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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

THE RISE AND DECLINE 0F COCOA
PRODUCTION IN SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA
FROM 1900 TO 1993

presented by
Ezekiel Ayodele Walker

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

3% 5 degree in 10/5 dd");

mat/flew.

Ma Jorxnrofessor

Date June 17, 1997

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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COCOA
PRODUCTION IN SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA
FROM 1900 TO 1993

By

Ezekiel Ayodele Walker

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1 999

ABSTRACT

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COCOA PRODUCTION IN SOUTHWESTERN
NIGERIA FROM 1900 TO 1993

BY

Ezekiel.Ayodele Walker

This dissertation. examines the rise and. decline of
cocoa production in southwestern Nigeria between 1900 and
1990. This study traces the introduction and spread. of
cocoa to .Agege, Ibadan, Ife and Ondo. In the years
following the decline of the cocoa farms of Ibadan and some
other northern Yoruba towns, large numbers of farmers
migrated to Ife and Ondo where there were still large areas
of uninhabited farmland. The influx of migrant farmers into
these areas resulted in the commercialization of land,
which. engendered. significant changes in the land tenure
system. By the mid 19503, Nigeria had emerged as one of the
most prominent exporters of cocoa on the world with export
volumes reaching about 280,000 metric tons. Besides, cocoa
became the major foreign exchange earner of Nigeria,
accounting' for' about thirty' percent of foreign exchange

earnings. Yet, by the late 19708, the cocoa industry in

Nigeria began a downward spiral from. which it has not
recovered. This dissertation focuses on the intersection of
government policies, cocoa farmer decisions and
environmental factors in analyzing the decline of the

industry.

Cepyright by
EZEKIEL AYODELE WALKER
1999

“Modem-21L!

I was privileged to receive a grant from the
Rockefeller Foundation in 1988, which allowed me to do the
fieldwork for this study. I would like to express my most
heartfelt gratitude to Professors David Robinson and Harold
Marcus who were responsible for bringing me back to the US
after a six-year hiatus in Nigeria. Words are inadequate to
express my thankfulness for their compassion and the
unqualified support they gave me throughout my stay at
Michigan State University. My deep appreciation goes to
members of my doctoral committee. Professor LoRomer's
friendship during my career at Michigan State University was
uplifting and heartwarming. I thank him for taking me
through many meaningful excursions into contemporary
European history that allowed me to appreciate the global
dimensions of this study. Many thanks also to Professor
Eldredge for agreeing to serve on my committee at such short
notice, and for making many useful comments. My deep
appreciation to Professor John Staatz of the Agricultural
Economics department for reading my dissertation
meticulously, and making many useful suggestions.

The relationship between a doctoral candidate and a
dissertation director is a unique one. Professor David
Robinson, my dissertation director has an unusual ability to
encourage without flattering, and correct without

discouraging. On several occasions his perceptive comments

opened up entirely new directions for the dissertation, for
which I am grateful. I also thank him for reading the
dissertation carefully, and making detailed suggestions. I
thank Professor Harold Marcus for his sensitivity to my
financial needs at various stages of my career at Michigan
State University. I am grateful to him for his insightful
comments regarding my work.

I was also fortunate to receive the enthusiastic
response of many people in the cocoa growing areas. From the
farmers whose unfettered responses made fieldwork a
rewarding experience, to my able research assistants, Felix
Kokumo and Aderemi Adewale, who went beyond “the call of
duty" in their dedication to garnering information, I say a
big thank you.

These and many others who have surrounded my life have
contributed to giving shape to this work. I owe them an
immense debt. To my parents whose unswerving support during
my six-year hiatus in Nigeria, assuaged the pain of not
being able to come back to the US on schedule, I say a big
thank you. Finally, I thank God from whom all blessings
flow.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Maps

Key to Abbreviations

Introduction

Chapter 1:

Chapter 2:

Chapter 3:

Chapter 4:

Chapter 5:

Chapter 6:

Review of sources and historiography

Historical Background to the rise of
Cocoa growing in southwestern Nigeria
The Yoruba Wars

British colonial economic policy and
cocoa production

European Missions, Agege planters and
the rise of cocoa production in Nigeria

The agricultural and biological aspects
of cocoa

The origin of cocoa

The Botany of cocoa

Climate

Soil structure

Adaptation of the cocoa tree in Nigeria
Establishment and maintenance of cocoa

farms

The rise and fall of cocoa production in
Ibadan

British colonial government and cocoa

Production

Swollen shoot and the fall of Ibadan cocoa

Ibadan in the post-swollen shoot era

Migrants, new settlements and new
structures of production in Ife and Ondo
The rise of cocoa production in Ife and
Ondo

The establishment of new cocoa farms

The Marketing Board, the appropriation of

surplus and cocoa farmer impoverishment
Historical background

w

viii

ix

34

35
45

49

62
63
67
70
72
73
78
87
88

99
106

110

111

136

147

148

The establishment of the Nigerian Cocoa 155
Marketing Board

The impact of Board policies on cocoa 175
farmers

Chapter 7: The oil boom, rural-urban migration and 183
the attenuation of households
Agriculture and the immediate post 184
colonial period
Agriculture and Development schemes, 187
1973-19808
The failure of cocoa rehabilitation 200

Chapter 8: Structural Adjustment, new marketing
arrangements, and the empowerment of labor 214

Historical background 215
Structural Adjustment and cocoa marketing 217
Resolution of crisis 237
Chapter 9: Conclusion 247

Bibliography 260

vii

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

1:

List of Tables
Dates on which cocoa was first planted
in several Ondo villages.

Dates of establishment and arrival of
migrants in some Ife towns.

Previous occupation of some migrant
farmers in Akeredolu and Ago-Gboro.

How hired laborers were used in
selected cocoa villages in the 19508.

: Accumulation of reserves by the Marketing

Board.

Nigerian cocoa producer prices as
percentage of World prices.

Cocoa production in Nigeria as a
percentage of world production from
1900/1-1986/87 in metric tons.

Government revenue from SFEM
Trend in nominal producer price of cocoa

per metric ton for pre-SAP and SAP
Periods.

10: Annual average exchange rate

(1970-1989)

wu

.119

.120

.131

.137

.163

.169

.188

.218

.220

.221

LIST OF MAPS

 

1.Map of Ibadan Empire
2.Map of Ondo State

3.Map of selected cocoa villages in
southeast Ife

 

61

143

144

 

ANCE
BCGA
IJAHS
JHSN
NISER

SAP
SFEM

ng to Abbreviations

Association of Nigerian Cocoa Exporters
British Cotton Growing Association

Central Bank of Nigeria

Church Missionary Society

International Journal of African Historical
Studies

Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
National Archives Ibadan

Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research
Structural Adjustment Program

Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market

INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty-five years agricultural production
in Nigeria has been on a downward spiral. Between 1945 and
1964, Nigeria had become the second leading world producer
of palm oil and palm kernels. In the early 19603, Nigeria
accounted for approximately eighteen percent of the world
output of and was second only to Ghana in volume of
production. Besides, in 1960, the role of cocoa as a foreign
exchange earner was unsurpassed. In fact, about twenty
percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings were obtained
from cocoa. From 1970, however, Nigeria's share of the world
market output for some of the major cash crops began to
decline. For example, in 1972, Nigeria's share of the world
market output for cocoa dropped from eighteen to sixteen
percent. This trend was exacerbated by the neglect of the
agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy that occurred
with the advent of the oil boom in the mid 19708. By the
late 1970s the petroleum industry was responsible for about
ninety-one percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings.

The impact on the cocoa industry was almost mortal.
From an output of 280,000 tons in the 1979/80 season, there
was a progressive decline to 155,000 tons in 1980/81, and

then to 151,000 tons in 1984/85. Nigeria’s cocoa production

has fluctuated between 95,000 and 150,000 since the 1986
season.

Using archival and oral sources, this dissertation
examines the remote and proximate factors responsible for
the decline and present stagnation of the cocoa industry. In
chapter one, I discuss the historiography on cocoa
production in southwestern Nigeria. I argue that although
significant amounts of work have been done on various
aspects of the cocoa industry, namely: its growth and
development, the role of marketing boards and the impact of
the oil boom on agricultural production, there has been no
systematic study of the decline of cocoa production.

In the second chapter, I provide a historical
background to the rise of cocoa cultivation. I divide this
chapter into two parts. In the first part, I discuss the
Yoruba civil wars during which various Yoruba city—states
fought for self-determination after the collapse of the Oyo
Empire. To be sure, the degree of involvement of the
belligerents in the civil wars determined their
responsiveness to the new economic opportunities that came
with the transition from the slave trade to “legitimate
commerce."

In the second part, I focus on the normalization of
British colonial authority. I discuss the formulation of

British colonial economic policy and its contribution to the

growth of cash crop production in Nigeria. I examine the
demand for cocoa on the world market and the efforts of
missionaries in disseminating knowledge on the economic
potential of cocoa. I trace the role played by the Agege
planters not only in starting new cocoa farms, but also in
financing the African Church that became pivotal in
spreading cocoa to the city-states in the interior of
Yorubaland.

In chapter three, I examine the agricultural and
biological aspects of cocoa. I trace the origin and spread
of cocoa cultivation from the Amazon Basin in Central
America to Southeast Asia and Africa. I focus particularly
on the adaptations of the cocoa crop to the peculiar
climatic and soil conditions of West Africa.

In chapter four, I discuss the rise and fall of cocoa
production in Ibadan. I examine the introduction of cocoa to
Ibadan and its emergence as the largest producer of cocoa in
southwestern Nigeria. Besides, I examine the structure of
cocoa production in Ibadan with particular emphasis on land
rights. I also show how the outbreak of the swollen shoot
disease contributed to the demise of the Ibadan cocoa belt.

In chapter five, I focus on the migration of stranger-
farmers from Ibadan and other older cocoa growing
communities to Ife and Ondo. To be sure, although the Ifes

had planted cocoa in the southwestern part of the town, the

southeast forests were still largely uninhabited by the late
19408. So also were the forests along Ondo-Akure road. I
show that migrants constituted the bulk of the population of
these uncharted areas and that their influx in large numbers
resulted in the commercialization of the land tenure system.

In chapter six, I analyze the impact of the marketing
board on the cocoa industry. I focus on how the marketing
board reserves were spent and how the policy' of price
stabilization affected producer prices. I examine the
residual incomes of the farmers and how they influenced
their investment patterns. How did cocoa farmers spend their
money? Did they expand their acreage's? To what extent were
they able to control the spread of diseases?

In chapter seven, I focus on the impact of the oil boom
of the 19708 on the cocoa industry. I show how the rural-
urban migration that occurred during this period resulted in
the attenuation of the household and increased the cost of
maintaining cocoa farms. I also examine the impact of the
scarcity of labor on cocoa production.

In chapter eight, I examine the impact of the
Structural Adjustment Program on the cocoa industry. I
discuss the main features of the program and their
implications for the cocoa industry. I argue that the de-
regulation of the Nigerian economy and the withdrawal of

subsidies on fertilizers and farm implements made the cost

of maintaining cocoa farms prohibitive. I also show how
hired laborers have become the primary beneficiaries of the
SAP program as cocoa farmers, most of whom are over sixty
years old, have to share farms with laborers to keep down
the cost of production.

In chapter nine, I provide a conclusion that draws on
the information in the preceding chapters to reflect on the

decline of the cocoa industry.

CHAPTER ONE

 

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND REVIEW OF SOURCES

In studying the rise and decline of the cocoa industry
in southwestern Nigeria, I employed a combination of
different sources such as eyewitness accounts, oral
traditions, private papers and diaries, government
publications and archival materials. These sources, in
varying degrees, presented challenges and evoked critical
questions.

In this chapter, I discuss the merits and weaknesses of
the different categories of evidence. I begin by analyzing
the relevant archival materials on the cocoa industry. I
also evaluate the strengths and prejudices of government
publications such as the Annual Reports of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Central Bank Reports.
Finally, the extensive eyewitness accounts in the cocoa
growing areas are assessed.

This study has two main parts. The first analyzes the
rise of the cocoa industry from the 19008 to the 19608. This
section focuses on the spread of cocoa cultivation to
Ibadan, Ife and Ondo. The 19208 and 19308 witnessed Ibadan's
emergence as the major cocoa producer in Nigeria. By the mid
19408, however, cocoa production in Ibadan had declined, in
part because of the swollen shoot disease and also because
of the diminishing fertility of the soil. The late 19408

were the period of migration to the relatively new cocoa

producing areas of Ife and Ondo. Migrant farmers came from
all over Yorubaland in the wake of the high prices that were
being paid for cocoa in the 19508.1

The second part of this dissertation begins in the mid
19608 and ends in 1993. In this section, I focus on the
activities of the marketing board and the appropriation of
surplus. I analyze the investment patterns of cocoa farmers.
How much do they realize from cocoa production? How much of
their income do they re—plow into establishing new farms or
rehabilitating existing ones? To what extent does the
marketing board policy of price stabilization limit their
capacity to expand their holdings? In this section, I also
look at the decline of cocoa production. I analyze the
impact of the oil boom and the Structural Adjustment Program
on the cocoa industry.

The archival materials correspond to these two broad
periods. Documents are kept in the Search. Room. at the
National Archives in Ibadan. The materials for the period
between 1920 and 1960 consist primarily of colonial
government reports such as provincial papers, intelligence
reports, letters and memoranda. Colonial office documents
also include Blue Books, which contain copious figures on
imports and exports, custom duties, freight charges and
tariffs.2

The colonial government reports deal disproportionately
with different aspects of the colonial administration. For

example, the majority of the documents in the Ibadan

archives pertain to the Indirect Rule system. They include
correspondences between British officials regarding the
running of their different areas. They also include
petitions from various southwestern Nigerian personages on
questions relating to the Indirect Rule system.3

.Although archival documents are skewed towards
political history, there is adequate information on economic
and social history. Accounts of land disputes, the land
tenure system, and letters regarding the swollen shoot
disease feature prominently in these documents. There is
also considerable information on the marketing boards. They
consist primarily of annual reports and memoranda between
the board and the Federal Ministry of Trade. Files for the
immediate post colonial period focus primarily' on. cocoa
marketing under the re-structured commodity board.4

The documents on the colonial period, for the most
part, reflect the hierarchy of the colonial administration.
They also give a good sense of the main outlines of British
colonial policy. In addition, they provide adequate
information on the workings of the Indirect Rule system, and
the reactions of the indigenous population to it.

A district officer who was expected to write an annual
report of his activities administered each province. The
district officer was also the “man on the spot," and was
expected to be a liaison between the people and the
Resident. The district officer transmitted information about

local conditions to the Residents. Although the district

officer mediated local disputes as much as possible in the
provincial courts, matters of policy were left to the
Resident.5

There ~are provincial files that contain valuable
information on the different provinces of the defunct
Western. Region. The district officers who jpresided. over
these provinces were faced with the daunting task of
collecting accurate and comprehensive information. This task
was made difficult by the lack of good communications system
such as roads, and the paucity of support staff. Colonial
officials had to rely on interpreters not only in mediating
disputes, but also in collecting information on different
aspects of life in the provinces.6

There are several official publications that complement
archival sources, such as the Annual Reports of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Annual Reports of
the Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria and publications of
the Association of Nigerian Cocoa Exporters. For the most
part, these documents tend to give a positive image of
government contribution to agriculture. In fact, some of
their figures do not reflect actual village conditions. A
careful analysis of these documents, and the social and
political context in which they were compiled, should be
done before they can be used as source materials.7

Another important source of information for this study
is newspapers. The majority of newspaper reports on the

cocoa industry’ is investigative, and. as such. contain. a

substantial amount of valuable information. Yet, they have
to be used with caution. For the colonial period, some
newspapers tended to toe the line of government. Newspapers
that were particularly critical of colonial government
policy were denied advertisement. Owing to the fact that
this was the most important source of revenue for most of
the newspapers of this era, a great number of the more
militant ones had to fold up.

The post-colonial period was not different. Government
newspapers such as Daily Times and New Nigerian have tended
to give intellectual cachet to government policy. In using
government newspapers, one has to look beyond their narrow,
provincial interests and prejudices, and analyze the
“facts.” Regional newspapers, especially those in the cocoa
producing areas, are a goldmine of information on the cocoa
industry.

The Daily Sketch and the Nigerian Tribune are the two
most prominent newspapers in the cocoa belt. Because of
their proximity to the cocoa belt, they are able to provide
up-to-date information on various aspects of the cocoa
trade. The researcher, however, also has to be circumspect
in using them. The Nigerian Tribune is a privately owned
newspaper of the Awolowo family. Before Awolowo passed away
in 1987, this newspaper had been used as a conduit for
disseminating his political philosophy. For example, the
newspaper was less critical of marketing board policies in

the 19608 and 708 than most other newspapers, because its

10

proprietor, Awolowo, was an ardent proponent of using
marketing board funds for regional development.

The Sketch, on the other hand, was more liberal.
Although it is a regional government paper, it has had the
incredible fortune of having at its helm, independent-minded
and fearless journalists. It is no accident, therefore, that
the Sketch has experienced more forced closings, and more
censorship than any Nigerian newspaper. Over the last
decade, the Guardian has joined the ranks of the Sketch for
its intrepid reporting. Widely respected and acknowledged as
the flagship of Nigerian journalism, the Guardian, which is
privately' owned, has taken a bold and aggressive anti—
government position on most issues.8

Newspaper reports tend to be influenced by the
journalist’s ideological position, his or her class
interest, and in the case of Nigeria, ethnic background. To
be sure, the interpretation of the evidence is conditioned
by these factors; and at times, the evidence is completely
submerged under the obfuscating canopy of conflicting
interests. A good appreciation of these factors is essential
to employing this category of sources.

The second part of this dissertation makes extensive
use of oral sources. The oral sources for this dissertation
are primarily eyewitness accounts and recollections of
farmers. These accounts are more personal and less
structured. than. formal traditions. Formal traditions are

stories, poems, songs, genealogies and narrations of major

11

historical events or characters that are either in fixed or
free text, and are passed down from generation to generation
in a carefully constructed chain of transmission.9

This definition is pertinent for the pre-colonial
history of most non-literate African societies. One needs to
make a distinction between oral traditions and oral history.
Oral sources, such as eyewitness accounts, are not included
in the conventional definition of oral traditions because
they are not reported statements, but remembrances of people
who lived at the time of the event they are recounting.

One may ask how oral sources have historical value. One
can use them depending on the type of history one is writing
about. For the colonial period, oral sources are a useful
supplement to the archival materials, and. other" written
sources. Sara. Berry’ in Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic
Change in Rural Western Nigeria, makes extensive use of the
personal experiences of cocoa farmers, and Polly Hill more
or less does the same thing in her Migrant Cocoa Farmers of
Southern Ghana.1°

Although eyewitness accounts are different from oral
traditions, they do present the same problems. One of the
major problems I faced during my fieldwork was the lack of a
convenient communications system. The rural areas, where the
vast majority of the farmers I interviewed live, don't have
good roads. This becomes more problematic during the rainy
season when most of the roads are waterlogged. This renders

them impassable by car. During the rainy season, I couldn't

12

travel as much as I wanted, as I had to go by public trucks,
which were always packed beyond capacity. Owing to the poor
condition of the roads, these trucks were so ponderously
slow, that in most cases, a 12-mile journey from Akeredolu
to Kere took about two hours.11

Also, most prospective interviewees do not trust
strangers whose political affiliations and occupation are
unknown to them. Cocoa farmers are, for the most part,
apprehensive of anyone who looks westernized; they very
often assume that such a person is a government official who
has come to tamper with their land. The first order of
business for me, therefore, was to look for someone who
could introduce me to the influential farmers in a few of
the cocoa villages.12

I was very fortunate to meet Mr. Aderemi Adewale, a
student at the Obafemi Awolowo University. Mr. Adewale,
whose father was a cocoa farmer at Kere, agreed to work for
me as a field assistant. We made several trips to the cocoa
belt together. For my interviews in the Ondo cocoa villages,
I employed the services of Mr. Felix Kokumo, a former
student of mine and the son of a prominent Ogun priest. His
father had important ties to the cocoa belt, which fact
facilitated my fieldwork in the Ondo area.13

Informants were selected from a cross-section of the
farming population. For the most part, I interviewed village
elders, who were direct descendants of the founding

landowning families of the different cocoa villages. The

13

village population in Ife and Ondo generally regards these
elders as repositories of the history' of cocoa farming
because they have a first-hand account of its origin and
growth. Besides, most of the migrant farmers I interviewed
in Ife south and Ondo also gave first-hand accounts of their
experiences as they arrived in these villages in the 19508
and 19608, and helped in settling them.

My fieldwork began at Akeredolu village where I talked
extensively with the Chairman of the village, Chief Adedewe.
The Chairman gave me a good sense of the layout of the cocoa
belt of southeast Ife, providing me with names of villages
and cocoa farmers that he felt would be able to give me
information regarding cocoa production in their villages.
Chief Adedewe then introduced me to the prominent ex-
landowners at Akeredolu.14

These former landowners shared their recollections of
Akeredolu history with me. They talked about the settlement
of the village, the rise of cocoa production and the influx
of migrant farmers into Akeredolu. The oral interviews were,
for the most part, open-ended. As my informants told me
their stories, I interjected with specific questions. I
asked them what was the cost of setting up their cocoa
farms, the cost of maintaining their farms from the time
they established it up to 1991, the number of laborers they
have used, the volume of production over time, and the

returns from cocoa.

14

The chairman then took me on a tour of the village
and introduced me to each household. The Chairman felt that
this was important in order to dispel any apprehensions the
farmers might have about my intentions. After getting to
know most of the people in the village, I decided to stay
there for three months. I rented a room in the house of
Olodu, a hunter and foodcrop farmer.15

From my base at Akeredolu, I made forays into other
parts of Ife south such as Isoya, Osi-Soko, Area 5,
Wanisoni, Oloronbo, Kere and Molodo. At Akeredolu, I
interviewed 50 male farmers, 1 female farmer and 21
laborers. At Molodo village, I interviewed about 45 farmers
and 2 annual workers. At Kere village, I interviewed farmers
in 13 households; and at Aroko, Osi—Soko, Oloronbo and
Araromi-Oke Odo, otherwise known as Area 5, I interviewed
the farmers whose names had been suggested to me by Chief
Adedewe.16

In the Ondo cocoa growing area, my interviews followed
a similar pattern. I stayed in Ondo town for about four to
five days at a stretch, anytime I went to do interviews in
the Ondo cocoa areas. From Ondo town, I went to Omifon
Aladura on the Ondo-Ore road, Fagbo, Igbo-Oja, Uloen, Aba
Baba-Ibadan, Bamikemo Oja, and Bolorunduro. I also visited
four villages in the Idanre/Ifedore local government area,
namely: Ago-Gbogi, Isanmore, Legbira and Mofere, . I
interviewed 67 farmers and nine laborers in the Ondo cocoa

growing areas. In all, I visited 21 villages, and

15

interviewed 162 farmers and 30 laborers. According to my
informants, their experiences was representative of what was
going on in the other cocoa producing villages.17

One major drawback I faced was the issue of
remuneration. The majority of my informants wanted financial
reward for the information they were providing. Although I
did not give informants cash, occasionally I gave some of
their children presents. I also tried to make them realize
that my research was intended to help make their plight
known to a larger audience, and that the information they
provided would probably bring greater sensitivity to their
situation.

Apart from these logistical problems, there were some
epistemological concerns. First, most of my informants
sought to advance their own interests. They, therefore,
interpreted events in ways, which suited their needs. First,
landowners were especially critical of government for
enacting the Land Use Decree that abolished the payment of
ishakole. Migrant farmers on the other hand, viewed it
differently. Neither landowners nor migrant farmers were
favorably disposed to the growing influence of laborers in
the cocoa belt. In fact there was considerable tension
between the two groups, and I interviewed both groups
separately to avoid confrontation.18

In most cases, I interviewed farmers individually. This
was owing to the fact that most farmers were reluctant to

talk in a group for fear that their views might not be

16

popular. Others did. not feel comfortable with. divulging
intricate details about their cocoa farms to their peers. In
cases where I conducted group interviews, I did so with the
consent of the parties concerned.

For example, the ex-landowners at Akeredolu were very
willing to do group interviews. At Omifon .Aladura, the
elders of the village suggested that I do a group interview
because, for the most part they had good relations with one
another, and they each knew what the other had. I also did
group interviews at Mofere, Molodo and..Aba. Baba-Ibadan.
Also, laborers were generally more disposed to group
interviews than farmers. This was owing to the fact that, in
most cases, they worked in groups, and also because they
tended to find strength in being togetherulg

Group interviews helped to minimize the problems of
chronology and the dates of specific events. Although
farmers were recounting events in the recent past, they had
great difficulty remembering the exact time of these events.
The dynamics of group interviews allowed informants to
crosscheck the information they were providing one with the
other. I had so many instances of some farmers with good
memories correcting" others when they' were talking" about
their experiences.20

Farmers were able to estimate the approximate time an
event took place by linking them to some family occurrence
such as the birth of a child, the loss of a loved one and in

many cases even a larger national event. For example, many

17

of the elderly farmers recall, rather tremulously, the
Akintola regime during which cocoa prices plummeted to an
all-time low. Events such as the Civil War and the oil boom
are also easily recounted which fact made it possible for me
to contextualize the interviews.“'

Although it is difficult to prove the veracity of these
accounts, I interviewed informants several times to confirm
original recollections. The chairman of Akeredolu village
was also very helpful in verifying or refuting the accounts
of other farmers in his village. In most other cocoa
villages, I was able to make friends with a cross section of
the population quite easily. I found out that developing an
affective relationship with farmers made them more willing
to talk about their experiences. Also, once they had me in
their confidence, it was not difficult to ask them for
comments on what others had saidfi22

Oral sources provide a basis for assessing the
documentary' evidence. In the case of Nigeria, they' are
almost indispensable because, for the most part, government
documents, especially in the post-colonial period, present a
reality that is so different from what is happening “on the
ground." Although oral sources provide valuable information
for reconstructing the past, one should be aware that they
also embody the prejudices, frustrations, fears and hopes of

the dramatis personae.

18

Historiggraphy

Perhaps the most important question in the economic
history of southwestern Nigeria today is to explain the
rapid decline of cocoa production over the past twenty
years. A considerable amount of literature exists on the
growth of export production during the colonial period.
These works in varying degrees examine the role of
international trade in the development of the cash crop
economy of Nigeria.23 A few studies have been conducted on
the post-colonial period. Most of these studies focus on
the consequences of Africa’s incorporation into the world
capitalist system, while other works by agricultural
economists and economists, give descriptive accounts of the
performance of specific sectors of the Nigerian economy.24

The historiography on agricultural production in
Nigeria can be divided into three broad genres. The first
group of studies defines the development of cash crop
production in Nigeria in relation to the growth of the
European market economy. A significant number of these
studies are variations of the “vent for surplus” hypothesis
propounded by Hyla Myint.

Myint's seminal theory contends that international
trade spawned the effective demand which West African
economies needed to harness otherwise dormant resources of
land and labor. He argues that since West African economies

were able to fulfill their subsistence requirements in a

19

situation where they had copious, underutilized land and
abundant labor, they were able to take up export production
without any disruption of food production. In short,
international trade provided the incentive for surplus
production.

Significant proportions of the studies in the colonial
period. were outgrowths of the “vent-for-surplus theory."
For* example, G.K1 Helleiner reiterates the pertinence of
Myint’s theory in his book, Peasant Agriculture, Government
and Economic Growth in Nigeria, by stating that the growth
of cash crops during the colonial period was created
through the acquisition of more land for cultivation and
the dropping of leisure activities as a result of the
higher incomes farmers were realizing from cash crops. He
also contends that the creation of infrastructure such as
railroads not only revolutionized West African economies,
but also facilitated the expansion of export production.25

Carl Eicher examines agricultural development in Nigeria
during the colonial period. Although Eicher agrees that
indigenous smallholders made certain internal adjustments
during the colonial period, he emphasizes the impact of
British policies on agricultural growth. He states that three
important British decisions created the conditions for the

development of the Nigerian economy.

20

First, the colonial land ordinance of 1910 and later
1917, gave indigenous farmers absolute preserve on
agricultural production, as distinguished from East Africa,
where the British gave imprimatur to the growth of a white
settler' agrarian. communityn Second, the epidemiological
research policy for cash crops resulted not only in the
discovery of new and improved strains of cocoa, groundnuts
and oil palm, but also in the development of insecticides
and fungicides for checking cocoa diseases. Third, the
British supplanted expatriate trading companies with the
marketing boards in the 19308.26

Szereszewki also uses the “vent-for-surplus” model to
examine the radical changes that took place in the Ghanaian
economy' between 1891 and 1911 with the introduction. of
cocoa. He states that the incipient cocoa industry benefited
from a large supply of labor as labor input increased from
100,000 labor days in 1891 to 37 million in 1911. He
submits that the process of capital formation that led to
the phenomenal expansion of the industry was a direct result
of the monetization of labor.’7

The major weakness in all of these studies is that they
underplay the role of the smallholders in the development of
agricultural production in Nigeria. They give the impression
that colonial policy was the “deus ex machina" which created
the rapid agricultural growth of the early years of colonial
rule, and they ignore the strenuous expenditures of capital

and labor by the indigenous producers. For instance, how

21

was production organized? How was labor mobilized? What
kinds of investments did the farmers make?

Polly Hill puts the role of smallholders in proper
perspective in her book, flagrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern
Ghana. Hill argues that cocoa farming in Ghana was
established not by settled farmers who owned small acres of
individual plots, but by migrant Akwapin, Krobo and Shai
farmers who moved into the cocoa regions of Ghana from the
southern fringes of the forest belt and bought large tracts
of unused land. She maintains that cocoa farming among the
migrant farmers involved some degree of capital formation
and the investment of capital on land. and. agricultural
tools, and the re-plowing of profit on more cocoa land.
Through these uniquely capitalist processes, the migrant
cocoa farmers were able to expand cocoa production in Ghana
significantly.28

Sara Berry has followed up on Polly Hill’s observations
in her seminal work on Nigerian cocoa. Sara Berry argues
that the “vent-for-surplus” model needs to be modified in
the case of cocoa production. While she concurs that large
numbers of cocoa farmers sought previously unused land for
cocoa farming, actual cocoa. production. entailed
organizational changes which affected the way resources were
mobilized. For example, the commercialization of land,
finding sources of credit and the organization of labor make
cocoa production a more demanding vocation than the vent-

for-surplus model suggests.29

22

The second historiographical trend in the economic
history of Nigeria is Marxist. Although most of the Marxist
studies do not deal specifically with Nigeria, they
extrapolate from studies of different African regions and
make general statements about the Third World as a whole.
The Marxist tradition. has found. expression. in. both. the
dependency theory and the modes of production school.

The dependency theory was first articulated by Andre
Gunder Frank and later applied by Samir Amin, Walter Rodney,
Giovanni Arrighi, John Nabudere and John Saul.30 Based on
varying trends of development in the Third World, different
views of the theory have emerged. The main argument of the
dependency school, however, is that the incorporation of the
Third WOrld into the world capitalist economy created
distortions which have hindered the development of Third
World economies.31

Extending Frank's frame of thought, Samir Amin,
Emmanuel Arrighi, John Nabudere and John Saul argue that
underdevelopment is a product of the penetration of capital
into the Third World. Amin states that in South Africa a
significant capitalist center had emerged with the discovery
of gold and diamonds. This resulted in some form of
primitive accumulation whereby Africans were dispossessed of
their land and consigned to small and impoverished areas
where there was very little scope of transforming their
agriculture. Consequently, they formed a pool of cheap

labor, which ensured the greatest profits to the burgeoning

23

manufacturing industries in South .Africa and Northern
Rhodesia. Amin says that elsewhere on the continent,
especially in West Africa, integration into the world
capitalist economy was characterized by the payment of low
wages to local producers, which created. not only' cheap
exports for the metropolitan countries, but also unequal
exchange.”

The dependency theory came into being in the late 19608
and early 19708 after most African countries had become
independent. The theory is inherently flawed in that it sees
the backwardness of .African economies only in terms of
external factors. With the failure of government programs
and the pervasiveness of corruption in official circles in
the Third World, it is time for a closer analysis of the
impact of domestic policies on agricultural production.

In a counter-argument to the dependency theory, the
“modes of production” school argues that one needs to
differentiate between relations of exchange and relations of
production. Proponents of this school of thought such as
Meillasoux, Pierre-Phillipe R, Aidan Foster—Carter and
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, maintain that the coming of
capitalism into Africa did not engender the demolition of
pre-capitalist modes of production; rather, what happened
was a process of articulation of the pre-capitalist modes of
production into the world capitalist system.33

In the works of agricultural economists and economists,

there is a movement away from these theoretical issues to a

24

preoccupation with the statistics of production and
marketing. Agricultural economists such as S.M. Essang,
Olayide, Olatunbosun and Dina have compiled a considerable
amount of statistical information on different aspects of
the cocoa industry;34

S.M. Essang has written on wage differentials in the
cocoa belt among farmers and produce buyers between 1967 and
1969. iHe argues that the data. on the distribution. of
earnings in the cocoa belt suggests that large-scale farmers
had greater access to credit facilities than smallholders
who were in the majority. The smallholders had to resort to
borrowing money from moneylenders and licensed buying agents
who imposed high interest rates. This situation, according
to him, created sharp inequalities in the cocoa belt.35

Most studies by agricultural economists emphasize the
role of the Marketing Board in cocoa production. Helleiner,
in giving one of the most valid reasons for its
establishment argued that the only justification for its
continuance long after the end of the colonial period was
the fiscal role, which it had come to play. It had become a
conduit for mobilizing the agricultural surplus, designed to
meet the ever-increasing developmental needs of the country.
This view was also shared by S.M. Essang, who stated that
earnings from Marketing Board operations should be used for
the provision of infrastructures in the country.

Olatunbosun, Olayide and Teriba, however, argue that

despite the accumulation of large reserves by the government

25

of Western State, it was unable to finance cocoa
rehabilitation” They' also contend. that Marketing' Board
policy depressed producer earnings for many years; these
authors, through some statistical correlations, deduce that
low prices kept cocoa output downfi36

Granted, cocoa output has dropped significantly over
the past twenty years; however, this decline has to be put
in historical context. The fact of the matter is that with
the commercialization of the cocoa industry, it became
necessary for farmers to accumulate surplus in order to
maintain their farms. The capacity of cocoa farmers to
expand their farms, pay their laborers and spray their cocoa
trees was contingent on the amount of surplus they amassed.

Sara Berry offers a different perspective in her book,
Fathers WOrk for their Sons. Using empirical data collected
from two villages, which she christened Abakinni and
Abulekeji and two towns, namely, Eripa and Iree, she
suggests that rural stagnation derives not so much from the
exploitation of farmers by the Marketing Boards, but by the
way farmers have spent accumulated surplus. Berry argues
that successful farmers in southwestern Nigeria invest most
of their resources not in expanding cocoa production, but in
constructing social networks that would enhance political
preferment and seniority. She goes on to say that most
successful farmers do not see cocoa as “a way of life," but

as a vehicle for upward mobility, and that capitalization of

26

cocoa has not partitioned society into agrarian bourgeoisie
and proletariat.37

Sara Berry’s observations need to be qualified. There
is no question. that the majority' of successful farmers
tended to diversify their activities and use money earned
from cocoa to enhance their political and social status
within the community. There are examples of erstwhile cocoa
farmers who have become prominent politicians, produce
buyers, and traditional rulers; but these constitute only a
small proportion of the cocoa farming population.

To be sure, the vast majority of cocoa farmers are
smallholders who are spread across the cocoa belt in
tightly-clustered cocoa villages. For example, about eighty
percent of the farmers I interviewed in selected cocoa
villages from Akeredolu to Kere, a twelve—mile stretch of
road, have been in the area since the 19608. This is also
true of many villages in Idanre, Ile-Oluji and Ondo. For
the majority of smallholders, who cannot diversify their
economic activities, cocoa is a way of life.

The questions that need to be asked are: what options
are available to the farmers? Could they with their limited
resources get out of the circumscribed “world” of the
smallholder? Further, how have the majority of smallholders

in the cocoa belt spent their surplus? These questions are

27

pivotal to understanding the decline of cocoa production in
the postcolonial period.

.Although some of the studies on the post-colonial
period of the cocoa industry make reference to the decline
of cocoa production, there has been no systematic study of
this phenomenon. Sara Berry, in her article, Oil and the
Disappearing peasantry, talks about the exodus of people
from cocoa villages during the oil boom. The oil boom led to
an unprecedented growth in the Nigerian economy. The civil
service expanded and the urban centers blossomed. She opines
that owing to the increase in educational opportunities,
cocoa farmers encouraged their school age children to go to
school in order to take advantage of the new opportunities,
rather than prepare for life as cocoa farmersfi38

Bola Aluko, in a study of small-scale industries in
Western State, states that there was a significant increase
in the number of artisans in Ife during the oil boom years.
The oil boom produced a consumer society, as cars,
appliances, and all kinds of foreign goods flooded the
Nigerian. market. This created. opportunities for learning
trades such as automobile repair and repair of electrical
appliances. This attracted a large number of youths from the
cocoa villages.39

The Structural Adjustment Program in Africa has been
the subject of considerable scholarly attention. The
majority' of these works, however, are skewed

disproportionately toward the impact of the program on the

28

private sector of the economy. Structural Adjustment and
Beyond edited by Rolph van der Hoeven and Fred Van Der
Kraaij is a collection of articles on the political economy
of structural adjustment and the long-term developmental
implications of the program. Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan
Africa edited by Chhibber and Fischer examines macroeconomic
aspects of the program such as exchange-rate policy, the
parallel markets, financial sector policy and trade

° There are a number of case studies of structural

policy.‘
adjustment on individual African countries. The Gambia:
Economic Adjustment in a small open economy by Hadjimichael,
Rumbaugh and verreydt is an assessment of the performance of
the progam from 1985 when it was inaugurated to 1992. The
authors contend that although the prices of agricultural
commodities have fallen in Gambia, structural adjustment had
some positive results such as the diversification of the
export sector. The authors, however, do not analyze the
social consequences of the program. Open Economies:
Structural Adjustment and Agriculture edited by Golden and
Winters examines the impact of structural adjustment on
agriculture. Drawing from the literature on the
macroeconomic aspects of structural adjustment, the authors
focus on the impact of exchange rate and trade policies on
agriculture. Other studies on the impact of structural
adjustment on agriculture include Amani et al. who examine

the privatization of food markets, and Bloomfield and Lass

29

who study various aspects of the international cocoa
market.41

With particular reference to Nigeria, Bola Akanji, in
two NISER monographs, talks about the Structural Adjustment
Program and the proposed government ban on the export of raw
cocoa beans. Akanji also talks about the emergence of new
marketing arrangements in the cocoa industry, but does not
situate the work in a historical context. Julius Ihonbvere
discusses the political economy of structural adjustment.“'2

This dissertation is at once a work of synthesis, but
also uses empirical evidence to analyze the intersection
between government policies and farmer decisions. For
example, how did the movement of people from the rural areas
affect the cost of labor in the cocoa villages, and how did
this in turn affect the capacity of cocoa farmers to
maintain their farms? What were the implications of the
changing cost of production on labor relations and how did
this affect the volume of production? The same questions can
be asked of the Structural Adjustment Program.

Furthermore, we still need to clarify the role of
internal domestic policies, as opposed to the world
capitalist system, 'upon. agricultural. production” For
example, how were policies such as the “Green Revolution"
implemented. Why is it that in spite of massive amounts
allocated for cocoa rehabilitation, cocoa continues its

downward spiral? What was the impact of government programs?

30

Finally, not much attention has been given to the study
of the effects of ecological factors on the cocoa industry,
despite the debilitating consequences of the outbreak of the
swollen shoot disease, and the fact that these diseases
continue to scourge the new cocoa growing areas. This
dissertation therefore is intended to fill these gaps by
analyzing the interplay of government policies, ecological
factors and market forces, and evaluating their impact on
the cocoa industry. In addition, this dissertation is
intended to do a systematic analysis of the decline of cocoa

production in Nigeria in the pot-colonial period.

31

ENDNOTES

1 Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom and Socio—Economic Change in Rural Western

Nigeria

2 National Archives, Ibadan

Search Room, National Archives, Ibadan

Search Room, National Archives, Ibadan

Search Room, National Archives, Ibadan

The various files of the colonial officials mention the lack of good
communications network, and the problems associated with collecting
information.

7 Documents are located in the libraries of the: Cocoa Research
Institute of Nigeria; Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
and the Association of Nigeria Cocoa Exporters, Ibadan.

° I visited the following newspaper houses during my research in
Nigeria: Sketch, Nigeria Tribune, The Daily Times, and I got copious
newspaper cuttings on the other newspapers at the National Archives,
Ibadan.

9 Vansina, Jan., Oral Traditions: A Study in Historical Methodology,
London, 1965.

1” Hill, P., Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural
Capitalism, Cambridge, 1963

11'Oral interviews conducted at Akeredolu between 1989 and 1991.

n Fieldwork done in the cocoa belt of southwestern Nigeria between 1989
and 1991.

13Messrs. Aderemi Adewale and Felix Kokumo were my field assistants
throughout my fieldwork in Nigeria.

