hypothesized to affect U.S. involvement in foreign interstate crises is presented. These exogenous variables are presented in the equation specified below.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{USINVOLV} = {} & \beta_1 + \beta_2\text{senateseats} + \beta_3\text{elections} + \beta_4\text{growth} + \\ & \beta_5\text{superpower} + \beta_6\text{usmilexp} + \beta_7\text{systemlevel} + \beta_8\text{war} + \\ & \beta_9\text{soviets} + \beta_{10}\text{allydem} + \beta_{11}\text{americas} + \beta_{12}\text{africa} + \\ & \beta_{13}\text{europe} + \beta_{14}\text{nuclear}. \end{aligned}$$

As with the Poisson analysis, both domestic and systemic variables are included in the logit runs. Although this model is a 25% improvement over a null model in terms of correctly predicting the occurrence of U.S. third-party interventions, it does appear as if the crisis-specific characteristics are accounting for the variation explained by domestic-political factors in the event-count models. Given the importance of geostrategic concerns, such as Soviet involvement and regional location, this should not be too

surprising. However, alternative specifications presented below do show that domestic-political factors remain influential in U.S. intervention decision-making.

The initial model presented in Table 17 indicates that system-level and crisis-specific variables are significantly affecting U.S. foreign policy decision-making. For example, both U.S. military expenditures and the U.S. as a super power increase the likelihood of U.S. third-party intervention. This supports Proposition 1 in Chapter Two as well as Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the influence of threat on U.S. decision-making. The variable, level of military expenditures, serves as a proxy for the level of U.S. satisfaction with the international status quo. An increase in expenditures, then, indicates increasing unease with system characteristics. To counter this dissatisfaction, a more activist foreign affairs agenda is selected by an administration. This accords with the relationship proposed by Morgan and Palmer (1997). These scholars view the defense budget as a proxy for satisfaction. An increase or decrease in the appropriation serves as a useful indicator for an executive's perception of the threat level emanating from the international system. Given this perception, conflict-resolution efforts on the part of a president are likely attempts to alter sub-system status quos by committing political, economic, and military resources abroad. The results from Table 17 support the argument that decreases in satisfaction lead to increases in the likelihood of U.S. third-party crisis intervention.

The temporal dummy variable indicating the change to a bipolar system environment also serves as a proxy for threat. An internationalist U.S. foreign policy was instituted after World War II due to the perceived failure of U.S. policy during the

interwar years and the rise of the Soviet threat to U.S. security and interests.[3] As with Gowa (1998) and conventional wisdom, the results in Table 17 indicate that the U.S. became more active on the international scene and, in particular, it appears that conflict resolution became much more likely after World War II than during the interwar years.

An additional proxy variable for threat was also included. The variable--system level--appears to be strongly related to presidential decision-making during ongoing interstate crises. Dominant and mainly dominant system crises are much more likely to receive U.S. attention than more regionally focused subsystem conflicts. This result provides further support for Hypothesis 1. Dominant system crises presumably threaten U.S. security and interests to a far greater extent than regionally-based disputes. Consequently, U.S. attention and resources are more likely to be devoted to these major-power crises. This result supports a supposition offered by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997). These authors argue and find that interstate crises which involve major powers are more likely to draw in global organizations and third-party states that both possess a concern with resolving these serious disputes. Rather than deterring U.S. engagement, then, conflicts that involve major powers are associated with conflict-resolution attempts by U.S. administrations.

Table 17 provides little support for the constraining influence of domestic-political institutions. Political opposition appears unrelated to crisis intervention, as do

[3] Three further specifications were used to measure systemic threat. One used the U.S. share of the system's military troop levels while another used expenditures. The third measure compared U.S. expenditures to the Soviets, rather than the overall system's. High collinearity with other important variables prevented their inclusion in the final analyses presented in this chapter.

off-presidential election years.[4] Unlike the Poisson model, support for Hypotheses 7 and 8 is not provided by this logistic analysis. Even the annual percent increase in the gross national product does not appear to have much influence on presidential decision-making.

From this initial model, it seems that crisis saliency tends to be the most influential component of a president's decision calculus. Soviet involvement in an ongoing crisis, in particular, strongly affects a president's decision to intervene. Indeed, as the level of Soviet involvement increases, the likelihood of the U.S. contributing resources to aid a primary state or states involved increases dramatically. This supports Hypothesis 3. It furthermore appears to be the case that U.S. allies and the regime type of the primary crisis actors are influential in presidential decision-making. When a primary crisis actor is both a U.S. ally and a democracy the likelihood of conflict aid increases sharply. This to some extent supports Raknerud and Hegre's (1997) findings of war-joining behavior on the part of democratic regimes and suggests that democratic alliances may be more reliable than mixed regime type ones. Thus, the results in Table 17 provide support for Hypotheses 4 and 5.

Geographical salience additionally plays a role in U.S. intervention policy. Central and South American crises have overwhelming received U.S. assistance, while conflicts in Africa--and surprisingly Europe--have been neglected by U.S. presidents. This latter relationship may be due in part to the strength of these western European states. Many of these countries simply do not require U.S. aid to help resolve their

[4] An additional specification--the level of partisanship between the two parties in Congress--does tend to decrease third-party crisis involvement. In bivariate analyses, the variable is highly significant. In the multivariate models, however, the variable tends to be fragile, though the direction of the relationship remains the same.

conflicts of interest. It also indicates, as Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) similarly noticed, that the locus of interstate conflict has moved increasingly away from the European theater, to other less developed subsystems.

The impacts of two additional variables are also worth noting: the dummy for whether the U.S. was engaged in a major military conflict and the dummy for the presence of nuclear capable states. Both variables have a significant influence on presidential decision-making. Rather than deterring additional resource commitments, it seems, the U.S. tends to increase conflict-resolution attempts during major military engagements. Most likely, both direct military activity and third-party involvement are part of a broader U.S. foreign policy agenda designed to protect U.S. interests and allies. However, the evidence also indicates that Kegley and Wittkopf's (1996) supposition regarding the presence of nuclear powers is supported. Interstate crises involving at least one nuclear state are significantly less likely to receive American attention.[5] It may be that the U.S. tries to avoid quarrels where an underlying issue in contention involves nuclear capabilities for fear of aggravating or escalating an already tense situation.

The econometric model in Table 17 does not include two temporal dummies that were found to be important in the Poisson analysis. There has been considerable speculation, and some evidence in support, regarding the congressional constraints placed

[5] This finding appears to be at odds with the evidence presented earlier regarding system level. Given that major powers also possess nuclear weapons, wouldn't both variables influence presidential decision making in a similar direction? Interestingly, though, of the 356 crises involving the U.S. as a third-party, only 36 involved nuclear-capable states. Equally as interesting is that only 50 crises occurred in the mainly dominant and dominant systems, and nearly three-fifths of these crises occurred during the interwar years and World War II. The dominant system after World War II was defined by the U.S. bloc--Soviet bloc rivalry. Only 18 disputes were recorded. It seems, then, that U.S. involvement was virtually assured in the few crises that occurred in the dominant and mainly dominant systems. Crises in the subsystems, in

on presidential actions in foreign affairs after the Vietnam War. Many scholars have argued that the executive has been subject to increased oversight (e.g., the War Powers Resolution) by congressional committees and party leaders. Although not included in the first logistic model presented in Table 17, a post-Vietnam War dummy variable is moderately significant, but the sign indicates that increased involvement in interstate crises has occurred in the two decades following the Vietnam War. So, this result confirms what was found in Chapter Four with the Poisson analysis. However, one problem with the present survey is the nature of the dependent variable. It may be that military involvement is much less likely during the War Powers era, but the attention given to foreign affairs by both Reagan and Bush has increased the level of political and economic involvement. Involvement, though, is also a function of the total number of interstate crises occurring at any given time. Perhaps we should not be surprised at the attention given to foreign affairs by presidents elected after Vietnam due to the prevalence of salient interstate crises.

Additional results show little temporal change in presidential decision-making after the Cold War. Again, although not included in the model presented in Table 17, a dummy variable turns out positive, but insignificant. In the operationalization of 'post-Cold War,' I selected 1989, although as Wittkopf and McCormick (1998) pointed out, there are a number of events from 1987 to the collapse of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union that could be selected to demarcate a post-Cold War dummy. Similar to their coding, the beginning of the Bush presidency and the 101st Congress is chosen here.

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contrast, were less likely to receive U.S. attention, and even less likely if nuclear-capable regional states were the primary crisis actors.

Wittkopf and McCormick (1998: 446) showed that the COPDAB measure of net conflict and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States changed during Reagan's last year in office. The first year of the Bush administration, then, inaugurated a much more cooperative east-west relationship. Unlike the results from Chapter Four, however, there is little evidence from the logistic analyses to indicate a fundamental change in the incidence of third-party crisis intervention after the Cold War.

In Table 18, a model is presented without many of the additional proxy variables that were included in the full specification. A log-likelihood ratio test confirms that this model has been pared down too far. In other words, the variation explained by the more parsimonious model in Table 18 is significantly less than the full model presented in Table 17. It seems that while the domestic variables can be legitimately removed without a significant loss of information, the regional dummies cannot. We do see, however, that these geographic dummies are not accounting for the predictive power and statistical significance of the model. The main systemic and salience variables continue to be strongly related to U.S. third-party intervention decisions.