1‘Chief Adedewe was the Chairman of Akeredolu village during my
fieldwork in Nigeria.

15Chief Adedewe introduced me to the Adereti brothers, Jeremiah Akinwale
and the prominent ex-landowners at Akeredolu

16Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt of southwestern Nigeria at
different times between 1989 and 1991

17Ibid

“Ibid

19Interviews with all the laborers in Akeredolu and Mofere at different
times in 1990.

20For example, I did group interviews at Akeredolu, Omifon Aladura,
Aroko, and Aba Baba Ibadan.

21Fieldwork done in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991

”Ibid.

23Helleiner, G.K., Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth
in Nigeria, Homewood, Illinois, 1966. See also Mcphee, Allan., Economic
Revolution in British West Africa, London, 1926.

“ Eicher, Carl and Leidhom, Carl(eds) Growth and Development of the
Nigerian Economy, East Lansing, 1970.

” Helleiner, G.K., Peasant Agriculture...op.cit

“ Eicher, Carl., Growth and Development...op.cit

”'Szereszewski, R., Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-
1911, London, 1965.

” Hill, Polly., The Migrant cocoa farmers...op.cit

”'Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom...op.cit

” See for instance, Samir Amin., “Underdevelopment and Dependence in
Black Africa-Origins and Contemporary Forms"

31'See also Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul(eds) Essays on the Political
Economy of Africa, 1974; and Frank, Andre., Capitalism and
Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1976.

GMOU

32

” Amin, S., op.cit.,

” See for instance: Foster-Carter, A “The Modes of Production
Controversy" New Left Review, 1978, p107.

“ See for instance: Olatunbosun, D., Nigeria’s Neglected Rural
Majority, Ibadan, 1975

1” Essang, S.M., The Distribution of Earnings in the Cocoa Economy of
Western Nigeria, Ph.D dissertation, Michigan State university, 1970
“ Onitiri, H.M.A, and Olatunbosun, D.,(eds) The Marketing Board System
in Nigeria, Ibadan, 1974

4” Berry, S.S., Fathers Work for Their Sons, Berkeley, 1985

” Berry, S.S., Oil and the Disappearing Peasantry, Boston, 1986; see
also Berry S.S., No Condition is Permanent, Wisconsin, 1993

39Aluko, 8., Small Scale Industries in Western State of Nigeria,
University of Ife Press, 1972

'“See for instance Rolph Van Der Hoeven and Fred van Der Kraaij(eds)
Structural Adjustment and Beyond in Sub-Saharan Africa, Heinemann,
1994; See also Chibber, A and Fischer, S(eds)1991 Economic Reform in
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Symposium, Washington DC, World Bank; See also,
Hadjimichael, M.T.,

‘1 Akanji, 13., NISER Monograph Series No. 1 1992 and No. 3 1993
“Ihonvbere, Julius., Nigeria: Politics of Adjustment and Democracy, New
Brunswick, 1994

33

 

 

 

 

 

'CHAJHEHKEHWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE RISE OF COCOA CULTIVATION IN
SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA

By the turn of the nineteenth century, cocoa had
supplanted palm-oil and palm kernels as the major cash crop
of southwestern Nigeria. From the farms of the Lagos
merchants in Agege and Sango Ota, cocoa cultivation spread
to Ibadan, Ijebu, Ife, Ondo and some other Yoruba towns.
From a paltry production level of 206 tons in 1901, cocoa
production rose to 31,271 tons in 1922.1 Yet, in the late
nineteenth century, Yorubaland had been in the throes of a
protracted sanguinary civil war in which Ibadan, together
with its allies, was pitched in mortal combat with Ijesa and
the Ekitiparapo. Why did Yorubaland, theater of such fierce
conflict, become receptive to cocoa production? How did
Yoruba city-states make the transition from societies
organized around war and the slave trade to cocoa
cultivation?

In this chapter, I give a historical background to the
rise of cocoa production in Yorubaland. To achieve this, I
use a three—fold approach. First, I present a synthesis of
the views of scholars such as Bolanle Awe, Akintoye and
Toyin Falola to analyze the factors that precipitated the
Yoruba wars. To this end, I discuss the disintegration of
the Old Oyo Empire and the ascendancy of Ibadan to military
and political paramountcy in Yorubaland. Also, I examine

Ibadan imperialism and the resistance to it by a coalition

34

of other Yoruba city-states notably, Ijesa, Ekiti, and Ife.
Second, I analyze the resolution of the conflict by the
British in 1893, and the imposition of British colonial rule
on Yorubaland. I also discuss the inauguration of British
colonial economic policy and the introduction of cash crops
to Ybrubaland. Third, I assess the critical role played by
European missionaries and members of the nascent African
church not only in acquiring knowledge of planting cash
crops such as cocoa, cotton, and groundnuts, but also in
disseminating such knowledge to the interior of Yorubaland.
Finally, the response of the Yoruba to cash crop production

is noted.

THE YORDBA.WARS

The beginning of the nineteenth century was a period of
incredible turmoil in Yorubaland. The Oyo Empire, which had
been. experiencing' internal. political crises, finally
collapsed under the onslaught of the Muslim Fulani Jihadists
established in Ilorin.2 The demise of the Old Oyo Empire
had two closely related consequences. First, it created a
power vacuum in Yorubaland. To be sure, the Old Oyo empire
had held hegemonies over most of the Yoruba country and had
ensured the stability of the multifarious city-states that
comprised. the empire. Second, the capitulation. of Oyo
resulted in the absence of an effective bulwark against

Fulani imperialism.

35

According to Bolanle Awe, the Fulani had already
brought many Igbomina towns in the periphery of Yorubaland
under their control. In the wake of this clear and imminent
threat it was imperative for the Oyo-Yoruba, who were the
immediate offsprings of the Old Oyo empire, to reorganize
and present a concerted front against the inexorable attacks
of the Fulani. Ibadan became the center for the re-
configuring of Oyo—Yoruba power because its hilly topography
gave it strategic defensive advantages. Owing to the fact
that most of the forays of the Fulani were focused on the
areas under Ibadan authority, Ibadan became the palladium of
Yoruba sovereignty; Large bands of refugees migrated. to
Ibadan from other towns that were being attacked by the
Fulani for protection. Most of these refugees were military
men who began the process of building the Ibadan army.3

Besides growing as a military power, Ibadan’s
commercial importance grew. Toyin Falola states that
Ibadan’s geographical location between the coast and the
interior made it a commercial meeting place for traders from
all parts of Yorubalandfi‘ He states that markets were
established at Ayeye, Oja Oba and Oje areas of the city to
meet the needs of the regional economy; By the ‘mid-
nineteenth century, Ibadan had become a veritable middleman
in the trade between the Egba and Ijebu, who brought goods
from Lagos, and the people of Ijaye, Oyo and Ogbomoso.s

As Ibadan grew to military and economic prominence in

Yorubaland, the Fulani under“ Abdul Salami 1 established

36

themselves as masters of Ilorin. After successfully
defeating the Ibolo, the Fulani moved decisively into the
interior of Yorubaland and attacked Osogbo. The Osogbos
requested Ibadan’s help. The Ibadan army not only defeated
the Fulani at Osogbo but also stopped their eastward
movement. With this victory, many Oyo-Yoruba towns placed
themselves under the protection of Ibadan.6

Bolanle Awe states that although the Osogbo victory
stymied the Fulani advance in a southeasterly direction, it
did not deter them from looking for alternative ways of
invading Yorubaland. Therefore, they directed their energies
to the northeastern part of Yorubaland, in the Ekiti region.
Although the Ekiti were culturally similar to the Oyo-
Yoruba, they were fragmented politically and this fact made
them vulnerable to external invasion. The Fulani marched
through Otun and the Ekitis, who could not muster a united
force to confront the Fulani, called upon Ibadan for help.
Ibadan in response to the Ekiti's request rallied other Oyo-
Yoruba towns and drove away the Fulani from Otun.7

With the circumvention of Fulani expansionism, Ibadan
sought to build a new and powerful empire that would fill
the void created by the demise of the Old Oyo empire.
Pursuant to this goal, Ibadan undertook a series of
expansionist wars in which it defeated Ijaye, Ijebu and
Egba. By 1870, it had succeeded in liberating all the other

Ekiti towns under the control of the Fulani. Thereafter,

37

Ibadan established a system of government which facilitated
its control over the conquered territories.8

The new structure was intended to bring order to
Yorubaland, and also to bolster the strength of those weak
city-states that could not face the Fulani threat alone.
Besides, the Oyo-Yoruba, who were desirous to recreate the
halcyon days of the Old Oyo empire, saw Ibadan as the
paladin of this restoration. In fact, Alafin Atiba, the new
ruler of an enfeebled Old Oyo empire, gave imprimatur to the
idea of a reconstituted Yoruba community under the aegis of
Ibadan.9

According to Bolanle Awe, Ibadan established a system
of government known as Ajele which reflected the military
character of the town. The conquered territories were put
under the supervision of an official known as the
Babakekere, who for the most part was a man of proven
military ability. The Babakekere was a liaison officer who
appointed an Ajele to supervise the administration of the
subject town and to make sure that the town remained loyal
to Ibadan. Awe states that the Ajele was not always an
Ibadan man. In some cases, individuals from the subject
towns, whose loyalty to Ibadan was unimpeachable, were
appointed.10

The Babakekere also made sure that the economic
benefits of empire were maximized by coordinating the
collection of tribute from the conquered territories.

Further, subordinate territories became sources of

38

foodstuffs for Ibadan. Apart from the copious economic
advantages of the Ajele system, Ibadan also used it as a
springboard for further expansion into northern Yorubaland.“

Ibadan imperialism and the attendant exploitation of
these conquered sub—ethnic groups led to a festering
discontent among these various subjects. in: be sure, the
Ajele system. had. become disreputable; there was intense
competition among Ibadan chiefs to become Babakekeres
because of the power and influence which it brought.
Furthermore, the ajeles began to undermine the local
authorities of the conquered groups. The injustices of the
Ajele system engendered fissiparous tendencies within the
Ibadan empire. .Although there were a number‘ of revolts
against Ibadan authority, none of these groups could resist
the military power of Ibadan. Awe contends that in its
expansionist wars in Ekiti, Ijesa, Igbomina and Akoko,
Ibadan had demonstrated repeatedly that it was capable of
crushing any resistance to its authority. Ibadan defeated a
coalition of some Ekiti towns at Ikoro in 1855 and
annihilated a gargantuan Northern Ekiti coalition at Iye in
1875.‘2

In 1877, all these states, in a collective awakening,
realized that only a combined effort of all Ekiti people
could break the yoke of Ibadan overlordship. Consequently,
in mid-1878, they capitalized on Ibadan's involvement in a
war with the Egba and Ijebu to form the Ekitiparapo

confederacy with the object of driving away Ibadan from

39

Ekiti country. In the ensuing Kiriji war, the Ekitis
presented Ibadan with the most formidable challenge to its
illustrious career. After fifteen years of unmitigated
fighting, the British successfully brokered a peace between
the belligerents and effected the armistice of 1893.13

The Yoruba civil wars have generated much controversy
among historians. The relevance of these wars to the
economic history of Yorubaland lies in the fact that they
mark a watershed in the transition from the slave trade to
trade in cash crops. They also provide an insight into why
Yoruba city-states were responsive to the economic
opportunities of the incipient colonial economy.

Early observers, missionaries and historians see the
Yoruba civil wars as a struggle among Yoruba city states to
gain control of the trade in slaves. A.G Hopkins, for
instance, argues that the abolition. of the slave trade
resulted in the diminution of the volume of the trade. This
fact, he says, led to heated competition among Yoruba city-
states for control of the receding slave market. He goes on
to say that the demand for new products such as palm oil and
palm kernels, which require the use of large numbers of
laborers, might have contributed to the protraction of the
war.“

Other African historians such as J .F.A. Ajayi, Ralph
Austen, and R.S. Smith however, de—emphasize the role of
economic factors in the outbreak and prolongation of the

war. They contend that the civil wars should be put in the

40

wider context of the political and economic structure of
Yorubaland in the mid—nineteenth century. They argue that
access to political office was contingent upon membership of
certain lineages, whose prerogative it was to present
candidates for traditional titles or offices. Besides, the
major source of income for most families in Yorubaland was
not slaves, but agriculture. They posit that the demand for
palm oil did not lead to any major change in the method or
cost of production. Besides, it was more important to the
economic life of the coastal states such as Lagos, Ijebu and
Abeokuta than the interior states.”

Hopkins retorts by suggesting that Ajayi et al., based
their political interpretation on Ajayi's book, Yoruba
Warfare, which talks primarily about the Ijaye war, a
localized conflict that lasted from 1860—1865. Hopkins
states that Ajayi’s presuppositions do not take into account
the profound changes that took place twenty years later when
the Yoruba wars became a globalized conflict which
encompassed the entire Yoruba country. Hopkins goes on to
say that Ajayi’s argument of a stable agricultural milieu
cannot be sustained given the volatile military situation in
Yorubaland, where pillaging of farmlands occurred routinely.

Be that as it may, the Yoruba civil wars were a complex
event and cannot be explained in relation to either economic
or political factors alone. The evidence supports the
interplay of both economic and political factors because to

a large extent economic gains were used to advance political

41

interests and vice-versa. For example, the Ibadan leaders
put in place a comprehensive system of taxation which
provided money, slaves and foodstuffs with which they bought
firearms from European traders on the coast. Besides, as
Hopkins himself suggests, the Ibadan political class
emerged not from traditional lineages, but from a cadre of
military men who gained political preferment through their
military exploits.

Hopkins states that the Yoruba civil wars occurred at a
time when there was a palpable shift in European policy from
an informal trade relationship with Africa to one of formal
control. The economic crisis in Europe which began in the
early 18708 compelled many European merchants and financiers
to urge their governments to impose higher tariffs to
protect their domestic market and also to acquire colonies
overseas as sources of raw materials. Furthermore, the
fluctuations in business cycles affected the terms of trade
between West Africa and Europe.16

Besides, between 1880-1900, there was a plethora of
complaints about the unstable relationship between the Lagos
colony and the volatile Yoruba country. European and
African traders whose business interests were being
jeopardized by the wars in the Yoruba hinterland made
persistent demands for the annexation of YOrubaland to the
British colony. Consequently, the British government, whose
interests in West Africa were being contested by France and

Germany, moved. into ‘Yorubaland. to effectuate “peace and

42

order." To this end, Ijebu was attacked in 1892, and in
1893 the Governor of Lagos, Carter signed separate treaties
with Abeokuta, Oyo and Ibadan. By the end of 1893, British
colonial rule in southwestern Nigeria had become a “fait
accompli."l7

The resolution of the Yoruba civil wars had far-
reaching implications for the Yoruba country. First, it led
to the emergence of a large class of demobilized warriors.
To be sure, Ibadan had maintained its dominance over most of
the Yoruba country because it had a highly organized
standing army. With a population of about 100,000 before the
outbreak of the war, Ibadan enjoyed a decisive numerical
superiority over most Yoruba city-states.ls

Besides, the nucleus of Ibadan’s army was formed by a
critical cadre of experienced soldiers who had retreated
from the Old Oyo empire in the heat of the Fulani invasion.
Also, the incorporation. of other' Oyo-Yoruba towns ‘under
Ibadan's sphere of influence provided it with the resources
for a back-up force.

Akintoye states that the Ekitiparapo at the time of
Ibadan's expansion had a rag tag volunteer army led by some
warlords known as elegbes. They did not have the discipline,
training and experience of the Ibadan soldiers. The majority
of them were farmers who did not fight on a sustained basis.
The Ibadan warlords on the other hand, built their prestige
and influence in Ibadan society on their military

accomplishments. For them, warfare was not an end in itself,

43

but a means to achieving political prestige within Ibadan
society.19

In the late—18708, the Ekitis realized that without an
organized military, it would be impossible to dislodge
Ibadan. A major reorganization of the military in Ekitiland
began. The proponents of this change were Ekiti men who had
served in the Ibadan army and had mastered their techniques.
These war chiefs, some of whom were Ogedemgbe, Fajembola,
Arimoro and Fabunmi, began to form their own private armies
based on their Ibadan experience. They then undertook a
number of military expeditions against Ekiti towns that were
still under the influence of Ibadan. For the most part,
these private armies operated. as professionals and
constituted the nucleus of the Ekitiparapo resistance
against Ibadan. Of great significance, therefore, is the
fact that both sides prosecuted the war with a substantial
number of permanent soldiers.20

Furthermore, for those Yoruba towns under Ibadan's
suzerainty, economic life was in disarray. The countryside
of towns such as Osogbo, Igbajo, Apomu, Offa and Ikire, was
denuded by the depredations of Ibadan war chiefs. The Ibadan
soldiers continually harried the farms of these areas for
their food supply. This created a state of fear and
insecurity, and most farmers abandoned their farms.21

The post-civil war period was for most of Yorubaland a
period of reconstruction. For many Yoruba men who had fought

on either side of this conflict, life would never be the

44

same again. Men who were essentially soldiers of fortune
found themselves without a means of livelihood. Large groups
of men who had relocated because of the unstable conditions
of the war-torn areas needed a new lease on life. These men
and women became the critical manpower for the colonial

economy.

BRITISH COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND COCOA PRODUCTION

British economic policy in the period between 1893—1900
was desultory, as the government had not formulated any
coherent economic program for Nigeria. By the early 19008,
however, British colonial economic policy had begun to
crystallize. Two themes dominate the literature on colonial
economic policy. The conventional interpretation articulated
by scholars such as Allan Mcphee and G.K. Helleiner contends
that British capital created the infrastructure that led to
the expansion of trade in the West African colonies. They
suggest that this economic growth. resulted in. “positive
benefits" for the indigenous peoples of these areas.

The other perspective, put forward by Ihonvbere and
Toyin Falola, argues that the supposed benefits of colonial
economic policy were accidental and not orchestrated.
Colonial infrastructure, they argue, was not designed to
facilitate internal trade between different regions of
Nigeria, but to expedite the movement of produce from the
interior to the coastal ports. They suggest that the

beneficiaries of colonial economic policy were not the

45

African producers, but the stockholders of the various
European companies that dominated the West African economic
landscape.

In arguing for either' one of these positions, the
complexity of the colonial encounter is often lost. Although
British policy was dictated by national interest and not by
a desire to develop the colonized, the British. created
opportunities that did not exist before. Furthermore, the
uses to which these opportunities have been put by
successive governments in post-colonial Nigeria are as
important as questions about colonial exploitation.

According to Toyin Falola, British economic policy was
directed towards creating institutions that would facilitate
the development of cash crops. To this end, the British not
only began a transport program but also reorganized certain
aspects of the traditional economy' that they' considered
inimical to the functioning of the colonial economy.22

Falola goes on to say that the systematic exploitation
of raw materials in Nigeria did not begin until the British
launched their railroad program in 1898. Railroad
construction was initiated in response to the demands of
European merchants in the coastal towns who did not have
access to the hinterland. By 1901, the Lagos-Ibadan line, a
distance of about 150 miles, had been completed. The line
was extended to Jebba in 1909, and was further extended to
Minna, NOrthern Nigeria after the construction of the Niger

river bridge. By 1918, about 1,110 miles of rail had been

46

laid. The railroad linked economically strategic towns in
the interior of Nigeria to the coastal port of Lagos.

Also, the British discontinued the use of the cowry as
a medium of exchange and replaced it with coins. This was
owing to the fact that the cowry was considered bulky and
could be an impediment to speedy economic growth. Besides,
the British abolished the collection of tolls in Yorubaland
to ensure the free movement of goods and services.23

British economic policy was directed to developing the
resources of Nigeria through the agency of the indigenous
people. Consequently, the British government not only
refused to grant land to European planters but also rejected
the plantation system. In order to give this policy legal
force, the British enacted the Native Lands Acquisition Act
of 1900 and 1903 which stated that any expatriate who wanted
to obtain land must first get official permission from the
High Commissioner.24

Although the British government was not oblivious to
the economic advantages of plantation agriculture, it felt
that indigenous farmers would cope better with the vagaries
of the world market if they owned their own farms and
cultivated foodcrops. Besides, the acquisition of land for
plantations in areas such. as Eastern. Nigeria that were
densely populated would lead to the displacement of people
from their land and considerably alter social life.”

British policy was directed towards not only expanding

existing cash crops but also introducing new ones. To be

47

sure, the export of agricultural commodities to Europe
predates the formal establishment of colonial rule. In the
immediate post-slave trade era the most prominent exports
were palm oil, palm kernels and rubber. In fact, the
development of these exports was considered necessary to
bring closure to the trade in slaves. For some time the
trade in slaves went on concurrently with the palm oil
trade, an anomaly which compelled both the early Christian
missions and some abolitionists in Europe to advocate the
development of commercial agriculture.26

The export trade in palm oil, palm kernels and rubber
flourished up to the early 19008. Apart from being able to
meet the world market demand, Nigeria realized about 500,000
pounds annually from oil palm exports. Besides, rubber
exports contributed about 2.4 million pounds to the National
income in 1895 alone. By the closing years of the nineteenth
century, the prices of these commodities had declined on the
world market, and domestic production diminished
considerably.”

Whereas oil palm, palm kernels and rubber are
indigenous to Nigeria, cocoa is not. Cocoa was introduced
into Nigeria from Fernando Po in the 18708. The expansion of
cocoa in the early part of the twentieth century was
contingent on various factors of demand and supply. The
stimulus for the spread of cocoa came from Europe and
America where the enlarged demands of urban and industrial

centers created a new market for cocoa.28

48

The increased demand for cocoa led to high prices being
paid for it on the world markets. This facilitated the
expansion of cocoa to Africa, Asia and Australia.
Production. grew rapidly, and. by 1900, world. output had

reached 100,000 tons.29

EUROPEAN MISSIONS, AGEGE PLANTERS AND THE RISE OF COCOA
PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA.

The earliest cocoa farms in Nigeria were established at
Agege and Ota in the early 18808 by the Agege planters. The
Agege planters were an illustrious group of indigenous
merchants who had gained considerable economic success as
middlemen in the oil palm trade that replaced the trans-
Atlantic slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century. Owing to
the diminution of the oil palm trade at the close of the
century, a substantial number of Agege merchants began to
diversify their economic activities by planting food crops
in addition to cash crops.30

.As a result of their close association with
international commerce, the Agege merchants had become aware
of the growing demand for cocoa on the world market and also
of the efforts to plant the new crop in Fernando Po. By the
late 18908, many Agege planters had begun to experiment with
cocoa growing. These initial attempts at planting cocoa were
given added impetus by the high prices of cocoa on the world

market at this time.31

49

By the turn of the century many of the Agege planters
had amassed large holdings. Although the large farms of the
Agege planters required a large number of laborers, labor
was in short supply in the Lagos area because of the
deployment of substantial numbers of laborers for the Lagos-
Ibadan railroad. The Agege planters had to turn to the
interior of Yorubaland for laborers to tend their farms.
The procurement of laborers from the Yoruba hinterland was
coterminous with a major initiative by the European
missionaries not only to extend the frontiers of the gospel
but also to mobilize Yorubas to take up cash crop
production.32

To be sure, British colonial administration in Nigeria
was closely correlated with missionary activity. European
missions in West Africa had received tremendous inspiration
from the ideas of Buxton who had advocated the philosophy of
the “Bible and the Plough.”33 Buxton opined that there should
be a symbiotic relationship between the gospel and European
economic initiative. In other words, that the Bible should
pave the way for the so-called civilizing mission.34

Henry Venn, the missionary par excellence, however,
turned Buxton’s philosophy on its head and suggested that
the “Plough" should aid the Bible in Christianizing Africa.
It was Venn’s conviction that British economic expansion
would spawn an indigenous educated elite that would be on
the cutting-edge of uplifting Africa intellectually,

socially and culturally. To this end, this select few

50

should be properly schooled in industrial and technical
education so that they could acquire the necessary skills to
contribute to the trade of the Empire.”

The Christian Missions were also expected to reflect
this philosophy. venn, who was the general secretary of the
C.M.S, strove to create African Christian churches which had
a distinct African flavor. The long-term objective was to
create an African clergy that would be properly equipped to
spread the gospel to the interior of Africa. venn’s thinking
struck a chord in the consciousness of Africans not only in
the C.M.S. but also in the other denominations. African
parishioners of most of the West African coastal churches
began to clamor for greater roles in their churches.36

The consequences were astounding. Most of the coastal
churches, such as the Native Pastorate of the Anglicans and
some self-sustaining Baptist and Methodist churches, were
accorded a significant amount of autonomy. Furthermore, the
fundamental principles of Venn's philosophy of the “plough
and the Bible” were implemented in Abeokuta, Joal in Senegal
and Akropong in the Gold Coast.37

‘Venn, together' with. J.P. Davies, Henry' Robbins and
Thomas Clegg, presided over the introduction of cotton
cultivation to Abeokuta. Between 1852 and 1859, the
infrastructure for the processing of cotton, which comprised
about three hundred gins and six presses, had been
installed. An industrial center for the training of

indigenous technicians was also established. Cotton

51

production began in the mid-18508, and exports doubled every
year up to 1859. In the mid—1860s, however, exports began to
drop owing to the unsuitability’ of the soil, and. also
because of labor shortages created by the Ijaye war.38

After the demise of the Abeokuta experiment, the
Christian Missionary Society tried a similar scheme in Joal,
Senegal in 1861. The Joal plan was inspired by the need to
create new areas of cotton production because of the
American civil war. The man who was in charge of this
scheme, Bishop Kobes, enlisted the support of an Alsace
industrialist and a French merchant in Goree. Together they
began a 240 acre cotton plantation in Joal and hired 150
laborers. The Joal scheme, like its Abeokuta counterpart
failed because of unfavorable climatic conditions and the
ravages of locusts.39

The most successful attempt to domesticate cash crop
production was in the Gold Coast. Here, the Basel Mission
not only started a mission plantation but also encouraged
peasant production. The Basel Mission school was established
to provide instruction in farming methods and also to
experiment with a wide variety of crops. Between 1860 and
1868, the Basel Mission undertook a number of experiments
with cocoa. By the early 18808, it established itself as the
major distributor of cocoa seedlings for the incipient cocoa
industry of Ghana and Nigeria.40

From the foregoing presentation, it is evident that the

Christian Missions played a pivotal role in the introduction

52

of cocoa to West Africa. This they did through a process of
experimentation and domestication. Furthermore, they
combined these initiatives with encouraging Africans to take
up agricultural production. There efforts to mobilize
Africans to begin peasant production, however, were limited
partly because of an acute shortage of manpower and also
because of the creation of the African church.
THE AFRICAN CHURCH AND THE SPREAD OF COCOA

The monumental success achieved by the Christian
missions with the introduction of cocoa was predicated upon
a philosophy which gave a lot of autonomy to Africans not
only' in. ecclesiastical. matters Ibut also in. agricultural
production. Henry venn, the pioneer and moving spirit behind
these noble principles, passed away and these ideas were
“interred with his bones." The generation of Christian
Missions that took over from Venn repudiated his philosophy
and initiated a process of divesting Africans of whatever
influence they had acquired under venn’s dispensation.“l

Africans became chagrined by the profound volte—face of
the new breed of European missionaries. They had no desire
to abdicate Venn's philosophy which had so magnificently
sublimated their aspirations for African development. The
chasm between the races reached its apogee with the
abrogation of the African episcopate of the Niger Mission.
To all intents and purposes, the future trajectory of the
Christian church in Africa was to be shaped by Europeans

without African participation.42

53

Consequently, the African churches seceded from every
Christian mission in Lagos and began creating their own
churches. The first African church, the Native Baptist
Church of Dr. Mojola Agbebi, was formed in April, 1888. This
was followed by the United Native African Church of W.E.
Cole in August, 1891; the African Church of J .K. Coker in
October 1901, and finally, the United African Methodist
Church, Eleja in 1917. The news of the creation of
independent African churches quickly spread into the
interior to places such as Odopotu, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ido-
Ani, Ikirun and many parts of Ijebuland.43

The newly created African churches began to evangelize
in the hinterland of Yorubaland in the early 19008.
Superintendents of the African churches began to establish
churches in some of these areas. The response of the
indigenous population was tremendous. Traditional
authorities and Ogboni chiefs at Igbore and Abeokuta became
Christians and many people were converted in places as far
away as Ife, Ilesha and Ondo.44

The African churches began to recreate the philosophy
of the “Plough and the Bible” of Henry Venn. The most
eloquent spokesman of this movement, Dr. Mojola Agbebi,
enlisted the support of Ricketts in establishing an
agricultural mission at Agbowa near Ijebu-Ode. The mission
taught indigenous people farming, technical education and
the scriptures. By 1903, the mission had developed into a

full-fledged model farm with a cocoa plantation, rubber

54

trees and a coffee plantation. The farm, however, was
ephemeral, as it collapsed after the death of Ricketts.4546

The great expansion. of cocoa into the interior' of
Yorubaland was undertaken by members of the Native African
church founded by J.K. Coker in conjunction with the Agege
planters. J.K. Coker arrived in Agege in 1885 and bought a
plot of land at Ifako, where he established cotton and
kolanut. plantations. After' the Ibreakaway' of the .African
church from. St. Paul's Breadfruit, many' of the .African
clergy, among whom were Reverends D.C. Coates, J.A. Wright,
J.S. Fanimokun, M.O. Somefun and I.M.S. Williams, also
established plantations at Agege.47

Although the Agege plantations were conceptualized in
the spirit of Venn’s philosophy, they acquired a uniquely
different character from earlier experiments in Abeokuta,
and Akropong because they were contrived and financed by
Africans. Agege became successful not only' because the
planters were able to capitalize on the work done by the
Basel Mission by adopting cocoa, they also were able to
commercialize it.48

What began as a business venture became a powerful
conduit for propagating the gospel to the Yoruba hinterland.
Although J.K. Coker, the primum mobile of Agege, was imbued
with a determination to propagate the gospel, he was also
dedicated to making Africans self-supporting. J .K. Coker
came under the influence of venn’s ideas very early in life.

He became exposed to Venn’s ideas through his father Ajobo

55

who was an influential farmer in the heyday of the Abeokuta
scheme. Coker spent his early life on a cotton farm which
owed its existence to the policies of Henry Venn. Besides,
the cocoa seeds for the first cocoa farm in Agege were got
from the Basel Mission in the Gold Coast.49

Between 1893 and 1919, the Agege plantations grew
remarkably. For instance, during this period, Coker's gross
income rose from five thousand pounds to about twenty
thousand pounds. In addition to this, he had about two
thousand acres of land under cocoa cultivation at this time.
The economic success of the Agege planters was a powerful
centripetal force, as men came in droves both from the
immediate vicinity of Lagos and the interior of Yorubaland
to work on the plantations.”

Between 1904 and 1920, Coker and the other Agege
planters employed over twelve thousand laborers from the
Yoruba hinterland. These laborers were involved with all the
stages of cocoa production, from planting to harvesting and
fermenting. They thereby acquired critical skills that would
prove invaluable in later years in the city—states of the
hinterland.‘1

In addition to learning the techniques of producing
cocoa, the laborers were also given religious instruction.
To be sure, the Agege planters had established schools and
churches in the Agege area to give intellectual and
spiritual edification to workers and their families. They

were also being trained to become the vanguard of a new

56

offensive of Christianity in Yorubaland. Literacy in the
vernacular was emphasized and laborers were encouraged to
attend evening classes regularly.’2

The Agege plantation and the Church became involved in
a symbiotic relationship. Whenever the plantations
experienced labor shortages, the superintendents of the
African church were able to recruit substantial numbers of
laborers through the cooperation of the interior churches.
On the other hand, most of the laborers went back home upon
the expiration of their contracts with sufficient knowledge
of the Bible, Christianity and cocoa cultivation which they
introduced to their respective towns and villages. By 1920,
over ten thousand ex-Agege workers were proselytizing the
gospel and planting cocoa in Yorubaland.S3

The ex-Agege workers had a prodigious impact on the
social and economic life of the Yoruba city-states they
returned to. Apart from preaching the gospel, they also
talked about the economic success of the Agege cocoa farms.
Soon, many towns and villages in the hinterland began to
request cocoa seeds from the Agege planters, and information
on how to plant cocoa. With the adoption of cocoa on a large
scale by many Yoruba towns, the Agege planters found it
difficult to recruit laborers from the interior.54 By 1923,
cocoa production had declined considerably at Agege, paving
the way for the phenomenal expansion of cocoa in places such

as Ibadan, Ife, Okeigbo and Ondo.

57

 

A “- _.._...'-._.._.__‘.'-g.as- __.a.~ .- -

From the foregoing presentation, a number of
conclusions can be made. First, the end of the Yoruba civil
wars created conditions that were conducive to the erection
of British colonial economy. Because a substantial number of
men had depended solely on the spoils of war for sustenance,
the end of hostilities compelled them to look for
alternative sources of income. They not only provided the
necessary labor force for the railroad program of the
colonial administration but also were responsive to the new
cash crop economy.

Second, although the colonial administration
constructed the infrastructure of the cash crop economy, it
was the European missionaries and the superintendents of the
African church that were most responsible for the expansion
of cocoa in Yorubaland. Henry Venn and the C.M.S.
articulated the ideological framework for African
participation. in. the colonial experience. They’ contended
that an economically self-sufficient African would be more
amenable to the gospel. The African Church brought Venn's
vision to its apotheosis through a systematic combination of

the gospel and cocoa production.

58

ENDNOTES

 

‘ Ib/Min/Agric 1839, p.171
2 See for instance, Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria Annual Reports
3Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991
‘ Awe, B., “The Rise of Ibadan as a Yoruba Power” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 3, 2, 1965,

.221-230

Lloyd, P.C., The City of Ibadan, Cambridge, 1967; also Falola, Toyin, Politics and Economy in Ibadan,
1893-1945, Ibadan, 1989
6 Awe, 13., op.cit., p221-230
7 Akintoye, S.A., Revolution and Power Politics in Yorubaland 1840-1893, Longman, 1971, p. 42-68
8 Law, R.C.C., “The Chronology of Yoruba Wars of the Early Nineteenth Century, JHSN., Vol.. 5, No 2,
1970
9 Hopkins, A.G., “Economic Imperialism in West Africa” Economic History Review, 23, 3, 1968, p.580-
606
”Ajayi, J.F.A, and Smith, R.S., Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1964
'1 Awe, B., “The Ajele System”: A Study of Ibadan Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, JHSN, 3, 1, dec.
1964
‘2 Ibid., p.229-230
‘3 Ibid.
'4 Hopkins, A.G., “Economic Imperialism in West Africa” Economic History Review, 23, 3 1968, p. 580-
606
”Ajayi, J.F.A, and Smith, R.S., Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1964
1: Hopkins, A.G., “Economic Imperialism. . .op.cit, p.580-606

Ibid.
”Akintoye, S.A., Revolution and Power Politics. . .op.cit, p.42-68
‘9 Ibid.
2° Ibid.
2' Ibid.
: Falola, Toyin, (ed) Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development? New Jersey, 1987 p. 1-24

Ibid.
2‘ Eicher, Carl and Liedhom, Carl (eds) Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy, East Lansing,
1970, p.6-l6
2’ Ibid.
2“ Ibid.
27 Ibid.
2‘ Ibid.
’9 Ibid.
:3 Dada, S.A., 1.x Coker: Father of African Independent Churches, Ibadan, 1986, p.91-103
Ibid.

32 Ibid.
33 Webster, J.B., The African Churches Among the Yoruba, Oxford, 1964, p. 3-15
3‘ Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
3“'Webster, J.B., “The Bible and the Plough” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 1 l, 4, Dec.
1963.
3“ Ibid.
39 Ibid.
4° Ibid.
4‘ Webster, J.B., The African Churches. . .op.cit, p.42-55
‘2 Ibid.
“Ibid.
4‘ Dada, S.A., 1K Coker: Father of African Independent Churches. . .op.cit, 1986

59

 

‘5 Ibid.

‘6 Ibid.

‘7 Ibid.

‘8 Ibid.

‘9 Ibid.

5° Ibid.

5 ' Webster, J .B., “The Bible and the Plough” op.cit

’2 Ibid.

53 Berry, S.S., “Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa Growing in Ibadan and Ondo” Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria 4, 3 Dec. 1968

60

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I 953-1963 B \ +
oundory at
'0' 4"“ the Western Region ‘X 0’ Word "19"" 1'
Forcodos j
/A that“
5601!:- 12 ' V
an“§“"a‘% 2th.. ‘5’. 3’

Source: Awe, 8., “The Ajele System..." JHSN 3, 1 Dec. 1964

61

CHAPTER THREE

THE AGRICULTURAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF COCOA

The introduction of cocoa to Nigeria at the end of the
nineteenth century presented significant opportunities to
the Agege farmers, who had experienced a slump in the oil
palm trade. By 1901, the Agege planters had diverted their
energies to the cocoa trade, and between 1915 and 1917, the
cocoa trade had become established. For these Agege
pioneers, it was a period of transition not only from oil
palm to cocoa, but also in adapting to the new methods of
planting cocoa. The earliest attempt to domesticate cocoa in
West Africa was undertaken by the Basel Mission, which had
established a Botanical Garden in the Gold Coast in the late
18708.1 This was the breeding ground for what would become
the Nigerian variety of cocoa. Cocoa seedlings from this
experimental garden were widely distributed in Nigeria when
cocoa was introduced in the late nineteenth century.2

In this chapter, I examine the biological and
agricultural aspects of cocoa production. To achieve this, I
present a historical account of the origin and spread of
cocoa cultivation. This includes a general discussion of the
varieties of cocoa, and the soil and the climatic
requirements. Also, I analyze the attempts at adapting the

crop to Nigerian conditions through the creation of new and

62

improved varieties of cocoa. Finally, I focus on the
organization. of production in the early' years of cocoa

production.

The origin of cocoa

Cocoa originated from the rainforest of the Upper
Amazon basin in Latin America. Although the exact provenance
of the crop is still shrouded in mystery, the earliest
written accounts of its cultivation date back to the period
of the Spanish conquistadores.3 Hernando Cortes in his
letters to the Spanish monarchy on the eve of the conquest
of Mexico had indicated that the .Aztecs and the Mayan
Indians had cultivated cocoa and used it as a part of their
dietn"The crop was also widely used as a medium of exchange
in the Gulf of Mexico, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Besides,
tribute to the courts of Monteczuma and the powerful Mayan
overlords were paid in cocoa beans.

The Mayan Indians, it is recorded, produced a beverage
called “chocolatl” from cocoa beans by boiling it with maize
and capsicum. The Spanish, who were positively averse to
this drink, were able to come up with another drink which
involved mixing the ground cocoa beans with sugar.‘ This
beverage was the forerunner of chocolate milk which became
increasingly' popular in Spain at the beginning of the

sixteenth century. From Spain, chocolate milk spread to

63

Italy, France and England, Initially, cocoa exports
consisted of semi-processed cocoa that was mixed with sugar
and spices. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, as
the demand for cocoa increased, it became necessary to
export it in its raw state.6

The first major exporter of cocoa to the markets of
Europe was Venezuela, where, up to about 1825, only one
variety was grown. This type of cocoa, which was known as
the Criollo, had green and red pods which were noticeably
ridged and elongated. The seeds were roundish and whitish in
color. The Criollo had a desirable flavor which was immanent
in the beans. About 1825, a new variety of cocoa began to be
cultivated in Trinidad. This was shorter and broader and was
not elongated. Their seeds were purrple in color. This new
variety of cocoa was significantly higher yielding and more
resistant than the indigenous cocoa. The new variety was
called forastero(foreign).7

It has been suggested that the forastero variety was
the product of a process of hybridization which took place
after the indigenous Criollo cocoa of Trinidad had been
wiped out by the “blast” of 1727. The precise nature of the
blast is still unknown, but there is some speculation that
it could have been either a cyclone or an epidemic called
ceratacystis fimbriata. The Spaniards, in order to
rejuvenate cocoa cultivation in Trinidad, brought cocoa
beans of a different Criollo variety from eastern Venezuela

and cross-fertilized them with the surviving Criollo cocoa

54

trees. At about this time also a new variety of cocoa which
had some of the characteristics of the newer variety was
cultivated in Ecuador.

By 1850, the major cocoa producing countries of the
world were venezuela, Ecuador, and Trinidad. Production in
1850 has been estimated at about 16,000 tons. Consumption in
Europe was not widespread. To be sure, the drinking of
chocolate spread from Spain to France and England in the
seventeenth century, but for many years it was consumed only
by the aristocracies of these countries. This was owing to
the fact that the high export duty on cocoa beans made it
very expensive and put it beyond the limits of the common
folk.8

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the duty on
cocoa beans in England was as high as 18 10d per pound. This
restricted imports to only only about 250 tons, and half of
this was used in making cocoa for the Navy. Duties were
reduced progressively until 1844, when they went down to one
penny' per' pound for the British colonies. The duty' on
foreign cocoa beans also reduced to the same level in 1853.
These reductions facilitated the increase in the market for
cocoa, and by 1850, consumption in Great Britain had risen
to 1,400 tons per year.

While the substantial reduction of duties enabled the
price of cocoa beans to be reduced, technical developments
were equally important in the subsequent increase in

consumption.9 The demand for cocoa increased dramatically in

65

the early nineteenth century as a result of significant
technological changes in the chocolate industry. C.J. van
Houten, a Dutch scientist, developed a process for removing
the fat from the cocoa beans. This procedure reduced the fat
content of the chocolate drink considerably and enhanced its
taste. The second invention by M.D.Peter of Vevey
Switzerland was even more far-reaching. M.D.Vevey created
milk chocolate by mixing ground cocoa with milk solids and
sugar. In fact, the diversification of milk chocolate
products has been the defining feature of the cocoa trade
and the chocolate industry.lo

.As a result of the increased consumption. of cocoa
products, new production centers emerged. From about 1850 to
the turn of the century, cocoa cultivation experienced
tremendous flux. A new variety of cocoa was cultivated in
the state of Bahia in Brazil. The Brazilian cocoa came from
Belem on the Amazon, and produced pods of a uniform
character. The pods were also smaller than the indigenous
varieties and they were yellowish in color. The beans had a
purple color. It has been suggested that the Brazilian
variety known as “Comun” was the precursor of the Amelonado
variety which is planted in the major cocoa producing areas
of Africa.”

The cocoa tree was also introduced to the Philippines
and the East Indies and then to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), as
well as Fernando Po and Sao Tome islands. It was from these

islands that cocoa was introduced to Ghana, Nigeria,

66

Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. Despite the remarkable spread of
cocoa to all these new regions, the production of cocoa
remained concentrated in the Caribbean and South America
until the turn of the century.

By the 19208, West Africa had become the epicenter of
the cocoa trade, as Ghana became the leading producer of
cocoa in the world. The transformation. of the economic
landscape of Ghana by the Akwapim migrant cocoa farmers of
southern Ghana was soon duplicated in Nigeria by the rise of
cocoa production in Ife and Ondo. In 1940, of a world
production figure of 270,000 tons, .Africa. accounted. for

about seventy percent.‘2

The Botany of Cocoa

Cocoa is one of some twenty-two species that constitute
the genus theobroma, a member of the family sterculiaceae.
The genus is indigenous to the New World and the species
range from southern. Mexico in the North to ‘Brazil and
Bolivia in the South. The center of origin is considered to
be the basin of the Upper Amazon. Theobroma cacao is the
cocoa of trade.13

The natural habitat of the cocoa tree is the lower-tree
storey of the rainforest. This probably explains why the
conventional method of cultivation involves providing shade
for cocoa trees by" planting crops such. as bananas and

plantains. In this vegetation, the cocoa tree is exposed to

67

a high and fairly consistent annual temperature, high
rainfall levels and short dry seasons.14

Although there are three main types of theobroma cacao,
they all have some general characteristics. They are small
trees, which reach a height of about thirty feet and with
minor variations they all have a peculiar pattern of
branching. Cocoa trees begin to produce branches from the
main stem at between 3-5 feet high. These branches spreaf
out in a near-horizontal direction in a pattern that is
known as jorquette. In most cases, another branch known as
chupon may grow out of the main stem, below the jorquette
and come up straight to constitute another tier which may or
may not produce another jorquette.

In general, cocoa leaves develop in two stages. When
the tree is young, the leaves are very tender and are either
light green or reddish in color and hang vertically from
their petioles. Cocoa trees usually shed their leaves twice.
The stipules of the shed leaves leave marks on the cocoa
tree when growth starts again. When the cocoa leaves mature
they turn to a dark green color and they harden.

Cocoa i8 cauliflorous. The flowers and cocoa pods grow out
of the branches that have no leaves. The flowers and fruits
are produced on the stubs of the shed leaves. The flower has
five sepals, five petals, ten stamens in two groups, of
which only one is fertile, and an ovary of five united

carpels. The male section. of the flower comprises five

68

longpointed staminades and five fertile stamens which stand
across from the petals.”

There is as yet no definitive opinion on the
pollination of cocoa. The process, however, presents some
intriguing questions. First, although large numbers of
flowers are shed by cocoa trees, few of them are ever
pollinated. In fact, several studies suggest that only about
five percent of the flowers on cocoa trees are pollinated.
Second, the structure of the cocoa flower makes the
application of conventional interpretations difficult.

For one, the cocoa tree does not possess scent or
nectar that would facilitate insect pollination. Also, the
pollen is too glutinous to permit wind-pollination.
Furthermore, the position of the anthers, hidden in the
pouched petals, and the round wall of staminades, are
impediments to pollination.

Some scholars, however, posit that pollination in cocoa
is actuated by insects. Some self-pollination is engendered
by flower thrips and aphides; but these are by no means the
only agents. Research findings by Billes in Trinidad suggest
that a Ceratopogonid midge of the forcipomyia family, a
winged insect was responsible for pollination in some cocoa
growing areas of Trinidad. Several aspects of this genre
have been identified in the cocoa growing areas of West

Africa.16

69

CLIMATE

Cocoa grows in areas of the rainforest where rainfall
ranges between 45 and 200 inches. To be sure, there is
considerable variation in the annual rainfall of the cocoa
growing areas of the world. For example, in aouthern Ghana,
the annual rainfall is between 45-70 inches, and in
southwestern Nigeria the range is between 45-60 inches. This
rainfall pattern is representative of countries between 6
Latitude and the Equator, where the rainy season is
punctuated by a short dry spell in August. The same climatic
conditions exist in Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Fernando Po,
with. the. only' difference Ibeing' the fact that the rainy
season in West Cameroon is heavier and more continuous.

In central and south America, and southeast Asia
rainfall is for the most part less than 100 inches, except
in the Atlantic seaboard of Costa Rica, the east coast of
Malaysia and parts of Mexico and New Britain. The heavy
rainfall of these areas has resulted in soil erosion which
in turn has reduced cocoa yields in these areas.17

Although rainfall is an important climatic requirement,
its distribution is of far greater significance. In the
Amazon valley of Central America, rainfall is evenly
distributed throughout the year. In the major cocoa
producing countries of West Africa, there is a distinct dry
season, which is mild and short and which allows for cocoa
cultivation. In the southwestern part of Nigeria, the cocoa

belt is delimited by a rainfall zone which is close to the

70

minimum of 45 inches in the northern part of the belt and
which fluctuates between 55-60 inches in the southern areas
such as Ife and many parts of Ondo. Where the dry season is
long and harsh, soils which are deep and moisture-retentive
can enable cocoa to grow, while sandy soils which are not
moisture-retentive would not be suitable.18

Cocoa requires a temperature of between 650 to 700F
minimum and a maximum of between 850 to 900F. These lower
temperatures correspond to the northern and southern
extremities of the rainforest and the areas of high
altitude. In the major cocoa growing areas of Nigeria
temperatures range between 70 to 800F. Even in the high
altitude areas of Idanre and Ekiti, temperatures do not
significantly fall below this range. Although most cocoa
growing areas are below 1,000ft, there are notable
exceptions, such as the east Cameroon, which is 'about
2,000ft high, the Cauca valley in Colombia, at 3,000ft, and
the Chama valley in Venezuela, at 3,600ft. Excessively high
temperatures have a deleterious effect on the hormonal
structure of the cocoa tree, causing the tree to grow at
abnormal times, thus affecting growth and output.

Apart from affecting the development of the cocoa tree,
climatic conditions also have a great deal of impact on
other facets of cocoa cultivation, notably, fungal diseases
and processing. Fungal diseases such as black pod are spread
more quickly in areas with low temperatures and high

humidities. Furthermore, the distinct West African dry

71

season enables the farmers to ferment their cocoa
inexpensively as they dry their beans in the sun. In areas
with prolonged wet seasons such as west Cameroon and some

parts of Latin America, artificial drying may be necessary.19

SOIL STRUCTURE

The most important requirement for good cocoa soils are
root space and moisture retention. The amount of soil room
which a mature cocoa tree has must be enough to contain
water and the nutrients required for the sustenance of the
cocoa tree. A necessary requirement for fulfilling these
needs is for the soil to be loose and have large amounts of
clay so that the roots of the tree would be unencumbered.

Cocoa soils in the cocoa-growing areas of the world
vary in relation to the extent to which they possess these
requirements. In areas with consistently heavy rainfall,
good root aeration is a sine qua non. On the other hand, in
the cocoa belts of Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, which
have a pronounced dry season, moisture retention is a very
important factor. .According to Smyth and Montgomery, a
twenty-five percent clay content with silt should be present
between 10—12 inches into the soil to produce viable cocoa.

In a soil survey done in Nigeria in the mid-19408, Dr.
Vine opined that in Nigeria's conditions the main
determinant for good cocoa land was its clay content. The
cocoa growing areas of Agege and Abeokuta, which had

excellent rainfall, declined rapidly in the 19208 because of

72

the high acidity of the soil. Cocoa does better in upper
slope sites where rainfall is adequate, but which are
properly drained. Proper drainage ensures that root growth
is not obstructed by groundwater. The Idanre hills provide a
classic example of this type of condition. The Idanre cocoa
growing area, which comprises villages such as Legbira,
Mofere and Uloen, has a hilly topography and it is the
largest and longest-lasting cocoa producing area in

Nigeria.20

ADAPTATION OF THE COCOA TREE IN NIGERIA

In the early years of cocoa production in Nigeria,
farmers planted the amelonado variety. The amelonado
variety, which is grown all over West Africa, has no marked
variations. This species of cocoa, although high-yielding
had a long gestation period of about seven years. The output
of the cocoa tree is the yardstick for assessing the
viability of the tree. Between 1945 and 1953, the annual
yield of the amelonado cocoa in the Ghana cocoa belt, which
occupied an acre of about 4 million acres, was 1901b dry
cocoa per acre.21

Research conducted at the West African Cocoa Research
Institute at Tafo, Ghana, however, suggests that the annual
yield of 190pounds per acre grossly underrated the
productive capacity' of amelonado cocoa. For' example, 64

acres of cocoa planted under simulated farm conditions

73

produced an average of 612 pounds of dry cocoa beans over a
twenty year period. In fact, Adams and Mckelvie have
contended, based on their own research findings, that the
potential output of amelonado cocoa could be about 1,500
pounds per acre with the prospect of increased output with
the injection of new varieties.22

These findings therefore raised the obvious question of
why the amelonado cocoa was not performing to its real
potential on actual farm conditions in Ghana. Further
research revealed that the amelonado cocoa had a low
tolerance to certain cocoa diseases, notably, swollen shoot.
The outbreak of the swollen shoot epidemic in Ghana in the
late 19308 finally confirmed these apprehensions.

The colonial government in Ghana, in response to the
wholesale destruction of large sections of Ghana's cocoa
tree population, inaugurated the West African Cocoa Research
Institute at Tafo to replace the Cocoa Research Station
there in 1948. The mission of this Institute was to develop
cocoa hybrids that would be resistant to the swollen shoot
disease. Experiments conducted by Posnette at the old
station at Tafo had found that the swollen shoot disease was
caused by a virus, which he called 1A. After the creation of
the WACRI, a demonstration plot was established to calibrate
the rate of spread of the virus and its effects on yield.23

Of the 4,636 trees planted in 1944, thirty-one percent
had been infected in 1945, and by 1948, eighty-five percent

had been infected. A number of other discoveries were made.

74

Twelve species of peudococcid mealybugs were identified as
carriers of the virus. Of this collection, the most common
in both Ghana and Nigeria is P.Njalensis. This vector is
negatively phototropic, and thrives in the crevices of the
integument of the host tree, on old capsid lesions and the
underside of pod petioles. In its chronic stage, this virus
causes a reddish coloration over the whole lamina of the
young leaf. This red pigment later contracts to a red
mottle.24

Owing to the rapid rate of spread of the disease and
its malignity, the Institute recommended that in order to
control the disease all infected trees should be cut out.
Additional measures such as attacking the mealybugs and
getting rid of alternative hosts complement but do not
provide a viable alternative to cutting-out. It was,
however, agreed that the long-term solution would be to
expedite research on the discovery of cocoa strains that
would show some tolerance to the swollen shoot virus.2s

To be sure, the groundwork for the systematic Nigerian
cocoa breeding program was constructed at Tafo in Ghana.
Earlier attempts to initiate such a program in Nigeria had
proved ineffectual. In 1931, VOelker had attempted to create
new strains of the amelonado cocoa by crossbreeding cocoa
beans from nineteenth selected amelonado trees. The
selection was based on the number of pods per tree and the
number of beans in each pod. Although Voelker did set up a

seed garden where he planted the progenies of his

75

crossbreeding, which he christened T38, the results were
disappointing, as there was no significant increase in
productivity, noe did they show much vigor.26

Contemporaneous with VOelker’s initiative were the
significant experiments being carried out by Posnette in
Ghana. These experiments had a momentous impact not only on
cocoa production in Ghana, but also in Nigeria. In 1944,
Posnette brought about 100 Amazon cocoa pods from Trinidad.
These Trinidad introductions, which became the parent trees
for most of the cocoa planted in Ghana and Nigeria today,
were first selected by Pound in 1938.

Pound had visited Trinidad during the outbreak of the
witchesbroom disease there. He collected about 2,000 open-
pollinated cocoa seeds from trees that were unaffected by
the disease. These seedlings were sequestered in a garden at
Barbados, where he inseminated them into Trinitario
rootstocks. Pound later shipped them to Trinidad, where they
were planted at Marper Estate in 1943.27 i

The selections brought back by Posnette had about 3,000
seedlings, which were crossed with each other through hand-
pollination. The resultant hybrids which were called the F-
1 generation were more vigorous and faster yielding than
the parent seedlings. The F-1 hybrids became popular in
Ghana, as most farmers sought to plant them to replace the
cocoa trees that had been blighted by the swollen shoot
disease. Further crossing of the highest yielding progenies

of the F-1 series led to the creation of the F-2 hybrids and

76

this experiment was repeated with the F-2 to produce the F-3
variety. The F-3 generation was further crossed to produce
the west African Cocoa Research Institute Series 11, which
was more uniform and high-yielding than its predecessor. The
distribution of the seeds of the F-3 generation and the
WACRI-Series 11 began in Ghana in the late 19508.28

The second Nigeria breeding program was more elaborate
than the one actuated by Voelker. It began in 1962, under
the auspices of the newly created Cocoa Research Institute
of Nigeria. To a large extent, it was the continuation of
the experiments began by Posnette years earlier but taking
into account the climatic peculiarities of southwestern
Nigeria. To this end, a clear recognition of the local
problems of cocoa cultivation in Nigeria was necessary. For
the main cocoa producing areas of Ife and Ondo, this was the
severe dry season in some areas, and cocoa diseases such as
swollen shoot and Black pod.29

A breeding program, which started at the Cocoa Research
Institute of Nigeria in 1962, produced a variety of crosses
from the F-3 and WACRI-Series 11 which demonstrate a
capacity to survive without shade in dry season and
tolerance to Black pod and swollen shoot. These hybrids,
otherwise known as the CRIN elite, were widely distributed
to farmers between 1965 and 1967. For the most part, these
new strains of cocoa replaced the amelonado variety which

the majority of the farmers had planted up to that time.30

77

These new hybrids have a number of significant
advantages over the amelonado cocoa. First, they demonstrate
remarkable vigor under marginal conditions of rainfall and
dryness. Because of their vigor, they do not require the
elaborate prior planting of overhead shade, as they could
survive with minimal shade. Further, the new hybrids have a
greater recuperative power from cocoa diseases than
amelonado. According to my informants, however, these new
strains of cocoa are not necessarily better than the
amelonado. They contend that although the new hybrids have a
shorter gestation period and tend to be faster yielding in
the first five years, their productivity, unlike the

amelonados', tends to decrease with age.31

ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF COCOA FARMS

The establishment and maintenance of cocoa farms vary
from one cocoa-growing area to the other. Differences are
determined largely by climatic conditions, the availability
of capital and also by the traditions entrenched in each
cocoa-growing' area. In. Latin .American. countries such. as
Brazil, Venezuela, Equador and Trinidad, where the Spanish
developed cocoa cultivation, Hacienda-type farms were
prominent. In west Africa, on the other hand, the majority
of the farmers are smallholders with an average farm size of

about six acres.32

78

In the early years of cocoa growing in Latin America
and West.Africa, cocoa growing was done on a trial and error
basis. This was fraught with a lot of uncertainty because
farms were established without prior testing of the soil for
suitability. In some cases, planters assumed that because a
particular soil sustained luxuriant vegetation it would be
suitable for cocoa cultivation. Some of these assumptions
proved to be wrong and planters in some cases incurred
substantial losses.

The West African smallholder constructed the largest
cocoa growing industry in the world without scientific
knowledge. The West African farmer grew cocoa wherever he
could and where the experiment failed he sought new land.
Cocoa production in Nigeria has experienced considerable
shift from one location to the other. Cocoa production began
in Agege and Ota in the late nineteenth century and when
productio petered out in these areas in part because the
land was no longer fecund, cocoa production moved to Ibadan
and some parts of northern Yorubaland. The demise of the
Ibadan cocoa belt resulted in a further shift to Ife, Ondo,
Ekiti, and the Ore-Benin road.33

The preliminary activities involved in establishing a
cocoa farm varies from place to place and would depend on
whether the available land is occupied by forest or has
already been used for another crop. The majority of the land
in the major cocoa producing areas of the world, namely,

south and central America, West Africa and southeast Asia,

79

was under forest at the time of the introduction of cocoa.
In establishing cocoa under these conditions, the vegetation
could either be cleared or thinned before planting. Also
careful consideration should be given to the type of shade
to give the young cocoa plant. The cocoa seedling needs some
protection from the sun and also from strong winds to ensure
proper growth. Exposure to excess light will prevent the
canopy from forming on time, which will delay flowering and
the cropping of the cocoa tree. Besides, cocoa can be
interspersed with other tree crops such as kolanuts and
coconut palm.34

These two methods have their advantages and
disadvantages. Clearing the forest could damage the
intricate interrelationship between the soil, the plants and
the fauna, as substantial amounts of nutrients flow from one
to the other. A significant altering of this balance or
denuding of the top soil will diminish the nutrients that
are attached to vegetation. The advantage of this method,
however, is that planting is symmetrical and this in turn
facilitates the maintenance of the cocoa farm. Conversely,
this method is time-consuming and costly. It was widespread
in the large cocoa farms of south and central America and is
becoming popular in the cocoa growing regions of southeast
Asia.”

The other option of thinning the forest seems to be
less risky than clearing the forest. It is also relatively

inexpensive and easy to estaablish. This method has been

80

widely used in many parts of West Africa and Brazil. But it
has many drawbacks.

First, the selected cover trees may not provide
appropriate shade. More potentially dangerous, however, is
the fact that in areas of marginal rainfall the forest trees
may compete with the cocoa trees for soil nutrients.
Besides, some trees may become carriers of malignant viral
diseases. For example, the leucaena leucocephala, a small
leguminous tree which was used as permanent shade for many
years in many South American countries, was responsible for
the death of many cocoa trees in that region.36

In some parts of Ife south and Ondo where I did my
fieldwork, farmers who moved into these areas in the 19508
and early 19608 thinned the forest. This involved a
considerable use of hired laborers in felling some trees and
burning them. The selective clearing of trees is usually
done between January and March. Planting begins after a few
rains when the soil is wet enough to support germination.

The farmer’ and. his male children. do the jplanting.
Planting is done in two ways. Some farmers help sow cocoa
beans directly into holes made on heaps in the cocoa site,
while others develop seedlings near streams before
transplanting them into their cocoa farms. The wives and
children help to transport the seedlings to the farm during
planting. It seems that the second option was more popular
because the seedlings were less likely to be destroyed by

insects.37

81

Most farmers used bananas and plantains as temporary
shade for the cocoa seedlings and trees during the early
stage of growth to reduce transpiration and evaporation. In
addition, plantains store water and nutrients for the young
trees for use during the dry season. Cocoa trees were also
widely interplanted with kolanuts to provide the cocoa trees
with more permanent shade. Apart from providing shade for
cocoa, the plantains and bananas were used for domestic
consumption and the surplus was sold.38

As the cocoa tree matures and the canopy is formed,
there is a need to reduce the shade. It has been shown that
a gradual reduction of the shade increases the yield of the
cocoa tree because the nutrients that would otherwise have
been used by the cover trees now go to the cocoa tree. In
Ife south and Ondo, the plantain trees usually die off and
those that do not are cut off.39

Maintaining a cocoa farm involves weeding, pruning,
spraying the cocoa trees with insecticides and applying
fertilizers to the cocoa soil. To be sure, the cost of
maintaining a cocoa farm will determine how profitable it is
and in some instances how viable. This is because farmers
had to buy the inputs required for farm maintenance and also
use hired laborers.40

Up to the early 19608 Nigerian farmers planted the
amelonado cocoa, which began bearing fruit after about seven
years. Before the cocoa tree began producing, weeding was

done twice a year by the farmer, his children and in some

82

cases, laborers. Pruning of branches of other trees to give
enough light to the cocoa trees is also done. Furthermore,
any unwanted tree during growing of cocoa is removed by
putting fire around the stem to let it clie.‘l

From the mid-19608, with the infestation of cocoa trees
in Ife and Ondo with cocoa diseases, it became necessary to
spray cocoa trees with insecticides. Farmers start to spray
the cocoa trees as soon as the pod begins to form and most
farmers spray’ their cocoa about three times during' the
season. Most farmers employ hired laborers in spraying their
cocoa trees.‘2

In about 1965, the seedlings of the new cocoa varieties
that had been produced by the Cocoa Research Institute of
Nigeria were widely distributed to farmers in the cocoa belt
of Nigeria. These new strains have a gestation period of
about three years. The procedure for planting and
maintaining them is no different from the one used for the
amelonado.43

The harvesting of cocoa begins after seven years for
the amelonado and after three years for the CRIN elite.
Cocoa harvesting is labor-intensive. The number of laborers
required depends on the size of the farm. Harvesting cocoa
from a fairly large farm of about twenty acres would involve
the farmer, his male children and hired laborers.“

The harvesting of cocoa pods is not restricted to a
particular period, but is done several times a year. The

peak period, however, seems to be October. Amelonado cocoa

83

appears to have a more pronounced peak period than the new
varieties. According to my informants, most of the pods from
amelonado trees are harvested between September and January.
The new varieties, on the other hand, tend to spread out a
bit more.“

Harvesting entails removing ripe pods from cocoa trees
and slicing them open to extract the beans. The beans are
then put into baskets by the wives of the farmers and their
female children. After all the ripe cocoa beans have been
removed from the trees the farmer then ferments the beans.

In most parts of the cocoa belt that I visited, the
farmer' and. his household. carried. out fermentationu They
begin by cutting plantain or banana leaves and spreading
them on the ground. The harvested beans are poured on the
leaves and then covered with more leaves. This is left in an
open space within the farmers' compound for four to five
days to ferment. The farmers turn the heap of beans once or
twice to ensure even fermentation of the beans.

After fermenting the cocoa beans, the farmer and his
household then dry them. Drying of cocoa beans usually takes
between seven to ten days. The fermented beans are spread on
a concrete slab in the farmers compound and are left to dry
in the sun. Drying of the cocoa beans reduces their moisture
content and makes them safe for storage and shipment.46

From the foregoing presentation, a number of
conclusions can be made. First, cocoa is not indigenous to

West Africa. The amelonado cocoa, which was widely planted

84

in the cocoa growing areas of West Africa up to 1960, was an
adaptation of the Brazilian “comun”. Second, owing to the
susceptibility' of this species of cocoa. to the swollen
shoot, and its vulnerability to the extreme dry season in
some parts of the cocoa region, new strains were developed.
These new strains, which are products of various cross-
breeding programs in Ghana and Nigeria, have demonstrated
greater vigor than the amelonado. This is evidenced by the
fact that, in the short run, they are faster-yielding than
the amelonado. They have also shown greater tolerance to
cocoa diseases. They, however, do not have the long lasting
quality of the amelonado. Finally, the planting and
processing of both varieties of cocoa is still largely sone

by conventional methods.

85

ENDNOTES

 

' Cortes, H., Letter 1 fiom the Dispatches of Hernando Cortes, New York, Wiley & Putman, 1843
2 Bergmann, J.P., The distribution of cacao cultivation in Pre-Columbia America. Annals of Association of
American Geographers.
3 Alden, D., The significance of cacao production in the Amazon region during the late colonial period: an
essay in comparative economic history. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 120, 2: 103-
135
‘ Ibid
5 Wood, G.A.R, Cocoa, Longman, 1975, p2
‘5 Ibid., p.3
7 Ibid., p.4
8 Urquhart, D., Cocoa, Longman, 1956, p.3-4
9 Wood, G and Lass, RA., Cocoa, Longman, 1985, p.3-4
'0 Wills, 1., Agriculture and Land Use in Ghana, Oxford University Press, 1962, p.278-285
” Wood, G.A.R., Cocoa, op.citp.11-13
'2 Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt of southwestern Nigeria between 1988 and 1990
13Wood, G.A.R, Cocoa, op.cit., pl7-l8
'4 Posnette, A and Entwistle, H., The pollination of cocoa flowers, Report of the cocoa conference, London,
1957
'5 Urquhart, D., op.cit, pl7-23
'6 Ibid.
’7 Ibid.
'8 Smyth, A and Montgomery, R, Soils and [and Use in central Western Nigeria, Western Nigeria Govt
Ibadan, 1962.
‘9 Annual Report, West African Cocoa Research Institute 1954-55 p.23-27
2° Annual Report, Ibid 19423-1949, p9-l9
2' Annual Report, Ibid
22 Annual Report, Ibid, pl9-23
23 Annual Report, Ibid
2‘ Annual Report, Ibid 1961-62, p.114-117
2’ Annual Report, Ibid
2" Annual Report, Ibid
27 Annual Report, Cocoa Research Institute ofNigeria, 1962-63, p.58-69
2‘ Annual Report, Ibid
29 Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1990
30 See for instance Wood, G.A.R., op.cit
3' See for instance Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria,
Oxford, 1975
32 Wood, G and Lass, op.cit, p166-172
’3 Ibid
36 Ibid
:2 gr: interviews done in the cocoa belt of southwestem Nigeria between 1988 and 1990
l
3’ Ibid
3“ Ibid
39 Ibid
‘° Ibid
" Ibid
‘2 Ibid
‘3 Ibid
“ Ibid
‘5 Ibid
‘6 Ibid

86

CHAPTER FOUR

 

THE RISE AND FALL OF COCOA PRODUCTION IN IBADAN

Between 1903 and 1930, Ibadan province was the leading
producer of cocoa in Nigeria, contributing over thirty
percent to the national output. By the mid-19508, however,
over seventy percent of cocoa trees in the Ibadan cocoa belt
had been decimated by cocoa diseases, notably swollen
shoot.l This monumental catastrophe sounded the death knell
of Ibadan cocoa belt, as Ibadan never recovered from this
epidemic. Also, it engendered a re-structuring of the
relations of production in the southwestern Nigeria cocoa
belt.

Apart from some reports by the Cocoa Research institute
of Nigeria on cocoa diseases, there is no scholarly work on
the impact of swollen shoot and other diseases on the cocoa
industry.2 Most studies on the economic and social history
of Nigeria exist in a kind of ecological void. Yet, the
implications of diseases for the decline of the cocoa
industry are more important today than ever before because
about one-third of the cocoa trees in southwestern Nigeria
are affected by one kind of cocoa disease or the other.3

In this chapter, I analyze the significance of the
outbreak of the swollen shoot virus to the cocoa—driven
economy of Ibadan. To achieve this, I examine the

introduction, spread and development of cocoa production in

87

Ibadan. I pay particular attention to its impact on the land
tenure system and the economy of Ibadan. Further, I discuss
the outbreak of the swollen shoot disease in Egbeda-Olanla
axis and its spread to the outlying areas. The official
response to this epidemic and the reaction of the Ibadan
farmers will be noted. Finally, I analyze the re-structuring
of the economy of Ibadan. This involves a discussion of
migration to the relatively new cocoa growing areas of Ife
and Ondo and the taking up of new occupations by Ibadan

cocoa farmers.

British Colonialgovernment and cocoa production

The first attempt by the British colonial government to
begin cash crop production in Ibadan was in 1895, with the
introduction of cotton. In order to encourage Ibadan farmers
to begin planting the crop, the government gave them free
supplies of seeds and also brought in some cotton ginning
machines."The British Cotton growing Association, which was
inaugurated in 1902, to promote the British cotton industry,
played an influential role in establishing the cotton
industry in Ibadan. The B.C.G.A, negotiated the lease of a
five hundred thousand acre plot of land at Olokomeji, a
village south of Ibadan and built an experimental farm which
sought to determine “the best varieties of cotton, the most
suitable times of sowing, and the best methods of

cultivation.” The B.C.G.A.'s attempt to begin cotton

88

production in Ibadan was evanescent because of the
unsuitability of the land.‘

After the futile attempt to establish cotton
cultivation in Ibadan, cocoa was introduced. The rise of
cocoa production in Ibadan has been studied by Akinyele,
Ayorinde and Sara Berry. According to Berry, cocoa was
introduced to Ibadan by European missionaries, traders and
African converts in the mid-18908.

Armed with Buxton's philosophy, which was intended not
only to proselytize Africans, but also to make them self-
sustaining, converts such as Morakinyo, Ogunwole, Okogo,
Orukotan and Cornelius Phillips established new cocoa farms
in about twenty—four villages in the south of the town.6
These men began teaching farmers the techniques of planting
cocoa in these villages. Between 1890 and 1910, cocoa also
spread to villages such as Agbakin, Iroko and Kute in the
northern part of Ibadan.7

The development of the cocoa industry in Ibadan was
facilitated by the construction of a transport network
between Ibadan and Lagos. From 1897, the colonial
administration began building roads in Ibadan, and by 1906,
a major road had been constructed linking Ibadan to Lagos.
Also, railroad construction started in Lagos in 1898, and
was extended to Abeokuta in 1900 and Ibadan in 1901. The
creation of a rail and road network not only made it easy
for produce to be shipped from Ibadan to Lagos, it also

encouraged foreign companies to get involved in the cocoa

89

export trade.8 By 1917, cocoa had become the dominant crop
in the Ibadan economy. Owing to the decline of the cocoa
plantations of Agege and Ota, in the early 19208, laborers
who had worked on these plantations began to establish cocoa
farms in Ibadan and some other parts of the interior of
Yorubaland.9

Ibadan became one of the earliest Yoruba city-states to
experience a widespread adoption of cocoa. Many factors were
responsible for this. Sara Berry contends that because
Ibadan was a major participant in the Yoruba civil wars, the
cessation of hostilities created a large contingent of
demobilized soldiers who were unemployed. Consequently,
these soldiers looked for new opportunities. Because of the
propinquity of Ibadan to the older centers of cocoa
cultivation in Lagos, it was not difficult to gain knowledge

of the crop . ‘°

Furthermore, as cocoa trees began to bear
fruit, they attracted reasonable prices and had a more
stable market than any other crop. The enthusiasm for cocoa
cultivation in Ibadan was such that total acreage planted
rose from 41.6 acres in 1900 to 2,219.2 acres in 1913.11
Toyin Falola suggests that a majority of the ex—
warriors who settled in Ibadan appropriated land wherever
they could. These men usually brought with them members of
their family and a congeries of slaves and followers, and
exercised rights of ownership over land they had settled

on.12 He contends that this method of obtaining land did not

result in conflicts because the copious supply' of land

90

obviated the need to fight over possession. He went further
to say that ownership of land in Ibadan resided in the
lineage.

Each lineage was a collective group that traced its
descent through the male ancestors to the progenitor of the
lineage. To facilitate the unity of the lineage, members for
the most part, tended to live together in the same
household. With the influx of military chiefs and wealthy
men who had slaves and other dependents living with them,
some of these households acquired a cosmopolitan character.13

The head of the lineage held the land in trust for
every member. Every member of the lineage had usufructuary
rights which came from being born or being assimilated into
the lineage. No member of the lineage, however, could
alienate any portion of the land without the permission of
the other members.

Any ‘member of the household who needed more land
outside the lineage could get it either from another lineage
or by new settlement. Initially, such a member would possess
the land on an individual basis but upon his death it became
family property, which would be shared by his dependents.“In
the early years of cocoa cultivation in Ibadan, the
household was kaleidoscopic. Newcomers from other Yoruba
towns such as Ogbomoso, Ede, Gbongan, Offa and Iwo were
readily absorbed into the household. This development led to
the growth of “heterogeneous" households. Members of these

households, for the most part, had no loyalty to them and

91

they usually moved from one household to the other depending
on which one best served their interests.

In some instances, successful strangers left their
adopted household and established their own.” This open-door
policy led to the growth of big households where, at times,
newcomers outnumbered consanguineous members of the
household. This generated conflicts later on as children of
some household heads disputed the boundaries of cocoa land
given to newcomers. For example, in the case of Abiwinrin
versus Morakinyo brought before the District Officer, EP
Birch on 25th September 1916, Abiwinrin accused Morakinyo of
encroaching on his father's cocoa land and requested money
for damages and a restraining order against future
encroachment. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
Abiwinrin, and ordered Morakinyo to pay court costs and
desist from encroaching on Abiwinrin's father's land.l6

Sara Berry states that in the southern part of the
town, which was still sparsely populated, the hunters who
were the original settlers of the land were initially
receptive to strangers who came to look for land and eagerly
directed them to good cocoa land.17 The continued movement of
people into Ibadan to plant cocoa resulted in new relations
to land. The hunters in the south of Ibadan began to demand
the payment of Isagi and ishakole from the newcomers who
were moving into this area. Isagi was an initial gift to the
hunter for showing the newcomer the land. This gift was

either a small cash payment which did not exceed two pounds

92

or an imported alcoholic beverage. By the 19308, however,
isagi had risen in value to between five to fifty pounds,
depending on the size of the farm. Ishakole, on the other
hand, was a symbol of the authority of the landowner.18 These
two payments gave the newcomer the right to plant permanent
crops on the land but not the right of ownership. This meant
that the land was not transferable. Besides, if the newcomer
abandoned the farm, it would revert back to the original
owners.19

Ishakole varied from one lineage to another. Some
landowners demanded part of the produce of the tenant; some
required the tenant to clear the landowner's land once or
twice a year, while others demanded a cash payment. In most
cases, in Ibadan, the amount that was paid as ishakole was
nominal. It ranged from five shillings to ten shillings, and
if the newcomer could not make a cash payment, he could give
the landowner a few yams.20

Berry states that the growth of the cocoa settlements
of the hunters in the south of Ibadan resulted in a lot of
rivalry among the hunters' families. For example, the
Aperins, who were the most prominent hunters in the south of
Ibadan, gave out large parcels of land at Idi-ose, Aperin
and Akanran and by 1905 claimed ownership of about thirty-
two cocoa villages to the south of the Alagutan river. The
claims of the Aperins to some of this land were contested by
some other families and the district officer had to step in

and delimit each family's plot with a clear boundary.21

93

Ibadan chiefs, on the other hand, were not particularly
happy with the growing influence and economic strength of
the hunters. They argued that Ibadan land was community
property and as such the hunters in the south of Ibadan had
no right to appropriate such extensive tracts of cocoa land.
Ibadan chiefs suggested to the colonial authorities that the
hunters be divested of their settlements and that they be
given the prerogative to preside over the land on behalf of
all Ibadan people. The Resident of Ibadan, Ward—Price,
rejected the proposal of the Ibadan chiefs and upheld the
right of families to own land. He also tried,
unsuccessfully, to abolish the payment of isagi and
ishakole.22

Cocoa production in Ibadan in the years before 1920 was
organized around the lineage. Everybody in Ibadan society
gained access to land through membership of a lineage. The
lineage, however, was not the primary unit of production.
Individual households within. the lineage 'were the Ibasic
production units, and it was their responsibility to develop
the land allocated to them.23

To this end, the head of the household mobilized the
labor of his wife and children in cocoa production. In those
early years of cocoa production, large families were not
uncommon because the size of the family determined the labor
pool and this in turn determined the size of the cocoa farm.

Most Ibadan farmers married additional wives not only out of

94

emotional considerations but because of the economic
advantages they provided.24

.Although individual households were distinct production
entities, the lineage provided them with considerable
support especially when establishing new cocoa farms. Other
lineage members willingly provided their services in
clearing the forest and preparing the soil for cocoa
production. In short, the system ensured a steady supply of
labor on a modest scale.”

Some of the more prosperous Ibadan lineages, however,
were able to mobilize the labor of iwofa and other
dependents. A majority of these men were soldiers who had
amassed a lot of capital from booty and slaves. According to
my informants, iwofa, who were freeborn members of society,
were used by this group of cocoa farmers as surety for loans
given to tenants or other farmers.26

The ability of some Ibadan lineages to deploy large
numbers of people to cultivate their cocoa land created
sharp disparities in the size of Ibadan holdings. A survey
of cocoa farms in 23 Ibadan villages by the colonial
authorities suggests that fifty-five percent of the farmers
held. only' eighteen. percent of the cocoa farms and. the
average size of their holdings was 1.25 acres. Furthermore,
twenty-four percent held twenty-one percent of the land and
had. an average cocoa farm. of about 3.5 acres. Another
nineteen percent controlled forty-three percent of the land;

and a small group of farmers who constituted 1.7 percent

95

held eighteen percent of the land and had an average holding
of nearly forty acres.27
From the 19308, Hausas and Yorubas from Ekiti

constituted the bulk of the labor force. After the 19308,
Hausa laborers were used more than Yorubas. For the most
part, hired labor was employed on a casual basis rather than
on annual contracts. This was owing to the fact that the
rigorous work of establishing new farms had been done in
most parts of Ibadan in the previous decade. Most farmers in
the 19308 hired laborers primarily to clear the undergrowth
and harvest cocoa. Most laborers earned between 10 to 15
shillings per week.28

For most Ibadan farmers in the years before 1920, cocoa
farming was quite rewarding. Oral interviews with farmers at
Moniya, Omi-Adio, Akanran and Iddo suggest that prices
during this period. were quite high. and.‘most households
obtained a decent income from cocoa.29 Demand for tropical
raw' materials at the beginning of the first world. war
generally led to high prices for the principal cash crops of
West Africa. Cocoa prices rose from thirty five pounds per
ton in 1905 to about forty three pounds per ton at the onset
of the war. High prices resulted in the expansion of cocoa,
cotton and rubber farms.30

But this period of prosperity was ephemeral because as
the war progressed, the price of cocoa plummeted. To be
sure, the intensification of the war led to the

expropriation of merchant ships for military purposes.

96

 

Furthermore, German submarine warfare made many merchant
shipping lanes unsafe. Besides, access to some of the more
important European. markets was difficult because of the
European blockade.31 Owing to the shrinkage of the market by
the war, European trading companies reduced the price of
cocoa considerably. The prices of manufactured goods,
however, rose because most industrial production in Europe
was harnessed to meet the war-time needs of the
belligerents. As a result, Nigerian cocoa producers were
compelled to produce more to earn the money to buy their
basic needs.32

At the end of the war in 1918, production in Europe
resumed at a frenetic pace, as most European. economies
strove to Ibring their: economies to the jpre-war levels.
Again, demand for cocoa and other raw materials increased;
increased demand also led to a significant hike in prices.
By 1920, cocoa prices had risen to about seventy three
pounds per ton.33

Between 1920 and 1928, cocoa prices remained steady
despite sharp fluctuations in the prices of most of the
other raw materials. The major problem with Nigerian cocoa,
however, was its low quality, and unless something drastic
was done about it, the prospects for the future were bleak.
Indeed, in a market that was becoming increasingly
competitive, Nigerian cocoa risked being no longer

acceptable on the world market.

97

The Department of Agriculture, in response to the
urgent need to improve the quality' of Nigeria's cocoa,
established cocoa fermentaries in several villages in the
cocoa belt.34 These “cocoa houses", as they came to be known,
were to provide instruction to farmers on proper methods of
fermentation. In 1923, five cocoa houses were established in
the Ibadan area. By the end of 1924, cocoa houses had been
constructed in Abeokuta, Ife, Ilesha and Ondo Province. Most
villages formed Cooperative Unions in order to pool their
resources together to build fermentaries. The farmers
supplied the drying trays for fermenting the cocoa, while
the Department of Agriculture was responsible for the
technical staff.

By 1928, most areas of the cocoa belt had received the
necessary training in cocoa fermenting.” The improvement in
the quality of Nigerian cocoa did not immediately translate
into higher prices because of the world-wide depression of
1929. The depression of the 1930's affected every facet of
the Nigerian economy; industrial production was paralyzed,
and the terms of trade of primary producers declined.
Paradoxically, many people in the non-agricultural sectors
were becoming farmers because it was the only means of

ensuring sustenance . 36

In the cocoa belt momentous changes
were taking place.

.Although the prices of cocoa declined during the
depression, the volume of production remained steady. This

was owing to the fact that the cocoa trees that were planted

98

during the boom of the immediate post-war period began to
bear fruit in the 1930's. Furthermore, owing to the limited
opportunities outside the cocoa industry, more people
resorted to cocoa. Although new plantings declined in the
Ibadan cocoa belt, the 1930’s was the beginning of the great
expansion of the Ife-Ondo cocoa belt.”