Logistic Results: Alternative Specifications

Table 19 presents a slightly different model specification. Rather than a continuous measure of political opposition, a trichotomous variable for divided government has been included. This broad measure of divided government indicates that intervention decisions are moderately influenced by the level of political opposition. While not significant at a standard level, opposition control on Capitol Hill does tend to constrain executive attention to foreign affairs. One can also see from Table 19 that the

systemic and crisis-specific variables are not unduly affected by the inclusion of this new variable.

An additional problem with the previous logit analyses may be the presence of outliers. Figure 14 demonstrates that a number of observations are not predicted accurately by the logistic model presented in Table 19. The sizes of the circles indicate the influence these observations are having on the estimates. So, not only are there covariate patterns that the model cannot account for, but a number of these observations are having a disproportionate influence on the coefficients.

Two of the most influential covariate patterns involve World War II crises. Given the important distinction between conflicts during this global war period and those occurring before and after it, it may be that the decision calculus for intervening in ongoing wars is different than intervening in crisis situations that could potentially escalate to war. Regardless of the causes, it does appear that the model is not accurately accounting for the World War II cases. Interestingly, both Gelpi (1997) and Huth (1998) removed observations that occurred during major wars for fear of confusing the determinants of two very different foreign policy decisions. According to Gelpi (1997: 264), "decisions that escalate the geographic scope or intensity of a major military conflict [are] fundamentally different from decisions to initiate an armed conflict, or that escalate an existing dispute up to the use of major force."

Looking at the results in Table 20, it does appear as if the World War II crises are heavily affecting the domestic-political variables. While elections continue to have little effect on third-party interventions, both the presence of divided government and the

growth rate do appear to play a role in presidential decision-making.[6] The divided government variable is particularly interesting, because once again the relationship indicates that political opposition tends to constrain executive decision-making in foreign affairs. Presidents are less likely to intervene when they face a Congress controlled by the opposition party.

It is also evident from Table 20 that the systemic and crisis-specific variables are even more strongly related to third-party interventions when these World War II cases are removed. In fact, the model in Table 20 represents a 28% improvement over a null model in terms of correctly predicting the occurrence of U.S. interventions.

Diverting Attention to Foreign Affairs

The argument posited in Chapter Two was that domestic-political forces should tend to constrain executive actions in foreign affairs. Given the electoral importance of domestic issues and the potential costs involved in foreign policy activism, presidents should avoid costly conflict-resolution attempts during times of domestic turmoil. This line of argument, however, contradicts the logic of diversionary theory. The analysis that follows is intended to further test whether any evidence exists for diversionary behavior on the part of a president with regard to third-party intervention decisions.

From Table 21, we can see that the results do not appear to support the political manipulation of international events. Indeed, the direction of many of the relationships is

[6] The unemployment rate, while not as significant as congressional opposition, has a similar effect on presidential decision making. As unemployment increases, presidents appear less likely to help resolve foreign crises abroad. Indeed, more than likely executive attention is devoted to addressing the domestic concerns of the U.S. public, such as stimulating demand through monetary and fiscal policy. Interestingly, the relationship of this economic indicator is opposite of GNP growth. It is not clear why such conflicting effects exist.

contrary to what many diversionary models propound. For instance, the presence of divided government appears to decrease the likelihood of crisis involvement. This is opposite what James and Hristoulas (1994) argued. Divided government, they suggested, should lead to increased diversionary uses of force (admittedly their variable was statistically insignificant). To be sure, there is a difference between crises when the U.S. is a primary actor and those where the U.S. has the option to intercede as a third party to help resolve an interstate dispute. James and Hristoulas only investigated crises where the United States was a primary actor, and it perhaps should not be surprising that an opposition-controlled Congress was found to be unrelated to presidential decision-making.[7] It seems, though, that presidents are neither initiating crises nor instigating peace efforts primarily for domestic-political ends.

Furthermore, presidential approval appears to have little to do with foreign policy decision-making of this kind. While the sign of approval is in the same direction as that reported by Ostrom and Job (1986) in their work on the political use of force, this variable is far from reaching statistical significance in the present analysis. Now, it may be that these crisis situations are neither salient nor visible enough for presidents to garnish a significant short term increase in public support. However, it seems that the Bosnian crisis did present the Clinton administration with a perfect opportunity to display leadership skill and statesmanship to the American people. Therefore, it is not a priori certain that these international events do not represent possible opportunities for political advantage.

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[7] Meernik and Waterman (1996) proffered a similar argument to James and Hristoulas (1994). While Meernik and Waterman measured congressional opposition differently (support for a president's position

Interesting, as well, is the irrelevance of both presidential and war-time elections in determining third-party crisis intervention. While the operationalization used here for presidential elections is slightly broader than in other studies (i.e., a full year-long period, rather than one quarter prior to an election), the variable clearly appears unrelated to U.S. third-party crisis intervention. The same goes for war-time elections. Contrary to Fordham (1998) and Stoll (1984), the analysis presented here finds no relationship between peace-making initiatives and elections held during war-time. In Table 22, we see that the four election variables are not only insignificant, but their signs are consistently negative. Given the opportunities these events present, it is unclear why no relationship exists between elections and U.S. conflict-resolution efforts.

In addition, I find that a president's behavior during his first term in office does not significantly differ from the remaining years he serves (see Table 23). That is, there appears to be no honeymoon effect with regard to third-party intervention. Most likely, as Russett (1990) surmised, incoming executives are unfamiliar with foreign affairs and feel a need to act on domestic promises made to constituency groups during the presidential campaign. My evidence simply suggests that a president's attention is not systematically drawn to or away from issues of foreign policy during his first year in office. This result presumably does not support a political manipulation argument. The first year in office is a time of increased flexibility for a president. Consequently, bold initiatives should be undertaken to provide early policy successes for the campaign three years down the road. The lack of evidence, however, suggests that presidents may be focusing domestically rather than internationally during their first year in office.

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on selected roll-call votes), their variable was also insignificant.

In diversionary research, the misery index has been a commonly used variable for domestic conditions. Following the approach of Hess and Orphanides (1995), I selected the gross national product (GNP) as a substitute proxy. As mentioned above, I find that the percent change in the annual gross national product to be inversely related to crisis intervention. As growth goes down, then, presidents appear more willing to commit political, economic, and military resources to help resolve conflicts abroad. Once, again, this can potentially be interpreted as supporting a diversionary theory. However, this result on the other hand, may indicate that disputes are being initiated by foreign leaders with an eye towards U.S. domestic conditions. Aware of America's long reach and extensive interests, states may be trying to time strategic moves around domestic conditions that they believe may decrease the likelihood of a president becoming involved. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1990: 748), for instance, suggested that the Soviet decision to enter Afghanistan may have been partly due to U.S. domestic conditions following the Vietnam War and the perception by Soviet leaders that the American public would not tolerate engagement abroad (see also the argument posited by Ward and Widmaier, 1982, and the empirical evidence presented by Leeds and Davis, 1997).[8]

Another interesting finding that does not support a diversionary interpretation of U.S. third-party intervention is the relationship between current war involvement and foreign policy activism. The results here indicate that the likelihood of conflict-resolution

[8] Although the relationship between GNP growth and third-party intervention is subject to some interpretation, there appears to be little uncertainty with regards to the unemployment rate. In a model from 1935-1994 (although not shown), the direction of the relationship indicates that economic downturns focus

initiatives increases when the United States is at war. Contrary to dissuading executives from engagement, conflicts tend to encourage American succor in resolving quarrels abroad. Now, this result may simply indicate that the U.S. is directing an active foreign policy agenda. Policymakers and foreign policy elites may believe that U.S. interests necessitate both direct military activity and the contribution of resources to aid in the settlement of other important regional disputes. So, rather than an either-or strategy, administrations may find both direct conflict involvement and conflict resolution to be important components of a foreign policy agenda designed to alter the current international status quo.

Predicted Probabilities

One way of evaluating the influence of an individual exogenous variable on third-party crisis involvement is through predicted probabilities. Given the non-linearity of the logistic model, the coefficients do not simply refer to the change in Y due to a one-unit change in x_i. Consequently, shifting the level of one variable, while holding the values of the other independent variables at their means, provides information with regard to the size of the each variable's impact on foreign conflict intervention (see Appendix D for descriptive statistics on variables used in Chapter Five).

In the final model presented in Table 20, for instance, the mean probability of Y is 61%. That is, when the values of the exogenous variables are all held at their means, the probability of a president intervening in an interstate crisis is about 61%. When there is a unified government (i.e., divided government equals 1), the probability of involvement

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attention *away from* issues of foreign policy. Presumably, such domestic troubles are directing White

jumps to nearly 67% (see Table 24). However, when the government is fully divided with one party in control of the presidency and another in control of both houses of Congress, the likelihood of involvement drops to 53%. Economic growth also has a substantial influence on the probability of Y. At its empirical low, the likelihood of involvement is over 85%. At its high, the probability of crisis involvement drops to less than 45%.