From the foregoing presentation, the growth of the
cocoa industry in Ibadan should be clear. Cocoa began in
Ibadan in the 18908 and the rate of its acceptance increased
tremendously by the early 19208. Cocoa planting in Ibadan
peaked in the 19308, and new plantings declined thereafter.
For example, out of 305.6 acres of cocoa planted in 1904,
Ibadan accounted for 173.0 acres. In 1914, out of a total
acreage of 3,943.8 cocoa land, Ibadan accounted for 2,752.00
acres. In 1928, out of 40,995.2 acres planted in cocoa,
Ibadan's contribution was 13,782.2 acres.38

In Ondo and parts of Ekiti, however, new plantings rose
from the late 19208 to the early 19408. By the mid 19308,
Ibadan's share of the national output had dropped to about
one-quarter.” With the outbreak of the swollen shoot disease
in 1944, Ibadan ceased to be a factor in the cocoa industry

of southwestern Nigeria.

Swollen Shoot and the Fall of Ibadan cocoa

A number of studies have been done on the impact of

diseases on cocoa. In 1953, it was estimated that of a world

99

production of 750,000 tons, 200,000 tons of cocoa beans were
destroyed by diseases. This amounts to about 25 percent of
potential production. In a more recent study done by Cramer
in 1973, he suggests that about 20.9 percent of the world's
potential production of cocoa is lost to diseases every
year.

The swollen shoot disease has been the major destroyer
of cocoa trees in Ghana and Nigeria. In fact, it is more
pronounced in West Africa than anywhere else. The swollen
shoot disease is caused by a virus whose malignant strain
destroys the cocoa tree in a short time. The amelonado
variety of cocoa, which was the most widely grown variety of
cocoa in West Africa in the 19508 and early 19608, was
particularly susceptible to the swollen shoot virus.

The virus is spread from tree to tree by mealybugs.
.Although. about twelve 'mealybugs have Ibeen identified. as
carriers of the disease, only two of them are common in West
Africa: pflanococcoides njalensis and pflanococcoides citri.
For instance, p. njalensis is found mostly on young cocoa
trees, and in some cases, large clusters accumulate on cocoa
pods.

The p. njalensis forms a symbiotic relationship with
ants on cocoa trees. The ants feed on the honeydew which the
mealybugs emit; in return, the ants protect the mealybug
colonies by building tents over them. The p. njalensis has a
life expectancy of about six weeks, and goes through three

metamorphoses before becoming an adult. The first stage,

100

which is the metamorphosis into instar nymphs, is the most
critical for the spread of the swollen shoot disease. This
is because instar nymphs are numerous and are extremely
active.

The swollen shoot disease was first detected in the
Eastern Region of Ghana in 1936, when the stems of cocoa
trees became distended. Initially the government did nothing
about it, but after the death of almost half of the cocoa
trees in the eastern cocoa belt, the government took drastic
steps to prevent the disease from spreading. This resulted
in. the inauguration. of the cutting' out campaign. in. an
elaborate fashion in 1947.

In March 1944, the colonial government in Nigeria
ordered a survey of Nigerian cocoa to determine whether or
not there were cases of the swollen shoot virus. This
investigation was necessitated by the appearance of the
disease in Ghana, where it had caused considerable damage to
cocoa trees. Before the disease was brought under control in
Ghana in the early 19608, it had. decimated. about four
million cocoa trees annually. ”

The survey team, which was led by John West and Charles
Todd, jprincipal research. officers with. the ‘West .African
Cocoa Research Institute at Tafo, Ghana arrived in Nigeria
in mid-1944. The Survey, according to John West, was
undertaken for two reasons : First, to enable them to carry
out a comprehensive survey of the symptoms of swollen shoot

and the fungus related with capsid attack in Nigeria, and

101

second, to “help the Nigerian Agricultural Department with
the propaganda on the control of swollen shoot."41

In November 1944, the Survey Team submitted an Interim
Report to the Resident through the Senior District Officer
in which they stated that “experiments conducted on selected
cocoa trees show that a transmissible virus exists on the
cocoa farms in the Olanla, Badeku and .Akanran areas."
According to the Report, the symptoms found in the infected
trees were similar to those found among the various strains
of swollen shoot recognized in Ghana. The Report stated,
however, that the types of the swollen shoot virus in
Nigeria were less malignant than the ones in Ghana and
likely to cause less destruction.42

The main infected area had its center about fifteen

miles east of Ibadan and was about twelve miles long and six
miles wide. Infection in this area was scattered, but there
were uninterrupted outbreaks toward the center. A smaller
infected district was at Olanla, about twenty miles to the
north. There were also reports of smaller' outbreaks in
Ilesha, outside of Ibadan province.43 In mid 1945, the Survey
team was able to determine that the spread of swollen shoot
in Nigeria was fairly rapid, judging by the number of trees
which had been affected since the disease was first
discovered in 1944.

In the Ibadan cocoa belt, outbreaks of swollen shoot
seemed to appear first in mature well-grown cocoa. However,

near Badeku, along the Ife road there are examples of the

102

disease having spread to younger cocoa trees. In order to
halt the further spread of the disease, the Egbeda-Badeku-
Olanla axis was declared an area of “mass infection.”“

In order to effectively control the swollen shoot
disease, the Survey recommended the cutting-out of the
affected trees. In order to implement the cutting-out
program, the Assistant Director of Agriculture advised the
secretary of the Western provinces that it would be
necessary to inform the Olubadan-in-council of where the
cutting-out program would begin and to enlist the support of
his representatives. They also decided to undertake
intensive propaganda in all the affected areas to make
farmers aware of the implications of the outbreak and the
urgency of destroying infected trees to protect their cocoa.

The Survey decided that cutting-out would start about
the middle of December 1945. They proposed to start on
selected outbreaks on the north and south sides of the
Ibadan—Ife road between Egbeda and Idiomo. They also stated
that outbreaks would be chosen for treatment where
replanting has a good chance of succeeding.45

The cutting-out program met with stiff resistance from
Ibadan farmers. The Ibadan farmers articulated their
opposition to the cutting-out program through the Maiyegun
league, a cooperative society which had been created in 1942
to address the problems of farmers in the cocoa belt. The
Maiyegun league, which had a membership of about six

thousand farmers, refused to believe that cutting of the

103

cocoa trees was the only remedy for the swollen. shoot
disease. They argued that when some cocoa farms were
affected by “jurijuri” (capsids), the cocoa trees recovered
from such attacks after having been left fallow for about
two years. They, therefore, recommended the same
treatment for the swollen shoot disease. Furthermore, since
the cutting-out of moribund trees in the center“ of an
infection would involve the destruction of the healthier
surrounding trees which showed mild symptoms, the farmers
felt a sense of direct loss. As a result, the farmers asked
for a compensation of ten shillings and six pence for each
destroyed cocoa tree.46
The acting Secretary of the Western provinces, in a
letter to the Assistant Director of Agriculture, rejected
the demands of the Ibadan farmers for compensation on the
grounds that the cutting-out services were free and that
these services were protecting them against the loss of
their other farms. Furthermore, he stated that it might be
difficult to identify legitimate recipients of compensation
and that the settlement claims could jeopardize a cutting-
out program that needed to be carried out expeditiously.
Finally, he argued that payments of compensation would set a
precedent which might destroy the cocoa farmers' sense of
their own responsibility for the control of this disease.‘7
Ibadan farmers rejected this official position by
resisting the cutting-out program violently. In an attempt

to resolve this debacle, the Acting Secretary of the Western

104

Provinces suspended the cutting-out program. An extensive
program of instruction was then undertaken, which included
the conducting' of large numbers of chiefs, farmers and
people in authority to see outbreaks near Ibadan and in
Ghana in order to observe the extent of the destruction in
these areas.48

After a tour of the areas of mass infection in Ibadan
and Ghana, the Olubadan-in-council and the Ibadan Native
Authority became convinced of the necessity for treatment
and gave their full support to the campaign. Furthermore,
the colonial administration agreed to pay a compensation of
6 pence for every destroyed tree. Thereafter, cutting-out
was started in June, 1946 and continued, with minor
obstructions at Akufo and Oloibiri villages, until the early
19508. Between 1946 and 1950, about 1,061,553 cocoa trees
had been cut and over one hundred and thirty thousand pounds
had been paid in compensation to the farmers.49

To be sure, the delay in cutting-out the affected trees
in Ibadan because of the resistance of the farmers led to a
costly loss as the disease spread more rapidly than
expected. This resulted in a precipitous decline of Ibadan
cocoa. production. The efforts of the government at new
plantings were futile because most of the soil outside the
areas of infection were unsuitable for cocoa. By the early
19508, the total acreage of cocoa land in Ibadan had

plummeted to about 500 acres from 12,649.6 acres in 1930.50

105

Ibadan in the post-swollen shoot era

The progressive decline of Ibadan cocoa led to the
intensification of changes that had begun in the cocoa
industry of Southwestern Yorubaland since the 19308. In the
mid-19308, the relatively new cocoa producing areas of Ife,
Ondo and Ekiti started expanding and new plantings were
taking place in the uncultivated forests in these areas. The
failure of new plantings in Ibadan, and some parts of
northern Yorubaland resulted in a series of migrations into
these areas. Even where new plantings had succeeded,
holdings had been severely fragmented and had become
unviable.SI

To be sure, migration into the cocoa belt of Ife and
Ondo was one of the ways Ibadan farmers responded to the
loss of their farms. Oral interviews conducted at Akanran,
Omi-Adio, Lalupon suggest that most of the Ibadan farmers
who migrated did so in groups. This was necessary in order
to provide a network of support in the new areas. Most of
them did not stay in the new cocoa belt permanently, as they
usually came back during the off-season to pursue other
businesses.”

Second, some Ibadan farmers gave up cocoa farming
entirely and took to food crop farming. I encountered many
food-crop farms at Omi-Adio and Ido. Others took to other
skilled trades such as carpentry, painting and bricklaying.
From the preceding analysis, a number of conclusions can be

made. First, the historical background of Ibadan made it

106

receptive to the introduction of cocoa. With the cessation
of the Yoruba civil wars, Ibadan's large body of demobilized
soldiers sought new opportunities in the new colonial
economy. By 1920, cocoa production had spread to most parts
of the south and north of Ibadan, and Ibadan became the
major producer of cocoa in southwestern Nigeria. Third, the
outbreak of the swollen shoot disease in the early 19408 led
to a gradual destruction of Ibadan cocoa trees. The
resistance of Ibadan farmers to the cutting-out program and
the failure of new plantings exacerbated the demise of the
Ibadan cocoa belt. Finally, the fall of the Ibadan belt made

Ibadan farmers begin to take up other occupations.

 

107

 

ENDNOTES

l Ib/Agric 1/339, p.171, National Archives, Ibadan
2 See Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria Annual Reports
3 I got this evidence from fieldwork conducted in the cocoa belt from 1988 to 1991
4 Nworah, D.K., “The West African Operations of the British Cotton Growing Association, 1904-1914”
gtfi'ican Historical Studies, 4, 2, 1971 p318-320
Ibid
6 Berry, S.S., “Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa Growing in Ibadan and Ondo” Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, 4, 3 Dec 1968.
7 Ibid
8Tamuno, T.N., “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway” Nigeria Magazine, 83, Dec. 1964, p272-292
9 Dada, S. A., J.K. Coker: Father of African Independent Churches, Ibadan, 1986 pl6-32
l0Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria, Oxford, 1975 p49-53
” Western Nigeria, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Survey,
1944-49
:: Akinyele, I.B., Outlines of Ibadan History, Lagos, 1946, p88-90
Ibid
i: National Archives Ibadan, Oyo provincial papers 1 676 Vol 1 p48-53
Ibid
'6 National Archives Ibadan, Oyo provincial papers 4/5 49/ 1917
‘7 Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom...op.cit p59-61
‘8 Ibid p 93-95
19 National Archives Ibadan, Oyo provincial papers 1 676 Vol 1 p48-53
2° Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom...op.cit p59-61
21Ibid p1 16-1 18
’2 Ibid
23 Oral interviews with descendants of the earliest cocoa farmers at Moniya, Omi-Adio and Akanran
glggdes in 1989. See also, Toyin Falola, Politics and Economy in Ibadan, 1893-1945, Lagos, 1989
l
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
27 National Archives Ibadan, Oyo provincial papers 1 4363 Vol 2, p76
28 Oral interviews conducted at Moniya, Omi-Adio and Akanran villages in 1989, See also Berry, S.S.,
Cocoa , Custom...op.cit 126-130
29 Ibid
3° Oni, SA All Econometric Analysis of the provincial and aggregate response among Western Nigeria
Cocoa fanners(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1971) chapter 2.
3‘ Olorunfemi, A ., Anglo-German Commercial Rivalry in West Africa 1884-19 1 8(unpub1ished Ph.D
gislieatation , University of Birmingham, 1977)p35 1-161
1
’3 Lagos Weekly Record, July 7, 1920
:gazional Archives Ibadan, Annual Report(Department of Agriculture) 1923, p7-10
l
36 Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom...op.cit p83-84
3’ Ibid
38 Western Nigeria, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Survey
1944-49
39 Ibid.
‘° Ib Min Agric 1/5 File No. 43, Vol 2, p.184.
4' Ib Min Agric 1/340, p. 468
‘2 Ibid., p.469
‘3 Ibid., p.469-47l

108

 

‘4 Ibid., p.473

‘5 lb Min Agric 1/341, p.27

‘6 Ibid., p.30

47 Ibid., p.45

‘8 Ibid., p47

‘9 Ibid., p.47-48

5° Western Nigeria, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Survey,
1951-52

2 Oral interviews 00119110th at Akanran, Lalupon, Omi-Adio and Moniya between 1990 and 1991
Ibid

109

CHAPTER FIVE

IMIGRANTS, NEW SETTLEMENTS AND NEW STRUCTURES OF
PRODUCTION IN IPE AND ONDO

The demise of cocoa production in Ibadan facilitated
significant changes in the configuration of the cocoa
economy of southwestern Nigeria. In this chapter, I explore
these changes from three broad perspectives. First, I
discuss the migration of some of the farmers who had lost
their cocoa farms to cocoa diseases to Ife and Ondo, where
there were still substantial amounts of uninhabited land
suitable for cocoa growing. The movement of farmers from
other Yoruba city-states to Ife and Ondo will be
highlighted. Second, I analyze the structure of the emergent
cocoa-producing areas of Ife and Ondo, paying particular
attention to the changing patterns of rights to land
engendered by the increased commercialization of land.
Third, I examine the cost of establishing new farms, the
relations of production between farmers and laborers, and
the returns from cocoa farms.

A significant literature exists on various aspects of
the migration of cocoa farmers into the forests of Ife south
and Ondo. For example, Sara Berry, J .A. Adejuwon and Toyin
Falola have written about the patterns of settlement in the
new areas and the new structures of production that were

created. In this chapter, I introduce new evidence to

H0

corroborate some of their findings . In addition, I talk
about the dynamics of establishing new farms, and how
relations between landowners and migrant farmers affected

the expansion of holdings.

THE RISE OF COCOA PRODUCTION IN IFE AND ONDO

 

According to Sara Berry, cocoa production in Ife and
Ondo provinces began in the late 18908. Cocoa was introduced
into these two areas by superintendents of the African
Church and farmers who had acquired knowledge of the
cultivation of the crop from the Agege planters. The first
person to plant cocoa in Ondo was Charles Phillips, a Bishop
of the Anglican Church. Although Bishop Phillips did not
plant cocoa for commercial purposes, he tried to encourage
farmers in the Ondo area to cultivate the new crop.1

His attempt to make farmers aware of the potential of
cocoa was futile because the farmers did not want to invest
time, energy and money on a crop whose commercial value they
were unfamiliar with. Despite Bishop Phillips' limited
success at making farmers take to the new crop, he was able
to influence many Christian converts, who spread the
knowledge of cocoa to some other Yoruba city-states. For
example, Gureje Thompson, a Christian who had worked with
Phillips in Ondo, started the first cocoa farms in Ilesha
between 1910 and 1913. Bishop Phillips also talked to

members of the clergy and parishioners in Ife about the

value of growing cocoa.2

1H

According to Sara Berry, farmers in Ife and Ondo, did
not begin to experiment with cocoa in large numbers until
laborers who had worked on the farms of the Agege planters
returned to these areas with news of the financial success
of cocoa. The earliest farms in Ife and Ondo were
established at the periphery of the towns. In Ife, cocoa
farms were set-up to the south and west at Isoya, Ladin, and
Ashipa. As cocoa became more popular in the 19208, farmers
established farms in the southwestern part of Ife. In Ondo,
farmers began planting cocoa at Fagbo, Oboto, Bagbe, Lemoso
and Igunsin before 1920. After 1920, Ondo farmers began to
move to villages along the Ondo-Akure road and Ile-Oluji.3

The growth of the cocoa industry in these two areas and
the commercial opportunities it presented had two closely
related implications. First, owing to the labor requirements
of cocoa, large groups of migrant workers came to the “new"
cocoa producing villages. Second, because of the
availability of land suitable for cocoa growing in Ife and
Ondo, farmers from the older cocoa growing areas such as
Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ijebu began to relocate to these
areas.‘

J.O Adejuwon contends, on the basis of a study of 136
Ife villages, that the majority of the settlers in 126 of
them did not come from other Yoruba states, but were Ife
indigenes.s Although this assertion has some validity for
villages in the southwest part of Ife, the same cannot be

said of villages in the southeastern part. Berry's findings

112

and my own fieldwork at Akeredolu suggest that there were
large amounts of unoccupied land along the Ife-Ondo road,
and from the late 19408 onward more migrants settled in this
area than Ife farmers.6

The village—head of Akeredolu, together with some of
the most influential landowners, stated that the forests
adjoining the present-day Akeredolu were first occupied by
Legan, Detise and Deladan, who were hunters. These three men
came to this area in the 19408 with their families and
followers. The farmers among them did not plant cocoa; they
grew foodstuffs, some of which were yams, maize and cassava.
With the construction of the feeder road from Akeredolu to
Araromi-Okeodo, most of the farmers began to move close to
the road in order to have easy access to the markets.7

Cocoa production at Akeredolu began in the early 19508
with the advent of Mr. Akeredolu, a produce buyer from Ondo.
Akeredolu built a store in the village and began selling
cocoa seedlings to farmers in the area. Shortly thereafter,
migrant farmers began to move into this area from other
Yoruba city-states, and by the late 19508, the road from
Akeredolu to Araromi-Okeodo had been occupied by cocoa
farmers.8 At Akeredolu, Agodi and Araromi, of the 50 cocoa
farmers I interviewed, 39 were migrant farmers and 11 were
Ife landowners. At Kere village, out of 21 farmers
interviewed, 16 were migrant-farmers.

The influx of migrants into the southeast parts of Ife

continued farther east to Esera, Oosa, Olorunda, Apata

113

Oloko, Olomu Oja and Aworele. As one went farther east, the
proportion of migrants increased in relation to Ife
indigenes. For example, village elders at Oosa told me that
the population of Ifes in the village was only about 10
percent. At Ara, it was about 30 percent. According to my
informants, one possible explanation for this was that Ife
farmers preferred to establish farms as close to the Ife-
Ondo road as possible for easy evacuation of produce. When
it became difficult to get land in the villages of southeast
Ife, migrants moved to Ondo.9

Toyin Falola, in a study of migrants in Ife villages,
states that migrants did not participate in the political
life of the Ife villages. Their primary goal was to obtain
rights to cocoa land under the most favorable circumstances.
This included finding a landowner who was not too demanding
and enlisting the services of laborers at reasonable wages.
In most of the villages I visited in southeast Ife, the
division between ex-landowners and migrant farmers was
sharp.10

At Aroko, however, the distinction between landowners
and migrant farmers was blurred. This is perhaps because
Aroko was one of the earliest areas of cocoa growing in Ife
south, and it had attracted a considerable number of
migrants from Ibadan in the 19308. At that time uninhabited
land was still plentiful and most migrants did not have any
difficulty obtaining land. Chief Salami Agbaje, an Ibadan

migrant farmer, told me that by the mid-19508, there were

H4

more Ibadan migrant farmers than Ife landowners. By the
early 19608, Ibadan migrant farmers were no longer treated
as strangers, because of their long presence in the village.
In fact they had become so influential that they began to be
elected as village—head. Chief Salami Agbaje was the
village-head of Aroko at the time of the interview.”

The majority of the migrants in the cocoa belt of Ife
south came from. the older cocoa. growing' areas such. as
Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu, Okua-Otin, Oru, Oyan and Osogbo.
Most of them came as result of the destruction of their
farms by cocoa diseases, and others came to seek a new means
of livelihood. For example, out of 52 migrant farmers
interviewed at Akeredolu 33 of them came from cocoa growing
areas that had been blighted by cocoa diseases. This fact is
corroborated by Toyin Falola’s study of migrant cocoa
farmers in Ife. He states, inter alia, that by the early
19508, migrant farmers from Ibadan, which had experienced a
considerable decline in its cocoa production, could be found
throughout the southeastern part of Ife in areas such as
Amukegun and P080.12

Cocoa cultivation in Ondo also followed a similar
pattern. Most Ondo indigenes planted cocoa in the outlying
villages of Ondo before moving into the interior. Most
villages around Ondo town such as Fagbo, Oboto, Uloen and
Igbo-Oja are dominated by Ondos, while those in the interior
have a majority migrant population.” I also encountered a

cocoa village that was composed entirely of migrants. Baba

115

Ibadan Orisumbare, who migrated to the Ondo area from Ibadan
in the mid-19308, was the first farmer to establish a cocoa
farm at Ago-Gboro. Baba Ibadan paid the landowner 10 pounds
for rights to the land, and after paying ishakole for about
six years, was granted ownership of the land. Over the next
ten years, Baba Ibadan brought nearly all the members of his
lineage to Ago-Gboro. They were later joined by some Oyo
refugees from Ife, and together they have been controlling
the affairs of Ago-Gboro ever since.14

In Ondo, the 19308 and 19408 witnessed an upsurge in
cocoa cultivation. Cocoa cultivation expanded along Ondo-
Akure road, especially at Idanre. Most migrant farmers went
to Idanre not only because of the availability of unused
land, but also because of the high fertility of Idanre soil.
Oral interviews conducted at Idanre suggest two versions on
the history of cocoa cultivation there. The official history
of Idanre states that cocoa was first planted at Idanre in
about 1921 by wabumoye who had learned about cocoa growing
at Tiloko near Okitipupa. Wabumoye established his first
cocoa farms near the Idanre waterbed and began teaching the
people of Idanre the techniques of planting cocoa. He was
later made the Batuwase of Idanre, an important chieftaincy
position.”

The older farming families at Ayefemi-Idanre, however,
disagree with this official history. They posit that it is
improbable that cocoa could have been introduced by Wabumoye

because there is no evidence that cocoa was grown in

116

Okitipupa at this time. They contend that cocoa was
introduced to Idanre by Babalona, a cocoa farmer from
Ifetedo in about 1923, and that the official history was
invented to give credit for the introduction of cocoa to an
indigenous personage.” The account of the cocoa farmers at
Ayefemi village was corroborated by farmers in many other
Idanre villages. From Babalona's farms at the waterbank of
Idanre, cocoa cultivation spread gradually to villages in
the hinterland such as Legbira, Isanmore, Ago-Gbogi and
Mofere.l7

In the late 19208 and 19308, most of the migrants in
Idanre villages were from northern Yorubaland and the older
cocoa producing villages of Ife such as Apomu, Gbongan,
Ifetedo and Ikire. In the early 19408, however, most of the
migrants who came to Idanre villages were from eastern
Yorubaland from places such as Akoko, Ekiti, and Owo. In
fact, I encountered some villages where there were more
eastern Yoruba migrants than any other group. For example,
of 12 farmers interviewed at Isanmore camp, eight were from
Ekiti and one was from Ife and the remaining three were ex-
landowning families from Ondo. At Ago-Gbogi out of seven
farmers interviewed, four were from Ekiti, two from northern
Yorubaland and two from Ife.18

Although there was suitable cocoa growing land in
Ekitiland, it was far from the major cocoa buying centers
and this led to high transportation costs. In order to

minimize the cost of production, farmers moved from Ekiti

117

towns to Ondo. Most of the Ekiti migrants I talked to had
farms in Ekitiland before relocating to Idanre.l9 By the mid-
19708, most of the virgin forests in Ife and Ondo had been
occupied and migration into Ife and Ondo had slowed down
consideraby because of the oil boom.

From. the ‘preceding’ analysis, two inferences can. be
made. First, the demise of the early cocoa growing areas of
Ibadan, Okua-Otin and Oyan eventuated in the migration of
some farmers from these areas to the relatively newer cocoa
areas of Ife and Ondo. This wave of migrants was swelled by
people who sought new opportunities in cocoa farming.
Second, although cocoa production was started in Ife and
Ondo by the indigenes in the early 19208, by the early 19208
migrant farmers had outnumbered Ifes and Ondos in most parts

of the Ife southeast and Idanre.

118

Table 1: Dates on Which Cocoa was First Planted in Several Ondo Villages

 

 

 

Date Villggg

1898 West of Town (Okeigbo)
1909 South (Aj ebamidele)
1905-6 Bagbe

1912 Igunshin

c.1914 Ogun

1901-17 Lemosho

1901-17 Igbado

1910-17 East of Town (Fagbo)
1918 Oboto

c.1920 Bolorunduro

1922 Wasimi

1922 Ago-Ileshi

1926 Adebulu’s camp

1926 Obun-Ondo

1926 Owena

 

 

Source: Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change...p.65

119

 

Table 2: Dates of Establishment and Arrival of Migrants in Some Ife Villages

 

 

 

VilLale Date Founded First strangers arrived Last stmggrs arrived
Aba Iresi 1929 1929 late 19405
Abanta 1928 1945 -----
Akeredolu 19th century mid-19505 ----

Amula Suji 19‘h centry c.1960 -----
Asawure 1936 late 19405 c.1960
Aye-Oba ----- late 19305 c.1960
Banaba 19th century 1959
Egbejoda 1924 c.1950 -----

Isoya Before 19‘“ century c.1936 .....

Okoro ---- 1947 .....
Ologiri 1960 1960 1968
Olope 19205 1947 1960
Omidire ----- 1947 late 19505
Omifilnfun 1934 c.1939 late 19505
Onigbodogi 1947 1947 early 19605
Oniperegun 19th century c.1950 -----
Sekunde --- 1931 -m_-
Womonle ----- c. 1945 .....

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Sara Berry., op.cit., p.63

MIGRANT FARMERS AND NEW RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

The migrant farmers who settled in Ife and Ondo

villages were regarded as strangers. To be sure, the

120

migration of people from other Yoruba city-states to Ife was
not a new phenomenon. The first group of migrants to arrive
in Ife were the Oyo refugees. To a large extent, the
relations between the Ifes and the Oyo refugees shaped the
attitudes of the Ife to other migrants who arrived at the
time of the expansion of cocoa farming.

The Oyo refugees had escaped south from northern
Yorubaland as a result of the persistent onslaught of the
Fulani jihadists on the Old Oyo Empire. The refugees, most
of whom came from Oyo, Ejigbo, Isundunrin, Offa, Ikoyi,
Irawo-Awo and Ede, settled in large numbers at Moro,
Ipetumodu, Eduabon, Yakoyo, Ifa-lende, Sope, Waro, Ogi,
Apomu and Ikire. The Oyo refugees arrived in Ife during the
reign. of Ooni .Akinmoyero, who was sympathetic to their
situation. Olaolu .Ajulo suggests that the Ifes readily
accepted. the Oyos for two jprincipal reasons; first, to
bolster their weak army, and second, to make farmland
available to the Modakeke for Ife's food needs. The Oyo, on
the other' hand, acquiesced to the demands of the Ifes
because their main concern was to make a home for themselves
in this new area.20

The establishment of Oyo farms led to the expansion of
the economy of Ife because the Oyos began to produce not
only for themselves, but also for the larger domestic market
of Ife. Besides, the enlisting of Oyo to serve in the Ife
army greatly enhanced the military capabilities of Ife, and

Ife embarked on a series of expansionist wars which made it

121

a legitimate contender for a position of influence in the
new balance of power in Yorubaland.

The relationship between the Ifes and the Oyos
deteriorated because most Ife families tried to relegate the
newcomers to a subordinate status. Some Ife chiefs took
advantage of the vulnerability of the Oyo refugees by making
them construct their houses and tending their farms. The
Oyos resisted the attempts of the Ifes to consign them to an
inferior status by organizing a series of revolts against
Ife chiefs between 1830 and 1840.21

In order to resolve this problem, Ooni Adegunle Abewela
resettled the Oyo refugees outside the town walls in the
southeastern part of Ife, after Parakoyi. The Oyo refugees
left their hosts en masse to build their new town which they
named Modakeke. The new town expanded rapidly as new
arrivals came in from northern Yorubaland. By 1884, the
population of Modakeke had risen to about sixty thousand.22

The Ife chiefs, however, were not willing to relinquish
their lands to the Modakeke, and from the 18508 to the turn
of century, Ife landowners strove to dispossess the
Modakekes of their farms. The chasm between the Ifes and the
Modakekes was deepened by the attempts of the Ife to return
to the status quo ante. To this end, they assassinated Ooni
Abeweila, who had brokered the peace between them, and then
they attacked Modakeke. In the ensuing war, the Ife forces

were annihilated and they took refuge at Isoya and the

122

outlying villages until 1854, when Ibadan reconciled the
twwo belligerents.23

Ife attacked Modakeke again in 1878 during the Yoruba
civil war. Modakeke allied with Ibadan against the
Ekitiparapo, while Ife, after a brief stint with Ibadan,
defected to the camp of the Ekitiparapo. This alignment put
Ife on a collision course with Modakeke. After a violent
encounter in 1882, Ife town was incinerated and many of its
citizens were sold into slavery. The Ifes had to await the
British treaty of 1893 to return to their homeland.24

The British treaty of 1893 not only ended the YOruba
Civil War, but also articulated the terms upon which the
peace would be based. The parties agreed that Modakeke
should be evacauted from Ife territory and relocated in an
area under Ibadan’s jurisdiction. In 1909, the Modakeke were
resettled at Ode-Omu on the north side of Osun river. A year
after the removal of the Modakeke from Ife, Ooni Olubuse,
who had been the most strident campaigner against Modakeke,
died. He was succeeded by Ademiluyi, who favored the return
of the Modakekes to Ife. From 1912 to 1921, the issue of
whether the Modakeke should return to Ife was debated. In
the end, .Ademiluyi and. his pro-Modakeke supporters
prevailed, and the Modakekes returned to Ife in 1922.”

The return of the Modakekes to Ife occurred at the time
of the expansion of cocoa in Ife. MOst of the cocoa farms
that had been established by the Modakekes before their

exodus were now controlled by the Ifes. The Modakeke, upon

123

returning to Ife, went back to their farms and began
planting' neW' cocoa seedlings. Ife farmers demanded
compensation in recognition of their status as landowners.
Furthermore, the Ife landowners demanded customary dues from
the Modakekes for reaping the palm trees on the Ife farms.
The Modakekes in a letter to the British Resident, said, “we
stand or fall together, but we will never pay any rent, nor
will we leave our present farms, compensation or no
compensation”.26

After a bitter, litigious struggle between the Ifes and
the Modakekes, Ooni Ademiluyi, in an attempt to resolve the
debacle, summoned a meeting of the representatives of the
two towns. After a series of negotiations, the Modakeke
agreed to pay the Ifes compensation in the form of annual
tribute, which recognized the superior rights of the Ife
chiefs to the land. The Mbdakekes also extracted a
commitment from the Ooni to end harrasment by the Ifes.
Since the mid-19208, therefore, the payment of annual
tribute or ishakole had been enforced by Ife landowners and
traditional authorities. This fact is corroborated. in {a
report of the British Resident, which says “it is probable
that ishakole as an economic proposition is of comparatively
recent origin sometime in the 203."27 Ife-Modakeke relations
set a precedent upon which Ife attitudes to the influx of
other migrant farmers would be shaped.

The new migrant farmers in the expanding cocoa belt of

Ife were not treated differently from the Modakekes.

124

Initially, they were able to get rights to land at minimal
cost. To be sure, many of my informants who came to Ife and
Ondo in the 1930s took advantage of this situation to
acquire large tracts of cocoa land.28

As cocoa became more popular in the 1950s, however, a
greater number of people sought to establish their own cocoa
farms. This resulted in the commercialization of land. The
new migrants in Ife had to pay isagi and ishakole in order
to be given rights to the land. In Ondo, however, most
landowners did not collect ishakole.29

In the cocoa villages of Ife and Ondo, neither the
price of isagi nor the value of ishakole was fixed. Isagi
varied from 3d to 6d per heap. There were some factors that
determined whether or not the aspiring farmer got land and
the amount of isagi he or she paid. First, the disposition
of the migrant farmer was of critical importance. Migrant
farmers were interviewed extensively by their prospective
landowners regarding their family background, previous
occupation and why they wanted to take up cocoa farming.
Many of the landowning families I talked to said that the
deportment of the migrant farmer determined the outcome of
the negotiation.”

At Ago-Gboro village, along Ondo-Ore road, Baba Ibadan
told me that he obtained rights to his cocoa plot for a
nominal fee and that the rapport between him and the
landowner was so good that after six years, the land was

ceded to him. I also encountered similar cases at Kere, and

125

Iponrin villagesf‘l The migrant was also expected to make
prompt payments of ishakole annually. Before his cocoa began
to bear fuit, the migrant could pay his ishakole in yams.
When his cocoa began to bear fruit, the migrant was expected
to pay between 56 lbs to 112 lbs of cocoa or its equivalent
in cash. The payment of ishakole and isagi in Ife differed
from the earlier payments in Ibadan not only because they
were much higher, but also because from the mid-19508, they
became set.32

One of my informants, Michael Olanrewaju, arrived at
Kere in the late 19503 from Ibadan. Michael acquired rights
to some land by paying an isagi of eighteen pounds. Before
his cocoa began to bear fruit, the landowner got fifteen
yams as ishakole. When his cocoa trees had matured and he
started to harvest cocoa, the landowner demanded either
three hundred weights of cocoa, or its value in cash.33

The payment of ishakole was, however, not widespread in
cocoa villages in Ondo. Out of the 67 migrant farmers I
interviewed in the Idanre local government area, which
included Legbira, Ayefemi, Mofere, Isanmore camp and Ago—
Gbogi, none of them paid ishakole after paying for rights to
cultivate cocoa. I did come across a few cases in the older
cocoa producing areas such as Fagbo and Oboto where isagi
and ishakole had been collected.34

The payment of ishakole generated a lot of tension
between the landowners and the migrant farmers. For example,

Shittu. Makinde, an indigene of Modakeke whose farnl was

126

situated at Oke-Owena on Ife—Ondo road, a distance of ten
miles from Ife town, was attacked by a gang of landowners
because of his refusal to pay ishakole. In a petition to the
District Officer, Ife Division, he stated that: “On the 28th
December, 1948, I was in my hut with my families[sic] when I
saw a gang of men with guns, cutlasses, axes, sticks and
other weapons ready to fight against me for this ishakole
matter."3s Shittu Makinde took flight and made his was to
Ife.

Many other ishakole case appeared before the customary
court in Ife. The case of Gabriel Arewa is of particular
interest because the Ooni of Ife expressed his opinion on
the issue of ishakole. Gabriel Arewa, the plaintiff, had
taken Samuel Toriola to court for not paying ishakole from
15th December, 1946 to 15th December 1947. Gabriel Arewa was
claiming six cwts and one quarter of dried or its cash value
of eighteen pounds and two shillings. The Ooni of Ife urged
migrant farmers to honor their ishakole obligations. The
Customary Court ordered Samuel Toriola to pay his
outstanding dues.36

The commercialization of land in Ife and Ondo altered
the land tenure system. Unlike in Ibadan, where ownership of
the land was bestowed on the lineage, in Ife and Ondo
ownership of land devolved upon the Oba who held it in trust
for the entire community. In Ife and Ondo, the Ooni and the
Osemawe had the prerogative to assign land to families or

individuals who needed them.37

127

Whereas in Ife the apportionment of land to such
families automatically conferred right of ownership upon
them, in Ondo this was not necessarily the case. According
to Ward-Price, most Ondo families who obtained land with the
authorization of the Osemawe and who had cultivated such
lands for years had no permanent rights to the land. To be
sure, a family could use a plot of land as long as it wanted
and even allocate it to members, but it could not grant land
to non-family members. Furthermore, in both Ife and Ondo,
communal land could not be sold. This tradition remained in
force up to the late 1920s in the early years of cocoa
cultivation in Ife and Ondo because uninhabited arable land
was still copious and because not many migrant farmers had
arrived to occupy such land.38

With the increased demand for cocoa land, however, and
the inflow of migrant farmers in large numbers from the
early 19403, the conditions for obtaining cocoa land
changed. In fact by the late 19408, a system of tenancy
which made the payment of ishakole obligatory had been
established in Ife. In Ondo, however, certain aspects of the
traditional system lingered. In some of the villages where
ishakole had been collected, there had been considerable
friction between the Osemawe, who insisted upon exercising
his traditional rights to the land by asking that payments
on the land and ishakole should be made to him, and the Ondo
families who had farmed these lands for generations. The

Ondo landowners were able to resist the Osemawe's demands

128

successfully. It seems that the farther away from Ondo one
went, the less effective were the mechanisms for collecting
ishakole.39

The phenomenal rise in the commercialization of land in
the relatively “new” settlements of Ife and Ondo should be
put in some larger historical context. In other cocoa
growing countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana,
commercialization of land was not pervasive. In southern
Ghana, for example, Akwapin migrant cocoa farmers who had
acquired ownership of most of the cocoa land in southern
Ghana did not demand money from stranger-farmers for rights
to use the land.40

The stranger-farmers of southern Ghana could gain
access to cocoa land only through a form of sharecropping
christened the abuse system. Under the abusa system, the
stranger-farmer entered into an agreement with the landowner
to be the caretaker of the farm for a specified period.
Although the abusa laborer had no rights to the land, he
assumed all the responsibilities of the farmer. He would
clear the undergrowth, harvest the cocoa beans and also dry
and ferment the beans.“

The abusa laborer depended on the labor of his
household and in cases where the household labor was
inadequate, he benefited from the services of other abusas.
Most of the abusa laborers were paid one-third of the cocoa

output for the year, while the remaining two—thirds went to

129

the landowner. Only in rare cases did the landowner pay the
abusa a set amount for his services.42

The migrant-farmers who came to Ife and Ondo were not a
monolithic group. There were marked differences among them.
They came from different backgrounds and different
occupations, but all were united by an abiding desire to
obtain good cocoa land. There was a group from the older
cocoa growing areas of Okua, Oyan, and Ago-oru where cocoa
was no longer fecund because od the old age of the trees.
Some came from the more established cocoa producing area of
Ibadan where cocoa farms had been blighted by the swollen
shoot disease. There were some other migrants who had
previously engaged in some other occupation, but turned to
cocoa farming not only because their previous occupation was
no longer profitable, but also because cocoa prices in the
19508 were quite attractive. Cocoa prices rose from 625
pounds per ton in 1947/48 to 170 pounds per ton in 1951/52
and then to 196 pounds per ton in 1954/56. The news of the
rise in price gave added impetus to the movement of people
into the cocoa belt of Ife and Ondo.‘3

Over ninety percent of the migrant farmers who came to
Ife and Ondo obtained rights to cocoa land in the
uninhabited forests of these areas. After acquiring rights
to the land, the migrants began establishing new farms. This
involved a substantial expenditure of capital. To be sure,

most of the migrant farmers came with some working capital,

130

but a significant number of them did not have nearly enough

money to start their own farms.

Table 3: Previous Occupation of Some Migrant Farmers in Akeredolu and

 

 

Ago-Gboro
Previous occupation Akeredolu Ago-Gboro
Hunter 3 2
Farmer 8 4
Produce Buyer 2 1
Motor Mechanic 2 -
Civil Servant l -
Bricklayer l 1
School Teacher 1 -
Petty Trader 3 2
Goldsmith 1 1
Barber 1 -
Other 1 3

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Fieldwork at Akeredolu and Ago-Gboro

Migrants who did not have the money to establish their
own farms upon arriving in the new cocoa producing areas
started out as hired laborers and saved money over a period

of time to get access to land. One informant at Poso, a

131

village close to Kere, arrived at Poso around 1957. This
informant worked as an annual laborer for five years after
which he got rights to a piece of land for twenty pounds and
agreed to pay ishakole on an annual basis. I encountered
many other cases of migrants who served as laborers in
several of the villages I visited.“ In fact, about one—
quarter of the migrants who came to Ife and Ondo worked as
laborers at one time or the other before they started their
own cocoa farms. Migrants who had come to Ife because they
lost their cocoa farms or because they wanted a change of
occupation tended to have enough savings to start their own
farms."