Clearly, the most influential variable is Soviet involvement. As the level of USSR participation in these same crisis events increases, the likelihood of presidential engagement increases considerably. In addition, the temporal change from interwar to Cold War has an important influence on crisis involvement. Before World War II, the likelihood of intervention is about 40%, however after 1947 this leaps to over 65%.

When all three domestic-political variables are held at their empirical high values, their constraining influence is apparent. Indeed, the likelihood of involvement is only 33% when a president faces political opposition on the Hill and a deteriorating economic situation necessitates attention to the domestic scene. However, when such domestic-political constraints are lifted, the propensity to intervene as a third-party increases to nearly 60%. The most influential variables, though, appear to be those associated with the precise characteristics of the crises themselves. Excluding Soviet involvement, when a crisis involves both a democracy and an ally, plus the conflict occurs in either Central or South America, the probability of intervening to help resolve the conflict is about 95%. This falls to less than 50% when none of these characteristics is present.

House resources to the resolution of economic and social issues on the home front.

Conclusion

In this chapter, a model of third-party crisis intervention was empirically tested against a set of cases from 1918-1994. Moderate support was found for the argument that divided government tends to discourage attention to foreign policy by presidential administrations. Even more interesting, perhaps, was that little, if any, support was found for a diversionary model of foreign policy decision-making. Greater attention to foreign affairs does not appear to have occurred during midterm or presidential election years. Furthermore, this does not change when controlling for whether the United States is at war or not.

Little evidence was found indicating that presidential approval influences intervention decisions. Not only was the substantive strength of this variable negligible, but the variable was also highly insignificant. Domestic economic conditions do appear important, however. In both models, the gross national product and the unemployment rate were significantly related to third-party interventions. These variables further appear to sustain a structural-constraints theory of crisis intervention. The unemployment rate was inversely related to intervention and statistically significant (p <.05). Economic growth was also inversely related to intervention, which may represent strategic behavior on the part of the primary crisis actors who are wary of U.S. interference.

Most crucial, however, in the decision to intervene were the individual characteristics of the interstate crises. Salience, measured by Soviet involvement and geographic location were both highly influential in determining U.S. involvement. Furthermore, both alliance ties and the nature of the governing regimes of the primary crisis participants played a role, both encouraging presidential attention. Lastly, crises

involving nuclear-capable states were much less likely to receive American aid, as Kegley and Wittkopf (1996) surmised.

Temporal change was not nearly as clear as had been expected. While the evidence presented above supports Gowa's (1998) findings regarding U.S. foreign policy behavior before and after World War II, the evidence for a structural change after Vietnam or following the end of the Cold War is much less clear. It may be that an increase in the number of foreign crises provided greater opportunities for presidential involvement during the two decades following the Vietnam War. It may also be true that while political and economic involvement in these crises continued to be fairly high, the actual use of military force to aid the resolution of crises decreased significantly. Or, it may be that primary crisis participation by the United States decreased while third-party involvement remained fairly prominent. The analysis presented in Chapter Six is intended to answer some of these puzzles.

The evidence presented in this chapter additionally exposes a weakness of the event-count analysis. While the Poisson model is able to capture broad system and domestic trends and their effects on uses of force or third-party conflict interventions, the most powerful exogenous variables tend to be associated with the specifics of the individual crises themselves. Figure 15 illustrates the substantial variation that exists in the propensity to intervene as a third-party in foreign crises. That is, even during the same year the propensity to intervene fluctuates widely based on certain crisis-specific characteristics. Particularly after 1974, such variation within a given year is clearly apparent. Third-party crisis involvement, then, varies significantly depending on the types of conflicts that erupt. By not specifying these important factors that clearly enter into an

executive's decision calculus, models may misstate the relationship between domestic-political institutions, the systemic environment, and foreign policy decision-making.

TABLE 17: Logistic Results, Equation 1, 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Robust Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-3.31	1.05	-3.15	.002
Senate Seats	Domestic	.005	.01	.36	.716
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	-.19	.33	-.56	.574
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.02	.03	-.80	.421
Super-power	Systemic	.78	.40	1.98	.048
US Military Expenditures	Systemic	$2.24*10^{-8}$	$1.20*10^{-8}$	1.86	.063
System Level	Systemic	.63	.19	3.29	.001
War Involvement	---	.97	.35	2.80	.005
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.87	.18	4.92	.000
Ally*Democracy	Crisis	.46	.16	2.95	.003
Americas	Crisis	1.34	.53	2.54	.011
Africa	Crisis	-.61	.30	-2.03	.043
Europe	Crisis	-1.17	.43	-2.74	.006
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-.87	.49	-1.77	.076

N = 356
Log-likelihood: -192.95
χ^2 (13) = 68.71 (.0000)

Pseudo R^2 = .201
Correct Prediction: 73.31%
Null Model: 58.5%
Goodness-of-fit = 231.27 (.14)

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 18: Logistic Results, Equation 2, 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Robust Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-3.38	1.01	-3.35	.001
Senate Seats	Domestic	.006	.01	.41	.681
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	-.15	.32	-.46	.643
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.02	.03	-.77	.444
Super-power	Systemic	.79	.37	2.12	.034
US Military Expenditures	Systemic	$1.74*10^{-8}$	$1.14*10^{-8}$	1.53	.125
System Level	Systemic	.44	.18	2.41	.016
War Involvement	---	1.16	.35	3.36	.001
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.85	.17	5.16	.000
Ally*Democracy	Crisis	.30	.15	2.03	.042
Americas	Crisis	1.82	.50	3.63	.000

N = 356
Log-likelihood: -199.36
χ^2 (10) = 31.02 (.0000)
Pseudo R^2 = .174
Correct Prediction: 71.91%
Null Model: 58.5%
Goodness-of-fit = 294.66 (.07)

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 19: Logistic Results, Equation 3, 1918-1994

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Robust Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-2.61	.62	-4.19	.000
Divided Government	Domestic	-.23	.16	-1.47	.143
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	-.22	.33	-.66	.507
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.03	.03	-1.11	.266
Super-Power	Systemic	.92	.40	2.90	.022
US Military Expenditures	Systemic	$2.09*10^{-8}$	$1.21*10^{-8}$	1.73	.084
System Level	Systemic	.62	.19	3.17	.002
War Involvement	---	1.02	.34	2.97	.003
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.88	.18	4.94	.000
Ally*Democracy	Crisis	.45	.16	2.84	.004
Americas	Crisis	1.32	.52	2.53	.011
Africa	Crisis	-.65	.30	-2.14	.033
Europe	Crisis	-1.16	.43	-2.70	.007
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-.87	.50	-1.73	.085

N = 356
Log-likelihood: -191.96
χ^2 (13) = 67.7 (.0000)

Pseudo R^2 = .205
Correct Prediction: 72.19%
Null Model: 58.5%
Goodness-of-fit = 311.03 (.13)

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 20: Logistic Results, Equation 4, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Robust Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-2.66	.64	-4.13	.000
Divided Government	Domestic	-.31	.17	-1.82	.068
Off-Presidential Year Election	Domestic	-.16	.35	-.46	.644
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.06	.03	-1.90	.059
Super-Power	Systemic	1.04	.47	2.19	.028
US Military Expenditures	Systemic	$2.65*10^{-8}$	$1.35*10^{-8}$	1.97	.048
System Level	Systemic	.48	.24	1.97	.049
War Involvement	---	1.07	.37	2.90	.004
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	1.09	.20	5.30	.000
Ally*Democracy	Crisis	.40	.16	2.45	.015
Americas	Crisis	1.44	.55	2.62	.009
Africa	Crisis	-.69	.32	-2.14	.032
Europe	Crisis	-.78	.52	-1.49	.137
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-.90	.52	-1.74	.081

N = 315
Log-likelihood: -168.39
χ^2 (13) = 67.12 (.0000)

Pseudo R^2 = .218
Correct Prediction: 74.6%
Null Model: 58.5%
Goodness-of-fit = 269.02 (.16)

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 21: Logistic Results, Equation 5, 1935-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Robust Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	—	-4.08	1.15	-3.54	.000
Presidential Approval	Domestic	.01	.01	.80	.423
Divided Government	Domestic	-.32	.18	-1.73	.083
Off-Presidential Year Election	Domestic	-.08	.41	-.20	.842
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.07	.05	-1.56	.119
Super-Power	Systemic	1.43	.82	1.76	.079
US Military Expenditures	Systemic	$2.77*10^{-8}$	$1.57*10^{-8}$	1.77	.077
System Level	Systemic	.54	.33	1.62	.105
War Involvement	—	1.14	.38	2.96	.003
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	1.41	.28	5.07	.000
Ally*Democracy	Crisis	.36	.18	1.94	.052
Americas	Crisis	1.24	.58	2.13	.033
Africa	Crisis	-.53	.35	-1.54	.124
Europe	Crisis	-.66	.76	-.86	.387
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-.99	.57	-1.73	.084

N = 264
Log-likelihood: -136.53
χ^2 (14) = 57.41 (.0000)

Pseudo R^2 = .237
Correct Prediction: 75.8%
Null Model: 58.6%
Goodness-of-fit = 259.21 (.17)

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 22: Logistic Equation 6, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