Many migrant farmers also participated in a variety of
non-market institutions which provided them with the support
to establish their cocoa farms. An informant at Molodo in
southeast Ife told me that when he arrived at Molodo in the
late 19508, he and seven other farmers organized themselves
into a group known as “ajo alasalatu". Under this
arrangement, each member of the group contributed a
specified amount into a common pot at the beginning of each
month. Each member of the group then took turns to use the
combined group money. Usually the farmers with the most
urgent financial needs used the money before others. This
was an institutional mechanism for pooling resources
together to help migrant farmers in financial straits.
Furthermore, some migrant farmers provided specialized

services to landowners and other established farmers. These

132

migrants, many of whom were skilled workers, played a
critical role in building houses, providing blacksmithing
services and hunting for game.46

Although the size of farms varied from place to place,
the average size of the farms of migrants was between four
to six acres. One of the problems with trying to determine
the size of farms in Ife and Ondo was the fact that most of
the farmers have more than one farm and in most cases they
planted other crops besides cocoa. It was, therefore,
important to differentiate between their cocoa farms and
their food farms. Also, there was the problem of multiple-
ownership. Sometimes it was difficult to know whether a
particular cocoa farm was a family farm or individual farm.
It was, therefore, important to ask farmers specific
questions about ownership.

At Kere village, I interviewed eleven migrants on
matters related to landownership. Of these eleven migrants
interviewed, one bought eight acres, three bought six acres
of cocoa land each, five farmers bought three acres each.
All of these farmers paid between 20 to 40 pounds to acquire
rights to their plots of land. The informant with eight
acres of cocoa land has two separate farms.47

For the most part, landowners had much larger cocoa
farms than migrant farmers. The case of Chief Adereti at
Akeredolu village illustrates this fact. Furthermore, most
of the ex-landowners are second-generation farmers who

inherited substantial holdings from their fathers. Chief

133

Adereti, a sixty-five year old cocoa farmer at Akeredolu, is
one of the two surviving sons of one of the pioneering
families of Akeredolu village. Adereti stated, inter-alia,
that because landowning families did not have to pay for
land, they appropriated as much land as they could
cultivate. What determined the size of their farms was the
capacity of each landowning family to employ laborers to
establish. their' cocoa farms. Chief .Adereti inherited. 30
acres of cocoa land in the mid-19503, and in the early
19603, he appropriated another 15 acres for food crops.48
Another informant from a landowning family at Akeredolu
said that in his younger days, he was a hunter, and although
he used to help his father in his cocoa farm, he never owned
a. far“: of his own” When. his father“ passed. away' in. th
mid19503, he inherited his 25-acre farm. He acquired 5 acres
of his own in the late 19503 and in the 19603 he set up a
foodcrop farm of about 15 acres. Another informant said he
was born in Ife and moved to Akeredolu to live with his
father when he was eight years old. His father died in the
late 19503 when he was twenty years old and he inherited his
father’s cocoa farm which was fifteen acres. He also
established an additional S-acre farm in the mid-19603.49
Landowners also benefited from the fact that they
collected “isagi” and “ishakole” from the migrant families
to whom they gave usufruct. For landowners with a large
contingent of tenant farmers, this amounted to a substantial

stock; of capital. Adereti, for’ instance, was collecting

134

these payments from six migrants farmers by the late 19503.
Jeremiah Akinwale (now deceased) used to collect “isagi” and
“ishakole” from four farmers.so

In Ondo, the cocoa farms of the landowning families
were bigger than those of their Ife counterparts. At Uloen
village, Robert .Akinkuebi inherited. his father’s 32-acre
farm in the 19603 and has since added about 8 acres of his
own. I also came across landowning families at Fagbo,
Igbooja and Bamikemo with cocoa farms ranging from 50 to 70
acres. An informant at Fagbo who obviously had much
experience with the establishment of new farms said that
Ondo cocoa farms were bigger than those of other areas
because most Ondo landowners had been successful businessmen
in Lagos and as such had more capital to invest in new cocoa
farms.Sl

Although the size of the farms of migrant farmers in
Ondo 'was not. much. different from. those of Ife farmers,
migrant farmers in Ondo tended to have more cordial
relations with landowners. This is owing to the fact that
most migrant farmers in Ondo did not pay ishakole. In Ife,
on the other hand, there were many disputes between
landowners and migrant farmers on ishakole.

Not all migrant farmers had small holdings. A majority
of those who had substantial holdings inherited them from
their parents who had migrated to Ife and Ondo between the
mid-19303 and late-19403. One informant inherited a 30-acre

cocoa farm from his parents in 1960. his parents had moved

135

to Ile-Oluji from Ogbomoso in the 19403 with some followers.
At this time there was still plenty of unused land in Ile-
Oluji and Samuel's father, who was a man of considerable
means, took advantage of this situation to establish a large
cocoa farm. .Albert Olowookere of .Akeredolu 'village also
inherited his 20-acre cocoa farm under similar

circumstances.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCOA FARMS

The establishment of a new cocoa farm began with the
felling of trees, clearing undergrowth and preparing soil
for cocoa production. Although the basic unit of production
in the new cocoa producing areas remained the household, the
majority of the farmers employed hired laborers. This was
because household labor could not cope with the rigors of
starting a new farm. Since over 90 percent of the migrant
farmers who came to Ife and Ondo occupied previously unused
land, hired laborers were a sine qua non for establishing

new farms . 52

136

Table 4: How hired laborers were used in selected cocoa villages in the 19505

 

 

Village No. of farmers No. who used No. who used No. who used No. who
Interviewed Annual Contract Daily-paid did not use
workers Workers Laborers laborers
Kere 21 18 m m 3
Akeredolu 25 20 l 1 3
Molodo 8 5 2 --- l

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Fieldwork done at Kere, Akeredolu and Molodo between 1989 and 1990

In the late 19403 and early 19503, the majority of the

hired laborers were from eastern and northern Yorubaland.

From the late 19503, however, the number of Yoruba-speaking

laborers decreased, and most of the laborers came from the

eastern part of Nigeria and the “middle belt". The hired

laborers from the non-Yoruba speaking areas were

generically referred to as “agatu”. Nearly all the hired

laborers in the 19503 worked on an annual basis. An annual

laborer is hired to work on a cocoa farm for one year at an

agreed rate. The

annual laborer is the quintessential

laborer. He had no aspirations to become a cocoa farmer,-

all he wanted to do was sell his labor power.53

There were other forms of labor at this time, such as

contract workers and daily-paid workers. Laborers who were

hired on a contractual basis worked on already existing

137

cocoa farms and were assigned specific tasks, such as
weeding, for an agreed sum of money. Contract laborers
worked from between one week to two months. The daily-paid
laborer was a rarity in the 19503 and 19603 because the
energies of the farmers were directed toward a sustained
development of new cocoa farms and the daily-paid laborer
could not provide a steady supply of labor for the year.54

The laborers usually came to the cocoa growing areas in
groups. In most cases they came at the behest of other
laborers who had been working in the cocoa belt and who had
some experience with cocoa production. Upon arriving at the
cocoa village, the laborers met with the village head and
the principal landowning families who welcomed them and
provided them with accomodations until they were hired by
the cocoa farmers in the village.”

After hiring the annual workers, the cocoa farmer
provided them with accomodations and was also responsible
for their feeding. In some cases, the cocoa farmer,
especially if he was a landowner, provided the laborer with
land to plant foodcrops. Very feww hired laborers came with
their families. The village head of Akeredolu, Chief
Adedewe, said that in the busy days of settlement in
Akeredolu, there were about three hired laborers who came
with their families.”

Because the landowner was responsible for the
maintenance of the laborer, their wages were generally low.

The wages of annual workers varied from 15 pounds to 30

138

pounds per annum. Annual workers worked in gangs, and the
number of annual laborers that worked on a particular farm
depended on the size of the farm and the thickness of the
vegetation. Each gang of annual laborers had a leader who
was experienced and who determined how many laborers would
work on a particular farm. He was also responsible for
negotiating the terms of payment with the farmer. In
addition to the responsibilities of the annual laborer for
establishing the new farm, which included clearing the
forest and planting the cocoa beans, he was also expected to
do household chores.57

In estimating the returns from cocoa farms, one has to
take into account the cost of establishing them. This
depended on the amount of money spent on getting rights to
land, hiring laborers and maintaining the farms until they
matured. Most farmers who owned small to medium sized farms
of about four to five acres spent between 20 to 30 pounds
on acquiring rights to land, and they hired two to three
laborers. They were also expected to pay for the maintenance
of the hired workers.’8

Farmers who owned larger farms of between 20 to 60
acres, on the other hand, were in most cases landowners and
therefore did not buy land. They, however, hired between six
to ten laborers on an annual basis. Since the cocoa farmers
in southwestern Nigeria planted the amelonado variety of
cocoa which took about six to eight years to mature, these

investments lasted for that period.

139

One informant at Akeredolu who inherited his father's
30 acre land in the 19503 employed eight laborers on an
annual basis for about four years to prepare the land for
cocoa cultivation. He paid them an agreed sum of about 30
pounds each per annum..After four years, he reduced the size
of his labor force to five, but at the same rate. In the
mid-19603, when my informant’s cocoa began to bear fruit, he
used to realize about three and a half tons of cocoa from
his farm. This yield lasted for about ten years.”

This informant's returns are a fair representation of
what most ex-landowners got from their cocoa in Ife
villages. The returns in Ondo were higher than in Ife. I
came across landowners at Uloen who used to realize between
six to eight tons in the 19603. Farmers with small to medium
sized farms got lower returns. One sixty year old informant
at Fagbo told me he arrived at Fagbo in 1954 from Isuwa
Akoko and bought about six acres of land. He was able to buy
the land from the money he had saved as a tailor.

After acquiring rights to the land, he employed four
men to clear the land and plant the cocoa. This informant
used daily-paid workers and he used to pay them about 10
pence per day. He was also responsible for their feeding
anytime they worked for him. He used the four men
consistently for about ten years before increasing the labor
force to six. This was necessary because his cocoa had
started bearing fruit and he needed more hands to harvest

the beans.

140

The initial harvest of this informant was two bags.
This was because all the trees did not start bearing fruit
at the same time. In 1969, however, this informant made
about one ton from his farm. Another cocoa farmer with a
small cocoa farm, James Adeyemi, migrated to Uloen village
in Ile-Oluji from Egbe-Ekiti in 1962. Before relocating to
Uloen, Chief Adeyemi was a saw-miller. From his savings from
the saw-milling Ibusiness, he Ibought an. eight-acre farm.
James used to get about six and a half bags from his farm in
the early seventies; this rose to almost one ton in the late
seventies.60

According to my informants, women played a significant
role in the early days of cocoa cultivation in Ondo and Ife.
.Although they were not involved in clearing the thick
forests and undergrowths, they assisted the men in planting
the cocoa in nursery beds and then transplanting them in the
farms. As the cocoa began to bear fruit, their role enlarged
to include harvesting, fermenting and drying of cocoa. In
recent times they have become more involved in the foodcrop
trade.61

Many of the farmers I interviewed in the cocoa belt of
Ife and Ondo said that although cocoa yields were good in
the 19603 and 19703, they did not make much profit. They
went further to say that despite the fact that prices were
relatively' stable throughout this period, they' were too
low.62 It is within this context that one can understand the

impact of the marketing board on cocoa production.

141

The massive influx of migrant farmers and workers into
Ife had two closely related consequences. First, it led to
the commercialization of land and second, it engendered a
system of tenancy which dramatically altered the land tenure
system in Ife and Ondo. Finally, despite the increase in the
price of cocoa on the world market, the prices being paid by
the marketing board were not enough to provide the farmers

with any substantial residual income.

142

 

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ENDNOTES

‘ Berry, S.S., “Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa Growing in Ibadan and Ondo” Journal of the Historical

Sociely of Nigeria 4,3, Dec. 1968

2 Berry, S.S., Cocoa, custom and Socio—Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria, Oxford, 1975, p.41.

3 Ibid., p.42

4 Ibid

5 Ibid., p.62. Also fieldwork conducted in several cocoa villages in southeast Ife at different times between

1989 and 1991

6 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu and Uloen at different times in 1990

7 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu between 1989 and 1990

8 Ibid

9 Ibid

‘° Falola, Toyin., “Migrant Settlers in Ife Society, c1830-l960”, Calabar Historical Journal 3, l, 1985

p. 18-33

1' Oral interviews conducted at Aroko in April, 1989

'2 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu and Kere between 1989 and 1991; See also Toyin Falola, “Migrant

Settlers. . .” op.cit, p. 18-33

'3 Ibid

” Oral interviews done at Ago-Gboro in February, 1990

'5 Oral interview done at the palace of Oba of idanre on November 17th 1990

16 Oral interviews done at Aiyefemi-Idanre

‘7 Oral interviews done at different times at Ago-Gbogi, Legbira, Isanmore and Mofere in 1990

‘8 Ibid.

'9 Ibid.

2° Ajulo, Olaolu, The outline history of Modakeke, Ibadan, 1989, p.53; See also: Johnson, S., History of

the Yorubas, Lagos, 1921, p.230

2‘ Ibid.

22 Ibid., p.232

23 Oral interview with Jeremiah Akinwale, a Modakeke indigene.

2‘ Johnson, S., History of the Yorubas, Lagos, 1921, p.230

2’ Ife Divisional Papers

26 Ibid.

2" Ibid.

28 Oral interviews done in different parts of the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991

:2 Oral interviews conducted at Akeredolu, Bamikemo-Oja and Omifon Aladura between 1990 and 1991.
Ibid.

31 Oral interviews done at kere and Iponrin villages between 1990 and 1991.

32 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu at difi‘erent times between 1989 and 1991

33 Oral interview with Michael Olanrewaju at Kere on February 22nd 1989

3‘ Oral interviews done in Idanre local government and Fagbo a different times between Nov. 1990 and

June 1991

35 Ife Divisional Papers, December 30, 1948.

36 Daily Times, May 10, 1944

:; Ward-Price, H.L., Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces, Lagos, 1939, p.77-85
Ibid.

39 Oral interviews conducted at Fagbo, Oboto and Igbo-Oja at different times between October, 1989 and

January 1991; See also Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom and Socic-Economic Change...

‘0 Hill, P., The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer, Oxford, 1956, p.8

" Ibid, p.9.

‘2 Ibid, p.10-11

‘3 Marketing Board Reports; Also oral interviews done in the cocoa belt from 1989 to 1991

‘4 Oral interviews conducted at Poso, Molodo and Kere in 1990

‘5 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu at different times between 1989 and 1991

145

 

‘6 Ibid.
47 Oral interviews conducted at Kere between 1989 and 1990
48 Oral interview with Mr. Adereti at Akeredolu on January 26, 1989
49 Oral interviews conducted at Akeredolu at different times between 1989 and 1990
50 Oral interviews with Mr. Adereti and Jeremiah Akinwale at different times between 1989 and 1990
5‘ Oral interviews conducted at Uloen and Fagbo in 1990
52 Oral interviews done at Bamikemo and Akeredolu in 1990
53 This is based on my conversations with Chief Adedewe and hired workers at Akeredolu and Kere
between January and June 1989.
5‘ Ibid.
’5 Ibid.
5" Ibid.
2: Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt at different times between 1989 and 1991
Ibid.
’9 Ibid.
6° Ibid.
6‘ Ibid.
62 Ibid.

146

1CHA£HHHR SIX:

T‘ MARKETING BOARD , THE APPROPRIATION OF SURPLUS

AND COCOA EARMER IMPOVERISHMENT

By the mid-19603, cocoa had become the primary foreign
exchange earner of Nigeria and was contributing about
twenty-three percent to the Gross National Income. Besides,
it was the dominant export of the southwestern Nigerian
economy and was central to the economic life of the majority

of Yoruba farmers.1

The mechanism for generating government
revenue from cocoa production, which had been put in place
with the creation of the Nigerian Produce Marketing Board in
1948, was firmly entrenched by the mid-19503.2 To be sure,
the Cocoa Marketing Board was solely responsible for
marketing Nigerian cocoa, and its operations had irrunense
consequences for the growth and development of the cocoa
industry.

In this chapter, I examine the impact of the activities
of the marketing board on the cocoa economy of southwestern
Nigeria. In order to situate this chapter within a
historical context, I present a background to the creation
of the marketing board. Also, I analyze the structure and
price policy of the board. I focus on the mechanisms for the

appropriation of surplus and the creation of a reserve fund.

Furthermore, I evaluate the uses to which marketing board

147

reserves were put. Finally, I assess the responses of the

cocoa farmers to the operations of the marketing board.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Nigerian Produce Marketing Board was established as
a means of controlling the sharp fluctuations in the price
of cocoa in the world market on the eve of the Second World
War. The guiding principles for the operation of the board
were inspired by the measures instituted by the colonial
government during the inter-war period to stabilize prices.
These measures were put in place in response to the
agitation of Nigerian cocoa farmers for higher prices from
European trading firms.3

To be sure, most of the cocoa in Nigeria was bought by
European firms, who were responsible for exporting it and
selling it on the world market. The European merchants, some
of whom were G.B Ollivant, John Holt & Co, Hendersons of
Manchester, Miller Brothers of Liverpool and Pickering &
Berthoud, had a network of international agents who provided
them with up-to-date information of prices that were being
offered on the world market for the principal cash crops. In
setting the price of cocoa, the overseas offices of these
European firms took into account the cost of shipping, the
prices being offered by the various firms and the prices
being offered by the manufacturers.4

The exporting firms bought cocoa through indigenous

middlemen who were familiar with the cocoa villages. These

148

middlemen were not only given cash advances by the exporting
firms, but also instructions regarding what price they were
to buy cocoa. Because of the poor communication network
between the cocoa villages and most buying centers, cocoa
farmers could not verify the prices they were being offered
by the middlemen. Besides, most cocoa farmers were
illiterate and had no way of ascertaining the veracity of
whatever information the middlemen provided on the situation
of the market. My informants contended that because of these
disabilities they were not infrequently exploited by the
middlemen.’

The European exporting firms were able to maximize
their profits through considerable economies of scale. The
European firms, apart from. being' the ‘main. exporters of
Nigerian cocoa, also monopolized the distribution of
manufactured goods to Nigeria. The cocoa industry was
therefore a buyers' market. European firms had the leverage
to manipulate prices either on the selling side or on the
purchasing side to considerable advantage.6

By the 19303, the number of European trading companies
had decreased significantly. Some firms liquidated their
businesses while others merged with more financially viable
ones. The dislocation of the world market in the immediate
post-World War 1 period made the cocoa trade risky. The
parlous economic conditions of most European countries that
bought Nigeria's cocoa was further compounded by the

Depression of the late 19203.

149

Owing to the low demand for cocoa worldwide, profits
were low. European firms jostled. intensely' for’ an. ever
shrinking market. Some trading firms suffered irrecoverable
losses. Only firms with a large and sufficiently diversified
capital base survived. this chaotic period. By' the late
19303, four firms (United Africa Company, G.L.Gaiser, Cocoa
Manufacturers Ltd. and John Holt) were responsible for about
eighty percent of the Nigerian cocoa trade.7

The dominance of these four firms gave them a complete
control of the cocoa market. They' were therefore in a
position to determine prices based on their own interests.
Besides, European trading firms often consulted with one
another and in most cases articulated a joint buying policy.
The Nigerian farmers were not passive recipients of the
prices generated by these buying agreements. Between 1937-
1938, Nigerian farmers organized a cocoa pool through which
they were able to negotiate with the European firms not on
an individual basis but as a collective body. Furthermore,
the cocoa pool ensured that farmers did not go through
middlemen in their dealings with European firms.8

The primary objective of the pool by cocoa farmers was
to break the coalition of exporting firms and return cocoa
marketing to the arena of more competitive market forces.
This resolution. by ‘Nigerian. cocoa farmers had. a Domino
effect on cocoa 'marketing, as Ghana cocoa farmers also
determined not to sell their cocoa at the low prices offered

by the European trading firms. The colonial government up to

150

this time remained aloof in matters regarding prices, but
this impasse forced them to consider new options. To this
end, they set up the Nowell Commission in 1938 to look into
the marketing of West African cocoa and make recommendations
as to how best to resolve the crisis.9

The NOwell Commission, after an extensive tour of the
cocoa producing areas of Ghana and. Nigeria, made some
observations. The Commission discovered that there had been
considerable attrition among European trading firms since
the 19203 because the cocoa trade was not particularly
lucrative at that time and trading firms were involved in an
intense competition to gain control of a diminishing market.
One of the consequences of this unfettered rivalry was that
some trading companies actually operated at a loss. Besides,
the unprofitability of cocoa marketing discouraged United
States buyers from participating despite the fact that the
US was the largest buyer of West African cocoa. It was
therefore 'understandable 'that the IEuropean. trading' firms
would form a cartel to minimize competition as much as
possible. The Commission, however, criticized the notion of
a buying agreement among the trading firms and made
alternative recommendations.10

The Nowell Commission suggested, inter alia, that
Nigeria cocoa producers should be given the prerogative to
sell their cocoa directly to European exporters. The
Commission suggested that cocoa farmers form cooperative

societies which would pull the resources of the farmers

151

together and give them a strong bargaining position vis-a-
vis the European shippers. Furthermore, the Commission,
while acknowledging the efficiency and organizational
abilities of the exporters, recommended that they not be
allowed direct access to the farmers. All transactions were
to be done through the newly created cooperative bodies.”

The Commission eliminated the position of the middlemen
but made allowance for the cooperative societies to recruit
members of their permanent staff from the pool of defunct
middlemen. The Commission rejected the notion of price
stabilization. It contended that it was too risky for
government to underwrite the price of cocoa because the
unpredictability of the international market might lead to
great losses for the government.12

The colonial government signed the Nowell Commission
Report in September, 1938, but it was too late to implement
changes in the structure of cocoa marketing in Nigeria for
the 1938/39 season. With the outbreak of war in 1939, the
Nowell Report was put in abeyance. The colonial government
directed its energies to creating new marketing schemes to
meet the exigencies of allied war effort.13

To be sure, the Second World War had two closely
related consequences on the cocoa trade. First, because of
the economic blockade on Germany, which was a major buyer of
West African cocoa, the cocoa market shrunk dramatically.

This was exacerbated by the fact that access to other

152

markets was di srupted by the not - too - infrequent
expropriation of merchant ships for war purposes.

Because of the fact that the exporting firms could not
deal with the hazards of shipping cocoa under the volatile
conditions of the war, the British government felt compelled
to intervene in the procuring of cocoa from West Africa.
Consequently, the British government decided to buy the
entire cocoa output of both. Ghana and. Nigeria for the
duration of the war. Although the British government
suggested that this measure was necessary ostensibly to save
the economies of the two countries, it did underscore the
strategic importance to Britain of keeping its biggest West
African colonies loyal during the war.”

In order to facilitate the shipping of cocoa to
Britain, a Control Board was established in London. The
Control Board employed a Controller who, together with
representatives of the European trading firms, supervised
the buying of cocoa in Nigeria. The purchase of cocoa was
done by the agents of the exporting companies who were now
answerable to the Control Board.‘5

Specific quotas were allocated to each firm, and the
quotas were rigidly enforced. The price of cocoa was
determined by deducting transportation costs and other
miscellaneous expenses from the market price set by the
Control Board. For the most part, the price offered at the
beginning of the buying season by the Control Board remained

invariable throughout the year. It was therefore fairly easy

153

for most farmers to compute their cocoa earnings. The
stability which the new arrangement provided was a far cry
from the pre—war marketing situation which was characterized
by sharp fluctuations.l6

From 1942, however, the West African Produce Control
Board took over completely the shipping and selling of
cocoa. This was because of the fact that the apportioning of
quotas was becoming problematic, as the big exporting firms
began to clamor for quota increases. Furthermore, the
marketing of West African cocoa became increasingly
bureaucratic, and exporting firms were mired in a morass of
paperwork. The government felt that complete control was
necessary to avoid the convoluted administrative
procedure.17

The activities of the Control Board in securing West
African cocoa and the marketing structure that was generated
by this initiative became the critical foundation for the
erection of the marketing board in Nigeria in the post-war
period. The Control Board, through its price control policy
accumulated substantial reserves, which translated to
millions of pounds that could be used not only to maintain
the colonial infrastructure, but also to ‘undertake
development projects. From the British standpoint, it did
not make sense to abandon a policy that had worked so well
during the war. Besides, almost every facet of the cocoa
industry was now affected by the mechanisms created by the

Control Board, and a radical overhaul of the system would

154

involve a substantial expenditure of time, energy and

money.18

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NIGERIAN COCOA MARKETING BOARD

The Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Board, established in 1947,
was solely responsible for the entire spectrum of cocoa
marketing operations. This involved buying cocoa from the
primary producers, grading for export, and selling to
overseas manufacturers. The ordinance which established the
Board mandated it to "secure the most favorable arrangements
for the purchase, grading, export, and marketing of cocoa,
and required it to assist by all possible means in the
development of the cocoa industry of Nigeria for the benefit
and prosperity of the producers."”

There has been considerable controversy in the
literature regarding the justification for and against the
creation of the cocoa marketing Board. G.K. Helleiner argues
that the only“ justification for the ‘maintenance of the
marketing board arrangement after the colonial period was
the ‘fiscal role' the Board had come to play. It had become
a conduit for the mobilization of cocoa earnings for the
developmental needs of the country. This fiscal role,
according to Teriba, has resulted in replacing private
investment with public investment in a most wasteful and

inefficient way.20

155

Other writers have justified the existence of the Board
on the grounds that farmers would rather spend their money
on conspicuous consumption than expand their holdings. They
posit that the surpluses from marketing Board operations
should, of necessity, be used for general economic
development and more importantly, for the provision of
infrastructures in the country. This position, however,
ignores the real sacrifices and tough choices that farmers
made in the establishment and maintenance of cocoa farms.
The opportunity cost of investing in cocoa farms was quite
high and it sometimes meant that farmers would forego
certain luxuries in order to set up their farms.21 Further,
arguments for and against the Marketing Board, however, have
failed to place the operations of the Board within a proper
historical context. What was the significance, scale and
impact of the operations of the marketing board on the
income of cocoa farmers? Did cocoa farmers earn enough from
cocoa production to be able to expand their holdings
significantly? How did government spend the huge reserves
that were accumulated during the marketing board years? To
pursue a systematic account of the impact of the marketing
board, I engage these questions in relation to the
operations of the board both in the colonial and post-
colonial periods. In addition, I use empirical evidence to
trace the extent to which farmers expanded their holdings.

The structure and functions of the marketing board were

radically different from those of the erstwhile Control

156

Board. The overriding principle that undergirded the
marketing board was price stabilization. This principle was
based on the idea that by paying farmers prices that were
much lower than world market prices in years when the demand
was high, they would be able to create a reserve fund which
would serve as a safety net in the event of a slump in the
world market. The reserve fund would also be used to finance
research on improved varieties of cocoa. The idea of price
stabilization had been rejected by the NOwell Commission on
the grounds that it would. put too much. burden on the
government.22 Furthermore, the Marketing Board, unlike the
Control Board, reinstated African middlemen to their pre-war
position as buyers of cocoa. Therefore, instead of buying
directly from cocoa farmers, the Board employed the services
of buying institutions that had been created by commercial
firms and the Association of Nigerian Cocoa Exporters. These
reconstituted middlemen were known officially as Licensed
Buying Agents and they were authorized to buy cocoa from the
cocoa farmers on behalf of the Board.23

The price policy of the Marketing Board, however, was
not different from the war-time arrangement. Prices were
announced. at the beginning of the cocoa 'year and they
remained fixed throughout the season. The Board published a
list of cocoa buying stations throughout the cocoa belt and
the minimum price which Licensed Buying Agents could pay for

a ton of cocoa. The minimum price did not, however, include

157

transportation costs, which varied based on the distance of
the cocoa area to Lagos.24

Licensed buying agents were commissioned to buy cocoa
for the board at the various buying stations at not less
than the minimum price provided for the year. They were also
responsible for inspecting the cocoa to ensure that it was
the quality required by the marketing board, and to bag it
at the standard weight. Furthermore, they were responsible
for storing the cocoa beans and shipping them to Lagos at
the appropriate time.”

From 1951, Licensed Buying' Agents were given cash
advances by the Board with which to buy cocoa from the
farmers. The cash advance was a uniform amount that included
money for the cocoa that would be purchased and overhead
costs. The advance also made allowance for some profit
profit for the agent.26 Recruitment of L~B.A's was based on
certain criteria. First, the licensed buying agent must have
enough capital to buy and handle a minimum of two hundred
and fifty tons of cocoa. The capital requirement at the
inception of the Board in 1947 was five thousand pounds.
This rose to ten thousand. pounds in the 1951/52 cocoa
season. Furthermore, a prospective agent must have a store
with the space for about one hundred tons of cocoa.27

It would seem that the requirements for becoming a
licensed buying agent were low, because African
participation in the buying of cocoa increased. For example,

the number of African licensed buying agents increased from

158

four in 1947 to eleven in the 1951/52 buying season.
Furthermore, African buyers were becoming more competitive
as they began to increase their share of the total
marketings. The African share of the cocoa output rose from
about thirteen percent in 1948 to about sixteen percent in
the 1951/52 season.

The licensed buying agents had a network of smaller
cocoa buyers who acted as intermediaries between them and
the farmers. The primary responsibility of these smaller
buyers was to collect small quantities of cocoa from the
cocoa villages into larger parcels for the licensed buying
agents. The subsidiary buyers employed the services of
scalers, who were responsible for weighing the cocoa beans.

All scalers were literate, and had a keen sense of the
quality and quantity of cocoa. They did not receive an
official commission from the licensed buying agents. They
got their income either from the subsidiary buyer or from
their manipulation of their dealings with the farmers.28

The Nigerian Central Marketing Board operated from 1947
to 1954, when it was reorganized. At its inception in 1947,
the Central Marketing Board had an initial capital of 8.5
million pounds which it had inherited from the accumulated
reserves of the Control Board. By 1952, the reserves of the
Board had increased to 26 million pounds. This increase was
made possible by the consistently high demand for cocoa in
the post-war era. Besides, supply trailed behind demand and

this engendered high prices. Despite the efficiency that

159

characterized the operations of the Central Board, there was
a move to reorganize it in 1953.29

The desire to reorganize the Board was coterminous with
significant changes that were taking place on the Nigerian
political landscape. To be sure, the late 1940's was a
period of great political ferment in Nigeria, as opposition
to the Richards Constitution heightened. The Nigeria leaders
decried the principle of nomination, which undermined their
desire for proper political representation. They argued that
nominated officials were puppets of the colonial
administration and could not serve the interests of the
Nigerian people.

They went further to say that the colonial government
did not consult Nigerians before the Constitution was
ratified by the House. The British official response to the
agitation of Nigerians for the renunciation of the Richards
Constitution was the introduction of the Macpherson
Constitution. After considerable consultation, the regional
conferences agreed on a federal system of government, with
three regions. The three regions were to cease to be
administrative regions. They were to become political
regions with powers to pass legislation which would be
effective within their own boundaries.3o Consequently, some
delegates to the August 1953 Constitutional conference in
London proposed that the existing Commodity Boards should be
regionalized. They suggested that a committee be formed to

work out the modalities of the new regional marketing board.

160

The committee’s report, which was submitted to the resumed
conference in January 1954, was approved.

The committee recommended that the commodity boards
which were responsible for the marketing of all Nigeria’s
cash crops on a country-wide basis be replaced by regional
marketing boards, which would be responsible for the buying
arrangements of all cash crops within each region of
Nigeria. The new regional boards would be responsible for
price stabilization, research and economic development. The
committee also recommended the creation of a central board
which would prescribe grades for cocoa beans and also handle
shipping and overseas sale of cocoa.31

Also, the committee stated that the Directorate and
shareholders of the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, the
overseas selling body of all the commodity boards, be
reorganized to correspond with the new changes. The
committee agreed that the reserves of the old commodity
board be distributed to the new regional bodies on the basis
of derivation. To this end, an initial sum of 25 million
pounds of the defunct commodity board was transferred to the
Western Region Marketing Board. In order to ensure a smooth
transition to the regional marketing board, the Governor—in-
Council established a “shadow" marketing board until
required legislation was passed to make the Board legal.32

The Marketing Board Law was established by the
legislature of the Western Region on the 28th September

1954, and the Board became a statutory organization on the

161

13t of October 1954. The Western Region Marketing Board
began functioning in the 1955/56 cocoa season. The structure
of the new regional board was not too different from that of
its predecessor. The new regional board also appointed
licensed buying agents to purchase produce on its behalf and
also fixed their remuneration for the services rendered by
them. The producer prices fixed by the board were subject to
approval by the Governor-in-Council, who also had the power
to advise the board on matters of policy.

In addition, the sales tax, which had been instituted
by the Nigerian Central Legislature in 1953, was adopted by
the Western Region Marketing Board under the Adaptation
Ordinance of 1954. The cocoa farmer pays the tax to the
licensed buying agent at the time of sale. The Produce Sales
tax for cocoa was 4 pounds per sale.33

There were, however, a few significant changes. The
Western Regional Legislature enacted a law which appointed
Inspectors. Inspectors were appointed to supervise the
activities of licensed buying agents. This included
scrutinizing their books for discrepancies, inspecting
storage facilities and monitoring the shipment of produce
from the buying outlets to the ports.34

The Western regional government, which was headed by
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, saw the marketing board as a source
of generating revenue to finance the development of the
region. The official policy of the government was

articulated in a report of the Ministry of Agriculture and

162

Natural Resources presented to the legislature. The
Permanent Secretary stated inter alia that the greatest
increase in the national wealth of the Western Region was
likely to come from the maximization of the agricultural
potential of the region. He stated that: “it is principally
from the revenues which the cash crops produce that the
development projects will be financed." In addition, the
Ministry also sought to provide social services to the
people of the region, and increase the real incomes of
cocoa farmers.35

The Western Region Marketing Board accumulated huge
reserves between 1954 and the early 19703. How were these
reserves accumulated and how was the money spent? What were

the consequences of marketing board policies?

Table 5: Accumulation of Reserves by the Marketing Board

 

 

 

 

Year Producer price of cocoa per World price of cocoa per Marketing
ton ton Board Reserves
1954/55 200 360 +5,025,823
1955/56 200 215 4,000,000
1956/57 150 182 -1,160,961
1957/58 150 291 +4,900,000
1958/59 150 203 +7,500,000
1959/60 160 205 +1,098,560
1960/61 160 175 -l,l89,610
1961/62 100 155 +3,157,207
1962/63 105 157 +3,104,086

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Annual Reports of the Western Nigeria Marketing Board, 1954-1959

163

Cocoa prices were remarkably high in the early 19503.
At the time of the take-over of the operations of the
Marketing Board by the Western Region, stocks in Europe and
America were lower than at any time since the end of the
Second World War. When it became obvious that the 1953/54
cocoa output would be low, manufacturers became anxious to
guarantee adequate supply of cocoa to meet the rising demand
on the European and American markets. The selling price for
cocoa on the world market was 470 pounds per ton.

In light of this significant hike in the price of
cocoa, the Western. Region. Marketing' Board felt that an
increase in producer prices was justified. They, however,
had to square this off against the possibility of a decline
in prices in the coming year. After careful deliberation,
the Board recommended that producers be paid 200 pounds for
cocoa which was of grade 1 quality and 185 pounds for grade
2 crop. These recommendations were accepted and endorsed by
the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board.36

The high prices of cocoa on the world market compelled
manufacturers to be more judicious in the use of cocoa beans
and to keep stocks to the barest minimum. In addition, the
consumption of chocolate declined in the major consuming
countries, especially the United States. As these trends
unraveled, and the supply of cocoa came to par with demand,
prices fell to more normal levels.

At the end of the 1954/55 season cocoa prices had

dropped to about 270 pounds per ton. The majority of the

164

season's cocoa had, however, been sold at about 360 pounds
per ton. The Western region Marketing Board in its first
year of operation, added 5,025,835 pounds to its reserves.
What is more significant, however, is the differential
between producer prices and world market prices. At the time
when cocoa was selling for 360 pounds on the world market,
producers were being paid 200 pounds per ton. The marketing
board made a whopping 160 pounds on each ton of cocoa.37

It should be remembered that cocoa producer prices for
the 1954/55 season were fixed on the basis of the
recommendations made to the Nigerian Marketing Board by the
“shadow" marketing board because the laws establishing the
Western Nigeria Marketing Board had not been enacted. By the
beginning of the 1955/56 season, however, the Western Region
Marketing Board had become legally constituted. When the
Board met in July of 1955 to set producer prices for the
coming year a number of important changes had taken place on
the world market.

The high prices ruling on the world market in the
1953/54 season and for* most of the 1954/55 season. had
resulted in a considerable increase in the prices of cocoa
products. This impelled consumers to begin to use cocoa
substitutes, which fact resulted in the decline of
consumption. Slowed consumption translated into a decline in
the demand for cocoa. This resulted in a considerable

decline in selling prices. At the time the Board met in

165

July, 1955, the world market price of cocoa was between 200
and 230 pounds.38

As a result of the dramatic change in the cocoa market,
the Board had to decide whether of not to lower the producer
price for the 1955/56 season. On the advice of the Nigerian
Central Marketing Board, the Board decided to maintain, for
the 1955/56 season, the producer price of 200 pounds per ton
that they had paid the previous year..Although the Board was
going to incur a small deficit, they were motivated by the
fact that one of the primary responsibilities of the Board
was to ‘maintain stable producer' prices for as long‘ as
possible.39

Further, the Board stated that the price to be paid for
the 1956/57 cocoa season would not be less than 150 pounds.
Throughout the 1955/56 season, cocoa supply' outstripped
demand and world market prices fell much lower than
previously expected. The f.o.b. price received during the
season averaged 217 pounds per ton, and consequently there
was a total deficit on the Board's trading operations of
about 4 million pounds for the year ending 30th September
1956.40

In the 1957—58 season, cocoa prices rose again, in part
because of Brazil's sales policy and the unpredictability of
the West African crop. By mideApril 1958, cocoa prices had
soared to 340 pounds per ton. Towards the close of the
season, however, speculation on a bumper 1958-59 crop and

lower consumption estimates engendered a reduction in buying

166

estimates and brought down prices. An average f.o.b. price
of about 290 pounds per ton was realized at the end of the
season and the Board ended its operation with a trading
surplus of about 4.9 million pounds.

In calculating the producer price for the 1958-59
season, the Board felt that cocoa farmers should be
compensated for the decline in prices in the 1957-58 season.
The Board, however, was of the opinion that in the interest
of stability, prices should be set at levels that could be
maintained not only from one season to the next, but for an
extended period of time. The Board therefore decided to peg
prices at 150 pounds per ton.

Cocoa output in Nigeria in the 1958-59 season was the
highest ever. The volume of production rose to about 131,513
tons. A large number of the cocoa trees that had been
planted in the great wave of migration in the late 19403 and
19503 had begun to bear fruit. .Although prices were
depressed in the face of heavy mid-season purchases in West
Africa, the bulk of the Nigerian crop had been sold by then
at an average f.o.b. price of about 283 pounds per ton. The
surplus realized by the Board was over 7.5 million pounds.

The upsurge in cocoa production which began in 1958-59
continued until the 1961-62, season when cocoa production
rose to 186,720 tons. The significant increases in the
volume of production not only in Nigeria, but also in other
cocoa producing countries, invariably forced world market

prices of cocoa down. Although the Board made a surplus of

167

1,098,560 pounds in the 59-60 season, the unrelenting slump
in world market prices made it call for a reconsideration of
producer prices.‘1

The Board requested a re-evaluation of producer prices
despite the fact that it had made a commitment at the end of
the 1955-56 season not to allow the producer price to go
below 150 pounds. The consensus among members of the Board
of directors was that that amount would give the Board the
leverage to adequately pursue its price stabilization
objectives, and at the same time ensure a decent standard of
living for cocoa farmers. The Board obviously conveniently
chose to ignore its initial commitment of maintaining the
producer price at 150 pounds per ton.42

The world market price of cocoa fell in the 1960-61
season to 175 pounds per ton and there was the real
possibility of a further downward slide. The Board suffered
a deficit of 1,189,610 pounds in 1960-61, and in order to
obviate the depletion of its substantial reserves the Board
moved swiftly to reduce producer prices to 112 pounds. The
decision of the Board to reduce producer prices did not go
unchallenged.43

Some members felt that the reduction contradicted the
price stabilization policy of the Board, and that given the
substantial reserves it had. amassed. over’ the 'years the
farmers deserved. a safety' net. The Governor' of ‘Western
Region, acting on instructions from the Regional Executive

Council, ordered an inquiry into allegations of a plan to

168

delay the reduction of cocoa prices. The Commission began
its hearing in open session on 15th May 1961, and the
Commissioner submitted his report at the end of the year.
Although nothing came out of this hearing, it underscored
the fact that price stabilization was not intended to serve
the interests of the farmers.“

Table 6: Nigerian Cocoa Producer Prices as Percentage of World Prices

 

 

 

Year Percentage of World Price
1948 32.2
1949 98.4
1950 50.0
1951 46.9
1952 68.5
1953 70.8
1954 43.3
1955 67.5
1956 96.2
1957 72.1
1958 48.0
1959 55.1
1960 76.9
1961 95.2
1962 59.5
1963 62.5
1964 62.5
1965 100.0
1966 47.7
1967 48.9

 

 

 

Source: S.O Olayide and Dupe Olatunbosun, Trends and Prospects of Nigeria’s
Agricultural Exports, p.77

The Western Regional government had already stated in
its economic policy objective that cocoa was the life-blood
of the Western Region and that returns from cocoa would be
fully utilized for the development of the state. To this
end, the Executive Council enacted into law the bill

establishing the Western Nigerian Development Corporation.