Variable	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Constant	-2.62	-2.67	-2.66	-2.69
	(*p*=.000)	(*p*=.000)	(*p*=.000)	(*p*=.000)
Divided Government	-.29	-.28	-.31	-.30
	(*p*=.081)	(*p*=.096)	(*p*=.068)	(*p*=.077)
GNP Growth Rate	-.06	-.06	-.06	-.06
	(*p*=.071)	(*p*=.069)	(*p*=.059)	(p=.060)
Super-Power	1.08	1.07	1.04	1.05
	(*p*=.025)	(*p*=.025)	(*p*=.028)	(*p*=.028)
US Military Expenditures	$2.52*10^{-8}$	$2.49*10^{-8}$	$2.65*10^{-8}$	$2.61*10^{-8}$
	(*p*=.064)	(*p*=.067)	(*p*=.048)	(*p*=.052)
War Involvement	1.01	1.03	1.07	1.09
	(*p*=.008)	(*p*=.006)	(*p*=.004)	(*p*=.008)
Soviet Involvement	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09
	(*p*=.000)	(*p*=.000)	(*p*=.000)	(*p*=.000)
System Level	.48	.45	.48	.46
	(*p*=.045)	(*p*=.061)	(*p*=.049)	(*p*=.057)
Ally*Democracy	.39	.39	.40	.40
	(*p*=.017)	(*p*=.017)	(*p*=.015)	(*p*=.015)
Americas	1.43	1.42	1.43	1.43
	(*p*=.010)	(*p*=.010)	(*p*=.009)	(*p*=.009)
Africa	-.70	-.70	-.69	-.69
	(*p*=.030)	(*p*=.030)	(*p*=.032)	(*p*=.032)
Europe	-.75	-.73	-.78	-.76
	(*p*=.152)	(*p*=.160)	(*p*=.137)	(*p*=.146)
Nuclear Power	-.90	-.89	-.90	-.90
	(*p*=.084)	(*p*=.088)	(*p*=.081)	(*p*=.084)
National Elections	-.25	---	---	---
	(*p*=.374)			
Presidential Elections	---	-.20	---	---
		(*p*=.534)		
Off-Presidential Year Elections	---	---	-.16	---
			(*p*=.644)	
War Elections	---	---	---	-.04
				(*p*=.960)
	N = 315	*N = 315*	*N = 315*	*N = 315*
	LL = -168.11	*LL = -168.32*	*LL = -168.39*	*LL = -168.50*
	$\chi^2(13) = 67.22$ *(.000)*	$\chi^2(13) = 65.73$ *(.000)*	$\chi^2(13) = 67.12$ *(.000)*	$\chi^2(13) = 65.6$ *(.000)*
	Pseudo R^2 *= .22*	*Pseudo* R^2 *= .22*	*Pseudo* R^2 *= .22*	*Pseudo* R^2 *= .22*
	Model Pred.: 73.4%	*Model Pred.: 74.6%*	*Model Pred.: 74.6%*	*Model Pred.: 74.9%*
	Null Model: 58.5%	*Null Model: 58.5%*	*Null Model: 58.5%*	*Null Model: 58.5%*

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Significance level in is parantheses. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 23: Logistic Results, Equation 7, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

Variable	*Model 1*	*Model 2*
Constant	-2.69	-2.71
	(p=.000)	(p=.000)
Divided Government	-.30	-.29
	(p=.075)	(p=.089)
GNP Growth	-.06	-.06
	(p=.060)	(p=.062)
Super-power	1.04	1.03
	(p=.028)	(p=.031)
US Military Expenditures	$2.61*10^{-8}$	$2.63*10^{-8}$
	(p=.052)	(p=.053)
War Involvement	1.08	1.08
	(p=.003)	(p=.003)
Soviet Involvement	1.08	1.08
	(p=.000)	(p=.000)
System Level	.46	.46
	(p=.057)	(p=.057)
Ally*Democracy	.40	.40
	(p=.014)	(p=.014)
Americas	1.43	1.42
	(p=.009)	(p=.009)
Africa	-.69	-.69
	(p=.032)	(p=.032)
Europe	-.76	-.76
	(p=.146)	(p=.145)
Nuclear	-.89	-.90
	(p=.084)	(p=.085)
Honeymoon	—	.06
		(p=.870)
	N = 315	*N = 315*
	Log-Likelihood = -168.50	*Log-Likelihood = -168.50*
	$\chi^2(12)$ = 65.5 (.000)	*$\chi^2(13)$ = 65.6 (.000)*
	Pseudo R^2 = .22	*Pseudo R^2 = .22*
	Model Prediction: 74.92%	*Model Prediction: 74.60%*
	Null Model: 58.5%	*Null Model: 58.5%*

NOTE: The dependent variable is U.S. third-party involvement in an ongoing interstate crisis. Significance level in is parantheses. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. Errors are robust.

TABLE 24: Marginal Effects on Changes in the Probability of Third-Party Crisis Intervention, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

Variable	*Variable Type*	*Change in Predicted Probability*
Divided Government	Domestic	.14
Off-Presidential Year Election	Domestic	.03
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	.42
Super-Power	Systemic	.25
U.S. Military Expenditures	Systemic	.44
System Level	Systemic	.28
War Involvement	---	.23
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.52
Ally*Democracy	Crisis	.26
Americas	Crisis	.28
Africa	Crisis	.17
Europe	Crisis	.19
Nuclear Power	Crisis	.22
Domestic Variables	---	**.57**
Systemic Variables	---	**.79**
Crisis Variables (w/o USSR)	---	**.83**
Crisis Variables (w/ USSR)	---	**.93**

NOTE: The values in this column represent the change in the probability of Y (intervention) when the exogenous variable is fluctuated from its empirical low to its empirical high. The other independent variables are held at their mean values. The average probability of U.S. third-party intervention is .61.



FIGURE 14: Influence of Outliers on U.S. Third-Party Crisis Intervention, 1918-1994



FIGURE 15: U.S. Propensity to Intervene as a Neutral Third-Party in an Interstate Crisis, 1918-1994

CHAPTER 6

TESTING U.S. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION INTO INTERSTATE CRISES: MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC ANALYSIS

In Chapter Four, we observed the temporal variability that exists with regards to U.S. third-party interventions in interstate crises. In addition, we found that the number of crises an administration was engaged in was strongly dependent on broad changes in system structure. Unlike Gowa's (1998) results on militarized interstate dispute (MID) involvement, though, domestic-political variables, such as congressional opposition and economic growth, also appeared to play a role in presidential decision-making. In Chapter Five, the logistic estimation demonstrated that the event-count analysis may have suffered from underspecification. Particular characteristics of the interstate crises could not be controlled for, and these characteristics, such as Soviet involvement, the regime types of the primary actors, and whether these actors were nuclear capable, had a tremendous impact on third-party interventions. It also seemed that when these individual crisis characteristics were controlled for, the influence of domestic-political factors decreased considerably, although political opposition in Congress continued to decrease conflict-resolution initiatives. It was also found in Chapter Five that the directions of the relationships of these domestic-level variables tended to support a structural-constraints theory of democratic decision-making in foreign affairs, rather than a diversionary one.

Domestic opposition and economic weakness did not appear to divert executive attention to interstate crises abroad.

In this chapter, the analysis is expanded once more to account for the variability in the foreign policy choices coded in the dependent variable. In Chapter Five, political, economic, and military involvement in interstate crises were all collapsed into one category. The question remains, though, whether differences exist in the international and domestic-political climates that foster low-level versus high-level involvement. As the work of Wittkopf (1990, 1995) demonstrates, how the U.S. engages the rest of the world is as important a question as whether to engage it. Below, a multinomial logistic model is presented that evaluates the determinants of separate foreign policy choices.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first discuss the need to evaluate the different options available to an executive, drawing on the work of Most and Starr (1989) and others. Next, I present the multinomial model and discuss its basic properties. I then present the results of two regression runs that once again examine the roles played by domestic, systemic, and crisis-specific variables. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of the findings.

Substitutability in Foreign Policy

In a speech given in 1975, Henry Kissinger insisted that "the traditional agenda of international affairs--the balance among major powers, the security of nations--no longer defines our perils or our possibilities... we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive, old solutions are unavailing" (quoted in Keohane and Nye 1996: 236). Kissinger's words were prophetic, yet they are

even more appropriate for today's international climate, than that of 1975. Not only are the foreign policy problems of today very different that those of yesteryear, but American society has grown increasingly skeptical of both the usefulness and morality of military solutions (see Brooks and Kanter, 1994; Lewis, 1994; Garwin, 1994; Holsti, 1996). The national security rhetoric that defined the Cold War, and was used to justify America's extensive role in the world, has given way as international threats to U.S. sovereignty have diminished. Indeed, at the same time as the anti-Communist consensus collapsed in the mid to late 1970s, American politics became increasingly pluralistic. As a result, foreign policy decision-making became much less dictated by the national security establishment, and the American public has continued to remain suspicious of national security pretensions (Lewis, 1994).

The projection of influence abroad, though, has always been a controversial issue, Cold War or not. Americans have consistently affirmed their reservations about the use of military force (Holsti, 1996). Given the importance of sovereignty and individual freedom to the Republic's origins, plus the strong desire to avoid the examples set by the European powers, this should perhaps not be surprising (Fisher, 1995; Rosati, 1999). In more modern times, certainly, there has been considerable disagreement over the appropriate use of American's armed forces. Reagan's foreign aid to Latin America, Kennedy's Bay of Pigs invasion, and Clinton's deployment of troops into the Bosnian conflict each generated significant political opposition, often a result of conflict between foreign policy elites and the American public. Particularly when U.S. troops are called upon to intervene in the affairs of other states, discord arises over the proper direction and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

Scholars of international relations have rarely addressed why or when certain foreign policy tools, rather than others, are used to protect American interests abroad (exceptions include Most and Starr, 1989; Morgan and Palmer, 1998). Certainly, we would expect U.S. presidents to be discriminate as to when military force is required. Given that, as Brooks and Kanter (1994: 15) noted, intervention can be defined broadly to "encompasses the entire spectrum of coercive techniques--diplomatic, economic, military, or new techniques based on new technology--with which we seek to change the character or alter the behavior of another government," scholars need to pay close attention to presidential actions other than the use of military force. While America's place in the global order naturally invites active engagement in many interstate crises, depending on public and congressional support, the salience of the crisis, and the level of systemic threat, a president may opt for diplomacy over military engagement. There is a need, then, as Morgan and Palmer (1998: 3) have pointed out, to compare the international and domestic circumstances surrounding different foreign policy choices.

The Multinomial Logistic Model

Although the ICB dataset codes a four category variable for U.S. third-party involvement in interstate crises, the frequency of covert military and direct military activity is quite small. Consequently, these two distinct categories are combined to produce a trichotomous endogenous variable. It is defined as follows: (1) no involvement, (2) low-level involvement (political and economic), (3) high-level involvement (semi- and direct military). The outcome variable, then, codes for the specific U.S. policy choice on an unordered scale of zero to two. The objective is to assess whether the determinants

of low-level involvement mimic those of higher levels of involvement, or whether significant differences emerge with regards to the determinants of distinct foreign policy choices.

The multinomial model is calculated similar to the binary logistic regression presented in Chapter Five. A set of coefficients, β_i, β_j, β_k, is estimated that correspond to the three categories of the dependent variable. So, the probability of any outcome occurring is calculated by the following formulas:

$$P(Y=1) = \frac{e^{X\beta_i}}{e^{X\beta_i} + e^{X\beta_j} + e^{X\beta_k}}$$

$$P(Y=2) = \frac{e^{X\beta_j}}{e^{X\beta_i} + e^{X\beta_j} + e^{X\beta_k}}$$

$$P(Y=3) = \frac{e^{X\beta_k}}{e^{X\beta_i} + e^{X\beta_j} + e^{X\beta_k}}$$

To identify the model, one category is set as a baseline from which the remaining coefficients are measured relative to this base group. So here, an individual coefficient will confirm or disconfirm whether a variable has any influence on the type of U.S. peace-making response (low or high-level) to an interstate crisis event.

An ordered logit model is a conceivable alternative for estimating the posited relationships. However, one has to assume that the level of involvement is ordered correctly, with the military option only used after diplomatic or economic attempts have been exhausted. With the multinomial framework, such an assumption is not required. The military option is merely assumed to be a different foreign policy choice.

Consequently, the likelihood of low-level versus high-level involvement is compared to the option of not intervening at all, and the interpretation of the individual coefficients is then relative to this base category.

Results

Table 25 displays the results from an analysis of the full time frame, 1918-1994. The multinomial estimation is designed to provide information on whether the foreign policy option selected by the executive to address an interstate crisis is influenced by domestic, systemic and crisis-specific factors. These results, however, must be considered tentative given the dispersion of the dependent variable. As Table 5 illustrates, the variable is skewed away from high-level involvement, and in fact less than 20% of the cases involve the direct use of U.S. peace-keeping forces or personnel.

In this first model, the results parallel those from Chapter Five. Crisis-specific and system-level variables tend to be the most strongly related to U.S. decision-making of this kind. Domestic-political factors, such as elections and the economy appear to have little influence, although congressional opposition is marginally related to low-level interventions.

The differences observed between low and high-level intervention are interesting, however. Systemic variables, such as system level, U.S. military expenditures, and the bipolar international environment are all much more strongly related to high-level third-party interventions than low-level ones. Plus, all are positively related to the decision to intervene. U.S. military expenditures, for example, which serves as a proxy for the evaluation of the international status quo, tends to increase the likelihood of high-level

interventions. Its lack of significance with low-level interventions suggests that measures of systemic threat may be less important in determining when diplomatic or economic means are used to help resolve interstate conflicts abroad, but tend to be extremely important when the military option is selected.

The results also suggest that the specifics of the crisis situation are extremely important in the type of action a president takes. While the regime type and alliance portfolios of the primary actors play an important role in whether the United States becomes politically involved in helping to resolve the crisis, they have only a minimal effect on the military option. Given that America's democratic allies tend to be powerful states in their own right, contributing peace-keeping troops and personnel is most likely deemed unnecessary.

Similarly, nuclear-capable actors tend to discourage both political and military involvement by the U.S., although military involvement is more strongly affected. Presidents clearly attempt to avoid conflicts where one or more of the primary crisis actors possesses nuclear weapons. However, third-party conflict-resolution attempts in which U.S. armed forces are used are particularly unlikely to occur when the presence of nuclear weapons constitutes an underlying issue in contention.

In Table 26, the World War II cases have been once again removed to evaluate whether any effects can be attributed to this particular time period. It does appear that the domestic-political effects are being obscured by these influential World War II crises. Both congressional opposition and the growth rate are moderately influential in determining low-level third-party interventions. However, opposition appears to be less

important when it comes to high-level involvement. The growth rate, though, shows an even stronger relation to high-level interventions than low-level ones.

The system and crisis-specific variables all show similar relationships to the results presented in Table 25, although the variables--system level and U.S. military expenditures--are clearly affected by the great power crises that occurred during World War II.

One variable that has not been mentioned is war involvement. It appears that low-level conflict-resolution attempts are positively related to when the United States is at war. However, the strength of this relationship is not the same for high-level interventions. Active diplomatic and economic means appear to be used along with direct engagement to defend U.S. interests abroad. In other words, low-level conflict-resolution attempts tend to go hand in hand with primary crisis activity. If war is politics by other means, than both conflict resolution and the direct use of military force presumably are used together to accomplish foreign policy objectives. The lack of significance for high-level third-party interventions during wartime can most likely be attributed to the insufficient variation on the dependent variable. With the World War II observations included, this variable is significantly related to both high and low-level third-party interventions. In general, then, it appears that conflict resolution and direct engagement are used together to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Although not shown, public approval for a president once again seems to have little impact on foreign policy decision-making. In neither model is a president's approval rating prior to a given crisis significantly important in the determination to intervene. The evidence demonstrates that these interstate crises abroad rarely are seized upon by

administrations for immediate electoral gain. In fact, if anything, the evidence appears to support the argument that presidents are increasingly constrained in their handling of foreign affairs as domestic opposition rises.

Conclusion

According to Most and Starr (1989: 102),

> If foreign policies can indeed be alternative routes that foreign policy decision makers adopt in order to attain their goals, then it would seem plausible that decision makers who are confronted with some problem or subjected to some stimulus could, *under at least certain conditions, substitute one such means for another.*

Indeed, by not accounting for the policy options executives have at their disposal, scholars risk drawing inferences that may be based on spurious relationships. At a minimum it would seem necessary to investigate the determinants of distinct foreign policy actions. Third-party intervention is one such option that has not been sufficiently addressed. The level of commitment by the U.S. to interstate crises is a further distinction to make.

The results presented in this chapter suggest that the determinants of political and economic intervention may be different than interventions involving U.S. peace-keeping troops and personnel. For instance, conflicts that involve U.S. democratic allies may invite U.S. low-level intervention. However, the further commitment of military resources may still depend on important systemic concerns and geographic salience. It also appears to be that domestic-political opposition serves as a constraint on U.S. involvement. Under divided government presidents are less likely to intervene as a third-party than under a unified national government. The same relationship once again does

not hold for high-level interventions, which may indicate that there is something unique about crises requiring significant U.S. aid that enables a president to ignore congressional opposition.

Admittedly, the results presented in this chapter are only tentative given the lack of variation found in the dependent variable. Surely, though, there is a need to further examine the notion of foreign policy substitutability. Indeed, only by accounting for the many tools an executive has at his disposal to address international issues, can we systematically explain foreign policy decision-making.