169

This law, which came into force on 16th April 1959, repealed
the Western Region Production Development Board Law, and
gave the Corporation virtual autonomy in the running of its
affairs.“

The main objective of the Corporation was to diversify
the economy of Western Region through industrial
development. The Corporation began a fruit canning factory
in Ibadan, a rubber factory in Ikpoba, a Pepsi-Cola bottling
company in Ibadan and Lagos, a Nigerian Domestic Gas Supply
company, a textile mill and a water resources development
corporation, to mention a few. What is important from the
point of view of this dissertation is the source of revenue
for these projects.-46

In 1961 alone, the Corporation received allocations of
approximately 8 million pounds from the government of
Western. In addition, it got a loan of about 3 million
pounds from the Board. Between 1959 and 1962, the
Corporation received close to 27 million pounds in loans and
allocations from the reserves of the Board. Furthermore,
money from the Board's reserves was used to establish
subsidiaries of the Corporation, such as the National Bank
of the Western Region and the Western Nigeria Finance
Corporation. Besides, the Corporation received loans from
the Regional government.47

According to the report of the Coker Commission of
Inquiry that was set up to probe the activities of the

Marketing Board, the Board had since its creation to 30th

170

Seotember, 1961 acquired a total sum of 64,221,933 pounds,
of which 42,547,189 pounds was received from the old
Commodity Marketing Boards. The Board had disbursed
31,176,014 pounds in grants to the Western Regional
government for varoius development projects. Furthermore,
the Board spent 10,108,152 pounds on loans or deposits to
help some indigenous companies among which were the National
Investment and Properties Company Limited and the National
Bank of Nigeria. In addition, the Board gave loans of 14,
200,000 to the Federal and Regional Governments, and to some
regional statutory corporations.

The activities of the Marketing Board need to be put in
proper historical context. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the first
premier of western Region, maximized the use of the
marketing board as a vehicle for the economic development of
the region. During his tenure, practically all development
programs in the region were tied to the surplus generated by
the marketing Board. In fact, according to the Coker
Commission of Inquiry, this administration over-extended
itself by starting projects that would need a regular supply
of capital well beyond his tenure in office.48

Consequently, his successor, Ladoke Akintola, was mired
in a financial quicksand. With very little surplus capital,
Akintola further reduced producer prices. Farmers look back
at the Akintola era with a sense of horror. For them, it was
the low water mark of cocoa production. WOrld market prices

of cocoa declined from 1960 to 1966, and the government

171

reduced producer prices in order to extract more of the
surplus. Producer prices during this period never exceeded
120 pounds per ton. Cocoa producer prices reached an all—
time low of 72 pounds per ton in 1966.-49

The military struck in Nigeria's first coup d'etat in
1965. The military intervened in Nigerian politics,
ostensibly to rid the country of the first generation of
Nigerian politicians who had been blamed for the
mismanagement of the country's economy, and lack of a sense
of nationalism.” The consequences of this coup for Nigeria's
political history need not detain us here. It should be
mentioned, however, that after a series of counter coups the
country found itself embroiled in a bloody civil war which
lasted from 1967 to 1970. By 1970, the military had firmly
established themselves as the new masters of Nigeria.’1

Between 1967 and 1975, when Nigeria experienced the
first phase of ndlitary rule, marketing board policies did
not change. The military governor of Western State, General
Adeyinka Adebayo, continued with the policy of using the
Board as a source of revenue for development programs. In
fact the differential between world market prices and
producer prices widened during this period.’2 Cocoa
production rose dramatically in the 1966/67 season to
256,331 tons, showing an increase of 46.5 per cent over the
previous season. Cocoa prices on the world market fluctuated
between 230 to 250 pounds per ton. In spite of the

relatively high prices of cocoa during this season, farmers

172

were paid an average of only 86 pounds per ton. By 1968,
cocoa accounted for 65 per cent of Nigeria's total export
value. World market prices in 1968 rose to 264 pounds per
ton, the highest since 1959. Cocoa farmers received 133
pounds per ton, only half of the world market price.’3

The trading' surpluses accumulated. in. the six: years
between 1963 to 1968 were more than those accumulated in the
eight years between 1955 and 1962. To be sure, the Board's
accumulated reserves stood at about 26 million pounds in
September, 1962, but had risen to 55.02 million pounds by
1968.

The consistently low producer prices of the 19603,
generated considerable concern among cocoa farmers as the
vast majority of them were finding it difficult to make ends
meet. This was compounded by an increase in the cocoa sales
tax to six pounds per sale. The financial strain of the new
tax increase was felt most by farmers in the Ibadan cocoa
producing areas where cocoa production had dwindled to
insignificant levels.‘4

It was therefore no surprise that the most strident
opposition to the tax increase was undertaken by Ibadan
cocoa farmers. Representatives of the Ibadan farmers sent
numerous petitions to the Military Governor of the State,
and to the Olubadan and his chiefs asking for a reduction of
the sales tax to one pound and ten shillings. Furthermore,
farmers protested against the local councils which had been

set up in the villages to facilitate government development

173

programs. The farmers complained that the local councils had
become conduits for extracting money from farmers without
rendering any services. Council officials went on sporadic
tax raids and harassed farmers who could not pay their
taxes. All the appeals of the Ibadan farmers fell on deaf
ears.”

In a dramatic move, Ibadan farmers began to organize.
They formed the Egbe Agbekoya, and. began. meeting' every
Sunday. The Egbe Agbekoya was by no means restricted to the
Ibadan cocoa growing areas. Farmers congresses were set up
in all the major cocoa producing centers, and they sent
their representatives to Ibadan periodically to keep abreast
of developments there.‘6

Tafa Adeoye, a cocoa farmer from a village near
Akanran, who had acquired a large reputation as an intrepid
hunter, emerged as the leader of the militant wing of the
Agbekoya movement. The farmers resolved not to pay the new
rates, and they resorted to violence and demonstrations to
express their resolve. Their refusal to pay taxes put them
on a collision course with the military government, which
began to clamp down on the various branches of the
movement.’7

In July, 1968, cocoa farmers all over Western State
took to the streets in a violent demonstration against the
policies of the Board. They destroyed public vehicles,
public buildings, and finally had a show down with the anti-

riot police squad. In the ensuing confrontation, farmers who

174

were armed only with machetes and dane guns were massacred
in full view of an incredulous public. The Agbekoya riots as
they came to be known , i l lustrate the deepening
contradictions between the interests of the State and the

struggle of the cocoa farmers for economic survival.’8

THE IMPACT OF BOARD POLICIES ON COCOA FARMERS

How then did all of this affect cocoa farmers? The
majority of the cocoa farmers who came to the new cocoa
growing regions of Ife and Ondo were not large scale
planters. Although a few migrant farmers in Ife, and more so
in Ondo, had farms that were quite substantial, the average
farms of migrants was six acres. These farmers had to make a
considerable investment in new land and labor not only to
establish new farms, but also to maintain them. Besides,
most of them depleted their savings during the gestation
period before cocoa began bearing fruit.’9

Most of the cocoa planted in the late 1940's and early
1950's began bearing fruit in the late 1950’s. The majority
of the farmers who had six acres of cocoa land realized
between 10 to 15 bags of cocoa for the entire six acres in
the first three years of harvesting. Cocoa yields increase
progressively before they reach a peak and begin to taper
off..Afolabi Olabintan, a cocoa farmer with seven acres of
cocoa land at Akeredolu, told me that in the first three

years of harvesting cocoa beans he got 7 bags. This

175

increased to about 12 bags in 1960 and 17 bags in 1967.
Olabinton case is fairly representative of the majority of
the migrant farmers in the cocoa belt.60

In monetary terms, ten bags of cocoa at a Board price
of 215 pounds per ton in 1967 would fetch the farmer about
107.5 pounds sterling. The majority of the cocoa farmers
made anywhere from 17 to 20 bags of cocoa each from their
farms after three years of the initial harvest. Average
income per cocoa season for most migrant farmers was about
80 pounds sterling. There were, however, marked variations.
Most landowners who had access to large amounts of land did
realize relatively large quantities of cocoa beans from
their farms.

Aderemi Adereti, a prominent landowner at Akeredolu,
had 20 acres of cocoa land in 1950. When he began to harvest
his cocoa, Adereti realized approximately 20 bags. By 1967,
Adereti was making about 3 tons of cocoa from his farms.
Francis Adeyeye, another ex-landowner who had 16 acres of
cocoa land between 1955 and 1965, made about 1,000 pounds
sterling as revenue from cocoa on an annual basis during
that period. Large landowners were in the minority in the
cocoa belt, most cocoa farmers were smallholders who did not
make much of a profit from cocoa production.61

How were cocoa earnings spent? How much residual income
did cocoa farmers have? A survey of 25 migrant farmers and
six landowners at Akeredolu shows that the migrant farmers,

the majority of whom had farms that were between 5 to 6

176

acres increased their holdings by about 2 to 3 acres between
the 1950's and the late 1960's. On the other hand,
landowners with holdings of between 10-15 acres, increased
their holdings by between eight to ten acres.62 Landowners
were able to increase their holdings more substantially than
migrant farmers, in part because they had unlimited access
to land, and also because some of them were able to take
advantage of the ishakole payments that were made to them by
migrant farmers. Yet, the increases in the farms of cocoa
producers, when taken together, was very marginal because
the majority of cocoa producers in southwestern Ybrubaland
were migrant farmers.63

The situation was a little bit better in Ondo villages
where farms were relatively larger. At Omifon Aladura, about
90 per cent of the farmers interviewed bought additional
cocoa land, of an average size of about 4 acres, in the
period between 1960-1970. Almost all the farmers I talked to
were unanimous in their view that the marketing board had
shortchanged them and that their inability to expand their
holdings was a direct result of the low returns they were
receiving for cocoa.64

In determining the residual incomes of cocoa farmers, I
took into account the size of their families, annual income
and expenditure. I interviewed 20 farmers at Akeredolu
village specifically for this purpose. Of the twenty farmers
interviewed, only two made between 1,000 and 1,400 pounds

sterling on an annual basis between the early 19503 and the

177

late 19603. Eight of these farmers had 50 pounds or less
remaining after household expenses such as education of the
children, food and other miscellaneous expenses. Seven of
them had about 150 pounds remaining, five had 200 pounds
left and only two had residual incomes of about 300 pounds.“

These residual incomes do not include costs for the
maintenance of cocoa farms. Maintenance costs of cocoa farms
would depend on the size of the farms and the number of
laborers hired by the farmer. Most farmers hired annual
workers in the early 19503 and 19603, and maintenance costs
ranged from 50 pounds to 150 pounds. This further eroded
whatever gains the farmer made from cocoa.66

The depressed conditions of the cocoa belt spawned a
number of significant changes not only in the attitudes of
cocoa farmers to cocoa production, but also in labor
relations. The vast majority' of the cocoa farmers who
migrated to Ife and Ondo in the late 1940's up to the 1960's
saw cocoa growing as a way of life. In those early years,
most of them grew foodcrops primarily for domestic
consumption. From the mid-1960's, however, a few of them
began to grow foodcrops for cash. This trend became common
in the oil boom years.

Besides, some cocoa farmers began using sharecroppers
as early as the late 1950's to reduce labor costs. This
trend increased in the late 1960's and mid-19703, as labor
costs more than doubled. In addition to this, farmers

started buying fertilizers to improve the fertility of the

178

soil, and insecticides to control cocoa diseases. The
growing inability of cocoa farmers to maintain their cocoa
farms would result in the decline of the cocoa industry in

later years.67

CONCLUSION

From the preceding analysis, a number of conclusions
can be made. First, the cocoa marketing board was inspired
by the efforts of the colonial administration to avoid the
fluctuations in the world market prices of cocoa by offering
farmers a set price at the beginning of each season.
Although this policy of price stabilization was put on hold
in the immediate post World War 11 era, the framework for
the appropriation of surplus remained the same. With the
reorganizations of 1948 and 1954, a few changes were made.
For instance, inspectors were appointed to supervise the
processing and grading of cocoa. Besides, the policy of
price stabilization was resumed.

Second, the official justification for the marketing
board was its price policy. The Board argued that by
maintaining a set price throughout the season irrespective
of world market conditions, the farmer had the capacity to
plan ahead and rationalize his activities. Furthermore, this
had the added advantage of shielding the cocoa farmer from
the vagaries of the world market. By creating a reserve fund

from the surplus generated in buying seasons when world

179

market prices were high, the Board could pay more when
prices plummeted.

One can accept the premise of these arguments without
detracting from the fact that the main thrust of the system
was largely exploitative. To be sure, the Board did incur
losses between the late 1950's and 1962 to shore up producer
prices. But the total deficit during this period did not
exceed 5 ndllion pounds sterling. This pales by comparison
to the profits that accrued to the Board. Between 1954 and
1962, the Board made a profit of about 30 million pounds,
and this figure nearly doubled in the period between 1962
and 1968.

Throughout this period, farmers consistently received
relatively low prices for their cocoa. Consequently, there
was very limited expansion of cocoa holdings. In addition,
there were significant changes in the relations of
production as cocoa farmers began to use sharecroppers in
order to cut down on cost of production. The growing
inability of farmers to maintain their cocoa farms created

the basis for the decline of the 19703 and 803.

180

ENDNOTES

 

l Olayide, 8.0., Economic Survey of Nigeria, Ibadan, 1976
2 Helleiner, G.K., Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Homewood, Illinois,
1966
3 See report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa, CSO/348833National Archives
Ibadan
‘ Ibid
5 Fieldwork done in the cocoa belt of Ife southeast and Ondo
6 See Report of the Commission...op.cit
7 “Manifests to the cocoa producers of the World” see Report of the Commission...op.cit
8 Brown, D.H., “The development of cooperative marketing societies in Nigeria” Third West African Agric.
Conference, Lagos, 1938
9 Ibid
1° See Nowell Commission Report, National Archives, Ibadan
“ Ibid
”Ibid
'3 Ibid
1: cso 26, File 36148 573, Vol 1, “West African Control Board” National Archives, Ibadan
Ibid
'6 Ibid
'7 Ibid
'8 Ibid
‘9 Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board Proceedings, File No AR.S/PB.6, National Archives, Ibadan, p.3
2° Helleiner, G.K., op.cit
2' See for instance, Proceedings of the NISER on the marketing board system
22 Nowell Commission...op.cit
23 Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board proceedings...op.cit., p. 12
2‘ Ibid
2’ Ibid
“Ibid
2' Ibid
28 Fieldwork done in the cocoa belt from 1989 to 1991
29 Nigerian Central Marketing Board Proceedings, File No AR.S/PB.5, National Archives, Ibadan
3° See for instance, Groundwork of Nigerian History
3' Nigerian Central Marketing Board, File No AR. S/PB.5 op.cit, p. 2
”mao3
33 Ibid, p.4
3" Ibid
35 See Oyo Provincial Papers 1/1735 Vol. 2 p. 181 Produce Inspection and Growing of Cocoa
:5 Annual Report of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, National Archives 1954/55
Ibid
3' Ibid
39 Annual Reports of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, op.cit 1955-57
‘° Ibid, 1957/58
" Ibid
42Ibid, 1959/60
‘3 Ibid
4‘ Ibid, 1961
I: Annual Report of the Western Nigerian Development Corporation 1959-1963
Ibid
‘7 Ibid
‘8 Coker Commission of Inquiry
‘9 Annual Report of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, 1965

181

 

:2 See for instance, Ademoyega, Wale, Why We Struck, Ibadan, 1981
Ibid

3 Annual Report Of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board...op.cit
Ibid

5‘ Fieldwork done in the cocoa belt Of southwestern Nigeria

‘5 Ibid

5" Ibid

5' Ibid

5' Ibid

’9 Ibid

6° Ibid

6' Ibid

62 Ibid

‘3 Oral interviews done at Omifon Aladura between 1989 and 1991

64 Oral interviews conducted at Akeredolu between 1989 and 1991

6’ Ibid

'6 Ibid

6' Ibid

182

CHAPTER 7

THE OIL BOOM, RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND THE ATTENUATION OF

HOUSEHOLDS

The period between 1973 and 1983 is arguably the most
eventful in Nigeria's post-colonial history. This period
witnessed an unprecedented surge in economic growth as a
result of the commercialization of the Nigeria petroleum
industry. Foreign exchange earnings rose from 411 million
pounds in 1970 to about 2 billion pounds just three years
later.1

This change in Nigeria's economic situation was
heightened by the Arab oil embargo of the mid-1970's. The
embargo engendered an upward spiral of oil prices and
enlarged Nigeria's foreign reserves. For instance, annual
revenues from oil rose from 2 billion in 1973 to 10 billion
in 1977 and then to 26 billion in 1980.2 Furthermore, the
windfall from oil made it possible for successive Nigerian
governments to undertake massive rehabilitation schemes in
agriculture. In spite of government attempts to
revolutionize agriculture through programs such as the
“Green Revolution" and “Operation Feed the Nation, "
agricultural production stagnated during the period of the
oil boom.

In this chapter, I examine the impact of the oil

industry on the cocoa industry. In order to provide a

183

framework for understanding the dramatic shift in the
structure of the Nigerian economy, I analyze the role of
agriculture in Nigeria's economy up to 1974. I discuss the
discovery of oil and its rise to a position of dominance in
the JNigeria economy. .Also, I examine the ‘various
developments plans that were made during the period of the
oil boom. Particular emphasis will be placed on government
efforts to increase cocoa production through granting
subsidies to farmers for fertilizers and insecticides, and
the creation of agricultural credit banks for giving loans
to farmers. Finally, I assess the impact of government

programs on the cocoa industry.

Agriculture and the immediate post-colonial pgriod

From 1960 to about 1974, agriculture played a dominant
role in Nigeria's economy. Nigeria was the second leading
producer of cocoa in the world, and the world's leading
producer of palm oil and groundnuts. Besides, Nigeria was a
prominent exporter of rubber, cotton and hides. Since the
commercialization of oil, however, there has been a
significant decline in the contribution of agriculture to
the Nigerian economy. The contribution of agriculture to the
gross domestic product fell from around 60 per cent in 1960
to about 21 percent in 1977, and eventually to less than 10

percent in 1978.3

184

The emergence of oil to a position of primacy in the
Nigerian economy occurred in the 1970's, but historically
exploration began in 1908, when a German company established
the Nigerian Bitumen Company to prospect for Bitumen in the
marshland between Lagos and Okitipupa. The company stopped
operations at the outbreak of the First WOrld War. In 1937,
Shell DPArcy, the forerunner of the present day Shell
Petroleum Company, resumed oil exploration in Nigeria.
According to Jide Osuntokun, Shell D'Arcy got the rights to
prospect for Nigeria oil “under the Mineral Oil Ordinance
no. 17 of 1914 and its amendments of 1925 and 1950, which
allowed only companies registered in Britain or any of its
protectorates the right to prospect for oil in Nigeria, and
further provided that the principal officers of such
companies must be British subjects."‘

Shell D'Arcy made an initial geological survey from
1938 to 1941. This initiative was truncated by the Second
WOrld war. It resumed exploratory activities after the war
by undertaking geophysical tests from 1946 to 1951. After
the discovery of an insignificant amount of oil in 1951,
Shell struck commercial oil at Oloibiri in 1956. Commercial
shipments began two years later, but were on a modest scale
until the mid-1960's, when offshore production began.‘

In 1963, oil production increased from 0.16 to 0.29
million barrels per day. Expansion was delayed by the civil
war, but production increased rapidly after the cessation of

hostilities surpassing one million barrels a day in 1970 and

185

passing the two million mark in 1973. By 1981, the
production level was fluctuating around the government
target of about 2 million barrels per day.6

Up to 1958, the role of the colonial administration in
the oil industry was regulatory. It concentrated on storage,
loading and shipping of petroleum products. Oil companies,
which possessed the technology controlled the industry. This
structure changed dramatically in the 1970's, because of the
increase in the commercial value of oil in the
industrialized world. The Nigerian government, eager to take
advantage of the lucrative oil market hiked state taxes on
oil.7

The resolve of the Nigerian government to monitor the

operations of the multinational corporations resulted in the
establishment of the Nigerian National Oil Company in 1971.
The primary goal of this company was to guarantee Nigerian
participation in exploration, production and marketing. In
1976, the Nigerian government created the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation to supplant the N.N.O.C.8

The defining moment in the growth of the Nigerian oil
industry came in 1971, when Nigeria became a member of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In conformity
with O.P.E.C's policies, Nigeria gained control of majority
shares in all foreign companies. Nigeria's share of the
proceeds of the oil industry rose from 55 percent in 1974
and 60 percent in 1979.9 Since 1973, oil has been the

mainstay of the Nigerian economy. Oil now accounts for about

186

93 percent of Nigerian export earnings, 75 percent of
foreign exchange earnings, 87 per cent of total government
revenues, and 45 percent of the gross domestic product.
Consequently, Nigeria's development plans since 1970 have

been totally dependent on its oil revenue.lo

Agriculture and Development Schemes 1973-1980's

Owing to increased revenue from oil sales, the Nigerian
government became more ambitious in its agricultural
policies. The Federal government embarked upon four main
projects in its attempt to modernize Nigeria agriculture.
The first was the creation of irrigation projects under the
aegis of the Nigerian River Basin Development Authority. The
second was the Agricultural Development Projects financed in
part by loans from the World Bank, and also by the
government. The third was the expansion of local processing
of cocoa into semi-finished products, and the fourth was the
enactment of the Land Use Decree, which was intended to
restructure the land tenure system in the agricultural
sector.‘1

To facilitate access to credit by farmers, the Nigerian
Agricultural Bank, created in 1972, was renamed the Nigeria
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank Ltd., to reflect the
emphasis placed on cooperatives by the government.
Furthermore, the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme was

established to encourage commercial bank lending to farmers.

187

Table 7 : Production in Nigeria and a5 a % of World Production from 1900/01 to 1986/87
(in 1000 metric tons)

 

 

Year Nigeria’s Production World Production Nigeria’s share of
World Production
1900/01 0.208 1 15 0.002
1910/11 4 251 1.59
1920/21 18 371 4.85
193081 51 532 9.57
1935/36 96 737 13.13
1940/41 103 672 15.33
1945/46 105 660 15.91
1950/51 112 813 13.78
1955/56 116 855 13.57
1960/61 198 1,189 16.65
1965/66 185 1,226 15.09
1970/71 308 1,499 20.55
1975/76 216 1,510 14.30
1980/81 156 1,638 9.53
1981/82 183 1,725 10.61
1982/83 156 1,538 10.14
1983/84 115 1,515 7.59
1984/85 151 1,950 7.74
1985/86 120 1,926 6.23
1986/87 80 1,922 4.16

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Report on the Proceedings of the National Conference on Cocoa Trade in Nigeria, p.20

The Agricultural Development Projects were a response
to the strains that were beginning to appear in the cocoa
industry in the early 1970's. From 1946 to 1958, Nigerian
cocoa production had stagnated at about 100,000 tons
annually. Thereafter, production increased steadily,
reaching a peak of 294,000 tons in the good growing season
of 1964-65. This level, however, was not achieved again
until 1970/71, when excellent growing conditions resulted

in a record crop of 303,000 tons. In the intervening years,

188

1966-1969, production was much below the average of the
preceding years.12

It should be remembered that the substantial increases
in production in the late 1950's and the early 1960's came
from the large plantings of cocoa made in the 1950's, and
the introduction of an effective pest and disease control
program. Owing to unusually low producer prices between 1963
and 1969, there had been no new plantings or replanting on a
significant scale. Increases in cocoa acreages between 1950
and the mid 1960's were very marginal indeed, and the vast
majority of cocoa farmers stopped buying new cocoa land.

Government surveys done in the late 1970's, show that
about 900,000 acres of Western State's cocoa trees, which
constituted about 60 percent of the usually accepted total
of 1.2 million acres were more than 30 years old. This
corroborates my fieldwork done between 1989-91. The State
government realized that a large scale replanting of cocoa
trees had to be undertaken. They recognized, however, that
such a project presented technical problems that were beyond
the capacity' of the average farmer’ tot overcome without
substantial technical assistance.“

To this end, the first cocoa project was initiated in
1971. The proposed project was intended to maintain
Nigeria's share of a world market that was expanding at 3.5%
annually. The western State government projected that this
objective could be achieved not only through rehabilitating

some 460,000 acres of aging cocoa trees over the next ten

189

years, but also establishing 95,000 acres of new cocoa. It
was estimated that Nigeria would produce 385,000 metric tons
by 1985.'5

In order to facilitate the implementation of the first
phase of the cocoa rehabilitation program, the Cocoa
Development Unit was created in 1971. It became a statutory
body under Edict No 8 of 1979. The Unit was charged with the
responsibility of general development and improvement of
cocoa as an important economic crop in Nigeria.16

The specific objectives for which the unit was
established comprised: (a)raising and distribution of high
yielding, disease resistant and earlier maturing cocoa
seedlings to meet the demands of the farmers in the cocoa
producing states; (b) provision of technical advice on soil
selection and inspection;(c)giving farmers adequate
information on preplanting, planting and post-planting
operations in cocoa development.(d)training of project staff
and farmers, and maintenance of cocoa seed garden for
adequate supply of improved planting materials. Further, the
unit sought to construct feeder roads into the cocoa growing
villages to ease the distribution of inputs into the cocoa
belt and the evacuation of produce.”

In establishing their cocoa farms, farmers would be
given credit for labor, fertilizers, seedlings and capsid
control. Credit would be in two forms: first, cash would be
made available to farmers for part of the labor required for

farm development and maintenance until plantings are four

190

years old. Second, farmers would receive, at no charge,
cocoa seedlings produced by the project unit in centralized
nurseries, along with fertilizers, insecticides and
sprayers.18

Furthermore, the Unit estimated that some 1,500 miles
of secondary roads needed upgrading to facilitate the
efficient shipment of cocoa from the growing areas to the
buying centers. Provision. was also to .be made for the
rehabilitation of 600 miles of feeder roads from 1974-1977.
The main focus of the road project was to be in the eastern
part of the state, namely: Akure, Ilesha and Ife. Repair of
roads would also be undertaken in the Mid-Western State.
Some 63 miles of road would be constructed in this area.
Projected costs for the cocoa rehabilitation projects were
$32.3 million. The proposed WOrld Bank loan of $16.0 million
would finance 50% of project costs, ” Between 1971 and 1983,
the 'unit planted. 42,385.67 hectares of cocoa for’ about
53,603 farmers. From 1984 to 1989, 4,462,105 cocoa seedlings
were distributed to plant 4,000 hectares throughout the
state. These included plantation plantings of 507.5 hectares
at Ago-Own. Also, seedlings of other crops such as cashew,
oil palm, kola and coffee were raised and distributed to
farmers. In addition, loans totaling 11.5 million dollars
were made available to farmers during this period.20

To further boost cocoa production, the Federal
government ordered a reorganization of the Western Nigerian

Marketing Board. The main thrust of this move was to de-

191

emphasize price stabilization by reducing the differential
between. the world. market price- and. domestic price. The
government opined that because the marketing board had
absolute freedom to utilize all its surplus funds in
whatever way it deemed fit, the Board had often neglected
the interests of the farmer and pursued its own agenda. The
government stated that it would “bring the activities of the
Board as closely as possible to the level of the farmers."21

To this end, the Federal government established the
Technical Committee for Producer Prices. This was the body
that was now responsible for fixing producer prices at the
opening of the season. The Secretariat of the Technical
Committee was in the Central Bank with the Permanent
Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance as its
chairperson. Commodity boards’ representation on this body
was nominal.”

Furthermore, the Western Nigerian Marketing Board was
renamed the Nigerian Cocoa Board by the Commodity Boards
Decree No. 29 of 1977. In relation to the buying and
marketing of cocoa, the newly created Nigerian Cocoa Board
was no different from. the defunct ‘marketing' board. The
Nigerian Cocoa Board was, however, charged with three new
responsibilities. First, the Board was to facilitate the
development and rehabilitation of cocoa producing areas
through the construction of roads and feeder roads. Second,
the Board was to ensure that adequate supply of fertilizers

and improved seedlings and other necessary inputs are made

UH

available to farmers. Finally, the Board was to address the
problem of deterioration in the quality of Nigerian cocoa.23

The deterioration in the quality of Nigeria's cocoa
began in 1967, as a result of the need to decongest the
Lagos port. Because of this operation, the jpractice of
having the states' Produce Inspection Services examine cocoa
beans before shipment was discontinued. This arrangement had
been put in place after the 1952/53 season, when Nigeria's
cocoa was almost totally rejected on the WOrld market
because of its low quality. By this arrangement, the Federal
Produce Inspection Service restricted its activities to the
final check on graded produce. It only received graded
produce from the States Produce Inspection Services and not
directly from the Licensed Buying Agents.”

Both the State’s and the Federal Produce Inspection
Services were operating together at the ports before 1967.
The state's Produce Inspection Services received. graded
produce from L.B.A's and conducted its own independent test
before passing the produce on to the Federal Inspection
agents. Any graded produce that did not meet the accepted
standard was rejected. Thus, before 1967, there were
effective safeguards to the maintenance of good quality
cocoa.

With the dissolution of the two-tier system of produce
inspection, these safeguards were removed. It was now
possible for L.B.A's to transport their produce direct into

Federal Inspectors' hands and to negotiate their way through

W3

to shipment. In many instances, cocoa beans that had been
rejected in stores in the interior were smuggled to port by
L.B-A's and successfully shipped.”

Between 1967 and 1978, the quality of Nigeria's cocoa
declined significantly. For example, the amount of moldy
beans in. Nigeria's total export rose from. less than 1
percent in 1967 to about 30 per cent in 1978. This fact
generated considerable concern among manufacturers. For
instance, C.A. Ireland, the Group Cocoa Buyer for Rowntree
Mackintosh LTD, York, in a letter to the General Manager of
the Nigerian Cocoa Board expressed concerns about “the very
serious lowering of standard of quality of Nigerian cocoa
beans."26

Mr. Ireland stated, inter alia that, in a particular
consignment of 450 tons, at least 80 per cent of the beans
were moldy, and that the bag was infested with mold eating
parasites. He opined that poor quality cocoa increased the
cost of production as the cocoa had to be treated at every
stage of the manufacturing process so that it would not
jeopardize the quality of the finished product. He wanted to
know how such poor quality cocoa could have been allowed to
be shipped from Nigeria. Anthony Weldon, the Managing
Director of Cocoa Merchants LTD, who were the major
suppliers of cocoa to Rowntree, went further to suggest that
if nothing were done to improve the quality of Nigerian
cocoa, the company might reduce its purchases of Nigerian

cocoa and increase those from Ghana.”

194

The Nigerian Cocoa Board, faced with the problem of
marketing poor quality cocoa, wrote to the Permanent
Secretary, Federal Ministry of Trade, requesting the re-
introduction of the two-tier system. Although the Federal
Produce Inspection authorities had denied the allegations of
corruption leveled against them. by the various Produce
Inspection centers in the interior, the General Manager of
the cocoa board felt that there was irrefutable evidence to
support the claims that the Federal authorities were
colluding with some L.B.A's to export adulterated produce.
The Permanent Secretary, after reviewing both positions, re-
introduced the two-tier system.

The Nigerian Cocoa Board in its ndssion statement had
said that the farmer would be the centerpiece of its new
cocoa policy. Since the inception of the Board in 1977, the
cocoa producer prices had been increased from 660 naira per
ton in 1976/77 to 1,500 naira per ton in 1983/84 season, an
increase of 127 percent. According to the Board, the
increases in producer prices were intended to give farmers
more disposable income to enhance their capacity to
undertake “agronomic ‘practices such. as weeding,
spraying...for improved yield."”

In order to guarantee a smooth flow of the Board’s
marketing arrangements, the Board also increased the buying
allowance paid to licensed buying agents. The Board posited
that any measure that augmented the financial situation of

the farmers to the neglect of the L.B.A's might create

195

unnecessary tensions. Pursuant to this goal, the allowance
of the L.B.A'3 had been raised from 43 naira per ton in
1976/77 season to 68 naira in the 1983/84 season. Another 10
per‘ cent increase was approved. for the 1984/85 season.
Furthermore, the Board increased the transport allowances of
the L.B.A'3 to encourage them in their purchasing
activities.”

Perhaps one of the ‘more ambitious programs of the
Nigerian Cocoa Board was the Cocoa Spraying Chemical Subsidy
Scheme. The Cocoa Subsidy Scheme had been introduced by the
defunct marketing board in response to the swollen shoot
blight of the late 1940's and 1950's in Ibadan and some
older cocoa growing areas. The Cocoa Research Institute of
Nigeria had shown that up to 50 percent of the cocoa in
southwestern Nigeria could be destroyed by cocoa diseases if
not adequately sprayed. The new Board felt that the scheme
put in place in 1959 by the marketing board, which allowed
L.B.A'3 to distribute chemicals and fertilizers, was prone
to abuses and should be reorganized to make it more
efficient.”

As a result, at a meeting of the Inspectors of the
Board on July 17th 1979, the Board reorganized the
distribution system for cocoa chemicals. According to the
general manager of the Board, Mr. J.A. Akinsipe, cocoa
farmers would now buy their chemicals from area offices of
the Board located in the cocoa producing areas as well as

through. the Cooperative Supply’ .Association. and. the

196

Cooperative Produce Marketing Union. Furthermore, the
subsidy on cocoa chemicals would be increased to alleviate
the financial burden which the provision of chemicals was
bound to impose on farmers.3|

The Price Fixing Authority in Lagos had fixed the rate
allowable as subsidy on a metric ton of cocoa at 25 naira.
The new Board found out, however, that the subsidy grant
approved for the defunct marketing board in the late 1950's
was too small to sustain the requirements of the farmers.
The Board contended that the old rate could only fulfill
1/6th of the needs of the farmers in the late 1970's. The
Board proposed a new rate of 50 naira per ton in 1978, and
got approval for it in 1984.32

The Board also introduced the Cocoa Spraying Pump
subsidy scheme. It recognized the fact that provision of
adequate chemicals without the spraying equipment would not
be effective against cocoa diseases. To this end, the Board
made available to farmers spraying pumps at highly
subsidized rates to replace the ineffectual garden-type
sprayers. The Board stated that approved selling prices
would be conspicuously displayed at all distribution centers
within the areas covered by each area office. The Board went
further to say that all classes of farmers should be
accommodated, as the Board did not intend to give room to
any kind of discrimination.”

According to a 1981 cocoa quarterly progress report,

the Board's Subsidy Schemes received wide acclaim from

197

farmers throughout the cocoa growing areas of the country.
The Board spent approximately 3 .7 million naira on chemical
subsidy in 1977, 5.4 million naira in the 1980/81 season,
and 4 million naira in 1981/82 cocoa season. Also, over
10,000 units of the spraying pumps were distributed in the
cocoa growing areas between 1977 and 1981.34

The activities of the Cocoa Development Unit and the
Board regarding the distribution of new varieties of cocoa
seedlings and cocoa chemicals are corroborated by the oral
evidence. The Chairman of Akeredolu village, Mr. Adedewe,
told me that the C.D.U set up a nursery at Akeredolu in
1972. Each farmer was given 900 seedlings per acre and a
loan of 75 naira to rehabilitate their farms; farmers who
wanted to establish new farms were given a loan of 150
naira. They also had access to fertilizers and pesticides.”

The third major initiative of the government was to add
more value to cocoa by expanding local processing. The first
Nigerian processing factory at Ikeja, Lagos was commissioned
in August, 1965. The construction of infrastructure began
shortly thereafter, and production began in July 1967. The
factory, known as Cocoa Industries Limited, was established
to process cocoa beans into cocoa products such as cocoa
butter, cocoa cake and powder. The factory would also
provide industrial raw materials such as cocoa liquor, cocoa
cake and cocoa powder for manufacturers of finished products
such as Cadbury, Food Specialties and UAC Food Division.”

For the first fifteen years of its existence, Cocoa

198

Industries Limited was the only cocoa processing factory in
the country. It was a subsidiary of the Odua Investment
Company, which was created by the erstwhile Western Nigerian
Development Corporation. From 1967 to 1977, when the Cocoa
Board was in existence, the Cocoa Industries Limited
processed less than. 2 jpercent of total production. For
example, of a total production of 203,000 metric tons in the
1977/78 season, C.I.L. purchased only 1,500 metric tons. In
1978, the Federal government established two additional
factories at Ede and Ile Oluji to expand local processing of
cocoa. The Nigerian Cocoa Board paid equity participation
shares in the newly constructed cocoa processing factories
in 1979. The ultimate goal of the government was to
gradually phase out cocoa exports.”

In order to give the new cocoa processing plants some
degree of autonomy in the buying of raw cocoa beans, the
government made a provision in Decree No. 29 of 1977 which
stated that: “for the avoidance of doubt, no commodity board
is given exclusive rights in relation to the production,
sale or purchase, processing of or any other matter in
connection with the relevant commodities in so far as the
domestic market is concerned, but the Boards shall have
exclusive responsibility for any commodity meant for export
trade."”

The processing factories took advantage of this
provision immediately by appointing their own buying agents

to purchase cocoa, mainly from middlemen. According to the

199

Board, the factories were paying its buying agents prices
that were higher than those approved by the Price Fixing
Authority. The implication of this situation was that
farmers, and more importantly, middlemen who were able to
establish contact with the factories would obtain higher
prices than their colleagues who were not so privileged. The
payment of higher prices by the processing plants did not
last long, however, as the plants had to reduce their prices

to cut down on the cost of production.39

The failure of cocoa rehabilitation

In spite of the massive amounts spent on cocoa
rehabilitation by the WOrld Bank and the Federal Government
of Nigeria, cocoa production did not increase. Although the
projection for the volume of cocoa production in Nigeria at
the end of the project year in 1983 was 385,000 metric tons,
cocoa production actually decreased below the amount that
was recorded before the inauguration of the project. Between
1970 and 1975, average production was about 241,000 tons. In
1976, the volume of production fell to 223,000 tons and in
1979, there was a further slide to 133,000 tons. In 1983,
cocoa production had slumped to an all-time low of 100,000
tons.“0

What was responsible for this anomaly? The decline of

cocoa production in spite of these huge investments should

200

be put in the wider context of the decline of commodity
production in developing countries that enjoyed export booms
in the 19703. To be sure, the 19703 was a decade of
unprecedented economic prosperity for the world's commodity
producers. The export booms, however, did not translate into
growth in other sectors of the economy.

This phenomenon, christened “Dutch. disease” is
observable in the Nigerian economy. The oil boom had led to
a rapid expansion of the Nigerian economy. Construction work
had begun on the Nigerian highway system; foreign
multinational construction companies such as Julius Berger,
C.Zard. and. Soleh. Boneh. were employing large numbers of
laborers.“

In addition, there was a burgeoning of urban centers,
with. a corresponding' growth. of State and. Federal
bureaucracies. Furthermore, owing to the importation of
foreign goods such as cars, electrical appliances and
household utensils, Nigeria had become a veritable service
economy. This created opportunities for people to go into
skilled. trades such. as automobile repair, tailoring' and
other non-agricultural small scale businesses.42

Sara Berry, in a 1979 study, was able to track the
movement of people from two cocoa villages in southeast Ife
to Ife town to learn skilled trades. Berry argues that
increasing oil revenues to the state obviated the need for
the State to appropriate surplus. According to Berry, this

weakened peasant solidarity as producer prices rose

201

significantly. Cocoa prices increased from about 300 naira
in the 1970/71 season to about 1,000 naira in 1978. Farmers,
who had perceived the state as a common enemy because of the
policies of the Board, now reverted to family based
institutions for mutual support.43

More importantly, education and politics were now seen
as the surest paths to economic and social advancement.
Berry states that a substantial number of the children of
cocoa farmers she interviewed. in. the two 'villages were
either going to school or engaged in non-agricultural
activities. Also, a large number of the artisans, mechanics
and teachers she interviewed were children of cocoa
farmers.44

A 1972 study of small scale businesses in Ife by Aluko
shows that there were 212 persons involved in the automobile
repair business. This group was composed of apprentices,
journeymen and master mechanics. By 1979, this group, which
did not include apprentices who now had to finish their
training before they could become members of the Ife
Mechanics Association, had increased to 1,256.“

Berry's work and. my' own findings suggest that the
increase in educational opportunities during the oil boom
years had a far greater long term impact on the relations of
production in the cocoa belt than anything else. With the
creation of new states in Nigeria during the oil boom years,

the Nigerian public sector grew as new states civil service

202

were created. To be sure, the public service became the
largest employer of labor.46

With the expansion of the Nigerian bureaucracy,
education became more valued. In fact, people began to see
education as a means of gaining access to the civil service.
Besides, in a Nigeria where government was becoming big
business, education became a vehicle for social and economic
preferment.47

Most of my informants argue that because the cocoa
trade was not particularly lucrative in the 1960's and
1970's, they encouraged their children to go to school. For
the landowners with substantial holdings, cocoa was a way of
life, but they perceived the future of their children in
very different terms. They saw their cocoa farms as the
springboard for transporting their children into the more
prosperous world of the oil boom. The figures of children
who left cocoa villages in pursuit of education are
staggering.