TABLE 25: Multinomial Logistic Model of Domestic, Systemic and Crisis-Specific Variables on U.S. Third-Party Involvement in Interstate Crises, 1918-1994

Category 1: Political or Economic Involvement

Variables	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-2.51	.66	-3.79	.000
Divided Government	Domestic	-.25	.17	-1.46	.145
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	-.27	.35	-.77	.439
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.03	.03	-.99	.323
Super-Power	Systemic	.79	.40	1.95	.051
U.S. Military Expenditures	Systemic	$1.08*10^{-8}$	$1.21*10^{-8}$	.90	.370
System Level	Systemic	.41	.22	1.84	.066
War Involvement	---	.94	.40	2.39	.017
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.85	.17	5.16	.000
Ally * Democracy	Crisis	.50	.17	2.95	.003
Americas	Crisis	1.06	.52	2.05	.040
Africa	Crisis	-.78	.34	-2.28	.023
Europe	Crisis	-.88	.43	-2.03	.043
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-.68	.49	-1.39	.164

Category 2: Military Involvement

Variables	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-5.94	1.05	-5.64	.000
Divided Government	Domestic	-.22	.24	-.95	.344
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	-.06	.45	-.14	.887
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.04	.05	-.82	.413
Super-Power	Systemic	1.70	.61	2.77	.006

Table 25 (cont'd):

U.S. Military Expenditures	Systemic	$5.41*10^{-8}$	$1.63*10^{-8}$	3.32	.001
System Level	Systemic	1.45	.32	4.49	.000
War Involvement	---	1.12	.52	2.15	.032
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.99	.21	4.69	.000
Ally * Democracy	Crisis	.26	.24	1.11	.268
Americas	Crisis	2.32	.64	3.60	.000
Africa	Crisis	-.27	.46	-.60	.548
Europe	Crisis	-2.63	.71	-3.68	.000
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-1.53	.75	-2.03	.042
N=356	*$\chi^2(26) = 140.94$ (.0000).*				
LL = -298.79	*Pseudo $R^2 = .19$*				

NOTE: The dependent variable is the level of U.S. third-party involvement in an interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

TABLE 26: Multinomial Logistic Model of Domestic, Systemic and Crisis-Specific Variables on U.S. Third-Party Involvement in Interstate Crises, 1918-1994 (Excluding World War II Cases)

Category 1: Political or Economic Involvement

Variables	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-2.63	.70	-3.76	.000
Divided Government	Domestic	-.31	.18	-1.76	.079
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	-.25	.37	-.68	.495
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.05	.03	-1.60	.111
Super-Power	Systemic	.84	.44	1.93	.054
U.S. Military Expenditures	Systemic	$1.87*10^{-8}$	$1.32*10^{-8}$	1.42	.156
System Level	Systemic	.46	.27	1.71	.088
War Involvement	---	1.14	.46	2.47	.013
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	.99	.19	5.20	.000
Ally * Democracy	Crisis	.44	.17	2.56	.011
Americas	Crisis	1.14	.53	2.13	.034
Africa	Crisis	-.79	.35	-2.23	.026
Europe	Crisis	-.65	.48	-1.35	.178
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-.73	.50	-1.46	.143

Category 2: Military Involvement

Variables	*Variable Type*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*	*T-score*	*P*
Constant	---	-5.84	1.17	-4.99	.000
Divided Government	Domestic	-.33	.25	-1.31	.192
Off-Presidential Year Elections	Domestic	.18	.49	.368	.713
GNP Growth Rate	Domestic	-.12	.06	-2.09	.037
Super-Power	Systemic	2.18	.80	2.73	.006

Table 26 (cont'd):

U.S. Military Expenditures	Systemic	$5.27*10^{-8}$	$1.93*10^{-8}$	2.74	.006
System Level	Systemic	.65	.44	1.48	.140
War Involvement	---	.88	.64	1.37	.171
Soviet Involvement	Crisis	1.50	.26	5.69	.000
Ally * Democracy	Crisis	.19	.25	.76	.446
Americas	Crisis	2.56	.68	3.74	.000
Africa	Crisis	-.38	.49	-.78	.436
Europe	Crisis	-2.15	.99	-2.19	.029
Nuclear Power	Crisis	-1.46	.76	-1.92	.055

N = 315 $\chi^2(26) = 123.53\ (.0000)$
LL = -256.69 *Pseudo* $R^2 = .19$

NOTE: The dependent variable is the level of U.S. third-party involvement in an interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0.

TABLE 27: Estimated Coefficients of Multinomial Logit Models Moving from No Involvement to a Higher Level of Involvement

Variable	Equation 1		Equation 2 (Excluding WWII)	
	No involvement to low-level	*No involvement to high-level*	*No involvement to low-level*	*No involvement to high-level*
Constant	-2.51***	-5.94***	-2.63***	-5.84***
	(-3.79)	(-5.64)	(-3.76)	(-4.99)
Divided Government	-.25	-.22	-.31*	-.33
	(-1.46)	(-.95)	(-1.76)	(-1.31)
Off-Presidential Year	-.27	-.06	-.25	.18
Elections	(-.77)	(-.14)	(-.68)	(.368)
GNP Growth Rate	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.12**
	(-.99)	(-.82)	(-1.60)	(-2.09)
Super-power	.79*	1.70***	.84*	2.18***
	(1.95)	(2.77)	(1.93)	(2.73)
U.S. Military	$1.08*10^{-8}$	$5.41*10^{-8}$***	$1.87*10^{-8}$	$5.27*10^{-8}$***
Expenditures	(.90)	(3.32)	(1.42)	(2.74)
System Level	.41*	1.45***	.46*	.65
	(1.84)	(4.49)	(1.71)	(1.48)
War Involvement	.94**	1.12**	1.14**	.88
	(2.39)	(2.15)	(2.47)	(1.37)
Soviet Involvement	.85***	.99***	.99***	1.50***
	(5.16)	(4.69)	(5.20)	(5.69)
Ally*Democracy	.50***	.26	.44**	.19
	(2.95)	(1.11)	(2.56)	(.76)
Americas	1.06**	2.32***	1.14**	2.56***
	(2.05)	(3.60)	(2.13)	(3.74)
Africa	-.78**	-.27	-.79**	-.38
	(-2.28)	(-.60)	(-2.23)	(-.78)
Europe	-.88**	-2.63***	-.65	-2.15**
	(-2.03)	(-3.68)	(-1.35)	(-2.19)
Nuclear Power	-.68	-1.53**	-.73	-1.46*
	(-1.39)	(-2.03)	(-1.46)	(-1.92)
	N=356 $\chi^2(26)=140.94(.0000)$		*N=315* $\chi^2(26)=123.53(.0000)$	
	LL = -298.79 *Pseudo* $R^2=.19$		*LL = -256.69* *Pseudo* $R^2=.19$	

NOTE: The dependent variable is the level of U.S. third-party involvement in an interstate crisis. Models estimated in Stata 5.0. T-ratios in parentheses.

***$p<.01$

**$p<.05$

*$p<.10$

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The 'end of history' as Francis Fukuyama (1992) imaginatively put it has not yet emerged. Despite the tremendous growth in democratic regimes, conflicts continue to percolate in many parts of the world; at least 90 by one count since the collapse of the Soviet empire (see Jentleson, 1997). While the end of the Cold War has meant many things, it has not as Bruce Jentleson (1997: 39) writes "meant the end of war...U.S. military forces have been actively deployed more times to more places thus far in the 1990s than in any comparable length of time during the Cold War." In 1996 alone, the United States had approximately 30,000 peace-keeping troops in at least six different countries around the world (*The Economist*, November 23, 1996).

Political and economic involvement has further helped resolve emerging conflicts in regions such as Central and South America, the Middle East, East Asia, and the Mediterranean. Indeed, given the increasing importance of conflict resolution, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher even urged that a new diplomacy is needed "that can anticipate and prevent crises...rather than simply manage them" (quoted in Jentleson, 1997: 57). This would presumably bode well for the emergence of an international system free of interstate conflict. Certainly, research by Greg Raymond (1994) and Jacob Bercovitch (1991, 1996) has already demonstrated that democracies show a propensity to

resolve their quarrels without the use of force. Strategies such as mediation and juridical arbitration are prevalent policy choices, and ones that effectively avoid other more belligerent possibilities. Conceivably then, if the growth of democracy continues unabated, such conflict resolution strategies may well come to constitute the primary responsibility of great power foreign policies in the foreseeable future.

Yet, at the same time that the U.S. has appeared ready and willing to intervene in crises abroad, those in positions of power have been selective about the conflicts to engage. The Balkans, for example, have received considerable attention while the crisis in East Africa between Ethiopia and Eritrea has generated only a token response from the Clinton administration. The why question that logically follows this example is a primary concern of this dissertation.

Despite the pervasive role third parties play in the resolution of interstate crises, little attention has been devoted to comprehensively accounting for when such states intervene and the consequences they have on the conflicts themselves. While the major power states, the United States in particular, appear ready at times to assist in conflict resolution, we know little about the decision-making of these intervening states. Surely, there is a need to understand the conditions that lead great powers to play an active role in preventing dispute escalation.

Furthermore, if leaders base their foreign policy decisions in part on the likelihood of great power intervention, then conflict initiation and escalation cannot accurately be modeled without incorporating the potential third-party participant. Certainly the leaders of Ecuador and Peru, Presidents Alberto Fujimori and Jamil Majuad, agreed to resume peace negotiations as a result of pressure put on the two countries by the United States, as

well as by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. So, not only can third parties have a potential impact on the policy choices of leaders in crisis, but such interventions may also serve to alter the preference profiles of these governments as well.

Research on third parties should additionally help refine our understanding of U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Crisis bargaining, for example, presents only one type of foreign policy problem that decision-makers must confront. To understand more broadly the choices made by foreign policy elites, attention needs to be devoted to the important factors entering into different decision rules.