At Akeredolu village, I interviewed 25 cocoa farmers
who had children of school age in the early 1970's. These
farmers had between them 150 children. Over ninety percent
of these children attended the primary school at Akeredolu.
After their primary school education, some of them went on
to high school, and those who could not make it to high
school went to learn artisanal trades in Ife, Ifetedo and
some other big towns. Of this number that left the cocoa

village in the 1970's, only 9 have returned to the cocoa

203

village. At Akeredolu, I encountered ten households that had
only the aged farmer and his wife.

At Molodo village, the figures are no less daunting. I
interviewed 9 cocoa planting families who had between them
44 children of school age in the 1970's. All of them went to
primary school at either* Molodo or Isoya. .After their
primary school education, 10 of them went for further
studies, 9 females got married and only come back to the
village occasionally, 1 passed away, 21 went to learn
various trades in Ife and some other urban centers, and only
4 are back in the village.48

The consequence of this rural-urban exodus was the
attenuation of the household. It should be remembered that
household labor was pivotal to the establishment of new
farms in the wake of the great migrations of the late 1940's
and 1950's. Household labor for the most part complemented
hired labor in the heady days of clearing the virgin forests
of Ife south and large parts of Ondo province. In most
cases, household labor was solely responsible for fermenting
cocoa beans.49

Owing to the fact that children of cocoa farmers who
had acquired an education moved on with their lives in the
relatively buoyant arena of the public and private sectors,
cocoa farmers became increasingly dependent on hired
laborers. This situation has been compounded by the old age
of the vast majority of cocoa farmers. At Mofere in Idanre,

of the 15 farmers interviewed 10 were over 65 years old. At

204

Akeredolu, of the 40 some farmers interviewed, 35 were over
65 years of age. For these farmers, cocoa is perforce a way
of life, as they don't have the strength to go into other
professions.”

Also, the implementation of the two projects was
questionable. One of the major complaints of cocoa farmers
was that in spite of the heavy investment on cocoa
rehabilitation, the majority of cocoa farmers did not
benefit from the various schemes that were introduced. In
fact, one of the contradictions of this period was the
increase in the cost of production.’I

One informant at Akeredolu said that the Cocoa Subsidy
Scheme, although well intentioned, was a failure because the
majority of the farmers did not buy the chemicals at
subsidized rates. Although the Board had said in its mission
statement that chemicals would be distributed not by
L.B.A'3, but at area offices of the Board, this did not
happen. Unscrupulous Board officials in the area offices
took advantage of this new arrangement to sell chemicals to
their cronies and relations in exchange for pecuniary
benefits. These ‘agents' then sold the chemicals to the
farmers at more than the subsidized rates. Besides, loans
that were given to farmers were inadequate.”

Alhaji Akibu of the Lagelu local government area in
Ibadan stated that, for the most part, farmers in his local
government area did not receive the required chemicals in a

timely fashion. This was a widespread problem in the cocoa

205

belt. This problem was deeply rooted in the structure of the
Technical Committee on Producer Prices. Owing to the fact
that members of the cocoa board were not adequately
represented on this body, prompt communication of important
measures emanating from the board had been delayed. For
example, 3.615 million naira had been approved for the Cocoa
Board as subsidy on spraying pumps, drying ovens and coffee
hullers in 1981. This money was not released until 1985 and
the board got authorization to disburse part of the said sum
only in May of 1986.53

Besides, most farmers did not have access to credit
facilities despite the fact that the two projects had made
provision for it. Farmers complained that the beneficiaries
of the loans were not farmers, but people who had. no
connection to the cocoa belt. As a result, farmers could not
maintain their farms properly. Cocoa farms were not
adequately sprayed and farmers could not afford to apply
fertilizers to overused land."4

Consequently, the cocoa belt became ravaged by cocoa
diseases such as capsids and swollen shoot. This has to be
put in the context of the low prices that were still being
paid to cocoa farmers by the Cocoa Board. Although the Board
agreed in principle to drastically change its price
stabilization policy, in reality, this policy was put into
operation only in 1981 and 1982.

For instance, in 1978, of a world market price of 2,121

naira per ton, cocoa farmers received about 1,030 naira per

206

ton, which amounts to 48.5 percent of the world market
price. In 1979, cocoa farmers received 51.35 percent of the
world market price, while in 1980 they received 89.28
percent. The Board suffered a deficit of 0.9 and 8.2 percent
in 1981 and 1982 respectively, and by 1985, the farmers
share of the market had dropped to about 69.5 percent.‘5

Cocoa prices between 1976 and 1985 hardly kept pace
with the cost of maintaining cocoa farms. The cost of labor
increased dramatically during the oil boom years because
employers paid more competitive wages in the urban centers.
One informant at Fagbo village in Ondo State told me that
when he moved to the village in 1954, he employed three
laborers to clear the land and plant the cocoa. At that time
he used to pay them about ten pence per day. He was also
responsible for their feeding anytime they worked for him.
He consistently used four men for about ten years before
increasing the labor force to six.‘6

This was necessary because his cocoa had reached
maturation and he needed more hands to harvest the cocoa
beans. From 1970 to 1983, his labor force varied from six to
eight men depending on the thickness of the undergrowth and
the quantity of cocoa beans to be harvested. The cost of
labor, however, increased progressively from ten pence per
day in the early 1960's to twenty pence in the early 1970's
to one naira in the late 1970's, and five naira in the mid

1980's. In short, between the early 1970's and late 1970's,

207

the cost of labor increased by over 500%, and by the mid
1980's, it had gone way over the ceiling.’7

One of the more significant changes in labor relations
was the fact unlike in the 1950’s and 1960’s, when most
farmers used annual laborers, the majority of cocoa farmers
in the late 1970's and 1980's used daily paid workers. This
was owing to the fact that most farmers could not afford to
hire laborers on an annual basis. The cost of hired laborers
was prohibitive.”

The case of one informant at Akeredolu who used annual
workers up to the mid 1980's is illustrative of this trend.
In the 1950's, he used to pay his annual workers 30 pounds.
This rose to 120 naira in the early 1970's, and 250 naira in
the late 1970's. By the mid 1980's, annual laborers were
asking about 500 naira for their services.”

In the face of these seemingly insuperable forces, the
farmers had to evolve strategies for survival. First, the
high cost of labor coupled with the exodus of youths from
the rural areas resulted in the intensification of
sharecropping. Owing to the fact that most farmers could not
afford to hire laborers, they entered into a contract with
laborers.”

These contracts, otherwise known as sengbe in Ife south
or alasepin in Ondo require that the sengbe (sharecropper)
clear the land, spray the cocoa trees, and harvest the

beans. The harvest is then divided into three equal parts.

208

The sengbe (sharecropper) takes one part and the remaining
two parts go to the landlord.

There were also other variations of the sengbe
arrangement. One informant who hails from Isoko in Delta
State told me that in some cases the tenant farmer after
harvesting and fermenting the cocoa, turns in the finished
product to the farmer for sale. The rational behind this is
that the farmer might be able to get a better price for the
cocoa than the laborer. The money realized from the cocoa is
then shared equally by both the laborer and the landlord.-61

There were other forms of tenancy which intensified at
this time. For example, some farmers rented out their farms
for a specific amount every year. At.Araromi, a laborer told
me that he had rented a cocoa farm from 1983 to 1986 at a
cost of 1,400 naira. All the proceeds of the farm for those
three years belonged to the laborer. He was also responsible
for the maintenance of the farm during the period of
tenancy.-62

In most of the sengbe cases I investigated, the
landlord was responsible for buying the chemicals and
fertilizers. In practical terms, the benefit the farmer got
from the sengbe arrangement was that he did not have to pay
the laborer‘ directly' for' his services. Furthermore, the
arrangement was a very effective way of assuring labor
supply throughout the season, as the laborers return is tied

to his completing the harvest.

209

Despite the vigorous attempts by cocoa farmers to
reduce the cost of production, their efforts were not nearly
enough to stem the tide of decline. Cocoa trees that were
not adequately sprayed succumbed to the ravages of diseases.
Besides, yields from healthy trees dropped because farmers
could not meet the fertilizer needs of the trees. The volume
of cocoa production in Nigeria declined from about 205,000
metric tons in 1978 to 155,000 metric tons in 1981 and then

to 115,000 metric tons in 1984.63

CONCLUSION

From the preceding analysis a number of conclusions can
be made. First, the oil boom of the 19703 and early 19803
led to a drastic restructuring of the Nigerian economy.
Nigeria moved away from an economy that got about 60 percent
of its foreign exchange earnings from agricultural products
by 1970 to an economy that realized over 90 percent of its
foreign exchange earnings from oil by the mid-19703.
Increased revenue from oil led to greater investment in
agriculture.

This investment in agriculture found expression in
various schemes intended to rehabilitate Nigerian
agriculture and increase production. The Cocoa Development
Unit was established to preside over the two cocoa projects
financed by both the Federal government of Nigeria and the

WOrld Bank. In spite of the huge sums the government spent

N0

on cocoa rehabilitation, cocoa production actually declined
in the oil boom years.

The decline of cocoa production in an era of
significant growth in the Nigerian economy can be explained
by a number of factors. First, the implementation of the
projects is questionable. My informants state that loans
given to farmers were, for the most part, inadequate. They
contend that although a cocoa subsidy scheme was put in
place, agents of the Cocoa Board used it as a means of
enriching themselves, as they rarely sold farm inputs to the
farmers at the approved prices.

Of far more significance, however, was the fact that
the expansion of the Nigerian economy created incredible
opportunities in education and the public sector. This
eventuated in the massive migration of laborers from the
farms to the urban centers in pursuit of more lucrative
jobs. Further, the children of cocoa farmers, who formed an
important part of farm labor, joined this cavalcade into the
urban centers. This movement led to an increase in the cost
of maintaining cocoa farms, as competition for labor had
become ‘more intense. The inability' of cocoa farmers to
maintain their farms adequately resulted in the spread of
cocoa. diseases, which. fact contributed. immensely’ to the

stagnation of cocoa production in the oil boom years.

211

ENDNOTES

 

l Onimode, B., lrnperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, Ibadan, 1983
9 Ibid.
3 Olayide, 8., Economic Survey of Nigeria, Ibadan, 1976, p.2
4 Osuntokun, J., “Oil and Nigerian Development” Development Outlook 1, NO 3, 1986, p.40
9 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
7 OnOh, J ., The Nigerian Oil Economy, New York, 1983 p. 19-21
9 Ibid., p.30-33
9 Ibid., p.33-37
1° Appraisal Study Of Cocoa Rehabilitation in Nigeria, Ministry Of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Library, Ibadan, p.1-5
” Ibid.
'9 Ibid.
'3 Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991
1‘ Appraisal Study...op.cit., p7-13
'5 Ibid.
16 Annual Reports Of the Cocoa Development Unit 1976-1991
'7 Ibid.
'8 Ibid
19 Appraisal Study...op.cit., p7-13
:2) Annual Reports Of the Cocoa Development Unit...op.cit
Ibid.
29 P.P.R 202.28 p.2 National Archives, Ibadan
93 Ibid., p.3
9‘ File NO, c/5h.l8 p.21-27
9‘ Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
9' Ibid
99 P.R.P 202.28...Op.cit p.2-6
39 Ibid.
9' Ibid.
39 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
99 Ibid
99 Oral interviews with Chief Adedewe at Akeredolu between 1989 and 1991
9“ P.R.P 202.28...Op.cit p.7-8
9' Ibid
9' Ibid
99 Ibid
‘9 Gill and Duffus Papers, NISER, Ibadan
4' Onimode., op.cit p.168-180
‘9 ibid
2: Berry, S.S., “Oil and the Disappearing Peasantry” Boston, 1986, p.3-8
Ibid.
‘9 Aluko, 5., Small-Scale Industries in Western State of Nigeria, Ife, 1972 p.22-25
:Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991
Ibid.
48 Oral interviews conducted at Akeredolu and Molodo between 1989 and 1991
49 Oral interviews done at different times in different areas Of the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991

so Oral interviews conducted at Mofere, Legbira, Uloen, Akeredolu and Bamikemo-Oja from 1989 to 1991

9' Ibid.

212

 

52 -
Ibid.

53 Interview with Alhaji Akibu in Lagelu local government area of Ibadan in 1990

54 Oral interview done in the cocoa belt fi'om 1989 tO 1991

99 Central Bank Annual Reports, 1978-1982

:3 Oral interview conducted at different times at Fagbo village between 1989 and 1991
Ibid.

9“ Ibid.

59 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu village between 1989 and 1991.

:1) Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt of southwestern Nigeria between 1989 and 1991
Ibid.

99 Ibid

‘9 Ibid.

213

CHAPTERS

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, NEW MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE

EMPOWERMENT OF LABOR

In July 1986, the Federal government of Nigeria
inaugurated the Structural Adjustment Program. This program
was a response to the economic recession Nigeria had been
experiencing since 1982. The recession was precipitated in
part by the crumbling of the world oil market, and more
fundamentally, by structural weaknesses in the Nigerian
economy which date back to the period between independence
and 1970.

In this chapter, I analyze the impact of the Structural
Adjustment Program on the cocoa industry. In order to put
this program in proper historical context, I examine the
remote and immediate factors that led to its adoption. Also,
I discuss the broad outlines and objectives of the program.
Finally, I assess the impact of the program on the cocoa
industry. To achieve this, I examine the consequences of the
abolition of the Board on the farmers. I also pay particular
attention to the impact of deregulation on production and

labor relations.

214

 

Historical background

By 1979, the Western economies, having been caught
unawares by the Arab oil embargo, began to pursue a policy
of oil conservation. Furthermore, the growth of 'non-OPEC
producers like Mexico made it possible for western economies
to stockpile oil. Consequently, the share of OPEC countries
on the world. oil market was reduced. and. Nigeria's oil
earnings plunged from $22.4 billion in 1980 to $16.7 billion
in 1981, and to about $14.3 billion in 1982.‘

The decline of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings
spawned a balance of payments crisis which was reflected in
the Federal government's huge budget deficit from 1981 to
1983. Furthermore, the impressive foreign reserves of about
23 billion naira which had been accumulated during the oil
boom was squandered by the profligate regime of Shehu
Shagari. Nigeria now had to borrow money to finance its
capital and recurrent projects.2

By 1983, Nigeria's foreign debt had risen to about 17
billion dollars. For Nigeria to maintain a continuous stream
of credit, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund called for a restructuring of the Nigerian economy.
They argued that structural adjustment would attract foreign
investors and put Nigeria in a position to pay back its
loans. The military regime of Buhari and Idiagbon did not

accept the I.M.F conditionalities on the grounds that they

215

would not only further weaken the Nigerian economy, but also
bring great hardship on the Nigerian people.3

For Buhari and Idiagbon, what Nigeria needed was
greater financial stringency and a clamp-down on corruption.
In spite of the spirited attempts of the military regime of
Buhari and Idiagbon to sanitize the Nigerian economy by
imposing fiscal discipline and curtailing government
spending, the continued fall of oil prices and the
accumulation. of debts made the need. for‘ an. alternative
arrangement compelling. Besides, while it was generally
accepted that the military regime of Buhari/Idiagbon had
tried to grapple with the devastating currents of change in
the international and domestic economies, there were forces
within the military that felt that the time was ripe for a
new philosophy.‘

Therefore, on 26th August 1985, Ibrahim Babangida
seized power in a bloodless coup. After reorganizing the
supreme military body, the new military masters asseverated
that a radical restructuring of the economy was necessary to
stem the seemingly irrepressible tide of economic
disintegration. Ibrahim Babangida threw up the issue of
structural adjustment and. the I.M.F's $2.5 billion. loan
program for public debate. A committee was set up to monitor
the pulse of the Nigerian people. After about a year of open
debates and disquisition on the issue, it was clear that

public opinion was against the Structural Adjustment

216

Program. Yet, Babangida defied public opinion and adopted

it.5

Structural Adjustment and Cocoa Marketi_ng

The Structural Adjustment program was intended to
diversify and reconfigure the Nigerian economy by
stimulating domestic production in the agricultural,
manufacturing and industrial spheres. Furthermore, it was
hoped that by generating internal production through the
utilization of local raw materials, the balance of payments
deficit would be reduced, and there would be a diminution of
Nigeria's dependence on Western imports. The Structural
Adjustment Program also strove towards the deregulation of
the economy by removing administrative encumbrances, and
also by reducing the stranglehold of government on the
economy. This new economic philosophy, according to the
government, was intended to effect liberalization of trade,
privatization and the fostering of a market economy.

It also devalued the Nigerian currency(naira). In order
to facilitate devaluation of the naira, the Babangida regime
created a Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market(SFEM), later
known as Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market and renamed
Foreign Exchange Market in September 1986. The SFEM presided
over a the auction of a specific amount of hard currency,
notably US dollars, allocated to it every week by the
Central Bank. Commercial banks and specialized foreign

exchange dealers were allowed to bid for up to five percent

217

of the foreign currency allocated for the day. The lowest
bid in the auction was used to set the exchange rate of the

naira in relation to the US dollar.6

Table 8: Government Revenue From SFEM

 

 

 

 

 

Week Foreign SFEM First-Tier Difference Windfall
exchange Rate Rate Between Profits
supplied to (N airs/Dollar) Second and
SFEM by First -Tier
CBN Rates

1 50.0 4.6140 1.5691 3.0483 152.42

2 50.0 5.0839 1.6010 3.4829 159.15

3 75.0 3.4999 1.7000 1.7999 134.99

4 80.0 3.9101 1.7838 2.1263 170.10

5 75.0 4.1775 1.9142 2.2633 169.75

6 80.0 3.8525 2.0132 1.8393 158.18

7 75.0 3.6000 2.2000 1.4000 105.00

8 86.0 3.4993 2.3000 1.9930 89.90

9 75.0 3.4599 2.4000 1.0599 79.49

10 75.0 3.4945 2.4931 1.0014 75.11

1 1 75.0 3.0005 2.5954 0.4051 30.38

12 75.0 3.2000 2.5954 0.6046 45.35

13 75.0 3.3000 2.5954 0.7046 35.23

 

 

 

 

 

Source: J. Attah, M. Kwanashie and O. Ojowu(eds) The Nigerian Economy under SFEM, Zaria,

1987 p.48

Furthermore, the Federal government of Nigeria decided
to dissolve the commodity' boards. The scrapping’ of the
commodity boards is arguably one of the most revolutionary
changes that have taken place in the post-colonial period.
To be sure, by 1983, the marketing boards had come under
increasing obloquy by political analysts and academics who

contended that the decline in commodity production was

218

directly related to the exploitative tendencies of the
boards. Besides, the news of the folding-up of the marketing
boards was received. gleefully' by’ farmers ‘who attributed
their impecunious situation to the activities of the Board.7

There was therefore considerable optimism that the
cocoa market, which had been paralyzed for a long time,
would become bouyant under the new configuration. This
optimism in the emergent framework was based on the
assumption that since the farmers would now have a greater
say in the sale of their cocoa, they would invariably have
the leverage to determine their' economic destiny; Cocoa
prices would now be based purely on market forces, and
farmers looked forward to having the upper-hand in the
negotiations that would result from the new marketing
arrangements.8

The government announced new requirements for
participating in the cocoa trade. According to Decree No 18
of 1986, the government would issue licenses to two
categories of exporters: first, private exporters, which
comprised foreign merchants and indigenous buyers. Second,
union exporters which. was made up of cooperative
organizations created by farmers themselves to market cocoa.
This group, for the most part, sold cocoa to agents of the
Association of Nigerian Cocoa Exporters.(ANCE)9

Both groups of exporters employed the services of
licensed buying agents, and could obtain licenses to operate

in one or more states. These exporters had huge capital

219

expenses as they constructed warehouses in the cocoa growing
areas and in the main port in Lagos to store their cocoa. In
addition, they each had to pay registration fees of about
10,700 naira.lo

Table 9: Trend in nominal producer price of cocoa per metric ton for pre-SAP and SAP periods

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Price/Naira
1982 1300

1983 1400

1984 1500

1985 1500

1986 3500

1987 7500

1988 1 1000

1989 7500

 

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports from 1982-1989

The deregulation of the cocoa industry eventuated in
the proliferation of individual produce buyers and export
merchants. Furthermore, it led to the enlargement of the
influence of foreign export merchants such as Syrians and
Lebanese. Owing to the fact that each of these groups of
cocoa buyers wanted a controlling influence on the cocoa
market, a vicious price war emerged.‘l Consequently, the
price of a ton of main crop cocoa which sold for 3,270 naira
at the end of 1986, rose to 7,500 naira in 1987. This upward
trend continued with the cocoa light crop which was
harvested from May through June to July and August. The
price increased from 7,500 naira in 1987 to 11,000 naira in
the first quarter of 1988 and then to about 24,000 naira by

August 1983.12

220

From mid-1987, the price war which debouched from the
interplay of market forces had exacerbated. This was owing
to the fact that the farmers could now sell their cocoa to
the highest bidder. This situation was further compounded by
the fact that the naira was falling progressively in value
and the exchange rate further deteriorated. For example,
between 1986 and 1990, the naira had dropped from 4.057
naira to the dollar to 11.114 naira to the dollar. The
continued downward slide of the naira induced two
consequences. First, it resulted in the rise of the price of
cocoa to reflect the exchange rate. Second, it made
possession of large amounts of naira a sine qua non fOr

survival in the economic war that had broken out.[3

Table 10: Annual Average Exchange Rate(1970-l989)

 

 

 

Year ExchaflgRate (Sper N aira) Year Exchggflate (Sper Naira)
1970 1.4000 1980 1.8286
1971 1.4000 1981 1.6534
1972 1.5200 1982 1.4856
1973 1.5200 1983 1.3822
1974 1.5891 1984 1.6085
1975 1.6239 1985 1.1206
1976 1.5960 1986 0.7686
1977 1.5466 1987 0.2519
1978 1.6482 1988 0.2204
1979 1.6591 1989 0.1358

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports 1970 to 1989

In the early part of 1988, the price of cocoa rose

phenomenally from about 7,000 naira per ton to as much as

221

28,000 naira per ton. .Alhaji Sunmonu Olapade Posolore
Adedire of P030 village in Ife south told me that he had
never experienced such a high price for cocoa since he began
planting cocoa in the 1960's. For the farmers, especially
those who had large holdings, it was a boom period.“

Some farmers succeeded in parlaying the price war into
a huge financial success. For example, of fifteen farmers I
interviewed at Igbo-Oja village in Ondo, nine had made a
profit of over forty thousand naira during the cocoa boom,
with two out of nine scaling the one hundred thousand naira
mark. At Akeredolu village in Ife south, I interviewed about
30 farmers regarding their incomes during the boom. Of the
thirty farmers interviewed at Akeredolu, ten had realized
over forty thousand naira. At Omifon .Aladura, on the
Ondo/Ore road, three of the ten informants I talked to had
made a profit of upwards of eighty thousand naira. At Fagbo
village via Ondo, six farmers had made over fifty thousand
naira of the twelve I had interviewed.”

There is no question that all over the cocoa belt there
were farmers who benefited enormously from the cocoa boom.
This fact is corroborated by newspaper reports which attest
to the increased standard of living of rural farmers. Cocoa
farmers now flaunted their new found wealth by' buying
expensive cars such as Peugeot 505 Evolution, Mercedes Benz
and the like. They also organized parties, and became not

infrequent visitors to Beer parlors where they closed the

222

bars on a regular basis and at times drowned themselves in
bacchanalian orgies.l6

The phenomenal increase in the price of cocoa, and the
resultant availability of disposable income generated a
severe inflationary spiral which was to have far reaching
consequences for the cocoa farmers. For instance, according
to Daily Sketch investigations, Idanre, the largest cocoa
producing local government area in the country became
incredibly' expensive. The 3prices of food items tripled;
alcoholic beverages and soft drinks now sold at double the
regular price. In addition, there was a hike in transport
fares from Idanre to other parts of the state.17

Indeed, for the farmers of the cocoa belt and some
other traders associated with the cocoa industry, these were
happy times. For the indigenous produce merchants, however,
it was a difficult period” This was because indigenous
merchants could not compete effectively with the expatriate
merchants. A Daily Times investigative report of December
10, 1988 stated that foreign firms such as Kopek, Wasseli,
and Afro-Continental had taken over the produce trade and
rendered the indigenous merchants dormant.18

For example, the Association of Nigerian Cooperative
Exporters, (ANCE) a major indigenous export body which had
handled between twenty to thirty thousand tons annually
since 1960, was able to market only about 4,043 metric tons
in the 1988/1989 season. Some indigenous produce merchants,

however, who had been courageous enough to buy cocoa at this

223

time in the hope that the price would pick up on the world,
market incurred monumental losses. Chief Fagboyegun,
arguably the foremost indigenous produce buyer in Nigeria
lost approximately ten million naira to speculation.'9

According to his son, who was one of the Directors of
the company, they had stockpiled about 1,500 tons of cocoa
which they had bought at about twenty-four thousand naira
per ton. With the price crash of mid-1989, the company had
to hurriedly sell their cocoa at drastically reduced prices.
There are many cases of indigenous buyers who lost out of
the price war of the cocoa boom era.20

In explaining the plight of indigenous exporters, Mr
M.D Ola, Managing Director of Lagricom, a big exporting
company argues, that the Federal government gave the foreign
export merchants the scope to an unrestricted exploitation
of the cocoa trade. He opines that the foreign exporters
could secure foreign exchange much easier than their
Nigerian counterparts. They could also get bank loans in the
Nigerian currency because they had copious financial
guarantees. As a result of this advantage, foreign merchants
completely dominated the export trade.21

Mr. Ola also contended that the cocoa boom was
artificially created by foreign merchants who had large
disposable amounts of the Nigerian currency. Owing to the
downward slide of the naira, they bought as much cocoa as
possible knowing they could sell it on the world market for

hard currency. Nigerian farmers on the other hand, maximized

224

their earnings by taking advantage of the competition among
the foreign export merchants for the cocoa market.”

This bizarre economic behavior should be situated
within the context of the Structural Adjustment Program. The
creation of the Foreign Exchange Market had led to the
devaluation of the naira against the hard currencies of the
cocoa buying nations of the world. Furthermore, there was a
dearth of foreign exchange on the Nigerian money market. The
foreign merchants who had greater access to credit
facilities hijacked a substantial amount of foreign exchange
at official exchange rates, and sold them for naira at the
higher parallel market rates. Armed with large amounts of
naira, they were able to dominate the cocoa trade in the
immediate post-SAP period by bidding up the domestic price
of cocoa.23

The cocoa boom of 1988 to mid-1989 has evoked intense
debate. The apologists of the S.A.P have pointed to the
phenomenally high prices of cocoa and its resultant benefits
to some farmers as one of the outstanding gains of the much
vaunted program. They have made these assertions without
much attention to the fact that only a small percentage of
the farming population benefited. Further, no attempt has
been made to analyze whether or not there were any
multiplier effects from the cocoa boom.24

To be sure, the cocoa boom was limited in scope.
Farmers 'with. large holdings and. substantial 'yields

capitalized on the windfall to make huge gains. The extent

225

to which their profits generated further growth within the
economy needs to be evaluated. It should be pointed out that
the vast majority of cocoa farmers who benefited from the
boom spent a substantial amount of their profits
rehabilitating their farms. Many of my informants claimed
that for the first time, they had the means to spray their
cocoa trees and buy fertilizers. As a result the volume of
production rose significantly in southwestern Nigeria from
about 140,000 metric tons in 1987 to about 253,000 metric
tons in 1988.”

The cocoa boom was, however, short-lived. By mid-1989,
the world market price of cocoa had dropped sharply as a
result of a glut on the world market. This new development
led to a drastic collapse in the domestic price of cocoa.
Cocoa which sold at between 17,000 and 22,000 naira per ton
in March 1989, had plummetted to about 5,000 naira per ton
in June, a decrease of about sixty-four percent.26

The cocoa farmers, not particularly knowledgeable about
the intricacies of the international financial system, nor
the circumstances that led to the boom of 1988-1989,
unleashed their venom on the indigenous exporters and the
licensed buying agents. The spokespersons for the farmers
whom I interviewed betrayed their ignorance of the workings
of the system by directly accusing these groups for the
downturn in the fortunes of the cocoa industry. They stated

that the indigenous exporters together with the L.B.A'3 had

226

discouraged the foreign companies from continuing with the
buying of cocoa at extravagant prices.”

To drive home their point, farmers refused to sell to
indigenous buyers and. began to negotiate directly‘ with
foreign companies. Moreover, in the cocoa villages I visited
at the time, namely; Aroko, Iyanfoworogi, Isoya, Osi-Soko,
Akeredolu and kere, representatives of these villages met to
discuss the possibility of forming groups and applying for
licenses as buying agents. The farmers reasoned that if they
could get licenses, their interest could be better served,
and that they would have the leverage to curb the supposed
interference of the indigenous buying houses.” The farmers
soon found themselves in a quandary. Foreign companies who
were not willing to buy cocoa at a loss, refused to revert
to the scandalously high prices of the boom period. Farmers
could either sell their cocoa at drastically reduced prices
or allow them to rot in their stores. The cocoa farmers held
out for a while and demonstrated remarkable resilience in
sticking to their demands. The withholding of cocoa by the
farmers led to a reduction of cocoa exports by 450 percent
from 29,331 metric tons in January 1989, to 6,437 metric
tons in August of the same year.29

The cocoa trade got a slight boost late in 1989 when
some. merchant banks entered. the ‘market thus encouraging
farmers to bring out their hoarded produce. The entry of the
merchant banks into the cocoa business pulled up farm gate

prices. Merchant banks, like the expatriate export houses,

227

decided to invest in the cocoa export trade in order to get
foreign exchange for their business transactions. According
to newspaper reports, merchant banks sought the services of
an Apapa based forwarding company in finding L.B.A'3 in
Idanre and Akure who could purchase the cocoa for them. The
reports claim that five merchant banks in Lagos had pooled
their resources together and were investing about 140
million naira into the cocoa trade.”

The merchant banks had some advantages over all other
cocoa exporters at this time. First, the expatriate firms
could no longer compete because they had almost exhausted
their stock of naira during the brief boom which they had
initiated. Second, owing to a Federal government edict,
merchant banks, unlike other cocoa exporters, were exempt
from paying interest on cocoa exports. Third, the merchant
banks had enough liquidity to drive away the competition.
Thus while exporters were offering between 5,000 and 5,500
naira per ton as farm gate prices, merchant banks were
offering 7,500 naira per ton.”

The merchant banks, however, did not participate in the
cocoa market for long. By the end of 1989, they had
accomplished their objectives and they discontinued buying
cocoa on any significant scale. The activities of the
merchant banks, however, was not enough. to cushion. the
effects of the price collapse of 1989 as only few farmers

benefited from their relatively higher prices.

228

The vast majority of cocoa farmers suffered devastating
losses. According to newspaper reports, a farmer at
Bolorunduro village near Ondo described the 1989/90 season
as a “suicidal one.” Mr. Samuel Akindunni stated that at the
same time in the previous year, he had made about 80,000
naira, but had withheld his cocoa in 1989, because his
projected earnings could not exceed 15,000 naira.32

The reaction of the farmers to the downturn in the
price of cocoa should be put in perspective. The
artificially created boom of 1987-1989 brought in its wake
an inflationary spiral that was unprecedented in the history
of the cocoa industry. Prices of farm. implements rose
substantially. Alhaji Arowolo Giwa of Ilare village
complained bitterly that he never imagined that a time would
come when he would buy a cutlass for 60 naira and a hoe for
50 naira. To be sure, the price of cutlasses rose from 6
naira in 1984 to 60 naira in 1989.33

In Idanre, which is the leading cocoa producing local
government area in Nigeria, the cost of living rose
significantly. The cause of the high cost of living in the
town was traced to the boom in the cocoa trade.
Investigative reporters of the Daily Sketch, a newspaper
house in Oyo State, stated that transport fares from Idanre
to Akure about 12 kilometers, which formerly cost between 1
naira and 1 naira 50 kobo now costs 5 naira. Food items such
as beans, cassava flour and rice now sell at more that

double their pre-cocoa boom price.34

229

The harsh economic realities of the price collapse in
Nigeria led to an unprecedented wave of smuggling of cocoa
across the border to neighboring west African countries such
as Dahomey and Benin republic. Smuggling of cocoa beans
across the Nigeria-Benin border had been on the rise since
1984 when the economic recession in Nigeria became acute. In
fact, in the 1983/84 season, it was estimated that about
20,000 tons of cocoa was smuggled out of the country.

The major cause of smuggling of cocoa beans was the
restriction placed on foreign exchange by the military
regime of Buhari/Idiagbon and the steady decline of the
naira against the hard currencies of the world market. Since
smugglers of cocoa beans to Benin and Togo were paid in
convertible currency, they were able to make huge profits in
the parallel market. For example, one ton of cocoa which
sold for 1,500 naira in the 1983/84 season, could fetch
anywhere from 8,000 to 10,000 naira across the border.

In spite of the efforts of the anti-smuggling committee
to curb the traffiking of cocoa across the border, it has
not abated. In fact with the price collapse of 1989/90, the
smuggling of cocoa was done with renewed vigor. It was
estimated that in 1990, about 30,000 tons of cocoa found its
way across the border.”

Of far more significance, however, for the relations of
production in the cocoa belt was the incredible rise in the
wages of labor, and the prices of chemicals and fertilizers.

The cocoa boom led to an intensification of a process that

230

had begun with the oil boom when laborers began to exert
their will upon cocoa farmers by demanding higher wages. One
informant at Igbo-Oja village via Ondo said that although he
made a lot of money during the cocoa boom, he has had to
spend extensively on labor. He said he has spent about 2,400
naira per annum since 1988-89 as compared with the 250 naira
he spent in the mid 1970's.36

The situation in Ife south was not different from what
obtained in Ondo State. For example, at Akeredolu village, I
met a seventy year old farmer who said he had been spending
about 2,000 naira on laborers since 1988 as compared with
the 400 naira he used to spend in the 1970's. At Molodo
village in Ife south, an eighty year old informant told me
that since 1988, he had spent about 25 naira for fifteen
heaps of cocoa.37

The phenomenal hike in the wages of laborers became
problematic because laborers were demanding money for jobs
which they had contracted just before the slump occurred.
Farmers were, therefore, faced with the difficult situation
of paying the wages they paid during the boom in an
increasingly depressed cocoa economy. This of course
generated a lot of tension in the cocoa villages as laborers
ganged up for war against the farmers.38

To compound this problem, the prices of fertilizers and
chemicals had been on the increase since the abolition of
the marketing board. The marketing board through the cocoa

subsidy scheme had made provision for the supply of

231

fertilizers and chemicals to farmers at subsidized rates.
Although the evidence shows that most farmers did not get
chemicals and fertilizers at the controlled rates, the
prices were still affordable.”

With the scrapping of the marketing board in 1986, the
subsidies were withdrawn and farmers were left to buy these
products at the actual market price. The farmers thus found
themselves in a double squeeze. One, from rising cost of
labor, the other from the high prices of chemicals and
fertilizers. For example, the price of a 25 kilogram unit of
fertilizer rose from 10 naira in 1984 to 28 naira in 1987
and then to 40 naira in 1988. The price of a 25 kilogram
unit of agrochemicals rose from 50 naira in 1984 to 70 naira
in 1988 and then to 100 naira in 1989.“0

The consequences were profound. From 1986, when this
trend began, there has been a progressive decimation of
cocoa trees by diseases. This has led to a drastic reduction
in output, and farmers have watched helplessly as their
cocoa trees have atrophied one after the other. The rapid
spread of cocoa diseases needs to be put in context.
According to Bola Akanji, before the dissolution of the
marketing board, cocoa farmers used to apply approximately
three units of chemicals to one acre of cocoa three times a
year. With the withdrawal of subsidies, farmers could only
apply one unit of the same chemicals to one acre of cocoa.‘1

At Igbo-oja village in Ondo an informant told me that

in the fifties and the early sixties when he became involved

232

in cocoa production, the incidence of cocoa diseases was not
prevalent. He said that he started spraying his cocoa trees
from the late sixties. At that time, my informant used to
spend about 110 pounds per annum to spray his cocoa trees.
From 1980, however, my informant said there was a marked
increase in the cost of farm maintenance.”

This trend reached its apogee in 1988, when he spent
about 2,400 naira on chemicals and fertilizers alone. These
examples are by no means isolated. They are a reflection of
what appears to be a general trend. One of the most
pronounced effects of the escalating cost of farm management
has been the inability of cocoa farmers to cope with the
ravages of cocoa diseases. This has led to the death of a
lot of cocoa trees, and a decline in the output of cocoa
farms.43

For instance, of a total of about fifty farmers
interviewed at Akeredolu, thirty had suffered substantial
decreases in cocoa yields. One informant at Akeredolu who
used to realize about three tons of cocoa from his thirty
acre farm, could get only about one and half tons by the mid
1980's. At Molodo, an informant told me that the initial
output from his two farms used to be two and a half tons.

This farmer realized about two and a half tons from his
farms before decline set in. The decline was not drastic
initially as he was able to get about two tons for some
years. From 1984, however, my informant began to realize

just a little over a ton from his two farms. This informant

233

told me that about one-quarter of his cocoa trees have been
affected by diseases.“

An informant at Igbo-oja in. Ondo State gave me a
broader perspective on the declining productivity of the
cocoa producing areas. This farmer inherited an eight acre
cocoa farm from his father in the mid-fifties, and five
years later bought two acres of virgin land at Oboto. In the
late fifties and early sixties, he used to realize about
eight bags of cocoa from his inherited farm. When his new
farm at Oboto became productive by the turn of the decade,
his combined yield rose to two tons. There has, however,
been a steady decline in the output of his two farms since
1984.99

My informant attributes this to the old age of the
cocoa trees, and the declining fertility of the soil. This
has made the cocoa trees to be less fecund than they used to
be. Furthermore, the old age of the trees has made them more
vulnerable to diseases. This has been exacerbated by the
inability of the farmer to meet up with the rising cost of
chemicals and fertilizers.

The farmer said that although successive governments in
Nigeria had made attempts to rehabilitate cocoa farms since
the mid 1970's, these attempts have been half-hearted. These
programs, according to my informant, had been undermined by
corrupt officials who diverted money that was meant for the
project to personal use. Consequently, the majority of the

cocoa trees in the cocoa belt are over twenty years old.‘6

234

The inability of the farmers to spray their cocoa farms
has resulted in decreasing yields and diminishing incomes.
One of the most dramatic fallouts of the SAP has been the
emergence of a class of farmers who used to be laborers.
These laborers were able to parley the extraordinary
increase in the cost of labor to great advantage by buying
their own cocoa land. Those who are unable to buy cocoa
farms rent farms from cocoa farmers for an agreed period of
time.“7

.At Araromi, I talked to a thirty-two year old laborer
turned farmer who hails from Ogoja in Akwa-Ibom State. This
informant arrived at Akeredolu in 1987, and was employed as
a laborer in the 1987/88 cocoa season. Owing to the cocoa
boom he was able to buy his own piece of land on which he
plants foodcrops such as cassava, cocoyams, vegetables, okra
and pepper. In addition, he rented a cocoa farm for three
years at 1,400 naira in early 1989.48

At Akeredolu village, where I interviewed all the
laborers involved in the cocoa trade, the changes in the
relations of production are brought into sharper relief. Of
the twenty some laborers in the village, nine of them now
have their own cocoa farms. Eight of them, including one
woman, still offered their services as dailyepaid laborers,
and sharecroppers. Two of them are annual workers, and the
remaining one is a renter49

To be sure, laborers appear to be the primary

beneficiaries of the Structural Adjustment Program. The

235

cocoa farmers, on the other hand were at the short end of
the stick. Owing to the diminishing earnings from cocoa
production, cocoa now plays a less prominent role in the
lives of farmers than in earlier times. Most cocoa farmers
have diversified their economic activities by paying more
attention to foodcrops. They also take greater care of the
crops they use for canopy such as oranges and kolanuts.’0

The kolanut trade, which has been in existence since
the inception of the cocoa trade has grown in importance.
The kolanut is bought by female traders known as “alajapa.”
They start buying in January and end in April. The alajapas
buy the kolanut with the integument, and then sell to
retailers who remove the cover from the kolanuts and sell to
Hausa traders who ship the kolanuts to the great markets of
the North.”

The economic rewards to the farmers have been
encouraging. For example, an informant at Akeredolu said
apart from the fact that he realized about 1,200 naira from
kolanut sales in 1989/90, he has also been making fairly
decent profit from his fifteen acre foodcrop farm. He
realized about 4,300 naira in 1987, about 4,000 naira in
1988, and about the same amount in 1989. Besides, the cost
of producing foodcrops is significantly lower than the cost
of producing cocoa.

The majority of the cocoa farmers I talked to argue
that although cassava, maize, bananas and oranges and the

other foodcrops will not replace cocoa farming, farmers now

2%

have something to fall back on if cocoa is going through
lean times. They cited the example of the price crash of
1988—89, and suggested that were it not for the increased
diversification of the cocoa industry many farmers would
have abandoned their cocoa farms . Although foodcrop
production is increasing owing to its short term gains, most
farmers are using the surplus generated from the sale of
foodcrops to rehabilitate their cocoa farms. Most farmers at
Akeredolu realized between one thousand to four thousand
naira from their foodcrop farms. Apart from the pecuniary
benefits of these farms, they also met the foodstuff needs

of the farmers.’2

Resolution of Crisis

The collapse of the boom of 1987/88 and its attendant
hardships on farmers and indigenous produce buyers impelled
the federal military government of Nigeria to try to salvage
the situation. To this end, the government came up with a
near revolutionary agenda aimed at improving the value of
cocoa through the expansion of local cocoa processing
industries. The government therefore decided that exports of
raw cocoa beans would be banned from January, 1991.53

The government averred that a ban on cocoa exports
would be beneficial for a variety of reasons. First, unlike
prices of cocoa beans which are disseminated internationally

through speculation on the London and New York futures

237

market, prices of cocoa products are, to some extent,
determined by the forces of demand and supply in the
domestic market. The government speculated that the
processing factories would offer more competitive prices
than the export merchants and their' buying‘ agents were
offering.’4

Second, processing of cocoa beans would add more value
to them. Their thinking is based on the relative value of
equal amounts of cocoa beans and the finished product. The
ratio for processing cocoa beans into cocoa products is as
follows: 1.25 tons cocoa beans= 1 ton cocoa liquor; and 2.50
tons cocoa beans = 1 ton cocoa butter and 1 ton cocoa
cake/powder. For a cocoa bean processor to break even on his
manufacturing operations, he would have to sell one ton
cocoa liquor at a price equivalent to a ratio of 1.25 times
the price of cocoa beans and sell one ton cocoa butter/one
ton cocoa cake at a price equivalent to a combined ratio of
2.50 times the price of cocoa beans plus processing costs
and a profit margin.‘5

Professor Sam Aluko has suggested that in spite of this
lopsided ratio, the processed cocoa was significantly more
profitable than exporting the raw beans. Stressing the
advantages in increasing the value of Nigerian cocoa through
processing, he called for an increase in the number of cocoa
processing plants in the country, adding that, “if possible
we not export a single cocoa bean out of the country." Aluko

stated that a ton of cocoa sold for 1,300 pounds on the

238

 

 

*77

world market, whereas a ton of cocoa butter that was
processed from 1 and a quarter tons of cocoa fetched between
2,000 and 2,500 pounds.56

Cocoa farmers viewed the proposed policy with a lot of
apprehension. Farmers were restless over the fact that the
aggregate capacity of the three plants existing in the
country which is just about 90,000 metric tons falls short
of the national output of 163,000 metric tons. More
disturbing was the fact that existing processing industries
could. only’ produce about 50 percent of their capacity.
Besides, as Bola Akanji points out "two of the companies
produced less than a quarter of their installed capacity
between 1984 and 1989.””

The amount of cocoa processed in Nigeria is the lowest
among West African cocoa producers. In the 1986/87 season
Cote d'Ivoire processed 100,000 metric tons of cocoa beans
from a total production of 619,000 metric tons. This
increased to 120,000 metric tons in the 1988/89 season from
a total production of 810,000 metric tons. During the same
period, Nigeria ground 14,000 metric tons out of a total
production of 123,000 metric tons in 1986, and 10,000 metric
tons out of a production figure of 141,000 in 1987/88.”

In addition, there were two major manufacturers:
Cadbury and Food Specialties who are responsible for
converting' over' 90 percent of semi—processed. cocoa into
finished products such as chocolate, cosmetic products and

cocoa drinks. These manufacturers use only about 2,750 tons

239

of cocoa powder which is processed from about 6,600 tons of
raw cocoa beans. The obvious inference is that the combined
use of cocoa beans by both the processing plants and the
manufacturers lags way behind the volume of production.59

This was compounded by the fact that the technology for
adding value to Nigerian cocoa is imported. According to
newspaper investigations, the majority of these plants need
complete overhauling. Owing to the unavailability of spare
parts, there has been a drastic reduction in the efficiency
of these machines. The decline in the efficiency of these
machines is reflected in the diminution of Nigeria's export
of cocoa products. For example, Nigeria's export of cocoa
butter dropped from 11,218 metric tons in 1985 to 5,716
metric tons in 1987, and to 4,700 metric tons in 1989.60

The Cocoa Association of Nigeria in a memorandum to the
Federal Ministry of Trade stated that Nigeria needs at least
800 million naira to construct four more processing
factories to effectively pursue the moratorium on the
exportation of raw cocoa. They argued that Nigeria has a
potential cocoa output of about 210,000 metric, and if the
ban is lmplemented without the new factories, storing
unprocessed beans in warehouses will cost no less than 1.1
billion naira.“

They went further to say that since the three existing
industries at Ikeja, Ede and Ile-Oluji had the capacity to
process 90,000 tons, Nigeria. would. need. four' additional

factories with a capacity to process 30,000 tons each for

240

the excess 120,000 tons. They estimated that since the cost
of building a factory with the capacity to process 30,000
tons of cocoa is between 160 to 200 million naira, 800
million naira would be needed to construct the factories.
They also stated that allowance should be made for recurrent
expenditure and rehabilitation of the factories.”

The Ondo Farmers Congress responded by mobilizing
farmers to meet with the Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida,
to have him rescind the moratorium on cocoa exports. The
secretary-general of the Congress, Chief Biodun Komolafe
said that the meeting became necessary because farmers were
becoming restless. He said if nothing was done to allay
their fears, they may abandon their farms. He suggested that
the government grant the farmers subsidies to enable them
cushion the effects of the losses they would incur from
unsold cocoa.63

The Federal government, in an attempt to obviate the
loss of excess cocoa when the moratorium became effective
approved 24 million dollars for the construction of six new
processing plants which would begin functioning in June
1991. This figure was considerably lower than the estimates
of the Cocoa Association of Nigeria. At the official
exchange rate at the time, it would amount to 240 million
dollars.64

The government reasoned that what was needed were small
plants that would be strategically located all over the

cocoa belt to cut down on transportation costs, and not

241

large factories. It was estimated that the new plants would
have a combined production capacity of 73,000 metric tons.
Further, about 7.9 million dollars would be given to the
three existing processing factories at Ikeja, Ile-Oluji and
Ede to refurbish their' machinery' and. replace antiquated
equipment. The money would be given to the six companies
from a loan that was expected from the African Development
Bank which had a fund that was devoted to stimulating the
export of processed and manufactured products.“

The plan of the military government to expand the
processing of cocoa in Nigeria did not pan out, however,
because it could not come up with the money to construct new
plants, and renovate existing ones. With the continued slide
of the Nigerian currency, the prices of inputs for the
proposed processing plants rose. Nigeria's attempts to get
more loans from the World Bank did not succeed as the
financial houses seemed to be more interested in collecting
Nigeria's debt. Consequently, in November, 1990 the
government canceled the proposed. ban of cocoa exports.
Nigeria still remains a cocoa exporting country, with
production levels fluctuating between 160,000 and 180,000
metric tons.

From the foregoing presentation, a number of
conclusions can be reached. First, the Structural Adjustment
Program was a response to two main problems. The glut in the
world oil market had brought down the price of oil from the

unprecedented levels of the 1970,s and early 80,3. As a

242

result, Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings fell. In order
to meet up with an unwieldy recurrent expenditure, and to
pay for capital projects that were contracted during the oil
boom, Nigeria soon depleted its foreign reserves.

Nigeria then resorted to borrowing money from the I.M.F
and the World Bank. By 1983, Nigeria's foreign debt had
risen to about 20 billion dollars. To compound this problem,
Nigeria's economy grew at such glacial speed. In order to be
eligible for more loans from the major international
financiers, Nigeria had to adjust its economy.

Structural adjustment led to the devaluation of the
naira and the deregulation of the economy. This program had
profound consequences on the cocoa trade. First, with the
removal of government controls, cocoa prices were now
determined. by' market forces, as ‘were prices of cocoa
inputs. This generated a price war which led to a temporary
boom in the cocoa trade. This boom, however, was artificial,
and did not reflect the actual market value of cocoa.

The boom resulted in the increase in price of
agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, chemicals and farm
implements. It also led to an increase in the cost of labor.
Although on the short run some farmers were able to cope
with these increases because of the substantial amounts they
made during the boom, some of them began to find it
difficult to maintain their farms after their gains had

petered out.

243

To be sure production increased substantially during
the cocoa boom, and some farmers were able to rehabilitate
their farms. The inability' of farmers, however, tot get
adequate inputs on a sustained basis to maintain their farms
has set in motion a spiral of decline. On the other hand,
hired laborers are the primary beneficiaries of the
Structural Adjustment Program as the farmers have had to
hire them as sharecroppers, which fact has given them some

degree of autonomy in the cocoa belt.

244

ENDNOTES

 

' Onimode, B., Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, Macmillan Press, Ibadan, 1983
2 Ekwe-Ekwe, H., Issues in Nigerian Politics since the Fall of the Second Republic, 1984-1990, New York,
1991
9 Ekwe-Ekwe, H., Ibid
‘ Ibid., p.37-38
9 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p39-44
2 Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt from 1989 to 1991
Ibid
9 See for instance, New Nigerian, April 11, 1985, p5
1° Akanji, B., NISER monograph series, NO 1, 1992, Cocoa Marketing
1; Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt of southwestern Nigeria from 1989 to 1991
Ibid.
‘3 Information collected at the foreign exchange department of the United Bank for Africa in 1989
'4 Oral interview done at Poso
‘5 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu, IgbO-Oja and Omifon Aladura at different times between 1989 and
1990
'9 Ibid.
'7 Ibid.
'9 Ibid
:3 Oral interview with the Managing Director Of Fagboyegun Enterprises in Owo, 1989
Ibid.
2 For Mr. Ola’s views see: Sunday Sketch, September 24, 1989, p.5
Ibid.
23 Oral interview with indigenous exporters: Fagboyegun in Owo, Opeke at Ile-Oluji
:2 Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991
Ibid.
26Gill and Duffus Statistics, NISER, Ibadan
27 Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt of southwestern Nigeria between 1989 and 1991
28 Oral interviews conducted at Isoya, Osi-SOkO, Aroko and Akeredolu. I talked specifically to Alhaj i
Salami Agbaje and Chief Adedewe about the plans Of farmers to form unions tO sell cocoa directly to
foreign exporters.
29 See for instance: Sunday Concord, August 6, 1989, p.16
99 Sunday Sketch, March 5, 1990 p.1
9' Ibid.
32 Sunday Tribune, November 26, 1989 p.1
93 Sunday Sketch, September 24, 1989, p.1
3‘ Ibid
3‘ Guardian, November 6, 1990, p.8
” Oral interviews done at IgbO-Oja in December 1989
37 Oral interviews done at Akeredolu and Molodo between 1989 and 1990
:2 gm] interviews conducted in the cocoa growing areas Of southwestern Nigeria from 1989 to 1991
id.
9° Ibid.
9' Akanji, 13., NISER monograph series, No 3, 1993 p. 19-22
2 Oral interview done at IgbOoOja in December, 1989
Ibid.
44 Oral interview conducted at Molodo village in 1989
45 Oral interview done at IgbO-Oja in December 1989
‘9 Ibid
1; Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991
Ibid

245

 

‘9 Oral interviews with all the laborers at Akeredolu village in 1991

5° Oral interviews done in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991

51 Oral interview with Yaya Adereti regarding the kolanut trade in 1991
52 Oral interviews conducted in the cocoa belt between 1989 and 1991
99 Guardian, January 8, 1990 p.1

9‘ Ibid.

99 Minutes of Sales Committee, File NO OS. 21 p. 55-56,NA1

99 Nigeria Tribune, Dec. 15 1986, p.1

9' Akanji, 13., Series NO 3, op.cit p. 19-22

99 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

99 Ibid

6' Nigerian T ribune, 2/6/90, p.l

6’ Guardian, 10/26/90, p.3

63 Nigerian Tribune, Feb. 6, 1990, p.1

9" Guardian, Oct.26, 1990, op.cit p.3

6’ Ibid

246

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

Much has been written on the cocoa industry of
southwestern Nigeria. Most of this historical research has
focused on the growth of the industry. Although there have
been studies on some aspects of the decline of cocoa in
Nigeria, there has been no systematic account of this
problem” This dissertation. is intended. to contribute to
filling this lacuna. In this chapter, I present a summary of
my findings, and articulate the contribution of this
dissertation to the historiography.

This study' analyzes the rise and. decline of cocoa
production in southwestern Nigeria from 1900 to 1990. The
first part of the dissertation is essentially a synthesis of
the works of various scholars. It focuses on the rise of
cocoa cultivation and its emergence as the leading foreign
exchange earner in Nigeria. Cocoa production began on a
significant scale on the farms of the Agege planters. From
the farms of the Agege planters, cocoa cultivation gradually
spread into the interior of Yorubaland as news of the
financial viability of the crop was disseminated.

The end of the Yoruba civil wars provided the catalyst

for the expansion of the cocoa industry. Large numbers of

247

ex-warriors now' sought alternative ‘means of income. The
Ibadan ex-warriors were the first to respond to the
opportunities which cocoa production provided. This was
understandable because Ibadan society had been organized
around war. To be sure, almost every facet of Ibadan life
was harnessed to the war effort. In fact, Ibadan economy was
dependent on taxes and tributes it extracted from its
subjects, and also from booty.

The escalation of interest in the cocoa trade
engendered a demand for good cocoa land. Sara Berry states
that by 1910, all the cultivable land north of the town had
been occupied by ex-warriors and their followers. The
[depletion of the land to the north of Ibadan led to a
movement to the southern part of the town.

Initially, people from other parts of YOrubaland were
able to get land without much difficulty. But as good cocoa
land became scarce, Ibadan landowners began to collect a fee
from strangers for the right to use the land. This fee which
was known as isagi was paid either in cash or in kind. In
addition to paying this fee, strangers were supposed to pay
ishakole. This payment which was done annually was in
recognition of the superior rights of the landowner to the
land.

By the mid 19303, cocoa production in Ibadan had soared
from about 10,000 tons per year in 1925 to about 40,000 tons
in 1933. In fact, by this date Ibadan had replaced Agege as

the preeminent cocoa producer in Nigeria. The response to

248

cocoa production in other parts of Yorubaland was slow. This
was because unlike the Ibadans, they had other alternatives.
Buoyed by the relative success of the cocoa trade in Ibadan,
however, Ondos, Ifes and Ekitis began to show some interest
in cocoa growing.

Ibadan’s dominance of the cocoa industry began to wane
in the early 19403, in part because of the declining
fertility of the soil, and also because of the outbreak of
the swollen shoot disease. The colonial authorities in an
effort to prevent the spread of the disease asked Ibadan
farmers to cut out infected trees. Ibadan farmers saw this
as a threat to their livelihood and they refused to cut out
the diseased trees. They formed the Maiyegun league not only
to articulate their opposition to this suggestion by the
colonial administration, but also to resist any attempt to
cut their cocoa trees.

In order to make the Ibadan cocoa farmers recognize the
potential danger the swollen shoot disease posed, the
colonial authorities organized a trip with the Olubadan and
some prominent chiefs to the Gold Coast where the disease
had wrought monumental havoc. This trip opened their eyes to
the only' option the Ibadan farmers had--cutting' out of
affected trees. Unfortunately for the Ibadan, the disease
had spread rapidly and after the first phase of the cutting
out program, over 1 million trees had been cut. Needless to
say, after the cutting out program, Ibadan became a cipher

in the cocoa industry of southwestern Nigeria.

249

With the decline of cocoa production in Ibadan and some
older cocoa growing areas, there was a movement of cocoa
farmers into the relatively new cocoa growing areas of Ondo
and Ife south. To be sure, Ife and Modakeke farmers had
planted cocoa in villages to the north and west of the town,
but there were swaths of uncultivated land to the south and
southeastern part of the town. Ife farmers began to move
into these areas in large numbers in the late fifties.

The movement of farmers into the south eastern part of
the town was swelled by the large influx of immigrants from
Ibadan and some older cocoa growing areas of northern
Yorubaland. My fieldwork in the cocoa belt shows that the
majority of the farmers who settled in these relatively new
areas were non-Ifes. For the most part, Ifes established
cocoa farms in areas that were not too far from the town.
For example, cocoa villages such as Akeredolu, Molodo,
Isoya, Osi-Sooko and Esera had a substantial number of Ife
indigenes.

As one moved farther east, however, the proportion of
Ifes in the cocoa villages diminishes. For example,
villages such as Kere, Atobaba, Apata Oloko, Apata Lami,
Amukegun, Ara, and Aba Aafa had immigrant populations of
more that seventy percent. Immigrant farmers from the same
town tended to live together in clusters. In most of these
villages, there were contiguous households that had only
immigrants from Ibadan or any of the many towns in northern

Yorubaland such as Otun, Okua-Otin, Iragbiji, and Ikirun.

250

The pattern of settlement in the Ondo cocoa growing
area was similar to Ife's. Ondo cocoa farming families had
begun planting cocoa in the outlying villages of Ondo such
as Oboto, Fagbo, Uloen and Igbo-Oja in the 19303. In the
19503, there was a substantial influx: of migrants from
Ibadan and northern Yorubaland to villages in the interior
of Ondo province such as Bamikemo-Oja, Aba Baba Ibadan, and
Omifon .Aladura. There was, however, a greater wave of
migration into Ondo in the late 19503 by immigrants from
eastern Yorubaland. To be sure, these new immigrants
outnumber Ondos in cocoa villages in the Idanre/Ifedore
cocoa growing area such as Legbira, Mofere.

By the late 19503, a large number of the cocoa planted
by the immigrants had begun to bear fruit. The rise in
production also coincided with a period of high demand for
cocoa on the world market. High demand on the world market
translated into high. prices for cocoa. beans. The cocoa
farmers, however, were not the primary beneficiaries of this
boom.

One of the principal arguments of this dissertation is
that owing to the relatively low' prices paid. to cocoa
farmers by the marketing boards, cocoa farmers, for the most
part could not expand their holdings significantly. Also,
although the Nigerian government had made huge investments
in the cocoa industry and had expected cocoa production to
reach 385,000 metric tons by 1983, cocoa production actually

stagnated during the oil boom. This dissertation is intended

251

to re-define the intellectual foundation for understanding
the Nigerian economic crisis by focusing on the impact of
government policies on cocoa production.

The marketing board put in place a price
stabilization policy ostensibly to provide a safety net to
farmers. By paying farmers a set amount throughout the year,
they would be shielded from the uncertainties of the world
market. Besides, by creating a reserve fund, farmers could
be offered competitive prices in case of a slump in the
world market.

Although the marketing board validated its price
stabilization policy by deploying its reserves to safeguard
producer prices in 1959 and 1962, the total amount spent on
price stabilization between 1954 and 1968 was less than 17
percent of the reserves accumulated by the board during this
period. The majority of the money in the reserve fund was
used by successive governments in the southwestern part of
Nigeria for development projects that were unrelated to the
cocoa industry. For example, the western Nigerian regional
government established in 1959/60, the western Nigeria
Development Corporation which got over 90 percent of its
financing from the marketing board.

Cocoa prices in the 19603 were remarkably low. In fact,
prices between 1962 and 1968 did not exceed 160 pounds per
ton. The attempt of the military government to increase
produce taxes in 1968 led to the farmers riot of 1968. With

an. unwonted. display’ of truculence, cocoa farmers 'vented

an

their pent-up feelings by destroying public vehicles, and
engaging the police in a violent confrontation. The
Agbekoya riot as it came to be known, was a testament to the
collective disaffection of cocoa farmers with their economic
condition.

The depressed condition of the cocoa belt invariably
set the stage for the massive exodus of people from the
cocoa villages to the urban centers during the oil boom. The
oil boom of the mid-19703, saw an unprecedented growth of
the INigerian. economy; .As foreign. exchange earnings rose
progressively from 411 million pounds in 1970 to 2 billion
pounds in 1973, and close to 2.5 billion pounds at the close
of the decade the Nigerian economy expanded.

It was a decade of frenetic activity in construction,
and the importation of consumer goods. It also witnessed the
enlargement of the civil service. With the implementation of
the Udoji Commission's recommendations on review of salaries
in 1974, all roads led to the urban centers in pursuit of
the so-called “oil money."

The cocoa belt could not withstand these irresistible
centripetal forces that had been umleashed upon an
unsuspecting rural population. Even the most Panglossian
farmers, who held the hope of better days for the cocoa
crop, soon capitulated under the powerful allure of the new
and improved oil-driven economy of Nigeria. Cocoa farmers no
longer contemplated a future where their children would be

worthy inheritors of their cocoa farms, but one that will

253

equip them for their place in the Nigerian public service.
And as government became increasingly immersed in business,
this commitment deepened.

It is no accident, therefore, that between 1973 and
1981, more than 95 percent of all children of school age in
the cocoa belt went to elementary school. Of this number,
about 75 percent went on to secondary school while the
remainder went to work either as laborers in one of the many
construction companies that now dotted the Nigerian
landscape or learned a trade. The majority of the female
children who did not pursue their education beyond the
elementary school level also either learned a trade or got
married in the urban centers.

The rural-urban drift had profound implications for the
cocoa industry. As people began to leave the cocoa belt,
households became enfeebled“ Household labor' was a
supplement to the services of hired laborers. For the most
part, household labor was responsible for harvesting, and
fermenting cocoa.

With the attenuation of households, farmers became
increasingly' dependent on. hired laborers. This was
compounded by the fact that the oil boom compelled the
farmers to pay competitive wages to hired workers. Between
the early 19603 and. the late 19703, the cost of labor
increased by over 500 percent. In the 19503, annual workers
charged 30 pounds per annum. This rose to 120 naira in the

early 19703, and 250 naira in the late 19703.

254

Owing to the rise in the cost of hired laborers,
farmers had to devise ways of reducing the cost of
production. Farmers resorted to sharecropping as a means of
obviating the hiring of laborers. The sharecropping contract
required that the laborer clear the land, spray the cocoa
trees, harvest the beans and ferment them. The fermented
cocoa is then divided into three equal parts, with the
laborer taking one and the owner of the farm the remaining
two parts.

Cocoa farmers also began to diversify their economic
activities. An increasing number of cocoa farmers began to
pay more attention to food crop production than ever before.
For example, at Molodo village, a female cocoa farmer began
a lucrative trade in oranges in the mid 19703. By the end of
the decade, this woman was making more money from oranges
than from cocoa. Farmers began to sell a wide variety of
foodcrops such as cassava, maize, yams and cocoyams.

By 1981, the oil boom had come to an end. This
engendered an economic dislocation of immense proportions.
The Nigerian government began borrowing to meet up its
capital and recurrent expenditures. The value of the
Nigerian currency fell in relation to the hard currencies of
the world. As oil prices continued to tumble down, Nigeria
accepted the recommendations of the World Bank and the I.M.F
to restructure its economy.

The Structural Adjustment Program was inaugurated in

1986 by the Babangida regime. It was intended to liberalize

255

the Nigerian economy through deregulation and privatization.
It also involved the devaluation of the naira, ostensibly,
to encourage international investment.

The S.A.P resulted in the abrogation of the marketing
boards and the withdrawal of subsidies on agricultural
inputs such as fertilizers, chemicals, and herbicides. With
the scrapping of the marketing board, the cocoa industry was
put in the arena of market forces. A.vicious price war broke
out as exporting firms competed to have a control of the
cocoa market. Foreign exporters who had a lot of excess
naira completely dominated the cocoa export trade.

On the short run, prices skyrocketed as the foreign
companies were willing to pay any amount not only to outbid
their' Nigerian competitors, but also to ‘ward. off other
foreign exporters. To be sure, cocoa farmers smiled all the
way to the bank. Cocoa prices which had been depressed for
many years, rose to about 24,000 naira per ton in the
1987/88 season.

The flip side of the boom, however, was an insidious
inflationary spiral which would deplete most of the gains
cocoa farmers had made during the boom. The prices of farm
implements rose, as did the prices of chemicals and
fertilizers. In addition, the cost of labor rose by more
than 300 percent. As long as the boom lasted, the farmers
could afford these exorbitant prices. But the boom was

short-lived.

rm

 

The cocoa boom ended in late 1988, but prices did not
go down. Cocoa farmers were harried by laborers for money
for work done during the boom. The prices of farm
implements, chemicals and fertilizers did not respond to the
price collapse. Unable to meet their expenses, some cocoa
farmers sold some of their farms; others opted for
sharecropping. In the process, laborers began to wield more
influence in the cocoa belt as a substantial number of
them began to buy cocoa farms or establish foodcrop farms.

At Akeredolu, of the 21 laborers I interviewed, 9 had
their own farms in 1990. At Mofere, in the Idanre local
government area, of the 9 laborers interviewed 3 had their
own farms in 1990. The remaining six either rented cocoa
farms or worked as sharecroppers.

The inability of cocoa farmers to maintain their farms
adequately, has led to the spread of cocoa diseases. In most
parts of the cocoa belt, production increased during the
cocoa boom because farmers could afford to spray their cocoa
and pay laborers to cut the weed and apply fertilizers. The
volume of production in Nigeria rose from about 130,000
metric tons in 1986/87 to over 200,000 metric tons in the
1987/88 season. This underscores the fact that given enough
money farmers could mobilize the necessary inputs to
increase production. Furthermore, a few cocoa farmers
rehabilitated their farms.

In the absence of these conditions after the price

collapse, most cocoa trees have become vulnerable to the

257

ravages of disease. In some parts of the cocoa belt, about
one third of the trees have been affected. This has led to a
decline in the volume of production from 200,000 metric tons
from 1987 to early 1989 to about 130,000 metric tons in the
1990/91 season.

In order to resolve the crisis in the cocoa industry
the military government of Ibrahim Babangida, proposed a ban
on raw cocoa beans, effective Jan 1, 1991. The government
argued that by increasing the value of cocoa through semi-
processing, not only will farmers get more money for their
produce, but the government will also increase its foreign
exchange earnings. The ban on the export of cocoa beans was,
however, rescinded in November 1990, because the government
could not only get funding to overhaul existing processing
plants, but also to build six new ones. Needless to say,
Nigerian cocoa is still, for the most part, exported.

With particular reference to the historiography, by
analyzing the impact of the appropriation of surplus by the
marketing board on the cocoa industry, this dissertation
goes beyond the analyses found in most of the existing
literature which. concentrate on the fiscal role of the
marketing board. It shows how the appropriation of surplus
by the marketing board deprived the farmers of much-needed
residual income which could have given them the capacity to
better maintain their farms, and expand their holdings. This
dissertation also focuses on the impact of the domestic

policies of successive governments in Nigeria on the cocoa

258

industry. For the most part, government policies were
characterized by corruption, improper implementation of
projects and neglect of the cocoa industry, especially
during the oil boom. years. This analysis of Nigeria's
domestic policies is part of a growing body of literature
which attempts to move away from explaining Africa's
economic problems only in relation to external factors.

Moreover, this study underlines the significance of
environmental factors in the decline of the cocoa industry.
The rapid spread of cocoa diseases over the past twenty
years is a result of the inability of the cocoa farmers to
tend to their farms properly. Because a majority of them
were cash-strapped, they could not buy sufficient amounts of
insecticides and pesticides to spray their cocoa trees. This
has eventuated in declining output.

Besides, this dissertation shows how the intersection
of government policies and environmental factors have
created the conditions for new social and economic
arrangements in the cocoa belt. To be sure, sharecropping
has become pervasive in the cocoa belt, and laborers are now
buying their own cocoa land in substantial numbers. Also, as
cocoa continues to decline, the sense of security which
farmers had acquired in the early years of cocoa growing is
receding. And as farmers make spirited attempts to diversify

their economic activities, cocoa is no longer seen as a way

of life.

259

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ARCHIVAL MATERIALS

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Scheme

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Commodity Boards

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Standard Cocoa

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1929-1930

an

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the Yoruba Provinces

ORAL INTERVIEWS

I collected individual interviews in the following villages:
Akeredolu
Oboto

Igbo—Oja

Uloen
Bamikemo-Oja
Fagbo

Kere

Isoya

Osi-Soko
Araromi-Oke Odo
Esera

Amukegan

Ara

Olorunda

Oosa

Aba Aafa

261

 

 

Aworele
I collected group interviews in the following villages:

Omifon.Aladura
Molodo

Aroko
Akeredolu
Asoko Kajola

Oral Informants

 

The following is a list of principal informants interviewed
at different times between December 1989 and November 1991.

Na Place 1393
‘Albert Adesanya Igba 80
Lasisi Iyiola Akeredolu 50
Akinmade Olarele Igbo-Oja 74
David Akinyeye Fagbo 60
Sule Adefisoye Molodo 42
Aderibigbe Olufowomade Igbo-Oja 80
Chief J. Giwa Fagbo 60
Jerome Akinsimidele Igbo-Oja 60
Alfred Akinyosoye Igbo-Oja 70
Nimota Olayinka(female) Akeredolu 65
Adebolu Adesangban Akeredolu 4O
Yaya Adereti Akeredolu 70
Anthony Akinwande Fagbo 50
Chief Isaac Adetunlese Igbo-Oja 45
Raimi Olayade Molodo 35
Gato Akinmurele Igbo—Oja 73
Moses Adegboyega Fagbo 54
Elugboye Akeredolu 90
Titus Ago-Gbogi 71

RH

Olonisaye

Ogunyemi

Ade

James Mark

Chief James Adeyemi
Robert Akinkuebi
Samuel Ogunwole
Jeremiah Akinwale
Chief Legiri

J.A. Akinsete

J.O. Ogunmakin
Oyewole Adeyeye
Alhaji Saliu Ajao
Chief G.O. Akinlosotu
Chief Salami Agbaje
Sumaila Adereti
Ademola Salami

Jide Olaiya

Chief Adedewe

Chief Ojo Oloro
Chief N.D.Akinmurele
Ayo Akinwole

Edward Ojo

4Albert Olowookere
High Chief Ojomo Alapahun
Yusuf Omope

Baba Ibadan

Asimi Ajao

Michael Olanrewaju
Rufai Adeleke
Musibau

Alhaji Sunmonu Posolore
Bashiru Alao

Ajibade

J.0.0yeleke

Salawu Oyewole

Isanmore
Isanmore

Ago Titun
Iranmunje
Uloen

Uloen
Bamikemo—Oja
Akeredolu
Omifon Aladura
Fagbo

Fagbo

Fagbo
Bamikemo-Oja
Omifon Aladura
.Aroko
Akeredolu
Bamikemo-Oja
Akeredolu
Akeredolu
Igbo-Oja
Fagbo
Akeredolu
Ago-Gboro
Akeredolu
Ago-Gboro
Ago-Gboro
Ago-Gboro
Ago-Gboro
Kere

Kere

Kere

Poso

Kere

Kere

Kere

Kere

X8

55
53
34
47
68
38
44
84
74
56
67
58
73
71
74
69
34
41
74
76
86
55
69
46
64
67
78
54
65
67
62
71
61
74
63
72

Sunmonu Tanimojo
Ganiyu

Ademola Odunlade
Francis Adeyeye
Karimu Anjorin
Rufus Akinyeluwe
Raphael Akinnowowe
Chief Lijoka Akintoke
Akinola Teniola
Lawrence Makinde
J. Kekere Ekun
Olusegun Adedoye

Kere

Kere
Akeredolu
Akeredolu
Akeredolu
Ayefemi
Ayefemi
Ayefemi
Asoko Kajola
Akeredolu
Akeredolu
Akeredolu

I interviewed the following laborers:

John Adoyi

Sunday Ntodo
Moses Ayoh

David Ejoor Ntodo
Ajene Usman
Michael Onoja
Dele Aboh

Johnson Oseme
Julius Azubuike
Shaibu Adejo
Matthew Odogeren
Anthony Onah
Yellow Nwaduneshe
Ojukwu Lechi
Ibrahim

Augustine Olodu
Thompson Ohia
Ugochukwu (female)

flfi

68
41
55
73
65
63
57
68
81
61
69
50

Jimoh Ibami
Lucky Odje
Sylvanus

I interviewed the following indigenousegpgrters:

Fagboyegun Enterprices Owo
Opeke Stores, Ile Oluji

NEWSPAPERS
Concord

Sunday Concord
Daily Times

Daily Sketch
Lagos Weekly Record
Nigerian Herald
New Nigerian
Nigeria Tribune
Sunday Sketch
West African Pilot

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Appraisal Study of Cocoa Rehabilitation in Nigeria, Ministry
of Agriculture and Natural Resouces Library.

Annual Reports of the Cocoa Development Unit

Annual Reports of the Association of Nigerian Cocoa
Exporters.

Annual Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.

Central Bank Reports

Coker Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
certain statutory corporations in western Nigeria.

Annual Reports of the Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria
Annual Reports of the Western Nigeria Development
Corporation

flfi

 

 

Ayoola Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
the Agbekoya riots of 1968, Ibadan, 1969

Nigeria Gazette

Nigeria Handbook

THESES AND PUBLISHED PAPERS

Adeyeye, 5.0., The Western Nigeria Cooperative Movement,
1935-1964, Master’s thesis, University of Ibadan

Essang, S.M., The Distribution of Earnings in the Cocoa
Economy of Western Nigeria, Ph.D dissertation, Michigan
State University, 1970

Agiri, B., “Kola in western Nigeria, 1890-1930: A.History of
the cultivation of cola nitida, in Egba Owode, Ijebu Remo
Iwo and Ota areas” University of Wisconsin, 1972

World Bank, Towards accelerated development in sub-Saharan
Africa, Washington, D.C., 1981

World Bank, Towards sustained development in sub-Saharan
Africa, Washington, D.C, 1984

 

BOOKS

Ajayi, J.F.A & Smith, R.S., Yoruba Warfare in the
Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1964

Akanji, B., NISER Monograph Series Nos 1&2

266

 

 

Akintoye, S.A., Revolution and Power Politics in

Yorubaland, 1840-1893, Longman, 1971
Akinyele, I.B., Outlines of Ibadan History, Lagos, 1946
Aluko, B., Small Scale Industries in Western Stateof

Nigeria, University of Ife Press, 1972
Anthony, K., et al. Agricultural change in Tropical Africa,
Ithaca, 1979
Atanda, J.A., The New Oyo Empire: Indirect Rule and
Change in Western Nigeria,1894-1934, London,1973
Ayandele, E.AJ, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria,
London, 1966
Barker, J., The politics of Agriculture in Tropical Africa,
Sage, 1984
Bassett, T, and Crummey, D.,(eds) Land in African agrarian
systems, Madison, 1993
Bates, Robert., Markets and States in Tropical Africa,
Berkeley, 1981
Essays on the political economy of rural
Africa, Cambridge, 1983
Bauer, P., West African Trade, London, 1963
Beckman, B., Organizing the Farmers: cocoa politics and
national development in Ghana, Uppsala,1978
Beer, C.F., The politics of peasant groups in western
Nigeria, Ibadan, 1976
Berry, S.S., Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in
Rural Western Nigeria, Oxford , 1975

Fathers Work for their Sons, Berkeley, 1985

flW

 

Berry,S.S., No Condition is Permanent, Wisconsin, 1993
Coleman, James., Background to Nigerian Nationalism,
Berkeley, 1960
Commins, S, et a1. Africa's agrarian crisis: the roots of
famine, Boulder, 1986
Crook, Richard., “Farmers and the State." in Douglas Rimmer,

ed., Rural transformation in tropical Africa, Athens, Ohio,

1988
Crowder, Michael., West africa Under Colonial Rule,
Hutchinson, 1968
Dada, S.A., J.K Coker: Father of African Independent

Churches, Ibadan, 1986
Dunn, John, ed. West African states: Failure and Promise,
Cambridge, 1978
Eicher, Carl and Liedhom Carl (eds) Growth and Development
of the Nigerian Economy, East Lansing, 1970
Ekwe-Ekwe, H., Issues in Nigerian Politics since the Fall
of the Second Republic, New York, 1991
Fadipe, N.A., Sociology of the Yoruba, Ibadan, 1970
Falola, T and Ihonbere, J., The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s
Second Republic, London, 1985
Forde, C.D and Scott, R., The Native Economies of Nigeria,
London, 1946
Forrest, Tom., “Agricultural policies in Nigeria, 1900—
1978." in Heyer, R and Williams, eds., Rural

development in tropical Africa, New York,1981

flfi

Frank, Andre Gunder., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in
Latin America, New York, 1976
Galletti, R., Baldwin, K.D., and Dina, I.O., Nigerian Cocoa
Farmers, London, 1956
Goldfrank, W.L., The World System of Capitalism; Past and
Present, Sage, 1979
Gutkind and Wallerstein,(eds) The political Economy of
Contemporary Africa, Sage, 1976
Hart, K., The political economy of West African
agriculture, Cambridge, 1982
Helleiner, G.K., Peasant Agriculture, Government and
Economic Growth in Nigeria, Homewood

Illinois, 1966

Heyer, J., Rural Development in Africa, St Martin's Press,
1981
Hill, P., Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana,

Cambridge, 1963

Hill, P., The Gold Coast Cocoa Farmer, Oxford, 1965

Hogendorn, J., Nigerian groundnut exports: Origins and early

development, Zaria, 1978

Hopkins, A.G., An Economic History of West Africa,
Longman, 1973

Howard, Rhoda., Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana,
Croom Helm, 1978

Johnson, S., A History of the Yorubas, Lagos, 1921

Klein, Martin (ed) Peasants in.Africa, Sage, 1980

Lloyd, P.C., The City of Ibadan, Cambridge, 1967

mm

Lloyd, P.C., Yoruba Land Law, Ibadan, 1962

Mabogunje, A.L., Yoruba Towns, Ibadan, 1962

Mcphee, A., The Economic Revolution in British West
Africa, London, 1926

Mikell, 6., Cocoa and chaos in Ghana, New York, 1989

Moock, J., Understanding Africa's rural households and
farming systems, Boulder, 1986

Olatunbosun, D., Nigeria’s Neglected Rural Majority, Ibadan,

1975

Olayide, 8.0 Economic Survey of Nigeria, Ibadan, 1976

Onimode, B., Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria,
Ibadan, 1983

Onoh.J The Nigerian Oil Economy, New York, 1983

Olatunbosun, D., (eds) The Marketing Board System in

and Onitiri, Nigeria, Ibadan, 1974

Olusanya, P.O.,et a1 Migrant farmers of the eastern cocoa
zone of southwestern Nigeria, Ife, 1978

Palmer, Robin and Parsons, Neil., The Roots of Rural Poverty

in Southern and Central Africa,
Heinemann, 1977

Panter-Brick, Keith, S, ed, Soldiers and oil: The political

transformation of Nigeria, London, 1978

Peel, J., Ijeshas and Nigerians, Cambridge, 1983

Rose, T., Crisis and recovery in sub-Saharan Africa, Paris,
1985
Szereszewski, R., Structural Changes in the Economy of
Ghana, 1891-1911, London, 1965

270

Urquhart, D.H., Cocoa, London, 1955
Vansina, Jan., Oral Traditions: A.Study in Historical
Methodology, london, 1965
Ward-Price, H.L., Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces,
Lagos, 1939
Watts, Michael, ed, State, oil and agriculture in Nigeria,
Berkeley, 1986
Webster, J.B., The African Churches Among the Yoruba, 1888-
1922, Oxford, 1964
Wells, Jerome., Agricultural policy and economic growth in
Nigeria, 1962-68, Ibadan, 1968
Wills, J., Agriculture and Land Use in Ghana, Oxford
University Press, 1962

Williams, Gavin., Nigeria: Economy and Society, Rex Collins,

 

1976
Wood, G.A., Cocoa, Longman, 1975
ARTICLES
Ajayi, J,F.A., and Austen, R.A., ‘Hopkins on Economic

Imperialism in West Africa',

Economic History Review, 25, 2, May 1972

Akintoye, S.A., ‘The Economic Background of the
Ekitiparapo’, Qgg 4,2, Jan. 1968
“The Ondo Road Eastwards of Lagos c1870-1895".
JOurnal of African History 10,4, 1969

27]

Awe, B., “The Ajele System: A study of Ibadan Imperialism
in the Nineteenth Century" Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, 3, 1 Dec. 1964

“The End of An Experiment: The Collapse of the Ibadan
Empire, 1877-1893” Journal of the Historical Society of

 

Nigeria 3,2, Dec 1965

Berry, S.S., “Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa Growing in
Ibadan and Ondo" Journal of the Historical Society of

Nigeria, 4,3 Dec. 1968

Hopkins,.A.G., “Economic Imperialism in West Africa: Lagos,
1880-1892” Economic History Review, 21,3, Dec 1968

 

Law, R.C “The Chronology of Yoruba Wars of the Early
nineteenth Century," Journal of the Historical Society of
Nigeria, 2, 2, 1970

 

Lloyd, P.C., “Some Problems of Tenancy in Yoruba Land
Tenure" African Studies, 12, 3, Sept. 1953

 

Myint, Hlya., “The Classical Theory of International Trade
and the Underdeveloped Countries" Economic Journal, 68,
270, June 1958

 

Nworah, K.D., “The West African Operations of the British
Cotton Growing Association, 1904-1914" African Historical
Studies, 4,2, 1971

 

Osuntokun, J ., “Oil and Nigerian Development" Development
Outlook, 1, no.3, 1986

 

 

Webster, J.B., “Agege Plantations and the African Church"
Nigerian Institute of Social and. Economic Research
Conference Proceedings, March, 1962

In

Webster, J.B., “The Bible and the Plough" Journal of the
Historical Society of Nigeria 11,4, Dec. 1963

 

 

 

 

273

 

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