The Politics of Conflict Resolution

In this dissertation, I develop a theory of U.S. third-party intervention into ongoing interstate conflicts. I assert that systemic threat, domestic-political opposition, and crisis saliency all enter into the decision calculus of a president when considering the deployment of political, economic, or military resources to help prevent the escalation of a crisis situation. It is the international climate that essentially provides the opportunity for active intervention. However, domestic conditions together with the saliency of the crisis both help determine an administration's willingness to become involved.

The empirical evidence I find strongly demonstrates that all three components of my theoretical model play a role in U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Not only is U.S. third-party intervention behavior associated with broad systemic-level changes. But, geographic salience and domestic-political conditions also are related to these types of resource commitments abroad. Furthermore, the evidence here provides further support for the importance of regime type in U.S. decision-making. In both the interwar and post-

World War II periods, democratic governments involved in crisis situations were much more likely to receive U.S. aid than non-democratic regimes.

In Chapter One, I discuss the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decision-making. I argue, contrary to neo-realist structural theories, that domestic politics plays an important role in international affairs. Indeed, I suggest that not only must societal-level concerns be incorporated to effectively model the complexity of interstate affairs, but it is also clear that foreign policy decisions necessarily have an impact on the domestic setting, such as by upsetting trade ties, discouraging investment, or raising the prices of certain goods and services. Consequently, a president will be compelled to monitor these sorts of domestic-level externalities.

Yet, as a number of other scholars have insisted (for example, Putnam, 1989; Martin and Simmons, 1998), we need to not only understand *whether* domestic interests play a role in state decision-making, but we also need to know *how* such domestic interests affect policy choices. For example, diversionary theories maintain that democratic political processes incite belligerent foreign policy initiatives. To avoid electoral or policy defeat, many scholars insist that leaders are willing to instigate interstate disputes to induce a rally-around-the-flag effect. Others, however, suggest that democratic decision processes dissuade executives from engaging in foreign policy adventures. The institutional constraints placed on presidential decision-making--for instance the need to put together a coalition to ensure policy success, public accountability, and media oversight--all confer caution in foreign policy decision-making. In this dissertation, then, both theoretical arguments are tested against the ICB data.

To be sure, though, the systemic environment and strategic interests must also concern incumbent administrations. Consequently, only a multi-level model of international behavior that incorporates both structural and liberal variables will successfully explain foreign policy decision-making. In Chapter Two, then, I also emphasize that U.S. third-party intervention policy cannot adequately be understood without attention given to systemic structure and the unique characteristics of the crises themselves. Drawing on the work of Regan (1998) and Fordham (1998) I surmise that as threat increases, a president should increasingly turn to foreign policy to protect American interests abroad. Given that U.S. interests are closely linked to a stable international order, executives should actively attempt to prevent crises from becoming full-scale conflagrations.

Yet, even under high threat conditions, not all crises will receive U.S. attention. Surely, some conflict situations are more salient to U.S. interests than others. For instance, many disagreed on the importance of the Bosnian situation and the necessity of a U.S. troop deployment to the region. Few, however, would disagree that preventing the escalation of the Egyptian-Israeli skirmish in 1948 was in America's interests.

The remaining three chapters empirically test the hypotheses delineated in Chapter Two. For example, in Chapter Four an event-count model is used to test the relationship between systemic threat, domestic opposition, and third-party intervention. Chapter Five then extends the analysis by incorporating crisis saliency on the right-hand-side of a logistic equation. The dependent variable in this chapter collapses all interventions into a dichotomous measure of conflict intervention or no intervention. In the final empirical chapter, the level of U.S. involvement is examined by expanding the

dependent variable. This trichotomous variable separates interventions into low-level (political and economic) and high-level (military). A multinomial logistic model is then used to assess the influences of the right-hand-side variables on low-level versus military interventions.

Conflict Resolution in a Dynamic International Environment

In Chapter Two, I argue that systemic conditions should play an important role in presidential foreign policy decision-making. Specifically, as threat increases the U.S. will tend to become more active in international affairs. Conflict resolution is an integral aspect of this foreign policy activism. While the results from the Poisson regression must be interpreted with some caution, third-party intervention does appear to have increased significantly from the more isolationist interwar period to the tense Cold War environment. An analogous change occurred after 1989 and the collapse of Eastern Europe. From 1989 through 1994 the incidence of U.S. conflict-resolution attempts decreased considerably. Presumably, the end of the Cold War, the focus on domestic priorities, and the beginnings of Russian democracy have all played a role in convincing many that scarce resources should be spent domestically, rather than abroad. Many Americans also began to question the continued need for the U.S. to act as an international policeman; preventing conflicts from escalating as well as punishing states when they did.

Admittedly, this conclusion flies in the face of Jentleson's (1997) evidence related to U.S. foreign policy activism after the Cold War. Given the prevalence of intrastate conflict in the 1990s, however, it is entirely possible that my conclusions here regarding

interstate conflict remain valid. Albeit, with the event-count model it is difficult to know whether U.S. willingness declined or whether interstate conflict opportunities have become less prevalent in the post-Cold War world. There certainly is some evidence to suggest that the latter may be the case. Conflicts have tended to be internal, rather than external, conflagrations.

Chapters Five and Six continue to demonstrate the importance of systemic factors in the decision to intervene. The logistic analysis in Chapter Five provides evidence that the U.S. reacts to the level of systemic threat. Increases in military expenditures tend to increase the likelihood of third-party interventions. Given that the variable is lagged, such increases in the defense budget seemingly indicate a dissatisfaction with U.S. security, and a more activist foreign policy is the consequence. Administrations further show a marked propensity to involve the U.S. in crises that include major world powers, while minor-power crises are less likely to receive U.S. attention.

Chapter Six interestingly demonstrates that systemic conditions are particularly influential when it comes to the commitment of military resources abroad. While playing a role in low-level interventions, high-level interventions, such as those that involve U.S. troop deployments are strongly related to systemic threat.

Domestic Demands and Conflict Interventions

The evidence presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six also demonstrates that domestic-political demands play a role in presidential decision-making related to conflict resolution. In Chapter Four, for instance, I find the economic growth rate to be statistically significant and negatively related to U.S. third-party interventions. Off-

presidential year elections similarly show a significant and negative relationship with intervention. Further evidence also, though only marginally, indicates that a partisan effect may exist. Democrat administrations demonstrate a greater propensity to intervene than their Republican counterparts, and political opposition within Congress tends to prevent conflict-resolution attempts. The latter variable, admittedly, is statistically significant at only a *p*-level of .17.

Interestingly, three of the four domestic-political variables have a constraining effect on third-party interventions. Rather than inciting presidential attention to international events, domestic conditions appear to discourage foreign policy initiatives. Only economic growth shows a relationship that potentially supports a diversionary view of foreign policy. As economic conditions deteriorate, presidents may be intervening in these salient interstate events to divert Americans' attention from their pocket book woes. However, the relationship may also indicate strategic behavior on the part of the primary crisis actors. Believing that the U.S. may intervene, foreign state leaders may time their dispute initiations when domestic-political conditions inside the U.S. will focus executive attention on internal affairs.

Chapter Five further shows third-party interventions to be unrelated to electoral or public approval forces. Not only is approval for a president insignificant, but neither election years nor the honeymoon period appear to increase the propensity to intervene abroad. Furthermore, political opposition on Capitol Hill is significant ($p < .10$) and negatively associated with third-party crisis involvement. This result indicates that presidents are less likely to intervene as a third-party in ongoing crises when the opposition party controls one or both houses of Congress. Presumably, presidents are

concerned about risky foreign policy ventures being used against the administration or fellow partisans on the Hill in future elections.

In Chapter Six, I find that such domestic opposition plays a stronger role in low-level interventions than high-level ones. Such a difference may indicate that high-level crises are salient enough to overcome partisan opposition to foreign policy initiatives. However, it may also be the case that the lack of variation in the dependent variable is hiding what could eventually be found to be a significant relationship. Indeed, while divided government is insignificant at a .05 level, the point estimate is similar to its low-level intervention value and the relationship is in the same direction.

I also find in Chapters Five and Six that war involvement tends to play a role in third-party interventions. However, the relationship is opposite what might be expected; war involvement tends to increase the propensity to intervene as a third-party in ongoing crisis situations. Most likely, both primary actor engagement and third-party conflict-resolution attempts are part of a larger foreign policy agenda that involves protecting U.S. interests abroad. Executive attention in one arena of foreign policy may spur increased attention to other festering problems abroad as well.

The Importance of Crisis Saliency

Given the importance of crisis saliency to U.S. intervention policy, the event-count model may be inadequate for evaluating foreign policy decision-making. That is, if meaningful explanatory variables cannot be included in the estimation, then perhaps the Poisson model is underspecified resulting in inconsistent coefficients. Figure 15 demonstrates that the propensity to intervene varies significantly within any given year.

For instance, in 1971 a border crisis emerged between Sudan and Egypt. The U.S. contributed semi-military aid to help prevent its escalation. That same year, however, a crisis between Cambodia and Thailand erupted, as well. This time the U.S. refused to intervene with even low-level aid. So, not only is the assumption of invariance across time potentially invalid. But, this invariance is directly tied to salience and consequently can be addressed via right-hand-side variables in the logistic model.

Indeed, we see that the precise characteristics of the crises significantly influence the decision to intervene. Easily the most important of these characteristics is a Soviet presence. As the level of involvement by the U.S.S.R. expands, the likelihood of the U.S. intervening tends to increase substantially. Not surprisingly, this result is confined to the post-World War II period, although a positive (though not significant) association is present during the interwar years as well. However, during the Cold War the odds of U.S. third-party involvement in crises are 5 times greater if the Soviets have also intervened.

The probability of intervention is interestingly reduced by the presence of nuclear-capable states. U.S. administrations appear to avoid regional crises that involve a nuclear issue. Further support for this conjecture is found in Chapter Six. The presence of nuclear-capable states tends to have a larger effect on high-level interventions than low-level ones. That is, the size of the coefficient is two times greater for high-level interventions, similarly suggesting that the U.S. is unwilling to contribute military resources to conflicts that are unlikely to be resolved in the near-term.

The U.S. also appears prepared to support its democratic allies. While crises involving at least one state with an entente or defense pact with the U.S. are marginally more likely to receive U.S. aid, when the ally possesses a democratic regime U.S.

attention is nearly certain. In fact, regime type alone is statistically significant in both the interwar and Cold War periods, indicating that for the U.S. at least, the governmental structure of states in crisis appears to have an invariant influence on foreign policy decision-making. That is, peace-making initiatives are much more likely to be undertaken by the United States when democratic regimes, rather than non-democratic ones, are engaged in crisis situations.

Interestingly, though, the commitment of resources to our allies for conflict resolution appears to have a limit. While willing to contribute political and economic support, there appears to be no significant relationship between high-level interventions and democratic allies. It may be, however, that America's democratic friends possess the political and military capabilities to settle their own quarrels without the presence of U.S. troops and personnel.

Geographic location is an additional component in an administration's decision to intervene abroad. The U.S. shows a systematic proclivity to help solve crises in its own backyard. Crises within Central and South America are much more likely to receive U.S. aid then crises that emerge in Africa. The evidence in Chapter Six shows this relationship to be even more strongly supported for high-level interventions. The likelihood of a military intervention is significantly higher for Western Hemisphere quarrels than other regions. In fact, burgeoning interstate quarrels in Africa on average receive U.S. assistance less than half the time. Ultimately, the independent effect of the African region is to decrease the likelihood of U.S. third-party involvement. Admittedly, when one examines the multinomial results, the regional dummy for Africa is insignificant for high-

level interventions. However, this is most likely a consequence of insufficient variance in the right-hand-side dummy variable.

Future Research Possibilities: The Effects of Third Parties

Third parties continue to be under studied by international relations scholars. Yet, their effects on conflict escalation and conflict alleviation may be profound. This dissertation has provided some initial evidence for the systemic, domestic, and crisis-specific factors that enter into the decision by a U.S. administration to intervene as a peace-maker. Of course, many research avenues remain unexplored. For example, there is little empirical evidence linking third parties to successful conflict resolution, although some preliminary research by Duyvesteyn (1996) suggests that interstate conflicts that involve military interventions may be both longer and more costly in terms of battlefield deaths than conflicts that do not involve third parties. These results are anomalous and directly contradict the stated goal of many third-party interventions.

Duyvesteyn's results, though, only beg for further analysis. Are third parties intervening in disputes that are unlikely to be resolved in the first place? That is, do the great powers come riding in only after conflicts threaten to affect their interests, through resource destruction, trade interruption, or spatial contagion? Such questions need to be answered to get a handle on the effectiveness of, and continued reliance on, third-party interventions.

Duyvesteyn's research furthermore only addressed high-level third-party interventions. However, we know that states have other tools to affect policy change. It

would certainly be interesting to know whether Duyvesteyn's results regarding high-level interventions are also supported for political mediation efforts, as well.

Attention must also be given to the role of issues in interstate conflict and third-party interventions. If the underlying issues in conflict between two or more states affects the likelihood of military force being used, such issues may additionally contribute to the intervention of third parties. Might troublesome territorial questions be avoided by third parties, concerned that the quarrel will require a considerable resource commitment? Might issue type be confounding Duyvesteyn's results regarding third parties and the severity of interstate conflict?

In conclusion, then, neutral third-party interventions into interstate disputes are relatively common actions taken by the great powers in the 20th century. The U.S., in particular, has seemingly played an instrumental role in helping to resolve many incipient crisis situations. Yet, clearly much more work needs to be done before any definitive conclusions can be reached regarding the determinants of third-party decision-making and the effects these interventions have on the conflicts themselves. Such additional research is necessary, though, if scholars hope to meaningfully model the complexity of interstate conflict.

TABLE 28: Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Results

Variable type	*Hypothesis*	*Hypothesized direction of relationship*	*Variables*	*Direction of relationship found*	*Strength of relationship found*	*Chapter*
Systemic	Hypothesis 1	+	Super-power	+	Strong	Chapters 4, 5 & 6
			System level	+	Strong	Chapter 5
					Moderate to strong	Chapter 6
	Hypothesis 2	+	US Expenditures	+	Moderate to strong	Chapter 5
					Strong	Chapter 6
Crisis Saliency	Hypothesis 3	+	Soviet Involvement	+	Strong	Chapters 5 & 6
	Hypothesis 4	+	Democracy	+	Moderate to strong	Chapters 5 & 6
			Ally*Democracy	+	Strong	Chapters 5 & 6
	Hypothesis 5	+	Ally	+	Low	Chapters 5 & 6
			Ally*Democracy	+	Strong	Chapters 5 & 6
	Hypothesis 6	+	Americas	+	Strong	Chapters 5 & 6
			Africa	-	Moderate to strong	Chapters 5 & 6
			Europe	-	Moderate to strong	Chapters 5 & 6
Domestic-Political	Hypothesis 7	-	Divided government	-	Low or none	Chapter 4
					Moderate	Chapter 5
					Low to moderate	Chapter 6
			Senate seats	-	Low	Chapter 4
					None	Chapters 5 & 6
	Hypothesis 8	-	Election years	-	Strong	Chapter 4
					Low or none	Chapters 5 & 6
	Hypothesis 9a	+	GNP growth	-	Strong	Chapter 4
					Moderate	Chapters 5 & 6
	Hypothesis 9b	-	GNP growth	-	Strong	Chapter 4
					Moderate	Chapters 5 & 6

APPENDIX A

TABLE 29: Chapter Four Correlation Table

	Elec.	GNP	Seats	Super	WWII	Viet.	Cold
Election	1.00						
GNP	-.13	1.00					
Senate Seats	.13	.25	1.00				
Super-Power	-.01	.03	-.35	1.00			
World War II	-.08	.40	.31	-.40	1.00		
Post-Vietnam War	-.01	-.04	-.20	.47	-.19	1.00	
Post-Cold War	.05	-.05	-.18	.23	-.09	.49	1.00

APPENDIX B



FIGURE 16: Histogram of Event-Count Model Dependent Variable

APPENDIX C

Table 30: Chapter Five Correlation Table

	Div. Govt	Election	Rate	Super	Expend.	Level	War	Soviet	AllyDem	Americas	Africa	Europe	Nuclear	Party
Divided Government	1.00													
Off-Presidential Election	-.12	1.00												
GNP Growth Rate	-.34	.02	1.00											
Super-Power	.33	-.01	.001	1.00										
Military Expenditures	-.20	.02	.53	.15	1.00									
System Level	-.21	.09	.12	-.43	-.03	1.00								
War Involvement	-.01	-.10	.30	-.02	.16	.24	1.00							
Soivet Involvement	-.03	.04	.05	-.07	.002	.38	.13	1.00						
Ally*Democracy	.02	-.01	-.03	.18	-.04	-.04	-.006	-.05	1.00					
Americas	-.01	.01	-.03	.05	-.03	-.13	-.05	-.18	.19	1.00				
Africa	.05	.03	.03	.34	.18	-.31	-.15	-.20	-.12	-.22	1.00			
Europe	-.16	-.01	.03	-.48	-.09	.44	-.01	.19	.02	-.19	-.31	1.00		
Nuclear Power	.07	.05	.004	.24	.12	.03	-.002	.15	.31	-.04	.02	-.03	1.00	
Party of President	.67	-.03	-.15	.31	.15	-.27	-.02	-.12	-.02	.03	.10	-.18	.10	1.00

APPENDIX D

TABLE 31: Mean Values for Exogenous Variables, 1918-1994

Variable	*Mean*	*Standard Deviation*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Divided Government	1.84	.91	1	3
Off-Presidential Year Election	.18	.38	0	1
GNP Growth Rate	2.70	5.61	-21.12	17.22
Senate Seats	54.15	10.16	35	76
Unemployment Rate[a]	7.25	4.26	1.2	21.7
Super-Power	.67	.47	0	1
U.S. Military Expenditures	4798812	$1.39*10^7$	$-4.49*10^7$	$4.61*10^7$
System Level	1.49	.92	1	4
War Involvement	.19	.39	0	1
Soviet Involvement[b]	1.72	.98	1	4
Ally*Democracy	1.65	.92	1	4
Americas	.11	.31	0	1
Africa	.29	.45	0	1
Europe	.23	.42	0	1
Nuclear Power	.10	.30	0	1

NOTE: N=359.
[a]N = 315.
[b]N = 356.

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